

## **GORDON AT KHARTOUM**



George E. Gordon. (The Great Speeches of the British Empire)  
H. B. S. 2120 C. 121

© George E. Gordon

London, 1882

Charles George Gordon  
1882

# GORDON AT KHARTOUM

BEING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF  
EVENTS

IN CONTINUATION OF "A SECRET HISTORY OF THE  
ENGLISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT"

BY

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

*"We are an honest nation, but our diplomatists  
are cones, and not officially honest"*—GORDON.

LONDON: PUBLISHED BY  
STEPHEN SWIFT AND CO., LTD.  
MCMXI

V671.M8

D7.2

2314

CHISWICK PRESS CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND  
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON

## PREFACE

**I**N the present volume, which is a continuation of my "Secret History of the Occupation of Egypt," I take up once more the task of chronicling the events of my time. Lord Cromer's recent book, "Modern Egypt," makes this a duty to the truth which I feel ought not to be postponed, while there is also the hope that by insistence it may still be possible to direct those in power with us to adopt an attitude towards the Mohammedan World less antagonistic than in the past to its thoughts and feelings.

The period treated here, between 1882 and 1886, is the darkest of the whole Anglo-Egyptian record, a monument indeed of perverse unwisdom recognized by all. But I doubt if it is yet fully understood how immense a wrong was inflicted by our English mismanagement of affairs at Cairo, not only on Egypt and the Upper Nile, but on all Mohammedan lands hindered by it in their work of liberal enlightenment, and thrown back for a whole generation on lines of fanatical reaction. This I hope to make clear. Lord Cromer would have us believe that it was contrary to our Government's desire that we remained on in Egypt in spite of repeated declarations of an intention to withdraw. It will here be shown that there was never any such intention at the Foreign Office, and that if it existed in Mr. Gladstone's mind it was of that barren kind which refuses to take the means which alone can lead to the desired result. With regard to the Soudan and the series of barbarous campaigns which signalized those three disastrous years, the explanation, too, has been made that these were

## *Preface*

forced by circumstances upon our Government, as was also the separation of the Upper from the Lower Nile, a separation brought about under conditions of violent disruption, which made it a permanent injury to Egypt and absolute ruin to the Soudan, with the depopulation of whole provinces through famine and disease and chronic warfare. It will be shown that European action alone was the initial cause of the trouble, that the fanatical character of the Soudanese revolt was due solely to the intervention of the Christian Powers at Cairo and that its extent and violence were increased by each successive step of English intervention, also that to the refusal to make peace with the Mahdi, either before or after the fall of Khartoum, may fairly be ascribed all that subsequently happened of misfortune to the tribes of the Upper River. These were realities that needed placing in their proper perspective, and I have endeavoured in this volume to present them as they to my knowledge were.

My personal position while the chief tragedy of the time, Gordon's fatal mission to Khartoum, was being enacted was one singularly advantageous for my present purpose of accurate narration. Occupying no official post, I nevertheless found myself a deeply interested spectator behind the official scenes in London, as well as behind those of the Oriental world, and from time to time playing a small part myself in the drama, close enough to the chief personages to observe the details of their action, and in near view of the machinery used for their stage effects. The diary, which with an instinct of its future importance I kept carefully written at the time, remains with me as a sure guide on which I can rely for each day's happenings, and this, in spite of its many crudities of thought and expres-

## *Preface*

sion, and much in it that I am conscious is to my own disadvantage, I have decided to print almost uncensored as it stands. It is the strongest evidence I can offer of the accuracy of my narrative, and the best refutation of the pseudo-history which has grown up about the mission. On many points I am very conscious that my diary needs apology. It was written with no thought of publication, and contains harsh judgements of men and things with many of which I have since come to disagree, violences of language of which I am now ashamed, and expressions of feeling softened since by years and by that tolerance of view taken in old age of human insanities. Much in it I would willingly not have written, or written otherwise, and much recording my own sayings and doings I would suppress in publishing if it were not for the feeling that to do so would impair its entire sincerity. In telling things disadvantageous to others I could not in fairness be sparing of my own mistakes. Therefore I leave all unexplained to its own justification and the indulgence of my readers.

On one point only have I thought it necessary to reconsider at any length my attitude of the time. This is in respect of the blame laid by me on Gordon for the failure of his mission on lines of peace. As will be seen from my diary I was one of the few Englishmen who, with a strong feeling of esteem and affection for Gordon, disapproved from the first of his mission, suspecting what was indeed the fact, that there was in it a political intrigue connected with the continued occupation of Egypt, and I was one of the very few who rejoiced at the failure of the relief expedition and the fall of Khartoum. My belief, however, at the time, that Gordon was himself through his soldier's obstinacy mainly responsible for the

## *Preface*

failure, and that he did, as was being pretended by Ministers, exceed his instructions, wantonly changing the character of his mission from a peaceful one to one of war, was unjust, and I recognize the necessity of correcting my misjudgement. The publication of Lord Cromer's book four years ago, with its exaggerated attack on Gordon on these very heads, roused my suspicion and caused me to re-examine the evidence connected with the whole matter, and I speedily discovered that, though Gordon made without doubt many mistakes in its discharge, the prime responsibility of the mission as one necessarily of war was certainly not his, but that of those who sent him; also, on further examination, that in spite of Lord Cromer's denial the failure of the mission was principally due to no other than Lord Cromer's self.

I have consequently devoted several chapters of the present volume to clearing up this much vexed matter, and I have added to them, for the special benefit of Egyptian readers ignorant of Gordon's superlative moral merit and regarding him only as a too zealous agent of the British Government, and so their enemy, a memoir of this great man's life and character, gathered in part from his published letters scattered through many works now out of print and notably from those wonderful letters to his sister collected by Dr. Hill, in part from my own recollection of him, and that of others who knew him personally. In this, which has been to me a labour of love as well as of reparation, I have been powerfully assisted by Gordon's nephew and literary heir, Colonel Louis Gordon, by his sole surviving sister, Mrs Moffitt, and by his niece, Miss Gordon, who are the chief living authorities on all things concerning him. These have not only put me on the track of all published knowledge, but have been good enough



## *Preface*

to entrust to me many important documents not hitherto printed, which will be found either in the text of this volume or the Appendix. One of these is of deciding value to the case, a letter which Lord Cromer in his *apologia* seems to have forgotten, and which fixes on himself the responsibility of the mission as one far wider in scope than has hitherto been admitted.

If I have anything to add to these few words of preface it is this—I have been reproached with lack of patriotism in that I have made it my business of late years to denounce the errors and political misdeeds of my fellow countrymen in Egypt. In answer to this I can only say that I belong to a generation of Englishmen holding an idea of patriotism entirely different from that now accepted, and one that I think saner. According to the teaching of my youth the patriotic idea was essentially connected with the love of the land of one's birth, the passion of courage which prompted Thermopylae and Bannockburn and the thousand and one battles where men have stood up in defence of their homes against invading strangers; also with that other moral courage which strengthened a man to oppose in speech the folly of his fellow men whom he saw doing dishonour to that land. It had nothing whatever to do with the modern idea, now prevalent among Englishmen, of solidarity with the enterprises, often criminal, of the cosmopolitan finance of London and Liverpool and Manchester, which has usurped control over our lives and honour in its dealings with our national affairs abroad, which controls our press, manipulates our parliament, and uses our ancient and honourable English name for its base un-English purposes. There is no lack of patriotism in refusing to bow to this new leadership in evil, or in denouncing its ungodly doings.

## *Preface*

I am by instinct of birth a conservative to my inmost fibre, that is to say a believer in tradition and the value of all that is ancient in our national institutions and creeds and moralities. I remember the disgust of my older Tory friends when, under Semitic influence thirty-five years ago, the new-fangled style of Empress was proposed to be added to the time-honoured title inherited by our Sovereign Lady Queen Victoria, and when the British Empire first began to be talked about as an improvement in nomenclature on our long sufficing Kingdom of England. What was good enough for the "spacious days of great Elizabeth" was surely, we protested, good enough for us. We wanted none of the imperial nonsense. As to a transfer of our patriotic loyalty from our good island realm of England to a colonial monarchy beyond the seas, it seemed not only a vulgarity but a contradiction in physical terms. We did not spare our mockery and contempt for the whole "Brummagem" innovation.

This is my sentimental view of British imperialism still, nor is it a matter of sentiment alone with me. My reading of history has taught, and practical experience has confirmed to me the fact that the task undertaken by a nation of ruling other nations against their will is the most certain step for it upon the road to national ruin. It is impossible to exercise tyrannical authority abroad and retain a proper respect for the dignity of liberty at home. The two things are not permanently compatible. The virus of lawlessness in foreign lands infects the body politic at home by a gradual process of contempt for human brotherhood and equal right, which are the basis of all law and the only guarantee of freedom in free nations. Nor, on the other hand, can a community afford to distribute its energies in a hundred different direc-

## *Preface*

tions without injury to its mental balance and danger of intellectual decay. The British Empire of the present day is being run on lines of speculation which is often sheer gambling. It has lost the sense of all economy in its finances, and all moderation in its spendthrift ways. How can it be moderate with a thousand speculative ventures to uphold in all four quarters of the globe? Moreover—and this is perhaps the most dangerous feature of it all—the vanity of imperialism, of being members of an imperial caste, is rapidly teaching Englishmen to rely, wherever possible, for their living upon the labour of others rather than their own. The great Crown Colonies, the Indian Empire, and the South African federation are all slave communities in disguise, where white men do not work themselves but live by “native” labour. The example of their sloth is gaining rapid ground at home, and soon all will be too proud to do any manual service. The virile part of the community is flocking already to lands where they can live in less laborious ways; the feebler part remains to propagate and starve at home. Who shall say that England is not on a perilous downward path?

What moves me most to anger is to note how, just as four hundred years ago the Spanish race, urged by the speculative lust of gold and a belief in their own supreme imperial and Christianizing mission, rushed out upon the innocent New World and enslaved and slew its primitive peoples happier far than they, so we English speaking men enslave and slay in the name of civilization—here, there, and everywhere—races less well armed, but in other respects more fit for survival in the spaces they have primitively occupied than ourselves. The work of subjugation goes on under a score of false pretences;

## Preface

and these, officially recorded, remain for the misleading of posterity in the pages of our printed Blue Books. History thus comes to be written in a sense suited to the self satisfaction of those who would like to think themselves God's messengers to an unenlightened heathendom, while in reality they are only gathering in its wealth, and their crimes of conquest are concealed. In the days of Spain's madness there was a single honest monk who denounced his fellow countrymen for their misdeeds, and dared to love the Indians more than his own people, because he saw these suffering atrocities of injustice at their conquerors' hands. He was not popular in Castile for his plain speaking. Yet where—among the nations—is imperial Spain to-day? And which has the better title now to be called a patriot, Las Casas or Pizarro?

There will be found at the end of the volume an Appendix containing a selection of papers forming the *pièces justificatives* of this portion of my history. Some of these are of considerable intrinsic value, others of less importance, but needed for the refutation in detail of the historic inaccuracies of Lord Cromer's book, and in answer to certain remarks found in it concerning myself. Such especially are the additional evidence here brought forward of the Khedive Tewfik's connection with the riots at Alexandria and Tantah in 1882, which, without reason given, Lord Cromer has pronounced to be unproved, and my correspondence with 10, Downing Street, which he has in a few sentences attempted to discredit. The correspondence makes my position towards Mr Gladstone absolutely clear, as does, in another direction, my more generally interesting correspondence with my Oriental friends.

The pencil drawing of Gordon, reproduced as

## *Preface*

frontispiece to the volume, is by Edward Clifford, and is now in the collection of the National Portrait Gallery. Though inadequate as displaying Gordon's more popularly heroic attitude, it is the only one that at all reveals his inner and more mystic mind, or which I recognize as a true presentment of the man as I personally remember him.

W. S. B.

*13th September 1911*

Twenty-ninth anniversary  
of Tel-el-Kebir.

# CONTENTS

	PAGE
GENERAL GORDON . . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>
PREFACE . . . . .	v

## CHAPTERS

I. THE DUFFERIN SETTLEMENT . . . . .	1
II. SIR EVELYN BARING ARRIVES AT CAIRO . . . . .	38
III. GORDON'S WORK ON THE WHITE NILE . . . . .	87
IV. GORDON IN PALESTINE . . . . .	122
V. GORDON'S LAST MISSION . . . . .	144
VI. WAS GORDON DISOBEDIENT? . . . . .	181
VII. EXCITEMENT ABOUT GORDON IN LONDON . . . . .	207
VIII. MY EXCLUSION FROM EGYPT . . . . .	245
IX. CONSTANTINOPLE IN 1884 . . . . .	284
X. GORDON'S DEATH. CHAOS . . . . .	344
XI. RANDOLPH CHURCHILL AND THE FOURTH PARTY . . . . .	412
XII. THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1885—RANDOLPH AT THE INDIA OFFICE—DRUMMOND WOLFF'S MISSION . . . . .	471
NOTE ABOUT THE MAHDI'S DEATH . . . . .	505

## APPENDICES

A. UNPUBLISHED GORDON PAPERS . . . . .	509
B. MR. BLUNT'S ORIENTAL CORRESPONDENCE . . . . .	539
C. CORRESPONDENCE WITH DOWNING STREET . . . . .	568
D. CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD RANDOLPH CHUR- CHILL . . . . .	608
E. ARABI'S PROGRAMME OF 1883, AND MOHAMMED ABDU'S VIEWS . . . . .	617
F. EXTRACTS FROM LADY ANNE BLUNT'S DIARY . . . . .	627
G. LETTERS TO MR. BLUNT ALLUDED TO IN, AND EXEM- PLIFYING, THE TEXT . . . . .	630
INDEX . . . . .	645

## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX A

### UNPUBLISHED GORDON PAPERS

COLONEL DONNELLY'S CONVERSATION WITH COLONEL C. G.  
GORDON, 30TH OCTOBER 1880 (FROM AMONG SIR  
HENRY GORDON'S PAPERS)

THIS was the first time I had seen Colonel Gordon since he left England as Lord Ripon's private secretary. I asked him what was the real reason of his giving up. He gave me to understand a number of things made him feel that he was *de trop*. "For instance," he said, "just after we started, Lord Ripon gave me the minutes and evidence in the inquiry into Yakub Khan's connection with Cavagnari's murder, and asked me to make a *présis* and give him my opinion. This was difficult. But after sitting up the greater part of two nights I was able to give them back with my remarks all over them in red and black ink. He asked me what I thought of it. I said I did not see any evidence to prove Yakub guilty, he very likely was glad Cavagnari was murdered, but I could see nothing to show that he was implicated in the crime, and you know (to me, Donnelly) three out of five of the Council (mentioning their names) were of that opinion.

"Lord Ripon looked into it and told me to telegraph from Aden to his, Yakub's, keepers to meet him at Bombay. I said: 'My Lord, I think that will hardly do as you have not yet been sworn in and Lord Lytton is still Governor General and may make a great fuss.' Lord Ripon agreed, thought I was right and said the telegram was not to be sent. When we got to Bombay Lord Ripon again asked me to telegraph to Yakub's keepers to meet him at some station on the way to Simla. I had to ask White (military secretary) as I did not know the route sufficiently to fix on a station. He was awfully taken aback. Did I know what the consequences would be? Every one in India would be staggered and so on. Begged me to persuade Lord Ripon not to take such a step. I told him that it did not seem to me it would make any difference one way or the other, but as he was so very strong on the point, I said I would let Lord Ripon know before I did anything. I wrote a note and sent it in early in the morning to Lord Ripon, saying that I myself did not think it would matter, but, as White was so very anxious on the subject, believing the end of the world would come if such a step were taken, I thought



## Appendix A

it as well to let him know before I carried out his, Lord Ripon's, instructions. This was just before breakfast, and he came out in a few minutes very indignant that any one should have ventured to overrule his orders, he had no intention of being controlled, and so on. All breakfast time he looked quite hurt, and injured, and indignant. After breakfast I left White talking with him in a beseeching way, and presently he (Lord Ripon) came and asked me if I had sent the telegram. I said No, I was waiting to see White to settle the place. 'Well,' he said, 'perhaps after all it was as well not to send it.'

"Now this is only one instance," Gordon said. "There were lots of snubs of this kind. You know I shouldn't have minded getting snubbed, if there was any use in it—but I saw it was only sure to get worse. Lord Ripon was being surrounded and guided by the very people from whom Lord Northcote had begged me to keep him clear. When he got to Simla I was sure he would be completely in the hands of the Lytton party. I felt I was *de trop* and could do no good, and that it was as well to give up as soon as possible. I told Lord Ripon so. He was very nice about it, said that his regard for me had only been increased by what had happened, but he saw it was advisable I should resign, was much obliged to me for doing so, was only afraid of the awkwardness. I showed him the letter I had written. He said I was giving him too great praise and taking all the blame on myself—did not wish me to publish it. But I said I had written it, it was too much trouble to write it again. And so I sent it. We parted on the best of terms. He said he had a greater regard for me than ever, and so on. In fact I have no doubt he was much relieved by being rid of me."

The opinion Gordon gave Lord Ripon on the Afghan question was this. He said either Yakub Khan was guilty or not. If he was not, and there was no reason for saying he was (*vide* secret papers, Court of Enquiry on Yakub Khan), he ought in justice to be restored. And moreover he was the only man who was likely to be able to hold the country who had any following. "Take him back yourself, my Lord. You can easily do it with 3,000 cavalry. If you succeed, you will be looked upon as the greatest Governor-General India ever had, and if you fail and are killed you will have a splendid marble monument put up to you." But Lord Ripon did not seem to see the monument. I offered to do it myself with Yakub and some lakhs of rupees. But they would not have it. What was the use of my being there? There was no one who cared to look forward and have a policy, only to let things drift."

As to Candahar, Gordon's opinion was that we ought to give in

## *Gordon Papers*

to the Ruler of Afghanistan if we wished him to hold the country. The position of Candahar with relation to Herat and Cabul was such [here a diagram is given] that it was impossible for any man to really rule the country unless he held Candahar. But he thought we had managed our withdrawal from Cabul very badly. We had been in such a hurry as to look like running away. Our prestige in India had been much shaken by the Maimand disaster, and Roberts had only been able to get at Ayoub Khan's rearguard. As an illustration of our loss of prestige in India, he gave an incident which occurred lately. When the Russian gunboats were in the harbour of Bombay, the Parsees brought their children to see them and to be introduced to the Russian officers.

Things were constantly happening which must have made his presence—to say the least—irksome with a man of Lord Ripon's calibre of mind. For instance, the day before they started [from London], Lord Houghton was lunching with Lord Ripon, Gordon kept away till after lunch was over. But Lord Houghton was still there when he came in. On being introduced by Lord Ripon, Lord Houghton said he was delighted to hear he was going as private secretary; he could not congratulate Lord Ripon too highly on his great good luck in having such a secretary, he was very glad Lord Ripon was going as Governor-General, but almost more glad that Gordon was going as his secretary.

EARL OF NORTHBROOK TO GENERAL C. G. GORDON

*Private.*

*Jan. 18, 1884.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I enclose a letter to Sir William Hewett. We have written officially to him by this mail announcing your mission, and authorizing him to meet your demands up to £1,000 upon your receipts. I am sure you will like Hewett. As there is no telegraphic communication with Suakin we shall arrange for the Helicon to be at Suez from Malta to take you to Suakin. If she should not be available you will have to put up with the Cygnet, but she is not nearly so comfortable as the Helicon.

I will telegraph to you to Port Said to say which arrangement has been made, to the care of the senior officer.

I was very glad to see you in such good heart about affairs this afternoon, and I trust that by God's blessing you will succeed in arranging them as satisfactorily as circumstances admit.

Yours very sincerely,

NORTHBROOK.

## Appendix A

GENERAL C G GORDON TO MISS GORDON

19. 1. 84

MY DEAR AUGUSTA,

I arrived in town very tired at 6 a.m. yesterday, went with Brockenhurst to Barracks, washed and went [to] Wolseley, he said Ministers would see me at 3 p.m. I went back to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 p.m. Wolseley came for me. I went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke and Northbrook, they said ha. I seen W and did I understand their ideas. I said yes, and repeated what W had said to me as to their ideas, which was "*they would evacuate Soudan*" They were pleased and said, "that was their idea. Would I go?" I said "yes" They said "when?" I said "To-night" And it was over. I started at 8 p.m. H R H [Cambridge] and Lord W [Wolseley] came to see me off. I saw Henry [Sir H. Gordon] and Bob [R. F. Gordon], no one else except Stokes, all very kind. I have taken Stewart with me, a nice fellow, we are now in train near Mont Cenis. I am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Will you tell Sir J. Cowell all this. Lord Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to me. I said I was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King [of Belgians] at once, and told him to wait a few months. Kindest love Mina, Helen and yourself, A. Burton, and Hayter and Ellen [these two were servants at Rockstone Place]

Believe me, my dear Augusta, yr affect. brother

C. G. GORDON.

Address—Care H M Consul Suez

MEMORANDUM AS TO GENERAL GORDON'S DOINGS IN CAIRO  
JANUARY 1884, BY COLONEL [SIR CHARLES] WATSON  
(FROM SIR HENRY GORDON'S PAPERS)

On Saturday the 19th January when I went into Sir Evelyn Wood's room at the War Office he said, "Embrace me" I said "What has happened?" He said, "The English Government is sending General Gordon out to settle the affairs of the Soudan and he started from London last night with Colonel Stewart and the Brindisi Mail" I said, "That is the best thing I have heard for the last year. Is it to be made public, or is it still a secret?" He said, "It is to be made as public as possible, tell everybody. Then we did some ordinary business, and I went to my own office. Colonel Bruce Campbell was there, having come as usual for the latest information. He said, "What news have you for me?" replied, "The newest and best is that General Gordon is coming out to settle the Soudan, and is now on his way." He said, "

## *Gordon Papers*

don't believe it. The English Government will never let him come." "Well," I said, "I think you'll see it's true" Then he went away.

That evening I had to take some papers to Nubar's house for him to sign. Soon after I went in he said, "I am to be congratulated. The weight of the Soudan is off my shoulders. If any one can manage it, Gordon can." He really did seem glad that Gordon was coming out, which was good of him considering the abusive way in which Gordon had both written and spoken of him.

The next day Nubar stopped me in the street to talk about Bashi Bazouks, who had come to Cairo and were troubling him about their pay, and he again repeated how glad he was that Gordon was coming out. The following day every one was talking about it, several Egyptians said, "Finished with the Mahdi." But that was too hopeful a view. I had to see Major Vincent about the War Office budget, in which he was very eager to make more economies, and he asked how much money was Gordon likely to want for taking all the people out of the Soudan and settling up the affairs there. I said that Gordon couldn't answer that question himself, that there was no doubt that he would do the job better and cheaper than any one else. Sir Evelyn Baring seemed hopeful and said, "That it was specially understood that Gordon was under the English and not under the Egyptian Government, and that therefore he would be under him [Baring] and not under Nubar. But," he added smiling, "not that it is very likely that Gordon will take orders from me or any one else."

The next day, the 22nd, Sir Evelyn Wood said to me, "Gordon is coming out with the intention of going straight through the Canal and on to Suakin, without coming to Cairo, I can quite understand his not liking to come to Cairo, but it is very important he should see Baring before going to the Soudan, and it would look badly if he did not call on the Khedive. I shall therefore go down to Port Said to-morrow to meet and try to bring him up to Cairo, and I want you to come with me. Nubar has arranged for a boat and train to bring him up here."

That day there was a telegram from Slatin Bey in Darfour, stating that he was constantly being attacked by the Mahdi's people, that his ammunition was running out, his soldiers were getting demoralized, and he had had to shoot several of them, and he could not hold out much longer unless ammunition and reinforcements were sent him. It was arranged to send a telegram to Dongola to be sent to him as soon as possible, telling him that General Gordon was going to the Soudan to withdraw all the Egyptian troops, and everybody else who wished to leave. This

## *Appendix A*

message was to be sent to the Mudir of Dongola with orders to send it on by several different messengers, so as to make sure of Slatin Bey getting it

In the afternoon Sir E Wood asked me to see Nubar to make sure that the necessary arrangements had been made for bringing Gordon quickly up from Port Said. Nubar looked very tired and spoke French, said he was too tired to talk in English. He sent for Tigrane who looked very sulky, but it was not clear whether it was because Gordon was coming out, or because he was not so important a man as in Cherif's time. Nubar gave him orders to see that everything was ready for Gordon's journey, and said that no expense would be spared to send him to Khartoum in the shortest possible time, as the sooner he got there, the sooner things would be settled. That night we dined at Sir E Baring's, a regular Consular dinner—Austrian, Russian, Netherlands, etc. I was sitting next Tigrane, who would hardly say a word, he does not seem quite to approve of the advance of English ideas. Nubar on the contrary, who was also there, seemed very cheerful. It will be curious to see whether Tigrane will continue to work with Nubar or not. Other people came in after dinner for dancing.

The next morning Sir E Wood sent to me to say that he was unhappy about Slatin Bey and the people in Darfour, and asked me to ask Nubar not to send the message to Dongola until Gordon had arrived. Nubar was not in his office, and I waited a good while in Tigrane's room, who was much more talkative than the night before. He said he was not let to do anything now, and that Nubar and Sir E Baring managed everything. He seemed rather doubtful of the success of Gordon's mission to the Soudan, on account of the power that the Mahdi had up there.

At 11.30 Sir E Wood and I started for Ismailia, and arrived there about 5 p.m. Sir Evelyn was rather uneasy in his mind about Gordon, as he thought it might be difficult to persuade him to come to Cairo. At Ismailia we were met by the Governor and other Notables, and went straight over to the pier, where a steam launch was waiting to take us to Port Said, among others who were there was Khalil Agha, an Albanian policeman, who had been with me in the campaign, and who had now charge of the roads and gardens at Ismailia. A little French red faced doctor begged for a passage as he had been telegraphed for from Port Said. We started at once and reached Port Said at 11.30 p.m. A lot of people met us, and accompanied Sir Evelyn to the Hôtel des Pays Bas, where rooms had been engaged for him by the Governor.

Next morning I went to the P and O Office and saw Mr Roy, who said that the "Tanjore" from Brindisi would not be in till

## *Gordon Papers*

the afternoon, but he was proved to be wrong, for half an hour afterwards she was in sight, and, by the time we had finished breakfast, and Sir Evelyn had inspected the company of the 8th Battalion stationed at Port Said, the "Tanjore" was in the harbour close to H M S "Carysfort," which had been sent from Malta to take General Gordon to Suakin, and was now waiting for him with steam up ready to start. Our steam launch was at the pier, and we went out to the "Tanjore" at once. General Gordon was on the poop talking to Col Stewart. A minute served to make him and Sir E. Wood acquainted with one another, and at the same moment the English Consul put into General Gordon's hands a bundle of cipher telegrams from Lord Granville and Sir E. Baring, and Col. Stewart and I went down at once into the saloon to decipher them. The Captain of the "Carysfort" came on board to report his ship ready, and Sir E. Wood seemed at first a little doubtful how to break the intelligence to General Gordon that he was expected to come to Cairo instead of going to Suakin as he intended, but the latter proved quite amenable, and as soon as he was told that the steam launch was alongside to take him to Ismailia, said he was ready to start at once, so their baggage was put in, and in five minutes we were steaming to Ismailia somewhat to the astonishment of the Captain of the "Carysfort," who expected to have taken the General with him. Stewart and I continued deciphering the telegrams, which were all to the same effect, that General Gordon had better go to Cairo while he and Sir Evelyn Wood were becoming acquainted with one another. It was curious to think that Gordon had sent Sir Evelyn to Egypt, while Sir Evelyn had really been the means of getting Gordon sent to the Soudan.

Although Gordon had started so readily for Cairo, he at first seemed of opinion it would have been better if he had gone to Suakin to make friends with the chief of the tribes who were fighting against Baker. He seemed to have little doubt of the practicability of the scheme, but, as he might not have been able to get by that road to Khartoum, and as the main thing was to get him to that place as soon as possible, there is little doubt it was better for him to go by the Nile valley. The five hours to Ismailia were employed by Sir E. Wood making Gordon fully acquainted with the state of affairs in Egypt and the Soudan. At five o'clock we reached Ismailia and went at once to the station, where a special train was ready to take Gordon to Cairo. In the carriage was Mahommed Bey Tuhani, who had formerly been Gordon's secretary in the Soudan, and who had been sent down by Gordon's request to meet him. He is jet black and now quite blind, having lost his sight on the White Nile, whither Gordon

## *Appendix A*

sent him for taking bakshish to the extent of £3,000. This did not prevent his being very glad to see his old master again, and his pleasure was increased when Gordon put £100 into his hands. He is a wonderful old man, very clear-headed about the Soudan, knowing nearly every chief by name. He said that Mousa, the chief of the Hadendowa, whom Gordon had hoped to meet at Suakin [was away] and that his son Mohammed was at Kassala with part of the tribe, while the rest of it had left him, and with the Halega tribe under Osman Digna were fighting against Baker at Suakin. It is possible, therefore, that Gordon might not have found it as easy as he thought to get through that way. Tuhami was of opinion that a great many people in the Soudan would be very glad to hear of Gordon's arrival, and that many of those who had joined the Mahdi on account of their hatred of the Egyptian Government would leave him. He repeatedly insisted that the rebellion was rather against bad Government than a religious revolt.

The train reached Cairo at 9 o'clock, but there were not many waiting to receive the General as we were not due till half an hour later. Gordon went off with Sir E. Wood. After he had started Nubar Pasha and the Khedive's first aide-de-camp came up just too late to receive him.

The next morning Mohammed Tuhami came to our house with a clerk, Abo El Melik Shai, and at once set to work to write telegrams to a number of the Notable people in the Soudan, informing them that Gordon was going up to bring peace to the country. During the morning one Arab after another came in until there were seven or eight at work. Gordon looked in for a few minutes, but spent most of the time with Sir E. Baring, Sir E. Wood and Nubar. He also went to see the Khedive, and said he had been very humble and made it up with him. He arranged with him that Abd el Shakoor, the son of Abd el Kader, one of the late Sultans of Darfour, was to be sent back to that country. This had been proposed by Gordon years ago. The Khedive would never agree to it before. In the afternoon Abd el Shakoor looked in, and the meeting between him and Tuhami was very interesting. It should be remembered that Tuhami was secretary to Ismael Pasha Ayoub when he as Governor-General of the Soudan conquered Darfour, or to speak more correctly when Zebehr Rahama conquered it for him and killed the Sultan. The young man, Abd el Shakoor, seems intelligent, but at first sight does not show the strength of character which he would require. Gordon came in and told him he was to start with him the next night. The young man asked for a few days delay to collect his family, but Gordon cut him short, saying, "Look, you want a throne, throne first,

## *Gordon Papers*

family afterwards." Tuhami and the other clerks did not finish their work until late.

After dinner I went over to Sir E. Wood's to see Gordon, who had just gone. Sir E. was sitting with Slade, and was very low. Gordon, who before he left London had protested in the strongest manner against sending Zebehr to the Soudan, had that evening written a paper to show why it would be a good thing to take Zebehr with him. Sir E. said he had a great respect for Gordon, but he really could not change his opinion entirely in twelve hours. I said it was not the least surprising, as it was very usual for Gordon to change his opinion on the smallest provocation, but in this case I was sure it would all come right, and that Zebehr would not go. In the same paper he expressed a wish that Zebehr and he might be confronted with one another in order that the former might bring any accusation against him he thought fit.

Leaving Sir E. I went home and found Gordon, who seemed equally low. He said he had been talking all day and was quite done. Speedy was also at our house, and he and Gordon had been having an argument about King John of Abyssinia. He rather took King John's part, while Gordon said he was a man on whom no reliance could be placed. Gordon said King John had never stated what he wants, and that if he had a port he wouldn't know what to do with it. He said, however, he might have Senheit and Gallabat, and free trade at Massowah.

The next morning Tuhami came again and wrote a proclamation for Gordon to distribute in the Soudan. Gordon stopped at our house for a couple of hours, during which time a great many people, principally Egyptians, came to see him. The majority were persons whom he had known before, and who wished to go up to the Soudan with him. He refused all the applications, and the only two he agreed to take with him were Ibrahim Bey Fawzi, who had formerly been with him in the Soudan, and Ibrahim Effendi Ruchdi, whom he took as clerks. Ibrahim Bey Fawzi had been promoted by Gordon to every grade from Lieutenant to Colonel, and regarded Gordon as his Father. He had also at one time been in disgrace with Gordon, and had been put in chains. During the Egyptian campaign Ibrahim Fawzi had been with the rebels at Abou Kir, and had been without employment since the disbandment of the old Egyptian army. Ibrahim Ruchdi was a Khartoum clerk, who had been temporarily employed in the Soudan office in Cairo. Gordon took him back to the Soudan at an increased rate of pay, *i. e.*, £20 a month. A little later in the morning a deputation of merchants interested in the Soudan commerce came to present Gordon with an address, and to beg that he would do what he could to protect the interests of Soudan



## Appendix A

merchants He replied to them that he had been sent out from England by the English Government with a definite object, viz to withdraw the Egyptian Government from the Soudan, that the all knew that the Egyptian Government in the Soudan was bad and had been used to oppress the people, that the present state of affairs could not continue, but that he would do his best to set up some system of self-government in the Soudan After the deputation retired, General Gordon went out, and I went to the War Office and arranged for lithographing the proclamation alluded to above

General Gordon and Colonel Stewart lunched with us Giegl Pasha came in afterwards and we all went to Sir E. Baring's, with whom were Nubar Pasha and Sir Evelyn Wood Sir Evelyn Baring said that General Gordon had expressed a wish that certain matters between him and Zebehr Pasha might be discussed, and Zebehr Pasha was called in Gordon and Zebehr sat near one another, with an interpreter between, and Zebehr Pasha was asked what he had to say He said that Gordon without cause had confiscated his property, had put his people in chains, and had caused his son to be killed, that when Gordon had gone to the Soudan he (Zebehr) had put his hand on his (Gordon's) hand and had asked him to consider his son as his own son Then General Gordon said that he had confiscated the property of Zebehr because he had been convicted by a court of enquiry at Khartoum of having instigated his son to revolt against the Government that the conviction was to a certain extent based upon a letter written from Zebehr to his son and found among the latter's (Suliman's) papers Zebehr "I never wrote such a letter You should produce it as proof of what you say" General Gordon "I cannot produce the letter as it was attached to the proceedings of the court and sent with the latter to his Highness the Khedive If the proceedings can be found the letter should be found with them" Zebehr "If the letter can be found I deserve to lose my head," and he drew his hand across his throat Gordon "If the letter was not written, I was not justified in what I did" Then Sir Evelyn Baring said that he would see that the "proceedings" were looked for, and he directed Sir E. Wood to endeavour to find them Then Zebehr said to Gordon "And you killed my son, although I had specially entrusted him to your care" Gordon "I did take care of your son and I had him promoted to the rank of Bey, and then afterwards he treacherously killed 200 Egyptian soldiers in the Bahr Gazal" Zebehr fenced the question for some time and at last said "I was no longer responsible for my son, you had made him a Bey, you were responsible" Then Sir E. Baring said that "apparently there

## *Gordon Papers*

were two questions between Zebehr and Gordon, the first concerning Zebehr himself which turned on the existence of a certain letter which would be searched for, that if Zebehr was proved not to be guilty he would see that compensation was made to him for his losses; the second question concerned Zebehr's son, for whose action it now appeared Zebehr did not hold himself responsible." Zebehr stood up and made a speech mainly to the effect that the name of England and the justice of England were known to all nations, and that he would leave all in the hands of his Excellency. Zebehr then left the room. Sir E. Baring said that the next point to discuss was whether Zebehr Pasha was to go to the Soudan or not, as General Gordon had suggested the advisability of his going. General Gordon said "I had better not be here while you are discussing that. Hear what Watson has to say." And he went out. Sir E. Baring asked me what I had to say, and I answered that I considered it would be the greatest possible mistake to let Zebehr go to the Soudan with Gordon, and that, if my own opinion was of no value, I had been requested by one who knew the Soudan well to do all I could to prevent his going, as it was almost certain that one or the other would not come back alive. Sir E. Wood also said that he did not think it advisable for Zebehr to go, and Nubar Pasha expressed the same opinion, but more mildly. Nubar gave me the idea that for some reason or other he was annoyed at having Zebehr's affairs stirred up again and wanted it to relapse into oblivion as soon as possible. Gordon and Zebehr were then called in again, and Sir E. Baring informed the latter that it was considered desirable he should not at present go to the Soudan, but that the question of his return and of his position generally would be discussed as soon as General Gordon had returned in safety. Soon after, every one went away.

That evening there was a large dinner at Sir E. Wood's, Nubar Pasha, Abd el Kader, etc, etc. At 9 o'clock we drove to Boulac Dakrour station to see Gordon off, his train was to start at 9 30, but at the last minute it appeared that Abd el Shakoore, the Sultan of Darfour, in place of coming with two or three people as Gordon had arranged, had brought all his family and followers, nearly fifty in number. Gordon did not like to leave them behind, so fresh carriages were put on, and the people and baggage were tumbled into the train, which started at 10 30. During the following days Tuhami brought me several papers respecting affairs in the Soudan, which he asked me to send to General Gordon for his guidance.

Cairo, 10th Feb., 1884

## Appendix A

GENERAL SIR GERALD GRAHAM TO SIR HENRY GORDON

Saxon, Feb. 4th, 1884

MY DEAR SIR HENRY,

I have been accompanying your brother as far as Korusko and seen him start off on his journey across the desert. He is much more cheery and confident than he was when he left Cairo, and looks forward to constructing a government and army out of native materials as if it were the simplest thing in the world. He has certainly an extraordinary influence over the natives, the secret of which seems to me to be that he is really fond of them and enters into their feelings, while he at the same time shows an energy that must appear to them superhuman.

GERALD GRAHAM

GENERAL C. G. GORDON TO MONSIEUR DE MOUTARDIN, RUE  
ROGATE, NO 7, PARIS (FROM SIR HENRY GORDON'S PAPERS)

(Apparently translated from the French)

Khartoum, 5 Novr 84.

MY DEAR SIR,

Thank you for your letter 25 August received yesterday by a spy, and also for your good wishes for our security. The Arabs are tranquil enough, they are at the South and S W and East, but otherwise they are not. We are in much vicissitude. I regret sensibly that your Consul, Mr. Harbin, who went down in a steamer with Colonel Stewart, and Mr. Power, English Consul, after an uproar were killed *en route* with the other M. M. I do not understand, for the steamer had been blinded, had a gun and a good force. They left here the 10th of September. I had them escorted below Berber, and they ought to have been at Dongola the 20th September, but an officer has informed me that on the 14th October they had not arrived there. It is very grievous. Excuse a longer letter, for I have so many things to do.

Believe me my dear M. de Moutardin, Yours sincerely,

C G GORDON.

P S You say to me, "Expedition for my relief," thank you, no,— "Expedition for the relief of the garrisons of the Soudan," *that is the title* you understand, is it not? I was sent to succour the garrisons of the Soudan, I have failed, they sent the Troops to make up for the failure on my part. Slatin Bey is with the Mahdi 8 miles distant from here, he is well and has become Muslim, as they say is the case with all the Europeans! The time of Martyrs for the faith is ended!

## *Gordon Papers*

SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON

War Office, Cairo, 24 2 1885.

MY DEAR SIR HENRY,

Since posting my letter to you I have had forwarded to me from Kortî a letter from your brother dated 14. 12. 84. It is sad to get it, but I thought you would like a copy, so send one. He evidently knew there was treachery at work in Khartoum some time before it fell. The last paragraph concerns some small commissions I did for him, it is of no consequence. The letter was given to Sir Charles Wilson at Gubat by Kashim el Moos, who commanded the steamers. So Wilson must have had an anxious time going up. He would have done anything to save your brother, and must have felt there was no hope before he left Khartoum behind him. It is a sad story, but I cannot help envying your brother,

Ever yours sincerely,

C M WATSON

I have shown the letter to Sir F. Stephenson and Sir E. Baring. The latter took a copy of it.

*Enclosure.*

Khartoum, 14. 12 84

MY DEAR WATSON,

I think the game is up and send Mrs Watson, you and Graham my adieux. We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after 10 days time. This would not have happened (if it does happen) if our people had taken better precautions as to informing us of their movements. But this is "spilt milk," good bye. Mind and let my brother (68, Elm Park Road, Chelsea) know what I owe you

Yours sincerely,

C G. GORDON

The above was received at Gubat by Sir C. Wilson on the 22 January 1885.

SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON

War Office, Cairo, 10. 3 1885

MY DEAR SIR HENRY,

Since last writing to you I have had a second letter from your brother, but of earlier date than the one of which I sent you a

## Appendix A

copy I am so often asked for copies of it that I have had it lithographed in facsimile, and enclose you a copy of it. You will see he speaks strongly about the government, and he had reason. Why was not General Graham allowed to go on last year? But it is not much use talking about it now. I only hope that the government will at last realize that the Soudan business is a large one that will take years to settle. I have seen young Anderson of the artillery. He started for Souakim yesterday with General Graham. I hope you are all well,

Yours very sincerely,  
C M WATSON

### *Enclosure in Facsimile*

Kartum, 26 11 84

MY DEAR WATSON,

Thanks for your letter which I received yesterday, the steamer which brought it, had to run the gauntlet of no end of rifle fire and of 6 guns, she was struck 3 times by shells, but only 7 were wounded. I hope you and Mrs Watson are well. I am not ill-treated I consider, but the Cairo people up here they are the ill used. I will accept *nothing whatever* from Gladstone's Government. I will not even let them pay my expenses. I will get the King to pay them. I will never put foot in England again—but will (D.V. if I get out) go to Brussels and so on to Congo. How is Miss Arnott, the lady who was with me? I greatly fear for Stewart, Power and Herbin, French Consul. With kindest regards, believe me yours sincerely, with kindest regards to Mrs Watson,

C G GORDON

### LAST TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL GORDON (FROM AMONG MRS MOFFITT'S PAPERS)

Junior United Service Club,  
London, S W  
8 June 1886

An Egyptian Clerk, who was taken prisoner by the rebels at the fall of Khartoum, and at last succeeded in effecting his escape from Omdurman, gave me a copy of an Arabic telegram of which he said the following was the story.

