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
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THE  
WORKS  
OF THE FAMOUS  
Nicholas Machiavel,  
CITIZEN and SECRETARY  
OF  
FLORENCE.

WRITTEN  
Originally in *ITALIAN*; and from thence newly  
and faithfully Translated into *ENGLISH*.



LONDON,

Printed for *John Starkey*, *Charles Harper*, and *John Amery*, at the *Miter*, the *Flower-de-Luce*, and the *Peacock*, in *Fleetstreet*. 1680.





THE SEVERAL  
TREATISES

Contained in this

BOOK.

1. **T**He History of *Florence*.
2. **T**he *Prince*.
3. The Original of the *Guelf* and *Ghibelin* Fa-  
ctions.
4. The Life of *Castruccio Castracani*.
5. The Murther of *Vitelli*, &c. by Duke *Valentino*.
6. The State of *France*.
7. The State of *Germany*.
8. The Discourses on *Titus Livius*.
9. The Art of *War*.
10. The Marriage of *Belphegor*, a Novel.
11. *Nicholas Machiavel's* Letter in Vindication of  
Himself and his Writings.

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THE

THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
FLORENCE,

CONTAINING

An account of the Heroick Enterprizes, Publick and Private  
Transactions; with the Civil Dissentions, Changes  
and Alterations in that

GOVERNMENT

ALSO AN

Account of the Affairs of *ITALY*, and the Actions,  
Designs and contrivances of most of the  
*PRINCES* and *STATES* therein

IN

Eight Books.

By *NICOLAS MACHIAVEL.*

LONDON,

Printed for *John Starkey, Charles Harper, and John  
Amery, at the Miter, the Flower-de-Luce, and  
the Peacock, in Fleetstreet. 1680.*



THE  
EPISTLE  
TO  
CLEMENT, VII

**B**Eing commanded by your Holiness (whilst in a private condition) to writ the History of *Florence*, I addressed my self to it with all the art and diligence herewith nature and experience had endued me. Having deduc'd it to the times, in which, upon the death of *Magnifico Lorenzo de Medici*, the whole form and model of *Italy* was altered; and being to describe the height and importance of what followed in a loftier and more vigorous stile, I judg'd it best to reduce what I had written till those times into one Volume, and present it to your Holiness, that you might at least have a taste of the fruit you had sown your self, and of my labour and cultivation. In the perusal of this work your Holiness will see first, to what ruine and convulsions our Country was expos'd for many ages by the variations of Governments, after the declension of the Roman Empire in the

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## The Author's Introduction.

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West. You will see how your Predecessors, the *Venetians*, the Kingdom of *Naples*, and the Dukedom of *Milan* took their turns of Empire and Sovereignty in this Province. You will see your own Country refusing obedience to the Emperors, by reason of the divisions, and those divisions continuing till under the protection of your Family, it began to settle into a Government. And because it was your Holiness particular command, that in my character of your Ancestors, I should avoid all kind of flattery, true praise not being more pleasing to you, than counterfeit is ungrateful; fearing in my description of the bounty of *Giovanni*, the wisdom of *Cosimo*, the courtesie of *Piero*, the magnificence and solidity of *Lorenzo*, I may seem to have transgressed your holiness direction, I do most humbly excuse my self, both in that, and whatever else in my descriptions may appear unfaithful to your holiness dissatisfaction; for finding the memoirs and relations of those who in sundry Ages made any mention of them, full of their commendations, I must either present them as I found them, or pass them by as if I envied them. And if (as some write) under their great and egregious exploits there was always some latent and ambitious design, contrary to the interest and liberty of the publick. I know nothing of it, and am not bound to relate it: for in all my narrations I never desired to cloak or palliate a dishonourable action, with an honourable pretence; nor to traduce a good action, tho to a contrary end. But how far I am from flattery

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## The Author's Introduction.

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ry, is to be seen in the whole course of my History, especially in my speeches, and private discourses, which do plainly, and without reservation, describe with the sentences, and order of their language, the dignity and humour of the persons. I avoid likewise in all places such words as are impertinent to the verity, or reputation of history, so that no man who considers my writings impartially, can charge me with adulation; especially if he observes how little or nothing I have said of your holiness own Father, whose life was too short to discover him to the world, & I too downright to expatiate upon it. Nevertheless had he done nothing more but given your holiness to the world, that very thing outweighs all the actions of his Ancestors & shall leave more ages of honour to his family, than his malevolent fortune took years from his life. I have endeavored, (Most Holy Sir) as far as might be done without blemish to the truth, to please all people, and it may so fall out I have pleased no body. If it should, I should not wonder, seeing in my judgment it is impossible to write any thing of our own times, without offence to several. Yet I come forth cheerfully into the field, hoping that as I am honoured and employed by your holiness goodness I shall be defended by your holiness judgment; and then with the same confidence & courage as I have writ now; I shall pursue my engagements if my life lasts, & your holiness continues amongst us.

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The Author's

# INTRODUCTION.

**W**hen I first took upon me to write the History of Florence, and its transactions both at home and abroad, I thought to have begun at the year 1434, at which time the Family of the Medici (exalted by the merits of Cosimo, & his father Giovanni) was in greater authority than any other in that City; believing that Messer Leonardo d' Arezzo, and Messer Poggio, two excellent Historians, had given particular description of all the passages before. But upon diligent perusal of their writings to inform myself of their orders and methods, that thereby my own might have better approbation, I found that in their narratives of the Florentine Wars, and foreign negotiations, they had been accurate enough; but in their civil dissensions, their intrinsic animosities, and in the effects which followed them, they were either totally silent, or where any thing was mentioned, it was with such brevity and abruptness as could yield neither profit nor recreation to the reader. Which I conceive they did, either out of an opinion, that they were inconsiderable, and unworthy to be transmitted to Posterity; or else they apprehended a necessity of reflecting upon some great persons, whose family would be disobliged thereby; both which arguments (if I may speak it without offence) are beneath the grandeur and magnanimity of a great person. For if any thing in History be delightfull or profitable, it is those particular descriptions; if any thing be usefull to such Citizens as have the Government in their hands, it is such as represents the feuds and dissensions in the Cities, that thereby they maybe enabled to maintain their own unity at other peoples expence; if the example of any Commonwealth moves a man, certainly that which is written of ones own makes a much stronger impression; and if the factions of any State were ever considerable, the factions in Florence were not to be pretermitted; the greatest part of other States have not had above one, which sometimes has advanced, and sometimes ruined the Government; but Florence has had many divisions. Everybody knows how in Rome after the expulsion of their King, there arose division betwixt the Nobles and the people, which continued till one of them was oppressed. So it was in Athens, and all the Commonwealths which flourished in those times; but in Florence the first dissention was betwixt the Nobles; the next betwixt the Nobles and Citizens; and then betwixt

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## The Author's Introduction.

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*betwixt the Citizens and the Plebs : in all which, one was no sooner superior, but it divided again; and the effects of those divisions were Murders, and Banishments, and dispersion of families, such as never occur'd in any City, that can be remembered. And truly in my judgment, nothing demonstrates the power of our City so much as the consequences of those divisions, which were enough to have subverted and destroyed any other in the world. But ours grew still greater thereby, so remarkable was the courage of the Citizens, and so efficacious their industry for the advancement of their Country, that those few which surviv'd the miseries of their Predecessors, did more by their constancy & courage towards the advancement of their interest, than the malignity of those accidents could do to depress it. And doubtless had Florence been so happy after it had freed it self from the Empire, to have assum'd such a form of Government as would have preserv'd it in unity, I know not any commonwealth, either ancient or modern, that would have exceeded it, or have been comparable to it, either in riches or power. For it is observable, after the Ghibelins were driven out of the Town in such numbers as all Tuscany and Lombardy were full of those exiles, the Guelfs, and such as were left behind in the expedition against Arezzo (which was the year before the battle of Campaldino) were able to draw out of their own Citizens 1200 Horse, and 12000 Foot, And afterwards in the war against Philippo Visconti Duke of Milan being to try their fortune rather with their riches than their arms (which at that time were very much weakened) in five years space (which was the length of that war) the Florentines expended five millions, and 500000 Florens; and when that War was compos'd, to ostentate and publish the power of that Commonwealth, they march'd out with an army, and besieg'd Lucca. I do not see therefore, for what reason these divisions should not be worthy of relation; and if those Noble Authors were restrained by fear of offending the memory of such as they were to speak of, they were mightily out, and seem not to have understood the ambition of mankind, and their desire to have the names of themselves and ancestors transmitted to Posterity; nor did they remember that many people, not having opportunity to make themselves eminent by good and laudable acts, have endeavour'd to compass it by any way, how scandalous and ignominious soever. Neither did they consider that the actions which carry greatness along with them, as those of Governments and States, what ends soever they have and which way soever they are described, do still leave more honour than infamy to their Family; the consideration of which things prevail'd with me to alter my design, and to begin my History from the very foundation of the City: and because it is not my intention to transcribe what has been*

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## The Author's Introduction.

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*been done before by other people, I shall relate such things only as occur'd within the City to the year 1434, mentioning the accidents abroad only so far as will be necessary for the intelligence of the other; after which year I shall give a particular description both of the one and the other. Besides, for the better and more lasting understanding of this History, before I treat of Florence, I shall discourse of the means by which Italy fell under the dominion of those Potentates which govern'd it at that time; all which shall be comprehended in my four first Books: the first shall give a short recital of all transactions in Italy, from the dissolution of the Roman Empire to the year 1434. The second shall give an account of all affairs from the foundation of the City of Florence, to the end of the War against the Pope, which commenc'd upon the expulsion of the Duke of Athens: the third shall conclude with the death of Ladislaus King of Naples; and in the fourth we shall end with the year 1434, from whence afterwards to our present times we shall give a particular Narrative of all proceedings both within the City and without.*

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T H E  
T A B L E  
O F T H E  
Florentine History.

Book I.

<p><b>T</b>he Northern Nations healthful and prosperous <span style="float: right;">pag. 1</span> Their Method of evacuation upon their excessive increase <span style="float: right;">ibid.</span> Their excessive increase, the ruine of the Ro- man Empire <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The Western Gothes the first invaders of that Empire <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Rome sack'd by them under the command of Alaricus <span style="float: right;">2</span> Boniface Governor of Africk for the Empe- ror <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Gallia over-ruin by the Franks, and from them called France <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The Hanni conquer and denominate Hunga- ria <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Britain called Anglia from the Angli <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The Hanni invade Italy under Attila <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Attila besieges and takes Aquilegia <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> He advances to Rome, but retires at the re- quest of the Pope <span style="float: right;">3</span> The Hanni driven back over the Danube, re- turn home <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The first residence of the Roman Emperors at Ravenna <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> New Emperors elected by the Romans up- on the non-residence of their old <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The Lombards invade Italy <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Odoacres call'd King of Rome, and the first of the Barbarians which thought of fix- ing in Italy <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The old Empire divided into Cantons <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Theodorick invades Italy, slays Odoacres, calls himself King of Rome, and held his residence at Ravenna <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Theodorick dies <span style="float: right;">4</span> Ballasarius General for Justinian the Empe- ror <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Totila takes, sacks, and burns Rome <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Narfetes a new General for Justinian <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Longinus alters the Government in Italy <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Alboins kill'd by the conspiracy of his Wife <span style="float: right;">ib.</span></p>	<p>The authority of the Bishops of Rome began to encrease <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Bishops of Rome employed as Ministers by the Emperors and Kings, and sometimes exe- cuted by them <span style="float: right;">7</span> The Eastern Empire destroyed in the times of Heracleus the Emperor <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The King of France exempts the Pope from all humane jurisdiction <span style="float: right;">8</span> Pascal created Pope <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The original of Cardinals <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Eugenius the second Pope <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Ospurcus made Pope, changes his name <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The original of Pisa <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The Government of Italy, anno 931 <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Agabito Pope <span style="float: right;">9</span> Gregory the fifth Pope, expelled and restored, dejects the Romans of their power of crea- ting Emperors, and confers it upon six Prin- ces of Germany <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Clement the second Pope <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Nicholas the second Pope, excludes the Ro- mans, and renounces the Papal Elections to the suffrage of Cardinals only <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Schism and anti-Popes in the Church <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The difference between Henricus and the Pope, the ground of the Guelf and Ghibli- lin factions <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The original of the Kingdom of Sicily <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Urbain the second Pope <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The first Croissade <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Pascal the second Pope <span style="float: right;">11</span> Alexander the third Pope <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> A new anti-Pope <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The Pope's penance to King Henry of Eng- land, upon the complaints about Thomas Becket <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> Celestin the third Pope <span style="float: right;">12</span> Honorius the third Pope <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The Orders of St. Dominick and St. Francis instituted, 1218. <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The Titles of King of Naples and Jerusalem annexed <span style="float: right;">ib.</span> The house of the Esti made Lords of Fer- rara. <span style="float: right;">13</span> The</p>
--	---

# The TABLE

<p><i>The Guelfs side with the Church, the Ghibilins with the Emperor</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Innocent the fourth Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Clement the fifth Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Adrian the fifth Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Nicholas the third of the house of Urfin</i> 14</p> <p><i>The first introduction of Popes Nephews.</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Martin the tenth Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Pope Celestine resigns to Boniface the eighth</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The first Jubilees ordained by Boniface every 100 years</i> 15</p> <p><i>Benedictus chosen, dies, and is succeeded by Clement the fifth, who removed his residence into France, 1036.</i> ib.</p> <p><i>John the 23th. Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Visconti a great Family in Milan, made Princes of that City by the extirpation of the Torri</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The first Duke of Milan</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Dukedom of Milan falls to the Florentians</i> 16</p> <p><i>The original of the Venetians</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Candia given to the Venetians by the French</i> 17</p> <p><i>Benedict the twelfth Pope.</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Clement the sixth Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Jubilee reduced to 50 years</i> 18</p> <p><i>Avignon given to the Pope by the Queen of Naples</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Innocent the sixth Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Urban the fifth Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Gregory the twelfth Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Pope returns to Rome after 71 years residence in France</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Urban the sixth Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Clement the seventh anti-Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Guns first used between the Genoefes and Venetians</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Urban and Clement succeeded by Boniface the 9th. and Benedict the 13th.</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Boniface dies, Innocent succeeds him; and Gregory the 12th. Innocent</i> 19</p> <p><i>Alexander the fifth elected, and succeeded by John the 23d.</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Three Popes at once</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Martin the fifth</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Queen of Naples calls in the King of Aragon to her assistance, adopts him, and makes Braccio de Montonie her General</i> 20</p> <p><i>The state of Italy</i> ib.</p>	<p><i>The Union and Government of the City of Florence</i> 25</p> <p><i>The Antiani</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Captain of the People and Podesta</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Their Militia</i> ib.</p> <p><i>A generous Custom</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Manfredi King of Naples, a great Patron of the Ghibilins</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Carlo d' Angio call'd into Italy by the Pope</i> 26</p> <p><i>A new model of Government in Florence</i> ib.</p> <p><i>New commotions in Florence</i> ib.</p> <p><i>A second model by the Guelfs</i> 27</p> <p><i>Gregory the tenth Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Florence under excommunication</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Innocent the 5th.</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The jealousy of the Pope.</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Nicholas the third Pope</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Ghibilins return</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Martinus Pope</i> 28</p> <p><i>The Government of Florence reformed by the Citizens</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The three Priors to govern two months, to be chosen out of the City indifferently</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Signori</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Discord between the Nobility and People</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Priory and Gonfalonier</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Persuasions to the Nobility to be quiet</i> 29</p> <p><i>The same to the People</i> ib.</p> <p><i>New reformation in Florence, 1298.</i> 30</p> <p><i>The difference in the Family of the Cancellieri, the occasion and consequence</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Bianchi and Neri</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Charles of Valois made Governor of Florence</i> 31</p> <p><i>New troubles occasioned by Corso Donati</i> 32</p> <p><i>The Medici and Giugni</i> 33</p> <p><i>Florence burned, 1304.</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Corso Donati condemned</i> 34</p> <p><i>His Death</i> ib.</p> <p><i>New divisions in Florence</i> 35</p> <p><i>Castruccio Castracani</i> 36</p> <p><i>The Council of the Signori to sit forty months, whereas before it was occasional</i> 37</p> <p><i>Election of Magistrates by Imborsation.</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Ramondo da Cordona General of the Florentines</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Duke of Athens Governor of Florence</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Lodowic the Emperor called into Italy</i> 38</p> <p><i>The death of Castruccio and the Duke of Calabria</i> ib.</p> <p><i>New reformation in Florence</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Florentines quiet at home</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Their Buildings</i> ib.</p> <p><i>A Captain of the Guards</i> 39</p> <p><i>Maffeo da Marradi</i> ib.</p> <p><i>Lucca sold to the Florentines</i> 40</p> <p><i>Taken from them by the Pisans</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Duke of Athens</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The Speech of one of the Senators to the Duke of Athens</i> 41</p> <p><i>The Duke's Answer</i> 42</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>The</i></p>
<p>Book II.</p>	
<p><b>T</b><i>He convenience of Colonies</i> 22</p> <p><i>The Original of Florence</i> 23</p> <p><i>The denomination of Florence</i> ib.</p> <p><i>The first division of Florence</i> 24</p> <p><i>The Guelf and Ghibilin Faction in Florence</i> ib.</p>	<p><i>The Duke's Answer</i> 42</p> <p><i>The</i></p>

## The TABLE.

<i>The Duke of Athens chosen Prince by the People</i>	ib.	<i>Giovannide Medici's reply to Rinaldo</i>	75
<i>His practices in Florence</i>	ib.	<i>The factions of Urano and the Medici</i>	76
<i>Three conspiracies against the Duke at one time</i>	43	<i>The great courage of Biagio del Milano</i>	ib.
<i>Commotion in France</i>	44	<i>The cowardize of Zenobidel Pino</i>	ib.
<i>The Duke expell'd</i>	45	<i>Piccinino revolts</i>	77
<i>His character</i>	ib.	<i>Carmignuola General of the League</i>	ib.
<i>New reformation</i>	46	<i>Peace betwixt the League and the Duke</i>	78
<i>The Nobility deposed</i>	ib.	<i>Giovanni de Medici's Speech to his Sons at his death</i>	ib.
<i>The Nobility attempt to recover their authority</i>	47	<i>Cosimo heir to his Father</i>	79
<i>The people arm against them</i>	ib.	<i>Volterra revolts</i>	ib.
<i>The Nobility utterly depressed</i>	48	<i>Recovered again by the Florentines</i>	ib.
		<i>Rinoldo persuades to war with Lucca</i>	80
		<i>Urano opposes it</i>	ib.
		<i>The cruelty of Astorre</i>	81
		<i>Rinaldo accus'd</i>	82
		<i>His Speech to the ten</i>	83
		<i>Pagolo Lord of Lucca deposed</i>	84
		<i>The Florentines defeated</i>	ib.
		<i>Peace between the Florentines and the Luchesi</i>	ib.
		<i>Florence in confusion</i>	85
		<i>Cosimo Medici deposed and imprisoned</i>	87
		<i>Federigo's Speech to Cosimo his Prisoner</i>	ib.
		<i>Cosimo banished</i>	88
		<i>Rinaldo's Speech to his friends</i>	ib.
		<i>Eugenius the Pope labours a Peace</i>	90
		<i>Cosimo recalled</i>	ib.
		<i>Rinaldo's answer to the Pope</i>	ib.
		<i>Book III.</i>	
<i>Emulation betwixt the middle and the meaner sort of people</i>	50		
<i>The Citizens Oration to the Senate</i>	51		
<i>New reformation</i>	53		
<i>Gregory the 11th. holds his residence at Avignon</i>	ib.		
<i>New Commission for the management of the War</i>	ib.		
<i>A conspiracy of the Guelfs</i>	54		
<i>The conspiracy defeated</i>	ib.		
<i>The Speech of Salvestro de Medici</i>	55		
<i>The Balia</i>	ib.		
<i>Reformation again</i>	56		
<i>Luigi Guicciardini's Oration</i>	ib.		
<i>New troubles</i>	57		
<i>The Speech of a Plebeian</i>	58		
<i>The people rise again</i>	59		
<i>The demands of the people</i>	60		
<i>Michael de Lando, a Carder of wooll.</i>	ib.		
<i>Michael overcomes the multitude</i>	62		
<i>The popular faction distinguished from the Plebeian</i>	ib.		
<i>Another reformation</i>	64		
<i>The Commons expelled from the Government</i>	65		
<i>Michael Lando imprisoned</i>	ib.		
<i>Benedetto's Speech to his friends upon his going into banishment</i>	ib.		
<i>He dies at Rhodes</i>	66		
<i>Veri de Medici's Speech to the Senate</i>	67		
<i>Donato Acciaivoli confin'd</i>	68		
<i>A new conspiracy defeated</i>	ib.		
<i>The Duke of Milan practises against the City of Florence</i>	69		
<i>Several Families banished</i>	ib.		
<i>The King of Naples dies</i>	ib.		
		<i>Book V.</i>	
		<i>The Souldiers in Italy distinguished into two parties</i>	93
		<i>The Duke of Milan promises his Daughter to Count Francis Sforza</i>	ib.
		<i>The Pope invaded, makes Peace with Sforza</i>	ib.
		<i>Wars in Romagna</i>	ib.
		<i>Sforza General of the Pope's League</i>	94
		<i>Peace betwixt the League and the Duke</i>	ib.
		<i>New Ordinances in Florence</i>	ib.
		<i>Alphonso King of Atragon defeated by the Genoeses, and brought Prisoner to Duke Philip</i>	95
		<i>The Duke and his authority in Genoa.</i>	ib.
		<i>Genoa delivered to the Duke of Milan</i>	96
		<i>How it recovered its liberty again</i>	ib.
		<i>Rinaldo's Oration to the Duke of Milan</i>	ib.
		<i>The speech of a Citizen of Lucca to the People</i>	98
		<i>Controversies between the Greek and Roman Churches</i>	102
		<i>Determined at Florence, by the submission of the Greek</i>	ib.
		<i>The Pope deluded, and his Country invaded by Nich. Piccinino</i>	103
		<i>The Speech of Neri, a Citizen of Florence, to the Venetian Senate</i>	104
		<i>Nicolo Piccinino defeated by Count Sforza</i>	106
		<i>Book IV.</i>	
<i>Peace betwixt Florence and Milan</i>	72		
<i>Imola taken by the Duke Philip</i>	73		
<i>The Florentines overthrow</i>	ib.		
<i>Rinaldo Albizi's exhortation to be quiet</i>	74		
		b 2	He

## The TABLE.

<i>He escapes to Fenna, and from thence very strangely to his Army</i>	ib.
<i>Verona surprized by Nicolo</i>	107
<i>Recovered again by the Count</i>	ib.
<i>The Duke of Milan encouraged in his Expedition into Tuscany by Nicolo and the Florentine Exiles</i>	108
<i>The Patriarch of Alexandria General for the Pope</i>	ib.
<i>The Pope discovers intelligence between the Patriarch and Nicolo, and resolves to secure him</i>	ib.
<i>Is secured by Antonio Governor of the Castle at Rome, and dies</i>	109
<i>Commissioners from the Venetians to the Count</i>	ib.
<i>Nicolo makes a diversion into the Territories of Florence</i>	
<i>The Count desirous to follow him, but is hindered by the Venetians</i>	ib.
<i>Of Nicolo's proceeding after he left Lombardy</i>	110, 111
<i>Nicolo's practices to surprize Crotona</i>	112
<i>Brescia relieved by the Venetians</i>	ib.
<i>The Duke of Milan's Fleet defeated by the Venetians</i>	ib.
<i>Nicolo engages the Florentines at Anghiari, and is defeated by them</i>	ib.
<i>The Speech of Count Poppi to the Florentine Commissioners</i>	114
<i>Neri's answer</i>	ib.

### Book VI.

<b>T</b> <i>he Duke of Milan proposeth a Peace to Count Sforza, and offereth his Daughter in Marriage to the Count</i>	116
<i>The ingratitude of the Venetians</i>	ib.
<i>Micheletto General for the League</i>	ib.
<i>Nicolo's insolence to the Duke of Milan</i>	117
<i>Peace between the Duke of Milan and Count Sforza</i>	ib.
<i>Naples taken by the King of Arragon</i>	118
<i>Florence reformed</i>	119
<i>Nicolo Piccinino dies of grief; a courageous, but unfortunate General</i>	ib.
<i>A new War in Lombardy</i>	121
<i>Count Sforza courted by all parties</i>	ib.
<i>The Duke of Milan dies</i>	ib.
<i>The Count made General for the Milanese</i>	122
<i>The Venetians ambitious of the Duchy of Milan.</i>	ib.
<i>Alphonso invades the Florentines</i>	ib.
<i>Retreats out of Tuscany</i>	123
<i>The Venetians fall upon Count Sforza in his Trenches at the Siege of Caravaggio, and are totally routed by the Count</i>	124
<i>Peace between the Venetians and the Count, by which the Venetians were obliged to assist the Count in his obtaining the Duchy of Milan.</i>	125

<i>An Oration made by one of the Milan Embassadors to the Count</i>	ib.
<i>The Count's answer</i>	126
<i>Cosimo de Medici a friend to the Count</i>	127
<i>The Venetians assist the Milanese against the Count</i>	128
<i>The Milanese reduced to great straits by Sforza</i>	ib.
<i>Milan delivered to Sforza, and he made Duke thereof, enters into a League with the Florentines</i>	129
<i>The King of Arragon and the Venetians enter into a League</i>	ib.
<i>Their Embassy to the Florentines</i>	ib.
<i>The Florentines answer.</i>	ib.
<i>The Florentines prepare War</i>	130
<i>Federigo the Emperor comes into Italy to be Crown'd, and enter Florence</i>	ib.
<i>The King of Arragon invades Tuscany</i>	ib.
<i>The strange conceit and undertaking of a Citizen of Rome</i>	131
<i>Peace between the Duke of Milan and the Venetians</i>	ib.
<i>The King of Arragon enters into the League</i>	134
<i>The Pope solicits a War against the Turk</i>	ib.
<i>A prodigious Tempest</i>	ib.
<i>The Genoese invaded by the King of Arragon</i>	135
<i>Genoa delivered to the French</i>	ib.
<i>The King of Arragon dies</i>	ib.
<i>Calisto the third dies, and Pius the second chosen Pope</i>	136
<i>The Genoese revolt from the French</i>	ib.
<i>Naples invaded by Giovanni d' Angio</i>	ib.
<i>The King of Naples defeated</i>	ib.
<i>He recruits his Army, fights and defeats Giovanni.</i>	ib.
<i>Giovanni being defeated, and deserted of his Souldiers, flies into France</i>	ib.

### Book VII.

<b>C</b> <i>osimo de Medici, and Neri Capponi, the two great Citizens in Florence</i>	138
<i>Cosimo dies</i>	139
<i>His children, riches, honours, and actions described</i>	139, 140, 141
<i>Giacopo Piccinino murdered</i>	142
<i>Francesco Sforza Duke of Milan dies</i>	144
<i>The Florentines invaded by the Venetians</i>	148
<i>Peace between the Florentines and Venetians</i>	149
<i>Piero de Medici's Speech to the Florentines</i>	ib.
<i>His death</i>	150
<i>Thomaso Soderini in great favour with the Florentines</i>	ib.
<i>Lorenzo and Guiliano de Medici made Princes of the City of Florence.</i>	ib.

A con-

## The TABLE.

<p><i>A conspiracy of the Nardi</i> 151  <i>Bernardo defeated, and taken</i> 152  <i>The Duke of Milan in Florence</i> ib.  <i>Tumults in Volterra</i> ib.  <i>Volterra surrendered and sacked</i> 183  <i>Italy in two factions</i> 154  <i>Troubles in Tuscany</i> ib.  <i>A conspiracy against the Duke of Milan takes effect, and the Duke slain</i> 155, 156</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Book VIII.</p> <p><b>A</b> <i>Nimosity between the Fatti and the Medici in Florence</i> 158  <i>A conspiracy to destroy Lorenzo and Giuliano de Medici</i> ib.  <i>Rinati del Pazzi dissuades from the enterprise, but in vain</i> 159  <i>The conspiracy miscarries</i> 161  <i>The Pope and King of Naples make war upon the Florentines</i> 162  <i>Lorenza de Medici's Speech to the Florentines</i> ib.</p>	<p><i>The Pope and King invade their Territories</i> 164  <i>Genoa rebels against the State of Milan</i> ib.  <i>The gratitude of the Florentines</i> 165  <i>The Pope's Army defeated</i> 166  <i>Lodovico Sforza Governor of Milan</i> 167  <i>Lorenzo de Medici arrives at Naples</i> 168  <i>The Isle of Rhodes assaulted by the Turks</i> 169  <i>The Duke of Calabria defeated</i> 171  <i>A new League</i> ib.  <i>Castello besieged by the Army of the Pope</i> 172  <i>The Coloni provoke the Pope, and are ruined in Rome</i> 173  <i>The company of S. Giorgio</i> ib.  <i>Aquila rebels against the King of Naples</i> 174  <i>Is protected by the Pope</i> ib.  <i>The Genoese overthrown</i> 176  <i>The Venetians defeated</i> 177  <i>Count Girolamo murdered</i> ib.  <i>His death revenged by his wife</i> ib.  <i>Galeotto Lord of Faenza murdered by his Wife</i> 188  <i>The character of Lorenzo de Medici</i> ib.  <i>His death</i> 189</p>
---	--

# A T A B L E

Of the several Chapters in the

# P R I N C E.

<p><b>C</b>hap. I. <i>The several sorts of Governments, and how they are obtained</i> 199          Chap. II. <i>Of Hereditary Principalities</i> ib.          Chap. III. <i>Of mix'd Principalities</i> 200          Chap. IV. <i>Why the Kingdom of Darius, usurp'd by Alexander, did not rebel against his successors after Alexander was dead</i> 203          Chap. V. <i>How such Cities and Principalities are to be govern'd, who before they were subdued, lived under their own Laws and Constitutions.</i> 204          Chap. VI. <i>Of Principalities acquir'd by ones own proper conduct and arms</i> 205          Chap. VII. <i>Of new Principalities acquir'd by accident and supplies from other people</i> 206</p>	<p>Chap. VIII. <i>Of such as have arrived at their dominion by wicked and unjustifiable means</i> 209          Chap. IX. <i>Of Civil Principalities</i> 211          Chap. X. <i>How the strength of all Principalities is to be computed</i> 212          Chap. XI. <i>Of Ecclesiastical Principalities</i> 213          Chap. XII. <i>The several forms of Military discipline, and of those Soldiers which are called mercenary</i> 214          Chap. XIII. <i>Of Auxiliaries, mix'd Soldiers, and Natives</i> 217          Chap. XIV. <i>The duty of a Prince in relation to his Militia</i> 218          Chap. XV. <i>Of such things as render men (especially Princes) worthy of blame or approbation</i> 219          Chap.</p>
--	---

# The TABLE.

<p>Chap. XVI. Of <i>Liberality and Parsimony</i> 220</p> <p>Chap. XVII. Of <i>cruelty and clemency, and whether it is better for a Prince to be loved, or feared</i> 221</p> <p>Chap. XVIII. <i>How far a Prince is obliged by his promise</i> 222</p> <p>Chap. XIX. <i>Princes are to be cautious of making themselves either odious, or contemptible</i> 223</p> <p>Chap. XX. <i>Whether the building of Citadels, and other things that Princes many times do, be profitable, or dangerous</i> 227</p> <p>Chap. XXI. <i>How a Prince is to demean himself to gain reputation</i> 229</p> <p>Chap. XXII. <i>Of the Princes Secretaries</i> 230</p> <p>Chap. XXIII. <i>How flatterers are to be avoided</i> 231</p> <p>Chap. XXIV. <i>How it came to pass that most</i></p>	<p><i>of the Princes of Italy have lost their dominions</i> 232</p> <p>Chap. XXV. <i>How far in human affairs fortune may avail, and in what manner she may be resisted</i> 233</p> <p>Chap. XXVI. <i>An exhortation for the delivery of Italy from the Barbarians</i> 234</p> <p><i>The original of the words Guelf and Ghiblin.</i> 236</p> <p><i>The life of Castruccio</i> 239</p> <p><i>The Relation of the murder committed upon Vitellozzo Vitelli Oliveretto da Fermo, Pogolo, and the Duke de Gravina, (all of the house of the Ursini) by the machination and management of Duke Valentine</i> 253</p> <p><i>The State of France in an Abridgment</i> 256</p> <p><i>The State of Germany in an Abridgment</i> 265</p>
--	---

A

# T A B L E

OF THE

# DISCOURSES.

## Book I.

<p><b>C</b>hap. I. <i>What have been generally the Principles of all Cities, and particularly of Rome</i> 268</p> <p>Chap. II. <i>The several kinds of Commonwealths; and under which kind the Roman is comprehended</i> 270</p> <p>Chap. III. <i>Upon what accidents and tumults in Rome the Tribune of the people was created, by which that Commonwealth became more perfect</i> 272</p> <p>Chap. IV. <i>The dissensions betwixt the Senate and the People of Rome, were the occasion that Commonwealth became so powerful and free</i> 273</p> <p>Chap. V. <i>Where the Guardianship of liberty may be most securely deposited, whether among the People or Nobility; and which has greater occasion to tumultuate, he that would acquire more, or he that would defend, and keep what he has</i> 274</p> <p>Chap. VI. <i>Whether in Rome such a form of</i></p>	<p><i>Government could be established, as should take away the animosities betwixt the Senate and the People</i> 275</p> <p>Chap. VII. <i>How necessary it is for the conservation of a State, that any Citizen be securely accused</i> 277</p> <p>Chap. VIII. <i>Unjust calumnies are no less perturbations to a Commonwealth, than legal accusations are profitable and good.</i> 278</p> <p>Chap. IX. <i>How much a single person is necessary for the establishment of a new Commonwealth, or the reformation of an old</i> 279</p> <p>Chap. X. <i>As they are to be praised who lay the foundations of any Republick or Kingdom, so they are to be condemned who set up a Tyranny</i> 281</p> <p>Chap. XI. <i>Of the Religion and Ceremonies of the Romans</i> 282</p> <p>Chap. XII. <i>How necessary for the preservation of a State it is, that Religion be in esteem, and how much Italy has suffered for want of it, by means of the Church of Rome</i> 284</p> <p>Chap. XIII. <i>How the Romans pretended Religion.</i></p>
--	---

# The TABLE.

- ligion many times to regulate their City, to prosecute their Wars, and to pacify their tumults 285
- Chap. 14. The Romans were wont to interpret their Auspices with accommodation to their own pleasures and designs; and when at any time they were forced to transgress, they managed it wisely, and pretended to be very precise; and if any body rashly despised them, he was sure to be punished 286
- Chap. 15. How the Samnites in the extremity of their affairs, as their last refuge, had recourse to Religion 287
- Chap. 16. A people accustomed to the dominion of a Prince, though by accident they may acquire their liberty, yet it is with great difficulty, if they maintain it 288
- Chap. 17. A people wholly corrupted in their manners, may possibly recover their liberty, but they will find insuperable difficulty to maintain it 289
- Chap. 18. A corrupt City having made it self free; how its liberty may be maintained; and not having made it self free, how its liberty may be procured 290
- Chap. 19. Though a weak Prince succeeds an excellent the Government may stand; but if one weak Prince succeeds another, 'tis impossible 292
- Chap. 20. Two good Princes, immediately succeeding, may do great things; and well-grounded Commonwealths having always a virtuous succession, their Conquests, and Acquisitions must of necessity be according 293
- Chap. 21. How much that Prince or Commonwealth is to be condemned, which neglects to train up Souldiers of its own ib.
- Chap. 22. What is to be observed from the Combat betwixt the three Roman Horatii, and the three Alban Curiatii 294
- Chap. 23. That our whole fortune is not to be ventured upon part of our force, and that for that reason the keeping of passes is many times dangerous ib.
- Chap. 24. In well ordered Governments, offence and desert are never set one against the other, but he who does well, is rewarded, and he who does otherwise, is punished 295
- Chap. 25. Though it is many times convenient to reform the old Fundamental Customs of a free City, yet it is convenient still to retain some shadow and appearance of their ancient ways 296
- Chap. 26. A new Prince in a new Conquest, is to make every thing new ib.
- Chap. 27. Men are as seldom perfectly bad, as they are perfectly good 297
- Chap. 28. For what reasons the Romans were less ingrateful to their Citizens, than the Athenians ib.
- Chap. 29. Whether the Prince, or the People, is most subject to be ingrateful 298
- Chap. 30. What rules are to be observed by a Prince or Commonwealth to avoid this vice of ingratitude; and how a General or great Citizen is to demean himself to elude it 299
- Chap. 31. That the Romans used no extraordinary punishments towards their great Captains, when they committed an error of ignorance, or malice, provided the Government was not damnified by it 300
- Chap. 32. A Commonwealth or Prince is not to defer his beneficence till the necessity of the object requires it 301
- Chap. 33. If an inconvenience encreases either within a State, or against it; it is better to temporize and comply, than to endeavour to remove it by violence 302
- Chap. 34. The Dictatorship was useful, not hurtful to the Commonwealth of Rome, and how that Power which is usurp'd, and illegally assumed, is pernicious to a State, not that which is conferred legally by the suffrage of the people 303
- Chap. 35. How it came to pass that the creation of the Decem-virat was prejudicial to the liberty of that State, though it was done freely, and by publick suffrage 304
- Chap. 36. Citizens who have executed the greatest Offices, ought not afterwards to disdain or scruple the less 305
- Chap. 37. What troubles and offence was created in Rome by the Agrarian Law; and how dangerous it is to make a new Law opposite to an old Custom, with too much retro-spection ib.
- Chap. 38. Weak Commonwealths are generally irresolute, and ill advised, as taking their measures more from Necessity than Election 307
- Chap. 39. Divers people have many times the same Accidents 308
- Chap. 40. The creation of the Decem-virat in Rome, what things are most remarkable in it; and how far such a Constitution may be useful or pernicious to a Commonwealth 309
- Chap. 41. For a mean man to grow immediately insolent, or a meek man immediately cruel, without just steps of gradation, is both imprudent and unprofitable 311
- Chap. 42. How easily mens manners are corrupted ib.
- Chap. 43. Those Souldiers which fight for their own honour are the best, and most to be trusted 312
- Chap. 44. A multitude without an Head is altogether unserviceable; nor is any man to threaten that has any thing to desire ib.
- Chap. 45. 'Tis a thing of ill example to break a new Law, especially for the Maker: and 'tis no less dangerous to the Governor of

# The TABLE.

<p>of a State, to multiply injuries, and repeat them every day 313</p> <p>Chap. 46. How men leap from one passion to another, and how they who at first aim at nothing but self-preservation, when secured of that, grow oppressors of other people 314</p> <p>Chap. 47. Though the people, in things that are discussed in general, are many times mistaken, yet when they are reduced to particulars, they are more sensible and judicious 317</p> <p>Chap. 48. To prevent the advancement of mean people to the Magistracy, it is particularly to be contrived that the competition be betwixt the best and most noble, and the wickedest and most abject 318</p> <p>Chap. 49. If those Cities which have been free from their foundation (as Rome) have found it difficult to contrive such Laws as might maintain them so. Those which have been always servile, will find it almost impossible 319</p> <p>Chap. 50. No Magistrate or Council ought to have power to check or controul the publick acts of the City 320</p> <p>Chap. 51. A Prince or Commonwealth that is constrained to do a thing, is to seem to do it frankly, and without any compulsion ib.</p> <p>Chap. 52. The best and most secure way to repress the insolence of an ambitious and powerful State, is to preclude and stop up those ways by which he would come to his greatness 321</p> <p>Chap. 53. The people (deceived with a false appearance of good) do many times desire that which turns to their destruction: and how great hopes and large promises do easily debauch them 322</p> <p>Chap. 54. How great the authority of a grave man is, to assuage the tumultuousness of the people 323</p> <p>Chap. 55. How easily things are managed in a City where the Commons are incorrupt; how hard it is to erect a principality where there is not an equality; and where it is not, a Commonwealth is impossible 324</p> <p>Chap. 56. Great accidents, before they happen to any City or Province, are commonly prognosticated by some sign, or predicted by some men 326</p> <p>Chap. 57. The multitude united, is formidable and strong, but separated, is weak and inconsiderable ib.</p> <p>Chap. 58. That the multitude is wiser, and more constant than a Prince 327</p> <p>Chap. 59. What Leagues or Confederacies are most to be trusted; those which are made with Princes, or those which are made with free States 329</p> <p>Chap. 60. How the Consulship, and other Dig-</p>	<p>nities in Rome were conferred without respect of age 330</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Book II.</p> <p>Chap. 1. Whether the virtue or fortune of the Romans was the occasion of the greatness of their Empire 333</p> <p>Chap. 2. With what Nations the Romans contended, and with what obstinacy those Nations resisted 335</p> <p>Chap. 3. It contributed much to the grandeur of the City of Rome, that they ruined the neighbouring Cities, and admitted strangers to their own dignities and privileges 337</p> <p>Chap. 4. There are three ways which Commonwealths have taken to enlarge their Territories 338</p> <p>Chap. 5. The variation of Religion and Languages, with the accidents of Deluges and Plagues, have been the cause that many great things have been forgotten 340</p> <p>Chap. 6. How the Romans proceeded in making of Colonies 341</p> <p>Chap. 7. How the Romans allowed Liberty to the Colonies 342</p> <p>Chap. 8. What it is that causes some people to leave their native Countries, to dispossess other people ib.</p> <p>Chap. 9. What those occasions are which do most commonly create War among Princes 344</p> <p>Chap. 10. That, according to the common opinion, money is not the sinews of War ib.</p> <p>Chap. 11. 'Tis not discretion to enter into strict amity with a Prince, whose reputation is greater than his strength 346</p> <p>Chap. 12. Upon an apprehension of being invaded, whether it be better to make War, or expect it ib.</p> <p>Chap. 13. That from mean to great fortune, people rise rather by fraud, than by force 348</p> <p>Chap. 13. Many people are mistaken, who expect with meekness and humility to work upon the proud 349</p> <p>Chap. 15. Weak States are irresolute and uncertain in their Councils, and slow Councils are most commonly pernicious 350</p> <p>Chap. 16. How much the Soldiers of our times do differ from the Discipline of the Ancients 351</p> <p>Chap. 17. How the Armies of our times are to judge of Artillery, and whether the general opinion of it be true 353</p> <p>Chap. 18. How by the authority of the Romans, and the universal Discipline of the Ancients, the Foot are more serviceable than the Horse 355</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Chap.</p>
---	--



# The TABLE.

<p>Chap. 19. <i>The Conquests of Commonwealths that are ill governed, and contrary to the model of the Romans, do conduce more to the ruine than advancement of their affairs</i> 357</p> <p>Chap. 29. <i>No Prince or Commonwealth, without manifest danger, can employ foreign Forces, either Auxiliary, or Mercenary</i> 359</p> <p>Chap. 21. <i>The first Prator which the Romans ever sent out of their own City, was to Capua, and that was 400 years after they began first to make War</i> 360</p> <p>Chap. 22. <i>How uncertain the judgment of most people are in things of greatest importance</i> 361</p> <p>Chap. 23. <i>How the Romans upon any accident which necessitated them to give judgment upon their Subjects, avoided always the mid-way</i> 362</p> <p>Chap. 14. <i>That in the generality, Castles and Citadels do more mischief than good</i> 364</p> <p>Chap. 25. <i>To attempt a City full of intestine divisions, and to expect to carry it thereby, is uncertain and dangerous</i> 367</p> <p>Chap. 26. <i>He who contemns or reproaches another person, incurs his hatred without any advantage to himself</i> ib.</p> <p>Chap. 27. <i>Wise Princes, and well govern'd States, ought to be contented with victory; for many times whilst they think to push things forward, they lose all</i> 368</p> <p>Chap. 28. <i>How much it is for the interest of all Governments, that all injury be punished, whether against the publick, or particular persons</i> 369</p> <p>Chap. 29. <i>Fortune casts a mist before peoples eyes, when she would not have them oppose her designs</i> 370</p> <p>Chap. 30. <i>Princes and Republicks that are truly magnificent, do not make their Leagues and Alliances with money, but by their virtue, reputation, and force</i> 372</p> <p>Chap. 31. <i>How dangerous it is to believe Exiles too far</i> 373</p> <p>Chap. 32. <i>How many several ways the Romans used to conquer their Towns</i> 374</p> <p>Chap. 33. <i>How the Romans upon any Expedition, gave their Generals general Commissions</i> 375</p>	<p><i>tion of Brutus his Sons</i> 380</p> <p>Chap. 4. <i>A Prince is never safe in his new Conquests, whilst they are in being, whom he dispossessed</i> 381</p> <p>Chap. 5. <i>How a King may lose his Kingdom, though he comes to it by inheritance</i> ib.</p> <p>Chap. 6. <i>Of Conspiracies</i> 382</p> <p>Chap. 7. <i>How it comes to pass, that in the changes of State, from liberty to servitude, and from servitude to liberty, some are very innocent, and others very bloody</i> 391</p> <p>Chap. 8. <i>He who would change the form of a Government, is to consider seriously upon what grounds he does it, and the disposition of the subject</i> 392</p> <p>Chap. 9. <i>How he that would succeed, must accommodate to the times</i> 393</p> <p>Chap. 10. <i>A General cannot avoid fighting, when the enemy is resolved to engage him upon any terms</i> 394</p> <p>Chap. 11. <i>One person that has many enemies upon his hands, though he be inferior to them, yet if he can sustain their first impression, carries commonly the Victory</i> 396</p> <p>Chap. 12. <i>A wise General is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own Army, but to prevent it to his enemies</i> 397</p> <p>Chap. 13. <i>Whether we are more safe in a good General with a bad Army, or a good Army with a bad General</i> 398</p> <p>Chap. 14. <i>What strange effects new inventions have sometimes in a Battel, and how new noises have the same</i> 399</p> <p>Chap. 15. <i>One General is best for an Army, and that to govern it by Commissioners, is not so good</i> 400</p> <p>Chap. 16. <i>That in times of difficulty, virtue is in esteem; in times of ease and luxury, men of riches and alliance are in greatest request</i> 401</p> <p>Chap. 17. <i>A man is not to be disobliged, and employed afterwards in any matter of importance</i> 402</p> <p>Chap. 18. <i>Nothing is more honourable in a General, than to foresee the designs of his enemy</i> 403</p> <p>Chap. 19. <i>Whether for the Government of the multitude, obsequiousness and indulgence be more necessary than punishment</i> 404</p> <p>Chap. 20. <i>One instance of humanity wrought more upon the Falisci than all the force of the Romans</i> 405</p> <p>Chap. 21. <i>How it came to pass that Hanibal, by methods quite contrary to what were practis'd by Scipio, did the same things in Italy that the other did in Spain</i> ib.</p> <p>Chap. 22. <i>How the austerity of Manlius Torquatus, and the humanity of Valerius Corvinus gain'd each of them the same honour and reputation</i> 406</p> <p>Chap. 23. <i>Upon what occasion Camillus</i> d was</p>
---	---

## Book III.

<p>Chap. 1. <i>That a Sect or Commonwealth be long-lived, it is necessary to correct it often, and reduce it towards its first Principles</i> 377</p> <p>Chap. 2. <i>'Tis the part of a wise man sometimes to pretend himself a fool</i> 379</p> <p>Chap. 3. <i>The liberty newly acquired, could not have been preserved, but by the execu-</i></p>	<p><i>tion of Brutus his Sons</i> 380</p> <p>Chap. 4. <i>A Prince is never safe in his new Conquests, whilst they are in being, whom he dispossessed</i> 381</p> <p>Chap. 5. <i>How a King may lose his Kingdom, though he comes to it by inheritance</i> ib.</p> <p>Chap. 6. <i>Of Conspiracies</i> 382</p> <p>Chap. 7. <i>How it comes to pass, that in the changes of State, from liberty to servitude, and from servitude to liberty, some are very innocent, and others very bloody</i> 391</p> <p>Chap. 8. <i>He who would change the form of a Government, is to consider seriously upon what grounds he does it, and the disposition of the subject</i> 392</p> <p>Chap. 9. <i>How he that would succeed, must accommodate to the times</i> 393</p> <p>Chap. 10. <i>A General cannot avoid fighting, when the enemy is resolved to engage him upon any terms</i> 394</p> <p>Chap. 11. <i>One person that has many enemies upon his hands, though he be inferior to them, yet if he can sustain their first impression, carries commonly the Victory</i> 396</p> <p>Chap. 12. <i>A wise General is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own Army, but to prevent it to his enemies</i> 397</p> <p>Chap. 13. <i>Whether we are more safe in a good General with a bad Army, or a good Army with a bad General</i> 398</p> <p>Chap. 14. <i>What strange effects new inventions have sometimes in a Battel, and how new noises have the same</i> 399</p> <p>Chap. 15. <i>One General is best for an Army, and that to govern it by Commissioners, is not so good</i> 400</p> <p>Chap. 16. <i>That in times of difficulty, virtue is in esteem; in times of ease and luxury, men of riches and alliance are in greatest request</i> 401</p> <p>Chap. 17. <i>A man is not to be disobliged, and employed afterwards in any matter of importance</i> 402</p> <p>Chap. 18. <i>Nothing is more honourable in a General, than to foresee the designs of his enemy</i> 403</p> <p>Chap. 19. <i>Whether for the Government of the multitude, obsequiousness and indulgence be more necessary than punishment</i> 404</p> <p>Chap. 20. <i>One instance of humanity wrought more upon the Falisci than all the force of the Romans</i> 405</p> <p>Chap. 21. <i>How it came to pass that Hanibal, by methods quite contrary to what were practis'd by Scipio, did the same things in Italy that the other did in Spain</i> ib.</p> <p>Chap. 22. <i>How the austerity of Manlius Torquatus, and the humanity of Valerius Corvinus gain'd each of them the same honour and reputation</i> 406</p> <p>Chap. 23. <i>Upon what occasion Camillus</i> d was</p>
--	---

# The TABLE.

<p>was banished from Rome 409</p> <p>Chap. 24. The prolongation of Commissions brought Rome first into servitude 410</p> <p>Chap. 25. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus, and several other Citizens of Rome 410</p> <p>Chap. 26. Women are many times the destruction of States 411</p> <p>Chap. 27. How the civil discords in a City are to be composed, and of the falsity of that opinion; that the best way to keep a City in subjection, is to keep it divided 411</p> <p>Chap. 28. A strict eye is to be kept upon the Citizens; for under pretences of officiousness, and piety, there is hid a principle of Tyranny 413</p> <p>Chap. 29. That the transgressions of the people do spring commonly from the Prince 413</p> <p>Chap. 30. A Citizen who would do any great matter by his own authority, must first extinguish all envy. In what manner things were to be ordered upon the approach of an enemy, and how a City is to be defended 414</p> <p>Chap. 31. Powerful States, and excellent Persons, retain the same mind and dignity in all kind of conditions 416</p> <p>Chap. 32. The ways which some people have taken to prevent a Peace 417</p> <p>Chap. 33. In the obtaining a Victory, it is necessary your Army has a confidence not only in one another, but in their General 418</p> <p>Chap. 34. What vogue, fame or opinion dispotes the people first to favour some particular Citizen; and whether they, or a Prince, distributes their offices with most prudence and judgment 419</p> <p>Chap. 35. What dangers they incur; who make themselves authors of any enterprise; and the more extraordinary the design, the greater the danger 420</p> <p>Chap. 36. The reasons why at the first Charge,</p>	<p>the French have been, and still are accounted more than men; but afterwards less than women 422</p> <p>Chap. 37. Whether fighting in small parties, or pickeering before a Battel be necessary; and how the temper of a new enemy is to be found without them 423</p> <p>Chap. 38. How a General is to be qualified, that his Army may rely upon him 424</p> <p>Chap. 39. A General ought to know the Country, and how to take his advantage in the ground 425</p> <p>Chap. 40. How fraud in the management of War is honourable and glorious 426</p> <p>Chap. 41. That ones Country is to be defended by all means, and whether honourable or dishonourable, it imports not, 'tis well defended 427</p> <p>Chap. 42. That forced promises are not binding 427</p> <p>Chap. 43. Those who are born in the same Country; retain almost the same nature thro' all the variety of times 428</p> <p>Chap. 44. Confidence and boldness does many times obtain that which would never be compassed by ordinary means 428</p> <p>Chap. 45. Whether in a Battel it is best to give or receive the Charge 429</p> <p>Chap. 46. How it comes to pass that in a City the same family retains the same manners and customs a long time 429</p> <p>Chap. 47. A good Citizen is to forget all private injury, when in competition with his love to his Country 430</p> <p>Chap. 48. When any enemy commits any grand fault, 'tis to be suspected for a fraud 430</p> <p>Chap. 49. A Commonwealth which desires to preserve it self free, has need of new provisions every day; and upon what score Fabius was called Maximus. 431</p>
---	--

# The TABLE.

## A Table of the Art of War.

**C**hap. 1. How the Seigneur Fabritio Colonna being refreshing himself one evening with some other Gentlemen in a beautiful Garden, took occasion to enter upon this discourse of War. 435

Chap. 2. A person of Honour, and Condition is not to make War his profession. 438

Chap. 3. How a Commonwealth ought not (in prudence) to permit any of its Citizens to make War their profession. 439

Chap. 4. That a King ought not to permit his Subjects to make Arms their profession, for the mischiefs which do frequently ensue. 440

Chap. 5. In what Countries the best Soldiers are to be raised. 442

Chap. 6. Whether it be best to choose young men out of the Cities, or Country. 443

Chap. 7. Of the inconvenience, and convenience of Trained-Bands, or a settled Militia. 444

Chap. 8. Of what sort of people an Army is to be composed. 445

Chap. 9. How the Romans raised their Legions. 446

Chap. 10. Whether it is best for a Militia to consist of a great number or a small. 447

Chap. 11. How the inconveniencies which follow great Armies, may be prevented. 448

Chap. 12. Of the Cavalry. 449

### Book II.

**C**hap. 1. What Arms were most used by the Ancients in their Wars. 450

Chap. 2. Of the Arms which are used at present, and of the invention of the Pike. 451

Chap. 3. Whether the ancient or modern is the best way of arming. ib.

Chap. 4. How Foot should be arm'd, and of the force and convenience of Men at Arms. 453

Chap. 5. The difference betwixt men at arms and foot, and upon which we are most to rely. 454

Chap. 6. How the Soldiers were exercised. 455

Chap. 7. Of what number of men, and of what arms a Battalion is to consist; and of exercising in Companies to make them ready either to give a charge, or receive it. 456

Chap. 8. Of three principal ways of drawing up a Company, and putting them into a posture to fight. 458

Chap. 9. The manner of rallying Soldiers after a rout, and to make them face about a whole Company at a time. 459

Chap. 10. To range a Company in such order that it may be ready to face the enemy, on which side soever he comes. 460

Chap. 11. To draw up a Company with two horns, or another with a Piazza, or vacancy in the middle. 461

Chap. 12. Of the Baggage and Train belonging to a Company; how necessary it is that they have several Officers, and of the usefulness of Drums. 462

Chap. 13. A discourse of the Author about military Virtue; and how it is become so despicable in our days. 463

Chap. 14. What number of horse are to be put into a Battalion, and what proportion is to be observed for their baggage. 465

### Book III.

**C**hap. 1. The order observed by the Roman Legions when a Battel was presented. 466

Chap. 2. The forms observed in their Battels by the Macedonian Palanx. 467

Chap. 3. How the Swisses ordered their Battalions. ib.

Chap. 4. How the Author would make use of both Greek and Roman Arms for his Battalion, and what was the ordinary Army of the Romans. 468

Chap. 5. The way of drawing up a Battalion, according to the intention of the Author. 469

Chap. 6. The description of a Battel. 470

Chap. 7. The Author's reasons for the occurrences in the Battel. 471

Chap. 8. The Exercises of an Army in general. 476

### Book IV.

**C**hap. 1. The considerations and subtilties to be used in the drawing up an Army to fight. 478

Chap. 2. The Arts which are to be used during the Fight. 481

Chap. 3. Stratagems after the Fight. 482

Chap. 4. Two other ways of ranging an Army to Fight. ib.

Chap. 5. Of the constraint and advantage a man may have to Fight. 483

Chap. 6. Directions for a General. 484

Chap. 7. Which way a Battel is to be avoided, though pressed newer so earnestly by the Enemy. ib.

Chap. 8. How Soldiers are to be encouraged to fight; and how they are to be cooled and asswaged. 485

# The TABLE.

*asswaged when their courage is too high* 485  
 Chap. 9. *A General ought to be skilful and eloquent to persuade or dissuade as he sees occasion* ib.  
 Chap. 10. *Certain considerations which encourage Souldiers, and make them as virtuous as valiant* 486

## Book V.

Chap. 1. *How the Romans marched in an enemies Country, and in what manner they are to be imitated* 487  
 Chap. 2. *How an Army is to be marshalled to march in an enemies Country* 488  
 Chap. 3. *How to put an Army presently into order, and draw it up, so as if upon a march it should be attack'd, it may defend it self on all sides* 489  
 Chap. 4. *Of commands derived by word of mouth, by Drums and Trumpets, and of the nature of Pioneers* 491  
 Chap. 5. *Of the Provisions that are necessary for an Army* ib.  
 Chap. 6. *How the Ancients divided the spoil, and of the pay which they gave to their Souldiers* 492  
 Chap. 7. *To know the surprizes which are contriving against you upon your march* 493  
 Chap. 8. *One is to know the Country perfectly well thorow which he is to pass, and keep his enterprizes secret* ib.  
 Chap. 9. *Of certain things which are requisite upon a march* 494  
 Chap. 10. *How to avoid fighting near a River, though pressed by the enemy; and in what manner you may pass it* ib.  
 Chap. 11. *How to make your passage thorow a streight, though you be pressed by an enemy* 495

## Book VI.

Chap. 1. *What kind of places the Greeks and the Romans chose out for their Camps, with a short recapitulation of what has been said before* 496  
 Chap. 2. *The form of a Camp* 497  
 Chap. 3. *Of the several Watches and Guards about the Camp* 501  
 Chap. 4. *To observe who goes and comes to the Camp* ib.  
 Chap. 5. *Of Military Justice, and the method used by the Ancients in the punishment of offenders* ib.  
 Chap. 6. *The Ancients had neither Women, nor Gaming in their Armies; and of the manner how they discamp'd* 502  
 Chap. 7. *The safety and health of a Camp is to be regarded, and it is by no means to be besieged* 503  
 Chap. 8. *Directions as to Provisions* ib.  
 Chap. 9. *How to lodge more or less than four Battalions, and what number of men is sufficient to make Head against an enemy,*

*be he as numerous as he may* 504  
 Chap. 10. *Certain Artifices and Advertisements of War* ib.  
 Chap. 11. *How to rid ones self of an Army that is pressing upon ones heels* 505  
 Chap. 12. *How a man may make a Princes Favourite suspected, and divide his Forces* 506  
 Chap. 13. *In what manner seditions and mutinies in an Army are to be appeased* 507  
 Chap. 14. *How the Ancients relied much upon their auguries, and other accidents* ib.  
 Chap. 15. *That we are not to fight with an enemy reduced to despair; and several arts that may be used to surprize him* 508  
 Chap. 16. *How a suspected Town or Country is to be secured, and how the peoples hearts are to be gained* 509  
 Chap. 17. *War is not to be continued in the Winter* ib.


## Book VII.

Chap. 1. *How Towns or Castles are to be fortified* 510  
 Chap. 2. *What order is to be observed by him who shuts himself up in a Town, with resolution to defend it* 513  
 Chap. 3. *Advertisements for such as are distressed for provisions within a Town, and for such as besiege them, and would reduce them to that necessity* 514  
 Chap. 4. *Other advertisements both for the Besiegers and the Besieged* ib.  
 Chap. 5. *A man is not to depend upon the countenance of the enemy, but is rather to suspect what even he sees with his eyes* 515  
 Chap. 6. *How to disfurnish a Garrison of its men, and to bring a terror upon a Town* ib.  
 Chap. 7. *To corrupt a Garrison, and take it by treachery* 516  
 Chap. 8. *Good Guard is to be kept in all places and times* ib.  
 Chap. 9. *Ways to write privately to ones friends* 517  
 Chap. 10. *How to repair a breach, and the way to defend it* ib.  
 Chap. 11. *Of Mines* 518  
 Chap. 12. *Good Guards are always to be kept, and your Souldiers not to be divided* ib.  
 Chap. 13. *That when one sees himself block'd up on every side, it is good to expose ones self now and then; and of the advantages which have ensued* ib.  
 Chap. 14. *General Rules to be observed in Military Discipline* 519  
 Chap. 15. *The way to have many Horse in your Country* 520  
 Chap. 16. *A General is to invent of himself, and not follow altogether the practises of his Predecessors* 521  
 Chap. 17. *The Author returns, and with a short Discourse concludes his Book* ib.  
*The Marriage of Belphegor* 524



The First Book  
 OF THE  
 HISTORY  
 OF  
 FLORENCE.  
 By NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.

To His Holiness CLEMENT the VII.



HE people which live North-ward beyond the *Rhine* and the *Danube*, being born in a healthful and prolifick Clime, so many times increaseth to such insustainable numbers, that part of them are constrained to abandon their Native, in quest of new Countries to inhabit. When any of those Provinces are overcharged, and disposed to disgorge; the Order they observe is, to divide into three parts, so equally that each of the three consists of a just proportion of Noble and Ignoble, Rich and Poor. After which they cast Lots; and that part to whose fortune it falls, marches off to new Quarters where they can be found, while the other two disburden'd of their supernumeraries remain behind, and enjoy their own Patrimonies in peace.

*The Northern Nations healthful and prolifick. Their method of evacuation upon their excessive increase.*

These inundations and redundancies of people were the destruction of the Roman Empire, to which the Emperours themselves gave great opportunity; for having forsaken *Rome*, the ancient Seat of the Empire, and remov'd their Residence to *Constantinople*, they left the Western Empire more weak, as being more remote from their inspection, and by consequence more obnoxious both to their Governours and Enemies. And indeed, for the destruction of an Empire founded upon the blood of so many brave men, there could not be less carelesness in the Princes, less treachery in the Ministers, nor less force and impetuosity in those who invaded: for one inundation being unable, several conspir'd and at last effected its ruine.

*Their excessive increase, the ruine of the Roman Empire*

The first from those Northern Countries who invaded that Empire, (after the *Timbri* which were vanquish'd by *Marius* a Citizen of *Rome*) were the *Visi Gots* or *Western Gots*; who after some Skirmishes and Conflicts upon the Confines of the Empire, were by concession of the Emperours assign'd, and for a long time permitted quietly to possess a part of the Countrey along the *Danube*. And although upon several occasions, and at sundry times they invaded the Roman Provinces; yet by the vigilance and power of the Emperours they were always repell'd. The last that overcame them so gloriously, was *Theodosius*; who having subdu'd them to his obedience, they did not (as formerly) create themselves a King; but contented themselves with his Government and Pay, they submitted to both, and serv'd him faithfully in his Wars: But *Theodosius* being dead, and his two Sons *Arcadius* and *Honorius*

*The Western Gots, the first invaders of that Empire.*

*Honorius* succeeding; not inheriting his Virtue and Fortune as well as his Crown, the Empire began to decline, and the times (as their Emperour) to grow worse and worse.

To the three parts of the Empire, *Theodosius* in his life-time had preferred three Governours; *Ruffinus* to the East, *Stilico* to the West, and *Gildo* to the South; who all of them after the death of *Theodosius* despising the Title of Governours, resolv'd to make themselves Kings. *Gildo* and *Ruffinus* miscarried in their first Enterprize and were ruin'd: But *Stilico* being better at Hypocrisie than his Brethren, endeavour'd to insinuate and work himself into a confidence with the Emperours, yet with design so to perplex and disturb their Affairs, that he himself might afterwards with more ease leap up into the Saddle. To incense the *Visigots*, and provoke them to mutiny, he counsel'd the Emperours to abate and retrench their former allowance; and lest they should not be sufficient for the molestation of the Empire, he contriv'd that the *Burgundi*, *Franchi*, *Vandals* and *Alani*, (Northern people like the other, and in motion for new Quarters) should fall likewise upon the Roman Provinces.

Rome sack'd by them, under the command of *Alaricus*.

*Boniface* Governour of *Africk* for the Emperour.

The *Visigots* as soon as they found themselves retrench'd, that they might be in better order to revenge it, created *Alaricus* their King, under whose conduct they assail'd the Empire; and after several Rencounters and accidents, they over-ran all *Italy*, and sack'd *Rome*. Not long after, *Alaricus* died, and was succeeded by *Ataulfus*, who marrying *Placidia* the Emperours Sister, Articled upon the Match, to assist in the Relief of *France* and *Spain*, which Provinces were at that time much infested by the *Vandals*, *Burgundi*, *Alani*, and *Franchi* upon the aforesaid occasion. *Ataulfus* undertook only the *Vandals*, who having possess'd themselves of that part of *Spain* call'd *Betica*, being press'd hard by the *Visigots*, and distressed beyond all remedy, they were call'd over by *Boniface* (who at that time Govern'd *Africk* for the Emperours) to come and plant there, for those Provinces being then in rebellion, he was afraid his ill Administration might be discovered. This invitation and their own Exigence concurring, the *Vandals* embrac'd that Enterprize, and performed many memorable and brave things in *Africk*, under *Genfericus* their King.

*Gallia* overrun by the *Franks*, and from them call'd *France*.

The *Huns* Conquer and Denominata *Hungaria*.

*Britain* call'd *Anglia* from the *Angli*.

The *Huns* invade *Italy* under *Attila*.

*Attila* besieges and takes *Aquilegia*.

In the mean time *Theodosius* the Son of *Arcadius* succeeded to the Empire, who regarding but little the Affairs of the West, gave those Nations the first thoughts of fixing in their New Conquests. Accordingly the *Vandals* in *Africk*, the *Alani* and *Visigots* in *Spain*, began to set up for themselves, and Lord it over the Natives. The *Franchi*, and the *Burgundi*, not only over-run and possess'd themselves of *France*, but according to the parts they possess'd, they gave it their Names; one of them being call'd *Francia*, and the other *Burgundia*. The success of their Comrades inviting new multitudes to the subversion of the Empire, the *Huns* fell upon *Pannonia* (which is a Province upon the banks of the *Danube*) and giving it their Name, have denominat'd it *Hungaria* to this very day. Then as an addition to the disorders, the Emperour finding himself attacked in so many places, to contract the number of his Enemies, he began first to treat and capitulate with the *Vandals*, then with the *Franks*, which Treaty increas'd the Authority of the *Barbarians*, and diminish'd his own. Nor was the Island of great *Britain* (call'd *England* at this day) exempt from its troubles: For the *Britains* grown apprehensive of the people which had Conquered *France*, and not discerning which way the Emperour would be able to defend them, call'd in the *Angli* (a Nation in *Germany*) to their assistance. The *Angli*, under the Conduct of *Vortiger* their King, undertook their defence, and at first behav'd themselves faithfully; afterwards their Opportunity increasing with their Power, they drove the Natives out of the Island, possess'd themselves of it, and gave it their Name in commutation for its liberty. Being robb'd of their Country, and made Valiant by Necessity, though they were not able to recover their own, the *Britains* began to think of invading some other, and planting themselves there. In this Resolution they cross'd the Seas with their whole Families, and possess'd themselves of those parts which lie upon the Coasts of *France*, and are call'd *Britain* to this day. The *Huns* (who as was said before had over-run *Pannonia*, being streighten'd and disturb'd in their Quarters by other Nations, viz. the *Zepidi*, *Eruli*, *Turings* and *Ostrogots* (or Eastern *Goths*)) they rose again, and put themselves once more in motion for New Habitations. Not being able to force their way into *France*, which was at that time defended by the *Barbarians*, they fell into *Italy* under *Attila* their King, who not long before (to rid himself of a Partner in the Government) had slain *Bleda* his own Brother, and by that means made himself absolute. *Attila* King of the *Zepidi*, and *Velamis* King of the *Ostrogots* remained as his Subjects. *Attila* having in this manner made his inroad into *Italy*, he besieg'd *Aquilegia*, lay (without interruption) two years before it, wasted the Country round about it, and dispersed the Inhabitants, which (as we shall afterwards declare) was the occasion of building the City of *Venice*. After he had taken, sack'd and demolish'd *Aquilegia*,

*Aquilegia*, and several other Towns, he advanc'd towards *Rome*, but forbote the destruction of it upon the intercession of the Pope, for whom *Attila* had so great a Reverence and Veneration, that upon his single persuasion, he withdrew out of *Italy* into *Austria*, where he died. After *Attila's* death, *Velamir* King of the *Ostrogots*, with the Commanders of other Nations, took up Arms against *Tetricus* and *Euricus*, *Attila's* Sons: One of them they kill'd, and forc'd the other with the *Hunni* back again over the *Danube* into their own Countrey: Upon which the *Ostrogots* and *Zepidi* plac'd themselves in *Pannonia*, and the *Eruli* and *Turingi* remain'd upon the Bank of the *Danube*.

He advances to *Rome*, but retires at the request of the Pope.

The *Hunni* driven back over the *Danube*, return home.

*Attila* being departed out of *Italy*, *Valentinianus* at that time Emperour of the West, had a design to repair that Empire; and for his Capacity of defending it with more Ease and Convenience against the irruptions of the *Barbarians*, he quitted *Rome*, and settled his Residence at *Ravenna*. The Calamities wherewith the Western Empire had been oppressed, were the occasion that the Emperour residing at *Constantinople*, had many times transfer'd the possession of it to other people as a thing of great danger and expence, many times without the Emperour's permission; the *Romans* seeing themselves deserted, had created new Emperours in order to their defence; and sometimes other persons taking advantage of their own Interest and Authority, Usurp'd, as it happen'd when *Maximus* a Citizen of *Rome*, got possession of it after the death of *Valentinianus*, and forc'd his Widow *Eudoxia* to take him for her Husband, who desirous of revenge, and disdaining (being of Imperial extraction) the Embraces of so inferiour a person, she invited privately *Gensericus* King of the *Vandals* into *Italy*, remonstrating the Easiness and Utility of the Conquest; who allured by the Prize, was without much difficulty, perswaded. He entred *Italy* with his Army, march'd up to *Rome*, found it abandon'd, sack'd it, and continued in it fourteen days; after which he took and plundr'd several other Towns, and having laden both himself and his Army with the Spoyl, he return'd into *Africa*. The *Romans* returning (upon his departure) *Maximus* being dead, they made *Avicus* (a *Roman*) Emperour. After many occurrences both within *Italy* and without, and the death of several Emperours, the Empire of *Constantinople* fell into the hands of *Zeno*, and the Empire of *Rome* (by Stratagem and Artifice) to *Orestes*, and *Augustulus* his Son, who, preparing to defend it by force, were invaded by the *Eruli* and *Turingi* (plac'd as we said before upon the Banks of the *Danube*) Confederate for that Expedition under the Command of *Odoacres* their General. Of such places as they had thought good to baulk and leave empty, the *Lombards* possessed themselves, a Northern Nation like the rest, and Commanded by *Godoglio* their King, which were the last People that plagued *Italy*, as shall be shown in its place. *Odoacres* having made his way into *Italy*, he encountred, vanquish'd, and slew *Orestes* near *Parva*, but *Augustulus* got off. After this Victory, that the Title might change with the Government, *Odoacres* caus'd himself to be call'd King of *Rome*, and was the first Chieftain of those Nations (which at that time over-ran the whole World) that thought of fixing in *Italy*; for (either suspecting their abilities to keep it, by reason of the easiness and facility wherewith it might be reliev'd by the Emperour of the East, or for some other secret cause) the rest had ravag'd and plunder'd it, but they always retur'd, and sought out other Countreys for their Establishment and Plantation.

The first Residence of the Roman Emperours at *Ravenna*.

New Emperours elected by the *Romans*, upon the non-residence of their old.

The *Lombards* invade *Italy*.

*Odoacres* call'd King of *Rome*, and the first of the *Barbarians* which thought of fixing in *Italy*.

In those days, the ancient Empire of *Rome* was reduc'd under these Princes. *Zeno* Governing in *Constantinople*, Commanded the whole Empire of the East. The *Ostrogots* Commanded *Mesia*: The *Visigots*, *Pannonia*: The *Suebi* and *Alani*, *Gascogne* and *Spain*: The *Vandals* *Africa*: The *Franchi* and *Burgunds*, *France*: The *Eruli* and *Turingi*, *Italy*. The Kingdom of the *Ostrogots* was devolv'd upon a Nephew of *Velamir's* call'd *Theodorick*, who retaining an Amity with *Zeno* Emperour of the East, writ him word; That his *Ostrogots* being in Valour superiour to other Nations, they thought it unjust and unreasonable to be inferiour in Territory and Command, and that it would be impossible for him to confine them within the Limits of *Pannonia*. That being therefore necessitated to comply, and suffer them to take up Arms in quest of New Countreys, he could do no less than give him timely advertisment, that he might provide against the worst, and if he pleas'd assign them some other Countrey, which by his Grace and Favour they might inhabit with more Latitude and Convenience. Whereupon *Zeno* partly out of fear, and partly desirous to drive *Odoacres* out of *Italy*, directed *Theodorick* against him, and gave him that Countrey for his pains, when it was his fortune to catch it. *Theodorick* accepts the Proposition, removes from *Pannonia* (where he left the *Zepidi* his Friends) and marching into *Italy*, slew *Odoacres* and his Son, call'd himself King of *Rome* by his Example, and made *Ravenna* his Residence, upon the same Reasons as had prevail'd before with *Valentinian*: *Theodorick* was an excellent person both in War and Peace. In the first he was always Victor, in the last a continual Benefactor; as that City and that Nation experimented often.

The Old Empire divided into Cantons.

*Theodorick* invades *Italy*, slays *Odoacres*, calls himself King of *Rome*, and held his residence at *Ravenna*.

He divided his *Ostrogots* into several Countreys, appointing Governours over them, that might Command in time of Wars, and Correct in time of Peace. He enlarged *Ravenna*, and repair'd *Rome*, and restor'd all its Priviledges, except its Military Discipline. Without any noise or tumult of War, by his own single Wisdom and Authority, he kept all the *Barbarian Princes* (who had Cantonized the Empire) in their just bounds. He built several Towns and Castles between the *Adriatick-Sea* and the *Alps*, to obstruct any new Incurſion by the *Barbarians*; and had not his many Virtues been full'd and eclipsed towards his latter end by some Cruelties he committed upon a jealousie of being depos'd (as the deaths of *Symmachus* and *Boetius*, both of them virtuous men, do sufficiently declare) his Memory would have been this day as honourable, as his Person was then: for by his Vertue and Bounty, not only *Rome* and *Italy*, but all the rest of the Western Empire was freed from the continual Conflicts, which for so many years it indur'd by the frequent irruption of the *Barbarians*, and reduc'd into good Order and Condition: And certainly if any times were ever miserable in *Italy*, and those Provinces which were over-run by the *Barbarians*, they were the times betwixt the Reigns of *Arcadius* and *Honorius*, and his; for if it be consider'd what inconveniences, and damage do generally result to a Commonwealth or Kingdom upon alteration of Prince or Government, especially if effected not by forreign force, but civil dissention: If it be observed, how fatal the least Changes prove to Commonwealth or Kingdom how potent soever, it may easily be imagin'd how much *Italy* and other Provinces of the Roman Empire suffer'd in those days, losing not only their Government, but their Laws, Customs, Conversations, Religions, Language, Habits; and even their Names: The thoughts of any one of which things (without so great an accumulation) would make the stoutest heart to ake, much more the seeing and feeling of them. And as this was the destruction, so it was the foundation and augmentation of many Cities. In the number of those which were ruin'd was *Aquileia*, *Luni*, *Chiusi*, *Popolonia*, *Fiesole*, and many others. Among those which were new built, were *Venice*, *Siena*, *Ferrara*, *Aquila*, and several other both Towns and Castles, which for brevity sake I omit. Those which from small beginnings became great and considerable, were *Florence*, *Genoa*, *Pisa*, *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Bologna*, to which may be added the ruine and reparation of *Rome*, and several other Cities which were demolish'd and rebuilt. Among these devastations, and inroads of new people, there sprang forth new Languages, as is visible by what is us'd both in *France*, *Spain*, and *Italy*, which being mixt with the Language of their Invaders and the ancient *Roman*, is become new, and clear another thing to what it was before. Besides not only the Provinces lost their Names, but particular places, Rivers, Seas, and Men; *France*, *Italy*, and *Spain*, being full of new Appellatives, quite contrary to what they were of old; as the *Po*, *Garda*, and *Archipelago*, for Rivers and Seas; and for Men, in stead of *Cesar* and *Pompey*; they began to be call'd *Peter*, *John*, *Martien*, &c. But among all these Variations, the changing of their Religions was of no less importance: for the Customs and Prescription of the ancient Faith being in combat and competition with the Miracles of the New, many tumults and dissentions were created, which had the Christian Church been unanimous and entire, would never have happen'd: but the *Greek*, the *Roman*, the Church at *Ravenna* being in contention, and the Heretick, with the Catholic as furiously zealots, they brought great misery upon the World, as *Africa* can witness, which suffer'd more by their Arrianism (which was the Doctrine of the *Vandals*) than by all their avarice and cruelty. Whilst men lived expos'd to so many persecutions, the terrour and sadness of their hearts was legible in their faces; for besides the multitude of Calamities they endured otherwise, great part of them had not power to betake themselves to the protection of God Almighty (who is the surest refuge of all that are in distress) for being uncertain whither their devotions were to be directed, they died miserably without any.

*Theodorick* therefore deserved no small praise, who was the first which gave them respite from the multitude of their Evils, and restored *Italy* to such a degree of Grandeur in the thirty eight years which he reigned there, that there was scarce any thing to be seen of its former desolation; but when he died, and the Government devolv'd upon *Atalaricus* the Son of *Amalasuunda* his Sister, in a short time (the malice of their Fortune being not exhausted as yet) they relaps'd, and fell over head and ears into their old troubles again: For *Atalaricus* dying not long after him, the Kingdom fell into the hands of his Mother, who was betray'd by *Theodate*, (a person she had call'd in to assist her in the Government.) She being remov'd, and he made King, to the great dissatisfaction of the *Ostrogots*, to whom that Usurpation had made him insufferably odious; *Justinian* the Emperour took courage, began to think of driving him out of *Italy*, and deputed *Bellisarius* his General for that Expedition, who before had Conquer'd *Africa*, driven out the *Vandals*, and reduc'd



reduc'd it under that Empire again. Having first possess'd himself of *Sicily*, and thence pass'd his Army into *Italy*, *Bellisarius* recover'd *Naples* and *Rome*. The *Goths* foreseeing their destruction, kill'd *Theodate* their King as the occasion of all, and elected *Visigetes* in his place, who after several Skirmishes was at length besieged and taken in *Ravenna* by *Bellisarius*, who (not prosecuting his Victory as was expected) was call'd back by *Justinian*, and his Command given to *Johannes* and *Vitalis*, who were much short of their King, who was at that time Governour of *Verona*; and being kill'd shortly after, the Kingship fell to *Totila*, who beat the Emperours forces, recover'd *Tuscany*, and subdu'd the Governours of all those Provinces which *Bellisarius* had reduc'd. Upon which misfortune *Justinianus* thought it necessary to send him again into *Italy*; but returning with small Force, he rather lost what he had gained before, than acquir'd any new Reputation. For *Totila* (whilst *Bellisarius* lay incamp'd with his Army at *Hofstia*) besieg'd *Rome*; and took it as it were under his Nose; and then upon consideration that he could neither well keep nor relinquish it, he demolish'd the greatest part of it, forcing away the people, and carrying the Senators as Prisoners along with him, and taking no notice of *Bellisarius*, headwanc'd with his Army into *Calabria* to encounter and cut off certain Supplies which were sent out of *Greece* to reinforce him. *Bellisarius* seeing *Rome* abandon'd in this manner, address'd himself to a very honourable Enterprize, and entering the City, repair'd the Walls with all possible Celerity, and re-invited the Inhabitants when he had done. But Fortune concurr'd not to the nobleness of his design: for *Justinianus* being at that time invaded by the *Partis*, *Bellisarius* was call'd back to repell the Invasion. In obedience to his Master, he march'd his Army out of *Italy*, and left that Province to the discretion of the Enemy, who seiz'd again upon *Rome*, but us'd it not so barbarously as before, being wrought upon by the prayers of *Saint Remond* (a person very eminent in those times for his Sanctity) he apply'd himself rather to repair than destroy it. In the mean time *Justinian* had made a Peace with the *Partis*, and resolving to send new Supplies into *Italy*, he was diverted by a new Alarm from the *Sclavi* (another Northern people) who had pass'd the *Danube*, and fallen upon *Illyria* and *Thrace*: So that *Totila* had his full swing, and was in a manner in possession of all *Italy*. As soon as *Justinian* had Conquer'd the *Sclavi*, and setled the Countreys which they had invaded, he sent a new Army into *Italy* under the Conduct of *Narfetes* an Eunuch, a brave Captain, and of great experience in the Wars. Being arriv'd in *Italy*, he fought, beat, and kill'd *Totila*, after whose death the remainder of the *Goths* retir'd into *Parva*, and made *Tera* their King. On the other side, *Narfetes* after his Victory took *Rome*, and then marching against *Tera* he engag'd him about *Nocera*, defeated his Army, and slew him among the rest: By which disaster the very Name of the *Goths* was well near extinguish'd in *Italy*, where they had reigned from the time of *Theodorick*, to this *Tera*, full seventy years. But *Italy* was scarce warm in its Liberty, when *Justinianus* dy'd, and left his Son *Justinus* to succeed, who by the Counsel of his Wife *Sophia*, recall'd *Narfetes* out of *Italy*, and sent *Longinus* in his place. *Longinus*, according to the Example of his Predecessors, kept his Residence at *Ravenna*, in other things he digress'd, and particularly by introducing a new form of Government in *Italy*, not constituting Governours in every Province as the *Goths* had done before, but deputing a Captain in every City or other Town of importance, with the Title of Duke. Nor in this distribution did he show any greater favour to *Rome*, than to the rest; for removing the Consuls and Senate (Names which to that time had been sacred among them) he constituted a Duke which he sent every year from *Ravenna*, and his Government was call'd the Dukedom of *Rome*. But he that more immediately represented the Emperour at *Ravenna*, and had the Universal Government of *Italy*, was call'd *Esava*. This division not only facilitated the ruine of *Italy*, but hasten'd it exceedingly by giving the *Lombards* opportunity to possess it. *Narfetes* was much disgusted, with the Emperour for calling him off from the Command of those Provinces which by his own Vertue, and effusion of his blood he had acquir'd: And *Sophia* not thinking it injury sufficient to get him recall'd, had given out contumelious words, as if she would make him Spine among the rest of the Eunuchs. Whereupon in great disdain *Narfetes* encourag'd *Alboino* King of the *Lombards*, (who at that time Govern'd in *Pannonia*) to invade *Italy* and possess it.

As was shown before, the *Lombards* were enter'd and had taken possession of such places upon the *Danube* as had been defended by the *Eruli* and *Turingi*, when *Odovover* their King conducted them into *Italy*. They had continued there some time, till their Kingdom fell to *Alboino*, for a daring and courageous man, under whom passing the *Danube*, they encounter'd with *Commodus* King of the *Zepiri* (a People plant'd in *Pannonia*) and overcame him. Among the rest *Rosmunda* one of *Commodus* Daughters was taken Prisoner, whom *Alboino* took

*Bellisarius*  
General for Ju-  
stinian the Em-  
perour.

*Totila* takes,  
sacks, and  
burns *Rome*.

*Narfetes* a  
new General  
for *Justinian*.

*Longinus* al-  
ters the Go-  
vernment in  
*Italy*.

took for his Wife, made himself Lord of her Countrey, and mov'd by the barbarousness of his nature, he caus'd a Cup to be made of her Father's Skulke, and in memory of that Victory, drank out of it very often. But being call'd into *Italy* by *Narsetes*, with whom he had retain'd a Friendship in his Wars with the *Goths*; he left *Pannonia* to the *Hunns* (who as we said before, return'd into their own Countrey after the death of *Atrila*) march'd into *Italy*, and finding it so strangely Cantoniz'd and divided; he possess'd (or rather surpriz'd) *Parva*, *Milan*, *Verona*, *Vicenza*, all *Tuscany*, and the great part of *Flaminia* (call'd now *Romagnia*): So that presuming from the greatness and suddenness of his Conquests, all *Italy* was his own, he made a solemn Feast at *Verona*; where much drinking having exalted his Spirits, and *Commodus* his Skull being full of Wine, he caus'd it to be presented to *Rosmunda* the Queen, who sat over against him at the Table, declaring (and that so loud she could not but hear) that at a time of such hearty and extraordinary Mirth; it was firs she should drink one Cup with her Father. Which expression touching the Lady to the quick, she resolv'd to be reveng'd; and knowing that *Almachilde*, a young and valiant *Lombard*, had an intrigue with one of her Maids, she prevail'd that she might personate her one night, and lie with him her self. Accordingly *Almachilde* being introduc'd upon a time into a very dark place, he enjoy'd *Rosmunda* instead of her Maid. The Business being done, *Rosmunda* discover'd her self, told him what was pass'd; That now it was at his Choice, whether he would kill *Alboino*, and enjoy her and her Kingdom, or be kill'd himself for vitiating his Wife. *Almachilde* had no fancy to be slain, and therefore chose the other Proposition of killing his Master; but when they had kill'd him, they found themselves so far from acquiring the Kingdom, that they were afraid of being made away by the *Lombards*, out of the affection they bare to the Memory of *Alboino*; for which cause packing up with all the Jewels and Treasure they could make, they march'd off to *Longinus* at *Revenna*, who receiv'd them honourably.

*Alboino*  
kill'd by the  
Conspiracy of  
his Wife.

During these Troubles, *Justinus* the Emperour died, and *Tiberius* was elected in his Place; but being employ'd in his Wars against the *Parthians*, he was not at leisure to send Relief into *Italy*. Which *Longinus* looking upon as an opportunity to make himself King of the *Lombards*, and of all *Italy* besides, by the help of *Rosmunda* and her Treasure, he imparted his Design to her, and perswaded her to kill *Almachilde*, and take him afterwards for her Husband. She accepted the Motion, and having in order thereunto prepar'd a Cup of Poison, she gave it with her own hand to *Almachilde* as he came thirstily out of a Bath, who having drank off half, finding it work, and great Convulsions within him, concluding what it was, he forc'd her to drink the rest, so that in a few hours both of them died, and *Longinus* lost all hopes of making himself King. In the mean time at a Convention of the *Lombards* at *Parva* (which they had made their Metropolis) they creat'd *Clefi* their King, who re-edified *Imola*, that had been destroyed by *Narsetes*. He conquer'd *Rimini*, and in a manner all up as far as *Rome*, but died in the middle of his Carriere. This *Clefi* behav'd himself so cruelly, not only to Strangers, but even to the *Lombards* themselves, that the Edge of their Monarchical inclination being taken off, they would have no more Kings, but constituted Thirty, they call'd Dukes, to Govern under them. Which Counse was the cause the *Lombards* extended not their Conquests over all *Italy*, nor dilated their Dominion beyond *Benevento*, *Rome*, *Ravenna*, *Cremona*, *Mantua*, *Padua*, *Monfelicce*, *Parma*, *Bolonia*, *Faenza*, *Furl*, *Cesana*; some of them defended themselves for some time, other never fell at all under their subjection. For having no King, they were first render'd unapt for the Wars; and when afterwards they reassum'd their Old Government, and created Kings again, the small relish and taste the people had had of Liberty, render'd them less obedient to their Prince, and more contentious among themselves, and not only put a stop to the Carriere of their Victories at first; but was the occasion afterwards, that they were driven out of *Italy*. Things being in this posture with the *Lombards*; The *Romans*, and *Longinus* came to terms with them, and it was agreed, that Arms should be laid down on all hands, and each enjoy what was in their proper possession.

The Authority of the Bishops of *Rome* began to increase.

About this time the Bishops of *Rome* began to take upon them, and to exercise greater Authority than they had formerly done. At first the Successors of Saint *Peter* were venerable and eminent for their Miracles, and the holiness of their Lives; and their Examples added daily such numbers to the Christian Church, that to obviate or remove the Confusions which were then in the World, many Princes turned Christians, and the Emperour of *Rome* being converted among the rest, and quitting *Rome*, to hold his Residence at *Constantinople*; the Roman Empire (as we have said before) began to decline, but the Church of *Rome* augmented as fast. Nevertheless, untill the coming in of the *Lombards*, all *Italy* being under the dominion either of Emperours or Kings, the Bishops assumed no more power than what was due to their Doctrine, and Manners; in Civil Affairs, they were  
subject

subject to the Civil Power, employ'd many times by the Emperours and Kings, as their Ministers; and many times executed for their ill Administration. But *Theodorick* King of the *Goths*, fixing his Seat at *Ravenna*, was that which advanc'd their interest; and made them more considerable in *Italy*; for there being no other Prince left in *Rome*, the *Romans* were forc'd for Protection to pay greater Allegiance to the Pope. And yet their Authority advanc'd no farther at that time, than to obtain the Preference before the Church of *Ravenna*. But the *Lombards* having invaded, and reduc'd *Italy* into several Cantons; the Pope took the opportunity, and began to hold up his head: For being as it were Governour and Principal at *Rome*, the Emperour of *Constantinople* and the *Lombards* bare him a respect, so that the *Romans* (by mediation of their Pope) began to treat and confederate with *Longinus* and the *Lombards*, not as Subjects, but as Equals and Companions; which said Custom continuing, and the Popes entring into Alliance sometimes with the *Lombards*, and sometimes with the *Greeks*, contracted great reputation to their dignity: But the destruction of the Eastern Empire following so close under the Reign of the Emperour *Heracleus*, in whose time the *Sclavoni* (a people we mention'd before) fell again upon *Illyria* and over-ran it, and call'd it *Sclavonia*, from their own Name. The other parts of that Empire being infested first by the *Persians*, afterwards by the *Saracens*, out of *Arabia*, under the Conduct of *Mahomet*, and last of all, by the *Turks*; and having lost several Provinces which were members of it, as *Syria*, *Africa*, and *Egypt*: The Pope lost the convenience of the Emperours protection in time of Adversity, and the power of the *Lombards* increasing too fast on the other side, he thought it but necessary to address himself to the King of *France* for assistance; so that the Wars which hapned afterwards in *Italy*, were occasioned by the Popes, and the several inundations of *Barbarians*, invited by them; which manner of proceeding having continued to our times, has held, and does still hold *Italy* divided and infirm. But in my description of Occurrences betwixt those times and our own, I shall not enlarge upon the ruine of the Empire, which in truth receiv'd but little assistance from the Popes, or any other Princes of *Italy*, till the dayes of *Charles* the 8th. but discourse rather how the Popes with their Censures, Comminations and Arms, mingled together with their Indulgences, became formidable and revered, and how having made ill use both of the one and the other, they have lost the one entirely, and remain at the discretion of other people for the other. But to return to our Order. I say that *Gregory* the Third being created Pope, and *Aistolfus* King of the *Lombards*; *Aistolfus* contrary to League and Agreement, seiz'd upon *Ravenna*, and made War upon the Pope: *Gregory* not daring (for the reasons abovesaid,) to depend upon the weakness of the Empire, or the fidelity of the *Lombards* (whom he had already found false) appli'd himself to *Pepin* the Second, who from Lord of *Austracia* and *Brabantia*, was become King of *France*, not so much by his own Virtue, as by the Chivalry of his Unkle *Pepin*, and *Charles Martel* his Father: For *Charles Martel* being Governour of that Kingdom, gave that memorable defeat to the *Saracens* near *Tours* upon the River *Tourne*, in which above 200000. of them were slain; upon the reputation of which Victory under the discipline of his Father, and his own deportment in it besides, *Pepin* was afterwards made King of that Kingdom; to whom, when Pope *Gregory* appli'd himself for Relief against the *Lombards*, *Pepin* return'd Answer, that he would be ready to assist him, but he desir'd first to have the honour to see him, and pay his personal respects. Upon which Invitation Pope *Gregory* went into *France*, passing thorow the *Lombards* Quarters without any interruption, so great Reverence they bare to Religion in those days. Being arriv'd, and honourably receiv'd in *France*, he was after some time dismiss'd with an Army into *Italy*; which having besieg'd *Pavia*, and reduc'd the *Lombards* to distress, *Aistolfus* was constrain'd to certain terms of Agreement with the *French*, which were obtain'd by the intercession of the Pope, who desir'd not the death of his Enemy, but that he might rather be converted and live. Among the rest of the Articles of that Treaty, it was agreed, That *Aistolfus* should restore all the Lands he had usurped from the Church. But when the *French* Army was return'd into *France*, *Aistolfus* forgot his Engagement, which put the Pope upon a second Application to King *Pepin*, who re-suppli'd him again, sent a new Army into *Italy*, overcame the *Lombards*; and possessed himself of *Ravenna*, and (contrary to the desire of the Grecian Emperour) gave it to the Pope, with all the Lands under that *Exarchat*, and the Countrey of *Urbino*, and *la Marca* into the bargain. In the interim *Aistolfus* died, and *Desiderio* a *Lombard*, and Duke of *Tuscany*, taking up Arms to succeed him, begg'd Assistance of the Pope, with Promise of perpetual Amity for the future; which the Pope granted, as far as the other Princes would consent. At first *Desiderio* was very punctual, and observed his Articles to a hair, delivering up the Towns as he took them to the Pope, according to his Engagement: King *Pepin*, nor was there any *Exarchus* sent afterwards from *Constantinople* to *Ravenna*,

Bishops of Rome employ'd as Ministers by the Emperours and Kings, and sometimes executed by them.

The Eastern Empire destroy'd in the time of *Heracleus* the Emperour.

*Ravenna*, but all was Arbitrary, and manag'd according to the pleasure of the Pope; Not long after, *Pepin* died, and *Charles* his Son succeeded in the Government, who was call'd the Great, from the greatness of his Exploits. About the same time *Theodore* the First was advanc'd to the Papacy, and falling out with *Desiderio*, was besieg'd by him in *Rome*. In his exigence the Pope had recourse to the King of *France* (as his Predecessor had done before him) and *Charles* not only suppli'd him with an Army, but marching over the *Alps* at the Head of it himself, he besieg'd *Desiderio* in *Pavia*, took him and his Son in it, sent them both Prisoners into *France*, and went in person to *Rome*, to visit the Pope, where he adjudg'd and determin'd, That his Holiness being God's Vicar, could not be subject to the Judgment of Man. For which the Pope and people together, declar'd him Emperour, and *Rome* began again to have an Emperour of the West; and whereas formerly the Popes were confirm'd by the Emperours, the Emperour now in his Election was to be behold- ing to the Pope; by which means, the power and dignity of the Empire declin'd, and the Church began to advance, and by these steps to usurp upon the Authority of Temporal Princes. The *Lombards* had been in *Italy* 222 years, so long as to retain nothing of their original Barbarity but their name. *Charles* being desirous to reform *Italy*, in the time of *Leo* III, was contented they should inhabit and denominate the parts where they were born, which since then, have been call'd *Lombardy*; and because the name of *Rome* was venerable among them; he appointed that part of *Italy* which was adjacent, and under the *Exarchat* of *Ravenna*, should be call'd *Romagnia*. Moreover, he created his Son *Pepin* King of *Italy*, extending his Jurisdiction as far as *Benevento*; all the rest was continued under the dominion of the Grecian Emperour, with whom *Charles* had made an Alliance. During these Transactions, *Pascal* the First was elected Pope, and the Parish Priests in *Rome*, by reason of their propinquity and readines at every Election, to adorn their power with a more illustrious Title, began to be call'd Cardinals; arrogating so much to themselves, (especially after they had excluded the Voices of the people) that seldom any Pope was created but by them, out of their own number. *Pascal* being dead, he was succeeded by *Eugenius* the Second, of the Order of *Santa Sabina*. *Italy* being in this manner under the Authority of the *French*, changed its Form and Oeconomy in some measure; for the Pope having incroach'd upon the Temporal Authority, created *Counts* and *Marquesses*, as *Longinus* *Exarchat* of *Ravenna*, had made *Dukes* before. After some few, *Ospurcus* a Roman succeeded to the Papacy, who not satisfied with the uncomeliness of his Name, call'd himself *Sergius*, and gave the first occasion for the changing their Names, which has since been frequently practis'd at their several Elections. About this time *Charles* the Emperour died, and his Son *Lodovic* succeeded, yet not so quietly, but that there arose so many and so great differences betwixt his Sons, that in the days of his Grand-Children, the Empire was wrested from his Family, restor'd to the *Almans*, and the next German Emperour was call'd *Ainolfus*. Nor did *Charles* his Posterity by their dissentions lose only the Empire, but their Sovereignty in *Italy* likewise; for the *Lombards* resuming Courage, fell foul upon the Pope and his *Romans*; who not knowing to whose protection to betake himself, was constrain'd to make *Berengarius* (Duke of *Friuli*) King of *Italy*. Encouraged by these Accidents, the *Hunni* (who at that time were planted in *Pannonia*) took heart, and invaded *Italy*, but coming to a Battel with *Berengarius*, they were overthrow'n, and forc'd back again into *Pannonia*, or rather into *Hungaria*, it being at that time call'd by their Name. At that time *Romano* was Emperour of *Greece*, who being General of his Army had usurp'd upon *Constantine*, and forc'd the Government out of his hand; and because during these innovations, *Puglia* and *Calabria* (which as I said before, had subjected themselves to that Empire) were then in Rebellion; inrag'd at their insolence, he permitted the *Saracens* to possess those Countreys, if they could gain them; who invading them thereupon, immediately subdu'd them, and attempted upon *Rome*. But the *Romans*, (*Berengarius* being employ'd against the *Hunni*) made *Alberigo*, Duke of *Tuscany*, their General; by whose Valour their City was preserv'd, and the *Saracens* raising their Siege retir'd, built a Castle upon the Mountain *Gargano*, and from thence Lorded it over *Puglia* and *Calabria*, and infested all that part of *Italy* besides. Thus it was that *Italy* in those times was marvellously afflicted towards the *Alps* by the *Hunni*, towards *Naples* by the *Saracens*; and it continued in that Agony several years, under three *Berengarii* successively; during which time the Pope and the Church were under no less perturbation; having no refuge to fly to, by reason of the dissention among the Western Princes, and the impotence of the Eastern. The City of *Genoa*, and all its Territory upon the Rivers, were over-run by the *Saracens*; which, by the resort of multitudes (driven thither out of their own Countrey) was the foundation of the Grandeur of *Pisa*. These Accidents, happen'd in the year DCCCCXXXI. But *Ottone* Son of *Enricus* and *Matilda*, and Duke of *Saxony*, coming

The King of France exempts the Pope from all humane Jurisdiction.

*Pascal* created Pope. The Original of Cardinals.

*Eugenius* the II. Pope.

*Ospurcus* made Pope, changes his Name.

The Original of *Pisa*. The Government of *Italy*, Anno 931.

to the Empire, and being a man of great reputation for his Conduct and Prudence; *Agabito* the Pope addressed himself to him, imploring his Assistance in *Italy* against the Tyranny of the *Berengarii*. The States of *Italy* in those days were Govern'd in this manner. *Lombardy* was under the Jurisdiction of *Berengarius* the Third, and *Albertus* his Son. *Tuscany* and *Romania* under the Dominion of a Governour deputed by the Emperour of the West. *Puglia* and *Calabria* were part under the *Greek* Empire, and part under the *Saracens*. In *Rome*, two Consuls were created out of the Nobility every year, according to ancient Custome, to which a Prefect was added to administer Justice to the people. They had moreover a Counsel of Twelve, who provided Governours annually for all Towns under their Jurisdiction. The Pope had more or less power in *Rome*, and in all *Italy*, according as his favour was more or less with the Emperour, or other persons which were more potent than he. *Ottone*, to gratifie his request, came into *Italy* with an Army; fought with the *Berengarii*, drove them out of their Kingdom (which they had enjoy'd 55 years) and restor'd the Pope to his former dignity. *Ottone* had a Son, and a Grand-Child of his own Name, both which, one after the other, succeeded in the Empire, and in the time of *Ottone* the Third, Pope *Gregory* the Fifth was expelled by the *Romans*. *Ottone* undertook a new Expedition into *Italy* in his behalf, and having once again re-establish'd him in his Chair, the Pope to be reveng'd of the *Romans*, took from them the power of Creating the Emperours, and conferr'd it upon six German Princes; Three Bishops, *Munster*, *Treves* and *Colen*, and Three temporal Princes, the Duke of *Brandenburg*, the Prince *Palatine* of the *Rhine*, and the Duke of *Saxony*; and this happen'd in the year 1002. After the death of *Ottone* the Thurd, *Enrico* Duke of *Bavaria* was created Emperour by the said Electors, and was Crown'd twelve years after by *Stephanus* the Eighth. *Emicus* and *Simionda* his Wife, were eminent for their Piety, having as a Testimony of it, built and endow'd several Churches, and among the rest that of *S. Miniato*, near the City of *Florence*. In the year 1024, *Enrico* died, was succeeded by *Corrado* of *Suevia*, and he by *Enrico* II, who coming to *Rome*, and finding a Schism in the Church, and three Popes in being at the same time, he degraded them all, and causing *Clement* II. to be elected, was Crown'd Emperour by him. *Italy* was then govern'd partly by the People, partly by Princes, and partly by the Emperours Ministers, the chiefest of which (to whom the rest did in all matters of importance refer) had the Title of Chancellor. Among the Princes, the most powerful was *Gottifredus*, Husband to the Countess *Matilda*, who was Sister to *Emicus* II. She and her Husband had the possession of *Lucca*, *Parma*, *Reggio*, and *Mantua*, with all that Countrey which is now call'd the Patrimony of the Church. The Popes at that time had no small trouble upon their hands, by reason of the ambition of the people of *Rome*; who having at first made use of the Papal Authority to free themselves of the Emperours, as soon as the Popes had taken upon them the Regiment of the City, and reform'd things as they thought good themselves; of a sudden they became their Enemies; and they receiv'd more injury from the people, than from any other Christian Prince whatsoever, Rebelling and mutining at the same time the Popes by their Censures, made the whole West to tremble; nor was the design of either of them less than to subvert the Authority and Reputation of the one and the other. *Nicolas* II. arriving at the Popedom, as *Gregory* V. had taken from the *Romans* the privilege of creating the Emperour; so he depriv'd them of their concurrence to the Election of the Pope, restraining it wholly to the suffrage of the Cardinals; nor contented with this, by agreement with the Princes which Govern'd at that time in *Puglia* and *Calabria*, (for reasons which shall be mentioned hereafter) he forc'd all the Officers sent thither by the people, to assert their Jurisdiction, to pay Allegiance to the Pope, and some of them he displaced. After *Nicholam* was dead, there happen'd a great Schism in the Church: The Clergy of *Lombardy* would not yeild obedience to *Alexander* II. who was chosen at *Rome*, but created *Cadalo* of *Parma*, Anti-Pope. *Enrico* detesting the extravagant dominion of the Popes, sent to *Alexander* to resign, and to the Cardinals, that they should repair into *Germany*, in order to a new Election; so that he was the first Prince which was made sensible of the effects of their Spiritual Fulminations; for the Pope calling together a new Council at *Rome*, depriv'd him both of his Empire, and Kingdom. Some of the *Italians* following the Popes, and some of them the Emperours party, was the foundation of that famous Faction betwixt the *Guelfs* and *Ghibilins*, in so much that for want of forreign inundations by the *Barbarians*, they turn'd their Arms upon themselves, and tore but their own Bowels. *Enrico* being Excommunicated, was forc'd by his own Subjects to come into *Italy*, where bare-footed, and upon his knees he begg'd his Pardon of the Pope, in the year MLXXX. Notwithstanding all this, not long after, there happen'd a new quarrel betwixt *Enrico* and the Pope; whereupon, provok'd by a new Excommunication, he sent his Son *Enrico* with an Army, who by the Assistance of

*Agabito* Pope.

*Gregory* the 5. Pope, expell'd and restor'd; deverts the *Romans* of their power of creating Emperours and confers it upon six Princes of *Germany*.

*Clement* 2d. Pope

*Nicolas* 2d Pope, excludes the *Romans*, & reduces the Papal Elections to the suffrage of Cardinals only.

Schism, and Anti-Popes in the Church.

The difference betwixt *Henricus* and the Pope, the ground of the *Guelfs*, and *Ghibilin* Factions.

the Romans (whose hatred the Pope had contracted) besieg'd him in his Castle; but *Roberto Guiscardo* coming from *Puglia* to his relief, *Enrico* had not the courage to attend him, but rais'd his Siege and retir'd into *Germany*. However the Romans continued obstinate, and *Robert* was forc'd to sack the Town, and reduce it to its ancient Ruines, from whence by several Popes it had been lately restor'd. And because from this *Roberto*, the Model of Government in the Kingdom of *Naples* did proceed, it will not (in my judgment) be superfluous to give a particular Narrative, both of his Countrey and Exploits. Upon the differences betwixt *Charlemain's* Heirs (as is said before) a new Northern people call'd *Normans* took occasion to invade *France*, and possess'd themselves of that part of it which is now call'd *Normandy*. Of this people, part went into *Italy*, in the time when it was infested by the *Berengari*, the *Saracens*, and *Hunns*; settling in *Romania*, and performing very valiantly in all those Wars. Of *Tancred*, one of the Princes of those *Normans*, were born several Sons, among which, *William* call'd *Ferabar*, and *Roberto* call'd *Guiscardo*, were two. *William* arriv'd to be Prince, and the Tumults in *Italy* were in some measure compos'd. But the *Saracens* having *Sicily* intire, and daily invasions made upon *Italy*, *William* entred into Confederacy with the Princes of *Capua*, and *Salerno* and with *Milorcus* a Grecian (who by the Emperour of *Greece* was deputed Governour of *Puglia*, and *Calabria*) to invade *Sicily*, and in case of Victory, it was agreed among them, that both Prey and Countrey should be equally divided. The Enterprize was prosperous; they beat the *Saracens*, drove them out of the Countrey, and possess'd it when they had done. But *Milorcus* causing more Forces to be transported privately out of *Greece*, seiz'd the Island for the Emperour, and divided only the Spoil. *William* was not a little disgusted, but reserving his indignation for a more Convenient time, he departed out of *Sicily* with the Princes of *Capua* and *Salerno*; who having taken their leaves of him to return to their Homes, in stead of marching to *Romania*, as he pretended to them, he fac'd about with his Army towards *Puglia*, surpriz'd *Melfi*, and behav'd himself so well against the Forces of the Emperour, that he made himself Master of most part of *Puglia* and *Calabria*, which Provinces at the time of *Nicolas II.* were Govern'd by his Brother *Roberto*; and because he had afterward great Contention with his Nephews about the inheritance of those States, he made use of the Pope's mediation, who readily comply'd, being desirous to oblige *Roberto*, that he might defend him against the German Emperour, and the people of *Rome*; and it afterwards happen'd (as we have said before) that at the instance of *Gregory VII.* he forc'd *Enrico* from *Rome*, and suppress'd the Sedition of the Inhabitants. *Robert* was succeeded by two of his Sons, *Roger* and *William*; to their Inheritance they annexed the City of *Naples*, and all the Countrey betwixt it and *Rome*; besides that, they subdu'd *Sicily*, of which *Roger* was made Lord. But *William* going afterwards to *Constantinople*, to marry that Emperour's Daughter, *Roger* took advantage of his absence, seiz'd upon his Countrey, and elated by so great an acquit, caus'd himself first to be call'd King of *Italy*; but afterwards contenting himself with the Title of King of *Puglia* and *Sicily*, he was the first that gave Name and Laws to that Kingdom, which to this day it retains, though many times since, not only the Royal Blood, but the Nation has been changed; for upon failure of the *Norman* Race, that Kingdom devolv'd to the *Germans*; from them, to the *French*; from the *French*, to the *Spaniards*; and from the *Spaniards*, to the *Flemens*, with whom it remains at this present. *Urban II.* though very odious in *Rome*, was gotten to be Pope; but by reason of the dissensions there, not thinking himself secure in *Italy*, he remov'd with his whole Clergy into *France*. Having assembled many people together at *Anvers*, he undertook a Generous Enterprize, and by a learned Oration against the Infidels, kindled such a fire in their minds, they resolv'd upon an Expedition into *Asia* against the *Saracens*, which Expedition (as all other of the same nature) was call'd afterwards *Crociate*, because all that went along in it carry'd a red Cross upon their Arms, and their Cloths. The Chief Commanders in this Enterprize were *Gottofredus Eustachio*, *Alduino di Buglione* Earl of *Bologna*, and *Peter* the Hermit, a man of singular veneration both for his prudence and piety. Many Princes and Nations assisted with their Purfes, and many private men serv'd as Volunteers at their own Charges. So great an influence had Religion in those days upon the Spirits of Men, encourag'd by the Example of their several Commanders. At first the Enterprize was very successfull, all *Asia minor*, *Syria*, and part of *Egypt* fell under the power of the Christians; during which War, the Order of the Knights of *Jerusalem* was instituted, and continued a long time in *Rhodes*, as a Bulwark against the *Turks*. Not long after the Order of the Knights Templers was founded, but it lasted not long, by reason of the dissoluteness of their Manners. At sundry times after these things, upon sundry occasions, many accidents fell out, in which several Nations, and particular men signaliz'd themselves. There were engag'd in this Expedition; the Kings of *England* and *France*, the States of *Pisa*

The Original  
of the King-  
dom of *Sicily*.

*Urban* 2d.  
Pope.

The first  
Crosiade.



*Pisa, Venice, and Genoa*, all behaving themselves with great bravery, and fighting with variety of Fortune, till the time of *Saladine the Saracen*; but his Courage and Virtue improv'd by intestine differences among the Christians, robb'd them of the glory they had gain'd at the first, and chased them out of a Countrey, where for Ninety years they had been so honourably, and so happily plac'd. After the death of Pope *Urban*; *Pascal II.* was chosen to succeed him, and *Emrico IV.* made Emperour, who coming to *Rome*, and pretending great friendship to the Pope, took his advantage, clapt both him and his Clergy in Prison, and never discharg'd them till they had impowr'd him to dispose of the Churches in *Germany* as he pleas'd himself. About this time *Matilda* the Countess died, and gave her Patrimony to the Church. After the deaths of *Pascal* and *Emric*, many Popes and many Emperours succeeded, till the Papacy fell to *Alexander III.* and the Empire to *Frederick Barbarossa a Swede*. The Popes of those days had many Controversies with the people of *Rome*, and the Emperours, which till the time of *Barbarossa*, rather increas'd than otherwise. *Frederick* was an excellent Soldier, but so haughty and high, he could not brook to give place to the Pope. Notwithstanding he came to *Rome* to be Crown'd, and return'd peaceably into *Germany*. But that humour lasted but little, for he return'd shortly into *Italy*, to reduce some Towns in *Lombardy*, which denied him obedience. In this juncture, Cardinal *de S. Clemente* (a Roman born) dividing from Pope *Alexander*, was made Pope himself by a Faction in the Conclave. *Frederick* the Emperour being then incamp'd before *Crema*, *Alexander* complain'd to him of the Anti-Pope: *Frederick* reply'd, That they should both of them appear personally before him, and that then, hearing faithfully what each of them could say, he should be better able to determine which was in the right. *Alexander* was not at all satisfied with the Answer, but perceiving the Emperour inclining to the Adversary, he Excommunicated him, and ran away to King *Philip of France*. For all that, *Frederick* prosecuted his Wars in *Lombardy*, took and dismantled *Milan*. Which put the Cities of *Verona, Padua, and Venice*, upon a Confederacy for their Common defence. In the mean time the Anti-Pope died, and *Frederick* presum'd to Create *Guido of Cremona* in his place. The *Romans* taking advantage of the Pope's absence, and the Emperour's diversion in *Lombardy*, had re-assum'd something of their former Authority, and began to require Obedience in the neighbouring places which had been anciently their Subjects. And because the *Tuscans* refus'd to submit, they march'd confusedly against them, but they being re-inforced by *Frederick*, gave the *Roman* Army such a blow, that since that time *Rome* could never recover its old Condition either for Populoufness or Wealth. Upon these Events, Pope *Alexander* was return'd to *Rome*, presuming he might be safe there, by reason of the Animosity the *Romans* retain'd against the Emperour; and the Employment his Enemies gave him in *Lombardy*. But *Frederick* postponing all other respects, march'd with his Army to besiege *Rome*. *Alexander* thought it not convenient to attend him, but withdrew into *Puglia* to *William*, who upon the death of *Roger* (being next Heir) was made King. *Frederick* being much molested, and weaken'd by a Contagion in his Army, rais'd his Siege, and went back into *Germany*. The *Lombards* which were in League against him, to restrain their Excursions, and streighten the Towns of *Pavia* and *Tortona*; caus'd a City to be built (which they intended for the Seat of the War) and call'd it *Alexandria*, in honour to Pope *Alexander*, and defiance to the Emperour. *Guido* the new Anti-Pope died likewise, and *John* (of *Fermo*) was chosen in his room, who by the favour of the Imperial party, was permitted to keep his Residence in *Monte Frascone*, whilst *Alexander* was gone into *Tuscany*; invited by that people, that by his Authority they might be the better defended against the *Romans*. Being there, Embassadors came to him from *Henry King of England*, to clear their Masters innocence in the death of *Thomas Becker*, Arch-Bishop of *Canterbury*, with which he was publickly, and most infamously aspersed. To inquire into the truth, the Pope sent two Cardinals into *England*, who (notwithstanding, they found not his Majesty in any manifest guilt) yet for the scandal of the Fact; and that he had not honour'd the said Arch-Bishop with the respect he deserved, they prescribed as a Penance; That he should call all the Barons of his Kingdom together, swear his Innocence before them, send 200 Soldiers to *Jerusalem*, to be paid by him for a twelve-month, and himself follow in person with as great a Power as he could raise, before three years were expir'd; that he should disanul all things pass'd in his Kingdom in prejudice to the Ecclesiastick liberty, and consent, that any of his Subjects whatever, should appeal to *Rome*, when, and as often, as they thought it convenient: all which Conditions were readily accepted, and that great Prince submitted to a Sentence there is scarce a private person but would scorn at this day. But though his Holiness was so formidable to the Princes abroad, he was not so terrible in *Rome*; the people in that City would not be coaks'd, nor persuaded to let him live there, though he protested he would meddle no

Pascal 2d.

Alexander  
3dA new Anti-  
Pope.The Pope's  
penance to  
King Henry of  
England, upon  
the complaints  
about Thomas  
Becker.

farther than Ecclesiastical matters; by which it appears, things at a distance are more dreadful, than near at hand. In the mean time *Frederick* was return'd into *Italy*, with resolution to make a new War upon the *Pope*; but whilst he was busie about his preparations, his Barons and Clergy gave him advertisment, that they would all forsake him, unless he reconcil'd himself to the Church; so that changing his design, he was forc'd to go and make his submission at *Venice*; and pacification being made, the *Pope* in the Agreement vested the Emperour of all the Authority he pretended over *Rome*, and named *William* King of *Switzerland* and *Puglia*, his Confederate. *Frederick* being an active Prince, and unable to lie still, embark'd himself in the Enterprize into *Asia*, to spend his Ambition against the *Turks*, which he could not do so effectually against the *Pope*. But being got as far as the River *Ciduo*, allur'd by the clearness and excellence of the Waters, he would needs wash himself in it, and that washing gave him his death. Those Waters being more beneficial to the *Turks*, than all Excommunications to the Christians; for whereas these only cool'd and asswag'd his Ambition, they wash'd it away, and extinguish'd it quite.

*Frederick* being dead, nothing remain'd now to be suppress'd, but the contumacy of the *Romans*. After much argument and dispute about their Creation of Consuls, it was concluded, the *Romans*, according to ancient Custom, should have liberty to choose them; but they should not execute their Office, till they had sworn fealty to the Church. Upon this accord *John* the Anti-Pope fled to *Monte Albano*, and died presently after. In the mean time, *William* King of *Naples* died also; and having left no Sons but *Tanacred* a Bastard, the *Pope* design'd to have possess'd himself of his Kingdom, but by the opposition of the Barons, *Tanacred* was made King. Afterwards *Celestin III.* coming to the *Papacy*, and being desirous to wrest that Kingdom from *Tanacred*, he contriv'd to make *Enrica* (*Frederick's* Son) King, promising him the Kingdom of *Naples*, upon Condition he would restore such Lands as belong'd to the Church, and to facilitate the business, he took *Costanza* (an ancient Maid, daughter to King *William*) out of a Monastery, and gave her him for his Wife; by which means the Kingdom of *Naples* pass'd from the *Normans* (who had found it) and fell under the dominion of the *Germans*. *Henricus* the Emperour having first settled his affairs in *Germany*, came into *Italy* with his Wife *Costanza*, and one of his Sons call'd *Frederick*, about four years of age, and without much difficulty possess'd himself of that Kingdom, *Tanacred* being dead, and only one Child remaining of his Issue, call'd *Roger*. Not long after *Enricus* died in *Sicily*, he was succeeded in that Kingdom by *Frederick*; and *Otto* Duke of *Saxony*, chosen Emperour by the assistance of *Pope Innocent III.* But no sooner had he got the Crown upon his Head, but contrary to the opinion of all men, he became Enemy to the *Pope*; seiz'd upon *Romania*, and gave out Orders for the assaulting that Kingdom; Upon which being Excommunicated by the *Pope*, and deserted by his Friends, *Frederick* King of *Naples* was chosen Emperour in his place. The said *Frederick* coming to *Rome* to be Crown'd, the *Pope* scrupl'd it, being jealous of his power, and endeavoured to persuade him out of *Italy*, as he had done *Otto* before; which *Frederick* disdainingly, retir'd into *Germany*, and making War upon *Otto*, overcame him at last. In the mean time *Innocent* died, who besides other magnificent Works, built the Hospital *di Santo Spirito* at *Rome*. *Honorius III.* succeeded him, in whose *Papacy* were instituted the Orders of *S. Dominick* and *S. Francis*, in the year *MCCXVIII.* *Honorius* Crown'd *Frederick* to whom *John*, descended from *Baldwin* King of *Jerusalem* (who commanded the remainder of the Christians in *Asia*, and retain'd that Title) gave one of his Daughters in marriage, and the Title of that Kingdom in Dower with her; and from that time, whoever is King of *Naples*, has that Title annex'd. In *Italy* at that time they liv'd in this manner: The *Romans* had no more the Creation of Consuls, but in lieu of it they invested sometimes one, sometimes more of their Senators with the same power. The League continued all the while; into which the Cities of *Lombardy* had entred against *Frederick Barbarossa*; and the Cities were these; *Milan*, *Brescia*, *Mantua*, with the greater part of the Cities in *Romagna*, besides *Verona*, *Vicenza*, *Padua*, and *Trevigi*. The Cities on the Emperours side were *Cremona*, *Bergamo*, *Parma*, *Reggio*, *Modena*, and *Trenta*: The rest of the Cities of *Lombardy*, *Romagna*, and the Marquisate of *Trevizan*, took part according to their interest, sometimes with this, sometimes with the other party. In the time of *Otto III.* one *Exelmo* came into *Italy*, of whose Loyns there remaining a Son, call'd also *Exelmo*, being powerful and rich, he joyn'd himself with *Frederick II.* who (as was said before) was become an Enemy to the *Pope*. By the encouragement and assistance of this *Exelmo*, *Frederick* came into *Italy*; took *Verona* and *Mantua*, demolish'd *Vicenza*, seiz'd upon *Padua*, defeated the united Forces of those parts, and when he had done, advanc'd towards *Toscany*, whilst in the mean time *Exelmo* made himself Master of the Marquisate of *Trevizan*. *Ferrara* they could

*Celestin 3d.*  
Pope.

*Honorius 3d.*  
Pope.

The Orders  
of *S. Dominick*,  
and *S. Francis*,  
instituted  
1218.

The Titles of  
King of *Naples*  
and *Jerusalem*  
annex'd.



could not take, being defended by *Azone da Este*, and some Regiments of the Popes in *Lombardy*. Whereupon when the Siege was drawn off, his Holiness gave that City in Fee to *Azone da Este*, from whom those who are Lords of it at this day are descended. *Frederick* stop'd, and fix'd himself at *Pisa*, being desirous to make himself Master of *Tuscany*, and by the distinctions he made betwixt his Friends and his Foes in that Province, rais'd such animosities, as proved afterwards the destruction of all *Italy*: For both *Guelfs* and *Giblins* increas'd every day, the first siding with the Church, the other with the Emperour, and were call'd first by those Names, in the City of *Pistoia*, *Frederick* being at length remov'd from *Pisa*, made great devastations, and several inroads into the Territories of the Church; in so much that the Pope having no other remedy, proclaim'd the *Croisada* against him, as his Predecessors had done against the *Saracens*. *Frederick* (lest he should be left in the lurch by his own people, as *Frederick Barbarossa*, and others of his Ancestors had been before,) entertain'd into his Pay great numbers of the *Saracens*, and to oblige them to him, and strengthen his opposition to the Pope, by a party that should not be afraid of his Curses; he gave them *Nocera* in that Kingdom, to the end that having a Retreat in their own hands, they might serve him with more confidence and security. At this time *Innocent IV.* was Pope, who being apprehensive of *Frederick*, remov'd to *Genoa*; and thence into *France*, where he call'd a Counsel at *Lyons*, and *Frederick* design'd to have been there, had he not been retain'd by the Rebellion of *Parma*. Having had ill Fortune in the suppressing of that, he march'd away into *Tuscany*, and from thence into *Sicily*, where he died not long after, leaving his Son *Currado* in *Suevia*, and in *Puglia*, his natural Son *Manfred*, whom he had made Duke of *Benevento*. *Currado* went to take possession of the Kingdom, died at *Naples*, and left only one little Son behind him in *Germany*, who was call'd *Currado*, by his own Name. By which means, *Manfred* first as Tutor to *Currado*, got into the Government, and afterwards giving out that his Pupil was dead, he made himself King, and forc'd the Pope and *Neapolitans* (who oppos'd it) to consent. Whilst Affairs in that Kingdom were in that posture, many Commotions happen'd in *Lombardy*, betwixt the *Guelfs* and the *Giblins*. The *Guelfs* were headed by a Legate from the Pope, the *Giblins* by *Ezelino*, who at that time had in his possession all that part of *Lombardy* on this side the *Poe*. And because while he was entertain'd in this War, the City of *Padova* rebell'd, he caus'd 12,000 of them to be slain, and not long after, before the War was ended, died himself in the thirtieth year of his age. Upon his death, all those Countreys which had been in his hands, became free. *Manfred* King of *Naples* continued his malevolence to the Church, as his Ancestors had done before him, holding Pope *Urban IV.* in perpetual anxiety, so that a length he was constrain'd to convoke the *Crociata* against him, and to retire into *Perugia*, till he could get his Forces together: but finding them come in slowly and thin, conceiving that to the overcoming of *Manfred*, greater supplies would be necessary, he address'd himself to the King of *France*, making his Brother *Charles* Duke of *Angio*, King of *Sicily* and *Naples*, and excited him to come into *Italy*, and take possession of those Kingdoms: Before *Charles* could get to *Rome*, the Pope died, and *Clement V.* succeeded in his place. In the said *Clements* time, *Charles* with 30 Gallies arriv'd at *Osira*, having Order'd the rest of his Forces to meet him by Land. During his residence at *Rome*, as a Complement to him, the *Romans* made him a Senator, and the Pope invest'd him in that Kingdom, with condition that he should pay 50 thousand Florins yearly to the Church; and publish'd a Decree, that for the future, neither *Charles*, nor any that should succeed him in that Kingdom, should be capable of being Emperours. After which *Charles* advancing against *Manfred*, fought with him, beat him, and kill'd him near *Benevento*, thereby making himself King of *Sicily*, and that Kingdom. *Currado* (to whom that State devolv'd by his Fathers Testament) gathering what Forces together he could in *Germany*, march'd into *Italy* against *Charles*, and ingaging him at *Tagliacozza*, was presently defeated, and (being afterwards discover'd in his flight) taken and slain. *Italy* continued quiet, till the Papacy of *Adrian V.* who not enduring that *Charles* should continue in *Rome*, and govern all (as he did) by virtue of his Senatorship, he remov'd to *Viterbo*, and solicited *Ridolfus* the Emperour to come into *Italy* against him. In this manner, the Popes sometimes for defence of Religion, sometimes out of their own private ambition, call'd in new Men, and by consequence new Wars into *Italy*. And no sooner had they advanc'd any of them, but they repent of what they had done, and sought immediately to remove him, nor would they suffer any Province, (which by reason of their weakness they were unable themselves to subdue) to be enjoy'd quietly by any body else. The Princes were all afraid of them; for whether by fighting, or flying, they commonly overcame, unless circumvented by some Stratagem, as *Bouface VIII.* and some others were by the Emperours, under pretence of Friendship and Amity. *Ridolfus* being retain'd by his War with the King of *Bohemia*, was not

The House of the *Este* made Lords of *Ferrara*.

The *Guelfs* side with the Church, the *Giblins* with the Emperour.

*Innocent 4th* Pope

*Clement 5th* Pope.

*Adrian 5th* Pope

Nicholas 3d.  
of the House of  
Ursin.

at leisure to visit *Italy* before *Adrian* was dead. He which succeeded him was *Nicholas* the III. of the House of *Ursin*, a daring, ambitious man; who resolving to take down the Authority of *Charles*, contriv'd that *Ridolfus* the Emperour, should complain of *Charles*. his Governour in *Tuscany*, of his siding with the *Guelfs*, who after the death of *Manfred* had been receiv'd and protected in that Province. To comply with the Emperour, *Charles* call'd away his Governour, and the Pope sent his Cardinal Nephew to take possession of it for the Emperour; to recompense that Kindness, the Emperour restor'd *Romania* to the Church, which had been usurp'd by his Predecessors, and the Pope made *Bartoldo Orsino* Duke of *Romagnia*: growing more powerfull by degrees, and believing himself strong enough to look *Charles* in the face, he began to expostulate, turn'd him out of his Senatorship, and publish'd a Decree, that no person for the future of Royal Extraction should ever be Senator in *Rome*. Not contented with this, he carri'd his Designs farther, and was in the mind to have droven *Charles* out of *Sicily*; to which end, he held secret intelligence with the King of *Aragon*, who effected it afterwards in the time of his Successor. He design'd likewise to have made two Kings out of his Family, one of *Lombardy*, the other of *Tuscany*, by whose power and assistance the Church might be defended from the incursions of the *Germans* abroad, and the oppression of the *French* at home. But he dying before any thing could be done, was the first Pope that gave so manifest demonstration of Ambition, or that, under pretence of advancing the Church, design'd only to exalt and magnifie his own Family; and though from this time backward no mention is to be found of Nephew, or any other of his Holiness Kindred, yet forward all History is full of them; and as formerly the Popes have endeavour'd to leave them Princes, they would leave them Popes now adays if they could, and make the Papacy hereditary.

The first introduction of Popes Nephews.

Martin 10th.  
Pope.

But the Principalties they erected, have been hitherto short-liv'd; for the Popes seldom living long, the first gust of wind shakes them, for want of their Authority and Courage to sustain them. Thus Pope being dead, *Martin X.* succeeded, who being born a *French-man*, was a friend to the *French*; and *Charles* (in the Rebellion of *Romania*) sent an Army to his Assistance, who having besieg'd *Furli*, *Guido Bonatti* an Astrologer being in the Town, appointed the Garrison a certain time to fall upon them; and following his direction, they did it with such success, that the whole *French* Army was either taken or kill'd. About this time, the practices betwixt Pope *Nicholas* and *Peter* King of *Aragon*, were put in execution; the *Sicilians* by that means kill'd all the *French* they found in the Island; and *Peter* made himself Lord of it, upon pretence it belonged to *Constanza*, *Manfreds* Daughter, whom he had married; but *Charles* in his preparation for its recovery, died; left *Charles II.* his Son, at that time a Prisoner in *Sicily*, who for his enlargement, promis'd to surrender himself again, if in three years time he prevail'd not with the Pope to invest the House of *Aragon* with the Kingdom of *Sicily*. *Ridolfus* the Emperour, in stead of coming into *Italy* himself, to recover the reputation of the Empire, sent an Embassadour thither with full power to enfranchise such Cities as would buy out their Freedom: Upon which, many Cities redeem'd themselves, and chang'd their Laws, with their Liberty. *Adulfus* Duke of *Saxony*, succeeded in the Empire, and in the Popedom, *Piero del Murone*; by the Name of Pope *Celestine*; but having been a Hermit, and exceedingly devout, in six months time he renounced, and *Boniface VIII.* was chosen in his room. The Heavens (preseeing the time would come *Italy* should be deliver'd both from the *Germans* and *French*, and remain intirely in the hands of its Natives; that the Pope though freed from foreign impediments, might not be able to usurp, and establish himself in the Power which he exercised then) rais'd up two great Families in *Rome*, the *Colomni*, and the *Ursini*, that by their Authority and Allyance they might be able to circumscribe his Holiness, and keep him within his bounds. Pope *Boniface* was sensible of them, and apply'd himself very zealously to have extirpated the *Colomni*, excommunicating them first; and then proclaiming the *Crociata* against them; which, though it might be some prejudice to them, was more to the Church: For those Swords which had been drawn in vindication of the Gospel, and done honourable things; when for private ambition they were unsheath'd against Christians, they lost their first sharpness, and would not cut at all; and so it came to pass, their immoderate desire of satiating their Appetite, by degrees lessened the Pope power, and disarm'd them.

Pope Celestine resigns to Boniface 8th.

Two of that House which were Cardinals, he degraded; *Sciarra* (the chief of them) escaping in disguise, being discover'd, was taken by the *Spanish* Privateers, and clap'd to an Oar; but being known at *Marsellis*, he was rescu'd, and sent away to the King of *France*, who by *Boniface* was Excommunicated thereupon, and depri'd of his Kingdom. *Philip* King of *France*, considering very well that in all open Wars with the Popes, he had either run some eminent danger, or come home by the loss; began to look about for some Artifice;

and at length, pretending great readines to comply, and counterfeiting a Treaty, he sent *Sciarrà* privately into *Italy*, who being arriv'd at *Anagnia* (where at that time the Pope had his Residence) gathering his Friends together in the night, he seiz'd upon his Holiness, who (tho inlarg'd afterwards by the people of the Town) died shortly in a Delirium with meer sense and indignation. This *Boniface* was the first Pope which ordain'd Jubilees in the year M.C.C.C. and decreed they should be celebrated every hundred years. These times produce'd many troubles betwixt the *Guelfs* and the *Gibelin's*, and *Italy* being forsaken by the Emperours, many Towns recover'd their liberties, and many were usurp'd. Pope *Benedict* restor'd their Caps to the Cardinals of the House of *Colonna*, absolv'd King *Philip*, and gave him his Blessing. *Benedict* was succeeded by *Clement V.* who being a French-man remov'd his Court into *France*, Anno M.C.C.C.VI. During these Transactions *Charles II.* King of *Naples* died, and left the Succession to *Robert* his Son. The Empire was in the mean time fallen to *Arrigo* of *Luxemburg*, who came to *Rome* to be Crown'd, though the Pope was not there; upon whose arrival many commotions followed in *Lombardy*, and all banished persons, whether *Guelfs* or *Gibelin's*, being restor'd to their former Habitations, conspiring to supplant one another, they fill'd the whole Province with the Calamities of War, notwithstanding the Emperour employ'd his utmost power to prevent it. *Arrigo* removing out of *Lombardy* by the way of *Genova*, return'd to *Pisa*, with design to have driven King *Robert* out of *Tuscany*, but not succeeding in that, he march'd to *Rome*, but continued there a few dayes only, for the *Ursini* by the help of King *Robert* forc'd him to remove, and he march'd back again to *Pisa*, where, for his more secure Warring upon *Tuscany*, and supplanting that King, he caus'd it to be assaulted on the other side by *Frederick* King of *Sicily*. But in the height of his Designs, when he thought himself sure both of *Tuscany* and its King, he died, and the succession went to *Lodovick* of *Bavaria*. About this time *John XXII.* was created Pope, in whose Papacy, the Emperour ceased not to persecute the *Guelfs*, and the Church, but King *Robert* and the *Florentines* interposing in their defence, great Wars ensued in *Lombardy*, under the Conduct of the *Visconti* against the *Guelfs*, and against the *Florentines* in *Tuscany*, by *Castruccio di Lucca*. And because the Family of the *Visconti* were the Original of the Dukedom of *Milan*; one of the five Principalities that govern'd all *Italy* afterwards, I think it not amiss to deduce it a little higher. After the League among the Cities in *Lombardy* (which I have mentioned before) for their mutual defence against *Frederick Barbarossa*, *Milan* being rescued from the ruine that impended; to revenge it self of the injuries it had receiv'd, enter'd into that Confederacy, which put a stop to the Emperours career, and preserv'd the Churches interest in *Lombardy* for a while. In the proces of those Wars, the Family of the *Torri* grew very powerful, increasing daily more and more, while the Emperour's Authority was small in those parts. But *Frederick II.* arriving in *Italy*, and the *Ghibelin* Faction (by the assistance of *Exelino*) prevailing, it began to dilate and spread it self in all the Cities, and particularly in *Milan*; the Family of the *Visconti* siding with that party, drove the Family of the *Torri* out of that Town: But long they were not banish'd, for by an accord made betwixt the Emperour and Pope, they were restor'd. Afterwards when the Pope remov'd with his Court into *France*, and *Arrigo* of *Luxemburg* came to *Rome* to be Crown'd, he was receiv'd into *Milan* by *Maffeo Visconti*, the Head of that House, and *Guido della Torre*, the Chief of the other. Yet how kindly soever they carry'd it outwardly, *Maffeo* had a secret design, by the Emperour's being there, to drive out the *Torri*, believing the Enterprize the more practicable, because *Guido* was of the Enemies Faction. He took the advantage of the peoples complaints against the behaviour of the *Germans*, incouraging them slyly to take Arms, and rescue themselves from their barbarous servitude. Having dispos'd things as he desired, he caus'd a tumult to be rais'd by one of his Confidants, upon which the whole Town was to be in Arms, and pretendedly against the *Germans*. The Tumult was no sooner begun, but *Maffeo*, his Sons, Servants, and Partizans were immediately in Arms, and ran to *Arrigo*, assuring him that Tumult was rais'd by the *Torri*, who not content with their private Condition, took that occasion to ruine him as an Enemy to the *Guelfs*, and make themselves Princes of that City. But he desired him to be secure, for they and their party would not fail to defend him, when ever he requir'd it. *Arrigo* believed all to be true that *Maffeo* had told him, joyned his Forces with the *Visconti*, fell upon the *Torri* (who were disperfed up and down the City to suppress the Tumult) killed those of them which they met, banished the rest, and seized their Estates: So that *Maffeo Visconti* made himself Prince. After him, there succeeded *Galeazzo*, and *Aza*, and after them *Luchino* and *John*, who was afterwards Arch-Bishop of that City: *Luchino* died before him, and left two Sons, *Barnardo* and *Galeazzo*; *Galeazzo* dying not long after, left one Son, called *Giovann Galeazzo, Conti di Versu*, who after the death of the Arch-Bishop, killed his Uncle *Barnardo*, made himself Prince, and was the first that took upon him the Title of Duke of *Milan*. He

The first Jubilees ordain'd by Boniface every 100 years  
Benedict chosen, dies, and is succeeded by Clement 5th who remov'd his residence into France,  
1306.

John 22. Pope

The Visconti a great Family in Milan, made Princes of that City by the extirpation of the Torri.

The first Duke of Milan.  
left

The Duke-  
dom of Milan  
falls to the Sfor-  
za's.

left two Sons only, *Philip*, and *Giovan Maria Angelo*, who being slain by the people of *Milan*, the Government remain'd wholly to *Philip*. He dying without issue Male, the Dukedom was translated from the House of the *Visconti*, to the *Sforza's*; but of the manner and occasions of that, hereafter. To return therefore, where I left.

*Lewis* the Emperour, to give reputation to his party, and to be formally Crown'd, came into *Italy*, and being at *Milan*, to drain the City of its Money, he pretended to set them at Liberty, and clap'd the *Visconti* in Prison. Afterwards, by the Mediation of *Castruccio da Luca*, he releas'd them, march'd to *Rome*, and (that he might more easily disturb the tranquillity of *Italy*) he made *Piero della Carvvaro*, Anti-Pope: by whose reputation, and the interest of the *Visconti*, he presum'd he should be able to keep under both the *Tuscans*, and *Lombards*. But *Castruccio* died in the nick, and his death was the Emperours ruine, for *Pisa* and *Lucca* rebelled out of hand. The *Pisans* took the Anti-pope, and sent him Prisoner to the Pope into *France*, so that the Emperour despairing of his Affairs in *Italy*, he left them all as they were, and retired into *Germany*. He was scarce gone, before *John* King of *Bohemia* came into *Italy* with an Army (being invited by the *Ghiblins* in *Brescia*) and possess'd himself both of that City and *Bergamo*. The Pope (however he dissembled it) was not averse to his coming, and therefore his Legat at *Bologna* favoured him privately, looking upon him as a good Antidote against the Emperours return. These under-hand practises chang'd the Condition of *Italy*; for the *Florentines* and King *Robert*, perceiving the Legat a favourer of the *Ghiblin* Faction, turn'd Enemies to all people that profess'd themselves their Friends. In so much as without respect to either *Ghiblins* or *Guelfs*, many Princes associated with them; among the rest were the Families of the *Visconti* & *Scala*, *Philippo di Gonzaga* of the House of *Mantua*, the Families of *Carava* and *Esse*, whereupon the Pope Excommunicated them all. The King apprehensive of their League, return'd home to reinforce himself, and coming back with more Force into *Italy*, found his Enterprize very difficult notwithstanding; so that growing weary of the business (though much to the dissatisfaction of the Legat) he return'd into *Bohemia*, leaving Garrisons only in *Modena* and *Reggio*, recommending *Parma* to the Care of *Marfilio*, and *Piero de Rossi*, who were eminent men in that City. As soon as he was departed, *Bologna* enter'd into the Confederacy, and the Colleagues divided the four Towns that were remaining to the Church among themselves, *Parma* to the *Scali*, *Reggio* to the *Gonzagi*, *Modena* to the *Esse*, and *Lucca* to the *Florentines*. But many differences follow'd upon that division, which for the greatest part were compos'd afterwards by the *Venetians*. And now I speak of the *Venetians*, it may appear indecorous to some people, that among all the occurrences and revolutions in *Italy*, I have deferr'd speaking of them, notwithstanding their Government and Power places them above any other Republick or Principality in that Countrey.

The Original  
of the Veneti-  
ans.

