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P A P E R S

CONNECTED WITH THE

RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY IN INDIA,

SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE

REPORT OF THE ARMY COMMISSION.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.



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P A P E R S

CONNECTED WITH

THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY IN INDIA,

SUPPLEMENTARY TO

THE REPORT OF THE ARMY COMMISSION.

No. 1.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM SIR JOHN LAWRENCE, BRIGADIER-GENERAL CHAMBERLAIN,
AND COLONEL EDWARDES.

MEMORANDUM.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the territories under your administration, and what is their distribution ?

1. The abstract numbers are as follows :—

Artillery	-	-	-	1,691
Cavalry	-	-	-	707
Infantry	-	-	-	11,157
Total				13,555

Their detail and distribution is shown in the accompanying statement, No. I.

2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the territories under your administration, and what should be their ordinary distribution ?

2. The abstract numbers recommended are as follows :—

Arm.	Regiments	Troops or Companies	Number of Men.
Sappers and Miners	—	2	200
Artillery	—	29	2,900
Cavalry	5	—	2,500
Infantry	17	—	17,000
Total	—	—	22,600

For detail and distribution, see Statement No. II.

3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the territories under your administration, and what is their distribution ?

3. The armed troops are as follows :—

Native regulars	-	-	1,000	
„ irregulars	-	-	7,710	
Punjab	-	-	20,860	
Police	-	-	13,050	
Depôts	-	-	2,750	
Levies	-	-	7,076	
Total				52,446

For details, see the accompanying statement, No. III. The unarmed troops are, of course, not shown here, but in round numbers they are about 12,000 men.

4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the territories under your administration, and what should be their ordinary distribution ?

4. The abstract numbers recommended are as follows :—

Arm.	Regiments.	Troops or Companies.	Number of Men.
Pioneers	—	2	200
Artillery	—	8½	840
Irregular Cavalry	15	—	7,400
Police Horse	—	54	5,400
Infantry	31	—	27,624
Police Battalions	12	1	10,900
Total	—	—	52,364

For detail and distribution, see Statement No. IV.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

5. What proportion of native troops now serving in the territories under your administration are regulars, irregulars, and police corps? Of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur?

5. The first clause of this question is answered in Answer No. 3.

The proportion of castes in the native troops in these territories stands thus:—

Mussulmans	-	-	-	30,188
Sikhs	-	-	-	14,692
Hindoos of mixed castes	-	-	-	7,566
Total				52,446

The following is the detail:—

Arm.	Mussulmans.	Sikhs.	Hindoo, mixed.	Total.
Hindustanee Regulars	166	—	834	1,000
" Irregulars	6,939	—	771	7,710
Punjabee Irregulars	10,837	6,460	3,563	20,860
Police Horse	3,033	1,517	—	4,550
" Foot	3,400	3,300	1,800	8,500
Depôts	1,096	1,056	598	2,750
Levies	4,717	2,359	—	7,076
Totals	30,188	14,692	7,566	52,446

6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?

6. Regulars	-	-	-	None.
Irregulars	-	-	-	36,064
Police	-	-	-	16,300
Total				52,364

For details, see Answer No. 4.

7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the territories under your administration, and state the ratios both inclusive and exclusive of police corps?

7. By the foregoing proposals the ratio of European to native troops, inclusive of police, is as 3 to 7. The ratio of Europeans to natives, exclusive of police, is as 5 to 8. As a rule the *minimum* of Europeans should be 1 to 3 natives, and the *maximum* 1 to 2. Assuming this principle to be expedient, to 22,600 Europeans we might have 67,800 natives. The actual proportion now submitted is 52,364 natives, or a mean between the two ratios. The larger the proportion of police, the lower may be the ratio of Europeans. As a mere question of security, a large European force is essential; but to administer the country, a still larger number of native is indispensable. The country can neither be held nor worked by Europeans alone. If, at first sight, the ratio of natives in the present proposal be deemed too great for safety, it must be borne in mind that on the side of the Europeans are ranged 102 field-pieces of artillery, against 22 on the side of the natives; or, if it be thought that less natives would suffice for the administration, the answer will be found in a careful inspection of the details and distribution. At every point the natives have been reduced to the lowest practicable number.

8. Not required?

8. Not required.

9. Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the territories under your administration? and state its amount.

9. The total accommodation is more than sufficient for the European troops. We have at present 13,655

European soldiers, and accommodation (permanent or temporary) for 20,000. We are also constructing temporary barracks at Campbellpore, and permanent ones at Umritsir and Mooltan. New barracks have been sanctioned at Ferozepore. No difficulty has been experienced this year in sheltering the European troops.

10. Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the territories under your administration for the strength of European troops you deem necessary; and to what extent?

10. Additional accommodation would be required for 12,131 men, as shown in Statement No. V., because some of the present barracks are of a temporary nature, and others are not in the places where they are wanted. In no place, however, will really good barracks be thrown away by the proposed arrangements, except at Peshawur, where it is necessary to save life. Until new barracks were erected at all the required points, the distribution of the European force would be modified so far as to fill all existing barracks at whatever station.

GENERAL REMARKS.

1. Having now replied categorically to the questions propounded by the Governor-General, we proceed to offer some general observations.

2. It will be seen that the military occupation of the country is placed upon very stable foundations. The European force is nearly doubled. The native troops are largely diminished in numbers, and changed from what is called the regular to the irregular system. The organized police is greatly enlarged. The mess of the Artillery is transferred from the hands of natives to those of Europeans. For the old regular native cavalry, a new force of European cavalry is substituted.

3. It is anticipated that these radical changes will be effected without any financial sacrifice. We have not the means or time to exhibit the exact difference of expenditure, but, from a rough calculation, believe that there will be little if any. By Statement No. VI. the rates of pay for the troops remaining the same, there would be a saving of nearly five lakhs of rupees per annum. But the pay of the various troopers of the Punjab cavalry has been lately raised from 20 rupees to 25 rupees a month; and a strong recommendation has been submitted to Government for a similar increase in the Hindostanee cavalry. Making allowance for this increase, and for a corresponding one in the pay of native cavalry officers, it is anticipated that there will be neither saving nor loss. The increase and decrease of the several arms may be conveniently shown below:—

Arm	Former Strength.	Proposed Strength.	Increase.	Decrease.
Europeans	12,050	22,600	9,550	—
Natives, Regular and Irregular	53,717	36,064	—	22,653
Police	9,000	16,300	7,300	—
Totals	79,767	74,964	16,850	22,653

Result:—actual decrease of 5,803.

4. The details of the column headed "Former Strength" will be found in the accompanying statement, No. VII., but it should be explained that the regiments of Europeans are there calculated as only 850 men, being the average strength to which they had unhappily sunk for want of recruits previous to the rebellion, while each regiment in the scheme for the future is assumed to be 1,000 men, the strength at which they should be invariably and carefully maintained by regular annual reinforcements. If the

regiments in both cases were assumed to be 1,000 strong, the increased establishment of Europeans would be only 7,900 men.

5. Another feature of the proposed changes is that the whole decrease is effected in those classes of the native soldiery who are entitled to pensions, while any increase of natives is confined to the police to whom pensions are only given in special cases. This is a great prospective advantage.

6. On the whole, then, it will be seen that in drawing up the present proposal, while on the one hand due weight has been given to considerations of finance, and on the other a full share of employment has been provided for the military classes of our subjects, the whole system of military occupation in the Punjab has been so remodelled as to place that important frontier province of our Indian Empire thoroughly within the grasp of our own countrymen. At the same time it should never be forgotten, that no system, however carefully elaborated, however theoretically complete, can ever work efficiently and securely unless it be placed under the guidance and control of officers thoroughly competent to discharge the duties entrusted to them.

7. It has been assumed in the present proposals that the occupation of the Peshawur and Kohat districts is to be maintained; but should Government ultimately decide otherwise, the necessary modifications, being all on the side of reduction, would be very simple.

8. Retaining Peshawur and Kohat, it was necessary to meet the serious difficulty as to the insalubrity of Peshawur, which has so long been under the consideration of Government. On a former occasion Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain and Lieut.-Col. Edwardes had advocated the withdrawal of all European troops from the Peshawur valley, while Sir John Lawrence thought such a measure would be unsafe, and that Peshawur must be held by Europeans or not at all. But the new station of Nowshera is admitted to have never yet been fully tried by European troops, and is known to be at all events much healthier than Peshawur. As yet, too, the long desired bridge over the Indus at Attock (which was a *sine qua non* in the proposed withdrawal of the Europeans) has not been constructed, or begun. For the present, therefore, we would unanimously recommend that Nowshera be a station for Europeans, and that as soon as the Grand Trunk road through the Punjab be completed, the construction of the Attock bridge be commenced without delay, so that before its completion a definite judgment may be formed as to the possibility of cantoning European troops at all in the valley of Peshawur.

9. The result of the arrangement now proposed would be to place about 2,000 European soldiers in the whole valley, instead of about 2,500. But the great change is in transposing the men, by locating at Peshawur only 300 instead of 2,000, and 1,650 at Nowshera instead of a third of that number.

10. Little expense for barracks is involved in the transposition, for already there are barracks at Nowshera for a regiment of 1,000 men, quite capable of holding 1,200, and it is believed that the remaining 450 may be housed in the barracks which were erected as a sanatorium for invalids from Peshawur.

11. The reasons for withdrawing the European troops from Peshawur are not only sanatory but military, to remove the embarrassment of an unwieldy cantonment from what would be the field of action in any great crisis on the frontier. But if Nowshera prove healthy, there would be no military objection to locating there the European force. On the contrary it is a good military point, affording a proper base to the irregular force at Peshawur, a useful link with Attock, and a convenient support to Murdan. It also commands the passage of the Cabul river. When to these reasons it is added that excel-

lent stone barracks have been just built there at great expense, it seems unreasonable to abandon Nowshera till, like Peshawur, it prove decidedly unhealthy for the troops.

12. If on the other hand Government should desire not to withdraw the mass of European troops from the cantonment of Peshawur, then the following distribution of frontier garrisons is recommended:—

Station	Artillery		Cavalry	Infantry	Total.
	Troops.	Reserved Companies			
Peshawur -	2	1	350*	1,000	1,650
Nowshera -	1	—	150	1,000	1,250
Attock -	—	0½	—	150	200
Campbellpoor	1	1½	500	1,850	2,600
Totals -	4 or 400 men	3 or 300 men	1,000	4,000	5,700

* Head-quarters of cavalry regiment here for sake of the existing barracks.

13. By either of the above proposals nearly 8,000 European soldiers are placed within 100 miles of Peshawur; 7,000 of whom, in an emergency, could be concentrated in a week on any point.

14. Whether the Peshawur cantonment be in future occupied by European or native troops, it will be equally necessary to have a new fort there, and that it should be garrisoned by European soldiers. A fort is indispensably necessary to contain an ordnance depôt, the civil treasury, a granary, and (in addition to the accommodation for the regular garrison) a barrack to receive the families of all European residents at Peshawur in case of emergency. The old fort at Peshawur was designed solely to overawe the town, and is too far from the British cantonment to answer our purposes. It is, moreover, greatly dilapidated, and to repair and adapt it would be almost as expensive as to build a suitable position. A fortification on European principles is not required, but a strong enclosure, with a curtain wall high enough for protection against direct fire, flanked by solid bastions for heavy guns, and surrounded by a ditch. The best site for all purposes would be the high ground on which stand the houses of the late Col. Mackeson and Col. Phillips. A fort planted here would command the cantonment with its fire, and sufficiently control the city. The old fort (on the completion of the new one) might be converted into a godown or serai.

15. The Peshawur depôt magazine should be merely one of issue, and on as small a scale as possible. Stores should not be manufactured there. It is an evil, accumulating military materiel unnecessarily. Trans-Indus-Peshawur should be regarded as an outpost, and kept as free as possible from embarrassment.

16. If our proposal to place only a native irregular brigade at Peshawur be adopted, the irregulars should occupy the barracks formerly built for the European soldiers; by which present expense in housing the natives would be saved, and the barracks be kept in repair, so as to be available at any time for a European force.

17. All old native lines and superfluous bungalows not required by the irregular brigade should be levelled.

18. Passing now from the Peshawur valley, a few words are necessary regarding other military positions in this territory.

19. Campbellpoor, the new Cis-Indus cantonment selected by Sydney Cotton, is only on trial, but it is expected to prove a healthy place. At present, its only apparent defect is, that it is off the line of the high road. This is, however, a very serious one, and as the buildings as yet are only temporary, it is

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes

strongly recommended that the country be again carefully searched for a suitable site on the high road. Campbellpore is said to be the only site capable of cantoning 7,000 men, but a site fit for 5,000 men is all that we require.

20. Rawul Pindee is, in every respect, a first-rate position for European troops. Its strategic importance is great. It covers Murree, supports Peshawur, and is well placed for Kohat and the Derajat. Lastly, it combines the salubrity of the hills with the comfort and convenience of the plains.

21. Sealkote was not well chosen for general purposes. It is in a corner, and designed chiefly to observe Jummo; but it has proved salubrious, and Government has laid out enormous sums there in buildings. Instead, however, of placing two European corps of infantry at this place, it is strongly recommended to canton one at Jhelum, a point of which the importance was shown throughout the events of 1857. It is the midway link between the Upper and Lower Punjab. Its occupation would become immediately necessary in the event of disturbance in the Cashmere territories. Its situation on the highly navigable river, from which it takes its name, points it out at once as a future emporium of commerce, and as the site of a military magazine, which cannot be left without European troops. Its salubrity, too, is second only to that of Sealkote. A fort should be erected to command the passage of the river, of the same description as recommended for Peshawur. Nature has provided an admirable site on a mound about 400 yards from the river bank, commanding the bridge, the road, the town, and the cantonment. A small fortified magazine already exists about 1,000 yards in rear, but it is only adapted for stores; is in low ground, and commands nothing.

22. Lahore, Delhi, and Ferozepore must be held in strength, and also have a sufficient force to take the field in an emergency. Ferozepore contains the grand arsenal of the Punjab, and is so well placed to aid in controlling the Cis-Sutlej states. Lahore and Delhi are political capitals, and their importance does not rest on the fading prestige of former dynasties, but on the natural causes and advantages which have ever made them the seats of empire. Much has lately been said in anger about abandoning Delhi, but it is believed that those who advocate the measure would fail to find an equal site on the banks of the Jumna.

23. Mooltan is a warning against neglecting these landmarks of nature. It is the débouche of the Ravee, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers; the key of communication between the Punjab and the sea. From time immemorial there had been a fortress to secure it. The last Afghan governor died in defending it. The conquering Sikhs rebuilt, enlarged, and strengthened it, till it became the first fortress in the Punjab. We took it with infinite pains in the war of 1848-9, and then allowed an officer of engineers to declare it useless. At his bidding we dismantled it, and in 1857, when the first storm arose to try the strength of our grasp upon the country, we at once betook ourselves to the ancient stronghold, and hastily repaired its breaches.

24. If, indeed, the late struggle has shown anything, it is the folly of the English prejudice against forts; and we would strongly urge that there should be no station in India without a "keep" of some kind to which non-combatants could retreat upon emergency.* We must really learn to remember that we are on a foreign soil, and cease to despise the commonest military precautions. The simplest plan (in

old stations) will now be to select one or two barracks, or other suitable buildings in the cantonment, and designating them "the keep," connect them in such a way by walls and towers as to be a secure post in case of need. Within the post should be a granary, in which a month's supply should be kept for the numbers liable to take refuge. By buying in and selling out the grain at certain seasons of the year, fresh stores would be kept up, and the expense covered. At many stations the church, from its height, solidity, tower, &c., is well adapted for defence. What sad loss of European life might have been saved by the precaution of such a "keep" at Cawnpore!

25. It will be seen that it is no part of the present scheme to caution European troops in the Simlah Hills. Both military and sanatory reasons are against it. Late events have shown that every effective European soldier should be in the plains, ready to act at a moment's warning. In the hills they are entirely dependent on carriage, and may be unable to move in a crisis of the last importance. Their presence in the plains is an essential element in our occupation of India. Remove them to the hills and their moral influence over the disloyal is lost. Natives believe little that they do not see. Again, our object is to use the hills as sanatoria, and this is defeated by sending up the sick and the healthy indiscriminately. Indeed, there are sick men whom the hills make worse, and healthy men whom they make sick. Instead, therefore, of marching two or three whole regiments up the hills, let the selected sick and weakly of every European regiment within reach be sent there to recover. The stations of Murree, Dhurmsala, Dug-shaic, Kussowlie, and Soobathoo, would afford accommodation for all the European invalids of the Punjab and Delhi territory. By this arrangement the European artillery and cavalry would share with the infantry the advantages of the hill stations, which they have not hitherto done. And it may be added, that the healthy Europeans are far happier in the open plains, and would never go to the hill stations if allowed a choice.

26. Profiting by the experience of the past year, it is proposed to transfer the mass of the artillery from the hands of native to those of European gunners. The value of artillery is perhaps greater in Asia than in any other part of the world. Guns are an object of intense fear to the natives of India, and for that reason become objects of attachment and worship to the Indian gunner. A small European force with a powerful artillery should be irresistible, and no mutiny of a native army without guns could hope to be successful. Many officers would, for these reasons, object to any artillery at all being left in the hands of the natives, but in practice it is not expedient to go to this extreme. The frontier must be excepted. Here, in the first place, a mountain train is necessary, and a European mountain train in India is an anomaly. The men are not able to undergo the fatigue that is involved, and they require an amount of carriage and supplies which render prompt or rapid movement impossible. The Peshawur mountain train was originally manned by Europeans, but natives were substituted after the very first expedition in which they were engaged. Again, for similar reasons, the defence of the frontier requires native irregular cavalry and infantry, and it would be as unwise to brigade European artillery with native troops only as to tell a frontier force that it could not be trusted with guns. Throughout the crisis of 1857 there were 18 field guns manned by native irregulars upon the line of the Indus, and their conduct was so good that to disband them would be unjust. Moreover, if native artillery be not allowed, European artillerymen must be located in the Derajat, which is as unhealthy as Peshawur, and European infantry be employed to guard them. For these reasons it will be observed that in the present scheme the native infantry of the frontier has been maintained, and so long as the mass of our artil-

* The stations in the Punjab where keeps will be required, are—
 Nowshera, Meean Meer,
 Campbellpore, Mooltan Cantonment,
 Rawul Pindee, Jullundhur,
 Sealkote, Umballa,
 wherever, in fact, there is not a fort

lery in India is manned by Europeans we need not fear to have a few native guns upon the border.

27. It is recommended, however, to reduce the size of each Punjab light field battery from six to four guns, a number which it is believed will suffice at Kohat, Bunnoo, and Derah Ishmael Khan. This reduction in the three existing batteries would give six out of the eight guns required for Peshawur, leaving two to be provided.* Two more are required at Derah Ghazee Khan, and then there will be 22 native field pieces on the frontier instead of 18, as heretofore. The details of the former and proposed arrangement are shown in the subjoined comparison.

FIELD GUNS ON THE FRONTIER.

Before.			Proposed.		
Station.	European.	Native.	Station.	European.	Native.
Campbellpoor -	-	-	Campbellpoor -	12	-
Nowshera -	-	-	Nowshera -	12	-
Peshawur -	24	-	Peshawur -	-	8
Kohat -	-	6	Kohat -	-	4
Bunnoo -	-	6	Bunnoo -	-	4
Derah Ishmael Khan and Derah Ghazee Khan	-	6	Derah Ishmael Khan and Derah Ghazee Khan	-	4
Total -	24	13	Total -	24	22

Total increase, 4 guns native.

The mountain trains of Peshawur and Hazara remain as before, and are not included in this statement of field artillery

28. The only inconvenience that arises from this proposal is that there is no battery from which to take the two guns for Derah Ghazee Khan. They need never be moved, and might be a separate subaltern's command.

29. Before quitting the subject of artillery attention should be drawn to the great saving in expense which would result from retaining native drivers and gun lascars with all the European artillery of the local army. If the gunners and cavalry escort are Europeans, there can be no fear of the drivers. This was strongly shown at Delhi, where their conduct was admirable. Drivers are not of the sepy class, but of the syce class; and it is an incidental advantage to give an opening to the artillery syces for promotion. The royal artillery of the line would have European drivers as usual.

30. And here we would add that it is desirable always to have some artillery from the line serving in India; not merely as a field of exercise for that arm, but to excite emulation in the artillery of the local army.

31. We cannot conclude this report without advert- ing to the urgent necessity of completing the main line of communication from Kurnaul to Attock. Large sums have already been expended on this road, but half a million of money is still required to complete it. Until this has been effected, the military communication must remain at the mercy of the elements. The road from Lahore to Mooltan is still worse. From the nature of the soil and the line which has been adopted, large sums would be required to improve it. This, however, is of little consequence if the railroad be pushed forward to completion.

32. Lastly, we would urge the imperious necessity of having good steamers on the Punjab rivers. Boats of light draught and great steam power are wanted in considerable numbers. Those now plying on the Indus are few in number, and quite unfitted for the navigation of these rivers. It is only by great exertion, and at immense cost, that during the late crisis we have been enabled to transport stores from Kurrachee to the Punjab, and the delay might have been fatal. A

* i. e., supposing Government to approve the withdrawal of the European troops from Peshawur to Nowshera.

country fertilized by rivers, and broken by ravines and hills, like the Punjab, can neither be strongly held nor wisely managed without a system of roads and bridges, and river navigation.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner, Punjab.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, Brig.-Gen.,
Commanding P. I. Force.
HERBERT B. EDWARDES, Lieut.-Col.,
Commissioner of Peshawur.

Murree, June 24, 1853.

From Sir JOHN LAWRENCE, G.C.B., to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

SIR,
Murree, June 26, 1853.
IN continuation of my letter of yesterday, I have now the honor to forward the united replies of Brig.-Gen. N. Chamberlain, C.B., Lieut.-Col. Edwardes, C.B., and myself, to the fourteen questions having reference to paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235 of 25th November 1857, from the Court of Directors.

2. Our replies on the remaining forty-two questions bearing on the re-organization of the armies of India, will follow as soon as possible.

I have, &c.

J. LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

ANSWER TO QUESTIONS having reference to paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235 of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bengal presidency, and what is their distribution?
1. We have no correct data from which to answer this.
2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the Bengal presidency; and what should be their ordinary distribution?
2. To speak confidently on this point would require a more detailed knowledge of many parts of the presidency than we possess; but the subjoined table has been drawn up to the best of our judgment, and amounts to 54,600 men.

No	Civil Government.	Distribution.			Total.	
		Division of the Army.	Station.	Number.	Of each Division	Of each Government.
1.	Bengal -	Presidency	Calcutta -	2,000	5,000	10,000
			Dum Dum	1,000		
			Dacca	1,000		
			Arracan	1,000		
		Pegu -	2,000	2,000		
		Dinapoor -	2,000	3,000		
			1,000			
2.	N. W. Provinces	Benares -	Benares -	2,000	5,000	17,000
			Saugor -	1,000		
			Jubbulpoor	1,000		
			Ghazeepoor	1,000		
		Cawnpoor -	Cawnpoor	2,000	5,000	
			Allahabad	2,000		
Meerut -	Meerut -	Agra -	2,000	7,000		
		Rohilcund	2,000			
		Meerut -	3,000			
3.	Supreme Government.	Central India.	Neemuch -	5,000	5,000	5,000
			Mhow -			
4.	Punjab -	Sirhind -	Lahore -	Peshawur -	} Details given in answer to former questions	22,600
Grand Total						54,600

Sir John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

In distributing the European troops we are decidedly of opinion that they should not be frittered away in detachments, but centralized, firstly, with reference to political requirements; and secondly, to the healthiest places within those political circles.

We have not gone into a detail of the different arms, as that seems to be a mere question of proportion.

3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the Bengal presidency, and what is their distribution?

3. No correct data available; but we subjoin a statement, No. VIII., showing to the best of our ability all the troops serving in the presidency in January 1857, before the mutiny, amounting to,—

Europeans	-	-	19,670
Natives	-	-	176,834
Total			- 196,504

For details, see No. VIII.

4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the Bengal presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

4. Having decided (in Answer 2) the number of European soldiers indispensable for holding the country, we would lay down the principle that native soldiers should be as five to two, and we would endeavour to keep as nearly as practicable to the following proportions :—

European soldiers	-	-	2
Native infantry	-	-	3
Police	-	-	2
Total			- 7

The result would be as follows :—

Government.	Europeans	Natives.	Total
Bengal	10,000	25,000	35,000
North-West Provinces	17,000	42,500	59,500
Central India	5,000	12,500	17,500
Punjab	22,600	56,550	79,150
Bengal Presidency	54,600	136,500	191,100

On the subject of proportioning natives to Europeans, it should be remembered of how many races the population of India is made up; that some are much more warlike and robust than others; and that the European check ought to vary with the native power. Thus, in the Punjab and Upper India less than one European to two Sikhs or Pathans or Goorkhas would not be safe; whereas with the Hindostanees it might be one to three; and with the southern races one to four. Statement No. VIII. shows that before the mutiny European soldiers were only one to nine.

5. What proportion of native troops now serving in the Bengal presidency are regulars, irregulars, and police corps? Of what races are they composed, and in what proportion do the races occur?

5. No correct data available.

6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?

6. No regulars. Irregulars and police in the proportion stated in Answer 4, but the farther south and the easier the country, the more the police may be increased.

7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the Bengal Presidency? and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive, of police corps.

Answered in No. 4.

8. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally? and state the ratios as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps.

8. The proportion laid down in Answer 4 for Bengal should pervade the whole of India. At least we

know of no element of security which could render it safe to increase the proportion of natives, except that of Christianity.

9 and 10. Concerning barrack accommodation?
9 and 10. No correct data available.

11. What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what portion should be composed of troops raised for service in India?

11. The proportions which, for all considerations, seem best are as follows :—

Branch.	Line.	Locals.
Artillery	‡	‡
Cavalry	‡	‡
Infantry	‡	‡
Sappers and Miners	None.	All.

It is very desirable to keep up emulation and improvement by having fresh regiments from home periodically; but the attendant evils are, expense of transport, and strangeness to the country and climate; and the amount of line troops should be limited accordingly. The artillery is the great strength of the army, and it should be chiefly local—as little liable as possible to calls from England for general service. The cavalry for India should be of a totally different kind from that which is in vogue in the British line. What are called “light dragoons” are too heavy for Indian horses, climate, and warfare. Every possible ounce of steel and brass should be got rid of, and accoutrements brought down as nearly as practicable to the standard of a cross-country sportsman. It is not probable that so plain and simple a cavalry would be admitted into the line, and therefore this branch of the Indian army must needs be chiefly local. The infantry may be half and half; for the necessity of making the dress of the marching soldier as light, easy, and simple as possible, has lately been recognized in the line to a very great extent, though leather stocks are still seen. The engineer branch would be of little use, if not thoroughly acquainted with the country. This seems a proper place to urge that on line regiments going home, all soldiers should be allowed to volunteer to remain in India.

12. Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them?

12. The new regiments of Europeans should, we think, be officered from the officers of the old native army. The temporary disadvantages inseparable from their inexperience of European soldiers, would be compensated by their knowledge of the country and language. The state, too, must find employment for these officers, whose devoted services as a body, during the late crisis have established claims which cannot be overlooked, and there seems no other opening for them. The circumstances of the late crisis have, however, been so exceptional, and caused in the Bengal presidency such a great derangement of promotion, that justice to the officers, as well as the service, seems to demand that the whole of the officers of the cavalry and infantry of that presidency should be thrown into two general lists for the two branches, and replaced according to seniority from their status on the 10th May 1857. As it is, the surviving officers of the worst corps have benefited by the mutiny, and have superseded not only their contemporaries of the best native regiments, but also those of the European regiments, who have been putting down the mutineers. A very general dissatisfaction prevails upon this head, and it is very easy to remedy it now before beginning a new system. Having thrown all the officers into a general cavalry and general infantry list, the Adjutant-

General's department of the army, and the generals of division, should be called on to report those officers whose inefficiency for the public service is notorious, and such officers should be struck off the rolls of the army, and allowed to retire on the pension of their rank or on a bonus commensurate with their service, or in some cases both.

The really efficient officers should then be posted to the new army according to seniority.

13. Under the supposition that a considerable increase take place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxtaposition with the purchase promotion system, than what now accrues from the existence of the royal artillery, royal engineers, royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority promotion is the system?

13. We do not see why it should create any greater embarrassment, but should it do so, we have no hesitation in recommending that the present purchase promotion system be no further extended, as it is based on the vicious principle that money is the test of fitness for superior rank, and consequently deprives the State of the just average of ability inherent in its poor and wealthy officers as a body. There is a very legitimate and very useful way of giving money its influence in quickening promotion, viz., the system which is recognized in the Indian armies of all the juniors who can afford it (a point on which public opinion keeps a wholesome check) joining in buying out their senior, and benefiting by the promotion according to seniority. It will not be questioned, that the officers of the royal engineers, royal artillery, and royal marines are at least as efficient as the officers of the line.

14. The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to Questions 7 and 8; if so, to what extent?

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

14. Should corps of foreign mercenaries (coloured races) be raised, we do not think that the proportion of European troops could be modified to any sensible degree. But we would offer the strongest objection to such a system. Military service is one of the most powerful means of conciliation which the British Indian Government has at its disposal; but after we have given all the service that is available, it is still one of the popular complaints that we give so little. It is a necessity of our position in India that we must spend a large proportion of the revenues of the country on European soldiers, but no such necessity exists for bringing in Mahommadan, Hindoo, and Buddhist foreigners from other tropical countries. Such a policy would be felt to be oppressive, and would be departing from the benevolent desire we have ever had to rule India for the benefit of the Indians. Moreover, with the memories of 1857 still fresh, we doubt much whether the natives of India are not the most docile of coloured military races. Again, every foreign coloured soldier that you bring into India displaces an Indian soldier,—a soldier, too, by caste and profession,—who will take to no other livelihood. What would the advocates of foreign mercenaries propose to do with these displaced military classes? No statesman can ignore them. The wise policy is to feed, use, and control them.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, Brig.-Gen.
Commanding P. I. Force.
HERBERT B. EDWARDES,
Commissioner.

STATEMENT No. I.

STATEMENT of European Troops of all Arms now serving in the Punjab and Delhi Territories.

Stations.	Artillery.	Strength.	Cavalry.	Strength.	Infantry	Strength.	Remarks.
PESHAWUR DIVISION—							
Peshawur	3-2 horse, 3-2, 4-2, and 3-6 foot.	374	Peshawur light horse.	180	H. M.'s. 70th, 81st, and Eurasian Company	1,390	
Nowshera	" " " "	"	" " " "	"	Wing H. M.'s. 81st	568	
Campbellpoor	" " " "	"	" " " "	"	H. M.'s. 98th	882	
Rawulpindee	C. Batt Royal, and 4-2 horse	274	" " " "	"	H. M.'s. 94th	880	
LAHORE DIVISION—							
Meean Meer	1-2 and 1-3 horse Det., and 3-4 foot.	233	" " " "	"	H. M.'s. 7th Fusiliers and detachments of other corps.	*1,443	*H. M.'s 7th Fusiliers is 999 strong
Ferozepoor	1-2, 2-2, 6-6 foot	104	" " " "	"	H. M.'s 24th foot	941	
Mooltan	V. Batt. Royal, 4-3 foot	307	" " " "	"	Wing 1st Bombay Fusiliers	1386	† The artillery and infantry were included together, not separately shown.
Sealkote	" " " "	"	7th Dragoons	466	H. M.'s. 52nd Foot	827	
Umritsir	2-1 foot, 5-1 foot	73	" " " "	"	Wing 1st Bombay Fusiliers	858	
Delhi	" " " "	186	" " " "	"	H. M.'s. 61st Foot and 2nd European Regiment.	1,525	
UMBALLA DIVISION—							
Umballa	" " " "	"	9th Lancers	61	H. M.'s 27th Foot and convalescents	766	
Jullundhur	1-3 horse	102	" " " "	"	H. M.'s. 37th Foot	750	
Dugshate	" " " "	"	" " " "	"	Detachments of various regiments.	273	
Kussowlee	" " " "	"	" " " "	"	" " " "	19	
Subathoo	" " " "	"	" " " "	"	" " " "	19	
Phullour	2-2 foot	38	" " " "	"	Detachment 87th	76	
	Total of artillery	1,691	Total of cavalry	707	Total of infantry	11,157	

ABSTRACT.

Artillery	-	-	-	1,691	} The sickness in Lahore and Umballa divisions is about 11 per cent.
Cavalry	-	-	-	707	
Infantry	-	-	-	11,157	
Total	-	-	-	13,555	

Prepared from Returns dated June 1.

R. LAWRENCE, Off. Mil. Sec.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen Chamberlain, and Col. Edu ardes.

STATEMENT No. II.
With reference to Question 2.
PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN TROOPS in the Punjab and Delhi Territories.

No	Station.	Engi- neers	Artillery.		Cavalry	Infantry.	Total.	Remarks.
			Troops or Batteries	Foot Reserved Companies				
1	Peshawur	-	-	1	-	200	300	The reserved company of artillery and the 200 infantry are to garrison the proposed fort.
2	Nowshera	-	2*	-	150	1,300	1,650	
3	Fort of Attock	-	-	0†	-	150	200	† If the new cavalry regiments are to be 500 strong, as recommended, then two regiments should be at Campbellpoor, furnishing a detachment to Nowshera. But if the strength of regiments is to be 800, then one must suffice. The half reserved company at Campbellpoor, in time of disturbance, would move up to Attock. If any reduction in the proposed number of artillery be necessary, it should be effected at Campbellpoor rather than Pindée. It is desirable to place as many headquarters of corps as possible at Campbellpoor, and so free the Peshawur valley.
4	Campbellpoor	-	2	1‡	850†	2,350	3,550	
5	Rawalpindée	1 comp. Sappers	2	-	-	2,000	2,300	The other half troop detached to Umritsir, to be periodically relieved.
6	Jhelum	-	1	1	-	1,000	1,200	
7	Sealkote	-	1	-	500	1,000	1,600	The reserved company is required for the magazine and fort at each of these stations.
8	Lahore	-	1‡	1	500	2,000	2,750	
9	Mooltan	-	1	1	-	1,000	1,200	† A company of infantry and detail of foot artillery will be detached to garrison the fort of Phillour.
10	Derah Ishmal Khan	-	-	1	-	-	100	
11	Umritsir	-	0‡	1	-	1,000	1,150	It is recommended that entire infantry regiments should not, as formerly, be sent to these sanataras, but convalescents from all regiments and all branches, artillery, cavalry, and infantry. In any accidental absence of convalescents, a garrison of one company should be at Kussowlie as a refuge for the other stations.
12	Jullundhur and Kangra.	-	1	1‡	-	1,000†	1,200	
13	Ferozpoor	-	1	2	-	2,000	2,300	Delhi requires an European garrison, but is not healthy for them. It is recommended, therefore, that one regiment be located in the palace, which is the most healthy part, and that the adjoining station of Meerut be kept always strong, with special reference to reinforcing Delhi. Meerut is remarkably healthy, the distance is 40 miles. If there be no railroad, there should be a transport train. There should also be a supper company and reserved company of artillery at Meerut, available for Delhi.
14	Umballa	1	2	-	500	1,000	1,800	
15	Kussowlie, Dugshae, Soobathoo	-	-	-	-	-	-	
16	Delhi	-	2	1	-	1,000	1,300	
16	Total	2	17	12	2,500	17,000	22,600	

R. LAWRENCE, Off. Mil. Sec.

STATEMENT No. III.

STATEMENT of the NUMBER of NATIVE TROOPS of each Arm now serving in the Punjab and the Delhi Territory.

Stations	Native Regulars				Total.	Native Irregulars				Total.	Punjab Irregulars				Total.	Police		Total.	Depôts			Total.	Levies			Grand Total
	Artillery	Cavalry	Sappers	Infantry		Artillery	Cavalry	Sappers	Infantry		Artillery	Cavalry	Infantry	Cavalry		Infantry	Cavalry		Infantry	Cavalry	Infantry		Cavalry	Infantry	Total	
Peshawur	-	-	-	1,000	1,000	120	1,000	2,120	-	-	2,700	2,700	200	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	1,089	605	1,694	7,714		
Rawul Pindée	-	-	-	-	-	-	400	300	700	-	900	900	100	900	1,000	-	-	-	-	-	201	290	491	2,604		
Kohat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	120	1,800	1,920	50	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	18	13	31	1,815		
Jhelum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	900	100	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	300	300	-	1,420		
Derah Ishmael Khan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	120	400	900	1,420	200	900	1,100	-	-	-	-	732	1,016*	1,808	4,313		
Bunnoo	-	-	-	-	-	-	290	-	290	120	-	900	1,020	200	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,420		
Murdan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	400	800	1,200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,200		
Derah Ghazee Khan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900†	900	-	500	-	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	210	233	443	2,143		
Asun	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	500	-	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	500		
Hazara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	1,800	1,860	150	100	250	-	-	-	-	-	48	155	203	2,313		
Lea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	150	-	150	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	192	204	854		
Lahore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	900	150	900	1,050	-	-	500	500	-	300	300	15	-	2,450	
Gojranwalla	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	150	-	150	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	466		
Umritsir and Govind- ghur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	150	900	1,050	-	-	-	108	-	108	1,158		
Goosara	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	900	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,500		
Ferozpoor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900		
Goordaspore	-	-	-	-	-	-	500	-	500	-	-	150	-	150	-	300	300	-	-	-	-	-	-	950		
Mooltan	-	-	-	-	-	-	500	-	500	-	-	900	900	1,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	89	-	89	2,489		
Shahpoor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	-	19	119		
Gojerat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	-	30	130		
Jhung	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200		
Sealkote	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	300	300	-	400		
Noorpoor and Kangra	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900		
Jullundhur	-	-	-	-	-	-	500	-	500	-	900	900	100	-	100	-	-	50	50	-	-	-	-	1,550		
Phillour	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	850	850	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	350		
Hooshyarpoor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	100	-	300	300	83	-	-	-	-	83	443		
Loodianah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	100	-	300	300	27	-	-	-	-	27	427		
Umballah	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	900	100	900	1,900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,900	
Sirsa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200	300	500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	500		
Hissar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	300	-	300	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	700	717	1,017		
Delhi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	120	500	900	1,520	200	900	1,100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,820		
Jhujur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	900	200	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	308	600	908	2,008†		
Goorgaon	-	-	-	-	-	-	720	720	120	-	-	120	900	1,200	-	-	-	-	-	-	222	-	222	2,222‡		
Rohtuck	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200	-	200	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	200		
Paniput	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100		
					1,000				6,990						20,860									2,450	7,076	51,426

* The levies are divided between Derah Ishmael Khan and Bunnoo, and are distributed along the border

† This is the 2nd Belooch battalion

‡ For the levies at Jhujur, 200 sowars and 600 infantry, belonging to Maharaja of Puteeala, are included

ABSTRACT.		
Native Regulars	-	1,000
Native Irregulars	-	6,990
Punjab Irregulars	-	20,860
Police	-	13,050
Depôts	-	2,450
Levies	-	7,076
Grand Total	-	51,426

R. LAWRENCE, Major, Off. Mil. Sec.

STATEMENT NO. IV.
With reference to Question 4.
PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF NATIVE TROOPS in the Punjab and Delhi Territories.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwards.

No.	Station.	Troops of Batteries	Artillery		Cavalry.		Infantry		Total.	REMARKS
			Foot.	Irregular	Police, Horse	Punjab Regiments	Police Battalions			
1	Peshawur	1 comp. pioneers	2*	-	850 ^b	600 ^c	2,250 ^d	900	4,900	^a One troop to be horse artillery of 6 pioneers, and 1 battery of 9 pioneers, each to consist of 4 pieces and 100 m.n.
2	Nowshera	-	-	120 Mountain train, 8 guns.	150	-	450	-	720	^b Head quarters of 2 regiments furnishing detachment to Nowshera, each regiment 500 sabres.
3	Fort of Western Border	-	-	-	-	-	1,800	-	1,800	^c Though entered here, perhaps never more than one ressalah would be in the lines, the other 5 being detached at outposts and on roads.
	Yosufzaye and Husht-nuggur.	-	-	-	400 guides.	-	824	-	1,224	^d In this return a police and irregular infantry regiment is counted as 900 bayonets.
5	Fort of Attock	-	-	-	-	-	160*	-	160	^e To be detached from the regiment at Campbellpore.
6	Campbellpore	-	-	-	150 ^f	-	740	-	890	^f One squadron from the regiment at Pindce
7	Hazara	-	-	70 ^g Mountain train.	-	150	1,800 ^h	100*	2,120	^g 4 guns ^h One of these corps will be the Harzara Goorka battalion
8	Rawul Pindce	-	-	-	350	400 ⁱ	900	900 ^j	2,550	ⁱ This is a company of sattuies. ^j These 4 ressalahs and the police battalion are to be distributed in the Sind saugor, and Chueh Doabs.
9	Jhelum	-	-	-	-	-	900	-	900	This regiment is well placed in the event of a disturbance in any direction
10	Kohat	1 comp. pioneers	1	50	200 ^k	300	1,800	900	3,450	^k To be detached from the head-quarters at Bunnoo
11	Bunnoo	-	1	25	300	300	1,800	-	2,525	^l For the whole district
12	Derah Ismael Khan	-	1	25	500	200 ^m	900	900 ⁿ	2,625	^m For the civil duties of the whole division ⁿ 2 guns
13	Derah Ghazee Khan	-	1*	-	500	300 ^o	900	-	1,750	^o For the district duties
14	Asun	-	-	-	500	-	-	-	500	
15	Leiah	-	-	-	-	150	-	-	150	
16	Mooltan	-	-	-	500	400 ^p	900	900	2,700	^p These to be employed throughout the Mooltan division
17	Googaira	-	-	-	-	-	900	-	900	
18	Lahore	-	-	-	500	700 ^q	1,800	900 ^r	3,900	^q These are to be employed throughout the Lahore division
19	Sealkote	-	-	-	-	-	900	-	900	
20	Umritsar	-	-	-	500 ^r	-	900	900 ^s	2,300	^r 150 of these to be detached to Goordasspore ^s For the civil duties of the district
21	Jullundhur	-	-	-	500	100	900	-	1,500	
22	Hooshyarpore	-	-	-	-	100	-	900 ^t	1,000	^t For civil duties generally
23	Kangra and Noorpoor	-	-	-	-	-	900	-	900	^u 2 companies at Noorpoor, and the head-quarters at Kangra.
24	Phallour	-	-	-	-	-	900	-	900	
25	Ferozepore	-	-	-	500	-	900	-	1,400	^v For civil duties generally.
26	Umballa	-	-	-	500	400 ^w	900	900 ^x	2,700	^w This is the strength of the Mussecree Goorkha battalion
27	Sumlah	-	-	-	-	-	700 ^y	-	700	^y Detail as follows - Delhi district, 2 troops Goorgaon do, 2 do Punput do, 1 do
28	Delhi	-	-	-	500	500 ^z	1,800	900 ^{aa}	3,700	
29	Goorgaon	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	900	^{aa} For civil duties generally, ^{ab} Detail as follows - Sirsa, 2 troops Hisar, 2 do Rohtuck, 2 do Jujur, 2 do
30	Hansi and Hissar	-	-	-	-	800 ^{ac}	-	900 ^{ad}	1,700	^{ac} For civil duties generally, ^{ad} Detail as follows - Sirsa, 2 troops Hisar, 2 do Rohtuck, 2 do Jujur, 2 do
30	Totals	2 comps	5½	290	7,400	5,400	27,624	10,900	62,364	^{ae} For civil duties generally

R. LAWRENCE, Off. Mil. Sec.

STATEMENT NO. V.
BARRACK ACCOMMODATION

No.	Stations	Accommodation in Dec. 1857.	Additional accommodation on Ap 30, 1858.	Total.	Proposed Number of Europeans	Accommodation wanting.	REMARKS
1	Peshawur	3,200	550	3,750	300	-	
2	Nowshera	768	268	1,036	1,650	600	There is already accommodation for 1 European regiment, besides this, there is the convalescent depot building, so that with due notice the 1,650 men could be covered in by the next hot weather.
3	Attock	300	-	300	200	-	There is temporary accommodation for these troops which will suffice until regular barracks are built
4	Campbellpore	-	-	-	3,550	3,550	Barracks for a wing are now ready, and by next hot weather, with timely notice, accommodation for 2,550 might be got ready. The 2nd European regiment of infantry might in the interim be placed in the Sumlah Hills.
5	Rawul Pindce	1,230	-	1,230	2,300	1,070	The extra accommodation of a temporary character might be made ready by next hot weather
6	Sealkote	1,200	-	1,200	1,600	400	The extra accommodation might readily be furnished
7	Mooltan	108	144	252	1,200	948	Barracks for an European regiment have been ordered, and until ready, by using the iron frames received from England a whole regiment can be covered by next hot weather
8	Meean Meer	1,528	115	1,643	2,750	1,107	By the aid of the iron frames (received from England) this accommodation might also be furnished by next hot weather
9	Umritsar	100	-	100	1,150	1,050	Accommodation will be ready by next hot weather
10	Ferozepore	1,036	-	1,036	2,300	806	Accommodation can be given in the arsenal, and by using the iron frames
11	Jullundhur	1,231	-	1,231	1,200	-	
12	Umballa	424	1,500	1,924	1,800	-	
13	Kussowlee	334	-	334	-	-	
14	Subathoo	596	300	896	-	-	
15	Durgshae	960	-	960	-	-	
16	Delhi	-	-	-	1,300	1,300	
17	Jhelum	-	-	-	1,200	1,200	If orders are issued in time, accommodation can speedily be provided.
18	Derah Ismael Khan	-	-	-	100	100	Temporary accommodation could be arranged for, by hiring bungalows, &c
	Totals	-	-	16,512	22,600	13,131	An effort might be made to provide accommodation, but if not ready before the hot weather commenced the men might be kept at Mooltan

R. LAWRENCE, Off. Mil. Sec.

Str John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

STATEMENT No. VI.

STATEMENT approximated of Expenses of Troops in Punjab and Delhi Territories before the Mutinies.

Regulars, Native.		Rupees.
Artillery, 1,330, say 13 troops or companies at 3,200 rs.		41,600
Cavalry, 3,000, say 6 regiments at 25,000 rs.		1,50,000
Infantry, 34,720, or 30 regiments at 15,000 rs.		4,50,000
Total regular infantry		6,41,600
Irregulars.		Rupees.
Artillery, 120, at 3,200 rs.		3,200
Cavalry, 5,000, 10 regiments at 16,000 rs.		1,60,000
Infantry, 1,620, 3 regiments at 10,000 rs.		30,000
Total irregulars		1,93,200
Punjabees, Irregulars.		Rupees.
Artillery, 630, 5 companies at 3,000 rs.		15,000
Cavalry, 3,037, 6 companies at 16,000 rs.		96,000
Infantry, 9,550, 11 regiments at 10,000 rs.		1,10,000
Total Punjabees		2,21,000
Europeans.		Rupees.
Artillery, 2,000, say 20 companies at 10,000 rs.		2,00,000
Cavalry, 700, 1 regiment at 40,000 rs.		40,000
Infantry, 9,350, 11 regiments at 30,000 rs.		3,30,000
Total Europeans		5,70,000
Abstract of foregoing.		Per mensem Rupees
Regulars, native		6,41,600
Irregulars, native		1,93,200
Punjabees		2,21,000
Europeans		5,70,000
Total per mensem		16,25,800
Add for Punjab Police —		
7 battalions, at 8,500 rs.		59,500
27 rissallas, at 2,460 rs.		67,420
Grand total per mensem		17,52,720
Or per annum		210,32,640
Add for Trans-Indus batta, given to troops at Peshawur, &c.		6,00,000
		216,32, 64

STATEMENT approximated of Expense of Troops proposed for Punjab and Delhi Territories.

Natives.		Rupees
Artillery, 5½ troops, 3 companies, or 8½ at 3,200 rs.		27,200
Cavalry, 7,400, 15 regiments at 16,000 rs.		2,40,000
Cavalry Police, 54,000, or 54 rissallas at 2,400 rs.		1,29,600
Infantry, Irregular, 27,624, or 31 regiments at 10,000 rs.		3,10,000
Infantry Police, 10,900, or 12 battalions at 8,500 rs.		1,02,000
Sappers, 2 companies at 1,500 rs.		3,000
Total		8,11,800
European.		Rupees.
Artillery, 17 troops, 12 companies, or 29 companies at 10,000		2,90,000
Cavalry, 2,500, or 5 regiments at 30,000 rs.		1,50,000
Infantry, 17,000, or 17 regiments at 30,000 rs.		5,10,000
Total per mensem		9,50,000
Abstract.		Rupees.
Natives		8,11,800
Europeans		9,50,000
Total per mensem		17,61,800
Total per annum		211,41,600
Comparison.		Rupees.
Cost of troops before mutiny per annum		216,32,640
Cost of troops, as per proposed statement, per annum		211,41,600
Decreased expenditure per annum		4,91,040
Deduct from above decrease:—		
Amount of additional pay granted to 5½ regiments of Punjab cavalry at 2,500 rs. per regiment, being per mensem 14,166 rs., or per annum		1,69,992
		3,21,048
Also, amount of proposed increase to remaining 9½ regiments at 2,500 rs. per regiment, being 23,333 rs. per mensem, or per annum		2,79,996
Net Decrease		41,032

R. LAWRENCE, Off. Mil. Sec.

STATEMENT No. VII.

MEMORANDUM showing the NUMBER of TROOPS of all branches, EUROPEAN and NATIVE, serving in the Punjab and the Delhi Territory previous to the Rebellion of 1857.

Station	Europeans.				Native Regulars				Native Irregulars.				Punjab Irregulars.				GRAND TOTAL.	Remarks		
	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Sappers.	Infantry.	Total.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Sappers.	Infantry.	Total.	Artillery.	Cavalry.			Infantry.	Total.
Peshawur	628	1,700	2,320	100	500	112	5,600	6,312	1,000			1,000							9,632	*A corps of Irregular Cavalry is shown at Jhelum, as the 6th I Cavalry was only lent to Sindh during the Persian war.
Attock				100				100											100	
Shumshabad										500				500					500	
Shul-Kudur							1,120	1,120											1,120	
Nowhera		850	850				1,120	1,120	120	500				620					2,590	
Rawul Pindies		850	850	210			1,120	1,330		500			720	1,220					3,300	
Jhelum				100			2,240	2,340		500*				500					2,840	
<i>Lahore Division.</i>																				
Lahore	540	850	1,390		500		3,360	3,860											5,250	
Umritsir and Gwinda	80		80	100			1,120	1,120											1,300	
Ferozpoore	160	850	1,010		500		2,240	2,740											3,750	
Goondaspoore										500				500					500	
Mooltan	80		80	210			2,240	2,450		500				500					3,030	
Sralkote	190	850	1,040		500		2,240	2,740											3,780	
Noorpoor and Kangra				100			1,120	1,120											1,220	
<i>Serhind Division.</i>																				
Umballa	220	700	920		500		2,240	2,740											3,660	
Jutog Simla													720	720					720	
Dugshie		850	850																850	
Kussowhe		850	850																850	
Subathoo		850	850																850	
Jullundur	110	850	960		500		2,240	2,740											3,700	
Phillour							1,120	1,120											1,120	
Hooshyarpore				210			1,120	1,330		500				500					1,830	
Delhi				200			3,360	3,560		500				900					3,560	
Hapsi										500				1,400					1,400	
<i>Punjab Irregular Force.</i>																				
Kohat														138	550	2,700	3,348		3,833	
Bunoo														138	550	1,800	2,488		2,488	
Derah G Khan															550	1,800	2,350		2,350	
Asun															550		500		500	
Derah I Khan														284	550	900	1,734		1,734	
Hoti Murdan															285	550	845		845	
Hazara														70	1,800	1,870			1,870	
Grand Total	2,000	700	9,350	12,050	1,330	3,000	112	33,600	38,042	120	5,000		2,340	7,460	630	3,035	9,550	13,215	70,767	

Organized Police in the Punjab —
Mounted Police, 27 Troops - - - - 2,700
Police Battalions, 7 - - - - 6,300
9,000

N B.—The strength of European Regiments is assumed to be 850 bayonets; Native Infantry Regiments, 1,120, and Punjab Irregular Regiments, 900.

R. LAWRENCE, Off. Mil. Sec.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwards.

(No. 7.)

From Sir JOHN LAWRENCE, G.C.B., to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

Murree, August 3, 1858.

SIR,
In continuation of my No. 6 of 24th July, I have now the honor to forward the united replies of Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, C.B., and Lieut.-Col. Edwards, C.B., and myself, to the series of cavalry questions, which was forwarded with your No. 160 of 21st July, to which we have added a few general remarks in conclusion of these papers on the re-organization of the Indian Army.

I have, &c.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes, of which the irregular cavalry of the Punjab is composed?
 1. Hindostanees from round about Delhi, like the rest of the irregular cavalry. Pathans of the Trans-Indus and Afghanistan, Punjabee Mahommedans, numerous Sikhs, and a few Hillmen.
 2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?
 2. The Delhi territory, Allyghur, Boolundshuhur, Mozuffernuggur, Rohilcund, the Cis and Trans Indus, Afghanistan, the Punjab generally, and the Cis-Sutlej.
 3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Punjab, either by the regulations or the practice of the
 3. See our Answer No. 3, on "the Recruiting and Composition of Infantry Corps" in the Punjab, with letter No. 3, of 1st July 1858.
 4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?
 4. See Answer No. 4, in the Punjab infantry paper, with letter No. 3 of 1st July 1858.
 5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?
 5. See Answer 5 in ditto.
 6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Punjab, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?
 6. See Answer 6 in ditto.
 7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?
 7. See Answer 7 in ditto.
 8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?
 8. See Answer 8 in ditto.
 9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?
 - 9, 10. See Answers 9, 10, in ditto.
 10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?
 - See No. 9.
 11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Punjab when first enrolled?
 11. See Answer No. 11 in ditto.
12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Punjab be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?
 13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Punjab be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?
 - 12, 13. See Answers Nos. 14 and 15 of ditto. The same principles are equally applicable to the irregular cavalry, and we have only to add here that we do not put forward our views of counterpoising one race of natives with another as any panacea for all the evils of the old army. No one remedy, no one principle of reform or organization will meet the case, and to put any one forward as a charm for ruling native troops would only be empirical. We want a thorough revision of all details, and earnest attention to all the defects that have been revealed in the mutiny. Amongst those defects unquestionably the worst, and the one which operated most fatally against us, was the brotherhood or homogeneity of the Bengal army, and for that particular defect the remedy is counterpoise—1stly, the great counterpoise of Europeans; and, 2ndly, that of various native races. Had the old Bengal army had all the other remedies applied to it ten years ago which we have recommended in these papers for the improvement of its discipline, staff, &c., &c., it would doubtless have been a better army; but if its brotherhood had been left unbroken, unchecked by any adequate European force, and in the unsuspected possession of our magazines, posts, and artillery, it would still have broken bounds like water at this one weak point, whenever its common prejudices were violently assailed.
14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Punjab be homogeneous as to race or caste?
 14. We would have one or two homogeneous as exceptions, for the sake of variety of system. See the question discussed in our Punjab infantry paper, Answer No. 16, with letter No. 3 of 1st July 1858.
15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Punjab be composed of *resalabs*, each of which shall consist of separate tribes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?
 15. Both systems. See Answer No. 17 of the above quoted paper.
16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Punjab are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?
 16. As a rule for the army at large, we are decidedly in favor of the provincial system advocated in answer No. 18 of the Bengal infantry paper, with letter No. 3 of 1st July 1858, but with reference to the peculiar nature of the Punjab frontier service, we would advocate in the Punjab irregular cavalry the following proportions of races:—
 - 2 Mahommedans.
 - 2 Sikhs.
 - 2 Hindostanees.
17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?
 17. No change in the present system seems required.
18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?
 18. All that is required is to enforce the existing orders. See Answer No. 6 in the infantry paper for Bengal, with letter No. 3 of 1st July 1858.
19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Punjab?
 19. No, certainly not; nor of any other cavalry regiments in India. The tendency would be to make the natives dragoons, so as to correspond with the

Europeans, who would naturally become the model for the whole corps. It is one of the blessings of this crisis that it affords an opportunity of getting rid of the regular native cavalry, which we consider to have been a total misapplication of the European system, a branch of the old army which was at once costly and inefficient; and it would be throwing away all past lessons now deliberately to adopt a plan which would not only give us native dragoons again, but rob us of our irregulars. The experiment, as tried by Sir S. Cotton at Peshawur was a very valuable one, for it made a few Europeans go a long way, at a dangerous time; but the natives associated with them are thorough dragoons, than which nothing can be more foreign to the Asiatic genius.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps and subject to periodical relief?

20. See No. 19.

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

21. See No. 19.

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

22. Yes.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed,—with similar, or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?

23. If Europeans must be associated in the cavalry with native troopers, they should have the same weapons as other European cavalry in India.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Punjab be armed?

24. Privates with sword and carbine. Native officers and non-commissioned officers with sword and pistol. Picked duffadars and troopers at the discretion of the commanding officer might carry spears.

25.

25. No reply required.

26. How should the irregular cavalry of the Punjab be dressed and equipped, with a view to the efficiency and comfort of the native trooper? Do the present dress and equipment admit of improvements? if so, state them?

26. The Punjab irregular cavalry are very sensibly dressed and equipped; in a native "chup kun" with "kummerbund" and turband, "pijamahs" and boots; swords and carbines for privates, and pistols and swords for officers. This requires no alteration. The saddles, however, in some cases, require changing. At present some of the men have got "char jamuhs," which are excessively hot, and give the horses sore backs. A light "kâthee" admitting of a native seat should, in these instances be substituted. In the irregular cavalry generally, especially in Hindostan, where rough and ready work is seldom seen, the tendency is to polish and polish the irregulars into regulars. Few European officers have the free spirit of the irregular; and they tighten everything in the regiment, discipline and clothes, year by year. There is one relic of olden times which it is to be hoped will now be positively forbidden by government; the steel scabbard of the regulars, which blunts the sword, loads the horse, and by clatter and glitter betrays every movement.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?

1. See the corresponding answer in the infantry paper which accompanied letter No. 4, of 12th July 1858.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

2. Ditto.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?

3. Ditto.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Punjab irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

4. Ditto.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the Punjab irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

5. Perhaps 15 per cent

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwards.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Punjab, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. As in the infantry, the promotion is given to the best men, preference being shown to seniority when possible. Here we must explain (what should, indeed, have been added to the corresponding answer in the infantry paper) that an endeavour has been made (though not so steadily persevered in as it might have been) to keep up a proportion of *races* among the native officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as among the men of a corps, so that this consideration often decided a promotion.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Punjab generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. Certainly so.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

3. They are selected on that account.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. See corresponding answer in the infantry paper.

5.

5. No reply required.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check a quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers?

6. The only instance we can recall of the mutiny among the Punjab irregular cavalry, was a partial one in the 2nd Punjab irregular cavalry, at Delhi. It was confined to the Hindostanee section of the corps, and the 3 Hindostanee native officers were the ringleaders. The Sikh native officers of the same squadron on this occasion warned the European officers that something was wrong among the Hindostanees, though they had not been admitted to their council and could not say what was meditated. The mutineers made overtures to a Pathan native officer of a Punjab infantry regiment, who immediately gave information, and the ringleaders were hanged on the spot.

7, 8, 9. Questions.

No replies required to Nos. 7, 8, 9.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwards.

10. Have retiring pensions, proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?
10. See corresponding answer in the Bengal native infantry paper.
11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished.
11. See corresponding answer in the Bengal native infantry paper.
12. What is the charge upon the finances of the state on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?
12. Ditto.
13. Should the system of promotion generally, by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers, if at all in operation, be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?
13. Wherever existing it should be abolished, and merit be the rule.
14. Are native commissioned officers, generally, fit to take part in the conduct of court-martial?
14. See our corresponding answers in both the Punjab and Bengal native infantry papers.
- 15, 16. Questions.
No replies required to Nos. 15, 16.
17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?
17. There are now three European officers, and a fourth "doing duty," (not including the medical officer), and this is the complement we would advocate.
18. Question.
18. No reply required.
- 19, 20. Questions.
No reply required to Nos. 19, 20.
21. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bengal army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?
21. None should be mounted by Government. Not only does a man take less interest in the Government horse, but in critical times the trooper who rides a Government horse has a direct inducement to desert; the trooper who rides his own has something to lose.
22. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular cavalry of the Bengal army were mounted?
22. We believe about 700 rupees.
23. Whence are the horses obtained? and of what breed are they?
23. The Government studs in India.
24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Punjab and of the Bengal army draw its horses?
24. The troopers of both services prefer the mares of Hindostan; failing which, they look for horses in the Punjab, and only take northern horses in the last resort, because they cannot stand the heat or quick work, though they are admirable for artillery.
25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army and of the Punjab?
25. Hitherto not more than 125 rupees (though the "Chunda," or Horse Fund, allowed 150 rupees), for which the reasons will presently be shown.
26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?
26. There is great scarcity of horses, and yearly increasing.
27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency?
27. For Europeans of light weight and short height, there is no horse like the Arab; for he stands heat and exposure, and poor food, in a wonderful manner. But Arabs are too small for such European dragoons as have hitherto been in India; and to mount such men the only horses are, 1stly, New South Wales; 2ndly, Cape; 3rdly, Stud. For draught, the northern horses are excellent; but when taken to Hindostan, they fall off in condition, and are rejected. If the artillery in the Punjab, from Peshawur to Umballa, were limited to the northern horses, it would greatly ease the demand upon the Government studs and other sources of supply for the cavalry; and when in course of relief the artillery went to Hindostan, the horses should be mutually exchanged between the relieving and relieved troops or batteries; so as to keep the northern horses in a congenial climate. We would also suggest that all stud-bred colts should be gelded, and thus admit of mares being used with them in the ranks.
28. Is it advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies, for a supply of horses for the army of India?
28. We think it very advisable that the studs should be maintained. No source of supply can be spared. But we should think that the studs could be placed both on a better and cheaper footing. It is the general opinion that the stud colts are pampered, and that their constitutions are made delicate by high feeding, so that when hard work and poor food overtakes them on a campaign, they fall off, and lose condition. And this seems proved by the very different result among the fillies, which being rejected from the Government service remain with the zemindars, get hard hoofs, tough constitutions, muscular legs, and good wind, and are at last bought cheap by sowars in the irregular cavalry, who prefer them to any other stamp of horse, for their real serviceable qualities.
29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army, and in the Punjab irregular force?
29. Used to be 20 rupees, but is now 25 rupees.
30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field, during a protracted campaign?
30. The former rate of 20 rupees had a long and fair trial, and was unquestionably insufficient; and more so the farther the corps were sent up country. The extra five rupees supply all that was wanted, and ought not to be increased. But we advocate the improvement of the pay of native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, with other modifications, as detailed in subjoined Appendix A.
- 30 b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Punjab irregular force, and of the Bengal army, been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?
- 30 b. There was no debt in the irregular cavalry of the Punjab force. Bankers were not allowed, and great attention was paid by the officers to prevent debt. From time to time advances were taken from Government for the purchase of horses, when any unusual mortality had occurred. This saved the men greatly. In the Bengal irregular cavalry there was a banker in every regiment; and every regiment was in debt from 30,000 to 60,000 rupees. Corps have been known to owe a lakh of rupees.
31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?
31. See Answer 30.

32. What is the system of the Punjab irregular cavalry, and of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, with respect to Assamees, and the market value of the Assamee? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such vested interests or not? Are they favourable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

32. In the Punjab irregular cavalry the value of an Assamee is simply that of the horse, equipments, arms, and accoutrements. Nothing more is allowed to be given or taken. In the Bengal irregular cavalry more than the value is, we believe, invariably given; but the amount is very various. The number of Assamees held by the native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, is the same in the Punjab and Bengal irregular cavalry, as shown in the margin,

3	Rossaldars	5 = 15
3	Rossaldars	5 = 15
1	Wardce Major	5 = 5
6	Naib Rossaldars	2 = 12
6	Jemmadars	2 = 12
6	Kote Duffadars	1 = 6
46	Duffadars	1 = 46
Total Bargeers		113

but during the crisis of 1858 double the number was sanctioned in the Punjaub, for the sake of raising men. No capitalists out of the corps are allowed to hold Assamees. The objections to bargeers (or Assamees held by native officers, &c.), are numerous and substantial. They are more the private servants of their silladar than of Government; and the silladar constantly favors them in matters of duty for the sake of saving his horse, while as constantly quarreling and bickering on other points. The settlement of these disputes is very difficult and troublesome. The bargeer on a silladar's horse is not of the same use to Government as a "khooduspah;"* and the aggregate of all the bargeers is no less than one-fifth of the whole corps. The best commandants in the Punjab cavalry advocate the abolition of bargeers, and on the whole we decidedly concur with them. The only advantage of the bargeer system is, that the native officers like it; to meet which we would propose that the pay of each native officer be increased by way of compensation. We are quite certain that if bargeers were abolished, desertions would be diminished; for the opportunity of acquiring a horse, arms, and equipments tempts numbers of this class to desert on service and join the enemy as a "khooduspah."

33. What is the pay of mounted police in the North-Western provinces, and in the Punjab?

33. In the North-Western provinces, we believe the pay of mounted police varied from 18 to 20 rupees, but has now been raised to 25 rupees. In the Punjab it was 20 rupees; but Government has been asked to allow 24 rupees.

34. What is the organization of the mounted police of the North-Western provinces, and of the Punjab?

34. We do not know what the present organization of the North-Western provinces mounted police is. It used to consist of a few sowars for each district, strictly local. In the Punjab each district has one or more ressallahs, of the constitution shown in the margin.

	Rupees.
1	Rossaldar - - - 100
2	Jemmadars 60/ = 120
4	Duffadars 30/ = 120
4	Naib Duffadars 25/ = 100
1	Moonshee - - - 30
1	Trumpeter - - - 20
20	Sowars - - - 1,980
Total Rupees 2,470	

35. Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the North-Western provinces composed, and that of the Punjab?

35. In the North-Western provinces we cannot say. In the Punjab the majority are Sikhs and Punjabee Mahomedans, with a sprinkling of Hindostanees

from the south, and Pathans from the north; some Beloochees, &c.

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36. How is the mounted police recruited; that is, what is the agency employed, the precautions taken before or by the local authorities in entertaining men?

36. There are always more candidates for the mounted than for the foot police, and the captain had little trouble in filling up vacancies, especially before the present war, when military employment was very scarce among the people of the Punjab, in comparison with Hindostanees.

37. Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police at rupees 20 per mensem been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?

37. It was just enough for man and horse to exist on, but left no margin for any emergency or accident to either.

38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

38. There was no difference before the late war between the pay of the horse policeman and that of the irregular trooper. Both had 20 rupees a month. This rate was found quite inadequate to the requirements of the irregular horse in the Punjab, and it has lately been raised by Government to 25 rupees. The greatest difficulty was experienced, previous to this increase, in coaxing Punjabee recruits to the frontier.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army been increased or diminished?

1. Diminished, even more than in the infantry. Formerly offences against discipline in the corps were tried by a punchayat or jury of native officers, under the guidance of the commandant; but this popular and effective institution has been abolished. Commandants have been prohibited from punishing or reducing non-commissioned officers, except by the forms of court-martial. Discharge of men has been put a stop to. The commandant has not even the power to order any man in his regiment to give an extra allowance of grain to a horse out of condition. All minor punishments must be dealt out according to regulation. In fact every thing has been laid down by Procrustean rule; and the "irregular cavalry" has long been a misnomer.

2. Question?
No reply required to No. 2.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

3. To reduce the efficiency of the regiments, and to render them dangerous to the State.

4. Question?
No reply required to No. 4.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of head quarters? or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

5. The discipline mainly depends on the character and ability of the European and native officers pre-

* One who owns the horse he rides.

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sent, but especially on that of the commanding officer. At the same time we consider that the careful and judicious supervision of a superior authority is essentially necessary, and that such authority, so exercised, must do good, and cannot do harm. We allude here to the supervision of officers commanding brigades and divisions, beyond which there should be no interference except in extreme cases.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

6. See our reply to a similar query in former paper. (No. 6 of Infantry, No. 4, on "European Officers.")

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

7. See our reply to Query No. 7 of Infantry Paper No. 4.

8, 9, 10, 11, 12.—Questions.

No replies required to Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

13. After going through the course prescribed, the European officers should in the first instance be selected for their probable aptitude for this branch of the service; be appointed to do duty on probation; and subsequently, if successful, be promoted from grade to grade in accordance with their merit.

14. Question.

No reply required to No. 14.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?

15. No difference observable. The character and general qualities of the European officers have however certainly had some influence. These qualities have also had an effect on the character of a mutiny in the first instance. Thus, the men of some corps took the lead in mutinies; those of others were seduced or overawed into mutiny. In some corps the sepoys murdered their own officers, in others they warned them to escape, and so on.

16. Question.

No reply required to No. 16.

17, 18. Questions.

No replies required to Nos. 17 and 18.

19, 20. Questions.

No replies required to Nos. 19 and 20.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

21. No; certainly not advisable. It would be really reviving in a new phase the old system of regular native cavalry, which was so costly and so useless.

22. If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

22. We do not think the scheme advisable; but if carried out, we would advocate two dragoon squadrons to one native. In this case they should be mounted, officered, and armed like the Europeans. We do not see how there could be two systems working smoothly in the same regiment.

APPENDIX A.

STATEMENT showing the present PAY of the IRREGULAR NATIVE CAVALRY in the Punjab Force, and how it is proposed to increase it.

Ranks.	Monthly Pay.		Decrease.	Increase.	REMARKS.
	Present.	Proposed.			
8 Bessaldars -	Ra. 150 each	Ra. 1 at 300 1 at 250 1 at 200	Ra. 150 100 50		Each by our proposal loses 5 bargeers, equal to 20 rs. a month.
3 Bessaldars -	60 each	1 at 150 1 at 135 1 at 120	70 55 40		Ditto.
6 Naib Bessaldars	50 each	None	300		These officers are drones, and should be got rid of
6 Jemmadars -	45 each	2 at 80 2 at 70 2 at 60	70 50 30		Will lose 2 bargeers each equal to 8 rs. a month.
6 Koto Duffadars -	35 each	45 each		60	Lose 1 bargeer each.
48 Duffadars -	28 each	35 each		336	Ditto.
Pay Duffadars Staff Allowance.	6	6			
6 Nishan Burdars -	28 each	35 each		42	
2 Trumpeters -	25 each	30 each		30	
Staff Allowance of Trumpet-Major.	5	10		5	
Ditto for 1 Assistant Trumpet-Major.	None	5		5	
500 Sowars -	25 each	25 each			
Woordee-Major -	105	150		45	Will lose 5 bargeers.
1 Nakeeb -	20	None	20		
1 Native Farrier -	None	40		40	
1 Moonshee -	30	40		10	
Horse Allowance of 2 Native Doctors.	64 each	15 each		17	This is to be irrespective of an increase of pay which is strongly recommended.
6 Nalbunds -	None	15 each		90	A sowar now does this duty.
2 Lascars -	5 each	1 at 5 1 at 7		2	
1 Bazar Chowdrie -	11	11			
1 Mootsuddee -	5	5			
3 Weighmen -	3 each	4 each		3	
Total			320	1,300	Amounts to an increase of 980rs.

Yearly increase, 10,760 rs.

SUPPLEMENTARY GENERAL REMARKS on the Subject of IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

We will now enumerate a few other points which seem to require attention.

1. It sometimes happens that a subaltern commands an irregular cavalry corps, and often that a junior captain does so. To prevent his being commanded by the senior captain of a company of infantry, he should have the official rank of field officer.

2. In the same way, the second in command should take precedence of captains of infantry.

3. A second in command should not have less than 600 rupees a month.

4. Officers of irregular cavalry should draw the same rate of pay whether they come from the cavalry or infantry branch of the service; and when on leave of absence or sick leave should be liable to the same deductions as officers of the other branches, and no more. At present the officers of irregular cavalry are at a disadvantage.

5. We have recommended the abolition of "bargeers." If this be decided on, native officers (whose second horse was mustered as a bargeer's)

should be obliged to keep up a second charger, for which the proposed extra pay is a compensation.

6. If "naib rissaldars" be abolished, it could be best done by absorption; and in the interval they should be put on the pay of a junior rissaidar.

7. The new rates of pay for the cavalry should cover all charges, wherever the men are sent to. Extra batta should be abolished for foreign service; though it would rest with Government, as a special case, to compensate the men for famine prices in an enemy's country.

8. Ordinary batta should be defined for all ranks, so as to determine furlough pay and donation batta.

9. Half pay to be regularly remitted to all ranks on furlough, and the balance paid on return to the regiment. At present a man receives no pay while on leave (though he takes his horse with him) and gets it all paid to him when he rejoins. The consequence is that he runs in debt.

10. Compensation for horses to be raised to 150 rupees, and to be granted whenever a man fairly loses his horse in action. Under the present regulations, if a wounded man is dismounted and loses his horse, but is not killed himself, he gets no compensation for his horse. The commanding officer should judge whether the horse was lost unavoidably, or wilfully, or by negligence.

11. The penalty of dismissal* for a man who is dismounted more than three months is too severe. Oftentimes the commandant is in fault.

12. The irregular cavalry should take precedence of all infantry, both as regiments and individuals.

13. A hospital and hospital establishment, the same as other corps, and hospital tent and carriage should be allowed.

14. Government tents should be allowed for the standard and rear guards, and carriage for them on the march.

15. The carbines and pistols should have the same bore (No. 24 seems the best).

16. A forge allowance of 60 rupees per mensem should be allowed for each corps for the repair of arms.

17. General Chamberlain thinks that the pay of the mounted police should not approximate so closely to that of the irregular cavalry as has been proposed in the Punjab,† the popularity of the police service being likely to place the military branch at a disadvantage as to recruits. But Sir John Lawrence and Lieut.-Col. Edwards do not concur in this, for the following reasons:—The army and police together do not furnish employment for all the candidates, and both branches can be as select in picking recruits as is necessary. Therefore, no difference of pay seems required to give the cavalry the best stamp of recruits; and both can be paid with reference only to the duties they have to perform, and the expenses they are put to. The duties of the police are constant and responsible. They are always riding about on some errand or another; consequently there is great wear and tear of horses and accoutrements, far more so than in the cavalry as a class. (The Punjab cavalry, it must be admitted, has had great mortality in horses, from unhealthiness of particular stations; but this is exceptional.) Again, great temptation is placed in the way of the men of the police; and it is practically necessary both to diminish their necessities and to increase the stake they have to lose. The case is, however, different with the native officers of police, who are not worked or tempted in proportion; and we have accordingly proposed far higher rates of pay for the native officers of the irregular cavalry.

18. Lastly, we wish to draw attention to the disproportionate pensions given to the irregular cavalry. (See our remarks on this subject in reference to the irregular infantry, Answer 12 of the Infantry Paper No. 3, on "Organization, Promotions, and Rewards.")

SUPPLEMENTARY GENERAL REMARKS ON VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE SERVICE.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig - Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwards.

1. At present there are two honorary distinctions available for the native soldiers:—

1stly. The order of British India, which is limited as to numbers, and is given only for long and faithful and honourable services.

2ndly. The order of Merit, which is to afford personal reward for personal bravery, irrespective of rank or grade or length of service.

There is here no order as a reward for general Merit, and the consequence is, that the order of Merit, though devised for valour alone, is given frequently for general service. This is inappropriate, and either the order of British India should be thrown open to all merit, or else there should be a third order for valour alone.

2. Formerly there were in the Bengal presidency twelve companies of sappers and miners, all natives. The result in the rebellion was that all their scientific instruction was turned against us. In future there should be no native sappers and miners; but six companies of European sappers and miners, and any natives required to relieve the Europeans of manual labour should only be pioneers, and never be instructed in sapper work.

3. Men in the European cavalry not found able to ride should be transferable to the artillery or infantry, which now they are not.

4. The heavy saddles and appointments of the European cavalry should be done away with, and the lightest possible substituted. Otherwise it would be of little use to get light-weight men.

5. Also wooden scabbards, which keep swords sharp, should be substituted for steel, which blunt them.

6. In the instruction of all cavalry, but especially European, more attention should be paid to independent horsemanship and the use of arms, so that each trooper may be self-contained, and not dependent on the formation of ranks. Native troopers are very much more at home in the use of horse and arms than our dragoons, who in every particular—weight of men, weight of accoutrements, drill, and equitation—require to be lighter and freer, to be of real use in India. It is no uncommon thing for a trooper to be unable to get his horse to leave the ranks when called by his officer to the front.

7. The pay and audit regulations require revision. At present they are too voluminous and confusing, though much simplified from what they were some years ago.

8. The system of "retrenchments" as now practised in the pay department is productive of great public and private inconvenience, and is universally complained of. Pay is arbitrarily retrenched from abstracts, and then explanation, or further information, or vouchers, are called for. The opposite course should be pursued, as is believed to be the case in other presidencies. Explanation or support of charges should be called for, with notice that if not furnished in a certain time, say three months, the sums must be retrenched.

9. At the present time it may not be irrelevant to draw attention to the evil of allowing greatly differing scales of pay for similar ranks and offices in separate provinces. Every new increase is in its way a revolution, which spreads to the neighbouring provinces and services, and carries with it discontent among large bodies of men. Within the last few months the rate of twenty-five rupees a month for police sowars has been originated in the North-Western provinces; and increased rates for native officers of military police in Oudh, at the very time that large numbers of Punjab troops and levies were serving in those parts. These questions of pay are too wide to be dealt with piecemeal, and it is very desirable that they should be harmonized by the Supreme Government on more general considerations. Pay, like most other things, is a relative quantity, and men may be well

* See Para. 61, Sec. 39, Military Regulations.

† Irregular cavalry 25 rs.; mounted police, 24 rs.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

satisfied with allowances till they see others get more.

10. In concluding these papers on the re-organization of the native army in India, in which the injurious effects of over-centralization have been unreservedly pointed out, and the restoration of greater authority to commanding officers warmly advocated; we desire to acknowledge a full consciousness of the opposite dangers which arise from abuse of discretionary power. Of the two evils, if one must be chosen, we would accept the latter, in general reliance on the character and sense of duty of our own countrymen, and in face of the paramount necessity of our position as conquerors in India. But we believe that a reasonable and middle course is to be found in substituting for the distant, minute, and weakening interference of army head-quarters, the supervision of selected local brigadiers and generals of division. If care be taken that these important appointments be given to those who can most efficiently fulfil the duties, and not allowed to sink again into sinecures and rewards for mere length of service, a constant and vigorous control would at all times be kept over the commandants of regiments, and we should neither hear of corps being driven into mutiny by harshness, nor allowed to drift into it by pampering and weakness. A mercenary army is a keen and effective weapon, but it is only safe in a tight and determined grasp. By the system which we have in view, and have endeavoured to describe, while the commanding officer would possess real authority in his regiment, the brigadier in his cantonment, and the general in his division, there would still remain ample scope for the large and comprehensive control of the commander-in-chief, a control which, divested of all detail, would have leisure to take in the general arrangements, enunciate great principles, and ensure unity of system in the army.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.

HERBERT B. EDWARDES,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Note.—I have signed for Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, who has had to leave Murree on emergent duty.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

From Sir JOHN LAWRENCE, G.C.B., to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

SIR,
Murree, Sept. 24, 1858.
I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 168, of the 30th of July last, forwarding a series of questions relative to the reorganization of the Artillery and Engineer branches of the Bengal Army, which are herewith returned, with the views of Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, Col. Edwardes, and myself, duly recorded.

I have, &c.
J. LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

ARTILLERY.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF THE ARTILLERY.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Bengal army are composed?
1. Usually half Hindoos and half Mahomedans. In the troop of Major V. Coxe (which was at Rawul

Pindee), we have ascertained that the proportions were as follows:—

Mahomedans	-	-	-	52			
Hindoos	-	-	}	58			
					Brahmunns	-	26
					Rajpoots	-	29
			{				
			Inferior castes	3			
Total				-			
				-			
				110			

2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Bengal army are composed?
2. Mahomedans and low caste Hindoos.
3. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Bengal army are composed?
3. Same as No. 2. The drivers were usually syces promoted for smartness.
4. Should native gunners, or golundauzes, continue to be enlisted, and to form part of the artillery of the Bengal army?
4. As explained in Paras. 26, 27, 28, of our "General Remarks," forming Enclosure No. 2, in letter No. 1, of 25th June 1858, we would not have one gun manned by natives, if we could help it; but consider that there must be some at frontier stations where artillery is necessary, but where European infantry could not be placed. The rule should be, to have as few native artillery as possible, and in those few to secure as many native Christians and low caste natives as can be got. It is true that the native Christians would be liable to be overpowered in a mutiny, but their destruction would leave the guns unmanned.
5. Should native drivers continue to be employed with European artillery?
5. Yes; in the local Indian artillery, not in the royal artillery. (See reasons assigned in Para. 29 of our "General Remarks," quoted in the last answer.)
6. From what districts are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundauze drawn?
6. Oudh, Allahabad, Rohilcund, Behar. In the native troop, quoted in Answer No. 1, the proportions were—

From about Allahabad	-	-	40
From Oudh	-	-	36
From Rohilcund	-	-	31
From Behar	-	-	3

Total - 110

7. From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn?
7. The whole of Hindostan.
8. From what districts are the drivers taken?
8. Ditto. Often out of the sudder bazars or lines of large cantonments, like Meerut, Cawnpoor, and Umballah.
9. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded by regulation or practice of the service from the golundauze of the Bengal army, and if so, for what reason?
9. Yes. (See our Answer 3. Infantry Paper on the "Recruiting and Composition of Corps," Bengal army.)
10. The same question is repeated both with respect to gun lascars and drivers?
10. Same as No. 9. But there were more men of inferior caste in the lascars, and many more in the drivers, than in the golundauze. The drivers (or "drabees," as they call themselves), were becoming almost a class of themselves.
11. Supposing the native artillery were continued in the Bengal army, are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits for the golundauze might with advantage be enlisted?
11. See our Answer No. 4, in both the Bengal and Punjab Infantry Papers on "Recruiting and Compo-

sition." From the artillery we would exclude high caste men altogether, and recruit from low caste men and native Christians. The complement of a battery is so small in comparison with a regiment of infantry or cavalry, that we think this more decided line, which is recommended by policy, might be taken without inconvenience. One of the objects of the late mutiny was to preserve the aristocracy of the upper castes. It has failed, and we should not give them another chance. The inveterate servility of the system was well illustrated the other day by even a Sikh havildar telling General Chamberlain that the havildar-majorship of a regiment was too good a berth for any but a high caste man.

12. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the golundauze of the Bengal artillery, for the gun lascars, and for the drivers?
12. The same as in other branches of the service, recruiting parties or native officers introduced their own friends and relations.
13. On entertainment of recruits for the golundauze, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Bengal artillery, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?
13. See military regulations applicable to the whole native army. But we do not think gun lascars or drivers were registered.
14. Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice, if golundauze continue to be enlisted?
14. See Bengal Infantry, Answer No. 8 ("Recruiting and Composition").
15. The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.
15. Ditto, ditto.
16. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundauze of the Bengal artillery.
16. See military regulations and articles of war.
17. The same question is repeated with regard to the gun lascars and drivers.
17. We do not think any oath was administered to either.
18. How long has this form of oath been in use in the Bengal artillery?
18. We do not know.
19. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath, administered to the golundauze, gun lascar, or driver, when first enrolled? or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?
19. See Answer 11 in the Punjab Infantry Paper, on "Recruiting and Composition."
20. If native artillerymen continue to be used, should the different battalions be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only, or be recruited over a wide area, irrespective of districts?
20. As far as the native Christian artillerymen will be concerned, it matters not whence they come. But to the native element, the provincial principle laid down in Answers 14 and 15 of the Punjab Infantry Paper should be applied as far as practicable. The number will be so small that the point is of less importance.
21. The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers?
21. Ditto, ditto.
22. Should the battalions, or companies, or troops of golundauze be homogeneous as to race or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed up together?
22. All native Christians, if possible; otherwise, low caste men.

23. If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
23. The natives who are not Christians should be balanced caste against caste.
24. The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and to drivers.
24. Ditto, ditto.
25. What agency should be employed for recruiting golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?
25. The best native Christians, or best men of whatever class was wanted, should be selected for recruiting. But soldiers on leave would act as recruiting parties, and bring friends from home sufficient for the artillery.

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26. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?
26. Strictly enforce the present rules, which are quite sufficient.
27. If native drivers be discontinued, would you replace them by Europeans raised for that duty, or by European gunners trained to the duty as part of their exercise; or by Anglo-Indians, enrolled for this special duty?
27. We should regret the discontinuance of native drivers; but if determined on, then their places had better be supplied by Anglo-Indians as far as procurable, and failing them, by European gunners trained to this duty. Separate classes of Europeans would be inconvenient in India, where casualties are difficult to fill. We think Anglo-Indians might with great advantage be introduced into the artillery to the extent of one-fourth or one-fifth, both as gunners and drivers. The saving in Europeans would be considerable; and the Anglo-Indians, from their knowledge of the language and habits of the people, would often prove useful, especially in time of war.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE ON MILITARY CODE.

1. Are the same articles of war applicable to the European gunners and to the golundauze of the Bengal artillery?
1. No; but the law in both cases is based on the same principles.
2. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the golundauze of the Bengal artillery?
2. See Reply No. 1, Bengal Infantry Paper No. 2, on "Military Code and Rules of Discipline," where it is fully discussed.
3. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war as respects the European artillery?
3. No. We have not the requisite experience; but Europeans in all the branches of the service must of course be under the same articles of war.
4. Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same articles of war as the golundauze; and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes?
4. Yes. They are all tried and punished under the same articles, and the improvements are required for all.
5. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
5. See the Infantry Paper quoted in Answer 2. The treatment of Europeans and natives is necessarily different, and must remain so till their natures become assimilated by common principles of action.

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6. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Bengal army?
6. Certainly not.
7. What means are adopted to acquaint the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers with the military code under which they serve?
7. The articles of war were periodically read to them as to other native soldiers.
8. What proportion of the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?
8. Perhaps 10 per cent. of the golundauze. Hardly any of the drivers.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the Bengal artillery, what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundauzes, and drivers; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?
 1. Formerly seniority alone; latterly seniority tempered by merit. But unless character was decidedly bad, seniority prevailed.
 2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the golundauze generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?
 2. Their intellect was originally average; but they reached posts of responsibility when their efficiency was gone.
 3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundauze from among whom they have risen?
 3. No.
 4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?
 4. None.
 5. Do the golundauze of all grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary gun drill; are they practised at laying guns and mortars, at cutting fuzes, judging distances, adapting charges to mortars, &c.; or do the European officers themselves execute those details?
 5. Yes. They went through the whole laboratory course; and no gunners could have been more perfectly instructed in practical gunnery.
 6. Can the golundauze of the Bengal artillery frequently read English and write it?
 6. Very few. Perhaps one or two in a troop.
 7. Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work?
 7. Certainly not. It has proved a great evil in the present mutiny. They should be confined to gun drill.
 8. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer?
 8. Where the European officer is efficient the native officer strengthens him, and *vice versa*.
 9. Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundauze been found on occasions of mutiny to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European officers in checking or quelling mutiny? Have the native officers passively or overtly sided with the mutineers or with the Government they had sworn to serve, and with the European officers?
 9. We believe they have generally sided with the mutineers. Bukht Khan aspired to be captain-general of India, and asked the king of Delhi for a patent making the office hereditary.

10. If native artillery be continued in the Bengal army, should the grades of native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished?

10, 11. On the point involved in these two questions, we are not agreed. Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain having advocated either native Christians, or low caste natives for the few native artillery required, is very decidedly opposed to giving them any commissioned officers of their own class. He would let none of them rise higher than a havildar-major; and leave all command in the hands of the European officers and European serjeants. In the native infantry 900 men are associated in one body. There are not native Christians enough in the country to fill the ranks; perhaps not enough low caste men even available. But if there were, it would not be sound policy to refuse employment to that large class of high caste natives, who live by either military service or highway robbery; and when such masses of men are brought together, hope as well as fear is necessary to restrain them, and if the native commissioned grade were withdrawn discontent would follow. For this reason General Chamberlain advocated commissioned grades for the native infantry. But the case is different in the artillery. Here very few men are required; but those few possess the control of the most effective weapons of war. Let these natives then be taken from those classes which have no traditions of empire, and let them be kept in the ranks and non-commissioned grades. They will be content with plenty of bread and little power, and will look upon the European serjeants and officers as their natural leaders. They will know that but for us they would have been in menial offices, and that if we lost the country they would sink to those offices again. Old native officers are fond of telling of the golden days when a chumar or a low caste man dare not wear his dhotee like a Brahmin or a Rajpoot, but the equality they deplored has not been thrown away upon the humble classes. Throughout the mutiny our low caste servants have, as a rule, shown singular fidelity. The passive courage of the drivers, syces, and doolee bearers under fire is well established; and General Chamberlain would advocate making gunners of the best of them, and placing European non-commissioned officers over them, as proposed in Question 11, to keep them from aspiring.

Lieut.-Col. Edwardes differs from the above opinion, and thinks that as every class has an inherent right to rise by merit, and our whole system tends to foster that right in contradistinction to the Indian system of caste, the surest way to keep any class contented and efficient is to give a fair scope to its energies. He would, therefore, leave it to be a pure question of merit. If among the native Christian or low caste non-commissioned officers there were men fit for the commissioned grades, they should get them. If not, let Europeans take the places. It is to be hoped that it will be quite exceptional to have any guns manned by natives at all, and in those few cases, Lieut.-Col. Edwardes believes that the native gunners would be less liable to sympathize with mutiny, if admitted to the commissioned grades, than if they were excluded.

Sir John Lawrence concurs with Lieut.-Col. Edwardes, and thinks that if a low caste man will prove faithful in the non-commissioned grades, he will be still more to be depended on in the higher ones. Having obtained the higher reward of a commission, he will have a strong inducement to continue to deserve it. The late Colonel Skinner used to say that the best and bravest native officer he had known in his regiment was a resaldar, by name Peer Khau, who had been a syce (groom), and who would never have been enlisted, but that a trooper was killed at a time when no eligible recruit was available. Ambition, and the desire of improving the social position, is as strong in the low man as in the high caste man. The difference is, that the one too often considers advancement as his right, and the other as the reward

of desert, or at any rate as due to the favor of his European superior.

11. Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned as would give one to each gun of a battery, in lieu of the native commissioned officers of golundauze, be advisable?
11. Answered above.
12. If the abolition of the grades of golundauze commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundauze, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as commissioned grades.
12. Those who advocate the abolition of the native non-commissioned grades think good service pay and pensions on a graduated scale would satisfy the ambition of the classes for whom only it is proposed, viz., the native Christians and lowest caste natives, who have hitherto not been eligible at all to be either non-commissioned officers or gunners. The gun lascars and drivers had little to look forward to, except pay and pensions after long service, and in all European batteries they remained true; while the whole of the native artillery, to whom the prizes of the service were open, turned their guns against us. On the other hand, those who advocate keeping the commissioned grades believe that pay cannot effectually be substituted for honor and authority in any military service.
13. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundauze to the British service and the British rule?
13. No. They seem to have had little or no effect. The high-caste artillerymen played for something higher than pensions. They claimed to possess the country.
14. Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions?
14. Yes. See pay and audit code.
15. Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Bengal artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny?
15. Only when associated with Europeans. In the native batteries and troops, they went with the artillerymen. So did the syces and grass-cutters.
16. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained or modified, or prospectively be abolished?
16. Modified by a competent committee. See Reply No. 12, in (Bengal) Infantry Paper No. 3, on "Organization, Promotion, and Reward."
17. Can you state the charge upon the finances of the Bengal presidency, on account of military pensions to the native artillery of the Bengal army?
17. No.
18. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grade of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?
18. Certainly.
19. Are commissioned officers of golundauze generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?
19. Not more so than those of the native cavalry and infantry. See Reply No. 14, infantry (Bengal) Paper 3, on organization, promotion, and rewards. The native members were old and sleepy, and left the evidence, the judgment, and the sentence pretty much to the superintending officer. When asked their opinion, they said, "Whatever your honor pleases."
20. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?
20. Under the seniority system they were not. Under the merit system they would be.
21. Under the supposition that the artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it as far as practicable with the royal artillery?
21. We have already said that we would retain native drivers as more economical, and we think the same as to gun lascars and native artificers, who would also be far more efficient in India than Europeans. After a fatiguing march an Englishman cannot be expected to set to work in the heat of the day to repair damages; but unless the damages were repaired during the day, the troop often would have to halt. Especial care should in future be taken to keep the complement of artillerymen full, not only in troops and batteries, but reserve companies; and there should never be less than three officers present with a troop, besides the medical officer.
22. What would this assimilation involve of change in the system of the Bengal artillery?
22. If entirely assimilated, there would be a large addition of both men and officers, and consequently of expense.
23. What would it involve of change in the material of the Bengal artillery?
23. Additional horses, waggons, and carts; and, of course, syces and grass-cutters in consequence.
24. What modifications would it be expedient to maintain in the organization of the Bengal artillery, when assimilating it to the royal artillery, in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service?
24. Our present pieces and carriages, native drivers, gun lascars, native artizans, forge, &c. See Answer 21.
25. Need the materiel of the Bengal artillery, if assimilated to that of the royal artillery, be at all modified in consequence of climate and service in India?
25. English guns and carriages are alike too heavy for Indian horses, roads, and no roads. The wood of the English carriages is too unseasoned for this country. Our 9-pounder guns and 24-pounder howitzers are found to be the most serviceable pieces.
26. Do you advocate the maintenance of horse artillery at its present strength?
26. Horse artillery, being intended to act with cavalry, should be proportioned to cavalry force. We think too much horse artillery has been hitherto kept up. There is a tendency to sacrifice the foot artillery and horse batteries to this dashing branch of the service, especially in the number of officers attached to them; and after all, the batteries are more effective in the field.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of the commandants of native battalions of artillery and of officers in command of golundauze batteries of the Bengal artillery been increased or diminished?
 1. We believe they have been diminished, for the artillery was under the same system as the rest of the native army. General orders and regulations applied to all alike. An increasing centralization of power in the persons of the commander-in-chief, and adjutant-general has characterized all recent administration.
2. What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundauze of the Bengal artillery?
 2. It was one of the seeds of the late mutiny.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

3. If golundauze artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline, and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers ?
3. See replies noted below.
Bengal Infantry Paper No. 2. Reply No. 1 ; Bengal Infantry Paper Replies 6 and 7 ; the principles in which are equally applicable to the artillery.
4. Is the efficiency of the Bengal corps of artillery, affected by the number of officers taken away from corps duties for staff employment ?
4. Yes ; unquestionably.
5. How can the demand for European officers of artillery for staff and detached employments be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of the corps of Bengal artillery ?
5. By increasing the number of artillery officers, and limiting the number available for staff and detached employments to a fair but fixed proportion.
6. Would the general standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure which by removing the hope of staff employment, cut off the inducement which young artillery officers now have to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches of knowledge useful to the State ?
6. Certainly ; and Government would lose the services of many valuable men, whose idiosyncracies, or studies, impel them towards other lines ; Everest, Cautley, Dixon, Lawrence, for instance, rendered far higher services to the country than they could have hoped to do in their own departments.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.

HERBERT W. EDWARDES,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

ARTILLERY.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF THE ARTILLERY.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Punjab irregular force are composed ?
1. Sikhs and Punjabee Mahomedans, with a few Hindostanees. No Trans-Indus Mahomedans, either from within or without the border.
2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Punjab irregular force are composed ?
2. There are no gun lascars. The gunners do the work.
3. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Punjab irregular force are composed ?
3. There is no separate class of drivers. The gunners drive as well as clean the guns and harness, and perform all the details of duty. To this end Sir Henry Lawrence proposed and obtained a larger proportion of gunners, and the measure has been found as efficient as economical. It keeps the men always occupied. During the past year their pay was raised from 7 rs. to 8 rs. a month, partly to compensate them for heavy work, wear and tear of clothes, &c., and partly to secure the selection of recruits for the artillery.
4. Should native gunners, or golundauzes, continue to be enlisted, and to form part of the artillery of the Punjab irregular force ?
4. See Paragraphs 26, 27, 28, in our "General Remarks," enclosed in letter of 25th June, on the re-organization of the Bengal army.

5. Should native drivers continue to be employed with European artillery ?
5. Yes. See paragraph 29 of the same "General Remarks."
6. From what districts are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundauze drawn ?
6. The Sikhs come mostly from "the Manjha" (about Umrissir), and a few from Malwa (Cis-Sutlej states) ; the Mahomedans of the Punjab from Jhey-lum, Lahore, Rawul Pindiee, and Jullundhur ; the Hindostanees from Oudh chiefly.
7. From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn ?
7. There are none.
8. From what districts are the drivers taken ?
8. There are none.
9. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded, by regulation or practice of the service, from the golundauze of the Punjab irregular force, and if so, for what reason ?
9. In addition to the remarks in Reply No. 3 of Punjab Infantry Paper, on the "Recruiting and Composition of Corps" (with our letter No. 3, of 1st July 1858), it should be here stated that for the past three years the artillery have been prohibited recruiting from the Trans-Indus Mahomedan tribes. Very few had found admittance into the ranks ; but one traitor can paralyze the power of a battery for a time by spiking the guns. After witnessing on one occasion, at Dersumund in Meranzye, the effect on the Pathan soldiers of a religious appeal, it appeared to Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain imperative to close this branch of the service to such a risk.
10. The same question is repeated both with respect to gun lascars and drivers.
10. There are none.
11. Supposing that native artillery were continued in the Punjab irregular force, are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits for the golundauze might with advantage be enlisted ?
11. See Answer 4 of our paper quoted in above answer, No. 9. We think this is the branch, above all others, in which native Christians might with most advantage be introduced ; and next to them, low caste men and muzzubees. Artillerymen are few in number, almost always at head-quarters, under the eye of their European officers, and not subject to the same amount of pressure from their comrades. We know from experience that the lowest castes possess that sort of courage requisite to stand quietly under fire ; and without doing it abruptly and injudiciously, which would disgust the well-behaved men we have at present, we would advise taking the earliest opportunity of introducing the change.
12. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the golundauze of the Punjab irregular force, for the gun lascars, and for the drivers ?
12. The same as for the infantry. There was a difficulty in procuring Hindostanees, as they do not like the frontier ; and for this class application was made to officers in the Oudh irregular force.
13. On entertainment of recruits for the golundauze, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Punjab irregular force, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts ?
13. The same as in the other branches of the service. See Answer No. 6 in the paper quoted above in Reply No. 9.
14. Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice, if golundauze continue to be enlisted ?
14. None. The present rules only require to be rigidly enforced.

15. The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.
15. There are none.
16. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundauze of the Punjab irregular force?
16. The same as in the infantry. (See Answers 9 and 10 in the paper quoted above in Reply 9.)
17. The same question is repeated with regard to the gun lascars and drivers.
17. There are none.
18. How long has this form of oath been in use in the Punjab irregular force?
18. Two years.
19. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the golundauze, gun lascar, or driver when first enrolled? or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?
19. See Answer No. 11 of paper quoted above in Reply No. 9.
20. If native artillerymen continue to be used, should the different battalions be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only, or be recruited over a wide area irrespective of districts?
20. In any new battery that might be raised we would begin the new system advocated in Answer No. 11. In the rest of the Punjab artillery recruiting might go on irrespective of districts, as the number is very small.
21. The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.
21. There are none.
22. Should the battalions, or companies, or troops of golundauze be homogeneous as to race or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed up together?
22. If not Christian, composite, as at present.
23. If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
23. One-third Punjabee Mahomedans; one-third Sikhs; one-third Hindostanees. No Trans-Indus Mahomedans, on the frontier at all events.
24. The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and to drivers.
24. There are none at present, and their introduction is not desired.
25. What agency should be employed for recruiting golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?
25. The present agency; selected men of the classes required.
26. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?
26. Those prescribed by the military regulations.
27. If native drivers be discontinued, would you replace them by Europeans raised for that duty, or by European gunners trained to the duty as part of their exercise, or by Anglo-Indians enrolled for this special duty?
27. Native or Anglo-Indian drivers should be continued, even if native artillerymen be altogether abolished, which seems to us impracticable on the frontier, where the lightest and handiest troops are essential for entering the hills.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Are the same articles of war applicable to the European gunners and to the golundauze of the Punjab irregular force?
1. There are no European gunners in the Punjab irregular force. Two staff serjeants are attached to each battery, and they are under the same articles of war as the European troops.

2. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the golundauze of the Punjab irregular force?
2. See Answer 1, Infantry Paper No. 2, on "Military Code and Rules of Discipline."
3. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war as respects the European artillery?
3. No special articles are required for the European artillerymen, who will be governed by the same articles as all other European soldiers.
4. Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same articles of war as the golundauze, and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes?
4. There are none.
5. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
5. See Answers 1 and 2, Infantry Paper No. 2, on "Military Code and Rules of Discipline."
6. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Punjab irregular force?
6. See Answer 3 of Punjab Infantry Paper No. 2, on "Military Code and Rules of Discipline."
7. What means are adopted to acquaint the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers with the military code under which they serve?
7. Periodical rehearsal of articles of war.
8. What proportion of the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?
8. Perhaps 10 per cent.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the Punjab irregular force artillery, what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundauzes, and drivers? Is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?
1. Merit, with consideration shown to seniority.
2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the golundauze generally intelligent, useful and efficient?
2. Generally very much so.
3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundauze from among whom they have risen?
3. Yes; because that got them their promotion.
4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?
4. No; general superiority and fitness for command, shown in daily duties, is the qualification for promotion.
5. Do the golundauze of all grades undergo systematic instruction, in anything else than ordinary gun drill? Are they practised at laying guns and mortars, at cutting fuzes, judging distances, adapting charges to mortars, &c., or do the European officers themselves execute those details?
5. The golundauze as a class are only instructed in the gun drill, and manual labour of serving and working the guns. The native officers and non-commissioned officers are taught by the officers to cut fuzes, judge distances, charge shell and Shrapnel, &c., and are punished if they do not learn. Sometimes the golundauze give a helping hand, and if zealous and intelligent they become instructed; but they are not regularly taught or examined in such matters.
6. Can the golundauze of the Punjab irregular force frequently read English, and write it?
6. General Chamberlain can only call to mind one

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

native officer who does so, and one non-commissioned officer who is trying to learn. No golundauze.

7. Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work?
7. No; we think they should be kept to gun drill.
8. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer?
8. Strengthens a good officer and cannot weaken a bad one.
9. Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundauze been found on occasions of mutiny to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European officers in checking or quelling mutiny? Have the native officers passively or overtly sided with the mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve, and with the European officers?
9. There has been no mutiny to test the point.
10. If native artillery be continued in the Punjab irregular force, should the grades of native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished?
11. Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned officers as would give one to each gun of a battery in lieu of the native commissioned officers of golundauze be advisable?
- 10, 11. Yes; decidedly we would advocate the retention of native officers in this frontier force. At present there are two European non-commissioned officers with each battery, and it is the wish of the commandants to get rid of these two, because they give more trouble than all the rest of the battery. From the want of society, even a steady non-commissioned officer takes to drinking. When found incorrigible, and broken in health by a course of delirium tremens, they are removed, and replaced by fresh ones, who run the same career. A little while ago one who joined left immediately, saying that if he stayed he must become a confirmed drunkard. Poor fellows! their case is much to be pitied, for education has provided them with no resources. General Chamberlain got them entirely removed from the infantry, for the above reasons, but the artillery commandants were at that time averse from parting with theirs. Now, after a longer trial, they wish to be rid of them; and General Chamberlain recommends that natives be substituted with an additional European officer, or if that be not approved, that there be six serjeants in each battery (as contemplated in the question) so that they may have a mess and society of their own. It is almost impossible however to get native officers and European non-commissioned officers to work together. The European should not be commanded by the native as a matter of policy, nor a respectable native officer by a drunken serjeant, as a matter of both policy and justice.
12. If the abolition of the grades of golundauze commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundauze, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as commissioned grades?
12. We think not.
13. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundauze to the British service and the British rule?
13. There has happily been no opportunity of testing it, but in a mutiny the same result might be expected as in Hindostan. A few would remain.

The majority would take arms against us. Pensions act as an anchor no doubt, but only in ordinary weather. They would not hold in a storm such as 1857.

14. Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions?
14. There are none.
15. Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Punjab irregular force artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny?
15. There has been no mutiny.
16. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified or prospectively abolished?
16. Modified as recommended in Answer 12, Bengal Infantry Paper No. 3, on "Organization, Promotion, and Rewards."
17. Can you state the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the native artillery of the Punjab irregular force?
17. No; but it must be very small, as the force has not been long in existence.
18. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grade of native commissioned officers (if these are retained), be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?
18. It is so already, and ought so to remain.
19. Are commissioned officers of golundauze generally fit to take part in the conduct of court-martial?
19. Intellectually they were; but the system was a farce. See an Answer No. 14, Infantry Paper 3, "Organization, Promotion, and Rewards."
20. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?
20. (See our Answer No. 15, in the paper above quoted.) A well-selected native officer is a more intelligent man than the common run of serjeants, who generally have little or no influence with native soldiers, while native officers have a great deal.
21. Under the supposition that the Bengal artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it as far as practicable with the royal artillery?
21. (See Bengal Artillery Paper.)
22. What would this assimilation involve of change in the system of the Bengal artillery?
22. Ditto, ditto.
23. What would it involve of change in the matériel of the Bengal artillery?
23. Ditto, ditto.
24. What modifications would it be expedient to maintain in the organization of the Bengal artillery, when assimilating it to the royal artillery, in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service.
24. Ditto, ditto.
25. Need the matériel of the Bengal artillery, if assimilated to that of the royal artillery, be at all modified in consequence of climate and service in India?
25. Ditto, ditto.
26. Do you advocate the maintenance of horse artillery at its present strength?
26. Ditto, ditto.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience have the powers of the commandants of native battalions of artillery and of officers in command of golundauze batteries of the Bengal artillery been increased or diminished?
1. Answered in the Bengal Paper.

2. What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundauze of the Bengal artillery ?
2. Ditto, ditto.
3. If golundauze artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline, and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers ?
3. Ditto, ditto.
4. Is the efficiency of the Bengal corps of artillery affected by the number of officers taken away from corps duty for staff employment ?
4. Ditto, ditto.
5. How can the demand for European officers of artillery for staff and detached employments be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of the corps of the Bengal artillery ?
5. Ditto, ditto.
6. Would the general standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure which by removing the hope of staff employment, cut off the inducement, which young artillery officers now have, to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches of knowledge useful to the State ?
6. Ditto ditto.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.
HERBERT B. EDWARDES,
Lieut.-Colonel.

I have signed for Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, who is absent on special duty.

J. L.

From Sir JOHN LAWRENCE, G.C.B., to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

SIR, Murree, July 1, 1858.
IN continuation of my letter of 26th June, I have now the honor to forward the united replies of Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, C.B., and Lieut.-Col. Edwards, C.B., and myself, to the double series of 42 questions (for the Punjab and for all Bengal) on the re-organization of the native armies, which were received with your letter No. 48, of 15th June.

2. Replies under the heads of "Military Code and Rules of Discipline," and "Organization, Promotions, and Rewards," will follow without delay.

I have, &c.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

ANSWERS to the QUESTIONS on the RECRUITING and COMPOSITION of CORPS, with reference to the whole BENGAL NATIVE ARMY.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bengal army is composed ?
2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from ?
- 1 and 2. Three-fourths, perhaps, are Brahmuns and Rajpoots of Oudh and Behar ; and the rest Gwalas and Aheers of different districts, Mahomedans of Oudh and Behar, a few Hindoos from Rohilcund, a few Sikhs, and fewer Gookhas.
3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army ?
3. Part 2, section 31, of the military regulations details those superior castes of natives which are eligible for the ranks. They exclude all inferior

castes ; and make no mention of Eurasians or Christians, neither of whom were in practice admitted to the ranks, though Eurasians were employed in the lands, and as drummers and fifers.

4. Are there any races, tribes or castes, hitherto neglected, or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army ?

4. We would refer generally to our Answer No. 4, regarding the Punjab forces ; to which we would add, our strong conviction of the duty and wisdom of bringing as many Christian natives into the service as possible. The Karens of Pegu are a Christian race, and should be freely enlisted ; and next to them we would desire to see aboriginal races, like the Sonthals, Bheels, &c., and segregated tribes, such as the Bundeelas and Gonds, made available as counterpoises. Probably few of these secluded people would like to go far from their homes at first, but the provincial system which we have proposed entirely meets their present case, and in time, as the service became appreciated, they would probably go to any part of India. Again, the Eurasians, who have so long been a reproach to us, should now be elevated by enlistment and proper care.

We would advocate the collection of all Christian natives and Eurasians together, in separate corps, and not dispersing them in the Hindoo and Mahomedan ranks, where in peace they would have no influence, and be exposed to petty annoyances, and in any rebellion would fall victims, and be lost to the State.

To each Christian native corps there should be an ordained Christian teacher and pastor, either European or native.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies ?

5. Small recruiting parties, who bring in their own relations and friends, and thus make the native army one great fraternity.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts ?

6. See the military regulations, containing the form originally introduced in the Punjab, but afterwards prescribed for the whole army ; but we believe that in most regiments the form is almost a dead letter. In future it should be rigidly enforced, for it is a more valuable check than ever.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoy, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken ?

7. Chiefly the recommendation of men in the service, who were considered guarantees.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army ?

8. A relative proportion of the respective castes should be fixed, and adhered to ; and the prescribed attestation of magistrates should be invariably obtained. But these precautions will be of little use unless a proportionate share of promotions be given systematically to each race in the corps. Some races are more astute and obsequious than others, and if allowed become masters of the regiment.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army ?

9. See military regulations.

10. How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army ?

10. We do not remember, and have not the general orders at hand to refer to.

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11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits of the native infantry of the Bengal army?
11. See answer under this head for the Punjab troops.
12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?
12. We do not know personally, but should think so, and would advocate it.
13. Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps; and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?
13. None that we know of.
14. Should each infantry corps be raised in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?
15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?
- 14 and 15. For a full reply to these two questions, see our accompanying Punjab paper.
16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribes, or caste?
16. Some should be so; but most corps should be mixed, of the races prevailing in the respective provinces. (See the Punjab answer.)
17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?
17. Both; for each system has advantages, and there is safety in variety of systems. The army should be no more homogeneous in system than in race.
18. If corps are not homogenous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
18. Having under questions 14 and 15 fully given our reasons for advocating a provincial system for the native army, we will only add here,—
Firstly, that regiments of native infantry should be provincial, every regiment being composed of the races of the respective province, but not all containing the same proportions of races; on the contrary, all varying as much as possible, each with a different element predominating, and the predominating element in no case exceeding one-half of the corps. (See the changes rung on the Punjab races, in Answer 16, for the Punjab.)
Secondly, that regiments of military police should not be provincial, but local, composed of the races of a particular district, and the districts conterminous.
19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?
19. See Answer 19 for the Punjab.
20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?
20. Ditto.
21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency, or its dependencies?
21. None other seems required than recruiting parties of the races required, and men on leave. The variety of races to be introduced in future will render recruiting easy.
22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?
22. The same.
23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency?
23. The existing rules quoted in Answer 6 only require to be enforced.
24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?
24. The same.
25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country; and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments or in companies, or otherwise?
26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?
27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?
- 25, 26, 27. To this introduction of foreigners we are entirely opposed. See our reasons stated in full in Answer 14 with our letter of 26th of June 1858.
28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?
28. As stated in our Punjab answer, we think it would be a misapplication of European power.
- 29 to 32 inclusive, concerning the organization of such companies?
- 29 to 32 inclusive, consequently, require no answer.
33. How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?
33. With a light musket and bayonet. On the frontiers where hill tribes are to be kept in order they might have two-grooved rifles, but never the Enfield, or any weapon equal to that in the hands of the European troops.
34. How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?
34. With a percussion carbine and sword.
35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?
35. There can be no advantage in a leather stock, tight coat, and trowsers which fetter the free use of the legs. In the late native army, in a really well-dressed regiment, a sepoy could neither stoop to the ground nor take rest in his accoutrements. Some improvements have recently been effected in the European soldiers' dress, but much remains to be done before they get the full use of their limbs, and the greatest possible ease in a hot climate.
36. How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?
36. In a loose tunic, with open throat, no stock; a good thick turband that will ward off sun, or cold, or blows, and loose pantaloons without a single button, fastening round the waist by a string.
37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?
37. We are decidedly opposed to this. See our reasons in Answer 37 of the Punjab paper.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native divers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?
38. See our Answers 38 in the Punjab paper.
39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?
39. Ditto.
40. Would such a system be favourable, or the reverse, to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops, which is an element of strength?
40. Ditto.
41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?
41. Ditto.
42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?
42. Ditto.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner, Punjab.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.
HERBERT B. EDWARDS,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS ON THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS, with reference to the PUNJAB TROOPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force is composed?
1. Firstly, Mahomedans of independent countries beyond our frontier, such as Cabul, Candahar, the Affcedee hills, Swat Boneyr, &c. Secondly, Trans-Indus Mahomedan British subjects, from the Peshawur valley, Kohat, &c. Thirdly, Cis-Indus Mahomedans. (These are three broad distinctions which should be carefully observed.) Fourthly, Sikhs. Fifthly, Hindoo hill races, which come under two classes, viz., those of the Jummoo independent hills, known as the Dogra Rajpoots, and the Rajpoots who are British subjects, residing in the hills between the Ravee and Sutlej. Sixthly, a sprinkling of Hindostanees, 1,295 in the eleven regiments, of whom 288 were Mahomedans, and 1,007 Hindoos. Seventhly, 470 Goorkhas.
2. What districts are these several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?
2. Answered in No. 1.
3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment either by the regulations or the practice of the Punjab irregular force?
3. By the practice of the force, sweepers, muzzubees (or sweeper Sikhs), mosullees (or Mahomedan sweepers), and the lowest Mahomedan and Hindoo classes generally, such as those laid down in the standing military regulations, section xxxi., part 2, para. 6, were excluded. There were also no Christians in the force. Originally there were some few Eurasian Christians (fifers and buglers) transferred from the native infantry regiments of the line; but being very few in number, and having no respectable associates, they fell into bad habits and disrepute, and were for this reason remanded to their original corps, since which there have been none.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from which recruits might with advantage be drawn from the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force?

Sir John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwards.

4. No class should be excluded from the native army; but though we ourselves may and ought to rise above caste, we cannot practically ignore it, so long as the natives themselves socially maintain it. If low caste men, sweepers, &c. be promiscuously enlisted in the ranks, one great political object which we have in view (viz., the counterpoise of races,) will not be attained, for assuredly the low caste men, true to their traditions, will submit in everything to the higher castes in the regiment; and if their good conduct and military smartness raise them to rank, it will only bring them superior pay, and not give them that influence over their military subordinates which discipline requires; at least, we think that a great change must previously come over the native army on the question, before the lowest castes can be usefully associated with the highest castes in one corps. Moreover, we believe that the native soldiers already in the ranks would be disgusted if recruits whom they considered unfit associates were suddenly to be forced upon them in large numbers. We are aware that the armies of Bombay and Madras show all classes mixed together; we do not know how this works practically. It would be possible for the European officers, following the bent of their own wishes and feelings, to imagine that sweeper subahdars (for instance) were really the commanders of their men, and yet for that command to extend no farther than the parade ground or the orderly room, and to ease altogether in the lines and interior economy of the regiment. But assuming that all caste prejudice has really been broken down in those armies, we would observe, firstly, that in them the majority of the community, or, in other words, public opinion, is indifferent to caste, while here the community is bigoted in its favor; and, secondly, that the mixed system has in them happily grown up from the beginning, so that high caste men who now enlist in those armies, do it with their eyes open and of their own accord, led either by the difficulty of getting service elsewhere or by some peculiar circumstances, whereas the caste system has unhappily grown up and been indigenous in the Bengal armies from the beginning, and has in them the same strength as the mixed system in the sister presidencies. However strongly then we may feel the tyranny of caste, and however resolved we may be to do all in our power to overthrow it, yet sound wisdom requires that we should not conceal the practical difficulties, but set them candidly forth and then endeavour to meet them; and this especially because the low castes themselves are not prepared to help us, and seize the freedom we wish to give them. We have heard of a small guard of the Bombay army on detached duty making their own jemadar, a man of low caste, carry on his head the bundle of their clothes, &c., to which the jemadar, away from his European friends, submitted as a matter of course. And whether that anecdote be true or not, we have seen, during the last year, that when a regiment of native soldiers in the Bengal army mutinied, the whole of the low caste camp followers, tent-pitchers, grooms, grass-cutters, sweepers, &c., went off with them like a flock of sheep, and thereby lost their service, unable to resist the habitual slavery of race. For these reasons, our advice would be that we introduce the new system gradually, by having separate regiments for the lowest castes,* into which any native physically fit should be admitted; that a certain number of higher caste men be admitted into these low-caste regiments if, for want of service, they

* In the newly raised Punjab regiments there are two entirely composed of muzzubees i.e. sweepers of the Sikh religion. They are pioneers, and are doing well.

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apply for it, as the best means of bringing about voluntary close association; and that similarly a certain number of the *lowest* caste men be admissible into high caste regiments where the commanding officer sees that it can be done without offence. But we would (at this stage) deprecate the forcing of any fixed proportion or number of lowest caste men into the existing regiments of the force, lest in doing justice to one class we be felt (wrongly or rightly) to be doing injustice to another. Before leaving this question, it seems necessary to explain, firstly, that though for the sake of contradistinction we have spoken of the Punjab regiments as "high caste regiments," yet in point of fact they would not be so considered by natives, as the Hindoo soldiers in them are generally Soodras; and, secondly, that in native estimation there is the widest difference between low caste and lowest caste men, which ought not to be overlooked. The Soodra is a low caste man in the eyes of the Brahmin and Rajpoot, but the two latter have no objection to serve with the former, whereas a sweeper is by all three considered to be an outcast.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the district?
5. Recruiting parties, the friends and relatives of the soldiers, and men on leave at their homes.
6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?
6. British subjects are attested by the local civil authorities according to the form originated in the Punjab, and since adopted by the commander-in-chief for the whole native army. Subjects of independent states cannot be attested, but are usually introduced by trustworthy servants of Government.
7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoy, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?
7. Security is taken from some responsible party; and his registry is attested by the same form as others.
8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations, and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes? (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops of the Punjab irregular force).
8. We can suggest no improvement.
9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force?
10. How long has this form been in use in the Punjab irregular forces?
- 9 and 10. Originally no oath was administered; but about two years ago, on this being brought to the notice of Government, though it was not deemed advisable to subject the old soldiers to an oath after so long a period, orders were issued that all new recruits should be sworn according to the oaths laid down in para. 33 of sec. xxxi. of the military regulations.
11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording, or matter of the oath administered to the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force?
11. We fear that in practice no oath will bind. The unconscientious will boldly disregard it. The conscientious will find such loop-holes as the following: "We swore fidelity to our colors, and we kept the oath; for when we mutinied, we took the colors with us." "The water we were sworn on came out of a well in the lines, and not from the Ganges; so it was no oath at all." Or "No oath taken to an infidel is binding."

Yet it is necessary to have some solemn engagement to appeal to; and therefore we would still have

recruits sworn in. But in the spirit of Act V. of 1840, we would substitute for all heathen or Mahomedan oaths, an oath before Almighty God. We would also simplify the oath to the fewest possible words with the utmost possible scope; thus, "I inhabitant of village, pergunnah, district, province; do swear before Almighty God, that I will be a faithful soldier and servant of the British Government; that I will march wherever I am directed, and will obey all the orders of any European officers."

12 and 13. Concerning seafaring tribes?

12 and 13. No answers required.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only?

15. Or, should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

14 and 15. This is a very important question, but after mature consideration, and with reference to the events of the past year, we come decidedly to the conclusion that regiments of native infantry should be provincial in their composition and ordinary sphere of service; as we cannot do without a large native army in India, our main object is to make that army safe; and next to the grand counterpoise of a sufficient European force, comes the counterpoise of natives against natives. At first sight it might be thought that the best way to secure this, would be to mix up all the available military races of India in each and every regiment; and to make them all "general service corps." But excellent as this theory seems, it does not bear the test of practice. It is found that different races mixed together do not long preserve their distinctiveness; their corners, and angles, and feeling, and prejudice, get rubbed off, till at last they assimilate; and the object of their association to a considerable extent is lost. To preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and which while it lasts makes the Mahomedan of one country despise, fear, or dislike the Mahomedan of another, corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits within which differences and rivalries are strongly marked. Let all the races, Hindoo or Mahomedan of one province be enlisted in one regiment, and no others; and having thus created distinctive regiments, let us keep them so, against the hour of need, by confining the circle of their ordinary service to the limits of their own province, and only marching them on emergency into other parts of the empire, with which they will then be found to have little sympathy. By the system thus indicated two great evils are avoided; firstly, that community of feeling throughout the native army, and that mischievous political activity and intrigue, which results from association with other races and travel in other Indian provinces; and secondly, that thorough discontent and alienation from the service which has undoubtedly sprung up since extended conquest has carried our Hindostanee soldiers so far from their homes in India proper. There can be no question that a contented servant is better than a discontented one. Unfortunately we have tried too much hitherto to purchase the contentment of our native armies by increased pay, batta, &c. This has not answered its purpose, and has produced many evils. It has enriched the sepoy, but not satisfied them. Nothing can reconcile natives to long absence from their homes, where they leave their wives and lands. The sepoy felt they were being coaxed into foreign service, and got both angry and insolent, with a sense of power; we believe that what is called "general service," has been prominent among the causes which undermined our once faithful native army. If then in future we keep our regiments moving ordinarily in a circle round about their homes, we shall add greatly to their real

* i.e. anywhere very distant from their homes.

happiness, and consequently their loyalty,* and be able to get rid of all mischievous increases of pay. Fewer men will also suffice, for the furloughs will be shorter; and in fact we believe that the service will thus be rendered more safe, more economical, and more popular.

It may be asked whether a difficulty would not arise in getting provincial regiments to move on foreign service in an emergency? but we are convinced that under efficient and popular commanders (whom no mercenary troops can dispense with), the men would cheerfully march when necessary to repulse a foreign enemy, or put down a distant rebellion, satisfied in their own minds that at the close of the war they would again return, with honor to their own province.

Having above laid down the general principle of provincial regiments, we would explain, that not to deprive the State of the advantage and precaution of having a few foreign regiments in every province, we would always have a proportion of the provincial regiments stationed in the next adjoining province. As a rule, one-fourth of the regiments of each province might be thus absent for two or three years at a time, and then return, and be relieved by another one-fourth; but in the Punjab we would allow one-third, for the following reasons:—The Punjab frontier, Trans-Indus, requires regiments peculiarly equipped and organized, and it is desirable that they should not be moved. Again, it is desirable that the Goorkha regiment at Jutog, the Goorkha regiment in Hazara, and the guides in Yusufzye should be locals. This leaves only the 16 regiments in the interior of the province from which to detach corps for service in the North-West provinces or Oudh; and, as 15 out of the 31 Punjab regiments will never leave that province, a third of the 16 interior corps may well take a tour of more distant duty for three years at a time, which would give each of them six years uninterruptedly in their own province.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

16. There are already in the Punjab the following homogeneous corps:—

Regiment of Goorkhas	-	-	1
Muzzabee pioneers	-	-	2
			—
Total	-	-	3

A second Goorkha regiment (the Nusseree battalion, usually stationed at Jutog) does not belong to the Punjab irregular force; and is at present serving in Hindostan, therefore we do not count it here. If more regiments of Goorkhas could be obtained we should be glad, but it appears impracticable, and more Muzzabee corps are not required. Hence, we do not recommend any more homogeneous regiments for the Punjab, but that all the other provincial corps should be mixed, some being in the proportion observed in the new Punjab corps, viz. :—

Mahomedan companies	-	-	4
Sikh ditto	-	-	4
Hill Rajpoot ditto	-	-	2
			—
			10

* It is an old saying, that to learn the heart of a people, you must go to their ballads, proverbs, and games. In the capitals of Delhi and Lahore, it is a common thing to see a delighted crowd of natives collected round a showman with a monkey. This monkey has a red jacket, and is evidently of the military caste; he is called Muror Khan. The showman is supposed to be a recruiting officer, and he begins by offering to Muror Khan a stick, which stands for a musket, and seven rupees a month if he will enlist and march to Cabul. Muror Khan rejects the offer with all the pantomime of disgust, and throws away the stick, which the showman again and again offers him, raising the terms from seven to twenty rupees, but always with the same result. At last the showman is convinced that the recruit will not take foreign service and leave his wife (another monkey named Zuhorun) at any price, so he changes his tone, and again presenting the stick, says, "Well then, will you take twelve annas a month and serve at Delhi?" (or Lahore, as the case may be). Muror Khan immediately rushes at the stick, accepts the service, dances about with the most ridiculous antics and gestures of delight, and finally sits down with folded arms upon a little stool, in an attitude of supreme content. The sympathy of the by-standers is evinced in roars of laughter and approbation, and it is clear that every man of them is of the same mind as Muror Khan.

Others, having a predominant element, thus:—

Sikhs	-	-	-	5
Mahomedans	-	-	-	3
Hill Rajpoots	-	-	-	1
Hindostanees	-	-	-	1
				—
Total	-	-	-	10

Sir John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col Edourdes.

Or—

Mahomedans	-	-	-	5
Sikhs	-	-	-	3
Hill men	-	-	-	1
Hindostanees	-	-	-	1
				—
Total	-	-	-	10

Again, in one corps the whole of the Mahomedans might be Pathans of the Trans-Indus, though this should be quite exceptional. In another regiment they might be all Punjabee Mahomedans from the Cis-Indus, and so on.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, if possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

17. Both systems have advantages. The men are happier in homogeneous companies, but it is a question whether mixed companies are not the better check. We would, therefore, have both. There is advantage in a variety of systems.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

18. Answered in No. 16.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts; or should police corps be recruited from a wide area, without reference to districts?

19. Keeping in view the conditions and proportions of races already laid down, recruiting for the army and police may go on in the same districts, as no danger can ensue. In raising police, the principle should be that three-fourths should be men of the district or conterminous districts, and one-fourth foreigners.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force?

20. No, certainly not; keep them as distinct as possible.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the district for the Punjab irregular force?

21. No other than that already described in Answer 5.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?

22. The same.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force?

23. The existing rules quoted in Answer 6 should be rigidly enforced.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Punjab?

24. The same.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

- 25, 26, 27. Concerning enlistment of natives of other tropical countries?
- 25, 26, 27. Answers not required.
28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?
28. Certainly not. It would be a misapplication of European power.
- 29 to 32 inclusive. Concerning the organization of such companies?
- 29 to 32 inclusive. Answered by No. 28.
33. How should the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force be armed?
33. The frontier and hill regiments should all have light two-grooved rifles, so as to be superior to the mountain tribes, but inferior to our own European troops, who should, of course, always have the most effective weapon known. The regiments in the interior of the Punjab should have a light musket and bayonet.
34. How should police corps in the Punjab be armed?
34. With a percussion carbine and a sword. At present they have heavy muskets, a bayonet, and a sword. The more lightly police are equipped the better.
35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?
35. No reply required.
36. How should the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?
36. As at present, viz., with a loose tunic, no stock, a turband, and loose pantaloons fastened round the waist by a string, not by buttons.
37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached; what is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?
37. To this we are all opposed, though not on the same grounds. Sir John Lawrence and Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain think that the wider the European and native regiments can be kept apart the better, and that any improvement in smartness and drill which the native regiments might acquire from association would be more than counterbalanced by familiarity with the vices and defects of too many of the European soldiery, which still leave so much to regret even after the ameliorations and improvements of late years. Colonel Edwardes would not apprehend the above evil consequences, but he joins the other members in thinking the proposed combination impracticable on the following grounds:—In the first place, the management of a European regiment is totally different from that of a native regiment, and we can foresee nothing but inconvenience from the colonel of a European regiment (who must necessarily be the senior officer) controlling the system of the commandant of the native corps. Secondly, it would be embarrassing to have two regiments thus inseparably tied together, and would greatly complicate the reliefs. Thirdly, it would nullify all the proposals for provincial battalions. A certain number of native troops are, however, necessary with European troops to relieve them from exposure to the sun, and leave as many Europeans available as possible. Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain and Colonel Edwardes think, therefore, that, instead of as heretofore, drawing the sepoys hap-hazard from the line, it would be better permanently to attach one or two companies of sepoys*

to each regiment of European infantry, care being taken that high caste natives should not be enlisted for this duty, but those races who would most readily fraternise with the European. Sir John Lawrence, however, does not think that anything would be gained by such an arrangement, and would rather adhere to the ordinary practice.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?
38. As may be gathered from the last answer, we think there is both a certain analogy and encouragement, and also certain difference in the two cases. The gun lascars and native drivers economize European power, and, in practice, have been found not only most convenient and useful in ordinary wars, but singularly faithful in the late exceptional crisis when their loyalty was put to the severest imaginable test; but the gun lascars and native drivers are not highly disciplined, drilled, and armed with offensive weapons as the native auxiliary regiments or companies with a European regiment would be; and, so far, the latter would be a new experiment.
39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?
39. The one or two companies could be placed in a barrack of their own wherever most convenient. With so small a body the matter is not important.
40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?
40. Answered partly in No. 39; but we all think that if an auxiliary native corps were attached to a European one, it would end in the delegation of most important duties to the sepoys, such as magazine guards, &c., which ought always in future to be confined to Europeans.
41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?
41. We consider that auxiliary corps would be at all times embarrassing and inconvenient.
42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support; and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?
42. Under the former system, in which the native army so greatly overbalanced the European one, it was not desirable to develop the native military talent and self-reliance. It was politic, under such circumstances, for instance, to promote sepoys by seniority and not by merit, and to keep the command of companies in the hands of European officers. But if the readjustments and reforms in the Indian army which we have advocated be carried out, we need not any longer be under the lamentable necessity of debilitating our native troops. We can then strive to make them vigorous and effective, contenting ourselves with the reservation of the artillery and latest improvements in the rifle for the European troops, and the certainty that whenever a native regiment, however efficient, mutinously separates itself from its European officers it will find that it has lost its most vital principle.
- JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner of the Punjab.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.
HERBERT B. EDWARDES,
Lieut.-Colonel.

* To be commanded by subalterns of the European regiment.

(No. 4.)
From Sir JOHN LAWRENCE, G.C.B., to Lieut.-Col.
DURAND, C.B.

SIR, Murree, July 12, 1858.

IN continuation of my No. 3 of the 1st instant, I have now the honor to forward the united replies of Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, C.B., and Lieut.-Col. Edwardes, C.B., and myself, to the papers of questions noted in the margin, both for the Bengal army at large and for the Punjab irregular force.

2. The replies on Paper No. 4, concerning European officers, will shortly follow.

I have, &c.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

INFANTRY No. 2.

I.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the Bengal native army?

1. This is a very large question, and to answer it in detail would be to draw up new articles of war, for which time does not now suffice. We limit ourselves, therefore, to a few general remarks. It is generally felt throughout the army that the articles of war for the native troops are so technical, and are so stringently construed, that justice is often sacrificed to form, and that it is difficult for a court-martial to observe their niceties and refinements; that prisoners admitted by all the authorities of the regiment, division, and judge-advocate's department to be guilty, frequently escape punishment and return triumphantly to their regiment, to the great injury of discipline.

Even judge-advocates disagree about the requirements of the articles; whereas, to influence the native soldiery (which is their most valuable function), they should be so simple that any sepoy could understand them, though so comprehensive that no real offender could escape.

The forms of procedure also in the courts-martial cannot be made too simple. Errors in procedure or in sentences should never be allowed to quash the proceedings. The revising authority should return them for correction, pointing out the errors, so that justice may not be defeated.

For instance, the proceedings of a court-martial should not be declared null and void because the court sat till past 4 p.m., instead of adjourning at 4 p.m., and sitting again next day for half an hour, which recently occurred.

Again, when a court sentences a prisoner to a punishment in excess of that prescribed by the articles, the confirming authority should not be obliged to release the prisoner, but allowed to reduce the punishment. At present, when a sepoy is tried for insubordination, and found guilty, he is often released because the court, instead of sentencing him to imprisonment without labour, sentenced him to imprisonment *with* labour. This seems like tying up our own hands in our own laws. It surely would be better for the discipline of the army that the revising officer should have the power to remit the "labour" and confirm the rest of the sentence.

Again, a court-martial is not allowed to award less than the prescribed punishments, though widely various shades of culpability are observable in every case. We would advocate a greater latitude in this respect.

Again, a prisoner erroneously tried and convicted by an inferior court for a superior crime is, under the present system, released, instead of being remanded for trial by a superior court, which seems the reasonable course, for here there is no violation of the principle that a man once acquitted cannot be tried again.

In our opinion, however, native regimental courts-martial should be abolished. They are a solemn farce, and might with great advantage to discipline be merged in the commanding officer.

It is not to be doubted that the gradual weakening of commanding officers has hastened the gradual dissolution of the discipline of the native army. We are a free people, rejoicing in constitutional liberty, and we have loved to treat our native subjects in the same way, forgetting that they are not yet fitted for it, and are certain to abuse it. What they respect is power in their immediate superior, not power a thousand miles off, in some jealous constitutional check. We must revert somewhat to first principles, and while guarding strictly against individual abuse of power, make every native soldier look up to his commandant.

Without going into minute detail, the following will indicate the nature of the powers which we would wish to see vested in the commanding officers of native infantry regiments:—

Powers of a Commanding Officer.

1. To dismiss any soldier whose term of service had not exceeded five years.

2. To recommend the dismissal of a soldier of more than five years' service, to the brigadier, whose decision to be final, and not liable to appeal.

3. To reduce any non-commissioned officer one step, placing him at the head of the roll of lower rank.

4. To imprison any soldier or non-commissioned officer for a term of two months, half of which may be solitary confinement, and to recommend imprisonment up to six months, requiring the confirmation of the brigadier.

5. All imprisonment to involve loss of pay (except subsistence allowance), as it involves loss of the prisoner's services to Government.

6. Any man sentenced to more than four months' imprisonment to be struck off the rolls of the regiment.

7. The commanding officer (and he alone) to sentence any sepoy to be flogged for insubordination or theft, to the extent of 30 lashes. No sepoy to be flogged twice in one month. Any sepoy flogged three times to be dismissed the service.

9. The commanding officer may fine any sepoy, non-commissioned officer, or native officer, within the limit of one month's pay in one year.

9. Every sentence of punishment to be entered in regimental orders.

Under the above rules petty civil crimes, in which both parties are soldiers or camp followers, would be tried by the commanding officer, while serious civil crimes would be referred to the civil courts.

Military crimes (as distinguished from military misdemeanors), requiring more than six months' imprisonment, would be tried by a district court-martial (which should be the only court-martial for native officers and soldiers), under the orders of the general commanding the division, whose confirmation of any sentence up to 14 years' imprisonment, with transportation, should be final, beyond which sentences should require the confirmation of the commander-in-chief.

A district court-martial should not require more than five members, of whom two should be native commissioned officers, and three European officers (only one European officer and no native commissioned officer being of the prisoner's regiment). Commissioned native officers should, as a rule, be tried by the above district courts-martial; but when exceptional cases required it, might be dismissed without trial by the chief military authority of the province.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained; or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

2. Neither. See Answer No. 1.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal army?

3. Certainly not.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bengal army with the military code under which they live and are governed?
4. Periodical parades, at which the articles are read. The sepoys gained little knowledge in this way. Their ideas were gathered from the precedents furnished by the management of their own and other corps, and the punishments awarded by courts-martial.
5. What proportion of native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?
5. Perhaps 10 per cent.
6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bengal presidency?
6. We only know of one such corps in Bengal, viz., Captain Rattray's, and are not aware by what code it is managed.
7. How is discipline maintained and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bengal presidency?
7. See Answer 6.
8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?
8. See Answer 6.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.
HERBERT B. EDWARDES,
Lieut.-Colonel.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the Punjab irregular force?
1. The Punjab irregular force was nominally governed by the same articles of war as the regular native infantry. See, therefore, our answer to this question in the Bengal paper.
2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
2. Our views on the subject of punishment are fully given in answer to Question 1 in the Bengal paper.
3. Does the system of native courts martial work satisfactorily in the Punjab irregular force?
3. It would not have done so if left to its own operation; but it was in practice modified and its defects counteracted, by the supervision of the superior authorities. For instance, if the letter of an article of war required a guilty man to be released for some informality, the man was summarily dismissed, instead of being allowed to return to his corps in triumph. Again, when the nature of the proof against an offender would be insufficient to meet the requirements of an article of war, but the offender's guilt was evident or notorious, he was summarily dismissed without further trial.
4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Punjab irregular force with the military code under which they live and are governed?
4. Originally the soldiers of the Punjab force took no oaths of allegiance on enlistment, and consequently the articles of war were not read to them; but on this being brought to the notice of the Government, it was ordered that all new recruits should take the oaths, and from that time the articles of war were periodically read to the men. Those soldiers who had been previously enlisted were not called upon to swear allegiance. See Answers Nos. 9, 10 on "the Recruiting and Composition of Corps" in the Punjab force.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?
5. Perhaps 5 per cent.
6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Punjab?
6. Their own European officers have magisterial powers, and deal with petty offences; and the civil courts take cognizance of serious crimes.
7. How is discipline maintained and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Punjab?
7. See Answer 6. In military cases the officers punish according to their own discretion, subject to appeal to the Chief Commissioner.
8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?
8. Hitherto the body of military police has been small and the selection of officers easy, and the system has been found to work well. The body will now be larger, and there would be no objection to a simple code.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.
HERBERT B. EDWARDES,
Lieut.-Colonel.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Bengal native infantry, what is the system of promotion? Is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?
1. Nominally seniority and merit; but really seniority, for the senior was never passed over unless he was imbecile.
2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?
2. Proverbially dull and inefficient. How, indeed, could they be otherwise, when their position was considered a reward of long service, not a link in the discipline of the corps. Extreme age aggravated all their natural defects.
3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?
3. Originally average, but below it from age.
4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?
4. None.
5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers?
5. That depends on the disposition and energy of both the European and native officers; but, on the whole, we believe that, as far as their influence went, the native officers strengthened their European commanders.
- Does a full complement of the European militia against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?
- Yes; certainly.
6. Has it been found in the native infantry of the Bengal army that on the occurrence of mutinies the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny?
6. We believe that on very few occasions did they give any information or aid to check the late

mutiny; but in former years, when there was dissatisfaction and mutinous feeling in particular corps, the native officers, as a body, did tell their European officers what was going on.

Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

Even in the mutiny of 1857 the native officers went away with, rather than led the mutineers; and in any body that remained loyal there was generally a large proportion of native officers.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bengal army.

7. Continued, certainly, but on a better system. Unless human nature can be altered, there must either be prizes for ambition or discontent. Besides, we regard the native officer as an indispensable link in the management of a native regiment.

8. Is the substitution of our European serjeant or corporal to each company of a native regiment, in lieu of its native officers, advisable?

8. Decidedly not. European serjeants and corporals could not, in the climate of India, perform the multifarious duties of native officers, nor would they have due influence with the men, or know anything wrong that was going on in the regiment. Instead of being an element of strength, we fear they would prove one of weakness and dissatisfaction. This was found to be the case in the Punjab regiments, and they were in consequence removed.

9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

9. No. There must be a gradation of ranks, and a machinery for managing the men, which no pecuniary privileges, without rank, can give. It would neither be efficient nor popular.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

10. The pensions have always been very highly valued; indeed, one source of discontent was the difficulty of getting invalidated, which was created by late orders circulated confidentially to invaliding committees. Under those orders it is notorious that a man could hardly get pensioned off while life was left in his body. Still the institution was much valued, and if it did not prevent the recent mutiny it was because other questions of more vital moment were concerned; the mutiny, however, appears to have been very much among the younger sepoys. We believe that the practice of invaliding committees in the Bombay army is much more liberal than in that of Bengal, and that this is one reason of the greater efficiency of the Bombay native commissioned and non-commissioned grades.

11. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

11. Certainly. But we wish here earnestly to urge upon Government that to select native officers for merit and keep them meritorious, the European officers themselves must be selected and efficient. A bad European officer cannot work a system of merit, he would soon spoil the best native officer in the world; and the more these questions of army reform are thought over, the more clearly will it be seen that the educating of the European officer lies at the root of the matter.

12. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

12. This is a question which cannot be summarily answered. If Government determine to maintain a system of pensions for their native troops (as we would advocate), it would be well to appoint a committee of selected officers to go carefully into the details; and even before such a committee could proceed to deal with the question, it would be right for them to be informed of the actual amount of burden which the present system and scale of pensions has imposed upon the State, in order that it may be seen in what ratio it had annually accumulated, and whether it was disproportionate or otherwise to the object in view and to the revenues of India. We shall confine ourselves now to a few general remarks upon the existing system, beginning with the scale of "invalid pensions," as shown in the annexed statement deduced from the pay and audit regulations.

In the first place it will be there seen that the regulars after 15 years' service obtain larger pensions than the irregulars after 20; this, on the face of it, is unjust, and has probably grown up from a period when the irregular troops were a very inferior and unimportant body. But even before the late mutiny the irregulars had risen in numbers, discipline, and reputation to a very important position, and at present they really constitute our native army.

Again, the same inequality pervades the rates of pension in the two branches, the regular subahdar getting 20 rupees while the irregular only gets 18 rupees, and so on through all the ranks. If the regular soldier saw more service or took a larger share of it than the irregulars, this difference would be just; but it is notorious that whenever regulars and irregulars serve together in the field, the hardest work is always put upon the irregulars, the superior efficiency of whom is now very generally admitted, and has certainly been conspicuous in the crisis of 1857.

On these points, therefore, we would say that doing away with the regulars altogether the term of 20* years should still be adhered to as the period of service entitling the irregular soldier to the first rate of pension, with increased rates after 30 and 40 years respectively.

For the first of those rates (obtainable after 20 years), we would say generally that the present scale for irregulars is sufficient (with the exception of native doctors, to whose case we will allude presently); but we would abolish the present rule by which a native soldier, even after fulfilling his period of service, cannot get his pension unless unfit for active service; this seems unjust, and is certainly felt to be a grievance. No doubt it originated in financial considerations; but if the strict system of discipline we advocate be adopted, instead of every enlisted soldier coming gradually on the pension list as heretofore, probably one third would be dismissed for inefficiency or misconduct at various stages of their service, which would be fully as economical as keeping men out of their pension as long as they could walk, and much better for the state.

On the subject of "wound pensions" we have nothing to remark farther than that the scale seems unequally adjusted, especially as between regulars and irregulars, infantry and cavalry, and will require impartial reconsideration to adapt it to the altered composition of the native army.

Turning lastly to the subject of "family pensions," (and again premising that we do not attempt to deal with the question of rates, which depends so greatly on imperial considerations,) we would recommend that the principle of bonuses should be as largely substituted for that of annuities as possible. In the first place, if the scale be fairly fixed on the principle of life insurance, it should be no loss to Government

Sir John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Eduardes

* Our own European officers only get pensions after 20 years, of which 18 must be in India.

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in aggregate amount; secondly, it would be a saving of machinery; thirdly, a bar against frauds, which have been so largely practised; and, lastly, it would be more applicable to many cases, and therefore more popular and beneficial to the service. The only case in which a pension should be given, is where the heir of a deceased soldier who was a British subject is a minor, male or female, and may be thus protected by us from interested relations; in all other cases (viz., adult heirs of British subjects, and all heirs of soldiers not British subjects,) a bonus should be given. This would not only save a vast deal of trouble and peculation, but our experience leads us to believe that it would be greatly preferred by the people beyond our border, especially in the numerous cases where the heirs are females, who often evince an irresistible repugnance to presenting themselves and complying with our pension rules; thousands of rupees have thus been lost to the families of Pathan native officers, with, of course, a corresponding loss of good report to our Government.

Having made these general remarks on the subject of pensions, we desire to touch also on the kindred question of pay, for which there seems no more appropriate place in these papers.

We believe that great emulation, ambition, and satisfaction would be excited among the soldiers, and consequently great vitality infused into the native army, by a graduated scale of pay in every rank, the effect of which has been found very great in our own Civil Department, which existed in the Sikh army under Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and will be found more or less (though in an unorganized form) in the armies of most Asiatic rulers.

It is obvious that a recruit cannot be worth as much to the State as a veteran soldier, and no good purpose is answered by putting them on a level as to pay.

For the first year a sepoy should get	6	0	0
After 1 year	-	-	7 0 0
After 10 years	-	-	7 8 0
After 15 years	-	-	8 0 0
After 20 years	-	-	8 8 0

In the non-commissioned and commissioned native ranks the scale should be graduated by merit, not by length of service, as follows:—

In each regiment there are 60 naicks, who now get 12 rupees each, which is rather disproportionately high.

We would have,—

20 on 10 rupees,
20 on 11 do.
20 on 12 do.

This would give an average of 11 rupees, or a saving of 1 rupee on each naick.

The havildars are also 60 in number, and get 14 rupees each, which is moderate.

We would have,—

20 on 14 rupees.
20 on 15 do.
20 on 16 do.

which would be an average of 15 rupees, or 1 rupee in excess of present rates.

The jemmadars are 10 in number, and now get 30 rupees each, which is decidedly low.

We would have,—

2 on 25 rupees.
2 on 30 do.
2 on 35 do.
2 on 40 do.
2 on 45 do.

which would average 35 rupees, or an increase of 5 rupees.

The subahdars are also 10 in number, and get 67 rupees each, in which we would advocate the following improvement,—

2 on 60 rupees,
2 on 70 do.
2 on 80 do.
2 on 90 do.
2 on 100 do.

which would give an average of 80 rupees, or an increase of rupees 13.

To these changes in the principle of pay for the native army, we attach considerable importance, and venture to recommend them to mature consideration.

There is another change (one of organization) which we would advocate in connexion with the broad questions of pay and pension. There are many soldiers in every regiment who, from weak constitution or accidents, are not fit for active service, and yet not objects for the pension list; who, moreover, are attached to the service, and have no desire to be invalided. These men might with advantage be formed into veteran battalions, for ordinary garrison duties in the interior of the country. No man should be allowed to volunteer into the veteran battalions till he had served 20 years; but his future service with the veterans should count for increased rates of pension, the same as if he had remained in his own corps. Such a system would meet an existing want, would be both useful and popular, and a relief to the pension list. The operation of it would probably be to create one veteran battalion to 10 regiments of the line.

It remains only to allude to the class of native doctors, in which hitherto the rates of pay and pension have been unaccountably and unreasonably low, in proportion to the outlay of time and industry which they have incurred in their education, and the importance of the duties with which they are entrusted. It does not do to raise men's intellectual standard and keep them down in the social scale. Their sense of justice and of power alike rebel against it. In the late crisis it has been remarkable how active the native doctors have been against us. They have been the very brains of the mutiny in many regiments and stations, and we attribute it to the feelings above described. We would strongly recommend, therefore, that both the pay and pensions of native doctors be liberally increased; but the service is a separate one, and will have to be separately considered by Government.

13. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal native infantry?

13. This information can only be furnished by the military auditor general.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

14. Those of the late native army were certainly not. The whole system has been a farce. The native members, as a rule, were guided by the European superintending officer; and then went out and told the prisoners they were very sorry for the sentence, but could not help it. Native officers selected by merit, and not by seniority, would be quite qualified to sit; and if only to keep up their dignity, we would advocate their sitting on district courts-martial; regimental courts being abolished.

15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals, in professional intelligence and efficiency?

15. Native commissioned officers who have been promoted by seniority, and are consequently worn out, cannot be compared with European serjeants and European corporals selected for their smartness, without reference to seniority, more particularly while those European serjeants and corporals remain in their own regiments, among their own countrymen, and under a strict system of discipline, to which they are themselves obliged to conform. But if those serjeants and corporals be transferred from a European to a native regiment, their phase is altered. Their smartness and professional intelligence loses more than half its value, for they cannot impart it. They know little or nothing of the language or feelings of the men; and failing to explain themselves, become violent and rough, irritating the sepoys with abuse picked up in the barracks, and of which they know not the meaning. They no longer have a rigid discipline over them, are to a great extent their own masters, and fall off accordingly.

Taking, however, the best instances of the few European serjeants and corporals who, when placed in a native regiment, maintain their former discipline and efficiency, and know something of the native languages, we have still no hesitation in saying that they never can be equally useful to the commanding officer in managing native soldiers, as selected native commissioned officers.

16. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps?

1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades, as well as with European officers; or,—
 2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades; or,—
 3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers?
16. The Punjab irregular system.
3. This third system is what we advise; and to secure efficiency in the commanding officers, it should be a rule that on attaining the rank of regimental major, an officer should vacate the command, unless invited by Government to remain.

17. How should the police corps be officered; the question applying to both European and native commissioned grades?

17. One European and one native officer to each battalion, and one subahdar and one jemadar to each company, as in the Punjab police.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good service pay and pensions, as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers, suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

18. Certainly not.

19. In police corps is there on first admission, any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing? Or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades? Or on promotion to commissioned grades?

19. No; when the natives generally are educated, this may be done in police corps. At present it is found impracticable, even in irregular infantry corps. It should be explained that the military police have no detective duties.

20. Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies proved favorable to our power in India?

20. Decidedly so.

21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate Governments, to time, or to local circumstances, be allowed?

21. By all means.

Or should endeavours be made to assimilate, or even to amalgamate the three armies?

On no account.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.
HERBERT B. EDWARDES,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

PENSION MEMO.—Invalid I.

Regulars of the Line after 15 Years Service.

	Rupees per Mensem.
Subadar-majors and subadars - - - -	25
Jemadars - - - - -	12
Drum-majors, European descent - - -	10
Havildars, naiks, drum-majors European descent, tindals, native doctors, farrier-majors, sirdars, camel batteries, havildars and naicks of syce-drivers, and of gun lascars - - - - -	7
Troopers, sepoy, native drummers, gun lascars, farriers, sowars of camel batteries, and syce-drivers.	4
Sirdars of ordnance drivers - - - -	3½
Ordnance drivers, bheesties, syces, grass-cutters, lascars - - - -	3

But after 40 years' service the following scale is sanctioned to men of *unblemished character* :—

Subadar-majors and subadars - - - -	40
Jemadars - - - - -	20
Havildar, naicks, drum-major (without reference to parentage) drummers	
Christians - - - - -	12
Native drummers, troopers, sepoy - - -	7

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

Local Infantry and Irregular Cavalry after a Service of 20 Years.

Subadars, local infantry - - - -	18
Jemadars - - - - -	10
Havildars, drum-majors - - - - -	6
Naick and native doctors - - - - -	5
Drummers and sepoy - - - - -	3½
Gun tindals - - - - -	4
Gun lascars and bheesties - - - - -	3
Ressaldars, woodie-majors - - - - -	25
Ressaidars - - - - -	18
Naib rersaidars - - - - -	12
Jemadars - - - - -	7
Kote duffadars - - - - -	6
Duffadars, native doctors, trumpet-majors -	5
Nishanchees, trumpeters - - - - -	4
Sowars - - - - -	3½
Bheesties - - - - -	3

NOTE.—I. Fighting men of irregular cavalry, after 40 years' service, are entitled to superior rates, according to scale allowed to regular infantry.

II. As a rule no pensions are granted to regulars or irregulars, unless the man is unfit for active service.

III. A service of three years in the higher ranks is necessary to enable a soldier to obtain the pension of that rank.

IV. Regulars have to serve 15 years, irregulars have to serve 20 years, before they are entitled to any pension, unless wounded, &c., which will come under No. II.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Punjab irregular force, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. The rule is to give the promotion to the best man, preference being always shown to the senior if possible.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Punjab irregular force generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. Particularly so. In all positions they afford the greatest assistance to their officers.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

3. They are selected men, and consequently far above the average.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. No other than that of general qualification for command.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers?

Does a full complement of the European militia against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?

5. Certainly not, when the command is in the hands of a competent European officer.

A full complement of European officers would interfere with the efficiency of the native commissioned officers; but in the Punjab irregular force the complement was only four European officers.

6. Has it been found in the infantry of the Punjab irregular force that on the occurrence of mutinies the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers?

6. There has been no mutiny in the Punjab irregular force. In the 3rd Sikh local infantry (which has since been attached to the Punjab irregular force) there was a partial mutiny in 1853, the men refusing to build their own lines. The instance afforded an illustration of the truth that the European officers are the key-stone of the irregular system, and must be selected and efficient, or their regiment will be worthless. The 3rd Sikh regiment had been injudiciously managed from its very enlistment. Changes in the terms of service had not been properly explained to the men, and a feeling had consequently grown up that faith had not been kept. Lastly, a weak and childish commanding officer had been appointed, and when he ordered the men to do what by the rules of the service they were not actually bound to do, but which they would have done cheerfully if there had been discipline in the corps, most of them refused, and passively resisted the order. A court of inquiry ensued, and one or two native officers who had aided and abetted the movement, and two companies of men were dismissed the service. Even on this occasion the other native officers told their European officers what was going on.

7, 8, 9, 10, 11.

7, 8, 9, 10, 11. No answers required.

12. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?

12. See our answer to the same question for the Bengal army.

13. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the Punjab irregular force, infantry branch?

13. This information can only be furnished by the office of the military auditor general. But it is believed that the charge is very small.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial.

14. Yes; mentally they are quite fit to do so, and to pass judgment on most cases brought before them; but from want of moral resolution most native officers will give up their own judgment to that of their European superiors.

15, 16.

15, 16. Require no answer.

17. How should the Punjab police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

17. Just as they are now; one native commandant to each battalion, and one subahdar and one jemadar

to each company. Also one European captain of police, who supervises both the infantry battalion and such troops of police cavalry as are in the division.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers and regular corps have no native commissioned officer, but only good service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

18. Certainly not.

19. In Punjab police corps is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing? or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

19. There is no other test for admittance or promotion than general fitness for command.

20, 21.

20, 21. Not required.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.
HERBERT B. EDWARDES,
Lieut.-Colonel.

(No. 6.)

From Sir JOHN LAWRENCE, G.C.B., to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

SIR,

Murree, July 24, 1858.

In continuation of former letters, I have now the honor to forward the united replies of Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, C.B., Lieut.-Col. Edwardes, C.B., and myself, to the paper of questions European officers noted in the margin.

2. This disposes of the last paper of questions which has reached us.

I have, &c.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.

INFANTRY.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bengal army? and state the orders, or measures, or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect.

1. The powers of commanding officers have certainly been diminishing for many years, till it had become a standing complaint in the regular native army; but this seems to have been effected not so much by actual orders and measures as by the changing practice of the service—by a gradual interference at army head-quarters with the internal economy and discipline of regiments, and the consequent centralization of influence, not in the commandant of the regiment, but in the adjutant-general and commander-in-chief. Rewards and punishments are the two great sources of a commanding officer's influence over his men, and both seem to have been almost taken out of his hands. The principle of seniority promotion has been so hedged in, watched, and enforced (even by such a professed military reformer as Sir Charles Napier, whose general order on the subject is perhaps the strangest on record), that practically the commanding officer had no discretion whatever, and promoted the senior on the roll rather than enter upon a vain struggle to prefer a better man. No doubt the sepoy as a body liked this. It gave every man in the regiment, whether fit or unfit, a vested right in the upper ranks, to which a system of merit promotion

would only have admitted the most efficient. The one system only asked them to live, the other would call on them to exert themselves. The regimental commandant was interested in superseding the inefficient, and the inefficient found a readiness at headquarters to believe injustice had been committed. One or two such unsuccessful struggles after better things disheartened the most zealous commanding officer, who gradually lapsed into indifference, leaving the regiment to the undisturbed enjoyment of its vested rights, its life without emulation, its poor opinion of the colonel, and its reverence for the central institutions. Nor was more discretion left to the commandant in the matter of punishments. The authority given him by article of war 112 is altogether inadequate to the control and discipline of a mercenary regiment. His powers of summary punishment were so small as to be ridiculous. He could neither flog for insubordination nor dismiss for general bad character. He could not give extra duty to the negligent soldier nor refuse furlough to an habitual offender. He could not send a non-commissioned officer to drill, nor reduce him without formal trial; and he was even prohibited from confining one before trial, and required to put him simply under arrest. When to all these restrictions is added the facility of direct appeal, through the post-office, by any sepoy to the commander-in-chief, and even the reception of anonymous petitions, we can understand how such a system in course of years undermined the legitimate influence of the commanding officers of regiments, and gradually reduced them to the cyphers which they were found to be in 1857.

2. During the above period, have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?

2. We understand this question to refer to all the regimental officers below the commanding officer, and we believe that in European corps the powers of such officers have not been interfered with; but in native corps, in proportion as the commandants lost their own power, so they and their adjutants absorbed the power of the officers in charge of companies, who had really less influence than the havildar major, and ceased to take much interest in the corps.

3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

3. A laxity of discipline throughout the native army, which made it ripe for mutiny on any difficulty. For years the regimental officers have been driven to coax instead of command their men. The policy of Government, indeed, wore the same appearance, attributable probably to that sense of weakness which necessarily sprang from the inadequate European force in the country. So far, however, from this being a good reason for weakening the European officers, and strengthening the sepoys, it was in our opinion the very reverse.

4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?

4. The sepoys lost respect for them, and the officers lost zeal.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of headquarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?

5. Assuredly on the authority and influence of the regimental officers, whether on service or in quarters.

6. Should the power of commanding officers, and of officers in charge of companies, be increased or diminished?

6. Certainly increased. There seems to have been in this, as in many other particulars of our military policy, a growing forgetfulness of our real position in

India, and of our relations to a large mercenary army, evincing itself in an exaggerated protection of the sepoy, and a jealous depression of his European officer. Late events have shown that both cannot command, and we would strongly advocate making our own countrymen the depositories of power, as by far the lesser evil. Trust the European officers with power, train them to its exercise, supersede them unhesitatingly if they prove unequal to the trust, and heavily punish them if they abuse it. We may then hope to hear no more of mutiny.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

7. In Answer 6 the strengthening of all the European officers has been recommended, with a summary treatment of them if found inefficient. The Answer 1 (and others) of the paper on "Military Codes and Discipline" (No. 2, infantry). New articles of war were sketched out for that purpose, and throughout these papers we have advised the substitution of the irregular for the regular system, and submitted many other suggestions which it is unnecessary here to recapitulate. We will now add some further particulars, in which an improved discipline might be secured. The root of all discipline is efficiency of command, and this can only be secured by a persistent course of selection of European officers for the native army. No irregular regiment can be efficient without picked native officers, but these can only be selected and controlled by a good European commandant. It will behove Government, therefore, to exercise a close and firm supervision over the selection from the European regiments, or otherwise, of officers for the native army, and at first they should only be appointed on probation.

Indeed, it is to be hoped that efforts will be made to secure a really efficient staff by establishing in each presidency a military college, where any officer who is zealous and ambitious may study the science of his profession. The germ of such an institution already exists in the Thomason College at Roorkee, but on a totally inadequate scale.

Connected with the same subject of officers capable of creating and maintaining discipline, we believe that no army can be kept in working order without an "unemployed list," to which inefficient officers at any stage of their career may be transferred, both from the staff and from the line; and we would decidedly recommend the introduction into the army of the civil service rule limiting the period of an officer's continuance in the service. No civilian can serve more than 32 years unless specially invited by Government to remain. Military officers enter the service two or three years earlier than civil officers, and their term could be proportionately increased. The rule should therefore be that on the completion of 35 years' service every officer must retire, unless invited to serve longer. It is believed that this measure would contribute greatly to the efficiency of discipline of the army. Present incumbents should get five years' notice, but a premium of increased pension be offered to them to go at once, say 100*l.* to a colonel, and lieutenant-colonels and majors in proportion. Above all, we would draw the earnest attention of Government to the necessity of selecting efficient brigadiers and generals of division, and not allowing those offices, which demand faculties both mature and unimpaired, to be regarded as mere rewards for length of service. The army is in truth nothing but an organization of mental and physical force, and it is the last institution in the state in which anything weak or worn can be safely left. From the highest to the lowest, every link in the chain of discipline must be equal to the strain it is to bear.

The only other points which occur to us as not having been touched on in other parts of these papers are—

1stly. The propriety of relieving daily all guards within the distance of a mile; and

2ndly. The discontinuance, as far as practicable, of petty guards detached on escort only.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col Edwardes.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig. Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace, or in time of war?
8. In war; when the sepoys look to their officers, and value them more.
9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, and the occupation to be found for them, and the like?
9. We think that 800 privates should be the maximum of an infantry regiment in time of war; and that in peace it might be allowed by the gradual occurrence of vacancies, to fall to 700, or even 600 if the service admitted of it. And whenever such a temporary reduction was made, a proportion of non-commissioned officers should also be allowed to lapse. It is of great political importance to avoid masses of armed natives, whether in a station, or an individual corps; masses give confidence and breed disaffection; small corps are best both in the infantry and cavalry. As to occupation, we do not know that they could be advantageously employed otherwise than instruction, drill, regular exercise, guards, and escorts. But they should be constantly handled. No day should pass in any season of the year without a regiment being under arms once a day, if only for ten minutes.
10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bengal army ever been so great in times of peace, that it might have been in part employed, otherwise than on mere military duties?
10. As far as numbers were concerned, no doubt there were many available for other than military employment; but it would have been against the prejudices of the sepoys to do anything but military duty.
11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?
11. No, the men would have mutinied. In time of war they will throw up field works; but even then they do not like it.
12. In appointing European officers to native corps,
1. Should native corps have a full complement of European officers according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers; or
 2. A full complement of European officers, and no native commissioned officers; or
 3. A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?
12. This has been already answered in Reply No. 16 of the Infantry Paper, No. 3 on "Organization, Promotions, and Rewards." The system specified in the 3rd clause is the one we advise.
13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?
13. To European corps, till they have thoroughly learnt their duty.
14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?
14. We would advise that every cadet should first go to a European regiment and there stay two years. After two years or any number of years if an officer wished to qualify himself for a native corps, or any other staff appointment; and provided that he had passed an examination in Hindostanee (which should be a *sine quâ non*), he should be sent to the military college, and there go through a course of study in vernacular languages and professional knowledge. Half-yearly examinations should be held, and the student allowed to accomplish the course and pass as rapidly as he could; but no officer should be allowed to stay who could not pass in two years; and any officer, who having entered the college, evinced no disposition to study, should be remanded to his corps at once. After passing the college the students would return to their regiments. Their respective qualifications and fitness for particular departments of the staff should be formally reported to Government by the inspecting officer, and Government would then select as many as were wanted for staff employ. Those assigned to native corps should "do duty" for one year on probation, after which they would either be permanently appointed to the corps, or transferred to some other department, or remanded to the European branch, according to circumstances. By such a system a well selected, highly trained, and efficient staff would be secured for the irregular native regiments.
- But should there be no military college, of course there would be no better way of training an officer than by sending him (after two years with a European regiment) to do duty with a native corps.
15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?
15. No. It was not the paucity of officers, but the bad system which ruined the regiments. As a general remark the officers taken for the staff were not superior (*when taken*) to those left; though they usually *became* so by more active employment, in a sphere which gave more scope for exertion and discretion. The few officers left with the line regiments ought under any other system to have found more to do, and more call upon their faculties, more room for usefulness. But the more companies they got charge of, the more they saw that they had no power, and that all authority, and hope, and fear centred in the adjutant and adjutant-general. Thus they lost heart, and retrograded rather than advanced in zeal and efficiency.
16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies between the conduct of regiments with few, and those with many European officers present?
16. No. The mutiny seems to have been quite irrespective of the number of officers.
17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments?
17. This must be admitted to be a very difficult question, involving as it does such important interests of Government, and of a large body of Government servants; and after giving to it all the thought of deliberation which time admits of, we are not prepared confidently to recommend any plan as the best that can be devised, but we proceed to submit the conclusions at which we have now arrived.
- The object in view is to secure to Government the power of selection for all staff appointments; and still to leave the regiments of the line fully and efficiently officered. To attain this end we think no plan so suitable and simple as the general gradation list for the army of each presidency, which has been proposed by Brig.-Gen. Jacob, C.B.,* in the general working of which we concur, though we should be inclined to modify some parts of the scheme and to reject others, which will best be shown in the following recommendations.
- 1stly. That as proposed by General Jacob, "The whole of the European officers of the cavalry† and infantry, and those of the artillery and engineers above the rank of colonel, be formed into one general gradation list, in which, under ordinary circumstances, all will rise by seniority." "This general gradation list to be styled the 'unemployed list.' " All the officers borne on it who may hold no special

* "Observations on a Scheme for the Re-organization of the Indian Army," by Brigadier-General John Jacob, C.B. London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1857.

† We would go farther, and advocate that all cadets should come out in the infantry branch, whence selections should be made for the cavalry after a year.

"appointments, will reside in India at such places as Government may direct, but will have no public functions to perform." "The officers of artillery and of engineers each to be borne in a separate list up to the rank of colonel inclusive; and thereafter to be incorporated in the general list of the whole army. The senior colonel of artillery or engineers, when senior in the army, being promoted to major-general as vacancies may occur."

"2ndly. Rank in this list to be the only permanent rank; all regimental and other rank being temporary only, and to continue only so long as officers may be serving with regiments, or be otherwise employed in a military capacity."

"3rdly. In case of officers being promoted for good service, &c. by the Queen, they are to take their places in the general gradation list according to the dates of their promotions, and are to enjoy every advantage exactly as if they had risen to such places by seniority only."

It does not appear whether in General Jacob's plan these officers promoted by substantive brevet would come on the prescribed strength of the establishment for the line, as vacancies occur in the rank to which they have been promoted, or would be in excess of the ordinary strength. The former would be objectionable as taking the step away from the line and keeping up in an aggravated form the jealousy which has always existed against brevet. The latter therefore is what we would recommend. Government might *prima facie* object to this as an increase of expenditure; but this objection vanishes when the great saving is considered which will be effected by the smaller number of officers required by the irregular system, and the great reduction there would be in the establishment of field officers. It is not at all likely that the number of brevets would ever bring up the establishment to its former proportions.

One of the objections to brevet rank has been the loose way in which it has been given. If it carried with it substantive advantages, the honor would be given with more discrimination. Brevet should not be dealt out to every staff or commanding officer who was present in a great action, but to such of them only as distinguished themselves in that position. It would then be more valued and less grudged. The spirit of no army can be kept up without brevet promotions for unusual services, and the more substantive they are the more emulation they will excite.

4thly. That there should be two rates of pay, one for unemployed and one for employed officers, as recommended by General Jacob, though we think some modifications in his scale might be made with advantage, as shown below.

Number	Rank of Officer.	Unemployed Monthly Pay.		Monthly Employed Pay.		Total Monthly.	
		General Jacob's	Ours	General Jacob's.	Ours.	General Jacob's	Ours.
1	General - -	Rs. 1,500	Rs. 1,100	Rs. None.	Rs. None.	Rs. 1,500	Rs. 1,100
2	Lieut.-General	1,200	1,000	3,000	2,000	4,200	3,000
3	Major-General	1,000	900	1,000	1,100	2,000	2,000
4	Colonel - -	600	600	600	600	1,200	1,200
5	Lieut.-Colonel	400	400	400	430	800	800
6	Captain - -	300	300	300	with Europeans 200 with Natives 430	600	with Europeans 500 with Natives 600
7	Lieutenant -	200	200	None.	100	200	300

N B—Command allowance of rupees 400 per regiment, and the usual company allowance, office establishments, &c., to be in addition to the above rates.

The pay proposed by General Jacob for generals and lieutenant-generals seems unnecessarily large, and likely to induce officers to remain in the country who might otherwise retire. It is a great object to get younger men in the higher commands of the army. A distinction should, we think, be drawn between a captain employed with native troops and one employed with Europeans. In the former case he is

a selected officer, and more depends upon his individual abilities. The captain with a European company would also get command allowance, which the captain with natives would not.

We think 300 rs. is not too much for a lieutenant in active employment. If with a European regiment he would seldom or never get command of a company, and if doing duty with a native regiment of irregulars he fully deserves command allowance.

Lastly, we would go farther than General Jacob, and add to the "employed" and "unemployed" rate of pay a third rate or "subsistence allowance" of exactly one half the "unemployed" rates for officers who from any reason of incapacity or vice are thoroughly inefficient, yet cannot be brought under the lash of a court-martial. A penance of six months or a year on "subsistence allowance" would bring many a useless officer to his senses, and perhaps prove the saving of him.

5thly. We refrain from dealing with the question of rates of pay to officers "when absent from India on leave to Europe or elsewhere," as this brings the Indian army in contact with the home army, and can only be adjusted with reference to both.

6thly. We cannot leave this matter of pay of European officers without drawing attention to the general status of the military surgeons both in pay, rank, and precedence, and honorary distinctions. It is not too much to say that the efficiency of an army depends upon the efficiency of its medical staff. As a question of policy, therefore, it would be good economy to so raise the status of this service that the best European talent should be attached to it, while, as a matter of justice it is obvious that their preparatory education is higher, and their duties more arduous, self-denying, and valuable to the State, than those of almost any other branch of the army. As far as possible they should, on field service, keep out of fire, but practically this is impossible, and the returns of the late war, or any war, will show how fully the military surgeons share the dangers of the troops;* yet as far as we have observed only one military surgeon † has yet obtained any honorary distinction in the operations of 1857-8, and in the official army list of 20th January 1858, there was not one surgeon in the Bengal army who was a member of the Order of the Bath. This exclusiveness is, we believe, peculiar to the British army, and as it is very keenly felt by a most zealous and gallant body of men, it cannot too soon be remedied.

7thly. This leads us to suggest a change in the present table of precedence between civil and military servants, in which there is apparent both unfairness and anomaly. The principle which should guide precedence is, we think, the office held by an officer covenanted or uncovenanted, not his standing in the service, and the following table will indicate the adjustment which we consider adapted to the changes in the Indian services:—

Chief Commissioners of Provinces - - -	} To rank with Lieut.-Generals.
Sudder Boards, Secretaries to Supreme Government, Financial and Judicial Commissioners - - -	
Judges, Commissioners, and Secretaries to Lieutenant-Governors - - -	} " Major-Generals
Magistrate and Collector, Deputy Commissioner, Secretary to Chief Commissioners or to Boards, and Director of Education - - -	
	} " Colonels.
	} " Lieut.-Colonels.