On or about the 29th December 1884, General Gordon dictated this telegram to him. It was written on a small piece of paper. General Gordon then took a cartridge, took out the bullet and shook the gunpowder out of it. He then folded up the telegram, put it in the cartridge in place of the powder, and replaced the

## *Gordon Papers*

bullet, so that the cartridge looked as if it had not been touched. General Gordon then gave it to a messenger who put it with his other cartridges and started for Dongola.

I have never heard that he arrived, neither have I any means of confirming the truth of the clerk's story. It seems, however, very unlikely that he should have invented such a tale, or have written the telegram himself.

The translation of the telegram is as follows

"To the Sovereign of the Kingdom

"After salutations I would at once, calling to mind what I have gone through, inform their Majesties the Sovereigns of the actions of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, who appointed me as Governor General of the Soudan for the purpose of appeasing the rebellion in that country.

"During the twelve months that I have been here, these two Powers, the one remarkable for her wealth and the other for her military force, have remained unaffected by my situation, perhaps relying too much on the news sent by Hussein Pasha Khalifa who surrendered of his own accord. Although I personally am too insignificant to be taken into account, the Powers were bound nevertheless to fulfil the engagement upon which my appointment was based, so as to shield the honor of the Governments.

"What I have gone through I cannot describe. The Almighty God will help me."

I would observe that the fact of General Gordon speaking of having been "twelve months" in the Soudan would lead to the supposition that the telegram was written later than the clerk stated. This is quite possible as Egyptians are not good at remembering dates.

C. M. WATSON

SIR CHARLES WILSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON

Mountjoy Barracks, Phoenix Park, Dublin,  
Sep 9 1885

MY DEAR GORDON,

There has never been any doubt in my mind as to the manner of your brother's death. He was killed before sunrise, apparently before it was quite daylight, a short distance outside the Palace gates, where he met a party of Arabs. He fell at the first discharge, but whether killed, or severely wounded, we do not know, his body when seen afterwards had several lance wounds, and his head was cut off by a Dugaini Arab and exposed on a pole in the

## *Appendix A*

open space between the Mahdi's two camps at Omdurman I tried to keep these details from the correspondents in the Sudan, knowing how painful they would be to you and his family, but as you have asked for them I give them now. The body was left on the ground some time, and then appears to have been buried with others in the ditch south of Khartum. One account was that the body was buried under a large cairn of stones, where it fell, by people throwing stones at it as they passed, a common Arab custom. The decapitation is also Arab and what one might naturally expect, on the other hand the Arabs never mutilate the dead as the Ethiopic tribes do. Our dead were untouched except by lance thrusts, whilst those on the Sawakin side were horribly mutilated. You may therefore be certain that no insult was offered to your brother's body.

My view is that your brother was roused up, just before daylight, by the news that the Arabs had entered the town, that he hastily collected his cavasses (armed servants) and left the Palace with the intention of reaching the stone church, where the ammunition was stored, and then of blowing up the magazine or trying to hold out till we arrived. He probably intended picking up the Austrian Consul on his way, but unfortunately was met by a party of Arabs just after he left the Palace gates. The Arabs apparently did not know it was your brother when they fired, they only saw the cavasses in their Egyptian uniform. Your brother, if he had chosen, might have made an attempt to save his own life by going on board the steamers which always had steam up, but you know as well as I do he would never have done that. The steamers tried to get down the river, but turned back when fire was opened upon them from Omdurman, had a European been on board they might have run the gauntlet. My account of your brother's death is based on two independent reports made not very long after the fall of Khartum and before the wild stories which so rapidly grow out of such an event, in semi-civilised countries, had time to obscure the truth. In all essential particulars these reports have been confirmed by later ones. The two reports I allude to were one by a cavass of Ibrahim Bey Rushdi's, whose master was killed with your brother and who was present when they were killed. This man was of Turkish origin, and bribed some Arabs to bring him across the desert, from Khartum he went down to Cairo with the Mudir of Dongola. The other was by a leading Sheikh of the Shagiyeh, whom we had sent to Khartum with letters for your brother, this man was in Khartum when it fell, and saw your brother's body not long after he had been killed, he came down to us by the Wady Bishara road. The two men were unknown to each other, of different race,

## *Gordon Papers*

and came by different roads, at an interval of a few days, there could not therefore have been any collusion

Watson is collecting all he can about the last days at Khartum, have you written to him?

Yours sincerely,  
C W WILSON

NOTES FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A REFUGEE WHO CAME FROM  
KHARTOUM ON OR ABOUT THE 3RD NOVEMBER 1887 to  
SUAKIN (FROM AMONG MRS MOFFITT'S PAPERS)

Rank, *Sergt Major*  
Nationality, *Turk*

Was formerly in the Garrison at Berber, but escaped at its fall to Kartoum, where he was one of four Sergeants Orderlies to Gordon. He was "on duty" on the 26th, and was with Gordon in the "look out" on the top of the Palace. Gordon the evening before warned the people that he had seen a great deal of extra excitement going on in the rebel camp, and that unless a "good resistance was made that night the town would fall" The soldiers were in a starving state and many left the lines in search of food, the civilians armed themselves and went on to the lines. As the morning star rose the rebels made a feint at the portion of the defence under Ferag Pasha (with the black troops), but at the same time they directed their full attack at the defence commanded by Hassan Bey Benassawie (with the 5th Regt, fellaheen) and succeeded in getting into the town. Gordon, when he heard the rebels in the town, said "It is all finished, to-day Gordon will be killed ("enhardeh Gordon cassoora"), and went downstairs, followed by the four sergeants, who took their rifles with them. He took a chair and sat down on the right of the Palace door, the four sergeants standing on his left, all at once a sheikh galloped up with some Baggara Arabs, the sergeants were on the point of firing when Gordon, seizing one of their rifles, said "No need of rifles, to-day Gordon is to be killed" (as before) The Sheikh told Gordon that he had been ordered by the Mahdi to bring him alive. Gordon refused to go, saying that he would die where he was, and adding that no harm was to be done to the four sergeants who had not fired on the rebels. The Sheikh repeated the order three times, and each time Gordon gave the same answer. After a few words the Sheikh drew his sword and rushing up to Gordon cut him in a slanting direction over the left shoulder, Gordon looking him straight in the face and offering no resistance of any kind. His head was cut off and taken to the Mahdi at Omdurman, and his body was buried close to the door



## Appendix A

of the Palace and a tomb built over it. The four sergeants were not hurt, but taken prisoners, and two have already managed to escape. The sergeant, on being questioned about the report made by Colonel Kitchener, states that food was so scarce that Gordon himself lived on a handful of doura, which was made into a thick soup, the people living chiefly on the fibre of the palm-tree made into cakes. All the animals were killed, with the exception of a donkey, over which there was a guard. Finally an officer stole it and sold its flesh at any price he asked. A fish was caught and sold in a similar manner.

Ibrahim Bey FOWSI is now at Omdurman, Farag Ullah Bey is at Galabat

SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON

Cairo, 2 July 1885

MY DEAR SIR HENRY,

Very many thanks for sending me the "Journals," which have reached me this afternoon. I have only just had time to glance at them, but write at once to catch the Italian mail. They seem most interesting. What a pity it is that he did not keep them all from the beginning of the siege instead of sending them down by Stewart, but of course he thought it safer to do the latter.

I was very glad to read your paper in the introduction about Sir Charles Wilson, who seems to be unjustly blamed. Have you seen him since he came to England? I was a little sorry to see the footnote on page 121 about Abd-el-Kader Pasha, as it does not quite convey the truth about his refusal to go to the Soudan. He agreed to go on certain conditions, the most important of which was that the abandonment of the Soudan was not to be announced, but in the instructions which were drawn up for him the abandonment was a leading feature. I made this note upon them at the time.

"N B Abd-el-Kader did not agree to these instructions on the ground that an immediate abandonment of Khartoum was inexpedient, and that to go to the Soudan with such an intention would lead to certain failure. The proposal to send him therefore fell through (16 Jan. 1884)."

Abd-el-Kader always remained of the same opinion that to proclaim the abandonment of the Soudan was to make the removal of the garrisons impossible. He is one of the best Pashas I have met with, *one who has not got rich*.

I shall write again when I have read the Journals

Yours very sincerely,

C. M. WATSON

## *Gordon Papers*

### SIR CHARLES WILSON'S ACCOUNT OF HIS EXPEDITION TO OMDURMAN SENT TO SIR H. GORDON

Mountjoy Barracks, Dublin, 27 July 1885.

1. The force under Sir H. Stewart was sent across the desert to occupy Matammeh, open up communication with General Gordon's steamers, and through them with Khartum. It was hoped that the presence of this force, which was not much larger than a battalion at war strength, on the Nile at Matammeh would withdraw some of the pressure on Khartum, but it was not sent to relieve that place.

2. My mission was to communicate with General Gordon, to deliver Lord Wolseley's letters to him, to ascertain from him the exact position of affairs at Khartum, to inform him that the forces advancing for the relief of Khartum would be concentrated at Matammeh and Shendy by the first week in March, and to have three officers in Khartum to assist General Gordon in the defence until relief came. I was then to return to Korti, bringing the English soldiers down the river with me. There was never any question of my attempting the relief of Khartum.

3. No one at Gubat, no one on the steamers of General Gordon's flotilla had the slightest suspicion that a crisis would occur at Khartum within a few days of our arrival at Matammeh. The first time that the officers and men on the steamers expressed a doubt as to the safety of Khartum was when we came under fire of the guns at Halfiyeh. There was therefore no urgent necessity for an immediate start without consideration for the position of the little force which had been more than decimated on its march to the Nile.

4. The steamers left Gubat at 8 a.m. on the 24th, and arrived off Omdurman at 2 p.m. on the 28th; they were heavily laden with grain, yet they made better time up the river as far as times can be compared, than Lord C. Beresford in the "Safieh," manned by officers and men of the Second Division of the Naval Brigade who had come across after the steamers left, this shows when once started there was no delay. Had the steamers started at 3 p.m. on the 21st, the day of their arrival, they would on the evening of the 25th have been some distance below Halfiyeh, out of sight of Khartum and unable to exert any influence over the events which occurred at Khartum at dawn on the 26th. It is absurd to suppose the Mahdi's plans would have been altered by his knowing the two steamers were coming up, he probably believed, as General Gordon did, they could not pass the batteries.

## Appendix A

5 The steamers were under fire from both banks, in action with the Mahdi's army, for four hours, it was impossible to land in the face of such a strong force, they came out of action a little after 4, and about 5 or soon after hauled into the bank to obtain information. We ascertained then, *sc* on the evening of the 28th, that Khartum had fallen through the treachery of Fara Pasha at dawn on the 26th, and that General Gordon had been killed. These were the two capital facts which it was necessary the Government and Lord Wolseley should know, all we have learned since is matter of detail. There was frequent communication with natives on the way down, they all told essentially the same story and there was never any doubt in my mind as to the truth of the main points.

6 It may be interesting to know that General Gordon's last great sortie was on the 17th January, the day of Abu Klea, and that it is almost certain he and his garrison had heard of the fight at Abu Klea, and possibly Gubat before the end came.

C. W. W.

MR EDWARD HAMILTON TO SIR HENRY GORDON

10, Downing Street, 20th July 1884

DEAR SIR,

I beg to return to you Lord Wolseley's letter, of which I have retained a copy.

Mr Gladstone is much obliged for your further note of to-day on the subject of the position of affairs at Khartoum. He admits the force of what you say, but he was under the impression that there was a known route to the South and to the sea from Khartoum, and that there must be persons, perhaps many persons, who are acquainted with it from the course of trade or otherwise. He would be glad to know whether he is right or wrong in this impression. Faithfully yours,

E. W. HAMILTON

MEMORANDUM BY SIR HENRY GORDON, DATED 22nd July 1884

FORWARDED TO MR GLADSTONE, 23rd July 1884

GENERAL GORDON'S PRESENT POSITION

There is no proof that Khartoum is invested upon the South—on the contrary there is presumptive evidence that it is not, since the Rebels, if in position there, would find it difficult to keep up their communications for supplies of Food, while their flank would be exposed on either side to constant attacks—by means

## *Gordon Papers*

of steamers from Khartoum. All communications that have come to hand, whether true or not, point to the country to the South as being open, and as of supplies coming in.

There is no question but what if General Gordon wished to leave with Colonel Stewart he could do so at any time, he could go to the Bahr-el-Gazelle—or he could move to the Equator (see General Gordon's own statement that he could get away to the Congo, also Sir Samuel Baker's letter to the "Times" of 30th April, and to the fact, according to Dr. Hill's book, "Colonel Gordon in Central Africa," that he was travelling to and fro on a "low Nile," in March and April 1874)

But it is equally certain that General Gordon would not desert the people who have been faithful to him

It is not a question of the safety of the garrison, but it is one of the protection of the traders at Khartoum

The former might be moved to Sennaar and thence transported further to the South, the latter would not leave—to do so would be worse than death (see enclosure in No. 3, Egypt, dated Khartoum, 8th April 1884, showing that General Gordon had traded with the people whom he would not desert)

The question would be the same if a force were at Khartoum

No doubt General Gordon at this time is doing all he can to secure the safety of the inhabitants, and would not care how he accomplished it

It is believed that he is conferring with the Mahdi, having this object in view, although he has no faith in his (the Mahdi's) power. If General Gordon could secure the safety of the people of Sennaar and Khartoum he would retire, since it may be assumed that Kassala is safe.

It seems probable that the Rebels to the North of Khartoum are instigated by Zebehr, and that the money at Berber has been too great a temptation to the Governor of that Station. It is doubtful whether Berber was not quietly given over to the rebels, and that it did not fall by assault

The Tribes to the North of Khartoum rose in rebellion for the reasons stated in the "Times" of the 10th March, under date of Khartoum 7th March, "this is not owing to disaffection, but to fear caused by the pronounced policy of the abandonment of the Soudan, which policy has been published by sending down the widows and orphans and Caro employées from Khartoum. We cannot blame them for rising when no definite sign is shown of establishing a permanent Government here. The Mahdi is a non-entity as to any advance on Khartoum, but all-powerful through his emissaries when backed with pronounced policy of abandonment without establishing a permanent Government."

## *Appendix A*

On the other hand while General Gordon may not, at this time, be in actual personal danger more than that incidental to disaffection at Khartoum, or from the daily contingencies which present themselves in time of war, yet the time is approaching when some steps must be taken to prove that he, as the agent of the British Government, is not to be abandoned, and to this must be coupled the fact that his ammunition is running short, and that he has not been heard of for so long a period.

It was hoped that the outbreaks among the tribes to the North of Khartoum would long ago have been put down, and that the country would have been quiet such an expectation, however, has not been realized, and when General Gordon's ammunition fails he will be at the mercy of the Rebels

In the absence of a Government that could secure the safety of the inhabitants, matters could not improve, it is therefore necessary, imperatively so, to reconsider General Gordon's application to have Zebehr sent up (see "Times," 5th March, dated Khartoum, 3rd March)

"It is now admitted that Zebehr Pasha is the only man connected with the Soudan, who is endowed with the ability and firmness necessary to head any Government here.

"It is out of the question that General Gordon should leave Khartoum without first having formed a Government which would in some measure stem the wave of fearful anarchy that must eventually sweep over the Soudan. The arrival of Zebehr Pasha would draw off to his side the bands of rebels which are now scattered over the Soudan, and his great knowledge of the tribes fits him more than any other man to take the place of the Egyptian Government. He would, of course, come here under certain stringent conditions. General Gordon had foreseen this ever since he left Cairo." I mentioned to Lord Granville in consequence of confidential information from Cairo, to the effect "that if Zebehr went up to Khartoum his first act would be to hang General Gordon," that it would be dangerous to send Zebehr up, and to this opinion I have adhered up to the present time.

As, however, the rebels remain in force to the North of Khartoum, and as matters have not improved, and cannot improve unless some future in the way of Government is made clear (bearing also in mind that General Gordon will not desert the people at Khartoum, unless he can leave them in safety), the time has now arrived that Zebehr should be sent up. It would be in compliance with General Gordon's own request, and Zebehr might be offered a sum of money provided he established an independent Government and so enabled General Gordon to leave Khartoum. The payment might be withheld until the object in

## *Gordon Papers*

view, viz., General Gordon's absence from Khartoum, had been secured.

It is believed that if Zebehr was sent up all danger to the peoples at Khartoum, Sennaar and Kassala would cease, and the country would be quieted.

At the same time it is necessary that other precautions should be taken the more especially as General Gordon's ammunition is daily decreased by expenditure. It would therefore seem desirable that a force should be sent to Suakim in order to open the road from that place to Berber (one of General Gordon's suggestions), out of course if Zebehr agrees to go, and is successful, then this force would not be called into action, although no delay should take place in its preparation.

It would be out of place my making any remarks upon any expedition advancing by the Nile, nevertheless I do not believe it to be practicable.

Any movement of Abyssinia upon Kassala and Sennaar would raise the whole of the Soudan, and would do an amount of harm that cannot be contemplated.

H. W. GORDON,

THE RT HON W. E GLADSTONE, M P, TO SIR HENRY  
GORDON

10, Downing Street, 22 Feb 1885.

DEAR SIR HENRY GORDON,

As long as a hope could in any way be entertained that your distinguished and excellent brother had survived the betrayal of Khartoum, I was unwilling to forgo the slender consolation it might afford, and I have also been delayed in writing this note for two or three days by an inquiry on a kindred subject. But I cannot longer forbear from addressing to you my humble tribute to his memory, insignificant as that tribute must be when rendered to one, whose fame has not only become a national possession, but gone forth throughout the world.

Though I had not the privilege of his personal acquaintance, yet his was a character of which I think many features could be plainly read even from a distance. The judgement of mankind has pronounced him a hero, and the application of that lofty name is specially marked in his case by the fact that it applies not only to his public acts, but to the man, to the spirit of self-sacrifice, such as distinguished martyrs and apostles, to a simplicity of character not less remarkable than his profound enthusiasm and his boundless courage. I cannot but add, though it is perhaps presumptuous, my admiration of his astonishing command, under circumstances

## Appendix A

so difficult of military resource, and of that inexhaustible strength of will which formed the crown of his powers; it is difficult to wish any of his virtues had been in any respect restrained, yet I reflect with pain, now that catastrophe has come, how ill his generous confidence was requited by some of those for whose welfare, though they were of a foreign race, it was his desire to live or die. I congratulate you on your close and intimate association with General Gordon, and I trust that among us there are and will be many who will strive to learn lessons in their several places from this noble example of Christian heroism. Believe me with much respect, faithfully yours,

W E GLADSTONE

SIR HENRY GORDON TO MR. GLADSTONE

23rd February (1885)

DEAR MR GLADSTONE,

I am very much obliged for your very kind note of sympathy, and for the very handsome manner in which you speak of General Gordon's character and services. It is not for me to dwell upon them, and the subject is a very painful one, and therefore I hope you will forgive the brevity of my reply.

Yours faithfully,

H W GORDON

H M QUEEN VICTORIA TO MISS GORDON

Osborne, 17th Feb 1885

DEAR MISS GORDON,

*How* shall I write to you, or how shall I attempt to express *what I feel*? To *think* of your dear, noble, heroic Brother, who served his Country and his Queen so truly, so heroically, with a self-sacrifice so edifying to the World, not having been rescued. That the promises of support were not fulfilled—which I so frequently and constantly pressed on those who asked him to go—is to me *grief inexpressible*! indeed it has made me ill! My heart bleeds for you his Sister, who have gone through so many anxieties on his account, and who loved the dear Brother as he deserved to be. You are all so good and trustful, and have such strong faith, that you will be sustained even now, when *real* absolute evidence of your dear Brother's death does not exist—but I fear there cannot be much doubt of it. Some day I hope to see you again, to tell you all I cannot express. My daughter Beatrice, who has felt quite as I do, wishes me to express her deepest sympathy

## *Gordon Papers*

with you. I hear so many expressions of sorrow and sympathy from *abroad* from my eldest daughter the Crown Princess, and from my cousin the King of the Belgians—the very warmest Would you express to your other Sisters and your elder Brother my true sympathy, and what I do so keenly feel, the *stain* left upon England, for your dear Brother's cruel, though heroic, fate

Ever

Dear Miss Gordon,

Yours sincerely and sympathizingly,

V R I

### MISS AUGUSTA GORDON TO QUEEN VICTORIA

Rockstone Place, Southampton

MADAM,

The letter which your Majesty has so graciously honoured me with has deeply touched and gratified me I am so thankful to know of your sympathy for, and the endeavours you so very kindly made to save my dear Brother, though *others dared* to prevent your supporting him in his just demands Never can I cease to be deeply grateful to your Majesty for the great kindness you have shown towards him. I think he received the gracious message you sent him through me as in one of the Volumes of his Diaries he returns a little letter in which I told him of your Majesty's message If permitted I should like to bring over the Original Diaries when I have the great honour to wait on your Majesty next month

I am your Majesty's devoted subject and servant,

M AUGUSTA GORDON

### MISS AUGUSTA GORDON TO MR BLUNT

Rockstone Place, Southampton, *11th September 1882*

Will you kindly give me a copy (two if you can spare them) of your letter on Egypt written to Mr Gladstone and others I am sending on by the first mail your letters and the 19th Century to my Brother at the Cape Strange you were not listened to by those in authority. I fancy there are many of your way of thinking and there would be many more if they knew the rights and wrongs done to Egypt

A. GORDON



## Appendix A

MR BLUNT TO GENERAL C G GORDON

Delhi, 24th January, 1884

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I feel obliged to write to you about your mission to the Soudan I see it announced to-day by telegraph without explanation of its object, but I cannot wait till more definite news arrives, and I desire to warn you It may be you are going there to make peace between the Mahdi and our troops in Egypt, to acknowledge his sovereignty in the Soudan, and arrange terms for the evacuation of Khartoum If so, I can only wish you God speed It is a good work, and you will accomplish it But if, as I fear it may be, from the tradition of some of those in power, the object of your mission is to divide the tribes with a view to retaining any part of the country for the Khedive, to raise men for him and scatter money, it is bad work, and you will fail It must be so Neither your courage, nor your honest purpose, nor the inspiration which has hitherto guided you, will bring you success I know enough to be able to assure you that every honest Mohammedan in Egypt and North Africa and Arabia sympathizes with the Mahdi's cause, not necessarily believing him to have a Divine mission, but as representing ideas of liberty and justice and religious government, which they acknowledge to be divine For this reason you will only have the men of Belial on your side, and these will betray you I beg you be cautious Do not trust to the old sympathy which united Englishmen with the Arabs I fear it is a thing of the past, and that even your great name will not protect you with them Also consider what your death will mean the certainty of a cry for vengeance in England, and an excuse with those who ask no better than a war of conquest I wish I could be sure that all those who are sending you on your mission do not foresee this end Forgive me if I am wrong in my fears, and believe me yours, very gratefully, in memory of last year,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

MRS SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT

134, St Owens, Hereford, Dec 27, 1884

DEAR SIR,

Will you allow me, personally a stranger, to tell you how interested I am in the result of your application to Mr Gladstone respecting your mediation with the Mahdi

You will the more readily understand my great interest, when I mention that I was in London for some weeks last spring for the purpose of devising some means for the rescue of General

## *Gordon Papers*

Gordon, and that I was about the first (I believe) to suggest the Volunteer Expedition of which I see by the "Pall Mall Gazette" you had heard

I saw Captain Brocklehurst, having called upon him though a stranger, but knowing his friendship for General Gordon. My own scheme was in the first place to have raised a "Khartoum Fund," for which I had many promises, and would have had no difficulty in raising from £80,000 and upwards. My idea was to pay the safe conduct for General Gordon and his garrison (in fact for all his people at Khartoum) from Khartoum to Cairo, a certain sum to be paid to the chief of each tribe, the amount to be in proportion to the extent of territory over which the safe pass would be given. I saw many members of the House of Commons and other influential persons, but after discussion, though my plan was approved by many, it was waived in favour of the Volunteer Expedition, to which I promised to transfer the £100 I should have subscribed to the "safe conduct" scheme.

But the Government negatived decidedly the Volunteer movement, and my plan had fallen through. It was with much regret that I returned here, having after much anxiety and trouble effected nothing of that on which my heart was set.

If I had known you were in London I would have ventured to have called on you. I have a strong personal regard for General Gordon, and with many members of his family I am on terms of friendship. Now, I am perplexed whether to wish you success in your application to the Premier—if it would save General Gordon I would pray for it—but if you should be frustrating plans for his safety I could not. I write to you freely though a stranger, and I hope you will forgive me, but the one great interest which I think we both have in common, General Gordon, will plead my excuse.

Believe me, dear Sir, yours faithfully,

ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT

MR. BLUNT TO MRS. ALLNATT

Crabbet Park, Dec 29, 1884

MY DEAR MADAM,

I am sorry that I did not know of your plans for rescuing General Gordon by peaceful means last year, as your support and that of friends so liberal and sincere in their efforts would have given great weight to my plea with Mr Gladstone, and might perhaps have turned the scale with him in favour of negotiation. This course would, I am convinced, have been an infinitely surer and better one than that of war which our Government have chosen.

My point of view in the matter is of course rather a different

## Appendix A

one from yours, for you look only to General Gordon's safety whereas I look also, and indeed primarily, to the well-being of the Nile populations, but I see no reason that our efforts should not even now be made in common

From all the accounts I receive, Lord Wolseley's expedition will meet with determined opposition, and it is quite possible that it may be several months yet on the road—in which case the time will shortly come when necessity will compel the Government, if they would not fail altogether in their object of saving Gordon's life, to have recourse to our ideas if not to our help. My principal fear indeed is that, going to work through ignorance of the conditions before them in a blundering way, their attempt to treat will be so protracted that Khartoum will in the interval have fallen. I will not, however, be a prophet of evil, only would urge you not to relax your efforts. Any independent appeal made just now to Mr Gladstone would, I believe, have at least the good effect, that it would force on his attention the daily increasing gravity of Gordon's situation

Very faithfully yours,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

MRS SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR BLUNT

134, St. Owens, Hereford, *Febry* 17, 1885

MY DEAR SIR,

I thank you for your letter just received. I have given up (as you see) all hope of the precious life having been saved. But how cruel has been the martyrdom of his, during weeks and months owing to the Government, of which one cannot speak with aught but the greatest contempt and indignation. Knowing the faith of the devoted Christian soldier, I have the hope or rather the consolation of thinking that as he was deserted by man so his God was nearer to him day by day.

I go tomorrow (Wednesday) till Saturday to Mr Egmont Hake the Biographer of "Chinese Gordon." I should like very much to talk over one or two matters with you now, respecting the recovery of his bible and journal, etc., and also of the proposed additional expedition. Is it not madness to send one of the Khedive's sons as Governor General of the Soudan? I thought the Egyptians were hated by the poor Soudanese.

Unhappy land! What will be the outcome of all this? God, who created the world out of chaos, can bring order out of the Egyptian confusion.

Believe me, My dear Sir, Yrs sincerely,  
ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT

## *Gordon Papers*

MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT

38, Montpellier Terrace, Cheltenham,  
*Feb 21, 1885*

MY DEAR SIR,

I am staying here till Wednesday, when I shall D V return to Hereford, where I shall anxiously await the result of your kind effort to procure for me the bible of dear General Gordon.

In the train to-day I read in the papers, with dismay, the reply of the Government to the questions respecting the important and precious records of Khartoum kept by its devoted Defender. They decline to say what course they will take regarding them. I have just written to Sir Henry Gordon most earnestly beseeching him, out of regard to his brother's memory, to apply for the possession of the journal, 6 volumes, on their arrival. One dreads such important and deeply interesting records getting into the hands of men so unscrupulous as those comprising the present Government. The papers would probably be cruelly mutilated before leaving their hands, if there were aught in them that would condemn those who sacrificed their devoted Envoy to paltry party devices.

I am my dear Sir, Yrs sincerely,  
ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT

### EXTRACT FROM EDITH, LADY LYTTON'S DIARY

*June 7, Simla, 1880* — In the evening, while we were at dinner under the Shemiana on the lawn, Lord William [Beresford] arrived, having left Lord Ripon at Umballa and come on very quickly to reach us for our last evening. He says the heat has been tremendous and worse than he has ever felt it, and he and Major White had to put ice on their heads one night, expecting every minute to succumb. But Lord Ripon and party have not complained or been ill. Lord William told us about Colonel Gordon being so odd, he says the world is not big enough for him, and that there is no king or country big enough. He hit Lord William on the shoulder, saying, "Yes, that is flesh, that is what I hate, and what makes me wish to die." He resigned the Private Secretaryship, to the Viceroy's great inconvenience, because he was asked to answer an address at Bombay saying that Lord Ripon had read it with interest and would write again at some time, and he said: "You know perfectly that Lord Ripon has never read it, and will not write, and I can't say those sort of things, so I shall resign, and you take in my resignation." Colonel Gordon received a telegram from China asking him to go and fight the Russians

## *Appendix A*

there, so he has gone off to do so, and his last word to Lord William was, "Everyone will say I am mad, but you say I am not"

COLONEL LOUIS A GORDON TO MR BLUNT

Carpenters, Horsham, Sussex, *Sept* 4, 1911

DEAR MR BLUNT,

I am glad to see that you, in your new book "Gordon at Khartoum," are undertaking the vindication of my uncle's memory against an attack on it, which Lord Cromer thought fit to make in his "Modern Egypt" so many years after the death of General Gordon and my father Sir Henry Gordon. I know that nothing that Lord Cromer could write would in the least affect General Gordon's memory, but the remarks he makes leave a nasty taste in the mouth and it is very desirable that they should be responded to in detail.

In "Modern Egypt," page 43, Vol. I, I observe a note which affects my father, Sir Henry Gordon, Lord Cromer says "At the instance however, of General Gordon's friends and family, a good deal of violent and very foolish abuse of Lord Granville—and if I remember rightly, of others—was omitted. It is in my opinion to be regretted that this was done. The publication of the Journal, as it was originally written, would have enabled the public to judge more accurately of the value of General Gordon's criticisms, than was possible when only an expurgated edition was issued." This contains an accusation of tampering with the Journals which the facts do not warrant.

As far as Sir Henry Gordon is concerned, expurgation of the kind referred to by Lord Cromer was certainly not authorised. In his "Description of the Journals," page lxxv, my father says "I have arranged . . . for their issue in a very nearly entire state, only some 6 or 7 pages being omitted which contain, in my opinion, no matter of public interest, while with regard to names those who are well acquainted with the affairs of Egypt can fill in the blanks without difficulty." That no fraud has been exercised on the public in the matter, and that the public has not been deprived of the opportunity of reading the Journals in full, is sufficiently plain by the fact that the Journals were deposited by my family in the British Museum plain for all folk to see, so that anyone, caring to do so, can satisfy himself on the subject.

Yrs sincerely,

L. A. GORDON

## APPENDIX B

### MR. BLUNT'S ORIENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

#### I AS TO HIS PROPOSED MEDIATION WITH THE MAHDI

##### MR. BLUNT TO SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU AT PARIS

London, *April 7, 1884.*

To my noble and dear friend, the learned Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, the martyr of liberty, may God continue to enlighten him.

Your letter, which Her Ladyship has now translated to me in full, has given me much pleasure except in what you say of your not being able yet to come to England, but I send you by this post the money needful for your journey and trust that you will acknowledge to me its safe arrival. I wrote four days ago to M. Sanua telling him something of the state of opinion here, and since that time I have written a letter which will be published in the 'Times' of to-morrow or Wednesday in which I have proposed a solution of the present difficulties and misfortunes in Egypt. I trust that it may meet with your approval, for in it I propose that the Egyptian question shall be referred to an European Congress, that the English army shall retire from the country and that Egypt shall be placed under the joint protection of the Powers, and so govern herself according to her own will.

I propose also that peace shall be made with the Mahdi, and General Gordon be recalled from Khartoum—nor have I forgotten to recommend that the decrees of exile against the patriots of Egypt shall be reversed. With regard to Egypt and Syria and the Arabian Caliphate you know well my views, for they are published in the book which I wrote three years ago founded on your learned instructions and your views conveyed to me through our dear friend (peace be with him) Mohammed Khalil. But with regard to the Mohammedans of India these are my views, and I beg that you will communicate them to the noble prince the Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din (to whom also I send my best compliments) that he may know them himself and communicate them to the Nawab Rasul Yar Khan and the Ulema of Hyderabad, though I have already told them of my thoughts, having spoken freely to all the Mohammedans of India whom I met. My thoughts therefore about India are these. According to the principles which I

## *Appendix B*

hold in political affairs I desire to see liberty and self government established everywhere, and in India no less than in other countries of the world now held in subjection, and I am not prejudiced by the fact that I was born an Englishman into wishing for other advantage there than to the Indians, nor should I hesitate to approve of any wise plan which should hasten their freedom. At the same time my journey in India has convinced me that the people of that country are not yet sufficiently united to form an independent nation, unprotected by some external Power. If all Indians were of one creed and one language and one race, as was the case in Egypt, I would say to them as I said to you, "Bismillah," in the name of God go forward and fear nothing. But it is not so. I see that though they might free themselves from the English domination, which is hateful to them, they are not yet prepared to set anything of profit to them in its place. I see that they must be educated and prepared for self government. Otherwise their effort would not prosper. For this reason I have said to them, and I say it again, take patience for a few years and work out your political education under a government which allows you this privilege of education, and later the moment will come when you shall be able to unite and form a Nation. To the Mohammedans I say this especially, for they are but as one to five of the population of India, and at the present moment they are also inferior to the Hindus and Parsis in education, so that it is possible their condition would be worse under native than under English rule. By advising them to found an University I desired first to give them a centre of unity which should add to their strength, for strength is in union,—and secondly to prepare them to take their full part in the regeneration of their country. At present, by standing aloof from public affairs and by remaining in ignorance of English, which is the official language, they are putting themselves at a disadvantage with the other races and religions of India. I trust therefore that the learned Seyyid, when he writes to Hyderabad will encourage them to proceed in this good work, and not to spare their efforts in the direction I have pointed out.

With regard to your newspaper I shall be happy to do what I can to help you. But I advise you strongly to be moderate in your language about the English Government—not that anything you can say about its action in Egypt can surpass my own anger and impatience,—but because I see in the friendship of England still the best hope for Islam. Believe me, though England has acted through all this matter as an enemy of religion, there are still more Englishmen who sympathise with our hopes for the nations of the East than you will find amongst all the rest of the Europeans. You cannot trust the French or the Russians or the

## *Oriental Correspondence*

Austrians or the Italians to act with you sincerely as friends—and the English being stronger at sea than all others, must always be counted with, and if possible secured as friendly. This may yet come about, and I should be sorry to see an irreconcilable breach made between the party of reform in Islam and the English people. Think this matter fairly over. For centuries England was the friend of Islam, and I find very many Englishmen now who regret and condemn the change of policy.

You see I have spoken openly all that is in my heart  
Your friend in good and bad fortune,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU TO MR BLUNT

(*Translation from the Arabic*)                      Paris, April 11, 1884

To H. E. my dear friend, friend of the Moslems, helper of the Arabs and defender of the Egyptian nation, etc

After salutation to you and to the well-instructed Lady Anne Blunt—yesterday your letter reached us, and reading it we found it full of wisdom and useful counsels to the Moslems, and it confirmed our trust in you that you are their friend.

The Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din presents you his salutation and will certainly write to the people of India in Hyderabad and elsewhere, and will advise them to be quiet, and will tranquilize their minds as you suggested, and he will expound to them the idea you have so clearly set forth in your letter, and will put the details before them in the best and most lucid manner.

Next, we rejoiced at the admonition you were kind enough to give us, and at your promise to help our newspaper (the Indissoluble Link), and this was our hope in you. And indeed God the Most High created you to do good, and to assist the cause of right, and to defend the oppressed. And the true character of our newspaper is only this, and to serve those views for which you are labouring, namely, the preservation of the independence of the Eastern peoples, and the admonishing of the English Government that it may abandon its action troubling the minds of Moslems and make fast their friendship, and that so it shall have them with it on its side. And indeed we do not love those other Powers referred to in your letter, nor go with the policy of any one of them.

And so may peace be with you and the mercy of God. Your sincere friend,

MOHAMMED ABDU ,



## Appendix B

SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT

*Private*

Paris le 21 Avril, 84

MON CHER MONSIEUR,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre aimable lettre dont je vous remercie et à laquelle je m'empresse de répondre

Quoique je n'ai nullement appris pendant les dix années que j'ai passées en Egypte que M Gordon fût, à l'époque où il était Gouverneur du Soudan, ami de la liberté et défenseur de l'Islam, je n'hésite pas cependant, étant donnée la pleine confiance que j'ai en votre parole, à plaindre son malheureux sort et à regretter qu'il soit tombé dans une situation qui devient de plus en plus critique

Je ne vous cache pas, cher Monsieur, qu'il m'aurait été facile, vu la confiance que le Mahdi paraît vouloir avoir en moi ainsi que celle de ses principaux partisans dont un grand nombre sont de mes élèves Soudanais, de prévenir ce désastre qui menace Gordon Pacha si les dernières batailles entre Graham et Osman Digna ne s'étaient pas engagées, mais après ces batailles sanglantes qui ont coûté tant de sang Arabe, je crois que le Mahdi et ses partisans sont réduits à voir que le seul moyen de rattrapper le terrain perdu et de consolider leur prestige serait de s'emparer de Khartoum et d'arrêter M Gordon sinon de lui arracher la vie.

Cependant, si vous voulez, cher Monsieur, m'écrire avec plus de détails et *en français* sur les bases de la paix que vous voudriez conclure et avec qui désireriez vous qu'elle soit faite pour qu'elle soit acceptable et en règle, je ne manquerais pas alors de vous fixer sur tout ce que je pourrais faire dans cette circonstance et sur les moyens efficaces dont on pourrait se servir pour sauver la vie à ce malheureux Gordon

En attendant le plaisir de vous lire, je me mets à votre entière disposition et vous prie d'agréer mes salutations distinguées.

JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI

MR BLUNT TO SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN AFGHANI

10, James Street, le 24 Avril, 1884

NOBLE ET CHER AMI,

La bonne réponse que vous avez bien voulu me faire à mes questions sur le sort de Gordon me touche profondément. Je sais combien il a dû vous coûter de prendre ainsi part à un projet qui aurait pour but de prêter aide à un homme qui malgré ses principes avoués a fait tant de tort à la cause que nous aimons, mais je vois dans cette affaire une occasion puissante pour obtenir du Gouvernement Anglais l'abandon de sa politique actuelle en

## *Oriental Correspondence*

Egypte Je viens d'adresser formellement à M Gladstone une lettre où je lui fais savoir qu'il serait encore possible pour lui non seulement de sauver la vie à Gordon mais d'amener la pacification de toute la vallée du Nil. Hier encore on était résolu d'envoyer une nouvelle expédition Anglo-Egyptienne au Soudan, mais il paraît que déjà ma lettre aurait produit quelque effet et qu'on soit maintenant de nouveau à la paix. Je compte donc sous peu de jours recevoir quelque communication du Gouvernement qui mènerait à un tentatif de négociations et je voudrais vous prévenir que je pourrais à tout instant vous prier de vouloir bien venir à Londres où bien d'envoyer le Sheykh Mohammed Abdu me parler.

Je vous prie de regarder d'un bon œil mes idées pacifiques. Comme je vous ai déjà dit, je vois dans l'Angleterre la seule puissance qui pourrait redevenir un ami sincère de l'Islam, et je vois dans la nécessité où est dans ce moment notre Gouvernement un puissant levier pour amener l'abandon de sa position actuelle d'hostilité. Quant aux conditions de paix je ne suis pas encore en position de vous les formuler. Mais selon moi elles devraient s'étendre jusqu'à la cession du Soudan entier au Mahdi. Je vous envoie copie d'une lettre que j'ai eu de Gordon il y a près de deux ans qui vous sera preuve de son bon caractère.

Bien votre dévoué,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

MR BLUNT TO SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN

10, James Street, le 25 *Avril*, 1884

NOBLE ET CHER AMI,

Depuis ma lettre d'hier je l'ai d'une source certaine que notre Gouvernement s'est décidé absolument contre l'expédition, pour le moment, de toute force militaire Anglaise ou Egyptienne à Berber. Or il est presque sûr qu'on se prépare à une négociation, et déjà on me fait entendre que je recevrai sous peu une réponse définitive à ma lettre. Que pensez vous, pourrai je aller en personne à Obeyd en qualité d'Envoyé Britannique traiter avec le Mahdi en lui reconnaissant la souveraineté du Soudan? Et croyez vous qu'à ces conditions les tribus qui assiègent Khartoum permettraient à Gordon et aux Chrétiens de la ville de retourner sous sauf-conduite en Egypte? Ou bien, si je ne pourrai pas aller en personne, croyez-vous qu'il se trouverait quelque autre envoyé capable de mener la négociation à bonne fin? Je vous prie de vouloir bien me répondre à ces questions.