That that Exception may be remov'd, and the occasion appear, it will be necessary to look back for some time, to make their Original conspicuous, and the reasons for which they reserv'd themselves so long from interposing in the Affairs of *Italy*. *Attila* King of the *Hunni* having besieg'd *Aquilegia*, the Inhabitants after a generous defence, being reduc'd to distress, and despairing of Relief, convey'd their Goods, as well as they could, to certain Rocks in that point of the *Adriatick Sea* which were not inhabited, they escap'd after them themselves. The *Padouans* seeing the fire so near them, concluding when *Aquilegia* was taken, his next visit would be to them, sent away their Goods, Wives, Children, and unserviceable people to a place in the same Sea, call'd *Rivo Alto*, leaving the young men, and such as were able to bear Arms, for the defence of the Town. The Inhabitants of *Montefelice*, and the Hills about it, fearing the same destiny, remov'd to the same Islands. *Aquilegia* being taken, and *Padoua*, *Montefelice*, *Vicenza*, and *Verona* overcome and sack'd by *Attila's* Army; those which remain'd of the *Padouans*, and the most considerable of the rest, settled their Habitations in certain Fens and Marshes about the afore-said *Rivo Alto*: and all the people about that Province, which was anciently call'd *Venetia*, being driven out of their Countrey by the same Calamities, joyn'd themselves with them; changing (by necessity) their pleasant and plentiful Habitations, for rude and barren places, void of all Commodity and Convenience. But their number being great, and their Quarter but small, in a short time they made it not only habitable, but delightful; framing such Laws and Orders to themselves, as secur'd them against miseries of their Neighbours, and in a short time made them considerable, both for reputation and force. So that besides their first inhabitants, many people resorting to them from the Cities of *Lombardy*, upon occasion of the Cruelty of *Clefi* King of the *Lombards*, they multiply'd so fast, that when *Pepin* King of *France* at the solicitation of the Pope, undertook to drive the *Lombards* out of *Italy*, in the Treaties betwixt him and the Emperour of *Greece*, it was agreed that the Duke of *Benevento* and the *Venetians*, should be subject neither to the one nor the other,

but

but enjoy their Liberty to themselves. Moreover, Necessity having determin'd their Habitations among the Waters, having no Land to supply them, it forc'd them to look about which way they might live, and applying to Navigation, they began to trade about the World, and not only furnish'd themselves with necessary Provisions, but by degrees brought thither such variety of Merchandize, that other people which had need of them came to them to be supply'd. At first, having no thoughts of Dominion, they were wholly intent upon what might facilitate their Trade, and in order thereunto, they acquir'd several Ports, both in *Greece* and *Syria*, and in their passage into *Asia* the *French* making use of their Ships, they gave them (by way of Recompence) the Island of *Candia*. While they lived at this rate, their Name was grown formidable at Sea, and so venerable at Land, that in most Controversies betwixt their Neighbours they were the only Arbitrators: as it happen'd in the difference betwixt the Confederates upon the division of the Towns, where the cause being referred to them, they awarded *Bergamo* and *Brescia* to the *Visconti*. But having afterwards in process of time conquer'd *Padoua*, *Vicenza*, *Trievigi*, and after them *Verona*, *Bergamo* and *Brescia*, besides several Towns in *Romagna* and else where, their power began to be so considerable, that not only the Princes of *Italy*, but the greatest and most remote Kings were afraid to provoke them. Whereupon, entering into a Conspiracy against them, the *Venetians* lost all in one day, that in so many Years, and with so vast Expence they had been gaining; and though in our times they may have recover'd it in part, yet not having regain'd their Reputation and Power, they live at the mercy of other people (as indeed all the Princes of *Italy* do.) *Benedict* XII. being Pope, looking upon *Italy* as lost, and fearing that *Lodovic* the Emperour should make himself Master of it, he resolv'd to enter into strict Amity with all those who held any Lands that belong'd formerly to the Empire, presuming their fear to be dispossess'd, would make them faithful in the defence of *Italy*, and zealous to keep him out: accordingly he publish'd a Decree to confirm all the usurp'd Titles in *Lombardy*, and to continue their Possession. But that Pope died before his Promise could be made good, and *Clement* VI. succeeded him. The Emperour observing with what liberality the Pope had dispos'd of the Lands belonging to the Empire, that he might not be behind him in so generous a point, he gave all Lands that had been usurp'd from the Church, to such persons as had usurp'd them, to hold them of the Empire, as the other of the Pope. By which Donation *Galeotto Malatesti* and his Brothers became Lords of *Rimini*, *Pejaro*, and *Fano*, *Antonio da Montefeltro* of *la Marca* and *Urbino*, *Gentil da Varano* of *Camerino*, *Giovanni Manfredi* of *Faenza*, *Guido di Polenta* of *Ravenna*, *Sinebaldo Ordelaffi* of *Furl* and *Cesena*, *Lodovico Aledosi* of *Imola*, besides many others in other places: so that of all the Lands which belong'd to the Church, there was scarce any left without an interloper; by which means, till the time of *Alexander* VI. the Church was very weak, but he recover'd its Authority in our days, with the destruction of most of their Posterity. At the time of this Concession, the Emperour was at *Taranto*, where he gave out, his Design was for *Italy*, which was the occasion of great Wars in *Lombardy*, in which the *Visconti* made themselves Lords of *Parma*. About this time, *Robert* King of *Naples* died, and left two Grand Children by his Son *Charles*, (who died not long before) leaving his eldest Daughter *Giovanna* Heir to the Crown, with injunction to marry *Andrea*, Son to the King of *Hungary*, who was his Nephew. But they liv'd not long together, before *Andrea* was poison'd by her, and she married again to *Lodovico* Prince of *Taranto*, her near Kin-man. But *Lewis* King of *Hungary*, Brother to *Andrea*, to revenge his death, came into *Italy* with an Army, and drove *Giovanna*, and her Husband out of the Kingdom. About these times there happen'd a very memorable passage in *Rome*; One *Nicholas di Lorenzo* Chanceller in the Capitol, having forc'd the Senate out of *Rome*, under the Title of *Tribune* made himself head of that Common-wealth, reducing it into its ancient form, with so much Justice and Virtue, that not only the neighbouring Provinces, but all *Italy* sent Embassadors to him. The ancient Provinces seeing that City so strangely reviv'd, began to lift up their Heads, and pay it a respect, some out of fear, and some out of hopes. But *Nicholas*, notwithstanding the greatness of his Reputation, not able to comport with so great an Authority, deserted it himself; for being overburthen'd with the weight of it, he left it in the very beginning, and without any constraint, stole privately away to the King of *Bohemia*, who, by the Popes Order, in affront to *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, was made Emperour, and to gratifie his Patron, he secur'd *Nicholas*, and Clapt him in prison. Not long after, as it had been in imitation of *Nicholas*, one *Francesco Baronegli* possess himself of the Tribuneship, and turn'd the Senators out of *Rome*: so that the Pope, as the readiest way to suppress him, was glad to discharge *Nicholas* of his imprisonment, and sent him to *Rome*, to resume his old Office; whereupon, *Nicholas* undertook the Government once more, and caus'd *Francesco* to be executed. But the *Colonnese* becoming his Enemies by degrees, he himself was put to death

*Candia* given  
to the *Veneti-  
ans* by the  
*French*.

*Benedict*  
12th Pope.

*Clement* 6th  
Pope.

by them, and the Senate restor'd to the Exercise of its former Authority. In the mean time the King of *Hungary*, having depos'd Queen *Giovanna*, return'd to his own Kingdom: But the *Pope* desir'd to have the Queen his Neighbour, rather than that King, and order'd things so, that the Kingdom was restor'd, upon Condition her Husband *Lewis* renouncing the Title of King should content himself with that of *Taranto*. The Year *MCCCL*. being come, his Holiness thought fit that the Jubilee appointed by *Pope Boniface VIII.* to be kept every hundred years, should be reduc'd to fifty, and, having pass'd a Decree to that purpose, in gratitude for so great a Benefit, the *Romans* were contented he should send four Cardinals to *Rome*, to reform their City, and create what Senators he pleas'd. After which the *Pope* declar'd *Lodovic* of *Taranto* King of *Naples* again, and *Giovanna*, highly oblig'd by that favour, gave the Church *Avignon*, which was part of her Patrimony. By this time *Luchino Visconti* being dead, *John Arch-Bishop* of *Milan* remain'd sole Lord, and, making several Wars upon *Tuscany* and his Neighbours, became very considerable. After his death, the Government fell to his two Nephews, *Bernardo* and *Galeazzo*, but *Galeazzo* dying a while after, he left his Son *John Galeazzo* to share with his Uncle in the State.

In these dayes, *Charles* King of *Bohemia* was created Emperour, and *Innocent VI.* *Pope*, who having sent Cardinal *Giles* (a *Spaniard*) into *Italy*, by his Virtue, and the excellence of his Conduct, he recover'd the reputation of the Church, not only in *Rome* and *Romagna*, but all *Italy* over. He recover'd *Bologna*, that had been usurp'd by the Arch-Bishop of *Milan*. He constrain'd the *Romans* to admit a forreign Senator every year of the *Popes* nomination. He made an honourable Agreement with the *Visconti*. He fought and took Prisoner *John Aguto* an *English-man*, who with four thousand *English* was entertain'd in *Tuscany*, upon the *Ghiblin* accompt. After these Successes, *Urban V.* being *Pope*, he resolv'd to visit both *Italy* and *Rome*, where *Charles* the Emperour came to meet him, and having continued together several Months, *Charles* return'd into his Kingdom, and the *Pope* to *Avignon*. *Urban* died, and *Gregory XII.* succeeded, and because Cardinal *Egidio* was dead, *Italy* relaps'd into its former distractions, occasion'd by the Caballing of the people against the *Visconti*. Whereupon the *Pope* at first sent a Legat into *Italy* with six thousand *Britans*, after whom he follow'd in Person, and re-establish'd his Residence at *Rome*, in the year *MCCCLXXXVI.* after it had been kept in *France*, *LXXI.* years.

After the death of this *Pope*, *Urban VI.* was created. Not long after at *Fondi*, ten Cardinals quarrelling with his Election, and pretending it was not fair, created *Clement VII.* The *Genoveses* in the mean time (who for several years had lived quietly under the Government of the *Visconti*) rebell'd. Betwixt them and the *Venetian*, there happen'd great Wars about the Island of *Tenedos*; in which War by Degrees all *Italy* became concern'd, and there it was that great Guns were first us'd, they being a *German* Invention. Though for a while the *Genoveses* were predominant, and held *Venice* blockt up for several Months together; yet in the conclusion, the *Venetian* had the better, and made an advantageous Peace, by the assistance of the *Pope*. In the year 1381 (as we have said before) there was a Schism in the Church, and *Giovanna* the Queen favour'd the Anti-Pope. Whereupon, *Pope Urban* practis'd against her, and sent *Carlo Durazzo* (who was of the Royal House of *Naples*) with an Army into her Kingdom, who possess'd himself of her Countrey, and drove her away into *France*. The King of *France* undertaking her quarrel, sent *Lodovic d'Angio* to repossess the Queen, and force *Urban* out of *Rome*, and set up the Anti-Pope. But *Lodovic* dying in the middle of the Enterprize, his Army broke up, and return'd into *France*. *Urban* thereupon goes over to *Naples*, and claps nine Cardinals in Prison, for having sided with *France* and the Anti-Pope. After that, he took it ill of the King, that he refus'd to make one of his Nephews Prince of *Capua*, but concealing his disgust, he desir'd *Nocera* of him for his Habitation, which as soon as he was possess'd of, he fortified, and began to cast about which way to deprive him of his Kingdom. The King taking the Alarm, advanc'd against *Nocera* and besieg'd it, but the *Pope* escap'd to *Genoa*, where he put the Cardinals which were his Prisoners to death. From thence he went to *Rome*, and created 28 new Cardinals. In the mean time *Charles* King of *Naples* went into *Hungary*, was proclaim'd King there, and not long after kill'd. He left the Kingdom of *Naples* to his Wife, and two Children he had by her, one call'd *Ladislao*, and the other *Giovanna*.

*John Galeazzo Visconti* in the mean time had kill'd his Uncle *Bernardo*, and possess'd himself of *Milan*, and not content to have made himself Duke of *Milan*, he attempted upon *Tuscany*; but when he was in a fair way to have conquer'd it, and to have made himself King of all *Italy*, he died. *Urban VI.* died also, and was succeeded by *Boniface IX.* *Clement VII.* the Anti-Pope died likewise at *Avignon*, and *Benedict XIII.* was created in his room. *Italy* all this while was full of Soldiers of Fortune, *English*, *Dutch*, and *Britans*, some of them Commanded by Princes, which upon several occasions had been invited thither;

The Jubilee reduc'd to 50 years.

*Avignon* given to the *Pope* by the Queen of *Naples*.

*Innocent 6th* *Pope*.

*Urban 5th* *Pope*.

*Gregory 12th* *Pope*.

The *Pope* returns to *Rome*, after 71 years absence in *France*.

*Urban 6th* *Pope*: *Clement 7th* Anti-Pope.

Guns first us'd betwixt the *Genoveses* and *Venetians*.

*Urban* and *Clement* succeeded by *Boniface 9th* & *Benedict 13th*.

thither, and some of them which had been sent by the Popes, when their residence was at *Avignon*. With this medly of Nations the Princes of *Italy* maintain'd their Wars many times, till at length *Lodovico da Conso Romagnuolo* having train'd up a Party of *Italians*, call'd the Soldiers of *Saint George*, by his Valour and Discipline less'n'd the Reputation of the Forreigners, and made them afterwards more useful and considerable in the *Italian Wars*: The Pope upon certain differences which arose betwixt him and the *Romans*, remov'd to *Sceff*, where he remain'd till the Jubilee in the year 1400. at which time, to invite him back again for the benefit of their City, the *Romans* condescended that he should have the annual nomination of a forreign Senator, and be permitted to fortifie the Castle of *St. Angelo*; upon which Conditions being return'd, to enrich the Church, he ordain'd, That in every Vacancy, each Benefice should pay an Annat into the Chamber Ecclesiastical. After the death of *John Galeazzo Duke of Milan*, though he left two Sons *Giovan-Mari-Angelo*, and *Philip*, the State was divided into many Factions. In the troubles which followed, *Giovan-Mari-Angelo* was slain, and *Philip* for some time kept Prisoner in the Castle of *Pavia*; but by the Valour and Allegiance of the Governour, he escap'd. Among the rest who had seiz'd the Cities which belong'd formerly to *John Galeazzo*, *William della Scala* was one, who having been banish'd, and retiring to *Francesco de Carrara* Lord of *Padua*, by his means he recover'd the State of *Verona*, but he enjoy'd it a short time; for *Francesco* caus'd him to be poison'd, and assum'd the Government himself. The *Vicentini* hereupon (having till then liv'd quietly under the protection of the *Visconti*) growing jealous of the greatness of the Lord of *Padua*, submitted themselves to the *Venetians*, who at their instigation made War upon him, and beat him first out of *Verona*, and at length out of *Padua*. By this time Pope *Boniface* died, and *Innocent VII.* was elected in his place. The people of *Rome* made a solemn Address to him for the Resitution of their Liberty and Forts, and being deny'd, they call'd in *Ladislaus* King of *Naples* to their Assistance; but their differences being afterwards compos'd, the Pope return'd to *Rome*, from whence for fear of the people he fled to *Viterbo*, where he had made his Nephew *Loaovic, Conte della Marca*; after which he died, and *Gregory XII.* succeeded, upon Condition he should resign when ever the Anti-Pope should be persuaded to do the same. At the intercession of the Cardinals, to try whether it was possible to accommodate their differences, and reunite the Church, *Benedict* the Anti-Pope came to *Porto Veneri*, and *Gregory* to *Lucca*, where many Expedients were propos'd, but nothing concluded; whereupon the Cardinals forsook them both, of one side and the other, *Benedict* retired into *Spain*, and *Gregory* to *Rimini*. The Cardinals by the favour of *Baldassare Cossa*, Cardinal and Legat of *Bologna* call'd a Council at *Pisa*, in which they created *Alexander V.* who immediately excommunicated King *Ladislaus*, invest'd *Luigi d'Angio* with his Kingdom, and by the assistance of the *Florentines*, *Genoueses*, *Venetians* and *Baldassare Cossa* the Legat, they assaulted *Ladislaus*, and drove him out of *Rome*. But in the heat of the War, *Alexander* died, and *Baldassare Cossa* was created Pope, with the name of *John XXIII.* *John* was created at *Bologna*, but remov'd to *Rome*, where he found *Luigi d'Angio* with the Forces of *Provence*; having joyn'd himself with him, they march'd out against King *Ladislaus*, fought with him, and routed his Army; but for want of good Conduct, not pursuing their Victory, King *Ladislaus* rally'd, recover'd *Rome*, and forc'd the Pope away to *Bologna*, and *Luigi* to *Provence*. The Pope casting about with himself which way he might restrain and lessen the power of King *Ladislaus*, caus'd *Sigismund* King of *Hungary* to be chosen Emperour, invited him into *Italy*, to which purpose they had a Conference at *Mantua*, where it was concluded, a General Council should be call'd for uniting the Church; upon the accomplishment of which, it was presum'd they should be better able to defend themselves against the incroachments of their Enemies.

At this time, there were three Popes in being at once; *Gregory*, *Benedict*, and *John*, which kept the Church very low, both in force and reputation. The place appointed for their Convention was *Constance*, a City in *Germany*, contrary to the intention of Pope *John*; and though by the death of King *Ladislaus*, the great Reason was taken away that mov'd the Pope to that proposition, nevertheless, things being gone so far, and he under an obligation, he could not handsomly come off, but was forc'd to go to it. Being arriv'd at *Constance*, it was not many months before he found his Error, and endeavour'd to have escap'd; but being discovered and taken, he was put in Prison, and compell'd to renounce. *Gregory*, one of the Anti-Popes renounced by Proxy, but *Benedict*, the other Anti-Pope refus'd, and was condemn'd for a Heretick; at last finding himself abandon'd by all the Cardinals, he renounc'd likewise, and the Council created a new Pope, *Viz. Oddo* of the House of *Colonna*, who took the name of *Martin V.* upon which, the Schisms were compos'd, and the Church united, after it had been divided fourty years, and several Popes living at one and the same time. As we said before, *Philip Visconti* was at this time in the Castle of *Pavia*.

*Boniface*  
dies, *Innocent*  
7th succeeds  
him, and *Gre-*  
*gory* the 12th.  
*Innocent:*

*Alexander*  
5th elected, and  
succeeded by  
*John 23d*

Three Popes  
at once.

*Martin* 5th.



*Pavia*. But upon the death of *Fantino Care* (who in the troubles of *Lombardy* had made himself Lord of *Vercelli*, *Alexandria*, *Novara*, and *Tortona*, and contracted great wealth) having no Sons, he bequeath'd his Dominions to his Wife *Beatrix*, injoyning his Friends to use their utmost endeavour to Marry her to *Philip*; by which Marriage, *Philip* being much strengthen'd, he recover'd *Milan*, and all the whole Province of *Lombardy*: after which, to recompense her great Benefits (according to the example of other Princes) he accus'd his Wife *Beatrix* of Adultery, and put her to death. Being arriv'd at that height both of Power and Grandeur, he began to contrive against *Tuscany*, and pursue the designs of his Father *John Galeazzo*. *Ladislaus* King of *Naples* at his death, had left to his Sister *Giowanna* (besides his Kingdom) a formidable Army Commanded by the chief Captains in *Italy*, and among the rest, by *Sforza da Contignuolo*, a person of particular repute for his Valour in those Wars. The Queen (to clear her self of an aspersion of too much intimacy with one *Pandolfello* which she advanc'd) took to her Husband *Giacopa della Marca*, a Frenchman, of Royal Extraction, but upon condition he should content himself to be call'd Prince of *Taranto*, and leave the Title and Government of the Kingdom to her. But the Soldiers as soon as he was arriv'd in *Naples* called him King, which occasioned great differences betwixt him and the Queen, sometimes one prevailing, and sometimes the other. But at length the Government rested in the Queen, and she became a severe Enemy to the Pope. Whereupon *Sforza* to drive her into a necessity, and force her to his own terms, laid down his Commission, and refused to serve her against him; by which means being (as it were) disarm'd in a moment, having no other remedy she apply'd her self to *Alphonso* King of *Arragon* and *Sicily*, adopted him her Son, and to Command her Army, she entertained *Braccio da Montone*, as Eminent a Soldier as *Sforza*, and an Adversary of the Pope, upon account of certain Towns (as *Perugia* and others) which he had usurped from the Church. After this, a Peace was concluded betwixt her and the Pope; but *Alphonso* suspecting least she should serve him, as she had done her Husband, began privately to contrive how he might possess himself of the Forts: But the Queen was cunning, and prevented him by fortifying her self in the Castle of *Naples*. Jealousies increasing in this manner, and no-body interposing, they came to an Ingagement, and the Queen by the help of *Sforza* (who was returned to her Service) overcame *Alphonso*, drove him out of *Naples*, abdicated him, and adopted *Lodovic d'Angio* in his place. Hereupon new Wars ensued betwixt *Braccio* (who was of *Alphonso's* party) and *Sforza* (who was for the Queen.) In the process of the War *Sforza* passing the River *Pescara*, was by accident drowned. His death was a great prejudice to the affairs of the Queen, who thereupon would have run great hazard of being droven out of her Kingdom, had not her loss been supplied by *Philip Visconti*, Duke of *Milan*, who forced *Alphonso* back again into *Arragon*. But *Braccio*, not at all discouraged at *Alphonso's* departure, continued War upon the Queen, and besieged *Aquila*. The Pope looking upon *Braccio's* greatness, as a diminution to the Church, entertained *Francisco* (the Son of *Sforza*) into his pay, who marching with an Army to the relief of *Aquila*, ingaged *Braccio*, routed his Army, and slew him. Of *Braccio's* party, there remained only *Otho* his Son, from whom the Pope took *Perugia*, but left him the Government of *Montone*. But he also was not long after slain in *Romania*, in the *Florentine* assistance; so that of all those who fought under the Discipline of *Braccio*, *Nicolas Piccinno* was the man now of greatest reputation. Being come thus near with our Narrative to the times we designed, that which remains being considerable in nothing but the Wars which the *Florentines* and the *Venetians* had with *Philip* Duke of *Milan*, (of which, our Relation shall be particular when we come to treat of *Florence*.) we shall forbear to enlarge any farther, and only in short, reduce it to Memory, in what state and posture *Italy* then stood with its Princes, and Armies.

The Queen of *Naples* calls in the King of *Arragon* to her assistance, adopts him, and makes *Braccio da Montone* her General.

The State of *Italy*.

Among the principal States, Queen *Giowanna* held the Kingdom of *Naples*, *La Marca*, the *Patrimony*, and *Romagna*. Part of their Towns belonged to the Church, part to their particular Governours, or others which had Usurped them: as *Ferrara*, *Modena*, *Reggio*, to the Family of the *Esti*, *Faenza* to the *Manfredi*, *Imola* to the *Alidosi*, *Furlis* to the *Ordeluffi*, *Rimini* and *Pesaro* to the *Malatesti*, and *Camerino* to the House *Varana*. *Lombardy* was divided, part under Duke *Philip*, and part under the *Venetian*. All the rest who had had any sovereignty or principality in those parts, being extinct, except only the House of *Genzagua*, which governed in *Mantua* at that time. Of *Tuscany* the greatest part was under the Dominion of the *Florentines*; *Lucca* only, and *Siena* lived free under their own Laws: *Lucca* under the *Guinigi*, and *Siena* of it self. The *Genoueses*, being free sometimes, sometimes under the Authority of the *French*, and sometimes of the *Visconti*; they lived without any great reputation, and were reckoned among the meaner and most inconsiderable states of that Countrey. Their principal Potentates were not themselves in Command, but their Armies managed by their Generals. Duke *Philip* confined himself to his Chamber, and not being



to be seen, his Wars were manag'd by Commissioners. The *Venetians* altering their Scene; and making War by Land, they disbarqued that Army which had made them so glorious by Sea; and according to the Custom of their Country, gave the Command of it to other people. The Pope, being a Religious person, and *Giovanna* Queen of *Naples* a woman, were not so proper to Command in person, and therefore did that by necessity which others did by indiscretion. The *Florentines* were under the same necessity, for their frequent divisions having exhausted their Nobility, and the Government of the City remaining in the hands of such as were bred up to Merchandize; in their Wars they were forc'd to follow the fortune and direction of strangers: So that the Armies all *Italy* over, were in the hands of the smaller Princes, or such as had no Sovereignty at all. Those smaller Princes embracing those Commands, not from any impulse or stimulation of Glory, but to live plentifully and safe. The others Education having been small, not knowing what other course to take, they took up Arms, hoping thereby to gain either Honour or Estate. Among these the most eminent were *Carnignuola*, *Francisco Sforza*, *Nicholo Piccinno*, brought up under *Braccio*, *Agnolo della Pergola*, *Lorenzo*, and *Micheletto Attenduli*, *Il Tartaglia*, *Giaccopaccio*, *Ceccolino da Perugia*, *Nicolo da Tolentino*, *Guido Torello*, *Antonio dal Ponte ad Hera*, and many others. With these may be reckon'd those Princes which I have mention'd before, to which may be added the Barons of *Rome*, the *Orsini*, *Colonnaesi*, and other Lords and Gentlemen of the Kingdom of *Lombardy*, who depending upon the Wars, had fetled a kind of a League and Intelligence betwixt themselves, model'd it with that artifice, and temporized so exactly, that most commonly who ever were Enemies, both sides were sure to be losers. By this means, the Art of War became so mean and unserviceable; every little Officer that had but the least spark of Experience could have easily corrected it. Of these lazy Princes, and their despicable Officers shall be the subject of my ensuing discourse; but before I come to it, it will be necessary (according to my promise at first) to deduce *Florence* from its Original, and give every one a clear prospect what was the State of that City in those times, and by what means it arriv'd at it, thorough the imbroilments of a thousand years, in which *Italy* was involv'd.

THE



THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
FLORENCE.  
Book II.

The Convenience of Colonies.

**A**Mong the great and admirable orders of former Kingdoms and Common-wealths (though in our times it is discontinued and lost) it was the Custom upon every occasion to build new Towns and Cities; and indeed nothing is more worthy and becoming an excellent Prince, a well-disposed Common-wealth, nor more for the interest and advantage of a Province, than to erect new Towns, where men may cohabit with more Convenience, both for Agriculture, and Defence. For besides the Beauty and Ornament which follow'd upon that Custom, it render'd such Provinces as were Conquer'd, more dutiful and secure to the Conquerour, planted the void places, and made a commodious distribution of the people; upon which, living regularly and in order, they did not only multiply faster, but were more ready to invade, and more able for defence. But by the negligence and omission of Common-wealths and Principalties, this method being at present disus'd, the Provinces are become weaker, and some of them ruin'd. For (as I said before) it is this order alone that secures a Countrey, and supplies it with people. The security consists in this, that in a new Conquer'd Country, a Colony placed by Authority, is a Fortres and Guard to keep the Natives in obedience; neither without this can a Province continue inhabited, or preserve a just distribution of the people, because all places being not equally fertile or healthful, where it is barren, they desert; where unwholsome, they die; and unless there be some way to invite or dispose new men to the one, as well as the other, that Province must fail; the abandoning some places leaving them desolate and weak, and the thronging to others making them indigent and poor. And forasmuch as these inconveniences are not to be remedied by Nature, Art and Industry is to be apply'd; and we see many Countreys which are naturally unhealthful, much better'd by the multitude of Inhabitants; the Earth being purify'd by their Tillage, and the Air by their Fires, which Nature alone would never have effected. Of this, *Venice* is instance sufficient; for though seated in a sickly and watrish place, the concourse of so many people at one time, made it healthfull enough. *Pisa* by reason of the malignity of the Air, was very ill inhabited, till *Genoa*, and the Inhabitants upon its Rivers, being defeated and dispossest'd by the *Saracens*, it follow'd, that being supplanted all of them at once, and repairing thither in such Numbers, that Town in a short time became populous and potent. But the Custom of sending Colonies being laid aside, new Conquests are not so easily kept, void places not so easily supply'd, nor full and exuberant places so easily evacuated. Whereupon many places in the world, and particularly in *Italy*, are become desolate and deserted in respect of what  
in

in former ages they have been, which is imputable to nothing, but that Princes do not retain their ancient appetite of true glory, nor Common-wealths the laudable Customs they were wont.

In old time, by the virtue and courage of these Colonies, new Cities were many times built, and what were new begun enlarg'd. In which number the City of *Florence* may be reckon'd, which was begun by the Inhabitants of *Fiesole*, and augmented by the Colonies. It is a true Story (if *Dante*, and *John Villani* may be believ'd) that the City of *Fiesole*, though plac'd it self on the top of a Mountain, nevertheless, that their Markets might be better frequented, and their Commodities brought to them with greater convenience to the Merchant, they order'd them a place, not on the top of the hill; but in the plain, betwixt the bottom of the Mountain, and the River *Arno*.

The Original of Florence

These Merchants (in my judgment) were the first occasion of building in that place, and what was originally but Store-houses for receipt of their Commodities, became afterwards a Town, and place of Habitation.

After the *Romans* had Conquer'd the *Carthaginians*, and render'd *Italy* safe against Foreign imbroilments, they multiply'd exceedingly; for men will not incommode themselves, but where they are constrain'd by necessity; and though the terrours of War may force them for shelter to fortify'd places and rocks, yet when the danger is over, their profit and convenience calls them back again to their houses, and they prefer Elbow-room, and Ease before any such restraint. The security which follow'd in *Italy* upon the reputation of the *Roman* Common-wealth, might possibly be the occasion that this place (from the aforesaid beginning increasing so vastly) became afterwards a Town, and was call'd at first *Arma*.

After this there arose Civil Wars in *Rome*, first betwixt *Marius* and *Silla*, then betwixt *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, and afterwards betwixt them that Murder'd *Cæsar*, and those which reveng'd his death. By *Silla* first, and after that by the three *Roman* Citizens (who revenged the Assassination of *Cæsar*, and divided the Empire) Colonies were sent to *Fiesole*; all or Part of which settled in the plain not far from the Town which was already begun.

That, by this occasion, the place was so replenish'd with Houses, Men, and all things necessary for Civil Government, that it might be reckon'd among the Cities of *Italy*. But from whence it assum'd the name of *Florence* is variously conjectur'd. Some would have it call'd *Florence* from *Florino* one of the chief of that Colony. Some say it was not call'd *Florentia*, but *Fluentia* in the beginning, in respect of its nearness to the River *Arno*; and they produce *Pliny* as a witness, who has this Expression, That the *Fluentini* are near to the Channel of the River *Arno*. But that (in my opinion) is a mistake, because *Pliny* in his Book design'd to tell where the *Florentines* were seated, not what they were call'd. Nor is it unlikely but that word *Fluentini* might be corrupted, because *Frontinus* and *Tacitus* (who writ, and were near contemporary with *Pliny*) call'd the Town *Florentia*, and the people *Florentini*, soasmuch as they were Govern'd in the time of *Tiberius*, according to the same

The Denomination of Florence.

Laws and Customs with the rest of the Cities in *Italy*; and *Cornelius Tacitus* relates that Embassadors were sent from the *Florentines* to the Emperour, to desire that the Waters of the River *Chiane* might not be disimbogued, or diverted upon their Countrey; neither is it reasonable to think that City could have two names at one time. My opinion therefore is clear, that whatever might be the occasion of its Original or Denomination, it was always call'd *Florentia*; that it was founded under the Empire of the *Romans*, and began to be mention'd in History in the time of the first Emperours; that when that Empire was first afflicted by the *Barbarians*, *Totila*, King of the *Ostrogoths* demolish'd *Florence*; that 250 years after, it was rebuilt by *Carolus Magnus*, from whose time till the year 1215. it follow'd the fortune of the rest of *Italy*, and was subject to those that Commanded; during which it was governed first by the Successors of *Charles*, afterwards by the *Berengaris*, and last of all by the Emperours of *Germany*, as has been shewn in our general discourse. In those days it was not in the power of the *Florentines* to extend their bounds, or to perform any memorable action, by reason of their subjection to Foreign Dominion. Nevertheless in the year 1010. on St. *Romulus* day (which was a solemn Festival among the *Fiesolans*) they took, and destroy'd *Fiesole*, either by the connivance of the Emperours, or by the opportunity of an *Interregnum* betwixt the death of one Emperour and the Creation of another, at which time all the Cities were free. But afterwards when the *Popes* assum'd more Authority, and the Emperours power began to diminish, all the Towns in that Province began to comport themselves with less regard or reverence to their Princes; so that in the year 1080. in the days of *Arrigo* 3. though *Italy* was divided betwixt him and the Church, yet till the year 1215. the *Florentines* by submitting to the Conquerours, and designing no farther than their own preservation, kept themselves quiet and intire. But as in the Body of Man, the later they come, the more dangerous and mortal are the Diseases; so *Florence* the longer it was

was before it fell into the paroxysms of faction, the more fatally it was afflicted afterwards when it did. The occasion of its first division is considerable, and being mention'd by *Dante* and several other Writers as remarkable, I shall take the liberty to discourse of it briefly.

The first Division of Florence.

Among other great and powerful Families in *Florence*, there were the *Buondelmonti*, and *Uberti*, and not long after them the *Amidei*, and *Donati*. In the Family of the *Donati*, there was a Lady (a Widow) very rich, who had a great Beauty to her Daughter. The Lady had resolv'd with her self to Marry her Daughter to *Messr. Buondelmonte*, a Young Gentleman, the head of that Family. This intention of hers (either by negligence, or presuming it safe enough at any time) she had not imparted to any body, so that before she was aware *Messr. Buondelmonte* was to be Married to a Daughter of the House of *Amidei*. The Lady much dissatisfy'd with her Omission, hoping nevertheless her Daughters Beauty might be able to dissolve the Contract, seeing him pass one day alone towards her House, she took her Daughter along, and went down to accost him, and opening the Gate as he went by, she saluted him, and told him, she could not but congratulate his Marriage, though indeed she had kept her Daughter (presenting her to him) in hopes she should have been the Bride. The young Gentleman beholding the Excellent Beauty of the *Damoselle*, contemplating her Extraction, and that her Fortune was not at all Inferiour to the persons he had chosen, fell immediately into such a passion and desire to Marry her, that not considering the promise he had made, the injustice he should commit, nor the ill consequences that might follow, he reply'd, *Seeing (Madam) you have preserv'd her for me (being not yet too late) it would be ingratitude to refuse her*, and without more ado, he Married her. The notice of his inconstancy was no sooner divulg'd, but it was taken in great indignity by the Families of the *Amidei* and *Uberti*, who at that time were nearly ally'd. Having consulted among themselves, and several others of their Relations, it was concluded, the affront was insupportable, and not to be expiated but by the death of *Messr. Buondelmonte*; and though some remonstrated the evils which might follow, *Moscha Lambertucci* repli'd, That to consider every thing, was to resolve on nothing; super-adding an old Adage, *That a thing once done, is not capable of Remedy*: upon which the Fact being determin'd, the perpetration was committed to the said *Moscha*, *Stiatta Uberti*, *Lambertuccio Amidei*, and *Oderigo Fesanti*. Upon *Easter-day* in the morning, they address'd themselves to the work, and being privately convey'd to a House belonging to the *Amidei*, between the *Old Bridge* and *St. Stephens*, *Messr. Buondelmonte* passing the River upon a White Horse, (as if an injury could as easily have been forgotten, as a Marriage have been broken) they set upon him at the foot of the Bridge, and slew him under a Statue of *Mars*, which was placed thereby. This Murder divided the whole City, part of it siding with the *Buondelmonti*, and part with the *Uberti*; and both the Families being powerful in Houses, Castles, and Men, the Quarrel continued many years before either could be ejected; yet though the animosity could not be extinguish'd by a firm and stable peace, yet things were palliated and compos'd sometimes for the present, by certain Truces and Cessations, by which means (according to the variety of accidents) they were sometimes at quiet, and sometimes together by the Ears. In this Condition *Florence* continued till the Reign of *Frederick 11.* who being King of *Naples*, and desirous to strengthen himself against the Church; to corroborate his interest in *Tuscany*, joyn'd himself to the *Uberti* and their party, by whose assistance the *Buondelmonti* were driven out of *Florence*, and that City (as all *Italy* had done before) began to divide into the Factions of the *Guelfs*, and the *Ghiblins*. Nor will it be amiss to commemorate how each Family was engag'd. The Families therefore which sided with the *Guelfs* were the *Buondelmonti*, *Nerti*, *Rossi*, *Frescobaldi*, *Mozzi*, *Baldi*, *Pulchi*, *Gherardini*, *Foraboschi*, *Bagnesi*, *Gusdalotti*, *Sacchetti*, *Manieri*, *Lacardesi*, *Chiararamonti*, *Compiobbesi*, *Cavalcanti*, *Giandonati*, *Gianfilazzi*, *Scali*, *Guallerotti*, *Importuni*, *Bostichi*, *Tornaquinci*, *Vecchiotti*, *Fosinghi*, *Arrigucci*, *Agli*, *Sili*, *Adimari*, *Visdomini*, *Donati*, *Pazzi*, *della Bella*, *Ardinghi*, *Theobaldi*, *Cerchi*. With the *Ghiblins* there joyned the *Uberti*, *Manelli*, *Ubracci*, *Fisanti*, *Amidei*, *Infanganti*, *Malespini*, *Scolari*, *Guidi*, *Galli*, *Cappardi*, *Lamberti*, *Soldaneri*, *Cipriani*, *Toschi*, *Amieri*, *Palermi*, *Migliorelli*, *Pigli*, *Barucci*, *Castani*, *Agalanti*, *Bruneleschi*, *Caponsacchi*, *Elisii*, *Abbati*, *Fedaldini*, *Guicci*, *Galigai*; to which Families of the Nobility, many of the populacy joyn'd themselves on each side, as their interest or affections carried them, so that in a manner the whole City was engag'd either on one side or the other. The *Guelfs* being driven out, retir'd into the Vale upon the River *Arno* mention'd before, and the greatest part of their Garrisons being there, they defended them as well as they could against the Attacks of their Enemies. But when *Frederick* dyed, those persons who were Neuters, retaining great interest and reputation with the people, thought it more serviceable to the City of *Florence* to reconcile their differences and unite them, than by fomenting them, to destroy it. Whereupon endeavouring a Composure, they prevail'd

The Guelfs and Ghiblins Faction in Florence.

at length that the *Guelfs* should lay aside their indignation, and return, and the *Ghibelines* renounce their suspicion and receive them. Being united in this manner, it was thought reasonable to provide for their liberty, and to contrive some Laws for their defence, before the new Emperour should get the power into his hands. In order thereunto they divided the City into six parts; They chose twelve Citizens (two for each part) which, under the title of *Antiani*, they invested with the Government, but chang'd them every year. To prevent any animosity that might arise from the determination of the matters judicial; they constituted two Forreign Judges, ( one of them call'd the Captain of the people, and the other the *Podesta* ) to decide all Civil and Criminal Causes which should occur. And because Laws are but transient, and of little duration, where there is no power to defend them, they establish'd XX Colours in the City, and 76 in the Territory, under which all the youth was list'd, and oblig'd to be ready in their Arms under their respective Colours, as often and whenever the Captain, or *Antiani* should require them. Moreover, as their Ensigns were distinct, so were their Arms; some of them consisted of Cross-bows, some of them of Halberds. Their Ensigns were chang'd at every *Pentecost* with great solemnity, and dispos'd to new Men, and new Captains put over their Companies. Besides, to add Majesty to their Army, and provide a refuge for such as were wounded, or disabled in Fight, where they might refresh, and recruit again, to make head against the Enemy, they order'd a large Chariot cover'd with Red, and drawn by two white Oxen, upon which their Standard of White and Red was to be plac'd. Whenever their Army was to be drawn out, this Chariot was to be drawn into the Market-place, and with great formality consign'd to the Captains of the people. For the greater magnificence and ostentation of their Enterprises, they had moreover, a great Bell ( call'd *Martinello* ) which Rung continually a month before they march'd with their Army, that the Enemy might have so much time to provide for his Defence. So much Gallantry there was then amongst men, and with so much Magnanimity they behav'd themselves, that whereas now adays it is reputed policy and wisdom to surprize an Enemy, and fall upon him while he is unprovoked, it was then thought treacherous, and ignoble. This Bell, when they march'd, was carried along with the Army, and by it the Guards set, and reliev'd, and other Military Orders deriv'd. By this Discipline in Civil and Martial affairs, the *Florentines* laid the foundation of their liberty. Nor is it to be imagin'd what strength and authority it acquir'd in a short time, for it came not only to be the chief City in *Tuscany*, but to be reckon'd among the Principal of all *Italy*, and indeed there was no grandeur to which it might not have arriv'd, had it not been obstructed by new and frequent dissensions. Ten years together, the *Florentines* liv'd under this Government; in which time they forc'd the *Pisorese*, *Aretime*, and *Sanesi* to make peace with them, and returning with their Army from *Siena*, they took *Volterra*, demolish'd several Castles, and brought the Inhabitants to *Florence*. In these Expeditions, the *Guelfs* had the principal Conduct, as being much more popular than the *Ghibelines*, who had carried themselves imperiously during *Frederick's* Reign, and made themselves odious; or else it was because the Church party had more Friends than the Emperours, as being thought more consistent with their liberty. The *Ghibelines* in the mean time, being displeas'd to see their Authority so sensibly decrease, could not be satisfy'd, but attended all occasions to repossess themselves of the Government. When *Manfreds* the Son of *Frederick* King of *Naples* was invested in that Kingdom, and had over-power'd the power of the Church, conceiving it a fair opportunity, they practis'd privately with him, to reassume their Government; but they could not manage it so cunningly, but their practice was discover'd to the *Antiani*, who summoning the *Uberti* thereupon; the *Uberti* not only refus'd to appear, but took Arms, and fortify'd themselves in their houses; at which the people being incens'd, took Arms likewise, and joyning with the *Guelfs*, drove them out of *Florence*, and forc'd the whole *Ghibeline* party to transplant to *Siena*. From thence they desir'd the assistance of *Manfredi* King of *Naples*, who sending them supplies, by the Conduct and Diligence of *Frinata* ( of the House of *Uberti* ) the *Guelfs* received such a blow upon the River *Archia*, that those which escap'd ( supposing their City lost ) fled directly to *Lucca*, and left *Florence* to shift for it self. *Manfreds* had given the Command of the auxiliaries which he sent to the *Ghibelines*, to the *Conte Giordano*, a Captain of no small reputation in those times. *Giordano*, after this Victory advanced with his *Ghibelines* to *Florence*, reduc'd the City to the obedience of *Manfredi*; depos'd the Magistrates, and alter'd or abrogated all the Laws, and Customs that might give them the least figure or commemoration of their liberty: Which injury being done with little discretion, was receiv'd by the people with so much detestation, that whereas before they were scarce Enemies to the *Ghibelines*, they became thereby inveterate and implacable; and that mortal animosity was in time their utter destruction. Being to return to *Naples* upon affairs of great importance to that Kingdom, the *Conte*

The Union  
& Government  
of the City of  
*Florence*  
The *Antiani*.

The Captain  
of the People,  
and *Podesta*  
Their Militia.

A generous  
Customs.

*Manfredi*,  
King of *Naples*,  
a great Patron  
of the *Ghibelines*.

*Giordano* left Comte *Guido Novello* ( Lord of *Casentino* ) in *Florence*, as Deputy for the King. This *Guido Novello* call'd a council of *Ghiblimes* at *Empoli*, wherein it was unanimously concluded, that *Florence* should be razed, being (by reason the people were so rigid *Guelfs*) the only City capable to reinforce the declining party of the Church.

*Ferinata Uberti.*

Upon so cruel and barbarous a Sentence against so Noble a City, there was not one Friend or Citizen oppos'd, besides *Ferinata dells Uberti*; who publickly and couragiously undertook its defence: Declaring, That he had not run so many dangers, nor expos'd himself to so many difficulties, but to live quietly afterwards in his own Countrey; nor would he now reject what he contended for so long, nor refuse that which his good fortune had given him; he was resolv'd rather to oppose himself (against whoever should design otherwise) with as much Vigour and zeal as he had done against the *Guelfs*; and if jealousy and apprehension should prompt them to endeavour the destruction of their Countrey, they might attempt if they pleas'd; but he hop'd, with the same Virtue which drove out the *Guelfs*, he should be able to defend the City. This *Ferinata* was a man of great Courage, excellent Conduct, Head of the *Ghiblimes*, and in no small esteem with *Manfredi* himself. These qualifications, and the consideration of his Authority, put an end to that resolution, and they began now to take new measures, and contrive wayes of preserving the State. The *Guelfs* who had fled to *Lucca*, being dismiss'd by the *Lucchesi*, upon the Counts commination, they withdrew to *Bologna*, from whence being invited by the *Guelfs* of *Parma*, to go against the *Ghiblimes*, they behav'd themselves so well, that by their Valour, the Adversary was overcome, and their possessions given to them: So that increasing in Honour and Wealth, and understanding that Pope *Clement* had call'd *Carlo d'Angio* into *Italy*, to depose *Manfredi* (if possibly) They sent Embassadors to his Holiness to tender their assistance; which the Pope not only accepted, but sent them his own Standard, which the *Guelfs* carry'd ever after in their Wars, and is us'd in *Florence* to this very day. After this, *Manfredi* was beaten, dispos'd of his Kingdom, and Slain, and the *Guelfs* of *Florence* having performed their share in that Action, their party grew more brisk and couragious; and the *Ghiblimes* more timorous and weak. Whereupon those who with Count *Guido Novello* were at the helm in *Florence*, began to cast about how they might, by benefits, or otherwise, gain and cajole the people, whom before they had exasperated by all circumstances of injury: But those remedies (which if us'd in time, before necessity requir'd, might possibly have prevail'd) being apply'd abruptly, and too late, did not only not contribute to their safety, but hasten'd their ruine. To coaks and insinuate with the people and their party, they thought it would do much if they restor'd them to a part of that Honour and Authority which they had lost. To this purpose they chose XXXVI. Citizens from among the People, and adding to them two Forreign Gentlemen from *Bologna*, they gave them power to reform the State of the City as they pleas'd. As soon as they met, the first thing they pitch'd upon, was to divide the City into several Arts (or Trades) over each Art they plac'd a Master, who was to administer Justice to all under his Ward; and to every Art a Banner was assign'd, that under that, each Company might appear in Arms, when ever the safety of the City requir'd it. At first these Arts, (or Companies) were twelve, seven greater, and five less; the lesser increasing afterwards to fourteen, their whole number advanc'd to XXI, as it remains at this day. The Reformation proceeding quietly in this manner, and contriving many things for the common benefit of the people, without interruption; Count *Guido* thinking himself under an equal Obligation to provide for his Soldiers; caus'd a Tax to be laid upon the Citizens, to raise Money for their pay; but he found such difficulty in the business, he durst never collect it: Whereupon, perceiving all lost, unless something was suddainly done; he combin'd with the chief of the *Ghiblimes*, and determin'd to take that back again by force from the people which so unadvisedly they had given.

*Carlo d'Angio* call'd into *Italy* by the Pope.

A new Model in *Florence*.

With which design, having assembled the several Companies in their Arms, (and the XXXVI. Reformators with them) causing a suddain Alarm to be brought in, the Reformators being frighted, and retiring to their Houses, the Ensigns of the several faculties were display'd, and several Armed men behind them immediately; understanding that Count *Guido* and his party were at *St. Johns*, they made a stand at *St. Trinita*, and chose *Giovanni Soldanieri* for their Captain. The Count on the other side, hearing where they had posted, advanced against them; and the people, not declining, they met in a place which is now call'd *Loggia dei Tornaquinci*, where the Count was worsted, and most of his party slain. Being off of his mettle, and fearful the Enemy would assault him in the night, and cut his Throat; his Men being cow'd, and unable to defend him, without considering other remedy, he resolv'd to preserve himself by flying, rather than by fighting; and accordingly (contrary to the persuasion of the Heads of the *Ghiblimes*) he retired to *Prato* with what men he had left. When he found himself safe, and his fear over, he became sensible of his

New Commotion.

his

his Errour; and being desirous to have repair'd it next morning, at break of day, he drew out his Men, march'd back to *Florence*, designing to recover that Honourably, which he had so Scandalously lost; but he found himself mistaken, for though it might have cost the people hot water to have expell'd him, they found it no hard matter to keep him out when he was gone; in somuch that being repuls'd, he drew off with great sorrow and shame to *Casentino*, and the *Ghiblimes* return'd to their Houses. The people being Conquerours, out of affection to all such as had a love for their Countrey, they resolv'd to reunite the City once more, and call'd home all their Citizens which were abroad, as well *Ghiblimes* as *Guelfs*. Hereupon the *Guelfs* return'd, after six years banishment, the *Ghiblimes* late attempt was pardoned, and they receiv'd back again; but yet they continued odious both to the people, and *Guelfs*, the last not being able to extinguish the memory of their banishment; nor the first to forget their Tyranny and insolence, when the Government was in their hand; so that their animosity was deposited neither on the one side, nor the other.

Whil'st the affairs of *Florence* were in this posture, a report was spread, that *Corradine*, Nephew to *Manfredi*, was coming with Forces out of *Germany*, to Conquer the Kingdom of *Naples*; upon which the *Ghiblimes* conceiv'd fresh hopes of recovering their Authority: and the *Guelfs* being no less solicitous for their security, begg'd the assistance of King *Charles*, in case *Corradine* should come. *Charles* having comply'd, and his Forces upon their March, the *Guelfs* became so insolent, and the *Ghiblimes* so timorous, that two days before the *French* Army arriv'd, the *Ghiblimes* fled out of the City, without staying to be expell'd. The *Ghiblimes* departed, the *Florentines* new Modell'd their City, choosing Twelve principal Magistrates to continue in Authority only for two Months, not under the title of *Antiani*, but *Buoni-buomini*. Next to them they constituted a Council of 80 Citizens, which they call'd *La Credenza*: after which, 180 were chosen out of the people, which with the *Credenza*, and the 12 *Buoni-buomini* were call'd the General-Council: besides which, they erected another Council, consisting of 120. both Citizens and Nobles, which Council was to consummate and ratifie whatever was debated or resolv'd in the rest. Having settled their Government in this manner, and by new Laws, and Election of Magistrates of their own party, fortifi'd themselves against the Machinations of the *Ghiblimes*, the *Guelfs* confiscated the *Ghiblimes* Estates, and having divided them into three parts, one was assign'd to publike uses, another given to their Magistrates and Captains, and the third distributed among the *Guelfs*, to recompense the damage they had receiv'd. The *Pope* to preserve *Tuscany* to the Faction of the *Guelfs*, made King *Charles* Imperial Vicar of that Province. By this method, the *Florentines* having maintain'd their honour and reputation abroad by their Arms, and at home by their Laws, they remain'd firm and secure; in the mean time the *Pope* dyed, and after a two years vacancy, and a tedious dispute, *Gregory X.* was elected; who being at the time of his Election (and a long while before) in *Syria*, and (by consequence) ignorant of the humours of the Factions, he carry'd not himself with that caution towards them, as his Predecessors had done. But in his way to *France*, being arriv'd at *Florence*, he thought it the Office of a good Pastor to endeavour to compose their differences, and prevail'd with them to receive Commissioners from the *Ghiblimes* to negotiate the manner of their return; but though their Peace was made, and all particulars concluded; the *Ghiblimes* were too jealous to accept them, and refus'd to come back. The *Pope* imputed the fault to the City, and excommunicated it in his passion, under which censure it continued whil'st he lived; but after his death, when *Innocent V.* was created, it was taken off. *Innocent V.* was succeeded by *Nicholas III.* of the house of the *Orsini*; and because the *Popes* were alwayes jealous of any great power in *Italy* (though rais'd by the favour of the Church) and constantly endeavour'd to depress it; great troubles, and frequent variations ensued; for the fear of a Person grown Potent to any degree, was the advancement of another less powerful than he; who growing powerful by his preferment, as his Predecessor had done, became formidable like him; and that fear was the occasion of his debasement. This was the cause that Kingdom was taken from *Manfredi*, and given to *Charles*. This was the reason that *Charles* became terrible afterwards, and his ruine was conspir'd for *Nicholas III.* (mov'd by the considerations aforesaid) prevail'd so, that *Charles* by the Emperours means, was remov'd from the Government of *Tuscany*, and *Latino* (the *Popes* Legat) sent thither in his place, by Commission from the Emperour. *Florence* at this time was in no very good condition, for the *Guelfish* Nobility being grown insolent, and careless of the Magistrates, several Murders and other violences were daily committed, the Malefactors passing unpunish'd by the favour and protection of the Nobles. To restrain these infolencies, it was thought good by the Heads of the City, to recall those who were banished, which gave opportunity to the Legate to reunite the City; and to the *Ghiblimes*; to return: whereupon instead of XII. Governours which they had before, they

A second Model by the *Guelfs*.

The 12 *Buoni Buomini. La Credenza.*

*Gregory X.*

*Florence* under Excommunication. *Innocent 5.*

The Jealousie of the *Popes.* *Nicholas 3.*

The *Ghiblimes* return.



Martinus Pope. were increas'd to XIV. (VII. of each party) their Government to be Annual, and their Election by the Pope. Two years *Florence* remain'd under this Form, till *Martino* (a *Frenchman*) was created Pope, who restor'd to King *Charles* whatever Authority Pope *Nicholas* had taken from him: So that *Florence* being again in Commotion; the Citizens took up Arms against the Emperours Governour, and to restrain the *Ghibelines*, and correct the insolence of their Nobility, put the City under a new form of Government. It was in the year 1282. when the Corporation of the Arts having been invested with the Magistracy and Militia, had gain'd great reputation; whereupon by their own Authority they order'd that instead of the XIV. Three Citizens should be created (with the Title of *Priori*) who should Govern the Common-wealth for two Months, and be chosen indifferently out of Commons or Nobility, provided they were Merchants, or professed any Art. Afterwards the chief Magistracy was reduc'd to Six persons (one for each Ward) where it continued to the year 1342. in which the City was reduc'd into Quarters, and the *Priori*, to Nine, they having been advanc'd to 12. by some accident in the mean time. This Constitution was the occasion (as shall be shew'd in its place) of the Nobilities ruine, who upon sundry provocations were excluded, and afterwards without any respect, oppress'd by the people. At first the Nobility consented to its Erection, as an expedient to unite, and accommodate all differences; but afterwards incroaching, and interfering for the Government, all of them lost it. There was likewise a Palace assign'd for the constant Residence of this Council, (in which the Magistrates were formerly accusom'd to confer with the Commissioners of the Church) and Serjeants, and other necessary Officers, for their greater honour, appointed to attend: Which Council, though at first it had only the Title of *Priori*; yet afterwards for Magnificence sake, it had the addition of *Signori*.

The Signori. For a while the *Florentines* continued quiet within themselves, though they had Wars abroad with the *Aretines* (who had driven out the *Guelfs*) with whom they engag'd successfully in *Campaldino*, and overcame them. Upon which, the City increasing both in Wealth, and number of Inhabitants, it was thought good to enlarge their Walls, which they did to its present Circumference; whereas before its Diameter was only from the Old Bridge to *S. Lorenzo*. The Wars abroad, and Peace at home, had almost exterminated both the *Ghibelines*; and *Guelfs* in that City; there remain'd only those sparks of animosity (which are unavoidable in all Cities) betwixt the Nobles and the People; for the one solicitous of their freedom according to their Laws, and the other impatient to Command them, it is not possible they should agree. Whilst they were apprehensive of the *Ghibelines*, this humour did not show it self in the Nobility; but when the *Ghibelines* were low and depress'd, it began to exert, and the people were injur'd daily, beyond the Vindication either of the Magistrates, or Laws; every Nobleman making good his insolence, by the multitude of his Friends and Relations, both against the *Priori*, and the Captain. The Heads therefore of the *Arts* (by way of remedy against so great inconvenience) provided that in the beginning of its Office, every Council of the *Priori* should create an Ensign, or *Gonfaloniere di giustizia*, out of the people, assigning him 1000 men in 20 Companies, which were to be ready with their Arms, and their *Gonfaloniere* to see Justice administer'd whenever the Court, or their Captain requir'd them. The first in this Office, was *Ubaldo Ruffoli*, who drawing out his Bands, demolish'd the Houses of the *Galetti*, because one of that Family had slain one of his Fellow-Citizens in *France*. The establishment of this Order by the Arts was not difficult, by reason of the jealousies and emulations amongst the Nobility, who were not in the least sensible it was intended against them, till they felt the smart of it, when it was put in Execution. This Constitution was terrible to them at first, but afterwards they return'd to their old insolence again; for having insinuated themselves into the Council of the *Priori*, they found means to hinder the *Gonfaloniere* from executing his Office. Besides, Witness being always required upon any accusation, the Plaintiff could hardly find any body that would give Testimony against the Nobility. So that in a short time *Florence* was involved in its own distraction, and the people expos'd to their former oppression, Justice being grown dilatory and tedious, and Sentence, though given, seldom or never executed. The Populace not knowing what resolution to take in this Case, *Giano della Bella* (a person of Noble extraction, but a Lover of the Liberty of the City) encourag'd the Heads of the *Arts*, to reform the City, and by his persuasion it was Ordain'd that the *Gonfaloniere* should reside with the *Priori*, and have 4000 men under his Command; they likewise excluded the Nobility out of the Council of the *Signori*.

Discord betwixt the Nobility and people.
The Priori The Gonfaloniere.
 They made a Law that all Accessaries, or Abettors, should be liable to the same punishment with those who were actually Guilty; and decreed that Common report should be sufficient to convict them. By these Laws (which were called *Ordinamenti della Giustizia*) the people gain'd great reputation: but *Giano della Bella*, being look'd upon as the contriver of



of their Destruction, became odious to the Nobility; and not to them only, but to the wealthiest of the Populace, who began to suspect his Authority, and not without reason, as appear'd afterwards upon the first occasion was given him to abuse it. It happened one of the Commons was killed in a fray, where several of the Nobility were present; *Corso Donati* being one amongst the rest, the Murder was laid to his Charge, as the most furious and desperate. He was taken into Custody by the Captain, but (however causes went) whether he was innocent of the Crime, or the Captain fearful to condemn him; he was presently discharg'd. The people offended at his discharge, betook themselves to their Arms, ran to the House of *Giano della Bella*, and beg'd of him, that he would be the means that the Laws he had invented might be put in Execution. *Giano* had privately a desire that *Corso* should be punish'd, and therefore advis'd not the people to lay down their Arms, (as many conceived he ought) but encouraged them to address to the *Signori* with their Complaints, and desire their Vindication. The people full of rage, thinking themselves abused by the Captain, and abandon'd by *Giano*, went not to the *Signori* (as directed) but away they ran to the Captain's Palace, and plunder'd it; which action displeas'd the whole City, and was laid upon *Giano*, by such as meditated his ruine; whereupon some of his Enemies happening afterwards to be of the *Signori*, he was accus'd to the Captain as an Incendiary and Debaucher of the people.

Whilst his Cause was in agitation, the people took Arms again, flocked in great numbers to his House, and offer'd to defend him against the *Signori* his Enemies. *Giano* had no mind to experiment the popular favour, or trust his life in the hands of the Magistrates, as fearing the Malignity of the one, no less than the unconstancy of the other; but to secure himself against the malice of his Enemies, and his Countrey against the commotion of his Friends, he resolv'd to give way to their Envy, and Banish himself from that City which he had preserv'd from the Tyranny of the Nobility by his own danger and charge. The Nobility, after his departure, to recover their dignity, which they conceived lost by the dissensions among them, united, and apply'd themselves by two of their Number, to the Senate or *Signoria* (which they judg'd to be their friends) to intreat them to mitigate in some measure the acerbity of those Laws which were made against them: which demand was no sooner known, but the people (fearing the *Signoria* should comply) began immediately to tumultuate, and, betwixt the ambition of the one, and suspicion of the other, they fell soon after to blows. The Nobility stood upon their Guards in three places, at St. *John's*, in the *Mercato nuovo*, and the *Piazza de' Mozzi*, under three Commanders, *Forese Adinari*, *Vanni de' Mozzi*, and *Geri Spini*. The people were got together under their Ensigns in great Numbers at the Senator's Palace, which at that time was not far from St. *Pruccolo*; and because the people were jealous of the *Signori*, they deputed six Citizens to share with them in the Government. In the mean time, while both parties were preparing for the Combat, some both of the Nobility and Commons, with certain Religious persons of good Reputation, interpos'd themselves, remonstrating to the Nobility, that the Honour they had lost, and the Laws made against them, were occasioned by their arrogance and ill Government; that now to take Arms, and betake themselves to force, for the recovery of what was lost by their own dissention and ill-management, would be the ruine of their Countrey, and a detriment to themselves. That they should consider in number, riches, and malice, they were much inferiour to the people. That that Nobility they so vainly affected, by which they thought to advance others, when they came to fight would prove but a meer Title and Name, unable to defend them against the advantages which their Enemies had over them. To the people it was represented imprudence to drive things too far, and make their Adversaries desperate; *For he that hopes no good, fears no ill*. That if ought to be considered, their Nobility were they which had gain'd so much Honour to their City in its Wars, and were not therefore in justice to be used at that rate. That they could be content to have the Supreme Magistracy taken from them, and endure it patiently; but they thought it unreasonable, and insupportable to be at every body's mercy (as their new Laws rendered them) and subject to be driven out of their Countrey upon every *Cappriccio*. That it would be well to mitigate their fury, and lay down their Arms, rather than to run the hazard of a Battel, by presumption upon their Numbers, which had many times fail'd, and been worsted by the less. The people were divided in their Judgments, some were for engaging, as a thing some time or other would necessarily be; and better now, than to defer till their Enemies were more powerful: and if it could be imagined the mitigation of the Laws would content them, they should be mitigated accordingly; but their insolence and pride could never be laid by, till by force they were constrain'd to't. To others more moderate and prudent, it appear'd that the alteration of the Laws would not signifie much, but to come to a Battel might be of very great importance; and their Opinion prevailing, it was provided

Perswasion  
to the Nobility  
to be quiet.

The same to  
the people.

New reformation in Florence 1298.

provided that no accusation should be admitted against a Nobleman without necessary testimony. Though upon these terms both parties laid down their Arms, yet their jealousies of one another were mutually retain'd, and they began again to fortifie on both sides. The People thought fit to re-order the Government, and reduc'd their *Signori* to a less number, as suspecting some of them to be too great favourers of the Nobility, of whom the *Mansini*, *Magalotti*, *Altoviti*, *Peruzzi*, and *Cerretani* were the chief. Having settled the State in this manner in the year 1298. for the greater Magnificence and Security of their *Signori*, they founded their Palace, and made a *Piazza* before it, where the houses of the *Uberti* stood formerly: About the same time also the Foundation of the Prisons were laid, which in few years after were finished. Never was this City in greater splendor, nor more happy in its condition than then, abounding both in men, riches, and reputation. They had 3000. Citizens in the Town fit to bear Arms, and 70000. more in their Territory. All *Tuscany* was at its devotion, partly as subjects, and partly as friends. And though there were still piques and suspicions betwixt the Nobility and the People, yet they did not break out into any ill effect, but all lived quietly and peaceably together; and had not this tranquillity been at length interrupted by dissention within, it had been in no danger from abroad; being in such terms at that time, it neither feared the Empire, nor its Exiles, and could have brought a force into the Field equivalent to all the rest of the States in *Italy*. But that disease from which *ab extra* it was secure, was ingendred in its own bowels. There were two Families in *Florence*, the *Cerchi*, and the *Donati*, equally considerable, both in numbers, riches, and dignity; being Neighbours both in City and Countrey, there happened some exceptions and disgust betwixt them, but not so great as to bring them to blows, and perhaps they would never have produc'd any considerable effects, had not their ill humours been agitated and fermented by new occasion. Among the chief Families in *Pistoia*, there was the Family of the *Cancellieri*. It happened that *Lore* the Son of *Gulielmo*, and *Geri* the Son of *Bertaccio*, fell out by accident at play, and passing from words to blows, *Geri* received a slight wound. *Gulielmo* was much troubled at the business, and thinking by excess of humility to take off the scandal, he increased it and made it worse. He commanded his Son to go to *Geri's* Fathers house, and demand his pardon; *Lore* obey'd, and went as his Father directed: but that act of humanity did not at all sweeten the acerbity of *Bertaccio's* mind, who causing *Lore* to be seiz'd by his servants (to aggravate the indignity) he caused him to be led by them into the stable, and his hand cut off upon the Manger, with instruction to return to his Father, and to let him know, *That wounds are not cured so properly by words, as amputation*. *Gulielmo* was so enraged at the cruelty of the fact, as he and his friends immediately took Arms to revenge it; and *Bertaccio* and his friends doing as much to defend themselves, the whole City of *Pistoia* was engaged in the quarrel, and divided into two parties. These *Cancellieri* being both of them descended from one of the *Cancellieri* who had two Wives, one of them called *Bianca*: that party which descended from her, called it self *Bianca*; and the other in opposition was called *Nera*. In a short time many conflicts happened betwixt them, many men killed, and many houses destroyed. Not being able to accommodate among themselves, though both sides were weary, they concluded to come to *Florence*, hoping some expedient would be found out there, or else to fortifie their parties by the acquisition of new friends. The *Neri* having had familiarity with the *Donati*, were espoused by *Corso*, the head of that Family. The *Bianchi*, to support themselves against the accession of the *Donati*, fell in with *Veri* the chief of the *Cerchi*, a man not inferiour to *Corso* in any quality whatever. The malignity of this humour being brought hither from *Pistoia*, began to revive the old quarrel betwixt the *Cerchi* and *Donati* in such manner, that the *Priori*, and other Principal Citizens began to apprehend they should fall together by the ears, and the whole City come to be divided. Hereupon they applyed themselves to the *Pope*, desiring he would interpose his Authority to assuage those differences which were too great for their private power to compose. The *Pope* sent for *Veri*, and press'd him earnestly to a reconciliation with the *Donati*. *Veri* seemed to be surpris'd at his importunity, pretended he had no prejudice to them at all, and because reconciliation presuppos'd a quarrel, there being nothing of the latter, he thought there was no necessity of the first. So that *Veri* returning from *Rome* without any other conclusion, the Malevolence increas'd, and every little accident (as it happened afterwards) was sufficient to put all in confusion. In the Moneth of *May*, several Holidays being publickly celebrated in *Florence*, certain young Gentlemen of the *Donati*, with their friends on Horseback, having stopt near *St. Trinity*, to see certain Women that were Dancing, it fell out that some of the *Cerchi* arriv'd there likewise with some of their friends, and being desirous to see as well as the rest, not knowing the *Donati* were before, they spur'd on their horses, and jumbled in among them. The *Donati* looking upon it as an affront, drew their Swords; the *Cerchi* were as ready to answer them, and after several cuts and slashes given and received,

The difference in the family of the *Cancellieri*, the occasion and consequence.

The *Bianchi* and *Neri*.

both

both sides retir'd. This accident was the occasion of great mischief; the whole City (as well People as Nobility) divided, and took part with the *Bianchi* and *Neri*, as their inclinations directed them. The chief of the *Bianchi* were the *Cerchi*, to whom the *Admirari*, the *Abbati*, part of the *Josinghi*, the *Bardi*, *Rossi*, *Frescobaldi*, *Nerli*, *Mammilli*, all the *Mozzi*, the *Scali*, *Gerrardini*, *Cavalcanti*, *Marespini*, *Bostichi*, *Grandsonati*, *Vecchietti*, and *Arriguelzi*, joyn'd themselves; with these sided several of the populace and all the *Ghibeline* faction in *Florence*; so that in respect of their Numbers, they seem'd to have the whole Government of the City. The *Donati* on the other side were heads of the *Neri*, and follow'd by all the rest of the before mentioned Nobility, who were not engag'd with the *Bianchi*; and beside them all the *Parzi*, *Bisdolini*, *Manieri*, *Bagnesi*, *Tornaquinci*, *Spini*, *Buondelmonti*, *Gianfigliuzzi*, and *Brunelleschi*; Nor did this humour extend it self only in the City, but infected the whole Countrey. In so much that the Captains of the *Arts* and such as favour'd the *Guelfs*, and were Lovers of the Commonwealth, very much apprehended least this new distraction should prove the ruine of the City, and the restauration of the *Ghibelins*. Whereupon they sent to the *Pope*, beseeching him to think of some remedy, unless he had a mind that City (which had been always a bulwark to the Church) should be destroy'd or become subject to the *Ghibelins*. To gratifie their request, the *Pope* dispatch'd *Matteo d' Aquasparta* (a *Portugal* Cardinal) as his Legate to *Florence*, who finding the party of the *Bianchi* obstinate and untractable, as presuming upon the advantage of their Numbers, he left *Florence* in an anger, and interdicted them; so that the Town remained in more confusion at his departure, than he found it. All parties being at that time very high, and dispos'd to mischief, it happen'd that several of the *Cerchi* and *Donati* meeting at a Burial, some words pass'd betwixt them, and from words they proceeded to blows, but no great hurt done, for that time: Both sides being returned to their houses, the *Cerchi* began to deliberate how they might fall upon the *Donati*, and in Conclusion they went in great numbers to attack them, but by the Courage of *Corso* they were repell'd, and several of them Wounded. Hereupon the City fell to their Arms; the Laws and the Magistrates were too weak to contest with the fury of both parties. The wisest and best Citizens were in perpetual fear. The *Donati* and their friends having less force, were more anxious and solicitous of their safety, to provide for it as well as was possible: At a meeting of *Corso* with the heads of the *Neri*, and the Captain of the *Arts*, it was concluded that the *Pope* should be desired to send them some person of the Blood Royal to reform their City, supposing that way the most probable to suppress this *Bianchi*. The Assembly, and their resolution was notify'd to the *Priori*, and aggravated against the Adverse party as a Conspiracy against their Freedom. Both factions being in Arms, *Dante*, and the rest of the *Signori* taking Courage, with great Wisdom and prudence causing the people to put themselves in Arms, by Conjunction of several out of the Countrey they forc'd the heads of both parties to lay down their Arms, confin'd *Corso*, *Donati* and several of the faction of the *Neri* to their houses; and that their proceedings might seem impartial, they committed several of the *Bianchi*, who afterwards upon plausible pretences were dismiss'd. *Corso* and his accomplices were discharg'd likewise; and supposing his Holiness to be their friend, took a journey to *Rome* to persuade him personally to what by Letters they had begg'd of him before. There happen'd to be at the *Popes* Court at that time *Charles de Valois* the King of *France* his brother, call'd into *Italy* by the King of *Naples* to pass over into *Sicily*. The *Pope* (upon the importunity of the *Florentine* Exiles) though fit to send him to *Florence* to remain there till the season of the year serv'd better for his transportation. *Charles* arrived, and though the *Bianchi* (who had then the Supremacy) were jealous of him, yet being Patron of the *Guelfs*, and deputed thither by the *Pope*, they durst not oppose his coming; but on the Contrary, to oblige him they gave him full Authority to dispose of the City as he pleased. *Charles* was no sooner invest'd with his Authority, but he caus'd all his friends and Partizans to Arm, which gave the people so great a jealousy that he would Usurp upon their Liberties, that they also put themselves in Arms, and stood ready every man at his door to resist any such attempt. The *Cerchi* and the chief of the *Bianchi* (having had the Government in their hands and managed it proudly) were become generally odious, which gave encouragement to *Corso* and the rest of the *Neri* who were banish'd, to return to *Florence*, being assur'd that *Charles*, and the Captains of the companies were their friends. Whilst their suspicion of *Charles* had put the City in Arms, *Corso*, his Comrades, and many of their followers enter'd into *Florence* without any impediment: And although *Veri de Cerchi* was perswaded to oppose, he refus'd it, and told them, he would leave their Chastisement to the people of *Florence*, against whose interest *Corso* did come. But he was mistaken in his Measures, for in stead of being punished, he was received

*Charles of Valois* made Governor of *Florence*.

ceived very kindly by the people; and *Veri* was forc'd to fly for his safety. For *Corso* having forc'd his entrance at the *Porta Pinti*, drew up and made a stand at *S. Pietro Maggiori* (a place not far from his Palace) and having united with such of the people, and his friends as desir'd Novelty, and were come thither on purpose; the first thing he did was to discharge all Prisoners whatever and however committed, whether by private or publick Authority. He forc'd the *Signori* to return privately to their houses, and elected a certain Number (of the faction of the *Neri*) out of the people, to supply their places. For five days together they ransack'd and plunder'd the houses of the chief of the *Bianchi*. The *Cerchi* and the heads of that faction, seeing the people for the most part their Enemies, and *Charles* none of their friend, were retir'd out of the City, to such Castles as they had, and whereas before they would not entertain the Counsel of the *Pope*, they were now glad to implore his assistance, and to let him understand that *Charles* was not come to the advantage, but to the prejudice of the City. Whereupon the *Pope* sent his Legate *Matteo di Aquasparta* to *Florence* the second time, who not only made a peace betwixt the *Cerchi* and *Donati*, but fortified it by several marriages and alliances. Nevertheless insisting to have the *Bianchi* participate of the Chief Offices, and being deny'd by the *Neri* who had them in possession, he left the City as ill satisfi'd as before, and again Excommunicated it for its disobedience. Thus both parties continued discontented. The *Neri*, seeing their Enemies so near, were apprehensive lest by their destruction they should recover the Honours and Authority which they had lost; and as if these Fears and Animosities had been not sufficient to do mischief, new affronts and injuries were offered. *Nicholas de Cerchi*, being going with some of his friends to some of his houses, as he pass'd by the *Ponte ad Africo*, was assaulted by *Simon* son of *Corso Donati*. The Conflict was sharp, and on either side deplorable, for *Nicholas* was kill'd upon the place, and *Simon* so wounded that he died the next Morning. This accident disturb'd the whole City afresh, and though the *Neri* were indeed most Culpable, yet they were protected by the Government, and before judgment could be obtain'd, a Conspiracy was discover'd between the *Bianchi* and *Piero Terrants* (one of *Charles* his Barons) with whom they practis'd privately to be restor'd to the Government. The Plot was detected by several letters from the *Cerchi* to the said *Piero*, though some imagin'd they were counterfeited by the *Donati*, to divert the infamy they had incurr'd by the assassination of *Nicholas*. The *Cerchi* and all their Clann were at this time Prisoners to the *Donati* (and among the rest *Dante* the Poet) their Estates were Confiscated, and their houses demolish'd. Their party, with several of the *Ghibilines* that had joyn'd themselves with them, were dispers'd up and down in sundry places, attending new troubles to better their Condition; and *Charles* having finish'd what he design'd when he came thither, return'd to the *Pope* in pursuance of his Expedition into *Sicily*, in which he managed himself with no more prudence than he had done in *Florence*; but losing many of his men, he went back into *France*, with no little dishonour. After *Charles* was departed, for some time *Florence* was quiet, only *Corso* was dissatisfied, as not thinking himself in Authority suitable to his deserts: for the Government being in the hands of the people, he believed it managed by such as were much his inferiours. Moved therefore by these provocations, to varnish over a foul design with a fair pretence, he calumniated several Citizens who had had charge of the Publick money, for imbeziling of it, and applying it to their private use; giving out that it was fit they should be inquir'd after, and punished: several of his mind did the same, and many others by their ignorance and Credulity were persuaded that what *Corso* did was out of pure care and affection to his Country. On the other side the persons accus'd, having the favour of the people, stood upon their justification, and so far these differences proceeded, that after several expostulations, and civil controversies, they came at length to take Arms. On one side there were *Corso*, *Lotieri* Bishop of *Florence*, with many of the Nobility, and some of the Commons. On the other side there were the *Signori*, and the greatest part of the people: so that there was fighting in many places of the City. The *Signori*, perceiving their affairs in some danger, sent to *Lucca* for aid, and immediately all the people in *Lucca* came in to their assistance; by whose supervision things were presently compos'd, the tumults asswag'd, and the people continued in their former Liberty and Government, without any other punishment of the Author of the scandal. The *Pope* had heard of the tumults at *Florence*, and sent thither *Nicholas da Prato* his Legate to appease them, who, for his quality, learning and behaviour, being a man of great reputation, he quickly obtained such credit with the people, that they gave him Authority to reform, or Model their Government as he pleas'd. Being of the *Ghibiline* faction, he was inclin'd to call home those of that party who were banish'd; But first he thought it convenient to ingratiate with the people, by restoring their Ancient Companies, which Act added as much strength

New troubles  
occasioned by  
*Corso Donati*.

strength to their interest, as it took away from the Nobles. When he had, as he thought, sufficiently oblig'd the multitude, The Legate design'd to call home the Exiles, and try'd many ways to effect it, but was so far from succeeding in any of them, that he render'd himself suspected to the Governors, was forc'd out of the City, and leaving all in confusion, in a great passion he Excommunicated it at his departure. Nor was this City molested with one humour only, but several; there being at once the factions betwixt the Nobility and the people, the *Guelfs* and the *Ghibelines*, the *Bianchi*, and the *Neri*. At that time all the City was in Arms, and many bickerings happen'd. Many were discontented at the Legate's departure, being willing the banish'd Citizens should return. The Chief of them who rais'd the report were the *Medici* and the *Giugni*, who (with the Legate) were discover'd to be favourers of the Rebels; in the interim skirmishes and Rencounters pass'd in several places of the Town, and to add to their Calamity, a fire broke out in the *Orto S. Michel* among the houses of the *Abbati*, from thence it went to the houses of the *Caponjacchi*, and burn'd them, from thence to the houses of the *Macci*, *Amieri*, *Toschi*, *Cipriani*, *Lamberti*, *Carvalcanti*, and all the New Market; from thence it pass'd to the *Porta S. Maria*, burn'd that, and then wheeling about to the Old Bridge, it consum'd the Palaces of the *Gherardini*, *Pulci*, *Amidei*, *Lucardesi*, and with them so many other houses, that the number of all that were consum'd by that fire amounted to more than thirteen hundred. Some were of opinion it began by accident in the height of the Conflict. Others affirm it was done on purpose by *Neri Abbati*, Prior of *S. Piero Scharagio* (a dissolute and mischievous person) who seeing every body engaged, thought he might commit a piece of wickedness then, which no body should be able to remedy; and to the end it might succeed the better, and give less suspicion of him, he set the houses of his own party on fire, where he could do it with convenience. These Conflicts, and this Conflagration happen'd in *July 1304.* at which time *Corso Donati* was the only person who did not arm in those tumults; and not without reason, for thereby he presumed (when weary of their fighting they should incline to an agreement) he should more easily be chosen Empire betwixt them; at length all Arms indeed were layd down, but more that they were tyr'd, and weary of their miseries, than from any relentment or condescension on either side. The whole consequence of all was, that the Rebels were not suffer'd to return, and the party which favour'd them was forc'd to comply. The Legate being come back to *Rome*, and understanding the new distractions in *Florence*, persuaded the *Pope*, that if he design'd to compose them, it would be necessary to send for twelve of the Principal Malecontents of that City, which being the nourishment and fomentors of their miseries, their miseries would cease as soon as they were remov'd. The *Pope* took his Counsel, sent for twelve of the Chief Citizens (who came to *Rome* in obedience to his summons) and among them *Corso Donati* was one. Upon the departure of these Citizens the Legate signifi'd to the Exiles, that now was their time (the City being destitute of their heads) to return. Whereupon the Citizens which were banish'd, getting what force together they were able, they march'd to *Florence*, enter'd where the walls were unfinish'd, and pass'd on as far as the *Piazza* of *S. John*. It was a remarkable passage to consider, that those people who fought in their behalf whilst humbly and unarm'd they begged to be admitted, seeing them come forcibly into the City with their weapons in their hands, turn'd against them immediately, and joyning with the people, beat them out of the City. This Enterprize was lost by leaving part of their forces at *Lastra*, and not attending the arrival of *Tolosetto Uberti* who was coming from *Pistoia* with three hundred horse; but supposing Expedition of greater importance to their success, than Strength, they found (as many had done before) That *delay takes away the opportunity, and celerity the force*. The Rebels repuls'd, *Florence* return'd to its old divisions. To lessen the Authority of the *Carvalcanti*, the people assaulted and took from them the Castle of *Stinche* in the *Val di Greve*, which had belong'd anciently to that family; and because those who were taken in this Castle, were the first which were put in the new built Prisons, that building took its name from the Castle from whence they came, was call'd *le Stinche* from thence, and is call'd so to this day. After this, those who had the Government in their hands re-establish'd the Companies of the people; gave them the *Ensigns* which had been us'd at first under the discipline of the *Arti*. The Captains, the *Gonfalonieri* of the Companies, and the Colledge of the *Signori* were call'd, and Orders were given that they should assist the *Signoria* or Senate at all times, in time of Commotion or injury, with their Swords, and in time of peace with their Councils. To the two old Governours they added another call'd *Essecutore*, whose Office it was by conjunction with the *Gonfalonieri* to restrain and correct the insolence of the Grandees. In the mean time the *Pope* dying, *Corso* and his fellow Citizens return'd from *Rome*, and

The *Medici*  
and *Giugni*.

*Florence*  
burned, 1304.

might have liv'd quietly, had not the insatiableness of *Corso's* ambition created new troubles. To gain reputation it was always his Custom to oppose the sentiment of the Nobility in whatever was propos'd; and which way he observed the people to encline, thither he constantly directed his Authority, to work himself into their favour; so that in all Innovations and Controversies he was the Head; all persons resorting to him who had any thing extraordinary in design. Hereupon he became so odious to several considerable Citizens, that the faction of the *Neri* subdivided, and fell into open division among themselves, because *Corso* made use of private Force and Authority, and of such Persons as were enemies to the State. Yet such was the Awe and Majesty of his Person, that every body fear'd him; to deprive him of the peoples favour (which, that way, was easily disingaged) it was given out that he design'd upon the Government, and meant to make himself King; Which from his extravagant way of living was credible enough, and much confirm'd when afterwards he married a daughter of *Ugucione della Faggruola* chief of the *Bianchi*, and *Ghibilins*, and the most powerfull Person in the City. This Alliance was no sooner known among his Enemies, but his adversaries took Arms, and the people for that reason were so far from appearing in his defence, that the greater part of them joyn'd with his Enemies. The Chief of his Enemies (and who were at the head of them) were *Ressò della Tosa*, *Pazzino de Pazzo*, *Geri Spini*, and *Berto Brunelleschi*. They, their followers and the greatest part of the people, ran with their Swords drawn to the foot of the Palace of the *Signori*, by whose Order an accusation was prefer'd to *Piero Bianca* Captain of the people, against *Corso*, as a person who (by the assistance of *Ugucione*) conspired to be King. Upon this impeachment he was summon'd, and refusing to appear, was declared a Rebel for his Contumacy; there having been but two hours time betwixt the accusation and sentence: judgment pronounc'd, the *Signori*, with the several Companies of the people (their banners display'd) went presently to apprehend him. *Corso* on the other side not at all dismay'd either at the severity of the sentence, the authority of the *Signori*, nor the unconstancy of his friends (who had many of them forsaken him) fell to fortifying his house, hoping to have defended himself there till *Ugucione* (to whom he had sent word of his condition) should come to his rescue. His houses, and Avenues were fortifi'd and barricado'd by him, and strengthen'd with such Garrisons of his friends, that though the people were very numerous and press'd hard to have enter'd them, they could not prevail. The Conflict was smart, many kill'd and wounded on both sides, and the people finding there was no entrance that way by force, got into the houses of his Neighbours, and through them they brake unexpectedly into his. *Corso* finding himself environ'd by his Enemies, and no hopes of relief from *Ugucione*, despairing of Victory, he resolv'd to try what was possible for his Escape; advancing therefore with *Gherarda Bandini* and several other his most faithful and valiant friends, he charg'd so furiously upon his Enemies, that he brake them, and made his way thorow them (fighting) out of the *Porta della Croce*: Nevertheless being pursu'd, *Gherardo* was slain by *Boccaccio Cavicevilli* upon the *Africa*, and *Corso* was taken Prisoner at *Rouezano* by certain Spanish horsemen belonging to the *Signaria*. But, disdainning the sight of his Victorious Enemies, and to prevent the torments which they would probably inflict, as they were bringing him back towards *Florence*, he threw himself off his horse, and was cut to pieces by one of the Company; his body was gather'd together by the Monks of *S. Salvi*, and bury'd, but without any solemnity. This was the sad end of that Magnanimous Person, to whom his Country, and the *Neri*, ow'd much both of their good fortune and ill; and doubtless had his mind been more Moderate, his memory would have been more honourable; however he deserves a place among the best Citizens this City did ever produce, though indeed the turbulence of his Spirit caus'd his Country and party both to forget their obligations to him, and at length procur'd his death, and many mischiefs to them. *Ugucione* coming to the relief of his Son in Law as far as *Remoli*, and hearing he was taken by the people, presuming he could do him no good, to save his own stake, he return'd back as he came.

1308. *Corso* being dead in the year 1308. all tumults ceas'd, and every body liv'd quietly till news was brought that *Arrigo* the Emperor was come into *Italy* with all the *Flarentine* Exiles in his Company, whom he had promis'd to reinstate on their own Country. To obviate this, and lessen the number of their Enemies, the Magistrates thought fit of themselves to reinvite all those who had been rebels, but some few which were particularly excepted. Those which were excepted, were the greatest part of the *Ghibilins*, and some of the faction of the *Bianchi*, among which were *Dante Alegheri*, the Sons of *Veri de Cerchi*, and *Giano della Bella*. They sent likewise to desire the assistance of *Robert* King of *Naples*, but not prevailing in an amicable way without terms, they gave him the Government of their City for five years, upon condition he would defend them as his subjects. The Emperour in his passage came

came to *Pisa*, and from thence coasting along the shore, he went to *Rome*, where he was Crown'd in the year 1312; after which, addressing himself to the subducion of the *Florentines*, he marcht by the way of *Perugia* and *Arezzo* to *Florence*, and posted himself with his Army at the Monastery of *St. Sabui*, where he continued fifty days without any considerable exploit. Despairing of success against that City, he remov'd to *Pisa*, confederated with the King of *Sicily* to make an Enterprize upon *Naples*, and march'd forward with his Army; but whilst he thought himself sure of Victory, and *Robert* gave himself for lost, the Emperour died at *Buonconvento*, and that Expedition miscarri'd. Nor long after it fell out that *Ugucione* became Lord of *Pisa*, and by degrees of *Lucca*, where he joynd himself with the *Ghiblines*, and by the assistance of that faction, committed great depredations upon the Neighbours. The *Florentines* to free themselves from his Excurfions, desir'd King *Robert* that his Brother *Piero* might have the Command of their Army. In the mean time *Ugucione* was not idle. To increase his numbers, and extend his dominion, partly by force, and partly by stratagem, he had possess'd himself of many strong Castles in the Vallics of *Arno*, and *Nievole*, and having advanc'd so far as to besiege *Monte Catini*, the *Florentines* thought it necessary to Relieve it, lest otherwise that Conflagration should consume their whole Country. Having drawn together a great Army, they March'd into the *Val di Nievole*, gave battel to *Ugucione*, and after a sharp fight, were defeated. In the battel, they lost 2000. men besides *Piero* the Kings Brother, whose body could never be found. Nor was the Victory on *Ugucione's* side without some qualification, he having lost one of his Sons, and several Officers of Note. After this disaster, the *Florentines* fortifi'd at home as much as they could, and King *Robert* sent them a new General call'd the *Conte di Andrea* with the title of *Conte Novello*. By his deportment (or rather by the Genius of the *Florentines*, whose property it is to increase upon every settlement, and to fall afterwards into factions upon every accident) notwithstanding their present War with *Ugucione*, they divided again, and some were for King *Robert*, and others against him. The chief of his Adversaries were *Sama della Tosa*, the *Magalotti*, and other popular families, who had greatest interest in the Government. These persons sent first to *France*, and then into *Germany*, to raise men, and invite Officers, that by their assistance they might be able to rest themselves of their new Governour the *Conte*. But their fortune was adverse, and neither could be procur'd. Nevertheless they gave not their Enterprize over, though they had been disappointed both in *Germany* and *France*; they found out an Officer in *Agobbio*; having driven out King *Robert's* Governour, they sent for *Laudo* from *Agobbio*, and made him *Effecutore*, (or indeed Executioner) giving him absolute power over their whole City. *Laudo* being naturally cruel and avaritious, march'd with arm'd men up and down the City, plundering this place, and killing in that, as those who sent for him gave him directions; and not content with this insolence, he Coyn'd false money with the *Florentine* stamp, and no man had the power to oppose it; to such grandeur was he arriv'd by the dissention of the Citizens. Miserable certainly, and much to be lamented was the Condition of this City, which, neither the Consequences of their former divisions, their apprehension of *Ugucione*, nor the Authority of a King was sufficient to unite. Abroad they were infested by *Ugucione*; at home they were pillag'd by *Laudo*; and yet no reconciliation. The Kings friends, many of the Nobility, several great men of the *Populace*, and all the *Guelphs*, were Enemies to *Laudo* and his party. Nevertheless, the Adversary having the Authority in his hand, they could not without manifest danger discover themselves; however, that they might not be deficient in what they were able to do towards the freeing themselves of so dishonourable a Tyranny, they writ privately to King *Robert*, to intreat that he would make *Conte Guido da Buttsfolle* his Lieutenant in *Florence*. The King granted their request, sent the *Conte* to them forthwith, and the adverse party (though the *Signori* also were Enemies to the King) had not the Courage to oppose him. But the *Conte* for all that, had not much Authority confer'd, because the *Signori*, and *Gonsalarnieri* of the Companies were favourers of *Laudo* and his accomplices. During these troubles in *Florence*, the daughter of *Alberto* coming out of *Germany*, pass'd by the City in her way to her husband *Charles* Son to King *Robert*. She was very honourably received by such as were freinds to the King, who complaining to her of the sad Condition of their City, and the Tyranny of *Laudo* and his party, she promis'd her assistance, and by the help of her interposition, and such as were sent thither from the King, the Citizens were reconcil'd, *Laudo* depos'd from his Authority, and sent home to *Agobbio* full of treasure and blood. *Laudo* being gone, they fell to Reform; and the *Signoria* was confirm'd by the King for three years longer; and because before there were VII in the Senate of *Laudo's* party, VI new were chosen of the Kings, and they continu'd XIII. for sometime;

New divisions.

*Laudo de Agobbio.*



*Castruccio  
Castracani.*

but they were reduced afterwards to VII their old number. About this time *Uguccione* was driven out of *Lucca*, and *Pisa*, and *Castruccio Castracani*, a Citizen of *Lucca*, succeeded him in the Government; and being a brave and Courageous young Gentleman, and Fortunate in all his Undertakings, in a short time he made himself Chief of the *Ghibelin* faction in *Tuscany*. For this cause, laying aside their private discords, the *Florentines* for several years made it their business, first to obstruct the growth of *Castruccio's* Power, and afterwards, (in case he should grow powerful against their will) to consider which way they were to defend themselves against him: and that the *Signori* might deliberate with more Counsel, and Execute with more Authority, they Created XII. Citizens (which they call'd *Buonhumani*) without whose advice and concurrence the *Signori* were not to do any thing of importance. In the mean time the Authority of King *Robert* expir'd; the Government devolv'd once more upon the City, which set up the old *Rettori* and *Magistrates* as formerly, and their fear of *Castruccio* kept them Friends, and united. *Castruccio* after many brave things performed against the Lord's of *Lunigiana*, sat down before *Prato*: The *Florentines* alarm'd at the news, resolv'd to relieve it, and shutting up their Shops, they got together in a confus'd and tumultuous manner about 20000 Foot and 1500 Horse; and to lessen the force of *Castruccio* and add to their own, Proclamation was made by the *Signori*, that what ever Rebel of the *Guelfs* should come in to the relief of *Prato*, should be restor'd afterwards to his Country: upon which Proclamation more than 4000 of the *Guelfs* came in and joyned with them, by which accession, their Army being become formidable, they march'd with all speed towards *Prato*, but *Castruccio*, having no mind to hazard a Battail against so considerable a force, drew off and retreated to *Lucca*. Upon his retreat, great Controversie arose in the Army betwixt the Nobility and the people. The people would have pursued, and fought in hopes to have overcome and destroyed him; the Nobility would return, alledging they had done enough already in exposing *Florence* for the relief of *Prato*. That there being a necessity for that, it was well enough done, but now, no necessity being upon them, little to be gotten, and much to be lost, fortune was not to be tempted, nor the Enemy to be follow'd. Not being able to accord among themselves, the business was referred to the *Signori*, which consisting of Nobility and Commons, they fell into the same difference of opinion, which being known to the City, they assembled in great multitudes in the *Piazza*, threatening the Nobility highly, till at last they condescended. But their resolution coming too late, and many constrain'd to joyn in it against their persuasions, the Enemy had time, and drew safely off to *Lucca*. This difference put the people into such a huff against the Nobility, the *Signori* refus'd to perform the Promise they made to the Rebels which came in upon Proclamation, which the Rebels perceiving, they resolv'd to be before hand, if possible, and accordingly presented themselves at the Gates of the City to be admitted before the Army came up; but their design being suspected, miscarried, and they were beaten back by those who were left in the Town: To try if they could obtain that by treaty, which they could not compass by force, they sent eight *Embassadors* to the *Signori*, to commemorate to them the Faith they had given; the dangers they had run thereupon; and that it could not be unreasonable they should have their promised reward. The Nobility thought themselves obliged, having promis'd them particularly as well as the *Signori*, and therefore employ'd all their interest for the advantage of the Rebels; but the Commons (being intrag'd that the Enterprize against *Castruccio* was not prosecuted as it might have been) would not consent; which turn'd afterwards to the great shame and dishonour of the City. The Nobility being many of them disgusted thereat, endeavour'd that by force, which was denyed them upon applications; and agreed with the *Guelfs*, that if they would attempt their entrance without, they would take up Arms in their assistance within; but their Plot being discover'd the Day before it was to be Executed, when the banish'd *Guelfs* came to make their attack, they found the City in Arms, and all things so well dispos'd to repell them without and suppress those within, that none of them durst venture, and so the Enterprize was given over without any effort. The Rebels being departed, it was thought fit those Persons should be punish'd who invited them thither; nevertheless though every Body could point at the delinquents, yet no Body durst Name them, much more accuse them. That the truth might impartially be known, it was ordered that the Names of the Offenders should be written down; and deliver'd privately to the Captain; which being done, the Persons accused were *Amerigo Donati*, *Teghiala Frescobaldi*, and *Loderingo Gherardini*, whose Judges being now more favourable than (perhaps) their crime deserv'd, they were only condemn'd to pay a Sum of Money, and came off.

The tumults in *Florence* upon the alarm by the Rebels, demonstrated clearly that to the Company of the People one Captain was not sufficient; and therefore it was ordered for  
the



the future, that every Company should have three or four, and every *Gonfalonier* two or three join'd to them, which should be call'd *Pennomeri*, that, in case of necessity, where the whole Company could not be drawn out, part of it might appear under one of the said Officers. And as it happens in all Common-wealths, after any great accident, some or other of the old *Laws* are abrogated, and others reviv'd to supply them, so the *Signoria* being at first but occasional and temporary, the Senators and *Collegi* then in being (having the power in their hands) took Authority upon themselves to make a Council of the *Signori*, which should sit forty Months for the future, their Names being to be put into a purse, and drawn out every two Months. But for as much as many of the Citizens were jealous their Names were not in the purse, there was a new *Imborfation* before the forty Months began. Hence it was, the custom of the purse had its Original, and was us'd in the Creation of their Magistrats, both at home and abroad, whereas formerly they were chosen by a Council of the Successors, as the term of the Office began to expire. At first this way of election was call'd *Imborfationi*, and afterwards *Squittini*. And because every three, or at most five years, this custom was to be us'd, it was thought they had prevented great mischiefs to the City, occasion'd by multitude of Competitors, and tumults at every election of Magistrats, which tumults being to be corrected no way (in their Judgments) so readily, they pitched upon this, not discerning the evils which they conceal'd under so small a convenience. It was now in the year 1325. when *Castruccio* having seiz'd on *Pistoia*, was grown so considerable, that the *Florentines* (jealous of his greatness) resolv'd before he had settled his new conquest, to fall upon him, and recover it (if possible) out of his hands. Whereupon of Citizens and their Friends they assembled 20000 Foot, and 3000 Horse, and encamp'd before *Alto Pasco*, by taking it, to render the relief of *Pistoia* the more difficult. The *Florentines* took that pass, and when they had done, they march'd towards *Lucca*, foraging and wasting the Countrey. But by the Imprudence and Treachery of their Commander, little progress was made. This Person (call'd *Ramondo da Cardona*) observing the *Florentines* to have been very liberal of their liberty, and to have confer'd the Government sometimes upon Kings, sometimes upon Legats, and sometimes upon more inferiour Persons; he thought with himself, that if he could bring them into any exigence, or distress, it might easily fall out that they would make him their Prince; to this purpose he frequently desir'd and press'd to have the same Authority invested in him in the City, as he had in the Army, otherwise he could not require nor expect that Obedience which was necessary for a General. The *Florentines* not hearing on that Ear, their Captain proceeded but slowly, neglecting his time, as much as *Castruccio* improv'd it; for *Castruccio* having procur'd supplies from the *Visconti*, and other Princes of *Lombardy*, and made himself strong, *Ramondo* (who before lost his opportunity of conquering for want of fidelity) now lost the possibility of preserving himself, for want of discretion; for marching up and down lazily with his Army, he was overtaken by *Castruccio* near *Alto Pasco*, assaulted, and after a long fight, broken to pieces; in which Action many *Florentines* were taken Prisoners and Kill'd, and their General among the rest, who receiv'd the reward of his infidelity and ill Counsel from Fortune her self, which had been more properly bestow'd by the hands of the *Florentines*. The calamities which *Castruccio* introduced upon the *Florentines* after his Victory; the Depradations, Imprisonments, Ruin's, and Burnings, are not to be express'd; having no Body to oppose him, for several Months together, he went where, and did what he had a mind to, and the *Florentines* thought themselves happy, (after such a defeat) if they could save the City. Nevertheless they were not so desperately low, but they made great provisions of Money, rais'd what Soldiers was possible, and sent to their Friends for assistance; but no providence was sufficient against such an Enemy: they were forc'd therefore to make choice of *Carlo Duke of Calabria* (the Son of King *Robert*) to be their Sovereign; if it would please him to undertake their defence; for that Family having been us'd to the Supremacy of that City, they promis'd him rather their Obedience, than Friendship. But *Carlo* being personally employ'd in the Wars of *Sicily*, he sent *Gualsiers* (a French Man and) *Duke of Athens*, to take possession in his behalf. He as his Masters Lieutenant, took possession of the Government, and created Magistrats as he pleas'd. Notwithstanding his behaviour was so modest, and in a manner so contrary to his own Nature, every one lov'd him. Having finish'd his War in *Sicily*, *Charles* came with a thousand Horse to *Florence*, and made his entry in July 1326. His arrival gave some impediment to *Castruccio*, & kept him from rammaging up and down the Country with that freedom and security which he had formerly done. But what the City gain'd abroad, it lost at home, and when their Enemies were restrain'd, they became expos'd to the insolence and oppression of their Friends: for the *Signori* acting nothing without the consent of the *Duke*, in a years time he drain'd the City of four hundred thousand *Florins*, though in the Articles of agreement

The Council of the *Signori* to sit forty Months, whereas before it was occasional.

Election of Magistrats by *Imborfation*.

*Ramondo da Cardona* General of the *Florentines*.

The *Duke of Athens* Governor of *Florence*.

Lord the Em-  
perour called  
into Italy.

The Death  
of Castruccio  
and the Duke  
of Calabria.

New reform-  
ation.

agreement it was expressly provided he should not exceed 200000. So great were the Impositions which he, or his Father laid upon the Town; and yet as if these were too few, their miseries were increas'd by an accumulation of new jealousies, and new Enemies. For the *Ghiblins*, of *Lombardy* were so fearful of *Carlos* advance into *Tuscany*, that *Gualazzo Visconti*, and the rest of the princes of *Lombardy*, with Money and fair Promises persuaded *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, (who had been Elected Emperour against the Popes will) to pass into *Italy* with an Army. Being arriv'd in *Lombardy*, he pass'd forward into *Tuscany*, made himself Master of *Pisa* by the assistance of *Castruccio*, and having receiv'd a considerable supply of Money there, he march'd on towards *Rome*: Whereupon *Charles* (being fearful of his Kingdom) and leaving *Philippo da Sagimto* his Lieutenant in *Florence*, went Home with the Force he brought with him. Upon his departure, *Castruccio* seiz'd upon *Pisa*, and the *Florentines* got *Pistoia* by stratagem: *Castruccio* march'd immediatly to recover it, sat down before it, and manag'd his business with so much Conduct and resolution, that though the *Florentines* made many attempts to relieve it, both by Insults upon his Army, and incursions into his Country, their Attacks, and their diligences were all ineffectual, they could not possibly remove him; for so firmly was he resolv'd to chastise the *Pistoians*, and weaken the *Florentines*, that the *Pistoians* were constrain'd to surrender, and receive him once more for their Lord; by which Action as he contracted much Honour and Renown, so he thereby contracted so much Sickness and Infirmity, that he died shortly after upon his return to *Lucca*. And, because one ill or good accident goes seldom alone; *Charles Duke of Calabria* and Lord of *Florence* died at *Naples* much about the same time; so that in a very small space the *Florentines* were freed from the oppression of the one, and the apprehension of the other. They were no sooner free, but they fell to reforming, null'd all the Laws and Ordinances of the ancient Councils, and created two new, one of them consisting of three hundred of the Commons, the other of two hundred both Commons and Gentlemen; the first was call'd the Council of the People, and the second the Common Council.

The Emperour being arriv'd at *Rome*, he created an *Anti-Pope*; decreed many things to the prejudice of the Church; and attempted more, which he was not able to carry; so that at length he removed (with no little disgrace) from *Rome* to *Pisa*, where, either disdainning his Conduct, or for want of their Pay, eight hundred *German* Horse mutiny'd, fortifi'd themselves at *Monte Ariaro*, and as he was departed from *Pisa* towards *Lombardy*, possess'd themselves of *Lucca*, and drave out *Francisco Castracani*, whom the Emperour had left Governour of the Town: Being Masters of that City, and their intentions to make what profit of it they could, they offer'd it to the *Florentines* for twenty thousand *Florins*, but by the advice of *Simon della Tosa* it was refus'd; this resolution would have been much to the advantage of our City, had the *Florentines* persever'd; but changing it afterwards, it prov'd much to their detriment; for refusing it at that time when they might have had it so cheap, they had much more for it afterwards, and were denied it; which was the occasion that *Florence* chang'd its Government often, to its great inconvenience. *Lucca*, being refus'd in this manner by the *Florentines*, was purchased for 30000 *Florins* by *Gherardino Spinoli* a *Genovese*, and (because People are more slow and indifferent in accepting what is offer'd, than in conceiving what is not) as soon as it was known to be bought by *Gherardino*, and at how cheap a rate, the *Florentines* were much troubled they had it not themselves, and blam'd all those who had any way discouraged them. To buy it being too late, they sought to gain it by force, and to that end sent their Army to over-run and spoil the Country about it. About this time the Emperour was return'd out of *Italy*, and the *Pope*, by Order of the *Pisani*, sent Prisoner into *France*. The *Florentines* upon the Death of *Castruccio* (which follow'd in the year 1328) till the year 1340 continu'd quiet at Home; Intent only upon their Wars abroad. In *Lombardy* upon the coming of *John* King of *Bohemia*, and in *Tuscany* upon the account of *Lucca*; they adorn'd their City likewise with many new Buildings, and particularly the Tower of *St. Reparata* according to the directions of *Giolto* the most Famous Painter in his time. Moreover, upon an inundation of the River *Arno* in the year 1333 (in which the Water swelling twelve fathoms high in some places of *Florence* carried away several Bridges, and many Houses were ruin'd) they repair'd all, with great care and expence. But in the year 1340 this tranquillity was disturb'd, and they had new occasion of alteration. The *Grandees* of the City had two ways to maintain, and increase their Authority. One was by ordering the *Imborsations* so; as the Magistracy should fall always either to them or their Friends. The other was by making themselves chief in the Elections of the *Rettori*, and thereby obliging them to be favourable to them afterwards in all their determinations. And of this second way they were so fond and conceited, that not content with two *Rettori* (as they had formerly)

The Floren-  
tines quiet at  
Home.

Their Build-  
ings.

formerly. A while after they set up a third, with the Title of the Captain of the Guards, in which Office they plac'd *Jacomo Gabrieli d' Agobbio*, with absolute Power over the Citizens. *Jacomo* in the sight of the Government, committed daily many Injuries, but more especially to *Piero de Baldi*, and *Bardo Frescobaldi*. Being Nobly descended, and by consequence proud, they could not endure, to have a stranger do them wrong, in defiance of their other Magistrates. To revenge themselves of him, and the Government, they enter'd into a Conspiracy with several Noble, and Popular Families in the City, who were disgusted with their Tyranny. The manner concluded upon was, that every one should get as many Arm'd Men into his House as he could, and that on All-Saints Day in the Morning, when all the People were at Mass, they should take Arms, kill the Captain, and the chief of their Governours, and afterwards make new Magistrates, and new Laws for the State. But because dangerous enterprizes, the more considered, are always the less willingly undertaken; it happens that Plots which allow too much time for their Execution, are generally discover'd: There being among the Conspirators a Gentleman call'd *Andrea di Bardi*, whose fear of Punishment prevailing upon him, beyond his desire of Revenge, he betray'd all to *Jacomo Alberti*, his Kinsman, *Jacomo* imparted it immediatly to the *Priors*, and the *Priors* to the Governours. And because the design was so near Execution, All-Saints day being at hand, many of the Citizens assembled in the Palace, and judging it unsafe to defer, they would needs persuade the *Signori* to cause the great Bell to be rung, and the People commanded to their Arms. *Taldo Valori* was at that time *Gonfaloniere*, and *Francisca Salvati* one of the *Signori*. Being Relations of the *Bardi* they dissuaded the sounding of the Bell, alledging it was not secure to Arm the People upon trivial Occasions, because Authority given to them, without some power reserv'd to restrain them, was never known to produce any good, and that it was much easier to raise a Tumult, than to suppress it. They judg'd it better therefore to inquire farther into the verity of the thing, and punish it rather Civilly (if it appear'd to be true) than in a furious and tumultuous manner to correct it, perhaps with the destruction of the whole City. But these Arguments serv'd not the return, but with Vilainous language, and Insolent behaviour the *Signori* were constrain'd to cause the Bell to be rung, upon which the People immediatly took Arms, and away to the Piazza. The *Bardi*, and *Frescobaldi* perceiving they were discover'd, and resolving to overcome with Honour or die without Shame, betook themselves to their Arms, hoping they would be able to defend that part of the City beyond the Bridge where their Houses were; whereupon they broke down the Bridges, and fortif'd themselves, till they should be reliev'd by the Nobility of the Country, and other Persons their Friends. But that design was frustrated by the People which lived among them in the same part of the City, who took up Arms for the *Signori*; finding themselves entermixt, and that design not like to succeed, they abandon'd the Bridges, and retreated to the Street where the *Bardi* dwelt, as stronger than the rest, where they made a most valient defence. *Jacomo d' Agobbio* knew well enough that all this Conspiracy was against him; and having no great inclination to be kill'd, in a terrible fright, with his hair standing right up, he ran to the Palace of the *Signori*, and secur'd himself among the thickest of the Arm'd Men. The other of the *Rettori*, though not so conscious, were much more couragious, especially the *Podestà* call'd *Maffeo da Maradi*, who presenting himself where they were fighting, and passing the Bridge *Rubaconte*, threw himself undauntedly among the Swords of the *Bardi*, and made a sign for a Parly. Upon which, out of reverence to his Person, his Courage and good qualities, they let fall their Arms, and stood quietly to attend him. In a modest and grave harangue he blam'd their proceedings; remonstrated the danger they were in, if they did not yield to the indignation of the People; he gave them hopes likewise of a fair hearing, and a merciful sentence, and promis'd his intercession for them; then returning to their *Signori* he persuaded that they would not use extremities, and conquer with the loss of so many Citizens lives, nor condemn without hearing. In short, so far he obtain'd, that by consent of the *Signori*, *Baldi*, *Frescobaldi* and their Friends left the City, and retir'd to their Castles without any Impediment. They being gone, and the People disarm'd, the *Signori* proceeded only against such of the Families of the *Baldi* and *Frescobaldi* as had taken Arms, and to lessen their Power, they bought the Castles of *Mangona*, and *Vernia* of the *Bardi*, and made a Law that no Citizen should for the future possess any Castle within twenty miles of *Florence*. Not many months after *Sigghia Frescobaldi*, and several others of that Family were beheaded, having been proclaim'd Rebels before. But it was not sufficient for these Governours to have conquer'd and suppress'd the *Baldi* and *Frescobaldi*; like other People (whose insolence for the most part increases with their Power) they grew impetuous as they grew strong. Whereas, before the *Florentines* had only one Captain of the Guards to afflict them, they chose another now for the Country, investing him with great

A Captain  
of the Guards*Maffeo da  
Maradi.*

Authority;

Authority, that those Persons whom they suspected, might not be suffered to live quietly either within the City or without; and besides this they abus'd and provok'd the Nobility in such manner, that they were ready to Sacrifice, and sell both themselves and City to be reveng'd, and watching for an occasion, they met one, and improv'd it. By the many troubles in Lombardy, and Tuscany, Lucca was fallen under the Dominion of *Mastino della Scala* Lord of Verona; who engaged to deliver it up to the *Florentines*, but did not perform; for being Lord of Parma he thought himself able to keep it, and valued not the breach of his Faith. The *Florentines*, in revenge, joyn'd with the *Venetians*, and made such war upon him, he had well nigh lost most of his territory; but the *Florentines* got little by it, more than the satisfaction to have distress'd *Mastino*: for the *Venetian* (according to the practice of all States when enter'd into League with People less powerful than themselves) having taken *Trevigi*, and *Vicenza*; made a peace without any regard to the *Florentines*. A while after, the *Visconti* Lords of Milan, having taken Parma from *Mastino*, conceiving himself unable to keep Lucca any longer, he resolv'd to sell it. The *Florentines* and the *Pisani* were competitors in the purchase, and whilst the bargain was driving, the *Pisani* perceiving the *Florentines* like to carry it, in respect that they were the more wealthy of the two; they betook themselves to force, and joyning with the *Visconti*, they sat down before it. The *Florentines* not at all discourag'd, proceeded in their bargain, and having concluded their terms, they paid down part of the Money to *Mastino*, and giving Hostages for the rest, the Town was to be deliver'd, whereupon *Naddo Rucellai*, *Giovanni de Bernardino de Medici*, and *Rosso di Rsccardo de Ricci*, were sent to take possession, who passing by force into Lucca, they were receiv'd by *Mastino*, and the Town deliver'd up into their hands. However, the *Pisani* continued their siege, and endeavour'd by all possible industry to gain it by force. The *Florentines* on the other side were as solicitous to relieve it, but after a long War, with great dishonor, and the loss of their Money, they were driven out of it; and the Town became subject to the *Pisans*. The loss of this City (as in such cases doth frequently happen) put the People of Florence into a Mutiny against their Governors, so that in all places they upbraided the conduct and administration of their Superiors. At the beginning of the War the management of the Military affairs was committed to XX. Citizens, who made *Maletesta di Rimini* their General, who having executed his Command with little courage, and less discretion, they apply'd themselves to *Robert King of Naples* for assistance. In compliance with their request, King *Robert* sent them supplies under the Command of *Gualtieri Duke of Athens*, who (the Heavens ordaining that all things should concur to their future misery) arriv'd at Florence at the very time when the Enterprize of Lucca was utterly lost. The XX. Governors of the Militia, seeing the People inrag'd, thought by choosing a new General, either to inspire them with new hopes, or take away the occasion of their obloquy; and because their fears were still upon them, that the Duke of Athens might defend them the better, they first made him Conservator, and afterwards General. The Nobility, upon the reasons above said, being highly discontented, and many of them retaining a correspondence with *Gualtieri* ever since he was Governor of Florence in the behalf of *Charles Duke of Calabria*, they began to think now was their time to wreck their malice, and to ruine the City, believing there was no way left them to subdue the People who had insulted so long, but by subjecting them to a Prince, who knowing the Generosity of the Nobles, and the insolence of the Commons, might recompense both according to their deserts; besides they presum'd it would be something meritorious, if upon their motion, and by their cooperation he acquir'd the Government. In pursuance of this design, they had many private meetings, in which they prest him to take the Government wholly into his hands, and they would assist him to the utmost. Nor were the Nobility alone in this business, some of the Popular families (as the *Peruzzi*, *Acciarvoli*, *Antellesi*, and *Buonaccorsi*) joyn'd themselves with them; for being much in debt, and unable out of their own Estates to clear themselves, they Plotted against other Peoples, and to free themselves of their Creditors, made no scruple of enslaving their Country. These persuasions exasperated the Ambition of the Duke, who, to gain the reputation among the people of being just and exact, persecuted those who had the management of the Wars against Lucca, caus'd *Giovan de Medici*, *Naddo Rucellai*, and *Gualmo Altoviti* to be put to death, banish'd several others, and others he fined. These executions startled the middle sort of the Citizens, only the Grandees, and the Common People were satisfi'd; the last, out of their natural pleasure in mischief, the first to see themselves so handsomly reveng'd for the insolencies they had receiv'd from the People. Whereupon, when ever the Duke appear'd in the streets, he was pursued with acclamations, and applauses of his integrity, every one exhorting him to go on in finding out, and punishing the frauds of their Neighbours. The Authority of

Lucca sold to the Florentines.

Taken from them by the Pisans.

The Duke of Athens.

of the XX. was much lessen'd, the Dukes reputation increas'd, and a general fear of him overspread the whole City; so that to show their affections towards him, all People caus'd his Arms to be painted upon their Houses, and nothing but the bare title was wanting to make him a Prince. Being now in a condition (as he thought) of attempting any thing securely, he caus'd it to be signifi'd to the Senate, that for the good of the Publick he judg'd it necessary they should transfer their Authority upon him, and that (seeing the whole City approv'd it) he desir'd he might have their resignation. The *Signori*, having long foreseen the ruine of their Country approaching, were much troubled at the message: They were sensible of the danger they were in, yet not to be deficient in any Act of duty to their Country, they refus'd him courageously. As a pretence and specimen of his Religion, and humility, the Duke had taken up his quarters in the Monastery of St. Croce, and being desirous to give the finishing stroke to his wicked designs, he by Proclamation requir'd all the People to appear before him the next morning in the *Piazza* belonging to that Monastery. This Proclamation alarmed the *Signori* more than his message, whereupon joyning themselves with such as were lovers both of their liberty and Country, upon consideration of the Power of the Duke, and that their force was insufficient, it was resolv'd they should address themselves to him in an humble and supplicatory way, to try if by their Prayers they might prevail with him to give his Enterprize over, or else to execute it with more moderation. All things being concluded, part of the *Signori* were sent to attend him, and one of them accosted him in this manner. *My Lord, we are come hither, mov'd first by your Proposal, and next by your Proclamation for assembling the People, presuming your resolution is to obtain that by force, to which upon private application we have not consented: it is not our design to oppose force against force, but rather to remonstrate the burden and heaviness of that load you would take upon your self, and the dangers which will probably occur. And this we do, that you may hereafter remember, and distinguish betwixt ours, and the Counsel of such as advise the contrary, not so much out of respect and deference to your advantage, as for the venting their own private fury and revenge. Your endeavour is to bring this City into servitude, (which has always liv'd free) because the Government has been formerly given by us to the Kings of Naples, whereas that was rather an association, than a subjection. Have you consider'd how important and dear the Name of Liberty is to us? A thing, no force can extirpate, no time can extinguish, nor no merit preponderate. Think, Sir, I beseech you, what Power will be necessary to keep such a City in subjection. All the strangers you can entertain will not be sufficient; those which are Inhabitants you cannot prudently trust; for though at present they are Friends, and have push'd you forward upon this resolution, yet, as soon as they have glutted themselves upon their Enemies, their next Plot will be to expel you, and make themselves Princes. The People, in whom your greatest confidence is placed, will turn, upon every slight accident, against you, so that in a short time you will run a hazard of having the whole City your Enemies, which will infallibly be the ruine both of it and your self; because those Princes only can be secure, whose Enemies are but few, and they easily remov'd either by banishment or death; but against universal hatred there is no security, because the spring and fountain is not known, and he that fears every Man, can be safe against no Man. If yet you persist, and take all possible care to preserve your self, you do but encumber your self with more danger, by exciting their hatred, and making them more intent and serious in their revenge. That time is not able to eradicate our desire of Liberty, is most certain. We could mention many good Cities in which it has been reassum'd by those who never tasted the sweetness of it, yet upon the bare character and tradition of their Fathers, they have not only valu'd, but fought and contended to recover it, and maintain'd it afterwards against all difficulties and dangers. Nay, should their Fathers have neglected, or forgot to recommend it, the publick Palaces, the Courts for the Magistrats, the Ensigns of their freedom (which are of necessity to be known by all Citizens) would certainly proclaim it. What action of yours can counterpoize against the sweetness of Liberty? For what can you do to expunge the desire of it out of the Hearts of the People? Nothing at all, no, though you should add all Tuscany to this State, and return every day into this City with new victory over your Enemies. The Honor would be yours, not ours; and the Citizens have gain'd fellow-servants rather than subjects. Nor is it the power of your deportment to establish you. Let your Life be never so exact, your conversation affable, your judgments just, your liberality never so conspicuous, all will not do; all will not gain you the affections of the People; if you think otherwise, you deceive your self, for to People that have liv'd free, every link is a load, and every bond a burthen. And to find a state violently acquir'd, to accord quietly with its Prince (though never so good) is impossible; of necessity one must*

The Speech  
of one of the  
Senators to the  
Duke of Athens

comply and frame it self to the other, or else one must ruine and destroy the other. You have this therefore to consider, whether you will hold this City by violence (for which all the Guards and Citadels within, and all the friends could be made abroad, have been many times too weak) or be content with the Authority we give you, to which last we do rather advise, because no Dominion is so durable as that which is voluntary, and the other (however your ambition may disguise it) will but conduct you to a height, where being neither able to advance, nor continue, you must tumble down of necessity, to your own great detriment as well as ours. But the Dukes heart was too hard for such impressions as these. He reply'd, That it was not his intention to extirpate, but to establish their Liberty: that Cities divided were the only Cities that were servile, and not those that were united. That if he by his conduct could clear their City of their Schisms, Ambitions, and Animosities, he could not be said to take away, but to restore their liberty. That he did not assume that Office out of any ambition of his own, but accepted it at the importunity of several of the Citizens, and that they would do well to consent themselves, as their fellows had done. That as to the dangers he was like to incur, he did not consider them; It was the part of an ignoble Person to decline doing good, for fear of evil that might follow; and of a Coward to lay aside a glorious Enterprize, upon the meer doubtfulness of the success. That he hop'd so to demean himself, that they should in a short time confess, they had fear'd him too much, and trusted him too little. The Senate finding by this answer no good was to be done, consented the People should meet next morning, as appointed, and the Government by their Authority to be transfer'd upon the Duke for a year, with the same conditions it had been formerly given to the Duke of Calabria. On the 8th of September 1242. The Duke, accompany'd by Giovan della Tossa, all his Consorts, and many Citizens besides, coming into the Piazza, taking the Senate with him, he mounted upon the Ringhiera, (which are the Stairs at the foot of the *Palagie de Signori*) and caus'd the Articles of agreement betwixt the Senate and Him to be read. When the Person who read them came to the place where the Government was mentioned to be given to him for a year, the People cry'd out, *For his Life, For his Life.* Francesco Rusticelli, one of the *Signori*, rose up to have spoke, and endeavor'd to compose the tumult; but he was interrupted, and could not be heard. So that he was chosen Lord by consent of the People, not for a year, but for ever, and afterwards taken and carried thorow the multitude with general acclamation. It is a custom among the *Florentines*; that whoever is intrusted with the Guard of their Palace, is to be shut up in it in the absence of the *Signori*. That trust was at that time in the hands of *Rimieri di Giotto*, who being corrupted by some of the Dukes Creatures, receiv'd him into the Palace without any constraint. The Senate being surpriz'd, and much affronted, return'd to their Houses, left the Palace to be plundered by the Dukes servants, the *Gonfalone del Popolo* to be turn'd out, and the Dukes Standard to be set up, all which were immediatly done to the ineffimable trouble of all good Men, but to the joy and satisfaction of those who maliciously or ignorantly had consented to his exaltation. The Duke was no sooner settled in his Dominion, but to suppress their Authority, who were the greatest propugnators of their liberty, he forbid the *Signori* to meet in the Palace, and consign'd them a private house. He took away the Ensigns from the *Gonfalonieri* of the companies of the People. He discharg'd all Prisoners, he recall'd the *Baldi* and *Frescobaldi* from banishment, prohibited the wearing of arms; and to defend himself within, he made what friends he could abroad: to that purpose he carels'd the *Aretini* and all others which depended any way upon the *Florentines* jurisdiction. He made a peace with the *Pisani* (though he was become a Prince) that with the more advantage he might make War with them afterward. He took away their Bills and assignments from the Merchants, who had lent the State money in their War with *Lucca*. He increas'd the old Gabels, and impos'd new. He dissolv'd the Authority of the *Signori*, and in their places he set up three *Rettori*, *Barghiane da Perugia*, *Guglielmo da Scesi*, and *Cerretiers Budonini*; with whom he constantly advised. The Taxes he laid upon the People were great, his judgments unjust, and that humanity and preciseness which he counterfeited at first, was now turn'd most manifestly into cruelty and pride, by which means many Citizens of the more Noble and Wealthy sort, were Condemn'd, Executed, and some time Tortur'd. And that his Government might be as unsupportable, abroad as at home, he instituted six new *Rettori* for the regiment of the Country, who carryed themselves with the same insolence and oppression there, as he did in the City. He was jealous of the Nobility; though he had been often oblig'd by them; and some of them had been recall'd from their banishment by him; yet he could not imagine it compatible with the generosity of a Noble Spirit to submit and truckle to him. Hence it was, he apply'd himself to the People, cajoling them, and scrugging into their favour, by which and his power abroad; he doubted not to be able to justify his

The Dukes  
Answer.

1242.

The Dukes  
of Athens chosen  
Prince by  
the People.

The Duke of  
Athens his pra-  
ctice in Florence.

his proceedings, how unjust and Tyrannical so ever. The month of *May* being come, in which the People were wont to make merry; he caus'd the inferiour sort of the People to be dispos'd into several Companies, gave them Ensigns and money, and honoured them with splendid titles, so that half of the City went up and down feasting and junketting among their Brethren, while the other half was as busie to entertain them. The fame of his new Dominion being spread abroad, many Persons of *French* extraction repair'd to him, and he prefer'd them all, as the most faithful of his friends; so that in a short time *Florence* was not only subject to the *Frenchmen*, but to the *French* customs and garb; all People, Men as well as Women, without respect of indecency or inconvenience, imitating them in all things; But that which was incomparably the most displeasing, was the violence he and his Creatures us'd to the Women, without any regret. Upon these provocations the Citizens were full of indignation. It troubled them to see the Majesty of their Government prostitute and ruin'd; it troubl'd them to see Ordinances abolish'd; their Laws abrogated; honest conversation corrupted, and civil modesty despis'd; for they who had never been accusom'd to any regal pomp whatsoever, could not without sorrow behold the *Duke* environ'd with his Guards both on foot and on horse-back. But their destruction being in his hands, they were necessitated to dissemble, and to court and honor him outwardly whom they hated at their hearts; another inducement was the fear they had conceiv'd upon the frequent executions, and continual taxes with which he impoverish'd and exhausted the City; and the *Duke* understood very well both their fear, and their anger. It happen'd that *Matteo di Morozzo*, to ingratiate with the *Duke*, or to disentangle himself, had discover'd to him a certain Plot which the house of *Medici* and some others had contriv'd against him. The *Duke* was so far from inquiring into the matter, that he caus'd the informer to be put to death, by which act he discourag'd such as would otherwise have advertis'd him, upon occasion, and animated those who were dispos'd to destroy him. He likewise caus'd the tongue of *Betoni Cimè* to be pull'd out with such cruelty that he died of it; and for no other cause but that he had spoke against the taxes, which he impos'd upon the City. This last outrage compleated the rest; the People grew perfectly mad, and the *Duke* perfectly odious: for that City, which was accustomed heretofore to speak of every thing freely, and to do what they list'd, could not possibly brook to have their hands tyed, and their mouths stop'd up by a stranger. Their fury and passion increasing at this rate, not only the *Florentines* ( who neither know how to maintain liberty, nor endure slavery ) were incens'd, but the most servile Nation in the World would have been inflam'd to have attempted the recovery of its freedom. Whereupon many Citizens of all qualities and degrees resolv'd to destroy him; and it fell out, that, at the same time, three Conspiracies were on foot by three sorts of People, the Grandees, the People, and Artificers. Besides the General oppression, each party had its peculiar reason. The Nobility were not restor'd to the Government; the People had lost it; and the Artificers trade was decay'd. The Archbishop of *Florence*, *Agnolo Acciaiuoli*, had in his Sermons highly magnifi'd the qualities of the *Duke*, and procur'd him great favour among the People; but after he was Governor, and his tyranny became notorious, they found how the Archbishop had deluded them. To make them amends for the fault he had committed, he thought nothing could be more reasonable, than that the same hand that gave them the wound should endeavour to cure it, and therefore he, made himself head of the first and most considerable Conspiracy, in which were engag'd with him the *Bardi*, *Rossi*, *Frescobaldi*, *Scali*, *Altoviti*, *Magalotti*, *Strozzi*, and *Mancini*. The Principals of the second Conspiracy were *Manno* and *Corso Donati*, and with them the *Pazzi*, *Caviccioni*, *Cerchi*, and *Albizzi*. Of the third *Antonio Adimari* was the head, and with him the *Medici*, *Bordini*, *Rucellai*, and *Aldobrandini*. Their design was to have kill'd him in the house of the *Albizzi*, whether it was suppos'd he would go on Midsummer day to see the running of the Horses; but he went not that day, and that design was lost. The next proposition was, to kill him as he was walking in the streets, but that was found to be difficult, because he went always well arm'd, and well attended, and his motions being various and uncertain, they could not tell where it was most proper to way-lay him. Then it was debated to slay him in the Council, but that also was not without danger, because though they should kill him, they must of necessity remain at the mercy of his Guards. Whilst these things were in debate, among the Conspirators, *Antonio Adimari*, in hopes of assistance from them, discover'd the Plot to some of his Friends in *Siena*, told them the Principal of the Conspirators, and assur'd them the whole City were dispos'd to redeem themselves; whereupon one of the *Siennesi* communicated the whole business to *Francesco Brunelleschi* ( not with intention to have betray'd it, but in presumption he had been privy to it before ) and *Francesco*, out of fear, or malice to some that were engag'd in it, discover'd all to the *Duke*. *Pagolo*

*Matteo di Morozzo.*

Three Conspiracies against the Duke at one time.



Commotion  
in Florence.

*de Mazzeccha*, and *Simon de Montepoli* being immediatly apprehended, they confess'd the whole matter, with the number and quality of the Conspirators; at which the Duke was much surpriz'd, and counsel being given him, rather to summon the Conspirators to appear, than to secure them abruptly (because if they fled of themselves, he would be as safe without scandal) he summon'd *Adimari*, who appear'd in confidence of the number of his Accomplices. *Adimari* was arrested, and the Duke advis'd by *Francesco Brunelleschi*, and *Ugucione Buondelmonti*, to betake himself to his arms, and go up and down to their houses, and kill all of them they met. But, his force in the Town was Judg'd too small, for that resolution, and therefore he pitch'd upon another, which (had it succeeded) would have secured him against his Enemies, and provided him with Men. The Duke was wont upon any great Emergencies, to call the chief Citizens together, and to advise with them. Having first sent to prepare what force he was able, he caus'd a list of three hundred Citizens to be made, and deliver'd to his Sergeants, to summon them to Council by their Names, resolving when they were met, to kill, or imprison them as he pleas'd. *Antonio Adimari* being secur'd, and so many great Citizens summon'd (which could not be done without noise) many of them (and especially those who were conscious) began to suspect, and some refus'd absolutely to obey. The list having been brought to them all, and perus'd by every one of them, they began to understand, and encourage one another to take Arms, and dye manfully like Men, rather than be driven quietly like sheep to the slaughter: so that in few hours all the Conspiracies were known, and the Conspirators united: holding Counsel among themselves, it was concluded, that the next day being the 26 of July 1343, a tumult should be rais'd in the old Market-place, upon which all were to take Arms, and excite the people to liberty. The next day, the Signal being given by sounding a Bell (as it was agreed before) every Body took Arms, and crying out Liberty, Liberty, the People betook themselves to their Arms likewise, and fell to fortify in their several Quarters, under their respective Ensigns, which was done by the contrivance of the Conspirators. The chief of all Families, both Nobility, and People met, and took an Oath to live and die with one another in the destruction of the Duke (except only the *Buondelmonti*, the *Cavalcanti*, and the four Families of the People, which consented to make him Prince, who, with the Butchers and Rascality of the City, ran down arm'd to the *Piazza* in defence of the Duke.) The Duke, alarm'd at these proceedings, fortiss'd his Palace, call'd home his Servants, which were lodg'd in several parts of the Town, and sallying forth with them on Horseback, towards the Market-place, they were many times assaulted by the way, and many of them slain, being forced back, and recruited with 300 fresh Horse, he was in doubt with himself, whether he had best fall upon them again, or stand upon his guard; and in the mean time the *Medici*, *Cavicculli*, *Ruccellai*, and other families that were most disoblig'd by the Duke, were in no less fear, that if he should make a sally, many who had taken Arms against him in the uproar, would show themselves his friends; desirous therefore to keep him from sallying, and by that means, increasing his numbers, drawing what force together they were able, they advanc'd towards the Market-place, where some of their fellow Citizens had posted themselves in defence of the Duke. The Citizens which were there in the front, and had appear'd first for their Prince, seeing themselves so briskly confronted, chang'd their sides, left their Duke in the lurch, and joyn'd with their fellow Citizens, all but *Ugucione Buondelmonti*, who retired into the Palace, and *Gianozzo Cavalcanti*, who retreating with some of his party into the New-Market, and getting upon a bench made an earnest speech, exhorting the People to stand firm to the Duke, and having got more force to him, to fright them (if his persuasion fail'd) he threatned to kill them all, Man, Woman, and Child, if they joyn'd or persisted in any design against him. But seeing no body follow him, nor no body near to chastise him for his insolence, perceiving he had troubled himself hitherto in vain, he resolv'd to tempt his fortune no farther, and so retir'd peaceable to his house. The conflict, in the mean time, in the Market-place, betwixt the People and the Dukes party was great, and though the Dukes Creatures were reinforc'd from the Palace, yet they were beaten, part taken Prisoners, and part leaving their Horses to their Enemies, got on foot into the Palace. Whilst the contest continu'd in the Market-place, *Corso*, and *Amerigo Donati*, with part of the People broke up the *Stinche*, burn'd the Records of the *Podestà*, and publick Chamber, sack'd the Houses of the *Rettori*, and kill'd all the Dukes Officers they could meet with. The Duke on the other side, finding he had lost the *Piazza*, the whole City was become his Enemy, and no hopes left him of being reliev'd, He resolv'd to try if by any act of kindness or humanity he might work upon the People. Calling his Prisoners (therefore) to him, with fair and gentle language he gave them their liberty, and made *Antonio Adimari* a Knight, (though not at all to his satisfaction) he caus'd his Ensign to be taken down, and the Standard,



dard of the People to be set up upon the Palace: Which things being done unseasonably, and by force, they avail'd but little. In this manner he remain'd block'd up in his Palace, not at all delighted with his condition; having coveted too much formerly, he was now like to lose all, and in a few days was in danger of being famish'd or slain. The Citizens, to give some form to their Government, assembled themselves in the S. *Reparata*, and created XIV. Citizens (half of the Nobility, and half of the People) who with their Bishop should have full Power to model and reform the State as they pleas'd. The Authority of the *Potesta* they committed to VI Persons of their own election, which they were to exercise till he that was elected should come. There were at that time many strangers resorted to *Florence*, in assistance to that City, among the rest the *Sienese* had sent six Embassadors (of honorable condition in their own Countrey) to negotiate a peace betwixt the Duke and the People. The People refus'd any overture, unless *Guglielmo da Scesi*, his Son, and *Cerrettieri* *Bisdomini* were deliver'd into their hands, which the Duke obstinately deny'd, till the threats of those who were shut up with him in the Palace constrain'd him to consent. Greater, doubtless, is the insolence and contumacy of the People, and more pernicious the mischiefs which they do, whilst they are in pursuit of their Liberty, than when they have acquir'd it. *Guglielmo* and his Son were brought forth, and deliver'd up among thousands of their Enemies; his Son was a young Gentleman, not yet arriv'd at eighteen years of age; yet neither his youth, his comeliness, nor innocence were able to preserve him; those who could not get near enough to do it whilst he was alive, wounded him when he was dead; and as if their swords had been partial, and executed the dictates of their fury with too much moderation, they fell to it with their teeth, and their hands, biting his flesh, and tearing it to pieces. And that all their Senses might participate in their revenge, having fasted their ears upon their groans, their eyes upon their wounds, and their touch upon their bowels (which they rent out of their bodies with their hands) their taste (likewise) be treated and regal'd, that their inward parts, as well as their outward, might have a share of the *Ragouff*. This Barbarous outrage, how fatal soever it was to them two, was very lucky to *Cerrettieri*, for the People being tyr'd in the formalities of their execution, forgot they had any more to punish, and left him in the Palace, not so much as demanded, from whence the next night he was safely convey'd by his Relations, and friends. The People having satiated themselves upon the Blood of those two, the peace was concluded; the Duke to depart safely himself, and all that belong'd to him, for which he was to renounce all his Claim and Authority in *Florence*, and to ratify his renunciation when he came out of the *Florentine* Dominions to *Casentino*. The Articles being agreed, on the VI. of *August*, attended by a multitude of Citizens, the Duke departed from *Florence*, and arriv'd at *Casentino*, where he ratify'd the renunciation, but so unwillingly, that had not *Conte Simone* threatned to carry him back to *Florence*, it had never been done. This Duke (as his actions demonstrate) was covetous, cruel, difficult of access, and insolent in his answers. Not being so much affected with the kindness and benevolence of People, as with their servitude and servility; he chose to be fear'd rather than belov'd. Nor was the shape and contexture of his Body less contemptible, than his manners were odious. He was very little, exceeding black, his beard long and thin, not apart about him, but concurr'd to make him despicable. In this manner the exorbitancies of his administration in ten Months time depriv'd him of his Dominion, which had been plac'd upon him by the Counsels of ill Men. These accidents happening thus in the City, all the Towns under the jurisdiction of *Florence*, took courage, and began to stand up for their liberty; so that in a short time *Arezzo*, *Castiglione*, *Pistoia*, *Volterra*, *Colle St. Gimignano* rebell'd, and the whole territory of *Florence* (after the example of its Metropolis) recover'd its freedom. After the Duke and his Creatures were removed, the XIV. chief Citizens, and the Bishop, consulting together, thought it better to pacify the People with peace, than to provoke them again by War, and therefore pretended to be as well pleas'd with their liberty as their own. They sent Embassadors therefore to *Arezzo*, to renounce the Authority they had over them, and to enter into an alliance of amity with them, that though they might not hereafter command them as subjects, they might (upon occasion) make use of them as friends. With the rest of the Cities, they made as good terms as they could, retaining amity with them all. This resolution being prudently taken, succeeded very happily; for in a few months *Arezzo*, and all the other Towns return'd to their Obedience, and it is frequently seen, to decline, or renounce things voluntarily, is the way to gain them more readily, and with less danger and expence, than to pursue them with all the passion and impetuosity in the World. Affairs abroad being compos'd in this manner, they apply'd themselves to a settlement at home, and after some debates and alterations betwixt the Nobility and the People, it was concluded the third part of the *Signoria* or Senat should consist

The Duke  
expell'd.

His Cha-  
racter

of

New Reformation.

of the Nobility, and half the other Magistracies to be executed by them. The City (as is said before) was divided into six parts, out of which sixth, six *Signori* were chosen, (one out of every sixth) only by accident now and then their number was increas'd to XII. or XIII. and reduc'd it again to six afterwards; at length they resolv'd to reform in that particular, either because the *Sesti* or sixths were ill distributed, or else (designing more Authority to the Nobility) they thought it convenient to increase the number of the Senators. Hereupon they divided the City into Quarters, and in every Quarter, three *Signori* were created, to superinspect it. The *Gonfaloniere della Giustizia*, and *Gonfalonieri* of the Popular Companies, were laid aside, and instead of them they created XII. *Buon-Uomini*, and VIII. *Configlieri*, four of each sort.

The Common Wealth being settled in this Method, might have continued quiet and happy, had the Grandees been contented to have fram'd it themselves to such modesty of Conversation as is requisite in a Civil Government. But their practices were quite contrary; when they were but private Persons, no Body was good enough to be their Companions, and being in Office, scarce any too good to be their Subjects, every day producing new instances of their Arrogance and Pride, insomuch that the People were exceedingly troubl'd, to consider with what impatience and fury they had remov'd one Tyrant to make room for a thousand. In this manner things stood at that time, the insolence of one side, and the indignation of the other fermenting to that degree, that the Chief of the People (complaining of the Enormity of their great Ones, and their haughtiness to the People and to the Bishop) desir'd that he would be an instrument to restrain the Grandees to their share in the other Offices, and effect that the Senate might consist only of the People. The Bishop was naturally a good Man, but easie and unconstant; from that unconstancy of temper it was, that his Associates first wrought upon him to favour the Duke of Athens, and afterwards persuaded him against him: in the late Reformation he appear'd highly for the Nobility, now upon the instance and solicitation of the Popular Citizens, he was as earnest for the People, and supposing to have found the same irresolution in other People, as was eminent in himself, he fancy'd himself able to prevail with the Nobility to consent. Hereupon con-voking the XIV. (who were as yet in possession of their Authority,) with the best language he could use, he exhorted them to resign the dignity of the Senate to the People, if they bare any respect to the tranquillity of the City, or their own safety and preservation. But these Words wrought a contrary effect in the minds of the Nobility *Ridolfo de Bardi* reprehending him very smartly, upbraided the Levity and Treachery of his behaviour with the Duke, and concluded at last, that the Honours and employments they were in, they had acquir'd with hazard, and would defend them with the same; and in this squabble he and his Brethren left the Bishop, and went to the rest of the Nobility to communicate with them. The People were made acquainted with their answer on the other side, and whilst the Grandees were providing what strength they could for the defence of their Senators, the Commons thought it no time to attend for Orders, but ran immediatly to their Arms, and with them to the Palace, calling out to the Nobility to renounce. The noise and tumult were great; the *Signors* found themselves forsaken; for the Grandees finding the People universally in Arms, durst not appear, but kept themselves close at home as obscurely as they could: whereupon the Popular Senators, endeavouring to pacifie the People, alledg'd that they were honest and good Men, and prevail'd (though with great difficulty) that they might be sent safe to their houses. The Senators of the Nobility being dismiss'd, the Office was taken away from the four Grand Couufellors, and transfer'd upon XII. of the People, and the eight Popular Senators which remain'd. They restor'd the *Gonfaloniere della Giustizia*, and XVI. *Gonfalonieri* of the Companies of the People, and reform'd all Counsels in such manner that the Government remain'd entirely in the People. When those exorbitances happen'd, there was a great scarcity in the City, which occasion'd the discontents both of Nobility and People (the People for want of Victuals, the Nobility for want of Comniand) and gave incouragement to *Andrea Strozzi* to usurp upon their liberty. *Andrea* selling his Corn at a cheaper rate than his Neighbours, had greater resort of poor People to his House, which he observing, mounted on Horseback one morning, with several of the Rabble at his heels, he cry'd out to the rest to take Arms, and in a few hours he got together more than 4000 Men, with whom he march'd to the Palace of the Senate, and demanded to have it open'd: but the Senators partly by threatning, and partly by force, disingag'd themselves of them, and afterward, when they were gone frighted them so with their Proclamations, that by little and little they dissolv'd, and went every Man to his Home, and left *Andrea* alone to escape as he could. Though this accident was rash, and had the common end of such desperate attempts, yet it gave no little hopes to the Nobility of prevailing against the People, seeing the Refuse and Rascallity of the City had an animosity against them.

The Nobility depos'd.

them. That they might not slip so fair an occasion, it was resolv'd that they should fortify themselves with their assistance (if they could gain it) and recover by force, what by injustice was taken from them. And so bold they grew in their confidence of Victory, that they began to provide Arms publickly, to fortify their Houses, and send to their friends in *Lombardy* for help and supplies. The People and their Senators were as busy on the other side, they provided themselves with what Arms they could get, and sent to the *Savasi*, and *Perugins* for relief. The Auxiliaries on both sides being arriv'd, the whole City was immediately in Arms. The Nobility had posted themselves in three places on this side the River *Arno*, at the Palace of the *Cavicculli* near *S. John*; at the Palaces of the *Pazzi*, and *Donati* near *S. Piero Maggiore*; and at the Palace of the *Cavalcanti* in the new-Market: those of the Nobility who were on the other side of the River, had fortifi'd the Bridges and Streets which were in the way to their Houses. The *Nerli* possess'd themselves of the *Ponte alla Carraja*; the *Frescobaldi* and *Mannelli*, of *S. Trinita*; the *Rossi* and *Bardi* were upon their guard at the old Bridge; and the *Rubaconte*. The People in the mean time form'd themselves into a posture under the *Gonfalone della Giustizia*, and the Ensigns of the People, and being drawn up in array, it was thought best immediately to fall on; the first that march'd were the *Medici* and *Rondinelli* who assaulted the *Cavicculli* on that side which is towards the *Piazza de S. Giovanni*. The service was very hot (great stones being tumbled upon them from above, and volleys of Arrows sent liberally among them from below) and continued three hours compleat; but the numbers of the People increasing, and no relief like to get near them, the *Cavicculli* submitted to their multitudes, and surrendered. The People sav'd the House and the furniture, only they took away their Arms, and Commanded them to distribute and disperse themselves into such Popular Houses as were there acquaintance and friends. The *Cavicculli* being beaten from their Post, the *Pazzi* and *Donati* (being less powerful) were sooner remov'd. The *Cavalcanti* were only remaining on that side of the River, yet more considerable than the other, both in respect of their numbers & situation. But they, seeing all the *Gonfalonieri* advancing against them, where as three of them only had overpower'd the rest, surrendered like their Neighbours without any remarkable defence: and now three parts of the City were in the Hands of the People, there was but one left in the Power of the Nobility, but more difficult and inaccessible, by reason it was so secure by the River *Arno*, the Bridges and Avenues were of necessity to be clear'd before any good could be done, and they (as is said before) were abundantly provided. The first of them that was assaulted was the old Bridge, which was as bravely defended, and the People repuls'd. Finding their further Attempts there would be but in vain, they try'd what could be done at the *Ponte Rubaconte*; but finding their entertainment no better, they left four *Gonfaloni*, and some other Ensigns to block up those Passes, and march'd with the rest to the *Ponte alla Carraja*. The *Nerli* had the defence of that Quarter, and behav'd themselves valiantly, yet their Bridge (as having no Towers) being weaker or else overlaid with the numbers of their Enemies, (which were much increased by the accession of the *Capponi* and other Families about them) they were on every side oppress'd, forc'd from their *Barricadoes*, and constrain'd to retire. When they were Defeated, they advanc'd against the *Rossi*, and from them against the *Frescobaldi*, overwhelming them both, the whole Populace beyond the River being come in to their assistance. The *Bardi* was the only party remaining, but that so obstinately courageous, neither the fortune of their Comrades, the unanimity of the People against them, nor the impossibility of relief could prevail with them to surrender, but they would rather die fighting, or see their Houses pillag'd or burn'd, than submitted themselves quietly into the hands of their Enemies. And they defended themselves; for though many times they were assaulted, both at the old Bridge, and the *Ponte Rubaconte*, the People were alway repuls'd, and with considerable loss. There was in old time a Lane to pass from the *Via Romana*, betwixt the Palaces of the *Putti* to the Wall upon *S. Gorges-hill*. To this Lane the People sent six *Gonfalonieri* with Orders to fall upon the *Bardi* behind, who pursued them so effectually, the *Bardi* were disheartned, and the People prevail'd; those of the *Bardi* who were appointed for the keeping of the *Barricadoes*, no sooner hearing that their houses were attack'd, but they quitted their Posts, and ran in in hopes to defend them. By this means the *Barricades* at the old Bridge were won, and the *Bardi* discomfitted, who (as many as could) betook themselves to their heels, and were received by the *Quaratesi*, *Panzanesi*, and *Mozzi*. The People (especially the baser sort) greedy of Prey, plunder'd their Houses; demolish'd their Castles; and when they had done, burn'd them all with such inhumanity, as the greatest Enemy the City had would have been asham'd to have committed. The Nobility being utterly subdued, the People took upon them the Government of the State, and because it consisted of three sorts (the more potent, the middle sort and the base) it was or-

The Nobility attempt to recover their Authority.