* While writing this, the English mail of 17th June has been received, containing a list of officers honoured with the Victoria Cross for service in the Crimea. Amongst them is Surgeon James Mouat, C.B., for having voluntarily proceeded to the assistance of Lieut.-Colonel Morris, C.B., 17th Lancers, who was lying dangerously wounded in an exposed situation after the retreat of the light cavalry at the battle of Balaklava, and having dressed that officer's wounds in presence of, and under a heavy fire of the enemy. Thus, by stopping a serious hæmorrhage, he assisted in saving that officer's life.

† Dr. Tritton.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwardes,

Joint Magistrate and Collector, First class Assistant Commissioner, Collector of Customs	} To rank with Captains
Assistant Magistrate and Collector, Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Collector of any description	

Subalterns.

8thly. It is unnecessary to add that we entirely disagree with General Jacob in his proposal that "a distinct and separate Civil Service be prospectively abolished." It is true that some military men display ability for civil affairs, but they are exceptions, and as a rule, men will be best fitted for that line in which they have been trained. It may be replied that the training of the young soldier is the best training for the young civilian, but to this we cannot agree. The curriculum at a military college lays the foundation for military science; that at a civil college for judicial and administrative duties, and as the ends differ, so do the means. There are some things common to both, like languages, history, and mathematics, but the two roads of learning soon diverge, and it would be as much out of place for a future judge to acquire the mysteries of Vauban as for a future commander to devote himself to law. If the cadet be selected for transfer to the civil service at an early age, within a year or so of his coming to India, the experiment may very probably succeed, for he is young, and can acquire the groundwork he requires. But he has derived no advantage from being a soldier. He was one only in name, and whatsoever professional knowledge he had acquired belongs not to the profession he has to pursue. He must begin at the beginning and go to school again. If, on the other hand, he be transferred after several years, he may be an accomplished soldier, but has missed the opportunity of acquiring that varied knowledge which alone can make him an able civil officer.

Again, it is one of the evils of our position in India that the mass of Europeans is in the service of Government. The class views of the civil, military, and uncovenanted services fail to give us a sufficient variety of interest and feeling to impart vigour and health to public opinion, and to withdraw the purely civil element would only aggravate this evil.

It would also banish that emulation which is now so beneficial to both the army and civil service. In fact, we can see many evils and no single advantage that would result from such a measure.

9thly. With regard to General Jacob's proposal that all "Candidates appointed to the Indian service be educated at a military college in England, and reside at such college for at least two years, and not more than four years, the minimum age for admission to be fourteen, and the maximum eighteen years, the residence at the college to be free of all pecuniary charge to the cadet," we would certainly recommend that there be such a military college in England, which might be called the "Junior Military College;" but it is unquestionable that the system of direct appointments has worked well as an auxiliary to the Addiscombe College, often bringing into the service at a later age men of riper education; and we think it would be giving the service more chances of getting efficient men if the following system were pursued:—

1stly. Half the cadets to be educated at the college, with admission from the age of 14 to that of 18, and to remain two years.

2ndly. Half to be appointed direct, from 16 to 18 years of age.

3rdly. All appointments to be obtained by competition; those to the college on entrance, and direct ones on appointment to the army.

4thly. The college cadets to pay 100*l.* a year each, with the exception of sons of servants of the East India Government, civil or military, who should be admitted at half rates.

5thly. That a "Senior Military College" be established in India, as described in Answers 7 and 14 of

this paper, for completing the military training of staff officers.

We believe that the system which has been roughly indicated in the above suggestions will meet the requirements of the case, and secure the best interests both of Government and the officers of the army. The general gradation list secures that degree of conservatism and equal promotion which must ever be popular with the majority of any service. The principle of selection for employment secures for Government the abilities of its best servants in the most important posts, and throws open the highest offices to emulation, industry, and ambition, while the three gradations of pay enable Government to deal effectively with delinquents, without absolutely ruining them, and will thereby carry public opinion along with such decisions. The junior and senior military colleges ensure the means of obtaining a sound professional education to every officer who desires to acquire it. The modified system* of brevet, while increasing the inducements to render gallant service, provides a check upon the abuse of the prerogative, and diminishes the risk of unjust supercession. On the whole, a scientific and effective staff will be produced, without depriving the line of its officers, or the officers of hope.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army, as regimental officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

18. Nothing could be more depressing and injurious to the officers of the army.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency.

19. How could it be otherwise? few men pursue knowledge for its own sake alone.

POSTSCRIPT.—The papers connected with the native infantry of the future Indian army having now been disposed of, and their scope having afforded no opportunity of touching on the condition of the European soldiery, we desire to add our hope that it will be improved, and our conviction that, unless it be so, difficulty will be felt in maintaining the largely increased force of British troops in India. To draw more recruits to the army the status of the soldier must be put on a footing more consonant with the advancing civilization of the English people. And foremost among measures of amelioration should be the removal, as far as practicable, of all restriction, upon the number of married soldiers in a regiment* which is felt to be an intolerable interference with personal liberty, and contrary both to good morals and real discipline. By the present rules only six wives are allowed in a company of 100 men when in England, and twelve when the regiment comes to India. The result is, that many wives are left at home worse than widows; and many thousands of young men are withdrawn to foreign shores unmarried, increasing the number of unmarried women in the mother country, with all the attendant evils to population and society. It would be more expensive, doubtless, to provide passages and barrack accommodation for so many more wives; but it would be money well spent in raising the character of the service. Married soldiers are more respectable, healthy, contented, and efficient; and if, when their regiments were ordered home, they were allowed to volunteer, most of them would remain in India and be worth double the number of unacclimated soldiers. It would save Government much expense of transport, and save many a man from being thrown upon his parish. At the close of their Indian service they

* Sir John Lawrence and Brig.-Gen. Chamberlain believe that not more than 25 per cent of married soldiers would prove practicable. Lieut.-Col. Edwardes thinks there need, and should, be no limit.

might be settled in the hills, in the veteran battalions, holding hill-forts and stations. Their sons would grow up healthy, and be employed in Government offices, telegraphs, civil departments, volunteer horse, &c., while their daughters would make good wives for soldiers. Another crying evil in the life of the British soldier in India (as, indeed, in any part of the world) is spirit drinking. It is probable that until the soldiers themselves, by a higher tone of feeling, derived from their own class at home and from the kindly instruction of their officers extended voluntarily from the parade to the barrack, come to see the evil of this habit themselves, there is not much to be hoped for from restrictive measures; but some modifications of the present practice might be found beneficial.

In the first place, there seems no necessity to give rum to the soldiers on board ship. Many a recruit here first learns the habit of drinking drams. Either beer or porter might be given, or else grog (*i. e.*, rum diluted with water), as is done to sailors.

2ndly. Grog, instead of raw spirits, might be sold at the canteens, and at a higher rate.

3rdly. Beer and porter might be sold cheaper. Government has already done much in this direction lately, by bringing good English beer and porter into the canteens, and selling it under cost price. This was a good beginning. The next step should be to supply no raw spirits at all.

In urging a change of this kind, we do not expect too much from its adoption; for we believe that no restrictions can avail to supply the want of moral discipline, and to impart this rests with the officers and chaplains.

Ignorant and thoughtless as the present race of soldiers are, we have seen what reforms can be effected among them by officers like Oglander,* Havelock, or Hedley Vicars; and the reflection brings us back to the necessity of aiming to provide the army with well-educated and thoughtful commanders.

2. It also brings us to another point which we wish to represent, and for which no other opportunity has appeared in these papers, viz., the present position of the chaplains in India. There are two grades,—

- 1stly. Full chaplains, on 800 rupees a month; and,
- 2ndly. Assistant chaplains, on 500 rupees.

The numbers of the junior grade have from time to time been greatly increased, while those of the senior grade have, we believe, remained the same. The consequences may be seen in the official list, which shows that the last of the full chaplains was 14 years in obtaining his promotion. The evil is gradually but surely increasing, and it is probable that those assis-

tant chaplains who are now joining the service will never be full chaplains during their 17 years of servitude for pension. This is an anomaly, and shows that the ecclesiastical establishment has outgrown the existing rules. It is understood that several assistant chaplains last year presented a petition to Government on this subject, the object of which was to be allowed a "time-service" for promotion, every assistant chaplain becoming a full chaplain after nine years' service, so that the number of chaplains should not prejudice promotion. The petition is believed to have been hitherto unsuccessful, but seems so reasonable that it should find a place in any comprehensive review of the Indian services. We would, however, recommend that instead of there being only one long-delayed step in the chaplain's service, there should be three at shorter intervals, as follows:—

Assistant chaplains, on appointment, and for	Monthly
the first 4 years - - -	500 Rs.
After 4 years, and up to 7 years - - -	600
After 7 years, and up to 10 years - - -	700
After 10 years - - -	800*

The distinctions of full and assistant chaplains might be abolished; but instead of all chaplains (full or assistant) being independent of each other, as now, we would strongly advise that where two chaplains are stationed together the junior should be subordinate to the senior. Indeed, it is sufficiently apparent that from there being only one bishop and one archdeacon to the Bengal presidency, there is as great a want of general visitation, control, supervision, and adjustment of appointments in the church as of organization to devise and carry out measures of social and Christian amelioration. The limits of the presidency have been periodically extended, and it has now become necessary to add largely to the European troops. The number of chaplains, which was previously insufficient, will have to be increased. It is greatly to be hoped that the supervising machinery will also be enlarged.

In conclusion, we will venture to urge that there is no branch of the Indian service in which the principle of careful and conscientious selection is more imperatively required than in the appointment of chaplains. The influence for good which a really earnest clergyman can effect in an Indian cantonment is hardly to be over-estimated.

JOHN LAWRENCE,
Chief Commissioner.
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
Brigadier-General.
HERBERT B. EDWARDS,
Commissioner.

Sir John Lawrence, Brig-Gen. Chamberlain, and Col. Edwards.

No. 2.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM H. B. E. FRERE, ESQ., COMMISSIONER IN SIND.

H. B. E. Frere, Esq.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS having reference to Paragraph 5 of the Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, from the Court of Directors.

Commissioner's Office, Kurachee,
November 8, 1858.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and what is their distribution?

1. The replies from the military authorities at Bombay will give this information more accurately than I can in detail.

The present numbers are of course exceptional. The ordinary establishment has of late years been—

European infantry (H.M.) -	4 regiments.
" " (Company's) -	3 regiments.
" cavalry (H.M.) -	1 regiment.
" artillery (Company's) -	1,600 men.

They have heretofore in time of peace been usually distributed between—

Bombay.	} Sind.
Belgaum.	
Poona.	} Aden.
{ Kirkee (Europ. cavalry).	
{ Ahmednuggur (head-quarters artillery).	

They are now much dispersed in detachments all over the presidency, few large stations being without a detachment of Europeans.

* The Colonel of the 26th Cameronians. Such was his influence that about 600 of the men became "Teetotalers," as it is called. Within a year of his death, nearly all took again to drinking. The instance is sometimes quoted, with strange perversity, to prove the uselessness of trying to improve the soldiers! To us it seems to prove how easily they may be led to good by an officer who will take the trouble.

* The financial effect of this would be a benefit of rupees 7,203, in ten years to the assistant chaplain, in comparison with the promotion asked for after nine years.

H. B. E. Frere,
Esq.

2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

2. As regards numbers, this can hardly be answered without reference to Question 7, q.v.

It seems to me principally, if not wholly, a question of finance.

Our income is limited, and capable of little rapid extension. Large portions of it are very precarious.

We cannot long go on borrowing. It is necessary to our existence that we should bring our expenses, of which the military charges are the heaviest portion, within our income. Even in a military point of view the value of a surplus income, good credit, and a contented native population, which needs no large force to keep it from rising, is greater to us in India than that of a powerful and well prepared army. Give us the former and *time*, and we must, with our naval superiority and vast mechanical resources, always be a fair match for any enemy, whether internal or external that can assail us. But if we have a deficient income, low credit, and discontented classes among our own subjects, the largest and best appointed army will only precipitate our downfall. *Time* will then befriend our enemies, who will have only to force us to keep our army up to a war standard in time of peace in order to ensure our ultimately ruining ourselves by costly victories.

This is not the place to dwell on the political and social questions affecting the feeling of our subjects towards our Government, further than to note that no army we could possibly maintain, if our pecuniary resources were double what they are, could enable us long to hold the country, if any large classes once become convinced that there are other Governments possible which would be preferable to ours, and to introduce which it is worth their while to make some present sacrifice.

Hence it is necessary, in answering the present question, always to bear in mind that we *must* bring our expenses within our income, and that the vital question is not what do we want to ensure our perfect safety, but what can we afford to spend for defence? and how can we lay it out to the best advantage?

The form, therefore, in which I would put this question is, "What army can you afford to hold that part of India for which Bombay is the natural base of operations? What proportion of that army should be Europeans, and how should they be distributed?"

The most obvious divisions of India for military purposes would be one which gave the valley of the Ganges and its tributaries to one army with their base at Calcutta; the valley of the Indus, with its tributaries, to another army with its base at Kurachee; the western coast, from the Gulf of Cutch to Mangalore, including Rajpootana, Malwa, the Deccan, Bedur, and Berar, to a third army with its base at Bombay; Southern India and the Coromandel coast to a fourth army, having its head-quarters at Madras, Ceylon, Burmah; and the Straits Settlements to a fifth army with its head-quarters at Rangoon or Point de Galle.

But according to existing divisions the Bombay presidency proper, including Sind, with Rajpootana and Malwa, fall to the lot of the Bombay army; and considering the necessity which exists for a considerable disposable force on this frontier and seaboard, its duties may still be taken at about a fourth of the whole military duties of India.

Supposing then that the finances of India allowed an army of 200,000 men, 50,000 would be assigned to Bombay, of whom 12,500 (*vide* the answer to Question 7) would be Europeans,—

Artillery	-	-	-	3,500
Cavalry	.	-	-	500
Infantry	.	-	-	8,500
				<hr/>
				12,500
				<hr/>

Who might be thus distributed (the numbers given are merely roughly proportionate approximations) :—

—	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Bombay - - -	1,000	500	3,000
Poona - - -			
Kirkee - - -			
Ahmednuggur - - -			
Belgaum - - -	500	-	1,000
Sholapoor - - -	100	-	-
Malgaum - - -	100	-	-
Mhow - - -	300	-	1,000
Neemuch - - -	100	-	-
Nusseerabad - - -	100	-	-
Deesa - - -	500	-	1,000
Ahmedabad - - -			
Baroda - - -			
Kurachee - - -	500	-	2,000
Aden - - -	200	-	500
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	3,500	500	8,500

The same proportions would hold good whatever the size of the army we could afford, whether 100,000 or 200,000.

If we had the money to pay them I should not consider India sufficiently provided till we could assemble 30,000 men, half of them Europeans, at any given point in the interior, at two months' notice, and 60,000 within three months, and at half that notice at any spot on the frontier or seaboard, without denuding any single station of troops. But this is in a great measure a question of facilities for movements rather than of numbers, and requires the completion of a good system of rail and steam communication and telegraph.

I have classed Bombay, Poona, Kirkee, and Ahmednuggur together, because it is impossible to consider their wants separately. An adequate European garrison must always be at hand to protect Bombay, but it is a very bad place for European soldiers, and with a station like Poona within 100 miles, situated on the healthy highland of the Deccan, and connected by railway with Bombay, it is advisable to keep the Europeans as much as possible up there, sending down to Bombay only such men as are absolutely required for current garrison duties.

Kirkee is the best station for European cavalry who have long been quartered there, and may be considered a part of Poona.

I have only proposed to have 500 European cavalry which is less than the ordinary Indian strength of one regiment. My reason for proposing so small a force is that there can be no question that for ordinary Indian service, European cavalry is less efficient in proportion to its expense than artillery and infantry, and if you have money to spare, it is advisable rather to increase your European force in those arms than in cavalry; of course, when you have amply sufficient European infantry and artillery there is no reason why you should not have as many more European cavalry as you can conveniently pay for; but not till then.

Ahmednuggur probably from its being such a good climate, and having a fort, has been made the principal artillery station, and there must always be a considerable reserve of artillery within easy reach of Bombay.

Accidental circumstances led to the division of the troops among these four stations, Bombay, Poona, Kirkee, and Ahmednuggur, and a great amount of capital, public and private, has been invested in providing quarters for them. It is impossible entirely to disregard such considerations, especially at a time of financial pressure like the present. But if we were now arranging for the first time, it would probably be best to have but two European stations; Bombay on the coast and one in the Deccan above the Ghauts.

The other stations for European infantry have been chosen, Belgaum as the key of the Southern Mahratta country; Mhow as commanding Malwa, Candeish,

and the trunk road to Agra; Deesa as commanding Guzerat and Rajpootana; Aden as commanding the Red Sea; Kurachee as the key of the valley of the Indus and the Punjab, as an advanced post to the west, superior even to Bombay in position, and very salubrious. It is one of the most valuable military positions in India; but for all local and provincial duties, a very small garrison would suffice.

Deesa and Ahmedabad have been coupled together, because the objects aimed at in having Europeans at the two stations are nearly identical. Deesa is more advanced and has a better climate, while the arsenal of the division is at Ahmedabad. It would of course be better not to separate the arsenal from the principal post in the division, and better still to concentrate both at a spot near Aboo, where Europeans could be kept in better health, than in the plains.

At the other stations there would be no more Europeans than are necessary for the artillery, which would be stationed there.

This distribution is made on the supposition that our army will be more massed than it has heretofore been, that no regular troops, European or native, will be stationed at places like Shikarpoor, Sukkur, Hyderabad, Bhooj, Rajcote, Broach, Surat, Dhoolia, Sattara, Kolapoor, and Dharwar, and that all the duties at these and other minor stations will be performed by local corps and police.

3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and what is their distribution?

3. As in the case of Europeans, this information will be more accurately given in detail by the military authorities at Bombay, and the present state of things is quite exceptional.

Before the mutiny the numbers were:—

- 29 Regiments of the line.
- 1 Battalion of veterans.
- 1 Marine battalion.
- 2 Belooch battalions.

33 Regiments of infantry, not locals.

- 3 Regiments of light cavalry.
- 2 " of Sind horses.
- 1 " of Poona horse.

6 Regiments of cavalry.

About 1,000 artillerymen, with about an equal number of lascars and drivers.

500 sappers and miners.

And they were commonly distributed at the following stations:—

—	Artillery.	Sappers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
SIND DIVISION				
Jacobabad	-	-	3 Regts. S H.	-
Shikarpoor	Artillery.	-	-	2 Regts.
Hydrabad	Do.	-	-	2 do.
Kurachee*	Do.	-	-	2 do.
NORTHERN DIVISION.				
Bhooj	Do.	-	-	1 do.
Rajcote	Do.	-	1 Regt. L.C.	1 do.
Ahmedabad	Do.	-	-	2 do.
Deesa*	Do.	-	1 Regt. L.C.	1 do.
Baroda	Do.	-	-	3 do.
Broach	-	-	-	A detach.
Surat	Artillery.	-	-	1 Regt.
Tanna	-	-	-	Detach.
POONA DIVISION.				
Bombay Garrison	Artillery.	-	-	3 Regts.
Poona	Do.	Hd. Qrs. Sappers and Miners.	Poona Horse at Scroor.	3 Regts.
Ahmednuggur	Do.	-	-	3 do.
Malgaum	Do.	-	-	1 do.
Sattara	Do.	-	-	1 do.
Dapolee	-	-	-	Veterans.
SOUTHERN DIVISION.				
Belgaum*	Artillery.	-	-	2 Regts.
Sholapoor*	Do.	-	1 Regt. L.C.	2 do.
Dharwar	-	-	-	1 do.
Kolapoor	Artillery.	-	-	1 do.
Aden	Do.	-	-	1 do.
-	-	-	6 Regts.	33 Regts.

Besides which, Nusseerabad, Neemuch, and Mhow were occasionally garrisoned by the Bombay troops, when the above distribution would be altered.

H. B. E. Ferris, Esq

The artillery at stations marked * were often exclusively Europeans.

1. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

4. Vide answers to Questions 2 and 7.

As in the case of Europeans, I would regulate the numbers of the army according to the finances; and I should consider that we had as large an army as was desirable in India, when, from the peace establishment we could assemble 30,000 men in equal proportions natives and Europeans, at two month's notice, and 60,000 in three months at any given point of the interior, and at half that notice at any spot on the coast or frontier.

I would assign a fourth of the whole army to Bombay, and three fourths (¾ths) of the Bombay army should be natives. If we could pay an army of 200,000 men in India, 50,000 would be the proportion for Bombay, of whom 37,500 would be natives in the following proportions:—

- Artillery - 700
- Sappers - 500
- Cavalry - 7,500 (say 10 regts. of 750 each)
- Infantry - 28,800 (say 36 regts. of 800 each)

Total - 37,500 *

who might be thus distributed in time of peace.

—	Artillery.	Sappers	Cavalry.		Infantry.	
			Men.	Regiments	Men.	Regiments
Bombay*	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poona (Scroor for the Cavalry)*	200	250	750	1	6,400	8
Nuggur*	-	-	-	-	-	-
Belgaum (Kuladgee for the Cavalry)*	-	-	750	1	1,600	2
Sholapoor*	-	-	750	1	1,600	2
Malgaum*	-	-	-	-	1,600	2
Asseerghur	-	-	-	-	800	1
Mhow*	-	-	750	1	2,400	3
Neemuch*	-	-	-	-	1,600	2
Nusseerabad	-	-	750	1	1,600	3
Deesa	-	-	-	-	2	2
Ahmedabad	100	-	1,500	2	3,200	4
Baroda*	-	-	-	-	1,600	2
Kurachee*	-	250	-	-	3,200	4
Jacobabad*	300	-	2,250	3	1,600	2
Aden	100	-	-	-	1,600	2
-	700	500	7,500	10	28,800	36

The stations marked * are those which I should consider depôts whence in time of war, a force of six regiments of cavalry and sixteen of infantry could be drawn.

Whatever the number of men, the number and dispositions of the battalions and regiments should, I think, be about what is shown above. If the finances will not bear the expense of so many men, reduce each regiment to 600 bayonets or sabres, and even still less if necessary.

5. What proportion of native troops now serving in the Bombay presidency are regulars, irregulars, and police corps, of what races are they composed, and in what proportion do the races occur?

5. Of the troops shown in answer to Question 3, all the artillery and sappers and miners were regulars, and were generally Hindoostan men, nearly the same in composition as the corresponding arms in the Bengal army, with the mixture of some Mah-rattas.

* These are merely proportionate approximations.

H. B. E. Frere,
Esg.

Of the thirty-three regiments of infantry twenty-nine were of the line, regulars in the fullest sense of the word. Probably about half of the men before the mutiny were natives of Hindoostan, of the same races as composed the Bengal army; but as a general rule, much inferior in appearance, for the Bengal army naturally got the *élite* of such classes for Hindoostan as were inclined to take service in our army. The other half were natives of the Deccan and Concan, perhaps in about equal proportions, genuine Mahrattas, with some Deccan Mahomedans and Purwarees or other low caste men, the finest and best men of both classes being from the Concan. The proportions varied very much in different corps, and in some regiments, the Hindoostan men formed such a large majority that the corps were commonly spoken of as "Hindoostanee" regiments. There were always a few Malabar and Telinga men, and in many regiments Jews, who were usually among the best soldiers in their corps. Of other races there was a mere sprinkling, though some pains have been taken of late years to introduce Seikhs and Belooches.

The veteran battalion was of course composed of the same classes as the line regiments, but a large majority were, I believe, from the Concan, where the battalion was stationed.

The marine battalions were mostly Concan Mahomedans and Purwarees, or low caste men, with a few Mahrattas, but all of classes more or less used to a seafaring life.

The two Belooch battalions were recruited in Sind and on the frontier. The first contained a large proportion of Pathans and men from the neighbourhood of Peshawur with many men of Belooch descent. The second had a rather larger admixture of Belooches born in Sind, and of other races from that province. Of pure Belooches from Beloochistan, the proportion in either regiment is small.

The above thirty-three regiments were all exclusively under military control;—even the marine battalion when on garrison duty in Bombay being treated like a line regiment. The marine battalion and two Belooch regiments had only three European officers and a surgeon each, and in interior economy, though not in discipline, differed slightly from the line regiments; but they were never spoken of as irregular regiments. There were in fact no irregular infantry regiments in the Bombay army, all the corps not under exclusive military control being usually classed as "police" or "local corps," and all more or less subject to the civil authorities. They are shown in the following table:—

Name of Corps	Locality	No. of European Officers.
1. Guzerat Police Corps	Guzerat, head-quarters, Kara.	Commandant
2. Guzerat Cooly Police Corps.	Do., do. Ahmedabad	Commandant.
3. 1st Khandeish Bheel Corps.	Candesh, head-quarters, Darrungam, Concan; head-quarters, Tanna.	Commandant, 2nd in command, and adjutant, to each corps
4. 2nd do. do.		Commandant.
5. Ghaut Police Corps		Commandant.
6. Sawuntwaree Local Corps	Sawuntwaree - -	Commandant, 2nd in command, and adjutant
7. Kolapoor Infantry	Kolapoor - -	Commandant, 2nd in command, and adjutant.
8. Rutnagherry Rangers	Southern Concan, Rutnagherry,	Commandant.
9. Kutch Legion (recently raised).	Kutch - -	Commandant and adjutant.

Besides these, there were corps of drilled infantry as police at

Poona,
Ahmednuggur,
Sattara,

Under the superintendent of police.

The two former (Poona and Ahmednuggur) were exclusively employed as police, and on civil duties in guarding district treasuries, &c. The Sattara regiment used to be organized and employed as a line

regiment, under a single European officer as commandant, but I am not aware what changes have lately been made in it.

The Sind rural police consisted before the mutiny of 19 companies of drilled infantry, under the command of lieutenants of police, with an adjutant lately appointed, at—

Shikarpoor - - -	7 companies.
Hydrabad - - -	6 "
Kurachee - - -	6 "

Their duties were exclusively civil, guarding treasuries, &c., and as protective police. To these has lately been added an extra battalion of 800 men, now in course of formation.

As a general rule all the local corps mentioned above were recruited from the localities in which they served, sometimes with a considerable admixture of the same material as our regular army, but usually smaller or otherwise inferior men.

Some were intended to be recruited from particular tribes, *e.g.*, No. 2, from the Coolies or Bheels of Guzerat, the Mahee Caunta, and Rajpootana; Nos. 3 and 4, from the Bheels of Candesh; No. 5, from the Thakores, Coolies, &c. of the Western Ghauts in the Northern Concan; and Nos. 6, 7, and 8, from the military classes of those particular districts of the Mahratta country. The extent to which this original intention was adhered to varied much, according to the individual views or prejudices of the commanding officer; and sometimes considerable numbers of men foreign to the district were introduced. I have seen some of them, especially the Bheel corps, in Candesh, when they contained very few but Bheels, and were in equipment and parade discipline equal to any light infantry regiments of the line.

In the Sind rural police it has always been an object to have a considerable admixture of foreigners, principally Hindoostan men and Mahrattas, and they still preponderate. It was a part of Sir Charles Napier's policy regarding his excellent police, that a majority of the *protective* police in a newly conquered country should not be natives of the country.

Of the cavalry shown in Answer 3, the three regiments of light cavalry were regulars, composed of very much the same material as the Bengal regular cavalry, with the same comparative physical inferiority, and from the same cause as above stated in speaking of the infantry. The admixture peculiar to the Bombay cavalry consisted of Deccan Mahrattas and Mahomedans, but not generally in large numbers.

The Poona irregular horse, and the two regiments of Sind irregular horse, were irregulars, *i.e.* silledars, and exempt from the ordinary regulations of the army, but directly subordinate to the military authorities. As a body they are composed of very much the same materials as the old irregular cavalry of Bengal (Skinner's horse, &c.) and of his Highness the Nizam, the admixture of Deccan Mahomedans and Mahrattas being greatest in the Poona horse.

The same description applies, I believe, to the Southern Mahratta horse; but when I knew them eight years ago there was a large proportion of Mahrattas in them.

The civil corps are:—

I. The Guzerat horse, head-quarters at Ahmedabad, composed of much the same material as the Poona horse, with a large mixture of inhabitants of Guzerat, Cutch, Rajpootana, and Kattywar.

II. The Cutch horse, a small local corps, principally composed of natives of Cutch, with a few Hindoostanees and Deccanees.

* It always struck me that, at least as regarded the Sind horse, the term "irregular" was misapplied, as in all the essentials of military discipline they were as regular and orderly as troops could be. The term "silledar regiments" would much more nearly describe their real peculiarities.

III. In Sind the mounted police are :—

—	Drilled.	Undrilled and Camel Suwars.	Total.
Shikarpoor - - -	300	130	430
Hydrabad - - -	300	50	350
Kurachee - - -	300	25	325
Total - - -	900	205	1,105

They are generally Beloochees or Pathans, natives of Sind and the Punjab, with a few Afghans, Hindoo-stanees, and Deccanees.

6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?

6. The establishments proposed in my answer to Question 4 were intended to be all troops of the regular army, and I think it would be a great mistake to attempt to lay down or to maintain any fixed proportion between them and the police.

It seems to me to have been one of the capital errors of our system of late years to confound the functions of the army and the police, and to keep up an army which was in many respects used merely as a local police force, and to raise corps of police which discharged hardly any duty of real police, and which, except in exemption from many military regulations and from the control of the commander-in-chief, differed in no function that they performed from the army.

I much fear that this fundamental error, as it appears to me, will be perpetuated and extended by the accidental circumstance that during the late crisis the existence of a large military force nominally police, but really a separate army, independent of the commander-in-chief of the army, under the exclusive orders of the chief civil authority, contributed greatly to the salvation of more than one province of the empire.

There can, however, in my opinion, be little doubt that the principle of maintaining such a double army is wrong, both in a financial and military point of view, and that the only sound system is one which keeps up an army for purely military purposes under military chiefs, and restricts the police to their purely police and civil duties, under the authority of the civil magistrate.

If this be done, the respective strength of each branch will depend on considerations generally independent of each other, and the army and police corps will bear no permanent proportion to each other.

A sufficient police should be maintained to perform all real, police, and civil duties. It should be divided into detective and protective police, the latter being sufficiently strong to take all civil guards and escorts, including gaol guards, Treasury guards, and the like. Whatever strength it has beyond what is necessary for such purposes, is not only superfluous but positively mischievous.

The police, should, however, be sufficiently strong to keep in order all troublesome tribes and populations within our own border, without having recourse to the troops of the regular army. The latter should never be called on for active service except against a foreign enemy, or in case of actual organized rebellion and internal war.

There can be no doubt that if these limitations were carefully observed, the defence of the country might be effected with a very much smaller number of men and at less expense than at present, and it must be borne in mind that the strength of the police, as well as of the army, must in the long run be a pure question of finance. It is not what we want, but what we can pay for, that we ought to consider; and if we gave due attention to this momentous question, we should find it much more easy to satisfy our real wants than it is at present.

But effectually to carry out such a system, it is absolutely necessary that both the army and police should be under one local head, with power to vary the expenditure either on the army or the police, and to increase or decrease salaries and establishments within a fixed limit, restricting the total expenditure per annum. It is for want of this power and responsibility that we are rapidly drifting to financial ruin, and that whilst our expenditure is far higher than it need be and greater than our income can afford, there is hardly a department in the State which is in a thoroughly efficient condition.

This inefficiency, easily demonstrable and often admitted, places it in the power of almost any public officer of energy and ability to increase the state expenditure by impressing on the supreme authority the urgent necessity for an increase of some particular branch of his department; while there is hardly a man, from the Governor-General downwards, who has power, without reference to England, entirely to remodel the expenditure of any single department, still less of any dozen departments, so as to bring the total expenditure within a given limit.

It is only by granting such power to the Governors of our great provinces that we can possibly make both ends meet, and ascertain the necessary strength, either of our army or our police, or indeed of any department in the State.

With regard to the proportions between regular and irregular troops, I would entirely abolish the distinction. There should be no troops in the army but such as were subject to the control of the commander-in-chief; and with regard to native troops, I would entirely discard those regulations, the observance or non-observance of which constitutes the present difference between regulars and irregulars.

The essential difference between the two bodies is not the being subject to or exempt from rule generally. Both are subject to rules of their own, and the difference is in the nature of the rule, which is often stricter and more imperative in the irregular than in the regular corps; but the unwritten rules of common sense, applied according to the judgment of a single selected officer, to which the so-called irregular is subject, appears to me much better adapted for the government of native troops than the written rules, intended to insure uniformity of system and conformity to the English army, which have lately governed the regular Indian army; therefore I would advocate the general adoption of the former system.

In speaking of irregular troops it must be borne in mind that many of our so-called irregular corps have been mere disorderly copies of regular troops, the officers commanding them having as little real command over their men as in a regular corps. No argument can be drawn from the failure of such corps.

7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the Bombay presidency? and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive, of police corps.

7. I think it a great mistake to attempt to fix any proportion between European and native troops, except on combined considerations of efficiency and finance.

You require an army to hold the country, and your finances are limited. The great question is, what is the composition of the army which will give you the nearest approach to the force you require, at an expense within your financial means?

There are five propositions which seem to me so self-evident that I will not, unbidden, offer argument in proof of them,—

1st. That it is impossible to hold India with a purely European or foreign army.

2nd. That it is equally impossible to hold it with an entirely native army.

3rd. That there is nothing but our own mismanagement to prevent natives of India being as good soldiers and as loyal to us, their foreign masters, as they have ever been.

H. B. E. F. *Esq.*

4th. That native soldiers are, man for man, far less costly than Europeans.

5th. That a mixed force of natives and Europeans combined is absolutely more efficient, taking all seasons and descriptions of military service together, than any purely European force which you could maintain at the same expense.

The problem to be solved is, then, after employing as many native soldiers as are absolutely necessary to the efficiency of an European force in hot weather, and for services which are better performed by natives than by Europeans, what further proportion of the cheaper and more accessible native element may you add to your army, without impairing its efficiency for general military service?

Judging from late experience, it is difficult to provide efficiently for all the duties of a large army in the field during a protracted campaign in India without nearly as many native as European troops. One half may, therefore, be taken as the minimum proportion which native troops should bear to Europeans, and which it would be desirable to have, even if the difference in cost and difficulty of providing Europeans were not greater than that of providing natives.

In some of our best campaigns, where there has been least reason to desire any alteration in the composition of the force, the proportion has been about one European to three native fighting men; and I have heard Sir Charles Napier argue that a force mixed in such proportions, and led by European officers, was superior in Asia to an equal number of any European troops, except French and English. He was doubtful regarding Russians, whom he had never seen in action; but he affirmed that any general with three-fourths natives, such as the troops he had himself commanded in Sind, and one-fourth Englishmen, ought, in a pitched battle, all other things being equal, to beat an equal number of Austrians, Prussians, or Spaniards. This was a deliberate opinion, which he repeated in writing, and was not hastily formed or given.

Three to one, then, is about the ratio which I should consider natives should bear to Europeans in order to give us the most efficient army which could be kept up for any given sum. A larger proportion of Europeans would give more than you require of the most costly element in your army; a smaller one might reduce too low the element which is most formidable in a general action.

But the proportion would vary in the different arms. In the artillery, the backbone of the army, the advantage of having Europeans is, from the paramount value and importance of the arm, the great utility of individual muscular power and many other reasons, comparatively greater and the drawbacks fewer, than in other arms; and, therefore, in the artillery Europeans should so far preponderate that there should always be at least sufficient to work every gun, save in very rare exceptional cases, where (as on the Sind frontier) it is altogether impossible to keep Europeans permanently stationed. In the cavalry the advantages of employing Europeans are at a minimum, and a very small proportion of Europeans will suffice; one of the principal reasons being that European dragoons can never in this country dispense with their grasscutters and other followers who are necessarily on foot, and thus Europeans, as cavalry, lose much of the superior celerity and independence and other natural advantage of cavalry as compared with infantry, and the advantage of employing the more costly European for such service is much lessened.

I do not think the ratio should be affected by the number of men it may be found necessary to employ as police. It seems to me essential to a sound military system to keep the standing army and the police more distinct than we have done heretofore. In former days our army did much police work. Now our police does in many parts of India much of the military duty. I think the latter is, if anything, the more dangerous mistake of the two, and I think it very essential to economy and efficiency in both branches of the service

that our army should be regulated by our really military wants, and that our police should be restricted to what is needed for its civil duties, to repress ordinary crime, and to preserve internal peace. It is only when a police grows beyond what is sufficient for its legitimate duties that its numbers can have any bearing on our military wants.

8. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally, and state the ratios as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps?

8. The last answer is applicable to this question also.

9. Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Bombay presidency? and state its amount.

9. I am not able accurately to state the total amount of barrack accommodation in the Bombay presidency, but it is notorious that it is quite inadequate to the wants of even the comparatively small body of Europeans serving in the presidency before the mutiny.

I would draw a wide distinction between shelter suitable for the temporary accommodation of Europeans and barracks in which European soldiers can live for long periods without getting sickly and demoralized.

The quarters for European troops generally throughout the presidency are of the former description.

Of the latter description there was not previous to Sir Charles Napier's time a single barrack in existence. Since then excellent barracks have been built.

At Hyderabad (Sind), for one regiment, 700 men.

At Kurachee, for one regiment, 1,100 men and a troop of horse artillery.

And, I believe, at Poona for two regiments (not completed).

The barracks at Sukkur (unused), at Deesa, and at Poona are, I believe, not so inferior in convenience or so unhealthy as others. But, with the exception of the new barracks on Sir Charles Napier's plan above specified, there are none which ought not, on economical grounds, to be condemned and rebuilt if required as permanent quarters for Europeans.

10. Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the Bombay presidency for the strength of European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?

10. There would at present be only temporary shelter for the European troops I deem necessary. Barracks as permanent quarters would have to be built everywhere. Even at Kurachee and Poona, additional barracks would be required.

But the necessity for new barracks would exist, even if no more than the old force of Europeans were kept in the country. There can be no doubt that even in an economical point of view, the old style of barrack was most objectionable. I do not think even the latest built by any means perfect; and I think even better barracks than any we have might be built at not greater cost than those of the latest style.

11. What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what portion should be composed of troops raised for service in India?

11. As far as I am able to judge, the European troops, like every other branch of the army in India, should be a portion of Her Majesty's regular army, and the European portion should be available for service in every part of the British empire.

Every regiment in the army should have permanent head-quarters, either in the United Kingdom, in India, or the colonies. The ordinary European garrison of India should all have the permanent head-quarters of the corps composing it in India, and should not leave India except on extraordinary emergencies; and in like emergencies in India, regiments of the army, whose permanent head-quarters were in the United Kingdom or colonies, might temporarily reinforce the garrison of India.

12. Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them?

12. Many good officers for European regiments might, no doubt, be found among the officers of the native army; but, as a general rule, officers who have served long with our regular native regiments, do not make good officers for Europeans. The system of treating the two races of soldiers, and the peculiar habits of command acquired, are very different. A man who has served long in command of natives is, on that account, less respected as a regimental officer by the lower class of European soldiers, unless they find he has unusual claims to their respect. Even then, he will take longer to establish his position than if he came among them an unknown man. I should say that, if efficiency alone were looked to, it would be best to officer any new European regiments, as much as possible, with officers who have not served long enough with regular native regiments to get their habits of life fixed.

13. Under the supposition that a considerable increase takes place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxtaposition with the purchase promotion system, than what now accrues from the existence of the royal artillery, royal engineers, royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority promotion is the system?

13. I do not see how it could.

14. The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could with safety to our power and supremacy in India be modified from the ratio stated in reply to Questions 7 and 8? If so, to what extent?

14. I think any plan for enlisting any large number of foreign mercenaries would render it necessary to have a larger proportion of European troops than if the mercenaries were natives of India. Some tribes of negroes have, I believe, a sort of dog-like fidelity. But they have peculiarities of their own very dangerous to their employer, and as far as I can judge of races of whom my personal knowledge is very limited, Tartars, Chinese, or Malays, with whom your only bond of union must be the mercenary one of pay, would require an overpowering force of Europeans to ensure their fidelity.

H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the police infantry of the Scinde police is composed?

1. The regular infantry (rural police) were originally almost all of the same material as the native infantry of the Bombay army, chiefly Hindoostan men and natives of the Deccan, who, from want of size or other causes, did not get enlisted in our native regiments of the line. It was a part of Sir Charles Napier's policy that this branch of the police should contain a considerable admixture of foreigners; Punjabees and Pathans were early admitted, and of late years a good many natives of the country, Beloochees and Sindees. It now contains representatives of all the military classes of West and North India and the countries adjoining.

The city police (untrained infantry) contains a few Hindoostan and Deccan Nujeebs and Burkundauze, but is generally composed of Sindees and Beloochees or Pathans, natives of Sind. H. B. E. Frere,
Esq.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

2. They are all recruited almost exclusively in Sind. The men who are not natives of Sind are enlisted at our military stations in the province from among those men who may have come to seek service or with connexions serving in our army.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulation or the practice of the Scinde administration?

3. No. There are some non-military classes, members of which are not to be found in the police; but when a good recruit offers, no objection is ever made to him on account of his race, tribe, or caste?

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the Scinde police?

4. No. There is no exclusion, and I think the best men procurable are got.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts from whence the Scinde police is drawn?

5. None. The commanding officer makes his own arrangements, and has generally many more candidates than he can employ for any vacancy.

6. On enlistment of recruits what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

6. None whatever are prescribed by any authority superior to the captain of police. The officers commanding police corps have the matter entirely in their own hands, and generally take great care to enlist none but known men for whose character they have some guarantee, but they make their own arrangements for this purpose.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?

19. I do not think this is a point on which any authoritative regulation should be attempted. Commanding officers of the regular army corps as well as of the police should be allowed to get the best recruits they can find, when and how they can. They should never be restricted to or excluded from any particular district.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

20. Certainly not. It seems to me one of the capital errors of our late proceedings that we have made our late police in many districts a kind of secondary army, with looser discipline and inferior and harder duties.

The qualities you require in most branches of the police are very dissimilar from those you want in a soldier, and a man is injured as a policeman by learning to ape a soldier. This is very visibly the case in bodies like the London police and Irish constabulary, and precisely the same reasons hold good in India also.

Sir Charles Napier fixed the pay of his police on the principle that the policeman should have higher wages than the soldier, and I think he was right.

I consider that if we gave up the attempt to make our police an inferior kind of soldiers, we should have a much smaller, better paid, and more efficient body of police at less total cost, and be enabled to keep up a much larger, more efficient, and more disposable army without getting into debt.

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Esq.

These remarks are not intended to apply to the military organization of some branches of police which I think essential to order and efficiency, nor to the habit of drawing our police officers generally from among young military men, the army being, I think, usually up to a certain age the best school for such duties. But military order and organization are quite distinct from military spirit; the former are useful if not essential to large bodies of protective police, the latter are not only not useful, but are positively mischievous to the *men* of a body of police, who should always be carefully taught that their function is to keep the peace, not to distinguish themselves by their courage and prowess in fight.

I believe these principles are quite as applicable to the task of preserving the peace among savage and warlike tribes as in a quiet commercial town. Your policeman must always have so much of the hero in him as to be ready to risk his life single-handed in a contest with a host of savage breakers of the peace, whether in a dark alley or on a mountain side; but this is something quite different from his looking to a fray as the summit of his hopes, and to victory in fight as more glorious than inducing the enemy to retire peaceably to their homes without a contest, which is what you want the policeman to effect.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting for the Scinde police?

21. None whatever, but that of the commanding officer, and that which he may devise for himself.

24. Should precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in Scinde before the local authorities of the districts from whence the police are drawn?

24. I do not think any are needed; and if they interfere in any way with the authority and direct responsibility of the commanding officer I should think, them mischievous.

34. How should police corps in Scinde be armed?

34. As at present. Their arms should differ according to the work required of them. The rural police (drilled infantry) should be armed with light percussion fusils and bayonets. The mounted police with sword and carbine, or matchlock. The city police (detective and town police), the detectives and trackers with sword and shield of the country; the town nujeebs with staves, swords, and in some cases fusils or matchlocks.

36. How should the native infantry of the Scinde police be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier.

36. As at present. The rural police in brown tunics, loose trousers of the same colour or dark blue, and Kilmarnock caps or puggrees. The city police, in their native costume of uniform colour, but distinguished from the common people merely by bearing arms.

H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

II.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bombay army is composed?

1. I believe about half are natives of the Gangetic India, of the same races, tribes, and castes as the Bengal native infantry, but inferior in quality, the Bengal army having the pick of such men as offer. There are also many Hindostan and Oude men in the Bombay army belonging to castes, members of which were not usually admitted into the Bengal army. The other half are chiefly Mahrattas, and Deccan Mahomedans, and Purwarrees, with a few Telingas, Jews, and half-caste Christians. There were, before

the late mutiny, two regiments (the Belooch battalions) composed of Beloochees, Sindces, Affghans &c., and orders have lately been issued for raising other corps of this class of men. A few Beloochee and Sikhs have, of late years, been enlisted in most infantry corps.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes and castes drawn from?

2. This has heretofore depended very much on the commanding officer, who had generally an opinion of his own as to where he was likely to get the best recruits, and could generally get leave to recruit there. Out of Hindostan and Oude, the usual recruiting districts are the Deccan about Poona, Nuggur, and Sholapoor, and the Southern Concan, whence excellent soldiers have always been drawn. The district of Sawunt-Warree especially, has always furnished some of our best infantry recruits.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bombay army?

3. No particular race, tribe, or caste that I know of has ever been excluded from enlistment by the regulations of the Bombay army.

In practice, the commanding officers of corps had generally a preference for some particular race or caste, to which the recruiting of their regiment was, so far as lay in their power, confined; but this was purely a matter of personal preference, and the practice of one commanding officer was often reversed under his successor. Of late years there has been, till shortly before the mutiny, a growing preference for the fine men of the upper classes in Hindostan; and, with a view to correct this tendency, orders have been sometimes given from army head-quarters to enlist from particular races, Beloochees and Sikhs, &c. But in general it has been the traditional policy of the Bombay army to avoid having a large majority of the men in a regiment of any one particular race or caste. Even in regiments which, like the Belooch battalions, were originally intended to be raised from a particular race, or which, like the 21st and 22nd native infantry, were generally considered Hindostanee regiments, measures were from time to time taken by individual commanding officers to prevent the material of the corps becoming too uniform.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bombay army?

4. I know of none. I cannot but think it a great mistake to interfere with the discretion of commanding officers in this respect. They should be left quite unfettered to make their own arrangements for recruiting wherever and whatever men they think best. The soundness, or otherwise, of the discretion they exercise is speedily seen in the state of their corps. The interference of head quarters in such matters has greatly increased of late years, and much, I think, to the detriment of the service, especially where it has been directed to ensure conformity to one particular mode of proceeding.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts from which the Bombay army is recruited?

5. In general commanding officers make their own arrangements. Occasionally, when a large augmentation was suddenly ordered, recruit depôts have been established, and the men so enlisted were drafted off as required to different corps. I do not know how the system answered in other respects, but it was, I believe, universally condemned by the commanding officers of the regiments so furnished with recruits. They complained that they never got from the general depôt such good recruits as when they employed their own recruiting parties.

5. On enlistment of recruits what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

6. A form of registration by the local authorities is prescribed, but I have not got the particulars at hand to refer to. I do not know what particular object they are intended to secure, and I can imagine none which would counterbalance the undoubted evils of a multiplication of such forms, of which we have already far too many.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoy, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?

7. I am not aware of any precautions taken in such cases, and cannot imagine any to be necessary, as the recruit would probably, and ought generally, to have been known from his childhood to the officer enlisting him.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bombay army?

8. I think all existing regulations should be abolished as far as they interfere with the perfect free agency of commanding officers in such matters. This matter of recruiting is pre-eminently one on which the commanding officer, if fit for his post, must be better qualified to judge than anyone else, and in which any mistake he may make is most quickly seen by himself and all his superiors, and most easily corrected. It is hardly possible that, if unfit to choose recruits, the commanding officer can be qualified for his position in other respects; and it is certain that the best conceived regulations on such a subject, if stereotyped and imposed on commanding officers so as to interfere with their free agency, immediately become mischievous. Recruiting is an act of selection, and it appears to me a self-evident absurdity to prescribe rules for selecting, which the party entrusted with the responsibility of the selection shall be bound to follow. What you want is a certain quantity of bone, muscle, and other physical qualities, joined to docility, courage, and fidelity, and nothing can, I think, be more unwise than to hamper a man with any rules to fetter his proceedings in looking for such qualifications beyond what his common sense and experience may dictate to him.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bombay army?

9. I have not got the form at hand to refer to.

10. How long has this form been in use in the Bombay army?

10. I am not aware. It is, I believe, an old form.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the sepoy of the Bombay army?

11. Some special formality to remind the recruit of the solemnity of the engagement on which he is entering, must, I think, be beneficial; but the pledge should not be in the form of an oath. If such oath were taken in any form which the recruit would consider more binding than a mere verbal pledge, it must be in a form which his British officers would generally consider idolatrous or blasphemous.

Moreover, such oaths make the recruit fancy that it is the oath which binds him to the State, and not the obligations inherent in the relation which exists between the State and a volunteer soldier, which the natives well understand when left to themselves, and commonly designate by their well-known allusions to their "Salt." The consequence of the recruit substituting in his own mind the obligation of the oath for the natural obligation of fidelity to the State, is, that whenever he meets a Moolah or a Brahmin to

adjure him by some more potent form of oath to do some act inconsistent with his fidelity, he is the more prone to obey, under the impression that his oath to the State is overruled.

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12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bombay presidency of seafaring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

12. There are many such races, tribes, and castes, and marine corps, to almost any amount which could be required in India, might be raised from them.

13. Has the Bombay presidency any marine corps, and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?

13. The Bombay marine battalion is, I believe, 1,000 strong. It is recruited generally from the Concan and Guzerat coasts. The men are generally Purwarrees* of various castes and Mussulmen of the coast, who are a peculiar race, much given to a seafaring life. There are also a few Mahrattas

14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only?

14. I think there should be no such restriction. Each regiment should, I think, have permanent headquarters, as recommended by General John Jacob, and many of the recruits would naturally be drawn from that neighbourhood. But I would on no account impose any restriction on the commanding officer in this respect; any such restriction must, sooner or later, produce most mischievous results. You may select the best possible recruiting district, and yet a commanding officer may in the exercise of a wise discretion consider it highly inexpedient to take any recruits from it for his own particular regiment, and you ought to permit him to select from a fresh field, without requiring him to give reasons sufficient to satisfy departments at a distance. If the matter is left entirely to him you may be very sure that, allowing for a few individual aberrations, you will on the whole get the best recruits procurable, and where the best recruits are procurable is the best recruiting district.

15. Or, should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

15. Decidedly, without any reference to districts. I can imagine but one reason assigned for indicating peculiar districts whence recruits should be drawn, and that is, a fear lest any single favourite district should obtain a monopoly of the privilege of supplying our army with recruits, and thereby give them a bond of union other than their duty to Government, and reproduce one of the causes which facilitated the late mutiny.

But there is little danger of this being the case now—when opinions are much more divided than formerly as to what class of men is preferable as material for naval soldiers, some men preferring Sikhs, some Pathans, and many continuing to prefer Hindostanees of various classes and races. But admitting the danger, it is much more likely to be enhanced than diminished by any prescription of the district whence the recruits are to be drawn,—a rule which could hardly fail to produce an evil very similar to that which it is intended to remedy.

* Purwarree is a generic term used in Western India to denote a class of men who are not outcasts, for they are divided into numerous very distinct castes, and are as particular in such matters as their high caste brethren, but who are accounted impure by the higher caste Hindoos, and generally in a Mahratta village live apart outside the village walls, whence the name "Purwarree," outside the village. They comprise the Mhars, known in some parts as Dhers, and Merasees and Soortees, who are a very important part of every Mahratta village community, acting as village watchmen and messengers, as conservators of boundaries, and taking a part in every ceremony connected with the land of which they claim to be the autochthones. They were probably the original inhabitants, subdued by Hindoo invaders and reduced to a species of helotage. They are perhaps the most numerous race of Purwarrees, Mhars, Chumbas, and other races answering to the Dehances Passes of Hindostan are also accounted Purwarrees. The Purwarrees found in our army are mostly Mhars and a few Chumbars, and are physically a very fine, energetic, and intelligent race of men.

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Esq.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

16. In my opinion certainly not. I think such a rule would be most dangerous. A corps of soldiers should have no common bond of union other than their duty to the State, and the rule above described would furnish them with a common bond rarely consistent with their duty as soldiers, and often diametrically opposed to it. Our great object should be to make the men feel only as soldiers, and, as far as we can, to sink entirely all considerations of race, tribe, or caste. Experience shows that there is no military duty, not even service beyond sea, which is found inconsistent with the strict observance of the necessary rules of caste and religion, by men who have the true spirit of soldiers, and it has repeatedly been shown in practice that there is no reason whatever why a man's caste should in any way interfere with his ordinary duties as a soldier, or be known to his comrades or commanding officer otherwise than every individual peculiarity must be known.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

17. Certainly not. I think it a fundamental principle in any native army, that no question should ever be raised as to a man's tribe, caste, or religion, except as a matter of identification like his father's name or surname.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

18. I do not think any rule should be laid down, nor should officers or men be allowed to consider that such circumstances as race, tribe, or caste had anything to do with the selection of a soldier. No restriction whatever should be placed on the discretion of a commanding officer in selecting men, beyond requiring him to get such men as he can make into good soldiers. Another strong reason against attempting to lay down any fixed rule on such a subject is that the best proportion must be always altering. What may have been a reasonable proportion a generation or two ago, or even ten years ago, may have become unreasonable now, but your rule once laid down never alters till it has been proved actively mischievous, and has meantime often produced incalculable evil.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?

19. I do not think that either with regard to military or police, any rule as to the recruiting district should be prescribed to commanding officers.

It is most necessary to the efficiency of police that they should not be allowed to play at soldiers, and if the essential distinction between the police and the army is duly observed, I do not see how they can clash in recruiting any more than the London and Irish constabulary interfere with the army at home.

For police you require more than one class of men; some (detectives) must almost necessarily be taken from the district in which they serve, others (protective police) may be advantageously men of other provinces, but both classes should be chosen for qualities different from those required in soldiers, and are spoiled if allowed to consider themselves a military body.

It seems to me that the non-observance of this distinction between military and police is one of the main causes of our present financial embarrassment and of many of our military difficulties. When the distinction is not observed, it gives us a police expensive and

extensive beyond our wants, while, as soldiers, they are not as efficient a force as might for the same cost be entertained.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

20. Certainly not; for the reasons above given the two services should be kept as distinct as possible. This opinion does not at all affect my conviction that a certain degree of military organization is essential to many branches of the police force, and that in general young military men make the best European officers to command police. No doubt, also, a native who is well fitted for the police may often be well qualified as a soldier, and *vice versa*; but the two classes of duties being entirely and essentially distinct, much harm must result from any confusion between them.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bombay presidency or of its dependencies, or in districts of other presidencies?

21. I do not think any special agency should be employed. Recruiting should be left entirely to commanding officers to be managed by them as they think best.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps or a distinct agency?

22. The same answer applies to this question also.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bombay presidency?

23. No precautions whatever, as far as I am aware, are needed, and I can imagine none which would not do much more harm than good.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bombay presidency?

24. The last answer applies to this question also.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country; and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?

25. I think it would be a very great, if not a fatal mistake, to look to other tropical countries out of India for recruits for the non-European portion of our Indian army. I do not speak of what may be advisable in a sudden emergency, but as part of our ordinary system I have heard of and I can imagine no single reason for such a step, except that such tropical foreigners will be found able to stand the sun as well as natives, and will be more trustworthy.

As regards the first point, their capacity for standing the extreme heat of an Indian sun, I would admit, for the sake of argument, that if men of the tribes I have heard named, Malays, Dyaks, Caffirs, Negroes, &c., could be dropped down in the midst of a hot weather campaign, as few of them would be likely to die of mere solar heat as if they were natives of the country. But it is not heat alone which kills men in and after such a campaign, and I know of no reason for hoping that tropical foreigners would be more exempt than Europeans from the diseases which are caused by such heat, combined with bad and insufficient food and shelter, damp, and malaria, while they would be far more obnoxious to all that great and fatal class of diseases which are caused or aggravated by mental depression. Judging of such men (of whom I have, of course, little or no personal knowledge) by what I hear and read of them, and by what I do know of other semi-barbarian tropical races with which I am acquainted, I should say that, under adverse circumstances, which would only rouse the spirit of the European and increase his powers of endurance, physical as well as mental, the tropical foreigner would sink into apathy and die, and there can be little doubt

of their utter helplessness and hopelessness under all trying circumstances, when deprived of the leaders whom they know and to whom they are accustomed, an incident which must often happen in war.

Of all the heroic characteristics which distinguish us as a nation, and which make us what we are, there is none more marked than what is called the "not knowing when we are beaten," the endurance and steadfastness which continues a contest as a matter of duty, even when all apparent hope of success is gone. Many Asiatic nations, the Turks, for instance, and Arabs, have it in a high degree, and some of the races of India; but I never heard it attributed to the tropical foreign races whose enlistment for Indian service is usually advocated, and some of them are said to be remarkably deficient in it, giving up, in a stupid, sullen despair, and refusing all further effort when they believe themselves beaten.

I think there can be little doubt that in circumstances like the siege of Delhi and defence of Lucknow such races would be found less enduring than either Europeans or natives of India.

I doubt, therefore, whether any real advantage would be found in employing them in active operations, and whether in the long run, they would be found more capable of bearing the climate than Europeans, or more powerful auxiliaries than natives of India.

In times of peace they have absolutely no superiority over good native troops, while in many points they are much more troublesome and expensive.

As to their superior fidelity, I think it will be more than doubtful if they are ever employed in numbers sufficient to make them a real counterpoise to the natives of India.

They can have to us no single tie but the mercenary one of pay, in which we may be at any time outbid. No sepoy in India can possibly be so purely and entirely mercenary as these tropical foreigners must be. In temporary discontents they may be less likely to join, owing to their general want of sympathy with the bulk of the native population; but in any general contest for empire they will assuredly be more liable to corruption, because there is but one single motive to be influenced. The solitary example of Swiss fidelity can hardly be held to disprove the experience of all purely mercenary armies from the beginning of time. They are good for conquest, with both pay and plunder before them, but can never be depended on for defence against an invader who appears able as well as willing to buy them over.

The expedient of relying on such foreigners has again and again been tried by oriental despots, and is indeed a stereotyped part of their policy. A body guard of exotic mercenaries so pampered and indulged as to leave them nothing to gain by change, so hated by the people as to make their interests one with those of their master, and so small as to put independent action out of the question, has often shown exemplary fidelity to a tyrant. But when such a body outgrows the small dimensions which are essential characteristics of such a guard, it has invariably been found dangerous and generally fatal to its employer, and in no case has it ever afforded an example which the Government of British India would follow without certain danger, and hardly doubtful disgrace.

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

26. This is answered above. There can be no objection to letting any commanding officer get men where and how he pleases, and if he has a fancy for men who are not natives of India, and can get them, let him do so, and try them. I believe the result would be to prevent his wishing to repeat the experiment; but, in my opinion, no special agency or extra expense, should on any account be allowed for such a purpose. Every plan of the kind proceeds on the supposition, which I believe to be most erroneous, that natives of India are not to be trusted; but I hold

entirely with General Jacob (*vide* his letter to Sir C. Trevelyan), that in the military races of India we have the best possible material for a native Indian army, and that nothing whatever has failed us but our own bad workmanship. Every incident of the last two years seems to me to point to the same conclusion, and I feel convinced that, had the same system been applied to any other materials, drawn from any other race with which I am acquainted, the progress of failure and ruin would have been much more rapid.

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

27. *Vide supra*. In a mercenary army no agency should ever be permitted to supersede that which the commanding officer of the corps to be recruited may devise for himself.

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?

28. I should say, decidedly not. Such an arrangement must, I should think, be bad for the discipline of Europeans, and utterly destructive to the morale of the native portion of the corps.

I have never heard any reason assigned for a scheme beset with such manifold inconveniences, except that the Europeans are required as an antidote to suspected native treachery, and as a kind of body guard to the European officers serving with the native corps. For any such purpose they seem to me to be about as effectual as concealed armour against the knife of the assassin, but a poor security at best, and one which renders life hardly worth having, if it can only be preserved on condition of maintaining such safeguards.

It appears to me that, unless we can keep India principally by native agency, in whose fidelity we can feel the same sort of reasonable confidence which we felt while we were laying the foundations of our empire, we shall soon become weary, if we do not become incapable of holding it. The process of holding the wolf by the ears can never be tolerable as an habitual mode of life, and it becomes impossible when the wolves are counted by tens of millions, and the holders of them can never exceed a hundred thousand.

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

29. *Vide* last answer. I believe any such plan, however modified or disguised, would be the signal, if not the occasion, of our Indian empire slipping from our hands.

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?

30. *Vide supra*. The idea of keeping one portion of an army to watch another and guard against its proving faithless seems to me utterly inconsistent with any possible condition of permanent security.

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

31. Very seriously, I should think.

32. How should such companies be armed? with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?

32. There should be no difference in the mode of arming owing to difference of race. Any such difference should depend solely on the service the troops are required to perform, and their physical capabilities for bearing arms.

33. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be armed?

33. With the best known infantry weapons, adapted in size to the ordinary strength of the men using them.

*H. B. E. Frere,
Esq.*

34. How should police corps in the Bombay presidency be armed?

34. According to the service they are required to perform. No one but the officer commanding them can well judge what is required, and the question should be left to him, taking care that he does not overarm his men by trying to make soldiers of them. Staves and swords for the foot police, except those who are employed to guard treasuries and prisoners, who should have percussion fusils and bayonets, and swords and light percussion carbines for the mounted police, are the arms generally required.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

35. The only advantage I know of is, that the difference between European and native troops may not be perceptible further off than the colour of the face can be seen. If the dress of the European soldier were what the climate requires, and calculated only for convenience and efficiency, I know no reason why the native dress should not assimilate to it quite as closely as is necessary for the purpose above specified.

36. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

36. A very loose single-breasted frock coat without collar, just long enough to cover the thighs. Loose trousers, buttoning at the ankle, of cloth in cold weather, and stone coloured or "kakee" linen in the hot weather; a colored puggree, a canvas haversack to carry what he requires on the march, waistbelt and pouch and belts of the natural colour of the leather, without either blacking or pipeclay. The above makes, so far as I can judge, the best dress and equipment I have seen. It is becoming and serviceable, and most comfortable to the men.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

37. I do not think, as a general rule, this plan will be found to answer. It would be generally incompatible with the selection of thorough qualified officers to command natives, which is, I think, a fundamental principle in the organization of a sound native army. The native portion of the legion would soon come to be considered inferior to the European, and such feeling of inferiority is quite incompatible with any useful result from such association. Whenever European and native regiments are together on active service, a strong feeling of attachment as well as of emulation grows up between the Europeans and any corps of the native force which prides itself on being soldierlike, and you may tell with much certainty the spirit which animates a native regiment if you observe the feeling between its sepoys and the European soldiers. I could mention numerous instances of this within my own knowledge. Attachments so formed endure for years, and have always excellent effects on both races of soldiers, but I doubt if they would ever be formed by such an arrangement as is indicated in the question, unless very effectual means were taken to prevent the native portion of the mixed legion being considered an inferior body.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

38. I think not. The duties to be performed by the men of each race being, in the case of the artillery, so essentially different.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

39. *Vide* answer to Question 37.

40. Would such a system be favourable, or the reverse, to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?

40. I think anything which tends to make the native army be considered an inferior branch of the service, must do harm to both officers and men. Officers should be taught to consider service with a native corps a proof of special qualification and trust. The men should be taught to emulate as soldiers the soldierlike qualities of their European brethren. I do not see how this is compatible with the kind of permanent association here spoken of, and therefore I think the plan not likely to do good; but I cannot see that such association is at all incompatible with security, or likely to impair the sense of the superior power of Europeans, a knowledge of which is, no doubt, one element of strength.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

41. This could hardly be answered without trying it.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

42. The spirit of entire confidence and self-reliance seems to me essential to the idea of a soldier of any kind, and without it he must become not merely an useless but a most mischievous encumbrance to the State. To train the native soldier to act in habitual dependence on European support seems to me to be equivalent to emasculating him, and an army of such soldiers must be far worse than none at all. It is because I think that the plan of auxiliary native battalions, in permanent association with European corps, is not calculated to promote such habits of self-confidence and reliance, that I doubt its working for the good of the native portion of the army. No doubt, however, means might be devised for rendering such association of native with European corps more habitual and permanent than at present, which would be free from such objections; but I do not see the precise object to be gained.

H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Bombay army, what is the system of promotion? Is it based on merit alone or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. On merit and seniority combined. The senior who is thoroughly qualified is generally taken; but simple seniority and merely blameless service confer no insuperable claim.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bombay army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. I should say remarkably so. They are, as a body, excellent officers.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

3. Yes, as far as I have seen, they are very generally much superior to the average of the ranks from which they rise.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?
4. None that I know of. The man's character, as known to his European officers, is the test.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers? Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers?

5. As far as my observation goes, I should say the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men greatly added to, if it be not essential to, the full influence of good European officers. I cannot see how the legitimate influence of the European officer could be communicated to the men generally without the intervention of the native officers.

I should think a full complement of European officers must militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers. The best managed regiments I have known, have generally been those in which the complement of European officers was far from complete. There is not occupation with a native corps of the Bombay army, in time of peace, for more than three or four officers, and if more are present, they not only take work which is better left to, because it is better done by, native officers, but deteriorate themselves for want of full employment. I believe it is different in the Madras army, where the system affords more occupation to the European officer, without interfering with the native officers.

6. Has it been found in the Bombay army that on the occurrence of mutinies the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers?

6. In all the cases, three in number, in Sind, which came under my personal observation, the native officers gave information of the disaffection of their men. In each case the information was given in time to prevent a successful rising, and in at least one case, it was given long beforehand, and in such a manner as admitted of every precaution being taken.

In none of these cases did any of the native officers openly side with the mutineers, but some were suspected of secretly conniving at their plot.

In the Sind horse, under great and continued temptation, the native officers behaved with exemplary fidelity, as well as intelligence. No mutiny took place where they were quartered, but they aided to obtain information of an intended rising of the frontier tribes, and to arrest the ringleaders exactly as European officers with the same opportunities might have done. In their own ranks there never was a single case of even well-grounded suspicion of want of fidelity in either officers or men, and their simple presence kept to its duty another notoriously disaffected corps of Bengal irregular cavalry which was quartered at the same place.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bombay army?

7. I consider it essential to the very existence of a useful native army, that native officers should be continued very much as at present, but they should be differently treated. The number of European officers with a native corps should be diminished; they should be all selected men. The work of officers of companies should all be done by the native officers, and they should not be the puppets of a formal system of drill and paper returns.

8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment, in lieu of its native officers, advisable?

H. B. E. Frere,
Esq.

8. I should say that unless the serjeant and corporal were fully equal to most European commissioned officers, the effects of such an arrangement would be fatal to the native army, and even if they were so qualified, the arrangement would be mischievous in the extreme.

I entirely concur with what has been recorded by many eminent authorities, and especially by General Jacob, as to the absolute necessity, if we would keep India, that we should allow none but educated European gentlemen in feeling and principles, and if possible, by birth and station, to have any immediate connexion as officers with our native army, and no more of them than can be supplied with full and responsible employment.

The substitution of two European non-commissioned officers for the native officers of each company would, if the Europeans were not superior to the generality of that class at present, exclude all the best native soldiers from our ranks, and add infinitely to the hostility of race, of which we have lately had so many symptoms, and which, unless corrected, must lead to irreparable evil and disaster. I can conceive few single measures better calculated speedily and irretrievably to ruin our native army, and however individually excellent the Europeans may be, it is morally and physically impossible that they should ever supply the place which the present race of native officers fills in the Bombay army, by forming a link between the European commissioned officer and his men.

But while they would not form such a substitute for what we have got, even if fully equal as officers and gentlemen to our present race of commissioned officers, they would, in other ways, be a very mischievous superfluity. There is not work enough to afford full regular occupation for even one active-minded European in a well-disciplined company of natives, and the two Europeans must, like all half idle men, become actively mischievous to an extent directly proportioned to their capacity for fuller employment.

9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of services be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

9. I should think certainly not. Our best native officers and soldiers do not serve simply for pay but for distinction; and would not enter at all if debarred promotion to posts of influence and honor. I do not think, from all I can learn, that good service pay and pension at all influence men till they have been some time in the service. They have a great effect in deciding the old soldier to serve on or to retire; and in influencing his conduct while such rewards are in near prospect. I should much doubt if they ever influence a recruit, as the prospect of promotion to honorable office certainly does.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

10. They have no doubt had a considerable effect; but I think we impair that effect by giving the pension indiscriminately, and as a right, to good and bad soldiers indifferently, and on medical examination, which gives rise to much malingering.

11. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

11. I should say yes, assuredly.

*I. B. E. Frere,
Esq.*

12. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

12. I think no pensions should be given as matter of right.

They should be given at the recommendation of the commanding officer to men of a certain age and of approved service when disabled by loss of health or worn out in the service. Instead of the present matter-of-course pension, I would propose, that after a certain number of years of good service, the soldier should if he wished it, and if his commanding officer approved, be absolved from further ordinary duty, continuing to receive a certain portion of his pay on condition that he presents himself for muster periodically at the fixed head-quarters of the regiment, does duty there at a slightly enhanced rate of pay for a number of days in each year, sufficient to keep up his drill, and is ready to be called out for permanent garrison duty when summoned by proclamation, becoming eligible for pension and exemption from further service when fairly worn out.

The benefits I should expect from such a system would be:—

1st. Some reduction in the expense of the pension list.

2nd. A reduction in the number of men necessary for the peace establishment of a regiment.

3rd. We should have always at hand a force of old soldiers, sufficient, with a few recruits, to take much garrison duty, and set free for distant service a large and very efficient proportion of our army on the active establishment.

I have always seen reason to believe that pensions, when fairly earned, and given with discrimination to men who have given the best part of their lives to the State, have a very beneficial effect, and that the money is well laid out; and this belief has been in no way modified by the fact, apparently well attested, that large numbers of pensioners in the North-Western provinces behaved as badly, and some even worse, than the general run of mutinous soldiers. The classes whence they were drawn, their habits and feelings, were all identical with those of the sepoy, and it was even less matter of surprise that a pensioner should misbehave than a man in active service. Old servants, whether of the State or private individuals, are proverbially discontented. It is notorious that the inhabitants of Chelsea and Greenwich hospitals are, as a body, less content with their position than their brethren on active service. But we must look for the effect of the pension; not to the pensioner, but to the expectant, and on the public at large. Whatever fault a native may find with our government, he generally makes some exceptions, grounded on the liberality and the good faith of our government in this matter; and I much doubt if the same effect would be produced, were the amount of the pension list added to the pay of men on active service. I think it a mistake to judge of the effect of pensions, or any similar arrangement, from what occurs during an exceptional period like that of the late mutinies. It was unmistakeably a period of national delirium, and it is not the best mode of guarding against a recurrence of the paroxysm to treat the patient as though his delirious ravings and acts were any guide to his ordinary course of conduct when in his sober senses.

13. What is the charge to the state of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bombay army?

13. I am not aware of the exact amount.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

14. I should say they were generally proportionately as well qualified for such duty as the officers of any other army I know. I have occasionally obtained their assistance as assessors on civil trials, and have always had reason to be satisfied with their efficiency.

15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

15. I should say, generally, that in professional intelligence that native commissioned officers were, as a body, very much superior to the general run of European non-commissioned officers, and for duty with natives very conspicuously superior in efficiency. Sometimes, as in the Sind irregular horse, they seem to me even better fitted for detached duty than great numbers of English commissioned officers. I have no doubt whatever that, as far as regimental duties go, native officers are to be got for our Indian army, as efficient, generally, as any large number of European officers we could spare for such duty. It is as commanding officers that the superiority of the selected European is very decided.

16. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps;

1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades, as well as with European officers; or,

2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades; or,

3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers?

16. I should say—1st. That the separation of military from police corps was imperative; 2nd. That every native regiment should be officered on the third of the plans above alluded to, with a full complement of native commissioned officers, and with not more than three or four European officers, all of them selected men. There are few things connected with India regarding which I feel more strongly convinced than that this is the least costly, because it is the most efficient, mode of officering native regiments.

17. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

17. Fully with native officers, and from one to three European officers, according to the character of the people and the work to be done.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good service pay and pensions, as incitements to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

18. Having expressed an opinion above adverse to any such scheme, I need only add that I do not think any possible amount of good service pay and pension would make the regular as popular as the irregular corps, or draw to them as good recruits.

19. In police corps, is there, on first admission, any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing; or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades; or on promotion to commissioned grades?

19. I believe not. It is, as far as I know, left entirely to commanding officers of police corps to impose or withdraw such tests. Any such test, if rigorously applied, must exclude some of the best natural-born policemen.

20. Has the distinct organization, and the difference of system, regulations, and the component races in the three native armies proved favourable to our power in India?

20. I believe it has been one of the main causes of our safety lately. I do not see how, if the three armies had been assimilated, the late mutiny could

have been otherwise than universal, and India, for the time at least, must have been lost to us.

I am convinced few things can be more dangerous to our power than compulsory uniformity.

21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate Governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed; or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

21. I think that all such individual peculiarities as indicate individual character should not only be allowed, but encouraged. I cannot imagine any really healthy organization existing without them. Whenever the local Government recommended any peculiar arrangement on the ground of its being called for by temporary or local circumstances, the presumption should always be, that they had good grounds for so thinking; and the point should always be conceded, unless some very clear and obviously valid objection could be stated. The reverse of this has been our usual policy. The peculiarity may not be in truth really necessary in itself, but it is an absolutely necessary symptom of that which distinguishes the separate individual from the lifeless copy, and its removal destroys individuality.

It must be borne in mind, that there is no such thing as stereotyping any branch of the administration of human affairs; least of all is such a process possible in the organization of an army. Thirty years of profound peace may, and often has, changed the best army of the age into a set of lifeless automata easily defeated by any rabble which had the individual spirit and other characteristics of a living body. It may be fairly doubted whether any great general ever found his army ready made to his hand. Re-organization, more or less in accordance with his own personal views and temporary exigencies, has usually been his first task.

But though no army can maintain its perfection for more than a few years—and constant change for the better or the worse is as much a law of nature in armies as in all other human contrivances,—much may be done to defer decay, and to keep up in time of peace that spirit and martial pride, that fidelity to a particular dynasty or service, and those other characteristics which will be most useful when the body comes to be remodelled to suit some future exigency. All assimilation, no matter to how perfect a model, which aims at removing individual peculiarities, has a tendency to injure such characteristics of vitality, and consequently to hasten decay.

There are, in my opinion, but very few points in which diversity of system causes any practical inconvenience, even when the diverse bodies are serving together. Diversity of organization or composition is of comparative little consequence, if each separate body be large and commanded by its own officers; and I can think of no points, save the rates of pay for similar arms, the mode of promotion of officers likely to command, and the general principles of formation in the field, in which diversity can be of real practical inconvenience, and regarding which assimilation is desirable.

I cannot but think that any attempt to assimilate the Indian armies to each other, beyond those points in which diversity is of practical importance in the field, must hasten the deterioration of the whole body.

The course I would, in preference, most strongly recommend is, the direct reverse to assimilation and amalgamation. The unwieldy size of our Bengal native army was no doubt one element of its ruin, by precluding any officer, but more especially the commander-in-chief, with his five years' tenure of office, from gaining even a general knowledge of the whole body. It seems to me that our Indian forces should be redivided into at least four, if not more, armies, so as to admit of a really active commander-in-chief gaining a general knowledge of the whole body under his command; and the utmost latitude in organization should be allowed to local authorities, within the limits imposed by a due regard for the finances of the empire.

Even with regard to the three points on which I admit assimilation to be in some respects desirable, there are exceptions and limitations so numerous as almost to negative the rule. For instance, it is doubtless desirable that the rates of pay for similar arms should be in some respects similar; yet this must be subject to many local variations. Every military man knows the inconvenience of having the same rate of pay for service in an expensive presidency town, and at a cheap out-station. The best military races in India, who will serve for 7 rupees in the valley of the Ganges, or at the Nizam's Hyderabad, will not voluntarily take service in Sind on 10 rupees; and the irregular cavalry soldier, who finds 20 rupees enough for himself and his horse in one part of India, would starve on 30 rupees in another. It is only, therefore, when different bodies of the same arm are serving together in the same place that uniformity should be insisted on. So, in the promotions of officers likely to command, a system, say that of seniority, which might answer admirably for engineers or artillery, might fail to secure in cavalry that youthful vigour and dash required for a good captain of a troop. Again, a system which secures the flower of our aristocracy for Her Majesty's household troops might fail to secure good officers for distant and inconspicuous service in a tropical climate. Even with regard to formation in the field, much allowance must be made for national character. The formation which suits the steady and enduring English soldier is not equally liked by the impetuous Frenchman. The diversities of national character in our Indian army are at least as great as among the nations of Europe; and the Oude or Seikh sepoy, the Affredee and the Goorkha, have each their favourite mode of fighting, and some of them must act to disadvantage if all are compelled to adopt any one uniform mode of formation.

H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

INFANTRY.

I.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the native army?

1. I, of course, have no practical experience of their working, but judging from what I hear and see, the articles of war for the native portion of the Bombay army have always appeared to me to be utterly unsuited to the government of such a force.

2. Their general idea is taken from the articles of war of Her Majesty's army, modified with the intention of making them suit natives of India; but our native army differs from our English and from most European armies in several characteristics, which are so important as to make what is suitable for the one quite unsuitable to the other.

3. Our English army is a national force, our Indian native army is to a much greater extent a mercenary force. There are powerful feelings to which you can appeal in the one case, and not in the other.

4. The pay and position of an English soldier is, in many respects, inferior to those of the industrious and well-educated of the class whence he is usually taken. Hence, simple dismissal, especially during the earlier years of his service, is no punishment. The reverse is the case with the native soldier; he is better off than the generality of the class whence he is drawn, and simple dismissal is a substantial punishment, involving the loss of an eligible and lucrative employment.

5. On the other hand, the English soldier, after a few years' service, becomes unfitted for earning his livelihood by other occupations, and if cast adrift, must often beg or starve. This is not the case with the sepoy; there are many professions in our own provinces open to him if he leaves our army, and he can always, if he wishes, find military service in the armies of other States.

H. B. E. Fiere,
Esq.

6. These two latter considerations point to simple dismissal at the will of a commanding officer as a punishment much more effectual, and at the same time less liable to abuse from undue severity, in the native than in the British army. To the native dismissal is a substantial punishment during the earlier years of service, and later in life does not become absolute ruin, as in the case of the English soldier; hence the long array of provisions in the articles of war calculated to enforce the unwilling service of an underpaid English soldier, and to secure him from ruin when he has long served the State, and become unfit for other employment, are quite inapplicable to the native soldier.

7. But the main difference of all is that the English soldier comes of races habituated to self-government, and you can only get good recruits in large numbers by letting them see that, however ill-paid and undesirable the service is in some respects, the soldier has still rights of his own. The non-military class in England would not, with their eyes open, tolerate paying for an army of their own countrymen ruled on purely despotic principles. The articles of war give to the engagement between the soldier and the State some semblance of a voluntary compact, and any breach of the articles of war becomes a breach of a law apparently in some degree self-imposed, punishment for which commands little sympathy among Englishmen.

8. Asiatic soldiers, on the other hand, come all of races habituated to despotic government, and in the dealings of a State with its servants and subjects they understand and appreciate no other. The grant of rights which they can enforce against their sovereign and employer simply puzzles them, and a code like the articles of war and army regulations, by giving rise to vague notions of some ill-understood rights, which some unknown authority is apparently suspected of wishing to subvert, creates a vague feeling of suspicion and discontent. Natives much prefer serving under a master whose wishes and temper once understood are to them a law and rule of conduct of which they know the exact provisions and obligations. An Englishman asks "What are my rights and duties?" The Asiatic guesses what they will be by the answer to his question, which is always, "Who is my master?" and amid all the intricacies and divided responsibilities of our present system, this is a question to which he can rarely get a clear and decided answer. In some respects his adjutant or commanding officer, the brigadier or adjutant-general, the commander-in-chief or governor in council, are all, more or less, his masters; but he can never clearly understand the exact relation of each authority to the other, still less can he find the one master whose will to him is law, for he still perceives behind the government itself some power which prevents the government from being absolutely despotic.

9. That the natives infinitely prefer the individual despotism is clear from the preference they always show for it, when the two forms of subordination are presented to their choice. Service in an irregular corps is always preferred to a regular one, and no one can deal long with natives without finding that they prefer serving a man they know and can trust, and that they will rely on his arbitrary will, rather than get the most binding charter of rights that ever was written on paper, by a man whom they do not know.

10. In all that General Jacob has written and published on this subject I most fully agree. Rules and laws of some kind there must be, but they should be confined to a definition of who is to be obeyed. The authority of the immediate commanding officer should be made supreme over all natives who are placed under his orders, to the extent of dismissing them from the service; and he should be held strictly responsible to a superior commanding officer up to the commander-in-chief, for the mode in which the authority so given is exercised. But the responsibility should be always retrospective, in the shape of praise or blame for what is done, and should never involve the necessity of applying for previous sanction. Whatever appears

soundest and best in the way of rules for such exercise of authority should be embodied in manuals and text-books, which leave an opening for discretion and judgment, and should never assume the form of blind and unalterable law.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

2. Regarding the kinds of punishment, there should, I think, be no distinction whatever subjecting one class of troops to punishments from which others are exempt. The arguments for special rules for each kind of force all are founded on the difference between the two armies already noticed, the European soldier being often the unwilling servant who is to be retained in the service by fear of punishment, the sepoy being the voluntary member of a service, expulsion from which is, in itself, severe punishment. In a service like the latter I can imagine no reason for any peculiar military code at all. Offences against discipline and military orders can be severely punished by simple deprivation, temporary or entire, of all advantages of the service, while for any other offence the general code may be so arranged as to inflict sufficient penalty. There is no so-called military offence which does not in its essence constitute civil crime, and which might be punished as such, if proper provision were made in the general code.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bombay army?

3. First, I believe their working depends very much on the superintending European officer to whose opinion they are very apt to show more deference than is consistent with independent judgment. I have rarely heard complaints such as I have seen stated against the system in the Bengal army, that native courts-martial are unduly lenient. Perhaps the contrary is often the cases in Bombay.

2. Secondly, I do not think native courts-martial should ever be allowed, except as delegates of authority conferred on them by the commanding officer. He should be the sole and supreme judge over the men, and the occasions must be rare in which such delegation can be necessary or advisable.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bombay army with the military code under which they live and are governed?

4. I know of none, except the periodical reading on parade of the articles of war, which I imagine are understood by but few; and even if thoroughly understood, they would teach little without a thorough knowledge of the glosses supplied by departmental rules and general orders, with which but few even of the European officers in a regiment have more than a superficial acquaintance.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?

5. I cannot say.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bombay presidency?

6. Under the general regulations, especially those noted in the margin. There are

Bombay, Regulation XII. of 1827. some circular orders of the Sudder
Do. IV. of 1830. Adawlut and of Government relating
Do. III. of 1833. ing to police corps generally in

force. But they have never been separately collected or codified. They do not apply to Sind, where the only orders affecting the police are those issued by the late Governor, and the civil commissioners who succeeded him.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bombay presidency?

7. Mainly, I believe, by the power of dismissal.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps and the authority of their European and native officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

8. I believe, in the old provinces of Bombay, the pay is generally very low, and the penalty of dismissal in consequence, not heavy. The discipline is, therefore, of necessity more lax than it ought to be. In Sind, where the pay is better in proportion to the ordinary rate of wages, the working of the system is quite satisfactory, and it would be so everywhere if the police were adequately paid.

H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE (SIND).

No replies required to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in Scinde?

6. The police in Sind are subject merely to the ordinary civil regulations and to such general rules as may from time to time be laid down by the captain of police under the authority of the Commissioner in Sind, and the Bombay Government.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in Scinde?

7. The captain of police has absolute power of appointment, promotion, and dismissal of all men and officers of the force, subject, of course, to the general authority of the Commissioner and Government. This is found ample for the maintenance of discipline and authority.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

8. Yes. It is by far the best organized, best disciplined, and most efficient police I have known or heard of in India. I know of no change which it would be desirable to introduce, beyond raising the pay in some branches and in some localities, where a general rise of wages has placed the policeman in a less favourable position than he formerly occupied as compared with the day labourer.

H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS (SIND).

From No. 1 to 16 inclusive no replies required.

17. How should the Scinde police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

17. The present number of European officers is hardly sufficient. There should be one captain and one lieutenant or adjutant of police in each of the three divisions, and a superintendant with an assistant, over the whole province. The European officers should be generally taken from the army, but uncovenanted officers, if otherwise fit, should not be excluded.

The native officers should be, as at present, promoted from the ranks of the police, at the discretion of the captain and superintendent; their pay at present is too low and should be raised.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

19. I should say decidedly not. Native officers are in my opinion absolutely essential in any military body composed of natives.

19. In Scinde police corps, is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing? or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades? or on promotion to commissioned grades?

H. B. E. Frere,
Esq.

19. There is no test beyond what the captain and lieutenant of police may choose to impose. The selection rests entirely with them, and I do not think it could be in better hands.

No replies required to Nos. 20 and 21.

H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

QUESTIONS having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of November 25, 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in Sind, and what is their distribution?

1. One.

Station.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.
Shikarpoor -	None -	1 company - -	1 light field battery
Hydrabad -	None -	2 companies - -	1 light field battery.
Kurrachee -	None -	2 companies, and head-quarters Her Majesty's 51st.	1 light field battery.
Total in Sind	None -	9 companies - -	3 light field batteries.

This is exclusive of the depôt at Kurrachee for recruits and invalids belonging to regiments in the Punjab, the strength of which is of course very variable.

In ordinary times of peace it has been usual to keep two complete regiments of European infantry in Sind, divided between Hydrabad and Kurrachee, a troop of horse artillery at Kurrachee, and sometimes a light field battery of European artillery, but till the present year, the batteries at Hydrabad and Shikarpoor have been usually native goulundauze.

2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for Sind, and what should be their ordinary distribution.

For service in the province, no European troops whatever, nor any portion of the regular army would be required, the police being ample for all provincial requirements.

As a part of the general defence of India, the duty to be performed by the troops in Sind would consist of:—

1. Garrisoning Kurrachee, which is the key of the Indus, and a seaport of remarkable salubrity, where troops can be embarked and disembarked at all times of the year, and where they are admirably placed for movement up the Indus, and in any direction by sea. It must be in a few years one of our principal arsenals, and greatest military stations in India.

2ndly. Keeping open the communication up the line of the Indus with Mooltan and the Punjab.

3rdly. Observing the Bolan Pass, one of the two great highways from the West into India.

It is only the first of these duties which should be assigned to Europeans as an ordinary part of our system owing to the extreme heat in Central and Upper Sind. I think it would usually be found convenient to keep at least one-fifth of the whole force of European infantry and artillery of the Bombay army at Kurrachee, and if our finances allowed of our keeping more than 10,000 Europeans in the Bombay army, the excess could not be better posted than at Kurrachee.

At present the high price of forage at and near Kurrachee, renders it unadvisable to post any European cavalry there, and none could exist and remain efficient during the hot weather in Upper Sind.

H. B. E. Frere,
Esq.

3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in Sind, and what is their distribution?

3. The ordinary distribution of native troops has been in time of peace.

Station.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Infantry.
Jacobabad	2 regiments, irregular cavalry, Sind horse.	—	—
Shikarpoor	—	Light field battery.	2 regiments.
Hydrabad	—	Light field battery.	2 regiments.
Kurrachee	—	—	2 regiments.

At present the only native troops are the two regiments of Sind horse at Jacobabad, a single regular regiment of native infantry at Kurrachee, and an extra police battalion lately raised at Hyderabad.

The civil duties everywhere are taken by the police.

Orders have been lately issued to raise a 3rd regiment of Sind horse and two sillidar rifle regiments at Jacobabad, where they are now in process of formation.

4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for Sind, add what should be their ordinary distribution?

4. No portion whatever of the regular native army is required for provincial purposes in Sind, the police being ample for every local duty.

As a part of the general defence of the country, the frontier field force on the scale recommended by Brig. - Gen. Jacob, and (with the exception of the artillery) already sanctioned by Government should be maintained, and posted where they will command the Bolan Pass.

I think that when we have completed the railway now in course of construction from Kurrachee to the Indus opposite Hyderabad, and with such flotilla belonging to Government and private companies as will, in a few months, be on the Indus, no troops need be permanently posted at Hyderabad, nor at Shikarpoor, nor anywhere else in Sind, except at Jacobabad and Kurrachee.

5. What proportion of native troops now serving in Sind are regulars, irregulars, and police corps? Of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur?

5. As regards the regulars and irregulars, *vide supra*, answer to Question 3. The information regarding the races of which they are composed will be found in the answer to this question relating to the Bombay army generally.

The Sind police was the first body of the kind organized in India, on a system devised by Sir Charles Napier, under the orders of Lord Ellenborough. They are divided into—

1. "Rural police."—A body of drilled infantry, whose functions are purely protective. They guard prisoners, gaols, and treasuries, and wherever permanent guards are required. They were originally entirely Hindostan and Deccan men, Sir C. Napier holding that, in a newly conquered country, a large proportion of the protective police should be foreigners. It was also found at first difficult to get Sindees and Beloochees to submit to the uniform and drill, but of late years many of them have been enlisted.

2. "Mounted police"—a body of police horse, some of them armed and equipped like the irregular cavalry. There are many Hindostan men in the ranks, but the majority are natives of Sind, Beloochistan, and Affghanistan. Their functions are partly protective and partly detective. A portion of the mounted police in each collectorate are Beloochees of various frontier tribes, dressed in their national costume and riding Belooch mares; and a few of them, who are employed in the sandy portions of the desert, ride camels.

3. "City police."—A small proportion of these men are ordinary nujeebs and burkundauze for protective police purposes in towns, but most of them are trackers and detectives, and, with very few exceptions, natives of Sind.

6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?

6. *Vide* answer to Question 4. I not think it would be possible to fix any proportion. The strength of the police should be regulated by purely local and provincial wants, the state of crime, &c., to which the number of troops of the regular army quartered in Sind, would have no reference whatever, the latter being dependent on purely general considerations connected with the defence of the whole presidency, and totally irrespective of local wants.

7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in Sind; and state the ratios both inclusive and exclusive of police corps?

8. *Vide* answer to the same question relating to the Bombay presidency.

9. Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in Sind? and state its amount.

9. Observing the distinction between barracks sufficient for temporary accommodation, and such as are fit for permanent quarters, I should say, that of the former class there is ample accommodation for a regiment at Sukkur. No European troops are ever likely to be stationed there permanently, but the barracks are occasionally used by troops passing, and should be kept up in a serviceable state.

There are very fine barracks, with ample accommodation for one regiment (700 men), begun by Sir Charles Napier, at Hyderabad. It is not a place where I would recommend Europeans being permanently stationed, but the barracks will always be of use for the temporary accommodation of troops when Kurrachee is over-crowded, or for regiments going up the river, and they also should be kept in good repair.

At Kurrachee there are excellent barracks for a regiment of infantry (1,100 men) and a troop of horse artillery, and inferior shelter for about 2,000 more Europeans. The latter is only fit for temporary use, and it would be an economical measure to pull them down and rebuild them on a better plan.

10. Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in Sind for the strength of European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?

10. Good barracks for at least 3,000 men should be provided at Kurrachee, in addition to the good barracks now there, and in substitution for some of the old temporary buildings.

H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

From H. B. E. FRERE, Esq., to Lt.-Col. DURAND, C.B.
SIR, November 6, 1858.

I HAVE the honor to forward replies to the questions received with your letters noted in the margin, and to express my regret that a constant press of current business has occasioned so much delay. The answers to the remaining questions are now in the copyist's hands, and will be forwarded, I hope, in the course of a few days.

2. I have answered all the questions to the best of my knowledge, believing that though I can speak with official or professional authority on comparatively few points, the opinions of a non-military person, who has lived more with the military than with any other class of his countrymen in India, would not be without their value on most of the questions which engage your attention.

3. And as you have done me the honor to consult me, I feel assured that when interests of such magnitude are at stake, you will pardon my expressing in a more condensed form my general views on the subject of the inquiry which you have in hand, referring for details to the answers to your questions.

4. Throughout the discussion which has taken place regarding the re-organization of the army, it strikes me we have very generally forgotten that the main question is one of finance. We are now, with no external war on our hands, living far beyond our income, which is at best limited, not capable of rapid extension, and in some important items, very precarious. The vital question is not "What army would we think desirable or sufficient?" but "What army can we afford?" This applies not only to the numerical strength of our army, but to the relative proportions of natives and Europeans, and to all the most important points touched on in the Court's despatch.

5. It seems to me that in the strictest military point of view, the restoration of our finances and credit is the first thing to be thought of; that a surplus income, good credit, and a contented native population, which needs no large force to keep it from rising, are as important to the commander-in-chief as a powerful and well-appointed army, and that the command, to whoever is entrusted the task of re-organizing the army, must be not to "make the army all you desire or consider sufficient," but "do the best you can to raise the most efficient army possible at a given annual charge."

6. The most sceptical must now be convinced, that admitting the re-conquest of India over and over again to be within the power of England, no army which it can be worth our while to maintain, could hold India, unless we can revert to our old normal condition, when our subjects generally acquiesced passively in our rule, and when we were rarely reminded that it was necessary to use our army except against independent or semi-independent states. It seems to me utterly impossible that our present system of holding the country with European detachments scattered over it can be persevered in, without the destruction of all discipline and an aggravation of the feeling of general distrust, which makes Englishmen, as well as natives, suppose that a detachment of Europeans is necessary at almost every station.

7. The material power of England was, no doubt, ample, if properly directed, to have crushed the United States in the war of independence. We retired from the contest and gave up our colonies, not because we felt we were the weaker party, but because we felt we could not retain them without an expenditure of blood and treasure so vast, and the creation of feeling so bitter, as to render the price of retention greater than the value of the possession to be retained.

8. If we would avoid the necessity which obliged England to cast off her American colonies, we must continue to govern our own Indian province hereafter as we have generally done before, through the respect and with the consent of the natives, and to trust, for the general maintenance of internal peace, to our police. A conviction of our superior military power is one necessary element of real respect, but such respect derives its greatest strength from a belief in our superior wisdom, justice, and moderation, and is something very different from the simple conviction of our superior brute force, on which it is now so much the fashion to recommend reliance.

9. Sooner or later the language of the Government of India to the ruler of every subordinate province must be, "We can afford you no more than so many millions per annum for your army; you must do your best with that, and preserve internal peace at home, and be prepared to assist in repelling attacks from abroad. What you cannot effect by force of arms, you must secure by sound policy and good government; and no government can be good, de-

pending solely on a military superiority, which requires to be constantly exerted and exhibited, in order to check the spirit of rebellion." *H. B. E. Frere, Esq.*

10. But for the task which this command would, at the present moment, impose upon the governments of three-fifths of India, powers the most dictatorial are necessary. We have always hitherto been and are still in the condition of an insolvent Irish landowner before the Encumbered Estates Act was passed, empowered still further to pledge and waste an income already insufficient to meet the current charges, but without any power to revise the expenditure as a whole, that is, to reduce charges which it is mathematically impossible to meet in full, and to apply the saving to purposes either necessary to the existence of the estate, or calculated to improve its income.

11. One of the most potent causes of this dilemma appears to me to be our false system of centralization. Of true centralization of power in India, I at once admit the absolute necessity. Nothing can be more thoroughly centralized than a vigorous oriental despotism where all the centralization is by persons: where, from the sovereign down to the headman of the village, there is a continual personal chain of subordination, and where anything like concurrent powers or jurisdiction in the same locality is utterly unknown.

12. But our attempts at centralization during the last 25 years have been the reverse of all this. They have been all by departments instead of by persons. I know of no successful instance of the kind in history, and it appears to me to be the true, almost the only source, of a general decay of vital power ominously coincident with a dropsical increase in the extent of the body throughout which the vigorous action of that power is necessary to continued existence.

13. In every natural despotism, in every vigorous despotism of which we have any record, each subordinate from the sovereign downwards, is one of several functionaries who represent, in a more limited area, the grade above them. The delegation of independent power for special purposes, or in a particular department, direct from the sovereign, and independent of his local representative, has always been an exceptional measure to meet some temporary exigency, and generally a sure symptom of decay and weakness.

14. But of late years in India our Government has presented to the people the spectacle of a number of departments with independent or concurrent powers sometimes pulling together, by virtue of national habits of order and subordination, but oftener unconsciously and unavoidably thwarting and impeding each other to an extent quite subversive to good government. Nowhere in India is it now possible to find any functionary of a grade higher than the village headman, who can say that he represents Government in all its departments, that he has himself undivided authority within the territorial bounds of his charge, and that he is responsible only to one superior representative of Government.

15. From the Governor in Council, with very imperfect legal authority over a great portion of the army, and some weight, but no authority whatever in matters of legislation, with post offices, telegraphs, and accounts under entirely independent control, with but little power to sanction expenditure, and still less to readjust both income and charges, this infinite subdivision of power and responsibility is continued in an increasing ratio down to the subordinate civil magistrate, within whose territorial charge, as large as one of the smaller kingdoms in Europe, are a dozen distinct departments, — military, judicial, medical, ecclesiastical, police, postal, educational, for inquiries into tenures, surveys, and many others, — all independent of local authority and subordinate to some chief, often so distant that his powers of control, for any useful purpose, are absolutely nullified. To our native subjects nothing is more bewildering than this infinite subdivision of authority.

H. B. E. Frere,
Esq.

16. We cannot defend our departure from the orthodox pattern of despotic governments by saying that our system has worked well in practice. In the first day of serious trial, the machinery, moved by such slender threats from so many and such distant sources of power, became utterly disordered and refused to move; and the action of Government in its distant provinces has only continued where an irregular assumption of power and responsibility saved the State by acts of happy and patriotic illegality.

17. Nor does our system of pseudo-centralization in any way conduce to economy in the finances. Even the Governor-General at the head of his Supreme Council, if he creates a new office or adds to the salary of an old one, is unable to readjust the expenditure of a single province without risk of his revision being disallowed by the home Government, and I have known this power very lately exercised on a large scale, and with the most mischievous results to our finances,—lacs of rupees being annually wasted and lost for want of the establishments which every authority in India, who had anything to say to the subject, admitted to be absolutely necessary to the collection of the Government dues. Yet the same authority, so powerless in one respect, can make peace and war, and incur millions of debt. Similar anomalies are found in all branches of our administration. There are few of the superior servants of Government with a sphere of authority so limited, that they cannot do much to increase the charges of the State by neglect and apathetic adherence to forms, if not by their own act or influence. Fewer still who might not, if they had the power, readjust the expenditure of their departments so as to secure greater efficiency, if not an absolute saving of expense.

18. The late alteration in the constitution of India may confer on the Governor-General the autocratic powers he requires; but I respectfully contend that a similar process must be continued lower down in the scale; that we must centralize by persons and not by departments, and that in place of numerous independent departments, undivided power must be delegated to the administrators of all our larger provinces, if we would avoid general bankruptcy and ruin.

19. Most of all is this necessary in the army, where the very essence of the institution is despotic power, joined to individual responsibility, and where any division of authority has invariably, in any season of trial, proved fatal.

20. How little our own armies have conformed to this rule, I need not now point out. Even in Europe, our almost invariable want of success at the commencement of a war, and the enormous losses by which final success is preceded, have become proverbial. As we know no nation of which the people are individually at once so bellicose, so full of resources, moral, and material, and so subordinate to legal authority, none of the current explanations of this phenomenon seem to me sufficient. It may be that our usual national habits of managing affairs by the counsel and consent of many, rather than by the absolute will of one, form an obstacle to that military organization for which the nation is in many other respects so well adapted, and that we do not succeed, till that habit has been for the time laid aside. Be that as it may, we find, as matter of fact, that our most successful generals and expeditions have been either beyond the reach of post, or have succeeded only when imminent danger or exasperation at repeated failures, led the nation to a tacit concession of dictatorial powers.

21. These may be truisms, but they point at what seems to me a radical and incurable defect in the means we are now adopting to reorganize our Indian army.

22. A commission well selected and faithful to its charge, may expose abuses and trace the causes of disasters, but I submit it must be essentially powerless and useless to create or reform an army, unless it acts at the bidding and in the confidence of one man pre-

pared and empowered to carry out at once, such of its views as may commend themselves to his judgment.

23. In all great operations, the army must be the creation of the general. A commission can no more supply him with a ready made army than with hands or teeth. No one can imagine Wellington or Napoleon fighting with an army organized by an independent commission, nor can we separate the idea of our Indian army from the Clives, Cootes, Lawrences, and Wellesleys who formed it. It is true that a good army will ever produce good generals, but they will always be men of the second order. Growing up with and in the army, they may, however, generally be relied on as sufficient for the ordinary wants of an empire, for everything except the crisis which calls for and creates the natural general or great conqueror.

24. Such a crisis is the reformation of an army which has become effete. No army or military system can be stereotyped; a continued career of conquests, like that of the Romans, may for generations and centuries, while continually operating on fresh fields of action, maintain the vitality of a military system; but even then, the organization of the army alters as its bulk increases. The legions which defended Rome, in the first Punic war, were nearly as different from those which fought under Titus as either were from the Macedonian phalanx. Commonly a single generation of profound peace is sufficient to cause such serious change in any military organization as to render necessary a thorough reformation of the army. It is vain to expect a general merely system-made to reform the system which produced himself; still more hopeless is the task, if entrusted to a commission of officers of inferior rank, but still system-made. The only hope is in the man, rare in every army, but always to be found among a military nation, who, comprehending the great principles of military science, can apply them to circumstances different from those under which he learnt them. But he must have power to apply them without reference to precedent or usage.

25. Such a crisis is now upon us; and I submit that it is equally hopeless to attempt reorganization, either by commissions of many men trained according to the effete system, or by any one man, however able, who is empowered to inquire and form an opinion, but not to act on it.

26. For inquiry and report as to the causes of such a disaster, no individual can possibly supply the place of a commission. His opinion must always be more or less liable to the imputation of partiality, and such inquiry is precisely one of those judicial acts to which the consent of several good judges is necessary, in order to give it weight in public estimation.

27. Still less can we hope for any successful reorganization as a result of the inquiries of an individual whose duties are limited to inquiry and report, without the powers of a general commanding in chief to act on his convictions and to carry them into practice. The soundest conclusions he can draw may be set aside as individual crotchets unless they happen to be supported by a certain number of opinions from the more experienced, but possibly less judicious individuals he has consulted. Even if adopted, how small is their chance of success when the task of carrying out his views is entrusted to persons indifferent, it may be, or even bitterly hostile and unconsciously anxious to see the best considered plans of the reformer justify their own prophecies of failure.

28. I would, therefore, respectfully but very earnestly state my opinion that the duties of any Commission should be limited to inquiry into the causes of disasters and the defects of the system which has broken down, if there is supposed to be any doubt or room for further inquiry on those heads, leaving the re-organization of the army to individual officers empowered at once to give effect to the reforms which they may find necessary, either as commander-in-chief, if the required man be found in the higher ranks of the army, or as a minister of war, should he not

happen to be a military man of rank sufficient to give him the supreme command.

29. It seems to me that we have very unnecessarily increased our difficulties by enlarging the sphere of our inquiries beyond what was absolutely called for. About half of our native army has failed us. We shall, as we proceed, find much to reform in the other half. But there can be no present reason why we should increase our difficulties by undertaking the reform of that which appears at all events to answer its present purpose. The Madras army may not be perfect, but its imperfections are at all events not identical with those of the late Bengal army. When we consider the large number of officers present with each regiment, and devoted to its duty, with no temptation to leave it, the excellent system of recruiting and promotion in the native ranks, and the admirable standing orders which leave so much discretion to authority, but lay down such sound principles for exercising that discretion, we must see that the Madras army has not been exposed to some of the most active causes which destroyed the army of Bengal.

30. Similarly, it has been shown that a considerable portion of the Bombay army is free from the taint of disaffection. There is much, no doubt, in both armies which must speedily be altered, but not for the same reasons or in the same way as the Bengal army, to the re-construction of which our attention should now, I think, be first devoted.

31. The rage for assimilation to certain favorite patterns has already done infinite mischief. Is there no danger that abandoning the attempt to assimilate to standards of proved excellence, we may attempt assimilation to ideal standards of whose practical value we have absolutely no proof whatever.

32. We have further unnecessarily added to our task by including in it the reformation of the police. No doubt the necessary strength of the army depends much on the state of the police, but not more than it depends on the general state of feeling of the people; and for both the loyalty of the people and the efficiency of the police we ought to look solely to the civil government.

33. It seems to me to have been one of our capital errors during late years to confound the functions of the army and the police. The employment of our regular troops on police duties was not a greater mistake than the maintenance of a police larger than is required to prevent crime, and the entrusting to it duties which rightly belong to the army. Nothing can be more distinct than the duties of the two bodies, and the waste of our financial resources, which is caused by our present tendency to maintain, under the name of police, an army independent of the military authorities, and opposed to every sound military principle, is the least of the many evils entailed by the system. In some of our provinces there is said to be no police worthy of the name, and there of course it is the first duty of the civil government to create an efficient police. But in other provinces the police is redundant, and is, in fact, a civil army; and there the first duty of the civil government is to reduce the police to what is really necessary, and to transfer the surplus to the regular army. Under the present system of divided duties and responsibilities it is as vain to hope for the means of supplying the defect as to expect the self-sacrifice which shall confess and cut off the superfluity.

34. I will now briefly describe the plan which I would recommend for the re-organization of that portion of the army which has failed. It will be unnecessary for me to point out how much I am indebted to what Brig.-Gen. J. Jacob, C.B., has written on this subject. But in expressing once for all my general obligations to his writings and concurrence with his views, I would state that my opinion is founded on no hasty assent to a speculative theory, but on a close personal observation, during many years, of the practical effect of his system, on both natives and Europeans.

35. There can be no doubt that the armies of Madras and Bengal, as lately organized, were far too large

and scattered for a single command. To wield either effectually in time of war was an Herculean task, to keep either in real efficiency in dull times of peace was scarcely less difficult, while the reconstruction of the larger of the two at a period when absolute dictatorial powers are not readily conceded, would far overtask the powers of any one man.

36. We may therefore safely assume that the number of separate bodies into which the whole army of India is divided must be increased.

37. There are five grand natural military divisions of our Indian empire. 1. The valley of the Ganges; 2. The valley of the Indus; 3. The West Coast; 4. The East Coast; 5. Burma and the Straits (to which might perhaps be added Ceylon). Each of these divisions has its separate natural lines of operations; on the first four of which it is hardly necessary to specify Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Kurrachee as the natural bases.

38. It might be possible to adjust five such armies to the existing distribution of Governments in India; but there is an immense advantage in making each military division correspond with the area of a separate civil government, and I cannot believe that with all the apparatus of a complete government at Bombay, the anomaly of governing from Calcutta provinces in the Deccan and Guzerat, which are within 200 or 300 miles of Bombay, and the language and races of which are identical with those of the Bombay presidency, can be long maintained again. Instead of extending the authority of the Punjab Government eastwards towards Delhi, the more natural course would be to extend it down the Indus to the sea, which must ever be the natural base of all operations in that valley and beyond its western frontier.

39. A recasting of the limits of the civil governments into which British India is divided seems, therefore, to me a necessary accompaniment to any re-organization of our armies, so as to make the jurisdiction of each of the subordinate civil governments correspond with the natural division of the country to be occupied and defended by each army.

40. In the meantime, while such a measure is being matured, there is no necessity to suspend action with regard to the army; but it is an additional reason why our first efforts at re-construction should be confined to those forces which occupy the valleys of the Ganges and Indus, and which may be taken at about half of the whole army required for India.

41. Such restriction in the task of reorganization would still leave to the governments and armies of Madras and Bombay no light task.

42. To each would be assigned a certain portion of the peninsula, to be occupied and defended by the army of the east or west coast, as the case might be, with power to the commander-in-chief, acting under the authority and with the consent of the Government of his presidency, to modify the stations to be occupied by his army, as he might think best in a military point of view.

43. The sole restriction imposed on the subordinate Governments should be a limit to the total military expenditure. The ordinary charges must be brought within the limits of ordinary income, extraordinary charges arising from the present condition of the country, and necessarily met by loans, being separately submitted for periodical revision and sanction to the supreme Government.

44. The Madras army would probably extend the ordinary limits of the territory it garrisons by occupying the country it now holds in Berar, and the Saugor and Nerbudda territory, while the Bombay army might retain the stations it has lately occupied in Rajpootana, Central India and the Deccan.

45. The civil government of each presidency would have,—

1st. So to rule as to keep the country in order with no other aid than the police.

2nd. To organize, when it does not exist, such a police force as should suffice, not only to detect and prevent crime, but to provide against any disturbance

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within our own provinces short of actual rebellion ; in fact, for all police and really civil duties, setting the army free for purely military duties.

3rd. It would also have to consider, in conjunction with the local commander-in-chief, all the great and important questions affecting the organization of the army, with a view to avoid such errors as have ruined the army of Bengal, *e.g.*, it would have to decide on the number and size of battalions and regiments in the native army ; the number and rank of European officers, by what device of a staff corps, half-pay list, or otherwise, the evil effects of drawing away for staff employment the officers best recommended may be avoided, what can be done by any change in the system of enlistment or promotion of native officers to maintain their efficiency and fidelity, &c. &c.

46. In these and in all other details, the utmost latitude of discretion should be allowed to a local commander-in-chief whose views are supported by the Government of his presidency, provided that certain limits of total military expenditure be observed ; that the Government be not pledged to any prospective expenditure, by alterations of rates of pay or pension without the sanction of the Governor-General in Council, and that a certain amount of force of each arm be kept available within certain geographical limits, for such general service as the government of India may require.

47. The commander-in-chief in India would exercise supreme command, absolved from all charge of the details of any single army, and so relieved, the Government of India would find in him an efficient coadjutor in estimating the value of each army, and in disposing of the great military questions which alone would come before it from the subordinate Governments.

48. The relations of the commander-in-chief of each army to the civil government of the territory garrisoned by that army, and of both civil government and commander-in-chief to the Governor-General of India, would much resemble what in practice they were, in one of the subordinate presidencies 50 years ago, when, whatever the theory may have been, distance and the difficulty of communication rendered each presidency practically independent on all questions save those of really imperial moment.

49. It could hardly be a difficult task for the Supreme Government, if relieved from the necessity for continued interference in petty details which the present system entails, to fix accurately the proportion which the necessary military expenditure of each army should bear to the total military expenditure of India. Everything beyond this limit would for the present be put down as an extraordinary charge, and would come forward periodically for consideration and revision.

50. But the amount to be so allowed, either as fixed or extraordinary charge, should on no account depend on the revenue of the presidency to which the army belonged. The army of India should be considered as a whole maintained and available for the general defence, and the expenditure should be regulated by the means in the general exchequer and by the duty to be done, not by the revenues of the presidency at which the head-quarters of each separate portion of the army might be situated.

51. But it would be otherwise with the police, whose number and pay should bear some proportion to the amount which the persons and property they protect contribute to the state exchequer. It must, however, be borne in mind that the district in which the police is maintained, is often not that which contains the persons or property to be protected.

52. Judging from what is done by the police as organized by Sir Charles Napier, under Lord Ellenborough's orders, in Sind, and as copied more or less imperfectly in every body of police which has since been raised, though in some places it has been rather travestied, I have no doubt that a thoroughly efficient police would prove a measure of economy in the general

expenditure, while it would give the Government a grasp on the country such as it has never yet had.

53. I will not enter here into details, because I hold the subject to be quite distinct from army organization. But one thing is indispensable in both reforms. The whole subject must be entrusted to one head in each province, with full power to carry out his views, and not merely to inquire and report.

54. In the organization of the armies which are to occupy the valleys of the Ganges and the Indus, the first principle to lay down is the same as that already stated with regard to the armies of Madras and Bombay, viz. — that each commander-in-chief, acting under the orders and with the sanction of the local government, should have power to remodel the army under his command, subject to the obligation of confining the local expenditure within definite financial limits to be fixed by the Supreme Government.

55. It is absolutely necessary to the success of this or of any other plan of re-organizing the army that no officer should be appointed either to the command in chief or to any command above that of a company, unless he has been selected for the duty, and the selection in all the higher grades should be such as to ensure the appointment of none but men of proved efficiency. I need not dwell on this subject, for the known incapacity of a great number of our superior officers, the inevitable consequence of our seniority system, is, I believe, the least disputed of all causes of the wide spread evil done by the mutiny.

56. But I speak advisedly and on careful consideration when I say, that in the Bombay army, where the officers commanding brigades and divisions are generally younger men than in the other presidencies, about half of the whole number has been, as a general rule, for as long as I can remember, either notoriously incapable, or past active work, and that of the other half the majority is so much past the prime of life, as to be unfit to bear severe field-service. On looking at the lists I find that the proportion of officers in actual command of divisions and brigades, who were really both professionally competent and physically fit for active service, has of late years been rarely as great as one-fourth of the whole number, and the Government who appointed them has been, as a general rule, practically powerless to pass them over.

57. I see no difficulty whatever in arranging that every officer filling such a situation should be really efficient. Veterans of unimpeached character, but unfit for active service, who, under the present system, get brigades and divisions, might be provided with good service pensions of sufficient amount to compensate for foregoing the position and emoluments of an active command. The total expense of such an arrangement would be a mere trifle compared to the increased efficiency which it would place within the reach of Government.

58. As regards the details of re-organization in the armies of the Indus and Ganges, I have little to add to what has been already placed on record by Brig.-Gen. John Jacob.

59. The number of men now paid for purely military services under various denominations in the tract to be occupied is, I believe, far beyond what would be required for the general peace establishment, and the duty of each commander-in-chief of an army would be to weed out what was useless, and to reduce the rest to such order as to enable him to work with them as one body rather than to create an army *de novo*.

60. His first task would be, in conjunction with the civil government, to fix accurately the limits of duty and responsibility between the military and police, and to take the whole of the military under his immediate and effective control.

61. In organizing into an army the very heterogeneous mass of troops which he would find thus placed under his command, two modes of action present themselves, one to prescribe a model and enforce conformity to it, the other to adopt any thoroughly sound body as a germ or nucleus, and to add to or permit it to grow till it has attained the required dimensions.

62. To the former course there is this insuperable objection, that all our most cherished models have been broken or fallen to pieces, from Peshawur to Bengal; all that for generations past we have been told to imitate has failed us, and this system of assimilation to patterns prescribed by distant authorities, who can never see the results of their orders, is everywhere execrated by the best informed men as one of the main causes of our misfortunes.

63. But we are not without thoroughly sound examples of troops who have stood the shock, and who prove that the art of making perfectly good and loyal soldiers, even of the natives of the most rebellious provinces, has not been lost from among us. We hear of such bodies in other provinces, and I can testify to their existence here, under more than one form of organization. Getting rid of what is doubtful and insecure, let us make such bodies the nuclei of our future army.

64. Should we then take the best of them, and prescribe them as models to the rest?

65. Certainly not; but having selected the best living man (or men, if they are to be found) who had shown capacity to form such soldiers as we require, I would give him full power as a general of division to extend the sphere of his operations till he could fill up the existing gaps in our lines of defence.

66. There are many races which contribute the raw material to our army, and they require very different treatment in detail, though there are a few grand simple general rules which apply to all our dealings with them.

67. That native soldiers should be treated as men with feelings, passions, and prejudices, capable of being developed and worked on for good or for evil, not as mere machines or animals obeying some invariable instinct of caste or race, still less as incarnate demons incurably prone to every form of evil; that after various fashions and with various forms of external difference, they will conform themselves to whatever their European officers are themselves, and wish their men to be, whether brave, zealous, or loyal soldiers, or careless, idle, mercenary, and discontented drones, that they obey the man who represents the Government and wields its power, and not the system or abstraction embodied in rules. All these may seem truisms, but we have too often forgotten them in our dealings with our native soldiers, and obedience to the laws they embody will be found more or less at the root of all successful attempts to command Asiatics, whether in former or more recent days.

68. But it may be asked, granting the existence of sound germs or stocks which may be safely allowed to grow, and that we have discovered and recognized them, what is to be done while a native army is in process of growing from such germs as may exist?

69. We have already in the country the European force which, under any circumstances, must form the backbone of the army. It will hardly be questioned that a total absence of native troops would be a safer condition than the presence of large bodies of men disarmed or distrusted, and requiring to be watched, so that in many parts of the country a general disbandment of the remaining native army would actually add to our strength.

70. We must first of all then get rid of what is incurable, bad, and dangerous. Race alone, to which we are now trusting, will be a most fallacious guide. Not only shall we dismiss many good and useful soldiers, and retain many bad and traitorous ones, but we shall perpetuate a most false and dangerous principle.

71. It is certain that we shall be miserably deceived if we intrust the expulsion of the bad and corrupt portion of our army to any distant authority. A good general personally inspecting a corps under his own command, will soon find out whether the regiment is really to be depended on, whether the officers and men mutually trust each other, as is absolutely necessary, if the body is ever to be better than a broken reed. But it is vain to expect the generality of even good officers to report that they distrust their men. There are, I

believe, hundreds of officers whom no consideration of personal humiliation and ruin would keep silent, but who would be deterred from speaking out their distrust by a mistaken feeling of what is called *esprit de corps*, and who are confirmed in their fatal mistake by a sense of the imminent personal dangers they incur by their silence, which gives to the risks they run an unreal halo, resembling that of an act of duty.

72. No amount of writing or returns to an office at a distance, nor of formal inspections of the old regulation pattern, would elicit the truth in such cases. But a few days with such a corps would show the real feeling to a good general, armed with the powers of a commander in the field, and able at once to weed the army of men and officers whose value as soldiers he had good reasons to doubt.

73. But I believe the more frequent result of such close intercourse between a good general and his troops would be to restore confidence where it has not existed for months and years, and to render trustworthy that which at present is really not so. Those who have never witnessed the effect on disorganized and demoralized troops of the arrival of a general in whom they have confidence, could never believe how much he may effect without apparently doing anything; and I am convinced that the mere presence on the spot of a commander who could and would at once reward and punish, without previous report or waiting for instructions, would alone go far to make trustworthy soldiers of many corps whose own officers now mistrust them.

74. But even if the only effect of his presence were to effect a great reduction in the numbers of the native soldiers now in our pay, I believe the remainder would be more than adequate to our wants.

75. Let it be borne in mind that the army is to be absolved from the ordinary police duties, and it will be evident that the events of the past year, if properly interpreted, have shown us how to do, in time of peace, with a smaller native army than has heretofore been deemed necessary.

76. We may lay it down as a proved fact that no force of Europeans in the field, for a long campaign, is thoroughly efficient without at least an equal number of native auxiliaries to take duties for which Europeans are unsuited. A native army equal in numbers to the Europeans may then be taken as the minimum proportion necessary to efficiency within the regions of tropical heat.

77. We may raise the proportion of the less costly and more easily replaced material as high as two natives to one European fighting man, and still, in the opinion of our ablest generals, the efficient fighting power of the aggregate body will be superior on their own ground to that of any army which can be brought against them. This, then, may be taken as a safe maximum proportion of natives to European fighting men in our army for Indian service.

78. Between the two extremes, one to one and one to four, therefore, we may regulate the proportion, according to what we can get in the shape of European recruits and what we can pay for, both of Europeans and natives.

79. The sufferings of the past year have been of little service, if they have not taught us how to manage with fewer troops than formerly, and how to make those few more efficient.

First. They must be more massed than at present, and the number of distinct permanent stations must be fewer.

80. The great obstacle to this now is the prevailing want of confidence, which creates a panic wherever there is not a force of Europeans. To remove this and inspire confidence is the part of the civil government. It can and it must be done, otherwise life will be to all Europeans intolerable, and the tenure of the country, on any terms, which can make it worth holding, will be impossible.

81. It needs but little knowledge of military affairs to know that, unless for a temporary purpose, the system of holding the country by detachments, each

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so small as to render the preservation of discipline impossible, is a great waste of strength; and that a country can be held by a numerically smaller body of men when they are concentrated into bodies, each capable of independent action, than when they are dispersed in detachments, which may be frequently compelled to remain inactive and on the defensive.

82. Even in our present condition as to means of locomotion and fortified defence, there are many permanent stations which, I think, might with advantage be abandoned. In the enumeration I confine myself to parts of the country with which I am personally acquainted.

83. Secondly. Our strength might be further economized if everything in the shape of an arsenal were made easily defensible by a small body against anything short of a siege, and our larger military depôts on the frontier or seaboard should be fortified so as to stand a regular siege.

84. In all our foreign expeditions it has been a standing difficulty to collect any large body of men without denuding any station of troops. The number of men so locked up and taking no duties but the station guards of our scattered, ill-arranged, and unprotected cantonments has been in itself a considerable army.

85. The expense of providing at each of our permanent stations defensible posts where a very small body of men could protect the families and non-combatants belonging to the army, its reserve ammunition and baggage, and the more valuable public property, need not be large, and could be distributed over a long period.

86. But in this, as in everything else, nothing useful can be done unless we trust to local and individual power and responsibility. Let the general commanding and the chief civil authorities of the province know that they can lay out a certain sum, and no more, in the year, on any object of the kind indicated, regarding which they may agree, and something effectual may in time be done for the money. But if the duty and responsibility is to be divided among half-a-dozen different departments, all practically independent of each other and of the general, and if the result is to be merely a recommendation to a power 1,000 miles off, the present state of things will continue while we remain in India. The same money will be spent, but to little or no purpose.

87. Any moral effect produced by many of our small stations would be far better secured by the habitual formation of camps of exercise, where the troops might be annually marched to a certain rendezvous for instruction in field and outpost duty, as well as in manœuvring in large masses. This kind of exercise will become more than ever necessary as railways and steamers supersede daily marching, and the ordinary annual reliefs cease to become, as they now are, a very useful school for field service.

88. Thirdly. Better arms and superior organization in the natives retained in our service would still further aid us to reduce the numbers who must be kept on foot. It is as much as a man's reputation for sanity is worth to urge this truth at a time when it seems an almost universal opinion that natives are never to be trusted with any but inferior weapons. Yet, I think, it would not be difficult to show the unsoundness of this prevalent belief, not merely because the argument, if good for anything, would require us to restrict our sepoy to bows and arrows or staves; but by the plain reason that if there is a certain work to be done, and it is desirable to employ no more men than are really wanted to do it, it is obviously the wisest plan to give them the best tools they can use. If there are, as all admit, duties for which a native soldier is more useful to his European comrade than another European would be, why employ two sepoy with flint muskets, or three with clubs, when one man, with a good rifle, could do the work better? The expense in direct pay, as well as in carriage, commissariat, and all incidental expenses, is greater for the larger and less efficient

body, and there are three men to be taught and kept to their duty instead of one. If the native soldier be, as some [most unjustly and untruly, I believe,] assert, incurably untrustworthy, why employ three traitors, each of whom has a certain amount of physical force independent of you, and which you cannot take away from him, when one traitor with good tools will do the work equally well, and be more manageable.

89. In a financial point of view the difference is enormous. I once calculated that fully three-fourths of a million might at once have been saved in the arm of native cavalry alone by adopting the best equipment and organization we know, while the efficiency of the arm would be fully doubled. It would not be necessary to give expensive or very formidable arms to the police, whose power ought not to rest in their superior physical force. If the population generally are prohibited from carrying arms, all you require is that the policeman should be somewhat more than a match for a ruffian he has to apprehend, and swords and ordinary light fusils or carbines are as effectual and sufficient as better weapons. When the police require Enfield rifles and artillery, it is time they should stand aside, and make way for a regular army.

90. Fourthly. A much smaller number of troops would suffice, if the facilities for moving them were greater.

91. As regards natives, I am convinced that one of the readiest and most economical means of increasing their mobility would be to adopt General Jacob's plan of extending to the infantry the sillidar principle, which has been found so efficacious as applied to cavalry.

92. In the latter arm the value of the principle is now recognized, and sillidar cavalry are generally admitted to be fully equal in efficiency, while in facility of movement they are infinitely superior to cavalry organized on what is called the regular system.

93. But as applied to infantry, the sillidar mode of organization has been less known, and the first trial on a large scale is now being made by General John Jacob in the rifle regiments of his frontier field force. I will, therefore, at present express only my conviction that the principle will be found as valuable for the other arms as for cavalry, and that, while effecting an important saving of expense, it will render the troops we entertain much more moveable than at present by the ordinary means of field transport, and, consequently, render a smaller number of men able to do the work of larger bodies under the old system.

94. Fifthly. With respect to extraordinary means of transport, it is fortunate that our great lines of military communication correspond exactly with our great commercial lines, and that no line of real military importance can be projected which is not worth construction on commercial grounds. This coincidence is perhaps less marked with regard to lines of communication parallel with the sea coast. But the law still holds good, and taking into account all military advantages, Government may, I believe, safely guarantee the usual rate of interest on any line which a respectable company can be found to undertake. In every point of view, I know no line of more importance than that which would connect Kurrachee with Mooltan, and the latter city with Peshawur and Lahore, running parallel to the only frontier the invasion of which is something more than a remote possibility. I feel convinced that no expense which the finances of India can bear should be spared to render this line, by both river steamer and rail running parallel to each other, as perfect as possible. The effect, however, cannot be very immediate, and I will therefore refer for details to a separate memorandum on the subject, as applied to the portion of India with which alone I am personally acquainted.

95. For the formation of common roads much greater latitude should be given than is at present allowed to local authorities. Every head of a province should have a certain sum allowed to him yearly for this purpose, and he should be desired to do his best with it towards improving the communications within his

charge, beginning with the trunk lines. Sums unspent in one district might be transferred at the end of the year to another which could spend more. I am convinced no other system will for centuries to come give to India the roads we require for military or commercial purposes.

96. In estimating the strength of the army required for India, we must take into the account that the events of the last year have, to a very considerable extent, relieved us from all apprehension of active hostility on the part of subordinate native states within our border. The force required at any native capital is now clearly necessary rather for the defence of our ally than to coerce him, and I cannot but believe that the declaration of a more liberal policy in cases of succession; guaranteeing all native chiefs who are not, according to native custom, heirless, against annexation of their estates, except in case of proved disloyalty, would do much to reduce still further the chance of our ever having to use our Indian army against the chief of an Indian state. No such guarantee need, of course, extend to what are really attributes of sovereignty. It would merely assure chiefs against all fear of their estates and property being confiscated under color of an extinction of the line to which the rights of sovereignty may appertain.

97. Seventhly. The system of permanent head-quarters for regiments, recommended by General J. Jacob, might, I believe, be made the means of greatly promoting both economy and efficiency in our native army. It would then be possible to allow men who had served past the prime of life in the active ranks of the army to retire with a provision for their maintenance, which would secure to the State their services during a portion of each year for exercise, and for permanent garrison duty on full pay when required. This arrangement might be made far less costly and less liable to abuse than the pension list, to which it would be a valuable auxiliary, and often an excellent substitute, in securing efficient men for the active ranks of the army.

98. There can also be no doubt that the system of permanent head-quarters would greatly facilitate recruiting.

99. The combined effect would be that it would be possible, on emergency, to move out for active service every formed soldier capable of enduring a campaign, leaving at the same time a sufficient garrison of veterans, convalescents, and recruits to afford protection to the station, and to the regimental families and property, the disposal of which is now so frequently a source of serious inconvenience.

100. It would also be possible with safety to reduce much more extensively and rapidly from a war to a peace establishment, and to consult immediate economy without the risk of reducing too far the available strength of the army.

101. It does not appear to me at all impossible, by the system I have described, in the course of two years to bring our military expenditure within the limits of our present income, and still, if we steadily persevere in it for the few years required to extend our railway system, to be able to concentrate 30,000 men, half of them Europeans, at any given point in the interior of India with two months' notice, and 60,000 at three months' notice, and similar numbers with half that notice on the frontier or seaboard.

102. With less than this, I cannot think that our Indian army is equal to our requirements; but I must again repeat that the first of our necessities seems to me to bring our ordinary military expenditure in time of peace within our ordinary income, and to be able to trust to our police for the preservation of internal peace.

103. I believe the principles above stated are applicable more or less to the whole of India. But I will not attempt to show how they should be applied beyond the valley of the Indus, of which alone I have some personal knowledge.

104. It has always appeared to me one of the capital errors of the existing organization of India, that the

sea base of all military operations in the Punjab should be laid on the banks of the Hooghly, and that the civil and military administration should be but a branch of that of Bengal. H. B. E. Frey
Esq.

105. Nor is it possible to be blind to the inconveniences of a division which makes the southern portion of the valley and its army a dependency on Bombay, while the northern looks to Calcutta for orders.

106. Believing that the jealousy of local self-government and the disposition to meddle in affairs which can only be properly settled by local authority, which we mistake for centralization, is one of the most potent causes of our misfortunes, and that it is certain, if persevered in, to ensure our ruin, I would increase rather than diminish the powers of local administration which already exist here in Sind; but it seems to me absolutely necessary that the army and civil service of the whole valley of the Indus should be as distinct as those of the other great divisions of India.

107. By making the army of the Indus a body as separate as those of Madras and Bombay, one step would be gained towards equalizing the present great disparity in size between the three armies, which is productive of many practical inconveniences.

108. But I look on the measure principally as rendering it possible for one general officer to make himself master of the whole position his army has to defend, and really to command that army, during his tenure of office—which is clearly impossible now.

109. He would find himself charged with the task of occupying and defending, with a given number of men, a given territory, able, within a year, to become personally acquainted with all the important parts of his command, and armed with power to make any changes in which he could secure the concurrence of the civil government of the province, provided the military charges were kept within certain given limits.

110. Such charges would be divided under two heads: 1st, a fixed share of the total ordinary military charges of India, proportioned to the ordinary extent and requirements of his command; and, 2nd, extra expenditure, chargeable to the present condition of India.

111. The latter would probably be in the form of so many extra corps or extra men temporarily added to the ordinary strength of each corps of his army; and to the possibility of reducing such extra expenditure his attention would be perpetually drawn by the necessity for proving periodically, to the local as well as to the supreme governments, the necessity for its continuance.

112. He would find his army composed of—

1. European troops.
2. Sepoy regiments on the old footing.
3. Irregular regiments, some as they existed before the mutiny, others raised since, very various in character and organization, but all armed and disciplined, more or less, as far as parade movements go, according to the regular pattern.
4. Irregular police regiments, and levies of various kinds made over to him by the civil government, after retaining as police, under civil control, only so many as were wanted for purely police and civil purposes.

113. His attention would probably be first directed to his European troops, and he would find that at the two extremities of the line of his operations, he had a good sea-coast climate at Kurrachee, and good mountain stations in the Himalaya and Sub-Himalayan ranges.

114. His first object would be to secure permanent head-quarters for his European troops in these comparatively healthy regions, where the families, invalids, and convalescents might live always, and the effective men, when not on active field service, might be quartered in climates more congenial to an Euro-

*H. B. E. Frere,
Esq.*

pean constitution than the generality of Indian stations.

115. To render such stations easily defensible and accessible, so that the largest possible portion of his efficient European force might be always available at the shortest possible notice, whenever wanted for distant field service,—to provide good barracks, and the appliances necessary to keep his men and their families and followers in health and efficiency,—would alone, when more pressing wants had been provided for, furnish ample occupation for years to a succession of most active-minded general officers.

116. There are few subjects of greater importance than the condition and management of the European soldiers in India, but space allows me only here to state my firm belief, grounded on much and careful observation, that in a cantonment situated as I have described, and furnished, as it would have been by Sir Charles Napier, with really good barracks, (and the best that can be built are the most economical,) with good, respectable, and comfortable quarters for the married men, gardens, playgrounds for their children, with amusements for the idle, workshops for the industrious, and reading-rooms for the studious—the European soldier might last in efficiency double the number of years he does now, rear children to be useful in many ways to the State, instead of seeing them die prematurely, as four-fifths of them now do, and he might add in many ways not only to our physical security, but to our moral strength.

117. None of these are Utopian dreams. I have seen separately, in different stations and regiments, all the appliances I would desire, and have witnessed their good effects, and I feel convinced that all that the most sanguine in such matters ever expected might be attained, and a great saving in our total military expenditure be at the same time effected, if the general officer on the spot had the power, in conjunction with the local civil government of the province, to carry out all the improvements he desired, within certain limits as to expense. It is the necessity for applying for sanction for every trifle to distant authorities, who know, through reports, but little, and can themselves see and hear nothing whatever of local wants, that is the great obstacle to improvement of every kind.

118. A powerful and readily moveable European force at each extremity of his frontier line would greatly lessen the necessity for scattering the European troops over the country; still, stations would remain, like Mooltan, very unfavourable to the European constitution, which must nevertheless, on account of their great strategical importance, be garrisoned by European troops. These might be held by detachments of men, selected as being ripe and seasoned soldiers, who, by frequent reliefs, might be kept in fair health and efficiency.

119. If we can keep our European force in India always recruited up to its present strength in time of European war as well as European peace, the general would have to consider merely how to preserve the efficiency and make the most of what he has got without attempting to do with less.

120. But the possibility of keeping up such a supply of European recruits is a point which ought to be very carefully weighed, for it is obviously impolitic to habituate ourselves to rely exclusively on a species of force, our supply of which may be diminished just at the moment when we shall need it most.

121. With regard to his native troops, the general's first care would be to obtain a good body of European officers, and before he can do this, it will be absolutely necessary to decide on the course to be adopted with regard to officers in civil employ, and to put some check on the system which at present drains the army of many of its best officers.

122. As regards the territories on the Indus, there seem to be peculiar facilities for disposing of a question which elsewhere is beset with some difficulty. There is no local civil service, and the members of the civil service of Bengal and Bombay who serve there

are but a small minority of the whole body of European civil officers.

123. Two courses suggest themselves whereby the many anomalies and inconveniences of the present want of system may be remedied.

124. One is, an enlargement of the existing civil service of the western presidency to such an extent as may enable it to provide for all civil duties in Sind and the Punjab as well as in Bombay, and thus to form for the whole of India three nearly equal bodies; one for the civil duties of Bengal and north-west provinces, a second for Madras and the whole south of the peninsula, and a third for Bombay and the Indus territories.

125. The alternative measure is the creation of a separate fourth civil service for the territories on the Indus. If this measure were adopted, members of the existing civil service now serving in Sind or the Punjab might have the option of being transferred to the new service, ranking as at present, and retaining all their existing rights and liabilities to pension, civil fund, &c., in their own service, abandoning merely their claim on the appointments in their old presidency, which are usually reserved to the civil service of that presidency.

126. Whichever plan were adopted, military officers who had been in civil employ for more than two years, and whose qualifications were certified by their immediate official superior, by the head of their department, and by the provincial government, to be satisfactory, might have the option of being transferred, by order of the home government only, to the new civil service. They would in that case become exempt from liability to be ordered to join their regiments, and they would cease to have any further concern with the army, save that, until regulations could be matured for a general scheme of pensions, &c., they might retain their army rank and all the claim it gave them to pension for length of service.

127. I would make an exception in the case of officers in the police force. They would rarely, if ever, leave their police corps or duties to claim regimental command, but they would be eligible in turn for all brigade and superior commands for which their police duties, placing them early in command of large bodies of men, would form an excellent training.

128. Really diplomatic service might be open to military officers, as at present, without interfering with their military rank or prospects.

129. Military officers transferred to the new civil service might rank in it with civilians, according to the length of time they had actually served in a civil capacity.

130. Young officers might still, as at present, be taken from the army and employed in civil duties, and at the end of a definite period, say two years, the local government might decide whether such as wished to be transferred were qualified to be recommended to the home government for permanent transfer.

131. Some similar process should be adopted with regard to the civil staff of the army, including the commissariat and pay departments, the judge-advocate-general's department, superintendents of bazaars, &c. There are many good reasons why such appointments should always be held by military men, and officers who have been selected for such duties should rise in their several departments as long as they were efficient; but when once so diverted from military duty, their path in life should be quite distinct from that of the regimental officer, and they ought never on any account to be allowed to interfere with officers doing regimental duty, still less to supersede them.

132. Whether this can best be done by one staff corps, or by several, one corps for each separate department, or by any other device, is a matter of detail. Numerous plans have been and many more might be devised; none free from some objections. But such objections are generally of very trivial moment compared with the object in view.

133. For it may be set down as a truth hardly disputable, and of cardinal importance, that there can be no reasonable hope of ever keeping an useful native army as long as we persevere in our present system of making staff appointments away from the regiments an object of ambition to regimental officers, and a better provision for a young man in position and emolument than the command of native soldiers.

134. Some native soldiers—whether few or many—we must have. They must ever be an essential and preponderating element in any permanent Indian army, and if they are to be ever anything but a source of anxiety to the general, they must be commanded by men who serve with them from choice, who have a pride in their duty, whose whole hearts are in their work, and who feel they can make themselves obeyed.

135. This can be easily effected by making such service a matter of selection and a prize, as it is now with most of what are called irregular corps, where a man's hopes are limited to his corps, which he has no temptation to leave till he becomes qualified for brigade or higher command.

136. The purely military staff of the adjutant and quartermaster-general's departments and the personal staff of general officers would of course be selected, as at present, from the best qualified officers of the army without any restriction, and should always be objects of ambition to a soldier who is fond of his profession. Not only are the duties purely military, but the appointments are so few in number that the prospect of getting one would not exercise any disturbing influence on the minds of regimental officers generally, or prevent their entire devotion of their regimental duty.

137. Deducting officers transferred to the civil service, to the civil staff of the army, selected for service with native regiments and for the military staff of the army, together with the necessarily large number absorbed by the additional European regiments, few officers would remain unprovided with duty, even of the large body whose regiments have disappeared. But if any such remain for whom no place could be found in so many and such various lines of employment, it will be the soundest economy to provide for them by a pension or half-pay list. For nothing is more pernicious to the efficiency of a native corps than an European officer serving with it unwillingly, or even listlessly, or without responsible or influential duties.

138. For the future every cadet will join an European regiment, and do duty there for two years after his arrival in the country, and none, it is to be hoped, will ever be transferred to a native regiment except as a privilege, and with something more than their own free will.

139. Of the sepoy regiments which remain on the old footing, nothing need be altered beyond what is obviously and unmistakably necessary for greater efficiency, such as giving efficient powers of command to the nominal commanding officer, and getting rid of officers who nominally belong to it, but whose liability to serve does not increase the effective strength of the regiment, while it interferes with the prospects of those who do, and greatly increases the apparent cost of the native army.

140. The differences in organization in different branches of the same army which the retention of these corps will involve are not greater than it is probably desirable to have in every large army, but which in an Indian army may be considered the inevitable consequences of a healthy system, and the necessary signs of that true vitality which alone can resist a contagion such as lately infected a whole army.

141. The commander-in-chief, to whom irregular regiments and police corps are made over as a portion of his army, will, for the same reason, be cautious in enforcing uniformity to any approved model. A reduction may no doubt be effected to a great extent of what is either superfluous in numbers or vicious in organization. But mere peculiarity, if not obviously

objectionable, is preferable to that external uniformity which has afforded such fatal facilities for combination and has so aided the contagion of evil example.

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142. Above all it must be borne in mind that the whole army of the Indus is essentially a frontier army, facing in close proximity warlike and aggressive nations, who have twice successfully invaded India, since we first gained territorial footing on the continent, and who boast themselves prepared to repeat the attempt whenever it suits them, while they are daily becoming more subject to those military and political influences which affect the great family of European nations. Whatever we may think of its possibility or of its chance of success, an invasion of India is a common topic of conversation in every assemblage of chiefs between Jabriz and Peshawur, the day dream of more than one sovereign prince, and a subject of more or less thought and reflection to every one who aspires to be a successful soldier. There can be no doubt of the grave results which must follow any advance of our armies beyond our present frontier. But if we would avoid inviting aggression, or combinations, which may force us to advance in self-defence, we must be better prepared than we have been during the last ten years, and our frontier army must not only be in numbers sufficient to render attack hopeless, but it must always be ready for the field. If we would preserve peace, every corps and every station west of the Indus should be permanently on a footing prepared for immediate war.

143. The above remarks may appear vague and general, but the main point to be insisted on is, that all particulars and details must be left to local arrangement, that there must be no attempt to dictate on such points from a distance, and that no one system, however well devised, is or can be of universal application.

144. It is, I believe, a fashionable theory that railways, electric telegraphs, and similar appliances render it easier for a central government to control its distant subordinates, and safer to exercise that power. So far from this being the case, they seem to me to render it necessary to concede formally greater powers, because the facilities of reference holds out a temptation to refer, instead of acting, as a man was compelled to do before such facilities existed. On the other hand, the facilities of communication greatly diminish the danger of intrusting despotic powers to men at a distance, owing to the greater publicity they ensure and increased facilities they afford to aggrieved parties to seek redress at the hands of the central government.

145. I will now as briefly as possible recapitulate the points on which I have dilated at, I fear, inconvenient length.

1. The question of organizing the army is essentially a financial question, and the first question must be, not what army we could desire? but what is the best army we can afford?

2. Reorganization of an army is not a work which can be executed by a commission. The labours of any commission should be confined to inquiry, and report on defects and causes of disaster.

3. The task of reorganizing the army must be intrusted to individual officers acting with local governments, each independent in its sphere of territory, and within certain limits as to total expenditure, and only generally accountable to the supreme government.

4. A system of centralization by persons, each despotic in his own sphere, must be substituted for our present system of centralization by separate and independent departments.

5. The present task of reorganization should be more immediately confined to replacing that portion of the army which has fallen away.

6. The reorganization of the army must be kept quite distinct from that of the police.

7. The civil government, endued with more autocratic powers and stricter responsibilities than at present, must undertake so to govern as to require no further aid or protection in ordinary times against internal disaffection or rebellion than can be furnished

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by the police, and must itself undertake the reform of that police where necessary.

8. The army of India should be divided into five distinct bodies, each under a separate commander-in-chief, viz. :—

- 1st. The army of the valley of the Ganges, with its base at Calcutta.
- 2d. The army of the valley of the Indus, with its base at Kurachee.
- 3d. The army of the west coast, with its base at Bombay.
- 4th. The army of the east coast, with its base at Madras.
- 5th. The army of Burmah, the Straits, and Ceylon. The whole under a commander-in-chief in India.

9. The boundaries of the civil governments to be readjusted so as to correspond with the divisions, each of which is occupied by a separate army.

10. For the present we may restrict any attempt at entire reorganization to the armies occupying the valleys of the Ganges and the Indus.

11. The governments of Bombay and Madras will be charged with the duty of garrisoning definite portions of the Peninsula, with full power to modify the stations and constitution of their armies, under the general control of the Governor-General and the commander-in-chief in India, within certain limits of annual expense for regular charges, and with the obligation to seek periodical sanction for extraordinary war charges, and to keep a certain force always available for general duty beyond the limit of the presidency.

12. These governments should also be empowered to reform their police, on the principles first adopted by Sir Charles Napier in Sind, so as to relieve the army of all civil duties, and to provide against all contingencies, save external aggression or organized rebellion.

The commander-in-chief in India to be absolved from all detailed command of any one army, and to aid the Governor-General in exercising an efficient general control over the whole military strength of India.

14. The relation of local governments and the commander-in-chief to the Governor-General to be the same as in practice 50 years ago.

15. The total military expenditure to be considered as a whole, and divided to each army according to the work to be done, without any reference to the revenue of the presidency to the occupation of which the army is allotted.

16. The police to be a local charge, and its strength to have some reference to what is paid by the persons and property protected.

17. Succession to active command by seniority to cease on reaching the rank of field officer. Veterans of unimpeached character who may be passed over on account of age and physical incapacity, consequent on length of service, to succeed by seniority to higher rates of good service pensions.

18. In the territories on the Indus and the Ganges, the local commander-in-chief in conjunction with the the civil government, having discriminated accurately between what is required for military and what for police duties, should take over under his own command all the bodies employed on the former class of duties.

19. These he must then weed and organize, not by enforcing conformity to any one model, but by letting any one body of proved excellence grow and expand till it has filled up the gaps which defection may have left in our line of defence.

20. To do this, the best men who have shown they can make good soldiers of natives should be selected as generals of division, and intrusted with the task of reformation.

21. We must first get rid of what is incurably bad and dangerous; but we must not, in judging of this, trust to race as a guide.

22. Still less must the task of weeding be intrusted to distant authority. It must be left to a general, seeing, hearing, and deciding for himself on the men he commands as they came personally before him.

23. In time of peace we shall not require so large a native army as heretofore.

24. The proportion of natives to European fighting men may vary, according to our means, from that of one native to one European up to four natives to one European.

25. In order to make smaller numbers more efficient—

1st. Our troops must be more massed than they are at present.

2d. All arsenals should be made defensible, and entrenched lines should be provided for baggage and non-combatants in every large permanent cantonment which occupies an important strategical position. But all other stations and all stations on the frontier should be held as camps of a force in the field.

3d. The best arms procurable should be given to all soldiers, natives as well as Europeans. The police will not require them.

4th. The facilities for moving troops should be improved, and with this view the sillidar principle should be extended to all native troops.

5th. Railways, roads, and steamers should be extended as much as possible.

6th. We must abandon a policy calculated to alienate native princes, and enable them to take care of themselves, and keep their own subjects in order, reducing contingents, &c.

7th. Permanent head-quarters should be established for regiments, serving at the same time as recruit and invalid depôts.

26. By these means, in the course of a few years, we ought to be able to concentrate 30,000 men, half of them Europeans, at any given point in the interior at two months' notice, 60,000 at three months' notice, and within half those periods on the frontier and seaboard, with less than this we cannot be secure in India.

27. In applying these principles to the valley of the Indus, we should begin by giving it an army and civil service as distinct from those of the rest of India as in the other presidencies.

28. The commander-in-chief of such an army would have—

1st. To provide proper quarters for his European regiments at Kurachee as the sea base of his operations, and in salubrious regions of the Sub-Himalayan ranges.

2d. In order to get a really efficient body of European officers for the native force, arrangements should be made for transferring all officers in civil employ to a local civil service, and all in civil departments of the military service to a staff corps, leaving with the native corps none but officers who serve in them from choice and as their permanent profession.

3d. In reorganizing the native army, variety of organization is not *per se* to be regarded as a reason for change, and no attempt should be made at assimilation for the mere sake of uniformity.

29. The whole of the Indus or frontier army should be kept permanently on a war establishment.

I have, &c.

H. B. E. FRERE,
Commissioner in Sind.

No. 3.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HUGH ROSE, G.C.B.

From Maj.-Gen. Sir HUGH ROSE, G.C.B., to
Maj.-Gen. BIRCH, C.B.
Camp Hingolee, February 24, 1859.

SIR, WITH reference to the reorganization of the armies of India, I have the honor to enclose to you, for submission to the Right Honorable the Governor-General and Viceroy, my answers to the questions as to the "recruiting and composition of corps," contained in the first head in the inquiry, entitled "Infantry."

I regret that I have been so long delayed in sending these answers. But my brief experience in this country, and the very conflicting opinions which I have heard, respecting almost every question, from those whose experience is greater and more valuable than my own, rendered it necessary that I should weigh well and sift these opinions before I come to a decision on them. The delay has enabled me to modify and change some opinion which I had come to on the important matters which form the subject of the questions.

My duties as commander of a division, especially in the field, in which I have been for the greater part of the time since I received the questions, take up nearly the whole of my time. I could not, therefore, by any means give the undivided attention which I wished to answering the questions.

I might have answered the questions more briefly; but I did not think that my opinions, unsupported by facts, would be of much value; and I conceived that it would be agreeable to his Lordship to hear how easily some military difficulties, those of caste for example, could be overcome without creating a sensation, and without undue exercise of power. I venture to say that no one could have been more sincerely anxious, or have taken more trouble than myself, to carry out the Governor-General's wishes in the matter in question.

I request you to have the goodness to submit my apologies for the delay in the transmission of the answers to the Right Honorable the Governor-General, and to inform the Governor-General that the answers to the questions in the remaining heads shall be submitted to you as quickly as possible for his Lordship's consideration.

I have, &c.
HUGH ROSE, Major-General,
Commanding Field Forces south of the Nurbudda.

THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

Answers to Questions.

1. The native infantry of the Bombay army is composed, with few exceptions, of men of all the numerous races, castes, and callings, from the "Brahmin" to the Wher, both included, of Hindoostan men, a few Rajpoots, Mahrattas, Hindoos, generally of a lower caste than those from the upper provinces, Mussulmans, Jews, Malabarres, a few native Christians, and a limited proportion of Purwarrees or Whers.

Some regiments have lately enlisted a limited proportion of Affghans.

It is just towards the Jews to state that they are universally allowed to be good, intelligent, and faithful soldiers; the only regret expressed by officers respecting them is that they are so few in numbers. A Jew was the only native officer in the late 27th regiment Bombay native infantry, who informed its officers of the intended mutiny of the regiment, and by so doing saved their lives. Another Jew native

officer has written a very clever little work on light infantry drill, with diagrams.

2. From Oudh, the Doab, the districts opposite the Doab on the right bank of the Jumna, viz., Calpee, &c., the Deccan, Northern and Southern Malabar.

3. No races, tribes, or castes were formerly excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bombay army, except that the "Maugs" (hangman), and "Mehters" (sweepers), would not, on account of their calling, be accepted as recruits. Liberal as is the feeling in the Bombay army as to caste, other races or castes would not serve in the same corps with the "Mhaugs" or "Mehters."

Since the mutiny the Bombay system, as to indiscriminate enlistment from all parts of India, has undergone a modification, as is seen in two circulars. The first, I mention it confidentially, because it is so headed, directs that "at the present time" the recruiting parties from regiments "in the Sawunt "Warree country and in Malwa" are to cease enlisting in those localities until further orders. The second circular prescribes that the recruits for native regiments of the Bombay army "shall be wholly "drawn from the provinces under the Bombay "presidency."

I think that it would be advantageous not to exclude Bengal men or any inhabitants of India from the Bombay army, because such exclusion would not be favorable to that complete mixture of races in regiments and corps of the Indian army which is desirable; and if the Bombay army were recruited wholly from the Bombay presidency, it would be too much drained to allow of its furnishing a proper proportion of recruits for the armies of the other presidencies.

4. No races, tribes, or castes are excluded from the field of enlistment, except the "Mhaugs" and "Mehters" (hangmen and sweepers).

The "Bheels," "Coolies," "Ghouds," and other hill tribes will not enlist into the army, but enter willingly police corps, because, like all mountaineers, they dread the removal from home, to which service in the army would subject them. The police corps, in which they enter, serve only in their own district, and they cannot serve out of it, unless with their own consent.

I feel convinced that if the "Bheels," "Ghouds," &c. were civilized by good military discipline, combined with an useful military education, such as is afforded by the Austrian institution of the "Frontier Regiments" (Grenz Regimenter), they would become useful soldiers.

The system of the "Grenz Regimenter," which is a social as well as a military institution, is praised by all foreign officers and military authors who are acquainted with it. It has produced many good officers and soldiers, amongst others Omar Pasha. It is economical, it ensures a most useful military education, protects a difficult and extensive frontier, and affords also military aid, when required, to other portions of the Austrian empire. Mr. Moies, Attaché to H.M.'s mission at Vienna, visited two years ago the districts where the "Grenz Regimenter" are established, and drew up a very valuable report on them.

I venture strongly to recommend the introduction of this excellent institution, not only into the Bombay presidency, but into all India, modified, of course, so as to suit Indian requirements. In a quarter of a century it would civilize Indian races, now removed from the sphere of civilization, who otherwise will be always benighted.

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The "Bheels," "Coolies," "Ghounds," and other hill tribes are supposed to be aborigines, driven by the conquerors of India from the plains into the hills. They have lived for ages in a state of savage seclusion; if they have a faith, it is so confused that they cannot describe, and that, consequently, no one can understand it. Their morality is what might be expected. It is not very long since that the "Ghounds" occasionally eat young children without incurring the censure of their community.

The Bheel corps hitherto has not answered, nor do I think that it will do so under the present system. The men have not sufficient inducement to serve well, or abandon their vices. They are underpaid, have no pensions, nothing to look forward to, and are not improved by an useful education. They drink and desert a good deal; have as many wives as they can, &c.

The Cooly corps is in a state of transition, but as yet they are useless for military purposes.

I will not say that the Anglo-Indians, as a race, have been neglected, but they certainly have not been made enough of. I think that it would be advantageous to raise their position, encourage their education, and attach them as much as possible to the State. It should not be lost sight of that, in a country where we have so many millions of natural opponents, the Anglo-Christians are the only natives who are our natural friends, and it is due to them to say that, with one exception, a rebel in arms, I have found them loyal and intelligent. The Anglo-Indians are not numerous enough for, or, generally speaking, of a class suited to, the ranks. But acclimatized and acquainted as they are with the language and customs of the natives, they would be very useful in the civil departments of the army, such as the commissariat, military transport, interpreter department, &c. There is a great deficiency of good military interpreters, who are now officers on full pay of regiments. There are many disadvantages in the present system of interpreters. In the first place, a regiment is deprived of an intelligent and useful officer when it is obliged to furnish an interpreter to an European regiment, where his duties, with the exception of acting as interpreter at courts-martial, are unimportant, and hardly suited to his position, such as inquiring the price of provisions, settling disputes with carters and servants, &c.

I remember a case where the only captain of a regiment in the field was taken from it in order to act as interpreter to a detachment of dragoons on the march and not in the field.

Lastly. British officers, with very few exceptions, are not sufficiently acquainted with the Indian languages to read and understand written native documents, or compose a native letter. In fact, I do not think that at this moment there are above four or five officers in the Bombay army who could, without the help of a moonshee, compose or write a proper native letter.

If the Anglo-English and Portuguese, who are intelligent and zealous, and who always know one native language, were taught to know and write all the spoken and written native languages, they would be most useful in the intelligence department, and general officers, or officers commanding brigades in the field, who now are obliged to refer for translation important and confidential reports, addressed to them in the field by native authorities or native officers, or non-commissioned officers commanding outposts, or patrols, to some native clerk in the employment of a civil officer or of the commissariat, &c. I received, two days ago, a native document respecting the Rohillas and Arabs, which no officer of my force could read or understand.

5. A recruiting party, under the command of an intelligent non-commissioned officer, is sent by the officer commanding the regiment into the provinces from whence recruits are required for a particular race or caste in his regiment; the recruiting party is composed of natives of the province; on reaching

the province the party separates, each soldier going to his native place, where he enlists recruits, or rather he persuades young men, relatives or neighbours, to accompany the party back to the headquarters of the regiment, where they are approved or rejected by the commanding officer and surgeon of the regiment; the recruit receiving two annas a day subsistence from the day on which he agreed to serve.

6. No precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts that I am aware of. A recruit's register is made out, according to a prescribed form, by the commander of the recruiting party.

7. Of course, a notoriously bad man would not be accepted in cantonments by a regiment. If a man, unaccompanied by any security, offers himself as a recruit in cantonments, inquiry, as much as possible, is made into his character and motives for enlisting, and that proving satisfactory, his military fitness is alone looked to. The commanding officer prefers that a sepoy of the regiment should present and give an account of a recruit, in which case he is, in a manner, his guarantee. When a regiment is popular, a great part of the recruits for it are enlisted in this way; young men come to their friends or relatives in a regiment for the purpose of enlisting into it.

8. The practice in the Bombay army is, generally speaking, so little exclusive, and is so conducive to the mixture of the different races, castes, and callings, that, provided the present system be adhered to, I would suggest no other change in it than that a standing regulation should be issued, ordering that there should not be in a regiment a predominating number of soldiers of any particular caste or race.

9. The oath, as prescribed by the Government general order of the 11th of April 1857, which was taken by the recruits, or recruits holding the colours, was as follows:—

"I, _____, private in the _____ regiment, do swear that I will not abandon these colours, but always defend them to the utmost of my power, and that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes a good soldier and faithful servant, and failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to the penalties described in the articles of war which have been read to me."

If a recruit for the artillery is to take the oath, he does so on a gun.

The oath at present sworn by a recruit in a native infantry regiment on enlistment is as follows:—

"I, _____ a sepoy of the _____ regiment N.L.I., do swear before this colour that I will not desert these colours, and that I will obey all orders issued by my superior officers, and that if I commit any offence I will abide by the punishment that may be awarded to me by the articles of war."

The ceremony of swearing in recruits is performed on the 1st of a month, in the event of any recruits having been enlisted during the preceding month. After muster, in presence of the regiment, the colours are brought to the front, and the recruits, taking hold of them, repeat the oath.

On this subject the native articles of war, section i., article 1, page 2, run as follows:—

"Every recruit prior to being enrolled in his regiment shall have the first four articles of the second section of these articles of war read to him and explained, and when reported fit for duty in the ranks, such declaration as is now used in the three presidencies shall be made to him by the officer commanding in front of the regiment or corps in presence of the native officers and soldiers, and an oath or declaration shall be required of him according to the forms of his religion, such oath and declaration to be the like as are now used in the respective presidencies."

10. The original oath was established G. G. O. of the 11th of April 1807.

11. Experience shows that the declaration by oath, whether by the colours or the gun, has little or no effect on a sepoy, if, under the influence of intrigue, bad discipline, or his priest, he wishes to break it. A clever Brahmin can suggest various ways by which the oath can be evaded. For instance, that if sepoys should mutiny, taking along with them their colours and guns, they would not break the oath which they had taken "not to desert their colours or guns;" or that the recruit may declare that he was impure the day on which he took the oath, &c.; or, lastly, that an oath tendered by or given to an English infidel was not binding.

I think that the most binding oath on an Indian soldier, of any caste or race, would be a simple declaration by his faith or religion ("deen") and the "nimmuck hullall" (fidelity to the salt, that is, to his master or employer,) to be faithful to the Queen and to the officers whom Her Majesty may be pleased to place in command over him, and to obey their orders.

None of the titles of honor given to the rank of Queen, according to Indian custom, should be omitted; if they were, the Indian recruit's feelings of respect for Her Majesty would be diminished.

The natives of India have a traditional respect for the office of Queen, or "Ranee." They acknowledge the power of Ranee as much as that of Rajah or Maharajah; and it is worthy of remark, that in the late troubles the Ranees have increased the influence of their office by displaying far more courage in the field and intelligence in council, whether on our or on the rebel side, than the princes, witness the Ranee of Bhopal on our and the Ranee of Jhansi on the opposite side.

The fidelity to the salt is in the eyes of Indians the best guarantee of fidelity, because, although not a point of faith, it is one of "dustoor" (custom), which is all-in-all to and innate in them.

But the oath of an Indian recruit, however binding it may be made, must always be a feeble tie, unless it form a component part of a first-rate military system, of which discipline is the life and soul. No oath will be binding on a native soldiery who have never had discipline or who have lost it, and who are incited by bad passions and bad advisers to rise against masters who are of a faith, country, and color different from their own, who, in their eyes, are of no caste at all. Discipline is a combination of high military feeling, or honor, order, and subordination; and when native soldiers are under its influence, then the oath to the Sovereign and duty to their colours will make them faithful to trusts which in the eyes of a good soldier take the place of every other tie.

12. Several castes of seafaring habits inhabit the seaboard of the Bombay presidency. They are for the most part known by the designation of Gabdees, Karmees, Colies, Boees, and Daldees; all these castes take service as lascars in ships and in the coasting trade, but few enlist either in police corps or regiments of the line. These castes gain a sufficiency for their livelihood, and it is not their custom to enlist, otherwise I should think that they would make useful recruits for a marine corps, if their attachment to custom could be overcome, and a sufficient inducement offered to them to give up their calling.

The fishermen are mostly low Hindoos and not fit for service, being very small of their race. Their habits and customs are, besides, wholly unmilitary.

13. The Bombay presidency has a marine corps, but it is not composed of the castes of people of seafaring habits stated in the reply to the previous question, but for the most part of Mussulmans, Purwarrees, and Mochees. The marine battalion is composed of ten companies, each company consisting of 1 subadar, 1 jemadar, 1 colour havildar, 4 havildars, 5 naiks, 2 drummers and fifers, and 80 privates, and 1 bheestee. There are three European officers attached to it; a commandant, adjutant and quartermaster, and interpreter. It is recruited chiefly from the Deccan and Conkan.

14. Certainly not. The raising each infantry corps in a prescribed district, and recruiting it there and there only, would be favourable to confederacy and conspiracy, both of which are the authors, or at any rate the organizers, of mutiny.

15. Certainly. It would be desirable that each corps should be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts; and that the army of each presidency should recruit in the other two presidencies as well as in its own.

The armies of the three presidencies should be recruited also by Affghans, Seikhs, &c.; this might be effected by recruiting parties being sent to Peshawur, the Punjab, and Kurrachee, where Affghans resort. One Seikh might discover a Hindoo or Mussulman conspiracy to mutiny, and *vice versa*.

16. Certainly not, for the reasons stated in my answer to No. 14 question.

The mixture of races and castes in a corps not only checks confederacy, but it weakens and often removes the influences of caste. A soldier of high caste says that he is contaminated by touching a man of low caste; but in a regiment composed of men of all castes he must, in the various duties of military life in the ranks, on guard, in railroads, come constantly in contact with a comrade of low caste. The contact gradually wears away the sensitiveness of caste, although its exclusiveness may at first have been offended by inroads on its privileges inseparable from the discharge of military duties, or indeed of those of the world's daily life. The native soldier of high caste, in a regiment composed of men of all castes, perceives that he daily and hourly infringes the illogical injunctions of caste; but notwithstanding his conscience and his common sense tell him that this regard of caste in no way prevents his being a good soldier and an honest and happy man.

A clever native, himself a man of high caste, gave me convincing proofs of the pliability and contradictions of caste. He said that the very soldiers of high caste, who urge that their caste renders it impossible that they can perform certain military duties or orders, perform daily in their own country those same duties for their relations or masters. He added, that reflection would convince any one that this must be so, as it was impossible that a man of high caste and very small means could either afford to dispense with the performance of indispensable work or duties offensive to caste, or, on the other hand, hire men of low caste to perform them.

It is the more desirable that caste should disappear, because it is almost superfluous to state that it acts very unfavorably on discipline and military operations. And, moreover, if the privileges of caste be allowed, the refusal of men of high caste to perform their share of military duties which are against their caste would throw these duties on British soldiers or native soldiers of low caste, which is an injustice, and opposed to the letter and spirit of all military regulations.

In proof of what I have said in the preceding paragraphs respecting the disadvantage of caste privileges, I beg to adduce a few examples.

The commanding officer of engineers reported to me in a battery under fire at the siege of Jhansi that one of his men refused to rivet with cowhides the side of an embrasure which had been blown away, because it was against his caste. I told the soldier that if he did not immediately obey his officer I would try and punish him in the battery. The man obeyed at once.

A staff officer told an officer in command last year that the men of a certain corps would not, on account of their caste, work in the trenches at a siege, although these same men had dug trenches for irrigation, and worked in the fields every day in the year in Oudh, and elsewhere.

An officer of the Bombay army succeeded for a short time at a station to the mixed command of Bengal and Bombay troops. An application was made to him afterwards for the payment, according to custom,

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of the price of additional grain for the dinners of high caste men of a Bengal regiment, because they had thrown away the first dinners in consequence of their having been contaminated by the shadows of British soldiers passing by whilst the dinners were being cooked.

In the first instance we see that if the rights of caste were acknowledged, the right of a soldier to disobey his orders in action must be also acknowledged; and in the second, that siege operations or field fortifications, &c. could not be carried on by soldiers of high caste, that consequently these important operations must either be abandoned or be performed, although not their turn of duty, by British soldiers or soldiers of low caste; and in the third and last instance, the rejected dinners, a privilege of caste is claimed entailing an item of expenditure which I think would not be passed by the most liberal committee on army extraordinaries, which is subversive of all good comradeship, and exhibits a fastidiousness of caprice which no wise mother would allow in her nursery.

I know of many instances where the pride and intolerance of caste have produced a bad feeling between different corps, and in the interior.

Privileges of caste render discipline exceptional, that is to say, subordinate to the real or imaginary injunctions of caste. I need not observe that such a discipline is no discipline at all.

Good discipline and high military feeling, which is its invariable companion, education, and mixture of races will obliterate the endless and indefinite distinctions of castes, all of which are more or less opposed to the harmony and efficiency of the military service. They would have disappeared long since if they had not been tolerated; for the sake of conciliation, I will not say that they were not encouraged. The peak, the stock, and the chin strap, to all of which the native soldier of the Bombay army had at first his objections, because they had formed part of an animal which he worships, are now quietly worn without disturbing his peace of mind.

The Turkish Mussulmans, a dominant race, and under an independent Mussulman Emperor, have yielded to foreign, mainly British council, rights, many of which were won by conquest or grounded on the Khoran, far more important and definite than the privileges of Indian caste. If a fraction of the policy which induced Turkey to give up valued rights had been brought to bear on Indian caste, a British question, India would never have been in the dangerous predicament of having a native army of which a large portion became willing instruments of disaffection and political intrigue, because they had a discipline with exceptions, and a fidelity with reserves.

I am far from advocating a crusade against caste, or from proposing the adoption of corrective measures against it. I think that the wisest and most dignified course which the Government can pursue as to caste is neither to acknowledge nor to coerce it; not to enlist men into the service whose feelings as to caste or creed render it impossible that they can fulfil the *sine qua non* of military discipline and success—obedience.

I would act with perfect straightforwardness towards the Indian recruit. I would not allow him to be in any, the smallest doubt as to his future obligations as a soldier. He should be told on his enlisting that he was allowed to cook and eat his food in his own way, as he does at present; but that in all other respects he must conform to the regulations of the British service; and that no exception whatever, whether as to caste or creed, will be allowed to discipline or obedience. If this fair warning should prevent from enlisting fanatical Brahmins, who, after all, like the Levites, are a priestly and not a military race, or bigoted Mussulmans, the Indian army would gain rather than lose by their absence from its ranks.

I have no doubt that in a few years sepoys would not

object to a modified system of British messing, which would obviate the inconvenience now arising from all the men of a regiment being employed in cooking.

What occurred in the Bombay army during the mutinies is a striking proof of the disadvantages of homogeneity.

The Bombay army, with a few exceptions, came very well out of the mutinies. The two principal exceptions were the late 21st and 27th regiments. In the first there were a very preponderating homogeneity of high caste Oudh men; in the latter, of Mahrattas of a particular district. Both regiments were re-formed into new corps with new numbers, the 30th and 31st. A curious instance, on the other hand, of the advantages of mixture of castes or races is seen in one of the cases in question. It was a Jew officer, as already mentioned, who announced to the officers of the Mahratta regiment the intention of their men to murder them, and thus saved their lives, for which act of fidelity the mutineers murdered his mother.

It may be argued in favor of homogeneity in a corps that a regiment of which more than half, nearly all, the men were Sikhs, Bengalees, Mahrattas, &c., had acted admirably during the late revolt, in cantonments or in the field. But this reasoning is not well founded.

For such a corps or regiment may have been composed of a race hostile to the race or caste of the rebels or mutinous sepoys; or it may have been under a commander, a speciality, who had remarkable knowledge and experience of the character of natives, and great talent and tact in managing them. He may have had a system of his own, the success of which was due to his rare qualifications. But this is a system which may be called personal, and does not outlive its author. It is useless for the ordinary run of capacities.

Or such a regiment may have been placed in peculiar and fortunate circumstances; brigaded with a large European force; have been on very good terms with some regiment in that force; fought successfully under a first-rate commanding officer, side by side, with it against the rebels; and become, at an early period of the revolt, pledged to or identified with the right side. But supposing that this same regiment had been under a commonplace commander, and perhaps slack discipline, far away from all European influence, and exposed to the intrigues of designing men, the case would, probably, have been different.

It is clear, therefore, that as a general rule or a safe system, mixture of races or castes in a regiment is the best guarantee against confederacy and insubordination.

17. The reason which renders it inexpedient that corps should not be homogeneous is equally valid as regards companies. The races or castes should be mixed in each company in the same proportion as in the regiment.

18. I think that the proportion of each race, tribe, or caste, whether in corps or companies, should be such that the insubordination or mutiny of any one caste or tribe would not excite apprehension on account of their predominant numbers, but could be easily quelled by the rest of the corps or company.

19. I think that it is desirable that separate corps should be maintained for military and police purposes, and that the recruiting for both should be allowed in the same district. Police corps in the Bombay presidency are now restricted to recruiting in the districts over which they exercise police authority. I think that it would be an improvement were the police, like the army, to be recruited from a wide area, without reference to districts.

It is true that it is urged that, for the sake of local knowledge, a policeman should be an inhabitant; on the other hand, local ties and connexions are in the way of his performing impartially and strictly his duties. Besides, an intelligent and active policeman should, although new in a country, acquire sufficient local knowledge in two or three months. I have had under my command native officers and non-commis-

sioned officers of cavalry who have acquired it in half that time, and made excellent reports on the state of the country.

I am unable to answer the questions respecting police without making a digression on that subject, and describing some of the various sorts of police which exist in the Bombay presidency, and which, I believe, exist more or less throughout India.

1stly. The state of India, especially latterly, has necessitated an extension of the police system under a variety of forms, and corps of military police have been raised for quelling turbulent populations, or resisting incursions of bands of marauders into districts of the Bombay presidency. Thus, the Bheel corps was organized to put down the insurgent Bheels in the Sautpoora range; the Coolie corps to protect the Bombay frontier districts from the incursions of Kohillas from the Nizam's dominions.

2dly. An ancient and purely Indian police has been maintained in some places. For example, "the Ramoosees," who are a caste of thieves, or whose calling was to thieve. In the cantonments of Poona and Ahmednuggur they are employed as police on the distinct understanding that, in consideration of the pay which they receive, they are not only not to exercise their calling against their employers, but to prevent others from doing so. It is the system of black mail.

3dly. A regular foot police in uniform, and armed, have been introduced into the city of Bombay, and partially into towns and districts of the presidency.

4thly. Each collector or magistrate has police sowars attached to himself and his subordinates.

5thly. At Sattara the late Rajah's guards have been converted into a police corps, they retain their scarlet uniforms, collars, &c.