En même temps je compte persuader le Gouvernement de restaurer le parti National en Egypte. Mais dites moi franchement

## Appendix B

ment votre idée Qui devons nous proposer en place de Tewfik? Serait ce Arabi ou un autre? Les Circassiens, si je ne me trompe, voudraient Ismail Les autres voudraient encore peut-être Halim Mais l'opinion change si vite que je n'ose dire absolument à qui on donnerait les votes si la chose était remise à l'élection Surtout qui pourrait agir en Egypte de concert avec le Mahdi?

Inshallah! nous menerons l'affaire cette fois-ci à bonne fin

Votre bien dévoué,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR BLUNT TO ARABI PASHA

(*Sent in Arabic*)

10, James Street, April 26th, 1884

To my noble and dear friend Arabi Pasha, may God strengthen his patience

After saying that it has given us extreme pleasure to have news of you and the rest of the noble Egyptian exiles—this is to inform you that the hopes of your return to Egypt are, as I think, greater now than at any previous time since you first went away in Exile The reason of this is (after the will of Providence that truth should prevail) that the English Government has fallen into great trouble in Egypt, first on account of the finance and secondly with regard to the Mahdi They are therefore entirely anxious to leave Egypt, and they see that it is necessary in order to do this that a stable Government should be set up at Cairo, and a prince established who should be able to live in friendship with the Mahdi

Therefore it is probable that they will abandon Tewfik inasmuch as he is incapable of governing and will entrust the government to other hands before they withdraw their troops And in these last days the danger to General Gordon at Khartoum obliges them to come to terms quickly, and I have proposed (with the permission of God) to go as Envoy to the Mahdi in order to make peace and to save the life of General Gordon, and, if they should accept my offer, I do not fear but that they will also accept my plan for the restoration of good government in Egypt Now therefore tell me clearly, on what terms could you and your companions return to Egypt? I know that you could serve with Halim Pasha But tell me, is it impossible that you could serve with Ismail? I have several times received messages from Ismail, and his friends tell me that he promises to act with you if he is restored But do you think it would be possible to trust him? I should propose that in any case the command of the army should be in your hands Or is there any other prince among the Princes of Islam whom you would serve and who could live at peace with the Mahdi, I ask

## *Oriental Correspondence*

you these things because the aspect of politics continually changes, and what is true to-day is not true to-morrow, and what was rejected yesterday may once again be accepted

Also a conference is assembling at which it will be necessary that your opinion should be heard. Therefore write to me your full mind and the mind of your companions, and, if you should resolve that you could return to Egypt as Minister to Ismail, telegraph to me then one word "content," and I shall understand. If you consider that it will be impossible for you to serve under Ismail, telegraph the word "refused."

For the rest all things are going well. There are many Englishmen now who recognize your services to Egypt and I am hopeful of your return there

Your friend,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

You must not suppose from my writing in this sense that I want you to make friends with Ismail. What I want is that you should tell me your real opinion as to whether it will be possible for you to work with him

SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR BLUNT

*Privée*

Paris, *April* 28, 1884.

MON CHER MONSIEUR,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre que j'ai lue avec beaucoup d'attention et à laquelle je m'empresse de répondre

Vous ne devez pas ignorer l'importance que les Mohamétans attachent à la mission divine avec laquelle le Mahdi a paru et qu'ils comprennent par ce mot, Mahdi le sauveur de l'Islam des mains de ceux qui ne sont pas de leur religion. Or je ne vois pas qu'on puisse conclure un traité de paix avec le Mahdi et par conséquent arrêter sa marche tant que celui-ci voit les Anglais en Egypte. Mais si les bases de la paix stipulent que l'Egypte sera aux Egyptiens et que Gordon Pacha sera sauvé avec tous les Chrétiens qui sont avec lui et que, enfin, les troupes Anglaises seront retirées de l'Egypte, je vois qu'il serait possible sinon facile de mener cette affaire à bonne fin et d'arrêter l'invasion du Mahdi jusqu'à un certain point et jusqu'à un certain temps. Dans ce cas il faudrait envoyer une commission de paix composée en grande partie de Mussulmans et de quelques Anglais. Quand aux Mussulmans ils auraient pour instruction de dire qu'ils viennent de la part de la Nation Egyptienne Mussulmane car si ils seraient envoyés de la part du Gouvernement Egyptien, je ne crois pas qu'ils réussissent dans leur mission étant donné l'aversion dont le Mahdi

## Appendix B

est animé à son égard, et de la part du Gouvernement Anglais, ils ne seront pas écoutés. Nous en avons acquis une preuve par le Cheick El Morghani. Quant aux quelques Anglais qui feront partie de la mission, il est bien entendu qu'ils iront de la part de leur Gouvernement, quoique, par le fait, tous, Mussulmans et Chrétiens seront des missionnaires Anglais.

Dans le cas qu'on décide à envoyer cette commission, et dans les conditions que je me suis permis de vous exposer, je crois que vous, cher Monsieur, vous devez être le premier nommé parmi les missionnaires, car les Mussulmans ne peuvent pas trouver beaucoup de défenseurs comme vous. Pour les Mussulmans qu'il faudrait envoyer, je les désignerai et vous en ferai connaître les noms quand le moment serait venu et qu'on se serait décidé d'une façon définitive.

Vous me demandez en qui faut-il remplacer Tewfik? Je réponds que quand le moment serait venu il ne serait difficile ni à vous ni à moi ni à qui que ce soit de le savoir. Il faudrait se prononcer pour celui que la *nation Egyptienne* veut et pas pour un autre.

Votre bien dévoué,  
JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI

MR BLUNT TO SEYVID JEMAL-ED-DIN

10, James Street, le 2 Mai, 1884

NOBLE ET CHER AMI,

Je vous remercie bien de vos instructions sur la manière de négocier qui sont absolument d'accord avec mes idées personnelles. Pour le moment le Gouvernement se retire du tentatif proposé, mais je suis toujours en relation indirecte avec eux, et je pense bien qu'ils se trouveront encore dans la nécessité de recourir à nos bons offices. Seulement l'hésitation pourra bien coûter la vie à Gordon. Pour le moment le Gouvernement est toujours dans l'intention d'abandonner Khartoum, Berber et Dongola, mais je prévois que dans le cas que Gordon soit encore debout à Khartoum à l'époque du cru du Nil le public anglais pourra exiger une opération militaire.

Quant au général il se pourra que son intention serait de se retirer vers le Congo, quand il trouvera qu'il ne pourra plus se tenir à Khartoum, et je crois que le Mahdi serait bien avisé de lui laisser le passage libre. L'idée de Gordon au Congo paraît avoir toujours été d'y fonder un Etat indigène qui pourrait faire face à l'invasion de l'Europe, et en tant il mériterait votre sympathie. Faites un pont d'or pour l'ennemi qui s'en fuit. Je suis cependant pleine-

## *Oriental Correspondence*

ment de votre avis qu'il soit nécessaire au Mahdi de s'opposer sans délai de Khartoum Je vous prie de me croire bien votre ami.

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT

Paris, le 7 Mai, 1884

MON CHER MONSIEUR,

Je viens d'arriver de l'Italie J'ai été à l'exposition de Turin et ce n'est que ce matin que l'on m'a remis vos deux lettres que j'ai lues avec beaucoup d'attention.

Votre dernière lettre m'a d'autant plus appris que vous ne vous intéressez plus au sort de Gordon qu'il m'a édifié encore une fois sur la loyauté et la grandeur d'âme qui vous caractérisent. Tout en vous remerciant d'avoir bien voulu m'envoyer le livre bleu contenant certaines correspondances relatives au Général Gordon, dès quelles vous avez pu constater qu'il n'était nullement ami de la liberté ni défenseur de l'Islam, j'ai la ferme conviction que votre nom sera gravé dans le cœur de chaque musulman en particulier et de chaque Arabe et Oriental en général à cause de l'intérêt immense que vous prenez pour eux et dont il ne sauraient vous être trop reconnaissant. J'espère, cher Monsieur, que vous continuerez à suivre cette voie digne d'un caractère aussi loyal que le vôtre et que le bon Dieu vous aidera à récolter les fruits du travail dur que vous faites

Veillez, je vous prie, me faire rappeler au bon souvenir de Madame Blunt tout en lui présentant mes respectueux hommages et soyez persuadé que je me mets à votre entière disposition pour tout ce que je pourrais faire pour vous.

Votre bien dévoué,

JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSAYNI AFGHANI

ARABI PASHA TO MR. BLUNT

(*Sent in English*)

Colombo, 2nd June 1884

To my lord Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, may God preserve him.

It is with the greatest pleasure that I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th April 1884 I must strongly insist on the fact that Ismail Pasha is a treacherous person who is notorious for his untrustworthiness, being the causer of the destruction of Egypt. The national Debt of our country is the work of his hands. There is no one of the prince's family who possesses the requisite qualifications for the throne but Halim Pasha He is,

## Appendix B

besides the direct descendant of the first Khedive; being the son of Mohammed Ali. Tewfik (the present Khedive) and the others are members of a third branch, so that Halim Pasha, who is directly the ancestral representative, is the real owner of the throne. To add to his right he has the voice of all the Egyptians in Egypt to hail him, and he has for a long time undergone trials of a very grave nature, having been subjected to tyranny. Also he would be able to make a treaty between the Mahdi and the Government of Egypt, inasmuch as those whom the Mahdi trusts are able to effect this for him.

If you are resolved to go to the Mahdi, I must most earnestly entreat you to secure beforehand some letters stamped with my seal, in order that they may serve as the proof that you are a faithful friend of the Moslem world, and that you have been instrumental in saving our lives. May God preserve you. Your most faithful friend,

AHMED ARABI.

ARABI PASHA TO LADY ANNE BLUNT

(Translated from the Arabic) Colombo, March 2, 1885

To the noble and exalted lady, Lady Anne Blunt, may God protect her. Amen

After presenting my best salutations to your distinguished self and your illustrious husband, and in response to your two letters with inclosures relating what Mr. Blunt had written in the "Times" on Egypt and England and the Sultan, with the remarks made thereon, permit me to assure you that all that Mr. Blunt has stated in the "Times," and declared publicly in many utterances, and all that he described in his poem (kasid) "The Wind and Whirlwind," of the disasters and calamities that must ensue, all these are true, and we see them happening now, as it was necessary they should happen, and truly the Most High God inspired him with truth to speak these things, and with a just understanding. For the time has come now when God shall choose his servants, and shall deliver the weak and oppressed and abase the mighty and oppress the oppressor, and shall manifest His power and His strength to the unjust. And thus in times past He confounded men's reasoning by His wonderful judgements on the nations that are gone. Thus He destroyed Babylon the adulterous, the violent city, and thus the empires of Persia and of Rome, and I grieve with a great grief over the decline of the star of England caused by her misdeeds in Egypt and in the Soudan. But God has heard the cry of the oppressed and the voice of the blood which has been shed, and

## *Oriental Correspondence*

the terrible cry of the widow and of the young children, and surely He has taken His vengeance on the covetous. Yet, believe me, the people of Egypt used to believe good of the English nation. It was they of all others that they trusted, as the foremost among nations, and as the chief hope of those who sought to obtain their freedom, and they grieve now seeing their belief a deception, and their trust a delusion.

And what has England gained by her invasion of Egypt, and what in the Soudan? Rather let us say, what has she lost? For God knows she has gained nothing. She has lost her good name, the friendship of all Moslems, and of our Lord the Sultan. She has lost, too, Gordon Pasha, through acting on false counsels, and Hicks and Earle, and how many other officers, and she has lost the respect of all hearts by this war against free men in the Soudan. When will she cease to rush forward on her course, to send armies of revenge on men who are themselves avenging their Egyptian brothers, on men defending their country, and who delight to drink the cup of death rather than that they should see an enemy left within its borders. I tell you, *fifteen* millions of such as these occupy at this moment the Soudan country and Darfur, and all of them are partisans of the Mahdi, having made a convention with him unto death, and in accordance with the precepts of our noble Koran. Thus the Mahdi increases in strength with the English aggression, and this is God's law with his creatures, with all who have been given intelligence to see and reflect and understand.

"A decree has come forth from God. There is no escape from the judgement of God. God shall exalt whom He will, and abase whom He will. The oppressor shall repent when repentance shall not avail him. And God is not unmindful of the deeds of the unjust." (Quotations.)

My son Mohammed Bey and the family send you a thousand thousand greetings. From your friend and servant,

AHMED ARABI.

SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT

*(Translated from the Arabic)*

Paris, May 12, 1885

After salutations, etc. I say, I am not alone in gratitude for your distinguished efforts which have forced the Government to evacuate the Soudan. No, be certain that all Moslems, especially the Arabs, will be grateful for this your action to the end of time and they will write your name on tablets inlaid with precious stones and titles of glory and honour for your zeal and courage.

But there is left one thing still to be done and that is that you



## Appendix B

should say to the Government, "How can you leave this land thus without a treaty with the Mahdi and whose will be the duty of repelling the Mahdi's attacks? how also can the Government leave the roads of commerce blocked? or does it desire the destruction of trade? Is it not incumbent on the Government when it has determined to evacuate the Soudan to send a man of trust, a Moslem, to the Mahdi that he may discuss with him as to a peace and secure Egypt from his attacks and to close the gates of conflict and reopen those of Commerce" I think that if this question were presented to parliament all opinions would agree with it

I see too that this would be easy, even apart from your own action and that when the cost has been decided on you will be only needed to complete it But without a treaty of peace with the Mahdi the situation cannot be brought to a final conclusion. This is what I have thought it necessary to say to you

With salutations to you and your consort,

Your friend,

JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI.

### ARABI PASHA TO LADY ANNE BLUNT

(Translated from the Arabic) Colombo, August 14, 1885

To my lady, dear Lady Anne Blunt May God preserve her

After best salutations to yourself and Mr Blunt I was happy to receive your letter dated July 17th, and thanked God that you are in good health, of which I hope for the continuance I sent you a telegram the same day as to my willingness to serve the country even with Tewfik and Sherif, and I now write this in confirmation

I can assure you that I am prepared to serve my country, to work hard at reforms in it, and to labour for its advancement to the highest pitch of honour and prosperity

Therefore I should not mind whether I served with Tewfik or another, my one only object being the establishing of just law for all men alike, giving to all security for their persons and for their civil and religious rights, and putting an end to wrong and injustice between class and class of (Egyptian) subjects, always bearing in mind the claims on me of the English people (*nation*) to whom I shall be grateful as long as I live

I have, too, a firm trust that the English Government would aid me in carrying out reforms, and that, after establishing a strong, just, and equitable Government, it will leave Egypt to the Egyptians, thus fulfilling its promise and completing what it has commenced

## *Oriental Correspondence*

As to Sherif, he is well disposed and anxious for the good of the country, but Nubar is not really interested in the welfare of Egypt, and the Egyptians are weary at his holding high office in the country.

Now, therefore, since you and your friends, and my friends, are of opinion that it would be fitting for me to take office even with Tewfik, I would agree also to that I should hope for success in making those reforms of which we have already sown the seeds—notwithstanding Tewfik's remaining—if supported by the English Government, and in surmounting those difficulties, both home and foreign, which have beset Egypt in these latter times.

And God is our Helper, and in Him our trust.

Your sincere friend,

AHMED ARABI THE EGYPTIAN

## II. EVIDENCE AS TO THE MASSACRES AT ALEXANDRIA, TANTAH, AND ELSEWHERE, IN 1882

SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU TO LADY ANNE BLUNT

*(Translated from the Arabic, received 5th August, 1883, from  
Beyrout.)*

To the Lady Anne Blunt May God show us her countenance, etc.

Next, among those persons who have information about the riot in Alexandria in particular, there is Mustafa Abd el Rahim, who was present at the riot and stopped its rage with the regular soldiers with Suleyman Sami (may God have mercy on him). And he is prepared to bear witness on being requested to do so, as he has informed me this night.

And of those who have complete information of the conduct of the Khedive Tewfik and of his endeavours and the endeavours of his assistants to disturb the peace and tranquillity of Egypt, and to excite the Muslims against the Christians, and vice versa, there is here Ahmed Bey Minshawi, one of the Notables of Egypt, a man of wealth and of determination and of extreme straightforwardness. It was he who protected Christians in the riots of Tantah, and in other massacres in the province of Charbiyeh, which Ibrahim Pasha Adhem, the Khedive's protégé, got up after the bombardment of Alexandria; and he is prepared to bear witness against the Khedive and against his agents before any Court or in any

## Appendix B

Tribunal—even in the Egyptian Tribunals—and he has no fear of anything, and is not alarmed by any danger. He has been intending to write a letter to Mr Blunt, of his own accord, to express his readiness and his earnest wish to put before Englishmen, and before everyone inclined to justice and equity, the things known to him, and he is now with us in Beyrut, and if you wish to summon him he is ready.

Convey my salutations to Mr Blunt and present to him on my behalf and on behalf of every Egyptian—indeed of every Englishman—exceeding thanks for his energy and noble deeds. And salute for me Mr Sabunji. May God protect you in his keeping.

MOHAMMED ABDU

13th Ramadan, 1300

AHMED BEY EL MINSHAWI TO MR BLUNT

(Translated from the Arabic, received August 5, 1883)

To the high-minded Mr Blunt. May God preserve him!

After presenting salutations and praise and thanks

Also, I beg you will be my representative in presenting thanks from me and from all Egyptians—indeed from all Eastern people, to Lord (Randolph) Churchill and his companions—though they are all dependent on you for what they accomplished in Parliament.

Also I am prepared, with all preparation, to bear witness against the Khedive and the men of his government as to their plan, which they carried out, of shedding the blood of Christians and others. In so doing I fear not the blame of any blamer, nor do I dread the authority of any ignorant ruler in whatsoever country I may be, or before whatsoever tribunal I may appear, and whenever the indictment against Tewfik is officially brought forward and witnesses are wanted I am ready in Beyrut, and if I went elsewhere I would let you know. And I pledge myself in the name of God that I will also bring witnesses of the Egyptians who will bear witness to the crimes of the Khedive and his wicked accomplices.

And my friend the Sheykh Mohammed Abdu knows that perfectly well, and sends you salutations. Remain in God's protection.

Eg,

AHMED MINSHAWI

Beyrut, 15th Ramadan, 1300

## *Oriental Correspondence*

TRANSLATION OF REMARKS BY SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDO ON  
MAJORA MACDONALD'S STATEMENT (RECEIVED

*Aug. 13, 1884)*

We have read a statement by Major MacDonald, published in the Blue Book (Egypt, 1884), in refutation of Mr Blunt's letter to the "Times" newspaper, and have noticed in it certain things calling for remark

I do not know whether a ten weeks' residence with Mr Cameron at Tantah could have enabled him to understand the true state of matters he has written about, or not

I shall not here discuss the history of Ibrahim Adhem's dismissal from his office as Governor; but I assert that Ibrahim Adhem was in fact, on the upper storey of the prefecture on the day of the massacre at Tantah, and that he was looking on from the window of that upper storey at the murderers and the murdered; and that these persons were murdered in the court of the Mudirieh while he looked on at them, and that he himself ordered the water carriers to wash the blood from the ground at the Government House (of which evidence was given by the water carriers before the Court of Inquiry)

As to what Macdonald says about many of the Europeans finding safety in the prefecture of police, it is true, only the person who protected them was the chief of the city police, Ali effendi Lebfb, who saved many lives, but was arrested after the war and kept in prison until the end of the Inquiry, when the Court sentenced him to hard labour for a year, after much intercession. Now what plea was there for the arrest of this Zabib, a person worthy of confidence, whose protection of Christians is testified to by Major Macdonald (who understood the whole truth in ten weeks).

Ibrahim Adhem is a Kurd—not a Circassian—and a man who, each time that they gave him a post, stipulated with the Government that he should be authorized to make use of the kurbaj on the fellahin and the omdehs of the district Ay, when he was Mudir of Mansourah at the time of Riaz Pasha's first Ministry, Riaz learned that he was ill-treating people with the kurbaj, and wrote to him as follows "You are bound to act according to law, governing mercifully, if you use the kurbaj you will incur the censure of the law" On receiving this communication he chose to resign his post rather than rule mercifully and according to law.

His resignation under the Mahmud Samy Ministry took place for that reason also; and when the Khedive reappointed him as Mudir of the Gharbieh, after the war, he carried on his government with his habitual severity, afterwards, when the number

## *Appendix B*

of his enemies increased and the patience of the people of his province was so exhausted that they could no longer bear with him, the Government disgraced him, and, dismissing him, appointed Husseyn Pasha Sarai in his place

Ibrahim Adhem was one of the supporters of the first movement of Arabi, but when the massacre occurred at Tantah, Arabi learned that he had participated in it either by instigation or by deed, and ordered him to be arrested. He was not arrested for not joining in the rebellion, in fact he was arrested on the third day from the massacre, before it was known whether he would give or refuse his support. Indeed, Ibrahim Adhem's sworn official despatches to the Ministry of the Interior indicate sufficiently that he did not deserve the praises lavished on him by Major Macdonald. Possibly some of the officers of the English army may have praised him, but I do not consider this enough to exculpate him from his deeds of violence. Let anyone who would like to learn what measure of savagery Ibrahim Adhem attained, inquire of his son—Ibrahim Hafzy Bey.

As to the unhappy Yusuf Abu Diab—he arrived at the railway station on the day of the massacre about three hours after the disturbance had begun. He did not instigate riot (anything or any one), but saved a Christian girl and took her to the Mudirieh, and reprimanded the Mudir, taking him to task for sitting in the Mudirieh while he allowed people to be massacred. And for this reason the unfortunate man was hanged. Those Europeans of whom Macdonald testifies were in such consternation that they did not even distinguish their own children, and were running into every hole—how then could they know Yusuf Abu Diab, and distinguish his face or his words?

The chief of the station and telegraph at the first bore witness to the innocence of Yusuf Abu Diab, but the Mudir Ibrahim Adhem threatened all the people with arrest and death unless they bore witness according to his desire; thus they altered their testimony under coercion. The statements made by people subsequently have all been under fear. But those Courts of Inquiry and their acts are part and parcel of the acts of the Anglo-Egyptian Government after the war, into which it is permissible to examine and investigate. We know indeed what has been its course and its acts. No man in his senses will believe in it, for it has been of that species in which the enemy sits in judgement on his enemy, and if we would speak of it we would have to recount the whole of the conduct of the Government after Tel-el-Kebir, and this would lead us into too great length—without profit.

Yusuf Abu Diab's innocence was confessed by the blood relations of the people massacred, and they begged his pardon from

## *Oriental Correspondence*

Lord Dufferin, who asked it from the Khedive—and the pardon was granted, but the order was issued secretly to hang him before the time fixed for the execution. The news of the pardon did not arrive till after the execution.

Possibly Macdonald can testify to the Europeans—French, English, and others—but we know the value of such testimony, and if we had a free and fair Government it would learn the truth through a different set of people.

Seyyid Osman has published a long article in the “*Intran-sigeant*” (French newspaper), stating all the facts. It is also well known to a number of people that the first President of the Court of Inquiry at Tantah wanted to carry out the investigation equitably, and to interrogate the Mudir Ibrahim Adhem on his culpability as to the riot, but the Government perceiving him to be upright, dismissed him and appointed in his stead Mahmud Pasha Fellaky, who was nominally at Tantah while his administration was at Cairo.

Thus the Mudir was saved from trial, while Yusuf Abu Diab was hanged in his stead.

I could show the object of silence as to past deeds, to speak of which would open the door wide to censure on the Government of England, which desires to establish justice in Egypt.

### MR. BLUNT'S NOTE OF A CONVERSATION WITH ISMAIL BEY JOWDAT AT CONSTANTINOPLE, *Oct. 24, 1884*

Ismail Jowdat spent 3 hours with me telling the events of the Egyptian Revolution, much of it new, and very interesting. With regard to the Khedive's responsibility for the massacres he was very explicit. His official position at the time of the war, as *Chef du Bureau Européen de la police du Caire*, gave him every opportunity of knowing the facts, and he knew them. The following is the account he gave me which I shall transcribe from notes taken while he was speaking.

The first intrigue that he knows of in which the Khedive was concerned was in Boheyra where the Khedive employed Ibrahim Bey Towfik—he lived in the house of Hassaneyn Abu Hamza at Damanhour, Governor of the province—in the spring of 1882 to purchase the alliance of certain Sheykhs of the Oulad Ah Bedouins against the National Ministry, to make a civil war between the Bedouins and the army. They were engaged to make disturbance, and a regular agreement was drawn up in which the Arabs promised to support the Khedive against the army in the case of civil war. For this they were to receive, and actually did receive £E13,000, the signatories to the document being Ibrahim Bey Towfik, the

## *Appendix B*

Mudir, and Mahmud abu Ismail el Aluani, Mahareb abu Keshik, Abd ed Dayim Hoteiteh, Abu Shayib, Hassaneyn abu Hamza and five others (Sheykhs of the Oulad Ali)

Ismail Jowdat was sent down to Boheyra semi officially by Arabi to inquire into this matter, and saw the Sheykhs and the document, and persuaded them to rescind their promise to the Khedive, and obtained from them an oath of allegiance to the National Government in Arabi's room at Cairo. This same Ibrahim Tewfik was sent by the Khedive during the war to Mansourah to stir up trouble, but did not succeed there. There was a report made against him signed by all the Notables of Dakhaleh under Mohammed Bey el Hantour sub Mudir of the province, after which he was imprisoned by order of the National Assembly.

With regard to the riots of the 11th June at Alexandria the details did not come under Ismail Jowdat's official notice. But he heard the main facts at the time. He heard of the riots at 5 o'clock on the 11th, and went at once to the Palace, and heard how it had been ordered, and about the telegram sent by the Khedive, as we know them, viz. that the disturbance was arranged by Omar Pasha Lutfi with Seyd Kandil, who, however, took to his bed to avoid being connected with its execution. He also heard at the time of a telegram having been sent by the Khedive in cypher to Omar Lutfi giving him his orders. But he did not see a copy of the telegram.

Of what happened during the war he had more certain knowledge, as he was responsible for the safety of all the Europeans in the country, and had spent some £E3,272 of his own money in finding and keeping them—sums which have never been repaid him, though he has the highest testimonials from M. de Martino the Italian Consul at Cairo of the care taken by him.

The Khedive's chief agent during the war was a certain Osman Raafat, intendant des Ecuries, who is still employed by him on various secret missions. Immediately after the evacuation at Alexandria he sent him in disguise to the house of his brother-in-law, Mohammed Bey Hellal, to concert measures with Ibrahim Pasha Adhem the Mudir, and they concerted together the riots against the Christians in order to force on an English intervention. Ismail Jowdat confirms my account given in my letter to the "Times" with regard to Ibrahim Adhem's conduct, except that the Christians killed were killed at the Mudirieh, not at the Prefecture, and Ibrahim shut himself inside the house and let the killing continue. His words were "Il était dans une chambre en bas de la Mudirieh pendant le massacre. Les Chrétiens se sont réfugiés dans la Moudirieh. Il s'est enfermé dans sa chambre et a

## *Oriental Correspondence*

laissé faire. Les vagabonds et galériens d'Alexandrie ont fait le massacre." Abu Diab did his best to stop the trouble, and protested with the Mudir, and saved many lives. He was condemned on false testimony produced by Ibrahim Adhem, who afterwards, moved with remorse, asked his pardon before he suffered, but Abu Diab refused to forgive him. The only other mistake made by me is that I called Ibrahim a Circassian. He is a Kurd, son of the head employée of Mohammed Ali's stables.

Osman Raafat also came to Giseh during the war to raise troubles again with the Mufettish Feridun Bey. The details of this affair are known to M. de Martins. Sir Charles Wilson took notes of the Tantah affair from Ismail Jowdat. Osman Raafat then went to the Fayoum to stir up the Herabi Bedouins under their chief Abd el Kawî el Jibah and Saadawî el Jibali.

Ismail Jowdat knew these affairs at the time of their happening, but he gained positive proof of the Khedive's connection with them in the following manner. Not long ago Osman Raafat came to see him at Constantinople, and he asked him to breakfast with Husseyn Pasha Ghaleb, one of the Sultan's A D C's, the same who called on me yesterday, and then having plied him with wine he told them the whole story. He went on from Constantinople to Vienna, where he had a commission from the Khedive to invest certain sums of money and dispose of certain jewels. Osman Raafat was arrested at Wasta by a soldier, but was let go by a Circassian official, and thence fled to Helouan and Suez. After the war Osman Raafat was sent by the Khedive to get back the money taken from Palmer by the Bedouins, and he kept £2,000 out of the £3,000.

### NOTES OF CONVERSATION WITH DR MUSTAFA BEY NEGDI. EXTRACT FROM JOURNAL, Oct 27, 1884

He (Mustafa) then gave us the whole history of the Tantah massacre in detail, which he knew first from the official inquiry made before Arabi when it happened, and at which he assisted, and secondly from Ahmed Minshawi, with whom he had lived afterwards at Beyrout, and who came here with him, and who had repeatedly told him the story. The true facts were these:

The Mudir of Tantah, Ibrahim Adhem, with Osman Raafat, excited the populace against the Christians, as Ismail Jowdat related, telling them that Arabi had ordered it—and the Mudir shut himself up also as related. Minshawi lived at a village called Koreyshiyeh, and happening to come in that day by train with Abdallah Pasha's son, Emin Bey, and Husseyn Wasif, a magistrate, they found Christians being killed, and Minshawi interfered.



## Appendix B

They called out to him that Arabi had ordered it, but Minshawi had said to the effect of "damn Arabi," and insisted on their stopping. He had then gone with Abu Diab, who had also been trying to stop the massacre, to the Mudirieh, and had kicked in the door of his room, and expostulated with him for letting the thing go on, Abu Diab using strong language, for he was very angry. Then they telegraphed to Arabi at Kafr Dowar to send soldiers to stop the massacre, but the telegram had to go round by Ramleh and was delayed. But at last the massacre was stopped. The whole thing was inquired into at Kafr Dowar immediately, and the Mudir was sent to Cairo and there imprisoned till the end of the war, Dawish Pasha replacing him. After the war he was reinstated, and when the Commission was sent to Tantah, Ismail Yusrî, the President, who was a comparatively honest man, ascertained the truth and informed the Khedive that he should be obliged to find him guilty, and so begged to be superseded on the Commission. This was done, and an officer less scrupulous was appointed who accepted the false evidence Ibrahim Adhem was allowed to trump up against Abu Diab. Ibrahim Adhem, however, was deposed—and Huseyn Wasîf (a Circassian, not the same as the magistrate) was appointed. He it was who was made a scapegoat of for Ibrahim Adhem's sake, and was deprived by Clifford Lloyd and sent to the Soudan. Mehariz Bey, formerly sub-Mudir, is now Mudir of Boheyra. Minshawi is the son-in-law of Abdallah Pasha the English renegade, and his son Emin still goes by the name of the Englishman.

Mustafa Bey confirms all Ismail's statements of the Khedive's connection with the Alexandrian massacres. He was at Alexandria at the time and was the Doctor employed to examine the bodies. There were 51 Christian bodies, 23 Mohammedan, of which 8 Mustafezzin, all the latter by pistol shots. The English doctor wanted to make out that the Christian bodies had wounds made by "des armes blanches," but this was not the case. It was certainly Omar Lutfi and Seyd Kandil (a blackguard he calls him), who got up the not, and Mustafa states his conviction that Cookson also was concerned in it. About Malet he does not know—nor about Dervish. But he feels sure of Cookson. His evidence will be most valuable, and he will come to England to give it. He also says that Omar Lutfi certainly gave orders to the Mustafezzin to come unarmed. I like this worthy doctor much. In face and figure he is not unlike Lord Lyons.

DR MUSTAFA BEY NEJDI'S FURTHER STATEMENT OF *Nov 5, 1884*

"Peu de jours après le bombardement nous avons appris à Kafr

## *Oriental Correspondence*

Dowar qu'il y a eu des Chrétiens tués à Tantah; et Toulba Pacha, d'après l'ordre d'Arabi, a envoyé chercher Ahmed Minshawi pour témoigner sur ce qui y était arrivé. Celui-ci est venu avec un autre notable nommé El Arabi au camp, et Arabi Pacha lui a demandé ce qui en était. J'étais présent avec Toulba Pacha et quelques Colonels. Ahmed Minshawi a répondu qu'il était venu à Tantah et qu'il y avait sauvé la vie à un Chrétien à la gare du chemin de fer, et qu'après il a fait venir ses gens de son village et qu'il a pu étouffer les massacres. Il nous a raconté que le Mudir Ibrahim Adhem et Meheriz son adjoint s'étaient enfermés dans la Mondirieh pendant qu'on tuait le monde, même chez le Mudir. Il nous a aussi dit qu'il avait télégraphié au Khedive et à Arabi Pacha, et Arabi a fait venir le télégraphiste de Kafr Dowar qui n'en savait rien mais il a expliqué la chose en disant que les télégrammes de Tantah à Kafr Dowar devaient d'abord passer à Alexandrie avant d'être remis à destination. C'était la règle du service. Sur ce Arabi a fait une station nouvelle au camp, pour que les dépêches pourraient lui venir directement de l'intérieur. Arabi a remercié Minshawi de ce qu'il avait fait et il est retourné chez lui."

### MINSHAWI'S EVIDENCE AS GIVEN BY HIM *Nov. 3, 1884*

On the day of the massacre of Tantah I came in to Tantah by train from my own village, Koreyshiyeh, two hours distant (half-hour by train) partly to see my brother-in-law Emin Bey on his road to Cairo, partly to learn the news, and while at the station we heard a great noise and were told that it was the Christians being killed by the mob in Tantah, and I, wishing to end this, telegraphed to the Khedive at Ramleh and to the Ministry (that is to say Arabi at Kafr Dowar) asking an order to interfere. I also telegraphed to my village for men to come and help me, and I waited four hours (during that time Abu Diab arrived from Damietta) for an answer and no answer came. And while we were there waiting the tumult came near us, and a man, a Syrian Christian, the cashier of Zanani the interpreter of the Greek Consulate, ran towards me pursued by a soldier of the Mudirieh and called to me for protection, and taking a stick from one of the bystanders I drove the soldier away, and with the help of others put a stop to what was happening at the station. Then I went with these to the door of the Mudirieh to inquire what the Mudir was doing, and to call upon him to interfere and put an end to the bloodshed. And on my way I met Abu Diab at the door of the Mudirieh who had come from Damietta and was also restoring order, and who had under his protection a young Christian

## *Appendix B*

girl whom he was leading by the hand, and we went together to the Mudrieh, and when we arrived there we found in the courtyard three corpses of Christians who had just been killed there, and we asked for the Mudir and were told that he was in his room, one of the rooms adjoining the courtyard. And we called to him, but there was no answer. Then Abu Diab kicked the door in, and we found Ibrahim Adhem, the Mudir, with his wakil, Meheriz, sitting there. And Abu Diab in a loud voice asked them what they were doing there allowing these murders to be done in his house by his own men. And when they made no answer he called to Ibrahim Adhem, calling him a dog and a coward. I heard this with my ears. Next I went to the Khan where I heard the Christians had shut themselves up, and I found a mob trying to force the door, and my men having come an hour afterwards from Koreyshiyeh we drove them away and found inside a large number of Christians, Syrians, Jews, and others, huddled together like frightened sheep. And I put guards, and the next day brought them out and took them to my village, and after some days those that wished to leave the country I took by train to Port Said, two trains full, and those (about 120) that chose to remain I took to my own house and fed them there during the whole time of the war.

Some days later I went to Kafr Dowar and gave evidence as I now give it before Arabi Pasha when he made an inquiry into the affair, and Ibrahim Adhem was sent a prisoner to Cairo and another man (Dawish Pasha) appointed by the Government in his place. I also gave my evidence after the war when the first Commission came to Tantah (there was no Englishman on this Commission), and afterwards they gave me a paper to sign, purporting to be my evidence, but it was not what I had said but the contrary, and I refused to sign it. Much pressure was put upon me to make me do this, and one day in the Khedive's palace at Cairo, on his fête day, Bairam el Kebir, Takla Bey Bishara warned me that if I did not sign I should suffer for it. I also refused Ahmed el Sherif, sent by Sultan Pasha, when he came round the villages to take money for the sword given to Wolseley.

When a new Commission under Ismail Yusri and the English came to Tantah they did not ask me for my evidence (Ismail Yusri warned me in private not to mention that I had sent a telegram to the Khedive, of which the copy has been found in the telegraph office, to ask for an order to interfere) of what had happened at Tantah but only as to those killed at Santah. They therefore did not take my evidence.

I declare that Abu Diab was entirely innocent, and that of those hanged at Tantah for this matter only 2 were guilty, Abu Salaam

## *Oriental Correspondence*

of Santah, and a soldier of the Mudiréh Ibrahim Adhem and Mehariz were the cause of the bloodshed. The killing was done by the vagabonds from Alexandria and the soldiers of the Mudiréh. The same thing happened at three other places—at Tantah 49 killed, at Santah 3 were killed, at Mehallet el Kebir 6 or 7, at Mehallet abu Ali jem el Suk 2 or 3. Also the same thing would have happened at Dumanhour but for the Wakil Abd el Razak whom the Khedive has sent in chains for 15 years to the Soudan. I heard of Osman Raafat being at Tantah on the day of the massacre in the house of one of his brothers-in-law. He has two brothers-in-law at Tantah, Mohammed Hellal and Ibrahim Hellal.

Ibrahim Adhem was restored as Mudir after the war, and he got up the evidence against Abu Diab in revenge for the words spoken by him on the day of the massacre. Abu Diab died an innocent man. He was not discouraged to the last, but told his father not to weep and told the executioner to make haste. At the last moment Ibrahim Adhem asked his pardon. But Abu Diab said, "God will judge between us to-night, to-day for me, to-morrow for you." I assure you, Sir, by God, that Abu Diab died unjustly.

Before the Commission had left Tantah Ibrahim Adhem came one day to my village with 4 English officers, and summoned all the notables of the neighbourhood and declared to them that I was in disgrace with the Khedive and the English, and warned them to have no dealings with me, and that if any had a quarrel against me the Khedive would support him against me, and four months passed and no one came. Until the day of the massacre I was respected by all men. I had no quarrel with Ibrahim Adhem nor any one, but my action that day has been the cause of my ruin. When Ibrahim Adhem was removed from Tantah, Husseyn Pasha Wasif was appointed in his place. He received me into favour, but the Khedive wrote to him by his own secretary not to see me. Husseyn Pasha shewed me this letter—I saw it with my eyes—and begged me to excuse him if he asked me to come no more to his house. This drove me from my country. It is clear that by saving the lives of the Christians that day I have gained only anger from the Khedive and trouble.

PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT

Balta-Liman, 15 *Décembre*, 1884

MON CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,

Je vous remercie d'avoir pensé à m'écrire, j'aurais voulu en vous répondant vous donner des nouvelles de chez vous, mal-

## *Appendix B*

heureusement dans notre paresseux Orient les choses ne changent pas aussi souvent que dans votre actif Occident. Ici les jours se suivent et se ressemblent, il n'y a donc rien qui vaille la peine de vous être rapporté. Depuis quelques jours j'aperçois des signes non équivoques d'une tendance de rapprochement avec l'Angleterre, des communications ont eu lieu entre Monsieur Wyndham et la Porte en vue de trouver un terrain propice qui permettrait aux deux partis de traiter les affaires égyptiennes. Je crains que cette fois encore la Turquie et l'Angleterre n'aient, par leur lenteur, manqué le moment favorable de pouvoir en finir entre elles. Les puissances signataires du traité de 1841-42 paraissent vouloir se mêler de la question, elles trouveraient peut-être mauvais que la Porte traitât directement avec l'Angleterre, dans ce cas le nouvel ambassadeur d'Angleterre, quel qu'il fût, il est très douteux qu'il pût réussir dans le sens du désir de son Gouvernement. Tout dépend de la pression plus ou moins grande qu'exercera l'Europe.

Je porterai à la connaissance du Sultan ce que je croirai lui être utile, sans cependant m'illusionner sur le résultat, car il est inutile de chercher de la vigueur, de la précision, dans les actes du Gouvernement Impérial. La peur, plus que l'intérêt même, précipitera à toutes ses actions, quoiqu'on fasse. La bienveillance de Musurus Pacha pour Tewfik est sans doute le résultat du mariage de son fils avec la fille d'un certain Antoniadis, partisan d'Ismail, comme tous les voleurs.

A propos d'Ismail, je vous dirai qu'il dépense beaucoup d'argent ici, et j'en sens les effets. Le brave homme donne son or contre de la parole qu'emporte aussitôt le vent. Avant que cette lettre vous parvienne Monsieur Whittaker sera à Londres, il vous communiquera une proposition qui je crois aura votre pleine approbation.

Recevez etc,  
HALIM

PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT

Balta-Liman, 6 *Janvier*, 1885

CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,

C'est le 4 janvier seulement que j'ai reçu votre lettre du 19 Décembre.