The People Arm against them.

gan'd

The Nobility utterly depressed.

dain'd that the more potent should have the Nomination of two Senators; the middle sort of three, and the meaner of three. The *Gonfalonieri* to be chosen (*Alternatim*) of the one and the other. Besides this, all the Old Laws against the Nobility were reviv'd and put in force, and to weaken them the more, many of them were mingl'd with the Common People. The destruction of the Nobility was so great at this time, and their party so irrecoverably debilitated, that not daring to take Arms again, against the People, they became pusillanimous and abject, which was the Occasion that *Florence* lost not only its Generosity but its Generosity also. From this depression of the Grandees, the City continued quiet to the year 1353, in which interval happen'd the Famous Pestilence (so Eloquently celebrated by *Giovanni Boccaccio*) in which there died in *Florence* above 96000 People. The first War the *Florentines* made, was against the *Visconti*, being provok'd by the Ambition of the Archbishop, who at that time was Prince of *Milan*: which War was no sooner finished, but new factions began in the City; for though the Nobility was so cow'd, and intimidated, there was no danger of them; yet fortune had her ways to create them new troubles by new and different dissensions.



THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
FLORENCE.

Book III.

THE great and natural animosities betwixt the People and the Nobility, arising from an ambition in the one to command, and an aversion in the other to obey, are the springs and fountains of all the calamities incident to a City: and indeed there is scarce any thing dangerous or troublesome to a Common-wealth, but takes its original and nourishment from their diversity of humour. This was it which kept *Rome* divided. This was it (if it be lawful to compare great things with little) which kept *Florence* divided, though in each City with different effects. For, in *Rome*, the enmity betwixt the people and the Nobility was determined by Expostulation and Reason; in *Florence*, by the Sword. In *Rome*, those things were settled and compos'd by Law, which, in *Florence*, were scarce done by the slaughter and banishment of many of their best Citizens. *Rome* increased still in its Military Vertue; but that in *Florence* was utterly exhaust. From a primitive equality of its Citizens, *Rome* was brought to an immense inequality: whereas *Florence*, on the contrary, from a vast inequality, was reduced to a strange equality. Which diversity of effects must have certainly proceeded from diversity in their designs. The people of *Rome* desired no more than to share and communicate with the Nobility in the great Offices of the City. The people of *Florence* not only desired, but fought and contended to have the Government to themselves, with perfect exclusion to the Nobility: and the desires of the *Romans* being more reasonable, there importunity was the more supportable by the Nobles, so that they condescended without coming to blows; and after some small controversy and dispute, it was concluded a Law should be made, by which the people should be satisfied, and their Dignities preserved to the Nobility.

On the other side, the demands of the people of *Florence* were extravagant and unjust; upon which score the Nobility preparing for the defence, their differences determined in banishment and blood: and the Laws which ensued were fram'd more to the advantage of the Victor, than the benefit of the Publick. Hence it proceeded, that the success of the people in *Rome*, rendered that City more potent and considerable; for the people being admitted to the administration of the Magistracy, Armies, and Empire, equally with the Nobles, they became inspir'd with the same Vertue and Magnanimity as they: and as their Vertue increased, their power increased with it.

But in *Florence* the people prevailing, deposed the Nobility of their Authority; and if they had a mind to recover it, it was necessary by their conversation and behaviour not only

to be, but to profess themselves like the people. And this was the cause of the changing their Arms, the variation of their Titles, and Families which was frequent in those times among the Nobility, to recommend them to the Commons, and make them pass amongst them: so that the Eminency of their Arms, and the Generosity of their minds, (for both which the Nobility was formerly famous) was spent and expir'd, and not to be reviv'd in the people, where the least spark of it was not to be found; which rendered *Florence* every day more abject and base. And whereas *Rome*, transported with its own Vertue, grew to that height of Pride, that it could not subsist longer without a Prince. *Florence* was reduced to that pass, that a wise Legislator might have form'd the Government according to what scheme and model he pleased. All which, by perusing of the preceeding books, will be obvious to any body. Having shewn therefore the foundation of *Florence*; the original of its Liberty; the occasion of its Dissention; and how the factions of the Nobility and people concluded with the Tyranny of the Duke of *Athens* and the destruction of the Nobility: it remains now, I should discourse of the Emulations betwixt the people and the multitude, and several accidents which they produced.

Emulation  
betwixt the  
middle and the  
meaner sort of  
people.

The power of the Nobility being depress'd, and the War with the Arch-Bishop of *Millan* at an end; there appeared no respect of future contention in *Florence*: But the ill fate of our City, the ill conduct of their Affairs, suffered a new Emulation to spring up (betwixt the Families of the *Albizzi* and *Ricci*) which produced as great division in the Town, as was at first betwixt the *Buondelmonti* and the *Uberti*, and afterwards betwixt the *Cerchi* and *Donati*. The Popes (who had then their residence in *France*) and the Emperors who resided in *Germany*, to make good their reputation in *Italy*, had many times, upon several occasions, supplied us with multitude of Souldiers of all Nations, *English*, *Dutch*, and *Britains*. The Wars ended, and they out of pay, being Souldiers of Fortune, they were constrain'd to make bold sometimes with one Prince, and sometimes with another; and force them to contribution. In the year, 1353, it happened one of the Companies came into *Tuscany* (under the Command of Monsieur *Real* of *Provence*) and put the whole Country into a fear: whereupon the *Florentines* not only made publick provision of men, but several private Citizens (and the *Albizzi* and *Ricci* among the rest) furnished themselves with Arms for their proper defence. There was a mortal hatred betwixt these two Families, each of them aspiring at the Government, and conspiring the destruction of the other. However as yet they were not come to Hostility; only they clash'd, and interfer'd in their Counsels, and in the executions of the Magistracy. But upon this occasion, the City being arm'd, there happen'd a quarrel, by accident, in the old Market place; to which the People, that were near, flock'd, as they do on all such occasions. To the *Ricci* it was reported the *Albizzi* had fallen upon some of their Family. To the *Albizzi*, that the *Ricci* were come out in defiance of them. Hereupon the whole City got together; and no small difficulty it was to the Magistrate to restrain either of the Families, or to put an end to a Conflict which was begun by chance, without the fault or contrivance of either. This accident, though meerly contingent, reviv'd their animosity, and put them both upon designs of increasing their Parties. And because, by the ruine of the Nobility, the Citizens were reduced to such an equality, that the Magistrates were become more venerable than formerly; they resolv'd both of them to advance their interest rather by ordinary means, than private violence. We have declar'd before, how, after the Victory of *Charles* the First, the *Guelfs* were created Magistrates; and great authority given them over the *Ghibelin* Faction: which authority and prebeminence, time, accident, and their new divisions had so far enervated, that the *Ghibelins* were grown into the Government, and exercised the principal Offices as well as the *Guelfs*. *Ugucione de Ricci* being at that time the head of that Family, prevail'd to have the Laws against the *Ghibelins* renewed: to which Faction, it was suppos'd by many, the *Albizzi* were inclin'd; whose Original being anciently from *Arezzo*, they transplanted from thence, and settled in *Florence*: so that *Ugucione* design'd by the renovation of those Laws, to render that Family incapable of any great Office; providing thereby, that it should be criminal for any person descended from the *Ghibelins*, to exercise the Magistracy. This practice of *Ugucione* was discovered to *Piero*, Son of *Philippo de gli Albizi*, who resolv'd to connive at it; presuming he should declare himself a *Ghibelin*, if he oppos'd it. These Laws, though renewed by the prevalence, and ambition of the *Ricci*, subtracted nothing from the reputation of the *Albizzi*, but were the foundation of many mischiefs. Nor indeed can a Republick make any Law so pernicious, as a Law of retro-spection: *Piero* having rather promoted, than resisted those Laws; that which his enemies intended as an impediment, proved a means and occasion of his preferment: for, being made the chief person to super-inspect the execution of those Laws, he exercised more authority than before; and became the only favourite of the Faction of the *Guelfs*. And,

because in these Laws there was no definition of a *Ghibelin*, nor no Magistrate deputed to discover them, they were of little importance; only the Captains were appointed to inquire them out, and to admonish them, that they were not to take the Magistracy upon them; if they did, they should be liable to a penalty. Whereupon, those who were afterwards incapacitated for the Magistracy, were called *Ammoniti*. But, at length, the Captains growing bold and audacious in their office, without any regard whether they were conscious or not; they admonished who they pleased, as their avarice or animosity directed them.

*The Ammoniti*

So that from the year 1357, (in which this Law was renewed) to the year 1366, there were more than 200 Citizens admonished. By which means, the Captains, and the Faction of the *Guelfs* were grown great and considerable; especially *Piero de gli Albizi*, *Lapo da Castiglionchio*, and *Carlo Strozzi*, for the fear of being admonished, made all people respect them. And, though the insolence of their proceedings disgusted many more; yet none look'd upon it with so much indignation as the Family of the *Ricci*, who had been the occasion of that disorder, which was not only like to be the ruine of the Common-wealth, but the promotion and advancement of their Enemies, quite contrary to what they designed. *Ugucione* therefore (being one of the Senate, to put an end to those inconveniences which he by accident had created) obtain'd a new Law; that to the six Captains, three more should be added; two of them to be chosen out of the inferior Mechanicks: and prevail'd that the *Ghibelins* should not be convicted but by 24. of the *Guelfs*, deputed particularly to that office. For the time, these Laws in some measure tempered the exorbitance of the Captains so as their admonitions lost much of their terror; and if any, they were but few that were admonished. Notwithstanding the emulation betwixt the *Albizi* and *Ricci* continued; their leagues, practices, and consultations going on with more eagerness, as their fury suggested. In this distraction the City continued from the year, 1366, to the year 1371; at which time the *Guelfs* recovered their power.

In the Family of the *Buondelmonti*, there was a Gentleman called *Benchi*; who for his Gallantry in the Wars against the *Psans*, was prefer'd to be one of the people; and by that means qualified to be a Senator. But when he expected to be admitted into the Senate, a Decree was made, that no person of Noble Extraction, that was become one of the people, should be received into the Senate. This Decree was highly offensive to *Benchi*, who, upon consultation with *Piero de gli Albizi*, resolv'd with his admonitions to depress the meaner sort of the people, and make themselves Governors of the City. And indeed, by his influence upon the Nobility, and *Piero's* upon the wealthiest of the Citizens, the Faction of the *Guelfs* began to grow more considerable: for with their new models and regulations they ordered things so, that the Captains and 24. Citizens were wholly at their disposing; their admonitions exercised with as much audacity as formerly; and the house of the *Albizi* (being head of that Faction) increased exceedingly. The *Ricci* in the mean time were not behind hand in using all their interest and friends to obstruct their designs; so that every one lived in great apprehension as fore-seeing their destruction was approaching. Whereupon many Citizens out of affection to their Country assembled in *S. Piero Scheraggio*; and having discoursed of their disorders among themselves, they went afterwards to the Senate, to whom, one of the most eminent among them, made this harrangue.

*Most Magnificent Lords; we have many of us doubted, whether to assemble by private order, (though upon publick occasion) might not be offensive, and render us remarkable for our presumption, and punishable for our ambition. But when we considered, that daily, without the least caution or regard, many Citizens do meet, and confer; not for any benefit to the Common-wealth, but in pursuit of their own private designs: We presum'd, that if they were permitted to meet, and Conspire against the peace of their Country, without displeasure to your Lordships; those whose design was nothing but its preservation and prosperity, needed not to fear your reproof. If therefore we have not incur'd your Lordships disfavour we are not much solicitous what others judge of us, because we find they are as indifferent what we think of them. The love we bear to our Country, most Magnificent Lords, was that which assembled us at first, and now presents us before you, to remonstrate our distractions; (which (though too great) encrease daily upon our bands,) and to offer our utmost assistance to remove them. How difficult soever their Enterprise may appear we cannot despair of success; if laying aside private respects, you would be pleased with publick force to exert your authority, The corruption of their Cities in Italy, has vitiated ours: for since Italy freed it self from the yoke of the Empire, all the Towns (wanting their former restraint) flew out into extreams, and ordain'd Laws and Governors, not as free men, but as people divided into Factions. From this Fountain all our miseries, all our disorders do spring. In the first place, no friendship nor integrity is to be found among the Citizens, unless among those whose*

*The Citizens  
Oration to the  
Senate.*

wickedness makes them faithful, having been formerly engaged together in some villainous action, either against their Neighbour, or Country. Religion, and the fear of God, is utterly extinguished. Promises and Oaths are binding no farther than they are profitable; and used not for a tie, but a snare, and as a means to facilitate their cheats which are always more honourable, by how much their success is less difficult and dangerous. Hence it is, that vicious and mischievous men are commended for their industry; and good men, which are innocent and quiet, are reckoned for sots. And certainly, as there is no sort of corruption but may be found in Italy, so there are no sort of people more unhappily adapted to receive it. The young men are idle, the old men lascivious; all sexes, all ages, all places full of licentious brutality above the correction of the Laws. Hence springs that avarice among the Citizens; and that ambition, not of true glory, but of dishonourable preferment; which, being accompanied with hatred enmity, schism, and dissention, are commonly followed by executions, banishments, affliction of good men, and exaltation of evil: for good men depending upon their innocence, and not looking abroad for any thing extraordinary; either to advance, or defend themselves do too often miscarry without either, and become the sad objects of the cruelty of Usurpers. This creates inclination to parties, and increases their power; ill people siding for covetousness, ambition, revenge, or some other sinister end; and good people for fear: and that which renders our condition more deplorable, is to behold the Contrivers and Ring-leaders of all, (as if a word could make them innocent, and consecrate the iniquity of their actions) guilding, or rather decking over their ill designs with some illustrious Title: for, being all enemies to liberty, let them pretend as they please, either to defend an Optimacy, or Populacy, the result, must be destruction: for the fruit they expect from their Victory, is not the honour of having delivered their Country, but the satisfaction of having mastered their enemies, and usurped the dominion to themselves: and being arrived at that height, what is there so unjust, what is there so cruel, what is there so ravenous as they? Hence forward Laws are made, not for publick benefit, but their private advantage, hence forward, War, and peace, and Amity is concluded; not for common honour, but particular humor. And if the other Cities of Italy are repleat with these disorders, ours is much more: Our Laws, our Statutes, and Civil Ordinances, are made according to the ambition and capricio of the Conqueror; and not according to the true interest of people, that would be free: whence it follows, that one Faction is no sooner extinguished, but another succeeds: for that City which would maintain it self by Faction rather than by Law, can never be quiet: when one party prevails, and depresses its rival beyond the power of opposition, it sub-divides of necessity, and falls out with it self; and then all goes to wrack, the people not being able to defend themselves with those private Laws which were made at first for their preservation. That these things are true the ancient and modern dissentions in our own City can sadly demonstrate. When the Ghibilins were destroyed, it was every mans judgment the Guelfs would have lived honourably and quietly a long time after: and yet it was not long before they divided into the Factions of the Neri and Bianchi: when the Bianchi were over-powred, new parties arose, and new troubles attended them; sometimes fighting in behalf of the Exiles, and sometimes quarrelling betwixt the Nobility and the People; and (to give that to others, which either we could not, or would not possess quietly our selves) committing our liberty sometimes to King Robert, sometimes to his brother, and at last to the Duke of Athens; never fixing or reposing in any Government; as not being agreed to live free, nor contented to be servile. Nay, so much was our State dispos'd to division, that rather than acquiesce in the administration of a King, it prostituted it self to the regiment of an Agobbian, of mean and ignominious Extraction. The late Duke of Athens cannot be mentioned with any honour to this City; yet his insolence and Tyranny may make us wiser for the future. Being in Arms at his expulsion, we fell to it among our selves and fought with more fury one against another, than we had ever done before; till at length the Nobility was overcome, and at the mercy of the people: and it was the general opinion (their insupportable pride and ambition being taken down) there could be no more faction or troubles in Florence: but we have found to our cost, how false and fallacious mans judgment is. The pride and ambition of the Nobility was not extinct, but transmigrated into the people; who, by degrees, grew as impatient for authority as they; and having no other way to attain it, but by domestick dissention, they reviv'd the obsolete names of Guelfs, and of Ghibilins; which it had been happy for this City never, to have known. And, that nothing which is humane, may be perpetual and stable; it is the pleasure of the Heavens that in all States or Governments whatsoever, some fatal Families should spring up for their ruine and destruction. Of this, our City can afford as many, and as lamentable instances



stances as any of her neighbours; its owing its miseries not only to one or two, but several of those Families: as first, the Buondelmonti and Uberti; next, the Donati and the Cerchi; and now, the Ricci and Albizi, (a shameful and ridiculous thing.) We have not enumerated our divisions nor deduc'd our ill customs so high, to upbraid or to discourage you by them; but rather as a memorial of their causes, to shew that they are in our memory as well as yours; and to exhort you by their example, not to be diffident or timorous in correcting them. For in those days the power of the Nobility was so great, and their alliances so considerable; the Laws and Civil Magistrates were too weak to restrain them: but now the Emperor having no power, the Pope no influence; all Italy, and particularly this City, reduc'd to such a parity, as to be able to Govern our selves; where is the difficulty? What impediment remains, why this Common-wealth (in spite of all examples to the contrary) may not only be united, but reform'd and improv'd by new Laws and Constitutions, were your Lordships disposed to create them? To which good work, we do most humbly importune you, not out of private passion, so much as publick compassion for our Country. Our corruption is great, and tis you only can correct the rage, and expel the contagion that spreads and luxuriates among us. The disorders of our Ancestors are not imputable to the nature of the men, but to the iniquity of those times; which being now altered, gives this City fair hopes, by the institution of better Laws, to better its fortune; whose malignity is easily to be overcome by a prudent restraint of ambition; a seasonable inhibition of such customs as propagate Faction; and a discreet election and adherence to such things as are compatible with our freedom. And better it is you do it now legally of your selves, than by deferring it, to divert that office upon the people and make them do it by force.

The Signori mov'd then by these arguments, (which they had fram'd to themselves before) and by authority and encouragement afterwards, commisionated 56 Citizens to superintend for the safety of the Common-wealth. True it is, many men are more proper to preferre good Laws, than to make them; and these Citizens employ'd themselves more in extirpating the present Factions, than providing against new; by which means they succeeded in neither: for not taking away the occasion of the new; and one of the present Factions being more potent than the other, it could not be done without great danger to the Common-wealth. However, they depriv'd three of the Family of the Albizi, and as many of the Ricci of all Magistracy (unless of the Guelfish party) for three years; in which number, Piero de gli Albizi, and Ugucione de Ricos were two. They prohibited all Citizens for the coming into the Palace, unless the Senate was sitting. They decreed, that in case of battery or unjust interruption in the possession of their Estates, it should be lawful to accuse any man (though of the Nobility) to the Council, and to make them answer to their Charge. These Laws had greater reflection upon the Ricci than the Albizi; for though they were equally intended the Ricci suffered most by them: Piero indeed was shut out of the Palace of the Signori; but at the Palace of the Guelfs (where his authority was great) his entrance was free; and though he and his Comrades were forward enough in their admonitions before they were much forwarder now, and new accidents occur'd to make them yet worse. Gregory XI. was Pope at that time, whose residence being at Avignon, he governed Italy by Legates, (as his Predecessors had done before him.) These Legates being proud and rapacious, had brought great calamity upon several of the Cities. One of these Legates being at that time in Bologna, took the advantage of a scarcity which was in Florence, and resolv'd to make himself Lord of Tuscany: to which end, he not only omitted to supply the Florentines with provisions but to deprive them utterly of all other relief, as soon as the Spring appeared, and gave opportunity for his motion, he invaded them with a great Army, hoping they would be easily conquered, because they were both famished, and disarm'd: and possibly his design might have taken, had not his Army been mercenary, and corrupt; for the Florentines having no other weapons to defend themselves, betook themselves to their bags, and paid his Army 130000 Florins to draw off. To begin a War, is in any mans power; but, alas, no body can end one. This War was commenc'd by the ambition of the Legate, but prosecuted by the indignation of the Florentines; who entered into an immediate League with Monsieur Barnabo, and all the Cities which were at enmity with the Church. To manage it, they created eight Citizens, whom they invest'd with absolute authority of proceeding without appeal, and disbursing without account. This War against the Pope, though Ugucione was dead, reviv'd those who had followed the fortunes of the Ricci, who in opposition to the Albizi, had favoured Barnabo, and appeared against the Church; and the rather, because the eight were all enemies to the Guelfs: whereupon Piero de gli Albizi, Lapo da Castiglionechio, Carlo Strozzi, and others, united to defend themselves against their adversaries. And while the eight great Citizens were employed

New Reformation.

Gregory XI. holds his Residence at Avignon.

New Commission for the management of the War

ployed in the management of the War, and they in their admonitions, the War continued three years, till the death of that Pope. However, it was carried on with so universal satisfaction, that the Eight were continued yearly in their Office, and got the Title of *Santi*; notwithstanding they had sequestred the riches of the Churches, forc'd the Clergy to the execution of their Functions, and despis'd the censures of the Pope. So much did the Citizens at that time prefer the advantage of their Country, before the quiet of their Consciences: and so earnest were they to make it appear to the Church, that, as when they were friends, they had power to defend it; so now being enemies, they were as able to distress it; having put all *Romagna, la Marca, and Perugia*, into Rebellion. But, though they were able to maintain War, at this rate, against the Pope, they could not so well defend themselves against their Captains and Factions. The indignation and hatred the *Guelfs* had conceived against the Eight, augmented their insolence; and they affronted them as well as the rest of the chief of the Citizens. Nor was the arrogance of the Captains inferior to the insolence of the *Guelfs*; they had made themselves more formidable than the *Signori*; and men went with more awe and reverence to their Houses, than to the Senators Palace: insomuch, that not an Ambassador was sent to *Florence*, but he receiv'd Audience from; and had particular commission to the Captains. Pope Gregory being dead, this City had no more Wars abroad; yet, at home, it was in great confusion: the imperiousness of the *Guelfs* was grown insupportable, and no way visible to suppress them: it was judg'd therefore necessary to take Arms, and commit the superiority to the decision of Fortune. On the *Guelfs* side there were all the ancient Nobility, and the greatest part of the more powerful Citizens; of whom, as (we have said) *Lapo, Piero, and Carlo* were the chief. On the other side, were all the inferior sort of the people headed by the Eight, and assisted by *Georgio Scali, Tomaso Strozzi, the Ricci, the Alberti, and the Medici*. The rest of the multitude (as it happens always in such cases) joyn'd with the discontents. The power of their adversaries seem'd very considerable to the *Guelfs*; and their danger great, if any Senate should prove their enemies, and go about to destroy them: desirous to prevent it, they assembled together; where, examining the State and condition of the City, they found the persons which had been admonish'd, were so numerous, that they had thereby disoblig'd most of their Citizens and made them their enemies. They could propose no other remedy; but as they had degraded them of their honours, so to banish them the City, seize upon the Senators Palace by force, and constrain the whole Town to come over to their side, according to the example of the *Guelfs* their Predecessors; whose quiet and security was to be attributed wholly to their banishing their adversaries. As to the design, all of them agreed; but they differed about the time. It was in the year 1377, in the month of *May*, when *Lapo* conceiving it unsafe to defer; acquainted them that delays were dangerous especially to them; considering, that in the next Senate *Salvestro de Medici* might be chosen *Gonfaloniere*, who was a known enemy to their sect. *Piero de gli Albizi* was of another sentiment, and thought it best to protract; in respect that more force would be necessary, which were not to be got together privately; and to raise them publicly, was to run themselves into palpable danger. His judgment therefore was, that they should have patience till *S. John's* day, which was at hand; at which time, in regard it was one of the greatest Festivals, and great resort would come to the City of Court, they might convey in what numbers they pleas'd, without danger of discovery. And to obviate their apprehension of *Salvestro*, he propos'd to have him admonish'd; and if that would not do, to put the change upon him, by some fraud or artifice in the imbursement; and fust in some other of the Colledg of his quarter, to defeat him securely of that Office. This last opinion being approv'd, it was resolv'd to put off; though *Lapo* consented unwillingly, urging, that delay was uncertain; that no time can, in all circumstances, be convenient; and that he who expects a perfect opportunity, seldom attempts any thing; and when he does, it turns commonly to his own disadvantage. However, they proceeded to admonish him, but could not hinder *Salvestro*. And, for the change, the Eight had got an inkling of that, and took care to prevent it; so that *Salvestro* was drawn for *Gonfaloniere* by *Alamanno de Medici*. Being of a Noble Popular Family, he could not endure that the People should be oppress'd by the power of a few great persons; resolv'g therefore with himself, to put a period to their insolence: seeing he was favour'd by the people, and back'd by several of the principal Citizens; he communicated his designs with *Benedetto Alberto, Tomaso Strozzi, and Georgio Scali*; all of them concurring in the Plot, and ingaging their assistance. Upon this they form'd a Law privately, whereby the *Ordini della Giustizia* against the Grandees were reviv'd, the authority of the *Capitani di parte*, retrench'd; and the *Ammoniti* re-admitted to the Magistracy. And, because it was best to propose and enact it at one time, if it were possible (for it was first to be presented to the Colledges, and afterwards debated

1377.

A Conspiracy of the *Guelfs*.

The Conspiracy defeated.

ted

ted in the Councils,) *Salvestro* being in his Office, (which, for the time, is, as it were, Prince of the City) he caused a Colledge and Council to be called both together in one morning; and coming in person to the Colledge, (which were none of his friends) he proposed the Law to them which he had prepared; but it was rejected as an innovation, and he could not prevail to have it pass'd. *Salvestro*, seeing himself defeated in his first practice to obtain it, pretended some necessity to go forth; and, without being perceived slip'd away to the Council; where, having placed himself so as he might be heard and seen by the whole Assembly, he told them as follows:

*That, being made Gonfaloniere, he did not think he had been design'd for the Cognizans and determination of private Causes, (which have their peculiar Judges) but to superintend the State, to correct the insolence of the Grandees; and to moderate and rectifie such Laws as were found prejudicial, nay, destructive to the Common-wealth. That in both cases he had been diligent to the utmost; and employed himself with all possible industry: but the perverseness and malevolence of some men was so untractable, and contrary to his good designs; they did not only hinder him from perpetrating any thing for the benefit of the publick; but they denied him their Counsel, and refused ser to hear him. Wherefore, finding it was not in his power to be any way beneficial to his Country; he knew not for what reason, or with what confidence he should continue in an Office which either he did not really deserve, or of which he was thought unworthy by others. For this cause his intention was to retire and leave the people to the election of another, who might be more vertuous, or more fortunate than he.*

The Speech  
of *Salvestro de  
Medici.*

And having said, he departed from the Council towards his own house. Those of the Council, who were privy to the design, and others, desirous of novelty, raised a tumult thereupon; to which, the Senators and Colledges immediately resorted; and meeting their *Gonfaloniere*, they prevailed with him, partly with their authority, and partly with their intreaty, to return to the Council, which, by that time, was in great confusion: many of the Noble Citizens had been threatened, and injuriouly treated; and, among the rest, *Carlo Strozzi* had been taken by the buttons, by an Artificer, and doubtlesly slain, had not the standers-by interposed; and, with some difficulty, sav'd him. But he which made the greatest hubub, and put the City in Arms, was *Benedetto de gli Alberti*, who, from a window of the Palace, cry'd out aloud to the people, to Arm; Upon which the *Piazza* was fill'd with arm'd men immediately; and the Colledges did that out of fear, which they had denied upon request. The Captains of the parties had, in the mean time, got together what Citizens they could, to advise what was to be done against this Decree of the Senate. But when they heard of the tumult, and understood what had pass'd in Council; they all of them slunk back to their houses. Let no man that contrives any alteration in a City, delude himself, or believe that he can either stop it when he will, or manage it as he pleases. *Salvestro's* intention was to have procur'd that Law, and settled the City. But it fell out quite otherwise; for their humours being stir'd, every man was distracted: the shops shut up; the Citizens assaulted in their houses: several remov'd their goods into the Monestaries and Churches, to secure them; all people expecting some mischief at hand. The whole Corporation of the *Arts*, met, and each of them made a *Syndic*. Hereupon the *Priori* call'd their Colledges, and were in Counsel a whole day together with the *Syndics*, to find out a way to compose their disorders to the satisfaction of all parties; but, being of different judgments, nothing was agreed. The next day the *Arts* came forth with Ensigns displaid; which the Senate understanding, and doubting what would follow, they call'd a Counsel to prevent the worst, which was no sooner met but the tumult increased, and the Ensigns of the *Arts* marched up into the *Piazza* with Colours flying, and store of arm'd men at their heels. Thereupon to satisfy the *Arts*, and the multitude, and (if possible) to dispel that cloud of mischief which was impending; the Council gave General power (which, in *Florence* is called *Balia*) to the Senators, Colledges, the Eight, the Captains of the Parties, and the *Syndics* of the *Arts*, to reform the State as they should think most advantageous for the publick. Whilst these things were in agitation; some of the Ensigns of the *Arts*, joyning themselves with some of the rabble, (being stimulated by certain persons, who were desirous to revenge themselves of some late injuries which they had received from the *Guelfs*) stole away from the rest; went to the Palace of *Lapo da Castiglionchio*, broke into it, plundered it, and burned it. *Lapo*, upon intelligence of what the Senate had done, in contradiction to the orders of the *Guelfs*, and seeing the people in Arms, having no variety of choice; but either to hide, or to fly; he absconded first in *S. Croce*, but afterwards fled away to *Casentino*, in the disguise of a Frier; where he was often heard to complain of himself, for having consented to *Piero de gli Albizi*: and of *Piero* for having protracted their attempt upon the Government till *S. John's* day. *Piero* and *Carlo Strozzi*, upon the first

The *Balia.*

first

Reformati-  
on again.

first noise of the tumult, hid themselves only, presuming (when it was over) they had relations and friends enough to secure their residence in *Florence*. The Palace of *Lapo* being burn'd, (mischiefs being more easily propagated, than begun,) several other houses ran the same fate, either out of publick malice, or private revenge: and that the greediness and rapacity of their Companions might, if possible out-do theirs; they broke up the Goals, and set the prisoners at liberty: and, after this, they sack'd the Monastery of *Agnoli* and the Convent *di S. Spirito* to which, many Citizens had convey'd much of their goods. Nor had the publick Chamber escap'd their violence, had not the awe and reverence of one of the *Signori* defended it; who being on horse-back, with some persons in Arms attending him, oppos'd himself, in the best manner he could, against the fury of the People; which being appeas'd in some measure, either by the authority of the *Signori*, or the approach of the night, the next day the *Balia* indemnified the *Ammoniti*, with proviso, that for three years, they should not exercise any Magistracy in that City. They rescind'd those Laws which were made in prejudice to the *Guelfs*. They proclaimed *Lapo da Castiglionechio*, and his accomplices, Rebels: after which, new Senators were chosen, and of them, *Luigi Guicciardini* was made *Gonfaloniere*. Being all lookt upon as peaceable men, and lovers of their Country great hopes were conceiv'd the tumult would have ceased: notwithstanding, the shops were not opened; the people stood to their Arms, and great Guards kept all over the City: so that the *Signori* entred not upon the Magistracy abroad, with the usual pomp, but privately within doors, and without any ceremony at all. These Senators concluded, nothing was so necessary nor profitable for the publick, at the beginning of their Office, as to pacifie the tumult: whereupon, by Proclamation, they requir'd all Arms to be laid down; all shops to be opened; and all persons, who had been call'd out of the Country, to the assistance of any Citizen, to depart. They dispos'd Guards in several places of the Town; and order'd things so, that if the *Ammoniti* could have been contented, the whole City would have been quiet. But they not being satisfied to attend three years before they should be capable of Office, the *Arts*, in favour to them, got together again; and demand'd of the Senate, that, for the future, no Citizen might be admonish'd as a *Ghibelin*, by either the Senaté, the Colledge, the Captains of the Parties, the Consuls, or *Sindic's* of any *Art* whatsoever: requiring likewise, that new imbursement might be made of the *Guelfs*, and the old one be burn'd. Their demands were presently accepted, both by the Senate and Counsels; supposing thereupon, their new tumult would have ceased. But those that are covetous, and impatient for revenge, are not to be satisfied with bare restitution. Such as desired disorder, to enrich and wreck themselves upon their enemies, perswaded the Artificers they could never be safe, unless many of their adversaries were banish'd, or destroyed. Which practices being remonstrated to the Senate; they caus'd the Magistrates of the *Arts*, and the *Sindic's*, to appear before them, to whom *Luigi Guicciardini* the *Gonfaloniere* spake, in this maner:

*Luigi Guicciardini's* Oration.

If these Lords, and my self, had not long since understood the fortune of this City; and observ'd, that its Wars abroad were no sooner determin'd, but it was infested with new troubles at home; we should have more admir'd, and more resent'd the tumults which have happen'd: but things that are familiar, carrying less terror along with them, we have born the late passages; with more patience; especially, considering we were not at all conscious to their beginning; and had reason to hope they would have the same end as former tumults have had upon our condescension to their great, and their numerous demands. But finding (to our Sorrow) you are so far from composing your thoughts, or acquiescing in what has been granted, that you are rather exasperated, and conspire new injury against your fellow Citizens, and endeavour to banish them; we must needs say, the ignobleness of your proceedings provokes us to displeasure. And certainly, had we imagin'd, that in the time of our Magistracy, our City should have been ruin'd, either in siding with, or against you, we should have declin'd that honour, and freed our selves from it, either by banishment, or flight. But, supposing we had to do with people not utterly destitute of humanity, and void of all affection to their Country; we willingly accepted of the preferment, as hoping, by the gentleness of our deportment, to be too hard for your ambition and violence. But we see now, by unhappy experience, the mildness of our behaviour, and the readiness of our condescensions do but increase and elate you, and spur you on to more dishonourable demands. We say not this to disgust, but to inform you; let others represent to you what will please; it shall be our way to remonstrate what is profitable. Tell me (upon your words) what is there more that you can justly desire of us? You propos'd to have the Captains of the Parties divested of their authority; it is done. You mov'd, the old imbursements might be burn'd, and new ones decreed to supply them; we consented. You had a mind the *Ammoniti* should be re-admitted to places

places of honour and trust; we granted it: Upon your intercessions, we pardoned those who had burned houses, and rob'd Churches; and, to satisfy you, have sent several of our principal Citizens into Exile. To gratify you, the Grandees are circumscrib'd with new Laws, and all things done that might satisfy you: what end therefore will there be of your demands? Or, how long will you abuse the liberty you enjoy? Do you not perceive, that we can be overcome with more patience, than you can subdue us? What will be the conclusion; or, whether will your dissensions hurry this poor City? Can you have forgot how Caltruccio, (an inconsiderable Citizen of Luca) taking advantage of the divisions, possessed himself of it? Do not you still remember, that the Duke of Athens, from a private person, became your Lord and your Sovereign; and all from our own differences at home? Whereas, when we were united, the Arch-Bishop of Mullan, nor the Pope himself, were able to hurt us; but were glad (after several years War) to lay down with dishonour. Why then will you suffer your own discords (in time of Peace too) to bring a City into slavery, which so many potent enemies, in time of War, were not able to captivate? What can you expect from your divisions, but servitude? What from the goods you have, or shall hereafter take violently from your neighbours, but poverty? The persons you plunder, are they, who, by our care and appointment, supply the City with all things; and if it be defeated of them, what can we do to sustain it? What-ever you gain, (being unjustly acquir'd) you can hardly preserve: from whence, famine and poverty must necessarily follow. These Lords therefore, and my self do command, and (if it be consistent with our, Dignity) intreat, and beseech you, that you would compose your selves for this once, and be content with our past condescensions; or, if they be too little, and there remains still something to be granted; that you would desire it civilly, and not with the force and clamour of a tumult; and if your request be just, you will not only be gratified; but occasion taken away from wicked men, to ruine your Country, under your shelter and pretence.

These words being true, had great influence upon the people, inasmuch that they return'd their thanks to the *Gonfaloniere*, acknowledged that he had behav'd himself like a good Lord to them, and a good Citizen to the City, and promised their obedience to what-ever he commanded. To breake the ice, the *Signori* deputed two Citizens for each of the chiefest Offices, to consult with the *Syndics* of the *Arts*, what, in order to the publick good, was most fit to be reformed; and to report it to the Senate. But, whilst these things were transacting, a new tumult broke out, which put the City into more trouble than the former. The greatest part of the robbery, and late mischief, was committed by the rabble, and rascality of the people; and of them, those who had been most eminently mischievous, apprehended, when the greater differences were reconcil'd, they might be questioned, punished for the crimes they had committed, and (as it always happens) be deserted by those very persons who instigated them at first: to which was added, a certain hatred the inferior sort of the people had taken against the richer Citizens, and the Principals of the *Arts*, upon pretence that they were not rewarded for the service they had done, with proportion to their deserts. For when, as in the time of *Charles* the First, the City was divided into *Arts*, every *Art* had its proper Head and Governour, to whose jurisdiction, (in Civil cases) every person in the several *Arts*, were to be subject. These *Arts* (as we said before) were originally but XII, afterwards they increased to XXI, and grew to that power and authority, that, in a few years, they ingrossed the whole Government of the City: and because, among them, some were more considerable, and some less; they came, by degrees, to be distinguished, and VII of them were call'd *Maggiori*, and XIV, *Minori*. From this division, and the other reasons aforesaid, proceeded the arrogance of the Captains of the Parties; for those Citizens who had anciently been *Guelfs*, (under whose Government those Offices were always preserved) did ever indulge the chief and better sort of the *Arts*; and discountenance the more inferior, and all that took their parts: hence it was, all the before-mentioned troubles and tumults were derived. But because, in the ordinary Companies and Corporations of the *Arts*, there were many trades (in which the meaner sort of people were employed) of no distinct and peculiar Company, but were incorporated with other Trades, as the quality of their employments made them fit; it fell out, that when they were not satisfied with their work, or any other ways injured by their Masters; they had no person to repair to for redress, but to the Magistrate of that Company of which they were sworn; from whom, they conceived, they had not received that justice, which ought to have been done them. Of all Companies of the City, the Company of Clothiers was the greatest, and had most of these sort of people depending upon it; inasmuch, that being the first in wealth and authority by the industry of its Members, it maintain'd (and does still) the greatest part of the multitude. The baser sort of people there-  
fore

New troubles

fore (both of this Company, and the rest) were highly incens'd upon the foresaid occasions; and being excited, by fear of correction, for the pillaging and firing of the Palaces, they met many times in the night, to discourse of what was pass'd; and to admonish one another of the danger they were in; and to animate and unite them, one of the most daring, and most experienced among them, made this Speech:

The Speech  
of a Plebeian.

*Were it now to be considered, whether we were immediately to take Arms; to burn, and plunder the houses of our fellow Citizens, and rob the Churches; I should be one of those who should think it worthy of further debate, and perhaps, prefer harmless poverty before hazardous gain. But, since Arms are taken, many mischiefs have been done; and much prize has been got; it is (in my judgment) most natural, to advise which way our gains are to be preserved; and how we may best secure our selves against the ills we have committed. I am certainly of opinion, if no man should do you that service, your own necessity would advise you. You see the whole City full of complaints, and indignation against us; the Citizens, frequent in their meetings; and the Senators perpetually with the Magistrate. Be confident, 'tis to design against us; to contrive new ways, and to contract new Forces to destroy us. It remains therefore upon us, to do two things; one is, to provide, that we be not punished for our pass'd offences: the other, that we may live with more liberty and satisfaction for the future. To justify therefore our former misdeeds, in my thoughts, it is convenient to increase them with new; and by the artifice of redoubling our mischiefs, our conflagrations, and robberies, to allure and engage more companions to our Party. For, where many are guilty, none are punished; though small faults are revenged, great ones are generally rewarded; and where the disease is epidemical, few people complain; an universal calamity being always more supportable than a private. So then, to multiply our misdeeds, is the readiest way of obtaining our pardon, and prevailing for those things which we believe conducive to our liberty; nor is there any difficulty to discourage us; it seems to me, the enterprise is not only easy, but certain; because those who should oppose us, are divided, and rich: their divisions will give us the Victory; and their riches (when we have got them) shall maintain it. Let not the antiquity of their blood dismay you, (though objected so insolently.) All men having the same original, are equally ancient; and nature has made no difference in their constitution, strip them naked, you are as well as they: dress them in your rags, and your selves in their robes, and you will doubtless be the Nobles; for 'tis nothing but poverty and riches that discriminates betwixt you. It troubles me, to think, that there are many of you unquiet in your consciences, for what you have done; and resolv'd to be guilty of no more: if it be so, I was mistaken in my judgment, and you are not the persons I thought you. Neither conscience, nor disgrace, ought at all to deter you; they that overcome, (let the means be what they will) are never troubled with the dishonour: and, for conscience, you ought not to be concern'd. Where the fear of famine, and death, and prisons, are so pregnant, there is no room for apprehensions of Hell. Observe the ways and progress of the World; you will find the rich, the great, and the potent, arrive at all that wealth, and grandeur, and authority, by violence or fraud; and when once they are possessed, you will see with what confidence and security they gild over the brutality of their usurpations; with the unjust (but glorious) title of conquests. Observe, on the other side, those whose pusillanimity or sottishness affrights them from those courses, what becomes of them? they are choak'd up and consumed in servitude and poverty: honest servants, are perpetual servants; good men are always badly provided for; the bold and unscrupulous, do soonest free themselves from bondage; and the most fraudulent and rapacious, from indigence and distress. God and Nature have laid every mans fortune before him; and we see men more naturally dispos'd to rapine, than industry; to bad actions, than good. Hence it is, we devour one another; and he that can do least, goes always by the worst.) Force, therefore, is to be used, when occasion is given; and, what fairer opportunity can be offered by Fortune? The Citizens are divided; the Senate irresolute; the Magistrate frighted; so that before they can unite, and come to any resolution, our work will be done, and we be either absolute Princes of the City, or Masters of such Cantons, as will not only pardon us for what is pass'd, but inable us to awe our enemies for the future. I confess, this resolution is dangerous, and bold; but where necessity urges, boldness is prudence; and danger in great things, was never considered by men of the least courage and gallantry. Those enterprises which begin with danger, do end with reward; and men never free themselves from one peril, but by adventuring a greater. Again, having prisons, and tortures, and death before our eyes, (as we have) it cannot but be more hazardous to stand still, than to look out for security: in the first, our destruction is certain; in the other, contingent. How often have I heard you complain of the avarice of your superiors; and the injustice of your Magistrates? Now, in your*

time,

time, not only to free, but to advance your selves into a capacity of retaliating, and giving them as much occasion of fearing you, as you have had of them. Time has wings, opportunity flies away; and when once pass'd, is never to be reclaim'd. You see our enemies are preparing, let us prevent their preparation: who-ever begins first, is sure to prevail, to the ruine of their enemies, and exaltation of themselves. Go on therefore with courage, this enterprize will yield honour to many of us, but security to us all.

Though their own propensity was too much, this speech push'd the people forward, with more impetuosity, to mischief; so that after they had drawn together what company they were able, they concluded to take Arms, and oblig'd themselves, by oath, to relieve one another, when any of them should fall under the correction of the Magistrate. Whilst they were in this manner conspiring against the Government, the Senators had notice of it from one, and having caused one *Simone* to be apprehended, he confessed the whole plot, and that the next day was intended for a tumult. whereupon, fore-seeing the danger they were in, they assembled the Colledges, and such Citizens as sided with the *Smice's* of the *Arts*, and laboured the preservation of the City. Before they could be got together, it was night; and the *Signori* were advis'd to consult with the *Consoli dell' Arti*, who agreed unanimously, that the whole City should Arm; and the *Gonfaloniere del Popolo*, draw all the Companies, the next morning, into the *Piazza*. At the time when the Citizens met, and *Simone* was upon the Rack, one *Nicolada Frisano* being in the Palace, to do something about the clock, returned with all speed to his house, put the whole neighbourhood into an uproar, and brought above a thousand arm'd men together into the *Piazza di Santo Spirito* in a moment. The alarm increasing, came to the rest of the Conspirators, who immediatly took Arms; and, in a short space, *San Piero Maggiore*, and *San Lorenzo*, (as they had appointed before) were full of Arm'd men. The day being arriv'd, which was the 21<sup>st</sup>. of *July*, in favour of the Senate, there were not above 80 men appeared in their Arms, and none of the *Gonfaloniere*; for they having intelligence the whole City was in Arms, were afraid to stir out of their houses. The first party of the people which advanced to the *Piazza*, was that which had met at *San Piero Maggiore*; but the Forces which were drawn there before, did not remove. Not long after them, appeared the rest of the multitude, who, finding no resistance, with hideous noise, demanded their prisoners of the *Signori*, and not succeeding by threats, to gain them by force, they set fire to the Palace of *Luigi Guicciardini*, and burned it to the ground; whereupon, for fear of worse mischief, their prisoners were ordered to be delivered. When they had recovered their prisoners, they took the Standard *della Giustizia* from the *Essecutore*, burned many houses under it, and persecuted all people that they were angry with; whether upon publick, or private account; many Citizens, upon particular quarrels, conducting the tumult to the houses of their adversaries; it being sufficient, to cry out in the multitude, *To such an house, to such a man*; or for him that carried the Standard, to direct it to such a place. They burned the accounts and books of the Company of the Clothing Trade; and after they had done mischief good store, that they might accompany their exorbitance with some laudable action, they made *Salvestro de Medici*, a Knight, and as many more of their Partners, as the whole number amounted to 64, among which, there were *Benedetto*, and *Antonio de gli Alberti*; *Tomazo Strozzi*, and several others; some of which, received their honour much against their wills: In which accident, one thing is more then ordinarily remarkable; that those persons, some of them, whose houses were burned; were, the same day, knighted by the same persons which had burned them; so unconstant are the people, and so small the distance betwixt their kindness, and revenge; an experiment of which, was seen in their behaviour to *Luigi Guicciardini*, the *Gonfaloniere della Giustizia*. The Senators finding themselves abandoned by their Guards, by the chief of the *Arts*, and their *Gonfaloniere* themselves, were very much perplexed, no-body coming into their assistance, as they were commanded; and, of the 16 *Gonfaloni*, there was only the Company of the Golden Lion, and two more, which appeared, and they staid not long in the *Piazza*; for, not finding themselves followed by their Brethren, they also returned to their houses: the Citizens, on the other side, seeing the fury of the multitude uncontrollable, and the Palace of the *Signori* deserted, some of them kept close in their houses; others thrust themselves into the crowd, thereby to secure their own houses, and their friends; by which means, the numbers of the people were much increased, and the power of the Senate extremely diminished. The tumult continued in this violence all day long; and, at night, there were above 6000 men together at the Palace of *Stephano*, behind the Church of *S. Barnaby*. Before day, they constrained the several *Arts* to send for their Ensigns; and having got them in the morning, they march'd with their Colours before them, to the Palace of the *Podesta*, who refusing



The demands  
of the people.

fusing to surrender; they fell upon it, and forced it. The Senate desirous to compose things another way, perceiving nothing was to be done by force, called three Members of their Colledges, and sent them to the Palace of the *Podestà*, who found, that the heads of the people had been already in consultation with the *Sindici* of the *Arts*, and some other considerable Citizens, to resolve what was fit to be demanded of the Senate: so that they returned in a short time to the Senate, with four Deputies from the people; and these following proposals. That the Clothing Trade might not, for the future, be subject to the Government of a foreigner; That three new Companies, or Corporations, should be erected; one, to consist of Carders, and Diers; another, of Barbers, Taylers, Shoemakers, and such other Mechanicks; and the third, of the more inferior Trades, out of Which Companies, two should be chosen to sit in the Senate; and three to sit among the *14*, which had the Government of the *Artimiori*, or inferior Trades. That the Senate should provide Halls for these new Companies, where they might meet, and consult about their affairs. That no person, of any of these Companies, should be constrained to pay any debt under fifty Duckets, for the space of two years. That no interest should be paid out of the Banks, and only the principal to be restor'd. That all prisoners, and condemn'd persons, should be discharged. That all the *Ammoniti* should be re-admitted to all honours. Many other things were demanded in behalf of their friends; and, on the contrary, as to their enemies, they insisted, that several of them might be imprisoned, and several admonished. To give perfection to all, it was necessary they should be ratified in the Counsel of the Commons; which was deferred till the next, because two Counsels were not to be held in one day. In the mean time, the *Arts* seemed all of them to be content, and the people to be satisfied; having promised, as soon as their Laws and demands were confirmed, they would retire to their houses. The next morning being come, and the Counsel of the Commons deliberating upon their demands; the voluble and impatient multitude were got together, and marching, with Ensigns displaid, into the *Piazza*, with so obltrepous and dreadful a noise, as affrighted both the Counsel, and Senate: whereupon, *Guerriante Marienouli*, one of the *Signori*, (induced more by fear, than any private exception) went down, under pretence to secure the Gate below, and march'd off to his house. He could not, however, convey himself so privatly away, but the Rabble discovered him, yet without any violence to him, only crying out, as he passed, that all the Senators should leave the Palace; if not, they would burn their houses, and knock their children on the head. By this time, the Law they urg'd, was concluded; the Senators returned to their Chambers; and the Counsel gone down, (not daring to go forth) were walking up and down the Court and the Cloysters, despairing of the safety of the City, by reason of the bruitishness, and barbarity of the multitude, and the crossness or pusillanimity of those who might have either bridled or suppressed them. The *Signori* were likewise in no less doubt and confusion, seeing themselves not only forsaken by one of their own Members, but relieved by no-body, neither with intelligence, nor supplies. Whilst they were in this hesitation, uncertain what they ought, or what they were able to do, *Tomazzo Strozzi*, and *Benedetto Alberti*, (prompted by private ambition, of being themselves the last of the Senators which should remain in the Palace, or else, because it was really their judgment) persuaded them to give way, to yield to the fury of the people, and retire privatly, every man to his own house. This counsel being given by persons who had been heads of the people, (though others seem to approve it) displeas'd *Alamanno Acciavoli*, and *Nicola de Bene*, exceedingly, who (recollecting their courage) made answer; That, if others of the Senate had a mind to depart, they would not hinder them; but, for their parts, till the expiration of their authority permitted them, they were resolv'd not to leave the Palace, but with the loss of their lives. This difference redoubled the horror of the Senate, and the rage of the people: insomuch, that the *Gonfaloniere*, choosing to resign his Office with shame, rather than retain it with danger, recommended himself to *Tomazzo Strozzi's* protection, who took him out of the Palace, and conducted him to his house: in like manner, the rest of the *Signori* departed one after another; and *Alamanno*, and *Nicolo*, (who were so magnanimous before, lest they should be thought more valiant than wise, got our also, and returned like the rest; so that the Palace, remained in the hands of the people, and the eight Officers for the administrations of War, who had not as yet laid down their Commands.

*Michaele di Lando.*

When the people made their entrance into the Palace, the Ensigns of the *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia*, was carried by one *Michaele di Lando*, a Carder of Wooll. This *Michaele* (without shoes on his feet, and scarce cloathes on his back) being followed by a great rout, an up to the top of the stairs, and being got within hearing of the place where the Senators sat, he turned himself about to the multitude, and said; *You see, Gentlemen, this Palace, and this City, is yours; how shall they be disposed of, or, what is your pleasure shall be done?*

To



To which, they universally replied, it was their pleasure he should be *Gonfaloniere*, and govern the City as he thought best. *Michael* accepted the Office, being a prudent and sagacious man, more obliged to Nature than Fortune; and the first thing he resolved, was, to compose the tumults, and settle the City. To hold the people employed, and gain time for the digestion of his designs, he commanded them abroad, in search of one *Ser Nuto*, (who had been intended for Provost Marshal, by *Lapo de Castiglioni*, and most of those who were about him, went away in his pursuit. To begin (then) his dominion with justice, as he had acquired it by Grace, he caused Proclamation to be made, that no man should dare to burn, or steal any thing for the future; and to terrify the more, he caused a Gallows to be set up in the *Piazza*: proceeding next to the reformation of the City, he turned out the *Sindici*'s of the *Arts*, and put new in their places; He deprived the *Signori*, and the Colleged of their Authority, and burned the bags of their Office. By this time the people had found *Ser Nuto*, brought him to the Palace, tyed him up to the Gallows by one of his legs, and every one that was about him, having torn off a peice, in a moments time, there was nothing of him to be seen, but one of his feet. On the other side, the *Otto della Guerra*, (supposing the Government in them, upon the departure of the *Signori*) had designed new Senators to succeed them. But *Michael* understanding it, sent to them to be gone out of the Palace, and to let them know, it should appear to all people, that he could govern *Florence*, without their counsel or assistance. After this, he assembled the *Sindici*'s of the *Arts*; and created four new Senators out of the inferior sort of people; two for the better, and two for the worse Trades. Moreover, he divided the State into three parts,; one of them to relate to the new *Arts*; another to the less; and the third to the greater. He gave to *Salvestro de Medici*, the revenue of the shops upon the old Bridge; to himself, the *Podestaria* of *Empoli*; besides many other Acts of beneficence to several Citizens, and friends of the people, not so much for their own sakes, but that they might be always willing, and able to defend him. The people however, began to suspect, that *Michael* was partial to the better sort; and to discern that they had not so much interest in the Government, as would be necessary for their safety. Whereupon, push'd forward by their accustomed insolence, they took Arms again, and came marching, with their Colours flying, to the *Piazza*, in a bravado, requiring the Senators to come down to the *Ringheria*, and deliberate upon certain new things they had to propose for their security, and good. *Michael* was sensible of their insolence, but (not to provoke them any farther, before he knew what they would have) he only blamed their manner of address; desired them to lay down their Arms, and, that then, by fair means, they should obtain that; which did not stand with the Dignity of the Government to grant by constraint: with which answer, the people being highly incensed, they drew up at new *S. Maria*, against the Palace, and created eight Commissioners, with their Ministers and dependants, to gain themselves reverence and reputation: so, as at that time, the City had two Tribunals; and were governed by two distinct Administrations. Among the Commissioners it was resolv'd, that eight persons, to be chosen by the body of the *Arts*, should be always resident in the Palace, with the Senators, to give Sanction to what ever the *Signori* resolv'd upon. They took from *Salvestro de Medici*, and *Michael de Lando*, what ever in their former Counsels they had conferred upon them; assigning several Offices, and pensions, to many of their friends, to support the Dignity of their employments. Having concluded, in this manner, among themselves, to make all the more valid, they sent two of their Members to the Senate, to demand their confirmation; otherwise, to let them know, that what they could not obtain by civil application, they were able to do by force. These two Commissioners delivered their message to the Senate, with great confidence and presumption; upbraiding the *Gonfaloniere* by his Office, and other honours which he had received from them; and that, in return, he had most ungratefully behav'd himself towards them and coming, at the end of their objurgation, to threaten him; *Michael*, unable to indure so great insolence, (more suitably to the Majesty of his Place, than the meanness of his Birth) resolv'd, by some extraordinary way, to correct such extraordinary impudence, and drawing his sword, he cut them very much, and caused them afterwards, to be manacled and imprisoned.

This action of the *Gonfaloniere* was no sooner known, but it put all the multitude in a flame: and believing they should be able to gain that by violence, which they could not compass without, they immediately to their Arms, and march'd round about the Palace, to find where, with most advantage, they might fall on. *Michael*, on the other side, suspecting the worst, resolv'd to be before-hand, as judging it more honourable to fall upon them abroad, than to expect them within the walls, till they fell upon him, and forced him out of the Palace (as they had done his Predecessors) with great shame and dishonour. Gathering therefore together a great number of Citizens, (who having found their error) were

were resorted to him; he marched out as strong as he could, on horse-back, and advanced to fight them as far as new S. *Maries*.

The people (as I said before) were as forward as he; and marching about towards the Palace, to take their advantage, it happened, *Michaelè* made his sally at the same time, and they missed one another. *Michaelè* returning, found the people had possessed themselves of the *Piazza*, and were storming the Palace; whereupon, he charged them so smartly on the rear, that he brake them immediately; some of them he chased out of the City; and forced the rest to throw down their Arms, and hide themselves. This victory being obtained, the tumult dissolved, and the City became quiet, and all by the single valour of the *Gonfaloniere*; who for Courage, Generosity, and Prudence, was superiour to any Citizen of his time, and deserves to be numbred among the few Benefactors to their Country: for, had he been ambitious, or ill-disposed, the City had lost its liberty, and relapsed into greater tyranny than that in the time of the Duke of *Athens*. But, his goodness would not admit a thought against the good of the publick; and his prudence managed things so, that many submitted to him, and the rest he was able to subdue.

*Michaelè* overcomes the multitude.

These passages amazed the common people; and put the better sort of Artificers into an admiration of their own stupidity, who could not endure the grandeur of the Nobility, were now forced to truckle to the very skum of the people. When *Michaelè* had this good fortune against the people, at the same time, new Senators were drawn, two of which were of so vile and abject condition, every body desired to quit themselves of so infamous a Magistracy. Whereupon, the first day of *September*, when the *Signori* made the first entrance upon their Office, the people being so thick, that the *Palaci* was full of arm'd men; there was a cry sent forth from among them, that no Senator should be made out of the meanest sort of the people; and, in satisfaction to them, the Senate degraded the other two, (one of which was called *Tira*, and the other *Boraccio*) and, in their places, *Giorgio Scali*, and *Francesca di Michaelè*, were elected.

Afterwards, they dissolved the Corporations of the meaner Trades, and of all their dependants; only *Michaelè di Lando*, *Ladovico di Puccio*, and some few others were excepted. They divided the Magistracy into two parts; one for the greater, the other for the lesser sort of *Arts*. Only it was concluded, the Senate should contain five of the lesser *Arts*, and four of the greater; the *Gonfaloniere* to be chosen sometimes out of one, and sometimes out of the other. This Constitution and Establishment, settled the City for a while: and, although the Government was taken out of the hands of the people; yet, the Artificers of the meanest quality, had more power than the popular Nobility, who were forced to comply, to satisfy the *Arts*, and divide them from the baser sort of people. This was much approved by those who desired the faction of the *Guelfs* (which had handled several of the Citizens with so great violence) might be depressed; among the rest which were advanced by this new model, *Giorgio Scali*, *Benedetto Alberti*, *Salvestro de Medici*, and *Tomaso Strozzi* were made, as it were, Princes of the City. These proceedings exasperated the jealousies betwixt the popular Nobility, and the meaner sort of people, by the instigation of the *Ricci*, and *Albizi*, of which two parties, because we shall have frequent occasion to discourse (many sad and great actions happening afterwards betwixt them) we shall, for better distinction, call one of them the Popular, and the other the Plebeian Party, for the future.

The popular Faction distinguished from the plebeian.

This Government continued three years, with frequent examples both of banishment and death: for those who were at the helm, knowing there were many male-contentments both within the City, and without, lived in perpetual fear. They who were discontented within, attempted, or conspired every day something or other against the State. Those without, (having no restraint upon them) by means sometimes of this Prince, sometimes of this Common-wealth, raised several scandals both of the one side and the other. At that time, *Giannozzo da Salerno*, General for *Carlo Durazzo*, who was descended from the King of *Naples*, happened to be at *Bologna*, attending a design, which; they said, *Durazzo* had undertaken against Queen *Giovanna*, at the instigation of the Pope, who was her mortal enemy. There were in *Bologna*, at the same time, several Exiles from *Florence*, who held strict intelligence both with Pope *Urban* and *Carle*: which was the cause, that those who governed in *Florence*, living in great jealousy, gave credit easily to the calumniations of all those Citizens that were suspected. During this general apprehension, news was brought to the Magistrate, that *Giannozzo da Salerno*, with the assistance of all those who were banished, was to march down with his Army against *Florence*; and that several in the City had engaged to take Arms in his behalf, and to deliver up the Town. Upon this information, many were accused; in the first place, *Piero de gli Albizi*, and *Carlo Strozzi* were named; and after them, *Capriano Mangioni*, *Jacopo Saccchetti*, *Do-*  
nato

nato *Barbadori*, *Philippa Strozzi*, and *Giovanni Anselmi*; all which were secured, except *Carlo Strozzi*, who escaped; and (that no-body might dare to take Arms for their rescue) the Senate deputed *Tomaso Strozzi*, and *Benedetto Alberti*, with a competent number of Souldiers, to secure the City. The Prisoners being examined, and their charge, and answer compared, they were found, not Guilty; and the Captain refused to condemn them; hereupon those who were their enemies, incensed the people so highly against them, that, in a great fury, they forced the Captain to condemn them. Neither could *Piero de gli Albizzi* be excused, either for the greatness of his Family, or the antiquity of his Reputation; he having a long time been the most feared, and the most revered Citizen in *Florence*. Whereupon, either some of his true friends, (to teach him moderation in the time of his greatness,) or some of his enemies, (to check, and alar'm him with the unconstancy of fortune) at a great Treat which he had made for several of the Citizens, sent him a salver of Comfits; among which a nail was privately conveyed; which being discovered in the dish, and viewed by the whole Table, it was interpreted as an admonishment to him, to fix the wheel of his fortune, for being now at the height, if its rotation continued, he must of necessity fall to the ground; which interpretation was verified first by his fall, and then by his death. After this execution the City remained full of confusion, both Conquerors and Conquered being affraid: but the saddest effects proceeded from the jealousy of the Governors, every little accident provoking them to new injuries against the Citizens, by condemning, admonishing, or banishing them the Town; to which may be added, the many new Laws and Ordinances which they made to fortifie their authority; which were executed with great prejudice to all such as were suspected by their party: for, by them, 66 were commissioned, with the assistance of the Senate, to purge the Common-wealth of such people as they thought dangerous to the State. These Commissioners admonished 39 Citizens; several of the Populace; and debased many of the Nobles; and to oppose themselves more effectually against foreign invasions, they entertained into their pay an English man, called *John Aguto*, an excellent Officer, and one who had commanded in *Italy* for the Pope, and other Princes, a long time. Their alarms from abroad were caused by intelligence, that *Carlo Durazzo* was raising several Companies for the invasion of the Kingdom of *Naples*; and the *Florentine* Exiles joyned with him in the Expedition; but to obviate that danger, they provided not only what force, but what mony was possible; and when *Carlo* came with his Army to *Arezzo*, the *Florentines* being ready with fourty thousand Florines to receive him, he promised he would not molest them. After he had received their money, he proceeded in his enterprise against *Naples*; and having taken the Queen, he sent her Prisoner into *Hungary*. His Victory there, suggested new jealousy into the Governors of *Florence*: they could not imagine their money could have greater influence upon the King, than the friendship his Family had long maintained with the Faction of the *Guelfs*, who were undone by him. Apprehensions increasing at this rate, enormities increased with them, which were so far from extinguishing their fears, that they were exceedingly multiplied; and the greater part of the City were in great discontent. To make things worse, the insolence of *Giorgio Scali*, and *Tomaso Strozzi* were added, who being grown more powerful than the Magistrate, every one feared, lest, by their conjunction with the Plebeians, they should be ruined.

Nor did this Government seem violent and tyrannical to good men only, but to the seditious, and debauched: for this arrogance of *Giorgio's* being some time or other of necessity, to have an end; it happened, that *Giovanni di Cambia* was accused by one of his acquaintance, for practising against the State; but upon examination, *Cambia* was found innocent by the Captain; and the Judge gave sentence, that the Informer should suffer the same punishment, which should have been inflicted on the other, had his charge been made good. *Giorgio* interposed, with his intreaties and authority to preserve him; but, not prevailing, he, and *Tomaso Strozzi*, with a number of arm'd men, rescued him by force, plundered the Captains Palace, and forced him to hide himself. This action made the whole City detest him; put his enemies upon contriving his destruction, and Plotting which way they might redeem the City out of his hands, and the Plebeians, (who, for three years together, had had the command of it.)

To this design, the Captain gave the opportunity; for the tumult being appeased, he went to the Senate, and told them;

*That he had cheerfully accepted the Office, to which they had elected him, presuming he had served Persons of Honour and Equity; who would have taken Arms to have promoted and vindicated Justice, rather than to have obstructed it: but his observation and experience had acquainted him with the Governors of the City and their manner of conversation; that dignity which so willingly he had taken up for the benefit of his Country*

Country, to avert the danger and detriment impending, he was as ready to lay down.

The Captain was sweetned by the Senate, and much confirmed by a promise made to him of reparation for what he had suffered already, and security for the future. Hereupon, several of them consulting with such of the Citizens as they thought greatest lovers of their Country, and least suspicious to the state; it was concluded that they had now a fair opportunity to redeem the City out of the clutches of *Giorgio* and his Plebeians; (most people having alienated their affections from him, upon his last insolence) and the best way would be to improve it before they had time to reconcile; for they knew the favour of the people was to be lost and gained by the least accident in the World.

For the better conduct of their affairs, it was thought necessary that *Benedetto Alberti* should be drawn into the Plot; without whose concurrence, the enterprize would be dangerous. This *Benedetto* was a very rich man, courteous, sober, a true lover of his Country, and one infinitely dissatisfied with the irregularity of their ways; so that it was no hard matter to persuade him to any thing that might contribute to the ruine of *Giorgio*; for that which had made him before an enemy to the Popular Nobility, and the faction of the *Guelfs*, was the insolence of the one, and the tyranny of the other; and afterwards finding the heads of the multitude no better than they, he forsook them likewise, and all the misdemeanors and impieties which were committed after that, were done without his approbation or consent; so that the same reasons which inclined him to the people at first, the same reasons impelled him now to desert them.

Having brought *Benedetto* and the heads of the *Arts* to their Lure in this manner, and furnished themselves with Arms, they seized upon *Giorgio*, but *Tomaso* escaped. The next day after he was apprehended, *Giorgio* was beheaded, with so great terror and consternation to his party, that they were so far from endeavouring his rescue, that all of them crowded in to behold his execution. Being brought to die before those people who had so lately adored him, he complained of the iniquity of his fortune, and the malignity of those Citizens, who, by their injury and justice had constrained him to side with a multitude which was not capable either of gratitude or fidelity; and discovering *Benedetto* in the midst of the Guards, he said; And can you, *Benedetto*, consent that this wrong should be done to me? Were you in my place, I assure you, I would not suffer it: but let me tell you, this day is the last of my misfortunes, and the first of yours. After which, lamenting his unhappiness in having committed his fortunes and life to the constancy of the people, which is shaken by every rumor, or accident, or conceit, he laid down his head, and it was cut off

in the midst of his armed and insulting enemies: after him several of his confederates were executed, and their bodies dragged about the streets by the people. His death put the whole City into commotion; for at his execution, many Citizens had put themselves into Arms in favour of the Senators, and the Captain of the people, and some upon the dictates of their own private ambition and revenge. The City being full of various humors, every one had his private design, which all desired to compass before they laid down their arms. The ancient Nobility called *Grandi*, could not brook that they were deprived of publick employments, and therefore set all their wits upon the tenters, to recover what they had lost; and arm'd, upon pretence of re-investing the Captains of the *Arts* with their original authority. The popular Nobility and the greater *Arts* were disgusted, that the Government should be communicated to the inferior *Arts*, and the lowest sort of the people. On the other side, the inferior *Arts* were disposed to augment, not detract from their authority; and the meaner sort of people were as tender and jealous of loosing their Colledges: which distractions caused the City to tumultuate several times in one year; sometimes the Nobility; sometimes the better Trades; sometimes the lesser; sometimes the common people; and sometimes altogether betaking to their Arms in several parts of the Town; upon which, many skirmishes and rencounters happened betwixt them and the Guards of the Palace; the Senators contending sometimes, and sometimes complying, as they judged most likely to remedy those inconveniences: so that after two Treaties, and several *Balia's* created for the reformation of the City; after many mischiefs, and troubles, and dangers, they came to an agreement, That all who had been imprisoned after *Salvestro de Medici* was made *Gonfaloniere*, should be discharged. That all dignities and pensions conferred by the *Balia* of LXXVIII should be taken away. That their honours should be

Reformation

restored to the *Guelfs*. That the two new *Arts* should be deprived of their Incorporation and Governors, and all their members and dependents disposed into the old Companies as formerly. That the *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia* should not be elected by the lesser *Arts*; and whereas before they had the disposition of half, they should hereafter be capable but of a third part of the Offices of the City, and the best of them too to be put out of their power: so that the popular Nobility and the *Guelfs* reassumed the whole Government and

and the Commons were absolutely dispossessed, after they had held it from the year 1378, to 1381. Nor was this Magistracy less injurious towards the Citizens, nor less grievous in its principles, than the Government of the people; many of the popular Nobility, who had been eminent defenders of the peoples interest, being clap'd in prison, with great numbers of the chief of the Plebeians: Among which *Michaele Lando* was one; nor could the many good Offices which he had done in the time of his authority, protect him from the rage of that party, when the licentious and unrestrained multitude ruined the City: so little was his Country thankful for all his great actions. Into which error, because many Princes and Common-wealths do frequently fall, it happens, that men terrified by such examples, before they can be made sensible of their Princes ingratitude, do fall into their displeasure. These slaughters and these exilements had always, and did then displease *Benedetto Alberti*; and he both publickly and privately condemn'd them. Whereupon, the Government were fearful of him, as believing him one of the Plebeians principal friends, and one who had consented to the death of *Giorgio Scali*, not out of any disapprobation of his conduct, but that he might remain alone in authority after him. By degrees, his words and demeanor came to be suspicious, and the party that was uppermost watch'd him very narrowly, to find out some occasion to send him after *Giorgio*. Things being in this posture at home, no great action happened abroad; that little which did happen, was occasioned more by fear of what they might, than from any prejudice that was actually sustain'd; *Lodovico d'Angio* coming into *Italy* about that time, to drive *Carlo Durazzo* out of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and repossess the Queen *Giovanna*. The passage of this Prince put the *Florentines* into no little distraction; *Carlo*, upon the old score of amity, desired their assistance; *Lodovico* (like those who seek new friendships) demanded their neutrality. The *Florentines*, (that they might please both parties, if possible) to comply with *Lodovico*, and supply *Carlo*, discharged *Aguto* from their service, and recommended him to Pope *Urban*, who was a professed enemy to *Carlo*; which artifice was easily discovered by *Lodovico*, and he thought himself much injured thereby. While the War continued in *Puglia* betwixt *Lodovic* and *Charles*, supplies were sent out of *France* to reinforce *Lodovico*: which Forces (being arrived in *Tuscany*) were conducted to *Arezzo* by those who were banished out of that Town, where they removed all those who were of *Charles* his party; and just as they design'd the same measures against *Florence*, as they had taken against *Arezzo*, *Lodovic* died, and the affairs of *Puglia* and *Tuscany* followed his fate, for *Charles* secur'd himself of his Kingdom, which he thought he had lost; and the *Florentines*, who were not sure to defend their own, bought *Arezzo* of those who had kept it for *Lodovic*. *Charles* having secured himself of *Puglia*, departed for *Hungaria*, (which Kingdom was, by inheritance, descended to him) leaving his Wife behind him in *Puglia*, with *Ladislao* and *Giovanna*, (two of his children,) as shall be shewn more fully.

The Commons expell'd from the Government.

1381  
*Michaele Lando* imprisoned.

*Lodovic's* death.

*Carlo* possessed himself of *Hungary*, but died shortly after; howe'r his Conquest of that Country was so grateful an exploit to the *Florentines*, that never greater expressions of joy were made for any victory of their own, as appeared as well by publick as private magnificence; many Families keeping open houses, and feasting exceedingly, but none with that pomp and extravagance as the Family of the *Alberti*; the provision and ostentation of whose entertainments, were fitter for the condition of a Prince, than for a private person. Which extravagance gained him much envy, and that, being seconded by a jealousy in the Government, that *Benedetto* had designs against it, was the occasion of its destruction: for they could not be safe, whilst they thought it might fall out every day, that he (reconciling himself with the people) might turn them out of the City as he pleased. Things being at this uncertainty, it happened that he being *Gonfaloniere delle Compagnie*, his Son in Law *Philippo Magalotti* was made *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia*, which accident redoubled the apprehension of the Governours, as thinking *Benedetto* grew upon them so fast, their authority must of necessity decline: but desirous to remedy it what they could, and if possible, without a tumult, they encouraged *Bese Magalotte* (his enemy and competitor) to acquaint the Senate, that *Philippo* not being of age for the execution of that Office, he could not, nor ought not enjoy it: and the cause being heard in the Senate, *Philippo* was adjudged incapable of that Dignity, and *Bardo Mancini* succeeded in his place; a person fiercely against the faction of the people, and a perfect enemy to *Benedetto*. Having entred upon his Office, he called a *Balla* for reformation of the State; which *Balla* imprisoned *Benedetto Alberti*, and banished all the rest of his Family, only *Antonio* was excepted: Before he was carried away, *Benedetto* called all his friends together, to take his leave of them; and finding them sad, and the tears in their eyes, he spake to them as follows:

*Carlo d'Angio's* death.

Magnificence envied.

You see (Gentlemen) in what manner fortune has ruin'd me, and threaten'd you: I do not wonder at it, nor indeed ought it to be strange to you: seeing it so happens always to them

*Benedetto's* Speech.

them, who, among ill men, are studious of being good, or solicitous of sustaining that which all people are desirous to pull down. The love to my Country associated me first with Salvestro de Medici; and the same love divided me afterwards from Giorgio Scali: it is nothing but that, and the injustice of their proceedings, which have made me hate those who are now at the Stern; who, as they have had no-body that could punish them, so they are desirous to leave no-body to reprehend them. I am content with my banishment, to free them of the fear they have conceived not only of me, but of all that are sensible of their Tyranny and injustice. For my self I am not so much concern'd; the honour conferred upon me when my Country was free, I can quietly relinquish whilst it is in servitude and bondage; and the memory of my past condition will give me more pleasure, than the infelicity of my present can give me regret. My greatest affliction will be, to consider my Country is become a prey to particular men, and exposed to their insolence and rapine: it troubles me likewise for you, lest those evils which this day are consummated in me, and but commencing in you, should prove greater detriment to you than they have done to me; however, comfort your selves; bear up against any misfortune, and carry yourselves so; that if things happen adversely, (as doubtless they will) it may appear to all people that you were innocent, and that they succeeded without the least fault or contribution of yours.

Benedetto  
dies at Rhodes.

Afterwards, to give as great testimony of his virtue abroad, as he had done at home; he went to the Sepulchre of our Saviour, and, in his return back, died at Rhodes. His bones were brought back to Florence, and buried with great solemnity by those very people who pursued him, whilst he was living, with all the calumny and injustice imaginable: nor were the Alberti the only sufferers in these distractions, many Families beside that, were admonished, and imprisoned. Among the rest there were *Piero Benini*, *Matteo Alderotti*, *Giovanni e Francesco del Bene*, *Giovanni Benchi*, *Andrea Adimari*, and with them several of the lesser Artificers. Among them which were admonished, were the *Covoni*, the *Benini*, the *Rinucoi*, the *Formiconi*, the *Corbizzi*, the *Manelli*, and the *Alderotti*. The *Balia* was by custom created for a precise time; and being now in the execution of these Citizens, who were fairly elected; having done what they could for the satisfaction of the State, they desired to lay down, though their time was not critically expir'd; which the people understanding, many of them ran with their Arms to the Palace, crying out there were several more to be admonished, and several more to be imprisoned before they renounced. The Senate was much displeas'd, but entertained them with fair promises, till they had fortified themselves so, as they were able to make them lay by those Arms, for fear, which in their rage they had taken up: nevertheless, to comply in some proportion with the fierceness of the humour, and lessen the Authority of the Plebeian Artificers; it was ordered, that whereas the third part of the Offices of the City were in their hands before, they should now be reduced to a fourth part only: and (that there might always be two of the most trusty and faithful persons to the State, in the Senate) authority was given to the *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia*, and four other Citizens, to put a certain number of select mens names into a purse, out of which, at every meeting of the Senate, two were to be drawn.

Affairs thus settled in the year 1381, the City continued quiet within till 1393; in which year *Giovan Galeazzo Visconti* (called the *Comte di Vertu*) took his Uncle *Barnabo* prisoner, and made himself, by that, Master of all Lombardy. This *Comte di Vertu* had an opinion he could make himself King of Italy by force, as easily as he had made himself Duke of Milan by fraud; so that in the year 1390 he began a War upon the Florentines, which, though prosecuted with variety of fortune on both sides, yet the Duke was many times in danger to have ruined Florence; and doubtless had ruined it, had not it been prevented by his death. However, their defence was couragious, as might be expected from a Republick; and the end of the War less unhappy, than the course of it had been dreadful; for when the Duke had taken *Bologna*, *Pisa*, *Perugia* and *Siena*, and prepared a Crown, to be crowned King of Italy in Florence, he died in the nick, and his death permitted him not to taste the pleasures of his past Victories, nor the Florentines to feel the calamities which would have followed their losses. Whilst this War with the Duke was on foot, *Maso de gli Albizi* was made *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia*, who, upon *Piero's* death, was become a great enemy to the Alberti: and (because in all Factions, the humour and animosity does still ferment and increase) *Maso* (though *Benedetto* was dead in his banishment) had an itching desire, before he laid down his Office, to be revenged of that Family, and he took his opportunity upon the examination of a certain person who impeach'd *Alberto*, and *Andrea de gli Alberti* of intelligence with the Rebels. Upon this accusation they were immediately taken into custody, and the whole frame of the City altered. The Senate took Arms, assembled the people, created a *Balia*, by authority of which many Citizens were confined, and new  
imbor-

imbarcation of Officers made: most of the *Alberti* were confined; many Artificers adomished, and put to death. Upon which provocation, the *Arti* and inferior sort of people took Arms, in as much heat as if their lives or reputation had been taken from them. Part of them ran to the *Piazza*, and part to the house of *Veri de Medici*, who, after the death of *Salvestro*, was become the head of that Family. To cajole those who were in the Market place, the Senate sent *Rinaldo Giansigliuzzi*, and *Donato Acciavoli* (as persons more acceptable to the people than any else) to command them, and sent with them the Ensign of the *Guelfs*, and the people. Those who went to the house of *Veri*, begg'd of him to take the Government upon him, and free them from the Tyranny of those Citizens who were enemies to every thing that was good. All those who have left any memorials of the passages of those times, do agree in this; That, had not *Veri* been more vertuous than ambitious, he might have made himself Prince of the City, without any impediment: for the great damages justly and unjustly sustained by the *Arti* and their friends had so incensed them, that there wanted nothing but an head, to satiate their revenge. Nor was *Veri* without those that minded him of his advantage; for *Antonio de Medici* (who had long time born him a grudge) perswaded him very earnestly to take the Government upon him; to whom *Veri* returned this Answer.

*As your threats, when you were mine enemy, did never affright me; so your Counsels now you are my friend, shall never delude me.*

And, turning about to the multitude, he bid them be courageous, for he would secure them, if they would follow his direction. Then, marching in the midst of them into the *Piazza*, he went up to the Senate, and told them;

*That he could not be sorry his conversation had been such, as had procured him the love of the people; but yet he was much troubled they had made a wrong judgment of him, not at all sutable to what his conversation had deserved: for, never having given the least example of ambition, or faction, he could not but wonder from whence they should deduce their opinion; that, as a turbulent person, he would be the maintainer of their factions, and, as an ambitious man, the Governor of their State. He begg'd of their Lordships, that the error of the multitude might not be imputed to him; for what ever was in his power, he submitted to them, with the first opportunity; he recommended it to them to use their fortune temperately, and content themselves quietly with an imperfect victory, rather than to make it intyre by the destruction of the whole City.*

*Veri de Medici's Speech to the Senate.*

*Veri* was much applauded by the Senate; they desired that he would be a means that all Arms might be laid down, and that afterwards they would not fail to do what he and the other Citizens should advise. After his harangue in the Senate, *Veri* returned into the *Piazza*, and having joyned his Brigade with those under the Command of *Rinaldo* and *Donato*, he gave this account to them all; That he found the *Signori* very well disposed towards them: that many things had been proposed, but the shortness of the time, and the absence of the Magistrates had prevented any conclusion; wherefore he made it his request to them, that they would lay aside their Arms, and give obedience to the Senate, assuring them, that with the Senate, gentleness would prevail farther than insolence, and entreaty than threatening; and that they should want neither security nor preferment, if they would be directed by him: upon which assurance they all returned to their houses. Arms being in this manner laid down, the Senate secured the Palace with their Guards; then they lifted 2000 Citizens which were best affected to the State, and divided them equally by Companies, with orders to be ready to relieve them when-ever they were called: the rest which were not lifted, were not suffered to bear Arms. These preparations being made, they imprisoned many of the Artificers, and put several of them to death who had been most pragmatical in the late commotions; and, to add more Majesty and reputation to the *Gonfalonera della Giustizia*, it was provided that no person should be capable of that Office under 45 years of age: to secure their Government, they made several other Laws and Ordinances which were in supportable, not only to the persons against whom they were made, but even to those who were honest, and of their own party; for they could not believe a State well grounded, or safe, that was to be defended with so much violence and severity. Nor were the *Alberti* which remained in the City, the only persons dissatisfied with these proceedings; nor the *Medici* (who look'd upon the people as meerly over-reach'd) many others were with this extravagant severity exceedingly disgusted. The first man that opposed them, was *Donato* the son of *Acciavoli*. This *Donato* though he was one of the Grandees of the City, and rather superior, than equal to *Maso de gli Albizi*, (who, for service done in his *Gonfaloniership*, was become, as it were, Master of the City) yet, among so many malecontents, it was impossible he should be pleased, nor prefer (as many people do) private advantage before publick convenient: and therefore his first project was, to try if he could



call those who were banished, or at least restore the *Ammoniti* to their old Offices and Commands. To this purpose he insinuated with several Citizens, whispering it into the ears first of one, and then of another; that there could be no other way to quiet the people, or stop the dissention of the parties; concluding, that he attended only till he was of the Senate, and then he would make it his business to bring it to pass. And because, in all humane actions, delay breeds weariness, and haste danger; to avoid the one, he ran himself upon the other. Among the Senators, there was *Michaelè Acciaiuoli* his confederate, and *Niccolò Ricoveri* his friend. *Donato* judged this too fair an opportunity to be slip'd; and therefore desired them, that they would move to the Council for a Law for restoration of the Citizens. Being over-persuaded by him, they propos'd it to their brethren, who were all of opinion, that innovations are not to be attempted where the success is doubtful, and the danger inevitable. Whereupon *Donato*, having tryed all ways in vain, in his passion caus'd it to be told them, that seeing they would not permit the City to be reformed by fair means, it should be done by foul: which words being highly resent'd, the Senate communicating the whole business with the principal Governors, cited *Donato*, who, upon his appearance, being confronted, and convicted by the person to whom he deliver'd his message, he was committed to custody, and confin'd to *Barlette*. With him were imprison'd *Alamanno*, and *Antonio de Medici*, with all which were descended of *Alamanno's* Family and several others of the more inferior *Arts*, that were in reputation with the people. All these things happened within two years after *Maso* had reassum'd the Government. The City remaining in this posture, many discontented at home, and many exiles abroad; there chanc'd to be at *Bologna* among the banished men, *Picchio Cavicciulli*, *Tomaso de Ricci*, *Antonio de Medici*, *Benedetto de gli Spini*, *Antonio Girolami Christofano de Carlone*, with two more of inferior condition, all of them young, brisk, and dispos'd to encounter any difficulty that hindred their return to their Country. To these it was privately signified by *Pigiello*, and *Baroccio Cavicciulli*, (who, at the same time, were admonish'd in *Florence*) that if they would come into the Town, they would convey them into an house, from whence they might kill *Maso de gli Albizi*, and call the people to Arms; who being discontented, would be easily provok'd; and the rather, because they would be headed by the *Ricci*, *Adimari*, *Medici*, *Menelli*, and several other considerable Families. Allured by these hopes, on the fourth of *August*. 1397, they arriv'd privately in *Florence*; and (being dispos'd of according to agreement) they sent out to observe the motions of *Maso*, by whose death they presum'd they should raise a tumult among the people. *Maso* was gone out, and (by accident) in an Apothecary's shop not far from *San Piero Maggiore*; the messenger that was to set him, seeing of him there, repair'd immediately to his Comrades to give them information; who taking their swords, ran directly to the place, but he was gone. Not at all discouraged with their first miscarriage, they turned towards the old Market, where they killed one of their adversaries. Upon which, a great noise being rais'd, and a clamor of the people crying out, *Arms, Liberty, Arms; let the Tyrants die*; they march'd towards the new Market, where near the *Calimbra* they slew another; and so going forward with the same shout and out-cry, no-body taking Arms, they stopp'd in the *Loggia della Nigbittosa*: and mounting there upon the highest place they could find, the multitude being round about them, (but come rather to stare than assist) they exhorted them to take Arms; and free themselves from a bondage which so highly they abhor'd; they assured them, the complaints and lamentations of such as were oppress'd in the City, had mov'd them to endeavour their liberty, and not any private injury to themselves: that they were enforc'd they had the prayers of many good people, that God would give opportunity to their designs. Had they had an Head to have command'd them, it was believ'd they would have succeeded at any time; but now occasion was offer'd, and they had Captains enough to conduct them; they stood gaping upon one another, expecting like fots, till those persons who endeavour'd their freedom, were knock'd on the head, and their slavery redoubled. They could not likewise but marvel, that they, who, upon the least injury, were heretofore ready to take Arms, should not stir now upon so great and numerous provocations, but suffer so many of their Citizens to be banish'd, and admonish'd when it was in their power to restore the one to their Country, and the other to their Offices. These words (how true soever) mov'd not the multitude in the least, either because they were affraid, or else because the death of the two persons which were killed, had made the murderers odious: so that the founders of the tumult perceiving that neither words nor actions would work any thing, understanding too late, how dangerous it is to enterprize the liberty of a people that are resolv'd to be slaves; and despairing of success, they retreated into the Church of *S. Reparata*, not to secure their lives, but to protract their deaths. Upon the first noise of this tumult, the Senate had arm'd, and caus'd the Palace to be shut up; but when they heard

*Donato Acciaiuoli* confin'd.

1397.

A new Conspiracy defeated.



heard what the business was, who were the Authors, and what was become of them; they took courage, and commanded the Captain, with what Forces he could get, to go and apprehend them; which was no hard matter to perform; for the Church-doors being broken open, and part of them slain, the rest were taken prisoners; who, upon examination, confessed nothing; but that *Barocco* and *Piggiello Cavicciulli* were the only incendiaries, and they were both of them killed.

After this accident, there happened another of greater importance. About this time (as we said before) the City had Wars with the Duke of *Milan*, who finding open force was not like to prevail, applied himself to artifice; and by the help of the *Florentine* exiles, (of which *Lombardy* was full) he procured a treaty with several in the Town, in which it was concluded, that at a certain day, from the nearest places to *Florence* they could contrive, the greatest part of the Exiles which were able to bear Arms, should pass by the river *Arno* into the City; and then joining suddenly with their friends within, should run to the Palace of the Senate, and other houses of the chief Officers, and having slain them, model, and reform afterwards as they pleased. Among the Conspirators in the Town, there was one of the *Ricci* called *Samminiato*, who (as it falls out in most plots, where few are not sufficient, and many not secure) seeking for a companion, found an informer; for imparting the business to *Salvestro Cavicciulli*, (whose own injuries, as well as his relations, might have made him more faithful) he post-poning his future hopes to his present fear, discovered all to the Senate. Whereupon *Samminiato* being seized, they extorted the whole process of the Conspiracy, but of his accomplices no-body was taken, but one *Tomaso Davisi*; who coming from *Bologna*, not knowing what was happened in *Florence*, was apprehended by the way, before he got thither; all the rest, upon the imprisonment of *Samminiato*, fled away in great fear, and dispersed. *Samminiato* and *Tomaso* being punished according to the quality of their offence, a new *Balia* was made of several Citizens; and authority given them to inquire farther after delinquents, and to secure the State. This *Balia* proclaimed Rebels, 6 of the Family of the *Ricci*, 6 of the *Alberti*, 2 of the *Medici*, 3 of the *Scali*, 2 of the *Strozzi*, *Bm do Altoviti*, *Bernardo Adimari*, and several others of meaner condition. They admonished, besides, the whole Family of the *Alberti*, *Ricci*, and *Medici* for ten years, except only some few. Among those of the *Alberti* which were not admonished, *Antonio* was one, being esteemed a quiet and a peaceable man. Their jealousy of this plot being not yet out of their heads, a Monk happened to be apprehended, who had been observed, whilst the conspiracy was on foot, to have passed many times betwixt *Bologna* and *Florence* and he confessed he had frequently brought Letters to *Antonio*; *Antonio* being taken into custody, denied it obstinately at first; but being confronted by the Monk, and the charge justified against him; he was fined in a sum of money, and banished three hundred miles distance from the City; and that they might not always be in danger of the *Alberti*, they decreed, that none of that Family above 15 years of age, should be suffered to continue in the Town. These things happened in the year 1400, two years after *Giovan Galezo* Duke of *Milan*, died: whose death, (as we have said before) put an end to a War that had been prosecuted for twelve years. After which, the Government having extended its authority, and all things at quiet both abroad and at home, they undertook the enterprize of *Pisa*, which succeeded so well: they took the Town very honourably, and enjoyed that and the rest very peaceably, till the year 1433. Only in the year 1412, the *Alberti* having transgress'd against the terms of their banishment, a new *Balia* was erected, new provisions made for the security of the State, and new impositions inflicted upon that Family.

About this time, the *Florentines* had War likewise against *Ladislau* King of *Naples*, which ended in the year 1416, upon the death of that King. During the time of the War, finding himself too weak, he had given the City of *Cortona* to the *Florentines*, of which he was Lord; but afterwards recovering more strength, he renewed his War with them, and managed it so, that it was much more dangerous than the former; and had not his death determined it, (as the other was by the death of the Duke of *Milan*) doubtless he had brought *Florence* into as great exigence as the Duke of *Milan* would have done; and endangered, if not ruined its liberty. Nor did their War with this King conclude with less good fortune than the other; for when he had taken *Rome*, *Siena*, *la Marka*, and *Romagna*; and nothing remained but *Florence*, to hinder his passage with his whole force into *Lombardy*, he died; so that, death was always a true friend to the *Florentines*, and did more to preserve them, than all their own conduct or courage could do. From the death of this King, this City remained at peace (both abroad and at home) eight years; at the end of that term, their Wars with *Philip* Duke of *Milan*, reviv'd their factions, which could never be

The Duke of Milan practices against the City.

Several Families banished.

1400.

The King of Naples dies.

be suppressed, but with the subversion of the State, which had governed from the year 1371, to 1434, with much honour, and maintained many Wars with much advantage, having added to their Dominion, *Arezzo, Pisa, Cortona, Livorno,* and *Monte Pulciano,* and doubtless would have extended it farther, had the City been unanimous, and the old humours not been rubb'd up, and reviv'd, as in the next book shall be more particularly related.

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THE



THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
FLORENCE.

Book IV.

**A**L L Cities (especially such as are not well constituted under the Titles of Common Wealths) do sometime or other alter their Government, yet not (as many think) by means of Liberty and Subjection; but by occasion of servitude, and licentiousness: for only the name of Liberty is pretended by popular Persons, such as are the instrument of licentiousness; and servitude is sought for by those that are Noble, neither of them both desiring to be restrain'd either by Laws or any thing else. Nevertheless when it does happen, (as it happens but seldom) that a City has the good fortune to produce, and advance some Wise, Honest, and Potent Citizen, by whom the Laws may be so order'd, that the humors and emulations betwixt the Nobility and the People, if not perfectly compos'd, may be yet so well circumscrib'd and corrected, that they may be check'd from breaking forth to its prejudice; Then it is That City may be call'd free, and that State pronounce it self durable; for being founded upon good Laws and Orders at first, it has not that necessity of good Men to maintain it. Of such Laws and Principles many Common Wealths were antiently constituted; and continued a long time. Others have wanted, and do still want them; which has frequently occasion'd the variation of the Government, from Tyranny; to licentiousness; and from licentiousness to Tyranny: for by reason of the powerful animosities in all of them, it is not, nor can be possible, they should be of any duration, one disgusting the Good, and the other, the Wise. One doing mischief with ease, and the other good with difficulty; in this the insolent have too much Authority; in another the sots; and therefore it is convenient that both one and the other, be supported and maintained by the fortune and Valour of some Eminent Man, though he may be taken from them by Death, or made unserviceable by misfortune. I say therefore, that Government which flourished in Florence from the death of *Giorgia Scali*, which fell out in the year 1381 was supported first by the conduct of *Maso degli Albizi*, and afterwards by *Niccolo Uzano*.

This City from the year 1414 till the end of the 22, remain'd quiet, King *Ladislaus* being dead, and *Lombardy* divided into several Cantons; so that neither abroad nor at home, had they the least cause of apprehension. The next Citizens in Authority to *Niccolo Uzano*, were *Bartolmeo Valori*, *Nerone de Nigi*, *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, *Neri de Gino*, and *Lapo Niccolini*. The factions which sprung from the animosity betwixt the *Albizi*, and the *Ricci* (which were with so much mischief reviv'd afterward by *Salvestro de Medici*) could never be extinguish'd, and although that which was most generally succour'd, prevailed but three years,

years, and was afterwards depress'd, yet the greatest part of the City had imbib'd so much of their humor, as could never be wrought out. True it is, the frequent exprobrations, and constant persecutions of the heads of that party from the year 1381 to 1400 had almost brought them to nothing. The first Families which were persecuted, as the chief of that faction, were the *Alberti*, *Ricci*, and *Medici*, who were rob'd of their Men, as well as their Money, and if any of them continued in the City, their employments and dignities were most certainly taken from them; which usage had indeed debas'd that party, and almost consum'd it. However the memory of the injuries receiv'd, and a secret desire of being reveng'd lay close in the Hearts of many of them; and having no opportunity to show it, they kept it private to themselves. Those of the Popular Nobility who govern'd the City so quietly, committed two errors which were the ruine of their Government. One was in their insolence, upon the long time of their Government; The other, that by reason of emulations among themselves, contracted by long possession of the State, they had not preserv'd that inspection which they ought to have done, over those who were able to disturb them. Whereby (daily running themselves deeper in the displeasure of the People, and either not regarding new Plots, because they did not apprehend them, or else encouraging them, to supplant one another) the house of *Medici* recover'd its Authority. The first of them which began to rise, was *Giovanni* the Son of *Bicci*, who, being grown very wealthy, of a benign and courteous nature, by concession of those who Govern'd, was made Supreme Magistrate; and his advancement celebrated with so universal satisfaction and joy (the People believing they had now got a Protector) that the graver sort began to suspect it, and observing all the old humors reviving again. And *Niccolo Uzano* fail'd not to advertise the other Citizens, and to remonstrate how dangerous it was to promote one of so general a reputation; that disorders were easily suppress'd in the beginning; but when grown to any height, they were hardly to be remedy'd: and that he knew *Giovanni* to be a man in parts much superiour to *Salvestro*. But *Niccolo* was not regarded by his Brethren, who envy'd his reputation, and desir'd more company to take him down. Florence being in this manner infested with these humors, which began privately to ferment, *Philippo Visconti*, second Son to *John Galeazzo*, becoming Lord of Lombardy by the death of his Brother, supposing himself in a condition for some great enterprize, was very ambitious to recover the Sovereignty of *Genoua*, which was then free, under the administration and conduct of *Tomaso da Campo Tregoso*; but he durst not be too confident of success either in that, or any other design, till he had enter'd into an alliance with the *Florentines*, the reputation of which, he concluded would carry him thorow all. To that purpose he sent two Embassadors to *Florence*, to propose it. Many Citizens advis'd to the contrary, though they were contented the amity which had been betwixt them for many years should be continu'd, yet they had no mind to a League, as knowing what reputation, and advantage would accrue to him thereby, and how unprofitable it would be to their City. Others were for the League, by vertue of which they might put such termes upon him, as (if he transgress'd) should discover his ill intentions to the World, and justify any War they should make upon him for the breach of his agreement: after great debate, a Peace was concluded, and *Philip* oblig'd himself not to meddle with any thing on this side the Rivers *Magra* and *Panaro*. Having settled his alliance, *Philip* fell upon *Brescia*, and took it; and after that upon *Genoua*; and took that contrary to the opinion of *Florence*, who had promoted the peace, they having been confident that *Brescia*, by the help of the *Venetian*, and *Genoua* by its own proper strength, would have been able to have held out. And because, in his Treaty with the *Doge of Genoua*, *Philip* had reserv'd *Serezana* and other Towns on this side the *Magra*, with condition when ever he would part with them, that the *Genoeses* should have the refusal (having broke his promise) the whole League was violated; Besides, he had made an agreement with the *Legat of Bologna*. All which things consider'd together, alter'd the affections of the *Florentines* towards him, and being jealous of new troubles, made them look out for new remedies. *Philip* having intelligence of their apprehensions; to justify himself, and feel the inclinations of the Citizens, or else to lull and delude them; he sent Embassadors to *Florence*, to let them know he was much surpriz'd at the suspicion he understood they had conceiv'd against him, and was ready to renounce any thing that might give them the least occasion of displeasure. The effect this Embassy produc'd in the City, was only to divide it; part (and that the most considerable in the Government) was of opinion they should Arm, and put themselves into a Posture against the designs of their Enemies. If preparations were made, and *Philip* was quiet, no War would ensue, and they might contribute to a Peace. Others out of envy to the Government, or apprehension of the War, concluded it no Wisdom to be suspicious of a friend without great provocation; and that what he had done was not worthy

*Uzano* advises against the *Medici*.

*Philippo Visconti* Lord of Lombardy.

Peace betwixt *Florence*, and *Milan*.

Worthy (in their judgments) of such rigid proceeding. They knew well enough to create the *Ten*, and to raise Men was the same thing as declaring of War, which if done with so Potent a Prince, would be certain ruine to the City, without any prospect of advantage; for if they prosper'd, and got the Victory, they could not make themselves Masters of any thing considerable, *Romagna* being betwixt, nor could they attempt any thing aginst *Romagna* by reason of its vicinity to the Church. However their opinion prevail'd who were for preparations; they created the *Ten*, they rais'd Souldiers and laid new Taxes upon the people; which lying more heavily upon the Common, than the better fort of Citizens, fill'd the City with complaints, all people crying out of the oppression of the great people, who to satiate their Ambition, and enlarge their Authority, had engag'd them in an expensive and unnecessary War: they were not yet come to an absolute rupture with the Duke, but all things were full of suspicion; For *Philip*, at the request of the Legate of *Bologna* (who was fearful of *Antonio Bentivoglio*, a banish'd man, and at that time in the Castle *Bolognese*) had sent new forces into that City to secure it, which Forces being near the Dominions of *Florence*, created no little jealousy in that State. But that which gave the strongest alarm to all people, and made the greatest discovery of the War was the Dukes practices at *Furlù*. The Lord of *Furlù* at that time, was *Giorgio Ordellaffi*, who dying left his Son *Tibaldo* to the Tutelage of *Philip*. The Mother suspecting the integrity of his Tutor, would have sent him to her Father *Lodovico Alidosfi* Lord of *Imola*, but the people of *Furlù* constrain'd her to deliver him up to *Philip*, in pursuance of the Testament of *Ordellaffi*. *Philip* to disguise his designs, and give less occasion of jealousy, order'd the Marquels of *Ferrara*, to send *Guido Torelli* with certain Souldiers to take possession of *Furlù* in his Name, and as his Lieutenant, and so that Town fell into the hands of *Philip*: Which intelligence coming to *Florence* at the same time with the news of the arrival of forces at *Bologna*, facilitated the resolution for War, though before there had been strong opposition, and *Giovanni de Medici* did publicly dissuade it; alleading that though they were certain enough of the Dukes inclinations yet it was better to expect him, and receive his attack, than to prevent it by advancing aginst him; for it was the beginning of the War, must Justifie the prosecution; the aggressor would be in the fault, and the other excusable to all the Princes of *Italy*; Neither could they demand the assistance of their Neighbours with so much confidence, to invade other People, as to defend themselves; nor would any body fight so chearfully to gain from others, as to secure their own. To this it was answer'd, that the Enemy was not to be expected at home; that fortune is oftner a friend to the Invader, than to the invaded; and that (though it may be possibly more expence) yet there is less damage and detriment in making War in an Enemies Country than in ones own. These arguments carried it; and Orders were given to the *Ten* to try all ways, and turn every stone for the recovery of *Furlù*, out of the hands of the Duke. The Duke observing how serious and busie the *Florentines* were in retrieving a place he had undertaken to secure, sent *Agnolo della Pergola* with a considerable force, to *Imola*, That the Prince having his hands full at home, might not be at leisure to think of the defence of his Grandson. *Agnolo* advanced with his Army, near *Imola* and (though the *Florentines* lay at *Modigliana*) took the Town one night by the benefit of a great Frost which had frozen the Ditches, and sent *Lodovico* Prisoner to *Milan*. The *Florentines* seeing *Imola* lost, and the War publicly owned; commanded their Army to march and besiege *Furlù*, which being accordingly performed, that Town was immediately beleagured, and to hinder the Conjunction of the Dukes Forces to relieve it, they hired the Comte *Alberigo* with his Squadron from *Zagonara*, to keep them in perpetual alarm, and to make daily in-roads to the very walls of *Imola*: *Agnolo* perceiv'd by the strong entrenchment of our Army, that *Furlù* could not without great difficulty be reliev'd, so he resolv'd to set down before *Zagonara* presuming the *Florentines* would not lose that place; and that if they came to relieve it, they must not only raise their Siege before *Furlù*; but fight his Army upon great disadvantage. Hereupon the Duke *Alberigo's* Forces were constrain'd to a Parley, in which it was agreed the Town should be surrender'd, if in fifteen days time it was not reliev'd by the *Florentines*. Their condition being known in the *Florentine* Camp, begot great disorders there, as well as in the City, and every body desiring to wrest so great a prize out of the hands of the Enemy, their Host hasten'd the loss of it; form marching from *Furlù* to the relief of *Zagonara* they came to an engagement and were utterly defeated, not so much by the Valour of their Enemies, as the badness of the weather; for our Men having march'd several hours thorow deep ways in perpetual rain, finding the Enemy fresh and drawn up with advantage, it was no hard matter to overcome them. Nevertheless in a Victory so famous all over *Italy*, it was strange, and yet true, that there died no body of any Eminence but *Lodovico Albizi*, and two of his Sons, who falling from their Horses, were stuf'd in the dirt. The news

*Imola* taken  
by the Duke  
*Philip*.

The *Florentines*  
overthrown.

*Albizi's exhortation to be quiet.*

news of this defeat put the whole City of Florence into a dumps, especially the Grandees who had persuaded the War; they saw the Enemy strong and courageous; themselves without force or friends; the people incens'd, railing up and down the Streets; upbraiding them with the great Taxes, and the impertinence of the War; girding, and scoffing at them with most contumelious expostulations, are these they which created the *Ten* to terrifie the Enemy? Are these they who have reliev'd *Furli*, and rescued it out of the hands of the Duke? See how strangely their Counsels are discover'd, and the ends to which they inclin'd, not to defend our Liberty (which is an Enemy to them) but to increase their Power, which God in his Wisdom has most justly diminish'd. Nor is this the only enterprize they have pull'd upon the City, but several others, and particularly that against *Ladislao* which was parallel exactly. To whom will they now address for supplies? To *Pope Martin*? *Braccio* can be witness how they us'd him before: To *Queen Giovanna*? She was forc'd formerly to desert them, and throw her self into the Protection of the King of *Aragon*? Such language as this, and whatever could be invented by an enraged people, was the Common dialect in the Streets. To prevent inconveniencies, the *Senate* thought good to assemble several Citizens, who with gentle words should endeavour to quiet those humours, which were stir'd in the people. *Rinaldo degli Albizi*, was one of them, who (being eldest Son to *Maso*, and by means of his own Vertue and the reputation of his Father, arriv'd at considerable esteem in the City) spake to them at large. He told them that it was neither justice nor prudence to judge things by success, seeing many times good Counsels miscarry, and ill ones do prosper. That to commend ill Counsels upon their good success was to encourage Errour, rather than Virtue, which would turn to the great prejudice of the publick, because they are not always unfortunate. On the other side, to condemn wise Counsels for the unhappiness of their event, is as blameable as that; seeing thereby honest Citizens are discourag'd and deter'd from speaking their judgments; though the exigence be never so great. Then he demonstrated the necessity of the War, and how (if it had not been carried into *Romagna*) it would have broke out in *Tuscany*. He told them, it had pleas'd God their Army should be beaten; yet their loss was not so great as it would be, if the design should be abandon'd, but if still they would bear up against their misfortune, and put themselves forward to the utmost of their Power, they should not need to be much sensible of their loss nor the Duke of his Victory. That they ought not to be discourag'd at their Expences and Taxes, it being necessary to increase at them sent, as a way to lessen them hereafter. He told them that greater supplies are more necessary in an offensive, than a defensive War, and in conclusion he exhorted them to the imitation of their fore-fathers, who by the Manliness of their behaviour in all their distresses, did always defend themselves against any Adversary whatever.

Incouraged by his Authority, the Citizens entertain'd the *Comte de Oddo* Son to *Braccio*, into their pay; committing him to the instruction of *Nicolo Piccinino* who had been brought up under *Braccio*, and was reputed the best of his Officers; to whom they joyn'd other Commanders of their own, and certain Horse Officers, which were remaining of the late defeat. For the raising of more Monys, they created XX. Commissioners out of the Citizens; who finding the chief Citizens low, and depress'd upon the late overthrow, overlaid them with Taxes, and opress'd them exceedingly. These impositions disgust'd them much; yet at first in the point of honor they thought it beneath them to complain of their own private usage; only they blam'd the Taxes in general, and press'd to have them abated; being publickly known, it was publickly oppos'd; and so far neglected in the Councils, that to make them sensible how difficult a matter they had undertaken, and to render them odious to the people, order was given that the Taxes should be collected with all strictness and severity; and in case of opposition, it should be lawful for any man to kill him who resist an Officer. Whereupon many sad accidents ensued among the Citizens; many being wounded, and not a few slain: so that it was believ'd the Parties would have proceeded to Blood; and every sober man apprehended some mischief at hand. The Grandees having been accustomed to be favour'd, could not endure that strictness, and the others thought it but just to have all taxed proportionably. In these confusions, several of the Prime Citizens met, and concluded to take the Government upon themselves, because their backwardness and remisness had given the multitude confidence to reprehend actions of the State, and reincurag'd such as were wont to be the heads of the people. After many Cabals, and frequent discourses among themselves, it was propos'd to meet altogether at a time, which they did above LXX. of them in the Church of *St. Stephano*, by the connivance of *Lorenza Ridolfi de Fidi*, and *Francesco Gianfigliuzzi*, two of the *Senate*. *Giovanni de medici* was not at the meeting, either not being call'd (as a Person in whom they could put no confidence) or refusing to come being contrary to his judgment. *Rinaldo*

*naldò de gli Albizi* made a Speech to them all. He remonstrated to them the condition of the City; how by their negligence the Authority was relaps'd to the people; which in the year 1281. their Fathers had taken out of their hands. He represented the iniquity of the Government from 1277. to the year 1280. and remember'd them how in that Interm, many there present had had their Fathers and Relations kill'd. That now the dangers were the same, and the disorders no better. That the multitude had already impos'd a Tax as they pleas'd; and would doubtless by degrees (unless greater force, or better order was taken to prevent them) create Magistrates at their pleasure; which if they should do, they would usurp their places, and ruine a State which for 47. years together had flourish'd with much honour and reputation to the City; and Florence fall under the Government of the multitude. (One half in perpetual luxury, and the other in fear) or else under the Tyranny of some single Person that should usurp. Wherefore he assur'd himself that whoever was a lover of Honor or his Country, would think himself oblig'd to resent it and be put in mind of the Virtue of Bardo Mancini, who with the destruction of the Alberti rescu'd the City from the same dangers; and as the occasion of that boldness and incroachments of the multitude proceeded from negligence and remissness in the Magistrate, the Palace of the Senate being full of new and inferior men, he concluded, the best way to remedy it, would be to do as they did then; to restore the Government to the Grandees to clip the wings of the inferior Trades by reducing them from XIV. to VII. By which means their authority in the Councils would be retrench'd, both by the diminution of their number, and the restauration of the Nobility, who upon the old score of animosity would be sure to keep them under; adding that it was great Wisdom to make use of all people, opportunity, and according to the convenience of their time: for if their fore-fathers had done prudently to make use of the multitude to correct the insolence of the Grandees; it would be no less discretion, now the people were grown insolent, and the Nobility under haiches, to make use of the Nobility to reduce them to their balance; which might be two ways effected either by artifice, or force: for some of them being in the Commission of Ten, it was in their power to bring what numbers they thought good into the City, and to dispose them as they pleas'd without any observation.

Rinaldo was much applauded, his Counsel by every Body approv'd; and Urdio among the rest, return'd this answer. That indeed all that had been said by Rinaldo was true, his remedies good and secure, when applicable without manifest division of the City; and that might be done exactly, if Giovanni de Medici could be drawn to their party; if he were separated from them, the people might rise, but could do nothing for want of a head; but whilst he was firm to them, nothing was to be done without force and if they should betake themselves to that, he could not but foresee a double danger either of not gaining the Victory; or not enjoying it when it was good. He modestly remember'd them of his former advices, and how they had neglected to prevent these difficulties in time, which might easily have been done; But that now he thought it unpracticable, unless some way could be found to gain Giovanni to their party.

Hereupon Rinaldo was deputed to attend Giovanni, and try what might be done. He waited upon him, and press'd him with all the arguments he could use to joya with them, and that he would not, by favouring and indulging the people make them insolent and sawcy to the ruine both of the City and Government. To which Giovanni reply'd,

That it was the Office of a wise and good Citizen (or least in his judgment) to preserve the ancient laws and customs of a City; nothing being more injurious than those alterations; that many being offended, it must necessarily follow many must be discontented and where many are so, some ill accident or other is daily to be expected. That in his opinion this resolution of theirs would be subject to two most pernicious effects.

The first by conferring honors upon them, who having born none of them before, would understand less how to value them, and by consequence complain less for the want of them. The other in taking them away from those who have been accustomed to them, and would assuredly never be quiet till they be restor'd to them again. So that the injury to one party will be greater than the benefit to the other; the author of the change gains fewer Friends than Enemies; and the latter be much more industrious to do him a mischief, than the former to defend him. Men being naturally more prone to revenge, than gratitude; loss (for the most part) being in the one, but profit or pleasure always in the other. Then, turning about to Rinaldo, he said. And you, Sir, if you would recollect what has pass'd, and with what cunning, and subtilty things have been formerly transacted in this City, you would be cooler and less hasty in this resolution; for who ever ad-

wis'd it, as soon as with your power he has divested the people of their Authority, he will usurp upon you, and become your Enemy by the same means you intend to oblige him. Nor will it fall out better to you than it did to Benedetto Alberto, who by the persuasions of those who did not love him, consented to the ruine of Giorgio Scali and Tomaso Strozzi, and not long after was himself banish'd by the same Persons which in-weighed him: he advis'd him therefore to consider more seriously of the business, and rather than to proceed, to follow the example of his Father, who to ingratiate with the people, abated the Excise upon Salt; procur'd, that whosoever's Taxes was half a Floren or under, should pay it if they pleas'd, otherwise it should never be levyed. Prevail'd that the day the Councils assembled, should be proviledg'd; and all Persons for that time protected from their Creditors; and at last concluded that for his own part he was resolv'd to acquiesce in the Government as it stood then, and to leave the City as he found it.

These transactions being talk'd of abroad, procur'd much reputation to Giovanni, but more hatred to the other Citizens whose conversation he declin'd what he could, to give the less encouragement to those who designed new troubles, under his familiarity and favour: declaring to every Body he discours'd withal about it, that in his judgment, factions were rather to be extinguish'd, than fomented at that time; and that as to himself, he desir'd nothing more cordially, than love and unanimity in the City, though several of his own party were dissatisf'd with him, and had advis'd him to be more stirring and active in the business. Among the rest *Alamanno de Medici* was one, who being naturally furious, egg'd him on to take this opportunity of revenging himself upon his Enemies, and obliging his friends; reproaching him by the coldness of his proceedings, which (as he told him) gave his Enemies occasion to practise against him, without fear or respect; which practices (it was to be doubted) would succeed one time or other, and be the destruction both of his family and friends. *Cosimo*, his Son, importun'd him to the same, but *Giovanni*, neither for what had been reveal'd, nor prognosticated could be mov'd from his resolution; however, the faction appear'd plain enough, and the whole City was most manifestly divided. There were at that time attending the Senate in the Palace, two Chancellors, *Martino*, and *Pagolo*. The latter was a favourer of *Uzano*, the former of the *Medici*. *Rinaldo*, finding *Giovanni* inexorable and not to be wrought over to them, contriv'd to turn *Martino* out of his office, presuming after that the Senate would be more inclinable to them. Which design being smelt by the Adversary, *Martino* was not only continued in his Place but *Pagolo* turn'd out to the great detriment and dissatisfaction of his party, and doubtless the effects would have been dreadful, had not the War lien so heavy upon them, and the late defeat at *Zagonara*, put the City into such confusion. For whilst these things were agitated in Florence, *Arnolo della Pergola* with the Duke's Troops had taken all the Towns which the *Florentines* held in *Romagna*, (except *Castracaro* and *Modigliana*) some for want of due fortification, and some for want of courage or fidelity in the Garisons. In the acquisition of these Towns, two things happen'd, which demonstrate how grateful valour is even to an Enemy, and how much cowardize and pusillanimity is despis'd. *Biagio del Milani* was Captain of the Castle call'd *Montepetroso*, which being not only besieg'd, but set on fire by the Enemy, looking over the walls, and finding no way to escape, or preserve the Castle, he caus'd straw and bedding, and what other cloaths he had, to be thrown over the walls, where he saw the fire was not yet come, and then letting down two of his Children upon them, he cry'd out to the Enemy, *Here take such moveables as God and my fortune have given me; 'tis in your power to force them, and not in mine to preserve them; but for the treasure of my mind, in which my glory, and honour consists you cannot ravish that from me, and I will never surrender it.* The Enemy (amaz'd at his Gallantry) ran presently to save the Children, and presented him Ropes and Ladders to have preserv'd himself; but he refus'd them, and chose rather to die in the flames, than to be sav'd by the Enemies of his Country. An example worthy of the commendation of Antiquity, and the more remarkable by how much few of them are to be found. The Children were restor'd to what ever could be preserv'd and sent home by the Enemy (with singular generosity) to their Relations, who receiv'd them not with more joy, than they were entertain'd by the State, which for their Fathers and their own sakes, kept them at the publick charge during their lives.

The factions of *Uzano* and the *Medici*

The great courage of *Biagio del Milano*.

The Cowardize of *Zenobi del Pino*.

The other happen'd in *Galeata*, where *Zenobi del Pino* was *Podesta*, who without any defence at all, deliver'd up his Castle to the Enemy, and afterwards persuad'd *Agnolo* to quit the Alps in *Romagna*, and betake himself to the hills in *Tuscany* where he might spin out the War with more advantage, and less danger to himself. *Agnolo* not able to brook such meanneſs and baseneſs of his Spirit, deliver'd him over to his Servants to dispose of him as they



they pleas'd, who after millions of affronts, and derisions allow'd him nothing but painted cards for his dyet,, declaring they intended of a *Guelf* to make him a *Ghiblin* that way, but what ever they intended, in a short time he was starv'd to Death.

In the mean time Conte *Oddo*, with *Nicolo Piccinino* were enter'd into the *Valdi Lamona*, to see if they could reduce the State of *Faenza* to an amity with the *Florentines*; or at the least hinder *Agnola della Pergola* from making his incursions so freely into the territory of *Romagna*. But the vale being very strong: and the inhabitants martial, Conte *Oddo* was slain, and *Piccinino* carried Prisoner to *Faenza*. However as it fell out, the *Florentines* obtain'd by this loss, what they would have hardly gain'd by the victory; for *Nicolo Piccinino* transacted so well with the Governour of *Faenza*, and his Mother, that by his persuasion, they became friends to the *Florentines*, and enter'd into a League with them, by which he was releas'd. But *Piccinino* follow'd not that Counsel which he had given to others: for either being debauch'd by the Towns he pass'd thorow; or looking upon the condition of the *Florentines* to be but low, and his own to be better'd in another place; he departed abruptly from *Arrezzo*, where his post was, and stealing away into *Lombardy*, he took up

*Piccinino* re-  
volts.

Arms under that Duke. The *Florentines* weaken'd by these accidents; and disheartened by the expence of the War; concluded they were unable to carry it on, upon their own private account; hereupon they sent Embassadors to the *Venetians*, to desire their assistance (which they might easily and effectually grant) against the growing greatness of a Person, who if let alone, would be as dangerous and destructive to them, as to the *Florentines*. *Francesco Carmignuolo* persuaded them likewise to the same enterprize, who was an excellent Souldier as any in those times; had serv'd formerly, under the Duke. But then he was revolted from him; and come over to the *Venetian*. The *Venetian* was uncertain what to determine, not daring to be too confident of *Carmignuolo*, because not sure whether his animosity to the Duke, was real or pretended. Whilst they remain'd in this suspence, the Duke found a way, by corrupting one of his Servants, to cause him to be poison'd, but the poison being too weak did not kill him out-right but brought him to great extremity. The *Venetians* having notice of this, laid their suspition aside; and the *Florentines* continuing their solicitations, they enter'd into League with them, by which it was agreed the War should be prosecuted by both parties, at the common expence; that what ever should be taken in *Lombardy*, should be deliver'd to the *Venetians*; and what ever in *Romagna* and *Tuscany*, should be put into the hands of the *Florentines*: and *Carmignuolo* was made General of the League. By means of this alliance the War was transfer'd into *Lombardy*, where it was manag'd by *Carmignuolo* with that discretion and courage, that in a few months time he took several Towns from the Duke, and *Brescia* among the rest; which last in those times, and according to the method of those Wars, was accounted a miracle. This War continued five years, and the Citizens of *Florence* were much impoverish'd by the Taxes which had been continued as long. Hereupon a regulation was agreed upon, and (that all people might be charg'd according to their Estates) it was propos'd the Personal Estate should be chargeable as well as the real; and that who ever had to the value of a hundred Florens in goods, should pay half a proportion. But there being Law and Authority to levy this Tax, but not men enough to compel them, the Grandees were disgusted, and oppos'd it, before it was perfectly concluded: only *Giovanni de Medici* promoted it so vigorously, that he carried it against them all. And because in the Books of assessment, every man's goods were rated (which the *Florentines* call *Accatascare*) this imposition was call'd

*Carmignuolo*  
General of  
the League.

*Catascio*. Moreover this Law restrain'd the Tyranny of the Nobles, not permitting them to strike, or terrifie such as were inferior to them, in the Counsels, as formerly they had presum'd. This Tax therefore though accepted chearfully enough by the Commons, went much against the minds of the Nobility. But it being in the Nature of man, never to be satisfi'd, and as soon as possess'd of what with great vehemence he desir'd, to wish as fiercely for another. The people not content with the proportions set them by the Law, demanded a retrospecton, and that it might be consider'd how much the Nobility had paid less in times past, than was now allotted them by the *Catascio*, and that they might be forc'd to pay it for the reimbursement of such as had sold their Estates to enable them to pay their Taxes before. This proportion affrighted the Grandees much more than the *Catascio*: so that to defend themselves against both, they decry'd the *Catascio* as unjust and unequal, in laying a Duty upon goods and household-stuff (which are here to day, and lost to morrow) and exempting mony, which many people kept privatly in their hands, so as the *Catascio* could not discover it. To which they added, that it was not but reasonable those Persons who relinquish'd, or neglected their own private affairs for the better management of the publick, should be favour'd in the Taxes; for devoting their whole labour to the benefit of the State, there was no justice nor equity in the World, that the City should have the profits

*Catascio*.

of their Industry, and Estate, and from others receive only the contribution of their Estates. Those who were for the *Catasto*, reply'd that as their goods varied, the Taxes might be varied too; and to any inconvenience from that, a remedy might be found. As to the money conceal'd, that was not to be consider'd for making no profit of it, there was no reason it should be paid for; and when ever they employ'd it, it would be sure to be discover'd. For the pains they took, and their solicitude for their Country, if it were troublesome to them, they might have liberty to retire, for there was no doubt but some well affected Citizens would be found, who would not repine to serve the City both with their Counsel and Estates: and that there were so many honors, and other perquisites attending those great Offices, as might suffice any reasonable Persons, without abatement of their Taxes. But their great discontent was from another cause; the Nobility were offended that they could not make War at other peoples charge, as they were us'd to do formerly, but were oblig'd to bear their share as well as their Neighbours. Had this way been found out before, there would have been no War with King *Ladislaus*, then; nor with Duke *Philip* now; both which Wars were undertaken to fill the coffers of some particular Citizens, more than for any general necessity; but this commotion of humours, was appear'd by *Giovanni de Medici*, who convinc'd the people, it was not convenient to look backward. That their business now was to provide carefully for the future, and if the former impositions had been unequal and unjust, they were to thank God a way was found to relieve them, and not make that a means to divide which was intended to unite the City; as it would certainly do, if the old assessments, and the new were adjusted, for it was better to be contented with half a victory than to venture all for an absolute; many instances making it out, that where more has been striv'd for, all has been lost. With these and such like discourses, he pacified the people, and the design of retrospection was quite laid aside.

Peace betwixt  
the league and  
the Duke.

1428

However the War with the Duke being carried on for a while, a peace at length was concluded at *Ferrara* by the mediation of a Legate from the Pope. But the Duke not observing the conditions at first, the League took Arms again, and coming to an engagement with his Army at *Asolo*, they defeated him quite, and forc'd the Duke to new propositions, which were accepted by the League: by the *Florentines*, because they were grown jealous of the *Venetian*, and sensible, that the vast charge which their City was at, was to make others more powerful than themselves. by the *Venetians*, because they observ'd *Carmignuola*, after the Duke was overthrown, to advance but slowly, and make little or no advantage of his victory, so as they could not place any further confidence in him. In this manner the peace was concluded in the year 1428, by which the *Florentines* were restor'd to what they had lost in *Romagna*; the *Venetians* had *Brescia*, and the Duke gave them *Bergamo*, and the Territory belonging to it, over and above. This War cost the *Florentines* 3 millions and five thousand Ducats; the success of which, was Grandeur and Authority to the *Venetian*, but poverty and dissention to themselves. Peace being concluded abroad, the War was transplanted, and broke out at home. The *Grandees* of the City could not digest the *Catasto*; and not seeing any way of suppressing it, they contriv'd ways of incensing the people against it that they might have more Companions to oppose it. They remonstrated therefore to the Officers for collection, that they were to search, and Catastar the goods of the Neighbouring Towns, lest any of the *Florentine* goods should be conveyed thither. Whereupon all that were Subjects to that City, were requir'd to bring In Inventories of their goods within a certain time. But the *Volterrani* complaining to the Senate, incens'd the Officers so highly, they put eighteen of them in Prison. This action provok'd the *Volterrani* exceedingly, but the regard they had for their Prisoners, kept them at present from any commotion.

About this time *Giovanni de Medici* fell Sick, and finding his Sickness to be mortal, he call'd his Sons *Cosimo* and *Lorenzo* to him, and said;

*Giovanni de  
Medici's  
Speech to his  
Sons at his  
Death.*

I suppose the time that God, and Nature allotted me at my Birth, is now expir'd I die contented, leaving you rich, and healthful, and honourable, (if you follow my footsteps and instruction) and indeed nothing makes my Death so easie and quiet to me, as the thought that I have been so far from injuring or disabling any Person, that I have done them all the good offices I was able; and the same course I recommend to you. For matter of Office and Government (if you would live happy and secure) my advice is, you accept what the Laws and the people confer upon you; that will create you neither envy nor danger, for 'tis not what is given that makes men Odious, but what is usurp'd; and you shall always find greater number of those who encroaching upon other peoples interest, ruin their own at last, and in the mean time live in perpetual disquiet. With these arts, among so many factions and enemies, I have not only preserv'd but augmented my reputa-

reputation in this City, if you follow my example, you may maintain and increase yours. But if neither my example nor persuasion can keep you from other ways, your ends will be no happier than several others who in my memory have destroy'd both themselves and their Families.

Not long after he died, and was infinitely lamented by the greatest part of the City, as indeed his good qualities deserv'd: for he was charitable to the height; not only relieving such as he ask'd but preventing the modesty of such as he thought poor, and supplying them without it. He loved all People: the good he Commended; the bad he Commiserated. He sought no Office, and went through them all. He never went to the Palace, but invited. He was a lover of Peace, and an Enemy to War. He reliev'd those who were in adversity, and those who were in prosperity he assisted. He was no friend to publick extortion, and yet a great arguement of Common Stock. Courteous in all his employments; not very eloquent, but solid, and judicious. His complexion appear'd melancholy, but in company he was pleasant and facetious. He died rich, especially in Love and Reputation; and the inheritance of all descended upon his Son *Cosimo*.

The *Volterrani* were weary of their Imprisonment, and to recover their liberties, promis'd to condescend to what was requir'd. Being discharg'd, and return'd to *Volterra*, the time for the new *Priors*'s entrance into the Magistracy arriv'd, and one *Giusto* (a Plebeian but a Man of good interest among them) was chosen in the place. Having been one of those who were imprison'd at *Florence* he had conceiv'd a mortal hatred against the *Florentines*, and it was much increas'd by the instigation of one *Giovanni* (a Person of Noble extraction) who being in Authority with him at the same time persuaded him that by the authority of the *Priors*, and his own interest, he would stir up the People to rescue themselves from their dependance upon *Florence*, and afterwards make himself Prince: upon this encouragement *Giusto* took Arms; possess'd himself of the Town; imprison'd the *Florentine* Governor, and, by consent of the people, made himself Lord. The news of these revolutions in *Volterra*, was not at all pleasing to the *Florentines*; But their peace being made with the Duke, and their Articles sign'd they thought they had leisure enough to recover that Town; and to lose no time, they made *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, and *Palla Strozzi* Commissioners, and sent them thither out of hand. *Giusto* suspecting the *Florentines* would assault him, sent to *Sienna*, and *Lucca* for relief. The *Siennesi* refus'd him, alledging they were in League with the *Florentines*: and *Pagolo Guinigi* (who was then Lord of *Lucca*) to reingratiate with the people of *Florence* (whose favour he had lost in their Wars with the Duke) not only deny'd his assistance to *Giusto*, but sent his Ambassador Prisoner to *Florence*. The Commissioners to surprize the *Volterrani*, before they were aware, assembled what strength they had of their own, rais'd what foot they could in the lower *Val d' Arno*, and the territory of *Pisa*: and march'd towards *Volterra*. *Giusto* discourag'd neither by the desertion of his Neighbours, nor the approach of the Enemy, rely'd upon the situation, and strength of the Town; and prepar'd for his defence. There was at that time in *Volterra*, one *Arcolano* (a Brother of that *Giovanni* who had persuaded *Giusto* to take the Government upon him) a Person of good credit among the Nobility. This *Arcolano* having got several of his Confidants together, he remonstrated to them, how God Almighty by this accident had reliev'd the necessities of their City; for if they would take Arms with him; remove *Giusto* from the Governmet, and deliver all up to the *Florentines*, they should not only have their old priviledges confirm'd, but be themselves made the chief Officers of the Town. Having consented to the design; they repair'd immediatly to the Palace where *Giusto* resided; and leaving the rest below *Arcolano* with three more went up into the dining-room, where they found him with other Citizens; they pretended to speak with him, about business of importance, and having (in the variety of their discourse) drill'd him to another Chamber, *Arcolano* and his accomplices fell upon him with their Swords: but they were not so nimble but *Giusto* had the opportunity to draw his, and wound two of them, before he fell himself, yet his destiny being unavoidable, he was kill'd, and thrown out into the Palace yard. Whereupon those who were Confederatè with *Arcolano* taking Arms, they deliver'd up the Town to the *Florentine* Commissioners who were not far off with their Army. The Commissioners march'd directly into the Town, without any Capitulation, so that then the condition of the *Volterrani* was worse than before; for among other things, a great part of their Country, was dismembred; and the Town it self reduc'd to a *Vicarsata*. *Volterra* being in this manner lost, and recover'd at the same time, there had been no danger of new War, had not the ambition of some Men pull'd it down upon their heads. There was a person who for a long time had serv'd the *Florentines* in their Wars against the Duke: his name was *Nicola Fortebraccio*, Son of a Sister of *Braccio da perugia*. This *Nicola* was disbanded upon the Peace; and at the time of these

*Cosimo* heir  
his Father.  
*Giusto*.

*Volterra* re-  
volts.

*Giusto* slain.

these accidents at *Volterra* had his quarters at *Fucecchio*, so that the Commissioners made use of him, and his Souldiers in that enterprize. It was believ'd, that whilst *Rinaldo* was engag'd with him in that War, he had perswaded *Nicolo* upon some pretended quarrel, to fall upon the *Lucchesi*; assuring him that if he did, he would order things so in *Florence*, that an Army should be sent against *Lucca*, and he have the command of it. *Volterra* being reduc'd, and *Nicolo* return'd to his old Post at *Fucecchio*; either upon *Rinaldo's* instigation, or his own private inclination, in *Novem.* 1429. with 300 Horse and 300 Foot, he surpriz'd *Ruoti*, and *Compito* two Castles belonging to the *Lucchesi*; and afterwards falling down into the plain he made great depredation. The news being brought to *Florence*, the whole Town was in uproar, and the greatest part was for an expedition against *Lucca*. Of the chief Citizens which favour'd the Enterprize, there were all the *Medici*, and *Rinaldo*, who was prompted thereto either out of an opinion it would be for the advantage of that Common-Wealth, or out of an ambition to be made head of it himself. Those who oppos'd it were *Nicolo da Uzano*, and his party. And it seems an incredible thing, that in one City, upon one occasion, there should be such contrariety of Judgments. For the same people who after ten years Peace, oppos'd the War against Duke *Philip*, (which was undertaken in defence of their liberties) the same Persons now, after such vast expence, and so many Calamities as their City had undergone, press'd and importun'd for a War with the *Lucchesi*, to disturb the Liberties of other People. And on the other side, those who were for the War then, resisted it now. So strangely does time alter the Judgments of Men; so much more prone are people to invade their Neighbours, than to secure themselves, and so much more ready are they to conceive hopes of gaining upon others than to apprehend any danger of losing their own. For dangers are not believ'd till they be over their heads; but hopes are entertain'd though at never so great distance. The People of *Florence* were full of hopes upon intelligence of what *Nicolo Ferreraccio* had done and did still do, and upon certain letters which they received from their *Rettori* upon the confines of *Lucca*. For their deputies in *Pescia*, and *Visco*, writ them word that if they might have liberty to receive such Castles and Towns as would be deliver'd up to them, they should be Masters of the greatest part of the Territory of *Lucca*; and it contributed not a little to their encouragement, that at the same time, they received an Embassie from the *Senate* of *Lucca*, to complain of *Nicolo's* invasion, and to beg of the *Senate* that they would not make War upon a Neighbour City, which had preserv'd a constant amity with them. The Ambassador's name was *Jacopo Vicciani*; who had been Prisoner not long before to *Pagolo Guinigi* Lord of *Lucca*, for a Conspiracy against him; and (though found guilty) had been pardon'd for his Life. Supposing he would have as easily have forgiven his imprisonment, as *Pagolo* had done his offence he employ'd him in this Embassie, and sent him to *Florence*. But *Jacopo* being more mindful of the danger he had escap'd, than the benefit he had receiv'd; encouraged the *Florentines* to the enterprize; which encouragement added to the hopes they had conceiv'd before, and caus'd them to call a General Council (in which 498. Citizens appear'd) before whom the whole project was more particularly debated.

*Rinaldo* per-  
suades the War. Among the Principal promoters of the expedition (as I said before) *Rinaldo* was one, who represented to them, the great advantage that would accrue to them by the taking of that Town. He insisted upon the convenience of the time, as being abandon'd by the Venetian, and the Duke; and not capable of relief from the Pope, who had his hands full another way. To which he added the easiness of the enterprize, the Government having been usurp'd by one of its own Citizens, and by that means lost much of its natural vigor, and ancient disposition to defend its liberties; so that it was more than probable, either the people would deliver it up, in opposition to the Tyrant, or the Tyrant surrender for fear of the people. He exaggerated the injuries that Governor had done to their State, the ill inclination he still retain'd towards them; and the dangers which would ensue if the Pope or Duke should make War upon it; concluding that no enterprize was ever undertaken by the State of *Florence* more easie, more profitable; or more just.

*Uzano* oppo-  
ses it. In opposition to this it was urg'd by *Uzano* that the City of *Florence* never undertook any War with more injustice, or hazard, nor any that was more like to produce sad and pernicious effects. That first, they were to invade a City of the Guelfish faction, which had been always a friend to the City of *Florence*; and to its own danger and prejudice many times receiv'd the Guelfs into its bosom, when they were banish'd, or unsafe in their own Country. That in all the Chronicles of our affairs, it was not to be found, that City had ever offended *Florence*, whilst it was free; and if at any time since its subjection, it had transgress'd, (as indeed it had during the Government of *Castruccio*, and under

under this present Lord) it was but reasonable to lay the saddle upon the right Horse; and to impute the fault rather to their Tyrants, than Town. If War could be made against the Tyrant, without detriment to the City, well and good; the injustice would be the less. But that being impossible, he could never consent that a City of so ancient amity and alliance, should be ruin'd for nothing. However because Men lov'd then at such a rate, that no account was made of what was just and unjust, he would waive so trifling an argument, and proceed to the profit and emolument of that War, which was the thing now adays most seriously considered: did believe those things were most properly call'd profitable, which carried least damage along with them; but how that expedition could with any equity be call'd profitable, he could not understand; seeing the damage was certain, and the benefit but contingent. The certainty of the damage consisted, in the vastness of the expence which must of necessity be great enough to discourage a City that was quiet and at peace, much more one that had been already harass'd out with a tedious and a chargeable War, as their City had been. The advantages propos'd were the taking of Lucca, which he confess'd would be considerable. Yet the accidents and impediments with which they might meet were so far from being to be slighted, that to him they seem'd numerous and insuperable, and the whole enterprize impossible. Nor ought they to presume that either the Venetian or the Duke would be content that they should conquer it, for though the Venetian seem'd to comply, it was but in gratitude to the Florentines at whose charges they had so largely extended their Empire, and the other was only cautious of engaging in a new War, and new expence, and attended till they were tired and exhausted, that he might fall upon them with advantage. He minded them likewise, that in the middle of their enterprize, and in the highest hopes of their Victory, the Duke would not want means to relieve the Lucchesi, either by supplying them with money under hand, or if that would not do, by disbanding his Men, and sending them as Souldiers of Fortune, to take pay under them. Upon these reasons he persuaded them to give over that design, and to live so with that Usurper, as to create him what Enemies they could, for he knew no way so ready to subdue the Town, as to leave it to his Tyranny, and let him alone to afflict and weaken it as he pleas'd. So that if the business was manag'd as it should be, that City might quickly be brought to such terms that the Usurper, not knowing how to hold it, and the City as unable to Govern it self, would be constrain'd to throw it self voluntarily under their protection. Nevertheless seeing their eagerness was such that his reasons could not be heard, he would undertake to prognosticate; that the War which they were about should cost them much money; expose them to many dangers at home, and in stead of taking Lucca, and keeping it to themselves, they should deliver it from an Usurper, and of a poor, servile, but friendly City, make it free, and malicious, and such as in time would grow to be a great obstacle to the greatness of Florence.

This enterprize being thus canvass'd on both sides, it came (privately and according to custom) to the votes of the whole Convention, and of the whole number, only 98 were against it. Resolution being taken, and the ten men created for the carrying on of the War, they rais'd men with all speed both infantry and Horse. For Commissaries, they deputed *Astorre Gianni*, and *Rinaldo de gli Albizzi*, and made an agreement with *Nicola Fortebaccio* that he should deliver what Towns he had taken, into their hands, and take pay under them. The Commissaries being arriv'd with their Army in the Country of *Lucca*, they divided, *Astorre* extending himself upon the plain towards *Camaggiore*, and *Pietra Santa*; and *Rinaldo* with his Squadron marching towards the Mountains, presuming that if they cut off its intercourse with the Country, it would be no hard matter to become Masters of the Town. But both their designs were unhappy; not but that they took several Castles and Towns, but because of sundry imprudences committed in the management of the War, both by the one and the other. *Astorre Gianni* gave particular evidence of his indiscretion in the passage which follows. Not far from *Pietra Santa* there is a vale call'd *Seraveza*, rich, full of Inhabitants; who understanding the approach of that Commissary went out to meet him, and to desire that he would receive and protect them as faithful servants to the people of Florence. *Astorre* pretended to accept their offer, but afterwards he caus'd his Souldiers to seize upon all the strong places, and passes in the vale; and assembling all the Inhabitants in their Principal Church; he kept them Prisoners and commanded his men to plunder and destroy the whole Country; after a most cruel and barbarous way, prophaning the Churches and Religious Houses, and abusing the Women, as well Virgins as others. These passages being known in Florence, offended not only the Magistrates, but the whole City. Some of the *Seravezi*, who had escap'd the hands of the Commissary, fled directly to Florence, telling the sadness of their condition to all Persons they met with, and being en-

The Cruelty  
of *Astra*.

The Saravезesi complain.

couraged by several who were desirous to have *Astorre* punish'd, either as an evil Man, or as an adversary to their faction; they address'd themselves to the *Ten*, and desired to be heard; and being introduc'd, one of them step'd forth and spake to this purpose.

*We are assured (most magnificent Lords) our words would not only find belief, but compassion among you, did you but know in what manner your Commissary first seiz'd upon our Country, and afterwards upon us. Our Vale (as 'tis likely your Chronicles may remember you) was always of the Guelfish party; and many times a faithful receptacle for such of your Citizens as by the persecutions of the Ghibilins, were not suffered at home. Our Ancestors and we have always ador'd the very name of this Illustrious Republick; and esteem'd it as the head and principal member of that party. Whilst Lucca was Guelfish, we submitted very quietly to their Commands; but since it fell under the dominion of an Usurper, who has relinquish'd its old friends, and joyn'd himself with the Ghibilins, we have obey'd him, 'tis true, but rather by force, than by consent: and God knows how often we have beg'd for an opportunity to express our affection to our old friends. But how blind and deceitful are the desires of Man; That which we prayed for, as our only felicity, is become our destruction. As soon as we heard your Ensigns were marching towards us, supposing them not our Enemies, but our ancient Lords, and friends, we went immediatly to wait upon your Commissary, and committed our valley, our fortunes, and our selves into his hands, relying wholly upon his Generosity, and presuming he had the Soul (if not of a Florentine) at least of a Man. Pardon (I beseech you) my freedom, we have suffer'd so much already, nothing can be worse, and that gives me this confidence.*

*Your General has nothing of a Man but his Person, nor of a Florentine but his Name. He is a mortal Disease, a savage Beast, and as horrid a Monster as ever any Author ever describ'd. For having wheeled us together into our Cathedral under presence of discouraging some things with us, he made us his Prisoners: ruin'd and burn'd our valley; rob'd, and spoiled, and sacked, and beat, and murdered the inhabitants; the Women he ravish'd, the Virgins he forced, tearing them out of the arms of their Parents, and throwing them as a prey to his Soldiers. Had we provok'd him by any injury either to his Country or himself: we should have been so far from complaining, we should have condemn'd our selves; and esteem'd it no more than what our own insolence and unworthiness had pull'd upon our heads. But having put our selves freely into his power; without Arms or any other capacity of resistance; to be then rob'd, and abus'd, with so much injury and insolence; is beyond humane patience; and we cannot but resent it. And though we might make all Lombardy ring with the sadness of our complaints; and with imputation, and scandal to this City, diffuse the story of our sufferings all over Italy, we have wav'd and declin'd it, thinking it unjust to asperse so Noble, so Charitable a Common-wealth, with the cruelty and dishonour of a Barbarous Citizen, whose insatiable avarice had we known, or could have but suspected, before we had try'd it; we would have strain'd and forc'd our selves to have gorg'd it (though indeed it has neither bounds nor bottom) and by that means (if possible) preserv'd part of our Estates, by sacrificing the rest. But that being too late, we have address'd our selves most humbly to your Lordships, begging that ye should relieve the infelicity of your Subjects; that other People may not (by our president) be terrifi'd or discourag'd from committing themselves under your Empire and Dominion. If the infinite and unsupportable injuries we have suffer'd, be too weak or few to procure your compassion; yet let the fear of God's displeasure prevail, whose Temples have been plund'r'd and burn'd, and his People betray'd in the very bowels of his Churches.*

And having said thus, they threw themselves before them upon the ground, yelling, and imploring that they might be reposess'd of their Estates and their Country; and that their Lordships would take care (seeing their reputation was irrecoverable) that at least the Wives might be restored to their Husbands, and the Children to their Parents. The cruelty and inhumanity of his behaviour having been understood before; and now particularly related by the sufferers themselves; wrought so highly upon the Magistrates, that immediatly they Commanded *Astorre* back from the Army, cashier'd him, and made him afterwards incapable of any Command. They caus'd inquisition likewise to be made after the goods of the *Saravезesi*: such as were found, were restor'd, what could be found, was reprim'd afterwards by the City, as opportunity was offer'd.