I have said quite enough to show that in the Bombay presidency there is not one uniform police system or an organized police, and that, therefore, I should have misled and given wrong answers if I had replied to the queries as if there had been such a police.

I believe that in Bengal police corps, or military police, have been raised for the purpose of supplying temporarily the place of disbanded regiments, as well as for doing police duties.

I think it most desirable that there should be one organized system of three sorts of police throughout India.

1stly. Military police, cavalry and infantry, in the proportion of two troops to a battalion. No artillery or engineers.

Their duties to watch and subdue turbulent populations, protect frontiers, perform police duties when required, and give military aid to police when called on. Never to leave the district except in cases of extreme emergency.

Their organization to be on the Austrian system of frontier regiments.

No homogeneity of race in these corps, which will be composed as much as possible in equal proportions of the different hill races, Bheels, Coolies, Ghounds, &c., and of men also of other tribes or castes, having certificates of good character.

The corps not to bear the denomination of races, but of the provinces or mountains to which they belong, such as the Candeish or the Sautpoora military police.

The military police to be officered (with the exception of the commander, who will be British), generally speaking, by meritorious non-commissioned officers of native regiments from the army, and from the non-commissioned officers of the police, when specially recommended for important service or acts of useful courage.

Military police, battalions or troops, to be under the general officer commanding the division, as regards their discipline and organization, but under the civil authorities in all matters relating to aid to the police or police duties. If the military police are to take part in an operation they should be under military command.

The men to be dressed in a dark green tunic, or long loose jacket, with pockets; trousers loose in the leg and tight at the ankles; no braces; ankle boots; short leather gaiters; dark green turban; two-grooved rifle, bayonet sword, and black leather belts and pouch. The dress to be cloth for winter; stout cotton, with a country dye, for summer. Oil-cloth cloak, Austrian pattern, lined with dark serge, for cloak and bed.

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Rural Police, Mounted and Foot.

Their duties to be purely police; to be composed of all races and castes bearing a good character. The organization, equipment, and armament of the foot police to be like that of the Irish constabulary, made to suit India. To be organized by and entirely under the civil authorities. Dress like that of the military police, with a slight distinction.

Mounted rural police to be sowars.

To be officered, generally speaking, by meritorious non-commissioned officers from the army.

To be entirely under the civil authorities.

Urban Police, Mounted and Foot.

Their duties to be entirely police.

To be composed of men of all races and castes bearing a good character.

The organization, armament, and dress of the foot to be like that of the rural police.

The mounted police to be Sowars.

To be organized by and entirely under the civil authorities.

To be officered, generally speaking, by meritorious non-commissioned officers from the army.

20. I would regard the infantry of the military police as nurseries from which valuable men, especially non-commissioned officers, might be drawn for the army.

If the Austrian system, which I propose, be adopted, with necessary modifications for India, the military police corps would be schools as well as nurseries for the army; and there would be a constant flow of civilized and educated youth from the military police into the army. If also, as I propose, the military police be officered in a great measure by meritorious non-commissioned officers of the army, many of them would have come from the military police, and be accustomed to its duties and systems.

I would on no account regard the rural and urban police as nurseries for the army. A good policeman must possess superior qualifications to those of a common soldier.

The police are scattered in twos and threes over the country. The nature of their duties exposes them to all sorts of temptations, from which a soldier is carefully withdrawn.

A policeman should read and write reports, keep accounts and a journal; never drink, and have a good character; he must turn a deaf ear to corruption in all the attractive forms in which it will assail him. It is clear that no police would be good unless composed of men of this superior description. It is as clear that it will be difficult to find the number of such men required for the rural and urban police of India.

Consequently the police of India never would be efficient if it were to be a nursery for the army; if it were to be drained of the good and scarce men which it had collected with so much difficulty for the army.

I have ventured to dilate on the question of Indian police, whether military or civil, because I think that public security and order in India must for the future depend in a great measure on the police. If it is honest and efficient, it will give a support to law and order, which no army, however numerous or well disciplined, can afford.

The army has beaten and dispersed the rebel troops; taken their strongholds and artillery. The rebels are fugitives for their lives, but no longer combatants for a cause. What remains to be done for the pacification of India is a question of education, internal administration, and police; the civil authority, of course, receiving military aid when required.

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A good native police is the more valuable, because it is less likely to fraternize with the disorderly and the disaffected than a native army.

If a police be good, that is, if it be intelligent in tracing out crime and active in seizing its perpetrators, it is sure to be unpopular, particularly in a country where the amount of offence is or has been considerable. The daily, hourly duties of a good policeman bring him in never-ceasing collision with the interests of the disorderly; he must become an object of their mistrust and dislike; it is the disorderly who are always the foremost in the ranks of disaffection or intestine strife. Consequently a good police must be antagonistic to these classes who are most likely to endeavour to convulse India.

It must be borne in mind that a policeman possessing higher qualifications, and performing more responsible duties than a soldier, should receive higher pay. In London a common policeman receives fifty* shillings a week, which is much higher pay than that of a soldier. If the police are to be good in India, they must be paid to the full in the same proportion; and as a reward for long and useful service, they should have a good pension; because an Indian policeman works for those who are not of his nation, creed, caste, habits, or color, against those who are the same as himself in all these essentials.

Financially speaking, the money expended in good pays and pensions to ensure a trustworthy and efficient police would be a saving, because,—

1stly. Two hundred good policemen do more good service than eight hundred half-and-half or tolerable policemen.

2dly. An excellent police would enable the Government to diminish the standing army, which will be another important saving.

21. I think that pensioners might be advantageously and economically employed, under the officers commanding divisions, in recruiting in the districts in which they reside, receiving as a stimulus to exertion a gratification for each good recruit.

Their knowledge of the inhabitants would much facilitate their performance of this duty.

This system would keep the pensioners in the path of duty, by giving them respectable employment in the service of the Government; it would make them in a measure guarantees for the recruits, and save the expense, loss of men, and discipline which more or less ensue from the employment of regimental recruiting parties.

22. I would employ a distinct agency, the pensioners for the army. I have stated in answer No. 19, the means of recruiting for the military police, and as regards a civil, that is, rural and urban police, I think that if it were well paid and organized, it would be so popular a service in India that it would only be necessary to make a selection from candidates, and not to recruit for it.

23. When a pensioner sends in a recruit, he should transmit, if possible, with him, to the adjutant of the regiment into which the recruit enlists, a register of his character, age, village, trade, or calling, and description from the pottail or other authority of his town or village. This register to be signed by the civil officer of the district, or one of his subordinates.

The register would be a guarantee for the recruit, both as regards conduct and desertion.

Recruits or candidates for the police corps should produce the same register as recruits for the army, as well as specimens of their writing, and should be able to read. No policeman to be promoted to be serjeant of police until he could speak English. If he can speak and write it, a mark should be placed opposite his name as a recommendation for further promotion.

No means should be neglected of attaching the inhabitants of India to Great Britain, and of making them as English as possible.

Their knowledge of the English language will be favorable to the attainment of this desideratum, and

increase their usefulness most materially as servants of the British Government.

24. This question has been already answered.

25. I think so. I would raise regiments for service in India in all the British colonies or possessions where the climate is hot, except the Ionian islands. I do not think that it would be wise to introduce the Greek element into India. The Russian officers in the Crimea said that their Greek levies set at naught all their attempts to keep them within the bounds of order and discipline. I have done duty in Malta, and can testify to the efficiency and good feeling of the Royal Malta Fencibles, who have frequently volunteered for foreign service. Thousands of Maltese leave Malta and seek employment in Constantinople, the Turkish and Syrian posts, Alexandria, Tunis, and Tripoli. I have almost invariably found these Maltese well disposed towards the English, and ready to assist them in any difficulty. If the Maltese were properly paid and pensioned, I am sure that they would gladly serve in India, in Maltese battalions, or a regiment of, say, three battalions, one of which should be light infantry. The proximity of Malta, *viâ* Egypt to India, is another reason for forming Maltese corps for Indian service.

The Maltese are Arabs by origin, and their language and habits fit them for service in the East.

In a political point of view, it would be wiser to employ the superabundant population of Malta in the British service than to allow so many thousand inhabitants of this important stronghold to be under foreign rule close to it.

26. The West Indies, Sierra Leone, the Cape of Good Hope, Malta, Ceylon, Hongkong, for Chinese and Tartars. The Tartars are excellent soldiers. It may be urged against the enlistment of natives of other tropical climates for Indian service that Great Britain has put down the troubles in India solely with British and Indian troops, and that she could do so again. But I cannot admit the correctness of this reasoning. Great Britain would, in all probability, should troubles hereafter occur in India, never again be in such favourable circumstances for quelling them as during the last two years. She was in profound peace with all the world, free from, not only troubles, but political agitation at home. The Porte and Egypt sanctioning, and the other powers interested in Turkish affairs not opposing, the passage of troops and warlike stores through Egypt to India.

India ought to be able, single handed, to protect herself against foreign aggression or intestine troubles, or both united. It has been urged that the employment of foreign troops would hurt British prestige, because indicating a deficiency of British power. But I think, on the contrary, that the presence in India of British troops, subjects of the British Crown, from every quarter of the globe, would confirm the belief of the natives, that the sun never sets in Her Majesty's dominions, and that Her rule is as powerful as it is extensive.

27. For Maltese recruits the civil and military authorities in Malta, the consular agents at Tunis, Tripoli, and in the Levant. For the West Indians, the civil and military authorities. For Africa, the civil and military authorities at Sierra Leone.

28. It would be fractioning instead of uniting the valuable European material. And if a regiment were detached, the company would, in a manner, be useless.

The mixture of one European company with nine companies of a native regiment would proclaim so unmistakably its cause, that is, want of confidence in the native companies, that even in the most peaceful terms, a mutual mistrust, and mistrust engenders dislike, would arise between the European and the native soldiers.

In times of trouble or mutiny, the first wish of insubordinate sepoy in the native companies would be to get rid of their European guards, and their great numerical preponderance of nine to one would encourage them to give effect to their designs.

* Sic in orig.

If there were more than one company, of course the danger of combination of the native against the European companies would be diminished.

But still even in this case I think that the disadvantage of the mixture of European with native companies in one regiment would outweigh its advantage. There would be two totally different systems of commissariat, barracks, messing, &c., in one battalion. But the chief objection is that the native would see too closely cases of inebriety and irregularity which will occur at times amongst the men and women of the best disciplined British regiments. At present the sepoy admires the British soldier on parade; and he admires him still more in the field. I think that too near a neighbourhood, too much intercourse, would diminish the British military prestige, which it is necessary should exist unalloyed in the mind of the native soldier. Besides, if British soldiers and sepoys lived in the same lines, there would be the risk of frequent disputes about the families of the native soldiers, a matter as to which sepoys are most susceptible.

29. The answer to this question is rendered unnecessary by my previous one.

30. Answer same as for 29.

31. Answer same as for 30.

32. Answer same as for 31.

33. The percussion musket and bayonet.

34. This question has already been answered.

35. Yes, with the exception stated in the answer to the next, No. 36, question.

36. The native soldier likes his English uniform, with the exception of the trowsers; these he wears invariably to his great discomfort, especially on marches, over his "dotees," or native trowsers. The sepoy has the same attachment for his "dotees" that the Hungarian soldier has to his tight pantaloons, which he wears, even in Italian heat, under his summer linen trowsers. The sepoy, I think, should be dressed, the new helmet for the army in India, an excellent head dress included, like the English soldier, except that I would give him the same trowsers, gaiters, and ankle boots (the Zouave dress) as to the military police. If this description of dress, certainly the best for infantry, be given to the British army, there would be no difference in dress, which would be desirable between British and native troops.

The dress should be cloth for winter, strong cotton, with a country dye, for summer. I would recommend the Austrian great coat, and a forage cap, with a white "puggree," for the British and native soldiers.

37. I think that, on the whole, the disadvantages of the proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry, in close and permanent association, outweighs the advantages, for the reasons stated in the previous answer.

Whilst I entertain these opinions, I think that it is most desirable that British and native regiments or troops, whether in cantonments or in the field, should be invariably brigaded together, and that no opportunity should be lost for maintaining the best possible feeling between them.

In the field it is necessary that a British force should always be accompanied by a native force. The latter performs with admirable patience and goodwill indispensable duties in the sun, which would soon render a British regiment inefficient from sun sickness. The native troops furnish, on the march and in camp, guards for treasure, commissariat, baggage, &c. The sepoys, in an excellent spirit, seem to take a pleasure in doing for their English comrades a hard duty, which they know they could not do except with loss of health.

I never witnessed in the force and division under my command a single quarrel between British and native soldiers. On the other hand, I have seen with unmingled pleasure the existence of excellent feeling between them. For example, H.M.'s 86th regiment and the 25th Bombay native light infantry, both highly disciplined regiments, whether on the march or in action, the men of these two regiments called and acted towards each other like brothers ("baees"), and were ready to share in common hardships and dangers.

Nothing will tend more to promote the attachment of the sepoy to British rule than the existence of a friendly feeling between the British and Native soldiery, and as so good a state of feeling can exist between them under the present system, I should be sorry to recommend any change in it, such as the incorporation in companies or regiments of the British and native element. This good feeling will, I feel confident, always exist, provided one condition be never lost sight of; that condition is discipline, which lays the foundation of mutual esteem between English and Native troops, and maintain.

38. Even supposing that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents a very partial analogy, and I cannot think that it is more, with the arrangement proposed in 37 question, I do not think that the practical working of that association is, as far as my experience goes, at all encouraging. When I took command of the Central India field force, I found that a Bengal European field battery with native drivers, which formed part of it, was without drivers, because they had mutinied and deserted, thus rendering the battery unable to move. I know another instance where the native drivers in mutiny ran the guns into a ditch and deserted.

39. An answer is rendered unnecessary by my answer to No. 37 question.

40. I do not think that such a system would be favorable to that vigilance which has become essential and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength.

41. I do not recommend the adoption of such an arrangement.

42. Same answer as to 41 question.

I have, &c.

HUGH ROSE, Major-General,
Commanding Field Forces south of the Nerbudda.

Maj.-Gen.
Sir Hugh Rose,
G.C.B.

No. 4.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM GENERAL JOHN JACOB.

BOMBAY LIGHT CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the light cavalry of the Bombay army is composed?

Chiefly of good caste; Hindoos from Upper India, with about 10 per cent. of Mahrattas, and the like number of Mussulmans.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from? *Gen. J. Jacob*

Chiefly from Hindoostan Proper; the Mahrattas and some of the Mussulmans from the southern districts of the Bombay presidency.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the light cavalry of the Bombay army, either by the regulations or the practice of the ?

Yes; no very low caste men are ever enlisted.

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4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the light cavalry of the Bombay army, if that branch of the service be continued?

The attending to, acknowledging at all, in any way, any distinctions of races, tribe, caste, &c., as giving any rights or implying any merits, appears to me to be a very great error.

Men should be enlisted with reference to individual qualifications only. Any race, tribe, or caste, the individuals of which possessed high personal qualifications, would necessarily predominate over the others, but not by reason of race, tribe, or caste, but simply on account of their personal and individual qualifications. This cannot, I think, be too much insisted on, or too frequently kept in view.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the native regular or light cavalry of the Bombay army?

Regimental arrangements only.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the light cavalry of the Bombay army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

None that I am aware of.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

Do. do.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

All such matters should be left wholly to regimental commanders to arrange as they find best. Races, tribes, and castes should not be attended to at all.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

I have not a copy of the oath. It is well known.

10. How long has this form been in use in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

Since its first formation.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the light cavalry of the Bombay army when first enrolled?

The practice of administering such oaths is, it appears to me, very gravely erroneous. It implies that this oath alone is what binds the soldier to his duty. Such swearing always tends to induce untruth, inasmuch as it creates the impression that when not bound by oath the soldier may be unfaithful.

12. Should the light cavalry corps of the Bombay army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

All such matters should be left wholly to regimental commanders.

13. Or should the light cavalry corps of the Bombay army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

14. Should the corps of light cavalry of the Bombay army be homogeneous as to race or caste?

All considerations of races, tribes, or castes should be omitted, and such circumstances should never be acknowledged as implying any degree of merit or demerit. Men should be enlisted in consideration of personal qualifications only, and entirely at the discretion of regimental commanders, who should be left to make their own arrangement for obtaining good recruits wherever they pleased.

15. Should the corps of light cavalry of the Bombay army be composed of troops or squadrons, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

16. If the corps of light cavalry of the Bombay army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

These arrangements should be left wholly to the regimental commanders. If each regiment had fixed permanent head-quarters, an abundant supply of recruits to fill vacancies would always be ready at hand, and no agency whatever would be required.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

None.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the light corps of cavalry of the Bombay army?

No; the less the native Indian soldiers have to do with any Europeans, except gentlemen, the better.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed, with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers, with whom they would be associated?

The proposal, if acted on, would, however carried out, ruin the Indian army. The chief, the peculiar advantage of our native troops is their readiness, their independence of all those heavy commissariat arrangements, barrack accommodations, &c. which are necessary for European troops in India. Under the proposed arrangement all would be rendered helpless, the solid strength of the European regiment and the activity of the native corps would both be wanting, while the higher classes of natives, whose presence is invaluable in our ranks, would be wholly excluded from the service.

24. How should the light cavalry of the Bombay army be armed?

With cutting swords and short double-barrel carbines.

25. Has any advantage been derived from the dress and equipments of the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bombay army being assimilated to those of the European dragoons?

I think not.

26. How should the light cavalry of the Bombay army be dressed and equipped with a view to the efficiency and comfort of the native trooper?

The dress should be a loose double-breasted tunic of thick broadcloth, with plenty of pockets in it; cloth overalls; the head dress should be a helmet, or Kilmarnock cap, or the native Indian pugree; for

summer wear, the tunic should be of grey or drab coloured cotton cloth, with overalls of the same; accoutrements of black unvarnished leather.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

I have a strong opinion that there should be no articles of war. Such a system of laws appears to me to be founded on principles radically false and mischievous. The practical effect of articles of war on the mind of the native Indian soldier is to show him that we expect him to disobey, that his normal state is disobedience. The only law to the native Indian soldier should be the orders of his English commanding officer.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

I think there should be no such rules at all. Commanding officers should have magisterial powers over their men; but it is clear to me, that any commanding officer who would retain in his corps a native Indian soldier after subjecting him to corporal punishment must be quite unfit to command native Indian soldiers. Corporal punishment should always be followed by disgraceful dismissal, and should only be resorted to in cases of disgraceful crime, plundering, theft, violence to country folks, and such like.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

The present system of native courts-martial appears to me to be very deeply erroneous in principle; such courts imply that the native officers are intrusted with higher powers than their European commander. The authority of the European commander should be paramount over the native soldiers of his regiment, and his orders should be the only laws recognized. Under such a rule the native court-martial might often be very useful.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Bombay light cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

The articles of war are read out in the vernacular to the regiment once a month.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the Bombay light cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

I cannot say.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the light cavalry of the Bombay army what is the system of promotion; it is based on merit alone; on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

Merit and seniority combined.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the light cavalry of the Bombay army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

They are generally as intelligent, useful, and efficient as could be expected under the present construction of the service, which is such that the so called native officers are not really officers at all.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

Generally so.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

No special examination is adopted that I am aware of, and I have a strong opinion that all such examinations are fallacious.

5. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer, between the European officer and his men, weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer? Does the full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers?

This must depend wholly on the personal characters, &c. of the individuals.

The full complement of European officers proper for a native Indian regiment is in my opinion four. The fact of the commanding officers and subalterns of troops and companies being European is absolutely inconsistent with efficiency in our native Indian army. There can be no native officers in reality where the youngest cornet or ensign commands every native of every rank.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers?

In the Bombay army the native officers have been generally most faithful and actively useful.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

In my opinion the captains and subalterns of troops should be native commissioned officers.

8. Is the substitution of a European serjeant and corporal to each troop of light or irregular corps of cavalry in lieu of its native commissioned officers advisable?

Most inadvisable; the practice would be found to be most mischievous. Native soldiers should not be commanded by any Europeans but gentlemen.

9. If the abolition of the grades of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the native trooper, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after special periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

It is in my opinion impossible to form a really good, trustworthy, and efficient native Indian army unless higher rank and position than the service now offers to them be thrown open to the native soldiers. Instead of abolishing the commissioned ranks of natives, I would make the native officers in effect captains and subalterns, give them real command, and impose on them real responsibility.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

The pensions must have had—and have actually had—considerable effect in attaching men to the service.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

But in this case, as in all others throughout the Indian services, the attempt to prevent the possibility of abuse has crushed all life out of the system, and under a better arrangement the effect of the same amount of public expenditure in pensions would assuredly have been tenfold greater than it is under existing regulations.

The pensioners of each regiment should remain attached to that regiment.

Every man after twenty years' service might be allowed a moderate pension, and after 30 years' service a more liberal allowance. The commanding officer, in consultation with his medical and other officers, should have power to transfer men to the regimental

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pension list after the prescribed period of service, and such pensioners should be borne on a separate roll as pensioners of such a regiment. It should be at all times discretionary with regimental commanding officers to discharge any man without pension. The pensioners should be considered as belonging to the regiment, and no other than the regimental authorities should have anything to do with them. They should reside and receive their pensions at regimental head-quarters only. There is no circumstance regarding the organization of our native Indian army which I am more clearly convinced of than this of the advantage and even necessity of fixed permanent regimental head-quarters, where pensioners and families can all reside in safety and comfort, and where an ample supply of the very best material for our ranks would be continually in readiness to our hands.

I have heard the proposed fixed head-quarters for regiments objected to, because some stations must be much more favored by climate, and present generally far more local advantages, than others. But in practice this objection is found absolutely groundless. *Permanent* residents adapt themselves to the peculiarities of any locality, and the ingenuity men are called upon to exercise in counteracting local disadvantages, and a kind of pride which all men take more or less in overcoming difficulties, soon causes them even to prefer their own place of abode, however little it may be favored by nature, to any other whatever.

The feeling is universal, and the facts are beyond doubt.

I have myself for twelve years past seen the head-quarters of my own corps established with perfect success in the most unfavourable locality which could probably be found on earth; and many of our pensioners now prefer continuing to reside at Jacobabad, on the Sind frontier, rather than returning to their homes in Hindustan, although some of these pensioners continuing at the regimental head-quarters are Brahmins and high caste Hindoos, while Sind is a thoroughly Mahomedan country. Each regimental head-quarters would, in fact, under the system proposed by me, become a military colony, where the rising generation would be continually educated for service in our ranks. Many of the best recruits in the Sind irregular horse have been thus born and bred, as it were, in the service.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the Bombay presidency on account of military pensions to the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

I cannot say.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these be retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

All promotion should go by merit only, of which the commanding officer should be the sole judge. A commanding officer should have full power to admit natives at once as native officers, if he thought proper to do so.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

Generally; in the Bombay army they are so.

15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

The qualifications of individuals of these different classes are so extremely various that it is almost impossible to institute such comparisons with advantage. The native officers of the Bombay army, even under the present organization, are, I think, perhaps superior in mere intelligence to the generality of European non-commissioned officers, but very inferior to them in force of characters and moral power. The Asiatic and European character are, in fact, in many respects complementary to each other.

16. What is the best organization for native corps of regular cavalry?

1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers? or,
2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grade? or,
3. Be officered like corps of irregular cavalry, viz., with a full complement of native commissioned officers, but with only three or four European officers?

Four European officers to each regiment. Troop officers, natives only. European officers appointed to regiments by careful selection; and other details as laid down in the annexed printed scheme.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

A fourth officer might be added as quartermaster, and commanding officers should have full powers to discharge, dismiss, enlist, and promote all ranks of natives. Commanding officers should be allowed the selection of their own European subordinates.

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular? and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

The irregular service is certainly generally preferred, chiefly for the reason that in it the native officers are really and not only nominally officers. But the services, regular and irregular, cannot be compared in this way, for there is more difference between individual irregular corps than between many of those belonging to distinct branches of the service.

I have, &c.

JOHN JACOB, Brig.-Gen.,
Commandant-in-Chief on the Frontier.

SCHEME for the REORGANIZATION of the INDIAN ARMY,
by Brigadier-General JOHN JACOB, C.B., &c. &c.

The Queen of England formally to assume the style and title of Empress of India, and to be proclaimed accordingly.

The armies of the several Indian presidencies to be henceforth styled the Royal armies of India.

In each of these armies, the whole of the European officers of the cavalry and infantry, and the European officers of the artillery and engineers above the rank of colonel, to be formed into one general gradation list, in which, under ordinary circumstances, all will rise by seniority.

Rank in this list to be the only permanent rank, all regimental and other rank being temporary only, and to continue only so long as officers may be serving with regiments, or be otherwise employed in a military capacity.

In case of officers being promoted for good service, &c., by the Queen, they are to take their places in the general gradation list according to the dates of their promotions, and are to enjoy every advantage exactly as if they had risen to such places by seniority only. This general gradation list to be styled the "unemployed list." All the officers borne on it who may hold no special appointments will reside in India at such places as Government may direct, but will have no public functions to perform.

A fourth presidency, to be styled the North-West Presidency, and a fourth army, to be formed; our present Bombay and Bengal armies together being divided into three equal parts for this purpose.

Ultimately, the whole establishment of European officers may probably be somewhat less than at present; but, under the proposed arrangements, the number of officers in the whole general list of each army can readily be adjusted in practice to meet the demands of the public service; when these shall have been correctly ascertained, no further changes will probably be requisite.

For an army of the strength of the present army of Bombay, the following establishment might be proper:—

Battalions or Regiments.	Colonels.	Lt.-Cols.	Captains.	Lieuts.
5 Artillery - -	5	10	50	30
4 Engineers - -	4	8	40	40
3 Cavalry - -	3	6	30	30
33 Infantry - -	33	66	330	330
45	45	90	450	450

Generals - - - - 5
 Lieut.-Generals - - - 10
 Major Generals - - - 15

The ranks of major and
 ensign to be abolished.

The several ranks of officers while unemployed in India to receive pay as follows:—

General - - - -	1,500 Rs. per mensem.
Lieutenant-General - - -	1,200 "
Major-General - - - -	1,000 "
Colonel - - - -	600 "
Lieutenant-Colonel - - -	400 "
Captain - - - -	300 "
Lieutenant - - - -	200 "

These rates of pay to be allowed to officers wherever residing, by permission, in India, and the like number of pounds per annum to be allowed to each when absent from India on leave to Europe or elsewhere.

The option of retiring on full pay of the rank attained to in the general list to be allowed after 30 years, and on half pay after 20 years.

Leave of absence to be granted at the discretion of the local governments.

Subscriptions to military and all other funds to cease to be compulsory.

A distinct and separate civil service to be prospectively abolished.

Officers while unemployed or employed in civil capacities are not to be in any way subject to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, or to military rule or etiquette.

All candidates appointed to the Indian service to be educated at a military college in England, and to reside at such college for at least two years, and not more than four years.

The minimum age for admission to be fourteen, and the maximum eighteen years.

The course at the college to include full instruction in mechanical and in physical science generally, and in political economy, also riding, rifle practice, and hardy exercises.

The residence at the college to be free of all pecuniary charge to the cadet, unless he decline proceeding to join the service in India in due course, in which case—to cover all cost to the State—he should pay at the rate of 100% per annum for the period during which he has resided at college.

From the general list formed as above mentioned, officers are to be selected for every species of public employment, civil and military.

For each native infantry regiment, the establishment of English officers may be as follows:—

	Pay.
1 Colonel - - - -	600 Rs. per mensem.
1 Lieutenant Colonel - - -	400 "
2 Captains (to be each Adjutant and Quartermaster) - - -	300 "

The pay assigned to each being in every case staff-pay, to be drawn in addition to the pay due to each according to his rank in the general list. But though an officer may hold a lower rank in the general list than that which is assigned to his position in a regiment or on other military employment, the temporary rank is always to hold good for precedence and command during the period of employment.

For the cavalry, the like establishment of officers may be allowed, with one hundred rupees extra pay to each rank, to cover the cost of horses and other expenses.

For a brigade of any strength:—

	Staff Pay.
1 Major-General - - - -	1,000 Rs. per mensem.
1 Captain, Major of Brigade	400 "

For a division:—

1 Lieutenant-General - - -	3,000	"
1 Lieutenant-Colonel, Adjutant-General - - - -	400	"
1 Lieutenant-Colonel, Quartermaster-General - - -	400	"
1 Captain, A.D.C. - - - -	300	"
1 Major-General, Adjutant-General of the Army - - -	1,500	"
1 Major-General, Quartermaster-General - - - -	1,500	"
1 Colonel, Deputy Adjutant-General - - - -	500	"
1 Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster-General - - -	600	"

Proper office establishment, &c., to be allowed to commanding and staff officers; company and troop allowances and contracts as usual.

All officers, when absent on leave beyond the division in which they may be serving, are to receive unemployed pay only, and if other officers act for them when absent, even within the division otherwise than on duty, the officer acting for the absentee is to receive his staff pay in addition to his own.

Officers of the rank of captain in the general list are to be considered eligible for selection to fill any of the regimental ranks or other appointments. Lieutenants on the general list are not to be considered eligible for higher regimental or other military appointments than that of Lieutenant-Colonel.

At their own request, and with the approval of the regimental commanding officers, any unemployed officers may be attached to do duty with regiments or departments without extra pay.

The recommendations of officers commanding regiments, with respect to the appointment of officers to fill vacancies in their corps, or to their removal therefrom to the unemployed list in consequence of proved incapacity, &c., are to be attended to. All enlistments, discharges, promotions to and reductions from all ranks of native officers and soldiers, are to rest with the colonels of regiments, and are to be signified by them, with reasons, &c., if necessary, in regimental orders.

Articles of war for native Indian troops to be entirely abolished.

Colonels commanding native Indian regiments are to have full magisterial authority over all ranks of natives of India in their regiments, followers as well as soldiers. Such powers to extend to the award and infliction of imprisonment, with hard labour, for a period of seven years, without the confirmation of higher authority being required; to imprisonment for fourteen years, subject to the confirmation of the general officer commanding the brigade; to transportation and capital punishment, subject to the confirmation of the general officer commanding the division.

Regimental lieutenant-colonels and captains are likewise to exercise magisterial powers under the control of the colonels commanding their regiments, and to such extent as he may think proper to authorize.

In all cases involving the award of a graver punishment than three months' imprisonment with hard labour, the infliction of corporal punishment above twenty-five lashes, or of a fine above fifty rupees, regular proceedings of the trials are to be recorded in full, to be laid before the general officer commanding, when required.

Cases of less serious nature may be dealt with summarily, on due investigation by the commanding officer at public regimental orderly room. A record of all such proceedings is to be entered in a proper book kept for that purpose, and preserved among the regimental records for the inspection of general officers.

Colonels of regiments are to be held strictly and solely responsible to their superior officers and to the State, but not to the native Indian soldiers, for the propriety of all such proceedings.

Permanent head-quarters to be established for each native Indian regiment, and complete carriage for every corps to be always kept up ready for a march, at a day's warning.

For the European infantry, the establishment of officers per regiment may be:—

1 Colonel - - - -	600 Rs. per mensem.
2 Lieutenant-Colonels, each - - -	400 "
10 Captains - - - -	300 "
1 Adjutant - - - -	300 } To rank above
1 Quartermaster - - - -	300 } the Lieutenants.
10 Lieutenants - - - -	200 Rs. per mensem.

The officers of artillery and of engineers each to be borne in a separate list up to the rank of colonel, inclusive; and thereafter to be incorporated in the general list of the whole army. The senior colonel of artillery or engineers, when senior in the army, being promoted to major-general as vacancies may occur.

Unemployed pay to be the same for all arms.

Employed pay, whether regimental or ordnance, &c., to be allowed as for the cavalry.

Each battalion of artillery to have field officers and staff as for an European regiment, the numbers of captains and lieutenants being adjusted according to circumstances, to the number absent on leave, and the number required for the ordnance department, and other artillery staff duties. All artillery officers in India to be considered as "employed" when not on leave.

In the ordnance department, the rank and pay of the various grades to be adjusted as follows:—

Senior Commissary - - -	as Colonel.
Senior Deputy Commissary - - -	as Lieutenant-Colonel.

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Commissaries of Division	- as Captains.
Assistant Commissaries	- as Lieutenants.
Commandant of Artillery—	
Major-General	- - - 1,100 Rs. per mensem.
Major of Brigade—Captain	- 500 "
	Inclusive of horse allowance.

No difference of pay between horse and foot artillery.

Engineer officers attached to the engineer corps, or holding other military appointments, to be on the same footing as artillery officers; but the duties of engineer officers in India are generally purely civil, and their salaries, &c., should be adjusted specially for each appointment.

In all appointments other than military, officers will receive their unemployed military pay, in addition to such emolument as may be assigned to them in their civil capacities; and when absent on leave, or on any account other than public duty, beyond the range of their immediate superior, they will receive only the unemployed rates of pay.

JOHN JACOB.

BOMBAY IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army is composed?

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

Of nearly every race, tribe, and caste in India and Central Asia, I believe. The regiments of the Sind irregular horse are chiefly composed of Hindoostanees, mostly Mussulmans, the agricultural and landholding classes of the districts around Delhi, Ferruckabad, &c.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army, either by the regulations or the practice of the

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

None, that I am aware of.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relative to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

Everything should be left to the discretion of the regimental commander.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army when first enrolled?

No oath is used that I am aware of; none has ever been used in the Sind irregular horse. I have a deep conviction that the use of any such oaths is of most

pernicious effect, as explained in answers to former questions respecting other branches of the service.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bombay army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bombay army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army be homogeneous as to race or caste?

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army be composed of Rissalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

All such matters should be left wholly to the discretion of regimental commanders. The practice of recognizing differences of tribes, caste, &c., as implying merit or demerit, or in any way affecting a man's position as a soldier, is most faulty. Men should be enlisted as soldiers, and their merits estimated according to their power and willingness to perform their duties as soldiers. Caste, &c., should never be alluded to or recognized in any way. If any man's peculiarities of caste, &c., be found to interfere with the performance of his duties as a soldier, these peculiarities should be treated exactly as would be bodily defects or infirmities, and the man so defective or infirm should not be enlisted, or his services should be dispensed with as soon as such defects become apparent. Peculiarities of belief or of practice which interfere with military duty should be considered and treated, not as conferring privileges, but as signs of weakness, just as would be physical disorders.

I have always acted thus with a large body of native Indian soldiers for some seventeen years past and with the happiest effect. In this corps all men's religions are respected, but none are allowed to be obtrusive, and an officer might serve for many years in the Sind horse without ever hearing even any mention of caste.

In these proceedings I have always carried the public opinion of all classes of natives with me, depending on natural law and on those feelings and attributes which are common to all mankind; I have never met with any opposition, but have, on the contrary, met with cordial support from all classes, even when I positively prohibited all public displays, ceremonies, &c. on such occasions as the Mohurram and Dewallee.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

None; all such matters should be left wholly to regimental commanders.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

None.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bombay army?

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers, with whom they would be associated?

No. These questions appear to me to be equivalent to asking whether each troop of horse artillery should not have a Lancaster gun of ten tons weight or so attached to it.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army be armed?

At the discretion of regimental commanders. In my own opinion, good English cutting swords and short double-barrel carbines are the best arms for all native Indian cavalry.

26. Do the dress and equipments of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army admit of improvement? If so, state them.

This question seems to imply that all the corps of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army are alike; but this is not the case. These corps differ from each other in a great variety of particulars, and in fact they have only one peculiarity in common, which is, the horses being the property of the men.

The Sind irregular horse are certainly as well and efficiently dressed as the means allowed will permit, and their equipments has often been officially reported by various general officers to be perfection.

But the pay of all our irregular cavalry is too low, and it would be true economy to increase that of the Sind irregular horse serving on the frontier to forty-five rupees per man and horse monthly, and that of corps serving in the interior of India to thirty-six rupees monthly for each private man and horse complete, with corresponding rates of pay for the higher grades. The style of dress and equipments should be left to the discretion of commanding officers.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

No articles of war have ever been in use in the Sind horse; how far they have been applied to the other corps of irregular cavalry I cannot precisely say.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

There should be no special rules at all. Everything should be left to the discretion of a selected commander.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

Courts-martial are not resorted to at all in the Sind irregular horse. They have been in use in other irregular corps; but the system works most unsatisfactorily.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

5. What proportion of the troopers of the irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

The practice in different corps differs very greatly. No code was ever in use in the Sind irregular horse since I have commanded the corps, except the regimental orders, and no law thought of except the will of the commander.

III. ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

Gen. J. Jacob.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined.

It is not possible to reply to these questions generally, inasmuch as the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army is not of homogeneous construction. Some corps differ from others as much as Her Majesty's life-guards do from Cossacks, and I would observe that this remark applies to the questions respecting irregular cavalry generally.

In the Sind horse, promotion by merit alone is the rule, and the commandant is the sole judge of such merit.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

The commissioned officers of the Sind irregular horse are generally very good, and whether in command of troops and squadrons with a regiment in a body, or in command of detachments on distant outposts, are, in my opinion, quite equal in efficiency, within their own sphere of action, to the average of captains and subalterns of the regular regiments.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

Undoubtedly so; being chosen for merit only, their acquirements and qualifications are necessarily the highest.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

In the said Sind irregular horse no man is promoted from the ranks until he shall have passed an examination in his drill.

Before promotion to be pay duffadar, the candidate is required to pass a strict examination as to his knowledge of accounts, Persian, writing, &c. &c. No other special examination is used. But the first selection of a man from the ranks of the private soldiers is the most important move of all, for from that time he is necessarily more prominently brought to the notice of his officers, so that his whole service is one continuous examination. This is the state of things in the Sind irregular horse; the practices differ greatly in other corps.

5. No reply required.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

Nothing could have been more noble than the conduct of the men and officers of every grade in the Sind irregular horse on the occasion of the late mutiny and attempted rebellion on the Sind frontier. Reports on this subject in full have been made to Government in the secret department. Never were native Indian soldiers so tried and tempted; but not a man failed in his duty. There never has been the least symptom of a tendency to any idea of the possibility of mutiny in our own ranks. I speak of the Sind irregular horse only; regarding other corps, I am not so well informed.

7, 8, and 9. No replies required.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

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12. What is the charge upon the finances of the Bombay presidency on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry?

The answers given in full to similar questions regarding the light cavalry, &c., apply with equal force here, and to every part of the army.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers, if at all in operation, be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Any system of promotion for any other reason than merit and efficiency is, and must always be, most mischievous.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

The native officers of the Sind irregular horse have not been accustomed to courts-martial, but I have always found them quite as fit for any duty required of them as European subalterns generally.

15 and 16. No replies required.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular? and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

The answers given to similar questions respecting other branches of the service apply with equal force to the irregular cavalry.

19. If irregular corps of cavalry have native commissioned officers, and the regular corps of native cavalry have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the high pay to the troopers and non-commissioned officers of the regular cavalry be an equivalent to the absence of commissioned grades, and draw as good recruits to the regular as the contrary system will draw to the irregular corps?

No, assuredly not.

20. Is it advisable to keep up regular native cavalry in the Bombay army? Would the substitution of irregular cavalry be as efficient, and less costly?

Under the term irregular cavalry, troops are classed together as of one description which, in reality, differ from each other as much as the Numantian horsemen did from the troopers of Gustavus Adolphus. Really irregular cavalry, such as our Belooch horse, or some of the Russian Cossacks, are often most useful, are frequently invaluable, in war. But we must have regular cavalry also. We could not carry on war without such an arm, and to the question as it stands, it must be answered that we must keep up both regular and irregular cavalry.

But the Sind irregular horse, though classed with the irregulars, is in reality more regular than any of the regulars themselves; and I apprehend that the question refers, not to real regularity or irregularity of the corps, but to peculiarity of organization. It is the practice now to style all corps irregular in which the horses and arms are the property of the men, and all corps regular in which the horses and arms belong to and are maintained by the State.

But this practice leads to numerous erroneous impressions, and under this classification Cromwell's Ironsides themselves would become irregulars.

Now it is quite certain that if the European officers were properly selected, and left to rule their regiments as they found best, a perfectly regular native Indian cavalry could be formed on the Sillidar system (that is, the system of the men furnishing their own horses and arms), which should be more efficient than any

cavalry now known in the East, whether European or Asiatic, and which should at the same time cost the State only two-thirds of the cost of the existing native light cavalry of India.

21. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bombay army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?

The whole should be on the sillidar principle, and all arrangements and details be left to the regimental commander.

22. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bombay army are mounted?

Five hundred rupees each.

23. Whence are the horses obtained, and of what breeds are they?

All parts of the world.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bombay presidency draw its horses?

From the districts in which each corps may be serving.

The Sind horse is chiefly supplied from Beloochistan and Herat.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay presidency?

It is impossible to answer this question generally; it is like asking what is the average cost of horses in the world.

The cost of the horses of the Sind irregular horse averages about two hundred and twenty-five rupees each.

26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bombay army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

I believe not.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bombay presidency?

Yes. The present system absolutely excludes from our ranks a very great number of the very best horses in the world, and introduces many of the worst. The powers of a horse are not to be estimated by measuring his height at the withers.

28. Is it advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies, for a supply of horses for the army of India?

The breed of saddle horses in England has notoriously degenerated exactly in proportion as it has increased in height (*vide*, among other authorities, a little book lately published, entitled "On the Deterioration of our Saddle Horses.") If we look back to the English turf about a century ago, we see horses, standing no higher than our ordinary Arabs at present, running such distances as four and six mile heats with such weights as twelve stone on their backs, and doing this in such time as is now unapproachable. In 1722, Flying Childers with 9 stone 2 lbs. ran over the Beacon course at Newmarket—four miles one furlong and one hundred and thirty-eight yards—in seven minutes and thirty seconds.

In the same year he beat Lord Drogheda's Chaunter, ten stone each, six miles, for a thousand guineas. When six years old (1721), he beat Almanzor and others over the round course at Newmarket—three miles, six furlongs, and ninety-three yards—in six minutes and forty seconds; weight, 9 stone 2 lbs. In fact, this short, compact, strong constituted horse, with ten or even twelve stone on his back, could with ease have doubly or trebly distanced in

four or five miles, the best horses now in England, even giving the latter two or three stone.

Flying Childers was got by the Derby Arabian out of Betty Leedes, whose granddam was a Barb mare, and whose sire was the Leedes Arabian; he was thus of nearly pure Arab and Barb blood, and was what would now in England be called a very small horse, having been only 15 hands high.

Again, twenty years later, Little Cartouch, also of Arab stock, standing only 14 hands high, ran repeatedly four and six mile heats, carrying twelve stone; and at these weights and distances he beat everything that could be brought against him.

The endurance of the horses of that day, bred from Arabs, was quite as remarkable as were their performances themselves; they remained running season after season; sound, fresh, and always winning for six or seven years together; and one of them won twenty-eight times.

The long-legged, feeble-bodied racehorses of the present day are seldom able to run more than one public race, carrying 8 stone 7 lbs. for a mile and a half or two miles at most. After this effort they are generally unfit to stand further training, their legs having generally failed.

The introduction of the tall, weak-constituted modern English horse into the great continental studs of Europe has ruined them as it has done the studs in India; and for some years past it has been found necessary to have recourse to Arab horses alone for breeding purposes; but meanwhile the native breeds in France and Germany have been ruined, and a new race of animals has to be created.

In India, the introduction of the English horse has been fatal to our studs.

These establishments might, under proper management, have been invaluable to the Anglo-Indian Government; as it is, they have proved worse than a dead loss, for all the old native breeds of horses in India have been ruined by them, as in Austria, Prussia, and France.

The Indian breeding studs should undoubtedly be maintained, and those in the Bombay presidency on a much larger scale than heretofore. But they should be established on entirely different principles from those now acted on.

Superintendents should be appointed, who possess some considerable knowledge of the physiology of horse-breeding, as well as some practical knowledge of the details of the business; the studs should be established in localities favourable to the health of the horse, and particularly where the monsoon rains are light. A number of the best and most healthy mares of any breed procurable (as Arab mares are not to be had at any price) should be taken to commence with, and thereafter none but the best and purest Arab blood should ever be admitted into the breeding stud. Agents should be sent to the interior of Arabia to buy the best horses procurable for stallions, but if this were found impracticable, sufficiently good horses for our purpose would after a time readily be found in the Bombay market.

Let none but Arab blood be admitted; let due attention be paid to the shape, and particularly to the constitutional qualities of individual horses; let all be excluded from the breeding stock in whom any constitutional defect might be apparent; appoint properly qualified officers to superintend the business, and it is certain that our Indian studs would, in twenty years' time, produce an abundant supply of the best horses on earth.

Meanwhile abolish all remount committees, appoint properly qualified remount agents at Bombay and Kurrachee, permit these remount agents to buy up for the service all the Arab horses which they consider fit for cavalry purposes without any sort of attention to the height of the animals at the withers, or any other particular measurement. If you can get a larger and really well-shaped blood-horse, so much the better; but large blood-horses are very rare, and a horse of 14 hands high is often able to carry twenty

stone with perfect ease, while one of inferior breed, of 15 or 16 hands, may not be able to carry half so much, half so far, or so fast. Gen. J. Jacob.

The best horse I ever had was under 14 hands in height; he was of great depth and size of body, was equal to any weights, and was the best hunter of his day (1831 to 1835) in the Deccan. He carried me (eleven stone) 40 miles in three hours at a trot. I swam the Godavery on him at Kopergaum in the height of the monsoon, when the ferry-boat had been carried away by the stream, which was running so Pytrong that no other boatmen could be persuaded again to attempt the passage; and though carried down a mile or more, the good horse took me, accoured in heavy hunting gear, across the torrent as steadily and safely as if he had been going along the dry road. There was nothing that this horse could not do well; he worked hard for me for fifteen years; was never sick or sorry; he was as strong as an elephant, as fast as an antelope (I once ran one to death on him in the Deccan, a performance which at that time was thought beyond the powers of any horse), and as gentle and docile as a child; but such a horse would have been excluded from the ranks of our cavalry, because he was two inches below the standard height!

From inquiries that I have made in Arabia as well as in Bombay and elsewhere, I have every reason to believe that if the idea of a standard height was done away with, and horses only selected on consideration of their ability to do the work required of them, nearly two thousand Arab horses annually could be supplied for our remounts more than are now purchased.

As it is, the Arab breeders are disgusted, and will not bring their horses to market. I have heard them declare that we prefer bad horses to good ones; and low-bred, tall, long-legged, useless creatures to compact powerful little blood Arabs, who would work the others into fits in a week—and there is much truth in the declaration.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bombay army?

The pay is different in different regiments; that of the Sind irregular horse is thirty rupees for horse and man complete.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign?

30b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

This rate of pay is undoubtedly too low, and should be increased. No debts are permitted in the Sind irregular horse. I am informed that the Poona horse and other corps suffer much inconvenience from debt. Two hundred men of the Poona horse were transferred to the Sind irregular horse, and they brought with them debts acknowledged by the commanding officer to the amount of forty thousand rupees.

32. What is the system of the irregular cavalry with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests or not? Are they favourable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

It differs much in different corps. In the Sind irregular horse the sale of assamees is allowed, permission being obtained first, in every instance, from the commanding officer, the sales being by open and free auction to the highest bidder—no buying in permitted. Every case is specially considered; any man

Gen. J. Jacob: wishing to buy a horse (assamee), asks permission to do so at orderly room. This system works well in the Sind irregular horse; but in this as in other things, "whatever is best administered is best," and all these arrangements should be left to commanding officers, who will usually produce the best results, when permitted to work after their own fashion.

33. What is the pay of mounted police in the Bombay presidency and in Sind?

34. What is the organization of the mounted police of the Bombay presidency and of the Sind?

In Sind there are two distinct classes of mounted police; the one organized like the Bengal irregular cavalry, receiving 20 rupees a month per man and horse, and the other perfectly irregular Belooch horse, receiving 15 rupees a month per man and horse.

35. Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the Bombay presidency composed, and of what races, &c. is the mounted police of Sind composed?

The first class is chiefly composed of men of Hindustan; the second class of the Belooch tribes of Upper Sind.

36. How is the mounted police recruited, that is, what is the agency employed; the precautions taken before, or by the local authorities in entertaining men?

By volunteers; no agency is employed and no precautions are taken.

37. Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police at rupees 20 per mensem been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?

The pay, twenty and fifteen rupees respectively, is I think sufficient.

38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

It does not appear to me that the difference between the pay of the police and that of the irregular cavalry can, in any way effect the supply of horses for the latter.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of the light cavalry in the Bombay army or of irregular cavalry been increased or diminished?

2. During the above period have the powers of officers commanding troops of the regular native cavalry of the Bombay army been increased or diminished?

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the light cavalry and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

4. What is the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of officers in charge of troops?

The system of centralization, of subjecting the minds of all regimental officers to blind and unyielding regulation, has greatly diminished their commanding powers. The habitual non-exercise of their own reason and discretion must have and undoubtedly has greatly lessened that individual force of character by which alone the Asiatic soldiers can be efficiently commanded by European officers. Similar questions to those have been replied to in full under other heads; those answers equally apply here, and it seems unnecessary to repeat at length what has been before recorded.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of headquarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

The real effective discipline and useful military power of a corps of Asiatic soldiers in our service depend wholly on the personal character and influence of its English officers. The useful power of the Asiatic soldier depends entirely on what the English gentlemen has instilled into him.

If no virtue has gone out from the English officer, none will be found in the sepoy.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

I have answered these questions in full above, and it seems unnecessary to repeat the replies here. The scheme for the reorganization of the Indian army proposed by me would, I am convinced, be found practically to provide for every want and to remedy every defect. It would be difficult and troublesome to carry into effect at first, by reason of the strong prejudices formed under the present faulty system, but there would be constant and continually increasing tendency towards perfect arrangement; and before long the soundest possible state would be arrived at, which nothing could afterwards shake or disorder. The discipline would depend on internal attraction instead of on external pressure; there would be a continual tendency in all the parts of the army to aggregate the more firmly instead of to fly to pieces.

8 and 9. Replies to similar questions having been already received, no answers required to Nos. 8 and 9.

10. Has the strength of the light or irregular cavalry been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

Certainly not in the Bombay presidency.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the light and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army otherwise, without injury to its horses and discipline?

I know not on what duties it is here proposed that the cavalry should be employed. The irregular cavalry of the Bombay army are already continually employed on every species of duty on which cavalry could be employed at all.

12. If native regular cavalry be kept up with a full complement of European officers, would you attach cavalry cadets at once to native corps, or for a time to dragoon corps?

It is a most excellent arrangement to cause all officers on first joining the army to serve for a year or two with an European regiment, if such regiments be well commanded; but the advantage of the arrangement depends wholly on the character, conduct, internal good order, and discipline of the European corps to which the young officers may be attached.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

A few known good officers should be selected at first for merit alone to command regiments. These commandants should be permitted to select their own subordinates, and thus a school for the training of future commanders would at once be formed.

A young officer or two might be occasionally or generally attached to do duty with a regiment, and would thus have an opportunity of qualifying himself for permanent appointment in the corps. All these

matters are fully provided for in my scheme for the reorganization of the army.

14. Is the efficiency of the corps of regular cavalry in the Bombay army affected by the number of officers taken away from their corps for staff employment?

The regular cavalry is so well paid, and is so favourite a service, that there is very little inducement to any officer to accept any appointment elsewhere; the efficiency of a cavalry corps is therefore never injured by the number of officers withdrawn from it for staff employ.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?

There has been no open mutiny in the cavalry of the Bombay army, regular or irregular; but I am aware that a large number of men of our regular cavalry were disaffected, and inclined not to support their officers.

The number of European officers actually present with a corps does not appear to me to have caused any effect on the fidelity or otherwise of the sepoys; but the construction, the organization of a corps, on the principle of having the captains and subalterns of troops European officers in the one case and native officers, in the other, produces a most powerful effect on the fidelity of the native soldiers.

It is not the mere number of European officers which affects this question, but it is certain that native Indian soldiers are always more powerful, more obedient, and more faithful under a few well-selected officers than under a great number taken at hazard, without regard to character or qualification.

16. In the event of irregular cavalry being the only native cavalry maintained in the Indian armies, how should the officers of the regular native cavalry be employed? With European dragoon corps raised for service in India, or with the irregular cavalry substituted for the regular?

With the European dragoons. No native Indian troops can ever be properly organized, can ever be made perfectly trustworthy, unless the European officers be appointed to them by judicious selection, and then allowed full powers over their men.

Most of the officers formed in the old "regular school" would probably be found unfit to command natives on sounder principles than those to which they have been accustomed.

17. Of what strength should the corps of European dragoons raised for service in India be; that is, the aggregate force of European dragoons being fixed, should it be divided into corps of 400 sabres, or corps of 800 sabres, or of any other number, with a view to effectively meeting the requirements of the service?

The best strength for a cavalry regiment is, in my opinion, 800 men of all ranks.

18. If corps of the strength of 400 sabres were preferred, would the same number of European officers as are now attached to corps of native regular cavalry suffice, and could the officers be thus rendered available?

Four hundred is, in my opinion, too few for a cavalry regiment, and the principle of adjusting the organization of the army so as to provide for a temporary and accidental circumstance, seems to me to be very faulty.

19. Is the system of formation in double ranks as well suited to European cavalry in India, as the system advocated by many British and foreign officers of experience, viz., that cavalry should form and manœuvre in single rank? Please to state at length the grounds upon which your opinion is based.

I have often used the single rank formation on particular occasions in war, and as an exercise; and I

think it sometimes very convenient, and often more powerful in attack than the two rank close formation, especially when the numbers are small. Gen. J. Jacob.

20. Assuming the single rank system to be desirable in India, of what strength should each corps be?

The most essential thing to the success of cavalry attacks is the having good and ready supports and reserves; the separating the two ranks from each other gives more supports and reserves, disorder in the leading rank being then quite consistent with perfect order in the one following it.

The single rank formation may be—I certainly am of opinion that it is—more convenient and often more powerful, but it is so solely because the second rank removed to a certain distance in rear forms a better support for the front rank than when close up to it.

But these formations do not appear to me to affect in the slightest degree the question of the number of men it is best to have in a regiment.

It signifies nothing in a tactical point of view what the strength of the regiment of cavalry may be; for under arms the integer of the cavalry line is the squadron, as the battalion is of the infantry; you may have as many squadrons as you please in a regiment.

But eight hundred men form a very convenient number for a regimental command, and of this strength I should recommend all cavalry regiments—native and European—to be, whatever tactical formations might be adopted.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

It would certainly be practicable to do so; but I do doubt if it would be advisable. It would, I think, be much better to form the native irregular horse into a separate regiment, and to brigade such regiment when thought proper with the European dragoons.

22. If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

Equal numbers would be the best, I think. The men should be armed, mounted, and organized as described for irregular cavalry generally. Officers for these as for all other troops of the Indian army should be carefully selected, in consideration of qualifications and merit only, from the general list of the army. But I am very doubtful as to the propriety or advantage of the proposed arrangement; it might answer exceedingly well when the officers of the European and native troops thoroughly understood the Asiatic soldiers and treated them accordingly.

When the native soldier feels that he is understood and justly appreciated by officers whom he also respects, there is nothing which he will not readily do or submit to. But under other conditions a little misunderstanding might lead to fatal mischief.

JOHN JACOB, Brig.-General,
Commandant-in-Chief on the Frontier.

REORGANIZATION OF ARMIES OF INDIA.

Classification.

The heads of inquiry in the Court's despatch may be classed as follows:—

- I. The recruiting and the composition of corps.
- II. The military code and rules of discipline.
- III. Organization, promotion, and rewards.
- IV. European officers.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bombay army is composed?

Nearly all the races, tribes, &c. of the Bombay presidency, with the exception of Parsees, and in considerable proportion of those of Hindostan proper.

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2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?
All the districts of the Bombay presidency and from Hindostan proper.
3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bombay army?
Yes; occasionally enlistment has been ordered to be confined to certain races and districts.
4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bombay army?
I think it would be far the best proceeding to take no notice of any questions regarding race, tribe, &c., but to entertain men with consideration of their individual fitness.
5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts from which the Bombay army is recruited?
No special agency; the business is managed by regimental commanding officers.
6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?
None that I am aware of.
7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoy or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?
Ditto.
8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bombay army)?
I would leave all such arrangements wholly to the commanding officers, and enlist men solely with respect to individual fitness.
9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bombay army?
I have not a copy of the oath, but it is well known.
10. How long has this form been in use in the Bombay army?
Since 1798, I believe.
11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the sepoy of the Bombay army?
I think that all such oaths are bad in principle, and that it would be far better to use none whatever.
12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bombay presidency of seafaring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?
Yes; the greater part of the inhabitants along the whole coast are such.
13. Has the Bombay presidency any marine corps, and if so, of what strength and whence recruited?
Yes, there is a marine battalion, which is, I believe, 800 strong. Its ranks are filled with Conkanees, Purwarees, and Soortees. These men are most efficient for the particular service required of them.
14. Should each infantry corps be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?
Each corps should have a permanent head-quarter, and there, of course, recruits would generally be entertained.
15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?
In enlisting men nothing should be considered but their fitness, morally and physically, for the work required of them. All such matters should be left wholly to regimental commanders.
16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?
No race, tribe, or caste, &c., should be acknowledged or attended to in any way. The sole question should be the qualities of the men, as men only, and with reference to the performance of the duties to which they were to be employed.
17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste, or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?
This question is replied to in the last answer. No questions relating to tribe, caste, &c., should be entertained for one moment; such distinctions should not be acknowledged at all.
18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
Distinctions of tribes, castes, &c., should neither be attended to or acknowledged in any way.
19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?
The police should be wholly distinct from the army, and policemen should not be encouraged or allowed to consider themselves as soldiers. Nothing seems to me to be of more mischievous effect than such a practice. I would leave all such questions as to recruiting wholly to the discretion of individual commanding officers.
20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?
No, assuredly not. Nothing could be more mischievous to both services. The policemen should be constables, and as little combative as possible.
21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the district of the Bombay presidency or of its dependencies, or in districts of other presidencies?
No special agency is employed. None seems necessary, but, on the contrary, its employment would, in my opinion, be hurtful.
22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?
I would leave all such matters to be managed by individual commanding officers.
23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bombay presidency?
None whatever; all should be left to the discretion of commanding officers. No regulations, no precautions, will suffice to supply the want of intellectual activity on the part of commanding officers.
24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for the police corps in the Bombay presidency?
The only precaution required in all cases is that care should be taken to choose proper European commanders, to whose discretion all details should be left.
25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?
The only question with regard to entertaining men in the service should be whether they be fit for that service, or otherwise. All recruits should be con-

sidered as men only, without any acknowledgment of differences with respect to country, religion, tribe, caste, &c.

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

Answered above.

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

All recruiting arrangements should be left wholly to commanding officers.

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?

No. A native Indian soldier should never be associated, if possible, with any Europeans but gentlemen. He should, as far as it can possibly be managed, never see an European in any but a superior position—none not possessing higher and nobler attributes than his own.

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

None but the utterly degraded, the very offscourings of Eastern society, would take service under such an arrangement, which, in my opinion, would prove utterly ruinous to our power.

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

Helplessly so. But if the arrangements were attempted, there would be an end of our Indian empire at once.

32. How should such companies be armed; with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?

33. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be armed?

All infantry should be armed alike, with short double-barrel small bored rifles.

34. How should police corps in the Bombay presidency be armed?

This must depend wholly on the particular work to be done. The police in the towns are best armed with sticks only.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

There are no advantages whatever to be counterbalanced. The dress and equipment of our English soldiers are ludicrously absurd. The dress and accoutrement of the London Fire Brigade is probably the best model for the soldier's equipment. Certainly the only principle which can in such matters be wisely adopted is to study the bodily comforts, protection, and freedom of action of the men, without the least regard to anything but power and efficiency.

36. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

The best dress for the soldier in India is a loose broadcloth tunic, with plenty of pockets in it, like a shooting-coat; loose cloth trowsers, to button round the ankle, and a good cotton cloth puggree. In the hot season, in the daytime, white cotton clothing of the like make should be adopted. Pipe-clay knapsacks and cross-belts should be wholly abolished.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association? Gen. J. Jacob.

This arrangement would answer admirably if the commanding officer of the European regiment were a man who understood how to treat properly respectable natives, and if he felt a pride in his native soldiers. Otherwise it would signally fail, and at best it is quite unnecessary.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

No. The gun-lascar arrangement is excellent, but the lascar is considered and treated wholly as an inferior being, and such treatment would exclude from our ranks all the best soldiers in India. The men of the Sind irregular horse always fraternize most readily with English soldiers wherever and whenever they meet each other, and they associate on terms of *perfect equality*. I have known a sowar knock a stout European down with his fist when the man had been insolent to him, and yet neither party made any complaint, but their comrades on both sides pronounced all fair, and the men shook hands over it, and by way of proving restored friendship the English soldier handed over to the Mussulman his short clay pipe to smoke, which he did readily, and they passed it backwards and forwards from mouth to mouth without the least scruple. This is a most common practice among them when they meet European soldiers, yet they are perfectly good Mussulmans, and are highly respected by all classes of natives. They delight in taking care of the English soldiers whenever they require their aid, and they take care of a drunken European as if he were one of their own children. They conduct themselves very much like the French Zouaves.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

The arrangement seems objectionable, wherefore this question need not be entered on.

40. Would such a system be favorable, or reverse, to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?

There is no real strength which is not founded on national law. Both our European and Asiatic soldiers will always be more efficient and most faithful in proportion as we strive more and more to cultivate their individual powers as men, and to make them respect themselves.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

It is certain that all soldiers should be trained to habits of self-reliance as much as possible, and it is quite clear to me that, with properly selected officers, and with a proper organization, our native Indian army may be made as powerful, as true, as completely trustworthy as any Europeans on earth. Nothing has failed us now except our own foolish work. We have persisted for a long series of years in opposing every law of nature in our treatment of our Asiatic soldiers, and, having systematically destroyed health

Gen. J. Jacob. and living force throughout our army, we need not be surprised that it has fallen to pieces.

Had we striven to cultivate and to develop living power, instead of crushing it under blind regulation, all would have been sound, healthy, and strong.

All would soon become so now if true principles were adopted.

I annex a scheme for the reorganization of the native Indian army, which, in my opinion, cannot fail of complete success if adopted at once.

JOHN JACOB, Brig.-General,
Commandant-in-Chief, S. I. Horse.

Jacobabad, June 27, 1858.

(No. 293 of 1858.)

From Brigadier-General JOHN JACOB, C.B., to
Colonel DURAND, C.B.

Commandant's Office, Jacobabad,
June 7, 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt this day of your printed letter, No. 19, of the 21st May 1858, to my address, with accompaniments; and with reference to their subject, to state that, with respect to the questions regarding the numbers, distribution, and accommodation of troops in the Bombay presidency generally, I am not in possession of the information necessary to enable me to reply to these queries with precision; and as you will, of course, receive replies from those officers who have the necessary records to refer to regarding such matters, it seems best that I should not trouble you with approximations only to exact information.

2. With respect to the other questions on the list having reference to the presidency of Bombay or to India generally, I beg leave to observe, that it appears to me to be wholly erroneous to suppose that the numbers of European troops to be stationed in that presidency, or in India, should bear any particular proportion to the numbers of native troops employed.

3. It cannot, it appears to me, be wise to attempt to regulate the numbers of Europeans to be employed in the service by any such considerations as the proportion which these numbers may bear to the native troops; but it seems that such numbers must depend on totally different circumstances, such as the nature of the duties to be performed, the climate, local position, &c.

4. For instance, on this frontier Europeans would be totally useless; they could not live in this climate; and in one year regiments would probably be reduced to companies, however well the men might be sheltered. While if they had to take the field in the summer time, one day might suffice to destroy the whole force. Kurrachee, on the contrary, is probably the best place in all India at which permanently to mass a large European force for imperial purposes, and totally irrespective of merely provincial requirements.

5. I would also remark, that it seems to me to be absolutely certain that we cannot hold India by an army chiefly, or in large proportions, composed of English soldiers, and that to attempt to do so must be attended with speedy and utter ruin.

6. In the first place England could not supply the numbers of soldiers supposed, on the most moderate estimate, to be required for the purpose of maintaining such an army in the East.

7. And again, it is clear to me, that if we could command even such a host of Europeans as the grand army with which Napoleon invaded Russia, the attempt to coerce India by such forces would only end in more complete and hopeless failure.

8. The mere brute force of hundreds of thousands of men becomes powerless before that of hundreds of millions of such people as the nations of India. The whole force of the Mogul empire was never able to subdue even one of these nations—the Rajpoots.

9. To attempt to govern India by the force of numbers of English soldiers must, it seems to me, alienate from us all of the best of the inhabitants of

the country, who are now assuredly inclined to favor and to support our power; while those inclined to be dissatisfied with our rule, who have hitherto been effectually restrained by the knowledge that the feelings of the great body of the people were with us, would then be free to display their hostility.

10. Whatever the numbers of European soldiers employed, if we found ourselves placed in opposition to the whole people of India, composing all the classes above referred to, the result could not long be doubtful.

11. We should, I conceive, speedily find ourselves in the position of a waggoner who, finding his horses unruly and troublesome, and perhaps getting a kick from one of the animals, should dispense with the services of the team, and place himself with one or two of his friends between the shafts. It is certain that though the men might break their hearts with their exertions, they would not move the load one inch. But let the driver, instead of finding fault with the poor horses, improve his own guiding power a little, let him handle his team more skilfully, and he would soon find all working together with irresistible power, quietly, steadily, and well.

12. Thus I am convinced that this great empire also cannot be controlled by English bone and muscle, by numbers of English bodies; but it can be held in perfect safety and security by English mind, by English moral power; by the influence of a moderate number of cultivated English gentlemen, rather than by a multitude of rude soldiers.

13. It is certain that the natives of India—even of Hindoostan proper—habitually under proper treatment, and commanded as *men*, in accordance with living principles and natural laws, can be made as good, true, and faithful soldiers as any Europeans whatever.

14. This has been long known to me, but its truth has been placed beyond a doubt by the facts which have occurred—while I was absent in Persia—during the last year in Upper Sind, where a body of native officers and Hindoostanee sepoys, mostly from the most disturbed districts around Delhi, standing alone amidst the rebellious inhabitants of the country, and the disaffected sepoys of other corps in the Government service, when tried and tempted as none of their brethren have been tried or tempted elsewhere, not only remained themselves perfectly faithful and true, but, without an European soldier within hundreds of miles of them, controlled and repressed every attempt, however insidious, or however formidable, by whomsoever made, whether by secret persuasion or open force, at mutiny and rebellion around them, and thus saved the lives of all the Europeans in this province, and prevented a violent open rebellion throughout Sind and Beloochistan; while in some instances they knew that their sons and relations, though probably as true men as themselves, were being executed as traitors by British officers in Hindoostan.

15. I beg leave to suggest that the correspondence relating to the conduct of the troops, the proceedings on this frontier, and the treatment of men detached from hence on recruiting service in Hindoostan, during the past year, be called for from the Commissioner in Sind, or from the Government of Bombay. This correspondence would, I think, with reference to the subjects now treated of, be found most significant and interesting.

16. Previously to the receipt of your letter under reply, I had been requested by the Commissioner in Sind, to answer questions with respect to this province similar to those which I have now been favored with from yourself, wherefore it seems to me that I cannot do better than forward herewith a duplicate of my reply to Mr. Freere, which I have accordingly the honor to do.

I have, &c.
JOHN JACOB, Brig.-General,
Commandant-in-Chief, S. I. Horse.

QUESTIONS referred by the COMMISSIONER in SIND to Brigadier-General JOHN JACOB, with his REPLIES thereto.

Jacobabad, June 5, 1858.

1. The number of European troops of each arm now serving in Sind ?
I am not informed on this head.

2. The number and the distribution of the European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the occupation of Sind ?

It seems to me that this question cannot be answered wisely if the occupation of Sind be considered as a provincial matter only. Sind being the most exposed portion of the frontier of India, the military occupation of this province can only be properly discussed with reference to imperial interests.

For local purposes, for the mere occupation, no European troops are actually necessary, except two companies of artillery; but with a view to imperial interests and necessities, Kurrachee seems to me to be in every respect the best position in all India at which permanently to station a large body of European troops.

The climate is most favourable, as good, perhaps, as any in the world. While the troops there stationed would be in the best possible position as a reserve force for service in the Punjab or anywhere on our north-west frontier, the means of transport by land and water are continually improving; and if placed on a proper footing, a force of ten thousand men might reach the Punjab from Kurrachee in the space of one month.

On the other hand, being massed at a seaport town, the troops could be readily transported by sea to any other part of the empire.

The presence of a large force of European troops at Kurrachee would, in my opinion, tend more than any other measure to keep all quiet throughout and beyond our north-western provinces; while, if the regiments had their permanent head-quarters established at Kurrachee, they would always be able to move anywhere on service, leaving sick, weakly recruits, and unfits, as well as the wives and families of the members of the corps in safety and comfort at their homes, to which the men would return on the conclusion of the duty on which they might be commanded; and this seems to me to be an arrangement which conduces in a most powerful manner to the efficiency of soldiers in the field.

I should recommend, then, that a force be permanently stationed at Kurrachee, consisting of two troops of horse artillery and four field-batteries, fully horsed and manned, ready at all times for field service, with a grand arsenal and ordnance depôt, and four reserve companies of artillery, two companies of European sappers, and ten regiments of European infantry. There should be no other European troops anywhere in the province.

3. The number of native troops actually now in Sind, and the number you regard as indispensable for Sind; also their distribution ?

I have no means of supplying the information required in the first part of this question; with respect to the latter part, the only native troops required for Sind are those composing the frontier field force. The frontier field force might consist of the three regiments of Sind irregular horse, with three troops of Sillidar horse artillery, and three regiment of Sillidar infantry, as detailed in former correspondence with the Commissioner in Sind and with Government. The permanent head-quarters of these corps should be established at Jacobabad. No troops are, in my opinion, required at other stations or anywhere in the interior of Sind. A proper organized police force should be maintained for internal duties, such as gaol guards, &c. 1,500 mounted and 4,500 foot police might suffice for Sind, exclusive of the frontier; but on this matter I am not fully informed, and am doubtful as to exact number without having the records to refer to.

5. What proportion the Europeans should bear to the native portion of the regular army in Sind ? *Gen. J. Jacob.*

This question is answered above, but it would be highly advisable to attach a full company of gun lascars, of the old strength of 120 men, to each troop and company of European artillery and of European sappers.

6. What proportion the Europeans should bear to the native troops, regulars, and police together ?

It appears to me that the numbers of Europeans to be employed should be determined on without any reference to the proportion they may bear to other troops, but on considerations depending on totally different questions and principles.

7. What barrack accommodation exists in Sind for European troops ?

There is accommodation for a troop of horse artillery and two regiments of infantry at Kurrachee, and for one regiment at Hyderabad.

8. What barrack accommodation, if any, must be provided in order that Sind may have adequate cover for the European troops you consider necessary ?

Good barracks must be provided at Kurrachee for a troop of horse artillery and eight companies of foot artillery, two companies of sappers, and for eight regiments of infantry.

9. What proportion the European should bear to the native portion of the regular army in India generally, and what proportion when native police corps are included ?

The idea of any such proportions appears to me to be wholly erroneous.

Forty thousand European infantry would be ample for all India; of these, I should advise that ten thousand be quartered at Kurrachee, five thousand at other convenient stations in the Bombay presidency, five thousand in the Madras presidency, ten thousand in the Bengal presidency, and the remaining ten thousand in reserve at Simla.

The whole of the artillery in India should be European, with the exception of a few troops and companies formed for special service in particular localities where Europeans could not live.

JOHN JACOB, Brig.-General,
Political Superintendent and Commandant
on the Frontier of Upper Sind.

INFANTRY.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bombay army, and state the orders or measures or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect ?
2. During the above period have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished ?
3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bombay army ?
4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains in charge of companies ?

At the end of the last century a new organization was introduced into the native Indian army, which was then, in fact, completely remodelled.

Up to this time each battalion of sepoy had been commanded by a captain selected from an European corps of the Indian army. Henceforth the number of European officers was increased nearly to the

Gen. J. Jacob

present complement, and then the rule of regulation commenced to supersede that of individual character. The change then commenced has continued to increase until regulation wholly superseded common sense and reason, and centralization destroyed every vestige of personal influence and individual power. It would be useless to allude to particular orders. Since the date above mentioned, the system of centralization and blind regulation has been gradually but unceasingly growing to the perfection in which it was lately seen before the largest of our three Indian armies fell to pieces.

All vital power, all good feeling, all personal attachment, all binding force of reason and moral sense had been eradicated from our native army. The outward appearance, the showy form, the mechanical discipline, were greatly improved; but the ties which formerly bound the sepoy to his English officer were completely destroyed; a tradition of them hardly remained; and on the least shake given from without the whole fabric fell to pieces.

Our system had at last destroyed the commanding, the administrative, the organizing powers of our English officers on the one hand, while it tended to make the native Indian soldiers less obedient, less inclined to submit to our rule on the other.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of headquarters or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies and of the commanding officer of the regiment?

The real effective and only useful discipline of a native Indian corps, whether on service or otherwise, depends solely on the moral power and influence which the English commander brings to bear on the sepoy.

6. Should the power of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?

The power of the English commanding officer should be very greatly increased. The officers commanding companies should be natives of India.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

Few European officers to be appointed to native regiments, and those carefully selected for such appointments; full powers to commanding officers; abolition of regulation and centralization.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?

The influence of the higher class of English mind, when fairly and freely brought to bear on the Oriental, is at all times absolute; but the effect of such influence will, of course, be most apparent when there is most to be done and most to be dared and endured.

9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

I think that 800 is about the best strength for a regiment in time of peace. In war I should add two or more companies, which should remain at regimental head-quarters, and from these casualties should be supplied as often as circumstances might allow; all recruits being entertained at the permanent regimental head-quarters.

No occupation is ever wanting in a well-trained and well-instructed regiment. Continual exercise is requisite to perfect order.

10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bombay army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

I do not think so to any great extent; but I have several times known regiments to be so employed

with advantage. Both the 21st and the 18th regiments Bombay native infantry, to my personal knowledge, built their own lines and houses for their officers in Sind, mixing the mud, moulding the bricks, and doing every species of work themselves.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?

Not without great increase of numbers. They have generally been fully employed on their ordinary military duties.

12. In apportioning European officers to native troops, (1), should native corps have a full complement of European officers, according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers; or, (2), a full complement of European officers, and no native commissioned officers; or, (3), a smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?

Four European officers are ample for each native regiment; the commanders of companies and their subalterns being native officers.

13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?

Yes.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

Officers for native corps should be appointed by careful selection from the general roll of the army.

15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies between the conduct of regiments with few and those with many European officers present?

17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

Questions Nos. 15, 16, and 17 are best answered, I think, by an extract from a published work of mine given below.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army, as regimental officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

It would, I think, be fatal to whatever may remain of efficiency under the the present organization; but the rule should be to select for native regiments, not from them.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

Answered above.

JOHN JACOB, Brig.-General,
Commandant-in-Chief, S. I. Horse, and
Pol. Superintendent of the Frontier.

**SCHEME for the REORGANIZATION of the INDIAN ARMY,
by Brigadier-General JOHN JACOB, C.B., &c., &c.**

The Queen of England formally to assume the style and title of Empress of India, and to be proclaimed accordingly. The armies of the several Indian presidencies to be henceforth styled the Royal armies of India.

In each of these armies, the whole of the European officers of the cavalry and infantry, and the European officers of the artillery and engineers above the rank of colonel, to be formed into one general gradation list, in which, under ordinary circumstances, all will rise by seniority.

Rank in this list to be the only permanent rank, all regimental and other rank being temporary only, and to continue only so long as officers may be serving with regiments, or be otherwise employed in a military capacity.

In case of officers being promoted for good service, &c., by the Queen, they are to take their places in the general gradation list, according to the dates of their promotions, and are to enjoy every advantage exactly as if they had risen to such places by seniority only. This general gradation list to be styled the "unemployed list." All the officers borne on it who may hold no special appointments will reside in India, at such places as Government may direct, but will have no public functions to perform.

A fourth presidency, to be styled the North-West Presidency, and a fourth army to be formed; our present Bombay and Bengal armies together being divided into three equal parts for this purpose.

Ultimately the whole establishment of European officers may probably be somewhat less than at present; but under the proposed arrangements the number of officers in the whole general list of each army can readily be adjusted in practice, to meet the demands of the public service. When these shall have been correctly ascertained, no further changes will probably be requisite.

For an army of the strength of the present army of Bombay the following establishment might be proper:—

Battalions or Regiments.	Colonels.	Lt.-Cols.	Captains.	Lieuts.
5 Artillery - -	5	10	50	50
4 Engineers - -	4	8	40	40
3 Cavalry - -	3	6	30	30
33 Infantry - -	33	66	330	330
45	45	90	450	450

Generals - - - - 5
 Lieutenant-Generals - - - 10
 Major-Generals - - - - 15
 The ranks of major and ensign to be abolished.

The several ranks of officers, while unemployed in India, to receive pay as follows:—

General - - - -	1,500 Rs. per mensem
Lieutenant-General - - -	1,200 "
Major-General - - - -	1,000 "
Colonel - - - -	600 "
Lieutenant-Colonel - - -	400 "
Captain - - - -	300 "
Lieutenant - - - -	200 "

These rates of pay to be allowed to officers wherever residing, by permission, in India, and the like number of pounds per annum to be allowed to each when absent from India on leave to Europe or elsewhere.

The option of retiring on full pay of the rank attained to in the general list to be allowed after 30 years, and on half pay after 20 years.

Leave of absence to be granted at the discretion of the local governments.

Subscriptions to military and all other funds to cease to be compulsory.

A distinct and separate civil service to be prospectively abolished.

Officers while unemployed or employed in civil capacities are not to be in any way subject to the authority of the commander-in-chief of the army, or to military rule or etiquette.

All candidates appointed to the Indian service to be educated at a military college in England, and to reside at such college for at least two years, and not more than four years.

The minimum age for admission to be fourteen, and the maximum eighteen years.

The course at the college to include full instruction in mechanical and in physical science generally, and in political economy, also riding, rifle practice, and hardy exercises.

The residence at the college to be free of all pecuniary charge to the cadet, unless he decline proceeding to join the service in India in due course, in which case, to cover all cost to the State, he should pay at the rate of 100l. per annum for the period during which he has resided at college.

From the general list formed as above mentioned, officers are to be selected for every species of public employment, civil and military.

For each native infantry regiment the establishment of of English officers may be as follows:—

1 Colonel - - - -	600 Rs. per mensem.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel - - -	400 "
2 Captains (to be each Adjutant and Quartermaster)	300 "

The pay assigned to each being in every case staff pay, to be drawn in addition to the pay due to each, according to

his rank in the general list. But though an officer may hold a lower rank in the general list than that which is assigned to his position in a regiment or on other military employment, the temporary rank is always to hold good for precedence and command during the period of employment.

For the cavalry the like establishment of officers may be allowed, with one hundred rupees extra pay to each rank, to cover the cost of horses and other expenses.

For a brigade of any strength:—

	Staff Pay.
1 Major-General - - -	1,000 Rs. per mensem.
1 Captain, Major of Brigade -	400 "
For a division:—	
1 Lieutenant-General - - -	3,000 "
1 Lieutenant-Colonel, Adjutant-General - - -	400 "
1 Lieutenant-Colonel, Quartermaster-General - - -	400 "
1 Captain, A.D.C. - - -	300 "
1 Major-General, Adjutant-General of the Army -	1,500 "
1 Major-General, Quartermaster-General - - -	1,500 "
1 Colonel, Deputy Adjutant-General - - -	500 "
1 Colonel, Deputy Quartermaster-General - - -	500 "

Proper office establishment, &c., to be allowed to commanding and staff officers; company and troop allowances and contracts as usual.

All officers, when absent on leave beyond the division in which they may be serving, are to receive unemployed pay only, and if other officers act for them when absent, even within the division, otherwise than on duty, the officer acting for the absentee is to receive his staff pay in addition to his own.

Officers of the rank of captain in the general list are to be considered eligible for selection to fill any of the regimental ranks or other appointments. Lieutenants on the general list are not to be considered eligible for higher regimental or other military appointments than that of lieutenant-colonel.

At their own request, and with the approval of the regimental commanding officers, any unemployed officers may be attached to do duty with regiments or departments without extra pay.

The recommendation of officers commanding regiments, with respect to the appointment of officers to fill vacancies in their corps, or to their removal therefrom to the unemployed list, in consequence of proved incapacity, &c., are to be attended to. All enlistments, discharges, promotions to and reductions from all ranks of native officers and soldiers, are to rest with the colonels of regiments, and are to be signified by them, with reasons, &c., if necessary, in regimental orders.

Articles of war for native Indian troops to be entirely abolished.

Colonels commanding native Indian regiments are to have full magisterial authority over all ranks of natives of India in their regiments, followers as well as soldiers. Such powers to extend to the award and infliction of imprisonment, with hard labour, for a period of seven years, without the confirmation of a higher authority being required; to imprisonment for fourteen years, subject to the confirmation of the general officer commanding the brigade; to transportation and capital punishment, subject to the confirmation of the general officer commanding the division.

Regimental lieutenant-colonels and captains are likewise to exercise magisterial powers, under the control of the colonels commanding their regiments, and to such extent as he may think proper to authorize.

In all cases involving the award of a graver punishment than three months' imprisonment with hard labour, the infliction of corporal punishment above twenty-five lashes, or of a fine above fifty rupees, regular proceedings of the trials are to be recorded in full, to be laid before the general officer commanding, when required.

Cases of less serious nature may be dealt with summarily, on due investigation by the commanding officer at public regimental orderly room. A record of all such proceedings is to be entered in a proper book kept for that purpose, and preserved among the regimental records for the inspection of general officers.

Colonels of regiments are to be held strictly and solely responsible to their superior officers and to the State, but not to the native Indian soldiers, for the propriety of all such proceedings.

Permanent head-quarters to be established for each native Indian regiment, and complete carriage for every corps to be always kept up ready for a march at a day's warning.

Gen. J. Jacob.

For the European infantry the establishment of officers per regiment may be:—

1 Colonel	-	-	-	600 Rs. per mensem.
2 Lieutenant-Colonels, each	-	-	-	400 "
10 Captains	-	-	-	300 "
1 Adjutant	-	-	-	300 } To rank above
1 Quartermaster	-	-	-	300 } the Lieutenants
10 Lieutenants	-	-	-	200 Rs. per mensem.

The officers of artillery and of engineers each to be borne in a separate list up to the rank of colonel, inclusive; and thereafter to be incorporated in the general list of the whole army. The senior colonel of artillery or engineers, when senior in the army, being promoted to major-general as vacancies may occur.

Unemployed pay to be the same for all arms.

Employed pay, whether regimental or ordnance, &c., to be allowed as for the cavalry.

Each battalion of artillery to have field officers and staff as for an European regiment, the numbers of captains and lieutenants being adjusted according to circumstances, to the number absent on leave, and the number required for the ordnance department and other artillery staff duties. All artillery officers in India to be considered as "employed" when not on leave.

In the ordnance department the rank and pay of the various grades to be adjusted as follows:—

Senior Commissary	-	-	as Colonel.
Senior Deputy Commissary	-	-	as Lieutenant-Colonel.
Commissaries of Division	-	-	as Captains.
Assistant Commissaries	-	-	as Lieutenants.
Commandant of Artillery—			
Major-General	-	-	1,100 Rs. per mensem.
Major of Brigade—Captain	-	-	500 "
			Inclusive of horse allowance.

No difference of pay between horse and foot artillery.

Engineer officers attached to the engineer corps, or holding other military appointments, to be on the same footing as artillery officers; but the duties of engineer officers in India are generally purely civil, and their salaries, &c., should be adjusted specially for each appointment.

In all appointments other than military, officers will receive their unemployed military pay, in addition to such emolument as may be assigned to them in their civil capacities; and when absent on leave, or on any account other than public duty, beyond the range of their immediate superior, they will receive only the unemployed rates of pay.

JOHN JACOB.

REMARKS.

The cause of the late failure of the native army is inherent in our modern Indian military system. We have, more especially since the great Madras mutiny in 1809, which was organized by the English officers, with their commander-in-chief at their head, sedulously persisted in separating the sepoy from his European regimental superiors.

We have endeavoured to place him directly *en rapport* with Government and the commander-in-chief, who are generally as myths to the native Indian soldier, and have made him despise his own European officers and cease to regard them as superiors.

This state of things acts and reacts on both parties; and perhaps the most fatal effect of long persistence in the system we have pursued is the actual degradation of the European mind which follows on the stagnation which it produces.

Without due exercise, the strongest natural powers fade and disappear. Slavery unfits man for freedom, and the power of commanding comes with the exercise of command.

The natives of India are quite incapable of self-government. They do not in the least understand what it means. They cannot conceive that a subject can have any rights whatever not dependent on the favor of the sovereign. They expect their sovereign to govern them absolutely, and according to his own superior knowledge and ability, not according to their instructions.

We have never appeared to them to have acted as sovereigns in India; we have, on the contrary, shown what must appear to the Asiatic to be marks of fear and of distrust of our own rights throughout our whole administration. We hold India as foreign superiors only; but we have been perpetually proclaiming to the natives of India that they are our equals, that we only

rule as their representatives and by their sufferance, that they are not bound to obey us, and that we have no right to command them.

Our "regulations," civil and military, are all to the same effect.

The English soldier, as a free citizen, is on an equality with his officer. He has rights, as such, which he well understands, and which he is able to make use of, and a portion of such rights he voluntarily surrenders on entering the army. Our Mutiny Act defines what portion of such rights he thus surrenders, and he retains all others.

The pre-existing equality is the very essence of the articles of war.

But this equality is precisely what does not exist with respect to the Indian soldier. He does not even pretend to such an equality; he understands nothing about it. In his ordinary condition, before enlisting as a soldier, he must either be a despot himself or be subject to despotic rule. It is, indeed, only because the European officer is a superior being by nature to the Asiatic that we hold India at all.

The native of India enters our service without an idea beyond that of implicit obedience to his officers being his duty. He cannot even imagine any other state of things, if the officers are to have any authority over him at all.

But the effect of our regulations is such that, after entering the service, he soon perceives that his officers are quite powerless, and their demeanour, formed in the regulation school, shows that they do not expect him to be unhesitatingly obedient.

Nothing can be weaker than this. Such a state of things must tend to develop the worst qualities of both parties, native and European.

The army is, therefore, not bound together by any strong internal force, and the least pressure from without causes it to fall to pieces.

Under the arrangements indicated above, it will, ere long, be discovered what each officer on the general list may be fit for, and he may then be employed according to the greatest advantage.

If, on fair trial, he appears to be totally useless, let him be removed, and let him retire on full or half pay, according to his period of service; but in the variety of work required to be performed in India, this will rarely be requisite.

It is essential to the successful working of the organization here proposed that the officers on the unemployed list should be fairly and even liberally paid.

The presence alone of a number of English gentlemen in India is attended with much advantage to the English Government, and these should have the means of living respectably, and of pursuing those studies and occupations which may qualify them for public employment in this country.

Under a system by which every man must feel that his standing and advancement in the service and in society depended wholly on his own industry, acquirement, and cultivated natural talents, the greatest possible amount of mental power and moral growth must be developed, and, while the numbers of Europeans in the public service in India might even ultimately be much reduced, their commanding power would be very greatly, almost infinitely increased.

Where cases of abuse of power occur—as occur they must and will—let them be dealt with individually. Avoid as much as possible making general regulations, which destroy all healthy freedom of action and mental development.

We should avoid striving too much after outward uniformity. The same just principles, applied equally well and with equally successful result by different men, may cause different arrangements with respect to unimportant details.

No two leaves on a tree may be exactly alike, but the same vital process has produced all from the same materials. To force all the leaves, or all men's minds, into one mould must be equally fatal to vegetable life and to mental power.

Let the system be such as to tend to cultivate and to develop such power. Let them apply their powers in the manner they find best adapted to produce the desired effect, and let them be strictly responsible for the results.

If officers will not exert themselves, or if they have done their best in vain, and the results are unsatisfactory, such officers are in their wrong places, and should at once be removed to the unemployed list until work more fitted for their powers be ready for them.

The obvious objection to the organization proposed is the difficulty of finding properly qualified officers for the higher positions; but it is certain that time will speedily remedy this. The school will form such officers, and nothing else will do so.

We must expect to meet with some difficulties at first in remedying such long-continued and deep-seated errors; but if our principles of action be sound, their tendency in practice will be gradually to bring about the best possible state of affairs.

However the details may be arranged and carried out, it appears to be quite certain that until such principles as are here maintained be acknowledged and be acted on, the British empire can never be in a sound or satisfactory condition.

I have studied the subject for a long series of years with all the patient research and observation, and with all the power of thought which I could bring to bear on it. I have had, in practice, opportunities of applying, on a tolerably extensive scale, the principles which I advocate, such as have fallen to the lot of few men living. These principles have never failed of success in working. They are of universal application, being founded on natural laws, and if carried out fairly in India, they must and would speedily render our Asiatic soldiers quite as trustworthy as their European brethren in arms.

The goodness of the sepoy depends on what his English officer instils into him. The raw material has no power for good, and very little for evil. The native Indian soldiers are to us collectively exactly what our limbs are to our individual bodies. They are the bones and muscles of the whole frame, of which the European gentlemen are the brains and nerves; and where the latter are healthy and vigorous, the former will always be perfectly obedient, and strong only to do our bidding.

JOHN JACOB, Brigadier-General,
Commandant-in-Chief, Sind Irregular Horse, and
Political Superintendent on the Frontier.

(No. 362 of 1858.)

From Brigadier-General JOHN JACOB, C.B., to Colonel
DURAND, C.B.

Political Superintendent's Office,
Jacobabad, June 27, 1858.

SIR,
I HAVE the honor to return my replies to the questions received with your letter, No. 60, of the 16th June to my address.

I have, &c.
JOHN JACOB, Brig.-General,
Commandant-in-Chief, S. I. Horse, and
Pol. Superintendent on the Frontier.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES OF INDIA.

Classification.

The heads of inquiry in the Court's despatch may be classed as follows:—

- I. The recruiting and the composition of corps.
- II. The military code and rules of discipline.
- III. Organization, promotion, and rewards.
- IV. European officers.

INFANTRY.

Gen. J. Jacob,

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the police infantry of the Sind police is composed?

All the races and tribes of the country, except the Hindoos of Sind, who never bear arms. There is also a large number of all classes of men from other countries in the ranks of the police.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

The neighbouring countries and provinces.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Sind administration?

No.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the Sind police?

No. Individual fitness alone has been considered. No objections are ever made on the score of tribe, caste, &c. &c.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts from whence the Sind police is drawn?

The candidates offer themselves. No agency is requisite.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

No special precautions are adopted or found requisite. The usual registry, &c., take place.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?

None.

8. What alteration should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native in the)?

None.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the ?

None used in the Sind horse or in the local corps that I am aware of.

10. How long has this form been in use in the ?

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the ?

All such oaths are futile, and tend to induce the recruit to suppose that it is only an oath which binds him to truth. I hold all such practices in utter contempt, and have never adopted or permitted them in the Sind horse, but have rather endeavoured to make the men feel that nothing can be more true than truth, nothing more faithful than fidelity. If a soldier be base enough to rebel against his officer, he will not be bound by any oath.

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the of seafaring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

There are great numbers of fishermen and boatmen in Sind. They are a fine race of men, but as yet they have never enlisted; they are much attached to home.

13. Has the any marine corps, and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?

No such corps in Sind.

Gen. J. Jacob.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?
15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact without reference to districts?
16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?
17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste, or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?
- Every infantry corps should have a permanently fixed head-quarters, which should never be changed, and there all recruiting should be carried on, the recruits being entertained without the least regard to race, tribe, caste, &c. &c. or to any considerations but those of individual character and qualifications. In time the very best recruits are those born and bred in the regiments, and all the men's families settle at regimental head-quarters, wherever their native country may be.
18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?
- Nothing can give greater strength and security than this arrangement.
- Under it the corps proceeds on service with full confidence that their families are left in the enjoyment of every comfort and protection, and that they are well cared for, however long the absence of the regiment, and however distant the service on which it may be employed.
- Pensioners should be mustered with their regiments, and reside at regimental head-quarters, and when the regiment might proceed on service, an officer and a small detachment should always be left at head-quarters.
- No differences of tribe, caste, &c., should ever be acknowledged, individual fitness should alone be considered.
20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?
- No; the policemen should never be taught to look on themselves as soldiers; they should not be combative.
21. What agency should be employed for recruiting for the Sind police?
- No special agency is required.
22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?
- I would leave all such matters wholly to commanding officers.
23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of ?
- None.
24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in Sind before the local authorities of the districts from whence the police are drawn?
- None required.
25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?
- No.
26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?
- Arrangements altogether objectionable.
27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?
- Ditto.
28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of a native regiment?
- Certainly not.
29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps, and subject to periodical relief?
- The arrangement is utterly bad in principle, it is therefore useless to discuss details.
30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed, relatively to the lines of the native troops?
- Ditto.
31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?
- Hopelessly so.
32. How should such companies be armed? With similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they should be associated?
33. How should the native infantry of the be armed?
- All infantry soldiers should be armed with short double-barrel rifles.
34. How should police corps in Sind be armed? According to the work Sind required of the men in each particular locality. The rural police with common muskets, the town police with staves.
35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?
- There are no advantages whatever. The disadvantages are very great. This question is answered in detail above.
36. How should the native infantry of the Sind police be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?
- Ditto.
37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?
- Answered above.
38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?
39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?
40. Would such a system be favorable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?
41. How should such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?
42. Is it desirable that the native troops should require a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence of European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system

of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?
All these questions are answered above.

JOHN JACOB, Brig.-General,
Commandant-in-Chief, S. I. H.

June 25, 1858.

PRIVATE LETTER to SIR C. TREVELYAN, K.C.B.,
&c. &c.

Jacobabad, March 24, 1858.

MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,

I AM obliged by your letter of the 3d February, which reached me to-day.

With respect to the English army, I almost entirely agree with your doctrines. It is certain that that army can never be in a sound condition until purchase be wholly abolished.

If this were done, and the free action of public opinion admitted, no member of the service being prohibited or discouraged from publishing discussions of facts or ideas, a Mutiny Act would scarcely be requisite, and the flower of all England would press forward to fill the ranks; while every man of every grade might be free to retire from the service whensoever he thought proper.

Let these reforms be made; establish fixed permanent head-quarters for each regiment in its native county; allow men to rise as a matter of course, when fit for promotion, by merit, from among the private soldiers to the highest grades; and the business is done.

Each regimental head-quarters would be a military nursery and school of the best possible description.

The arrangements there should be such as to make every one as comfortable and as little under unpleasant restraint as possible, consistently with the object in view. There all recruits would be enlisted and trained; invalids and veterans would return there for health and repose. Wives and families would reside there in peace and comfort, while their husbands and fathers were on service elsewhere; and the service men could, with the greatest possible ease and advantage, be relieved in a body every one, two, or three years—the latter period should never be exceeded, I think. At the same time, individual members of the regiment might continually be passing to and fro, as convenience or the wants of the service might require. I need not, however, enlarge on these details, for you will readily perceive how the arrangement would develop itself.

This would make all England warlike, and ready to serve. The soldier would cease to be separated entirely from the citizen, and the whole male population would probably, in time of need, be ready, able, and willing to take to arms.

As to the service in India especially, the enormous errors which exist everywhere with respect to the true principles of Indian administration almost appal me. It seems quite impossible to cause a glimpse of the truth to be seen; even the great broad facts which in the administration of this frontier, and in the construction of the Sind irregular horse, have been shown to all the world for the last ten years and more, are still called Utopian theories of mine, and demed existence, even by our next neighbours in the Punjab.

The proposal to hold India by the bodily power of English soldiers, by force of muscles instead of by force of brains, which seems at present to be universally accepted, appears to me so enormously unwise, that I feel certain that if the attempt be actually made, it must result in the total ruin of the Empire. Nothing seems more certain than that we can only hold this great empire of India by our moral superiority. The inhabitants of India are not barbarians. Science, knowledge, social condition, administrative wisdom, &c. &c., were in India, under Akbar, very far in advance of the state of things in England under Elizabeth. No amount of mere brute force could coerce two hundred millions of such people. The influx of large numbers of the lowest class of Englishmen, of ten thousands of English bodies, with very little English mind in them, will more than anything else tend to destroy the reputation and the reality of our superiority as moral beings; coarse vice and brutal manners, as the Oriental esteems them, will be then chiefly apparent to the Asiatics as the characteristic attributes of Englishmen, who will thus very soon be hated and despised. The idea of holding India by an army of English private soldiers appears to me to be so intensely absurd, that it is difficult to deal with the question with becoming gravity. We could hardly obtain recruits for the Crimea: how can we expect, under the

present system, to obtain them for this country in greater numbers? Without the assistance of large numbers of native Indian troops, an army of Europeans could not move or subsist in the field; the enemy would only have to keep a little out of the way at first, to leave the Englishmen to follow their own strange devices, and they would all die,—aided by knapsacks, cross-belts, and pipeclay, the sun and the climate would do the business most effectually. Indeed, the helplessness and ignorance of the officers and men of royal troops in this country at first is often ludicrous. While it should be remembered that they would then under the new arrangements have no association with the regular native army to aid their inexperience, and that the wants and habits of the Englishman are entirely different from those of the people of the country, so that no amount of force would enable them to help themselves to what they required.

Again, seasons frequently occur (I have known many such) when every man is disabled by fever: at such times our military force would be annihilated, we having no regular native Indian army, and having wilfully placed the people in the position of conquered enemies, restrained by physical force only, instead of their being, as now, generally our fast friends.

But, after all, what is it that has failed us in India, and caused all this outcry for European bodies?

Not the people, for they have generally remained quiet, and even friendly. Not the native qualities even of the sepoys in our ranks, who have been murdering our women and children; for those of our native Indian soldiers who most nearly remained in the state of raw material—who had imbibed the least of what we have been pleased to call regular discipline—have behaved the best—our regulation men have rebelled!

Nothing indeed has failed us, nothing turned against but our own rotten work.

We have systematically degraded and corrupted the European mind in India, and especially in Bengal; have destroyed all its commanding power over the regular sepoy; while at the same time, for a quarter of a century past, we have been flattering the sepoys, and petting them most when they most deserved severe punishment; we have been perpetually telling them that they are the finest fellows on earth, instead of really making them decent people, and raising them in the scale of being. Lastly, we were always afraid to tell the disorderly Bengalees they were wrong, and instead of correcting what was amiss with them, we always forced the other armies—whose men were true, and well-behaved enough—to “assimilate with the ‘practice in Bengal!’” however absurd such a practice might be.

We can depend absolutely, with certainty and safety, on the power for good which goes out from our own minds, and which we have accumulated in the minds of our Asiatic soldiers; such power never has failed, and never can fail us at our utmost need. But if we give forth no such power, we shall find none at our service in the sepoy when we require it.

Our regulation system has merely corrupted the raw material of our native army, made the men think us afraid of them, and made them strong only for evil. A system equally ill-adapted to the nature of the men would have made murderous and mutinous ruffians even of Europeans, as this has done with the Asiatics.

There are many millions of men among the natives of India fitted to make as good and faithful soldiers as any men on earth. There is no fault justly to be found with the raw material.

The men of the Sind irregular horse—natives of the districts around Delhi—are quite as trustworthy as are European soldiers. Yet such ignorance prevails with regard to these matters, that even now, in organizing my third regiment, it was actually proposed to alter the construction of the Sind horse—to “assimilate it with the ‘practice in Bengal!’” The fact is, that the system now prevailing in the service destroys all healthy growth of mind, wherefore no wisdom is to be found anywhere to be brought to bear on our Indian administration. It is quite clear to me that the army of India must be a native Indian army; that great numbers of European private soldiers are not required for India, and would even be injurious to our rule.

What European troops we have other than artillery should be massed at certain places where the climate is favorable, and whose position might enable the troops readily to be despatched to any part of the empire requiring their presence. The European regiments permanently belonging to and forming part of the Indian armies should have their regimental head-quarters in India.

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The seat of the Indian government should be removed from Calcutta, and established either in Bombay or at Agra,—either place has some peculiar advantages.

A new presidency should be formed, which should have a separate government, army, &c. &c., while the supreme government should have no connexion with any presidency in particular.

The new presidency should be the north-western presidency, and it might include the Punjab, Sind, Cis-Sutlej Sikh States, Bhawalpoor, and the Thurr, also Delhi and the districts adjoining. The Indian presidencies would then be Bengal, Madras, Bombay, and Lahore, with the supreme government at Agra or Bombay.

Forty thousand European infantry would be ample for all India; of these I would quarter ten thousand at Kurrachee, as the best and most convenient station in all India for European troops; five thousand might suffice for the Bombay presidency, and a like number for Madras; ten thousand for Bengal; and the remaining ten thousand I would place at Simla.

The whole of the artillery in India should be European, with the exception of a few troops and batteries, formed for special service in particular localities where European troops could not live, such as this frontier of Sind.

The strength of the artillery in India should be increased. All the native artillery in the armies of the three presidencies should be replaced by Europeans, the gun lascars attached to whom should be replaced on their old footing, as they were in 1828; a full and complete company of gun lascars being attached to each European company. These men are most useful, and save the European artillerymen from fatal exposure and fatigue, while they themselves are not of a class ever to become dangerous to us.

In each presidency there should be a full regiment of European sappers and miners, all the men of which should be good artificers, surveyors, &c.; each company of European sappers having a company of natives attached to and working with it. Such corps would be invaluable for the superintendence and execution of public works.

For the new presidency of Lahore, the artillery might consist of six battalions of the usual strength, and one brigade of four troops of horse artillery. These four troops, with twelve field batteries, should always be kept complete, fully horsed and manned for field service.

The reserve artillery might be chiefly posted at Kurrachee and Lahore; at both which places there should be grand ordnance depôts.

A native army for each presidency might be formed and organized, as described by me in the printed scheme for the reorganization of the Indian army, &c.

The total strength of the native troops should not I think be much reduced.

No alterations as to numbers appears requisite in the Madras army, and the three armies of the other presidencies might about equal in numbers the old armies of Bengal and Bombay together.

For all internal public duties, such as gaol guards, &c., a properly organized police should be employed, something similar to that which has been found to answer so well in Sind.

The frontier field force, so often recommended by me, should be embodied for service in this quarter, and no other troops are required for Sind.

Some room should be found for common sense in the audit department, and the paralyzing effect of centralisation should be partly remedied by a system of local audit.

If these recommendations were followed, and the principles set forth in my letter to Sir J. Lawrence of the 12th December last were acted on and carried out in practice, our Indian empire would speedily be brought into the soundest and strongest condition possible.

The greatest dangers to which that empire is now exposed are the consequences of European violence and folly.

If we attempt to govern by brute force, or by patronising Christian priests, bishops, and missionaries, we shall inevitably bring about absolute ruin.

It seems to me, that to introduce our State religion at all into our rule in the East is a very great and fatal error. The government of such an empire, which comprises hundreds of millions of men, holding twenty different faiths and creeds, to which they are attached as to their lives, cannot, consistently with any sort of justice, patronise or acknowledge any one of those creeds rather than another. The only safe, honest, and righteous cause is as a government entirely to ignore all.

No priest of any religion should be appointed, patronised, or directly paid by the State. Let private persons, com-

munities, or congregations make their own arrangements to provide for their respective spiritual wants, and all will be well; while the most fearful and deplorable mischief must and will assuredly ensue from the contrary proceeding.

I am sending to my friend Captain Pelly, now in England, some correspondence which may, I think, interest you, and I requested that a copy may be made and sent to you. The letters will show you what can be made, under the most difficult circumstances, even of the Hindostanees of Delhi—fathers, brothers, and sons of the sepoy of Bengal.

I hope that you read my letter in reply to Colonel Sykes' remarks in the "Times." The whole essence of the matter in question consists in the fact that I have been working on those attributes which are common to us and to the sepoy as men, and which lead towards the highest moral nature; I have endeavoured to cultivate and to aid in the development of these common attributes, and those in which we differ have retired out of sight.

I have, &c.
JOHN JACOB.

INFANTRY.

I.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

No replies required to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in Sind?

No code.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in Sind?

By the common sense of the captain and lieutenants of police.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps and the authority of their European and native officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

Yes.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the native army of the Bombay presidency?

I would abolish them *in toto*. These articles of war are simply mischievous. They are entirely opposed to every Oriental idea of government.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bombay army.

The system appears to me to involve the unspeakable absurdity of an assembly of native officers judging between the English commandant and the men under his command.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bombay army with the military code under which they live and are governed?

The articles of war are read to the troops every month.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves, in the vernacular dialect, the articles of war?

I should think about one-half.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bombay presidency?

No code that I am aware of.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bombay presidency?

I do not know enough of the details of the arrangements in the police corps in Bombay to answer these questions.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps and the authority of their European and native officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

The corps themselves are very different from each other as to organization and all else.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

No replies required to Nos. 1 to 16.

17. How should the Scinde police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

There should be a superintendent of police for the whole province, and an assistant superintendent to aid him in his duties; a captain and a lieutenant of police in each collectorate or division of the province.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

Native officers appear to me to be absolutely essential to the efficiency of all.

19. In Scinde police corps, is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

No; I believe not.

No replies required to Nos. 20 and 21.

V.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Bombay army what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

Merit and seniority combined.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bombay army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

I think that they are far more so than could have been justly expected under the organization of our native regiments.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

Undoubtedly they generally are so.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

No special examination is used, I believe, but the man's whole service is an examination.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers, between the European officers and their men, weaken the influence of the European officers? Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?

Nothing can possibly weaken the influence of English officers but their own want of moral power, or their being prohibited from exerting it. The present organization of our native regiments is utterly destructive of that moral power, and very greatly injurious also to the development of the powers of the native officers.

6. Has it been found in the Bombay army that on the occurrence of mutinies, the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

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I am not in a position to answer as regards the Bombay army generally. Among my own soldiers of the Sind irregular horse the feeling and conduct of the native officers has been exactly similar to the feelings and conduct of the European officers, and the men have behaved just as the best English soldiers might have done.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bombay army?

8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?

The native officers under a proper organization would be the very nerves of the whole body, of which the sepoys formed the bones and muscles, and the European gentlemen the brains. A native soldier should never be associated in the same corps with Europeans other than gentlemen; he should only observe the European officers holding high and important posts, and being worthy of such positions.

9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions claimable after specified periods of services be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

My ideas on these subjects have been for long past in print before the world, and it seems to me that I cannot better answer these questions than by giving the following extracts from my published works.

EXTRACTS FROM TRACTS ON THE NATIVE ARMY OF INDIA, by Brigadier-General JOHN JACOB, C.B. Smith, Elder, and Co., London.

"There is one erroneous opinion with regard to our native Indian troops, which would appear unworthy of notice were it not that it has lately proceeded from those considered to be high authorities on these matters, but who in truth were totally ignorant of the feelings and springs of action of our Indian soldiery.

"I allude to the often expressed opinion, that if we were to make too much of our native officers, they would take the command from us. Nothing can possibly be more unfounded, more contrary to truth, than such an idea. We hold India by being in reality, as in reputation, a superior race to the Asiatic. If this natural superiority did not exist, we should not and could not retain the country for one week.

"Whatever tends to make European gentlemen 'cheap,' to lessen their evident value, to hold up their vices rather than their virtues to the view of the natives, to show them to the Indians only in inferior positions, where their powers are not called forth, and where they have little influence for good, must tend to destroy in no slight degree the hold which we have on the people.

"Whatever raises the European character in the eyes of the natives of India, and in reality, must greatly add to our security and power.

"The native officers feel the greatest devotion and gratitude towards their European commanders who most succeed in raising their character and position.

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The more the European is able to improve them, the greater does he appear in their estimation. They cannot govern themselves; they are too proud to submit to an equal, but they will all with the greatest delight and pride submit to the English gentleman, whom they all acknowledge and feel to be their superior.

"If we really are a morally superior race, governed by higher motives and possessing higher attributes than the Asiatics, the more the natives of India are able to understand us, the more they will know and feel this, and the firmer will be our power.

"The seniority system, so far from being just, is the greatest possible injustice to the really deserving man, while it holds out the greatest possible encouragement to the lazy, the idle, and the good-for-nothing. Throw everything open to fair competition, and let the best man win. This is the style of justice which sepoy and all other men really like best in their hearts. Let there be no favoritism, but let the European officers honestly and continually endeavour to choose the *best* men for promotion, and the best possible feeling will assuredly be created and maintained between them and their native soldiers.

"The real error is in employing such numbers of costly Europeans in command of native companies, whose duties would be just as well or better performed by native officers properly chosen, and formed in a good school.

"The great number of European officers now allowed prevents the native officer, whatever his merit, from attaining a responsible or very respectable position in the army, thereby keeping out of its ranks natives of birth, wealth, and family, and preventing in the native soldier the full development of that love for and pride in the service which are essential to great efficiency. There are already too many European officers with reference to regimental duties only. A certain number of European officers is necessary, but very few suffice. Three to a regiment actually present is, perhaps, the best number. The duties of subaltern officers, and even of captains of troops and companies, are most efficiently performed by native officers.

"If there were but one European officer in a regiment, he would, if possessed of proper qualifications, and if intrusted with proper power and authority, soon form around him such a body of native officers as would make the corps far more effective under the one Englishman, than it could be under any number of Europeans, who held the opinions with regard to native troops which now to a great extent prevail.

"The want of power intrusted to regimental commanders is one enormous evil now existing in our native army. It is, perhaps, a necessary consequence of another very great error.

"The seniority rise among the officers of a native regiment, originally appointed at hazard, renders it impossible at present to ensure there being at the head of each native regiment a man capable of wielding the powers necessary to govern it efficiently and well.

"It is quite possible to select for a larger army, when the matter is rightly understood. It is the quantity of power given out by the European brains, not the number of European bodies employed, which controls the native soldiers.

"The posting of officers to native regiments, without regard to qualification, is a proceeding attended with ruinous consequences.

"The presence of unselected Europeans, in such numbers as are at present borne on the strength of native corps of the line, is not less ruinous.

"Qualifications, not numbers, are necessary for the leaders of native Indian soldiers. One active, energetic, right feeling and right thinking English gentleman can, even when alone, infuse an excellent spirit into thousands of these Eastern soldiers, till they will follow him anywhere, obey him in all things, and feel

the greatest pride in acting in his absence as they know he would wish them to do if present.

"The feelings thus engendered are most powerful and most honorable.

"The native officers and men feel the deepest gratitude towards him who has raised their moral, intellectual, and worldly position, and are actuated by the strongest wish and energetic zeal to show that they are worthy of the respectable position in which they find themselves.

"With 30 Europeans, on the contrary, instead of one, the native officer finds himself of no importance, and the sepoy becomes a lifeless automaton.

"The Englishman becomes too common to be held in proper and wholesome respect. He is seen holding no important position, but in the performance of trifling duties, which any native officer or non-commissioned officer would do equally. He is often seen idling away his time in frivolous, or wasting his energies in vicious pursuits. The prestige of the superior race is thus destroyed, while it too often happens that the European officer, having nothing important to occupy him, loses somewhat of his own self-respect.

The young boy is placed in command of the old subadar, from whom, when anything is to be done, he has to crave instruction, and the men see that, so far from taking a pride in them and in the service, their European officers are generally longing to be removed from them, craving intensely for staff appointments, &c.

"The example of the idle, the evil-minded, and the indifferent does more harm than the good can remedy. To be in a healthy state, the native soldier should never see his European officer living an idle, useless life, or holding a degraded or unimportant position. While the European officer should be proud of his men, and, as Sir J. Malcolm most justly observed (Government of India, Appendix E., paragraph 25), it should be arranged that the command of native corps should be most sought after of all existing appointments."

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

The beneficial effect of retiring pensions has been greatly injured by the troublesome forms which have to be gone through regarding them, but they certainly have been of very considerable effect notwithstanding.

11. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Yes. This question is answered above, in the extracts given from published works.

12. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

Each regiment should have a fixed head-quarter, and there all its pensioners should reside; they should, in fact, remain attached to the regiment, and under the regimental commander only.

13. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the native infantry of the Bombay army?

I cannot say.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

In the Bombay army they are so generally, I believe.

15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

The native officers of the Sind irregular horse are quite equal to any European subalterns in the performance of their ordinary duties, and very far superior to the usual average of English private soldiers. The qualifications of the native officers of the Bombay army generally must of course be proportionate to the care bestowed on their selection, and the importance of the duties intrusted to them.

16. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps?

1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades, as well as with European officers; or,

2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades; or,

3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers?

17. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

All these questions have been answered above.

19. In police corps is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

I cannot say.

20. Has the distinct organization, and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies, proved favorable to our power in India?

It certainly has to this extent, that had "assimilation with the practice in Bengal," which has been forced on the other two armies with such injurious effect for the last quarter of a century, been carried a very little further, the Indian empire must have been totally lost to England.

21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of the system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate, or even to amalgamate, the three armies?

The organization should be the same in principle in all; the details should vary, to suit the wants of each locality, of which the local government should solely judge; there should be no attempt to amalgamate, and none to assimilate, to anything but the dictates of wisdom and common sense.

JOHN JACOB, Brig.-General,
Commandant-in-Chief, S. I. H., and
Political Superintendent on the Frontier.

ARTILLERY.

Gen. J. Jacob.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF THE ARTILLERY.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Bombay artillery are composed?

Chiefly men of Hindustan proper.

2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Bombay artillery are composed?

Chiefly Concanes.

3. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Bombay artillery are composed?

Chiefly men of the Concan and Deccan.

4. Should native gunners or golundauzes continue to be enlisted and to form part of the artillery of the Bombay army?

I am of opinion that the artillerymen of the Indian army should be Europeans, with the exception of a very few troops and batteries employed in localities in which Europeans could not live.

5. Should native drivers continue to be employed with European artillery?

I think not. The construction of the Bombay horse artillery is, in my opinion, better where the gunners and drivers form one body.

6. From what districts are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundauze drawn?

Hindustan proper.

7. From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn?

The Concan chiefly.

8. From what districts are the drivers taken?

The districts of the Deccan, the Concan, and Guzerat.

9. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded, by regulation or practice of the service, from the golundauze of the Bombay artillery, and if so, for what reason?

Very low castes have been excluded.

10. The same question is repeated, both with respect to gun lascars and drivers.

None have been excluded, I believe.

11. Supposing that native artillery were continued in the Bombay army, are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits for the golundauze might with advantage be enlisted?

I think that the artillery generally should be Europeans. The question of considering races, tribes, castes, &c., has been fully replied to in answering questions relating to the other arms. The principles there referred to are of universal application.

12. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the golundauze of the Bombay artillery, for the gun lascars, and for the drivers?

Regimental only.

13. On entertainment of recruits for the golundauze, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Bombay artillery, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?

None.

14. Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice if golundauze continue to be enlisted?

All should be left to regimental and battalion commanders.

Gen. J. Jacob.

15. The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.
Ditto.
16. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundauze of the Bombay artillery?
The same as is in use throughout the native army.
17. The same question is repeated with regard to the gun lascars and drivers.
Ditto.
18. How long has this form of oath been in use in the Bombay artillery?
Since 1792, I believe.
19. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the golundauze, gun lascar, or driver when first enrolled, or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?
I have a strong opinion that all such oaths are of most mischievous effect, and I would abolish them *in toto*. This subject has been fully treated of in replies to questions regarding the other arms.
20. If native artillerymen continue to be used, should the different battalions be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only, or be recruited over a wide area irrespective of districts?
All such arrangements should be left to regimental commanders.
21. The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.
Ditto.
22. Should the battalions, or companies, or troops of golundauze, be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed up together?
No differences of race, tribe, caste, &c., should be considered or acknowledged in any way. Individual fitness should alone be thought of.
23. If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
Ditto.
24. The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and drivers.
Ditto.
25. What agency should be employed for recruiting gun lascars and drivers?
Regimental only.
26. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?
None.
27. If native drivers be discontinued, would you replace them by Europeans raised for that duty, or by European gunners trained to the duty as part of their exercise, or by Anglo-Indians enrolled for this special duty?
I would adopt the organization of the Bombay horse artillery, the gunners and drivers forming one body.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Are the same articles of war applicable to the European gunners and to the golundauze of the Bombay artillery?
No.
2. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the golundauze of the Bombay artillery?
I have a strong opinion that these articles of war should be totally abolished.
3. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war as respects the European artillery?
Ditto.

4. Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same articles of war as the golundauze, and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes?
Yes, they are so. The improvement I would adopt would be the having no articles of war whatever.
5. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
Commanding officers should have magisterial powers over all ranks of native Indians under their command, and no special rules are required.
6. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Bombay army?
No.
7. What means are adopted to acquaint the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers with the military code under which they serve?
The articles of war are read to them monthly.
8. What proportion of the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?
I cannot say.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the Bombay artillery, what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundauzes, and drivers; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?
Merit and seniority combined.
2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the golundauze generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?
My personal experience dates 20 years back. They were so then; but the fact is, their assimilation with the practice in Bengal has ruined the native artillery of Bombay.
3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundauze from among whom they have risen?
Yes, generally.
4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?
No special examination.
5. Do the golundauze of all grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary gun drill? Are they practised at laying guns and mortars, at cutting fuzes, judging distances, adapting charges to mortars, &c., or do the European officers themselves execute those details?
The natives are taught everything. The European officers, of course, also execute the details here referred to.
6. Can the golundauze of the Bombay artillery frequently read English, and write it?
No.
7. Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work?
I would have no native gunners; but if there be native gunners, they should be taught everything. Suspected servants are the most dangerous of all.
8. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer?
The influence of good native officers is invaluable.
9. Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundauze been found,

on occasions of mutiny, to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectually to aid their European officers in checking or quelling mutiny? Have the native officers, passively or overtly, sided with the mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve, and with the European officers?

Their conduct has been extremely various.

10. If native artillery be continued in the Bombay army, should the grades of native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished?

Maintained.

11. Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned officers as would give one to each gun of a battery, in lieu of the native commissioned officers of golundauze, be advisable?

No.

12. If the abolition of the grades of golundauze commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundauze, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as commissioned grades?

No.

13. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundauze to the British service and the British rule?

To a limited extent they have so. This seems to me to be a very important subject, and I have treated of it in full in replies to questions regarding other arms.

14. Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions?

The lascars do; the drivers do not.

15. Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Bombay artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny?

Generally so.

16. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

Modified; as fully set forth in replies to questions respecting other arms. Pensioners should remain with their regiments.

17. Can you state the charge upon the finances of the Bombay presidency on account of military pensions to the native artillery of the Bombay army?

No.

18. Should not the system of promotion generally be seniority to the grade of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Undoubtedly.

19. Are commissioned officers of golundauze generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

I believe so.

20. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

I think so.

21. Under the supposition that the artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it as far as practicable with the royal artillery?

The Bombay artillery does not require remodel-

ling. It differs from the royal artillery only in respect of such matters wherein the difference of localities renders such differences necessary.

22. What would this assimilation involve of change in the system of the Bombay artillery?

23. What would it involve of change in the material of the Bombay artillery?

I cannot answer these questions with precision sufficient to render the replies of any value.

24. What modifications would it be expedient to maintain in the organization of the Bombay artillery, when assimilating it to the royal artillery, in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service?

25. Need the material of the Bombay artillery, if assimilated to that of the royal artillery, be at all modified in consequence of climate and service in India?

The principle appears to me to be totally erroneous. The Bombay artillery is organized for service in the Bombay presidency, its peculiarities adapt it to that locality. It cannot be right to break up this order and re-arrange the machinery on a plan adapted to different circumstances.

26. Do you advocate the maintenance of horse artillery at its present strength?

Undoubtedly the horse artillery is the most efficient portion of the corps.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of the commandants of native battalions of artillery, and of officers in command of golundauze batteries of the Bombay artillery, been increased or diminished?

I cannot say.

2. What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundauze of the Bombay artillery?

Ditto.

3. If golundauze artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers?

Abolish articles of war and leave regimental officers to deal with their men as they find best.

4. Is the efficiency of the Bombay corps of artillery affected by the number of officers taken away from corps duties for staff employment?

No; scarcely any one is taken away.

5. How can the demand for European officers of artillery for staff and detached employments be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of the corps of Bombay artillery?

By augmenting the number of officers, chiefly of the captains.

6. Would the general standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure which, by removing the hope of staff employment, cut off the inducement which young artillery officers now have to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches of knowledge useful to the State?

Undoubtedly; all such attempts are ruinous. Every effort should be made to cultivate and develop individual power and qualifications, and to employ these wherever they may be found most useful to the State, without the least regard to the particular branch of the service to which the officer may belong.

JOHN JACOB, Brig.-General,
Commandant on the Frontier.

No. 5.

Sir M. Cubbon,
K.C.B.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM SIR MARK CUBBON, K.C.B.

From the COMMISSIONER for the GOVERNMENT of the TERRITORIES of HIS HIGHNESS the RAJAH of MYSORE to Lieut.-Col. H. M. DURAND, C.B.

SIR, Bangalore, July 24, 1858.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 22, dated Allahabad, the 21st May 1858, enclosing a printed copy of letter No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, from the Honorable the Court of Directors.

2. I have since had the honor of receiving five series of questions on the points raised in the Honorable Court of Directors' despatch, copies of which I have now the honor to return, with my answers in juxtaposition. These answers are the result of a long experience, combined with a pretty close attention to the thoughts and feelings of our native subjects generally, and of the military pensioners who are scattered over the country, and who may be considered the truest exponents of the sentiments of the effective troops. Without presuming to think that my opinions are worthy of particular notice, I am not without some confidence in their justness, because they entirely coincide with those of Major Haines, the Superintendent of the Bangalore division, by whom the greater part of the answers have been written, and whose comprehensive knowledge on every point connected with the native army, and whose sound judgment, are not equalled by those of any officer of my acquaintance in the Madras army.

I have, &c.

M. CUBBON, Commissioner.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Madras army is composed?

The Madras army is composed chiefly of Hindoos of the following castes: a few are of Rajput families, who settled long ago in the south of India; a few also are Bengalees, or men from Oude and the North-West provinces; and the rest of the Hindoos may be classed as Gentoos, or those who use the Teloo-goo language, and Malabars, or those who use the Tamil language. The former come from the districts of the Northern Circars, and the latter, among whom are included all Hindoo castes as well as Christians and Pariahs, come from the southern provinces of the Madras presidency. The Hindoos altogether number about two-thirds of the army, the remaining one-third being Mussulmans. In some regiments the proportion of Mussulmans is only one-fourth, but in those regiments which were raised in Mysore, the Mussulmans outnumber the other castes.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

The Gentoos, or those who speak Teloo-goo, come from the Northern Circars; they are generally fine looking, and smart, cleanly parade men, but they are soft in constitution and in heart, and do not undergo fatigue like the men recruited from the southern districts. The Malabars come from the southern districts, Chingleput, North and South Arcot, Trichinopoly, Salem, Madura, Tanjore, and Tinnavelly, comprising those portions of the country which were formerly called the Southern Poligars. The men

derived from these countries are black in complexion, of middling stature, well knit, and of great strength in comparison to their size, both physically and constitutionally. They are capable of undergoing great fatigue, in making long and continuous marches; are hardy and of high courage when acting in a body. Both Gentoos and Malabars are docile and easily disciplined. The Mussulmans recruited from the southern provinces are preferred to the Patans, or those who are recruited in the Hyderabad and Kurnool countries, and in Cuddapah. The latter have not the stamina, nor are they so amenable to discipline as the former.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Madras army?

No tribes or castes are excluded from enlistment in the Madras army.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Madras army?

None.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Madras presidency, or of any other territory or presidency?

Both European and native officers are sent out into the districts with recruiting parties, but more frequently the latter.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

See general regulations.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?

See general regulations.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Madras army?

It does not appear that any change is necessary.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Madras army?

See articles of war.

10. How long has this form been in use in the Madras army?

Ditto, ditto.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits of the native infantry of the Madras army?

Ditto, ditto.

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Madras presidency, or its dependencies, of seafaring habits; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

The fishermen of the Coromandel coast are doubtless employed in voyages in coasting vessels and in

vessels which trade to the Straits, Burmah, and to the Tenasserim and Chittagong coasts. On the western coast there are seafaring men among the Moplas and indigenous people of that province; a marine corps might be formed from such men, though the use of such a corps in the Madras presidency is not apparent.

13. Has the Madras presidency any marine corps; and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?

There is no marine corps in the Madras presidency.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only?

If corps were to be recruited each in a prescribed district, secret combination would be likely to be got up in such corps; therefore such restricted recruiting is not advisable.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

It is better that every corps be recruited from a wide area for the reasons shown in the foregoing answer.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

There are several objections to each corps being homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste. On certain festivals it would be necessary to give the whole regiment leave, and there would be no one left for duty. Regiments thus formed would ever be jealous of each other; the high caste regiments would presume upon their superiority of caste, and look down upon the lower caste regiments, and treat them with arrogance, which the latter would certainly resent, and there would be constant conflicts. At present all are mixed, and stand in the ranks together, ranged according to their size, but irrespective of caste, and there are never any caste disputes, which would be of constant occurrence with homogeneous regiments of different castes stationed together. This system would also have the effect of congregating too many men of "one mind," which in itself is an insuperable objection.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste; or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

The same objections exist to making companies homogeneous as to making regiments so; the peace of a regiment would be constantly disturbed by jealousies and brawls between the high caste and the low caste companies; a distinction which would have to be carried out to the minutest details—there would be high caste and low caste quarters in the lines; high caste and low caste bazars and shops, a high caste and low caste well, and so on, *ad infinitum*.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

Perhaps no better proportions can be found than those which already exists in the generality of regiments on the Madras presidency, viz., two-thirds Hindoo and one-third Mussulmans.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?

Recruiting for police corps should be carried on from a wide area without reference to districts. Indeed, it would be preferable that a police corps should not be recruited in the district in which it is destined

to be employed; for there should be no local influences or partialities allowed to have existence in a police corps; a topographical acquaintance with the country and a knowledge of the character of the people would be easily acquired after a short period of service in the district.

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20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

Police corps might be regarded as nurseries, from which drafts might be made for the line, though it is suspected that few would leave a police corps for the line, especially if the police corps is chiefly recruited from the district in which it is serving; this may be added as an additional reason for recruiting for the police from distant districts.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting for the native infantry of the Madras army?

The present seems to answer very well.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?

The same as has been recommended in Answers 19 and 20, that police corps be recruited from a wide area of districts.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Madras presidency?

The present precautions are, if anything, over strict.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps, in the Madras presidency?

In a modified and somewhat relaxed degree.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments or in companies, or otherwise?

The requirements of the Madras presidency do not appear to call for such a scheme. Rumours have prevailed at different times that the government intended to recruit from foreign countries, and it is consistent with my knowledge that this impression caused great agitation, not only in the native regiments, but throughout the country.

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

Ditto, ditto.

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

Ditto, ditto.

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?

The system here suggested would have the effect of distributing European troops in small numbers over a wide extent of territory, and in every place where a native regiment is stationed in the proportion of one European to nine armed and disciplined natives, without counting the population. No position could be conceived which would be more favorable to a great sepooy conspiracy; and, after recent events, who can tell but that such a distribution might in itself invite such a conspiracy; it seems that no precaution as to locality of barracks or armament of these European companies, could avert their destruction when the time came for the conspirators to strike the blow.

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The system would operate as a constant irritant upon the minds of the sepoy, as showing our distrust of them, and it would be an invitation to them to conspire for the destruction of the Europeans, as the opportunity could not be more fairly offered to them.

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

Are disposed of by the answer to 28.

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?

Ditto, ditto.

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

Ditto, ditto.

32. How should such companies be armed, with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?

Ditto, ditto.

33. How should the native infantry of the Madras army be armed?

The present musket is good enough, though it would be better if it were somewhat lighter. But the sepoy does not complain of the weight of his present musket, his great grievance is the present knapsack; relieve him of that, and he will consider it as great a boon conferred upon him, as if the government had given him a considerable increase of pay. When the knapsack was first introduced into the Madras army, it was a small and convenient pack, the present knapsack or its like was introduced in 1817, and it is the curse of the native army. More men have been invalided and pensioned from the chest-founding action of the knapsack than ever would have been from the ordinary risks of the service. The knapsack is looked upon as the bore of the service, and were it to be removed altogether, it is certain that the sepoy of the whole army would greet the measure as a great boon, and the service would instantly become much more popular than it has recently been, and plenty of recruits would be found; why should not this be done at once?

34. How should police corps in the Madras presidency be armed?

Police corps might be armed with the fusil and sword-bayonet, formerly used by the native regiments of light infantry, with black belts.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

They do not, as the native ungreka approximates somewhat to the tunic now introduced into the royal army; a modification of the two would make a convenient, and at the same time soldier-like dress for the native troops, loose trousers, of the shape now in use in the British army, called "peg top," are very well adapted for native infantry; as for the turband, wonderful to say, the Madras sepoy seems attached to present muster, but the native muslin turband of a uniform shape would be far more acceptable, and in every respect far preferable.

36. How should the native infantry of the Madras army be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

Answered by the foregoing. The shoe which has been recently introduced into some corps in lieu of the sandal is hateful to the men as an approximation to the European costume, and less easy to the foot, and ought to be abolished.

37. It has been proposed, that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached, what is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

40. Would such a system be favorable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops, which is an element of strength?

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions, in permanent association with European corps?

I can see no necessity for the system indicated in these paragraphs. The power and authority of the Government and the safety of European corps would, I conceive, be best secured by massing the latter in such stations as might be considered most desirable, together with as small a number of native troops, as might be sufficient for the ordinary duties, and by distributing the native army throughout the country, in single stations and detachments. This arrangement would be highly acceptable to the native troops by relieving them of much of the irksomeness of the profession, by enabling them to live at less expense, and to attend more to their families, while the difficulty and danger of communication would render it almost impossible to organize a general conspiracy. It would also bring the officers into closer communication with their men and increase their influence; when required for service, the troops would be easily collected, and easily instructed in field manoeuvre. Of the danger of quartering any considerable body of natives with Europeans, we have received some very severe lessons in the Madras establishment, and I can say, from my own personal experience, that such an arrangement was looked upon with peculiar favor by the enemies of our rule.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the Madras native army.

It does not occur to me in what way any improvement can be made to the articles of war in use with the Madras native army.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

I think the special rules should be retained, as it is provided that corporal punishment may be inflicted for the following offences:—"Mutiny, insubordination, and violence, or using or offering violence to superior officers; drunkenness on duty; sale of or making away with arms, ammunition, accoutrements, or necessaries; stealing from comrades, or other disgraceful conduct." Strange as it may sound to European ears, the abolition of corporal punishment was highly unpopular in the native army of Madras.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Madras army?

It works satisfactorily, and is generally considered by the men a fair tribunal.

4. What means are adopted, to acquaint the native troops of the Madras army with the military code under which they live, and are governed?

Certain sections of the articles of war are read to the men on parade once in three months. Such parts of the standing orders of the service as affect them are also read to them on parade every six months. The above are read in Hindostance, Teloo, and Tamil; the three standard languages of the Madras army.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves, in the vernacular dialect, the articles of war?

A large proportion of the men can read the articles of war in their own language, as reading and writing are qualifications necessary to their promotion.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Madras presidency?

There are no police corps yet established in the Madras presidency.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Madras presidency?

Ditto, ditto.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

Ditto, ditto.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Madras army, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

The system of promotion to the commissioned ranks is to give due weight to seniority, keeping in view, at the same time, the efficiency required of native officers; but it is not regulated by seniority alone. The promotions to the non-commissioned ranks are all made by selection, without regard to seniority; the smartest and best-qualified men being selected; care being also taken that a due proportion of the several castes is preserved in these grades.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Madras army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

Under the present system of promotion in the Madras army, it may be said that all native officers are well deserving of their commissions when they first obtain them; but, doubtless, after some time, some of them abate in zeal, and become indolent, and merely look for serving their time till they can retire on their pensions; nevertheless, it may also be said that a very good average number of intelligent, useful, and efficient native officers is to be found in every native regiment in the service.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

As a body, I should say their acquirements are of a higher grade than those of the men; there are many whose acquirements are very superior.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

There is none.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers, between the European officers and their men, weaken the influence of the European officers?

Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?

The influence of the European officers with their men is not weakened by the intervention of the native

officers. I think the contrary is the effect. Neither is the efficiency of the native officer affected by a full complement of European officers.

Sir M. Cubbon,
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6. Has it been found in the native infantry of the Madras Army, that on the occurrence of mutinies, the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

It has not been found that the native officers have given timely information of intended mutiny, although it is impossible that such could have been organized without their participation, active or passive; nor can it be said that the European officers have been of any use in preventing mutiny, because the intention to mutiny, however well known to the whole regiments, and to the country at large, has been wrapt in impenetrable concealment from the knowledge of the European officers. There is a remarkable general order by the commander-in-chief, dated the 15th February 1813, on this subject, the private history of which I happen to know, in which nine native commissioned officers and one non-commissioned officer, convicted by a court-martial, were pardoned by the commander-in-chief, not from thorough conviction of their innocence, but for political reasons; while their guilty associates, 27 in number, non-commissioned and privates, were ordered for execution at six several stations of the army. Were it not for the fear of being tiresome, I would mention some instances which passed under my own observation, of a guilty knowledge of serious conspiracy against our rule, possessed by the country in general, and of the secrecy with which public offenders were concealed.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Madras army?

The native commissioned officers should certainly be retained; the grade is in itself a most useful one, both as regards the discipline and interior economy of regiments and as regards public policy. There is no doubt but that the native officer is a great aid to the European officer of the company, as a channel of communication with his men. If the grade of native commissioned officer were abolished, the service would be deprived of its only prize, and it would then become most unpopular.

8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment, in lieu of its native officers, advisable?

By no means; I fear the conduct and language of these serjeants and corporals, generally speaking, would be such as to engender a feeling of disrespect, if not a worse feeling towards them, on the part of the men; there should be no European authority exercised over the sepoys inferior to that of the commissioned officers.

9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

I think no scheme that the financial state of the empire would ever afford, would compensate for the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

On the Madras side retiring pensions, their punctual payment, and their disbursement at the talook cutcherries nearest to the homes of the pensioners, have had certainly the effect of rendering the service popu-

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lar, not only amongst the recipients themselves, but amongst their neighbours, who are witnesses to the care bestowed by Government on their old military servants. The pension may be said to be the most powerful link which connects the native army with the Government. Great agitation, and, I may say, positive disaffection had been caused by some unwise innovations made in the management of the pension department, previous to the arrival of Lord Elphinstone as Governor of Madras; and it was the impression amongst the best informed that but for the statesman-like policy of that nobleman in correcting the evil, the general discontent would have resulted in a tremendous explosion.

11. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

The present system appears to succeed well in the Madras army, viz., "promoting for efficiency, but occasionally for seniority also. Always to give the preference to superior qualifications would exclude the fair claims of long and faithful service;" but all regimental promotions should rest entirely in the hands of the officers commanding regiments and companies. It is possible that this power might occasionally be abused, but no possible abuse could be productive of so much evil to the cause of discipline and proper feeling as teaching the troops to look to other quarters for preferment. The material from which native officers are made must necessarily be good, as the non-commissioned grades are formed of select men; a private need only have served three years in that rank to become eligible for the grade of naik or corporal, so that the rank of havildar is attainable when a man is still young and active.

12. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?

Any tampering with the present system of pensions is much to be deprecated, as unsettling men's minds, while any reduction might be attended with fatal consequences.

13. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the native infantry of the Madras army?

I have not the means of answering this question.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

They are generally fit; but on a court-martial, whether it be native or European, members are always found who take a more prominent part in the proceedings than some of their colleagues. The results of these native tribunals have been fair and successful.

15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

European serjeants and corporals are doubtless smarter and better acquainted with the minutiae of drill, but as substitutes for native officers in native regiments, they would fall far short of the latter in efficiency and utility in instructing and drilling and otherwise looking after the men of the regiment. The professional ability and efficiency of the native officers being of a more useful quality for the instruction of the men, and for the maintenance of discipline and interior good order of native regiments, I consider them therefore for their requirements superior in professional intelligence and efficiency to European serjeants and corporals.

16. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps?

1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers; or,

2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades; or,

3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers?

The formation of separate police corps should not in my opinion cause any change to be made in the present organization of the military corps. The latter should be fully officered with European and native commissioned officers; and if it should be found necessary to form police corps to any great extent, it might be advisable to increase the number of European officers in the regiments of the line, from whence officers for the police corps must be drafted.

17. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

The police corps should be officered from the European officers of the line regiments, a commandant and adjutant would probably be sufficient; but as these officers would most probably be vested with the powers of joint magistrates for the district in which their corps is employed, they should be selected with regard to their qualification for that duty. The police corps might, on their first formation at least, obtain their native commissioned officers from the regiments of the line, from which volunteers might be found for this service, on their receiving promotion of one grade in rank. Steady and efficient non-commissioned officers might also be found willing to volunteer for the service, provided their previous services were allowed to count for pension. In this manner a good nucleus might be formed for the organization of every police corps.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

Certainly not. The abolition of the native commissioned grade in the regular service must cause its ruin in the estimation of the people.

19. In police corps is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing; or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

Police corps have not yet been formed in the Madras presidency; but I should be disposed to advocate the requirement of a certain degree of proficiency in reading and writing the vernacular of the district in which the police corps is employed, to qualify for promotion to the non-commissioned grades.

20. Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies proved favorable to our power in India?

The limitation to the Bengal army alone of the late lamentable mutiny must be considered as most satisfactory proof in the affirmative.

21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate Governments, to time, and to local circumstances be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

Recent events have taught us that it is favorable to our power in India to leave the three armies to the distinct administration of their own presidencies, without attempting to assimilate, much less to amalgamate, them.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

Before answering these questions, I would respectfully beg attention to the accompanying printed copy of Sir Henry Russell's evidence before a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1832, because it gives the clearest, and, with one mistake (corrected at the foot of page 112), the most accurate account (however incredible some of the particulars may appear), I have seen of the progress of the native troops on the Madras establishment, from a state of unsuspecting fidelity to that of general dissatisfaction and partial mutiny; and because in my opinion it seems to be in the highest degree desirable to bring the Madras army back, as near as possible, to the condition in which it stood at the beginning of the present century, just before the changes Sir Henry adverts to were introduced.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Madras army? and state the orders, or measures, or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect.

The powers of officers commanding regiments and companies began to be abridged with the introduction of the new system of discipline, shortly after my arrival in India, greatly to the prejudice of subordination and respect for the European officers on the part of the native troops. To my personal knowledge, officers commanding have been threatened by their men with a letter to the adjutant-general, and I know an instance of a native officer, just returned from Madras, causing it to be believed throughout the regiment and station, that his influence with the adjutant-general had alone prevented the removal of his major from the command. The effect of this state of things on the temper of the army may easily be supposed. But the most serious blow given to the cause of discipline was the establishment, in 1809, of a direct underhand correspondence between the adjutant-general's office and the sepoys, who were thus encouraged to disregard their officers, and look up to head-quarters only. This extreme system was discontinued some years ago, when Sir Robert Vivian became adjutant-general, and much has been done since to weaken the evil. But, however desirable the present commander-in-chief and the head-quarter staff may be, to put an end to it, years must yet elapse before its demoralizing effects will cease to be felt throughout the army. I do not allude to any particular orders, but to the general change in the system. In the words of Sir Henry Russell, "their drill was changed, their dress was changed; all the regulations that governed them were changed; everything was to be done in a new and smarter way; and the old sepoys, who had grown grey in the service had again to undergo the same process that they had passed through when they were recruits. The details of the army had, for the first time in India, fallen into the hands of a school who thought that everything depended on show, and that no sacrifice was too great for the attainment of outward smartness and uniformity."

2. During the above period, have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?

Answered above.

3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps, upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Madras army?

Answered above.

4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?

Answered above.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?

Sir M. Cubbon,
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Unquestionably upon the influence and authority of officers commanding companies and the regiment. The less interference on the part of head-quarters the better, except in discountenancing unnecessary drill and duty.

6. Should the power of commanding officers, and of officers in charge of companies, be increased or diminished?

Certainly increased, and greatly increased.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

I know of no measures so well calculated to improve the subordination and loyalty of the native troops as by restoring to officers commanding companies and regiments the power which they formerly possessed, by abandoning the unavailing attempt to bring them up to the European standard of smartness in appearance and parade drill, by giving them lighter and less harassing work, and not exposing them to the expenses and the suffering inseparable from frequent movement.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?

I am not aware that any difference exists in this respect.

9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

The strength of regiments would of course be regulated by the public exigencies; at present the question is, not whether sufficient occupation can be found for the native troops, but whether native troops can be found for the various duties required of them.

10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Madras army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been, in fact, employed otherwise than in mere military duties?

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?

Never in my time.

12. In apportioning European officers to native troops,—

1. Should native corps have a full complement of European officers, according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers; or,
2. A full complement of European officers, and no native commissioned officers; or,
3. A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?

I am not aware that any inconvenience has practically arisen from the present organization of the Madras army with regard to the establishment of European and native officers, the complement of the former appears to have been fixed to meet the general requirements of the service for civil and staff as well as for regimental duty.

To abolish the native officers would destroy the prospects and the temper of the whole army.

13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?

I think it desirable that the cadets should be attached to an European corps, or some institution, and be well grounded in military duties before they join native regiments.

Sir M. Cubbon,
K.C.B.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

Not in the least, because native troops require little superintendence in garrison, and in time of war, the staff would generally be available for regimental duty.

16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies, between the conduct of regiments with few and those with many European officers present?

I have not observed any difference in this respect.

17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

As it is at present.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army, as regimental officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men, to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

I think the effect would be most injurious. The lives of the ablest young officers would be rendered almost objectless; they would sink into indolence and vicious habits, and thus lose the respect of their men; whereas, at present, the men of a native corps take great interest in the successful career of an officer of the regiment who has distinguished himself on the staff or in civil employment, and they speak of him with pride, as belonging to them. The severance of kindly sympathy between the men of a native regiment and the officers on detached employment is by no means so wide as is generally supposed.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

Certainly it would.

M. CUBBON, Lieut.-Gen.,
Commissioner of Mysore and Coorg.

From the COMMISSIONER for the Government of the Territories of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore to Lieut.-Col. H. M. DURAND, C.B.

SIR, Bangalore, July 25, 185 .

I HAVE the honor to enclose three papers which ought to have been transmitted with my letter of yesterday's date, viz. :-

1. Sir Henry Russell's evidence.
2. Statement of the composition of the Mysore barr (irregular infantry).
3. Statement of the Mysore silladars (irregular horse).

I have, &c.

M. CUBBON,
Commissioner.

SIR HENRY RUSSELL'S EVIDENCE BEFORE A SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Jovis, 19^o die Aprilis 1832.

THE RIGHT HON. SIR JOHN BYNG IN THE CHAIR
HENRY RUSSELL, Esq., called in and examined.

2227. You have been some time in India?—I have been 23 years in India.

2228. At what presidency?—I belonged to the Bengal presidency; but I was chiefly employed in a political situation within the limits of the Madras army.

2229. When did you leave India?—In the year 1820.

2230. What were the situations you held?—I was originally an assistant to the resident at Hyderabad; and I afterwards myself held the situation of resident for eleven years.

2231. It appears that in your evidence before the Political Sub-Committee, you have said that the greatest danger we have to apprehend in India is from our native army; the Committee are desirous to understand from you more particularly your reasons for so thinking?—My reasons for thinking that the greatest danger we have to apprehend in India is from our native army are, that our military force is the sole and exclusive tenure by which we hold the government, and that the fidelity of the troops of whom that force is composed is necessarily precarious; they are foreigners and mercenaries; they are attached to a government that pays them well, and treats them kindly, and they will generally follow wherever their officers will lead them; but we have no hold upon them, through either national honor or national prejudices, and cannot expect from them what we do from English soldiers fighting for English objects. They are peculiarly susceptible of being practised upon, and may be induced, either by our own mismanagement, or by the artifices of designing persons, to turn against us those very arms which now constitute our only strength.

2232. Will you state what is the particular danger you apprehend, and whether it is increased by any circumstances in our treatment or management of the native force?—We have already had two striking instances to show the nature of that danger, in the agitation among the sepoys in 1806, of which the massacre at Vellore was the principal feature, and in the insubordination of the European officers in 1809. The system which has been pursued towards both those branches of our army has been essentially erroneous; their vital importance to the very existence of our power has not been sufficiently considered. Towards the European officers a short-sighted system of economy has been prosecuted, injurious in the first instance to the army, and in its consequences to the Government; and with respect to the sepoys, much of that care which ought to have been bestowed on securing their attachment, and improving the substance of their efficiency, has been wasted in a frivolous, vexatious attention to outward forms. My personal knowledge is chiefly confined to the troops of the Madras presidency. When I first went to Hyderabad, 30 years ago, there were at that station six battalions of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry. The command of those corps was, at that time, among the best situations that an officer could hold, and it was consequently held by the best officers. An officer commanding a corps was then a person of importance; he had his markets, his commissariat, his artificers, and followers of every description attached to his immediate corps. His allowances were considerable, and enabled him to exercise hospitality towards his officers, and to be liberal to his men. The first of those allowances that was taken away was, I believe, the bazaar allowance, consisting of a duty levied on spirituous liquors, tobacco, and other intoxicating drugs. This duty, in the general bazaar, which belonged to the officer commanding the whole force, produced near 5,000*l.* a year; and in the battalion bazars, which belonged to the commanding officers of corps, about 1,000*l.* The reduction of this allowance was followed by that of the tent contract, and of others of smaller amount, of which I cannot now recollect the particulars, and by degrees the advantages of a command were reduced so low, that no officer would take the command of a corps whose character or pretensions enabled him to procure any other situation. It was in these reductions that the discontent of the army first originated; and in 1803, when the Mahratta war began, that feeling was so strong, that I have no doubt, if it had not been diverted by active employment, the same insubordination which showed itself in 1809 would have broken out at that time. The feeling began among the European officers. What may be the case in an European army I cannot say, but in an Indian army it is impossible that discontent can prevail in any great degree, and for any length of time among the officers, without ultimately producing its effect upon the men; though not designedly imparted, it must imperceptibly descend to them. The commanding officers had then lost much of the weight and importance before enjoyed; they were no longer able to keep up the same appearance, or exercise the same liberality towards their men, and were, consequently, no longer objects of the same consideration in their eyes. A spirit of reciprocal and general dissatisfaction grew up, which loosened the ties that bound the different ranks to one another, as well as to the Government. From the beginning of the Mahratta war, the troops were for three years under canvas, they were exposed to unusual hardships, and when they returned to their cantonments, instead of being allowed any indulgence or repose, they were teased and worried with a new, and I must say, a puerile system, which altered everything they had been accustomed to. Their drill was changed, their dress was changed, all the regulations that governed them were changed; everything was to be done in a new and smarter way; and the old sepoys, who had grown grey in

the service, had again to undergo the same process that they had passed through when they were recruits. The details of the army had, for the first time in India, fallen into the hands of a school who thought that everything depended on show, and that no sacrifice was too great for the attainment of outward smartness and uniformity. A single specimen of the new orders that were issued at Hyderabad will enable the committee to estimate the character of the whole code. When any sepoy on guard wanted to retire for a particular purpose, he was to be detained until a certain number had the same occasion, and they were then to be marched down under a naick or corporal, that even the calls of nature might be answered in military order. They were forbidden to wear their marks of caste on parade; their whiskers were to be trimmed in an uniform manner; a leathern cap* was to be substituted for the turban they had previously worn; and there was no end to the silly compliances that were required of them. The disgust which such a system as this could not fail to excite is manifest. If any of the alterations enjoined were really worth the importance that was attached to them, they might have been accomplished, if the attempt had been made at any other time, or even at that time, with temper and discretion: but it was the fashion of the day to enforce everything with rigour, and the sepoya were already in a frame of mind ill-suited to bear the trials they were exposed to. Advantage was no doubt taken by designing persons, who instilled suspicions into the sepoya that our real intentions went far beyond their dress. They fancied that the picker and brush suspended from their belt bore some resemblance to the cross. The tight drawers reaching to the knee, which they had worn for years, were all at once suspected to be breeches; and the leathern cap was only a step in the process of changing the turban for the hat. Unhappily, we seemed to do everything to give a color to those suspicions; and in spite of various warnings, we persisted in a course of measures by which we spread a general belief among the sepoya that we intended to compel them to become Christians, and by which they were at length irritated to desperation. It was remarked that the fakeers, a class of religious mendicants, who are very numerous in India, and frequent the stations of the army in particular, were at this time unusually active throughout the country. Some were actuated by religious bigotry, and some, no doubt, were employed by our political enemies, and it was afterwards ascertained that they had been busy in inflaming the alarm and discontent of the sepoya, and spreading the disaffection from one station to another. At Vellore, where only any extreme violence was perpetrated, the sepoya were instigated by some of the members of Tippoo's family who resided there, but they only took advantage of the disaffection; they did not create it, the feeling was universal. It showed itself at the same time at Hyderabad, and at various different and distant stations; and if immediate steps had not been taken to rescind the obnoxious orders and allay the general irritation, the whole presidency would have partaken of the same calamity that happened at Vellore. It is neither easy, nor is it important, to distinguish the particular incident that produced the explosion. Among the variety of causes that were in action, any single one might have been inadequate to the effect. Discontent and disaffection had been growing for a length of time; by degrees the mine was charged, and any accidental spark was sufficient to inflame the mass.

2233. Will you state whether, in your estimation, the danger that you apprehend is greater or less now than at former periods?—Since that time our treatment of the sepoya has been more judicious; indeed, I am not aware of anything in our present mode of treating them that requires to be changed. Our danger, I apprehend, is greater now than it was before 1806, inasmuch as it would be more easy to revive the same alarm in the minds of the sepoya than if it had never before prevailed; and the sphere of it is enlarged with every extension of our native army. During our wars with Hyder Ally our sepoya, in addition to other serious privations, were, I believe, a year and a half in arrear of pay. I doubt whether such an arrear now would not produce an insurrection.

2234. Does this danger, in your opinion, arise from feelings peculiar to the army, or common to them with other natives; and does it arise more from the Hindoos or from the Moslems?—To a certain extent, the feelings from which our danger arises are common to the natives of every part of India, but they prevail more among the Mahomedans than the Hindoos, and more among the Madras than among the Bengal sepoya. The Mahomedans are much more under the influence of religious fanaticism than the Hindoos, and are constitutionally of a more eager and irritable temper. The northern tribes, from which the Bengal sepoya

are chiefly drawn, are, both morally and physically, a much finer race than that from which the Madras army is recruited. The Bengal sepoya are born soldiers, the Madras sepoya are taught to be so; and considering what they are in their original condition, it is surprising what their officers contrive to make of them. Among the Bengal sepoya, Hindoos of the better class greatly preponderate. Among the Madras sepoya, there is a much larger proportion of Mahomedans and Hindoos of the lower castes. Mutinies have been of less frequent occurrence among the Bengal than among the Madras sepoya; and even when they have occurred they have been attended with less acrimony and violence.

2235. Can you state whether any symptoms or tendency to this state of things now appear or have lately appeared?—I am not aware that there is any peculiar indication of danger at the present time, or that there is any greater reason to apprehend it now than there must be at all times while we are obliged to rely on one part of the population for the means of keeping the remainder in subjection.

2236. In what way do you think that the danger, such as it is, can best be warded off?—The best means of warding off the danger consist, I apprehend, in a steady, uniform, conciliatory treatment both of the European officers, and of the native soldiers. Towards the European officers, the great error that has been committed has been the reduction to so very low a scale of the allowances attached to the actual command of a corps. The allowances of the inferior ranks are necessarily of minor importance. A junior officer is satisfied if he can live creditably on his pay; and as long as the allowances of the commanding officer are liberal, every subaltern feels his interest in them, and knows that, if he lives, he will enjoy them in his turn. I have always thought, and I still think, that it is an object of first-rate importance, in the treatment of the army, to make the post of the command of a corps so advantageous in point of emolument, as to render the best officers in the service willing and anxious to hold it. In our treatment of the native soldiers we ought, above all things, to avoid the most remote appearance of a desire to interfere with their religious customs or prejudices, and to hold out to them as many objects of ambition as we can with safety. Horse and palanquin allowances; situations such as that of aide-de-camp to general officers; medals, grants of land, honorary distinctions and privileges of every kind, are eminently useful. They are peculiarly gratifying to the natives themselves, and can be attended with no inconvenience to us.

2237. Will you state to the Committee, with reference again to your evidence before the Political Sub-Committee, why you think the native officers are discontented?—The chief cause of the discontent which I think prevails among the native officers is, that when once they have attained the rank of subadar, they have, generally speaking, nothing more to look to, having got all that they can get, they have no further inducement to exert themselves; they become first indolent, and then dissatisfied. There ought, as long as possible, to be some higher object kept in their view, to which, by diligence and fidelity, they may still attain. Honorary distinctions, such as I have just spoken of, are one obvious method of attaching them to the service. The employing them more extensively in military command would perhaps have more effect in this way than any other measure. At present no native can reach such a rank in our army as will admit of his commanding an English serjeant. But how far it may be safe to do this is a critical question, and requires most careful consideration. Though it promises advantage, it also threatens danger. There was a native officer on the Madras establishment of the name of Mohammud Yoosuf, who was entrusted, in our early operations, with a considerable independent command, of which he discharged the duties with judgment and fidelity; and if we raise the natives to higher offices in the civil department, it will be difficult to maintain the exclusion of them in the army. But in this as in every other attempt to enlarge the field for the employment of the natives, it must be remembered, that although they are calculated to improve their condition, they are so many steps towards the extinction of our own authority. If we both give the natives power, and teach them how to use it, they will not much longer submit to our control. On this subject there is a preliminary consideration, which I am afraid we overlook. In what character, and for what purpose do we appear in India? If we are to act as mere philanthropists, and to consider only how we can best improve the moral and political condition of the Indian population, we may govern them as we would govern one another, and the sooner we can make them wise enough and strong enough to expel us from the country, the greater will have been our success. If we go as subjects of England, for the extension of English power and the improvement of English interests, a different course must be pursued. We may govern them as kindly

Sir M. Cubbon,
K.C.B.

* Not a cap, but a new pattern turban and leather cockade.—M. C.

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K.C.B.

as we can; it is our interest as well as our duty to do so; but we must retain all substantial power in our own hands, and must remember that, be our objects what they may, the natives of India can never stand upon the same level with ourselves; they must be either above us or below us.

2238. You seem to lament that the allowances of the European officers in the native corps should have been diminished, and you mention the reduction of the bazaar allowance; do you, upon the whole, think it would have been desirable to continue that allowance?—I do. I confine my observation exclusively to the officers in the actual command of corps; and though I have no doubt that the reduction of the bazaar allowance, of the tent contract, and of other emoluments enjoyed by the army, was supported by specious reasons, and had, in each case, its specific advantages at the time, I think that the ultimate consequences were not sufficiently considered, and that the attachment of the European officers has been weakened, and the efficiency of the army impaired, by measures directed exclusively to economy.

2239. Did not the profit derived from the bazaar arise from the consumption of spirits and opium and intoxicating drugs?—It did, and so it does at present; but the profit does not now go to the officers.

2243. To what purpose does the money now go?—To the Government. It passed through an intermediate process: in the first instance, it was thrown into a general fund called the bazaar fund, of which the produce was divided periodically among officers of a certain rank throughout the army, but it was perfectly understood at the time that that was only a prefatory measure to a resumption of the duty by the Government themselves; and accordingly, at the expiration of, I think, about two years, it was resumed, and is now received by the Government.

2241. While the profit of the bazaar was received by the commanding officers of corps, must not that have operated as an inducement with them to encourage the consumption of spirits and opium, and other drugs of that sort?—In point of fact, I think it did not. I do not believe that drunkenness was at all more prevalent than it has been since. One strong reason why such should not be the case was, that the conduct of the commanding officer was open to the inspection of the whole body of officers collectively; and such an abuse would not have been suffered by them to prevail to any extent.

2242. Had you any opportunity of observing the state of any military body while the commanding officer received the bazaar allowance?—I lived as the only civil servant at a very large military station for about three years while that allowance prevailed.

2243. Did you reside there after it ceased?—I did.

2244. Did you observe any difference?—None whatever.

2245. Since when have you observed that the command of a native corps has ceased to be an object of ambition with

the European officers?—If it were necessary to draw any line, I should say that the Mahratta war, the operations connected with which lasted from 1803 to 1806, may be considered as the period of the alteration.

2246. Do you attribute the disinclination to be satisfied with the command of a corps to the reduction of allowances?—Principally.

2247. Have not the staff situations to which officers in the army are eligible very much increased in number?—They have, I believe, in some degree; but those situations, in point of value, are not to be put in competition with what the command of a corps formerly was.

2248. At present are not some of the staff situations so advantageous as to make officers prefer them to the command of a corps?—The reason of the preference I should rather say is, that the command of a corps is so little advantageous. There is no great advantage attached to the staff situations; military officers in some cases hold political situations; that, for instance, of resident at native courts, of which the allowances are considerable; but the military staff situations are attended with very little emolument.

2249. You have spoken of grants of land to native soldiers. Have you ever observed that practice prevailing in any part of India?—I have never myself been in the part of India where it has prevailed, but I have understood that in the upper parts of Bengal it was usual formerly, and perhaps still is, to make grants of land to the native officers and sepoy, instead of pensioning them at the expiration of a certain period of service; and I have been told that many prosperous villages were formed of the retired sepoy who had had land so allotted to them.

2250. Should you think it desirable to adopt any such practice more extensively?—I think it is one of the measures that might be adopted with advantage. The great object is to give the native soldier something ulterior to look to, and to make him feel that he has something to lose if he behaves ill.

2251. Then you would make those grants of land in some degree dependent upon the good behaviour of the native soldiers?—Unquestionably.

2252. From your knowledge of the presidency of Madras, do you think there would be any difficulty in allotting portions of land for such a purpose?—I should think none whatever. I should think there are many parts of the territory dependent upon the Madras presidency where such a practice might be introduced with advantage.

2253. In the case you have mentioned, were the grants of land given to the soldiers as well as to the native officers?—They are given to all persons having served for a certain length of time, and having maintained a certain character, the grant varying in value according to the rank that the individual may have attained before his retiring from the service.

ABSTRACT STRENGTH OF FOUR BATTALIONS OF BARR, as it stood on the 30th June 1858.

Battalions.	Commandants.	Rissaldars.	Subadars.	Adjutants.	Jemadars	Havildar Majors.	Havildars.	Drummers	Fifers.	Sepoys.	Vakeels.	Writers.	Hakeems.	Jakumbands.	Puckalies.	Washermen.	Orderlies.	Armourers.	Smiths.	Carpenters.	Chucklers.	Lascars.	Total.	Total Pay of each Battalion.
1st Syed Eshock	1	1	10	1	10	1	70	7	10	478	1	5	1	1	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	4	626	Rs. an. p. 4,800 8 0
2nd Syed Abdool Rahmon.	1	1	9	1	10	1	70	10	9	510	1	5	1	1	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	4	659	4,993 8 0
3rd Meer Ameen-odeen.	1	1	10	1	10	1	70	10	10	540	1	5	1	1	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	4	691	4,472 0 0
4th Butcha Row	1	1	10	1	10	1	70	10	10	540	1	5	1	1	10	10	1	1	1	1	1	4	691	4,472 0 0
Total	4	4	39	4	40	4	280	37	39	2,068	4	20	4	4	40	40	4	4	4	4	4	16	2,667	18,738 0 0
Wanting to complete	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	3	1	92	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	97	658 0 0
Establishment	4	4	40	4	40	4	280	40	40	2,160	4	20	4	4	40	40	4	4	4	4	4	16	2,764	19,396 0 0

Military Assistant's Office,
Bangalore, July 15, 1858.

E. B. RAMSAY,
Officiating Military Assistant.

STATEMENT showing the present STRENGTH of BARR, specifying the different Castes in each Rank, the Rate and the Amount of Pay to the 1st and 2nd Class Battalions, as it stood on the 30th June 1858. Sir M. Cubbon,
K.C.B.

Rank.	Musulmans.	Brahmins.	Maharattas.	Rajpoots.	Koonbees.	Allaymons.	Ranchaywar.	Punchal.	Chucklers.	Total.	First Class.			Second Class.		
											No.	Pay of each Rank.	Total.	No.	Pay of each Rank.	Total.
Commandants	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	Rs. an. p. 120 0 0	Rs. an. p. 240 0 0	2	Rs. an. p. 100 0 0	Rs. an. p. 200 0 0
Rissaldars	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	80 0 0	160 0 0	2	70 0 0	140 0 0
Subadars	29	1	1	4	2	2	-	-	-	39	19	30 0 0	570 0 0	20	25 0 0	500 0 0
Adjutants	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	25 0 0	50 0 0	2	20 0 0	40 0 0
Jemadars	34	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	-	40	20	16 0 0	320 0 0	20	14 0 0	280 0 0
Havildar Majors	3	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	15 0 0	30 0 0	2	12 0 0	24 0 0
Havildars	210	1	14	20	16	17	2	-	-	280	140	9 0 0	1,260 0 0	140	8 0 0	1,120 0 0
Drummers	1	-	-	-	-	36	-	-	-	37	17	7 8 0	127 8 0	20	6 8 0	130 0 0
Fifers	2	-	-	-	-	37	-	-	-	39	19	7 8 0	142 8 0	20	6 8 0	130 0 0
Sepoys	1,458	8	173	82	151	189	7	-	-	2,068	988	6 8 0	6,422 0 0	1,080	5 8 0	5,940 0 0
Vakeels	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	16 0 0	32 0 0	2	16 0 0	32 0 0
Writers	1	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	10	8 0 0	80 0 0	10	8 0 0	80 0 0
Hakeems	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	8 0 0	16 0 0	2	8 0 0	16 0 0
Jakumbunds	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	8 0 0	16 0 0	2	8 0 0	16 0 0
Puckallies	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	20	6 0 0	120 0 0	20	5 0 0	100 0 0
Washermen	-	-	-	20	19	1	-	-	-	40	20	5 0 0	100 0 0	20	4 8 0	90 0 0
Orderlies	1	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	2	6 0 0	12 0 0	2	6 0 0	12 0 0
Armourers	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	4	2	9 8 0	19 0 0	2	9 8 0	19 0 0
Smiths	1	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	4	2	8 0 0	16 0 0	2	8 0 0	16 0 0
Carpenters	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	4	2	9 0 0	18 0 0	2	8 0 0	16 0 0
Chucklers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	4	2	3 8 0	7 0 0	2	3 8 0	7 0 0
Lascars	2	-	1	-	7	-	-	6	-	16	8	4 8 0	36 0 0	8	4 8 0	36 0 0
Total	1,802	36	190	131	199	284	9	6	10	2,667	1,285	-	9,794 0 0	1,382	-	8,944 0 0

Military Assistant's Office,
Bangalore, July 15, 1858.

E. B. RAMSAY,
Officiating Military Assistant.

ABSTRACT STRENGTH of SEVEN REGIMENTS of SILLADARS, as it stood on the 30th June 1858.

Regiments.	Regimentdars.	Rissaldars.	Surzufferdars.	Zufferdars.	Jemadars.	Trumpeters.	Dhunka Navaz.	Nishanburdars.	Silladars.	Surpaishcars.	Paishcars.	Nakeeba.	Mounted Muhaldars.	Pydul Muhaldars.	Ihandawallahs.	Elephant.	Horses.	Total Pay of each Regiment.
1st Syed Fackrodeen	1	5	1	6	30	2	1	1	365	1	6	1	6	1	4	-	426	Rs. 9,744
2nd Kristna Row	1	6	1	6	30	2	1	1	360	1	6	1	6	1	4	-	422	9,768
3rd Termul Row	1	6	1	6	30	2	1	1	344	1	6	1	6	1	8	-	406	9,443
4th Hunmunt Row	1	6	1	6	30	2	1	1	339	1	6	1	6	1	4	1	401	9,386
5th Mahomed Abass	2	6	1	6	30	2	1	1	366	1	6	1	6	1	4	-	429	10,114
6th Bamboo Row Mannay	1	5	1	6	30	2	1	1	358	1	6	1	6	1	4	-	419	9,584
7th Lutchmun Row	1	5	1	6	30	2	1	1	391	1	6	1	6	1	4	-	452	10,247
Total	8	39	7	42	210	14	7	7	2,523	7	42	7	42	7	32	1	2,955	68,286
Wanting to complete	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	360
Establishment	7	42	7	42	210	14	7	7	2,523	7	42	7	42	7	32	1	2,958	68,646
Supernumerary	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	250

Military Assistant's Office,
Bangalore, July 15, 1858.

E. B. RAMSAY,
Officiating Military Assistant.

Sir M. Cubbon.
K.C.B.

STATEMENTS showing the PRESENT STRENGTH of SILLADARS, specifying the different Castes in each Rank, and the Rate of Pay, as it stood on the 30th June 1858.

Rank.	Musulmans, including Pindarees	Maharattas.	Brahmins.	Urees	Rajpoots.	Sikhs.	Naidoos.	Koonbees.	Allaymoos.	Christians.	Chacklers.	Stallions.	Total Strength.	Pay.	
														Rate of each Rank.	Total.
Regimentdars	2	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	Rs. 250 0 0	as. p. 2,000 0 0
Rissaldars	12	6	15	2	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	39	120 0 0	4,700 0 0
Surzufferdars	5	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	60 0 0	420 0 0
Zufferdars	20	15	3	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	25 0 0	1,050 0 0
Jemadars	108	61	21	2	18	1	-	4	-	-	-	-	210	30 0 0	6,336 0 0
Trumpeters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	14	20 0 0	280 0 0
Dhunka Navaz	6	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	20 0 0	140 0 0
Nishanburdars	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	22 0 0	154 0 0
Silladars	1,302	884	139	7	129	16	1	11	3	1	-	30	2,523	20 0 0	50,486 0 0
Surpashcars	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	35 0 0	245 0 0
Pashcars	-	-	42	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	30 0 0	1,260 0 0
Nakeebis	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	24 0 0	168 0 0
Mounted Mahaldars	42	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42	20 0 0	840 0 0
Pydul Mahaldars	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	6 0 0	42 0 0
Jhanda Duffadars	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	7	5 0 0	35 0 0
Jhaneawallas	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	23	-	25	4 0 0	100 0 0
Elephant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0 0 0	30 0 0
Total	1,517	974	231	12	147	18	2	16	17	1	29	30	2,995	-	68,286 0 0

* 1 at 140 rupees, 38 at 120 rupees each.

† 2 at 45 rupees each; 2 at 33 rupees each; 206 at 30 rupees each.

‡ 2 at 30 rupees each; 1 at 24 rupees; 1 at 22 rupees; 2,519 at 20 rupees each.

Military Assistant's Office,
Bangalore, July 15, 1858.

E. B. RAMSAY,
Officiating Military Assistant.

From the COMMISSIONER for the Government of the Territories of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

SIR,
Bangalore, August 12, 1858.
It has occurred to me that I may appear to have made a mistake in stating in one of the answers enclosed in my letter to you of the 24th July last, that there are no police corps yet established in the Madras presidency, and that I ought to explain that I considered the Malabar corps, from its organization, its appointments, and its measure of discipline, to be, properly speaking, a local irregular corps, not a police corps, as contemplated by the question; and that I concluded the fullest information regarding it would have been furnished by head-quarters.

I have, &c.

M. CUBBON,
Commissioner.

REPLIES to QUESTIONS having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the territories under your administration, and what is their distribution?

1. At Bangalore there are, at present, 79 men of the Madras horse artillery, 119 men of foot artillery, of the 1st dragoon guards 433 men, 500 men of the 60th rifles; total at Bangalore 1,172 rank and file. At Mysore, 92 men of the 3rd battalion of the 60th rifles; and at Hurryhur, 94 men of the 60th rifles, both detachments temporarily.

2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the territories under your administration, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

2. Not fewer than one complete European regiment of infantry at least 1,000 strong, or still better 1,200. One complete regiment of European dragoons at least 700 strong, and 300 European artillery, horse and foot, I conceive, should always be stationed at Bangalore.

3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the territory under your administration, and what is their distribution?

1. At Bangalore, about 124 of the 3rd regiment L. C., and 585 of the 20th regiment N. I.; at the French Rocks, the left wing of the 52nd regiment N. I., 217, at Mysore 76, and at Hoonsoor 49; at Hurryhur, the 35th regiment N. I. 339 men; at Mercara in Coorg, the right wing of the 52nd native regiment.

4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the territory under your administration, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

4. I consider one entire native regiment necessary to be stationed at Mercara in Coorg, together with one brigade of European artillery, for special reasons. One entire native regiment at Hurryhur on the northern boundary of Mysore, and one native regiment at the French Rocks, or at a new station proposed by the Commander-in-Chief between Seringapatam and Mysore. At Bangalore such a number as the military authorities may deem necessary to carry on the duties usually assigned to natives, and not more; perhaps, about two regiments of native infantry. I am not aware that any necessity exists for stationing a regiment of native cavalry at Bangalore.

5. What proportion of native troops now serving in the territory under your administration are regulars, irregulars, and police corps; of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur?

5. The troops alluded to in answer to the previous questions are all regulars. Besides these, there are four battalions of Mysore irregular infantry, consisting in all of about 2,200 men, and seven regiments of Mysore irregular horse, consisting of about 2,500 privates. Both these are distributed throughout the country as revenue and judicial guards, as escort for treasure, and generally for police purposes, the silladars being always available for service when called for by the Madras Government, and at this very moment

1,000 of them are serving under the orders of the Madras Government beyond the frontier of Mysore. The accompanying statements will show of what races the Mysore troops are composed, and in what proportions the races occur.

6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?
6. I am not aware that any alteration is necessary in this respect.
7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in Mysore and Coorg? and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive, of police corps.
7. The number of Europeans proposed is in the proportion of two to five of the regular native troops, and two to between nine and ten of the regular and irregular troops.
9. Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the territory under your administration? and state its amount.
9. When the new dragoon barracks in course of construction are finished, there will be abundant accommodation for the European troops proposed to be stationed at Bangalore.
10. Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the territory under your administration for the strength of European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?
10. None.

M. CUBBON, Lieut.-Gen.
Commissioner of Mysore and Coorg.

REPLIES to QUESTIONS having reference to Para. 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November, 1857, 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Madras presidency, and what is their distribution?
2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the Madras presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?
3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the Madras presidency, and what is their distribution?
4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the Madras presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?
5. What proportion of native troops now serving in the Madras presidency are regulars, irregulars, and police corps? Of what races are they composed, and in what proportion do the races occur?