Je suis avec intérêt dans les journaux les péripéties de vos démarches, tant près de l'association internationale d'arbitrage et de paix, que près du Premier Ministre. Je suis tout à fait de votre opinion et je dirai qu'une terminaison à l'amiable et sans violence de la question égyptienne ne peut se faire sans le concours du Sultan parcequ'il est la légalité, le droit, mais, si on veut passer outre, alors c'est l'inconnu et on ne peut savoir comment et où on

## *Oriental Correspondence*

aboutira. Je trouve que l'Angleterre a perdu comme la Turquie un temps précieux; ces deux puissances pouvaient l'arranger à l'amiable entre elles sans laisser de place à l'ingérence des autres puissances peut-être même de la France, l'Angleterre aurait beaucoup gagné et la Turquie aurait eu aussi sa part de bénéfice. Maintenant que les Puissances font mine de vouloir prendre en main la question égyptienne sous prétexte qu'elle est internationale, je crois que l'Angleterre et la Turquie ont perdu, toujours dans la prévision que les Puissances s'occuperont sérieusement de la question.

Recevez, etc,  
HALIM

PRINCE HALIM TO MR BLUNT

Balta-Liman, 19 *Janvier*, 1885

CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,

Votre lettre du 8 janvier m'est parvenue, je veux remercier pour les nouvelles que vous voulez bien me donner.

Il est probable que Hassan Fehmi Pacha sera à Londres avant que vous receviez cette lettre. Je considère la mission de l'envoyé Ottoman comme une preuve patente de la bonne volonté de sa Majesté le Sultan de relier les bonnes vieilles relations des deux gouvernements que les événements d'Egypte ont un peu terni. En tout cas, c'est un pas fait vers un arrangement, mais je doute que Hassan Pacha puisse arriver à une solution définitive.

Les dernières nouvelles reçues du Soudan se montrent par l'état critique de l'expédition anglaise, si les troupes qui traversent le désert entre Korti et Mutamma arrivent sans encombre à cette dernière ville la  $\frac{4}{5}$  de la besogne serait faite sans doute. Alors seulement le Gouvernement Anglais pensera peut-être sérieusement à donner une solution à la question égyptienne. Je ne serais pas étonné si Souakin et Masaoua ou tout au moins un de ces deux ports resta définitivement entre les mains de l'Angleterre.

Recevez, etc,  
HALIM

PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT

Balta-Liman, 13 *Février*, 1885

CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,

Selon votre désir j'ai remis la lettre en arabe adressée par vous à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, je l'ai fait accompagner par votre lettre adressée à moi, aussitôt que j'aurai une réponse je ne manquerai pas de vous le faire connaître immédiatement. Je n'ai pas jugé nécessaire de présenter au Sultan votre rapport à Hassan

## *Appendix B*

Pacha Fehmi—Sa Majesté aimant les primeurs en tout Je n'ai pas reçu la pièce que vous m'annonciez m'être envoyé par votre secrétaire

Rien de nouveau ici si ce n'est l'entrée en scène de l'Italie d'une manière extravagante, il en sera de même tant que la Turquie se bornera à protester chaque fois qu'on lui marchera sur le pied

A vous, etc

HALIM

P S Personne ne peut répondre de la fermeté du Gouvernement Ottoman

LETTER TO H M THE SULTAN OF TURKEY (ABDUL HAMID)

(*Sent also in Arabic*)

Crabbet Park, Three Bridges, Sussex, *January 3, 1885*

SIR,

The grave perils which on every side menace the Mohammedan nation and which cannot but distress Your Majesty in the discharge of your high duties towards your people must be my excuse if I venture to address you on certain points which appear to me of vital moment in the present conjuncture of affairs for Islam

It will not be unknown to Your Majesty that for some years past I have travelled widely in Mohammedan lands and that circumstances have placed me in a position to learn the thoughts, the fears, and the aspirations of those who under various governments acknowledge Your Majesty as their chief, the supreme Head and Prince of their religion, and Your Majesty also doubtless knows the active part I took three years ago in endeavouring to prevent the great misfortune of the invasion of Egypt by my countrymen, and afterwards to set in a true light the injustice of their action and the supreme miseries which they have caused I trust therefore that Your Majesty will accept as the ideas of one devoted in all his heart to Mohammedan interests and Your Majesty's, the view of policy which I now presume to lay before you

I With regard to those Mohammedans who live under other rule than Your Majesty's,—I can assert without fear of mistake that at no other period of modern history has the Caliphal authority exercised so powerful an influence on their imagination as now In all parts of the world Mohammedans are conscious of the danger to them as a nation, and the sacred office held by Your Majesty is regarded by them as the only safeguard remaining of their political existence Especially within the last four years have they learned the necessity of closer union under Your Majesty's com-

## *Oriental Correspondence*

mand, if they would not become altogether lost and scattered; and they are willing as they never were before to put aside the differences of opinion which have so long divided them and to accept Your Majesty as the fountain for them of authority. On this subject I have conversed with many learned men in many countries, and I find that what they practically desire is this. The evils of which they complain are a decay of sound education, a decay of morals and a decay of wealth, and they attribute these misfortunes not indeed to a defect of the sacred law, which they all hold to be sufficient, but to a defect of the power to interpret it in accordance with modern necessities, and of the authority which should enforce that interpretation and make it binding on men's practice. They desire therefore that Your Majesty should be pleased to consider in what way it would be possible to encourage the meeting of some general assembly of Ulemas of various lands under Your Majesty's supreme appointment to discuss all these matters, and devise remedies for their very urgent needs. They think that by a common agreement alone of the faithful of all lands under Your Majesty a true result could be obtained.

This they desire and also that Your Majesty should take a more open part in the exercise of your high office by issuing from time to time and publishing authoritative statements of your views regarding the many public events which arise, gravely interesting to Mohammedans at large, in order that these may be kept in closer sympathy with Your Majesty on matters concerning all. Thus it seems to me that it would be of supreme advantage at the present moment that Your Majesty should take the whole Mohammedan world into your confidence with regard to the English occupation of Egypt. The strength of Your Majesty's position lies in the moral influence you possess over the vast populations outside Your Majesty's own Empire, and this can only be exercised to its full extent by making your wishes public. Advantage has too long been taken by European Governments of Your Majesty's silence to spread false reports regarding Your Majesty's ideas, and in these modern days no Power can afford to dispense with publicity as a spiritual weapon.

2 With regard to Your Majesty's own dominions I am encouraged by the high character Your Majesty bears as a sincere Reformer, to urge upon you to take cognizance of the many abuses and breaches of the law which afflict the remoter provinces of your Empire. These to my sorrow I have noted on my many journeys; and I know that they are a scandal to the world and a cause of National weakness. I could, if Your Majesty would permit, explain in what way I think they could be remedied; and



## *Appendix B*

Your Majesty may trust me not to recommend those European remedies which Your Majesty rightly judges to be unsuited to the genius of Eastern lands and subversive of the principles of their religion. I should ask Your Majesty neither to grant concessions to Europeans, nor to employ Europeans in your Government, nor to adopt European forms of Administration. The reforms I would advocate are different from these, and are on the contrary designed to establish Mohammedan Government on its true national basis and in stricter accordance with its religious law. In this way I am confident that, God aiding Your Majesty, a sound political and financial basis could be secured for Your Empire.

Lastly—I would urge upon Your Majesty a certain course of policy towards the Great European Powers, who one and all covet your dominions. It is essential for any plan of reform and recuperation that an interval of peace should be secured you. The two Governments which most threaten the Mohammedan nation at this moment are the Russian and I grieve to say my own, and they must be dealt with vigorously each in its own manner. The present is an opportunity of the most favourable for making terms with England, but these can only be secured advantageously for Islam by courage and determination. Your Majesty must declare yourself in clear language according to certain terms as to which I could advise Your Majesty, and I think that I can assure you of success. But I venture to warn Your Majesty against any concession of principle which might separate you from the full approval of Mohammedans in various lands. The part which is yours to play in your dealings with our Government is that of the fearless exponent of the Mohammedan will. As Sultan of Turkey Your Majesty has undoubted rights in Egypt, but in this age of lawless aggression it is necessary that sovereign rights should be backed by the popular will and in Your Majesty's instance by that full exercise of your Caliphal authority which is yours as Prince of the Faithful.

If Your Majesty on the perusal of this letter will deign to hear me further I will make it my duty to lay my plan in detail before Your Majesty.

I am, with profound respect, Your Majesty, Your most faithful servant

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT

Constantinople, 17 *Juillet* 1885

CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 3 courant qui m'annonce l'achat des

## *Oriental Correspondence*

chevaux. Je vous remercie pour la peine que vous vous êtes donnée pour cela.

Mr Whitaker n'est pas encore de retour. En attendant, ce que je vois dans le journaux ne me parait pas être très différent du passé. Lord Salisbury dans l'exposé de la politique du nouveau cabinet, fait à la chambre des Lords le 6 courant, déclare que l'Angleterre est liée d'honneur au Khédive. Un premier Ministre ne s'engage au fond comme cela, s'il avait l'intention de suivre une autre voie que ses predecesseurs. Le lien d'honneur n'est pas facile à briser, comme par exemple le lien d'intérêt, où on a la faculté de se montrer désintéressé même magnanime en le brisant. Lord Salisbury donne pour raison du lien d'honneur, l'honêteté du Khédive, vis-à-vis du gouvernement Anglais et il n'y a que quelques jours que Tewfik Pacha protestait de son dévouement et de son inaltérable attachement à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, en jettant sur la pression irrésistible des Anglais tout le passé. Ces protestations du Khédive sont prises ici pour ce qu'elles valent et pour la forme on se montre content. Le grand cordon du Schafcate à été envoyé à sa femme comme preuve de la satisfaction Impériale,

Je vous renouvelle, cher Monsieur Blunt, l'expression, etc

HALIM

## APPENDIX C

### AUTHOR'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH DOWNING STREET

#### THE EARL OF DUFFERIN TO MR. BLUNT

*Private*

Cairo, 16 December '82

MY DEAR BLUNT,

Many thanks for your letter of December 8th, and especially for having sent me the pamphlet, of which I had heard, and which I have studied with the attention it seems to deserve

I am quite alive to the importance of the question you refer to of the indebtedness of the peasantry It is one of those evils which meet us both in India and in Ireland, and you may depend upon my doing my best to discover a remedy if any such there be

We have induced the Government to let out of prison at once, something like 450 of those who have been shut up in jail.

Yours sincerely,

DUFFERIN

#### MR BLUNT TO THE EARL OF DUFFERIN

January 23rd, 1883

MY DEAR LORD DUFFERIN,

I have delayed thanking you for your letter of the 16th December informing me of the release of 450 of the political prisoners, until I had seen Napier and learned from him a little more clearly than I could by letter what were the terms of agreement come to with regard to them when the trial was compromised I had understood from Broadley that the terms would include an amnesty, and I had hoped it would have been a general one, and that the whole of the unfortunate people detained in the prisons on charges rising out of the "rebellion" would have been set free Now, however, it seems that, though an amnesty has been decreed, many exceptions to it have been made, that while some have been released, others are being arrested, and that the Courts are still trying and executing men on criminal charges connected with the events of June and July. I trust that the interest I take in opposing this particular form of injustice will excuse me with you if I say a few words on the matter The world, it is true, is full of injustice which we cannot remedy, but here the remedy would seem within our hands, and the injustice is one for which every Englishman who knows the facts is responsible

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

First, as regards the exceptions made to the amnesty, it would seem most unfair that the leaders of the "rebellion" having foregone their right of being publicly defended, any of their followers or associates should be punished for rebellion. Arabi's defence included the defence of every man in Egypt, and with the commutation of his sentence every other sentence should have been commuted. The two strongest cases I have heard of, of persons excepted from the amnesty, are Akkad's and Awwam's, men charged with no crime, but who have nevertheless been exiled, the one to Massowah and the other to the White Nile, punishments which Malet has, I think, explained in his despatches to be equivalent to death. These two cases I also recommend to your special attention from the fact that the sufferers are men whose quarrel was originally with English, not Egyptian, officials, and whose exception from the amnesty has consequently a rather compromising appearance for them. Akkad's original offence lay in his having protested in 1879 against Rivers Wilson's confiscation of the Moukabalah claims, a thing he was perfectly justified in doing, which, moreover, he had been invited to do by a notice published by Wilson in the papers. For this he was sent by Riaz on a false charge to the White Nile, the details, Napier tells me, he has laid already before you.

Awwam's case is still stronger, and it affects Colvin. Awwam was an employé under Colvin on the Cadastral survey, and was dismissed for having drawn up a report showing the incapacity of the officers conducting the survey and their waste of public money—all which is now admitted. The wrong done him made a martyr of him with the Nationalists, and when Arabi came into office in February he was appointed his secretary. For this, and presumably at Colvin's suggestion, he was arrested by the English authorities on their landing at Alexandria in July, and put in irons. He then wrote a letter to the Khedive demanding to know the reason of his arrest, and was transferred, still in irons, to the Borgho prison, where Ninet saw him seventy-four days afterwards. Then, when the disclosures relating to that prison began to be made, Awwam would seem to have been sent without trial to Khartoum, and is probably there at the present moment. These are strong cases, but I have little doubt there are many others quite as strong.

Secondly. It is surely a mockery to decree an amnesty affecting only persons who happen to be actually in prison, and omitting from its operation both men already dealt with and men to be dealt with in the future on charges connected with the past. From all I hear the reign of terror has not been diminished in the provinces by the decree—whatever may be the case at Cairo—the prisons are still full and men are being arrested daily.

## Appendix C

Lastly I cannot understand how it can be the wish of our Government to make scapegoats of the rank and file of those charged with the criminal acts of June and July while the chief offenders enjoy immunity. If one thing has been proved to the satisfaction of the Government more than another, it is that Omar Lutfi was responsible for the murderous character of the riots of the 11th of June. Yet we read still of executions at Alexandria for crimes committed on that day by others, the chief culprit himself being the while at large, in honour, and holding high office under the Khedive. I say nothing of the Khedive himself, though you doubtless know how little his conduct on that day would have borne investigation.

Having thus discharged my conscience of what I consider a duty, let me now allude to the other part of your letter, that relating to the debts of the fellahin. It was the scheme of Arabi and the Nationalists last February to solve the difficulty by making it illegal to lend money on mortgage of land except with the consent of an officer to be appointed for the purpose in the chief town of each district, and then only to an amount small in proportion to land value. Thus the only borrowers would have been persons able and intending to repay. I quite understand that such a regulation might have checked the flow of capital into the country and in consequence have reduced the public revenue, but the object of the Nationalists was to prevent at all costs the passing of the land into the hands of strangers, and I repeat that this *must* be prevented if there is to be a cessation of the popular discontent in Egypt. This seems to me a far more vital matter than the form of government of the country, or even the reform of the administration. But probably it can only be effected by a reduction of the revenue, and consequently of the rate of interest on the debt. The Nationalists also intended to form a National Bank to make the required advances. But I feel that very likely it is useless my saying anything on this head, for I fear the Government at home has no serious desire to effect anything but a makeshift arrangement agreeable to the European public, and strong enough to last their time. I wish you could have seen Mohammed Abdu or some others of the Nationalist leaders before they left Egypt. They would have told you in an hour more than you could learn from all the English officials at Cairo in a fortnight. Nevertheless I beg you to believe that I still look confidently for a solution compatible with Egyptian aspirations at your hands, and I remain yours truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

THE EARL OF DUFFERIN TO MR. BLUNT

*Private and Confidential.*

CAIRO, 12th Feb. '83

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd of January. It must have been delayed en route

You are really under a wrong impression as to what is going on here, as you will see by the enclosed memorandum from Sir Charles Wilson, to whom I referred your letter.

As for el Accad, he is quite unworthy of the interest you take in him. His complicity with Arabi is beyond doubt, and he misappropriated some funds which Halim Pasha entrusted to him for the purpose of bribing Arabi to support his, Halim's, candidature

I have sent home a report on the reorganization of Egypt, from which you will see that I am doing what I can to promote the establishment of just principles of Government in this country.

Believe me, my dear Blunt, yours sincerely,

DUFFERIN.

P S.—I need not remind you that there is no man who has done more to prevent this Government from exercising undue severity in the case of the rebels than Sir Charles Wilson

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

10, James Street, *January 16, 1883.*

MY DEAR EDDY,

I think you will admit that the despatches published to-day, taken in connection with Colvin's reappointment as Controller in Egypt, absolve me from any duty of reticence I may have had toward Mr Gladstone on the events of the past year. In spite of all that has been said and promised and avowed, annexation stares us in the face as unmistakably as if the word had been written. I am sorry, more than for Egypt, that it should have come to this.

Yours affec ,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.*

10, Downing Street, *12th March '83.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

As Campbell Bannerman has to answer a question this afternoon founded on your letter which will (I understand) amount to what he could tell you, were he to see you, perhaps an interview

## Appendix C

would be of little good. He tells me that every piece of fresh information they get at the Admiralty (*eg* from Lord Alcester) fully confirms his account in the House of Commons, and therefore it seems to resolve itself into a question of the known intentions of the authorities in Egypt as well as of the Government at home against what Gill and Palmer *fancied* their mission to have been.

I apologize for having perhaps expressed myself too strongly yesterday. But the Government have nothing in the world to conceal, and the organisers of the Expedition surely ought to know better the objects of it than the unfortunate men charged with the mission.

Yours as always affec,  
E. W. HAMILTON

MR. BLUNT TO MR. EDWARD HAMILTON

Paris, *Sep* 14, 1883

DEAR EDDY,

When I saw you on Wednesday I told you that I had thought of taking Sabunji with me, but had given up the idea. Since then, however, I have heard that the man I counted on to help me in Egypt is no longer there, and I have consequently determined to take Sabunji. The fact is I should be very helpless without him, and if it should so happen that I could be of any good it would be as well to have him at hand.

I shall leave him at Port Said or Suez till I have seen Baring, and as I told you, I have no intention of doing anything without Baring's countenance. If Baring will not listen to anything I have to propose I shall not waste any time in Egypt, but shall go on to Ceylon and India. I shall caution Sabunji to get into no mischief, and he has always acted as far as I am aware squarely in his service with me. We start to-night for Marseilles, and so farewell. I will write to you from Egypt.

Yours affec,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

Cairo, *September 28th*, 1883.

MY DEAR EDDY,

I promised to write to you, and I will keep my promise, but you must not expect me to say anything pleasant or flattering. I found Baring extremely amiable and willing to listen to all I had to say, and I believe he told me his own views frankly. Our ideas

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

on many of the reforms wanted in Egypt were the same. His scheme for relieving the debts of the peasantry seemed a sound one—and he struck me generally as being a man of sympathy and courage. But when I have said this I have said all. On the main point of giving Egypt back her liberty we are worlds apart. He neither wishes it, nor has the least idea of attempting it. “What Egypt wants,” he told me, “is peace and order, not another revolution, we have restored the Khedive and the Circassians to power, and I shall do my best to keep them there.”

With regard to Dufferin's famous Charter I find neither he nor any one else look upon it as in the least serious or in the least important—and they are right. The elections are not serious, nor were ever intended to be by those who drafted the Charter. The electoral lists are drawn up by the Government, the voting takes place under the eye of the Governor and in the Prefecture of Police—and in most instances the Governor or the Prefect of Police are the candidates chosen. It could not have been otherwise. The Circassians have been encouraged to re-establish their rule by a reign of terror. There is no protection of any kind against arbitrary arrest, arbitrary confiscation of property, and imprisonment without trial. The prisons in the country districts are still full of untried men. There is no liberty of speech, or of the press—and at Alexandria they began the elections by hanging two more men charged with instigating the riots of last year. How should any one but the Prefect of Police be chosen? Mr. Gladstone, who knows everything, doubtless knows that in India, where the people have been crushed for ages, they worship Siva the god of destruction. Here they worship the Prefect of Police. Yet less than two years ago there were both freedom of speech and of the press, elections fairly representative, and the beginning of a real Constitution. It may have been necessary for Imperial or international reasons to destroy this and to revert to a system of “peace and order” as Baring calls it, but it cannot be necessary to talk of having given the Egyptians liberty!

Baring himself is too honest to pretend that his system is anything but “Egypt for the Turks.” But he fancies he can manage Tewfik and the half dozen men who form his party, and give Egypt a mitigated and not altogether inhuman despotism. If he succeeds in this he will have accomplished something, but I cannot believe that he will at all succeed. Tewfik and Sherif have no following in this country beyond the palace walls, and, even supposing them to be the absolutely supple tools Baring believes them to be, they have no kind of moral influence and very little energy. The minor English officials tell me they are unable to redress the least wrong or introduce the simplest reform in the departments in which they



## Appendix C

serve, and that Baring and Maxwell should be able, through the weak medium of Tewfik, and Sherif, and Fakri, to do more than obtain a shadow of justice and compassion for the people I cannot understand. You know how different this is from my own idea of reforming the people through men of their own race whom they respect, and are ready to work with, and you may imagine my disappointment at getting from Baring nothing better than poor Malet's stale idea of Egypt for the Turks.

I spoke to Sir Benson Maxwell, who is a really good man, about getting some kind of protection for the people from arbitrary arrest, and he has promised to do so. But he is going away on leave and nothing will be even begun before Christmas. On the whole it seems to me that no fate could possibly have been devised for Egypt more sad or more hopeless than what I see before me, and it would have been far more merciful to have put the Egyptians at once out of their misery by annexing their country last year than to play at giving them "native rule," under conditions which through much suffering will lead to exactly the same result a year or two years hence. I consequently leave Egypt a sadder and a wiser man than I came. I shall publish my poem—and make my protest and set out "to-morrow for fresh fields and pastures new"

Yours, etc.,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

PS.—I wonder whether Mr Gladstone knows that there are still twelve Bedouins in prison at Suez arrested for the Palmer murder and untried. Among them a woman and two or three children kept as hostages!

MR BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING

Cairo, Oct 1, 1883

MY DEAR SIR EVELYN,

I have received a letter from Abd el Razak Bey, F R G S, ex-director of the Naval College, who with some four others has been in prison here for the last three months on a charge originally of connection with a political plot. He was, however, ordered to be dismissed by the Commission appointed to inquire into the matter, but was nevertheless retained by Osman Pasha Ghaleb through superior orders "on suspicion," and is still in the Zaptieh prison. He now asks me to come and see him, and as I am leaving Cairo to-morrow I shall be much obliged to you if you can kindly obtain me an order to enter the prison.

Since seeing you on Wednesday I have had opportunities of

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

ascertaining the feelings of the people here, and I am convinced that unless something is speedily done to relieve their sufferings you will have trouble.

I am, dear Sir Evelyn, yours truly,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT

Cairo, Oct 1, 1883

DEAR MR BLUNT,

I regret that I am unable to accede to the request contained in your letter. The decision as to permission being given to prisoners to receive visits lies entirely within the competence of the Egyptian Government. I must decline to interfere in the manner in which they exercise their discretion in dealing with the subject.

Very truly yours,  
E. BARING

MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING

*Private.*

Suez, October 3rd 1883

MY DEAR SIR EVELYN,

Your note by some accident was posted by your cavass instead of being sent by hand, and so did not reach me till just as I was leaving Cairo yesterday morning, and I think it is right you should know that receiving no answer I had already gone to the prison, and seen Abd el Razak Bey and the others. I found them comfortably lodged and in good health, with the exception of Mustapha Bey Sidki, who seemed seriously ill, and I received from them all the same account, that their release had been ordered by the Commission (which included two of the Belgians who came here as judges) more than three months ago, since which time no further inquiries had been made into their case. Abd el Razak had written to the Khedive, but without reply, and they believe themselves to be detained by the order of Osman Pasha Ghaleb. No English inspector had been to see them, and no inquiry had been made into their case. Now, however, that I have got your letter I fear that, should my visit become known to the Prefect of Police, or the fact that they wrote to me, the prisoners might be made to suffer from their and my imprudence. They believe themselves likely to be sent without further trial to the Soudan, and, as so many have suffered that fate during the past year, I trust that you will give them your protection. They were arrested on a charge which would seem to have been false, for their release was ordered by the court which examined it, and in any other country in the world they would be now at liberty

## Appendix C

As far as I can learn, Lord Dufferin interfered with these matters as long as he was here, for he had promised a political amnesty at the time of Arabi's trial, but after his departure arrests were again made, and I understand on very high authority that there are at the present moment several thousand untried prisoners in the various towns of the Delta and Upper Egypt. I can speak from experience of the terror in which respectable people, in no way connected with the army, but known to have sympathized with the Liberal party, are now living in Cairo, and, as I said before, the excessive tyranny of the police and the Mudirs is goading men to new disquiet. Trusting that you will forgive me for not having waited for your answer, and that as far as the prisoners are concerned the fact of their having written to me and of my having seen them may be kept a secret, I remain, dear Sir Evelyn,

Yours very truly,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

Suez, *October 3rd*, 1883.

MY DEAR EDDY,

You will have perceived that when I wrote the other day I was very angry, and I think that I had cause. But that is no reason why I should not write again. When I saw Baring I had not had any conversation with my own political friends, and I could not guess the condition of affairs. Now I have seen and talked to a great number of them, and I can speak with certainty as to their feelings and, I believe, with equal certainty as to the general feeling of the country.

The first and only obstacle that I see to a peaceable settlement of the country is the present Khedive. It is absolutely impossible he should remain, unless it is intended to occupy the country permanently with our troops—and I doubt if even that would altogether protect him. I have asked people of every class about him and I have not found one that did not despise him. The Circassians and the rest of the fanatical class look upon him as a traitor to his religion, and the liberals as a traitor to his country. You know that till the bombardment I supported him with the National party as against Hahm or Ismail or other pretenders, but I am certain that no reconciliation is possible. You do not believe in his culpability in the matter of the riots of June, but all the Egyptians here do, and within the last three days I have had very important evidence on that head offered me. Now, I don't wish to make too much of this—it was a stroke of party politics

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

But what the Nationalists will never forgive is that he has had innocent men as well as men who acted at his instigation hanged for these very acts. I have now the evidence of two men of the highest respectability, one of whom is Ahmed Bey Minshawi, the Sheykh who is so honourably mentioned in the Blue Books as having saved the lives of several hundred Christians at Tantah, to the effect that the riots there were equally the work of the Khedive's friends, and that Yusuf Abu Diab, who was hanged for the affair, was not only innocent but did his best to save lives. Innocent men have everywhere been arrested and imprisoned on charges connected with these things to gratify the spite of the Khedive and his few partisans. You will say perhaps that these tales are not true, but they are certainly believed in—and in the belief lies all the difficulty of reconciliation. For myself I believe so strongly in the Khedive's treachery that I would certainly not advise Arabi to return to Egypt, were the option given him, under Tewfik's rule.

The Circassians of course do not quarrel with him on this account (for they look on the fellahin as their proper scapegoats), but for his conduct during the war and his feebleness of character. As you know, they are very few in numbers in the country, only a few thousand, and they say they want a *man* not a woman to protect them against Europe and against another rising of the fellahin. I believe there is a strong party among them for Ismail Pasha, a few for Husseyn on account of his extreme bigotry, and a few for Hassan, his brother. Among the more liberal-minded Halim is a favourite, as he is among many of the Egyptians through Abu Nadara's advocacy, though very few people know him. His enemies say he is not a politician and cares only for cats and birds. Nobody will hear at all of Ibrahim on account of his letter to the Duke of Cambridge. The Khedive of course has a party, though he has no friends. This consists first of the Ministers who have come into power through his restoration—though all these cannot be counted on—secondly of Butros Pasha and other rich Copts, and I believe the Coptic money-lenders of the Said. The Patriarch and the mass of the Coptic clergy belong to the "Hesbu el Horiye," the party of liberty, which now occupies the place of the National party of two years ago. Also, thirdly, of the financiers, bankers, and rich Syrian and Greek merchants of Alexandria. It is, however, safe to say that there is nobody of the Khedive's party, except the Ministers, who do not support him as a natural stepping-stone to annexation.

The fellahin of the Delta, as far as I can gather, are divided in opinion, those of the remoter districts caring nothing for politics, and having still a traditional respect for Effendina—whoever he may

## Appendix C

be—the other part believing that Arabi will return. Of this there has grown up within the last few months a very strong belief in Cairo and the towns—and there is no doubt in the world that he is popular in spite of his misfortunes. I have heard people complain of him for his conduct in the war, for his neglect of blocking the Suez Canal, for his praying when he ought to have been fighting, and for his running away at Tel-el-Kebir. But they talk kindly of him and are proud of him as the first *fellah* who ever held supreme power in Egypt, and I had abundant proofs of their goodwill to myself as his friend. Except the Khedive I see no obstacle to his recall. Sherif might, I believe, work with him again as far as the Nationalists are concerned, and Ismail Eyoub certainly could. But Ali Mubarak Pasha, Khairi Pasha, Omar Lutfi Pasha, and Osman Ghaleb, the Prefect of Police, and Sultan Pasha would have to retire from power. I cannot conceive their being any loss—and there are certain Mudirs, too, in the provinces, who have been exceptionally bloodthirsty and tyrannical, whose position would be incompatible with a return of the liberal party to office. I am of opinion that the only prince of the family of Mehemet Ali who could unite parties is Halim. But I think you would do far better to make Arabi himself the chief of the state—Halim after all is a Turk and the people only look to him as the alternative to the present regime.

The more I have seen of the people the more convinced I have become that the present reign of terror cannot continue. If you withdraw the troops without establishing something and somebody that the people like, you must have trouble. The army may be as fond of Sir Evelyn Wood as he is said to think, but that will not prevent them owning the first resolute man who proposes to dethrone the Khedive—he is too unpopular with the people to be popular with the army—and, if the Nationalists are too crushed to turn on him yet awhile, the Circassians certainly will. You will then find yourselves with some really unscrupulous adventurer at the head of a revolution, and you or your successors will annex the country. I am writing in the belief that you do not intend or wish for such a result, but to persist in thrusting Tewfik on the Egyptians is to invite annexation.

I had intended to write this to the "Times," but I wrote it instead to you, hoping that you may show it to Mr Gladstone. I would rather you did not show it to the F O, for they would only use it to my friends' disadvantage. The whole thing depends now on Mr Gladstone. If he insists on restoring liberty to Egypt nothing is easier—but not on the present lines.

Yours affectionately,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

Haddo House, Aberdeen,  
21st October, 1883

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Your two interesting letters written from Egypt, for which many thanks, have both reached me while I am holiday making in Scotland, but I have taken steps to secure their being seen by Mr Gladstone Your account of affairs in Egypt is, to say the least of it, depressing I won't make any comments on what you say. I will content myself with being the receptacle of bad news and the conduit pipe of it to headquarters I will only say that I can't conceive how it would be possible, without the grossest breach of faith, for the English Government to countenance the ousting of Tewfik, whatever sort of fellow he may be.

Holiday making is neither conducive to letter writing, I find, nor to the catering of news, so I am afraid I shall, as far as being a correspondent is concerned, make a poor return for your budgets. Good luck to you and a pleasant trip to India.

Yours affectionately,  
E. W. HAMILTON.

SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT

Cairo, December 31, 1883.

SIR,

I have received a letter from Chérif Pasha informing me that the Egyptian Government intends to forbid your disembarkation in Egypt on your return journey from India—His Excellency adds. "Par courtoisie, et en vue d'empêcher tout incident facheux de se produire dans le cas ou il entrerait dans les intentions de Monsieur Blunt de s'arrêter en Egypte, à son retour des Indes, je crois devoir vous demander Monsieur le Ministre, de vouloir bien informer d'avance votre compatriote de cette interdiction"

In compliance, therefore, with the request of the Egyptian Government, I beg to communicate their decision to you.

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

E. BARING.

MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING

Delhi, January 26, 1884.

MY DEAR SIR EVELYN,

I have to acknowledge the receipt, under flying seal from Mr. Primrose, of your letter of the 31st December, which reached me

## *Appendix C*

yesterday I confess that the contents surprised me, not merely on account of the nature of the message your letter contained for me from the Khedive's late Prime Minister, but still more from the fact that you should have transmitted it in an official form without comment, explanation, or expression of disapproval.

That the Government of which Sherif Pasha was the head should have disliked my presence in Egypt I can well understand, for I have been more than once, as you know, instrumental in bringing their abuse of power to official ears, but I am ignorant of having offended against any law which should authorize my exclusion, as the subject of a friendly Power, from Egypt, and still less am I conscious of having done what should forfeit me my right to your diplomatic protection. Indeed, the circumstances of my recent visit to Egypt would seem to entitle me to this last in an especial manner, for you will not have forgotten that I came there last September with special recommendation to you from the highest official quarter, and that my renewed interest in Egyptian politics was authorized by suggestions emanating from the same high source. But for this, I believe I may say with truth that I should not have stopped in Egypt at all on my way eastwards, and most certainly that I should not have encouraged hopes there which the sequel might fail to justify.

With equal truth I can assure you that, had you informed me in a less formal manner that the interests of Egypt would be best served by my not returning to Cairo this spring, I would have willingly consented inasmuch as at the moment of my receiving your letter I had all but abandoned my intention of so doing, partly on account of quarantine difficulties, partly because I recognized in Nubar Pasha's accession to office an adjournment by our Government of the special hopes which interested me.

Now, however, in face of your official communication, I feel myself obliged to do something towards asserting the right, which is mine as a British subject, of residing where I will abroad under British protection, and especially, because I hold property there, in Egypt. Nubar Pasha is an enlightened man, with whom I have the pleasure of being personally acquainted, and he is not likely of his own motion to renew his predecessor's threat of excluding me from the country, but I fear I must ask you, as I do most formally ask you, to be good enough to give me your written assurance either that the prohibition forwarded by you has ended with Sherif Pasha's dismissal, or that you are prepared, should I be so disposed as to wish to land in Egypt, to take all necessary measures to protect me from annoyance. Less than this would be equivalent to my abandoning a right which, as a matter of principle as well as of convenience, I am not prepared to forego.

*Corresponde.* <sup>v. w. if</sup> *Downing Street*

I will only add that letter <sup>the</sup> if addressed to the Rubattir <sup>then</sup> Steamer "China," at Aden, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of March or at Suez on the 12th, and will prevent further misunderstanding

I am, my dear Sir Evelyn, yours faithfully,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

*Private.*

Bombay, January 30, 1884

MY DEAR EDDY,

What, in the name of all that is blunder-headed, does Baring mean by sending me *in official form* and without explanation a threat of the late Sherif Pasha's that he would prevent my landing in Egypt? You surely explained to him the meaning of my last visit and the encouragement which had been given me (I don't mean merely through myself) to make a move in Egyptian politics. Or what is the history of it? Of course I have been obliged to answer, but as yet have done so semi-officially only, and without putting all the dots upon the I's, and have left him a door of retreat from what you must see is quite a false position. Please don't let him force me to go any further.

Seriously, would it not be better to work with me frankly at last by telling me exactly what it is you want in Egypt. Unless you really mean annexation, you will need every honest man's help to get you out of your difficulties, and the day will come when you will not despise mine. It is only two years ago if I remember rightly that you told me Gordon was mad. But you must not drive me too far. I have a serious work to do in the East, a work of which the establishment of good government in Egypt is only a small part, and one way or other, with God's help, I mean to do it. It is a good work and you could further it greatly in Downing Street if you chose to trust me, but I am sure you cannot hinder it, certainly not by shutting me out of Egypt. I had nearly given up the idea of going back there this spring, for my thoughts were in another direction, when I got Baring's letter. But I shall most certainly fight the matter out if he insists. Only I beg of you think it carefully over and if possible let Baring be advised to send me a sensible reply.

We leave Bombay on the 1st of March

Yours affectionately,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.



## Appendix C

SIR EVELYN BARING to MR. BLUNT

Cairo, Feb 26, 1884

DEAR MR BLUNT,

On receipt of your letter of January 26th I placed myself in communication with Nubar Pasha I enclose for your information a copy of my letter and of Nubar Pasha's reply.

You will observe that Nubar Pasha's views are identical with those entertained by Cherif Pasha

Very truly yours,  
E BARING

MR HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 28 Feb, 1884

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Thanks for writing to me I know nothing whatever of the steps which the Egyptian Government have taken with regard to yourself, and I am certainly not aware that they were taken at the instance of the English Government or of its representative at Cairo

I am afraid—and my fears are confirmed by what you say in your last letter—that you have considered the fact of your corresponding with the Prime Minister's Private Secretary on Egyptian matters as an encouragement, however intentionally guarded the correspondence may have been on my side This may lead to misunderstanding, and I feel bound to consider not so much myself (for that matters little) as my master Moreover it is difficult for me in writing to show exactly how far I write on my own account—a difficulty which is enhanced by the impossibility of my devoting the time and care necessary for corresponding on important subjects

Having regard then to these considerations I think it my duty not to attempt to write about such subjects, and that it will be better for you and me if we drop writing to one another on public questions I daresay I am to blame in this matter, as it has always been an interest and pleasure to me to hear your views which you have the power of expressing so well, and I have been tempted to egg you on I hope you will not misunderstand what I have said I don't think I need have any fear on this account, for I am sure our friendship is strong enough not to be affected by anything I may do from a sense of public and official duty I have been awfully busy of late, busier than ever Whenever not wholly absorbed in work, my thoughts have of late been mainly occupied by the long and very serious illness of poor Pembroke I wish I had time to send more news, but that is not possible

Correspondence of Wilfrid Hamilton, Downing Street

For the sake of your own sake, I hope you won't act in the matter of the Egyptian Government in such a way as to get you and your family into trouble. I hope I have said nothing which will be a source of inconvenience to you, and you will make due allowance for the difficulties and by yours affectionately,  
E. W. HAMILTON

Mr. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT, April 4, 1884

10, Downing Street,

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Welcome back. I am truly glad to hear of your safe return, and Lady Anne's safe return. I shall like of all things to arrange an early meeting, etc. Thanks for taking my remarks in such good grace

Yours affectionately,

E. W. HAMILTON

MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON W E GLADSTONE, M.P

Crabbet Park, April 23, 1884.

MY DEAR SIR,

A few days ago some gentlemen of the many interested in the fate of General Gordon called on me to ask my advice as to the best means of extricating him from the imminent peril in which he lies, and they suggested the formation of a band of volunteers which should endeavour to run the gauntlet of their besiegers and having forced their way to Khartoum should bring him back with them in safety by the same road. The idea seemed to me a generous but wholly impracticable one, and I told them so, frankly adding that much as I should wish to join in any reasonable attempt to save General Gordon's life, I could not with the principles I hold, be a party to an armed attempt against the Arabs whom I hold to be in the right as I hold General Gordon to be in the wrong. I promised however that should anything in the shape of peaceful negotiation be proposed I would willingly aid them to the full extent of my power.

Since then I have most opportunely received information which leads me to feel certain that if properly approached not only could terms be obtained from the besiegers of Khartoum which should include General Gordon's safe return with such of his companions as might choose to accompany him, but that a general pacification of the Upper Nile might at the same time and by the same means be effected. In view therefore of the urgency of the situation (for believe me, Sir, it is urgent), I deem it a duty to offer through

Appendix C

you my services to H. M.'s Government. I say to H. M. Government merely private negotiations could. But I do not apprehend that large public interests are involved. But I do not apprehend that any absolute departure from general principles of policy announced by the Government would be required in conducting them to a successful termination.

With regard to my own part in the matter I will only add that I should not be necessary for me to go myself although I believe I should be ready to do so if the circumstances to the Sudan absolutely require it.

I am, my dear Sir, yours faithfully,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private*

10, Downing Street, Whitehall  
24th April, 1884

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr Gladstone is obliged for your letter. He must to-day confine himself to saying that he is communicating its contents to his colleagues in the Cabinet

Yours,

E. W. HAMILTON

*Private*

Same date

MY DEAR WILFRID,

I add a private line. Considering all that has gone before, I can help thinking you would do well to approach the Government by other means than those in Downing Street. Could you not take Harry Brand into confidence with a view to your viewings sitting through him to Lord Hartington?

Yours aff

E. W. H

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

10, James Street, Buckingham Gate,  
April 24, 1884. 7 o'clock p m

MY DEAR EDDY,

If it was a matter concerning my own wishes or one of small importance I would willingly consult Harry Brand, who would do all he could I know to serve me. But this is the most serious step I have taken in my life and one which involves consequences not to me only but to this country and to many besides, and I dare

*Correspondence with Downing Street*

not treat it except with those wholly responsible. If Mr. Gladstone cannot see <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ way, perhaps he may be willing to do so later. I was in the House this afternoon and listened attentively to his declarations, and I gathered from them that he has not yet closed the door to negotiations by any absolute decision of an immediately warlike nature. So that I will wait his time, confident that if I can be of use he will not scruple, on a point of formality in connection with past events, to give me timely notice. Only I fear that perhaps the time given us all may be shorter than he thinks, for already according to my latest accounts the tribes are gathering from every side in arms, and though I still think it not too late it may well be so soon. I shall be in London till Saturday when I go back to Crabbet but shall be always within reach if required.

Yours affectionately,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

MR. HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 30 April 1884.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

Mr. Gladstone desires me to thank you for your offer to act as mediator in the Soudan, of which, however, Her Majesty's Government are not able to make use, inasmuch as it must already be known throughout that region that they, in common with the Government of Egypt, have no other desire than to promote the evacuation of the country and the restoration of its liberties.

Believe me, yours truly,  
HORACE SEYMOUR.

SIR PHILIP CURRIE TO MR. BLUNT

Foreign Office, May 17, 1884.

SIR,

I am directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant in which you complain of the refusal of the Egyptian Government to allow you to land in Egypt on your return from India, which refusal was communicated to you through Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo.

I am to inform you that the decision not to permit you to visit Egypt is one with which Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to interfere.

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,  
PHILIP W. CURRIE.