Rinaldo accus'd.

*Rinaldo de gli Albizi* was accus'd on the other side for managing the War, not so much for the publick profit of his Country, as for his own, it was objected against him, that from the very hour of his Commission, he laid aside all thoughts of reducing *Lucca*, and design'd no farther than to plunder the Country, to fill his own pastures with other Peoples cattle,

Cattel, and furnish his own houses with other Peoples goods. That his own Bokty and his Officers being too little to satisfie him, he barter'd and bought the plunder of his common Soldiers, and, of a General, made himself a Merchant. These calumniationes being come to his ears, netled his honest, but haughty mind; more perhaps than a wife Man would have suffer'd them to do. However they disturb'd him so, that in a rage both against Magistrate and City, without expecting, or so much as desiring leave he return'd upon the spur to Florence, presented himself before the *Ten*, and told them;

*That he now found how difficult and dangerous it was to serve an unconstant People, and a divided City; the one entertain'd all reports and believ'd them. The other punish'd what was amiss, condemn'd what was uncertain, but rewarded nothing that was done well. So that if you overcome, no body thanks you; if you mistake every body blames you; if you miscarry every body reproaches you; either your friends persecute you for emulation, or your Enemies for Malice. However for his part he had never, for fear of Scandal or imputation, omitted any thing which he judg'd might be of certain advantage to his Country. But that now indeed the baseness of the calumnies under which at present he lay, had master'd his patience, and chang'd his whole Nature. Wherefore he beg'd the Magistrates would for the future be more ready to justify their officers, that they might act with more alacrity for the good of their Country. And that seeing in Florence no Triumph was to be expected, that they at least would concern themselves so far, as to secure them from obloquy. He admonish'd them likewise to reflect, that they themselves were officers of the same City, and by consequence every hour lyable to such slanders as may give them to understand how great trouble and disquiet honest Men conceive at such false accusations.*

His Speech  
to the *Ten*

The *Ten* endeavour'd to pacifie him as much as the time would allow; but transfer'd his command upon *Neri di Gino*, and *Alamanno Salviati*, who instead of rambling, and harrasing the Country, advanced with their Army, and block'd up the Town. The season being cold, the Army was lodg'd at *Capanole*, the new Generals, thinking the time long, had a mind to be nearer and encamp before the Town, but the Souldier objected the ill weather, and would not consent, though the *Ten* sent them positive orders to that purpose, and would not hear of excuse:

There was at that time resident in Florence, a most excellent Architeect call'd *Philip*, the Son of *Brunellesco*, of whose Workmanship this City is so full, that after his Death he deserv'd to have his statue set up in Marble in the principal Church of the Town, with an inscription under it, to testifie his great excellence to the Reader. This *Philip* upon consideration of the banks of the River *Serchio*, and the situation of the Town, had found out a way to drown it. This invention he imparted to the *Ten*, and so convinc'd them, that by their order, experiment was to be made, which was done, but it turn'd more to the prejudice of our camp, than to the detriment of the Town. For the *Luccesi* perceiving the design, heighten'd and strengthened their banks one that part where the river was to overflow, and afterwards taking their opportunity one night, they brake down the sluice which was made to turn the water upon them; so that their banks being firm and high, and the banks towards the plain open, it overflowed their Camp, and forc'd them to remove. This design miscarrying, the *Ten* call'd home their Commissioners, and sent *Giovanni Guiccardini* to command the Army in their stead; who clap'd down before the Town, and straiten'd it immediately. Finding himself distress'd, the Governor of the Town, upon the encouragement of *Antonno dell Rosso*, a *Senese* (who was with him as resident from the Town of *Sienna*) sent *Salvestro Trenta* and *Lodovico Borvisi* to the Duke of *Milan*, to desire he would relieve him. Finding him cold in the business, they entreated him privately that he would at least send them supplies, and promis'd him (from the People) that as soon as they were arriv'd, they would deliver both Lord and Town into their hands; assuring him that if this resolution were not suddenly taken, their Lord would surrender it to the *Florentines*, who had tempted him with several fair proffers. The fear of that, made the Duke lay aside all other respects, wherefore he caus'd the Conte *Francesco Sforza* his General, publickly to desire leave to march with his forces into the Kingdom of *Naples*; and having obtain'd it, he went with his Troops to *Lucca*, notwithstanding the *Florentines*, upon notice of his transaction, sent to the Conte *Boccaccinor Alamanni* their friend to prevent it. *Francesco* having forced his passage into the Town, the *Florentines* drew off to *Labrafatta*, and the Conte march'd out, and sat down before *Pescia*, where *Pagolo da Diacetto* was Governor, and in great fear ran away to *Pistoia*. Had not the Town been better defended by *Giovanni Malavolti*, than by him, it had been most dishonourably lost. The Conte, not able to carry it at the first assault, drew off to *Buggiano*, and *Stilano* a Castle not far off and burn'd both of them to the ground. The *Florentines* displeas'd with this devastation, apply'd themselves to a remedy which had often preserv'd



them, and knowing that Souldiers of Fortune are easier corrupted than beaten, they caus'd a considerable sum to be proffer'd to the Conte, not only to depart; but to deliver them the Town. The Conte perceiving no Man was to be squeez'd out of that City, accepted the proposition in part; but not thinking it convenient in point of honor to put them in possession of the Town, he articked to draw away his Army upon the payment of 50000 Ducats. This agreement being made, that the people of *Lucca* might excuse him to the Duke, he seiz'd upon their Governour, which they had promis'd to depose. *Antonio dell' Rosso* (the *Sienna* Embassador) was at that time in *Lucca*, as we said before. This *Antonio* by the Authority of the Conte, meditated the destruction of *Pagolo*. The heads of the Conspiracy were *Pietro Cennami*, and *Giovanni da Chruizano*.

The Conte was quartered out of the Town, upon the Banks of the *Serchio*, and with him the Governour's Son. The Conspirators, about 40 in number, went in the night to find out *Pagolo*, who hearing of their intention, came forth in great fear to meet them, and inquire the occasion. To whom *Cennami* made answer; That they had been too long Govern'd by him; that the Enemy was now about their walls, and they brought into a necessity of dying either by Famine or the Sword; That for the future they were resolv'd to take the Government into their own hands, and therefore they demanded that the Treasure, and the Keys of the City might be delivered to them. *Pagolo* repli'd, that the Treasure was consum'd; but both the Keys and himself were at their service, only he had on request to make to them, that as his Government had begun, and continued without blood, so there might be none spilt at its conclusion. Hereupon *Pagolo* and his Son were deliver'd up to the Conte. *Francesco*, who presented them to the Duke, and both of them dyed afterwards in prison.

*Pagolo* Lord  
of *Lucca* de-  
pos'd.

This departure of the Conte, having freed the *Lucchesi* from the Tyranny of their Governour, and the *Florentine* from the fear of his Army; both sides fell again to their preparations; the one to beleaguer, and the other to defend. The *Florentines* made the Conte *Orbino* their General, who begirt the Town so close, the *Lucchesi* were constrain'd once more to desire the assistance of the Duke, who under the same pretence as he had formerly sent the Conte, sent *Nicolo Piccinino* to relieve them. *Piccinino* advancing with his Troops to enter the Town, the *Florentines* opposing his passage over the River, the *Florentines* were defeated after a sharp engagement, and the General with very few of his Forces, preserv'd themselves at *Pisa*. This disaster put the whole City in great consternation; and because the enterprize had been undertaken upon the peoples account, not knowing where else to direct their complaints, they laid the fault upon the Officers and managers, seeing they could not fix it upon the contrivers of the war; and reviv'd their old articles against *Rinaldo*. But the greatest part of their indignation fell upon *Giovanni Guiccardini*; charging him that it was in his power to have put an end to the war, after Conte *Francesco* was departed; but that he had been corrupted by their mony; part of which had been remitted to his own house by bills of exchange; and part he had received himself, and carried it with him. These reports and rumors went so high, that the Captain of the people, mov'd by them, and the importunity of the contrary party, summon'd him before him, *Giovanni* appear'd, but full of indignation, whereupon his relations interpos'd, and to their great honor, prevail'd so far with the Captain, that the process was laid aside. The *Lucchesi* upon this Victory, not only recover'd their own Towns, but over-ran, and possess'd themselves of the whole Territory of *Pisa*, except *Biancina*, *Calcinaja*, *Liccorno*, and *Librafatta*; and (had not a conspiracy been accidentally discover'd in *Pisa*) that City had been lost among the rest. The *Florentines* however recruited their Army, and sent it out under the command of *Micheletta*, who had been bred up a Soldier under *Sforza*.

The Duke having obtain'd the Victory, to overlay the *Florentines*, with multitude of Enemies, procur'd a League betwixt the *Genovesi*, *Sansesi*, and the Lord of *Piombino*, for the defence of *Lucca*; and that *Piccinino* should be their General, which thing alone was the discovery of the plot. Hereupon the *Venetians* and *Florentines* renew there League. Open Hostilities are committed both in *Lombardy* and *Tuscany*; and many Skirmishes and Rencounters happen with various fortune on both sides; till at length every Body being tyr'd, a General Peace was concluded betwixt all parties in the month of *May* 1433. by which it was agreed that the *Florentines*, *Sennefi*, *Lucchesi* and who ever else during that war had taken any Towns or Castles from their Enemies, should restore them, and all things return to the possession of the owners. During the time of this war abroad, the malignant and factious humors began to work again and ferment at home; and *Cosimo de Medici* after the Death of his Father, began to manage the publick business with greater intention and magnanimity; and converse with his Friends with greater freedom than his Father had done. Insomuch that those who before were glad at the death of

*Giovanni*,

1433.

Peace be-  
twixt the *Flo-*  
*rentines* and  
*Lucchesi*.



*Giovanni*. were much surpriz'd and confounded, to see him so far out-done by his Son. *Cosimo* was a wise and sagacious Gentleman, grave, but grateful in his presence; liberal, and courteous to the highest; never attempted any thing against any party, nor the State, but watch'd all opportunities of doing good to every Body, and obliging all people with his continual beneficence. So that indeed the excellency of his conversation, was no little distraction and disadvantage to those who were at the helm. However, by that way he presum'd he should be lyable to live as freely, and with as much Authority, in *Florence*, as other people: or else being driven to any strait by the malice of his Adversaries, it would be in his power to deal with them, by the assistance of his friends. The great instruments for the propagation of his interest were *Averardo de Medici*, and *Puccio Pucci*, *Averardo* with his prudence procuring him much favour and reputation. This *Puccio* was a Person so eminent for his judgment, and so well known to the people, that he denominated the faction, which was not call'd *Cosimo's*, but *Puccio's* Party. The City was divided in this manner at that time, when the enterprize was taken against *Lucca*; during which the ill humors, were rather provok'd, and incens'd than extinguish'd. And although *Puccio's* Party were the great promoters of it at first, yet afterwards in the prosecution of it many of the contrary party were employ'd, as Men of more reputation in the State. Which being above the power of *Averardo de Medici*, and his comrades to prevent, he set himself with all possible Art to calumniate those Officers; and upon any misfortune (and no great thing can be managed without it) all was imputed rather to their imprudence and ill conduct, than to the Virtue of their Enemies. He it was that aggravated his Enormities so strongly against *Afforre Gianni*. He it was that disgusted *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, and caus'd him to desert his Command without leave. He it was which caus'd the Captain of the people to cite *Guiccardini* before him. From him it was, all the other aspersions which were laid upon the Magistrates and the Generals, did proceed. He aggravated what was true; he invented what was false; and what was true, and what was false were readily believ'd by those who hated them before.

These unjust and irregular ways of proceeding were well known to *Nicolo Uzano*, and other heads of that Party. They had many times consulted how they might remedy them but could never pitch upon a way. To suffer them to encrease, they were sensible would be dangerous; and to endeavour to suppress them, they knew would be difficult. *Nicolo da Uzano* was the first Man that expos'd his disgust; but observing the war to be continued without, and the distractions encreasing at home; *Nicolo Barbadori*, desirous of *Uzano's* concurrence to the destruction of *Cosimo*, went to seek him at his house, and finding him alone very penfive in his study, he persuaded him with the best arguments he could use, to joyn with *Rinaldo* in the expulsion of *Cosimo*, to whom *Nicolo da Uzano* repli'd in these Words.

*It were better for your self, for your Family and the whole Common-wealth, if both you and your whole party, had their regards (as they say you have) rather of Silver than Gold. Their Counsels then, proceeding from Heads that were gray, and replet with experience, would be fuller of Wisdom, and advantage to the Publick. Those who design to drive Cosimo out of Florence, ought first to consider his interest with their own. Our Party you have christen'd the party of the Nobility, and the contrary faction, is call'd the faction of the people. Did the truth of the matter correspond with the Name, yet in all adventures the victory would be doubtful; and we ought in discretion rather to fear than presume, when we remember the Condition of the Ancient Nobility of this City, which have not only been depress'd, but extinguish'd by the people. But we are under greater discouragements than that, our Party is divided, theirs is entire. In the first place *Neri de Gino*, and *Nerone de Nigi* (two of the Principal of our City) have not declar'd themselves as yet; so that it remains uncertain which side they will take. There are several houses and families divided among themselves. Many out of a pick to their Brothers, or some other of their Relations, have abandon'd us, and betaken to them. I shall instance in some of the chief, and leave the rest to your private consideration. Of the Sons of *Maso de gli Albizi*; *Lucca*, out of animosity to *Rinaldo*, has engag'd himself on the other side; in the Family of the *Guiccardini*, among the Sons of *Luigi*, *Piero* is an Enemy to his Brother *Giovanni*, and sides with our adversaries. *Tomaso* and *Nicolo Soderini*, in opposition to *Francesco*, their Uncle, are manifestly defected. So that if it be seriously deliberated, who are on their side, and who are on ours, I know no reason why ours should be call'd the faction of the Nobility more than theirs. And if it be alledg'd, that the people are all on their side; so much is ours the worse; for when ever we come to blows, we shall not be able to oppose them. If we insist upon our dignity, it was given us at first, and has been continued to us*

*Nicolo da Uzano's answer to Barbadori.*

for.

for fifty years by this State; and if now we should discover our weakness, we should certainly lose it: If you pretend the justice of our cause, and that that will give us reputation, and detract from our Enemies;

In answer, it is fit that justice should be known and believ'd by other people, as well as our selves; which is quite contrary, the whole cause of our present Commotion being founded upon a bare suspicion, that Cosimo would usurp, and make himself Sovereign, of our City. Though this suspicion passes among us, it does not wish other people who accuse us, even for our accusation of him. Examine the crimes upon which we ground our suspicion; what are they, but that he distributes his money freely, according to every Mans necessity; and that not only upon a private, but publick account, not only to the Florentines, but to the foreign Commanders: that he favour this or that Citizen which desires to be a Magistrate; that by the general reputation he has among all People, he advances this, or that, of his friends to employments as he sees occasion: so that the whole weight and strength of his impeachment, lies in this; that he is charitable, liberal; ready to his friend; and belov'd by all People. Tell me I beseech you what Law is it that prohibits, that blames, and condemns beneficence, or love? 'Tis true, these are ways by which Men aspire and do many times arrive at the Supremacy; but they are not thought so by other People; nor are we sufficient to obtrude them; because our own ways have defam'd us; and the City (having lived always in faction) is become corrupt and partial, and will never regard our accusations. But admit you succeed and should prevail so far as to banish him (which truly if the Senate concur might be done without difficulty) how can you think among so many of his friends as will be left behind, and labour incessantly for his return, to obviate or prevent it? Certainly it will be impossible; his interest is so great, and himself so universally belov'd, you can never secure him. If you go about to banish the chief of those who discover themselves to be his friends, you do but multiply your adversaries; and create more Enemies to your self; return he will, in a very short time, and then you have gain'd only this point, to have banish'd a good Man, and readmitted a bad: for you must expect he will be exasperated, his Nature debauch'd by those who call him back; and being oblig'd to them so highly it will be no prudence in him to reject them. If your design be to put him to Death formally, by the cooperation of the Magistrate; that is not to be done; his wealth, and your corruption will preserve him. But admit he should die, or being banish'd never return, I do not see what advantage will accrue to our state. If it be deliver'd from Cosimo, it will be in the same danger of Rinaldo; and I am of their number who would have no Citizen exceed another in Authority. If either of them prevail (as one of them must) I know not what obligation I have to favour Rinaldo more than Cosimo. I will say no more, than God deliver this City from private usurpation, and (when our sins do deserve it) particularly from his. Do not therefore persuade to a thing that is every way so dangerous; do not fancy that by the assistance of a few, you can oppose against a multitude: all the Citizens you converse with, partly by ignorance, and partly by malice, are dispos'd to sell their Country; and fortune is so favourable as to have presented them a Chapman. Manage your self therefore by my Counsel for once; live quietly, and observe, and (as to your liberty) you will have as much reason to be jealous of your own party, as the adverse. When troubles do happen, let me advise you to be a Neuter; by it you will stand fair with both sides, and preserve your self, without prejudice to your Country.

These words rebated the edge of Barbadoro's fury; and all things remain'd peaceable during the war with Lucca. But peace being concluded, and Uxano deceased, the City was left without wars abroad, or Government at home; every Man driving on his own pernicious designs; and Rinaldo (looking upon himself was now as Chief of the Party) press'd and importun'd all such Citizens as he thought capable of being *Gonfalonieri*, to take Arms and wrest their Country out of the jaws of a person, who by the malice of a few, and the ignorance of the multitude, would otherwise inevitably enslave it. These Plots and counter-plots, on Rinaldo's side, and his Adversaries kept the City in a perpetual jealousy; Insomuch that at the creation of every Magistrate it was publickly declar'd how every Man stood affected both to the one faction and the other; and at the Election of Senators, the whole City was in an uproar: every thing that was brought before the Magistrate (how inconsiderable and trifling so ever) created a mutiny: all secrets were discover'd: nothing was so good, or so evil, but it had its favourers and opposers; the good as well as the bad were equally traduc'd; and no one Magistrate, did execute his Office.

Florence remaining in this confusion, and Rinaldo impatient to depress the Authority of Cosimo, considering with himself that Bernardo Guadagni (were it not for his arrears to

the Publick) was a fit Person to be chosen *Gonfaloniere*; to qualifie him for that Office, he discharg'd them himself. And coming afterwards to a *Scrutiny*, it fell out that Fortune (which has been always a friend to our disorders) made *Bernardo Gonfaloniere* for the Months of *September* and *October*. *Rinaldo* visited him forthwith, and told him that the Nobility, and all People that desir'd to live happily, were much rejoic'd at his preferment; and that it was now his business to carry himself so as they might never repent it: he laid before him the danger of dividing among themselves; and how nothing could contribute so much to their Union, as the depression of *Cosimo*; for he was the Man, and no other, who kept them down, by the immensity of his treasure, and rais'd up himself so high, that without timely prevention he would make himself Sovereign. That (as he was a good Citizen) it was his Office to provide against it, by assembling the People in the *Piazza*; taking the State into his protection; and restoring its liberty to its Country: he put him in mind that *Salvestro de Medici* could (though unjustly) curb and correct the Authority of the *Guelfs*; to whom (if for no other reason but for the Blood which their Ancestors lost in that quarrel) the Government belong'd; and what he did unjustly against so many, *Bernardo* might do justly, and therefore safely against one. He encourag'd him not to fear: for his friends would be ready to assist him, with their Arms in their hands. The People that were his creatures, were not to be regarded, for no more assistance was to be expected by *Cosimo* from them, than they had formerly yeild'd to *Giorgio Scali*. His riches was not to be dreaded; for, when seiz'd by the *Senate*, his wealth would be theirs, and for conclusion he told him, that in doing thus, he would unite and secure the Common-wealth, and make himself glorious. *Bernardo* reply'd in short, that he believ'd what he said to be not only true but necessary: and that time being now fitter for action than discourse, he should go and provide what force he could, that it might appear he had companions in his Enterprize. As soon as he was in possession of his Office; had dispos'd his Companies, and settled all things with *Rinaldo*, he cited *Cosimo*, who (though dissuaded by most of his friends) appeared presuming more upon his own innocence, than the Mercy of his Judges. *Cosimo* was no sooner enter'd into the Palace, and secur'd; but *Rinaldo* with all his servants in Arms, and his whole party at his heels, came into the *Piazza*, where the *Senators* causing the people to be call'd, 200 Citizens were selected to constitute a *Balia* reformation of the State. This *Balia* was no sooner in force, but the first thing they fell upon in order to their reformation, was the process against *Cosimo*; many would have him banish'd; many executed; and many were silent, either out of compassion for him, or apprehension of other people; by means of which non-concurrence, nothing was concluded. In one of the Towers of the Palace (call'd *Alberghettino*) *Cosimo* was a Prisoner in the Custody of *Federigo Malavolti*. From this place *Cosimo* could hear and understand what was said; and hearing the clutter of Arms, and frequent calling out to the *Balia*, he began to be fearful of his Life; but more, lest he should be assassinated by his particular Enemies. In this terror he abstein'd from his meat, and eat nothing in four days but a morsel of Bread. Which being told to *Federigo*, he accosted him thus.

*You are afraid to be poison'd, and you kill your self with hunger. You have but small esteem for me, to believe I would have a hand in any such wickedness; I do not think your Life is in danger, your friends are too numerous both within the Palace, and without: if there be any such designs, assure your self they must take new measures; I will never be their instrument, nor imbrue my hands in the Blood of any Man, much less of yours; who has never offended me: courage then; feed as you did formerly; and keep your self alive for the good of your Country and friends; and that you may feed with more confidence, I my self will be your Taster.*

*Federigo's speech to Cosimo his Prisoner.*

These words reviv'd *Cosimo* exceedingly: who with tears in his Eyes kissing and embracing *Federigo*, in most pathetic and passionate terms he thank'd him for his humanity; and promis'd him reward, if ever his fortune gave him opportunity: *Cosimo* being by this means in some kind of repose; and his business and condition in dispute among the Citizens; to entertain *Cosimo Federigo* brought home with him one night to Supper, a Servant of the *Gonfaloniere's* call'd *Fargannaccio*, a pleasant Man, and very good company. Supper being almost done, *Cosimo* (hoping to make advantage by his being there, having know'd him before very well) made a sign to *Federigo* to go out; who apprehending his meaning, pretended to give order for something that was wanting, and went forth. After some few preliminary words when they were alone, *Cosimo* gave *Fargannaccio* a token to the Master of the Hospital of *S. Maria Nuova* for 1100 Ducates, a thousand of them to be deliver'd to the *Gonfaloniere*, and the odd hundred for himself. *Fargannaccio* undertook to deliver them; the Money was paid; and the *Gonfaloniere* was desir'd to take some opportunity of visiting *Cosimo* himself. Upon the receipt of this sum, *Bernardo* became more moderate,

*Cosimo banished.*

1433.

*Rinaldo's speech to his Friends.*

moderate, and *Cosimo* was only confin'd to *Padua*, though *Rinaldo* design'd against his Life. Besides *Cosimo Averardo*, and several others of the *Medici* were imprison'd and among the rest *Puccio*, and *Giovanni Pucci*. For greater terrour to such as were dissatisfied with the Banishment of *Cosimo*, the *Balia* was reduc'd to the eight of the Guards, and the Captain of the people. Upon which resolution, *Cosimo* being conven'd before the *Senate* the 3 of *October* 1433, received the sentence of Banishment; with exhortation to submit, unless he intended they should proceed more feverely both against his Person and Estate. *Cosimo* received his sentence very chearfully. He assur'd them, that honorable convention could not order him to any place, to which he would not willingly repair. He desir'd of them, that since they had not thought fit to take away his Life, they would vouchsafe to secure it, for he understood there were many in the *Piazza* who attended to kill him; and at length he protested that in what ever place or condition he should be, himself and his Estate should be always at the service of that City, *Senate*, and people. The *Gonfaloniere*, bad him be satisfied; kept him in the palace till night; convey'd him than to his own house; and having supped with him delivered him to a guard to be conducted safely to the Frontiers. Wherever he pass'd, *Cosimo* was honorably receiv'd; visited publickly by the *Venetians*; and treated by them more like a Sovereign than a Prisoner, *Florence* being in this manner deprived of a Citizen so universally belov'd, every Body was dismay'd, as well they who prevail'd, as they who were over-power'd. Whereupon *Rinaldo*, foreseeing his Fate, that he might not be deficient to himself, or his party, call'd his Friends together, and told them.

*That he now saw very evidently their destruction was at hand; that they had suffer'd themselves to be overcome by the intreaties, and tears, and bribes of their Enemies, not considering that ere long it would be their turns to weep, and implore, when their Prayers would not be heard, nor their tears find any compassion; and for the money they had received, not only the principal would be required, but interest extorted with all possible cruelty. That they had much better have died themselves, than *Cosimo* should have escap'd with his Life, and his friends be continued in *Florence*. Great Men should never be provok'd: when they are, there is no going back. That now there appear'd no remedy to him, but to fortifie in the City; which our Enemies opposing, (as doubtless they will) we may take our advantage and banish them by force, since we cannot by Law. That the result of all this would be no more (than what he had inculcated before) the restauration of the Nobility; the restitution of their honors and Officers in the City; and the corroboration of their party with them, as the adversary had strengthened his with the People. And that by this means, their party would be made more strong by assuming more courage and Vigor, and by acquiring more credit and reputation. At last supperadding; that if these remedies were not apply'd in time, he could not see which way, amidst so many Enemies, the State was to be preserv'd, and he could not but foresee the City and their whole party would be destroy'd.*

To this, *Mariotto Boldovineti* oppos'd himself, alledging the haughtiness of the Nobility, and their insupportable Pride; and that it was not prudence in them to run themselves under a certain Tyranny, to avoid the uncertain dangers of the People. *Rinaldo* perceiving his Counsel not likely to take, complain'd of his misfortune, and the misfortune of his party; imputing all to the malignity of their stars, rather than to the blindness and inexperience of the Men. Whilst things were in this suspense, and no necessary provision made, a letter was discover'd from *Agnolo Accinivoli* to *Cosimo*, importing the affections of the City towards him, and advising him to stir up some War or other, and make *Neri de Gino* his friend, for he did presage the City would want Money, and no Body being found to supply them, it might put the Citizens in mind of him, and perhaps prevail with them to solicit his return; and if *Neri* should be taken off from *Rinaldo*, his party would be left too weak to defend him. This letter coming into the hands of the *Senate*, was the occasion that *Agnolo* was secur'd, examin'd, and sent into banishment; and yet his example could not at all deter such as were *Cosimo's* friends. The year was almost come about since *Cosimo* was banished; and about the latter end of *August* 1434, *Niccolo di Croco* was drawn *Gonfaloniere* for the next two months, and with him eight new *Senators* chosen of *Cosimo's* Party.

So that that election frighted *Rinaldo* and all his friends. And because by Custom it was three days after their election before the *Senators* were admitted to the execution of their office, *Rinaldo* address'd himself again to the heads of his Party, and remonstrated to them the danger that was hanging over their heads: that the only remedy left them was immediately to take Arms, to cause *Donati Velluti* (who was *Gonfaloniere* at that time)

to erect a new *Balia*: to degrade the new *Senators*; to create others (for their turns) in their places: to burn the old, and fill up the next imborfation with the names of their friends: this resolution was by some people held necessary and good, but by others it was thought too violent, and that which would draw very ill consequences after it. Among the number of dissenters *Palla Strozzi* was one; who being a quiet, gentle, and courteous Person, apter for study, than the restraining of factions, or opposing civil dissentions reply'd that all enterprizes that are contriv'd with the least shadow of wisdom, or Courage, seem good at first, but prove difficult in the execution, and destructive in the end. That he had thought (the *Dukes Army* being upon their frontiers in *Romagna*) the apprehension of new War abroad, would have employ'd the thoughts of the *Senate*, better than the differences at home. That if it should appear they design'd an alteration of the Government, (which could hardly be conceal'd) the people would always have time enough to get to their Arms, and perform what was necessary for their Common defence; which being done of necessity, would not carry with it either so much wonder, or reproach.

Upon these considerations it was resolv'd, that the new *Senators* should be permitted to enter; but such an eye to be had to their proceedings, that upon the least injury, or reflection upon their party, they should unanimously take Arms and rendezvous at the *Piazza* of *St. Pulinare*, from whence (being not far from the Palace) they might dispose of themselves as their advantage directed. This being the result of that meeting, the new *Senators* entred upon the Office; and the *Gonfaloniere*, to give himself a reputation, and to render himself formidable to his Enemies, caus'd his predecessor *Donato Velluti* to be clap'd in Prison, as a Person who had embezled the publick treasure: after this, he felt, and sounded his Brethren about *Cosimo's* return; and finding them dispos'd, he communicated with such as he thought the heads of the *Medici's* party, who encouraging him likewise, he cited *Rinaldo Rinaldo Peruzzi*, and *Nicolo Barbadori*, as the Principals of the contrary faction. Upon this citation, *Rinaldo* concluding it no time longer to protract, issued forth from his house with a considerable number of Arm'd Men, and joynd himself with *Ridolfo Peruzzi* and *Nicolo Barbadori*, immediately: there were among them several other Citizens, besides a good number of Souldiers (which being out of pay were at that time in *Florence*) and all drew up (as was before agreed) at the *Piazza* of *St. Pulinare*. *Palla Strozzi*, though he had got good store of people together, stur'd not out of his House, and *Giovanni Guiccardini* did the same; whereupon *Rinaldo* sent to remember them of their engagement, and to reprehend their delay: *Giovanni* reply'd, that he should do disservice enough to the Enemy, if by keeping his house, he prevented his Brother *Piero's* going forth to the relief of the *Senate*. *Palla*, after much solicitation, and several messages, came on Horseback to *St. Pulinare*, but unarm'd and with only two footmen at his heels. *Rinaldo*, perceiving him, advanc'd to meet him; upbraided him with his negligence, and told him that his not joyning with the rest, proceeded from the want of fidelity or courage; either of which was unworthy a person of his quality or rank. That if he thought by not doing his duty against the other faction, he should save his own stake, and escape with his liberty and Life; he should find himself mistaken. That for his own part, if things happen'd adversely he should have this consolation, that he was not backward with his advice before the danger; nor in it with his Power: Whereas he and his Comerads could not without horror remember that this was the third time they had betray'd their Country. First, when they preserv'd *Cosimo*; the next, when they reject'd his Counsels; and the third then, in not assisting with their supplies; to which *Palla* made no answer that the standers by could understand but muttering to himself, he fac'd about with his Horse, and returned from whence he came.

The *Senate* perceiving *Rinaldo* and his party in Arms, and themselves utterly deserted, they caus'd the Gates of the Palace to be barracado'd up, as not knowing what else was to be done. But *Rinaldo* neglecting his opportunity of marching into the *Piazza*, by attending supplies which never came to him, depriv'd himself of his advantage; gave them courage to provide for their defence and to several other Citizens to repair to them, both with their Persons, and advice. In the mean time, some friends of the *Senators* which were least suspected went to *Rinaldo* and acquainted him, that the *Senate* could not imagine the reason of this commotion: that if it was about the business of *Cosimo* they had no thoughts of recalling him. That they never had any inclination to offend him; if these were the grounds of their jealousy, they, might assure

assure themselves if they pleas'd; come into the Palace, be civilly received, and readily gratified in their demands. But fair words would not down with *Rinaldo*, who told them that the way he had prepos'd to assure himself, was by reducing the *Senators* to their private Condition; and reforming the City to the benefit of all People. But it seldom happens that any thing is well done where there is equality in Power, and difference in judgment.

*Ridolfo Peruzzi* (moved with what the Citizens had said) told them that for his part he ask'd no more but that *Cosimo* might be kept out: that if that were granted, he had his designs: that he would not fill the City with Blood, nor impole upon the *Senate*; that he was ready to obey them if they pleas'd, and accordingly he marched with all his followers into the Palace, and was joyfully received. *Rinaldo's* staying at *St. Pulmaro*; pusillanimity of *Palla*, and *Ridolfo's* revolt defeated *Rinaldo* of his victory and rebated much of the first edge and vigor of his Party: with all which, the Popes Authority concurr'd. Pope *Eugenius*, being driven out of *Rome* by the people, was at that time resident in *Florence*; who understanding the tumult; and judging it incumbent upon his office (if possible) to appease it, he sent *Giovanni Vresleschi* (a Patriarch and great friend of *Rinaldo's*) to desire he might speak with him, for he had authority and interest enough with the *Senate* to secure and content him, without Blood shed, or other detriment of the Citizens: upon the persuasion of his friend, *Rinaldo* with all his Squadron march'd to *St. Maria Novella* where the Pope lay. *Eugenius* let him know the promise the *Senate* had made him to commit all differences to his determination; and that (when their Arms were laid down) all things should be ordered, as he pleas'd to award. *Rinaldo* observing the coldness of *Palla*; and the inconstancy of *Peruzzi*, and having no more cards to play, cast himself into his Holiness his Arms, not doubting but his interest was sufficient

*Eugenius* the  
Pope labours a  
peace,

*Cosimo* recall'd to  
protect him.

Hereupon by the Popes direction notice was given to *Nicolo Barbadori* and the rest which attended *Rinaldo* without, that they should go home and lay down their Arms, for *Rinaldo* was in treaty with him about a Peace with the *Senate*; upon which news they all disbanded, and laid down their Arms. The *Senate* continued their Treaty by the mediation of the Pope; but in the mean time sent privately into the Mountains of *Pistoia* to raise foot, and causing them to joyn with their own forces and march into *Florence* in the night, they possess'd themselves of all the Posts in the City; call'd the people together into the Palace; erected a new *Baha*; which the first time they met, recall'd *Cosimo*, and all that were banish'd with him. And on the contrary factign, they banish'd *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, *Ridolfo Peruzzi*, *Nicolo Barbadori*, *Palla Strozzi*, and so great a number of other Citizens, that there was scarce a Town in *Italy* but had some of their exiles, besides several which were banish'd into foreign Countries. So by this and such accidents as these, *Florence* was impoverish'd in its wealth and industry, as well as inhabitants. The Pope beholding the destruction of those Men who by his intercession had laid down their Arms, was much troubled, complained heavily to *Rinaldo* of their violence, exhorted him to patience, and to expect submissively till his fortune should turn. To whom *Rinaldo* made this answer.

*Rinaldo's*  
answer to the  
Pope:

The small confidence they had in me, who ought to have believ'd me, and the too great confidence I had in you, has been the ruine of me and my party. But I hold my self more culpable than any body; for believing that you who had been driven out of your own Country, could keep me in mine. Of the vicissitudes, and uncertainty of fortune, I have had experience enough. I have never presum'd in its prosperity, and adversity shall never deject me; knowing that when she pleases she can take about, and indulge me: if she continues her severity, and never smiles upon me more, I shall not much value it, esteeming no great happiness to live in a City where the Laws are of less authority, than the passions of particular men. For might I have my choice, that should be my Country where I may securely enjoy my fortune and friends; nor that where the first is easily sequester'd, and the latter to preserve his own Estate, will forsake me in my greatest necessity. To wise and good men 'tis always less ungrateful to hear at a distance, than to be a spectator of the miseries of his Country; and more honorable they think to be an honest Rebel, than a servile Citizen.

Having said thus, he took his leave of the Pope, and complaining often to himself of his own Counsels, and the cowardice of his friends, in great indignation he left the City,

City, and went into banishment. On the other side, *Cosimo* having notice of his restoration, return'd to *Florence*, where he was received with no less ostentation and triumph, than if he had obtain'd some extraordinary Victory; so great was the concourse of people, and so high the demonstration of their joy, that by an unanimous and universal concurrence he was saluted, *The Benefactor of the people, and the Father of their Country.*

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THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
FLORENCE.

Book V.

**G**overnments in the variations which most commonly happen to them, do proceed from order to confusion, and that confusion afterwards turns to order again. For Nature having fixed no sublunary things, as soon as they arrive at their achme and perfection, being capable of no further ascent, of necessity they decline. So, on the other side, when they are reduced to the lowest pitch of disorder having no farther to descend, they recoil again to their former perfection: good Laws degenerating into bad customs, and bad customs ingendring good Laws. For, virtue begets peace; peace begets idleness; idleness, mutiny; and mutiny, destruction: and then, *vice versa*; that ruine begets Laws; those Laws, virtue; and virtue begets honour and good success. Hence it is, as wise men have observed, that Learning is not so ancient as Arms; and that in all Provinces as well as Cities, there were Captains before Philosophers, and Souldiers before Scholars. For good and well conducted Arms having gotten the victory at first, and that victory, quiet. The courage and magnanimity of the Souldier could not be depraved with a more honourable sort of idleness, than the desire of learning; nor could idleness be introduced into any well-governed City by a more bewitching and insinuating way. This was manifest to *Cato* (when *Diogenes* and *Carneades* the Philosophers were sent Embassadors, from *Athens*, to the Senate) who observing the *Roman* youth to be much taken with their doctrine, and following them up and down with great admiration; foreseeing the ill consequences that honest laziness would bring upon his Country: he obtain'd a Law, that no Philosopher should be admitted into *Rome*. All Governments therefore do, by these means, some time or other come to decay; and when once at the lowest, and mens sufferings have made them wiser, they rebound again, and return to their first order unless they be suppress'd, and kept under by some extraordinary force.

These vicissitudes and revolutions (first by means of the *Tuscans*, and then of the *Romans*) kept *Italy* unsettled, and rendered it sometimes happy, and sometimes miserable: and although nothing was afterwards erected out of the *Roman* ruines, comparable to what was before; (which nevertheless might have been done with great glory under a virtuous Prince) yet in some of the new Cities and Governments, such sprouts of *Roman* virtue sprung up; that though they did not usurp upon one another, yet they lived so amicably and orderly together, that they not only defended themselves, but repelled the *Barbarians*.

Among these Governments was the *Florentine*, though perhaps inferior in circumference  
of



of territory, yet in power and authority equal to any of them: for being seated in the heart of *Italy*, rich, and ready upon all occasions, they defended themselves bravely when ever they were invaded, or brought the victory to their allies, where ever they sided.

If therefore by reason of the courage of those new Principalities, the times were not altogether quiet; yet the severity of the War did not make them insupportable. For that cannot be called Peace, where the Governments clash, and invade one another; nor that War, in which no men are slain, no Towns pillaged, nor no Governments destroyed. The Wars of those times were begun without fear; carried on without danger; and concluded without detriment. Insomuch, that that virtue which used to be extinguish in other Provinces, by means of a long peace, was spent and exhausted in *Italy* by the faintness of the war, as will be more conspicuous by our description of the occurrences betwixt 1434 and 1494. In which it will appear how, at length, a new way was opened to the excursions of the *Barbarians*; and *Italy* relapsed into its old servitude and bondage. And if the actions of our Governors, both at home and abroad, be not to be read (as the actions of our Ancestors) with so much wonder and admiration of their courage and grandeur. Yet, in other respects they may seem as considerable, seeing how many Noble and great people have been restrained, and kept under by their Arms, how weak and ill managed however. And though, in our description we make no mention of the fortitude of the Souldier, the conduct of the Captains, nor the love of the Citizen towards his Country; yet we shall discover what cheats, what cunning, and what arts were used by both Princes, Souldiers, and Citizens, to preserve a reputation which they never deserved. And this perhaps may be as worthy our knowledge, as the wisdom and conduct of old; for if the examples of Antiquity do teach us what to follow; our more modern transactions will tell us what to avoid.

*Italy*, by those who commanded it, was reduced into such a condition, that when, by agreements of the Princes, a Peace was made up, it was presently interrupted by those who had Arms in their hands: so that they neither gained honour by their Wars, nor quiet by their Peace. A Peace being concluded betwixt the Duke of *Milan* and the League in the year 1433, the Soldiers unwilling to disband, turned the War upon the Church. These Souldiers were at that time of two Factions, the *Braccesean*, and the *Sforzescan* Faction. Of this latter, *Conte Francesco*, the son of *Sforza*, was Captain; the first was commanded by *Nicolo Pescinino* and, *Nicolo Forte Braccio*. To these two parties all the rest of the Souldiers in *Italy* joyned themselves. Of the two, *Sforza's* party was most considerable, as well for the courage of their *Conte*, as for a promise the Duke of *Milan* had made him, to give him in Marriage a natural daughter of his called *Madonna Bianca*; the probability of which alliance gained him great reputation. After the Peace of *Lombardy* was concluded; both these parties, upon several pretended occasions, turned their Arms against *Eugenius* the Pope. *Nicolo Forte Braccio*, was moved by an old animosity *Braccio* had always retained to the Church. The *Conte* was spurred on by his ambition: *Nicolo* assaulted *Rome*, and the *Conte* possessed himself of *la Marca*; whereupon, the *Romans* (to evade the War) turned *Eugenius* out of *Rome*, who fled to *Florence*, though with no little danger and difficulty. Being arrived there, upon consideration of the danger he was in, and that he was deserted by all the Princes, who refused, upon his score, to take up those Arms again, which so lately, and so willingly they laid down; made his Peace with the *Conte*, and gave him the Signorie of *la Marca*, though the *Conte* had added insolence to his usurpation, and, in his Letters to his Agents, dated them in Latin (as they do frequently in *Italy*) *Ex Givitate nostro Firmiano, invocato Petre & Paulo*. But not contented with the Grant of that Country, he would needs be created *Gonfaloniero* of the Church, and the Pope condescended; so much did his Holiness prefer an ignominious Peace before dangerous War. The *Conte*, upon these terms, became a friend to the Pope, and converted his Arms against *Nicolo Forte Braccio*; betwixt whom, for many Months together, several accidents happened in the territory of the Church; so that which side soever prevailed, the Pope and his Subjects suffered more than those that managed the War. At length, by the mediation of the Duke of *Milan*, an agreement (in the nature of a Truce) was concluded betwixt them, by which both of them remained Masters of several Towns in the Patrimony of the Church. The War was in this manner extinguished in *Rome*, but it brake out again presently in *Romagna*, by the means of *Battista da Canneto*, who had caused certain of the Family of the *Grisoni* in *Bologna* to be assassinated; and drove out the Pope's Governor, and many others which he suspected to be his enemies; to keep by force, what he had got by surprize, he address'd himself to *Philippo* for aid; and the Pope to countermine him, and revenge the injuries he had received, applied to the *Venetian* and *Florentine*. Both parties being supplied, there were two great Armies in *Romagna* of a sudden: *Philippo's* Auxiliaries

1433.  
The Souldiers in *Italy* distinguished into two parties. The Duke of *Milan* promises his Daughter to *Conte Francesco*.

The Pope invaded, makes peace with *Francesco Sforza*.

Wars in *Romagna*.

Fransforza  
General of the  
Pope's League

Auxiliaries were commanded by *Niccolo Piccinino*. The *Venetian* and *Florentine*, by *Gattamelata*, and *Nicolo da Tolentino*. Not far from *Imola* they came to a *Battel*, in which the *Venetians* and *Florentines* were defeated; and *Nicolo da Tolentino* sent Prisoner to the Duke, where he died in a few days, either by Poison or grief. The Duke being either impoverished by the War, or apprehending this Victory would quiet the League, followed not his advantage, but gave the *Pope* and his Confederates opportunity to recruit; who choosing the *Conte Francesco* for their General, they sent him to drive *Forte Braccio* out of the Lands of the Church; and to try if they could put an end to that War which they had begun in favour of the *Pope*. The *Romans* seeing his Holiness in the field again, and his Army considerable, they desired to be reconciled; and, having concluded the terms, they received a Governor from him. Among other Towns, *Nicolo Forte Braccio* had possessed himself of *Fiesole*, *Montecatani*, the City of *Castello*, and *Alcesi*; not being able to keep the field, *Nicolo* was retreated into this latter Town, and besieged by the *Conte*. The siege proving long, by the bravens of *Nicolo's* defence, the Duke began to cast about, and consider, he must either hinder the League from carrying the Town, or look to himself as soon as it was taken. To give the *Conte* therefore diversion, he commanded *Niccolo Piccinino*, by the way to *Romagna*, to pass into *Tuscany*: whereupon, the League judging the defence of *Tuscany* of more importance than the reducing of *Alcesi*, they sent to the *Conte* to stop *Piccinino's* passage, who was at that time with his Army at *Furbi*. Upon these orders the *Conte* raised his siege, and marched with his Forces to *Cesena* having left the War of *la Marca*, and the care of his own affairs to the management of his Brother *Lione*. Whilst *Piccinino* was labouring to pass, and *Francesca* to obstruct him, *Nicolo Forte Braccio* fell upon *Lione*, and with great honour to himself, took him Prisoner, plundered his people, and following his blow, took several Towns in *la Marca* at the same excursion. This news was very unwelcome to the *Conte*, who gave all his own Country for lost; nevertheless, leaving part of his Army to confront *Piccinino* he marched himself against *Forte Braccio* with the rest, forced him to an engagement, and beat him. In which defeat *Forte Braccio* was hurt, taken prisoner, and died of his wounds.

Peace betwixt  
the League and  
the Duke

This Victory recovered all that *Nicolo Forte Braccio* had taken from him; and forced the Duke of *Milan* to desire a peace, which he obtained by the mediation of *Nicolo da Esti*, *Marquis of Ferrara*, by which it was agreed, that the Towns which the Duke had got in *Romagna* should be restored; and his Forces withdrawn into *Lombardy*; and *Battista da Camato* (as it happens to those who owe their dominion to the courage or power of other people) as soon as the Duke's Forces were drawn off, despairing to remain in *Bologna* upon his own legs; quitted the Town, and left it to re-admit its old Governor *Antonio Bentivoglio*, who was chief of the contrary party.

All these things succeeded, during the banishment of *Cosimo*; upon whose return, those persons who were active in his restoration, and those who had suffered more than ordinarily before, concluded (without regard to any body else) to secure themselves of all the Offices in the State. The Senate which succeeded for the months of *November* and *December*, not satisfied with what their predecessors had done in favour of their party; they lengthned the time, changed the places of several which were banished, and sent many new ones into banishment after them. The Citizens were questioned and molested, not only for their inclinations to the parties, but for their wealth, their relations, and private correspondencies. And had this procription proceeded to blood, it had been as bad as *Othoman's*, or *Silla's*; nor was it altogether without; for *Antonio di Bernardo* was beheaded, and four other Citizens (of which *Zanobi Be' Eratelli*, and *Cosimo Barbadori* were two) who having escaped out of their Dominions, and being gotten to *Venice*; the *Venetians* (valuing *Cosimo's* friendship before their own honour and reputation) caused them to be secured, sent them prisoners home; where they were most unworthily put to death. However, that example gave great advantage to *Cosimo's* party, and great terror to the adverse; when it was considered that so potent a Republick should sell its liberty to the *Florentines*, which was supposed to be done not so much in kindness to *Cosimo*, as to revive and incense the factions in *Florence*; and by engaging them in blood, to render the animosities in that City irreconcilable, the *Venetians* being jealous of no other obstruction to their greatness, but the Union of those parties. Having pillaged and banished all such as were enemies, or suspected to be so to the State, they applied themselves to chafe and oblige new persons to corroborate their party; restored the Family of the *Alberti*, and who ever else had been proclaimed Rebel to his Country. All the *Grandees* (except some few) were reduced into the popular rank; the Estates of the Rebels they sold to one another for a song. After which, they fortified themselves with new Laws, new Magistrates, and new Elections, pulling out such as they thought their enemies, and filling the purses with the names of their friends. But admonished by

New Ordinances in Florence

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the ruine of their friends; and thinking not enough for the security of their Government; to make the imborfation as they pleas'd; they contriv'd, that all Officers of life and death should be created out of the chief of their party; and that the Persons who were to oversee the imborfations, and the new *Squadrans*, should (with the Senators) have power to create them. To the Eight of the Guards, they gave authority of life and death. They decreed, that the banished Persons should not return (though the time of their banishment was expired) till leave given them by four and thirty of the Senate and the Colledges; when their whole number amounted but to thirty and seven. They made it criminal to write, or receive Letters from them: every word, every sign, every motion that was unpleasing to the Governors, was punished severely; and if any one remained suspected who had escaped these injuries, they loaded him with new duties and impositions, till, in a short time, they had cleared the City of their Enemies; and secur'd the Government to themselves. However that they might want no assistance from abroad, and intercept it from such as should design against them; they enter'd into League with the Pope, the *Venetians*, and the Duke of *Milan*.

Things being in this posture in *Florence*, *Giovanna* Queen of *Naples* died, and, by will, made *Rinieri d'Angio* her heir. *Alphonso*, King of *Aragon*, was at that time in *Sicily*; and having good interest with many of the Nobility of that Kingdom, he prepared to possess it. The *Neapolitans* and several others of the Lords were favourers of *Rinieri*. The Pope had no mind that either the one or the other should have it but would willingly have governed by a Deputy of his own. In the mean time *Alphonso* arriv'd out of *Sicily*, and was received by the Duke of *Sessa*; where he entertained certain Princes into his pay, with design (having *Capua* in his possession, which was governed at that time, in his name, by the Prince of *Taranto*) to force the *Neapolitans* to his will. Wherefore he sent his Army against *Caietta*, which was defended by a Garisoti of *Neapolitans*. Upon this Invasion, the *Neapolitans* demanded assistance of *Philip*; who recommended the Enterprize to the people of *Genoa*; the *Genoeses* not only to gratifie the Duke, who was their Prince, but to preserve the goods and effects which they had at that time both in *Naples*, and *Caietta*, rigg'd out a strong fleet immediately. *Alphonso* having news of their preparations, reinforced himself, went in Person against the *Genoeses*, and coming to an engagement with them of the Island of *Ponsus*, he was beaten, taken Prisoner, (with several other Princes) and presented by the *Genoeses* into the hands of Duke *Philip*. This Victory astonish'd all the Princes of *Italy*, who had any apprehension of the power of *Philip*; beleving it would give him opportunity to make himself Master of all: but he (so different are the judgments of men) took his measures quite contrary. *Alphonso* was a wise and prudent Prince; and as soon as he had convenience of discoursing with *Philip*, remonstrated to him how much he was mistaken in siding with *Rinieri*; for that assuredly, having made himself King of *Naples*, he would endeavour, with all his Power, to bring *Milan* in subjection to the *French*, that his assistance might be near him, and that upon any distress, he might not be put to it to force a way for his supplies; nor was there any way to do it so effectually, as by ruining him, and introducing the *French*. That the contrary would happen by making *Alphonso* Prince; for then, having no-body, to fear but the *French*, he should be oblig'd to love and cherish the Duke above any body in whose power it would be to give his enemies a passage; by which means *Alphonso* should have the title, but the power and authority would remain in Duke *Philip*: infomuch, that it import'd the Duke much more than himself, to consider the dangers of one side, with the advantages of the other, unless he desir'd more to satisfy his passion than to secure his State. For, as by that way he would continue free and independent; by the other, (lying betwixt two powerful Princes) he would lose his State quite, or living in perpetual apprehension, be a slave to them both. These words wrought so much upon the Duke, that, changing his designs, he set *Alphonso* at liberty, sent him back to *Genoa*, and from thence into the Kingdom of *Naples*, where he landed at *Caietta* which upon the news of his enlargement, had been seized by some Lords of his party. The *Genoeses* (understanding how, without any regard to them, the Duke had discharged the King; and, considering with themselves, that of all their danger and expence, he had ingross'd the honour, impropriated the thanks of the Kings enlargement, and left them nothing but his regrate and indignation for having defeated and taken him prisoner) were highly dissatisfied with the Duke.

In the City of *Genoa*, when it has the free exercise of its liberty by the free suffrages of the people, a chief is chosen, which they call their *Doge*; not with the absolute power of a Prince, to determine arbitrarily of any thing; but to purpose and recommend what is to be debated and resolv'd upon by the Magistrates in the Council. In the same City there are many Noble Families so mighty and potent, they are not without difficulty to be brought

*Alphonso*  
brought prisoner to Duke *Philip*.

The *Doge*  
and his authority in *Genoa*.

to any obedience to the Magistrate. Of all those Families, the *Tregosi* and *Adorni* are most powerful and wealthy; and from them spring all the divisions of the City, and all the contempt of the Laws; for differing perpetually among themselves, and pretending both to the *Dogeship*; they are not contented to have it fairly decided, but came many times to blows; by which, as one is set up, the other is always depressed; and sometimes it falls out, that that party which is over-power'd, and unable to carry that Office otherwise, calls in foreign assistance, and prostitutes that Government, which they cannot enjoy themselves, to the dominion of a stranger.

*Francisco Spinola.*

By this means it comes often to pass, that they who have the Government in *Lombardy*, have the command of *Genoa* likewise; as it happened at the time when *Alphonso* was taken prisoner. Among the principal Citizens of *Genoa*, who caused that City to be delivered into the hands of the Duke, *Francisco Spinola* was one; who not long after he had been very active to enslave his Country, became suspected to the Duke (as it often happens in those cases) *Francisco* being highly dissatisfied, left the Town; and by a kind of voluntary exile, had his residence at *Caietta*; being there at that time when the engagement was with *Alphonso*, and having behav'd himself very well in it; he presumed he had again merited so much favour from the Duke, as to be permitted to live quietly in *Genoa*; but finding the Duke's jealousy to continue, (as not believing he, that had betrayed his Country could ever be true to him) he resolved to try a new experiment, to restore his Country to its liberty, and himself to his honour and security at once; believing no remedy could be admittred so properly to his fellow Citizens, as by the same hand which gave them their wound. Observing therefore the general indignation against the Duke for having delivered the King; he concluded it a convenient time to put his designs in execution; and accordingly he communicated his resolutions with certain Persons, which he had some confidence were of the same opinion, and encouraged them to follow him. It happened to be *S. John Baptist's* day (which is a great Festival in that City) when *Arismino*, a new Governor, sent them from the Duke, made his entry into *Genoa*. Being entred into the Town in the Company of *Opicino* (his predecessor in the Government) and other considerable Citizens, *Francisco Spinola* thought it no time to protract, but running forth Armed into the streets, with such as were before privy to his design, he drew them up in the *Piazza* before his house, and cryed out *Liberty, Liberty*. 'Tis not to be imagined with what alacrity the people and Citizens ran to him at that very name; insomuch, that if any out of interest or other consideration, retain'd an affection for the Duke, they were so far from having time to arm, and make defence, they had scarce leisure to escape, *Arismino*, with some of the *Genoeses* of his party, fled into the Castle which was kept for the Duke. *Opicino* presuming he might get thither, fled towards the Palace, where he had 2000 men at his command, with which he supposed he might not only be able to secure himself; but to animate the people to a defence; but he reckoned without his Host; for, before he could reach it, he was knock'd on the head, torn in pieces by the multitude, and his members drag'd about the Streets.

*Genoa recovers its liberty.*

After, this the *Genoeses* having put themselves under new Magistrates and Officers of their own, the Castle and all other posts which were kept for the Duke, were reduced, and the City perfectly freed from its dependance on the Duke. these things thus managed, though at first they gave the Princes of *Italy* occasion to apprehend the growing greatness of the Duke, yet, now observing their conclusion, they did not despair of being able to curb him; and therefore, notwithstanding their late League with him, the *Florentines Venetians* and *Genoeses* made a new one among themselves. Whereupon *Rinaldo de gli Albizi*, and the other chief *Florentine* Exiles seeing the face of affairs altered, and all things tending to confusion, they conceived hopes of persuading the Duke to a War against *Florence*, and going upon that design to *Milan*, *Rinaldo* accosted the Duke as followeth:

*Rinaldo's Oration to the Duke of Milan.*

If we, who have been formerly your Enemies, do now with confidence supplicate your assistance for, our return into our own Country, neither your Highness, nor any body else, (who considers the Progress of humane affairs, and the volubility of fortune) ought at all to be surprized, seeing both of our past and present actions, of what we have done formerly to your self, and of what we intend now to our Country, we can give a clear and a reasonable account. No good man will reproach another for defending his Country, which way soever he defends it. Nor was it ever our thoughts, to injure you, but to preserve our Country; which will be evident, if you consider how in the greatest stream of our victories and success, we no sooner found your Highness dispos'd to a peace, but we readily embraced it, and pursued it with more eagerness, than your self; so that as yet we are not conscious to our selves of any thing that may make us doubt of your favour. Neither can our Country, in justice, complain, that we are now pressing and importuning your

your Highness to employ those Arms against it, when we have obstinately oppos'd them before, in its defence: for that Country ought equally to be beloved by all which is equally indulgent to all; and not that, which despising the rest, advances and admires only a few. No-body maintains it unlawful in all cases to bear Arms against ones Country. Cities are mix'd bodies, yet have they their resemblance with natural bodies; and, as in these, many diseases grow which are not to be cur'd without violence: so in the other, many times such inconveniences arise, that a charitable and good Citizen would be more criminal to leave it infirm, than to cure it, though with amputation, and the loss of some of its members. What greater distemper can befall a polittick body than servitude? And what more proper remedy can be apply'd than that which will certainly remove it; Wars are just, when they are necessary; and Arms are charitable when there is no other hopes left to obtain justice. I know not what necessity can be greater than ours; nor what act of charity more commendable, than to wrest our Country out of the jaws of slavery. Our cause then being both just and charitable, ought not to be slighted; either by us, or your Highness, though it were only in compassion. But your Highness has your particular provocation besides; the Florentines having had the confidence, after a peace solemnly concluded with you, to enter into a new League with the Genoeses your Rebels; so that if our prayers and condition should be unable, your own just indignation and resentment should move you, especially seeing the enterprize so easie. Let not their pass'd carriage discourage you, you have seen their power and resolution to defend themselves formerly; and both of them were reasonably to be apprehended, were they the same now as they have been. But you will find them quite contrary; for, what strength, what wealth, can be expected in a City which has lately exploded the greatest part of its rich and industrious men? What obstinacy or resolution can be apprehended in a people which are divided, and at enmity among themselves? Which enmity is the cause that, that very treasure which is left, cannot now be employ'd so well as it formerly was; for men do chearfully disburse, when they see it is for the honour and security of their Country; hoping, that peace may reprice, what the War has devour'd. But when in War and Peace they find themselves equally oppress'd; and under a necessity in the one, of enduring the outrages of their enemies; and in the other, of truckling to the insolencies of their friends; No-body will supply our advance one farthing towards its relief: and the people suffer more many times by the avarice of their friends, than by the rapacity of their enemies; for in this last case they have hopes some time or other to see an end of it; but in the other they are desperate. In your last War you took up Arms against an intire and united City; in this, you have to do only with a remnant. Then, you attempted upon the liberty of the City; now, you will endeavour to restore it: and it is not to be feared, that in such disparity of causes, the effects should be the same. Nay rather your Victory is certain, and what advantage and corroboration, that will be to your own State, is easily judg'd; having Tuscany oblig'd to you thereby, and readier to serve you in any of your designs, than Milan is self. So that, though formerly this conquest would have been look'd upon as usurpation and violence; it will be now esteem'd an high piece of justice and charity. Suffer not therefore this opportunity to pass, and be sure, if your other enterprizes against this City have produced nothing but expence, difficulty, and dishonour; this will make you amends, and with great ease, turn to your great honour and advantage.

The Duke needed not many words to excite him against the Florentines; he had an hereditary quarrel to them, which (besides the blindness of his ambition) did always provoke him, and now more than ordinarily, upon occasion of their new League with the Genoeses. However the expences and dangers he had formerly pass'd, the memory of his late defeat, and the vanity and ill-grounded hopes of the exiles, discouraged him quite. The Duke, upon the first news of the Rebellion in Genoa, sent *Niccolo Piccinino*, with what Forces he had and could get together, towards that City, to recover it, if possible, before the Citizens should have compos'd themselves, or put the Government into order; presuming much upon the Castle which stood out for him. And though *Niccolo* drove the Genoeses up into the Mountains, and took from them the vale of *Pozzavori*, where they had fortified themselves; yet he found so much difficulty afterwards, (though he had beat them into the Town) that he was forc'd to draw off. Whereupon at the instigation of the exiles, he received orders from the Duke, that he should attack them on the East-side of the River, and make what devastations he could in their Country towards *Pisa*; supposing, that by the success of this expedition, he should be able to judge from time to time what course he was to steer. Upon the receipt of these orders, *Niccolo* assaulted *Serezana*, and took it and then having done much mischief in those parts to alarm the Florentines, he marched towards

Lucca

*Lucca*, giving out he would pass that way into the Kingdom of *Naples*, to assist the King of *Aragon*. Pope *Eugenius*, upon these new accidents, departed from *Florence* to *Bologna*, where he proposed and negotiated an accommodation betwixt the Duke and the League; representing to the Duke, that if he would not comply, he would be forc'd to part with the Conte *Francesco* to the League; for *Francesco* being his confederate, was at that time under his pay. But, though his Holiness took much pains in the business, that treaty came to nothing; for the Duke would not consent, unless *Genoa* were restored; and the League were as obstinate to have it remain free; so that all parties growing diffident of the peace, each of them began to make provision for War. *Nicolo Piccinino* being arrived at *Lucca* the *Florentines* began to apprehend new troubles, caused *Neri di Gino* to march with all speed into the Country of *Pisa*, and obtained of the Pope that Conte *Francesco* might joyn with him, and their united Forces take their Post before *St. Gonda*: *Piccinino* being at *Lucca*, desired a passport to go into the Kingdom of *Naples*, and being denied, he threatened to force it. The Armies and Officers were of equal number and eminence; so that neither side being over-forward to run the hazard of a Battel, by reason of the extraordinary coldness of the weather, (it being in *December*) they lay by one another several days without any action at all. The first that moved was *Nicolo Piccinino*; who was inform'd, that if in the night he assaulted *Vico Pisano* he should easily carry it. *Nicolo* attempted it; but failing of his design, he plundered the Country about it, and burn'd the Town of *S. Giovanni alla Vena*.

This enterprize (though for the most part ineffectual) encouraged *Nicolo* to proceed nevertheless; especially, observing that the Conte and *Neri* dur'd not to molest him: thereupon he assaulted *St. Maria in Castello* and *Filetto*, and took them both: nor did the *Florentines* Army move for all that: not that the Conte was affraid to come forth, but because the Magistrates in *Florence* (out of respect to the Pope, who was mediating a peace) had not as yet resolv'd upon the War: and that which was but prudence in the *Florentines*, being interpreted fear by the enemy, they took courage, and with all the Forces they could make, sat down before *Barga*. The news of that siege caused the *Florentines* to lay aside all compliments and respect; and to resolve not only to relieve *Barga*, but to invade the Country of the *Lucchesi*. Whereupon the Conte marching directly against *Nicolo*, and giving Battel to force him from the *Siege* he worsted his Army, and made him draw off: the *Venetians* in the mean time perceiving the Duke had broke the League, sent *Giovan Francesco da Gonzaga* their General, with an Army as far as *Chiaradadda*, who spoyling the Duke's Country, constrained him to call back *Nicolo Piccinino* out of *Tuscany*. Which revocation, with the Victory they had lately obtained against *Nicolo*, encouraged the *Florentines* to an expedition against *Lucca*, and gave them great hopes of success: in which they carried themselves without either fear or respect, seeing the Duke (who was the only person they apprehended) employed by the *Venetians*; and the *Lucchesi*, by having, as it were, received their enemies into their houses, and given them cause to invade them, had left themselves no grounds to complain.

1437.

In *April* therefore, in the year 1437 the Conte march'd with his Army; and before he would fall upon any thing of the enemies, he address'd himself to the recovery of what had been lost, and accordingly he reduced *St. Maria de Castello* and what-ever else had been taken by *Piccinino*. Then advancing against the *Lucchesi*, he sat down before *Camajore*; whose Garrison and inhabitants (though well enough affected to their Lord) being more influenced by the terror of an enemy at hand, than their fidelity to their friends a far off, surrendered immediately; after which, he took *Massa* and *Serazian* with the same dexterity and reputation; and then turning his Army towards *Lucca* in the month of *May*; he destroyed their Corn, burn'd their Villages, stubb'd up their Vines, and their Fruit-trees, drove away their Cattel, and omitted nothing of outrage and hospitality that is, or can be committed by Souldiers. The *Lucchesi* seeing themselves abandoned by the Duke, and unable to defend their Country, retir'd into the Town, where they intrench'd and fortified so well, that they did not doubt (by reason of their numbers within) but to be able to Make it good for some time, as they had formerly done. Their only fear was of the unconstancy of the people, who being weary of the siege, would probably consider their own private danger before the liberty of their Country, and force them to some ignominious accord. Whereupon, to encourage them to a vigorous defence, they were called together into the Market-place, and one of the wisest and gravest of the Citizens spake to them as followeth.

The Speech  
of a Citizen of  
*Lucca* to the  
people.

You have often heard, and must needs understand, that things done of necessity, are neither to be praised, nor condemned. If therefore you accuse us of having drawn this War upon you, by entertaining the Duke's Forces, and suffering them to assault you; you

are



are highly mistaken. You cannot be ignorant of the ancient and inveterate hatred the Florentines bear you; so that 'tis not any injury in you, nor any resentment in them, but your weakness and their ambition which has provoked them; the first giving them hopes, the other impatience to oppress you. Do not think that any kindness of yours can divert them from that desire; nor any injury of yours provoke them to be worse? 'Tis their business therefore to rob you of your liberty; 'tis yours to defend it; and what either of you do in pursuance of these ends may be lamented, but cannot be wondered at by any body: we may be sorry our Country is invaded, our City besieged, our Houses burned; but who of us all is so weak as to admire it? Seeing, if our power were as great we would do the same to them, and, if possible, worse. If they pretend this War was occasioned by our admitting of Nicolo; had he not been received, they would have pretended another; and, perhaps; had this invasion been deferred, it might have proved more fatal and pernicious; so that 'tis not his coming is to be blamed, but our ill fortune, and the ambition of their nature; for we could not refuse the Duke's Forces; and when they were come, it was not in our power to keep them from doing acts of Hostility: you know very well, that without the assistance of some considerable Prince, we had not been able to defend our selves; nor was any man more proper to relieve us, both in respect of his fidelity and power, than the Duke. He restored us to our liberty, and 'twas but reasonable he should secure it. He was always an enemy, to those who would never be our friends; if therefore we have provoked the Duke, rather than we would disoblige the Florentines, we have lost a true friend and made our enemy more able and more ready to offend us: so that it is much better for us to have this War, with the friendship of the Duke; than to have peace, with his displeasure: and we have reason to hope he will rescue us from these dangers to which he has exposed us, if we be not wanting to our selves. You cannot forget with what fury the Florentines have many times assaulted us; and with what honour and reputation we have repelled them, even when we have had no hopes but in God and in time, and how both of them have preserved us. If we defended our selves then; what reason now is there to despair? Then we were deserted by all Italy and left as a prey to the Enemy; now we have the Duke on our side, and 'tis not improbable the Venetians will be but slow in their motions against us; seeing it can be no pleasure to them to see the power of the Florentines increase. Then the Florentines were more free and unengaged, had more hopes of assistance, and were stronger of themselves and we every way weaker; for then we defended a Tyrant, now we fight for our selves; then the honour went to other people, now it returns upon us; then they were united and entire, now they are divided, and all Italy full of their Rebels. But if we had none of these reasons, nor none of these hopes to excite us, extreme necessity would be sufficient to animate us to our defence. Every enemy ought in reason to be apprehended by us, because all of them seek their own glory, and our destruction; but, above all, the Florentines ought to be most dreadful, who are not to be satisfied with our obedience, tribute, nor the government of our City; but they must have our persons and Wealths, to satiate their cruelty with our blood, and their avarice with our estates; so that there is no person nor condition among us so mean, but ought justly to fear them. Let No-body therefore be dismay'd to see our Country wasted, our Villages burn'd, and our Lands possessed by the enemy: if we preserve our City, they of course will revert: if we lose our City, to what purpose will they be kept maintaining our liberty; the enemy can hardly enjoy them: but losing our liberty what comfort would it be to retain them? Take arms therefore with courage, and when you are engaged with your enemy, remember the reward of your Victory is not only the safety of your Country, but the preservation and security of your children and estates.

These last words were received by the people with such warmth and vigor of mind, that unanimously they promised to die rather than to desert their City, or entertain any treaty that might intrench upon their liberty; that immediately order was taken for all things necessary for the defence of the City. In the mean time the Florentine Army was not idle, after many mischiefs and depredations in the Country, they took Monte-Carlo upon conditions; after which they encamp'd at Uzano, that the Lucchese being straitned on all sides, and made desperate of relief, might be constrained to surrender. The Castle was strong, and furnished with a good Garrison; so that was not so easily to be carried as the rest. The Lucchese (as was but reason) seeing themselves distressed, had recourse to the Duke, and recommended their case to him with all manner of expression; sometimes they commemorated the services they had done him: sometimes they remonstrated the cruelty of the Florentines: what courage it would give the rest of his friends to see him interpose in their defence; and what terror it would infuse to see them expos'd: for if they lost their liberty

and their lives, he would lose his honor, and his friends, and the fidelity of all those who had ever expos'd themselves to any danger for his sake: which words were deliver'd with tears, that if his obligations should fail, his compassion might move him to assist them. In-  
 somuch that the Duke, adding to his old animosity to the *Florentines*, his late engage-  
 ments to the *Lucchesi*, but above all being jealous of the greatness of the *Florentine*, which  
 of necessity would follow so important acquiescence; he resolv'd to send a great Army into  
*Tuscany*, or else to fall so furiously upon the *Venetians*, that the *Florentines* should be con-  
 strain'd to quit that enterprize to relieve them: he had no sooner taken this resolution  
 but they had news at *Florence* that the Duke was sending forces into *Tuscany*; which made  
 them suspicious of their designs, and therefore, to find the Duke employment at home,  
 they sollicit the *Venetian* very earnestly that they would attack him in *Lombardy* with all  
 the power they could make: but they were not only weakened, but disheartened by the  
 departure of the Marquis of *Manitona*, who had left their service, and taken arms under the  
 Duke. Whereupon they return'd this answer, that they were so far from being able to in-  
 gross the War, they could not assist in it, unless they sent *Conte Francesco* to command their  
 Army; and oblig'd him by Articles to pass the *Po* with them in person (seeing by the old  
 agreement he was not to go so far) for without a General they would undertake no War;  
 nor could they have confidence in any but the Count; nor in him neither, unless he oblig'd  
 himself to pursue the War in all places alike.

The *Florentines* were of opinion the War was to be carried on briskly in *Lombardy*; yet  
 on the other side to remove the *Conte* was to destroy their designs against *Lucca*, and they  
 were very sensible, that demand was made, not so much out of any necessity they had of the  
*Conte*, as to defeat that enterprize. The *Conte*, for his part, was by contract oblig'd to  
 to go into *Lombardy* whenever he should be requir'd by the League; but now he was unwill-  
 ing to forfeit his hopes of that alliance which the Duke had promis'd him, by marrying  
 him to one of his relations. So that betwixt the desire of conquering *Lucca*, and the fear  
 of having Wars with the Duke, the *Florentines* were in no little distraction. But their  
 fear (as it always happens) was the stronger passion of the two, insomuch as they were con-  
 tent (as soon as *Uzano* was taken) the *Conte* should pass into *Lombardy*. But there was  
 still a difficulty behind, which not being in their power to dissolve, gave the *Florentines*  
 more trouble and jealousy, than any thing else; and that was, that the *Conte* would not  
 be oblig'd to pass the *Po*, and without it, the *Venetians* would not entertain him, there  
 being no way to accommodate this difference, but of necessity one of them must submit; the  
*Florentines* persuaded the *Conte* that in a letter to the *Senate* of *Florence* he should oblige  
 himself to pass that river; alledging that a private promise not being sufficient to dissolve a  
 publick stipulation, he might do afterwards as he pleas'd; and which way soever he acted,  
 this convenienc'e would certainly follow, that the *Venetians* having begun the War, would  
 be compelled to pursue it; and that humor be inevitably diverted, which was so much to  
 be fear'd.

To the *Venetians* they intimated on the other side, That that letter, though private, was  
 sufficient to bind him, and that they ought to be satisfied therewith: that whilst it might  
 be done securely it would be best to conceal it, and indulge his respects to his Father-in-Law  
 for it would be neither for his, nor their advantage to have it discovered, without mani-  
 fest necessity: and in this manner the *Florentines* concluded upon the *Conte*'s passage into  
*Lombardy*; and the *Conte* having taken in *Uzano*, cast up certain new works about  
*Lucca* to keep from falling, & recommended the War to the Commissioners which succeed-  
 ed; he pass'd the *Alpes*, and went to *Reggio*, where the *Venetians* (being jealous of his  
 proceedings) to discover his inclinations, put him at first dash upon passing the *Po*,  
 and joyning the rest of their Army; which the *Conte* peremptorily refus'd, and many ill  
 words pass'd betwixt him and *Andrea Mauroceno* who was sent about it from the *Venetians*:  
 upbraiding one another by their pride and infidelity; and after several protestations  
 on both sides; on the one, that he was not oblig'd to it; on the other that he should  
 not be paid without it, the *Conte* returned into *Tuscany*, and his adversary to *Venice*. The  
*Conte* was quarter'd by the *Florentines* in the Country of *Pisa*; and they were not with-  
 out hopes of prevailing with him to reassume his command against the *Lucchesi*; but they  
 found him not dispos'd; for the Duke not understanding he had refus'd to pass the *Po*, in com-  
 pliment to him (fancying by his means he might preserve *Lucca*) he desired him that he  
 would be an instrument to make peace betwixt the *Lucchesi* and the *Florentines*, and if he could  
 to comprehend him also, insinuating by this by, that in convenient time he should  
 marry his Daughter. This march had great influence upon the *Conte*, who persuaded  
 himself the Duke having no heirs Males might thereby in time come to the Governmen-  
 t of *Milan*. Upon which grounds he discourag'd the *Florentines* from prosecuting the war,  
 affirming

Jealousie be-  
 twixt the *Venetian*  
 and the  
*Conte*.



affirming that for his own part he would not stir, unless the *Venetians* paid him his arrears, and performed the rest of their Covenants; for his pay alone would not do his business, wherefore it concern'd him to secure his own State, and therefore he was to look out for other allies, and not depend only upon the friendship of the *Florentines*: that seeing he was abandon'd by the *Venetians* he was oblig'd to a stricter regard to his own affairs; and threaten'd very slyly to make an agreement with the Duke. These tricks and expostulations were not at all to the *Florentines* satisfaction. They found their design upon *Luca* lost, and their own State in danger, whenever the Duke and the *Conte* united. To prevail with the *Venetians* to make good their terms, *Cosimo de Medici* was dispatched to them, (supposing his reputation might have some influence upon them) and a long speech to their *Senate*, he represented the posture of affairs in *Italy*; the power and conduct of the Duke; and concluded, that if the Count and he joyned, the *Venetians* would be confin'd to the Sea, and the *Florentines* in no small danger of their liberty: to which it was answer'd by the *Venetian* that they had well considered the condition of *Italy*, and their own; and did believe they were every way able to defend themselves; however it was not their custom to pay any Body for doing other People service. It belonged therefore to the *Florentines* to see the *Conte* satisfied, seeing it was they had had the benefit of his service, or rather (if they had a mind to preserve themselves in security for the future) to correct and rebate his insolence than to pay him; for Men put no bounds to their ambition; and if he should then be paid without doing any service, his next demand, in all liklyhood, would be more insolent and dangerous: in their judgment therefore it was high time to put a stop to his career, and not let him run on, till he became incorrigible; but if out of fear, or any other consideration they had a mind to continue him their friend; their best way would be to pay him; with which answer *Cosimo* return'd, and nothing was concluded.

The *Venetians* untractable

The *Florentines* nevertheless interceded very earnestly with the *Conte* that he would not forsake the League; who had no great inclination to it himself; but his desire to consummate the marriage with the Duke's Daughter, kept him in such suspense, that upon every little accident he was ready to leave them. The *Conte* had left his Towns in *la Marca*, to be secured by *Furlano*, one of his principal Officers: this *Furlano* was earnestly solicited by the Duke, that he left the *Conte's* service, and joyned himself to him. Whereupon laying aside all other respects to save his own stake, the *Conte* came to an agreement likewise with the Duke, and among the rest of the Articles, this was one, that for the future the *Conte* should not intermeddle in the affairs either of *Romagna* or *Tuscany*. After he had made this peace with the Duke, the *Conte* was very importunate with the *Florentines* to come to an agreement with the *Lucchesi*; and he persuaded them so far, that finding no other remedy, they came to a composition with them in the month of *April* 1438, by which capitulation the *Lucchesi* were to have their liberties preserved; and the *Florentines* to keep possession of *Monts Carlo*, and some other Castles which they had taken before; after which they writ many sad letters up and down *Italy*, lamenting that seeing God and Man were unwilling that the *Lucchesi* should fall under their Dominion, they had been constrained to a peace with them: and so much were they concerned for their disappointment in that enterprise, that seldom has any Body been known to lose their own Estates with more impatience and regret, than the *Florentines* express'd, for not gaining other peoples. However though the *Florentines* at that time had so many irons in the fire; they forgot not their alliances with their Neighbours, nor the decoration of their City. *Nicolo Fortebraccio* (who had married a Daughter of the *Conte de Poppi*) being dead, *Poppi* had the command of the *Borgo san Sepulcro*, the Castle, and other appendices, which he kept in behalf of his Son-in-Law, whilst his Son-in-Law lived; refusing afterwards to surrender them to the *Pope* who demanded them as usurped from the Church: upon which refusal the *Pope* sent the *Patriarch* with an Army to recover them by force. The *Conte de Poppi* finding himself unable to defend them, offered them to the *Florentines*, who would not accept them: however upon the *Pope's* return to *Florence*, they interposed, and laboured an agreement betwixt his Holiness and the *Conte*.

*Conte de Poppi.*

But finding the Treaty difficult and dilatory, the *Patriarch* fell upon *Casertina*, took *Prato Vaccino* and *Romena*, and proffered them likewise to the *Florentines*; but they could not be accepted, unless the *Pope* would consent they should restore them to the *Conte*, which after much argumentation he did, upon condition the *Florentines* should use their interest with *Conte Poppi* to restore *Burgo* to him. The mind of his Holiness being at quiet by this means the *Florentines* (the Cathedral Church of their City, call'd *Santa Reparata*, having been out of repair, long since begun to be mended, and now brought to that perfection, Divine service might be celebrated in it) entreated his Holiness that he would oblige them

them so far, as to consecrate it himself: to which he willingly condescended; and for the greater magnificence of the Church and City, and the ostentation and honor of the Pope, a Gallery was built from *Santa Maria Novella* (where the Pope held his Court to the Church which was to be consecrated) four fathoms wide, and two high; covered over with very rich Cloths, under which, only his Holiness, his Court, and such Magistrates of the City as were appointed to attend him, were to pass all the rest of the Citizens and people, having dispos'd themselves in the street, the Church, and a top of their Houses; to behold so glorious a spectacle. The Ceremony being pass'd with the usual solemnity; his Holiness, as a token of more than ordinary respect, confer'd the honor of Knighthood upon *Gualano de Avanzati* at that time *Gonfaloniere de Giustizia* but always a very eminent Citizen; to whom the Senate (that they might not seem behind hand with the Pope in any point of Beneficence) gave the Government of the *Pisa* for a year.

Controversies betwixt the Greek and Roman Churches.

About this time certain differences arising betwixt the Greek and the Roman Churches, they could not agree in all particulars about the Divine Worship: and for as much as in the last Council of *Basil*, much had been said upon that subject by the Prelats of the Church, it was resolv'd that all diligence should be us'd to bring the Emperour, and the Prelats of the Greek Church together to the Council of *Basil*, to try if there was any way to accomodate them with the Romans. Though it was derogatory to the Majesty of the Emperour, and contrary to the pride of his Prelats, to yield in any thing to the Romans, yet the Turk lying heavy upon them, and fearing that of themselves they should not be able to resist him, that they might with the more confidence and security desire relief from other people, they resolv'd to comply, and accordingly, as was directed by the Council of *Basil*, the Emperour, the Patriarch, and several other Prelats and Barons of Greece, arriv'd at *Venice*; but being frighted from thence by the Plague, it was resolv'd they should remove to *Florence* and all their differences be discuss'd and determin'd in that City: being assembled, and for many days together both Roman and Greek Prelats, all of them in the Cathedral; after many and long disputations, the Grecians condescended, and complied with the Church and Bishop of *Rome*.

Determin'd at Florence, by the submission of the Greek.

The peace betwixt the *Lucchesi*, and the *Florentines*, and betwixt the Duke and the Conte, being concluded; it was thought no hard matter to put an end to the Wars of *Italy*, especially in *Lombardy*, in *Tuscany*; for the War in the Kingdom of *Naples* betwixt *Rinaldo di Angio* and *Alphonso d' Aragona*, was hardly to be compos'd but by the ruine of one of them: and though the Pope was discontented for the loss of so many Towns; and the ambition of the Duke and *Venetian* was sufficiently known; yet it was suppos'd necessity would force the one to lay down, and weariness the other: but they were out in their conjectures; for neither Duke nor *Venetian* could be persuad'd to be quiet; but on the contrary they took Arms afresh, and *Lombardy* and *Tuscany* was fill'd again with their Hostilities. The ambitious and haughty mind of the Duke could not brook that the *Venetians* should keep *Bergamo* and *Brescia*; and the rather because he observ'd them always in Arms, perpetually making incursions all over his Country; in which, he thought he should not only restrain them, but recover all he had lost, when ever the Pope, the *Florentines*, and the Conte should desert them: he design'd therefore to take *Romagna* from the Pope supposing when he had gain'd that, it would not be in his Holiness Power to offend him; and the *Florentines* seeing the fire at their own doors, would not stir for fear of themselves; or if they did, they could not assault him conveniently. The Duke understood likewise how angry the *Florentines* were with the *Venetians*, about the business of *Lucca* and upon that score concluded them the less likely to take up arms for the *Venetsians*. and as to Conte *Francesco*, he did not doubt his new amity, and the hopes of his marriage, would keep him quiet and safe.

To prevent Scandal, and give less occasion to any Body to stir (having oblig'd himself by his Articles with the Conte not to meddle with *Romagna*) he caus'd *Niccolo Piccinino* to take the enterprize upon himself, and fall upon it as of his own ambition and avarice: *Niccolo*, at the time of the treaty betwixt the Duke and the Conte, was in *Romagna* and (by the Dukes direction) shew'd himself much dissatisfied at his agreement with his implacable adversary, the Conte. Whereupon he retired with his Army (in great discontent as was pretended) to *Camurata* (a Town betwixt *Furl* and *Ravenna*) and fortified himself, as if he design'd to make good that Quarter, till he could find some better entertainment, and the report of his disgust being spread all over *Italy*, *Niccolo* took order to have his services and the Dukes ingratitude, remonstrated to the Pope; and that though by the interest of two of the principal Generals, he had got all the forces of *Italy* under his command, yet if his Holiness would say the word, he could contrive things so, that one of them should become his enemy, and the other unserviceable; for if he would provide him with monies and

and supply him with Men, he would fall upon the Towns which the Conte had usurped from the Church, and by giving the Conte employment for the preservation of his own Countries, render him incapable of being subservient to the ambition of the Duke. The Pope believing what he said to be rational and true, sent him 5000 Ducats, besides large promises of provision for himself and his Children; and though many times he was admonished to have a care of being deceived yet he would never suspect, nor admit one word to the contrary.

The City of *Ravenna* was at that time commanded for the Church by *Ostasio da Polenta*, *Nicolo* conceiving it no time to protract (his Son *Francesco* having plunder'd and sack'd *Spoleto* to the great satisfaction of the Pope) resolv'd to attack *Ravenna*, either thinking the enterprize easie in it self, or else holding private intelligence with *Ostasio* the Governour; which soever it was, he had not invest'd it many days, before it was surrendered upon articles; and that being taken *Bologna*, *Imola*, and *Furli* followed in a short time; and that which was most strange, was, that of twenty strong holds which in those parts were garison'd by the Pope, there was not any one but submitted to *Nicolo*; and not contented with these affronts to his Holiness, he added contumely to his injustice; and writ the Pope word, that he had us'd him according to his deserts: for having impudently endeavour'd to interrupt the old friendship betwixt him and the Duke; and fill'd all *Italy* with letters that he abandoned the Duke; and sided with the *Venetian*. Having possess'd himself of *Romagna*, he left it to the Government of his Son *Francesco*; and passing himself with the greatest part of his Army into *Lombardy*, he joyn'd the rest of the Dukes forces; assaulted the Country of *Brescia*; and in a short time brought it under subjection, and when he had done so, laid siege to the City: the Duke desirous that the *Venetians* might be exposed, excus'd himself to the Pope the *Florentines*, and the Conte, pretending, that what was done by *Nicolo* in *Romagna*, if it were contrary to their capitulations, was no less contrary to his inclination; suggesting privately, that when time and opportunity contributed, he would make him sensible of his disobedience: the *Florentines*, and the Conte gave no great credit to what he said; believing (as was true) that it was nothing but artifice to keep them in suspense, till he conquered the *Venetians*, who supposing themselves able alone to contend with the Duke, were too proud to desire assistance of any body, but with their Captain *Gatamelato*, would wage War with him by themselves. The Conte *Francesco* desired, by permission of the *Florentines*, that he might have gone to the relief of King *Renaud* (had not the accidents in *Romagna* and *Lombardy* diverted him) and the *Florentines* for the old friendship betwixt them and *France*, would have willingly consented, and the Duke would have assist'd *Alphonsus*, for the kindness he had express'd to him in his former distress: but both the one and the other had too much employment at home, to concern themselves in any differences abroad: the *Florentines* seeing *Romagna* over-run, and the *Venetians* baffled by the Duke (apprehending their own, by the calamity of their Neighbours) desired the Conte to come into *Tuscany*, that they might consider of some way to obstruct the Dukes forces, which were then much stronger than ever they had been; adding withal, that if their insolence was not suddenly restrained, there was no state in *Italy* but would feel the inconvenience.

The Conte knew well enough the apprehension of the *Florentines* was but reasonable; yet his desire that his marriage with the Dukes daughter might proceed, kept him in suspense: and the Duke perceiving his mind, kept him up with reiterated hopes, (if he stir'd not against him) for the young Lady was now of age to have it consummated, and many times the Treaty was so far advanced, that all convenient preparations were made for the Wedding, when of a sudden some new scruple or cavil was found to protract it: however to make the Conte more secure, he added some deeds to his promises; and sent him thirty thousand *Florens*, to which the Duke had engag'd himself by the articles of marriage. But this transaction hindered not the proceeding of the War in *Lombardy*. Every day the *Venetian* lost some Town or other; the Boats they sent to secure the Rivers, were sunk and dispers'd by the Dukes forces; the Country of *Brescia* and *Verona* harass'd and possess'd; and those Cities both of them so straightly block'd up, the common opinion was, they could not hold out: the *Marquess* of *Mantua*, who for many years had been their General, left them; and went over to the Duke; so what their pride would not suffer them to do in the beginning; in the process of War, they were driven to by their fear; for finding now they had no remedy but in the friendship of the Conte, and the *Florentines*, they demand'd it of themselves; but not without much diffidence and suspicion, lest the *Florentines* should make them the same answer, which in the enterprize of *Lucca*, they had received from them, about the affairs of the Conte: but they found them more tractable than they expected, and indeed more than their carriage towards them had deserv'd. So much more prevalent in the

The Pope des-  
luded, and his  
Country in-  
vaded by *Pi-*  
*cinno*.

the *Florentines* was their old quarrel to their Enemies than their new pick and exceptions to their friends. And having long before prefigured the distress into which the *Venetians* of necessity would fall; they had represented to the Conte how inseparable his ruine would be from theirs; and that he would find himself deceiv'd, if he expected the Duke would esteem him more in his good, than his adverse fortune; for it was fear of him (whilst his affairs were uncertain) and nothing else, had moved him to that treaty about his Daughter; and forasmuch as the same thing which necessity constrains people to promise, it constrains them to perform; it was necessary to continue the Duke in the same distress; which could not be done, but by preserving the Grandeur of the *Venetians*. He ought therefore to consider, that if the *Venetians* should be forced to quit their territory upon the land; he would not only be deprived of the conveniences he might have from them, but of all that he might reasonably expect from other People who were afraid of them; and if he reflected upon other states of *Italy*, he would find some of them poor; and some of them Enemies; and alone (as they had often inculcated) the *Florentines* were not able to maintain him; so that in all respects it was his interest to sustain the Dominion of the *Venetians* upon the *Terra firma*. These persuasions, added to the hatred the Conte had conceived against the Duke, for his juggling about his Daughter, dispos'd him to the agreement; yet not so as to oblige himself to pass the *Po*.

The Conte earnestly persuaded not to desert the *Venetians*.  
1438.

The Articles were agreed in *February* 1438, in which the *Venetians* engag'd to defray two thirds of the Charge of the War, & the *Florentines* one; each of them obliging themselves at their own expences to defend the Conte's lands in *la Marca* in the mean time. Nor was the League contented with these forces and allies; for they joyned to them the Lord of *Faenza*, the Sons of *Pandolfo Malatesta da Rimini* and *Piero Giampagolo Ursino*; they tried the Marquess of *Mantoua* likewise; but they could not remove him from the Duke; to whom the Lord of *Faenza* revolted (upon better conditions) though he had enter'd the League; which put them into great fear they should not be able to execute their designs in *Romagna* so readily as they propos'd: at this time *Lombardy* was in such distress, that *Brescia* was besieged by the Dukes forces, and reduced into such a condition, it was daily expected when by famine it should be constrained to surrender. *Verona* was in the same condition, and if either of them was taken, it was concluded all farther opposition would be in vain, and all their expences hitherto lost: against this there was no visible remedy, but to send the Conte into *Lombardy* and in that there were three difficulties. One was to persuade the Conte to pass the *Po*, and carry on the War in all places: the second was, that the *Florentines* seemed to be exposed thereby, and left to the discretion of the Duke, who retiring into his own fastnesses, might divide his forces, and facing the Conte with one party, joyn with their rebels with the other, and march into *Tuscany*; which was a course they were not a little afraid of. The third was, to resolve which way the Conte might pass most securely into the Contry of *Padua* to the *Venetian* Army. Of these three difficulties, the second relating to the *Florentines*, took up the greatest debate; but knowing the necessity, and tired with the *Venetians* (who press'd for the Conte with all imaginable opportunity, and protested that without him they would give over all) they prefer'd the necessity of their associate before any danger of their own.

However, the difficulty of the way was refer'd to be secured by the *Venetians*; and because for the managing of this Treaty, and inclining the Conte to pass into *Lombardy*, it was thought fit that *Neri* the Son of *Gino Capponi* should be dispatched to him; the Senate concluded to send for him to *Venice*, to make the employment the more grateful, and instruct him the more commodiously about the way the Conte was to march. Upon this invitation, *Neri* departed from *Cesena*, and came by water to *Venice*, where never any Prince was received with more honour and acclamation than he was by the Senate; for upon his coming and the resolutions which thereupon they were to take, they believed the whole happiness and safety of their Government did depend: *Neri* being introduced into the Senate, spake to them in this manner.

*Neri's* Speech to the *Venetian* Senate.

Most Serene Prince,

MY Masters were always of Opinion, that the greatness of the Duke would be the destruction of your Commonwealth and their own; and that if any thing prevented it, it must be the Grandeur and prosperity of both. Had this been credited in time by your Lordships our condition had been better than it is; and your state secure from many dangers wherewith it is now infested; but you not having given us either assistance, or credit, when our necessities required, we could not make such haste to your relief; nor you desire it so readily as you might have done, had you known us better either in prosperity or adversity; or understood that where we love once, our love is inextinguishable,

guishable, and where we have once, our hatred is immortal: the love and respect we have always retained to this illustrious Senate, you your selves do know; having many times seen Lombardy full of our forces which was sent in to your relief: our animosity to Philip is known to all the World, and we shall continue it to his family; for 'tis impossible old love, or inveterate hatred can ever be expung'd, let the new injuries, or endearments be as many as they will: we are, and have been assured, that in this War we might have stood neuter, with great favour from the Duke, and no danger to our selves: for though by your expulsion he had made himself Master of Lombardy; yet there would be enough left in Italy to secure us; seeing envy is always concomitant with power, one increases with the other; and where envy is, War and distraction must follow. We were not insensible likewise (by declining this War) how great charges, and danger we should have avoided, and how easily, by our stirrings we may transplant into Tuscany: but all these discouragements have been overrul'd by our affection of the state, and we resolv'd to assist you with the same vigour, as we would defend our selves: to this end (most Noble Lords) my Masters judging it necessary above all things to relieve Verona and Brescia; and imagining that impossible, but by the conduct of the Count; they sent me first to him, to persuade his passing into Lombardy, (to which your Lordship knows he would never be oblig'd) and to try the same arguments with him, as wrought upon us: as he is invincible in Arms, so he is not to be outdone in courtesie; and that frankness and Generosity which he saw us practise towards you, he has endeavour'd to exceed: he understood we very well how much he should leave Tuscany expos'd by his departure, but observing how we postponed our own safety to yours, he very generously has promised to do the same, and prefers your interest before his own. My business here is to proffer you the Count at the head of 7000 Horse, and 2000 Foot; ready to receive your Orders, and seek out the Enemy as you please to direct. My request therefore is (and it is the request of my Masters, and his own) that he be not exceed'd the number which he was oblig'd to bring in to your service, so you would enlarge your reward; that neither he may repent of his enterprise, nor we be sorry we persuaded him.

These words of Neri's were heard with as much attention by the Senate, as if they had been delivered from an Oracle, and so much was the auditory revived thereby, they had not patience to let their Duke reply according to custom; but rising all of them upon their feet, with their hands lifted up, and tears in their eyes, they gave the Florentines thanks for the good office they had done them; and him, for the diligence and dexterity of his dispatch; promising that no time should ever obliterate it, not only in their own hearts, but in the hearts of their posterity; and that their Country and themselves would always be at the service of the Florentines. But the transport being over they fell into serious debate about the way the Count was to take, that bridges and all other conveniences might be provided: four ways there were before them. One from Ravenna, along the shore; but that lying most upon the Sea, and the Fens, was not approved: the next was the direct way, but obstructed by a Castle call'd the *Ucellino* which was garrison'd by the Duke, and to be taken, before they could pass; and that could not be done in a short time without great difficulty, and to be long about it would frustrate their relief in another place, which required all possible expedition. The third way was by the forest of *Lugo*, but the *Po* being overflown, that was unpassable. The fourth was thorow the Country of *Bologna*, over the bridges at *Puledrano*, *Cento*, and *Picue*, and so by *Finale* and *Bondeno* to *Ferrara*, from whence partly by water, and partly by land, they might pass into the Country of *Padua*, and join with the Venetian Army: this way also had its difficulties, and they were liable to be impeded by the Enemies Army; yet being chosen as the best; notice was given to the Count; who departing with all imaginable speed, arriv'd in the Country of *Padua* on the 10th. of June; the arrival of so great a Captain in Lombardy, revived the whole Government of Venice; and whereas before they were almost desperate of their safety; they began now to take courage, and expect new conquests upon the Enemy. The first thing the Count attempted, was the relief of *Verona*, to prevent which, *Nicolo* march'd with his Army to *Soave* (a Castle betwixt the Country, of *Vicensa*, and *Verona*) there he entrenched; throwing up a ditch from *Soave* to the marches of *Adice*.

The Count finding himself obstructed thorow the plain; resolv'd to march over the mountains to *Verona*; presuming that *Nicolo* would either believe he could not pass that way, by reason of its steepness and cragginess; or let him pass so, before he believed it, that it would be too late to interrupt him. Wherefore, taking eight days provision along with him, he march'd his Army over the Mountains, and at *Soave* came down into the plains. And though *Nicolo* had thrown up some works to incommode him, yet they were too weak to give him a stop. *Nicolo* finding the Enemy pass'd beyond his imagination; and fearing

to be forced to an engagement upon some disadvantage; he drew off to the other side of the *Adice*, and the Count, without farther obstacle, marched into *Verona*. Having overcome the first difficulty, and relieved *Verona*, the next thing the Count was to attempt, was to succour *Brescia*. That City is seated so near the *Lake di Garda*, that though it was blocked up by land, yet the Lake was open, and they could supply themselves with provisions. Upon that consideration, the Duke had put what force he could upon the Lake, and in the beginning of his designs, had secured all the Towns which were capable of supplying them by the benefit of the Lake.

The *Venetians* had Gallies likewise upon the Lake; but they were not strong enough to encounter the Dukes. The Count thought it necessary with his Army to Land, to give the *Venetian* Gallies some advantage upon the Water; and therefore he concluded to attempt some of those Towns which lay conveniently for the furnishing of *Brescia*, he clap'd down therefore with his Army before *Bandolino* (a Castle standing upon the Lake) hoping if he took that, the rest would surrender. But in that enterprize, his fortune deceived him; for most of his Men falling sick, he was forced to raise the siege and remove his Army to *Zemo*, a Castle belonging to the *Veronesi*, where the air was more healthful, and the Country more plentiful. The Count retired, *Nicolo*, not to slip the opportunity of making himself Master of the Lake, left his Camp at *Vegasio*, and with a select party went to the Lake where joyning with the rest, he fell so furiously upon the *Venetian* Squadron, that he broke it quite, and took most of them Prisoners. Upon this Victory, most of the Castles upon the Lake, surrender'd to the Duke. The *Venetians*, startled at this defeat, and fearing lest the *Brescians* should yield thereupon, they solicited the Count very earnestly, both by letters, and Messages, that he would attempt to relieve them. The Count, perceiving his hopes of doing it by the Lake, absolutely defeated, and his way by the fields impossible by reason of the Trenches, and Bulwarks, which were so numerous and strong, and an Army to make them good, so that to venture among them would be inevitable destruction, the way by the Mountains having been succesful to him at *Verona*, he resolv'd to try it once more for the relief of *Brescia*. Having pitched upon his way, the Count departed from *Zemo*, and by the *Val d'Acqui*, marching to the Lake of *St. Andrea*, he pass'd to *Fisbobbè*, and *Penda* upon the *Lake di Garda*, from whence he advanced to *Tenna*, and sat down before it; it being necessary that Castle should be taken before he could get into *Brescia*. *Nicolo* having intelligence of his design, marched his Army to *Pischiara*, and from thence (joyning with the Marquis of *Mantoua*, and a commanded party of his best-men) he proceeded to engage the Count, who giving him battle, *Nicolo* was beaten; his Army dispersed; many of them taken Prisoners; and those which escaped, many of them fled to their Camp, and many of them to the Fleet. *Nicolo* got off himself into *Tenna*, and night being come, concluding if he stay'd till morning he could never get farther, to avoid a certain danger, he expos'd himself to a doubtful. Of all his retinue, *Nicolo* had only one servant with him, a lusty strong *German*, and one that had always been very faithful to him. *Nicolo* persuad'd his *German*, that if he would put him into a sack, he might carry him off to some secure place upon his shoulders, as some luggage of his Masters. The Enemy lay round before the Castle, but (transported and secure upon their Victory the day before) without any Order, or guards: by which means the *German* found no great difficulty in the business, for putting himself into the habit of a freebooter, and mounting his Master upon his shoulders, he pass'd thorow their whole Camp, and brought him safe to his party. This Victory, had it been improv'd as happily as it was gained, might have given more relief to *Brescia*, and more felicity to the *Venetians*; but being ill managed, they had little reason to exult, and *Brescia* remaining in the same necessity as before; for *Nicolo* was no sooner returned to the forces which he had left behind, but he set all his wits to work which way he might exploit some new thing to atone for his loss; and obstruct the relief of the Town: he knew himself the situation of the Citadel of *Verona*, and had learned from the Prisoners taken in that War: not only that it was ill guarded, but the way how it might easily be surprized: he believed therefore that fortune had presented him with an opportunity of recovering his honor, and converting his Enemies joy, into sadness and sorrow. *Verona* is in *Lombardy*, seated at the foot of those Mountains which divide *Italy* from *Germany*; so that it stands partly upon the Hill, and partly upon the plain; the River *Adice* rises in the vally of *Trento* and running into *Italy*, does not extend himself immediately thorow the plains; but banding to the left hand among the Mountains, it comes at length to the City; and passes thorow the midst of it: yet not so as to divide it into equal parts, for towards the plain it is much greater, then towards the Mountains: upon the rising part of the City, there are two Castles, one of them called *San Piero*, and the other *San Felice*, which appear stronger in their situation, than their walls; and do by it command the whole Town. In the

*Nicolo Piccino* defeated by the Count.

Escapes to *Tenna* and from thence very strangely to his Army.

the plain on this side the *Adice*, behind the wall of the City, there are two Fortresses about a thousand paces distant one from the other; of which the one is called the old Citadel, and the other the new. On the inside of one of them, there passes a wall to the other and is (in respect of the other walls which fetch a compass) as the string to a bow. All the space betwixt these two walls, is full of Inhabitants and called the Borgo of *San Zeno*. These two Castles and the Borgo, *Nicolo* designed to surprize, believing it would be no difficult matter, both because of the former negligence of the Guards (which he presumed after the late Victory would be much greater) and of an opinion he had, that no enterprize was so feasible as that which the Enemy believed was impossible to be done. Having drawn out a party of choice Men in order to his design, he joyned with the Marquess of *Mantoua*, and marching in the night to *Verona*, he scaled the new Citadel, and took it without being perceived, and then forcing upon the *Port di S. Antoine*, the signal was given to his Horse, and they marched all of them into the Town. Those of the old Citadel who were upon the Guard, hearing the noise when the Sentinels in the other Citadel were knock'd on the head, and when the Gate of *S. Antoine* was broken up, believing it was the Enemy, cryed out to the People to Arm; and fell a ringing their Bells. The Citizens taking the alarm, came together in great Confusion! those of them who had most courage, got to their Arms, and retreated with them to the Palace of the *Rettori*: in the mean time *Nicolo's* Souldiers had plundered the Borgo *di S. Zeno*, and advancing towards the Town, the Citizens, perceiving the Duke's forces was entred, and no way left to defend themselves: advised the *Venetian Rettori* to retire into the fortresses, and preserve themselves and their goods, for (as they said) it would be much better to do so, and attend better fortune; than by endeavouring to avoid the present danger, to be knock'd on the Head, and the whole City pillaged; hereupon the *Rettori*, and all the *Venezians* betook themselves to the Castle of *S. Felice*; and several of the principal Citizens went to meet *Nicolo* and the Marquess of *Mantoua* to beg of them that they would rather possess that City rich, and with honor, than poor to their disgrace; especially seeing they had not by an obstinate defence deserved preferment from their old Masters, or hatred from their new. The Marquess and *Nicolo* having encouraged them what they could, they protected them from plunder as much as was possible; and because they were confident the Count would immediatly address himself to the recovery of the Town, they contrived with all imaginable industry to get the Fort into their hands; but what they could not take, they block'd up with ditches and trenches cut about to obstruct the Enemy from relieving them.

*Verona was surprized by Nicolo.*

The Count *Francesco* was with his Army at *Tenna*, where upon the first report of this surprize, he believed it but vain; afterwards understanding the truth, he resolved by a more than ordinary speed to recompence his former negligence, and expiate its disgrace. And though all the chief Officers of his Army advis'd him to give over his enterprize of *Brescia*, and *Verona*, and retire to *Vicenza*, least otherwise the Enemy should encompass him where he was, yet he would not consent; but resolved to try his fortune for the recovery of *Verona*, and turning about to the *Venetian Provedutori*, and *Barnardetto de Medici* (who assisted as Commissioner for the *Florentines*) he encouraged them in their doubts and assured them he would retake it if any of the castles held out for him. Having put all things in order, and drawn out his Men, he marched towards *Verona* with all expedition: at first sight, *Nicolo* imagined he was marching to *Vicenza*, as he had been counselled by his officers; But observing him to march on, and direct his forces towards the Castle of *S. Felice*, he thought it time to provide for his defence: but all was too late, the trenches, and embarrasments were not finished; the Souldiers separated, and plundering, and could not be got together time enough to hinder the Count from getting into the Citadel, and from thence into the City, to the great disparagement of *Nicolo*, and detriment of his party, who with the Marquess of *Mantoua*, retreated first into the Citadel which they had taken, and from thence escaped to the City of *Mantoua*, where rallying the remainder of their forces, they joyned themselves with the Army before *Brescia*: so that in four days time *Verona* was won and lost by the Duke's forces. Being Winter time, and the weather very cold the Count having after his Victory, put in some supplies of victual into *Brescia*, though with very great difficulty, he removed his quarters to *Verona*, having given order for the building certain Gallies to *Forboli* that Winter, to be ready against the Spring, that then he might be so strong both by land and by Water, as to give *Brescia* an effectual and total relief.

Recovered by the Count.

The Duke seeing the War at a stand for a time, and his hopes of being Master of *Verona* and *Brescia*, at an end; all which he attributed to the Counsel and supplies of the *Florentines*, whose affection could not be alienated, by all the provocations the *Venetians* had given them; nor gained over to his side, by all the promises which he had made them; that they



The Duke encouraged in his expedition into Tuscany by Nicolo and the Florentine exiles.

might be sensible of their own oversight, and feel the inconveniences they had pulled upon themselves, he resolved to invade Tuscany, to which he was much encouraged by Nicolo, and the Florentine exiles. Nicolo's design was upon the possessions of Braccio, and to drive the Count out of La Marca: the other had an itching after their own Country, and a mind to be at home, so that both parties animated the Duke with such arguments as were most suitable to their particular designs: Nicolo told him he might send him with an Army into Tuscany, and leave Brescia besieged; for he was Master of the Lake; was well entrenched about the Town; had several strong Castles in the Country; and good Officers and Souldiers enough to resist the Count, if he should make any attempt in another place; which was not to be imagined till he had relieved Brescia, and that was impossible: so that if he pleased, he might make War in Tuscany, and not quite his enterprize in Lombardy; he remonstrated besides that the Florentines would be constrained, as soon as they saw him in Tuscany, to call back the Count or be ruined; and whichsoever of the two happen, his Victory would be certain.

The exiles, inculcated, that if Nicolo came near Florence with his Army, it was impossible; but the People, tired out with their Taxes and the insolence of the Grandees, would take arms and revolt; as to his passage to Florence, they promised it should be easie, and Casertino open to them, by the interest and correspondence which Rinaldo held with that Governor: so that the Duke, inclinable of himself, was much fortified and encouraged by their persuasions: the Venetians on the other side (though the Winter was very sharp) press'd the Count to the relief of Brescia with his whole Army; but he refused, alledging it was not to be done at that time; that better weather was to be expected, and that in the interim their Fleet should be got ready and then it might be attempted both by Land and by Water; which answer giving no satisfaction, the Venetians became slow, and remiss in sending them provisions, so that in their Army many People died. The Florentines having advertisement of all these passages, were greatly dismay'd; seeing the War brought home to them of Tuscany, and that in Lombardy, not turn'd to account: nor were they less fearful of the forces of the Church; not that the Pope was their Enemy, but that they found that Army at the devotion of the Patriarch who was their implacable adversary: Giovanni Vitelleschi Cornetano was first Apostolical Notarie, then Bishop of Riscanati, after the Patriarch of Alexandria, and being at last created Cardinal, was called the Cardinal of Florence; This Cardinal was a cunning and Courageous Person, so capable of business that the Pope, had a strong affection for him, gave him command of the forces of the Church, and in all the Popes enterprizes in Tuscany, Romagna, Naples, and Rome, he was constantly his General; so that by degrees he gained so great authority both over the Army, and the Pope, that the Pope began to be afraid to command him, and the Army to refuse their obedience to any body but he. The Cardinal being at that time in Rome, when the news arrived that Nicolo was marching into Tuscany.

The Patriarch of Alexandria General for the Pope.

The Patriarch a friend to Rinaldo.

The fear of the Florentines was highly increased, because from the time of Rinaldo's expulsion, that Cardinal had been an Enemy to their state, for the Articles of agreement which were, by his mediation procured in Florence, were not made good, but rather managed to the prejudice of Rinaldo, he having been the occasion of his laying down his Arms, & that, the occasion of his banishment; so that the Government of Florence began to fear the time was come for the restauration of Rinaldo, if he joyned with Nicolo in his expedition into Tuscany and their apprehensions were augmented by the sudden departure of Nicolo, who seemed to them to leave an enterprize which he had almost compleated, to embark himself in another that was more dangerous and doubtful: which they presumed he would never have done, without some private intelligence, or unknown invitation: these their apprehensions they had infused into the Pope, who was grown sensible of his error in having transferred so much Authority upon other People. But whilst the Florentines were in this suspense, fortune presented them a way, to secure themselves of the Patriarch: that State had scouts abroad to intercept, and peruse all letters, to see if they could meet with any correspondence to the prejudice of the State; at Monte Pulciano it happened a packet was taken which the Patriarch had written to Nicolo Piccinino without the knowledg or consent of the Pope. Though the Character was strange, and the sense so implicate and abstruse, that nothing could be made out of it, yet that obscurity, considered with its directions to an Enemy, alarmed his Holiness so, as he resolved to secure him. The care of his apprehension he committed to Antonio Rado da Padoua, whom he had made Governor of the Castle of Rome. Antonio as soon as he had his orders, was ready to execute them, and expected an opportunity. The Patriarch had resolved to pass into Tuscany and having fixed upon the next day for his departure from Rome, he sent to the Governor that he would be upon the bridge next morning at a precise hour, for he had something to discourse with him: Antonio

The Pope discovers intelligence betwixt the Patriarch and Nicolo, and resolves to secure him.

thought

thought now his opportunity was come, ordered his People as he thought convenient, and at the time appointed was ready expecting the Patriarch upon the Bridge, which was to be drawn up, or let down, as occasion required. The Patriarch was punctual, and came exactly at his time, and *Antonio* entertaining him a while upon the bridge, gave a sign, and on a sudden the bridge was pulled up, and the Patriarch in the Castle; so that of the General of an Army he became a Prisoner in a moment. The People which were with him, began to swagger at first, but understanding afterwards it was his Holinesses direction, they were pacified and quiet: and the Governor of the Castle comforting him with fair words, and giving him hopes of a better condition, the Patriarch replied, that great Persons were not to be discharged again; that those who deserved to be seized, did not deserve to be dismissed, and it was his own case, for he died in Prison not long after, and *Lodovico* Patriarch of *Aquileia* was made General of the Pope's Army in his place; who though before he could not be engaged in the Wars betwixt the Duke and the League, yet then he was persuaded; and promised to be ready for the defence of *Tuscany*, with 4,000 Horse and 2,000 Foot.

the Patriarch secured and dies.

Being delivered from this danger, there was another of no less importance, and that was their fear of *Nicolo* upon the confusion of affairs in *Lombardy*, and the differences betwixt the *Venetians* and the Count: for better information, the *Florentines* sent *Neri* the Son of *Giño Capponi*, and *Guliano d' Anazenti* to *Venice*, as also to settle the prosecution of the War for the next year, commanding *Neri*, upon the resolution of the *Venetians*, to repair to the Count, to sound his, and exhort him to such courses as should be necessary for the security of the League: these Embassadors were scarce got onward on their way, as far as *Ferrara*, before they had the news that *Piccinino* had passed the *Po* with 6000 Horse. Thereupon they made what haste was possible, and being come to *Venice*, they found that *Senate* very positive to have *Brescia* relieved at that very time, not being (as they said) able to attend any better, nor their state to put out any Fleet, so that without present supply, they would be forced to surrender, which would compleat the Duke's successes, and be the loss of all their Territories by Land: finding them so perverse, *Neri* went to *Verona*, to hear what arguments the Count could produce to the contrary, who with good reasons made it out to him, that to endeavour the relief of *Brescia* in that juncture, would be not only ineffectual at present, but much to their prejudice afterwards, for considering the season of the year, and situation of the Town, nothing could be done, he should only harass and disorder his Men so, as when a proper time for action should come, he should be forced to draw off to *Verona* to supply himself with what the Winter had consumed, and what was necessary for their future support; so that all the time that was fit for action, would be spent in marching backward and forward. To adjust these things, *Orsato Justiniani*, and *Giovan Pisani* were sent to *Verona* to the Count, by whom it was concluded (after much dispute) that the *Venetians* for the ensuing year should give the Count 80000 Ducats, and 4000 a piece to the rest of his Army. That he should march forth with his whole Army, and fall upon the Duke, endeavouring by some smart impression upon his Country to make him recal *Nicolo* out of *Lombardy*. After which conclusion, they returned to *Venice*, but the *Venetians* (the sum being thought very great) went on but slowly with their preparations. *Nicolo Piccinino* proceeded however, was got already into the Country of *Romagna*, and tampered so successfully with the Sons of *Pandolfo Malatesta*, that they deserted the *Venetians* and took up Arms under the Duke: this news was unpleasing at *Venice*, but at *Florence* much more; because that way they thought to have given *Nicolo* a stop. But the *Malatesti* being in Rebellion, the *Florentines* were not a little dismayed, especially fearing, that their General *Piero Giampagolo Orsino* (who was then in the territories of the *Malatesti*) might be defeated, and they by consequence disarmed: these tidings, were also no small trouble to the Count, who began to apprehend if *Nicolo* passed into *Tuscany*, he might be in danger of losing *La Marca*, and (disposed to secure his own Country if he could) he came to *Venice*, and being introduced to the Duke, he declared to him, that his passage into *Tuscany* would be convenient for the League, for the War was to be carried on, where the General, and Army of the Enemy was, and not among their private, and particular Towns, and Garrisons: because their Army once beat, there is an end of the War; but though their Garrisons be taken, and their Towns reduced, if their Army be intire, they should be never the nearer, but the War (as it does many times happen) would break out more severely. Assuring them that *La Marca* and all *Tuscany* would be lost if *Nicolo* was not briskly opposed; which being lost, no remedy could be expected in *Lombardy*; but if it might, he did not understand how he could with any excuse abandon his own Subjects and friends; for coming into *Lombardy* a Prince, he should be loth to leave it as a private Captain. To this the Duke of *Venice* replied, that it was manifest, and nothing more certain, that if he left *Lombardy*,

Commissioners to the Count from the *Venetians*.

The Count desirous to follow *Nicolo*.

and

Dissuaded  
by the Duke of  
Venice.

and passed the *Pa* with his Army, all their territories upon Land would be lost; and that it would be to no purpose to consume more money in defending it. For he can be no wise Man who endeavours to defend that which he is sure to lose, and he no fool who refuses to lose his Country alone, rather than his Country and Money too, and if the loss of their affairs should follow, it would then be clear enough how much it imported the reputation of the *Venetians*, to protect *Romagna* and *Tuscany*. But the whole *Senate* was against his opinion, believing if he succeeded in *Lombardy*, he should be sure every where else, and that could be no hard task; that State, upon *Nicolo's* departure, being left weak and infirm, so that that might be ruined, before *Nicolo* could be called back, or any other sufficient remedy provided. That if things were curiously examined, it would be found that *Nicolo* was sent into *Tuscany* upon no other errand, but to divert the *Count* from his enterprize in *Lombardy*, and remove the War from his own Country by carrying it into another: so that if the *Count* should pursue him without irresistible necessity, he would rather accomplish his designs, and do as he would have him: but if they continued their Army in *Lombardy*, and shifted in *Tuscany* as well as they could; they would be sensible of their ill resolution when it was too late, and find that they had lost all in *Lombardy* irrecoverably, without any equivalence or reprisal in *Tuscany*.

They came  
to a resolution.

In this manner every Man having spoken, and replied, as his judgment directed him; it was concluded to be quiet for some days, to see what the agreement betwixt *Nicolo* and the *Malatesti* would produce: whether the *Florentines* might rely upon *Piero Giam Pagolo*; and whether the Pope proceeded fairly with the League as he had promised he would. This resolution being taken, not long after, they had intelligence; that *Piero Giam Pagolo* was marched towards *Tuscany* with his Army; and that the Pope was better inclined to the League at that time, than before; with which advertisements the *Count* being confirmed, he was content to remain in *Lombardy* himself; that *Neri* should be dispatched thither with a 1000 of his Horse, and five hundred others, and if things should proceed so, as that his presence should be necessary in *Tuscany*; upon the last summons from *Neri* the *Count* engaged to repair to him without any delay. Accordingly *Neri* marched away, arrived with his forces at *Florence* in *April*, and the same day *Giam Pagolo* arrived there also; in the mean time *Nicolo Piccinino* having settled the affairs of *Romagna*, was designing for *Tuscany*; and being inclined to have marched by the way of the *Alps* of *S. Benedetto*, and the vale of *Montone*, he found that passage so well defended by the conduct of *Nicolo da Pisa*, that he believed his whole Army would not be able to force it: and because of the suddenness of this irruption the *Florentines* were but indifferently provided either with Souldiers, or Officers, they committed the passes of the other *Alps* to the guard of certain of their Citizens, with some new raised Companies of Foot, among which Citizens *Bartholomeo Orlandini* had the command, and more particularly the keeping of the Castle of *Marradi*, and the pass that was by it. *Nicolo Piccinino* supposing the pass of *S. Benedetto* insuperable by reason of the courage and vigilance of the Commander; chose rather to attempt the other way where the cowardice and inexperience of the chief Officer was not like to give him so great opposition. *Marradi* is a Castle built at the foot of those *Alps* which divide *Tuscany* and *Romagna*; but on the side of *Romagna*, at the entrance into the *Vale di Lamona* though it has no Walls, yet the River, the Mountains and the inhabitants make it strong. For the Men are martial and faithful, and the River has worn away the banks, and made such Grotes and hollows therein, that it is impossible from the valley to approach it, if a little Bridge which lies over the River be defended: and on the mountain side the Rocks and the Cliffs are so steep, it is almost impregnable: but the pusillanimity of *Bartolomeo* debas'd the courage of his Men, and rendered the situation of his Castle of no importance: for no sooner did he hear the report of the Enemies approach, but leaving all in confusion, away he ran with his Party, and never stoped til he came at *Borgo a San Lorenzo*. *Nicolo* (having possess'd himself of that pass: strangely surprized to consider how poorly it had been defended; and as much pleased that now it was his own) marched down into *Mugello*, and having taken several Castles, he staid at *Pulciano* to refresh; from whence he made his excursions as far as *Monte Fiesole*, and was so bold to pass the River *Arno*, scouring, foraging, and plundering the Country within three miles of *Florence*. The *Florentines* however were not at all dismayed, but the first thing they did was to secure the Government, of which they were not much afraid both for the interest which *Cosimo* had with the people; and the method they had taken to reduce the chief Officers of the City into the hands of a few of the most potent Citizens, who with their vigilance and severity kept under all such as were discontented, or studious of new things, besides they had news of the resolutions in *Lombardy*: of *Neri's* approach; with the number of his forces, and that the Pope had promised to supply them with more: which hopes were sufficient to support them till *Neri's* arrival. But *Neri* finding

finding the City in some disorders, resolv'd to take the field, and restrain *Nicolo* from foraging so freely: and therefore drawing together, what Infantry he could, out of the People, he joyned them with his Horse, march'd into the field, and took *Remole*; which the Enemy had possess'd. After the taking of that Town, he encamp'd his Army there; obstructed the excursions of *Nicolo*; and gave the City great hopes of sending him farther off. *Nicolo* observing, though the *Florentines* had lost many of their Men, it procur'd no commotion; and understanding they were all quiet and secure in the Town, he concluded it vain to lose time any longer, wherefore he changed his designs, and resolv'd to do something which might cause the *Florentines* to provoke him to a Battle, in which he doubted not to overcome, and then all things would follow as he expected, of course. there was at that time in *Nicolo's* Army, *Francesco Conte di Poppi* who (when the Enemy was in *Mugello*) revolted from the *Florentines*, with whom he was in League, the *Florentines* had a jealousy of him before and endeavour'd to continue him their friend, by enlarging his pay, and making him there Deputy over all the Towns which were near him, but nothing could do, so strongly did his affection incline him to the other party, that no fear, nor act of kindness what ever was sufficient to divide him from *Rinaldo*, and the rest of the Brethren, who had had the Government formerly: so that he no sooner heard of *Nicolo's* approach, but he went in to him immediately, and solicit'd him with all imaginable importunity to advance towards the City and march into *Casentino*; discovering to him the whole strength of the Country, and with what ease and security he might straiten the Enemy. *Nicolo* took his Counsel, and marching into *Casentino*, he possess'd himself of *Romenna*, and *Bibiena*, and afterwards encamp'd before *Castle San Nicolo*. That Castle is plac'd at the foot of those *Alps* which divide *Casentino* from the vale of *Arno*; and by reason it stood high, and had a strong Garrison in it, it was no easie matter to take it, though *Nicolo* ply'd it continually with his Cannon.

The Count  
Poppi revolts  
from the Flo  
rentine.

This siege continued twenty days, during which time the *Florentines* had got together what force they could, and had already under several Officers 3000 foot at *Fegghine*, commanded by *Piero Giam Pagolo* as General, *Neri Capponi*, and *Bernardo de Medici* as Commissioners. The Castle of *San Nicolo* had sent out four Persons to give them notice of their Condition, and press them for relief: whereupon the Commissioners examining the situation of the place, found it was not to be relieved but by the *Alps* which came down from the Vale of *Arno*, the tops of which might easily be possess'd by the Enemy, before they could come at them, in respect they had a shorter cut to them, and the *Florentines* could not stir, but they must of necessity be seen: so that to attempt a thing which was not like to succeed, was to expose and cast away their Men without doing any good: upon these considerations the Commissioners having commended their courage pass'd, advis'd them to continue it whilst they were able, and when they found they could hold it no longer, to surrender upon as good termes as they could: hereupon after 32 days siege *Nicolo* became Master of the Castle, but the losing so much time upon so inconsiderable a place, was (in great part) the miscarriage of that enterprize: for had he invest'd *Florence*, or but keep it blocked up at a distance, the Governor of that City would have been constrain'd to raise Money, and Men, and must have supplied it with provisions, with much more difficulty, having the Enemy so near them, besides many would have been pressing for peace seeing the War so likely to continue: but the desire the Count di Poppi had to be revenged of that Garrison (which had been his Enemy a long time) caus'd him to give that Counsel, and *Nicolo* to oblige him, consented to it, which was the destruction of both: and indeed it seldom happens, but private animosity, proves a prejudice to the interest of the publick. *Nicolo*, pursuing his Victory, took *Passina* and *Chiusi*, and the Count di Poppi persuad'd him to continue in those parts, alledging that he might extend his Quarters betwixt *Chiusi*, and *Pieve* as he pleas'd, and making himself Master of the *Alps*, he might as he saw occasion, return to the old post in *Casentino* and the Vale *Arno*, or falling down into *Vale di Chiana* and the *Vale de Fevere*, be ready upon the least motion of the Enemy. But *Nicolo* reflecting upon the rockiness of those places, only he reply'd his Horses could swallow no stones, and removed to *Borgo a S. Sepulcro* where he was received with all demonstration of kindness, from whence he endeavour'd to debauch the Citizens of *Castello*, but they were too firm to the *Florentines* to entertain any such motion. Being desirous to have *Perugia* (where he was born) at his devotion, he went either with 40 Horse to make them a visit, and was honorably treated, but in a few days he rendred himself suspected, having been wheedling with the Legate and several of the Citizens, and made many proposals to them, but none of them succeeded; so that receiving 8000 Ducats of them, he returned to his Army.

*Nicolo* ill  
advised by  
Count Poppi.

After this he got intelligence in *Cortona*, and was very busie in seducing it from the *Florentines*,

Nicolo practices to surprise  
Crotone.

Brescia  
relieved.

rentines, but being discovered before it was ripe, that also came to nothing. Among the principal of that City there was on *Bartolomeo di senso*, who going the Rounds one night by the Captains order, wastold by a Country Man his friend, that if he had no mind to be killed, he should have a care, and go back. *Bartolomeo* pressing to know his reason; he found the whole series of the Plot, and went immediately to the Governor, and acquainted him: how, seizing upon the Conspirators, and doubling his Guards thereupon, expected the coming of *Nicolo* according to agreement, who came indeed punctually at his time, but finding himself discovered, returned to his quarters. Whilst things were carried on in *Tuscany* at this rate, with little advantage to the forces of the Duke, his affairs in *Lombardy* were as unquiet, but with more detriment and loss, for Count *Francesco* as soon as the season gave leave, took the field with his Army, and the *Venetians* having repaired their fleet in the Lake, he thought it best in the first place to make himself Master of that, and to drive the Duke out; supposing when he had done that, the rest would be easie. Whereupon he caused the *Venetian* Fleet to set upon the Dukes; which they did, and defeated them; after which he took all the Castles which they had in their possession, so that the Enemy which besieged *Brescia* by land, understanding the destiny of their Comerades, drew off from the siege; and left the Town free, after it had been straitned three years. Having finished his business there, and obtained so important a Victory, the Count thought fit to seek out the Enemy, who was retired to *Socino*; a Castle upon the River of *Oglia*, and dislodging them there, they retreated to *Cremona*: where the Duke made a head, and resolved to defend that part of his Country. But the Count advancing daily against him; being fearful he should lose all, or a great part of his Territory, he began to lament the resolution of sending *Nicolo* into *Tuscany*; and to redress his error, he writ word to *Nicolo* of the condition he was in, pressing him with all speed to come back to his relief. The *Florentines* in the mean time had joynd their forces with the Popes, and made a halt at *Anghiari* a Castle at the foot of the mountains which part *Val di Tevere*, from *Valdichiana*, four miles distant from *San Sepulcro*; betwixt which places the way was plain, the Country champain, fit for Horse, and proper for a Battle. Having heard of the Counts Victory, and that *Nicolo* was recalled, they thought the Victory might be obtained without more hazard or labour, and therefore orders was dispatched in all haste to the Commissaries to avoid an engagement by all means; for *Nicolo* could not stay in *Tuscany* many days. These orders coming to *Nicolo's* ear, finding that of necessity he must part; that he might have left nothing untried, he resolved to provoke them to a Battle, believing he should take them unprovided, seeing (according to their intelligence) they could have no reason to expect any such thing; and to this he was much encouraged by *Rinaldo*, the *Conte di Poppi*, and all the *Florentine* exiles, who knew well enough they were undone if *Nicolo* departed; but if they could bring them to a fight, there was a possibility of prevailing, and if they did lose the Victory, they should lose it with honor.

The Battle  
of Anghiari.

This resolution being taken, the Army moved; and being advanced as far as *Borgo* before the *Florentines* perceived it, he commanded 2000 Men out of that City, who, (relying much upon the conduct of their General, and the promises he made them, being also desirous of plunder) followed him cheerfully. Marching on from thence directly towards *Anghiari* in *Battaglia*, *Nicolo* arrived with his whole Army within two miles, when *Micheletto Attendulo* perceiving a great dust, and suspecting it to be the Enemy, cryed out to have all People stand to their Arms. The tumult in the *Florentine* Camp was not small; for that Army encamped ordinarily without any Discipline, and being negligent besides, in presumption the Enemy were further off, they were fitter to fly than to fight; all of them being disarmed, and straggled from their quarters into such places as the shade, or their recreations had carried them. Nevertheless so much diligence was used by the Commissaries, and the General, that before the Enemy could get up, they were on Horseback, and in order to receive them; and as *Micheletto* was the first that discovered them, so he was the first that engaged them; running with his Troop to secure the Bridge which crossed the way not far from *Anghiari*. *Micheletto* having posted himself at the Bridge, *Simomino* an Officer of the Popes, and his Legate, placed themselves on the right hand, and the *Florentine* Commissaries, and General on the left; having planted the foot as thick as possible upon the banks; there was only one way for the Enemy to attack them and that was by the bridge; nor had the *Florentines* any where to defend themselves but there; only they ordered their foot, that if the Enemies foot, should leave the high way, and fall upon the flanks of the Horse; they should let fly at them with their; Crossbows, and give their Cavalry a secure passage over the Bridge.

The first that appeared, were gallantly received by *Micheletto*, and repulsed; but *Astorre*, and *Francesco Piccinino* coming in with a commanded party, to their relief, they charged

ged him so briskly, that *Micheleto* was not only beat back over the Bridge, but pursued to the very end of the Town, and they which pursued them being charged again in the Flank, were repulsed over the Bridge, and all things as at first. This skirmish continued two hours compleat: sometimes *Nicolo*, and sometimes the *Florentines* being Masters of the Bridge; and though the fight upon the Bridge was equal to both, yet on this side and the other, *Nicolo* had much the disadvantage. For *Nicolo's* men passing the Bridge were received by a gross of the Enemy, which being drawn up with advantage by reason of the ground, could charge, or wheel, or relieve those that were distressed as they saw occasion. But when the *Florentines* passed over, *Nicolo* had no place to relieve his Men for the ditches and banks in the way, as it appeared in the conflict; for though *Nicolo's* forces gained the Bridge several times, yet by the fresh supplies of the Enemy they were still forced to give back: but when the *Florentines* prevailed, and passed over the Bridge, *Nicolo* had not time, by reason of the briskness of their charge, and the incommodity of the ground to reinforce his Men, but those which were behind were forced to mix with those that were before, one disordered the other, and the whole Army was constrained to fly, and every Man got to *Borgo* as well as he could. The *Florentines* let them go, as having more inclination to the plunder, which in Horses, Arms, and other things afforded them a plentiful prey; for with *Nicolo* there escaped not above 1000 Horse, most of the rest being taken Prisoners: the Citizens of *Borgo* who had followed *Nicolo* for prize became prize themselves, and were most of them taken; with all their carriages and colours: this victory was not so much prejudicial to the Duke, as it was advantageous to *Tuscany*, for had the *Florentines* lost the Day, that Province had been his; but he losing it, lost nothing but his Arms and his Horses, which a little money would recruit. Never was there any War made in an Enemies Country with less execution than in this, for in so great a rout, and so sharp an engagement, which lasted four hours, there was but one Man slain, and he not by any wound or honorable exploit, but falling from his Horse he was trodden to Death: with such security did they fight then; for all of them being cuirassiers on Horseback, and compleatly armed, they could not presently be killed, and if they found there was no likelihood of getting off themselves, or being rescued by their friends, they surrendered before they could come at them to slay them: this Battel both in it self and consequences, was a great instance of the unhappiness of that War; for the Enemy being beaten, and *Nicolo* fled to *Borgo*, the Commissioners would have pursued, and besieged him in that place, to have made there Victory intire: But some of the Officers and Souldiers would not obey; pretending they would dispose of their plunder, and cure themselves of their wounds, and which is more remarkable the next day about noon without any regard to, or leave from their superior Officers, they went to *Arezzo*; deposited their prey; and returned to *Anghiari* when they had done.

*Pucinino* defeated.

A thing so contrary to all order and military discipline, that the reliques and remainder of any well governed Army would easily have rob'd them of their Victory, which so undeservedly they had obtained. And besides this, the Commissioners giving order that all prisoners should be kept (to prevent their rallying, or getting together again) in spite of their Orders, they dismiss'd them all. A thing most justly to be admir'd, that an Army so constituted, should be able to get the Victory, and that the Enemy should be so poor spirited as to be beaten by them. Whilst the *Florentines* therefore were marching to *Arezzo* and returning again, *Nicolo* had opportunity to quit *Borgo*, and draw off all his Men towards *Romagna*; and with him the *Florentine* exiles, who seeing their hopes desperate of returning to *Florence* they dispersed themselves into all parts of *Italy*, and some of them into other Countries, as their conveniences prompted them, of these *Rinaldo* chose *Ancona* for his residence, and afterwards (to obtain a mansion in Heaven, for that which he had lost upon Earth) he went to visit the Sepulchre of our Saviour; from whence being returned, as he was sitting at Table very merry at the Wedding of one of his Daughters, he fell down on a sudden, and died. His fortune being favourable so far, as to take him away in one of the most pleasant days of his Life; a man truly honorable in all conditions, but would have been much more, had his Stars brought him forth in a City that had been united; for *Florence* being factious, the same things disgusted there, which would have been rewarded in another place. The Commissaries when their Men were come back from *Arezzo*, and *Nicolo* departed, presented themselves before *Borgo*; whereupon the Townsmen would have surrendered to the *Florentines*, but could not be accepted: in this Treaty and negotiation, the Commissaries became jealous of the Popes Legate, lest he had a design for seizing it for the Church; so that they came to ill language, and doubtless some ill accident would have happened, had those proposals proceeded: the Popes Legate being gratified in his desires: that controversie fell to the ground. Whilst they were fo-

solic-

sollicitous for the enterprize of *Borgo*, news came that *Nicolo Piccinino* was marched towards *Rome*; but others said towards *La Marca*, wherefore the *Legate*, and many of the rest, gave their opinions to march towards *Perugia*, to be ready to defend either *Rome* or *La Marca*, whether *Nicolo* was fled with *Bernardo de Medici*; and *Neri*, with the *Florentines*, were to march for *Casentino*: this being determined, *Neri* departed with his forces to *Rassina*; took it; and *Bibiana*, *Prato Vecchio*, and *Romeni*; from thence he marched to *Poppi*, and besieged it on two sides; one towards the plain of *Certomondo*; and the other upon the mountain that goes along to *Fronzoli*. Count *Poppi* seeing himself forsaken both by God and Man, had shut himself up in *Poppi*, not with any hopes of relief, but to make his conditions so much the better; and *Neri* coming before it, and forming his siege; he desired a parly, and had as good terms offered, as in his state could be expected, which were to go away himself, and his Children, with what ever they could carry with them, for which the Town, and its Territory was to be delivered to the *Florentines*; whilst the Treaty was managing, he came down to the Bridge over the *Arno* which is at the end of the Town, and calling to *Neri*, in great sorrow and affliction he said to him,

*Poppi's*  
speech to the  
*Florentine*  
Commissaries.

*Had I considered my own ill fortune, and your power as I should have done, I had been now as a friend congratulating your victory, and not supplicating your Mercy as an Enemy. Fortune at present is favourable and propitious to you: to me it is rigid and severe; I had Horses and Arms, and Subjects, and Estate, and who can wonder if I part with them unwillingly? but if you please (as you may) to command all Tuscany, we must of necessity obey: I have this only to comfort me, that had not I committed this error, such would not have been that exercise nor demonstration of your Generosity, for if now you should think fit to preserve me, you will leave to the World an indelible instance; and example of Clemency: let therefore your compassion exceed my offence, and permit at least that this single residence may continue to those from whom your predecessors have received formerly many obligations.*

*Neri's* answer.

*Neri* replied, That he had unhappily placed his hopes upon People which could do him no good. That he had transgressed so highly against the Republick of Florence, that as things then stood, there was a necessity of yielding up all, and that he must abandon those places, as he was an Enemy to Florence, which as a friend he had refused to preserve; for he had given so ill a Testimony and example of himself, That he could not be continued; and in every chance of fortune had been so unconstant and various, that they could not have any confidence but that still he would be working to the prejudice of their state, and yet it was not so much him, as his interest they were afraid of. But if he would withdraw into Germany, the Government of Florence would intercede, that he might reside there as a Prince and be a friend to him, for the obligations he said they had received from his Ancestors. To which the Count answered in great passion, that he would be farther off the *Florentines* than so; and laying aside all further Capitulation (seeing no remedy) the Count delivered up the Town, and all his other concerns to the *Florentines*; only his goods, his Wife and Children departed with him, very disconsolate, for having lost a Dominion which his predecessors had enjoyed above 400 years. These successes being known in Florence, were received with great joy and acclamation, both by the Magistrates and People. And because *Barnardetto de Medici*, found that *Nicolo's* marching towards *Rome* or *La Marca* would be of little importance, he returned with his forces to *Neri*, and both of them coming back to Florence, it was resolved that they would be entertained with the highest honors which could be conferred by that City, upon their victorious members, and accordingly they were received in a Triumphant manner, by the Senate the Captains of the Parties, and the whole City beside.

THE





THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
FLORENCE.

Book VI.

**I**T always was (and 'tis reasonable it be) the design and end of all those who make war, to enrich themselves, and impoverish the Enemy; nor is conquest and victory desired upon any other score, but to magnifie the one, and to depress the other: hence it is, that when ever victory impoverishes or debilitates you, you have either transgressed, or fallen short, of what you aimed at in the War. That Prince, or Commonwealth is enriched by Victory, when he exirpateth his Enemy, and impropriats the spoil. On the other side, his Victory impoverishes him, when (though he overcomes his Enemy) he cannot utterly extinguish him, and the spoil and prey is left to the Souldiers. This Prince, this Commonwealth is unhappy in its losses, but more in its victories; for being defeated, it is lyable to the injuries of its Enemies; and being victorious, to the contumely of its friends, which as they are less reasonable, are less supportable, seeing it is again necessitated to oppress and disgust its subjects by new impositions and taxes: and if these be the least humanity in Government, it cannot rejoyce or exult in a victory, which makes all its subjects sad. The well Governed Commonwealths of old, were wont to fill their Bags with Gold and Silver; distribute donatives, remit subsidies and tribute to the people and solemnize their victories with merriment and feasting; but those of whom we write, drained their Exchequer, impoverished the people, and never secured themselves of their Enemies; which proceeded from the disorders in the management of the War; for having beaten, and pillaged the Enemy, they neither kept them Prisoners, nor killed them; so that (being incensed) they forbore revenging themselves upon the Conqueror no longer than he which cammanded them could recruit them with Horses and Arms: and the plunder and ransoms falling to the Souldiers, the Conquerours made no advantage of the spoils of the Enemy, but were forced to tear their supplies out of the bowels of their Subjects; nothing of benefit accruing to the people, they were rendered more imperious and cruel in their taxes: and those Souldiers had brought things to that pass, that both the Conqueror and conquered (if they intended to preserve their authority over their Men) were in necessity of more money; for the one side was to be recruited, the other to be rewarded; and as the one could not fight, unless he was newly equipped; so the other would not engage him without recompence for what was passed; from whence it happened, that one side had no great joy of its victory; and the other no great sence of its loss; for the conquered had time to recruit, and the Conqueror had none to pursue. This disorder and perverseness in

the Souldier was the reason that *Nicolo* was recruited, and on Horse back again, before his defeat was known thorow *Italy*; and sharper war he made upon his Enemies afterwards, than he had ever done before. This it was, that after his tour before *Brescia*, enabled him to surprize *Vercina*; this it was, that after he was worsted at *Verona*, gave him opportunity to invade *Tuscany*; this it was, that after his loss at *Anghiari*, recruited him again, and made him stronger in the field (ere he got to *Romagna*) than he was before, which gave the Duke new hopes of defending *Lombardy*, though by means of his absence he had looked upon it as lost: for whilst *Nicolo* was giving the Enemy an alarm at *Tuscany* the Duke of *Milan* was reduced to a condition of hazarding all; and therefore apprehending he might be undone, before *Nicolo* (who was sent for) would come to his rescue, to stop the Career of the Count, and temper his fortune by industry, which he could not do by force; he had recourse to those remedies which in the like case he had many times used and sent *Nicolo da Este* Prince of *Ferrara* to *Peschiera* to the Count, to persuade him in his name to a Peace; and to remonstrate to him that the prosecution of the War could not turn to his advantage; for if the Duke should be distressed, and unable to maintain his reputation, the Count would be the first which would suffer by it; by reason the *Venetians* and *Florentines* would have no farther occasion, and by consequence no farther esteem for him: and as a testimony of the sincerity of his proposal, the Duke offered to consummate his Marriage, and send his Daughter to *Ferrara* to be delivered to him as soon as the peace was concluded; to which the Count replied, that if the Duke did truly desire peace, he might easily have it; for the *Venetians* and *Florentines* were as much inclined to it as he, but the difficulty would be to persuade them he was in earnest, as knowing he would never have proposed any such thing, had not some necessity constrained him; and as soon as that should be removed, he would make War upon them again.

The Duke  
proposeth a  
peace.