6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?
7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the Madras Presidency? and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive, of police corps.
8. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally? and state the ratios, as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps.
9. Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Madras presidency, and state its amount.
10. Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the Madras presidency for the strength of the European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?
11. What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what portion should be composed of troops raised for service in India?
12. Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them?
13. Under the supposition that a considerable increase take place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxtaposition with the purchase promotion system than what now accrues from the existence of the royal artillery, royal engineers, royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority promotion is the system?
14. The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to Questions 7 and 8? If so, to what extent?

Sir M. Cubbon,
K.C.B.

The whole of these questions, from 1 to 13 inclusive, will have been answered by the head-quarters of the Madras army; but I can say positively, that the introduction of the foreign mercenaries indicated in paragraph 14 would be received with great distaste, not only by the existing Madras army, but by the population in general.

M. CUBBON, Lieut.-Gen.
Commissioner of Mysore and Coorg.

No. 6.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SYDNEY COTTON.

Major-Gen.
Sydney Cotton.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Punjab is composed?

The old irregular cavalry regiments were composed of Brahmins, Rajpoots, Syuds, Patans of Rohilkund and adjacent provinces, and Mahomedan Rajpoots, their numbers in the 7th irregular cavalry (which may, in this respect, be taken as a specimen

of the service), on the 1st May 1857, stood as follows:—

Mahomedans, Syuds, and Patans	-	392
Mahomedan Rajpoots	-	82
Brahmins	-	62
Rajpoots	-	28
Seikhs	-	20
Hindoos of an inferior description	-	2

Since then Seikhs and other Hindoos of the Punjab, as also the better classes of Mahomedans of the Punjab, and Trans-Indus Pathans have been enlisted.

Major-Gen.
Sydney Cotton.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

Huriana and Rotuck furnish Mahomedan and Hindoo Rajpoots; Delhi, Meerut, Goorgoan, and Rohilcund furnish Pathans; Brahmins are principally furnished by Oude, Cawnpore, and Allahabad.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Punjab, either by the regulation or the practice of the

I know of no regulations for enlisting or excluding any races, tribes, or castes, but it has been the practice to exclude the low castes, such as sweepers, googurs, barbers, and the like.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?

Native Christians, when they can be obtained in sufficient numbers to form a troop, would be highly desirable. Sweepers have been tried under the name of "Bidur," or without fear, and I believe were good soldiers; but prejudice, and dislike entertained for them by the other men led to their being got rid of, and I would by no means recommend these men being placed in a regiment with other castes. It might be, however, very desirable to have a few regiments composed of them only, the place of native officers being filled with European serjeants or officers (European); intelligent men who distinguish themselves in European cavalry regiments could be posted as sub-officers to these corps, and I think the system would work well.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?

Until the present outbreak no agency has been required. Candidates for admission have been always with the regiment.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Punjab, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

A roll of the recruit, with a reference to some man of respectability in his village, is sent to the civil authority for verification and registry.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

See reply to No. 6.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?

Recruits should be enlisted for general service. If irregular corps are preserved in their present strength, I recommend that the counterpoise of castes be preserved by enlisting a distinct race for each squadron.

I consider however it would be far preferable to reduce the present strength of irregular cavalry corps to about 300 to 350 men, including all ranks, and forming each corps wholly of one caste, taking care that a due proportion of each class be introduced into the service.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?

No oath whatever is administered at present to irregular cavalry recruits on enlisting.

10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?

Vade foregoing answer.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Punjab when first enrolled?

I think an oath somewhat similar to that of the infantry might well be introduced into the irregular cavalry.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Punjab be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only?

If the present strength of corps be reduced, each corps might then be raised in a prescribed district, and recruited from that only. If the present strength be retained, then each squadron might be so raised and recruited.

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Punjab be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?

I recommend the system of recruiting corps or squadrons in distinct districts.

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Punjab be homogeneous as to race or caste?

Each corps or each squadron of a corps should be homogeneous as to race and caste.

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Punjab be composed of *ressalahs*, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

The mutiny of the native army has clearly shown us the evil results of amalgamating the castes; and, judging from the experience of the past, I recommend the system of forming bodies of distinct and separate tribes.

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Punjab are not homogeneous but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

I think the irregular cavalry might be composed of half Hindoos and half Mussulmans, the latter including Trans-Indus Pathans, Punjabee and Hindustanee Mahomedans generally, and the former class consisting of Sikhs and Hindustanee Rajpoots. If native Christians be obtainable, a proportion of these would be very desirable for this as well as other branches of the service.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

The irregular cavalry has ever been and is likely to continue a popular service with all classes of natives, and a scarcity of recruits is not, I think, to be apprehended. Should such occur, and if, as recommended, corps are enlisted from particular districts, the civil officers of those districts could lend them aid in obtaining recruits, if the corps is at any great distance from the district.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Punjab?

I consider the present precaution of a verification roll sufficient.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Punjab?

Certainly not. Such a measure would lead to the deterioration of the European soldier in every respect. I think, however, that it would be beneficial to the service if a troop or squadron of natives were enlisted for service with European corps, to save the European soldiers from duties of exposure, such as that of the rear-guard on the march, and for covering foraging parties while on service.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?

Vide foregoing reply.

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

Vide foregoing reply.

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

Vide foregoing reply.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of the native troopers with whom they would be associated?

Vide foregoing reply.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Punjab be armed?

The present arms of the irregular cavalry are good and serviceable. I do not think anything can be better than a tulwar and carbine for the men of this service.

26. How should the irregular cavalry of the Punjab be dressed and equipped, with a view to the efficiency and comfort of the native trooper? Do the present dress and equipments admit of improvements? If so, state them.

The present dress of the irregular cavalry is not good; it takes a long time to put it on. I would substitute the tunic for the alkalik; a good large puggree and black or brown leather belts. There should be but one dress, the new coat for full dress, the old one for undress. One uniform should be fixed for the whole service. It should be supplied to the men from the clothing agency.

Nolan's saddle has been tried in the 7th irregular cavalry by Col. Mulcaster, and found to answer well.

The saddle is covered with a shabraque of cloth, dyed in England so as to imitate a leopard's skin. This is not expensive, and looks remarkably well.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the native army?

Yes; the removal of all restrictions, leaving to courts, in all cases, their full powers, the adding to minor punishments (Article 112) 25 lashes, and reduction of non-commissioned officers, also granting commanding officers power to punish native commissioned officers.

An article should be added subjecting men who, in time of peace, being ordered on an ordinary working party refuses to work or leaves the party without leave, to the full penalties courts-martial have the power to award.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

I think special rules should be retained, but they should be much more stringent.

2. Does the system of native courts-martial work well in the irregular cavalry of the native army?

No; native officers are ready enough to punish any disgraceful conduct, especially if it be against their own tenets, but they will not uphold discipline, and will not punish breaches of it. I expect no real discipline to exist in the native army as long as native officers sit on courts-martial, and until commanding officers have power to punish summarily native commissioned officers, and to reduce non-commissioned officers to the

ranks. In corps officered by European officers trials should be held by them only, and when there is a scarcity of officers, two should be deemed a sufficient number to form a court. In the case of a less number than two, the court-martial should be dispensed with, and on a summary of evidence, the commanding officer should award punishment, possessing, in that case, the full powers of a court-martial.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the cavalry of the native army with the military code under which they are governed?

The articles of war are read on parade.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the cavalry of the native army can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

About one in ten.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the native army, what is the system of promotion? Is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

It varies according to the ideas of the commandant for the time being, and of the Government in the case of commissioned officers. There is no rule that it shall be based seniority.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the native army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

A few are, a great number are the reverse. Of the few that are, they are men that have had rapid promotion, and are still in their prime. Of the others, they are generally illiterate and bigoted men, who have been permitted to rise by seniority from good behaviour, or rather from having nothing recorded against them?

8. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

Those who on account of their acquirements and superior intelligence have been rapidly pushed on, of course are; the others are often the reverse, and have to depend for every information that requires to be written on a sowar.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on a promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

None.

6. Has it been found, on occasions of mutiny, that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

As far as I know native officers generally lead mutineers, or prompt them, pushing the men forward, and keeping in the back ground themselves.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule.

Yes, I believe, they have, although they do not appear to have influenced the conduct of the native army in the recent mutiny.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained? or modified? or prospectively abolished?

It should be modified with reference to the irregular cavalry who should be put on precisely the same footing as the line, and to prevent its being over-crowded, I would suggest greater care in the selection of recruits, who after being two months in the service should be inspected by a medical committee, and men who do not seem strong and healthy should be discharged; they should again be inspected minutely by

Major-Gen.
Sydney Cotton.

Major-Gen.
Sydney Cotton.

the inspecting officer, and he should discharge any he does not approve of; after this, they should be subject to half-yearly inspection by a medical committee, till they have been five years in the service.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the native army?

I do not know.

13. Should the system of promotion generally, by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers, if at all in operation, be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule.

Most certainly, merit and efficiency should only be the rule.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

No, not the best of them.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the native army?

Yes, I would make it *allowable* to fill up every third vacancy in the commissioned grades by a direct nomination thereto, of a young and intelligent man, who had not served previously, his first three years of service being on probation.

21. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bengal army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?

Government should, of course, give every assistance in its power. I would suggest that all stud horses that are not required for the artillery and the dragoons should be offered to officers commanding irregular cavalry corps, at their chunda rate, and that all corps should have this advantage alike.

22. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army were mounted?

I do not know.

23. Whence are the horses obtained, and of what breeds are they?

I do not know.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army draw its horses?

From the Government stud districts, the large fairs, and the Afghan dealers of these; the mares from the stud districts are the best, the Afghan the worst horses.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency?

About 180 rupees.

26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

Scarcely.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency?

No.

28. Is it advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies for a supply of horses for the army of India?

They should, undoubtedly, be maintained; they produce the best horses (mares) now in the irregular cavalry, and Government should either increase the number of the studs, or at any rate, have stallions sent in greater numbers than at present round all the districts where there are no studs. Some were sent into the Sind Saugor district about five years ago, and

the irregular cavalry corps in the division have obtained excellent remounts from their produce.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army?

Twenty rupees a month.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field, during a protracted campaign?

Certainly not.

30 b. Have the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army been embarrassed by debt or free from debt?

They are all necessarily more or less in debt.

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

It should, and fixed rates of chunda, &c. be established. The lowest sum that a really efficient corps can be maintained on is twenty-five rupees per sowar per month.

32. What is the system of the Bengal irregular cavalry with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamnee? Are there restrictions upon the numbers which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large interests or not? Are they favourable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

In most corps the value is fixed. In the 7th irregular cavalry it is 200 rupees, which includes the horse only, arms, clothing, &c. being valued and sold separately.

Ressaldars and ressaidars are allowed five bargeers, naib ressaidars and jemadars two, kote duffadars and duffadars one. I would recommend that ressaidars and ressaidars be limited to two. The bargeer system has been abolished for years in the Bengal irregular cavalry, and with the greatest advantage. The few now retained are only to enable the officers to be always mounted on parade, in case of one horse being sick, &c.

The bargeer system is the worst possible, the owners of the assamees, looking on them as mere investment of capital, only try to make the most profit out of them.

33. What is the pay of mounted police in the Punjab?

34. What is the organization of the mounted police of the Punjab?

35. Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the Punjab composed?

36. How is the mounted police of the Punjab recruited; that is, what is the agency employed?

37. Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police at rupees per mensem been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?

38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience have the powers of commandant, of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army been increased or diminished?

They have been greatly diminished.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

The result of the diminution of power in commandants has been to impair discipline.

Major-Gen.
Sydney Cotton.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops, and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

The discipline of a corps on service, as everywhere else, depends entirely upon the knowledge the men have of their immediate commander's will and ability to punish breaches of discipline. That authority which is distant a native always thinks he can evade, and he holds it in no dread or awe.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

They should be greatly increased.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

To increase the number of European officers. Three more should at least be attached to each regiment, who should, however, in no way remove any responsibility from the native troop officers, but assist in a general supervision, and in the conduct of detachments. On parade they should take the place of squadron leaders.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

They should be selected from those who, by their intelligence and horsemanship, are most fit, and should be sent to a light cavalry corps to pass their drill, should they not belong to that branch.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies, in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry), whose complement of European officers was short or full?

I have had no experience to speak from, and I consider the power of the European officer to have been so reduced, that it can have no reference to the question, whether it be answered in the affirmative or negative. The native soldier had ceased to look upon his officer with awe or respect, power being the only thing a native does respect.

21. Would it be practicable or advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry, a body of native irregular horse?

vide reply to Query No. 19., Sec. 1.

22. If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? how mounted? how officered?

One squadron to a regiment, mounted and armed as all other irregular cavalry; officered as recommended in answer to No. 4, Section 1, as far as the troops go, and to be considered a component part of the regiment to which it is attached.

SYDNEY COTTON, Maj.-Gen.
Commanding Peshawur Division.

Peshawur, August 7, 1858.

(No. 205.)

From Maj.-Gen. SYDNEY COTTON to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

SIR, Peshawur, June 21, 1858.

IN acknowledging the receipt of your printed circular No. 37, under date May 21, 1858, with its accompaniments, viz., the printed Despatch No. 235, of 1857, addressed by the Court of Directors to the Governor-General of India in Council, and the printed questions

submitted by yourself, having reference to Paragraph 5 of the said Despatch of the Honorable Court; I have the honor to state, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, that I had, previous to the receipt of your letter now under acknowledgment, prepared for the consideration of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and of Government, a despatch containing my views in full on the subject of the "reorganization of the army," which I have now the honor to send direct to you (the despatch not having, at the time of receiving your letter No. 75, been sent to its destination).

2. In looking carefully over the printed questions, and in endeavouring to reply to them *seriatim*, in compliance with your directions, I observe that I could not give satisfactory replies to each, without entering in the answers required an explanation in each case of my views in the general project.

3. The accompanying despatch, addressed to the Chief of the Staff with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, however, answers in full all your questions, and in a manner which, when laid before his Lordship, will, I trust, be so explanatory of my views, as to place them more clearly and in a more convenient manner before him than could be done by any other means.

4. It must, I am sure, be apparent to the Right Honorable the Governor-General, that the natives generally of India, owing to recent lamentable events, have had their eyes opened to the fact, that the troops of this country possess a power in themselves so great and so formidable, as to enable them at any time, unless organized under the most strict and necessary regulations, to rise upon the British Government, and shake its empire to the very foundation. They cannot have failed, I am sure, to observe that nothing but a want of well-arranged and well-organized plans, under competent chiefs, has saved our government in this fearful crisis.

5. The army has in this instance taken the lead, and everywhere that mutiny prevailed, did the inhabitants of the country await, with intense anxiety, the issue of the contest between the British Government and its soldiery, being prepared, it is my firm belief, to rid themselves of our government, should the tide of events in the struggle have turned against us. On the Peshawur frontier this is openly, I believe, avowed; indeed, the people of this country would not assist the British Government, until the regular troops had been deprived of the power to act against us.

6. With these preliminary remarks, I assure the Government that its own position (placed heretofore, as has been proved by unfortunate circumstances, on a foundation the most insecure and most dangerous that could well be imagined), will become even more insecure and more dangerous than ever, if the power to rise and rebel be ever again at the disposal of the native troops.

7. It is true that the sepoy of the Madras and Bombay presidencies did not in a body, by the blessing of Divine Providence, rise simultaneously against the British rule at the critical moment; but they must have been observers of passing events, and cannot fail to have noticed the providential escape of every living European throughout the country.

8. The Madras troops, it must be remembered, have mutined before now, and are capable of making great combinations to effect their ends. They might therefore mutiny, or combine to mutiny, *en masse*, at any time; and I sincerely hope that the Government of India will never place implicit confidence in them any more than in others.

9. In order then to place the native troops, of whatever creed or caste they may be composed (whether of Bengal, Madras, or Bombay), in a position to do us no mischief, and at the same time to give us the benefit of their services, which cannot be avoided in such climates as those of India, there must be an entire and complete change in the military occupation of the country. The object of my despatch then is to

Major-Gen.
Sydney Cotton.

submit for consideration my humble opinion of systems hitherto prevailing, which have so eminently failed, and at the same time to propose certain systems which I think must be substituted with a view to the future security of the British Government in India.

10. The general principles, it will be found, which I advocate are these, viz.,

1. To incorporate in the battalions and regiments of the line the European and native soldiers, the former having never as yet acted, and never can act for any length of time, without the aid of native troops, owing to the heat of the climate and the exposure, and thus by bringing the two together regimentally, in the proportion of two Europeans to one native, their aid would be obtained without risk.

2. That the Government of India should for the future be so essentially military that commanders might be enabled to act with promptitude. All embarrassment by departmental rules should be at once removed, and the power of commanders of large bodies of troops should be vastly increased.

3. The troops should be kept together in much larger bodies than heretofore; they should be told off in brigades with an efficient staff as if in the field; being at all times and in all respects ready for field service.

These bodies of troops to be designated *corps d'armée*; every soldier in India should be on the rolls of some *corps d'armée*, whether detached from necessity in small numbers or otherwise.

4. That the police force of the country (not armed and trained like soldiers as heretofore) should be increased, so as to do away with the necessity of employing the troops in detached or escort duties in every possible case, and not, in fact, to allow armed and regular soldiers to stray away from their regiments.

5. It should be a capital offence for any native of the country, excepting such as are specially sanctioned by Government, to have arms in their possession, or the implements of making them, or to have or to make warlike implements of any sort.

11. My despatch, it will be found, refers to all these subjects, bringing them under one view, together with others, which I have felt it my duty to bring under notice, my object being to induce Government to make a radical reform in all existing military regulations.

I have, &c.
SYDNEY COTTON, Maj.-Gen.
Commanding Peshawur Division.

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From Maj.-Gen. SYDNEY COTTON to Maj.-Gen. Sir W. R. MANSFIELD, K.C.B.

Division Head-Quarters, Peshawur,

June 11, 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to request that this despatch may be laid before his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief at your convenience, the subject of which, I am well aware, is of the highest importance to the interest of Government and of the army, which, unhappily, has fallen into a state of unprecedented anarchy, by the general mutiny of the native troops.

PARA. 1.—Introductory Address.

1. I trust it may not be considered presumption in me, to offer remarks and suggestions on the reorganization of the army, in which I am permitted to hold so important a command, seeing that a measure of such vital importance must shortly come under the consideration of Government.

Impressed then with the belief that the suggestions of experienced officers, at such a moment, will not be unacceptable to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and to the Government, I hesitate not to record my sentiments, however valueless they may prove to be. Having been connected with the armies of India in all its presidencies, with but little intermission, for nearly 48 years, commencing as cornet in 1810, in a regiment of light dragoons, and passing through all the grades of the service to that of major-general, and having been employed on the staff as military secretary in Bengal, deputy adjutant-general Queen's troops, both in Bombay and Madras, few officers in Her Majesty's service have ever had such an opportunity of observing the working of systems prevailing generally throughout India. On these grounds I venture to found my claim to the title of an experienced officer.

PARA. 2.—*Consequent on the Mutiny, Military Authority must chiefly prevail in India, and European Troops must be employed mainly in the occupation of the country.*

2. The recent mutiny in the Bengal, and partially in the Bombay and Madras presidencies, has opened our eyes at last to the fact that we must not rely with any confidence on the native troops of any creed or caste, as a body. The people of the vast empire of India now under British rule, having been conquered by the sword, must by that weapon be held in subjection; and the sword must be firmly grasped for the future, by the hand of the European soldier, throughout the length and breadth of the land; the government of India must henceforward be more essentially military; but no one, I think, could reasonably expect that Great Britain would be able to furnish exclusively, troops in sufficient numbers for the military occupation of such a country.

The climate is much too hot for the European in many situations, where military duties have to be performed; and the expenditure of troops would be vastly too great, if the European alone endeavoured to take those duties. The natives of the country must, therefore, be called in to assist us, and a certain limited number must be armed and trained as soldiers, but by no means in the same numbers as heretofore. In fact, the native troops must be used as auxiliaries, and nothing more; and they must be placed in such positions as to be powerless to do mischief. And here I would earnestly implore of the Government to take warning by the past. It is true that some native troops have, during the great crisis of the rebellion, remained faithful to the British Government, but the fidelity of these few is to be attributed more to local circumstances, and to peculiar positions, rendering it difficult for them to act against us, than to any real attachment to the British Government. The mutiny may be considered as a great national movement, in which the whole army has taken the lead, and in which all are in heart concerned; the object being to expel from the country, or to destroy the Christian conquerors, who are hated as such universally, and indeed naturally, and despised and looked down upon as enemies to their religion.

PARA. 3.—*No Confidence can be hereafter placed by the British Government in the Native Troops of India exclusively.*

3. The newly raised troops of the Peshawur and Mooltan frontiers, and of the adjacent countries in and bordering on our territory, who have so well served us in our difficulties, and by adhering to or espousing our cause saved us at a most critical moment, are no more to be depended on than any others. I verily believe that these troops, derived from much more energetic and intelligent races, would become still more formidable than the Hindostanees, if, by a sudden change in their sentiments towards us, arising out of a fanatical cry, to which they are quite capable of responding, they might choose to desert our cause.

Already do they feel their importance as the saviours of our tottering Government. Already do they feel the power which we have placed in their hands, and they have before their eyes the baneful example of rebellion, which has been shown them by their Hindostanee neighbours, tending to prove that our Government has hitherto been placed on an insecure foundation.

This very feeling will, in after times, deter many who had formerly considered us invincible, to ponder well ere they commit themselves, by entering the service of so uncertain and insecure a Government.

PARA. 4.—*The early Disbandment of the whole Native Army, as originally constituted, recommended.*

4. Having adverted, therefore, to the fact, that the Hindostanee troops can never again be trusted as a body, and having endeavoured to show that no native of the country is deserving at our hands of implicit confidence, I would suggest, as a preliminary step towards reorganization, that the whole of the native regular cavalry and infantry of the Bengal army remaining embodied, whether armed or disarmed—whether apparently loyal or otherwise,—be *in limine* discharged from the service of the British Government. This act would be just on our part. The troops, as a body, having proved themselves to be, *as at present constituted*, not only unworthy of our confidence, but dangerous to us in the extreme.

PARA. 5.—*The newly-raised Troops to be kept embodied, but their organization to be changed. When once the terms are finally settled, no Concessions are to be made to any extent whatever, at their own seeking.*

5. With regard to the newly-organized levies, they should be kept embodied and treated with liberality; but at the same time so grafted on and amalgamated with European troops that they would be powerless to do harm.

Their organization must be changed, as will be suggested herein-after; and should it be deemed expedient, which no doubt it might be, to re-enlist in our service any portion of the old army of the country, the men should be hired on terms better suited than those of previous times to our welfare and security; terms of such rigid discipline as would ensure ready and willing obedience to all such orders of superiors as are commonly issued to soldiers of all armies, without affording them the means of concealing their transactions as heretofore, and of combining to mutiny against their employers. And whilst enforcing discipline with such troops, let our treatment of them be liberal; we must begrudge them nothing that is right to give them; but that once settled and determined on, let no concessions whatever be henceforward made, when urged and solicited by themselves. Concede nothing to native troops at their own requiring; they are incapable in such concessions of imputing to their employers aught but weakness.

PARA. 6.—*Powers of Military Commanders to be greatly increased; one Commander-in-Chief of all the Indian Armies recommended, with four Commanders of the Forces placed in convenient localities.*

6. Of all the changes required in the great army of British India, there is none so much needed, indeed, so imperatively called for, as the power to act on sudden emergencies, by officers holding commands. It is most necessary that they should have the means nearer at hand, to obtain instructions from the supreme military authorities and the sanction of proposed measures without delay. The great machinery of military affairs is by much too complicated for such a country as India; I would therefore suggest, that commanders of the forces, with vastly increased powers to act on their own responsibility, may be so located, and within the reach of the troops, as to

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Sydney Cotton.

remove all possibility of delay in carrying out measures of public utility.

In my humble opinion there should be but one commander-in-chief of all the armies of India, whose motto should be "Ubique," and he, as supreme military authority, should be vested with powers in ordinary matters to act, without referring to the Supreme Government of the country. It is impossible adequately to express or to explain the embarrassment caused, and the evils to which the soldiers are liable, by the difficulty and delay which occur in obtaining authority for carrying out the most trifling measures of necessity.

I would have commanders of the forces, but not commanders-in-chief, at the subordinate presidencies, viz., there should be one in Bengal, one at Madras, one at Bombay, and one in the Punjab and adjacent provinces, all four reporting to the chief of the staff, for the information of his excellency the commander-in-chief.

The whole of the armies of India should be under one system, and under the same code of regulations, so that they might be transferred from one presidency to another without difficulty or inconvenience.

PARA. 7.—*Commanders of the Forces to be empowered to order Military Works to be undertaken and completed on a more extended and liberal scale than at present.*

7. The rigid departmental rules at present in force, which deprive the executive officer of the power of acting under or by the orders of the military authorities on the spot, except in the most paltry cases, are injurious to the soldiers. The departmental superiors, to whom most matters must be referred, having no real interest in questions submitted for their consideration, and not being exactly aware of the nature of the exigencies of the troops, put aside matters of immediate necessity in the ordinary course of business, and by the delay which takes place, the object is frequently lost. Indeed, so long is the process, and so hopeless the prospect of obtaining what is required, that wants are often endured, because the season must pass away ere authority for works can be obtained.

PARA. 8.—*The Abolition of all Distinctions between Officers and Soldiers of the Armies of India strongly advocated and recommended, as a measure of imperative necessity, and highly advantageous to the interests of the Government of England and India.*

8. The amalgamation of the services is another measure of expediency as well as of necessity, which should be at once resorted to, and the present is the most convenient opportunity of accomplishing it.

The crown of Great Britain has erected, under the names of Queen's and Company's services, a barrier which is a stumbling-block to all improvement, and causes embarrassment in carrying out measures of great public utility. In the reorganization of the Indian army, these services should be blended. The very feelings of jealousy which now exist, even between brothers and relations, as well as countrymen engaged in the same duties, arising from this unnecessary and stupid distinction, is prejudicial to the interests, in a thousand ways, of the great government under which we are all serving. It is scarcely to be understood how it has happened, that the crown of England should so long have permitted the existence of such a barrier, which, to the nation at large, is so highly prejudicial. India is, or ought to be, the great nursery or school of officers (commanders and staff) for the services of the crown.

The great field for the exercise of military talent, and ingenuity, in officers and soldiers, is alone to be found in Her Majesty's Indian possessions; and to India mainly the crown should look for officers of military experience in her European wars.

It is too late to train and make officers when war breaks out in Europe, and can officers be formed and

made efficient within the limits of Great Britain and her smaller colonies, where the three arms of the service rarely or never, in time of peace, come together in the field? Certainly not. Hence then, I maintain as regards "European services," that the interests of the crown are not consulted by the barrier which at present exists, in regard to Indian officers, and that as regards "Indian services," it is necessary that all European officers serving in the same army, should be placed on the same footing, and thereby made available in common for all duties with the troops.

PARA. 9.—*Organization of the Regular Troops of India, by a combination of Europeans and Natives in all regular Corps of Horse and Foot, recommended. British Artillery never again to be trusted to natives.*

9. The Europeans and natives must, in my opinion, be henceforward associated, and placed in more immediate contact than heretofore for the public safety.

The regular native army of Bengal, such as its regular cavalry and infantry, I consider as gone for ever; and the army must be re-modelled on principles totally different from those of former times, which have proved to be so thoroughly faulty.

It is scarcely necessary to make any allusion to the artillery branch of the service, which requires perhaps no reorganization, excepting that in no way in future should the natives of the country be entrusted with British artillery, nor should any native of India be instructed in the use of such dangerous weapons.

The native drivers are good horsemen, and the gunners most excellent; but they cannot be trusted. They have a religious veneration for their guns, and, in proportion as they are most valuable to the government they serve, so are they more formidable when they choose to be rebellious. Considering that in times of peace the regular native army of the State has hitherto been chiefly employed in police duties, such as escorting public and private property about the country, I would recommend that the army be reduced in numbers, whilst the police of the country be increased, and that the regular native soldiers be never permitted to travel, and be scattered over the country, as heretofore, in small parties. I would combine the regular native horse and foot altogether with the European corps, in proportion of two Europeans to one native. To the 40,000 European infantry which I would fix as the least amount of force required for the Bengal presidency, I would attach 20,000 natives, trained, armed, and disciplined precisely in the same manner, and, being incorporated with the Europeans, they should be subject to the same rules and regulations of barrack discipline. With every due consideration for their religious prejudices, and respect for their peculiar habits, I would keep them quite distinct in their quarters from the European soldiers; but the bugle which sounds the "assembly" for parade should bring together, by companies, (only so far distinct,) the Europeans and natives of the corps.

These corps would consist then of 1,500 men; 1,000 Europeans, rank and file, and 500 natives. On parade each corps should be formed up in two battalions, each battalion having the due proportion of two Europeans to one native. The natives should take their fair proportion of all regimental duties. On the regimental guards, the two should in general be associated; the native being placed on sentry on posts of exposure to heat for which the European is not calculated. I advocate the measure as one of vast utility, so found by experience throughout my command, during the past 12 months, of extraordinary difficulty.

In Peshawur the newly-raised troops have universally been associated in this manner. They were first combined together from necessity owing to the paucity of European troops, who had by night and day to guard against the insurrection, for ever expected, of the faithless Hindoostanee troops in garri-

son. This system was first proposed to me by Brigadier Galloway, and it has succeeded admirably. To this measure I mainly attribute the rapid progress towards efficiency which has been made in Peshawur by the newly-raised corps of the country. The steadiness of these troops on the duties of the station is now perfectly wonderful. At first it was supposed that the native troops might not relish being brought so closely in contact with the European soldiers, but not only do they like it, but they are proud of their position, and strive to the utmost of their ability to bring themselves to the same perfection as Europeans, and the serjeants of guards, and even the European soldiers generally take a pleasure in drilling and instructing their native comrades.

The Europeans too feel their value as helpmates in such a climate, and are kind to them. I have raised a corps of cavalry, which is one of the most valuable corps that I have seen in India, modelled on the same principle. I have had the "Peshawur Light Horse" constantly under canvas since August last, and the corps is perfect in itself for field service. The corps consists of two troops of Europeans (eighty privates each) and one of natives of the same strength. On service in the district the cattle of the army must be protected by cavalry whilst grazing, and if baggage breaks down or strays by accident, it is the native soldier only who can be detached on escort to bring it up, he alone can bear the exposure in such a climate. Foraging parties too in the heat of the day must be sent out, and hence the European is saved for services of different and greater importance. All power to rebel and do mischief is thus taken from the native soldier, and he has become a most valuable and necessary auxiliary, and I do not hesitate here to assert, because I know it to be a fact, that the white and black races so associated would work together in the field with one common rivalry for the public good; and I verily believe that the three troops of cavalry constituted as is the "Peshawur Light Horse" are fully as valuable to the State, and would be fully as powerful when in contact with the enemy in India as the same number of dragoons exclusively European.

The two fraternize in the most extraordinary manner. When serving with the Madras cavalry, which I did for many years in a regiment of dragoons, I observed the same thing, the European and native troopers being continually on terms of good fellowship and friendly towards each other, and when I advocate the measure of associating Europeans and natives, I do not hesitate to give it as my opinion that 20,000 native soldiers embodied and placed as part and parcel of the same corps with Europeans would be in full as valuable to Government as were 40,000 of the same before kept in battalions distinct from each other. The native companies of the regular forces should be classified; they should be enlisted for not less than seven years, and should be composed of Hindoos, Mussulmans, Goorhkas, Seikhs, in fact, all sorts, but they must be in separate companies. They should be completely officered like the European companies with European officers. The grade of native officers in such battalions should be for ever abolished. In each troop or company there should be a European serjeant-major or European color serjeant, the native non-commissioned officers of companies should be termed havildars and naicks as heretofore. The native non-commissioned officers should be selected and rise by merit and not by seniority, and to no higher grade than that should they ever rise in the regular army; and in order to encourage the well-behaved and deserving non-commissioned officers, they might for special services and general good conduct be promoted into the irregular corps, where, being perfect in drill, their services would be acceptable, or they might be removed into the civil branches of the service. Those natives who would choose to serve the Government on such terms should be enlisted, and none other. They should be hired to serve everywhere, and to work, as the soldiers of all nations work, with the spade and the pickaxe. It has been urged by some

that the natives, when embodied with Europeans, might lose respect for them, owing to their dissipated habits. This is a mistake arising from a want of knowledge of European troops. Unfortunately, in isolated positions, when the European soldiers are not properly looked after, some drunkenness prevails; but in well regulated corps, as all should be and generally are, a drunken soldier is never seen in a barrack square. Drunkenness is not now a prevailing crime, as it used to be in the army. I can safely assert, that during the five or six years that I have been in the Peshawur cantonment, I have not seen half a dozen drunken soldiers about the station, so vigilant are the police authorities and so strict the regulations relative to drunkenness.

PARA. 10.—*Organization of the Irregular Native Cavalry and Infantry recommended.*

10. The native irregular cavalry and infantry must next come under consideration. I am of opinion that about 40,000 men of the latter would suffice for the service of the Bengal presidency. They should be armed with firelocks and two-grooved rifles, but the Enfield rifle should never be trusted to them, and as I would congregate troops very much more than heretofore in great military cantonments, and would keep them under strict rigid discipline, as in our military colonies, the irregular forces should be chiefly therein contained and distributed in due proportions to the other arms of the service. For instance, Trans-Jhelum, I would have an army of 25,000 men, and these should garrison the whole of the posts and stations in the Sind-Saugor district, and on the Peshawur, Kohat, and Hazarah frontiers. This force should be composed of the three arms and all services. It should be placed in the Sind-Saugor district (as the great frontier force of India), which has been found to be most healthy, and I would place the greater part of this body as near to the Indus as possible, say, on the plains at Campbellpore (if these plains are found on experience to be healthy). Campbellpore is admirably situated as a support to the frontier posts of Kohat, Peshawur, and Hazarah, being nearly equi-distant from these posts respectively; and I would keep only such troops at these advanced frontier posts as are politically required to preserve order, looking to the great frontier force in the Sind-Saugor district as the base of all operations on the border, and available for service at a moment's notice in any direction at all seasons of the year, furnishing detachments for all these posts of the frontier, viz., Kohat, Peshawur, and Hazarah, and the minor stations attached to them.

Proper arrangements should be made at once for the transport of these troops, sheds should be erected on all the great roads at convenient distances, and the river Indus should be bridged at Attock. Of the constitution of the native irregular cavalry and infantry corps, as I think, and it is admitted by every one, that they have not at present nearly sufficient European officers, I would alter the present organization in that respect. It is proposed by many well acquainted with the subject, and I am inclined to consider that opinion is founded on wisdom, that instead of increasing very much the number of European officers, as at present established, it would be far better to reduce the effective strength of corps in numbers of men, and to increase the number of European officers slightly, so that corps of cavalry should not exceed 300 men, two squadrons of three troops, and corps of infantry should not exceed 400 rank and file, in four companies. To each corps of irregular cavalry I would post a commandant and second in command, with two officers doing duty besides the adjutant.

To each corps of irregular infantry a commandant and second in command, and three European officers doing duty, each company thereby, with a second in command, having its own European commander, besides the adjutant. I would not deprive these irregular regiments of their native officers; they should remain

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as at present constituted in that respect; but the commanders of regiments should have increased powers, and native officers as well as men should be subject at his hand to instant dismissal for breaches of discipline.

It should not be necessary to raise these native officers from the ranks; on the contrary, the respectable natives of the country of the upper grades being desirous of serving the British Government might be hired as native officers, bringing with them clansmen on whom they could depend, and over whom personally they might have some moral influence and control.

As regards classes and castes in these irregular corps I am inclined to think that as their numerical strength regimentally would be so small, and as I would keep the army cantoned generally in larger bodies than heretofore, that it might be best that each corps should be composed of one class or caste, so that the counterpoise might be by regiments and not by troops and companies, as was suggested with regiments of their original strength.

PARA. 11.—*Selection of Officers for appointments to Irregular Corps.*

11. In selecting the European officers for these duties, the greatest care should be taken; they should be well paid, and discouraged in every possible way from changing from one branch of the service to another.

PARA. 12.—*The introduction of Foreigners of color as Soldiers in the British Service disapproved of.*

12. I do not think it ever would be necessary, if my proposal were carried out in full, to bring foreigners of colour into the Indian service. I think they would become a very great burden to the State when worn out, and, perhaps, very troublesome. Look at the Arabs in the Deccan in the service of Nizam, and if I mistake not, the corps composed of Malays, Caffres, and sepoys in the British service in the Ceylon regiments in former days were not found to answer, neither do I think that the natives of this country, situated as I have recommended, could ever combine together in general rebellion against the British Government.

PARA. 13.—*The Armies of India to be divided into corps d'armée, told off into brigades, with staff complete, as for field service. These corps d'armée should take the field for exercise for two months in each year.*

13. I would divide the army into corps, each corps to consist of at least 20,000 men, and be numbered and kept entirely on field establishments. These corps d'armée, as they should be termed, should be under the command of a major-general, with the personal staff of military secretary and two aides-de-camp, with a general staff of assistant adjutant-general, assistant quartermaster-general, and deputies, so competent to the duties of the command and so complete that business could meet with no hindrance. These corps d'armée should have their own commissariat, ordnance, and barrack departments, and be divided into brigades, fully officered, with staff as on field service. Camp equipage and carriage should always be kept up, so that the troops might move at a moment's notice; and every corps d'armée should take the field for exercise two months in every year. The present system of placing 12,000 men of the three arms (sometimes more and sometimes less) under one brigadier, with a single brigade major, should be at once discontinued. The Honorable the Court of Directors of the East India Company, who have established this system, probably looking to small expenditure, and that only, do not appear to have been aware or mindful of the necessities of armies. These old arrangements may cause a small draft on the treasury for commanders and staff; but they are not economical, because practically (under

such circumstances) troops cannot be efficient for immediate service. Every soldier, to whatever arm he may belong, should be kept on the roll of a corps d'armée, where rigid and strict discipline being maintained, and all the military exercises being practised, none would be deteriorated by being temporarily on detached duties. It must be necessary, of course, sometimes to detach troops from these large bodies, but detachments should be relieved very frequently and hence very little evil would happen to them.

The great forts, such as "Fort William," might or might not be an exception to this rule. It is impossible for any officer to enter into a detailed statement, pointing out all the necessary localities for these corps d'armée in a political point of view, and, therefore, in writing on the subject I can only recommend for the consideration of Government the general principles on which I would reorganize the army. The whole of my suggestions are intended to point very distinctly to the great principles on which such a country as India should henceforward be ruled, with a view to its future security, the general reorganization being essentially military.

PARA. 14.—*Soldiers not to be employed on Police Duties or escorting Prisoners. The Police of the country to be increased in numbers, but not to be drilled and armed as Soldiers, except in certain localities.*

14. And now with regard to the general police of the country, which I would augment so as to discontinue altogether the practice of employing soldiers of the army in police duties, or such duties as would cause them to stray or straggle all over the country. In the first place I would on no account arm and discipline police like soldiers, because by that measure the Government are training the police to be just as formidable as native soldiers of the regular army have been. The Peshawur and frontier districts must be exempted from this; the police must be armed in these places. Concluding that the British Government will never for the future allow the population of this country to be armed, it is wholly unnecessary to think of training policemen with arms and to drill them as soldiers.

When the country becomes settled therefore, and the people deprived of their arms, as they must be, and having settled down to peaceful occupations, it will be unnecessary to give the police of the country generally any other weapon than the tulwar; indeed, even that might not be necessary. A few fire-arms at the police posts, under the constables or chiefs of police, would suffice to keep order in the country, I will leave to others to determine the amount of police force required, so as to avoid in all ordinary cases calling for the service of the troops, as treasure escorts, &c., by the civil authorities, as has been the practice heretofore.

PARA. 15.—*A General List instead of Regimental Lists, recommended for Officers serving on the Staff and other detached duties in India, and in Irregular Corps.*

15. I think that if the European officers serving on the staff and other detached duties, and in irregular corps in India were placed on one general list, as in the artillery, it would be far better to have them so, than on regimental lists, because from those general lists, selections being made for the regimental and staff duties, the officers best suited for the various occupations, would find their way into their proper places. Officers might be regularly appointed in the regular service and rise accordingly.

PARA. 16.—*Recommending the Abolition of the System by which Troops such as the Punjab Force are kept under the Civil Authorities of Government, removed from the control of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.*

16. The system at present prevailing of raising officers rapidly from the lower to the higher grades,

to meet the emergencies of services, according to their qualification, will I hope and trust speedily remove from the service that exceedingly objectionable arrangement, by which large bodies of troops are kept under the control and management exclusively of the civil officers of Government entirely removed from the authority of the commander-in-chief of the army.

I have heard but two reasons given for the prevalence of such an extraordinary system, and which in times of war and difficulty could not possibly be sustained, which are,—

Firstly, it enables the local Governments to place in authority over such troops younger and more efficient officers; and secondly, being under the immediate control of the local civil government, which is vested with powers at once to meet the wants and demands of the troops, the usual embarrassments which are experienced by the troops of the army are never felt. Does not this speak volumes, as to the defects of the systems under which the regular army suffers, when it is actually found necessary to organize and keep up forces separate and distinct from the regular army for frontier services, the army embarrassments rendering it unserviceable in such positions? Indeed, the army must and should be under one authority, and the army embarrassments must and should be removed. The present machinery of military matters are, indeed, as before stated, much too complicated. During the greater part of the recent rebellion, fortunately for the troops of the Peshawur frontier, the ordinary channels of communication with the far distant Government were closed, and the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, ever ready and prompt to meet the exigencies of the times, acted entirely on his own responsibility, and the most useful and necessary measures were sanctioned without a moment's delay. No sooner, however, were the roads thrown open, than the military machinery became again clogged, and matters were restored to their pristine embarrassment.

I offer these remarks solely for the public good, not intending to reflect on any acts of my superiors, but simply to prove how much the present military administration needs reform.

PARA. 17.—*Recommending that Officers of the Army should not be taken from Military Duties and employed in the Civil Service of the Country.*

17. I would urgently recommend also the Government to abolish a system by which some of its best and most valuable military officers are excluded from the power to do good in their own profession by being locked up in cutcheries and commissariat offices, and employed in the various civil services of the country.

If the Government thinks that these officers of whose valuable services the army is deprived, are or ever can be, with all their talent, courage, and devotion, qualified to command troops as they should be commanded, when brought out on a sudden emergency to serve with or lead them in the field, I, as an old soldier, can solemnly assure it that they cannot be so. To have the entire confidence of the troops, and that moral influence so essential to military government, officers must be identified with their men, and must be associated with them in peace as well as in war. They must know well their wants; and enter warmly into their feelings, and so maintain discipline by paternal and friendly intercourse, rather than by perpetually turning to the clauses of the Mutiny Act. There is much more required of an officer than courage in battle and a clear head to discern. The admiration of the soldier towards any man who is dauntless in battle will be gained, it is true, for the moment, but their general confidence in him must still be wanting, if he be a stranger to the troops.

Let the army then have its own, and let the civil services of the country be otherwise provided for.

PARA. 18.—*Esprit de Corps of Officers taken from them by various objectionable Rules.*

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18. The unsettled state at present of the officers of the army in India under that existing system is enough to ruin the finest army in the world. Regimental officers being from the commencement of their career taught, as it were by contagion, to look to pecuniary advantages, whether in civil or civil military life, have no *esprit de corps*, and escape from their men the first moment they can get the opportunity.

There is another vast evil prevailing, principally in the Bengal presidency, to which I cannot help alluding, as tending in like manner to unsettle the minds of officers, and to take from them all interests in and affection for the soldier of the service to which they belong, and that is the indiscriminate leave of absence which is given to officers to visit the hills and Cashmere for six months in every year. Of all the inventions that could be hit upon to ruin and injure the younger officers in particular of the army, and to take away from them all feelings of affection towards the soldiers with whom they are enrolled, and ought to be continually associated, none could be more effectual than this. Besides large bodies of young officers congregating, and away from military control, and leading a life of continued idleness for so long a period, resort to every description of immorality and debauchery, and are in fact utterly ruined, and thereby rendered unfit, to a very considerable extent, for the duties of their profession when they return to them.

Medical officers are indeed too incautious in granting medical certificates, and officers reported incapable of doing their military duties are to be seen in droves, who are gaming and drinking all night in the hill stations, full of health and vigour, unblushingly laughing amongst themselves as to their adroitness in misleading the doctor.

This is by no means an incorrect picture of military life generally prevailing in the upper provinces of Bengal.

PARA. 19.—*To save Troops, the Improvement of Roads and Bridges recommended; the introduction of Sappers (European) recommended, and also the discontinuance of the system of employing Officers and Soldiers of the Line as Overseers of Public Works.*

19. I would here take leave to refer to several matters which bear very much on the question of reorganization.

1st, the necessary strength of the army depends very much on the state of the roads and bridges, and the means of transporting troops.

Government has expended vast sums of money in the construction of roads in the Punjab, which have remained unfinished for the last two or three years.

The want of proper overseers and trustworthy men in the public works has caused a vast waste of public money.

I would recommend that a most efficient corps of sappers, European and native, be kept up with each *corps d'armée* ready at all times to carry on under the executive engineers the great military works in progress; the former should be employed as overseers and chief artificers, and the latter as tradesmen.

The system heretofore prevailing of employing officers and soldiers of the line, as overseers on the lines of roads is most objectionable. The former (young officers) are sent to overlook the construction of great works, of which they are entirely ignorant, and naturally idle, as many young officers are, they become more and more so, when away from the duties of their profession, and the control of their commanding officers.

In many cases they are worse than useless to Government, and become totally ruined as officers by the bad habits they contract. The latter (the common soldier) cannot be trusted with money, frequently

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turn out dishonest, rob the Government, and return to their corps with lost character.

The soldiers generally, European and native, should, when available, be employed as laborers in the public works, and the great military gardens, which should be cultivated near to, but not in the stations of the army, receiving for their services working money. The labor of soldiers in cool weather is most valuable to Government, much more so than that of coolies, for the same money, and the system is in every way useful to the soldiers themselves; it assists them very much in providing for their families, prepares them, by practice, for throwing up field works in time of war, and affords them healthy recreation.

PARA. 20.—*Sheds for Troops recommended on the Military Roads, and that the Land Transport Trains should be improved and vastly increased.*

20. Sheds should be erected, as before hinted at, along all the great military roads, for the shelter of troops in the heat of the day, and the land transport trains for the conveyance of troops in hot weather, recently introduced from necessity in various parts of the country, should be vastly increased and improved, and they should be kept up until the railway is introduced, and river steam navigation improved throughout India. I would never move troops in the ordinary course of relief in tents, they should march from shed to shed in the ordinary routes, and the marches might be much longer with the same fatigue to the men.

PARA. 21.—*Intelligence Department recommended as most necessary on the Reorganization of the Army.*

21. A system of espionage, so essential to good Government in a conquered country, should be established and freely paid, and all breaches of regulations (such as being found with arms in possession, &c.) should be considered as capital offences, and summarily dealt with, by order of military commanders. One of the greatest wants of an army, quartered as it were in an enemy's country (for so we must view India more or less for a long time to come) is a good and efficient "Intelligence Department."

The commanders of all the great military bodies should have a well organized establishment of this nature, with ample funds at their disposal to pay for secret intelligence, a strict surveillance may be kept, and in such times as these are kept over the post office receipts and issues, and letters of a seditious nature may be often so intercepted, but the natives generally are much too cunning to expose their mutinous designs to such a risk of discovery. They have other modes of communicating which require the most shrewd and practised hands to trace and discover.

PARA. 22.—*Temporary Barracks recommended instead of Puckah Barracks; Officers Quarters and Mess Houses to be built and furnished by Government, and Officers as much as possible to be prevented from accumulating temporary Lumber, such as Furniture, &c.*

22. The construction of suitable barracks for the troops, European and native, in the great cantonments is another subject of vast importance. It is wholly unnecessary to build such costly barracks as those recently constructed in the Punjab. The kutcha barracks of an improved construction, such as those built by Lieut. Taylor, of the Bengal engineers, at Campbellpore, at the cost of 3,000 rupees for 50 European soldiers, are sufficiently good for any troops. The temporary buildings are much preferred as being cooler than pukka buildings by the soldiery, and then when it becomes necessary from political motives, and from localities becoming unhealthy, to change quarters, the loss is not severely felt by Government.

These temporary buildings ought to last ten years at least, at the expiration of which time, in all likelihood, may be considered expedient to take up new positions

for the troops; and here I can venture to give, as instances of the instability of military posts, the three great stations of Peshawur, Rawul Pindce, and Sealkote, which have cost the Government so many lacs, or perhaps crores of rupees, every one of which is either useless to Government or injurious to the troops.

Peshawur has proved to be so sickly as to be almost untenable; Rawul Pindce, although healthy, is so situated as to have no political object in itself, and is too far distant from the frontier to be a good support in the time of need; and Sealkote is politically entirely useless. There, then, is a powerful argument in favour of temporary barracks as quarters for troops.

In all the three above-named stations, the most costly buildings have been erected.

Native troops also must throughout be quartered in barracks, but of inferior construction, of course, to those of the Europeans. No soldier, white or black, should ever live out of barracks, and for the European officers everywhere should quarters be built by Government in close proximity to their men.

Of all the arrangements I have proposed for the maintenance of discipline, none is of greater importance than this. During the great mutiny, from first to last, I have never allowed the officers of corps, armed or disarmed, loyal or disloyal, to be absent from their men; their constant attendance has prevented combination. With 10,000 Hindoostanee troops in the Peshawur district and only 2,000 Europeans, I have successfully maintained order under such a system, that although 2,500 men have mutinied, not a European officer or soldier, woman, or child have fallen at the hands of the mutineers. I earnestly beg of the Government to take this suggestion most seriously under consideration.

Mess houses, too, for the European officers, of temporary materials, should be every where constructed, with the officers' quarters on a moderate scale, and the quarters and mess houses should be sufficiently well furnished by Government. In fact, the officers should be thereby enabled to move at a moment's notice, without loss or encumbrance, and in every way should they be discouraged from keeping up useless baggage and furniture. The mess establishment of corps, at present cumbersome and exorbitant, should be entirely abolished in such a country as India; camp fashion, as it is termed, should be re-introduced as in former times, when messes, in my opinion, were as comfortable and as good as at present.

The mess house allowance would of course be discontinued, and when the troops are in the field a liberal allowance for mess tents and carriage should be paid by Government, six or eight hundred rupees a month per corps, if the Government did not choose to provide mess tents, to be gradually diminished if the troops remained long under canvas.

The camp equipage for each *corps d'armée*, with carriage for the same, should be kept in cantonments, at all times complete and ready for service. The regiments should be held answerable for tents only when using them. It was bad economy when, by a Government enactment, the carriage for camp equipage was discharged. I refer in particular to the embarrassment of the late commander-in-chief, when he could not move on Delhi from want of carriage.

PARA. 23.—*A Citadel or entrenched Camp to be constructed near all Military Cantonments.*

23. To every great military cantonment should be attached a sort of "citadel," for the security of public property, which at all times should contain the arsenal and treasury.

The "citadel" should be an entrenched camp, defensible and garrisoned by a portion of the *corps d'armée* continually relieved; on the score of health, it never would answer in Asiatic climates to huddle troops together in small spaces.

The cantonments must be open, airy, and spacious, and when the troops are in the field or danger apprehended, all valuable property, with the soldiers' fami-

lies, &c., should be placed for safety in the "citadel," if such a term may be used.

PARA. 24.—*Relative to the Employment of Eurasians in the service of Government as Soldiers.*

24. I have collected and established in one company the half-caste native drummers of the disarmed Hindoostanee corps serving in the Peshawur division, and having trained them in the use of the two-grooved rifle, and equipped them for field service, they are not only a reliable body, but are most useful, taking their duties in common with the European troops.

The principal duty of this company is to escort the batteries of artillery whenever guns are required to leave the park.

I can report most favourably on the Eurasian company, and strongly recommend that persons of that class may meet with greater encouragement than they have hitherto done.

The double object of this measure is to improve the condition of a class which as heretofore employed had fallen into a state of degradation, and, at the same time, to obtain a reliable body of men really attached to Government.

Considering them like Europeans (one of the main objects being to raise them as near as possible to the standard of European troops) I have placed the Eurasians on the rolls for commissariat rations; Sir John Lawrence opposed that part of the measure as unnecessary, although he warmly advocated their being enrolled as fighting men; but I know what their feelings are, and they are most anxious to continue their present system of messing. I know well also the value to them of the rations, and I urgently recommend that they be rationed accordingly in common with the European troops.

PARA. 25.—*A strict watch to be kept on the Manufacture of Cannon and Warlike Stores.*

25. I recommend that a strict and watchful eye be kept in future over the manufacture of implements of war. I would exclude the native altogether from the ordnance foundries and the manufactories of percussion caps and other warlike stores and implements. I would make it a capital offence for any native to manufacture such articles, or to have in their possession the implements by which they are made. Regardless of the danger attending the dissemination of such knowledge throughout India in the art of war in all its branches, the native infantry soldiers have been taught by us to be gunners, and the people of the country have been taught to prepare weapons, and thus it appears, by incautious systems, we have been training the inhabitants to rise up in rebellion, well prepared for our destruction.

PARA. 26.—*More European Officers required in India, and the pay of the lower grades recommended to be increased.*

26. There are not at present nearly sufficient European officers in India, or on its establishment, for the ordinary services of the country. I consider the ordinary pay and allowances of the lower grades of regimental European officers to be wholly insufficient, many officers are, in consequence, in such bad circumstances, as materially to interfere with their efficiency.

If the Government be pleased to build quarters for officers near to and adjoining the soldiers' barracks, as I have recommended, it would be a great and necessary boon conferred on them if the officers were allowed to occupy them as in Europe, without charge for rent; and I recommend very strongly that the pay and allowances of all officers may be consolidated.

PARA. 27.—*Hills not recommended for large bodies of European Troops.*

27. I do not recommend that European troops should be located and quartered in the hills, except such as are specially recommended by experienced

medical officers for change of air and recovery of health. There are many diseases, particularly those of an organic nature, which are not improved by the hills, and to the patients suffering under such diseases the hills often are fatal.

The climates of the mountains are, in fact, more or less unnatural; we ascend mountains gradually until human life becomes extinct. The damp and rain of the Himalayahs are very injurious in some cases, particularly with old soldiers suffering from chronic dysentery, the result of living long in tropical climates and leading a hard life. In heart complaints, too, the hills are injurious.

When bodies of troops, such as regiments, are placed in the hills, of course every description of disease will be found amongst them to which the human frame is liable. To many the climate is fatal, whilst to others of course the cool atmosphere is beneficial. I would, therefore, recommend the hills for troops only when the proper selections are made. The soldiers dislike the hills exceedingly. The confinement is bad for them in every way. I recommend that the best selections may be made on the most advantageous and healthy ground in the plains for the great cantonments.

PARA. 28.—*Conclusion.*

28. I feel confident, that with armies constituted and organized throughout India as I have suggested, the public safety would be maintained, and with forces infinitely less in numerical strength than those heretofore in the service of Government.

Very much more might be written on this most important subject. I am quite unable now to enter into detailed particulars relative to the services of the Bombay and Madras presidencies, nor into the amount of artillery and cavalry required for Bengal. My despatch, already perhaps too lengthy, contains however my views as to the general principles of re-organization of the whole of the armies of India, subject to local modifications. My object in thus addressing my superiors at such a moment on such a subject has, it appears to me, been sufficiently attained without entering into more minute particulars.

I have, &c.

SYDNEY COTTON, Maj.-Gen.
Commanding Peshawur Division.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS,

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bengal army is composed?

The Bengal native infantry regiments of the regular army were composed chiefly of natives of the upper provinces of Hindustan; Hindoos and Mussulmen, with a small proportion of men from the Punjab.

The Hindoos consisted of Brahmins, Rajpoots, Gwalas, and other inferior castes. The Mussulman portion comprised Pathans, Seiks, Synds, and Moguls. The Punjabees consisted of Sikhs and Punjabee Mussulmans.

The following is the average proportion of classes, in native corps of the Bengal army:—

Brahmins	-	$\frac{7}{24}$	} Of 1,140 natives, the Christian drummers and musicians being excluded.
Rajpoots	-	$\frac{1}{4}$	
Inferior Hindoos	-	$\frac{1}{8}$	
Mussulmans	-	$\frac{1}{8}$	
Punjabees	-	$\frac{1}{8}$	

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

Lucknow, Goruckpore, Rohilcund, Allahabad, Benares, Jaunpore, Arrah, Agra, and the Punjab.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army?

Yes. All inferior castes who were employed in menial occupations, *vide* Para. 6, section xxxi., military

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regulations. Musbee Sikhs were also excluded from enlistment; men were rarely entertained who did not come from the districts mentioned in reply to question.

Recruits from other parts were not discouraged, but seldom presented themselves for enlistment.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

It is very likely that the Burmese, Karens, and Sonthals might be employed with advantage. Good soldiers might also be drawn more extensively from the Hill tribes surrounding the Peshawur and Kohat districts, as well as from the Derejat.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency, or its dependencies?

Recruiting parties, the civil authorities affording them aid.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?

The instructions contained in Paras. 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23, section xxxi. of military regulations, seem to afford all the information that can be desired on this head.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army?

It is very possible that recruiting depôts, placed under the command of well-selected officers, might be established with great benefit, for the purpose of recruiting from the various tribes and castes throughout the country.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit, on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?

Vide Para. 33, section xxxi., military regulations, to which a slight addition is made, to the purport that the recruit binds himself to serve beyond the sea agreeably to G. O. C. C., dated July 30, 1856.

10. How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army?

I know not exactly; but certainly for upwards of 20 years.

11. Can you suggest any improvement, in the wording or matter of the oath, administered to the recruit for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

No. I think the form is as good as can be drawn out.

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

I am unable to give a satisfactory answer to these questions.

13. Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps; and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?

14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and recruited there and there only?

In a plan for the reorganization of the native army, which I have submitted for the consideration of the Governor-General, I have suggested that corps of the irregular portion of the army may be with advantage reduced to 400; and if such be the case, there would be no objection to their being raised and

recruited in districts, not to remain there, but for general service.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?

If corps should be stronger than 400, I then think a counterpoise should be preserved, by enlistment from separate parts of the country.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

If not more than 400 they may be so with safety, provided that corps of different tribes or castes are cantoned together, so as to have the counterpoise by regiments.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? or should the tribes or castes be mixed up in each company?

I think the unanimity with which the native army has mutinied should be sufficient to prove the necessity of carefully avoiding a mixing up of castes and tribes in each company. In such a system it is a well-known fact, that the Sikhs and Mussulmen became, to a certain extent, converts to Hindooism. If castes are not kept distinct in regiments, they should certainly be kept so in companies.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

I think that as Mussulmen are much more fanatical and dangerous than the Hindoos, they should never exceed one-third of a regiment. I should propose, therefore, one-third Sikhs, one-third Hill Pathans or Punjabee Mussulmen, and one-third Hindoos of Hindustan.

If the Karens or Burmese were employed, it would perhaps be expedient to embody them in separate regiments.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?

Under the impression that police corps should never be armed, trained, or disciplined like corps of the army, they might, I think, very advantageously be raised in the districts in which their employment lies; but police corps must, in my opinion, be organized on principles totally different from those on which corps of the army are formed.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

Decidedly not.

21. What agency should be employed for recruitment in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?

I think recruiting depôts would prove the most efficient means by which good recruits would be obtained.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?

Police corps if kept in the districts in which they were raised could recruit for themselves.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency?

I think all recruits for the army, as far as possible, should be derived from the countries or districts under the control of the Government, and then every measure should be taken by which the apprehension of deserters may be ensured. The rules already laid down by Government regarding the registry of

recruits, and for the verification of their descriptive rolls, if strictly carried out, contain all that is necessary on this head.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?

The principles of the rules above alluded to, might be made applicable to police corps, although if the latter are recruited in their own districts, the rules might be a good deal simplified.

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?

In the scheme of reorganization which I have submitted, I have strongly recommended that 500 natives should be permanently embodied in every European corps, so that there might be a proportion of one native to two Europeans, in which the natives would be harmless to do mischief, but at the same time would be most valuable auxiliaries. I will not enlarge upon the many great advantages of this scheme, having detailed them at length in my despatch, but I cannot but again urge the importance and usefulness of the measure upon Government.

I cannot in any way recommend that so small a body of Europeans as one or even two companies should form the portion of a native regiment. In this small proportion the efficiency of the Europeans, would in my opinion be utterly sacrificed. They would speedily deteriorate in both character and discipline.

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose; or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

The concluding para. of the foregoing para. will be deemed a sufficient reply to this.

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?

I should recommend that the barracks of natives incorporated with Europeans, as I have proposed, should be situated on the flank of the Europeans.

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

In the plan I have proposed the commissariat arrangements need not be interfered with in any way.

32. How should such companies be armed; with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?

Considering the native soldiers, associated as I have proposed with the Europeans, to be thoroughly reliable, I would recommend their being armed with the same weapons as the Europeans.

33. How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?

All the irregular infantry might be armed with the two-grooved rifle or common musket.

34. How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?

In districts where the population is disarmed a tulwar would be amply sufficient for a policeman, with a few fire-arms retained in the chokee; but where the population remains armed, as in the Peshawur valley, the police corps must be armed with a musket or fusil.

36. How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

I can conceive no dress better suited to the native army than the present costume of the whole of the Punjab force, which consists of a loose coat and pantaloons of linen, or drilled-dyed khakee for the summer, and a suit of drab cloth of "burruck" for the winter.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment; a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

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I believe this arrangement would prove eminently successful, the permanent association of the native with the European soldier would be productive of the best results, as a proof of which one need only look back to the excellent feeling which sprung up between European and native corps after being brigaded together for a long period in Afghanistan. I have already recommended that the proportion of two Europeans to one native should be adopted in incorporating the two races, and I still think this the best calculated to ensure a reliable and efficient organization.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

I do not think that sufficient analogy to the proposed arrangement exists in the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers to draw any inference as to the results of its operation.

But the Pe-hawur light horse, a corps organized under my own orders and superintendence, affords excellent illustration of what may be expected from the admixture of the European and native soldiers. This corps consists of three troops, two of which are European and the third native, the latter being composed of men of the Punjab and of the Peshawur and Hazara districts, trained in every way as dragoons. I may confidently say that this corps is as fully efficient as one wholly European. The European finds the native a valuable helpmate, and is kind to him, while the native is proud in being associated with the European, and emulates him in everything. The most cordial feeling exists between the two races.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

I think the natives should be placed on the flanks of the Europeans.

40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops, which is an element of strength?

Highly favourable.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

Neither in peace nor in war do I see any obstacle in carrying out the arrangement. On the contrary, I believe in all times and under all circumstances it will be found highly advantageous to the service.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

A spirit of confidence or self-reliance on the part of the native troops would be, in my opinion, fraught with danger to the State; every effort therefore should be made to check the growth of such a feeling, and nothing would do this more effectually than by keeping a smaller proportion of natives than that of Europeans in each mixed regiment.

SYDNEY COTTON, Maj.-Gen.,
Commanding Peshawur Division.

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Sydney Cotton.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the Bengal native army?

1. I believe the present articles of war are utterly beyond the comprehension of the native soldier; if such a code is preserved at all, it should be much curtailed and simplified, being in my opinion, wholly useless in its present form. I should recommend the following alteration:—

Crimes.	Punishments.
Mutiny, desertion, and all capital crimes.	Death, transportation by the sentence of an European court-martial, sentence being carried out, under orders of officers commanding division.
Disobedience, neglect of duty, and all other crimes not capital.	To be punishable with or without hard labour, solitary confinement to the extent of 14 days, and corporal punishment not exceeding 50 lashes, these punishments being awardable by commanding officers of regiments.

2. Should the special rules regarding punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

2. The present rules for regulating punishment in offences admitting of less serious notice than those requiring trial by court-martial, are far too mild and are useless in upholding discipline. Corporal punishment and solitary confinement in cells should be inflicted at the discretion of commanding officers, whose powers should, in every respect, be much increased; all excepting capital crimes, I think, should be punished under the orders of the commanding officer.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal army?

3. It has utterly failed in its object; the native officers have no sense of justice, are totally ignorant of the articles of war, and of their duties at a court-martial. The proceedings as at present conducted are farcical.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bengal army with the military code under which they live and are governed?

4. The articles of war are read quarterly at a regimental parade, by the interpreter of the corps, but as above said, the men cannot understand them.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?

5. Among the sepoy, not one in a hundred can read vernacular dialect of the articles of war.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bengal presidency?

7. How is discipline maintained and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bengal presidency?

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

6, 7, and 8. Being unacquainted with the organization or interior economy of police corps, I am unable to answer these questions.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Bengal native infantry, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

The system of promotion may be said to be based wholly on seniority.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient.

The native officers of the Bengal army are generally dull and inefficient, wholly useless in supporting the discipline of their regiments. Were they otherwise, the mutiny has clearly shown us that they would be very dangerous and mischievous.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen.

No superior acquirements or intelligence distinguishes them from the men, by whom they are never respected as they ought to be in their position.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

None.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers, between the European officers and their men, weaken the influence of the European officers?

Yes, I think it does; if the native officers were not in existence, the European officers would convey their orders themselves direct to the men, instead of, as at present, through the native officers. The men are, therefore, brought much less under the influence of the European officers than they otherwise would be.

2nd. Does a full complement of the European, militate against the professional efficiency of the native, commissioned officer?

2nd. Yes; a full complement of commissioned officers would materially militate against the efficiency of the native officers, inasmuch as the latter would be rendered ciphers.

6. Has it been found in the native infantry of the Bengal army, that on the occurrence of mutinies, the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

To both these inquiries I say decidedly no. Although the native officers must always have been aware of what was going on in the lines, yet, excepting in very solitary instances, they have given no information to their European officers, nor aided them in any way.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

I recommend that they should be abolished?

8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment, in lieu of its native officers, advisable?

Yes. I think such an arrangement very advisable.

9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

It would, of course, take some time to reconcile the native mind to this loss of rank and pay; but I think such a measure very necessary; the Government also might reward deserving men by promotion in police corps, or by civil employment, in addition to retiring pensions, and to good service pay. The latter boon should be granted under the orders of the commanding officer.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

Yes. In ordinary times I think they have.

11. Should not the system of promotion, generally by seniority, to the grades of native commissioned officers, (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Yes; but a proper counterpoise of castes, and above all things, the proper influence of the European soldier should be maintained among native troops. In all the regular native corps, I recommend the abolition of native commissions, and in irregular corps only, the strength of which I would much reduce, would I keep up those grades.

12. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?

As the native army will now be considerably reduced, the system of pensions might be maintained with advantage. The boon of the pension is doubtless very highly esteemed by the native soldier.

13. What is the charge to the state, of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal native infantry?

I know not.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

Certainly not.

15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

Most decidedly not.

16. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps?

1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as European officers; or,
2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades; or,
3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with a few European officers?

Fully officered with Europeans, but with no native officers.

17. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

In my scheme I have recommended that the police corps should be armed with the tulwar only, concluding that the people of the country are disarmed throughout Hindustan. Such corps might well be officered by natives, as, armed as I have proposed, they could not prove dangerous, although fully efficient to carry on the police duties.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned corps, but only good service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

Police corps might well be officered by the good deserving men of regular regiments, and this added to the superior pay, with good service pay and pensions, would I imagine prove sufficient inducement for men to enter into the regular regiments. Every distinction, in my opinion, should be made between military and police corps.

19. In police corps is there, on first admission, any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades?

I do not know.

20. Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies proved favourable to our power in India?

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I think the distinct nature of the armies of the three presidencies has been one of the means which has checked the spread of the mutiny.

This happy result has, I think, emanated solely from the difference of races, and not from distinct organization or system, and for proof of this it is only necessary to look at the many Bombay regiments which have shown disaffection, and in which men were enlisted from the same class as that to which the mutinous sepoys of Bengal belong.

21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to views of separate governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

I see no reason for keeping up any distinction between the three armies; on the contrary, I think all should be placed on exactly the same footing.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bengal army? and state the orders or measures or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect.

1. I believe the powers of commanding officers have been diminished from various causes:—

1st. The facility with which sepoys were able to appeal against their commanding officers, and the ready way in which these appeals were received and attended to by officers in high command. It was quite notorious the manner in which sepoys with grievances used to congregate at Simla to present their petitions to the commander-in-chief, and there have been numerous instances in which sepoys dismissed by regimental court-martial have subsequently been reinstated.

2nd. The timid way in which corporal punishment and solitary imprisonment were introduced into the native army; these most necessary punishments have never up to the present time been really carried out in the native army, and the sepoys were not slow to take advantage of the indecision displayed in their limited introduction.

3rd. The rigid adherence to promotion by seniority was another cause by which the power to reward was taken out of the hands of the commanding officer.

4th. The incompetency of officers in consequence of old age to command their regiments; in eight regiments in the Peshawur division I had not three who were able to command their regiments efficiently.

5th. I think the various acts of misconduct of the native army, all more or less bordering on mutiny on different occasions, were never dealt with with sufficient severity, in consequence of which the sepoy has not held the power of Government, much less the authority of his military superiors, in that dread or awe so necessary to the preservation of discipline in a large army composed of men who under their own systems of government have been ruled with rods of iron, and were unable to appreciate our leniency.

2. During the above period have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?

2. The little power to punish and the less to reward in the hands of the European officers generally has

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rendered them so many ciphers in the eyes of the sepoys.

3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

3. That there has been no discipline whatever in native regiments.

4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?

4. The officers have had no interest in their companies which they had not the means of controlling, and have generally neglected their men, unable to reward the good or to punish the bad men; European officers were neither respected nor obeyed in the way that discipline requires. It will be easily seen how little power remained in their hands, when it is mentioned that furlough and promotion, the two things most prized by a native soldier while in the army, were given by a regimental gradation roll, totally independent of the European officers of companies.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend (especially of a native corps), upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?

5. It ought to depend upon the proper control over the men of efficient officers. The distant authority of head-quarters is unknown or respected by the sepoy, excepting in appealing against commanding officers.

6. Should the power of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?

6. Considerably increased.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

7. That native regiments should always be cantoned alongside European corps, and be made sensible of the influence of the latter. Real discipline in the native army can only be maintained by the presence of the European soldier.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?

8. The influence of the European officer is doubtless felt in his superior courage and intelligence, but without the aid of efficient commissioned or non-commissioned officers he has little power over his men; in action they may follow him, but he cannot control them; the want of discipline is here seriously felt, and is frequently the cause of disaster; the influence of European officers, limited at all times, is perhaps less in times of peace.

9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

9. I have recommended in my scheme for reorganization for the regular infantry, that 500 should be amalgamated with every European corps. A system of instruction, such as I would propose, would fully occupy the time of officers and men. The formation of camps of exercise during the cold weather, during which every description of military field engineering should be learned and practised by the men, and this, combined with the necessary drill exercise and target practice, for the remainder of the year, would, I believe, afford full occupation for all parties. The

construction and repair of their own barracks should, moreover, form a portion of the men's duties.

10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bengal army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than in mere military duties?

10. Not with due consideration to the efficiency of the army.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?

11. Perhaps not under existing rules and customs, but these should be abolished, and the troops should be made to do anything required of them. I see no reason why they should not be employed in military works.

12. In apportioning European officers to native troops,—

1st. Should native corps have a full complement of European officers, according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers; or,

2nd. A full complement of European officers and no native commissioned officers; or,

3rd. A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?

12. In the regular infantry I would abolish native commissions, and have European officers; only in irregular corps, the strength of which I have already said I would much reduce, I would have a full complement of native officers, with a less number of European officers.

13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?

13. I think cadets on appointment should be attached to regiments in England, or in military colonies or garrisons abroad, such as Malta, Gibraltar, where duty and discipline are much more rigidly carried on; and after a year's instruction, and acquiring a knowledge of all parts of their duty, I would then send them to India to be posted to corps whether native or European.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

14. I think all young officers should have the ground-work above recommended with this I consider them more qualified for their duties either in European or native corps.

15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

15. Yes, it is most seriously impaired.

16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies between the conduct of regiments with few and those with many European officers present?

16. No; as regards the mutiny there was no difference, for the reason already explained, viz., that the European officers generally had little or no control over their men, the increased number under such circumstances was of little benefit. I must, however, add, that the case is widely different in action, where there is no comparison between the conduct of native regiments with few, and those with many European officers. This has not only come under my own observation, but has been remarked in all our campaigns.

The presence of a considerable number of European officers is indispensably necessary to a native corps; without them in action it becomes a disorderly rabble, more dangerous than useful.

17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

17. The vacancies should at once be filled up, and the officer selected for staff or detached employ should be placed on a staff corps; in my plan for reorganization I have recommended that all the officers of the infantry should be placed on a general list, by which means all would be more available for employ in the way considered best suited to the interests of the service.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army, as regimental officers to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

18. If the army is reorganized as I have proposed with a due proportion of commanders and staff officers, and if officers are selected with reference to their qualifications to fill the commands and staff appointments of the army, I think there should be sufficient inducement in the army itself for officers to acquire a knowledge of languages, and to improve themselves generally in professional knowledge.

I cannot but condemn the present system which deprives the army of its best and most intelligent officers for employment in a civil capacity, and in other duties totally opposed to those of their own profession. This must be most injurious to the efficiency of the army.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

19. The officers of the army should be induced to study their own profession in all its branches, and by their professional acquirements only they should be selected for military staff employ as above recommended. Under this system the cutting off the hope of employment in the civil departments would improve the standard of military acquirements and general efficiency of officers. The present great encouragement held out to officers for leaving their regiments to enter civil employ, or to take up appointments for which they are not qualified, unsettles their minds and unfits them for their ordinary military duties.

SIDNEY COTTON, Maj.-Gen.

Commanding Peshawur Division.

Peshawur, July 20, 1858.

ARTILLERY.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF ARTILLERY.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Bengal artillery are composed?

The golundaz are about equally composed of Hindoos and Mussulmen. The service is a most favourite one, particularly the native horse artillery. Men of all the better classes, Pathans, Seikhs, Brahmins, Chatries, were numerous, and Gwallas and the other sects enlisted for the line were found in the native artillery.

2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Bengal artillery are composed?

As above, with a sprinkling of the lower classes. The old and best style of gun lascar came from the coast about Chittagong, a creature half soldier half sailor, with a Tartar caste of feature, called, I believe, Mhugs. Their race is nearly extinct in Upper India. Their re-introduction for the work lascars were originally intended for might be considered expedient.

3. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Bengal artillery are composed?

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Men of all castes and creeds, excepting the lowest. The Chumar was even admitted. The best men are those who distinguished themselves as syces. Generally the lower classes.

4. Should native gunners or golundazes continue to be enlisted, and to form part of the artillery of the Bengal artillery?

Most certainly not.

5. Should native drivers continue to be employed with European artillery?

No; I do not recommend it.

6. From what district are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundaz drawn?

From the Oude and Arra districts, and the North-West provinces generally,

7. From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn?

As above; and, in fact, from all parts.

8. From what districts are the drivers taken?

From all parts.

9. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded by regulation or practice of the service from the golundaz of the Bengal artillery; and if so, for what reason?

Soodees and sweepers and lower castes, on account of its being supposed that the higher classes would not enlist and serve with those castes.

10. The same question is repeated both with respect to gun lascars and drivers.

See preceding answer.

11. Supposing that native artillery were continued in the Bengal artillery, are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits for the golundaz might be enlisted?

I am not aware of any.

12. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the golundaz of the Bengal artillery for the gun lascars and for the drivers?

For golundaz and lascars, by recruiting parties, or by men going on furlough bringing their relations; but there are generally hanging about regiments men waiting for vacancies. Drivers are generally replaced by smart syces taught in the rough school of a bare backed horse at water or exercise.

13. On entertainment of recruits for the golundaz, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Bengal artillery, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?

I am not aware; but I believe a reference is generally made to the civil authorities of the districts the recruits came from.

14. Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice, if golundaz continued to be enlisted?

No; I think the present are sufficient for natives.

15. The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.

See preceding answer.

16. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

The words of the oath are contained in para. 33, sec. xxxi., military regulations; the word "gun" being substituted for "colour."

Major-Gen
Sydney Cotton.

17. The same question is repeated with regard to the gun lascars and drivers.

As above.

18. How long has this form of oath been in use in the Bengal artillery?

I do not know.

12. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the golundaz, gun lascar, or driver when first enrolled, or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?

If an oath is of any use at all with a native, the present is sufficient for all purposes. It should be clearly explained to him that it binds him to serve on foreign service and beyond the seas, whether within the frontier of the British Government or beyond it.

20. If native artillerymen continue to be used, should the different battalions be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only; or be recruited over a wide area irrespective of districts?

Each company should be recruited in a prescribed district, and from that only.

21. The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.

See preceding answer.

22. Should the battalions, or companies, or troops of golundaz be homogeneous as to race or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed up together?

The companies of battalions should be homogeneous.

23. If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes or castes, be entertained?

In equal proportions; as, for example, a battalion might be formed of a company of Hindoo Rajpoots, one of Sikhs, one of Pathans of Hindustan, and one of Punjabee Mussalmen.

24. The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and to drivers. Same as above; Chumars and Gwallas being introduced.

25. What agency should be employed for recruiting golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers?

Occasional recruiting parties whenever recruits are wanting.

26. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundaz, gun lascars, or drivers?

No other precautions appear to me to be necessary than are required for the infantry recruit.

27. If native drivers be discontinued, would you replace them by Europeans raised for that duty, or by European gunners trained to the duty as part of their exercise, or by Anglo-Indians enrolled for this special duty?

By Europeans of light weight. Both gunners and drivers should be taught both to ride and drive, as well as to man the guns.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Are the same articles of war applicable to the European gunners and to the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

They ought to be made so, with a few modifications.

2. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

I think they might with advantage be abolished. European courts-martial only should be allowed for the trial of capital crimes, all other offences should be

disposed of under the orders of commanding officers, whose powers should be correspondingly increased.

3. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war as respects the European artillery?

No.

4. Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same articles of war as the golundaz, and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes?

Yes.

5. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained; or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

The present special rules have far too lenient a tendency. I see no advantage in assimilating them to the rules which obtain in the British army. What is most wanted is, to furnish commanding officers with increased powers; no appeal beyond them should be listened to.

6. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Bengal army?

In no portion of the native army does the system of courts-martial work satisfactorily; the ends of discipline are at present rarely met by it, and crime to a certain extent goes unpunished.

7. What means are adopted to acquaint the golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers, with the military code under which they serve?

They are read to them by interpreters at stated intervals, but with no satisfactory result, for none comprehend them.

8. What proportion of the golundaz, gun lascars, and drivers can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

I know not exactly, but very few read and write at all, and none comprehend the vernacular of the articles of war.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the Bengal artillery what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundaz, and drivers? is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

Seniority alone; a system which has deprived the commanding officer of the power to reward the really deserving men, and to check the advancement of the indifferent ones; a more fruitful source of evil in the army cannot well be devised. All emulation and encouragement in the performance of duty was nullified, and the link between the European officer and the native soldier, so necessary to discipline, was here found worse than useless.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the golundaz generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

The native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and more particularly the former, having been promoted by seniority, were generally worn out from old age, with impaired intellect and energies, they were neither trusted by the officers nor respected by the men.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundaz from among whom they have risen?

No; the acquirements of those who were worn out from old age, probably stupified with the use of opium, or some such drug, were generally of a lower standard than those who were younger in the service.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

No.

5. Do the golundaz of all grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary gun drill? Are they practised at laying guns and mortars, at cutting fuzes, judging distances, adapting charges to mortars, &c., or do the European officers themselves execute those details?

All golundaz used to go through a series of instruction at annual practice, but especially on enlistment (before the mutiny) at Meerut. The sooner their instruction is stopped the better, if still continued.

6. Can the golundaz of the Bengal artillery frequently read English and write it?

No.

7. Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work?

Most certainly not, although if native gunners are to be retained, in spite of our sad experience in the recent mutiny, I do not see how they are to be employed without the knowledge of some laboratory work.

8. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of European officer?

A native officer is generally, under the seniority system of promotion, a nonentity, but still it is necessary to intrust to him certain duties connected with the discipline of the men, and to require them to respect him. The presence therefore of the native officer, in my opinion, certainly tends to weaken the position and influence of the European officer.

9. Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundaz been found on occasions of mutiny to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European officers in checking or quelling mutiny? Have the native officers passively or overtly sided with the mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve, and with the European officers?

Certainly not. At Bareilly the mutiny was commenced by Bukt Khan, a subadar of Captain Kirby's battery, who, having been more intelligent and sociably disposed than his brother native officers had been treated on all occasions with the greatest kindness by the English artillery officers. He had therefore no cause for dissatisfaction, but was still a prime mover in the rebellion. From my own experience, and from the information I have received, I consider that the native officers, as a body, have proved more faithless to the Government than any other class. There are perhaps a few exceptions, but how few! I am not aware of a single instance where a native officer has afforded real active assistance to the European officers in quelling mutiny.

10. If native artillery be continued in the Bengal army, should the grades of the native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished?

Abolished; for if efficient they are dangerous and mischievous; and if otherwise, they are useless.

11. Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned officers as would give one to each gun of a battery in lieu of native commissioned officers of golundaz be advisable?

I should not recommend it, the character of the European deteriorates when associated with natives in such limited numbers.

12. If the abolition of the grades of golundaz commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundaz, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as commissioned grades?

Amplly sufficient.

13. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundaz to the British service and the British rule?

Certainly not as regards the recent mutiny. Look at the native batteries and troops at Delhi, Neemuch, Nowgong, Fyzabad, and the many it was necessary to dishand for safety's sake.

14. Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions?

Yes.

15. Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Bengal artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny?

In some cases, when under the wholesome influence of European gunners, as in those batteries manned by Europeans and driven by natives.

16. Should the systems of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?

Considerably modified.

17. Can you state the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the native portion of the Bengal artillery?

No.

18. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grade of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Decidedly.

19. Are commissioned officers of golundaz generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

Certainly not.

20. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and proficiency?

They are not to be compared with the European serjeants.

21. Under the supposition that the Bengal artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it as far as practicable with the royal artillery?

Yes, as far as the nature of the climate and other local circumstances will permit.

22. What would this assimilation involve of change in the system of the Bengal artillery?

An increase of European officers (particularly field officers) and men. I should think also that the vacancies of all officers withdrawn for staff employ should be filled up. It has been quite deplorable to see the inefficient manner in which the troops and batteries of the Bengal artillery have been officered. Only a few days ago there was one subaltern officer only with one troop and two batteries of the Peshawur division of artillery. I may make the same remark as regards the paucity of the men. During the latter part of 1857 and the beginning of 1858 the 1st troop 2nd brigade horse artillery was only able to parade with its guns without waggons. No. 19 light field battery can now only bring out four guns and waggons, in both cases in consequence of the paucity of men. I could mention numerous other instances to show that the Bengal artillery is neither efficiently officered nor manned at present. I trust both these glaring deficiencies will be made good.

Major-Gen.
Sydney Cotton.

Major-Gen
Sydney Cotton.

23. What would it involve of change in the matériel of the Bengal artillery?

If by "matériel" it is intended to mean the present ordnance, gun carriages, ammunition, &c., I do not see that any change is necessary, although I should hope that the Government will give to the Bengal artillery all the benefits of new scientific improvements, the introduction of which may have been found advantageous to the service after undergoing the usual tests at Woolwich.

24. What modifications would it be expedient to maintain in the organization of the Bengal artillery when assimilating it to the royal artillery, in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service?

The present guns and carriages are certainly more adapted to India than those of the royal artillery which have been recently brought out.

25. Need the matériel of the Bengal army, if assimilated to that of the royal artillery, be at all modified in consequence of the climate and service in India.

No.

26. Do you advocate the maintenance of horse artillery at its present strength?

Yes. I do not think there is a superabundance of horse artillery, but it would be advantageous to substitute 9-pounder for 6-pounder guns in more troops; and I should recommend that all be placed upon the "detachment" system.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of the commandants of native battalions of artillery, and of officers in command of golundaz batteries of the Bengal artillery been increased or diminished?

Diminished.

2. What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundaz of the Bengal artillery?

Disrespect, contempt of authority, mutiny.

3. If golundaz artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers?

Full powers being granted to commanding officers to advance and promote those they think fit, and to inflict punishment to the extent which is now awardable by district courts-martial, corporal punishment and solitary confinement being brought into active play when necessary.

A proper selection of officers should be made, and these should be shifted as little as possible.

4. Is the efficiency of the Bengal corps of artillery affected by the number of officers taken away from corps duties for staff employment?

Yes, decidedly.

5. How can the demand for European officers of artillery for staff and detached employments be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of the corps of Bengal artillery?

They should be removed to the staff corps of the army, and their vacancies filled up in the regiment of artillery.

6. Would the general standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure, which, by removing the hope of staff employment, cut off the inducement which young artillery officers now have to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches of knowledge useful to the State?

They would certainly become more devoted to their branch of the service, the practical and theoretical knowledge of which, with its collateral studies, require much time and attention. If the inducement to leave their military duties were cut off, the officers would be more settled, and would attain to higher acquirements in their own profession.

I cannot but condemn a system which takes officers away from their legitimate duties, and places them in situations where it is impossible that they can serve the State with advantage.

Having completed my replies to this series of questions respecting the reorganization of the native artillery of the Bengal army, I conclude by stating that I utterly condemn the system of employing the natives of the country with guns, either in the capacity of gunners or drivers, for in both positions they can do the Government incalculable mischief.

If the experience of the recent mutiny is to teach us anything, it must surely point out that the fidelity of no native, whatever be his caste or breed, can henceforth be depended upon.

The conduct, during the mutiny, of the native artillery has been no better than that of their brethren of the infantry and cavalry; and only the other day I was informed of the native gunners of one of the Punjab light field batteries having been concerned in a seditious combination, formed by the Malwah Sikhs of the 10th irregular cavalry at Dera Ismail Khan, for the purpose of murdering the European officers of the station.

I say, therefore, abolish all native artillery. Not only should no guns be again entrusted to natives, but every means should be taken to discourage, and to prevent them from acquiring a knowledge of the use of them.

Some officers argue that natives make efficient artillerymen and excellent drivers, and therefore recommend the continuance of the native artillery; but I maintain that their great efficiency is the very source of danger to be guarded against, and it forms, therefore, the most cogent reason for discontinuing the employment of natives with guns.

I earnestly trust the Government will take warning from the past, and bear in mind that every gun in the hands of natives forms a rallying point for mutiny and source of danger. A retrospect of the mutiny clearly shows that no native force is actually formidable, unless supported by artillery. Had the mutineers not been armed with a powerful artillery, well manned by native golundaz, there is every reason to believe the mutiny would have been crushed in the beginning; for the mutineers, however numerous, have never stood in the field unless backed up by guns.

SYDNEY COTTON, Maj.-Gen.

Aug. 21, 1858. Commanding Peshawur Division.

No. 7.

Col. Mayhew.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM COLONEL MAYHEW, ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

From Lieut.-Col. MAYHEW to Lieut.-Col.
DURAND, C.B.

(No. 1473 A.) Adjutant-General's Office,
Head-Quarters, Allahabad,
SIR, July 6, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter, No. 20, of the 21st of May last, with its

appended series of questions relative to the proportion which the European army should bear to the native in the Bengal presidency, as the broad and fixed basis of our power.

I am afraid that considerable delay has taken place in submitting my replies, but it has been unavoidable, owing to the difficulty I have found in collecting the material for the enclosed returns, called for by

Questions 1, 3, and 5; and which are still, I regret to say, somewhat imperfect, as I have no information as to the various police corps lately raised.

I shall now proceed to answer your questions *seriatim*, to the best of my ability, on a subject which admits of so great a variety of opinion.

1. *Vide* return enclosed.

2. For many years to come a European force of not less than sixty thousand men, of all arms, will be required for the restoration of order, and to awe the rebellious spirit which is abroad throughout India, but has so far particularly developed itself in the Bengal presidency. The troops should be in the proportion of artillery 10,000, cavalry 8,000, and infantry 40,000, without taking into account the sappers, which need only be a corps of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The distribution of this force may be left very much as it is at present, making Calcutta, Dinapore, Allahabad, Lucknow, Agra, Delhi, Lahore, and Jhelum large entrepôts for European troops, on which all their outposts might be assembled, whether for offensive or defensive operations, and where large stores of every kind should be always in state of preparation for service.

3. *Vide* return enclosed.

4. The troops of the line have so signally failed in responding to the fidelity which we deemed we had purchased by the many advantages and privileges accorded to them from time to time by the Government, that it appears to me they have one and all forfeited every claim to consideration, and should be disbanded at once. To such portion as has shown *active* loyalty to the State, enhanced benefits might be granted as a *reward*, but every man should be given distinctly to understand that all *claim* has ceased under old regulations. Numerically they might be retained in equal proportions with Europeans for cavalry, infantry, and sappers, and be distributed in like manner, and always associated as much as possible.

5. *Vide* return enclosed, which is very imperfect as to police corps, of which little is known, nor can the races of which the native army is composed be ascertained with any accuracy, so innumerable are the tribes of Rajpoots and others. Oude and Behar contribute the majority of our infantry, and Rohilcund and Hurriannah of our cavalry; the Doab, from Mynporee downwards, also furnishes many soldiers of all arms.

6. I am of opinion that the whole native infantry should be formed on the same footing as the Loodianah, Ferozepore, and Kelat-i-Ghilizie regiments, and that all the cavalry be irregular, by which arrangement a large margin would be given for the selection of officers for the various staff duties, all of whom might be borne on the strength of such corps, though not necessary for their discipline. The proportion of police corps required to carry on the civil duties is a question I cannot answer, and which will depend very much on the state of security in which our civil treasuries and gaols are placed.

7. I have already stated that the native troops, exclusive of police corps, should be numerically equal to the European.

8. A proportion of one to three, exclusive of police corps, would, in my opinion, be the safest for India generally for many years to come.

9. Barrack accommodation is very deficient, but the question is one to be disposed of in the quarter-master-general's department.

10. Yes, very largely, I apprehend.

11. The majority of the European army of India should be raised for exclusive service in the country, in the proportion of 3 to 1 to her Majesty's regular troops. Economy, acclimation, and aptitude for the peculiar nature of the service, and knowledge of the country and its people, make it very desirable that officers and men should devote their lives to the service. One-third of royal troops would suffice to control this body if necessary, and to infuse the leaven of modern improvement that may be required to maintain the Indian institutions on a level with those of Europe.

12. The permanent European corps cannot be more readily commanded than by the British officers of the mutinied battalions of the native army, forming the complement for one European regiment out of two native ones, as is being done at present with the new cavalry and infantry corps.

13. I apprehend not, but I do not clearly understand the scope of this inquiry.

14. In the event of another rise against British dominion in India, no troops are safely to be trusted but European ones, and the ratio of one to three is the safe one.

I have, &c.
W. MAYHEW, Lieut.-Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Col. Mayhew.

DISTRIBUTION RETURN OF THE TROOPS, EUROPEAN AND NATIVE, serving on the Bengal Establishment on May 1, 1858.

Division.	Stations.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.		European Non-commissioned and Rank and File	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned, and Rank and File
			European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-commissioned and Rank and File		
Presidency.	Fort William	Her Majesty's 73rd Foot	24	763	—	—
	Allypore	Calcutta Native Militia	3	2	995	—
	Ballygunge	Governor-General's Body	—	—	—	—
		Guard	3	1	134	—
	Calcutta	5th Company, 3rd Battalion, Royal Artillery	7	179	—	—
		Her Majesty's 2nd Battalion, 60th Foot	22	817	—	—
	Barrackpore	Her Majesty's 19th Foot	38	1,052	—	—
		2nd Native Infantry (Grenadiers)	5	3	730	—
		32nd Native Infantry	12	1	643	—
		34th ditto	13	1	362	—
	Dum Dum	43rd ditto	11	1	731	—
		3rd Company, 9th Battalion, Royal Artillery	7	187	—	—
		Head-Quarters, 5th Battalion, Artillery	2	7	—	—
	Berhampore	4 Companies, Her Majesty's 35th Foot	11	249	—	—
		63rd Native Infantry	12	2	809	—
	Akyab	11th Irregular Cavalry	4	—	341	—
		Arzacan Battalion	5	3	737	—
	Jelapigoree	73rd Native Infantry	9	1	1,136	—
		Sylhet Light Infantry, Battalion	6	3	940	—
Cherra Poorjee	Munneepore Regiment*	4	—	568	—	
	1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion	5	2	1,021	—	
Eastern Frontier.	A Company of Assam Local Artillery	1	1	107	—	
	2nd Assam Light Infantry Battalion	4	1	1,113	—	
Gowahatty	Kamroop Regiment*	4	1	917	—	
	Total	211	8,274	11,223	—	
Dinapore.	Dinapore	4th Company, 5th Battalion, Artillery	—	76	48	—
		Her Majesty's 35th Foot	27	576	—	—
	Bhaugulpore	7th Native Infantry	3	—	60	—
		8th ditto	4	—	84	—
	Darjeeling	40th ditto	3	—	105	—
		Hill Rangers	3	2	620	—
	Dorundah	5th Irregular Cavalry	2	—	64	—
		Sebundy Sappers and Miners	1	2	206	—
	Chylebassa	Ramgurh Irregular Cavalry	1	—	183	—
		Sikh Volunteers*	4	—	197	—
	Sasseram	Her Majesty's 6th Foot	23	728	—	—
		Shekhawattee Battalion	3	—	748	—
	Nepaul	Resident's Escort	1	—	84	—
		3rd Sikh Cavalry	4	—	284	—
	Benares	Left Wing, 25th Native Infantry	5	—	461	—
		37th Native Infantry	5	1	139	—
50th ditto		13	2	208	—	
Regiment of Loodianah		3	—	409	—	
8th Company, 2nd Battalion, Royal Artillery		6	105	—	—	
Azamgurh	Her Majesty's 34th Foot	32	763	—	—	
	6 Companies of Her Majesty's 37th Foot	16	290	—	—	
Ghazee-pore	Her Majesty's 37th Foot	22	406	—	—	
	5 Companies of Her Majesty's 54th Foot	14	295	—	—	
Chunar	European Invalid Battalion	77	184	—	—	
	European Veteran Company	—	80	—	—	
Doojunpore	2nd Battalion Military Train	13	233	—	—	
	Her Majesty's 10th Foot	24	787	—	—	
Singah	Her Majesty's 84th Foot	33	792	—	—	
	Total	344	5,276	3,850	—	
Cawnpore.	Cawnpore	3rd Company, 5th Battalion, Artillery	3	75	34	—
		The Benares Horse*	2	—	220	—
		Cawnpore Levy*	4	—	754	—

* Raised since the mutiny.

Col. Mayhew.

Division.	Stations.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned, and Rank and File.	Division.	Stations.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned, and Rank and File.																																										
Cawnpore.	Futtehgurh	3rd and 7th Companies, 14th Battalion, Royal Artillery	12	295	—	Meerut.	Moradabad	1st Company, 1st Battalion, Artillery	3	88	81																																										
		Her Majesty's 80th Foot	21	495	—			Her Majesty's 60th Foot (1st Battalion)	18	785	—																																										
	Ukberpore	Futtehgurh Levy*	9	—	502		Rohilkund.	Shahjehan-pore	4th Company, 1st Battalion, Artillery	3	44	6																																									
		7th Punjab Infantry	9	—	819				1st Company, 5th Battalion, Artillery	2	61	21																																									
	Etawah	3rd Company, 1st Battalion, Artillery	3	79	69		Meerut.	Shahjehan-pore	Her Majesty's 9th Lancers	17	827	—																																									
		Her Majesty's 89th Foot	44	901	—				Her Majesty's 42nd High-lancers	37	682	—																																									
	Kantah	3rd European Regiment	24	904	—		Meerut.	Shahjehan-pore	Her Majesty's 78th High-lancers	22	759	—																																									
		Her Majesty's 7th Hussars	30	504	—				Her Majesty's High-lancers	34	931	—																																									
	Mahun	2nd Battalion, Rifle Brigade	32	971	—		Meerut.	Shahjehan-pore	Her Majesty's 93rd High-lancers	30	904	—																																									
		Head Quarters and 3rd Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse Artillery	40	1,014	—				2nd Punjab Cavalry	8	—	720																																									
	Buntena	2nd Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse Artillery	8	116	24		Meerut.	Shahjehan-pore	4th Punjab Infantry	6	20	855																																									
		F Troop, Royal Horse Artillery	4	110	18				24th ditto	6	20	846																																									
	Lucknow.	Lucknow	3rd Company, 8th Battalion, Royal Artillery	5	165		—	Meerut.	Huldwanee	60th Native Infantry	16	1	1,006																																								
			6th Company, 11th Battalion, Royal Artillery	5	105		—			1st Extra Goorka Regiment*	5	—	408																																								
		Lucknow	5th Company, 12th Battalion, Royal Artillery	6	183		—		Meerut.	Huldwanee	Her Majesty's 6th Dragoon Guards	27	620	—																																							
			5th and 6th Companies, 13th Battalion, Royal Artillery	11	242		—				22nd Punjab Infantry*	4	—	1,011																																							
		Lucknow	1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery	5	103		19		Meerut.	Huldwanee	23rd ditto*	4	2	892																																							
			2nd Company, 3rd Battalion, Bengal Artillery	6	93		76				2nd Company, 4th Battalion, Artillery	1	60	29																																							
		Lucknow	2nd Company, 8th Battalion, Bengal Artillery	—	—		100		Meerut.	Huldwanee	Mhairwara Battalion	4	2	729																																							
			3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade	40	925		—				Mahar Regiment	3	2	565																																							
		Lucknow	Her Majesty's 20th Foot	38	824		—		Meerut.	Huldwanee	Total	431	9,504	14,221																																							
			Her Majesty's 23rd Fusiliers	44	979		—				Sirhind.	Umballah	4th Light Cavalry, Lancers	1	1	36																																					
Lucknow		Her Majesty's 53rd Foot	24	939	—	Sirhind.	Umballah		Her Majesty's 27th Foot	31			902	—																																							
		Her Majesty's 97th Foot	39	837	—				Sirhind.	Umballah			5th Native Infantry	2	—	19																																					
Lucknow		1st European Bengal Fusiliers	24	875	—								Sirhind.	Umballah	13th Punjab Infantry	7	3	939																																			
		Ferozepore Regiment*	4	2	784										Sirhind.	Umballah	1st Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse Artillery	3	106	23																																	
Lucknow		Lahore Light Horse*	3	131	5												Sirhind.	Umballah	Head-Quarters, 1st Battalion, Artillery	2	5	—																															
		1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry*	4	—	589														Sirhind.	Umballah	6th Light Cavalry	6	—	17																													
Lucknow		Her Majesty's 2nd Dragoons	21	530	—																Sirhind.	Umballah	Her Majesty's 67th Fusiliers	24	1,008	—																											
		2nd Punjab Infantry	9	—	1,091																		Sirhind.	Umballah	33rd Native Infantry	8	2	863																									
Lucknow		5th ditto	6	—	1,011																				Sirhind.	Umballah	36th ditto	6	2	124																							
		2nd Troop 1st Brigade Bengal Horse Artillery	4	107	21																						Sirhind.	Umballah	61st ditto	9	1	129																					
Lucknow		E Troop, Royal Horse Artillery	8	184	—																								Sirhind.	Umballah	4th Sikh Infantry	5	—	385																			
		4th Company, 14th Battalion, Royal Artillery	7	151	—																										Sirhind.	Umballah	16th Punjab Infantry*	5	1	874																	
Lucknow	Her Majesty's 32nd Foot	15	401	—	Sirhind.			Umballah																									2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, Artillery	1	69	35																	
	Her Majesty's 54th Foot	23	563	—																													Sirhind.	Umballah	3rd Native Infantry	7	2	104															
Lucknow	Allahabad Levy*	4	—	477																															Sirhind.	Umballah	Left wing, 4th Native Infantry	5	—	340													
	34 Companies of Her Majesty's 80th Foot	10	305	—																																	Sirhind.	Umballah	Total	123	3,101	3,900											
Lucknow	Total	618	14,393	6,626																																			Sirhind.	Umballah	Head-Quarters and 1st Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery	6	107	23									
	Lucknow	Total	618	14,393																																					6,626	Sirhind.	Umballah	3rd Company, 3rd Battalion, Artillery	4	84	88						
Saugor District.																																												Saugor	1st Company, 3rd Battalion, Bengal Artillery	3	63	23	Lahore.	Lahore	Head-Quarters and 3rd Company, 4th Battalion, Artillery	4	77
	52nd Native Infantry	13	2	151																																					Lahore.				Lahore	8th Light Cavalry	4	1			359		
Saugor District.	Marowa	3rd Irregular Cavalry	2	—																																								135		Lahore.	Lahore	9th ditto			3	—	170
		31st Native Infantry	8	2							889	Lahore.																																Lahore				Her Majesty's 7th Fusiliers			44	1,114	—
Saugor District.	Malthone	42nd ditto	11	1		226	Lahore.				Lahore																																					16th Native Infantry			—	—	784
		Total	40	68		1,429			Lahore.	Lahore																																						26th ditto			2	—	144
Meerut.	Meerut	Head-Quarters and 3rd Troop, 1st Brigade Horse Artillery	9	114		20							Lahore.	Lahore																																		49th ditto			6	1	696
		Head-Quarters 3rd Battalion, Artillery	2	6		—									Lahore.	Lahore																																4th Sikh Irregular Cavalry*			1	—	38
		Meerut	Meerut	3rd Light Cavalry		7											2	79																														Lahore.			Lahore	21st Punjab Infantry*	2
				Her Majesty's 75th Foot		24											790	—	Lahore.	Lahore																																16th Irregular Cavalry*	2
		Meerut	Meerut	Nusseree Battalion		8											2	831			Lahore.	Lahore																														15th Punjab Infantry*	4
				Meerut Light Horse European*		9											121	—					Lahore.	Lahore																												2nd Company, 1st Battalion, Artillery	2
		Meerut	Meerut	5th Troop, 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery		2											2	90							Lahore.	Lahore																										5th Company, 8th Battalion, Artillery	1
				4th Company, 4th Battalion, Bengal Artillery		2											75	27									Lahore.	Lahore																								85th Native Infantry	6
		Meerut	Meerut	1st Punjab Cavalry		4											—	480											Lahore.	Lahore																						59th ditto	8
				1st Punjab Infantry		4											—	924													Lahore.	Lahore																				10th Light Cavalry	6
		Meerut	Meerut	17th ditto*	5	1		1,040									Lahore.	Lahore																																		Her Majesty's 24th Foot	26
				1st Sikh Infantry	5	—		948																									Lahore.	Lahore																		20th Punjab Infantry*	4
		Meerut	Meerut	2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery	4	106		30																											Lahore.	Lahore																Head-Quarters and 1st Company, 2nd Battalion, Artillery	5
				1st Company, 4th Battalion, Artillery	3	56		26																													Lahore.	Lahore														2nd Irregular Cavalry	4
		Meerut	Meerut	Head-Quarter's, 8th Battalion, Artillery	3	56		26																															Lahore.	Lahore												4th Troop, 3rd Brigade, Horse Artillery	3
				Her Majesty's 61st Foot	17	789		—																																		Lahore.	Lahore									4th Company, 3rd Battalion, Artillery	2
		Meerut	Meerut	2nd European Bengal Fusiliers	20	804		—																																									Lahore.	Lahore		1st Company, 6th Battalion, Royal Artillery	7
				4th Irregular Cavalry	3	—		232																																	Lahore.				Lahore							62nd Native Infantry	8
		Meerut	Meerut	2nd Sikh Cavalry	7	—		634																																						Lahore.	Lahore					69th ditto	10
				Landour Regiment*	6	—		466				Lahore.																																Lahore								11th Punjab Infantry*	4
		Meerut	Meerut	2nd Company, 5th Battalion, Bengal Artillery	4	75	16	Lahore.			Lahore																																									Her Majesty's 2nd Dragoons	29
				Her Majesty's 8th Foot	17	898	—		Lahore.	Lahore																																										Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry	23
Meerut	Meerut	Meade's Horse*	3	—	408	Lahore.	Lahore						1st Irregular Cavalry	3																																						—	544
		Kemaon Battalion	5	2	692								Lahore.	Lahore	2nd Punjab Light Field Battery	2																																				—	140
Meerut	Meerut	Total	618	14,393	6,626										Lahore.	Lahore																																4th Native Infantry			8	2	427
																			Lahore.	Lahore																												Lahore			Lahore	Lahore	Lahore
Lahore.	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore																Lahore	No 4 Garrison Co of Artillery																															
																			Lahore.	Lahore		Lahore	Lahore	Lahore																								Lahore			Lahore	1st Punjab Light Field Battery	1
Lahore.	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore																Lahore				10th Punjab Infantry*	3																										—	939
																			Lahore.	Lahore		Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	3rd Punjab Cavalry	8																				—			638		
Lahore.	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore																Lahore						4th ditto	4	—	537																							
																			Lahore.	Lahore		Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Lahore	Total	372	4,073	13,753																							

* Raised since the mutiny.

* Raised since the mutiny.

Col. Mayhew.

Division.	Stations.	Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned, and Rank and File.
Peshawur.	Peshawur	3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, Artillery	1	35	36
		6th Company, 7th Battalion, Royal Artillery	6	185	—
		Her Majesty's 70th Foot	25	909	—
		24th Native Infantry	5	—	830
		27th ditto	1	—	733
		7th Irregular Cavalry	4	—	586
		18th ditto	4	—	588
		9th Punjab Infantry*	5	—	930
		14th ditto*	5	—	931
		18th ditto*	4	—	918
	Attock	4th Company, 8th Battalion, Artillery	—	—	39
	Belim Khan	4th Company, 2nd Battalion, Artillery (with European drivers attached)	3	144	31
		Her Majesty's 81st Foot † Peshawur Mountain Train Battery	33	1,041	—
	Shubkuddur	8th Punjab Infantry*	5	1	186
		21st Native Infantry	10	2	923
	Nowshera	5th Light Cavalry	5	—	445
		Her Majesty's 88th Foot	33	800	—
	Rawul Pindee	84th Native Infantry	9	2	865
		4th Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery	5	2	93
		Her Majesty's 9th Foot	42	893	—
		58th Native Infantry	9	2	775
	Kohat	17th Irregular Cavalry	6	—	586
18th Punjab Infantry*		3	—	904	
3rd Punjab Infantry		4	—	957	
Campbellpore	6th ditto	3	—	920	
	Peshawur Light Horse (European and native)	10	189	98	
Abbottabad	Hazara Mountain Train Battery	1	—	81	
	2nd Sikh Infantry	3	1	933	
Koolachee	5th Punjab Cavalry*	3	—	584	
	13th Punjab Infantry	5	—	940	
Murdan	Corps of Guides, Infantry and Cavalry	6	—	1,047	
	3rd Punjab Light Field Battery	1	2	142	
Bunnoo	3rd Sikh Infantry	3	—	860	
	9th Irregular Cavalry	3	—	240	
Ukora	3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery	3	98	30	
	Kelati Ghelzie Regiment	6	—	1,137	
Total			292	4,367	19,286
Rangoon	Right Wing, 25th Native Infantry		6	1	397
China	47th Native Infantry	15	4	498	
	65th ditto	9	2	888	
	70th ditto	13	2	886	
Total			37	5	2,272
Kussmore in Scinde	6th Irregular Cavalry		4	—	584

* Raised since the mutiny.
† 7 companies at Peshawur and Nowshera.

N.B.—No returns having been received from the following corps, they have been omitted:—

European.	Native.	
6th Battalion Bengal Artillery.	7th Battalion Foot Artillery.	} Raised since the mutiny.
Royal Engineers, 4th and 23rd Companies.	9th ditto.	
Her Majesty's 5th Fusiliers	Sirmoor Battalion.	
13th Light Infantry.	Beatson's Horse.	
20th Foot.	Behar Horse.	
64th "	Rohilcond Horse.	
82nd "	Jodhpore Sikh Horse.	
90th "	Mooltan Regiment of Cavalry.	
	Towanna Horse.	
	Mynpoorie Levy.	

ABSTRACT.

Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned, and Rank and File.
QUEEN'S.			
Royal Artillery (9 troops and 13 Companies)	95	2,369	—
6 regiments of Cavalry	136	2,885	—
37 regiments of Infantry	1,150	31,983	—
Total	1,381	37,237	—

Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-commissioned and Rank and File.	Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned, and Rank and File.
HONOURABLE COMPANY'S.			
<i>Europeans.</i>			
3 brigades of horse artillery (9 troops)	46	967	—
5 battalions foot artillery (20 companies)	66	1,512	—
3 regiments of infantry	68	2,583	—
European invalid battalion	77	214	—
3 regiments of light horse*	27	441	—
Total	284	5,717	—
<i>Natives.</i>			
3 troops horse artillery	10	6	279
1 battalion foot artillery (3 companies)	3	2	262
Gun laecars attached to the European horse and foot artillery	—	—	1,071
Governor-General's body guard and 7 regiments of light cavalry	35	6	1,371
38 regiments of native infantry	320	43	21,833
24 regiments of local and irregular infantry †	98	23	15,714
15 regiments of irregular cavalry ‡	47	—	5,527
1 company Assam local artillery	1	1	107
2 companies Sebundy sappers and miners	1	2	206
Total	515	83	46,370
<i>Punjab Irregular Force.</i>			
5 batteries §	10	5	621
No 4 garrison company of artillery	2	—	131
8 regiments of cavalry ¶	45	—	4,404
1 troop Peshawur light horse*	—	—	193
28 regiments of infantry ¶¶	135	27	24,804
Corps of guides	6	—	1,047
Total	199	32	31,180

* Raised since the mutiny.
† Including 9 regiments raised since the mutiny.
‡ Including 2 regiments of horse raised since the mutiny.
§ Including the Peshawur mountain train battery.
¶ Including 4 Sikh regiments raised since the mutiny.
¶¶ Including 13 regiments raised since the mutiny.

W. MAYHEW, Lieut.-Col.,
Adjutant-General of the Army.
Adjutant-General's Office,
July 6, 1858.

From Lieut.-Col. MAYHEW to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

(No. 2087.) Adjutant-General's Office,
Allahabad, Head-Quarters,
SIR, August 13, 1858.

In reply to your letter No. 61, of the 16th June, I have the honour to submit replies to the first series of questions on "the recruiting and command position of corps."

1, 2. *Vide* return enclosed, and my reply to Question 5 of the first series.

3. Men of low caste have been generally excluded by the regulations, and practically commanding officers have carried the point too far. Lord W. Bentinck, when commander-in-chief, attempted to introduce the inferior castes into the army, but did not meet with support, and subsequently the measure was adopted; *vide* General Orders by the Governor-General, 31st December 1834.

5. The agricultural classes generally, such as koor-meets, pasees, and rajbhurs might with great advantage be introduced very largely into the service, but the lowest tribes will, I apprehend, be found totally wanting in the spirit necessary to make good soldiers, and never will be fit for promotion to the smallest command, in consequence of the servility almost inherent in their social position.

5. Recruits for the service have always been found so readily, that no agency beyond the regimental

Col. Mayhew.

appliances have been necessary. Men returning from furlough have generally brought recruits from their villages to fill up vacancies, whence a system of relationship and dependence has too largely prevailed in most corps.

6. See Government General Order, No. 486, 6th August 1852.

7. The few children of sepoy born in the lines, and camp followers generally, are little encouraged, and are very seldom enlisted, except as classees, drummers, and latterly band boys; they are often very smart, but disreputable.

8. The total exclusion of Brahmins and town-bred Mahomedans, the partial enlistment of Rajpoots and Mahomedans of rural districts, and the very large admission into the ranks of all arms of gwallas, ahirs, and cultivators generally, such as koomees, pasees, and rajbhurs of the Azingurh and Goruckpore districts, will improve the *personnel* of the native army as far as possible.

9 and 10. The oath in use was first published with the articles of war in 1796, and no change has been since sanctioned. The judge advocate-general will reply to these questions in full.

11. The only change necessary in the existing form is the addition of the words "by sea or land;" but the oath should be very distinctly explained to each recruit before he is sworn in,—which should never be till he has become accustomed for several months to the service,—and at drill.

12. There are no seafaring races in Bengal, but the Dacca and Chittagong Mahomedan population may be tried with advantage, and formerly were admitted into the old marine corps, as least averse to serving beyond sea.

13. These corps are called now general service regiments, such as the 25th, 40th, 47th, 65th, 67th, and 68th native infantry.

14 and 15. A mixture of tribes of the same *faith* is very desirable, and corps should be raised for general service without reference to districts, and as widely as possible all over the country.

16. Regiments should be decidedly homogeneous so far as Hindoos, Mahomedans, Seikhs, and Goorkhas are concerned; the admission of the three latter partially only in our old corps of the line quite neutralized their influence as counterpoises to Hindoo predominance of feeling throughout the infantry. In the cavalry and artillery the Mahomedan ascendancy prevailed from the same cause.

17. It is not desirable to have companies of one class; nor would it be quite practicable, with reference to the disproportion of the admixture of castes; it would also tend to a class feeling very prejudicial to harmony in a regiment.

18. Not applicable.

19. It is advisable to recruit police corps locally, which will insure a better class of men, and give them a greater stake in the welfare of their respective districts. Corps for general service should be recruited generally, and the wider the area the better.

20. The police corps should be kept as distinct as possible from the line; no community of feeling should be encouraged.

21. Recruiting depôts should be established, under very conscientious officers, as permanencies, in every suitable district; whence alone the recruits should be allotted to corps as required. This system will supersede the "bhy-bundee" tendency, which has here-

tofore been so baneful to the service, and still offers such impediments to the introduction of new feelings into the native army.

22. The police corps should, as I have said before, be kept as distinct as possible from the general service regiments.

23. The local civil authorities who attest recruits should be enjoined to pay strict attention to the correctness of the returns as to caste, employment, and residence of these men. At present this important duty is slurred over. The registries should be sent for verification monthly to the Sudder stations by officers commanding recruit depôts, who should be held responsible for the correctness of descriptive rolls sent with recruits to corps; he should also frequently personally visit his district, and inquire into the truth of these registries, and keep them corrected where necessary.

24. Not applicable.

25, 26, 27. The only foreign troops in India should be Europeans, as I have said before. Black races will always make common cause against white races, and should not be trusted; they would probably be nearly as expensive as Europeans, and more difficult to keep up.

28, 29, 30, 31, 32. The native corps should be separate, I think; the close admixture of the European with the native soldier will lower the former in the eyes of the latter; idiosyncracies of the two races are incompatible, and should be kept as distinct as possible.

33. The native army of the line should be armed with the common percussion musket, which is very efficient, and not readily adapted for general use without the cap, which should be kept as far as possible out of the reach of native manufacturers.

34. The old flint musket will answer every purpose of a police corps, and will give them all the superiority over the population that is desirable.

35, 36. There is no advantage in the present uniform of the native soldiers, and it is unsuited to their habits. A costume something like that of the zouaves will add to the comfort and efficiency of all soldiers serving in India.

37, 38, 39, 40, and 41. I have answered these questions in the negative, and recent experience shows that the admixture has not worked well generally; in fact the practice is to be discontinued in the artillery, and should not be introduced into the other branches. In peace and war time the vigilance which has become essential to the maintenance of our power may at all times be secured by a proper combination of the troops of both races in brigades, each corps having the homogeneous elements that can alone give it respectability in its own estimation and weight with other troops.

42. The permanent association in the same corps of European and native soldiers would, I am convinced, have the effect of making the expensive and needy Englishman dependent on the rich and usurious Hindoo, to whom he would find himself constantly bound by debt, and thus a spirit dangerous to discipline would be fostered, in spite of the utmost care of the ruling powers. This might certainly be obviated, in a measure, by the frequent change of the native portion of a corps from its European base; but the amalgamation will thereby be weakened, and retain none but its worst features.

I have, &c.

W. MAYHEW, Lieut.-Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

RETURN showing the RACES and CASTES of which the NATIVE ARMY was composed on the 1st of April 1858.

Col. Mayhew.

Corps.	European Commissioned Officers.	European Non-commissioned Officers.	Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	Number of each Race and Caste.																Total.			
				Christians.	Mussulmen.	Brahmins.	Rajpoots.	Hindooes of inferior description.	Seikhs.	Punjabees.	Hindoostanees.	Cis-Sutledge.	Trans-Indus.	Hill States of Nepal.	Huzara Tribes.	Affghans.	Goorkas.	Hillmen.	Mhara.		Mhairata.	Bheela.	Moogeahs, Grassuals, and other predatory Tribes.
Artillery	6	4	2,241	-	553	77	88	445	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,168
Light Cavalry	26	3	1,259	23	624	344	231	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,259
Infantry (Regular)	248	47	21,838	486	3,590	6,203	6,404	4,326	135	192	-	-	-	-	590	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21,928
Infantry (Irregular).	240	29	42,715	20	1,853	1,532	2,911	3,821	3,504	15,286	896	2,270	2,867	358	23	52	271	3,677	566	915	803	223	41,828
Cavalry (Irregular).	94	-	10,703	41	3,531	350	540	181	833	2,401	1,219	167	467	19	-	105	29	2	-	-	-	-	10,194
Artillery (Irregular).	10	6	998	-	-	-	-	-	-	465	38	15	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	553
Subundy Sappers and Miners.	1	2	209	-	2	18	179	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	209
Total	625	91	80,053	572	10,452	8,526	10,362	8,818	4,472	18,474	2,158	2,452	3,339	877	23	137	890	3,679	566	915	803	223	77,133
N.B.—Aggregate of corps the races of which are not shown in the Returns																				2,920			
				Grand Total																80,053			

Adjutant-General's Office, Head-Quarters, Allahabad, August 13, 1858.

W. MAYHEW, Lieut.-Col., Adjutant-General of the Army.

(No. 2505.)

INFANTRY.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1, 2. The articles of war for the native troops are sufficient for every purpose, if enforced; but they have been so neutralized by the many special regulations against inflicting the punishments of flogging and imprisonment that commanding officers of corps are practically almost powerless. Since corporal punishment has been, to all intents and purposes, abolished, it has become a very common feeling amongst the sepoy that, do what they may, they can only be dismissed or sent to drill; and their European officers have felt keenly that such has really been the case for years past. The only middle course, that of simple imprisonment, has been a mockery, as there never has been a proper place to carry it out, nor any restrictions as to the food or personal comforts of a prisoner confined in the quarter-guard of a corps.

3. In the native army the scope of trial by court-martial never has been properly understood, and native courts have ever been a by-word. The European superintending officer and the interpreter have always been the judges at such tribunals. The sooner they are done away with *in toto* the better. Courts composed entirely of European officers would, I am persuaded, be more popular with the native troops generally.

4, 5. The articles of war may be read half-a-dozen times a year to the troops under arms, but no other means of explaining them to the men have been had recourse to generally. Not above ten men per company can read in the vernacular dialect of the articles of war; indeed, education is on the most primitive footing throughout the native army of Bengal; nor do the men care to improve themselves in that respect, although they have the means placed at their disposal for the purpose.

6, 7, 8. I have not the means of replying satisfactorily to these questions, but I apprehend that officers commanding police corps are less restricted as to rewarding and punishing their men than those of the line; and that, consequently, their authority depends more on their personal conduct and aptitude for command.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. Promotion in the army is based almost exclusively on seniority, although by regulation it should depend somewhat on merit and education; and Government, in its anxiety to secure the affections of the sepoy,

has countenanced the practice till it has grown into a system, which the general good behaviour of the native soldiery has, to a great extent, rendered comparatively harmless.

2, 3, 4. The native officers in most corps of the line are old and worn out before they obtain the rank of jemadar; and their struggle onwards for a higher rate of pension is an incumbrance to the service and a pain to themselves. They are in no wise superior to the generality of the men amongst whom they have risen merely by seniority. Old age and decrepitude have not generally been considered bars to promotion to the commissioned grades, nor has any test or examination as to mental or bodily fitness been generally resorted to where character has been respectable.

5. Such native officers are not likely to weaken the influence of their European superiors; indeed, every trifle in a company is generally referred to the latter by the former, who cares not to take upon himself the responsibility and risk of deciding a case that may be reversed by his superiors.

6. The native officers have apparently always been the tools rather than the leaders of their corps, and have joined them in all the excesses they have been guilty of. In the present disorganization of the Bengal army, but few of them appear to have been influential for good or evil, and fewer still have sided actively with the European officers, although all of them must have been well aware of the mischief that was brooding in the ranks of every regiment.

7. In an army composed on the irregular system, such as I have suggested, native commissioned officers will be necessary to carry on the current duties of a corps; but they should be selected for superior education and intelligence and character, and never advanced in grade unless found fully equal to their position morally and physically.

8. Certainly, European serjeants and corporals would be a bad substitute for native officers in a corps. It is with great difficulty that we have managed to secure two good staff serjeants to a native regiment; and I apprehend that such an experiment, on a larger scale, would be found impracticable, and that these men would have no weight.

9, 10. The first question has been disposed of, and the inefficacy of every bond, whether of pay, pension, or honours, to secure the fidelity of the native army, has been proved beyond a doubt by the rebellion still prevailing generally in its ranks.

11. Most certainly, as I have said before.

12. The whole system of pensions, as a *right*, should be withdrawn from the native soldier, and he should

Col. Mayhew.

be very distinctly taught that, in future, they will be granted solely as *rewards* for merit and efficient service; and the sooner this is proclaimed the better, as I fear a misconception on this point prevails in the native army now arising in every quarter.

13. I have not the means of answering this question.

14. Not one native officer in a hundred has any acquaintance with the system on which trial by court-martial is based. In their own corps they generally prejudge a case, and are obstinate in adhering to their opinion, however opposed to the evidence produced; and they finally conform, solely at the instigation of the European officers on the court, to a legal judgment.

15. Certainly not generally at present.

16. The organization which prevails in the regiments of Kelati, Ghibzee, Loodianah, and Ferozepore is the best adapted to a native army, such as I have proposed to reconstruct. European officers can be lent to such a corps when required for field service; and at other times the full complement of native officers would, under the supervision of its European staff, be fully equal to its discipline and various duties in cantonments.

17. Not applicable.

18. If commissions, with present rates of pay and advantages, be given to the irregular and police corps, and denied to regular corps, and good service pay and pension substituted, of course the former service will offer the greatest advantages, and be the most popular.

19. Not applicable.

20, 21. The distinct organization of the armies of the three presidencies is beneficial to the security of the British power over so extended a territory, and amongst such various tribes, all of whom are closely attached to their homes and customs. I conceive that amalgamation would be impracticable. Indeed, the Bombay army has at present a larger admixture of the Bengal element than is desirable; and the fidelity of these troops has, in consequence, been more than suspected during the rebellion.

Sept. 4, 1858. W. MAYHEW, Lieut.-Col.,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

(No. 2722.)

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. The powers of commanding officers of native corps of the line have been very much curtailed since Lord William Bentinck's rule over the Bengal army. A system of centralization of all business in the department of the Military Secretary to Government has deprived of real power or influence every other branch of the service. These changes have been brought about so gradually and in so many different ways, that the process cannot easily be traced, but the result is very manifest.

2. The same cause has operated to the like effect throughout the service.

3. The diminution of the power and influence of commanding officers has had a ruinous effect on the native soldiery. The sepoy used to look up to his "colonel" as the source of all reward and punishment, and as the only medium he had of communicating with the Government, of which he knew nothing nor it of him; whereas he is now told that his commander is unable to decide on most questions affecting his rights, and that all he can do is to refer them to that unknown and remote power which he does not understand, but dreads.

4. Officers commanding companies have shared in a very great measure with their commanding officers in the loss of influence over their men; attention to their wants and punctuality in bringing forward their claims still secures to many captains the affection of their men, but the necessity of appealing to a distant power and the uncertainty of the result, go very far to undermine their confidence in the only European

they have to depend upon, and whose verdict they would gladly look up to as their law.

5. The discipline of a corps on service, and everywhere, depends on the authority and personal influence of its officers, and the more they can exert both the better will a corps behave, whether in quarters or in the field. A soldier naturally looks to his captain first, and to his colonel afterwards, to recognise any good conduct he may have displayed; he is necessarily unknown to every other authority, and can look for no reward at its hands.

6. The powers of all British officers with whom the native soldiery come in daily contact should be increased considerably, so as to show that the Government which both serve has confidence in those it has placed in immediate authority over its native military subjects.

7. Discipline will be very much improved if the articles of war be carried out strictly, and unchecked by the innumerable provisions which have of late years rendered them rather nominal than real. A more rapid distribution of justice will also tend vastly to infuse vigour into the system.

8. The influence of an officer over his men is created in peace time for exercise in war. Native soldiers have no confidence in officers of whom they know nothing, and to whom they are not personally attached, and to whom they cannot look up for support on the score of long association; mere dash will seldom induce a sepoy to follow an unknown leader into danger.

9, 10, 11. I have before given as my opinion that the native army should be reorganized on the irregular system, and commanded by a few carefully selected officers capable of inspiring their men with confidence and respect for the European character and authority, and to whom they could confidently look for speedy and undisputed settlement of their rights and deserts. Hitherto, corps of the line have been ruined in discipline by the constant detachment of men in small bodies from head quarters for the innumerable duties for which police corps are alone adapted. They have consequently had at most stations but little leisure for other employment, and I very much doubt whether it would have been practicable to employ them on public works. The same class of men enlisted heretofore readily in the corps of sappers and miners, and did not feel themselves lowered in general estimation by manual labour; but the system of the service generally had become so opposed to such employment that it would have been difficult to introduce it. To work with the axe and spade should be one of the stipulations made with every soldier admitted to the service henceforth; he has shown during the war how ably he can entrench against us.

12. Answered before fully.

13, 14. All young officers should serve the first year or two with an European corps, and be perfectly instructed in drill; they might then join a native corps, if they showed an aptitude for the native languages and characteristics joined with temper and judgment.

15. The quality rather than the number of the officers present with a native corps has made it good or bad for the time being, and the reputation of a regiment very generally changes with its officers; its best ones should not therefore be taken away for staff employment.

16. During the late revolt, the best and most appreciated officers have been killed first, to put a stop at once to all influence they might exert over the better disposed soldiers; but corps with many and few officers have mutinied equally.

17, 18, 19. I have explained before how officers can be made available for staff employments, by withdrawing them from the native corps of the line, or

the strength of which they will be borne merely for the sake of general promotion on the seniority system. This arrangement would at the same time facilitate a change from staff to regimental duty, and *vice versa*, without materially interfering with the efficiency of a corps or checking the very natural ambition of every officer to be brought on the staff of the army

after a fair period of regimental duty, and thus also would the standard of acquirements be kept up throughout the service.

Col. Mayhew.

I have, &c.
W. MAYHEW, Lt. Col.,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

September 15, 1858.

No. 8.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM COLONEL KEITH YOUNG, JUDGE ADVOCATE-GENERAL.

Col. K. Young

From Colonel KEITH YOUNG, to Lieut. Col. DURAND,
C.B.

(No. 702.)

Judge Advocate-General's Office,
Head-Quarters, Allahabad,
June 25, 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE herewith the honour to forward replies to the queries received with your letter No. 81, of the 16th instant. The replies to the further series of questions, which I have since received, shall have immediate attention.

2. I may remark that the many and responsible duties of the Judge Advocate's Department leave me little leisure for entering minutely into the different questions on which my opinion has been asked, and I hope, if there are any points on which a further exposition of my views is required, that you will do me the favour of bringing them to my notice, and I shall be prepared to furnish such additional explanations as may appear requisite to elucidate the matter.

I have, &c.
KEITH YOUNG, Col.,
Judge Advocate-General of the Army.

The Oath for Sikh Recruits.

" I, inhabitant of son of
" swear by the Gooroo Grunth Sahibjee, and if I tell
" a falsehood may the Gooroo Grunth Sahib cause
" misfortune to descend upon me, that I will never
" forsake or abandon my colours; that I will march
" wherever I am directed whether within or beyond
" the Company's territories; that I will implicitly obey
" all the orders of my commanders, and in everything
" behave myself as becomes a good soldier and faith-
" ful servant of the Company; and, failing in any
" part of my duty as such I will submit to the penal-
" ties described in the articles of war, which have
" been read to me."

10. The oath first came into operation when the articles of war of 1796 were published. The Sikh oath was first published to the army in general orders of the 7th October 1853.

11. I am doubtful as to any advantage that is likely to accrue from swearing in recruits. The results of the last year have clearly shown how entirely powerless any form of oath has been to secure the fidelity of the sepoy. All have alike gone, those, who it may be presumed from education or from superior intelligence knew well the importance to be attached to an oath, as well as the more ignorant, who regarded it probably as a mere form to be forgotten as soon as it was made. I can scarcely believe that the oath kept one sepoy true to his allegiance; no disgrace attaches in their minds to breaking it. The disgrace rests only on the punishment, and there is no advantage in the administration of an oath that might not I believe be equally gained by simply declaring to a sepoy at the time of his enlistment that he was expected to obey implicitly his superiors, and to go wherever he was ordered, whether by sea or land, and that no objection made by him hereafter would be received as an excuse for disobedience. If, however, it is considered desirable that the formality of swearing in recruits should be observed, I think it will be well to introduce the form in use in general service corps, and to lay down clear and defined rules for the manner in which the oath is to be administered, and the period after enlistment when it is to be taken.

12. Apply to the Adjutant-General's Department.

13. Ditto, ditto.

14, 15, 16, 17, 18. I should like to see all plans fairly tried, and I think myself it would be very desirable to have some corps recruited entirely from certain castes or certain districts. For instance, corps exclusively composed of Sikhs, Rajpoots, Gwalas, Beloches, Goorkhas, Punjabbees, Oude men, and Bhajpoores; and again I would propose having other regiments in which the companies were similarly composed, the regiments thus containing men of all castes and from all districts, but the companies being men entirely of one caste or one district. The latter organization would, I think, be found to be preferable for the mass of the native army, as corps exclusively composed of one caste or recruited in one district would have too much of nationality about them, and I conceive it would not be either politic or prudent to encourage national regiments, except to a very limited extent.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. This question can be better answered in the Adjutant-General's Department.

2. This also. But I may remark that Oude and the adjacent districts that were formerly under the Oude Government furnish about three-fourths of the recruits for the Bengal infantry. Bhojepore and Northern Behar supply also many very good Infantry recruits.

3. Most of the lower castes are excluded, but the Adjutant-General's Department can reply to this fully.

4. Yes; but I would exclude no race, tribe, or caste now, provided the men were physically fit for the service.

5. The Adjutant-General's Department will answer this.

6. Ditto, ditto.

7. Ditto, ditto.

8. Ditto, ditto.

9. The following is the oath sanctioned by authority, but in practice the words, " I will go wherever I am ordered, whether by sea or land," have been introduced into the form of oath administered to recruits in general service regiments.

" I, A. B., inhabitant of village,
" pergunnah, subdah, son of
" do swear that I will never forsake
" or abandon my colours, that I will march wherever
" I am directed, whether within or beyond the Com-
" pany's territories; that I will implicitly obey all the
" orders my commanders, and in everything behave
" myself as becomes a good soldier and faithful servant
" the Company; and failing in any part of my duty
" as such, I will submit to the penalties described in
" the articles of war, which have been read to me."

Col. K. Young.

Some regiments again should, I think, be composed of men of all castes, creeds, and countries, and posted to companies indiscriminately as in the native army of Bombay, and as has been heretofore the custom in Bengal. The principal objection raised to this plan is that the men cannot, when so organized, be brought to cook in messes, but this is a matter of not so much importance as it at first sight appears to be, for as a general rule all natives of India cook for themselves; but whether or not, they invariably carry their few simple cooking utensils with them in their pack; and if messing were established throughout the native army, each man would still preserve his own individual cooking utensils, and the baggage of the army would be in nowise decreased by the arrangement.

But I should like to see all *three* modes of organization fairly tried, and it will probably be found that each has its separate advantages, and that it will be desirable to adopt and retain all three different plans.

19. The police should not be men of the districts in which they are stationed.

20. No.

21, 22, 23, and 24. These are questions that can be better answered by the adjutant-general and superintendent of police.

25. I think it will be very desirable to enlist natives of other tropical countries, and I would dispose of them as recommended for natives of India, that is, in separate regiments, in separate companies of a regiment composed of any caste or class, and in regiments where men of all castes and creeds are posted indiscriminately to companies.

26 and 27. These are questions that require greater knowledge than I possess of the countries where recruits are likely to be procurable.

28, 29, 30, 31, and 32. I would not advocate having companies of Europeans attached to native regiments.

33. In my opinion they should be armed with the common percussion musket and bayonet.

34. A portion with the common percussion musket and bayonet, the rest with swords and spears.

35. I see no advantage to be gained in servilely imitating the dress of European troops.

36. I should think there could be no better dress than that in use in most of the Punjab regiments, with a turban head-dress. The colour of the dress might vary in different corps, and be red, green, or khakee, according to choice.

37. I would deprecate having any large body of natives intimately associated with European troops; but there is one class of whose services I think we might with advantage avail ourselves in small numbers, and attach them as auxiliaries to all European regiments, both Queen's and Company's. I allude to the class who supply these corps with cook-boys; these men are generally, and I may say always, of very low caste, and they seem distinct from all other natives who enter the service of Europeans. They are always considered to be a faithful body of men, and so far as I know have invariably behaved well throughout the late disturbances, clinging as it were to the regiments to which they belong, and considering themselves indeed as part and parcel of the corps. They look up to the men for protection, and though there may be instances in which they are maltreated, these are but of rare occurrence, while they do not seem to object to the rough and rude behaviour they meet with. My proposal would be to have a company raised of these men, to be attached to each European regiment of cavalry and infantry in the service. The company to consist of 100 privates, and to be organized and completed with native commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the manner that may be decided upon for the regular native corps of the army. I would attach to the company two European officers, to be specially selected for their knowledge of the language, the senior to command and to draw a command allowance of 100 rupees a month, and the junior 50. These companies would be very useful in saving the Europeans from exposure, and in actual warfare they might

be of essential service in guarding convoys and taking numerous duties, upon which it would otherwise be necessary to employ European soldiers.

I have proposed there being a company of infantry attached to each cavalry regiment also, as the native infantry soldiers would be equally useful in relieving the European trooper of many harassing duties, and they would always be able to keep up with the regiment in long forced marches, by taking advantage of the numerous ponies that accompany cavalry in this country.

38, 39, 40, and 41. The artillery branch of the service should be exclusively composed of Europeans as far as practicable.

42. I think that in reorganizing the native army the object should be to avoid as much as possible anything likely to instil an independent spirit of self-reliance in the sepoy, and that we should foster in him a feeling of dependence upon his European comrade. This feeling, however, all native soldiers more or less possess, and are not likely to lose, and in none is it more conspicuous than amongst the Sikhs and Goorkhas, who have fought side by side with the Europeans during the present war, and would willingly go anywhere with them. They have a confidence in the European which they have not in their own countrymen.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

Replies.

1. Until something is definitely settled regarding the organization of the native army, it will, I think, be premature to take the question of articles of war into consideration. I may remark that about two years ago very extensive changes were proposed in the present native articles of war. The amended articles, to which the then commander-in-chief, General the Hon. G. Anson, had given much attention, were approved of by his Excellency, and were sent on to Government, but nothing has been heard of them since. They are probably with the Legislative Council, having been detained pending the arrangements for reconstructing the native army; but whatever the constitution of that army may be, many more changes in the articles of war will be necessary beyond those already recommended.

Postponing the discussion of the question, as before observed, till the organization of the army has been to some extent decided upon, I would observe that by whatever military code the army is to be governed, it should, in my opinion, be left to the commander-in-chief to determine, with the sanction of Government, what the provisions of that code are to be. It is scarcely possible that the Legislative Council, composed as it is almost entirely of non-military gentlemen, should have a sufficient knowledge of the requirements of the army to decide with advantage on the questions likely to come before them connected with the articles of war, and for the good working of which, after they may become law, the commander-in-chief will always be considered the responsible party. The long delay too that there must be in making necessary amendments from time to time, or in introducing any fresh article that the commander-in-chief may deem essential for preserving discipline, are, I think, strong reasons why it should be pronounced inexpedient to continue in the Legislative Council the power of framing articles of war.

Whatever therefore may be the future of the Bengal native army, I think it will be desirable to propose to the Legislative Council at the appropriate time to pass an act abolishing the present native articles of war, and to vest authority in the commander-in-chief with the sanction of the Governor-General in Council, to frame such articles, rules, or regulations as he may consider expedient from time to time for the preservation of discipline in the Bengal army. If it should be found, however, that though the Legislative Council can annul the existing articles, the intervention of Par-

liament is required to allow of Government and the commander-in-chief providing a substitute for them, I think it will be desirable to address the Home Government on the subject. A similar provision to that recommended might be made for the armies of the other presidencies, or if thought proper, the mode of dealing with the more serious offences in all three presidencies might be left to be declared by the Supreme Government.

In elucidation of the evils resulting from framing articles of war under a legislative enactment, I may mention that by the greater portion of the present native army, consisting of Seikhs and levies of all kinds, the articles of war are understood to be ignored altogether, commanding officers proceeding for the trial and punishment of offenders under magisterial authority. I have no official knowledge that such is the case, but it is a matter of general notoriety, so that although it is declared by the articles that all native soldiers are to be subject to them, they are entirely set aside and treated with a disregard but ill-calculated to ensure respect for legislative enactments, and there is besides for after consideration the illegality of all trials held otherwise than under the authority of the articles of war. Were the power of making them vested in the commander-in-chief, matters might have been properly provided for at once, and all illegal proceedings avoided.

2. Answered in the preceding.

3. I think that under the present system of trials by native courts-martial substantial justice is administered, and what is more, I believe the sepoys think so too, but I am at the same time of opinion that equally satisfactory results might be arrived at by less complex machinery, and the majority of cases now tried by native courts-martial might be disposed of with advantage by commanding officers of regiments, provided that these officers are selected officers, not merely succeeding by seniority, and that their proceedings are open to proper supervision. This arrangement would be one entirely consonant with native habits and feelings, who love despotic power, whether as the governor or the governed, and for the future it seems unquestionable that the hands of commanding officers must be strengthened if a severe discipline is to be maintained.

4. Under the provisions of the 158th article of war certain named portions of the native articles are directed to be read every three months at the head of every regiment, troop, or company, mustered in the service, and to every recruit at the period of his attestation. Such standing rules and regulations as there may be in regiments are read and explained at fixed times, as may be directed by the commanding officers of regiments; and whenever any general order is published affecting the native army, it is translated and read to every regiment. If a sepoy errs, it ought not to be from ignorance of the penalty that attaches to his offence.

5. The record of regiments will show this.

6. The police corps are not amenable to the articles of war. The superintendent of police will best be able to explain under what code they are governed.

7. The superintendent of police will be best able to answer this question.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

Replies.

1. As a general rule on seniority, but merit has to a certain extent, though a very trifling one, something to say to the matter. But this question, and indeed all those under the same head, will be better answered in the department of the adjutant-general of the army.

2. Certainly not; with rare exceptions, native officers are mostly worn out before they attain their commission, and from this a judgment can be formed of their efficiency. As to intelligence, they are much on a par with the rest of the regiment, and if a judgment is to be formed of their usefulness from the benefit that their services have been to Government

during the late mutinies, the verdict will not be in their favour. They have seldom offered any check to the misconduct of the men, and if they have not openly joined them, they have rarely been found to have given notice of their intended mutinous proceedings, of which they must have been well cognizant.

But still in my opinion native officers should be maintained, for soldiers must have something to look forward to in the way of promotion and reward, and those promoted for good conduct or meritorious qualifications of any kind, without reference to seniority, are more likely to remain faithful and attached to our rule than where a contrary system prevails. It may be argued that in the late mutinies native officers, whether promoted by seniority or by merit, having been found to be useless, they should be done away with altogether, but by a similar train of reasoning it might be shown to be inexpedient to keep up any native army at all. We must have a native army, and we must have some system of promotion in it, call those promoted confirmed officers, or by whatever designation you like.

3. As a general rule the acquirements of native officers are not superior to those of the men; but I may remark, that a sepoy of superior acquirements would be tolerably certain, if a well-conducted soldier, of being promoted sooner than his less gifted comrades.

4. No, none.

5. No. I am not aware that the intervention of the native officers weaken the influence of the European officers. A great deal depends upon the character of these officers respectively, and if the European officer does his duty, it is not in the power of the native officer to weaken his legitimate influence with his men. Of course, if European officers neglect their duty, the native officers can do nearly as they like.

As therefore remarked, there is not, as a general rule, any professional efficiency in the native commissioned officers.

6. My experience of mutineers is very limited; but I believe it may be stated without contradiction, that the instances in which native commissioned officers have given timely information of intended risings are very exceptional, but when mutiny has once broken out, they have very often sided with their European officers. During the late mutiny however, their leaning has rather been towards the mutineers, on the ground, I believe, that they were deserting a hopeless cause, that they were abandoning, in fact, a sinking ship.

7. In my opinion the grades of native commissioned officers should not only be maintained, but they might be increased in number, so that no soldier should be left during his whole service without seeing before him the chance of continued prospective advancement.

8. No; I do not think it would be advisable to have an increase of European non-commissioned officers with native regiments under any circumstances. This class of men are not as a general rule calculated to exercise a proper supervision over native soldiers.

9. I would prefer having native commissioned officers, as remarked in my reply to Question No. 7.

10. The result of the late mutinies shows that retiring pensions were ineffectual in attaching native troops to the service, but at the same time it may be observed that the impression amongst them was almost universal that the British Government was extinct, and that consequently their pensions were lost to them. It stands to reason that men in the receipt of pensions, or expectant of them, are far less likely to join in pulling down a government that it is their interest to protect than others differently situated, and I have no doubt that under ordinary circumstances pensions work a very salutary effect. There is not likely to be another mutiny that will sweep away, as did the last apparently, all confidence in the stability of Government, and it was under the impression of this feeling that very many of the men joined in the revolutionary movement.

Col. K. Young.

Col. K. Young.

11. Yes; in my opinion merit and efficiency should be the tests of promotion, and I would leave all in the hands of commanding officers of regiments, removing them summarily from their commands if they were found to abuse the trust reposed in them.

12. The system of pensions in operation in the Bengal army should undergo a searching examination before anything is decided on the subject, and it should be compared with the systems prevailing in the presidencies of Madras and Bombay. I know nothing of the former; but in the latter it is understood to be the practice to invalid in the native army men comparatively young in age and constitution, and who would be certain of being rejected if sent up before an invaliding committee in Bengal. No doubt the pension list in the Bombay presidency is proportionably much larger than in Bengal, but the Bombay system is in my opinion the correct one, and I may add also that it is actually the cheaper of the two; for in Bengal the worn-out men so frequently seen in our ranks are in fact pensioners, and receiving a higher rate of pay than they would if invalidated. It is true the amount paid them does not appear under the head of pension, but it ought to be so included whenever pay is given to men unable to do longer service. It would be better far to decrease the strength of your army than keep ineffectives in it.

13. Pension paymasters will be able to answer this.

14. Native commissioned officers are of use at a court-martial in sifting the particulars of the case under trial, but this, I think, is all. They have a voice in the verdict; but as regards the sentence, they are mostly guided altogether by the European officers superintending the proceedings, and it is perhaps as well that it should be so, their ideas and ours of the punishments required to maintain discipline being very different. I remember some years ago, when conducting the proceedings of a general native court-martial upon the trial of a sepoy charged with wounding a British officer at Loodianah, that after the man was declared guilty, and the sentence came under the consideration of the court, the first native officer gave his opinion that a month or six weeks' imprisonment in the quarter-guard would be a sufficient punishment. The matter was argued amongst them for some time, and a sentence of death was at last decided upon, and the man was executed. But it was a long time before the court arrived at this decision, and had they been

left to themselves it is possible enough that the punishment might have been, as originally proposed, a few weeks' imprisonment in the quarter-guard. I should see no objection to native officers sitting on a court-martial so long as they are under proper control.

15. Certainly not.

16. I think the best organization for native corps will be to have them as irregular corps are at present, but with a slight addition of European officers.

17. This question will be best answered by those who have had more to do with police than I have; but in my opinion their organization should be of a similar nature to that of the native army, as recommended in my previous reply, but with fewer European officers; the authority of the commanding officer of a police regiment being supreme in everything relating to his corps.

18. With reference to previous replies, no reply to this question seems called for.

19. The superintendent of police will answer this.

20. Yes; to my judgment the distinct organization of the armies of the three presidencies have proved very favourable to our power in India. The differences that there are between them have prevented a coalition that would probably have been fatal to our rule.

21. There, no doubt, is much in the system of the army of each presidency that might with advantage be grafted on the others; but I would advocate as little interference as possible with what each presidency considers best for its own native army, and there is an undoubted benefit to be derived in troublous times like those through which we have passed in having armies or portions of armies swayed by different intervals. Had the three armies been assimilated, as argued for by some people, we might have had the whole of our troops in mutiny instead of only the Bengal portion of it. I may remark, however, that supposing it were in contemplation to carry out what appears to me very objectionable, the measure of assimilating or rather amalgamating the three armies, I fear in practice there would be insuperable difficulties, especially as regards the Madras army. It is to be hoped these difficulties will operate to prevent any attempt at amalgamation, which I am convinced would be a step in the wrong direction.

KEITH YOUNG, Colonel,

Judge Advocate-General of the Army.

July 9, 1858.

No. 9.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM BRIGADIER COLIN TROUP.

Brigadier
Colin Troup.

From Brigadier TROUP to Lieut-Col. DURAND, C.B.
SIR,

Bareilly, August 11, 1858.

In reply to your letter, No. 86, of the 16th of June last, received with the series of questions connected with the reorganization of the native infantry of the Bengal army, which, with my replies thereto, are herewith forwarded, I have the honour to state, that from the loss of all my property, amongst which there were documents containing memoranda, the accumulation of many years, connected with the subject, and having no orders or books of any kind to refer to, I have had to trust entirely to memory; and understanding from your letter now under reply that my answers to the different questions were required with the least practicable delay, I regret that from the circumstances, and from the fact of having had to prepare them through many interruptions, they will be found not so full or complete as I could have wished.

I have, &c.

COLIN TROUP, Brigadier,
Commander at Bareilly.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bengal army is composed?
 1. Generally of Brahmins, Rajpoots, Gwallas, and Mahomedans, there are some others of inferior caste, but the proportion is comparatively small.
 2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?
 2. Chiefly from the province of Oude, Buxar, Bojpoor, and Arrah, but many, although not in such numbers, are drawn from Agra, Etawah, Mynpooree, Cawnpore, Allahabad, Azimgurh, Jounpore, Benares, and Ghazeepore.
 3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army?
 3. Yes, many have been excluded, both by the regulations and by the practice of the Bengal army.

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4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army?
4. I think there are several.
5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?
5. Excepting when necessary to send out recruiting parties, which is seldom required, the bulk of recruits were brought by the men of the regiment returning from temporary leave or furlough, but many of the relations of the men came of themselves from their homes to be enlisted in the regiment in cantonments.
6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of district?
6. If the enlistments are made by recruiting parties, each recruit on enlistment should be taken to the theseldar of the district in whose jurisdiction the village he belongs to is situated, that the theseldar may verify the name, caste, parentage, and residence of the recruit. Lists of recruits, with the theseldar's signature, should be shown to the district officer, from which he should prepare a nominal roll of recruits, and hand it over to the recruiting officer for delivery to the commanding officer of the regiment. If the enlistment is made at regimental head-quarters, the adjutant has to prepare monthly rolls in duplicate for each district of all recruits, and forward them to the district officer, who keeps one copy for registry in his office, and returns the other, duly verified, to regimental head-quarters.
7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?
7. I am not aware that by the regulations of the service any precautions are directed, nor do I know what was the practice generally throughout the army, and although I am quite convinced that had the orders for the registry of recruits been rigidly carried out instead of being in most instances slurred over by the local authorities, that it would have been most beneficial in its results, so little faith had I in it that in the regiments I commanded I had, in addition to the registry, a committee of native officers, aided by the regimental pundit and moulvie, to examine all recruits enlisted in the regiment; and as I never took one who could not get a man of the corps to be his security, I held him responsible for the recruit until he was dismissed drill and joined the ranks. This committee was relieved weekly, and after the recruit had been passed by it as to caste, parentage, place of residence, &c., his descriptive roll, with the number, name, and company of his security was entered in a book kept for the purpose, signed by the president of the committee, and by the surgeon of the regiment, that he was fit for the service. I regret to state, however, that notwithstanding all these precautions, I found that I had in many instances been imposed upon as regarded the recruit's caste and place of residence.
8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army)?
8. I am of opinion that there should be three permanent recruiting depôts, with a commandant of experience, a surgeon, and two European serjeants to each, established for providing the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army with recruits; one at Buxar, to provide all corps at and below Benares; one at Lucknow, to supply all corps at and below Allahabad as far as Umballa; and another in the

Punjab, to supply all corps stationed there and at Ferozepore, so as to make the depôts efficient without being expensive. I would suggest that each depôt should have a certain number of men from each regiment in their circle always present at the depôt, and that each commanding officer should, on the 1st of each month, forward to the officer commanding the depôt of his circle a return, showing the number of men wanting to complete his regiment on that date; on receipt of this return the commandant of the depôt would, from amongst the men present belonging to the regiment at the depôt, detach a sufficient number to procure the recruits required, and as soon as they were brought in, passed by the surgeon, and duly registered, they should, under the care of a suitable number of the men of the regiment present at the depôt, be forwarded on to their regiments. By this simple arrangement the army would, at a very trifling expense, be always kept complete with efficient men, and the State would never be put to the expense of paying for more men than was actually necessary to complete the army. Added to which, the system would have the good effect of giving a certain portion of deserving men extra leave. Those on duty from corps at the depôt would not, of course, be entitled to any extra batta. As far as regards races, tribes, and castes, with the exception of Christians, who, in my opinion, should never be allowed to serve in the ranks amongst natives, I think the service should be thrown open to all tribes and castes without distinction; in fact, so long as a man is in other respects considered fit for the service, his caste or tribe, with the exception of Christians, should be no bar to him; although I should be glad to see separate corps of native Christians, who, I feel certain, would answer very well.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?
9. "I, *pergunah*, inhabitant of *province*, son of *do swear that I will never forsake nor abandon my colours; that I will march wherever I am directed, whether within or beyond the Company's territories; that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes a good soldier and a faithful servant of the Company; and in failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to the penalties described in the articles of war which have been read to me.*" The above oath is administered to all recruits in front of the colours, in presence of the regiment, paraded for the purpose. The time for administering the oath is when the recruit has been dismissed drill and previous to his joining the ranks as a soldier, the articles of war being first read to him:
- The following oath is the one administered to Sikh soldiers:—
- "I, *inhabitant of*, son of *swear by the Gooroo Grunth Sahibjee, and if I tell a falsehood may the Gooroo Grunth Sahibjee cause misfortune to descend upon me, that I will never forsake, &c. &c.*" (as above).
10. How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army?
10. I really cannot tell, but as far as my memory serves me, I am not aware, excepting for general service and Sikh regiments, that there has been any change in the oath of allegiance administered to the recruits since I have been in the service.
11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits for the native infantry of the Bengal army?
11. I think the oath should run thus:—
- "Do swear that I will never forsake nor abandon my colours; that I will serve in any part of H.M.'s dominions, and cheerfully embark on board of ship

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" whenever required to do so ; that I will implicitly
" obey all orders of my superiors, &c. &c. &c."

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes ?
12. I am not aware that there are any seafaring tribes in the native infantry of the Bengal army ; nor am I aware of the existence of any in the Bengal presidency.
13. Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps, and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited ?
13. I am not aware that the Bengal presidency has any corps of the description indicated.
14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only ?
14. Most certainly not.
15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts ?
15. They should be recruited over the wide area, without any reference to districts.
16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste ?
16. Homogeneous, most certainly.
17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste, or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company ?
17. No ; I do not think the tribes and castes should be mixed up, but homogeneous ; but unless the whole regiment were so, it would be utterly impossible to preserve the companies of men of one tribe and caste, as removals from various causes would require to be made frequently from one company to another, on account of promotion, sizing, equalizing, &c.
18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should races, tribes, or castes be entertained ?
18. If not homogeneous, but composite, the races, tribes, or castes should as far as possible be kept in three equal proportions.
19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts ?
19. In my opinion, there can be no possible objection, the nature of the services being perfectly distinct, to their both recruiting in the same district ; I feel confident that it would make both the police and all corps more efficient if they were recruited from a wide area without reference to districts ; and with this view, the less they are allowed to serve in the vicinity of their homes the better.
20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries, from which men might be drawn for the army corps ?
20. Most certainly not ; the nature of the services are so totally different, that the policeman would contract habits and ideas which would quite unfit him for a soldier ; he would be always more or less discontented, and would not readily bend to discipline.
21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies ?
21. The agency recommended in answer No. 8.
22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency ?
22. I would employ exactly the same agency.
23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency ?
23. Exactly the same as are at present in force, *vide* answer No. 6, with this difference, that the depot officers should be held responsible that the registry of the recruit, as regards parentage, caste, and residence, should be real and not fictitious, as it is at present.
24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency ?
24. I think not ; the same precautions should be adopted for both.
25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise ?
25. I do not think it would be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, nor do I know of any equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country ; should it, however, be deemed advisable to try the experiment, there can be no doubt but Africans would be the best ; but it is a question if they would stand the climate a bit better than our European soldiers, or if they are fit to be trusted one bit more than the natives of the country, for they are famed for being most treacherous, added to which they would be quite as expensive as the European soldier, in which case, I think, we are far better without them. The experiment, however, might be tested by raising one regiment of them on trial, and if after a fair trial it was found to answer, the number might be increased. They should, I think, be formed in separate regiments.
26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred ?
26. The Kaffers from the Cape in preference to any other race.
27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting ?
27. I should think the Governor of the Cape could arrange, through the civil and military authorities there, for getting any number of recruits of this description, and would be by far the best agency.
28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments ?
28. No, most certainly not.
29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief ?
29. I feel quite certain that either of the plans would never be found to answer ; the European and native soldier should be kept distinct as a regiment.
30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops ?
30. On the flanks of the lines. Native lines should, in my opinion, always be in the centre ; and if the proportion of one European soldier to every two natives is maintained in all situations, the army will be a very efficient one.
31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements ?
31. They would ; but there are more serious objec-

tions to the proposal, in my opinion, than the mere complication of commissariat arrangements.

32. How should such companies be armed; with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?
32. Both should be armed alike.
33. How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?
33. With the Enfield rifle.
34. How should the police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?
34. With the common detonating musket at present in use.
35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?
35. It does.
36. How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?
36. I am of opinion that the native soldier of the regular army should, both in dress and in everything else, as far as the system can be made applicable to natives, closely imitate the European soldier in everything.
37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of a European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?
37. I cannot think that this plan would ever be found to answer; my opinion is, that such permanent association with the native would, in the course of a short time, so demoralize the European, that he would only be so in name, the maintenance of discipline, or anything like it, would be impossible; and I must say I should be very sorry to see the proposal put in practice.
38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?
38. Certainly not; the two cases are in no way parallel, the European artilleryman has nothing whatever to do with the gun lascar or driver; he never sees them except on parade, and even there their duties are so perfectly distinct that they never come in collision with each other; but this is quite different to their being mixed up on an equality on duty, which is what I understand from the preceding question, the detrimental result of which would be more than I can possibly explain in the mere answer to a question.
39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?
39. To carry out the object in view, which with very much deference I consider a very erroneous one, they should be as close together as possible.
40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?
40. It would not be favourable, but the very reverse; instead of raising the native to the standard of the European by the arrangement, it would humiliate the European and bring him down to the level of the native, by which that awe of European troops which at present exists, and which it would be well to foster, for doubtless it is a great element of strength, would,

from the intimate and continued association, in a very short time be entirely done away with.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?
41. In my opinion the arrangement would never be found to meet the requirements of the service, although it would doubtless work better in time of war than in peace.
42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?
42. Surely it cannot be for a moment doubted but that the permanent association with European corps would produce the latter sentiment, if the native soldier is systematically trained with the European one, when separated from him, and obliged to act without him, he would be found of little use, for he would have no dependence upon himself; whereas, were he taught to acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, without being dependent on European troops, he would fight all the better when required to act with them.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the Bengal native army?
1. I think I could if I had them by me, but having lost all my books and papers I have nothing to refer to.
2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
2. As far as possible they should be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army.
3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal army?
3. It most certainly does not.
4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bengal army with the military code under which they live and are governed?
4. The articles of war are regularly read and explained to them every three months at a public parade ordered for the purpose.
5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?
5. A very small proportion indeed. I doubt very much if more than fifty men in any regiment could be found who could do so correctly.
6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bengal presidency?
6. I really do not know, for I never had anything to do with them.
7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bengal presidency?
7. I do not know.
8. Do you consider the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?
8. I must here observe, that until very lately there has never been anything like a military police in the Bengal presidency during the thirty-seven years that I have been in it; there has been nothing better than a civil or what is called a burkundaz police, which, in

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the truest sense, is a curse to the population. My association with it and the means of personal observation is so slight, that I can say but little about the military police which has been raised during the present year; but if I am to believe what natives have told me, even making every allowance for their exaggeration, and the very little which has come immediately under my own notice, however good the provisions made, the working is the very reverse of satisfactory.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Bengal native infantry, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. On seniority alone, provided the character is good.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. Very far from it; they are the most stupid, useless, worn-out race that ever existed; no amount of instruction could ever make them efficient or capable of performing their duties, even passably, like the men; when away from the immediate control of the European officer they are not to be trusted.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

3. Certainly not; they are from age and long service so infirm and apathetic that they are generally commanded by, instead of commanding; those under them; added to this, it is quite a mistake to suppose that the mere fact of giving a man a commission made him all at once a native gentleman of influence; so far the contrary, it must be well known to all those who are at all conversant with the native character that however much appearances may be kept up before the European officers, that when away from their control the youngest sepoy in the company, if of a higher caste, was considered a better man than the subadar, and this was productive of the most pernicious consequences as regards discipline and duty, but more especially the manner in which it influenced the minds of native officers when sitting as president and members of courts-martial.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. No, there is not.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers, between the European officers and their men, weaken the influence of the European officers? Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?

5. It does most materially, because the European officer is, in a great measure, compelled, from the position which the native one holds, to repose a trust in him which he is very seldom worthy of.

I do not think so.

6. Has it been found in the native infantry of the Bengal army that on the occurrence of mutinies the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

6. I am not aware of their ever having done so, but, on the contrary, have always practised the grossest deceptions and played a double part throughout. I am not aware, excepting during the recent crisis, that they ever sided openly with the mutineers, although I

am fully aware they always did so secretly, and although they have openly made the show of siding with the European officers on occasions when the men did break out into open mutiny, selfish motives alone induced them to adopt the measure, for there was not one amongst them that did not know and tacitly aid in the coming storm without ever warning their European officers of what was about to take place; and had native officers of regiments, under such circumstances, been summarily dismissed the service, and their promotions filled up from other corps, I feel quite certain that mutiny would have been less frequent in the Bengal native infantry.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

7. Discontinued most certainly.

8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?

8. Most advisable; a system which I have long since advocated; but instead of being supplied from the European troops serving in India to answer the object in view, they should be of a superior class, educated and sent out from England for the express purpose.

9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of services, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

9. This is a subject that I have closely studied for the last twenty years, and have during that period, at various times, got the opinions of men of almost every native regiment in the service, I can therefore speak with the utmost confidence upon it. No man on entering the service ever thinks of looking forward to the higher grades, so much so that by far the greater majority of them would, had they the option, take their pension after serving fifteen years; I could, had I space here, give ample proof of this. The fact of the old native commissioned and non-commissioned officers clinging so pertinaciously to the service, as they generally do, has, I know, deceived many, who have not given the matter that study which it is worthy of, into the belief that they remain on in the service in the hope of gaining distinction and a higher rate of pension; but in reality this is not the true cause, as I have it from the men themselves; the fact is, that many of them remain on in the service so long that they have outlived their families, and have no home to go to; others again say, "I have remained in the service until I am so old that I would be useless at home, therefore the best thing I can do for my family is to continue in it as long as I can, and save all the money I can for their benefit, but had I been allowed, I should have been very glad to have taken my pension after having served twenty-one years." My opinion is, that the pay of the regular native soldier should be fixed at 8 rupees per month in all situations, that the non-commissioned officers should be paid exactly as at present, and that there should be no such thing as marching batta, carriage at a certain rate per man when marching; and lines, when in cantonments, should be furnished by the State, this, with a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of services, regulated on the same system as that in Her Majesty's army, would in my opinion make the native soldier more contented and efficient than he has ever been, and more than compensate for the loss of the commissioned grades.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service ?
10. They certainly ought to have had this effect, and it was generally supposed, even by the most experienced officers, that it was so, but recent events fully prove such not to have been the case.
11. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule ?
11. Most certainly promotion for merit and efficiency ought to be the rule generally, but I do hope, that under any circumstances, the native commissioned grades will cease to exist.
12. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished ?
12. They should be prospectively abolished.
13. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal native infantry ?
13. I do not know, but I am aware it is something ruinously large.
14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial ?
14. No, they are not.
15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency ?
15. Most certainly they are not.
16. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps ?
1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers ; or,
 2. Fully officered with European, but, have no native commissioned grades ; or,
 3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers ?
16. To be efficient as a military body, and capable of acting as useful soldiers, they should be fully officered with European commissioned and two European non-commissioned officers to each company, but should have no native commissioned officers ; unless organized in this way, if ever called upon to act against a disciplined enemy, instead of being of any use as soldiers, they will become both a dangerous, undisciplined, and disgraceful rabble. In my opinion infantry soldiers, but more particularly native ones, cannot have too much European supervision to render them efficient ; and if the military corps are to be kept separate from the police ones, and not broken up and detached in small parties all over the country on police duties, far removed from the eye of the European officer, sometimes for several months together, as used to be the case, if pains is taken in the recruiting and training, I will venture to say, the British soldier excepted, they will be equal to any in the world.
17. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades ?
17. The infantry police should have no native commissioned officers ; each corps should have a commandant, a second in command, and adjutant, a surgeon, and two European serjeants and two corporals, besides the usual number of native non-commissioned officers to each company. Surely after the fearful warning we have had it would be needless for me to impress upon my superiors the necessity there is for an extended European supervision throughout the

length and breadth of the land, for they may rest assured that no native, of whatever rank, is worthy of trust without it.

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18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits ?
18. I think so ; but I consider it most objectionable and very impolitic that soldiers being paid by and serving the same government should have such a difference in their organization.
19. In police corps, is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades ?
19. I cannot speak positively on this point, but I think there is no such test on promotion or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing on admission, or if there is, they are very superficial indeed.
20. Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies proved favourable to our power in India ?
20. I think it has not.
21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavour be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies ?
21. Amalgamation of the three armies would be very difficult, if not impossible, but every endeavour should be made to assimilate the system and organization and composition of all three.

IV. EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bengal army, and state the orders, or measures, or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect ?
1. They have been very materially diminished. I have no records to which I can refer, but may mention generally the following :—The almost total abolition of the power of inflicting corporal punishment ; the withdrawal of the power of summary dismissal of bad characters, and of those pronounced physically unfit for the service by their medical officers ; the almost compulsory promotion of seniors of grades ; the withdrawal of the privilege of granting letters to soldiers having civil suits, and of leave beyond that for a month to officers or soldiers ; the restrictions imposed by the recent articles of war on the powers of regimental courts-martial ; the withdrawal of the power of franking soldiers' letters ; the orders regarding good-conduct pay and badges as recently altered, by which a bad man, if he showed a clean sheet for one year, was necessarily rewarded ; the new rules for courts of request, by which a soldier could get irremediably in debt in defiance of both his captain and commanding officer ; the increased number of detached guards ; the constant references required on every point ; the interference on the part of the different departments, especially the pay and audit ; all and each rendering the commanding officer and his captains of companies perfect cyphers without the means of rewarding good, or effectually and readily punishing

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bad, characters. Over his European officers a commanding officer had no control, being unable to reward or punish them; his recommendations for staff employ never asked for, and when offered, seldom attended to; and officers of his corps taken away whom he could not have recommended had he been asked to do so, and even against the protest, which resulted in the good men and officers looking upon their commanding officer as a nonentity, and therefore ceased either to assist or please him in the performance of their various duties, feeling that he had no power whatever of advancing their interests by rewarding them for their exertions, whilst the bad set him at utter defiance, knowing that unless they did something very flagrant that he was equally powerless to punish them for their misdeeds.

2. During the above period have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?

2. Necessarily diminished, as the powers of the regimental commandants have been restricted as regards both rewards and punishments.

3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

3. The result has been most detrimental; the good officer and man was disgusted at finding that his captain and commanding officer had not the means of rewarding him, and that there was nothing to be gained by showing his good character; and the smart intelligent officer and soldier was disgusted because there was no opportunity given him of gaining distinction, while the slothful, careless, or bad knew that the commanding officer could do them but little harm, and that they might go to a very great extent without incurring permanent disgrace, and consequently defied him. Commanding officers of companies and corps generally lapsed into a state of indifference, finding that those who followed the *laissez faire* system were considered the best officers, as they gave least trouble, and the men conducted themselves according to their natural dispositions, certain that so long as they were not outrageously slothful or ill-behaved, each had good pay, must see his family in turn, and at the end of a specified period must get an increase of pay or promotion, or transfer to the invalid establishment, and consequently cared little or nothing for his officer, the more so that their officers for these reasons seldom mixed with them, and indeed, as a rule, cared little about their corps, and were constant and urgent in their endeavours to get away from it.

4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?

4. The same remarks apply to this as to the preceding question. Indifference in the performance of their duties on the part of the officers, except in a very few instances, which made the rest more glaring, and carelessness on the part of the soldier. Latterly a mutual feeling of dislike was engendered, as neither could respect or have any confidence in the other.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of headquarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?

5. The discipline of a corps on service depends entirely upon the authority of a commanding officer of the regiment, supported by the influence and authority of those in command of companies. As a rule men have but little faith in things beyond their own experience, and guide their actions chiefly in accordance with the sentiments of those around them; hence a soldier is well or ill behaved according to the

society he keeps, and is diligent or negligent as he finds his captain disposed. He is trained moreover in times of peace to look to his captains (at least he ought to be) for rewards, indulgences, and punishment, and on service naturally turns to him for guidance, which he cannot and will not of a stranger, and such to him are the head-quarters of the army.

6. Should the power of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?

6. Most assuredly increased. Under the present system the captain of a company and the commanding officers of a regiment are mere cyphers. In a native corps the commanding officer should be supreme over both the Europeans and natives under him. He should be the source of all indulgences, rewards, and punishments, and be able to invalid and discharge all natives; from his dicta there should be no appeal on the part of a native, except through the immediate European superior of the soldier; certain rules being laid down for good-conduct pay, promotions, discharges, pensions, &c.; if he acted contrary to them he should be relieved of his command. The captains of companies should be the initiators of all rewards, indulgences, and punishments to be carried out by the commanding officer, who should follow out their recommendations so far as justice and the good of the service allow. Over Europeans the commanding officer should have the power of granting all indulgences of leave, and alone be the medium of applications for staff employ, which should never be complied with unless he can give a recommendation, and no officer should be withdrawn for staff employ until he had completed five years' regimental duty (exclusive of periods spent on leave), at the end of which time, should he be a candidate for staff employ, he should proceed to the head-quarters of the division in which he is serving, for the purpose of undergoing a professional examination in one in the languages; should he pass which, his name should be recorded, or he should be permitted to study for the particular employment he may have selected, but in no instance should this be done without a good character from his commanding officer, the character being confined to recorded facts, and not be allowed to given in general terms.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

7. Many suggestions have been made in the foregoing answers; but here I would sum up that a system of discipline should be adopted which would show the soldier that his commanding officer, whether captain or colonel, had the confidence of his superiors, which can be done only by carrying out a set of well-digested rules. A soldier should feel, and likes to feel, that all his indulgences depend entirely on those that know him, and with him, as with others, the delay necessary to a reference takes away half the benefit, hence his great ambition should be to please, whilst he dreads, his captain, being assured that justice will be done him. For this it is absolutely necessary that the same rules should obtain for every regiment, and that these rules should be few, clear, and simple, and altered as seldom as possible, such as to ensure a uniform rate of pay in all situations, and pensions claimable after prescribed periods of service; certain and speedy punishment awardable by the commanding officer modified only by his own known good character; leave and promotion given by the regimental roster, except where his bad character or qualifications should deprive him of the indulgence and reward; instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, well grounded and not superficial; a clear understanding of all that is required of him; a knowledge that while his conscientious scruples would not be interfered with, he must, on taking and while he retains the service of his masters, act as a soldier, and make his prejudices bend to the requisitions of the service. At present the pay and audit rules are so complicated that no one understands them; the pensions are claimable only on the medical opinion of perfect strangers; punishments

and rewards are uncertain, and from their general ignorance they cannot understand what is required of them, and find that many of their European officers are quite ignorant of their manners and customs, and can therefore be easily imposed upon, or demand of them, what they have been told shall never be required, duties which make them outcasts at their homes.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?

8. This will depend upon their training; if the influence gained over them by their European officers be firm in time of peace it will be increased in time of war, as regards a good officer, as service shows men to each other, and draws out their real character.

9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

9. Having previously stated that I consider that corps of native infantry should have the full complement of European officers, I shall reply to this with reference to the native portion alone. A native regiment should never exceed 800 men in times of peace, these being divided into ten companies of 80 privates, with 5 havildars, 5 naicks, 2 drummers, 1 lascar, and 1 bhisty per company, one of the havildars being a pay havildar; 1 drill havildar, 1 drill naick, 1 fife major, 1 drum major, 1 tindal, and 2 native doctors for the regiment; all to be trained to arms, and made to erect, repair, and keep clean and in order, their own lines, materials being supplied to them. The men should be employed in learning or keeping up their knowledge of all the duties required of European soldiers, of reading, writing, and arithmetic in one or other of the vernacular languages; of scaling, and the duties of sappers and miners, and in furnishing military guards, all civil guards and escorts being supplied by the police, who alone should be employed on civil duties.