## Appendix C

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private* 10, Downing Street, 21st May 1884  
MY DEAR WILFRID,

Rumours have reached me that you are about to found your complaint against the Government for being excluded from Egypt partly on the ground of certain "interviews" which you had with me last autumn

I feel bound to notice these rumours by writing you a line, but I may say at the outset, knowing you as I do, that I wholly and entirely discredit them for more than one reason

In the first place, I unfortunately saw so little of you before you left England that I know we had no "interviews" with the solitary exception of your coming to say good-bye to me, when I recollect that our conversation was limited to wishing you "bon voyage," adding as I believe I did that letters from you abroad would continue to interest me as they always had

In the second place, I studiously avoid ever attempting to quote Mr Gladstone's views—(and his views alone have weight)—which I have no title whatever to represent

In the third place, had I committed any indiscretions—as to which my conscience is absolutely clear—any use of them by yourself could only have one result, and that would be, to show that I was quite unfit for my present post of confidence. Of doing this I am sure you have not the smallest intention.

You will I know excuse my bothering you on this matter. All that I want is the shortest authority from yourself to deny the truth of the rumours. For this purpose only do I ask for such an assurance, and not for my own satisfaction, because I am convinced that you would be the last person in the world to take at a disadvantage one of your oldest and sincerest friends, who occupies a place of great trust and delicacy

Yours affectionately,  
E. W. HAMILTON

I hope if fortune favours me to see you again soon

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

Crabbet Park, May 22 1884

MY DEAR EDDY,

I have no wish to make a scandal of this or any other matter unless absolutely forced into it, and still less to do you an injury and so I have decided, before going further, to lay the whole fact privately before Mr Gladstone. He will then be able to decide

*Correspondence*

*to Mr. Gladstone at 10, Downing Street*

whether I have or have not a right to complain. You may rely upon me to be scrupulously accurate between us, but I have a right to exaggerate anything that passed between us, the time, imperfectly, but sufficient to prove to me, and any doubt of the accuracy of my recollection, that our conversation in Downing Street the day I saw you there before I went abroad was by no means limited, I saw you there before I went on my voyage." I do not however suppose, to "wishing me have all along asserted, namely that you suppose, to "wishing me Egypt on my way Eastwards. Unless wholly upon this for what I another person, whom you probably was encouraged to stop in that time desirous of a reasonable explanation, Mr. Gladstone was at Nationalists, and I went to Egypt and was altogether deceived by under this impression. You will say that I was altogether deceived by of a mystification, but I find this very difficult, for restoring the Exiled any rate the doubt should be cleared up. I repeat, I have not and at to have it done in public, if I can have it done in private. I wish not wish to make a scandal. I look upon Mr Gladstone as really a friend to most of my ideas, and I would far rather not be driven into a position of antagonism to him. But the withdrawal of my right of protection in Egypt is a violent proceeding and one that I cannot accept without protest. The notice was served on me formally, publicly and I may say brutally, and Lord Granville has refused me even a reason. This is not fair, and my only resource is to force an answer through Parliament, when the whole matter will be sifted. I have fortunately made it a rule to have no political secrets as regards my own acts, and so am prepared to argue it out. But I quite understand that others are not in my free position, and, if you can assure me that Mr. Gladstone will give the matter his serious private attention and not merely put me off with an official reply I will write to him on the subject. With regard to my really going to Egypt I have no wish in the present position of affairs to do so. I could do no good there politically nor could I even if I wished it make matters worse; and I am far from well and want rest and not a new campaign. But my right to protection is a matter of principle and I have certain real, if not very large, material interests in Egypt which I may at any time require to see to. Indeed Baring's action in withdrawing his protection and preventing my landing has already cost me perhaps a couple of hundred pounds. This is exactly how things stand, and I await your answer, before taking further steps.

Yours ever,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

Appendix

MR. HAMILTON . BLUNT

Private  
MY DEAR WILFRID, 10, Downing Street, 24<sup>th</sup> May 1884

Thanks for your letter

I am very sorry that your recollection of what took place last autumn should be so entirely at variance with my own recollection of it. But I cannot conceive that any private conversation between friends, whatever complexion you may put upon it, can be construed into what you call "a scandal", and I recognize the kindness of your desire not to cause me bother.

Mr Gladstone never fails to give his personal attention to every communication made to him, so I need hardly assure you that a statement coming from you will be fully considered by him.

I am very sorry to be the cause of adding at all to your labours, etc

Yours as always,  
E. W. H

MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON W. E. GLADSTONE, M P

Crabbet Park, May 31, 1884

MY DEAR SIR,

The privilege you have, at various times during the last three years, accorded me of addressing you on public matters must be my excuse if I now appeal to you on a matter mainly personal namely my recent exclusion from Egypt on my return from India and the still more recent refusal of H. M.'s Government to afford me protection there invariably given to British subjects. The circumstances of my case are briefly as follows

Towards the close of last session I received a visit from a gentleman well known to yourself but not otherwise connected with political life or at all with Egypt, during which he urged upon me the desirability of my "making a new move" in Egyptian politics. His idea was that public opinion in England had sufficiently changed during the previous twelve months for it to be possible to propose with some chance of success a restoration of the National party before the British troops were withdrawn from Egypt, and he furthermore suggested that the matter might best be brought forward if a popular demonstration should occur on the occasion of the Elections under Lord Dufferin's Charter. He thought that the leaders of the liberal party if such there still were at Cairo might be advised to propose Arabi as their Candidate and, if his election were secured, that there would afterwards be no difficulty in bringing about his recall from exile. The idea was a

## Correspondence with Downing Street

new one to me, and I thought that at first it seemed to me a quite impracticable one, and I did not encourage it, especially as at the time I had abandoned all immediate thoughts of again taking an active part in Egyptian politics. It seemed to me that, without the concurrence of H. M.'s Government, it would only result in failure, and I knew how little real liberty of choice the Electors would have and how certain would be the punishment imposed upon the leaders in any such movement. I nevertheless on this suggestion wrote to an intelligent friend at Cairo, on whom I believed I could rely, to inform me what chance of success the plan would offer, and I received his answer towards the end of August. He informed me that "though there was no party in favour of Arabi's return, it was because it was not thought of as possible. Many regretted him, but the punishment inflicted on him and the spite wreaked on all who were mixed up with his revolution, which continued daily to be exercised, prevented any one from attempting to follow his example. There was a big party which thought of him with regret, but until quite lately my correspondent had hardly heard a word about his return at Cairo. Lord Dufferin's parliament had always been a mere toy and a thing to laugh at by all who knew Egypt. With the existing system of Palace and Ministerial supremacy, where no man dared do right because he instantly made himself a marked man, the Parliament would be a convenient tool for the Government. The bare idea of its showing independence under the existing regime would be ridiculous. At the same time if Arabi returned to Egypt, any constituency would return him, unless pressure were put on the Electors. If the elections were left alone, pressure would certainly be put on any constituency for which Arabi might present himself as Candidate. But, if Englishmen watched the ballot, he might get returned, although that constituency would most certainly be made to suffer in a hundred ways for its temerity. . . . If the people thought that a new era was dawning and they might vote fearlessly, of course Arabi would be returned by any constituency in Egypt, but they had had a severe lesson and 'a burnt child dreads the fire.'"

This letter, dated the 20th of August 1883, reached me if I am not mistaken on the 29th, and on the same day, I again called, by his invitation, on the gentleman already referred to, and he then told me that since his last talk with me he had seen you and that he could now assure me that it was your personal wish to find an excuse for restoring the exiles, and he advised me strongly to go to Cairo, where I should be well received by Sir Evelyn Baring and where I could talk the matter over with him. "Sir Evelyn Baring," he said, "will arrive in a few days at Cairo and he had *carte blanche* to begin a new policy in place of Sir Edward Malet's



## Appendix

which had failed" This put the matter on a more hopeful light and I at once determined to stop in Egypt on my way to India and, if I found Sir Evelyn Baring in reality favourable to the idea to propose Arabi's Election to the Liberals of Cairo. Although I will not say that the communication was delivered to me in terms as a message from you, I certainly accepted it as in some sort such, and I find it difficult to believe that it was wholly unauthorised by you or at least that you were unaware that it would be made. Nor can I doubt that a restoration of the National Party was a most natural and wise resolve, for it was only by such a course that the promised evacuation of Egypt could with any prudence have been effected, or the Charter of Egyptian liberty been made a reality.

I therefore began to prepare my plans of action, as well as it was possible to do so beforehand, and arranged to leave England on the 12th of September, for Suez, whence I could visit Cairo and learn how matters really lay and whether my stay there could with any advantage be prolonged.

Moreover on the day of my departure I received a note from Mr Hamilton, your private secretary, asking to see me before I left, and I went to call on him in Downing Street and talked the matter of my visit to Egypt over with him. I told him of my plans with regard to the Cairo Elections, and he approved of it and seemed to approve, and assured me of Sir Evelyn Baring's readiness to confer with me, and we discussed certain details regarding my visit and he gave me advice on other political matters. Although Mr Hamilton and I are old friends, I had not seen him for some time previously to this visit and we did not talk, as far as I am aware, at all on private matters, nor had I been to Downing Street for nearly a year, and, notwithstanding his reserve which I noticed as to yourself, I remained distinctly under the impression that his language on the occasion was authorised by you. You had left England some days before for Norway, and Mr Hamilton, if anyone, was there to represent you. Thus I was and still am convinced that my journey was made with your sanction, and that on that account I had special claims on Sir Evelyn Baring for his protection in case my visit should give rise to annoyance.

As a matter of fact I only stayed ten days in Egypt, and meddled in no way at Cairo with the Elections. I found them half over when I arrived, and on calling on Sir Evelyn Baring, found him with quite other views from what I had been led to expect. He received me indeed most amiably and discussed with me the whole situation, but when I talked of a Nationalist restoration we no longer agreed. I spoke my mind perhaps rather

## Correspondence with Downing Street

too freely told about his power, which I felt certain must end, as it has ended, in failure, but I have nothing else to reproach myself with in my communications with him, and beyond giving some advice and a very qualified encouragement to the friends and relations of the Exiles as to their eventual return and ascertaining some valuable facts with regard to the history of the previous two years, I did little while there that had a political significance. It was therefore with real surprise that I received Sir Evelyn's notice delivered officially and without explanatory excuse or remark four months later that I was not to disembark in Egypt on my return from India.

This, Sir, is the principal point in the case which I would lay before you. A second is that the decision to exclude me from Egypt seems to have been come to simultaneously with a determination to inflict certain petty annoyances on me in regard to a small property I have in Egypt, annoyances which, reckoned only in money value, will represent a loss to me of perhaps a couple of hundred pounds. It is equally difficult to understand that these should have been entered on with or without Sir Evelyn Baring's knowledge, *with*, because they are an act unworthy of a public servant towards a political opponent, *without*, because they occurred precisely at the extreme plenitude of Sir Evelyn's power, when hardly a sparrow fell to the ground in Egypt without his knowledge.

A third point is the refusal of the F. O. to *assign me any reason* for declining to support my demand of admission as a British Subject into Egypt. Although I am advised that the Egyptian Government has a technical right to refuse entrance into Egypt, as far as I have been able to ascertain, it is a right which has never before been enforced there against a British Subject, and the British Government have never before refused protection *without assigning reason*. It seems to me therefore that it is a public duty with me not to let this pass without protest, for if it be admitted in my case that it depends upon the arbitrary goodwill and pleasure of the Foreign Minister of the day to decide who among British Subjects shall and shall not be protected abroad, it surely establishes a dangerous precedent, limiting criticism on foreign affairs to agreement with the Government. I have ventured to disagree with Lord Granville on his policy in Egypt. *Without assigning reason* he excludes me from Egypt, the inference seems clear that I am subjected to pains and penalties for my free speaking, a thing altogether out of accordance with English political practice. Nor can I think that the immediate convenience of excluding me from Egypt, which I presume is the unavowed motive, can be worth so very new and questionable a departure.

## Appendix C

Under all these circumstances I am induced to believe that a personal appeal to you I shall be best consulting the general interests as well as my own. I have been advised that my remedies with Parliament and the publicity which should oblige the Foreign Office to give me a fair answer, but I have no wish, in the presence of such large public questions as are at the present moment being debated with regard to Egypt, to bring a personal grievance of my own in connection with that country unnecessarily before the public, and I feel sure that you will admit the soundness of my reasoning, and will so far favour me as to place before Lord Granville my unofficial request that he will reconsider his decision with regard to my recent application

I am, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

P S—I may add that should you feel any doubt as to the accuracy of my recollection of the two conversations here recorded, I possess reasonable proof of it in the shape of memorandums written at the time. These I should be happy if you required them to show you privately

[N B—Sir Evelyn Baring subsequently, 1891, assured me that the annoyances complained of in this letter in regard to my property were none of his instigation, and I accepted and accept his assurance implicitly.

My correspondent in Egypt quoted in the letter was Mr Arden Beaman, late official interpreter to the British Agency, and one well qualified to give the opinion quoted. The friend of Mr Gladstone referred to was of course Sir James Knowles.]

### MR BLUNT TO MR HAMILTON

St James' Club, Piccadilly, W, *May 31, 1884*

DEAR EDDY,

I send you my letter to Mr Gladstone, which I have very carefully drawn up, so as to be within the limit of things which I am quite sure of, and which I could, if necessary, support by reasonable evidence. With regard especially to my conversation with you, I have kept myself well within the limit of things written. I am convinced that the little I quote will remind you of much more than was said. As to the main fact of Mr Gladstone's having, last year the thought of restoring the Nationalist party and allowing it to be helped through my instrumentality, the more I think it over the less I doubt it. Please then forward my letter to him without delay, and let me have his answer before Parliament

*Correspondence*

*Downing Street*

meet again so that I may be able to see you at some other time, which in the present critical position of affairs is a most valuable opportunity. I am sure you cannot say that I have shewn

Yours affectionately,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 10 June 1884.

DEAR BLUNT,

Mr Gladstone has received and considered your letter of the 31st ult., and he desires me to say in reply that it is, in his opinion, impossible that any friend of his could, without the grossest error of judgment, have given you any ground for the suppositions that he was favourable (a) to the restoration of the exiles to Egypt, and the election of Arabi under Lord Dufferin's scheme, or (b) to your stopping in Egypt on your way to India for the purpose of promoting Arabi's candidature.

With regard to your account of your interview with Hamilton on the day you started for Egypt, Mr. Gladstone is convinced that you entirely mistook Hamilton.

Without, however, questioning in any way your intentions or your honour, Mr Gladstone has deplored your proceedings in Egypt as alike injurious to Egyptian and British interests, and he has entirely concurred in the course which has been taken by the Foreign Office in reference to yourself.

I am, yours truly,

HORACE SEYMOUR.

MR BLUNT TO MR. SEYMOUR

James Street, June 11, 1884.

DEAR SEYMOUR,

I beg you to thank Mr Gladstone for me for the courteous form of his answer to my letter, and to say that I do not propose bringing the matter of my exclusion from Egypt before Parliament until after the present crisis.

Yours truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

MR HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 5 Aug 1884.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Thanks for your friendly note. I did not, however, need to be assured that, so far as you were yourself concerned, any allusion

Appendix C C

to our conversation last Sunday I am sorry I am-er had no unamendly inten-  
towards me I am only sorry that our memories should not be  
more in accord, but I can honestly say two things. One that my  
asking you to come and say good-bye was merely the impulse of  
a friend who values the friendship of another. The other, that I  
have no recollection whatever of any announcer of your in-  
tentions in Egypt, and that the strictly private nature of our good-  
bye meeting is confirmed by my own diary, and by my not having  
reported any part of it to Mr. Gladstone

If I was incautious, I shall try to amend my ways in future

I am going off to Scotland almost immediately, and whatever  
your movements may be, pray be assured that they will always  
carry with them the best wishes of

Yours affectionately,  
E W HAMILTON

MR BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON W E. GLADSTONE, M P

Crabbet, Novr 18, 1884

MY DEAR SIR,

I venture once again to address you on a matter of very large  
importance connected with past events in Egypt, and which  
still exercising a powerful influence for evil on the prospects of  
Government in that country and our own good name throughout  
the East

You will not have forgotten the charges brought by Lord  
Randolph Churchill last year against the Khedive of complicity  
in organizing the riots of Alexandria, or the opinion which I have  
more than once expressed that they were well founded. My  
original knowledge of the matter came through my connection  
with Arabi's trial, and when I found that in spite of the promise  
of amnesty men were still being tried and executed on accusations  
connected with that affair I did not hesitate to put in Lord Ran-  
dolph's hands the few facts then at my command. At the same  
time I took no leading part myself in bringing the matter before  
the public. Since that time, however, a variety of accidents have  
put me into possession of a complete chain of new evidence  
giving me the right to speak at last with absolute certainty on  
the great events of that time. I am able now not only to trace the  
history of the Alexandrian riots with a sure hand, but to produce  
full evidence of the Khedive's orders having been given for the  
riots of Tintah, Dumanhour, and other towns of the Delta  
month later. Moreover (and this I consider the most important  
feature of the case) I have ascertained and am prepared to prove  
that there was a total miscarriage of justice under the Commission

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

instituted to try cases connected with these massacres after the war. The chief offenders were not punished, in many instances innocent men were put forward by the Khedive's officers to suffer for the guilty, and in others those condemned were not only innocent, but had taken an active part in saving Christian life. In the case of Lord Randolph Churchill's indictment, the written statements it was objected were unsigned. But the witnesses I can now bring forward are men of acknowledged character, and much of their evidence was officially acquired, while they are ready to appear in person either publicly or in private in support of their assertions.

Such being the case I feel that I cannot do better than lay the facts privately before you, and request that you will personally examine the value of my new evidence. I have as yet communicated it to none of my political friends, and I can assure you that I had far rather keep it remote from public dispute. It is a question of justice to be done and reparation made, for there are innocent men still in prison, and the families of others who have suffered death are in distress, and it is you alone who can adequately repair the wrong or restore the honour of English justice where it has been compromised.

At the same time I am aware of the many calls upon your time, and should you consent to an inquiry I should be satisfied if you would allow yourself to be represented by deputy in all the details, begging you only to retain the responsibility in your own hands, and not to refer me to the Foreign Office, which has been throughout deaf to my representations, also as it is a question of evidence and witnesses I would suggest that persons of judicial training would best discharge the duty of representing you in an inquiry. I should ask no better than that the case should be referred for decision to ordinary English judges.

Having said this, I need hardly add that I am myself absolutely certain of all the main facts of which I propose to produce evidence, as certain as I am of any in history, nor need I assure you that I have a perfect confidence that when you too shall have been convinced of the deceptions practised upon our agents in Egypt, you will hasten to do justice. It is not too much to affirm that this initial failure of justice after the war has been the cause of all subsequent failures, and that there is little prospect of renewing honest life in Egypt through our intervention as long as so great and notorious a treachery remains unpunished.

I am, my dear sir, yours very faithfully,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

*Appendix. C*

MR HAMILTON TO MR BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 21st Nov 1884

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Your note was most welcome as it gave me tidings of you whereabouts, as to which in spite of many inquiries of friends could ascertain nothing I send this half line in anticipation of any reply Mr Gladstone may send you when he has been able to read your letter—which was not feasible for him to do to-day

You don't say where you have been betaking yourself, but I hope we may soon meet

Yours affectionately,

E W H

MR HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 25 November, 1884

MY DEAR BLUNT,

Mr Gladstone desires me to say in reply to your letter of the 18th of this month, that under your inhibition to communicate with the Foreign Office, he cannot do more than acknowledge its receipt

Yours faithfully,

HORACE SEYMOUR

MR BLUNT TO MR. GLADSTONE

(*Précis*)

London, March 12, 1885

A letter saying that since the fall of Khartoum he has put himself once more in correspondence with those in Europe who are in correspondence with the Mahdi, with the result that he has ascertained that the road to peaceful negotiation is open He is authorized by them to say that a preliminary discussion might be opened in Egypt, but not through the ordinary diplomatic or military channels—the basis of negotiation to be 1. Release of captives 2 Immunity for the tribes involved in the war 3 Retirement of British or Egyptian forces to Wady Halfa and Souakin 4 Evacuation of Souakin and Massowah in favour of the Sultan 5 Recognition of the Mahdi as sovereign within these limits 6 Establishment of diplomatic relations with England 7 Freedom of commercial intercourse 8 Possibly a convention limiting the Slave Trade He is further authorized, in order to save further bloodshed, to offer the services of an Arab gentleman to convey an immediate message explaining the attitude of the English Government towards the Soudan

*Correspondence with Downing Street*

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Confidential*

10, Downing Street, March 14, 1885

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr Gladstone is obliged to you for your letter, which he wishes me to acknowledge on his behalf.

You imply that the Mahdi would not deal with Lord Wolseley and Sir E Baring, our accredited representatives in Egypt. But why then does not the Mahdi send either some representative of his own with his views ready to be presented to the Government here, or some communication of those views, which might come to head-quarters at once? One may almost say that anything short of this is paltering with the case.

Yours always,

E W HAMILTON

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

*(Précis)*

London, March 16, 1885

Explains the difficulty in the way of a representative being sent, the road not being open and the Mahdi being unaware whether his representative would be well received. Suggests sending an Arab gentleman under a safe conduct to Khartoum. Will Mr Gladstone be disposed to facilitate the journey of such a gentleman, giving him a sufficient knowledge of the disposition and ideas of the British Government to enable him to arrange a formal embassy on the part of the Mahdi?

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.*

10, Downing Street, March 19, 1885.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Many thanks for your note. It did not occur to me to connect Drummond Wolff's Question with your letters. It is not my fault that you have not had a further letter from me on the subject of your last communication. All I can for the moment say is that it is the subject of consideration. I am aware of what you consider the urgency of the matter to be.

Yours affectionately,

E W H

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Confidential.*

21 March, 1885.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Your letter to me of the 16th has been taken into consideration. I am to remind you that Lord Wolseley has been instructed



## Appendix C

to forward any overtures which may be made by the Mahdi, the immediate consideration of the Government. If it is thought that the Mahdi is not aware of these instructions, it might possibly be arranged that the Arab gentleman should convey information through the British lines. But the Government would require to be satisfied as to the gentleman's character and intentions.

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON

MR BLUNT TO MR GLADSTONE

(*Précis*)

March 24, 1885

Thanking for message received through Mr Hamilton, which however, is not sufficiently definite to be acted on, but holds himself in readiness to give any further explanations, and suggesting it by word of mouth.

MR HAMILTON TO MR BLUNT

*Confidential*

10, Downing Street, March 28, 1885

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr Gladstone cannot perceive that the last letter I wrote you by his direction was really indefinite. It practically conveyed to you an intimation that, if the Government could be assured of the Arab gentleman's character and intentions, a passage through the British lines might be arranged for him. Mr Gladstone is afraid that he cannot suggest any other mode of proceeding.

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON

MR HAMILTON TO MR BLUNT

*Private*

10, Downing Street, March 28, 1885

MY DEAR WILFRID,

I am sorry I cannot say more, but I must adhere to instructions.

Yours affectionately,

E. W. H.

MR HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, March 30, 1885

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr Gladstone went out of town on Saturday night, and according to present arrangements he will not return to London before

*Correspondence with De la Rue & Street*

the 9th of April. Under these circumstances I am afraid any interview is out of all question

All I can do for the moment is to communicate on the subject of your letter received this morning with Lord Hartington, who is not only Mr. Gladstone's locum tenens, but who is now more directly concerned as War Minister than any other member of the Cabinet in matters affecting the Soudan

Yours affectionately,  
E. W. H

MR. BLUNT TO MR HAMILTON

*March 30*

Saying it would not be worth while sending a special messenger to say that Lord Wolseley would forward communications. What is required is an explanation of what the terms might be if a mission was sent. While Mr Gladstone says there is no intention of restoring Egyptian rule in the Soudan, Wolseley is appointing Prince Hassan Governor-General, Graham is pounding the "rebels" at Souakin, and Baring is arresting Zebehr at Cairo. Mr. Blunt is going abroad and will see those in communication with the Mahdi, and will ascertain their further views

MR HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Confidential.*

10, Downing Street, Whitehall,  
*April 2nd, 1885*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

All that I am at liberty further to say to you, before you go abroad, is to remind you that H.M Government have again and again declared their objects to be the security of Egypt and the freedom of the Soudan, and to point out to you that the Mahdi has indicated to them nothing whatever. If it is thought that the objects of the British Government are not known to the Mahdi, why cannot steps be taken to communicate them to him? If they are known to him, surely it is for him then to make some declaration upon them in return?

Yours always,  
E. W HAMILTON.

Bon voyage and au revoir.

MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W E. GLADSTONE, M.P

*Paris, April 8, 1885.*

MY DEAR SIR,

Yesterday the Mahdi's principal agent in Europe met me here, and I went through the whole subject of our recent correspond-

## *Appendix C*

ence carefully with him, and especially the draft of terms suggested in my first communication, and read to him Mr Hamilton's last letter containing the declaration that the Government policy is that of freedom for the Soudan and security for Egypt. Of the draft of terms I am glad to say he fully approves, as a possible basis of negotiation with the Mahdi, and he is willing to accept the declaration of policy as generally compatible with that basis. Also he is prepared to send the Arab gentleman as bearer of a communication stating that England's policy is one of "freedom for the Soudan and security for Egypt," and he assures me that the Mahdi will in turn despatch a mission of peace to England, which may be expected to arrive not later than September. The Arab gentleman will, moreover, if the Government is willing, arrange in the interval for an armistice, for the better treatment of captives, and for immunity for such tribes as may have joined the English arms.

The Mahdi's agent also begged me to say that he trusted the Government would not be deceived by the reports recently circulated of defection from the Mahdi's standard, and so delay despatching the messenger to Khartoum. There was no truth at all in these reports, but on the contrary, there was every certainty that as soon as the agricultural season was over on the Upper Nile, hostilities would be resumed, nor would these permanently cease as long as a British or Egyptian army remained in the Soudan. With regard, however, to an advance upon Egypt proper, he made the remark that the Mahdi was a reformer, not a conqueror, that he had no quarrel with the Egyptians either there or elsewhere, many thousands of them being actually gathered under his flag, and that the establishment of a just and legal Egyptian Government at Cairo would at once end any danger of such an advance by depriving it of excuse in popular sympathy. The Mahdi was popular with the fellahin of Egypt, because he had rid their brethren, the Soudanese, of an intolerable tyranny, and they would continue to look on him as a possible deliverer as long as their wrongs remained unredressed. If through the means now placed at the Government's disposal a truce of two or three years was concluded, England would have time to do justice, and it would be her fault if at the end of it the war was renewed. The Mahdi had no mission of conquest in Egypt.

Finally he requested me to explain that Ministerial declarations made in England are not understood in the Soudan, and that there is a great mistrust of all military communications. If the Mahdi had understood General Gordon as having a really friendly mission towards the Soudanese he would certainly have entered into friendly communications with him. But, up to the present

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

moment, it has been the universal belief in the Soudan that England has no other object ~~than~~ to conquer and retain the country. For this reason it is essential that the communication of a contrary policy should be made through some one known to them and promising credit with the people.

From all I heard yesterday I am satisfied that it depends wholly now upon the Government to prolong the Mahdi's hostility, or change it into friendship, and I therefore await with much hope your answer to this letter.

Believe me, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

MR HAMILTON TO MR BLUNT

*Confidential.*

10, Downing Street, *April 11, 1885.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone is obliged for your letter, written from Paris on the 8th, which I duly delivered to him.

He does not well see how he can add anything material to the letter which I wrote to you on the 2nd, and of which he himself was cognisant, though he was away from London. In that letter there were reiterated the declared objects of the British Government in the Soudan, objects which they are as desirous as ever of securing, and which hardly need to be enlarged upon.

Let me add a word on my own account. I cannot help thinking you must understand the delicacy and difficulty which the Government must feel about holding communications with you, on matters relating to Egypt, directly or indirectly, when it is believed that you mistrust and are opposed to the Ruler of that country whom they are bound and likewise intend to support.

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON

MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON W E. GLADSTONE, M.P.

10, James Street, *April 14, 1885.*

MY DEAR SIR,

I returned yesterday from Paris, and hasten to answer your last letter. The Mahdi's agent is ready now to send the messenger whenever it suits you to give him the necessary facilities. But he has impressed very strongly and repeatedly upon me the necessity there is of his having a *written* message in Arabic to deliver. This need not go beyond the sense of the words Mr.

## Appendix C

Hamilton has already used in writing to me, but it must be a form intelligible to the Mahdi and others whom it concerns. Without this, he says, it will be impossible to convince the Mahdi that the message is quite sincere on the Government's part, or at any rate that his followers should be so convinced. My knowledge of Arab ideas leads me to feel sure that in this he is only reasonable, nor do I conceive that the Government, which has already sent written communications through their Generals to Osman Digna and other chiefs, would now find a difficulty in writing this message to their supreme chief Mohammed Ahmed. It will not be necessary that the title "el Mahdi" should be employed towards him in the letter, and I could, if desired, suggest a form of address which would be considered friendly without acknowledging this special pretension. The strictest secrecy would be maintained by the messenger until his delivery of the letter at the Mahdi's camp.

Thus the suggestion made in Mr Hamilton's first letter to me, that the Mahdi should send a mission to England, can be conveyed to him in a way he will understand as being sincerely offered, and all that need further be done will be to instruct the military authorities to receive with scrupulous courtesy the Envoys on their arrival at the British lines.

I am, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

MR BLUNT TO MR HAMILTON

St James Street, *April* 15, 1885

MY DEAR EDDY,

I have replied to the first part of your letter in the enclosed to Mr Gladstone, and I add a few words in answer to your own remarks, as I should be sorry there should be additional difficulty through misunderstanding. For reasons which you know, and for others which you do not know, I have of course, as you say, "mistrust" of the Khedive, but the extent of my "opposition" to him you probably exaggerate. I have had very little correspondence with Egypt since my last visit there under circumstances which you will remember, and the failure of Baring's policy since has been due to its inherent weakness far more than to the action of his opponents, certainly than to mine. I believe still what I have always believed, that there is no course open to the Government, if it would keep its pledges and have peace in Egypt, but to restore the National party, and, if that is impossible, then annexation by Europe, if not by England, is the only end

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

Mr Gladstone has seemed to me up to the present to stand in the way of each a possible arrangement, and on this ground especially I have from time to time opposed him, but, if it could be shown to me that the peace and happiness of Egypt was compatible with his rule, I should not surely out of obstinacy refuse to be reconciled.

The questions, however, of the Soudan and Egypt may for the immediate present perfectly well be kept apart, and I see no reason why the Government should hesitate to communicate with me on the former if not on the latter. They have publicly declared the Soudan to be independent of Egypt, and Mr Gladstone has recently assured me through you that he earnestly desires to maintain its freedom.

Yours affectionately,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Confidential* 10, Downing Street, April 16, 1885  
MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone is afraid that he cannot draw a distinction for present purposes between Egypt and the Soudan, and so I am obliged again to point out the difficulty of his holding communications with yourself on the subject of your correspondence with him.

It is to be observed that H.M. Government has received no application from any agent of the Mahdi to be allowed a pass through the British lines to enable him to deliver a message. I cannot say with what response such an application might meet

Yours always,  
E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private* 10, Downing Street, 25 April, 1885.  
MY DEAR WILFRID,

My last note was not intended to invite further remarks. It aimed rather at hinting that under altered circumstances the correspondence should close. I am afraid this must be the case. I have no authority to communicate further with you on the matter.

Yours always,  
E. W. H.

## *Appendix C*

MR HAMILTON TO MR BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 17 *May*, 1885

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr Gladstone is much pleased by your kind gift. The little volume will much interest him, and he hopes you will accept his best thanks. He says it will be a pleasure to him to turn from the Soudan to Proteus.

Yours affectionately,

E. W. HAMILTON

MR. HAMILTON TO MR BLUNT

10, Downing Street, Whitehall, 11 *June* 1885

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Many thanks for your kind note. I hope we have never met but as friends, and that the only difference which pending changes will make will be that I may see more of you in relations of "greater freedom and less responsibility." I am afraid for some little time to come I shall be awfully pressed by the ordeal of packing. I have to turn out not only of office, but of home.

In haste

Yours affectionately,

E W H

MR BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON ROBERT BOURKE, M P

10, James St., *July* 3, 1885

MY DEAR BOURKE,

As you are doubtless considering the Soudan question just now at the F O I think it may be of assistance to you to know briefly what has passed between me and the late Government in regard to possible negotiation with the Mahdi.

It began in April, 1884, when I wrote to Mr. Gladstone in connection with schemes then on foot for rescuing Gordon, and offering my services as mediator. Mr. Gladstone seems himself to have had some inclination to accept, but on reference to the rest of the Cabinet my offer was declined.

Secondly I made an attempt in December, through one of the Peace Societies, to gain a hearing. I had ascertained that the Mahdi would be accessible to offers of withdrawal for Gordon and the garrison from Khartoum, and I went to Hawarden with the hope of seeing Mr. Gladstone and explaining the position to him. But I was not received.

Thirdly, after the fall of Khartoum, I again wrote to Mr

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

Gladstone delivering a message I had received from a religious personage in correspondence with the Mahdi proposing to open negotiations for peace or truce. It was just before Graham's second campaign in March, and this time Mr Gladstone responded, and a correspondence followed which led to my being authorised to give certain messages to the personage in question, and I went abroad at Easter to deliver them. It was then proposed to send a messenger through the British Lines to explain the pacific views of the Government, and arrange for the opening of more formal negotiations, and it seemed as if the matter would be arranged, when for some reason which I do not exactly know the thing collapsed. I fancy it was on account of the news spread just at that time of a rival Mahdi having sprung up in Kordofan and the idea that Mohammed Ahmed was no longer in full power at Khartoum, but I am not sure. In any case the correspondence suddenly came to an end.

Although all this was more or less confidential as between myself and Downing Street, there is no reason I think now that I should make any mystery about it to you, especially as it would probably be open still to Lord Salisbury if he liked to take the negotiation up at the point where Mr Gladstone dropped it—and I should be glad if you would show this letter to Lord Salisbury and offer him the confidential perusal of the papers I have relating to it. I will not say more at present than that I still think it would be possible as it would certainly be most desirable to come to terms with the Mahdi.

Yours very truly,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

[N B—I cannot find any answer to this letter, nor do I remember its purport. It led to nothing, the Mahdi's death being shortly after announced. But for this it is probable that Lord Salisbury would have negotiated.]

MR. BLUNT TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

*September, 1885*

MY LORD,

I have the honour to lay before your Lordship the fact that I have received a summons through the Lords of H. M. Treasury to present myself before the Tribunal of First Instance at Cairo on the 19th of October next on a matter connected with a property I hold in Egypt, and to beg your Lordship to inform me whether I shall receive there the protection usually accorded to



## Appendix C

British subjects I make this request in consequence of a notification served on me two years ago by Sir Evelyn Baring with Earl Granville's approval to the effect that I should not then be allowed to land at Suez on my passage from India

For further particulars regarding the case of my exclusion from Egypt by the late Government I beg to refer your Lordship to Blue Book, Egypt, No 27, of 1884, containing my correspondence with the Foreign Office, to the report of a debate in the House of Commons of the 4th August of the same year, and to the enclosed memorandum

Your Lordship will observe that Sir Evelyn Baring's action against me seems to have been based originally upon a misstatement of Sherif Pasha regarding a visit paid to Egypt in 1883, and afterwards to a fear entertained by the late Government that my influence there would be prejudicial to their policy. But I venture to hope that your Lordship will not regard me with the same apprehension, and that, having inquired into the facts, you will restore to me the protection generally accorded to British subjects abroad. I may mention that my prolonged absence from Egypt has occasioned and is occasioning me considerable money losses

I am, my Lord, your obedient humble servant,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

### THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR BLUNT

Foreign Office, *Oct 5, '85*

MY DEAR MR BLUNT,

We have applied to the Egyptian Government to obtain permission for you to return—but we have received the most decided negative. Of course it is in our power to apply pressure to the Egyptian Government. But if we do so, we shall make ourselves responsible for the consequences. It is therefore a matter of duty to us, first to ask you, whether you will undertake not to meddle in any sense with political questions or projects while you are there? If you will give us this undertaking we will telegraph to Egerton to do his best

Yours very truly,

SALISBURY

### MR BLUNT TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

10, James St, *Oct 6, 1885*

MY DEAR LORD SALISBURY,

I most readily undertake not to meddle with political questions or projects while in Egypt, my object in going there being first to

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

look after my property and secondly to assert the right I possess as an Englishman of claiming the protection of my Government while travelling abroad.

Nor do I wish, if it can be arranged that the case I am cited to appear on can be postponed so long as till December or January, to complicate Sir Henry Drummond Wolff's diplomacy by appearing at Cairo during his special mission I quite understand that my arriving there with him on whatever errand might cause embarrassment. But, if I do not now insist upon my right, I run the risk of being perpetually excluded from a country where I have property and where I may one day desire to reside.

I therefore hope that you will insist with the Egyptian Government on the necessity of permitting my visit unmolested

Yours very truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT

Châlet Cécil, *September 10th, '85*

DEAR MR. BLUNT,

I am much obliged to you for your letter. We are in communication with Egypt upon the subject matter of it. I have no wish to cause you any inconvenience, and I hope it will be possible for us to accede to your wishes. Supposing, however, that we can do so, it will be necessary to interpose some delay in the manner you suggest, because I am afraid that your appearance and that of Sir Drummond Wolff at the same moment in Egypt might lead to unauthorised and wholly exaggerated rumours upon questions of future policy.

Yours very truly,

SALISBURY

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT

Foreign Office, *October 10, '85*

DEAR MR. BLUNT,

I did not get your note till my return from Newport. I telegraphed immediately and have received to-night the answer that the Khedive, as a matter of deference to H. M. G. is willing to permit you to come to Egypt, freely for the purpose of looking after your private affairs. The permission is evidently given with much apprehension. I need only add that now my honour as well as yours are involved in your abstaining from any political action—but that I feel assured we may confidently count upon.

Believe me, yours very truly,

SALISBURY

## APPENDIX D

### AUTHOR'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

Gastein, *August 3, 1883*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

Many thanks for your letter, also for the Cairo papers which amused me I am sorry to tell you I have not received your book, "The Future of Islam" I hope it will reach me as I have every opportunity of reading so interesting a work with the care and attention which it deserves Have you done anything yet about getting into Parliament Northcote has come to awful grief over the Canal which has been much more fatal to him than to Gladstone I hope Gorst and Wolff will make long and damaging speeches against the Khedive on Baring's vote, Mind you egg them on This is a horrid dull place and we are badly lodged I wish I had done with it

Yrs most sincerely,  
RANDOLPH S CHURCHILL

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M P, TO MR BLUNT

Gastein, *August 14, 1883*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I have to thank you for your two very interesting letters and enclosures I cannot see my way to doing anything myself in the matter, for I am too far off to communicate effectually with you and secondly it is a sine qua non of these baths that one should do absolutely nothing I hope you will write to the Times just to keep the thing alive, and in the winter by one or two speeches in the country I shall try to rub it all in The awkward fact remains that the Government has made no answer to my indictment and in all probability cannot make one You appear to have given up your intention of going to Ceylon to see Arabi which I am sorry for This a desperately dull place and time hangs heavily The Baths are lowering I think and one feels quite indisposed for any exertion I shall hope to be back in London by the 2nd week in September in case you should still be there We leave this on the 29th.

Yrs most sincerely,  
RANDOLPH S C

P S I have to thank you for your most interesting book which reached me safely When is Ninet's book coming out?

*Correspondence with Lord R. Churchill*

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT

Innsbruck, (end of) *August* 1883.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I arrived here this morning from Ischl and found your letter for which many thanks. I have read your poem with pleasure and I need not say with perfect sympathy. Publish it. Poetry often makes converts where prose fails. I have no doubt that you are a Cassandra and that we shall pay dearly for our freaks in Egypt. But it is a despairing task to try and right the wrong. But I mean to do what I can in my little way when the proper season for extra Parliamentary utterances may arrive. I have a horrid idea that the advent of the opposition to office might be worse for Egypt than any conceivable eventuality. I imagine from your last letter that you are still decided on your journey to India, and I wish you a safe and speedy return.

The idea of having Arabi elected to the new Senate is ingenious; but to be effective he should be elected in many districts. Otherwise it might turn to ridicule.

Believe me Yours most faithfully,  
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT

Blenheim Palace, *Dec* 26, 1883

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I have to thank you for three long and highly interesting letters. I have not written before because I really did not know whether letters had much chance of reaching you. However if I do not write you will think I do not value your letters which would be a great error on your part. I have not much to tell you. I hope by the time you get this that you will have seen the speech I made at Edinbro' on Egypt which is fully reported in the Times of the 19th. I cannot tell you what effect it produced as you would think me very conceited. All I can say is that I am more than satisfied. Tewfik's position grows more hopeless every day. There is no Government in Egypt at all. I think we shall be able to make it very hot for the G. O. M. when Parliament meets. Your poem was very highly praised in the reviews. Gorst is in India at Hyderabad on legal business of the Nizam. Please remember me most kindly to Lady Anne and accept for her and yourself from me the warmest wishes of the season. Do not delay your return too long. We must have stirring times in the spring.

Yours ever,  
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

## *Appendix D*

WRITTEN BY MR BLUNT AND APPROVED BY LORD RANDOLPH  
CHURCHILL

“AM I A TORY DEMOCRAT?”