As to the business of his Marriage, he could not repose any confidence in his promise, having been so often baffled by him before: nevertheless, if every thing else were agreed, he should proceed in it as his friends should advise. The *Venetians*, who are jealous of their Souldiers, where they have no reason to be so, had reason enough to be suspicious here, which the Count being desirous to remove, prosecuted the War with all diligence imaginable; but his mind was so inflamed with ambition, and the *Venetians* so slack, and intepidated with jealousy, little more was done that Summer: so that when *Nicolo Piccinino* returned into *Lombardy*, Winter came on, and the Armies were sent to their Winter quarters. The Count to *Verona*; the Duke to *Cremona*: the *Florentines* into *Tuscany*, and the *Popes* Army to *Romagna*, which after the Battle of *Anghiari*, assaulted *Furla* and *Bologna* in hopes to have taken them from *Francesco Piccinino*, who kept them from his Father, and defended them so well, they could not get them out of his hands; nevertheless their coming into those parts so terrified the people of *Ravenna* that to avoid the domination of the Church by consent of *Ostasio di Potenza* their Lord, they submitted to the *Venetian*, who (in recompence of his kindness, that he might never recover by force, what he had given them with so little discretion) sent *Ostasio* with his only Son to spend their days in *Candia*, where they died: in which expedition his Holiness wanting Money, (notwithstanding the Victory at *Anghiari*) he was glad to sell the Castle of *Borgo a San Sepulcro* to the *Florentines* for 2000 Ducats.

The ingrati-  
tude of the *Ve-*  
*netians*.

Things being in this posture, and all sides thinking themselves safe as long as it was Winter; all thoughts of peace were laid aside, especially by the Duke, who thought himself doubly safe, both in the season of the year, and the arrival of *Nicolo*; had therefore broke of his Treaty with the Count a little abruptly; and in great haste rigged out *Nicolo* again with all provisions and accoutrements that were necessary for the War: the Count having notice of his preparations, went to *Venice* to consult the Senate how affairs were to be ordered the next Summer. When *Nicolo* was ready (perceiving the Enemy out of order) he never staid for the spring, but in the coldest of the Winter he passed the *Adda*, and *Acra*, surprized 2000 Horse, and took most of them prisoners: but that which touched the Count nearest and startled the *Venetians*, was the defection of *Ciarpellone* one of his principal officers, who went over to the Duke: the Count had no sooner the news, but he left *Venice*; and coming with all possible speed to *Brescia*, he found *Nicolo* retired, and gone back to his former station: the Count had no mind, finding the Enemy gone, to follow him at that time; but chose rather to defer, till some advantage should tempt him, and give him opportunity to revenge himself: he prevailed therefore with the *Venetians* to recal the forces they had in the *Florentine* service in *Tuscany*; and to confer the command of them upon *Micheleto Attendato*, *Garramelata* being dead. The spring being come, *Nicolo Piccinino* was first in the field, and besieged *Cornano*, a Castle some twelve miles distant from *Brescia*: to the relief of which, the Count addressed himself; and betwixt these two Gene-

*Micheleto*  
General for the  
League.

als

rals the War was managed as formerly. The Count being fearful of *Bergamo*, went with his Army and encamped before *Martimengo*, a Castle which (if taken) lay very convenient for the succouring of *Bergamo* (which City was by *Nicola* greatly distressed) who finding he could not easily be disturbed, but by the way of *Martimengo*, had supplied it plentifully with all things, so as the Count was forced to besiege it with all his Army: whereupon *Nicola* marched with his forces where he might most conveniently incommode him, and intrenched himself so strangely, the Count could not (without manifest danger) assault him so that thereby he brought things to that pass that the besieger was in more distress than the besieged; and the Count than the Castle. For the Count could neither keep the siege for want of provisions, nor rise, for fear of *Nicola's* Army; and every body expected victory for the Duke, and destruction for his Enemy: but fortune, (which never wants ways of favoring her friends, and disobliging her Enemies) brought it about that *Nicola* in confidence of his Victory was grown so insolent haughty, that without respect to the Duke, or himself, he sent him word, that he had served him a long time, and as yet not gained so much ground as would bury him when he died; he desired therefore to know what recompence he was to expect for all his dangers, and fatigues; for it being now in his power to make him absolute Master of *Lombardy* and to put all his Enemies into his hands, he thought it but reasonable, as he was certain of his Victory, to be secured of his reward; and therefore he did propose he might have the City of *Piacenza* made over to him, that when he had tired and worn himself out in his Wars, he might have that Town for his recess; and at the last he took the boldness to threaten the Duke with the quitting his enterprise, if he was not gratified in his demands. This contumelious and insolent way of capitulation, was so offensive, and detestable to the Duke, that he resolved to lose all, rather than comply; so that this arrogance in *Nicola* wrought an effect upon him, to which the Arms nor the minaces of the Enemy could never reduce him; and that was to make peace with the Count, to whom he sent *Guido Buone da Fortuna* with proposals of peace; and the proffer of his Daughter; which was embraced with both Arms by the Count and his Collegues.

*Nicola's* insolence to the Duke.

All being privately agreed among themselves; the Duke sent a message to *Nicola* to require him to make a Truce with the Count, for a twelve month; pretending his treasure was low, and had been so exhausted with the War, that he could not but prefer a certain Peace, before a Victory that was doubtful. *Nicola* admired his resolution, as not able to imagine what should make him reject so glorious a Victory; not in the least suspecting, that he bogled at the remuneration of his friends, and chose rather to let his Enemies escape; so that not obeying him readily, the Duke was constrained to threaten, that without immediate compliance, he would deliver him up as a prey for his own Soldiers, and his Enemy. Whereupon *Nicola* submitted, but with the same alacrity as on that is forced to forsake both his Country and friends; complaining, and lamenting his unhappiness, whose Victory over his Enemies was always interrupted either by his fortune, or the Duke. The truce being made, the Marriage betwixt *Madona Bianca* and the Count was consummated, and the City of *Cremona* given to her in Dower: after which, the peace was concluded in November 1441 at which for the *Venetians*, *Francesco Barbado*, and *Pagolo Frano*; for the *Florentines* *Agnolo Acciaino* were present; the *Venetians* got by this peace *Pesciera*, *Asola*, and *Leonata* a Castle belonging to the Marquess of *Mantoua*.

Peace betwixt the Duke and the Count.

1441

The Wars in *Lombardy* being ended, the only part of *Italy*, where there was any Hostility, was in the Kingdom of *Naples*, which not being able to be composed, was the occasion of new troubles in *Lombardy*. During the Wars in those parts, *Alfonso* of *Aragon* had overrun the whole Kingdom of *Naples*, and left the King of *Rinato* nothing at all but the Country about the Metropolis. Whereupon *Alfonso* conceiving the Victory already in his hands, resolved whilst he besieged *Naples*, to seize upon *Benevento*, and the rest of the Towns which were yet remaining to the Count in those Countries, supposing it might be done without much danger, the Count himself being employed in *Lombardy*; and his design succeeded as easily as he imagined; for he took all his Towns with little or no opposition. But the news arriving of the peace in *Lombardy*, *Alfonso* began to apprehend lest the Count (to recover what he had lost) should joyn with *Rinato*, and *Rinato* being of the same opinion, sent to invite, and sollicite the Count, that he would come, and revenge himself of his Enemy, by relieving his friend. On the other side *Alfonso* was as earnest with the Duke, that in respect of the friendship which was betwixt them, he would give the Count some diversion, and by employing him in greater affairs, enforce him from undertaking of this. *Philippo* entertained the motion very readily; not considering it intrenched upon that peace, which not long before he had concluded with so much prejudice to himself: he caused therefore to be signified to the *Pope Eugenius*, that then was the time to recover the Towns

Towns which the Count had taken from the Churches, and for his easier success, he professed him *Nicolo Piccinino* (who was in his pay) during the War, but discharged upon the peace, and was at that time in *Romagna* with his forces: the Pope received the proposition very joyfully upon a double account, both as he hated *Francesco*, and desired his own, and though he had been cheated by *Nicolo* once before, yet now the Duke interposing, he could not suspect him in the least; joining his forces therefore with *Nicolo's*, he marched into *la Marca*: the Count being much alarm'd at the news, got what strength together he could, and went to encounter them.

*Naples taken by Alfonso.* In the mean time *Alfonso* took *Naples*; and all that Kingdom fell into his hands except *Castelnuovo*: *Rinato* having left a strong Garrison in *Castelnuovo*, went away himself for *Florence*, where he was most honorably received, but finding he was not able to continue the war, he stayed there but some certain days, and away he passed to *Marsilia*; during which time *Alfonso* had taken *Castelnuovo*, and the Count was got into *La Marca*, but not so strong as the Pope and *Nicolo*: wherefore he addressed himself to the *Venetian*, and *Florentine*, for assistance both of men and money; representing to them that unless they now looked upon them, and did something to restrain the Pope and *Alfonso*, whilst he was in being, afterwards they would have enough to do to secure themselves; for they might joyn with Duke *Philip*, and divide all *Italy* betwixt them: for some time both *Venetian* and *Florentine* suspended their answer, either because they were unwilling to make his Holiness, and *Alfonso* their Enemies; or else, because their hands were already full in *Bologna*. *Hannibal Bentivoglio* had driven *Francesco Piccinino* out of that City, and to enable himself to defend it against the Duke (who was a favourer of *Francesco*) he had desired the assistance of the *Venetians* and *Florentines*; and they not denied it. Whilst the affairs in *Bologna* were in this manner uncertain, they could not resolve to give the Count their assistance; but *Hannibal* defeating *Francesco* afterwards, so that all things there seemed to be composed, they then concluded to supply him. Yet first to secure themselves against the Duke, they renewed the League with him, to which the Duke was not averse, for though he had consented to the War against the Count, whilst *Rinato* was in the field; yet now *Rinato* was routed, and his whole Kingdom taken from him, he had no mind the Count should be destroyed likewise: and to that end he not only consented to the aid which they desired, but he writ to *Alfonso* to draw his forces back again into *Naples*, and not to prosecute the War there any longer; to which, although *Alfonso* was very unwilling, yet in respect of his obligations to the Duke, he quietly consented, and drew off his Army to the other side of *Trento*.

Whilst things were in this posture in *Romagna*, the *Florentines* were not unanimous at home: among the Citizens of chiefest reputation and authority in that Government, *Neri* the Son of *Gino Capponi* was one, of whose interest *Cosimo de Medici* was most particularly jealous, in respect of the great vogue he had both in the City, and Army: for having a long time had the Command of the *Florentine* forces, he had gained them exceedingly by his courage and deportment: besides the many great services performed by him and his father (the Father having taken *Pisa*, and the Son defeated *Nicolo* at the Battle of *Anghiari*) were fresh upon the memory, and caused him to be beloved by most people, but dreaded by such as were fearful of more Companions in their Government. Amongst other of their principal Officers, there was one *Baldaccio d' Anghiari* an excellent Souldier; not to be surpassed, either for courage or conduct in all *Italy* at that time: having always commanded their foot, he had gained so great influence upon them, that it was generally believed, with him they would undertake any enterprize what ever, when ever he desired them. This *Baldaccio* was a great lover of *Neri*, of whose bravery and prudence he had all along been a witness, which to the rest of the *Grandeas*, gave great occasion of suspicion; and thinking with themselves that to let him alone would be dangerous, but to imprison him much more; they resolved to make him away, and fortune effected it. *Bartolomeo Orlandini* was at that time *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia*: who having been sent to keep the pass at *Marradi* (as was said before) when *Nicolo Piccinino* made his inroad into *Tuscany*, had most basely deserted it, and exposed a Country which was almost inaccessible of it self. *Baldaccio* was so much provoked, or rather ashamed at his cowardice, that he spake slightly of him, and writ several letters expressing his contempt; which *Bartolomeo* resenting highly, and being conscious it was true; he resolved to be revenged, and expiate his own fault with the death of his accuser: his resolution being known to other of his Enemies, they encouraged him to proceed, and at one blow to revenge himself for the injury he had received; and deliver the state from a person they could neither retain without danger, nor dismiss without ruine. Having fixed upon his way *Bartolomeo* shut up several armed Men one day in the Chamber; and *Baldaccio* being come to the Piazza (as he constantly did) to discourse with the Magistrates, and require orders for his conduct, the *Gonfaloniere* sent to speak with

*Baldaccio* General of the *Florentine* foot.

Speak with him, and he presently obeyed: seeing him coming, the *Gonfaloniere* went to meet him, and entertained him about his affairs three or four turns in the *Senators Chamber*; but at length having drilled him near the Chamber where his ambush was laid, he gave the Signal, and all of them rushing upon him (who was alone, and without arms) they killed him, and threw him out of the Palace window which looks towards the *Dogana*; and then cutting off his Head, and carrying his trunk into the *Piazza*, they left it there all day as a spectacle for the people; he had only one Son by his Wife *Annalena*; which living not long after him, *Annalena* deprived both of Husband and Child, and resolving to have no farther conversation with Man, she made a Monastery of her house, and shutting her self up with several other Noble Persons, which came to her to that purpose; she spent the remainder of her days there in great piety and devotion, calling the Monastery by her own Name, and immortalizing her memory, both by the one and the other. This action was no small diminution to *Neri*; and took away a considerable part of his reputation and friends yet it did not satisfy the contrivers, for having been more than ten years at the helm, the authority of the *Balia* expired, and every body began to talk and act with more freedom than they thought convenient, they judged it necessary to revive that Court, for the encouragement of their friends, and the depression of their Enemies; Hereupon, in the Year 1444, the Councils created a new *Balia*, which re-established the Offices; contracted the number of the Officers which were to chuse the *Senators*; renewed the *Chancery* of reformation; removing *Philippo Peruzzi* out of the *Chancellorship*, and putting one into his place who they believed would be Governed by them. They prolonged the banishment of those that were refractory; imprisoned *Giovanni*, the Son of *Simone Vespucci*; degraded the *Accoppiatori* as Enemies to the State, and with them the Sons of *Piero Baroncelli*; all the *Seragli*, *Bartolomeo*, *Francesco Castellani*, and several others; by which means they procured great reputation, and authority to themselves, and no little prejudice and disparagement to their Enemies; and having settled themselves at home in the Government, they began to look about, and inquire how things were managed abroad.

*Nicolo Piccinino* (as we said before) being abandoned by *Alfonso*; and the Count, by assistance of the *Florentines*, became formidably powerful, he assaulted *Nicolo* not far from *Fermo*, and gave him so great a defeat, that *Nicolo* was glad to fly (almost alone) to *Montecchio*, where he fortified himself so well, and defended himself so bravely, that in a short time his whole Army repaired to him again, and put him into a condition of supporting easily against the Count, and the rather, because Winter being come, both of them were constrained to send their Armies into quarters. All Winter long *Nicolo* was employed in encreasing his Army, which was much furthered by the assistance of the *Pope*, and *Alfonso*; insomuch that when the Spring appeared, and both Armies took the field, the Count was much too weak for *Nicolo*, and indeed brought to that extremity of want, that he must of necessity have been ruined, had not the Duke frustrated the advantage which *Nicolo* had got over him. *Philip* sent to *Nicolo* to desire he would come presently to him, for he must needs speak personally with him about business of very great importance; and *Nicolo*, being greedy to know it, left his command to his Son *Francesco*, and went to *Milan* to the Duke; relinquishing a certain victory, for an uncertain reward, which being perceived by the Count he thought that occasion of engaging the Son in his Fathers absence, was not to be slipped, and coming to a fight with him near the Castle di *Monteloro*, he overthrew *Francesco*, and took him Prisoner.

*Nicolo* arriving at *Milan*, finding himself deluded by the Duke, and understanding the defeat, and imprisonment of his Son, he took it to heart, and died with sorrow 1445 in the 64 year of his age, a more brave, than a fortunate General. He left only two Sons; *Francesco*, and *Giacoppo*, whose conduct was less, and fortune worse than their Fathers; so that the Disciples of *Braccio* were almost extinct, whilst the *Sforzeschi* being more successful, became more glorious. The *Pope* understanding *Nicolo* was dead, and his Army overthrown (not daring to rely much upon the King of *Aragons* supplies) desired a peace of the Count, and obtained it by the mediation of the *Florentines*, by which the *Pope* was to have in *la Marca*, *Osimo*, *Fabriano*, and *Ricanato* restored, and all the rest were to remain to the Count. After this accommodation in *la Marca*, all Italy had been quiet, had not the *Bolognesi* disturbed it. there were two super-eminent families in *Bologna*, the *Camneschi*, and the *Bentivogli*; *Hannibal* was the head of the latter, and *Battista* of the first. To beget the greater confidence betwixt them, many matches had been made; but among Men that aspire to the same degree of greatness, an Alliance is sooner made, than a friendship. *Bologna* was in League with the *Venetians*, and *Florentines*; which League was made by *Hannibal Bentivogli's* means after *Francesco Piccinino* was expelled. *Battista* understanding how earnestly the Duke desired the friendship of that City, contrived how he might

1444

Florence reformed.

*Nicolo* dies. 1445.

Troubles in Bologna.

might kill *Hannibal*, and deliver that City to the Duke; and having concluded the circumstances, on the 24<sup>th</sup> of June 1445, *Battista* and his accomplices set upon *Hannibal*, and slew him, and when they had done, declared themselves for the Duke. The *Venetians* and *Florentine* commissaries were at the same time in the Town; and at the first report of the tumult, returned privately to their houses, but finding the people thronging in great numbers in the Market place, complaining, and exclaiming against the Murderers of *Hannibal*; they took courage; joyned themselves with them, and putting them into a posture; they fell upon the *Cannescchi*, and in half an hours time, routed them, killed part of them, and drove the rest out of the City. *Battista* not having opportunity to get away, nor his Enemies to kill him, betook himself to his house, where hiding himself in a chest, or Bing to keep Corn in, they searched for him a whole day, and could not discover him: being assured he was not gone out of Town, they came back again and threatened his Servants so, that one of his Lacqueys betrayed him, and carried them to him; then drawing him out of his hole in armour as he was, they killed him, and dragged him about the Streets, and burned him; so that the Victory of the Duke was sufficient to encourage that enterprize, but his expedition in relieving it, was not great enough to make it good. By the death of *Battista*, and the expulsion of the *Cannescchi* their tumults were composed; but the *Bolognesi* remained in no little confusion, there being none of the family of the *Bentivoglio's* left to govern them; for *Hannibal* had only one Son, of about six years old called *Giovanni*; and it was feared lest some difference and division might arise betwixt the friends of *Bentivoglio* (in whose power it was to restore the *Cannescchi*) to the destruction of their party; and Country.

Whilst they were in this suspence, the *Conte di Poppi* being by accident in *Bologna*, sent word to the principal of the City, that if they would be governed by one of *Hannibal's* blood he could direct them where they might have one; for about twenty years since, *Hercules*, a Cousin-German of *Hannibal's* being at *Poppi*, had the enjoyment of a young Maid in that Town, who was brought to bed afterwards of a Son called *Santi*; which, *Hercules* affirmed, to him many times, was his, nor was it to be denied, for who ever knew them both, must needs owne a more than ordinary resemblance. The Citizens giving credit to what he said, dispatched some of their Citizens to *Florence* immediately, to see the Youth and to desire *Neri*, and *Cosimo*, that he might be delivered to them: the reputed father of *Santi* was dead, and the Son lived with an Uncle called *Antonioda Cascese*, a rich Man, without Children of his own, and a great friend of *Neri's*: *Neri* out of respect to his Uncle, thinking the business not to be despised, nor on the other side, rashly accepted, proposed that *Santi* might be sent for; and that in the presence of *Cosimo* and the *Bolognian* Embassadors; they might hear what he could say for himself; he was sent for accordingly, and behaved himself so well, the *Bolognesi* were ready to worship him; so strangely prevalent sometimes is the love of a faction; yet there was nothing concluded at this meeting, only *Cosimo* took *Santi's* aside and told him,

*Santi Bentivoglio.*  
*Cosimo's*  
Speech to *Santi*  
No Body can counsel you better in this case, than your self: because you may follow your own inclination. If you be the Son of *Hercules Bentivoglio*, you will apply your self to such things as are worthy and suitable to the honor of that house. But if you be the Son of *Agnolo da Cascese*; you will continue in *Florence*, and spend the rest of your days basely in the ordering of Wool.

This Speech netled the young Man, and whereas before he seemed to be irresolute, he now declared he would refer himself wholly to *Cosimo*, and *Neri*, and do as they directed him; and (it being agreed with the Embassadors) Clothes and Horses were bought, and equipage provided, and a while after being honourably conducted to *Bolonia*, he was made Governour both of *Hannibal's* Son, and the City, which office he executed so well, that whereas all his predecessors were killed by their Enemies; he lived quietly all his time and died lamented at last.

After the death of *Nicolo*, and the peace concluded in *La Marca*; *Philip* wanting a new General to command his Army made private overtures to *Ciarpellone* one of the most experienced officers in the Counts Army; and at last coming to an agreement, *Ciarpellone* desired leave of the Count to go to *Mulan*, and take possession of certain Castles which *Philip* had given him in the late Wars. The Count suspecting the business (to disappoint the Duke, and prevent his serving against him) he caused him first to be stopped, and afterwards to be killed, pretending to have found him engaged in Conspiracy against him; at which manner of proceeding the Duke was highly incensed, but the *Venetians* and the *Florentines* were pleased well enough, as apprehending the least amity betwixt the Count and the Duke; however this indignity set all *La Marca* in an uproar, and was the occasion of new War there. *Gismondo Malatesti* was Lord of *Rimino*; and being Son-in-Law to the Count,

Count, he expected to have had the Government of *Pesaro*; but the Count having reduced it, gave the Command of it to his Brother, which *Gismonda* took very ill; and to make it the worse, his mortal Enemy *Federico di Monte Feltrò*, by the Count's means, had usurped the Dominion of *Urbino*: upon these provocations *Gismondo* joyned himself with the Duke, and solicited the Pope and the King of *Naples* to make War upon the Count; who to give his Son-in-Law a relish of the War to which he had such a mind, he resolved to begin, and to fall first upon him; whereupon the Countries of *Romagna* and *La Marca* were in a tumult immediately; for *Philip*, the King of *Naples*, and the Pope sent all of them assistance to *Gismondo*, and the *Venetians* and *Florentines* (though they sent him no Men) supplied the Count with what monies he wanted: *Philip*, not content to make War against him in *Romagna* only, designed to deprive him of *Cremona* and *Pontremoli*, but *Pontremoli* was defended for him by the *Florentines*, and *Cremona* by the *Venetians*; so that the War was received again in *Lombardy*; and many troubles ensued in the Country of *Cremona*, among which the Dukes General *Francesco Piccinino* was overthrown at *Casale* by *Micheletto* and the *Venetian* Army; and the *Venetians* conceiving hopes thereupon of deposing the Duke, sent their Commissary to *Cremona*, assaulted *Ghiaradadda*, and took all that Country, except *Cremona* it self; and then passing the *Adda*, they made their excursions to the very walls of *Milan*: the Duke not satisfied with his condition, applied himself to *Alfonso* King of *Aragon* for succour; representing the ill consequences which would follow upon his Dominions in *Naples*, if *Lombardy* should fall into the hands of the *Venetians*: *Alfonso* promised to send him supplies, but their passage would be difficult without the permission of the Count, upon which consideration, Duke *Philip* addressed himself to the Count, and begged of him that he would not abandon the Father-in-Law who was both aged and blind. The Count was much offended with the Duke, for having pulled those Wars upon him; and on the other side the greatness of the *Venetians* did not please him at all; besides his money was gone, and the League supplied him but coldly; for the *Florentines* were now freed from their apprehensions of the Duke, which was the great cause of their caring less for the Count, and the *Venetians* desired his ruine, as the only person capable of carrying the whole state of *Lombardy* from them.

New war in Lombardy.

The Count courted by all Parties.

Nevertheless, whilst *Philip* was seducing him to his side, and promised him the Command of all his forces, upon a condition he would leave the *Venetians*, and restore *La Marca* to the Pope; they sent Embassadors to him, promising him *Milan*, when it was taken, and the Generallhip of their Army *in perpetuum*, so he would prosecute the War in *La Marca*, and obstruct the supplies which were sending by *Alfonso* into *Lombardy*. The *Venetian* proffers were great, and his obligations to them considerable, they having made that War on purpose to secure *Cremona* to the Count; again the Duke's injuries were fresh, and his promises not to be trusted. Yet the Count remained doubtful which he should accept; his obligation to the League, his Faith given, the late good offices which they had done him; and their many promises for the future, were great arguments on one side; yet he was loth on the other side to deny the importunities of his Father-in-Law; but that which swayed with him most of all, was the poison which he suspected was hid under the promises of the *Venetians*, to whose discretion he must leave himself (if he succeeded in their Wars) both for their performance, and his own preservation; which no wise Prince would ever do, till necessity compelled him. But this suspense and difficulty of resolution in the Count, was taken away by the *Venetians*; who having a design by some practices and intelligences in the Town, to get it for themselves, upon some other pretence they caused their forces to march into those parts, but their plot was discovered by him that governed there for the Count, and in stead of gaining *Cremona*, they lost the Count, who laid aside all respects, and joyned with the Duke.

Pope *Eugenius* was dead, *Nislo V.* created his successor, and the Count advanced with Duke *Philip* his whole Army to *Cotegnola* in order to his passage in *Lombardy*, when news was brought to him that Duke *Philip* was dead, which happened in the year 1447: on the last of *August*. These tidings much troubled the Count, whose Army could not be in good order, because they had not had their full pay. The *Venetians* he feared, as being in arms, and his professed Enemies, now upon his revolt to the Duke. *Alfonso* had been always his Enemy, and he was fearful of him; he could have no confidence in either the Pope or the *Florentines*, for the *Florentines* were in League with the *Venetians*, and he was in possession of several Towns which he had taken from the Pope: however he resolved to bear up bravely; look his fortune in the face; and comport himself according to the accidents which should occur: for many times secrets are discovered in action, which dejection and despondency would have concealed for ever. It was no little support to him to believe, that if the *Milanese* were oppressed; or that jealous of the ambition of the *Venetian*, no Man was so pro-

1447.



per for them to apply to, for protection; as himself. So that taking courage thereupon, he marched into the Country of *Bologna*, and from thence passing by *Modena* and *Reggio*, he encamped upon the *Lenza*, and sent to the *Milanesi* to offer them his service: the *Milanesi*, after the Duke's death, were divided into factions; part of them had a mind to be free, and part of them to live under a Prince; and of those which were for a Prince, part were for the Count, and part for *Alfonso*: but they which were for a Commonwealth, being more unanimous prevailed, and erected a republick according to their own model, to which many of the Cities in that Dukedom refused to conform, supposing they might make themselves free as well as *Milan* if they pleased; and those who were not inclined to that Government, would not submit to it in them. *Lodi* and *Piacenza* therefore surrendered to the *Venetian*; *Pavia* and *Parma* made themselves free; upon which confusions, the Count removed to *Cremona*, where certain deputies of his to that purpose, met with certain Commissioners from *Milan*, and came to an agreement, by which it was agreed that he should be General of their forces, and all conditions performed to him which were concluded in his last treaty with the Duke; to which was superadded that *Brescia* should be put into the Count's hands, till he should be possess'd of *Verona*, and that then keeping the last, the first should be restored.

The Count made General for the *Milanesi*.

Before the death of the Duke, Pope *Nicolo* upon his assumption to that Chair endeavoured to make a general peace, betwixt all the Princes of *Italy*; and to that purpose he negotiated with the *Florentine* Embassadors which were sent to his creation, for a Diet to be held at *Ferrara*, to treat either of a long cessation, or a firm peace; and accordingly the Pope's Legate was met there, by Commissioners from the *Venetians*, the Duke, and the *Florentines*. *Alfonso* sent none, for he was at *Tibols* with a great Army in favour of the Duke, and believed (as soon as the Count could be debauched from them) he should have a fair opportunity to fall upon both the *Venetian*, and *Florentine*. In the mean time the Count lay still in *Lombardy*, attending the consummation of the Peace, to which *Alfonso* would not send, but promised to ratifie what should be agreed by the Duke. This peace was a long time in debate, but at length it was concluded, it should either be a cessation for five years, or a perpetual Peace, as the Duke of *Milan* should chuse; the Duke's Commissioners, returning to know his resolution, they found him dead, however the *Milanesi* were willing to stand to their agreement, but the *Venetians* would not condescend, fancying great hopes to themselves of overrunning that State, because *Lodi* and *Piacenza* had submitted to them soon after the death of the Duke; and believing either by treaty or force they should be able to reduce the rest, before any Body could come in to their relief; and thus they fancied the rather, because the *Florentines* were engaged in a War with *Alfonso*. *Alfonso* was at this time at *Tibols*, and being impatient to pursue his designs upon *Tuscany* (according to agreement betwixt him and the Duke) conceiving the War already commenced in *Lombardy*, would give him convenience, he had a great mind to have some footing in the State of *Florence*, before the War should apparently break out; to that purpose he entred into correspondence with some persons in the Castle of *Cennina*, in the upper *Val d'Arno*, and took it: the *Florentines* were much surprized at so unexpected an accident, and seeing that King in motion against them, they listed Men, created a new Council of Ten, and provided themselves for War, with as much industry as any of their predecessors. The King was marched already with his Army into the Country of *Siena*, and had used his utmost endeavours to get that City into his clutches; but it continued firm to the *Florentines*; refused to admit him, and all the rest of the Towns, under its jurisdiction, did the same. Yet they furnished him with provisions, their weakness and the King's great strength excusing it.

The *Venetians* ambition of the Duchy of *Milan*.

*Alfonso* invades the *Florentines*.

The King's resolution was changed of invading the *Florentines* by the way of the *Val d'Arno*, either because *Cennina* was taken from him again, or that the *Florentines* were too well furnished with Souldiers in those parts; wherefore he turned towards *Volterra*, and surprized many Castles in the Country belonging thereto. From thence he passed into the County of *Pisa*, where, by the assistance of *Arrigo*, and *Fatio* (Counts of *Gherardesca*) he took some posts, and then assaulted *Campiglia*, which being defended by the *Florentines*; he was not able to carry; so that the King leaving Garisons in the places he had taken; and certain Troops to make excursions upon the Enemy; with the rest of his Army retired and took his quarters in the Country of *Siena*. The *Florentines* in the mean time being secured by the season of the year, provided themselves with Souldiers with all possible care, and gave the command of them to *Foderigo* Lord of *Urbino*, and *Gismondo Malatesta da Rimini*, betwixt whom there was some precedent difference, yet it was so prudently composed by *Neri de Gino*, and *Barnardetto de. Medici* their Commissaries, that they took the field together before the Winter was over; recovered the places lost in the Country of *Pisa*; and the

the *Pomeranie* in the *Volterran*; stirring and restraining his excursions of those who were left by *Alfonso* upon the Coasts, so as they were scarce able to secure their Garrisons. As soon as the Spring was come, the Commissaries had a Rendezvous of all their Army (which consisted of about 5000 Horse, and 2000 Foot, at *Spedalletto*; and the King had another of about 15000, some three miles from *Campiglia*: and when it was supposed he would have fallen upon that Town, he turned about to *Piombino*, believing it would be no hard matter to gain it, in respect that it was but indifferently provided; and if he did, it would be no little prejudice to the *Florentines*, seeing from thence he could harraß them with a tedious War; and by sending forces there by Sea, infest the whole Country of *Pisa*. This Policy of *Alfonso's* startled the *Florentines*, and consulting what was to be done, it was concluded, that if they could lye with their Army upon the coasts of *Campiglia*, he would run a hazard of being beaten, or be forced to draw off with no little disgrace. To this purpose they rigg'd out four Gallies which they had at *Ligorn*, and sent three thousand foot in them to reinforce *Piombino*, and then posted themselves at *Caldane* a place of no easie access; for to lie upon the coasts in the plain, they judged it more dangerous, and more subject to attacks; the *Florentines* were to be supplied from the neighbouring Towns, which being thin, and but ill inhabited, they were but indifferently furnished; so that the Army was much incommoded, especially for *Wine*; for none growing there, and coming with great difficulty from other parts, it was not possible to provide for them all. But the King (though straitned by the *Florentines*) had plenty of all things by the way of the Sea. The *Florentines* perceiving it, had a mind to try experiment, whether their forces could not be supplied by Sea likewise, whereupon they caused their Gallies to be brought, loaded them with victuals, and having dispatched them accordingly, they were set upon by seven of *Alfonso's* Gallies, and two of them taken, and the other two fled. This disaster cut off all hopes of relieving that way: so that 400 of the looser sort of Souldiers ran away to the Kings Camp for want of *Wine*; and the rest mutiny'd, graming that they should be confin'd to so hot places where there was no *Wine*, and the *Water* very bad: hereupon the Commissaries took it into debate, and it was concluded that they should leave that Post, and address themselves to the recovery of certain Castles which remained in the hands of the King.

On the other side the King, though he wanted no provision, and was more numerous in Men, found himself no less distressed, for his Army was full of the diseases which those maritime Countries do produce, they were grown so general and fierce, that many Men died, and most of them were sick. Upon this consideration, a Peace was proposed, and the King insisted upon 50000 *Florentines*, and that *Piombino* might be left to his discretion. Which demands being deliberated at *Florence*, many who desired peace, were earnest to have them accepted; affirming they could not expect success in a War, which required so vast an expence to maintain it: but *Neri Capponi* going to *Florence*, gave them such pregnant reasons to the contrary, that the whole City agreed to refuse them, and the Governor of *Piombino* was well entertained; and promised to be relieved both in time of War and Peace, if he would defend it courageously as he had hitherto done. The King having notice of their resolution, and perceiving his Army too sickly and infirm to take the place, he brake abruptly from his siege; left above 2000 of his Men dead behind him; retreated with the rest of his Army thorow the Country of *Sienna*, and from thence into the Kingdom of *Naples*, highly dissatisfied with the *Florentines*, and threatening them with a new War when occasion offered.

*Alfonso retreats of Tuscany.*

Whilst these things passed in *Tuscany*, the Count *Francesco* being made General for the *Milanese*, thought fit before any thing else, to reconcile himself with *Francesco Piccinino*, (who had a command likewise under him) that he might assist him in his enterprises, or at least oppose them with more circumstances of respect: after which, he took the field with his Army, and the Citizens of *Panza*, suspecting their own ability to defend themselves against so formidable a force; and yet unwilling to bring themselves under the yoke of the *Milanese*, they offered to surrender to him, upon condition they might not fall under their domination. The Count had a great mind to that City, and looked upon it as a fine initiation, and pretence, to the rest of his designs. Not was it fear, or the imputation of breaking his Faith, that restrained him from taking it; for great Men think it dishonorable for to lose; but none to gain, though with fraud and injustice. His great doubt was, left in taking it, he should disoblige the *Milanese*; so as they should give themselves to the *Venetian*; and in not taking it, he was jealous they should surrender to the Duke of *Savoy*, to which he saw too many of the Citizens inclin'd, in either of which cases, his authority in *Lombardy* would be lost. At length judging it less danger to take that City himself, than to let another Man get it; he resolv'd to accept it, persuading himself it would satisfy the

*Milanese*, to let them know, how fatal it might have been for him to have refused it; seeing those Citizens would certainly have delivered it to the *Venetian*, or the Duke of *Savoy*, either of which ways their State had been undone; and that it was better in his possession who was their friend, than in either of theirs, both of them being too potent, and both of them their Enemies. The *Milanese*, for all his compliments, were much unsatisfied with the business, as plainly discovering the ambition and ends of the Man; but they thought best at present to conceal it, not knowing whether they were to betake themselves (upon a rupture with the *Count*) but to the *Venetians*, whose pride, and arrogant terms, they dreaded and abhorred; so that they concluded not to break with the *Count*, but to obviate their present miseries, with his assistance, hoping when they were freed from the former, some propitious opportunity might happen to quit them of him; for they were not only infested by the *Venetians*; but by the *Genoese*, and the Duke of *Savoy* in the name of *Charles* of *Orleans*, descended from a Sister of *Philip*; but the *Count* defended all against them without any trouble. Their greatest adversary was the *Venetian*, who was come near with a powerful Army to seize upon their state, and had *Lodi* and *Piacenza* already in their possession, which last, the *Count* beleagured, and after a long siege, took it, and sack'd it; after he had recovered that City, Winter coming on, he drew his Army into quarters, and went himself to *Cremona*, where all that Winter he entertained himself with his Wife; but as soon as the Spring appeared, the *Venetian*, and *Milanese* were both in the field: the *Milanese* had a great desire to retake *Lodi*, and afterwards to come to an agreement with the *Venetian*: for the expense of the War was increased; and the fidelity of the *Count* suspected. In order to this, it was resolved their Army would march to *Caravaggio* and besiege it; supposing that upon the taking of that Castle, *Lodi* would surrender. The *Count* obeyed their Orders, though his own inclination was to have passed the *Adda*, and invaded the Country of *Brescia*. Being set down before *Caravaggio*, he intrenched and fortified his Army so well with Ditches and Ramparts, that the *Venetians* could not attempt to relieve it without great disadvantage.

However the *Venetians* advanc'd with their Army, under the Command of their General *Micheletto*, within two flights shot of the *Counts* camp; continued there several days, and had many skirmishes with them. Notwithstanding the *Count* persisted in his siege, and press'd them so hard, they must of necessity surrender. The *Venetians*, believing the loss of that Castle would be the loss of their whole enterprize, were much dissatisfied with the news, and calling a Counsel, after many disputes it was concluded, there was no way but to attack the *Count* in his trenches, which was not to be done without great disadvantage; but the *Senate* of *Venice*, though naturally timorous, and not apt to any sudden or dangerous resolutions, was in this case so much transported, as rather to venture all than lose that; though the loss of that would be the ruine of all. It was concluded therefore to fall upon the *Count*, and standing to their Arms one morning very early, they assaulted that part of the camp, which was the weakest guarded, and (as it usually happens in such surprizes as that) at the very first onslaught, they put the whole *Sforcean* Army into disorder. But the *Count* so rallied them again, that after many attempts, and irruptions upon their Works, they were not only repulsed, but so shattered and dispersed, that of their whole Army (in which there were more than 12000 Horse, there were not above 1000 escaped, and their whole baggage and train of Artillery taken; so that never till that day had the *Venetians* received so considerable a defeat.

The *Venetians*  
totally de-  
feated.

Among the rest of the prey and Prisoners there was found a *Venetian Proveditore* who before the Battle had spoken opprobrious words of the *Count*, calling him Bastard and Coward: this *Proveditore* finding himself in the hands of his Enemies, being conscious of his offence; and expecting no otherwise, but that his reward would be sutable: according to the Nature of base Spirits, (who are always insolent in prosperity, and poor and abject in adversity) throwing himself with tears at the feet of the *Count*, he acknowledged his fault, and beseech'd his pardon. The *Count* took him up by the arm, and bad him be of good courage: but afterwards he told him, he could not but wonder a Person of prudence, and that gravity as he desir'd to be thought, should commit so great an error, and indecorum, as to speak reproachfully of those who did not deserve it. As to Bastardy he accused him of, he knew not the passages betwixt *Sforza* his Father, and *Madona Lucre* his Mother, for not being then present, he was not able to order them better, and therefore he did hope nothing which they did could be imputable to him. But this he knew; that since he had been capable of any thing himself, he had carried himself so, as no body could reprehend him, to which, both he and his *Senate* could give fresh and irrefragable testimony; at last he admonish'd him to be more modest for the future, to have more caution in all his enterprizes, and then he dismiss'd him. After this Victory, the *Count* march'd his Army into the Country

Country of *Brescia*; possess'd himself of all wherever he came; and then encamped within two miles of the City. The *Venetians* upon their overthrow, suspecting (as it happened) that *Brescia* would be the first thing the *Count* would attempt, reinforc'd it as much as in so short a time they were able; got what forces they could together with all imaginable diligence; and sent to the *Florentines*, to desire their assistance by vertue of their League: who being freed from their War with *Alfonso*, supplied them with a 1000 foot and 2000 Horse; with which forces having got an Army together, the *Venetians* began to think they were in a condition to treat, and for a long time, it had been the custom and fate of the *Venetians* to recover twice as much by peace, as they lost by the War. They understood very well, the *Milanese* were jealous of the *Count*; whose design was not so much to be their General, as their Prince; they knew it was in their own power to make peace, with which of them they pleased; for both of them desired it; one out of ambition, the other for fear. They concluded at last to compose with the *Count*, and to proffer him their assistance for the subduction of *Milan*; presuming that the *Milanese* finding themselves betrayed by the *Count*, in their fury would submit to any dominion but his; and then they being most capable of defending them; were the most likely to be the Persons they would chuse for their protection.

Upon this resolution, they sent to try the *Count*, and found him very inclinable to a peace, as desiring the victory at *Caravaggio* might be appropriated to him, and not to the *Milanese*. A peace therefore was struck up, and the *Venetians* obliged themselves to pay to the *Count*, (till *Milan* should be taken,) 13000 *Florens* a month, and maintain in his service 4000 Horse, and 2000 Foot during the War. The *Count* on the other side engaged to restore to them, all the Towns, Prisoners, and what ever else had been taken in that War by him; reserving to himself only such Towns as were in Duke *Philips* possession when he died. The news of this agreement, disquieted the *Milanese* much more than their Victory had rejoiced them. The Magistrates storm'd; the People complain'd; the Women and Children lamented; all of them in one chorus pronouncing the *Count* a Traitor and an infidel. And though they did not expect to reclaim him from his ingratitude, by any prayers or promises they could make him, nevertheless they thought fit to send Embassadors to him, to see with what confidence, and expressions he could receive them after such barbarous disloyalty, and being brought into his presence, one of them spake to him to this Effect.

Those who desire to obtain any thing of other People, are wont to accost them with prayers, or promises, or threats; that either their compassion, or profit, or poverty might move them to condescend; but in Men that are cruel, and covetous, and prepossess'd with their own greatness and authority; there being no room for either of the three, 'tis in vain for any Man to think to mitigate them with prayers, to oblige them with promises, or to fright them with threats. We therefore, understanding (though too late) your cruelty, your ambition, and your insolence; are come hither, not to beg any thing of you (for if we did, we are sensible it would not be granted) but to commemorate and charge you with the benefits you have received from the People of *Milan*; and to remonstrate with what ingratitude you have requited them; that among the many miseries which you have brought upon us, we may have at least the pleasure to reprehend you for them. You ought to remember your condition after the death of the Duke; you were at hostility with the Pope, and King *Alfonso*; you were discarded by the *Venetians*, and the *Florentines*, who, upon some just and late provocation; or else finding you useless, were become (as it were) your Enemies: you were tired and weary of the War you had maintained against the Church, you were left without Men, without money, without friends, desperate of preserving your own, much more of gaining from others; under which exigencies, of necessity you must have sunk, had not our innocency, and plain-heartedness supported you. We, we were they who received you into our Arms, moved by the reverence we retained for the memory of our Duke; with whom you had enter'd into so near and so late an alliance; presuming (and as we thought) with reason, that the love you profess'd to him, would have been extended to his People; and that our rewards being added to his, the amity betwixt us, would not only have been firm, but indissoluble; and for that cause to your old articles with the Duke, we threw in *Verona* and *Brescia*. What could we give, or promise you more? and you, what could you have (or indeed ask) more of us, or any Body else at that time? You received from us a kindness you could not look for; and us, in recompence, have received a mischief we never deserved: nor was this the first instance of your fallhood; for no sooner were you in possession of the command of our Army, but against all justice and obligation, you received *Pavia* into your hands; which, indeed, gave us the first hint of what was to be expected from

Peace betwixt the *Venetians* and the *Count* excluding the *Milanese*.

The Oration of one of the *Milan* Embassadors to the

from your friendship; however be swallowed that injury, in hopes such an conquest might have satiated your ambition. But alas! those who must have all, will not be satisfied with a part. You promised that all your conquests afterwards should be ours; but alas! you know what you should give us at several times, you could take from us at once; this is verified since your victory at Caravaggio, which though won with the expence of our treasure and blood; is by your baseness perverted to our ruine. O how unhappy are those Cities who are constrained to defend their liberty against such an invader, but much more unhappy are they who in their defence are forced to employ such mercenary and such treacherous instruments as you. May we be an example to posterity; though Thebes and the King of Macedon could be no warning to us; who having beaten their Enemies, and made their General by them, and their Prince afterwards by himself. We are not therefore to be condemned for any thing; but our confidence in you, who have passed life, and insatiable appetite of dominion, ought to have taught us better than to have trusted a person who had betrayed the Prince of Lucca; squeezed the Florentines and the Venetians, despised the Duke, despised a King, and committed several injustices (above all) both against God and the Church. And indeed we had no reason to believe that so many Princes and Potentates should be of less authority with Francesco Sforza, than the Milanese, or that he would be just in his engagements to us, when he had broke them with every body else. But our infidelity cannot excuse your treachery; nor clear you of that infamy, which our just and deplorable complaints will fix upon you all the World over. Nor can any thing secure you against the stings and compunctions of your own Conscience; for inverting those Arms which we had provided for our defence; against our own liberty and freedom; you cannot think any thing so proper for you, as the reward of a Parricide. And if yet your uncontrollable ambition should blind you; the evidence the whole World will give of your impiety, will open your eyes; and God himself will open them, if either perjury, or falsehood, or treason, do offend him; or if in his divine providence, for some occult good, he sees it fit to forbear it; and so show himself to us a favourer of ill Men. Do not therefore delude your self with the assurance of victory; the just anger of God will oppose you; and we are resolved to lose lives and liberties together; and if it so fall out that we should be constrained to submit; there is no Prince in Italy but we will choose before you; and if our sins be so great; as to pull down the greatest misery in the World upon our heads, and force us into your hands, be assured, that dominion which you begin with infamy and fraud; will end in the destruction of you or your Children.

The Count was nettled by every part of the speech, yet without any extraordinary commotion in either gesture or words, he made them this answer. That being injured so highly, as they thought themselves; he would bear with the indiscretion of their language; though to persons capable of judging betwixt them, there was nothing that they had charged him with, which he could not easily refute. He could make it appear, that he had not injured the Milanese, but secured himself only against their intelligence and designs. That if they reflected upon their carriage after the Battle of Caravaggio, they would find, that instead of rewarding him with Verona and Brescia, as they had contracted, they were underhand negotiating a peace with the Venetians; that the burden and scandal of the War might be left upon his shoulders; whilst they ran away with the profit of it; and the honour of the peace; so that if they looked impartially into the matter, they would find; he had done nothing but what they had endeavoured before; and that if he had desired to do it so long, the more they were oblig'd to him; and with the more justice he might resort to ingratitude upon them. That as to the truth, or falsity of what was on either side alledged, the end of the War would make it appear; in which, that God which they had so solemnly invocated to revenge them, would demonstrate which of the two was most tender of displeasing him, and which with most equity he opposed.

The Embassadors being departed, the Count prepared to invade them; and the Milanese for their defence; to which purpose they joyned themselves with Francesco and Giacomino, who upon the score of the old animosity betwixt the Bracceschi and the Sforzeschi, had been faithful to the Milanese; hoping by their means to preserve their liberties, till they should have opportunity to divide betwixt the Venetians and the Count, which amity they did not think would be of any long continuance. The Count was of the same opinion, and thought it his best way to bind them by rewards, seeing they were ticklish in their promises. In the distribution therefore of the War, he was contented the Venetians should attack Cremona; whilst he with the remainder of the Army, assaulted the rest of that State: this article being proposed to the Venetians was so grateful, that upon that very reason they continued

nued their friendship to the *Count*, till he had overrun most of the Country of *Milan*; and so straitned that City, that no provisions could come at it. So that despairing of other relief, they sent Embassadors to *Venice*, to intreat, that they would commiserate their case, and (according to the practice of all Commonwealths) rather support those who stood for their liberty, than a Tyrant; who if he should gain their City, would be too strong afterwards for them. Nor ought they to believe he would be content with the terms of their capitulation, who had violated his League with that state. The *Venetians* were not yet Masters of *Crema*; and being loth to discover themselves till that were in their possession, they answered them in publick, that their alliance with the *Count* would not suffer them to assist them; but privately they entertain'd them so, as they might give their Masters assured hopes of their friendship. The *Count* was got already so near *Milan*, that he had taken some part of the suburbs; and the *Venetians* having reduc'd *Crema*, they thought it time to publish their amity with *Milan*, with whom they were secretly agreed; and the first article they agreed to, was the conservation of their liberty. This League being ratified, the *Venetians* commanded such forces as they had with the *Count*, to march back to their Army, they signified likewise to the *Count*, the peace which they had concluded; and gave him twenty days time to accept it himself. The *Count* was not at all surpris'd at the inconsistency of the *Venetians*; he had foreseen it long before, and expected it should happen every day. Yet he could not but regret it as much, as the *Milanesi* had been molested at his: he desired two days to give in his answer to the Embassadors, which time he resolv'd to detain the *Venetians* who were in his service, and go on with his enterprize. He gave out publicly he would accept of the peace; and sent Embassadors to *Venice*, with full power to ratifie it; but they had private instructions to the contrary, to spin out and protract the conclusion by all the cavils and subtilties they could invent: and that the *Venetian* might give the more credit to his pretences, he made a truce with the *Milanesi* for a month; drew off his Army, and dispers'd it into such places as he had taken in that Country: this stratagem of his was the occasion of his victory afterwards, and the ruine of the *Milanesi*; for the *Venetians* presuming upon the peace, were slower and more remis in their preparations for War.

And the *Milanesi*, seeing the cessation confirmed, the Enemy removed, and the *Venetian* their friend; believed for certain the *Count* would trouble them no mote: which opinion was pernicious to them two several ways, in making them more negligent for their defence; and in sowing their land, which devour'd much of their corn, and was the reason they were sooner distressed. On the other side, nothing was hurtful to them, but was beneficial to the *Count*, and gave him time to respite, and look abroad for allies. During this War in *Lombardy*, the *Florentines* had not declar'd of either side: nor shown any favour to the *Count* when he took part with the *Milanesi*; nor afterwards; for the *Count* having no great need of them, had not sought their assistance; only after the defeat at *Carrara*, (as they were oblig'd by the League) they sent aid to the *Venetians*. But now the *Count* was alone, and had no body else to resort to, he was inforced to press their assistance, publickly to the state, and privatly to his friends, but especially to *Cosimo de Medici*, who in all his undertakings had counsel'd him faithfully, and freely supplied him: nor did he desert him now in his distress; but furnish'd him with what could privatly be convey'd, encouraged him to go on in his design; he propos'd likewise that the City would publickly own him; but he found difficulty, in that *Neri* the Son of *Capponi* was the most potent Man in *Florence*, and to him it appeared more for the interest of that City, that the *Count* should accept of the peace, than prosecute the War. His first apprehension was least out of indignation to the *Count*, the *Milanesi* should give themselves up to the dominion of the *Venetian*, which would be the ruine of them all: then, if the *Count* should succeed, and *Milan* come into his hands, so great an Army, with so great a territory added to it, must needs (in his judgment at least) become dangerous, and formidable; for if he were troublesome whilst but a *Count*, when a Duke he would be insupportable. For these reasons he affirmed it would be better for the republick of *Florence*, and for all *Italy* besides that the *Count* should remain as he was, with his reputation in the Army; and *Lombardy* be divided into two Commonwealths, which were never like to joyn to the ruine of their Neighbours; and singly, and by themselves, they were not able to do hurt; to compass which, he saw no way so probable, as by preserving their old amity with the *Venetians*, and disclaiming the *Count*.

These arguments were not approved by *Cosimo's* friends, believing they were not so much *Neri's* judgment, as jealousie; lest the *Count* being made a Duke, *Cosimo* should grow too powerful by being his friend. *Cosimo* on the other hand perswaded that their alliance with the *Count* would be for the advantage both of *Florence*, and all *Italy*; for it was madness to imagine

*Cosimo de Medici* a friend to *Francesco*,

*Neri Capponi* against him.



imagine *Milan* could continue a Commonwealth, seeing the humour of the Citizens; their manner of Life, and the old factions and differences among them, were not capable of any form or system of civil Government; so that of necessity the *Count* must be Duke of it, or the *Venetians* Lords: and in that case no body could be so weak, but to prefer a single Neighbour, competently powerful, before an Enemy that was remote, but more great and uncontrollable. Neither could he believe the *Milanesi* would give themselves up to the *Venetians*, for the *Count* had the bigger party in the Town, and when ever they found themselves unable to defend their liberties any longer; they would more probably surrender to the *Count* than the *Venetian*. These varieties of opinions kept the City a long time in suspense; but at length it was agreed that Embassadors should be dispatch'd to the *Count*, to treat about their alliance; if they found him so strong, that there was likelyhood he should prevail, then they should conclude; but if otherwise, they were to cavil, and protract. By the time, these Embassadors had got to *Reggio*, they had news the *Count* was become Master of *Milan*. For the *Count* as soon as his truce was expired, and had clapped down again before it with his Army, hoping to carry it in a short time, in despite of the *Venetians*, for they could not come to relieve it, but by the river *Adda*, which was easie to be hinder'd; being Winter, he could not fear they would remove him with their whole Army, and before the Spring he doubted not to carry it, especially seeing *Francesco Piccinino* was dead, and *Giacopo* his Brother remained sole Captain of their forces. The *Venetian* had sent an Embassador to *Milano*, to encourage them to defend themselves; and to assure them of speedy and effectual relief; and so far they were as good as their words, that during the Winter many skirmishes and conflicts passed betwixt the *Venetians* and the *Count*; till when the weather began to be open, they came down with their Army (under the command of *Pandolfo Malatesta*) and encamped upon the river of *Adda*; where it being debated in Counsel whether they should fall upon the *Count*, and run the hazard of a Battle; it was opposed by *Pandolfo*, (upon his experience both of the *Count* and his Army) who advis'd, the Town might be relieved without any such danger, the *Count* being distressed already both for forrage and Corn. Wherefore his opinion was, that they should block him up where he was, and intercept his provisions, which would keep up the Spirits of the *Milanesi* and divert them from surrendering to him.

The *Venetians* assist the *Milanesi*.

This resolution was most plausible to the *Venetians*, because they thought it safe in it self, and did hope by keeping the Town in constant necessity, it would be forc'd at last to deliver up to them; for considering how the *Count* had provok'd them; they could not imagine they would surrender to him. In the mean time the *Milanesi* were reduced to extrem misery, for being a populous City, the poor People fell down dead in the Streets for want of Bread; and this scarcity begetting murmurs and complaints in several places, the Magistrates were afraid of some tumult or other, and us'd all possible diligence to prevent their assembling. The multitude is not suddenly to be engag'd in any mischief; but when once they are dispos'd, the least accident imaginable sets them on work: It happen'd that two persons of indifferent condition being in discourse near the *Porta Nuova* about the calamities of the City, and what ways were left to preserve it; People got about them, by degrees, so as in a short time they were in a considerable number; upon which a rumour was spread in the Town, that they were in Arms against the Magistrates at *Porta Nuova*: hereupon, the whole multitude (who expected some occasion) put themselves in Arms, made *Gasparre da Vico Mercato*, their leader, and marching up to the place where the Magistrates were in Council, they fell upon them with such fury, that all which could not escape, were slain; among the rest *Lionardo Veneta* the *Venetian* Embassador, who had laugh'd at their miseries, and was judg'd the principal occasion of their wants: having made themselves Masters of the City, they deliberated which way to relieve themselves of their distresses, and it was unanimously resolv'd (seeing their liberty was not to be preserved) that they should throw themselves under the protection of some Prince which should be able to defend them, but they were divided about the Person; some were for King *Alfonso*, some for the Duke of *Savoy*, some the King of *France*, not one word all the while of the *Count*; so great and implacable was the indignation of the People against him; yet at last, not agreeing in the rest, *Gasparre da Vico Mercato* mentioned the *Count*, and display'd gravely before them, that if their design was to rid themselves of the War, the *Count* was the only person to be chosen; for the People of *Milan* were in necessity of a certain and present peace, not of a tedious and only possible supply.

*Gasparre da Vico Mercato* his advice.

Then he fell with great words to mitigate the proceedings of the *Count*; he accus'd the *Venetians*: he accus'd all the Princes of *Italy*, (who some for ambition, and some for avarice) would not permit them to live free. And now since their liberty was lost; and they must yield to some Body or other, his opinion was, they should do it to one that knew them:



them; and was able to defend them; that they might be sure of peace for their servitude, and not be engaged in greater, and more pernicious War. The People heard him with great intention, and when he had done, they cryed out with one voice that the Count should be the Man; and *Gasparre* their Embassador to invite him; who carrying him the joyful news, was kindly entertain'd, and the Count enter'd into *Milan* 26th of February 1450, and was received with great acclamation, even by those Persons which not long before had so highly traduced him. The news of this conquest arriving at *Florence*, they despatched orders immediatly to their Embassadors who were upon the way, that instead of treating an agreement with him as Count (which was their instruction before) their business should now be to congratulate him as Duke. These Embassadors were honorably entertain'd, and bountifully presented by the Duke; who knew, against the Power of the *Venetians*, he could not have in all *Italy* more faithful nor more potent allies, than the Citizens of *Florence*, who though freed from their apprehensions of the House of the *Visconti*, were nevertheless obnoxious to the forces of the King of *Aragon*, and the *Venetians*; for they knew the Kings of *Aragon* would be their Enemies, for the amity and correspondente they had always maintain'd with the *French*; and the *Venetians* knew their old fears of the *Visconti* were occasioned by them, and remembring with what eagerness the *Visconti* were persecuted, and that if they came into their power, they were like to fare no better, they were bent wholly upon their ruine. For these reasons the new Duke embrac'd an agreement with the *Florentines*, very willingly, and the *Venetians*, and the King of *Aragon* confederated against them; the King of *Aragon* undertaking the *Florentines*, and the *Venetians*, the Duke; who being new, and scarce settled in his Government, they suppos'd would not be able to confront them with all his own forces, nor all the friends he could make. But because the League betwixt the *Florentines* and the *Venetians*, was not yet fully expir'd; and the King of *Aragon*, upon conclusion of the War at *Piombino*, had made an accord with them, it did not seem convenient to break the peace abruptly, but rather to attend some accident that might give them pretence to invade them. Whereupon they sent Embassadors to *Florence* (each of them, apart) to let the *Florentines* know, that the Leagues which had passed betwixt them were not made to offend any body, but to defend one another. Then the *Venetians* complained that the *Florentines* had suffer'd *Alexander* the Dukes Brother to pass with his forces into *Lombardy* by the way of *Lunigiana*: and besides had been the authors and Counsellors of the agreement betwixt the Duke, and the Marquess of *Mantoua*; all which they affirmed was done to the prejudice of their State, and contrary to the amity betwixt them; insinuating as friends, that who ever injures another Person wrongfully, gives him a right to revenge himself; and who ever breaks peace, must prepare for War. The answer to these Embassies was committed to *Cosmo*, who in a wise and eloquent oration, recapitulated the benefits the republick of *Venice* had receiv'd from that State; declaring what empire and dominion they had gain'd with that treasure, and forces, and advice of the *Florentines*; demonstrating that as the amity betwixt them was propos'd by the *Florentines*; they would not be the first which would break it. For having been always lovers of peace, they were well satisfied with their friendship; and would always endeavour to preserve it. The truth was, all people wonder'd at their complaints & that so grave and judicious a Senate, should concern themselves for things so trivial and vain; but seeing they thought them worthy of their consideration, they could not but declare, that their Country was free and open to any body; and that the Duke was a Person of such qualifications, that he needed not the advice, or favour or any in the choice of his Allies; and therefore he was afraid there was something more at the bottom, than they had hitherto discovered; which if hereafter it should appear, the *Florentines* doubted not, but to manifest it easily to the World, that as their friendship had been profitable, their enmity could be dangerous. How ever things were smoothed over pretty handsomly for that time; and the Embassadors seemed to go away well enough content: yet the alliance the King of *Aragon* & the *Venetians* had made, and the manner of their deportment; gave the Duke, and *Florentines* both; more reason to prepare for a War, than to rely upon their peace: upon which the *Florentines* confederating with the Duke the *Venetians* discover'd themselves, made a League with *Sienna*, and banish'd all the *Florentines*; and their subjects, out of *Venice* and its dominions: and not long after, *Alfonso* did the same, without any respect to the League he had made with them the year before; and without any just, or so much as pretended occasion. The *Venetians* were desirous to get *Bologna* into their hands, and to that end furnishing certain of their exiles with a proportionable force, they march'd thither in the night and by the common shore got into the Town so privatly, their entrancè was not perceiv'd, till they gave the alarm themselves; upon which *Santi Bontivoglio*, leaping out of his bed; was inform'd the whole City was in the possession of the Enemy. *Santi* was advised by ma-

*Francesco*  
enter'd *Milan*,  
and made Duke  
of it.  
1450

The Duke of  
*Milan* and the  
*Florentines*  
Confederate.

The King of  
*Aragon* and  
the *Venetians*.

Embassadors  
from them to  
*Florence*.

The *Florentines*  
answer.

Preparations  
for War in Flo-  
rence.

ny which were about him, to fly, and preserve himself that way, seeing there was not any left to secure the State. However he resolv'd to try his fortune, and taking arms, and encouraging his servants to follow him, he went forth, and having joyn'd them to some of his friends, he charg'd a party of the Enemy, beat them, kill'd several, and forc'd all of them out of the Town; by which action he was thought to have given ample testimony of his extraction from the house of the *Bentivogli*. These passages made it clear to the *Florentines* that a War was intended; and therefore they betook themselves to their ancient methods of defence: They created a Council of Ten. They entertain'd new officers. They sent Embassadors to *Rome*, *Naples*, *Venice*, *Sienna*, and *Milan*, to desire aid of their friends; to discover such as were suspicious: to gain such as were irresolute; and to pry into the Counsels of their Enemies. From the *Pope*, they could obtain nothing but general words, civility, and exhortations to peace. From the King of *Aragon* nothing but idle excuses for having dismiss'd the *Florentines*; offering his passport to any which demanded it: and although he endeavour'd by all means to conceal his preparation for War, yet the Embassadors found him a juggler, and perceived several of his practices against their State. With the Duke therefore they renewed their League; procur'd an amity with the *Genoefes*; compos'd the differences about the reprisal, and many other things which had formerly obstructed it: they try'd all ways to frustrate or break the Treaty; and they went so far as to supplicate the great *Turk*, to banish all *Florentines* out of his Country; but that Emperour would not hearken. The *Florentine* Embassadors were prohibited entrance into the Dominions of the *Venetian*, because (forsooth) they were in League with the King of *Aragon*, and could not send any Embassies without his participation. The *Siennes* received their Embassadors, treated them well, lest they should be overrun, before the League could relieve them; and therefore they thought it best to collogue, and lull those Arms a sleep, which they were not able to resist. It was conjectured then, that the *Venetian* and King both, sent Embassadors to justify the War; but the *Venetian* Embassador being refus'd likewise to be admitted into the territories of *Florence*, the King's denied to do that office alone, and the whole Embassie came to nothing: by which the *Venetians* found themselves us'd with the same rudeness and contempt, which not many months before they had exercis'd upon the *Florentines*.

Federigo the  
Emperor enters  
into Flo-  
rence.

In the midst of these apprehensions, the Emperour *Federigo* 3. pass'd into *Italy* to be crown'd, and on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of *January* 1451, enter'd into *Florence* with an equipage of 1400 Horse. He was honorably entertain'd there by the *Senate*; and continued with them to the 6<sup>th</sup> of *February*, upon which day he departed for *Rome*, in order to his coronation; where having performed that ceremony, and celebrated his nuptials with the Empress, (which was come thither by Sea) he departed again for *Germany*; returned by *Florence*, (where all the old honors were retreated) and having been oblig'd in his passage by the Marquess of *Ferrara*, he gave him a grant of *Modena* and *Reggio* as a reward. But the *Florentines* were not by all those solemnities diverted from their preparations; for their own reputation, and the terror of their Enemies, the Duke and they had enter'd into a League with *France*, which with great joy, and ostentation they publish'd all over *Italy*.

Tuscany inva-  
ded by the King  
of Aragon's for-  
ces.

In the month of *May* 1452 the *Venetians*, not thinking it fit to dissemble any longer, invaded the territories of the Duke of *Milan*, by the way of *Lodi* with 16000 Horse, and 6000 Foot; whilst at the same time the Marquess of *Monferrat* (upon some designs of his own, or the stimulation of the *Venetians*) assaulted him on the other side by the way of *Alexandria*. The Duke had got an Army together of 18000 Horse, and 3000 Foot, with which (after he had furnish'd *Alexandria*, and *Lodi*, with strong Garisons, and fortified all places where the Enemy might offend him) he fell into the Country of *Brescia*, where he did great mischief to the *Venetians*, both parties plundering the Countries, and burning such Towns as were not able to defend themselves: but the Marquess of *Monferrat*, being defeated not long after by the Garison at *Alexandria*, the Duke was at more leisure to infect, and make his inroads into the Countries of the *Venetian*. Whilst the War was carried on in *Lombardy* in this manner, with various, but inconsiderable accidents, the Wars in *Tuscany* was commenced betwixt the King of *Aragon* and the *Florentines*, and manag'd with as little ardour, and success as the other. *Ferrando* (a natural Son of *Alfonso's*) march'd into *Tuscany* with 12000 Men under the command of *Federigo* Lord of *Urbino*. His first enterprize was to assault *Foiano* in *Valdisiana* (for the *Siennes* being their friends, they enter'd that way into the *Florentine* dominions) the Castle was weak; the walls but indifferent; the Garison but small; yet those they had within it were valiant and faithful; the whole number which were sent for the security of that place, not exceeding 200. Before this Castle *Ferrando* encamp'd, and either their courage was so little without, or theirs

so great within) that it took him up 36 days before he could master it. Which time gave the *Florentines* great convenience of providing other places of higher importance, and drawing their forces together and disposing them into better order, than otherwise they could have done.

This Castle being taken, the Enemy march'd into *Cbianti* where they attempted two little Towns which were held by a few private Citizens; and were repuls'd. Leaving them, they remov'd to *Castellina* (a little Castle upon the confines of *Cbianti*) and fate down before it. This Castle was about ten miles from *Sienna*; weak in its works, but weaker in its situation; yet in neither so weak, as the courage of the assailants; for after 44 days siege, and all the art, and force they could use, they were glad to draw off, and leave the Castle as they found it. So little formidable were the Armies in those days, and so inconsiderable the Wars, that those places which are now deserted as impossible to be kept, were then defended as if they had been impossible to have been taken. Whilst *Ferrando* was with his Army in *Cbianti*, he made many incursions into the Country of *Florence*, running up with his parties within six miles of the Town, to the great terror and detriment of their subjects, who, having got together about 8000 Souldiers, under the Command of *Astorre de Faenza*, and *Gismondo Malatesta*, held off from the Enemy towards the Castle of *Colle*, being unwilling to come to a Battel, because they knew if they lost not their Army, there was no danger of the War; for the little Castles which should be taken would be restored upon the peace; and the great Towns were secure. the King had likewise a Fleet of about twenty Vessels ( Gallies and Foists ) in the Sea of *Pisa*, which Fleet ( whilst *La Castellina* was assaulted by Land ) was employ'd by the King to batter the Castle of *Vada* that stood upon the Sea; and they did it so effectually, that in a short time by the inadvertency of the Governor, they got it into their hands: from whence afterwards they ran over the whole Country thereabouts, but those excursions were presently refrain'd by certain *Florentine* Souldiers which were sent to *Campiglia*. The Pope in the mean time concerned himself no farther, than to mediate an accord. But though he was so tender in engaging abroad in any action of War, he found himself at home in no little danger. There was at that time in *Rome* a person call'd *Stephano Porcari*, a Citizen born, of good extraction, and learning, but most eminent for the Generosity of his mind. This *Stephano* was ambitious ( as most are which are desirous of Glory ) to perform, or at least attempt some thing that might make him memorable to posterity. And nothing occur'd so honourably to his thoughts, as to deliver his Country, from the insolence of the Prelats; and reduce it to its primitive liberty; hoping if he effected it, he should be call'd either the *Father* or the *Restorer* of his Country. His great hopes and encouragement in this enterprize was deduc'd from the iniquity and ill lives of the Prelates; which were highly displeasing both to the Barons and People of *Rome*. But his greatest confidence was grounded upon certain verses of *Petrarch's* in that *Canto* which begins, *Spirito Gentile &c.* The verses are these:

*Stephano  
Porcari.*

*Sopra il monte Tarpejo Canzon vedrai.  
Un Cavalier ch' Italia tutta honora,  
Penso piu d' altrui che di se stesso.*

*Stephano* was of opinion that Poets were many times inspir'd, and had perfect and divine inflations from above. So that he concluded what *Petrarch* had prophesied in that *Canto* would certainly come to pass, and he did not know any man fitter than himself to accomplish it, in respect of his eloquence and learning and favour, and friends. Having taken up this fancy, he could not contain himself, but his words, gesture, and manner of living discover'd him, and render'd him suspicious to the Pope; who to secure himself against his plots, confin'd him to *Bologna*, and sent instructions to the Governor to have an eye over him every day. But *Stephano* was not to be discouraged by one disaster; it rather animated him in his design; in so much that with the greatest caution he could, he continued his practices with his friends, and now and then would steal to *Rome* and back again with such expedition, as he would be sure to present himself before the Governor at that time he was to appear. But afterwards, having drawn in as many as he thought necessary for his work he resolv'd to proceed to action, without farther delay; and sent to his correspondents in *Rome*, that at a prefix'd time, a splendid supper should be prepar'd; all the conspirators to be invited to it; and each of them have private orders to bring his Confident along with him, and he promised to be there himself precisely at the time. All things were ordered exactly to his directions; and he himself was punctually with them; for as soon as supper was ready, and serv'd up to the Table, he presented himself amongst them, in a Robe of cloth of Gold, his collar and other ornaments about him; to give him Majesty and reputation (and having

having embrac'd all the Conspirators) in a long oration he exhorted them to be courageous, and dispose themselves cheerfully in so glorious an enterprize. Then he appointed the way, ordering one of them to seize the *Pope's* Palace the next morning; and the other to run about the streets, and excite the People to Arm. But his Conspiracy coming to the ear of the *Pope* (some say by the treachery of his confederats, others by his being seen in the Town) which way soever it was, the *Pope* caus'd him and the greatest part of his Comerads to be apprehended the very same night after supper, and put to death, as they deserved. This was the end of that enterprize, and though among some People perhaps, his intention might be commended, yet his judgment must necessarily be blam'd; for such attempts may have some shadow of glory in the contrivance, but their execution is certain destruction.

*Stephano* and  
his confederats  
put to Death.

1453.

The War in *Tuscany* had continued about a year, and in the spring 1453 both Armies had taken the field, when in relief of the *Florentines* *Alexandro Sforza* the Dukes Brother arriv'd with a supply of 2000 Horse, by which the *Florentine* Army being much increas'd; and the Kings Army become inferior in number, the *Florentines* thought fit to recover what they had lost, and with little labour took some of their Towns again: after which they encamped at *Fosano*, which by the carelessness of the Commissaries was sack'd; so that the inhabitants being dispers'd, they were hardly got to inhabit there again: and when they did come, it was not without great exemptions and reward. The Castle of *Vada* also was retaken; for the Enemy perceiv'ing they could not hold it, they set it on fire, and departed. Whilst the *Florentine* Army was employ'd in this manner, the King of *Aragons* Army, not having the courage to come near them, were retreated towards *Sienna*, from whence they made frequent excursions into the Country about *Florence*, where they made great hububs; committed many outrages, and brought great terror upon the People, Nor was the King defective in contriving other ways of assaulting his Enemies, dividing their forces or detracting from their reputation. *Gherardo Gambartori* was at that time Lord of *Valdibagno*. This *Gherardo* and his Ancestors, had always been in the *Florentine* service, either as hired, or recommended. *Alfonso* was tampering with this *Gherardo* to deliver up his territory to him, and he promis'd to give him an equivalence in the Kingdom of *Naples*. This transaction was not so private, but they had news of it in *Florence*, and an Ambassador was dispatch'd to remember him of his own and his predecessors obligations to that State; and to admonish him to prefeere in his amity with them, as they had constantly done. *Gherardo* pretended to be surpriz'd at what the Ambassador told him; swore a thousand oaths that never any such wickedness enter'd into his thoughts; proffer'd to have gone in person to *Florence*, and resided there, to secure them of his fidelity; but being unhappily indispos'd, himself, his Son should go a long with him, and remain there as a perpetual Hostage. His proffers, and his imprecations together made the *Florentines* believe that *Gherardo* was honest, and his accuser the Knaves, in which opinion they acquiesced. But *Gherardo* went on with the King, and rather with more eagerness than before; and when all was agreed, *Alfonso* sent Fryer *Puccio* (a Knight of *Jerusalem*) to take possession of the Castles and Towns which belong'd to *Gherardo*.

The vale of  
*Bagno* revolts.

But *Bagno* retaining its affection to *Florence*, promis'd obedience to the Kings Commissary, with no little regret: *Puccio* was in possession of almost all that State, only the Castle of *Coxano* was behind, which was likewise to be deliver'd. When *Gherardo* made this surrender, among the rest of his own creatures about him there was one *Antonio Gualandi*, a *Pisan*, a young Gentleman and brave, and one that highly detested this treachery in *Gherardo*. Pondering with himself, the situation of the place, the number of the Garrison; the dissatisfaction he observ'd both in their gestures and looks, and finding *Gherardo* at the Gate ready to introduce the Enemy; he convey'd himself betwixt the Castle and *Gherardo* and taking his opportunity with both his hands thrust him away; and then causing the wicket to be shut, he exhorted the guards to stand faithfully to the *Florentines* against so false and so flagitious a Man: the report of this action arriv'ing at *Bagno*, and the Towns which were about it, they unanimously took Arms against their new Masters, and setting up the *Florentine* colours upon the walls they drove them all out of that Country: this news coming to *Florence*, they immediately clap'd their young Hostage into Prison, and dispatch'd supplies to *Bagno* and those parts to secure them, and made that Country dependant upon themselves. *Gherardo* (a Traitor in the mean time, both to his friends and his Son) had much ado to escape; leaving his Wife, Family, and fortune in the hands of his Enemies. This accident was lookt upon as a great deliverance in *Florence*: for had the King made himself Master of those parts, he might with little expence have overrun all as far as *Valdi Tevere*, and *Casentino*, and brought such distraction upon their affairs, that the *Florentines* must have divided their Army, and been disabled thereby from attending the

*Arago-*

*Aragonian* forces about *Sienna*, with their Army entire. Besides the provisions which the *Florentines* had made in *Italy* to oppose the confederacy of their Enemies; they sent *Agriolo Acciajuoli* their Ambassador into *France*, to negotiate with that King for the sending King *Rinaldo d'Angio* into *Italy*, in the behalf of the Duke and themselves, and to represent to him, that coming thither for the defence of his friends, when he was once entred, and had settled them, he might set up his own claim to the Kingdom of *Naples* and they would be engag'd to assist him, and so whilst in *Lombardy* and *Tuscany* the War was carried on (as we have related) in *France*, the Treaty was concluded; and *Rinaldo* oblig'd in *June* to come into *Italy* with 2400 Horse; and the League on the other side oblig'd at his arrival at *Alexandria*, to pay him 30000 Florents, and 10000 *per men*. afterwards whilst the War should continue: but being ready (upon this stipulation) to pass into *Italy*, he was obstructed by the Duke of *Savoy* and the Marquess of *Monferrat*, who were friends to the *Venetians*, and would not suffer him to pass. Hereupon *Rinaldo* was desired by the *Florentine* Ambassador to march with his Forces into *Provence*, and for the encouragement and reputation of his friends, to pass himself and part of them into *Italy* by Sea, leaving the rest in *Provence*, till the King of *France* should prevail with the duke of *Savoy* that they might march through his Country: and as the Ambassador advised, it was done; for *Rinaldo* went by Sea, and the rest at the King of *France's* mediation, were permitted to pass into *Italy* through the Dominions of the Duke of *Savoy*. King *Rinaldo* was received by the Duke of *Milan* with all the demonstrations of Kindness imaginable; and having joyned their Forces, they assaulted the *Venetians* with such terror, that in a little time, all the Towns they had taken about *Cremona* were recovered; and not contented with them, they took almost all the Country of *Brescia*; for the *Venetian* Army, not thinking it self secure in the field, was retreated under the very walls of that City. Winter coming on, and the Duke at *Verona*, he thought fit, for the refreshment of his men, to put them into quarters, and assigned *Pianzenza* for the quarters of *Rinaldo*; where having remained all that Winter in the year 1453, without any action considerable; when the Spring was come, and the Duke resolv'd to draw into the field, and drive the *Venetians* out of all they had upon the *terra firma*, *Rinaldo* signified to the Duke, that of necessity he must return into *France*. This resolution of *Rinaldo's* was unexpected to the Duke, and gave him no little anxiety. He went to him immediately, himself, and endeavour'd with all possible importunity to dissuade him; but neither prayers nor promises could prevail with him any farther, than to leave part of his forces with them, and to engage himself to send his Son *Giovanni*, who in his room should continue in the service of the League. How unwelcome so ever it was to the Duke, *Rinaldo's* departure was not at all displeasing to the *Florentines*; for having recover'd what they had lost themselves, and being grown fearless of *Alfonso*, they had no more, that the Duke should get more than his own Towns in *Lombardy*. *Rinaldo* continuing his resolution, departed for *France*, and (as he had promis'd) sent his Son *Giovanni* into *Italy*; who staid not in *Lombardy*, but remov'd presently to *Florence*, where he was honorably entertain'd. This departure of *Rinaldo* dispos'd Duke *Francesco* to peace; the *Venetians*, the *Florentines*, and *Alfonso*, were all weary of the War, and ready to embrace it; and the Pope desired it above all, by reason that that very year *Mahomet* the great Turk had taken *Constantinople* and made himself Master of all *Greece*: which alarm'd all *Christendom*, but especially the *Venetians* and the Pope, who imagin'd already they felt his Terrors in *Italy*. The Pope therefore desired all the Potentates of *Italy* that they would send their several Plenipotentiaries to him, to negotiate a general peace. His motion being accepted and the Ambassadors met; when they came to the matter, so much difficulty arose; as there was but small hopes of accommodation.

*Alfonso* required that the *Florentines* should reimburse him for all the charges he had been at in the War: and the *Florentines* expected the same. The *Venetians* demanded *Cremona* of the Duke; and the Duke *Bergamo*, *Brescia*, and *Crema* of them. So that these difficulties seem'd impossible to be remov'd. Nevertheless, what was so desperate at *Rome*, among so many, was easily concluded betwixt two of them, at *Milan*, and *Venice*; for whilst the peace was negotiating at *Rome*, and proceeded thus slowly; on the ninth of *April* 1454 it was determin'd betwixt the Duke and the *Venetians*; that each of them should be restor'd to what they were possess'd of before the War. That the Duke should have liberty to recover what the Marquess of *Monferrat*, and the Duke of *Savoy* had taken from him; and that three months time should be allow'd to the rest of the Princes of *Italy* to come in. The Pope, the *Florentines*, the *Siennese*, and other little Potentates came in within the time prefix'd, and ratif'd it; and the *Venetians*, *Florentines* and Duke, made a peace betwixt them three for 25 years. *Alfonso* was the only Prince of *Italy* who seem'd to be refractory,

1453

Peace betwixt  
the Duke and  
*Venetians*.

Alfonso enters  
into the  
League.

fractory; conceiving he could not concur without diminution, in respect he was to be admitted rather as an auxiliary, than a principal: upon which score he continued irresolute a good while, and would not declare; at length upon several Embassies from the Pope and other Princes, he suffered himself to be prevailed upon, and he and his Son entred into the League for 30 years. After which the King and the Duke made several alliances and cross-matches together; marrying their Sons and Daughters reciprocally into one anothers families. Yet, that *Italy* might not be left without seed or foundation for a new War, *Alfonso* would not enter into the League, till he had leave by consent of the colleagues to make War upon the *Genoeses*; and *Gismondo Malatesta*; and *Astorre* Prince of *Faenza*: Peace being concluded upon those terms, *Ferrando Alfonso's* Son, who had been at *Sienna*, returned into *Naples*, having done nothing considerable in *Tuscany*, but lost many of his Men.

New troubles  
by *Giacopo Pic-*  
*cinino* encour-  
rag'd privately  
by *Alfonso*.

This Peace being made, and most of the Princes comprehended, the only fear that remained, was, lest the differences betwixt *Alfonso* and the *Genoeses* might disturb it. But it prov'd otherwise, for *Alfonso* did nothing openly to molest it; it was the ambition and avarice of the Mercenary Souldier which interrupted it; the *Venetians* (as their custom is upon the conclusion of peace) disbanding their Army, *Giacopo Piccinino* one of their Generals, with several other considerable officers (without leave) departed into *Romagna*, and from thence to *Sienna*, where he began new Hostilities, and took several Towns. In the beginning of these troubles, and of the year 1455 Pope *Nicolo* died, and *Calisto 3.* was chosen to succeed. This Pope, to repress these new and approaching Wars, rais'd what forces he could, under the command of his General *Giovanni Ventimiglia*, and joyning them with the forces of the *Florentines* and the Duke (who were likewise got together to suppress those commotions) they march'd together in a Body against *Giacopo*, and coming to an engagement with him near *Bolsena*, notwithstanding *Ventimiglia* was taken prisoner *Giacopo* was worsted, and got off in disorder to *Castiglione della Pescaia*; where, had he not been supplied with money by *Alfonso* he had been utterly ruin'd. Which relief made all People believe that that enterprize was undertaken, and prosecuted by *Alfonso's* order, and direction: and *Alfonso* perceiving he was discover'd, to reconcile himself to the Colleagues, (whom he had disoblig'd with that pitiful War) he brought it about that *Giacopo* should restore all he had taken in the territory of *Sienna*, upon the payment of 20000 *Florens*; after which conclusion, he receiv'd *Giacopo* and his forces into the Kingdom of *Naples*. In these times, though the Pope was very intent upon the curbing of *Piccinino*, yet not so but he had eye still upon the interest of *Christendom*, which was then much overlaid by the *Turk*.

*Calisto 3* fo-  
licits a War a-  
gainst the *Turks*.

To this end he sent Embassadors, and preachers into all the Provinces of Europe, to persuade them to arm against the common Enemy of their Religion; and with their persons and purses to give what assistance they were able: so that in *Florence* great store of alms were collected; and several People wore the red cross, to intimate that they were ready in their Persons to engage in that War. Besides which, several solemn processions were made; nor was there any thing in publick or private wanting, to show them among the forwardest of the Christians in that enterprize, either for Counsel, or Money, or Men. but the edge of this *Crossad* was taken off, by a late intelligence they receiv'd, that the *Turk* having besieg'd *Belgrade* a Town in *Hungary*, not far from the *Danube*; was beaten off by the *Hungarians*, and himself wounded: so that the terrour which all *Christendom* conceiv'd upon the taking of *Constantinople*, being abated, they went on but coolly in their preparations for War; and in *Hungary* likewise upon the Death of the *way-wod* their General, their Victory was prosecuted but faintly. But to return to the affairs in *Italy*. The troubles commenced by *Giacopo Piccinino*, being compos'd in the year 1456, and all humane contention in appearance at an end; it pleased God to begin a new War of his own, and to send such a storm and tempest of Wind in *Tuscany*, as produc'd most strange and memorable effects, above the records of time past, or the credit of time to come. Upon the 24 of *August*, about an hour before day near the upper Sea towards *Anconia*, a thick dark cloud, of about two miles wide, was seen crossing over *Italy*, and pointing towards *Pisa*; which cloud being driven by an extraordinary impulse (whether natural or supernatural I cannot say) was divided into several parts; sometimes hurried up to the sky; sometimes as furiously towards the Earth; sometimes twisting round like a Cylinder, knocking and dashing one against the other with unconceivable violence, with great lightnings and flashes of fire before them; which concussions made a noise more dreadful and loud than ever any thunder or Earthquake was known to have done. The terror of this tempest was so great, every one believed the World was at an end; and that the Heavens, the Earth, the Waters, and the rest of the Elements, were resolving into their first chaos and confusion: nor were the effects less formidable where it pass'd, especially about the Castle of *S. Casiana*. This Castle

A prodigi-  
ous tempest.



is about eight miles from *Florence*, situate upon the mountain which parts the vales of *Pisa* and *Griève*; betwixt this Castle, and the Town of *S. Andrea* (upon the same mountain) this whirlwind passing, reach'd not to the Town; and of the Castle it carried away only the battlements and chimnies; but betwixt the said places it laid several houses flat with the ground; tore up the Churches from their foundations, and carried the Roofs of the Churches of *San. Martino* & *Bagnuolo*, and of *Santa Maria della pace*, whole and entire, above the distance of a mile. A Messenger and his mules were hurried out of the way, into the neighbouring valley, and found dead the next day. The sturdiest Oaks and the strongest trees, were not only blown down, but carried an incredible distance from the place where they grew. Insomuch that when day appeared, and the tempest was over, the people remained stupid, and in strange consternation. The Country was desolate, and wasted; The ruins of the houses and Churches terrible; The lamentation of those whose houses were subverted and their cattle, servants, or friends found dead in their ruins, was not to be seen nor heard without great horror and compassion. But God sure intended rather to affright, than chastise the *Tuscans*; for had this tempest happened in any of their Cities where the houses were thick, and the inhabitants numerous, as it fell upon the hills where the oaks and trees and houses were thin; doubtless the mischief and desolation had been greater than the mind of man can comprehend. But God Almighty was pleased to content himself with this essay, to make mankind more sensible of his power, if they persisted to offend him.

But to return where I left, *Alonso*, as I said before, was not at all satisfied with the peace; and seeing the War which he had caused *Giacopec Piccinino* to make, upon the *Siennese* (without any reasonable occasion) had produced no considerable effect; he had a mind to try what that would come to, which by the League he was permitted to undertake: So that in the year 1456. (desiring to fix that Government in the family of the *Adorni*, and to supplant the *Fregosi* who were then in possession) resolved to invade the *Genoese* both by Sea and by Land. To this end, he caused *Giacopec Piccinino* to pass *Tronto* with his Forces and fall upon *Gismondo Malatesta*, (by way of diversion) who having secured his Towns was not much terrified at his reproach, so that his enterprize on that side turn'd to little account. but his invasion of *Genoa* created him and his Kingdom more troubles, than he ever desir'd: *Piero Fregosa* was at that time Duke of *Genoa*. This *Piero*, finding himself unable to bear up against so powerful a King: upon consideration of his own weakness, resolv'd at last to surrender that State to one that should be able to defend it, and perhaps sometime or other give him a reasonable reward; he sent Embassadors therefore to *Charles 7* of *France* to desire his protection, and tender him the Government. *Charles* accepted the offer, and to take possession of the City, he sent *Giovanni d'Angio* (King *Rnato's* Son) who not long before was returned from *Florence* into *France*; for *Charles* was persuaded that *Giovanni* being acquainted with the humors, and customs of the *Italians*, was properer for that Government, than any Man he could send: besides from thence he believ'd he might prosecute his designs against *Naples* with more ease and convenience; his Father *Rnato*, having been expell'd that Kingdom by *Alonso* of *Aragon*. Hereupon *Giovanni* departed for *Genoa*, was receiv'd honorably by the Town, and invested with the whole power both of the City, and State.

The *Genoese* assaulted by *Alonso*.

*Genoa* delivered to the *French*.

This accident was not at all pleasing to *Alonso*; he found now he had pull'd an old boot over his head; however he carried it bravely, went on with his enterprize and was advanc'd with his Fleet under *Villa Marina* at *Porto Fino*, when surpriz'd with a sudden distemper, he died. The death of *Alonso*, put an end to the Wars against *Giovanni*, and the *Genoese*: and *Ferrando* succeeded his Father *Alonso* in the Kingdom, was in no little trouble, having an Enemy upon his hands of such reputation in *Italy*; and a jealousy of several of his Barons, who being inclin'd to new changes, he was afraid might side with the *French*; besides he was acquainted with the ambition of the *Pope*, and being scarce settled in his Kingdom, was fearful lest he should attempt something to supplant him: his only hopes were in the Duke of *Milan*, who was no less sollicitous for the affairs of that Kingdom, than himself; apprehending that if ever the *French* came to be Masters of *Naples*, their next enterprize of course would be against him; for he knew they might pretend to *Milan* as an appendix to that Crown. For these reasons, as soon as *Alonso* was dead, *Francesco* sent letters and Men to *Ferrando*; the first to keep up his heart, the other his reputation: Upon the death of *Alonso* the *Pope* designed to give his Nephew *Piero Lodovico Borghia*, the Government of that Kingdom; and to gloss over the business, and make it more plausible to the Princes of *Italy*, he gave out that that Kingdom belonging formerly to the Church; his intention was only to reduce it to that condition, and therefore he desired the Duke of *Milan* would not give any assistance to *Ferrando*; and offer'd him such Towns as he had possess'd

*Alonso* dies



possess'd formerly in that Kingdom. But in the midst of his contrivances *Calisto* died, and *Pius 2.* succeeded him, who was a *Siennesi* of the Family of the *Piccol Huomini*; and his Name *Aeneas*.

*Calisto 3.*  
dies and *Pius*  
2. chosen in his  
chair.

The *Genoese*  
revolts from  
the *French*.

1459.

The King-  
dom of *Naples*  
invaded by *Gio-  
vanni d' An-  
gelo*.

*Ferrando* dis-  
comfited.

This Pope employing his thoughts wholly for the benefit of *Christendom*, and the Honour of the Church, and laying aside all private passion; and advantage at the intreaty of the Duke of *Milan*, crown'd *Ferrando* King of *Naples*: judging it a readier and safer way to compose the differences of *Italy* by confirming him that was already in possession, than by assisting the pretences of the *French*; or setting up (as *Calisto* did) for himself. However *Ferrando* took it for a favour, and to requite it he made *Antonio* the Popes Nephew Prince of *Malsi*; married him to his natural Daughter; and besides this, restor'd *Benevento* and *Ferracina* to the Church. And now all the Arms in *Italy* were visibly laid down, and *Pius* (as *Calisto* had begun before) was moving all *Christendom* against the *Turk*; when a new quarrel sprung up betwixt the *Fregosi*, and *Giovanni* the Lord of *Genoa*, which produc'd a greater, and more important War than the last: *Petrino Fregosi* was retir'd to a Castle of his in *Riveria*; much discontented, that *Giovanni d' Angio* having been prefer'd to his dignity in *Genoa* by him and his Family, had not gratified them as they deserved: so that by degrees it was come to a feud. *Ferrando* was very well pleas'd with the difference; as being the only way to secure him in his Kingdom, and therefore he sent *Petrino* supplies both of men and mony, hoping thereby *Giovanni* might be expuls'd out of the State of *Genoa*. *Giovanni* having notice of their intelligence sent for relief into *France*, which having received, he march'd out against *Petrino*; but *Petrino* by the access of more supplies from sundry places, being grown too strong, *Giovanni* retreated, and applyed himself to securing the City; which he did not do so carefully, but *Petrino* in one night surprized several Posts in it, but was beaten the next morning, himself, and most of his Men slain. this victory elevated *Giovanni* so far, that he resolv'd to attempt upon *Ferrando*; departing from *Genoa* in *October* 1459 with a great Fleet, he sail'd to *Baia*, and from thence to *Sessa*, where he was honorably received by that Duke.

There had joyn'd themselves with *Giovanni*, the Prince of *Taranto*, and the Citizens of *Aquila*; besides several other Princes and Cities; so that already that Kingdom was more than half lost. Upon which *Ferrando* desir'd aid of the Pope, and the Duke of *Milan*, and to lessen the number of his Enemies, made peace with *Gismondo Malatesta*, which peace disgust'd *Giacopo Piccinino* so highly (*Gismondo* being his natural Enemy) that he deserted *Ferrando*, and took up Arms under *Giovanni*. *Ferrando* sent mony likewise to *Federigo* Lord of *Urbino*, and as soon as could be expected, got together a considerable Army (according to those times) with which he march'd against the Enemy, and finding them upon the River *Sarni*, he engaged them, but was defeated and his most considerable officers taken; after this victory, most of the Towns and Castles surrendred to *Giovanni* only *Naples* & some few neighbouring Towns and Princes, adher'd still to *Ferrando*. *Giacopo Piccinino* advis'd to march directly for *Naples*, and make himself Master of the chief City, but *Giovanni* replyed he would first ruine the Country, and then the City would come with more ease; but his rejecting the Counsel of *Piccinino*, was the loss of that design; for he did not know that the members follow the head more naturally, than the head the members: *Ferrando* was fled into *Naples*, and there resorted to him diverse of his Subjects who were driven from their homes, whom he receiv'd, and having with all possible gentleness, gained some monies of the Citizens, he got a small body of an Army together; he sent new Embassies to the Pope and Duke for supplies and was reliev'd with more plenty and speed than before; for they were both of them afraid, that the loss of that Kingdom would turn to their prejudice. Much strengthened by their supplies, *Ferrando* march'd out of *Naples*; and having recover'd his reputation, in part, he recover'd some of his Towns: But whilst the War was carried on in that Kingdom with such variety, an accident happen'd which rob'd *Giovanni* of his opportunity of completing that enterprize. The *Genoese* were extremely dissatisfied with the insolent Government of the *French*; had taken Arms against the Governor, and forc'd him into the Castle; in this action the *Fregosi* and *Adorni* concurr'd; and the Duke of *Milan*, supplyed them both with mony and men: King *Rinaldo* pass'd that way with a fleet towards the relief of his Son, imagining by the help of the Castle he might recover the Town; and landing his men in order thereunto, he was beaten in such sort, that he was forc'd back into *Provence*. This news dismay'd *Giovanni* not a little: however he gave not his enterprize over, but continued the War by the help of such Barons whose revolt from *Ferrando* had render'd them desperate of pardon: at length after many occurrences, both Armies came to a Battle near *Troia*; in which *Giovanni* was routed, but his defeat troubled him not so much, as the loss of *Piccinino*, who left his side, and went back again to *Ferrando*. His Army

Army being broke, he got off into *Histria* and from thence into *France*. This War continued 4 years, and miscarried by the negligence of the General, when the Souldiers had many times overcome. In this War however the *Florentines* were not publickly concern'd <sup>Giovanni</sup> defeated. The truth is upon the death of *Alfonso*, his Son *John of Aragon* being come to that Crown, sent his Embassadors to desire their assistance for his Nephew *Ferrando*, according to their obligation by their late League with *Alfonso*; but the *Florentines* returned, that they did not think themselves oblig'd to assist the Son in a quarrel commenced by the Father; and as it was begun without their consent or knowledg, so without any assistance from them it might be continued or ended. Whereupon, in behalf of their King, the Embassadors protested them guilty of the breach of the League, and responsible for all the losses which should follow; and having done that, in a great huff they departed. During the revolutions in this War, the *Florentines* were at quiet abroad, but at home it was otherwise, as shall be shown more particularly, in the following Book.

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THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
FLORENCE.

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Book VII.

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**I**N the reading of the last Book, it may appear (possibly) impertinent, and a digression, for a Writer of the *Florentine* History to have broke out, and expatiated upon the affairs of *Lombardy* and *Naples*. Yet I have done it, and shall do it for the future; for though I never profess'd to write the transactions of *Italy*, yet I never bound my self up from giving a relation of such important and memorable passages, as would make our History more grateful and intelligible; especially seeing from the actions of other Princes and States, wars and troubles did many times arise in which the *Florentines* were of necessity involved: for example, the War betwixt *Giovanni d'Angio*, and King *Ferrando*, proclaimed in them so great a hatred and animosity one towards the other, that it was continued afterwards betwixt *Ferrando* and the *Florentines*, and more particularly the House of *Medici*. For King *Ferrando* complaining, not only that they had refus'd him their assistance, but given it to his Enemies; that resentment of his, was the occasion of much mischief, as will be shown in our narration.

And because in my description of our Foreign affairs, I am advanc'd to the year 1463. (being return'd to our domestick) it will be necessary to look back for several years. But first by way of introduction (as my custom) I shall say, that they who imagine a Commonwealth may be continued united, are egregiously mistaken. True it is, dissention does many times hurt; but sometimes it advantages a State. It hurts when it is accompanied with parties, and factions; it helps, when it has none. Seeing there-

fore, it is impossible for any Legislator or founder of a republick, to provide there should be no piques, nor unkindnesses betwixt Men; it is his business what he can, to secure them against growing into parties and *Clans*. It is then to be consider'd, that there are two ways for Citizens to advance themselves to reputation among their Neighbours, and they are, either publickly or privatly. The Publick way is, by gaining some battle, surprizing and distressing some Town; performing some Embassy carefully and prudently; or countessing their State wisely and with success; the private way is, by being kind to their fellow Citizens; by defending them from the Magistrats; supplying them with money, promoting them to honors; and with plays and publick exhibitions to ingratiate with the People. This last way produces parties and factions, and as the reputation acquir'd that way is dangerous and fatal, so the other way it is beneficial (if it sides with no party) as extending to the publick. And although among Citizens of such qualification, there must needs be emulations and jealousies, yet wanting partisans, and People which for their advantage will follow them, they are rather a convenience than otherwise, to a Government; for to make themselves more eminent and conspicuous than their Competitors, they employ all their faculties for its advancement, prying and observing one anothers actions so strictly, that neither dares venture to transgress.

The emulations in *Florence* were always with faction; and for that reason always were dangerous; nor was any party unanimous any longer than it had an adverse party in being; for that being overcome, and the predominant party having no fear, nor order to restrain it, subdivided on course: *Cosimo de Medici's* party prevail'd in the year 1434; but (the depress'd party being great, and many powerful Men amongst them) for a while they continued unanimous and supportable, committing no exorbitance among themselves, nor injustice to the People, which might beget them their hatred. Insomuch as when ever they had use of the People for their readvancement to any place of authority, they found them always ready to confer it upon the chief of that party, whether it was the *Balia* or any other power which they desir'd: and so from the year 1434 to 55 (which was 21 years) they were six times created of the *Balia* by the Counsels of the People.

*Cosimo de Medici and Neri Capponi the two great Citizens in Florence,*

There were in *Florence* (as we have many times hinted) two principal Citizens, *Cosimo de Medici*, and *Neri Capponi*. *Neri* had gain'd his reputation in the publick way, and had many friends, but few partisans: *Cosimo* on the other side had advanc'd himself both ways, and had friends and partisans both, and these two continuing friends, whilst they lived together, they could ask nothing of the People; but it was readily granted, because unanimity went along with the Power. But *Neri* dying in the year 1455, and the adverse party being extinct, the Government found great difficulty to recover its authority, and *Cosimo's* great friends were the cause of it, who were willing to detract from his authority, now his adversaries were suppress'd. This was the beginning of the divisions in 1466, in which year, in a solemn council, where the publick administration was debated, those to whom the Government at that time belonged, advis'd that there should be no *Balia* for the future: that the way of imbursement should be laid aside; and the Magistrats be chosen by lots, as in the former *Squittini's* or elections. To obviate this humour, *Cosimo* had two ways, either to possess himself forcibly of the Government by the power of his party, and depose his Enemies: or to let things go which way they would, and attend till time should make his friends discern, that they did not take the Government, and authority so much from him, as from themselves. Of the two he made choice of the last; knowing that according to that constitution, the purses being full of his friends, he could without any danger reassume his Authority when he pleas'd. The City being thus reduc'd to its old way of creation of Magistrats by lots, they thought they had perfectly recover'd their liberty, and that for the future elections were to be made not according to the influence of the Nobility, but the inclination of the People. So that sometimes the friend of one Grandee was rejected, and sometimes of another, and those whose houses were formerly full of Clients and their presents, had now scarce householdstuff left, or servant to attend them: those who were formerly their inferiors, were now become their equals, and their equals advanced to be their Superiours: they were not regarded nor respected, but rather derided and abus'd; all People taking the freedom to talk of them and their Government as they pleas'd, even in the streets and high ways, without any contradiction; so that it was not long after, they discovered, that as he had told them, it was not so much *Cosimo*, as themselves which were degraded.

However *Cosimo* took no notice, but in all propositions that would please the People, he was the first who concurr'd. But that which was most terrible to the Nobility, and made *Cosimo* look about him, was the receiving of the *Catastro* of the year 1427 by which the impositions were to be laid by order of Law, and not by the capriccios of particular Men.

This

This Law being reviv'd, and Magistrats already chosen to put in execution, the Nobility assembled, and went to *Cosimo* to beg of him that he would be a means to rescue them out of the jaws of the people; and restore the State to a condition that might make him powerful, and them honorable. To which *Cosimo* replied he would do it with all his heart, provided it might be done legally by the consent of the people and without any force, of which he would not endure to hear. Then they endeavoured in the Counsels to prevail for a new *Balia*, but they could not obtain it; whereupon they returned to *Cosimo*, and press'd him with all expressions of humility that he would consent to a Parliament; but *Cosimo* (resolved to make them fully sensible of their error) absolutely refused it, and because *Donati Cochis* (being *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia* at that time) presum'd to call a Parliament without his consent, *Cosimo* made him so ridiculous and contemptible in the *Senate*, he was not able to continue there but as a distracted Man, was sent home again to his house: Nevertheless, lest things should run too far to be recovered, *Luca Pitti* (a bold and tenacious Man) being made *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia*, he thought it a convenient time to have the Government to him, that if any thing miscarried in that enterprize it might be imputed to *Luca*: And accordingly *Luca* in the very beginning of his office, urged the People many times to the restoration of the *Balia*, threatening those of the Counsels with opprobrious and insolent language; and not long after he executed what he had threaten'd; for in August 1453 in the vigil of *San Lownzo*, having filled the Palace with armed Men, he called the people together in the *Piazza*, and constrained them by force to consent, to what they had voluntarily refused. Having repossess'd themselves of the state, created a new *Balia*, and changed the Magistrats according to the pleasure of a few; that the beginning of their Government might be as terrible, as it was forcible, they confin'd *Girolamo Machiavelli* and some others, and deprived many of their honors. *Girolamo* not being exact in observing his bounds, was proscrib'd, and wandring up and down *Italy* to excite the several Princes against his own Country, by the Treachery of one of the *Senators* in *Lunigiana*, he was apprehended, brought back to *Florence*, and executed in Prison: This Government (which lasted eight years) was very violent, and insupportable: for *Cosimo* being grown old, weary of business, and infirm in his body; could not be so sedulous as formerly, so that the City was become a prey to a few particular Citizens; who in requital of his good service to the State, made *Luca Pitti* a Knight, and he (in return of their kindness) appointed, that whereas before they were called *Prisori dell'Arti*, now (that they might at least retain the Title, though they lost the possession) they should be called *Prisori della liberta*. He ordered likewise that whereas formerly the *Gonfalonieri* sat on the right hand of the *Retori*, they should sit in the midst of them hereafter: and (that God might have his share in the revolution) he caused solemn services, and processions to be performed, by way of thanks for the honors to which they were restored.

*Luca* was richly presented both by *Cosimo* and the *Senate*; after whom the whole City came in flocks, so that it was believed he had given him that day to the value of 20000 Ducats by which means he grew into such reputation, that not *Cosimo*, but he was looked upon as the Governor of City; and he arrived at that point of vanity, to begin two stately and magnificent houses one in *Florence*, & the other at *Rucina*, not above a miles distance from the City: but that in *Florence* was greater, and more splendid, than the House of any other private Citizen whatsoever; for the finishing of which he baulk'd no extraordinary way; for not only the Citizens and better sort, presented him, and furnish'd him with what was necessary about it; but the Common people gave him all of them their assistance: besides all that were banish'd, or guilty of Murder, Felony, or any other thing which expos'd them to public punishment, had Sanctuary at that house provided they would give him their labour: The rest of his Brethren, though they built not such houses, they were no less rapacious than he, so that though *Florence* had no Wars abroad to destroy it, it had Citizens at home, in its own bowels, which would not suffer it to prosper: In the mean time, as we have said before, the Wars happen'd in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and the *Pope* had difference with the *Malatesti* in *Romagna* concerning *Rsmino* and *Cesana*, which they had taken from him, and desired to recover: so that betwixt the thoughts of that, and the enterprize against the *Turks*, the time of *Pius* his whole Papacy was consum'd. But *Florence* fell again into its old factions and dissensions. The divisions in *Cosimo*'s party began in 55 upon the occasions aforesaid, and by his wisdom (as is said before) they were restrained. But in 64 *Cosimo* fell sick, and dyed, generally lamented, both by his friends and his Enemies, for they, who lov'd him not whilst at the Helm, seeing their fellow Citizens so rapacious whilst he was living, (the reverence they bore to his Person making them less insupportable than otherwise they would be) could not but fear, now he was dead, and his influence lost, they should be utterly ruined, and in his Son *Piero* they could repose little confidence; for

Luca Pitti,

Girolamo  
Machiavelli;

Cosimo dies

though he was of himself a good Man, yet being infirm, and but young in the State, they supposed he would be constrained to comply with them, and they become more head-strong and incontrollable in their wickedness: so that *Cosimo* died universally lamented, and certainly he deserved it; for he was the most famous and memorable Citizen (of a Person that was no Souldier) that ever *Florence* or any other City produc'd: he exceeded all his contemporaries, not only in Authority and Estate, but in liberality and prudence; which qualities made him a Prince in his Country, and beloved by all People: his munificence was more eminent after his death, than before, for when his Son *Piero* came to look over his writing, and to enquire into the particulars of his Estate, he found there was scarce a Man of any quality in the City, to whom *Cosimo* had not lent a considerable sum; and many times when he heard of the exigencies of any Person of quality, he supply'd them unasked. His magnificence appear'd in the multitude of his buildings; for in *Florence* he built the Convents of *S. Marco*, and *S. Lorenzo*, and the Monastery of *S. Verdiano*: in the *Monti di Fiesole*, *S. Garatomo*, and the Abbey in *Mugello*, he not only repaired a Church of the *Minor's*, but he took it down, and rebuilt it from the ground: besides this in *S. Croce*, in *Servi* in *Areoli*, in *S. Miniato*, he erected altars, and most sumptuous Chappels, all which besides the building, he adorn'd with all the utensels and decorations required in so sacred a place. Besides his religious houses, he built several private houses for himself, one in the City suitable to his quality; four without, at *Careggio*, *Fiesole*, *Casagivolo*, and *Trebi*, all of them fitter for Princes, than private Men: and as if his buildings in *Italy* were too few to make him famous, he built an Hospital in *Jerusalem*, for the reception and relief of poor and infirm pilgrims brought thither by their devotion; in which fabrick, he laid out a vast sum of Money: and albeit in his actions and buildings he behaved himself like a King, and was the only Prince in *Florence*, yet he was so moderate, and untransported in all things, that in his conversation, his *Parades*, his alliances, and his whole manner of life, he retained the modesty of a Citizen; for he was sensible that ostentation and Pomp in that which is every day to be seen, contracts more envy, than moderation, and gravity, Being to seek for matches for his Sons, he did not endeavour for the alliance of Princes, but married his Son *Giovanni* to *Cornelia Alessandri*, and *Piero*, to *Lucretia Tornabuoni*, and contracted his Grand-children by *Piero*, *Bianca* to *Guglielmo di Pazzi*, and *Nannina* to *Bernardo Rucellai*. Among all the States, Princes, and civil Governments of his time; no person came near him for sagacity and intelligence. Hence it was that in all the variety of his fortunes, when the City was so uncertain, and the people so voluble; He kept his Authority 31 years, for being a wise man and of great prospect, he foresaw any mischief at a distance, and was ready to prevent it, before it proceeded too far; or to frustrate the effects of it, if it did. Whereby he did not only subdue all domestick and private ambition at home, but restrained it so happily in several Princes, that whoever confederated with him and his Country, came off upon equal terms, if not worsted their enemies; and whoever oppos'd him, either lost their money, their time, or their State: and of this the *Venetians* can give ample testimony, who whilst in League with him against Duke *Philip*, were always victorious; but that League was no sooner broken, but they were beaten both by *Philip*, and *Francesco*: and when they joyned with *Alfonso* against the Republick of *Florence*, *Cosimo* with his own credit drained *Naples* and *Venice* so dry, that they were glad to except what terms of peace he would allow. Of all the difficulties therefore which *Cosimo* encountred both within the City and without, the conclusion was still honorable for him, and destructive for his enemies; so that the civil discords gain'd him authority at home, and his foreign Wars, power and reputation abroad; insomuch that to the territory and Dominion of his Country, he added the City of *Borgo a Sepulcro*, *Montedoglio*, *Casentino*, and *Valdi Bagno*, and by his virtue, and fortune, suppress'd his Enemies, and exalted his friends. He was born 1389. on *S. Cosimo*, and *Damiano's* day. The first part of his life was full of troubles, witness his banishment, his imprisonment, and his dangers in being killed. From the Counsel of *Constance*, after Pope *John* was ruin'd (whom he had attended thither) he was forced to fly in disguise, or otherwise he had been slain: but after the fortieth year of his age it was more pleasant and happy; not only such as were employ'd with him in publick affairs, but the managers also of his private treasure in foreign parts, participating of his felicity. From him many Families in *Florence* may derive their great estates: particularly the *Fornabuoni*, the *Benci*, the *Portinari*, the *Sapetti*, and in short all that had dependance either upon his counsel or fortune.

Though his disbursements were vast in building his Houses and Temples; and in his distributions to the poor, yet he would complain sometimes among his friends, that he had not laid out so much to the honour of God, as he was oblig'd; and that if he had done much more, he must confess himself his debtor. His stature was ordinary, his complexion worthy, his presence

presence venerable: his learning was not great, but his eloquence admirable; he was naturally prudent, courteous to his friends, merciful to the poor, profitable in his converse, cautious in his counsels; speedy in his executions, and in his sayings and replies, both solid and facetious. When he went first into Banishment, *Rinaldo de gli Albizzi* (drolling upon his exilement) sent him word, *The hen was hatching, to which Cosimo returned, that she would have but ill hatching so far from her nest.* To some of his Rebels who in a threatening way sent him word, *They were not asleep,* he reply'd, *he believ'd it, for he had spoil'd their sleeping.* When Pope *Pius* was encouraging and pressing all Christian Princes against the Turk, *Cosimo* said *the Pope was an old Man, but he had begun an enterprize as if he had been a Boy.* To the *Venetian* Embassadors, who came to *Florence* with the Embassadors of *Alfonso*, to complain of that Commonwealth, putting his hat off to them, he demanded the colour of his hair, they told him it was gray; he replyed, in time: *your Senators will be of the same colour.* Not many hours before his death, his Wife seeing him shut his eyes, enquired why he did so, and he told her *to use them.* Some Citizens after his return complaining to him that the City would be depopulated, and God Almighty offended, if he banished so many wealthy and Religious Men; he told them, *the City had better be depopulated than destroyed. That two yards of Cloath were enough to keep a Man from the cold; and that States were not to be preserved by the beads a Man carried in his hand.* These last expressions gave his Enemies occasion to calumniate him, as a person that was a greater lover of himself than his Country; and one that took more care of this World than the next. Many other of his wife sayings might be inserted, but being unnecessary, they are omitted. *Cosimo* was likewise a great lover and advancer of learned Men; upon which score he entertained in *Florence* *Argiropolo* a Grecian, as learned as any in his time, that by him the youth of *Florence* might be instructed in the Greek tongue, and in several of his Tenets. He entertained likewise in his House *Marsilio Ficino*, a great Patron of the Platonick Philosophy, whom he loved so entirely; and that he might follow his studies with more convenience, he gave him a house near his own Palace at *Caraggi.* So that his prudence, his beneficence, his success, and his way of living made him be belov'd, and feared among the Citizens, and much esteemed by all Princes of Europe. Whereby he left such a foundation to his posterity, that by their virtue they might equal him, by their fortune transcend him, and obtain as much honor as he had in *Florence*, in all the Cities and Countries of Christendom. Nevertheless towards the latter end of his days, he had several afflictions, he had but two Sons, *Piero* and *Giovanni*, of which *Giovanni* (the most hopeful) dyed, and *Piero* who survived, was infirm; and by the weakness of his body unfit either for publick or private business; so that after the death of his Son, causing himself to be carried about his house, he sigh'd and said, *this house is too big for so small a Family.*

It troubled him also that he had not (in his judgment) enlarged the dominion of the *Florentine* state, nor added to it empire, any considerable acquett: and it troubled him the more, for that he found himself cheated by *Francesco*, who when he was but Count, had promis'd him, as soon as he had made himself Master of *Milan*, to employ his Arms against *Lucca* in the behalf of the *Florentines*; but his mind chang'd with his fortune, and having got to be the Duke of *Milan*, had a desire to enjoy in peace, what he had obtained by War, so that after his elevation, he never medled in foreign concerns, nor made any more Wars, than were necessary for his own defence: which was a great disturbance to *Cosimo*, who now discerned he had been at great pains and expence to advance a Man who was both false and ingrateful. He perceived likewise that in respect of his age, and the infirmities of his body, he was not able to apply himself to publick or private business as he was wont; and he saw both the one and the other decline, the City going to wrack by the dissentions of the Citizens; and his fortune by his Ministers and Sons. These considerations gave him no little disquiet towards his end; yet he died full of Glory and renown; all the Cities and Princes of Christendom sent their compliments of condolency to his Son *Piero*, the whole City attended his Corps with great solemnity to the Grave, and by publick decree it was inscrib'd upon his Tomb *Padre della Patria.*

If in my description and character of *Cosimo*, I have rather followed the example of those who have written the lives of Princes, than of an Historian, it is not to be admir'd. He was a person extraordinary in our City, and I thought my self oblig'd to give him a more than ordinary commendation: during the time that *Italy* and *Florence* were in the condition aforesaid; *Lewis* King of *France* was infested with a furious War; which his Barons (at the instigation of *Francis* Duke of *Britan*, and *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy*) had rais'd. This War lay so heavy upon him, he could not assist *Giovanni* in his designs upon *Genoa* and *Naples*, but believing he had need enough of all the supplies he could get, he call'd back his forces; and *Savona* being at that time in the hands of the *French*, he order'd it to be deli-  
vered

vered to the Count, and left him if he pleas'd to pursue the enterprize against *Genoa*: the Count was easily persuaded, to a thing so much to his advantage; so that by the reputation of his amity with the *French King*, and the assistance given him by the *Adorni*, he possess'd himself of *Genoa*, and in gratitude to the *French King*, sent him a supply of 1500 Horse into *France*, under the Command of his eldest Son *Galeazzo*: by this means *Ferrando* of *Aragon*, and *Francesco Sforza* remain'd at quiet; the one Duke of *Lombardy*, and Lord of *Genoa*; the other King of the whole Kingdom of *Naples*, and having contracted alliances together, and married their Children the one to the other; they began to consider how they might secure their states to themselves whilst they lived, and to their heirs when they were dead.

In order to this, it was thought necessary, the King should make sure of such of his Barons as had sided against him in his Wars with *Giovanni d'Angio*, and the Duke should endeavour to extirpate all that had been favourers of the *Bracci*, who were mortal Enemies to the said Duke, and at that time in great reputation, under the conduct of *Giacopo Piccinino*. For *Giacopo* being the greatest Captain in *Italy*, and having no Sovereignty of his own; it concern'd all who had any, to have an eye over him, and more especially the Duke, who thought he could not enjoy his Dominion safely himself, nor leave it to his Sons, whilst *Giacopo* was living. Hereupon the King with all industry endeavour'd an accord with his Barons, used all possible art to reconcile himself to them; and he succeeded with much difficulty; for they found that whilst they were in Wars with the King, they must certainly be ruin'd; but by accommodation of their differences, and trusting themselves to him, there was only a hazard; and because Men do always avoid those evils with more readiness, which are most certain, Princes do easily deceive, such as are not able to contend. The Barons seeing nothing before them but destruction, if they continued the War, accepted his conditions, and threw themselves into his Arms; but not long after, sundry pretences were taken against them, and they were all of them extinguish'd. Which news, was so terrible to *Giacopo Piccinino* (who was then with his forces at *Salmona*) that by the mediation of his friends he immediatly practis'd his reconciliation with the Duke: and the Duke having offer'd him honorable terms, *Giacopo* resolv'd to accept them, and come in; and accordingly he went to *Milan* to present himself to him, attended by 100 Horse. *Giacopo* had served under his Father, and with his Brother a long time; first for Duke *Philip* and then for the People of *Milan*; so that by long conversation in those parts he had got a good interest, and was generally belov'd; and the present condition of affairs, had much increas'd it; for the prosperity, and Grandeur of the *Sforzeschi* had created them envy; and *Giacopo's* adversity and long absence had gain'd him compassion among the People, and a great desire to see him advanced: all which kindness discovered it self at his arrival; there being scarce any of the Nobility but went out to meet him; the streets were full of People to behold him; and no talk in the whole City but of him, and his family. But their extravagant acclamations were his ruine; for as they increas'd the Dukes jealousy, so they confirm'd his resolution to remove him, and that it might be done the more plausibly, and with less danger of detection, he order'd that his marriage with *Drusiano* his natural daughter (to whom he had been contracted long before) should be consummate. After which he practis'd with *Ferrando* to entertain him as General of his Army, and to give him 100000 *Florens* by way of advance; upon conclusion of these Articles, *Giacopo* and his wife accompanied an Ambassador from the Duke to *Naples*: where they were all very well received; and for several days entertained with all imaginable affluence and diversion; but desiring leave to pass to his Army at *Salmona*, he was invited by the King into the Castle, and after supper both he and his Son *Francesco* were apprehended, and clapp'd up into Prison, where not long after they were murdered.

*Giacopo Piccinino* murdered.

Thus were the Princes of *Italy* jealous of that virtue, which they had not in themselves; and not enduring it in other People, they expos'd that Country to calamities which not long after afflicted and destroyed it.

Pope *Pius*, having in the mean time accommodated the differences in *Romagna*, and finding an universal peace all over Europe; thought it a convenient time to solicit the Christians against the *Turks*, and reassum'd the whole methods which his predecessors had taken; by which all the Princes of Christendom were prevail'd withal to assist either with money, or Men: *Matheo* King of *Hungary*, and *Charles* Duke of *Burgundy* engag'd to go in Person; & were made Generals of that enterprize by the Pope, who was so well pleas'd with what he had done, that he went from *Rome* to *Ancona* to be at the Rendezvous of the Army, which was to meet there, and (by Ships which the *Venetians* had promis'd to furnish) betransported into *Sclavonia*. After the arrival of his Holiness, there was so great a throng and confluence of People, that in a few days all their provision was devour'd; and the neighbouring



bouring Towns not being able to supply, every Body was ready to starve for hunger: besides which they neither had money to pay the Soldier, nor weapons to Arm them; there was neither Duke of *Burgundy*, nor King of *Hungary* there; the *Venetians* indeed had sent a few Gallies under one of their Captains, but it was rather to show their Pomp, than to perform their promise; so far were they unfit for the transportation of an Army. So that in the midst of these disasters by reason of his great age and infirmities, the Pope died; the whole Army disbanded and returned to their own homes. Pope *Pius* dying in the year 1465, *Paul 2* (by birth a *Venetian*) was elected in his place. And as most of the Principalities in *Italy* had changed their Governors about that time, so *Francesco Sforza* Duke of *Milan* died, after he had enjoyed that Dukedom sixteen years, and *Galeazzo* his Son was declared his successor. The Death of this Prince was the occasion that the divisions in *Florence* encreased, & broke out much sooner than otherwise they would have done. *Cosimo* being dead, *Piero* his Son succeeded both to his authority and Estate; and having call'd to him *Diotisalvi Neroni* as honorable and great a Man as most in the City, (by whom, *Cosimo* upon his death had commanded his Son *Piero* to be governed in all his affairs) he let him know the great confidence his Father had repos'd in him, and that being desirous to obey him after his Death, as he had done whilst he was living, he did intreat his advice not only in his private and domestick affairs, but in his publick administration of the Government: & that he might begin first with his own particular business, he would show him the accounts and Books of his Estate, that he might understand how things stood; and direct him afterwards as he pleas'd. *Diotisalvi* promised to be ready, and faithful; but the accounts being produced and examined, were found very disorderly and imperfect: *Diotisalvi* (as a Person which respected his own interest, more than his professions to *Piero*, or his obligations to his Father, supposing it easie to rob him of his reputation, and divest him of the Authority which *Cosimo* had left him as hereditary) came to him therefore with Counsel very fair and reasonable in appearance, but inwardly destructive and pernicious. He represented to him the disorder of his accounts; and what sums of money would be necessary to have by him, if he meant to keep up his credit, or preserve his preferment in the State: he told him that those disorders were not any way so readily to be redress'd; nor his Coffers so naturally supplied, as by calling in such sums as were owing to his Father both abroad and at home. For *Cosimo* (to gain himself an interest) had been very ready to accommodate anybody that wanted; and the monies he had lent amounted to an incredible sum. *Piero* was well satisfied with his advice, and thinking it but just, he called in his money. But no sooner had he done it, but the Citizens cryed out upon him; declaimed against him as ingrateful and covetous, and used him as opprobriously, as if he had robbed them, and not demanded his own. *Diotisalvi* finding his design succeed, and that *Piero* was fallen into disgrace with the People, he consulted with *Luca Pitti*, *Agnolo Acciaiuoli*, and *Nicolo Soderini*, how they might depose him: they were all of them ready to embrace the design; but upon several grounds and provocations; *Luca* desired to succeed *Piero* in his command, for he was grown so great, he disdain'd to obey him: *Diotisalvi*, knew *Luca* was not fit to be chief in the Government, and therefore he thought, if *Piero* was removed; in a short time that authority would devolve upon him: *Nicolo Soderini* had a mind the City should be more free, and governed by direction of the chief Magistrates: *Agnolo*, had a private quarrel to the *Medici* for several reasons, and particularly these. *Raffaello* his Son had long before married *Alessandra de Bardi*, and had a great fortune with her: this Lady, either for his own defects, or other Peoples, was ill treated by both Father-in-Law, and Husband. *Lorenzo d' Ilarione* a young Gentleman her relation, pitying her condition, went with certain of his Comerads one night well Armed, and took her by force out of the house of *Agnolo*. The *Acciaiuoli* complained heavily of the outrage, and the cause being refer'd to *Cosimo*, he awarded that the *Acciaiuoli* should refund her portion, and that then it should be left to the Ladies election, whether she would return to her Husband or no. *Agnolo* did not think *Cosimo* in this determination, had dealt with him as a friend, and not being able to revenge it upon him, he resolv'd to do it upon his Son. Yet though their reasons and ends were diverse, the Conspirators agreed all in their pretence, that the City should not be governed by a peculiar Council, but by the Magistrates. The hatred of the People, and their occasions to revile him, were much exaggerated by the failing of several Merchants about that time, which was objected to *Piero* as a great prejudice to the City, as if the calling in of his money had broke them. To this aspersion it was added that he was negotiating a match for his eldest Son *Lorenzo*, with *Clarice* a Daughter of the *Orsini*, which they took in great dudgeon, and upbraided him by it, declaring that it was now apparent what he drove at; and that thinking his Son too good for any alliance in *Florence*, it was manifest he did not now look upon himself as a Citizen, but was casting about how he might make himself Sovereign: for he was too proud to have the Citizens to his kindred, had a desire to make them his subjects; and therefore he did not deserve

*Francesco Sforza died.*

deserve to have them his friends. These Conspirators believed they had all sure in their hands, for the greater part of the Citizens being deluded with the name of liberty, (with which the Conspirators had gilded and embellished their designs) had profess'd themselves on their side. There being a general ebullition of these sort of humors at that time in the City; it was thought convenient by some that were not at all taken with them, seeing they could not be absolutely depress'd, to find out a way to discuss and divert them; for whilst the People are idle, they are proper instruments for any commotion: to employ them therefore, and remove their thoughts from contriving against the Government (it being a compleat year since *Cosmo* died) for the entertainment and recreation of the City, they took occasion to make two publick and solemn Feasts, or shows (which are usual there) one of them represented the three Wise men, who were conducted by the Star to the place where our Saviour was born, and this was performed with so much Pomp and magnificence that for several months together the whole City was employ'd about the Pageants and preparation. The other was called a Tournament (which is a kind of skirmishing on Horseback) in which the young Gentlemen of the City had challenged the most eminent Knights of *Italy*; and among these young Gentlemen, *Lorenzo* the eldest Son of *Piero* carried the applause, not by favour or partiality, but by his own valour and dexterity. But these sports and divertisements were no sooner over, but the Citizens returned to their old jealousies, and every one pursued his own fancy with more eagerness than before; which occasioned great feuds, and they were augmented much by two unfortunate accidents. The one was, that the authority of the *Balia* was expired; the other that *Francesco* Duke of *Milan* was dead; upon whose death, the new Duke *Galeazzo*, sent Embassadors to *Florence* to confirm the capitulations which his Father *Francesco* had made with that City; one of the articles obliging them to pay *Francesco* an annual sum of mony: the chief of the adverse party thinking this a fair opportunity, oppos'd the *Medici* in the ratification; alledging that the agreement was made with *Francesco*, not with his Son; and that *Francesco* being dead, the obligation was void; for *Galeazzo* was not so great and considerable as his Father, and therefore his amity unlikely to be so profitable; so that though indeed there was not much gain'd by *Francesco*, there was less to be expected from his Son; and if any Citizen, to maintain his own private interest would pay him his annuity, it would be against the freedom and the safety of the City.

To this *Piero* reply'd, that so important an alliance, was not so carelessly to be lost, that nothing was more advantageous and necessary (as well for all *Italy* as *Florence*) than their alliance with the Duke; for thereby the *Venetians* would be discouraged from attempting upon that Dutchy, either by counterfeit friendship, or manifest War. But should this alliance be dissolv'd, no sooner would it be known to the *Venetians*, but they would fall immediately upon the Duke; and finding him young, without friends, and scarce warm in the State; they would easily carry it from him, either by fallacy or force; and in either of those cases, the Commonwealth of *Florence* must be destroyed. But his reasons could not be accepted; the sedition began to break out openly: the adverse party assembled in several Companies in the night, the greatest part of them in *La Pista*, and the friends of the *Medici* in the *Crocetta*: the Conspirators being impatient to have *Piero* destroyed, had gotten the subscription of several Citizens as favourers of their designs: but being got together, one night above the rest, after solemn debate in Counsel which way they were to proceed; it was unanimously agreed that the power of the *Medici* should be rebated; but they were divided in the way; the most moderate part propos'd that seeing the *Balia* was extinct, they should only take care it should not be revived; for if the Government fell into the hands of the Counsels and Magistrats (as it would do of course) in small time *Piero's* authority would evaporate; and with that, his interest among the Merchants; for his affairs were now in such a posture, that unless he could relieve himself by the publick Treasure, he would be certainly ruined; and when that should happen, there would be no farther danger of him, their liberty would be recovered without banishment or blood, which all good Citizens ought to desire; but if force was apply'd, infinite hazards might occur. If one be falling of himself, no body thrusts him; if any one thrusts him, every body sustains him. Besides, if nothing extraordinary being acted against him, he will have no occasion to Arm, or strengthen his party; and if he should, it must be with great charge, and disadvantage; for every one would suspect him, which would facilitate and hasten his ruine. Others were not satisfied with this delay; affirming that time would be more for his benefit, than theirs; and if they would proceed by cold delatory gradations, *Piero* would run no hazard, but they should run many. For the Magistrats (though they were his Enemies) suffering him to enjoy the priviledges of the City; his friends would make him Prince (as had happened in 58) to their utter destruction: and that though that Counsel was honest and peaceable,

yet this was wiser and more secure, and therefore to be executed, whilst the minds of the People were incensed: the way they proposed was to arm at home, and to entertain the Marquess of Ferrara into their pay abroad; and when a Senate of their friends happened to meet, then to rise, and secure themselves as well as they could. The result of all was, that they should attend such a Senate, and then make the best of their time. *Niccolo Fedini* (who was employed as Chancellor) was one of this Council; who being tempted by greater, and more practicable hopes, discovered the whole Plot to *Piero*, and gave him a list of the Conspirators, and a Catalogue of the subscriptions. *Piero* was astonished at the number and quality of his adversaries; and upon consultation with his friends, it was concluded, that he also should take subscriptions, and having committed the care of them to some of his confidants, he found the Citizens so fickle and unstable, that many of them who had subscribed to the Enemy came over, and obliged themselves to him. Whilst things were in this distraction, the time came about in which the supream Magistracy was to be renewed; to which *Niccolo Soderini* was advanced by the *Gonfaloniere de Giustizia*. It was a wonder to see the concourse not only of the better sort of Citizens, but of the common People which attended him to the Palace, and put on an Olive Garland upon his head by the way, (to signify that he was the Person upon whom the safety, and the liberty of their City did depend.) By this, and many examples of the same nature it is evident, how inconvenient it is to enter upon the Magistracy, or Government, with more than ordinary acclamation; for not being able to perform as is expected (and for the most part more is required) the People abate of their esteem, and come by degrees to despise you. *Thomaso* and *Niccolo Soderini* were Brothers, *Niccolo* was a person of greater Spirit, but *Thomaso* the more prudent. *Thomaso* being a friend to *Piero* and knowing the humor of his Brother; that he desired the liberty of the City, and that the Government might be preserved without offence to any body, he encouraged him to a new *Squittini*, by which means the *Borfi* might be filled with the names of such Citizens as were lovers of liberty; and the Government continued without violence, as he desired. *Niccolo* was easily persuaded by his Brother, and suffered the time of his Magistracy to expire in the vanity of that opinion, and his friends which were of the Conspiracy were well enough contented, as being already emulous of him, and not desiring the reformation should fall out during his authority; presuming they could effect it when they pleas'd, though another was *Gonfaloniere*. Whereupon his office expired with less honor than he entred upon it; by reason he had begun many good things, but perfected nothing.

This accident fortified the party of *Piero* exceedingly; confirmed his friends, and brought over such as were neuter: so that though all things were ready on all sides, they were delaid for several months, and not the least tumult appeared. Nevertheless *Piero's* party encreasing, his Enemies began to resent it, and met together, to perform that by force, which they might more easily have done before by means of the Magistrates; in order to which they concluded to kill *Piero* (who was at that same time sick at, *Correggi*) and cause the Marquess of Ferrara to advance towards the City; for when *Piero* was dead, they resolved to come armed to the Palace and force the Senate to settle the Government as they should direct: for though all of them were not their friends, yet they doubted not but to fright them into a concurrence. *Diotsalvi*, to disguise his designe visited *Piero* very often; discoursed with him about uniting the factions, and advised him very frankly. But *Piero* was informed of the whole conspiracy, and besides *Domenico Martegh* had given him notice that *Francesco Neroni* the Brother of *Diotsalvi* had been tempting him to their party, assuring him of success: Hereupon *Piero* resolved to be first in arms, and took occasion from their practices with the Marquess of Ferrara. He pretended he had received a Letter from *Giovanni Bentivogli* Prince of Bologna, importing that the Marquess of Ferrara was with certain forces upon the River *Albo*, and that it was given out, his design was for Florence; upon which intelligence, *Piero* pretended to arm, and (attended by a great number of armed men) he came to the City. At his arrival his whole party took arms, and the adversary did the same, yet not in so good order as *Piero's*; for his men were prepared, and the other surpris'd. *Diotsalvi's* Palace being not far from *Piero's*, *Diotsalvi* judged himself insecure at home, and therefore went up and down, sometimes exhorting the Senate to cause *Piero* to lay down his Arms; sometimes seeking out *Luca*, and encouraging him to be constant; but the briskest and most couragious of them all was *Niccolo Soderini*, who taking Arms immediately, and being followed by most of the Populace of his quarter, went to *Luca's* house, in-

*Niccolo Soderini* persuades *Luca* to take Arms against *Piero*.

where-

whereas now it was in his power by force of Arms to ruine *Piero* if he pleased: or if he desired peace, it was more honorable to give conditions, than to receive them. But all his Rhetorick could not work upon *Luca*; he had altered his mind, and received new promises of Alliances and rewards from *Piero*; and already married one of his Nieces to *Giovanni Tornabuoni*; so that instead of being persuaded by him, he admonished *Nicolo* to lay down, and return quietly to his house; for he ought to be satisfied, that the City should be governed by its Magistrates: for whether he was satisfied or not, it would be so; all People would lay down their Arms; and the *Senate* having the stronger party, would be Judges of their quarrel. There being no remedy, and *Nicolo* having no where else to dispose himself, went back to his house; but before he departed he told him thus.

*I cannot alone do this City any service. but I can prognosticate its miseries. The resolution you have taken, will deprive your Country of its liberty; your self of your authority; me of my Estate; and others of their Country.*

At the first news of this tumult, the *Senate* had caused their Palace to be shut up, where they kept themselves close with the Magistrates, without appearing for either side: the Citizens (especially those who had followed *Luca* seeing the party of *Piero* armed, and the other disarmed) began to contrive how they might shew themselves his friends, not how they might express themselves his Enemies. Whereupon the principal Citizens, and the heads of the factions met in the Palace before the *Senators*, where many things were debated relating to the Government of the City in that juncture, and the ways of reconciliation: but because *Piero* could not be there in respect of his indisposition, all agreed to go to him to his house, except *Nicolo Soderini*, who (having recommended his Children and family to the protection of *Tomaso*) was retired to his Country house, to attend there, the conclusion of these troubles, which he expected would be unhappy to him, and fatal to his Country. The rest being arrived at *Piero's* Palace, one of them being deputed, complained to him of the condition of the City by reason of the tumults; declared that they who took Arms first, were most conscious of them; that understanding *Piero* was the Man, and his design unknown, they were come to him to be informed from himself, and if it appeared to be for the advantage of the City, they promised to comply. To which *Piero* replied, that he who takes Arms first is not in the fault, but he who gives the occasion: that if they considered more seriously of their behaviour towards him, they would not wonder at what he had done for his own preservation: for they would find it was their conventions in the night; their subscriptions, and practices to defeat him both of his Authority and life, which had forced him to his Arms, yet having extended them no farther than his own house, he conceived it was good evidence his intentions were innocent, and rather to defend himself, than injure any body else, that he desired nothing, but his own security, and had never given them occasion to suspect him of other, that when the Authority of the *Balia* expired, he never attempted to revive it in any extraordinary way; but was willing (if they were so themselves) that the Magistrates should have the Government of the City; that *Cosimo* and his Sons knew how to live honorable in *Florence*, either with or without the *Balia*; and that in 58 it was for their interest, not his, that it was restored. But this was not sufficient, he found them of opinion, that whilst he was in *Florence*, there would be no safety, no tranquillity for them: a thing truly so far from his belief, he could never have imagined or thought upon it, that his own friends and his Father should not endure to live with him in the same City, seeing no action of his had ever express'd him otherwise, than a quiet and peaceable Man.

The *Senate* and chief Citizens attend *Piero* at his house.

Then turning about to *Diotisalvi*, and his Brothers who were all present, he reproached them severely by the favours they had received from *Cosimo*; by the confidence he had placed in them; and the great ingratitude which they had returned (which reprimende was delivered with so much zeal and efficacy, that had not *Piero* himself restrained them, some there present were so much enraged at their deportment towards him, they would certainly have killed him) and at last he concluded, that what ever they and the *Senate* determined, he would consent to, for he desired nothing of them but to live quiet and in peace. Hereupon many things were proposed but nothing concluded; only in general it was thought necessary the City should be reformed, and new Laws created: The then *Gonsaloniere de Giustizia* was *Bernardo Lotti*, a person in whom *Piero* had no confidence, and so resolved not to do any thing whilst he was in office, which he conceived would be no great prejudice to his affairs, because his time was almost expir'd. But at the election of *Senators* in September and October following, 1466. *Roberto Lioni* was chosen *Gonsaloniere*, who was no sooner settled in his office, but (all others thing being prepared to his hand) he called the People together into the *Piazza*, and created a new *Balia*, all of *Piero's* creatures, who fell presently upon the creation of new Magistrates, and chose them as *Piero* directed. Which

manac

manner of proceeding so terrified the heads of the adverse party, that they fled out of the City most of them; *Agnolo Acciaiuoli* to *Naples*, *Diotisalvo Neroni*, and *Nicolo Soderini* to *Venice*. But *Luca Pitti* remained behind, presuming upon his late alliance, and the promises which he had received from *Piero*; *Giovanni* the Son of *Neroni*, at that time Archbishop of *Florence* (to prevent the worst) banished himself voluntarily to *Rome*. All the fugitives were proclaimed rebels; and the family of the *Neroni* dispersed. Many other Citizens were banished likewise, and confined to particular places; nor was this all; a solemn procession was ordered, to give God thanks for the preservation of the State, and the unity of the City: in the time of which solemnity, certain Citizens were apprehended, tortured, and then part of them put to death, and part of them banished. But in all the inconstancy, and variations of fortune, nothing was so remarkable as the fall of *Luca Pitti*. He quickly learned the difference betwixt Victory and misfortune, betwixt honor, and disgrace. His house (which was formerly thronged with the visits and attendancies of the better sort of Citizens) was now grown solitary and unfrequented. When he appeared abroad in the streets, his friends and relations were not only afraid to accompany him, but to own or salute him; some of them having lost their honors for doing it, some of them their Estates; and all of them threatned. The noble structures which he had begun, were given over by the workmen; the good deeds which he had done were requited with contumely, and the honors he had confer'd, with infamy and disgrace. So that many persons who in his authority had presented him largely, in his distresses required it again: pretending it was lent, and no more; and these very People who before commended him to the skies, cried him down again as fast, for his ingratitude and violence: so that now when it was too late, he began to repent himself that he had not taken *Nicolo's* advice, and died honorably seeing he could not live so. Nevertheless *Agnolo Acciaiuoli* being then at *Naples*, before he attempted any thing of innovation, he resolv'd to try *Piero*, and see if there was no hopes of reconciliation; to which purpose he writ to him this following letter:

The Enem-  
ies of the Me-  
dici depreſi'd:

*Luca Pitti*  
deſerted.

*I cannot but smile to observe the wantonness of fortune, and what sport she makes herself in turning friends into Enemies, and Enemies into friends, according to her own humor and capriccio; you may remember how at the banishment of your Father (resenting the injury done to him above any danger of my own) I lost my Country, and escaped narrowly with my life. In Cosimo's days I refused no opportunity of honoring your family; and since he died, I have entertained none to offend it. True it is the weakness of your complexion, and the minority of your Sons, gave some kind of disquiet, and I was willing our Country might be put in such a posture, as to subsist after your Death; what ever I have done, was only to that end; not against you so much, as for the benefit of my Country: if that was an error, I am sorry for it, and do hope the innocence of my intention, and the service of my former actions may atone it: nor can I fear but I shall find mercy in a Family which has had so long experience of my fidelity; or that one single fault will be able to extinguish so many obligations. Piero having received this Letter, by the same hand returned him this answer.*

*Agnolo's* let-  
ter to *Piero* at  
the *Medici*.

*Your smiling at that distance, is the reason I weep not where I am: were you so merry in Florence, I should be more melancholy at Naples. I grant you have been a well wisher to my Father, and you confess he gratified you for it; so that if there be obligation on any side, 'tis on yours, because deeds are more valuable than words; and if you have been already rewarded for your good actions, it's but reasonable you should be punished for your evil: your pretence of love to your Country cannot excuse you, for no body but will believe the Medici as great lovers and propagators of their Country as the Acciaiuoli. Love therefore where you are, in dishonor, since you had not the discretion to love honorably here.*

*Piero's* an-  
swer.

*Agnolo* upon the receipt of this letter, despairing of Pardon, removed his quarters to *Rome*; wher associating with the Archbishop, and the rest of the exiles; they consulted what was the best way of lessening the reputation of the *Medici*; which at that time was tottering in *Rome*, and gave *Piero* no small trouble to sustain it; but by the assistance of his friends, they failed of their design. *Diotisalvo*, and *Nicolo Soderini* on the other side, used all possible diligence to provoke the *Venetian Senate* against their Country: supposing its Government being new, and ungrateful to many People, the first invasion would shake it, and that it would not be able to stand. There was at that time in *Ferrara* *Giovan Francesco*, the Son *Palla Strozzi*, who in the revolutions in 34 was banished with his Father out of *Florence*: this *Giovanni* was a Man of great credit, and reputed as rich a Merchant as any in the City. These new Rebels insinuating with him, persuaded him how easie it would be to recover their Country when ever the *Venetians* would undertake it; and they doubted not but they would undertake it, if part of the charge could be defrayed, other-

wife it was not to be expected: *Giovanni* was willing to revenge the injuries he had received; believed what they said, and promised to assist with all the Money he could make; upon which *Diotisalvi*, and *Soderini* addressed themselves to the *Doge*.

Complained to him of their Banishment, which they pretended was for no other cause, but that they were desirous their Country might be governed by the Laws; and the Magistrates (not a few of their *Grandees*) have the power to put them in execution. Upon this account it was, that *Piero de Medici* and his followers, having been used to a tyrannical way, had taken arms by an artifice, disarmed them by a cheat, and banished them by a fallacy, and as if this were not enough, God Almighty must be brought in, and made an accessory to their cruelty, whilst in a solemn Procession, and the sacred exercise of their devotion, many Citizens who (upon faith given that they should be safe) had remained behind, were seized, secured, tortured, and executed: a thing of most execrable and nefarious example. To revenge the inhumanity of those actions; and avert the judgments, which they would otherwise pull down upon their Country, they knew not where to apply themselves with more hopes than to that illustrious Senate which having done so much for the preservation of their own liberty, must need have some compassion for such as lost theirs. They beseeched them therefore as, free-men, to assist them against their Tyrants; as merciful, against the merciless; and remember them how the Family of the *Medici* had defeated them of *Lombardy*, when *Cosimo* (contrary to the inclinations of all the rest of the City) assisted *Francesco* against them: so that if the equity of their cause did not move them, the justice of their own indignation might provoke them.