10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bengal army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

10. Yes, but I consider the employment of native soldiers on other than mere military duties as highly objectionable.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?

11. Yes, under a proper system.

12. In apportioning European officers to native troops,—

1. Should native corps have a full complement of European officers according to the present scale besides a full complement of native commissioned officers?

A full complement of European officers, *i.e.*, 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 1 major, and 1 medical officer for the regiment, and 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, and 1 ensign per company, without any native commissioned officers.

2. A full complement of European officers and no native commissioned officers?
No native commissioned officers.

3. A smaller number of European officers than at present and a full complement of native officers?

Certainly not a smaller number of European officers.

13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?

13. Cadets on arrival should at once be posted to the native corps to which they are to belong.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

14. I should hope that it may never occur that a smaller number of European officers than the full complement will be assigned to native corps, as their efficiency as superiors of natives depends upon their being at once appointed to them.

15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

15. Very materially as at present carried out; but if an officer be made to serve with his corps for some five or six years, and the complement with the corps be maintained at the standard I have given in reply to question No. 12, Part I., the efficiency of the regiment would not necessarily be affected, particularly should two European non-commissioned officers per company be sanctioned.

16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies between the conduct of regiments with few, and those with many, European officers present?

16. None. And so long as the late and present systems last it will be quite immaterial whether there be few, or many, European officers present, as those officers have no influence over their men.

17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

17. By adding to each corps such a number of European officers as will provide for those required for staff employ and leave, combined with the plan of causing every officer selected for staff and detached employment first serving not less than five years with his regiment, exclusive of periods of absence on leave.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army as regimental officers to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

18. Under the rules I have proposed, I think it would be highly disadvantageous to their efficiency as regimental officers.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

19. I most certainly think it would.

COLIN TROUP, Brigadier,
Commanding at Bareilly.

MY DEAR DURAND, Bareilly, Sept. 9, 1858.

I HASTEN to reply to your's of the 31st ultimo, which I had the pleasure to receive a few days ago. The subject to which it refers is, no doubt, a most important one, but having lost all my memoranda, I have little beyond my own experience and assertion to adduce in proof of what I can say upon it. In 1831, although then a very young man, so perfectly satisfied was I, in my own mind, of the utter ruin it was to the service having native commissioned officers, and how beneficial it would be to have two European serjeants per company in their room, that the late Captain William Peel Milner, of our 31st N.I., and myself, our regiments being then stationed together

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at Barrackpore, set to work, and after the most careful study of, and inquiry into, the subject, drew up a most elaborate statement, showing the advantages of the system we proposed, and proving that the expense of two European serjeants to each company, instead of a subadar and jemadar, so far from being more, would be less, and rendering regiments much more efficient. What we proposed was, that the highest grade in the native army should be that of havildar, and that instead of being a life service, it should be limited, with a graduated scale of good-conduct pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, exactly the same as in the Queen's service. We proposed that the European serjeants so required should be a superior class of men, educated and trained for the purpose in England, something in the same way as those for the sappers are, that they should be enlisted for the Company's service, and transferred to the artillery or one of the European regiments, if on trial they were found unfit for their position in native regiments. We reckoned that by this means we would have, for the infantry alone, fifteen hundred Europeans always present with native regiments that could be depended on, so that it would have mattered very little how many officers were withdrawn from regiments for staff employ, or who might be absent on furlough or on leave on private affairs, medical certificate, &c. We proposed that one of the twenty European company non-commissioned officers should be serjeant-major, and one of them quartermaster-serjeant, the former on a salary of 100 (one hundred) and the latter 80 (eighty) rupees a month; that these two should always act as orderly-room clerks, and transact the whole of the regimental business, under the superintendence of the adjutant and quartermaster; that the other European non-commissioned officers should be denoted the company serjeant-major and company quartermaster-serjeant, the former getting the same pay as a serjeant-major of an infantry corps gets at present, and the latter the same as the quartermaster-serjeant, and to rise according to their merits and fitness to the situations of serjeant-major and quartermaster-serjeant as vacancies took place. It was not intended by this arrangement to entirely exclude deserving non-commissioned officers from our artillery and European regiments from filling these responsible situations, but to secure a better and more efficient class of men in room of the very inefficient worn out stupid ones who were generally sent from these branches of the service to fill them; I say generally, because, no doubt, there were some exceptions, but generally the men sent from the artillery and European regiments as serjeant-major and quartermaster-serjeant to native regiments were, in nine cases out of ten, both as regards ability and character, totally unfit for the situation, but how could it be otherwise? Officers commanding these branches of the service were naturally very loth to part with their good non-commissioned officers, and as anything was considered good enough for a native regiment, they, in reality, became a provision for all those of this class who were deemed too stupid to be of any use in their own regiments; but when it is considered that there were but two European non-commissioned officers to each native corps, and the very responsible and onerous duties which devolved upon them, I am fully aware that none but the most efficient and trustworthy could possibly do them justice, but that, generally speaking, the reverse was the case I too well know, so much so, that so far from being able to trust or place any confidence in them, beyond the mere duties of parade and drill, these men were nonentities, if not worse, in every native regiment in the service.

At the time I speak of, and during the three years Captain Milner and myself were at Barrackpore, we had the opportunity of getting the opinions of several different native regiments on our proposed scheme, and I have since then had at various times many opportunities of getting the opinions of by far the greater majority of the native army on it, which has

only confirmed my opinion, that had it been adopted, the native army would have hailed it as a real boon, and there would have been no such thing as mutiny in the Bengal army, which has led to the fearful tragedy that has passed.

However much others may have become converts to the popular clap-trap of the present day, that three European officers are sufficient for a native regiment, I know, and so do all those, and they are many, who have served for and served as long with natives as I have, that the idea is an insane one, and that without European example and constant European supervision, native troops are simply cowards in the field, mutineers in quarters, and in action far more dangerous than the enemy to whom they are opposed. I am aware that this is very strong language, but I am equally aware that it is God's truth, I therefore fearlessly state it, and although it does not concern me personally, for instead of entering, I am leaving the army, yet I cannot be so dishonest to that army in which I have passed nearly thirty-eight years of my life (having during that time held every situation that an officer can hold in the service) as to join in, contrary to my own experience and reason, with the popular hue and cry of the day, merely to please those who cannot possess half or even one-third the experience or knowledge that I know I do. If then, instead of being a benefit, it is proved in practice that it is really a misfortune to possess the knowledge of natives, but more particularly of native soldiers (which from my long and constant association with them in every situation in which a soldier can be tried), that I have, and instead of being a blessing, it is in reality proved to be a curse to possess moral courage sufficient to publicly and honestly make known the results of that experience as I do, and have ever done, then indeed I shall have cause both to regret and to blush when I think that I have been a soldier, and glad indeed shall I be when the time comes, if it ever does, when I can retire into obscurity and hang up my sword to rust upon the wall as a warning to my sons never to bear one.

If, however, my experience is worth anything, and God grant I may be mistaken, the day is not far distant when all I have thought, said, and written on the native army will be fully exemplified in the military police which is now being organized throughout the country. Leaving out of the question all that has happened during the year 1857-58, I most solemnly and sincerely declare that had I not been an eye witness to the fact, no power on earth could ever have persuaded me to believe that such a body would ever be organized on such a system. What conclusions can any reflecting man of experience and common sense arrive at but these:—"We had a native army fully officered with educated European gentlemen, which in point of material was, with the exception of the British army, equal to any in the world; in 1857-58 it mutinied and committed unheard-of atrocities, revolting to human nature; it has been replaced by an army recruited from the same soil, but with only three European officers to each regiment, and but one man to organize and superintend the whole;" then the only deduction that can be drawn from this is, that the officers and not the men are to blame for what took place in 1857-58. I am very curious to know by what line of reasoning or argument this conclusion has been arrived at, for it is only fair to suppose that the object now in view is to have a more efficient and trustworthy army than we had before. Now, as all the native regiments in the former army had generally from 10 to 12 officers present with them, and that the present ones are only to have three in all belonging to them, which is considered sufficient for duty, and to meet the contingencies of sickness, mortality, leave, &c., but even should all this be met by supplying other officers to replace them, even then the scheme is quite as weak as it is dangerous, and so expensive that it entirely frustrates the object it has in view; we have ample proof of

the system of three officers to regiments in the corps of the Punjab serving in this division. The other day we had a very brilliant little affair at Pillibheet, in which three out of five officers were wounded, amongst them Major Browne commanding 2nd Punjab cavalry, a first-rate officer, who is beloved by his men. Now mark me, if this regiment has to go into action again without Browne, the men will not obey the youngsters belonging to it, of whom they have no knowledge, and in whom they consequently can have no confidence. Again, we have the 17th Punjab infantry here, who also behaved well at Pillibheet, with only the commanding officer and adjutant present with it. The head-quarters being at Pillibheet, one wing was left in here with no European officer at all, consequently I was obliged to make over the command of it to my brigade-major, a Queen's officer, who cannot speak a word of the language, and being unable to get any other officer to relieve him, I have been obliged at all risks to order in the adjutant from Pillibheet to do so, leaving the command of the right wing to Captain Larkins, who, were he attacked again by the rebels, which is not very likely considering the example that has just been made of them, would have very great difficulty in providing for the safety of Pillibheet, and at the same time to go out and attack the rebels should they again make their appearance. I merely mention these facts to illustrate the absurdity and danger of the system; what then must it be with the military police, who are detached all over the country without any European supervision whatever, which in the present time is, I think, of the utmost importance, for the commanding officer and adjutant are generally at the head-quarter station. A military police is of all others what we most require for India, but instead of it being composed principally of foreigners, as it is, it should, I think, be raised from amongst the retainers of the principal landowners, who have everything at stake, and who would give ample security for their good conduct; every company of police should have an European attached to it; there are no end of men amongst our European pensioners who would answer admirably for this purpose, the simple question is this, what made the native army what it was? Merely European supervision and European example, without which it would have been both useless and dangerous. It was not that the material was bad, it was first-rate, it was the system that ruined it, as it would have ruined any other, not excepting the British army, which is the first in the world, had it been applied to it. This being the case, I think it would be but wise to endeavour to adopt a better and not a worse system than we had before, which I maintain we are now doing. But I must take leave of a subject which, as I have already said, in no way concerns or affects me personally, and I beg to apologize to you for having taken up so much of your time by touching on a matter so totally irrelevant to the subject of your letter now under reply; but having been good enough to give me leave to write freely, and as I am doing so privately, I have been led to say more than would

otherwise have been becoming in, or perhaps safe for me to do. But to return to the subject of your letter.

So confident am I that a man entering the service cares so little about obtaining the higher grades, that were he allowed ten rupees a month on enlisting, to cover everything in the shape of marching batta, &c., in fact to be the maximum of a soldier's pay in all situations, with the chances of promotion and good-conduct pay, that he would even gladly forego his claim to a service pension, for I well know it is to the present and not to future advantages that natives look; so much am I convinced of this, although perhaps it would not be wise to introduce it, that if a man got the pay and advantages above stated, with the addition of wound and death pension, that any number of the finest and best men in the country would be found ready and willing to enter the ranks.

When Lord Hardinge reduced the army in 1847 and 1848, by offering donations of so many months' pay to any who would take their discharge, considerable difficulty was experienced in reducing the army, that is, each infantry regiment from one thousand to eight hundred strong; but I well know that had his Lordship only offered to invalid all men who had served long enough for their pension, that instead of their being any difficulty, double the number necessary to carry out the object in view, that is, all in the grade of sepoy who were entitled to pension, with perhaps some few exceptions amongst the Mahomedans, would at once have availed themselves of the offer, so little do they look forward to the commissioned grades, for the reasons I have before given, namely, that they are so old before they attain them, and have become so habituated to the indolent life of a soldier, that they really are of no use at their homes. Commissioned and non-commissioned officers hang on as long as they can, not from any love to the service, but on account of the high pay they receive; but if any proof were wanting, surely the fact of the number of men who, as soon as they have served long enough for their pension, scheme, malingering, and feign all sorts of sickness to endeavour to gain it, should of itself be most convincing. I have known men in perfect health starve themselves to that degree, and play all sorts of tricks with themselves (so well managed that no legal proof could be obtained against them), that from being fine men they in a very short time became the most abject objects; again, I have known other men submit to the most rigid and severe medical treatment, although in reality they had nothing the matter with them, to obtain their pension. But if there is any doubt as to which of the two plans is the best, to have or not to have non-commissioned officers, surely the simple plan would be to first give the thing a fair trial without them, they could easily be created afterwards if found necessary; but remember, if the grade of commissioned officers is given in the first instance, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to do away with them afterwards, whether they are found to answer or not.

Believe me, &c.

COLIN TROUP.

Brigadier
Colin Troup.

No. 10.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM COLONEL BURN.

Colonel Burn.

REPLIES to Lieut.-Col. DURAND'S QUERIES on the REORGANIZATION of the ARMY.

INFANTRY.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. THE Bengal army is composed of Hindoos and Mahomedans, Seikhs and Goorkhas.

2. The Hindoos are drawn almost exclusively from Oude and Behar; the Mahomedans are recruited from the north-west provinces generally, Behar, and the Punjab; the Seikhs from the Manjah and Cis-Sutlej states; and the Goorkhas from Nipal, and the hills west of Nipal.

3. All classes employed in menial occupations are excluded from enlistment by regulation, page 215, Military Regulations. The fighting classes generally are enlisted in practice. Many Birhmans have of late years taken advantage of the privilege allowed to them by the laws of caste to usurp the more particular duties of the chatree, and have entered the army. They have proved themselves on many occasions good soldiers, and many, during the late struggle, have remained faithful; but they are not a fighting class, and ought to have been rigidly excluded from our ranks. I have frequently rejected them as Birhmans, and found them again seeking enlistment as Rajpoots.

Colonel Burn.

4. There are some few distinct tribes who would make good soldiers if they would enlist. The men of Hurrianna, for instance, are a very fine race, but they won't serve in our regular regiments as foot soldiers. The Juts of Bhurtpore, Delhie, and other districts would make excellent soldiers. The Grojars of the Upper Doab and the Delhie and Agra districts, under discipline, might be reformed, and would make good soldiers. They are a race of thieves, but so are the Afreedis of the Khyber Pass, who have done good service in the Punjab corps during the present insurrection. The Gualahs of Bengal, who are much employed by the zemindars and indigo planters, would make good soldiers.

A regiment or two of Mheturs might be tried as pioneers, but the lower castes of Hindoos generally I would continue to exclude from our ranks. They are not to be trusted either as soldiers or policemen, and their enlistment, to the exclusion of the better classes, will give very general disgust to the whole nation. We cannot put down caste by merely elevating the lower orders. They are as much wedded to the distinctive privileges of their class as the Brahmans or Chattries, and are so completely under the dominion of the upper classes that no discipline would induce them to break the bonds of caste and release themselves from its influence.

If the higher and better orders of the Hindoo races are not in future to be trusted, I do not see how the smallest reliance can be placed on the lower and less educated classes. These last, in their present degraded condition, will, I fear, prove themselves utterly unworthy of trust.

5. Recruits used formerly to offer themselves in such numbers at the head-quarters of regiments, even when stationed at a distance from the recruiting districts, that no special agency was employed for their enlistment. The recruits were generally the relations or fellow villagers of the soldiers of the regiment in which they sought service, and generally accompanied the leave men on their return to the corps.

6. No precautions for registry were observed until the rules laid down at pages 216 and 217 of the Military Regulations were adopted, from a system first introduced in the Punjab irregular force. A man's identity was thus in a measure established, and he could be traced to his real home if he misbehaved himself. It also established his true caste, which many concealed, as I have already stated.

7. It seldom happens that recruits are taken from the families of sepoy present with regiments. Of the small portion of an infantry regiment that is composed of Mahomedans, a few only have their families with them. Some of the inferior castes of Hindoos allow their families to reside with them in the lines, but the children brought up in the regiment do not often enlist. I do not know that any precautions are taken when enlisting men in cantonments or from the families of sepoy beyond the usual one of ascertaining that they are physically fit for the army.

8. I do not see that the material at our disposal affords much room for improvement. The future native army of Bengal, to work well, must be composed of an entire new set of men. None of the old leaven should be left to impregnate the new mass. Every man who has been suspected, and had his arms taken from him, should be dismissed. He can never again serve with credit. He will not be trusted by his officers, and will feel himself a shamed and degraded being. For the new army I would enlist all fighting classes, whether Mahomedans, Hindoos, or Seikhs, in due proportions, being careful only as regards their physical fitness for the service. I see no danger in this arrangement if the paramount race, the Europeans, are maintained in proper proportion to the native auxiliaries.

9. The form of oath is given at page 220 of the Military Regulations.

10. I do not know how long it has been in force.

11. The form of oath administered to the Sikh soldier appears more binding than that for the Hin-

dostanee. It might be adopted for all classes with the necessary alterations.

12. I do not know of any classes that would make good marines, unless the lascars employed in our ships be deemed fit for marine corps.

13. There are two corps, the 25th and 40th, which were looked upon as marine corps, and in former years were employed more exclusively as marines than of late years. There are other corps, called volunteers, the 65th, 67th, and 68th, that were embodied for general service beyond sea. All these corps are, I believe, recruited from the same classes as the other corps of the line.

14. I think it would have a very beneficial effect, if recruiting for each separate regiment were confined to a prescribed district. This might do good on the principle of *divide et impera*. There has always been great jealousy between the Oudh and Behar men; and I see that it was taken advantage of at Lahore, where the Behar men were separated from those from Oudh.

15. See foregoing reply.

16. I would not separate the races of Hindostan, that is, the Mahomedans and Hindoos; but I would have distinct regiments of Seikhs. I would even keep up the distinction so far as not to amalgamate the Manjah and Cis-Sutlej Seikhs. When Seikhs were first admitted into our army, I advocated their being kept in distinct regiments, and the late mutiny has confirmed me in the correctness of that opinion. The Seikhs belonging to the mutinous corps in Delhie went with them, and nothing would induce them to break this unnatural alliance, and join their countrymen who were fighting in our ranks. They remained with the rebels throughout the siege. The Goorkhas have always been kept distinct, and their conduct during the mutiny has shown with what advantage this distinction of races may be worked upon for the maintenance of our authority.

17. If distinctions are made in regiments by dividing the men into classes or tribes, quarrels will be incessant. If corps are recruited from one particular district, all the fighting classes of that district should be taken without distinction, and mixed up in companies, as has been the practice hitherto.

18. I would not observe any particular proportions of tribes, if recruiting for individual corps is confined to districts. It might not be possible, and would not, I think, be necessary, as the men having been brought up together, there is a fellow feeling amongst them, through of different castes.

19. Police corps that are not for local police duties should be recruited or filled up by drafts from the corps of the line. By this system the active service corps would be really efficient regiments, and the police corps would be composed of well-disciplined and steady old soldiers, in every way suited for the duties of a military police.

20. Instead of making the police corps nurseries for the corps of line, it will be observed from the preceding reply that I would make the line corps the nurseries for the police.

21. The best agency for recruiting is, to employ the leave men on this duty. They generally bring back with them excellent recruits.

22. See reply No. 20.

23. The precautions ordered to be taken for the enlistment of sepoy at pages 216 and 217 of the Military Regulations appear to be sufficient, if properly attended to.

24. See reply No. 20.

25. If natives of other tropical countries can be procured they ought certainly to be enlisted for service in India. I would form them in separate regiments.

26. The Malays, Arabs, and Kroomen all suggest themselves as the men best suited for soldiers. Afghans make excellent soldiers, and are enlisted to a large extent in the Punjab regiments. I have an idea that Chinamen, under discipline, would make

good soldiers; they are strong athletic men, and would be more tractable than the Malays or Arabs.

27. Recruits from these tribes could only be procured by sending commissioned European officers with a well-selected staff of natives, and an interpreter, to enlist them. These recruiting parties would require to remain some time on the spot with the men, to reconcile them to their new mode of life. Good pay and kind treatment, with but little drill at first, would soon effect this. Malays, I fear, are not to be had. The Ceylon rifle regiment, if I mistake not, find it very difficult to obtain recruits in sufficient numbers. Arabs could be had if they were permitted to return to their homes after a limited service.

Kroomen I know nothing about.

28. I would not mix the European and native soldiers together by attaching a company of Europeans to a native corps. Any such compulsory amalgamation is bad. Encourage voluntary friendships between the two classes, but do not attempt any unnatural combination of men of such totally distinct habits. It would certainly be looked upon by the native soldier in its true light, as a coercive measure.

29, 30, 31, 32. These are all answered in the above reply.

33. This is a very grave question, after what has occurred. Not to arm the sepoy with the Enfield rifle might be looked upon by the native army as a decided victory gained by them from Government. It would leave them, too, very much worse armed than any external foe they may be called on to encounter.

These, however, are trifling objections when compared with the great evil of placing in their hands so effective a weapon as the Enfield rifle. It would be putting them on a par with our European troops, for they are excellent shots, and they would never allow themselves in any future outbreak to be brought to close quarters, if they once discovered the advantages of the Enfield rifle at long range.

I would, therefore, arm all our native troops with the old percussion musket. With it they will be on a par with any native adversary they may be called on to encounter, and at close quarters, from the ease with which it is loaded, it is by many deemed preferable to the Enfield rifle.

35. The advantage of dressing the native soldier in close imitation of the European is, that at a distance the one is not distinguishable from the other.

Without this the fire of the enemy would be concentrated on the Europeans long before they got within musket range of each other. A looser and easier dress would be preferred by the natives, and also, I imagine, by the Europeans in this very hot climate.

36. I would give them the Zouave dress, or something very similar to it. The choking stiff collar of the tunic ought to be got rid of altogether. It is better than the collar of the old coat, but for natives collars are not required at all.

The summer dress, both for Europeans and natives, should be white, with a good-sized white turban, 10 yards by 20 inches of Scotch muslin, to wear loosely round the head when exposed to the sun, and round the waist as kammisband at all other times. For Europeans a solah helmet, painted white, to turn the rain, costing 12 annas, with a similar turban for the hot season, as above described, would be a good head-dress.

37. This mode of combining the two races, Europeans and natives, is preferable to that of adding a company of Europeans to every native corps. The combined regiments could not always work together, I fear, either in cantonments or in the field, and the number of officers who could be spared from the European corps would be small, and would never be the picked men of the regiment. The proposal is a plausible one, but I doubt if it would work well in practice.

The officers of the native regiment would be constantly changed, and would be too few in number for its proper discipline. It would be simply an irregular corps; and unless the officers attached to it were

higher paid than those attached to the European portion of the regiment, there is little doubt which would be preferred.

38. This will be better decided by the artillery, to whom I leave it.

39. If the Europeans and natives are to be associated, the barracks of each must be kept apart, as at present. The local and domestic habits of the two classes does not admit of their being more closely brought together in quarters.

40. A closer association of the two races, if founded on friendship, would be favourable to that vigilance which has become essential. A friendly warning of what was going on at Meerut on the 10th May 1857 would have prepared the European troops for immediate action. At present, the European and native troops are unable to communicate, from a want of knowledge of each other's language. I would encourage in every way the acquisition of English in the native army. It would soothe the inhuman cruelty that is inherent in the native mind. "So sensible were the Romans of the influence of language over manners, that it was their most serious care to extend, with the progress of their arms, the use of the Latin tongue." Britain should follow this example, and teach the English language throughout the Indian empire. The maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength, can only be upheld hereafter by having everywhere a sufficient European force, ready and armed with authority, to put down at once every rising, either of the native army or of the native population.

41. The present system of brigading European and native regiments on service, and also in cantonments, affords equal if not better facilities for combining the two services than any forced alliance of European and native corps ever will do. The warmest attachments spring up from the combination of European and native corps on active service. I would, therefore, adhere to the existing system, and not attempt to combine for any coercive purpose an European with a native regiment; the combination might be found very inconvenient at times, both in peace and war.

42. If the native troops are to be employed on active service in combination with Europeans, they ought to be encouraged to acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance. Without these requisite qualifications of a soldier, they would be little better than a mere rabble, and could give the European troops neither assistance nor support.

H. P. BURN,
Colonel.

Calcutta, July 17, 1858.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. I shall leave these questions to be answered by officers who are practically acquainted with the working of the military code and rules of discipline as introduced of late years.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. Promotion in the Bengal army has been, in all ordinary cases, regulated by seniority. It had become so much the practice, that it was looked upon as the right of the senior, and any deviation from this practice was regarded by the whole corps as an infringement of what they considered an established law of the service. Some commanding officers took advantage of the invaliding season, when a great many vacancies occurred, to promote smart and deserving men; they were generally selected from amongst the drill instructors. Others stoutly upheld the seniority system as the only safeguard against misconduct in the field and in cantonments.

2. The native officers in general of the Bengal army were very old men, and were perfectly useless. One great blunder of the mutineers has been the selection of these old and worn-out men to command them. It was the saving of our small army before Delhie that such men as Subadah Bukht Khan and others equally infirm were the leaders of the rebels.

Colonel Burn.

3. The acquirements of the native officers are of the same grade as those of the men.

4. There is no test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from the commissioned grade to another.

5. The intervention of the native officer between the European officer and his men might be made very beneficial; to effect this, the native officers must be men of education and of a better class of society than the privates.

If we had had men of this stamp in the army in 1857 to explain to the sepoys the utter groundlessness of their fears of being made Christians, there would have been no mutiny.

A full complement of European officers need not necessarily militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers.

The native officers in irregular corps, except those who are selected men of some little education and family, are not a bit more intelligent than their brethren in the regular army.

6. The native officers being of the same class in society, and generally closely allied to a portion of the men under them, have in all mutinies aided and abetted the mutineers. They are all equally affected by the same cause, and being equally ignorant, any common ground of offence is as much a grievance to the commissioned officer as it is to the private soldier.

7. I would continue the grade of commissioned officers in the native army, but I would appoint them from the educated and wealthier classes in the district where the corps is enlisted. On entering the army they should be examined, and the requisite for their admission into the service should be a knowledge of English.

Native commissioned officers are necessary in the native army as a medium of communication between the soldier and his European officer. They would listen with patience to the child-like complaints of the soldier, and send him away in good humour. The European officer might not receive him with similar patience, and he would return to his lines dissatisfied and grumbling.

8. I do not see any good to be derived from the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal in each company in lieu of its native officers. It would be a waste of European soldiers to fritter them away in native corps.

9. The rates of pay are high enough to ensure excellent recruits. An increase is given after specified periods of service. I would break through the old system of seniority promotion, and select men for the non-commissioned grades. Promotion to those grades, with good-service pay and pensions, as at present given, are quite sufficient to ensure an ample supply of good recruits, and to satisfy the men when enlisted. The pay is better than they could earn at the plough, or in any of the ordinary walks of life.

10. As a general rule the practice of granting pensions has not, it would appear, attached the men to the Government, but the conduct of the pensioners in the monster deluge which has swept through the land, ought not to be allowed to sweep away with it the rules for pension. Without them, any future native army must be filled with old and inefficient men.

11. If promotion to the native commissioned grade is to continue as hitherto, by advancement from the ranks, it ought to be by selection from the non-commissioned grades.

Once a commissioned officer, the promotions ought to be made by seniority, except for some very sufficient causes it be found necessary to pass a man over in promotion, or to promote a junior for some good or gallant act.

12. The pension establishment ought to be maintained as at present, both as a reward to old and well-behaved soldiers, and as the means of draining the army of its old and worn out and inefficient men of every class.

13. I have not the means of ascertaining the cost of the pension establishment.

14. The questions brought before native courts-martial are generally very simple, and have been dealt with by the native officers in a satisfactory manner under the guidance of the European superintending officer. One advantage of a native court is, that they thoroughly understand the native witnesses.

15. European serjeants and corporals are picked men, and are generally far superior in professional knowledge and efficiency to the native commanding officers, who are promoted by seniority.

16. I would beg to suggest the following plan for the reorganization of the infantry of the Bengal army. It embraces also a police force.

The European infantry to consist of 20 regiments, organized in the same manner as the existing European corps.

The native army to consist of 40 regiments of two battalions each. These forty corps to be officered as at present, the 1st battalion to be the active or service battalion, and the 2nd to be employed on police duties.

Recruiting to be confined to the 1st battalion, and the 2nd to be completed as vacancies occur by drafts of the oldest soldiers from the 1st battalion. The men of the 1st battalion would thus be young and active, and fit for any duty. The 2nd battalion would be composed of old soldiers well trained for the duties of a military police.

Of the forty regiments, I would propose to form,—

15 of Seikhs.
5 of Punjabs, Mahomedans.
10 of Oudh men, Hindoos and Mahomedans.
5 of Behar men, Hindoos and Mahomedans.
5 of other classes.

40 total.

Besides these, the Goorkahs must be kept up as at present in distinct regiments and located in the hills. If this useful body of men could be increased, a few more regiments might be added to the army with great advantage to the State.

We should thus have for the new army, as compared with the old,—

	Old Army.	New Army.
Europeans - - - - -	3	20
Native regiments, regulars - - - - -	74	40
Ditto police - - - - -	-	40
Irregular corps that had mutinied or been disarmed - - - - -	24	-
	<u>101</u>	<u>80</u>

The Punjab irregular force, and all local corps that have not been disarmed, to be maintained as at present.

The forty native regiments to be officered as at present, and the officers to be available for duty with either battalion. Those attached to the 2nd battalion to be limited to—

A commandant,
A second in command,
And adjutant;

with staff salaries as at present in irregular corps.

The 1st or service battalion to be always fully officered, and kept in the highest state of discipline. Irregular corps, with a limited number of officers, have done excellent service at times, and never better than during the present mutiny; but it must not be argued from this that irregular native corps with few officers, are better than regular corps with a proper complement of good and efficient officers. The higher the discipline, the more efficient the corps will be; and the greater the number of good European officers with a corps on service, the more effective will be the service rendered by that corps. The irregular regiments before Delhi and Lucknow were glad to have an addition to their established complement of officers. Out of 14 officers with the 4th Punjab regiment before Lucknow, twelve were wounded. The Sirmoor battalion, the Guides, and the 1st Punjab infantry suffered severely in officers before Delhi.

Even with our two European regiments the want of officers was greatly felt at Delhie. Several were appointed to do duty with these corps, but the men prefer their own officers. They did not serve with a goodwill under "sepoj officers," as they called them.

17. This question is answered above.

18. Whichever system is adopted, the recruits will follow their relations wherever they may be serving. I do not think that the distinction, if made, of having no native commissioned officers in the regular regiments, would render them less popular than police corps organized on a different system.

19. I cannot say.

20. The distinct organization of the native armies of the three presidencies has, without doubt, proved favourable to the existence of our power in India. The Madras army is as distinct in every way from that of Bengal as the armies of any two neighbouring nations of Europe.

The Bombay army is almost as much divided from that of Bengal as the Madras one. There are some Poorbeas in its ranks, and they keep up a communication with their homes in Oudh and elsewhere. Jacob's celebrated horse are almost all Poorbeas. Notwithstanding this connexion, the greater portion of the Bombay army has remained staunch, even when brought into actual conflict with our own rebellious sepoys. I would therefore maintain a distinction which has proved so beneficial.

21. After the warning we have had, I would on no account assimilate or even attempt to amalgamate the three armies. It would be only paving the way to future and greater mutinies than that which we are now putting down.

H. P. BURN,
Colonel.

Calcutta, July 22, 1858.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. The powers of commanding officers were much greater when I entered the army in 1824 than they are at present. I have no means of stating the orders by which this change has been brought about, and shall therefore leave commanding officers of corps to reply to this question.

2. The powers of officers have been diminished, I believe, both in European and native corps, in the same proportion as those of commanding officers.

3. The result has been to render the sepoy more independent of his commanding officer and to loosen the bonds of discipline. Amongst an ignorant and bigoted race, prompt punishment should follow crime, and for this reason I would restore to commanding officers the power to inflict heavier punishments without reference to station and divisional commanders. All punishments to be reported to the higher authorities, as a check upon their undue severity or their unjust infliction. It would be well, for some time to come, to establish the old and inflexible maxim of Roman discipline, that "a good soldier should dread his officers far more than the enemy."

4. Captains and officers commanding companies have complained much of late years of want of power to reward or punish. The commanding officer to be of any real use at the head of a regiment must be supreme. The commanders of companies should, therefore, be taught to look to him for any delegated authority he may find it right and proper to place in their hands. A commanding officer should command through his captains of companies; they must not be set aside as mere ciphers. An orderly room should be established in the lines of each regiment, and all complaints heard and settled there, as in European regiments. A record of all complaints, and the decisions on them, should be kept by the adjutant, and a copy of it sent weekly to the adjutant-general of the army. This would tend to show the state of discipline of the corps, and the fitness of the commanding officer in his judicial capacity. It would also be satisfactory to the officers commanding companies and their non-commissioned officers, as it would ensure a proper hearing of their complaints.

5. The discipline of a corps on service depends entirely on the capacity for command of a commanding officer. A weak, vacillating, or timid commander will never have a good corps at his command. A firm, decided, and bold commander will always have a well-disciplined corps under him, and be well obeyed.

6. The powers of commanding officers should be greatly increased, with the simple check over them of requiring a record and report of all that occurs. The powers of officers commanding companies ought not to be defined by regulation. Their *duties* must be defined, but any power that is delegated to them must be granted by their own commanding officer.

7. I would give a commanding officer all the powers of a magistrate, and would also allow him to dismiss men on proof of guilt.

8. The influence of the European officer is greatest in time of war.

9. In time of peace a native corps might be reduced to eight hundred men, provided the duties required of it were not too heavy; the war establishment to be one thousand privates. I do not see any real advantage to be found in employing the men beyond the limits of their duty as soldiers. If called upon to work as day labourers they must be paid for their work, and it would be dear at the lowest price, as it would be given unwillingly. Artizans in India are not fitted for soldiers; if they were, they might be employed in their several trades. An Indian soldier is naturally lazy and indolent, and follows the profession in order to escape from labour. The real soldier of India, the Chuttree, is, by the rules of his order, exempt from labour.

In the drilling season, the ordinary drill should include the construction of field works, and no recruit should be dismissed his drill without having gone through a regular course of instruction in the use of the pickaxe and shovel. This would do away with the prejudice against working in the trenches which existed in the old Bengal army. If a man is employed as an artizan or labourer, he must be excused from all duty. He cannot, in a climate like that of India, work by day and watch by night.

10. The strength of the Bengal army has never in time of peace been so great that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties.

11. Without an increase to the army it would not have been practicable to employ the troops, either European or native, upon public works.

12. I would apportion the European officers to native troops as suggested in a former reply. Every corps intended for active service should have a full complement of European officers with it, and a full complement of selected native officers.

13. Every cadet, on first arrival in India, should be attached to a European corps, and fully instructed in his military duties before joining his own corps. He ought further to be required to continue his studies while attached to this corps, and to pass an examination in the higher duties of his profession, and in Hindostanee, before entering on his duties as a soldier.

If Hazareebagh is to be a station for Europeans, a college for cadets ought to be established there, or it ought to be established at the nearest hill station for a European regiment.

14. Answered above.

15. The efficiency of a regiment is very materially affected by the withdrawal of officers from the corps for staff employ; and what is perhaps the worst effect of the staff system, every officer that withdraws from his regiment is rendered a discontented and dissatisfied man.

16. I cannot answer this question from experience, but a reference to the Army List shows that the only regular corps that have not been disarmed, the 21st, 31st, and Khelat-i-ghilzie regiments, have very few officers with them.

17. I would meet the demand for officers for staff employ by establishing a staff corps, to which all officers employed out of the line of purely military duty should be removed on appointment to the staff; their places to be filled up in corps in the ordinary manner.

Colonel Burn.

Colonel Burn.

I would divide the staff corps into grades, like the other regiments, and would give promotion in it after fixed periods of service; say,—

An Ensign	-	-	3
Lieutenant	-	-	8
Captain	-	-	9
Major	-	-	5
Lieutenant-Colonel	-	-	7

Total - - - 32 years.

No officer, under any circumstances, to remain on the effective branch of the army after forty years' service.

Colonels removed to the non-effective branch to receive a non-effective allowance (in lieu of their colonel's allowance) of 300*l.* a year. This sum to be given in addition to the pension, and to be subscribed for by the officers themselves, by the payment of a fee or donation on promotion to each higher grade, as in the military fund. The scale ought to be fixed as follows:—

		Rupees.
On promotion to Lieutenant	-	100
" Captain	-	500
" Major	-	2,500
" Lieut.-Colonel	-	4,400
" Colonel	-	10,000
Total	-	17,500

In order to prevent any undue pressure on the finances of the State, the removals during the first few years to be limited in number. This would in time relieve the army "of those old Indian lieutenant-colonels" to whom Sir Charles Napier ascribed the inefficiency of the regular corps of the Bengal army, as compared with the irregular regiments.

18. I would not cut off the supply of officers from regiments for special staff employ in the several non-military branches of the public service. Government has been well served by officers thus withdrawn from their regiments, and ought not, without good cause, to relinquish so fruitful a source of supply. By filling up the vacancies in corps as I have suggested in reply No. 17, many of the disadvantages of the present system would be got rid of.

19. If there was no inducement to study such as the prospect of staff employ holds out, the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large would no doubt be lowered.

Very few, I imagine, at the early age at which cadets come to India, would study for the sole sake of self-improvement.

H. P. BURN, Colonel,
Superintendent of Army Clothing.

Calcutta, August 2, 1858.

No. 11.

E. A. Reade,
Esq.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM E. A. READE, ESQ., BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE.

From E. A. READE, Esq., to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

SIR, Agra, September 6, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 21st June last, with certain questions relating to the native army and police battalions, to which I have herewith forwarded replies.

2. I have detained these answers for a considerable time, hoping, with reference to question 4 of the first part, to have been able to submit a compilation respecting inferior castes upon which I have been engaged for some months past at the request of Major Williams, the superintendent of police battalions.

3. The experience of several years as a settlement officer in close intercourse with the people in the interior and remote parts of districts, followed by that of recruiting agent for Shah Shoojas, 4th Broadfoot's sappers and miners, and subsequently the Sirmoor battalion, has impressed me with the conviction that amongst the numerous inferior castes of the bulk of the population intermediate of the dominant castes and outcasts, can be found the materials for soldiers and police as efficient and more faithful than those who have in so many instances joined in mutiny and rebellion, or otherwise proved faithless.

4. I beg to enclose a paper which has escaped the fate of most others at Agra, which may be considered interesting, as it illustrates the great variety of castes and clans of recruits sent from Goruckpoor to the regiments mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Yet these apparently incongruous elements have shown a marvellous unity at Chareekar, at Jullalabad, and Soobraon, crowned by the achievements at a later date of the Sirmoor battalion at Delhi.

5. There is, however, this difficulty, that the same castes in different districts essentially vary in the requisite characteristics of physical power, energy, and resolution; and in drawing up a list of castes and clans throughout so large a range as the North-Western provinces, it has been necessary to make inquiries from competent judges in parts of the country of which I have little local knowledge before either suggesting or warning against selection.

6. I hope, however, ere long to be able to complete what may be at least the basis of useful information to be enlarged by subsequent inquiry and experience.

7. In the meantime, on the general questions with the enclosed answers, I beg to add, as more readable than manuscript, two printed papers of the past year, the one an appendix to a confidential narrative submitted to the Government, and the other a memorandum on police, &c., containing opinions which I have not since seen reason to modify materially.

I have, &c.

E. A. READE.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bengal army and the police battalions of the North-West provinces is composed?

1. The native infantry of the Bengal army was almost wholly composed of the dominant castes and of the inhabitants of a few tracts of country only.

In the police battalions, so far as they have been formed, the class or caste distinctions are more numerous, the range of selection wider.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

2. From Oude mostly; Bhojpoor, the popular name for Shahabad, to a great extent; and in a less number from the districts of the Doab. Scarcely any from districts adjoining the Terai. This applies to the native infantry of the army.

So far as my observation has gone, there has been no principle of selection of men for police battalions, except to take men of all castes and no castes; Brahmans and Mahomedans generally being eschewed.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or

the practice of the Bengal army; or instructions respecting police battalions?

3. The rule is in part 2, section xxxi., paragraph 6, General Regulations, Bengal Army:—"Special care must be taken to reject all men of inferior castes," &c.

The practice in the police battalions may generally be said to be the reverse of this rule.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army or the police battalions of the North-West provinces?

4. Under different names in different localities there are more than 100 castes which have been hitherto systematically excluded from the military service under our Government. This is a wide subject, and will be treated of separately.

As above said, in police battalions such exclusiveness is the exception not the rule.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts?

5. I have heard veterans of the army 25 or 30 years ago allude to recruiting parties with colours, fife, and drum at the early part of the century. Latterly, native officers appear to have been more commonly sent out to bring men of their own stock, and neighbourhood of their native places.

I am not aware if European officers have been deputed on this duty.

6. On enlistment of recruits what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

6. Prior to 1852 there was, I believe, no check on the licence of recruits giving any name they pleased to themselves, their progenitors, or their native localities. False names were often given. Under orders of Government No. 486, dated 6th August 1852, the descriptions were sent to the collectors of districts to be certified.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops), in the Bengal army and in police battalions?

8. The European officer should go to the people; not selections made from a few classes, and tracts of country by native officers' licence of choice, and brought to the European officer. Exclude the sacerdotal class; they have no business with a profession that may involve the sacrifice of life. Exclude the Rajpoots who practice infanticide; they are faithless, remorseless, cruel. Avoid the opposite extreme of preferring outcastes. Give to native Christians encouragement and a fair chance, and select, but diversify the selection of intermediate castes, hitherto almost entirely excluded from the military profession, from all parts of the country. The same principle equally applies to police battalions.

14. Should each infantry corps, whether regular or police, be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

14. I am of opinion that there should be a recruiting depôt for each commissionership, usually comprising five to six districts in the division. The police battalions are for each such division. It would, however, be better to have the army recruiting depôt at some station other than the head-quarters of the police battalion.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

15. Answered in No. 14.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should

police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?

19. This is answered under No. 14. I see no objection to recruiting for two distinct branches of the public service being carried on in the same district.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

20. These two branches should be kept rigorously distinct. Experience has already proved this, for the admixture of the two was one of the primary causes of the failure of the police battalions raised by orders of Lord Ellenborough. See Mr. Thomason's Despatches, vol. i., pp. 170, 171. At the same time I see no objection to application by men in a police battalion to serve in the army being approved. To some the purely military service may be really attractive. But once enrolled in the army, there should be *nulla vestigia retrorsum*. The police battalion must on no account become a refuge for incompetent or discontented soldiers.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

21. Ordinarily European officers of the army, moving throughout the country, not merely in the main thoroughfares, but penetrating into the interior of districts. They should be well acquainted not only with the language but the usages of the agricultural classes, the main body of the population, and disposed to ready intercourse with them.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps or a distinct agency?

22. The same in kind, that is to say, the European officer the mainspring, but the agency to be quite distinct.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency or the police battalions of the North-West provinces?

23. With regard to recruits enlisted for the native army, I think the nominal roll form, No. 1, enjoined by the orders of the Governor-General, No. 486, 6th August 1852, would be more useful if there was an additional column after "father's name, &c.," viz., "referee." Generally, this would be a proprietor of the estate, and such reference has been found by experience in the matter of deaths, or family remittances, or any necessary inquiry, to be most useful. With this modification I think the rules in that order sufficient. The required information should be obtained from district officers where the recruiting officer has not the means of ascertaining it on the spot or from the mofussil establishments in his vicinity. The same rule should obtain for recruits for police battalions.

34. How should police corps in the North-West provinces be armed?

34. Infantry with percussion musket and bayonet, but not with rifles; mounted police with spear, sword, and pistol. It seems to be the opinion of competent military officers that carbines in lieu of spears with native cavalry rather tends to induce the men to eschew coming to close quarters with the enemy.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the North-West provinces?

6. I believe only general rules have as yet been laid down for police battalions. Police battalions, though the organization is military, are, and must necessarily be, a branch of civil administration. See Government Notification, 10th May 1858.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the North-West provinces?

7. By the commandant and sub-commandants being vested with the full powers of magistrates, or assistants to magistrates, for the punishment of offences committed by the men under their authority.

*E. A. Reade,
Esq.*

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps and the authority of their European and native officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

8. I can only speak with knowledge of the Agra divisional police battalion. Though there have been large drains upon it to aid other divisional battalions, and it may be said to be almost in a transition state, the system has worked well. The only defect I see in it is the second in command not being sub-commandant of the head-quarters district.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

17. How should the police corps be officered—the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

17. A commandant for the whole division.

A second in command for the same.

[Also sub-commandant of the head-quarters district.]

An adjutant for the same.

A sub-commandant for each other district.

A subaltern adjutant for the same.

A serjeant-major for each district.

A serjeant, European or East Indian, or a soobadar native, for each company.

A jemadar for each company.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

18. If native regular corps are retained in the army, I do not see how native commissioned officers can be dispensed with; but even if it were so, the good-service pay and pensions and distinctions would, I conceive, always make the army sufficiently attractive to ensure its obtaining, under good supervision, as good men as police battalions. But at present it must be remembered there is much and universal doubt whether pensions will be continued by the British Government; vast numbers have been forfeited, and many, it is to be apprehended, have lapsed by non-attendance; though, in the case of veterans especially, the journey would be hardly safe going, and wholly unsafe returning. Confidence must be restored before this question can be practically answered.

19. In police corps is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading or writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

19. I am not aware of any at present. There has not been time as yet. I am of opinion that literary tests are not desirable. The capability to read and write should be encouraged, but the inability should not bar promotion.

LIST OF THE SEVERAL CASTES OF THE NEPAUL RECRUITS levied at different times at GORUCKPOOR in 1840, 1841, and 1843.

CASTES.	CASTES.	CASTES.
1 Adheekaree.	25 Gayalee.	Roon.
Allay.	Juhusee.	Setee
Achayee.	Khurka.	Sawond.
Beend.	Khytee.	Sahes
5 Booruh.	Khawosa.	Sorkes.
Bhundaree.	Koor.	Thapa.
Bunsath.	30 Kunath.	Takoar
Beesta.	Mull.	Tewary.
Buhora.	Mazee.	Misser.
10 Bhatwol.	Nurgurkosee.	55 Zysee.
Bhatrye.	Newar	Kurmee, as carpenter, &c.
Bada.	35 Oochayhee.	Kamee, as sohar or sonaer.
Chund.	Olee.	Bandee, as drummer
Corkee	Oopudiah.	Offee, who digs iron
15 Cookee.	Poon.	Augree, who digs copper.
Chuttree.	Poonar.	Dhoid, as daz-see.
Danye.	40 Pookrail.	
Doodra.	Panda.	
Doora.	Rana.	
20 Gooroong.	Rawoth	
Gree.	Rajah	
Ghurtea.	45 Rokaha.	
Ghulay.		

LIST OF principal RECRUITING DISTRICTS IN NEPAUL.

District.	Province.	District.	Province.
Toolseepoor *	Mudhas.	Mooseekote	Rauj in hill.
Nyakote	Palpah in 2d hill	Phulaban	Do.
Seelguree	Dotee hill	Pookreethoke	Do.
Parpalthok	In upper hill.	Goolmee	Do.
Gurhoon	Rauj.	Khanchee	Do.
Easma	Hill do.	Dhoorkote	Do.
Tunhoo	Do.	Dewceer	Do.
Rohaneekote	Do.	Lumjoomkote	Do.
Isaurkote	Rauj in hill.	Gheering	Do.
Darmakote	In do.	Bhirkote	Do.
Coskee	Rauj in hill.	Reeing	Do.
Urgha	Do.	Srebtar	Do.
Sylanah	Do.	Bonkee *	Mudhas
Tansau (Toun)	Do Palpa.	Kubelese	In hill
Palpah	Do.	Mukwanpoor	Rauj do.
Pewtanah *	Do.	Bootwul *	Mudhas.
Katmaadhoo	In Nepaul.	Reeing	Rauj in hill.

The districts marked * are not recommended as recruiting fields. The inhabitants have a good deal of the Tharoo listlessness in them, and few would make good soldiers.

E. A. READE.

MEMO. 12th June 1857.

C.—ON THE POLICY OF GOVERNMENT.

THE defection of the 9th regiment N. I., which has on two former occasions set a good example by refusing to join in mutinous combination with other regiments, their systematic proceedings, from the particulars furnished by the officers, affording, as they do, irresistible evidence of long matured design; the almost daily intelligence of similar outbreaks of other regiments, only marked by greater exhibition of treachery and ferocity, the experience we have had under our own eyes of the real feelings of the regiment stationed here, whose disarming has saved Agra; and the manifest disposition of the detachments of contingents encamped around us, have impressed me with the strongest conviction that no dependence can be placed on a single regiment of the Bombay army, or any branch of it, which has been largely recruited from the fields of Oude, Bhojpoor (Shahabad), and Rohilkund, or districts closely adjoining Dehlee.

2. I am confirmed in this opinion by a recent letter from Sir Henry Lawrence, in which he distinctly declares that "nearly the whole Bengal army, except the Goorkhas and "Shekawatee regiment, must be disarmed." During his late residence of three weeks with me at Agra, his remarks on the temper of the native army, which he has profoundly studied, indicated a remarkable foresight of the present formidable combination; though his prediction that the head of the Government and some of the principal officers would be retained in the fort as hostages by sepoys, has happily not been fulfilled.

3. The present most alarming and wide-spread disaffection of our native soldiery of all arms, I attribute to various causes combined.

4. The preference which has been given to the dominant castes, whom those who have intimately studied the various phases of native character know, even amongst their countrymen, to be regarded as fair and false, that preference being based on the theory that they are men of higher spirit than those of the inferior orders, though in truth the natural bias of military men must be in favour of the forms and symmetry which nature has given to these classes partaking most largely of its gifts; the monopoly of military service by the inhabitants of particular regions, the restiveness of mercenary soldiers at recurring intervals, and the pampered pride of those of the Bengal army, who have been taught to believe that they have achieved the conquest of Upper India and are indispensable; the apprehensions of the Brahminical orders, whose influence on the lower classes, owing to the spread of intelligence, has been perceptibly declining, and who find in our soldiers the most ignorant, least cultivated, and easiest worked upon instruments of their intrigues; if these operating causes be taken, together with the readiness of the Mahomedans to avail themselves of any source of weakness to the Government to revert to aspiration and fanaticism, the present combination against our supremacy seems to be explained.

5. Such minor grievances as the question of the cartridge, the less intimate relation than formerly between officers and men, the cramped discretion of commanding officers, and the loss of local privileges by the annexation of Oudh, are points which agitate the surface; but they do not wholly explain the deep stream of unanimity of incongruous elements against British power in India.

6. It is useless to place any reliance upon the efforts and assurances of officers, unable as they are to compete with all the wiles of Asiatic heartlessness and duplicity working upon their attachment to their profession, their love of the ours under which they have served, and their kindly

feeling towards their men. There are still many officers in the 67th and 44th regiments who resent the recent measure of disarming the men as a harsh and unnecessary measure, though there is incontestible evidence that they were preparing for a conjunction with the mutineers at Dehli, whom numbers of them have since joined.

7. Owing to the marked distinction between the Goorkhas and the other regiments of the line, including the contingents raised and commanded by our own officers in certain native states, the ready attachment of the hill tribes to Europeans, and some similarity of habits, we may confide in their loyalty. But I am not myself without a bias regarding this class, from having been once employed by the Government to raise a regiment from amongst them for Shah Soojah's service, and having for years been recruiting agent in Eastern Nepaul for the Sirmoor battalion. I can conceive it possible that they might be drawn from their allegiance by an intrigue of their own nation; but coalition with the soldiery above mentioned I consider quite impossible.

8. The Seiks also, from their small number, their marked distinction from, and general dislike to, the class they designate Poorbeas, are not likely to combine with those who twit them on their own superiority, and the Mahomedans, who are their traditional aversion.

9. On the soldiery of native states, commanded by native leaders, it was reasonable to assume that reliance could be placed, as a political demonstration. It might even have been hoped that the Jats of Bhurtpoor and the Marhattas of Gwalior would prove auxiliaries in operations against the insurgent force; but experience has shown that their establishments, like our own, comprise many men taken from the same fields as those in arms against us; and the recent development before Muttra has proved that they are more likely to coalesce with mutineers than to fight against them.

10. We have, therefore, in these provinces scarcely any military supports but a few European soldiers and artillerymen. The rule of intermingling Seiks with the native regiments appears to have been imperfectly carried out, or altogether neglected; the Goorkhas are not available, and if report be true, the men of the Seik corps at Allahabad and Benares are mixed Seiks and Poorbeas, which latter class have it in their power to compromise the rest of the regiment by acts of treachery and assassination.

11. The arsenals and treasures confided to the keeping of our native soldiers have been plundered, or will be plundered. Their policy, if they have one, is to rob the treasury, let loose the convicts from the gaol, to murder or spare their officers as the caprice takes them, and to wend their way to Dehli, which they have selected as their battle ground.

12. Our military domination for the present is gone, and with it the energies of executive authority are paralysed. We have not only not available means to contend with or pursue the insurgent soldiers; but the police and other civil establishments, where such remain faithful, are unequal to contending with predatory clans, whose ancient traditions have been revived, and who have been quickened into active mischief by the evil example of those whose duty and oath was to maintain order.

13. I cannot see how any good can be effected by strategical combinations and dispersions of detachments of regiments, whose mutiny is only a question of time, in different parts of the country. It appears to me open to the very grave objection that the lives of military and civil officers are exposed to great risk; and that the people at large, who know their disaffection towards our Government even better than ourselves, will be alarmed and exasperated by the employment of such an agency. The people of the country, most assuredly the agricultural classes, the traders, and bankers, have no sympathy with our soldiery. They are disliked for their arrogance, often dreaded for their extortion, their advent causes terror, their departure is hailed with satisfaction. Such is the feeling of the country in ordinary times; it is now intensified, and from the feeling expressed, I cannot but regard the employment of this agency as calculated to convert a sepoy revolt into a national defection.

14. What then is the course to be pursued? It appears to me that we have, in our landed proprietaries and agricultural communities in the districts, and in our opulent citizens, the elements of successful combination and support in the cause of order restored or maintained, which, rightly managed, may be made conducive to the best results.

15. Little, doubtless, can be expected from the districts and portions of districts within the vicinity and vortex of the insurrection of Dehli. Predatory clans will have their full swing; local traditions must have their sway; the timid and temporizing, whom we cannot defend, must yield to

power and vengeance, which hangs over them while the usurpation lasts.

16. But in districts at a distance from the scene of contest for military supremacy, we have still a strength on which we can rely. We have almost daily evidence of shelter, kind treatment, and assistance to our fugitive countrymen at the hands of landowners. Some have boldly risked the vengeance of passing mutineers and the miscreants in their train by such acts. This, at least, is evidence of there being no sympathy between them and our enemies.

17. But further, the landed classes are on the side of order. Their municipal arrangements, with which we are too apt to interfere, all tend to the peaceful use of means, and peaceable enjoyment of the fruits of industry. The relations between the superior and inferior classes of the community are long established; the excitement of change is not sought for, and convulsions and disorders are only regarded as expectations of loss, injury, and annoyance.

18. The weight of control over the lower orders exercised by hereditary superiors is very great. It can be exercised to prevent crime or insure detection, to foster it and to maintain impenetrable concealment. If the Government can array so potent an auxiliary on its side, it surely must have strength; it surely must be impolitic to risk its being thrown into the scale against it.

19. Where landholders who have extensive possessions manage their own affairs, this power and influence will naturally be exercised to maintain and secure property and wealth. It will not be, as is too often the case amongst the landed aristocracy, in the power of corrupt agents to excite to disturbances and outrages from disloyalty or cupidity. The influence of such landholders is felt amongst their tribe and beyond their neighbourhood. The influence of example alone is efficacious without authority.

20. The Government has recently called for a return of the substantial landholders paying a land revenue of 10,000 rs. per annum and upwards, with brief notice of personal character. I am engaged in hastening the return through the press, its utility for reference in the present crisis being obvious.

21. It is to members of this class, capable, respected, and influential, supported by loyal tenantry and trusty retainers, that our district officers should turn as aids to the local establishments in preserving order in the interior of districts. The selection must be judicious, the sphere of exercise of aid and control defined, precautions must be taken against jealousies and the revival of ancient feuds. From amongst the number there may be those who can be trusted with permission to arm their tenantry, and enrol them in defensive bodies, on the assurance that the Government will eventually defray the additional expense, and requite special services by substantial rewards.

22. It should be clearly understood that they are not expected to contend with disciplined soldiers in the field; that this is a task which devolves on the Government, not on them. They should be required only to watch their movements, to communicate prompt intelligence, and to keep out of their way till they have passed on. Their plain duty and employed agency is to maintain order, and restore it when disturbed by such a visitation. They should have the powers of police officers and assistant magistrates within prescribed local limits, and communicate with the district officer direct.

23. It will be asked how this can be accomplished in those parts of the country where landed possessions are held by numerous members of a brotherhood, who are not under the influence of any single local head. But these have leading men, through whom the numerous proprietary community can be incited and united to co-operate in the same good cause, upon the assurance of commendation and reward, in which all will participate. I do not see that any risk would be incurred by the most popular and influential of the lumberdars being selected to represent their confederacy of coadjutorship with the magistrate.

24. But, it will be argued, there are Mahomedan landowners as well as Hindoo, and the principle advocated, in its application, may prove a source of danger as well as strength.

25. It will be wise to consider this objection in its extent. There may be delay in the re-occupation of Dehli, and Sir H. Lawrence may be correct in his remark, in the letter above alluded to, that if there be much delay we shall have to reconquer half India. No doubt every day's delay, though in the first collision the enemy have been signally defeated, must incite the Mahomedan section of our subjects to more fervent aspirations for the recovery of lost power. To this I may add, that there are many Mahomedan landholders who have great local influence. This is a full and fair view of one side of the case.

26. But our late census shows that we have in these provinces 13,803,645 male Hindoos to 2,376,270 Maho-

E. A. Reade,
Esq.

*E. A. Reade,
Esq.*

medans, including other classes not Hindoos, and that of the agricultural profession there are 9,549,192 of the former to 996,950 of the latter. Such a preponderance in numbers of that population, which I have shown above has no sympathy with our mutinous soldiery, must, if we do not drive it against us, depress and overwhelm the minority.

27. Further, admit that there must be delay in the re-establishment of our military domination, and the consequent evils of waning confidence in the classes not opposed to us, and excited hopes of those who are actively inimical, it does not follow necessarily that all Mahomedans should join the combination against our power.

28. No inconsiderable section of Mahomedans remains true to their traditions of their being the sword of God's wrath against idolators. They cannot believe that success will be obtained by consorting with them. The faithful can act only with the faithful. They anticipate the Divine wrath on the present unnatural coalition.

29. Then there is another large class in whom self-interest predominates over dreams of empire, who have properties at stake, or comfortable incomes attached to influential and respectable positions. They have no wish to lose either, and regard the present crisis with apprehension rather than exultation. To reckon upon loyalty would be absurd, but self-interest is a strong incentive. We may at least expect neutrality from this class, and neutrality is assistance.

30. No doubt many Mahomedans are embarrassed from extravagance and self-indulgence. Numbers are flocking towards Dehli in the hope of profiting by participating in plunder, and of getting rid of the incubus of incurred debt. Be it so; they have no local influence, their departure causes no regret. Disappointed money lenders, if they lose their money, have the consolation of being rid of those who would, if they had the opportunity, repay usurious accommodation by extortion.

31. The course therefore to be taken with Mahomedan landowners should be, to restrict them to the performance of those duties of police which are incumbent on them by the terms of the settlement contract. They, and especially those who have rent-free tenures, should be warned that any evidence of sedition or violence against their neighbours will be visited with confiscation. They should be held responsible for maintaining order on their estates, and neutrality, if the country is disturbed by the passage of mutineers, or the usurpation of parties in open rebellion. To them, as well as others, assurances of reward and commendation from the Government for special services should be held out. The measure of investing any of this class with powers should be adopted with extreme caution.

32. The aid of the influential classes who reside in cities can be obtained by evident care for their safety, and invited co-operation in measures of security and defence. Honours rather than rewards are preferred by this class; and these persons, whatever may be their religion, do not require to be told that mutinous soldiers, whose first step is to associate felons with themselves, have degenerated into mere plunderers, whose combination against the Government, if successful, would be only a prelude to universal spoliation.

33. On the grounds above stated, I am clearly of opinion that our wisest policy is to get rid of the detachments of contingents we now employ without delay. They are useless, and worse than useless. They are not sustaining the authority of Government; they are daily weakening it hold upon the bulk of the population. It may be impracticable or impracticable to disarm them, but they can at least be sent back to the native states from whence they came. They are more likely to abide still and watch the progress of events there than here.

34. We can rely on our European soldiers and ourselves for the defence of the seat of Government till reinforcements can arrive. We have a large available number of clerks, assistants in public offices, fugitives from other districts, and native Christians, whose families can be placed in the security of the fort on the condition that the adult males enrol themselves in the militia bodies which are about to be formed, and surely amongst the numerous officers now unemployed here, from their regiments having mutined or been disarmed, it would be easy to organize a body of officers' horse, whose occasional parade beyond the limits of the station would tend to supply, in popular estimation, our deficiency in cavalry.

35. In the district of Agra, and others still subject to the control of civil administration, let no time be lost in requiring the district officers to call upon landholders, of the descriptions and in the mode above suggested, to support the Government in the cause of public order, and to seek the co-operation of the wealthy and influential citizens in the same cause. The magistrate should be the head of the confederacy, and confer direct with the Government.

36. The time, I trust, is drawing near when the principle I contend for may be made efficacious in restoring order

and authority in the districts, from which the latter at present has been wholly withdrawn. I see nothing impracticable in a small reliable military force becoming the nucleus round which landholders and their tenantry will rally, and aid the executive in restoring complete authority, and prevention of new disturbances. The successful enforcement of the principle in one district will ensure its extension with equal success to others.

E. A. READE.

June 12, 1857.

MEMORANDUM ON POLICE AND AUXILIARY LEVIES FOR THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES. By E. A. READE, C.S., 4th November 1857.

PREFACE.

HAVING been requested by several officers to offer advice on the subject of police and reformation of establishments, I have thought it as well, having little leisure, to print off a few copies of a memorandum on these subjects.

It must be remembered that this has no official authority, and is only suggestive on points of practical experience.

EDW. A. READE.

Agra, January 20, 1858.

MEMORANDUM ON POLICE, N-W. P.

THE reformation and reconstitution of the police, North-Western provinces, is a large question. It is necessary for the Government to lay down certain principles, and details will follow.

The police generally, though many able officers have laboured to raise its character and improve its efficiency, has not given satisfaction either to the Government or the people at large. The system is faulty, the constitution defective, the pay insufficient, and the agency employed generally venal, deficient in courage, adepts in intrigue, and as the result has shown, has proved to a great extent disloyal to the Government during the present crisis. The case, however, is not hopeless; there are still numerous proofs of resolution, of fidelity, and of remarkable pertinacity and acuteness in the detection of crime.

I notice briefly each branch of the subject, with a few observations in support of what are, in my opinion, sound and practical principles.

VILLAGE POLICE.

Landholders are responsible by law and the tenor of their settlement contracts for prompt intelligence of crimes and occurrences, and for aid in the hue and cry against offenders. The value and efficacy of this aid in executive administration cannot be over-estimated, but it requires tact and influence of the magistrate to obtain it. If cordial co-operation is obtained, the magistrate has a strength which renders him almost independent of his police officers, and at least enables him to obtain a vigilant control over their proceedings. I lay stress on this, because it is my decided opinion that no system of police which can be devised will be successful if it excludes the large aid and interest which the landed classes are able and generally well-disposed to render in the cause of public order.

Landowners have the nomination of the police intelligencers, known by the name of goreyt, dowraha, khuburrusan, &c., in different parts of the country, whose remuneration is a plot of land rent-free, and of the chowkeedar or village watchman, who is paid either by assignments of land as above, or in money and perquisites.

These two offices are essentially distinct, and should remain so, though in some parts of the country the village watchman is called on to perform both duties, which are incompatible. He cannot work in the fields, watch by night, and make constant trips to the police station.

Wherefore the police intelligencer should have his separate duty for one or more villages, inhabited or otherwise, no tract of country being excepted, and be remunerated, as at present, by assignments of land. He should report periodically to the police station, even if he has no call to proceed there, promptly, if it be required, and aid by his local knowledge the preservation of peace and detection of crime.

There should be a village watchman for every fifty houses, paid in money, and receiving voluntary perquisites according to local usage. Hitherto both the nomination and pay of this class had been left to the landowners, but it has been recently ruled that they shall be paid at the *tuhseeldares*. I think this objectionable; it weakens the hold the landed

superior has upon one whose primary duty is to render service to the community of which he is the head, and it is apt to lead often to extortion of understrappers, and to chowkeedars swelling the train of officials instead of performing their village duties. A complaint for wages should be adjusted at the tulseeldaree, but there is no need to employ official agency otherwise. Wherever a village chowkeedar is appointed, the landholder should have the right of levying the cess of purjote or ground rent of houses to meet the expense.

The chowkeedar's duty should be watch by night, keeping order in markets or fairs, and assisting travellers and police on the spot.

DISTRICT POLICE.

I do not think that there is any objection to the present system of gradation of superior executive police officers.

The tulseeldar is a police darogah, or a deputy magistrate, discharging judicial as well as police functions. The next grade is that of naib darogah or thannadar, followed by that of mohurrir and jemadar, the latter being either at the thannah, or having charge of an outpost. This gradation is commendable. The defect of the system lies in the deficient pay and selection of the agency.

Effective reformation has been hindered by the want of discretion allowed to the local government in dealing with existing establishments. The most reasonable increase of expense has been discouraged, however trifling it may have been, and without due consideration of savings effected. Much valuable time has been lost in the endeavour, by the appointment of a roving commission, to pare down all the establishments of a continent to the same standard, irrespective of local circumstances and exigencies, and the remedy of obvious evils, therefore, has been partial.

Two sound principles have, however, been recognized, and their importance appreciated where they have been steadily enforced. The efficiency of an establishment is often improved when, by diminution of numerical strength, means have been afforded of giving to a limited number of officers higher pay. Both efficiency and repute is ensured by a resolute dissolution of family parties and local cliques, and increasing vigilance against their revival.

With regard to the superior officers, the tulseeldar and thannadar, I consider too much stress has been laid upon their having literary qualifications. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that many of the most learned, able, and intelligent officers have either utterly failed in this crisis, or have joined in the combination against our power. To fill up vacancies from the families and connexions of such persons would be a weakness and an impolitic concession which should be thoroughly disappointed, because it is certainly anticipated. The native army and the native amlah have been inflated with the notion that their services are indispensable to British dominion. It is imperatively necessary that this notion should be dissipated.

We must resort to the classes on which we can depend for loyalty and fidelity. We must employ more largely than we have hitherto done the agency of Europeans, of East Indians of known character and principle, and of landholders who have shown themselves able and willing to maintain order.

Amongst these classes there is sufficient intelligence, energy, and resolution for the service of the Government, without the accomplishments of scholarship, and from them selection should be made for vacant posts in the higher grades of fiscal and police establishments.

The remuneration must be adequate, the tenure of office secure from caprice, and the assurance of pension for long and faithful service must be indubitable and inviolable. Infinite mischief has been done by *ex post facto* rules regarding service pensions unsuited to the system of official tenure in bygone years. It has caused unjust deprivations of a reward fairly earned, it has grievously weakened the confidence of the public in that point where this Government has hitherto stood out in marked distinction from the native governments before it. In the matter of pensions of this description the public faith must not only be kept, it must not even be suspected.

The scale of pay noted below, graduated as a stimulus to good conduct, should be maintained:—

Tulseeldars, darogahs of police -	200	175	150
Naib darogahs -	80	60	40
Mohurrirs -	30	25	20
Jemadars -	20	15	10

The subordinates of district police or policemen should be of two classes, military or organized policemen, for which the term nujeeb appears suitable, and police burkundauzes or peace officers.

The exclusive employment of either class has proved a failure. The duties of policemen are either those which can be performed singly, or require to be carried out collectively.

In the former case the nujeeb generally needs requisite local knowledge and aptitude in dealing with village police; in the latter, peace officers have not the training and discipline necessary for the effective action of bodies of men. The admixture of both classes is a desideratum, and must be regulated by various circumstances, the extent of jurisdiction, the character of the people of the country, the propinquity of foreign territory, and other considerations.

The selection of nujeebs will be considered under the head of Divisional Police Battalions. As regards peace officers, an entire reformation is needed. Appointments are made upon no intelligible system. The situation is sometimes obtained as a reward for the capture of a criminal, more frequently on the recommendation of native officers anxious at all times to provide for their relatives and dependents, often to be rid of the importunity of a number of persons in waiting, without knowledge of antecedents, or test of qualifications. The Government has only required that they should be able to read and write.

The result has been that the selection has been little varied, that the smallest section of the population, the Mahomedan, has had the largest share of the patronage, and that what may be called the yeomanry of the country, the source from which able-bodied, resolute, active, and sufficiently intelligent men could be readily obtained, has been generally neglected.

The fact is, that there has been no system of recruiting for police, save in exceptional instances, and confined to officers who have made it a rule to become acquainted with the interior of their districts out of the track of main roads, and to hold communications with landowners and respectable inhabitants, unencumbered with official attendants and spies. The officer who will dispense with this hindrance to free intercourse, who will call up for inspection the village youth, and take note of those who appear to be alert, resolute, and cheerful, whatever may be their caste or profession, who will take the landowner's recommendation, and, when opportunity serves, give the tyro a six months' probation, will have only to see that a fair trial is given, and that intrigues of native official superiors are not allowed to succeed.

The selection cannot be too much diversified. The dominant castes and the Mahomedans consider it treason if selection be made out of their favoured orders, but they have been tried and failed.

I am decidedly opposed to the opposite extreme of exclusive patronage of the lowest classes. It is impolitic if it be resorted to as a revenge upon those who have had the exclusive privilege of office, and is disgusting to the mass of the people of those intermediate orders who, as well as the lowest, have been excluded.

It is unnecessary to specify the numerous inferior orders who make up many millions of inhabitants engaged before the outbreak in peaceful agricultural occupations, mechanical arts, and trades. From all, efficient policemen can be selected, none should be excluded.

But the European officer should select himself unimpeded, and unassisted except by his own judgment, and on a probation of six months. He may make mistakes, and will have summarily to set aside obvious failures, but in the long run he will not fail to obtain an efficient agency.

There should be a gradation also in this class of policemen, to admit of reward of merit and encouragement for good conduct. The lowest pay should be five rupees and the highest seven rupees, with a bonus of twelve months' pay after 30 years' service as a reward for good conduct, if the incumbent has not risen to grades which admit of pensions being granted.

CITY POLICE.

The remarks above apply to the police officers of the superior grades, but the office of chief city police officer or cotwal should be retained. The salary should range from 100 to 125 and 150 rupees.

In the minor towns the naibs or jemadars at outposts should be subordinate to the cotwal, and their reports should pass through the channel of his office to the magistrate. In the larger cities this may be inconvenient, but the office of cotwal should be rated at a higher pay than the other police officers, as the prize of meritorious service.

The policemen of cities and sudder stations should, as in the interior of the country, consist partly of nujeebs and of peace officers. In the interior, however, the latter should be armed with swords, in towns with truncheons only, with exceptions. These exceptions will be of detective policemen, a class whose head-quarters must necessarily be near the magistrate, and will be employed in the interior on special duty. This class would be armed with pistols, or unarmed, as the occasion might require.

E. A. Reade,
Esq.

*E. A. Reade,
Esq.*

The organization and selection of detective policemen requires much care, judgment, and constant attention.

The office of native superintendent of police has been disallowed by the Court of Directors, and, on principle, is objectionable. The magistrate himself is the proper superintendent of his police.

The number of detective policemen should be fixed according to the requirements of each district. They should be the *élite* of the whole body of policemen, and be composed of men of approved activity, intelligence, and patient persistence in tracking out criminals. Their regular salary should be from seven to ten rupees per mensem, and rewards should be given for special services.

Such rewards should not always be paid by Government. Private individuals should be required, if they desire to have the benefit of particular men's services, to promise specific rewards for success. The people will generally be found very reasonable if consulted, but the fact is they seldom are consulted.

The city watch and gate-keepers where enclosures obtain, should be selected by punchayet of each mohallah, subject to the veto of the magistrate. The pay should never be less than four rupees, and their arms should be a club and rattle.

The fund for the maintenance of this establishment is at present raised by cess on inhabitants, but of late years the conviction has been established that the system of octroi, or town duties, is more suitable to the tastes of the people, and yields a more than sufficient fund for watch and ward and ordinary conservancy.

CANTONMENT POLICE.

There can be no doubt that these establishments are ill-paid and inefficient. In the larger cantonments the bazaars have been the receptacle of plunder and the refuge of criminals. Chunar, which was within the limits of cantonments, was notably the place of worst repute in the whole Benares division.

The appointment of duly qualified officers as cantonment magistrates, subject to the military authority only in certain defined matters of military jurisdiction, to the superintendent of police for the division in regard to the appointment of executive officers, and the superintendent of divisional police battalions, in respect of detachments posted in cantonments appears to me to be essentially necessary, and to render it advisable to dispense with the separate office of superintendent of cantonment police.

As a general rule the cantonment police should consist only of detachments from the divisional police battalion and of a limited number of watchmen, suitably remunerated by a cess laid on householders in bazaars, or otherwise, within the limits of cantonments.

ROAD AND FERRY POLICE.

I doubt if the system of stationing watchmen at mile or two mile distances on the Grand Trunk Road has been efficacious in the prevention of robbery. The safety of the thoroughfare is better ensured by the uncertainty of the arrival of patrol guards. Ferry policemen should be selected men, vigilant, but not conspicuous. The expense of such establishments, and of guards stationed at halting grounds, should be defrayed from the ferry funds and surplus town duties.

DIVISIONAL POLICE BATTALIONS.

A police battalion for each district is one of the projects of the day. The organization will be more complete, the selection of men will take a wider range, the expense will be less, and uniformity of system will be better maintained, by having battalions, mounted and foot, for divisions.

The European commandant of a divisional police battalion should be an officer of judgment, standing, and experience, resolutely determined to abandon the illusions of recruiting only from dominant castes, or religious sections, and particular localities, to disregard the appearance only of stature and symmetry, and to diversify the selection of men as much as possible amongst all orders and classes without distinction.

The system must be changed, the European recruiting officer should go to the people at large, not merely certain classes of the people come to the recruiting officer. The principle of varied selection is as essential for organized police as for other branches.

The commandant should ordinarily reside at the same station as the commissioner of the division, for ready con-

sultation and reference, and his tours of inspection should be arranged in concert.

The complement of commissioned and non-commissioned officers of each battalion should be proportionate to the number of districts and to meet the casualties of officers posted to districts absent on leave from sickness or other cause. Ordinarily there are six districts in a division; I leave the determination of the number, grade, and pay of European officers to military authority; but the scale below appears fair:—

Commandant	-	-	-	-	1,000
Adjutant	-	-	-	-	450
6 Sub-commandants, each	-	-	-	-	600
6 Subalterns, each	-	-	-	-	350

Each district should be provided with a detachment under the command of a sub-commandant, a subaltern, and European serjeant-major, the detachment to consist of horse and foot, and distributed at *tuhseels*, *thannahs*, or particular localities, as may be determined with the approval of the commissioner, but always having a reserve at the *sudder* station, to meet any emergency, to perform parade duties, and to provide substitutes for vacant posts.

There should be also a limited number of supernumeraries recruited from all classes and all parts of the country, paid by subsistence allowance, undergoing drill, and ready to be drafted into the effective strength on vacancies.

The mounted force will be posted at particular points, or kept ready for occasional duty, the footmen will be employed in guard of the treasuries, *sudder*, and *mofussul*, and escort of remittances, at the *gaols*, and whatever an armed force acting in unison may be required. But they should never be employed in revenue duties, for which the collector has a separate establishment.

Reliefs and changes will be necessary, and it should be so arranged that they take place on occasion of transmission of large remittances to the principal receiving treasuries at the divisional head-quarters.

The grades of native officers, and rates of pay of fighting men and camp followers for the Punjab police, appear generally unobjectionable, but some variation is necessary to raise up the battalion to sufficient strength for a division, and it seems unnecessary to provide for medical and other establishments, which are available at all *sudder* stations, and any needful extra expense can be passed in a contingent bill.

Appended is an estimate of the strength and cost of the native portion of a police battalion, horse and foot, for a division, and also taken from *Shakespear's* tables is an approximate calculation of the actual present establishment for the Agra division, and the modifications suggested by the proposed measure.

The magistrates must necessarily retain some mounted men for intelligence, expresses, and patrols. They must also have a sufficient establishment of peace officers and detective policemen. The mounted and foot police battalion, I am of opinion, would be competent to perform other duties.

The jurisdiction of officers commanding detachments of organized police over the men, and of the magistrates, requires to be carefully defined. It is imperatively necessary that the magistrate's requisition should be obeyed without hesitation. The duty to be performed should, as a general rule, be described in writing, and the magistrate may suggest the strength of the party, but the officer commanding must determine this on his own responsibility.

The magistrate should be empowered to punish for actual disobedience and contempt of his authority; but such cases should always be certified for confirmation of the commissioner.

In all cases of felony or heinous offences, the jurisdiction should be with the civil authority only. But in case of misdemeanor and ordinary misconduct, it should be with the discretion of the officer commanding to make over the case to the magistrate, or himself to try the offender under special rules and vested authority.

For the adoption of one uniform and effective system throughout the country, for appellate authority in questions of organization, discipline, and control, and as the channel of communication with the Government, a superintendent of divisional police battalions is absolutely necessary.

The principles advocated, the system recommended, and the estimated strength of establishment must be considered permanently applicable to the state of a division in which order has been fully restored. That consummation cannot be effected in any division of these provinces without a military force, and auxiliary levies for temporary aid, which will be considered in a separate minute.

SCHEME OF A DIVISIONAL POLICE BATTALION.

<i>European Officers.</i>	
Commandant - - - - -	1,000
Adjutant - - - - -	450
6 Sub-commandants, 600 each - - - - -	3,600
6 Subalterns, 350 each - - - - -	2,100
	7,150
<i>Mounted.</i>	
11 Officers - - - - -	440
100 Troopers - - - - -	2,000
Moonshee, &c. - - - - -	30
	*2,470
<i>Foot.</i>	
6 European sergeants-major, 100 each - - - - -	600
12 Soobadars or sergeants - 50 do. - - - - -	600
12 Jemadars - - - - -	360
60† Havildars - - - - -	840
60 Naiks - - - - -	720
1,200 Sepoys - - - - -	8,400
120 Supernumeraries - - - - -	480
24 Bheesteers - - - - -	120
24 Cooks - - - - -	96
12† Pay Havildars - - - - -	60
6 Clashes - - - - -	30
1 Moonshee - - - - -	30
1 Clerk - - - - -	40
Allowance for forge, &c. - - - - -	120
	†12,496
Total Mounted and Foot - - - - -	†14,966
Grand Total - - - - -	22,161

This scheme is framed on the supposed permanent requirements of a division during a state of public tranquillity.

AGRA DIVISION.

PRESENT STRENGTH and COST of MOUNTED and FOOT POLICEMEN, GAOL, TUNSEELDAREE GUARDS, from Shakespeare's Tables.

	Muttra.	Agra.	Furruckabad.	Mynpooree.	Etawah.	Total Cost
Magistrates' Sowars (vol)	88	697	53	991	49	793
Police	73	403	223	1,346	91	445
Police	697	2,376	878	3,859	899	1,613
Treasury Guards	163	648	156	624	160	800
	810	4,023	1,308	7,317	689	13,490
						730
						3,649
						508
						3,017
						124,496
DEDUCT RESERVED.						
Magistrates' Sowars	16	263	26	463	20	373
Peace Officers at 5	306	1,810	260	1,750	250	1,250
Detectives at 7	30	140	25	175	30	140
	336	1,922	400	3,387	290	1,763
Deduct also for graduated increase of pay	-	206	-	375	-	186
						150
						10,442
						11,054

N.B.—The above includes the new district of Etah formed of portions of Mynpooree, Furruckabad, and Alygurh.

AUXILIARY LEVIES.

In the memorandum of this date on the subject of police, I have submitted an approximate estimate of the description, strength, and remuneration of police required for an ordinary commissionership in these provinces, being such as would be permanently required when the country has been completely tranquillized.

The complete organization of an effective police force on the principles advocated must be a work of time; it would not, of the strength proposed, even if it could be formed at once, be sufficient under existing circumstances, and for some considerable time at least there must of necessity be a powerful establishment to maintain order and security after the entire subjugation of resistance by military force.

The temporary aid, therefore, of auxiliary levies is indispensable, and this subject needs attention.

In June last the Government of these provinces was urged, in lieu of detachments of mutinous contingents,

* This is the strength and cost of a Punjab rissalah.
 † Punjab police battalion modified and enlarged.
 ‡ By substitution of organized mounted and foot police (European officers excluded), a reduction of 11,054, see estimate following, will be effected, and the additional expense of this estimate is a mere trifle compared with the cost of effective strength of native regiments heretofore employed in performing a large portion of the duties which will now devolve on the divisional police battalion. In some divisions, it will be necessary, no doubt, to have an additional rissalah. This would make the total monthly cost 24,526.

whose defection was a question only of days and hours, to substitute as the agency for maintaining order levies of the agricultural classes or yeomanry, collected by the influence of their landed superiors, and subject to the command of such of them as evinced fitness for authority and fidelity to the Government, the cost being defrayed by the State.

E. A. Reade, Esq.

The principle was disapproved of at the time, but was conceded on the occasion of Mr. Cock's experimental deputa- tion to the Alygurh district, when it was discovered that auxiliary levies could be raised at once, and not only so, but without a day scarcely for organization, could fight bravely by the side of our European soldiers against rebels.

At Agra bodies of militia, horse and foot, have been raised; and at the same place also Meerut volunteer corps have been formed.

It is readily admitted that good service has been rendered by such levies; that toil, dangers, and privations have been borne with exemplary courage and patience by them; but it is obvious that the number of the persons of the classes from which such levies have been raised is insufficient to produce any sensible effect in restoring or maintaining order through an extensive tract of country.

It is also obvious that, with the return of tranquillity, the resumption of public business, of public works, and mercantile pursuits, the classes who supply militiamen and volunteers now must resume their accustomed vocations.

The Government, therefore, must depend on the bulk of the population for auxiliary levies of sufficient numerical strength, and possessing other requisites for efficient public service.

New blood, much needed, will be infused into our police establishments by the Sikh levies from the Punjaub, who, under proper control, will no doubt prove effective men, but it is essential for the future safe and efficacious working of the system that there should be no exclusive class interest in the agency—no facilities for combination against authority. The police establishment is intended to be a regular permanent establishment; not one that may be temporarily useful, and ultimately dangerous.

With auxiliary levies, avowedly raised only for temporary service, there need be no apprehensions, if such be taken from the agricultural classes. There is not a nationality in India to which the temporary transition from agriculture to military service is not familiar. That service is often the condition of the tenure of land: the husbandman becomes a soldier, and reverts to his normal occupation with equal readiness.

Making the largest exception for predatory clans—for tribes lawless and unmanageable from temper, traditions, and revival of ancient feuds—it is patent to observation that a very large proportion of the agricultural population of these provinces has shown no sympathy with mutinous soldiers, mostly drawn from distant fields, and has been anxiously looking for the restoration of authority, under which they can resume the peaceable enjoyment of the fruits of their industry. In parts of the country this feeling has been intensified by observation and experience of the effects of Mahomedan usurpation of authority, supported by the violence of mutinous soldiers consorting with felons.

The last census shows for these provinces that there are 9,549,192 male Hindoos following the profession of agriculture, and having some right or interest in land more or less valuable, the security of which depends, in great measure, on order and tranquillity. It must be obvious in theory, even if there were not evidence of fact, that there must be leading men and followers of this class able and willing to assist the Government in a cause common to both.

Some officers have endeavoured to make use of this class as self-constituted combination against the enemies of the State who are in actual rebellion. I consider this to be a great mistake. It is the duty of landholders to maintain order in their estates, to prevent crime, and give no countenance to public offenders. But more could not be expected of their acting independently; and in the absence of European officers, to organize associations in bodies, than to keep down the baser populace. It was not to be expected that they could contend with disciplined mutineers and rebel forces. The result is that, though there have been successful collisions with the enemy, the effect has been transitory, and ultimately defeat and disaster, from want of system, co-operation, and precautions.

Such associations are useless without leaders, and these must be the representatives, and have the authority of Government, able and competent to organize, lead, and control. In other words, there must be European officers in command of yeomanry corps; and these are the auxiliary levies which the Government should at once raise and retain until the complete tranquillization of the country will admit of their returning to their usual occupations.

E. A. Reade,
Esq.

Amongst the superior landholders there are many the members of whose families would fittingly fill the grade of subordinate officers, and whose influence would bring village youth of all classes fit for military duties, and hearty associates with their hereditary superiors in the same cause.

The service required should be local within the limits of divisions and bordering districts of divisions.

It should be avowedly temporary, and with the condition of release at any time the Government thinks fit, awarding a bonus on discharge of three months' pay for certified good conduct.

The yeomanry corps should consist both of horse and foot, it being necessary for the efficiency of infantry bodies to have cavalry in support.

In the infantry it would be desirable to have as the first grade of non-commissioned officers, European serjeants selected for temper, sobriety, and experience, both for the benefit of drill and discipline, and also to obviate jealousies amongst inferior officers.

The rates of pay for infantry should be the same as those fixed for men of the police battalions. But with regard to the mounted force, it would be as well to adhere to the rates fixed by the late lieutenant-governor, the difference in excess between which and those fixed for a Punjaub Ressalah has caused some difficulty. The rates fixed by the lieutenant-governor are in the secretariat.

There can be no reasonable objection to a higher rate of pay for temporary service to men who have to provide their own horses, and the most practicable solution of the difficulty is to offer to the levy of jät horse now being raised in the district of Alygurh, the option of being enrolled as a yeomanry corps, or of being drafted into a police battalion, in the one case for temporary and in the other for permanent service.

The estimated strength and pay of a yeomanry corps is noted below.

Scheme suggested of officers and men of an auxiliary levy or yeomanry corps, and localities for depôts. Delhi excepted:—

European commandant	-	-	800	
Second in command	-	-	600	
Adjutant	-	-	450	
2 Subaltern officers	-	-	700	
Assistant surgeon	-	-	350	
				2,900
INFANTRY.				
2 European serjeants, at 100			200	
6 Soobadars	-	"	50	300
6 Jemadars	-	"	30	180
30 Havildars	-	"	14	420
30 Naiks	-	"	12	360
600 Sepoys	-	"	7	4,200
60 Supernumeraries	-	"	4	240
12 Bheesties	-	"	5	60
12 Cooks	-	"	4	48
6 Pay havildars	-	"	5	30
3 Clashes	-	"	5	15
Moonshee	-	-	-	30
Clerk	-	-	-	30
Allowance for forge, &c.	-	-	-	60
Native doctor	-	-	-	20
Dresser	-	-	-	5
Sweeper	-	-	-	4
				6,322
CAVALRY.				
4 Ressaldars	-	at 150	600	
4 Jemadars	-	"	50	200
24 Duffadars	-	"	35	840
4 Trumpeters	-	"	30	120
400 Sowars	-	"	25	10,000
ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCE.				
4 Kote duffadars	at	6		
4 Pay ditto	-	"	5	44
				11,804
				21,026

For the present Meerut and Alygurh would appear to be suitable localities for levy of yeomanry corps for the Meerut division; Etawah and Futtehgurh, when occupied, for the Agra division; and similarly Badaon and Bijnore for the Rohilcund division. The Delhi division I except as, from the proximity of its districts to the focus of rebellion, and the large amount of population being more or less completely as for other levies would not be advisable. The community will show the necessity and expediency of the proposed.

EPITOME.

MEMORANDUM ON POLICE, N. W. P.

Present defects.—A faulty system, defective constitution—insufficient pay—agency venal, adepts in intrigues—defective in courage—disloyal in great part during this crisis. But still proofs exist of resolution, fidelity, acuteness, and pertinacity in tracing crime.

Village police.—Position and duties of landowners—their aid essential. The rural intelligencer and village watchman. Both officers should be kept distinct—the former compensated by assignments of land—the other paid in money—money payments at the tihaseeldares to be the exception, not the rule, but on suits for wages. Duties of both classes defined.

District police.—Present grades of executive police officers commendable, but pay inadequate. Needless restrictions on local government in recasting establishments, though involving no increase of expense. Proof ample that diminution of numerical strength and higher pay to officers retained promotes efficiency, still further ensured by abolition of cliques and precautions against their revival. The delusion of the native army and native Amlah the same, as to both being indispensable to British dominion, must be dispelled. Loyalty and fidelity preferable to accomplishments of scholarship. Europeans, East Indians of character, and landholders, the classes from which executive police officers should be selected. Remuneration to be adequate, tenure of office safe from caprice, and the public faith regarding retiring pensions, shaken by *ex post facto* rules, must be rigidly kept. Triple gradation of salaries recommended to encourage zeal.

Of policemen distinct classes necessary. Exclusive employment of individual or organized collective agency fails. Both efficacious if employed according to the nature of the duty. Organized policemen, nujeebs—ordinary policemen or peace officers, burkundazes.

Present bad selection of the latter, patronage monopolized by the smallest section of the population. Proper system of recruiting rare and exceptional. European officers should select themselves from all parts of their district, visiting the interior. Selection cannot be too much diversified. Exclusive selection of the lowest castes or outcastes quite wrong. The numerous orders intermediate of dominant castes and outcastes the proper stock; no profession, craft, or trade to be excluded. The European officer to choose himself, and to allow six months' probation—gradation of pay recommended, with a bonus after 30 years' service of good conduct of 12 months' pay in lieu of pension.

City police.—Cotwals should be retained with whole or divided charge according to circumstances. Of ordinary policemen some to be detectives. Arming of ordinary policemen described and recommended. Detective policemen at head-quarters; care and judgment necessary in selection, they should be the elite of district police. Native superintendent not required. The magistraté his own superintendent of police. Rate of pay to detectives higher than ordinary, with rewards for special services by Government or individuals.

City watch as usual, but octroi or town duties more acceptable to the people than assessment on householders.

Cantonment Police.—Entire reformation necessary. The military bazaars notably the refuge of bad characters. Establishments ill paid. The establishments should be entirely reorganized. The cantonment joint magistrate properly selected. Subordinate to military authority in matters of military jurisdiction, precisely defined—otherwise to the commissioner or superintendent of police.

Road and Ferry Police.—Moveable patrols preferable to stationary watchmen on roads; uncertain arrivals of the former preferable to the somnolency or local partizanship of the latter. Ferry policemen to be selected carefully. Costs of such establishments to be defrayed from ferry funds and surplus town duties.

Divisional Police Battalions.—To consist of organized police, horse and foot, for divisions, preferably to separate levies for districts; organization thus more complete, range of recruiting wider, expense less. Commandant to be an officer of judgment and experience, resolute against the illusions of dominant castes and appearances of stature and symmetry. System of recruiting must be changed. European officers to go to the people—not merely certain classes brought to him. Diversified selection equally requisite in organized and ordinary police. Commandant to reside at the same station as commissioner, and to arrange tour of inspection in concert. Full complement of commissioned and non-commissioned officers requisite; scale of number and pay suggested. Each district to have a detachment under a sub-commandant and other officers, a reserve always kept at the Sudder station—a limited number of

supernumeraries on subsistence allowance ready to fill up vacancies. Guard of treasures, Sudder, and Mofussil, escort of treasure, gaols, other guards, and armed detachments in the interior where required, to be supplied from organized police, but not to be employed in collection of revenue.

Grades of native officers and rates of pay the same as in the Punjab, but the strength of a divisional battalion proportionably larger. Estimate of the comparative strength and cost of a divisional police battalion, with a reserve of peace officers and detectives, for the Agra division. Details of police force necessarily reserved by magistrates, mounted men for intelligence and expresses, peace officers for ordinary duties, and detectives. Definition of authority of magistrate and officer commanding respecting the men of the battalion. Magistrates' requisitions must be obeyed. Magistrates competent to punish for disobedience and contempt, to have jurisdiction in heinous offences, but misdemeanors to be tried by the officer commanding, vested with powers of assistant magistrate for that purpose. A superintendent of divisional police battalions required as appellate authority and channel of communication with Government.

POLICE BATTALION.	
Officers - - -	7,160
Foot - - -	12,496
Horse - - -	2,470
	<u>22,116</u>

The scheme of divisional police battalions and estimate of strength and cost framed to meet the permanent requirements of the country when completely tranquillized. At present temporary assistance must be furnished in auxiliary levies.

AUXILIARY LEVIES.

In memorandum of police, the scheme of revised establishment suited to permanent requirements of the country, after complete tranquillization. A permanent effective police force cannot be organized at once, and temporary extra aid is needed.

Yeomanry corps suggested to the Government in June in preference to the employment of mutinous contingents, disallowed at the time, but experimentally allowed in the Aylurh district with excellent effects.

The Agra militia men have done good service, but are too few to make any sensible impression, and all are now pre-

paring to resume their usual occupation. For auxiliary levies, Government must depend on the bulk of the people of the agricultural classes.

Exclusive employment of Seiks deprecated—temporary usefulness and ultimate danger to be guarded against.

Levy for avowedly temporary service incurs no risk, and is suited to the genius of the people. The transition between soldier and husbandman, natural and familiar.

The agricultural classes, omitting exceptions of predatory clans, have been loyal to the Government—have shown no sympathy with mutinous soldiers, and in parts of the country oppressed by Mahomedans, are eager to join our forces. 9,549,192 Hindoo male agriculturists, by last census, speaks for itself.

Yeomanry as a self-constituted combination ineffective—they require European organization and leadership—and yeomanry corps under European officers therefore are the auxiliary levies recommended.

Superior native officers should be selected from the landowners who would bring men from their tenantry stocks of every variety of order and class.

The service must be local within divisions, and districts bordering divisions.

The service to be temporary. Native officers and men to be guaranteed a bonus of three months pay on discharge with certificates of good character.

Each levy should consist of horse and foot. To prevent jealousies amongst native officers, the higher non-commissioned officers should be European sergeants selected for temper, sobriety, and experience.

Pay of infantry the same as for police battalion, but as the service is temporary, the allowance for the mounted branch might be higher.

Cost	Scheme suggested of officers and
European officers- 2,900	men of an auxiliary levy or yeomanry
Infantry - - - 6,323	corps, and localities for particular
Cavalry - - - 11,804	pôts. Dehlie districts excepted, as
Per mensem - - 21,026	largely implicated in the rebellion.

E. A. READE.

Agra, November 4, 1857.

No. 12.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM MAJOR-GENERAL HEARSEY.

Major-Gen.
J. B. Hearsey.

From Maj.-Gen. Sir JOHN HEARSEY, K.C.B., to
Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

SIR, Barrackpore, July 8, 1858.

HEREWITH I have the honour to forward two packets containing answers in full to the questions put to me therein.

I also send general observations in reply to the classification of questions on the reorganization of the armies of India.

I have taken as much time as I could spare from my duties as major-general commanding the presidency division, to enter fully into the matter laid before me.

May I beg the favour of my opinions on the subjects mooted being laid before the Right Hon. the Governor-General for his favourable consideration.

I have, &c.

J. B. HEARSEY, Maj.-Gen.,
Commanding Presidency Division.

P.S.—The third portion of questions, "European officers," shall be answered and sent to you as early as possible.—J. B. HEARSEY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

I am strongly of opinion that recruiting should cease in Oude, the Doab of the Ganges, and Jumna, in Shahabad or Boujepore, and in Rohilcund and Bundelcund, that no soldiers from those districts should remain in the regular army of Bengal.

That recruiting from the Punjab of Seiks, Punjaabee Musselmans, hill tribes of Kamaon, Ghurwal, Sirmoor, Bussahir, Chumba, Lahoul, the Dogras of the lower Cashmere hills, men from the hills of

Muree and the Huzareh hills, even the wild tribes of the Kohat, Kyberees, Momunds, and the hill tribes of the Damun Koh, the tribes that herd cattle on the banks of the Punjab rivers, the Jâts of Kansî Kissat, the Daoud Pootras of Bhawulpore, the inhabitants of the Shekawut country, the Rajpoots of Rajhpootana, the Beloches,—all might be entertained for the regular army.

No more Brahmins, no more Mussulmans of Hindostan proper, to be entertained in the regular native force.

Each tribe should be formed into companies of 80 men strong, no two companies of the same tribe in a regiment; this would cause emulation between companies on service, nay, on parade. I have found the lower tribes of Hindostanees, such as sheers (*i.e.* shepherds), gwallahs (*i.e.* herdsmen), and all others more pertinacious, regarding caste prejudices than any other. They have an idea it gives them more consequence; it certainly serves as an excuse for idleness, and their refusing to do many acts of duty in a military sense, such as they would not scruple to do if they were not in the army.

Every recruit, when enlisted, should be sworn (in the manner most binding to his tribe) to do the duties of a soldier in all situations, to use the spade, the shovel, and the pickaxe as the sappers and miners do, to work in trenches and on fortifications when required so to do, as also to make and repair roads, build barracks, thatch or tile them; in fact to be able to put themselves under cover when required to do so, without adventitious aid. Caste to be entirely ignored and set aside. Any soldier refusing to work, because it interfered with his caste, to be tried by court-martial and sentenced to be flogged, or trans-

Major-Gen.
J. B. Hearsey.

portation for life. This acknowledgment of caste prejudices has always been the weak point of the Bengal army, and should now, once for all, be denounced. All native soldiers to be enlisted for general service, to embark for foreign service at a moment's notice, and to serve in any part of the world where they may be required, for as long a period as it suited the Government, whether not relieved in three or in ten years.

II.—THE MILITARY CODES AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

A plain and most simple code or articles of war ought to be drawn out. No hair-splitting quibbles; these may answer for courts of law, but courts-martial should be considered courts of honour. One simple form is required: all technicalities should be banished. The only thing to be borne in mind ought to be "guilty" or "not guilty" of the crime charged. There should be no opening left for a military or any other kind of lawyer. Sentences to be confirmed by commanding officers of regiments, and immediately carried into execution. Soldiers (especially native ones) escaping punishment in consequence of the quibbles of law, defy the orders of their captains and the commanding officers of their regiments, and become "yāgee" or mutinous.

The commanding officers of regiments to be held responsible for the proper administration of justice. No reference to higher authority to be made, either to brigadiers, major-generals, or to the commander-in-chief, except in cases where the sentence of death is passed, or transportation for life. The commanding officer to have the power of summary dismissal from the service, as well as of corporal punishment or confinement in prison with hard labour. This would simplify military law much. The men to be enlisted are ignorant and wild Asiatics, who know no rule but despotism, and immediate punishment for crimes committed; these men would have a wholesome fear of their English officers and especially of their commanding officer, and would yield implicit obedience when they knew that he had full power to punish instantly all disobedience.

If commanding officers of regiments acted wrong, or showed they were otherwise unfit, they should be instantly removed from their commands; they should fully know and understand that such was the penalty for incompetence, but they should not be set up as automatons without authority or power, to be scoffed and laughed at by ignorant men, of a fierce and wild nature, who understand nothing but force and immediate obedience, for failing in the latter, nothing but mutiny and outrage can be the result.

Courts-martial for the future to be comprised entirely of European officers—an open court; all who wish to witness the proceedings to be permitted to do so, whether natives or Europeans.

One of the great causes of the present mutiny was the want of authority in commanding officers of regiments to punish immediately all crimes or faults committed and to reward for good conduct.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

In future, regiments for the native army should be composed of eight companies of natives and two companies of Europeans; these latter should be the flank companies, *i.e.*, grenadier and light companies. They should be armed with the Minie or Enfield rifle. The native companies to be composed each of a separate tribe of men,—say 80 Seiks, 80 Hillmen, 80 Jats, 80 Mahomedans of the Punjaub, 80 Rajpoots of Rajpootana, 80 Dogras of the lower Cashmere hills, 80 Beloches from Sindh, and 1 company of 80 men of Christian Africans, if they can by any means be obtained.

No Native Commissioned Officers.—The highest rank a native can attain to be havildar or serjeant; 2 (two) European serjeants to be appointed to each subdivision of a company, *i.e.* to 40 privates. These

divisions to be termed right and left subdivisions of it.

These 16 serjeants to be selected and kept up from the two European flank companies attached to the regiment; these men to be *sober, steady*, well-behaved men, and good and tolerable linguists. Serjeants should be allowed to rise to ensigncies or *commissioned officers*, as a spur to good conduct, after a certain number of years' service, or for exemplary gallantry in the field. Great emulation would be caused by thus allotting the tribes to different companies. It is not likely that eight different tribes would combine to mutiny in the manner the Bengal army has lately done, and if they did there would always be two British companies and one African Christian Company, armed with Enfield rifles, for their European officers to fall back upon, and do their best to overcome it. The two companies of Europeans and one of African Christians would be placed in barracks on the right flank contiguous to each other, the remaining seven companies could be huted as at present; but the small bungalows or pucca roofed houses for the serjeants, say eight in number, could be built to the front and rear of the vacant spaces of the huted lines of the men, and each house contain two serjeants and their families, if married men. The huts for the men to have flat mud roofs, to prevent fires or incendiarism. These 16 serjeants to be constantly amongst the men of their companies, so that no intrigue or conspiracy could go on without its coming to their knowledge.

Promotion.—Promotions to havildars and naiks not to go by seniority; active, smart good men, to be selected for such grades. If rewards are due to men who are not fit for non-commissioned officers, they should be made in money. Every eight years' service should entitle the sepoy, who had behaved well during that period, to 1 (one) rupee per mensem increase of pay, so that a sepoy having served well for thirty-two years, would be in the receipt of 10 rupees per mensem pay. It would not cause much extra expense, for but few sepoys serve thirty-two years.

No Pension Establishment, no Invalid List.—A bonus to be given to the sepoy who is no longer fit for duty after twenty-five years' service; also to all those who may be considered unfit for active service, and to those who have suffered from severe sickness consequent on exposure during active service at inclement seasons, or who may be crippled by accidents whilst on active service, or from severe wounds; a scale of recompense to be formed for that purpose.

If military colonies for old or disabled sepoys were established, where they could be located on waste lands, and their families, *i.e.*, wives and children with them (such was formerly done on the grand trunk road from Ranecgunge to Shereghatty when it was first opened), their sons could be brought up as soldiers, and join the regiments their fathers had served in, when they were of the proper age or size. Each superannuated sepoy to have land free or on very very light rent to cultivate. This would serve as a very material guarantee for the fidelity of such sons who were in the service. Old, *sober, steady* European serjeants, with their wives and families, and a native doctor (with medicines), and such other staff as might be deemed necessary, could be posted to each location to drill and instruct the boys. Old Christian drummers and musicians, with their families, could also be sent to these colonies, and have land given to them; they could also be the head-quarters of a missionary to attend to the religious wants of the Christians, and by setting them a good example and teaching them the way they should go, would eventually gain proselytes to the Christian religion.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

To each company of Europeans, also to the company of Christian Africans, as also natives, should be attached or posted, three (3) European officers, *viz.*, a

captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign, besides the usual number of non-commissioned officers, buglers, drummers and fifers. It should be the duty of the European officers to go to their lines, *i. e.*, the huts of their men, every morning and evening to listen to any complaint or grievance, and if in their power remedy it. If not in their power to do so, to report the circumstance in person (the senior officer of the company, the captain,) to the commanding officer of the regiment. These officers should encourage their men to tell them of *their home, their village difficulties*, and to show them they take an interest in their welfare, and also of their families. I have often assisted my men by *advances of money*, when they required it, to *marry their daughters, to pay arrears of rent to Government*, to re-build their houses when their families had the misfortune to be burnt out of them by accidents, to buy fresh cattle for the plough when the old ones had died or become useless from age or hurts.

In this manner I gained their hearts. The money I advanced was repaid me by instalments (*i. e.* kists) from their monthly pay. I thus became intimately acquainted with the names and characters of my men, their habits, their homes, and their village interests. Of course I never took interest for any loan I made them. I lost it, but I gained their good will. All crimes, faults, or negligences I invariably and severely punished, but I never cast their derelictions in the face of those men; they had committed a fault, and they had been punished, and there the matter ended; if they afterwards behaved well, they were rewarded. In action my men clung to me like bees. I have often had to strike them, with the flat of my sabre, and ask them, if they wished to disgrace me by not allowing me to lead them into danger; their reply was, "Who will look after us if we lose our father! Shall we not be disgraced if we permit you to be hurt!" Now, alas, the regiment I was brought up in, the 6th regiment Bengal light cavalry, is gone. I left it in 1829, and have only seen it once since, and that in the disastrous battle of Chilianwala. I commanded the irregular brigade and the rear-guard of the large army on that day. The native officers and men of my old regiment (the 6th cavalry) came to me the next day, and said, the flight of the cavalry would not have occurred if I had been with them. The 6th light cavalry (only three troops, were present, with two standards) was left fighting alone! and had to cut its way through large bodies of Sikhs back. The three troops lost both standard bearers (jomedars) killed; one of them had tied the standard pole so tight to his body that it could not be undone, and the cords were cut with the sword on that day.

Regiments should be commanded by young and active men in the prime of life, *good horsemen*, who would give *their whole time* to their men, and look strictly into the *interior economy* of their regiments. There are instances of lieut.-colonels and brevet-colonels of more than 50 years of age being able to do so, but I am afraid not many. They should be selected, and officers deemed incapable of command should be set aside, and sedentary employments given to them inspectors of officers, of papers, and such like, until they rose to the rank of colonel, and their services could be dispensed with altogether. For, though from age or inertness these officers are found to be incapable, they may have done good service to the state in the earlier portions of their servitude.

A staff regiment, or regiments of officers alone, could be formed.

The officers in it should have the option given to them of remaining staff officers distinct from their regiments, or at once rejoining it, never to leave it again during their service, except on the usual furlough, or on medical certificate, or the casual leave of a month every six months, as allowed by the regulations.

Officers belonging to the staff corps to have their names retained on the lists of their regiments, and

retained as supernumeraries or non-effective, holding their rank and being promoted on vacancies or casualties occurring *in it*, their regiment. For example, when the first captain or any other rank on the list for promotion was a staff officer, he should be promoted *and take rank in the staff regiment*; but being non-effective, the second captain on the effective list, and present with his regiment, should also be promoted from the same date, and be the effective major of his regiment, and so on through all the ranks from ensign upwards. This mode would be fair to all regiments. If possible, staff officers are to be selected for staff corps in the same number and rank, or from each grade, and this is to be continued as casualties occur in the staff corps, so that one regiment should not have more promotion than another. There would be plenty of room for selection. The situation of the casualty could be filled up by a competent officer. If one major, one captain, two lieutenants, and one ensign were thus taken from each corps for staff situations, or if required the number might be increased to two captains, three lieutenants, and two ensigns, but their vacancies to be immediately filled up. *Once on the staff, always on the staff.* The officers once selected not to be permitted to return to regimental duty. If staff officers commit faults, let them be punished by being turned out of the service, or reduced to half or quarter pay of their rank, or be put on half-pay or quarter-pay list as incapables or disobedients, in the same mode as civilians are now punished. Not only the adjutancies, but the quartermaster and interpreterships of a regiment, should be held open as a reward for a correct knowledge of the language of their men. They should not only study Persian and Hindostanee, but Poooshtoo and the dialect of the different tribes in their corps; for example, *Cashmeree, Punjaabee, &c. &c.* Money rewards of not less than rs. 1,000, should be given to all officers who passed a district examination for interpreters, and rs. 500 more when they passed a college examination in Calcutta.

I passed the latter when only six months in the service, and when I was not more than 16½ years of age. I was rewarded by Government, as was usual in those days (1808), by a donation of sa. rs. 1,200, and a sword with an honorary inscription on the sheath. I was invited to *dine* with Lord Minto, the then Governor-General, and made much of. This is the way to encourage young men, not as now deprive them of allowances, *their due* for the performance of regimental duties, by so doing you throw them into debt; they cannot afford to pay moonshees, for they have not the means, and eventually causing them to seek excitement in billiards, cards, shooting, racing, and in gambling generally. I speak, I write from experience from what I have seen, what I have witnessed.

J. B. HEARSEY, Maj.-Gen.,
Commanding Presidency Division.
Barrackpore, June 28, 1858.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND THE COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bengal army is composed?
1. Of Brahmins, of many denominations, Kashtriyas or Rajhpoots, Gwallahs, Aheers, Jats, and some few low caste men, such as Mallees, Kachees, Gurrereeahs (*i. e.*, shepherds), &c., have crept into corps.—*Vide* Military Regulations, Enlistment, Part II., Natives.

Paragraph 5—"Hindoos, Mahomedans, Seikhs, are eligible for recruits."

Paragraph 6—"Especial care, however, must be taken to reject all men of *inferior castes*, such as

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“Bunneahs, Kyeths, Naees, Thumolees, Gurrerecas, Lodhs, Bhojeeas, Kahars, Mooraeas, Kandoos, Ma-
“lees, Kachees, and any others habitually employed
“in menial occupations.”

The only castes left were Brahmins, Kashtryas or Rajhpoots, Gwallahs, and Aheers.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

2. From North and South Behar, especially the latter; principally from *Shahabad* and *Bojepoor*, the Doab of the Ganges and Jumma rivers, Rohilcund, many from Oude, and some from Bundelcund.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army?

3. Answered in No. 1 mostly. Bughailcund or Rewah, peopled by Chandaul Rajpoots, has given but few recruits to the Bengal native infantry. I have travelled much in that province, and never saw finer or more muscular men. The reason why we have so very few of the inhabitants of Bughailcund in our infantry I know not. I have also observed that there are but few Rajhpoots from Rajhestan and Rajhpootana enlisted in the ranks of the Bengal native infantry. Perhaps the drill and clothing are irksome to these warlike and independent races of men.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, or from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

4. Yes; besides the Rajhpoots of Bughailcund or Rewah, of Rajhestan and Rajhpootana, the hill tribes from Catchan, even to the Heizareh mountains, north of Rawul Pindee, and close to Hussen Abdool, and who have only recently found service under our Government as infantry sepahees; there are Goojurs, Mehwaters, inhabitants of Sheekawattee, Mahomedans of the Punjaub, Jats of Hanse, Hissar, and of the Bhurtpoor country, Raughurs, Belooches, the tribes of the Damun-i-koh or Solymanee hills, and others who inhabit the Thuls of the Punjaub rivers; also the Mahomedans of the districts of Mooltan and the Daood Pootra or Bhawulpoor.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Bengal army, that presidency, or its dependencies?

5. The great agency was that of native officers and men. When they went on their periodical furlough to their villages they were told to bring back with them young and strong youths fit for recruits; so that regiments became family cliques; nay, native officers took bribes in money to give security, and thus get inferior looking men into the service.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

6. *Vide* Military Regulations, section 31, page 217, in which all on the subject is fully laid down.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoy, or the followers of regiments; what precautions, if any, are taken?

7. The native commissioned, non-commissioned officers, or sepahees, on presenting these recruits, usually went security that the men were good and proper men, and fitting for the service. This opened a *trade or profit to the native officers*; they sold their interest, *their recommendation, or good word*, and made *not the least hesitation in telling falsehoods, so as to get the candidates enlisted*. The native officers sold their interest, making the recruit (if he could not give sufficient money) bind himself down by oath to serve these native officers as *menials* for a certain term of years. All this was kept secret from their European officers. Every imaginary precaution was taken as laid down under the head of “Enlistment,” in the Military Regulations, but no European, no officer, can overcome the tergiversation of a native.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Bengal army?

8. No Brahmins, no Mahomedans of Hindostan proper, should be entertained in the regular infantry of the Bengal army. All recruits should come from districts and countries *new to the old provinces* recruits have been usually drawn from.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?

9. This question is fully answered under the head “Enlistment,” in the Military Regulations, section 31, paragraph 33.

10. How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army?

10. The General Military Regulations of the Bengal army were corrected and published in 1855, under an order of the then Commander-in-Chief, head-quarters, Simla, 12th September 1855.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

11. As many tribes are likely for the future to be enlisted for the Bengal army, investigation should be made of what kind of oath each tribe holds to be most binding, and such oath should be administered.

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

12. None that I am aware of. I believe the seafaring population residing between voyages at Calcutta come mostly from the Eastern Archipelago, or the Malay peninsula. These serve on board of ships as tindals, secunnies, and lascars. Marine corps of seafaring habits might be formed from them, but of this I cannot speak with certainty.

13. Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps, and if so of what strength, and whence recruited?

13. Two regiments in the Bengal infantry were formerly called marine corps; the men were expressly enlisted for service beyond sea. This innovation was introduced at the earnest solicitation of my father, Col. Andrew Wilson Hearsey, during the governor-generalship of Sir John Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth, or in the period of the first governor-generalship of Lord Cornwallis. Infantry regiments had been formed by volunteers to proceed by sea to Madras. Unfortunately the transport, on which was half a regiment of sepoy, foundered in a typhoon, and was never heard of again. This caused a great dread of sea voyages, and innumerable objections were raised regarding *caste prejudices*, and these said caste prejudices have been ever since thrown in our teeth when the sepoy of the Bengal army were disinclined to obey any order or act in any country they disliked to go into.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

14. In my opinion each regiment should be formed of companies with only one tribe of men in them. These to be recruited from such tribes, but it matters not what district they dwell in—the more distant from each other the better.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area—in fact, without reference to districts?

15. It matters not how wide the area is if the tribe are the same of which the company is to be composed.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?
16. No; each company of a regiment should be homogeneous as a race or tribe; caste should *not* be allowed—it should be totally ignored.
17. If a corps is not homogeneous will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?
17. The companies should each be homogeneous. No caste prejudices to be allowed—the very word *caste* should be abolished from the army. If tribes are mixed they will act together. Many of the Sikhs joined the Poorbheas in the mutinies because the latter were more numerous; but as soon as they were separated, and not overawed by the Brahmins and Mahomedans, they proved true and faithful to their salt and to the Government.
18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
18. Answered above. Each company separate, and promotions, &c., to go separately and entirely in it. No commissioned officers, only non-commissioned, but with more pay. *Vide* my general remarks in answer to “Classification and Re-organization of the Indian Armies.”
19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military or police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?
19. Police corps may be raised as *militia* of all tribes. Caste notions to be abolished, to be under martial law, a very plain and simple code to be published and sanctioned. The officer commanding to have great power and no appeal from his decision, if he acts wrong to lose his appointment. A corps of police raised in one district to serve in another to prevent collision. To be moveable from one district to another as desirable. To have small *plain-bore* carbines and sword and shield as arms; after firing the carbine, a sling to be attached to it, so as it can be thrown across the back, and the sword and shield used. *The latter gives the Hindostanes much confidence.* Only to have 10 rounds of balled ammunition and 12 gun caps per man in pouch, no more; those expended, the sword must come into play. They can be recruited over as wide a district as possible. *They should not be the inhabitants of the district they are serving in.* Sir Charles Napier had many Seiks serving as police in Scinde.
20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?
20. No; keep them quite distinct.
21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?
21. Very little, if any, recruiting in Hindostan Proper, or in our old districts or possessions, or in Oude. The men in them being the relatives and connexions of the mutineers and pensioners who have been executed, transported, or have had their villages burnt and estates escheated, *will always be ready to turn traitors through revenge.* Officers should be sent on recruiting parties, otherwise there will be deceit and roguery. The officers should be good linguists, and selected for their knowledge of the native character.
22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?
29. I would leave much to the commanding officer of the police corps, he will not have European officers to spare to go on recruiting parties. The magistrate of districts from which the corps was raised would assist, taking good care the families of the recruits he sent were well known. They should be registered in presence of the recruit, and stand security for his good conduct; *this would be a material guarantee for his good behaviour.*
23. What precaution should be taken before the local authorities or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency?
23. The recruits should be taken before the civil authorities of the district with their parents or *blood* relatives; then long roll, or *descriptive roll*, minutely taken. The roll of father, mother, brothers, and other near relatives, their standing in the village or town to which they belong or in which they were born. The recruit should be present when these rolls were being registered, and he should be made to understand that his parents and relations were standing security for his faithful and good conduct; and that if he proved untrustworthy, punishment would fall on his securities as well as on himself, as also on his wife and family of children if he has or may have any. Their place of abode, *their holdings of land*, all, all should be registered; they are always well known in his village or town of residence, and should be entered into a register book, with date of enlistment, &c., to be kept in the magistrate's office for reference when required.
24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?
24. The same exactly. The magistrates or civil authorities to have separate register books for police corps.
25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and, if so, should they be formed in separate regiments or in companies, or otherwise?
25. *Christians* of all tropical countries, or of those countries which are subject to great heat of temperature, viz, Malta, Sicily, Naples, the Grecian or Ionian islands, Madeira, Brazilians, natives of our West India islands. *Christian* Africans such as serve on board of our men-of-war or merchant vessels. All kinds and descriptions of *Christians* who from infancy have endured great or high temperature, should be sought for and enlisted to serve in India as soldiers. These men could bear a campaign in the hot winds and rains without much mortality or sickness. I believe Christian, Malay, Cingalese, *Kareens* (from Pegu), native Christians of the Peninsula of India. There are many in Travancore, Tinevelly, and other districts of the Madras presidency. Jews (there are many in the native ranks of the Bengal army); or all Christians, no matter what church, whether *Nestorian* or otherwise, so as to be as independent as possible of Hindoos or Mahomedans; we must show them *practically* that we can rule them and keep them in subjection with armies of native Christians, as well as with British Europeans; that our recruiting districts for such men are inexhaustible, as well as for Englishmen. It would be good policy to do so.
26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical climates or countries, which are the countries to be preferred?
26. Christian Africans, Christian inhabitants of the Indian Archipelago, Christian *Chinese*, ditto from the Philippines, Malay Christians, ditto Hottentots, Kaffrians, nay, South American Christians, *all, all; but they must be Christians, and then TRUST can be reposed in them.*
27. What would be the best agency to employ for recruiting?
27. The consuls, the European residents (the missionaries, perhaps,) the governments of such British colonies where the kind of recruits required could be procured. European officers of Her Majesty's service could select them where present, and a board of

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medical officers could examine and pass them as constitutionally fit, and being free from any personal defect.

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?

28. Certainly. The flank companies, *viz.*, the grenadier and light companies should be European, *that is to say, Britons of all corps, Christian, or of other creeds or religions*, and two British serjeants to each battalion company.

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

29. The men should be selected from European corps, steady, sober men, and as good colloquials as can be had; some slight benefit in rations or pay might be allowed. The two serjeants for each of the battalion companies of these native Christian corps should be taken from the flank companies, and thus cause quick promotion to non-commissioned officers in them. No relief to the two European companies, they should be a component part of each corps?

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?

30. On the right flank of the lines or huts of the native soldiers, but a short distance from them. The Christian companies of natives all together; the Mahomedans and Hindoos separate from them, but only at a short distance and in the same line.

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

31. As our commissariat is now carried on I should certainly say not.

32. How should such companies be armed? with similar or different weapons from the native troops, with whom they would be associated?

32. Europeans with the Enfield rifle, and also with Colt's revolver, African and other *Christians* when formed into companies might be armed in the same manner. Natives, *i.e.* Hindoos and Mahomedans, with light fusils and bayonet; when in cantonment no ball ammunition in pouch, and no caps, ammunition stores of all kinds, treasure and valuable documents, to be kept in proper and secure pucca-roofed or bomb-proof buildings, and under lock and key, erected in a fortified square, in which a portion of the two British companies should always be on duty, and have proper quarters erected for them. In this square a proper proportion of European artillerymen should be also quartered or on duty, and 9-pounder guns or even 18-pounders should be mounted on the bastion, a good ditch and drawbridge and gates, well protected by out-works.

33. How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?

33. With light fusils and bayonets.

34. How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?

34. With small carbines (light ones), only 10 rounds of ball ammunition in pouch, and 12 caps; no bayonets, a sword and shield instead.

36. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

35. In my opinion there is a *great disadvantage* in dressing natives in the European uniform. It confines their limbs, and the muscles of the whole body are restrained and cannot have full play. The very best of all dresses would be a copy of the Algiers Zouave dress. I am of opinion that the Zouave dress is the very best dress also for European troops, serving in such a hot climate as India.

36. How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

36. As a Zouave.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

37. I prefer two European flank companies to a native regiment (of Christians if we can get them) or to a regiment composed of TRIBES OF MEN. Europeans kept separate, cause natives to have greater awe of them.

38. Do you consider the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

38. I am decidedly of opinion there ought to be *no natives, Hindostanees, or of any other tribes in the artillery, not even Syce drivers*, certainly no gollundauze or lascars. The defeat at Chiniat (near Lucknow) of the late lamented Sir Henry Lawrence was mainly caused by the *treachery and defection of his Syce gun drivers*. If Europeans cannot do these duties, they ought to be done by Christian Africans or even *Hindostanee Christians*.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

39. Answered in question No. 37.

40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?

40. I have answered this question, by my opinion of the proper formation of *companies of regiments*, and of the *necessity of officers visiting the lines or huts of their men at least twice a day*. The awe of European troops would remain the same as at present. The natives would not dwell within some distance of their barracks.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

41. As I have laid down I should think very well.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

42. To be trained systematically always to act in *dependence* or leaning on European support, *never to be permitted to lead an assault or to make the first attack, always to follow*, and to be made to look up to Europeans, as much, very much superior to them in personal gallantry and in endurance in "solidarité." The two companies *especially* with each corps should be a pattern, a *noble example*, whether on duty in their lines or barracks, on parade, or on actual service in the field. *They should feel convinced of the really great superiority of British troops*.

J. B. HEARSEY, Maj.-Gen.,

Commanding Presidency Division of
the Bengal Army.

Barrackporc, July 8, 1858.

III.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in the Bengal native army?

1. The articles of war for the native army ought to be very few, very plain, and very distinct, *no quibbling, no hair-splitting articles*, much, very much should be left to the discretion of the commanding officer of the regiment.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

2. All rules for punishment should be laid down so plain that he who runs may read, and understand them. Punishment should be severe; death, transportation for seven or fourteen years, or for life, flogging to the amount of 150 lashes. I have seen a trooper of the 6th light cavalry in 1812, take 500 lashes without a cry or a moan, and when released from the halberds he took up his jacket and shirt, and then going before his commanding officer saluted him!! The commanding officer should have the power of summary dismissal from the service, of course reporting the cause to the Commander-in-chief. Asiatics do not understand half-measures. Much, very much should be left to the discretion of the commanding officer of the regiment.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal army?

3. No. The system of native courts-martial does not work satisfactorily. All courts-martial in native regiments, should be composed entirely of European officers.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bengal army with the military code under which they are governed?

4. The articles of war are constantly read out to the regiment formed up into close column of companies, or in square on the parade, very few of the men understand what is read to them, very many ridicule them, and mock the reader. When I commanded the 6th regiment Bengal light cavalry, I had an abridged form of all important or necessary orders, regarding the different crimes that met with severe punishment, the duties of the different grade of commissioned and non-commissioned native officers and privates read out to them slowly and distinctly by a good and clear reader, and the men were asked every now and then if they understood what was read to them; this reading did not take ten minutes or a quarter of an hour, especially the money to be deducted for loss or damage to arms, &c., or clothing, so that every man fully understood it. Every Thursday on the weekly inspection of saddlery and kits, the men were assembled by troops, and the captain and subalterns falling in, these orders were read.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?

5. Very few indeed, certainly not five men per company. The men of the native regiments speak in the idiom of their provinces, usually called "Gaon-waice," i.e. "village language," they do not clearly understand Oordoo, which is much mixed up with Arabic and Persian; in speaking to them care must be taken to make use of words drawn from a Sanscrit root. This is the great colloquial art, to make or cause them to understand what is said to them. It is only after many years' service, they comprehend Oordoo. The "Kurra bohlee," the Bojepoore, is the language or provincialism they best understand.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bengal presidency?

6. I never had a police corps under my command, so cannot answer this question. They are, I believe, under the authority of magistrates, who I suppose punish according to the military or civil code, as either suit them.

7. How is discipline maintained and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bengal presidency?

7. I am told, *vis à voce* investigation and summary punishment.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

Major-Gen.
J. B. Hearsey

8. Summary, or "face to face investigation," and quick and sharp punishment, suits the Asiatic, the sepoy, or policemen, better than courts-martial. The references of courts-martial to different authorities keeps the prisoner in confinement sometimes for weeks, nay months, usually eight or ten days. The crime is forgotten, or becomes light by the apprehension of the men, by the length of time that has elapsed before punishment is inflicted. The prisoner is pitied, instead of being scorned, by the men; very, very frequently the prisoner gets off punishment altogether, because there is some petty informality in the proceeding or examination, or want of affirmation being duly taken, and the prisoner then laughs and jeers at the whole proceeding, and is ready to defy his officers and become mutinous.

J. B. HEARSEY, Maj.-Gen.,
Commanding Presidency Division.

Barrackpore, July 1, 1858.

III. ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Bengal native infantry, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone or on merit and seniority combined?

1. I am sorry to say it was based mostly on seniority. The commissioned, non-commissioned officers and men always thought that length of service gave them a right to promotion, whether deserving or not, whether fit or not. I have known men of my regiment totally unfit complaining to the commandant of the station, that I had deprived them of their "hug," i.e. of their "right," because I had passed them over, as totally unfit even to be a "corporal" or "naik." Merit alone should have promotion.

2. Are the native officers of the native Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. No, they are not; eight out of ten of the native officers of infantry and of regular cavalry are exceedingly stupid. If the same routine or the same manœuvres are to be performed, they will go through more mechanically than clock-work; make the least alteration or do anything new, they cannot comprehend it, and get confused and flustered, I mean the generality of them. If orders are to be given to them, you must make them repeat the orders to you to be assured that they fully understand them.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen.

3. No, the exceptions are indeed few and far between, they are usually so inert, so indifferent, that they lean on the ability of a smart non-commissioned officer and consult him, nay, frequently on a smart private or sepoy, and are guided and directed what to do by him, especially if he, the havildar or sepoy, should be a high-caste Brahmin.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. None that I am aware of; I introduced a test in the different cavalry regiments I have commanded, whether regular or irregular.

- 1st. The non-commissioned officer or private to be a good and strong horseman.
- 2nd. Shrewdness and sharpness of understanding.
- 3rd. Ability to use their arms mounted or on foot.
- 4th. Ability to put a troop or squad through its drill.
- 5th. To be able to read, write, and keep accounts.

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5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers? Does a full complement of the European, militate against the professional efficiency of the native, commissioned officer?
5. Yes, it does; the native sepoys and non-commissioned officers are *obliged* to go to the native commissioned officers *first*, and they forward the petition or complaint to their European officer, if they cannot settle the difference or quash the complaint, this gives a great opening to smother complaints. The European officer ought to be *all in all* to his men, no person should interfere.
6. Has it been found in the native infantry of the Bengal army, that on the occurrence of mutinies, the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?
6. A native officer *not siding* (covertly) with the men would, indeed, be an exception to the general rule; usually they encourage mutiny if they have an idea such mutiny may end in their benefit; I have known native non-commissioned, nay commissioned officers do all they could to discourage trustworthy sepoys giving evidence of or reporting mutinous acts or language of non-commissioned or other sepoys of his regiment.
- In my opinion they have *as a class* shown themselves of very little use in restraining their men from mutiny, especially if such non-commissioned officers or men were of a *high caste or grade* in the Brahminical tribe.
- They say, if they report such acts or language, they will be called tale-bearers, tale-tellers, *i.e.* "choogul khors."
7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued, in the native infantry of the Bengal army?
7. Certainly *discontinued*. The native commissioned officers are worse than useless.
8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?
8. Yes. The *serjeants* should be much, *nay always*, in the lines or amongst the huts of their men, and should have a good or fair colloquial knowledge of the language of the tribe of the men of their company, so as to understand what they say to each other when they may be conversing with one another in his presence. The serjeants ought to get a money reward when they passed a colloquial examination. There ought to be no corporals.
9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?
9. Yes, a graduated and *liberal* scale of money compensation is desirable, as good service pay. The pay could be increased after a term of five or six years *good service*; if any military or other crime is committed, the good service pay to stop for a period, should the man remain in the service. There ought to be no pensioners, no invalids; a bonus in money to be given in lieu.
10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?
10. No, they have not.
11. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?
11. If native commissioned officers are retained, promotion should *go by merit* not by seniority; but I would not have any native officers of higher grade than havildar or serjeant. If you give natives higher grades, *they take upon themselves, and look down upon or condemn their young European officers, especially if they are drilled by a native, or act as semeple when a native commands the company or parade*. Promotion to naik or havildar to go by merit or efficiency; by no means by seniority.
12. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?
12. No, all pensions *to be abolished* as soon as possible; even the present pensioners to be allowed to take a bonus in money and to be struck off. The whole expenses of the staff of pension payments would thus be saved to the State, and a stop be put to the frauds so frequent amongst the pensioners.
13. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the Bengal army?
13. I have no means of judging of this question; pension paymasters could easily answer it, by taking an average of ten or twenty years of their payments.
14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?
14. No, they are not; a native court-martial is a farce. The persons who really try the offenders are the superintending officers and the interpreter; the native officers pay but little attention to the evidence generally, and are but too often seen asleep or dosing during the trial.
15. Are native officers (commissioned) on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?
15. No, certainly not, in drilling or teaching the recruits, nor in manœuvring a squadron or regiment. Some of the native officers, especially Mahomedans, who can read and write may have more general knowledge; but there are not many such in the army.
16. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps,—
- 1st. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers; or,
- 2nd. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades; or,
- 3rd. Be officered like irregular corps, *viz.*, have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but few European officers?
16. I have answered this in a former question. The companies—
- 1st. Of a regular corps ought each to be composed of separate tribes of men, with two European *serjeants* to each company. No corporal for the havildars or *native serjeants* might suppose he was the European's superior on march. The regular corps with full complement of one captain, one lieutenant, and one ensign per company. The police corps one captain commandant, one lieutenant second in command, and one lieutenant or ensign adjutant, a toomendar; and other grades not to have the same denomination as those in the regular, not even of havildar or naik. The police corps might be raised in our old provinces, for it will be politic to give the inhabitants of them some employment. The police corps ought to serve at a distance from the district it was raised in.
- 2nd. The regular corps to be fully officered with European officers; no native commissioned grades.
- 3rd. The police corps, by one major or captain commandant, one lieutenant and adjutant, one captain or

second in command. They may have native officers, but not any having much authority.

The regular corps have been frequently detached by companies on treasure escort and other duties, such as garrisoning the forts under the Mormund and Khybean Hills near Peshawur. They should always have their full complement of European officers with them. They (the *sepöys*) must be taught to look up to and lean upon them on every occasion.

17. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

17. I would have no commissioned native officers. Europeans should take their place, and bear the titles as in the London police. Some of the best men might have a low grade corresponding to *havildar* and *nargar* given to them, but not those titles; all authority ought to rest in the European superintendent, inspectors, &c. &c. It is bad policy to let the men of a police native corps or regular corps believe or even suppose they can have command over an European of the lowest grade.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good service pay and pensions, as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

18. If practicable, I would have no higher grade in regular or irregular corps, whether of police or any other denomination, than a non-commissioned officer, all the higher grades should be filled by Europeans. No pensions ought to be allowed. A pension or invalid list is a severe bar against the State having in their pay as large a body of effective troops as it may require. The pensioners have not shown themselves faithful in the late mutiny, only a few individual cases, certainly not as a body. The State has to pay a large body of men and their relatives, who are no use to them even in such a crisis as the one now being subdued. The pension list of the late Bengal army cost the State nearly as much, I am told, as their effective force; in fact, the State had two armies to pay, an effective and a non-effective one, and the policy of keeping up the latter has failed. The pension establishment was always on the increase, I believe,—a source of one continued stream of deceit and chicanery, that required the eyes of an Argus to detect. By all means have good service pay, let it be handsome pay, worth receiving, and behaving trustworthily and well for. The recruits for the regular army should not be from the same tribes as the police force.

19. In police corps is there, on first admission, any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades?

19. The qualifications ought to be:—

- 1st. Trustworthiness.
- 2nd. Ability and activity.
- 3rd. Education—to read and write and keep accounts.

4th. Of good families, or families that have proved themselves trustworthy during the late disturbances.

20. Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulation, and component races in the three native armies proved favourable to our power in India?

20. The three armies have been and are composed differently. The Bengal army of high caste Brahmins, Kashtryas, Rajhpoots (Koormees, or cultivators of the soil), (Kaets, or water caste), (Gualas, or cowkeepers), (Aheers, or herdsmen), and but very few of the lower castes of Hindoos, Mahomedans, Sheeks, Seyeds, Moguls, and Pathans, indifferently, all considering themselves as Haram or undefiled.

The Bombay army has many Oude men and Poorbhecas in it of high caste; these men are from Oude and Shabad, Bojhpore, the Doab of the Ganges, and from Rohilcund and Bundelcund; they are mostly men rejected as too short or too small, or too weak, for the ranks of the Bengal army. These men sink their caste prejudices for service. All races are mixed together in the Bombay army, and there are a greater variety of them. The lowest castes have until very lately formed the larger portion of the Bombay army; Jews, Mahrattas, and other tribes and classes unknown in Hindoostan, find admittance.

In the Madras army the lowest of the low men of no caste are enlisted, "Chooroo Mootoos," i.e., sweepers or *mahters*—men who feed on carrion. I have seen these *sepöys*, with their wives, and children cut up horses, camels, bullocks, and other such animals that have died of disease, and take away the flesh for food, to the utter disgust of the Hindoos and Mahomedans of the 6th regiment Bengal cavalry. The men of the 6th light cavalry had such an abhorrence of them that they would not allow these men to take water from the spring from the side of the hill (at Telinhairee Nagpore) which they used. Nay, there was a serious affray in consequence of these *mlechas* attempting to take water from the spring. These classes or tribes, *Passees*, *Chummars*, *Dussads*, and *Chooroo Mootoos*.

21. Should a certain degree of distinctiveness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

21. Keep the armies as separate as possible, as to tribes and grades in them. The system and organization may be the same; but I would rather have them distinct—"Divide et impera"—never let them assimilate if possible. It is not good policy.

J. B. HEARSEY, Major-General,
Commanding Presidency Division
of the Bengal Army.

From Maj.-Gen. HEARSEY to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.
Sir,

Barrackpore, July 24, 1858.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you the answers to the 19 questions "Infantry," "European Officers" you sent to me.

May I beg the favour of your laying them before the Right Hon. Viscount Canning, &c., &c., Governor-General of India?

I have, &c.
J. B. HEARSEY, Major-Gen.

INFANTRY.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bengal army, and state the orders or measures, or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect?

1. The power of commanding officers of native corps of the Bengal army, has been very much diminished, ever since the half-batta question during the governor-generalship of Lord William Bentinck. The centralization of power has been going on, until it has been entirely usurped by Government and the Commander-in-Chief.

The commanding officers now can neither punish or reward.

Even courts-martial have been forbidden to punish a native *sepoy* for misbehaviour which would bring an European under the lash! I have not the series of orders by me to refer to, or the circulars or memo-

Major-Gen.
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randomly issued on various occasions, but they surely can be looked up in the adjutant-general's office.

2. During the above period have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?
2. Very much diminished in native corps.
3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps, upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bengal army?

The native officers and sepoy finding the immediate authority for punishment or reward taken from commanding officers and from the captains of companies, soon begin to hold those officers in contempt. Even courts-martial were curbed in the infliction of punishment.

I have heard sepoy have said, "Oh, what can he do, or a court-martial either. The worst that can happen will be dismissal from the service, and we can get that elsewhere." This was before so many countries were conquered or annexed, or had lapsed in default of direct heirs, to the British Government.

4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?
4. The result of diminution of influence has been carelessness of demeanor, dereliction of duty, and a sneering contempt of their commanding officer and the captains of their companies, and generally of all their European officers.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps; upon the distant authority of head-quarters or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?
5. On the immediate authority of the commanding officer of the corps and captains of companies, who should have full power to punish, when required, and also to reward by immediate promotion for gallant conduct and good service, without further reference to any higher authority. The native officers would then look up to their officers as the source of honour and of reward, and the sepoy be instant in obedience. Captains or officers in command of companies could recommend to their commanding officer when he was present, and when he was absent have the same authority to promote or punish even without court-martial. *Asiatics to be governed well must have a despotic rule; they cannot understand any other kind of government.*

6. Should the power of commanding officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?
6. Increased so as almost to be independent of reference to higher authority, especially in granting rewards. The Hindustanee proverb, fully illustrates this, viz.: "Jis ke pass dooe, oos ke pass hur koe," which translated means, "He who owns the ladle has everybody for friends."

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?
7. The great measure is full power to punish or reward, conferred on the commanding officers of native regiments, also on captains of companies with consent of their commanding officer.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?

8. In time of war; for a commanding officer does manage now and then to reward merit in action, by sending strong representations of good conduct to the commander-in-chief. The commanding officer of a native regiment ought to have the same power as the captain of men-of-war over the men under his authority.

9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops, in time of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

9. Regiments of native infantry might be reduced to 800 men, including *non-commissioned officers*. The men should be entertained under the proviso that they should work with the spade, pick, and the axe, in making roads, clearing away jungle, levelling parade grounds, laying out cantonments, clearing drains, building their own huts or lines, and any other labour that fatigue parties should be put to: these works in times of peace. In times of war clearing and levelling their encamping ground, erecting defensive works, redoubts, batteries, making trenches; field entrenchments also during the times both of peace and war.

10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bengal army ever been so great in time of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

10. The native regiments have frequently been 1,000 men strong during peace, and the men could have been spared, when not at exercise drill, in work described in answer to Question No. 9. I certainly think the native infantry ought *not* to be employed in the numerous small escort duties, during which, for twenty days and one month or more, they are away from the head-quarters of their corps, under a careless commissioned or non-commissioned, who will not take the trouble to look after them or keep them strictly to their duty. Their clothing, arms, accoutrements are neglected, and when they return they have to be sent to drill to re-learn all they have forgotten or become unused to, besides learning careless, slouching habits.

11. Would it be practicable to employ the troops on public works?

11. Certainly. They must be enlisted under the proviso that they are to be employed on public works or any manual labour the State may require from them, a certain daily sum to be given to them as *working batta* whilst so employed.

12. In apportioning European officers to native troops,—1st. Should native corps have a full complement of European officers, according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers?

12. First. One captain, one lieutenant, and one ensign to each company; also two European serjeants.

2nd. A full complement of European officers and no native commissioned officer?

Secondly. A full complement of European officers, as above detailed.

3rd. A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?

Thirdly. No native commissioned officer, two European serjeants in their stead, merely non-commissioned officers.

13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps?

13. No; never for the future allow your cadets or young European officers to be placed under the instruction of natives of any grade. Young officers, on arriving in India, ought to be attached either to Queen's regiments or to the Hon. Company's regiments of European infantry; and they should not be allowed to join a native corps until they were taught and were *au fait* in all the duties required to be attained by an accomplished subaltern of the army, a perfect knowledge of company drill, of the use of the Enfield rifle, sword exercise, fencing, *single stick*, and *horsemanship*.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to a native corps, how would you train them for this special purpose?
14. All officers ought to be expert in the use of all arms, either on foot or on horseback. If they went through a course of cavalry drill, also artillery practice, and were sent to the Thomason College, Roorkee, to go through a course of engineering, so much the better for the service.
15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of the officers taken from corps for staff employment?
15. Certainly; all regiments ought to have their full complement of officers at all times.
16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies between the conduct of regiments with few and those with many European officers?
16. Regiments have mutinied, whether with many or with few officers present with them. All the regiments forming the different contingents, viz. Scindiah, Kotah, Sepore, Joudpore, Mehedpore, Hansi, Rawgurh, and other local corps, in fact all regiments recruited from Behar, Shahabad, Oude, and the Dooab, whether they had 3 or 16 officers present, all mutinied. It was a general movement amongst the soldier class of Hindostan proper, all considerations were thrown to the winds. Count up the separate corps, whether contingent, local, irregular, or by any other denomination, and you will find very little if any difference between them. It was a planned, and was intended as a simultaneous movement to crush British power in India; that they might throw off the dominion of a foreign race, and then *sell their services to the highest native bidder*, but certainly to a Hindoo ruler.
17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of regiments?
17. I have answered this question by pointing out how a staff corps could be formed without injuring a regiment by reducing the number of officers present with it.
18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army as regimental officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men, to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?
18. I would never banish *the hope* of preferment. If officers show themselves competent for different staff situations, and are selected for such, of their own good will, by all means take them, but appoint or promote other officers to fill the vacancy thus caused in the regiment (*vide* my plan of a staff corps).
19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?
19. Too much encouragement cannot be held out to officers generally, to fit themselves for staff situations such as may suit their dispositions or tastes; you may depend upon it, that the more the mind is exercised the more useful to the State will the officer prove. Leave the opening *wide*, by which officers may be encouraged to fill staff, nay, *responsible staff situations*. Sir Charles Napier, in conversation with me, said, "The European officers of the Bengal army made *the best, most excellent staff officers*; but their regiments ought not to be left with such few regimental European officers, for it made the native officers of opinion they could do just as well *without European officers* ALTOGETHER;" and I deem the late Sir Charles Napier to have been a most unprejudiced and competent judge on that head.

J. B. HEARSEY, Maj.-Gen.,
Commanding Presidency Division of
the Bengal Army.

A COPY, word for word, from the Paper I gave in to Lord Canning (of which I kept a transcript), in July or August 1857. Major Gen.
J. B. Hearsey.

"Our regular cavalry *must* be European. The light active men, and bold riders of light weight, that are employed in many of the trades of England, as example, butchers' boys, ostlers, postillions, and such like, would answer well for the small Indian horse.

"These regiments need not be more than two squadrons each, or four troops strong of 80 sabres each. One squadron of natives of this country, well mixed in regard to religious creeds and castes, might form a portion of each regiment; *no Brahmans* amongst them.

"*Mounted Hottentots* from the Cape would answer better, to be eventually (when worn out) colonized in Assam.

"*Arms*.—To be trained to use the Enfield carbine (or carbine that loads at the breech), with ball, at a canter or gallop, as I have trained the 2nd irregular cavalry to do, so that the men could break a bottle with a single bullet in full career at from 30 to 50 paces distant. This would be a most formidable arm, as was shown in the instance of Capt. Merrywether, of the Scinde horse on that frontier, when with a small party of that corps he annihilated a tribe of plundering Jookranees, by the use of his improved carbine.

"The troopers are also to have a Colt's revolver pistol, a *proved* cut-and-thrust sword, and they must be taught to fence, *for the point and how to give it* is a murderous mode of using the sword against native horsemen.

"J. B. HEARSEY, Maj.-Gen."

ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE LIGHT CAVALRY OF THE BENGAL ARMY.

Bariackpore, December 3, 1858.

THE CAVALRY ARM OF THE BENGAL ARMY.

Our Cavalry.—Regulars must be European, composed of the light active men, and bold hard riders and light weights that are employed in many of the trades, &c. in England, such as butcher-boys, ostlers, postillions, &c., and such like; these would answer well for the small Indian Horses.

10 regiments.

European officers:—

- 1 Colonel.
- 1 Lieutenant-colonel.
- 1 Major.
- 4 Captains.
- 4 Lieutenants.
- 4 Cornets.
- 1 Adjutant—a subaltern.
- 1 Quartermaster—a subaltern.

These two last in excess of the four lieutenants and four cornets, as they must always remain with the head-quarters of the regiment, and cannot be detached with a troop or squadron on distant commands.

These regiments need not be more than two squadrons, or four troops strong, of 80 sabres each.

If natives must be enrolled, one squadron of two troops, or 160 sabres, might be attached as auxiliaries, to be officered as the European squadrons. These native squadrons must be well mixed in regard to religious breeds; no Brahmans among them; mostly Juths, Affghan or Mooltanee Mahomedans, Raghpoos and Rangurs. The best men for these auxiliary squadrons would be Hottentots, from the Cape. These Hottentots, when worn out, to form military colonies in Assam, or any other part of India where waste lands capable of cultivation can be made over to them.

Arms.—The Enfield carbine revolver to load at the breech, and a Colt's revolver; a five-barrel pistol, a straight cut-and-thrust sword, basket hilt, with

Major-Gen.
J. B. Hearsey.

ramrod back of the best steel, such as are turned out by Wilkinson; not cold iron, that the native talwars will cut through.

Training or drill in the use of arms.—The men to be trained to use the revolving breech-loading carbine at full gallop, and at a canter to fire at a bottle placed on the ground, in front of a butt, with ball, at 30 paces, passing it at that distance, until perfect in the use of that destructive arm.

In the same manner to practice with the Colt revolver pistol at 15 paces from the bottle.

These arms to be constructed as light as possible with reference to strength. All portions of the lock or parts of the pistol or carbine, when dismounted from the stock to be numbered 1, 2, 3, and so on. The same number is to be engraved on the lock plate and portions of the carbine and pistols. The screws also to be numbered on their heads, and the screw holes on the plate of the lock or elsewhere, so that the men may not destroy the worms of the screws or screw holes by attempting to force the wrong screws into them, or by changing the screws:

They must be taught by a serjeant-armourer to take the locks and portions of their fire-arms to pieces, to clean them, and put them together without injuring them; *z. e.* "set them up." This must be a most essential part of their drill.

The bore of the carbine and the pistol must be the same.

The pouch for their ammunition to be made to slide on a belt fastened round their waist (the cloak belt will answer), so that the rider may not have to fumble behind his back for his ammunition.

The sword exercise most to be taught is to give the point *with effect*, to guard the drawing cuts of the natives at the wrist and sword arm and *at the bridle and bridle arm*. The natives do not know how to parry the point, or are very awkward at it.

When Maj.-Gen. Sleigh was inspector of cavalry in India in 1844-45, he looked at the regiment I then commanded, the 2nd irregular horse at Neemuch, and expressed himself much pleased at my ball practice from matchlocks and capped carbines, at a gallop and at a hand canter. The men fired at a bottle on the ground, in front of a butt, they broke 18 out of 30 at 30 yards distant. I had also practised my men to the use of their spears and swords on horseback, in a hand canter and at a gallop, and in single combat. I always practised with them myself.

The use of the improved carbine with which the Sinde horse were armed by Colonel Jacob was shown in the instance of Captain Merryweather of that corps, when with a small party of his men he annihilated a tribe of Jookranec, who were plundering the Sinde frontier, by the use of this formidable weapon, and also, when a portion of that regiment, under the command of Captain Malcolm, at the battle of Goojerat, in the Punjab, attacked the Affghan horse, they fired at career within 20 yards; almost all the boldest and leading Affghan chiefs and horsemen were shot; and then throwing their carbines, which were fastened by a spring sling to their shoulder belts, they seized their swords suspended to their wrists, and dashed into the midst of the Affghans, and being supported by the 16th lancers, drove them off the field, with but little loss to themselves or to the lancers.

The men thus armed make excellent skirmishers in jungles and on hills on foot, which is also a great consideration. They can make a forced march, and secure a pass or important position, and hold it until supported.

Clothing.—The clothing should be so loose that the men may have free use of their limbs; no tight jackets. Copy the zouave horsemen's dress of Algiers; it is well adapted to this country. A good fez and a white turban round it (the white colour refracts the rays of the sun; dark colours absorb them) is the best prevention from a sun-stroke, or the stroke of a sabre. The fez or cap may be cotton wadded *inside*, and have ventilation holes around it near the top, to keep the head cool. All this is easily

packed when required to be so; or if the men are allowed an extra turban or head dress to take with them, the white turban can be occasionally washed.

Trowsers, shalwars, or loose nether garments, to tuck into wide boots, or tight, which I do not recommend, or tolerably loose pantaloons; these latter could have a steel chain down the stripe, made like the curb chain of a bit, but infinitely lighter. The officers of the Sinde horse have this also down the seam of their loose jackets, and a steel protection for the wrist, and steel chain shoulder-straps; they look well, and are useful as light defensive armour, and give important protection to the person.

Boots and spurs, such as have proved to have been the most useful; the boots must be loose and easily drawn on and taken off; they should be light, such as men can move in on foot with agility, whilst skimming in a jungly or hilly country, or in mountain passes or defiles, or when scaling walls or entrenchments.

HORSE APPOINTMENTS.

Saddle.—The saddle to be of the very lightest construction, with reference to due strength and also in regard to not galling the horse's back; *the lighter it can be made the better*. Stirrup leathers, girths, and sircingles the same; stirrup irons ought to be made as light as possible. Those in use now are heavy and clumsy articles, and ought to be reduced to half, nay, a quarter of their weight. Head stalls, bridles, and all the head gear should be the same in due proportion. A small steel chain in minute circles might be sewn on to the bridle to protect them from being cut. The officers of the Sinde horse have them so; patterns could be had from Colonel Jacob.

Bits.—This bit now in use is much too heavy. Bits can be made to look uniform and still be severe for headstrong or hardmouthed horses. The liberty of the bit can be armed to act on the jaw and the mouth, as also the palate. I have seen exceedingly violent horses—runaway brutes—managed with a four-ounce bit and a silk rope-twisted head-gear, which altogether would not weigh more than one pound.

Tethering chain or cord.—When it is considered that fourteen pounds weight on a horse is deemed a *distance* in racing, care should be taken to reduce the weight the horse is to carry as much as possible. A small chain sufficiently strong to tether a horse, and an iron peg (rather long) would be useful; but better still, a strong twisted cord could be made up into a running loop chain, and attached from the head stall to a ring in the pommel of the saddle; this would answer to tether to the iron peg, a ring to admit the cord should be at the head of the peg. This would be found very useful to tether a horse to after a long march or pursuit, so that the trooper may go and seek for forage for his horse and cook food for himself.

Horse shoes.—The shoes for horses and nails for fastening them should be made of the softest iron and light. Ten troopers per troop ought to be taught to shoe horses, and carry the necessary implements to do so with them; nay, it would be as well, if all the troopers were taught to do so; a pair of shoes and nails should be carried by every trooper in a spare holster pipe made for that purpose.

The mode of carrying the revolver pistol.—The revolver pistol should be carried on a slide in the waist belt, on a small holster pipe; the revolver carbine across the back from the shoulder to the hip, and, therefore, it ought not to be long in the barrel; the lighter these arms are made with reference to due strength the better. Carried on the person, if a man's horse is shot dead or disabled, or if the horse falls and the man is dismounted on the field or in the pursuit, he has his arms with him.

Lancers.—I would have a troop of lancers with each regiment; that weapon is very destructive in pursuit, if the men are taught to use it properly. I have myself found it difficult to get near enough to use my sabre effectually, especially if the foot soldier

you wish to cut down throws a cloth at your horse's eyes.

A lance with a steel socket and thin steel bars for a short distance down the side of the wood or bamboo of the lance from the socket would prevent the point being cut off, as I have seen it done; but still, not to be too heavy so as to overbalance the point of the lance, is most useful. The lance in making should be well balanced to make it handy.

Teaching horse and man for single combat.—The horse and man ought to be taught to act independently in single combat. The man can then twist and turn his horse as he likes, and will be always able to have him in hand; practice will make him perfect.

The irregular corps of Bengal cavalry I commanded for ten years (the 2nd) were all taught to exercise their horses in small circles, and to twist and turn them in every way at a hand gallop or canter. This gives the man great confidence in single combat.

Horses.—If the horse is compact, with good limbs, it is not of much consequence the animal being tall or high.

I have seen a horse but little taller than a Gallo-way, do double the work of a tall, leggy, country bred or Tarree horse.

In fact, horses of 14 and 14½ hands keep their flesh and condition better under work than larger horses, if they are compact, well coupled, and with good limbs and hoofs or hooves.

The horses of India, country ones, are usually faulty in their hoofs and turn them out, this being a common malformation of the pastern joint. These horses are always unsafe to their riders. They should not be admitted into the service; neither those with flat or contracted hoofs at the frog or heel into the cavalry; nor should any horses with suspicious marks of sores, for the disease named bursattee, from showing itself in the rainy season, when the scarred sore places break out afresh, is a pest. The disease is in the blood, and is incurable. The disease is named bursattee, from always appearing at the latter end of the hot weather, and spreading during the rainy season or bursaut, or during the choumassa or four months of that period of the year.

Picketing of horses in the field and in cantonments.—Many horses are ruined by the head and heel ropes being kept tight, and when these ropes are made of thin and tightly twisted rope.

Major-Gen.
J. B. Hearsey.

The horses often get their fore legs over the head-ropes, and in struggling to get them back again cut and injure the back sinews or the back of the pastern between the heel and the hoof.

Then the rope (without it is well defended by a "mozummeh," viz., a loop made of leather, strap shape, and lined with "naurdeh" or felted wool, round the pastern of the hind legs.) If the rope is not protected or fastened to the mozummeh it cuts into and frets the coronet, causing a disease in it, by hardening the portion close to the hoof, and forming a callous or bony excrescence, which interferes with the action of the coronet joint; nay, when the horse jerks up his hind quarters violently, if frightened or wishing to get loose, the peg is jerked out with violence, and the point of it runs into the muscles of the hind legs or into the abdomen, causing serious wounds; besides, it strains the hock joint, and is the cause of blood bogs and bone spavins.

Perhaps in England some mode of fastening horses in the field might be found out which would prevent these evils. An iron ring round a pole (well set into the ground) would do in cantonments, but then four times the space would be required for each horse, or they would lash out at each other. On a march, or in the field, poles could not be carried.

The horses should have a large and thick or well felted blanket each, to cover them in good weather or in the cold season (two such blankets in the rainy season), for the animals are out in the open air at all seasons; no stables are allowed.

A gurdunee, or large horse cloth, covering the neck (*i.e.*, "gurdu") and body to the tail, and fastened by a single under the flanks, is necessary for the hot weather, to save the animal from being worried to death by that pest in India, flies, and also to prevent the hair being burnt off by the direct rays of the sun and the scorching winds during the hot season.

J. B. HEARSEY, Maj.-Gen.,
Col. Old 6th Bengal Cavalry.

No. 13.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. D. MACPHERSON.

(No. 1178.)

From Lieut.-Col. J. D. MACPHERSON to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

Quartermaster-General's Office,
Head-Quarters, Allahabad,

June 24, 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 82, of the 16th instant, and in conformity to the instructions therein contained, I beg to enclose replies to the questions put to me, under the head of "The Recruiting and the Composition of Native Corps of Infantry in the Bengal Army, and in the Punjab Irregular Horse."

I have, &c.

J. D. MACPHERSON, Lieut.-Col.,
Officiating Quartermaster-General
of the Army.

BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY.

RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

Questions 1, 2, 3. Inapplicable.

4. Yes; the greater the scarcity of race, tribe, and caste in the ranks of the Bengal native infantry, the less dangerous will it probably be to us.

5, 6 and 7. Inapplicable.

8. All races, tribes and castes, should be admitted.

9. "I, _____, inhabitant of _____, son of _____, swear that I will never

"forsake or abandon my colours; that I will march wherever I am directed, whether within or beyond the Company's territories; that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes a good soldier and a faithful servant of the Company; and failing in any part of my duty as such, will submit to the penalties described in the articles of war which have been read to me."

Lt.-Col J. D.
Macpherson.

10. It was in use before I entered the service, in 1828.

11. Perhaps the words "by land or by sea" might be inserted after the words "Company's territories."

12. I have no knowledge of any, but the Chittagong Mussulmen are of sea-faring habits.

13. None.

14. No.

15. Yes.

16, 17, and 18. I would vary the organization as much as practicable, with reference to local and other circumstances: thus, I would have some corps homogeneous, such as the muzbee pioneers of the Punjab irregular force, or other outcasts. Then I would have other corps, in which each company should consist of one tribe or caste; and again I would have some corps with tribes and castes mixed up in each company, the outcasts only excepted, which should be kept by themselves. Where corps are composed of all races, tribes, and castes the proportion of each

*Lt-Col. J. D.
Macpherson.*

should be equalized as much as possible. Our object should be to have an efficient native army, and at the same time to take every precaution that is in any way likely to reduce the chances of its ever in any way combining against us. I would therefore employ men of every race, tribe, or caste that could be induced to enlist throughout the length and breadth of the empire.

19. I would recruit for both military and police in every district, according to the race or tribe from which it was desired to draw men.

20. Yes; if necessary or expedient.

21. The present system of recruiting parties, or of getting furlough men to bring candidates for enlistment, appears to meet all requirements.

22. The same; that is, each corps should look out for itself.

23. As at present. They should be identified, and their homes, &c. ascertained.

24. The same precautions should suffice.

25, 26, and 27. The more variety of race the better, and it might be practicable to get men from the Cape, from the Mozambique coast, and from the western coast of the Red Sea, by establishing recruiting depôts for the purpose. I offer these remarks with diffidence, as I have no experience of the countries in question. Africans from the Mozambique coast are procured for sugar plantations, both at Mauritius and Bourbon. They are an able bodied race of men, and ought to make good soldiers.

28, 29, 30, 31, and 32. My belief is that the more we keep our European and native soldiers apart, the better. They do not improve by being brought into contact with each other, and familiarity has the effect of weakening the wholesome feeling of the superiority of the European, which the native should entertain.

33. Percussion muskets.

34. Ditto, or fusils.

35 and 36. No, they do not. A pugree, tunic coat, and pair of loose pyjamas, would be the most suitable dress.

37. Entirely against it.

38. No, I do not; and during the late mutinies the gun lascars could not be trusted.

39. If it be determined upon to associate two such corps, the barracks could be well placed contiguous to each other.

40. I do not see that it would affect the vigilance of the European one way or the other, but I do think that it would tend much to lessen the awe of European troops, which it is desirable all natives should feel.

41. If in all other respects unobjectionable, the arrangement would be very advantageous, as regards many requirements of the service, both in peace and war. For instance, the native soldiers of such corps would be very handy, for duties entailing exposure to the sun, for treasure and commissariat guards, rear guards in ordinary marches, &c. But the objections to the mixing of Europeans and natives in the manner proposed are to my mind so great, as to outweigh the consideration of any such partial advantages as could be derived from it.

42. To cultivate a spirit of confidence and self-reliance is indispensable among native as among European troops.

We should have a small but highly trained native army, all the ordinary duties of the country being taken by the police battalions.

PUNJAB IRREGULAR FORCE.

RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. The infantry of the Punjab irregular force is composed chiefly of—

Sikhs,
Punjabee Mahomedans,
Trans-Indus Pathans,
Punjabee Hindoos,
Dogras and other Hill Rajpoots,
A few Gookahs, and
A few Hindoostanees,
Muzbee Sikhs.

(Note.—The further enlistment, of Hindoostanees has, however, long been prohibited, and by a recent order the Gookahs are to be drafted into one regiment, for Hazara.)

2. The Sikhs, chiefly from the Manjha, but there are also many from our Cis-Sutlej territories, and a few from the protected Sikh states.

Punjabee Mahomedans, chiefly from the Sind Sagur Dooab, and generally from all parts of the Punjab, a few from Hazara.

Trans-Indus Pathans, from Eusufzaie, Peshawur, the Afreedie hills, and Afghanistan.

Punjaubee Hindoos, from the several districts of the Punjaub.

Dogras and other Hill Rajpoots, from Kangra and the adjoining hill country.

Gookahs, from Kernaon and Nepal. Few in number, and obtained with great difficulty.

Hindoostanees, from Oudh and Behar.

Muzbee Sikhs, from all parts of the Punjab, and Loodianah, Ferozepore districts.

3. Yes; the enlistment of sweepers was prohibited in the old corps of the Punjab irregular force, and it has not been the practice to enlist in them either muzbees, ramdassees, and other classes of men who are looked upon by the people of the country as outcasts.

During the past year, however, two regiments of muzbees have been raised as pioneers. As a rule, subject to exceptions of course, as in the case of the Trans-Indus Pathans of Afghanistan, the Afreedie Hills, &c., and the Gookahs, the enlistment of men who reside in foreign territory, is forbidden.

4. Yes; the more varied the clan, caste, tribe, and country of our native soldiers, the less likely will they be to combine against us. The muzbees (sweepers who have adopted the Sikh religion) were valued as bold and daring men by the Maha Raja Runjeet Sing, and the 24th regiment Punjab infantry (pioneers) which is entirely composed of them, has done good service at Delhi and elsewhere, during the war.

A few corps of Ramdassees and other classes of outcasts in the Punjab, might also be enlisted into our service with advantage. They should, however, be kept to themselves entirely in regiments, without any admixture of other classes, by almost all of whom they are regarded as impure; their very touch even to be pollution. By giving them honourable service as soldiers, good treatment and good pay, we raise them in the social scale, and, humanly speaking, their own interests should bind them strongly to our cause, because under native rule, no such privileges would be continued to them; from being soldiers they would sink again into the degraded outcast.

(Note.—In the service of Runjeet Sing muzbees were employed as sepoys only, and none of them were ever suffered to attain the rank of officer.)

5. By recruiting parties detached from regiments in general, and by furlough men bringing candidates for enlistment. In some instances military officers on civil employ, procure recruits in their respective districts, at the request of commanding officers of corps. Military officers on civil employ have within the last year been largely employed in raising men, under the orders of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. A large number has thus been raised by Captain Adams, Assistant Commissioner at Goordaspore.

6 and 7. Inapplicable.

8. All restrictions as to race, tribe, or caste should be removed, but as a general rule men of our own provinces only should be enlisted, Gookahs and Pathans always excepted.

9. The only authorized oath is that given in the native articles of war, and it is, I believe, adhered to.

10. It was generally introduced, shortly after the Punjab irregular force was raised, in 1849–50.

11. The oath is probably as binding in its present form as it could be in any other. If retained at all, perhaps it might be well to add the words "by land or by sea" to the part of it which says "I will

"march wherever I am ordered, either within or beyond the Company's territories."

12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19. Inapplicable.

20. Yes, undoubtedly; but men are so easily obtained, that it would seldom prove necessary.

21. The usual recruiting parties generally, or district or other civil or political officers, might be employed, according to the class, tribe, caste, and country of men required.

22. Inapplicable.

23. The existing orders appear sufficient. By them a descriptive long roll of every recruit is made out in his regiment, and sent for verification to the civil officer, or other authority, in the district or country in which the recruit resides. As for men who reside in foreign territory, commanding officers generally take them only on the recommendation or responsibility of their native officers, or others whom they deem trustworthy.

24. The same precautions will suffice.

25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32. Inapplicable.

33. For the service of the Trans-Indus frontier, with the two-grooved rifle, otherwise with the percussion musket.

34. With the percussion musket or fusil.

35. Inapplicable.

36. The pugree, tunic, and loose pantaloons, as at present, appear to be all that can be desired.

J. D. MACPHERSON, Lieut.-Col.
Officiating Quartermaster-General
of the Army.

(No. 1313.)

From Lieut.-Col. J. D. MACPHERSON to Lieut.-Col.
DURAND, C.B.

Quartermaster-General's Office,
Head-Quarters, Allahabad,
July 5, 1858.

SIR,

In continuation of my letter, No. 11,780 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to enclose my replies to the questions received from you on the reorganization of the Bengal native army, subject "European Officers."

I have, &c.

J. D. MACPHERSON,
Officiating Quartermaster-General
of the Army.

BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY.

EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. The powers of commanding officers over their men have been both increased and decreased within the last 30 years. I am unable to quote the precise orders, measures, or changes, but I may state in general terms that in former days a commanding officer both punished and rewarded to a greater extent than he can now do. His powers of punishing were first decreased by the partial and then by the total abolition of corporal punishment, a measure which may be said to have left him without any adequate means of enforcing discipline. To amend this in some measure, he was within the last few years empowered to confine offenders for short periods, and flogging was reintroduced. Formerly he had the power of stopping a sepoy's furlough, if he disapproved of the man's conduct, if the man were in debt, &c. This obtains no longer, and there can be no doubt but that the attempts made to rule and govern the sepoy as if he were a British soldier have caused a great deal of hurtful and unnecessary interference with the commanding officer's authority, even in trivial matters. A sepoy had his furlough stopped because he was in debt, and his creditors objected; his character was also indifferent. He petitioned against this, and it was ruled in the department of the judge advocate that the commanding officer was not justified in stopping a mere debtor's leave: very good law, but a very bad way of ruling a sepoy.

2. The general tendency of every measure or order has been to lessen the powers and influence of commanding officers of native corps over their men.

3. The diminution of the powers of the European officer has of necessity told against discipline. As a rule the Bengal sepoy will shirk every duty he can contrive to avoid. Against this the European officer has ever to contend, and to diminish his powers could therefore have only one result.

4. The influence of captains or officers in charge of companies has depended more upon individual character than anything else, for any real power they can hardly be said ever to have possessed.

5. In a native corps, undoubtedly upon the European regimental officers, or rather upon the commanding officer.

6. I assume that for the future European officers will be specially selected to serve with native corps, with reference solely to fitness and qualifications.

In that case the powers of a commanding officer so selected should be greatly increased, as also, under his orders, those of his European officers. He or his officers, under his orders, should exercise summary jurisdiction in all cases of minor crime or breach of discipline, recourse being had to general court-martial only where grave offences have been committed.

7. The native soldier should be taught to look to his commanding officer, and to him alone, as his lord and master. Minor courts-martial should be abolished, and the commanding officer's authority should be interfered with as little as possible; his proceedings, on summary trials of offenders, must of course, however, be subject to revision. It is an axiom "that every man is the better of being looked after."

8. In war; he is then thrown more among his men, and has greater opportunities of making his influence felt.

9. I would fix the strength of each native regiment at 640 privates, or eight companies of 80 men each. They should all be enlisted as pioneers, and required to labour as such when not required for purely military duties. I would never have them idle if I could help it.

10. Yes; I think so, particularly at the larger military stations.

11. Undoubtedly, had they not been in a state of chronic mutiny, and certain to resist any attempt to make them labour. Colonel J. S. Hodgson, than whom no officer was better acquainted with the sepoy, published a scheme (see his *Military Musings*) for the employment of the native army on public works, and it is quite possible that some few individual officers might have succeeded in carrying it out, but the general conclusion is, I think, that it would have caused an outbreak.

12. I would adhere to the irregular system, a small number of European officers (who should be specially selected) and a full complement of native officers, with an increase to the number of their grades. I would have naib jemadars and naib subadars, as well as jemadars and subadars. A subadar has at present no further advancement to look for, and no motive for further exertion. This I would provide for by multiplying the grades as above in the commissioned ranks, by raising the higher salaries, and making the service more valuable. The Hyderabad contingent cavalry, rank Musselmen all of them, I am told, have been comparatively faithful during the rebellion. Their loyalty may be accounted for by the fact of their assamees being valued at 1,300 rupees.

13. To European corps.

14. With the professional knowledge they would acquire in European regiments, and a knowledge of the languages, they would not necessarily require any further special training. Some of our best irregular officers have been drawn from our European regiments: Colonel Edwardes, C.B., and the late Major Hodson, Major Daly, and others.

15. Undoubtedly, under the old system, because the best officers of the native regiments were generally withdrawn, and the native officers were generally useless or worse than useless.

Lt.-Col. J. D.
Macpherson.

Lt.-Col. J. D. Macpherson.

16. There has, I believe, been no difference whatever.

17. This will, I conceive, mainly depend upon the future organization of the army. Many officers advocate a staff corps. Our European regiments do not, however, appear to have suffered materially from the withdrawal of officers for staff and detached employ.

18 and 19. To deprive a man of any inducement to improve himself could never tend to his efficiency, either as a regimental officer or anything else, and any such measure must militate more or less against the general standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army.

J. D. MACPHERSON, Lieut.-Col.,
Officiating Quartermaster-General
of the Army.

(No. 333 A.)

From Lieut.-Col. J. D. MACPHERSON to Maj.-Gen.
BIRCH, C.B.

Quartermaster-General's Office,
Head-Quarters, Camp, Baraitch,
December 22, 1858.

SIR,

In forwarding the annexed replies to Colonel Durand's questions relating to the irregular cavalry and Bengal sappers and miners, I have to express my regret that absence on leave at Simla and subsequent employment in the field should have caused me to delay them so much.

2. In regard to the artillery, it is an arm of the service with the requirements of which I am not sufficiently acquainted to admit of my replying with any confidence to the series of questions put in Colonel Durand's circular, and I would therefore venture to hope that any expression of opinion by me in regard to them may be dispensed with.

I have, &c.

J. D. MACPHERSON, Lieut.-Col.,
Officiating Quartermaster-General
of the Army.

CAVALRY.

1.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army is composed?

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, either by the regulations or the practice of the

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

No race, tribe, or caste should be excluded.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Commanding officers make their own arrangements.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

The usual forms of registering the recruit's home and parentage, and having the register verified by the proper district authorities.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers, or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

They are simply registered, care being taken that the register is correct.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army.

Simply admit all classes.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

As prescribed by the native articles of war.

10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army when first enrolled?

No.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

No. I would raise them from all parts of India.

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?

Yes.

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be homogeneous as to race or caste?

14. No, not as a rule; but in many parts of India it might answer best to have entire corps of one class, such as of Jats, Muzheebee Seiks, and some others.

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of rissalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

I think the class rissalahs would answer very well in some cases, in others I would mix all races and castes, at the discretion of carefully selected commanding officers.

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army are not homogeneous but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

The proportions might be as equal as possible in such corps.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

Commanding officers.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

The usual precaution of registering homes and parentage.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bengal army?

No; I think Europeans and natives are better apart.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps and subject to periodical relief?

I would select them to form integral portions of such corps.

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

There could be no difficulty in having them on one flank either in camp or quarters.

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements.

They would of course require a commissariat establishment, which the irregular native cavalry do not.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?

They might be armed with the same description of weapons; indeed, they are so at present.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be armed?

With spear and sword and a few carbines per troop.

25. Do the existing dress and equipments admit of improvement? If so, state in what respects.

The spear is now, I believe, held to be a better cavalry weapon than the carbine.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Commanding officers should have power as paid magistrates, and deal summarily with all minor offences.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

They may be retained; but courts-martial should only be had recourse to in cases of grave crime.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

In no branch of the army.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

They have the articles of war read and explained to them.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

They can all comprehend them well enough.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

On merit chiefly, I believe.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

I think they are, generally.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

Yes, I think they generally are.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

I believe not.

No reply required to No. 5.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

Lt.-Col. J. D. Macpherson.

Generally speaking, they have behaved better than those of the infantry and artillery; not many of them have been ringleaders in the recent mutiny.