*May 1885*

With regard to English Home Politics I am prepared to support the Conservative party. That is to say, I desire no change in the existing Constitution or in the relations between Church and State. I am opposed to merely secular Education. I am a strong supporter of the House of Lords. On the land question I should like to see any measure introduced which should make the acquisition of land easier for the man of the people, believing this would be a popular, and in the truest sense, a Conservative measure. I consider, however, that the principles of liberty and property are closely connected, and I am altogether opposed to the Radical views of State ownership in land.

I am inclined to favour the idea of special commercial advantages being given to the British Colonies and India, and I am anxious to see the union between the Colonies and the Empire preserved.

In India I am for large reforms in the direction of self-government, believing these to be absolutely necessary on financial and political grounds if India is to remain loyal.

So, too, in Ireland I am in favour of Home Rule. I consider it urgent to accept the principle of Nationalism, both for Ireland's sake and for England's. My motto would be “Ireland for the Irish and England for the English.” The plan has succeeded in Hungary and Galicia in reconciling the Hungarians and Poles to the Austrian Crown. Why not, therefore, in Ireland?

Foreign politics are my strongest ground. With regard to these I am quite clear in my opinion that what is required for England is a return to plain dealing and respect for international law. These have been grossly outraged during the last four years by Mr. Gladstone's Government, and it is we with our complicated commercial interests in every part of the globe that will eventually suffer from the example given. Our relations with the States of Europe should be based upon a recognition of the fact that our system of parliamentary and popular government makes special alliances and secret treaties impossible. Our old-fashioned diplomacy, with its tortuous dealings, its equivocations and its concealments, is out of date and needs reform, and I would have the contrary to all these things introduced as a cardinal point of policy. As towards Europe we should make the most of our insular position, increase our navy and protect our shores. But in

## *Correspondence with Lord R. Churchill*

Asia we cannot be insular, and we must submit to the conditions of Empire as long as India remains in our charge. In this view we need the alliance of the Mohammedan nations against Russia, and I am in favour of England accepting the full responsibility of her position, as the heir of a great Mohammedan Empire. My quarrel with Mr Gladstone's action in Egypt was not based on any principle of non-intervention, for I am not a non-interventionist, but because he intervened unjustly, unwisely and in such a way as to alienate Mohammedan sympathies. I consider that a duty of reparation is required of England for the wrong done to the Egyptians and I advocate a reconciliation with the Sultan and a restoration of the Egyptian National party. I need hardly say that I am in favour of immediate peace with the Soudan.

Lastly, I consider that justice, not mere expediency, should be the determining law of our conduct towards all nations. I am strongly averse to the Manchester doctrine which allows injustice to weaker nations in the interests of finance and trade, though not of military glory. I believe, on the contrary, that it is England's duty to protect weaker nations from injustice where they come in contact with her. Nor can I convince myself that a high standard of national morality is incompatible with the extreme Conservative principles. I believe, on the contrary, that much of what was best in the so-called "Midlothian" doctrines has more real affinity to Tory than to Whig instincts, and I should be glad to see these adopted, now they have been discarded by the Radicals, as part and parcel of Conservative ideas. Truth, justice, liberty—these are great names, going at this moment in beggars' weeds about the world. Can these find an asylum in the new temple of Tory Democracy?

WILFRID BLUNT TO LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

*June 8, 1885*

MY DEAR CHURCHILL,

I am glad you have stated so clearly the Conservative policy, in nearly all of which I heartily agree, though on some points, such as Ireland, I have larger views than you are prepared for of Home Rule. The necessity for an inquiry into the working of the Indian Government is very urgent, and the fact that you should have included it in your programme, and are to support Mr Slagg's motion, gives me more hope than any thing else which has happened regarding India during the past year. The truth is that if India had to trust solely to the Whigs for reform it might wait till eternity, or rather till that crash came which certainly will come

## *Appendix D*

if the rigidity of the present bureaucratic system is not modified. The Whigs are bureaucrats born and bred and will not stir a finger to help us.

With regard to Egypt too, I think you are right. The day for such a policy as Mr Chamberlain's, which he has just announced, has gone by, and the only agreement which France is likely to come to with Mr Gladstone is one which will put Egypt practically into France's hands. Two years ago, or even perhaps a year ago, before the conference and the Nile campaign, Egypt's complete independence, under a strong and popular government might have been secured, but Mr Gladstone would not hear of it then, and by persisting in keeping Tewfik as the corner stone of his policy he has thrown away his chance. Now France will not be content with anything from him less than her own protectorate, or Europe with anything less than the letter of her bond. To get back our right to give Egypt liberty, the first condition will be that we guarantee her debt, the second that we make peace with the Sultan and act under his authority. Here, again, therefore, I look rather to you than to the Whigs for practical help. One knows by experience so exactly what Mr Chamberlain's arrangement would come to—an independent Egypt would be an Egypt separated from the rest of the Mohammedan world, but governed really in the sole interests of France and the bondholders. The form of a "native" government would be preserved, perhaps, but the form only. Egypt's "independence by arrangement with Europe" means Egypt for the bondholders, with France for their protector and Ismail for their king. If Mr Chamberlain had said a word about repentance for past errors I could have better believed him, but we heard all the promises and declarations he now makes, two years ago, and in far stronger language from Mr Gladstone himself, and with what result? No, I prefer your programme for Egypt, though it seems to promise less.

I will take this opportunity of giving you my view of what a Conservative Government might do for Egypt and generally for Western Asia. The Whigs will never do anything but harm, because they are Whigs and because they hate the Mohammedans, and the Radicals will never do anything at all, because they are Radicals and will undertake no responsibility. You know that the Mohammedan faith is in solution—that it is seeking to place itself on a new basis—to regenerate its political and social life. Enormous abuses exist everywhere, enormous injustices. The poor are ground down by the rich, the weak by the strong. The whole earth, as Arabi used to say, is famished for justice, and calls out for a deliverer. The recognition of this was the secret of his own influence. It is the secret of the Mahdi's. It may any

## *Correspondence with Lord R. Churchill*

day be the secret of England's. But in Mohammedan lands it is not sufficient to administer an equal law for it to be accepted by the people even for their own good. The law must be connected with their religious beliefs and sanctioned by their religious authority. I am not arguing whether it is best so—though I believe it is best—but am stating a fact. And it is the perverse refusal to acknowledge facts which has made of Lord Granville's policy in Egypt so piteous a failure. His idea would seem to have been, and Sir Evelyn Baring's with him—if idea at all they had—that the people's faith and social traditions were a “negligible quantity,” and that, no matter what the law and no matter who administered it, it would be accepted with thanks. For this reason, though Tewfik was notoriously regarded as a traitor to his faith and nation, they placed him in authority, and men with him for Ministers whose only merit was that they had preferred their interests to their beliefs and were without moral principle or religious prejudice. Even these, however, in later times have refused to serve them, and they have been forced to take up with Nubar and his speculating crew of Armenians as the element supple enough to do their bidding. This has had its effect. The whole of the religious forces of the country are against them, and the whole of the people. Their reforms have remained sterile, their attempts to pacify, impotent. The people have refused their friendship and their justice, and will have none of their advice. The Liberal party of Mohammedan reform have been driven out of the country, the honest men have been driven from the Administration, and the mass of the people into the arms of the Mahdi.

It is in the power of England, and England alone, to repair the evil done—and, what is more, it is England's duty. But it cannot be effected except at the cost of assuming Egypt's sole protection, and the protection also of general Mohammedan interests. The Sultan must be taken into confidence, peace must be made with the Mahdi, and Arabi must be recalled. Europe, too, must be bought out by accepting Egypt's debt. These conditions observed, all difficulty, it will be found, will disappear, and the regeneration of Egypt may at last be begun, and with it gradually of all the Mohammedan East.

It seems to me, therefore, that the Conservative Party, if it acts on your idea, has a great and satisfactory work before it, which, if honestly performed, and avoiding the snare of turning Egypt's protection into a means of providing Englishmen with places and pay, may yet redeem the past and give reality to the dreams of reformers. You especially, with your sympathy for popular causes, will know that the only foundation of success in the East, as in the West, is the consent of the people. Get the Egyptian people



## Appendix D

on your side, and all Mohammedans will follow you, and with hardly an effort you will transform the world

I wish you, therefore, all success in your electoral campaign. You have given too many proofs of your sincerity and steadfastness in this matter of Egypt for me to doubt you, and I know that you will do your best for her. Of the present Government I have long ceased to have any hope.

[N B —This letter was read to and approved by Lord Randolph Churchill for publication in the "Times," with the alteration of a single phrase concerning Ireland, the words "than you are prepared for of Home Rule" being changed into "than you are apparently yet prepared for"]

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL TO MR BLUNT

*Most Private* - India Office, Aug 13, 1885  
DEAR BLUNT,  
The enclosed explains itself. Will you see to it?  
Yours ever,  
RANDOLPH S C

COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM SIR H DRUMMOND WOLFF

(*Enclosure*) Dated Vienna, 12 August, 1885  
Received at London Office, 5 10 p m

"I think it would be well for Jemal-ed-din Afghani to come. Have you (any objection?),<sup>1</sup> if involving no responsibility or complicity on my part, and if it can be done without his coming into collision with Turkish authorities. I leave this probably to-morrow evening or Friday morning."

MR. A. W. MOORE TO MR BLUNT

*Private* India Office, 15 August /85  
DEAR MR BLUNT,  
I have just deciphered the enclosed from Sir H. Wolff. Lord Randolph is unwell and in bed, but I shall see him during the afternoon. I think it is best however to send you the telegram at once, as I understand the present arrangement is that Jemal-ed-deen leaves to-morrow.  
Please let me hear from you what I am to reply to Sir H Wolff.

Yours very truly,  
A W MOORE

<sup>1</sup> This is necessary to the sense, but the group or some equivalent has been omitted in cyphering —A W M 12/8

*Correspondence with Lord R. Churchill*

COPY OF A TELEGRAM FROM SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

(Enclosure.)

“Buda Pest, 15<sup>th</sup> August

“From something I have heard it would be well for Jemal-eddeen not to leave England till I can telegraph to you from Constantinople.”

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M P., TO MR BLUNT

India Office, *November 1, 1885*

DEAR BLUNT,

Many thanks for your letter and enclosures which I return I feel sure that your lecture on Egypt at Newcastle must have been profoundly interesting and instructive to the audience and a little more circulation of such facts would do much good You will certainly not receive an encouraging reply from Lord Salisbury about Arabi. Even if he was disposed (as I should be) to favour your views he would not dare take such a step on the eve of the Elections

Yours ever,

RANDOLPH S CHURCHILL

MR. BLUNT TO LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

Crabbet Park, *Dec 24, 1885*

MY DEAR CHURCHILL,

I am obliged to come to an immediate decision about continuing my connection with Camberwell or indeed in any active form with party politics, my pressing difficulty being Ireland. About this, now that Mr. Gladstone has taken up Home Rule, it is necessary for me to speak and at once to my Electors, and, unless I hear from you that there is still hope of an agreement between Lord Salisbury and Mr Parnell on a really solid basis, I shall conclude, as everybody tells me it is, that Conservatism and Home Rule are for the present incompatible terms and give up trying to make them agree I fear I have not in me the spirit of a good party man, but I thought at one time I could help you individually in the pursuit of better things Egyptian affairs seem in the same deadlock they were a year ago, and altogether I am far from hopeful or disposed for further combat.

Yours very truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

*Appendix D*

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL TO MR. BLUNT

*Private*

India Office, Dec. 26, 1885

MY DEAR BLUNT,

There is no question or doubt about the matter. If you want Home Rule you must go to Gladstone for it. We cannot touch it.

Yours ever,

RANDOLPH S C

## APPENDIX E

### ARABI'S PROGRAMME OF 1883 AND MOHAMMED ABDU'S VIEWS

I MR BLUNT'S LETTER REPRINTED FROM THE "TIMES"  
OF 13TH DECEMBER 1883

Colombo, *5th Nov*, 1883.

SIR,

I am sure the "Times" has many readers who will be interested to receive an account from an authentic source of the manner of life and present views of Arabi Pasha and his fellow exiles in the place of residence which nearly a year ago was assigned to them by the British Government.

I have been staying with them now for over three weeks, as their guest, and am therefore able to speak with some authority as to their ideas, and I think the time has come when these may be of service to the public, and, if I may be allowed to suggest it, perhaps even to those all-wise authorities who are still seeking to regenerate Egypt by putting round men into square holes, and square into round from their official chairs in Downing Street

With regard to the material welfare of the exiles, I am glad to have an excellent account to give. Although some of them suffered at first from the extreme dampness of the climate, all are now acclimatized; and even Toulba Pasha, who six months ago was pronounced by the doctors to be incurable with asthma, is enjoying perfect health.

They are all, too, I think, contented in mind and grateful for the treatment they receive from the Colonial authorities, which has been throughout most courteous to them, and except for certain inequalities in the amount of their allowances, with which I will not here trouble you, they would have nothing to complain of beyond the unavoidable bitterness which mingles with the bread of all exiles

The way of life of the exiles is simple. Each family occupies a separate dwelling, and most of them have chosen to reside in a rather remote suburb of Colombo, which has ceased to be fashionable, and where house rent is proportionately low. They send their children to school, attend the local mosques, pay visits to each other or to their neighbours, and attempt, with more or less success, themselves to learn a little English. Their society they find in the numerous Mohammedan community at Colombo,

## *Appendix E*

which, unlike such communities in many parts of India, is entirely mercantile, and possesses not a few men of substance, whose commercial establishments the more practical of the exiles hope that some day their sons will enter, and thus be enabled to earn an independent livelihood.

The Mohammedan community regard their Egyptian guests with feelings of the highest respect, as martyrs to their religion, and especially Arabi, as its late most famous champion, and so strong is this feeling regarding him among the lower class in Colombo that on Fridays, whatever mosque Arabi may choose to attend is sure to be thronged with a special crowd of worshippers. Besides this, however, there are certain English houses where the exiles are well received, and, on the whole, I think I may say that they are as popular as their ignorance of English will allow with the official community and the official residents.

I have naturally had constant conversations with the exiles on political matters, and more especially with Arabi, and have learned from him and unlearned much as to the events of last year. We have spoken, too, not a little of the future, and of the hopes which the national leader still cherishes of being one day recalled to Egypt, there to work out to its accomplishment the plan of reform he had conceived, and which I firmly believe that he alone possesses the genius to realize. For, whatever may have been his faults and failings (and they were doubtless great and many in his conduct both of the political and of the military campaigns of last year), I have been more than ever impressed during my present visit with the reality of Arabi's claim to be considered a patriot and a man of genius. By a man of genius I understand one who is capable of large and new ideas, who has the passion to impress these strongly upon others, and who above all possesses the courage and persistence required to work them to their end. These qualities Arabi certainly has, and I know of no other Egyptian of whom anything corresponding can be said.

His view of the present situation in Egypt is worth quoting.

"The English Government is attempting," he says, "an impossible task. They wish to make Tewfik popular and they wish to introduce reforms. But Tewfik will only remain popular as long as he is supported by the English troops, and when these are withdrawn he will fall. Personally, Tewfik is without a friend in Egypt. The Egyptians hate him for having betrayed his country, and the Circassians despise him for having betrayed his religion. The better friend he is to the English the less chance he has of conciliating his countrymen. In one way or other he will disappear. Then it will be for the Powers finally to decide what it is they really intend for Egypt. If they mean to annex it, one or

## *Arabi's Programme*

other of them will do so at the cost of a new revolt. If not, they must allow the Egyptians to choose their ruler and to work out their freedom for themselves."

The choice of a ruler should be made, Arabi thinks, by the Notables. The fellahin are not sufficiently instructed yet for a plebiscite. But the Sheikhs of the villages with the Notables of the towns would form a reasonable elective body. They would choose whom they would, a Mohammedan, a man of mark, Arabi hopes an Egyptian. But before investing him with power they would bind him by some Constitutional form which should prevent the recurrence of mere arbitrary rule, the rule which has ruined Egypt. Lord Dufferin's charter, Arabi considers, is insufficient for that purpose. It is a make believe, too weak to restrain the abuse of power, and liable through its weakness to become itself an instrument in the hands of despotism. Egypt, however, under a leader elected by the Notables, would find Notables capable of asserting and maintaining their rights, and a Constitutional Chamber would form itself without the need of any more foreign assistance. The Liberal Party, it is true, is now crushed and in hiding; but it would start from the ground with the least encouragement and find life again. Arabi does not at all despair of his countrymen, could the present unnatural régime be replaced by one sanctioned by public approval. The approval of the people is the basis of all stable government, and, whoever the new ruler of Egypt is, he must be made to understand that Egypt is not given him as a property but as a trust. Ismail Pasha thought all Egypt was his private garden. Tewfik Pasha is being taught to think that there is no law but what rests on his decree. This must not be in the future, the Prince must obey the law, not make it.

Again, the English Government is trying to introduce reforms, but through what instruments? It has driven away all the real reformers. They are in exile or in prison, or have been fined and otherwise frightened by police persecution to live "underground." The men who are left are either those who are too timid or too indifferent to join the party of liberty, or else the very men against whom the reformers rose. "How," asks Arabi, "can the English Government expect to establish justice through the Pashas who served Ismail, or liberty for the Egyptians through those very Turks and Circassians who have always hated liberty, and who look upon the Egyptians as their natural servants?"

With regard to finance, Arabi is of opinion that the best chance of permanently saving the solvency of the country lies in a new arrangement with the creditors. He says that the calculations of the Budget in recent years have been made without reference to

## *Appendix E*

the periodical recurrence of seasons of scarcity. There have been now five good Niles in succession, and there must come soon a bad one, which will upset the estimates. Also no allowance has been made for the recent great loss of capital by the fellahin, the murrains which have destroyed their oxen, the debts they have incurred, their now universal poverty. Unless the burdens of the fellahin are made very light for them for several years to come, they will never recover their prosperity and the land will become deteriorated and impoverished. Arabi is of opinion that in the interest of the creditors themselves it would therefore be prudent to lower the rate of interest for a fixed number of years, full payment to be resumed only at the end of the term when the country would be able to afford it. He thinks this, with great economy everywhere, is the best means of averting bankruptcy. The private debts of the fellahin should be settled also without delay by an arrangement to be made with the creditors by the Government, and I may say here that while I was recently in Egypt I ascertained from some of the leading money lenders that a composition would probably be accepted by them at from eight to ten millions, the total debts being valued by the same persons at about fifteen millions.

The future of the Suez Canal we have thoroughly discussed together, and it is Arabi's opinion, as it has long been mine, that the Canal is certain, sooner or later, to be internationalized. Arabi considers that it would be far better for Egypt that she should abandon as soon as possible all sovereign rights over it. The Isthmus of Suez, he says, is not necessary to Egypt, and the connection as long as it exists will form a pretext with Europe for intervention. If ceded to Europe this danger would cease, and Egypt might even claim a money indemnity for the rights yielded and so relieve herself of part of her financial difficulties.

Another important point on which the late national leader has distinct views is the Soudan question. Although he is of opinion that a certain connection will always be necessary between the lower and the upper waters of the Nile, he holds that in the present military and financial position of Egypt it is unwise to attempt the reconquest of all, or perhaps any of the lost provinces. He believes that the movement of the so-called Mahdi is not one merely of fanaticism, or that it is only a revolt of the slave dealers. He thinks that Mohamed Ahmed commands the goodwill of the inhabitants, and that it would be far wiser for the Egyptian Government to come to terms with him than to continue their military operations against him. The Soudan brings nothing into the Cairo treasury, and if Egypt is to enjoy liberty at home she should avoid ideas of conquest abroad. What terms

## *Arabi's Programme*

could be made with the Mahdi Arabi has been too long out of Egypt to judge, but from the communications which reached him while in power, he does not believe a friendly arrangement acknowledging Egypt's suzerainty to be impossible. The suzerainty of the ruler of Egypt the Soudanese would probably be glad to acknowledge, for it would protect them against European aggression.

Lastly, Arabi suggests the following as the most urgent matters requiring reform in his country

"1. That a settlement should be made by the Government of the existing debts of the peasantry, accompanied with a return to the old laws affecting the mortgaging of land and the recovery of debt so that the peasantry shall be thenceforth protected against usury

"2. That the mixed tribunals should be abolished

"3. That there should be a reformed common law in Egypt for all who reside there, placing Europeans and Egyptians on an equal footing in civil and in criminal matters

"4. That there should be security against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment (habeas corpus)

"5. That the village Sheykhs should be chosen by the villages, not appointed as now by the Mudirs

"6. That the abuses connected with forced labour should be reformed.

"7. That education should be extended to girls as well as boys in Egypt

"8. That domestic slavery should be completely abolished.

"9. That the position of officials in public offices should be made independent of ministerial caprice

"10. That taxes should be made equal to all, foreigners alike with Egyptians

"11. That a settlement should be made as soon as possible of the Moukabala claims."

Such are Arabi's ideas. I believe many of his reforms will be found identical with those contemplated by Sir Evelyn Baring, but I fear their realization will have to wait the advent of a more enlightened policy than any which now prevails at Cairo. As Arabi says, schemes of reform are of value only when in the hands of reformers, and there is no sign as yet in Egypt of any such being employed. Still, common sense will in the long run assert itself over political experiment, and there is an old proverb about the stone which the builders rejected, which may well in the present instance prove itself a true one, and I cannot help thinking that the day will come when the man who first pro-



## *Appendix E*

claimed Egyptian wrongs will be called upon to right them, and when Arabi, the first fellah who ever gloried in the name "Egyptian," will be brought back with something more than his old prestige to Egypt

A rather severe attack of fever, from which I am hardly yet recovered, prevents me from continuing this train of thought. But I hope on a future occasion to renew it, and in the meanwhile I am sure that Arabi's friends may make themselves happy as to his present lot. He is not yet forty-five years of age, and can well afford to wait a while for the hour of his restoration, and till it comes he could hardly have a pleasanter home or a more secure abode than that which Providence and the humanity of the British public have chosen for him.

I am your obedient servant,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

### II INTERVIEW WITH SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU, AS PUBLISHED IN THE "PALL MALL GAZETTE," AUGUST 17TH, 1884

Sheykh Mohammed Abdu is, we are inclined to believe, the first real Egyptian who has visited this country. We have had among us false Egyptians in plenty—Turks, Circassians, Syrians, Armenians, Jews—all claiming the nationality of the Nile, but a true son of the Ahl-el Ful, "the Race of Beans," never. Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, however, is an undoubted fellah. He wears a blue gown and a white turban, talks neither French nor English nor even Turkish, but only his mother tongue, Arabic, and is without the least varnish of western manners. He is a man of middle height, dark-skinned, black-bearded, and keen-eyed, grave in his general demeanour, but possessed of a pleasant smile, and, when excited, speaking with much modest eloquence and cheerful vigour. His countenance is decidedly an agreeable one, and brimful of intelligence. His father was and is still a peasant of the Delta, cultivating forty acres of land at Mehallet Nasr, and laying no claim to nobility of birth other than that given by countless generations of peasant ownership on the same plot of ground. But the son is far more now than a peasant. Sent twenty years ago as a promising boy to Cairo, he received his education in the ancient religious seminary of El Azhar, and is now one of the most distinguished of its Ulema, or rather was, for, in common with the rest of the Liberal religious party in the university, he is in disgrace with the powers that be, and is now an exile both from it and from Egypt. Although by temperament a moderate man, he joined Arabi and the popular movement before the war, became one of

## *Mohammed Abdu interviewed*

its chief leaders, and was involved in its ruin, and after Tel-el-Kebir he was singled out by his eloquence no less than by his liberalism as a dangerous man, and having narrowly escaped hanging was glad to reach Syria with his head safe upon his shoulders, but condemned to three years' exile and its attendant penury. Now he is on his first visit to Europe, to see with his own eyes the country which has been the ruin of his own. These particulars our representative, who called two days since on the Sheykh at Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's house in James Street, learned from his lips, and being acquainted with Arabic he was able to hold with him the following conversation

*Our Representative*: Without discussing past history, which we all admit to have contained fearful mistakes, what is your opinion of the present state of Egypt and of the policy now to be pursued?

*Sheykh Mohammed Abdu*: Since I have been in England all have asked me the same question. Every Englishman says he wishes Egypt well, but which of your statesmen has tried to prove his declarations? We Egyptians of the Liberal party believed once in English Liberalism and English sympathy, but we believe no longer, for facts are stronger than words. Your liberality we see plainly is only for yourselves, and your sympathy with us is that of the wolf for the lamb which he designs to eat. You have ruined everything that was good in us so that you may have an excuse for keeping possession of our country.

*O. R.*: Believe me, this is not true. It may appear to you so, but it is not so. Neither Mr. Gladstone, nor any of the Ministers, wish otherwise than to leave Egypt as soon and as absolutely as possible. No one wishes to annex your country.

*Sheykh*: If so, why not leave it at once? The only thing that the English Government has taught us is to be united in the wish to see you gone. Before the war and during the war we quarrelled with each other. We wished to break down the tyranny of our rulers, we complained of the Turks as foreigners, we wished to improve ourselves politically, and to advance as the nations of Europe have advanced in the path of liberty. Now we know that there are worse evils than despotism, and worse enemies than the Turks. We see in them our brothers in religion, if not in race; and if you would only leave us alone with them we should know how to get on in peace. There is no Mohammedan in Egypt so oppressed as to wish for any more of your help. We ask only one thing of you, and that is that you will leave us at once and for ever.

And Tewfik, do you include him in your forgiveness of the Turks?

## Appendix E

*Sheykh* Tewfik Pasha did us a great wrong in bringing you into our country. He joined the enemies of his religion at the time of the war, and it is impossible he can command our respect. But if he should repent, and especially if he should get rid of you, we might yet forgive him. Only we desire no traitors with Egyptian faces and English hearts.

And the French? Our leaving Egypt now would surely mean that they would occupy your country in our place.

*Sheykh* We do not think so. The French know that they could not gain our consent to their rule any more than you have gained it for your own. We should resist them, as we have resisted you. We want no foreign rulers from any country, and we know how to make all such rule impossible. The French could not in any case do us more harm than you have done.

And the Mahdi?

*Sheykh* Mohammed Ahmed is only dangerous to Egypt through your presence there. Were you to leave Egypt he would neither wish to attack us nor would his doing so be any danger. At present he has the sympathy of the masses, because they see in him a deliverer from Christian aggression, and they will join him when he comes to them.

And when will this be?

*Sheykh* The partisans of Mohammed Ahmed are already in the Said (Upper Egypt), but he will only himself advance when Khartoum is taken. Your Government are doing all they can to strengthen him.

How so?

*Sheykh* By the treaty they have made with the King of Abyssinia. This has made every man a fanatic, for it is written in our traditions, and is known to all, that through the Abyssinians our Holy City, Mecca, will be one day attacked and destroyed. The people everywhere see in this a new danger to their religion. How can your statesmen have made an alliance with this barbarous people? How can they have added this new trouble to the rest?

But were not all the Soudan people fanatics already?

*Sheykh (laughing)*. The Soudani are no more fanatics than I am. When I taught philosophy at Cairo many of the Egyptian students were afraid to come to my lectures, but there were eighty-four students from the Soudan, and every one of them came. When, however, they are threatened with a foreign invasion they become fanatical, just as you would be if a Mohammedan army were in the streets of London.

And has this anything to do with the news of a rising in Arabia?

*Sheykh* The news is true. We had been expecting it for a long

## *Mohammed Abdu interviewed*

while, and I do not doubt that your treaty with the Abyssinians has hastened it. When they are threatened, the Moslems take up arms. The people of Yemen are not fanatics more than the Soudani, but they love their liberty, as all the Arabs do.

And what ought we to do to allay the storm?

*Sheykh.* Cease to threaten us, and leave our country.

But what would become of the Christians in Egypt were our troops to leave? Would there not be new massacres?

*Sheykh.* There have been no massacres in Egypt except those caused by yourselves. The arrival of your fleet at Alexandria made the riots there begin. The landing of your troops brought on the riots at Tantah. There was no loss of Christian life until you came, nor will there be any when you go away. We have no quarrel with Christians as long as they abide by our laws and do not attempt to interfere with our Government.

There is then, you think, no obstacle to peace and prosperity in Egypt except our presence there? Would you not wish to see the National party restored before we go? Would you not like yourself to return to Egypt?

*Sheykh.* If I believed that your Government had any serious wish for our good I would propose a policy. But what is the use of my wasting words?

Speak, nevertheless. Whatever the Government may mean or wish, there are many in England who would see justice done to Egypt at any cost.

*Sheykh.* If England wanted to repair the wrong she has done us she would, as I have said, give us a first proof of her sincerity by ordering back her troops from Egypt. Next she would agree with the Powers of Europe and his Majesty the Sultan, with regard to a new ruler for us. It is not for me to say who this ruler should be. But whoever may be chosen, he should be some one not distasteful to the people and approved by the Sultan, and he should be named for a term of years, say seven or ten, at the end of which term the people should be allowed to elect their rulers finally for themselves. If he proved an honest man he might then retain office. But if dishonest, the people would have the comfort of thinking that he would not be there for ever, and so would take patience.

But how could we ascertain the wishes of the people? By what form of election?

*Sheykh.* Any new ruler now who should be a Moslem, and should come into office as the deliverer of Egypt from the English troops, would be loved by the Egyptians. Only he must be a Mohammedan, and, if possible, an Egyptian by birth. It is essential, however, that he should be content with limited power.

## Appendix E

What we want is not a new king, but a chief of our Egyptian nation, acting under the religious sovereignty of the caliphate. This kind of ruler the Egyptians understand, and they do not want a king.

And under such a ruler you and your fellow exiles could return to Egypt? What do you say about Arabi?

*Sheikh* I should like to see his return. If he holds office Arabi's place is in the Council, which must always supplement and control the ruler of Egypt. He speaks well. His ideas are noble. He is an honest man. His influence would all be on the side of good. But he is too careless of details to be a good administrator or a good general. Let him return as President, if they choose him, of the Mejliss—that is his place.

And the Ministry? What our Government complains of is that they cannot get a working set of men to rule the country.

*Sheikh* It is their fault if they have failed. Egypt is not wanting in honourable men, or men of capacity. But you insist on having those who will do your work, and no honest man in Egypt will work for the English Government. Again, you insist that they must rule your way and speak your language. The honest men generally do not speak English. They do not love English ways. Let us have a ruler we like, and we will all join to help him. We all want reform. We all want justice. We all want instruction. But there is an old proverb which says that "if the fish stinks at the head there is no freshness in the tail," and we want a ruler we can respect. Give us an honest chief for our nation, get him the sanction of our Sovereign the Sultan, and leave us to ourselves. With God's blessing we will have peace. We will even try to pay our debt.

But do all the Egyptians think as you do? I am inclined to believe that nine out of ten of the fellaheen would sooner have their taxes lessened by a Christian Government than raised by a Mohammedan.

*Sheikh* Do not delude yourself. The fellaheen are overtaxed, but at the present moment they do not complain of their taxes. They think first of how to deliver their country from the stranger, and, if it were possible, they would willingly pay more to see this end accomplished. I know it, as I have correspondents everywhere in Egypt. You might abolish all taxation, and they would not bless you if at the same time you took it as an excuse to stay. No, no. Leave us now, and we will call on God to reward you as our benefactors. But do not attempt to do us any more good. Your good has done us too much harm already.

## APPENDIX F

### EXTRACTS FROM LADY ANNE BLUNT'S DIARY

*Dec 8, 1882, Friday* [10, James Street]—General C G Gordon came to breakfast at 9 I am only sorry, now I have made his acquaintance, not to have known him sooner He does not appear to be otherwise than in perfect possession of perfect common sense. So much has been said to imply his being "touched" in the head that I put this down as a very distinct impression. But he is a man of ideas and in a prominent position, and as such it is convenient to find his ideas utopian or "mad" He staid about two hours talking to Wilfrid—told us he believed the Government now "sincerely" (because it suits them) intend to carry out liberal policy—Chamber of Notables, etc—in Egypt. Wilfrid replied that he would believe it when he saw that on the Budget question they act in such a manner, and he will judge them by what they settle about taxation. If they lighten the taxes of the fellahin it will be a proof of their sincerity, Nothing short of that will do, as the condition of the poor people is too desperate to be otherwise mended General Gordon would not allow that any party in Egypt could really abolish slavery. It was in their nature to keep slaves—they could not change their nature He does not, I think, quite know the state of feeling in the Mohammedan world or make allowance for the growth of a determination to reform on the part of those who, not having great possessions of slaves or anything else, will not be making great sacrifices in joining to suppress it

He is going out to "Palestine," he says, next week He must be being sent, though he did not say it, to inquire into the state of the Mussulman world there. Wilfrid promised to send the papers about the Sheykhs in Jerusalem to him (copies) and asked him to occupy himself with their case, which he said he would inquire into

And so we parted I hope we shall see him again

*August 18, 1883* [London].—At 1 o'clock Colonel [D H] Stewart came to luncheon. He has become very official in his views, though not in his manners He spoke of the hanging of the Bedouins at Tantah, and said that a friend of his who saw it remarked how easily they died, they had hardly to be touched by the rope before they were dead There would be no fear of any Englishman being attacked in the desert, he thought, for a long time owing to the terror spread by these executions. He seemed surprised when

## Appendix F

I said on the contrary that anywhere in the Arabian desert it would be very unsafe in consequence. Wilfrid added, of course in the Sinai peninsula it would be safe—there it always was safe (the danger had been from the war) In the end Colonel Stewart exclaimed, “Ah, well, I see we shall never agree, I wish England to be successful, justly if possible, and unjustly if it cannot be justly” He went away at 3

Sept 30 [Cairo].—List of persons arrested in connection with the pretended “Société des Vengeurs”

Huseyn Bey Fehmy	Huseyn Eff Sagr
Mustafa Bey Sidky	Saad Eff. Zaghoul
Abd el Razak Bey	Mustafa Eff Nashaat
Abd el Rahman Bey Hoja	Mahmud Eff Soudani
Mohammed Bey Fenni	Mohammed Bey Tahrir
Ali Bey Fauzi	Osman Bey (his son)
Sheykh Ahmed Nur	Ahmed Eff Rashaat
Mohammed Bey Shami	Mohammed Said (the French doctor)

also one Iskander and five servants

Sept. 30 —Suleyman’s account of Yusuf Abu Diab’s death Yusuf was a great friend of his (Suleyman’s), and of Abd el Aal whose A D C he was, a very good fellow, and all that had been said against him was false On the day of the Tantah massacre Yusuf abu Diab arrived from Damietta at 4 of the day. The massacre had begun at 1 of the day and was still going on, for it lasted twelve hours or more At the station on getting out of the train Yusuf saw a poor Christian woman from Alexandria whom the people were about to kill Yusuf saved her and taking her by the hand conducted her to the Governorat, to the Mudir Ibrahim Adhem, who was sitting in his room. Yusuf placed her in the Mudir’s charge, and afterwards reproached the Mudir for sitting still there while the massacre was going on He said, “You are Mudir and all the troops and police are under your orders You must take soldiers and go out and stop this. I shall inform Arabi Pasha of what you have allowed to happen” He took the next train and went to inform Arabi A few days after, Ali Pasha Fehmi was sent to Tantah to arrest the Mudir and bring him to Cairo where he was imprisoned in the Kasr en Nil for a few days and then sent to his house and ordered to remain there

After the war Suleyman (the narrator) was for a month in prison with Yusuf He had been arrested with Abd el Aal saying, “If you are to die I will die with you,” and he was with Abd el Aal in prison at Cairo In the meantime Ibrahim Adhem was reinstated by Tewfik at Tantah, and hearing Yusuf was in prison at Cairo he had him sent for to be tried before the Commission of

### *Extracts from Lady Blunt's Diary*

Inquiry at Tantah. On his arrival Ibrahim came to visit Yusuf. Suliman was present in the courtyard of the prison. Ibrahim Adhem took Abu Diab by the moustache and said, "The day of the massacre here you came and brought a *Nasrنامه* to me, you abused me and you said you would inform Arabi Pasha. Was it you who did this?" "It was I" "*Inshallah*, you shall not come out of this but to be hanged." This was just outside the room in the courtyard. Ibrahim Adhem then brought half-a-dozen men, Copts and Muslims, from the station and Abd er Rahman the zabit of Tantah, and said to them, "You will go before the *Mejliss Tahkik*, and say that on the day of the massacre I saw Yusuf abu Diab saying to the people, "Kill the Christians," and also that he often told Arabi Pasha that he ought to "kill Tewfik or let me do so," but he was not willing. A certain Mahriz Bey of Alexandria also bore witness against him falsely, these men swore through fear. The Commission sent Yusuf back to the Court Martial at Cairo with the *procès-verbal*, and the Court-Martial sentenced him to be hanged. Three days later he was sent to Tantah and executed. He was brave. Suleyman remained with him to the end. His last words to the people standing round him were "O my brothers, I suffer injustice. But God grant you may not see a day the like of this again and that I may be the last of those unjustly condemned." Then Ibrahim Adhem came up and said, "O Yusuf Effendi, forgive me." And Yusuf answered, "I do not forgive with my tongue, for if I should forgive with my tongue my heart would not forgive, and if my heart should forgive my children here would not forgive, and if my children should forgive, our Lord (God) would not forgive, for you are the cause of my being unjustly destroyed." Then he said, "Give me some water." And they give it him and he drank a few mouthfuls and said, "Put the rope on me."



## APPENDIX G

### LETTERS TO MR. BLUNT ALLUDED TO IN, AND EXEMPLIFYING, THE TEXT

#### I FROM SIR WILLIAM AND LADY GREGORY (EXTRACTS)

(*From Lady Gregory*)

Coole, *Sep.* 20, 1883 (received in Egypt) I am very glad you will stay in Egypt, even long enough to let in a little ray of light on what is going on Moberly Bell is really excelling himself just now I don't know if you have missed his accounts of the triumphal progress of the "amiable and virtuous" (Tewfik) I am delighted at it, because, as I wrote to Chenery, no one can say it is necessary to keep troops in the country to keep up so popular a ruler! The account of the prisons also would have been interesting if they were not revolting—so many poor wretches kept there for months and years, and then the door is opened and they are shut up again, after having been allowed to kiss Moberly's boots! I am afraid Clifford Lloyd, the new "Adviser," won't be an acquisition I don't know him, but by all accounts he is ambitious, pretentious, and autocratic He kept the country quiet here by driving the whole population of a town into prison, on suspicion, and his photograph reminds me of Colvin There is not much to say of Ireland, for there is a strange lull in the agitation of the last few years The people for the moment are busy with the harvest, and I fancy Parnell is trying to keep things as quiet as possible until the next session, when Gladstone has, I believe, promised him a very large measure of Home Rule, much more than his colleagues approve of I hope Arabi's election will take place, so that we may put M P after his name in future I hope they will think also of electing you, and that you will become the Randolph of debate in the Cairo House of Commons What a farce the whole thing is! It will be as before. The wretched Notables will be left alone until they speak of the Budget, and then will be gagged

*Oct.* 4. Sir William writes to me from London that you are credited with having gone to India with the intention of overturning English supremacy and establishing Mohammedan rule and rapine throughout the Peninsula So I think you have still a chance of Tower Hill! Kinglake especially has been lamenting over you

## Letters to Mr. Blunt

*Oct. 17.* Thank you for your letter from Suez. It gave me great pleasure to hear of the success of your visit (to Cairo), for I call it a success, having seen so many of your friends, and learned that the Khedive's state is so hopeless. I was pretty sure Baring would not do much for you, he has only just begun, and has not yet realized the difficulty of his position, and I am sure the Government here are trusting to him now as their last hope of helping them out of their mess, and won't take any new line till he fails. I am glad the poem ("The Wind and the Whirlwind") is to be published. It will make a more lasting impression than any prose could do, and ever since it was written I have felt it was pure waste of steam power keeping it shut up. Sir William is very much struck with it, and I feel it must convert the world. If this should reach you in Ceylon do homage to Arabi for me.

*Nov. 13.* I see Moberly Bell takes Gladstone's announcement of the withdrawal of the troops calmly, as they will be quite as effective at Alexandria, and easy to bring back at a moment's notice. None the less, I shall be glad when they are out of Cairo. I hate the idea of ever seeing them there, and perhaps the Khedive may think they are really going to let him be his own master, and commit some atrocity which Gladstone will have to notice, and which will give England an excuse to let him topple over.

*December 18.* Your letter in the "Times" (from Colombo) appeared the same day I heard from you. Sir William tells me to say how extremely good he thinks it. The time has nearly come when you will be appealed to, the mess is so great, and the bankruptcy of the country seems within measurable distance, and, indeed, is the first thing to hope for, and every one is so much at sea about the Soudan, and all the philanthropists will be down on the Government for allowing Zebehr, the king of the slave-dealers banished by Gordon, to be sent back at the head of an army. It will be just the thing for those benevolent beings—Randolph and Labouchere—to take up

*Jan. 10, 1884.* I saw in the "Times" that you had arrived and been warmly received at Calcutta. I wonder how Colvin received you. I think the time has come when you are wanted in Egypt. Dicey goes there to-day, a fellow passenger of Sir William's (on his way to Ceylon), evidently to help to form the Nubar-Dicey Ministry, which I have always looked forward to as the last possible combination before Arabi's return. I am glad old Sherif has gone. We shan't hear much more of his enlightened policy! If you could find any Nationalists in Egypt who would dare to lift up their voice and call for Arabi's return, I believe the English Radicals would take up the cry. Both Labouchere and Randolph

## Appendix G

are speaking out like men, but they must have some support from Egypt Sir William sails to-day for Colombo He writes from London that Hayward is very ill, shut up in his room and hardly expected to recover Kinglake says of him "He is too weak to hold his cards at whist, but not too weak to d—— his partner" I am sorry Chinese Gordon goes to the Congo instead of the Nile

*August 1* Many thanks for the printed correspondence, which is full of interest I have been looking over your letters to me of last year, and have copied the only passage relating to Mr Hamilton or Knowles, which I enclose I would lay as little stress as possible on the encouragement you had from Downing Street, as the G O M is capable of denying everything, and as much as possible on the incontrovertible fact of your threatened arrest I hope the debate will come on soon I was sure Mohammed Abdu would create a good impression, between his graceful dress and his graceful manner, which recalled Arabi's Mind you cultivate Parnell, now you have broken the ice He will be a great power in the next Parliament, and his support will be worth a good deal.