These last words prevailed so far upon the Senate, that they resolved, *Bartolomeo Coligni* (their General) should fall upon the Dominion of the *Florentines*, and to that purpose their Army being drawn together with all possible speed, and *Hercules da Esti* being sent by *Borso* Duke of *Ferrara*, joyned himself with them. Their first enterprize was upon the Town of *Doadola* which (the *Florentines* being in no order) they burned, and did some mischief in the Country about it. But the *Florentines* (as soon as *Piero* had banished the adverse party) had entered into a new League with *Galeazzo* Duke of *Milan*, and *Ferrando* King of *Naples*; and entertained *Federigo* Count of *Urbino* for their General: so that being fortified by such friends, they did not much value their Enemies: for *Ferrando* sent his Son *Alfonso*; and *Galeazzo* came in person (both of them with considerable forces) to their relief; and all of them together made a head at *Castrocaro*, a Castle belonging to the *Florentines* at the bottom of the *Alps* which descend out of *Tuscany* into *Romagna*. In the mean time, the Enemy was retired towards *Imola*; so that betwixt the one and the other, according to the custom of those times, there happened several light skirmishes, but no besieging nor storming of Towns, nor no provocation to a battle on either side, both parties keeping their tents, and staring one upon another, with extraordinary cowardize. This manner of proceeding was not at all pleasing to the *Florentines*, who found themselves engaged in a War, which was like to be expensive, and no profit to be expected: inasmuch that the Magistrates complained of it to those Citizens which they had deputed as commissaries for that expedition; who replied, That *Galeazzo* was wholly in the fault; and that having more Authority than experience, he knew not how to make any advantageous resolution; nor would he believe them which were able to instruct him, and that therefore it was impossible (whilst he was in the Army) that any great action should be achieved. Hereupon the *Florentines* addressed themselves to the Duke, and let him know.

That he had done a great honor (and it had been much for their advantage) in coming personally to their assistance; for his very name and reputation had made their Enemies retire: Nevertheless they could not but prefer his safety and the good of his State, before their own; because whilst he was safe, they could not be capable of fear; and if lost, they should be incapable of comfort. They could not therefore discharge themselves, nor express the respect they had for him better, than by remembering him, that (besides the danger where he was) it could not be secure for him to be any longer at that distance from *Milan*; for being but young in the Government, and his Enemies powerful and industrious; who knew what mischief they might meditate? and how easily execute it when they had done? so that they made it their request to him for the safety of his own person, and the preservation of his State, that he would leave only part of his forces with them, and return himself with the rest.

*Galeazzo* was as well pleased with their Counsel, as they were to give it; and without more ado returned from whence he came. The *Florentine* Generals (being rid of this incombrance, and that it might appear to the World who was the impediment before) advanced against the Enemy, so that they came presently to a battle, which continued half a day

The *Florentines* invaded by the *Venetians*.

day without any disadvantage; for there was not one Man killed, a few Horse hurt, and but a few Men taken prisoners. When Winter was come, and the time that their Armies were accustomed to go into quarters, *Bartolomea* retreated towards *Ravenna*; the *Florentines* into *Tuscany*; and the forces of the King and the Duke into their several Countries: but finding no tumult nor commotion in *Florence*, as they were promised by the Rebels; and the Souldiers which were hired not being punctually payed; the *Venetians* thought fit to treat, and in a short time a peace was concluded: this peace having deprived the rebels of all hopes, they divided, and went to several parts. *Diotsalvi* went to *Ferrara*, where he was entertained and relieved by the Marquis *Borso*: *Nicolo Soderini* removed to *Ravenna*, where he lived long with a small pension from the *Venetians*, and at last died: this *Nicolo* was accounted a just and courageous Man, but slow, and irresolute: which was the cause that he slipped an opportunity when he was *Gonfaloniere*, that he could never afterwards retrieve. Grown insolent upon their success, those of the *Florentines* who were in power (as if they fancied they had not prevailed, unless their cruelty did testify it,) plagued and tormented not only their Enemies, but how ever else they thought good to suspect; and obtained of *Bardo Altovili* to divest several Citizens of their honors, and that others should be banished; which was so great a strengthening to that party, and depression to the other; that they exercised the power which they had usurped, as if God and fortune had given them that City for a prey.

Peace between the *Florentines* and the *Venetians*.

These practices *Piero* understood not; and if he had, his illness would not have permitted him to redress them: for he was so stiff, and contracted with the Gout, he had the use of nothing but his tongue, with which he could only admonish and advise them to live civilly, and enjoy their Country in peace, and not be accessory to its destruction. To please and entertain the People, he resolved to celebrate the Marriage of his Son *Lorenzo*, to whom he had contracted *Claricia* a Daughter of the house of *Ursina*; which wedding was performed with a Pomp and magnificence answerable to the persons by whom, and for whom it was made; several days were spent in Balls, in Banquets, and Shows; and to demonstrate the Grandure of the House of the *Medici*, two martial spectacles were exhibited; one representing Horse and Men charging as in a field fight; the other the siege and expugnation of a Town; both of them contrived and discharged with the greatest glory and gallantry imaginable. Whilst affairs were in this posture in *Florence*, all *Italy* was at peace; but under great apprehensions of the Turk, who advancing in his designs, had taken *Negropont*, to the great scandal and detriment of all Christendom: *Borgo* Marquis of *Ferrara* died about this time, and was succeeded by his Brother *Hercules*. *Gismondo da Rimini* died (a perpetual Enemy to the Church) and left the Dominion to his Son *Roberto*, who was reckoned afterwards among the best Commanders of that age. *Pope Paul* died likewise, in whose place was created likewise *Sextus* called first *Francesco da Savona*, a Person of mean or rather base extraction, but for his courage made General of the order of *S. Francis*; and after that, Cardinal: This Pope was the first which shewed to the World what the Papacy could do: and that many things called errors before, might not only be excused, but hid and obfuscated by the Papal Authority. He had in his Family two persons (*Piero* and *Girolamo*) who (as was Generally believed) were his natural Sons, though they passed under more specious and honorable appellations. *Piero* being a Friar, was by degrees promoted to the Cardinalship, with the Title of *San Sefio*. To *Girolamo* he gave the Government of *Furla*, which he had taken by violence from *Antonio Ordelfassi* whose predecessors had a long time been Princes of that City: this secular and ambitious way of proceeding, procured his Holiness great estimation among the Princes of *Italy*; inasmuch as all of them desiring his friendship, the Duke of *Milan* gave to *Girolamo*, his natural Daughter *Catharine* in Marriage, and in Dower with her, he gave him the City of *Imola*, which by the like violence he had taken from *Taddeo Aldofsi*. Betwixt this Duke and *Ferrando* the King, a new alliance was contracted; for *Elizabeth* the Daughter of *Alfonso*, (the Kings eldest Son) was Married to *Giowan Geleazzo* eldest Son to the Duke. In the mean time *Italy* was full of tranquillity; no care incumbent upon those Princes, but to pay their respects one to the other, and by mutual matches, new obligations, and leagues, to fortifie and secure one another. Yet in the midst of this Peace, *Florence* was not without its convulsions; the ambition and dissention of the Citizens distracting their affairs; and *Piero* being interrupted by his own distempers, could not apply any remedy to theirs: How ever to discharge his Conscience, endeavour what he was able, and try whether he could shame them into a reformation, he called them all to his House, and saluted them in this manner.

*I never imagined the time could come in which the carriage of my friends should have made me inclinable to my Enemies; or the consequences of my Victory, have made*

*Piero's* speech to the *Florentines*  
me



me wish I had been beaten. I thought my party had consisted of Men whose appetites might have been bounded and circumscribed, and such as would have been satisfied to have lived quietly and honorably in their own Country, especially after their Enemies were expelled. But I find now, I was mistaken; ignorant of the natural ambition of the World; and more particularly yours. It is not enough (it seems) for you to be chief and Principal in so illustrious a City; and (though but a few) to have the honors, and offices, and emoluments; with which heretofore a much greater number was satisfied. It is not enough, to have the forfeitures and confiscations of your Enemies divided among you; it is not enough that (exempting your selves) you load, and oppress the rest with taxes; and appropriate them to your own private uses when they come in, but you must abuse and afflict your neighbours with all the circumstances of injury: you rob them of their Estates; you sell them justice; you abhor the Laws; you oppress the peaceable, and exalt the insolent: I did not think there had been such examples of rapine and violence in all Italy, as I find in this City. Has this City given us the Authority, to subvert it? Has it given us preheminance to destroy it? Has it honored us, to afflict it? I do profess by the Faith of an honest Man, and declare here publicly to you all, that if you persist in these courses, and force me to repent of my Victory, I will order things so, that you shall have but little comfort in abusing it.

Piero de Medici dies.

Tomaso Soderini in great favour with the Florentines, declines it discreetly.

Lorenzo and Giuliano de Medici made Princes of the City.

The Citizens replied modestly at that time, but not a jot of reformation; whereupon Piero sent privately to *Agnolo Acciaiuoli* to meet him at *Casaggiolo*, where they had long discoursed about the condition of the City; and it is not doubted but if he had lived, he would have recalled his Enemies to have restrained the exorbitances of his friends; but death would not suffer it, for after great conflicts both in his body and mind, in the 53 year of his age, he died: his virtue, and his bounty could not be perfectly conspicuous to his Country, being eclipsed by his Father, who died not long before him; and these few years he survived, were wholly taken up either by his own sickness, or the dissention of his friends. He was enterred in the Temple of *San. Lorenzo* near his Father, and his exequies performed with a Pomp proportionable to his quality, and deserts. He left behind him two Sons *Lorenzo* and *Giuliano*; pregnant, and hopeful enough of themselves, but the tenderness of their age was that which made every body apprehensive. Among (or rather above) the principal of that Government was *Tomaso Soderini*, whose prudence and authority was not only eminent in *Florence*; but in the Courts of all the princes of *Italy* after the death of *Piero*, *Tomaso* had the respect of the whole City, most of the Citizens flocking to his House, as their Chief; and many Princes directed their correspondencies to him; but he being wise, and sensible of his own fortune and the fortunes of his Family, refused their correspondence; received none of their letters, and let the Citizens know, it was not upon him, but the *Medici* they were obliged to attend: and that his actions might quadrate with his exhortations, having called all the chief families together in the Convent of *S. Antonia*, he brought in *Lorenzo* and *Giuliano de Medici* amongst them, where after a long and solid discourse about the condition of that City, *Italy*, and the several principalities within it; he concluded that if ever they would live happily and in peace; secure against foreign invasion, and dissention at home; it was necessary to continue their observance to the family of the *Medici*, and to give those young Gentlemen the Authority of their predecessors; for Men are not troubled at the promotion of ancient families; but upstarts, as they are suddenly advanced, are suddenly forsaken, and it has been always found more easie to preserve a family in power (where time has worn out his Enemies) than to raise a new one which will unavoidably be subject to new emulations: after *Tomaso* had spoke, *Lorenzo* began, and (though but young) delivered himself with so much gravity and composedness; that he gave them great hopes of his future abilities; and before they parted both of them were perfectly adopted. Not long after, they were installed in the dignities of their Father; entertained as Princes of the Government; and *Tomaso* appointed their chief Minister; by which means they lived quietly for a while both abroad and at home, without the least prospect or apprehension of troubles; but on a sudden, a new tumult unexpectedly arose to disturb them, and give them a hint of their following miseries.

Among the Families which suffered with *Luca Pitti*, and his party, was the Family of the *Nardi*; *Salvestro* and his brothers (the chief of that house) were first banished, and then (upon the War with *Bartolomeo Coglione*) proclaimed rebels. Among the Brothers, there was one of them called *Bernardo*, a brisk and courageous youth, who (not being able to subsist abroad by reason of his poverty, and having no hopes of returning by reason of the peace) resolved to attempt something that might be an occasion of reviving the War: a slight and inconsiderable beginning, producing great effects many times; because People are generally more prone to assist and improve a commotion, than to contrive and begin it

Ber

*Bernardo* had good acquaintance in *Prato*, and in the Country about *Pistoia*, but more especially with the *Palandre*, which (though a Country family) was numerous, and brought up, like the rest of the *Pistolesi*, in arms and in blood. He knew they were highly discontented, as having been ill used in the time of the Wars by the Magistrates in *Florence*: he knew likewise the disgusts of the *Pratesi*; the pride and rapacity of their Government, and some body had told him how ready they were for any practice against the State: so that from all these circumstances he conceived hopes (by debauching of *Prato*) of kindling such a fire in *Tuscany*, as by supplying it by fuel, they should not be able to extinguish: he communicated his design with *Diotisalvi*, and inquired of him, in case *Prato* should be surprized, what assistance he could procure him from the Princes of *Italy*. *Diotisalvi* looked upon the business as desperate and almost impossible; however seeing the part he was to bear in it, was secure enough; and that the experiment was to be made at another Mans cost; he encouraged him to go on, and promised him assistance from *Bologna* and *Ferrara*, if he could but secure the Town for a fortnight. *Bernardo* (tickled with his promises, and persuading himself his success would be good) conveyed himself privately to *Prato*, and imparting his designs to some persons, he found them readily disposed: the same compliance and alacrity he found in the *Palandre*, and having agreed with them both of the time, and the place, he sent the news immediately to *Diotisalvi*. The *Potestà* or Governor of *Prato* at that time was *Cesare Pretucci*; who being put in by them, preserved it for the *Florentines*. The Governors of such Towns had a custom to keep the keys of the castle themselves; yet (especially where there was no jealousy) if any of the Town desired to go in or out in the night, they were so civil, as to suffer them: *Bernardo* understanding the custom, came himself, and the *Palandre* with about a hundred armed Men, and lay close near the gate which goes towards *Pistoia*, whilst those in the Town who were privy to the conspiracy, armed likewise, and sent one of their number to the Governor to beg the favour of the keys, pretending there was a Citizen which desired to enter. The Governor suspecting nothing, sent one of the servants with the Keys, who being gone a convenient distance from the Palace, was knocked down, his charge taken from him; and the Gate being opened, *Bernardo* and his party were let in. Having entered, and discoursed a little while with their friends in the Town, they divided into two bodies; one of them under the conduct of *Salvestro a Pratese*, surprized the Castle; the other commanded by *Bernardo*, possess'd themselves of the Palace, took the Governor and his whole Family Prisoners, and committed them to the custody of some of his Men: which done, they set up a great cry for liberty in the Streets, and upon it many of the People resorted to the Market place: It being now day, and the Magistrates informed that the Castle and Palace were surprized, and the Governor and all his Family in Prison, they could not imagine from whence this accident should proceed. The eight (who in that City were supreme) met together in the Palace to consult what was to be done. But *Bernardo* and his accomplices, having run some time about the streets, and found few or no body come in; upon information that the eight were assembled, they went directly to them, and *Bernardo* took occasion to let them know, that their design was only to deliver their Town from servitude; and that if they would take Arms, and joyn with them in it, they would create immortal honor to themselves, perpetual peace to the People; then he remembered them of their ancient Liberty, and compared it with their present condition; and promised them such assistance in a few days, as the *Florentines* should not be able to contend withal: besides he assured them he had intelligence in *Florence*, and they would show themselves as soon as they understood their success in this Town: but the eight were not to be moved with bare words, and answered that they knew not whether *Florence* was in liberty or bondage, nor did it belong to them to inquire; this they knew that for their parts they desired no further liberty, then to continue under the same Magistrates which had then the Government of *Florence*, from whose hands they had never received any injury that might provoke them to take Arms against them: they admonished him therefore to release the Governor, leave the Town as he found it; and withdraw in time from an enterprize which he had rashly begun. But *Bernardo* was not to be discouraged so easily; for seeing intreaties and fair means had no better success, he resolved to try how far terror would work; and as a taste of what was to be expected, concluded to put the Governor to Death; having caused him to be haled out of Prison: he gave orders he should be hanged out of one of the Windows in the Palace: *Petrucchi* was brought almost to the Window with a rop about his neck, when he spied *Bernardo* attending to see him executed; and turning to him, he said.

*Bernardo* you think by cutting me off, to make the *Pratesi* follow you; but the effect will be quite contrary. The Veneration they bear to the Governors which are sent hither from *Florence*, is so great, it will incense them to see me destroyed, and your cruelty

A Conspiracy of the *Nardi*.

elty to me, will turn to your ruine; so that 'tis my life, not my death, must do your business; if I command them what you think fit to direct, they will obey me before you, and I following your direction, your design will be fulfilled.

Bernardo (who was no conjurer) thought his counsel was good, and therefore ordered him (out of a back window which looked into the Market-place) to require the obedience of the People, which as soon as he had done, he was carried back from whence he came. The weakness of the Conspirators was by this time discovered; and several of the inhabitants were got together, and Giorgio Ginori (a Knight of Rhodes) among the rest. This Giorgio being the first who took Arms, advanced against Bernardo who was riding up and down the Streets, sometimes persuading, and sometimes threatening the City. Having found him and charged him with a considerable number that followed, Bernardo was wounded, and taken prisoner, after which it was not hard to release the Governor, and over-power the rest; for being but few, and divided into several parties, they were most of them either taken or killed.

Bernardo  
defeated and  
taken.

In the mean time the news of this accident arrived at Florence, and was represented much greater than the truth. The first report was that Prato was surprized; the Governor and his whole Family slain; the Town full of the Enemies forces; Pistoia in Arms; and several Citizens of that City engaged in the Plot: so that of a sudden the Palace was full of Citizens, expecting orders from the Senate for what was to be done. There was in Florence at that time an eminent Captain called Roberto San Severino; it was resolved to send what forces they could get together of a sudden under his command towards Prato; that he should advance as near it as he could, give them particular notice of all passages, and act, as he in his discretion should see occasion. Roberto was presently dispatched, and marched with his party as far as the Castello di Campi, when he was met by a messenger from Petracci with the news that Bernardo was taken, his party defeated, and all things in quiet; so that he marched back again to Florence, and not long after Bernardo was brought thither to be examined by the Magistrats. Being questioned upon several things, and particularly what induced him to that enterprize, he replied, that choosing rather to die in Florence, than to live any longer in exile, he determined to do something which might make him memorable when he was dead. This tumult being composed almost as soon as begun, the Citizens began to return to their old way of security, thinking (without any regard or consideration) to enjoy the profits of a Government which they had so lately re-established and confirmed, from whence all those inconveniences ensued, which are too often the followers of peace; the youth being more vain and extravagant than formerly, squandered away vast sums, in Cloaths, and Treats, and all manner of Luxury; and having nothing to do, spent their whole time and Estates among dancing Masters, and Women: their whole study and ambition was to be thought glorious in their habit; and smart and poignant in their discourse, for he that could retort or bite the most readily, was thought the greatest wit, and had the greatest applause: and yet these effeminacies were much encreased, by the arrival of the Duke of Milan, who with his Lady and whole Court was come to Florence (to fulfil a pretended vow) where he was entertained with magnificence suitable to his quality, and the alliance betwixt them. Then was the first time it ever was seen in that City that in Lent when all flesh was forbidden by the Church, it was eaten publicly, without dispensation, or respect to the Laws of God, or of Men. Among the rest of the Shows which were made to entertain him, the Holy Ghost's descending upon the Apostles, being represented and exposed in the Church di S. Spirito; so many candles were used in the solemnity that some of them took fire, and burnt the Church to the Ground, which was looked upon as a judgment, and a manifest expression of Gods anger towards us; if then the Duke found the City of Florence full of niceness, and delicacy, and exorbitance in their manners, he left them much worse when he went away; so that the soberer sort of the Citizens thought it necessary for sumptuary Laws, and edicts of restraint for the regulation of expences in Cloaths, Funerals, and Feastings, to confine them within the compass of frugality and discretion.

The Duke  
of Milan in  
Florence.

Tumults in  
Volterra.

In the midst of this peace, there happened a new and unexpected tumult in Tuscany, about this Town of Volterra, it was the fortune of some of those Citizens to find a mine of Allum, who knowing the usefulness of it, and the advantage which might accrew, that they might be the better supplied with monies, and justified by better authority, they applied themselves to some of the considerable Citizens of Florence, and made them sharers in the profits. The business at first (as all things of that nature are) was little regarded by the Volterrans, but after, when they grew sensible of their gains, they strove too late, to do what at first might have been easily prevented. They began to examine and argue it in the Councils, alledging there was no reason a commodity found in the publick lands, should be converted to particular

particular use: hereupon Embassadors were sent to *Florence*, and the cause referred to a Committee of Citizens, who, being either bribed, or convinced, reported that the desires of the People of *Volterra*, were (in their judgment) unjust. That they could not find any reason why the defendants should be deprived of what by their own labour and industry they had acquired; and that therefore the mine was in all equity to be continued to them: though if they pleased they might command them to pay an annual sum of money, as a fee and acknowledgment of their Superiority. This being reported it rather increased than lessened the mutiny of the *Volterrans*; nothing was discouraged of in the whole City, but this affair: the People pressed hard for what they thought, themselves robb'd of: The Partizans were as zealous to keep what they had got, and upon reference to the *Florentines* it was confirmed to them; so that in a dispute, there was one eminent Citizen called *Picorino* slain, and after him several more of his party, and their houses plundered and burned; in the heat of their rage, they had much ado to forbear the same violence to the *Florentine* Magistrats, the fierceness of their fury being over, they sent Embassadors to *Florence* to represent to that *Senate* that if they would preserve to them their old privileges, they would continue their subjection, and maintain the City in its ancient dependance. But there was great argument about the answer: *Tomaso Soderini* was of opinion the *Volterrans* were to be received upon any terms, as thinking it dangerous at that time to kindle a fire so near their own Houses: for he was fearful of the disaffection of the Pope and the power of the King; nor durst he depend upon the amity either of the Duke or the *Venetian*, as not being certain of the courage of the one, or the fidelity of the other; harping still upon an old adage, *that a lean peace was better than a fat Victory*. *Lorenzo*, on the other side, thinking this a fair opportunity to demonstrate his Wisdom, and his magnanimity together; and the rather because encouraged by such as envied *Tomaso*, he declared against the tumult; resolved to punish them by force, and affirmed that if these were not corrected in *terrorem*, upon the least trivial and impertinent occasion, the rest of the Territories would do the same, without any fear or reverence in the World. The result of all being that they should be corrected; answer was returned to the Embassadors, that the *Volterrans* were not to expect the continuation of their privileges, having broken them themselves, and that therefore they were either to submit to the *Senate* without any Capitulation, or to expect the consequences of War. The *Volterrann* Embassador being returned with this answer; they prepared for their defence; fortified their Town; and sent for supplies to all the Princes of *Italy*; but none of them gave them any encouragement, but the *Siennesi*, and the Governor of *Piombino*.

The *Florentine*, on the other side, placing much of their success in their speed, dispatched away 10000 foot and 2000 Horse under the command of *Federigo* Lord of *Urbino*, who falling upon the Country of *Volterra*, did easily subdue it; after which he sat down before the City; but that standing high, and the hill being steep, it was not to be assaulted but on that side where the Church of *S. Alessandro* stood. The *Volterrans* for their better defence had hired about 1000 Souldiers, who observing the *Florentines* resolution to carry it, and that they were very strong in their Leaguer, believing it untenable, they began to be remiss and careless in their duties; but in any thing of mischief to their Masters, they were vigorous enough: so that the poor Citizens being assaulted without, and abused within, began to incline to a peace; but not being admitted to conditions, they were glad to throw themselves into the arms of their Enemies; who having caused them to open the Gates, the greatest part of the army marched in, and advancing to the Palace where their *Priors* were assembled, they commanded them to return to their houses; but by the way one of them was unluckily pillaged and reviled by a Souldier, and from that Action (the disposition of Mankind prompting him more naturally to mischief than good) proceeded the destruction of that City, which for a whole day together was robb'd, and rummaged by the Souldiers: neither Women, nor Children, nor Churches, nor any place being exempt from the rapacity as well of their Mercenaries, as Enemies. The news of this Victory was entertained in *Florence* with extraordinary joy, and being *Lorenzo's* own enterprize, it turned highly to his reputation: and one of his most intimate friends upbraided *Tomaso Soderini* by his Counsel to the contrary; what think you now, Sir (said he to him) *Volterra* is won? To whom *Tomaso* replied, I think it rather lost; for had you received it upon terms, it might have been serviceable, and contributed to the security of this City but being so kept by force it will be a trouble and weakness to you in time of War, and an expence and inconvenience in time of Peace.

In those dayes, the Pope being desirous to keep the Lands of the Church in their natural obedience, had caused *Spoliro* to be sacked, which Town by instigation of the Factions within it, had been in rebellion; and the City of *Castello* having been in the same contumacy,

cy, was afterwards besieged. In that Town *Niccolò Vitelli* was Prince, who retaining a great correspondence and friendship with *Lorenzo de Medici*, had supplies sent him from *Florence*. though not enough to defend *Niccolò*, yet sufficient to sow the seeds of such enmity betwixt the *Pope* and the *Medici*, as produced most pernicious effects. Nor had it been long before they had discovered themselves, had not the death of *Piero Cardinal de S. Sisto* intervened. For that Cardinal (having travelled thorow all *Italy*, and spent some time both at *Venice* and *Milan*, in honor (as he pretended) to the Marquess of *Ferrara's* wedding) had sited the Princes to see how they stood inclined to a difference with the *Florentines*: but being returned to *Rome*, he died, not without suspicion of being poisoned by the *Venetians*, out of an apprehension of his power, when ever he should have opportunity to exert it; for though his humor and extraction were mean, and his education retired, in a covert, yet upon his promotion to the Cardinalship, he discovered more pride and ambition, than was becoming not only a Cardinal, but a *Pope*. For he had the vanity to make a feast at *Rome* which cost him above 20000 *Florens*, and would have been thought an extravagance in the greatest King of his time. *Pope Sixtus* having lost his Minister, proceeded more coolly in his designs nevertheless the *Florentines*, the Duke, and the *Venetians* entered into a League; *Sixtus* and the King of *Naples* entered into another, and left room for several other Princes to come in if they pleased. By this means all *Italy* was divided into two factions, every day producing something or other which augmented the feuds; and particularly a dispute about the Isle of *Cyprus*, to which *Ferrando* pretended, but the *Venetian* had got the possession; upon which the *Pope* and *Ferrando* confederated more strictly: the great Captain of those times, and the most eminent for conduct was *Federigo* Prince of *Urbino*, who had served under the *Florentines* a long time: that their League might not have the advantage of such a General, the *Pope* and *Ferrando* resolved, if possible to debauch him from them, and to that end both of them invited him to *Naples*. *Federigo* obeyed, with great astonishment, and displeasure to the *Florentines*, concluding he would run the same fate which *Giacopo Piccinno* had done before him; but they were utterly mistaken; for *Federigo* returned with great honor from *Naples* and *Rome*, and was made General, of their League. In the mean time the *Pope* and the King were not idle but still feeling and tempting the *Senats*, of *Romagna*, and *Sienna*, to make them their friends, and enable themselves thereby to be revenged on the *Florentines*; of which the *Florentines* having advertisement, they provided such remedy against their ambition, as would consist with their time; and having lost *Federigo*; they entertained *Roberto da Pimmo* into their pay: they renewed their Leagues with the Citizens of *Perugia*, and the Senate of *Faenza*.

*Italy* in two  
Factions.

Troubles in  
*Tuscany*.

The *Pope* and the King pretended that the grounds of their dissatisfaction was, for that they had seduced the *Venetians* from their League, and associated with them themselves; and the *Pope* did not think that he could preserve the honor and reputation of the Church, nor Count *Girolamo* his Sovereignty in *Romagna*, whilst the *Venetian* and *Florentine* were united. The *Florentines* on the other side feared that they did not desire to separate them from the *Venetians* so much, to make them their friends, as to enable themselves more easily to injure them; so that for two years together *Italy* remained under these jealousies, and diversities of humor, before any tumult broke out. The first which happened (and that was no great one) was in *Tuscany*. *Braccio* of *Perugia* (a Person as we have said before, of great reputation in the Wars) left two Sons *Oddo*, and *Carlo*, whilst the last was very young, his Brother was slain unhappily in a tumult in the *Val di Lamona*. And *Carlo* (when capable for his age) was preferred by the *Venetians* to a command in their Army, out of respect to the memory of the Father and the hopefulness of the Son. The time of his Commission expired about that time, and *Carlo* would not suffer it to be renewed by the Senate; being resolved to see whether his own reputation, or his Fathers, could bring him back again to *Perugia*. To which the *Venetians* readily consented, as People which added something to their Empire, by every commotion: *Carlo* therefore, marched into *Tuscany*, but finding the *Perugians* in League with the *Florentines*, and his enterprize by consequence more uneasy than he expected, that nevertheless he might do something worthy to be talked of, he assaulted the *Siennesi* (pretending an old debenture to his Father for service he had done them) and fell upon them with such fury, that their whole Country was overrun. The *Siennesi* seeing themselves so fiercely invaded (and being naturally jealous of the *Florentines*) persuaded themselves, it was done by their consent, and made their complaints to the *Pope* and the King: they sent Embassadors likewise to *Florence*, who complained of the injuries they had received; and remonstrated, that without their privacy and connivance *Carlo* could never have assaulted them so securely. The *Florentines* excused themselves, assuring them they would employ their greatest interest that

*Carlo*

*Carlo* should not injure them any farther; and that in what way soever their Embassadors should propose, they would require him to desist: of which proceedings *Carlo* complained as much on the other side, declaring that for not having supplied him, the *Florentines* had robb'd themselves of a considerable acquit and him of great honor, and reputation; for he promised them the possession of that City in a short time; so much cowardize he had observed in the People, and so much disorder in their defence: whereupon *Carlo* drew off, and retired to his old Masters the *Venetians*: and the *Siennesi* (though delivered by the *Florentines* means) remained full of disgust, as not thinking it an obligation to rescue them from a calamity they had brought upon their heads. Whilst the affairs in *Tuscany* were carried on in this manner, by the *Pope* and the *King*, there fell out an accident in *Lombardy* of greater importance, and threatened greater destruction. There was a person called *Cola* (of *Mantua*) who taught the Latine tongue to several young Gentlemen in *Milan*; this *Cola*, being a learned, but ambitious man, out of pique to the Dukes conversation, or some private exceptions of his own, took occasion in all his discourse, wherever he came, to declaim against subjection to an ill Prince; and to magnifie their felicity whose fortune it was to be born, and brought up in a Commonwealth, affirming that all famous Men, had their education; not under Princes but Republicks; the latter preferring them as virtuous, the other destroying them as dangerous. The Gentlemen with whom he had entred into more particular familiarity were *Giovanandrea Lampognano*, *Carlo Visconti*, and *Girolamo Olgiatto*, and to these he had many times inculcated the excellence of the one Government, and the perniciousness of the other, and by degrees he became so confident both of their courage and inclination, that he persuaded them to a solemn oath, that as soon as their age would give them leave, they should employ all their faculties to redeem their Country from the Tyranny of their Prince.

The young Gentlemen, full of his documents, and a desire of observing their oaths: detesting the courses of the Duke, and resenting some particular injuries of their own, were impatient to put his directions in execution. *Galeazzo* was in his carriage both cruel and lascivious (each of which good qualities were sufficient to make him odious) it was not enough for him to debauch and vitiate the noblest Ladies of the City, but he took delight to publish it; no man (in his judgment) was handsomly punished who was not executed with some unusual circumstance of cruelty. He was suspected likewise to have murdered his Mother, for not fancying himself Prince enough, whilst she was in the way, he behaved himself so towards her, that she desired to retire to *Cremona* (which was the place of her dower) in which journey she was surprized with a sudden fit of sickness, and died, and her death, by many People, imputed to her Son. By tampering with or reflecting upon some Ladies of their relations, *Galeazzo* had highly disobliged both *Carlo* and *Girolamo*; and to *Giovanandrea* he had refused to give the possession of the Abbey of *Miramando*, which was granted to his predecessors by the *Pope*: these private injuries, egg'd on the young Gentlemen to revenge themselves, and deliver their Country; presuming if they could kill him, not only the Nobility, but the whole body of the People would follow them: resolved therefore upon the fact, they met many times to consult of the way, and their old familiarity rendered them unsuspected. Whilst they were contriving their business, to make themselves more dexterous and couragious when they came to it, their way was to strike and stab one another with the sheaths of those daggers which they had prepared to do the work, sometimes upon the arms, and sometimes upon the breasts of one another. At length they came to consider of the time and the place: in the Castle it was thought unsafe; a hunting, dangerous and uncertain; a walking, difficult, and unpracticable; in the conventions impossible; at length it was concluded he should be assassinated at some show or publick festivity, to which he would certainly come, at which time upon sundry pretences they might have opportunity to assemble their friends. They concluded likewise, that if any of them, upon any occasion whatever should be absent, or apprehended the rest should proceed, and kill him upon the place.

In the year 1476 Christmas coming on, and the Duke accustom'd on *S. Stephens* day with great solemnity to visit the Church of that Martyr, they pitched upon that for the time and the place. The morning arriving, they caused some of their principal friends and servants to arm, pretending they were to assist *Giovanandrea* who (contrary to the inclinations of some of his Enemies) was to bring certain pipes of Water into his grounds for his greater convenience: being armed according to directions, they conducted them to the Church; alledging that they would get leave of the Prince to justify what might happen: they caused several others likewise of their friends and allies to meet there, upon several pretences, presuming when the stroke was struck, and the business done to their hand, they would fall in then without any difficulty or scruple. Their resolution was, as soon as the Duke

Conspiracy  
against the  
Duke of Milan.

was killed, to get all those armed Men at their heels, and to march into that part of the Town where they thought they could raise the People with most ease, and persuade them to arm against the Dutchers, and the Ministers of the State not doubting but the People would readily follow them, being much distressed for want of provisions and promised (as they intended) the houses of *Cecco Simonetta*, *Giovanni Botti*, *Francesco Lucani*, and all the rest of the Governors, to plunder. Having laid their design thus, and encouraged one another to execute it bravely, *Giovanandrea* with his accomplices, went to Church betimes, and heard Mass together, after which *Giovanandrea* turning towards the image of *San Ambrogio*, he said, *Moss, venerable Patron of our City, thou knowest our intention, and for what end we expose our selves to so many dangers; be I beseech you kind and propitious to our enterprize, and by favouring of justice, let the World see how much injustice displeases you.* To the Duke on the other side, before he came to Church, many things happened which seemed to presage his Death. When he dressed himself that morning, he put on a Coat of mail which he usually wore, but on a sudden thinking it unhandsome or troublesome, he caused it to be pulled off and laid by. He had a mind to hear Mass in his own Chappel, but his Chaplain was gone to Saint Stephens Church, and carried all the implements along with him; having news of that, he ordered the *Bishop of Como*, should officiate for him, but he excused himself upon very reasonable impediments: so that he was necessitated (as it were) to go to Church: before he went, he caused *Giovan Galeazzo* and *Hermes*, his Sons to be brought to him, and when they came, he kissed and embraced them, as if he was never to see them again; at length (and very loath) being parted from them, he resolved to go to Church, and marching out of the Castle betwixt the Embassadors of *Ferrara* and *Mantona*, he went towards *S. Stephens*. The conspirators in the mean time, to give the less suspicion, and avoid the cold, which at that time was very great, were got up into a Chamber belonging to the Arch-priest, who was of their acquaintance; but hearing the Duke was coming they went down and placed themselves in the Porch, *Giovanandrea* and *Girolamo* on the right hand, and *Charles* on the left. Those who marched before the Duke were already entred, then came the Duke himself encompassed with a great multitude of People. As is usual in such pompous solemnities. The first which addressed themselves to their work was *Giovanandrea*, and *Girolamo*, who pretending to make room, pressed up to the Duke, and with short daggers which they had ready drawn in their sleeves, they stab'd him. *Giovanandrea* gave him two wounds, one in the belly, the other in the throat: *Girolamo* struck him in the throat likewise, and in the belly, *Carlo Visconti* being placed nearer the door, the Duke was past him before he was assaulted, and therefore he could not strike him before he was dead, however he must do his share, and with a schine gave him two deep wounds upon his shoulders; his blows were so sudden and thick, he was cut down and dead, before almost any body perceived it. Nor had he time to do or say more than to call upon the name of our Lady, (and that but once) as he fell. The Duke being slain, great hubub was rais'd, many Swords drawn, and (as it happens frequently in such cases) many people ran in great confusion about the streets, without any certain knowledge of what had passed. However those who were about the Duke, had seen him killed, and knew who they were that did it, pressed hard upon them to revenge it.

The Duke of  
Milan slain.

*Giovanandrea* being willing to have disengaged himself, got out of the church, thrust himself among the women who were there in great numbers upon their knees, but being intangled, and stopped by their coats, a Moor (who was one of the Dukes foot-men) got up to him, and killed him: *Carlo* was slain also by those who were by; but *Girolamo Olgiato* got out of the Church among the crowd; for seeing his companions dead, and not knowing whither to betake himself, he went to his own house, but was refused by his Father and his Brothers: his Mother having more commiseration recommended him to a Priest who had been an ancient friend of that family which Priest changed habits with him, and conveyed him to his house; where he remained two days in hopes some tumult or other would fall out, and he might have opportunity to save himself. But finding he was mistaken in that, and fearing to be found out where he was, he disguised himself, and endeavoured to get off, but was discover'd, secur'd, and delivered up to the Magistrate, to whom he confessed the whole process of the Conspiracy. This *Girolamo* was about twenty three years old, no less courageous and resolute at his death, than at the perpetration of the fact. Being strip'd and the Executioner with his knife in hand ready to give the stroke, he spake these words in Latine *Mors acerba, fama perpetua. stabit vetus memoria facti.* This Plot was carried on with strange secrecy, and executed with prodigious courage by these unhappy young gentlemen: but being neither follow'd nor defended by those whom they expected, they miscarried, and were slain. Let Princes by this example live so as to make themselves honor'd and lov'd, that no body may hope to kill them and escape; and let other People have care of relying upon the multitude too far,



far, how discontented soever; for in their distress they will be sure to forsake them. This accident put all *Italy* into an amaze, but much more what happen'd in *Florence* not long after; for that brake the Peace of all *Italy* which had continued for 12 years, as shall be shown in the next Book, whose end will be no less sad and deplorable, than the beginning is bloody and terrible.

THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
FLORENCE.

Book VIII.

**T**He beginning of this eight Book falling betwixt two Conspiracies, the one Executed at *Milan*, and already described; the other at *Florence*, and remaining to be related; it would have been convenient (according to my custom) to have said something of the quality and importance of Conspiracies, and I should willingly have undertaken it, had it not been done in another place, and the subject too copious to be passed over with brevity. Waving therefore a matter which would require so much consideration, and is else where amply discoursed; I shall tell, how the Family of the *Medici* (having subdued the adversaries which openly opposed them) to make themselves absolute in the City, and reduce the rest to a civil submission; were necessitated to disable those who were privately their Enemies. For whilst the *Medici* were but equal in authority, and as it were but in competition with other great Families; the Citizens which emulated their greatness, might oppose them publickly without danger, because the Magistrats being free and independant; neither party was afraid, till one of them was suppressed. But after the Victory in 66 the Government devolving wholly upon the *Medici*, they exercised it with so much rigor that those who were discontented were forced to comport themselves patiently under it, or by private and clandestine machinations to endeavour to remove it; which seldom and with great difficulty succeeding; they most commonly ruined the Conspirators, and augmented their Grandeur, against whom they were contrived. So that a Prince, according to that method to be deposed, if he be not killed dead, (as the Duke of *Milan*) which happens but rarely, he breaks forth into greater authority; and how good so ever before, becomes bad and tyrannical. For the practices of those Men, give him occasion to fear; fear, to secure himself; security, to be insolent; and from thence springs such aversions and hatred as is commonly his ruin; so that in conclusion treason does usually destroy the contrivers, and ruine them in time against whom they conspired.

Italy (as we said before) was divided into two factions the Pope and the King of Naples made one; the Venetians, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines made the other; and though betwixt them War was not solemnly declared, yet daily provocations were given on both sides, and the Pope very busie in his designs against Florence. *Philippo di Medici* the Archbishop of Pisa being dead, in crossnes to that Family, his holiness invested *Francesco Salvati* in that Bishoprick as knowing him to be their Enemy; and the Senate of Florence refusing him possession, new quarrels arose which created much trouble. Hereupon the family of the *Pazzi* was encouraged at Rome, and the Family of the *Medici*, affronted in every thing. The Family of the *Pazzi*, for quality and estate, was the most illustrious in Florence. The chief of them was *Messer Giacom*, who for his wealth and Nobility was mad a knight by the People: this *Giacomo* had only one natural Daughter living, but several Nephews by *Piero*, and *Antonio* his Brothers: the chief of them, were *Guilhelmo*, *Francesco*, *Rinato*, *Giovanni*, and (after them) *Andrea*, *Galeotto*, and *Nicolo*. *Cosimo di Medici* observing the Grandeur of that Family, had married *Bianca* his Niece, to the eldest, *Guilielmo*, in hopes by that alliance to remove the jealousy and animosity which was then betwixt the families. But (so uncertain and fallacious are all humane designs) it proved quite contrary. For those who were of *Lorenzo's* cabal, persuaded him it was dangerous, and a diminution to his authority, to advance such Citizens as were wealthy and potent; whereupon *Giacomo* and his Nephews were not preferred to those dignities which (in the opinion of other People) they deserved. This gave occasion of disgust to the *Pazzi*, and apprehension to the *Medici*; and the increase of the one, gave matter for the augmentation of the other. So that in all things where other Citizens were entertained, the *Pazzi* were rejected by the Magistrats. The Counsel of eight (upon a trivial occasion, without respect and difference usually shown to Persons of his quality) recalled *Francesco de Pazzi* from Rome, and required his residence in Florence. Hereupon the *Pazzi* complained highly of the Government, and spake bitterly of them wherever they came, which produced more suspicion in the Government, and more injury to themselves. *Giovanni de Pazzi* was married to the Daughter of *Giovanni Boromea* a very rich man, who being dead without other Children, his Estate descended to his Daughter. Notwithstanding, *Carlo* his Nephew got possession of part, and refused to surrender. The controversy coming to a hearing, it was decreed that *Carlo* should keep his possession, and the Daughter was defeated: which injustice, the *Pazzi* imputed wholly to the malevolence of the *Medici*; of which *Giuliano* complained many times to his Brother *Lorenzo*, admonishing him to have a care lest Grasping at too much, he rob'd himself of all. But *Lorenzo* being young, and elated with his power, would have a hand in every thing, and all must be acknowledged from him. The *Pazzi* being too noble and opulent, to swallow so many affronts, began to cast about how they might revenge themselves. The first who brake the ice, was *Francesco*, who being more sensible, and courageous than the rest, determined to recover what was his right, or to lose what he had.

Animosity  
betwixt the  
*Pazzi* and the  
*Medici*.

Retaining an implacable hatred to the Government at Florence, he lived most commonly at Rome, where he employed great sums of Money, as other Florentine Merchants did usually do. Having an intimate acquaintance with Count *Girolamo*, they complained to one another oftentimes of the inhumanity of the *Medici*, at length they came to a solemn debate, and it was concluded that for the one's recovery of his Estate and the others living freely in that City, it was necessary the present Government in Florence should be subverted, which could not be done, but by killing *Giuliano*, and *Lorenzo*. They were confident (having first convinced them of the easiness of the fact) the Pope and the King of Naples, would give their consents. Having entertained these thoughts betwixt themselves, they thought fit to communicate with the new Archbishop of Pisa; who being naturally ambitious, and lately disobliged, most readily embraced it: consulting themselves what measures were to be taken, it was resolved that *Giacomo de Pazzi* should be drawn in, without whose concurrence, the design was like to be more difficult. To this purpose it was concluded that *Francesco de Pazzi* should repair immediatly to Florence; and the Count and Archbishop continue at Rome to be near the Pope when things should be fit to be imparted. *Francesco* finding *Giacomo* more formal and untractable than he desired and signifying it to Rome, it was resolved to apply greater authority to dispose him, whereupon the Archbishop and the Count communicated the whole affair with *Giovan Battista* one of his Holiness his Generals.

Conspiracy  
against *Loren-*  
*zo* and *Giulian*  
*di Medici*.

This *Giovanni* was a man of great reputation in war; and particularly obliged both by the Count, and the Pope. Nevertheless he objected the great danger and difficulties of the enter-

enterprize, which the Archbishop endeavoured to refel by urging the assistance they were to expect both from the Pope, and the King of *Naples*. The hatred the Citizens of *Florence* bare to the *Medici*: the number of relations and friends which would follow the *Salviati*, and the *Pazzi*; the easiness to kill them, by reason of their frequent walking alone about the City without either guards or suspicion: and (after they were dead) the small or no opposition to be expected in the change of the Government: which allegations *Giovanni Battista* could not absolutely believe, because he had been assured the contrary by several considerable Citizens. Whilst these things were in this suspense, it happened that *Carlo* Lord of *Faenza* fell sick, and was given over for dead. Hereupon the Count and Archbishop conceived they had a fair opportunity to dispatch *Battista* to *Florence*, and thence into *Romagna*, under pretence of recovering certain Towns which *Carlo* of *Faenza* had taken from them. The Count therefore commissioned *Battista* to wait upon *Lorenzo*, and in his Name to desire his advice how he was to behave himself in *Romagna*: after which he was to visit *Francesco di Pazzi*, and *Giacopo di Pazzi*, and seeing if he could engage them in the design: and that he might carry the Popes authority along with him, they appointed him before he departed to receive his Holiness his Commands, who promised what could be imagined for the promotion of the enterprize: *Battista* departing speedily from *Rome*, arrived at *Florence*; consulted *Lorenzo* according to his instructions, was very civilly received, and so wisely and amicably answered in all his demands, that *Battista* was surprized, and began to look upon him as courteous, discreet, a friend to the Count, and one that had been maliciously misrepresented. However, he was to pursue his orders, and visit *Francesco*; he being at *Lucca*; he went directly to *Giacopo*, and upon the first motion found him very averse. But before he went away the Popes recommendation sweetened him so that he told *Battista* he might proceed in his journey to *Romagna*, and by that time he came back, *Francesco* would be in *Florence*, and they would talk farther of the business: *Battista* went to *Romagna* and returned; pursued his pretended transactions with *Lorenzo*; when he had done with him, went to the *Pazzi*, and ordered things so that *Giacopo* was drawn in upon serious consultation of the way. *Giacopo* was of opinion their design was impossible whilst both the Brothers were together in *Florence*; That they had better attend till *Lorenzo* went to *Rome*, which by report would be certain, and in a very short time. *Francesco* was willing enough to have had *Lorenzo* at *Rome*, but if the worst came to the worst, and he did not go thither, they might be sure to kill them both together at some wedding, some show, or some act of devotion: as to their foreign assistance, it was thought convenient that the Pope should send his forces against *Castello de Montone*, having just occasion of invading the Count *Carlo*, for the troubles and tumults he had raised in the Country of *Perugia* and *Sienna*; Notwithstanding they came to no positive resolution at that time; only they agreed that *Francesco di Pazzi*, and *Giovan Battista* should return to *Rome*, and there determine of all things with his Holiness, and the Count. The whole matter being redebated solemnly at *Rome*; they came to this conclusion, (the enterprize against *Montone* being confirmed) that *Giovan Francesco da Tolentino* (an officer of the Popes) should go into *Romagna* and *Lorenzo da Castello* into his Country; each of them get together what forces they were able, and keep them ready to be disposed of, as the Archbishop *Salviati*, and *Francesco dei Pazzi* should order; who being come to *Florence* with *Giovan Battista*, they prepared all that was necessary; and King *Ferrando's* Ambassador assured them of his Masters utmost assistance. The Archbishop, and *Francesco* being arrived at *Florence*, they persuaded into their party *Giacopo* the Son of *Poggio*, a learned youth, but ambitious, and studious of new things. That drew in likewise two *Giacopo Salviati's*, one of them a Brother, the other a Kinsman of the Archbishop's. They hired *Bernardo Bandini*, and *Napoleone*, two valiant young French Gentlemen, who had been much obliged to the Family of the *Pazzi*. Of Foreigners, besides them two, they entertained *Antonio da Volterra*, and one *Stephano* a Priest, who taught the Latine tongue to *Giacopo's* Daughter, and lived in his house.

*Rinato dei Pazzi* (a wise and student Man, and one who very well understood the consequences of such Plots) consented not to it; but rather detested it, and by all plausible ways endeavoured to dissuade it. The Pope had maintained at *Pisa* to study the Canon-Law, *Rafaelo di Riario* nephew to the Count *Girolamo*; from which place he was recalled by his Holiness, and promoted to a Cardinalship. It was judged commodious by the Conspiracy, that this Cardinal should come to *Florence* for the better concealment of their design, seeing that in his equipage all such of their confederats as were necessary, might be conveyed into the Town, which would much facilitate the work. Accordingly the Cardinal arrived, and was lodged by *Giacopo dei Pazzi* at a Country house of his at *Montughi*, not far from *Florence*. They desired by his means that *Lorenzo*, and *Guiliano* might be brought

*Rinato dei Pazzi* dissuades from the enterprize, but is vain.

brought together, and it was resolved that the first opportunity they should be killed. It was contrived then to make an entertainment for the Cardinal at *Fiesole*, but by accident, or on purpose, it fell out that *Guiliano* was not there; so that that design being defeated, their next was to invite the Cardinal to *Florence*, and thither they made no question but both the Brothers would come: the 26 of *April* 1478 was appointed to be the day. The night before, they met all together, and prepared and disposed all things for execution the next morning; but the day being come, news was brought to *Francesco*, that *Guiliano* was not there: upon that, the chief of them met together again, and concluded the business was no longer to be delayed, for being communicated to so many, it was not possible to conceal it: so that they determined without more ado, to assassinate him in the Church of *Santa Reparata*, when (the Cardinal being present) both the Brothers they presumed would be of course. They appointed *Giovanni Battista* to attack *Lorenzo*, and *Francesco dei Pazzi* and *Bernardo Bandini*, to do as much to *Guiliano*. But *Giovanni Battista* excused himself; the former familiarity he had had with *Lorenzo*, or some other accident having mollified his heart: he pretended his courage would not serve him to commit such an act in the Church, as would add sacrilege to his treason, and his denial was the first step to the destruction of them all; for being straitened in time, they were forced to depute *Antonio da Volterra*, and *Stephano* the Priest, to that office, two persons very unapt for such an action both in respect of their nature, and education; and certainly if in any thing a resolute, and great mind (accustomed by long experience, to cruelty and Blood) be necessary, it is in this case where Princes are to be killed. Having concluded, of their time, and other circumstances, there was nothing behind but the signal when they were to begin; which was when the Priest which celebrated the principal Mass, should receive the Sacrament himself: at which time the Archbishop of *Salviati* with his own followers, *Giacopo di Poggio* with his should possess themselves of the Palace of the *Senate*, that, either by persuasion or force the *Senate* might be brought over to their side, as soon as the Brothers were slain. Upon this resolution they went to the Church where the Cardinal and *Lorenzo* were already in their seats. The Church was thronged with people, and Divine Service begun, when it was observed that *Guiliano* was not there, whereupon *Francesco dei Pazzi* and *Bernardo* who were designed to murder him; went to him to his house, and with intreaties and other Artifice, got him along with them to the Church. It is very remarkable, and not often to be matched, that with so horrid, and detestable a design at their hearts, they could carry themselves with that tranquillity and composedness, for all the way as they passed they entertained him with youthful and pleasant discourse; and such was the security of *Francesco* that under pretence of caressing and embracing, he felt about his Body to see whether he was armed. *Guiliano* and *Lorenzo* both, knew well enough that the *Pazzi* bore them no good will, and that with all their hearts they would depose them if they could; but they believed whenever they attempted against them it would be legally, and without any violence upon their persons, and therefore suspecting nothing of danger in that kind, they dissimulated as much kindness to the *Pazzi*, as the *Pazzi* did to them. The assassines being ready, (those who were to kill *Lorenzo*, by the help of the crowd being got up to him without any suspicion, on that side, and *Guiliano*'s on the other) the sign was given, and *Bernardo Bandini*, with a short dagger provided on purpose, stabbed *Guiliano* into the breast, who passing a step or two forward, fell down upon the ground, *Francesco dei Pazzi* threw himself upon him stabbed him all over, and struck with such fury, that he hit his own leg, and made a desperate wound: *Antonio* and *Stephano* in the mean time attempted upon *Lorenzo*, and making several strokes at him, they wounded him slightly in the throat and nowhere else; for either by their own faint heartedness, or his courage in defending himself, or the interposition of those who were by, all of them were put off, and their whole enterprize miscarried: whereupon they fled in great terror, and hid themselves as well as they could; but being found they were shamefully put to death, and their bodies dragged about the City: *Lorenzo* on the other side, joining with those friends he had about him, betook himself to the vestry, and stood upon his guard. *Bernardo Bandini* seeing *Guiliano* dead, having an old quarrel to *Francesco Nori*, a great fiend to the *Medici*, he killed him into the bargain; and not satisfied with two murders, he crowded up to *Lorenzo* with his courage and alacrity to supply what the slackness and cowardice of his accomplices had left unfinished: But finding him barricado'd in the vestry, he could not come at him. In the midst of this great tumult, (which was so dreadful it was thought the Church would have been pulled down upon their heads) the Cardinal got up close to the Altar, where by the labour of the Priests he was preserved, till the tumult was appeased, and the *Senate* sent to conduct him to his own Palace; where he remained in great fear till the time he was dismissed. There were at

that time in *Florence*, certain *Perugians* who had been banished from their Houses in the time of their factions; these *Perugians* the *Pazzi* had drawn to their party, by promises of restitution. So that the Archbishop of *Salviati*, marching with *Giacopo di Poggio* and their followers to secure themselves of the palace, took them along with him; and being come to the Palace, he left some of his company below; with orders upon the first noise above stairs that they should seize upon the Gate, whilst he and the rest of the *Perugians* went up into the Castle. Finding the *Senate* was risen (by reason it was late) after a short time he was met by *Cesare Petrucci* the *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia*, so that entering further with him, and some few of his crew, he left the rest without, who walking into the Chancery, by accident shut themselves in, for the lock was so contriv'd, that without the key, it was not easily to be opened either within or without. The Archbishop being entered with the *Gonfaloniere*, pretending to impart some great matter to him from the Pope, he accosted him in so confused and distracted a way, the *Gonfaloniere* from the disorder both of his looks and expressions, began to suspect, sprung from him out of the Chamber with a great cry, and finding *Giacopo di Poggio*, he caught him by the hair of the head, and delivered him to one of the Sergeants. The noise running immediately to the *Senators* with such arms as they had about them, they set upon the Conspirators, and all them who went up with the Archbishop (part being shut up, and part unable to defend themselves) were either kill'd, or thrown alive out of the windows. Of this number, the Archbishop, the two other *Salviati*, and *Giacopo di Poggio* were hang'd. Those who were left below, had forc'd the Guards, and Possessed themselves of the Gate; infomuch that the Citizens which upon the first alarm had run into the Castle, were not able to assist the *Senate* either with their counsel or Arms. *Francesco de Pazzi* in the mean time, and *Bernardo Bandini* seeing *Lorenzo* escaped, and one of themselves (upon whom the hopes of that enterprize did principally depend) most grievously wounded, they were much dismay'd; *Bernardo*, concluding all lost, thinking to provide for his safety with the same courage, as he had injured the *Medici*, he made his escape. *Francesco* being returned to his house, tried if he could get on Horseback (for orders were, as soon as the fact was committed to gallop about the Town, and excite the People to liberty, and arms) but finding he could not ride by reason of the deepness of his wound, and the great quantity of blood which he had lost, he desired *Giacopo* to do that office for him, and then stripping he threw himself upon the bed. *Giacopo*, though an ancient Man, and not versed in such kind of tumults, to try the last experiment of his fortune, he got on Horseback, and with about an hundred Horse well armed, and formerly prepared, he marched towards the Palace, crying out: *Liberty, liberty*, to the People as he went along; but some of them being deafen'd by their obligations to the *Medici*. and the rest not desirous of any change in the Government, none of them came in. The *Senators* who were on the top of the Palace and had secured themselves as well as they could, threw down stones upon their heads, and frighted them with threats as much as possible. *Giacopo* was in great confusion, and knew not what to do, when his cousin *Giovanni Saristori* coming to him, and reproaching him by what was done already, advised him to go home to his house, and be quiet, assuring him there were other Citizens who would be as careful of the People, and their liberties as he. Being therefore utterly deserv'd of all hopes, *Lorenzo* alive, *Francesco* wounded, and no body appearing for him, he resolv'd to save himself if he could, and march'd out of *Florence* with his Party at his heels, and went towards *Romagna*. In the mean time the whole City was in Arms, and *Lorenzo*, surrounded by a strong Party of armed men, was reconveyed to his Palace. The *Senate's* Palace was recovered, and all those who had possess'd it were either taken or killed. The name of the *Medici* was with great acclamation cryed about the City, and the members of those who were slain were either dragged or carried upon the point of their swords about the streets; every body with great anger and cruelty persecuting the *Pazzi*. Their houses were all broken up by the People; *Francesco*, naked as they found him in his bed, was hurried out of his house to the Palace, and hang'd up by the Bishop and his Bretheren, Yet with all their contumely by the way, and all their affronts when he came there, they could not provoke him to give them one word; only he took grim, and fixed his eyes upon every one that abus'd him; and without any other complaint, he silently expired, *Guglielmo de Pazzi* Brother-in-Law to *Lorenzo*, was preserved in his house, both out of respect to his innocence, and the intercession of *Bianca* his Wife. There was not a Citizen in all the City, but went either armed or disarm'd to *Lorenzo* in this exigence, and proffered him both themselves and their fortunes; so great was the kindness and interest which that family by their prudence and liberality had gained in the People. Whilst this business happened, *Rinaldo di Pazzi* was retired to his Country house, intending to disguise himself, and escape if he could, but he was discovered, apprehended by the way, and brought back again to *Florence*,

The Conspiracy miscarries.

rence *Giacopo* was taken likewise passing the *Alps*, for the *Alpines* hearing what happened in *Florence*, seeing him pass that way, they pursued, took him, and returned him to *Florence*; nor could he prevail with them (though several time he made it his earnest request) to kill him by the way. Four days after this accident, *Giacopo* and *Rinato* were condemned, and put to Death, but among all who were executed (and they were so many that the streets, and high ways were full of their limbs) none was so much lamented as *Rinato*; for he was always esteemed an honest good Man, not guilty of that pride and arrogance which was observed in the rest of his family. And that this story might not pass without an extraordinary instance of the fury of the People, *Giacopo* who was buried at first in the Sepulchre of his Fathers, afterwards was torn from thence as an excommunicated Person, dragged out of the walls of the City, and thrown into a hole; and being taken up again, his body was drawn (in the same halter with which he was hanged) naked about the streets, and having no place allowed it to be quiet at land, was at last thrown into the *Arnus*. A great example of the inconstancy of fortune, to see a person of his wealth and authority, pulled so ignominiously in pieces, and ruined with so many circumstances of contempt. They spake indeed of his vices, and of a strange propensity in him to swearing and play, above the degree of the most profligate person; but those infirmities were abundantly recompensed in his charity and beneficence; for he was a great reliever of the poor, and endow'd several places of devotion. The Sunday before this plot was to be executed, that no Man might be a sufferer by any ill fortune of his, he paid all his debts; and all the effects in his Ware houses or custody which belongeth to other Persons, he consigned to their several owners with an unimaginable care, after a long examination, *Giovan Battista Montesecco* was at last condemned, and his head struck off. *Guiglielmo de Pazzi*, was banished, and his kinsmen which were left alive, imprisoned in a dungeon in the Castle of *Volterra*. When the tumult was over, and the Conspirators executed. *Guiliano's* funeral was celebrated with the universal condolment of the City, he having been a person of as much goodness and humanity as could be desired in one of his quality and extraction. He had only one Son, born some months after his death, who was christned *Giulio*, who proved so remarkable for his virtue and fortune, that the whole World rings of his reputation at this day; and if God gives me life, I shall speak largely of, when I come to the description of his times.

The forces which were got together under *Lorenzo da Castello* in the vail of *di Tevero*, under *Giovan Francesco Tolentino* in *Romagna*, in behalf of the *Pazzi*, were in their march towards *Florence*: but hearing of the miscarriage of their affairs, they returned from whence they came, Nevertheless the Pope and the King of *Naples* (though their Conspiracy had failed, and not produced those mutations which they hoped for in *Florence*) resolved to attempt that by open War, which could not otherwise be effected, and both the one and the other caused their forces to advance towards that City, with all possible diligence, declaring as they went, that all the design of their march, and all their desire of the Citizens, was not removing but the removal of *Lorenzo*, who was the only Enemy he had in the Town. The King's Army had already passed the *Tronto*, and the Pope was in the Country of *Perugia*; and lest his temporal power should be too little, he let loose his spiritual maledictions, and excommunications against him. Whereupon the *Florentines* seeing themselves invaded with such formidable numbers, addressed themselves to their defence, with all possible care. *Lorenzo de Medici* (because the War was pretended only against him) prest very earnestly that all the chief Citizens might be invited to the Palace before the Senate; and above 300 of them appearing, he spake to them in this manner.

*Most noble Lords, and you most magnificent Citizens.*

I do not well know whether I am to congratulate, or condole with you this day for the things which are passed; and truly when I consider with what malice and collusion, I was assaulted, and my Brother slain, I cannot but condole, and my whole heart and Soul is overwhelmed with the affliction; when after that I revolve with what promptitude, with what zeal, with what love, with what unanimity, and universal consent of the whole City, his death was revenged, and mine prevented; I cannot but rejoice, nay even triumph and exult. For as experience has now taught me that I had more Enemies in this City, than I suspected; it has convinced me on the other side, I had more true friends than I could have hoped for: so that I am to congratulate your goodness, and to condole the injury and iniquity of other People, which is the more deplorable, because rare, and undeserved. Think, I beseech you, most noble Citizens, to what point of infelicity fortune hath brought our family, when even among our friends, our relations,

The Pope and King of Naples make War upon the Florentines.

Lorenzo's speech to the Florentines.

ons, and in the very Church we are in danger. Those who are in distress, or apprehension of death, are wont to fly to their friends, and relations for shelter; we found ours not only disposed, but armed, and prepared, and impatient to destroy us. Those who are under any publick or private persecution, have usually their refuge and Sanctuary in the Church: where others are protected, we are assaulted: where Parricides and Murderers are secured, the Medici are murdered themselves: But God (who has not hitherto deserted our family) has preserved us, and undertaken our defence. What injury have we done any body, that could deserve such vehement revenge? Sure we our selves never offended those persons who have been so furious against us; if we had, we should not have left them in that capacity to revenge themselves; if it be publick censure, or injury which provoked them (and of that too I know nothing) 'tis you, nor we are offended; This Palace, this Senate, and the Majesty of this Government, is aspersed with undeserved decrees against the Citizens, in partiality to us, which to my own knowledge is far from being true. We would not have injured them if we had been able, and you would not have suffered us, had we been willing: whoever traces the truth to the bottom, will find our Family was not exalted by this Government for nothing, if I may speak it modestly, it was their humanity, their bounty, their munificence which constrained you to it: if then we have been beneficial to strangers, how came our relations to be disgusted? If their appetite of dominion prompted them to what they have done, (and the seeing of this Palace, and filling the Piazza with armed Men, is an evident demonstration it was nothing else) the design is sufficient conviction, and shows their brutality and ambition. If it were hatred and detestation of our authority, it was you that gave it us, and it is you were injured. But certainly, if any power or authority deserves to be regretted, 'tis that which is usurped, not that which is acquired by a continued stream of kindness and liberality. I appeal to you, most Illustrious Senators, whether any of my predecessors arrived at their Grandeur any way but by the unanimous consent, and promotion of this Court, My Grandfather Cosimo returned not from his banishment by violence, and force of Arms, but by your invitation. My ancient and infirm Father, was too weak to have supported his authority against so many Enemies; it was your bounty, it was your authority which defended it. When my Father was dead, and I (though but a Child) was left to succeed him, Alas! how could I have maintained the honor and dignity of the Family without your favour and instruction. Our house never was, nor ever will be able to govern this State, without your cooperation, and assistance. I cannot imagine therefore what quarrel they should have had against us, or what just reason for their envy; they should rather have turned their indignation upon their own ancestors, who with their insolence and avarice defeated them of that honor, which ours have gained by their generosity and goodness. But, let us gratifie them so far as to grant we had injured them, and that their combinations against us, were but reasonable and just; Why must they conspire against this Palace? Why must they confederate with the Pope, and King of Naples, against the innocence and liberty of this Commonwealth? Why must all Italy be involved in a War? For this they can have no excuse: if any Man have offended them, they might have offended him again, and not blended and confounded private injury with publick revenge. This is it which revives our calamities, though the Authors are extinct. That is it which has brought the Pope and King of Naples upon us with their Armies, though their declaration be only against me and my family. I wish to God it were true, and that their design was no farther: the remedy would be easie, and your deliverance at hand; I should not be so ill a Citizen as to postpone the publick, to my private security; no I would willingly quench your flames, though with my own blood and destruction: but because the injuries of great persons are alway clothed with some plausible pretences, they have chosen this, to exasperate you against me: if you think I deserve it, I am now in your hands, to be continued or rejected as you please: you are my Fathers, you are my Patrons, what ever you command, I will endeavour to do; and not refuse with my own blood to finish this War, which is begun with my Brothers.

The Citizens could not contain from tears, whilst Lorenzo was speaking, and with the same pity as they had heard him, he was answered by one deputed by the rest. That the whole City did acknowledge the merits both of his ancestors and himself. That he should be of good cheer, for with the same readiness and devotion as they had revenged his Brothers death, and prevented his, they would preserve his person and reputation, and expose their whole Country rather than desert him; That their actions might be commensurate, they appointed him a guard, to secure him against domestick designs, and payed them out of the publick treasure: after which they addressed themselves to the War; and raised what



Men and money they were able. They sent for aid to the Duke of Milan, and the Venetians according to the league; and the Pope more like a Wolf than a Shepherd, being ready to devour them, they tried all ways to justify themselves that they could think of, possess'd all Italy with his treachery against their state, remonstrated his impieties to all the World; and that he exercised his Papacy with as much injustice, as he gained it: for he had sent those (whom he had advanced to the highest degree of Prelacy) in the company of Traitors and Murderers to commit treason in the Church, in the time of divine service, and the Celebration of the Sacrament; and after that (having been unable to kill all the Citizens, alter the Government, and sack the City) he interdicted it with his Pontifical maledictions, and threaten'd to destroy it. But if God were just, and the violences of Men offensive to him; he must needs be displeas'd at the proceeding of his Vicar, and permit that Men (having no other refuge) might resort unto him. For which reason the Florentines not only refuse his interdiction, but forced their Priests to celebrate divine service as before. They call'd a Council in Florence, of all the Tuscan Prelats within their jurisdiction, and appeal'd to them concerning their differences with the Pope; against which in justification of his cause, it was alledged, that it belonged properly to the Pope to supplant Tyrants, to suppress ill Men, and to advance good; all which he was to remedy, as opportunity was offer'd. But that secular Princes had no right to imprison Cardinals; to execute Bishops; to kill, or dismember, or drag about the streets the bodies of the Priests; and to use the innocent and the nocent without any difference or distinction. Nevertheless the Florentines nor at all refusing his quarrels and complaints, dismissed the Cardinal which was in their power, and sent him back to the Pope; yet the Pope without any regard to that civility, caus'd them to be invaded with all his forces, and the Kings; both their Armies (under the Command of Alfonso Duke of Calabria Ferrando's eldest Son, and Federigo Conte d' Urbino) enter'd Chianti, and by means of the Siennese, who were of the Enemies party, took Radda; several other Castles; and plundered the whole Country. Next they encamp'd before Castellina; the Florentines seeing themselves thus fiercely attack'd, were in great fear, as having but few men of their own, and the assistance of their friends coming in very slowly; for though the Duke indeed, had sent them supplies, yet the Venetians refus'd it, as not thinking themselves oblig'd to relieve them in their particular quarrels; for as, they pretended, private animosities were not in reason to be defended, at a publick expence. So that the Florentines, to dispose the Venetian to better things, sent Tomaso Soderini Embassador to that State, whilst in the mean time, they rais'd what Men they could, and made Hercules Marquis of Ferrara their General. Whilst in this manner they were employ'd in their preparations, the Enemy had brought Castellina to such distress that, despairing of relief, the Garrison surrender'd, after forty days Siege. From hence, the Enemy advanced towards Arezzo, and sat down before Monte S. Senino. The Florentine Army was by this time drawn out, and being march'd towards the Enemy, had posted it self within three miles of them, and incommoded them so that Federigo sent to Urbino to desire a truce for some few days; which was granted, but with so much disadvantage to the Florentines, that those who request'd it were amaz'd when they had obtain'd it; for without it they must have drawn off with disgrace. But having those days allow'd to recollect themselves, when the time was expired they went on with their siege, and took the Town under the very nose of our Army. By this time Winter being come, to provide themselves good quarters, the Enemy drew his Army into the Country of Siena, the Florentines where they thought most convenient; and the Marquis of Ferrara (having done little good to himself or other People) return'd from whence he came. About this time Genoa was in rebellion against the State of Milan, and upon this occasion, Galeazzo being dead, and his Son Giovan Galeazzo a minor, and unfit for the Government, difference arose betwixt Sforza, Lodovico, Ottaviano, Ascanio, his Uncles, and Medona Bona his Mother; each of them pretending to the tuition of the Child. In which competition Madona Bona the Dutchess Dowager prevail'd, by the Counsels of Tomaso Soderini (the Florentine Embassador in that Court, at that time) and Cecco Simonetto who had been secretary to the late Galeazzo; whereupon Sforza flying from Milan, Ottaviano was drawn, as he was passing the Adda, and the rest dispers'd into several places, Roberto de San Severino ran the same fortune, and fled, having forsaken the Dutchess in those disputes, and joyned himself with the Uncles. The troubles falling out, not long after in Tuscany, those princes hoping from new accidents, or new success, every one of them attempt'd what he thought likely to restore him to his Country. King Ferrando observing the only refuge the Florentines had in their necessities, was to the State of Milan, determin'd to give the Dutchess so much employment of her own, that she should not be at leisure to send them any relief; and by means of Prospero Adorno, the Signore

The Pope and King invade the territories of the Florentines.

Genoa rebels against the State of Milan.

Roberto

*Roberto*, and the *Sforzi* which were banished, he wrought so that *Genoa* rebelled; nevertheless the little Castle remained firm to the young Duke, and the *Duchess* sent forces to them to recover the Town, but they were overthrown; whereupon considering with herself the danger which might accrue both to her Son, and her self, if the War should be continued, all *Tuscany* being imbroiled; and the *Florentines* in distress, she resolved; seeing she could not retain *Genoa* as a Subject, that she would have it as a Friend; and agreed with *Battistina Fregosi* (a great Enemy to *Prospero Adorno*) to deliver him the Castle, and make him Prince of *Genoa*, upon condition he would drive out *Prospero*, and give the *Sforzi* no assistance nor protection. After all was concluded betwixt them, the Castle was surrendered, and by the help of that, and his party, *Battistino* reducing *Genoa*, and according to their custom, made himself *Dogue*; the *Sforzi* and *Signore Roberto* being forced out of the Town, they passed with their followers into *Lunigiana*. The Pope and the King seeing the troubles in *Lombardy* composed, took occasion to infect *Tuscany* on that side towards *Pisa*, with those Persons which were driven out of *Genoa*; supposing by dividing, and diverting their forces, to weaken the *Florentines*; whereupon the Sumner approaching; they prevailed with the *Signore Roberto* to march with his Squadron from *Lunigiana*, into the Country of *Pisa*: *Roberto* put the whole Country into confusion; took several Castles from the *Pisians*, and plundered them; and made his excursions to the very walls of *Pisa* it self. About this time Embassadors arrived at *Florence*, from the Emperour, the King of *France*, and the King of *Hungary*, who from their several Princes being sent to the Pope, persuaded the *Florentines* to send Embassadors also, and promised their utmost endeavour with him, to conclude all their differences with an honorable peace. The *Florentines* consented, as well to excuse themselves to the World, as that they were really desirous of it. Having sent therefore their Embassadors, they returned as they went, without any accommodation; and the *Florentines* finding themselves abused or abandoned by the *Italians*, resolved to try if they could gain themselves any reputation by an alliance with *France*, to which purpose they sent as their Embassador *Donato Acciaiuoli*, a person well skill'd both in the Greek and Latine tongues, whose Ancestors had always born great office in that State; but being arrived at *Milan* in his journey he died; and *Florence*, in honor to his memory, and remuneration to his Children, buried him magnificently, at the publick charge; gave his Sons considerable exemptions; and his Daughters such portions as would marry them like themselves; and sent *Giud' Antonio Vesputi* (a Man well versed in the imperial and Pontifical Laws) to the King of *France* in his place. The inroad *Signore Roberto* had made into the Country of *Pisa*; (as all sudden and unexpected things do) gave the *Florentines* no little distraction. For the War lying heavy upon them in the Country of *Siena*, they could not see how they should be able to defend themselves on the other side; however they sent officers and all other provisions to reinforce the City of *Pisa*; and that they might keep the *Lucchesi* from assisting the Enemy, with money or anything else, they sent *Gino Capponi* as their Embassador to them; but he was received so ill, out of an ancient Enmity to the People of *Florence*, (upon former injuries received) and a constant apprehension to them, that he was many times in danger of being killed by the multitudes. So that his journey produced new quarrels, rather than new quiet; and thereupon the *Florentines* called back the *Marques* of *Ferrara*, entertained the *Marques* of *Mantona* into their pay; and with great importunity, desired of the *Venetian* Count *Carlo* the Son of *Braccio*, and *Deisebo* the Son of *Count Ginno*; who (after several scruples and demurs) were sent to them; for having made peace with the *Turks*; and no pretence left to excuse themselves, they were ashamed, to break faith with the League. *Carlo* therefore, and *Deisebo* being come, with a considerable number of Horse; and joynd to what forces they could conveniently draw out of the *Marques* of *Ferrara*'s Army, (which attended the Duke of *Calabria*) they marched towards *Pisa*, in quest of *Signore Roberto*, who was posted with his Army near the river *Serchio*; and though at first he made a show of expecting our Army; yet upon second thoughts, he removed, and retired into the Country of *Lunigiana*, to the same quarters where he lay before his expedition to *Pisa*. Upon his departure, *Count Carlo* reposse'd himself of all the Enemy had taken in that Country; and the *Florentines* being clear on that side, drew all their forces into one body betwixt *Colle* and *Santo Gimignano*; but upon *Carlo*'s conjunction there being several of the *Sforzeschi*, and the *Bracceschi* in the Army, the old feud began to revive, and it was believed, had they stayed longer together, they had fallen together by the ears; to prevent these inconveniences, it was resolved to divide the Army; that *Count Carlo* should march with his forces into the Country of *Perugia*, and the rest fortifie and intrench themselves at *Poggibonze*, to obstruct the Enemy from entering into the Country of *Florence*. By this division they supposed likewise the Enemy would be forced to divide; for they thought that either *Count*

*Carlo*

The gratitude of the *Florentines*.

*Carlo* would take *Perugia*. (where he had a great party as they believed) or that the Pope would be constrained to send a good body of Men to defend it; and to drive his Holiness into greater necessity, they ordered *Nicolo Vitelli* (who had left *Castello*, where *Lorenzo* his Enemy was predominant) with what force he could make to approach the Town, to drive out his adversary if he could, and keep it against the Pope.

The Popes  
Army defeat-  
ed.

At first, fortune seemed to encline to the *Florentines*, Count *Carlo* advanced strangely in the Country of *Perugia*; *Nicolo Vitelli*, though he could not get into the Town of *Castello*, yet he was Master of the field, and plundered round about it without any contradiction; and those forces which were encamped at *Poggibonzi* made their excursions to the very walls of *Sienna*. But at last all their hopes came to nothing, for first Count *Carlo* died in the very height of their expectations, whose death had nevertheless much bettered the condition of the *Florentines*, had they known how to have improved the victory which it produced; for no sooner was the death of Count *Carlo* known, but the Popes Army (being all together in *Perugia*) conceiving great hopes of overpowering the *Florentines*, took the field, and encamped upon the Lake within three miles of the Enemy: on the other side *Giacopo Guicciardini*, (at that time Commissary of the Army) by the advice of *Roberto da Kmimo*, (who since the death of Count *Carlo*, was the chief, and best reputed officer among them) knowing what it was that set the Enemy agog, they resolved to attend him; and coming to a Battel not far from the Lake (in the very place where *Hannibal* gave the *Romans* that memorable defeat) the Popes Army was routed. The news of this victory was extremely welcome in *Florence*, both to the Magistrates, and People; and it would have been great honor and advantage to that enterprize, had not disorders in the Army at *Poggibonzi* spoiled all, and the victory over the one Camp, been interrupted by a mutiny in the other; for that Army having got much plunder in the Country of *Sienna*, when they came to divide, there fell out great difference betwixt the Marquess of *Ferrara*, and the Marquess of *Mantoua*, so that they came to blows, and did one another what mischief they were able.

The *Florentines* finding no good was to be expected from them together, consented that the Marquess of *Ferrara* with his forces might march home; by which means the Army being weakned, without a head, and very disorderly, the Duke of *Calabria* being with his Army not far from *Sienna*, took a resolution of falling upon them; but the *Florentines* hearing of his advance, not trusting to their Arms, their numbers (which was much greater than the Enemy) nor the situation of their Camp (which were very strong) without expecting their coming, or seeing so much as the face of their Enemy, as soon as they perceived the dust, they fled, and left their Amunition, and Carriages, and Artillery behind them; and so cowardly and poor spirited that Army was become that the turning of a horses head or tail, gave either victory or defeat. This Rout filled the King's Souldiers with prize, and the *Florentines* with fear; for that City was not only afflicted with War, but with so violent a pestilence, that most of the inhabitants were forced to leave the Town, and betake themselves to the Country. This overthrow was rendred more terrible by sickness, for those Citizens who had Estates in the *Val di Pysa*, and the *Val Delsa*, being driven thither, and secure; were forced (upon this rout) to hurry back again to *Florence* as well as they could, and that not only with their goods and their Children, but with all their families and dependants, for every hour they were afraid the Enemy would have presented himself before the Town. They who had the administration of the War, being sensible of these disorders, commanded their Army (which was victorious in *Perugia*) that leaving their designs there, they should march into the *Val Delsa*, and oppose themselves against the Enemy, who, since their last victory, over-run that whole Country. And though that Army had so straitned *Perugia*, it was every hour expected to surrender, yet the *Florentines* chose rather to defend themselves, than to gain upon any body else; and raising their siege they were conducted to *S. Cassiano*, Castle about eight miles from *Florence*, as the only place where they might lie secure, till the other Army was rallied, and brought to them. The Enemy on the other side, being at liberty in *Perugia*, upon the withdrawing of the *Florentines*, took heart, and made their inroads daily into the countries of *Arezzo* and *Cortona*; and the other Army, which under the command of the Duke of *Calabria*, had routed them at *Poggibonzi*, took *Poggibonzi*, and *Vico*, pillaged *Certaldo*, made great spoil, and got great prize in that Country, after they sat down before *Colle* which (in those times) was looked upon as extraordinary strong, and being well man'd, and provided with all things, it was hoped it might entertain the Enemy, till their Armies could be united.

The *Florentines* having joyned all their forces at *S. Cassiano*, and the Enemy proceeding very fiercely in their leaguer; they resolved to march towards them, and post them-

selves as near them as they could, supposing they should thereby, not only encourage the Garison to defend themselves, but make the Enemy more cautious in all his attacks: Here upon they removed from *S. Cassiano*, and encamped at *S. Gimignano* about five miles from *Colle*, from whence with their Horse, and the lightest of their foot, they daily molested the Dukes Camp: but this was not enough for the Garison in *Colle*, for wanting all things that were necessary, they surrendered the 13 of *November*, to the great displeasure of the *Florentines*, but the great joy of the Enemy, especially the *Stenesi*, who besides their common hatred to *Florence*, had a particular quarrel against this Town.

Winter was now at the height; the season unfit for War; and the Pope and King (to give them hopes of peace, or to enjoy their victory quietly themselves) offered a truce for three Months to the *Florentines*, and allowed them ten days for an answer; which proffer was accepted; but as a wound is more painful when cold, than when 'tis first given, this small repose, gave the *Florentines* greater sence of the miseries which they had endured; insomuch as they began to talk freely, and upbraid one another by the miscarriages in the War, charging one another with the greatness of the expence, and the inequality of their taxes, and these exprobrations were not only in the streets, and among the ordinary sort of People, but even in their conventions, and publick counsels, in which one of them took the confidence to tell *Lorenzo* to his face, that the City was weary, and would have no more War, and that therefore he should bethink himself of peace; upon which *Lorenzo*, discerning the necessity, advised with such of his friends as he judged most faithful and able, and it was concluded by all (that seeing the *Venetians* were cold and uncertain; the Duke young, and imbroiled in new troubles at home) their best way would be to seek out for new alliance, and try what that would contribute to their success. Their great scruple was, into whose arms they should cast themselves, whether into the Popes, or the King's of *Naples*; and upon serious debate it was resolved into the King's, as a person of more stability, and likely to yield them better protection, in regard of the shortness of the Popes lives, and the changes upon their successions. For the small fear the Church has of any Prince, and the small regard it has of any body else in all its resolutions, causes that no secular Prince can repose any intire confidence, or communicate freely in his affairs, with any of the Popes; for he that associates with him in war, and in dangers, may perhaps have a companion and a sharer in his Victories; but in his distress he shall be sure to be alone, his holiness being still brought off by his spiritual influence and authority. It being therefore determined more profitable to reconcile with the King, there could be no way thought of so likely, as by *Lorenzo* himself, for by how much the more that King had tasted of his liberality, by so much the more they thought it probable he might succeed. *Lorenzo* embracing the motion, and having prepared for his journey, committed the City and Government to *Tomaso Soderini* (at that time *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia*) and left *Florence* in the beginning of *December*. Being arrived at *Risa* in his way, he writ to the *Senate*, and gave them an account of his design, and the *Senate* in honor to him, and that he might treat with more reputation, made him Embassador for the People of *Florence*, and gave him authority to conclude with him, according to his own judgment, and discretion. About this time *Signore Roberto da Santo Severino*, joyning with *Lodovico* and *Ascanio* (for their brother *Sforza* was dead) they invaded the State of *Milan*, in hopes to have re-invested themselves; having possess'd themselves of *Tortona*, and *Milan*, and the whole State being in Arms, the Dutchess was advised (to compose her civil dissensions) to restore the *Sforzi*, and receive them, into the Government again. Her great Councellor in this, was *Antonio Tassino a Ferrarese*, who, though meanly extracted, being come to *Milan*, was preferred to be Chamberlain both to the Duke and the Dutchess; this *Antonio*, for the comeliness of his person, or some other secret excellence, after the Dukes death, grew into great favour with the Dutchess, and in a manner governed the whole State; which was very unpleasing to *Cecco*, a Man of great prudence, and long experience in publick affairs, insomuch that he used all his interest both with the Dutchess, and the rest of the Governors to clip the wings of his authority, & remove him. *Antonio* having notice of his design, to countermine him, and have some body near which might be able to defend him, he advis'd the Dutchess to restore the *Sforzi*, and the Dutchess following his persuasion, invited them back again without communicating with *Cecco*: upon which he is reported to have told her that she had done a thing which would cost him his life, and deprive her of the Government. And so afterwards it fell out, for *Cecco* was put to death by *Lorenzo*, and *Tassino* turned out of *Milan*, which the Dutchess took in such dudgeon, that she forsook the Town, and left the Government of her Son to his uncle *Lodovico*, which act of her's in leaving that whole Dutchy to the Government of *Lodovico*, was the ruine of *Italy*, as shall be shown in its place. *Lorenzo de Medici* was in his journey towards *Naples*, and the truce betwixt the Parties,

*Antonio Tassino* a favorite of the Dutchess.

*Lodovico Sforza* Governor of *Milan*.

parties, in a very fair way, when on a sudden, beyond all expectation *Lodovico Fregoso*, having intelligence in *Serezana*, surprized the Town, and made all prisoners whom he found any ways affected to the *Florentines*. This accident was highly resented by the Governors of *Florence*, for they imagined it done by the order of *Ferrando*, and therefore complained heavily to the Duke of *Calabria* (who was with his Army at *Sienna*) that whilst they were in Treaty, they should be assaulted so treacherously; but the Duke assured them by Letters, and an Embassy on purpose, that what had passed was done without either his consent, or his Fathers. However, the affairs of the *Florentines* were judged in a very ill condition; their treasure being exhausted; their Prince, in the hands of the King; an old War on Foot with the Pope and the King, a new War commenced with the *Genoese*, and no friends to support them, for they had no hopes of the *Venetian*, and of the State of *Milan* they had more reason to be afraid, it was so various and unstable: the only hope remaining to the *Florentines*, was in *Lorenzo's* address to the King.

*Lorenzo de Medici* arrives at *Naples*.

*Lorenzo* arrived at *Naples*, by Sea, was honorably received both by the King, and the whole City; and though the War was begun for no other end but to ruine him, yet the greatness of his Enemies, did but add to his Grandeur; for being brought to his audience, he delivered himself so handsomly, and discoursed so well of the condition of *Italy*, of the humors of all the Princes, and People therein, and gave so good account of what was to be dreaded by War, and what was to be hoped for by peace, that the King admired the greatness of his mind, the dexterity of his wit, the solidity of his judgment, more now, than he had wondered before, how he could alone sustain so great an invasion, inso-much that he doubled his respects towards him, and began to think it his interest much more to make him his friend, than to continue him his Enemy. Nevertheless upon sundry pretences and fetches, he kept him in dispencc from *December* to *March*, not only to satisfy himself in a farther experience of *Lorenzo*, but to inform himself of the infidelity of *Florence*, for that City was not without those who would have been glad the King would have kept him, and handled him as *Giacopo Piccinino* was handled. These People began to complain, and spake ill of him, all over the Town, to oppose themselves publickly in the Councils against any thing that was moved in favour to *Lorenzo*; and gave out generally where ever they came, that if the King kept him much longer at *Naples*, they would alter the Government; so that the King forbore to dispatch him for some time, in expectation of a tumult. But finding all quiet, and no likelihood of any such thing, on the 6 of *March* 1479, he dismissed him, having first presented him so nobly, and treated him so honorably, that they had made a perpetual League, and obliged themselves mutually for the preservation of one anothers Dominions.

If therefore *Lorenzo* was great when he went from *Florence*, he was much greater when he returned; and was received with a joy, and acclamation in the City, suitable to his quality, and the recency of his deserts, who had ventred his own life so frankly, to procure peace to his Country. Two days after his arrival, the Articles of Peace were published, by which both the State of *Florence* and King had particularly obliged themselves to a common defence; that such Towns as were taken from the *Florentines* during the War (if in the King's power) should be restored: that the *Pazzi* which were prisoners at *Volterra*, should be discharged, and a certain sum of money payed to the Duke of *Calabria*, for a prefixed time. This Peace was no sooner published, but the Pope, and the *Venetians* were infinitely offended, the Pope thinking himself neglected by the King, and the *Venetians* by the *Florentines*, for both one and the other having been partners in the War, they took it unkindly to be left out of the Peace. Their displeasure being reported and believed at *Florence*, it was presently apprehended that the effect of this peace, would be a greater War.

New constitutions.

Hereupon the Governors of the State, began to think of contracting the government, and reducing it into a lesser number of Ministers, appointing a Council of 70 Citizens to transact such affairs as were of principal importance. This new Constitution settled the minds of those who were desirous of innovation, and to give it a reputation, the first thing they did, was to ratify the peace which *Lorenzo* had made with the King, and they pointed *Antonio Ridolfi*, and *Piero Nasi*, Embassadors to the Pope. Notwithstanding this Peace, the Duke of *Calabria* departed from the Country of *Sienna* with his Army, extending he was retained by the dissensions of that City, which were so great, that being quartered not far off, he was invited into the Town, and their differences referred to arbitration. The Duke accepted the overture, find several of the Citizens; imprisoned several; banished some, and some he put to death; so that he became suspicious, not only to the *Siense*, but to the *Florentines* also; that his design was to make himself Prince that City; nor could they devise any remedy, seeing they had entred into a League with the

the King, and thereby made both Pope, and *Venetians* their Enemies. And this suspicion was not only got into the brains of the multitude in *Florence* (a subtle interpreter of affairs,) but into the minds also of the Governors, so that it was generally concluded, the liberty of that City was never in more danger: but God who has always had a particular care of it in all its extremities, averted that evil, and by an unexpected accident, gave the King, the Pope, and the *Venetians* a diversion which imported them more, than their advantages in *Tuscany*.

*Mahomet* the great Turk, was with a great Army, encamped before *Rhodes*, and had lien before it several months: though his forces were numerous, and his diligence great, yet the valour of the besieged was not to be mastered, for they defended themselves so bravely, he was forced to draw off, and quit the siege, with a great deal of dishonor. Having left *Rhodes*, he sent part of his Fleet, under the command of *Giacometto Basca* towards *Velona*, and (either upon consideration of the easiness of the enterprize; or express command from the Grand *Signore* to that purpose) coasting about *Italy*, on a sudden he landed 6000 Men, assaulted the City of *Otranto*, took it; plundered it, killed all the Inhabitants, and when he had done, fortified both the Town and the harbour as much as possibly he could, and with a good party of Horse; scowred the whole Country about it: The King being much alarmed at this invasion, as knowing how great a Monarch he had to deal with, sent his Embassadors about to every Body, to let them know his condition, and to beg their assistance, against the common Enemy; besides which he pressed the Duke of *Calabria* with all imaginable importunity, to leave his designs at *Siena*, and come back with all his forces: this invasion though it was very dreadful to the Duke, and all the rest of *Italy*, yet it was welcome to *Florence* and *Siena*, the one thinking its liberty most miraculously preserved, and the other themselves as strangely delivered from those dangers which would of necessity have destroyed them. Which opinion was much encreased by the unwillingness wherewith the Duke departed from *Siena*; complaining and cursing his fortune, which by so unreasonable and an unexpected accident, had defeated him of the Dominion of *Tuscany*. The same thing, changed the Counsels of the Pope, and whereas before he would never admit any Embassador from *Florence*, he was grown now so meek, he would hear any body speak of a general Peace; and word was sent to the *Florentines* that when ever they found themselves enclined, ask pardon of the Pope, they would be sure to have it. The *Florentines* thought not fit to slip so fair an occasion; and therefore sent 12 Embassadors to the Pope, who entertained them with diverse practices after they were arrived at *Rome*, before he admitted them to audience: yet at length it was adjusted how all Parties should comport for the future, and what every one should contribute, in time of Peace, as well as in War; after which the Embassadors were admitted to the feet of the Pope, who was placed in great Pomp, with his Cardinals about him.

The Embassadors, to extenuate what had passed, laid the fault sometimes upon their own necessities; sometimes upon the malignity of other People: sometimes upon the popular fury; sometimes upon their own just indignation; as being so unhappy to be forced either to fight; or to die; and because death is the most terrible of all things, and all things will be tried, before that will be embraced, they had endured the War, the excommunications and all the ill consequences which followed; rather than suffer their liberty (which is the life of a Commonwealth) to be taken from them, and extinguished: nevertheless, if their necessity had run them upon the rocks, and forced them to do any thing which was displeasing to him, they were ready to make him satisfaction, and did hope, according to the example of their gracious Redeemer, he would be as ready to receive them into his most merciful Arms. To which excuses his Holiness replied with great heat and indignation, reproaching them by all the mischiefs which they had done to the Church; nevertheless, to preserve the Commandments of God, he was contented to grant them their pardon as they desired; but intimated withal, that they were to be more obedient for the future, and if again they transgressed, that liberty which now they were only like to have lost should be then taken wholly, and that justly, away, because they who deserved to be free, were such as practised good things, and not bad; and liberty abused, was destructive both to themselves, and other People; for to neglect their duty either to God or his Church, was not the office of good Men, but of such as were dissolute and lewd; the correction of which belongeth not only to Princes, but to all that are Christians, so that for what was to be passed, they were to lay the fault upon themselves; who by their ill deeds had given occasion of the War, and continued it by their worse; but now that was at an end, yet it was attributed more to the goodness of other People, than any merit in them; after which he gave them his benediction and the form of the agreement, to which he had added (besides what had been debated, and concluded on in Counsel,) that if the *Florentines* expected any

The Isle of  
*Rhodes* assaulted  
by the  
Turks.

The Embas-  
sadors to the  
Pope.

The Pope  
replies.



fruit from his blessing, they should furnish out fifteen Gallies and keep them in their pay till the Turk was beaten out of *Italy*. The Embassadors complained grievously to have an article of that weight superadded to what was concluded in the Treaty; but by all the friends they could make, and all the arts they could use, they could not prevail to have it expunged; whereupon returning to *Florence*, that *Senate*, to perfect the Peace, sent *Guido Antonia Vespucci* (who not long before was returned from *France*) their Embassador to his Holiness, and by his prudence, he brought the terms to be tolerable, and as a greater sign of his reconciliation, received several other marks of his Holiness favour. The *Florentines* having put an end to all their differences with the Pope. *Sienna* being free, they delivered from their apprehensions of the King, by the Duke of *Calabria* drawing away with his Army out of *Tuscany*, and the War continuing with the Turks, they pressed the King so hard to the restitution of such places as the Duke of *Calabria* at his departure had committed to the keeping of the *Sanesi*; that he began to fear the *Florentines* might desert him, and by making War upon the *Sanesi*, hinder the assistance which he expected from the Pope, and the rest of the Princes of *Italy*; whereupon he caused them all to be delivered, and by several new favours, reobliged the *Florentines* to him; from whence we may observe, that it is interest and necessity, not their hands or their words, which make Princes keep their promises. These Castles being restored, and the new League confirmed, *Lorenzo de Medici* gained greater reputation than the War first, and after, the peace (when they were jealous of the King) had taken from him. For at that time there wanted not those who calumniated him openly, as one, who to preserve himself, had sold his Country, and as by the War they had lost their Towns, by the peace they should lose their liberty. But when the Towns were restored; and honorable peace concluded with the King; and the City returned to its ancient reputation, the People (who are generally greedy to talk, and judge of things more by the success, than the Counsel) changed their note presently, and cryed up *Lorenzo* to the skies, as one who had gained more by his management in that peace, than their ill fortune had got them by the War; and that his prudence and judgment had done what all the Armies and power of their Enemies could not.

This descent of the Turks deser'd the War, which the Pope and the *Venetians* upon provocation of that peace, had designed against them, but as the beginning of the Turkish invasion was unexpected, and produced much good; so the end of it was unlooked for, and the occasion of much mischief; for *Mahomet* the Grand *Signore* died suddenly, and difference arising betwixt his Sons, those who were landed in *Puglia*, being abandoned by their Lord, came to an agreement with the King of *Naples*, and delivered up *Otranto* into his hands. This fear therefore being removed, which kept the Pope, and the *Venetians* quiet; every one began to be apprehensive of new troubles. On the one side the Pope and the *Venetian* were in League, and with them *Genoese*, *Sanesi*, and other lesser Potentates. On the other side, were the *Florentines*, the King of *Naples*, the Duke of *Milan*, and with them the *Bolognese*, and several other little States. The *Venetian* had a design upon *Ferrara*; they thought they had reason enough to attempt it, and hopes enough to carry it. The reason was, because the Marquess had declared himself obliged no longer to receive either their *Visdomine*, or their salt; for by compact after 70 years, that City was to be exempt both from the one and the other: to which the *Venetians* replied that so long as he retained the *Polesine*; so long he was, to receive the *Visdomine* and the Salt; but the Marquess refusing; they thought they had just occasion to take Arms, and their opportunity was convenient, seeing the Pope, in such indignation, both against the *Florentines*, and King; to oblige him the more, *Count Girolamo* being by accident at *Venice*, was honorably treated, made a Gentleman of that City, and had all the priviledges and immunities of a Citizen conferred upon him; which is a particular favour, and shows always the great esteem they bear to the Person which receives it. In preparation for this War, they laid new taxes upon their subjects; and for their General, they had chosen *Roberto da San Severino*, who upon some difference betwixt him, and *Lodovick* Duke of *Milan*, fled to *Tortona*, and having made some tumults there, he got off to *Genoa*, from whence he was invited by the *Venetians*, and made General of their Army. The news of these preparations coming to the ears of the League, they prepared themselves accordingly. The Duke of *Milan* chose *Federigo* Lord of *Urbino*, for his General. The *Florentines* chose *Franco di Porsano*; and to sound the Pope, and discover whether these proceedings of the *Venetians* were by his consent, King *Ferrando* sent the Duke of *Calabria* with his Army to quarter upon the *Tranto*, and desired leave of his Holiness that they might pass thorow his territories, from thence into *Lombardy* to the relief of the Marquess; which being absolutely denied, the *Florentines* and King thinking that a sufficient declaration of his mind, resolved to attempt it



by force, and try if that they could make him their friend, or at least give him such impediments as should hinder his supplying of the *Venetians*, who had already taken the field; invaded the *Marquess*; overrun most of the Country, and clap'd down with their Army before *Figarolo*, a Castle of great importance to the affairs of that Prince. The King and the *Florentines* having in the mean time concluded to fall upon the Pope, *Alfonso Duke of Calabria* marched his Army towards *Rome*, and by the help of the *Colonnese* (who were joyned with him, in opposition to the *Orsini* who sided with the Pope) he committed great spoils all over that Country. On the other side, the *Florentines* under the command of *Nicolo Vitelli* assaulted the City of *Castello*; took it; turned out *Lorenzo* who had kept it for the Pope, and gave it to *Nicolo* as Prince: the Pope was at this time in very great anxiety. *Rome* was full of factions within, and the Enemy in the Country without. Nevertheless, (like a courageous Prince, resolv'd to overcome, not to yield to his Enemies) he entertained for his General *Roberto da Rimino*, and inviting him to *Rome*, where he had assembled all the forces he could make, he represented how great an honor it would be to him, if he could rescue the Church from the calamities which were upon it; and that not only himself and his successors, but God Almighty would reward him. *Roberto* having taken a view of his Army, and all the Magazines, he persuaded the Pope to raise him what foot he could more, which was done with great diligence and expedition. The Duke of *Calabria* was all this while foraging about that Country, and making his inroads to the very walls of the City; which netled and provoked the Citizens so, as many of them came freely, and offered their service to remove them, which *Roberto* with many thanks, and great expressions of kindness accepted.

The Duke, understanding their preparations, thought fit to draw farther off from the City, supposing that *Roberto* would not venture to follow him at any distance from the Town; besides he had some expectation of his Brother *Federigo* who was to come to him with fresh supplies from his Father. *Roberto* finding himself equal in Horse, and superior in foot, drew his Army out of the Town, and directing towards the Enemy, he encamped within two miles of him. The Duke finding the Enemy upon his back, quite contrary to his expectation; perceived there was no remedy but he must fight; or run away; so that forced, and constrained, lest otherwise he should do a thing unworthy of a King's Son, he resolv'd to fight, turned upon the Enemy, and each of them having put their Army into order, according to the discipline of those times, they fell to it, and the battle continued from morning to noon, and was fought with more courage than any in *Italy* for fifty years before; there dying on the one side and the other above a thousand Men: the end of which fight was very honorable for the Church; for their infantry being numerous, so galled the Dukes Horse, that they were forced to turn tail, and the Duke had been taken, had he not been rescued by some Turks, which upon the delivery of *Otronta* took pay under him. *Roberto* having gained so absolute a Victory, returned triumphantly to *Rome*; but he enjoyed the pleasure of it but little, for in the heat of the battle having drunk a great quantity of cold water, he put himself into a flux, and died not many days after; his body being interred by his Holiness with all imaginable ceremony. The Pope having gained this Victory, he sent the Count towards *Castello* to try if he could recover it for *Lorenzo*, and what he could do upon *Rimino*; for after the death of *Roberto*, there being only one Child left in the tuition of his Lady, he thought it might be no hard matter to get into that Town; and doubtless he had succeeded, had not that Lady been assisted by the *Florentines*, who opposed him so happily, that he could do nothing against *Rimino*, nor *Castello*. Whilst these things were in agitation in *Romagna*, and *Rome*, the *Venetians* had taken *Figarolo*, and passed the *Po* with their Army; the Duke of *Milan's*, and the *Marquess* his Army (being in no small disorder, upon the death of the Count of *Urbino*) who falling ill was removed to *Bologna*; and died there; so that the *Marquess's* affairs began to decline, and the *Venetians* had great hopes of becoming Masters of *Ferrara*: On the other side the *Florentines* and King of *Naples*, used all possible art to bring the Pope over to their party, but not being able to do it by force; they threaten'd him with a Council, which the Emperor had pronounced already should be held at *Basil*. Whereupon, by persuasion of his Embassadors at *Rome* and the chief of the Cardinals (who were very desirous of peace) the Pope was constrained; and began to hearken to the peace, and tranquillity of *Italy*; and for fear the Grandeur of the *Venetians* should be the ruine of that Country, he became inclinable to the League, and sent his Nuncios to *Naples*, where a peace was concluded for five years betwixt the Pope, King of *Naples*, and *Florentines*, reserving a certain time for the *Venetians*, if they pleas'd to come in. Which being done, the Pope sent to the *Venetians* to desist in their War against *Ferrara*, but the *Venetians* were so far from complying, they reinforced their Army, and pursued it with more eagerness than before; for having

The Duke of Calabria defeated.

A new League.

defeated the Duke's forces, and the Marquesses at *Argenta*, they had advanced in such manner against the City, that their Army was encamped in the Marquesses Park. So that the League, thinking it no dallying any longer, resolv'd to assault them with all the forces they could make, and accordingly the Duke of *Calabria* had orders to march thither with the Army. The *Florentines* likewise sent what Men they could spare; and for the better administration of the War, a Diet was appointed to be held at *Cravenna*, where there met the Popes Legat, *Count Girolamo*, the Duke of *Calabria*, the *Signore Lodovico*, and *Lorenzo de Medici*, with many other Princes of *Italy*, in which Council the Method of the future War was debated, and having concluded that *Ferrara* could not any way be relieved more effectually, than by a brisk diversion, they desired *Lodovico's* permission to attack the *Venetians* thorough the Country of *Milan*; but *Lodovico* would not be persuaded, as fearing to pull a War upon his back, which he could not be rid off when he pleased: whereupon it was determined that they should march with their whole strength for *Ferrara*, and having mustered 4000 Horse and 8000 Foot, they advanced against the *Venetians*, who were 2200 Horse, and 6000 Foot. But the first thing the League thought fit to attempt, was a Fleet which the *Venetians* had upon the *Po*; and they assaulted it so smartly that they broke it at *Bardino*, destroyed 200 of their Vessels, and took *Antonio Justiniana* (the Proveditor of their Navy) Prisoner.

The *Venetians*, seeing all *Italy* combined against them; to give themselves greater reputation they entertained the Duke of *Reno* into their pay with 200 good Horses; and upon news of the defeat of their Fleet they sent him with part of the Army to face the enemy, whilst *Roberto da San Severino* passed the *Adda* with the rest, and approaching to *Milan*, proclaimed the Duke and Madam *Bona*, his Mother; hoping that *Lodovico* and his Government had been so odious in that City, that the very name of the other would have begot some commotion. This inroad at first produced some kind of terror: but the conclusion was quite contrary to what the *Venetians* had designed, for this compelled *Lodovico* to do, what he could not be brought to before; and therefore leaving the Marquess of *Ferrara* to the defence of his own Country, with 4000 Horse, and 2000 Foot, the Duke of *Calabria* with 12000 Horse, and 5000 Foot, marched into the Countries of *Bergona*, *Brescia*, and *Verona*, plundering and spoiling all about them, before the *Venetians* could send them any relief, for *Roberto* and his Army had much ado to secure that City: on the other side, the Marquess of *Ferrara*, had recovered a great part of his losses; for the Duke of *Reno* (who was sent to confront him) having but 2000 Horse and 1000 Foot was not able to oppose him: so that all that year 1483, things went on prosperously for the League. The next Spring (the Winter having passed, without any considerable action), both Armies took the field. The League, for greater expedition in their designs against the *Venetians*, had drawn their whole Army together; and (had the War been managed as wisely as the year before) had easily carried what ever the *Venetians* were possess'd of in *Lombardy*; for they were reduced to 6000 Horse, and 5000 Foot (whilst the Enemy consisted of 13000 Horse, and 6000 Foot), for the Duke of *Reno*, being entertain'd only for a year, when his time was out, was retired. But (as it many times happens where many are in equal authority) dissention among the Grandees, gives the Victory to the Enemy; for *Federigo Gonzagua* Marquess of *Mantua* being dead (who whilst he was living, kept the Duke of *Calabria*, and *Signore Lodovico* in good correspondence), there grew exceptions, betwixt them, and jealousies by degrees: for *Giovann Galeazzo* being of age, become capable of the Government, and married to the Daughter of the Duke of *Calabria*, he had a mind his Son-in-Law, and not *Lodovico*, should exercise the Government. *Lodovico*, smelling his design, resolv'd if possible, to prevent him. This inclination of *Lodovico's*, being known to the *Venetians*, they thought it a fair opportunity to gain (as they had done before) by peace, what by War they had lost; and making private overtures to him, in *August* 1484, they came to an agreement, which was no sooner divulg'd but the other Confederats were highly displeas'd, especially seeing all they had taken from the *Venetians* would be restor'd; the *Venetians* left in the possession of *Rovigo* and *Polisina* (which they had taken from the Marquess of *Ferrara*) and invest'd with all the Prerogatives and prebeminences which they had exercised over that City before; for every Man judg'd they had made a chargeable War; gained some honor, indeed in the prosecution of it; but in the conclusion, they had come off with disgrace; for the Towns which they had taken were restor'd, but the Towns they had lost were kept by the Enemy yet the confederats were glad to accept the Peace, being weary of the war, and unwilling to attempt their fortune any further, with the defects and ambi-

Castello besieged by the Army of the Pope.

Whilst in *Lombardy* things were managed at this rate, the Pope, by the mediation of *Lorenzo*, press'd hard upon the City of *Castello* to turn out *Nicolo Vitelli*, who (to bring over

over the Pope to their party) was deserted by the League. Whilst they were intrenched before the Town, those of the Garrison who were friends to *Vitelli*, sallied out upon the Enemy, and beat them from the Siege; hereupon the Pope recalled *Girolamo* from *Lombardy*; caused him to come to *Rome* to recruit his Army, and then sent him to pursue his designs against *Castello*: but judging it better upon second thoughts to reduce *Nicolo* by fair means than foul, he made peace with him, and reconciled him, as much as in him lay, to his adversary *Lorenzo*: and to this he was constrained more out of apprehension of new troubles, than any desire to peace; for he saw ill humours remaining betwixt the *Colonnese*, and the *Ursini*.

In the War betwixt the Pope and the King of *Naples*, the King of *Naples* had taken from the *Ursini* the Country of *Pagliacozzo*, and given it to the *Colonnese* who followed his party. When Peace was afterwards made betwixt the Pope and the King, the *Ursini* demanded restitution by virtue of that treaty. The Pope many times required the *Colonnese* to deliver it, but neither the prayers of the one, nor the threats of the other being able to prevail, they fell upon the *Ursini* with their old way of depredation and plunder. The Pope not enduring that insolence, drew all his forces together, and joining them with the *Ursini*, they sacked the Houses of all the *Colonnese* in *Rome*; killed those who refused, and destroyed most of the Castles which they had in those parts: so that those tumults were ended, not by peace, but by the destruction of one of the parties.

The *Colonnese* provoked the Pope, and are ruin'd in *Rome*.

In the mean time, the affairs in *Genoa* and *Tuscany* were in no better condition; for the *Florentines* kept *Antonio da Marciano*, with his forces upon the frontiers of *Serezana*, and with excursions and skirmishes, kept the *Serezani* in perpetual alarm. In *Genoa* *Bartolomeo Fregoso* Doge of that City, repoling too much confidence in *Paulo Fregoso* the Archbishop, was himself, his Wife and Children, seized by him, and the Archbishop made himself Prince. The *Venetian* fleet had at that time assaulted the King of *Naples*; possess'd themselves of *Galipoli*; and alarmed all the Towns about it; but upon the peace in *Lombardy*, all the differences were compos'd, except those in *Tuscany*, and *Rome*: for the Pope died five days after the Peace was proclaimed, either his time being then come, or else his indignation at the Peace (against which he was most obstinately averse) having killed him. However he left all *Italy* quiet when he died, though whilst he lived, he kept it constantly imbroil'd. Upon his death, *Rome* was immediately in Arms: Count *Girolamo* with his forces retired to the Castle: the *Ursini* were fearful the *Colonnese* would revenge the injuries they had so lately received: the *Colonnese* demanded their Houses and Castles to be made good; so that in a few days, Murders, Robberies, and burning of Houses, was to be seen in several parts of the City; but the Cardinals having perswaded *Girolamo* to deliver up the Castle into the hands of their Colledge, to retire to his own Government; and free the City from his forces; hoping thereby to make the next Pope his friend; he readily obey'd, deliver'd up the Castle to the Colledge, and drew off his forces to *Imola*. So that the Cardinals being rid of that fear, and the Barons of the assistance they expected from *Girolamo*, they proceeded to the Election of a new Pope; and after some little disputes, they made choice of *Giordan* *Battista* *Cibo* Cardinal *de* *Malfetta*, a *Genovesi*, with the name of *Innocent* the 8, who by the easiness of his Nature: (being a Man of peace) prevailed with them to lay down their Arms; and once more made all quiet at *Rome*.

Notwithstanding this Peace, the *Florentines* could not be prevail'd with to be quiet; it appearing to them dishonorable, and insufferable, that a private Gentleman should have taken, and keep from them the Castle of *Serezana*; and because it was an article in the Peace, that not only all that had been lost might be demanded again; but that War might be waged against any that obstructed it; they prepar'd Men and money to go on with that enterprize: whereupon *Agostino Fregoso*; who had surpriz'd *Serezana*; finding himself unable with his private force, to sustain such a War, he resign'd it to *S. George*. And seeing we shall many times have occasion to mention *S. George*; and the *Genovesi*; it will not be inconvenient to describe the orders and methods of that City, which is one of the principal in *Italy*.

The Company of *S. George*.

When the *Genovesi* had made peace with the *Venetians*, after the greatest War in which they had ever been engag'd, not being able to satisfy certain Citizens who had advanced great sums of money for the service of the publick, they made over to them the profits of the *Dogana*, appointing that every Man should share of them; according to the proportion of his principal sum, till his whole debt should be wrought out; and for their convenience of meeting, and better disposing of their affairs; they consign'd the Palace to them which was over the Custom-house: These Creditors erected a kind of Government among themselves, created a Counsel of 100 to deliberate and order all publick matters; and another of eight Citizens, to put them in execution; their debts were divided into several parts, which they

they called *Luogbi*, and their whole body was called *San. Giorgia*. Having established their Government in this manner, new exigences arising every day to the Commonwealth, they had recourse to *San. Giorgio* for supplies; which being rich, and well managed was able always to relieve them: but the Magistrates and community of the City (having granted them their customs before) were forced now when they borrowed any money, to make over their lands to them, and they had done it so frequently, that the necessities of the one, and the supplies of the other had brought things to that pass, that the greatest part of the Towns and Cities under the jurisdiction of *Genoa*, were fallen into their hands, and they Governed and disposed of them as they pleased, chusing annually their *Restori* or Governors by publick suffrage, without the least interposition or concernment of the Commonwealth. From hence it happened that the affection of the People was removed from the Government of the Commonwealth (which they looked upon as tyrannical) to the Government of *San. Giorgio*, (which was well, and impartially administered) and from hence the ease and often changes, of the State did proceed; which submitted it self sometimes to this Citizen, sometimes to that stranger, as occasion invited; and the reason was, because it was not *San. Giorgio*, but the Magistrates which altered the Government. Therefore when the contention was betwixt the *Fregosi*, and *Adorni* for Sovereignty of the City; because the controversy was only among the Governors of the Commonwealth; the greatest part of the Citizens withdrew, and left the State to him that could catch it; the office of *San. Giorgio* concerning it self no farther, than to swear the person advanced, to the conservation of their Laws, which have not been altered to this very day; for having Arms, and money, and conduct, they cannot be subverted without danger of a destructive Rebellion. A rare and incomparable example, not to be followed in all the visible, or imaginary Commonwealths of the Philosophers; to behold in the same Circle, among the same Citizens, liberty, and tyranny, civility, and corruption, justice, and rapine to be exercised at the same time; for that order alone preserved that City in its ancient and venerable customs. And had it fallen out (as in time doubtless it will) that the Government of the Commonwealth had fallen to the management of *San. Giorgio*, no question but before this it would have been greater, and more formidable than the republick of *Venice*. To this *San. Giorgio*, therefore *Agostino Fregosa* (not being able to keep it himself) delivered *Serezana*: *San. Giorgio* accepted it readily, undertook to defend it; put out a Fleet immediately to Sea; and sent forces to *Pietra Santa* to intercept any that should go to the *Florentines*, who were already encamped before *Serezana*. The *Florentines* on the other side had a months mind to *Pietra Santa*, as a Town which, by reason of its situation betwixt *Pisa* and that, would make *Serezana* inconsiderable, though they should take it; and in the mean time interrupt them in their Leaguer, as often as that Garrison should think it fit to come forth. To bring this about, the *Florentines* sent a considerable quantity of provisions and amunition, with a small party to convey them from *Pisa* to their Camp. Supposing that the Garrison of *Pietra Santa* would be tempted to take them, both from the weakness of the convoy, and the greatness of the prize: and their artifice succeeded, for the Garrison could not see such a booty, and suffer it to pass. This was as the *Florentines* desired, and gave them just pretence of hostility; whereupon, rising from *Serezana*, they marched to *Pietra Santa*, and encamped before it, which being well man'd, defended it self stoutly. The *Florentines* having disposed their artillery in the plain; they raised a new battery upon the mountain, intending likewise to batter it from thence. *Giacopo Guicardini* was their Commissary at that time, and whilst they were employed at *Pietra Santa* in this manner, the *Genoa* fleet took and burned the *Rocca di Vada*, and landing some Men, overran all the Country thereabouts. Against these forces *Bongiammi Gianfigliazza* was dispatched with a party of Horse and foot, who restrained their extravagance, so as they did not make their excursions as formerly. However the Fleet continued to molest the *Florentines*, and accordingly removed to *Ligorn*, where with bridges, and other military engines, having got close to the New Tower, they battered it smartly for several days together, but finding it to no purpose, they went off again with shame. In the mean time the siege at *Pietra Santa* went on very slowly; insomuch that the Enemy was encouraged, to attempt upon their battery, and sallying out when they saw their advantage, they carried it, much to their own reputation, and to the discouragement of their Enemy, who immediately drew off to about four miles distance, and the officers considering it was *October*, and the Winter far on, were of opinion to put their Army into their quarters, and reserve the prosecution of their siege, till a better season.

These disorders being known at *Florence*, filled all the chief officers with great indignation; upon which to recruit their Camp, and recover their reputation, they elected *Antonio Pucci*, and *Bernardo del Nero* for their new Commissaries; who being sent with a considerable

considerable supply of money to the Camp, remonstrated to the chief officers, the displeasure of the Senate, the State and the whole City; their commands to return their Leaguer with the Army; the scandal and infamy it would be, if so many great officers, with so great an Army, having nothing to oppose them but a pitiful Garison, should not be able to carry so weak, and so contemptible a Town. They represented likewise, the present and future advantage which they might expect if it were taken; so that they were all encouraged to return, and the first thing to be attacked, they resolved should be the Bastion, out of which they had been forced: in which action, it was manifest, what courtesie, affability, kind usage, and good words could produce in the Souldiers, for Antonio Pucci, persuading this, promising that, assisting a third with his hand, and embracing the fourth, incited them to the assault with such fury, that they regained the Bastion in a moment; but they did not take it without loss, for the Count Antonio da Marciano was slain from one of their great Guns. This success brought such a terror upon the Garison, that they began to think of surrendering. That things might be transacted with greater reputation, Lorenzo de Medici thought good to repair in person to the Camp, where he was no sooner arrived, but in a few days the Castle surrendered. Winter being come, it did not appear to those Officers convenient to prosecute the War, but to attend better weather, for the season of the year, by the malignity of the air had infected the Army extremely, for many of their chief Officers were sick; and among the rest, Antonio Pucci, and Bonifanni Gianfigliuzzi, were not only sick, but died, to the great regret of all People, so much honor and estimation had Antonio, acquired by his conduct at Pietra Santa. The Florentines had no sooner taken, and settled themselves in Pietra Santa, but Embassadors came to them from the Lucchese to demand it, as an appendix to their Commonwealth; alledging that among the rest, there was an express article that what ever should be taken either of the one side or the other, should be restored to the first owners. The Florentines did not deny the agreement, but answered that they could not tell whether in the Peace they were then negotiating with the Genoese, they might not be obliged to restore it, and therefore they could give them no positive resolution, till that was determined; and if it should happen that they should not be obliged, it would be necessary for the Senesi to think of some way to satisfy for the expence they had been at, and the damage they had received by the loss of so many considerable Citizens, and when they did so, they might be confident they should have it. This whole Winter was consumed, in negotiations of Peace, betwixt the Florentines and the Genoese, which were transacted at Rome by the mediation of the Pope: but nothing being concluded, the Florentines would have fallen upon Serezana in the spring, had they not been prevented by Lorenzo's indisposition, and a new War betwixt Ferrando and the Pope. For Lorenzo was not only troubled with the Gout (which was his hereditary disease) but he had so great pains and affliction at his stomach, that he was forced to go to the baths to be cured. But the chiefest occasion was the War, which was originally from hence. The City of Aquila was subject to the Kingdom of Naples, but so, as in a manner it was free. In that City, the Count de Mortorio was a Man of more than ordinary reputation. The Duke of Calabria lying with his Horse not far from Tronta, pretending a desire to compose certain tumults which had happened betwixt the Peasants in those parts (but being really ambitious to reduce that City to a more intire subjection to his Father) sent to the Count to let him know he desired to speak with him, and take his advice in the regulation of those affairs. The Count, not having the least jealousy, repaired to him immediatly, but he was seized, as soon as he arrived, and sent Prisoner to Naples.

Pietra Santa  
taken by Lorenzo.

This accident being known in Aquila, altered the affections of the whole City, insomuch that the People taking Arms, Antonio Concinello (the King's Commissary) was slain, and with him, such of the Citizens as were known to be affected to the Neapolitan interest: and that they might have friends to defend them in their Rebellion, they set up the Banner of the Church, and sent Embassadors to the Pope, to tender him the possession of their City, and implore his protection against the Tyranny of the King. The Pope was easily persuaded to their defence, as a Person that hated the King, both upon publick, and private accounts; whereupon being informed that Roberto da San Severino (a great Enemy to the State of Milan) was out of employment, he sent for him to Rome with all speed, made him his General, and solicited all the friends and relations of the Count de Mortorio to rise in his behalf; so that the Princes of Altamura, Salerno, and Bisignano took up Arms against the King. The King seeing himself engaged so unexpectedly in a War, sent to the Florentines, and Duke of Milan for their aid; the Florentines were very irresolute what was to be done; they thought it unreasonable, to leave their own designs, for the promotion of other Peoples, besides that, the taking up Arms again so suddenly against the Church, must needs be very dangerous; nevertheless being in League, and under an obligation,

Aquila rebels against the King of Naples.

The Pope undertakes its protection.

Peace concluded.

gation, they prefer'd their faith before either interest, or danger; took the *Orsini* into their pay, and sent their whole force ( under the *Count de Pirighano* ) towards *Rome*, in assistance of the King. By this means the King had two Camps, that under the Duke of *Calabria*, he sent towards *Rome*, in conjunction with the *Florentines*, to attend the motion of the Army of the Church; the other he kept at home, to secure his own Country against any commotion by the Barons, and in both places things occurred with variety of success: but at length the King remaining in all places superior, by the mediation of Embassadors from *Spain*, in *August* 1486 a Peace was concluded, to which the Pope ( being depress'd, and discouraged with his ill fortune ) consented, and all the Princes of *Italy* with him, only the *Genoese* were excepted, as Rebels to the State of *Milan*, and usurpers upon the territories of *Florence*. The Peace being concluded, *Roberto da San. Severino*, having been neither faithful to the Pope, nor terrible to the Enemy, was turned out of *Rome* in disgrace, and being pursued by the forces of the *Florentines* and the Duke; when he was past *Cesenna*, finding they gained upon him, and would be presently upon his back, he betook himself to his heels, and with about 100 Horse fled away to *Ravenna*, leaving the rest of his party either to be entertained by the Duke, or destroyed by the Country. The King having signed the Peace, and reconciled himself with his Barons, he caused *Giovanni Coppola*, and *Antonello d' Anversa* and their Sons, to be put to Death, as Persons who had betrayed his secrets to the Pope in the time of the War. By the experiment of this War, the Pope having observed with what diligence and alacrity the *Florentines* preserve their alliance, though he hated them before for their affection to the *Genoese*, and their assistance to the King, he began now to care for them, and show greater favour to their Embassadors, than formerly he had done: which inclination being intimated to *Lorenzo*, he improved it with all possible industry, as knowing it would gain him great reputation, if to his friendship with the King, he could add the amity of the Pope. This Pope had a Son called *Francesco*, and being desirous to advance him both in fortune and friends ( which when he was dead might support him ) he could not find a Person in all *Italy*, with whom he might more safely ally him, than with *Lorenzo de Medici*; and therefore he ordered things so that he married him to a daughter of *Lorenzo's*. This alliance being finished, his Holiness had a desire that the *Genoese* by agreement should deliver up *Serezana* to the *Florentines*, and declared to them that they could not in justice retain what *Agostino* had sold them; nor could *Agostino* convey that to San. *Giorgio* which was none of his own; but with all his arguments he could never prevail; so that whilst these things were in agitation in *Rome*, the *Genoese* went on with their preparations, and rigging out many of their Ships, before they could have any news of it at *Florence*, they landed 3000 Men, and assaulted the Castle of *Serezanello*, which stands upon the *Serezana* and was Garisoned by the *Florentines*, and having sacked, and burned the Town ( which lies on one side of it ) they advanced against the Castle, and having planted their Guns, they battered it exceedingly. This attack was new, and unexpected to the *Florentines*, insomuch that they drew what force they were able together, under the command of *Urginio Ursino*, at *Pisa*, and made their complaints to the Pope, that whilst he was in treaty with them for peace, the *Genoese* had invaded them; after which they sent *Piero Corsini* to *Lucca*, to preserve that City in its allegiance: they sent likewise *Pagocantomo Soderini* their Embassador to *Venice*, to try the minds of that Commonwealth. They desired aid likewise of the King of *Naples*, and *Signor Lodovico*, but neither of them supplied them, the King pretending apprehension of the Turkish fleet; and *Lodovico* with other shifts delayed to relieve them; so that the *Florentines* ( as they usually are ) were left alone in their necessity, finding no body so well disposed to assist them, as they were to assist other People. Nevertheless ( being not strange to them ) they were not at all discouraged, but raising a great Army under the Command of *Giacopo Guicciardini*, and *Pietro Vettori*, they sent them against the Enemy, who had lodged himself upon the River *Magra*. In the mean time *Serezanello* was closely besieged, and what with mines, and batteries, brought to great danger of being taken. Whereupon a Counsel being called, it was resolved to leave it, and the Enemy not at all declining, they came to an engagement, in which the *Genoese* were defeated, *Lodovico dal Fiesco*, and several of their principal officers taken Prisoners: yet this Victory could not encline the *Serezanello* to surrender, they rather prepared more obstinately for their defence; and the *Florentine* Commissaries being as diligent on their side, it was courageously both assaulted and defended. This Leaguer proving longer than was expected, *Lorenzo de Medici* thought it expedient to go himself to the Camp, where his arrival animated his own Souldiers, and discouraged the adversary; for upon observation of the vigour of the *Florentines*, and the coldness of their supplies from *Genoa*, freely, without any capitulation, they threw themselves into the arms of *Lorenzo*, and ( except some few who were more eminently active

The *Genoese* overthrown.



active in the Rebellion) they were all courteously treated by the *Florentines*: During this siege, *Signor Lodovico*, had sent his Horse to *Pontremoli*, in appearance, in our favour; but holding a correspondence in *Genoa*, a party mutinied against the Government, and by the help of those forces, secured the Town for the Duke of *Milan*: About this time, the *Germans* made War upon the *Venetians* and *Boccelino d' Osimo Nella Marca*, had caused *Osimo* to revolt from the *Pope*, and made himself Lord of it. This *Boccelino*, after many accidents was contented (upon the persuasion of *Lorenzo de Medici*) to deliver up that Town again to the *Pope*, which he did, and coming to *Florence*, he lived there (under *Lorenzo's* protection) very honorable, a considerable time; but afterwards removing to *Milan*, and not finding the same faith as he had done at *Florence*, he was put to death by *Lodovico's* command. The *Venetians*, being set upon by the *Germans* near the City of *Trento* were utterly defeated, and *Signor Roberto da San Severino* their General was slain: After the loss of this Victory according to their usual fortune, the *Venetians* made a peace with the *Germans*, but upon terms as exceedingly honorable; as if they had been the Conquerors.

The *Venetians* defeated.

About the same time great troubles arose likewise in *Romagna*: *Francesco d' Orso of Fursi*, was a Man of great authority in that City, and falling under the suspicion of the *Count Grolamo*, he was many times threatned by him: so that *Francesco* living in perpetual fear he was advised by his friends and relations, to be before hand with the *Count*, and seeing his intention was manifestly to take away his life, he should strike the first blow and make sure of the *Count*, and so by the death of another Person, secure himself. This Counsel being given, and as resolutely undertaken, they appointed the time to be at the Fair at *Fursi*; for several of their friends in the Country coming to the Town on course that day, they thought they should have enough of them present, without the danger of inviting them. It was in the month of *May*, in which the greatest part of the *Italians* have a custom of supping by day light. The Conspirators thought their best time to kill him would be after he had supped, when the servants were gone down to their own, and left him as it were alone in his Chamber. Having agreed upon the time, *Francesco* went to the *Count's* Palace, and having left his accomplices below, and told one of his Servants that he desired to speak with the *Count*, he was admitted, and finding him alone, after some previous and pretended discourse, he took his opportunity and killed him; then calling up his Companions, the Servant was slain likewise; and then the Captain of the Castle coming in by accident with some few in his company to speak with the *Count*, they fell upon him, and murdered him with the rest. Having finished their work, and raised a great hubub in the House, the *Count's* body was thrown out of the window, a great cry made of *liberty* and the *Church*, and the people exhorted to Arm, who abominating the cruelty and the advance of the *Count*, fell upon his Houses, plundered them, and made the *Countess Catherine* (his Lady) and her Family Prisoners: and this was done with so little opposition, that there was nothing but the Castle which hindered the accomplishment of their designs: but that Captain being obstinate, and not to be wrought upon by them to surrender, they desired the *Countess* to try if she could persuade him, which she promised to endeavour, if they would let her go to him into the Castle; and as Hostage for her fidelity, she would leave them her Children. The Conspirators believed her, and gave her leave to go to him; but she was no sooner in the Castle, but she began to swagger, and threaten them with death in revenge of her husband's; and when they told her they would kill all her Children, she bid them do their worst, for she knew how to have more. The Conspirators were not a little dismay'd at this accident; they saw the *Pope* sent them no succours, and hearing that *Lodovico* the *Countess's* Uncle was sending forces to her relief, they pack'd up what they could, and away they went to *Casello* so that the *Countess* being restored, she revenged the death of her husband with all possible cruelty. The *Florentines* had news of what happened to the *Count*, and immediately took occasion to attempt the Castle of *Piancaldoli* which had been formerly taken from them by the said *Count*; and accordingly sending their forces thither, they retook it; but with the death of *Ciecca*, a most excellent Architect. About the same time that this tumult happened in the City, another of no less importance, fell out in the Country of *Romagna* *Galeotto* Lord of *Faenza*, was married to the Daughter of *Giovanni Bentivoglio* Prince of *Bologna*: this Lady being jealous, or upon some other ill usage from her husband; or else ill natur'd of her self, had her Husband in such contempt, that she contrived to take away both his Authority and Life; and one day counterfeiting her self sick, she laid her self upon the bed, and having hid some of her Comers in her Chamber; she ordered when *Galeotto* came to visit her, they should rush upon him, and kill him. This Lady had communicated her design to her Father, who was well enough contented, hoping when his Son-in-Law was dead he might set up for him-

*Count Grolamo* murdered.

The *Countess* revenged the Death of her Husband.



Galeotto Lord  
of Faenza mur-  
dered by his  
Wife.

self. The time agreed upon for the Execution being come, *Galeotto* as he was accustomed) came to see his Wife, and having discoursed with her a while, the Conspirators rushed forth, and killed him before he could make any defence. Upon his death a great tumult was raised, and the Lady with one of her little Children called *Astorre* was forced to betake herself to the Castle. The people took arms; *Giovan Bentivoglio* (with a *Bergamese* who had been an officer under the Duke of *Milan*) having got some forces together marched into *Faenza* where *Antonio Boscoli* the Commissary of *Florence* was resident at that time, and having assembled all the chief of that party, they were in great argument about the Government of the Town; when the inhabitants of the *Val di Lamona*, had taken the alarm, and being got together in a throng, they fell upon *Giovanni*, and the *Bergamese*, they cut one of them to pieces, and took the other prisoner, and calling out upon *Astorre*, and the *Florentines*, they delivered the City to the conduct of the Commissary. This accident being known in *Florence*, was highly displeasing to every Body; nevertheless they caused *Giovanni* and his Daughter to be set at liberty, and took upon themselves the care of *Astorre* and the City, by universal consent of the whole People. After the Wars betwixt the greater Princes were composed; besides these, there happened many tumults in *Romagna la Marca*, and *Siena*, which being of no great moment, I think it superfluous to recount them. True it is, troubles in *Siena* (after the end of the War, and the Duke of *Calabria's* leaving those parts in the year 1488) were more frequent than else where, and after several variations (sometimes the people, sometimes the Nobility having the predominance) at length the Nobility prevail'd, and of them, the persons of greatest authority were *Pandolfo*, and *Giacopo Petrucci*, who, one of them for his conduct and the other for his courage, were made as it were Princes of that City; But the *Florentines* from the end of the War against *Serazana* to the year 1492 (in which *Lorenzo* died) lived in great felicity. For *Lorenzo* having by his great interest and prudence, procured peace all over *Italy*, he applied himself to enlarging the Grandeur of the City, and of his own Family; and first he married his eldest Son *Piero*, to *Alfonsina* the Daughter of *Cavaliere Orsimo*: his second Son *Giovanni* he advanced to be a Cardinal, which having no president, was the more remarkable; for he was but 13 years old, at the time of his promotion: for his third Son *Giuliano* (who was very young) he could make no extraordinary provision, because he lived not long after: but his Daughters were disposed of very well: one of them was married to *Giacopo Salvati*, another to *Francesca Cibo*; a third to *Piero Ridolfi*, the fourth (which he had married to *Giovanni de Medici* to keep his Family united) died. In his private affairs, especially in merchandizing, he was very unfortunate, for by reason of the exorbitance of his officers (who all of them lived like Princes) much of his fortune was wasted and squandered, inasmuch that he was constrained to be beholding to the State for great sums of mony. That he might be no longer lyable to the malignity of fortune, he left his trading, and fell a purchasing land, as a surer, and more durable way. In the Countries of *Prato*, *Pisa*, and the vale, he bought such possessions, as for the revenue, and magnificence of the Houses, were fitter for a King than a private person. After this he beautified and enlarged the City, and because there were many places uninhabited, he appointed new streets, and caused new houses to be erected to fill them; which was not only an augmentation, but a great Ornament to the City. That he might live quietly at home, and in time of War, keep his Enemies at a distance, he fortified the Castle of *Firenzuolo*, which stands towards *Bologna* in the middle of the *Alps*. Towards *Siena*, he began to repair *Poggio Imperial*, and make it very strong: towards *Genoa*, he secured that passage, by the redutation of *Pietra Santa*, and *Serezana*; with good stipends and Pensions he confirmed his friends, the *Baghoni* in *Perugia*, the *Vitelli* in the City of *Castello*: in *Faenza* he had a particular Government, all which were as so many Bulwarks to keep the Enemy from *Florence*. In times of peace he caressed the City with feasting, and plays, and tournaments, and representations of ancient triumphs, to delight and entertain the People: his only design being to see them pleased, the City supplied, and the Nobles respected: he was a great lover of Artists; and favourer of learned Men, of which *Agnola da montepulciano*, *Christofano Laudini*, and *Demetrius* the Greek can give ample testimony: the Count *Giovanni della Mirandola* (a person almost denied for his literature) left all the other parts of Europe which he had travelled, and (moved by *Lorenzo's* magnificence) fixt his residence at *Florence*. In Architecture, Musick, and Poesy, he delighted exceedingly. Many poetical compositions with several of his comments upon them are still to be seen. And that the *Florentine* youth might be encouraged to study, he erected an University in *Pisa*, and hired the best Scholars in *Italy* to read to them: he built a Monastery not far from *Florence* on purpose for Frier *Mariano da Chinazano* an Augustine Monk, and one which he esteemed an excellent Preacher. He was greatly beloved

Lorenzo de  
Medici.

both

both of God, and fortune, for all his designs came to a good end, and all his Enemies miscarry'd; for besides the *Pazzi*, he was set upon to have been killed by *Battista Frescobaldi*, in the *Carmine*; and by *Baldotto da Pistoia*, at his Country House; but both of them failed, and were justly punished, with all their confederats. The excellence of his conversation, the eminence of his wisdom, and the happiness of his fortune, made him honorable not only in *Italy*, but in all the Courts of the world. *Matthias* King of *Hungary* gave many testimonies of his affection: the *Soldan* by his Embassadors and presents, visited and presented him. The great Turk delivered *Bernardo Bandini* into his hands, who had murdered his Brother *Giulian*; all which rendered him highly venerable in *Italy*, and he added to his reputation every day by his prudence. In his discourse he was eloquent, and facetious; in his resolutions wise, in his executions, quick, and courageous; nor can any think be objected sufficient to eclipse these virtues, though he was indeed addicted to Women, took too much pleasure in the company of witty and satyrical Men; and would play at boys play sometimes beneath the dignity of his office; for he would play many times with his Children at all the most idle and Childish recreations they would put him to. So that if the gravity of his life, be considered with its levity, he will seem to be composed of two several persons, united by an almost impossible conjunction. The last part of his days was full of sorrow and disquiet, occasioned by the distempers of his body; for he was sorely afflicted with intolerable pains at his Stomack, which brought him so low, that in *April* 1492 he died, in the 43 year of his age. Never was there any man, not only in *Florence* but *Italy*, who departed with more reputation for his wisdom, nor more lamentation to his Country; and because upon his death, many desolations were like to ensue, the Heavens themselves did seem to preface it. The spire of the Church of *S. Reparata* was struck with thunder with such fury that a great part of the steeple was destroyed by it to the great consternation of the City. All the Inhabitants of *Florence*, and the Princes of *Italy*, bewailed him, which was particularly manifested by their several compliments of condolency, and whether they had reason or not, for what they did, the effects which succeeded a while after, did clearly demonstrate; for being deprived of his Counsels, *Italy* could not find any one remaining, able to satiate, or restrain the ambition of *Lodovico* Duke of *Milan*, for want of which, after his death such seeds of dissention brake forth, as have perplexed and embroiled all *Italy* ever since.

Lorenzo died

THE  
PRINCE,

Together with the

ORIGINAL

OF THE

*GUEL*F and *GHIBILIN*,  
Life of *CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI*,  
Murder of *VITELLI*, &c. by Duke *VALENTINO*,  
State of *FRANCE*,  
State of *GERMANY*.

By *NICOLAS MACHIAVEL*.

Faithfully Englished.

LONDON,

Printed for *John Starkey*, *Charles Harper*, and  
*John Amery*, in *Fleetstreet*. 1680.

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# NICOLO MACHIAVELLI

TO THE

Most Illustrious L O R E N Z O Son of  
PIERO de MEDICI.


**T**Hose who desire the favour of a Prince, do commonly introduce themselves by presenting him with such things as he either values much, or does more than ordinarily delight in; for which reason he is frequently presented with Horses, Arms, Cloath of Gold, Jewels, and such Ornaments as are suitable to his Quality and Grandeur. Being ambitious to present myself to your Highness with some testimony of my devotions towards you, in all my Wardrobe I could not find any thing more precious (at least to myself) than the knowledge of the Conduct and Atchievements of Great Men, which I learn'd by long conversation in modern affairs, and a continual investigation of old: after long and diligent examination, having reduced all into a small Volume, I do presume to present to your Highness; and though I cannot think it a work fit to appear in your presence, yet my confidence in your bounty is such, I hope it may be accepted, considering I was not capable of more, than presenting you with a faculty of understanding in a short time, what for several years, with infinite labour and hazard I had been gathering together. Nor have I beautified or adorned it with Rhetorical Ornaments, or such outward embellishments as are usual in such descriptions. I had rather it should pass without any approbation, than owe it to any thing but the truth and gravity of the matter. I would not have it imputed to me as presumption, if an inferior person as I am, pretend not only to treat of, but to prescribe, and regulate the proceedings of Princes: for as they who take the Landskip of a Country, to consider the Mountains, and the nature of the higher places, do descend ordinarily into the Plains, and dispose themselves upon the Hills, to take the prospect of the Valleys; in like manner, to understand the nature of the people, it is necessary to be a Prince, and to know the nature of Princes, tis as requisite to be of the people. May your Highness then accept this Book with as much kindness as it is presented; and if you please diligently and deliberately to reflect upon it, you will find in it my extreme desire that your Highness may arrive at that Grandeur which Fortune and your Accomplishments do seem to presage; from which pinnacle of Honour, if your Highness vouchsafes at any time to look down upon things below, you will see how unjustly, and how continually I have been exposed to the malignity of fortune.



# Machiavel's Prince.

## CHAP. I.

*The several sorts of Governments, and after what manner they are obtained.*



Here never was, nor is at this day any Government in the World, by which one Man has rule and dominion over another, but it is either a Commonwealth, or a Monarchy. Monarchies are either hereditary, where the ancestors of the Sovereign have been a long time in possession, or where they are but new. The new are either wholly, and entirely (as *Milan* was to *Franca Sforza*) or annex'd to the hereditary Dominions of the Conquerour (as the Kingdom of *Naples*, to the Kingdom of *Spain*.) These territories thus acquired are accustomed either to be subject to some Prince, or to live at liberty and free, and are subdued, either by his auxiliaries, or own forces, by his good fortune, or conduct.

## CHAP. II.

*Of Hereditary Principalities.*

I shall omit speaking of Commonwealths, as having discoursed of them largely elsewhere, and write in this place only of Principalities; and how according to the foregoing division, the said Principalities may be governed, and maintained. I do affirm then that hereditary States, and such as have been accustomed to the Family of their Prince, are preserved with less difficulty than the new, and because it is sufficient not to transgress the examples of their predecessors, and next to comply and frame themselves to the accidents that occur. So that if the Prince be a person of competent industry, he will be sure to keep himself in the throne, unless he be supplanted by some great, and more than ordinary force; and even then, when so supplanted, fortune can never turn tail, or be adverse to the usurper, but he will stand fair to be restored. Of this, *Italy* affords us an example in the Duke of *Ferrara*, who supported bravely against the invasion of the *Venetians* in 1484, and afterwards against Pope *Julius 10*, upon no other foundation but his antiquity in that Government; for a natural Prince has not so much occasion or necessity to oppress his Subjects, whereby it follows he must be better beloved, and retain more of the affections of his People unless some extraordinary vices concur to make him odious, so that the succession and coherence of his Government, takes away the causes and memory of innovations; for one new change leaves always (as in buildings) a tooting, and aptitude of another.

## C H A P. III.

## Of mixt Principalities.

**B**UT the difficulties consist in Governments lately acquired, especially if not absolutely new, but as members annexed to the territories of the Usurper, in which case such a Government is called mixed. The tumults and revolutions in such Monarchies proceed from a natural croiness and difficulty in all new conquests, for Men do easily part with their Prince, upon hopes of bettering their condition, and that hope provokes them to rebel, but most commonly they are mistaken, and experience tells them their condition is much worse.