No replies required to Nos. 7, 8, 9.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

Nothing has proved effectual; but they are well aware of the advantage of a provision for their old age, as afforded by retiring pensions.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

This is a question of finance. The pensions are highly valued, but at the same time, we can get almost any number of horsemen (as in the police) without allowing pensions.

13. Should the system of promotion generally, by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Merit and efficiency only.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

I think they are not generally fit.

No replies required to Nos. 15 and 16.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

The officers should be carefully selected.

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, which is the most popular, the regular or irregular? and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

The irregular is the better paid service of the two; the discipline is generally not so strict in minor details, and there are many little privileges, such as a man taking his horse with him on furlough, &c.; again, in former days, a sowar could always obtain leave to visit his home on his furnishing a substitute. This privilege was, however, withdrawn; why, I know not, for it was not only much prized by the men, but a supply of ready-made soldiers was always to be had from the class of substitutes; there was no occasion to enlist raw recruits, and Government was put to no extra expense by the practice.

No replies required to Nos. 19 and 20.

21. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bengal army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?

Irregular cavalry will answer best.

22. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army were mounted?

23. Whence are the horses obtained? And of what breeds are they?

Chiefly stud bred.

Lt.-Col. J. D.
Macpherson.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency draw its horses?

From the North-Western provinces and the Punjab; there are also some horses from Afghanistan, but they are not liked.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency?
From rupees 200 to rupees 250 I believe.

26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

A great scarcity of horses for irregular cavalry has always been a complaint.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency?

Let the breeding establishments in the Government studs be restored to the state they were in 30 years ago, when the Bengal stud horse was highly prized throughout India.

28. Is it advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies for a supply of horses for the army of India?

If the Government studs are improved or restored to the state they were in, as above mentioned, they could supply all wants very efficiently; whether this would prove less or more expensive than the importation of horses from foreign countries I have no means of inquiring.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army?

Has recently been raised to rupees 25 per mensem.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field, during a protracted campaign?

Yes.

30 b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army been embarrassed by debt or free from debt?

They are seldom free from debt, more or less.

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

It is now, I think, sufficient.

32. What is the system of the Bengal irregular cavalry with respect to *assamees*, and the market value of the *assamee*? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests, or not? Are they favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers alone are allowed to hold a given number of *assamees*. The system works tolerably well, I believe; but I would still do away with it, and have every man a *khodaspah*.

33. What is the pay of mounted police in the North-Western provinces and in the Punjab?
The same with the irregular cavalry, I believe.

34. What is the organization of the mounted police of the North-Western provinces and of the Punjab?

I have no knowledge of the North-Western provinces. In the Punjab they are organized into *ressalahs*, much after the fashion of irregular cavalry.

35. Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the North-Western provinces and of the Punjab composed?

In the Punjab mounted police there are Mahomedans

of both the Cis and Trans Indus, Seiks, Khutrees, and some Hindostanees.

36. How is the mounted police recruited; that is, what is the agency employed, the precautions taken before or by the local authorities in entertaining men?

Captains of police manage the recruiting. The usual precaution taken is to ascertain a man's home and parentage, so as to know where he is most likely to be found, if wanted at any time and from any cause.

37. Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police at rs. per mensem been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?

The Punjab police are well mounted, and very efficient.

38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

There is no difference in the pay, but the police get no pensions.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army been increased or diminished?

It has been diminished.

No reply required to No. 2.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

Unfavorable.

No reply required to No. 4.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of headquarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops, and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

On the officers immediately serving with the men.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

Increased.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

Give a commanding officer full power, and hold him responsible for the discipline of his corps?

No replies required to Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

They must be well conversant with the native language to begin with, good horsemen, good tempered, but firm, and the more *bonhomme* about them the better. They can then be best trained by being attached to irregular corps.

No reply required to No. 14.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?

None.

No replies required to Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

Practicable enough, but I do not see that there would be any advantage in it.

22. If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

I would not have more than one-third natives. It could be armed, mounted, and officered either on the regular or irregular system, as might be deemed best.

W. MACPHERSON, Lieut.-Col.,
Officiating Quartermaster-Gen. of the Army.

ENGINEER SOLDIERS OR SAPPERS AND MINERS.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND THE COMPOSITION.

1. What is the present constitution of the corps of sappers and miners of the Bengal army as respects the European and the native elements?
2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native sappers and miners of the Bengal army are composed?
3. What districts are the races, tribes, and castes drawn from?
4. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or practice of the Bengal army?
5. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the sappers and miners?

Men of all castes and races should be entertained.

6. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits?
7. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?
8. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of the corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?
9. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition and efficiency of the engineer soldiers?
10. What are the words of the oath administered to the engineer recruit on his entering the ranks of the sappers and miners?
11. How long has this form been in use in the Bengal sappers and miners?
12. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered? or do you think an oath useless? Would you substitute any form of covenant or engagement?
13. Should the companies of engineer soldiers be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste, or be composite, and have them mixed up; and if composite, in what proportion should the different classes enter?

I would have class companies.

14. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

Commanding officers can always procure recruits.

15. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality?

The usual precaution of registering their homes and parentage.

16. Has the recruiting of native engineer soldiers been hitherto from unskilled men, and is it practicable in the Bengal presidency with reference to the habits and qualities, moral and physical, of the people to adopt to any extent the system of the royal sappers and miners, by enlisting artificers and recruits conversant with some trade or special kind of labor?

17. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for hard labor and service in India with the natives of the country; and if so, should they be formed in separate companies, or mixed up throughout the companies?

Lt. Col. J. D.
Macpherson.

I would have class companies, as stated in reply to No. 13.

18. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries for engineer soldiers, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

19. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

All countries and races whence they can be procured.

20. Are the native engineer soldiers in sufficient strength for the requirements of service in the field?

I believe they have been.

21. Is there any reason why all native infantry should not be trained to the ordinary work in the execution of trenches, and be taught much now confined in general to sappers and miners?

I think it would do them a great deal of good.

22. Is any portion of the native infantry of the Bengal army accustomed to work in the execution of trenches, batteries, &c., and is the work done willingly?

I have never seen them refuse, though I have heard of them doing so. Among themselves, they will always labor readily at such works.

23. Has the sufficiency or insufficiency of the engineer soldiers of the Bengal army, noted by you, reference to the peculiar aptitude, or the reverse, of the native infantry of the line, or is your opinion based purely on the fair engineer wants of the service irrespective of considerations connected with the efficiency of the line in siege and field works?

24. Have the sappers and miners of the Bengal army as many European sappers and miners, non-commissioned officers, and privates as is desirable?

25. How many European sappers and miners, and of what grades, should be attached to a company of native sappers and miners?

I have not much experience, but I believe the corps of sappers and miners, aided occasionally by working parties, has always sufficed.

26. Are you aware of any advantage which accrues from making the dress of the native sappers and miners closely resemble that of the European infantry?

No.

27. How are the corps of Bengal sappers and miners armed?

With percussion carbines, I believe.

28. How should the engineer soldiers of the Bengal army be dressed and armed?

In Khakee colored uniform.

29. What proportion of the native Bengal sappers and miners can read and write their own vernacular?

30. What proportion can understand or speak English, or read and write English?

31. Besides practice in sapping, mining, and field operations, have the Bengal sappers and miners any schooling?

32. Do you consider that they are to be classed as skilled engineer soldiers?

*Lt.-Col. J. D.
Macpherson.*

33. With reference to the numerous demands for skilled European overseers and subordinates in the department of public works, and to military requirements, is it advisable to have in addition to native, a corps of European sappers and miners; if so, of what strength, and how officered?

They would be very valuable, but I am unable to say what strength they should be.

34. Could the corps of Bengal engineers furnish the requisite number of officers? believe not.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest any improvements in the articles of war in use in the Bengal army?

I would abolish them altogether, save in cases of grave crime, when European courts-martial only should be held.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

For all offences of a grave nature they might be retained.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bengal sappers and miners?

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native sappers and miners of the Bengal army with the military code under which they serve?

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. What is the system of promotion in the corps of Bengal sappers and miners? Is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

2. Are the native officers of the Bengal sappers and miners generally of that intelligence and efficiency which renders them useful in the field?

3. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the sappers and miners, from among whom they have risen?

5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officer and his men weaken the influence of the European officer?

6. Has it been found on the occurrence of mutinies that the native officers of sappers and miners gave timely information, or were of use in aiding the European officers to maintain discipline? Have they sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the Bengal sappers and miners?

Like all other classes, they should have something to look forward to from good service.

8. When the European non-commissioned officers of sappers come upon duty with the native commissioned officers, do the native commissioned officers or the European non-commissioned officers command in the absence of any European commissioned officer?

There is an old order, by which European non-commissioned officers of *sappers and miners* assume command on such occasions.

9. Is the substitution of a full complement of European serjeants and corporals of sappers and miners to each company in lieu of its native officers advisable?

If this be done, some other mode of rewarding good service than by promotion should be devised for the native sapper.

10. If the abolition of the grades of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the native sappers, would a graduated scale of good service pay, and retiring pensions claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

I believe it would answer.

11. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

They have undoubtedly been considered by the native troops to be perhaps the greatest boon of the service.

12. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified, or abolished?

This appears to be purely a question of finance. To grant the pensions would be advantageous, and render the service more attractive to the native soldier; but at the same time, we can get any number of native soldiers without them.

13. If native commissioned officers are retained, should the system of promotion generally by seniority be altered, and promotion by merit and efficiency be the rule?

By merit and efficiency alone.

14. Are native commissioned officers of sappers and miners, generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

The majority of all native officers, of whatever branch of the army, are unfit, in my opinion. I would have no native courts-martial.

15. Are the native commissioned officers of sappers and miners on a par, in professional intelligence and efficiency, with the European non-commissioned officers and privates of the sappers and miners?

I should think not, but have no personal knowledge on the subject.

16. What is your opinion of the system of appointing officers of the native infantry to the command of companies of native sappers and miners? Does it work well with the engineer soldiers, and is it advantageous as training to the European officers nominated to the duty?

I believe it has been found to answer well.

17. Has the distinct organization and the differences of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies, proved favorable to our power in India?

Undoubtedly. The more varied the systems, regulations, and races, the less likely are we to have combinations formed against us?

18. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

The more separate and distinct they are, the better.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of sappers and miners, increased or diminished in the Bengal army?

2. During the above period, have the powers of officers of companies been increased or diminished?

3. Has the discipline of the corps of Bengal sappers and miners been influenced by the above causes?

4. Upon what does the discipline of a body of sappers and miners mainly depend during a campaign; upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the corps?
5. Should the powers of commanding officers, and of officers in charge of companies, be increased or diminished?

6. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of the discipline and efficiency of the corps of Bengal sappers and miners?
I would beg to refer to my answers to the questions regarding European officers generally (forwarded to Col. Durand, with my letter, No. 1313, of 5th July last) as they are equally applicable to these questions.
J. D. MACPHERSON, Lieut.-Col.,
Officiating Quartermaster-Gen. of the Army.

Lt.-Col. J. D. Macpherson.

No. 14.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM COLONEL GREEN, ADJUTANT-GENERAL, BOMBAY.

Colonel Green.

(No. 2502.)
From Colonel GREEN, C.B., to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

Adjutant-General's Office,
Head-Quarters, Poona, July 28 1858.
Sir,
In continuation of my letter No. 2459, of yesterday's date, I have the honor to enclose my replies to the series of questions under the head "I. The Recruiting and Composition of Corps."

I have, &c.
EDMUND GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bombay army is composed?
1. Christians, Mussulmans, Hindoos, Jews, Seikhs. Men drawn from all parts of India without distinction of race, tribe, or caste, so long as they are reported fit to bear arms.
2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?
2. The Deccan, Concan, Hindostan (the North-West provinces for the most part), the Punjaub, Malabar (giving a small quota); Guzerat and Cutch (but few recruits).
3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bombay army?
3. None are excluded.
4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bombay army?
4. None have been excluded. Coolies and Bheels may have been neglected, but it remains to be proved if they will enlist with the understanding that they will go wherever called upon to serve, as is the custom in the Bombay army.
5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts from which the Bombay army is recruited?
5. Recruiting parties composed of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and men of the regiment, are sent out as occasion requires. Lately a European officer from each regiment was detached on this duty, and succeeded well or ill, according to the activity and intelligence of the officer. The experiment was generally successful.
6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?
6. The regulation on the subject will be found in Bombay Government General Order No. 539, 5 July

1855. (Jameson's Code, 3rd appendix, page 182, section xlvi., art. 214, *et infra*.)

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?
7. If the recruit be enlisted in the cantonment where the regiment is located, no precautions are taken; but if at another station, the man is examined by a committee, and if found fit, his register is sent to the commanding officer, and a copy to the adjutant-general. The same rule applies to the families of sepoys.
8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops,) in the Bombay army?
8. No alterations are required. It is only necessary to make officers commanding regiments individually responsible that none but eligible recruits are entertained, irrespective of race, tribe, or caste.
9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bombay army?
9. "I, A.B., private in the regiment, do swear that I will not abandon these colours, but always defend them to the utmost of my power, and that I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes a good soldier and faithful servant of the Company; and failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to the penalties described in the articles of war which have been read to me."
10. How long has this form been in use in the Bombay army?
10. Since the 11th April 1807.
11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the sepoy of the Bombay army?
11. No, I cannot. The oath appears to me to be useless. It does not prevent desertion, and puts that into the head of the recruit which probably he would never have thought of.
12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bombay presidency of seafaring habits; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?
12. The Mahomedan Calassees of Bombay and along the coast are a fine race of men, and would doubtless make an excellent marine corps, but they would require a high rate of pay. I know of no other races.
13. Has the Bombay presidency any marine corps; and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?
13. It has. The strength of the Bombay marine battalion is as follows:—

Colonel Green.

Commanding.	European Officers.			Native Officers.			Rank and File.	Hospital Establishment.	School Establishment.	Bazaar Establishment.	Followers.			Establishment.														
	Lieutenant and Adjutant.	Lieutenant, Quartermaster, and Interpreter.	Surgeon.	Subadar-Major and Subadars.	Jemadars and Native Adjutant.	Havildar-Major.					Sergeant-Major.	Quartermaster-Sergeant.	Colour Havildars.		Havildars.	Drummers, Fliers, and Buglers.	Nautes.	Privates.	Rheesties.	Boys.	1st Hospital Assistant.	2nd Ditto.	Apprentices.	Mahratta Pundit.	Assistant ditto.	Chowdry.	Pena.	Armourer.
1	1	1	1	12	12	1	1	1	12	48	24	80	1000	12	25	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	Establishment.

recruited almost wholly from the Northern Concan, and from the lowest races of Hindoos, with a fair proportion of Mussulmans.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

14. I think this would be highly impolitic; under existing orders the Bombay army can enlist only within the limits of the presidency. Few recruits are to be had from Cutch, Guzerat, Khandeish, and other districts. Being thus restricted to the Deccan, northern and southern Concan, and Sawunt Warree will have, in my opinion, the effect of making the Bombay army a Mahratta clique, as that of Bengal was of Oude.

15. Or, should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

15. Commanding officers should take recruits from all parts of the country without reference to race, tribe, or caste. Oude might be made exceptional, until the cause of the mutiny shall have been ascertained, and all Brahmins should be carefully excluded the service, civil and military.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

16. A mixture of all races, tribes, or castes.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste? Or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

17. The companies, in the same manner as the regiments, should be composed of men of all castes.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

18. This must depend upon the facility given to enlistment. If commanding officers are permitted to enlist where they please, the proportion of races, tribes, or castes should be equalized as much as possible, as a counterpoise.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?

19. Military corps should recruit from all districts, if possible; the police from that particular pergunnah in which it may serve. The latter I consider necessary, as the police to be efficient should be acquainted with the *locale*, and if possible the people of the district in which they serve. In military bodies such local knowledge is unnecessary.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

20. No. I would make commanding officers entirely responsible for recruiting their regiments, making their own arrangements.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bombay presidency or in its dependencies, or in districts of other presidencies?

21. Nothing beyond what should be within the reach of every commanding officer. Nothing more is required.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?

22. Replied to above. The police should make their own arrangements.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bombay presidency?

23. The existing regulations under this head are clear and distinct. If thoroughly acted up to, nothing more is required, or simply a modification.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bombay presidency?

24. Modified perhaps according to circumstances, these rules might with advantage be introduced to the police corps as tending to ready identification.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?

25. Certainly not. I think such a measure would be fraught with evil, if we have to *import* such natives, as admitting that we distrust those upon whom we should and must rely. If such men (Africans and others) can be found in India and induced to enlist they should be entertained like any other eligible native.

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

26. Replied to above.

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

27. Answered above.

28. Should a company, or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?

28. No; such an arrangement would militate against any perfect organization of a native army which we *must* have. Our object should be to make an efficient native army supported by Europeans. The mixture would ruin both.

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

29. Answered above.

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops?

30. Answered above.

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?
31. Answered above. The commissariat arrangements would be most perplexing.
32. How should such companies be armed? With similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?
32. Answered above.
33. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be armed?
33. For the present with the common percussion musket.
34. How should police corps in the Bombay presidency be armed?
34. This must depend upon political considerations. When the mutiny is put down, the country people generally disarmed, and thorough police arrangements organized, this body should be armed with a sword and truncheon only.
35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?
35. The abolishing the shako, knapsack, and stock has removed the disadvantages. The present dress is excellent, viz., Kilmarnock bonnet, tunic, and loose trousers. The imitation has the advantage of uniformity.
36. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?
36. The present dress cannot be altered for the better.
37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment officered from that European regiment alone should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?
37. In my opinion the plan would not answer. The association is unnecessary when the native regiments are organized on a firm foundation. The fact of the association argues that the corps should always be employed together, which frequently would be impracticable, while the proximity of the two distinct races would lead to scenes of violence and discord, and a depreciation of the moral force of the European tending to the worst results. While under such a system the native matériel would as certainly deteriorate and soon become worthless.
38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?
38. But very little. The company of European artillerymen are quite distinct from the gun lascars and drivers attached to the battery, and have nothing to do with them except on parade.
39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?
39. Answered above.
40. Would such a system be favorable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?
40. If the European soldier is required to watch the natives, such a result may be attained by the association, but the respectability of the native army would soon be lost, while the habits and practices of our barrack-rooms tend to anything but awe.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

Colonel Green.

41. Such an arrangement would answer neither in peace nor war. Our object should be to raise native troops faithful in themselves, fully impressed with the knowledge that our European superiority is ready at all times to crush them, we should little dread future mutinies. With a due proportion of European troops in the principal stations, our magazines, treasure, and artillery in the keeping of Europeans, such an event is impossible. In some situations in India European soldiers cannot serve and live, then we must depend upon natives; and the history of the Bombay army shows that our sepoys can be depended upon, and we may naturally look for greater attachment to the service under more perfect arrangements.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

42. Without confidence and self-reliance a native army would be a burden. To train the sepoys to act in dependence upon European support would paralyze the entire portion of the native army. It should be our endeavour to sustain them, and as during the mutiny this army has done so well, it should be our aim not to destroy vitality, but to give increased life by removing obstructions which may have caused mischief.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

(No. 2415.)

From Colonel GREEN, C.B., to Lieut.-Col.
DURAND, C.B.

Adjutant-General's Office,
SIR, Head-Quarters, Poona, July 26, 1858.

I HAVE the honor to enclose my replies to the series of questions, under the head infantry, "No. 2, Military Code and Rules of Discipline," and to intimate that my replies to the other series will follow in due course.

I have, &c.
EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

INFANTRY.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the native army of the Bombay presidency?
 1. The native articles of war should be abolished, and a few simple rules laid down by Government calculated to meet ordinary breaches of discipline. Commanding officers should have magisterial power to be exercised beyond a certain extent under the confirmation of brigadiers and general officers commanding divisions.
 2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
 2. The rules which obtain in the British army are not required to govern the native army; Europeans and natives being essentially different, a different mode of treatment is required.
 3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bombay army?
 3. Custom has made the system work smoothly, but the machinery is cumbersome, and might be much simplified by the proceedings being taken in the vernacular, the courts-martial assuming the form of a punchayet, superintended by a European officer.

Colonel Green.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bombay army with the military code under which they live are governed?
4. Portions of the native articles of war are read in Hindoostanee to the regiment at muster parade every month.
5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?
5. About one-third.
6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bombay presidency?
6. Under the civil regulations.
7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bombay presidency?
7. In minor cases by fine, extra drill, suspension, and dismissal. In major cases, neglect of duty, abuse of authority, &c., &c., by Section VIII. of Regulation XII. of 1827.
8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?
8. The police authorities consider that Section XIII. is deficient, inasmuch as hard labor cannot be awarded. Some additional authority would be an improvement, but the system appears to work satisfactorily, for security of life and property is found throughout this presidency to an extent which speaks highly in its favor.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

(No. 2459.)

From Colonel GREEN, C.B., to Lieut.-Col.
DURAND, C.B.

Adjutant-General's Office,
SIR, Head-Quarters, Poona, July 27, 1858.
IN continuation of my letter, No. 2415, of the 26th instant, I have the honor to enclose herewith my replies to the series of Questions, "III. Organization, Promotions, and Rewards."

I have, &c.
EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General.

INFANTRY.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Bombay army what is the system of promotion, is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?
1. Principally on merit, seniority having due weight, but constituting no claim.
2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bombay army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?
2. Yes, taking into consideration the little duty they have to perform, whereby their usefulness and efficiency are much impaired.
3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?
3. In some instances they improve as they rise; in others the contrary. It must be remembered that these men are simply subadars and jemadars. It cannot be expected that really good native officers can be found in or be selected from the class of men who now enlist in our infantry regiments, but as being promoted in a great measure by merit, their acquirements are usually superior to those of the men from among whom they have risen.
4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?
4. In many regiments tests or examinations are required and taken previous to advancement in or promotion to the non-commissioned grades.
By these means the qualifications of the men are known, and, ordinarily, examinations are not taken prior to promotion to the commissioned grades.
5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers?
- Does a full complement of the European militia against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?
5. I have never found it to have that effect. When a proper understanding exists, in a regiment, I think it strengthens the influence of the European officers. Certainly it has that effect.
6. Has it been found in the Bombay army that, on the occurrence of mutinies, the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?
6. Yes, timely and most valuable information, except in two instances, when the *émeute* was very partial and sudden. In all cases the native officers have sided with the European officers, and aided them to check mutiny.
7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bombay army?
7. Continued; but they should be placed on a different footing altogether.
8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?
8. Very unadvisable.
9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions claimable after specified periods of service be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?
9. To abolish the grade of native officer would be to destroy the native army altogether.
10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?
10. In my opinion very much so. It is looked upon by all as the greatest boon.
11. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?
11. The system of promotion for merit and efficiency should be the rule. Seniority carrying with it due weight, but there should be no claim (*hak*) in the matter.
12. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?
12. The system should be maintained, but modified to meet the requirements of the Bombay army. The rules which obtain in Bengal bearing hard upon pensioners who have served in western India, and being otherwise faulty.

13. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the native infantry of the Bombay army.

13. Rupees 8,69,834. 9a. 11 p. per annum, or Rs. 72,486. 3a. 6p. per month, as nearly as can be ascertained.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

14. Yes; generally so.

15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

15. When pains are taken with their instruction, their intelligence and efficiency is great, exceeding that of the common run of European serjeants and corporals.

16. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps?

16. As at present, but with four selected European officers, selected native officers, and men raised from all denominations of people, without respect to caste or tribe.

1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers?

They should be fully officered with native commissioned grades, but for the performance of *regimental* duty, and under a new organization four European officers, commanding officer, second in command, adjutant and quartermaster, and paymaster are ample. Under the present system the European and native officers stand in the way of each other.

2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades?

Answered above. *Vide* reply to Question No. 9.

3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers?

Like irregular corps, under selected European and native officers. Mere subadars and jemadars will not answer for the responsible duty which would devolve upon the native officers, whose position should be analogous to the present captains and subalterns. Should such a system be taken into consideration, the pay of the native officers must be placed on a more respectable footing, so as to induce a better class of men to enter the service. Those having property in the country, whose interests would be exerted towards the maintenance of order, and by their superior social condition be able to exert authority over the men.

17. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

17. The police corps should be officered entirely by respectable and selected natives of the district, but be under the supervision and inspection of British officers, especially qualified and chosen for this important duty.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

18. In my opinion the regular army under such a system would soon cease to exist, except as a useless and expensive mob.

19. In police corps, is there on first admission any test or examination as to the capabilities of reading and writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

Colonel Green.

19. No; promotion depends upon general efficiency, good conduct, intelligence, and gallantry, but the advantages possessed by a policeman who can read and write are not undervalued.

20. Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies, proved favorable to our power in India?

20. I have no doubt it has.

21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed; or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

21. This certainly should be allowed. The races of India are as varied as those of entire Europe. Rules should be made to suit local circumstances. The attempt to assimilate is full of danger, and contrary to reason, when things are not equal. The presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay are totally different as regards races and castes, and to amalgamate is to ruin.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

(No. 2698.)

From Colonel GREEN, C.B., to Lieut.-Col.
DURAND, C.B.

SIR,
Head-Quarters, Bombay Army,
August 6, 1858.

In continuation of my letter of the 28th ultimo, I have the honor to forward to you my replies to the series of questions "No. IV. European Officers." I have, &c.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

INFANTRY.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bombay army? and state the orders or measures, or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect.

1. Diminished to a considerable extent. Within my experience a commanding officer could inflict 300 lashes, without reference to superior authority. Subsequently their power was reduced, by flogging being interdicted, unless the punishment had been confirmed by higher authority; then the number of lashes was reduced, till flogging has become almost unknown in the native army. 30 years ago it was almost the only punishment.

Minor punishments are much curtailed; cross-arm drill has been abolished; and the duration of punishment by drills, heavy and light, shortened. These matters are now, much more so than formerly, under the supervision of brigadiers, general officers, and army head-quarters, and have been caused by orders that superior officers shall make themselves acquainted with the working condition of the several regiments.

2. During the above period, have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?

2. Neither increased nor diminished. More pains are taken in discriminating the degree of punishment.

Colonel Green.

I think that in most regiments, officers of both European and native corps have fully as much power as they possessed years ago. Commanding officers are now obliged to be better acquainted with these subjects than they were formerly, and punishments are more under regulation.

3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bombay army?

3. The diminution has caused a system of appeal and looking beyond the commanding officer, which has had an evil effect; the commanding officer should be all powerful in the idea of the sepoy. The well-meant interference of the superior authorities has weakened this, and thrown too much upon them and army head-quarters that responsibility which should be vested in commanding officers, and which the knowledge of the important position they occupy would cause them to exert with due discretion and zeal.

4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?

4. I am not aware of any increase or diminution.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps; upon the distant authority of head quarters, or upon the authorities and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?

5. Upon the authority and influence of officers in command of regiments and companies, influenced doubtless by the troops fully understanding that in all just and legitimate measures, their officers would be supported by the distant authority of head-quarters.

6. Should the power of commanding officers, and of officers in charge of companies, be increased or diminished?

6. The power of commanding officers should be increased, and that of commanding officers of companies enlarged if possible, but much must depend upon the mode in which the future discipline of the army is to be maintained. The native articles of war and defaulter rolls are opposed to all such extension of powers, and by these means commanding officers are almost helpless, and in times of difficulty quite so.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

7. Magisterial powers to commanding officers answers admirably in the irregular regiments, and should be generally introduced. Flogging should be ordered for the theft, insubordination, and any disgraceful crime, added to imprisonment and expulsion.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war?

8. In time of war. The influence of the British officer among natives is most felt in times of difficulty and danger. All must depend, however, upon the individual character of the officer.

9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

9. Regiments should not exceed 800 privates of 10 companies. On the reorganization of the army, perhaps 700 would be sufficient; and the men should be taught the use of the pick and the spade, equally with that of the musket. Every man should be enlisted with the understanding that he is to assist in the construction of public works (nothing menial or

degrading), and to go wherever ordered, by sea or land.

10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bombay army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

10. Seldom, if ever, under this presidency.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?

11. Not under the circumstances above stated.

12. In apportioning European officers to native troops,—

1. Should native corps have a full complement of European officers according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers; or,

2. A full complement of European officers, and no native commissioned officers; or,

3. A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?

1. A full complement of European and native officers is not required in the native army. The one stands in the way of the other.

2. Four European, and a full complement of native officers.

3. I have answered this in Clause 2. If it be determined that a full complement of native officers shall be maintained, we must proceed in their selection under a new system. The ranks of subadar and jemadar should be open to the native gentry of India, and a certain number of eligible men, having some stake in the country, admitted to the service, with the understanding that they make themselves competent to command.

The native officers should be held responsible for their companies in all respects; the subadar to be the captain, the jemadar the subaltern of the company. Promotion from the ranks to be continued to those who merit it, by being fully competent to command a company in all situations, having the payment thereof in all respects as the European officer does now. Such a system demands selected European officers with the regiments, and a departure from regulations; but to make a thoroughly efficient and faithful native army, a complete reorganization must take place.

13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps or first to European corps?

13. Cadets learn their duty better with their own branch of the service. Everything in their instruction depends upon the officer under whom they are placed.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

14. If fewer European officers are assigned to native corps, the cadets, as a general rule, should be attached to the European regiments; and after a time selections made to do duty with the native infantry corps, but the fewer idlers there are with these the better.

15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

15. I think not. A good commanding officer, with an efficient staff, will keep a regiment in perfect discipline, and this would more particularly be the case were the native officers men of superior character. The great call made, and want for European officers, are not for regimental duty, but for the garrison duties of courts-martial (principally European) and committees, required to report on all manner of departmental matters, which the departmental officers should be held entirely responsible for.

16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies, between the conduct of regiments with few, and those with many European officers present.

16. Of the Bombay army only one regiment actually mutinied. In a second case a partial outbreak was speedily put down by the great majority of the corps. In a third an intended partial rising was reported by the native officers, and prevented by disarmament. In these three the average number of European officers was present.

17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment, be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

17. By doubling the number of officers with the European regiments, and placing the surplus in battalions of officers without men. From these selections could be made for the various descriptions of staff or detached employ.

Under the present system the moral force of the European character is destroyed in the native army, by a number of idle officers having no suitable employment, striving by every means to get away from

regimental duty. The situation of talented energetic officers in such a position is deplorable; for in a well-conducted native regiment, more than an hour per diem cannot with utility be devoted to regimental duty. On occasions of field service, the influx of the staff absentees is in many instances most perplexing to a commanding officer, for years of civil employ do not qualify an officer to command a company or battalion in the field.

Colonel Green.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army as regimental officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

18. I think this would prove the ruin of the army.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

19. Certainly; ambition and hope would die. Such a state of things, it would be deplorable even to contemplate.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant General, Bombay Army.

QUESTIONS and REPLIES having reference to Paragraph 5, of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and what is their distribution?

Non-Commissioned, Rank and File.

Cavalry.	Artillery	Engineers.	Infantry	Total.
Royal - - 2,287	Royal - - 1,045 Bombay - - 1,836	Royal - - 240 Bombay - - 33	Royal - - 10,515 Bombay - - 2,755	14,087 4,626
				18,713

The distribution of the European troops is as follows :-

Southern Division

Station.	Artillery.	Engineers	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Bombay - -	Hd.-qrs., 2nd battalion - - -	- - -	- - -	Wing 57th regiment foot; company 92nd Highlanders.
Belgaum - -	3rd co. 1st battalion, and No. 17 light F. B. Bombay artillery	- - -	- - -	56th regiment foot; 2nd Bombay European regiment.
Dharwar - -	Hd.-qrs., 8th company, 14th battalion, with 2 guns, royal.	- - -	- - -	Company 56th regiment foot; company 74th Highlanders
Nurgoond - -	2 guns, 8th company, 14th battalion, royal.	- - -	- - -	2 companies 74th Highlanders.
Kuldghee - -	2 guns 8th company, 14th battalion, royal.	- - -	- - -	1 company 56th regiment foot.
Sholapoor - -	3rd company, 2nd battalion, and No. 14 Lt. F. B., Bombay.	- - -	Squadron 17th Lancers.	1 company 33rd Duke Wellington's regiment.
Kolapoor - -	3rd company reserve, and No. 15 Lt. F. B., Bombay.	- - -	- - -	3 companies 2nd Bombay European regiment.
Rutnagherry - -	- - - - -	- - -	- - -	Half company 2nd Bombay European regiment.
Sawunt Warree	- - - - -	- - -	- - -	Company 56th regiment foot.

Poona Division.

Poona - -	D. troop royal, 4th troop, Bombay -	Hd.-qrs., sappers and miners	- - -	18th royal Irish regiment; 33rd regt. foot.
Kurkee - -	- - - - -	- - -	Hd.-qrs, 3rd dragoon guards; 17th lancers.	-
Sattara - -	2nd company, 2nd battalion, Bombay, and No. 16 Lt. F. B.	- - -	Squadron 3rd dragoon guards.	2 companies 33rd regiment foot.
Ahmednuggur	Head-quarters, 1st battalion; head-quarters reserve, Bombay; and No. 10 light field battery	- - -	Squadron 3rd dragoon guards.	Company 33rd regiment foot; 2 companies 18th royal Irish regiment
Asseerghur - -	- - - - -	- - -	- - -	Company 18th royal Irish regiment.
Nassuck - -	- - - - -	- - -	- - -	Company 92nd Highlanders,
Malhgaum - -	2 guns, 7th company, 11th battalion, royal.	- - -	- - -	Company 92nd Highlanders.

Colonel Green.

Northern Division.

Stations.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Ahmedabad	1st co., 1st battalion, Bombay, and No. 3 Lt. F. B.	- - -	- - -	Wing 4th foot; company 89th foot.
Baroda	8th co 1st battalion, and X. battery, royal.	- - -	- - -	Company 51st foot.
Surat	2nd co., 11th battalion, royal	- - -	- - -	1 company European recruits.
Deesa	- - -	- - -	- - -	89th regiment foot.

Scinde Division.

Kurrachee	4th co. reserve, and No. 7 Lt. F. B., Bombay.	- - -	- - -	51st regiment foot.
Hydrabad	4th co., 1st battalion, and No. 5 Lt. F. B., Bombay.	- - -	- - -	2 companies 51st regiment foot.
Shikarpoor	1st co., reserve, and No. 9 Lt. F. B. Bombay.	- - -	- - -	Company 51st regiment foot.

Rajpootana Field Force.

Nusseerabad	2nd troop, Bombay horse	- - -	Squadron 8th hussars	83rd regiment foot.
Neemuch	3rd co., 4th battalion, royal, and siege train; 1st company, 2nd battalion, Bombay, and No. 2 Lt. F. B.	11th company royal.	- - -	72nd Highlanders.
Ajmere	- - -	- - -	- - -	Company 83rd regiment foot.

Central India Field Force.

Between Gwalior, and Jhansi, and Seprea.	1st and 3rd troops, Bombay horse - 5th co., 14th battalion, royal, and No. 6 Lt. F. B. 4th co., 2nd battalion, Bombay; 2 guns, 2nd co., reserve, Bombay; No. 4 Lt. F. B.; and No. 18 Lt. F. B.	21st company royal	8th hussars - 14th dragoons	Wing 72nd Highlanders; 86th regt. foot. 95th regiment foot. 3rd European regiment, Bombay.
Mhow	7th co., 11th battalion, royal; 2nd co., 6th battalion, Bengal; and No. 8. Lt. F. B.	- - -	Squadron 17th lancers.	Wing 71st Highlanders; 92nd Highlanders.
Jaulnah	3 guns, 2nd co., reserve, Bombay	- - -	- - -	2 companies 18th royal Irish.
Aden	2nd co., 1st battalion, Bombay	- - -	- - -	Wing 57 regiment foot.
Bengal Presidency.	- - -	- - -	- - -	64th regiment foot; 78th Highlanders; 1st European fusiliers, Bombay.

2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

I have embodied in the accompanying return the information which will apply to this question, and also No. 4. My reasons for recommending this distribution are therein given, and I trust it may be remembered that in framing it and the remarks, I have not overlooked the subject of expense that would be incurred by the alterations, while keeping in view that we are considering the important requirements of an empire.

3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and what is their distribution?

	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Artillery Drivers.	Gun Lascars.	Engineers.	Infantry.	Total.
Regular	1,417	933	493	613	567	30,958	34,978
Irregular	3,837	-	-	-	-	1,969	5,806
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	40,784

The distribution of the native troops is as follows:—

Southern Division.

Station.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Belgaum	- - -	- - -	Detach. south. Mahratta horse.	18th regt., 20th regt.
Dharwar	- - -	- - -	- - -	Hd.-qrs., 25th regt.
Nurgoond	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., 28th regt
Kulladghee	- - -	- - -	Hd.-qrs. south. Mahratta horse.	Wing, 15th regt.
Sholapoor	- - -	- - -	2nd Madras cavalry (Aden troop).	3rd regt.
Kolapoor	- - -	- - -	Detach. south. Mahratta horse.	Hd.-qrs., 15th regt.
Rutnagherry	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., 15th regt.
Vingoria	- - -	- - -	- - -	2 cos., 15th regt.
Ram Ghaut	- - -	- - -	- - -	1 co., 20th regt.
Baitsee	- - -	- - -	- - -	Ditto.
Tullawaree	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co. 20th regt.
Paldy	- - -	- - -	- - -	Ditto.
Beerea	- - -	- - -	- - -	Ditto.

Poona Division.

Poona	- - -	2 cos. sappers and miners.	Detach. Poona horse in the districts.	6th regt.
Sattara	- - -	- - -	Detach. south. Mahratta horse.	Hd.-qrs., 22nd regt.

Poona Division—cont.

Station.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Tasgaum	- - -	- - -	- - -	Detach., 22nd regt.
Ashta	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., 22nd regt.
Beeralia	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., 22nd regt.
Beejapoor	- - -	- - -	Wing south. Mahratta horse.	Co., 3rd regt., 1/2 co., 22nd regt.
Panderpoor-Mahabichwar.	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., 22nd regt.
Seroor	- - -	- - -	- - -	1/2 co., 22nd regt.
Ahmednugur.	Hd. qrs., 4th bat. No. 11 Lt. F. B., hd. qrs., 1 Co., 4th bat. No. 6, Lt. F. B., 5th co., 3rd bat., hd. qrs., 4th co., 4th bat., 6th co., 4th bat., with mountain train.	- - -	Hd. qrs., Poona horse. Detach., Poona horse.	8th regt. N.Lt.I.
Asseerghur-Kopergaum	2nd co., 4th bat. detach., 4th co., 4th bat., and mountain train.	- - -	Detach., Poona horse.	Co., 23rd regt. Co., 26th regt.
Ankols	- - -	- - -	- - -	1/2 co., 26th regt.
Nassick	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., 26th regt.
Chundore	- - -	- - -	- - -	1/2 co., 26th regt.
Tull Ghaut	- - -	- - -	Detach., Poona horse.	- - -
Malligaum	- - -	- - -	Detach., Poona horse.	- - -
Dhoolla	- - -	- - -	- - -	Hd. qrs., 26th regt.
Seepoor	- - -	- - -	- - -	Hd. qrs., 23rd regt.
Shada	- - -	- - -	- - -	2 cos., 23rd regt.
Chopra	- - -	- - -	- - -	Ditto.
Dapoollee	- - -	- - -	- - -	Hd. qrs., veteran battalion.
Bhewady	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., ditto.
Hurnee	- - -	- - -	- - -	Ditto.
Chiploon	- - -	- - -	- - -	Ditto.
Khier	- - -	- - -	- - -	Ditto.

Northern Division.

Ahmedabad	2nd co., 3rd bat., and No. 12 Lt. F. B., hd. qrs., 3rd bat.	- - -	Guzerat irregular horse.	2nd G. regt., hd. qrs., 11th regt.
Baroda	3 guns, 1st co., 3rd bat., and No. 17 Lt. F. B.	- - -	- - -	8th regt. Hd. qrs., 16th regt.
Broach	- - -	- - -	- - -	Wing, 16th regt.
Nandole	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., 8th regt.
Jumbooseer	- - -	- - -	- - -	1/2 co. 8th regt.
Gogo	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., 11th regt.
Dohud	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., 14th regt.
Sadra	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., 11th regt.
Pallunpoor	- - -	- - -	- - -	1/2 co., 31st regt.
Deesa	2nd co., 3rd bat., and No. 14 Lt. F. B.	- - -	Squadron 2nd regt.	31st regt.
Rajcote	3 guns, 1st co., 3rd bat., and 17 Lt. F. B.	- - -	- - -	17th regt.

Scinde Division.

Kurrachee	- - -	- - -	- - -	14th regt.
Kotree	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co. marine bat.
Frontier of Upper Sind	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Jacobabad	- - -	- - -	1st, 2nd, and 3rd regts. Sind horse.	- - -
Rogan	- - -	- - -	Detach., 2nd do.	- - -
Gundava	- - -	- - -	Ditto.	- - -
Hassanka	- - -	- - -	Ditto.	- - -
Ghurry	- - -	- - -	Ditto.	- - -
Kund Kote	- - -	- - -	Ditto.	- - -
Koornree	- - -	- - -	Ditto.	- - -
Kusmore	- - -	- - -	Detach., 3rd do.	- - -

Rajpootana Field Force.

Nussacerabad	4th co., 3rd bat., and No. 8 Lt. F. B.	- - -	Squadron, 1st lancers.	12th regt.
Neemuch	Detach. 1st co., 4th bat.	3rd co. sappers and miners.	Hd. qrs., 2nd regt.	13th regt.

Central India.

Colonel Green.

Station.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Cavalry.	Infantry.
Between, Gwalior, Jhansi, and Seepree.	- - -	B. co., Madras sappers. Det. 2nd and 5th cos., Bombay sappers.	Hd. qrs., 1st lancers, Hd. qrs., 3rd regt.	10th regt., 24th regt., 25th regt.
Bombay	- - -	- - -	Detach., 1st lancers (body guard). Wing, 3rd regt.	1st G. regt., 7th regt., marine bat.
Mhow	- - -	- - -	- - -	4th regt., 9th regt., 19th regt.
Jaulna	- - -	- - -	- - -	1/2 co., 6th regt.
Dhera Ghazee Khan.	- - -	- - -	- - -	2nd Belooch regt.
Muttinkote	- - -	- - -	- - -	Co., ditto.
Aden	6th co., 3rd bat.	1 co. sappers.	- - -	23rd regt.
Bengal	- - -	- - -	- - -	1st Belooch regt.

4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution?
 Replied to by the answer to Query No. 2.

5. What proportion of native troops now serving in the Bombay presidency are regulars, irregulars, and police corps; of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur.

The native troops serving in the Bombay presidency are composed of proportions as follows:—
 Regulars - - - - 33,564
 Irregulars - - - - 7,168
 Police - - - - 15,627

The races are as follows:—

Troops, exclusive of Police.	Regulars.	Irregulars.
Mussulmans	3,034	4,872
Chuttrie	2,289	205
Brahmins	3,123	111
Mahrattas	12,371	675
Purwarries	3,761	840
Other castes	8,562	448
Christians	424	17

6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?

I have shown this in the distribution statement. I do not venture to give an opinion as to the number of police that will be required, as so much must depend upon the internal state of the country.

7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the Bombay presidency? and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive, of police corps.

The European force should never be less than one half of the native troops, regular and irregular; this would leave a margin for the police, the ratio being probably one third European to two thirds native regular, irregular, and police.

8. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally? and state the ratios as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps.

The answer to No. 7 will apply much to this question, as to the proportion the European troops should bear to the native regular, irregular, and police; but the little knowledge I possess of the other presidencies, does not permit me to state the proportions in a satisfactory manner.

9. Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Bombay presidency? and state its amount.

No; there is not. There is permanent accommodation for four troops of horse artillery, eight companies of foot artillery, one regiment of cavalry, and seven regiments of infantry; also temporary

Colonel Green. accommodation for nine companies of foot artillery, one regiment of cavalry, and three regiments of infantry, Rajpootana and Central India not included.

10. Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the Bombay presidency for the strength of European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?

Certainly. For one troop of horse artillery, nineteen companies of foot artillery, three regiments of cavalry, and nine regiments of infantry, besides accommodation for sappers.

11. What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what portion should be composed of troops raised for service in India?

It must depend upon the state of affairs in Europe, as to what proportion of the European force for India should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what proportion should be composed of troops raised for service in India; but by having a large addition to the Bombay European force, India would be placed above the contingency of a continental war, which might force the necessity of the withdrawal of the royal troops at a most inconvenient time. Two-thirds of the European force of all arms for the Bombay presidency should therefore be composed of troops raised for service in India.

12. Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them?

I do not see how we can depart from the established custom adopted when an augmentation takes place, viz., by giving the senior of each grade throughout the arm to be augmented, advancement in the new regiment. The system of seniority could hardly be departed from now, without causing serious and natural discontent, though there can be no doubt that by thus placing the most unfortunate, and therefore the oldest officers of the army in the new corps, the interests of Government suffer severely.

13. Under the supposition that a considerable increase takes place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxtaposition with the purchase promotion system than what now accrues from the existence of the royal artillery, royal engineers, royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority promotion is the system?

This question appears to embrace the probability of certain officers of the mutinied Bengal regiments, being appointed to European corps "raised for service in India." The juxtaposition may be embarrassing if these new European corps are to be royal, because the officers entered the army under the seniority promotion system, as opposed to that of purchase promotion, to which they would now be brought in contact.

14. The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c., being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to Questions 7 and 8; if so, to what extent?

Whatever may be the feasibility of raising foreign mercenaries, the proportion of European to native or foreign mercenary troops should not be less than one in three.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

(No. 9950.)

From Colonel GREEN, C.B. to Maj.-Gen.
BIRCH, C.B.

Head-Quarters, Poona,

Dec. 14, 1858.

SIR,

IN continuation of my letter No. 2698, of the 6th of August last, I have the honor to forward to you, in the absence of Lieut.-Col. Durand, C.B., my replies to the series of questions No. 1 to 14, having reference to paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 233, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Honourable Court of Directors.

2. I regret to observe the delay which has taken place in submitting this last series; but I am very much pressed with work.

3. I have thought it my duty to answer the queries as concisely as possible, as my reasons for forming the opinions expressed do not appear to be called for.

I have, &c.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General.

MEMORANDUM.

1. The mutinies and uneasy feeling among the native troops, lately prevailing, have made it a matter of deep consideration, if it be not expedient to amend the system of our cantonments in India; but I wish to confine these remarks to the Bombay presidency, where many alterations must take place, in consequence of the number of regiments expected from England.

2. There can be no doubt that the system of triangulation is based upon sound military practice, as affording mutual support to the several stations thus arranged, with the power of concentration at any particular point which may be threatened, and if this be conceded, it appears according to reason, that the troops should be massed as much as possible, and small isolated detached stations avoided.

3. The massing of troops has many advantages; it affords a moral force, which must have great weight with the people of the country, a better discipline is maintained, and our native troops learn much from being brought into contact with regiments fresh from home; the movements of large bodies in the field become habitual, and there is always a force ready to act in any direction.

4. Small stations possess none of these advantages; the troops cantoned in them are sufficient only for the duty of the garrison, and in time of commotion they are liable to be besieged.

5. If small cantonments are to be deprecated, how much more so should be avoided the scattering the troops in detached bodies among them.

6. To divide a regiment into wings, or subdivide it into detachments,* has always, and most justly, been looked upon as a great evil; it ruins the discipline of a corps, and weakens the force which the united body possesses more by moral than any actual physical power that may be due to actual numbers.

7. The moral power attached to British soldiers has been strikingly shown lately in the Southern Mahratta country, in Sind, and also in Bombay, where the presence of a few hundred Europeans has overawed the turbulent, and in a great measure restored tranquillity and confidence in the permanency of our hold upon India. It is to be hoped that the arrival of reinforcements will prevent an outbreak, which might demonstrate the physical weakness so unhappily shown in Rajpootana, by our failures at "Awah," "Neembeera," and "Jerun." Failures of this kind where European soldiers have been present, are always calamities in India; how much then must they be lamented at present, and how strictly should they be avoided in future, when our prestige has been so rudely shaken!

8. Detachments of a few hundred Europeans located throughout our different stations would not

* I quote Sir Charles Napier as my authority.

long retain their moral effect, and in the case of any serious disturbance, the physical power of the soldiers would be lost, by the necessity of keeping the detachment as a protection to the cantonment, or of detaching so small a portion of it as to endanger the success of an offensive movement.

9. We should never strike a slight blow in India, and we must hereafter be careful that the effect of an aggressive movement be short, sharp, and decisive; crushing in its effects, in order that the example be permanent, otherwise we may expect a constant repetition of small wars, as dangerous as they are expensive.

10. The awkward position in which our European regiments are now placed has been forced upon us by circumstances, and could not have been avoided; to have withheld the assistance of the detachments now so widely scattered, would probably have lost provinces; and in great emergencies general rules must be departed from. Skill will be required to re-unite the divided regiments, and no time should be lost in carrying this into effect, risking something for so desirable an end.

11. The practice of cantoning our regiments in the neighbourhood of cities and towns belonging to independent chiefs is very objectionable, not only frequently causing unpleasant collisions, but the risk of sedition among the native portion, by contact with the disorderly soldiers, invariably to be found at native courts.

12. I would propose the entire abandonment of the cantonments of Baroda, Kolapore and Bhoj; the troops in garrison there being disposed of as hereinafter mentioned. The Guickwur, Rajah of Kolapore, and Rao of Cutch should be permitted to keep a quota of troops, sufficiently numerous for their personal protection, and to support their state, with which, excepting their actual number, the British Government should be in no way concerned. Under the judicious guidance of the residents at the courts, these should be sufficient for all purposes of police, the Government only lending their aid when the princes were unable to act against any refractory subjects.

13. The time has now arrived when our cantonments require a complete reorganization, and that accommodation be provided for a defensive position, in which can be placed the magazines and treasure. No cantonment should be without a "fortified square," the advantage of which has been shown at Mhow and Neemuch. Before these can be determined on, and the sites for the new barracks fixed, the situation of the cantonments should be reviewed, when I think it will be found that many, if not most of them, are not advantageously placed, with respect to their military positions, and the great requisite of a good supply of water; as regards this last essential provision, nothing can be worse than the situation of the Poona cantonment, where almost every year the artillery horses have to be sent in the hot season to the bank of the Mota Moollas, and there kept till the rains set in.

14. A select committee would point out many evils existing in the location of our several cantonments, which have been built on the spot where probably the force encamped on our taking possession of the country.

15. The number of troops to be located in each cantonment will depend upon the European force to be maintained under this presidency for the future, but we should have strong European brigades at Poona, Sholapore, Belgaum, in the Nassick district, at Mhow, Neemuch, Nusseerabad, Deesa, Ahmedabad, Surat, or Broach, Rajkote, and Kurrachee, requiring about 16 English regiments, while at Poona, Belgaum, and Kurrachee two regiments should be cantoned, and a complete (or more) regiment at the presidency.

16. The cavalry regiment at Kirkee should be removed to Poona, the Poona horse from Seroor to Sattara, the Southern Mahratta horse from Kulladghee to Belgaum; Baroda, Kolapore, Bhoj, and Dharwar should be abolished as military stations, the fort at the latter being entirely dismantled.

17. An English cavalry regiment should be quartered at Mhow, one at Nusseerabad or Neemuch, with another divided between Sattara and Sholapore. The light cavalry should be disposed, one in Rajpootana, a second at Deesa, and a third in the Deccan. Colonel Green.

18. Malligaum is an unsuitable cantonment, at times there is a scarcity of water, and the heat is intense; Nassick or Chandore would be a better location, it would domineer over the Bheels, and be in better communication with the presidency, Poona, and Ahmednuggur; Sattara should be formed into a brigade command, for being the head-quarters of the Mahratta families, a strong force should be stationed there at all times.

19. I take it for granted that the artillery will be all Europeans, and that a battery will be the component part of the garrison for each cantonment.

20. European troops cannot be stationed in Upper Sind, and Hyderabad is nearly as objectionable. The health of the soldiers suffers, and they become disorganized; the protection of all that part of Sind should be left to the arrangement of the commissioner and the commandant on the frontier. The building of the barracks at Hyderabad was a grave error, and our experience of the country requires no further experiments.

21. Thus massed we should overawe the entire population; as before said, scattered detachments are weak in themselves, and unable to strike a heavy blow. I calculate that at least 13 British regiments will be required, independent of our three European corps; and till we discover the cause of the present rising of our native soldiers, India will never be safe without an ample number of English soldiers.

22. No time should be lost in building "fortified squares," in which all of value should be stored; but as before stated, previous to undertaking such expensive works, and the building of barracks, we must consider the locality of our cantonments, for without judicious location, and an ample supply of water, such buildings would be useless, and we know that at several of our stations water is lamentably deficient in the hot season.

23. It is to be hoped that the Government will see the necessity of building suitable pendalls for the native troops; nothing can be worse than the present system of hutting; the first outlay for well-built native lines will in a few years be a great saving to Government, in hutting money and compensation for losses sustained by fire, which are of constant occurrence.

24. Above all, let it be our aim to keep the troops together, and to avoid cantoning them any where near towns and cities belonging to native princes.

25. These should be made to take care of themselves, and in case of any opposition to the wishes of Government, we can throw such a body of troops into the country as to render opposition futile.

26. By the adoption of some such plan as is herein set forth, I think no great additional expense will be entailed upon Government. The Sind division will be abolished, but Mhow, Neemuch, and Nusseerabad should be formed into one. The first class commands at Nusseerabad and Hyderabad will lapse, the latter altogether, and the former becoming a second class. The Candish brigade command would fall to Sattara, the Baroda command be transferred to Surat or Broach, the smaller command merging into a brigade at Chandore or Nassick, and brigadiers will be required for Mhow, Sholapore and Neemuch; but the advantage will be in the perfect security of the State, and thus these remarks may not be thought unworthy of consideration.

I mention Surat or Broach as a station, because between it and Ahmedabad, Baroda is checked. Broach appears to be a fine situation; Surat being considered unhealthy.

Colonel Green.

DISTRIBUTION of the BOMBAY ARMY, as proposed by the Adjutant-General.

Corps.	Artillery.			Cavalry.			Sappers		Infantry.	
	Horse Artillery	Field Battery.	Reserve Companies	European.	Native Regular.	Irregular	European Companies.	Native Companies.	English.	Native.
Poona	2			1			2	4	1½	2
Belgaum		1							2	1
Satara		1							1	1
Ahmednugger		2								1
Chandore or Nasick		1							1	1
Bombay		1							1½	4
Sholapore					1					1
Surat or Broach		1							1	1
Ahmedabad						1		1	1	1
Deesa	1	1		1					1	1
Nusseerabad		2	1	1				1	1	1
Neemuch		1		1					1	1
Mhow	1	2	1	1			1	2	1	2
Asseerghur			1							1
Rajkote		1							2	2
Kurrachee		1						1	1	1
Aden			2						½	1
Total	5	18	9	4	3	3	4	12	16	30

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

N.B. This distribution refers only to stations within the limits of the Bombay presidency.

(No. 9,968.)

From Col. GREEN to Major-Gen. R. I. H. BIRCH, C.B.

Adjutant-General's Office,
Head Quarters, Poona, Dec. 16, 1858.

SIR, I HAVE the honor to enclose my replies to the series of questions under the head "Cavalry," viz., "the recruiting and composition of corps," "rules of discipline and military code," "organization, promotion, and rewards," and "European officers;" and to intimate that my replies to other series will follow in due course.

I have, &c.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General.

IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army is composed?

Men from Hindoostan proper, chiefly from Rohilcund and the neighbourhood of Delhi and Furruckabad; from the Mahrattas of the Deccan, the Rohillas of Hyderabad (Deccan), and indeed of most races, castes, and tribes in India.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

Answered above.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army either by the regulations or the practice of the service?

Not that I am aware of.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

Not that I am aware of.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

That of commanding officers, who, until lately (since the mutinies), have been entirely unrestricted in this respect.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of the district?

None, that I am aware of.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

None, that I am aware of.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

Partiality towards any particular race, tribe, or caste should be avoided; but beyond this commanding officers should act upon their own discretion.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

There is no oath used.

10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

There is no form.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army when first enrolled?

There is no oath.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bombay army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

I think not. I advocate general enlistment from all districts and of all kinds of men, guided only by fitness to bear arms.

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bombay army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

Answered above.

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army be homogeneous as to race or caste?

All idea of caste should be excluded from the army. A man enlists for a soldier, and he should rest content to know that his commanding officer will at all times respect his prejudices, and never employ him in any degrading occupation. I have always found the best caste men the most easily managed.

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army be composed of ressalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

Composed of ressalahs, every man being placed therein by his commanding officer in the position which it is supposed he is best qualified to fill.

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

So that one should not predominate over the other. The greater the mixture the better. I think this should not be lost sight of, for a mass of people of one race, tribe, or caste are very likely to be of one mind, especially in matters of caste.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

That of commanding officers alone.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

None whatever. The commanding officer should make his own arrangements.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bombay army?

Certainly not. The less Europeans and natives are mixed up together the better. The British troops should be distinct corps; the native troops also distinct.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry, and subject to periodical relief?

Answered above.

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

Answered above.

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

Answered above.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?

Answered above.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army be armed?

With the old pattern curved dragoon sword and breech-loading carbine.

25. Do the dress and equipments of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army admit of improvement? If so, state them?

The dress and equipments, as at present, are most complete, and exactly what they should be.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

Articles of war are not used in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay presidency.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

The assimilation would not answer. Discipline is maintained in the irregular corps by commanding officers, who are magistrates. Except in extreme cases, the cases are settled by punchayets, approved and confirmed by commanding officers.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

In the irregular cavalry the men are not tried by courts-martial, except on special occasions.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

There is no military code for the guidance of the men of the irregular cavalry. The men enter the service on the understanding that they subject themselves to the custom of the regiment under the system of punchayets and the orders of their commanding officer.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

There are no articles of war to read. I can form no idea of the number of men who can read and write, but the number must be considerable.

I may here remark, that in this presidency there are three corps of irregular cavalry, viz., the Poona horse, the Sind horse (three regiments), and the Southern Mahratta horse (two regiments). The con-

stitution of these regiments is much the same; but the Mahratta horse are largely recruited from the district the name of which they bear. The Poona and Sind horse are mostly Hindoostanees, men from Rohilkund and the neighbourhood of Delhi; while in the former regiment are also many men from the Hyderabad (Deccan) districts. In both these corps there is also a fair sprinkling of Mahrattas.

The system in these three corps is not the same, and it is difficult, therefore, to write of them conjointly.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

I have reason to believe that the system observed in the regular army is also carried out in the irregular corps, viz., that merit, combined with seniority, leads to promotion.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

Very much so, indeed. Having so much actual command over their men, and being selected for intelligence, they are naturally useful and efficient.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

Naturally so, as they are selected from among the troopers.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

The practice, I believe, differs in the several corps. I am aware that in the Sind horse examinations are made before advancement.

5. Has it been found on occasion of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

In this respect the conduct of the irregular cavalry has been a pattern. Mutiny and sedition have been rare where the Sind and Southern Mahratta horse have been serving, but the fidelity of the men has been unquestionable, and the native officers have nobly supported the Government and obeyed and sided with their officers on all occasions. The Poona horse has not been so much in the way of these disturbances, but detachments of the corps have acted against the rebels with alacrity and determination.

6. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

The pension list has much influence naturally in attaching men to the service; but I cannot say that this has effected the fidelity which has marked the irregular cavalry of this presidency.

7. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

The system should be maintained, but it requires modification.

8. What is the charge upon the finances of the Bombay presidency on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry?

I cannot say.

9. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Alteration is not required, and promotion is obtained by merit and efficiency, combined with seniority,

Colonel Green.

Colonel Green.

10. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

They are perfectly fit to take any duty of this kind.

11. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

There should be four officers in each regiment, viz. :—

1. A commandant.
2. A second in command.
3. Quartermaster and paymaster.
4. Adjutant, with the usual medical staff.

12. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular, and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

I imagine the irregular cavalry, for the reason that the *ressaldars*, *naib ressaldrs*, &c., are indeed native officers. There is more dash in the service, and the men are less troubled with watering parades, unlimited stables, pipe-clay, and regulations, which are very hard upon the regular cavalry troopers.

13. If irregular corps of cavalry have native commissioned officers, and regular corps of native cavalry have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the high pay to the troopers and non-commissioned officers of the regular cavalry be an equivalent to the absence of commissioned grades, and draw as good recruits to the regular as the contrary system will draw to the irregular corps?

The absence of commissioned officers cannot be compensated for by any amount of good-service pay or pension. The service would no longer be sought after, and the regiment soon cease to exist from want of recruits.

14. Is it advisable to keep up regular native cavalry in the Bombay army? Would the substitution of irregular cavalry be as efficient, and less costly?

I would not keep up the regular native cavalry. No body of men could be more regular or efficient than the *Sind* horse. The difference of cost I cannot state, but I imagine a regiment of regular cavalry must be very costly. Its superiority to the irregulars is questionable; and, under existing regulations, a corps of *silladar* cavalry would make several marches before the "regulars" could be provided with carriage. The substitution is very desirable.

15. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bombay army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?

The whole should be placed on the footing of the *Sind* horse.

16. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bombay army are mounted?

About rupees 500 each.

17. Whence are the horses obtained, and of what breeds are they?

From the remount agent, a few from *Kattywar* and *Kutch*, also by regimental purchase.

The breeds are Arab, Persian, *Heratta*, *Kattywar*, and a few country breeds.

18. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bombay presidency draw its horses?

Generally from the neighbourhood of its own headquarters. The *Sind* horse from *Arrat*, *Beloochistan*, and the *Punjab*. The *Poona* horse use the Bombay market, the *Bheemthurree*, and other districts. The

Southern Mahratta horse mostly from the surrounding country.

19. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay presidency?

No average can be given. The mutiny has caused an enormous rise in prices; and in the *Deccan*, the *Poona* and *Southern Mahratta* irregular horse have been placed in difficulties to mount themselves.

20. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bombay army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

Formerly, fully so. The mutiny caused a difficulty at one time, and we have largely imported from the *Cape* and *Australia*. By judicious management at the colonies, at *Bombay*, and *Kurrachee* we should command any number of horses of the best kinds.

21. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bombay presidency?

I think we should annually, at the proper season, import a certain number of horses from the *Cape* and *Australia*. This would give vitality to the markets in those colonies, improve our mounted corps, and make us somewhat independent of Indian, Persian, and Arab dealers, who now have us at their mercy. We should have remount agents at the most suitable places, and these, acting in concert, would soon place the supply on a very satisfactory footing.

22. Is it advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies for a supply of horses for the army of India?

I doubt if studs will ever be profitable to Government. I think the dealers should be the stud-keepers; but my knowledge of these matters is so slight, that my opinion can carry no weight with it.

23. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bombay army?

In the *Sind* horse, rupees 30 per mensem for man and horse; in the *Poona* and *Southern Mahratta* horse, rupees 25.

24. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign?

On the frontier of *Sind* men and horses are kept thoroughly efficient for rupees 30 a month. In the *Deccan* rupees 25 a month are not sufficient; the men are in great distress, and the sooner this subject is inquired into the better. All must depend upon where the campaign is before the latter part of the question can be satisfactorily answered.

25. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army been embarrassed by debt or free from debt?

This subject has occupied much attention, and I believe the irregular cavalry is free from debt.

26. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

I would advise a consideration of the question, which is very pressing. *Sind* is now a cheap country, the *Deccan* very dear. I quite understand the difficulty of fluctuations of pay, but a horseman in the *Deccan* cannot support himself and horse efficiently on rupees 25 a month. The pay should be liberal, to ensure efficiency and to induce the landed proprietors to seek employment in these corps.

27. What is the system of the irregular cavalry with respect to *assamees*, and the market value of the *assamee*? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests,

or not? Are they favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

I believe there is a difference in the several corps. Assamees are sold by auction to the highest bidder, under the sanction of the commanding officer. The number of the assamees is restricted, and no man out of the corps is allowed to hold one. I advocate a restriction in the number of assamees to be held by any one individual; but in all these matters much must depend upon the commanding officers, who, if "selected," will not permit inefficiency either in horses or equipment, and the conduct of the duty.

28. What is the pay of mounted police in the Bombay presidency?

I cannot answer the question definitely, as I believe the pay varies in the several districts.

29. What is the organization of the mounted police of the Bombay presidency?

I cannot answer this question, as the police are purely civil corps.

30. Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the Bombay presidency composed?

I cannot answer this question.

31. How is the mounted police recruited; that is, what is the agency employed, the precautions taken before or by the local authorities in entertaining men?

The police are entirely under the civil authorities; and I have no information before me.

32. Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police at rupees per mensem been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?

I cannot answer this question.

33. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

I do not know; but existing circumstance, caused by high rates, press hard upon the irregular horse in the Deccan, that the men are in great difficulty to mount themselves properly.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of the light cavalry in the Bombay army or of irregular cavalry been increased or diminished?

In the regular cavalry the power of commanding officers has been much diminished.

Commanders of irregular cavalry being magistrates, their awards do not often come under cognizance at army head-quarters, and I think they remain much the same.

2. During the above period have the powers of officers commanding troops of the regular native cavalry of the Bombay army been increased or diminished?

Troop officers have much the same power as formerly.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the light cavalry and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

In the regular cavalry, as in the infantry, the system of centralization has done harm by teaching the soldier to look beyond his commanding officer. I know that the system is full of mischief, but to carry out what is necessary would involve a total change of the organization of our regiments, and I do not know that my opinion is required. I think that I am to answer only the questions as they are set down as concisely as possible.

4. What is the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of officers in charge of troops? Colonel Green.

The result is that endless references are made to head-quarters, to general officers and brigadiers, which the commanding officer should have full authority to decide. A selected officer well knows the extent to which he should exert his authority, and when to make a reference. A thorough reform is wanted in these matters.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps; upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops, and in command of corps of regular and irregular cavalry?

Upon the character and conduct of the officers of a regiment. Everything must depend upon this. Under well selected officers and a good system, a native corps can be made to do anything. Nothing can be expected from that in force at present, where every officer is striving his utmost to obtain employment elsewhere, and a number of idle English gentlemen are doing what should be the duty of native officers.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

I would much increase the power of commanding officers, and leave them to delegate to those under them such authority as might be considered expedient.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

Magisterial powers should be granted to commanding officers; they should have much power to punish and reward, to promote, enlist, and discharge; the promotion and dismissal of the native officers being subject to the sanction of the commander-in-chief, appeal in all cases being open to brigadiers and general officers in command.

8. Has the strength of the light cavalry and irregular cavalry been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

No military bodies should be employed in any but the duty of soldiers. In times of peace the soldiers should be trained to war.

9. Would it have been practicable to employ the light and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army otherwise, without injury to its horses and discipline?

do not know what other duty can be required of soldiers. To divert them from their legitimate work is to employ an expensive material in a very unprofitable manner. The Poona horse has been much injured by performing police duty.

10. If native regular cavalry be kept up with a full complement of European officers, would you attach cavalry cadets at once to native corps, or for a time to dragoon corps?

Cavalry cadets are much better doing duty with native corps.

With the English regiments they would imbibe prejudices against the natives, which are not easily eradicated.

11. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

There is no difficulty in making a selection from such a service as the Indian army. Peculiar fitness and merit should guide the selection, and commanding officers should choose their subordinates.

One or two officers should be selected to do duty with these corps, and be thus trained for permanent appointment.

Colonel Green.

12. Is the efficiency of the corps of regular cavalry in the Bombay army affected by the number of officers taken away from their corps for staff employment?

There are but few officers of the regular cavalry corps on the staff.

The superiority of their pay and allowances prevents the inducement for any ex-regimental employment but that of a superior character.

13. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?

There has been no mutiny in our regular cavalry regiments. A few disaffected men were in the 2d cavalry, but their designs were exposed by men of the regiment.

The 2d cavalry was strong in officers, but I have no idea that mere numbers have anything to do with the fidelity or discipline of a corps; quality and not number is what is required.

14. In the event of irregular cavalry being the only native cavalry maintained in the Indian armies, how should the officers of the regular native cavalry be employed; with European dragoon corps raised for service in India, or with the irregular cavalry substituted for the regular?

With European dragoons raised for service in India.

15. Of what strength should the corps of European dragoons raised for service in India be; that is, the aggregate force of European dragoons being fixed, should it be divided into corps of 400 sabres, or corps of 800 sabres, or of any other number, with a view to effectively meeting the requirements of the service?

In my opinion, 500 dragoons are as many as any one man can command properly in action; that number would make a very efficient regiment.

16. If corps of the strength of 400 sabres were preferred, would the same number of European officers as are now attached to corps of native regular cavalry suffice, and could the officers be thus rendered available?

The officers of the present three regiments could be drafted to two dragoon corps, which should be raised for service under this presidency; all in excess of a captain and two subalterns per troop being absorbed as casualties occur. In this I do not allude to the field officers, the number of which should be as in the royal regiments in India.

17. Is the system of formation in double ranks as well suited to European cavalry in India as the system advocated by many British and foreign officers of experience, viz., that cavalry should form and manœuvre in single rank? Please to state at length the grounds upon which your opinion is based.

I have not the experience on which to give an opinion on this point; but I think the single rank formation preferable, as being less liable to disorder, and the great principle of "supports" in cavalry tactics being so much easier attainable.

18. Assuming the single rank system to be desirable in India, of what strength should each corps be?

As I have said before, of 500 men, as this number leaves a good body of cavalry; counting for guards and sick.

19. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

The organization of the two should be quite distinct, as must be that of Europeans and natives.

European and native regiments work well together in brigade; but I would not advocate irregular horse being attached to European dragoons. The connexion will never answer.

20. If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

Answered above.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

From Colonel E. GREEN, C.B., to Major-General BIRCH, C.B.

Head-Quarters, Poona,
December 14, 1858.

SIR, ADVERTING to your letter, dated Allahabad, 27th November 1858, I have the honor to transmit my replies to the questions relative to recruiting, composition, organization, and discipline obtaining in the light cavalry of the Bombay army.

2. The remaining series I shall do myself the honor of forwarding without loss of time.

I have, &c.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

LIGHT CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the light cavalry of the Bombay army is composed?

Chiefly of Hindoostanees, Mahomedans, and Hindoos, with a small number of Mahrattas and men of the Madras presidency. The castes are generally superior to those taken in the native infantry regiments.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

Principally from Hindoostan, Oude, and the Doab, between the Jumna and Ganges.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the light cavalry of the Bombay army, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bombay army?

I am not aware that exclusion is practised, but the men of the cavalry regiments are, as above observed, of a higher caste, more Brahmins and Rajpoots, than in our native infantry regiments.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the light cavalry of the Bombay army, if that branch of the service be continued?

I think not. The cavalry officers are anxious to enlist men of all castes and tribes; but the service is not popular with many of the races, Rajpoots of Rajpootana, &c., and the Hindoostanees are in much esteem in the light cavalry.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the native regular or light cavalry of the Bombay army?

The agency of commanding officers, under the general rules of enlistment observed in this presidency, alike for artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the light cavalry of the Bombay army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

The regulations on this subject will be found in Bombay G.G.O., No. 539, 5th July 1855 (Jameson's Code, section xlvi., article 214, *et infra*, page 182, 3d Appendix), but they do not apply to men enlisted beyond presidency limits.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

None. The matter is left entirely to the commanding officer.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

It would, I think, be a wise precaution to prevent an undue proportion of any race, tribe, or caste being enlisted, as is now the case in the light cavalry; but beyond the promulgation of certain rules on this point, the commanding officer should be free and responsible for his enlistment.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

"I, A.B., private in the regiment, do swear that I will not abandon these colours, but always defend them to the utmost of my power, and that wherever I am ordered to go, I will march there; I will implicitly obey all the orders of my commanders, and in everything behave myself as becomes a good soldier and faithful servant of the Company; and failing in any part of my duty as such, I will submit to the penalties described in the articles of war, which have been read to me."

10. How long has this form been in use in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

To the best of my knowledge, it has not been altered since regiments of light cavalry were raised.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the light cavalry of the Bombay army when first enrolled?

No, I cannot. I hold it to be of no use, and I would abolish it altogether. No oath will bind a man who desires to break it.

12. Should the light cavalry corps of the Bombay army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

I think not. Our cavalry corps are enlisted for general service, and go anywhere. In many districts in India the natives have a peculiar dislike to go far from their homes.

13. Or should the light cavalry corps of the Bombay army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

Without reference to districts. I would as far as possible recruit the cavalry regiments in the same manner as the infantry, from all castes, tribes, and races, guided only by fitness for service.

14. Should the corps of light cavalry of the Bombay army be homogeneous as to race or caste?

Certainly not. I have replied to this in answer to question 13.

15. Should the corps of light cavalry of the Bombay army be composed of troops or squadrons, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

All mixed together, without reference to anything but the man's fitness for the place he occupies in the regiment.

16. If the corps of light cavalry of the Bombay army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

I do not see that any proportions can be prescribed. The general rule of the service should be to enlist men of all races, tribes, and castes, undue preponderance being allowed to none. Commanding officers should be held responsible that this be carried out.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting? Colonel Green.

Every commanding officer should be held responsible for the proper enlistment of his regiment, under the general rules above alluded to. No further agency is required.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

These have been adverted to in reply to query 6. The precautions appear good, and should be acted upon throughout India generally.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the light corps of cavalry of the Bombay army?

By no means.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?

Answered above.

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

Answered above.

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

Answered above.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?

Answered above.

24. How should the light cavalry of the Bombay army be armed?

With the old dragoon curved sword and breech-loading carbine.

25. Has any advantage been derived from the dress and equipments of the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bombay army being assimilated to those of the European dragoon?

None, that I know of. In this matter, by tight clothing and pipe-clay the light cavalry regiments have been almost spoiled; but nothing should be said against this service after the splendid conduct in the field of the 3d regiment, under Major Forbes and his gallant officers, in Persia and Central India.

26. How should the light cavalry of the Bombay army be dressed and equipped, with a view to the efficiency and comfort of the native trooper?

In Kilmarnock forage cap; shell jacket, coming well down over the hips, or short tunic; cloth overalls; clothes fitting loosely, that the man may freely use his arms and legs.

Old pattern dragoon sword, curved blade, and light breech-loading carbine.

Shortly, I would observe that all native cavalry should be modelled after the Scinde horse. As a service, the native regular cavalry is a mistake, and should be abolished.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

No. I think articles of war are of no use in the native army; a few plain regulations may be necessary, but the system in the irregular branch of the service works better. A punchayet does not require articles of war.

Colonel Green,

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

The assimilation will not answer. Under *selected* officers in regiments the native officers will maintain discipline without the special rules, which stand between the men and those whom they should look up to in all things.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

Yes; it works well according to regulation, and habit has become second nature; but I am convinced that the system spoils the native soldier, who should look to his commanding officer in all things. Much could be written on this subject. A constant change of commanders causes a want of confidence in the men, and the object of most European officers is to get away from the regiment as soon as possible.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Bombay light cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

The articles of war are read to them periodically on parade.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the Bombay light cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

I should think about two-thirds can read and write; some well, some indifferently.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the light cavalry of the Bombay army what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

Seniority combined with merit, the latter being a *sine quâ non*.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the light cavalry of the Bombay army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

Very much so, indeed.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

Being selected from among the troopers, their acquirements are naturally higher.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

I cannot answer this positively, not being intimately acquainted with the interior working of the system of promotion in the cavalry. A trooper's life is always one of test and examination, and he would not be promoted unless he was deserving.

5. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer? Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers?

It strengthens the influence of the European officer, especially if the troop native officers be men of character, because, notwithstanding their position, the British officer is still the judge between them; the dispenser of justice, honor, and reward. With a full complement of European officers, the efficiency of the native commissioned officer is overshadowed and kept in the background.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

Generally speaking, yes; very much so. In the 2d cavalry, one native officer behaved ill, and was tried. In the mutiny of the Bengal troops at Nusserabad, the native officers of the 1st lancers, and all the men, with the exception of a few, sided with the British officers, and after an ineffectual attempt to capture the guns, which were held by the mutineers, the regiment marched from the cantonment in perfect order, leaving families and all their property. Considering that two regiments of native infantry and a battery of artillery mutinied on this occasion, the conduct of the 1st cavalry was excellent, for the men are almost all Hindoostanees.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

Continued.

8. Is the substitution of a European serjeant and corporal to each troop of light or regular corps of cavalry in lieu of its native commissioned officers advisable?

Very inadvisable.

9. If the abolition of the grades of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the native trooper, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after special periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

No good-service pay or retiring pension could compensate for the abolition of the native commissioned grades; such a measure would soon effectually abolish the native army, as enlistment would cease.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

Doubtless the pension list has proved a strong hold upon the army; I always believed the strongest, but recent events have showed that it has not been effectual.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

The pension list is a wise and just system. The present regulation might perhaps be modified with advantage.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the Bombay presidency on account of military pensions to the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

Rupees 89,982. 14. 0 per annum, or rupees 7,498 9. 2. per mensem, as nearly as can be ascertained.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Promotion for merit and efficiency is the rule under the Bombay presidency, therefore alteration is not required.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

Yes; and they have done their duty well as members of the courts-martial during the present eventful period.

15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

I think so; and superior to the general average of serjeants and corporals.

16. What is the best organization for native corps of regular cavalry?

1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades, as well as with European officers; or,
2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades; or,
3. Be officered like corps of irregular cavalry, viz., with a full complement of native commissioned officers, but with only three or four European officers?

I have before stated that a number of European officers are not required with native regiments, as they should be constituted. A native regiment should have a commandant, a second in command, an adjutant, and a paymaster, quartermaster and interpreter; all other officers are superfluous, and there should be no idle British officers. The pay of the subadars and jemedars should be increased. Commissions held out to the native gentry as an inducement to them to enter the army, and the native officers held responsible for their troops in all situations, as the British officers are now. With four selected English officers, intrusted with much power, supported by selected native officers, and modifications of pay, rendered necessary by the altered conditions of the times, the cavalry regiments might be made very efficient; but as I have before remarked, native regular cavalry is a mistake, and should be abolished.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

I would place all the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army on the model of the Scinde horse.

An intimate acquaintance with those regiments for 18 years convinces me that they are as near perfection as possible.

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular, and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference? Colonel Green.

The classes are different; in the regular cavalry the men are mostly Hindoos, from Oude; in the irregular cavalry Mahomedans, from Rohilkund and the neighbourhood of Delhi. The regular cavalry is not popular, and recruits are not easily obtained. The irregular branch of the service is preferred, because their native officers are officers indeed, and there is more dash in the service altogether.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant General, Bombay Army.

December 10, 1858.

(No. 9988.)

From Colonel GREEN to Major-Gen. R. I. H. BIRCH,
C.B.

SIR, Head-Quarters, Poona, Dec. 17, 1858.

In continuation of previous correspondence on the same subject, I have the honour to enclose my replies to the series of questions on the subject of engineer soldiers or sappers and miners.

I have, &c.

EDMUND GREEN, Col.,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

ENGINEER SOLDIERS OR SAPPERS AND MINERS.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND THE COMPOSITION.

1. What is the present constitution of the corps of sappers and miners of the Bombay army as respects the European and the native elements?

	Europeans.						Natives.						Establishment				Artificers.														
	Non-Commissioned.						Com-missioned.		Non-Effective.		Non-Com-missioned.		Rank and File.		Pundit.	Hospital Assistants.	Hospital Apprentices.	Bazaar Chowdry.	Bazaar Peons.	Masonry Carpenter.	Masonry Smith.	Carpenters.	Smiths.	Hammermen.	Bellows Boys.	Masons.	Tinman.				
Warrant Officer.	Sergeant-Major.	Quartermaster Sergeant.	Sergeants.	1st Corporals.	2d Corporals.	Subedar Major.	Subedars.	Jemedars.	Pay Havildars.	Drill Havildars.	Drill Naique.	Bugle Major.	Havildars.	Naiques.														Privates.	Buglers.	Bheestees.	Recruit Boys.
Corps	1	1	10	10	10	1	4	5	5	1	1	1	14	39	500	9	10	12	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	5	5	6	6	6	1
Per company			2	2	2		1	1	1				4	8	100	2	2									1	1	1	1	1	

2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native sappers and miners of the Bombay army are composed?

Much the same as the native infantry; of all kinds and castes, from the Brahmin to the Parsee among the Hindoos; Syeds, Pathans, and Shaiks among the Mahomedans; Jews and Christians, a small number only.

3. What districts are the races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

From Hindoostan, the Deccan, and Concan, the Nizam's country, Guzerat, and Madras.

4. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment either by the regulations or practice of the Bombay army?

None have been excluded by regulation or practice. Mangs and Dhers are not represented in the ranks of the native army generally, their enlistment being obviously objectionable, and they never present themselves as soldiers.

5. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of en-

listment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the sappers and miners?

Not that I am aware of.

6. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits?

That of the commanding officer.

7. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?

The regulation on this subject will be found in Bombay G. G. O., No. 539, 5th July 1855, Jameson's Code, section xlv., article 214, *et infra*, page 182, 3d Appendix. but they do not apply to men enlisted beyond presidency limits.

8. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of, sepoys or the followers of the corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

None. The matter is left entirely to the commanding officer.

Colonel Green.

9. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition and efficiency of the engineer soldiers ?

The recruiting regulations do not require alterations ; but the pay of the sappers should be increased to make the corps efficient, for the service is not popular by reason of the hard work required from the soldiers.

10. What are the words of the oath administered to the engineer recruit on his entering the ranks of the sappers and miners ?

"I swear, in the presence of Almighty* God, that I will never desert my regiment, that I will obey every order of my officer to the best of my ability, that I will go wherever I am ordered, whether it be in India or in a foreign country, and that I will act in every particular as becomes a good soldier and faithful servant of Government ; and should I commit any offence as regards any point of my duty, then I will submit to whatever punishments are laid down in the articles of war which have been read before me."

11. How long has this form been in use in the Bombay sappers and miners ?

The above form has been in use in the corps for above 13 (thirteen) years.

12. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered, or do you think an oath useless ? Would you substitute any form of covenant or engagement ?

I think the oath useless. I would substitute a form of covenant or engagement, to which the recruit should subscribe his name or mark in the presence of witnesses at the time of enlistment.

13. Should the companies of engineer soldiers be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste, or be composite, and have them mixed up, and if composite, in what proportion should the different classes enter ?

Composite, and as much mixed as possible. The proportions must depend upon the numbers of the different classes offering for enlistment ; but if possible no one caste should predominate over another.

14. What agency should be employed for recruiting ?

That of the commanding officer alone, who should be held responsible in all respects for the proper enlistment of the corps.

15. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality ?

Nothing more is required than those alluded to in my reply to Query 7.

16. Has the recruiting of native engineer soldiers been hitherto from unskilled men, and is it practicable in the Bombay presidency, with reference to the habits and qualities, moral and physical, of the people, to adopt to any extent the system of the royal sappers and miners, by enlisting artificers and recruits conversant with some trade or special kind of labor ?

Yes, it has. There would be no possibility of enlisting artificers without increasing the rates of pay. Anything like skilled labor in India now obtains far higher wages than what enlistment holds forth.

17. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for hard labour and service in India with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate companies, or mixed up throughout the companies ?

I think this would be inexpedient and unnecessary

* For Hindoos, "Bhugwan;" for Jews, Christians, and Mussulmans, "Khooda."

were a scientific corps like the sappers placed in the position as regards pay that it should hold in comparison with the "line."

18. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries for engineer soldiers, which are the countries and races to be preferred ?

I would infinitely prefer our East India soldiers properly organized and suitably paid. The extreme dearth of all articles of consumption now existing causes the rates of pay to be insufficient to provide for the wants of a native soldier with a family.

19. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting ?

I am quite certain that recruiting in the manner alluded to would not answer, and cause a distrust and dislike of our rule among the natives of India, for which nothing could compensate.

20. Are the native engineer soldiers in sufficient strength for the requirements of service in the field ?

The corps of sappers and miners is insufficient for the duty it has to perform.

21. Is there any reason why all native infantry should not be trained to the ordinary work in the execution of trenches, and be taught much now confined in general to sappers and miners ?

This should be as much a part of the infantry soldier's training as the manual and platoon exercise.

22. Is any portion of the native infantry of the army of the Bombay presidency accustomed to work in the execution of trenches, batteries, &c., and is the work done willingly ?

The men are not accustomed to this work when in garrison. In the field they do what they are ordered, and willingly.

23. Has the sufficiency or insufficiency of the engineer soldiers of the Bombay army, noted by you, reference to the peculiar aptitude, or the reverse, of the native infantry of the line, or is your opinion based purely on the fair engineer wants of the service, irrespective of considerations connected with the efficiency of the line in siege and field works ?

Purely on the fair engineer wants of the service, irrespective of any other considerations.

24. Have the sappers and miners of the Bombay army as many European sappers and miners, non-commissioned officers and privates, as is desirable ?

The European non-commissioned officers attached to the native sappers, at the rate of six per company, are of little or no use as regards the military efficiency of the corps, though they serve to supply overseers to the department of public works.

25. How many European sappers and miners, and of what grades, should be attached to a company of native sappers and miners ?

I think it undesirable to attach European non-commissioned officers to the native companies of sappers. Few of them understand the management of natives, who work best under their own native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, if these are properly selected men. European non-commissioned officers are attached to the native sappers under present arrangement, but only nominally. They have nothing to do with the interior economy of the native companies, and at head-quarters live separately, have separate rules and duties, forming a distinct body, which they should be.

26. Are you aware of any advantage which accrues from making the dress of the native sappers and miners closely resemble that of the European infantry ?

The advantage is that it preserves uniformity. There is nothing disadvantageous in the dress if it be

made to fit loosely, and white lace or tape and pipe-clay be abolished.

27. How are the Bombay sappers and miners armed?

With two-grooved rifles and bayonet swords.

28. How should the engineer soldiers of the Bombay army be dressed and armed?

Dress: Kilmarnock forage cap, tunic and trowsers, as now ordered. Arms: Rifled carbine, as used by the royal engineers.

29. What proportion of the Bombay sappers and miners can read and write their own vernacular?

About 14 per cent. can read and write with facility. About 20 per cent. can read and write a little.

30. What proportion can understand or speak English, or read and write English?

About 4 per cent. can read and write English, and speak it with more or less fluency. About 6 per cent. understand it a little.

31. Besides practice in sapping and mining and field operations, have the Bombay sappers and miners any schooling?

All native non-commissioned officers are required to attend the school, when off duty, for three hours daily. In school they are taught elementary fortification and field works, simple plan drawing, arithmetic, and the preparation of office returns. The attendance of recruits is enforced; that of privates optional.

32. Do you consider that they are to be classed as skilled engineer soldiers?

No; but they are a useful body of men, who will turn their hands to almost anything. The men are so much detached on civil works that they have a smattering of most things without a thorough knowledge of any.

33. With reference to the numerous demands for skilled European overseers and subordinates in the department of public works, and to military acquirements, is it advisable to have, in addition to native, a corps of European sappers and miners; if so, of what strength, and how officered?

I think so, decidedly. There should be a battalion of European sappers and miners, to consist of six companies, and officered from the corps of engineers.

34. Could the corps of Bombay engineers furnish the requisite number of officers?

Certainly not.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war in use in the Bombay army?

No, I cannot. I think they are quite useless in native corps, and they are unintelligible to the men.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

A few standing rules may be adopted. The assimilation with those in the British army is unnecessary with native troops.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bombay army?

Yes; practice has made perfect. But except for high crimes and misdemeanors, I would have no courts-martial in the native army; only punchayets.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native sappers and miners of the Bombay army with the military code under which they serve?

They are read in portions to the men periodically after the muster parade.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS. Colonel Green.

1. What is the system of promotion in the Bombay sappers and miners; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

Merit and seniority combined.

2. Are the native officers of the Bombay sappers and miners generally of that intelligence and efficiency which renders them useful in the field?

When well selected they are very much so.

3. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

The practice has been to recommend no havildar for promotion to native officer who has not passed the examination for promotion to havildar.

4. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the sappers and miners from among whom they have risen?

Necessarily so, as they are selected from the most efficient of the sappers.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officer and his men weaken the influence of the European officer?

On the contrary; the European officer is necessarily the arbiter between the two. Generally speaking, the native officer has but small power in the native army, except in the case of one of much personal influence, either of caste or character.

6. Has it been found on the occurrence of mutinies that the native officers of sappers and miners gave timely information, or were of use in aiding the European officers to maintain discipline? Have they sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

There has been no mutiny in the sappers.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the Bombay sappers and miners?

Certainly continued.

8. When the European non-commissioned officers of sappers come upon duty with the native commissioned officers, do the native commissioned officers or the European non-commissioned officers command in the absence of any European commissioned officers?

It is the rule of the army of the Bombay presidency that no native commissioned officer can be commanded by a non-commissioned officer.

9. Is the substitution of a full complement of European serjeants and corporals of sappers and miners to each company, in lieu of its native officers, advisable?

In my opinion, very inadvisable.

10. If the abolition of the grades of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the native sappers, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

Under such a system, in my opinion, anything like an efficient native army would soon cease to exist.

11. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

They are a great bond, there cannot be a doubt. Events have shown that they have not been effectual. The movers of this wonderful mutiny have shaken the belief of the men in the stability of the pensions even.

Colonel Green.

12. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or abolished?

Certainly maintained. The system may be modified with advantage.

13. If native commissioned officers are retained, should the system of promotion generally by seniority be altered, and promotion by merit and efficiency be the rule?

The rule in the Bombay army is promotion by merit and efficiency, combined with seniority.

14. Are native commissioned officers of sappers and miners generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

Quite fit.

15. Are the native commissioned officers of sappers and miners on a par in professional intelligence and efficiency with the European non-commissioned officers and privates of the sappers and miners?

I think not. The European non-commissioned officers of sappers are specially trained in England for this scientific corps, and are selected for intelligence and efficiency.

16. What is your opinion of the system of appointing officers of the native infantry to the command of companies of native sappers and miners? Does it work well with the engineer soldiers, and is it advantageous as training to the European officers nominated to the duty?

As an emergency it may be very useful, but engineer officers should command engineer soldiers. To the infantry European officers so attached it is very advantageous, making them proficient in other duties than those peculiar to them. But all must depend upon the individual character of the officer.

17. Has the distinct organization, and the differences of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies proved favorable to our power in India?

I think this has proved the saving of the Indian empire. Had the organization, system, regulations, and component races of the armies of the three presidencies been one and the same, it cannot be doubted that the mutiny would have been general throughout India.

18. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate Governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

The races to be met with in the continent of India are as dissimilar in many respects as are the races of Europe. The attempt at assimilation should not be made. Armies and regiments must be raised from the surrounding population, to avoid the inconvenience and difficulty of gathering the material from a distance. Besides, this is not necessary. Everywhere there are abundance of men of all races, castes, and tribes. We should avoid being exclusive, and every man capable of bearing arms who presents himself should be enlisted without respect to caste. I think the amalgamation of the three armies would be impossible.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of sappers and miners increased or diminished in the Bombay army?

The powers of all commanding officers of native troops have been much diminished within my experience.

2. During the above period, have the powers of officers of companies been increased or diminished?

They are much the same now as they were before.

3. Has the discipline of the Bombay sappers and miners been influenced by the above causes?

I do not know that it has. The men are willing and obedient. But the system of looking beyond commanding officers is bad, and has been caused by the centralization of power in the superior officers, army head-quarters, and Government. All this causes constant references, and discipline is maintained more by pen and ink than the legitimate influence of commanding officers.

4. Upon what does the discipline of a body of sappers and miners mainly depend during a campaign? Upon the distinct authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the corps?

In times of difficulty and danger the discipline of all soldiers must depend upon the influence of the regimental officers. No distant authority can then avail.

5. Should the powers of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?

Under the system of selected officers, which I have all through these papers recommended as essential to the well-being of a native regiment, the power of a commanding officer should be almost unlimited, and he should be the judge of how much should be delegated to his subordinates.

6. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of the discipline and efficiency of the Bombay sappers and miners?

I do not know that I can make any suggestion peculiar to the sappers and miners to improve their discipline and efficiency. The pay of these men should be looked to, as it is insufficient. The native officers should be better paid. Times have changed much in the last 30 years, but our native army is much the same now as it was then.

EDWARD GREEN, Col.,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Head-quarters, Poona, Dec. 18, 1858.

(No. 10,031.)

From Col. GREEN to Maj.-Gen. R. I. BIRCH, C.B.

Head-Quarters, Poona,

December 18, 1858.

SIR,

IN continuation of correspondence on the same subject, I have the honor to enclose my replies to the series of questions on the subject of artillery.

I have, &c.,

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

ARTILLERY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF THE ARTILLERY.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Bombay artillery are composed?

Principally men from the upper provinces of India, of all the varieties of caste, with a fair sprinkling of Mahrattas.

2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Bombay artillery are composed?

The gun lascars are, generally speaking, of low caste, Purwaries and others from the Deccan and Concan.

3. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Bombay artillery are composed?

A mixture of all the races, tribes, and castes of India, but mostly enlisted within the limits of the Bombay presidency.

4. Should native gunners and golundauze continue to be enlisted, and to form part of the artillery of the Bombay army?

The golundauze should be absorbed, and none but European artillery allowed in India, except in certain cases where climate may interfere with the efficiency of British troops.

5. Should native drivers continue to be employed with European artillery?

No; guns should be manned and driven by Englishmen, and natives excluded from artillery altogether, with the exception above alluded to.

6. From what districts are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundauze drawn?

Principally from Hindoostan Proper; Oude and the Doab, between the Jumna and Ganges; also a few from the Concan and Deccan. Hindoostanees were selected on account of having more physical power to manage artillery.

7. From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn?

From the Deccan and northern and southern Concan.

8. From what districts are the drivers taken?

The drivers are of all districts; Hindoostanees, men from the Deccan and Concan, a few from Guzerat, in short, enlisted from all manner of people without distinction.

9. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded by regulation or practice of the service from the golundauze of the Bombay artillery, and if so, from what reason?

No exclusion has been practised; Hindoostanees were esteemed as being of greater physical power, otherwise all men were enlisted who were considered fit for artillery service.

10. The same question is repeated, both with respect to gun lascars and drivers.

In the same manner were the gun lascars and drivers entertained. The general low caste of the former is accounted for by the peculiarity of their duty; greasing gun wheels and other dirty work.

11. Supposing that native artillery were continued in the Bombay army, are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from whom recruits for the golundauze might with advantage be enlisted?

I do not know of any; as a service, the golundauze were ruined by the reduction of the pay from 8 to 7 rupees per mensem; but all eligible men willing to serve were entertained without respect to caste.

12. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the golundauze of the Bombay artillery, for the gun lascars, and for the drivers?

The commanding officers of battalions arrange these matters under orders from the commandant of artillery.

13. On entertainment of recruits for the golundauze, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Bombay artillery, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?

As regards the recruits for the golundauze, the orders respecting registry, &c., will be found in the 3d Appendix to Jameson's Code, page 182, section xlvi. (G. G. O., 5th July 1855, No. 539). No precautions are taken with respect to the gun lascars and drivers, and the rule quoted extended only to presidency limits.

14. Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice if golundauze continue to be enlisted?

The rules answered very well; but the above regulation could with advantage be adopted generally

throughout India. I may remark that enlistment for the golundauze has been stopped altogether.

Colonel Green

15. The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.

With the few men required alteration would be unnecessary, and native drivers are being replaced by Englishmen.

16. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundauze of the Bombay artillery?

"I solemnly declare in the presence of God that I will be faithful to Government, and will implicitly obey my superiors; and I further declare that I will never abandon my guns, but will defend them with my life."

17. The same question is repeated with regard to the gun lascars and drivers.

The only form of oath administered to either gun lascars or artillery driver on enlistment is to the effect that they will faithfully serve the Government for any period of service required of them, that they will never abandon the guns intrusted to their care, that they will serve wherever Government may direct. This form of oath is administered to them in front of a gun with their right hand placed on it, and the first section of the native articles of war read to them on parade.

18. How long has this form of oath been in use in the Bombay artillery?

Since the establishment of the golundauze battalions.

19. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the golundauze, gun lascars, or driver when first enrolled, or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?

No; I am impressed with the idea that the oath altogether is unnecessary; no oath or form of engagement will bind men to the service if they be indisposed to remain.

20. If native artillerymen continue to be used, should the different battalions be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only, or be recruited over a wide area irrespective of districts?

Irrespective of districts. The battalions should be composed of all kinds of men, enlisted, if possible, from all parts of India.

21. The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.

And I would apply the same answer. I am certain that local enlistments will not answer for corps accustomed to be employed on general service.

22. Should the battalions or companies or troops of golundauze be homogeneous as to race or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed up together?

Composed of all kinds of men to be procured in India, and no restriction allowed except personal disqualification for duty as a soldier.

23. If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

This must depend upon various circumstances, but as much mixed as possible, no one class or caste preponderating over others.

24. The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and to drivers.

And I would apply the same answer, though the matter is of minor importance, as their numbers are few and they are much divided already, being attached to the several field batteries.

25. What agency should be employed for recruiting golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?

Nothing is required beyond the agency of the commanding officer.

Colonel Green.

26. What precaution should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?

The golundauze should be enlisted under the rules laid down in the 3d Appendix to Jameson's Code, page 182, section xlvi., paragraph 214 (G. G. O., 5th July 1855, No. 539). These precautions should be generally ordered for all enlistments, as they appear to be desirable and feasible.

27. If native drivers be discontinued, would you replace them by Europeans raised for that duty, or by European gunners trained to the duty as part of their exercise, or by Anglo-Indians enrolled for this special duty?

I would replace the native drivers by English gunners taught to ride, drive, and manage the guns, as is usual with the Bombay horse artillery. I see no objection to Anglo-Indians being entertained in our European batteries if found fit for the service of artillery.

II.—THE RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Are the same articles of war applicable to the European gunners and to the golundauze of the Bombay artillery?

No; the European and native articles of war are separate and distinct.

2. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the golundauze of the Bombay artillery?

No, I cannot; but I would abolish them altogether as inapplicable for native troops.

3. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war as respects the European artillery?

No, I cannot.

4. Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same articles of war as the golundauze, and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes?

Yes; I have not been able to suggest any improvements.

5. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

The assimilation will not answer. Under *selected* officers in regiments the native officers will maintain discipline without the special rules, which stand between the men and those to whom they should look up to in all things.

6. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Bombay army?

Yes, it works well according to regulation, and habit has become second nature; but I am convinced that the system spoils the native soldier, who should look to his commander in all things; much could be written on this subject. A constant change of commanders causes want of confidence in the men, and the object of most European officers is to get away from the regiment as soon as possible.

7. What means are adopted to acquaint the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers with the military code under which they serve?

The articles of war are periodically explained to them.

8. What proportion of the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

I cannot answer this question with any degree of certainty. The golundauze are generally well educated; many of the gun lascars are taught in the battalion schools, and have picked up a good deal of English from the gunners; an ability to read and write is scarce among the drivers.

III.—THE ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the Bombay artillery, what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundauze, and drivers; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

One general system pervades the Bombay army as regards the native promotions, viz., merit and seniority combined.

2. Are the native commissioned officers of the golundauze generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

Very much so indeed; many of the native officers are highly efficient.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundauze from among whom they have risen?

Yes; consequent on their being selected from among the golundauze.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

I believe not.

5. Do the golundauze of all grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary gun drill? Are they practised at laying guns and mortars, at cutting fuzes, judging distances, adopting charges to mortars, &c., or do the European officers themselves execute those details?

The golundauze are taught everything, including laboratory exercises.

6. Can the golundauze of the Bombay artillery frequently read English and write it?

Not frequently.

7. Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work?

Certainly, if native artillery is to be maintained.

8. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer?

It strengthens the influence of the European officer, especially if the native officers be men of character; because, notwithstanding their position, the British officer is still the judge between them—the dispenser of justice, honor, and rewards.

9. Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundauze been found on occasions of mutiny to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European officers in checking or quelling mutiny? Have the native officers passively or overtly sided with the mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve, and with the European officers?

Two companies of golundauze were supposed to be disaffected. In one company at Shikarpoor eight men mutinied and seized two guns. They were driven from the guns by the remainder of the company, some of the 16th native infantry, and the police, and were all killed.

The company at Hyderabad was suspected. The subadar warned his officer; the men were disarmed, and the guns taken from them. A jemadar of golundauze and a havildar of drivers were executed. The other native officers of the two companies sided with the European officers.

10. If native artillery be continued in the Bombay army, should the grades of native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished?

The native officers, in this event, should be maintained.

11. Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned officers as would give one to each gun of a battery, in lieu of the native commissioned officers of golundauze, be advisable?
- I am of opinion that this would not answer.
12. If the abolition of the grades of golundauze commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundauze, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as commissioned grades?
- Certainly not.
13. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundauze to the British service and the British rule?
- They exercise a powerful influence undoubtedly, but have not proved effectual, as events have proved.
14. Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions?
- Yes.
15. Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Bombay artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny?
- Yes, generally so. I think the exception is the havildar or driver (a Hindoostanee) who was executed at Hydrabad in Sind.
16. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?
- Maintained; but a modification may be necessary. Certainly not abolished.
17. Can you state the charge upon the finances of the Bombay presidency on account of military pensions to the native artillery of the Bombay army?
- No, I cannot.
18. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grade of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?
- Promotion for merit and efficiency, combining with seniority, is the rule in the Bombay presidency, so that alteration is not required.
19. Are commissioned officers of golundauze generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?
- Quite so.
20. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?
- Yes, I think so.
21. Under the supposition that the artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it as far as practicable with the royal artillery?
- As far as practicable, yes; but in many respects the assimilation would be injudicious, for the system of the royal artillery is far from perfect. I think much good would ensue were the best parts of the two systems combined.
22. What would this assimilation involve of change in the system of Bombay artillery?
- Points of equipment, of manœuvre, and minor arrangements, which, as an infantry officer, I am hardly competent to detail.
23. What would it involve of change in the material of the Bombay artillery?
- Guns and carriages of all kinds. There is much difference in this respect between the royal and Bombay artillery.
24. What modifications would it be expedient to maintain in the organization of the Bombay artillery, when assimilating it to the royal artillery, in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service?
- There are scientific points connected with this question which I am not competent fully to answer.
25. Need the material of the Bombay artillery, if assimilated to that of the royal artillery, be at all modified in consequence of climate and service in India?
- The answer above given must apply to this question also.
26. Do you advocate the maintenance of horse artillery at its present strength?
- Yes, as applied to the four troops of this presidency. It is an admirable school for artillery officers and men, and on it is formed the efficiency of the field batteries.

IV.—THE EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of the commandants of native battalions of artillery, and of officers in command of golundauze batteries of the Bombay artillery been increased or diminished?

Much diminished, as regards commanding officers of battalions, in the same degree as with commanding officers of cavalry and infantry.

2. What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundauze of the Bombay artillery?

Frequent appeals to superior authority, when that of the commanding officer should be sufficient, if discipline is to be maintained by those intrusted with command.

3. If golundauze artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers?

By placing full confidence and power in the hands of the commanding officer, holding him responsible for the result, and removing him if he fails to maintain his influence and authority.

4. Is the efficiency of the Bombay corps of artillery affected by the number of officers taken away from corps duties for staff employment?

Almost all the field officers are on the staff. Commissaries of ordnance, gun carriage agent, agent for gunpowder, and similar appointments, take away those who should be inspecting field officers. The regiment is very much underhanded and should be extensively augmented.

5. How can the demand for European officers of artillery for staff and detached employments be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of the corps of Bombay artillery?

An extensive augmentation is the only remedy, for there are few artillery officers ex-regimentally employed, and if the staff employes were "seconded" as in the royal artillery, others must supply their places.

6. Would the general standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure which, by removing the hope of staff employment, cut off the inducements which young artillery officers now have to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches of knowledge useful to the State?

I think this would be a great evil. All hope would die. I cannot conceive any measure more calculated to ruin any service, for the object of Government should be to induce their servants to attain in all things as much proficiency as possible, in order that the fullest benefit may be derived from their services in any situation where they may be required.

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.

Head-Quarters, Poona, Dec. 18, 1858.

No. 15.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM COLONEL P. M. MELVILL, MILITARY SECRETARY, BOMBAY.

Colonel
P. M. Melvill.

From Col. P. M. MELVILL to Maj.-Gen. BIRCH, C.B.
Bombay, Military Department,
December 24, 1858.

SIR, I HAVE the honor to transmit my replies to Col. Durand's queries (Sections, Irregular Cavalry), in continuation of my former letters.

These, I beg to observe, complete the series forwarded to me.

I have, &c.

P. M. MELVILL, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

CAVALRY, IRREGULAR.

SECTION I.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army is composed?
 2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?
- Returns will be furnished.
3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army, either by the regulations or the practice of the ?
 4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?
 5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?
 6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?
 7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?
 8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulation and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?
 9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?
 10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?
 11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army when first enrolled?
 12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bombay army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?
 13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bombay army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?
 14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army be homogeneous as to race or caste?
 15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army be composed of ressalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?
 16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

The replies given to the same queries in previous sections are applicable here.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bombay army?

I do not understand in what manner European troops or squadrons could be introduced as component parts of irregular corps of cavalry.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers, with whom they would be associated?

As before.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army be armed?

I am not aware that any change in the present mode of arming the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army has been proposed; swords, carbines, and pistols have been found the most efficient weapons for such corps; but it may be a question whether lances might not be introduced with some advantage. It is a question, however, which properly belongs to cavalry officers to determine.

SECTION II.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?
2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

To these queries I can only give the same answers as I have given before.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

Irregular corps in the Bombay army, though subject to the articles of war, are managed still by the system of punchayet or courts of arbitration, and not generally by that of courts-martial.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?
5. What proportion of the troopers of the irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

As before.

SECTION III.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

Colonel
P. M. Melvill.

2. Are the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?
3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?
4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?
6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?
10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?
11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

Previous replies are applicable here.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the Bombay presidency on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry?
15,000 rupees per annum.
13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?
14. Are the native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

As before.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

I have above said that I think not.

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular; and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

I have replied to this before.

19. If irregular corps of cavalry have native commissioned officers, and regular corps of native cavalry have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the high pay to the troopers and non-commissioned officers of the regular cavalry be an equivalent to the absence of commissioned grades, and draw as good recruits to the regular as the contrary system will draw to the irregular corps?

I consider that good-service pay and pension cannot compensate to young and aspiring soldiers for the want of commissioned grades, to which to look forward as the early reward of good conduct; but the system of the regular and the irregular cavalry is so dissimilar that I doubt whether the recruiting for the one can under any circumstances interfere with the recruiting for the other.

20. Is it advisable to keep up regular native cavalry in the Bombay army? Would the substitution of irregular cavalry be as efficient and less costly?

I do not advocate the abolition of the regular native cavalry in the Bombay army, because I conceive that the men of this branch have ever done their duty in field and in garrison as efficiently as the infantry; that the native regular cavalry bears to the European cavalry precisely the same relation that the native regular infantry bears to the European infantry; and that neither in the cavalry nor in the infantry can the

place of regular corps be supplied by irregular corps, as at present organized, without the sacrifice of much of the general efficiency of the army. In giving this opinion, I refer to irregular cavalry corps as now constituted on the silladar system, the essence of which is, that the men provide their own horses, arms, and equipments. Such corps are never so well mounted as the regular corps, for which the horses are provided by the Government. For certain duties irregular corps are very valuable, because they are more easily moved and require little or no commissariat with them; but if good mounting be an element of efficiency, they can never be really so efficient as cavalry, and for the whole round of cavalry duties, as the regular regiments *ought* to be, though clearly they are less costly, as the expense of a regular cavalry regiment is estimated at 5½ lacs of rupees per annum, whilst that of an irregular regiment is not much more than 3½ lacs.

21. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bombay army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?

If irregular cavalry were mounted upon Government horses it would be difficult to distinguish them from regular corps. The leading and essential mark of difference between the two would then be removed.

22. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bombay army are mounted?

During the last year the cost of the light cavalry horses has averaged 515 rupees each. The average of the preceding three years is only 440 rupees.

23. Whence are the horses obtained, and of what breeds are they?

The Bombay army has been mounted hitherto from the Persian Gulf chiefly; some of the horses have usually been brought from Afghanistan, through Kurrachee, and during the past year supplies have been obtained from the Cape and from the Australian colonies, to meet the extraordinary demand. The Gulf horses are all Arab or Persian; the Afghan horses, or northern horses, as they are commonly termed in Bombay, are akin to the Persian. From the colonies, the horses brought are of course of the colonial breeds.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bombay presidency draw its horses?

From the resources of the country, wherever they may be stationed or be serving.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bombay presidency?

The men of the irregular cavalry provide their own horses, and no return of the cost is ever made to the Government, though known to commanding officers. The Government rate of compensation for horses lost, when compensation is granted, is 125 rupees each; and it has been stated in recent correspondence that the men commonly pay about 200 rupees each for the horses in the ranks.

26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bombay army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

I think they are.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bombay presidency?

I have no suggestions to make on this head.

28. Is it advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies, for a supply of horses for the army of India?

There was formerly a Government stud on this side of India, but it was abolished some years since, as

Colonel
P. M. Melvill.

experience proved it to be utterly useless, and an expense without any return to compensate for it. It would be difficult, I conceive, to devise a more expensive and less efficient mode of mounting the army of India than that of a Government stud or breeding establishment for horses.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bombay army?

In the Sind irregular horse the pay given is 30 rupees for each sowar, that is, rider and horse fully equipped. In the other corps it is 25 rupees for each sowar.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field, during a protracted campaign?

The irregular cavalry corps are usually well equipped, but indifferently mounted, particularly in the field and on protracted campaigns. This arises very much from their being dependent upon local resources for their remounts; and is probably an inherent defect in the system, which no increase of pay, within reasonable bounds, would suffice to correct.

30½. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bombay army been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?

Old corps like the Poona horse are greatly embarrassed, but the corps more recently raised, like the Sind and the Southern Mahratta horse, wherein there has been a careful superintendence exercised over the interior economy of the corps, are free from the embarrassment of debt.

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the _____?

Lately there have been complaints in some of the irregular corps of the insufficiency of the pay allowed, though larger than that which is given in the Bengal army. But on the closest calculation that can be made, it does not appear that the soldier of the irregular corps is worse off than the soldier of the line; and such being the case, it would be highly inexpedient to raise the pay of the one and not of the other.

32. What is the system of the irregular cavalry with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests, or not? Are they favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

I understand the term assamee to mean an individual place in the ranks of the corps represented by the horse. The market value of the horse thus representing a place in the corps is irrespective of the value of the animal, and depends upon the demand for such places. I have no exact knowledge of this market value of the assamee, but I believe it is very commonly taken at 400 or 500 rupees.

The restrictions placed on the number of assamees held by one man depend on the judgment of the commanding officer and the regimental regulations of each corps.

It is, I believe, the opinion of our best officers that all silladars should be effective, riding in the corps, and that no sallidar should have more or less than three assamees, native officers may hold a larger number. I do not advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of large vested interests, and I regard them as a very insecure guarantee either for the maintenance of the efficiency of the horses and equipments, or for the proper conduct of its duties.

33. What is the pay of mounted police in the Bombay presidency?

34. What is the organization of the mounted police of the Bombay presidency?

35. Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the Bombay presidency composed?

36. How is the mounted police recruited, that is, what is the agency employed, the precautions taken before or by the local authorities in entertaining men?

37. Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police at _____ rs. per mensem been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?

38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

I have no correct knowledge of the mounted police.

SECTION IV.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of the light cavalry in the Bombay army, or of irregular cavalry been increased or diminished?

2. During the above period have the powers of officers commanding troops of the regular native cavalry of the Bombay army been increased or diminished?

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the light cavalry and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

4. What is the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of officers in charge of troops?

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of headquarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops, and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

6. Should the power of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

10. Has the strength of the light cavalry and irregular cavalry been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the light and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army otherwise, without injury to its horses and discipline?

12. If native regular cavalry be kept up with a full complement of European officers, would you attach cavalry cadets at once to native corps, or for a time to dragoon corps?

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

14. Is the efficiency of the corps and regular cavalry in the Bombay army affected by the number of officers taken away from their corps for staff employment?

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?

The replies given to former queries may be applied to these.

16. In the event of irregular cavalry being the only native cavalry maintained in the Indian armies, how should the officers of the regular native cavalry be employed; with European dragoon corps raised for service in India, or with the irregular cavalry substituted for the regular?

In such an event, I conceive it cannot be of much importance to the general question in what manner

the officers thus rendered supernumerary may be disposed of; at the same time I consider it would not be expedient to officer the irregular corps entirely from the superseded regular regiments.

17. Of what strength should the corps of European dragoons raised for service in India be, that is, the aggregate force of European dragoons being fixed, should it be divided into corps of 400 sabres, or corps of 800 sabres, or of any other number, with a view to effectively meeting the requirements of the service?

The present establishment of European dragoon regiments serving in India, viz., four squadrons or eight troops, is found to be a convenient and efficient strength for every purpose that can be contemplated.

18. If corps of the strength of 400 sabres were preferred, would the same number of European officers as are now attached to corps of native regular cavalry suffice, and could the officers be thus rendered available?

It would probably be found better to assign the officers of two native regular cavalry regiments to one of European dragoons, supposing the strength of the latter to be about 800 sabres.

19. Is the system of formation in double ranks as well suited to European cavalry in India as the system advocated by many British and foreign officers of experience, viz., that cavalry should form and manœuvre in single rank? Please to state at length the grounds upon which your opinion is based.

This is a question for cavalry officers to decide.

20. Assuming the single rank system to be desirable in India, of what strength should each corps be?

I am not aware on what principle the established strength of the regiment is to be regulated by the system of formation for manœuvre.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?
22. If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

Whether practicable or not, I cannot think it advisable to mingle in one corps the European and the native elements of the army; and I fail to perceive the particular advantages to be expected from the combination of irregular native horse with European cavalry.

P. M. MELVILL, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

From Col. P. M. MELVILL to Maj.-Gen. BIRCH, C.B.
Sir, Bombay, December 18, 1858

I HAVE the honor to transmit my replies to Colonel Durand's questions (Sections, Light Cavalry) in continuation of my previous letters.

I have, &c.

P. M. MELVILL, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

CAVALRY.

SECTION I.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the light cavalry of the Bengal army is composed?

The Bombay light cavalry contains a considerable proportion of Mussulmans, and fully three-fourths of the men are from Hindoostan.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

This will be seen in detail from the returns furnished.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the light cavalry of Bombay army, either by the regulations or the practice of the

Colonel
P. M. Melvill.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the light cavalry of the Bengal army, if that branch of the service be continued?

None, that I am aware of.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the native regular or light cavalry of the Bombay army?

6. On enlistment of recruits for the light cavalry of the Bombay army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

10. How long has this form been in use in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the light cavalry of the Bombay army when first enrolled?

12. Should the light cavalry corps of the Bombay army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

13. Or should the light cavalry corps of the Bombay army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

14. Should the corps of light cavalry of the Bombay army be homogeneous as to race or caste?

15. Should the corps of light cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of troops or squadrons, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

16. If the corps of light cavalry of the Bombay army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the light corps of cavalry of the Bombay army?

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?

These questions are the same as have been put in

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the infantry sections of the queries, and the answers there given are equally applicable here.

24. How should the light cavalry of the Bombay army be armed?

It is a question among cavalry officers, whether the lance is an efficient weapon for native light cavalry. In the Bombay army there is one regiment of lancers, which is highly reputed for service in the field; and there are two regiments armed with swords and pistols, which have been equally distinguished in action.

25. Has any advantage been derived from the dress and equipments of the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bombay army being assimilated to those of the European dragoon?

I am not prepared to specify any advantage in this respect peculiar to the cavalry; and with regard to the horse equipment, there may have been positive disadvantage. But this is a point on which the opinion of experienced cavalry officers only can be of value.

26. How should the light cavalry of the Bombay army be dressed and equipped, with a view to the efficiency and comfort of the native trooper?

I am not prepared to propose any change in the present dress of the trooper; improvements might certainly be made in the horse appointments, and particularly in the form of the saddle. But on such points cavalry officers should be the best judges.

SECTION II.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?
2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?
4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Bombay light cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?
5. What proportion of the troopers of the Bombay light cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

The answers given to the queries referring to the infantry apply throughout this section.

SECTION III.

1. In the light cavalry of the Bombay army what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?
2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the light cavalry of the Bombay army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?
3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?
4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?
5. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European? Does a full complement of the European militia against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officers?

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers?

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the light cavalry of the Bombay army?

8. Is the substitution of a European serjeant and corporal to each troop of light or regular corps of cavalry in lieu of its native commissioned officers advisable?

9. If the abolition of the grades of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the native trooper, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after special periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

Answered in the former sections.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the Bombay presidency on account of military pensions to the light cavalry of the Bombay army?
Rupees 90,000 per annum, according to an approximate calculation.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency to the rule?

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

16. What is the best organization for native corps of regular cavalry?

1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers; or,

2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades; or,

3. Be officered like corps of irregular cavalry, viz., with a full complement of native commissioned officers, but with only three or four European officers?

As before.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army?

I think not. The irregular corps are officered by selection from every arm, cavalry, artillery, and infantry, and this is, I consider, the best possible system to ensure efficiency.

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bombay army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular, and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

Only officers who have served with both regular and irregular cavalry corps can be supposed to be qualified satisfactorily to answer this question.

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Secretary to Government.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and what is their distribution ?

1. There are at present 18,500 European troops serving under the Bombay presidency, viz. :—

Artillery	-	-	2,900
Cavalry	-	-	2,300
Infantry	-	-	13,300
			18,500

These are distributed throughout the territories of the presidency, and in Rajpootana and Central India.

2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution ?
2. This question cannot be answered satisfactorily at present, because it is impossible to deduce from the existing anomalous state of the country and of the native army any safe conclusions for the future.
3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the Bombay presidency, and what is their distribution ?
3. The total number of native troops serving under the Bombay presidency, by the returns of the 1st May 1858, was 38,000 men, distributed throughout the territories of the presidency, and beyond the frontier in Rajpootana and Central India.

4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the Bombay presidency, and what should be their ordinary distribution ?
4. For the same reason as assigned in the case of European troops, it is not practicable to answer this question satisfactorily or with any confidence. There is to be a change in the constitution of the native army throughout India ; there will, probably, be a change also in the duty to be performed by the native troops ; their subjection to the European branch may be made more or less immediate and direct ; the stations to be garrisoned by the Bombay army may or may not extend into Rajpootana and over the province of Malwa. These are some of the points that must be determined before any sure calculation can be ventured of the number of native troops deemed necessary for the Bombay presidency, and of the manner in which they should be distributed.

5. What proportion of native troops now serving in the Bombay presidency are regulars, irregulars, and police corps ? Of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur ?
5. The total number of irregular troops on the returns of the Bombay army is,—
- | | | | |
|----------|---|---|-------|
| Cavalry | - | - | 3,850 |
| Infantry | - | - | 2,000 |
| | | | 5,850 |

Of the police corps, which are entirely civil, I have no direct knowledge ; they form no part of the army, and are not borne on its returns.

The composition of the regular regiments of the Bombay native army, according to castes, is exhibited below, viz.,—

Christians	-	-	410
Jews	-	-	370
Mussulmans	-	-	3,200
Hindoos	-	-	25,120
Various low castes	-	-	4,865

The following is the classification according to countries :—

From Afghanistan	-	-	20
Bombay	-	-	30
The Concan	-	-	16,130
Candeish	-	-	160
Carnatic	-	-	180
Canara	-	-	12
Deccan	-	-	3,070

From Guzerat	-	-	300
Hindoostan	-	-	13,150
Madras	-	-	400
Malabar	-	-	280
Punjab	-	-	155
Rajpootana	-	-	4
Sind	-	-	75

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Thus, out of every hundred men, in round numbers, 75 are Hindoos, 12 are of the lower castes, and 10 are Mahomedans ; the remaining three may be Christians or Jews.

Again, of the entire army, 47 per cent. are from the Concan, and 38 per cent. from Hindostan.

6. What proportion of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regular, irregular, and police ?
6. I cannot venture to define the establishment of native troops until the constitution to be given to the native army has been determined ; and of course I am equally unable to divide the establishment between any proposed strength of regulars or irregulars.
7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the Bombay presidency, and state the ratios, both inclusive and exclusive, of police corps ?
7. Speaking very generally, I consider that the proportion of the European element to the native in the Indian army should not be more than one to two or less than one to three, and that it must vary according to circumstances.
8. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally, and state the ratios, as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps ?
8. The proportion of the European element fixed for India generally should rule that for Bombay.
9. Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Bombay presidency, and state its amount ?
9. The barrack accommodation in the Bombay presidency is generally inferior, both in kind and extent. There was accommodation before the present year for barely eight regiments of infantry and one of cavalry. More has been provided lately, but generally of only a temporary nature.
10. Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the Bombay presidency for the strength of European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent ?
10. Answered by the preceding.
11. What proportion of the European force should belong to Her Majesty's regular army, and what portion should be composed of troops raised for service in India ?
11. I conceive this to be immaterial, and may be allowed to fluctuate according to circumstances.
12. Under the supposition that additional corps of Europeans have to be raised for service in India, how would you officer them ?
12. The additional corps should be officered from the present establishment of the Indian army, on the same principle as when augmentations were made in former times.
13. Under the supposition that a considerable increase take place in the number of corps raised for service in India, and that they are officered from the officers of the mutinied battalions of the Bengal army, will this accession of seniority promotion corps create any greater embarrassment in juxtaposition with the purchase promotion system than what now accrues from the existence of the royal artillery, royal engineers, royal marines, and the three Indian armies, in all which corps and armies seniority promotion is the system ?
13. The purchase promotion system of Her Majesty's army produces no embarrassment in juxtaposition with

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the seniority promotion system of the Indian army. Nor can any augmentation in the number of corps on the one side or the other cause any embarrassment, so long as the two systems stand divided from each other; any attempt to amalgamate them would produce the utmost confusion.

14. The feasibility of raising corps of foreign mercenaries, such as Tartars, Chinese, Malays, Dyaks, Africans, Madagascarenes, &c. being assumed, would you consider that the proportion of European to native and foreign mercenary troops could, with safety to our power and supremacy in India, be modified from the ratio stated in reply to questions 7 and 8, if so, to what extent?
14. The advocates for the raising corps of foreign mercenaries must say whether they are to be regarded as taking the place of European or of native troops; in my opinion, the presence of such mercenaries would not enable the Government to dispense with any portion of the English troops in India.

From Col. P. M. MELVILL to Lieut.-Col. H. M.
DURAND, C.B.

SIR, Poona, July 24, 1858.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge your letters of the 21st May and 16th June last, and to transmit herewith my replies to the series of questions which accompanied those communications.

I have, &c.,
P. M. MELVILL, Colonel,
Secretary to Governor of Bombay.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bombay army is composed?
1. A return will be furnished showing this from the army departments.
2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?
2. A return will be furnished in answer to this question.
3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bombay army?
3. None, that I am aware of.
4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bombay army?
4. I know of none.
5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts from which the Bombay army is recruited?
5. Recruiting parties are detached by officers in command of regiments, but no general agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits.
6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?
- None. When the officer, commissioned or non-commissioned, in charge of a recruiting party has collected a batch of recruits, he takes them to the nearest military station, where the men are examined by a committee of officers, including a medical member, and if they are found fit for the service, a roll of their names is prepared and forwarded to the regiment to which they are to belong, and to the head-quarters of the army.
7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoy or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?
7. I am not aware of any.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops) in the Bombay army?
8. I can propose none.
9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bombay army?
9. There is a prescribed form, which will be furnished.
10. How long has this form been in use in the Bombay army?
10. I do not know.
11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the sepoy of the Bombay army?
11. None. I conceive it to be of little moment.
12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bombay presidency of seafaring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?
12. The seafaring tribes along the seaboard of the Bombay presidency are not numerous, and are chiefly engaged in the ordinary occupations of sailors or fishermen. They present no good material for the formation of marine corps.
- The native troops make indifferent marines. In the Indian navy they are found to be almost useless; and whenever a steam frigate is fitted out for war service, a detachment of artillerymen is embarked, to take the combined duty of gunners and marines.
- The constitution of a corps of marine artillery, composed wholly of Europeans, has been repeatedly proposed, but always rejected on account of the expense; but that such a corps is essentially required to complete the efficiency of the navy can hardly be questioned.
13. Has the Bombay presidency any marine corps, and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited?
13. There is one marine battalion on the strength of the Bombay army. Its establishment is that of a regiment of the line, with the exception of the European officers. It is recruited almost entirely in the Concan, and its ranks are filled with the lowest caste Hindoos, with a proportion of Mussulmans larger than in the regular regiments.
14. Should each infantry corps be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?
14. I think not.
15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?
15. I think it should.
16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?
16. I think the composition of every corps should be as heterogeneous as possible as regards race, tribe, or caste.
17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste, or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?
17. I consider homogeneity is to be avoided throughout the companies as throughout the corps.
18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
18. I consider the proportion immaterial, provided no one tribe or caste is allowed to unduly preponderate.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts ?
19. For police corps local recruiting is probably advantageous, as local knowledge is thereby secured, which must be of consequence.
20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps ?
20. No, I would not. In times of exigency, drafts may be taken from the police corps to fill gaps in the line, but generally speaking commanding officers prefer their own recruits or those obtained by their own parties.
21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the district of the Bombay presidency, or of its dependencies, or in districts of other presidencies ?
21. I cannot recommend any.
22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency ?
22. The police corps should have their own agency or means of recruiting distinct from the line.
23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion which recruits for the army of the Bombay presidency ?
23. I am not aware that any precautions of this nature are required.
24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bombay presidency ?
24. Police corps must make their own arrangements independently of the military.
25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country ; and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise ?
25. I think it is not expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries for service in India so long as a sufficient body of European troops can be maintained.
26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred ?
26. Experience only can answer this question. With the exception of Africans, it is difficult to point out any race or country where enlistment might be pursued with any prospect of advantage.
27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting ?
27. Officers possessed of the necessary qualifications may always be employed as recruiting agents.
28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments ?
28. I think the plan of mingling Europeans and natives in the same regiment must fail. The European and the native soldier are managed and treated differently ; and the two cannot be subjected to the same system of interior economy. If a company of Europeans be made a component part of all native regiments, such companies must have their own officers, separate barracks, and distinct commissariat. They will be, in fact, just so many small detachments, isolated from each other and from the European regiments ; and to maintain discipline under such circumstances will be almost impossible.
29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for the special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief ?
30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops ?
31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements ?
32. How should such companies be armed ; with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated ?
- 29, 30, 31, and 32. Disapproving of the plan altogether, I am not prepared to answer these questions.
33. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be armed ?
33. As at present ; I see no occasion for any change.
34. How should police corps in the Bombay presidency be armed ?
34. According to the duties they are to perform.
35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages ?
35. I think there is advantage in making the dress of the native soldier assimilate with that of the European ; but assimilation should not be carried to extreme.
36. How should the native infantry of the Bombay presidency be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier ?
36. Very much as at present.
37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association ?
37. I think the intimate, close, and permanent association of the European and native troops is not desirable, and therefore I do not approve of such a combination as is here contemplated.
38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it ?
38. The gun lascars and native drivers are little more than a superior kind of followers. I do not recognize the analogy.
39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps ?
39. They must be separated clearly and decidedly, if not widely.
40. Would such a system be favorable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength ?
40. Certainly unfavorable.
41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war ?
41. It would create much confusion in forming brigades or divisions for field service.

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42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

42. Native troops are, I consider, incapable of acquiring a spirit of self-reliance independent of the support of Europeans; and if trained, as they must be to act with Europeans, it follows of necessity that they must be trained to act in dependence on European support.

From Colonel P. M. MELVILL to Lieut.-Colonel
DURAND, C.B.

SIR, Poona, August 20, 1858.

I HAVE the honor to transmit my replies to your further questions, in continuation of my letter to your address of the 24th July last.

I have, &c.

P. M. MELVILL, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the native army of the Bombay presidency?
1. I am not prepared to do so.
2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
2. I do not see the necessity of any change in this respect.
3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bombay army?
3. I believe that it works quite satisfactorily.
4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Bombay army with the military code under which they live and are governed?
4. The most prominent of the articles of war are read to them on the monthly muster parade.
5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?
5. I am not prepared to answer this.
6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Bombay presidency?
6. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the civil police corps to be able to answer the questions relating to them satisfactorily, or with confidence.
7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Bombay presidency?
7. As above.
8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers, sufficient, and the working satisfactory?
8. As above.
1. In the native regiments of the Bombay army what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?
1. The system of promotion is based on merit, but with some regard to seniority where there is an equality of merit.
2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Bombay army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?
2. They are.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

3. Their acquirements are not superior to those of the men amongst whom they have risen, because they gain their promotion by their good conduct as soldiers, and not as a consequence of their acquirements of any higher kind.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. None.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers? Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?

5. The influence of the European officers can in no manner be so effectually exercised over the men as through the native officers. So long as the native officers are faithful their intervention tends to strengthen the influence of the European officers; but if they are not faithful, then of course their intervention is decidedly injurious.

The professional efficiency of the native officer is not affected by the number of European officers present with the regiment, excepting perhaps in the mere routine of the parade.

6. Has it been found in the Bombay army that on the occurrence of mutinies the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

6. Instances have occurred in which native officers have given notice to the European officers of an intended mutiny, and it has thereby been prevented; but generally speaking the native officers are not found to aid the Europeans in checking or suppressing mutiny. The sympathies of the native officers are usually with the men.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Bombay army?

7. I think they should be continued as an essential part of the constitution of a native regiment.

8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment in lieu of its native officers advisable?

8. I think not.

9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

9. No scale of pay or pension to be earned by length of service could compensate the young soldier for the loss of promotion which his merits might entitle him to look for at an early period of his career.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

10. If the native troops are attached to the British service, the retiring pension has great effect in producing that attachment.

11. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule ?
11. Promotion to the grade of native commissioned officer should be by selection for merit and efficiency, not by seniority. This should be the rule ; in practice some regard may be paid to seniority where merits are near to an equality.
12. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished ?
12. Pensions should be maintained.
13. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the native infantry of the Bombay army ?
13. In round numbers, rupees 8,70,000 per annum.
14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial ?
14. When promotion is by merit they are so.
15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency ?
15. Quite so.
16. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, what will be the best organization for the military corps ?
1. Should they be fully officered with native commissioned grades as well as with European officers ; or,
2. Fully officered with European, but have no native commissioned grades ; or,
3. Be officered like irregular corps, viz., have the full complement of native commissioned officers, with but a few European officers ?
16. Military corps forming part of the regular army should, I conceive, be fully officered in all the present grades, European as well as native.
17. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades ?
17. I am not competent to answer questions relating to the police.
18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits ?
18. I do not think it will.
19. In police corps is there, on first admission, any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades ?
19. I am not well acquainted with the system pursued in police corps.
20. Has the distinct organization and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies proved favorable to our power in India ?
20. I conceive that it has.
21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies ?
21. I do not consider the amalgamation of the three armies desirable, nor even their close assimilation.
1. Within your experience have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Bombay army ; and state the orders, or measures, or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect ?
1. I am not aware of any orders or measures having been issued or adopted of late years for the purpose of modifying the powers exercised by commanding officers. The free exercise of these powers is a matter rather of practice than of rule, and will vary according to the views and opinions of commanders-in-chief and of adjutants-general, and according to the personal character of commanding officers themselves.
2. During the above period have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished ?
2. Answered above.
3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Bombay army ?
3. This depends upon the character of the commanding officer, and the manner in which the power and influence belonging to his command are exercised.
4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies ?
4. The remarks made with respect to commanding officers of battalions apply equally to the case of officers in command or charge of companies.
5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps ? Upon the distant authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment ?
5. I consider that the discipline of a corps on service depends upon the system which has been established in garrison ; and that discipline, in war and in peace, depends upon the same principles.
6. Should the power of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished ?
6. I am not aware of any fixed standard by which such powers can be measured.
7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline ?
7. I am not prepared to suggest any in particular.
8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war ?
8. I conceive it is, and ought to be, the same.
9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like ?
9. In times of the most profound peace the Indian government must maintain its army ever in a condition ready for war. It can never disarm. I do not think that it will ever be practicable to employ the regular troops on public works, but it would be very easy and very profitable to raise corps of pioneers to be united with the more highly-trained sappers who, in war, would be attached as auxiliaries to the regular troops, and in peace could be engaged in making roads, building bridges, and other works of public utility.
10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Bombay army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties ?
10. Numerically, the Bombay army, for many years past, has been barely equal to its military duties.

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11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works ?
11. I think not.
12. In apportioning European officers to native troops,—
1. Should native corps have a full complement of European officers according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers ; or,
 2. A full complement of European officers, and no native commissioned officers ; or,
 3. A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers ?
12. I think that every native corps should have a full complement of European and of native commissioned officers, according to the present scale.
13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps ?
13. It is not of much consequence, perhaps, where cadets are first attached.
14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment ?
14. I cannot propose a mode of training for the duties of a native corps, so simple or so efficient as a course of duty with the corps itself. Depôts might be established, but they would most probably have an injurious effect on the character, moral as well as professional, of the officers congregated within them.
15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment ?
15. Undoubtedly, but not equally nor at all times the same.
16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies between the conduct of regiments with few and those with many European officers present ?
16. In the Bombay army there has not been an opportunity of drawing the comparison.
17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for, without injuring the efficiency of regiments ?
17. For staff employment, properly so called, that is to say, for the military staff of the army, officers may be taken from the regimental establishment without producing any injury to the efficiency of regiments. But, if to the proper staff be added *detached* employment, that is to say, if officers are withdrawn from their regiments to fill appointments in civil departments of every kind, surveys, public works, educational inspectorships, and a variety of miscellaneous offices, then the drain becomes fatal to the efficiency of the army. For this evil, which may really be called the disease of the Indian army, various remedies have from time to time been proposed. Staff corps and staff lists, and secondary promotion, and other schemes have been devised, but no scheme has ever yet been accepted as practically suited to the proposed end. The real remedy is, I conceive, in the substitution of civilians for soldiers in all offices where the duties are not of a military character.
18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army, as regimental officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State ?
18. It would be very disadvantageous to the general efficiency of regimental officers to cut off from them the hope of *staff* employment ; but it is not advantageous to lead them to seek employment

beyond the limits, taken in their widest extent, of their proper profession.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency ?

19. The standard of *professional* acquirements would not be lowered by confining the extra regimental employment of officers to the military staff.

From Colonel P. M. MELVILL to Maj.-Gen.
BIRCH, C.B.

SIR, Bombay Castle, Dec. 10, 1858.

I HAVE the honor to transmit my replies to Colonel Durand's questions (sections Engineers), in continuation of my previous letters of the 24th July, 20th August, and 4th September last.

I have, &c.

P. M. MELVILL, Colonel,
Secretary to Government.

ENGINEER SOLDIERS, OR SAPPERS AND MINERS.

SECTION I.

1. What is the present constitution of the corps of sappers and miners of the Bombay army as respects the European and the native elements ?

Four companies of native sappers and miners are attached to the Bombay army. These companies are organized on the system laid down by General Pasley in the year 1841, of which the general principles may be thus described :—The native sappers are essentially a working corps, but they are armed and drilled as infantry, and qualified to act as such if necessary. They are instructed and practised also in the duties of field engineering, such as making gabions, fascines, &c., the practical operations of a siege, such as the construction of parallels and approaches, sapping and mining, &c., and in the construction of military bridges and pontooning.

When fully drilled as soldiers and instructed in the duty of field engineers, the native sappers are detached for employment on public works, of permanent utility ; but unless the exigencies of the service require it, they are not to be broken up into small detachments. When practicable they are detached in entire companies, and each company is periodically brought back to head-quarters to renew the courses of instruction and revive discipline.

A few Europeans are attached to the sapper companies ; they are of a superior class, educated at Chatham, and specially appointed. They are all non-commissioned officers, and act as supervisors and instructors.

2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native sappers and miners of the Bombay army are composed ?
2. Out of 550 men, 300 are Mahrattas from the Concan and Deccan, and 225 are from Hindoostan ; 500 are Hindoos, and 50 are Moosulmans.
3. What districts are the races, tribes, and castes drawn from ?
3. Answered above.
4. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment either by the regulations or practice of the Bombay army ?
- None.
5. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the sappers and miners ?
5. None that I am aware of.
6. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits ?

7. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts ?
8. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of the corps, what precautions, if any, are taken ?
9. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition and efficiency of the engineer soldiers ?
10. What are the words of the oath administered to the engineer recruit on his entering the ranks of the sappers and miners ?
11. How long has this form been in use in the Bombay sappers and miners ?
12. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered, or do you think an oath useless ? Would you substitute any form of covenant or engagement ?
13. Should the companies of engineer soldiers be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste, or be composite, and have them mixed up ; and if composite, in what proportion should the different classes enter ?
14. What agency should be employed for recruiting ?
15. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality ?

The answers given in former sections of the queries are equally applicable here.

16. Has the recruiting of native engineer soldiers been hitherto from unskilled men, and is it practicable in the Bombay presidency, with reference to the habits and qualities, moral and physical, of the people, to adopt to any extent the system of the royal sappers and miners, by enlisting artificers and recruits conversant with some trade or special kind of labor ?

16. The system of the royal sappers is that adopted in the corps of Bombay sappers, in which recruits who are artizans or conversant with some trade or special kind of labour are enlisted, when such recruits are to be had. But the high price which labor, and especially skilled labor, bears in the Bombay territories, renders it difficult to obtain, on the pay of soldiers, men with such previous qualifications.

17. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries equally qualified for hard labor and service in India, with the natives of the country ; and if so, should they be formed in separate companies, or mixed up throughout the companies ?

17. I doubt both the practicability and the expediency of such enlistment. I do not know from what tropical countries engineer soldiers could be drawn, and I believe that no foreign mercenaries could be obtained who would not be more troublesome to manage, more expensive to maintain, and at the same time less efficient for service than English troops. As mere laborers, the natives of India are to be preferred ; they are more economical, and more easily managed ; as intelligent and skilful engineer soldiers, the British are the fittest and the best instruments in the hands of British officers ; and in the engineer corps, as in the infantry and the cavalry, the union of the two elements, native Indian and British, in such proportions as shall ensure the subjection of the first to the power of the second, is the best combination of strength that can be devised for the composition of the Indian army.

18. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries for engineer soldiers, which are the countries and races to be preferred ?

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19. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting ?
- 18, 19. Require no answer.

20. Are the native engineer soldiers in sufficient strength for the requirements of service in the field ?

20. Generally speaking, yes ; provided the full strength were always available for field service.

21. Is there any reason why all native infantry should not be trained to the ordinary work in the execution of trenches, and be taught much now confined in general to sappers and miners ?

21. The only reason to be adduced against the training of all native infantry soldiers to much of the ordinary work of the sappers and miners, is that the present strength of corps is barely sufficient for the performance of their proper duties, and the introduction of additional work would harass and distress the men, and might disgust them with the service. If such a system of general training for trench operations, &c. were adopted, it would be necessary, unless the strength of the army were largely augmented, or the duties of native soldiers of guards, &c. greatly reduced, to give the men working pay, in order to reconcile them to the additional labor.

22. Is any portion of the native infantry of the army of the Bombay presidency accustomed to work in the execution of trenches, batteries, &c., and is the work done willingly ?

22. Not habitually.

23. Has the sufficiency or insufficiency of the engineer soldiers of the Bombay army noted by you reference to the peculiar aptitude, or the reverse, of the native infantry of the line, or is your opinion based purely on the fair engineer wants of the service, irrespective of considerations connected with the efficiency of the line in siege and field works ?

23. My opinion, as above given of the sufficiency in numbers of the native engineer soldiers in proportion to the other branches of the Bombay army, is based purely on the actual requirements of the service, without reference to the line in any other respect.

24. Have the sappers and miners of the Bengal army as many European sappers and miners, non-commissioned officers, and privates as is desirable ?

24. There are only a very few Europeans attached to the native sapper corps of the Bombay army, and they are all non-commissioned officers. In the present constitution of the corps they are of little account, being generally drafted off for employment in the Public Works Department. The European sappers, I consider, should be kept distinct as a corps from the natives.

25. How many European sappers and miners, and of what grades, should be attached to a company of native sappers and miners ?

25. Two serjeants and four corporals, as at present, probably are sufficient for the purposes of the corps as at present constituted.

26. Are you aware of any advantage which accrues from making the dress of the native sappers and miners closely resemble that of the European infantry ?

26. I am not aware of any particular reason for dressing the sappers as the infantry of the line.

27. How are the Bombay sappers and miners armed ?

27. Percussion carbines, with sword bayonets.

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28. How should the engineer soldiers of the Bombay army be dressed and armed ?
28. I am not prepared to propose any change.
29. What proportion of the Bombay sappers and miners can read and write their own vernacular ?
29. I do not know.
30. What proportion can understand or speak English, or read and write English ?
30. I am not informed.
31. Besides practice in sapping, mining, and field operations, have the Bombay sappers and miners any schooling ?
31. There is a school in the corps, but I am not prepared to describe it.
32. Do you consider that they are to be classed as skilled engineer soldiers ?
32. I do not know what would be considered a fully skilled engineer soldier ; and not having the standard before me, I cannot say whether or not the Bombay native sappers can be regarded as coming up to it.
33. With reference to the numerous demands for skilled European overseers and subordinates in the Department of Public Works, and to military requirements, is it advisable to have, in addition to native, a corps of European sappers and miners ? If so, of what strength, and how officered ?
33. I think that for many reasons it is most desirable that there should be a corps of European sappers attached to the army, and that the relationship between the European and the native sappers and miners should be precisely the same in all respects as that subsisting between the European and native infantry. Looking to the requirements of the Public Works Department, as well as to those of a purely military nature, I conceive that two European companies might advantageously be added to the strength of the Bombay army, to be organized and officered exactly as the corps of royal engineers.
34. Could the corps of Bombay engineers furnish the requisite number of officers ?
34. The existing corps of Bombay engineer officers is altogether insufficient for the duties, civil and military, it is called upon to discharge.

SECTION II.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war in use in the Bombay army ?
 2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army ?
 3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Bombay army ?
 4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native sappers and miners of the Bombay army with the military code under which they serve ?
- Answered as for the infantry.

SECTION III.

1. What is the system of promotion in the Bombay sappers and miners ; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined ?
2. Are the native officers of the Bombay sappers and miners generally of that intelligence and efficiency which renders them useful in the field ?
3. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another ?
4. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the sappers and miners from among whom they have risen ?

5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officer and his men weaken the influence of the European officer ?
 6. Has it been found, on the occurrence of mutinies, that the native officers of sappers and miners gave timely information, or were of use in aiding the European officers to maintain discipline ? Have they sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers ?
 7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the Bombay sappers and miners ?
- The answers already given for the infantry apply equally here.
8. When the European non-commissioned officers of sappers come upon duty with the native commissioned officers, do the European non-commissioned officers command in the absence of any European commissioned officer ?
 8. An European non-commissioned officer cannot command a native commissioned officer.
 9. Is the substitution of a full complement of European serjeants and corporals of sappers and miners to each company in lieu of its native officers advisable ?
 9. The European serjeants and corporals cannot supply the place of the native commissioned officers.
 10. If the abolition of the grades of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the native sappers, would a graduated scale of good service pay, and retiring pensions claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades ?
 11. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service ?
 12. Should the system of pensioners now in force by regulation be maintained or modified, or abolished ?
 13. If native commissioned officers are retained, should the system of promotion generally by seniority be altered, and promotion by merit and efficiency be the rule ?
 14. Are native commissioned officers of sappers and miners generally fit to take part in courts-martial ?

Answered as before.

15. Are the native commissioned officers of sappers and miners on a par in professional intelligence and efficiency with the European non-commissioned officers and privates of the sappers and miners ?
 15. The non-commissioned European officers of the native sappers are all picked men, educated at Chatham. They are greatly superior in professional acquirements and efficiency to any native officers, either commissioned or non-commissioned.
 16. What is your opinion of the system of appointing officers of the native infantry to the command of companies of native sappers and miners ? Does it work well with the engineer soldiers ; and is it advantageous as training to the European officers nominated to the duty ?
- I think that engineer soldiers are best commanded by engineer officers. Whether European officers of the line can be advantageously attached to sapper companies, for their own training and instruction, is another question. With the existing establishment of officers, none could be spared from their proper sphere of duty for such detached instruction.
17. Has the distinct organization, and the differences of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies, proved favorable to our power in India ?

18. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate Governments, to time, and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

Answered before.

SECTION IV.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of sappers and miners increased or diminished in the Bombay army?
2. During the above period, have the powers of officers of companies been increased or diminished?
3. Has the discipline of the Bombay sappers and miners been influenced by the above causes?
4. Upon what does the discipline of a body of sappers and miners mainly depend during a campaign; upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the corps?
5. Should the powers of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?
6. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of the discipline and efficiency of the Bombay sappers and miners?

Answered as before.

P. M. MELVILL, Col.,
Secretary to Government, Bombay.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Bombay artillery are comprised?
1. The golundauze battalions contain a very large proportion of Hindoos and of men from Hindostan. Fully three-fourths of the whole number are Hindoos, and two-thirds are from Hindostan.
2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Bombay artillery are composed?
2. Returns showing the races, tribes, and castes of the gun lascars have not, hitherto, been prepared.
3. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Bombay artillery are composed?
3. Returns showing these particulars in the case of the drivers have not yet been prepared.
4. Should native gunners or golundauzes continue to be enlisted, and to form part of the artillery of the Bombay army?
4. I think not.
5. Should native drivers continue to be employed with European artillery?
5. The native drivers should I think be maintained as a class, but in limited numbers. They are very useful assistants to the Europeans of a battery, and may often save them from exposure and extra fatigue, but the battery must not depend upon the native drivers for its efficiency. The European gunners, or a certain proportion of them, must be trained to drive as a part of their exercise, and thus the battery will be independent of the natives attached to it, who are too few to be dangerous, but who, by deserting, might otherwise produce much mischief.
6. From what districts are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundauze drawn?
6. Answered above.
7. From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn?
7. Answered above.

8. From what districts are the drivers taken?
8. Answered above.
9. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded by regulation or practice of the service from the golundauze of the Bombay artillery; and if so, for what reason?
9. None.
10. The same question is repeated both with respect to gun lascars and drivers.
10. None.
11. Supposing that native artillery were continued in the Bombay army, are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits for the golundauze might with advantage be enlisted?
11. I am not prepared to name any.
12. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits, for the golundauze of the Bombay artillery, for the gun lascars, and for the drivers?
12. The same as for infantry.
13. On entertainment of recruits for the golundauze, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Bombay artillery, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?
14. Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice, if golundauze continue to be enlisted?
15. The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.
16. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundauze of the Bombay artillery?
17. The same question is repeated with regard to the gun lascars and drivers?
18. How long has this form of oath been in use in the Bombay artillery?
19. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the golundauze, gun lascar, or driver when first enrolled, or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?
20. If native artillerymen continue to be used, should the different battalions be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only, or be recruited over a wide area, irrespective of districts?
21. The same question is repeated with regard to gun lascars and drivers.
22. Should the battalions or companies or troops of golundauze be homogeneous as to race or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed up together?
23. If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
24. The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and to drivers.
25. What agency should be employed for recruiting golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?
26. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?
- 13 to 26. The answers given in the infantry section are equally applicable to the artillery.
27. If native drivers be discontinued, would you replace them by Europeans raised for that duty, or by European gunners trained to the duty as part of their exercise, or by Anglo-Indians enrolled for this special duty?
27. I would not introduce any new class of native drivers. I would retain the present class, and would have the European gunners trained to drive themselves. I would thus employ the services of the natives, but at the same time make the Europeans independent of their assistance.

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P. M. Melvill.

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P. M. Melvill.

1. Are the same articles of war applicable to the European gunners, and to the golundauze of the Bombay artillery ?
 1. The articles of war for the European troops are not the same as for the golundauze.
 2. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the golundauze of the Bombay artillery ?
 2. I am not prepared to do so.
 3. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war as respects the European artillery ?
 3. I am not prepared to do so.
 4. Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same articles of war as the golundauze, and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes ?
 4. The articles of war for the native army apply to the troops of all arms and to all enlisted men ?
 5. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army ?
 6. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Bombay army ?
 7. What means are adopted to acquaint the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers with the military code under which they serve ?
 8. What proportion of the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular ?
 - 5 to 8. These questions have been answered in the infantry section.
-
1. In the Bombay artillery, what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundauzes, and drivers; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined ?
 2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the golundauze generally intelligent, useful, and efficient ?
 3. Are their requirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundauze from among whom they have risen ?
 4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another ?
 - 1 to 4. Answered in the infantry section.
 5. Do the golundauze of all grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary gun drill; at cutting fuzes, judging distances, adapting charges to mortars, &c., or do the European officers themselves execute those details ?
 5. The golundauze are instructed in every part of artillery practice to the same extent as the European gunners.
 6. Can the golundauze of the Bombay artillery frequently read English and write it ?
 6. I believe not.
 7. Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work ?
 7. Perhaps not. But natives of some class must be employed in the laboratory work of the magazines and arsenals.
 8. Does the intervention of the native commissioned officer between the European officer and his men weaken or strengthen the position and influence of the European officer ?
 9. Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundauze been found on occasions of mutiny to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European officers in checking or quelling mutiny ? Have the native officers passively or overtly sided with the mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve, and with the European officers ?
 10. If native artillery be continued in the Bombay army, should the grades of native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished ?
 - 8, 9, and 10. Answered in the infantry section.
 11. Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned officers as would give one to each gun of a battery in lieu of the native commissioned officers of golundauze be advisable ?
 11. I doubt the expediency of any such change.
 12. If the abolition of the grades of golundauze commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundauze, would a graduated scale of good service pay and retiring pensions claimable after specified periods of service be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as commissioned grades ?
 13. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundauze to the British service and the British rule ?
 - 12, 13. Answered in the infantry section.
 14. Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions ?
 14. Yes.
 15. Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Bombay artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny ?
 15. There have been no instances to the contrary.
 16. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished ?
 16. I think it should be maintained.
 17. Can you state the charge upon the finances of the Bombay presidency on account of military pensions to the native artillery of the Bombay army ?
 17. In round numbers 60,000 rupees per annum.
 18. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grade of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule ?
 19. Are commissioned officers of golundauze generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial ?
 - 18 and 19. Answered in the infantry.
 20. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency ?
 20. In the artillery probably they can hardly be so considered.
 21. Under the supposition that the artillery be wholly European, would it be advisable to assimilate it as far as practicable with the royal artillery ?
 21. For Indian service, it would be advisable to assimilate the royal artillery with that of India.
 22. What would this assimilation involve of change in the system of the Bombay artillery ?
 23. What would it involve of change in the matériel of the Bombay artillery ?

24. What modifications would it be expedient to maintain in the organization of the Bombay artillery, when assimilating it to the royal artillery in consequence of the nature of the country, climate, and service?
25. Need the matériel of the Bombay artillery, if assimilated to that of the royal artillery, be at all modified in consequence of climate and service in India?
- 22, 23, 24, and 25. These are questions of professional detail which I am not prepared to answer.
26. Do you advocate the maintenance of horse artillery at its present strength?
26. Certainly. I do advocate the maintenance of the horse artillery at its present strength at *least*. In the Bombay army there is no native horse artillery.
1. Within your experience, have the powers of the commandants of native battalions of artillery and of officers in command of golundauze batteries of the Bombay artillery been increased or diminished?
2. What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundauze of the Bombay artillery?
3. If golundauze artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers?
4. Is the efficiency of the Bombay corps of artillery affected by the number of officers taken away from corps duties for staff employment?
5. How can the demand for European officers of artillery for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of the corps of Bombay artillery?
6. Would the general standard of acquirements be lowered by any measure which, by removing the hope of staff employment, cut off the inducement which young artillery officers now have, to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches of knowledge useful to the State?

Colonel
P. M. Melvill

The questions in this section have been answered in that of the infantry.

P. M. MELVILL, Col.,
Secretary to the Government, Bombay.

No. 16.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM COLONEL DAVIDSON, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

(No. 804 of 1858, Political Department.)

Lieut.-Col. DAVIDSON, to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C. B.

Hyderabad Residency,
June 7, 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch, No. 29, under date the 21st May 1858, giving cover to a printed copy of a letter, No. 235, dated 25th November 1857, from the Honorable the Court of Directors, and appending a series of questions, to which my replies are requested.

2. These questions have been replied to *seriatim* in the accompanying enclosure, and I now proceed to offer some general observations upon the subject of the fifth paragraph of the Honorable Court's Despatch.

3. I cannot but question the policy of entertaining low caste men. They are not more submissive or amenable to authority than the high caste, although they would not be able to plead caste for some peculiar acts of disobedience. Yet all are alike disinclined to go on board ship or proceed on foreign service.

4. No secret combinations to resist authority and to refuse Government employment have been so active and so determinedly carried out as those entered into conjointly by low castes, such as artizans, sweepers, washermen, peddors, and watchmen of villages, and similar low classes. I would not refuse these men a place in our ranks, but I doubt whether enlisting them in large bodies to supply the place of the Brahmin and Rajpoot Hindostan sepoys will suppress that tendency to mutiny, which seems inherent in all classes of the natives of India (Seikhs* not excepted), when once enlisted in government employ, nor will such a measure altogether meet the difficulty Government has to contend with in reorganizing the Indian army.

5. I would propose to enlist in the Hyderabad contingent, in place of two of the present infantry regiments of sepoys, two African corps taken indiscriminately from the races inhabiting that great continent, Hottentots, Caffres, Negroes, &c., refusing no race

physically suited for a soldier in a tropical climate, and apply this principle throughout the armies of India; that is, out of every eight regiments embodied, two should be foreigners capable of serving in a tropical climate; these must be in addition to the European army serving in India.

Col. Davidson.

6. Some political difficulties have, I perceive, been anticipated in regard to the enlistment of African corps; but the arguments adduced in support of these opinions do not seem to me to carry much weight with them.

7. The native governments have long since given us a practical lesson as to their opinion of the loyalty and fidelity of the sepoy soldiery of India. It will be found that their most trusted troops were always foreign mercenaries. The Nizam has at this present moment in his employ 18,000 Arabs and about 5,000 Rohillas (Affghans), and many more of the latter tribe are in his territory seeking employment. Not a petty rajah in Guzerat but has, or endeavours to have, his Arab or foreign guard, however small it may be numerically, for the protection of his person and treasury; alleging they find the foreign mercenaries faithful, while their own immediate subjects cannot be trusted. So far as the difference of circumstances admits, we might do well to imitate the Roman policy, which jealously excluded the employment of their conquered provinces of troops native to the place, and substituted for them men having no local sympathies of country and kindred.

8. If we do not have troops of this description, I must advocate the location of a European regiment, in addition to those I have specified, somewhere near Lingsoogoor or Moodgul, whichever is found the more favourable in point of climate, and another at Ellichpore, with a sanitary station near the latter cantonment at Chickuldah. This will be a more expensive arrangement than the enrolment of African corps, and considered with reference to tropical service probably not so efficient. In both cases, barrack accommodation in addition to what I have noted in answer to the questions put will be required.

8. If the strict letter of treaties be adhered to, we might not be able to place any European infantry in the subsidiary force, excepting a few artillery-

* The Seikhs have lately been largely employed by the Minister here, and openly give out that their day is coming, and that they will yet govern Hindostan.

men. *Vide* Article 3. of treaties of 1798 and 1800 respectively.*

9. By the treaty, however, of 1853,† the Hyderabad contingent, which are now British troops, might be all Europeans, as we are only bound by it to keep up 5,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and four batteries of artillery. The description of these troops is not specified, whereas in the treaties in which the subsidiary force is alluded to, eight regiments of sepoy and two regiments of cavalry (these might be European) are mentioned. We have hitherto in keeping up the subsidiary force considered one European soldier numerically as two natives, and it is clear the specification of sepoy battalions in the treaties had reference to the expense we were bound to incur for the support of the subsidiary force, not to the exclusion of European troops, if we judged their employment expedient.

10. The Nizam has never, so far as my means of information extend, objected to the introduction of European troops for the protection of his territory, and for many years a European regiment has been stationed at Secunderabad, while the larger portion of the artillery is also European. The preservation of peace and tranquillity in his dominions has always been the chief consideration of the Nizam and his minister, and if this can be more effectually secured by the substitution of European soldiers for sepoy, without subjecting the native government to expense, I do not apprehend any objection on their part, as there certainly has not been any hitherto. It was on the minister's own application that the 12th royal lancers were added to the subsidiary force last Mohorum. Very probably the Nizam might become alarmed, were he to see a very large number of European troops added to the subsidiary forces, but I do not think the augmentation which I have now proposed would cause him any uneasiness, and we must not overlook the paramount importance of permanently asserting our power and supremacy throughout British India.

11. All cantonments, whether belonging to the subsidiary force or contingent, must have a fortified or entrenched position erected within their limits, in which should be placed magazines, arsenals, stores, &c., and in which the force could rally or rendezvous in case of any sudden outbreak. Such a place of refuge would give a sense of security to the inhabitants, and in event of the force taking the field, enable a small portion of its number to defend their cantonment while the others were absent. Secunderabad, the head-quarters of the subsidiary force, is particularly exposed and insecure. The arsenal, magazine, commissariat godowns, are all isolated and dotted over the place, instead of being collected together in one entrenchment. The cantonment in reality is a small principality, is 20 miles in circumference, with 14 villages within its boundary, and a population varying from 70,000 to 80,000 souls, and with the augmentation of the European force the inhabitants will largely increase in number.

* Article 3rd of 1798.—“The proposed reinforcement of the subsidiary troops shall be in the pay of this state from the day of their crossing the boundaries, satisfactory and effectual provision shall be made for the regular payment of this force, which, including the present detachment, is to amount to 6,000 sepoy with firelocks, with a due proportion of field pieces manned by Europeans.”

Article 3rd of 1800.—With a view to fulfil this treaty of general defence and protection his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah agrees that two battalions of sepoy and one regiment of cavalry, with their due proportion of guns and artillerymen, should be added in perpetuity to the present permanent subsidiary force of six battalions of sepoy, of 1,000 firelocks each, and one regiment of cavalry, 500 strong (with their proportion of guns and artillerymen), so that the whole subsidiary force, furnished by the Hon. East India Company to his Highness, shall henceforward consist of eight battalions of sepoy (or 8,000 firelocks), and two regiments of cavalry (or 1,000 horse), with their requisite complement of guns, European artillerymen, lascars, and pioneers, fully equipped, with warlike stores and ammunition, which force is to be stationed in perpetuity in his Highness' territories.

† Article 3rd of 1853.—The Hon. East India Company further agrees that, in lieu of his Highness' present contingent, it shall maintain for his Highness, his heirs and successors, an auxiliary force which shall be styled the “Hyderabad Contingent,” according to the provisions for the maintenance of that force, which are detailed in the sixth article of this treaty.

It shall consist of not less than 5,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, with four field batteries of artillery. It shall be commanded by British officers fully equipped and disciplined, and controlled by the British Government through its representative, the Resident at Hyderabad.

12. If we are to believe the reports from Upper India, our worst and most vindictive enemies during the late rebellion were the rabble and lower classes of our own bazaars, and as an instance of how dangerous they are here, I would mention that about twelve years ago, during the Soonee and Shiah disturbances, for three days of the riot the mob got completely the ascendancy took to indiscriminate slaughter and plunder in the city of Hyderabad, attacking and gutting any house they thought more wealthy than its neighbour, and the disturbance was only suppressed after the loss of much life and the destruction of much property, and then only upon the issue of a proclamation, with subsequent orders by the Nizam that his Arabs should cut down every armed man found parading the streets.

13. The several other cantonments in the Hyderabad territory are as equally indefensible as Secunderabad, taking into consideration their size and the number of troops stationed in them; and from what I observe here, it is not alone the higher and fighting classes that are against us, but all alike have a hostile feeling towards those whom they regard as their conquerors.

14. I have selected Aurungabad in preference to Jaulnah as a station for a European regiment (but to furnish a detachment to the latter place), as being better situated strategically, all the roads from the west and south converging there in the direction of Central India. Indeed, viewing its unfitnes as a military post, Jaulnah might be altogether abandoned; but from our long occupation of it, at one time as the head-quarters of the subsidiary force, a large and wealthy commercial town has arisen around it, within British cantonments, the defence of which the native government would neglect, and allow it to be plundered, should we evacuate it entirely. I would therefore garrison it with a couple of companies of Europeans, a wing of native infantry, a squadron of irregular cavalry, and two guns, from the nearest station.

15. The Bombay presidency could more conveniently, from proximity, furnish the European regiment for Aurungabad, it being only 70 miles from Ahmednuggur, and 140 miles from Poona, which latter place is now connected by railway with Bombay.

15. It will be observed, that I propose the entire substitution of European for native artillery, as I am of opinion that for the future we must have none of the latter class either in the Hyderabad contingent or the subsidiary force.

16. The general police in the assigned districts is not at present by any means so efficient as I could desire it should be; it ought not to be reduced numerically, but it should be organized under a military system. Its numerical strength, as proposed by the Commissioner in the schedules recently submitted by him to the Government of India, does not seem to require increase; but uniformity and discipline, now entirely wanting, must be introduced, and this, it appears to me, can only be effected by the appointment of a lieutenant to each of the four districts, in subordination to one general superintendent or captain of police.

17. The hill rangers and frontier chowkedars do not properly belong to the police of the assigned districts, but, under the sanction of the Government of India, they are paid from the revenues of these districts. The former partakes more of the character of a military body, regularly drilled and efficiently armed; their principal duty is watch the range of hills extending from Adjuntah to the Wurda river, and to furnish treasure escorts to the tehsildars within their limits. The frontier chowkedars are entirely embodied at present as they were under the native government; they are badly paid and very useless; their ostensible duty is to watch the frontier between his Highness the Nizam's country and the Bombay districts.

18. As you are evidently anxious to obtain the information required without any avoidable delay, I have not thought it desirable to detain this report until I could gather from the districts minute particulars regarding the different races which constitute the district police, as accuracy could only be arrived at by the sacrifice of time, with which the results would be perhaps but little commensurate; but I shall be happy hereafter to furnish any further information in my power on this or any other subject which you may consider requisite.

19. I have herewith enclosed a sketch map* of the Nizam's territory, with the boundaries of the assigned districts marked off, from which my plan of military occupation of the Nizam's territory will be apparent. It may be remarked, that I have made no provision for the protection or safety of the eastern and north-eastern frontiers towards Nagpore, but all that tract of country in the Nizam's dominions is very jungly and no troops can remain and live there. It has been repeatedly occupied, but has always proved so unhealthy as to make the abandonment of it compulsory. The last corps stationed was at Wur-

rungul, where a company is now located, but the station proved very feverish and unhealthy, and was at last abandoned. It has, therefore, been found more expedient to keep a strong brigade at Bobarum for despatch wherever required in the eastern districts.

Col. Davidson.

I have, &c.
CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

QUESTIONS having reference to Paragraph 5 of Despatch No. 235, of 25th November 1857, Military Department, from the Court of Directors.

1. What is the number of European troops of each arm now serving in the Nizam's territory and assigned districts, and what is their distribution?

1. The European force ordinarily stationed within the Nizam's territory, consisted only of one regiment of European infantry and two companies of artillery, but under recent circumstances it has been increased to the extent shown in the following tabular statement (*vide* return of Hyderabad subsidiary force of 1st May 1858) :—

* Per Banghy Dak

Stations.	Corps.	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Surgeon or Assistant Surgeon.	Veterinary Surgeon.	Troop Quartermaster.	Riding Master.	Apothecaries or Assistant Apothecaries.	Serjeants.	Trumpeters, Drummers, and Buglers.	Farmers.	Rank and File.	Regimental Horses.	Bullocks.	Natives attached	Total, exclusive of the last 3 columns.
Secunderabad, headquarters Hyderabad subsidiary force.	B. troop horse artillery	-	1	2	1	-	1	-	-	5	2	3	93	153	-	264	108
	12th Royal Lancers (at Trimulgherry).	2	3	11	1	1	-	1	2	30	8	4	357	339	-	564	420
	Royal artillery (at Trimulgherry).	-	2	3	1	-	-	-	1	7	1	-	94	-	-	4	109
	4th battalion artillery	-	1	-	4	1	-	-	2	9	3	1	78	103	125	130	99
	1st battalion Royals	-	4	6	30	3	-	-	3	53	20	-	1,039	-	-	24	1,158
Total	-	7	12	50	7	1	1	1	8	104	34	8	1,661	595	125	986	1,894

Jaulnah - - - { 1 squadron Dragoons - - - }
 { 2 companies European infantry - - - }
 { Half battalion European artillery } Under orders from Bombay to Jaulnah, not joined.

2. What is the number of European troops of each arm you deem necessary for the Nizam's territory and assigned districts, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

2. One regiment of European cavalry, 700 rank and file, two troops of European horse artillery, three regiments of European infantry (1,000 each), six horse batteries, of which two to belong to the subsidiary force and four to the Hyderabad contingent.

The ordinary distribution of these troops should be as follows :—

At Secunderabad.

One regiment European cavalry.
Two regiments European infantry.
Two troops European horse artillery.
Two horse batteries

At Aurungabad.

One regiment European infantry.
One horse battery (Hyderabad contingent).

In Raichore Doab.

At Lingsoogor, or elsewhere.
One horse battery (Hyderabad contingent)

At Hingolee.

One horse battery (Hyderabad contingent).

At Ellichpoor.

One horse battery (Hyderabad contingent).

A sketch map is enclosed showing the distribution of the Hyderabad subsidiary force and Hyderabad contingent.

3. What is the number of native troops of each arm now serving in the Nizam's territory and the assigned districts, and what is their distribution?

3. The native portion of the Hyderabad subsidiary force is stationed at Secunderabad with the exception of a half troop of horse artillery, and one regiment of native infantry detached for temporary employment in the Raichore Doab. The following is a return of the force as it stood on the 1st May 1858 :—

Col. Davidson. NUMBER OF TROOPS now serving in the Nizam's Territories and assigned Districts, Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

At Secunderabad. (Vide Return of Hyderabad subsidiary force for April 1858.)

Corps.	Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Surgeon.	Assistant Surgeons.	Veterinary Surgeon.	Troop Quartermaster.	Riding Master.	Apothecaries or Assistant Apothecaries.	Native Commissioned Officers.	Sergants and Havildars.	Trumpeters, Drummers, and Buglers.	Farriers.	Rank and File.	Regimental Horses.	Bullocks.	Total, exclusive of the 2 last columns.
E. troop horse artillery	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	1	1	40	67	-	50
Detachment 2nd light cavalry	1	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	15	2	4	136	124	-	168
Detachment 7th light cavalry	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	4	11	1	3	115	112	-	138
Sappers and miners -	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	45	-	-	49
7th regiment native infantry	1	2	3	-	1	-	-	-	1	10	32	17	-	474	-	-	541
9th regiment native infantry	1	2	9	-	1	-	-	-	1	17	54	18	-	618	-	-	721
10th regiment native infantry	1	-	4	-	1	-	-	-	1	6	35	10	-	385	-	-	443
42nd regiment native infantry	2	2	10	-	1	-	-	-	1	18	55	19	-	699	-	-	807
49th regiment native infantry	1	1	11	-	-	-	-	-	2	19	48	15	-	544	-	-	641
Total	7	10	42	-	4	1	-	-	8	60	258	84	8	3,056	323	-	3,558

N.B.—Of the foregoing 1 regiment native infantry and half a troop of native horse artillery are temporarily detached on field service in the Raichore Doab.

NUMERICAL STRENGTH of the Hyderabad Contingent, according to authorized establishment.

Station.	Corps.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.
Bolarum	1 company of artillery	2	177
	1 regiment cavalry	18	537
	2 regiments infantry	34	1,804
Aurangabad	1 company of artillery	3	198
	1 regiment cavalry	19	559
	1 regiment infantry	17	902
Ellichpoor	1 company artillery	3	193
	1 wing cavalry	10	280
	1 regiment infantry	17	902
Hingolee	1 company artillery	3	193
	1 wing cavalry	9	279
	1 regiment infantry	17	902
Lingsoogoor	1 detachment company artillery	1	116
	1 detachment cavalry	1	22
	1 regiment infantry	17	902
Mominabad	1 regiment cavalry	19	559
	Total	190	8,520

N.B.—Of the foregoing all available troops from those stationed at Bolarum and temporarily detached on field service in the Raichore Doab, 300 infantry and 150 horse

Of the Troops above exhibited as serving in the Nizam's Territory and assigned Districts, the following portion of the Hyderabad Contingent are now on field service in Central India :—

From Bolarum.	From Aurangabad	From Ellichpoor	From Hingolee.	From Mominabad.
Head-quarters and squadron 2nd cavalry, with Gen Whitlock's column.	2nd infantry, 4 guns, 3rd cavalry.	Wing 5th infantry, 4 guns, left wing 4th cavalry.	Right wing 4th cavalry, 4 guns, wing 3rd infantry.	1st cavalry, leaving 1 troop for protection of the station.

At Shorappoor.

2 guns, 3rd company artillery, and 2 companies 4th infantry, under an European officer.

4. What is the number of native troops you deem necessary for the Nizam's territory and the assigned districts, and what should be their ordinary distribution?

4. The troops of native horse artillery, Hyderabad subsidiary force, and the four companies of artillery Hyderabad contingent being abolished on the organization of the six European horse batteries, I would retain the present establishment and distribution of

the remaining portion of the native force, as at present constituted, viz. :—

Hyderabad Subsidiary Force.

At Secunderabad - 1 regiment native cavalry.
5 regiments native infantry.

Hyderabad Contingent.

At Bolarum - 1 regiment cavalry (less 1 detachment)
2 regiments infantry (less 2 companies)

At Aurangabad - 1 regiment cavalry.
1 regiment infantry.

At Ellichpoor - 1 wing cavalry.
1 regiment infantry.

At Hingolee - 1 wing cavalry.
1 regiment infantry.

At Lingsoogoor - 2 detachments cavalry.
1 regiment infantry.

At Mominabad - 1 regiment cavalry (less 1 detachment).

At Wurrungul - 2 companies infantry.

I would replace 2,000 of the 5,000 infantry, which by the third article of the treaty of 1853 we are bound to keep up in the Hyderabad contingent by two regiments of 1,000 each, composed of Africans, Caffres, Hottentots, and other men of the Cape.