(Extract enclosed) "*Sep 3, 1883* Both Knowles and Button encourage me to try the elections, and say that Baring is sure to be delighted to see me, and will perhaps help It appears he has *carte blanche* to make another new policy for the Government, and as he is one of Lord Ripon's strongest supporters in India, it is supposed that he will favour Arabi's return, or, at any rate, the restoration of a National Party in some form or other"

(Second extract enclosed) *Sep 21* "Everything up to the moment has gone most prosperously The morning we left I got a note from Mr Hamilton asking to see me before I went, and I accordingly went, after nearly a year's absence to Downing Street, and found him very amable I told him exactly what I was going to do, and he approved and said he was sure Baring would be very pleased to see me, and that he would write to Lord Ripon's private secretary to do all he could for me in India About Egypt I told him I should try and get Baring to restore the National Party, but unless he would help me it was quite useless my trying, and I should not stay in Egypt So I shall know as soon as I get to Cairo whether it is possible or not I am certain Gladstone wants to restore, but wants to have his hand forced by a manifestation of popular desire in Egypt."

(From Sir William Gregory)

Coole, *Aug 24, 1844* I have read with great interest Mohammed Abdu's replies to his interviewer They are very valuable,

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

and would be ten times more so if anything could pierce the crust of our English stupidity and self-complacency. But we have made up our minds that the Egyptians whom we have been bombarding and slaughtering ought to love us, and that if they don't it is their perversity, which only time and subjection can remove. I shall be at Dalmeny on the 27th, and I daresay Gladstone will speak to me about Egypt, but he has made up his mind about it, that all the troubles of Egypt are due to military mutineers of whom Arabi was the instigator, that Tewfik is a virtuous and enlightened young prince to whom the honour of England is pledged, and that to secure him as Khedive the exile of Arabi and his friends must be maintained. You know how intolerant he is of a difference of opinion. So I daresay he will not allow me even to make an observation from a different point of view. I do not see how Arabi is to return, but I am of opinion, were he permitted to do so, it would be possible to establish a fairly decent Government in Egypt, a far better one than ours has been, and which would, at all events, suit the governed.

*(From Sir William Gregory.)*

Coole, Oct 5. Your second Indian article (on Race Hatred) is admirable, and I fear too true. I had no idea things were as bad as you describe, and I much fear there is little hope of improvement. The only chance is the personal character of the Viceroy and publicity. I wish our newspapers would take up the subject. The English second and third-class women are, as you say, the worst offenders. They are generally below their husbands, who are elevated by education and responsibility, and make themselves odious by their vulgarities and pretensions. The treatment of natives in Ceylon is very different. There the civil servants are generally very courteous and friendly with them, and there is no doubt that a most kindly feeling subsists between the races. It is not so, however, universally, in Colombo and Kandy the planters and merchants' clerks give themselves most offensive airs to natives, but in the purely native districts the relations are excellent. I hear from Indians that the contrast is remarkable, like going into another hemisphere. Still things are not as they ought to be. A young man of high native family constantly goes to Oxford and Cambridge, and is there received as a friend and an equal, is asked to all parties, and shares in all amusements. When he returns to Ceylon he is not tabooed, it is true, but he knows he is looked down upon as an inferior by merchants' clerks and planters, probably sons of pastrycooks and ladies' maids. This I always endeavoured to combat, and Sir Arthur Gordon is

## Appendix G

doing the same Mere civility and want of rudeness is not enough A native gentleman should be made to feel that you regard him as your equal, in short, as an Englishman He thoroughly understands and resents condescending civility I am going to write to Dufferin, and to recommend your article to him

The chances for Arabi and his friends are not encouraging I should like to see National bankruptcy proclaimed as an answer to French threats

(From Lady Gregory)

Coole, *March 29, 1885* —I wish a better fight could have been made on the Egyptian Convention My only hope for Egypt now is in the Mahdi Osman Digna seems to be profiting by all the good advice the "Times" has been giving him as to the best mode of fighting

*April 14* We came here a little too soon and the landscape looked as hard and dry as a Hobbema, but it is now as soft and mysterious as a Corot We spent last week in Dublin to manifest our loyalty The Royal visit has been so far a "great success"—that is to say, the "foreign invaders" and also Lord Spencer were cheered through the streets all through Dublin. Whether that means much I can't say, it is an excitable population and I saw a man who walked through the cleared space carrying two large band boxes cheered as much as anyone "St Patrick's Day," when played at the laying of a foundation stone, was cheered more than all, but the Prince was equal to the occasion and waved his hat as if it was meant for him The Princess looked very pretty and not more than five-and-twenty at the ball in her white dress and diamonds The ball the prettiest sight I ever saw I feel as if I had seen a crystallization of the pomps and vanities of the wicked world. Enough of that for a long time

As an antidote I spent to-day in visiting some of our own poor people It is the best part of living in Ireland that they are always bright and amusing and intelligent and witty One old woman asked me to come and see an old man "He was a real gentleman," she said, "if I asked him for five or seven shillings he never said, 'I haven't it,' and if he went out to cut his corn he never raised his back till the sun went down" She also told me, "If I had a little pig, I'd be in Heaven" Another, I hope meaning a compliment, said she had at first sight taken me for the priest's sister and was going to say, "How's Father Conside?" Then, when she recognized me, "Aren't we happy to have such a plain lady?" You will be tired of Ireland if I write any more

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

*May 5.*—What a terrible indictment your letter is against the Government, and how well deserved! Sir William desires me to say he goes with you in every word of it, which he does not always do. How ignominiously the whole affair is ending! It's a comfort to think Wolseley won't have a triumphal procession down Piccadilly this time. I am very anxious to know what Randolph advises you and what you make up your mind to about Parliament. I believe you would get in as a Tory Democrat easily enough. You could hit hard enough at the Government to please an English mob which enjoys hard-hitting as a substitute for prize fights. The only good thing that has reached me about the Prince's visit is that one spectator at his entry was heard to say to his neighbours, "I see a good many Radical hats in the crowd." "I suppose," said the other, "a Radical hat is a hat without a crown."

*May 15.* Very many thanks for the sonnets and your long letter. I knew you would be jubilant at the retreat and guessed you had been working for it. What pleases me most is thinking of Lord Wolseley having to eat his speech about the "hundred years," and also to think what a "cheer-up" this ignominious campaign must be to Arabi in Ceylon. It was delightful your sending the sonnets to Gladstone.

*June (?)*. I suppose any change must be good (alluding to the change of Government), and yet I don't think the G. O. M. has been sufficiently punished for his evil deeds. I hope Randolph will hold to his present principles, as far as the East is concerned, but the politician in and out of power is generally as different as the patient Turkish peasant and the tyrannical Turkish Pasha. As for you, you will never be able to support any Government, but will always be in opposition.

*June 19.* Randolph for India! I can think of nothing else, it amuses me so much the idea of Colvin's face when he hears it, and Lord Dufferin taking his orders from him, and Lord Reay, who went out in the strength of Gladstone's name. Will he be able to do any good, I wonder? One must never expect too much of people in office. Was it not delightful Arabi being cheered at St. James's Hall? It is rather hard being so far away from all the excitement.

*July 21.* I thought I recognized B.'s hand in the account of Wolseley's reception. What a parade would have been made if he had brought Gordon back! Lord Wolseley and Baring have told a friend of mine that they look on Drummond-Wolff's appointment as disastrous for Egypt, which makes me hopeful, as do the letters (in the "Times") of the "Twenty years Resident in Egypt," in which one finds the flavour of Moberly Bell—"only the old sea-serpent done up again."

## Appendix G

*August 14* I think you ought to write a sonnet on the Mahdi's death. The central idea about him to me is that he is the only man of the nineteenth century who is known by his deeds and not at all by his words. I wrote some lines myself, with which I herewith present you, but not expecting compliments.

### SONNET ON THE MAHDI'S DEATH

The Guide of Islam, silent, strong, world-known,  
Looked for peace won through battle's bloody fame,  
His brave, rash adversary now o'erthrown  
Who blindly in the tyrant's livery came  
His ally, his foe's enemy, the Sun  
Had struck as if in scorn the parting host,  
The task that made a nation almost done,  
A people freed but at most cruel cost  
But hardly had he viewed the promised land  
When blasting sickness came and struck him low,  
And a scarred face was his and failing hand  
Who was so mighty but an hour ago,  
And a hushed army round the dim tent stood  
Wherein their Chief gave up his sword to God

Write the sonnet yourself and use my last two lines, which I confess to thinking good, and publish it in your name. I have a feeling that something ought to be done to dignify the Mahdi's memory, such efforts have been made to vulgarize it.

### II FROM SIR ALFRED LYALL

Nainee Tal, *May 21st*, 1883

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I must send a reply to your letter from Knebworth, though people in England do not usually set much store by letters from India, which is beyond the civilized world. What I want to say is that I am very glad you are coming out to India to study the country—this time, and that I much hope you will pay me a visit. I have some rather extensive knowledge of Upper India, and of the leading natives, so that I may be able to put you in the way of seeing things as they are. In regard to the very curious point mentioned in your letter, why Rajputs are (to use the technical words) exogamous and Arabs endogamous, I can't offer an explanation, save only by saying that Islam overrides and sweeps away all the obsolete prejudices of blood or caste that are at the bottom of exogamy. Read McLennan, Morgan, and Maine—but

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

none of them will tell you exactly whence comes the idea lying at the root of the term "incest," *i.e.*, the offence of marrying within certain prohibited degrees

When you come out we will talk of Local Self-Government and the native magistrates' jurisdiction over Europeans. I am myself a consistent liberal in these matters. I think, with you, that our best chance of consolidating an Anglo-Indian empire out here lies in abolishing privileges and bringing forward the leading natives to political equality with ourselves. But we have been going so long on the other tack that the operation of changing our course has to be managed with a steady hand, and not too suddenly. Now there has been a lack of political seamanship in high quarters, and the vessel has got broadside to the wind, and has shipped a sea or two; I think we shall get right soon, and I hope we shall not alter our policy. But it must be always remembered that the whole business of governing India is an experiment on a very large scale. I always maintain that it has not been attempted, on this scale, since the days of the Romans, and no one can yet decide whether the policy of taking the natives into our confidence, or of keeping them out of all real power, is the better for the *English*. For myself, having to choose between two risks, I would select the risk of letting in the native, though if we do this in a hurry we may spoil everything, and provoke confusion, with a sanguinary reaction—just as things went too fast and led to a premature crisis in Egypt.

Sincerely yours,  
A. C. LYALL.

Camp, *January 16th*, 1884.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

The foolish and violent article about you in the "Pioneer" of this morning moves one's indignation for more reasons than one. These attacks all emanate, to my knowledge, from Calcutta.

I have hitherto written nothing whatever to officials in these provinces regarding your movements, as I believed you would prefer this. But I shall now send word to Allygarh, and to the Commissioner of Rohilcund, who is in political charge of Ranpore, that it would be a total mistake to suppose that in these provinces the Government takes any sinister view of your proceedings. I am taking every opportunity of declaring that I know you to have no intention whatever of propagating or encouraging disloyalty.

I hope you will keep me informed of your fortunes.  
Very sincerely yours,  
A. C. LYALL.



## Appendix G

Lieut-Governor's Camp, N.W. Provinces,

November 8th, 1884

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I am certainly doing what is possible on my part, to aid Amir Hassan's University project, but I fear he is beginning to discover sundry difficulties, especially in the way of lukewarmness and jealousies among his co-religionists. For myself, I am glad to assist any measure that may tend to uplift the heads of the Mohammedans of these parts. I am not at all afraid politically of Islam in India, if they were at any time disposed to make themselves troublesome, they would have to take the Hindus into very serious account. I mention this because people are inclined to have fits of vague panic about the Mussulmans. If the Russians ever find it worth while to make a strong demonstration against India, they would make a mistake in letting loose the Affghans upon us, for that would throw into our hands all the fighting power and enthusiasm of the Hindus. But I doubt the Affghans being so shortsighted as to help the Russians across the Indus, as the subjugation of Afghanistan would be the inevitable result of Russian success. The "St James's Gazette" makes a great cry over Macgregor's "confidential" memorandum, which seems to have been very freely circulated. I totally dissent from the notion that we are on the brink of some great catastrophe, though it is certain that our army is far too weak, and that we could not enter upon a campaign against a European invader. These military chiefs know little or nothing of the real state and temper of the Indian people, or of the elements of internal trouble with which we have to deal. And the articles in the "Times" upon the armies of Native States are written upon second-rate information, and are likely to be very mischievous if they have influence in high quarters.

So much of Indian politics. I took no personal offence whatever at your articles in the "Fortnightly." They are not intended to be pleasant to the Anglo-Indian official, and I may perhaps venture to say that here and there they are unnecessarily unpleasant. But I do not conceal my opinion, in discussing them out here, that there is truth in much of what you say, though to my mind the paper on race hatred is rather overstrained, and wants the strength of moderation. I wish you had given your readers some momentary glimpse of the other side of the shield. Nevertheless you have, as I tell the folk here, given us much that is salutary criticism, and there is no doubt that we Anglo-Indians are often a rough unpicturesque development of the contact between East and West; some of us finding ourselves rather too suddenly placed in unfamiliar situations, and having emerged un-

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

expectedly into the fierce light that beats upon office. On the other side, the Indians themselves do see both sides of the shield, and do not object to abate much in the matter of high politeness, in consideration of a strong and intelligent sort of administration, impartial among jarring races and creeds. They are themselves not yet ready to supply this kind of government, and they know its value. Also they know, much better than most English, what a bad government, by exceedingly courteous Asiatics, means. Moulvi Sami-ullah is just back from Egypt. I can see that he is considerably impressed by the badness of administrative institutions in Egypt, is rather inclined to ridicule them. As for such very discreditable incidents as that of Patna, they *must* occur now and then until the natives themselves pluck up courage to hit back or otherwise violently resent any personal insult. Laws and magistrates can do much, but can never protect a whole people that does not stand up for itself. Our magistrates are very fairly impartial between the two races in Court, and the people are rather too fond of airing their grievances in a helpless manner.

However, Lord Ripon has done a good deal towards stirring up the natives to a sense of independence and a desire to look after themselves—they now begin to see that if they will only come forward the English nation will meet them half way. Lord Dufferin has but to let the leaven work, and not to give countenance to a reaction.

In Egypt I can anticipate nothing but complications. I cannot see how we can possibly stand balancing as we do at present, keeping everything in suspense, without some final stumble, and yet it is becoming too late to withdraw. Probably our abandonment of the Soudan (which I think is necessary) will heighten the comparison and accelerate some crisis—the Soudan is just the country that entangles the forces of a civilized State, and where expeditions are as water poured into the sand.

Yours sincerely,  
A. C. LYALL.

Lieut.-Governor's Camp, North-West Provinces, India.

*February 23rd, 1885*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I am very sorry that my prediction as to the Soudan, quoted in your letter to me of Jan. 23rd, seems likely to be verified, as well as many predictions made by you. Never was such a demented policy followed so blindly to inevitable failure and disrepute, in open disregard of all the warnings of our Oriental experience, as that we see still being pursued in Egypt. However, I find, to my

## Appendix G

great relief, that the *contre coup* of our Egyptian blunders is not much felt in India, where they are mostly indifferent to the Mahdi and to our proceedings generally, though of course there is much talk of our unlucky adventures in that country. The Mahomedan generally is mainly interested in the Sultan, and Upper India keeps its eyes fixed on Afghanistan and on Russia's doings in Central Asia.

I have just read your "Fortnightly" article on Hyderabad affairs, which article will, you fear, entirely finish Lord Lytton's regard for you. I think, on the contrary, that he ought to be very much obliged to you, for instead of laying upon the Viceroy the whole burden of your displeasure at Salar Jung's treatment in 1876-77-78, you have discharged all your wrath upon that anonymous bureau that you call the Calcutta Foreign Office. Not Lord Lytton, it appears, but poor little Tommy Thornton, who acted as Foreign Secretary at that time, and whom Lord Lytton treated with scant ceremony, was the author of the policy of curbing Salar Jung. I observe that throughout your paper you denounce and convict of the highest crimes the Calcutta Foreign Office, and that the Viceroys and Governor-Generals are represented as sinning mainly by inadvertence. This peculiar tactic was introduced by the "Statesman" newspaper, and is intelligible in a journal that selects an antagonist who cannot hit back when attacked, for of course the Foreign Office, being impersonal and bound to secrecy, is dumb. I tried to induce Lord Ripon to let me roll over the "Statesman" when it once libelled me directly, but he wouldn't let me use confidential papers. I should hardly have expected, however, that so fearless and honourable an adversary as yourself would have adopted the same method.

I suppose I ought not to see anything comic in being accused of being "even more absolutely without moral scruple than" an English Foreign Secretary, or in reading that the history of the doings of the Calcutta Foreign Office, with which I was long connected about the time of which you are treating, is one of the most scandalous in diplomatic annals, that the Calcutta Foreign Office deliberately encouraged the Nizam in vice and dissipation in order to retain power in his state, and, finally, that it is indirectly responsible for Salar Jung being poisoned, but the situation is so novel that its ridiculous side most moves me. It seems clear to me that you are *not* behind the scenes, or you would see the thing in the same comic light, for it is quite in my power to prove that all these wild accusations against gentlemen who are just like yourself in honour and integrity, are unfounded and erroneous. You must not reply that you are attacking a system, or a department, not individuals, the policy of the Indian Foreign Office is dis-

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

tinctly directed by the individuals, the Viceroy and his Foreign Secretary, from time to time in office. And when you write that the policy of the Calcutta Foreign Office is one of organized aggression with a view to annexation—a policy carried on, you imply, in despite of well-meaning Governors-General—you are not only wrong, but the reverse is far nearer the truth. Take the instance of Berar, it is demonstrable by published papers that the attempt to annex and the whole policy of seizure was entirely Lord Dalhousie's own. With Lord Dalhousie's departure the whole process of annexation (except for rebellion) ceased some thirty years ago, his annexations were rather opposed than supported by the local officials and I challenge you to bring an instance in which the Calcutta Foreign Office has since advocated Indian annexations. In regard to the assertion for which, to my amazement, you vouch on your personal testimony, that the Calcutta Foreign Office is responsible for attempts made to corrupt the Nizam's youth, I am quite sure you could not prove it, for I know I could prove the contrary.

I hope you will ponder these words, and consider whether such very serious charges ought to be made, except when you are face to face with men who can answer, or except when you actually produce, as you do nowhere in your article, the evidence on which you rely.

Lord R. Churchill stayed with me two days. I liked him much. He seemed reasonable and moderate, and open-minded upon all Indian questions. India is moving forward very fast—whither, the gods alone know, or perhaps the gods are moving forward themselves too fast to have much time for speculation on anything but their own future. The Russian scare acts as a drag upon Indian radicalism, the advanced party does not want to let in Russia, and is beginning to perceive that only the English can keep her out long.

I am yours sincerely,  
A. C. LYALL.

Lieut -Governor's Camp, N.W. Provinces, India.

*May 4th, 1885*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I was very glad to see from your letter of March 25th, that you are quite ready to exchange explanations upon the disputable points in your article to which our correspondence refers. I will not go farther into the entangled questions of Hyderabad politics, except to say that I am prepared, if necessary, absolutely to prove all that I have averred. For example, I will prove that I, as

## Appendix G

Foreign Secretary, wrote letters insisting that greater care should be taken of the young Nizam's training and education, and that I pressed the point orally and by writing much more closely than Sir Salar Jung quite liked. Also I can prove, undeniably, that at my instance the Government of India proposed to bring to an issue the "Statesman" attacks upon Sir R. Meade by authorizing, indeed ordering, Sir R. Meade to prosecute the "Statesman" in London. It was the *India Office* which refused to allow the prosecution, the Calcutta Foreign Office and Meade were quite ready and resolute. But I cannot quote documents, much less publish them, without the consent of the Foreign Office and the India Office, so I cannot answer public attacks.

As you write in such friendly strain you will perhaps excuse me for expressing regret that the force and benefit of your articles on Indian affairs should be so much diminished (as they really are) by incautious use of unverified information. I have nothing whatever to say against the position you take up as an advanced Liberal and a Reformer in Indian politics, though I may not agree with all your views, or as to ways, means, and opportunities of reform, but it seems to me that your ends would be more likely to be met if you assumed a more impartial attitude. You will never persuade the English nation that Anglo-Indian officials are all fools or knaves. You were quite right to quote my letter in writing to the India Office. I intended it as a manifesto on your side, but I should guess you could afford to pass by Lepel Griffin. He is down on his luck just now, having lost the Foreign Secretaryship, and having been excluded from Raoulpindi Durbar, and he is consequently very sore indeed after such a tumble. I am inclined to be sorry for him as he is an able fellow in his way, but never did man more completely write himself down. He has a vaunting and exaggerated style that irritates people generally, and alarms the cautious officials in high places. His letter in the "Times" (early in April) for instance, about his having been intimately acquainted with one hundred ruling princes of India, is absurd grandiloquence, he only knows half a dozen worth mention politically.

It is hardly worth while that I should write to you about the present state of Indian feeling, for I fear you agree with Lord R. Churchill's dictum that the English official knows less than nothing about what the natives think. Nevertheless, I may say that to me the Indian people at large appears to have come out wonderfully well during the critical suspense we have been going through as to war or peace with Russia. If war came, I believe we should have the country well behind us, and supporting us against the Russians, and I have little fear of internal tumults or disorders.

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

so long as we hold our own beyond or on the North-West frontier. The Russians are, I think, entirely mistaken in their notion that they could stir up any trouble against us in India, where, on the contrary, they have a very bad reputation, and I fancy the natives do not worry themselves so much as you imagine about our bureaucratic manners and blunders, so long as they feel they have a strong and honest government to keep the peace and keep out invaders. This is not, of course, the view of the advanced Liberal native, who naturally wants to rise, but the great Conservative propertied classes have this feeling just now

I thought war was coming. Russia gave us a fair challenge by seizing Panjdeh, but now I suspect that Gladstone is only easing us down, and had never any intention of incurring more blood-guiltiness. His foreign policy has been most unlucky. He evidently has no head for this part of government, and his dealings with the Soudan have been lamentable. Apparently he will fulfil your prediction that "it will end by their absconding without making any arrangements at all."

I wish you would stand for a good Radical constituency and join John Morley. I believe you are at heart much nearer the extreme left than the extreme right, and you could arrange to say nothing about the game laws until you had saved your common country, abolished the Foreign Office and the Indian Council, and given India a dozen provincial parliaments. Sincerely yours,

A. C. LYALL.

### III LIEUT.-GENERAL GLOAG TO MR BLUNT

2, Tanfield Court, Inner Temple, E.C.

*August 19th, 1886.*

DEAR SIR,

I read your letter in the "Times" of yesterday with great satisfaction, on the subject of Burmah. As I have been all over that country, I know a great deal about it, and will not fail from time to time, as heretofore, to do my best to expose those who have befooled Lord Dufferin

1. Inquiry must be held into the real causes of the Annexation

2. I long ago pointed out that Young Thibô, reputed son of the late King Mengdom Meng, was neither a drunkard nor a debauchee, nor yet cruel. Sir Grant Duff can tell now what he is, as he has had him in charge.

3. An inquiry must be held into the method of making the Contracts entered into by Mengdom Meng with the Bombay Burmah Trading Company *in re* the Teak Forests, and maps and plans of

## Appendix G

the forests furnished, as also the number of trees cut down, and the number of young trees planted

4 A general inquiry into the conditions of trade in force between us and the late Mengdom Meng, for the present King Thibò is a mere youth, crassly ignorant of most things

I fully anticipate that independent members will take the question up in the House, and you should do your utmost to help them as I also will do I wrote long ago (1878) that annexation was wrong commercially and morally, as well as quite unnecessary A strong Resident, well supported, with a well-appointed establishment should have been located at Mandalay in 1879 when Mengdom Meng died, the slave question for ever settled, and order made to prevail, and the laws remodelled and respected—quietly, if not, under gentle but strong means I shall be glad to see you continuing along the paths of reason, truth, honesty and justice in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

A. K. GLOAG, Lieut-General, late Comr R A in British Burmah

National Liberal Club, *August 25th*, 1886.

\* \* \* \* \*

The whole affair has been a monstrous wicked thing *ab initio*. I did write to the "Times," but probably my letters were more truthful than they would have been agreeable to the mercantile bodies at Calcutta and Rangoon who I believe have been in the main the sole cause of our policy in Burmah Yours truly,

A K GLOAG.

## INDEX

*For the convenience of readers the public position of each principal person here named is given with a biography in brief*

**A** ARIF, MOHAMMED BEY, 326, 330, 332, 333, 334, 339  
 Abbas, Khedive, the present, proposal of appointing him still a minor with a Regency, 6, 8, 15, Appendix B  
 Abbasi, Sheykh Mohammed el, Sheykh el-Islam at Cairo, 70.  
 Abd-el-Aal Pasha, fellah Colonel, exiled with Arabi, 21, 68, 69, 276, 323, Appendix F  
 Abd-el-Kader Pasha, Governor of the Soudan in 1882, reason of his refusing to return there in 1884, Appendix A *Also* 15, 16, 77, 81, 170, 171, 189, 208  
 Abd-el-Mutalleb, Sherif of Mecca, 333  
 Abd-el-Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, 264, 396, 397, 409, 444, 466  
 Abd-el-Rasul, of Cashmere, 494, 500  
 Abd-el-Razak Bey, F R G S, ex-director of Naval College, imprisoned at Cairo in 1883, 70, 71, Appendix F.  
 Abdallah-el-Taishi, the Khalifa, successor to the Mahdi, 505  
 Abdallah Ibn Saoud, Nejd, living at Constantinople, 327  
 Abdu, Sheykh Mohammed, religious reformer, afterwards Egyptian Grand Mufti, living in exile at Paris in 1884, 203, 284, 286, in England in 1884,

270, interviewed for "Pall Mall Gazette," 277, Appendix E, author's correspondence with, 219, 277, 279, 284, 286, Appendix B, at the House of Commons, 272, his talk with Labouchere and Lawson, 273, with Churchill, 274 *Also* 66, 71, 98, 207, 208, 215, 219, 224, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278  
 Abdul Aziz, Ottoman Sultan, 329, 339.  
 Abdul Hamid, Ottoman Sultan, his character, 238, 302, 308, 309, 317, 318, 326, 327, 328, 337, 338, he favours Halim, 302, 321; his spies, 309, "un misérable et un fou," 309, his horses, 303, 305, 341, 389, his Selamlık, 318, his attitude towards the Grand Duke Nicholas, 308, he only trusts the Germans, 322, 333, his relations with Dufferin, 302, 303, 305, 322, 348, with other ambassadors, 305, 316, 317, 322, his manœuvres, 327; his women, 329, 337, his dislike of the ex-Khedive Ismail, 378, 447, author's letter to, 360, 389, Appendix B, proposed revolt against in 1885, 490, 491, 493. *Also* 15, 44, 50, 53, 80, 155, 177, 208, 238, 242, 248, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 314, 321, 322, 329, 332, 333,



## Index

- Abdul Hamid, Ottoman Sultan  
—*continued*  
338, 339, 340, 341, 358, 361,  
363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 375,  
378, 387, 398, 399, 403, 405,  
417, 418, 434, 436, 441, 449,  
451, 454, 455, 474, 475, 476,  
477, 480, 485, 486, 487, 488,  
492, 501
- Abu Diab, Yusuf Bey, aide-de-  
camp to Abd-el-Aal, unjustly  
hanged at Tantah, 21, 24, 69,  
325, 335, Appendices B and F  
"Abu Naddara," an Arabic  
journal published at Paris *See*  
Sanua
- Adhem, Ibrahim Bey, adherent  
of Tewfik and Mudir of Tan-  
tah, his responsibility for the  
massacres at Tantah, 21, 324,  
325, 335 *Also* Appendices B  
and F
- Ahmed Assad, Sheykh, secret  
agent of the Sultan sent to  
Egypt in 1882, 327
- Ahmed, Mohammed *See* the  
Mahdi
- Ala-ed-Din Pasha, adherent of  
Tewfik, appointed Governor-  
General of Soudan in 1883, 81
- Aleysh, Sheykh Mohammed el,  
Sheykh of the Malekite rite at  
Cairo, imprisoned by Tewfik in  
1882, and died in prison, 81
- Alexandria, bombardment of, 2,  
24, 63, riots at, 19, 20, 21,  
52, 73, 83 *Also* Appendix B
- Amir Ali, Mr Justice, now mem-  
ber of Privy Council, 242, 348.
- Ali Fehmi Pasha, fellah Colonel  
of the Guards, A.D.C. to  
Khedive, exiled with Arabi,  
65, 276, 324
- Ali Yusuf Bey, traitor at Tel-el-  
Kebir, 275, 323
- Allnatt, Mrs, 387; correspond-  
ence with, Appendix A
- Amir Hassan, Rujah of Mahmu-  
dabad, 297, 413.
- Amnesty promised by Dufferin  
in 1882, but broken in 1883,  
19, Appendix C
- Anderson, Mary, Miss, 419, 420
- Appleton, Mr, 353
- Arab race at Newmarket, 262,  
263, 264, 265, 272, at Cairo,  
315
- Arab studs in Poland, 221, 295,  
296
- Arabi, Ahmed Pasha, leader of the  
Egyptian revolution of 1882, his  
recall to Egypt contemplated,  
7, 8, 11, 12, 41, 42, Gordon's  
opinion of, 9, his memoran-  
dum sent to Dufferin, 13, 33,  
76, 77, Appendix B, his views  
on the Soudan, 16, 35, 77, 78,  
Appendix E, author's corre-  
spondence with, Appendix B,  
account of his behaviour at  
Tel-el-Kebir, 69, 323 *Also* 1,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15,  
17, 21, 29, 31, 40, 41, 42, 49,  
51, 52, 53, 61, 68, 69, 72, 76,  
77, 78, 79, 83, 98, 140, 170,  
211, 212, 213, 224, 228, 230,  
234, 235, 237, 238, 242, 245,  
246, 249, 251, 253, 254, 257,  
260, 268, 270, 276, 281, 305,  
310, 313, 323, 325, 379, 381,  
387, 440, 454, 461, 477, 503.
- Argyll, Duke of, 437, 450, 456
- Armenia, 337, 338, 342
- Atlee, Mr Falconer, Consul at  
Paris, 284, 289
- Austin, Alfred, Poet Laureate,  
friend of the author, 392
- Awwam, Effendi, Arabi's secre-  
tary, said to have betrayed  
Gordon, 421, Appendix C.

## Index

- Azarian, Monseigneur, Patriarch of the Catholic Armenians at Constantinople, 337, his opinion of Sultan Abdul Hamid, 338. \*
- Baker, Sir Samuel, well-known traveller, preceded Gordon as Governor of Equatorial Province of the Nile, 95, 97, his high salary, 100, his letter to the "Times" of 1st January, 1884, 161, Gordon's visit to, in 1884, 172. *Also* 100, 102, 104, 153, 161, 171, 172, 176.
- Baker, Valentine Pasha, brother of Sir Samuel, head of Egyptian gendarmerie, formerly Colonel of the 10th Hussars, 201, his defeat at Teb, 5th February, 203 *Also* 54, 161, 177, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 386; author's personal recollection of, 201.
- Bakir, Mirza, exiled Persian Sufi living in London, 273, 274, engaged as Oriental secretary to author, 276, 499
- Balfour, Arthur, Rt. Hon., M.P., afterwards Prime Minister, 410, 424, 435, 450
- Bannerman, Henry Campbell, Rt. Hon. Sir, M.P., Under-Secretary at the Admiralty, afterwards Prime Minister, his strange denial in the Palmer case, 23.
- Barnes, Rev. Dr., vicar of Heavertree, Gordon's religious adviser, 138, 139, 171, 172.
- Baring, Sir Evelyn *See* Cromer.
- Barttelot, Sir Walter, M.P., 489.
- Belkis, Queen, 314.
- Bell, Moberly, Mr., "Times" correspondent at Alexandria, 348, same as "Twenty Years' Resident," 456. *Also* Appendix G.
- Beresford, Charles, Admiral Lord, M.P., 63, 365.
- Berzati, Gordon's secretary in the Soudan, afterwards killed with Hicks, 191
- Bible, Gordon's, correspondence about the recovery of, 387, 389, Appendix A.
- Bilgrami, Seyd Huseyn, afterwards member of the Indian Council, 371.
- "Bitters," Francis Gore Curne, author's cousin living in Paris, 284, 287, 410.
- Bismarck, Prince, author's recollection of, 286, his connection with the Rothschilds, 260, 350, 395 *Also* 1, 220, 222, 255, 260, 262, 345, 350, 357, 371, 391, 394, 395, 400
- Bismarck, Count Herbert, 395
- Black Art, the, 259
- Blignières, M. de, French Financial Controller in Egypt, 51
- Blind, Karl, German revolutionist living in exile in London, 354, 356.
- Blount, Sir Edward, formerly British Consul at Paris, 389.
- Bourke, Rt. Hon. Robert, M.P., Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, afterwards Lord Connemara, Governor of Madras, 28, 220, 226, 278, 349, 388, 450
- Bowen, Lord Justice, 451.
- Bowles, Thomas Gibson, M.P., editor of "Vanity Fair," 343, 361, 369
- Brand, Hon. Henry, M.P., Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, 1883-1885, afterwards 2nd

## Index

- Brand, Hon. Henry, M.P.—*continued* •  
 Viscount Hampden and Governor of New South Wales, friend of the author, 228, 239, 241, 247, 248, 249, 255, 259, 374, 443, 446, 452
- Brett, Hon. Reginald, M.P., private secretary to Lord Hartington, afterwards Lord Esher, his friendship with Gordon, 8, 12, 150, his connection with the press, 162, 164 *Also* 173, 174, 227, 351, 369, 375
- Broadley, Mr. A. M., Arabi's Counsel in 1882, 67, 257, 270, his connection with the ex-Khedive Ismail, 353
- Brocklehurst, General, intimate friend of Gordon, 173, 174, author's talk with, 225.
- Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John, M.P., afterwards Lord Middleton and Chief Secretary for India, 494
- Buckle, Mr. G. E., editor of the "Times" in succession to Mr. Chenery, 210, 219, 220, 250, 271, 348, 367
- Buller, General Sir Redvers, 379, 384
- "Bungo," the Hon. Sir Michael Herbert, of the Paris Embassy, afterwards Ambassador at Washington, friend of the author, 387
- Burmese War, 497, 498, 499, 501, 502, 503 *Also* Appendix G, author protests against, 502
- Burnaby, Colonel Fred, author of "The Ride to Khiva," 213, 232; killed at Abu Klea, 362, 406
- Burne, Sir Owen, head of the Secret Department at India Office, 250
- Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas, M.P., workingman member, 248, 428
- Burton, Sir Richard, the well-known explorer, 101; Gordon's letter to, 137
- Burton, Lady, Gordon's letter to, 130
- Butler, General Sir William, in command of the garrison at Alexandria, his testimony about the bombardment of Alexandria, 475, as to Gordon's being refused permission to land in Egypt, 146
- Butros Pasha Ghali, Coptic Notable, afterwards Prime Minister in Egypt, assassinated in 1910, 69
- "Button," Hon. Algernon Bourke, on the staff of the "Times," cousin and friend of the author, 25, 209, 210, 212, 214, 216, 219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 235, 236, 238, 241, 242, 243, 245, 248, 249, 250, 254, 255, 257, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 269, 283, 352, 359, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, 384, 385, 389, 391, 393, 394, 395, 397, 402, 406, 409, 412, 418, 425, 445, 450, 452, 478
- Buxton, Mr. Francis, M.P., 405, 438
- Buxton, Rt. Hon. Sydney, M.P., 405
- Camberwell Election, Chapter XII, 471, 472, author is defeated at, 504, Appendix D
- Cambridge, H. R. H. George, Duke of, 180, 205, 206, 239

## Index

- Campbell, Sir George, M P, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, 235
- Campbell, Lady Archibald, 446.
- Campbell, Lady Colin, 478.
- Carmichael, Sir James, M.P., private secretary to Gladstone, 268.
- Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, M.P., President of the Board of Trade in Gladstone's Cabinet, 2, 251, 254, 274, 369, 370, 384, 440, 441, 489.
- Chandler, Rev. Dr. Arthur, Bishop of Blomfontein, cousin of the author, 479.
- Chaplin, Rt Hon Henry, M P, 386
- Chapman, Rev. Hugh, Vicar of St. Luke's, Camberwell, afterwards Chaplain of the Savoy, 504
- Charmes, Gabriel, French journalist, his legends about the author, 67, reason of his quarrel with Nationalist Government in 1882, 67 *Also* 243
- Charter, Lord Dufferin's, 29, 32, 33, 62, 76, letter to author, Appendix C.
- Chenery, Mr, editor of the "Times," 30, 31, 32, 210, 349, account of his death, 210
- Cherif Pacha *See* Sherif
- Churchill, Rt Hon Lord Randolph, M.P., Chief Secretary for India under Salisbury, afterwards Chancellor of the Exchequer, personally described, 26, 213, his indictment of Tewfik, 28, 29, 211, Appendix B; Morley's opinion of, 252, his popularity with Orientals, 274, 276, 465, 468, 496, his ideas about India, 211, 350, 370, 412, 413, 439, 444, would recall Arabi, 238, 260, 414, 454, his ideas about Egypt, 414, 444, 454, 455, 461, 486, on Tory Democracy, 429, he promises to support a Parliamentary inquiry into the Indian Government, 439, 496, 497, at the India Office, 452, 453, 456, 457, 460, 461, 464, 485, 491, 494, his views on Irish Home Rule, 445, 465, 469, 483, his connection with the Drummond Wolff mission, 454, 461, 475, 478, 480, 481, 485, 486, 487, 491, 503, his discussion with Jemal-ed-Din, 466, on a proposed revolution at Constantinople, 491, 493, his share in the annexation of Burmah, 497, 498, 501, 503 *Also* 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 38, 210, 211, 213, 218, 219, 235, 238, 245, 259, 262, 266, 278, 349, 350, 370, 371, 390, 408, 412, 413, 418, 419, 424, 429, 432, 435, 438, 440, 441, 443, 446, 447, 448, 450, 452, 453, 464, 466, 467, 468, 469, 479, 480, 481, 482, 492, 494, 495, 496, 500; author's correspondence with, Appendix D.
- Clark, Dr, M P, 356, 435.
- Coetlogon, Colonel, in command of Khartoum garrison, 1883, 85, 155, 186
- Colvin, Sir Auckland, Anglo-Indian official, English Financial Controller in Egypt, afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces of India, 12, 38, 41, 44, 51, 52, 282, 421, 452
- Connaught, H.R.H. the Duke of, 372.