This proceeds from another natural and ordinary cause necessitating the new Prince to overlay or disgust his new subjects by quartring his Army upon them, Taxes, or a thousand other inconveniences, which are the perpetual consequents of conquest. So that you make them your Enemies who suffer, and are injured by your usurpation, but cannot preserve their friendship who introduced you, because you are neither able to satisfy their expectation, or employ strong remedies against them, by reason of your obligations, wherefore though an Usurper be never so strong, and his Army never so numerous, he must have intelligence with the natives, if he means to conquer a Province. For these reasons *Lewis XII. of France*, quickly subdued *Milan*, and lost it as quickly, for the same People which open'd him their gates, finding themselves deceived in their hopes, and disappointed in the future benefits which they expected, could not brook, nor comport with the haughtiness of their new Sovereign: 'tis very true, Countries that have rebelled, and are conquered the second time, are recovered with more difficulty, for the defection of the People having taken off all obligation or respect from the Usurper, he takes more liberty to secure himself by punishing offenders, exposing the suspected, and fortifying where ever he finds himself weak; so that Count *Lodovick* having been able to rescue *Milan* out of the hands of the *French* the first time, only by harraising and infesting its borders, the second time, he recovered it, it was necessary for him, to arm and confederate the whole World against the said King; and that his Army should be beaten, and driven out of *Italy*: and this happened from the foresaid occasions. Nevertheless the *French* were twice dispossess'd. The general reasons of the first, we have already discoursed; it remains now that we take a prospect of the second, and declare what remedies the said King *Lewis* had; or what another may have in his condition, to preserve himself better in his new conquests, than the King of *France* did before him. I say then that Provinces newly acquir'd, and joyn'd to the ancient territory of him who conquer'd them, are either of the same Country, or Language, or otherwise. In the first case, they are easily kept, especially if the People have not been too much accustomed to liberty; and to secure the possession, there needs no more than to extirpate the Family of the Prince which governed before; for in other things maintaining to them their old condition, there being no discrepancy in their customs, Men do acquiesce and live quietly, as has been seen in the cases of *Burgundy*, *Bretagne*, *Gascogne* and *Normandy*, which have continued so long under the Government of *France*: for though there be some difference in their language, nevertheless their Laws and customs being alike, they do easily consist. He therefore who acquires any thing, and desires to preserve it, is obliged to have a care of two things more particularly; one is, that the Family of the former Prince be extinguish'd; the other, that no new Laws or Taxes be imposed; whereby it will come to pass, that in a short time it may be annexed and consolidated with his old Principality. But where Conquest is made in a Country differing in Language, Customs, and Laws, there is the great difficulty; their good fortune and great industry is requisite to keep it; and one of the best and most efficacious expedients to do it, would be for the Usurper to live there himself, which would render his possession more secure, and durable, as the great *Turk* has done in *Greece*, who, in despite of all his practices and policies to keep it in subjection, had he not fixed his Imperial residence there, would never have been able to have effected it. For being present in Person, disorders are discovered in the buds, and prevented; but being at a distance, in some remote part, they come only by hear-say, and that, when they are got to a head, and commonly incurable. Besides, the Province is not subject to be pillaged by officers, by reason of the nearness and accessibleness of their Prince, which disposes those to love him who are good, and those to dread him who are otherwise; and if any foreigner attacks it, he must do it with more care and circumspection, in respect that the Princes residence being there, it will be harder for him to lose it.

There

There is another Remedy, rather better than worse, and that is; to plant Colonies in one or two places, which may be as it were the Keys of that State, and either that must be done of necessity, or an Army of Horse and Foot be maintained in those parts, which is much worse; for Colonies are of no great expence; The Prince sends and maintains them at very little charge, and intrenches only upon such as he is constrain'd to dispossess of their Houses and Land, for the subsistence and accommodation of the new Inhabitants, who are but few, and a small part of the State; they also who are injur'd and offended, living dispers'd and in poverty, cannot do any mischief, and the rest being quiet and undisturb'd, will not stir, lest they should mistake, and run themselves into the same condition with their Neighbours.

I conclude likewise, That those Colonies which are least chargeable, are most faithful and inoffensive, and those few who are offended are too poor, and dispers'd, to do any hurt, as I said before; And it is to be observ'd, Men are either to be flatter'd and indulg'd, or utterly destroy'd; because for small offences they do usually revenge themselves, but for great ones they cannot; so that injury is to be done in such a manner, as not to fear any revenge. But if in stead of Colonies, an Army be kept on foot; it will be much more expensive, and the whole revenue of that Province being consum'd in the keeping it, the acquisition will be a loss, and rather a prejudice than otherwise, by removing the Camp up and down the Country, and changing their quarters; which is an inconvenience every man will resent, and be ready to revenge, and they are the most dangerous and implacable Enemies who are provok'd by insolences committed against them in their own houses. In all respects therefore, this kind of guard is unprofitable, whereas on the other side Colonies are useful. Moreover, he who is in a Province of a different constitution (as is said before) ought to make himself head, and Protector of his inferior Neighbours, and endeavour with all diligence to weaken and debilitate such as are more powerful, and to have a particular care that no stranger enters into the said Province, with as much power as he; for it will always happen that some body or other will be invited by the Male-contentes, either out of ambition, or fear. This is visible in the *Etolians*, who brought the *Romans* into *Greece*, who were never admitted into any Province, but by the temptation of the Natives. The Common method in such Cases is this; As soon as a foreign Potentate enters into a Province, those who are weaker, or disoblig'd, joyn themselves with him, out of emulation and animosity to those who are above them, insomuch that in respect of these inferior Lords, no pains is to be omitted that may gain them; and when gain'd, they will readily and unanimously fall into one mass with the State that is conquered. Only the Conqueror is to take special care they grow not too strong, nor be intrusted with too much Authority; and then he can easily with his own forces, and their assistance, keep down the greatness of his Neighbours, and make himself absolute Arbitrer in that Province. And he who acts not this part prudently, shall quickly lose what he has got, and even whilst he enjoys it, be obnoxious to many troubles and inconveniences. The *Romans* in their new Conquests observ'd this Course, they planted their Colonies; entertain'd the inferior Lords into their protection without increasing their power, they kept under such as were more potent, and would not suffer any foreign Prince to have interest among them. I will set down only *Greece* for an Example. The *Etolians*; and *Achaians* were protected; the Kingdom of the *Macedonians* was depress'd, and *Antiochus* driven out; yet the merits and fidelity of the *Achaians* and *Etolians* could never procure them any increase of Authority, nor the persuasions and applications of *Philip* induce the *Romans* to be his friends, till he was overcome; nor the power of *Antiochus* prevail with them to consent that he should retain any Sovereignty in that Province: For the *Romans* acted in that case as all wise Princes ought to do, who are to have an eye, not only upon present, but future incommodities, and to redress them with all possible industry, for dangers that are seen afar off, are easily prevented, but protracting till they are at hand, the remedies grow unseasonable, and the malady incurable. And it falls out in this case, as the Physicians say of an Hectick Fever; that at first it is easily cur'd, and hard to be known, but in process of time, no being observ'd, or resisted in the Beginning, it becomes easie to be known, but very difficult to be cur'd: So is it in matters of State, things which are discover'd at a distance (which is done only by prudent men) produce little mischief, but what is easily averted: But when thorow ignorance or inadvertency, they come to that height that every one discerns them, there is no room for any remedy, and the disease is incurable: The *Romans* therefore foreseeing their troubles afar off, oppos'd themselves in time, and never swallow'd any injury, to put off a War, for they knew that War was not avoided, but defer'd thereby, and commonly with advantage to the Enemy; wherefore they chose rather to make War upon *Philip*, and *Antiochus* in *Greece*, than suffer them to invade *Italy*; and yet at that time there was no necessity of either, they



they might have avoided them both, but they thought it not fit; for they could never relish the saying that is so frequent in the Mouths of our new Politicians, *To enjoy the present benefits of time*, but prefer'd the exercise of their courage and wisdom, for time carries all things along with it, and may bring good as well as evil; and ill as well as good. But let us return to *France*, and examine if what was there done, was conformable to what is prescribed here: and to this purpose I shall not speak of *Charles VIII.* but of *Lewis XII.* as of a Prince whose Conduct, and affairs (by reason his possession was longer in *Italy*) were more conspicuous; and you shall see how contrary he acted in every thing that was necessary for the keeping of so different a State. This *Lewis* was invited into *Italy* by the *Venetians*, who had an ambition to have got half *Lombardy* by his coming: I will not condemn the Expedition; nor blame the Counsels of that King, for being desirous of footing in *Italy*, and having no Allies left in that Country but all doors shut against him (upon the ill treatment which his predecessor *Charles* had used towards them) he was constrain'd to take his friends where he could find them, and that resolution would have been lucky enough, had he not miscarried in his other administration; for he had no sooner subdued *Lombardy*, but he recover'd all the reputation and dignity that was lost by King *Charles*: *Genoa* submitted; *Florence* courted his friendship, the Marquess of *Mantua*, the Duke of *Ferrara*, *Bentivoglio*, *Madam de Furlis*, the Lords of *Favenza*, *Pesaro*, *Rimini*, *Camerino*, *Plombano*, the *Lucchesi*, *Pisani*, *Sanesi*, all of them address themselves to him for his alliance and amity; Then the *Venetians* began to consider, and reflect upon their indiscretion; who to gain two Towns in *Lombardy*, had made the King of *France* Master of two thirds of all *Italy*. Let any one now think with how little difficulty the said King might have kept up his reputation in that Country, if he had observ'd the rules above said, and protect'd his friends, who being numerous, and yet weak, and fearful, (some of the *Pope*, and some of the *Venetians*) were always under a necessity of standing by him, and with their assistance he might easily have secur'd himself against any Competitor whatever. But he was no sooner in *Milan*, but he began to prevaricate, and send supplies to *Pope Alexander*, to put him in possession of *Romagna*; nor considering that thereby he weaken'd himself, and disoblig'd his friends who had thrown themselves into his arms, and agrandized the Church, by adding to its spiritual authority (which was so formidable before) so great a proportion of temporal, and having committed one error, he was forc'd to proceed so far, as to put a stop to the ambition of *Pope Alexander*, and hinder his making himself Master of *Tuscany*, the said *Lewis* was forced into *Italy* again. Nor was it enough for him to have advanced the interest of the Church, and desert'd his friends, but out of an ardent desire to the Kingdom of *Naples*, he shared it with the King of *Spain*; so that whereas before he was sole Umpire in *Italy*, he now entertain'd a Partner, to whom the ambitious of that Province, and his own Malecontents might repair upon occasion; and whereas the King of that Kingdom might have been made his Pensioner, he turn'd out him; to put in another that might be able to turn out himself.

It is very obvious, and no more than Natural, for Princes to desire to extend their Dominion, and when they attempt nothing but what they are able to achieve, they are applauded, at least not upbraided thereby; but when they are unable to compass it, and yet will be doing, then they are condemned, and indeed not unworthily.

If *France* then with its own forces alone had been able to have enterpris'd upon *Naples*, it ought to have been done; but if her own private strength was too weak, it ought not to have been divided; and if the division of *Lombardy* to which she consented with the *Venetian*, was excusable; it was, because done to get footing in *Italy*; But this partition of *Naples* with the King of *Spain*, is extremely to be condemn'd, because not press'd or quicken'd by such necessity as the former. *Lewis* therefore committed five faults in this Expedition: He ruin'd the inferior Lords; He augmented the Dominion of a Neighbour Prince; He call'd in a Forreigner as puissant as himself; He neglected to continue there in person; and plant'd no Colonies: All which errors might have been no inconvenience whilst he had liv'd, had he not been guilty of a sixth, and that was depressing the power of the *Venetian*. If indeed he had not sided with the Church; nor brought the *Spaniards* into *Italy*, it had been but reasonable for him to have taken down the pride of the *Venetian*, but pursuing his first resolutions, he ought not to have suffer'd them to be ruin'd, because whilst the *Venetian* strength was intire, they would have kept off other people from attempting upon *Lombardy*, to which the *Venetians* would never have consented, unless upon condition it might have been deliver'd to them, and the others would not in probability have forced it from *France*, to have given it to them; and to have contended with them both, no body would have had the courage. If it be urg'd that King *Lewis* gave up *Romagna* to the *Pope*, and the Kingdom of *Naples*, to the King of *Spain*, to evade a War; I answer, as before,

That

That a present mischief is not to be suffer'd to prevent a War, for the War is not averted, but protracted, and will follow with greater disadvantage.

If the Kings faith and engagements to the Pope to undertake this enterprize for him, be objected, and that he did it to recompence the dissolution of his Marriage, and the Cap which at his intercession his Holiness had confer'd upon the *Legate of Amboise*, I refer them for an answer, to what I shall say hereafter about the faith of a Prince, how far it obliges. So then King *Lewis* lost *Lombardy*, because he did not observe one of those rules, which others have followed with success in the Conquest of Provinces, and in their desire to keep them: Nor is it an extraordinary thing, but what happens every day, and not without reason. To this purpose I remember I was once in discourse with the Cardinal *d'Amboise* at *Nantes*, at the time when *Valentino* (for so *Caesar Borgia* Pope *Alexander's* Son was commonly call'd) possess'd himself of *Romagna*: In the heat of our Conference the Cardinal telling me that the *Italians* were ignorant of the art of War, I replied, that the *French* had as little skill in matters of State, for if they had had the least policy in the world, they would never have suffer'd the *Church* to have come to that height and Elevation. And it has been found since by experience, that the Grandeur of the *Church* and the *Spaniard* in *Italy*, is derived from *France*, and that they in requital, have been the ruine and expulsion of the *French*.

From hence a general rule may be deduc'd; and such a one as seldom or never is subject to Exception. *Viz. That whoever is the occasion of anothers advancement, is the cause of his own diminution*: because that advancement is founded either upon the conduct or power of the Donor, either of which become suspicious at length to the person prefer'd.

#### CHAP. IV.

*Why the Kingdom of Darius usurped by Alexander, did not rebel against his Successors, after Alexander was dead.*

THE difficulties encountered in the keeping of a new Conquest being consider'd; it may well be admir'd how it came to pass that *Alexander* the Great, having in a few years made himself Master of *Asia*, and died as soon as he had done, That state could be kept from Rebellion: Yet his Successors enjoy'd it a long time peaceably, without any troubles or concussions but what sprung from their own avarice and ambition. I answer, That all Monarchies of which we have any record, were govern'd after two several manners; Either by a Prince and his Servants whom he vouchsafes out of his meere grace to constitute his Ministers, and admits of their Assistance in the Government of his Kingdom, or else by a Prince and his *Barons* who were persons advanc'd to that quality, not by favour or condescension of the Prince, but by the ancientness, and Nobility of their Extraction. These *Barons* have their proper jurisdictions and subjects, who own their Authority, and pay them a natural respect. Those States which are govern'd by the Prince and his Servants, have their Prince more Arbitrary and absolute, because his Supremacy is acknowledged by every body, and if another be obeyed, it is only as his Minister and Substitute, without any affection to the Man. Examples of these different Governments, we may find in our time in the persons of the *Grand Signore*, and the King of *France*. The whole *Turkish* Monarchy is govern'd by a single person, the rest are but his Servants, and Slaves; for distinguishing his whole Monarchy into Provinces and Governments, (which they call *Sangiacchi*) he sends when and what Officers he thinks fit, and changes them as he pleases. But the King of *France* is established in the middle (as it were) of several great Lords, whose Sovereignty having been owned, and families beloved a long time by their Subjects, they keep their preheminance, nor is it in the King's power to deprive them, without inevitable danger to himself. He therefore who considers the one with the other, will find the *Turkish* Empire harder to be subdued, but when once conquered, more easie to be kept: The reason of the difficulty is, because the Usurper cannot be call'd in by the Grandees of the Empire; nor hope any assistance from the great Officers, to facilitate his Enterprize, which proceeds from the reasons abovesaid, for being all slaves, and under obligation, they are not easily corrupted; and if they could, little good was to be expected from them, being unable for the abovesaid reasons, to bring them any party: So that whoever invades the *Turk*, must expect to find him entire and united, and is to depend more upon his own proper force, than any disorders among them; but having once conquered them, and beaten their Army beyond the possibility of a recruit, the danger is at an end; for there is no body remaining to be afraid

of, but the Family of the Emperor, which being once extinguished, no body else has any interest with the people, and they are as little to be apprehended after the Victory, as they were to be relied upon before. But in Kingdoms that are governed according to the Model of *France*, it happens quite contrary, because having gained some of the *Barons*, to your side (and some of them will always be discontent, and desirous of change) you may readily enter: They can (as I said before) give you easie admission, and contribute to your Victory. But to defend, and make good what you have got, brings a long train of troubles and calamities with it, as well upon your friends, as your foes. Nor will it suffice to exterminate the race of the King; forasmuch as other Princes will remain, who upon occasion, will make themselves heads of any Commotion, and they being neither to be satisfied nor extinguished, you must of necessity be expell'd upon the first Insurrection.

Now if it be considered what was the Nature of *Darius* his Government, it will be found to have been very like the *Turks*, and therefore *Alexander* was obliged to fight them, and having conquered them, and *Darius* dying after the Victory, the Empire of the *Persians* remained quietly to *Alexander* for the reasons aforesaid; and his Successors, had they continued united, might have enjoyed it in peace, for in that whole Empire no Tumults succeeded, but what were raised by themselves. But in Kingdoms that are constituted like *France*, it is otherwise, and impossible to possess them in quiet: From hence sprung the many defections of *Spain*, *France*, and *Greece* from the *Romans*, by reason of the many little Principalities in those several Kingdoms, of which, whilst there remained any memory, the *Romans* enjoyed their possession, in a great deal of incertainty; but when their memory was extinct, by power and diuturnity of Empire, they grew secure in their possessions, and quarrelling afterwards among themselves, every Officer of the *Romans* was able to bring a party into the field, according to the latitude and extent of his Command in the said Provinces, and the reason was, because the race of their old Princes being extirpated, there was no body left for them to acknowledge, but the *Romans*. These things therefore being considered, it is not to be wondered that *Alexander* had the good fortune to keep the Empire of *Asia*, whilst the rest, as *Pyrrhus* and others, found such difficulty to retain what they had got, for it came not to pass from the small, or great Virtue of the Victor, but from the difference and variety of the Subject.

#### BOOK A P. V.

*How such Cities and Principalities are to be Govern'd, who lived under their own Laws, before they were subdued.*

WHEN States that are newly conquered, have been accustomed to their liberty, and lived under their own Laws, to keep them, three ways are to be observed: The first is utterly to ruine them; the second to live personally among them; the third is (contenting your self with a Pension from them) to permit them to enjoy their old priviledges and Laws, erecting a kind of Council of State, to consist of a few, which may have a care of your interest, and keep the people in amity and obedience. And that Council being set up by you, and knowing that it subsists only by your favour and authority, will not omit any thing that may propagate and enlarge them. A Town that has been anciently free, cannot more easily be kept in subjection, than by employing its own Citizens, as may be seen by the Example of the *Spartans*, and *Romans*. The *Spartans* had got possession of *Athens*, and *Thebes*, and settled an Oligarchie according to their fancy; and yet they lost them again. The *Romans* to keep *Capua*, *Carthage*, and *Numantia*, ordered them to be destroyed, and they kept them by that means. Thinking afterwards to preserve *Greece*, as the *Spartans* had done, by allowing them their liberty, and indulging their old Laws, they found themselves mistaken; so that they were forced to subvert many Cities in that Province, before they could keep it; and certainly that is the safest way which I know; for whoever conquers a free Town, and does not demolish it, commits a great error, and may expect to be ruin'd himself, because whenever the Citizens are disposed to a revolt, they betake themselves of course to that blessed name of Liberty, and the Laws of their Ancestors, which no length of time, nor kind usage whatever will be able to eradicate, and let all possible care and provision be made to the contrary, unless they be divided some way or other; or the Inhabitants dispersed, the thought of their old priviledges will never out of their heads, but upon all occasions they will endeavour to recover them, as *Pisa* did, after it had continued so many years in subjection to the *Florentines*; But it falls out quite contrary; where the Cities or Provinces have been us'd to a Prince whose race is extirpated and gone; for being on the one side accustomed to obey, and on the other, at a loss for their old Family, they

they can never agree to set up another, and will never know how to live freely without; so that they are not easily to be tempted to rebel, and the Prince may oblige them with less difficulty, and be secure of them when he hath done. But in a Commonwealth their hatred is more inveterate, their revenge more insatiable, nor does the memory of their ancient liberty ever suffer, or ever can suffer them to be quiet: So that the most secure way is either to ruine them quite, or make your residence among them.

## C H A P. VI.

*Of Principalities acquired by ones own proper Conduct and Arms.*

LET no man think it strange, if in speaking of new Governments, either by Princes or States, I introduce great and eminent Examples; forasmuch as men in their actions follow commonly the ways that are beaten, and when they would do any generous thing, they propose to themselves some pattern of that Nature; nevertheless, being impossible to come up exactly to that, or to acquire that virtue in perfection which you desire to imitate; a wise man, ought always to set before him for his Example the actions of great Men, who have excell'd in the achievement of some great Exploit, to the end that though his virtue and power arrives not at that perfection, it may at least come as near as is possible, and receive some tincture thereby: Like Experienced Archers, who observing the Mark to be at great distance, and knowing the strength of their Bow, and how far it will carry, they fix their aim somewhat higher than the Mark; not with design to shoot at that height, but, that by mounting their Arrow to a certain proportion, they may come the nearer to the Mark they intend. I say then, that Principalities newly acquired by an upstart Prince, are more or less difficult to maintain; as he is more or less provident that gains them. And because the happiness of rising from a private person to be a Prince, presupposes great Virtue, or Fortune, where both of them concur, they do much facilitate the conservation of the Conquest: yet he, who has committed least to Fortune, has continued the longest. It prevents much trouble likewise when the Prince (having no better residence elsewhere) is constrained to live personally among them. But to speak of such who by their Virtue, rather than Fortune, have advanced themselves to that Dignity, I say, that the most renowned and excellent, are *Moses*, *Cyrus*, *Romulus*, *Thebesus*, and the like: And though *Moses* might be reasonably excepted, as being only the Executioner of God's immediate Commands, yet he deserves to be mention'd, if it were only for that Grace, which tender'd him capable of Communication with God. But if we consider *Cyrus*, and the rest of the Conquerors and Founders of Monarchies, we shall find them extraordinary; and examining their Lives and Exploits, they will appear, not much different from *Moses*, who had so incomparable a Master; for by their Conversations and Successes, they do not seem to have received any thing from fortune, but occasion, and opportunity, in introducing what forms of Government they pleas'd; and as without that occasion, the greatness of their Courage had never been known, so had not they been magnanimous, and taken hold of it, that occasion had hapned in vain. It was necessary therefore for *Moses*, that the people of *Israel* should be in captivity in *Egypt*, that to free themselves from bondage, they might be dispos'd to follow him: It was convenient that *Romulus* should be turned out of *Alba*, and exposed to the wild beasts when he was young, that he might afterwards be made King of *Rome*, and Founder of that great Empire. It was not unnecessary likewise that *Cyrus* should find the *Persians* mutining at the Tyranny of the *Medes*; and that the *Medes* should be grown soft, and effeminate with their long peace. *Thebesus* could never have given proof of his Virtue and Generosity, had not the *Athenians* been in great troubles and confusion. These great advantages, made those great persons Eminent, and their great Wisdom knew how to improve them to the reputation, and enlargement of their Country. They then who become great by the ways of Virtue (as the Princes above said) do meet with many difficulties, before they arrive at their ends, but having compass'd them once, they easily keep them: The difficulties in the acquisition, arise in part from new Laws and Customs which they are forc'd to introduce for the Establishment and security of their own dominion; and this is to be considered that there is nothing more difficult to undertake, more uncertain to succeed, and more dangerous to manage, than to make ones self Prince, and prescribe new Laws: Because he who innovates in that manner has for his Enemies all those who made any advantage by the Old Laws; and those who expect benefit by the new, will be but cool and luke-warm in his defence; which luke-warmness proceeds from a cer-  
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tain awe for their adversaries who have their old Laws on their side, and partly from a natural incredulity in mankind, which gives credit but slowly to any new thing, unless recommended first by the experiment of success. Hence it proceeds that the first time the adversary has opportunity to make an attempt, he does it with great briskness, and vigour, but the defence is so tepid and faint, that for the most part the new Prince, and his adherents perish together. Wherefore for better discussion of this case, it is necessary to inquire whether these innovators do stand upon their own feet, or depend upon other People; that is to say whether in the conduct of their affairs, they do make more use of their rhetoric, than their Arms. In the first case, they commonly miscarry, and their designs seldom succeed; but when their expectations are only from themselves, and they have power in their own hands to make themselves obeyed, they run little or no hazard, and do frequently prevail. For further evincion, the Scripture shows us that those of the Prophets whose Armes were in their hands, and had power to compel, succeeded better in the reformations which they designed; whereas those who came only with exhortation and good language, suffer'd Martyrdom and Banishment, because (besides the reasons above said) the People are unconstant, and susceptible of any new Doctrine at first, but not easily brought to retain it: so that things are to be ordered in such manner that when their Faith begins to stagger, they may be forc'd to persist. *Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus* could never have made their Laws to have been long observed, had they not had power to have compelled it; as in our days it happen'd to *Frier Jerome Savanorola*, who ruined himself by his new institutions, as soon as the People of *Florence* began to desert him; for he had no means to confirm them who had been of his opinion, nor to constrain such as dissented. Wherefore such persons meet with great difficulty in their affairs; all their dangers are still by the way, which they can hardly overcome, but by some extraordinary virtue, and excellence: nevertheless when once they have surmounted them, and arrived at any degree of veneration, having supplanted those who envied their advancement, they remain puissant, and firm, and honorable, and happy. I will add to these great examples, another, perhaps not so conspicuous; but one that will bear a proportion and resemblance with the rest, and shall satisfy me for all others of that nature. It is of *Hiera* of *Syracuse*, who of a private person was made Prince of that City, for which he was beholding to fortune no further than for the occasion, because the *Syracusans* being under oppression, chose him for their Captain, in which command he behav'd himself so well, he deserved to be made their Prince, for he was a person of so great virtue and excellence, that those who have writ of him, have given him this Character, that even in his private condition, he wanted nothing, but a Kingdom to make him an admirable King. This *Hiera* subdued the old Militia, established a new; renounced the old Allies; confederated with others; and having friends and forces of his own, he was able upon such a foundation, to erect what fabrick he pleas'd; so that though the acquisition cost him much trouble, he maintain'd it with little.

## CHAP. VII.

### *Of new Principalities acquired by accident, and the supplies of other People.*

They who from private condition ascend to be Princes, and meerly by the indulgence of fortune, arrive without much trouble at their dignity, though it costs them dear to maintain it, meet but little difficulty in their passage, being hurried as it were with wings, yet when they come to settle and establish, then begins their misery. These kind of Persons are such as attain their dignity by Bribes, or concession of some other great Prince, as it happed to several in *Greece* in the Cities of *Jonia*, and upon the *Hellepont*; where they were invested with that power by *Darius* for his greater security and Glory, and to those Emperours who arriv'd at the Empire by the corruption of the Souldiers. These persons I say, subsist wholly upon the pleasure and fortune of those who advanced them, which being two things very valuable and uncertain, they have neither knowledg nor power to continue long in that degree, know not, because unless he be a Man of extraordinary qualities and virtue, it is not reasonable to think he can know how to command other people, who before lived always in a private condition himself; cannot, because they have no forces upon whose friendship, and fidelity they can rely. Moreover States which are suddenly conquered (as all things else in nature whose rise and increase is so speedy) can have no root or

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foundation, but what will be shaken and supplanted by the first gust of adversity, unless they who have been so suddenly exalted, be so wise as to prepare prudently in time for the conservation of what fortune threw so luckily into their lap, and establish afterwards such fundamentals for their duration, as others (which I mentioned before) have done in the like cases. About the arrival at this Authority either by virtue, or good fortune, I shall instance in two examples that are fresh in our memory, one is *Francis Sforza*, the other *Cæsar Borgia*; *Sforza* by just means, and extraordinary virtue made himself Duke of *Milan*, and enjoyed it in great peace, though gained with much trouble. *Borgia* on the other side (called commonly Duke of *Valentine*) got several fair territories by the fortune of his Father Pope *Alexander*, and lost them all after his death, though he used all his industry, and employed all the Arts which a wise and brave Prince ought to do to fix himself in the sphere, where the Arms, and fortune of other people had placed him: For he (as I said before) who laid not his foundation in time, may yet raise his superstructure, but with great trouble to the Architect, and great danger to the building. If therefore the whole progress of the said Duke be considered, it will be found what solid foundations he had laid for his future dominion, of which progress I think it not superfluous to discourse, because I know not what better precepts to display before a new Prince, than the example of his actions, and though his own orders and methods did him no good, it was not so much his fault, as the malignity of his fortune.

Pope *Alexander* the sixth had a desire to make his Son Duke *Valentine* great, but he saw many blocks and impediments in the way both for the present, and future. First he could not see any way to advance him to any territory that depended not upon the Church; and to those in his gift, he was sure the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Venetians* would never consent; for *Faenza* and *Rimini* had already put themselves under the *Venetian* protection. He was likewise sensible that the forces of *Italy*, especially those who were capable of assisting him, were in the hands of those who ought to apprehend the greatness of the Pope, as the *Ursini*, *Colonnese*, and their followers, and therefore could not repose any great confidence in them: besides, the Laws and alliances of all the States in *Italy* must of necessity be disturbed, before he could make himself Master of any part, which was no hard matter to do, finding the *Venetians* upon some private interest of their own, inviting the *French* to another expedition into *Italy*, which his Holiness was so far from opposing, that he promoted it by dissolution of King *Lewis* his former marriage. *Lewis* therefore passed the *Alps* by the assistance of the *Venetians*, and *Alexander's* consent, and was no sooner in *Milan*, but he sent forces to assist the Pope in his enterprize against *Romagna*, which was immediately surrendered upon the Kings reputation. *Romagna* being in this manner reduc'd by the Duke, and the *Colonnese* defeated, being ambitious not only to keep what he had got, but to advance in his Conquests, two things obstructed; one was the infidelity of his own Army; the other, the aversion of the *French*: for he was jealous of the forces of the *Ursini* who were in his service; suspected they would fail him in his need, and either hinder his conquest, or take it from him when he had done; and the same fears he had of the *French*; and his jealousy of the *Ursini* was much increased, when after the expugnation of *Faenza*, assaulting *Bologna*, he found them very cold and backward in the attack: and the King's inclination he discover'd, when having possess'd himself of the Duchy of *Urbino*, he invaded *Tuscany*, and was by him requir'd to desist. Whereupon the Duke resolv'd to depend no longer upon fortune, and foraign assistance, and the first course he took, was to weaken the party of the *Ursini*, and *Colonna* in *Rome*, which he effected very neatly by debauching such of their adherants as were Gentlemen, taking them into his own service, and giving them honorable pensions, and Governments, and Commands, according to their respective qualities, so that in a few months, their passion for that faction evaporated, and they turn'd all for the Duke. After this he attended an opportunity of supplanting the *Ursini*, as he had done the Family of the *Colonna* before; which happened very luckily, and was as luckily improved: for the *Ursini* considering too late, that the greatness of the Duke and the Church tended to their ruine, held a Council at a place called *Magione* in *Perugia*, which occasioned the rebellion of *Urbino*, the tumults in *Romagna*, and a thousand dangers to the Duke besides; but though he overcame them all by the assistance of the *French*, and recovered his reputation, yet he grew weary of his foreign allies, as having nothing further to oblige them, and betook himself to his artifice, which he managed so dexterously, that the *Ursini* reconciled themselves to him, by the mediation of *Signor Paulo*, with whom for his security he comported so handsomly by presenting with money, rich stuffs, and Horses, that being convinced of his integrity, he conducted them to *Sinagaglia*, and deliver'd them into the Dukes hands. Having by this means exterminated the chief of his adversaries, and reduc'd their friends, the Duke had laid a fair foundation for his great-

ness, having gain'd *Romagna* and the Dutchy of *Urbino*, and insinuated with the People by giving them a gust of their future felicity. And because this part is not unworthy to be known for imitation sake, I will not pass it in silence. When the Duke had possess'd himself of *Romagna*, finding it had been governed by poor and inferiour Lord's, who had rather robb'd than corrected their Subjects, and given them more occasion of discord than unity, insomuch as that Province was full of robberies, riots, and all manner of insolencies; to reduce them to unanimity, and subjection to Monarchy, he thought it necessary to provide them a good Governor, and thereupon he confer'd that charge upon *Raimiro d'Orco*, with absolute power, though he was a cruel, and a passionate Man. *Orco* was not long before he had settled it in peace, with no small reputation to himself. Afterwards the Duke apprehending so large a power might grow odious to the people, he erected a Court of judicature in the middle of the Province, in which every City had its advocate, and an excellent person was appointed to preside. And because he discover'd that his past severity had created him many Enemies; to remove that ill opinion, and recover the affections of the people he had a mind to show that if any cruelty had been exercised, it proceeded not from him, but from the arrogance of his Minister; and for their further confirmation; he caused the said Governor to be apprehended, and his Head chopt off one morning in the Market place at *Cesena*, with a wooden dagger on one side of him, and a bloody knife on the other; the ferocity of which spectacle not only pleas'd, but amaz'd the people for a while. But reassuming our discourse, I say, the Duke finding himself powerfull enough, and secure against present danger, being himself as strong as he desired, and his neighbours in a manner reduced to an incapacity of hurting him, being willing to go on with his conquests, there remaining nothing but a jealousy of *France*, and not without cause, for he knew that King had found his error at last, and would be sure to obstruct him. Hereupon he began to look abroad for new allies, and to hesitate and stagger towards *France*, as appeared when the *French* Army advanced into the Kingdom of *Naples* against the *Spaniards* who had besieg'd *Cajeta*; his great design was to secure himself against the *French*, and he had doubtless done it, if *Alexander* had lived. These were his provisions against the dangers that were imminent, but those that were remote, were more doubtful and uncertain. The first thing he feared was, lest the next Pope should be his enemy, & reassume all that *Alexander* had given him, to prevent which he propos'd four several ways. The first was by destroying the whole line of those Lord's whom he had dispossest, that his Holiness might have no occasion to restore them; The second was to cajole the Nobility in *Rome*, and draw them over to his party, that thereby he might put an awe, and restraint upon the Pope. The third was, if possible to make the Colledge his friends. The fourth was to make himself so strong before the Death of his Father, as to be able to stand upon his own legs, and repel the first violence that should be practis'd against him. Three of these four expedients he had try'd before *Alexander* died, and was in a fair way for the fourth, all the disseiz'd Lord's which came into his Clutches, he put to death, and left few of them remaining: he had insinuated with the Nobility of *Rome* and got a great party in the Colledge of Cardinals, and as to his own corroboration, he had design'd to make himself Master of *Tuscany*, had got possession of *Perugia*, and *Piombino* already, and taken *Pisa* into his protection: and having now farther regard of the *French* (who were beaten out of the Kingdom of *Naples* by the *Spaniard*, and both of them reduc'd to necessity of seeking his amity) he leapt bluntly into *Pisa*, after which *Lucca*, and *Sienna* submitted without much trouble, partly in hatred to the *Florentines*, and partly for fear, and the *Florentines* were grown desperate & without any hopes of relief; so that had these things happened before, as they did the same year in which *Alexander* died, doubtless he had gain'd so much strength and reputation, that he would have stood firm by himself, upon the basis of his own power and conduct, without depending upon fortune, or any foreign supplies. But his Father died five years after his Son had taken up Arms, and left him nothing solid, and in certainty but *Romagna* only, and the rest were in *nubibus*, infested with two formidable Armies, and himself mortally sick. This Duke was a Man of that magnanimity and prudence, understood so well which way Men were to be wheedled, or destroy'd, and such were the foundations that he had laid in a short time, that had he not had those two great Armies upon his back, and a fierce distemper upon his body, he had overcome all difficulties, and brought his designs to perfection. That the foundations which he had laid were plausible, appear'd by the patience of his Subjects in *Romagna* who held out for him a compleat month, though they knew he was at death's door, and unlikely ever to come out of *Rome*: to which place though the *Bagliani*, the *Vitelli*, and *Ursini* return'd, seeing there was no likelihood of his recovery, yet they could not gain any of his party, nor debauch them to their side: 'tis possible he was not able to put who he pleas'd into the Pontifical chair, yet



yet he had power enough to keep any man out who he thought was his Enemy: But had it been his fortune to have been well when his Father *Alexander* died, all things had succeeded to his mind. He told me himself about the time that *Julius XI.* was created, that he had considered well the accidents that might befall him upon the death of his Father, and provided against them all, only he did not imagine that at his death, he should be so near it himself. Upon serious Examination therefore of the whole Conduct of Duke *Valentine*, I see nothing to be reprehended, it seems rather proper to me to propose him (as I have done) as an Example for the imitation of all such as by the favour of fortune, or the supplies of other Princes, have got into the saddle; for his mind being so large, and his intentions so high, he could not do otherwise, and nothing could have opposed the greatness and wisdom of his designs, but his own infirmity, and the death of his Father. He therefore who thinks it necessary in the minority of his Dominion to secure himself against his Enemies; to gain himself Friends, to overcome whether by force; or by fraud; to make himself beloved, or feared by his people; to be followed and revered by his Soldiers; to destroy and exterminate such as would do him injury; to repeal and suppress old Laws, and introduce new; to be severe, grateful, magnanimous, liberal, cashier and disband such of his Army as were unfaithful, and put new in their places; manage himself so in his alliances with Kings and Princes, that all of them should be either obliged to requite him, or afraid to offend him; He, I say cannot find a fresher or better Model than the actions of this Prince. If in any thing he be to be condemned, it is in suffering the Election of *Julius XI.* which was much to his prejudice; for though (as is said before) he might be unable to make the Pope as he pleased; yet it was in his power to have put any one by, and he ought never to have consented to the Election of any of the Cardinals whom he had formerly offended, or who after their promotion were like to be jealous of him; for men are as mischievous for fear, as for hatred. Those Cardinals which he had disobliged, were among others, the Cardinals of *St. Peter ad Vincula*, *Collonno St. George*, and *Ascanius*. The rest, if any of them were advanced, to the Papacy, might well be afraid of him, except the Spanish Cardinals, and the Cardinal of *Roan*; The Spaniards by reason of their obligations and alliance; and the other, by reason of his interest in the Kingdom of *France*. Wherefore above all things, the Duke should have made a Spanish Cardinal Pope; and if that could not have been done, he should rather have consented to the Election of *Roan*, than *St. Peter ad Vincula*; for 'tis weakness to believe, that among great persons, new obligations can obliterate old injuries and disgusts. So that in the Election of this *Julius XI.* Duke *Valentine* committed an Error that was the cause of his utter destruction.

## C H A P. VIII.

*Of such as have arriv'd at their Dominion, by wicked and unjustifiable means*

NOW because there are two ways from a private person to become a Prince, which ways are not altogether to be attributed either to fortune or management, I think it not convenient to pretermitt them, though of one of them I may speak more largely where occasion is offered to treat more particularly of Republicks. One of the ways is when one is advanced to the Sovereignty by any illegal nefarious means: The other when a Citizen by the favour and partiality of his Fellow-Citizens is made Prince of his Country. I shall speak of the first in this Chapter, and justify what I say by two Examples, one Ancient, the other Modern, without entering farther into the merits of the cause, as judging them sufficient for any man who is necessitated to follow them. *Agathocles* the Sicilian, not only from a private, but from a vile and abject Condition, was made King of *Syracuse*, and being but the Son of a Potter, he continued the dissoluteness of his life, thro' all the degrees of his fortune: Nevertheless his vices were accompanied with such courage and activity, that he applied himself to the Wars, by which, and his great industry, he came at length to the Pretor of *Syracuse*: Being settled in that Dignity, and having concluded to make himself Prince, and hold that by violence, without obligation to any body, which was conferred upon him by consent, he settled an intelligence with *Amilcar* the *Carthaginian*, who was then at the head of an Army in *Sicily*, and calling the People and Senate of *Syracuse* together one morning, as if he had been to consult them in some matter of importance to the State, upon a signal appointed, he caus'd his Soldiers to kill all the Senators and the most wealthy of the People; after whose death, he usurped and possessed the Dominion of that

City without any obstruction: and though afterwards he lost two great Battels to the *Carthaginians*, and at length was besieged, yet he was not only able to defend that City, but leaving part of his forces for the security of that, with the rest he transported into *Africk*, and ordered things so, that in a short time he relieved *Syracuse*, and reduced the *Carthaginians* into such extream necessity, that they were glad to make peace with him, and contenting themselves with *Africk*, leave *Sicily* to *Agathocles*. He then who examines the Exploits and Conduct of *Agathocles*, will find little or nothing that may be attributed to fortune, seeing he rose not (as is said before) by the favour of any man, but by the steps and gradations of War; with a thousand difficulties and dangers having gotten that Government, which he maintained afterwards with as many noble Atchievements. Nevertheless it cannot be called Virtue in him to kill his fellow-Citizens, betray his Friends, to be without faith, without piety, or Religion; these are ways may get a Man Empire, but no glory nor reputation: Yet if the Wisdom of *Agathocles* be considered, his dexterity in encountering, and overcoming of dangers, his Courage in supporting and surmounting his misfortunes; I do not see why he should be held inferiour to the best Captains of his time. But his unbounded cruelty, and barbarous inhumanity, added to a million of other Vices, will not permit that he be numbred amongst the most Excellent Men. So then that which he performed cannot justly be attributed to either Fortune or Virtue, for he did all himself without either the one or the other. In our days under the Papacy of *Alexander VI. Oliverotto da Fermo* being left young many years since by his Parents, was brought up by his Uncle by the Mothers side, call'd *John Fogliani*, and in his youth list'd a Soldier under *Paulo Vitelli*, that having improved himself by his Discipline, he might be capable of some Eminent Command. *Paulo* being dead, he served under *Vitellozzo* his Brother and in short time by the acuteness of his parts, and the briskness of his Courage, became one of the best Officers in his Army. But thinking it beneath him to continue in any Man's Service, he conspir'd with some of his fellow-Citizens of *Fermo* (to whom the servitude of their Country, was more agreeable than its liberty) by the help of *Vitellozzo* to seize upon *Fermo*: In order to which, he writ a Letter to his Uncle *John Fogliani*, importing, That having been absent many years, he had thoughts of visiting him and *Fermo*, and taking some little diversion in the place where he was born, and because the design of his Service had been only the gaining of Honour, That his fellow-Citizens might see his time had not been ill spent, he desired admission for a hundred Horse of his Friends, and his Equipage, and beg'd of him that he would take care they might be honourably received, which would redound not only to his Honour, but his Uncles, who had had the bringing him up. *John* was not wanting in any Office to his Nephew, and having caus'd him to be nobly received, he lodged him in his own House, where he continued some days, preparing in the mean time what was necessary to the Execution of his wicked design: he made a great Entertainment, to which he invited *John Fogliani*, and all the chief Citizens in the Town. About the end of the treatment, when they were entertaining one another, as is usual at such times, *Oliverotto* very subtilly promoted certain grave discourses about the greatness of Pope *Alexander*, and *Cesar* his Son, and of their Designs; *John* and the rest replying freely to what was said, *Oliverotto* smil'd, and told them those were points to be argued more privately, and thereupon removing into a chamber, his Uncle, and the rest of his fellow-Citizens followed; They were scarce fate down, before Soldiers (which were conceal'd about the room) came forth, and kill'd all of them, and the Uncle among the rest; After the Murder was committed *Oliverotto* mounted on Horseback, rode about, and rummaged the whole Town, having besieged the chief Magistrate, in his Palace; so that for fear, all people submitted, and he establish'd a Government of which he made himself Head. Having put such to death as were discontented, and in any capacity of doing him hurt, he fortified himself with new Laws, both Military and Civil, insomuch as in a years time he had not only fix'd himself in *Fermo*, but was become terrible to all that were about him; and he would have been as hard as *Agathocles* to be supplanted, had he not suffered himself to have been circumvented by *Cesar Borgia*, when at *Singalia* (as aforesaid) he took the *Ursini*, and *Vitelli*; where also he himself was taken a year after his Parricide was committed, and strangled with his Master *Vitellozzo* from whom he had learned all his good qualities, and evil.

It may seem wonderful to some people how it should come to pass that *Agathocles*, and such as he, after so many Treacheries, and acts of inhumanity, should live quietly in their own Country so long, defend themselves so well against foreign Enemies, and none of their Subjects conspire against them at home; seeing several others, by reason of their cruelty, have not been able, even in times of Peace, as well as War, to defend their Government. I conceive it fell out according as their cruelty was well or ill applyed: I say well applyed (if that word may be added to an ill action) and it may be called so, when committed but once

once, and that of necessity for ones own preservation, but never repeated afterwards, and even then converted as much as possible to the benefit of the Subjects. Ill applyed, are such cruelties as are but few in the beginning, but in time do rather multiply than decrease. Those who are guilty of the first, do receive assistance sometimes both from God and Man, and *Agathocles* is an instance. But the others cannot possibly subsist long: From whence it is to be observed, that he who usurps the Government of any State, is to execute and put in practice all the cruelties which he thinks material at once, that he may have no occasion to renew them often, but that by his discontinuance, he may mollifie the People; and by his benefits bring them over to his side: He who does otherwise, whether for fear, or ill Counsel, is obliged to be always ready with his Knife in his hand, for he can never repose any confidence in his Subjects, whilst they, by reason of his fresh and continued inhumanities cannot be secure against him: So then Injuries are to be committed all at once, that the last being the less, the distaste may be likewise the less; but benefits should be distilled by drops, that the relish may be the greater. Above all a Prince is so to behave himself towards his Subjects, that neither good fortune or bad should be able to alter him; for being once assaulted with adversity, you have no time to do mischief, and the good which you do, does you no good, being looked upon as forced, and so no thanks to be due for it.

## C H A P. IX.

*Of Civil Principality.*

I Shall speak now of the other way, when a Principal Citizen, not by wicked contrivance, or intolerable violence is made Sovereign of his Country, which may be called a Civil Principality, and is not to be attained by either Virtue, or Fortune alone, but by a lucky sort of craft; This Man I say arrives at the Government by the favour of the People or Nobility; for in all Cities the meaner, and the better sort of Citizens are of different humours, and it proceeds from hence that the common people are not willing to be commanded and oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are not to be satisfied without it: From this diversity of appetite, one of these three Effects do arise, Principality, Liberty, or Licentiousness. Principality is caused either by the people, or the great ones, as, either the one, or the other has occasion: The great ones finding themselves unable to resist the popular torrent, do many times unanimously confer their whole Authority upon one Person, and create him Prince, that under his protection they may be quiet and secure. The people on the other side, when over-power'd by their Adversaries, do the same thing, transmitting their power to a single Person, who is made King for their better defence. He who arrives at the Sovereignty by the assistance of the great ones, preserves it with more difficulty, than he who is advanced by the people, because he has about him many of his old Associates, who thinking themselves his Equals, are not to be directed and managed as he would have them. But he that is preferred by the people, stands alone without Equals, and has no body, or very few about him, but what are ready to obey: Moreover the Grandees are hardly to be satisfied without injury to others, which is otherwise with the people, because their designs are more reasonable, than the designs of the great ones, which are fixt upon commanding, and oppressing altogether, whilst the people endeavour only to defend and secure themselves. Moreover where the people is adverse, the Prince can never be safe, by reason of their numbers, whereas the great ones are but few, and by consequence not so dangerous. The worst that a Prince can expect from an injured and incensed people, is to be deserted; but if the great ones be provoked, he is not only to fear abandoning, but conspiracy, and banding against him; for the greater sort being more provident and cunning, they look out in time to their own safety, and make their interest with the Person, who they hope will overcome. Besides the Prince is obliged to live always with one and the same people; but with the Grandees he is under no such obligation, for he may create, and degrade advance and remove them as he pleases. But for the better Explication of this part, I say, That these great men are to be considered two ways especially; That is, whether in the manner of their administration they do wholly follow the fortune and interest of the Prince, or whether they do otherwise. Those who devote themselves entirely to his business, and are not rapacious, are to be valued and preferred. Those who are more remiss, and will not stick to their Prince, do it commonly upon two Motives, either out of laziness or fear (and in those cases they may be employed, especially if they be wise and of good Counsel, because if affairs prosper, thou gainest honour thereby; if they miscarry, thou needest not

to fear them) or upon ambition, and design, and that is a token that their thoughts are more intent upon their own advantage than thine. Of these a Prince ought always to have a more than ordinary care, and order them as if they were Enemies professed, for in his distress they will be sure to set him forwards, and do what they can to destroy him. He therefore who comes to be Prince by the favour and suffrage of the People, is obliged to keep them his friends, which (their desire being nothing but freedom from oppression) may be easily done. But he that is preferred by the interest of the Nobles against the minds of the Commons, is above all things to endeavour to ingratiate with the People, which will be as the other if he undertakes their protection: And Men receiving good Offices, where they expected ill, are indear'd by the surprize, and become better affected to their Benefactor, than perhaps they would have been, had he been made Prince by their immediate favour. There are many ways of insinuating with the People, of which no certain rule can be given, because they vary according to the diversity of the subject, and therefore I shall pass them at this time concluding with this assertion, that it is necessary above all things, that a Prince preserves the affections of his people, otherwise in any Exigence, he has no refuge nor remedy. *Nabides* Prince of the *Spartans*, sustained all *Greece*, and a Victorious Army of the *Romans*, and defended the Government and Country against them all; and to do that great action, it was sufficient for him to secure himself against the Machinations of a few, whereas if the People had been his Enemy, that would not have done it. Let no man impugn my opinion with that old saying, *he that builds upon the People, builds upon the sand*. That is true indeed when a Citizen of private Condition relies upon the people, and persuades himself that when the Magistrate, or his Adversary, goes about to oppress him, they will bring him off, in which case many presidents may be produced, and particularly the *Gracchi* in *Rome*, and *Georgio Scals* in *Florence*. But if the Prince that builds upon them, knows how to command, and be a man of Courage not dejected in adversity, nor deficient in his other preparations, but keeps up the spirits of his people by his own Valour and Conduct, he shall never be deserted by them, nor find his foundations laid in a wrong place.

These kind of Governments are most tottering and uncertain, when the Prince strains of a sudden, and passes (as at one leap) from a Civil, to an absolute power, and the reason is, because they either command, and act by themselves, or by the Ministry and Mediation of the Magistrate: In this last case their authority is weaker, and more ticklish, because it depends much upon the pleasure and concurrence of the Chief Officers, who (in time of adversity especially) can remove them easily, either by neglecting, or resisting their Commands: nor is there any way for such a Prince in the perplexity of his affairs to establish a Tyranny because those Citizens and Subjects who used to exercise the Magistracy, retain still such power and influence upon the people, that they will not infringe the Laws, to obey his; and in time of danger he shall always want such as he can trust, So that a Prince is not to take his measures according to what he sees in times of peace when of the Subjects (having nothing to do but to be governed) every one runs, every one promises, and every one dyes for him, when death is at a distance: but when times are tempestuous, and the ship of the State has need of the help and assistance of the Subject, there are but few will expose themselves: And this experiment is the more dangerous, because it can be practised but once: So then, a Prince who is provident and wise ought to carry himself so, that in all places, times, and occasions the People may have need of his administration and Regiment, an ever after they shall be faithful and true.

## CHAP. X.

### *How the strength of all principalities is to be computed.*

TO any man that examines the nature of principalities, it is worthy his consideration, whether a Prince has power and territory enough to subsist by himself, or whether he needs the assistance, and protection of other People. To clear the point a little better, I think those Princes capable of ruling, who are able either by the numbers of their men, or the greatness of their wealth to raise a complear Army, and bid Battel to any that shall invade them; and those I think depend upon others, who of themselves dare not meet their Enemy in the field, but are forced to keep within their bounds, and defend them as well as they can. Of the first we have spoken already, and shall say more as occasion is presented. Of the second no more can be said, but to advise such Princes to strengthen and fortifie the Capital

Capital Town in their Dominions, and not to trouble himself with the whole Country; and whoever shall do that, and in other things, manage himself with the Subjects as I have described, and perhaps shall do hereafter, shall with great caution be invaded, for men are generally wary and tender of enterprizing any thing that is difficult. and no great easiness is to be found in attacking a Town well fortified and provided, where the Prince is not hated by the People.

The Towns in *Germany* are many of them free; though their Country and district be but small, yet they obey the Emperor but when they please, and are in no awe either of him, or any other Prince of the Empire, because they are all so well fortified, every one looks upon the taking of any one of them as a work of great difficulty and time, their Walls being so strong, their Ditches so deep, their works so regular, and well provided with Cannon, and their stores and Magazines always furnish'd for a Twelvemonth. Besides which, for the aliment and sustenance of the People, and that they may be no burthen to the publick, they have work-houses where for a year together the poor may be employed in such things as are the Nerves and life of that City, and sustain themselves by their labour. Military Discipline and Exercises are likewise much request there, and many Laws and good Customs they have to maintain them.

A Prince then who has a City well fortified, and the affections of his people, is not easily to be molested, and he that does molest him, is like to repent it, for the affairs of this world are so various, it is almost impossible for any Army to lie quietly a whole year before a Town, without interruption. If any objects that the people having houses and possessions out of the Town, will not have patience to see them plundered and burned; and that Charity to themselves will make them forget their Prince; I answer, that a wise and dexterous Prince will easily evade those difficulties, by encouraging his Subjects and persuading them, sometimes their troubles will not be long; sometimes, inculcating, and possessing them with the cruelty of the Enemy; and sometimes by correcting and securing himself nimbly of such as appear too turbulent and audacious. Moreover the usual practice is for the Enemy to plunder and set the Country on fire at their first coming, whilst every man's spirits is high, and fixed upon defence; so that the Prince needs not concern himself, nor be fearful of that for those mischiefs are pass'd, and inconveniencies received, and when the People in three or four days time begin to be cool, and consider things soberly, they will find there is no remedy and joy more cordially with the Prince, looking upon him as under an obligation to them, for having sacrificed their Houses and Estates in his defence. And the nature of Man is such, to take as much pleasure in having obliged another, as in being obliged himself. Wherefore all things fairly considered, it is no such hard matter for a Prince not only to gain, but to retain the affection of his Subjects, and make them patient of a long Siege, if he be wise, and provident, and takes care, they want nothing, either for their livelyhood or defence.

## CHAP. XI

### *Of Ecclesiastical Principalities*

There remains nothing of this Nature to be discoursed, but of Ecclesiastical Principalities about which the greatest difficulty is to get into possession, because they are gained either by Fortune or Virtue, but kept without either, being supported by ancient Statutes universally received in the Christian Church, which are of such power and authority, they do keep their Prince in his dignity, let his conversation or conduct be what it will. These are the only persons who have lands & do not defend them, Subjects, & do not govern them, and yet their lands are not taken from them though they never defend them, nor their Subjects dissatisfied, though they never regard them; so that these Principalities are the happiest and most secure in the world; but being managed by a supernatural power above the wisdom and contrivance of man; I shall speak no more of them, for being set up, and continued by God himself, it would be great presumption in any man who should undertake to dispute them. Nevertheless, if it should be questioned how it came to pass that in Temporal things the Church is arrived at that height, seeing that before *Alexander's* time, the *Italian* Princes, not only such as were Sovereigns, but every *Baron* and *Lord*, how inconsiderable soever in Temporal affairs, esteemed of them but little; yet since, it has been able not only to startle and confront the King of *France*, but to drive him out of *Italy*, and to ruine the *Venetians*, the reason of which, though already well known, I think it not superfluous, to revive in some measure

Before

Before *Charles* King of *France* passed himself into *Italy*, that Province was under the Empire of the Pope, the *Venetians*, the King of *Naples*, Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines*. It was the interest of these *Potentates*, to have a care, some of them that no foreign Prince should come with an Army into *Italy*, and some that none among themselves should usurp upon the other. Those of whom the rest were concern'd to be most jealous, were the Pope, and the *Venetian*: to restrain the *Venetians*, all the rest were us'd to confederate, as in the defence of *Ferrara*. To keep under the Pope, the *Roman Barons* contributed much, who being divided into two factions (the *Ursini*, and *Colonnefi* in perpetual contention, with their Arms constantly in their hands under the very nose of the Pope) they kept the Pontifical power very low, and infirm: and although now and then there happened a courageous Pope (as *Sextus*) yet neither his courage, wisdom, nor fortune was able to disintangle him from those incommodities; and the shortness of their reign was the reason thereof; for ten years time (which was as much as any of them reign'd) was scarce sufficient for the suppression of either of the parties, and when the *Colonnefi* as a man may say were almost extinct, a new Enemy sprang up against the *Ursini*, which revived the *Colonnefi*, and reestablished them again. This emulation and animosity at home, was the cause the Pope was no more formidable in *Italy*; after this *Alexander VI.* was advanc'd to the *Papacy*, who more than all that had ever been before him, demonstrated what a Pope with money and power was able to do; having taken advantage of the *French* invasion, by the Ministry and conduct of Duke *Valentine*, he performed all that I have mentioned else where among the Actions of the said Duke. And though his design was not so much to advantage the Church, as to aggrandize the Duke, yet what he did for the one, turned afterwards to the benefit of the other, for the Pope being dead, and *Valentine* extinct, what both of them had got, devolv'd upon the Church: after him *Julius* succeeded, and found the Church in a flourishing condition; *Romagna* was wholly in its possession, the *Barons* of *Rome* exterminated, and gone, and their factions suppressed by Pope *Alexander*, and besides, a way opened for raising and hoarding of money never practis'd before; which way *Julius* improving rather than otherwise, he began to entertain thoughts, not only of conquering *Bologna*, but mastering the *Venetians*, and forcing the *French* out of *Italy*: All which great enterprizes succeeding, it added much to his honor that he impropriated nothing, but gave all to the Church. He maintained also the *Colonnefi* and *Ursini* in the same condition as he found them, and though in case of sedition there were those ready on both sides to have headed them, yet there were two considerations which kept them at Peace. One was the greatness of the Church which kept them in awe; the other was their want of Cardinals, which indeed was the Original of their discontents, and will never cease till some of them be advanced to that dignity; for by them the Parties in *Rome* and without, are maintained, and the *Barons* oblig'd to defend them; so that the ambition of the prelates is the cause of all the dissention and tumults among the *Barons*.

His present Holiness Pope *Leo* had the happiness to be elected at a time when it was most powerful, and it is hop'd, if they made the Church great by their Arms, he by the integrity of his conversation, and a thousand other virtues will enlarge it much more and make it more venerable and august.

## CHAPTER XII.

*How many forms there are, of Military Discipline, and of those Souldiers which are called Mercenary.*

HAVING spoken particularly of the several sorts of Principalities as I propos'd in the beginning; considered in part the reasons of their constitution and their evil; and the ways which many have taken to acquire, and preserve them; it remains that I proceed now in a general way upon such things as may conduce to the offence, or defence of either of them.

We have declared before that it is not only expedient, but necessary for a Prince to take care his foundations be good, otherwise his fabrick will be sure to fail.

The principal foundations of all States, (new, old, or mixt) are good Laws, and good Arms, and because there cannot be good Laws, where there are not good arms, and where the Arms are good, there must be good Laws, I shall pass by the Laws, and discourse of the Arms.

I say, the Arms then with which a Prince defends his State, are his own, Mercenary, Auxilia-

ry or mixt. The Mercenary, and Auxiliary are unprofitable, and dangerous, and that Prince who founds the duration of his Government upon his Mercenary forces, shall never be firm nor secure, for they are divided, ambitious, undisciplin'd, unfaithful, insolent to their friends, abject to their Enemies, without fear of God; or faith to Men; so the ruine of that person who trusts to them is no longer protracted, than the attempt is deferred; in time of peace they divorce you, in time of War they desert you, and the reason is because it is not love, nor any principle of honor that keeps them in the field, 'tis only their pay, and that is not a consideration strong enough to prevail with them to die for you; whilst you have more service to imploy them in, they are excellent Souldiers; but tell them of an engagement, and they will either disband before, or run away in the battel.

And to evince this, would require no great pains; seeing the ruine of *Italy* proceeded from no other cause, than that for several years together it had repos'd it self upon Mercenary Arms; which forces 'tis possible may have formerly done service to some particular person, and behav'd themselves well enough among one another, but no sooner were they attackt by a powerful foreigner, but they discovered themselves, and shewed what they were to the World: hence it was that *Charles 8* chaulk'd out his own way into *Italy*; and that person was in the right, who affirmed our own faults were the cause of our miseries; but it was not those faults he believed, but those I have mention'd, which being committed most eminently by Princes, they suffer'd most remarkably in the punishment. But to come closer to the point, and give you a clearer prospect of the Imperfection and infelicity of those forces. The great officers of these mercenaries, are Men of great courage, or otherwise; if the first, you can never be safe, for they always aspire to make themselves great, either by supplanting of you who is their Master, or oppressing of other People, whom you desir'd to have preserved; and on the other side, if the Commanders be not courageous you are ruined again; if it should be urged that all Generals will do the same, whether mercenaries or others, I would answer, that all War is managed either by a Prince or Republick: the Prince is obliged to go in person, and perform the office of General himself: the Republick must depute some one of her choice Citizens, who is to be changed, if he carries himself ill; if he behaves himself well, he is to be continued, but so straitned and circumscrib'd by his commission, that he may not transgress: and indeed experience tells us that Princes alone, and Commonwealths alone with their own private forces have performed great things, whereas mercenaries do nothing but hurt. Besides, a martial Commonwealth that stands upon its own legs, and maintains it self by its own prowess, is not easily usurp'd, and falls not so readily under the obedience of one of their fellow Citizens, as where all the forces are foreign. *Rome*, and *Sparta* maintained their own liberty for many years together by their own forces and Arms: the *Swisses* are more material than their Neighbours, and by consequence more free. Of the danger of Mercenary forces, we have an ancient example in the *Carthaginians*, who after the end of their first War with the *Romans*, had like to have been ruin'd, and overrun by their own Mercenaries, though their own Citizens commanded them.

After the death of *Epaminondas* the *Thebans* made *Philip* of *Macedon* their General, who defeated their Enemies, and enslav'd themselves. Upon the death of Duke *Philip*, the *Milanese* entertained *Francesco Sforza* against the *Venetians*, and *Francesco*, having worsted the Enemy at *Caravaggio*, joyned himself with him, with design to have master'd his Masters; *Francesco's* Father was formerly in the service of *Joan* Queen of *Naples*, and on a sudden march'd away from her with his Army, and left her utterly destitute, so that she was constrain'd to throw her self under the protection of the King of *Aragon*, and though the *Venetians*, and *Florentines* both, have lately enlarged their Dominion by employing these forces, and their Generals have rather advanced than enslav'd them; I answer that the *Florentines* may impute it to their good fortune, because, of such of their Generals as they might have rationally feared, some had no Victories to encourage them; others were obstructed, and others turned their ambition another way; he that was not Victorious was *Giovanni Acute*, whose fidelity could not be known, because he had no opportunity to break it, but every body knows, had he succeeded, the *Florentines* had been all at his mercy: *Sforza* had always the *Bracceschi* in opposition, and they were reciprocally an impediment the one to the other. *Francesco* turned his ambition upon *Lombardy*, *Braccio* upon the Church, and the Kingdom of *Naples*. But to speak of more modern occurrences, The *Florentines* made *Paul Vitelli* their General, a wise Man, and one who from a private fortune had rais'd himself to a great reputation: had *Paul* taken *Pisa*, no body can be insensible how the *Florentines* must have comported with him, for should he have quitted their service, and taken pay of their Enemy, they had been lost without remedy; and to have continued him in that power, had been in time to have made him their Master. If



the progress of the *Venetians* be considered, they will be found to have acted securely, and honorably whilst their affairs were managed by their own forces ( which was before they attempted any thing upon the *terra firma* ) then all was done by the Gentlemen and Common People of that City; and they did very great things; but when they began to enterprize at land, they began to abate of their old reputation and discipline, and to degenerate into the customs of *Italy*; and when they began to conquer first upon the Continent, having no great territory, and their reputation being formidable abroad, there was no occasion that they should be much afraid of their officers; but afterwards when they began to extend their Empire, under the command of *Carmignola*, then it was they became sensible of their error; for having found him to be a great Captain by their Victories ( under his conduct ) against the Duke of *Milan*; perceiving him afterwards grow cool and remis in their service, they concluded, no more great things were to be expected from him; and being neither willing, nor indeed able to take away his commission, for fear of losing what they had got, they were constrain'd for their own security to put him to Death. Their Generals after him were *Bartolomeo da Bergamo*, *Roberto da San. Severino*, and the *Conte de Pitigliano*, and such as they, under whose conduct the *Venetians* were more like to lose than to gain, as it hapned not long after at *Vaila*, where in one Battel they lost as much as they had been gaining eight hundred years with incredible labour and difficulty; which is not strange, if it be considered that by those kind of forces the conquests are slow, and tedious, and weak; but their losses are rapid and wonderful. And because I am come with my examples into *Italy*, where for many years all things have been manag'd by mercenary Armies, I shall lay my discourse a little higher, that their Original and progress being rendered more plain, they may with more ease be regulated and corrected. You must understand that in latter times when the *Roman* Empire began to decline in *Italy*, and the *Pope* to take upon him authority in Temporal affairs, *Italy* became divided into several States: For many of the great Cities took Arms against their Nobility, who having been formerly favoured by the Emperours, kept the People under oppression, against which the Church opposed, to gain to it self a reputation and interest in temporal affairs: other Cities were subdued by their Citizens who made themselves Princes; so that *Italy* ( upon the translation of the Empire ) being fallen into the hands of the *Pope* and some other Commonwealths; and those *Priests* and *Citizens* unacquainted with the use and exercise of Arms; they began to take foreigners into their pay: the first Man who gave reputation to these kind of forces was *Alberigo da Como* of *Romagna*: among the rest *Braccio* and *Sforza* ( the two great Arbiters of *Italy* in their time ) were brought up under his discipline, after whom succeeded the rest who commanded the Armies in *Italy* to our days: and the end of their great discipline and conduct was, that *Italy* was overrun by *Charles*, pillaged by *Lewis*, violated by *Ferrand*, and defamed by the *Swizzers*. The order which they observ'd, was first to take away the reputation from the Foot, and appropriate it to themselves; and this they did, because their dominion being but small, and to be maintained by their own industry, a few foot could not do their business, and a great body they could not maintain; hereupon they changed their *Militia* into horse, which being digested into Troops they sustain'd and rewarded themselves with the commands, and by degrees this way of *Cavalry* was grown so much in fashion, that in an Army of 20000 Men, there was scarce 2000 Foot to be found. Besides they endeavour'd with all possible industry to prevent trouble or fear, either to themselves or their Souldiers, and their way was by killing no body in fight, only taking one another Prisoners, and dismissing them afterwards without either prejudice or ransom. When they were in Leaguer before a Town, they shot not rudely amongst them in the night, nor did they in the Town disturb them with any sallies in their Camp; no approaches or intrenchments were made at unseasonable hours, and nothing of lying in the field when Winter came on; and all these things did not happen by any negligence in their Officers, but were part of their discipline, and introduc'd ( as is said before ) to ease the poor Souldier both of labour and danger, by which practices they have brought *Italy* both into slavery, and contempt.

## CHAP. XIII.

## Auxiliaries, mix'd, and Natural Soldiers.

Auxiliaries ( which are another sort of unprofitable Soldiers ) are when some potent Prince is called in to your assistance and defence ; as was done not long since by Pope *Julius*, who in his Enterprize of *Ferrara* having seen the sad experience of his Mercenary Army, betook himself to auxiliaries, and capitulated with *Ferrand* King of *Spain*, that he should come with his Forces to his relief. These Armies may do well enough for themselves, but he who invites them, is sure to be a sufferer ; for if they be beaten, he is sure to be a loser, if they succeed, he is left at their discretion ; and though ancient Histories are full of examples of this kind, yet I shall keep to that of Pope *Julius* XI. as one still fresh in our Memory, whose Expedition against *Ferrara* was very rash and inconsiderate, in that he put all into the hands of a stranger ; but his good fortune presented him with a third accident, which prevented his reaping the fruit of his imprudent Election ; for his subsidiary Troops being broken at *Ravenna*, and the *Swizzers* coming in, and beating off the Victors, beyond all expectation he escaped being a Prisoner to his Enemies, because they also were defeated, and to his Auxiliary friends, because he had conquered by other peoples Arms. The *Florentines* being destitute of Soldiers, hired 10000 *French* for the reduction of *Pisa*, by which Counsel they ran themselves into greater danger, than ever they had done in all their troubles before. The Emperor of *Constantinople* in opposition to his Neighbors, sent 10000 *Turks* into *Greece*, which could not be got out again when the War was at an end, but gave the first beginning to the servitude and captivity which those Infidels brought upon that Country. He then who has no mind to overcome, may make use of these Forces, for they are much more dangerous than the *Mercenary*, and will ruine you out of hand, because they are always unanimous, and at the command of other people, whereas the *Mercenaries* after they have gotten a Victory, must have longer time, and more occasion before they can do you a mischief, in respect they are not one body, but made up out of several Countries entertain'd into your pay, to which if you add a General of your own, they cannot suddenly assume so much Authority as will be able to do you any prejudice. In short, it is Cowardize and sloth that is to be feared in the *Mercenaries*, and courage and activity in the Auxiliaries. A wise Prince therefore never made use of these Forces, but committed himself to his own ; choosing rather to be overcome with them, than to conquer with the other, because, he cannot think that a Victory, which is obtain'd by other peoples Arms. I shall make no scruple to produce *Cæsar Borgia* for an Example. This Duke invaded *Romagna* with an Army of Auxiliaries, consisting wholly of *French*, by whose assistance he took *Imola*, and *Furlì* : But finding them afterwards to totter in their faith, and himself insecure, he betook himself to *Mercenaries*, as the less dangerous of the two, and entertained the *Ursini* and *Vitelli* into his pay ; finding them also irresolute, unfaithful, and dangerous, he dismissed them, and for the future employed none but his own. From hence we may collect the difference betwixt these two sorts of Forces, if we consider the difference in the *Dukes* reputation when the *Ursini* and *Vitelli* were in his Service, and when he had no Soldiers but his own ; When he began to stand upon his own Legs, his renown began to increase, and indeed, before, his esteem was not so great, till every body found him absolute Master of his own Army.

Having begun my Examples in *Italy*, I am unwilling to leave it, especially whilst it supplies us with such as are fresh in our memory ; yet I cannot pass by *Hiero* of *Syracuse*, whom I have mentioned before. This person being made General of the *Syracusan* Army, quickly discovered the *Mercenary* Militia was not to be relied upon, their Officers being qualified like ours in *Italy*, and finding that he could neither continue, nor discharge them securely, he ordered things so, that they were all cut to pieces, and then prosecuted the War with his own Forces alone, without any foreign assistance. To this purpose the Old Testament affords us a figure not altogether improper. When *David* presented himself to *Saul*, and offered his Service against *Goliath* the Champion of the *Philistines*, *Saul* to encourage him, accoutred him in his own Arms, but *David* having tryed them on, excused himself, pretending they were unfit, and that with them he should not be able to manage himself ; wherefore he desired he might go forth against the Enemy with his own Arms only, which were his Sling and his Sword. The sum of all is, the Arms of other people are commonly unfit ; and either too wide, or too strait, or too cumbersome.

CHARLES VII. the Father of Lewis XI. having by his Fortune and Courage redeem'd his Country out of the hands of the *English*, began to understand the necessity of having Soldiers of his own, and erected a Militia at home to consist of Horse as well as Foot, after which, his Son King Lewis cashiered his own Foot, and took the *Swissers* into his pay, which error being followed by his Successors, (as is visible to this day) is the occasion of all the dangers to which that Kingdom of *France* is still obnoxious; for having advanced the reputation of the *Swissers* he vilified his own people, by disbanding the foot entirely, and accustoming his Horse so much to engage with other Soldiers, that fighting still in Conjunction with the *Swissers*, they began to believe they could do nothing without them; Hence it proceeds that the *French* are not able to do any thing against the *Swissers*, and without them they will venture upon nothing: So that the *French Army* is mix'd, consists of Mercenaries, and Natives, and is much better than either *Mercenaries* or *Auxiliaries* alone, but much worse than if it were entirely Natural, as this Example testifies abundantly; for doubtless *France* would be insuperable, if *Charles* his Establishment was made use of, and improved. But the imprudence of Man begins many things, which favouring of present good, conceal the poison that is latent, (as I said before of the Hectick Fever) wherefore a Prince who is rais'd to any Sovereignty, foresees not a mischief till it falls upon his head, he is not to be reckoned a wise Prince, and truly that is a particular blessing of God, bestowed upon few people! If we reflect upon the first cause of the ruine of the *Roman Empire*, it will be found to begin at their entertaining the *Goths* into their Service, for thereby they weakened and enervated their own Native courage, and (as it were) transfused it into them.

I conclude therefore, that without having proper and peculiar forces of his own, no Prince is secure, but depends wholly upon fortune, as having no Natural and intrinsic strength to sustain him in adversity: and it was always the opinion, and position of wise Men, that nothing is so infirm and unstable as the name of Power, not founded upon forces of his own; those forces are composed of your Subjects, your Citizens, or Servants, all the rest are either *Mercenaries* or *Auxiliaries*, and as to the manner of Ordering and Disciplining these Domesticks, it will not be hard, if the Orders which I have prescribed be perused, and the ways considered which *Philip* the Father of *Alexander* the Great, and many other Princes and Republicks have used in the like cases, to which Orders and Establishments I do wholly refer you.

#### CHAP. XIV.

##### *The duty of a Prince in relation to his Militia.*

A Prince then is to have no other design, nor thought, nor study, but War, and the Arts and Disciplines of it; for indeed that is the only profession worthy of a Prince, and is of so much importance, that it not only preserves those who are born Princes in their patrimonies, but advances men of private condition to that Honorable degree. On the other side it is frequently seen when Princes have addicted themselves more to delicacy and softness, than to Arms, they have lost all, and been driven out of their States; for the principal things which deprives or gains a man authority, is the neglect or profession of that Art: *Francesco Sforza* by his Experience in War, of a private person made himself Duke of *Milan*, and his Children, seeking to avoid the fatigues and incommodities thereof, of *Dukes* became private Men; for among other evils and inconveniences which attend when you are ignorant in War, it makes you contemptible, which is a scandal a Prince ought with all diligence to avoid, for reasons I shall name hereafter; besides betwixt a potent, and an impotent, a vigilant and a negligent Prince there is no proportion, it being unreasonable that a Martial and Generous person should be subject willingly to one that is weak and remiss; or that those who are careless and effeminate, should be safe amongst those who are Military and Active; for the one is too insolent, and the other too captious, ever to do any thing well together; so that a Prince unacquainted with the Discipline of War, besides, other infelicities to which he is expos'd, cannot be beloved by, nor confident in his Armies. He never therefore ought to relax his thoughts from the Exercises of War, not so much as in time of Peace, and indeed then he should employ his thoughts more studiously therein, than in War it self, which may be done two ways, by the application of the body, and the mind. As to his bodily application, or matter of action, besides that he is obliged to keep his Armies in good Discipline and Exercise, he ought to inure himself to sports, and by

Hunting

Hunting and Hawking, and such like recreation, accustom his body to hardship, and hunger, and thirst, and at the same time inform himself of the Coasts and situation of the Country, the bigness and elevation of the Mountains, the largeness and avenues of the Vallies, the extent of the Plains, the Nature of the Rivers and Fens, which is to be done with great curiosity; and this knowledge is useful two ways; for hereby he not only learns to know his own Country, and to provide better for its defence, but it prepares and adapts him, by observing their situations, to comprehend the situations of other Countries, which will perhaps be necessary for him to discover: For the Hills, the Vales, the Plains, the Rivers, and the Marthes (for Example) in *Tuscany*, have a certain similitude and resemblance with those in other Provinces; so that by the knowledge of one, we may easily imagine the rest; and that Prince who is defective in this, wants the most necessary qualification of a General; for by knowing the Country, he knows how to beat up his Enemy; take up his quarters; March his Armies; Draw up his Men; and besiege a Town with advantage. In the Character which Historians give of *Philopomenes* Prince of *Achaia*, one of his great Commendations is, that in time of peace he thought of nothing but Military affairs, and when he was in Company with his Friends in the Country, he would many times stop suddenly, and expostulate with them; if the Enemy were upon that Hill, and our Army where we are, which would have the advantage of the ground? How could we come at them with most security? if we would draw off, how might we do it best? Or if they would retreat, how might we follow? so that as he was travelling, he would propose all the accidents to which an Army was subject; he would hear their opinion, give them his own, and reinforce it with arguments; and this he did so frequently, that by continual practice, and a constant intention of his thoughts upon that business, he brought himself to that perfection, no accident could happen, no inconvenience could occur to an Army, but he could presently redress it. But as to the exercise of the mind, a Prince is to do that by diligence in History, and solemn consideration of the actions of the most Excellent Men; by observing how they demean'd themselves in the Wars, examining the grounds and reasons of their Victories, and Losses, that he may be able to avoid the one, and imitate the other; and above all, to keep close to the Example of some great Captain of old (if any such occurs in his reading) and not only to make him his pattern, but to have all his actions perpetually in his mind, as it was said *Alexander* did by *Achilles*; *Cæsar* by *Alexander*, *Scipio* by *Cyrus*. And whoever reads the life of *Cyrus* written by *Xenophon*, will find how much *Scipio* advantaged his renown by that imitation, and how much in modesty, affability, humanity, and liberality he framed himself to the description which *Xenophon* had given him. A wise Prince therefore is to observe all these rules, and never be idle in time of peace, but employ himself therein with all his industry, that in his adversity he may reap the fruit of it; and when fortune frowns, be ready to defie her.

## CHAPTER XV.

*Of such things as render Men (especially Princes) worthy of blame; or applause.*

IT remains now that we see in what manner a Prince ought to comport with his Subjects and friends: and because many have writ of this subject before, it may perhaps seem arrogant in me, especially considering that in my discourse I shall deviate from the opinion of other Men. But my intention being to write for the benefit and advantage of him who understands, I thought it more convenient to respect the essential verity, than the imagination of the thing (and many have fram'd imaginary Commonwealths and Governments to themselves which never were seen, nor had any real existence) for the present manner of living is so different from the way that ought to be taken, that he who neglects what is done, to follow what ought to be done, will sooner learn how to ruine, than how to preserve himself; for a tender Man, and one that desires to be honest in every thing, must needs run a great hazard among so many of a contrary Principle. Wherefore it is necessary for a Prince that is willing to subsist, to harden himself, and learn to be good, or otherwise according to the exigence of his affairs. Laying aside therefore all imaginable notions of a Prince, and discoursing of nothing but what is actually true, I say that all Men when they are spoken of, especially Princes (who are in a higher and more eminent station) are remarkable for some quality or other that makes them either honorable or contemptible. Hence it is that some are counted liberal, others miserable (according to the propriety,

propriety of the *Tuscan* word *Mifero*, for *Quaro* in our language is one that desires to acquire by rapine, or any otherway; *Mifero* is he that abstains too much from making use of his own; some munificent, others rapacious, some cruel, others merciful; some faithless, others precise. One poor spirited and effeminate, another fierce and ambitious, one courteous, another haughty, one modest, another libidinous; one sincere, another cunning, one rugged and morose, another accessible and easie, one grave, another giddy, one a Devote, and another an Atheist. No man (I am sure) will deny but that it would be an admirable thing, and highly to be commended to have a Prince endued with all the good qualities above said; but because it is impossible to have, much less to exercise them all, by reason of the frailty and crossness of our Nature, it is convenient that he be so well instructed as to know how to avoid the scandal of those Vices which may deprive him of his State, and be very cautious of the rest, though their consequence be not so pernicious, but where they are unavoidable, he need trouble himself the less. Again, he is not to concern himself, if run under the infamy of those Vices without which his Dominion was not to be preserved; for if we consider things impartially, we shall find some things in appearance are virtuous, and yet if pursued, would bring certain destruction; and others on the contrary that are seemingly bad, which if followed by a *Prince*, procure his peace and security.

## C H A P. XVI.

*Of Liberality, and Parsimony.*

TO begin then with the first of the above-mentioned qualities, I say, it would be advantageous to be accounted liberal; nevertheless liberality so used as not to render you formidable, does but injure you, for if it be used virtuously, and as it ought to be, it will not be known, nor secure you from the imputation of its contrary: To keep up therefore the name of liberal amongst men, it is necessary that no kind of luxury be omitted, so that a Prince of that disposition will consume his revenue in those kind of expences, and be obliged at last, if he would preserve that reputation, to become grievous, and a great exactor upon the people, and do whatever is practicable for the getting of Money, which will cause him to be hated of his Subjects, and despised by every body else, when he once comes to be poor, so that offending many with his liberality, and rewarding but few, he becomes sensible of the first disaster, and runs great hazard of being ruined, the first time he is in danger; which when afterwards he discovers, and desires to remedy; he runs into the other extrem, and grows as odious for his avarice. So then if a Prince cannot exercise this virtue of liberality, so as to be publickly known, without detriment to himself, he ought if he be wise, not to dread the imputation of being covetous, for in time he shall be esteemed liberal when it is discovered that by his parsimony he has increased his revenue to a Condition of defending him against any Invasion, and to enterprize upon other people, without oppressing of them; so that he shall be accounted Noble to all from whom he takes nothing away, which are an infinite number; and near and parsimonious only to such few as he gives nothing to.

In our days we have seen no great action done, but by those who were accounted miserable, the other have been always undone. Pope *Julius XI.* made use of his bounty to get into the Chair, but (to enable himself to make War with the King of *France*) he never practised it after, and by his frugality he maintained several Wars without any tax or imposition upon the people, his long parsimony having furnished him for his extraordinary expences. The present King of *Spain*, if he had affected to be thought liberal, could never have undertaken so many great designs, nor obtain'd so many great Victories. A Prince therefore ought not so much to concern himself (so he exacts not upon his Subjects, so he be able to defend himself, so he becomes not poor and despicable, nor commits rapine upon his people) though he be accounted covetous, for that is one of those Vices which fortifies his Dominion. If any one objects that *Cæsar* by his liberality made his way to the Empire, and many others upon the same score of reputation have made themselves great; I answer, That you are either actually a *Prince*, or in a fair way way to be made one. In the first case liberality is hurtful; in the second, 'tis necessary, and *Cæsar* was one of those who design'd upon the Empire: But when he was arrived at that dignity, if he had lived, and not retrenched his Expences, he would have ruined that Empire. If any replies, Many have been Princes, and with their Armies performed great matters, who have been reputed liberal, I rejoyne, that a Prince spends either of his own, or his Subjects, or other peoples.

In the first case, he is to be frugal: In the second he may be as profuse as he pleases, and baulk no point of liberality. But that Prince whose Army is to be maintained with free quarter, and plunder, and exactions from other people, is obliged to be liberal; or his Army will desert him; and well he may be prodigal of what neither belongs to him, nor his Subjects, as was the case with *Cæsar*, and *Cyrus* and *Alexander*; for to spend upon another's stock, rather adds to, than subtracts from his reputation, 'tis spending of his own, that is so mortal, and pernicious. Nor is there any thing that destroys it self like liberality; for in the use of it, taking away the faculty of using it, thou becomest poor and contemptible, or to avoid that poverty, thou makest thy self odious and a Tyrant; and there is nothing of so much importance to a Prince to prevent, as to be either contemptible or odious, both which depend much upon the prudent exercise of your liberality. Upon these considerations it is more wisdom to lie under the scandal of being miserable, which is an imputation rather infamous, than odious, than to be thought liberal, and run your self into a necessity of playing the Tyrant, which is infamous and odious both.

## C H A P. XVII.

*Of Cruelty, and Clemency, and whether it is best for a Prince to be beloved, or feared.*

TO come now to the other qualities proposed, I say every Prince is to desire to be esteemed rather merciful than cruel, but with great caution that his mercy be not abused; *Cæsar Borgia* was counted cruel, yet that cruelty reduced *Romagna*, united it, settled it in peace, and rendered it faithful: so that if well considered, he will appear much more merciful than the *Florentines*, who rather than be thought cruel, suffered *Pistoia* to be destroyed: A Prince therefore is not to regard the scandal of being cruel, if thereby he keeps his Subjects in their Allegiance, and united, seeing by some few examples of Justice you may be more merciful, than they who by an universal exercise of pity, permit several disorders to follow, which occasion Rapine and Murder; and the reason is, because that exorbitant mercy has an ill effect upon the whole universality, whereas particular Executions extend only to particular persons. But among all Princes, a new Prince has the hardest task to avoid the scandal of being cruel, by reason of the newness of his Government, and the dangers which attend it: Hence *Virgil* in the person of *Dido* extused the inhospitality of her Government.

*Res dura, & regni novitas, me talia cogunt  
Moliri, & late fines Custode tueri.*

My new Dominion, and my harder fate  
Constrains me to't, and I must guard my State.

Nevertheless he is not to be too credulous of reports, too hasty in his motions, nor create fears and jealousies to himself, but so to temper his administrations with prudence and humanity, that neither too much confidence may make him careless, nor too much diffidence intolerable. And from hence arises a new question, *Whether it be better to be beloved than fear'd, or fear'd than beloved?* It is answered, Both would be convenient, but because that is hard to attain, it is better and more secure (if one must be wanting) to be fear'd than beloved; for in the general, Men are ingrateful, inconstant, hypocritical, fearful of danger, and covetous of gain; whilst they receive any benefit by you, and the danger is at distance, they are absolutely yours, their Blood, their Estates, their Lives, and their Children (as I said before) are all at your Service, but when mischief is at hand, and you have present need of their help, they make no scruple to revolt. And that Prince who leaves himself naked of other preparations, and relies wholly upon their professions, is sure to be ruined; for a utility contracted by price, and not by the greatness and generosity of the mind, may seem a good pennyworth; yet when you have occasion to make use of it, you will find no such thing. Moreover Men do with less remorse offend against those who desire to be beloved, than against those who are ambitious of being feared, and the reason is because Love is fasten'd only by a ligament of obligation, which the ill Nature of Mankind, breaks upon every occasion that is presented to his profit; But fear depends upon an apprehension of punishment, which is never to be dispell'd. Yet a Prince is to render himself awful in such sort; that if he

he gains not his Subjects love; he may eschew their hatred; for to be feared and not hated, are compatible enough, and he may be always in that condition, if he offers no violence to their Estates, nor attempts any thing upon the honour of their Wives, as also when he has occasion to take away any Man's life, if he takes his time when the cause is manifest, and he has good matter for his justification: But above all things, he is to have a care of intrenching upon their Estates, for men do sooner forget the death of their Father, than the loss of their Patrimony: Besides occasions of confiscation, never fail, and he that gives once way to that humour of rapine, shall never want temptation to ruine his Neighbor. But on the contrary, provocations to blood, are more rare, and do sooner evaporate: But when a Prince is at the head of his Army, and has a multitude of Soldiers to govern, then it is absolutely necessary not to value the Epithet of cruel; for without that, no Army can be kept in unity, nor in disposition for any great act.

Among the several instances of *Hannibal's* great Conduct, it is one, That having a vast Army, constituted out of several Nations, and conducted to make War in an Enemies Country, there never hapned any Sediton among them, or any Mutiny against their General, either in his adversity or prosperity: Which can proceed from nothing so probably as his great cruelty, which, added to his infinite Virtues, rendered him both awful, and terrible to his Soldiers, and without that, all his Virtues would have signified nothing. Some Writers there are (but of little consideration) who admire his great Exploits, and condemn the true causes of them. But to prove that his other Virtues would never have carried him thorow, let us reflect upon *Scipio*, a person Honorable not only in his own time, but in all History whatever; nevertheless his Army mutined in *Spain*, and the true cause of it was, his too much gentleness and lenity, which gave his Soldiers more liberty than was surable or consistant with Military Discipline. *Fabius Maximus* upbraided him by it in the Senate, and call'd him *Corrupter of the Roman Militia*; The Inhabitants of *Locrus* having been plundered and destroyed by one of *Scipio's* Lieutenants, they were never redressed, nor the Legat's insolence corrected, all proceeding from the mildness of *Scipio's* Nature, which was so eminent in him, that a person undertaking to excuse him in the Senate, declared, that there were many who knew better how to avoid doing ill themselves, than to punish it in other people. Which temper would doubtless in time have eclipsed the glory and reputation of *Scipio*, had that authority been continued in him; but receiving Orders, and living under the direction of the Senate, that ill quality, was not only not discovered in him, but turned to his renown. I conclude therefore according to what I have said about being feared, or beloved; That forasmuch as men do love at their own discretion, but fear at their Princes, a wise Prince is obliged to lay his foundation upon that which is in his own power, not what which depends on other people, but (as I said before) with great caution that he does not make himself odious.

## CHAP. XVIII.

### *How far a Prince is obliged by his promise.*

HOW Honorable it is for a Prince to keep his word, and act rather with integrity than collusion, I suppose every body understands: Nevertheless Experience has shown in our times, That those Princes who have not pinn'd themselves up to that punctuality and preciseness, have done great things, and by their cunning and subtilty not only circumvented, and darded the brains of those with whom they had to deal, but have overcome, and been too hard for those who have been so superstitiously exact. For further explanation, you must understand there are two ways of contending, by Law, and by force: The first is proper to Men; the second to Beasts; but because many times the first is insufficient, recourse must be had to the second. It belongs therefore to a Prince to understand both, when to make use of the rational, and when of the brutal way; and this is recommended to Princes (though abstrusely) by ancient Writers, who tell them how *Achilles* and several other Princes were committed to the Education of *Chiron* the Centaur, who was to keep them under his Discipline, choosing them a Master, half Man and half Beast, for no other reason but to show how necessary it is for a Prince to be acquainted with both, for that one without the other will be of little duration. Seeing therefore it is of such importance to a Prince to take upon him the Nature and disposition of a Beast, of all the whole flock, he ought to imitate the Lyon and the Fox: for the Lyon is in danger of toils and snares, and the Fox of the Wolf: So that he must be a Fox to find out the snares, and a Lyon to fright



fright away the Wolves, but they who keep wholly to the Lyon, have no true notion of themselves. A Prince therefore that is wise and prudent, cannot, nor ought not to keep his *parole*, when the keeping of it is to his prejudice, and the causes for which he promised, removed. Were men all good, this Doctrine was not to be taught, but because they are wicked, and not likely to be punctual with you, you are not obliged to any such strictness with them: Nor was their ever any Prince that wanted lawful pretence to justify his breach of promise. I might instance in many modern Examples, and shew how many Confederations, and Peaces, and Promises have been broken by the infidelity of Princes, and how he that best personated the Fox, had the better success. Nevertheless it is of great consequence to disguise your inclination, and to play the Hypocrite well; and men are so simple in their temper, and so submissive to their present necessities, that he that is neat and cleanly in his collusions, shall never want people to practise them upon. I cannot forbear one Example which is still fresh in our memory. *Alexander VI.* never did, nor thought of any thing but cheating, and never wanted matter to work upon, & though no man promised a thing with greater asseveration, nor confirmed it with more oaths and imprecations, and observ'd them less; yet understanding the world well, he never miscarried.

A Prince therefore is not obliged to have all the forementioned good qualities in reality, but it is necessary he have them in appearance; nay, I will be bold to affirm, that having them actually, and employing them upon all occasions, they are extremely prejudicial, whereas having them only in appearance, they turn to better account; it is honorable to seem mild, and merciful, and courteous, and religious, and sincere, and indeed to be so, provided your mind be so rectified and prepared that you can act quite contrary upon occasion. And this must be premised, that a Prince, especially if come but lately to the throne, cannot observe all those things exactly which make men be esteemed virtuous, being oftentimes necessitated for the preservation of his State to do things inhumane, uncharitable, and irreligious; and therefore it is convenient his mind be at his command, and flexible to all the puffs, and variations of his fortune: Not forbearing to be good, whilst it is in his choice, but knowing how to be evil when there is a necessity. A Prince then is to have particular care that nothing falls from his mouth, but what is full of the five qualities aforesaid, and that to see, and to hear him, he appears all goodness, integrity, humanity, and religion, which last he ought to pretend to more than ordinarily, because more men do judge by the eye, than by the touch, for every body sees, but few understand; every body sees how you appear, but few know what in reality you are, and those few dare not, oppose the opinion of the multitude who have the Majesty of their Prince to defend them; and in the actions of all men, especially Princes, where no man has power to judge, every one looks to the end. Let a Prince therefore do what he can to preserve his life, and continue his Supremacy, the means which he uses shall be thought honorable, and be commended by every body; because the people are always taken with the appearance, and event of things, and the greatest part of the world consists of the people. Those few who are wise, taking place when the multitude has nothing else to rely upon. There is a Prince at this time in being (but his name I shall conceal) who has nothing in his mouth but fidelity and peace and yet had he exercised either the one or the other, they had robb'd him before this both of his power and reputation.

## C H A P. XIX.

*That Princes ought to be cautious of becoming either odious or contemptible.*

AND because in our discourse of the qualifications of a Prince, we have hitherto spoken only of those which are of greatest importance, we shall now speak briefly of the rest under these general heads. That a Prince make it his business (as is partly hinted before) to avoid such things as may make him odious or contemptible: and as often as he does that, he plays his part very well, and shall meet no danger or inconveniencies by the rest of his Vices: Nothing (as I said before) make a Prince so insufferably odious, as usurping his Subjects Estates, and debauching their Wives, which are two things he ought studiously to forbear; for whilst the generality of the world live quietly upon their Estates, and unprejudiced in their honor, they live peaceably enough, and all his contention is only with the pride and ambition of some few persons who are many ways, and with great ease to be restrained. But a Prince is contemptible when he is counted effeminate, light, unconstant, pusillanimous, and irresolute; and of this he ought to be as careful, as of a Rock in the Sea, and strive that his inall actions there may appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and fortitude.

titude, desiring that in the private affairs of his Subjects, his sentence and determination may be irrevocable, and himself to stand so in their opinion, that none may think it possible either to delude or divert him. The Prince who causes himself to be esteemed in that manner, shall be highly redoubted, and if he be feared, people will not easily conspire against him, nor readily invade him, because he is known to be an excellent Person and formidable to his Subjects; for a prince ought to be terrible in two places, at home to his Subjects, and abroad to his Equals; from whom he defends himself by good Arms, and good Allies; for if his power be good, his friends will not be wanting, and while his affairs are fixed at home, there will be no danger from abroad, unless they be disturb'd by some former conspiracy, and upon any Commotion *ab extra*, if he be compos'd at home, has liv'd as I prescribe; and not deserted himself, he will be able to bear up against any impression according to the example of *Nabis* the *Spartan*. When things are well abroad, his affairs at home will be safe enough, unless they be perplexed by some secret Conspiracy, against which the Prince sufficiently provides, if he keeps himself from being hated or despised, and the people remain satisfied of him, which is a thing very necessary, as I have largely inculcated before. And one of the best Remedies Prince can use against conspiracy, is to keep himself from being hated or despised by the multitude; for no body plots, but he expects by the death of the Prince, to gratify the people, and the thought of offending them will deter him from any such Enterprize, because in conspiracies the difficulties are infinite. By experience we find that many conjurations have been on foot, but few have succeeded, because no man can conspire alone: nor choose a Confederate but out of those who are discontented, and no sooner shall you impart your mind to a Male-content, but you give him opportunity to reconcile himself, because there is nothing he proposes to himself, but he may expect from the discovery. So that the gain being certain on that side, and hazardous and uncertain on the other, he must be either an extraordinary friend to you, or an implacable Enemy to the Prince if he does not betray you; In short, on the side of the Conspirators there is nothing but fear, and jealousy, and apprehension of punishment; but on the Princes side there is the Majesty of the Government, the Laws, the Assistance of his Friends and State, which defend him so effectually, that if the affections of the people be added to them, no man can be so rash, and precipitate as to conspire; for if before the execution of his design, the Conspirator has reason to be afraid, in this case he has much more afterwards, having offended the people in the Execution, and left himself no refuge to fly to. Of this many Examples might be produced, but I shall content my self with one which happened in the memory of our Fathers. *Hanibal Bentivogli* (Grandfather to this present *Hanibal*) was Prince of *Bolonia*, and killed by the *Canneschi* who conspired against him; none of his race being left behind, but *John* who was then in his Cradle: The Murder was no sooner committed, but the people took Arms, and slew all the *Canneschi*, which proceeded only from the affection that the House of the *Bentivogli* had at that time among the populary in *Bolonia*, which was then so great, that when *Hanibal* was dead, there being none of that Family remaining, in a capacity for the Government of the State, upon information that at *Florence* there was a Natural Son of the said *Bentivogli's* (who till that time had passed only for the Son of a smith) they sent Embassadors for him, and having conducted him honorably to that City, they gave him the Government, which he executed very well, till the said *John* came of Age. I conclude therefore a Prince need not be much apprehensive of Conspiracies, whilst the people are his friends; but when they are dissatisfied, and have taken a prejudice against him, there is no thing, nor no person which he ought not to fear. And it has been the constant care of all wise Princes, and all well-governed States, not to reduce the Nobility to despair, nor the people to discontent, which is one of the most material things a Prince is to prevent. Among the best ordered Monarchies of our times, *France* is one, in which there are many good Laws and Constitutions tending to the liberty and preservation of the King: The first of them is the Parliament, and the Authority wherewith it is invested; for he who was the founder of that Monarchy, being sensible of the ambition and insolence of the Nobles, and judging it convenient to have them bridled and restrained; and knowing on the other side the hatred of the people against the Nobility, and that it proceeded from fear (being willing to secure them) to exempt the King from the displeasure of the Nobles, if he sided with the Commons, or from the malice of the commons, if he inclined to the Nobles, he erected a third judge, which (without any reflexion upon the King, should keep the Nobility under, and protect the people; nor could there be a better order, wiser, nor of greater security to the King and the Kingdom; from whence we may deduce another observation, That Princes are to leave things of injustice and envy to the Ministry and Execution of others, but acts of favour and grace are to be perform'd by themselves. To conclude, a Prince is to value his Grandees, but so as not to make the people hate him.

Contemplating the lives and deaths of several of the *Roman* Emperors, it is possible many would think to find plenty of Examples quite contrary to my opinion, forasmuch as some of them whose Conduct was remarkable, and Magnanimity obvious to every body, were turn'd out of their Authority, or murdered by the Conspiracy of their subjects. To give a punctual answer, I should inquire into the qualities and conversations of the said Emperors; and in so doing I should find the reason of their ruine to be the same, or very consonant to what I have opposed. And in part I will represent such things as are most notable, to the consideration of him that reads the actions of our times, and I shall content my self with the examples of all the Emperors which succeeded in the Empire from *Marcus* the Philosopher, to *Maximinus*, and they were, *Marcus*, his Son *Commodus*, *Pertinax*, *Julian*, *Severus*, *Antoninus*, his Son *Caracalla*, *Macrinus*, *Helioabalus*, *Alexander*, and *Maximinus*.

It is first to be considered, That whereas in other Governments there was nothing to contend with, but the ambition of the Nobles, and the insolence of the people, the *Roman* Emperors had a third inconvenience, to support against, the avarice and cruelty of the Soldiers, which was a thing of such difficult practice, that it was the occasion of the destruction of many of them, it being very uneasy to please the Subject and the Soldier together; for the Subject loves Peace, and chooses therefore a Prince that is gentle and mild, whereas the Soldier prefers a Martial Prince, and one that is haughty, and rigid, and rapacious, which good qualities they are desirous he should exercise upon the people, that their pay might be encreased: and their covetousness and cruelty satiated upon them. Hence it is, That those Emperors, who neither by Art, nor Nature are endued with that address, and reputation as is necessary for the restraining both of the one and the other, do always miscarry; and of them the greatest part (especially if but lately advanced to the Empire) understanding the inconsistency of their two humors, incline to satisfy the Soldiers, without regarding how far the people are disobliged. Which Council is no more than is necessary; for seeing it cannot be avoided but Princes must fall under the hatred of somebody, they ought diligently to contend that it be not of the multitude; If that be not to be obtain'd, their next great care is to be, that they incur not the odium of such as are most potent among them. And therefore those Emperors who were new, and had need of extraordinary support, adhered more readily to the Soldiers than to the people which turn'd to their detriment or advantage, as the Prince knew how to preserve his reputation with them: From the causes aforesaid, it hapned that *Marcus Aurelius*, *Pertinax*, and *Alexander* being Princes of more than ordinary Modesty, lovers of Justice, Enemies of cruelty, courteous, and bountiful, came all of them (except *Marcus*) to unfortunate ends. *Marcus* indeed lived and died in great honour, because he came to the Empire by way of inheritance and succession, without being beholden either to Soldiers or people, and being afterwards indued with many good qualities which recommended him, and made him venerable among them, he kept them both in such order whilst he liv'd, and held them so exactly to their bounds, that he was never either hated or despised. But *Pertinax* was chosen Emperor against the will of the Soldiers, who being used to live licentiously under *Commodus*, they could not brook that regularity to which *Pertinax* endeavoured to bring them; so that having contracted the Odium of the Soldiers, and a certain disrespect and neglect by reason of his Age, he was ruined in the very beginning of his reign; from whence it is observable, that hatred is obtained two ways, by good works, and bad, and therefore a Prince (as I said before) being willing to retain his jurisdiction, is oftentimes compelled to be bad. For if the chief party, (whether it be people, or army, or Nobility) which you think most useful; and of most consequence to you for the conservation of your dignity, be corrupt; you must follow their humour and indulge them, and in that case honesty and virtue are pernicious.

But let us come to *Alexander* who was a Prince of such great equity and goodness, it is reckoned among his praises, that in the fourteen years of his Empire, there was no man put to death without a fair Tryal: Nevertheless being accounted effeminate, and one that suffered himself to be managed by his Mother, and falling by that means into disgrace, the Army conspired and killed him. Examining on the other side the Conduct of *Commodus*, *Severus*, *Antoninus*, *Caracalla*, and *Maximinus*, you will find them cruel and rapacious and such as to satisfy the Soldiers, omitted no kind of injury that could be exercised against the people, and all of them but *Severus* were unfortunate in their ends: for *Severus* was a Prince of so great courage and magnanimity, that preserving the friendship of the Army (though the people were oppressed) he made his whole Reign happy, his virtues having represented him so admirable both to the Soldiers and people, that these remained in a manner stupid, and astonished, and the other obedient and contented. And because the actions of *Severus* were great in a new Prince, I shall shew in brief how he personated of the *Flo*

and the *Lion*, whose Natures and properties are (as I said before) necessary for the imitation of a Prince. *Severus* therefore, knowing the laziness and inactivity of *Julian* the Emperor, persuaded the Army under his Command in *Sclavonia* to go to *Rome*, and revenge the death of *Pertinax* who was murdered by the Imperial Guards; and under that colour, without the least pretence to the Empire, he marched his Army towards *Rome*, and was in *Italy* before any thing of his motion was known: being arrived at *Rome*, the Senate were afraid of him, killed *Julian*, and elected *Severus*. After which beginning, there remained two difficulties to be removed before he could be Master of the whole Empire; The one was in *Asia*, where *Niger* General of the *Asiatick* Army, had proclaimed himself Emperor: The other, in the west, where *Albinus* the General aspired to the same; and thinking it hazardous to declare against both, he resolved to oppose himself against *Niger*, and cajole and wheedle *Albinus*, to whom he writ word, That being chosen Emperor by the Senate, he was willing to receive him to a participation of that dignity, gave him the title of *Cæsar*, and by consent of the Senate admitted him his Colleague; which *Albinus* embraced very willingly, and thought him in earnest; but when *Severus* had overcome *Niger*, put him to death, and settled the affairs of the East, being returned to *Rome*, he complained in the Senate against *Albinus*, as a person, who contrary to his obligations for the benefits received from him, had endeavoured treacherously to murder him, told them that he was obliged to march against him to punish his ingratitude, and afterwards following him into *France*, he executed his design, deprived him of his Command, and put him to death. He then who strictly examines the Actions of this Prince, will find him fierce as a *Lion*, subtle as a *Fox*, feared and reverenced by every body, and no way odious to his Army: Nor will it seem strange that he (though newly advanced to the Empire) was able to defend it, seeing his great reputation protected him against the hatred which his people might have conceived against him by reason of his Rapine. But his Son *Antoninus* was an excellent person likewise endued with transcendent parts, which rendered him admirable to the people, and grateful to the Soldiers; for he was Martial in his Nature, patient of labour and hardship, and a great despiser of all sensuality and softness, which recommended him highly to his Armies. Nevertheless his fury and cruelty was so immoderately great (having upon several private and particular occasions, put a great part of the people of *Rome*, and all the inhabitants of *Alexandria*, to death) that he fell into the hatred of the whole world, and began to be feared by his Confidants that were about him, so that he was killed by one of his Captains in the middle of his Camp. From whence it may be observed, That these kind of Assassinations which follow upon a deliberate and obstinate resolution, cannot be prevented by a Prince, for he who values not his own life, can commit them when he pleases; but they are to be feared the less, because they happen but seldom; he is only to have a care of doing any great injury to those that are about him, of which error *Antoninus* was too guilty, having put the Brother of the said Captain to an ignominious death, threatened the Captain daily, and yet continued him in his Guards, which was a rash and pernicious act, and prov'd so in the end. But to come to *Commodus*, who had no hard task to preserve his Empire, succeeding to it by way of inheritance, as Son to *Marcus*, for that to satisfy the people, and oblige the Soldiers, he had no more to do, but to follow the footsteps of his Father. But being of a brutish and cruel disposition, to exercise his rapacity upon the people, he indulged his Army, and allowed them in all manner of licentiousness. Besides, prostituting his Dignity, by descending many times upon the Theater to fight with the Gladiators, and committing many other acts which were vile, and unworthy the Majesty of an Emperor, he became contemptible to the Souldiers, and growing odious to one party, and despicable to the other, they conspired and murdered him. *Maximinus* was likewise a Martial Prince, and addicted to the Wars, and the Army being weary of the Effeminacy of *Alexander* (whom I have mentioned before) having slain him, they made *Maximinus* Emperor, but he possessed it not long, for two things contributed to make him odious, and despised. One was the meanness of his extraction, having kept sheep formerly in *Thrace*, which was known to all the world, and made him universally contemptible. The other was, that at his first coming to the Empire, by not repairing immediately to *Rome*, and putting himself into possession of his Imperial seat, he had contracted the imputation of being cruel, having exercised more than ordinary severity by his Prefects in *Rome*, and his Lieutenants in all the rest of the Empire; so that the whole world being provoked, by the vileness of his birth, and detestation of his cruelty, in apprehension of his fury, *Africa*, the Senate and all the people both in *Italy* and *Rome*, conspired against him, and his own Army joining themselves with them, in their Leaguer before *Aquileia* finding it difficult to be taken, weary of his cruelties, and encouraged by the multitude of his Enemies, they set upon him, and slew him.

I will not trouble my self with *Helioabalus*, *Macrinus*, nor *Julian*, who being all effeminate and contemptible, were quickly extinguished. But I shall conclude this discourse, and say that the Princes of our times are not obliged to satisfy the Soldiers in their respective Governments by such extraordinary ways; for though they are not altogether to be neglected, yet the remedy and resolution is easie because none of these Princes have entire Armies, brought up, and inveterated in their severall Governments and Provinces, as the Armies under the *Roman Empire* were. If therefore at that time it was necessary to satisfy the Soldiers rather than the people, it was because the Soldiers were more potent. At present it is more the interest of all Princes (except the great *Turk* and the *Soldan*) to comply with the people, because they are more considerable than the Soldiers. I except the *Turk*, because he has in his Guards 12000 Foot, and 15000 Horse constantly about him, upon whom the strength and security of his Empire depends, and it is necessary (postponing all other respect to the people) they be continued his freinds. It is the same case with the *Soldan*, who being wholly in the power of the Soldiers, it is convenient that he also wave the people, and insinuate with the Army. And here it is to be noted, that this Government of the *Soldans* is different from all other Monarchies, for it is not unlike the Papacy in Christendom, which can neither be called a new, nor an hereditary Principality; because the Children of the deceased Prince, are neither Heirs to his Estate, nor Lords of his Empire, but he who is chosen to succeed, by those who have the faculty of Election; which Custom being of old, the Government cannot be called new, and by consequence is not subject to any of the difficulties wherewith a new one is infested; because though the person of the Prince be new, and perhaps the Title; yet the Laws and Orders of State are old, and disposed to receive him as if he were hereditary Lord. But to return to our business, I say, That whoever considers the aforesaid discourse, shall find either hatred or contempt the perpetual cause of the ruine of those Emperors; and be able to judge how it came about that part of them taking one way in their administrations, and part of them another, in both parties some were happy, and some unhappy at last. *Pertinax* and *Alexander* being but Upright Princes, it was not only vain, but dangerous for them to imitate *Marcus*, who was Emperor by right of Succession. Again, it was no less pernicious for *Caracalla*, *Commodus*, and *Maximinus* to make *Severus* their pattern, not having force nor vertue enough to follow his footsteps. So then if a new Prince cannot imitate the actions of *Marcus*; (and to regulate by the example of *Severus*, is unnecessary) he is only to take that part from *Severus* that is necessary to the foundation of his State, and from *Marcus*, what is convenient to keep and defend it gloriously, when 'tis once established and firm.

## CHAP. XX.

*Whether Citadels, and other things which Princes many times do, be profitable, or dangerous?*

Some Princes for the greater security of their Dominion, have disarmed their Subjects; Others have cantonized their Countries; others have fomented factions and animosity among them; some have applyed themselves to flatter and insinuate with those who were suspicious in the beginning of their Government: Some have built Castles, others have demolished them; and though in all these cases, no certain or determined rule can be prescribed, unless we come to a particular consideration of the State where it is to be used; yet I shall speak of them all, as the matter it self will endure. A wise Prince therefore was never known to disarm his Subjects; rather finding them unfurnished, he put Arms into their hands; for by arming them, and inuring them to warlike Exercise, those Arms are surely your own; they who were suspicious to you, become faithful; they who are faithful, are confirm'd; and all your Subjects become of your party; and because the whole multitude which submits to your Government is not capable of being armed, if you be beneficial and obliging to those you do arm, you may make the bolder with the rest; for the difference of your behaviour to the Soldier, binds him more firmly to your Service; and the rest will excuse you, as judging them most worthy of reward, who are most liable to danger. But when you disarm, you disgust them, and imply a diffidence in them, either for cowardize, or Treachery, and the one or the other is sufficient to give them an impression of hatred against you. And because you cannot subsist without Soldiers, you will be forced to entertain Mercenaries, whom I have formerly described, and if it were possible for the said Mercenaries to be good, they could not be able to defend you against powerful Adversaries,

faries, and Subjects disobliged. Wherefore (as I have said) a new Prince, in his new Government, puts his Subjects always into Arms, as appears by several Examples in History. But when a Prince conquers a new State, and annexes it (as a Member) to his old, then it is necessary your Subjects be disarmed, all but such as appeared for you in the Conquest, and they are to be mollified by degrees, and brought into such a condition of laziness and effeminacy, that in time your whole strength may devolve upon your own Natural Militia, which were trained up in your ancient Dominion, and are to be always about you. Our Ancestors (and they were esteemed wise men) were wont to say, That it was necessary to keep *Pistoia* by factions, and *Pisa* by Fortresses, and accordingly in several Towns under their Subjection, they created, and fomented factions and animosities, to keep them with more ease. This, at a time when *Italy* was unsettled, and in a certain kind of suspense, might be well enough done, but I do not take it at this time for any precept for us, being clearly in opinion that the making of factions, never does good, but that where the Enemy approaches, and the City is divided, it must necessarily, and that suddenly be lost, because the weaker party will always fall off to the Enemy, and the other cannot be able to defend it. The *Venetians*, (as I guess) upon the same grounds nourished the factions of the *Guelfs*, and the *Ghiblins* in the Cities under their jurisdiction; and though they kept them from blood; yet they encouraged their dissensions, to the end that the Citizens being employed among themselves, should have no time to conspire against them; which as appeared afterwards, did not answer expectation; for being defeated at *Valta*, one of the said factions took Arms, and turned the *Venetians* out of their State. Such methods therefore as these, do argue weakness in the Prince; for no Government of any strength or confidence will suffer such divisions, because they are useful only in time of Peace, when perhaps they may contribute to the more easie management of their Subjects, but when War comes, the fallacy of those Counsels are quickly discovered. Without doubt, Princes grow great when they overcome the difficulties and impediments which are given them; and therefore Fortune, especially when she has a mind to exalt a new Prince (who has greater need of reputation than a Prince that is old and Hereditary) raises him up Enemies, and encourages enterprizes against him, that he may have opportunity to conquer them, and advance himself by such steps as his Enemies had prepared. For which reason many have thought that a wise Prince when opportunity offers, ought (but with great cunning and address) to maintain some enmity against himself, that when time serves to destroy them, his own greatness may be increased.

Princes, and particularly those who are not of long standing, have found more fidelity and assistance from those whom they suspected at the beginning of their Reign, than from them who at first were their greatest confidants. *Pandolfus Petrucci* Prince of *Sienna* govern'd his State rather by those who were suspected, than others. But this is not to be treated of largely, because it varies according to the subjects; I shall only say this, That those Men who in the beginning of his Government, opposed him (if they be of such quality as to want the support of other people) are easily wrought over to the Prince, and more strictly engaged to be faithful; because they knew that it must be their good carriage for the future that must cancel the prejudice that is against them; and so the Prince comes to receive more benefit by them, than by those who serving him more securely, do most commonly neglect his affairs.

And seeing the matter requires, I will not omit to remind a Prince who is but newly advanced (and that by some inward favour and correspondence in the Country) that he considers well what it was that disposed those parties to befriend him; if it be not affection to him, but Pique, and animosity to the old Government, it will cost much trouble and difficulty to keep them his friends, because it will be impossible to satisfy them: and upon serious disquisition, Ancient and Modern Examples will give us the reason, and we shall find it more easie to gain such persons as were satisfied with the former Government, and by consequence his Enemies, than those who being disobliged, sided with him, and assisted to subvert it.

It has been a Custom among Princes, for the greater security of their Territories to build Citadels and Fortresses to bridle and restrain such as would enterprize against them, and to serve as a refuge in times of Rebellion; and I approve the way because anciently practised, yet no longer ago than in our days, *Mr. Nicolo Vitelli* was known to dismantle two Forts in the City of *Castello*, to secure his Government; *Guidobaldo* Duke of *Urbino* returning to his State from whence *Cæsar Borgia* had driven him, demolished all the strong places in that Province, and thereby thought it more unlikely again to fall into the hands of the Enemy. The *Bentivogli* being returned to *Bologna*, used the same course: So that Fortresses, are useful, or not useful, according to the difference of time, and if in one place they do good, they

they do as much mischief in another: And the case may be argued thus, That Prince who is more afraid of his Subjects than Neighbours, is to suffer them to stand: The Family of the *Sforza's*, has and will suffer more mischief by the Castle of *Milan* (which was built by *Francesco Sforza*) than by all its other troubles whatever; so that the best fortification of all, is not to be hated by the people, for your Fortresses will not protect you, if the people have you in detestation, because they shall no sooner take Arms, but Strangers will fall in, and sustain them. In our times, there is not one instance to be produced, of advantage, which that course has brought to any Prince, but to the Countess of *Furly*, when upon the Death of *Hieronimo* her Husband, by means of those Castles she was able to withstand the popular fury, and expect till supplies came to her from *Milan*, and resettled her in the Government; and as times then stood, the people were not in a Condition to be relieved by any stranger. But afterwards they stood her in no stead when *Cæsar Borgia* invaded her, and the people being incensed, joyned with her Enemy. Wherefore it had been better for her both then, and at first to have possessed the affections of the people, than all the Castles in the Country. These things being considered, I approve both of him that builds those Fortresses, and of him that neglects them, but must needs condemn him who relies so much upon them, as to despise the displeasure of the people.

## CHAP. XXI.

*How a Prince is to demean himself to gain reputation.*

Nothing recommends a Prince so highly to the world, as great Enterprizes, and noble Expressions of his own Valor and Conduct: We have in our days *Ferdinand* King of *Aragon*, the present King of *Spain*, who may (and not improperly) be called a new Prince, being of a small and weak King, become for fame, and renown the greatest Monarch in Christendom; and if his Exploits be considered, you will find them all brave, but some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his Reign he invaded the Kingdom of *Granada*, and that Enterprize was the foundation of his Grandeur. He began it leisurely, and without suspicion of impediment, holding the Barons of *Castile* employed in that service, and so intent upon that War, that they dreamt not of any Innovation, whilst in the meantime before they were aware, he got reputation, and Authority over them. He found out a way of maintaining his Army at the expence of the Church, and the people, and by the length of that War, to establish such Order and Discipline among his Soldiers, that afterwards they gained him many honourable Victories. Beside this, to adapt him for greater Enterprizes, (always making Religion his pretence) by a kind of devout cruelty, he destroyed and exterminated the jews called *Marrans*, than which nothing could be more strange, or deplorable. Under the same Cloak of Religion, he invaded *Africa*, made his Expedition into *Italy*, assaulted *France*, and began many great things which always kept the minds of his Subjects in admiration and suspence, expecting what the event of his Machinations would be. And these his Enterprizes had so sudden a spring and result one from the other, that they gave no leisure to any man to be at quiet, or to continue any thing against him. It is likewise of great advantage to a Prince to give some rare Example of his own administration at home (such is reported of *Messer Bernardo da Milano*) when there is occasion for some body to perform any thing Extraordinary in the Civil Government, whether it be good or bad, and to find out such a way either to reward or punish him, as may make him much talk'd of in the world. Above all, a Prince is to have a care in all his actions to behave himself so as may give him the reputation of being excellent as well as great. A Prince is likewise much esteemed when he shows himself a sincere friend, or a generous Enemy, That is when without any hesitation he declares himself in favour of one against another, which as it is more frank and Princely, so it is more profitable than to stand neuter; for if two of your potent Neighbours be at Wars, they are either of such condition that you are to be afraid of the Victor or not: In either which cases it will be always more for your benefit to discover your self freely, and make a fair War: For in the first cause, if you do not declare, you shall be a prey to him who overcomes, and it will be a pleasure, and satisfaction to him that is conquered to see you his Fellow-sufferer, nor will any body either defend, or receive you, and the reason is, because the Conqueror will never understand them to be his Friends, who would not assist him in his distress; and he that is worsted will not receive you, because you neglected to run his fortune with your Arms in your hands. *Antiochus*, upon the invitation of the *Etolians*, passed into *Greece*, to repel the *Romans*: *Antiochus* sent Embassadors,



dors to the *Achaians* (who were in amity with the *Romans*) to persuade them a Neutrality, and the *Romans* sent to them to associate with them. The business coming to be debated in the Council of the *Achaians*, and *Antiochus* his Ambassador pressing them to be Neuters; The *Roman* Ambassador replied, *As to what he has remonstrated, That it is most useful and most consistent with the interest of your State, not to engage your selves in our War, there is nothing more contrary and pernicious; for if you do not concern your selves, you will assuredly become a prey to the Conqueror without any thanks or reputation; and it will always be, that he who has least kindness for you, will tempt you to be Neuters, but they that are your friends will invite you to take up Arms.* And those Princes who are ill advised, to avoid some present danger follow the Neutral way, are most commonly ruin'd: But when a Prince discovers himself courageously, in favour of one party, if he with whom you joyn overcome, though he be very powerful, and you seem to remain at his discretion, yet he is obliged to you, and must needs have a respect for you, and Men are not so wicked, with such signal and exemplary ingratitude to oppress you. Besides Victories are never so clear and compleat, as to leave the Conqueror without all sparks of reflexion, and especially upon what is just. But if your Confederate comes by the worst, you are received by him, and assisted whilst he is able, and become a Companion of his fortune, which may possibly restore the. In the second place, if they who contend be of such condition, that they have no occasion to fear, let which will overcome; you are in prudence to declare your self the sooner, because by assisting the one, you contribute to the ruine of the other, (whom, if your Confederate had been wise, he ought rather to have preserved) so that he overcoming, remains wholly at your discretion, and by your assistance, he must of necessity overcome. And hear it is to be noted (if he can avoid it) a Prince is never to league himself with another more powerful than himself, in an offensive War: because in that case, if he overcomes, you remain at his mercy, and Princes ought to be as cautious as possible, of falling under the discretion of other people. The *Venetians* (when there was no necessity for it) associated with *France* against the Duke of *Milan*, and that association was the cause of their ruine: But where it is not to be avoided (as hapned to the *Florentines* when the *Pope* and the *Spaniard* sent their Armies against *Lombardy*) there a Prince is to adhere for the reasons aforesaid. Nor is any Prince or Government to imagine that in those cases any certain counsel can be taken, because the affairs of this world are so ordered, that in avoiding one mischief, we fall commonly into another. But a Man's wisdom is most conspicuous where he is able to distinguish of dangers, and make choice of the least. Moreover a Prince to show himself a *Virtuoso*, and Honourer of all that is excellent in any Art whatsoever. He is likewise to encourage and assure his Subjects that they may live quietly in peace and exercise themselves in their several Vocations whether marchandize, Agriculture, or any other employment whatever, to the end that one may not forbear improving or embellishing his Estate for fear it should be taken from him, nor another advancing his Trade in apprehension of taxes; but the Prince is rather to excite them by propositions of reward, and immunities to all such as shall any way amplify his Territory, or powers. He is obliged likewise, at convenient times in the year to entertain the people by Feasting and Plays, and Spectacles of Recreation; and because all Cities are divided into Companies, or Wards, he ought to have respect to those Societies, be merry with them sometimes, and give them some instance of his humanity; and magnificence, but always retaining the Majesty of his degree, which is never to be debased in any case whatever.

## CHAP. XXII.

## of the Secretaries of Princes.

THE Election of his Ministers, is of no small importance to a Prince; for the first judgment that is made of him, or his parts, is from the persons he has about him; when they are wise and faithful, be sure the Prince is discreet himself, who as he knew how to choose them able at first, so he has known how to oblige them to be faithful; but when his Ministers are otherwise, it reflects shrewdly upon the Prince; for commonly the first error he commits, is in the Election of his Servants. No Man knew *Antonio da Venafro* to be Secretary to *Pandolfo Petrucci* Prince of *Sienna* but he could judge *Pandolfo* to be a prudent Man for choosing such a one to his Minister. In the capacities and parts of Men, there are three sorts of degrees; one Man understands of himself; another understands what is explained; and a third understands neither of himself, nor by any Explanation: The first is excellent

excellent, the second commendable, the third altogether unprofitable. If therefore *Pandulfus* was not in the first rank, he might be concluded in the second; for whenever a Prince has the judgment to know the good, and the bad of what is spoken or done, though his own invention be not excellent, he can distinguish a good servant from a bad, and exalt the one, and correct the other, and the Minister despairing of deluding him, remains good in spite of his teeth. But the business is how a Prince may understand his Minister, and the rule for that is infallible. When you observe your Officer more careful of himself, than of you, and all his actions and designs pointing at his own interest and advantage, that Man will never be a good Minister, nor ought you ever to repose any confidence in him; for he who has the affairs of his Prince in his hand, ought to lay aside all thoughts of himself, and regard nothing but what is for the profit of his Master. And on the other side, to keep him faithful, the Prince is as much concerned to do for him, by honouring him, enriching him, giving him good Offices and Preferments, that the wealth and honour conferred by his Master, may keep him from looking out for himself, and the plenty and goodness of his Offices, make him afraid of a change, knowing that without his Princes favour he can never subsist. When therefore the Prince, and the Minister are qualified in this manner, they may depend one upon the other: But when 'tis otherwise with them, the end must be bad; and one of them will be undone.

### CHAPTER XXIII.

#### *How flatterers are to be avoided.*

I Will not pass by a thing of great consequence, being an error against which Princes do hardly defend themselves, unless they be very wise, and their judgment very good. And that is about Flatterers, of which kind of Cattle all Histories are full; for Men are generally so fond of their own actions, and so easily mistaken in them, that it is not without difficulty they defend themselves against those sort of people, and he that goes about to defend himself, runs a great hazard of being despised: For there is no other remedy against Flatterers, than to let every body understand you are not disoblige by telling the truth; yet if you suffer every body to tell it, you injure your self; and lessen your reverence. Wherefore a wise Prince ought to go a third way, and select out of his State certain discreet men, to whom only he is to commit that liberty of speaking truth, and that, of such things as he demands, and nothing else; but then he is to inquire of every thing, hear their opinions, and resolve afterwards, as he pleases, and behave himself towards them in such sort, that every one may find with how much the more freedom he speaks, with so much the more kindness he is accepted; That besides them, he will hearken to no body; That he considers well before he resolves; and that his resolutions once taken, are never to be altered: He that does otherwise, shall either precipitate his affairs by means of his Flatterers; or by variety of advices, often change his designs, which will lessen his esteem, and render him contemptible. To This purpose I shall instance in one Modern Example:

Father *Lucas*, a Servant to *Maximilian* the present Emperor, giving a Character of His Majesty, declared him a person that never consulted any body; and yet never acted according to his own judgment and inclination; and the reason was, because he proceeded contrary to the prescriptions aforesaid, for the Emperor is a close Man, communicates his secrets with no body, nor takes any man's advice; but when his determinations are to be executed, and begin to be known in the world, those who are about him begin to discourage and dissuade him, and he being good natur'd does presently desist: Hence it comes to pass that his resolutions of one day, are dissolved in the next, no man knows what he desires or designs; nor no man can depend upon his resolutions. A Prince therefore is always to consult; but at his own, not other peoples pleasure, and rather to deter people from giving their advice undemanded; but he ought not to be sparing in his demands, nor when he has demanded, impatient of hearing the truth; but if he understands that any suppressed it, and forbore to speak out, for fear of displeasing, then, and not till then, he is to show his displeasure. And because there are those who believe that a Prince which creates an opinion of his prudence in the people, does it not by any excellence in his own Nature, but by the Counsels of those who are about him; without doubt they are deceived; for this is a general and infallible rule, *That that Prince who has no Wisdom of his own, can never be well advised*; unless by accident he commits all to the Government and Administration of some honest and discreet man: In this case 'tis possible things may be well ordered for a while;

but they can never continue; for his Minister or Vicegerent in a short time will set up for himself; but if a Prince who has no great judgment of his own, consults with more than one; their Counsels will never agree, nor he have ever the cunning to unite them; Every man will advise according to his own interest, or Capriccio; and he not have the parts either to correct or discover it: And other Counsellors are not to be found; for men will always prove bad, unless by necessity they are compelled to be good. So then it is clear, *That good Counsels (from whomsoever they come) proceed rather from the Wisdom of the Prince, than the Princes Wisdom from the goodness of his Counsels.*

#### CHAP. XXIV.

*How it came to pass that the Princes of Italy have most of them lost their Dominions.*

THE Qualities aforesaid being observed; they make a new Prince appear in the number of the more Ancient, and render him presently more firm and secure in his Government, than if he had descended to it by right of inheritance; for the Actions of a new Prince are liable to stricter observation, than if he were Hereditary; and when they are known to be virtuous, gain more upon people, and oblige them farther than antiquity of Blood; because Men are more affected with present, than pass'd things, and when in their present condition they find themselves well, they content themselves with it, without looking out any where else, employing themselves wholly in defence of their Prince, unless in other things he be defective to himself: So that thereby he will have double honor, in having laid the foundation of a new Principality, and embellished and fortified it, with good Laws, good Force, good Friends, and good Example; whereas he multiplies his disgrace, who being born Prince, loses his inheritance by his own ill management and imprudence. And if the Sovereign Princes in Italy, who in our time have lost their Dominions, be considered; as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others, there will be found in their beginning one common defect as to the management of their Arms, for the reasons largely discours'd of before: besides some of them will appear to have been hated by the people, or if they have had too much prudence as to preserve a friendship with them, they have been ignorant how to secure themselves against the Grandees; for without these errors no States are lost that have Money and strength enough to bring an Army into the Field. Philip of Macedon (not Alexander the Great's Father, but he who was overcome by Titus Quintus) had no great force in comparison of the Romans and the Grecians which invaded him; yet, being a Martial Man, and one that understood how to insinuate with the People, and oblige the Nobility, he maintained War several years against both of them, and though at last he lost some Towns, yet he kept his Kingdom in spite of them. Those therefore of our Princes who for many years together were settled in their Principalities, if they lost them afterwards, they cannot accuse fortune, but their own negligence and indiscretion, for not having in quiet times considered they might change (and it is the common infirmity of Mankind in a calm to make no reckoning of a Tempest) when adversity approached, they thought more of making their escape than defence, resting their whole hopes upon this, that when the people were weary of the insolence of the Conqueror, they would recal them again. Which resolution is tolerable indeed, when others are wanting, but to neglect all other remedies, and trust only to that, is much to be condemned, for a man would never throw himself down, that another might take him up; besides, that may not happen, or if it does, not with your security, because that kind of defence is poor, and depends not on your self, and no defences are good, certain, and lasting, which proceed not from the Princes own Courage and Virtue.

## CHAP. XXV.

*How far in human affairs Fortune may avail, and in what manner she may be resisted.*

I Am not ignorant that it is, and has been of old the opinion of many people, that the affairs of the world are so govern'd by Fortune and Divins Providence, that Man cannot by his Wisdom correct them, or apply any remedy at all; from whence they would infer that we are not to labour and sweat, but to leave every thing to its own tendency and event. This opinion has obtained more in our days, by the many and frequent revolutions, which have been, and are still seen beyond all humane conjecture. And when I think of it seriously sometimes, I am in some measure inclined to it my self; nevertheless that our own free will may not utterly be exploded, I conceive it may be true that fortune may have the arbitrement of one half of our actions, but that she leaves the other half (or little less) to be governed by our selves. Fortune, I do resemble to a rapid and impetuous River, which when swelled, and enraged, overwhelms the Plains, subverts the Trees, and the Houses, forces away the Earth from one place, and carries it to another, every body fears; every body shuns, but no body knows how to resist it; Yet though it be thus furious sometimes, it does not follow but when it is quiet and calm, men may by banks, and fences, and other provisions correct it in such manner, that when it swells again, it may be carried off by some Canal, or the violence thereof rendered less licentious and destructive. So it is with Fortune, which shows her power where there is no predisposed virtue to resist it, and turns all her force and impetuosity, where she knows there are no banks, no fences to restrain her: If you consider *Italy* (the seat of all these revolutions) and what it was that caus'd them, you will find it an open field, without any bounds or Ramparts to secure it; and that, had it been defended by the Courage of their Ancestors, as *Germany*, and *Spain*, and *France* have been, those inundations had never hapned, or never made such devastation as they have done. And this I hold sufficient to have spoken in general against Fortune. But restraining my self a little more to particulars, I say it is ordinary to see a Prince happy one day, and ruined the next, without discerning any difference in his humor or Government; and this I impute to the reasons of which I have discoursed largely before; and one of them is, because that Prince which relies wholly upon Fortune, being subject to her Variations, must of necessity be ruined. I believe, again that Prince may be happy, whose manner of proceeding concert's with the times, and he unhappy who cannot accommodate to them: For in things leading to the end of their designs (which every man has in his eye, and they are riches and honour) we see men have various methods of proceeding. Some with circumspection, others with heat; some with violence, others with cunning; some with patience, and others with fury, and every one (notwithstanding the diversity of their ways) may possibly attain them. Again we see two persons equally cautious, one of them prospers, and the other miscarries, and on the other side, two equally happy by different measures, one being deliberate, and the other as hasty; and this proceeds from nothing but the condition of the times which suits, or does not suit; with the manner of their proceedings. From hence arises what I have said, That two persons by different operations do attain the same end, whilst two others steer the same Course, and one of them succeeds, and the other is ruined. From hence likewise may be deduced the Vicissitudes of good; for if to one who manages with deliberation and patience, the times and conjuncture of affairs, come about so favourably that his Conduct be in fashion, he must needs be happy; but if the face of affairs, and the times change, and he changes not with them, he is certainly ruined. Nor is there any man to be found so wise, that knows how to accommodate, or frame himself to all these varieties, both because he cannot deviate from that to which Nature has inclined him; as likewise because if a man has constantly prospered in one way, it is no easie matter to persuade him to another; and he that is so cautious, being at a loss when time requires he should be vigarous, must of necessity be destroyed; whereas if he could turn with the times, his fortune would never betray him. Pope *Julius XI.* in all his Enterprizes, acted with passion and vehemence, and the times and accident of affairs were so sutable to his manner of proceeding, that he prospered in whatever he undertook. Consider his Expedition of *Bolonia* in the days of Messer *Govanni Bentivoglio*, The *Venetians* were against it, and the Kings of *Spain* and *France* were in treaty, and had a mind to it themselves; yet he with his promptitude and fury, undertook it personally himself, and that activity of his, kept both *Spaniards*, and *Venetians* in suspence (the *Venetians* for fear; the *Spaniards*, in hopes to recover the whole Kingdom of *Naples*, and the

the King of *France* came over to his side; for seeing him in motion, and desirous to make him his friend, and thereby to correct the insolence of the *Venetian*, he thought he could not deny him his assistance, without manifest injustice; so that *Julius* with his rashness and huffing, did that which never any other Pope could have done with all his cunning and insinuation: For had he deferred his departure from *Rome*, till all things had been put into exact order, and his whole progress concluded (as any other Pope would have done) he could never have succeeded; The King of *France* would have pretended a thousand excuses, and others would have suggested twice as many fears; I will pass by the rest of his Enterprizes, which were all alike, and prospered as well, and the shortness of his life secured him against change: for had the times fallen out so, that he had been forced to proceed with accurate circumspection, he would have certainly been ruined, for he could never have left those ways to which his Nature inclined him. I conclude then, That whilst the obstinacy of Princes consists with the motion of fortune, 'tis possible they may be happy; but when once they disagree, the poor Prince comes certainly to the ground. I am of opinion likewise, that 'tis better to be hot and precipitate, than cautious and apprehensive, for fortune is a Woman, and must be Hector'd, to keep her under; and 'tis visible every day she suffers her self to be managed by those who are brisk and audacious, rather than by those who are cold and phlegmatick in their Motions, and therefore (like a Woman) she is always a friend to those who are young; because being less circumspect, they attack her with more security and boldness.

## C H A P. XXVI.

*An Exhortation to deliver Italy from the Barbarians.*

HAVING weighed therefore all that is said before, and considered seriously with my self whether in this juncture of affairs in *Italy*, the times were disposed for the advancement of a new Prince, and whether there was competent matter that could give occasion to a virtuous and wise person to introduce such a form as would bring reputation to him, and benefit to all his Subjects; it seems to me that at this present many things concur to the exaltation of a new Prince, that I do not know any time that has been more proper than this: and if (as I said before) for the Manifestation of the courage of *Moses*, it was necessary that the *Israelites* should be Captives in *Egypt*; for discovery of the Magnanimity of *Cyrus*, that the *Persians* should be oppressed by the *Medes*; and for the illustration of the excellence of *Theseus*, that the *Athenians* should be banished and dispersed; so to evince and demonstrate the courage of an *Italian* spirit, it was necessary that *Italy* should be reduced to its present condition; That it should be in greater bondage than the *Jews*; in greater servitude than the *Persians*, and in greater dispersion than the *Athenians*, without Head, without order, harras'd, spoyl'd, overcome, over-run, and over-flown with all kind of Calamity: and though formerly some sparks of virtue have appeared in some persons, that might give it hopes that God had ordained them for its redemption; yet it was found afterwards that in the very height and career of their exploits, they were check'd, and forsaker'd by Fortune, and poor *Italy* left half dead, expecting who would be her *Samaritan* to bind up her wounds, put an end to the Sackings and devastations in *Lombardy*, the Taxes and Expilations in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and *Tuscany*, and cure her sores, which length of time had fester'd and imposthumated. 'Tis manifest how she prays to God daily to send some person who may redeem her from the cruelty, and insolence of the Barbarians. 'Tis manifest how prone and ready she is to follow the Banner that any man will take up; nor is it at present to be discerned where she can repose her hopes with more probability, than in your illustrious Family, which by its own courage and interest, and the favour of God and the Church (of which it is now chief) may be induced to make it self Head in her redemption: which will be no hard matter to be effected, if you lay before you the lives and actions of the persons above named; who though they were rare, and wonderful, were yet but men, and not accommodated with so fair circumstances as you. Their Enterprize was not more just, nor easie, nor God Almighty more their friend than yours. You have Justice on your side; for that War is just which is necessary, and 'tis piety to fight, where no hope is left in any thing else. The people are universally disposed, and where the disposition is so great, the opposition can be but small, especially you taking your rules from those persons which I have propos'd to you for a Model. Besides, many things that they did were super-natural, and by Gods immediate Conduct, the Sea opened, a cloud directed, a rock afforded water,

it rained *Manna*, all these things are recompensed in your Grandeur, and the rest remains to be executed by you: God will not do every thing immediately, because he will not deprive us of our free will, and the honour that devolves upon us. Nor is it any wonder if none of the fore-named *Italians* have been able to do that which may be hoped for from your illustrious Family: and if in so many revolutions in *Italy*, and so long continuation of War, their Military Virtue seems spent and extinguished; the reason is, their old Discipline was not good, and no body was able to direct to a better. Nothing makes so much to the honour of a new Prince, as new Laws, and new Orders invented by him, which if they be well founded, and carry any thing of Grandeur along with them, do render him venerable, and wonderful; and *Italy* is susceptible enough of any new form. Their courage is great enough in the Soldier, if it be not wanting in the Officer, witness the Duels, and Combats, in which the *Italians* have generally the better by their force, and dexterity, and stratagem; but come to their Battels, and they have oftner the worst, and all from the inexperience of their Commanders; for those who pretend to have Skill, will never obey; and every one thinks he has Skill, there having been no body to this very day, raised by his virtue and fortune to that height of reputation, as to prevail with others to obey him: Hence it came, that in so long time, in the many Wars during the last twenty years, when ever an Army consisted wholly of *Italians*, it was certainly beaten; and this may be testified by *Tarus*, *Alexandria*, *Capua*, *Genoa*, *Vaila*, *Bologna*, and *Mestri*. If therefore your illustrious Family be inclined to follow the examples of those excellent persons who redeemed their Countries, it is necessary as a true fundamental of all great Enterprizes, to provide yourself with Forces of your own Subjects, for you cannot have more faithful, nor better Soldiers than they. And though all of them be good, yet altogether they will be much better, when they find themselves not only commanded, but preferred; and cared for by a Prince of their own. It is necessary therefore to be furnished with these Forces, before you can be able with *Italian* virtue to vindicate your Country from the oppression of Strangers: And though the *Swiss*, and *Spanish* Infantry be counted terrible, they have both of them their defects: and a third sort may be composed that may not only encounter, but be confident to beat them; for the *Spanish* Foot cannot deal with Horse, and the *Swiss* are not invincible when they meet with Foot as obstinate as themselves. It has been seen by experience, and would be so again, the *Spaniards* cannot sustain the fury of the *French* Cavalry, and the *Swiss* have been overthrown by the Infantry of *Spain*. And though of this last we have seen no perfect Experiment; yet we had a competent Essay at the Battel of *Ravenna*, where the *Spanish* Foot being engaged with the *German* Battalions (which observe the same Order and Discipline with the *Swiss*) the *Spaniards* by the agility of their Bodies, and the protection of their Bucklers, broke in under their Pikes, and killed them securely; while the poor *Germans* were incapable to defend themselves; and had not the *Spaniards* been charged by the Horse, the *German* Foot had been certainly cut off. 'Tis possible therefore (the defect of both those Foot being known) to institute a third, which may buckle with the Horse, and be in no fear of their foot; which will be effected, not by the variation of their Arms, but by changing their Discipline. And these are some of those things which being newly reformed, give great grandeur and reputation to any new Prince: This opportunity therefore is by no means to be slip'd, that *Italy*, after so long expectation, may see some hopes of deliverance: Nor can it be expressed with what joy, with what impatience of revenge, with what fidelity, with what compassion, with what Tears, such a Champion would be received into all the Provinces that have suffered by those barbarous inundations. What Gates would be shut against him? What people would deny him obedience? what malice would oppose him? what true *Italian* would refuse to follow him? There is not, there is not any body but abhors, and nauseates this barbarous domination: Let your illustrious Family, then address it self to the work, with as much Courage and Confidence as just Enterprizes are undertaken; That under their Ensigns our Country may be recovered, and under their Conduct, *Petrarch's* Prophecy may be fulfilled, who has promised that,

*Virtu contr' al furore*  
*Prendera l' arme, and fia il combatter Corto.*  
*Che l' antico valore*  
*Ne gl' Italiani curr' non e ancor morto:*

Virtue shall arm 'gainst rage, and in short fight  
 Prove th' Roman Valour's not extinguish'd quite:



The Original of the words *Guelf* and *Ghibilin*, so much mentioned in History.