5. What proportion of native troops now serving in the Nizam's territory and assigned districts are regulars, irregulars, and police corps; of what races are they composed, and in what proportions do the races occur?

5. The only irregular troops of those which I have enumerated are the four regiments of cavalry in the Hyderabad contingent. Police corps are not included in the foregoing statements. The police corps in the Hyderabad assigned territories may be stated as follows :—

Districts.	Officers superior to Privates or Peons.	Privates or Peons.
North Berar	80	464
South Berar	72	492
Dharaseo District	34	198
Raichore Doab	55	349
Hill Rangers	19	163
Frontier Chowkies	21	238
Total	281	1,904

The native cavalry and horse artillery of the subsidiary force are composed principally of Musselmans and Mahrattas, descendants from and connected with

the ancient military retainers of the Nabobs of the Carnatic and the Rajahs of Tanjore and Mysore. The infantry are recruited principally from the districts of the Northern Circars, Arcot, Vellore, Coimbatore and Trichinopoly.

The following tabular statements show the races of which the subsidiary force and Hyderabad contingent are composed, and the proportion in which they occur.

SUBSIDIARY FORCE.

	Hindoos.	Mussulmans.	Inferior Castes.	Christians.	Per-centage.			
	All Ranks.	All Ranks.	All Ranks.	All Ranks.	Hindoos.	Mussulmans.	Inferior Castes.	Christians.
Cavalry	52	247	—	9	16·883	80·195	—	3·922
Artillery	None present.							
Infantry	1,811	1,155	128	182	55·281	35·256	3·907	5·556
Total	1,863	1,402	128	191	51·981	39·118	3·871	5·327

HYDERABAD CONTINGENT.

	Hindoos.		Mussulmans.		Inferior Castes.		Christians.		Per-centage.			
	Native Officers	Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	Hindoos.	Mussulmans.	Inferior Castes.	Christians.
Cavalry	8	808	73	1,025	—	13	—	19	13·470	85·160	—	555·809
Artillery	10	309	2	209	—	99	—	—	50·716	33·545	—	15·739·0
Infantry	70	2,072	30	1,879	—	1,441	—	31	38·783	34·565	—	26·091·561
Total	88	2,689	105	4,013	—	1,553	—	50	—	—	—	—
Grand total	2,777	—	4,118	—	1,553	—	50	—	32·678	48·469	—	18·275·588

It would inconveniently delay this report to obtain the same minute information regarding the police of the districts, and it may be sufficient to state that in Berar and the Dharaseo district, the district police comprises Mahrattas of all castes and Mussulmans. In northern Berar the Mussulmans predominate, in south Berar they are about equal. In the Dharaseo district, Hindoos greatly outnumber the Mussulmans, while in the Raichore Doab, there is no great preponderance on either side, the Hindoo portion consisting of Combees, Rajpoots, and Bedurs, and a small portion of Dhers. In all the districts, as a general rule, the village watch is kept by Mahars and Mangs.

6. What proportions of your proposed establishment of native troops should be regulars, irregulars, and police?

I do not propose to disturb the present proportion of regular, irregular, and police corps, but the last I consider under their present organization an utterly inefficient body of men. There is an entire absence of uniformity and discipline; these I would introduce and strictly enforce, and with this view would recommend a European superintendent to be placed over the whole, and an assistant over each police district.

7. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in the Nizam's territory and assigned districts? and state the ratios both inclusive and exclusive of police corps.

7. The troops which I have proposed to be employed in these territories may be summed up as follows:—

EUROPEAN.	
1 regiment of European cavalry	700
3 " " infantry	3,000
2 troops of European horse artillery	200
6 horse batteries	600
Total Europeans	4,500

NATIVES.

Subsidiary Force.

1 regiment native cavalry	350
5 " " infantry	4,000
Total	4,350

Hyderabad Contingent.

4 regiments irregular cavalry	2,336
6 regiments native infantry	5,412
Total	7,748

Police.

District	1,744
Hill rangers and frontier chowkies	441
Total	2,185

Total native troops	12,098
Total police	2,185

Total natives - 14,283

Proportion of European to Native troops.

Exclusive of police	1 European to 3·68 natives.
Inclusive of police	1 European to 3·17 natives.

The substitution of 2,000 Africans for 2,000 of the infantry contingent would leave the natives of India in proportion to the remainder of the forces as 1·88 to 1, or something less than two-thirds of the former to one-third of the latter.

8. What proportion should the European bear to the native troops in India generally? and state the ratios as affected by the inclusion or exclusion of native police corps.

8. I am of opinion that throughout India generally, there should be a proportion of one-third of Europeans to two-thirds of natives of India, inclusive of sepoy and police.

9. Is there adequate barrack accommodation for the European troops now serving in the Nizam's territory and assigned districts? and state its amount.

9. There is ample accommodation for European troops now serving in the Nizam's territory and assigned districts, as the barracks now available would hold conveniently about 3,000 men.

10. Would additional barrack accommodation have to be provided in the Nizam's territory and assigned districts, for the strength of European troops you deem necessary, and to what extent?

10. In event of the European force being increased to the extent herein proposed by me, at Secunderabad, four new ranges of barracks, with four ranges of buildings for married men would be required, with auxiliary buildings, and the addition of family quarters to the old infantry barracks, plans and estimates for which latter buildings have been already called for by the Madras Government. At Aurungabad barrack accommodation for 1,000 men would require to be built, and for a horse battery at Bolarum, Hingolee, and Ellichpoor.

CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

(No. 665.)

Lieut.-Col. DAVIDSON to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

Hyderabad Residency,
June 28, 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to forward replies to the series of questions enclosed in your letter of the 16th instant, No. 70.

I have, &c.
CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

Col. Davidson.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent is composed ?
 1. Mussulmans, Brahmins, Rajpoots, Mahrattas, Jelingees, Tamil Maungs, Bedurs, and other inferior castes ; Indo-Britons as musicians.
 2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from ?
 2. Hindoostan, Northern Circars, Carnatic, Baramahal, Ceded Districts, Deccan.
 3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Hyderabad contingent ?
 3. Formerly none ; but since the mutinies recruiting from Hindustan has been forbidden, but this restriction might advantageously be removed hereafter.
 4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
 4. None are precluded.
 5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts from whence recruits for the Hyderabad contingent are obtained ?
 5. Men returning from furlough bring their relatives or friends on the chance of being enlisted by commanding officers ; no separate recruiting parties are organized.
 6. On enlistment of recruits what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts ?
 6. None.
 7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoy, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken ?
 7. None.
 8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Hyderabad contingent ?
 8. Exclude Brahmins entirely.
 9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
 9. Those laid down in the articles of war.
 10. How long has this form being in use in the Hyderabad contingent ?
 10. Since 1854.
 11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording, or matter of the oath administered to the recruits for the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
 11. The oath is perfectly valueless. I do not know of any form that would make it more binding.
 12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the of seafaring habits ; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes ?
 13. Has the any marine corps ; and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited ?
 - No replies required to Nos. 12 and 13.
 14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only ?
 14. No.
 15. Or, should each corps be recruited over a wide area ; in fact, without reference to districts ?
 15. Certainly.
 16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste ?
 16. No.
 17. If a corps is not homogeneous will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste, or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company ?
 17. The tribes and castes should be mixed up in each company.
 18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained ?
 18. One-third Mussulman, two-thirds Hindoos of various castes, and natives of different tribes.
 19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts ?
 19. For police purposes, the men of the district should be recruited.
 20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
 20. Certainly not.
 21. What agency should be employed for recruiting for the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
 21. Leave it to the officers commanding regiments.
 22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency ?
 22. Leave it to the district officers.
 23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
 23. I do not think any precautions are necessary.
 24. Should similar, or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the assigned districts ?
 24. I do not think any precautions are necessary.
 25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise ?
 26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred ?
 27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting ?
 28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments ?
 29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief ?
 30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops ?
 31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements ?

32. How should such companies be armed? with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated? No replies required to Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32.

33. How should the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent be armed?

33. With percussion fusils or muskets of a lighter kind than the present one in use.

34. How should police corps in the assigned district be armed?

34. With swords and one half with fusils.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

No reply required to No. 35.

36. How should the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent be dressed with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

36. Tunic and a cloth turband of the description daily used by the men in their undress. The uniform should not be changed with every mutation of dress by the European soldiery, which is often very frequent in India.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

40. Would such a system be favorable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence, and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

No replies required to Nos. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42.

CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the Hyderabad contingent?

1. The code is at present too complicated, should be divested of technicalities of a legal nature; a simple charge should be drawn up, and, on conviction, the sentence left to the discretion of the court.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

2. They should be retained as at present.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Hyderabad contingent?

3. It does not. The judge-advocate in revising the trials has almost always to remark on inaccuracies,

either in drawing up charges or that the sentence is not in accordance with some particular article on which the charge was framed. Guilt thus often escapes punishment, which should not be the case in a military code. Occasionally, too, the prejudices and modes of thought of the native court are not in accordance with European ideas of law and justice, and a conviction can hardly be expected in such cases, or if a sentence is passed, it appears absurd according to our views of discipline and military law. I have on several occasions known the native soldier to apply for an European in preference to a native court-martial. I should, for this and other reasons, which will easily present themselves, be inclined to direct all charges of a grave and important nature to be tried by a court composed entirely of European officers.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Hyderabad contingent with the military code under which they live and are governed?

4. Certain articles laid down in the articles of war are read; but generally the man cannot comprehend the classification of charges and offences.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?

5. A regiment consists of 919 men, including native commissioned and non-commissioned officers; of this number, at an average, 80 men can read and write, and 146 can merely sign their names, while the rest are totally illiterate.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the assigned districts of the Nizam's territory?

6. The hill rangers in North Berar are amenable to the native articles of war, with that exception no organized body of police exists in the assigned districts.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the assigned districts of the Nizam's territory?

7. There are no police corps in the assigned districts.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

8. There are no police corps in the assigned districts.

CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Hyderabad contingent what is the system of promotion, is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. On merit and seniority, combined with efficiency.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. Yes, as far as the duties at present required from them extend.

8. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

3. No.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. They are expected to read and write, and have a knowledge of the elements of drill.

5. No reply required.

Col. Davidson.

6. Has it been found in the Hyderabad contingent that on the occurrence of mutinies the native officers have given timely information or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

6. There has been no general mutiny of any infantry corps of the contingent during the forty years it has been in existence. On a late occasion, when a portion of a cavalry corps of the contingent mutinied, the conduct of two or three men of the infantry implicated was brought to notice by the native officers, and the good conduct of the regiment was attributed to the fidelity of the native officers who decidedly took the side of the European officers.

No replies required to 7, 8, 9.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?

10. No; the native soldiery act so much on impulse that they are reckless of the sacrifice of their pensions.

11. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion by merit and efficiency be the rule?

11. The promotion by seniority is most objectionable, promotion should be made solely for merit and efficiency.

12. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?

12. The pensions should be retained.

13. What is the charge to the State of the military pensions to native officers and men of the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent?

13. About 99,176 Company's rupees per annum.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

14. Yes, to a certain extent. Vide answer to Question 3, under the head of Military Code, &c.

No replies required to Nos. 15 and 16.

17. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

17. An European officer to command, a native commissioned officer to every hundred men.

18. No reply required to No. 18.

19. In police corps, is there on first admission any test or examination as to capabilities of reading and writing, or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

19. None.

No replies required to Nos. 20 and 21.

CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

(No. 701.)

From Lieut.-Col. DAVIDSON to Lieut.-Col.
DURAND, C.B.

Hyderabad Residency,
July 8, 1858.

SIR,

In transmitting the replies to the several queries contained in paper No. 4, headed European officers, I avail myself of your invitation to make a few general observations on the queries numbered 8 to 19, to which specific answers are not required to be entered.

1. I consider that the influence of a good and efficient European officer is felt equally in time of peace and war.

2. A native regiment should never be numerically stronger than 800 men with a reserve company when on foreign service. I would employ the native army in every manner in which soldiers are ordinarily used, and would never listen to excuses of caste or anything of a similar nature when a soldier's duty was to be performed. It only requires a little time and energy to get rid of a system of petting and persuasion which has been the ruin of one of the native armies.

3. The Hyderabad contingent has been numerically small for the many military duties required of it, so that it could hardly be employed on public works; so employing the soldier is most legitimate, and with proper working money paid, any amount of labor might be obtained; the work should be paid for by the piece and not by daily hire.

4. Native corps have fought well, both with a full complement and with a small number of European officers, so there is no criterion to judge from. Then, again, the natives troops have fought at times most devotedly under their native commissioned officers alone; inefficiency and decrepitude should be got rid of, and the native commissioned officers selected in proportionate numbers from different castes; the grade will then be beneficial to the native army, indeed I doubt whether with any safety they could be dispensed with. For good and evil they have great influence with their men, although they often now-a-days deny it.

5. I would attach cadets in the first instance to European corps.

6. If a smaller number of Europeans are to be attached to native corps, they must be selected for their smartness, efficiency, and knowledge of the native character. The paucity of European officers with a regiment of natives does not in my opinion cause its inefficiency, provided the commanding officer is vested with authority to cause the men under his command to look to him for their advancement or degradation.

7. The system that has crept into the native army of judge advocates commenting on sentences of court-martial strictly legal, objecting to their severity, and in many instances causing them to be annulled, although confirmed by the commanding officer, operates most detrimentally on the discipline of regiments. It is obvious that the character of the individual or the motive by which a commanding officer may be induced to give effect to a sentence, apparently severe, for the specified offence, cannot be arrived at from the mere perusal of the proceedings.

8. All the acts of a commanding officer are brought before the commander-in-chief, and if the exercise of the full power with which he should be invested are injudiciously exercised, his removal from command would be preferable to lowering his authority in the eyes of the men.

9. The employment of regimental officers on staff duties enables Government to have a wide selection, and offers an honorable ambition for exertion on the part of the officers. I think the desire to fit themselves generally for any employment under Government would vanish if officers knew they had no hopes of any other occupation than regimental duty, such a regulation would therefore necessarily narrow and confine the studies and exertions of every officer in the army.

I have, &c.

CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

INFANTRY.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Hyderabad contingent? and state the orders or measures or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect.

1. No alteration has taken place.

2. During the above period have the powers of European officers, not commanding officers, been increased or diminished ?
2. No.
3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent.
3. No answer required.
4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of European officers not commanding officers of corps ?
4. No answer required.
5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps ; upon the distant authority of headquarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment ?
5. The men should look to their immediate commanding officer ; too much interference from headquarters lessens the commanding officer in the estimation of the men.
6. Should the power of commanding officers and of subordinate European officers be increased or diminished ?
6. The power should be increased.
7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline ?
7. The commanding officer should have the power of summarily dismissing bad characters ; his recommendations for promotion to higher grades should be attended to, and he should be invested with authority to reduce non-commissioned officers to the ranks for misconduct.
8. Is the influence of the European officers among the native troops greatest in time of peace or in time of war ?
8. No replies required to Questions 8 to 19 inclusive.

To queries 8 to 19, *vide* observations in transmitting letter No. 701, dated 8th July 1858.

CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

(No. 771.—Military Department.)

From Lieut.-Col. DAVIDSON to Lieut.-Col.
DURAND, C.B.

Hyderabad Residency,
August 3, 1858.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to forward my replies to the series of queries, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, cavalry.

I have, &c.
C. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent is composed ?
1. All races, the only stipulation being that the soldier enlisted is "ashraff," that is, born of a respectable father.
2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from ?
2. Every district throughout India, principally from the Deccan, Rohilkund, Meywar, and Delhi.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, either by the regulations or the practice of the ?
3. None.
4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
4. No.
5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
5. On the first embodiment of the Nizam's cavalry, now cavalry Hyderabad contingent, we induced as many of the chiefs in the Hyderabad service as possible to join our standard with their followers. At present we recruit almost entirely from the relations of the men residing with them in the lines. The supply is ample, indeed so much so that in a very few days another regiment from the "oomedwars" (expectants), living on their relations, could be raised. These men are all taught to ride from their earliest infancy, and are also made to have a more than usual pride in their horse and their sword.
6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of the districts ?
6. None.
7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken ?
7. Only to ascertain the man is ashraff, that one relative is in the service, who is security for his good conduct, and that he can ride well, and use his arms.
8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice relative to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
8. None necessary.
9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
9. That laid down in the articles of war.
10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
10. From the year 1856, when they were put under the articles of war ; before that no oath was taken. They were governed by their own military customs, and tried by punchayet.
11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent when first enrolled ?
11. I think no oath is necessary ; you cannot ensure a native's fidelity by administering one.
12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Hyderabad contingent be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only ?
12. Certainly not.
13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Hyderabad contingent be recruited over a wide area ; in fact, without reference to districts ?
13. Yes.

Col. Davidson.

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be homogeneous as to race or caste?
14. This is much left to the native officers. There is often a complete "barbunde," or clan, in one troop. Then again, another is formed of different races and castes, and both have done excellent service.
15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be composed of rissalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?
15. Mixed up together.
16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?
16. One-third Hindoos and Seikhs, the rest from fighting classes of Mahomedans, who have often violent antipathies to each other. Thus, you seldom find the Nagurs (converted Hindoos from Rajpootanah), the Meywattees, Shajehanpoor, Mhow, and Delhi men fraternize, except as being all Mahomedans.
17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?
17. I have shown above no agency is required.
18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?
18. None. Their instrumentality is not required.
19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?
19. I have given this subject now, and for many years back, much consideration, and I have come to the conclusion, a troop of Europeans should form a component part of each corps of irregular cavalry. Without entering into the question further, I would beg to remark, there is no doubt a good irregular cavalry corps is always desirous of emulating European dragoons when in the field together, and are anxious to show they can equal them in courage; besides a well-drilled troop of Europeans in each irregular corps would tend to keep the irregulars up to the mark in the way of smartness, and prevent a laxity in discipline too common to Asiatic soldiers.
20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India; or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?
20. Should be selected from the European cavalry corps in the first instance. Time can alone tell whether it should be enlisted for, and drafted all together into the irregular cavalry corps, or form an integral part of the European cavalry. I am inclined to think the latter as conducive to a better state of discipline, and that the troop should be periodically relieved; but that the relief should occur at a minimum period of five years. Then, again, as being actually embodied in the irregular cavalry, there would be altogether on all sides more *esprit de corps*.
21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?
21. Close at hand, forming a portion of the lines of the irregular cavalry corps.
22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?
22. I do not see that it necessarily should do so; of course, an extra commissariat establishment will be necessary, if no other European troops are cantoned at the same station.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed, with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?
23. If forming a component part of the irregular cavalry corps, should be armed in a similar manner; if not, should retain the arms of the regiment of the European cavalry to which they properly belong.
24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be armed? Does the arming of this highly efficient cavalry admit of improvement?
24. Yes; the front rank is now armed with spear (lance), sword, and one pistol, and the rear rank with carbine and sword. I think there should be only ten carbines to each troop. The spear is a favorite weapon with the irregular cavalry horseman, and sometimes they use it in a wonderful manner, at all times among broken masses and in pursuit it is formidable. The spears and swords of the Hyderabad irregular cavalry are excellent, the fire-arms generally bad. I would recommend the pistols to be all revolvers and the carbines breach-loading. I know it has been argued that we ought not to arm the native soldier too well; I consider that our object should be to have a soldier as efficient as possible, and to arm him badly is to do away with that efficiency; besides, furnishing him with or allowing him to retain bad arms, implies a suspicion of his fidelity, which he will not be slow to understand, and it will be as well to banish such ideas from his mind. It would put the Hyderabad cavalry to a great expense if called upon to furnish themselves with these new fire-arms, I therefore think the Government should provide them; it would be a handsome and graceful compliment and reward for the man's late services in Central India, and would be appreciated by all ranks. It would be advantageous to Government as furnishing them with a body of native cavalry as warlike, and in this manner as efficiently armed, as any in India.
25. Has any advantage been derived from the dress and equipments of the troopers of the regular native cavalry, &c., &c.?
25. No reply required.
26. Do the dress and equipments of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent admit of improvement?
26. The dress and equipments should not be changed, except so far as to suit the latter to the new fire-arms recommended in the preceding answer.

CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?
1. I would recommend the simplification of the present code, free of its present restrictions leaving the court to award what they may deem a suitable punishment for the offence.
2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
2. No.
3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?
3. Yes. Circular instructions were issued to officers commanding corps, on the cavalry being made amenable to the articles of war in 1856, requiring them to use the power with which they are invested, to instruct the court not to award corporal punishment or hard labour in irons for offences of a military nature.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Hyderabad contingent irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed ?
4. There are certain articles read in conformity with the articles of war; the men are generally perfectly indifferent and ignorant as to the legal application of the code, which is beyond a native soldier's apprehension.
5. What proportion of the troopers of the Hyderabad contingent irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular.
5. One-fourth of a corps who can read and write.

CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, what is the system of promotion, is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined ?
1. Promotion is based on merit in the first grade but afterwards on merit and seniority combined.
2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent generally intelligent, useful, and efficient ?
2. Very intelligent, as a body useful and efficient.
3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen ?
3. Not generally ; but in the ranks there are men of good vernacular education.
4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another ?
4. It is ascertained that they are acquainted with their duty.
5. No reply required.
6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny ? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers ?
6. On a late occasion, when a part of a cavalry corps, that has since done excellent service, evinced symptoms of mutiny, it was at the instigation of some of the native officers, the greater proportion remained faithful to their European officers, and by their endeavours the men had returned, and were actually in performance of their duty, before a body of Europeans arrived to coerce and punish the principal offenders.
- 7, 8, and 9. No replies required.
10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule ?
10. The Hyderabad cavalry were not in the receipt of pensions previous to 1855.
11. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished ?
11. The system of pensions should be maintained, but the code modified to place the irregular cavalry on something like an equality with the infantry, and in proportion to their superior rate of pay.
- The pension of a subadar of infantry whose pay is Company's rupees 41. 5. 2. (3rd class), after 20 years' service amounts to Company's rupees 20. 10. 7., while that of a ressaidar, the corresponding cavalry rank, is Company's rupees 7, he receiving pay of

Company's rupees 150. The same relative disproportion exists in the other grades. The wound pensions are very inadequate the gradation laid down in the classification of the injury received is not, in my opinion, the test of the amount of pension which resolves itself to the sowar, that being disabled in the service of the State and pensioned, he loses his maintenance and is unable to support his family. At the time the cavalry were not entitled to pensions, exceptional cases for wounds were always admitted and more adequate grants conferred.

Col. Davidson

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent ?
12. The amount of pensions is very trifling, as the cavalry have only participated in the grant since 1855.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if at all in operation) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule ?

13. Promotion to the grade of native officer should be by selection for merit and efficiency, without any regard to seniority ?

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial ?

14. Yes.

Questions 15 and 16.
No replies required.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingency ?

No.

Questions 18 to 23.
No replies required.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent draw its horses ?

24. Generally from Bombay and the Deccan.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent ?

25. Average price of remounts is 400 company's rupees.

Questions 26, 27, and 28.
No replies required.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Hyderabad contingent ?

29. The new rate of pay for a silladar is Company's rupees 30, of which one-third goes to the bargeer and two-thirds for the maintenance of the horse.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign ?

30. The Hyderabad cavalry are capitally mounted, and thoroughly efficient ; but a protracted campaign would ruin the silladars on their present rate of pay.

30 b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt ?

30 b. The Hyderabad cavalry are much embarrassed by debt.

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent ?

31. The pay of a silladar in the Deccan should be 35 or 40 rupees a month ; the native government pay their silladars from 40 to 55.

Col. Davidson.

32. What is the system of the Hyderabad contingent with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests or not? Are they favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and equipments, and to the conduct of duty?
32. The market value of an assamee averages 1,200 to 1,400 rupees. No restrictions are made in the number of the assamees held by native officers and silladars.
- I consider that the fact of native officers or silladars holding large pagahs gives them a stake and ensures their loyalty, and enables the proprietors to maintain their horses and equipments in a better state of efficiency than those who hold one or two horses. No silladar should be an owner of less than 10 horses.
33. What is the pay of mounted police in the assigned districts?
33. There is no body of mounted police as yet organized in the assigned districts.
34. What is the organization of the mounted police of the assigned districts?
34. *Vide* answer to 33.
35. Of what races, tribes, or castes is the mounted police of the assigned districts composed?
35. *Vide* answer to 33.
36. How is the mounted police recruited, that is, what is the agency employed, the precautions taken before or by the local authorities in entertaining them?
36. *Vide* answer to 33.
37. Where districts are large and duty heavy, has the pay of the mounted police at rupees per mensem been found adequate, and the police proved well mounted and efficient?
37. *Vide* answer to 33.
38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse, such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?
38. *Vide* answer to 33.

CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience have the powers of commandants of corps of the Hyderabad contingent cavalry been increased or diminished?
1. Has been much decreased in the last 20 years.

When I entered the Nizam's contingent in 1836, the commandant was supreme in his corps.

Question 2.
No reply required.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?
3. The discipline has been much injured by the diminution of the authority and powers of the commandant, and allowing the men to look to other sources for reward and promotion?

Questions 4 and 5.
No replies required.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?
6. Increased. A commandant's power in an irregular cavalry corps cannot be too great. If he has any fault of temper, want of activity and energy, he should be removed; but his authority, except subject to supervision, should be really supreme.

Questions 7 to 12.
No replies required.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?
13. I would select the best riders and most intelligent and active officers I could obtain from the cavalry and infantry of the Indian armies, and train them to the irregular cavalry work with those corps.

Question 14.
No reply required.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?
15. All the cavalry corps of the Hyderabad contingent were complete in their complement of European officers during the late mutinies. I do not consider a full or incomplete complement of officers has ever had anything to do with mutinies; they are generally brought about by impulses, and an inherent restlessness and desire of change and plunder common to every native soldier in India.

Questions 17 to 22.
No replies required.

CUTH. DAVIDSON,
Resident.

Hyderabad Residency, August 3, 1858.

No. 17.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM WILLIAM MUIR, ESQ.

W. Muir, Esq. (No. , of 1858.)
From WILLIAM MUIR, Esq., to Lieut.-Col. DURAND,
C.B.

SIR, Allahabad, September 13, 1858.
I HAVE the honor to subjoin some observations, for the consideration of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India, on the Indian army, as required by your circular letters Nos. 32 and 72, dated 21st May and 16th June.

2. My ignorance of professional details renders it unnecessary to follow your questions seriatim; but they will form a guide for the order of my remarks.

Number of European Troops for the North Western Provinces.

3. The extremely limited number of European troops for many years cantoned in these provinces has without doubt been a leading cause of the growing self-importance exhibited by the sepoy army. One of the honestest of themselves told Mr. Colvin, when endeavouring to elicit the causes of dissatisfaction, "It is we who have conquered India for you, from Ceylon to Peshawur." The idea once entertained was confirmed by all that the sepoys saw around them. From Meerut to Calcutta the European regiments were scattered singly at distances of three and four hundred

miles. Seeing this absence of European force, the sepoys were not unnaturally puffed up with the notion that they were essential to our existence, and that the fabric of our empire rested almost solely on one pillar,—the sepoy army.

Must be sufficient to crush the Idea of successful Opposition by the Native Army.

3. This is a notion which must never be possible again to grow up, if we are to govern the country with security and advantage.

But may be rendered less numerous by breaking up the Native Army into unconnected Parts.

4. No doubt the new form in which our native army is to be reproduced may of itself, to a great extent, prevent or limit the grounds for such a notion. In proportion to the degree in which the native army is broken up into provincial battalions and local forces, it will lose its sense of unity, independence, and concentrated power; and there will not be the same danger of the attempt, even in imagination, at measuring itself with the British in India.

But the late general Mutiny will make the Idea of Opposition more easy of Suggestion than it was before.

5. On the other hand, the fact of the sepoy army having once combined, and kept us long at bay, however, in the end unsuccessfully, will not be forgotten; and the idea will, *ceteris paribus*, recur in future more naturally and certainly than in past times. To be sure of repressing the thought of independence and of combination, the standing European force, available for the field, must be of a strength palpably and beyond all question in the mind of the native army, to overawe and render hopeless any combination amongst them.

Lowest scale of Troops in these Parts that which could cope either with the Punjabee or Hindoostanee Troops.

6. Happily the two centres of warlike races in northern India have no sympathy with each other. The Punjab (with due precautions on our part) is not likely to fraternize with the North-western Provinces. The lowest possible limit, therefore, of European troops consistent with the maintenance of a secure footing in the country, is that European force which would at any moment afford moveable troops sufficient to crush either the Punjabee or the Hindoostanee army. This would be the minimum to secure our continuance in India against the chances of disaffection and mutiny. We must be able at any hour to cope with either class of soldiers.

Necessity for large Brigades at a few prominent Positions throughout the Country.

7. But for the successful government of India it is necessary to provide something further. The very idea of independence must be checked in the native troops; and, for this purpose, the European forces must be of sufficient amount, and so distributed, as, in all parts of the land, to show that a force could be rapidly brought into the field able to overpower any classes of native troops that chose to combine. The power of throwing into the field a moveable column must be seen and felt everywhere. This will be best secured by posting brigades of such strength as to be able to furnish a moveable column of European troops at convenient, and not very distant, posts throughout the country. Such an arrangement would, I conceive, afford more palpable evidence of our power than the same amount of European troops distributed in small bodies at various posts, from which they could not be brought together so as to form a powerful moveable body without delay, and without the appearance of denuding outposts.

Brigade Stations.—Allahabad, Meerut, Lucknow.

8. For the North-western Provinces, I think, two such first-class posts would be needed, viz., Allahabad and Meerut. As Oudh is properly a portion of those provinces, I mention, as a third brigade station, Lucknow. These points would command Meerut, the

western districts; Allahabad, the eastern; and Lucknow, the trans-Ganges province, including Rohilcund.

W. Maur, Esq.

Agra will be protected by Gwalior.

9. I do not propose any such brigade at Agra, as, I presume, there will be a powerful European armament at Gwalior, in place of the late contingent, which would effectually secure that frontier.

For Rajpootana—Gwalior, Nusseerabad, Mhow.

10. For Rajpootana there should be two other European brigades at Nusseerabad and Mhow, the cost of which would be properly debitable to Rajpootana and Bundelcund, for the security and protection of which they would be mainly required.

Bengal—Nagpoor, Calcutta, Dinapoor.

11. I conclude that European brigades will likewise be provided for Nagpoor, Calcutta, and Dinapoor.

Madras and Bombay need not have such strong Brigades.

12. With Northern and Eastern India thus protected, the European forces required for Madras and Bombay need not be of corresponding strength.

Punjab.—Strength of Brigades.

13. Each brigade station should have three, and the less important two, regiments of European infantry, a regiment of European cavalry, two European batteries, and a reserve artillery company. The chief brigade stations would thus have, available for the field, two European infantry and one cavalry regiment with two batteries, leaving behind an infantry regiment and the reserve company of artillery to guard the cantonment with its magazine and treasury.

Brigades of this Nature would provide Force sufficient for internal Security and ordinary external Defence.

14. Such brigades, distributed in the manner I have ventured to suggest, would not only secure our footing in this country against any possible rising or combination of native troops, but would render the very idea of combination so hopeless that it would never be contemplated. This would be a peace and not a war establishment; but still, in concert with the native army, thus obliged to maintain its faithfulness, the European force would be always ready to repel foreign attack. An army of 18,000 to 20,000 European troops could be brought together on an emergency, the brigade stations being still held in something of the following manner:—

CIRCLE.	Brigade Stations.	Available Field Force				Total.	
		Infantry	Cavalry.	Artillery Troops or Batteries.	Infantry Regiments	Cavalry Regiments	Artillery Troops or Batteries.
N. W. Provinces	Meerut - - -	2	1	2			
	Allahabad - - -	2	1	2			
	Lucknow - - -	2	1	2			
Rajpootana and Central India	Gwalior - - -	2	1	2			
	Nusseerabad - - -	2	1	2			
	Mhow - - -	2	1	2			
Punjab	Three similar stations	-	-	-	6	3	6
Bengal	Calcutta - - -	1	0	1			
	Dinapore - - -	1	1	1			
	Nagpoor - - -	1	1	1			
Madras	Two brigade stations	2	1	2	3	2	3
Bombay	Two brigade stations	2	1	2	2	1	2

15. This would require for the supposed 16 brigade stations throughout India the following force:*

	Infantry	Cavalry.	Artillery	Total.
For moveable columns - -	25,000	5,200	2,500	32,700
To garrison 16 brigade stations	16,000	-	1,600	17,600
Total - - -	41,000	5,200	4,100	50,300

* An European regiment being estimated at 1,600 men, a cavalry at 400, and a battery troop or company at 100.

W. Muir, Esq.

Central Stations.

16. But besides these main military posts there are other important central points, which must be guarded by European troops. I refer chiefly to the divisional head-quarters of civil administration. In case of frontier war, our hold must be firmly retained upon our own districts in order to the successful maintenance of government, the provision of supplies, and the collection of revenue. Our central treasurers will also be at these stations, and late events have shown that treasure to any large extent cannot, with security, be left to the guardianship of native troops. The divisional stations must accordingly be held by bodies of European troops sufficient to guard against any chances of surprise or treason. The divisional stations should have forts or entrenchments, where the magazine and bulk of the treasure would be safe under a permanent European garrison; besides which, the force should be of sufficient strength to admit of a small detachment of Europeans taking the field when necessary.

Enumerated.

17. The following would be the divisional stations:—1, Bareilly; 2, Agra; 3, Benares; 4, Goruckpore; 5, Saugor; 6, Jubbulpore; 7, Jhansi. Each should have half a European regiment, a squadron of cavalry, a battery or troop of artillery, (for some of the stations a half battery might suffice,) and a reserve company or half company for the fortress or entrenchments. Saugor might have a full corps; or half a corps might be posted at Nagode, debitable to the Bundelcund states. In all, probably, eight infantry regiments, three or four cavalry regiments, six or seven batteries, and three or four reserve companies, would be required.

Minor Stations.

18. There would still remain about 29 or 30 stations, the head-quarters of district civil administration, to be provided for. They are as follows:—

Divisions	Districts.
Meerut	- Dehra: will be protected by the European depôt or sanatorium at Mussoorie. Seharunpore. Mozuffernuggur. Boolundshuhur. Allyghur.
Rohilcund	- Bijnore. Moradabad. Budaon. Shahjehanpore.
Agra	- Muttra. Etawah. Mynpoorie. Etah. Furruckabad.
Allahabad	- Cawnpore. Futtehpore. Banda.
Benares	- Jounpore. Mirzapore. Azimghur. Ghazeepore.
Goruckpore	- A second district will probably be formed out of this enormous tract, and will add to this list.
Jhansi	- Humeerpore. Jaloun (Calpee). Chundeyree (Scindiah's district).
Jubbulpore	- Mundla. The four first are minor districts. Seonie. Dumoh. Bartool. Nursingpore. Hoshungabad.
Kumaon	- Almora. Ghurwal. This will not require European troops.

Divisions.	Districts.
Jawud	- Jawud Neemuch (Rajpootana).
Nimar	- Nimar (Central India).
Ajmere	- Mhairwara.

Districts belonging to the North-western Provinces omitted.

19. Jawud Neemuch, being in Rajpootana, hardly falls within this scheme. But I have noted it as belonging to the north-western provinces. It would probably occupy the place of a second-class or divisional station, if indeed political reasons do not justify the locating of an entire European corps there.

Some minor Districts may be left out of account.

20. Mhairwara will be provided from Nussurabad, and Ninar from Mhow. Some of the small districts as Dehra, Etah, the Minor Saugor and Nerbudda districts, and Ghurwa may also be left out of account. There remain some 25 to be considered.

21. These are all centres of administration, having each a district treasury, several European officers with their establishments, and in many cases large cities close by.

Fortresses or Entrenchments.

22. Some of them are already provided with strong forts of old standing, as Allyghur, Almora, Furruckabad, while at others,* since the outbreak, measures have been taken for the construction of fortifications or entrenchments of greater or less strength.

Should exist at all Chief District Head-quarters.

23. It is important that forts or entrenchments of this kind should exist at all the chief district head-quarters, as places of refuge in case of any unexpected danger, and a receptacle for the treasure which must to some extent accumulate between each despatch to the central treasury. They should all have at least two or three pieces of light artillery; the larger forts, as Allyghur, Cawnpore, Furruckabad, would, I presume, be armed with heavy ordnance.

And be permanently garrisoned by European Troops.

24. It is equally important that all such forts should have permanently a garrison of European troops trained to artillery practice, of greater or smaller number (say from 200 to 300 men), according to the extent and military requirements of each.

25. Some might possibly be provided for by detachments from neighbouring stations; but the forces at the brigade posts ought not, I conceive, to be frittered away on this work.

A Garrison Corps would provide for this Want.

26. I would submit that this want might best be met by the formation of a *garrison corps*, to be raised from amongst the invalids and pensioners and soldiers who may prove constitutionally unfit for active employment in the field. The head-quarters might be at Chunar, from which garrisons would be furnished. Probably 1,200 men would supply all that is required in these provinces, or, with a reserve at head-quarters, 1,500.

Reserve of Artillerymen for these Posts.

27. Several of the larger forts† and more important cities‡ would also require some regular artillerymen, say from half to quarter of a company. Perhaps from three to four hundred artillerymen would suffice for this object.

NATIVE ARMY.

28. I proceed to offer some observations on the number and composition of our future native army.

* Shahjehanpore, Etawah, Mynpoorie, Cawnpore, Futtehpore, Mirzapore, Azimghur.

† Say from 20,000 to 30,000, at some periods when the revenue instalments fall due.

‡ Cawnpore, Furruckabad, Almora, Allyghur, and perhaps Calpee.

§ Seharunpore, Moradabad, Shahjehanpore, Muttra, Banda.

The Strength dependent on Decision as to Police Battalions.

29. In estimating the amount of native troops that will be required for these provinces, it is first necessary to consider how far the duties of the late sepoy army will henceforward be performed by the military police.

A Memorandum annexed on Police Battalions.

30. In respect of the constitution of police battalions, I beg to annex, as expressive of my views, a memorandum prepared for the chief commissioner Agra, in October 1857.

Advantage of them.

31. It is hardly necessary now to enlarge on the advantages of having a portion of our troops under this semi-military organization. Detached from the general army, and composed of local and isolated corps, the police battalions will have no sympathy and no concern in common with the regular regiments. The latter will not recognize them as a part of their own body, and the same gigantic union of purpose and corporate action which pervaded the entire Bengal army will then be scarcely possible.

32. The army proper will, by the formation of these corps, be employed on its own proper duties. It may be immensely reduced in numbers, and yet be really more valuable for the purposes of war, because more efficient in discipline, and (now that it is not frittered away in small detachments) more immediately and readily available for its duty on the field.

Pay of Police Corps should be lower than of Line Corps.

33. As to the constitution of the military police, I need not repeat here what I have said in the memorandum above referred to. I will only add that I think it of importance that the pay should be somewhat lower than in the line corps. All future enlistments should be at 6 rupees for the infantry and 22 rupees or 23 rupees for the cavalry; and, say a fourth or fifth part of each battalion might be reserved at the present higher rates* after long approved service. This would afford a sufficient distinction between the two services; or, allowing the proposed reduced rates to hold good universally, they might be increased to the rates of the regular army whenever a police detachment is called out of its division for field service.

District Commandants and Adjutants should be made Assistants to the District Civil Officers.

34. Farther, although it is absolutely necessary that the discipline of the corps should be exclusively in the hands of the military officers commanding, yet, as the police troops are to be for the most part employed in the direct aid of the civil administration, there is a danger of their usefulness being impaired by want of co-operation arising out of jealousies or misunderstanding between the military officer and the magistrate and collector. I am assured that in some quarters this difficulty already begins to show itself. It would to a considerable degree be removed if the district military officers were appointed *ex-officio* assistants to the magistrate and collector in the civil department. They should be encouraged to rise to the exercise of special assistants' powers, and to those of joint magistrate and deputy collector, on passing the prescribed examinations, by the grant of an additional monthly allowance, say 50 rupees for the former, and 100 rupees or 150 rupees for the latter. This would prove a stimulus to study and the acquisition of a knowledge of the language and habits of the people, and prove an excellent school for the raising of political and civil officers from the army. It would be a material aid to the civil administration. It would at the same time make the police force more useful, by making its officers more amenable to the magistrate. And while it thus made the commandant in one respect subordinate to the civil authority, it would leave him

* Present rates, infantry 7 rupees, cavalry 23 rupees.

free in matters of military discipline. It is probable that an arrangement of this sort would sensibly diminish the chances of jarring and opposition, and add to the usefulness of the military police.

Estimate of Military Police.

35. According to the scheme now being introduced, the following will be the police force for these provinces, including the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, but excluding Ajmere, Mhairwara, Jawud Neemuch, and Nimar (and of course Oudh also).

	Each Station.		Total.	
	Infantry	Cavalry.	Infantry	Cavalry.
7 Divisional (head quarter) stations.	800	250	5,600	1,750
Add Goruckpore - - -	-	-	800	250
31 District stations - - -	400	100	12,400	3,100
Total - - -	-	-	18,800	5,100

Number eventually necessary.

36. Some of the districts, as before explained, are of inferior size and importance, and may not require the full standard number. I think it likely that on tranquillity being restored the amount of military police will be susceptible of some reduction from that and other sources; but for a time this will not be possible. Indeed, there are now some auxiliary levies which swell the numbers above the standard. Although two or three divisions are as yet very imperfectly supplied, the infantry, by the last return, numbered above 15,500, and the cavalry 4,678, or in all above 20,000 men.

Military Police as it stood on 31st May 1858.

Native Officers.	Horse.			Native Officers.	Infantry			Grand Total.
	Non-commissioned Officers.	Troopers.	Total.		Non-commissioned Officers.	Privates.	Total.	
124	349	4,205	4,678	167	1,128	14,254	15,549	20,227

The present wants of these provinces will not be supplied under 18,000 foot and 3,000 horse. Hereafter, perhaps, it might be reduced to 15,000 foot and 4,000 horse.

Classes from which it should be recruited.

37. As regards the classes from which the military police should be recruited, I adhere to the rule advocated in my memorandum; "enlist from none exclusively, from all indiscriminately, choosing the most active able-bodied men of good general character and repute." I see no objection to the supply being drawn from the immediate neighbourhood of the division in which the men are to serve, provided they be not too much of one caste, or one social connection. I am not in favor of low caste police corps. It is more objectionable here than in the regular army, as the men come more in contact with the people, and are more connected with the civil administration. It is not wise to exercise our government in a way to breed contempt, if not disgust. At the same time I have no objection to the entertainment occasionally of companies of low caste men of the more respectable classes. I would vary the composition of the police as much as possible. The same or similar castes should be generally arranged by companies, so that they may work the more readily together.

Duties.

38. The district police thus formed would undertake all the ordinary duties of protection, guards, &c.

Regular Army not to be recruited from Police.

39. Two remarks of some importance remain. 1st. Recruiting the regular army from the police ranks should be jealously avoided. It would break

W. Muir, Esq. down the wall of partition which should be carefully maintained between the two bodies. It would tend to make the materials homogeneous, and introduce in the army that sympathy and fellow feeling with the police corps which it is essential to guard against.

Should be styled "Local Battalion," not "Police Corps."

2d. The name might be altered from "police corps" to "local battalions." It may seem an insufficient cause, but the name may render the service unpopular for military officers. It is natural they should feel a corps termed "police" to be something inferior, and we may lose something of the *esprit de corps*, which even in these local and semi-military bodies it is important to maintain. The vernacular names would correspond; "Moolkee pultun," for local battalion; "Jungee pultun" for line battalion.

Regular Native Army, isolated Regiments.

40. It remains to consider what amount of regular troops beyond these local battalions will be required. Before proceeding to the brigade and divisional stations, I would notice, first, several separate stations where isolated native corps will probably be required. There are some large cities which, either from their own importance, or the distance of European troops, should have the benefit of a native force independently of the local battalions. The following are of this character:—Allyghur, Moradabad, Furruckabad, Banda. At Moradabad and Banda there should be some native cavalry, say a regiment or a squadron. There would be besides a hill corps always at Almora, and another at Dehra. In all, this would give six isolated regiments.

Native Force required at the Brigade Stations.

41. At each of the first-class or brigade stations there should be posted two native corps of infantry and one of cavalry. The whole could be spared for field duty when a moveable force is required (the local duty being taken by the military police), so that the European field army would receive an accession of native soldiers equal in number to itself.

At the Central Stations.

42. At each of the second-class or central stations there should be a native infantry corps for fatigue and field duty, and sometimes a native cavalry regiment or squadron.

No Native Artillery.

43. I would have no native artillery of any description. At Agra we had none during the disturbances, and no inconvenience was felt from its absence. The Europeans were always ready to go out at any time of the year,—summer and rains, on the frequent expeditions undertaken in the neighbourhood; and I believe the exposure did them no harm. With the artillery in our own hands exclusively, the native troops will not dream of combination against us, even if our weakness in other respects were to tempt the idea. This arm requires comparatively few soldiers, and I see no reason why we should not depend solely on our own country for them.

Artillery of Native States should be placed under limitations.

I think farther, that, if possible, native states should be limited both in the number of artillermen they entertain, and in the calibre of their guns, if this can be done without transgressing treaties or giving great offence. No native government needs heavier ordnance than a mountain train of 3-pounders for all purposes of state, or the repression of petty emeutes. For all more serious work they should trust to our artillery. When threatened by invasion or domestic rebellion, the native states (as Dholepore, Kotah, Gwalior,) have always abandoned their guns to the enemy. Our enemies should not be allowed such opportunities of providing themselves with dangerous artillery.

Christian Artillery.

45. One exception, but an extremely limited one, might be allowed in favour of native artillery,—I mean a Christian company. In the present state of feeling this would be quite trustworthy for loyalty, and they would be useful in a fort or entrenchment. But as Christianity spreads, so as to include (as in Mysore) whole districts, the dependence of the native Christians upon our government will become weaker, and the character of individuals less easily ascertainable. When these days come I would not recommend any extensive enlistment of Christians into the artillery service. They might be accessible to influence from native states. Meanwhile there is no danger of having too many native Christians as gunners.

Abstract of European and Native Regular Army.

46. The following is an abstract of the European and native army, according to the above suggestions:

ABSTRACT of Peace Force required for the North-Western Provinces of the Bengal Presidencies.

Stations.	European Troops.				Native Troops.			
	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Total.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Total.
I. BRIGADE STATION.								
Meerut - - - - -	1 regiment	3 regiments	2 batteries and reserve company.	3,700	1 regiment	2 regiments	- - -	2,500
Allahabad - - - - -	1 " "	3 " "	2 " "	3,700	1 " "	2 " "	- - -	2,500
II CENTRAL STATIONS								
Bareilly - - - - -	Squadron	Wing	1 troop and $\frac{1}{2}$ company.	850	1 " "	1 regiment	- - -	1,500
Agra - - - - -	- - -	- - -	1 " $\frac{1}{2}$ "	650	- - -	1 " "	- - -	1,000
Benares - - - - -	- - -	- - -	1 " $\frac{1}{2}$ "	650	Squadron	1 " "	- - -	1,000
Goruckpore - - - - -	- - -	- - -	1 " $\frac{1}{2}$ "	650	- - -	1 " "	- - -	1,000
Saugor - - - - -	Squadron	1 regiment	1 " $\frac{1}{2}$ "	850	1 regiment	1 " "	- - -	1,500
Jubbulpore - - - - -	- - -	Wing	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop and $\frac{1}{2}$ company.	1,350	- - -	1 " "	- - -	1,000
Jhansi - - - - -	- - -	Wing	1 troop and $\frac{1}{2}$ company.	650	Squadron	1 " "	- - -	1,250
III. GARRISON CORPS.								
Chunar - - - - -	- - -	1 regiment	- - -	1,500	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
Reserve at tillery companies - - - - -	- - -	- - -	4 companies	400	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
IV NATIVE INFANTRY STATIONS.								
Allyghur - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	1 regiment	- - -	1,000
Moradabad - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	1 " "	- - -	1,000
Furruckabad - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	1 " "	- - -	1,000
Banda - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	Squadron	1 " "	- - -	1,250
Dehra - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	1 " "	- - -	1,000
Almora - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	1 " "	- - -	1,000
V CHRISTIAN.								
Artillery - - - - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	100	100
Total - - - - -	3 regiments	4 regiments	{ 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ batteries or 3 troops, 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ com- panies - - - }	14,700	5 regiments	17 regiments	100	19,600

Ratio of European Troops to Native Regular Troops.

47. Thus the European force for these provinces (exclusive of Nussurabad, Neemuch, and Nimar,) would consist of 11 regiments of infantry, 3 of cavalry, 10½ batteries or troops, with 9½ companies of artillery; in all 14,700 men. Against this there would be 17 regiments native infantry, 5 regiments native cavalry, and 1 company Christian artillery; in all 19,600 men, or in the proportion of 1½ native regular soldiers to the European soldier.

Ratio of Regular and Police Native Troops combined.

48. The permanent military police throughout the same tract will probably be about equal in its numbers to the regular army; so that there will be 1 European soldier to 2½ natives of the combined police and regular forces. The present standard of the military police would make the proportion about 1 to 3—a safe enough ratio when we have the whole artillery in our hands.

49. I should remark that the proposed arrangements go upon the presumption that the province of Oudh will be at least equally strongly provided for as the districts in the North-Western provinces.

Until Peace entirely restored more Troops will be necessary.

50. I must also add, that the proposed army is that which appears to me proper for a *peace* establishment. For some little time yet, even if our cold weather campaign be as successful as we hope it will be, many stations, as Moradabad, Shahjehanpore, Furruckabad, Cawnpore, Calpee, Jhansi, Banda, Jubbulpore, Ghaazepore, Azimghur, will require a far larger European force than I have contemplated in the above remarks. But when the country has once thoroughly quieted down, the scale I have ventured to suggest may be adopted, I think, without any risk.

Means of rapid Locomotion will add to the Value of European Troops, and lessen the Number necessary to hold the Country.

51. It is also to be looked for, that in a few years the advance of our railways, and perhaps increased facilities of river transport, will have greatly consolidated our power, and rendered our European forces incomparably more able than ever they could have been before, instantaneously to quell revolt or mutiny.

General Remarks.

52. I will now offer a few general observations connected with the army.

Classes to be enlisted.

53. And, first, *on the classes best fitted for enlistment.*

Evils of former system.

54. The chief fault in the former system was, that we confined ourselves almost exclusively to two or three leading castes; that we recruited from a limited area; and that from a combination of these causes a clanship—a family or social interconnection—grew up within the ranks.

Material in itself was good.

55. The men composing the late Bengal army were in themselves unexceptionable, of respectable character, and bold military disposition. They made good soldiers, and were peculiarly amenable to discipline.

No Class should be excluded.—Per-centage of each Caste throughout the North-Western Province Army.

56. I would by no means exclude Brahmins, Rajpoots, and Mussulmans from our new army, but would

confine their numbers within comparatively limited proportions. A per-centage throughout the army should be fixed for each main caste or cluster of castes, and any sensible variation from the prescribed ratio jealously checked. A scale something of the kind indicated below would answer for the north-western province army.

	Per cent.
Mussulmans from the Punjab - - -	5
” ” Doab and western districts -	5
” ” Benares and eastern do. -	5
Brahmins from Doab and western do. -	6
” ” Benares and eastern do. -	6
Rajpoots from Doab and western do. -	8
” ” Benares and eastern do. -	6
Aheers - - - - -	8
Jalis - - - - -	8
Seikhs - - - - -	10
Gookhas - - - - -	8
Low castes - - - - -	10
Miscellaneous castes - - - - -	15
	100

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Maximum should be fixed for chief Castes, not on any account to be exceeded.

57. It would not be necessary rigidly to adhere to this or to any other numerical scale; but there ought to be a maximum, say 15 per cent., beyond which none of the three grand castes, Brahmins, Rajpoots, Mussulmans, should on any account whatever be permitted to go.

Low Castes to be entertained in moderate numbers.

58. I am not an advocate for a large proportion of low caste soldiers; I would not exclude low castes. On the contrary, I would encourage a part of the regular army being always drawn from them, because variety of class is itself a benefit. But I do not expect any greater degree of faithfulness from them than from the high castes at times when disaffection is abroad. They are even more under the influence of Brahmins, and under caste bondage, than the higher castes. The low caste drivers generally went over *en masse* to the insurgents, while the most frequent and most marked instances of devotion and fidelity have been among the Brahmins. The Synds also in some places behaved well.

Further Precautions.

29. It is not enough to vary the castes. The growth of a common bond among the men must be avoided. This will be accomplished partly by extending the area, and partly by altering the system of recruiting. Enlistment should be encouraged in *every* district where the people show a readiness to enter the ranks. This will break *local* associations throughout the army.

60. Recruiting should take place solely through officers deputed to the several districts. The old plan of allowing men to bring their brothers, cousins, friends, as candidates should be stopped. It helped on the growth of the great brotherhood of the army. The recruiting officer should visit each tehseldaree station in his recruiting district, and choose the best looking men he can get according to proportions of caste prescribed for his guidance, by some central watching authority; I do not think any reference is ordinarily needed to the local civil officer. But if there be doubt as to respect, ability, feigning of caste, residence, or name, inquiry should be made to the tehseldar or magistrate.

DISPOSITION OF THE NATIVE ARMY.

There should be a local Army for each local Government.

61. It is not only necessary to avoid a homogeneous material in the composition of the new army; we must

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adopt every possible means to guard against the growth of association, sympathy, and combination throughout the whole. I doubt whether this will be at all effectually prevented unless the mass of the army is broken up, for all ordinary duties, into local and entirely separate bodies. So long as the great army of Bengal (including the Punjab and the north-western provinces) forms, in its discipline and tour of duty, a single and united body, there will always be the danger of a community of feeling and interest pervading the whole, and of the consciousness of a power of combined and independent action growing up.

So long as there is one vast Army combination will be possible.

62. It is true that the existence of police corps,—local battalions with their separate sphere and organization,—will prove to some considerable extent a safeguard against this. The regular army will see and feel that there is another element of power present everywhere, and perfectly distinct from itself; but the danger will still not be entirely removed. So long as the regiments of the Bengal army circulate, in their periodical reliefs, from Peshawur, along the Punjab and the Gangetic valley to Burmah, and back again through all this vast tract to Peshawur, they will feel that they are one body; they will be able to watch, as they lately did, the gradual withdrawal of European troops when they chance to be needed elsewhere; spying out thus what they vainly imagine to be the nakedness of the land, they may again become puffed up, arrogant, ambitious; and, impatient of discipline, break off to rapine, outrage, and intestine war.

63. To my apprehension the best security against such a contingency would be to frame a local army for each local government,—an army for Bengal proper, an army for the north-western provinces (including Oudh), and a Punjab army,—and to keep the tour of duty for each army, by ordinary relief, within the limits of its own administration. Everything should, I conceive, be done to segregate the local forces. As the regular reliefs of the police corps would be within each commissioner-ship, so the regular reliefs of the line corps would be within the limits of each local government. They would always be prepared at emergencies to march anywhere for foreign service; but this would be exceptional. Their regular and recurring duties should be so confined to their own territory that sympathy and community of interest, the interchange of thought and speculation, would not be possible. No regiment from one local army should take its regular tour of duty within another government. It was the 72nd native infantry from Agra that poisoned Nussurabad; from Nussurabad the flame spread to Neemuch, and gradually the whole Gwalior contingent was compromised. It is impossible to say how far this contingent might not have kept aloof from the mutinous army, had the 72nd and 23rd native infantry not been in their way. It certainly, for some considerable time, refused to join, and eventually maintained a perfectly distinct course of its own.

Local Army should be composed of local materials.

64. I think, farther, that the major part of each local army should be composed of local materials. The Seiks and Punjabees should, to my apprehension, be kept mainly to their country. By being long cantoned, in very large numbers in the southern provinces, they may become used to the people, and in case of need might not be available as a foreign element,—that which has of late proved their great value—in Hindostan. Many hundreds of Seiks employed with the Poorbea sepoy's threw on their lot with them in the mutiny. A separate organization, it is true, might have gone some way to prevent this; still it shows that, by contact with other races,

they can lose their distinctive character so far as it is practically of value to us. Everything should be done to keep up the separate and independent nationality of each army. Then, when any necessity requires their service elsewhere, they can be employed with the less dread of their sympathizing with any class of insurgents out of their own country.

The Punjab Frontier the best Field for the Seiks.

65. So far as the Seiks specially are concerned, this arrangement would have another advantage. The north-western frontier is the most exposed post, the hardest fighting is required there, and there lies the greatest fear of foreign aggression. It is well to have the best material in that line. I believe also that the Punjabee population with the frontier Affghans form an excellent counterpoise to the Seiks; and that there would be little fear of the Seik force having it all their own way in the Punjab.

Limited Portion of each Local Force might be of Foreign Elements.

66. While thus advocating that each local army should have its main portion composed of local elements, I see advantage in having a small portion, both of the police and regular armies, formed of men from a distance; it is a wholesome check on the rest. But the foreign material should be kept distinct, and as far as possible separate from the local levies, so as to prevent its mingling with them and taking their color.

Internal Composition of Corps.

67. I am hardly competent to offer an opinion on the internal arrangement of a regiment. If there be no military inconvenience, a corps composed of companies each of a separate caste would seem to have advantages. But I see no objection to some regiments being wholly composed of a single caste. The more that regiments are raised, each from a given district, or limited area, the better. Each has thus its own individual separate interests; it will less tend to sympathy with the rest of the army.

Increase of Commanding Officers' Power.

68. Neither am I competent to speak of military discipline, excepting in this general way, that I would abolish native courts-martial as an injurious farce. Commanding officers should be selected for intelligence and judgment, and the Government may then well place the reins to a great extent in their hands. Ordinary punishments, dismissal, &c. should rest with them.

Opinion in favor of Pensions.

69. I would not do away with pensions. They should be given after terms of faithful service. It is not sound reasoning to say that as they did not prevent the sepoy army from mutinying, therefore they were of no use, and should be done away with. The pension has undoubtedly had a most beneficial effect in the long series of service rendered by the native army. It failed before a still stronger motive; the pseudo patriotism which called on them to transfer their allegiance to a native dynasty, and the lust of power and plunder. But whenever it may fall to our lot again to encounter a foreign foe, either on our borders or without them, I am persuaded that the tie connecting the native soldier with our Government, and nerving him to fight for it, will be greatly strengthened by the privilege of pension, and I earnestly hope it will not be discontinued.

Opinion against short terms of Enlistment.

70. Short terms of enlistment have been advocated by some. But there is one evil from this system

which must not be overlooked. By constantly and rapidly changing the material of the army we shall scatter over the land great numbers of trained soldiers. It is better that the sepoy should continue to hold on by his profession, when once he has been well drilled, than that he should retire from the service to form a possible element of future trouble to us, should events tempt him to join our adversaries' ranks. It might be well to enlist with no period for discharge but the pleasure of the commanding officer. The effect would be to increase the power and influence of the commandant.

71. The precautions I have sought to press may seem to be unnecessary with the prospect of a powerful English brigade in every province. And, no doubt, so long as English troops on the scale contemplated are maintained throughout the country, disaffection will not be able to rear its head; and, the country being disarmed, there will be no risk of rising.

72. But it is to be feared that our present vigilance, and our jealousy of resting on any purely native body, will not always last. When the danger has passed away, and become dimmed by distance, a sense of security will again creep over us. The Government may be tempted to withdraw its brigades for foreign service, or for economy's sake to retrench their numbers. Necessity or parsimony may thus hereafter urge a dangerous diminution of our European force. So much the more prudent is it now to anticipate that danger, and by a radical change in the constitution of the army, which shall maintain its elements and parts distinct and independent, prevent the chances of mutinous combination.

I have, &c.

W. MUIR,

Member of the Sudder Board of Revenue,
and Secretary to the Government of
the North-Western Provinces.

*Expense of Military Police in some degree to be met
by Retrenchments in Civil Establishments.*

P.S.—I ought to have mentioned, that the cost of the police battalion will be to some extent met by retrenchments from the police and revenue establishments, the duties of which they will to some extent perform. This subject should have early consideration on the return of tranquillity.

Hill Sanatoria should be encouraged.

I trust that the European troops will be freely sent to the hill sanatoria. At least one regiment from each brigade station should, in ordinary times, be marched up into the Himalayas during the hot weather. There should be at least three hill stations for these provinces, including Oudh, viz., Mussoone, Nynee Tal, and Almora. The latter is perhaps hardly cold enough, and it would be better if a fourth station could be provided.

On reading over my paper, I find I have not said anything upon the question of whether there should be any native army. This is simply because I regarded it as axiomatic that there must be a native army if we are to do more than simply garrison several points throughout the country. Those who advocate a purely and exclusively European army are evidently unacquainted with the practical working of the administration of a vast empire like ours in India. We must have native troops, and that too in large numbers, for duties our English soldiers are not adapted to perform; and we must have them likewise to work with our European army, relieve it from unnecessary exposure and fatigue, and render its movements effectual. I have endeavoured, in my estimate, to limit the number so far as appeared compatible with secured and efficient government.

W. MUIR.

MEMORANDUM on the Re-organization of the Police, and on the Construction of a System of Police Battalions or Military Corps, dated 28th October 1857. By William Muir, Esq., Officiating Member, Sudder Board.

W. Muir, Esq.

The question of how the police shall be recognized depends materially upon another question—how is the native army to be re-organized?

If, as seems likely, there will not again be a Bengal army of the magnitude and unity of construction of the former, then the present opportunity may be seized for effecting an improvement in our police long desiderated.

The sepoys and native cavalry regiments performed the duty not only of guarding the country from foreign aggression, but also of putting down riots or local opposition, however petty. The guarding of fairs and festivals, escorting treasure, &c., and all other matters of internal administration, were committed to them. These duties were often vexatious, and affected discipline for strictly military operations.

A very general consent seems now to prevail that these duties can be more appropriately performed by local police battalions.

The army, as such, would thus be left free for its proper military duties, and there would be this farther political advantage in the scheme, that the battalions being local, and having their own interests distinct and separate from all other armed bodies, there would be less room, if any, for general combination between the corps among themselves, or with the regular army, than has hitherto existed. Without some bond, such as would be here dispensed with, discontent and insolence want a common material to work upon.

I do not say that if we had had police battalions in supercession, to a considerable extent of the sepoy army, they would not have failed us in the late hour of our need. After the example of defection had been shown, and after mutiny had attained to an imperial seat by its masterly dash on Delhi, and after our power thus seemed to the native eye in the extremest peril, if not actually levelled with the ground, I do not doubt that such battalions would have gone very much as all our other establishments, customs, police, &c., went. But in the steps which led to the mutiny there would have been an important difference. The native army would not have felt itself, in the same degree, an integral body that could move with concentrated strength and unity. It would not have had permeating all its parts that *esprit de corps* which gave it an independent life for evil action. It would have had less temptation to regard itself—as no doubt it did, in overweening vanity and insolence, regard itself—the one pillar on which our Indian empire was raised, and on which alone both the internal and the external defences of our power rested.

To break up into distinct forces the native army, with which we govern India is, then, in itself an essential advantage. It is a weighty argument in favor of police battalions.

It is also a measure which will relieve the army proper from a number of duties not proper to the army which used to harass both men and officers, affect military discipline, and fritter away the strength of our forces in matters more naturally connected with the civil administration.

In 1843 Lord Ellenborough introduced police battalions into some of the districts of these provinces. His model battalion was that for Bundelcund. Its constitution will be found explained in Mr. Thomason's minute on police battalions, No. 251, dated 22d May 1845, paragraphs 32 to 34.* The entire police duties were entrusted to this force, the guarding of the jails, treasuries, tehseldarees, &c. Detachments were posted at the thannahs, and the officers

* Vol. I. of his Despatches.

W. Muir, Esq. of those detachments were ex-officio police officers. Only a mohurrer was retained, for the men and officers being chosen for the qualities which constitute a good soldier, few, if any, were found competent even to write a deposition or submit a statement.

It was this error which made the system utterly break down. A force which, had it been confined to preventive duties, would have answered its purpose admirably, was utterly out of its place when put also to the discharge of detective and magisterial duties.

I remember being very glad to get 80 to 100 of the battalion cavalry to help me to overawe the outlaw Duryao Sing at Bahadurpore Khaga, in the Tullehpore district. This was a suitable duty, and in such duties they performed valuable service. But to expect that a battalion officer, because he is a good soldier, shall also make a good *police officer*, was preposterous. You choose a sepoy or military nujeeb, not because of his aptitude for tracking thieves or searching out the successive steps in a murder, but because "he is a young, stout, active man, who can be easily taught to handle a musket, and move well on the parade ground;"* and promotions to command in a battalion are made necessarily on very similar grounds.

It resulted that the men to whom the responsible duties of the detective and magisterial police in Bundelcund were committed, were utterly unqualified for their discharge.† "Scarcely one of them," writes Mr. Thomason, "can read or write, or understand the duties of a police officer; and the whole work is therefore thrown into the hands of . . . a mere writer, on 7 rs. a month." Mr. Thomason, therefore, earnestly recommended the return "to the old system, to revive the office of thannahdar, and replace the old police." As a looker-on from the adjacent district of Futtehpore, of which I was then in charge, I can speak to the utter incompatibility of the system for the duties required of it.

It broke down because two separate and incongruous duties were required of the same men.

Any system, to be successful, must discriminate, and provide separately for the wants and requirements of two distinct departments: the detective and police proper on the one hand; the preventive and protective on the other.

One body of men must be employed to trace offenders and follow them up to justice, to watch bad characters, and conduct initiative magisterial proceedings; another and distinct body of men to repress violence, oppose armed opposition, disperse riotous assemblies, and generally to overawe the country.

The former, the detective and magisterial police, should be solely and exclusively under the magistrate.

It should consist, as at present, of a thannahdar or darogah, a jemadar, a mohurrir, and burkundauzes; but the existence of a battalion will render it possible greatly to diminish the number of burkundauzes. As they will be employed almost exclusively in detective duties, they will require very careful selection, and I agree with Major Williams that they must be better paid. There might be three grades, receiving, say, 5, 7, and 9 rupees each.

The Tehseeldars should, as at present, have the powers of officers of police, and where they possess superior qualifications and tried experience, they may with great advantage be invested with the powers of assistant magistrates under the Act passed last year.

This is in accordance with Mr. Thomason's views. See item V., paragraph 40, of the above-quoted minute.

So much for the detective police.

The police battalions will require a military organization, for they are required to supply the place of a

military body, and they must be prepared, at times of emergency, to act to some extent in a concentrated and combined form. I agree, however, with Major Williams, that they need not be perfected in all the mysteries of the profession. They need be drilled only in those simple movements which are required in the ordinary manœuvres of practical action.

I think the corps should be regulated by divisions: an integral corps for each revenue and police division.

The strength will be proportioned by the number of districts, the number of tehseeldarces in each, the population, and area, and by the character of the people, whether peaceful or turbulent.

Guards will be required—1, for the gaols; 2, for the district treasuries; 3, for the tehseeldarces; and, 4, personal, for the magistrate, &c.

The strength of the jail guard will depend of course entirely on the size of the jail.

The district treasuries will need, say, half a company (40 men or so) each. The headquarters (divisional) treasury will, I conclude, have a European guard. There should be no accumulation of treasure in the district treasuries, but the surplus over the minimum required for the ordinary wants of the district, should be regularly and frequently transmitted to the central treasury.

At each tehseeldaree there should be a guard, say of 25 or 35 nujeeb, and 6 or 8 sowars, more or less, according to the area of the tehseelee, number of thannahs, character of the people, remoteness of populous towns, &c. A constant guard will be supplied from the nujeeb over the tehseelee treasury. The remainder will be available for general preventive and protective purposes, suppression of disturbances, apprehension of violent outlaws, &c. This will admit of a considerable reduction of the tehseelee chuprassics.*

The personal guards should be on a moderate scale, but they will be specially required for all officers moving in the district for some time to come at any rate.

I calculate that a district will require for these purposes from 300 to 500 infantry, and 80 to 150 cavalry.

There should also be a reserve of, say 200 or 300 infantry and 100 to 150 cavalry at the head-quarters directly under the major commanding. This will admit of periodical transfers of portions of the force from district to district, so that no portion shall remain at a time longer than, say, one or two years in a district, and all will, from time to time, come under the discipline of the divisional commandant. This will maintain a uniform degree of drill and discipline.

Similarly in districts, the tehseeldarce and other guards should be regularly shifted and a reserve be constantly under the direct personal drill and discipline of the captain commanding.

It is important that these battalions, as they are in great part to supersede (on the supposed principle) the former native army for purposes of internal administration, should be capable of being to a certain extent and under certain limitations massed together for local action.

It should be understood that they will never be expected to go on foreign service (i.e. out of India) or to any great distance from their own presidency. Ordinarily they will not be required out of their own division. Their proper sphere of action lies within it; but in case, for example, if a foreign war requiring us to denude the Doab of military force to a great extent, and there were a disturbance or rising in Shajehanpore, or at Jhansi, it would be a most valuable assistance if portions of the battalions from

* Minute quoted above, para. 23.

† Minute quoted above, para. 36.

* This is very much in accordance with Mr. Thomason's proposal, item v, para. 40, of Minute above quoted.

the adjoining divisions could be detached to aid in putting it down. This, it is true, would be *exceptional* service; still the discipline of the corps should be such that it may always be *possible* service.

For this end it is absolutely necessary that there should be a fair and efficient degree of acquaintance with military tactics, and a perfect power of executing all ordinary movements, and thus of combining with other military bodies under a common command.

A military character and discipline is essentially necessary for this end; and to secure it, the management of the corps must be solely in the hands of the military commandants. The civil officers of districts cannot be allowed any power of interference without deranging the military *morale* and *esprit de corps* of the battalions.

Recruiting, discipline, punishments, promotions, must then be exclusively in the hands of the captain commanding under the orders (with prescribed limitations) of the divisional commandant, and the superintendent. Punishment should be by the orders of the commandant; certain sentences requiring the confirmation of the superintendent, and an appeal, as proposed by Major Williams, to the lieutenant-governor. Heinous offences, involving the punishment of death and, say, of any punishment above three years' imprisonment, might be cognizable by the ordinary courts of justice. Similarly promotions above the rank of jemadar to be subject to the superintendent's confirmation; those of subadar to that of the lieutenant-governor.

There should be a general appeal from all orders of the commandant to the lieutenant-governor. I should have recommended an appeal to the commissioner of the division, if there had been no general superintendent. I do not see how the superintendent's authority

can be maintained if a local appeal to the civil power is allowed. W Muir, Esq.

The superintendent should receive say 1,500 rs. a month (rising to 2,000 rs.); the divisional commandants, say 1,000 rs.; the district commandant, 800 rs.; the adjutant, 500 rupees; other attachés, 300 to 350 rs.;—all hands to have additional allowances on being reported qualified for civil work; say 50 rupees additional for assistants powers, and 150 for joint magistrates.

In the magisterial position, every officer would of course be strictly subordinate to the magistrate; but *quoad* his military duty, quite independent. I do not see that the double functions would clash one with the other.

As to classes of people to be enlisted, I certainly agree with Major Williams; enlist from none exclusively; from *all* indiscriminately, choosing the most active able-bodied men of good general character and repute. The pay would be on a somewhat lower scale than for the regular army.

In fine, the force would be an embodied militia in the ordinary sense of the word, for local administrative purposes.

W. MUIR.

P.S.—The artillery arm will in future, I conclude, be reserved for *Europeans* only. I have not therefore contemplated the necessity of attaching guns to the battalions.—W.M.

Mr. Muir's paper having been received at the time of departure from Allahabad, no copy was left with the government of India at Allahabad.

Nov. 11, 1858.

H. M. DURAND.

No. 18.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM C. B. THORNHILL, ESQ.

From C. B. THORNHILL, Esq. C.S., to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

Allahabad, June 23, 1858.

SIR, I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 33, of the 21st instant, forwarding certain questions relative to the organization of the army in the north-western provinces.

2. The subject is one which I approach with diffidence, and have therefore endeavoured to explain in each case the grounds on which my replies have been based.

3. The annexed tabular statement contains in one view the answer to Questions 1 to 4, namely, the strength and disposition of the European and native army before the mutiny, and the arrangement which I would venture to suggest for the future.

4. I have found it more convenient to adhere to the civil division of the country into the seven circles of commissioners' jurisdiction, because this has formed the basis of the organization of the new police battalions, which force will, in a great measure, I imagine, supply the place of the old native army as mere local guards.

5. Commencing at the eastern limit of this presidency the first division is Benares, containing the six districts of Ghazeepoor, Benares, Mirzapoor, Jounpoor, Azimghur, and Goruckpoor.

6. The capital, Benares, would require the constant presence of an European force to overawe the populous city. In cases of emergency detachments could be sent with facility to the adjacent river stations of Mirzapoor and Ghazeepoor. It is therefore doubtful whether it might be necessary to have any European detachment at Ghazeepoor, the argument in favor of the arrangement being the valuable government property in the stud at that station. C. B. Thornhill,
Esq.

7. Assuming that a force would be stationed at Fyzabad on the Gogra, the cantonment of a regiment of European infantry at Azimghur would be sufficient for the protection of that and the adjoining district of Goruckpoor; which latter, it is feared, might prove unhealthy as a permanent location for European soldiers.

8. The fort of Chunar being held in sufficient strength, would protect the south of the Mirzapoor district.

9. The remaining districts would apparently be sufficiently guarded by the police battalions, without any other native troops than a corps of irregular cavalry at Benares or Sultanpoor.

10. The Allahabad division, under the old arrangement, comprised five districts, Allahabad, Futtehpour, Banda, Humeerpoor, and Cawnpoor.

C B Thornhill,
Esq.

11. The presence of the large force which would remain at the seat of government and the cantonment of one European regiment at Cawnpoor, would amply command the southern Doab. For some time to come it might be necessary to place a wing of one European infantry at Banda; but as that station has a reputation for unhealthiness, it might hereafter be sufficient to maintain a full regiment at Nowgong, leaving Banda to be held by native troops or the police battalion only.

12. Futtehpore being on the grand trunk road between Allahabad and Cawnpoor, at both which stations a strong force would be placed, and being in railway communication with both, would require nothing beyond the police battalion.

13. Humeerpoor is also protected by Cawnpoor and Jhansi, so that here also the police battalion would be sufficient without any European troops.

14. Cawnpoor would continue as heretofore a post for European soldiers.

15. Agra, Futteghur, and Allyghur fort, being garrisoned by Europeans, the police corps would hold Muttra, Mynpoorie, and Etawah. The latter would also derive protection from the garrison at Calpee. The facilities for procuring forage might perhaps lead to the cantonment of any cavalry attached to the Agra brigade at Muttra.

16. The garrison in the fort of Allyghur and the force at Meerut would render it unnecessary to place European troops at Bolunshuhur.

17. Roorkee and Meerut would protect Mozuffernuggur, Seharunpoor, and Deyra.

18. Bijnore lying between Roorkee and Moradabad, and Badaon being within 30 miles of Barreilly, it might be sufficient to have only three stations for European troops in Rohlcund, viz., Barreilly, Shajehanpoor, and Moradabad.

19. The Delhi division having been transferred to the Punjab Government would fall within the arrangement made for that presidency.

20. In the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, the stations of Jhansi and Nowgong, Mhow, Saugor, and Jubbulpoor, being garrisoned by European troops, would afford sufficient protection to the smaller stations, which might be adequately held by the police battalion.

21. In anticipating the efficiency of the police battalions to undertake so largely the duties heretofore performed by the native army, it is necessary to state that each divisional battalion will consist on an average of about 3,000 foot and 500 horse, but the numbers will necessarily be adjusted in accordance

with the requirements of the several districts comprised in each division. In round numbers the organized police for the six divisions of the north-western provinces may be taken at 20,000 foot and 3,500 horse.

22. The suggested strength of Europeans would be 5 regiments of cavalry and about 17 of infantry, besides artillery, and this suggests the reply to your 6th question, namely, that the European arm should not be less than one-third of the total strength of armed and disciplined natives of all kinds, and that recourse should be had chiefly to a system of organized police for the performance of all guard, escort, and interior detachment duties which formerly were discharged by the native army; the employment of a native army, being limited for the future to the discharge of those military duties in the field which the climate of this country renders prejudicial to the health of European soldiers.

The large number of armed and disciplined natives of the Punjab recently sent down into these provinces renders it a question of importance how this preponderance of men having a bond of union from being fellow countrymen may be best counterbalanced by arming and disciplining men from other parts of Hindostan. The consideration of this question, however, falls under your subsequent queries on enlistment.

The question of barrack accommodation is one which must be replied to by the Public Works department, but the European army which I have suggested would doubtless require very extensive accommodation in excess of that which already exists.

It may, I think, be assumed from recent experience that no formidable insurrection can be organized among the population of the districts under our rule, so long as the possession of artillery is strictly limited to European troops, and the concentration of treasure, within fortresses garrisoned by Europeans, carefully enforced.

Hereafter the general disarming of the whole population will probably render it practicable to reduce the strength of our European army to some extent, more especially if the training of the natives who may be entrusted with arms be limited, to mere instruction in their use, so as to prevent their attaining that degree of discipline which would render them capable of combining as a hostile army.

The bearing of the question of enlistment upon this subject will be noticed in the replies to your further questions, which I hope soon to have the honor of submitting in continuation of this letter.

I have, &c.

C. B. THORNHILL.

Station.	Former Force.						Proposed Force.				
	European.			Native.			European.			Native	
	Artillery	Cavalry	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry	Artillery	Cavalry	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry
Ghazepoor	Wing, N I	1 battery	.	1 regiment	.	Police battalion.
Mirzapoor	1 regt N I
Chunar	2 companies invalids	.	2 comp invalids, 2 ditto veterans.	.	.	Wing, N.I.	Invalids	.	1 veterans	.	Detachment police battalion.
Benares	3 regts N.I.	1 battery or troop	.	1 regiment	1 regiment	Police battalion.
Sultanpoor	1 regt irreg cavalry	.	1 regt.
Azunghur	.	.	.	N. detail of foot, 2 guns	.	1 regiment	Detachment police battalion.
Juanpoor	.	.	.	" " "	.	Wing, N.I.	Police battalion.
Goruckpoor	.	.	.	" " "	Detail from Segowlee	" " "
Total in the Benares Division	2 companies invalids	.	{ 2 comp invalids and 2 ditto veterans }	6 guns with native detail	1 1/2 irregular	5 regiments	1 1/2 batteries	1 regt.	2 1/2 regiments, 1 veteran	1 regiment.	
Allahabad	.	.	.	2 comp native artillery	.	1 regiment	2 troops or comp.	1 regt.	2 regiments	1 regiment	Police batt and 1 regt natives.
Futtehpoor	Detail	Police battalion.
Humeerpoor	" "	" "
Banda	1 regiment	1 battery	.	1 regiment	.	" "
Cawnpoor	.	.	.	3 companies	1 regiment regular	3 regiments	1 troop or comp	.	1 regt detach. at Calpee	1 regiment	1 native regt. and police batt.
Total in Allahabad	.	.	.	5 companies	1 regiment regular	5 regiments	3 1/2 batteries	1 regt.	8 1/2 regiments	2 regiments	
Agra	1 company	.	1 regiment	.	.	2 regiments	1 1/2 troop or comp.	.	1 1/2 regiment	1 regiment	1 native regt and police batt.
Muttra	Detail	" "	1 regt	.	.	Police battalion.
Etawah	{ 1 regiment	.	.	{ 1 regiment	.	" "
Mynpoorte	" "	" "
Futtyghur	.	.	.	Detail foot	.	" "	" "
Total in Agra	1 company	.	1 regiment	Detail foot	.	4 regiments	2 troops or comp.	1 regt.	2 1/2 regiments	1 regiment.	
Meerut	1 troop and 1 comp	1 regt.	1 regiment	.	1 regiment	2 regiments	2 troops or comp.	1 regt	2 regiments		1 regiment natives.
Allyghur	1 regiment	1 battery	.	Wing		Police battalion.
Boolundshuhur	Detail	" "
Mozuffernuggur	" "	" "
Siharunpoor	" "	" "
Roorkee	1,000 sappers	.	.	1 regiment	.	" "
Deyra	1 regiment	.	.	Invalids	.	Goorkha regiment.
Landour	.	.	Convalescents	" "
Total	1 troop and 1 comp.	1 regt.	1 regt and convalescents	.	1 regiment	5 regiments	2 1/2	1 regt.	3 regts, wing, invalids.		
Bareilly	.	.	.	1 company	1 regiment irregular	2 regiments	1 troop	1 regt	1 regiment		1 regt natives and police batt.
Moradabad	.	.	.	Detail	.	1 regiment	1 battery	.	Wing		Police battalion.
Bijnore	" "
Budaon	Detail	" "
Shajehanpoor	.	.	.	Detail	.	1 regiment	1 battery	.	1 regiment		" "
Almora	.	.	.	1 company	.	" "	1 comp, Nynee Tal.	.	" "		Goorkha.
Total	.	.	.	2 comp foot, 4 guns	1 regiment irregular	5 regiments	3 troops or comp	1 regt	3 regiments, 1 wing		
Delhi	.	.	.	1 company	.	3 regiments	1 battery	.	1 regiment		Police battalion
Goorgoon	" "
Jhansi	1 regiment irregular	1 regiment	.	.	.	1 regiment	" "
Sirsa	" "
Hissar	" "
Rohtac	" "
Kurhnaul	" "
Total	.	.	.	1 company	1 regiment irregular	4 regiments	1 battery	.	1 regiment	1 regiment.	
Saugor	1 company	.	.	.	1 regiment	2 regiments	1 battery	.	1 regiment		Police battalion.
Jubbulpoor	1 regiment	" "
Mhow	.	.	.	1 company	1 regiment	.	1 battery	.	1 wing		Native infantry
Nawode	Detail	Police battalion.
Dumoh	" "	" "
Jhansi	.	.	.	{ 1 company	1 regiment	{ 1 regiment	1 battery	.	1 wing	1 regiment	" "
Nowgong	" "	" "
Total	1 company	.	.	2 companies	3 regiments	5 regiments	3 batteries	.	3 regiments	1 regiment	
Grand total	6 comp. and 1 troop	1 regt.	{ 1 regt 4 comp invalids and convalescents }	10 comp. and 4 out-posts	8 regiments	33 regiments	16 1/2 batteries	5 regts.	{ 18 1/2 regiments, 1 veteran, 1 invalids }	6 regts irregular	8 regts. N I, 32 police batt

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C. W. THORNHILL, Inspector-General of Prisons.

SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE REPORT OF THE ARMY COMMISSION.

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PAPERS RECEIVED FROM BRIGADIER HILL.

Brigadier Hill. From Brigadier W. HILL, commanding Hyderabad Contingent to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

Head Quarters, Hyderabad Contingent,
Bolarum, August 23, 1858.

SIR,
I do myself the honor of forwarding my replies to a series of questions connected with the re-organization of the native infantry of the Madras army.

I trust that my replies to the questions regarding the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent have been received.

The series of questions connected with the irregular cavalry and artillery of the Hyderabad contingent shall also be duly forwarded as soon as I have drawn them up.

I have, &c.
W. HILL, Brigadier.
Commanding Hyderabad Contingent.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Madras army is composed?
 1. Mussulmans, chiefly from South Arcot and adjacent parts, Teloogoos from the northern division, Tamilians from the Malabar coast, Tranquebar, pariahs, a low and numerous class; also native Christians, many of whom are now sepoy in the native army. There are from 40,000 to 50,000 native Christians in the district of Tinnevely, from among whom extensive drafts might be made to introduce more of this particular class into the native infantry.
 2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?
 2. From all the districts and divisions of the presidency of Madras, south of the river Kistnah.
 3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Madras army?
 3. Many regiments in the infantry have for many years always recruited from certain districts; commanding officers have used their own discretion in obtaining drafts of men either from the northern or southern division of the army, but no particular races or castes have been excluded by order. For some years past since the stations of Cuttack, Saugor, Mhow, and Jubbulpoor have been occupied by Madras troops, Hindostan men have been entertained where the regiments were stationed.
 4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected, or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Madras army?
 4. East Indians might with advantage be drafted into native regiments of the line, and even incorporated in them, but they should be kept as a separate company in the regiment they may enlist into.
 5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts of the Madras presidency, or of any other territory or presidency?
 5. It has been customary for commanding officers to recruit for themselves according to their own discretion and judgment.
 6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?
 6. No precautions are observed, generally speaking the commanding officers send recruiting parties into

the districts from which regiments have been in the habit of getting drafts of men. The families and connexions of the recruits are usually known to the recruiting party. Physical fitness, however, is generally what is looked for in recruits, but no registry is taken.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoy, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?
7. Such men as are to be entertained are made to appear before the medical officer of the regiment, who reports upon the physical fitness for the duties of a soldier, if the man is healthy he is enlisted, and no other precautions are taken.
8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops in the Madras army?
8. Recruiting has become somewhat difficult of late years in the Madras presidency, and it is very difficult at the present time to obtain recruits to complete the establishment of infantry corps from 800 to 1,000 strong, agreeably to a recent order of Government. The difficulty of procuring men may be accounted for, first, by the county south of the Kistnah, having become settled down, the inhabitants of this part of the county have not been engaged in war, as their countrymen have in Upper India, and it may be said they are losing their warlike habits, for seldom is an armed man seen south of the Kistnah, or in the northern division of the presidency of Madras; another cause I think is the great demand for labor of all kinds, in consequence of emigration, which has annually drawn away thousands from the south. The great difficulty even of procuring men as "Dooly bearers" in the commissariat department, has recently been reported to the government of Madras, though formerly there was not the slightest difficulty ever found in procuring this class of men for the use of the army.
- With a view to the future improvement in the composition of the native army, I would suggest that one company in each regiment of infantry should be East Indians; this is an increasing and influential race in the Madras presidency, and if well fed and clothed, they would be found to be a good substitute for the Europeans. Native Christians likewise from Tinnevely might be drafted into regiments in larger numbers than they are at present.
9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Madras army?
9. I, private, do solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I will serve the Government with truth and loyalty, and that I will faithfully obey the orders of all officers set over me. I do also further affirm that I will never abandon these colours, and that I will defend them with my life.
10. How long has this form been in use in the Madras army?
10. Since it has been an organized army.
11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits of the native infantry of the Madras army?
11. The oath prescribed in the articles of war for the native army, is the same in the presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay; and it is a singular coincidence that the present form of oath has bound the native army of Madras to go wherever their

services may be required, which was just the reverse of the feeling throughout the late Bengal army.

It appears to me, however, desirable, that it should be clearly specified, and fully understood by every recruit who may hereafter be enlisted, that it should be for general service in any part of the British dominions, or beyond them, when necessary, either by sea or land, as the case may be.

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Madras presidency or its dependencies of seafaring habits; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?

12. The late Captain Biden master attendant at Madras, had constant applications made to him, by destitute East Indians, to send them to sea. As an experiment a scheme was proposed by this gentleman, and private contributions were raised at Madras to support these youths. As many as 70 or more, were thus maintained, and a naval school was formed by Captain Biden; as occasions offered, the young men were embarked on ship board, and apprenticed for long voyages.

On their return to Madras the committee of the naval school ascertained that the muscular development and growth of these Eurasians clearly proved that when properly fed and clothed, they possessed equal physical strength and frame with the European, and that they were fully as capable to endure hardships.

The Madras government did not consider it expedient to support this novel scheme, and as the Bombay government declined to receive any of these young men for their naval service on the ground that they had an abundant supply of East Indians for employment in that presidency, the naval school was at length abandoned.

13. Has the Madras presidency any marine corps, and if so, of what strength and whence recruited?

13. There is no marine corps at Madras, but the previous answer will show that, if thought advisable, one could be raised of East Indians.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

14. No regiment should be recruited in any one particular place.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

15. Recruit without reference to districts; safety will be found more in a mixture of *races* than having regard to different castes.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste?

16. Certainly not, unless whole corps of East Indians should be raised; and as they form so numerous a body in the presidency of Madras, this might be done, and it would be of great advantage to entertain them if they are fed and clothed exactly as Europeans.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste, or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?

17. The men of every company should be mixed up as much as possible. This will infuse a spirit of emulation, and prevent any combination for evil among each class or caste in the different companies.

18. If corps are not homogeneous but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

18. In the Madras presidency the Mussulman recruiting fields are gradually failing; many of this class are becoming cultivators, while those obtainable are

chiefly inhabitants of cities, consequently the worst men who can be entertained, as they are sure to have imbibed fanatical prejudices, so that I would not recommend more than one-fourth of the army to be Mussulmans, and as great a mixture of other races and castes as possible. *Brigadier Hill*

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?

99. An organized police corps, especially when mounted, will require very good men, and they should be entertained wherever they can best be had, irrespective of the wants of the army; and there is no reason why they should not be taken from the same districts as the recruits who are obtained for the army.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

20. They should be quite distinct, as they will be separate from the army.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting for the native infantry of the Madras army.

21. A recent order of the Madras government has sanctioned "recruiting depôts" in various parts of the presidency, in lieu of regiments recruiting their own men. This, I am of opinion, is a great mistake, and it would be well to abolish the depôts, they are unnecessary and expensive. It is for the interest of the officer commanding the depôt to look to numbers and not to quality in selecting men, as commandants are paid in proportion to the number of men they entertain at head-quarters. It should be left entirely to commandants of corps to recruit for their own regiments; and they should be allowed to send out small parties whenever they require men, and this without reference.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency?

22. A distinct agency.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connection with recruits for the army of the Madras presidency?

23. No precautions seem to be necessary. The answer to question 6 shows the method adopted to enlist recruits, which answers well.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connection with recruits for police corps in the Madras presidency?

24. It would be better, if possible, only to enlist men for the police, whose characters are known to the local authorities.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country, and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise?

25. The only races qualified for the military service are the Malays and the South Africans. There is a difficulty in entertaining Malays even for the Ceylon rifles, and none could be expected therefore for the Madras army. Sierra Leone would be a wide recruiting field for the army, and an agency especially for that purpose would obtain such certain annual supplies of recruits as would, I conceive, render it very advisable to raise a few corps for the Madras presidency of this particular race; as they are known to be excellent soldiers, expert marksmen, and would doubtless be true to the Government at all times, as

Brigadier Hill. they would enjoy the same advantages of pay and pensions as the native army are entitled to.

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

26. This question is replied to in the last paragraph.

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

27. An agency should be established at Sierra Leone for the purpose of enlisting men, and a regular depôt should be formed at Madras to receive the men on landing, from which they could be drafted to the different regiments as required. An officer would be the best agent to employ.

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?

28. From the experience I have had in the command of Europeans, I am confident that having European companies in native regiments would never answer. The habits and discipline of European troops are so entirely different from the native army, and so much tact and experience of the European character are required in maintaining a strict discipline over them, I am quite sure that it would be injurious both to the European and native soldier, to make the Europeans a component part of the native regiment.

29, 30, 31, and 32.

As my opinion has been expressed as opposed to the introduction of Europeans to form a component part of native regiments, I need not give any replies to the numbers in the margin.

33. How should the native infantry of the Madras army be armed?

33. With the percussion musket now in use.

34. How should police corps in the Madras presidency be armed?

34. With the carbine, pouch belt, sling bayonet, or sword belt, made of brown tanned leather, which is very serviceable. The carbine is preferable to the musket, which is too heavy and unwieldy, whereas a carbine is handy for close quarters, when police are required to quell tumults and petty disturbances in villages. A carbine can be held in one hand, while the other is used in collaring a man; and a musket is so heavy that the policeman would be hindered in doing his work effectually.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

35. It does not counterbalance the disadvantage to the native soldier.

36. How should the native infantry of the Madras army be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier?

36. I would recommend an entire change in the uniform of the native army. The present dress being an imitation of the European, is inconvenient and a trouble to the native, and from its tightness is much disliked by them. I have heard that it prevents many good men from joining our ranks. A semi-native dress would be the best and most popular among all the natives of the army of Madras, as follows:—A turban, neatly and uniformly tied, red would be the most uniform colour; a red "chapkhan," or "ulkalic," rather short, loosely made, with piping and cuffs the colour of the facings; a loose sort of Turkish trowsers, of woollen or cotton material, according to season; a pair of shoes or native sandals. The white summer clothing at present in use by regulation should be at once abolished, substituting for it the karkee ulkalic and trowsers in the hot season.

I would recommend that the above clothing should be issued by the Government in the following manner:—

Two suits of the karkee clothing one year, and cloth the next, with turban. This would not cost more than the present clothing, and would be a great saving to the sepoy, who has now to purchase a number of necessaries in addition to his native clothes, such as white jackets, cotton trowsers, stocks, cap covers, &c., which have helped to ruin the army by keeping them constantly in debt to provide those necessaries in addition to their native clothing. A sepoy's kit on joining his regiment amounts to 16 rupees, which should be paid for by the Government. I would suggest that the knapsack be abolished, and that each man should provide himself with a coarse canvas bag, to carry, at his own expense, any little additional kit he may require, which would be very small, as the dress now recommended would, in a great measure, avoid the necessity for the sepoy having any private kit.

The irregular cavalry, police, and sebondies take a pride in their uniform, which is partly native, and always wear it; and the infantry would do the same if permitted to have the same kind of uniform.

The carpet and cloak should be carried by the men as at present.

The "haversack" should be made of the "karkea" cloth. I believe this proposed costume, if properly introduced, would do more to improve the military tone and bearing of the sepoy than anything else.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment officered from that European regiment alone should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association?

37. I am decidedly of opinion that the proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association is quite impracticable. I speak from the experience of having risen in the Madras Fusiliers, and having commanded that regiment, that the most unremitting and undivided attention is required of an officer in the command of an European regiment; and he would have no time to attend to the discipline of an auxiliary corps.

The daily duties connected with the command are laborious and very responsible in maintaining strict discipline.

The interior economy of an European regiment is complicated; and so much tact and judgment are required to enable a commanding officer to become acquainted with the habits and character of the men, which includes the moral government of the entire regiment, that I have known officers whose whole previous service had been with native corps in the Madras army, and who were well qualified for the command of a native corps, totally fail when put in command of an European regiment.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars, and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

38. The artillery arm of our profession is so important in India that I would not recommend any natives to be associated with the Europeans. The gunners should all be taught to ride and act as drivers also.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

39. There is no necessity whatever for the regiments of European infantry and the native regiments being near each other at all.

40. Would such a system be favourable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength?

40. The very presence of European troops in the

same cantonment with a native regiment will be sufficient at any time to overawe the natives.

It has been necessary to keep native regiments at some of the single stations, purely because there has been no military police in the country; but there will be no necessity for this when the police are organized, and perform those duties which have heretofore fallen upon the native army.

I believe it would have a most overaweing effect to have larger bodies of European infantry in addition to European cavalry and artillery stationed near each of the largest cities, viz., Hyderabad, Nagpoor, Bangalore; 2 regiments European infantry, 1 regiment cavalry, 2 troops horse artillery at each to keep up that vigilance which has become essential from experience. At each of the other stations one European to one native regiment; and if the station is large, two native regiments. This would prevent any likelihood of combination on the part of the native troops; and there would be such an overaweing mass of European troops assembled at our largest cities, as would crush on the instant any rising among the population, should such ever be attempted.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war?

41. I have given my opinion in para. 37, that it is impracticable to associate an European and native regiment under one commander.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

42. I do not think it desirable, nor do I think it possible they could acquire such a spirit of confidence and self-reliance as to enable the native troops to act without European support.

I have frequently had native troops under my command during the recent war in Pegu; and in the time of danger they have no self-reliance, they have no confidence in themselves. They must be led by Europeans; I have found that even a private soldier placed among natives has had the desired effect of establishing confidence among them; and that from the native officer downward all have depended upon the European, and I think this feeling of dependence upon Europeans should be encouraged. It is a mistaken notion to suppose that native troops will act independently of Europeans, for they never have done so when any difficulties have had to be overcome.

This has been constantly observed in the field, and there is no doubt that the native troops can only act in dependence upon European support.

II. MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war in use in the Madras native army?

1. The articles of war and forms of trial should be much simplified.

Two descriptions of courts only are necessary, general and regimental or detachment courts-martial; the latter should have the power of trying all offences when deemed expedient, and to award any punishment now authorized, short of death or transportation for life; on shipboard, the line of march in the field, and at single stations, it should have this power also in cases of mutiny, sedition, or gross insubordination and disobedience of orders; sentences of courts-martial should be confirmed by the senior officer on the spot, or commanding officers of regiments. A general court-martial to consist of five, and a regimental or detachment court-martial of three officers respectively, either European or native, at the discretion of the commanding officer. Corporal punishment should be increased from 50 to 100 lashes, and should be always inflicted for disgraceful conduct, mutinous or grossly insubordinate behaviour, and refusal to obey orders.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army? Brigadier H.L.

2. The rules regulating punishments in the native army should be retained, and greater power should be delegated to commanding officers of regiments for inflicting them; by this means the hands of a commanding officer would be strengthened, which is very desirable for the maintenance of strict discipline.

The discipline and punishments required in the European army are so different from those required for the native army that the rules for the latter cannot in any way be assimilated to those which obtain in the British army.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Madras army?

3. It does, and I believe it will work with greater advantage to the discipline of the army if the alterations suggested in the first para. should be sanctioned by the Government of India.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Madras army with the military code under which they live and are governed?

4. The native articles of war are translated into Hindostanee, Telooogo, and Tamil, and a certain number of the articles, which are specially marked, are ordered to be read once every three months at the head of every regiment in the service. Parts of the infantry standing orders are also ordered to be read periodically.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?

5. About one-third of the men in a regiment can read for themselves.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the Madras presidency?

6. The Madras government have only recently appointed a commissioner of police, and three deputies to organize a military police corps for that presidency.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the Madras presidency?

7. The commissioner is a gentleman of the civil service, the deputies are officers of the army.

I am not acquainted with the discipline which is to be maintained in this police corps, or what proportion of native officers are to be appointed.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps and the authority of European and native officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

8. As I am not aware what provision has been made for maintaining the discipline of police corps, and the authority of their European and native officers, I can only suggest the measures which seem to me necessary. I think that great care should be taken in the formation of the mounted police especially, which should be composed of an efficient body of men, and the European officers should be selected for this purpose, whose habits, physical powers, and intelligence qualify them for this peculiar duty. East Indians would be an excellent class of people to entertain in the police, as being more trustworthy and faithful than the natives. As our railroads in India must hereafter be protected from being at any time injured, mounted police should, I think, have the entire supervision of the railroad. To this corps should be entrusted the maintenance of good order along the whole line of road, and they would at once furnish a safeguard to all travellers, and contribute a valuable resource "as cavalry" on any sudden emergency, and would be a suitable auxiliary to the army.

There should be regular divisions of police at stated distances, and the knowledge that would thus be imparted to the inhabitants of the country, that a body

Brigadier Hill. of "cavalry" could with ease be thus called out in an hour or two's notice by the aid of the telegraph, would render our railroads secure at all times.

Faithful, active, and deserving native officers and non-commissioned officers of the native regiments of the line might be rewarded by promotion into the foot police corps, and this would act as a stimulus to the native army.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Madras army what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. Promotion in the native infantry regiments of the Madras army is not by seniority alone. The regulations regarding promotions recommend a medium course to be adopted, by encouraging the seniors to look for promotion when there is no evident disqualification in the candidate, but as a general rule merit and professional intelligence qualify for promotion. The system of promotion in the Madras army is good, but should be left entirely with the commanding officers of regiments.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Madras army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. There are many intelligent native officers in the Madras army; there is no reason why they should not be a very useful class of men. In the Madras army many of these men, when well commanded and looked after, are very efficient officers, and considering their position, perform their duties satisfactorily. I have found, both in the Gwalior and Hyderabad contingents, that from the necessity there is for giving native officers the command of the companies of a battalion of infantry on parade, they become, generally speaking, a very efficient body, from the responsibility intrusted to them, which compels them to exert their minds more.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

3. Though the native officers of the army have not, as a general rule, been better educated than the men from among whom they have risen, they are usually selected for their superior intelligence; and from their daily routine of instruction in military duties they acquire a higher knowledge of their profession than the men possess.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. There is no examination ordered; the general supervision exercised by a commanding officer over the regiment enables him to become acquainted with those under his authority, and he is well able to judge of their qualifications for promotion to the commissioned grades, and also for their gradual advancement in promotion to each succeeding grade in the corps.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men, weaken the influence of the European officers?

5. This entirely depends upon whether the European officer is acquainted with the native language. If the European officer is ignorant of the language his influence is weakened, and the native officers take advantage of this and act at times very arbitrarily over their men; and the men do not complain against the native officers because the European officer cannot understand them.

Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?

I think that the full complement of European

officers to a company contributes to the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer, when they know the language and take that interest in their men which they ought to do.

6. Has it been found in the native infantry of the Madras army that on the occurrence of mutinies the native officers have given timely information or been of any use in aiding the European officers to check mutiny. Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

6. The native officers of regiments have certainly failed in these respects; they have been found to side with the men, whom they usually thrust forward to be as it were the mouth-piece of the corps, to avoid suspicion falling upon themselves. The mutinies which have occasionally occurred in the native regiments of the Madras army have been caused principally by some interference with their pay; and when orders connected with their pay, or on account of pension regulations, have not been properly explained to them, and consequently not thoroughly understood by the regiment in general.

Were it generally understood throughout the army that if timely notice of any mutiny, or intended mutiny, be not given to the commanding officer of a regiment, the whole of the native officers and non-commissioned officers of the regiment mutinying should be dismissed on the spot; it would, I believe, generally deter the native officers from siding with the mutineers.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued in the native infantry of the Madras army?

7. The rank of native officer upholds the military tone and respectability of the native army; as the grade is much coveted and looked up to by the men, I conceive that the rank of native officer is very necessary to be continued. If that grade be discontinued the men will be deprived of the greatest advantages and rewards they look forward to in entering the army, and of all they most prize; and in the estimation of the natives the rank of native officer adds much to the respectability of the military profession. I believe it to be essential in the formation of an army to study the interests and feelings of the men, and if what they prize most highly is taken from them it must affect their willingness and zeal in serving Government.

I believe that the native officers can be made a very efficient and useful body of men, and that it would be most detrimental to the native infantry to discontinue that grade in the army.

8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment, in lieu of its native officers, advisable?

8. Certainly not; the isolated position in which these few Europeans would be placed in a native regiment would have a very injurious effect upon them, and would be very likely to induce habits of drinking, which would lead to constant reductions, and have the effect of lessening that respect for the European character, which it will be now more than ever necessary to uphold among the natives.

9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of services, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

9. The graduated scale proposed in this question instead of the grade of native officer, will not, I believe, increase the efficiency of the army. I believe that if the native officers are abolished it will be a death blow to the prospects of the natives, as that grade is so much coveted by the men.

Brigadier Hill. ment necessary to ensure success when taking native troops into action.

Irregular corps are an excellent auxiliary to the regular native army, and are admirably adapted to the service for which they were originally intended.

But I believe it would be very hazardous to put the whole army on the same footing as the irregular troops, because the preponderance of native over European officers would necessarily bring the whole army almost entirely under native influence.

In the question of reorganizing the native army, it appears to me most essential, that the service should be made popular among the people of the country, and their interests and feelings should be considered, both as to distinctions and rewards for their service to the State; and these inducements should be on as liberal and extensive a scale as has been found necessary for our own countrymen.

This I look upon as not only just, but politic.

It will be most unpopular in the army if the grade of native commissioned officer is abolished, as it is a rank which is much sought after by the men who enter the army; for it must be remembered they do not enter it from any patriotic spirit, but to improve their condition in life.

The rank of native officer is much looked up to by the men; it exercises considerable influence over them, and the want of this influence would be severely felt in times of difficulty; we should then find we had not so great a hold upon the native troops if the non-commissioned officers are left to be the only link between the European officers and the native soldiers. We cannot quite assimilate the constitution of the native army to that of the European, their idiosyncracies of character being so totally different. Though a graduated scale of pay and pension may be substituted for the grade of native commissioned officer, I feel convinced that so inferior a class of men will enter the service it would entirely destroy the tone of the whole army.

17. How should the police corps be officered, the question applying both to European and native commissioned grades?

17. An European officer from the army should command the police corps, assisted by an adjutant, a jemadar of police, and a darogah, for each company should be attached. An opening might be made for intelligent and deserving men in the regular army to get promotion into the police corps.

18. If irregular corps and police corps have native commissioned officers, and regular corps have no native commissioned officers, but only good-service pay and pensions as an incitement to good conduct and efficiency, will the higher pay to privates and non-commissioned officers suffice to render the regular as popular as the irregular and police corps, and to draw as good recruits?

18. I have given in paragraph 16 a very strong opinion of what I believe to be absolutely necessary for the organization of the regular and irregular native service, which is comprehended in the present question; and I have there shown that we should draw a very inferior class of recruits for the regular army were the grade of native commissioned officer abolished.

19. In police corps is there on first admission any test or examination as to the capabilities of reading and writing? or are qualifications tested on promotion to non-commissioned grades, or on promotion to commissioned grades?

19. As police corps have not yet been formed in the Madras presidency there has been no test or examination as here asked. The difficulty that is experienced in procuring men for the native infantry who can read and write, will be equally felt in entertaining men for the police corps; but until the introduction of a system for educating the natives of the country in the common rudiments of reading and writing by

village schools, their qualifications generally must continue to be of a very inferior character.

20. Has the distinct organization, and the difference of system, regulations, and component races in the three native armies, proved favorable to our power in India?

20. I think recent events in this country have proved that the organization of the Madras army has been most favorable to the maintenance of our power in India, its component races having entirely separate interests from the Bengal army.

An influence for many years past has been exercised by the Mahomedans in Upper India over the minds of the Hindoo population. It is well known that since the Affghan war, the Mahomedans, commencing in the north, have proselyted to a very great extent from among the Hindoos all over Upper India; and this was considered to be so important a movement that the writers of the day spoke of the circumstances as probable to operate at a subsequent period in a manner hostile to our interests. A serious riot was caused by this proselyting in 1847 in the city of Nagpoor, when I was there. This influence is not observable in the Madras presidency. I cannot therefore but be persuaded that the distinct organization of the Madras army has proved favorable to our power in India.

21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, to time and to local circumstances, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to assimilate or even to amalgamate the three armies?

21. The regular native armies of the three presidencies should, I conceive, be assimilated in so far as having the same form of oath, the same system of discipline, and the same rates of pay throughout the country.

But I should by no means recommend an amalgamation of the three armies, for I believe that much of the safety of the country depends upon keeping them perfectly distinct.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Madras army, and state the orders, or measures or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect?

1. The powers of commanding officers have sensibly diminished in the Madras army. The changes in the practice of the service, combined with orders which have at times emanated from the head-quarters of the army, have decidedly withdrawn a great deal of that influence which was formerly possessed by a commanding officer, and it is very detrimental to his authority.

The following are some of the changes alluded to: Now, commanding officers are obliged to forward their recommendation rolls for promotion to the commissioned grades through the divisional authorities to the head-quarters of the army, in lieu of direct, as formerly.

This seems to indicate a want of confidence in the judgment and discretion of commanding officers, who naturally feel they are distrusted when making selections for promotion.

The powers of commanding officers have also much diminished by the limited punishments they are now authorized to inflict. Formerly also, the European regimental staff officers were selected by commanding officers. In 1856 an order was issued by the commander-in-chief directing that on a vacancy occurring the names of three officers should be submitted to head-quarters of the army, with their qualifications. This practically gives the selection to the commander-

in chief, and completely sets aside the commanding officer. The native army likewise know perfectly well that petitions are received at head-quarters, and it not unfrequently happens that these petitions are granted, which shows them that the authority of the commanding officer is not paramount; and this knowledge seriously undermines his influence, and consequently his power over his men.

This gradual increase of head-quarter influence has the effect of deterring officers from acting on their own judgment and responsibility. The evil which must eventually arise to an army which is governed by this system, is so forcibly described by Major-general Tucker, C.B., late adjutant-general of the Bengal army, in a recent pamphlet on the late mutiny, as to leave no room for doubting how badly the system must necessarily work.

He writes, "I was much struck when I first succeeded to the post of adjutant-general, at the way in which numbers of older officers in command of divisions, districts, and stations applied to me, both privately and publicly, for advice as to how they had best act in such and such emergencies. I found that to rely on themselves was the exception; that almost all seemed to wish to lean on authority before committing themselves to action; in a word, a great bugbear preventing their acting on their own judgment; that bugbear was the dread of responsibility."

Major-general Tucker adds, that he used his influence to combat this system; "he deprecated the reference of every petty detail for the opinion of the adjutant-general, and more broadly, the system of centralization which had sprung up."

2. During the above period, have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?

2. The European officers have but little power over their men at present. The punishments they are now authorized to inflict are trifling, and they have but little influence over their men.

3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps, upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Madras army?

3. The result of the diminution of power is to lead the men to look to others than their immediate superiors.

I conceive that the influence which a commanding officer ought to have in a regiment, and which is indispensable to the satisfactory exercise of his command, is materially diminished by the causes mentioned in paragraph 1, and this state of things is most injurious to the discipline of the native army.

4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?

4. A similar result is experienced by the captain or officer in charge of a company by the little influence he possesses at present among his men. He ought to be the only person his men should look to, as being most directly interested in them.

Though an officer in charge of a company now recommends for lance appointments, the commanding officer may select and appoint any man in the regiment he considers most fit for that grade. This leads the men to look to the commanding officer instead of to the company officer, and the very link which it is important to keep entire between a company officer and his men is severed, and his influence is materially diminished.

The promotion to lance naique should be given in the company in which the vacancy occurs, and this will prevent ill-feeling among the men; and they should be made to feel that their immediate superior is the proper person to look to for everything they want, and this will greatly increase his influence and power in his company.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment? Brigadier Hill.

5. There is no doubt that officers commanding companies have great influence over their men on service from their being thrown more together than when in garrison; their interests are much more identified then, and the men look up to their officers as their immediate superiors.

The moral influence also of the commanding officer over the whole regiment is increased, and this sensibly acts upon the discipline in the corps. The knowledge, however, that commanding officers have, that they are even then under the same strict scrutiny from head-quarters which is exercised over them when in garrison, deters most commanding officers from so entirely depending upon their own judgment, and taking upon themselves that responsibility which alone can gain for them the confidence and respect of those under their command and ensure the good discipline of a regiment.

6. Should the power of commanding officers, and of officers in charge of companies, be increased or diminished?

6. The power of commanding officers should in my opinion be decidedly increased.

When a commanding officer considers discipline requiring it, he should have the power of recommending for the consideration of the commander-in-chief the reduction to the ranks of havildars or naiks, for it is well known to those who command, that though a non-commissioned officer may not commit himself in a way to try him by a court-martial, and reduce him, he may be otherwise quite unfit for his appointment; and the knowledge that a commanding officer could have such a non-commissioned officer removed would have a most salutary effect among the grade of non-commissioned officers in a regiment.

He should also have the power of inflicting the punishment of solitary confinement extended to 14 days, which is a punishment much disliked by native troops.

My opinion regarding the authority of an officer in charge of a company is expressed in paragraph 4.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

7. The increase of power suggested in the previous paragraph, and the alterations which I have recommended in the manner of admitting sepoy to good conduct pay in class 3, paragraph 12, would in my opinion essentially conduce to the improvement of discipline in the native army.

When, however, recommending an extension of power to be delegated to an officer commanding a regiment, and consequently an increase of responsibility, I conceive that should he evince a want of judgment and disqualification for command, and an unfitness to be entrusted with the discretionary powers I have suggested, he should be removed from his command on a clear representation to that effect of his non-competency.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace, or in time of war?

8. I have replied to this question in paragraph 5. It is greatest in time of war.

9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation to be found for them, and the like?

9. The strength at which regiments are at present established is barely sufficient for the performance of the usual military duties which devolve upon the Madras army.

Brigadier Hill.

Regiments of the line should not be employed as they now are, on treasure parties, escorts, and the like, which, from the want of police corps, have hitherto been performed by the military.

The occupation which I would recommend for the troops would be their employment upon military works in their cantonments, and occasionally instructed in raising field entrenchments, which would be very useful.

10. Has the strength of the native infantry of the Madras army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

10. Never; and in most stations of the army there are scarcely sufficient troops for the performance of garrison duties.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops upon public works?

11. No. I would recommend a reconsideration of the regulations for paying working parties, for the rates of pay for the native army are much too low, being one anna per day, except when working under fire in presence of an enemy. This is quite inadequate remuneration for working parties, and it should be made more favorable to the men to get work done well and willingly.

12. In apportioning European officers to native troops—

1. Should native corps have a full complement of European officers according to the present scale, besides a full complement of native commissioned officers; or,

2. A full complement of European officers, and no native commissioned officers; or,

3. A smaller number of European officers than at present, and a full complement of native officers?

12. This question is to the same purport as paragraph 16 of No. 3 class, and has already been fully answered there.

13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?

13. There is no doubt the cadets would learn their duties more thoroughly by being first attached to European corps; but this would be very likely to give many of them a distaste for serving with the native regiments, and should be avoided. As it is, many young officers have a great dislike to the natives.

I strongly deprecate the present practice of putting cadets that are posted to native regiments under the drill havildar, as it is derogatory to an European officer to be instructed by a native in his drill.

The cadets should be instructed in their drill by the serjeant-major of the regiment, under the adjutant.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

14. It will be seen by my previous answers that I do not recommend a smaller number of European officers to a native corps.

15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

15. I have stated in paragraph 16 of 3rd class that the efficiency of a regiment is greatly affected by a number of officers being withdrawn for staff employment.

16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies between the conduct of regiments with few and those with many European officers present?

16. Not that I am aware of.

17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of regiments?

17. It appears to me, that in order to keep up the efficiency of the army by having a sufficient number of European officers with their regiments, the only demands which ought to be made upon it should be to provide for the head-quarter, general, and divisional staff of the army and political appointments; also the officering of contingent regiments, and the command of military police corps.

1st. I would recommend that the commissariat department should be a separate branch of itself, under the head of the civil department of the army, as it is in Her Majesty's service, and regimental officers should not be employed in it.

2nd. The public works department, which draws very largely upon the regiments of the line, should be made over entirely to the civil engineer's department, which can be supplied to any extent from England, if a sufficient inducement is held out by Government.

Employment in the public works department is most injurious to officers; they are taken away so entirely from all regimental duty, they become in a few years quite ignorant of the simplest details of their profession, and imbibe a disinclination for all military duties.

3rd. The judge advocate-general's department should be entirely abolished. These duties should be performed by officers from the line, appointed by the general officer of the division by warrant, when their services are required for conducting trials.

There is no reason why the advocate-general of each presidency should not undertake the duties now performed by the judge advocate-general of the army. This officer of the Crown is frequently referred to now by the Government when legal opinions are required. This system works well throughout the Queen's service.

4th. I would recommend the pay department being left exactly as it is now, as the present system works so well in the army, and so few officers are required for this department.

5th. The number of officers now in civil employment, such as commissioners and assistant commissioners of districts, causes a very great drain upon the army. The performance of these duties should be transferred to the civil service, or else that officers now so employed should have the option either of returning to their regiments, or continuing in civil employment, and giving up the service, when the vacancies in their regiments could be filled up.

I would suggest a distinction between officers holding political appointments and those who are commissioners, and performing only civil duties.

Political officers might thus be permitted to remain in the army as well as continue in their appointments.

I believe it to be absolutely necessary for the efficiency of the army that an entire change of system should be pursued with regard to officers of the army passing in the native languages.

Unless the officers are compelled to learn the language they will not do so. They will continue, as heretofore, to take no interest in their men; and I believe that the reason officers with native troops take so little interest in their men, and their men are so little able to judge of the character of their company officers, is mainly attributable to there being little or no verbal communication, and therefore there can be no sympathy between them.

I would recommend that every officer on entering the army should be obliged to study the language, and appear before a committee at the expiration of one year, examined as to the progress he has made,

and a report of the same sent to the adjutant-general of the army.

At the end of the second year he should pass another examination, and if he has not acquired sufficient colloquial knowledge of the language to enable him to converse freely with the natives, he should be obliged to leave the army, as is the case with young civilians on entering the service.

I would recommend that this plan should be adopted at once, as it appears to me of much importance to the native army.

I conceive that if the above proposals are carried out the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment will readily be met without injuring the efficiency of regiments.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army as regimental officers to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

18. In my opinion, certainly not. I believe that the only inducement young officers have to study and qualify themselves for the higher branches of their profession, is the hope of ultimately getting on the staff.

It is a great mistake to suppose that officers who are kept with their regiments are necessarily good regimental officers, for it too frequently happens that the disappointment of not being employed upon the staff makes them careless and indifferent to their commonest duties, and they become disgusted with constantly doing regimental duty; whereas the prospect of staff employment is a great incentive to take advantage of every opportunity of improving their minds and becoming acquainted with other branches of science, which they would not otherwise cultivate.

It will be found generally that those officers who have been on the general staff of the army are the best officers, provided they have not been too much away from regimental duty.

To guard against this evil I would suggest the strict enforcement of the orders of Government, limiting employment on the staff to five years at one time, except to political officers.

I regard this as one of the best measures for ensuring the efficiency of the army, and I believe the only effectual way of preserving it, as officers on the staff would then find it necessary to keep up their professional knowledge; this would give every officer in the army a prospect of being on the staff during some portion of his service, if he qualifies himself for it.

I would recommend that no regimental officer should be reappointed to the staff until he has performed a certain term of regimental duty.

There can be no necessity for retaining an appointment beyond five years, and it should never be deviated from. The certainty of returning to their regiments would lead staff officers to take a greater interest in their corps than they now generally do, and the prospect of staff employment will prevent regimental officers from being discontented.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

19. Most certainly it would, in my opinion.

From Brigadier W. HILL, Commanding Hyderabad Contingent, to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to submit my replies to a series of questions which you forwarded to me for that purpose, regarding the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent.

2. About three weeks ago I forwarded similar re-

plies to questions regarding the reorganization of the Madras army, which I hope reached you safe.

3. My replies regarding the artillery branch of the Hyderabad contingent will be shortly submitted to you.

I am, &c.

W. HILL, Brigadier,
Commanding Hyderabad Contingent.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent is composed?

1. The irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent is composed chiefly of Moslems, such as Moguls, Pathans, Shikhs, Synds, and a few Beloochees. Hindoos form a very small portion of this cavalry, and a very few Seikhs.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

2. Many men are drawn from the Deccan, though there are many from Hindoostan, about Shajehanpore, Delhi, and Lucknow.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, either by the regulations or the practice of the service?

3. None have been excluded from entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry, either by regulations or by practice.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

4. The Hindoos have been much neglected in this cavalry. In the 2nd cavalry now at Bolarum, there are only 70 Hindoos in the whole regiment of 500 sabres. The proportion of Hindoos is about the same in the other three regiments of cavalry.

As the inhabitants of the Hyderabad country are chiefly Mahomedan, the proportion of Moslems in this cavalry ought at once to be gradually diminished, and more Hindoos entertained, as the Mahomedan influence is by far too great, to prevent combination of the worst kind. The Seikhs also have been much neglected, as commandants of cavalry have not been partial to this race; but they should no longer be so sparingly enlisted.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

5. No particular agency is employed for obtaining recruits; there has always been an abundant supply of men ready for enlistment, so that no difficulty whatever has been experienced in recruiting.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, what precautions of registry, and other forms, are observed before the local authorities of districts?

6. No form is observed on enlisting recruits. When a man offers himself for service, he is first examined by the medical officer of the regiment, and if he is healthy, and is otherwise physically fit for the cavalry, the commanding officer of the regiment registers his name as a soldier.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers, or the followers of the cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

7. No precaution is taken when enlisting men, further than the commanding officer of the regiment satisfying himself that the candidate is in every way fit for a cavalry soldier.

Brigadier Hill

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

8. An alteration has already been made in our recruiting for the cavalry corps of the Hyderabad contingent, by restricting enlistments to men south of the Nerbudda, which affords an ample field for recruiting for the cavalry. No other alteration is required.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

9. The oath is the same as that administered to the native army.

10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

10. Only since March 1856, when the cavalry were brought under the articles of war by the orders of Government.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent when first enrolled?

11. I would recommend an addition to the present oath as follows, (viz.): that the troops of the Hyderabad contingent are, if necessary, to be employed on general service in all the provinces under British rule, as well as beyond those limits should the exigencies of the service require it.

This should be fully explained to every man in the irregular cavalry in future.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Hyderabad contingent be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

12. There is no necessity for this, and they are not at present raised in any particular district.

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Hyderabad contingent be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts?

13. They should be recruited as at present, from all parts of the Deccan and the surrounding country, south of the Nerbudda.

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be homogeneous as to race or caste?

14. Certainly not.

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be composed of ressalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

15. Most assuredly the corps of irregular cavalry should be composed of a mixture of races and castes, as being the best means of securing their fidelity. An instance of the advantage accruing from this occurred in the mutiny of the first cavalry Hyderabad contingent at Aurungabad last year. There were not more than 30 Seikhs in the corps, and two brothers, sons of a Seikh jemadar in the regiment, were the first to give intimation to the commanding officer of the mutiny of the corps; and all through it, these brothers were exposed to much danger from the men of the regiment, in consequence of their fidelity. I am of opinion that it would be very beneficial if one or two troops in each cavalry regiment were composed of the same tribe. In the 3rd cavalry Hyderabad contingent, one troop is entirely composed of Nagars. These Nagars are descendants of a Hindoo tribe called Marwars, in the Punjab, who were proselyted to the Mahomedan faith. This troop, with its ressalidar and native officers of the same race, exercises a very wholesome influence in the regiment.

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

16. The Mahomedan race is the most numerous throughout his Highness the Nizam's dominions; and Mahomedan influence in the Hyderabad country is consequently very great. I would recommend the proportion of this race in this Hyderabad cavalry should be much more limited than at present; and with the mixture of other races throughout the regiments, the danger of a combination for evil will be greatly diminished.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

17. No agency whatever is required.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

18. None are required.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

19. I would not recommend it.

Nos. 20, 21, 22, and 23.

As I do not recommend any portion of the irregular cavalry to have Europeans attached to it, I need not give replies to these four questions.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be armed? Does the arming of this highly efficient cavalry admit of improvement?

24. At present the irregular cavalry is armed as follows:—

All native officers have swords and pistols; troopers, one half, lance, sword, and pistol; the other half, carbine and sword. The spear is a weapon which the Hyderabad cavalry have had a peculiar fancy for ever since they were organized, about 40 years ago, and there is no doubt that they have earned for themselves a great reputation in the Deccan, as the cavalry are much feared for their prowess in the use of the spear.

The fire-arms, both carbines and pistols, are very bad indeed from long use, and they are quite worn out. I would recommend an improvement in their arms as follows:—

Every man should be armed with the spear and sword, with the exception of 10 men per troop, who should have the breech-loading carbines in lieu of the spear, and every man who is not armed with a carbine should have a Colt's revolver pistol.

The above would, I think, make the Hyderabad cavalry as perfect as it is possible for native cavalry to be.

25. No reply is required.

26. Do the dress and equipments of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent admit of improvements, if so, state them?

26. I am of opinion that the present dress (bottle green ulkalic) and equipments are very suitable for the irregular cavalry, and I do not think they need any improvement.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

1. The articles of war in use with the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent are the same as those which are used for the infantry. They might be improved with much advantage by omitting many useless and unnecessary articles; and I would recom-

mend greater powers being given to regimental courts-martial, which would strengthen the authority of the commanding officer over his men.

Formerly there were regimental "punchayets" in this irregular cavalry, and an appeal from a regimental to a divisional punchayet was allowed. This mode of dealing with military offences was abolished after the mutiny of the 3rd cavalry, in October 1855, by an order from Governor-General of India in Council, in a letter from Secretary to Government in the Military Department, dated 26th February 1856, directing that "henceforward the articles, which under the provision of article 158 are to be read to the troops every three months, may be read regularly to the artillery, cavalry, and infantry of the Hyderabad contingent, and to every recruit at the period of his attestation."

In my opinion it is a great improvement abolishing punchayets, and substituting trials by the articles of war. There must always be too much native influence with punchayets.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?
2. The punishments in the native army are very different from those which obtain in the British army, and they could not be assimilated.
3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?
3. It works very well, and satisfactorily.
4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Hyderabad contingent irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?
4. The native articles of war are translated into Hindoostanee and Nagree, and such articles as are of general usage are read to the men, and explained by their native officers.
5. What proportion of the troopers of the Hyderabad contingent irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?
5. The men who enter the irregular cavalry branch are a better class than those generally entertained in the infantry, and more intelligent. Fully half, if not more, of the troopers can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?
1. The system of promotion in the irregular cavalry is based entirely on merit and qualifications for advancement.
2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?
2. The native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the cavalry are very intelligent and superior men. They are chiefly men of good family, and are very efficient.
3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?
3. Their acquirements are generally of a higher order than those of the troopers from among whom they have been selected.

Many of them possess a thorough knowledge of the history of their country.

They are frequently employed upon detached commands, and prove themselves quite capable of acting in responsible situations. Their reports when employed in this independent manner evince a thorough knowledge of their duties.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

Brigadier Hill.

4. No; commandants of regiments have such a practical knowledge of their men from so frequently being employed with them in the districts, that they become fully acquainted with those who are best qualified for promotion.

5. No reply is required.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers?

6. They have not given information, either through fear, or a disinclination to act against their own men.

The dismissal, by order of the Governor-General, of the native officers of the 3rd cavalry, who were at Bolarum during the mutiny of that corps in October 1855, is conclusive as to the participation of the native officers in that mutiny.

During the mutiny of the 1st cavalry in July 1857, some of the native officers who evinced a desire to side with their European officers were placed in confinement in their tents by their own men, and threatened with death if they attempted to escape. There was evidently an inclination on the part of some of the native officers to continue faithful, but the fear of their comrades appears to have deterred them from aiding their European officers.

- 7, 8, and 9.

No replies required.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

10. I think so, decidedly.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

11. Most certainly maintained as at present, as being the best means of rewarding worn-out and faithful soldiers.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

12. I am unable to afford this information.

13. Should the system of promotion generally, by seniority, to the grades of native commissioned officers, if at all in operation, be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

13. This is replied to in paragraph 1 of this class.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

14. Yes, they are.

- Nos. 15 and 16.

No replies required.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

17. Experience has proved that the present mode of officering the irregular cavalry works very well; the only alteration I would recommend would be, to have four instead of three European officers as at present. It often happens that from sickness and other accidental causes there is but one European officer for duty in a regiment; and as detachments of cavalry are often ordered into the districts at the shortest notice, the addition of a fourth European officer would, I think, be very advisable.

- Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23.

No replies required.

Brigadier Hill.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent draw its horses?

24. Formerly the cavalry were obliged to purchase all Arab horses; but this was found to be so expensive to the men, that Deccan horses have of late years been admitted into the ranks.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

25. 400 rupees. Horses, however, have been so very scarce for the last year that much higher prices than this have been given; as much as 500 rupees have recently been given for a horse for the cavalry at Bolarum.

26, 27, and 28.

No replies required.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Hyderabad contingent?

29. A silladar's pay is 30 Company's rupees, and a bargeer's pay is 10 Company's rupees per month.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign?

30 b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?

30. The irregular cavalry of this contingent is very well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field through a protracted campaign, as the hard work and exposure they have so admirably sustained for the last 14 months has proved.

Their pay, however, is not sufficient to prevent their becoming much embarrassed by debt, chiefly in consequence of the high prices they are obliged to pay for their horses.

It must be borne in mind also that the cavalry receive no assistance from Government beyond their bare pay; they are not entitled to batta; they supply their own tents and transport for the same when in the field, which falls very heavily upon them when so constantly called upon for active service and escort duty as the Hyderabad cavalry are. They are obliged to keep one strong tattoo for every two horses, for carrying head and heel ropes, grain, forage, and a change of clothes for each sowar. It is this system which renders this cavalry so highly efficient, and enables them to move so rapidly; all cavalry should be thus supplied with tattoos. These expenses leave a silladar a comparatively small portion of pay for his own maintenance, the repairs of his arms and accoutrements, and renewal of uniform.

Another important thing to be considered is, that if a horse dies, or is by accident rendered unfit for further duty, the owner is at once compelled to resort to the money-lender for the means of replacing it, for it is obvious from these various demands upon a silladar's pay that he cannot possibly lay by sufficient to meet such an emergency as a sudden call for the price of a horse.

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

31. I would not recommend any increase to the pay, but I would suggest that whenever the cavalry are called out of their own cantonments they should receive batta, and that Government should provide them with tents and carriage for the same; also, that the men should be permitted to purchase horses at a lower rate than at present.

While the system of purchasing such expensive horses obtains in this cavalry, it is impossible for the men to keep out of debt. Every regiment is deeply involved, and were it not that each cavalry corps has its native banker, from whom the men receive great assistance for the purchase of horses in the way of loans, for which they have to pay 12 per cent. interest, the regiments could not be kept in an efficient state.

The money thus borrowed only affords relief of a temporary nature, and involves the men in greater difficulties for the future, and they rarely if ever get out of debt.

32. What is the system of the Hyderabad contingent with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests or not? Are they favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

32. There is no limit to the number of assamees which may be held by one individual. The value of an assamee varies from 800 to 1,200 rupees; 800 rupees however is the usual price now paid for them. This cavalry service has always been considered by the natives one of great honor, and many men of good family with private fortunes have entered it, which will account for the apparently very high prices paid for assamees. The cavalry service however has of late years been not so much sought after as formerly, as their advantages in it have been very much curtailed, and the same men do not enter the cavalry now as formerly. I think it is advantageous to have men with large vested interests in the cavalry, as it brings in men of better family. I think the present system of not restricting assamees favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps, in horses, and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty. My reason for advocating capitalists in the irregular cavalry is, that the more horses a man possesses, the more able is he to lay by something monthly towards meeting the outlay for replacing a horse when necessary.

Nos. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38.

There are no mounted police in the assigned districts, but if they were raised, it would tend greatly to the safety of many towns and villages, which are now constantly pillaged by Rohillas before troops can reach the part where their services are required.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of the Hyderabad contingent cavalry been increased or diminished?

1. I have not observed any increase or diminution of power of commandants of cavalry corps. They have local regulations for the discipline of their regiments, which are adhered to by commanding officers.

2.

2. No reply required.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

3. The powers and influence exercised by commanding officers in their regiments cannot be said to be detrimental to discipline, for that has been maintained, being based upon the local regulations for the Hyderabad cavalry, and the result has not been unfavorable to discipline.

Nos. 4 and 5.

No replies required.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

6. There is no necessity to increase the powers of commanding officers beyond what they now possess.

The following extract from the local regulations for the cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent will show that the native officers are the troop officers of the corps:—"Internal discipline, even to the punishment of slight military offences, to be left as much

" as possible to the rissaldars, rissaidars, and duffadars, and the internal management of the troop should be left to the native officers as much as possible; otherwise the men will not look up to them or respect them, neither will the troop be kept in order."

It will be seen from the above that the principle has been to encourage, as much as possible, the influence of native officers over their men. To a certain extent this influence is very necessary for the maintenance of discipline; but having very carefully observed this mode of carrying on discipline in the irregular cavalry, both in this contingent and at Gwalior, I am of opinion that native influence ought not to predominate to such an extent as almost to exclude that of the subordinate European officers, which it now in a great measure does.

The subordinate European officers often feel that this operates to their disadvantage. I have already recommended that there should be a fourth European officer appointed to each cavalry regiment.

For the better disciplining of these regiments, as well as to promote the increase of European influence over the men, I would suggest that each wing of a regiment should have an European officer to exercise a supervision over the native troop officers, and receive their reports for transmission to the commandants. This would strengthen the mutual interests of the European subordinate officers and their men, by bringing them more immediately in contact with each other, and I think could not fail to have a most beneficial effect.

The increased influence which would thus devolve upon the European subordinate officers of cavalry would also increase their responsibilities, and in times of difficulty and danger they would be much better able to support the authority of the commanding officer of the regiment than it is in their power to do under the present system.

Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

No replies required.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

13. From the experience I have had of the high spirit and bearing of the particular class of men who chiefly compose the irregular cavalry, I do not think too much care can be taken in the selection of the European officers for this peculiar branch of the service.

They should ride very well, and be men of much physical strength, to enable them to undergo the arduous and fatiguing marches which the native cavalry are constantly called upon to perform.

I would recommend that for the future all officers, before being permanently appointed to the irregular cavalry, should be sent on probation to the regiment for which they are intended, and reported upon by the commanding officer of the regiment to the brigadier or inspecting officer, as the case may be, upon whose final report of the qualifications of the probationer, the Governor-General would decide upon his fitness for the appointment.

14.

No reply required.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?

15. I have not observed any difference in this respect.

Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22.

No replies required.

W. HILL, Brigadier,
Commanding Hyderabad Contingent.

(No. 297 of 1858.)

From Brigadier W. HILL to Lieut.-Col. DUCAND, C.B.

Head Quarters, Hyderabad Contingent,
Camp Raichore, July 13, 1858.

SIR, I do myself the honor of acknowledging the receipt of a series of printed questions which you have forwarded to me, under instructions from the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, to be replied to with the least practicable delay.

2. I beg to submit the accompanying replies which have reference alone to the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent, which I have drawn up as carefully as my knowledge of the irregular service admits.

3. The space allotted to the replies to the series of questions would not allow of my writing them on the printed forms which were forwarded.

4. The suggestion which I have offered regarding the increase of one officer to the infantry, would equally apply to the cavalry branch of the irregular service, had I been called upon for an opinion upon that arm.

5. As the information regarding the reorganization of the native infantry of the Madras army comprehends very important changes in the service, I will give my utmost attention to the subject, and submit my replies to you as early as I possibly can.

I have, &c.

W. HILL, Brigadier,
Commanding Hyderabad Contingent.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent is composed?

1. Mussulmans, Rajpoots, Chetries, and Brahmans, with some portion of Mussulmans and Hindoos from the Deccan; but of the various races in the infantry the Hindoostan Hindoo race predominates as three to one.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

2. The men composing the regiments of infantry in the Hyderabad contingent are from Hindoostan generally, and they come from the same districts from whence they are drafted for the late Bengal army, viz., Oude, Delhi, Rohilcund, and Benares, but not below the latter.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Hyderabad contingent?

3. Officers commanding regiments have generally preferred men of high caste in their regiments to any other, both in studying the appearance of the sepoys, and from a general belief that they make the best soldiers; but none have been excluded from other classes.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded from the field of enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent?

4. Other races, though not excluded, have not been preferred so much, for the reasons given in the last paragraph.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the districts from whence recruits for the Hyderabad contingent are obtained?

5. Ten per cent. of the men proceed yearly to Hindoostan on leave, as in the late Bengal army, and their relations and bhaiebunds have been permitted by commanding officers to accompany the men on

Brigadier Hill. leave back to their regiments at the conclusion of their leave ; and in this manner recruits have been obtained for the Hyderabad contingent.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts ?

6. As recruits are obtained in the manner adverted to in the last paragraph, no local authorities are applied to for a registry of the men on leaving Hindoostan.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys, or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken ?

7. None is taken. Their relationship, or being a bhaiebund of the man who knows him, is considered sufficient voucher for his being entertained as a sepoy.

8. What alterations should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops) in the Hyderabad contingent ?

8. Orders were issued at the close of last year to cease recruiting men from Hindoostan for the Hyderabad contingent ; commanding officers were directed to enlist Deccan men, and from any other races which might hereafter afford good materiel for soldiers. This is most desirable, so as to prevent any combination in regiments, as well as to introduce another element in the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?

9. I, _____, son of _____, inhabitant of _____, town of the Pergunnah of _____ of Soobah of _____, swear that I will never abandon my colours ; that I will march whithersoever I may be ordered to go ; that I will obey the orders of my superior with my heart and soul, and without hesitation ; and that in every matter I will behave myself as a good and true soldier.

10. How long has this form been in use in the Hyderabad contingent ?

10. Ever since the Nizam's army was disciplined.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits for the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?

11. Though I have inserted the oath which is now administered to the infantry of the Hyderabad contingent, I think it very important that there should be an order of Government, directing that it should be thoroughly understood, that the troops of the Hyderabad contingent are to be employed on general service, in all the provinces under British rule, as well as beyond these limits, should the exigencies of the service require it.

The troops of the Hyderabad contingent have not hitherto drawn batta while marching, or while employed on field service ; which has been a matter of grievance to the men, and I think justly so ; and while other troops in the field drawn batta, and the Hyderabad contingent troops even when employed with them, are excluded from drawing any remuneration while marching, this induces men to be discontented, and I think with reason. I would therefore recommend, that there should be an order of Government to the effect that, whilst marching, or on field service, carriage for the native officers and men should be supplied at the public expense, according to a scale to be fixed upon.

12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the _____ of seafaring habits ; and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes ?

13. Has the _____ any marine corps ; and if so, of what strength, and whence recruited ? No reply required to No. 12 and 13.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised, each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only ?

14. Men should be enlisted from among any races or castes who may offer themselves as willing to be entertained as soldiers.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area ; in fact, without reference to districts ?

15. This is answered in paragraph 14.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, or caste ?

16. Certainly not.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, so far as may be possible, homogeneous ; each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste ; or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company ?

17. All tribes and castes should be mixed up in each company of a regiment, in order that a spirit of rivalry and emulation should be cultivated among the men. That general bond of union as to particular interests and prejudices, should not be recognized at all ; and by this means, I believe a strict discipline will be maintained ; when every man in the regiment will be encouraged to look for promotion by his own merit and good conduct in obtaining the goodwill of his commanding officer.

18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained ?

18. Two to one in favor of the Hindoo to the Mussulman. All other tribes should be enlisted as they offer themselves for service.

19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district, or kept to separate districts ; or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts ?

19. The recruiting for the military should be kept entirely distinct from the police, as they are under separate authorities.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?

20. Certainly not.

21. What agency should be employed for recruiting for the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?

21. There are men enough and more in the Deccan of various races to supply the Hyderabad contingent with recruits, and they constantly present themselves at the stations for enlistment. Should it ever be found necessary, a recruiting party from a regiment should be sent into the country to obtain men.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps, or a distinct agency ?

22. A distinct agency, as the requirements for each branch are so totally distinct from each other.

23. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent ?

23. A man who offers himself for a recruit is interrogated by the commanding officer of a regiment as to

his country and connexions, and being aided by the medical officer in ascertaining his physical fitness for a sepoy, he is chosen without any further precautions, and none are required.

24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the assigned districts ?

24. Similar precautions should be taken with regard to the men who offer themselves for the police.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country ; and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments, or in companies, or otherwise ?

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred ?

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting ?

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments ?

29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps and subject to periodical relief ?

30. Where should barracks of such companies be placed relatively to the lines of the native troops ?

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements ?

32. How should such companies be armed ; with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated ?

No replies required to Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32.

33. How should the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent be armed ?

33. With the usual infantry percussion arm.

34. How should police corps in the assigned districts be armed ?

34. With the carbine ; pouch belt, sling bayonet or sword belt, made of tanned leather. The carbine is preferable to the musket, which is too large and unweildy, whereas a carbine is handy for close quarters, when a policeman is required to quell tumults and petty disturbances in the villages.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages ?

35. No reply required to No. 35.

36. How should the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldier ?

36. With the loose tunic ; each man to have two, one made of broad cloth for cold and wet weather, the other of a light or cotton fabric. The pouch and belt and waist bayonet belt to be made of tanned leather. Pipe-clay to be abolished as a useless expense, and it ruins the leather. The newly-invented military ventilating helmet is the best head dress for the European officers, and the Kilmarnock forage cap, now in use in the Hyderabad contingent, is well suited for the sepoy.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached ; what is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or

irregular corps of infantry in close and permanent association ? *Brigadier Hill.*

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers present any analogy with such an arrangement and any encouragement to adopt it ?

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps ?

40. Would such a system be favorable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of European troops which is an element of strength ?

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war ?

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support ; and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps ?

No replies required to Nos. 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest improvement in the articles of war in use in the Hyderabad contingent ?

1. The articles of war in use with the Hyderabad contingent are the same as are in force in the Madras army.

They can be improved with much advantage, retaining those articles which are obviously necessary for the maintenance of strict discipline, and omitting many others which are not required and useless.

I would recommend greater powers being given to regimental courts-martial, which would at the same time invest the commanding officer of a regiment with more authority also over his men, in confirming and carrying into effect such sentences of courts-martial as would cause this tribunal to be more feared than it is at present, from its limited powers, and in many cases useless punishments, such as simple imprisonment. The alterations and improvements are too numerous to be alluded to here ; but a selected number of officers of the Company's army might draw up for submission to Government such a military code as would, in my opinion, be far preferable for administering justice to the soldier for military offences than if they were to be abolished, and paramount authority to be placed in the hands of the commanding officer of a regiment, and himself only to be responsible for its exercise.

No soldier, I conceive, should be deprived the liberty of appealing to a tribunal of his equals, if he considers himself wronged by his commanding officer.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army ?

2. The rules regulating punishments in the native army should be retained, and greater power given to commanding officers of regiments for inflicting them, by which means his hands would be strengthened, which is desirable for the maintenance of discipline.

The rules for the native army cannot, in my opinion, be assimilated to those which obtain in the British army.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the Hyderabad contingent ?

3. I think it does ; and I believe it will work with greater advantage if the alterations suggested in paragraph 1 should be sanctioned by the Government of India.

Brigadier Hill.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops of the Hyderabad contingent with the military code under which they live and are governed?

4. The native articles of war are translated into Hindoostanee and Nagree, and a certain number of the articles which are specially marked are read once every three months at the head of every regiment. They are understood in a way by the men, but the articles require to be simplified, when they will be better remembered.

5. What proportion of the native troops can read for themselves in the vernacular dialect the articles of war?

5. On an average about one-third of the men of a regiment can read for themselves.

6. Under what military or civil code are police corps in the assigned districts of the Nizam territory?

My reply to the three following questions is as follows:—

6. There is no police corps in the assigned districts of the Nizam's territories. The police are under no military or civil code peculiar to themselves, but in common with the other inhabitants of the district they are amenable to the provisions of the Indian penal code.

7. How is discipline maintained, and the authority of officers, European and native, upheld in police corps in the assigned districts of the Nizam territory?

7. As there is no police corps in the assigned districts there cannot, therefore, be said to be such discipline as is contemplated in this question. They are dealt with or summarily dismissed by the deputy or assistant commissioner as they please.

I have just marched through the Raichore Doab, which contains upwards of 5,500 square miles, for which I have been informed there are only 500 police peons. The consequence of this is, that there are not sufficient peons for the executive and current duties of the districts, as I have seen in every village or town I have encamped at.

8. Do you consider that the provision made for maintaining the discipline of police corps and the authority of their European and native officers sufficient, and the working satisfactory?

8. There is no doubt that the safety and security of the Raichore Doab is most imperfectly protected from the absence of an organized military police, of such a strength as would preserve the peace of the districts, by being of such a number as could be collected together on an emergency to act with effect in any part where a tumult or an assemblage of disorderly persons might collect together.

The deputy commissioner or his assistant is now in himself police superintendent, magistrate, judge, and collector.

Until a severance is made between the police and magisterial duties of the same officer and the police doubled to what it now is, there will be a constant fear of incursions from all sides, which actually did occur recently, and which caused the force I commanded to be marched into the Raichore Doab against insurgents.

There should be a superintendent of police, with his deputies under him, all military men, *selected for this duty*, which will entail constant moving about; and the police could then be well disciplined under a code of their own. It will be found that what I have stated as regards the defective police establishment in the Raichore Doab, and the entire absence of any discipline among the police, is equally applicable to the whole of the assigned districts in the Nizam's territory.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments of the Hyderabad contingent, what is the system of promotion;

is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. The seniority system of promotion does not obtain in the Hyderabad contingent. On a vacancy occurring among the native officers, the qualifications in reading and writing, merit, and general intelligence of the senior havildar is always taken into consideration by the commanding officer of a regiment in which the vacancy occurs, and should the havildar not possess the above requirements for a good native officer, he is passed over; and whenever a junior havildar is recommended for promotion, the names of all havildars senior to him are entered in a roll, with full statements of their various services and claims, which is forwarded to the brigadier commanding the contingent for his remarks, who submits the roll to the president, who sanctions the promotion.

Those men who have attained the grade of havildar, but who are unfit for promotion to the commissioned ranks, though otherwise good men, are made colour havildars, which gives them a little increase of pay.

The same rule is followed out from the grade of jemadar to subadar.

2. Are the native officers of the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. There are some intelligent and very good native officers in the infantry; but many of them neither read or write, which materially affects their usefulness and efficiency. Since the last three years, however, none are promoted to be native officers, except they can both read and write, and are otherwise active and intelligent.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men from amongst whom they have risen?

3. Many of the native officers do not possess the higher acquirements which they should have, for the reasons given in the last paragraph.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or in promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. There is no examination prior to promotion. The commanding officer's knowledge of the men, and their fitness for promotion, is the only test for advancement.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers between the European officers and their men weaken the influence of the European officers?

Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?

5. No reply required.

6. Has it been found in the Hyderabad contingent that, on the occurrence of mutinies, the native officers have given timely information, or been of any use, in aiding the European officers to check mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

6. In the orders of Government by the late Governor-General of India, in January 1856, Lord Dalhousie dismissed the native officers of the 3rd cavalry Hyderabad contingent for not having given such information to the European officers as his Lordship believed them to be possessed of regarding the mutiny in that regiment.

In July 1857, on the breaking out of the mutiny at Aurungabad of the 1st cavalry Hyderabad contingent, the first intimation which was given to the commandant of the regiment was by two Seikh brothers, who were bargeers in the regiment. Many of the native officers were placed in confinement in their own lines by their own men, and sentries posted over them in their tents, with orders to shoot them if they attempted to escape. A Bombay moveable column decided the issue of this mutiny.

There can be no doubt that, in all mutinies, the native officers must be cognizant of all that is going on among the men, many of whom have brothers and relations in the regiment; and it should be, I think, an understanding in all regiments that, if the native officers do not at once give information of any intended rising or mutiny, every one present should be dismissed on the spot.

7. Should the grades of native commissioned officers be continued or discontinued?
8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company of a native regiment, in lieu of its native officers, advisable?
9. If the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument thus closed to the native soldier, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of services, be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

No replies required to Nos. 7, 8, and 9.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native troops to the British service?
10. This question, regarding the pensioners of the Hyderabad contingent who have drawn their pensions in Hindoostan, cannot be replied to. In all probability they have paid the penalty of the mutineers about Lucknow and Benares, and have suffered, equally with the pensioners of the late Bengal army, by being deprived of their pensions.
11. Should not the system of promotion generally, by seniority, to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?
11. This question has been replied to in paragraph 1.
12. Should the system of pensions, as now in force by regulation, be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?
12. A soldier has only his pension to look to when age and long service compels him to leave his regiment. I believe pensions to be the most powerful bond of union that the Government possesses in preserving the fidelity of the soldiers to the State; and I consider that the system of pensions should still be maintained.

13. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men of the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent?

13. This question cannot be replied to, as all the pensioners in Hindoostan draw their pensions from the circles within which each pensioner resides.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in courts-martial?

14. The native officers generally depend upon the judge advocate, or other officer who superintends a court-martial, for the information elicited on trials, as the law of evidence, which is usually made much too complicated for their understandings, is somewhat beyond their comprehension; but in military trials generally, where the offences are simple, the native officers are fit to take part in courts-martial.

Replies from Nos. 15 to 21 inclusive, are not required in the printed form, and are not here inserted.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commanding officers of native corps been increased or diminished in the Hyderabad contingent; and state the orders, or measures or changes in the practice of the service, to which you attribute such effect?

2. During the above period, have the powers of European officers, not commanding officers, been increased or diminished? *Brigadier H*
3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps, upon the discipline of corps in the native infantry of the Hyderabad contingent?
4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of European officers, not commanding officers of corps?
5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of headquarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in command of companies, and of the commanding officer of the regiment?
6. Should the power of commanding officers, and of subordinate European officers, be increased or diminished?
7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

I find it necessary to embody my replies to these seven consecutive questions, in the following manner:—

There are three European officers in each regiment of infantry for the maintenance of discipline; a commandant, second in command, and adjutant. I have made minute inquiries in every regiment, since I have commanded, as to the mode of carrying on the duties of an infantry corps; and I have found, that *practically*, the entire discipline of the regiment is in the hands of the commanding officer. The second in command, with but few exceptions, has literally nothing to do but to attend to his duties on parade. As the commandant draws a stipulated allowance for each company in the regiment, for repair of arms, as well as for the supply of books and stationery, for the whole regiment, the interior economy of all the companies may, in fact, be said to be in his hands also.

The adjutant has his departmental books to keep; and though he receives the reports of the regiment, and listens to complaints, nevertheless, generally, the commanding officer is mainly the only person to whom the regiment looks to for everything.

I commanded the late Gwalior contingent, as well as the Hyderabad contingent; and I have narrowly observed the practice pursued by commandants, in the manner in which military discipline has been generally carried on; and I have found in both contingents, the practice has been, for the entire regiment to look up to the commandant *alone*; which doubtless diminishes the power of the subordinate European officers, and must render nugatory the respect and influence which I believe Government intended them to have in supporting the commanding officer in the discipline of the regiment.

This must be defective in principle; for all the responsibility in the regiment is in the power of one officer, who regulates every promotion, alone grants leave, with the exception of a few days, and in himself rests all the interests of the men. There has been a very fair opportunity of forming an opinion of irregular regiments during the late mutinies in Bengal. A regiment has frequently, from the exigencies of the service, been brought down to one officer, and sometimes to none at all. Officers from the line are then transferred to a body of men, who *require to be known* before they *fully confide* in him; and when their confidence is obtained, I believe that few European officers (who should be selected for the irregular service) will be found sufficient for the peculiar duties required of them.

I would suggest for the improvement of discipline, that the complement of European officers for the infantry should be *four* in number, and not *three* as at present.

An officer should have charge of each wing of the regiment; each should be answerable to the commanding officer for the discipline of his wing.

Brigadier Hill.

All complaints should be settled by the wing officer, unless they are of a grave or serious nature, when he should report the same to the commanding officer of the regiment; and he should have authority to grant leave of absence to the men of his wing, to the extent of one month, under the counter-signature of the commanding officer. He should be authorized to punish men to the extent laid down in the present regulations. Promotions should go in companies; and officers commanding wings should, on vacancies occurring, send in their recommendation rolls to the commanding officer, who will use his discretion in making the promotion; or should he consider it necessary, he would promote any other man in the company to the vacancy, as in his judgment he thinks best.

Should a wing officer consider an offence requires a heavier punishment than that which is laid down for a company officer, the man should be brought before the commanding officer, who will use his discretion in the punishment to be awarded.

I believe that discipline would be much improved if the above suggestions were sanctioned by regulation; the officers subordinate to the commanding officer would then have certain responsibilities delegated to them, and the authority of the commanding officer being held to be supreme throughout the regiment, his influence would be more advantageously exercised than it is at present, and it would be a very desirable improvement in the command of a regiment.

W. HILL, Brigadier,
Commanding Hyderabad Contingent.

(No. 446 of 1858.)

From Brigadier W. HILL to Lieut.-Col. DURAND, C.B.

Head Quarters, Hyderabad Contingent,
Bolarum, September 24, 1858.

SIR,

I do myself the honor of forwarding my replies to the questions on the artillery of the Hyderabad contingent, which now concludes the series of questions on the whole of the troops of this contingent, which I hope you have received.

2. I also did myself the honor of submitting some time since my replies to the questions on the re-organization of the Madras army.

I have, &c.

W. HILL, Brigadier,
Commanding Hyderabad Contingent.

ARTILLERY.

I.—RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF THE ARTILLERY.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the native gunners of the Hyderabad contingent are composed?
1. Mussulmans and Hindoos; there are many Brahmins among the latter caste.
2. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the gun lascars of the Hyderabad contingent are composed?
2. Mussulmans and Hindoo.
3. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the drivers of the Hyderabad contingent are composed?
3. Mussulman and Hindoo.
- Nos. 4 and 5.
No replies required.
6. From what districts are the several races, tribes, or castes which enter into the golundauze drawn?
6. They are drawn from the Deccan and Hindoo-stan.

7. From what districts are the races, tribes, or castes which compose the gun lascars drawn?

8. From what districts are the drivers taken? Recruits for both of these are taken from all classes, as height and a robust frame are not essential for their particular duties.

There are few Hindoostanees among the drivers. The Hindoostan men, from their height, are generally put into the golundauze.

9. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded by regulation or practice of the service from the golundauze of the Hyderabad contingent, and if so, for what reason?

9. None are excluded by any regulation.

10. The same question is repeated both with respect to gun lascars and drivers?

10. The same reply as paragraph 9.

11. Supposing that native artillery were continued in the Hyderabad contingent, are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits from the golundauze might with advantage be enlisted?

11. There are no Seikhs in either of the four companies of artillery in this contingent, and if native artillery are to be continued, it would be very advantageous to enlist some Seikhs into it, to counterbalance the influence of the Hindoostan and Deccan Mahomedans, who form the larger portion of the artillery.

12. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the golundauze of the Hyderabad contingent, for the gun lascars, and for the drivers?

12. No agency is employed. Recruits are easily obtained for the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers.

13. On entertainment of recruits for the golundauze, the gun lascars, or the drivers of the Hyderabad contingent, what precautions of registry and other forms are taken before the local authorities of districts?

13. No precautions are taken; but if they are physically fit, and are the regulation height for the artillery, the men are registered.

14. Would you suggest any alterations in the recruiting regulations or practice if golundauze continue to be enlisted?

14. None.

15. The same question is put with regard to gun lascars and drivers.

15. None.

16. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his being admitted into the golundauze of the Hyderabad contingent?

16. The same oath is administered to the artillery recruits as that which is in use with the infantry.

17. The same question is repeated with regard to the gun lascars and drivers?

17. The same as above.

18. How long has this form of oath been in use in the Hyderabad contingent?

18. The same length of time as in the infantry?

19. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the golundauze, gun lascars, or driver when first enrolled; or would you substitute any form of engagement for the oath?

19. If the native artillery are to be continued, I would recommend the same addition to the present oath as I have suggested for the infantry of this contingent.

Nos. 20 and 21.

No replies required.

22. Should the battalions, or companies, or troops of golundauze be homogeneous as to

race or caste, or composite, having all tribes or castes mixed up together?

22. The different races should be mixed up as much as possible, to prevent combination.

23. If composite, in what proportion should the various races, tribes, or castes be entertained?

23. There should be more Hindoos than Mussulmans; as many as three to one. Other races should be mixed with them.

24. The two foregoing questions are repeated with reference to gun lascars and to drivers?

24. I would suggest the same as for the golundauze.

25. What agency should be employed for recruiting golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?

25. The European officer commanding the company can best employ his own native officers and non-commissioned, as the best agency for procuring recruits.

26. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, when enlisting recruits for the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers?

26. It is not requisite to apply to any local authorities when enlisting recruits for the company of artillery.

No. 27.

No reply required.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Are the same articles of war applicable to the golundauze of the Hyderabad contingent as to its infantry?

1. They are the same as at present in use with the infantry.

2. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the golundauze of the Hyderabad contingent?

2. The same improvements as I have already suggested for the infantry of this contingent.

3.

No reply required.

4. Are the gun lascars and drivers under the same articles of war as the golundauze, and do any improvements suggested comprehend these classes?

4. They are under the same articles of war as the golundauze.

5. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

5. The rules for the punishment of the native army cannot be assimilated to the rules which obtain for Europeans.

6. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native artillery of the Hyderabad contingent?

6. Yes.

7. What means are adopted to acquaint the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers with the military code under which they serve?

7. Being written in Hindoostanee and Nagree, the native officers are able to explain them to the men of the company.

8. What proportion of the golundauze, gun lascars, and drivers can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

8. Not above one-third of the whole company can read in their own vernacular.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the Hyderabad contingent artillery, what is the system of promotion in force for the gun lascars, golundauzes, and drivers? Is it

based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined? *Brigadier Hill.*

1. On merit alone.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the golundauze generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. They are a very intelligent class of natives; the native commissioned officers especially are very superior men.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the golundauze from among whom they have risen?

3. As there are but few native officers in each company, those selected for promotion are men of higher acquirements and greater intelligence than the others.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. No; the officer commanding the company is able to judge of their efficiency, from daily observation of the manner in which they perform their duties.

5. Do the golundauze of all grades undergo systematic instruction in anything else than ordinary gun drill? Are they practised at laying guns and mortars, at cutting fuzes, judging distances, adapting charges to mortars, &c.; or do the European officers themselves execute those details?

5. The native officers and non-commissioned officers only are practised at laying guns and mortars, at cutting fuzes, and judging distances. The charges adapted to mortars are executed by the European officer and the warrant officers of the company.

6. Can the golundauze of the Hyderabad contingent frequently read English, and write it?

6. No, they cannot.

7. Is it advisable that native gunners should be conversant with laboratory work?

7. No.

8.

8. No reply required.

9. Have the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of golundauze been found, on occasion of mutiny, to evince cordial fidelity, to give timely information, and effectively to aid their European officers in checking or quelling mutiny? Have the native officers passively, or overtly, sided with the mutineers, or with the Government they had sworn to serve, and with the European officers?

9. The native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the 4th company artillery, which was at Aurungabad last year during the mutiny, did not give information of it; and among the executions for that mutiny, a havildar was shot; a golundauze was also transported. The commandant of that company had also reason to doubt the fidelity of the jemadar.

10. If native artillery be continued in the Hyderabad contingent, should the grades of native commissioned officers be maintained or abolished?

10. If the native artillery be continued, the native commissioned officers should be maintained.

11. Would the substitution of such a number of European non-commissioned officers as would give one to each gun of a battery, in lieu of the native commissioned officers of golundauze, be advisable?

11. I believe that the introduction of so few Europeans to a company of artillery as would give one to each gun of a battery, would be inadvisable. For in the event of a mutiny, this small number of Europeans could not defend themselves against a whole company of natives. They would probably be cut to pieces before assistance could reach them.

Brigadier Hill.

12. If the abolition of the grades of golundauze commissioned officers be advisable, and the prospect of distinction and emolument be thus closed to the golundauze, would a graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions, claimable after specified periods of service, be a compensatory encouragement, and as efficacious as commissioned grades?
12. I would not recommend the graduated scale of good-service pay and retiring pensions to the non-commissioned grades, as this proposal would not, I think, gain for the artillery such intelligent men as at present.
13. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the golundauze to the British service and the British rule?
13. They appear to have done so hitherto in this contingent.
14. Do the drivers and gun lascars receive pensions?
14. The gun lascars and drivers do receive pensions.
15. Have the drivers and gun lascars of the Hyderabad contingent artillery been found faithful in times of mutiny?
15. Their fidelity under such circumstances would be very doubtful.
16. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?
16. I believe that pensions are essential for preserving the fidelity of the army, as the only reward for old and worn-out men, and the only thing they have to look for if they serve the Government faithfully.
17. Can you state the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the native artillery of the Hyderabad contingent?
17. I am unable to provide this information.
18. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grade of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?
18. I have replied to this in paragraph 1.
19. Are commissioned officers of golundauze generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?
19. Yes, they are.
20. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?
20. Most certainly not.
- Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26.
No replies required.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience have the powers of the commandants of native battalions of artillery and of officers in command of golundauze batteries of the Hyderabad contingent artillery been increased or diminished?
1. I have not observed any increase or diminution in the powers of the commandants of the companies of artillery.
2. What has been the result upon the discipline of the golundauze of the Hyderabad contingent artillery?
2. The discipline has been well maintained, being based upon the regulations of the Madras artillery.
3. If golundauze artillery is continued, what measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline and the confirmation of the influence and authority of the European officers?
3. I would strongly urge that the golundauze artillery of this contingent should be abolished, and that

European artillery should be substituted for them. The following instance of what occurred at Aurungabad last year is a proof how little the native artillery can be relied on.

During the trials which took place after the Bombay column arrived there to quell the mutiny, it was discovered that the 1st cavalry had been told, that if they attacked the cantonment, the artillery were ready to join them and seize the arsenal. This, in connexion with the convictions for mutiny which took place in the 4th company of artillery, is conclusive of the disaffection which existed in that company.

The element of disaffection having once appeared in so serious a form as to propose the seizure of the arsenal and turning upon our own officers, is the strongest proof of the necessity for securing ourselves in future against the possibility of the occurrence of any such disaster should any unforeseen circumstances again throw this part of the country into the disturbed state it was last year.

Besides the four light field batteries in this contingent, there are in the arsenals at Aurungabad, Ellichpore, and Hingolee heavy pieces of ordnance, as enumerated in the return which is attached, with an abundant supply of ammunition, which would make the native artillery very formidable were they to turn against us and seize the arsenals.

I would therefore suggest that the four companies of native artillery should be abolished, and two European horse batteries be raised in their place, and that the whole of the heavy ordnance should be removed to Secunderabad as soon as there is room in the arsenal there to receive it.

The native officers of the contingent artillery being very intelligent men, might be provided for in the police corps, which I presume, from some of the questions which have been sent to me to answer, are likely to be organized in the Hyderabad territories; and the men of the four companies would form an excellent nucleus for the police.

Should it be decided upon to substitute European for native artillery in this contingent, two companies of European artillery might be lent by the Madras Government until the contingent batteries were formed, which would at once make the native artillery available for the military police, as they are ready trained.

Nos. 4, 5, and 6.
No replies required.

W. HILL, Brigadier,
Commanding Hyderabad Contingent.

RETURN of the whole of the HEAVY ORDNANCE in use with the Hyderabad Contingent.

Ordnance Office, Hyderabad Contingent,
Bolarum, September 24, 1858.

Stations.	Gun.		Howitzer.		Mortars.		Remarks.
	18 Pounds.	12 Pounds.	8 Inch.	5½ Inch medium.	8 Inch.	5½ Inch.	
Bolarum -	2	-	-	2	2	-	Gunpowder. 24,150 lbs.
Aurungabad -	2	-	2	-	2	6	18,600 "
Ellichpore -	2	-	-	-	1	-	11,000 "
Hingolee -	1	-	-	-	1	-	10,800 "
Singsoogoor -	-	-	-	-	1	1	3,000 "
Total -	7	-	2	2	8	7	67,550 "

T. R. ARDAGH,
Deputy Assistant Commissary,
In charge General Depot, H. C.

No. 20.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM COLONEL GALL.

CAVALRY.

1.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army when first enrolled?

I would abolish the custom of administering oaths to recruits. Neither Mussulmans or Hindoos would abstain from joining in a mutiny for their "oath's sake," and if the exaction of an oath does not do good, it does harm. The usual pretext for revolt in all armies has been the departure of their Government from the terms of an agreement, tacit or expressed, and the mutineer once made to believe, however falsely, that the Government has broken faith with him, easily persuades himself that he has received absolution.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

If the men enlisted for a corps be of different religions and different castes, I think it would be advisable to recruit each corps from a prescribed district, for there would always exist a certain want of sympathy between regiments composed of men drawn from different districts; this, added to the estrangement produced between man and man by differences of religion and caste, would lessen the probability of combinations for an unlawful object.

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry be homogeneous as to race or caste?

No; let caste be no obstacle to enlistment in any corps.

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of *ressalabs*, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

Mixed up together.

18. What precautions before local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, should be taken?

A register of the age, place of residence, parentage, caste, description, and date of enlistment of every recruit taken from a district should be furnished by the local authorities to the officer in charge of that district, to be preserved in his office.

A copy of the above should be forwarded with the recruit to the head-quarters of the corps in which he enlists, in the event of the man's desertion or absence without leave; under suspicious circumstances the district authorities would be warned, and any inquiries that might be deemed necessary instituted by the local police. All casualties of soldiers should be notified to the head men of the villages from whence they had been taken as recruits through the local authorities.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bengal army?

No; it would not be expedient to bring such a small body of Europeans into too close proximity with native troopers; familiarized with the weak points of the European soldier's character, and confiding in their numerical superiority, the natives might be disposed to take advantage of them.

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

I think not. The commissariat arrangements for a single troop or squadron would be very simple, and

might be conducted by a non-commissioned officer selected from the squadron itself, under the control of the commissariat officer of the district.

Colonel Gall.

- 23, 24. How should such troops of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?

I would arm the Europeans with better fire-arms than those given to the native troopers. I have heard competent judges speak of the carbine brought out by Her Majesty's 8th Hussars in the highest terms, provided it will stand wear, and on this subject there is a doubt no better weapon appears to have been yet furnished to European dragoons in India; it is, however, somewhat too heavy; a carbine should be light enough to be easily used with one hand. I would not give pistols to dragoons or irregular cavalry, the present dragoon sabre if kept sharp is an excellent weapon, but I would substitute wooden scabbards for steel ones (the wood cased in leather), at night the jingling of the steel scabbard betrays the position of a vedette as soon as he begins to patrol.

I would give native troopers a light carbine, loading at the bore, but I would arm one squadron in every corps of irregular cavalry with spears, the shaft of bamboo, the common long hunting spear called the boar-spear. There is no weapon like this in pursuit.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

I would subject native soldiers to all punishments which European soldiers are liable to suffer for grave offences.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

I would make efficiency, proved by a test, the rule of promotion, giving the prior claim to seniority of course; but I would make merit displayed on the field of battle, or on active service in the field, an exceptional ground for advancement, and in these cases dispense with all further proofs of fitness.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

No officer should be allowed to join an irregular corps until he had proved the possession of certain professional knowledge and certain acquirements, without which the duties of this branch of the service cannot be so efficiently performed as they ought to be; more than activity and zeal should be required of an officer destined to the command of an irregular corps. On service he is generally the first to come in contact with an enemy, he is the first upon whom the duty of reconnoitring a position devolves. As the general or other officer commanding a field force may be guided by the report of a reconnoissance, the information furnished by it should not only be most accurate, but accompanied by a plan of the ground, position, or external defences of the enemy, without which the clearest reports are imperfect; yet how very few cavalry officers comparatively have acquired the art of plan drawing, or sketching ground.

Colonel Gall.

21. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bengal army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?

None mounted by Government.

22. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army were mounted?

Between 600 and 700 rupees.

23. Whence are the horses obtained, and of what breeds are they?

Stud bred from the Government studs, *i.e.* half English or Arab, the dams being country mares.

Persians, and a few Arabs perhaps, from the Persian Gulf.

The want of breeding and size in the country mares is the cause of many defects in their produce; this remark only applies to the Haupper stud horses.

28. Is it advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of the British colonies for a supply of horses for the army of India?

The studs should be abolished, and the breed of horses for the Indian market encouraged in Persia, Arabia, Sinde, Turkistan, and the British colonies. India itself would supply a good number. The gift by Government or the loan of good stallions to zemindars who had bred eligible horses, would encourage them to improve the breed.

32. Do you advocate the existence in corps of (such) large vested interests or not?

I would limit the number of assamees held by any one man. A native officer who held a very large number would, I suspect, possess an influence that might be used with effect against the Government.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

I believe the discipline of a corps on service to depend mainly upon the authority of its immediate commanding officer, of a native corps especially, on the understanding that the decisions of a commanding officer are final, and that he is the source of professional power and advancement.

The distant authority of head-quarters involves references and appeals, and there is no right so liable to be abused by a native of India as that of appeal; in the native army it becomes dangerous when it is exercised by ill-disposed men as the means of augmenting their own importance, and weakening their commanding officer's position in the eyes of their more ignorant comrades; by natives, further, there is no power more respected than that of exercising liberality

and executing justice, whether in the form of reward or punishment, with promptitude and on the spot.

In European cavalry corps the power of investigating certain cases and inflicting punishment, or releasing a prisoner, should be conceded to troop officers; for instance, an officer in charge of a troop may hear that one of his best and steadiest men has been imprisoned in the guard-room; on inquiry into the circumstances of the case, he may find that the man was not to blame, or has committed an offence of no great magnitude; surely the officer might now award some minor punishment or release the prisoner, who would otherwise remain all night in imprisonment and be brought before the commanding officer on the following morning. The best soldiers are proud of saying, "I never appeared in the orderly room as a prisoner."

These remarks do not apply to a cavalry dépôt, where officers are mostly young and inexperienced.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

I would select them from amongst young officers, who should be induced to qualify expressly for cavalry appointments, proving their eligibility by an examination passed before competent judges.

After passing the examination they might undergo a short course of instruction at the European cavalry dépôt, or the head-quarters of any European cavalry regiment.

It is still a common error to suppose that scientific acquirements are only useful to officers of artillery and the engineers.

A large amount of information which now never reaches Government might be furnished by officers of irregular cavalry possessing moderate professional attainments, combined with a good colloquial knowledge of the language.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse? and

22. If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be mounted? How officered? How armed?

It is practicable. In the proportion of 250 irregular sowais to 500 European dragoons; the former armed and equipped like other irregulars, and attached as auxiliaries; cantoned near, parading and serving in the field with the Europeans, whom they would accompany everywhere. The association would be attended by certain inconveniences, but it could not be dangerous, as in the case of a troop of Europeans attached to a regiment of irregular horse. The officers might be drawn from complete regiments of irregular cavalry, or selected from those who had qualified for cavalry.

I would assign a larger proportion of officers to irregular corps than they now have. Some native officers are very intelligent, but on service in my opinion they do not supply the place of a European one.

R. H. GALL, Lieutenant-Colonel,
14th King's Light Dragoons.

Gwalior, July 31, 1858.

No. 21.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR J. HOPE GRANT, K.C.B.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army is composed?

1. The irregular cavalry is composed chiefly of Mahomedans of various tribes and races. In the early

days of its formation the nobles and chiefs of tribes brought their retainers into the field, and thus troops and regiments were raised. Gradually this has changed, and though the service still has attractions for men of mark, as all have to pass through the ranks to position, these have decreased. The Rajpoots were formerly in greater numbers than now, though there are still some to be found, and a few Brahmans.

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K.C.B.

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2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from ?

2. Rohilkund has given the best men, perhaps ; Mahomedans (Pathans), the descendants and relatives of the men of Eusofzye. Delhi supplies many sowars, and the least desirable in stamp. Zhujjur, Rhotuck, and Kullinore send forth hundreds, Rajpoots and "Ranghurs," Mahometan converts, good soldiers, though they need to be commanded. Hurrianah gives its share, and some of the best horsemen in the country are found in this district. A great many of the Zhujjur and Rhotuck men go to the Sind horse, tempted by the higher pay.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, either by the regulations or the practice of the ?