## *Index*

- Cookson, Sir Charles, British Consul at Alexandria, 63
- Coptic Patriarch, 69
- Cordery, Mr, Anglo-Indian official, resident at Hyderabad, 239, 250, 348, 486, Appendix G
- Corti, Count, Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, 300, author's conversations with, 301, 305, 315, 320, 321, 327, his account of the Berlin Congress, 320 *Also* 319, 341, 364
- Cotton, Sir Henry, M.P., 478
- Courtney, Rt Hon Leonard, M P, now Lord Courtney of Penwith, 359, 377, 397, 399, 402, 420, 428, 432
- Cowper, Hon Henry, friend of the author, 483, 484
- Cromer, Earl of, formerly Sir Evelyn Baring, his appointment to Cairo in 1883, 38, his "Nineteenth Century" article, 42, his views in 1883, 42, 59, 60, his reputation in Egypt, 51, 55, 57, his character, 54, 59, 60, 61, his early career, 58, author's talks with in 1883, 58, 60, 61, his connection with Lord Northbrook, 58, his untrustworthiness as an historian, 61, 151, 152, 157, his responsibility for Hicks, 84, his quarrel with Gordon in 1879, 124, 125, 247, his "Modern Egypt," v, viii, 144, 152, 155, his antagonism to Gordon, 151, 152, 167, his misquotation of a dispatch, 157, 171, his complaint as to the "Pall Mall Gazette," 152, 153, 154, 161, 162, 166, 167, 176, his responsibility for Gordon's failure, 157, 192, 193, 197, 198, 199, 202, 214, his unpublished letter to Gordon (date, 22nd January 1884), 194, is considered a failure, 223, 231, 344, 410, Lord Hardinge's opinion of, 374, to be recalled, 449, 450, 451. *Also* 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 70, 74, 75, 76, 83, 84, 85, 102, 122, 124, 125, 144, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 166, 167, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 186, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 214, 215, 219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 228, 231, 247, 254, 257, 321, 344, 345, 374, 393, 410, 429, Appendices A and C
- "Curly," Colonel George Knox, 231
- Currie, Mr Bertram, banker, member of the Indian Council, cousin of the author, and friend of Gladstone, 214, 352, 419, 420, 421
- Currie, Sir Donald, M P, shipowner, friend of Gladstone, 44, 235
- Currie, Mr. George, cousin of the author, 365, 370.
- Currie, Sir Philip, afterwards Lord, private secretary to Lord Salisbury, head of Foreign Office and Ambassador, cousin of the author, 130, 227, 373, 378, 386, 438, Appendix C
- Curzon, Rt Hon. George, M P, afterwards Lord Curzon of Kedleston, friend of the author, 451
- Dalhousie, Earl of, 431

## *Index*

- De la Warr, Earl of, political ally of author, 223, 225, 257
- Deli Nuzret, 327
- Dervish Pasha, the Sultan's envoy to Egypt in 1882, he accepted bribes, 327, 328.
- Dickenson, Dr., of the Constantinople Embassy, 338.
- Dilke, Rt Hon Sir Charles, M.P., Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Gladstone's Ministry, 10, 31, 169, 179, 247, 251, 254, 257, 330, 345, 346, 352, 360, 369, 371, 374, 383, 391, 390, his saying that Egypt would be "annexed under another name," 406. *Also* 440, 445, 452.
- Dillon, John, M.P., his letter to Morley, 252.
- Disraeli, Benjamin, Lord Beaconsfield, story of, 244. *Also* 412
- Drummond, Sir Victor, K C M G., afterwards Her Majesty's Minister at Munich, friend of the author, 287.
- Dufferin, Earl of, Ambassador at Constantinople, afterwards Viceroy of India, author's personal recollection of, 4, his Egyptian settlement, 4, 7, 18, 29, 30, 31, 32, 49, 62, 68, 141, his opinion of Arabi, 7, 8, 13; author's correspondence with, 20, Appendix C; his relations with Sultan Abdul Hamid, 303, 305, 322, 333, 344, 348, his responsibility for Burmah, 497, 498 *Also* 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 49, 62, 68, 73, 76, 81, 141, 145, 146, 148, 149, 152, 161, 222, 236, 238, 283, 302, 305, 318, 322, 333, 344, 409, 454, 486, 497, 498.
- Earle, General, killed in the Soudan, 377, 386
- Earle, Mrs., 399
- Egerton, Sir Edwin, *chargé d'affaires* at Cairo, afterwards Ambassador at Madrid, 223, 495.
- Elections, Egyptian, how managed, 52, 56, 68, 72, 73.
- Elliot, Sir Henry, formerly Ambassador at Constantinople, 301
- Escott, Mr T H S, editor of "Fortnightly," 392.
- Europe, responsible for the ruin of the Soudan, 79, 80
- Exclusion from Egypt, the author's, 75, 207, 218, 222, 245, 246, 247, 256, 274, 275, 278, 487, 492, 495. *Also* Chapter VIII and Appendix C
- Executions at Alexandria and Tantah, 22, 24, 26, 29, 53 *Also* Appendix B.
- Faris, Selim Effendi, journalist at Constantinople, author's talks with, 304, 305, 317, 321, 327, 329, 332, 339, 341, 358, 489, 490, 493
- Fehmy, Hassan Pasha, Sultan's envoy to London in 1885, 358, 359, 360, 361, 363, 366, 367, 368, 372, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 382, 389, 394, 407, 425
- Fenni, Mohammed Effendi, 71
- Ferid Bey, first Secretary of Turkish Embassy, 385, 448, his communication as to proposed revolution in Turkey, 489. *Also* 493.
- Ferry, M. Jules, French Prime Minister, 229, 262, 351.
- Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmund, Under-Secretary for Foreign

## Index

- Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmund—  
*continued*  
Affairs, afterwards Lord Fitzmaurice, 144, 150, 164, 174, 189, 203
- Flower, Mr Cyril, M P, afterwards Lord Battersea, 438
- Ford, Sir Clare, afterwards Ambassador at Constantinople, 436
- Forster, Rt Hon W G, M P, Chief Secretary for Ireland 1880-1882, 257, 261
- Fowzi, Ibrahim Bey, with Gordon in the Soudan, Arabist in 1882, accompanies Gordon to Khartoum in 1884, 175, 196, Appendix A.
- Gessi Pasha, served in the Soudan under Gordon, 116, 117, 119, 191, Suliman Zebahr shot by, 191
- Ghose, Mr Lal Mohun, Indian delegate, 496, 497
- Giegler Pasha, German official in the Khedivial service, 154
- Gladstone, Rt Hon Herbert, M P, afterwards Lord Gladstone, made use of by his father politically, 213, 250, 379.
- Gladstone, Rt Hon. W. E., M P, Prime Minister, his intention of restoring Arabi, 7, 11, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 57, 381, author's correspondence with through Sir E Hamilton, 75, 76, 223, 228, 234, 246, 247, 249, 256, 347, 349, 393, 399, 400, 408, 433, 487, 489, Appendix C. Hartington's intrigue against, 160, 161, 164, 167, 168, 169, 177, 205, 352, was he responsible towards Gordon? 175, 182, 183, 184, 203, he uses his son Herbert, 213, 250, 379, a political gambler, 215, his speeches, 226, 240, 278, 385, 386, 405, 425, at Hawarden on Christmas Eve, 356, violent language about, 362, at the play, 377, his defeat in the House, 9th June 1885, 443, Bright's letter to, 445, Cardinal Manning's opinion of, 500, he pronounces for Home Rule, 504  
*Also* 1, 2, 3, 9, 17, 19, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 38, 40, 49, 56, 67, 72, 134, 171, 173, 179, 210, 212, 214, 217, 222, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 232, 235, 237, 239, 242, 245, 249, 251, 252, 255, 259, 260, 261, 269, 273, 276, 283, 345, 346, 357, 359, 360, 364, 369, 378, 379, 380, 389, 390, 391, 392, 407, 424, 425, 426, 431, 436, 445, 472, 488, and Appendices A and C
- Gobineau, Count, author of "Essai sur l'inegalité des races humaines," friend of the author, 288
- Godley, Sir Arthur, K C B, Under-Secretary of State for India, 225, 239, 250, 391, 392
- Gordon, General Charles George, Pasha, "Chinese Gordon," vii, viii, his letters to author, 9, 10, 11, 12, 140, he calls on author, 10, 135, his testimony about Arabi, 9, 11, 12, 140, his character examined, 87, 88-94, his early work in the Soudan, 87-121; his Bible Christianity, 91, his chastity, 93, "Hailing the tram of the world," 94, he enters Ismail's

## Index

- service, 95; his interview with Sherif, 101, he is considered mad, 8, 94, 103, 122, 132, 136; his fatalism, 108-112, on the financial inquiry, 123; his quarrel with Cromer in 1878, 124, 151; Gordon and Lesseps, 125; his quarrel with Nubar, 129, 131, at the Foreign Office, 130, Rivers Wilson's recollection of, 132; in India, 133, Appendix A, at Jerusalem, 136-143, his religious monomania, 136, 138, his last mission to Khartoum, 144-206; "an unfit person," 151, he resigns his commission, 163; interviewed by Stead, 164, to have *carte blanche*, 166, to Sarawak the Soudan, 169, he visits Barnes, 171, his fighting plan, 177, Gordon and the Ministers, 179, was he disobedient? 181-206, his Foreign Office instructions, 182, his mistake about the Mahdi, 185, 191; Gordon and Zebehr, 190, the change of plan at Cairo, 188, 194, his mission extended by Cromer, 194-199, was help promised him? 204-206, at Khartoum, 207-209, 212. *Also* 213, 214, 216, 218, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 240, 243, 247, 248, 283, 287, 299, 348, 364, 370, 373, 374, 376, 387, 389, 392, 416, 452, 453.
- Gordon Papers, Appendices A and C.
- Gordon, Sir Henry, brother of General Gordon, 174, his correspondence with Gladstone and others, Appendix A.
- Gordon, Colonel Louis, viii, Appendix A.
- Gorst, Rt Hon. Sir John, M P., 28, 211, 213, 219
- Goschen, Rt. Hon George Joachim, M P, afterwards Lord, 126, 261, 267, 269, 270, 322, 375, 390
- Gower, Mr George Leveson, private secretary to Mr Gladstone, 1880-1885, friend of the author, 210
- Gower, Hon Frederick Leveson, M P., Lord Granville's brother and private secretary, 237, 451
- Graham, General Sir Gerald, 203, 213, 214, 402, 416, 427, 428, 430, his letters about Gordon, Appendix A.
- Granville, Earl, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1880-1885, chief obstacle to an honest settlement in Egypt, 17, 18, 31, his position in Gladstone's Cabinet, 168, his letters to Gladstone and Baring proposing Gordon, 150, 173, 175, confirms author's exclusion from Egypt, 245, Morley's opinion of, 252; Staal's description of, 398, his assurance to Bright about Alexandria, 445, out of office, 445. *Also* 2, 8, 17, 31, 67, 72, 74, 75, 85, 150, 154, 155, 163, 167, 168, 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 182, 189, 192, 194, 195, 206, 207, 235, 237, 254, 351, 359, 361, 365, 367, 374, 375, 378, 385, 391, 394, 395, 455, and Appendix G.
- Gregory, Sir William, friend and political ally of author, 29, 32, 242, 245, 266, 282, 347, 349,



## Index

- Gregory, Sir William—*continued*  
378, 440, 476, his letters to author, Appendix G.
- Gregory, Lady, friend and political ally of author, 25, letter from, 29 *Also* 30, 31, 32, 242, 245, 247, 253, 257, 265, 266, 373, 380, 389, 400, 486, extracts from her letters, Appendix G
- Griffin, Sir Lepel, high Anglo-Indian official, 391, 413, 414, 444, 465
- Gros Bois, 285
- Hafiz Behram Agha, Sultan's chief eunuch, 318
- Hake, Mr Egmont, author of "Chinese Gordon," 159, 439, employed to lecture on Gordon by Lord Salisbury, 475
- Halim Pasha, Prince, legitimate successor to the Khedive Ismail, Pretender to Khedivaté, his conversation with the author, 337, his correspondence with the author, 389, Appendix B *Also* 6, 13, 14, 15, 36, 50, 230, 249, 302, 310, 313, 315, 321, 336, 440
- Halim, Princess, 314, 336
- Hamilton, Sir Edward, Gladstone's chief private secretary, 1880-1885, friend of the author, his correspondence with the author, 278, 331, 340, 400, 401, 407, 420, 433, Appendix C *Also* 45, 65, 75, 76, 134, 216, 217, 218, 223, 224, 227, 228, 231, 246, 247, 252, 254, 259, 275, 451
- Harcourt, Rt Hon Sir William Vernon, M P., Home Secretary in Gladstone's Cabinet, 229, 378, 390, 448
- Hardinge, Hon Charles, of the Diplomatic Service, private secretary to Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, afterwards Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Viceroy of India, 363, 364, 374, 489, his opinion of Baring, 374.
- Harrison, Mr Frederic, Head of the Positivist Society, and friend of author, his conversations with the author, 248, 371, 431, 436, his speech at Westminster Town Hall, 4th March, 392 *Also* 251, 253, 254, 256, 383, 451, 497.
- Hartington, Marquess of, afterwards Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for India in Gladstone's Cabinet, his responsibility for the Gordon mission, 247, 248, his intrigue against Gladstone, 164, 165, 167, 369, 370. *Also* 2, 8, 150, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 173, 177, 178, 179, 203, 204, 214, 241, 252, 254, 276, 345, 390, 407, 408, 429, 432, 440, 445, 472, 473, 486
- Haymerlé, Baron, Prime Minister of Austria, early friend of author, 300
- Henderson, Consul at Aleppo, 303, 323.
- Herbert, the Hon Auberon, friend of the author, 213, 353, his individualist ideas, 483
- Herbert, Hon Sir Michael, friend of author. *See* "Bungo."
- Herbert, Hon Sidney, M P, afterwards Earl of Pembroke, friend of author, 450.
- Hicks Pasha, General, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 141, 146, 149,

## Index

- 150, 152, 153, 154, 159, 191, 200, 214, 386.
- Hicks Beach, Sir Michael, M.P., afterwards Lord St. Aldwyn, 239, 240, 252, 390.
- Hill, Mr, editor of "Daily News," 232
- Hobart Pasha, Admiral the Hon Augustus, in the Turkish service, author's conversations with at Constantinople, 302, sent as Sultan's private envoy to London, 364. *Also* 304, 366, 368, 378, 398, 416, 417, 441.
- Holkar, Maharajah, 454
- Holland, the Rev Scott, Canon of St. Paul's, 240
- Hope, Edward, author's private secretary, 283, 469
- Howard, George, M.P, afterwards Earl of Carlisle, friend of author, 237, 255, 259, 261, 267, 272, 404, 417, 462.
- Howard, Mrs. George, afterwards Countess of Carlisle, friend of author, 42, 215, 232, 237, 246, 249, 255, 259, 261, 265, 282, 402, 405, 415, 416, 418, 419, 425, 434, 440, 445, 462
- Hughes, Tom, author of "Tom Brown's Schooldays," 361
- Hunter, Professor, 400
- Hussey Pasha, aide-de-camp to the Sultan, 319, 403
- Ibrahim Adhem Bey, Mudir of Tantah, partisan of Khedive Tewfik, 324, his connection with riots at Tantah. *See* Tantah.
- Ibrahim - el - Senoussi, Sheykh, 403
- Ibrahim Bey. *See* Moelhy
- Inglefield, Colonel, 415.
- Ismail, ex-Khedive, his connection with Gordon, 89, 96, 98-104, 112, 118, 120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, his intrigues in London, 245, 257, 277, 279, 377, 447, author's talk with, 279, 280, Ismail as a boy, 311, 312, he lends money to the King of Italy, 315, his deposition in 1879, 329, is patronized by Bismarck, 358, Arabi refuses to have anything to do with, Appendix B. *Also* 50, 230, 239, 249, 281, 301, 359, 378
- Jaml Pasha, 303.
- James, Rt. Hon Sir Henry, M P, afterwards Lord James of Hereford, 278
- Jemal-ed-Din Afghani, Seyyid, well-known Moslem reformer living in exile at Paris, proposed mediation with the Mahdi through, 224, 226, 228, 286, 287, 338, 389, 409, 410, 411, Appendix B, his correspondence with author, Appendix B; in England, 464, his talks with Churchill, 465-468, his talks with Drummond Wolff, 473, 478, he is to help Wolff in his mission, 480, 481, 482, 486, 487, he leaves England angry, 500, 501; his death in 1902, 501 *Also* 40, 45, 46, 47, 208, 237, 272, 358, 368, 376, 386, 387, 388, 412, 444, 449, 457, 458, 461, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 479, 485, 488, 489, 491, 492, 499.
- Jews in Poland, 290, 293
- Jowdat, Ismail Bey, head of Cairo police during the war,

## Index

- Jowdat, Ismail Bey—*continued*  
in exile at Constantinople in  
1884, 310, 313, 319, his evi-  
dence on the Alexandria and  
Cairo massacres, 319, 323, 330,  
339, 340, Appendix B, in  
London, 342, 343, 356, 357,  
ordered to Constantinople,  
358 *Also* 434, 486, 487, 488
- Jung, Nawab Salar, Prime Min-  
ister to the Nizam, 55, 239,  
371, 413.
- Kandil, Seyd, Chief of Police at  
Alexandria in 1882, con-  
demned to prison for asserted  
connection with Alexandria  
riot, 69, 71 *Also* Appendix B.
- Khalil, Sheykh Mohammed, dis-  
ciple of Sheykh Mohammed  
Abdu, 66
- Kerr, General Lord Mark, 370,  
371, 372
- Khair-ed-Din Pasha, ex-Vizier,  
242, 245, 302, 303, 305, 307,  
329
- Kiamyl, Prince, cousin of the  
Khedive, 326
- Kimberley, Earl of, Chief Secre-  
tary for India in the Gladstone  
Cabinet, 452
- Knowles, Sir James, editor of  
the "Nineteenth Century Re-  
view," friend of Gladstone, 40,  
41, 42, 44, 209, 210, 246, 247,  
249, 275, 359.
- Kurds, proposed rising of, 330,  
342, 343
- Labouchere, Rt Hon Henry,  
M P, friend of author, 28, 213,  
214, 230, 252, 261, 271, 272,  
273, 274, his conversations  
with the author, 379, 380, 393,  
399, 424, 427, 429.
- Lagergren, Mr, Swedish traveller,  
299
- Laing, Mr, Director of the Regie  
at Constantinople, 326
- Laing, Miss, formerly companion  
to Princess Nazli, 313
- Lamb, Lady Caroline, 483
- Lambert, professional tennis  
player, 434
- Lampson, Sir Curtis, Bart, neigh-  
bour and friend of author, 401
- Langiewitz, General, Polish pa-  
triot, 316
- Lascelles, Sir Frank, G C B,  
Acting Diplomatic Agent in  
Egypt, afterwards Ambassador  
at Berlin, friend of author, 243,  
254, 257, 259, 261, 281.
- Lavison, Mr, secretary to ex-  
Khedive Ismail, 279
- Lawson, Sir Wilfrid, Bart, M P,  
28, 212, 213, 219, 232, 240,  
252, 255, 259, 266, 271, 273,  
274, 275, 276, 279, 282.
- Layard, Rt Hon Sir Henry, ex-  
Ambassador at Constantinople,  
317, 365
- Leconfield, Henry, Lord, cousin  
of author, 347, 357, 448
- Lee, Sir Henry Austin, K C M G,  
private secretary to Lord E  
Fitzmaurice at the Foreign  
Office, afterwards English repre-  
sentative on the Suez Canal  
Committee, 373
- Leigh, Mr, of the Diplomatic  
Service, afterwards Lord New-  
ton, 287
- Leitner, Dr, Orientalist, 236
- Leopold, King of the Belgians,  
101, 136, 143, 150, 158, 159,  
163, 164, 178, 182, 187
- Lesseps, Count Ferdinand de,  
his connection with Gordon,  
122, 123, 124, 125, 126

## Index

- Lloyd, Mr Clifford, Chief of Police in Ireland, employed in Egypt in 1884, 14, 267, 325
- Locker-Lampson, Mr Frederick, poet and friend of the author, 498.
- Long, Colonel Chaillé, American Colonel, served with Gordon in the Soudan, 178
- Lords, the House of, 266, 271.
- Lorne, Marquess of, afterwards Duke of Argyll, 404, 408, 409
- Lothian, Schomberg, 9th Marquess of, Chief Secretary for Scotland in Salisbury's Cabinet, friend of author, 437, 449, 452, 472.
- Lowther, Rt Hon. James, M P, 226, 263, 379, 392
- Lucan, Field-Marshal Lord, 426, 427
- Lubienski, Rev. Father, a Polish priest, 292, 293.
- Lumsden, Sir Peter, 370, 396
- Lyll, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred, Lieutenant-Governor of North-West Provinces of India, afterwards member of Indian Council, friend of author, 252, his letters to author, Appendix G.
- Lymington, Lord, M P., now Earl of Portsmouth, 242, 377
- Lyons, Lord, Ambassador at Paris, 132, 209, 344, 359
- Lytton, Earl of, ex-Viceroy of India, afterwards Ambassador at Paris, friend of the author, 133, 222, 257, 258, 390, 399, 451.
- Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed, the, 13, 15, 16, 70, 77, 78, 80, 82, 86, 149, 153, 155, 156, 161, 176, 182, 185, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 200, 203, 204, 208, 209, 212, 215, 217, 218, 221, 223, 224, 225, 227, 230, 231, 234, 235, 237, 240, 257, 261, 266, 267, 269, 272, 348, his character, 351, 442, his death, 459, 472, 505 *Also* 355, 362, 368, 369, 373, 379, 380, 384, 386, 387, 388, 393, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 411, 413, 416, 434, 438, 442, 444, 455, 466
- Malet, Sir Edward, Consul-General at Cairo, afterwards Ambassador at Berlin, 15, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 63, 73, 82, 83, 84, 146, 286, 374, 393, 422, his position with Bismarck, 346, 395
- Malkum Khan, Prince, Persian Ambassador in London, 277.
- Manning, Cardinal, 383, 384, 462, 469, 497
- Massowa, 376, 387
- Maxwell, Sir Benson, Adviser to the Egyptian Government in the department of Justice, 62, 63, 265.
- McCarthy, Mr Huntley, M.P., 422, 423, 461
- McCarthy, Mr Justin, M P, author's conversations with, 422, 423, 469, 476
- McGrath, Canon, 469
- Mediation proposed by author in the Soudan, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 234, 352, 354, 355, 356, 384, 386, 387, 388, 389, 444, 455, Appendices B and C.
- Mehariz Bey, Deputy Mudir at Tantah, his part in the riots, 325, 335. *Also* Appendix B.
- Merv, the Russians at, 467, 468.
- Metemmeh, 365, 368, 372, 373. *Also* Appendix A

## Index

- Meynell, Mr Wilfrid, friend of the author, 475, 478, 504
- Midhat Pasha, his character, according to Vefyk Pasha, 314, his death, 339
- Milner, Alfred, journalist, afterwards Governor of South Africa and Lord, 61, 487
- Minshawi, Ahmed Bey, afterwards Minshawi Pasha, 21, his visits to the author, 334, 338, his evidence as to the Tantah massacre, 335, 336, 339, 340, 341, his letter to author, Appendix B
- Mirza Bakir *See* Bakir
- "Modern Egypt," v, viii, its unreliable character as history, 61
- Moelhy, Ibrahim Bey, at one time private secretary to ex-Khedive Ismail, living as an exile in London in 1885, 354, 355, 357, 358, 359, 368, 381, 385, 401, 403, 408, 409, 434, 458, 459, 480, 487, 488, 491, 494
- Moffitt, Mrs, Gordon's sister, viii, Appendix A
- Mohammed Assad Bey, Muteserif of Candia, uncle-in-law of Aarif Bey, 342
- Moore, Mr A W, Lord Randolph Churchill's private secretary, 485, 495, 498
- Moore, Mr Lionel, Oriental secretary at Constantinople, and friend of the Prince of Wales, his conversations with the author, 63, 64, 65, 67.
- Monier, Sir Robert, Ambassador at St Petersburg, 346, 385
- Morley, Rt Hon. John, M P., formerly editor of the "Pall Mall Gazette," afterwards Cabinet Minister and Lord, his prediction about Lord Cromer, 39, his repentance for bringing about the war of 1882, 152, his "Life of Gladstone," 169, his conversations with the author, 232, 233, 234, 251, 260, 383, 420, his opinion of certain public men, 251, 252, 253, he is for "strong government, the cutting off of heads," 251 *Also* 144, 221, 252, 254, 256, 377, 385, 390, 402
- Morocco, French plan to annex, opposed by Communists, 353
- Morris, William, poet and friend of the author, 408, 488, 496, 499
- Munir Pasha, Chamberlain to the Sultan, 328, 332, 339
- Mustafa Bey Nejdî, Arabi's doctor, living in exile at Constantinople, 313, his account of Tel-el-Kebir, 323, as to Alexandrian riots, 325 *Also* 336, 339, 341, Appendix B
- Musurus Pasha, Turkish Ambassador, 322, 341, 491
- Nadir Shah gives Arab horses to the Turcomans, 479
- Napier, Major, now Lord Napier of Magdala, 225
- Napier, Hon Mark, Counsel with Broadley at Arabi's trial, friend of author, 221, 372, 373, 456, 478, proposes with others to rescue Gordon, 221
- Naworth Castle, 288
- Nazleh, Princess, cousin of Khedive Tewfik, 42
- Nebbî Ullah, Seyd, Khan of Lucknow, 382, 473
- Néldoff, M. de, Russian Ambassador at Constantinople,

## Index

- early friend of author, 300, 316, 339, 398.
- Neville, Lady Dorothy, 436.
- Nicholas, Grand Duke, commanding the Russian army before Constantinople in 1878, 388
- Ninet, Swiss patriot who sided with the Egyptian Nationalists in 1882, 313
- "Nineteenth Century Review," author's article on Egyptian Revolution in, 9, 11, article by Sir E. Baring on Lord Ripon's policy in India, 42, 43, author's article on proposed Arab race at Newmarket in, 237
- Nizam, the, of the Deccan, 388, 397, Appendix G
- Noailles, M. de, French Ambassador at Constantinople, 301, 319, 320.
- Northcote, Sir Stafford, afterwards Earl of Iddesleigh, leader of the Opposition, Chief Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Salisbury, 219, 220, 252, 261, 262.
- Northbrook, Earl of, First Lord of the Admiralty in Gladstone's Cabinet, his financial proposals, 344, 345, 346, 352, 370, with regard to native evidence, 347; his letter to Gordon, Appendix A. *Also* 8, 22, 23, 58, 133, 134, 150, 169, 179, 247, 278, 284, 299, 359, 410, 429, 447, 458.
- Novikoff, Madame de, 245, 277, 378, 447.
- Nubar Pasha, Armenian Prime Minister in Egypt, 30, 95, 102, 103, 118, 122, 129, 131, 140, 141, 170, 171, 175, 176, 178, 190, 194, 195, 197, 199, 214, 223, 243, 268, 287, his quarrel with Gordon in 1878, 129, 247.
- Obeid, Mohammed Bey, fellow officer killed at Tel-el-Kebir, 355-
- Odessa, 297.
- O'Kelly, James, M P, Parnellite member, correspondent of the "Daily News" during Dongola Expedition, 231, 272.
- Omar Pasha Lutfi, partisan of ex-Khedive Ismail, Governor of Alexandria, later War Minister, his connection with the Alexandrian riots, 19, 20, 21, 24, 52, 63, 71, 73, 83, Appendices B and C
- Omdurman taken by the Mahdi, January 1885, 363
- Osborn, Colonel, friend of Native India, 220
- O'Shea, Captain William, M P, 429
- Osman, Prince, cousin of the Khedive, 326.
- Osman Digna, the Emir, Mahdist leader, 54, 161, 200, 203, 394, 400, 426, 437.
- Paget, Sir Augustus, Ambassador at Vienna, and Lady Paget, 287.
- Pain, Olivier, French Socialist, reward offered for him dead or alive, 442, 486
- "Pall Mall Gazette," the, 152, 154, its change of front about Egypt, 161. *Also* 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 183, 223, 227, 247, 253, 255, 274, 350, 351, 353, 354-
- Palmer, Mr Edward, Professor of Arabic at Cambridge, venge-

## Index

- Palmer, Mr Edward—*continued*  
 ance taken on Bedouins for his death, 22, 23, debates in Parliament, 28, Consul West on the Palmer case, 53, Northbrook's responsibility for, 179
- Parnell, Mr Charles Stuart, M P., 251, 270, 272, 273, 379, 412, 414, 415, 422, 423, 429, author's talk with, 427, 428
- Pauncefote, Sir Julian, permanent Under-Secretary of State, afterwards Ambassador in America, 495
- Peace and Arbitration Association, 352, 353, 354, 356, 431
- Penjdeh, 467
- Pettit, match between Lambert and, professional tennis player, 435
- Poles and Ruthenians, 290, 294
- Policy, Prussian, of claiming the old Dutch colonies, 396
- Pollen, Mr John Hungerford, secretary to Lord Ripon, friend of the author, 363, 432, 465
- Poore, Major R., disciple of Urquhart, 377
- Potocki, Count Alfred, at Crabbet, 221, 222, author's visit to him at Lançut, 289, 290, 291, 292, at Antonine, 293, 294, his Arab stud, 295, 296
- Pratt, Mr Hodgson, philanthropist, organizer of the Peace and Arbitration Society, 352, 353
- Press, use made of by Governments, 117, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 250, 369
- Primrose Day with Churchill, 418
- Proteus, Love sonnets of, "Mr Gladstone turns to with delight," 433
- Punch Dinner, 275
- Quakers against peace, 378
- Queen *See* Victoria
- Ragheb Nashid, 276
- Ragunath Rao, Rajah, a letter from, 494
- Rafaat, Osman Bey, secret agent of the Khedive, 324, Appendix B
- Rama Swami, Indian delegate, 494, 499
- Raouf Pasha, Governor-General of Soudan in succession to Gordon, 10, 15
- Red Sea, origin of the name, 314
- Reform in *Foreign Policy*, author's lecture on, 497
- Reign of Terror at Cairo, 66
- Riaz Pasha, Prime Minister in Egypt, 11, 30, 55, 73, 126, 131, 146, 243, 251, 336
- Ripon, Marquess of, Viceroy of India, 58, 133, 134, 239, 251, 349, 363, 375, 397, 412, 413, 432, 450, 452, 465
- Roberts, General Sir Frederic, now Field - Marshal Earl Roberts, 430
- Rosebery, Earl of, afterwards Prime Minister, his connection with the Rothschilds, 395, his connection with the Turf, 237
- Rothschild, Nathaniel Lord, 229, 242, 255, 272
- Rothschilds, Messieurs, their connection with the "Times," 213, Bismarck's quarrel with, in Frankfort, 260, holders of Egyptian Stock, 160, 212, 214, 350.
- Russia and Afghanistan, 444, 466
- Russia and India, 444, 466, 467.

## Index

- Saad-el-Zaglool Effendi, assistant editor of the "Wakaya" under Mohammed, Abdu, Minister of Public Instruction under Cromer, 1906, now Minister of Justice, in prison, 71, author procures his release, 74, 75.
- Sabit Pasha, Tewfik's agent at Constantinople, 305
- Sabunji, Rev Louis, editor of "Nahlek," Oriental secretary to author, 45, 50, 51, 52, 66, 74, 76, Appendix B
- Salisbury, Marquess of, 73, 132, 235, 252, 255, 320, 321, 332, 391, 446, 452, 465, 468, 472, 478, 486, 487, 493, 495, 501, 502, 503, 505, takes office, 448, 449, engages to support Tewfik, 457; author's correspondence with, Appendix C
- Samî, Mahmoud Pasha, el Barodi, Nationalist ex-Prime Minister, exiled with Arabi, 64, 72, 276, 324.
- Sanguscko, Prince, 294.
- Sanua, James (Sheykh Abu Naddara), Egyptian Nationalist living in exile at Paris, and editor of "Abu Naddara," author visits him at Paris, 45, his puppet show and newspapers, 46 *Also* 47, 65, 208, 219, 387, 388
- Saoud el Tihawi, Sheykh, Bedoun Sheykh, his action at Tel-el-Kebir, "in the pay of both sides," 323
- Saracens, Arab chivalry inherited from, 362.
- Selborne, Lord Chancellor, 406
- Seljukian Sultans, descendants of, at Konia, 301.
- Seymour, Admiral Sir Beauchamp, Lord Alcester, his proclamation after bombarding Alexandria, 2, 473
- Seymour, Mr Walter, friend of the author, 370, 382, 456
- Shaftesbury, Lord, his warning to the Prince of Wales, 282.
- Shakespeare, "As You Like It" in open air, 446
- Sheffield, Mr. George, private secretary to Lord Lyons at Paris, considers Gordon's case hopeless, 209, author's conversations with, 344, 345, 346, 410 *Also* 284, 359.
- Shemsî, Emin Bey, Nationalist deputy in 1882, 71, 72, 73
- Sherif Pasha, Prime Minister in 1883, 30, 62, 71, 72, 101, 102, 124, 125, 126, 128, 151, 156, 160, 233, 243
- Sidki, Mustafa Bey, landed proprietor at Shubra, imprisoned in 1883, 71.
- Sinadino, M. Ambrose, Greek banker at Alexandria and agent of the Rothschilds, "Mecca pilgrims kept without water," 298
- Sinnett, Mr. A. P., well-known Theosophist, he explains the black art, 258, 259
- Siva Prasad, Rajah, says a royal order would override caste difficulties, 496.
- Slavery, two ways of dealing with, 96-99
- Slagg, Mr, M P, his motion for an inquiry into Indian Government, 439
- Souakin, 376, 380, 400, 402, 409, 416, 426, 427, 455.
- Spencer, Earl, 391, a born administrator, 268
- Staal, M. de, Russian Ambassador in London, friend of author,



## Index

- Staal, M de—*continued*  
222, 269, 298, 436, 445, 446,  
452, 454
- Stanley of Alderley, Henry, Lord,  
friend of the author, 24, 242,  
245, 302, 308, 310, 342, 345,  
361, 367, 372, 377, 394, 407,  
416, 452
- Stanley, Lady, of Alderley, 364,  
371
- Stanley, Hon Lyulph, M P,  
afterwards Lord Sheffield, friend  
of author, 212.
- Stead, Mr William, editor of the  
"Pall Mall Gazette," 1883-  
1885, Gordon's mission un-  
justly attributed to by Cromer  
in "Modern Egypt," 152, 153,  
162, 165, 166, 167, 168, he  
interviews Gordon at South-  
ampton, 164, 171, used by the  
Whigs, 169, his "scream of  
triumph," 183, author inter-  
viewed by, 220, 221, 351, 353,  
354, 355, described by Mor-  
ley, 253 *Also* 158, 170, 176,  
369, 426, 447, 484
- Stewart, Colonel D H, 81, 146,  
147, 148, 179, 181, 187, 189,  
196, 365, author's recollection  
of, 287, 299, Appendix F
- Stewart, General Sir Herbert, in  
command of the relief column,  
killed at Abu Klea, 362, 364,  
367, 368, 379, 406
- Suliman Sami Bey, Nationalist  
Colonel of the Alexandria gar-  
rison, hanged by the Khedive,  
23, 24, refused to give up  
certain papers incriminating  
the Khedive, 69, Appen-  
dix B
- Sullivan, Sir Arthur, musical com-  
poser, 413
- Sullivan, Sir Edward, Bart, 419
- Sultan, the Ottoman *See* Abdul  
Hamid
- Sultan Pasha, fellah Notable and  
Constitutionalist, betrayed the  
Nationalists to the Khedive in  
1882, and accompanied Wolse-  
ley on the campaign of Tel-el-  
Kebir, received £10,000 and  
a knighthood from the British  
Government, 46, 50, 71, 72,  
275, 324, Appendix B
- Talbot, General the Hon Sir  
Reginald, 367
- Tamai, battle of, 409
- Tantah, riots at, evidence in re-  
gard to, 19, 21, 28, 324, 325,  
334 *Also* Appendices B, C, F
- Taschaud, M, 381
- Tebbutt, Mr Charles, banker of  
St Ives, political friend of  
author, 504
- Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 3, 6, 16,  
36, 46, 49, 65, 74, 75, 77, 79,  
201, traitors at, 275, described  
by Arabi's doctor, 323
- Temple, Dr, Bishop of Exeter,  
afterwards Bishop of London,  
Gordon's visit to, 172, party  
at Fulham, 451 *Also* 139,  
172, 243
- Temple, Sir Richard, ex-Indian  
official, afterwards M P, 498
- Tennis at Hampton Court, 434,  
435
- Tewfik, Khedive, an impediment  
to an honest settlement in  
Egypt, 5, 7, 8, 17, 32, 56, 65,  
68, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 141,  
217, 369, 414, 454, 457, his  
connection with the riots, 28,  
31, 52, 211, 347, Appendices  
B, C, his weak and treacher-  
ous character, 49, 50, 249,  
411, Gordon's quarrel with,

## Index

- 122; he makes peace with Gordon, 197, his firman to Gordon, 193, Arabi's attitude towards, Appendix B *Also* 1, 4, 11, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 30, 33, 47, 48, 51, 55, 62, 64, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 120, 122, 130, 131, 140, 151, 153, 156, 157, 160, 162, 169, 170, 187, 189, 190, 194, 201, 212, 214, 218, 225, 228, 230, 232, 234, 253, 254, 266, 268, 284, 328, 336, 349, 360, 365, 366, 456
- Thebaw, King of Burmah, 497, 502, General Gloag's letters about, Appendix G.
- "Times," the, 1, 25, 30, 32, 76, 99, 153, 160, 161, 162, 166, 172, 175, 211, 213, 216, 219, 230, 231, 246, 248, 249, 253, 254, 257, 265, 274, 275, 354, 360, 361, 365, 367, 385, 397, 399, 426, 435, 445, 447, 455, 459
- Tory Democracy, "Am I a Tory Democrat?" 429, 443, 444, 445, Appendix D; old Tories, 439 *Also* 414, 441, 463, 465
- Trevelyan, Rt. Hon George, Bart, M P, Chief Secretary for Ireland, his description of Clifford Lloyd in Ireland, 268. *Also* 267, 391.
- Tulba Pasha, commander of garrison at Alexandria in 1882, afterwards at Kafr Dawar, exiled with Arabi, 63, 64, 324.
- Turkey, dying, 305, ruined by commercial treaties, 307, in Asia, 342, intended revolution in, 490, 491, 493
- Urquhart, David, author of "Spirit of the East," 377;
- Cardinal Manning's opinion of, 500
- Varkar, Mr. Chandra, 496, 499
- Vefyk Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier, 242, 245, 302, "a man of crotchets," 303, author's visit to "a most remarkable man," 306, "our Sultans worthless," 307, "the English have lost their political sense," 308, on the Sultan, 309, on Egypt, 310, 311, author breakfasts with him, 313, on Arabian history, 314, Count Corti's opinion of, 315, his son, 340
- "Vengeurs, Les," 70, Appendix F
- Victoria, Queen, speech on opening Parliament, 32, her letter to Miss Gordon, 204, 205, 206, Appendix A, Hassan Fehmy's audience with, 369.
- Villayet Ali, Nawab, 296.
- Villiers, Hon Frank, Lord Salisbury's private secretary, afterwards Sir Francis Villiers, Ambassador at Lisbon, 495
- Vivian, Hon Crespiigny, afterwards Lord, and Ambassador at Rome, 123, 127, 128.
- Volhynia, condition of peasantry in, 298
- Waddington, M, French Ambassador in London, 254, at the Congress of Berlin, 320, 321.
- Wagram, Prince, friend of author, author's visit to, at Gros Bois, 284, 285, visits Windsor, 479.
- Wales, Prince of, afterwards King Edward VII, 211, 235, 347, 348, 360, 368, 371, 392, 427, 447

## Index

- Wallace, Sir Mackenzie, 318
- Walsham, Sir John, Bart, of the Diplomatic Service, 287, 289
- Warren, Colonel, 22, 23, his method of dealing with Bedouins, 53
- Watson, General Sir Charles, friend of Gordon, 150, 194, 197, his letters about Gordon, Appendix A
- Webb, Mr Godfrey, clerk of the House of Lords, cousin of the author, 410
- Wentworth, Lord, afterwards Earl of Lovelace, brother-in-law of author, 432, 456
- West, Mr, British Consul at Suez, 52, 53
- Whittaker, Mr, editor of the "Levant Herald," conversation with author, 303, 304, on the Sultan's method of dealing with Ambassadors, 316, he explains Duffern's failure, 322 *Also* 368, 441.
- Wilson, General Sir Charles, Consul in Asia Minor, afterwards at Cairo and Khartoum, 15, 20, 146, 170, 416; author's recollection of, 147, 149, his letters relating to Gordon, Appendix A
- Wilson, Sir Rivers, Finance Minister in Egypt, friend of author, 93, 127, 128, 129, 132, 226, 229, 230, 495, 496, his recollection of Gordon, 132
- Windsor Park, 439.
- Winton, Mr. De, Anglo-Egyptian official, his talk with the author on Egypt, 277
- Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, afterwards Ambassador, 28, 211, 219, 220, 262, his mission to Constantinople and Egypt, 456; his plans in Egypt, 473, his conversations with Jemal-ed-Din, 474, 475, 476, 477. *Also* 360, 382, 390, 408, 413, 418, 436, 448, 449, 451, 454, 455, 458, 461, 480, 481, 488, 489, 490, 491, 494, 504
- Wolseley, Sir Garnet, afterwards Lord, 1, 4, 5, 8, 50, 78, 150, 159, 173, 174, 177, 203, 204, 205, 226, 228, 236, 238, 275, 299, 342, 346, 347, 348, 349, 363, 364, 366, 374, 375, 386, 394, 400, 461, his position at the Horse Guards, 393, his plan of campaign, 406, is angry with the Government, 406, and the Nile Expedition, 415, 416, wants to renew Soudan campaign, 425, 429, resolution for recall of, 431, his return from Soudan, 459
- Wood, General Sir Evelyn, in command of the army of occupation, 49, 51, 150, 194, 197, 201.
- Wood, Mr. Martin, of the Arbitration and Peace Society, he accompanies author to Harwarden, 356, 357, at the National Liberal Club, 435
- Wortley, Stuart, Colonel, 373.
- Wyndham, Rt Hon. George, M P, afterwards Chief Secretary for Ireland, cousin of author, 376, 419, 438, 442
- Wyndham, Sir Hugh, K C B., Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, 298, 299, 301, 363, 364, 374
- Wyndham, Hon. Percy, M P. for Cockermouth, cousin of the author, 236, 266, 271, 274, 298, 299, 363, 364, 375.
- Wynford, Lord, 353.

## Index

- Yildiz Palace, the Sultan at, 327;  
horses paraded at, 341.
- Yusuf, Ismail, President of the  
Commission on the Tanta  
massacres, 325.
- Zanzibar, Bismarck's designs on,  
394, 395.
- Zebehr Pasha, chief of the slave  
traders, 116, 119, recruits a  
Soudanese force, 190, 200;  
would he have betrayed Gor-  
don? 191; would he have saved  
Gordon many mistakes, 192,  
real reason for his arrest, 403  
*Also* 200, 494, 495.
- Zogheb Naghab, Syrian merchant  
of Alexandria, conversations  
with the author on board  
ship, 47, 49, 50, 51.