3. Of late years the demand for irregulars has been such that no man who could manage a horse and find good security amongst his comrades has been refused service.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

The Jâts were, perhaps, neglected on account of indifferent horsemanship. I am not aware of the exclusion of any warlike class at all familiar with horses.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

5. Recruiting has been usually carried on through the native officers and men of each corps. They train up their children for the service. No medium could be more efficient. Any native officer or man of family could raise a troop, if need be, in his own district. This was the agency adopted chiefly by officers to whom the raising of corps has been intrusted.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts ?

6. Men's names are registered in their own district, but desertion, ordinary desertion, is rare.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken ?

7. In irregular corps a list of candidates, the sons and relatives of men who have died or been killed, or who are still present, is kept, and these pass in as vacancies arise. In some corps this is carried to such an extent that the admission of an outsider is unknown. These candidates, or "omedwars," move about with the regiment. Doubtless there are many and great advantages in thus making a corps the home of a family from generation to generation, but there also disadvantages ; the circle from which the supply is drawn is narrowed ; class interests obtain to an injurious extent.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

8. I can suggest no alteration in the mode of recruiting. The ranks of the irregulars must be filled in a great measure for a long time from the Punjaub and the Pathans of Eusofzye and the border. There is no sympathy between the Pathan and the Seikh, and the former considers the Punjaubee Mussulman utterly degenerate. There is a fine race of Pathan about Pindée Gabe, in the Rawul Pindée district, who have lately taken service with us.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

9. Major Daly, C.B., has raised two corps of irregular cavalry, the 1st Punjab cavalry and 1st Oude

cavalry, and has augmented the corps of Guides, yet he never administered an oath.

10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army when first enrolled ?

11. I would have no oath. Oaths have not served to restrain the native army from the utmost brutality. No oath could have strengthened the fidelity of the Guides and Punjab corps, and in these they are not used.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only ?

12. Some corps might be raised with advantage in prescribed districts.

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts ?

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be homogeneous as to race or caste ?

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of rissalahs, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps ?

13, 14, 15. I think it is of little moment whether corps or troops be of distinct races. The efficiency of the regiment in either case would depend on the character and disposition of the commandant. Along the Punjab border we have had much experience of this sort. Some officers have endeavoured to make their corps Pathan ; others again are imbued with a Seikh fancy, companies and troops of races. In each case the result has been good, for the officers were in earnest.

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter ?

16. I would strongly advise that distinction of race should be preserved. Let the Seikh troops be Seikh, and the Pathan, Pathan. I prefer troops of different races for general service to corps of one race.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting ?

17. See 5.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

18. See 6 and 7.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bengal army ?

19. The introduction of a troop or squadron of Europeans would seriously embarrass the moveability, and therefore diminish the value of irregular cavalry.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief ?

20. If adopted, the troop should be enlisted specially for the purpose ; men and horses entertained on the silladar principle, and thus no Government commissariat would be needed. The commandant would have all necessary supplies in the bazaar.

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed ?

21. Bungalows built according to the custom of the district, each to hold eight or ten men, the most

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convenient and the most healthy plan. No stables would be required.

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?
22. See 20.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?

22. The European troops should be armed as perfectly as possible, with revolving carbines or pistols.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be armed?

24. Every irregular should have a sword, lance, and carbine. He has much detached duty to perform, which necessitates the possession of fire-arms. Picquets, escorts, vedettes, moving through hilly and jungly countries without fire-arms, are at the mercy of the enemy. This is well understood on both sides. With his carbine, the sowar is treated with respect; without it, he feels helpless. This is the general feeling amongst the men. I would leave it optional to the man to carry a lance.

No reply required to No. 25.

26. Do the existing dress and equipments admit of improvement; if so, state in what respects?

26. The dress is good. In some corps there has been a tendency to tinsel and trumpery, and to besmear the sowar and officer with gold and silver. There is no head covering like the puggree for the sowar, handsome and serviceable. The alkalih should be of the best materials, but simple, as becomes the service soldier. Belts and appointments should be of English manufacture; those of this country fail in the test.

J. HOPE GRANT, Maj.-Gen.,
Commanding Oude Field Force.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

1. I think such alterations necessary in the articles of war, to render them serviceable in the irregular cavalry, that I would abolish them altogether and substitute a few simple rules within the comprehension of all. They have never been used in "the Guides," and in the Punjab irregular force the general principles only are acted on. In the irregular cavalry a few general rules should suffice, such as the penalties of desertion, disaffection, insubordination, &c. The service is highly popular, and now that the pay is likely to be put on a better footing, it will become more so. Men riding their own horses give pledges for conduct, and the fear of discharge has a beneficial effect even on the lowest. When a sowar begins to require punishment, the best course is to get rid of him:

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

2. See 1.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

3. The system of courts-martial in irregular corps works well in no respect.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

4 and 5. Portions of the articles of war are read to the men from time to time. Those who are best acquainted with the articles are generally the scamps, "the lawyers," who boast of their use for evading punishment.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?
5. See 4.

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Commanding Oude Field Force.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. I believe promotion in the Bengal irregular cavalry was based chiefly on seniority. In the original corps all the commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers are or were very aged men.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. In the Punjab cavalry, where promotion is based on merit, the officers and non-commissioned officers are remarkable for their intelligence and efficiency.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

3. The native officers in the Punjab cavalry were chiefly men of family and influence. The non-commissioned officers selected from the ranks were certainly, as a rule, the best to be found.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. I am aware of no test or examination being in force prior to promotion, nor do I think it would be advisable that there should be any.

No reply required to No. 5.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

No replies required to Nos. 7, 8, and 9.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

10. Retiring pensions have undoubtedly much attached the people to our service and rule. The convulsion from which we are now emerging can hardly be said to prove the contrary. The swoop was so universal, the presence of Europeans so rare, that they may well be pardoned for thinking the rule at an end.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

11. The pension system should undoubtedly be maintained, though the opportunity should not be lost to modify and amend it.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

13. Merit and efficiency should rule all promotion; without them there can be no reliance on the conduct of a corps.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

14. The native commissioned officers on courts-martial invariably are guided by the nod and inclina-

tion of the superintending officer. They know no higher justice than his wish.

No replies required to Nos. 15 and 16.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

17. I think the present system of officers is good. Two subalterns should be attached to each corps, as in the Punjab.

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular, and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

18. The classes which have hitherto entered the regular and irregular branches are distinct; the latter attached a class for whom the regular service has no attractions, men of some money, fond too of the position and importance which belonged to the irregular branch. Oude supplied two-thirds of the recruits for the regular cavalry, yet I have never seen an Oude man an irregular.

No reply required to Nos. 19 and 20.

21. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bengal army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?

21. The efficiency and tone of the cavalry would be changed if horses were supplied by Government. Better that all should remain on the footing which has worked so well.

22. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army were mounted?

23. Whence are the horses obtained, and of what breeds are they?

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency draw its horses?

24. The irregular cavalry formerly drew their horses from the zemindars, whose mares were visited by the stud stallions. During the last few years Afghanistan and the countries beyond have contributed greatly to our wants. The fathers and brothers of many of the sowars are large zemindars, who breed especially for the service; particularly was this the case about Bareilly and in Hurriannah.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency?

25. The average cost of horses has now reached rs. 175 (I speak of a date prior to the mutiny) or even rs. 200. There has been a gradual rise effected since the increase of the irregular branch.

26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

26. The requirements of the irregular cavalry were with difficulty met of late.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency?

27. I would castrate the stallions passed into the service, and take mares also. By having good mares in the country you would breed good horses, which now you have not the power of doing.

28. Is it advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies for a supply of horses for the army of India?

28. The Government studs ought to be maintained, but a better system of breeding horses should be established. By introducing mares into the cavalry

service the expense of mounting it would be very much diminished, and the State might then bear the expense of keeping up a certain number of brood mares. Without good brood mares in the country you will never improve the stock of horses, even though the stallion is good. I would be inclined to purchase Arab stallions when they could be obtained. It is a much harder class of horse than the European in this country. The Cape horse is good, but I don't think the Australian stands the climate so well. The Dunnee breed of horses in the Punjab is most valuable; our demand during the last seven or eight years has been so extensive that few remain. Central India again might be looked to with great advantage.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army?

29. The pay of the troopers prior to the mutiny was 20 rupees.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign?

30. The pay was insufficient. This has been felt by every one connected with irregulars, and was generally acknowledged. Corps were overwhelmed in debt, and would have been unable in many instances to take the field but for the banker. In many corps the sowar never saw his pay. The whole abstract passed into the hands of the banker, who deducted his per-centage, varying from 24 to 48 per cent., and doled out subsistence money to his patient.

30 b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?

31 b. See 30.

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

31. Since March last it has been announced in the Punjab that the sowar's pay had been increased to rs. 25. The police generally throughout the kingdom have received the same notification. It has not been made known to the irregulars generally, but we act on the supposition that it is the case.

32. What is the system of the Bengal irregular cavalry with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests, or not? Are they favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

32. The assamee system in the irregular cavalry differs in corps. Some maintain a fixed-price, others again submit them to auction, but the whole question is in the banker's hands. He sells up one man, a bad or ruined debtor, and buys for another whose race is yet to be run; but the system is false, anything in excess of the value of the seller's horse and appointments is clearly a sale of the position, a kind of traffic which Government could never have intended to authorize. The regulations lay down the number of assamees to be held by officers and non-commissioned officers, and prohibit the possession of them by outsiders, but what with the smallness of the pay and the grasp of the banker, virtually the majority are held out of the corps. I would not tie down a commandant too tightly about bargeers, something should be left to discretion and circumstances; heretofore complaints have been made of the low characters of the bargeers; it should be remembered the pay (rs. 7), with everything to find, was not sufficient to tempt a good man unless attached to or connected with an officer, or one who had hopes of becoming eventually a khodaspal. I think no man should be entitled to claim bargeers; the fact of a man being a duffadar should not give him a bargeer, nor would I exclude a man of character

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and influence, although but a sowar, from the possession of an assamee. Barghees certainly attach men of position to the service by giving them the importance they love. They are not unfavorable to discipline, and if fairly paid would be desirable to some extent.

From No. 33 to No. 37 inclusive no replies required.

38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

38. I think it was a mistake making the pay of the horse police and the irregular cavalry the same, viz., rupees 25 a month, but I think 25 rupees are sufficient for an irregular horseman.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army been increased or diminished?

1. The powers of commandants of corps have diminished of late years.

No reply required to No. 2.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

3. Discipline should tend to strengthen the powers and influence of commandants; it has been the tight binding of rules and regulations at variance with the constitution of the service which has weakened them.

No reply required to No. 4.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps? Upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops, and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

5. The discipline of an irregular corps mainly depends on the character of the commandant; to be effective it should be so. Possessed of the authority necessary for his position, a good commandant will have sufficient influence with the officers commanding troops and squadrons to ensure a proper tone and the discharge of duty.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

6. See 1, 3, and 5.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

7. To improve the discipline and establish a certain uniformity of system in the irregular cavalry, would put the body under one head. There should be an inspector-general, under whom there should be inspectors or brigadiers of districts or divisions. The powers of commandants should be increased, but subject to the check and supervision of the inspector-general. Banks should be prohibited in regiments. On the first embodiment of corps debts for arms and various appointments must be incurred. Government

should here help the sowar. After a certain fixed period any man found in debt should be discharged. The great object of every commandant should be to preserve his men from debt. On rs. 20 per month this was impossible; on rs. 25 it should be made a *sine qua non* of service. This is not the place to discuss the general rules which should guide the service.

No replies required to Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

13. I would send no officer on entering the service direct to an irregular corps. He should do duty for two years at least with a corps of the line, infantry or cavalry. After that he should be appointed to "do duty," and thus become initiated. If an indifferent horseman or otherwise incapable, the commandant should have the power of getting rid of him.

No reply required to No. 14.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?

15. The only corps who can be said to have been staunch, to have perilled life and limb for us, with a valor and heroism unknown in our previous wars, have been the irregular corps with a few officers. In almost all the instances these officers have been changed by death and casualties, yet the discipline and loyalty of the regiment have remained. In the few corps of the line which have refrained from mutiny, their conduct has been chiefly attributed to the great influence exercised by one or two native officers. In no case have I heard it attributable to the presence of more or less European officers.

No reply required to No. 16.

No replies required to Nos. 17 and 18.

No replies required to Nos. 19 and 20.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

21 and 22. It would be very practicable and I think advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a squadron of irregular horse, armed, equipped, mounted in all respects like other irregular horse. They might be relieved from time to time, or permanently posted to the corps; I incline to the latter. The squadron should have its own European officer, familiar with the men and their customs, and all the orders of the commanding officer should be issued through him. It is not necessary to dwell on the duties which they could perform, and the exposure which the Europeans would thus be spared. They would also be of the greatest aid in procuring supplies and information during service.

22. If so, what portion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

See 21.

J. HOPE GRANT, Maj.-Gen.,
Commanding Oude Field Force.

No 22.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM BRIGADIER COKE.

Brigadier Coke. From Lieut.-Colonel JOHN COKE to Lieut.-Colonel
H. M. DURAND, C.B.

SIR, Moradabad, July 30, 1858.

As directed in your circular letter, No. 85, of the 16th June 1858, I have the honor to forward

herewith my replies to the different questions regarding the reorganization of the native army. I did not observe when I commenced my replies that under the head "Classification" I was replying to the heads of inquiry which afterwards formed the

subject of investigation by a series of questions. The result has been that some repetition has taken place, but this has in most questions only tended to elucidate the replies more fully; had I re-arranged the whole, more time would have been taken up, too much has already been lost in forwarding my replies. I only regret that they are now so imperfectly made.

I have, &c.,
JOHN COKE, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding at Moradabad.

REORGANIZATION OF ARMIES OF INDIA.

I AM of opinion that corps should be raised of separate classes and tribes. Thus, Sikh corps, composed of Sikhs, and no admixture of any class with them; Brahmins and Rajpoots in other corps; Gwallars and other lower caste Hindoos in other corps, but no sweepers or chumars should be enlisted; Hindostanee Musslemans in other corps; Goojoors separate; Meywattees separate; Pathans, Cis and Trans-Indus, with Punjabee Musslemans, in separate corps; Dograhs in separate corps, the same as the Goorkahs are at present. My reasons for this are, that in a rising of the Musslemans, you would always have Sikhs, Dograhs, Goorkahs, and Hindoo corps to depend on, and *vice versa*. By mixing the castes in one corps they become amalgamated, and make common cause, which they never would do if kept in separate corps. Hindoos and Musslemans are natural enemies; the same with Sikhs. Yet the result of mixing them in one corps has been to make them all join against Government, and not only the soldiers, but, through them, the Hindoo and Mussleman Zemindars, were incited to make common cause, which they never would have done had the races been kept in distinct corps. Our endeavour should be to uphold in full force the (for us fortunate) separation which exists between the different religions and races, not to endeavour to amalgamate them. "*Divide et impera*" should be the principle of Indian Government.

There is no military code nor rules of discipline wanted, except a book of standing orders for each province. The commanding officer should be both. If the commanding officer is incapable, remove him; but the whole army should not be ruined for the sake of a few incapables.

Military codes and rules for discipline may be very good for Europeans, but are worse than useless for natives. They make military lawyers, but spoil good soldiers.

The commanding officer should alone have the power of organization and promotion, and his recommendation be alone attended to for rewards. We have lost as good an army as any state could desire by that most fatal infatuation called centralization, by usurping the power of commanding officers, and by permitting those in power, under the pressure of public opinion in England, to legislate for Asiatics who were practically ignorant of everything regarding them.

The ruin of the Bengal army was commenced by Lord William Bentinck, and completed by Lord Dalhousie, with the aid of commanders-in-chief (one excepted), who had but one idea, viz., that what was considered desirable for Europeans must necessarily be the best thing they could devise for Asiatics.

A native corps should, in my opinion, consist of one commandant, one second in command, one adjutant, one quartermaster, and from three to five European officers doing duty, all mounted, not to interfere in the command of companies, which should be in the hands of the native officers, not the imbecile fools of the old army, but young men of good family, who should be entertained as jemadars. The best native officer in the corps should be native adjutant, and the next best officer native quartermaster. There should be no European serjeants. This is by no means to prevent able men from being promoted from

the ranks. There should also be greater rewards open to distinguished native officers than there are at present, more especially as we continue to draw our soldiers from the northern tribes. All the great rewards to the native portion of the community have been in the gift of civilians, and have, therefore, fallen to those who have been employed in a civil capacity. This should not be the case. We seem to understand less than any nation how to reward soldiers, probably from not being a military nation, and from having always been ruled by civilians; but it seems to me that the great rewards should be given to those soldiers of merit who have fought and hazarded their lives for the Government. I do not mean by rewards a *seidur bahadorship* on 60 rupees a month, because I consider this no reward for men who have performed great services. The rewards I would suggest are, the independent command of cavalry or infantry regiments on 400 or 500 rupees a month; *jageers* of the same value. Soldiers thus rewarded would be more likely to be faithful in a rebellion than *moonsifs*, *sudder ameens*, *tehsildars*, &c., who do not seem to have been faithful in the last mutiny. A few rewards of this description to the soldier excites the hopes of many. Numbers are thus impelled to exert themselves, the Government obtains the benefit of these exertions. It was truly said by Wallenstein, "That no gold was equal to the weight of a valiant soldier; that great hopes followed great rewards; and the greatest recompence produced both the best troops and most skilful officers."

Brigadier Coke.

INFANTRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, castes, &c., of the Bengal army?

I believe the Bengal native infantry to have been composed at the rebellion (Sikhs excepted) as it was 14 years ago, when I left the 10th regiment native infantry, of which I had been 9 years adjutant, viz., Musslemans, Rajpoots, Brahmins, and Hindoos of inferior castes, such as *Aheers*, *Kaiths*, *Koormees*, &c. About 200 Sikhs were added after the conquest of the Punjab, but they had little influence in the corps, and generally speaking, though utterly distinct in feelings from Hindostanees, yet, from having been placed in the same corps, became amalgamated and joined in the rebellion with the Hindostanees.

2. What districts are the several races, &c., drawn from?

Musslemans from all parts of India, Hindoos principally from Oude, Bojepoor, and Behar.

3. Have any races, &c., been excluded?

Yes, the lower class of Hindoos, such as *runheahs*, *chumars*, *sweepers*, &c., and they should still be excluded, as they will not fight. Sweepers might, but it is not desirable to entertain them, as it throws a slur on the whole native army. *Muzbee* Sikhs are doubtless of the sweeper caste, but they have been raised from their position by being admitted to take the *pahul*, and by being employed as soldiers by the great Maharaja of the Punjab, *Runjeet Sing*.

4. Are there any races, &c., hitherto excluded from enlistment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn?

I should think there are many tribes who would make excellent soldiers, such as *Goojoors*, *Jats*, *Mewuttees*, *Mahrattas*, *Rangurs*, *Rajpoots* of *Rajpootana*, and many others with whom I am not acquainted.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits, &c.?

I think no recruits in any district should be enlisted save by the commanding officer, or by such parties as he may send into the different districts either with or without an European officer.

Brigadier Coke.

6. On enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry should be observed?

I think it may not be amiss, especially after this rebellion, to have recruits registered in the different districts to which they belong, as is done in the Punjab, by sending in rolls of the recruit when he is enlisted to the district officer for attestation. I have not seen much practical good arise from it, but it may be a check to a certain extent on notorious bud-mashes getting into the corps, and of some use when the soldier is killed in preventing the Government being defrauded in claims for pensions.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments or from families of sepoys, what precautions are taken?

I know of none, and I conceive no precautions are necessary, the best guarantee being the presence of the father or family of the recruit.

8. What alteration should be made in the existing recruiting regulations?

None. The less regulations there are in the army the better; they are neither understood nor attended to. I would enlist from all tribes and castes in India, provided they will fight.

9. What are the words of the oath, &c.?

I do not remember the words of the oath, but it is high time that all oaths were done away with. A bad soldier will never be bound by an oath, and a good one does not require one.

10. How long has this form been in force?

I do not know; the sooner it is done away with the better.

11. Can you suggest any improvement in the words of the oath?

There is no oath wanted. The 1st Punjab infantry has been raised nine years; no man in it was ever sworn in, nor ever heard of the articles of war. They obey their commanding officer, go where they are ordered, and have shown, like the rest of the Punjab corps, how they can fight whenever they have been employed. If they disobey orders they are flogged; and till something of the Bengal line folly crept into the Punjab force, which had it been carried out by commanding officers, would have ruined the force, non-commissioned officers and men were summarily dismissed when they were found from vice or temper to be unfit for the service. The only fit judge of these matters is the commanding officer. Let native soldiers have only one master, their commanding officer, and they will be good and obedient soldiers; let them find that the brigadier is one master, the general a second, and the commander-in-chief a third, they will obey no master. To all officers who have thought on this subject, or who have experience of the native character, this truth is so self-apparent, that I can only imagine one reason why it has not been acted on, and that is, that the Madras mutiny has not been forgotten, and that Government doubt the loyalty of their European officers.

12. Are there any races, &c., of seafaring habits, &c.?

I am not sufficiently acquainted with these tribes to give an opinion. I should have thought, if there is no other objection to them, that the Malays would make excellent soldiers for this purpose.

13. Has the Bengal presidency a marine corps?

I do not know; I believe not.

14. Should each infantry corps be raised in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

Certainly not be confined to a prescribed district, without by a district is meant a province, such as the Punjab, Scinde, or the North-West provinces, then, I think, they should be confined to it, or rather to each separate tribe of that province, as before recommended.

15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area, &c.?

Answered at No. 14.

16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, &c.?

Yes, each corps should be, in my opinion, of one tribe or caste, as before stated.

17. If a corps is not homogeneous, should the companies be so?

Yes, certainly; the next best thing to having the whole corps of one caste is to have each company of one caste. The tribes or castes should not be mixed in the companies.

18. If the corps are not homogeneous, in what proportion should the castes be entertained?

I think half the corps should be of one caste and half of another; but I dislike the mixed corps, for the reasons before stated; still, if the Government will have it so, never mix the Punjab with the North-West provinces, or these with Scinde, Bombay, or Madras. Keep Oude separate from Bhojepoor and Behar, Delhi, Rajpootana, Gwalior, and Rohilkund all separate, for the same reasons as stated at the end of the reply to the first question.

19. If separate corps are to be entertained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be in the same district?

I think the whole police of the country should be in the hands of the military. All commanding officers of corps should be magistrates, all their officers assistants, and all regiments used for police purposes. There seems to be no reason why all should not be recruited from the same districts, but there should be regiments of police for detective purposes, which should be composed of all races and tribes, as it is evident that a Brahmin would not use the same endeavours to detect and capture a Brahmin as he would a Musselman, or any men of any other tribe with whom he is not allied; and the same will hold good with the rest of the other tribes and castes.

20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?

No, certainly not; but there can be no reasons why men should not be permitted to exchange into any regiment, provided they are not men of bad characters.

21. What agency should be employed in recruiting, &c.?

The commanding officer of the police corps, which should be raised and disciplined in the same manner as any other corps. Fewer officers would suffice for a police corps; a commanding officer and adjutant would be sufficient.

22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting police corps, &c.?

The same agency as for other corps, viz., the commanding officer.

23. What precautions should be taken before the district officers in recruiting for the army?

Registry of all recruits enlisted, on rolls being furnished by the commanding officer.

24. Should similar precautions be taken for the police?

Yes, the same.

25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries for service in India?

I think it would be well to enlist Malays, Chinese, and especially Africans, for service in Bengal, Burmah, Assam, and the provinces lying on the sea coast, and they should be kept in separate regiments for the reasons stated before.

26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?

Answered in No. 25; but there may be many other races fit for the purpose with whom I am not acquainted, if so, they should be enlisted if they will take service, and almost all men will, provided the proper means be adopted. I will elucidate this by an example. When I was at Kohat, nothing could

induce the Barucks of the Chountra plain and the Bangee Khil tribe of the hills near Kallabaugh to enlist, but they were most desirable men to get into the service, being notoriously brave men, capable of the greatest endurance, and the most daring robbers in the whole Kohat district. I captured three of the most notorious men of the Bangee Khil tribe in a raid, and sentenced them to imprisonment for three years; after some time I told them I would remit their punishment if they would take service and bring me men of their tribe; they agreed to do so, commenced in the police, and I have now some thirty of their tribe in the 1st Punjab infantry, gallant and good soldiers. The Baruck tribe I got through a mullich or head man to whom I had showed some kindness. I asked him to give me his son as a soldier, he did so, and though a man of 40 years of age came himself and enlisted in my corps, till, he said, that his men had got over the bugbear of the service, the slow march and balance step; he then took his discharge, I promoted his son, and have now some 50 Barucks in the 1st Punjab infantry. I mention these two cases to show that by tact and perseverance any men may be induced to enlist. Every endeavour should be made to induce the great tribe of the Wuzerees of the Kohat and Bemkoo frontier to enlist into our service; they are good horsemen and better footmen. This will be a work of some difficulty, as that great soldier General Nicholson did not succeed in obtaining the services of this tribe, still, I think, it may be done.

27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?

I cannot give an opinion; those on the spot are the only fit judges.

28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?

Certainly not; I would not have any European soldiers mixed up with natives for these reasons. In case of a rebellion, such as the one of 1857, the Europeans would probably have been murdered as well as the officers; but the principal objection I have to mixing up Europeans and natives is, that it tends to do away with the respect and fear for European soldiers which it should be our constant care to instil into the minds of natives. By mixing the European with the native soldier all his worst points are brought before the native; he is seen in a beastly helpless state of drunkenness, or exposing his person, or too often trying to get money out of natives by imposing on them. The native thus sees all the vices but understands none of the virtues of the European soldier, the result is loss of respect and contempt in place of fear.

29, 30, 31, and 32.

Answered in question No. 28.

33. How should the native infantry be armed?

All the Pathans, Dogras, and frontier tribes in our service, Goorkahs, and a portion, say, one in four, of the Punjab corps, should be armed with the two-grooved rifle, as this weapon is better adapted than any I have yet seen for hill warfare. The rest of the army and police with percussion muskets; and every infantry soldier should carry a good sword of his own selection, with the exception of the Goorkahs, who prefer the kookery to the sword.

34. How should the police corps be armed?

If a shorter and lighter weapon than the percussion musket is obtainable, I should prefer this arm for the police; a carbine such as was given to the irregular cavalry would, I think, with a sword, be a better weapon for the police than a musket.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

No, certainly not.

36. How should the native infantry be dressed? For head-dress, a turban of different colors, according to the different provinces from which men are enlisted; a loose blouse or tunic in place of the coat, with no collar or beads about the neck, which should be perfectly open; pantaloons not too loose below the knee, above very loose and roomy, to enable the wearer to sit and lie down with perfect ease, and to be no encumbrance to him in climbing hills, fastened not with braces but with a waist string, as Pajamas; for the feet, shoes, chupplees, or leathern sandals, as may be the habit of the people of the provinces from which they are enlisted.

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37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment a native irregular regiment should be attached, &c.?

I am averse to the arrangement, for the reason stated in question 28. This most undoubtedly would be the best mode in which Europeans and natives could be brought together, but I think the tendency would still be the same, and the advantage to be derived from it would not be commensurate with the evils likely to arise therefrom, as before stated.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

Doubtless the gun lascars and European artillerymen do bear some analogy to this question, but the gun lascars hold a very subordinate position, like the Sejer drivers, who are used as light weights to ride the horses. I am not aware that gun lascars are employed to work the guns, I am also not aware that these men have proved less rebellious than other native soldiers, if so, fear was probably the cause, as they were unarmed, save with swords that were perfectly harmless.

39, 40, and 41?

Replied to in answers to Nos. 37 and 38.

42. Is it desirable that native corps should acquire a spirit of self-confidence, &c. &c.?

I am of opinion that native or any other troops who have no self-reliance would be worse than useless in the hour of trial; I would do everything in my power to give self-reliance to native troops. I do not mean by self-reliance a mutinous and insubordinate spirit. Nothing can be more mutinous and insubordinate than an English mob, but this does not make them self-reliant; witness the way in which a policeman walks into the midst of a violent chartist mob and carries off his man. A mutinous and insubordinate army can only exist with a timid and weak government; no arrangement of troops, no amount of want of self-confidence will save an army under these circumstances, for they will soon find that their own want of self-confidence does not equal that of their rulers. I hope I shall always see native troops rely on Europeans for aid and support in the hour of danger, believing them to be their superiors in bodily strength, physical and moral courage; but I do not think we have in many cases since the late rebellion increased this feeling, and if it is not strenuously exerted our northern soldiers will not long continue to believe in the name alone.

II.—MILITARY CODE AND RULES OF DISCIPLINE.

1. Can you suggest any improvement in the articles of war?

There should be no articles of war for the native army. The commanding officer, as I have before stated, should be a magistrate; native soldiers committing any offence should be tried by him, and crimes exceeding the power of a magistrate to punish, such as murder, should after investigation be handed over to the sessions for trial, as in other civil cases.

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2. Should the special rules regulating punishments in the native army be retained or assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

There should be no special rules for regulating punishments of any kind in the native army, they should be left to the commanding officer, who should keep a register of the men tried, the crimes for which they were tried, and the punishments awarded; the trials to be conducted in the presence of the native officers in the vernacular. The nature of Europeans and Asiatics is so utterly different that it is manifestly as impossible to frame rules to suit both races as it is to render them of the same colour.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the native army?

No, certainly not; there should be no native courts-martial in the native army. Native officers sitting on a court will always endeavour to let off the offender for many reasons; there is always some clique who, either from being related to the offender or of the same tribe or village, will make it their business to get up a party amongst the native officers to screen the offender; if these native officers will not agree to this, it makes a feud, which shows itself in a thousand underhand tricks which tend to defeat justice and injure discipline. Native officers are also bad judges of punishment; certain crimes are great offences in our eyes, and considered of little moment by natives; this particularly applies to matters of discipline. Consult native officers fully in every matter regarding the proof of the crime, let the trial be open before all the native officers or men who are interested to attend, we lose much of the respect that we should otherwise obtain for our justice by closed courts, but let the sentence rest with the commanding officer alone. All crimes committed at head-quarters when he is present should be tried by him alone, nothing gives him a greater insight into the state of his corps. Evidence given before him when the matter is first investigated, and what is afterwards given before a court-martial, is as different as light from darkness; an investigation taken on the spot and at the time the offence is committed has a chance of eliciting the truth, the investigation before a court-martial never, as the evidence has been all tampered with, and everything settled and agreed on beforehand in the lines.

When any investigation is required affecting the state of a corps, let the court be composed of European and native officers mixed, the acumen of the European officer, and the insight into native character and local knowledge of the native officer, will be now likely to elicit the truth than any other kind of court, but it should only be used for the investigation of large matters.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the native troops with the military code under which they live and are governed?

I do not know what may have been done latterly in the line corps, the only code in the 1st Punjab infantry was my orders, which were very clearly understood. There is no military code required, and no military code could in my opinion be framed, supposing it was required, to suit the different races in the Bengal army. It would seem difficult to frame a military code that would suit English, French, Spanish, and Germans, but they are not a bit more dissimilar in their customs and natures than Hindoos, Seikhs, Goorkahs, Pathans, and Belochas, and I think this applies equally as well to civil as to military government.

5. What proportion of the native officers can read the articles of war in the vernacular?

I do not know what may have been the case in the line corps, but in the Pathan and Seikh corps there are not more than one or two men who can read and write. Those who can read and write are certainly not better soldiers than those who have not this accomplishment; amongst the native officers of the

1st Punjab infantry, who are a body of thoroughly good soldiers, competent to command their companies better than most European officers, there is but one officer who can read and write, though many of them speak three languages, Persian, Pushtoo, and Hindostanee, all two languages, Punjabee and Hindostanee.

6 and 7.

I do not know.

8. Do you consider the provisions made for maintaining discipline in the police corps satisfactory, &c.?

The Punjab police corps are the only ones I am acquainted with, and they are well managed by their commanding officers in the same way as the irregular corps.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTIONS, AND REWARDS.

1. In the native regiments what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, or seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

Chiefly by seniority, but many energetic officers laboured to get rid of their old and inefficient men, and to replace them with more efficient officers, both as regards age and qualifications, but what with the parsimony of the Government, in keeping officers and men on the rolls of the regiments who were only fit for the invalids, to which they would neither send them nor discharge them, and what with the obstacles which were thrown in the way of commanding officers, by head-quarters, to the promotion of junior and efficient men, the whole promotions for the last 20 years have been almost entirely by seniority.

2. Are the native officers of the infantry generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

Taking the average, I should think from two to three native officers might have been found in each regiment fit for their position.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the men amongst whom they have risen?

Generally speaking of a lower grade, as age, indolence, and disease had impaired whatever energy and intelligence they might have at first possessed.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to the commissioned grades?

None, that I am aware of; there is, I think, a general order directing that no man was to be promoted to naick after a certain date who could not read and write.

5. Does the intervention of the native officers, between the European officers and their men, weaken the influence of the European officers? Does a full complement of the European militate against the professional efficiency of the native commissioned officer?

No, I think not; but it appears to me that of late years there has generally speaking been a great want of sympathy between the European officer and his men, a great deal too much of the "damned black nigger" style of speaking, and I think this has principally arisen from two sources; one, that the officer finding himself powerless to reward or punish, ceased to take interest in his men; the second, that every officer who had interest or abilities only thought how he could get on the staff, and thus escape the tedious routine of regimental duty.

Undoubtedly the full complement of European officers militates against the efficiency of the native how officers, as it caused him to take little or no interest in his duties.

6. Has it been found on the occurrence of mutinies that the native officers have given timely information, or been of use to the European officer in checking the mutiny, &c.?

No, certainly not. But the officers now alive who were present with their corps in the late mutiny will be best able to answer this question.

7. Should the grades of native officers be continued?

Certainly be continued, and be made responsible for their companies.

8. Is the substitution of an European serjeant and corporal to each company desirable, in lieu of its native officers?

No, I do not think it advisable, for the reasons stated at question No. 28.

9. If the abolition of the grade of native officers be advisable, would good-service pay and pensions be a compensating encouragement, and as efficacious as the commissioned grades?

No, I do not think so.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching native troops to the British service?

The late mutiny has proved it to be ineffectual to those in the service; but it appears that a certain number of the pensioners in Oude when called on fought for the Government, all those that did not should of course be struck off the list; but I consider the pension establishment a powerful instrument in the hands of Government, and every native speaking of it looks on it as a great boon; I think it ought not to be abolished; but I consider our system of allowing men to serve on for the pension, who are unfit for the service, is ludicrous; every man considered unfit for the service up to 15 or 20 years should be paid up and discharged, provided his incapacity does not arise from wounds. If all soldiers who were unfit for the service up to 15 years were weeded out of the corps, it would save much malingering, and reduce the pension establishment to a great extent.

11. Should not the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers, if these are retained, be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Promote by merit, efficiency, and gallantry in the field alone in the commissioned grades; but in those corps who have seen much service, I would not be too greedy to promote to the non-commissioned grade from juniors; if the seniors are able-bodied men, and of good courage, it tends, with the northern soldiers, who are jealous of their name and character, to disgust them with the service, and by this means many valuable soldiers are lost to the State; but in all these matters let the commanding officer be the sole judge, he alone is qualified to give an opinion; he is more interested than any other man can be in having efficient officers. If he is fit for his position, he will endeavour by all means in his power to find out the men most fit for promotion; if he is unfit, remove him. A commanding officer in an engagement should endeavour to mark those soldiers who distinguish themselves, and he should impress on his European officers the necessity of doing this also; he should also listen to the recommendations of his native officers, and as soon as possible after the action he should note all this down, or it is forgotten. When he comes to make promotions, this is a great aid to him, and if it is done on the spot, there is no time for making up stories. You are thus enabled to reward the soldier who has distinguished himself.

12. Should the system of pensions now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively be abolished?

Grant pensions for good service to men disabled by wounds, and to heirs of soldiers killed in action or dying on service; but don't grant pensions for 15 years' service, discharge with one year's pay when over that period.

13. What is the charge to the State of military pensions to native officers and men?

I do not know.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part on courts-martial?

No; there should be no courts-martial in the native army, for the reasons stated at No. 3, head "Military Code and Rules of Discipline."

15. Are native commissioned officers on a par with European serjeants and corporals in professional intelligence and efficiency?

Taking efficient native officers and efficient serjeants, the former is infinitely their superior in efficiency and intelligence in the command of native soldiers; inefficient men of both classes are equally useless.

16, 17, and 18.

All replied to at answers Nos. 4, 19, and 20, head "Recruiting and Composition of Corps."

19. In police corps is there on first admission any test or examination as to qualifications of reading or writing, &c. &c.?

I consider writing or reading to be no test of efficiency, and therefore would by no means insist on it as a qualification for promotion or admission.

20. Has the distinct organization, and the difference of system, &c., in the three native armies proved favorable to our rule?

Most certainly favorable to our rule.

21. Should a certain degree of distinctness of system, organization, and composition, according to the views of separate governments, be allowed, or should endeavours be made to amalgamate the three armies?

The more distinct the organization and composition of our armies the better; we should, as I have before stated, use all our endeavours to prevent the amalgamation, not only of the three armies, but of each individual regiment. Even supposing it to be desirable, no one system could be devised to suit the whole.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience have the powers of commissioned officers of native corps been increased or diminished? State the orders or measures or changes in the practice of the service to which you attribute such effect.

Diminished to such an extent as to have been one of the principal causes of bringing about the mutiny. To enumerate the orders and measures it would be necessary to search the general orders from 1830 to 1856. The principal, I think, are, abolition of corporal punishment; power taken from commanding officers of discharging soldiers whom they considered unfit to remain in the service; reduction of non-commissioned officers to the ranks; of promotion save by seniority; having men sent back to him who had been dismissed as unfit men, and even by sentence of regimental courts-martial on their presenting petitions to head-quarters, and the general feeling engendered by these and other similar acts, that the commanding officer was helpless to punish or reward.

2. During the above period have the powers of officers of European or native corps been increased or diminished?

If by officers is meant officers commanding companies in native corps, diminished in the same ratio as that of commanding officers of corps. I know nothing about European regiments.

3. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

One of the principal causes of the present mutiny.

4. What has been the result of the increase or diminution of the influence of captains or officers in charge of companies?

Want of sympathy with their men, dislike to the service, and an incessant desire to get away from the regiment, either on staff employ, or if that was unattainable, to get away on leave or resign the service, or go to the invalids, or do anything to escape

Brigadier Coke. regimental duty, which, from their having no power and therefore no interest in the corps, had become intolerably irksome.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps on service mainly depend, especially of a native corps, on the authority of head-quarters or the officers of the regiment, &c. &c.?

The discipline of the regiment is alone maintained by the power and influence of the commanding officer and the officers commanding companies, and the reasons that corps have so seldom if ever mutinied on service are, that the pernicious influence of head-quarters is then partially in abeyance, commanding officers then take some of the requisite power into their own hands, and men are punished in a manner commensurate with their offences. Although the powers assumed by the commanding officers when on service are not what they ought to be, still it is sufficient to act as a check and keep men in order.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of officers in charge of companies be increased or diminished?

Increased in the manner before stated.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

Full powers to be given to commanding officers to reward, promote, punish, reduce to the ranks and to discharge all men he may consider unfit for the service. If European officers are still to be kept in command of companies, to allow them to have the powers they formerly held, viz., that their recommendation for promotion, punishment, discharge, &c., should be always attended to by the commanding officer without there be undeniable reasons for non-compliance, but I do not recommend that European officers be placed in command of companies.

The commanding officer to have power as a magistrate to try his men for all crimes, murder excepted, which after his investigation should be handed over to the sessions. No articles of war, no oath; the standing orders of the army and the field exercise are all that is required for drill and discipline; but the standing orders that will suit Hindostanees will not suit Seikhs and Pathans; each province should have its own separate orders, which should be carefully compiled in the same way as the standing orders for the regiment of artillery, including all forms required for the infantry, with plain rules and forms for the drawing pay of officers and men, so as, if possible, to protect the army from the injustice of the audit office, which has been the cause of greater disgust to the army than any other establishment in India.

8. Is the influence of the European officers among native troops greatest in time of peace or war?

In war, and for the reasons stated at No. 5.

9. What conclusions do you draw as to the course to be pursued with native troops in times of peace, with regard to the strength at which regiments should be maintained, the occupation found for them, &c. &c.?

Native troops should not be employed for any but legitimate purposes. By legitimate purposes, I mean police and their own discipline. It will not do, in my opinion, to work native troops at road making or other public works, without the whole army is made to do the same, and then they should be used as the sappers and pioneers are, paying them for their labor; but I do not think this kind of labor would be found remunerative to the Government. I worked the 4th Punjab infantry and a police corps in building the fort of Bahadoor Khel. This I consider legitimate work for soldiers; but it did not pay at the rate granted to the sappers. Cooly labour was found to be cheaper. If soldiers are used as police, guards for treasure, escorting the same, gaol guards, escorting prisoners, with their own work, to render them useful soldiers, it will be found that they have enough to do. With the average calls for service of the last 20 years, I am

averse to employing soldiers as laborers except on service. The best strength for an infantry regiment is eight companies of 100 men each. They are more handy in this manner, and sufficiently within the compass of the voice. But perhaps ten companies of 80 men is better for the State, as this enables the army to be more readily increased to 1,000 men per regiment in time of war, which, after deducting sick, guards, and left at the depôt, is not by any means too strong.

10. Has the strength of the native army ever been so great in times of peace that it might have been in part employed otherwise than on mere military duties?

I think, as before stated, it might well have been employed in police duties; but since the extension of our empire, and the triennial change of station, which I consider unnecessary, I think our native army has been rather over than under worked, and that this, to a considerable extent, rendered the service less popular than it formerly was when our empire was of smaller extent. To march a regiment from Peshawur to Barrackpore is a serious undertaking, and puts men to a very considerable expense.

11. Would it have been practicable to employ the troops on public works?

If the late Bengal army had been ordered to labor at the public works I think they would have mutinied, and I do not consider it desirable to employ the army on the public works, for the reasons stated at No. 9 Question.

12. In apportioning European officers to native troops, what proportions of European and native officers?

I have before stated what I consider should be the complement of European and native officers to a corps. All distinctions of regular and irregular should be abolished. European officers to each corps,—one commandant, one second in command, one adjutant, one quartermaster, and from three to five officers doing duty, but all mounted; two native officers to each company, to be held responsible for the conduct of their men; one native adjutant, one native quartermaster, not to be taken from the company officers, but to be in excess to the establishment of two officers per company.

13. If a full complement of European officers, would you attach cadets at once to native corps, or first to European corps?

Not a full complement, as in the old line corps. Cadets, on their first arrival in the country, should be sent to a military college on 200 rs. per mensem; such a place as Roorkee, where they should be kept till they have passed an examination.

For the Infantry.

Military drawing and surveying, to enable them to prepare military maps. Sufficient fortification to enable them to throw up field works, a bridge head, how to defend houses and buildings in the best manner. Infantry and artillery drill, with careful instruction in rifle and musketry drill, so as to enable them to teach their men when they join their corps. Gymnastic exercises, fencing, running, leaping, and swimming, so as to render them active, able-bodied soldiers. Languages, Hindostanee, Punjabee, or Pushtoo, according to the provinces they are to be employed in. I think half the young officers of the army, on their first arrival in the country, contracted habits of indolence, if not worse, which unfitted them for the service of the State in after life.

For the Cavalry.

The same as the infantry, with the exception of the drill; but they should be taught, not the cavalry drill alone, but equitation after the native fashion, riding at a tent pin with the spear, firing from horseback at speed, native method of using the sword, to wheel, turn, and stop their horse at speed; in fact, to give the officer perfect confidence in himself as a horseman.

I would now offer to the consideration of Government the benefit that would arise to the State if the four European cavalry corps which have been embodied were drilled after the principles laid down in Capt. Nolan's book of the 15th Hussars, mixed with native instruction, as before described. The commencement that has been made in enlisting men of less height and weight is all in the right direction. It is impossible that horses of this country can carry 16 or 17 stone and be of use as light cavalry. Twelve stone is the utmost that a horse can carry, and be able to undergo long marches and great fatigue, without entirely losing their condition; and, above all things, they cannot go the pace in the charge or pursuit. What appears to me to be necessary for this country is a body of cavalry that can inflict punishment on a broken enemy, and pursue them 15 or 20 miles after an engagement, following this up again for several days. Now, it is notorious that our European cavalry, with all their courage and gallantry, can neither do the one nor the other, as good native cavalry, if properly mounted and led, can do. The reason is, that the weight of the European kills the horses, and, from being trained to act in masses, they are not individually good horsemen, nor able to manage them properly. Their swords are spoiled by the steel scabbards, and they are not trained to use them at speed. These new corps, if properly trained and armed, would soon become all that is required, and as far excel the native horseman in these points as the European courage excels the native.

14. If a smaller number of European officers is assigned to native corps, how would you train them for this special employment?

Replied to in the answer to question No. 13.

15. Is the efficiency of regiments affected by the number of officers taken from corps for staff employment?

Under the old system, undoubtedly affected; under the new, if adopted, there would be no cause, as I would never allow the officers who have once joined a corps to leave it, except to exchange into the cavalry, and *vice versa*, or if selected for political employ or civil duties.

16. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies between the conduct of regiments with few and those with many European officers?

I should think not; but those officers who were with corps during the late mutinies will be able to give a better opinion than I can.

17. How can the demand for European officers for staff and detached employment be best provided for without injuring the efficiency of regiments? Brigadier Coke

I would have all officers, on arrival in the country, artillery and engineers excepted, sent to the military college, which should be established in a good climate, in the north of India, and as far as possible from any large town. Here all the young officers should be classed for the separate services, according to their qualifications, for the staff, cavalry, and infantry, without regard to relationship. Those cadets who could or would not pass the examination to be removed from the army.

The military college would all depend on the man who was placed at its head. With such men as Lieut.-Col. Tombs, of the artillery, Lieut.-Col. Reid, of the Sirmoor battalion, Major Lumsden, of the Guides, Lieut.-Col. Wilde, of the 4th Punjab infantry, or Major Taylor, of the engineers, for the first military governor, with the best masters procurable, European and native, an establishment would soon be formed that would turn out able and efficient officers in all branches.

18. Would it be advantageous to the efficiency of the officers of the army, as regimental officers, to cut off the inducement which the hope of staff employment affords to young men to qualify themselves in languages, sciences, and special branches useful to the State?

I have before stated that the only staff that would thus be open to cavalry and infantry officers is civil or political employ. The same, of course, with artillery and engineers. The other staff of the army to be selected from the military college, in which they would rise or remain stationary by their own efforts and abilities, provided interest did not interfere. The staff would thus become divided. The employment of the young officers in the police would, I think, greatly tend to fit them for civil employment when required. Political employ would be the great prize to stimulate men to exertion. I think, under these circumstances, with the training at the military college, there would be no want of incitement to officers to qualify themselves in a more efficient manner than at present for the service of the State.

19. Would the standard of acquirements amongst the officers of the army at large be lowered by any measure having such a tendency?

No, I think not; but be very much raised by the system proposed.

JOHN COKE, Lieut.-Col.,
Commanding at Moradabad.

No. 23.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM GENERAL BEATSON.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army is composed? Gen. Beatson.

In the days of Skinner and Gardner, when the irregular cavalry was in its glory, they were chiefly Mahomedans, with a few Rajpoots; but when the irregular cavalry was increased to a large extent, men of other castes were admitted, hence the degeneracy of that formerly glorious body of soldiers.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

Rohilcund used to be the great nursery for irregular

From Colonel BEATSON, commanding Beatson's Horse,
to Major-General BIRCH, C.B.

Camp Khull, on the Nerbudda,
January 15, 1859.

SIR,
I REGRET having delayed so long sending my answers to the enclosed questions on the organization of the army; but having been moving about rapidly after the rebels ever since I received the questions from you, will, I trust, plead my excuse for the delay.

I have, &c.
W. F. BEATSON,
Commanding Beatson's Horse.

Gen. Beatson.

horsemen, but I believe Gooreona and the Delhi districts furnished a great number latterly. I have heard of one regiment called "the Delhi Tailors," from being recruited by inferior men at Delhi.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, either by the regulations or the practice of the ?

In the time of Skinner and Gardner it used to be the custom to take only high caste men, but when officers got credit for the number they enlisted in a short time, instead of in the kind of men, they took all kinds of people, which destroyed the high character of the irregular cavalry.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

High caste men only should be admitted into irregular cavalry, by neglect of which they have lost that chivalrous feeling which they had in the days of Skinner, Gardner, and such commanders.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

I am not aware.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts ?

I am not aware.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken ?

The security of some man in the service as a silladar ought to be sufficient.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

Answered in No. 4.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

The same as in the infantry. I believe.

10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

I am not aware.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army when first enrolled ?

I would do it away altogether, it having been proved useless.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army, if continued, be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only ?

Each brigade, for it will be seen that I propose they should all be brigaded, ought to have a district to which it always returns after foreign service, but I would not confine the recruiting to that district, or refuse good men wherever they came from.

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be recruited over a wide area, in fact, without reference to districts ?

Answered in No. 12.

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be homogeneous as to race or caste ?

Men who are ashraf should be taken, of whatever race.

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of rissalahs, each

of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps ?

Be mixed together, keeping relations together as much as possible, when their interests would be injured by separating them; but to lay down a rule that there should be only Pathans in one troop, Moghuls in another, Rajpoots in a third, and Seikhs in a fourth, would be as invidious as having separate companies of Catholics, Protestants, and Presbyterians in an European irregular regiment.

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes enter ?

Answered in No. 14.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting ?

Get together a few good men who have distinguished themselves as soldiers, and you will require no other agency to raise any number of irregular cavalry of the right sort.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

Their assistance is not required, excepting to publish in their districts that an officer is at such a place recruiting for irregular cavalry, and that all men who are ashraf, and wish to take service, may go to him.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bengal army ?

I propose to have a squadron of light dragoons, armed with swords and breech-loading carbines, and half a troop of European horse artillery, two 6-pounders, and one 12-pounder howitzer, permanently attached to every brigade of irregular cavalry; the brigades to be two regiments of 600 each. In like manner I would have a squadron of irregular cavalry and half a troop of native horse artillery with every brigade of European cavalry. Such brigades would be fit for any service, and would soon fraternize, the natives becoming proud of their European comrades.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief ?

Answered in No. 19.

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed ?

The irregular cavalry used always to be placed at some distance from the regular troops. I would return to that system. There are things in which Europeans and natives never can be assimilated; it is better therefore that they should not live too near each other.

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements ?

Not in the least, if the commissariat officers were placed entirely under the officer commanding the brigade to which they are attached.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated ?

I would give them the same kind of arms, thus avoiding anything like suspicion. By my arrangement I render successful mutiny impossible, but I would not give cause for mutiny by showing suspicion. Each squadron of irregular cavalry attached to European brigades I would form of one troop of sowars and one of cabinets.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be armed?
Two squadrons in each regiment with carbines, and one with spears.

25. No reply required.

26. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be dressed and equipped, with a view to the efficiency and comfort of the native trooper? Do the existing dress and equipments admit of improvement? If so, state in what respects?

The form of dress of the Hyderabad cavalry is perfect. I would adopt that for the whole of the irregular cavalry, but each brigade should have a different color.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Do them away altogether, and let the men be tried by punchayets and their own officers.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be punchayets to the rules which obtain in the British army?

Answered above.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

No.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

I am not aware what was the custom in this respect in the Bengal irregulars.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

Very few; they ought to be men of the sword and not of the pen.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

I am not aware what has been the custom; but it ought to be based generally on merit and seniority combined, that is, if the merit of two men is equal, the senior should be preferred; but distinguished conduct in action should take precedence of anything else, and be instantly rewarded by promotion, the person so promoted remaining supernumerary of his rank till a vacancy occurs.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

It is the fault of the commanding officer if they are not.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

They ought to have shown themselves superior as soldiers before they were promoted; that is the only acquirement which should be considered in the irregular cavalry.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

Not that I am aware of.

5. No reply required.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers or with the European officers?

Gen. Beatson.

Apparently in the Bengal army they have been as bad as the men.

7, 8, 9. No replies required.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

Apparently not in the Bengal army.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained, or modified, or prospectively abolished?

I would grant pensions for length of faithful service, for wounds in action, and to the families of men killed in action or who died on service.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

I have no idea.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

When the claims are equal, the senior should be preferred; but merit should be the rule, and particularly gallantry in action.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

No.

15, 16. No replies required.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Men of family and influence who can bring a number of men and horses should, in raising new regiments, be put in as officers.

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular, and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

The irregular is the most popular, and their dislike of pipe-clay the reason.

19, 20. No replies required.

21. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bengal army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?

All the native cavalry should be irregular. If native gentlemen with money can be found, they should be the silladars; but the system of Government advancing money to buy horses and thereby practically becoming the silladars, has been found to answer admirably in Beatson's horse.

22. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army were mounted?

I am not aware.

23. Whence are the horses obtained, and of what breeds are they?

There used to be a great number of northern horses, also southern, from the Deccan and Kattywar; but our studs ruined the breeders.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency draw its horses?

Wherever they can find them,

Gen. Beatson.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency?
I am not aware.

26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

No.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency?

Do away studs, and you will bring back the dealers with northern and southern horses and others, who were ruined by the stud system; you may also import horses from the Cape, Australia, and Egypt; there are many good horses on the banks of the Nile, which seem to have been overlooked altogether.

28. Is it advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies for a supply of horses for the army of India?

Answered in No. 27.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army?

Twenty rupees a month, a great deal too little; the Hyderabad cavalry and Scinde horse get 30, which is the least a sowar ought to get; I recommend 40.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign?

No.

30 b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?

All in debt.

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Yes; all increased to 40 rupees a month, which would be about half what the useless regular cavalry of Bengal lose.

32. What is the system of the Bengal irregular cavalry with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests, or not? Are they favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

When you can get men of family and property to enter a corps, I would give them any number of assamees they can pay for. Their interests are then the best security for their fidelity, and ensure their keeping proper men to look after their horses and equipments.

33. What is the pay of mounted police in the North-Western provinces?

I know nothing of the mounted police.

38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

The pay of the Bengal irregular cavalry (20 rs.) was notoriously too small; so if the police got less they must have been worse mounted.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army been increased or diminished?

Diminished.

2. No reply required.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

Injurious.

4. No reply required.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps; upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops, and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

On the commanding officers of brigades and regiments. The men supposing they have to look to the distant authority of head-quarters, has a most injurious effect; but you must be very careful to whom you give command of brigades and regiments. You should give them great power, but remove them for the first abuse of it.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

The powers of commanding officers should be increased on the conditions stated in No. 5.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

Appoint proper officers to command, and enlist none but men who are ashraf in your irregular cavalry, and you will have no difficulty.

8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. No replies required.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

They must be gentlemen, good horsemen, fond of field sports and military exercises; know the native languages, and be able to understand that native gentlemen should be treated with all the courtesy you would show to gentlemen of any country. None but men of that stamp should be appointed to join the irregular cavalry as officers. If you cannot find a sufficient number, give the commanding officer clerks instead of officers.

14. No reply required.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry), whose complement of European officers was short or full?

The greater the number of bad officers, the worse will be the conduct of the corps. One good officer would have his regiment in better order, with clerks to write his papers, than with fifty bad officers. A depôt of incapables should be established in every division; and officers commanding brigades should have the power of sending any officer there, merely reporting his reasons for doing so. Any officer who did not disqualify himself for the depôt in six months to be sent home.

16, 17, and 18. No reply required.

19 and 20. No replies required.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

There should be a squadron of irregular cavalry, and half a troop of native horse artillery attached to each dragoon brigade; but it would require a peculiar selection of officers for such duties. The officer commanding this squadron to be answerable for the interior economy of his squadron, though of course under the general military command of the officer commanding the brigade to which he is attached.

22. If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

The Government should provide the horses and appointments, but in other respects the squadron should be organized as irregulars. Two European

officers would be enough, a captain and subaltern for the squadron, and three officers for each half battery of artillery.

Gen. Beatson.

I have, &c.

W. F. BEATSON, Colonel,
Commanding Beatson's Horse.

No. 24.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM MAJOR W. A. ORR.

From Major ORR to Maj.-Gen. BIRCH, C.B.

Sir, Hingolee, Oct. 18, 1858.

I HAVE the honor to forward replies to the questions on the reorganization of the army in India, sent to me by Colonel Durand, as called for in your letter under date the 25th ultimo.

I have, &c.

W. A. ORR, Major,
Commanding 1st Co. Artillery
and late Com. Field Force,
Hyd. Cont. serving in Central
India.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent is composed?
 1. Mahomedans, Rajpoots, and Sikhs, of whom the former form the great majority.
 2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?
 2. The Mahomedans (Pathans) were formerly principally drawn from Hindoostan, the neighbourhood of Bareilly, Shahjahanpoor, and the districts around Delhi; but of late years their sons and relations born within the Deccan have been entertained, and designated Deccan men. The Rajpoots are partly from Rajpootana, and partly descendants of former settlers towards the south and within the Deccan. The same remark applies to the Sikhs.
 3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, either by the regulations or the practice of the?
 3. Both the regulations and general practice of the service excluded all men who were not considered "bulla manus," or well born; individuals or persons who had served as menials were also carefully excluded, the object being of course to keep up a high standard of feeling and self-respect amongst men. This exclusiveness has not of late years been so strictly adhered to, and men have got into the service who would not formerly have been entertained.
 4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?
 4. No. I am aware of none; except, perhaps, Mahrattas. There appears to have been either a prejudice against this particular class, or it may be that they themselves have a dislike to our service; but certainly, from some unexplained cause, very few Mahrattas have ever found service in the Hyderabad contingent. I may mention, that on the first raising of the body of cavalry now known as the Hyderabad cavalry, it was designated the "Pathan horse," and none but individuals of that class and sect were ever allowed to be entertained.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

Major
W. A. Orr.

5. None whatever, but the name and reputation of the service. For every vacancy there is always a score of candidates ready to offer themselves, the sons and relations of men and officers in the corps. In a silladary service, like this, the right of appointing a bargeer or rider rests with the silladar, his selection subject of course to the approval of the commandant. This right of nomination is naturally held in much regard by silladars, as affording the means of providing for their relations and friends; but it has of late years, I think, unfortunately been much interfered with by commanding officers, and been consequently the cause of considerable discontent.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

6. None whatever, that I am aware of. The name of himself and father, age, height, and place of birth, being of course entered in the general register book of the regiment into which the recruit is admitted.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers, or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

7. The recruit is obliged to furnish the security of a near relative, who must also be in the service, for his good conduct; and he is further required to furnish a certificate of the respectability as well as legitimacy of his birth, and a written agreement that he shall conform to all such rules and regulations as may then be existing, or may thereafter be established for the discipline and good conduct of the service.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

8. I do not think any alterations are required. The old regulations are admirable on this point, if strictly carried out in practice by commandants.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

9. No oath is administered to the recruit on his entering the service. I have mentioned above what is required of the candidate before being entertained.

10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent when first enrolled?

11. I think it advisable that every man on being enlisted should be sworn in like recruits in all other branches of the service, and take the like oath.

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12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Hyderabad contingent be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only?
12. I do not see any reason for changing the present system of recruiting. It appears to me to work well; and the fact of the recruits being, as they are now, drawn from districts so widely separated, and composed of different castes and classes, prevents any thing like a common bond of union, and consequent risk of combination.
13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Hyderabad contingent be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?
13. This question is answered above.
14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be homogeneous as to race or cast?
14. I certainly think not. A mixture of races and castes must have the effect of keeping alive a feeling of emulation amongst the men, as well as affording a wider field of selection in recruiting.
15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be composed of *ressalahs*, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?
15. For the reasons stated above I think the different *ressalahs* should be composed of men of all sects, creeds, and castes, without any distinction.
16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?
16. A good proportion of each corps of the Hyderabad cavalry, bearing in mind its original composition, should, I think, be Mahomedan or Pathan. I should then give the preference to Rajpoots, Mahrattas, or well-born Hindoos, and lastly fill up the corps with Sikhs.
- Perhaps the following would be a good proportion:
- $\frac{2}{5}$ Mahomedans and Pathans.
 - $\frac{2}{5}$ Rajpoots, Mahrattas, or other Hindoos.
 - $\frac{1}{5}$ Sikhs.
17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?
17. There could not, I think, have been a better mode of procuring recruits than the old plan of permitting men going on leave or furlough to furnish a substitute called "Kidmut ewuzee." By this means there was always a large body of well-trained and well-drilled young lads—all of them with fathers or relations in the regiment—attached to the different corps, and as vacancies occurred they afforded an ample field from which efficient recruits could be selected.
18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?
18. I am not aware that any precautions are necessary under the existing mode of recruiting. Should any change be made in this respect it would then be requisite to take measures for guarding against the admission of improper persons.
19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?
19. I would deprecate such being done. I consider any measure of this nature would tend to destroy the high spirit and *esprit*, which now happily distinguishes the cavalry Hyderabad contingent. Both men and officers would naturally consider that such European force was associated with them for coercive purposes, and it would never be regarded with a real comrade feeling. A feeling, of distrust and jealousy would be created, which would undoubtedly have a pernicious effect on both the discipline of the regiment and its efficiency in the field.
20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?
20. In the event of its being determined that an European force shall compose a portion of each corps, I think it advisable that they should be enlisted and incorporated as an integral part of the regiment. In no other way could the men be ever induced to feel themselves identified with the corps, with its honor, its reputation, and its good name.
21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?
21. They should be separated entirely from the native portion of the lines. There would be many elements of discord between men so circumstanced, and I fear it would be vain to expect harmony between well-born and high caste natives, and even the very best behaved of our European soldiery, if brought in close contact.
22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?
22. It would be impossible to answer this question without entering very largely into the nature and composition of the cavalry service. No commissariat is attached to corps in the contingent. Each regiment has its own regimental bazaar, and in the event of the corps taking the field, or going on service, it is dependent on its own bazaar alone. Much of the efficiency of these corps of cavalry is owing to the admirable system of *silladars* being compelled to keep up a tattoo and *syce* between every two horses. This system enables the men to move with great rapidity and with little inconvenience, for after even a forced march, the tattoo is very nearly as soon up as the corps; the men get their own little wants supplied, and the horses are groomed, fed, and attended to.
23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?
23. I would strongly advise all European troops being furnished with the best description of arms procurable.
24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be armed? Does the arming of this highly efficient cavalry admit of improvement?
24. I think of late years the spear, the fittest weapon I know in the hands of a native, has been too much discarded. It has become the practice to introduce in lieu of the spear or lance with sword and pistol, a sword and carbine alone. I would recommend the return to the general use of the spear, giving carbines only to a certain number of men per troop and squadron. I do not think, after late events and the experience of the last year, that it would be advisable to give any native troops arms of a better description than the common percussion pistol or carbine, a sword, and lance.
25. No reply required.
26. Do the dress and equipment of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent admit of improvement? if so, state them.
26. The dress and equipment I consider quite perfect for irregular cavalry. It consists of a dark green cloth ulkaluk or tunic, red mundeel or puggree,

white pantaloons, and long jack boots, with black patent leather belts,—altogether a most efficient and soldier-like dress, and has the additional advantage of being much liked by the men themselves.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent.

1. I think the present articles of war work very well.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

2. I would advocate the present special rules for punishing crime being retained. Any extension of these rules would undoubtedly unpopularize the service, and act disadvantageously as regards procuring the class of men hitherto obtained as recruits.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

3. I think it does, and that the men prefer it to the old practice of punchayets. The present system renders them less liable to the caprices of ill-judging commandants. Much abuse used to prevail under the punchayet system.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Hyderabad contingent irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

4. The articles of war are regularly read to the men on parade by the mutsuddirs of troops, and in the event of any new orders or regulations being published they are at once read and explained to the men paraded for that purpose.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the Hyderabad contingent irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

5. In every troop numbering about 80 men, about 25 or 30 can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

1. The system of promotion is based on merit and seniority combined; but I think too much stress is laid on seniority. I consider in a service like the irregular cavalry of India, to which is attached so few European officers, that a wide field of selection should be given to commandants, and that in making promotions intelligence and efficiency should weigh more than length of service or standing.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

2. Generally speaking they are, but I think, as I said above, that it would be advisable if the claim to promotion depended more upon the qualifications of the individuals, than upon his length of service.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

3. In general the acquirements of the native commissioned officers are of a higher order than the common run of troopers; but as the possession of acquirements has not been made a *sine qua non* in making promotions, there are to be found uneducated men, of course, amongst the body of officers.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. No particular examination or test is exacted by regulations, but it is the practice of commandants of corps to subject all men before promotion to a certain test of their qualifications for advancement. I consider it very desirable that a previous examination should be established and enforced by regulation.

5. No reply required.

6. Has it been found, on occasions of mutiny, that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, giving timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers?

6. I think that in general it has been found, on occasions of mutinies or disturbances in corps of the Hyderabad cavalry, that the native officers have behaved well, and aided their European officers as far as the peculiar circumstances of the case admitted. It is true that during the mutiny of the 1st cavalry at Aurungabad, last year, a number of its native officers were deeply implicated; but I think this may have arisen from the predisposing causes which led to the outbreak—springing from a feeling of antagonism between two parties in the regiment.

7, 8, 9. No replies required.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

10. It is only of late years, and since the reorganization of the contingent in 1853, that pensions have been granted to the cavalry branch of the service. Those sanctioned before that time were exceptional and special cases.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?

11. The present system of pension should, I think, be maintained, but the men of the cavalry cannot help contrasting the small rate of pension granted to them compared with the pay they draw, and that granted to the artillery and infantry with reference to the pay drawn by those two branches.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent.

12. I have no possible means of ascertaining this point.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers, if at all in operation, be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule.

13. I have already replied to this in answer to Query No. 2.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

14. They are quite fitted from their general intelligence to take part in the conduct of courts-martial.

15, 16. No replies required.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

17. No, I think not, beyond the alterations I have mentioned in reply to Query No. 4. The present system works well and is popular with all classes of the men.

18. No reply required.

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19, 20, 21, 22, and 23. No replies required.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent draw its horses?

24. Until a year or two ago the supply of horses for the Hyderabad cavalry has been drawn from Bombay, and confined almost entirely to Arabs and Gulf horses, but latterly a general order by the Resident permits all horses being entertained, provided they pass the different tests and are approved by the commandant.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

25. Formerly the average cost of an Arab was about Hyd. rs. 400, but of late years it has risen to very nearly Hyd. rs. 450. Very good Deccan or country bred horses are procurable for a less sum, perhaps about Hyd. rs. 300 on an average, but they have not the enduring powers of Arabs, and are consequently more expensive in the end.

26, 27, 28. No replies required.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Hyderabad contingent.

29. The old sherra or allowance granted for each horse was Hyd. rs. 40, about Company rs. ; on the reorganization of the contingent the sherra was reduced to Company rs. 30, with prospective effect; this is divided into three portions, two of which go to the silladar and one to the rider or bargeer.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign?

30. I do not think the present allowance Co. rs. 30 sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign. None but a very good horse can stand the continued wear and tear demanded on active service from irregular cavalry, and the constant and harassing nature of the duties exacted, and good horses are not procurable without a high price. It must also be borne in mind that the old rate of allowance or sherra per horse and rider was Hyd. rs. 40, without reference to the exchange on different kinds of currency. When any of the corps go beyond the frontier on active service, the men are paid in the Company's currency, and at the fixed exchange of 21 per cent. between the Hyderabad and Company rupees, whereas the market value between the two kinds of rupees may be only 11 or 12 per cent. A clear loss of 9 or 10 per cent. is thus caused to the men. This was particularly felt by the corps serving during the late campaign in Central India.

30 b. Have corps of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?

30 b. This depends very much upon the commandant; I have known some corps free of debt which on a change of commanding officer became much involved; a judicious careful commandant I think always keeps his regiment free from debt.

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

31. I think a return to the old sherra (Hyderabad rupees 40) would be advisable; the difference to Government would be nothing in comparison to the means it would afford to improved efficiency in every way.

32. What is the system of the Hyderabad contingent with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee; are there

restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests or not? Are they favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments and to the conduct of duty?

32. The market value of the assamee is unlimited, but varies according to circumstances. It may be considered at present to average between 1,200 and 1,500 Hyderabad rupees; no restrictions exist as to the number which may be held by individuals in the corps; a regulation is, however, in force that all assamees sold shall be disposed of to fighting men, and registered in their names; this I think a wise rule, as preventing the purchase of assamees by improper persons whose influence might be prejudicial in the corps. The silladar has, however, the right of bequeathing his assamees to his widow or any other member of his family. I consider it advantageous encouraging the possession of large pagahs, for by doing so we get a better class of men to enter our service than would be the case if there was a limitation to the number of assamees they were permitted to hold. It is in every point of view desirable that the high tone of feeling in a service should be preserved, and this will be best done by giving encouragement to men of rank and birth, or members of old families entering it. The possession of a large stake would undoubtedly also have its own good effect in creating a desire for the stability of the existing government; nor have I observed that these large pagahs are worse kept up and maintained than the smaller ones, and this is a matter so completely under the control of the commanding officer that it will be entirely his own fault if any difference be ever permitted to exist.

33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38. No replies required.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of the Hyderabad contingent cavalry been increased or diminished?

I do not think within my experience that the powers of commandants have been unnecessarily diminished.

2. No reply required.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

I cannot see that any change in this respect has taken place. The same system has obtained in the service since I first entered it.

4, 5. No replies required.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

6. Without doubt the more the hands of the commanding officer is strengthened the greater will be his power and influence in the corps. In fact the men ought to be taught to look up to him entirely, and consider his authority supreme in all things; and such it ought to be, subject to certain restrictions.

7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. No replies.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

13. The selection of efficient European officers for irregular cavalry is a matter of very great importance, but it is one so well understood that it would be need-

less my entering upon it now. The number of officers (3) attached to corps of irregular horse is quite sufficient for ordinary cantonment duties, but I consider it very advisable that this number should be increased on the corps taking the field, where the presence and leading of European officers is absolutely necessary. I would recommend on corps of irregular cavalry going on service that at least two officers extra should be attached to it. I am of opinion that a proper regard is not paid in the Hyderabad cavalry to the drill and training of officers on first joining. No regular system is laid down or enforced of tuition in their new duties. They are allowed to pick up such knowledge in any way; and it should not be permitted to depend upon the individual himself whether he attains or not to a proper degree of efficiency in the

practice of drill and manœuvre established for light cavalry.

14. No reply required.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?

15. I do not think it has ever been found that the fact of there being a more or less number of European officers with a regiment, has had any effect on its conduct during a mutiny or disturbance in the corps.

16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22. No replies required.

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No. 25.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM CAPTAIN W. D ABBOTT.

Captain
W. D. Abbott.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent is composed?

The cavalry regiments are composed chiefly of Mahomedans. There is a small proportion of the better castes of Hindoos among them. In my own regiment (the 3rd cavalry) the proportion of Hindoos is very small, there being only thirty-two (32) Hindoos in the regiment, including commissioned, non-commissioned, and men in the ranks. There are 546 Mahomedans, and nearly all the native officers are Mahomedans. There is rather a larger proportion of Hindoos, I believe, in the other three regiments; but in them also, the great bulk of the regiments are Mahomedans, Synds, Pathans, Moguls, Sheikhs; and among the Hindoos, Brahmins, Rajpoots, Mahrattas, and a few Sikhs.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

From the upper districts in Hindustan; the neighbourhood of Cawnpore, Delhi, Shajehanpore, Lucknow, &c. &c., and a considerable number are Deccan men. The greater proportion, however, in this regiment, and the remark applies nearly equally to the other regiments, are Hindostan men. The exact proportion in this regiment is 331, commissioned, non-commissioned, and men in the ranks, north of the river Nurbudda, and 247 south of the Nurbudda. In the latter are included the sons of a great number of Hindustan men, who have married, and had sons born to them in the Deccan.

3. Have any race, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of Hyderabad contingent either by the regulations or the practice of the service?

The practice of the service, in accordance with the spirit of the regulations enjoined by the late Col. John Sutherland, which for many years past have been a guide to us (I speak from an experience of upwards of 20 years service with this cavalry), has certainly been to entertain the *better caste* men and to *exclude* those who were not. A person of inferior caste, or regarding whose birth any unfavourable circumstances existed (as to legitimacy, or the particular employment or occupation in life his parents pursued), has certainly been looked to, and has appeared to me to have weight and importance in the eyes of the men.*

* By this I mean, that as in the great majority of cases sildars have the nomination of their own bargeers, they in selecting them look to a man's reputable birth, and that the chances have been against a man who is not of reputable birth ("ashraof") obtaining service though physically fit.

No particular restrictions have existed as to race, that is to say, Mahomedans of different sects and classes, Mahrattas, Rajpoots, Sikhs, were all freely entertained, provided they were respectable and decently born, that is, of parents who had not been engaged in any menial capacity, &c.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

I am not aware of any.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

The service has been so popular hitherto, that no necessity has ever existed for sending parties out for the purpose of recruiting. Such men in the service as have connexions in Hindostan, often bring them down with them, when they return from visiting their homes on furlough. The same with regard to the Deccan men, they either bring their own connexions, or bai-bunds, who they consider likely to be approved of by the officer commanding the regiment.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

None whatever before the local authorities of districts.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

According to the regulations of the service, sildars are required to give "written security for the good conduct of the bargeers they entertain," but my impression is that the regulation is almost a dead letter.

8. What alteration should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

I cannot suggest any relatively to races, tribes, or castes. The Sikhs are now so extensively employed, Government might not consider it advisable to introduce any large number of them into our cavalry. At present there are very few; more in the 1st cavalry than any other regiment. My impression of their character (generally) is, that they are *hardy* and *brave*, but mean, greedy, and not very trust-

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worthy. There is a colony of Sikhs in the Deccan, at Nauduir, on the Godavery; but they are a very inferior class to the Punjaub Sikhs. I had some 50 or 60 sent to me when I commanded the 1st cavalry, as recruits, and could find very few fit for the service. Sikhs have a strong leaning towards Hindoos, and hold together with them very much. Two Sikhs behaved with exemplary fidelity during the disaffection in the 1st cavalry in June 1857.

There is one point in connexion with recruiting, which I would strongly urge on Government, and that is, the re-introduction of the system of substitutes, "khidmut rawur," which existed for a great number of years in this service, and was abolished by Lord Dalhousie, on the reorganization of the contingent.

It is the system which gives to the commanding officers the power to entertain men to serve in the ranks, as a temporary measure, in place of those who are too young to serve, or those who are absent on leave. It is exercised in this manner:—Suppose a man old and worn out, or who has fallen into ill health, or who, from an accident or any other cause, wishes to retire, but is unwilling to do so because the pension allowed by Government is not sufficient for his wants. He has, perhaps, a son, but the son is too young to serve. The commandant can entertain the son, allowing him to provide an efficient substitute to serve in his stead, until he himself is of a proper age. The man retires, and has the satisfaction of feeling that his retirement is not altogether loss to him, as he has made way for his son; and the substitute is on all occasions willing, of his own accord, to allot some portion of his pay (three or four rupees probably) to assist in the maintenance of the family. A man may suddenly die, leaving a young family; one of the sons may be entertained, giving a substitute until he is fit to serve; and the substitute will enter into an arrangement with the family, to allow three or four rupees a month towards their subsistence. There are often many desires (on urgent private affairs) to obtain leave when it is not their turn, and the requirements of Government cannot well dispense with their services. You can oblige good men by permitting them to take leave, providing a substitute, so that Government service does not suffer.

I have shown the manner in which the power is exercised. The advantages are these:—In the first place, it is most popular among the men, and they would, I feel sure, consider its re-introduction as a great boon, and it would serve to attach them still more to the service; it is, at the same time, advantageous to Government. It has the effect of keeping a much larger number of young men attached, as it were, to the regiment, and ready at any moment to take service.* It enables a commandant to satisfy himself fully of the qualification and character of a man before he is entertained permanently. It enables a commandant to exercise his discretion in assisting the families of deserving men, by entertaining one of the boys who gives a substitute until he is fit to serve. It is regarded by the men as an especial mark of distinction, in the event of a native officer dying, if the commandant should at once entertain his son (probably a boy), and allow him to provide a substitute until he is himself fit to serve.

The time a man serves as a substitute is a *probationary* term; and he is perforce brought to exercise a greater control over himself, and attention to his duties, than he could possibly be brought to do if he were permanently entertained, knowing that his eventual appointment to the service depends entirely on his good conduct. Thus attention to his duties and a desire to improve himself become the *groundwork* of his services.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

Hitherto it has not been customary to swear in re-

cruits on their entering the ranks; it has only on one occasion been done in this regiment, when Captain Mayne commanded the regiment, during the late Major Orr's absence on medical certificate. The form of oath then administered was, I am informed, the same as that used in infantry regiments. No form is given in our cavalry regulations.

10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

This is answered in my reply given to the former question (No. 9).

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent when first enrolled?

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Hyderabad contingent be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

I do not consider this advisable.

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Hyderabad contingent be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?

In my opinion, without reference to districts.

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be homogeneous as to race or caste?

I do not consider this would be advisable.

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be composed of *ressalahs*, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes; or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

A *ressalah* in our cavalry means a whole regiment, but I believe it is here intended to mean a squadron or troop. I conclude the object in keeping each class or caste in separate bodies or troops would be to play off one party against the other, in the event of any disaffection arising.

Whatever tendency a particular class might have (either Mahomedans, Hindoos, or Sikhs), it would be pretty generally felt, whether they were all collected in one troop or squadron, or dispersed through the regiment; it would be quite sufficient their being in the same regiment, they would find no difficulty in organizing any plans, or communicating them to each other. I do not think that one party would be a more effectual check on the other, from each party being kept in separate troops, whereas, on the other hand, supposing one party to be loyal and the other the reverse, much valuable assistance to a commanding officer and information might be afforded from the opportunities the well-disposed men would have of discovering plans, and taking measures to counteract them; and as I have before said, no difficulty would be experienced by either party in meeting or communicating with each other. In my opinion the castes should be mixed up.

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

I certainly think it would be advisable in raising *new* regiments, to have certain proportions of Mahomedans, Rajpoots, Sikhs, Mahrattas, &c. But it would be difficult, and perhaps not advisable to introduce any alteration in our regiments as they at present stand, and the *gradual* introduction of such a system would be difficult, and a work of great time, because we allow *silladars* the right of selecting their own bargeers, subject to the approval of the commanding officer; and I have already shown that the great proportion (indeed nearly the whole regiment) are Mahomedans.

* In fact, it keeps up the materials for another regiment.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

My reply to Question No. 5 shows that no particular agency is required to obtain recruits for this cavalry.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

This is a subject I have never considered, and to which I do not feel myself competent to give a reply. No doubt if such a system could be organized, that recruits should be drawn from that particular class of persons, who have resided in certain villages or towns for considerable periods, or who are landholders and householders, and have been for many years past (as is the case with many of our men); and that a recruit offering himself for service, or a man bringing his son, nephew, or other relation for service should be called on to furnish the security of this particular class of people, for the fidelity of the recruit, it would be a great additional security for his good behaviour, and would greatly extend the influence of Government over such districts.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

They would of course be invaluable in the field, but I do not think it advisable that a troop or squadron of Europeans should form a component part of a regiment. But I cannot conceive a more efficient arrangement both for security in cantonments, and perfect efficiency in the field, than if Government instead of making a squadron of Europeans a component part of a regiment, were to attach to each regiment 4 horse guns, (2 nine-pounders and 2 howitzers), with a sufficient number of Europeans to work them, on the same footing as horse artillery; that is; gunners mounted, and detachments. I cannot conceive a more efficient and valuable arrangement. With such an addition to my regiment I should feel the most perfect confidence under any circumstances in which I might be placed. In the field, the detachments used at the proper moment as cavalry, would fulfil all the advantages which could be hoped for, if a troop of European cavalry formed a component part of the regiment without being incorporated with the regiment, which would for some reasons be certainly objectionable. The men of the regiment and the Europeans, though separated in a measure (in all that is essential), would become attached to each other from association in time of service, and would learn to respect and trust each other, while the objectionable results which might take place from their being in the same regiment, and which present themselves to my idea (as regards the dislike natives would have to the Europeans forming actually part of their regiment, and residing in their houses; the wound to their pride and *esprit de corps*; the umbrage they might take at thinking they were not trusted), would all be avoided. Should any discontent at any time exist, likely to lead to the manifestation of a mutinous spirit, the presence of such a body of Europeans, with guns, would be an immediate and most effectual check on it, and on service I cannot sufficiently express the conviction I have of the important service such a body of troops could render, the guns forming as it were part of the regiment, and under the orders of the commander, as if they were a troop or squadron of the regiment. I know of no combination or arrangement by which so small a body of Europeans could be made so truly serviceable, or as an isolated body so secure. I would beg most strongly to recommend it.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be in

tegral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?

Let Government raise them in any manner they think most advisable; but once raised, they should, I think, be permanently attached to the regiment.

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

The situation would depend so much on the nature of the ground and the plan of cantonments, but I would have them separate from the cavalry, but sufficiently near to be of immediate use if required, and the lines so laid out and arranged as to be easily capable of defence.

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

No; I do not think so. In my opinion, the arrangements might easily be so made as to enable them to move almost as rapidly as our cavalry do now. Of course, the commissariat arrangements could be so complete on forced marches as when in cantonments, but sufficiently so for all necessary purposes.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troops with whom they would be associated?

The reply to this is contained in my answer to Question No. 19.

With regard to my remarks on the subject of "arms," I am of opinion that the men could not certainly be called on to change their pistols and carbines, but Government might be willing, in consideration of the good services performed in the late campaign, to assist them; that is, take the arms they now have; and present them with the carbines and pistols I recommend in lieu of them. The swords, I think, could be changed. The price of the English cavalry sabres (such as they have in the 2nd regiment) is not more than 10 or 12 Hyderabad rupees. They are first-rate weapons, and if every man sold the native sword he now has, he would be put to very little expense in the difference between the prices of the two, and the degree of efficiency effected would, I consider, be very great. It is an error to suppose that the men generally prefer the native sword; a few, a very few, may. Many would say they do, to avoid paying a few extra rupees. Nearly every native officer, and those to whom money is of less importance, all of them use English sabres; and the generality of swords in this regiment (*short* native swords, picked up in the bazaars for 5 or 6 rupees) are most inferior, useless weapons for cavalry. The price of the "Scinde Horse" carbine is, I hear, 40 Company's rupees. Our men's carbines cost them 29 or 30 Hyderabad rupees. If an order for pistols and carbines, such as I recommend, were given to a respectable gun-maker in England, so large a number would no doubt be obtained at a much lower rate. About 250 carbines and 250 pistols would be required for a regiment.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent be armed? Does the arming of this highly efficient cavalry admit of improvement?

Yes, in carbines, pistols, and swords. The carbine in use is an exceedingly defective weapon, very limited in range, and precision of aim uncertain and difficult. The *double-barrelled* carbine in use in the "Scinde Horse" is an infinitely superior weapon, and I most strongly recommend its introduction into our cavalry. The pistol is the old horse pistol, a most inferior weapon, and I most strongly recommend a *double-barrelled* pistol in place of it. I have heard "revolvers" spoken of, but I am decidedly averse to their introduction; I speak from considerable experience of the weapon. The bore is too small. The intricacy of a revolver would puzzle natives,

Cap'tain
W. D. Abbott.

Captain
W. D. Abbott.

and it would be dangerous to entrust them with them. The loading on horseback is very difficult, and the aim exceedingly difficult to acquire. The carbines and pistols should be of the *same* bore. A great number of our men's swords are *extremely* bad. A recruit endeavours to obtain his arms (which he is obliged to provide when he is entertained) at as low a cost as possible. If he has the choice of two swords, one at 10 and the other at 5 rupees, he will take the 5 rupee one. The greater number of the swords in this regiment are mere *rubbish*, being considerably shorter than even an infantry regulation sword, and *quite unsuited* for cavalry. It is extremely difficult to introduce improvements in these respects. The men object in every possible way, because it entails a little extra expense on them. The commanding officers succeeded in introducing, in the 2nd regiment of cavalry, English light cavalry sabres, and it has added greatly to the efficiency of the regiment. The men declare they never had such swords, and much prefer them (now that they have got them) to any others.

25. No reply required.

26. Do the dress and equipments of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent admit of improvements? if so, state them.

The only alteration I would make in the equipment would be to introduce a chain rein and headstall. Every cavalry officer is aware of the immense importance, indeed the actual necessity, for this on service. The cost would be small, about 3 rupees a man. I would not make any alteration in the bit or reins as they are at present; merely add a chain headstall and rein.

W. D. ABBOTT, Capt.,
Commanding 3rd Cavalry,
Hyderabad Contingent.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

I regret I am not able to do so.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

I do not feel myself sufficiently well acquainted with the subject to offer an opinion.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

It is preferable, I consider, to the system which formerly prevailed of "punchayets," but I do not think this implicitly to be depended upon as the mainstay and support of discipline; that is, there is generally too great a tendency to be over-lenient.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Hyderabad contingent irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed?

The articles of war are read to the men once in every three months.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the Hyderabad contingent irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

There are eighty-five men (85) in this regiment who can read and write.

W. D. ABBOTT, Capt.
Commanding 3rd Cavalry.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent, what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

On merit and seniority combined.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

A good number are intelligent and efficient; but there are at the same time many who have been promoted for seniority alone, and who are *worse* than useless. They are wanting in the intelligence and dash you require in a native officer, and are unable to influence and control their men or instruct them. The bad consequences of such promotions (in the case of troop officers) I have invariably found to be plainly visible in the state of their troops.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

With a few exceptions, I think not. Many of the native officers cannot read or write.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

Not any.

5. No reply required.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers?

I can only speak from my experience of what occurred in the 1st cavalry; and I am compelled to say, that on that occasion, the greater number of the leading native officers in the regiment, that is, taking the two senior grades, troop officers and jemadars (which is the next grade), did not evince cordiality or display any energy, or attempt to crush the mutinous spirit at its outbreak; I believe, however, that many, when they saw the serious consequences likely to result from the mutinous spirit which had then risen beyond their control, heartily repented of their folly. The head native officer, the Havildar-major, had not the slightest influence in the regiment, but he was perfectly loyal. Of the five troop officers who were present at Aurungabad two were faithful, and three were not; one had been left with his troop in charge of the station at Mominabad, and he behaved extremely well. Of the jemadars, two were the principal leaders in the mutiny; two were immediately pensioned as useless and imbecile; one was shot; two were transported for life; and one imprisoned for three years. In short, there were a few exceptions, but the native officers, as a body, behaved badly; many were disaffected, and many proved themselves unequal to the crisis.

7, 8, 9. No replies required.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

The system of pensions (which has been introduced during the last few years only) is, I think, appreciated by our men. I have often spoken to the native officers on the subject, contrasting the system of pensions with that which formerly obtained in this service, of giving a donation of six months' pay; and I have always found that they consider the pension system a great improvement and a great boon.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?

It should in my opinion be maintained.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

I have no means of ascertaining. The exact amount may be ascertained from the paymaster at Secundra- bad, or the Military Secretary to the Resident.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if at all in operation) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Promotion by merit and efficiency should, I think, be followed more than has hitherto been the case. No officer intrusted with the command of a regiment would, I think, pass over the claims of a deserving old soldier, if he were in any way fitted for promotion, but it is essentially necessary that promotion should be given to those whose intelligence, dash, the degree of respect they command from the men and the degree of attachment they show to Government, point them out as the fit men to command others. I think the commanding officer's selection should be attended to.

14. Are native commissioned officers, generally fit to take part in the conduct of court-martial?

Generally, yes; but in many instances certainly not. I do not think, however, that entire confidence can be placed in them, nor do I think the affirmation they make is, even in a remote degree, as binding on them as the oath is on members of an European court-martial.

- 15, 16. No replies required.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

I most strongly advocate a greater number of officers being attached to each regiment. I think that three European officers, independent of the commanding officer and adjutant, are absolutely requisite in the field, but I consider they should not be allowed to interfere in any way in the command of the troops, which should be left as much as possible as heretofore in the hands of the troop officers. I would even advocate a greater number of European officers being attached to regiments than that I have named.

18. No reply required.

- 19, 20, 21, 22, 23. No replies required.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent draw its horses?

24. Almost entirely from Bombay. Formerly a great number of Deccan horses were entertained, but the practice has fallen into disuse for two reasons; 1st, that the Deccan horses are fast dying out, and are not nearly so numerous as they were; 2nd. That commandants have found the great superiority of the Arab, and that its introduction into the regiments has so greatly added to their efficiency without much (until lately) to the price of remounts, that they have sought to introduce as many Arabs as possible into the regiments. There is an annual fair (in December) for Deccan horses, at Mulligaum; and formerly the remount agent at Bombay purchased yearly a number of *lots* for Government; he never could obtain a greater number than 200 or 250 suited for Government purposes. Some of the men profess to have a *preference* for Deccan horses, and say, they are easier trained to their paces and management; I believe it is chiefly because they are obtained at rather lower prices; but, in my opinion, there is *no comparison* between the two, the Arab being far the better and, *in the end*, the cheaper horse.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

In the year 1854, in this regiment	Hyd. Rs.
average price	423 10 0
In the year 1856	408 0 0
Since the last inspection, in December 1856, up to the present time	370 7 0
This calculation is made up to the time of the return of the regiment from field service.	

- 26, 27, 28. No replies required.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Hyderabad contingent?

A trooper and horse draw on the new scale Hyd. rs. 34. 4. 10.; of this sum 12. 6. 4. is the personal pay of the trooper, the remainder goes for the horse; on the old scale, man and horse drew 40 Hyd. rs., of this 25 goes for the horse, and 15 for the trooper.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign?

During the late campaign, Government allowed an extra allowance of five Company's rupees for each horse, which was divided in the same ratio as the rate of pay above mentioned; I think this (unless under very peculiar circumstances) is sufficient.

- 30 b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?

The men formerly were very much embarrassed by debt. The men were very extravagant, and lived much beyond their means. Attention was directed to this by Lord Dalhousie, and a great improvement has been effected in this respect during the last four or five years.

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Hyderabad contingent?

I do not consider any alteration necessary, unless it be in the pay of the second in command and adjutant. The pay of the second in command in the cavalry is the same as the corresponding rank in the infantry, 500 Co. rupees to each. There is an inconsistency in this, for the expenses of the one far exceed those of the other.

The adjutants of cavalry should, I think, draw "cavalry pay," as the medical officer attached to the cavalry does.

32. What is the system of the Hyderabad contingent with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests or not? Are they favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty.

The system with respect to assamees is to allow none but fighting men *in the service* to purchase them. Such persons are allowed to possess as many as they can purchase. There is no restriction as to the number. The market value ranges from 1,200 to 1,500 Hyderabad rupees. I have never myself heard of any ill effects to the established service resulting from allowing one man to possess a large number of assamees. Our regulations permit us to punish a silladar who has his horses in bad condition, or whose appointments are bad, by forfeiture of a portion of the horses' pay until these faults are rectified. Owners of large pagahs are necessarily (generally speaking) men of money; they can therefore better afford to keep their pagahs efficient, and if unfortunately it should be found necessary to punish neglect on their parts by forfeiture of pay, it does not come so heavy on them as it would on a man who owned only one horse. It secures to us also a better class of men, who, mostly speaking, rise to be (or entered the service in former years as) native officers.

- 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38. No replies required.

W. D. ABBOTT, Capt.,
Commanding 3rd Cavalry.

Captain
W. D. Abbott.

Captain
H. O. Mayne.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM CAPTAIN H. O. MAYNE.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

Having but little experience of the Bengal army I beg that the enclosed replies may be considered as applying to the old Nizam's and present Hyderabad contingent cavalry, as an offshoot of the Bengal army, in which I served for very many years.

H. O. MAYNE, Captain,
Commanding Mayne's Horse.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army is composed?

Synds, Shèkhs, Moghuls, Pathans, Mussulmans, Mewatis, Nagurs from Jhoong Noo, Kamikhaniis, Rajpoots (very few), Hindoo Sikhs from Deccan. } Principally from Rohilcund and North-Western provinces.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?

Oudh.
Rohilcund.
The Doab between the Ganges and Jumna.
The East of Bikarni.
The Deccan.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, either by the regulations or the practice of the ?

None by regulation; but in practice Brahmins, Jats, Goojurs, Kultris, Purbheas, Bundelas, and Doon-delas, and Mahrattas have generally been excluded from the Nizam's cavalry.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Yes; the enlisted numbers of Rajpoots, Sikhs, Kamikhaniis, Nagurs, and Jats are so small they might be increased with advantage, except that the Nagurs are not sufficiently populous.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

None. The popularity of the service, and the old system of "khidmut-aweri," lately and unwisely abolished, kept so many trained soldiers ever ready at regimental head-quarters, that all agency and recruiting parties were needless.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

None were ever used in the Nizam's cavalry.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers, or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions if any, are taken?

The security of two siladars is taken, backed by the recommendation of the troop officer, for the good behaviour of the recruit, and for any loss he may cause to Government. An "ashrafut nama" or certificate of respectability, and of the recruit not having performed menial service, was also taken.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

The "Khidmut-aweri" or "acting service" system, sanctioned by Cols. J. Sutherland, Evan Davies, and Jas. Blair, should be again introduced, at the option of commanding officers. It is an old and most popular practice, and by it the Government are the great gainers, as thereby they have always at least a squadron of "trained and tried soldiers," unpaid, present with each corps, ready for any emergency. It creates, *per se*, the very best recruit depôt that could be devised, and is, *in re*, a sort of "limited enlistment act." The principal argument brought against it is, that recruits so situated are not under the articles of war; but this may be easily obviated. I consider the articles of war as utterly unsuited for the native army generally, and especially for irregular horse. The men place little estimation on them, and understand them less. Their introduction into the Hyderabad contingent cavalry has not improved that service, whilst the old punchayet system was appreciated and considered far more just, and it certainly never failed in ensuring very high discipline.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Those laid down in the articles of war, and previous to their introduction, none. No native places any value on the oath, and the administering thereof will not deter him in the slightest degree from breaking it, if so inclined. Most natives, if they will but express free opinions, confess that no consideration for an oath ever prevents any of their brethren from the commission of a crime, and I believe it seldom or ever prevents either the European officer or soldier from the same.

10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

The "Khidmut-aweri" system has been in vogue in the Nizam's cavalry ever since its first organization in 1816 by Col. Evan Davies.

11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army when first enrolled?

None, save its abolition.

12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?

This and Nos. 13, 14, and 15 are best replied to collectively.

13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?

The high importance of preserving a balance of power in every native corps being now universally admitted, it is indispensable that they should be composed of equal numbers from the opposing classes of Mussulmans and Hindoos, each of which may be again divided into two tribes, who have little in common. We thus obtain four races in each corps, and these should always be recruited from their own special districts. Indeed, if not carefully avoided, this will follow as a natural result. The separate trooping of several races in one corps produces a valuable spirit of emulation and of honorable rivalry, which may be turned to the very best account by a judicious commandant, and by placing an amount of power in his hands otherwise unattainable, it will ever enable him to perfect discipline.

14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be homogeneous as to race or caste?

Replied to in answer to No. 13.

15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of *ressalabs*, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps?

Replied to in answer to No. 13.

16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter?

There are classes of Hindoos and Mussulmans who have nothing in common, and a corps should be composed of half of each race, again subdivided, *e.g.*,

1st Squadron. { 1st troop, N. W. P. Mussulmans.
2nd ditto, Rajpoots.

Right Wing. Left Wing ditto.

2nd Squadron. { 2nd troop, Nagurs and Kamikhanis
3rd ditto, Sikhs.

By which arrangement, whenever a squadron or wing may be detached, there will always be two opposing races.

17. What agency should be employed for recruiting?

Replied to in No. 12. Commandants should be allowed to make their own arrangements.

18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

None are needed with good recruiting officers; neither under the plan above suggested.

19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bengal army?

Certainly not; as then the degradation of the native soldier would be rapid. He would soon become the servant and sycophant of the European; he would lose all self-respect and spirit of emulation; he would have all the fatigue duties of the corps to perform, and seldom be allowed the opportunity of gaining distinction; and whenever acting with the European, the latter would surely obtain the credit, and thus the native soldier would soon sink into insignificance, on finding that he was ever put in the background.

20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European cavalry corps, and subject to periodical relief?

21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed?

No reply needed after the view expressed in reply to No. 19.

22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

No reply needed, &c.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed? with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated?

No reply needed, &c.

24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be armed?

Front rank, excepting three file on the outward flanks of each squadron, with strong hog spears and swords; the rest with breech-loading carbines and swords. Native commissioned officer as the one; native officers with swords, and over and under double-barrelled pistols, which are far preferable and more deadly than revolvers. These are always getting out of order, or the ball lost from the jerking of the horse.

I have seen a hundred instances in this campaign. The common revolver ball will not knock a man down, whereas one from a good sized pistol invariably does. The swords should be of different sizes and patterns, for what suits one man another is unable to use. Some are proficient with the point, others are cunning at the cut.

I have already noticed this subject at length in a communication made to Col. Durand on 23rd July last, forwarding an article I wrote thereon in the *Bombay Quarterly Review*, No. III., for June 1855, entitled "Light Cavalry in India."

No reply required to No. 25.

26. Do the existing dress and equipments admit of improvements? If so, state in what respects.

The existing dress and equipments of irregular cavalry are admirable, and give great satisfaction. Some few details might be improved which I have mentioned in the article above quoted.

H. O. MAYNE, Captain,
Commanding Mayne's Horse.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

None, save their abolition; a set of simplest regulations might be introduced, easily understood, and productive of a higher discipline than the articles of war induce.

2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army?

Degrees of punishment for the native army should be indicated rather than regulated, for at present the law frequently fails to punish the guilty. Wherefore, punishment should be left greatly discretionary with those to whom power is delegated to inflict. All natives are far better satisfied when punished by their commanding officer than when by sentence of court-martial.

3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

Most unsatisfactorily, for let officers work as they will, it is not possible to render the English principles of the articles of war either satisfactorily or intelligible to the *native mind*.

4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry of the military code under which they serve and are governed?

Recruits are instructed in certain of the principal Articles of War, and certain portions of them are read at muster parades, as ordered in the regulations, all of which is regarded by the native soldier as a solemn and necessary farce, and whatever he is taught and hears he feels not the slightest interest in remembering.

5. What proportion of the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular?

Not above 10 per cent.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army what is the system of promotion; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined?

Merit and seniority combined; but latterly seniority supported by a species of compulsion, emanating from the Adjutant-General's office, has been allowed to give a right to promotion, much to the detriment of the army.

2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient?

Yes; they are usually taken from the ranks in life,

Captain
H. O. Mayne.

Captain
H. O. Mayne.

far above (not in caste) those of the native officers of the regular army, and as they supply the place of European troop officers they are generally very intelligent, useful, and efficient.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

Yes, very superior, but the best native officers are those who have not risen from the ranks, but have been enlisted as native officers from the respectable and substantial yeoman of the district. Such have far higher authority over their men than when they have risen from among them.

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade, or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

No special examination has hitherto been prescribed, but a man should be always tested in his ability, attainments, and conduct during the routine of his daily service. I opine that examinations in cavalry duties should be made by cavalry commandants more generally and specifically than they are at present.

No reply required to No. 5.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers?

I am only personally acquainted with the mutineers of three corps. On part of the 1st cavalry Hyderabad contingent mutinying at Aurungabad, the Sikhs first produced a split in the corps, and this gave the opportunity to four native officers to side with their European officers. Three of these afterwards evinced gallantry of the highest order. Their fidelity not only saved the 1st cavalry, but the other corps at Aurungabad and the other stations in the Nizam's territory, but generally in the 1st cavalry Hyderabad contingent, the native officers were the ringleaders of the mutiny.

On the mutiny of the 2nd cavalry Gwalior contingent, only one native officer, Resaldar, showed fidelity and it was so distinguished that Government granted him the title of Sirdar Bahadour, together with the first class of "the Order of Merit," and other favors. I feel convinced that this liberality on the part of the Government has had the deepest effect on the minds of the natives, and that the resultant good will not be effaced during the next century. Native commissioned officers in our regular army should be discontinued, they are a useless race and are in the way of the European officers.

No reply required to Nos. 7, 8, and 9.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

Most assuredly not; and no pensions ever will do so, though higher pay may, by creating a greater present self-interest; I recollect, on pensions being first proposed in 1843, for the Nizam's cavalry, that the old soldiers and best men were most averse to the plan.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?

The pensions should be prospectively abolished, and the rates of pay increased as a counterpoise. Pensions should only be granted to those who distinguish themselves by bravery, fidelity, conspicuous and extraordinary good conduct, on the recommendation of committees, and under the special sanction of Government. In fact, enlarge the number of members of the "Order of Merit," and "Order of British India." Long length of service and ordinary good conduct to be disallowed as claims, the parties having been already paid by Government for both.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the State, on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

I have no means of ascertaining.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

Merit and efficiency should alone be the claims allowed for promotion, and the old system, so popular among natives, of bringing in young men of good family, reputation, and substance, as native officers, should be returned to.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

Seldom or ever. I have had immense practice in native courts-martial, especially during these mutinies, and have ever found it most difficult to ascertain the real sentiments of the court, who, if left helplessly and mercilessly to their own partiality, stupidity, and indecision, more often arrive at a wrong than a right conclusion. They usually leave no means untried to ascertain the opinion of the English superior officer, and the exceptions are rare, in which he has not ultimately to put into their mouths the finding, sentence, and punishment. Indeed, the best officers, after toiling assiduously for years, in the hope of obtaining an independent expression of opinion, resign themselves hopelessly to "instructing the Court."

No reply required to Nos. 15 and 16.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode of officering the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

EXTRACT from MINUTE forwarded to FOREIGN SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA.

European Officers.

Goona, March 17, 1858.

"13. The pay of the commandant is a matter I refrain from entering on; but I need hardly mention that the fullest powers should be conferred on him, late events having proved its absolute necessity; hence it is indispensable that all promotion should remain in his hands, and be notified to Government, that they may be gazetted.

"The second in command, who will possess increased responsibilities in one of these corps, should receive at least rupees 750 a month consolidated. No cavalry officer will come upon less, for the simple reason that he is better off with his own regiment. It has been apparent of late years, that cavalry officers will not accept these situations on rupees 500 salary, which is often less than the adjutant, his junior officer, draws.

"The adjutant's pay may be consolidated at rupees 600 a month. The present plan of paying men of different services at different rates, for doing precisely the same work, is wrong in principle, and is a constant cause of confusion and reference to the Audit office. The probationary plan which the Government have lately adopted in various departments cannot be too highly recommended here. Where officers are so few, the very life of a corps of irregular horse depends upon the peculiar aptitude of the officers attached to it, which practice alone will prove. Many a youngster of otherwise excellent qualifications, who might distinguish himself in other departments, fails in this; wherefore, a young officer on probation might be attached to each corps on rupees 400 a month, and after trial, if he does not possess, or is unlikely to gain that capacity essential for this service, he may be allowed to go elsewhere; but if fitted, the great benefit ensues of having an officer trained to the system, and capable of at once taking up the next higher grade, instead of being inefficient for months, whilst learning his duty.

"Assistant surgeons, with the Gwalior contingent cavalry, drew rupees 616; those with the Hyderabad

contingent cavalry drew rupees 530; therefore, with the increased medical charge, a consolidated allowance of rupees 550 may be considered but fair.

"Native Officers."

"14. The system of having a resaldar or resaldar-major, as the native staff of an irregular corps, is far preferable to that of having a junior native officer as native adjutant, or woordee-major. The first plan puts the native chief in his proper position, and in direct responsibility to the commanding officer, securing him both the obedience and respect of his junior officers and the men; the second creates a double government, and two parties are often formed in the corps in consequence. You cannot wholly deprive the senior native officer of the responsibility attached to him as such; on the contrary, on an emergency, he is one of the first called to account; but you partly take the power away from him by creating a junior official, whose constant aim will be to gain the highest influence in the regiment, not only over him, but over the other native officers, who are his seniors, to effect which he is constantly resorting to measures, which are productive of intrigue and bad feeling.

"The native chief should be, therefore, a man of great respectability, and well paid; and I have recommended a salary of rupees 300, being the same rate as is drawn in the Hyderabad contingent cavalry.

"15. The rank of resaldar-major is a misnomer, a Latin conjoined to an Undu term; the head of a resala or corps should be a resaldar. The term resaldar is also wrong, it meaning a messenger; it is also disliked. I have, therefore, taken up the old and more suitable rank of naib resaldar, and named rupees 150, that being the salary in all irregular horse for a troop captain. The pay of a jemadar of the late Gwalior contingent was first laid down at rupees 70; it was then reduced to rupees 45; but as this is too small to enable him to support his position respectably, I recommend only a reduction of rupees 10, and that his pay be fixed at rupees 60, as he has to provide himself with superior equipments and horse. The duffadars are named for the usual allowance of rupees, 10 over the sowar, or rupees 35 each.

"The shutur sowars rupees 30 each; these are the most useful adjuncts to irregular cavalry, or a force in the field; they carry orders, correspondence, pay, and perform any other duty, where great distance has to be performed with celerity, and where a horse would knock up; they can also be made most efficient in the field with Jacob's double rifles. They are no extra expense, one per troop being simply substituted for a sowar. Although at first sight it may seem of small moment, yet it is highly important to introduce half-caste trumpeters into these corps. Firstly, because as they can never be led away by disaffection, the corps without them will be deprived of one of its most essential adjuncts; indeed, it becomes partially useless without trumpeters. Again, Mussulmans consider trumpet blowing as a menial service, and none but the worst will accept the birth; hence they are generally "vauriens;" so to ensure the other element being introduced, an extra sum of rupees 5, should be allowed, and the trumpet-major, or non-commissioned trumpeter, should get rupees 40, and the trumpeter rupees 30.

"H. C. MAYNE, Captain,
"Commanding Mayne's Horse."

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular; and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

Service in irregular horse is far more popular among the military classes who enlist under British colours, than that of the regular cavalry. The many reasons for this preference may be all brought under one head. The absence of that *English* rule and reputation, which they consider unjust and vexatious. By "English rule," I mean a rule adapted to govern the English, and which is totally unsuited to control the native. There is scarcely a soldier in India who does

not consider the simple word of his officer as infinitely more trustworthy than all the rules, regulations, general orders, and acts which ever were published.

Captain
H. O. Mayne.

No replies required to 19 and 20.

21. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bengal army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?

Irregular horse should all be mounted on the siladaree system and entirely by themselves. If the Government interfere, it will not improve such matters and will only put itself to great cost. The mounting of irregular horse had far better be left to the energy and discretion of the Government appointment to command the corps. If better horses are desired, increase the "shurra," and the improvement follows *per se* as a matter of course.

22. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army were mounted?

I have no means of calculating.

23. Whence are the horses obtained, and of what breeds are they?

No means of ascertaining.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency draw its horses?

The Hyderabad contingent cavalry are mounted mostly on Arab horses from Bombay. On relinquishing command of the 3rd cavalry Hyderabad contingent in June 1857, the remounts for the last year were Atabs 85, Deccan 14, Hindoostance 3, Velaitee 2.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency?

The average cost of horses in the Hyderabad contingent cavalry, 3rd regiment for the 1856, was Hyderabad rs. 408, equal to about 350 Co. rupees.

26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

The system of mounting the Hyderabad contingent cavalry (one of free trade) answers admirably, and they are certainly the best horsed irregulars in India. The horses in our Madras cavalry are excellent, better could not be desired, and I have never heard of the Madras system failing to produce both full and good supplies of horses. That in Bombay is nearly similar and equally popular. I visited many of the studs during my sojourn in the Bengal presidency, in 1848-49-50, and inspected the horses of every cavalry corps and horse artillery that I met with. They were certainly far inferior both to the Madras and Bombay cattle.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses, for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency.

A wider adoption of the system of the other presidencies, and the transfer of the studs to the high and dry table-lands of the Deccan and Central India. The established localities in Bengal and the North-Western provinces, fostered by all our European knowledge, and Indian experience, have failed in producing a good hardy horse for military purposes, and as it is very certain that such horses can be bred in India, we should naturally inquire in what localities this success was attained. The old Mahratta horse, bred on the Bhumra river, nearly approached the Arab, in excellence, form, and endurance, whilst the good Kattywar horse is handsomer, more wiry, and more active than the Bengal stud-bred. Remove the studs to climates favorable for horse breeding and in a few years we shall have no more complaints about stud-bred cattle.

28. It is advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and Government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and

Captain
H. O. Mayne.

of British colonies for a supply of horses for the army of India ?

28. The studs should not be abolished, but the localities changed, as above recommended. Government should not be subject to the fluctuations of any market, or have to rely on foreign countries, as a war might cut off or seriously diminish the supply.

29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army ?

The pay of troopers in the Hyderabad contingent cavalry is old rate, H. rs. 40 ; C. rs. 36. 6 ; new reduced rate, C. rs. 30. During the late Central India campaign the Government paid *each* trooper rs. 5 extra (so that some got rs. 41), because their pay was insufficient to meet their expenses.

30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign ?

The above rates, with the extra pay, did no more than pay the expenses of the men, when everything is at war price, as must be the case whenever an army takes the field.

30 b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt ?

Scarcely ever; even with the H. C. "shurra," it is difficult to prevent debt.

31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?

Yes ; it should be increased to C. rs. 30, for reasons given in the following extracts :—

From Capt. H. O. MAYNE, Commanding Mayne's Horse, to Sir R. HAMILTON, Bart., Agent, Gov.-Gen. for Central India.

"Goona, Feb. 25, 1858.

"4. With regard to the 25 rupees rate of pay sanctioned 'for the present,' I beg most respectfully, yet most earnestly, that you will again submit to the Supreme Government the almost imperative necessity that exists for their sanctioning 30 rupees per man as first recommended.

"5. Nearly seventeen years' experience of irregular horse enables me to speak with certainty on this point, wherefore I hope you will forward on my views, as I believe that the arguments for granting the extra 5 rupees a month are of such paramount importance as will divest the reasons against the measure of the value they would otherwise possess.

"6. It is a significant fact, that the two bodies of irregular horse, who stood the firmest in the late revolt, were the Sindh horse and the Hyderabad contingent cavalry, both receiving 30 rupees a month. Another of great note is, that the cry of "Rupeya roz," a rupee a day, lured away the great mass of irregular cavalry to Delhi ; this rate being the "ultima thule" of their aspirations.

"7. It has been recorded by the most eminent irregular cavalry officers, Cols. J. Sutherland, E. Davies, J. Blair, J. Jacob, W. Mayne, and many others, whilst I know none who do not firmly hold the opinion, that the irregular cavalry horseman cannot be efficiently maintained as a cavalry soldier for *military* purposes on less than 30 rupees a month. Horse police can be kept for 20 rupees, but not the trooper for the field.

"8. In my intimacy with the Hyderabad contingent cavalry, I have heard many acknowledge that the great secret of their holding together during the late mutinies was to be found in the magnitude of the interests they had at stake, viz., the 30 rupees pay, the system of large "pagahs" or studs, and the value of their *assamees* or commissions.

"9. This will be better understood when I mention that the auction prices of these *assamees* averages from 1,200 rupees to 1,500 rupees each in the Hyderabad contingent cavalry on 30 rupees, whilst in the Gwalior contingent cavalry on 20 rupees, they fetch but 350 at most, and in the Bhopal contingent (which was stationary), on Bhopal rupees 20, the price was Bhopal rupees 400.

"10. The rate at which the value of the *assamee*, with the higher rate of pay, increases is very remarkable. The Hyderabad man draws one-third more pay than the Gwalior man, yet the value of the interest he has at stake is *quadrupled*.

"So that the Government by giving the Hyderabad rate, or 33 per cent. above the Gwalior rate, create a corresponding security of 400 per cent. and absolute funded interest in the Government, and entirely dependent on its stability.

"11. The partial mutiny of the 1st cavalry Hyderabad contingent was commenced by men who had no personal stake, and they drew others into the whirl. The entire mutiny was averted by the men of property holding firm to save their substance, and causing disunion. The immense value of the small increase is surely sufficient to outweigh any financial reasons for withdrawing it.

"12. Still more weightier influences however are obtained by the 30 rupees rate. That the efficiency in arms, uniforms, and horses can be largely augmented is very obvious, but with it a higher *morale* is gained. Men on a lower rate than 30 rupees are forced into pecuniary transactions, which though questionable, cannot be checked without harshness, if not injustice, whereas on the higher salary a commandant can forbid such at once. This principle has been long ago recognised by Government with regard to subordinates in the civil offices ; it is equally applicable to the irregular trooper.

"13. A better class of men are obtainable at the rate of a rupee a day, which makes it worth the while of the yeomen or zemindars to take service, and appoint their kinsmen agents for their property or farms. By recruiting from this class another very important interest is attached to the Government, and a firmer union created between it and the governed.

"14. As an officer of the Madras army I have ever been opposed to caste prejudices, and care not what a man be, so that he is good of his kind, for there is no doubt that the most respectable of each class make the best soldiers, whilst the disreputable make the worst, and though with these we shall, please God, have no more mutiny, yet the knowledge that the spirit still existed, would be very hateful.

"15. Even 30 rupees is often insufficient for the irregular horsemen in the service, for on the Sindh horse going to Persia, with their transit expenses paid ; their pay was raised temporarily to 35 rupees, and the same sum granted to the Hyderabad contingent cavalry during their present campaign in Central India. I know that these latter could not support themselves and horses, though many were drawing the old Nizam's cavalry rate of 36 rupees, plus 5 rupees, making 41 rupees, with food and forage at war prices (as they will always be on service), so if it was necessary to grant 35 rupees in these cases, surely no further proof is wanting of 25 rupees being insufficient.

"16. I submit, however, the average expenses of men in the Hyderabad and Gwalior contingents, the correctness of which I can vouch for :—

	Hyderabad Cavalry.	Gwalior Cavalry.
<i>First Outlay for a Sillar.</i>		
Price of a horse - - - -	Rs. an. 400 0	Rs. an. 250 0
Uniform and accoutrements - - - -	60 0	40 0
Arms - - - - -	50 0	47 0
Tattoo - - - - -	20 0	20 0
House - - - - -	30 0	30 0
Total - - - - -	560 0	387 0
<i>Monthly Expenses.</i>		
Grain and forage for horse and tattoo	10 0	9 0
Sya 4. and other servants 2. - - - -	6 0	5 0
Fund - - - - -	2 0	2 0
Food and clothing - - - - -	7 0	6 0
Interest on original outlay - - - -	5 0	3 12
Total - - - - -	30 0	25 12

"These monthly expenses may be reduced 4 or 5 rupees a month by great parsimony, to enable the debtor to pay off the money borrowed. He may possibly raise half the sum amongst his relations, and then it will take either man four years and more, if he is unfortunate, to clear himself of a necessary debt. The expense of renewing horses and accoutrements is not included in the above.

"17. The only men who can profit by the service are those with money or property, and here is another reason for men of this stamp being sought for, as with debt comes inefficiency.

"18. The Governor-General may be induced to extend the rupees 30 rate to the levies I am now raising, on the same plea that this sum was originally granted to the Nizam's cavalry and Sindh horse, viz., the distance of the men from their own homes; as they will have to come from the Punjab, Rohilkund, the south-east border of Bikaner, and the western parts of Rajpootana, the good men of which can only be tempted away by the higher rate, and also from the consideration that, as the cavalry in Central India will always be amongst native states more or less disorganized, and have to keep the surrounding districts under control, a superior and more effective body of cavalry for military purposes, such as the Sindh horse, or Hyderabad contingent cavalry, is absolutely necessary for operations and unvarying success.

"19. The rupees 25, "shurra," is sufficient for men who are in the midst of their own homes, as in the North-West provinces (where the duties will soon become those of mere routine) and the Punjab, where commerce flourishes, grain abounds, and the horse market is well filled; but here in Central India, we are deprived of all these advantages, and need some compensation.

"20. I earnestly beg, that if the Supreme Government are willing to grant the rupees 30, it may be notified to me at once, as the fact will make a great difference with the "materiel" of the new levies, which, when once entertained, takes many years to eradicate.

"21. Still, at the same time, should it be out of the power of Government to accede to it, the Governor-General may depend upon my using my best efforts to carry out his wishes, both in the letter and the spirit, and raise the most efficient force that can be produced at the rate he orders.

"H. O. MAYNE, Capt.,
"Commanding Mayne's Horse."

EXTRACT OF MINUTE.

"Goonah, March 17, 1858.

"10. With regard to the rate of pay for the men, I have already fully entered into the advisability of granting the rupees 30 "shurra," in my communication, as per margin No. 53, February 25, 1858. A rupee a day to arm, equip, and support a trooper and his horse, is certainly not an overcharge.

"A European dragoon costs 95 rupees a month, whilst our regular cavalry men cost 75 rupees each, including all expenses, the Government doing the work themselves at the least possible cost. Surely a contract then, taken at less than one-third of the first, and equal to two-fifths of the latter, must be considered the reverse of overpaid.

"11. It will be seen that in the corps thus constituted paid establishments, such as lascars, bheesties, native farriers, &c., whose services the men benefited by, are done away with, as also are the expenses of regimental native staff, and allowances for match and repair of arms, the increased rate being in lieu of these, and including all extra expenses.

"12. If the Government will grant rupees 30 shurra, the batta question is entirely done away with, for the men neither expect batta, or is it desirable to give it them. Enlisted for general service, on this rate they will go willingly anywhere, without fear of being ruined by debt from going on service."

Also because as the same rate of pay rs. 25 is now granted to mounted police, as well as to irregular cavalry. The latter, which Government intend to be the superior arm of the two, will rapidly become the inferior. The services of the mounted police are confined to local districts, where they have the opportunity of establishing homes. They have to find less expensive horses, uniform, arms, and accoutrements than those required for irregular horse. Their drill and discipline being less perfected, they gain that "aram" so precious to every native; they are also less liable to be called upon to engage in prolonged warfare, from all of which causes, the mounted police is becoming the favourite service. Hence, before many years, unless the pay of irregular horse is augmented, they must be content with the refuse of the recruiting districts, whilst the police have the pickings.

32. What is the system of the Bengal irregular cavalry with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee?

Replied to in Minute affixed to No. 31.

Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold?

Ditto, ditto. No restrictions exist in the irregular cavalry, and any new levies of horse modelled thereon.

Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests or not?

I do; and they are the only temptation the yeomen and landed proprietors possess to enter our service.

Are they favorable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?

Assuredly they are, for reasons given in Minute affixed to No. 31.

33. What is the pay of mounted police in Central India, or of Scindia's and Holkar's horse?

Central India, from 15 to 20 small rupees generally. Sindhia's State, rupees 20; Holkar's State, rupees 18.

No reply required to Nos. 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38.

H. O. MAYNE, Capt.,
Commanding Mayne's Horse

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army been increased or diminished?

Diminished, greatly to the detriment of the corps. It is an old saying, that a commandant of irregular horse should be a king; but the Government should not hesitate to depose him, if he systematically mismanages his kingdom, or is guilty of some glaring errors.

No reply required to No. 2.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army; of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

One result of the decrease of the powers of commandants is, that the men do not look to them as supreme, and, consequently, lost largely in respect for them; and the men getting "out of hand," was one of many minor causes of the mutiny?

No reply required to No. 4.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps; upon the distant authority of head-quarters, or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

Hitherto it has often depended upon the undue interference of various authorities at a distance; but I have no hesitation in asserting, and could prove

Captain
H. O. Mayne.
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Captain
H. O. Mayne.

from many cases, which I have carefully watched for years, that the discipline or disorder, the weal or woe of any regiment, European or native, regular or irregular, depends mainly on the moral influence, the tact, the example, the energy, the activity, the disuse of red tape, and the manly qualities possessed or wanting in a commanding officer. I have known corps highly improved or greatly deteriorated in a year by good and worthless commandants.

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished?

The powers of all grades in the army should be increased to an extent which would entitle full responsibility being taken from each grade for the amount of the charge under it. Thus, the commanding officer having full power in his regiment should not concern himself with the command of companies or troops; he should give discretion and confidence to their captains, and if they misuse either, he should correct them, and when anything goes wrong hold them responsible. The captains should exact the same amount of responsibility from their non-commissioned officers, holding each one responsible for his squadron and all that goes on in it.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

There are many measures which our best soldiers consider might be carried out, but want of space, and being on active field service taking up all my leisure, I have not the opportunity of replying as fully as I could wish. The careful selection of commandants with peculiar fitness for irregular horse, giving them full power and the choice of their European officers, will generally secure perfect discipline, and rarely fail to produce good.

No replies required to Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

All should first be taught their cavalry duties and discipline with European cavalry corps. Selections of the most careful kind should then be made of officers possessing the peculiar aptitudes for irregular horse. Such were made in former days (see the old lists of irregular commandants). These peculiar aptitudes are a willingness to mix with and make friends with the natives, an iron will, an

admirable temper, a love and excellence in horsemanship, hunting, and manly sports, a natural aversion to intrigue and party spirit, (a "lawyer" makes the worst commanding officer, and will ruin a corps in six months by raising questions,) a constitution capable of standing sun and exposure, an intimate knowledge of the habits and customs of natives, and the faculty of being able to turn these to use, and great proficiency in the language, especially in the colloquial. The list is long; but many of these qualities generally exist in one individual.

No reply required to No. 14.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?

I think the corps with few officers have generally shown a better spirit towards them; though "there are the saddest instances to the contrary."

No reply required to No. 16.

No replies required to Nos. 17 and 18.

No replies required to Nos. 19 and 20.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

It would fail in practice, and is on this and other grounds very unadvisable. The idea sprang up for a short period in India at the end of 1857, when men were mistrusting their own strength, but it has since rapidly died away.

22. If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

Replied to in No. 21.

I beg to apologise for the imperfect replies to many of the above questions; but they reached me at a time when we were on active field service, and the greater part of the day spent in the saddle, so that there was no leisure for aught save the regimental work, and raising of my new levies.

H. O. MAYNE, Captain,
Commanding Mayne's Horse.

No. 27.

PAPERS RECEIVED FROM MAJOR WILLIAMS, SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES.

Maj. Williams.

1. What are the races, tribes, or castes of which the native infantry of the Bengal army is composed?

1. This question can be answered accurately from returns. But it may be said generally, the native infantry has been mainly composed of Brahmins and Rajpoots.

2. What districts are the several races, tribes, and castes drawn from?

2. Principally from Oudh and Behar.

3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from enlistment, either by the regulations or the practice of the Bengal army?

3. Sikhs have been latterly admitted and there have always been about 10 per cent Mahomedans, but it may be said that all other tribes have been excluded to a great extent practically, for the men enlisted from other tribes and castes amounted to a comparatively small per-centage; all that are called low caste have

been practically excluded, as have been East Indians, Christians, Jews, Arabs, Punjabees, Vellaites.

4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes, hitherto rejected or excluded from the field of entertainment, from whom recruits might with advantage be drawn for the native infantry of the Bengal army?

4. Those hitherto neglected form the army raised since the mutiny, Sikhs have now been enlisted to the full extent desirable. Ditto, Punjabees of all sorts, and Vellaities since the mutiny. All procurable Goorkhas have been enlisted. East Indians and Christians should be sought for, and those of all classes who have shown loyalty and taken the side of good order during the rebellion.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits in the district of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?

5. Can be best answered from office returns.

6. On the enlistment of recruits, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?
6. Ditto, but I may observe that recruits entered in the rolls received from regiments were very often not traceable by the local authorities.
7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of sepoys or the followers of regiments, what precautions, if any, are taken?
7. Ditto.
8. What alteration should be made in existing recruiting regulations and practice, relatively to races, tribes, or castes (with a view to improve the future composition of the infantry of the native troops) in the Bengal army?
8. The particular race, tribe, or caste to be enlisted should be prescribed and the recruiting officers should be made to obtain from the proper local authorities unquestionable and satisfactory recognition of each recruit, acknowledgment of him by his neighbours and the head men of his village, and satisfactory certificates of his loyalty and general good conduct.
9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the native infantry of the Bengal army?
9. Not applicable.
10. How long has this form been in use in the Bengal army?
10. Ditto.
11. Can you suggest any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruits of the native infantry of the Bengal army?
11. In the case of Hindoos, the oath on Ganges water and salt has prevented men, who had their muskets loaded and cocked, presented at the heads of European officers, firing when reminded of the oath, and this, perhaps, most binding one, should be adopted if it is thought advisable to administer an oath at all.
12. Are there any races, tribes, or castes in the Bengal presidency of seafaring habits, and could marine corps be formed from such races, tribes, or castes?
12. For a seagoing marine corps none up country, unless picked men of the sweeper caste were taken, because they will eat any kind of food.
13. Has the Bengal presidency any marine corps; and if so, of what strength and whence recruited?
13. Not applicable.
14. Should each infantry corps be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there, and there only?
14. No.
15. Or should each corps be recruited over a wide area; in fact, without reference to districts?
15. Without reference to districts.
16. Should each corps be homogeneous as to race, tribe, and caste?
16. Certainly homogeneous.
17. If a corps is not homogeneous, will it be desirable that the companies of which it is composed should be, as far as may be possible, homogeneous, each company consisting of men of one tribe or caste, or should the tribes and castes be mixed up in each company?
17. The tribes and castes should certainly not be mixed up in each company. If homogeneous corps are not adopted, and the proportions pointed out in Answer 18 is not allowed, the companies should be homogeneous.
18. If corps are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportion should the races, tribes, or castes be entertained?
18. If it is decided that corps are not to be homogeneous, each should be composed of three different races, tribes, or castes in equal proportions in homogeneous companies. In my opinion the proper composition of corps would be entirely homogeneous, with a spirit of rivalry and almost antagonism between one corps and another, and the native army and the common people.
19. If separate corps are to be maintained for military and police purposes, should the recruiting for both be allowed in the same district or kept to separate districts, or should police corps be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts?
19. Police corps must be recruited from a wide area without reference to districts.
20. Would you regard police corps as nurseries from which men might be drawn for the army corps?
20. Men getting 7 rupees a month, as the military police, would very seldom take service in army corps.
21. What agency should be employed for recruiting in the districts of the Bengal presidency or its dependencies?
21. Officers like to raise their own men, and should be allowed to do so, provided strict injunctions on the requisite points are laid down. But the officer, whoever it may be, and it should be a military officer, should work in the locality from which he is drawing men, and be in unreserved communication with the local authorities.
22. Would you employ the same kind of agency for recruiting for police corps as a district agency?
22. The officers of police corps would raise their own men in the North-West, and they might be employed for raising men for Bengal.
23. What precautions should be taken before local authorities, or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the army of the Bengal presidency?
- Vide* answer to Question 8.
24. Should similar or different precautions be taken in connexion with recruits for police corps in the Bengal presidency?
24. Similar.
25. Will it be expedient to enlist natives of other tropical countries, equally qualified for service in India with the natives of the country; and if so, should they be formed in separate regiments or in companies, or otherwise?
25. With the exception of the Mahomedan races, of whom we shall always have too many, certainly as far as possible, if they can be got at anything like the pay of the Hindoostanee soldiers, not if they would cost nearly as much as Europeans. They should be in separate regiments.
26. If recourse be had to recruiting in other tropical countries, which are the countries and races to be preferred?
26. It is impossible to answer this, without making inquiries as to what races would enlist.
27. What would be the best agency to employ for such recruiting?
27. Military officials of government in those countries, or officers specially employed.
28. Should a company or companies of Europeans form a component part of native regiments?
28. No large body of armed natives of any sort should be trusted anywhere, without sufficient Europeans to coerce them, and enforce discipline among them; the attachment of a company or companies of Europeans to form always a component part of a regiment, is the least desirable way of securing this.

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29. If so, should such company or companies be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from European corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief?

29. If the principle is adopted, the Europeans should be enlisted for the special purpose, or selected from European corps in India, and should be picked men. The system of integral portions of European corps, subject to periodical relief, would never bring about the good understanding between the Europeans and natives, which it would be desirable to secure.

30. Where should the barracks of such companies be placed, relatively to the lines of the native troops?

30. The barracks of the Europeans should be in the centre, in front of the huts of the men on the north side, between the huts and the bells of arms, with the magazine beyond all.

31. Would such detachments seriously complicate commissariat arrangements?

31. Such detachments could not really complicate the commissariat arrangements.

32. How should such companies be armed; with similar or different weapons from the native troops with whom they would be associated?

32. The Europeans should be armed with the most improved weapons, and every officer with a native corps with a revolver, which should be carried always.

33. How should the native infantry of the Bengal presidency be armed?

33. The native infantry should be armed with a common detonator musket and bayonet.

34. How should police corps in the Bengal presidency be armed?

34. With detonators, sapper and miner carbines, and sword bayonets.

35. Do the advantages of making the dress of the native soldier a close imitation of that of the European soldier counterbalance the disadvantages?

35. Certainly not.

36. How should the native infantry of the Bengal army be dressed, with a view to the comfort and efficiency of the native soldiers?

36. As the Sikh corps are now in the Punjab.

37. It has been proposed that to every European local regiment, a native irregular regiment, officered from that European regiment alone, should be attached. What is your opinion upon this proposed combination of an European and an auxiliary native regular or irregular corps of infantry, in close and permanent association?

37. The combination of an European and native corps is better, I think, than the attachment of companies to a native regiment; but the officers must be ment to permanently attached to the native corps.

38. Do you consider that the association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers presents any analogy with such an arrangement, and any encouragement to adopt it?

38. The association of European artillerymen with gun lascars and native drivers can hardly be said to present an analogy; but I should look upon the continuation of European and native troops as a necessary measure, and not seek analogies.

39. How would you dispose the barracks and lines of the two associated corps?

39. The European barracks on the north, native lines on the south.

40. Would such a system be favorable or the reverse to that vigilance which has become essential, and to the maintenance of that awe of the European troops which is an element of strength?

40. Vigilance must always be maintained under any system, the proper awe of European troops which has been inculcated by the fact that two companies of Europeans have beat a whole native brigade will remain; the awe which commenced the mutiny at Meerut, that is, the fear that the Europeans were going to annihilate the native regiments, would disappear.

41. How would such an arrangement dovetail with the requirements of the service in peace and war.

41. Admirably; the proper proportion of each arm or branch of the army and of each class, European and native, would always be employed or detached.

42. Is it desirable that the native troops should acquire a spirit of confidence and self-reliance, or be systematically trained to act in dependence upon European support, and which sentiment would be fostered by the system of auxiliary native battalions in permanent association with European corps?

42. The main object at present is to discover some means of having a native army with some confidence that it will not mutiny. The events of the last year have shown that without European support, 40,000 native troops can effect nothing against 10,000 Europeans. There remains now only by the enforcement of proper discipline and association with Europeans to make a useful native army.

F. WILLIAMS,
Commissioner.

NOTE.

October 4, 1858.

1st. The mode of securing an efficient combination of Europeans and natives cannot be fully discussed in the answer to Questions 28 and 37.

2nd. The mere attachment of one or two companies of Europeans, or of a whole corps, to each native regiment, by no means effects all that is requisite.

3rd. There would be the European force to coerce the natives. But the two bodies would be separate; the constant intercourse between the two, and the presence at all times of the Europeans among the natives in the lines, would be wanting. For maintenance of internal discipline and observation of the behaviour and temper of the men in the lines, we should be dependent on native officers, and they have signally failed.

4th. Native corps, with the full complement of European officers and irregular corps, have been found equally untrustworthy, and native troops cantoned at the same station with an equal number of Europeans have mutinied.

5th. The abundance or paucity of European commissioned officers, and even the presence of European troops in the immediate propinquity, or the total absence of them, appear not to have had the slightest effect.

6th. The causes which led to the mutiny were, under all circumstances, in silent operation in the huts of every native regiment. Emissaries were entertained, extensive correspondence was kept up, rumours were circulated, grievances magnified, and mutiny matured in the lines, without the slightest check or hindrance on the part of the native officers.

7th. In the native cantonment of Meerut, where the mutiny commenced, the consciousness of guilt led to the ready belief of the report that the Europeans were coming to seize the magazines. And until European surveillance in the lines is secured the same may happen again, whether there are three officers or three-and-twenty, whether there are two companies of Europeans or a whole corps at hand.

8th. Even if the dread of the European force prevented mutiny, there would be no grounds for confidence, and much fear of mutual suspicion and antagonism, which would destroy the efficiency of the army.

9th. The disbanded regiments, though surrounded with Europeans and Sikh sentries, have been hotbeds of unreported sedition.

10th. The real remedy appears to be to abolish the worse than useless native officers, and substitute Europeans, who would be in constant communication with the men, granting to the native soldiers, in lieu of promotion to the non-commissioned grades, good conduct marks, carrying enhanced rates of pay and pensions.

11th. The number of Europeans might be increased without any extra cost, by reducing the number of natives, as shown in the following proposal for a native regiment :—

EUROPEANS.		NATIVES.
1 colonel	8 captains.	64 havildars.
1 lieutenant-colonel.	8 lieutenants.	64 naiks.
1 major.	8 sub-officers.	800 privates, in 8
1 adjutant.	8 serj.-majors.	companies of 100
1 interpreter and quartermaster.	8 serjeants.	each.
1 surgeon.	16 1st corporals	
1 regimental or staff serj.-maj.	16 2nd or lance do.	
1 do. quartermaster-serjeant.	20 Christian drummers.	
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
8	92	928
Total Europeans and Christians		100
Total natives		928
Total of regiment		1,028

12th. The pay of the eight regimental officers would remain as at present ; two of the 11 lieutenants drawing as now the staff allowances of adjutant and quartermaster.

	INCREASE.	SAVING.
	Rs. an. p.	Rs. an. p.
There would be an extra captain	415 6 0	
One lieutenant saved	- - -	256 10 0
The sub-officers in place of ensigns, to be non-commissioned officers promoted, and drawing 100rs. a month each, then in lieu of 5 ensigns at— 202rs. 12s. 5p = 1,013 14 1		
There would be 8 sub-officers at 100 each } 800 0 0		
Saving	- 213 14 1	213 14 1
8 serjeant majors at 45=360 rs.		
8 serjeants at 40=320 rs.		
Total	- 680 rs.	
Instead of,		
10 subadars - at 67=670		
10 jemadars - at 24=240		
Total	910	230 0 0
<i>New Class.</i>		
16 1st corporals at 35=560	- 560 0 0	
16 2nd ditto at 30=480	- 480 0 0	
4 new havildars at 14 -	- 56 0 0	
4 ditto naiks at 10 -	- 40 0 0	
800 privates instead of 1,000	- - -	- 1,400 0 0
Total	1,551 6 0	2,100 8 1
		1,551 6 0
		549 2 1

Ensigns should be posted on arrival to the European regiments, and when they have learnt something of their duty and of the country and language, passed by promotion into the native corps.

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13th. A considerable margin is left for enhancing the pay of serjeant-majors, serjeants, and corporals, which may have been put too low, and for good service extra pay to men.

14th. A regiment so constituted should be much more efficient than one on the old system.

15th. With as many Europeans in each company as there are now sometimes in a whole regiment, it should be more formidable in war, and much less so in cantonments, than one of the old native infantry corps.

16th. With such a number of Europeans to enforce discipline, and for the loyal native soldiers to rally round, there would be no mutiny, and if the native regiments that remained to be raised were so organized, there would be less fear in India of a native army than there is now.

17th. But even if the idea were thought worthy of adoption, it could only be carried prospectively in corps remaining to be reorganized or raised.

18th. It could not well be introduced in the native regiments, that have been fighting for us since the mutiny. For them other arrangements must be made.

19th. The gallant little Goorkhas of the Sirmoor and Kumaon battalions, who fought at Delhi, and the 66th who stood staunch at Nynce Tal, should be left on their present footing. To the Nusseree battahon, and to all Sikh corps, two companies of Europeans should be added.

20th. All native regiments of all sorts should be brigaded with European troops, each brigade being complete in each branch, artillery, cavalry, and infantry ; the artillery being always entirely European; the cavalry, part European and part native. Such corps of the latter as have been raised since the mutiny being retained on their present footing ; any raised hereafter to be irregular cavalry, with—

Commandant.
2nd in command.
Adjutant.

And in each troop—

1 lieutenant,
1 sub-officer,
1 serjeant-major,
1 serjeant,
2 corporals,
2nd corporals,

instead of the higher ranks of native officials.

21st. Fortified places should be held entirely by Europeans.

22nd. All the civil duties, such as guarding and escorting treasure, guarding gaols, &c., should be taken by the police battalions, but even with these a sufficient number of Europeans should be employed. Ample funds are forthcoming, if the responsibility of village communities for crimes committed in their neighbourhood, the perpetrators of which they do not produce, is enforced, and the immense and universally condemned establishment of village watchmen is entirely abolished.

23rd. If Europeans were thus proportioned in the army, and added to the police battalions, and Bengallee baboos were more employed as clerks in offices, and the present class of clerks as mofussil, revenue, and police officers ; if colonization of European capitalists were encouraged ; and all Christian non-military residents

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— of all stations, from the highest to the lowest, were obliged by a simpler law than that lately enacted, to train constantly, and be ready to act always as yeomanry cavalry or militia infantry, according to their means, and the native population is thoroughly, not nominally, disarmed; there will not be another rebellion.

24th. There is one other point which does not appear to be proposed for consideration in the heads of inquiry specified by the Court of Directors, which is worthy of adoption, that is, the employment of the native infantry as sappers and miners on military works, fortifications, barracks, roads, &c., &c.


25th. The native soldier, instead of being allowed to turn up his nose at the bare idea of labor, infinitely less derogatory than the low toil he readily undertakes for himself at home, should be fully employed: the time now wasted in cooking, eating, and concocting mutiny and revolt, should be devoted to making him perfect in the art of applying his labor.

26th. Were this done the mass of the native troops would be effectually kept out of mischief; the British Indian army would cease to be the only one which does not strengthen its positions by entrenchments, and Government would have for half the hire of common coolies* the services of fifty, sixty, or seventy thousand skilled laborers to reduce the heavy expenditure for public works.

27th. I await the receipt of the questions on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th heads of the general classification to give mean opportunity of submitting my opinion on the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th heads of inquiry.

* That is supposing such a high rate of working batta, the only batta that ever should be allowed, as 2 rs. per mensem were given to the men while so employed.

28th. There should be no more huts in the lines, but open barracks, each to hold a company, so that European officers could look after the men, and the men could not entertain propagators of sedition. They should be arranged so:—



F. WILLIAMS,
Commissioner.

No. 28.

Brig. Christie.
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PAPERS RECEIVED FROM BRIGADIER CHRISTIE.

CAVALRY.

I.—THE RECRUITING AND COMPOSITION OF CORPS.

1. What are the races, tribes, and castes of which the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army is composed?
 1. Shaiks, Syeds, Moguls, Pathans, Rangurs, (Rajpoot Mussulmans) Rohillas, Jats, Affghans, Rajpoots, Brahmins, and Seikhs a few.
 2. What districts are the several races, tribes, or castes drawn from?
 2. Hiansie, Hissar, Delhi, Boohundshur, Meerut, Moradabad, Kurnaul, Bareilly, Agra, Bhurtapore, Furruckabad, Mynpoorie, Shajehanpore, Puttealla, Loodianna, and a few from about Jullundur and Hoshayarpore, and Cawnpore and Lucknow, but only in a few regiments.
 3. Have any races, tribes, or castes been excluded from the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army either by the regulations or the practice of the
 3. No; excepting very low caste men, who never ask to be entertained.
 4. Are there any races, tribes, or castes hitherto neglected or excluded, from whom recruits might with advantage be enlisted for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?
 4. It would be an advantage to a regiment to have men from Rajpootana Proper, Bekaneer, and Shekwatie, and also Mahrattas; but these men would not take service heretofore as the pay was so very small, and, consequently, preferred the native service, as there they have plenty of pickings besides their pay.

5. What agency is employed for the enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

5. None. The Omichwars come in numbers to their relations in the regiment, and as vacancies occur are taken in.

6. On enlistment of recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, what precautions of registry and other forms are observed before the local authorities of districts?

6. None.

7. When recruits are enlisted in cantonments, or taken from the families of troopers or the followers of cavalry corps, what precautions, if any, are taken?

7. In my late regiment—the 9th irregular cavalry—I always made a recruit furnish two men in the regiment to stand security for his respectability and good conduct, before I entertained him.

8. What alterations should be made in your recruiting regulations and practice relatively to races, tribes, or castes, with a view to improve the future composition of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

8. An increase of pay and pension will bring a superior class of men into the ranks. As it is, a man of good family must be very poor before he takes service on 7 rupees a month, which is all a bargeer gets. On the other hand, if he has got 200 or 300 rupees, he finds it more profitable to trade with it than purchasing an assamee in a regiment of irregular cavalry, which are in most regiments sold for 300 or even 400 rupees each.

9. What are the words of the oath administered to the recruit on his entering the ranks of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?
9. I do not remember.
10. How long has this form been in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?
10. The form was only introduced since 1856, after I had left the irregular cavalry.
11. Can you recommend any improvement in the wording or matter of the oath administered to the recruit of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army when first enrolled ?
11. Not having seen the oath, I cannot form an opinion.
12. Should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be raised each in a prescribed district, and be recruited there and there only ?
12. No ; a mixture is good.
13. Or should the irregular cavalry corps of the Bengal army be recruited over a wide area ; in fact, without reference to districts ?
13. Yes ; without reference to districts.
14. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be homogeneous as to race or caste ?
14. No.
15. Should the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be composed of *ressalabs*, each of which shall consist of separate tribes or castes, or should the tribes or castes be mixed up together in the whole corps ?
15. *Ressalabs* of different tribes would be desirable, as you can always pit the one against the other in case of a row.
16. If the corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army are not homogeneous, but composite, in what proportions should the races, tribes, or castes enter ?
16. Equal, as near as they can be procured, but Mussulmans will always preponderate.
17. What agency should be employed for recruiting ?
17. The commanding officer alone.
18. What precautions should be taken before the local authorities or through their instrumentality, in connexion with recruits for the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?
18. Every man entertained ought to be registered by the local authorities in the district from whence he comes, and security taken from the head man of the village, if possible.
19. Should a troop or squadron of Europeans form a component part of the irregular corps of cavalry of the Bengal army ?
19. I do not consider this necessary.
20. If so, should such troops or squadrons be enlisted for this special purpose, or be composed of men selected from the European cavalry corps serving in India, or be integral portions of European corps, and subject to periodical relief ?
20. If it should be considered necessary, I would enlist specially for this purpose.
21. How should the barracks and stables of such isolated European troops or squadrons be placed ?
21. In rear of the regiment, and in front of the European officers' quarters.
22. Would such detachments of Europeans seriously complicate commissariat arrangements ?
22. Most certainly. Besides, in my opinion, a regiment of irregular cavalry ought to be able to move at an hour's notice, and this they could not do if they had to get commissariat stores, &c.

23. How should such troops or squadrons of Europeans be armed ; with similar or with different weapons from those in the hands of native troopers with whom they would be associated ?
23. With sabres and carbines, the same as the native troopers.
24. How should the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army be armed.
24. With tulwars and carbines.
- No reply required to No. 25.
26. Do the existing dress and equipments admit of improvement ? If so, state in what respects.
26. No ; I consider the dress and equipments of my old regiment—the 9th irregular cavalry—perfect, and I believe all the old regiments are dressed much the same. In some regiments of irregular cavalry the dress of the European officers is far too flash and expensive. I would recommend their being restricted to a plain, soldier-like uniform, and as like their men as possible.

J. CHRISTIE, Brigadier,
Commanding Dinapore Division.

II.—RULES OF DISCIPLINE AND MILITARY CODE.

1. Can you suggest improvements in the articles of war now in use in the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army ?
1. Since the irregular cavalry have been subjected to the articles of war, they have deteriorated very much. I would most earnestly recommend that the old *punchayet* system be re-introduced, which was invariably found to answer so well.
2. Should the special rules regulating punishment in the native army be retained, or should they be assimilated to the rules which obtain in the British army ?
2. I would have nothing to say to the special rules regulating punishment in the *regular* native army, or in the British army either.
3. Does the system of native courts-martial work satisfactorily in the irregular cavalry of the Bombay army ?
3. Most certainly not. I recommend they should be abolished in the irregular cavalry, and trial by *punchayet* introduced again.
4. What means are adopted to acquaint the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry with the military code under which they serve and are governed ?
4. In my regiment I had the old articles of war read which concerned the men, once a quarter.
5. What proportion of the troopers of the Bengal irregular cavalry can read and comprehend the articles of war in their own vernacular ?
5. Very few indeed can read, but all understand them when read and explained to them.

J. CHRISTIE, Brigadier,
Commanding Dinapore Division.

III.—ORGANIZATION, PROMOTION, AND REWARDS.

1. In the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army what is the system of promotion ; is it based on merit alone, on seniority alone, or on merit and seniority combined ?
1. Merit ; but if both seniority and merit are combined, of course the latter.
2. Are the native commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army generally intelligent, useful, and efficient ?
2. Yes, if they are promoted as above, and it is the commanding officer's own fault if any but efficient commissioned and non-commissioned officers are pro-

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moted. No man should be promoted to the grade of kote duffadar, who is not fit to be promoted to a commissioned officer eventually.

3. Are their acquirements usually of a higher grade than those of the troopers from among whom they have risen?

4. Is there any test or examination prior to promotion to a commissioned grade? or on promotion from one commissioned grade to another?

4. I never had any, having been intimately acquainted with the qualifications of all my officers and non-commissioned officers.

No reply required to No. 5.

6. Has it been found on occasions of mutiny that the native officers have evinced cordial fidelity, given timely information, or been useful in aiding their European officers to check or quell mutiny? Have the native officers sided with the mutineers, or with the European officers?

6. As a rule, certainly in the late mutiny the native officers have not evinced that fidelity which might have been expected from them, nor have they given any information or aided in quelling the mutiny; and as many, if not more, have gone with the mutineers as have remained faithful.

No replies required to Nos. 7, 8, and 9.

10. Have retiring pensions proved effectual in attaching the native trooper to the British service and the British rule?

10. In former days I thought they had, but from the day of the outbreak they cast all retiring pensions to the winds, as well as honors conferred for distinguished conduct in the field. For the time they were perfectly demented, but I believe they bitterly repent it now.

11. Should the system of pensions as now in force by regulation be maintained or modified, or prospectively abolished?

11. After the reorganization of the irregular cavalry, I would recommend the system of pension should be retained; moreover, that the pensions of irregular cavalry should be increased to the same scale as the regular regiments, because they are no longer locals, but liable to move from station to station the same as the regular troops, and employed in all warlike operations to a great extent. Moreover it is a notorious fact, that they are far harder worked than the regular troops, and yet a naick in the latter gets the same pension as a jemadar in the irregular cavalry, viz., 7 rupees per mensem.

12. What is the charge upon the finances of the State on account of military pensions to the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

12. I have no means of answering this question.

13. Should the system of promotion generally by seniority to the grades of native commissioned officers (if these are retained) be altered, and promotion for merit and efficiency be the rule?

13. Promotion for merit and efficiency should be the rule decidedly.

14. Are native commissioned officers generally fit to take part in the conduct of courts-martial?

14. Perfectly efficient on *punchayets*, which I strongly recommend should be re-introduced. Not so on courts-martial.

No replies required to Nos. 15 and 16.

17. Should any alteration be made in the mode officering the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?

17. I consider, as only three officers are allowed to regiments of irregular cavalry, they ought to be the best procurable in the army, and selected with great

care, for everything depends on them. They ought to be superior horsemen, with great dash, and well up to their work in every respect.

18. Among the classes which enter the regular and irregular cavalry of the Bengal army, which is the most popular, the regular or the irregular, and what reasons are assigned by the natives for the preference?

18. Decidedly the irregulars, as it is considered more honorable to ride one's own horse, and are altogether a more respectable class of men than those that enter the regular regiments, small zemindars, &c. Although the regulars are better paid, still the men who generally compose the irregular cavalry will not take service in the regular cavalry, disliking the constant parades, stable duty morning and evening, &c. I made a point of never interfering with the men with regard to their horses, provided they were in good condition, and up to any amount of work.

No reply required to Nos. 19 and 20.

21. Under the supposition that irregular cavalry should be the only native cavalry in the Bengal army, should part be mounted by Government, or the whole placed on the usual footing of irregular cavalry in this respect?

21. All the native cavalry should be irregular, and ride their own horses. Government mounting them would be much more expensive. Moreover, particularly on detached duties, the horses would not have that care taken of them as if they were the men's own property. They would be nothing more than a corps of bargeers, and consequently lose that self-respect which they at present possess.

22. What is the average cost to Government of the horses on which the troopers of the regular native cavalry of the Bengal army were mounted?

22. I have heard it affirmed that the horses supplied from the Government studs do not stand Government less than 800 rs. a head, taking into consideration price of buildings, stud officers, importation of stallions from England, interest of money, &c. I have no means of ascertaining the price of foreign horses imported by Government from the Cape and New South Wales lately.

23. Whence are the horses obtained, and of what breeds are they?

23. From the Government studs, Cape of Good Hope, and New South Wales, and a few from Afghanistan. With exception of the latter, they are bred from English and Arab stock.

24. Whence does the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency draw its horses?

24. From all parts of Hindostan and Afghanistan, and from the rejected colts and fillies at the Government studs. I would recommend that all the latter description of cattle should be offered, in the first instance, to regiments of irregular cavalry, previous to being disposed of to other parties by the Government stud officers, or sent to Calcutta for sale. I have purchased many horses of this description from the Hauper stud, which turned out particularly well.

25. What is the average cost of the horses of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal presidency?

25. A good irregular cavalry horse is not to be had under 200 rs., but many are admitted at a lower figure, say 150 rs.

26. Are the requirements of the mounted branch of the Bengal army adequately met by the system pursued for obtaining horses?

26. I believe they were adequately met from the Government studs up to the time of the mutiny. Since then, foreign horses have been imported to a great extent from the Cape and New South Wales, and I myself purchased a large number in Calcutta for Her Majesty's dragoons and royal artillery in September last.

27. Can you suggest any improvement in the system of obtaining horses for the European cavalry and artillery of the army of the Bengal presidency?
27. I would recommend that the natives of this country should be again encouraged to breed horses, as was the case in former days. When I entered the service, and for years afterwards, we were principally mounted from this source, and got excellent horses for the cavalry for 400 rs., and 450 rs. for cavalry and dragoons. I would also strongly recommend that much more care should be taken at the Government studs in the selection of mares for breeding purposes. This is the principal thing to be looked to to insure good stock, and I am sorry to add it has been little attended to in the breeding districts, the merest Tattoo mares being given in many instances to the Government stallions, in short any brute the natives choose to bring to the naulbund in charge of the horse in the district. At the yearly purchasing of colts by the stud officers, I would also suggest that more care should be taken in the selection, and that quality more than quantity should be more attended to than I have reason to believe has been the case for many years past. I would here also strongly urge, that in selecting officers for employment in the studs, the greatest care should be taken that none who are not in every respect fit for the situation, from their knowledge of horses, &c., shall be appointed. To my knowledge the very reverse has been the case in more instances than one.
28. Is it advisable that the Government studs should be maintained, or should they be abolished, and government rely on the markets of India, of foreign countries, and of British colonies, for a supply of horses for the army of India?
28. Government studs should be maintained, for in the event of war foreign horses might not be obtainable.
29. What is the pay of the troopers of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army?
29. Twenty rupees per mensem.
30. Has that pay proved sufficient to enable a corps to be well mounted and equipped, and thoroughly efficient in the field during a protracted campaign?
30. No, certainly not; it has been most inadequate.
- 30 b. Have corps of irregular cavalry of the Bengal army been embarrassed by debt, or free from debt?
- 30 b. Very much so; generally deeply indebted to the regimental banker.
31. Should any alteration be made in the pay of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army?
31. Decidedly; and I would recommend the following scale:—I consider the resaldars and resaidars are sufficiently paid; that the naik resaldars be raised to 55 rupees per mensem; jemadars to 50 rupees; kote duffadars to 40 rupees; duffadars to 35 rupees; trumpeters and nugarchies to 30 rupees; and sowars 27 rupees.
32. What is the system of the Bengal irregular cavalry with respect to assamees, and the market value of the assamee? Are there restrictions upon the number which any native officer or capitalist of the corps may hold? Do you advocate the existence in corps of irregular horse of such large vested interests or not? Are they favourable to the maintenance of the efficiency of a corps in horses and in equipments, and to the conduct of duty?
32. The only persons who can hold assamees in the irregular cavalry regiments are the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers: resaldars and resaidars, 5 each; naik resaldars and jemadars, 2 each; kote duffadars and duffadars, 1 each. None beyond this is allowed. A man *not* in the regi-

ment cannot hold an assamee on any terms; should such, however, be discovered, the assamee is at once forfeited, and given to a deserving bargeer. I still advocate bargeers to the above extent being allowed, as they much add to the respectability of the commissioned and non-commissioned grades, and I have never found any bad effects from it under a commanding officer who is well up to his work.

Brig. Christie.

33. What is the pay of mounted police in the North-Western provinces?

33. I cannot answer this question as far as the North-West provinces are concerned, but the "Behar horse" in this district get rs. 25 per mensem.

No replies required to Nos. 34, 35, 36, 37.

38. Is the difference between the pay of horse police and that of irregular horse such as to ensure the latter the superior mounting essential for his peculiar service?

38. The only horse police corps that I am acquainted with is the "Behar horse" in this district. They draw rs. 5 more per mensem than our irregular cavalry, and yet they are not half so well mounted as the 9th irregular cavalry were when I kept it; but the "Behar horse" is a new corps, and allowances must be made; to say nothing of the great difficulty of procuring suitable horses at the present time

J. CHRISTIE, Brigadier,
Commanding Dinapore Division.

IV.—EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

1. Within your experience, have the powers of commandants of corps of irregular cavalry in the Bengal army been increased or diminished?

1. Most injuriously diminished.

No reply required to No. 2.

3. What has been the result upon the discipline of the irregular cavalry of the Bengal army of the increase or diminution of the powers and influence of commanding officers of corps?

3. In former days the men looked up to the commanding officers, and did everything in their power to please him; now matters are greatly changed, knowing that all power has been taken out of the hands of commanding officers.

No reply required to No. 4.

5. Upon what does the discipline of a corps upon service mainly depend, especially of a native corps; upon the distant authority of headquarters or upon the authority and influence of officers in charge of troops, and in command of corps of regular or irregular cavalry?

5. On the influence and authority of the officer commanding, whether it be a regular or irregular corps, and that of troop officers?

6. Should the powers of commanding officers and of troop officers be increased or diminished? Most decidedly increased.

7. What other measures can you suggest for the improvement of discipline?

7. As recommended in No. 6, increased power to commanding officers.

No replies required to Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

13. If a few European officers are assigned to native corps of cavalry, whether regular or irregular, how would you select and train them?

13. I would select indiscriminately from both cavalry and infantry, taking only those who were good horsemen and otherwise qualified for the mounted branch of the service. For regular cavalry I would

Brig. Christie.
attach them for a certain time to European dragoon regiments, or until they became thoroughly acquainted with their duties. The system in the irregular cavalry being so different I would post them at once to irregular cavalry corps, where under a good commanding officer they would soon be up to their work.

No reply required to No. 14.

15. Speaking from your own experience, has any difference been observable in the course of mutinies in the conduct of corps (whether regular or irregular cavalry) whose complement of European officers was short or full?

15. Not the least; in this wretched mutiny there was no difference. In either case they have equally fallen away from their allegiance.

No reply required to Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20.

21. Would it be practicable and advisable to attach to each European corps of cavalry a body of native irregular horse?

21. I think it would be quite practicable, and advisable too, to attach to each European regiment of cavalry a body of irregular cavalry.

22. If so, what proportion should the native body bear to the European dragoons of the corps? How should it be armed? How mounted? How officered?

22. One squadron of irregulars to each European regiment of cavalry, to be armed with tulwars and carbines, mounted on their own horses, and officered by selection from the cavalry and infantry indiscriminately.

J. CHRISTIE, Brigadier,
Commanding Dinapore Division.

Dinapore, July 30, 1858.

MINUTE BY THE HONORABLE H. RICKETTS.

*Hon.
H. Ricketts.*

A COPY of these papers was sent to me only on the 19th ultimo. On this occasion, I desire to express my opinion on a few questions of general interest connected with reorganization.

It appears to be admitted that for some years to come there must be 50,000 English infantry in the Bengal presidency, including the Punjab and Oude. I shall assume that 25,000 will be British troops, and 25,000 British Indian troops, to be officered by officers of the late Bengal army. Sir W. Mansfield estimates the regular native army necessary to co-operate with the Europeans at 68 regiments, comprising 40,600 men. I compute them at 56 regiments comprising 32,000.* It is said that the officers of native infantry corps will be required to officer the 25 corps of British infantry, and

*40 foot, at 640 - 25,600
16 mounted, at 400 - 6,400
32,000

that, on the supposition that one-fourth of the captains and one-sixth of the lieutenants will always be absent on furlough† or sick certificate, none of the officers of these corps should be taken away for staff duties of any sort. If this be so, there will remain

	Mounted.	Foot.
Punjab	7	10
Oude	5	15
N. W. Provinces	7	20
Bengal	2	10
	25*	55

Local Corps.	
Assam	- 2
Sylhet	- 1
Muneeepore	- 1
Pegu	- 2
Arracan	- 1
Calcutta	- 1
N. W. Provinces	8
	16

Supposing each of the 40 corps of regular infantry to have four officers, aggregating 160, there will remain

§ As it has been resolved to appoint uncovenanted officers to the Bengal Police, the number required will be 256 not 276.

440. If each of the police corps and local corps shall have three officers, the number for 92 corps will be 276, leaving 164 officers to fill 324 offices of the staff, and of civil employ. That is, the number will be short by 160, or supposing one-fifth of the whole 600 to be always absent on furlough and sick certificate, the number short will be 280. Supposing all on civil employ to be remanded to their corps, and their places filled with others, the number short will

|| This number will be 104 if the uncovenanted officer for the Bengal police corps answer.

still be 124.|| These might be provided by indenting on each of the 25 British corps and each of the

25 British Indian corps to the extent of between two and three of all ranks from each corps.

It is clear, then, that in order to provide a sufficiency of officers for the corps organized, either the military men in civil employ must be made use of, or they must be seconded in their corps.

There is no question, perhaps, on which opinions are more equally divided than on the question of the employment of military men on civil duties. In many respects it is advantageous to the army; in many respects it is injurious. It is advantageous because it brings to the army men of superior acquirements and education, who would not join the army if they had nothing before them but a life of regimental duty. It induces those who have joined the army to study and to make themselves acquainted with the languages of the country. It leads to emulation between them and the members of the civil service employed in the same manner, and consequently to increased efficiency in both classes. It gives the Government a larger choice of men for posts of peculiar responsibility, and therefore secures them being better filled than they could be were the choice confined to the civil service.

It is disadvantageous because it takes all the most able and the most active from regimental duty, leaving, generally speaking, the incapable and the drones. Sir Sidney Cotton writes:—"Let the army have its own, and the civil service of the country be otherwise provided for. The unsettled state at present of the officers of the army in India under the existing system is enough to ruin the finest army in the world, regimental officers, being from the commencement of their career taught as it were by contagion to look for pecuniary advantages, whether in civil or military life, have no *esprit de corps*, and escape from their men, the first moment they have the opportunity." Worse than this, those left behind feel neglected and are discontented; disliking their position, they dislike their men, and the consequence is, on the part of the men, distrust and aversion. The practice of bringing back staff officers to their corps when ordered on active service is regarded as unfair by the regimental officers, who are deprived of the opportunity of benefiting, if they have, by attention to discipline, promoted the probability of success, and it is otherwise injurious by bringing to places of trust and responsibility officers who, from having been long on civil employ, are totally unfit to perform the duty demanded from them as regimental officers on active service. Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the disadvantages of the existing system predominate, and I would not employ military officers on ordinary civil duties, though I would not exclude them from

* See in Orig.

all civil employ. For some political officers the choice of the Government should not be narrowed. There are some for which military officers must be better qualified than civilians, and I would not so change the system as to deprive the Government of the services in the civil department of such men as Sir H. Lawrence and Sir J. Outram. In the Bengal

- * Chief Commissioner in Oude.
- Secretary in Foreign Department.
- Agent to the Governor-General in Rajpootana.
- Resident at Nepal.
- Agent to Governor-General, Central India.
- Commissioner in Pegu.
- Political Agent in Meywar.
- Under-Secretary, Foreign Department.
- Agent for Hill tracts of 10, Orissa.
- Political Agent in Jeypoor.
- Ditto in Joudpoor.
- Ditto in Gwalior.
- Revenue Surveyor-General, Bengal.
- Superintendent of Neemuch.
- Ditto of Cachar.
- Ditto of Munnepoor.
- 1st Assistant, Rajpootana.
- Ditto, Central India.
- 21 Asst. Resident, Nepal.

presidency there are 20 offices,* which I would still leave open to the army. The remainder of the 156 offices I would, as vacancies shall occur, fill with civilians. To the officers now holding these situations I would give the option of returning to the army or of becoming a special uncovenanted body to be gradually absorbed. I would allow promotion in this body to go on as it would have gone on had no alteration been introduced; a vacant office being given to one of them or to a civilian as, consistent with their claims, might be most conducive to the public service. It would be necessary to make special arrangements respecting their pensions and retirement after due consideration of the advantages they would have enjoyed had they remained in the army. I do not think that allowing the 20 offices I have named to be open to the army will perpetuate the uneasiness and craving for civil employ which has operated so injuriously, while there will still be openings for the Lawrences and the Outrams of the service.

I would have two corps of cavalry and four corps of infantry officered entirely by East Indians and natives, as follows:—

For each corps of cavalry:—
 1 major - - - 500 per mensem.
 4 captains - - - 300 "
 4 lieutenants - - - 225 "
 4 ensigns - - - 150 "

For each corps of infantry:—
 1 major - - - 450 "
 8 captains - - - 250 "
 8 lieutenants - - - 175 "
 8 ensigns - - - 125 "

I would allow young East Indian and native gentlemen to enter these corps as ensigns, and I would give commissions in them to deserving men from the ranks. The objections to such native corps will be, encouragement given to a warlike spirit among our native subjects, especially the practice it would give them in command; the inefficiency of corps so commanded for any really difficult service. The advantages will be the hope of advancement held out to all the clever and ambitious men in the army, and the consequent increased attractions of the service, and the increased inducement to loyalty and fidelity, the cheapness of a regiment so officered compared with the cost of a corps officered with Europeans.

It is my belief that in the absence of any promotion beyond that of a subadarship, and the monopoly by Europeans of all offices of emolument and command, were among the many causes of the estrangement of the army. Clever and able native officers, of whom there must be a few, though certainly not many, chafed at finding escape from a position inferior to that of the boy ensign hopeless, and all the young and ambitious longed for something more attractive than a subadarship, procurable only when their strength was on the wane, and their time for stirring service had passed. I would at once make the regiment of Lucknow a native regiment, and promote the best of the subadars to be major of the corps. Our army has lately seen native colonels, brigadiers, and generals, and it is impossible that they should not, among themselves, con-

tinually talk over the grievance of being debarred from all participation in post of rank and consideration.

Hon.
H. Ricketts.

The success of the scheme as regards efficiency for arduous service must depend entirely on the selection of officers, and the care taken by the visiting general officers to ensure the requisite training and discipline. It is my belief that a native corps may be brought into a state of excellent discipline, and that conduct in the field will depend on their confidence in their own skill. Even if it were certain that real efficiency and fitness for arduous service never would be acquired, still I would have the native corps if only for the effect their existence must have on the rest of the army. I would always place these corps at large stations where they could be brigaded with European troops, and they should be subjected to monthly inspections, not on parade only, but the whole management should be carefully scrutinized, and all loose and irregular practices immediately checked.

Of course it would be necessary to provide that these native officers should habitually be treated with courtesy by the European officers with whom they may be brought in contact. As far as may be practicable, the employment of a native officer in command over a European officer should be avoided, but when circumstances bring them together, I would not interfere with the rules of the service.

Opinions differ so much as to enlisting low caste men, and also as to mixing men of different castes in regiments and companies, that I would practically test each of the plans, and be guided by the result; I would have,—

- 3 regiments exclusively Brahmins.
- 3 " " Rajpoots.
- 3 " " Mahomedans.
- 2 " " Sweepers.
- 3 " " other low castes, but above Sweepers.
- 6 Different castes, excepting the lowest castes, divided by companies.
- 20 Different castes, excepting the lowest mixed.

Such an arrangement would, I think, give rise to much emulation. If, after a time, one plan should prove itself to be preferable to the others, it may be gradually adopted throughout.

H. RICKETTS.

February 24, 1859.

DISPOSITION OF 50 CORPS OF ENGLISH INFANTRY, 15 CORPS OF ENGLISH CAVALRY; 40 CORPS OF NATIVE INFANTRY, 16 CORPS OF NATIVE CAVALRY

	English Cavalry.	English Infantry.	Native Cavalry.	Native Infantry.
Peshawur	1	2	1	2
Mooltan	0	1	0	1
Nowshera				
Attock				
Rawul Pindies	1	4	2	3
Sealcote				
Jhelum				
Lahore	1	3	1	2
Jullundur	0	1	0	1
Umballah	1	2	1	2
Loodiana and Ferozepore	1	2	1	1
Delhi	1	1	1	2
Meerut	1	2	1	2
Agra	0	1	1	1
Rohilkund	1	3	1	3
Cawnpore	0	1	0	2
Oude	2	3	2	4
Allahabad	1	3	1	3
Banda	0	1	0	1
Gorrukpoore	0	1	0	2
Futtehghur and Mynpooree	0	1	0	1
Benares				
Gazeepore				
Azamghur	1	2	1	2
Juanpore				
Saugor and Nerbudda	1	3	1	4
Dunapore and Arrah	1	2	1	2
Hazareebagh	1	1	0	0
Borhampore and Darjeeling	0	1	0	0
Cheerapoonjee				
Assam	0	1	0	0
Dacca				
Calcutta				
Barrackpore	0	3	0	0
Dum Dum				
Total	15	50*	16	40

* See in orig.

* See in orig.

Hon.
H. Ricketts.

LIST of CAVALRY and INFANTRY OFFICERS on CIVIL EMPLOY

	Lieutenant-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	
1st European Light Cavalry -			3			Placed dis-
2nd ditto			3			posal Comt.
3rd ditto			2	1		Cs - Sutlej
4th ditto			2	1		States.
5th ditto			2	1		
1st European Bengal Fusiliers			2	1		
2nd ditto			2	1		
3rd European Regiment		1	4	1		1 Officiating.
4th ditto			2	1		
5th ditto			2	1		1 Officiating.
6th ditto		1	3	1		1 Revenue Sur-
2nd Native Infantry			3	1		vey.
4th ditto			1	1		
9th ditto			1	1		
10th ditto	1		1	1		1 Officiating.
11th ditto			2	2		
12th ditto			2	2		
13th ditto			2	1		1 Revenue Sur-
14th ditto		1	2	1		vey.
15th ditto		1	2	1		
16th ditto			1	1		
17th ditto			2	2		1 Revenue Sur-
18th ditto			2	1		vey.
19th ditto			2	1		
20th ditto			2	1		
21st ditto			1	1		
22nd ditto		1	1	1		1 Officiating.
23rd ditto			3	2		
24th ditto			1	1		1 Officiating.
25th ditto		1	1	1		1 Revenue Sur-
26th ditto			1	2		vey.
27th ditto			1	1		
28th ditto			1	1		
29th ditto		1	1	1		
30th ditto			1	4		
31st ditto			1	1		
32nd ditto			1	1		1 Revenue Sur-
33rd ditto			1	1		vey.
34th ditto			1	1		
35th ditto			1	1		
36th ditto			1	2		
37th ditto			2	2		
38th ditto			1	1		
39th ditto			1	2		1 Revenue Sur-
40th ditto			1	2		vey and 1 Offi-
41st ditto			1	1		cating.
42nd ditto	1		2	2		
43rd ditto			1	1		
44th ditto			2	1		
45th ditto		1	1	1		
46th ditto			1	1		
47th ditto			1	1		
48th ditto			1	1		
49th ditto			1	1		
50th ditto			1	2		
51st ditto			1	2		
52nd ditto			1	1		1 Revenue Sur-
53rd ditto		1	1	1		vey.
54th ditto			1	1		
55th ditto			1	3		
56th ditto			1	1		
57th ditto			1	1		
58th ditto			1	1		
59th ditto			1	1		
60th ditto			1	1		
61st ditto	1		1	1		
62nd ditto			1	1		
63rd ditto			1	1		
64th ditto			1	1		

List of Cavalry and Infantry Officers, &c.—cont.

	Lieutenant-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	
65th Native Infantry -			1			On special duty
66th ditto			2			with the Maha-
67th ditto			2			rajah of Rewah
68th ditto			1			1 In Revenue
69th ditto			1	2		Survey and
70th ditto			1	2		Civil Employ.
71st ditto			1	4		
72nd ditto			1	1		1 of these in the
73rd ditto		1	2	1		Revenue Sur-
74th ditto			1	1		vey.
Total	4	11	87	54		= 156

LIST of CAVALRY and INFANTRY OFFICERS serving in the MILITARY OFFICES.

	Colonels.	Lieutenant-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Total.
Personal Staff of the Governor-Gen.				2			
Ditto ditto Commander-in-Chief.				1	1		
Ditto ditto Lieutenant-Governor.				2			
Town Major				1			
General Officers of Divisions	1	1		1			
Secretariat of the Government, Military Department.		1		3			
Adjutant-General's Department				1	2	1	
Quartermaster-General's Department.				1	5	4	
Judge Advocate-General's Department.				1	7	1	
Audit Department		1	1			1	
Pay Department				11		2	
Surveyor-General's Department						3	
Army Commissariat Department, including the Auditor and Keddah Establishments.		1	4	26	25		
Stud Department				1	6	4	
Clothing Department			1	1	2		
Fort Adjutants				2	1		
Divisional Staff				1	1		
Personal Staff of General Officers					1	1	
Brigadiers		1	10	1	1		
Brigade Majors				13			
Military Employ	2	15	13	92	45	1	168
Civil Employ		4	11	87	54		156
Total	2	19	24	179	99	1	324

H. RICKETTS.

February 24, 1859.

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