THESE two Factions so famous in History, were eminent in *Italy* two ages before *Castruccio* was born. *Machiavel* in his Treatise of the Wars of that Country, affirms that *Pistoia* was the first place where those names of distinction were used, but the account wherewith the publick Libraries supply me, runs thus. These two words, *Guelf* and *Ghibilin*, deduce their original from a schism which molested the Church in the year 1130. by the competition of two Popes, *Innocent* 11. and *Anaclet*: the greatest part of Christendom acknowledged *Innocent*, who was particularly supported by the Emperors of the West. *Anaclet* the anti-Pope had persuaded into his interests, *Roger Comte de Naples* and *Sicily*, a martial Prince, and descended from the *Normans*, who had conquered that Country. The pretence of this double Election having kept a War on foot eight years together, which was still favourable to *Roger*, the Emperor *Conrad* the third march'd himself at the head of an Army of  *Germans*, into *Italy*, leaving his Grand-son Prince *Henry* to come after. *Roger*, to oppose him with men of his own Nation, allured to the defence of his Countries *Guelf* Duke of *Bavaria*. During the course of this War which began in the year 1139. it hapned sometimes that the Emperors Army was commanded by the said Prince *Henry*, who was brought up in a Village in *Germany* called *Ghibilin*, whose situation being very pleasant, made the very name of it dear to him. One day the Armies being drawn up, and ready to engage, the *Bavarians* to encourage their Comrades, cryed out in their language, a *Guelf*, a *Guelf*; and the Emperors Troops (being at the same time as well disposed to their General) to comply with the kindness he had for that place, cryed out on the other side, a *Ghibilin*, a *Ghibilin*. These words seemed barbarous to the *Italians* that were with *Roger*, who came to *Guelf* to know what they meant: He told them the Pope's Party were intended by the word *Guelf*, and the Emperors by the word *Ghibilin*: from that time those names grew so common in both Armies, that by them they answered their *Who goes there?* and they were given to the *Italians* according to their several sides. 'Tis true, at first they were used to discriminate only *Anaclet's* Party from the Emperors, but afterwards *Roger* having vanquished and taken prisoner Pope *Innocent*; as the price of his liberty he oblig'd him to erect the Countries of *Naples* and *Sicily* into Kingdoms, by which treaty *Roger* being taken off from the interest of the anti-Pope, and engaging entirely with the Church, he affix'd the name of *Guelf* to the Pope's Party, and confirm'd the name *Ghibilin* to the Faction of the Emperor.

The *Italians* would fain have the credit of the Etymology themselves, and by a certain gingling of words, (and that mightily strain'd) would have *Guelf* deriv'd from *Guardatori de se*, because (forsooth) 'tis they who defend the Faith of the Church: and that by corruption the word *Ghibilin* was form'd from *Guida belli*, that is *Guidatori di Bataglia*, a great Title, and suitable to the Majesty of the Empire.

Be it which way it will, these two Factions were in the height of their emulation two hundred years after, that is to say, about the year 1320. which was very near the time that *Castruccio* was in his prosperity. And in *Europe* the face of affairs stood thus.

The Popes (driven from *Rome* by the violence of the Emperors of the West) had transferred the Holy Chair to *Avignon* in *France*. In the year 1320. it was possessed by *John XXII.* a Prince of himself firm and entire, but one who by the precipitate counsels of other people had excommunicated the Emperor *Lewis* of the house of *Bavaria*, and been too busie with his fulminations against five more Princes of *Italy*, who (being treated by him like Tyrants) confederated against him; their names were *Castruccio* Sovereign of *Lucca*, *Scaliger*, Lord of *Verona*, the Marquis *d'Esti* Lord of *Ferrara*, and *Visconti*, and *Gonzague* the first Sovereign of *Milan*, and the other of *Mantoua*: which created troubles in *Italy*.

The Empire of the East was at that time torn, and distracted by the ambition of the *Palologi* and others, whilst in the mean time the Sultan *Orchan* son-of *Ottoman*, swept away *Lycania*, *Phrygia*, and all the Coast of the *Hellepont* from the *Greeks*.

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The Empire of the West was then in dispute betwixt *Frederick of Austria*, and *Lewis of Bavaria*, (whom *Machiavel*, by mistake or inadvertency, has called *Frederick, Lewis* after long and bloody Wars overcame his Competitor, and made several Voyages into *Italy* to invigorate and reinforce *Castruccio* and the *Ghiblins*.)

*France* was governed by *Philip le Long*, who at the solicitation of Pope *John* passed an Army into *Italy* to the relief of the *Guelfs*, which Army was commanded by *Philip de Valois* afterwards King, but his Expedition did not answer expectation; for either the running or bribes of the *Ghiblins* had dispelled the storm which our preparations threatened upon *Lombardy*; or our Forces were recalled upon some secret apprehension of a fourth War with the *English*, or by the vast projects of a fifth Expedition to the Holy Land.

*Spain* was divided into five Kingdoms, each of which had its peculiar King; four of them were Christians, and one a *Mahometan*.

*Navar* had the same King with *France*. *Philip the Long* found a way to extend the *Sack Law* into that Country, and defeat his Niece *Jane of France*, Daughter of *Lewis Hutin*, of both Kingdoms at once.

*Alphonso XI.* as *Mariana* calls him, (the *XII.* as *Garibay*) had at that time the Scepter of *Castile*, but his minority transferr'd the Conduct of Affairs into the hands of the two *Infanti*, *Don Pedro*, and *Don John*, inasmuch as by the jealousy and division betwixt the two Regents, that Kingdom was expos'd to such disorders as are inseparable from the minority of a Prince. At length the two *Infanti* were slain in the year 1320. in a Fight which their rashness caused them to lose to the *Mores* under the walls of *Granada*.

*Aragon* was in obedience to *Don Jacques* the second of that name; He was Brother to *Fredrick*, who reigned in *Sicily* to the prejudice of *Robert*, a Prince of the House of *Anjou*. This *Robert* was King of *Naples*, sided with the *Guelfs*, and leagu'd himself sundry times with the *Florentines* against *Castruccio*. *James*, King of *Aragon*, designing to establish himself in *Italy*, and judging that the Conquests which he mediat'd upon the Isles of *Corsica* and *Sardinia*, depended much upon the Concord of his Subjects at home; He caus'd a General Assembly of his Estates to be held in the year 1320. in which was concluded the Union of the Kingdoms of *Aragon* and *Valentia*, with the Principality of *Catolonia*.

*Don Denis* reigned in *Portugal*, a person eminent among his Subjects for magnificent Building, and in great veneration for his Piety and Justice. But the felicity of his Reign was disturb'd by domestick broils which he had with his Son, the Infant *Don Alphonso*, who succeeded him in the Crown. *Don Denis* institut'd the Order of *Christ* in the year 1320.

The *More, Ismael*, first of that name, had the Monarchy of *Granada*; the Battel which he gain'd 1320. against the two *Infanti* of *Castile*, reviv'd the affairs of that Nation, which were in their declension before, and gave new alarms to all *Spain*.

The King and Kingdom of *England* were both governed by favourites at that time. *Edward 2.* gave his authority and confidence, one while to *Gaveston*, and then to the two *Spencers*; and this weakness and imprudence of his created so many discontents, and render'd him so odious to the people, that after much trouble to quit himself of an Impostor who pretended to the Crown, he was forced to go thorow a cruel War against the Nobility, and another no less dangerous against *Robert Bruce* King of *Scotland*. These great stirs and commotions could not but give some jealousies to *France*, which seeing the Provinces that the *English* had on that side the Sea perpetually in Arms, was oblig'd to keep upon so strong a Guard, as was little different from an open War.

It is not then to be admir'd, the affairs of *Europe* being in this confusion, if *Italy* was left in prey to the *Guelfs* and the *Ghiblins*, and gave opportunity to the laying the foundation of so many Principalities, that the most part of them are still in existence. But it is certain, that neither *Paulus Jovius*, *Grolamo Briansi*, *il Biondo*, nor the rest of the Historians, who have written of the Wars and Concessions of these two Factions, have left any thing comparable to the adventures of *Castruccio*; they have lent me indeed some circumstances for the illustration and ornament of this History, and I have been forced to paraphrase upon five or six of the sayings of *Castruccio* to give them their true Grace, and make them intelligible, I know not whether I have followed the just temperament that is to be observed in a translation. 'Tis vitious to assume such liberty as the History will not bear, but on the other to tie ones self up to the same, and same quantity of words, is as disingenuous and servile. 'Tis true, the same comma's and stops were by no means to be neglected, were all treatises that are translated, like the fallacious answer of a Divine to *Braccio Montone* Sovereign of *Perusia*, which *Braccio* being a *Ghiblin* as well as *Castruccio*, departed for the Siege of *Aquila* a Town in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and being impatient to know his suc-

cess;

cels, upon application to an Astrologer, he received this answer, *Ibis redibis non morieris in bello*: which if punctuated thus, *Ibis, redibis non, morieris in bello*, threatned the said *Braccio* with the unfortunateness of his Expedition; whereas altering it thus, *Ibis, redibis, non morieris in bello*, portended quite contrary. An ambiguity like this was sent also to *Manfred King of Sicily*, not long before he was defeated by *Charles of Anjou*. **NO CARLO SARA VITORIOSO DEL RE MANFREDO**, and ought to be interpreted with great exactness and acuracy, the mistake of a comma being as much as a mans life is worth. There is another kind of Tyranny likewise, and that is when the Text of the Author is to regulate in a point of Religion: but here we are not under any such necessities, and he who in a quarrellom capriccio, to defame my translation, would compare every line, and put the *English* words all along under the *Italian*, would make a new and pleasant kind of Dictionary, and the beauties which are peculiar to each language, would be excellently presented.

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THE

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THE  
 LIFE  
 OF  
 CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI  
 OF  
 LUCCA.

*Written by Nicolo Machiavelli and Dedicated to  
 Zanobi Buonbelmonti and Luigi Alamani  
 his particular Friends.*

**I**T seems (most Excellent Friends) to those who consider it, very strange, that all, or the greatest part of them, who in this world have perform'd any thing extraordinary, and raised themselves above the pitch of their Contemporaries, have had their births and beginnings mean and obscure, or else infested and perplexed with all the difficulties that fortune could present. For all of them having been exposed to wild beasts when they were young, or being descended from base Parentage, and ashamed of their Extraction, they have declared themselves Sons of *Jupiter*, or some other Deity, of which sort the number being so great, and their story so well known, to repeat them would be both superfluous and troublesome. The reason I suppose to be, that fortune willing to demonstrate to the world, that 'tis not any ones prudence, but she that raises men to be great, begins to shew and exercise her power at a time in which prudence can pretend to no share in us; that all our successes may be acknowledged to her. *Castruccio Castracani* of *Lucca* was one of this sort, who in respect of the times in which he lived, and the place in which he was born, performed great things; for in his beginning he was neither more happy nor more eminent than the rest, as you shall understand in my description of his life, which I have thought good to transmit to Posterity, having observed many things in it (both for virtue and event) of extraordinary example; and to you it seemed most proper to direct it, as persons more delighted with honourable and heroic actions, than any I know besides.

I say then, the Family of the *Castracani* is reckoned among the most Illustrious Families in the City of *Lucca*, though at present (according to the fatality of all worldly things) it seems to be extinct. Out of this house there was born in former times one *Antonio*, who entering himself into Orders, was made a Canon of Saint *Mitchel* in *Lucca*, and in token of Honour called *Messer Anton*: He had no kindred but one Sister, who was married long before to one *Buonaccorso Cinami*: *Buonaccorso* being dead, and she being a Widow, she lived with her Brother, with resolution to marry no more. Behind the house in which he dwelt, Master *Anthony* had a Vineyard, which bordering upon several Gardens, was accessible from several parts, and without much difficulty. It hapned that one morning about Sun-rise, *Madam Dianora* (for that was the Sisters name) walking out into the Vineyard to gather herbs for a Salad (as women frequently do), she heard a rustling under the leaves, and turning towards it, she fancied it cryed; advancing up towards it, she saw the hands and face of a child, which tumbling up and down in the leaves, seemed to call for relief:

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Madam

*Madam Dianora*, partly astonished, and partly afraid, took it up very tenderly, carried it home, wash'd it and having put it in clean clouts, she presented it to Master *Anthony*, who understanding the case and seeing the Infant, was no less affected with wonder and compassion than his Sister before him. Debating with themselves what course was to be taken, it was concluded to bring it up, *Anthony* being a Priest, and she having no children. They christened it *Castruccio*, by the name of their Father, and look'd to it as carefully as it had been their own. *Castruccio's* graces encreas'd with his years, and his wit was so pregnant, they put him to nothing but he took it very well. *Anthony* design'd him for a Priest, and to resign his Canonship and other Benefices one day, and according to that design he gave him education; but he could not find that *Castruccio* had inclination to that kind of life; on the contrary, he perceived his natural disposition tending quite another way.

In short, *Castruccio* was scarce 14 years old, but abating by little and little of his awe and respects to *Antonio* and *Dianora*, he began to neglect his Studies, to devote himself to Arms, and taking great delight in wrestling, and running, and such violent exercises, his mettle was so well suted with the strength of his body, that none of his companions were able to cope with him. He troubled himself very little with reading, unless it were such things as might instruct him for War, or acquaint him with the great actions of some eminent Commander, which did not only disquiet *Antonio*, but afflicted him.

There was at that time in *Lucca* a Gentleman called *Francisco*, of the House of the *Guinigi* a handsome man, very rich, and remarkable for many good qualities, which recommended him to one of the first ranks in the Town. He had born Arms all his life long, and for the most part under the *Visconti*, Dukes of *Milan*. He had with them engaged for the *Ghiblins*, and the City of *Lucca* look'd upon him as the very life of their party. It was at the time when these two great Factions (the *Guelfs* and the *Ghiblins*) shared all *Italy* betwixt them, divided the Popes and the Emperors, engaged in their different interests the Inhabitants of the same Town, and the members of the same Family. *Francisco* accompanied usually by persons of Quality of his Cabal, walk'd often before the place of *St. Michael*, not far from the Palace of the *Podestat* or Governor. In that Market-place he took notice of *Castruccio*, who was often times playing there amongst his School-fellows and Comrades. He observed the youth always prescribed such sports to the rest, as he had chosen on purpose to prepare him for the War. *Francisco* could easily perceived how much the agility of *Castruccio* advanced him above his Companions, and he as easily perceived that he assumed an authority over them, and that they on their part paid him a reverence, and such a one as was accompanied with kindness and zeal. *Francisco* took a great fancy to the boy, inquired what he was, and being informed by some who were by, he had a months mind to have him himself: talking him to him one day, he ask'd him if he did not prefer a Gentlemans Family, where he might learn to ride the great Horse, and exercise his Arms before the Cloister of a Church-man where he must spin out his days in idleness and melancholy. He no sooner mentioned Horses and Arms, but *Castruccio* was ready to have leap'd out of his skin; but recollecting himself, a sentiment of modesty kept him from answering, till the fine words of *Francisco* having given him more confidence, he told him, that if he had the liberty of choosing he had rather a thousand times be employed as a Gentleman, than in the way for which he was design'd. His resolution was so pleasing to *Francisco*, that not long after he made a visit to *Antonio*, and begg'd *Castruccio* of him, in so pressing, and yet so civil a manner, that *Antonio* finding it impossible to master the natural inclinations of the youth, delivered him to *Francisco*.

By this means *Castruccio* changed his Education, and 'tis not to be believed with what easiness he improved in those exercises which are fit for a Gentleman to learn. It was to be admired with what address and vigor he mounted his horse, with what grace he managed his lance, and with what comeliness his sword; and this his dexterity distinguished him so highly from the croud of his companions, that it would have been imprudence in any one of them to have contended with him, either at the *Barriers* or *Justs*. To all these advantages he had an engaging way with him, that obliged where-ever he came; his actions and his words seemed premeditate and studied, so careful, and so regular he was lest he should say or do any thing that might any ways offend. He carried himself always with respect to his superiors, with modesty to his equals, and with civility and complaisance to those who were beneath him; so that these good qualities did not only gain him the affection of *Francisco's* whole Family, but the love and esteem of the whole City of *Lucca*.

He was eighteen years old when the Faction of the *Guelfs* drove the *Ghiblins* out of *Pavia*. *Visconti* Prince of *Milan*, a zealous Partizan of the *Ghiblins*, solicited Succours from *Francisco Guinigi*, who casting his eyes upon *Castruccio*, as the first mark of his affection, made him Lieutenant of a Company of Foot, and marched with him to *Visconti*.

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The first *Campania* this new Lieutenant made, put him into such reputation, that he eclipsed the glory of all the rest who served in that War: He gave so great and so many testimonies both of his courage and conduct, that his fame was spread all over *Lombardy*. When also he came back to *Lucca*, and observed the Town had doubled the respect which they had for him before, he applied himself to make new friendships, and to that purpose made use of all the courtesie and insinuation that is necessary in that case.

Not long after *Francesco Guinigi* fell sick, and finding himself near his end, having but one Son of about 13 years of age, called *Pagolo*, he sent for *Castruccio*, and committed the tuition of his Son, and the management of his Estate into his hands, and having gently remembered *Castruccio* that he was the Person who raised him, he begg'd that he would shew the same generosity towards *Pagolo* as he had done towards him; and if any thing was due to the bounty of the Father, to return it upon his Son. He fancied he discerned in the countenance of *Castruccio* all the marks and indications of a generous mind, and died without being disturbed with the least suspicion of his ingratitude.

The trust, and his administration of so great an Estate made *Castruccio* more considerable than before, but they created him likewise some enemies, and lessened the affection which some had had for him: for knowing him to be of an enterprising spirit, many began to fancy his designs were tyrannical, and to oppress the liberty of his Country. The *Signeur Giorgio Opizi* (chief of the *Guelfs* Faction in *Lucca*) was the most to be apprehended of all those that accused *Castruccio* with that abominable ambition. *Opizi* was of opinion that the death of *Francesco Guinigi*, head of the adverse party, would leave him Master of the Town, but he quickly found that the single reputation of *Castruccio* would be a new impediment to his usurpation; so that thinking to rob him of the affections of the people, he spread false reports, and aspersed him where-ever he came. At first these calumniation troubles *Castruccio* but little, but at length they alarm'd him to the purpose; for he suspected that *Opizi* would not fail to set him at odds with the Lieutenant which *Robert King of Naples* had settled in *Lucca* and that if that Governor was his enemy, he should in a short time be turned out of the Town. And against so great danger, his provision was this.

The Town of *Pisa* was then under the Government of *Huguccione de Fagivola*, originally of the Town of *Arezzo*; being chosen Captain by the *Pisani*, he had made himself their Sovereign, and having given protection to certain *Ghibilins* who were banished from *Lucca*, *Castruccio* entred into secret intelligence by the privacy of *Huguccione*, and being assured of his assistance he resolved the poor Exiles should be restored. To this effect he agreed with his friends in *Lucca*, who were of his Counsel, and jealous as himself of the power of the *Opizi*. All necessary measures were taken by the Conspirators. *Castruccio* had the care of fortifying privately a Tower in the City, called the Tower of Honour. He furnished it with ammunition, in case he should be forced to defend it; and having appointed the night for the execution of their design, *Huguccione* failed not at the precise hour to be at the *Rendezvous* betwixt *Lucca* and the neighbouring Mountains. Upon a signal given to *Castruccio* he advanced towards the Gate of *St. Peter*, and set fire to the Antiport next the fields, whilst *Castruccio* broke down another on the other side of the Town. In the mean time his associates cryed out *To your Arms*, to excite the people to rise, and thereby put all things into confusion. *Huguccione* entred with his Troops, and having seized upon the Town, he caused all the *Opizi* to be murdered, and all the rest of their party which fell into their hands. The Governor, for the King of *Naples* was turned out, and the Government of the Town altered, as *Huguccione* directed, who, to complete the desolations of *Lucca*, banished no less than a hundred of the best Families that belonged to it. The miserable Exiles fled part to *Florence* and part to *Pistoia*, two Towns of the Faction of the *Guelfs*, and for that reason enemies to *Huguccione*, and the prevailing party in *Lucca*.

The *Florentines* and whole Faction of the *Guelfs*, apprehending this great success would hazard to re-establish the power of the *Ghibilins* in *Tuscany*, they entred into consultation which way those Exiles might be restored. They set out a considerable Army, and encamped at *Monte Carlo* to open themselves a passage to *Lucca*. *Huguccione* on his side drew the *Lucca* Troops together, and put them under the Command of *Castruccio*, and then joyning them with his own from *Pisa*, and reinforcing them with a Squadron of German Horse which he got out of *Lombardy*, he marched out to encounter the *Florentines*. Whereupon the *Florentines* quitted their Post at *Monte Carlo* and entrenching betwixt *Monte-Carino* and *Pescia*, *Huguccione* possessed himself of the quarter which they had left. Their Armies being within two miles distance one from the other, their Horse met daily and skirmished, and they had come certainly to a peremptory Battel, had not *Huguccione* fallen ill just in the

nick. His disposition forcing him from the Camp to look out for better accommodation in *Monte-carlo*, he left the Command of the Army to *Castruccio*, his retirement, which discouraged his own men, and made them think of protracting the Battel, animated the *Florentines*, but brought no great advantage to their affairs. In short, the *Florentines* perceiving their Enemies without a General, began to despise them, and *Castruccio* observing how much they were elated, endeavoured to augment it. He pretended great Consternation, and to make his fear the more credible, he gave Orders that his Troops should be drawn up within the Lines, but with positive inhibition for any of them to go forth; though not a moment passed but the *Florentines* provoked them; but all to no purpose. Besides that, this pretended terror in *Castruccio* redoubled the rashness of the Enemy, and perfectly blinded them, he drew another advantage from it, which was to discover exactly the disposition of their Army and the Order of their March. When he had well observed them, and tempted their temerity as much as he thought fit, he resolved to fight them the next *Bravado* they made, and omitting nothing that might encourage his Soldiers, he assured them of Victory if they followed his Commands. He had observed that the weakest and worst arm'd of their Soldiers were disposed still in their wings, and their best placed in the Body. *Castruccio* drew up in the same Order, but distributed his Soldiers quite contrary, for the worst and most unserviceable he placed in the Body and his best men in the wings, In this posture he drew out of the Trenches, and had scarce form'd his Battalia, before the Enemy appeared, and with his usual insolence. *Castruccio* Commanded that the Body should march slowly, but the two wings were to advance as fast as they could; so that when they came to engage, there was only the wings that could fight; for *Castruccio's* Body having lagged by Command, the *Florentine* Body had too far to march before they could charge them, so as they remained idle, being neither able to do any thing against the Main Body that was design'd to oppose them, nor sustain those who were engaged in the wings, so it hapned that the *Florentine* wings (composed of the refuse of their Soldiers) were easily broken by *Castruccio's*, which consisted of his best, and when the wings of the Enemy (which were drawn up before their Body; so as the whole Army was ranged in the figure of a half Moon) were routed, they turn'd tail, ran among their own Body which was marching behind them, and put all into Confusion.

The loss was very great to the *Florentines*, they left above 10000 men dead upon the place Their best Officers, and the bravest of the *Guelfs* perished there unfortunately, and to make the defeat the more lamentable, there were several Reformades which died there, of extraordinary quality. Among the rest, *Piero* Brother to *Robert* King of *Naples*; *Carlo* Nephew to the said King; *Philip* Lord of *Tarentum*, who were all come, in Gallantry, to make that *Compagnia* with the *Florentines*. But that which made all the more wonderful was that *Castruccio* lost not above 300 men, though unhappily one of *Huguccione's* Sons were of that Number, his Name was *Francesco*, who fighting briskly at the head of the Volunteers, for want of good Conduct, was slain at the very first charge. So eminent a Victory as this, must needs put *Castruccio* into a reputation beyond expression; but *Huguccione* had like to have died, with meer jealousy, he foresaw that nothing of all this would redound to him; but the vain honour of commanding in chief, and that the real advantage would all fall to his Lieutenant; so that to use him at that rate, was to rob him of his Sovereignty: whereupon, nettled exceedingly, in great envy of his Fortune, he resolved he should die. Whilst he was in this black resolution, and attended nothing but some specious pretence to get *Castruccio* to him, and so draw him into his Net, it hapned that *Agnola Micheli* (a Person of great alliance as any in *Lucca*, was murder'd by one who took Sanctuary in *Castruccio's* House, and was protected: *Huguccione's* Officers pursued, and demanded the Criminal; but *Castruccio* denied them, and suffered him to escape. *Huguccione* (who was then at *Pisa*) unwilling to lose so fair an opportunity to revenge himself, sent for one of his Sons called *Nerli* (whom he put before into possession of the Sovereignty of *Lucca*) commands him to repair thither with all speed, and get *Castruccio* to his house under pretence of supping with some of the most eminent in the Town; and private Orders were given for the making him away, *Nerli* lay'd his ambush for *Castruccio* very handsomly, for suspecting nothing, he came to the Feast, and was arrested before he went out of the Palace. But *Nerli* (being over-circumspect, and imagining it might work some alteration in the Spirits of the People, if he killed him bluntly without any formality) writ to his Father to know how he should dispose of him. *Huguccione*, mad at his unreasonable prudence, departed from *Pisa* at the head of 400 Horse, to go himself in person to dispatch *Castruccio*; but, *Huguccione* was scarce got to *Bagni*, before the *Pisans* revolted; cut his Deputies throat; and slew all his Family that were left behind; and that he might be sure they were in earnest, they chose the *Comte de Guera desca*, and made him their

Government. Though he had news of this Rebellion before his arrival at *Lucca*, yet he thought it inconvenient to return; on the contrary, he made all the hast thither that he could, to be there (if possible) before the report, lest if the news got before him, it might have ill effect upon the *Luccheses*, and prevail with them to exclude him their City. But the *Luccheses* had heard it before, had such designs of their own, and the liberty of *Castruccio* was the thing they were to pretend. *Huguccione* was admitted, but his presence was not sufficient to keep them in their duties: They began to assemble in parties, to whisper and speak slightly of him in private, then to murmur, then to tumultuate, and taking Arms by degrees, they came boldly, and demanded *Castruccio* should be enlarged, and thus they did in so positive and audacious a manner, that *Huguccione* apprehending the consequences, delivered him to them: *Castruccio* not contented with that, conceiving vaster designs than formerly, and egg'd on by an equal impulse of honour and revenge, he assembled his friends, and taking the benefit of the favourable disposition of the People, he resolved to oppose himself against *Huguccione*, and forcing of him out of *Lucca* with all his party, *Huguccione* retired into *Lombardy* to the Lords of *Scala* where not long after he died very poor.

This was a happy turn for *Castruccio*, from the incommodities of a Prison, to the Supremacy of a Prince; and yet this was not enough. Finding himself accompanied by a great number of his Friends which encouraged him, and by the whole body of the people, which flattered his ambition, he caused himself to be chosen Captain General of all their Forces for a Twelve-month; and resolving to perform some Eminent action that might justify their choice, he undertook the reduction of several places which had revolted from that City in favour of *Huguccione*. Having to this purpose entered into strict alliance with the City of *Pisa*, they sent him supplies, and he marched with them to besiege *Serezane*. But the place being very strong; before he could carry it, he was obliged to build a Fortrefs as near it as he could. This new Post in two months time, tender'd him Master of the whole Country, and is the same Fort that at this day is called *Serezanello*, repaired since, and much enlarged by the *Florentines*. Supported by the credit of so glorious an exploit, he reduced *Massa*, *Carrara*, and *Laventia* very easily: he seized likewise upon the whole Country of *Lunigiana*, and to secure his Communication with *Lombardy*, he took *Pont Remols* by force, and drove out *Anastasio Palavicini* the Sovereign: So that full of glory he returned to *Lucca*, where the People thronged to meet him, and received him with all possible demonstrations of joy.

This was the happiest conjuncture for *Castruccio* in the world, for having been so discreet before to make his interest with the most considerable of the *Luccheses*, and among the rest with *Poggio*, *Portico*, *Baccanfachi*, and *Cecco Guinigi*, the favour of these great men, concurring with the inclination of the people, and every thing else contributing to his happiness, he was solemnly chosen their Sovereign Prince.

About this time *Frederick de Baviere*, King of the *Romans* passed out of *Germany* into *Italy*, to be crown'd Emperor there. *Castruccio* who had already wrought himself in some measure into his favour, put himself at the head of 5000 Horse, and went to wait upon him, having left as his Deputy in *Lucca*, *Pagolo Guinigi*, his Pupil, whom he had treated all along, as he had been his own Son, in consideration of the benefits he had receiv'd from his Father. *Frederick* received *Castruccio* with much kindness, and having done him several honours, and granted him many signal perogatives, he made him his Lieutenant in the whole province of *Tuscany*; besides all this, the Inhabitants of *Pisa* (at the same time mutining against their Governour *Gerardesca*, and driving him out of the Town) to defend themselves against his resentment, addrest to *Frederick* for protection, and he gave the Sovereignty of that Town to *Castruccio*. His choice was not displeasing to the Inhabitants who knew not where to find a better support against the Faction of the *Guelfs*, and particularly against the attempts of the *Florentines*.

After this, *Frederick* return'd into *Germany*, having made a Lieutenant General of all *Italy*, and left him in *Rome*. There was not at that time either in *Lombardy* or *Tuscany*, any of the *Ghiblins* of the Emperor's party, but looked upon *Castruccio* as the true head of their Faction. Those who were banished their Country upon that score, fled to him for protection, and promised unanimously that if he could restore them to their Estates, they would serve him so effectually, that the Sovereignty of their Country should be the recompence of his kindness. The chief of them were the *Guidi*, *Scolari*, *Uberti*, *Geruzzi*, *Nardi*, and *Buomocorsi*, all Exiles of *Florence*: So that, flattered by their promises, and encouraged by the strength of his own force, he entertained a design of making himself Master of *Tuscany*, and to give more reputation to his affairs, he enter'd into a League with *Matteo Visconti* Prince of *Milan*. He put out a Proclamation afterwards, that all his Subjects



Subjects which were capable to bear Arms, should be ready at a certain warning to put themselves into Service; and for the better order of the Muster Rolls, by which his Militia was to be regulated, the City of *Lucca* having five Gates, he divided the whole Country into five parts, and disposed every Soldier under his officer with so much exactness, that in a short time he could march with 20000 Men, besides what he could draw out of *Pisa*. Whilst he was fortifying himself with Soldiers and Friends; it fell out, that the *Guelfs* at *Plaisance* having driven out the *Ghiblins*, and received considerable succours from *Florence*, and the King of *Naples* came thundering down upon the Territories of the Prince of *Milan*. The Prince desired *Castruccio* to give the *Florentines* diversion; to carry the War into their Country, to withdraw them from *Lombardy*, and thereby to put them upon the defensive; *Castruccio* desired no more, and fell with a flying Army into the Valley of *Arno*, took *Fucechio* and *San-Miniato*, and ravaged the Country so effectually, that the *Florentines* were constrained to call back their Troops out of *Lombardy*; but the necessity of another diversion called back *Castruccio* to the recovery of *Lucca*. In his absence, the Family of the *Poggi*, which had been always his friends, and contributed more to his Elevation, than any of the rest; regretting that they had not been rewarded, according to the merits of their Services, conspired with several others of the Inhabitants to bring the City to revolt. They began the tumult one morning, and having put themselves in Arms, they killed the Chief Officer which *Castruccio* had established for the administration of justice. But whilst they were disposing themselves to push on their Sedition, *Stephano Poggio*, an old Man, of a peaceable temper, and one who had not meddled at all in the Conspiracy of his Relations, made use of the authority he had with them, caused them to lay down their Arms, and offered his intercession to *Castruccio* that they might obtain their demands. Upon the first notice of this Commotion, *Castruccio* drew a party out of his Army, and leaving the rest under the Command of *Pagolo Guinigi*, he marched with all diligence back to *Lucca*, where finding things quieter than he expected, he knew very well how to make his advantage of so temperate a submission, and disposed his Troops and his Friends in all the Posts that might make him Master of the Town. *Stephano Poggio*, who thought in this juncture he had highly obliged *Castruccio*, came to make him a visit, and judged it unnecessary to beg any thing of him; all that he requested was, that he would pardon his Family, allow something to their ancient Services, and give some little Indulgence to the transports of their youth. *Castruccio* received him with much affection, and told him that he was more pleased to find those troubles appeased, than he had been offended at the news of their Commotion; and having pressed him to bring the Male-contents to him, he added, that he thank'd his Stars for giving him such an opportunity of signaling his Clemency. Upon *Stephano's* importunity, and *Castruccio's* promise, they came all to attend him; but *Castruccio* apprehending that this new Service of *Stephano* might some time or other be reproached to him again, he resolv'd to make a signal Example; and accordingly regulating himself by the severe politicks of Usurpers who upon such nice and critical occasions make no bones to sacrifice the innocence of particular man, to the conservation of the multitude, he commanded that the Mutineers and *Stephano* with them should be conducted to Prison, and from thence to Execution.

Whilst he was thus employed, the *Florentines* recovered *San Miniato*, and *Castruccio* holding it imprudence to keep in the Field, whilst he was insecure in the Town, resolv'd to give some relaxation to his Arms: He endeavour'd privately to feel how the *Florentines* stood dispos'd to a Truce, and (the War having exhausted their Coffers) he found them so coming, that it was concluded for two years, upon condition that either party should retain what was then in their possession.

*Castruccio* being disintangled from his foreign Embarrassments, apply'd himself wholly to his security at home, and under several pretences, to quit himself of all those who were likely to dispute his Sovereignty of *Lucca*, not sparing his Confiscations, and Proscriptions against the Exiles, nor the Executions of any who were under his hands. To excuse himself he gave out that he had had too much Experience already of the infidelity of those people, to trust them again; But a strong Citadel which erected in the City, was the true way to continue his Authority; and to give the more terror to the Citizens, he caused the houses of his adversaries to be demolished, and the Citadel to be built of their Materials. His peace with the *Florentines*, and his Fortifications at *Lucca*, employ'd him not so much, as to lessen his thoughts how he might make himself greater; being unwilling again to come to an open War, he entertain'd private correspondencies, both on one side and the other. He had an ardent desire to make himself Master of the Town of *Pistoia*, persuading himself it would give him footing in *Florence*; and in this prospect he held a secret Commerce of amity with the different parties, which were predominant in *Pistoia*. This double

double intelligence was managed with that slyness and delicacy, that each of them believed they were particularly in his Confidence. It was a long time that these two opposite Cabals had divided, or rather distracted that City. The one called the Faction of the *Bianchi*, had *Bastiano da Poffente* for its head; and the other called the *Neri*, was commanded by *Jacopo de'Gua*. Each of them, boiling with desire to supplant its competitor, repos'd much upon the promises of *Castruccio*: and these two Heads of the Factions who had long been suspected to one another, took Arms at length both at a time. *Jacopo* posted himself towards the Gate that goes to *Florence*, and *Bastiano* towards that which leads to *Lucca*. At first it was in debate severally by each of them, whether they should call in the *Florentines*; but finding *Castruccio* more active, and his Forces better Soldiers, each of them sent privately to him to solicit his assistance: *Castruccio* carried it very demurely, and promised succour to both. He told *Jacopo*, that in person he would relieve him; and to *Bastiano* he sent word he would do it by *Pagolo Guinigi* his Lieutenant General, and the person of the world he loved best, for he regarded him as his Son. Having acquainted them both that they should expect their supplies about midnight, he agreed with *Pagolo*, and causing him to march with part of his Troops to joyn with *Bastiano* at one Gate, he with the rest advanced the common Road towards *Jacopo*. At both Gates they were admitted as Friends; but no sooner were they entered, but upon a signal given, *Bastiano* was killed on one side with all his chief friends, and *Jacopo* and his friends scaped no better on the other; the rest of their parties betaking to their heels, the whole Town was left at *Castruccio's* devotion. He came in person to reassure the Magistrates, and brought them out of the Palace whither they had fled to secure themselves; Having called the people together, he promised to cancel all the old debts, did many acts of Grace, lessened their imposts, and prevailed upon them to be obedient, by the force of his caresses, and new priviledges which he gave them. This profuseness of kindness, had coax'd likewise the Inhabitants of the Country, they came in great throngs to salute and recognize their new Prince, who sent them all home again in peace, all mightily taken with his Virtues, and possessed with hopes of his extraordinary benefits.

There was about this time some Mutinies in *Rome*, by reason of the dearness of provisions. The scarcity that was suffered, proceeded from the absence of the Popes, who kept then their Pontifical residence at *Avignon*, and it added much to the revolt, that the *Romans* could not endure to be governed by a *German*. This National animosity was the occasion of frequent Murthers, and perpetual disorder. *Errico* the Emperor's Lieutenant General found himself too weak to apply any remedy, and apprehended (not without cause) that the *Romans* had private intelligence with the King of *Naples*, that if their Forces should joyn, he should be forced out of *Rome*, and the Pope be restored. He concluded therefore his safest recourse would be to *Castruccio*; so that he sent to him for supplies, and begg'd of him that he would come along with them in person. *Castruccio* made no scruple of the Voyage, being equally transported to be able to do a meritorious piece of service to the Emperor, and put himself in a condition to be regarded at *Rome*, and look'd upon as the Moderator of their affairs whenever the Emperor should be absent. Leaving therefore the care of *Lucca* to the charge of *Pagolo Guinigi*, and contenting himself only with a Convoy of two hundred Horse, he came to *Rome*, and was received by *Errico* with all possible honour. His presence having received the Authority of the Emperor, he took a gentle way to pacifie the people. The first thing he did, was to provide plenty of all things, causing store of Corn to be brought thither from *Pisa*, to take off the pretence of their revolt: After which mingling very discreetly his favours and his chastisements, he reduced all the chief Citizens to their obedience to *Errico*; In acknowledgment of which *Castruccio* was made Senator of *Rome*, and several Honours conferred upon him with more than ordinary Ceremony. The day of his promotion, he came forth in a Habit suitable to his Dignity, but enriched with a delicate Embroidery, with two devices wrought in artificially, one before and the other behind; The first was before, and in these words, (as devout, as common) *HE IS AS IT PLEASES GOD*; and behind in these, *AND SHALL BE WHAT GOD WILL HAVE HIM*.

Whilst these things were in Transaction, the *Florentines* incensed that to the prejudice of their Truce, *Castruccio* had surpris'd the Town of *Pistoia*, resolv'd to recover it by force, and thought it not likely to be difficult, if they took the opportunity of his absence. Among the Fugitives from *Pistoia* who had saved themselves in *Florence*, there were two principally considerable, *Cecchi*, and *Baldini*. They were Men in Action, and had always retain'd a private correspondence with their Friends in *Pistoia*; and they managed all things so dexterously for a revolt, that they caus'd a good party of *Florentines* to enter one night into the Town, who restored them their liberty, with the destruction of all *Castruccio's* party

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This news being brought to *Rome*, touched *Castruccio* to the quick, who taking leave of *Errico*, with large Journeys came directly to *Lucca*.

The *Florentines* had notice of his return, and resolv'd stoutly to begin the War upon him, that he might not have leisure to prepare; wherefore having oblig'd all that (like themselves) were favourers of the *Guelfish* Faction, to put themselves forward in some extraordinary manner, they rais'd a strong Army, and march'd with all diligence to possess themselves first of the Valley of *Nievole* to facilitate their Communication with *Pistoia*; *Castruccio* on his side with what Forces he could get together, march'd directly for *Monte-Carlo*, and having intelligence where the Enemy was encamp'd, and how numerous their Army, he judg'd the danger would be as great should he go and confront them in the plain of *Pistoia*, as to attend them in the Valley of *Pescia*. He concluded therefore to draw them (if he could) into the streights of *Seravalle*, for narrow passes, and rough and difficult ways were convenient for a small Army as his was, which consist'd of not above 12000 Men; and would be a disadvantage to the *Florentines*, who were 40000 compleat. Wherefore, though he was well enough satisfi'd of the Courage of his Army, and understood the worth of every common Soldier, yet he thought good to withdraw out of that *Champagn* Country, lest he should suffer himself to be overwhelmed with the multitudes of his Enemies.

*Seravalle*, is a Castle betwixt *Pescia*, and *Pistoia*, situat'd upon a hill which on that side puts a stop to the Valley of *Nievole*. This Castle stands not upon the Road, but is about two flight shot higher, and the passage down into the Valley, is rather strait than steep, for the declension is very gradual to the place where the waters divide, and pass to discharge themselves into the Lake of *Tucechio* and that passage is so strait, that twenty Men in Front, take up the whole breadth. There it was that *Castruccio* design'd to engage the Enemy, as well to give the advantage of the strait to the smallness of his own Army; as to keep them from being sensible of the vast numbers of the *Florentines*; and prevent the terror which they might inspire. The Castle of *Seravalle* belong'd to the *Signor Manfredi* a *German*, who had made himself Lord of it, long before *Castruccio* had seiz'd upon *Pistoia*, and kept it by common consent both of the Inhabitants of *Pistoia* and *Lucca*. Either because he kept his Neutrality very strictly with both, or because the Castle was so strong of it self it need'd to fear neither. *Castruccio* knowing the importance of that place from the beginning found a way to gain intelligence with a person who liv'd in the Castle. The night before the day of the Battle, by the ministry of this Man, *Castruccio* caus'd Four hundred of his Soldiers to enter, who cut the Throat of *Manfredi*, and seiz'd on the Castle. Having secur'd so considerable a Post without noise, he endeavour'd to persuade the Enemy that he would not stir from *Monte-Carlo*, thereby to draw them into his Clutches, and make them hast with all speed to gain the avenues to the *Val de Nievole*, and this plot of his jump'd exactly with the *Florentine* design. For they having no mind that *Pistoia* should be the Theatre of the War, and being willing to remove it into the Vale, they encamp'd above *Seravalle*, with intention to have pass'd the Streights the next day, not imagining in the least that the Castle was surpriz'd. *Castruccio* having notice of their motion; about midnight drew his Army out of their quarters, and stole privately before break of day to the foot of *Seravalle*. The accident was odd, for as he march'd up the Hill on one side, the Enemy march'd up on the other: caus'd his Foot to advance by the way of the common Road, but he drew out a party of Four hundred Horse, and command'd them towards the left, on that side towards the Castle. There were Four hundred of the Enemies Horse, that were a Forlorn to their Army, and the whole Infantry follow'd them, but their Scouts were no sooner upon the top of the Hill, when on a sudden they fell foul upon the Troops of *Castruccio*. They were strangely surpriz'd for knowing nothing of the taking of the Castle, they could not imagine the Enemy would come to meet them: Insomuch that before they had leisure to put themselves into a posture, they were constrain'd to engage tumultuously with those Troops which were drawn up in good Order, but they in confusion; Not but some of the *Florentine* Cavaliers behav'd themselves gallantly, but the noise of so unexpected an Encounter, put them presently to a stand, and being desus'd in the Army, it put all into great disorder and fear. The Horse and the Foot fell foul upon one another, and both upon the baggage: Want of ground render'd the Experience of the Officers of no use, and the streightness of the pass, confounded all their Military cunning. The first Troops that *Castruccio* charg'd upon the top of the Hill, were immediately routed and the small resistance they made was not so much the defect of their courage, as the effect of the place, with the incommodity of which, and the strangeness of the surprize, they were constrain'd to give ground. There was no way left for them to run; on their Flanks the Mountains were inaccessible, their Enemies were in the Front, and their own Army in the

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rear. In the mean time, as this first charge of *Castruccio* was not sufficient to stagger the enemies Battel, he drew out a party of Foot, and sent them to joyn with the Horse in the Castle of *Seravalle*: this body in reserve having possession of the Hills, and falling upon the flank of the *Florentines*, forced them to give ground, and yield to the wild incommodity of the place, and the violence and fierceness of the enemy. The Reer-guard ran, and having got into the plain that looks towards *Pistoia*, every man shifted as well as he could.

This defeat was bloody and great; among the multitude of prisoners, there were many of the principal Officers; among the rest three Noble *Florentines*, *Bandino di Rossi*, *Francesco Brunelleschi* and *Giovanni della Tosa*, without mentioning several considerable *Tuscans*, and many of the King of *Naples* his Subjects, who, by their Princes order, were in the service of the *Florentine*. Upon the first tidings of their defeat, the *Pistoians* turned the *Guelfs* Faction out of Town, and came with their keys and presented them to *Castruccio*, who pursuing his Victory, carried *Prato* and all the Town in that plain, as well beyond as on this side the *Arno*: after which he encamped with his Army in the plain of *Peretola*, two miles from *Florence*, where he continued braving the City, and passed several days in the enjoyment of his good fortune, parting the spoil, and coining of mony, thereby exercising with great ostentation a kind of Sovereign right over their Territory; and releasing something of the rigour of his discipline, he gave his Soldiers liberty to insult as they pleased over the conquered; and to make his triumph the more remarkable, nothing could serve the turn, but naked women must run Courses on horse-back under the very walls of the City. But this gallantry and ostentation entertained him but lightly, or rather served but as a colour to hide his greater designs; for in the mean time he found a way to corrupt *Lupacci*, *Frescobaldi*, and some certain other Gentlemen in the Town, who were to have delivered him a Gate, and brought him into *Florence* in the night, had not their Conspiracy been discovered, and defeated afterward by the punishment of the accomplices.

This great Town being so streightned, and so long block'd up, that the Inhabitants seeing no other way of preserving their liberty, than by engaging it to the King of *Naples*, sent Embassadors to that Prince, and offered to throw themselves into his arms. It was not only for his honour to accept of their proffer, but for the general interest of the whole Faction of the *Guelfs*, which without that could subsist no longer in *Tuscany*. The terms being agreed, the treaty concluded, and the *Florentines* to pay him annually two hundred thousand *Florens*, he sent them four thousand Horse under the Command of Prince *Carlo* his Son.

During this negotiation an unexpected accident hapned, which put *Castruccio* into a cooler temper, and made him give the *Florentines* breath in spite of his teeth: there was a new Conspiracy against him at *Pisa*, not to be suppressed by his presence: *Benedetto Lanfranchi*, one of the chief Citizens in the Town, was the author of it: *Benedetto* troubled to see his Country subject to the tyranny of a *Lucchese*, undertook to surprize the Citadel, force out the Garrison, and cut the throats of all that were friends to *Castruccio*. But as in those kind of conjurations, if a small number be able to keep things secret, it is not sufficient to put them in execution; and therefore whilst *Lanfranchi* was endeavouring to hook in more associates, he met with those who were false, and discovered all to *Castruccio*. Two Noble *Florentines*, *Cecchi* and *Guidi*, who were fled to *Pisa*, were suspected to be the Traitors; and the suspicion of that perfidy left an ill stain upon their reputation; which way soever it was, *Castruccio* put *Lanfranchi* to death, banished his whole Family, and several of the chief *Pisans* were left shorter by the head.

This plot discovering to *Castruccio* that the fidelity of the Towns of *Pistoia* and *Pisa* would be always easily shaken; he put all things in practice that cunning or open force could suggest to keep them in their duties: but whilst his thoughts were upon the tenters about so important a care, the *Florentines* had some respite to recover their Senses, and expect the *Neapolitan* Succours, which being at length arriv'd under the Conduct of Prince *Carlo*, a general Council was held of the whole Faction of the *Guelfs*. Upon the resolution taken there, an Army was rais'd, the strongest that ever had been set out by that party, for it amounted to 30000 Foot; and 10000 Horse. When their Forces were ready, it was debated in the Counsel of War, whether they should begin with the Siege of *Pistoria* or *Pisa*: The latter carried it, for it was fancied the Conspiracy of the *Pisans* was so recent, that in probability it had left some seeds for a second revolt; besides, the Conquest of *Pisa* would bring *Pistoia* along with it.

This great Army opened their Campaign in the beginning of May 1328. *Lastra*, *Signia*, *Monte Lugo* and *Empoli* were taken immediately, and it advanced afterwards to besiege *San Miniato*. But *Castruccio* without discomposure, either by the greatness of their force, or the

the swiftness of their progress, believed rather that the favourable instant was arrived in which fortune was to put into his hands the supreme authority of *Tuscany*; and therefore judging this effort of the enemy at *Pisa* would succeed no better than their designs at *Seravalle*, he came and entrenched at *Fucechio* with 20000 Foot, and 4000 Horse, having put 5000 Foot into *Pisa* under the Command of *Pagolo Guinigi*.

*Fucechio* is a Castle seated so advantagiouly, that there is not a better Post in all the plain of *Pisa*; for it stands upon a little eminence equally distant from the two Rivers *Arno* and *Gusciana*. The place of their encampment could have been no where better chosen, for unless the enemy divided, and came upon them in two Bodies, (which must needs weaken them much,) they could not cut off the provisions which came to *Castruccio* both from *Lucca* and *Pisa*. To come and face them in their trenches, would be rashly to engage themselves betwixt his Army and *Pagolo's*. To turn towards *Pisa*, they must pass the River *Arno*, and leave the enemy upon their backs, which was an attempt as dangerous as the other. *Castruccio's* design was to make them pitch upon the last, and to invite them the better to pass over the River; instead of bringing down his Line to the bank, (as he might very well have done,) he turned it off short towards the walls of *Fucechio*, not so much to shelter himself under the said walls, but cunningly to leave the enemy such a space free, as might tempt them to pass the River. And in the whole art of War, there is nothing so subtil as the election of Posts and Encampments, and that was *Castruccio's* masterpiece.

The enemy having taken *San. Miniato*, consulted for some time whether they should fall upon *Pisa*, or *Castruccio* in his Camp: at length, all things well considered, it was concluded to march straight toward him. The River *Arno* was at that time so low, it was fordable, but with trouble, for the Horse pass'd up to the saddle, and the Foot with proportion. At last on the 10th of *June* in the morning, the *Florentines* put themselves into Battalia, and began to pass the River with a party of their Horse, and a body of 10000 Foot. *Castruccio* having deliberated all things, and provided for more than one Event, commanded a thousand Foot along the River, above the passage where the enemy appeared, and sent a thousand more to post themselves below it; and then advancing himself at the head of five thousand Foot and three thousand Horse, he came on couragiously against the enemy, as half of them were passed. The *Florentine* Foot, tired with the incommodity of their passage, and the weight of their Arms, advanced but faintly against him; and for their Horse, they that passed first had made the bottom so loose, and so slippery, that there was no passage for those who were to follow: on the contrary, their Horses either stuck fast in the mud, or their legs came up, and they threw their Riders into the water, where many of them were drowned. So that the *Florentines* perceiving their attempt there was not like to succeed, recovered the bank, and marching a little higher, they searched for a better place: but where-ever they made their point, and endeavoured to go over, *Castruccio* opposed them with the Infantry he had drawn out, which being arm'd lightly with Targets and Darts, were every where immediately, charged the enemy both in the Front and the Flank, and setting up at the same time most hideous shouts, the *Florentine* Horse being frighted with noise, and wounded with Darts, either run back, or threw their Riders under their feet. As to the *Florentines* who had passed first, they maintained their ground with a great deal of Gallantry, and till then the loss was equal on both sides; for if *Castruccio* doubled his endeavours to force back the enemy into the River, the enemy was no less zealous to gain as much ground as might serve for drawing up their Army when it should get over. Both Generals were very busie in the encouragement of their Souldiers, both with exhortation and example. *Castruccio*, to vilifie the enemy, remonstrated to his Army, that they were the same people they had beat before at *Seravalle*; the *Florentines* represented to their Troops how infamous it would be for so numerous an Army as theirs to be worsted by a handful of men. But *Castruccio*, observing the Battel grew tedious, and his own men began to be as weary as the enemy, and that there were as many wounded and dead on the one side as the other, he caused another Body of five thousand Foot to advance; as soon as they were got up to reer of their companions, those who had been fighting all the while, and were then in the front, were commanded to open to the right and left, and wheel off into the reer, whilst the other advanced into the ground they had forsaken; but whilst this was in agitation, the *Florentines* gained something upon them, but they enjoyed it not long, for being to deal with fresh men, they were quickly disordered, and followed with that vigour, they threw themselves into the River. As to the Horse both of the one side and the other, no advantage was to be observed. *Castruccio* being sensible that in number his was much inferior to the enemy, had commanded his Troops to entertain their Horse with slight skirmishing, only to gain time; for believing his Foot able to beat the ene-

enemies, he intended afterwards to joyn them with his Horse, and fall both together upon the Cavalry of the *Florentines*. The *Florentines* tried another passage above the first, thinking thereby to have flank'd *Castruccio* afterwards; but the bank on the other side being bad, and defended by the enemies Foot, they were repulsed again, and in as great disorder as before. Then *Castruccio* came up to them, and charged them so smartly in all parts, that they were totally defeated; so that of so vast an Army, scarce a third part were saved, and several of their chief Officers taken. Prince *Carla* saved himself at *Empoli* with *Michael Falconi*, and *Thadeo Albizi*, Commissaries General of the *Florentine* Army; one may easily imagine the plunder was great, and the slaughter no less. In short, according to the exactest computation, there were slain on the *Florentine* side 20231 men: on the side of *Castruccio* but 1570.

Here it was that Fortune began to be weary of the great actions of *Castruccio*, and (inconstant as she was) instead of giving him long life that might have crown'd his felicity as if she had been jealous of his glory, she interposed with the only obstacle that was able to interrupt the prosperity of so incomparable a man.

This Illustrious Hero tired with the fatigues of a Battel, as painful as glorious; coming out of the Fight with his imagination full of great things that might follow, and running over in his mind the probability of his good fortune, believing no hopes were left for the enemies loss, nor no bounds for his victory, he marched directly for the Gate of *Fucchio*. It having been always his principle to be first on horseback, and last that came out of the field, he rested there some time, not out of ostentation, but to thank and caress the Souldiers as they returned from the pursuit, and withal to be ready, in case the enemy should rally. Whilst he was standing there, covered with sweat, his heart panting, and out of breath, an unlucky cold wind came from the other side of the *Arno*, and with a pestiferous quality so affected his blood, that he fell immediately into the cold fit of an Ague: at first he neglected it, though he found a general alteration, as believing himself sufficiently hardned against the injuries of the air; but this negligence was very pernicious. The next night his Fit increased, and his Fever was so violent, his Physitians gave him over.

The universal sadness of the Souldiers made his triumphant Troops look as melancholy as if they had been beaten. All his Officers stood about him with tears in their eyes, but having taken them particularly by the hand, and desired them to withdraw, he caused *Pagolo Guinigi* to be called; took him in his arms, and with a feeble but affectionate voice, he spake to him as follows. *Had I imagined (dear Son) that fortune would have stop'd my course in the midst of the way that conducted me to Glory, and so soon interrupted the felicity of my Arms, I would have better enjoyed the fruit of my pains. 'Tis possible I should not have left your Territory so large; but I should have endeavour'd to have left it more quiet; by creating fewer enemies to my self, and less envy to you. I should have contented my self (dear Son) with the Sovereignty of Lucca and Pisa, and instead of intending the Conquest of Pistoia, and contracting the hatred of the Florentines by so many affronts, I should have endeavour'd by all means possible to have gained their affection: by so doing, if I had not lengthen'd my days, I should have made them at least more happy, and left you more quiet and secure. But fortune (who will have the ordering of all humane affairs) gave me not so much judgement as was necessary to know her, nor so much time as was requisite to master her. You have heard (for every body has told you, and I never denied it) how I came into your Father's house, young, inconsiderable, without hopes of advancement; in a word, in so mean a condition, that without his kindness, I could never have satisfied the ambition of my nature. Your Father brought me up with the same care and tenderness as if I had been his own, and I do acknowledg, if ever I gave any testimonies of Valour and Magnanimity, they were but the effects of those great examples which he set me, and the fair education I had from him, conducted me to that height which, not only you, but all the World has admir'd. When he came to die, he committed to my care and faith both your person and interest; have I betrayed his confidence in any thing? can you complain that my generosity has not been answerable to his? my heart does not reproach me by any ingratitude. I have not only preserv'd to you the fortune of your Father; but to leave you the fruit of my labours and success; I have declined all overtures of Marriage, lest hapning to have children of my own, my natural affection for them should have destroy'd my friendship for you; and lessen'd the acknowledgment which I owed to his bounty. It touches, it touches, dear Charge, when we speak of these things. You cannot comprehend the satisfaction I receive, to leave you Master of so puissant a State; nor can you imagine how it troubles me to leave it so unsettled and perplexed. The City of Lucca is under your subjection, but be sure 'tis not pleas'd with its condition; Pisa likewise is yours, but you know the natu-*

ral inconstancy of that people. Though it has been often subdued, and passed from one servitude to another, yet it will always disdain to pay obedience to any native of Lucca, and have a care how you regulate your Politicks in relation to this jealousy, which is inseparable from persons of different Countries. The Town of Pistoia is a place that ought always to leave upon your spirit some suspicion and umbrage of their fidelity. Besides, that it is divided within it self, the ill treatment which it has received from us will most sensibly excite it against our Family. But the worst of all is, the Florentines are your neighbours, and you know mortally offended, as having been worsted by me perpetually: but that is not sufficient to suppress them. They will be now overjoy'd and insult more upon the news of my death, than if they had conquered all Tuscany. As to the Succours, you are to expect I will not dissemble with you: you can hope for none but from the Emperor, or Princes of Milan, and you will be deceived if you expect any from them; they are either too slow, or too busy, or too remote. Depend not therefore upon any thing but your own Conduct, upon the memory of my Achievements, and the consternation which my Victory has brought upon our enemy. It will be no little advantage to you if you can allure the Florentines to an accommodation; and their fear, without doubt, sufficiently inclines them. Let your comportment with them for the future be different from mine; and as I have always provoked them, and believed nothing could so much contribute to my happiness, as to deal with them as enemies, let it be your care to desire their amity, and found not your repose upon any thing so much as an alliance with them. Nothing in this life imports us so deep as the knowledge of our own tempers, and how to employ them; but this Science belongs most properly to those who would govern; and it is necessary for such to spin out their lives in the luxuries of peace; when they find themselves unfit for warlike executions: my advice therefore ( dear Charge ) is, that you would live in repose, and if you will make the advantage of the troubles of my life to sweeten your own, you will remember to follow it. Farewel, I am going, and with this double satisfaction, that as I have left you the possession of a large Empire, so I have left you such precepts as will secure it to you.

Castruccio ended this passionate discourse by griping Pagolo by the hand, who heard him all the while with tears in his eyes: and as the last instance of his gratitude, this great person called for all the brave and faithful Officers of his Army, whether of Lucca, Pisa, or Pistoia, and having recommended to them the interests of Pagolo, he obliged them to an oath of Allegiance, and as soon as that oath was solemnly taken, the great Conqueror surrendered his soul. Never was victorious Army so sad, never any Prince so lamented, nor any memory so venerable. His exequies were honourably celebrated, and his body buried in the Church of St. Francis in Lucca. Pagolo succeeded, but not with the virtue and fortune of his predecessor; for not long after he lost Pistoia, and then Pisa, and much ado he had to keep the Sovereignty of Lucca; yet that continued in his Family to the fourth Generation.

These great actions do sufficiently prove that Castruccio was not only a man rare in his own age, but would have been the same in any former. His stature was higher, and his proportions better than ordinary: his aspect was charming, and he had so much grace and goodness in his aspect, that never man went unsatisfied from his conversation: his hair was inclining to red, and he wore it short above his ears: where-ever he went, snow, hail, or rain, let the weather be what it would, his head was always uncovered. He had all the qualities that make a man great: grateful to his friends, terrible to his enemies, just with his subjects, crafty with strangers, and where fraud would do the business, he never troubled himself to conquer by force. No man was more forward to encounter with danger, nor no man more careful to get off. He used to say that men ought to try all things, and be terrified at nothing; for it was clear God Almighty was a lover of Courage, because he made valiant men the Ministers of his judgments, and corrected the poor spirited by them. He had a strange presence of wit, and made his reparties with admirable quickness; he would rally very handsomly, sometimes he would be pleasant and innocent, and sometimes as bitter, and poignant. When occasion offered fairly, as he never spared any body, so he was never offended when he was bitten himself. We have some of his answers which he gave with much wit, and others of other peoples which he heard with as much patience.

He caused a Bird to be bought one day, and gave a Ducat for it; one of his acquaintance blaming him for giving so much: you ( says Castruccio ) would have given a penny for it your self? the other answering yes; then ( says Castruccio ) you would have paid dearer than I, for a Ducat is not so much with me.

Having a Flatterer about him who plagued him with perpetual requests, in great scorn

Castruc-



*Castruccio* spit upon his Clothes: The Flatterer reply'd wittily, *a Fisherman to get a pitiful little fish, is dabbled up to the neck, and shall I be afraid of a little spittle, that am catching a Whale.* *Castruccio* was pleas'd with his answer, and rewarded him for it.

A certain Hypocrite who loved his gut as well as he, reproach'd *Castruccio* one day, by the Luxury and Extravagance of his Table. *If that were a sin* (reply'd *Castruccio*) *there would not be so much feasting upon Holy-days.*

Passing one day thro' a street, where there lodg'd certain Women of but indifferent reputation, and seeing a young man come from them who blush'd, and was in mighty confusion that *Castruccio* had seen him; *Friend,* says *Castruccio,* *you should not be ashamed when you come out, but when you go in.*

He was always of an opinion that a Conqueror ought not to give too much liberty to his new Subjects, which upon a time he explained very subtilly to some who understood him; Having a knot given him that was very fast tyed, he was desired to undo it, and having try'd a good while to no purpose, *My Friend* (said he a loud) *If a thing that is tyed can give me so much trouble, I shall be much worse when once it is loos'd.*

He was often troubled with the assiduities of a person who pretended to be a Philosopher, and was always molesting his Entertainments with his admonitions and Morals; *Castruccio* weary of his insolence at his Table, told him, *You Philosophers are like Dogs, you never go any where but where you may have something to bite.* The Philosopher reply'd, *No Sir, we are more like Physicians, and go only to those who have extraordinary need of us.*

Passing one day from *Pisa* to *Legorn* by water, a great tempest arose on a sudden, and put *Castruccio* into some apprehension, which one of the Company observed, and told him by way of reproach, that he wonder'd such a man as *Castruccio* should be frighted, when he found no such passion in himself. *Castruccio* reply'd, *You have no reason Sir to be afraid, for every man values his life according to its worth.*

One ask'd him one time what he should do to make himself esteem'd; he reply'd, *when you'r invited to a Feast, have a care you do not set a wooden Statue upon a joy'd stool.*

A fellow boasting to him one day how many Books he had read, *Castruccio* told him, *It would have been more credit to have remembred half of them.*

A great Drinker, who was always debauching, us'd to value himself very much upon this score, That though his Belly was always full of Wine, he never was drunk. *Castruccio* told him, *a Quart pot was the same.*

A Friend of his seeing him engaged in an amour with a very pretty young Lady, blamed him very seriously that he suffer'd himself to be so taken by a Woman, *you are deceiv'd Sir,* said he, *she is taken by me.*

One found fault with him exceedingly for being so delicate and so expensive in his dyer; *You would not* (said *Castruccio*) *spend half so much in yours?* and being answer'd no, *Then* (reply'd *Castruccio*) *you are a greater Miser, than I am an Epicure.*

He was invited one evening to Supper by *Faddeo Bernardi*, a *Lucchese*, a very rich and sumptuous Citizen; being arriv'd at the house, and conducted by *Faddeo* into a Room, exceedingly well hung, the Pavement of Mosaique work, wrought curiously into Flowers, and Leaves, and Branches, which yielded a most excellent verdure. *Castruccio* admir'd it exceedingly, and pretending to have occasion to spit, he turn'd about, this way and that way, and at last spit in *Faddeo's* face; *Faddeo* was much troubled, but *Castruccio* excus'd it, and told him, *He thought he could have spit no where to have offended him less.*

One asking very seriously how *Cæsar* died? He answer'd as seriously, *Would I might die like him.*

One of his Courtiers having an ambition to regal him, made a Ball one night, and invited him to it; *Castruccio* came, entertain'd himself among the Ladies; and being in a good humour, fell a dancing and solacing among them; and doing some impertinencies which did not stand with the gravity of his rank: being admonish'd by one of his Friends that it would detract from his esteem; He told him, *I thank you Sir for your caution, but he that is counted wise all day, will never be thought a fool at night.*

One coming to him to beg a boon that *Castruccio* was unwilling to grant, *Castruccio* declin'd him, and would not seem for to hear; whereupon the Petitioner threw himself upon the ground, and put his head to *Castruccio's* feet; *Castruccio* reproving him, the other reply'd, *You your self are the cause, you heard so little when I stood up, I had a mind to see whether your Ears were upon your Toes.* Which answer got him more than he desired.

He was wont to say, *The way to Hell was very easie, for Men went thither upon their backs, and could find it with their eyes shut.*

Another desiring a favour of him, with a thousand impertinent and superfluous words; *Hark you Friend,* says *Castruccio,* *when you would have any thing with me for the future, send another Man to beg it.* Another

Another great talker having tired him with a tedious discourse, excused himself at last, and told him he was afraid he had wearied him, *No indeed Sir,* reply'd *Castruccio,* *for I did not mind one word that you said.*

He used to Droll upon a person, who having been a handsome boy, prov'd as handsome a Man, *His spite* (said he) *has been always against Married people; when he was a boy he debauched Men from their Wives, and now he debauches Women from their Husbands.*

He saw an envious man laugh, and asked him, *Do you laugh,* said he, *That things go well with your self, or ill with other people.*

When he was under the Tutelage of *Francesco Guinigi*, one of his Comrades asking him merrily, what he should give him for a box at his Ear, *Castruccio* answered immediately, *a Helmet if you please.*

He was forced to put a Citizen of *Lucca* to death, who formerly had been a great instrument of his advancement; and being reproached by some body, for dealing so severely with an old friend; *No,* says he, *you are mistaken, it was with a new foe.*

*Castruccio* compared the prudence of those persons, who though they pretended to Marry, would never be brought to't, to the discretion of those people, who though they talk'd much of going to Sea, kept constantly at Land.

He used to say, he wondered much at one Custom among men: when they buy any thing curious, either of Christal or Glas, they sound it, and employ all their senses to be sure it be good; but in choosing of a Wife, they use nothing but their sight, as if she was taken only to be look'd upon.

He was of opinion that after his Death there would be a general alteration; and being asked when he came to die, how he would be buried, he replyed, *With my face downward, for I am sure in a short time this Country will be turned topsie turvey, and then I shall be in the same posture with other men.*

Whilst he was in controversy with *Huguccio*, but had him in great veneration for his bravery and Conduct; being asked in discourse whether for the salvation of his Soul, he never had any thoughts of turning Monk, he answered no, for to him it seemed very strange if *Frier Lazarus* should go to Paradise, and *Huguccio de Faggiola* to Hell.

Being asked what time was most proper for a Man to Eat, to keep himself in health, he answered, *The rich when they are hungry, and the poor when they can.*

Seeing a Friend of his make use of his Servant to put up his Breeches, he told him, *I hope ere long, you'll have one to feed you.*

Seeing over the door of a certain person this Inscription in Latin, *God keep this House from ill people;* He cryed, *Then the Master must never come in to't.*

Passing by a little House with a great Gate, he said, *If they have not a care, this House will run away thorow the Gate.*

Being in discourse with the Ambassador of the King of *Naples* about the settlement of their Frontiers; upon some controversy betwixt them, the Ambassador ask'd him in a huff, *Why then Sir you are not afraid of our King?* *Castruccio* replyed gently, *is your King a good a man, or a bad?* being answered a Good; *Why then,* said *Castruccio,* *would you have me afraid of a good man?*

We might add many other answers of his, all full of weight, as well as wit; but these shall suffice. He dyed in the 44<sup>th</sup> year of his Age, and from the time he came first to appear in the world, in his good and his bad fortune he expressed always an equality and steadiness of spirit; and as he left several Monuments of his prosperity and good fortune behind him; so he was not ashamed to leave some memorials of his adversity: When he was delivered from *Huguccio's* imprisonment, he caused the Irons with which he was manacled, to be hung in the publickest place in his Palace, where they are to be seen to this day, being willing that posterity might know, that how fortunate soever he was in the main, he was not totally exempt from distress.

That which is still remarkable is, that having equalled the great actions of *Scipio* and *Philip* the Father of *Alexander*, he died, as they did in the 44<sup>th</sup> year of his Age, and doubtless he would have surpassed them both, had he found as favourable dispositions at *Lucca*, as one of them did in *Macedon*, and the other in *Rome*.



*A Narrative of the Murther of Vitellozzo Vitelli,  
Oliveretto da Fermo, Signor Pagolo, and the  
Duke de Gravina, (all of the Family of the Ursini)  
the one committed by Duke Valentine, and the other  
composed by Nicolo Machiavelli.*

**D**uke Valentine was returned from *Lombardy*, whither he had gone to excuse himself in relation to certain Calumnies objected against him by the *Florentines* about the revolt of *Arezzo*, and other Towns in the *Vale de Chiana*, and being come to *Imola*, upon consultation with his Friends, he concluded upon his expedition against *Giovanni Bentivoglio* Sovereign of *Bologna*, because Duke Valentine had a mind to reduce that City, and make it chief of his Dutchy of *Romagna*; of which the *Vitelli, Orsini*, and their followers having notice, it appeared to them all, that the said Duke Valentine grew too potent, and that upon the taking *Bologna*, it was to be feared, he would endeavour to exterminate them, and make himself the only great man in *Italy*. Hereupon a Dyet was held at *Magione* in *Perugia*, where there met the Cardinal *Pagolo*, the Duke de *Gravina Orsini, Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliveretto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni*, Sovereign of *Perugia*, and *Antonio da Venafro* sent from *Pandolfo Petrucci*, as head of *Sienna*. Upon serious deliberation about the greatness and disposition of the Duke, it was concluded very necessary to restrain him in time; otherwise there was great danger of a General destruction. Resolving therefore to desire aid of the *Florentines*, and to continue their amity with the *Bentivoglio*, they sent Embassadors to both; promising their assistance to the one, and begging the assistance of the other against the Common Enemy. This Dyet was quickly noised all over *Italy*, and such of Duke Valentine's Subjects as were discontented (among whom were the *Urbinati*) began to hold up their heads, and hope for a revolution. While the people were in this suspence, certain of the Inhabitants of *Urbino*, laid a plot to surprize the Castle of *San. Leo*, which at that time was kept for the Duke, and the manner was thus; The Governor of the Castle was busie in repairing it, and mending the fortifications, to which purpose having commanded great quantities of Timber to be brought in, the Conspirators contrived that certain of the biggest pieces should be laid (as by accident) upon the bridge, which they knew could not be cran'd up without a great deal of difficulty; whilst the Guards were employed in hoisting the Timber, they took their opportunity, seized upon the Bridge, and then upon the Castle, which was no sooner known to be taken, but the whole Country revolted and called in their old Duke; yet, not so much upon the surprize of that Castle, as their expectations from the Dyet at *Magione*, by means of which they did not question to be protected. The Dyet understanding the revolt of *Urbino*, concluded no time was to be lost, and having drawn their Forces together, they advanced, if any Town was remaining to the Duke, to reduce it immediately. They sent a new Embassy to the *Florentines* to sollicite their Concurrence against the common Enemy; to remonstrate their success, and to convince them that such an opportunity being lost, was not to be expected again. But the *Florentines* had an old pique to the *Vitelli* and *Ursini* upon several accounts, so that they did not only not joyn with them, but they sent their Secretary *Nicolo Machiavelli* to the Duke to offer him reception or assistance which he pleased to Elect. The Duke was at *Imola* at that time in great consternation; for unexpectedly on a sudden, when he dream'd nothing of it, his Soldiers revolted, and left him with a War at his Doors, and no force to repel it: But taking heart upon the *Florentine* Complement, he resolved with the few Forces he had left, to protract, and spin out the War, and by propositions and practices of agreement, gain time till he could provide himself better, which he did two ways, by sending to the King of *France*, and by giving advance Money to all Men at Arms and Cavalry that would come in. Notwithstanding all this, the *Ursini* proceeded, and marched on towards *Fossombrone*, where being faced by a party of the Dukes, they charged them, and

and beat them: The news of that defeat, put the Duke upon new Counsels, to try if he could stop that humour by any practice of accord; and being excellent at dissembling, he omitted nothing that might persuade them that they were the Aggressors and had taken up Arms first against him! That what was in his hands, he would willingly surrender; that the Name of Prince was enough for him, and if they pleased, the Principality should be theirs; and he deluded them so far, that they sent Signor *Pagolo* to him to treat about a Peace, and in the mean time granted a Cessation of Arms: However the Duke put no stop to his recruits, but reinforced himself daily with all possible diligence; and that his supplies might not be discovered, he dispers'd them as they came; all over *Romagna*: Whilst these things were in transaction, a supply of 500 Lances arrived to him from *France*; and though by their help he found himself strong enough to confront his Enemy in the field, yet he judged it more secure and profitable to go on with the cheat, and not break off the Capitulation that then was on foot: And he acted it so well, that a Peace was concluded; their old Pensions confirmed, 4000 Duckats paid down, a solemn engagement given not to disturb the *Bentivogli*; He made an alliance with *Giovanni*, and declared that he could not, and had no power to constrain any of them to come personally to him, unless they pleased to do it themselves. They promised on their part to restore the Duchy of *Urbino*, and whatever else they had taken from him; to serve him in all his Enterprizes: not to make War without his leave; nor hire themselves to any body else. These Articles being sign'd, *Guid' Ubaldo* Duke of *Urbino* fled again to *Venice*, having dismantled all the Castles and strong holds in his Duchy before he departed; for having a confidence in the people, he would not that those places which he could not defend himself, should be possessed by the Enemy, and made use of to keep his friends in subjection.

But Duke *Valentine* having finished the agreement, and disposed his Army into quarters all over *Romagna*, about the end of *November*, removed from *Imola* to *Cesena*, where he continued several days in consultation with certain Commissioners sent from the *Vitelli*, and *Ursini* (who were then with their Troops in the Duchy of *Urbino*) about what new Enterprize they were next to undertake; and because nothing was concluded, *Oliverotto da Fermo* was sent to propose to him, if he thought good, an expedition into *Tuscany*; if not, that they might joyn, and set down before *Sinigaglia*. The Duke replied, That the *Florentines* were his Friends, and he could not with honour carry the War into *Tuscany*, but their proposal for *Sinigaglia*, he embraced very willingly. Having beleaguerr'd the Town, it was not long before they had News it was taken, but the Castle held out; for the Governor refused to surrender to any body but the Duke, whereupon they intreated him to come. The Duke thought this a fair opportunity, and the better because he went not of himself, but upon their invitation; and to make them the more secure; he dismissed his *French*, and sent them back into *Lombardy* (only he retained a hundred Lances under the Command of his Kinsman *Monsieur de Candala*.) Departing about the end of *December* from *Cesena*, he went to *Fano*, where with all the cunning and artifice he could use, he persuaded the *Vitelli* and *Ursini* to stay with the Army till he came; remonstrating to them that such jealousies and suspicions as those, must needs weaken their alliance, and render it undurable; and that for his part he was a man who desired to make use as well of the Counsels, as the Arms of his Friends. And though *Vitellozzo* opposed it very much, (for by the death of his Brother he had been taught how unwise it was to offend a Prince first, and then put himself into his hands) nevertheless persuaded by *Paulo Ursini* (who underhand was corrupted by presents and promises from the Duke) he consented to stay. Hereupon the Duke upon his departure the 30th of *Decemb. 1502.* imparted his design to Eight of his principal intimates (amongst whom *Don Michael*, and *Monsignor d' Euma* were two) and appointed, that when *Vitellozzo*, *Pagolo Ursini*, the Duke of *Gravina*, and *Oliverotto* should come to meet him, two of his Favourites should be sure to order it so, as to get one of the *Ursini* betwixt them, (assigning every couple his man) and entertain them till they came to *Sinigaglia*; with express injunction not to part with them upon any terms till they were brought to the Dukes Lodgings, and taken into Custody. After this he ordered his whole Army, Horse and Foot (which consisted of 2000 of the first, and 10000 of the latter) to be ready drawn up, upon the banks of the *Metauro*, about five miles distant from *Fano*, and to expect his arrival. Being come up to them upon the *Metauro*, he commanded out two hundred Horse as a Forlorn, and then causing the Foot to march, he brought up the Reer himself with the remainder.

*Fano*, and *Sinigaglia*, are two Cities in *la Marca*, seated upon the bank of the *Adriatick* Sea, distant one from the other about 15 miles; so that travelling up towards *Sinigaglia*, the bottom of the Mountains on the right hand are so near the Sea, they are almost wash'd by the water, & at the greatest distance they are not above two miles. The City of *Sinigaglia* from

from these Mountains is not above a flight shot, and the Tide comes up within less than a Mile. By the side of this Town there is a little River, which runs close by the wall next *Fano*, and is in sight of the Road: So that he who comes to *Simigaglia*, passes a long way under the Mountains, and being come to the River which runs by *Simigaglia*, turns on the left hand upon the bank, which within a bow shot, brings him to a Bridge over the said River, almost right against the Gate: before the Gate there is a little Bourg with a Market-place, one side of which, is shouldred up by the bank of the River. The *Vitelli*, and *Ursini*, having concluded to attend the Duke themselves, and to pay their personal respects, to make room for his Men had drawn off their own, and disposed them into certain Castles at the distance of six miles, only they had left in *Simigaglia*, *Oliveretto* with a party of about 1000 Foot, and 150 Horse which were quartered in the said Bourg. Things being in this order, Duke *Valentine* approached, but when his Horse in the Van came up to the Bridge, they did not pass, but opening to the right and left, and wheeling away, they made room for the Foot, who marched immediately into the Town: *Vitellozzo*, *Pagolo*, and the Duke de *Gravina*, advanced upon their Mules to wait upon Duke *Valentine*; *Vitellozzo* was unarm'd in a Cap lin'd with green, very sad and melancholy, as if he had had some foresight of his destiny, which considering his former courage and exploits, was admired by every body: And it is said, that when he came from his house, in order to meeting Duke *Valentine* at *Simigaglia*, he took his last leave very solemnly of every body. He recommended his Family and its fortunes, to the chief of his Officers, and admonished his Grand-children, not so much to commemorate the fortune, as the magnanimity of their Ancestors. These three Princes being arrived in the presence of Duke *Valentine*, saluted him with great civility, and were as civilly received; and each of them, (as soon as they were well observed by the persons appointed to secure them) were singled, and disposed betwixt two of them. But the Duke perceiving that *Oliveretto* was wanting (who was left behind with his Regiment, and had drawn it up in the Market-place for the greater formality,) he wink'd upon *Don Michael* (to whom the care of *Oliveretto* was assign'd) that he should be sure to provide he might not escape. Upon this intimation, *Don Michael* clap'd spurs to his Horse, and rid before; and being come up to *Oliveretto*, he told him it was inconvenient to keep his Men to their Arms, for unless they were sent presently, to their quarters, they would be taken up for the Dukes; wherefore he persuaded him to dismiss them, and go with him to the Duke. *Oliveretto* following his Counsel, went along with him to the Duke, who no sooner saw him, but he call'd him to him, and *Oliveretto* having paid his Ceremony ~~set in with the rest.~~ Being come into the Town, and come up to the Duke's Quarters, they all dismounted, and attended him up, where being carried by him into a private Chamber, they were instantly Arrested and made Prisoners. The Duke immediately mounted, and commanded their Soldiers should be all of them disarmed; *Oliveretto's* Regiment being so near at hand, were plundered into the bargain. The Brigades which belong'd to *Vitelli*, and *Ursini* being at greater distance, and having notice of what had hapned to their Generals, had time to unite, and remembering the Discipline and Courage of their Masters, they kept close together, and marched away in spight both of the Country people, and their Enemies. But Duke *Valentine's* Soldiers, not content with the pillage of *Oliveretto's* Soldiers, fell foul upon the Town, and had not the Duke by the death of several of them, repress'd their insolence, *Simigaglia* had been ruined. The night coming on, and the tumults appeas'd, the Duke began to think of his Prisoners, resolv'd *Vitellozzo*, and *Oliveretto* should die, and having caused them to be guarded into a convenient place, he commanded they should be strangled; but they said nothing at their deaths, that was answerable to their lives; for *Vitellozzo* begged only that the Pope might be supplicated in his behalf, for a plenary indulgence. *Oliveretto* impeach'd *Vitellozzo*, and lay'd all upon his back. *Pagolo* and the Duke de *Gravina* were continued alive, till the Duke had information that his Holiness at Rome had seized upon the Cardinal *Orsino*, the Arch-bishop of *Florence*, and Messer *Jacopo da Santa Croce*; upon which News, on the 18th of *January*, they also were both strangled in the Castle of *Piense* after the same manner.

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An Abridgment written by *Nicolo Machiavelli*,  
Secretary of FLORENCE.

**T**HE Kings and Kingdom of *France* are at this time more rich and more powerful than ever, and for these following Reasons: First,

The Crown passing by succession of Blood is become rich, because in case where the King has no Sons to succeed him in his paternal Estate, it falls all to the Crown; and this having many times hapned, has been a great corroboration, as particularly in the Dutchy of *Anjou*; and at present the same is like to fall out to this King; who having no Sons, the Dutchy of *Orleans*, and State of *Milan* (his hereditary Countries) are like to devolve upon the Crown: So that at this day most of the good Towns in *France* are in the Crown, and few remaining to particular persons.

A second great Reason of the strength of that King is, That whereas heretofore *France* was not entire, but subject to several great Barons, who were able not only to expostulate, but to contend with the King (as the Dukes of *Guenn* and *Burbon* did formerly) the said Barons are now most obsequious and dutiful.

A third reason is, because formerly all the neighbouring Princes were ready upon every occasion to invade the Kingdom of *France*; the Dukes of *Burgundy*, *Britannie*, *Guienne* or *Flanders*, being always tempting them thereunto, and giving them access, passage, and reception, as it hapned when the *English* had Wars with *France*, by their Confederacy with the Duke of *Britagne*, they got admision into that Country, and gave the King of *France* his hands full: and in like manner the Duke of *Burgundy* was as troublesome, by means of the Duke of *Bourbon*. But now *Britagne*, *Guienne*, the *Bourbons*, and greatest part of *Burgundy* being united to that Crown, and very loyal and faithful; Those neighbouring Princes do not only want their old Confederates to invite and assist them, but they have them for their Enemies; so that the King of *France* is more strong, and his Adversaries more weak.

Another reason may be, That at this day the richest and most potent of the Barons are of the Blood Royal; so that upon defect of those who are before them, the Crown may come to them, upon which score they are firm to it, hoping that some time or other it may fall either to them or their posterity, whereas to mutiny or oppose, it might prejudice their succession, as it hapned to this King *Lewis* when he was taken in the Battel of *Britagne*, where in favour of the said Duke of *Britagne*, he was personally in Service against the *French*. Upon the death of King *Charles*, the Crown being legally in *Lewis*, it was disputed whether that fault and defection of his should not be a bar to his succession, and had it not been that he was very rich, by means of his frugality, and able to bear the Port of that Dignity at his own expence, and the next Heir *Monsieur d'Angoulisme* an Infants he had lost it; but for these reasons, and some favour which he had besides, *Lewis* was created King.

The last reason is, because the States of the Barons in *France* are not divided among the Heirs, (as in *Germany*, and several parts of *Italy*) but descend still to the Eldest Son who are the right Heirs; and the younger Sons are left, by some little assistance from their Elder Brothers to shift for themselves; whereupon they betake themselves generally to the Wars, endeavouring to advance themselves that way, and raise themselves fortunes: and hence it is the *Frenchmen* at Arms are better at this day, and stand fair for preferment.

The *French* Infantry cannot be good, for it being long since they had any War, they must needs want experience. Besides in the Country, the Towns are full of Tradesmen and Mechanicks, all of them so curb'd and cow'd by the Nobles, that they are grown pusillanimous and base; and therefore the King of *France* having found them unfit, makes no use of them in his Wars, unless it be of his *Gascoigns* who are something better than the rest, and the reason is, because bordering upon the *Spaniards*, they are constantly upon duty, or communicate something of their Nature. But for some years since they have shewn themselves better Thieves than Soldiers; nevertheless in defending and assaulting of Towns they do well enough, but in the field they are but indifferent, quite contrary to the *Germans* and *Switzers*, who are not to be dealt with in the field, but in storming or defending a Town, they are good for nothing; and I suppose it proceeds from hence that they cannot in both cases keep the same order which they observe in the field. Wherefore the King of *France* makes use of *Switzers*, and *Lanz-knights*, because his men at Arms dare not rely upon his *Gascoigns* in time of Service. And if his Foot were as good as his Men at Arms, no doubt but the King of *France* would be able to defend himself against all the Princes in *Europe*.

The *French* are naturally more fierce and hot, than dexterous or strong, and if resisted handsomly in their first charge, they slacken and cool, and grow as timorous as Women. They are likewise impatient of distress or incommodity, and grow so careless by degrees; that 'tis no hard matter, finding them in disorder, to master and overcome them.

And of this, Experience has been many times had in the Kingdom of *Naples*, and last of all at *Farigliano*, where they were twice as many as the *Spaniards*, and it was expected every hour when they should have swallowed them up: Nevertheless, because winter came on, and the weather grew bad, they began to straggle into the Neighbouring Towns, where they might be at more ease, and thereby leaving their Camp weak, and out of order; the *Spaniards* fell upon them, and beat them beyond all expectation. And it would have been the same with the *Venetians*, who had never lost the Battel of *Vaila*, had they forborn following the *French* example but for ten days: But the fury of *Bartolmeo d' Alviana* was too hot for them. The same hapned again to the *Spaniards* at *Ravenna*, who might have certainly ruined the *French* in respect of their ill Government, and want of provisions which were intercepted on that side towards *Ferrara* by the *Venetians*, and towards *Bologna*, by the *Spaniards* themselves; but by the rashness of some, and the indiscretion of others, the *French* got the Victory, and though as it was, it was bloody enough; yet it had been much more, had the strength of either Army consisted in the same kind of men; but the *French* force lying in his Men at Arms, and the *Spaniards* force in their Foot, the slaughter was the less. He therefore who would conquer the *French*, must be sure to preserve himself against their first impetus and attack, and in so doing he shall be sure to prevail; for *Cæsar's* character of them is true, *At first they are more than Men, at last less than Women*.

*France* in respect of its greatness, and the convenience of its Rivers, is opulent and rich; for their Commodities and labour are worth little or nothing, by reason of the scarcity of Money among the people, which is so great, it is with difficulty that they are able to raise so much as will pay the impositions of their Lords, though they are generally but small; the reason is, because every body gathers to sell as he has occasion, and no body can stay to finish his harvest as it should be. So that if there should be any body (which is seldom seen) so rich as to be a bushel of Corn beforehand, every body having of their own, there would be no body to buy it: and the Gentlemen, of what they receive of their Tenants, except it be for cloths, spend little or nothing; For Cattle, and Poultry, and Fish, and Venison, they have enough of their own: so that all the Money comes into the hands of the Lords; and doubtless at this time they are exceedingly rich, for the people are so poor, he that has but a *Blaren*, believes himself a Prince.

The Prelates of *France* carry away  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the Revenue of that Kingdom, because there are several Bishops who have Temporal as well as Spiritual Revenues, who having provisions enough of their own to keep their houses, spend not one farthing of their income, but hoard it up according to the Natural covetousness of the Prelates, and Religious; and that which accrues to the Chapters and Colledges, is laid out in Plate, and Jewels, and Ornaments, for the decoration of their Chappels; so that betwixt what is laid out upon their Churches,



and what is laid up by the Prelates; their money and their movables is of an immense value.

In all Counsels for the Government and Administration of the affairs of that Kingdom, the Prelates are always the greatest number, the other Lords not regarding it so much, as knowing the execution must come thorow their hands: so that both sides are contented, one to ordain, the other to execute, though there are many times some of the ancients and more experienced Souldiers taken in to direct the Prelates in such things as are out of their sphere.

The Benefices in *France* (by virtue of a Custom and Law derived anciently from the Popes) are conferred by the Colledges; insomuch as the *Canons*, when their Arch-Bishop, or Bishop dies, calling an Assembly, to dispose of their Benefices to them that are thought most worthy, whence it comes that they are frequently divided among themselves, because as many are prefer'd by favour and bribery, as by piety and worth: and it is the same with the Monks in the election of their Abbots. The other inferior Benefices are in the Gift of the Bishops. If the King at any time would intrench upon this Law, and choose a Bishop at his own pleasure, he must do it by force; for they will deny him possession; and though perhaps it be forc'd, that King is no sooner dead, but his Bishop shall be sure to be dispossessed, and another put in his place.

The *French* are naturally covetous, and desirous of other peoples goods, which they will lavish and squander as prodigally as their own: a French-man shall cheat, or rob you, and in a breath meet, and eat, and spend it as merrily with you as you could have done your self; which is contrary to the humour of the Spaniard; for if he gets any thing of you, you must look for nothing again.

The *French* are in great fear of the *English*, for the great inroads and devastations which they have made anciently in that Kingdom; insomuch, that among the common people the name of *English* is terrible to this day; those poor wretches not being able to distinguish that the *French* are otherwise constituted now than they were then; for that now they are Armed, good Souldiers, and united, having possession of those States upon which the *English* did formerly rely, as the Dutchy of *Burgundy*, and the Dutchy of *Britagne*; and on the other side the *English* are not so well disciplin'd; for 'tis so long since they had any War, there is not a man of them living who ever look'd an enemy in the face; and besides, there is no body left to joyn with them, if they should land, but only the Arch-Duke.

They are afraid likewise of the Spaniards, by reason of their sagacity and vigilance. But when ever that King invades *France*, he does it with great disadvantage; for from the place from whence he must march, to that part of the *Piræneans* by which he must pass into *France*, the distance is so great, and the Country so barren, that every time the *Spaniards* attempt any such thing, either by the way of *Perpignan*, or *Gebenna*, they must needs be much incommoded, not only for want of supplies, but for want of victuals to sustain them in so tedious a march; because the Country behind them is scarce habitable for its fertility, and that which is inhabited has scarce wherewithal for the Inhabitants; so that in these respects, towards the *Piræneans*, the *French* are in little apprehension of the *Spaniard*.

Of the *Flemmings* the *French* likewise are in no fear; for, by reason of the coldness of their Country, they do not gather enough for their own subsistence, especially of Corn and Wine, with which they are forced to supply themselves out of *Burgundy*, *Piccardy*, and other places in *France*. Moreover, the people of *Flanders* live generally of their own manufacture, which they vend at the Fairs in *France*, that is, at *Paris* and *Lions*, for towards the Sea-side they have no utterance for any thing, and towards *Germany* 'tis the same; for there are more of their Commodities made than in *Flanders*: so that when ever their Commerce with the *French* is cut off, they will have no where to put off their Commodities, nor no where to supply themselves with victuals: so that without irresistible necessity the *Flemmings* will never have any controverſie with the *French*.

But of the *Swizzers* the *French* are in no little fear, by reason of their vicinity, and the sudden incursions to which they are subject from them, against which it is impossible to make any competent provision in time, because they make their depredations and incursions with more ease and dexterity than other Nations, in respect that they have neither Artillery nor Horse; but though the *French* have Towns and Countries very near them, yet being well fortified and mann'd the *Swizzers* never make any great progress. Besides, the disposition of the *Swiss* is apter to battel and fighting in the field, than to the storming or defending of Towns: and it is very unwillingly (if ever) the *French* come to cope with them upon the Frontiers; for having no foot that is able to bear up with the *Swizzers*, their Men at Arms without Foot can do nothing: moreover, the Country is so qualified, that there is not room enough for the Men at Arms and Cavalry to draw up, and manage to advantage

vantage, and the *Swizzers* are not easily tempted from their borders into the plain, nor to leave such strong and well provided Towns (as I mentioned before) upon their backs; lest by them their supplies should be intercepted, and perhaps their retreat be obstructed.

On the side towards *Italy* they are in no fear, in respect of the *Apennine* Mountains; and the strong places which they have at the foot of them: so that who ever invades the Dominion of *France* in those parts, must be sure to overcome, or by reason of the barrenness of the Country about, he will hazard to be famished, or compelled to leave those Towns behind him which would be madness, or to attack them at disadvantage, which would be worse: so that on the side of *Italy* they are in no danger, for the reasons above said; and moreover, there is not a Prince in *Italy* able to undertake him, nor are the *Italians* now in such unity as in the days of the *Romans*.

Towards the South, the Kingdom of *France* is in no apprehension, because it is washed by the Sea on that side, and accommodated with Ports always full of Ships, (partly of the Kings, and partly of other petty Princes) sufficient to defend their Coasts from any sudden impression; and against any thing premeditated, they will have time enough to prepare; for it requires time to make a solemn invasion, and the preparation will be discovered by some body, besides, for further security, there are always parties of Men at Arms scowring upon the Coasts.

Their expence in keeping of their Towns is not so great; for the *French* Subjects are very dutiful, and the fortresses are not kept at the charge of the Kingdom, and on the borders (where Garrisons, and by consequence, expence would be more necessary) those flying bodies of Men at Arms save them that charge: for against any extraordinary insult, there will be time enough to provide, for that requires time to be fitted, and more to be executed.

The people of *France* are very humble and obedient, and have their King in mighty veneration. They live at very little expence, by reason of their great plenty, and every body hath something of his own: their clothing is coarse, of very cheap stuff, and they use no kind of Silks, neither the men nor the women; for if they should, they should be obnoxious to the Gentry, who would certainly be even with them.

The Bishopsricks in *France*, according to modern computation, are 146, and the Arch-Bishopsricks 18.

The Parishes are reckoned a million and 700, and the Abbies 740. Of the Priories there is no account.

Of the ordinary and extraordinary Entries of the Crown, I could get no exact account; I inquired of several, and all told me they were as the King pleased to require. Yet some persons told me that that part of his ordinary Revenue which arises out of his Gabels upon wine, and bread, and flesh, and the like, amounts to a million and seven hundred thousand Crowns: and his extraordinary, by Taxes, amounts as he pleases: but in case they fall short, he has another string to his bow, and that is by way of loans, which are seldom repaid. The Letters to that purpose, do commonly run thus: Sir, *The King recommends himself to you; and having at this time pressing occasion for money, He desires you would furnish him with the sum contained in this Letter; which sums are paid in to the next Receiver, and there are of them in every Town who receives all the profits and revenue accruing to the King by Gabels, Taxes, Loans, or otherwise.*

Those Towns which are subject to the Crown, have no rules or orders but what His Majesty is pleased to set them for raising of money either by Taxes or otherwise.

The authority of the Barons over their Subjects, and half their Revenues consists in bread, and wine, and flesh, as above said, and so much a year for hearth-money, but it must not exceed six pence or eight pence a hearth, to be paid every three months. Taxes and Loans they cannot require without the consent of the King, which he grants very rarely.

The Crown receives no other advantage from them than in the revenue for salt, and never taxes them but upon extraordinary occasion.

The King's order in his extraordinary expences both in War and Peace, is to command the Treasurers to pay the Souldiers, which they do by tickets of assignment. The Pensioners and Gentlemen repair to the Generals with their tickets from month to month, where they are entred, and having received a new policy from three months to three months, the Pensioners and Gentlemen go then to the Receivers of the respective Provinces where they live, and are paid immediately.

The Gentlemen belonging to the King are 200, their pay 20 Crowns a month; and paid as above said, each hundred has a Captain.

The

The Pensioners are no set number, and their Pensions are as uncertain, being more or less as it pleases the King; they are in a way of preferment, and therefore there is no exact rules for them.

The office of the Receivers General of *France*, is, to receive so much for fire, and so much for taxes by consent of the King; and to take care that both ordinary and extraordinary expences be paid at the time, and discharges given as aforesaid.

The Treasurers have the keeping of the money, and pay it according to their orders from the Generals.

The office of the Grand Chancellor is judicial and definitive, he can pardon and condemn as he pleases, and that even in Capital Causes, without the consent of the King. In Causes where the Clients are contumaciously litigious, He can prefix them a day for the determination of their Suit: He can confer Benefices, but that must be with the King's consent, for those grants are pass'd by the King's Letters under the Broad-Seal, wherefore that Seal is kept by the said Chancellor. His salary is 10000 Franks *per an.* and 11000 more for his Table, which Table is intended for the repast and entertainment of such Gentlemen, Lawyers and Counsellors as follow in his train, when they think fit either to dine or sup with him.

The sum which the King of *England* received annually from the King of *France* was fifty thousand Franks, in consideration of certain disbursements by the present King of *England's* Father in the *Dutchy of Britagne*, but the time of that payment is expired.

At present there is in *France* but one Grand Seneschal, when there are more, (I do not mean Grand Seneschals, for there is never but one) their authority is over the Militia both in Ordinary and Extraordinary, whom for the dignity of their Office they are obliged to obey.

The Governors of the Provinces are as many as the King pleases, and have their Commission for life or years, and their Salaries great or little, as he thinks good to appoint: the other Governors, to the very inferior Officers in every little Town, have all their Commissions from the King, for you must know there is no office in that Kingdom, but is either given or sold by that King.

Of the quantity of distributions for the Gentlemen and the Pensioners, there is no certain account, but as to them, the King's warrant is sufficient, for they are not liable to the Chamber of Accounts.

The Office of the Chamber of Accounts is to view and audit the accounts of all such as have any thing to do in the King's Moneys, as the Generals, the Treasurers, and the Receivers.

The University of *Paris* is paid out of the Rents of the Foundations of the Colledges, but very narrowly.

The Parliaments are five, of *Paris*, of *Raen*, of *Tbolose*, *Burdeaux* and *Douphine*, from either of which there is no appeal.

The Universities at first were but four, at *Paris*, *Orleans*, *Bourgi* and *Poitiers*, to which these at *Tours* and *Angiers* have been added since, but they are very inconsiderable.

The standing Army is as great (both for number of Men and Artillery) as the King pleases, and are quartered and disposed according to orders from him. Yet every great Town upon the Frontiers have Artillery and Ammunition of their own, and within these two years several more have been cast in several places of the said Kingdom, at the charge of the Town where they were made, and to re-imburse themselves, they are allowed a Toll of a penny an head for all Cattel, and as much for every bushel of Corn, whilst the Kingdom is under no danger of invasion. The standing Force is divided into four Bodies, which are disposed into four several Posts for the security of the Country, that is to say, into *Guienne*, *Piccardy*, *Burgundy*, and *Prevence*, but no precise number is observed in any, for they are lessened, or encreased, and removed from one place to another, as they have occasion to suspect.

I have with some diligence inquired what moneys were assigned every year for the charges of the King's Household, and his privy Purse, and I find it is what he pleases himself.

His Archers are four hundred, design'd for the Guard of his Person, among which there are two Scotch. Their Salary is three hundred Franks a man every year, and a Coat of the King's Livery. But there are 24 constantly at the King's elbow, and their Salary is 400 Franks *per an.*

His German Foot-Guards consisted formerly of three hundred men, with each of them a Pension of ten Franks a month, and two Suits of Apparel a year, that is, Coats and Shoes, one for Summer, and the other for Winter; but of these Foot there were 100 more particularly

cularly near the King, their Salary being 12 Franks *per mens.* and their Coats of Silk, which was begun in the time of King Charles.

The Harbingers are those who are sent before to take up Lodgings for the Court, they are 32 in number, and each of them has a Salary of three hundred Franks every year, and a Coat of the King's Livery. Their Marshals or chief Officers are four, and have each of them 600 Franks *per an.* In taking up their Lodgings, their method is this; they divide themselves into four parties, one Marshal (or his Lieutenant, in case he cannot wait himself) stays where the Court departed, to see all things rectified betwixt the followers of the Court, and the Masters of the Houses: another of them goes along with the Court; a third where the King lies that night; and the fourth where he lies the next, by which means they keep so exact an order, that they are no sooner arrived, but every man knows his Lodging, and is furnished with every thing got ready to his hand.

The *Provost del Hostel* is a person who follows always the person of the King, and his office is judiciary: where-ever the Court goes, his Bench is the first, and in all Towns where he comes the people may appeal to him as to their Lieutenant. His ordinary Salary is 6000 Franks. He has under him two Judges in Civil Causes, paid by the King, each of them 600 Franks *per an.* he has likewise under him a Lieutenant Criminal, and 30 Archers paid as above said. Those who are taken by this *Provost* upon any criminal account, cannot appeal to the Parliament. He dispatches all both in Civil and Criminal affairs, and if the Plaintiff and Defendant appear once before him, it is enough, their business is determined.

The Masters of the King's Household are eight, but there is no certain rule for their Salary, for some have 1000 Franks *per an.* some more, some less, at it pleases the King; over whom there is a *Grand Master* with a Salary of 11000 Franks *per an.* and his authority is only over the rest.

The jurisdiction of the Admiral of France is over all the Fleet, and Ships; and Ports belonging to that Kingdom: He can seize, and make what Ships he pleases, and dispose of them as he thinks good when he has done. His Salary is 10000 Franks.

The Knights of the King's Order have no certain number, depending wholly upon the King's pleasure. When they are created they swear to defend the Crown, and never upon any terms to be engaged against it: they can never be degraded or deprived of their Dignity but by death. The highest of their Pensions is 4000 Franks *per an.* some have less, for all are not equal.

The Chamberlains office is to wait upon the King, to see to his Chamber, and to advise him: and indeed his Chamberlains are persons of the principal reputation in his Kingdom: their Pensions are six, eight, and ten thousand Franks *per an.* and sometimes nothing, for the King does often confer those Places upon some great and rich stranger, whom he has a mind to oblige: but though they have no Pensions, they are exempted from all Gabels, and have their diet in Court at the next Table to the King's.

The Master of the Horse is to be always about the King; his authority is over the 12 Queries, and the same that the Grand Seneschal, the Grand Master, and the Grand Chamberlains is over those who are under them. He has the care of the King's Horses, and Harness, helps him up and down; and carries the Sword before him.

The Lords of the King's Council have Pensions of betwixt six and eight thousand Franks *per an.* at the pleasure of his Majesty; their names at present are, *Monsieur de Parigi*, *Monf. di Buonaglia*, the Baylis of *Amiens*, *Monf. du Ruffi*, and the Grand Chancellor; but *Rubertet*, and *Monf. di Parigi* govern all.

There is no Table kept for them since the death of the Cardinal of *Roan*, for when the Grand Chancellor is absent, *Parigi* does that office for him; and takes them with him.

The Title which the King of France pretends to the State of *Milan*, is thus; His Grandfather married a Daughter of the Duke of *Milan*, who died without Heir males.

Duke *Giovanni Galeazzo* had two Daughters women grown, and I know not how many Sons. Of the Ladies, one was called *Madona Valentina*, and was married to *Lewis* Duke of *Orleans*, Grandfather to this present King, descended lineally from King *Pipen*. Duke *John Galeazzo* being dead, his Son *Philsp* succeeded him, who died without legitimate issue, leaving only one natural Daughter behind him. Afterwards that State was usurped illegally by the *Sforzeschs*, as is reported, because they pretend it fell to the Heirs of the said *Madona Valentina*, and that from the very day in which the Duke of *Orleans* married with the House of *Milan*, he added to the three Lillies in his Coat of Arms, the Snake, which is to be seen at this day.

In every Parish in France there is a person called a *Frank Archer*, who is paid by the Parish, and is obliged to be always ready with a good Horse and Arms to wait upon the King, when

when ever they are required, whether abroad in time of War, or at home upon any other occasion: they are bound likewise to ride up and down for the security of such places as are liable to in-roads, or any ways suspected; and, according to the number of the Parishes, they are 1700000 men.

Their Lodgings are appointed by the Harbingers according to every mans office, and usually the richest men quarter the greatest Courtiers; and that neither the Lodger nor Landlord may have reason to complain, the Court has appointed a rate or rule to be observed generally for all people, and that is a *sous* or penny a day for their Chamber; in which there is to be bed, and chairs, and stools, and all things that are necessary.

There is an allowance likewise of two pence a day to every man for linen, (as towels and napkins) and for vinegar and verjuice; their linen is to be changed at least twice every week, but there being great plenty in that Country, they change oftner, as Lodgers desire it; besides which, they are obliged to keep their beds made, and their chambers swept and clean.

There is allowance likewise of two pence a day for the standing of every man's horse; they are not bound to provide any thing for them, only to keep their stalls clean, and carry out the dung.

Some there are who pay less, as their Landlords are good natured, or they can make any shift; but this is the ordinary rule of the Court.

The English Title to the Crown of *France*, upon my best inquiry, I find to be thus: *Charles* the sixth of *France* married his lawful Daughter *Katharine* to *Henry* the fifth, Son and Heir to *Henry* the fourth, King of *England*: In the articles of Marriage, (no notice being taken of *Charles* the seventh, who was afterwards King of *France*), besides the Dowry that was given with *Katharine*, *Charles* the sixth, Father to the said *Katharine* instituted *Henry* the fifth of *England* (his Son in Law, and to be married to the said *Katharine*) Heir to that Kingdom of *France*: and in case the said *Henry* should die before the said *Charles*, and the said *Henry* leave Sons that were legitimate behind him, that then the Sons of the said King *Henry* should succeed to the said Kingdom of *France*, upon the death of the said *Charles* the sixth; which was contrary to Law, because *Charles* the seventh was prejudiced thereby, and was afterwards of no validity or effect: against which the *English* pretend that *Charles* the seventh was illegitimate.

The Arch-Bishopricks in *England* are two.

The Bishopricks two and twenty, and

The Parishes 52000.

THE  
S T A T E  
O F  
GERMANY,  
I N

An Abridgment written by *Nicolo Machiavelli*,  
Secretary of FLORENCE.

**O**F the power of *Germany* no body can doubt, because it abounds so exceedingly in Men, and Money, and Arms. As to its wealth, there is not a Free Town in the whole Country, but has a publick stock beforehand of its own; and some say *Argentina* (*Strasburg*) alone has a Million of Florens constantly in bank. The reason of their opulence is, because they have nothing to exhaust them, but their Fortifications, and furnishing their Magazines (for reparations, and recruits cost them but little.) In the latter they have a very good way, for they have always in their publick Stores, Meat and Drink, and Firing for a Twelve-month: Besides, to entertain the industry of their people, they have wherewithal to set the poor on work, in case of any Siege, a compleat year together, so as they may subsist upon their own labour, without being burthenfom to the Town. Their Souldiers are but little expence to them, for they are always well arm'd, and well exercised; and on their Festival days, instead of the Common recreations, one takes his Musket, another his Pike, one one sort of Arms, another another, and practising among themselves, they grow very ready and dexterous; and after they are arrived at some degree of perfection, they have certain Honours and Salaries conferred upon them, which is the greatest part of their charge. So that in every free Town the publick Treasury is rich.

The reason likewise why the private persons are rich, is this because they live with great parsimony, and indeed little better than if they were poor; for they are at no expence in their Clothes, their Buildings, nor the furnishing of their Houses. If they have bread, and flesh, and any thing to keep them from the cold, they are well enough; and he that wants them, is contented, and makes some shift or other without them. Two Florens will serve them in Clothes ten years; and according to his degree every man lives at this rate; they do not trouble themselves for every thing they want, but only for those things that are absolutely necessary, and by that means their necessities are much fewer than ours: The result of which Custom is this, their Money goes not out of their Country, they contenting themselves with their own Native productions, whilst in the mean time every man is permitted to bring in what Treasure he pleases into *Germany*, to purchase their Commodities and Manufactures which in a manner supplies all *Italy*; and their gain is so much the more, by how much a small part of the profit of their labours, recruits them with Materials for new.

Thus do they live at liberty, and enjoy their own humors; for which reason they will not be got to the Wars, but upon extraordinary pay and that will not do it neither, unless they be commanded by their own Magistrates; Wherefore an Emperor has need of more Money, than another Prince, because if men be in a good condition already, they are not easily allured to the Wars.

As things stand now, the free States must unite with the Princes, before any great exploit can be undertaken by the Emperor; or else they must enterprize it themselves, which they would be able to do. But neither the one nor the other desires the greatness of the Emperor; for if ever he should get those Free States into his hands, he should be strong enough to overpower the Princes, and reduce them to such a degree of subjection, that he would manage them as he pleased himself, as the Kings of *France* have done formerly in that Country, and particularly King *Lewis*, who by force of Arms, and the cutting off some few Persons brought them to their present obedience. The same thing would happen to the States, if the Princes should be cajoled, they would lose their freedoms, be wholly at the disposition of the Emperor, and be forced to be satisfied with what he would vouchsafe to afford them. The distance and division betwixt the free States and the Princes, is supposed to proceed from the different humors in that Country, which in general are two; The *Swissers* are become Enemies to all *Germany*, and the Princes to the Emperor. It may seem strange perhaps, that the *Swissers*, and free States should be at variance and enmity, seeing the preservation of their liberty, and securing themselves against the Princes, is the common interest of both; But their discord is from this, that the *Swissers* are not only Enemies to the Princes, but to all Gentlemen whatever, and in their Country, they have neither the one, nor the other; but live without distinction of persons (unless in their Magistrates) in the most levelling liberty in the world. This practice of the *Swissers* makes all the Gentlemen which are remaining in any of the free Towns afraid of them; so that they employ their whole industry in keeping their States at a distance with them, and preventing any intelligence betwixt them. Moreover all of those States who have been Soldiers, and had their Education in the Wars, are mortally their Enemies moved thereunto by Emulation and Envy, because they themselves are not so famous abroad, and their animosity is so great, that they never meet in the field (let their numbers be small, or great) but they fall together by the Ears.

As to the Enmity betwixt the Princes, and the free Towns, and the *Swissers*, I need say no more, it being so generally known; as likewise of the jealousies betwixt the Emperor and the Princes. You must understand, that the Emperors principal apprehension is of the Princes, and not being able to correct them alone, he has made use of the assistance of these free States, and not long since, entertained the *Swissers* into his allyance, by whose means he thought himself in a very good condition. So that these common dissentions being considered, and the particular piques and suspicions betwixt one Prince, and one State and another; it is no easie matter to unite the Empire; and yet it is necessary it should be united, before any great thing can be performed by the Emperor. And though he who believes *Germany* in a condition to do great things, because there is visibly no Prince who has the power, or indeed the courage to oppose the designs of the Emperor, as formerly has been done, yet he must know that it is a great impediment to an Emperor not to be assisted by those Princes, for though perhaps a Prince dares not contend with him, he dares deny him his assistance; and if he dares not deny him that, he dares break his promise upon occasion, and if he dares not do that, will at least mak so bold to deferr and delay the performance so long, that when his supplies do come, they shall do the Emperor no good; all which things do infinitely disturb, and embarras his designs. And this was found to be true, when the Emperor would the first time have passed into *Italy*, in spight both of the *French* and the *Venetian*; in a dyet held at that time in *Constance*, he was promised by the several Free States in *Germany* a supply of . . . thousand Foot, and 3000 Horse, yet he could never get of them together above 5000, and that because by that time the Forces of one State came up; another was ready to depart, their time being expired and some sent Mony in lieu; upon which score that Enterprize was lost.

The strength of *Germany* consists in the free Towns rather, than in the Princes; for the Princes are of two sorts, Temporal and Spiritual. The Temporal Princes are brought very low, partly by themselves (every Principality, being cantonized and distributed to several Princes by constitution of their inheritances which are observed very strictly in those Countries) and partly having been much weakned by the Emperor and his assistance from the said States; so that now the amity of the Temporal Princes, is of little importance. There are likewise Spiritual Princes, whose Territories, if not cantonized and divided by those Hereditary Customs, are yet so weakned and enervated by the ambition of their own free Towns, and the favour that the Emperor shoves them, that the Electoral Archbishops, and the rest have little or no power in the great and chief Towns of their own Dominions; from whence it comes to pass, that being divided at home, they cannot favour the Enterprizes of the Emperor, though they would themselves. But to come to the Free, and the Imperial Towns, which are the strength of that Country, as being rich, and well-govern'd.

Those



Those Towns for several reasons, are grown cooler in the assertion of their Liberties, and much more in the acquisition of new, and that which they do not desire for themselves, they do not care another should have. Besides they are so many; and every one to be commanded by a General of their own, that their supplies, when they are disposed to send them, come but very slow, and when they do come, are not so useful as they should be; and of this we had an Example not many years since. The *Swissers* invaded the State of *Maximilian*, and *Suevia*: The Emperor contracted with the Free Towns to repell them, and they obliged themselves to assist him with an Army of 14000 Men, but he never got half of them, and the reason was as abovesaid, when the Forces of one Town came up, another marched off, insomuch that the Emperor despairing of success, came to an agreement with the *Swissers*, and left *Basil* in their possession. And if in this case, where their own interest was concerned, they have acted at this rate, it may be guessed how they will behave themselves in the concerns of other men; so that all these things laid together, though their power be great, yet it can turn but to little accompt to the Emperor. And the *Venetians* by their conversation and Commerce with the Merchants of *Germany*, in all their Transactions hitherto with the Emperor, have understood him better than any body else, and dealt more honourably by him; for had they been in any apprehension of his power, they would have insisted upon some caution, either by way of Money or Towns; and if they had seen any possibility of uniting the whole power of the Empire, they would never have opposed it: But knowing that to be impossible, it made them the more confident, and gave them hopes of success. If therefore in a single City, the affairs of the multitude are negligently managed, in a Province they will be much worse. Moreover those little States are sensible, that an acquisition in *Italy*, or elsewhere, would fall to the Princes, and not to them, because they might enjoy them personally, which could not be done by a Common-wealth, and where the reward is like to be unequal, people will not willingly be at an equal expence. Their power therefore is great, but of little importance, and he who peruses what has been said before, and considers what was been done for several years past, will find how little it is to be rely'd upon.

The *German Men at Arms* are well mounted, and many of them well enough arm'd, but their Horses are heavy and unactive, and it is to be observed that in their Encounters with the *Italians* or *French*, they can do nothing at all, not for any fault in the Men, but the accoutrement of their Horses, for their Saddles being little, and weak, and without bows, every little jostle tumbuls them upon the ground: and another of their great disadvantages is, that the lower part of their bodies are never arm'd whereby not being able to defend against the first impressiõ (in which the excellence of those Soldiers consist) they lie exposed (upon the close) to the short Swords of the Enemy, and may be wounded both themselves and Horses in those disarmed places, and it is in the power of every Foot man to pull them off on their Horses, and rip their Guts out when they have done, and then as to the manage of their Horses they are too heavy to do any thing at all.

Their Foot are very good, and very personable men, contrary to the *Swiss*, who are but small, rough hewn, and not handsome at all: But they arm themselves (unless it be some few) only with a Pike and a Sword, that they might be the more dexterous, and nimble, and light; and their saying used to be, that they arm themselves no better, because they feared nothing but the Artillery against which no Breast-plate, or croslet, or Gorget would secure them; other weapons they despise; for it is said their order is so good, and they stand so firm to one another 'tis impossible to break into them nor come near them if their Pikes be long enough. They are excellent in a Field fight, but for the storming of a Town they are good for nothing; and but little to defend one: and generally where the Men cannot keep their old orders and manage themselves with room enough, they are worth but little: Of this experience has been seen where they have been engaged with the *Italians*, or assaulted any Town, as at *Padua* where they came off very ill, though on the other side, in the Field they had done well enough. For in the Battel of *Ravenna*, betwixt the *French* and the *Spaniards*, if it had not been for their Lanceknights, the *French* had been beaten; for whilst the Men at Arms were confronted, and engaged with one another, the *Spaniards* had the better of the *French*, and had disordered their *Gascoigns*, so that had not the *German*s come in and relieved them; they had been utterly broken: and the same was seen lately when the *Spanish* King made War upon the *French* in *Guienna*, the *Spaniards* were more fearful of a Body of 10000 *German* Foot, which the King of *France* had in his Service than all the rest of his Army, therefore they declined coming to a Battel with all the Art they could use.

THE  
DISCOURSES  
OF  
Nicholas Machiavel,  
UPON THE  
FIRST DECADE  
OF  
TITUS LIVIUS.

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Faithfully Engliſhed.

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L O N D O N,

Printed for *John Starkey, Charles Harper, and  
John Amery, in Fleetstreet.* 1680.

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NICOLO MACHIAVELLI  
TO  
ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI <sup>do</sup>  
And COSIMO RUCELLAI <sup>ma</sup>

**I** Send you a Present which (though not answerable to my obligations) is doubtless the greatest that Nicolo Machiavelli was able to send, having expressed in it whatever I know or have learned by a long practice, and continued reading of the affairs of this World than which neither you nor any body else being to expect more, I am not to be blamed if my Present be no better. You may complain indeed of the poverty of my parts, my narrations being so poor; and of the weakness of my judgment, having perhaps mistaken in many places of my Discourses: if so, I know not which of us is less obliged to the other, I to you, for having forced me to write against my own inclination, or you to me, for having performed it no more to your satisfaction. Accept it then in the same manner as things are accepted from friends, among whom the intention of the giver is always more considered than the quality of the gift, and believe that as oft as I think of it, I am satisfied in this, that however I have been mistaken in many other circumstances, I have done wisely in this, having chosen you above all others for the dedication of my Discourses, both because in not doing it, I should have shewn my self in some measure ingrateful for the benefits received, and in doing it, I have transgressed the common custom of Authors, who for the most part direct their Works to some Prince, and (blinded with ambition and avarice) applaud and magnifie him for all the virtuous qualities, when perchance they ought rather to have reproached him with all the vices imaginable. To avoid that error, I have made choice, not of those who are actually Princes, but of such as by their infinite good parts do merit to be so; not of those who are actually able to advance me to Honours, Employments, and Wealth, but to those, who though unable, would do it if they could: for (to judge right, men are rather to esteem those in whose nature, than those in whose power it is to be liberal, and those who understand how to govern a Kingdom, than those who do govern it without that understanding.) Accordingly Authors do commend Hiero the Syracusan, though but a private person, above Perseus of Macedon, though a great King: because to Hiero there was nothing wanting to be an Excellent Prince, but a Principality; and Perseus had nothing but a Kingdom to recommend him to be King. Accept then (whether it be good or bad) what you commanded your selves, and if you be so far in an error as to approve my opinions, I shall not fail to pursue the rest of my History, as I promised in the beginning. Farewel.

THE  
DISCOURSES  
OF  
Nicholas Machiavel,  
CITIZEN and SECRETARY  
OF  
FLORENCE,

Upon The

First Decade of *TITUS LIVIUS*

T O.

ZANOBIUS BONDEMONTUS  
AND  
COSIMUS RUCCELLIUS.

LIBER. I.

Considering with my self what honour is given to Antiquity, and how many times (passing by variety of instances) the fragment of an old Statute has been purchased at an high rate by many people, out of curiosity to keep it by them, as an ornament to their house, or as a pattern for the imitation of such as delight in that art, and with what industry and pains they endeavour afterwards to have it represented in all the in-buildings. On the other side, observing the most honourable and heroick actions (describ'd in History, perform'd by Kingdoms and ancient Common-wealths; by Kings, great Captains, Citizens, Legislators, and others, which have not only tired, but spent themselves in the service of their Country) are rather admir'd than imitated, and indeed so far shun'd and declin'd, in all places, there is scarce any impression or shadow to be seen in this age of the virtue of our ancestors; I could not at the same time but admire, and lament it; and the more, by how much I observed in all civil and personal controversies; in all diseases incident to mankind, recourse is continually had to such judgments and remedies as have been derived to us by our predecessors; for to speak truth, the Civil Law is nothing but the sentence and determination of their fore-Fathers, which reduc'd into order, do shew and instruct our present Lawyers which way to decide; nor is the art of the Physician any thing more than ancient experience handed down to our times, upon which the Practiser of our age founds all his method and doctrine. Nevertheless, in the ordering of Common-wealths, in the conservation of their several members, in the Government of

N. n

King.

Kingdoms, in the regiment of armies, in the management of War, in the administration of Justice, in the enlargement and propagation of Empire, there is not to be found either Prince, Republick, great Captain or Citizen, which repairs to Antiquity for example; which persuaded me it proceeded not so much from niceness and effeminacy our present Education has introduced upon the world, nor from the mischief which turbulent and seditious idleness has brought forth in many Provinces and Cities in Christendom, as from our ignorance or inadvertency in History not taking the sense of what we read, or not minding the relish and poinancy with which it is many times impregnated; from whence it comes to pass, that many who read are much pleased and delighted with the variety of accidents contained in History, but never think them intended for their imitation, that being a thing, in their judgments, not only difficult, but impossible; as if the Heaven, the Sun, the Elements and Mankind were altered and dispossessed of the motion, order and power with which they were primitively invested. Being desirous to reduce such as shall fall into this error, I have judged it necessary to write upon all those Books of *Titus Livius*, (which, by the malignity of time, have not been intercepted) what I (according to ancient and modern opinion) shall think useful for their further explanation; to the end, that they which shall peruse these my discourses, may extract such advantage and document as is necessary for their proficiency and improvement by History; and though my enterprize appears to be difficult, yet by the assistance of those who put me upon it, I do not despair but to discharge my self so, as to leave the way much more easie and short to any man that shall desire to come after me.

## C H A P. I.

*What have been generally the principles of all Cities, and particularly of Rome*

Those who shall read the Original of the City of *Rome*, by what Legislators advanced and by what Government ordered, will not wonder it shall remain firm and entire for so many ages, afterwards so vast an Empire spring out of it as that Commonwealth arrived to. Being to discourse first of its Original, it is convenient to premise, that all Cities are built either by natives born in the Country where they were erected, or by strangers. The first happens when, to the Inhabitants dispersed in many and little parties, it appears their habitation is insecure, not being able apart (by reason of their distance, or smallness of their numbers) to resist an invasion, (if any Enemy should fall upon them) or to unite suddenly for their defence, without leaving their Houses and Families exposed, which by consequence would be certain prey to the enemy. Whereupon, to evade those dangers, moved either by their own impulse, or the suggestions of some person among them of more than ordinary authority, they oblige themselves to live together in some place to be chosen by them for convenience of provision, and easiness of defence. Of this sort, among many others, *Athens* and *Venice* were two: the first that built under the authority of *Theseus*, upon occasion of the like distance and dispersion of the natives. The other (there being many people driven together into certain little Islands in that point of the *Adriatick* Sea, to avoid the War which every day, by the access and irruption of new Armies of *Barbarians* after the declension of the Roman Empire grew intolerable in *Italy*) began by degrees among themselves, without the assistance or encouragement of any Prince, to treat and submit to such Laws as appeared most likely to preserve them: and it succeeded to their desire by the long respite and tranquillity their situation afforded them; that Sea having no passage at that end, and the *Barbarians* no ships to disturb them; so that the least beginning imaginable was sufficient to exalt them to their present authority and grandeur.

The second case, when a City is raised by strangers, it is done by people that are free, or depending (as Colonies), or else by some Prince or Republick to ease and disburthen themselves of their exuberance, or to defend some Territory, which being newly acquired, they desire with more safety and less expence to maintain (of which sort several were by the people of *Rome* all over their Empire) otherwise they are sometimes erected by some Prince, not for his residence so much as for his glory and renown (as *Alexandria* by *Alexander* the great). But these Cities not being free in their Original, do seldom arise to any extraordinary height more than to be reckoned the heads or chief of some Kingdom. Of this sort was *Florence*, for (whether built by the Souldiers of *Silla*, or perchance by the

Inhabi-

Inhabitants of the Mountain *dr Fiesole*, who presuming upon, and being encouraged by the long Peace under the Reign of *Augustus*, descended from their Mountain to inhabit the plain upon the River *Arno* (it was built under the Roman Empire, and could not upon those principles exalt it self higher than the courtesie of the Prince would permit. The Founders of Cities are free, when by themselves, or the Command of their Sovereign they are constrained upon occasion of sickness, famine, or war, to abandon their own, in quest of new Countries: and these do either possess themselves of such Towns as they find ready built in their Conquests, (as *Moses* did), or they build them *de novo*, as *Aneas*. In this case the power of the builder, and the fortune of the building is conspicuous and honourable, according as the cause from whence it derives its Original is more or less eminent. His virtue and prudence is discernible two ways, by the election of the Seat, and institution of the Laws; and because men build as often by necessity as choice, and the judgment and wisdom of the builder is greater where there is less room and latitude for his election; it is worthy our consideration whether it is more advantageous building in barren and unfruitful places, to the end that the people being constrained to be industrious, and less obnoxious to idleness, might live in more unity, the poverty of the soil giving them less opportunity of dissention. Thus it fell out in *Ravenna* and several other Cities built in such places; and that kind of election would doubtless be most prudent and profitable, if men could be content to live quietly of what they had, without an ambitious desire of Command: But there being no security against that, but power, it is necessary to avoid that sterility, and build in the fruitfullest places can be found, where their numbers encreasing by the plentifulness of the soil, they may be able not only to defend themselves against an assault, but repel any opposition shall be made to their grandeur; and as to that idleness to which the richness of the situation disposes, it may be provided against by Laws and convenient exercise enjoyn'd, according to the example of several wise men, who having inhabited Countries, pleasant, fruitful, and apt to produce such lazy people improper for service, to prevent the inconvenience which might follow thereupon, enjoyned such a necessity of exercise to such as were intended for the Wars, that by degrees they became better Soldiers than those Countries which were mountainous and barren could any where produce. Among whom may be reckoned the Kingdom of *Egypt*, which, notwithstanding that it was extremely pleasant and plentiful, by the virtue and efficacy of its Laws produced excellent men, and perhaps such as, had not their names been extinguished with time, might have deserved as much honour as *Alexander* the Great, and many other great Captains, whose memories are so fresh, and so venerable among us. Ah who ever would consider the Government of the *Soldan*, the discipline of the *Mamelukes*, and the rest of their Militia before they were extirpated by *Selimus* the Turk, might find their great prudence and caution in exercising their Soldiers, and preventing that softness and effeminacy to which the felicity of their soil did so naturally incline them.

For these reasons I conceive best to build in a fruitful place, if the ill consequences of that fertility be averted by convenient Laws. *Alexander* the Great being desirous to build a City to perpetuate his name *Dinocrates* an Architect came to him, and undertook to build him one upon the Mountain *Athos*, and to recommend and enforce his proposal, (besides the goodness of the soil) he persuaded him it should be made in the shape and figure of a man (a thing which would be new, wonderful, and suitable to his greatness). But when *Alexander* enquired whence it was to be supplied, the Architect replied, he had not considered of that; at which answer *Alexander* laugh'd very heartily, and leaving him and his mountain to themselves, he built *Alexandria*, where people might be tempted to plant by the richness of the Soil, the nearness of the Sea, and convenience of the River *Nile*. Again, if we examine the Original of *Rome*, and admit *Aneas* for the first Founder, it will fall in the number of those Cities built by foreigners: if *Romulus*, among such as were erected by the natives; either way it was originally free, without any dependance. It will appear likewise (as shall be shewn more particularly hereafter) by what Laws *Romulus*, *Numa* and others fortified and secur'd it; inso much that neither the fertility of the Soil, the commodity of the Sea, the frequency of their Victories, nor the largeness of its Empire were able to debauch or corrupt it; but it remained for several ages for piety and virtue more exemplary than any other Commonwealth either since or before it. And because the great things acted under that Government, and transmitted to us by *Titus Livius*, were performed by publick or private Counsel within or without the City, I shall begin with what occur'd in the Town, and was managed by publick debate, (as judging that most worthy our annotation) super-adding what ever depended thereupon; and with these discourses I intend this first Book (or rather Part) shall conclude.

## C H A P. II.

*The several kinds of Commonwealths and under which kind the Roman is comprehended.*

AVING the discourse of those Cities which in their beginning have been dependant, I shall speak of such as were originally free, and governed themselves according to their own fancies, Commonwealths or Principalities, as their own inclinations lead them. Of these (according to the diversity of their principles) their Laws and Orders were divers. Some of them at their first foundation received their Laws at one time from a single person, as the *Spartans* from *Lycurgus*. Others received them by chance, at several times, upon variety of accidents, as *Rome*; and that Commonwealth is doubtlesly happy, whose good fortune it is to have a person so wise as to constitute and dispose its Laws in such manner at first, that it may subsist safely and securely by them, without necessity of new modelling or correction. Of this sort was *Sparta*, which for more than 800 years was observed to remain entire and incorrupt, without any dangerous commotion. On the other side, that City must needs be in some measure unhappy, which, not having submitted to, or complied with the prudence of a single founder, is necessitated of it self to remodel and reform. Of these kinds, that is most unhappy whose principles were at first remote and devious from the right way which might have conducted to perfection; and indeed those Commonwealths which are in this degree, are almost impossible to be established by any accident whatsoever. But others (whose Commencements are good, and capable of improvement, though perhaps not exquisitely perfect) may become perfect afterwards by the concurrence of accidents, yet not without danger forasmuch as most men are averse, and will not easily admit of any new Law which introduces new Orders and Customs into a City, without great appearance of necessity, and that necessity arising necessarily from some danger impending, it many times falls out the Commonwealth perishes before remedy can be applied. Of this the Commonwealth of *Florence* is instance sufficient, which in the commotion of *Aretz* was the 11th. time reformed, and the 12th. time confounded by the sedition of *Prata*.

But being now to discourse of the State of the Roman Commonwealth, and what were the accidents and orders which advanced it to that perfection, it is convenient to premise (what has been asserted by several Authors) that there are but three sorts of Governments *Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy*, to either of which who ever intends to erect a Government, may apply as he pleases. Others (of no less reputation) are of opinion the forms of Government, are six, of which three are bad, and three good of themselves, but so easily corrupted, even they become fatal and pernicious. Those which are good are the three before mentioned, those which are evil are three others depending upon the three former; and carrying so near a resemblance, they many times interfere, and fall one into the other, as *Monarchy* into *tyranny*, *Aristocracy* into *Oligarchy*, and *Democracy* into *Anarchy* and *Confusion*: insomuch, that who ever forms his Government of one of the three former, forms it for no long time, because no care nor remedy can prevent, but it will degenerate into its contrary, by reason of the similitude berwixt virtue and vice: and these changes and variations of Government happened by accident amongst men; for at the beginning of the World the Inhabitants being few; they lived dispersed after the manner of beasts: afterwards, as they multiplied, they began to unite and, for their better defence, to look out for such as were more strong, robust, and valiant, that they might choose one out of them to make him their head, and pay him obedience; from hence the first distinction berwixt honest and dishonest did arise: for observing that if any injur'd his Benefactor, it immediately created an hatred and compassion among the rest, all people abhorring him that was ungrateful, and commiserating him that was injur'd; lest the same injustice might happen to themselves, they began to make Laws, and ordain punishments for offenders; and this was the first appearance of justice in the World; after which, being to make Election of their Prince, they did not so much respect the ability of his body, as the qualifications of his mind, choosing him that was most prudent and just; but by degrees their Government coming to be Hereditary, and not by Election, according to their former way, those which inherited degenerated from their Ancestors, and neglecting all virtuous actions, began to believe that Princes were exalted for no other end but to discriminate themselves from their subjects by their pomp, luxury, and all other effeminate qualities, by which means they fell into the hatred of the people, and by consequence became afraid of them, and that fear en-

creasing,



creating, they began to meditate revenge, oppressing some, and disabling others, till insensibly the Government altered, and fell into Tyranny. And these were the first grounds of ruine, the first occasion of Conjurat[i]on and Conspiracy against Princes, not so much in the pusillanimous and poor, as in those whose generosity, spirit and riches would not suffer them to submit to so dishonourable administrat[i]ons. The multitude following the authority of the Nobles, took up Arms against their Prince, and having conquered and extirpated that Government, they subjected themselves to the Nobility which had freed them; and detesting the name of a single person, they took the Government upon themselves, and at first (reflecting upon the late Tyranny) governed according to new Laws devised by themselves, postponing particular profit to publick advantage, so that both the one and the other were preserved and managed with great diligence and exactness. But their authority afterwards descending upon their Sons, (who being ignorant of the variations of fortune, as not having experimented her inconstancy) and not contenting themselves with a civil equality, but falling into rapine, oppression, ambition, and adulteries, they changed the Government again, and brought it from an Optimacy to be governed by few, without any respect or consideration of Justice or Civility; so that in a short time it hapned to them as to the Tyrant; for the multitude being weary of their Government, were ready to assist any body that would attempt to remove it, by which means in a short time it was extinguished.

And forasmuch as the tyranny of their Prince, and the insolence of their Nobles were fresh in their memory, they resolved to restore neither the one nor the other, but conclude upon a popular State, which was regulated so as neither Prince nor Noble should have any authority: and there being no States but are revered at first, this Populacy continued for some time, but not long, (especially after its Founders) for it fell immediately into an irresistible licentiousness, contemning all authority both publick and private; and every man living after his own mind, a thousand injuries were daily committed, so that forc'd by necessity, by the suggestions of some good man, or for avoiding the like enormities, they returned to their primitive Kingship, and from thence by degrees relapsed again in the manner, and upon the occasions aforesaid. And this is the Sphear and Circle in which all Republicks have, and do move; but it seldom or never happens that they return to the same circumstances of Government again, because it is scarce possible for any of them to be so long liv'd, as to pass many times thro' the same mutations and remain upon its legs. It sometimes comes to pass likewise, that in the conflicts and troubles of a State, being destitute both of countel and force, it becomes a prey to some neighbouring Commonwealth that is better governed than it: but admitting that could not be, Governments would fall from one to another, and make an infinite circulation. For these reasons all the foresaid forms of Government are in my judgment infirm and unstable; the three good ones from the shortness of man's life and the three bad ones from their proper imperfections. Whereupon, the wisest Legislators finding this defect, and avoiding every one of those kinds, they fram'd a Government which should consist of them all, believing it to be more permanent and stable, because, Prince, Nobles and People living in the same City, and Communicating in the same Government, they would be all of them in sight of one another, and more capable of correction. The person which in this kind has merited most praise was *Lycurgus*, who ordered his Laws in *Sparta* in such manner that giving King Nobility and People, each of them their portion, he erected a Government that continued for more than eight hundred years, to his great honour, and that Cities repose.

To *Solon* it hapned clear otherwise, (who was the *Athenian* Legislator) whose aiming only at a popular Government, was the cause it was so short lived, that before he died he saw the tyranny of *Pisistrates* spring out of it; and though forty years after the Tyrant's Heirs were expelled, and *Athens* restored to its liberty, yet resuming the old model which *Solon* had recommended, it could not continue above an hundred years, notwithstanding many new laws were super-added to restrain the insolence of the Nobility, and the looseness of the Commons. But there being no mixture and temperament of Principality and Optimacy with the other, in respect of *Sparta*, *Athens* was but of little duration. But to return to *Rome*, though it had not a *Lycurgus* to obstericate at its birth, and supply it with such Laws as might preserve its freedom so long.

Nevertheless, the accidents which hapned upon the dissention betwixt the people and the Senate produced that in some measure which was defective at its foundation; for though in its beginning its Laws and Orders were imperfect, yet it did not altogether defect from the right way which was to conduct it to perfection, *Romulus*, *Numa*, and all the rest of its Kings making many good Laws conformable to its freedom. But their ultimate design being to perpetuate their Monarchy, though that City remained free, there were many things omitted.

ted by those Princes which were necessary for its conservation. And though it fell out their Kings lost their Dominion upon the abovesaid occasions, yet those who expelled them, creating two Consuls in their stead, they rather drove the name than the authority of Kingship out of the City. After which, the Government residing in the Consuls and Senate, it consisted only of two of the three sorts, Monarchy and Aristocracy: it remained now to give place only to a popular Government, and the Roman Nobility being grown insolent upon occasions which shall be mentioned hereafter, the people tumultuated, took up Arms against them, and prevailed so far, that (lest otherwise they might lose all) it was consented the people should have their share, and yet the Senate and Consuls on the other hand retain so much of their former authority as to keep up their degrees as before: and this was the beginning of the *Tribunes* of the people, after the creation of which, that State became better established, every one of the three sorts having a share in the Government, and fortune was very favourable, that though it suffered many mutations and passed from a Monarchy to an Aristocracy, and from that to the people by the same gradations, and the same occasions I have mentioned; nevertheless the power was not taken from their Kings to transfer it upon the Nobles, nor from the Nobility to give it wholly to the people; but remaining mixt and compounded of all three, that Republick grew in time to be perfect, to which perfection the difference and jealousies betwixt the Senate and people contributed exceedingly, as shall be largely demonstrated in the two following Chapters.

## C H A P. III.

*Upon what accidents and tumults in Rome the Tribune of the people was created, by which the Commonwealth became more perfect.*

**A**CCORDING to the judgment of all Authors who have written of Civil Government, and the examples of all History, it is necessary to who ever would establish a Government and prescribe Laws to it, to presuppose all men naturally bad and that they will shew and exert that natural malignity as often as they have occasion to do it securely, for though it may possibly lie concealed for some time, it is for some cause or reason which want of prudent and experienced advisers might not discover, but time discovers it afterwards, and is therefore justly called the *Father of truth*.

After the expulsion of the *Tarquins* there appeared in Rome a very great union betwixt the Senate and people; the Senate seemed to have deposited their old arrogance, and taken up a gentleness and humility that rendered them grateful even to the meanest mechanic: in this manner they curb'd and constrained their evil designs as having no hopes of success while the *Tarquins* wereliving, who were formidable to the Nobility of themselves and would be much more, if the people by any ill usage should be animated to joyn with them, and this was the true ground of their hypocrisie. But no sooner were the *Tarquins* dead, and the Nobility discharged of their fear, but they began to expectorate, and spit out the venome had lain so long in their stomachs against the people using them with all imaginable injury and contempt, which carriage of theirs gives good testimony to my assertion, that man is naturally wicked, never does well but upon necessity; and when at any time it is at his choice, and he may follow his own genius with freedom, all things run immediately into disorder and confusion; and that saying is not without reason, *That Reputation and poverty make men industrious, but it is Laws which make them good*; otherwise, if people did well of themselves, Laws would be useless; but where that is not to be expected, Laws become necessary. No sooner were the *Tarquins* removed, and the authority and terror where-with they kept the Senate in awe, but it was thought fit to find out some new invention that might restrain the Nobility, and keep them in the same circles of humanity and justice as the *Tarquins* had done whilst they were alive: at length, after many squables and contentions betwixt the people and them, all was accommodated by the creation of a *Tribune* for the security of the people, which *Tribune* was to be invested with such authority and privilege as might enable him to become afterwards an Arbitor betwixt them, and a stop for the future to the insolence of the Nobility.

CHAP. IV. *R*

*The dissensions betwixt the Senate and the people of Rome, were the occasion that Commonwealth became so powerful and free.*

I cannot in silence pass over the tumults and commotions which hapned in *Rome* betwixt the death of the *Tarquins*, and the creation of those *Tribunes*. Nor can I forbear saying something against the opinion of many who will needs have *Rome* to have been a tumultuous Republick, so full of mutiny and confusion, that had not its good fortune and valour supplied for its defects, it would have been inferior to any other Commonwealth whatsoever. I cannot deny but fortune and valour were the occasions of the Roman Empire; but, in my judgment, they do not consider, that where the Souldier is good, the discipline is good; and where the discipline is good, there is commonly good fortune: but to return to the other particulars in that City, I say, those who object against the tumults betwixt the Nobles and the people, do in my opinion condemn those very things which were the first occasion of its freedom, regarding the noise and clamours which do usually follow such commotions, more than the good effects they do commonly produce, not considering that in all Commonwealths there are two opposite humours, one of the People, the other of the Nobles; and that all Laws which are made in favour of liberty, proceed from the differences betwixt them, as may easily be seen in the revolutions of *Rome*: for from the time of the *Tarquins* to the *Gracchi*, (which was more than three hundred years) in all the tumults in *Rome* seldom any body was banished, and seldomer put to death: so that it is not reasonable to esteem those popular tumults so dangerous and horrible, nor to pronounce that a seditious and bloody Commonwealth, which in so long time, among all their heats and animosities sent not above eight or ten persons into banishment, executed but few, and condemned not many to any pecuniary Mult. Nor can it be called reasonably disorderly and irregular, which produced so many examples of all sorts of virtue; for good examples proceed from good Education, and good Education from good Laws, and good Laws from those tumults, which many people do so inconsiderately condemn, and who ever examines their success, will not find they have produced any Laws or Violence to the prejudice of the Common interest, but rather on the contrary. And if any should object their ways were wild and unusual, to hear the people roaring against the Senate, and the Senate railing against the people. To see them running tumultuously about the streets, shutting up their shops, and leaving the Town, I answer, that all Cities ought to be allowed some ways of vent and evacuation for their passions, and especially those who expect assistance from their people in time of exigence and danger; in which number the City of *Rome* was one, and had this custom, that when the Commons had a mind to a new Law, they either committed some of the aforesaid outrages, or else refused to lift themselves for the Wars, so that to appease, it was in some measure necessary to comply with them; and the desires of a free people are seldom or never destructive or prejudicial to liberty. Because they commonly spring from actual oppression, or an apprehension of it; and if perhaps that apprehension should be vain, and ill grounded, there is the remedy of Conventions, in which some honest man or good Orator may remonstrate their mistake: and the people, though (as *Tully* says) they may be ignorant, yet they are capable enough of the truth, and do easily submit to it, when delivered to them by any person they think credible, and to be believed. So that it is an obligation upon us to judge more moderately of the Roman Government, and to consider that so many good effects as proceeded from that Republick, could not have been produced but from suitable causes: and if their tumults were the occasion of the creation of the *Tribunes*, they were more laudable than otherwise: for besides that they secured a share of the Government to the people, they were constituted as Guardians and Conservators of the Roman liberty, as shall be shewn in the Chapter ensuing.

## C H A P. V.

*Where the Guardianship of liberty may be most securely deposited, whether among the people or Nobility: and which has greater occasion to tumultuate, he that would acquire more, or he that would defend and keep what he has.*

They who have given us the wisest and most judicious scheme of a Commonwealth, have laid down the conservation of liberty as a necessary fundamental, and according as that is more or less secured, the Government is like to be more or less durable. But forasmuch as all Commonwealths consist of Nobility and Populacy, the question arises, In whose hands that liberty is deposited most safely. In old times among the *Lacedemonians*; and in our times among the *Venetians*; it was intrusted with the Nobility; but among the *Romans* with the common people; for which reason it is to be examined which of them made the better elections:

If we look back to their Originals, there are arguments on both sides; but if we regard only their fate and conclusion, the Nobility must carry it, in respect that the liberty of the *Spartans* and *Venetians* have been much longer lived. But on the other side, (to justify the *Romans*) freedom is (I conceive) most properly committed to their custody who have least appetite to usurp. And doubtless, if the ends and designs both of the Nobility and Commons be considered, it will be found the Nobility are ambitious of Dominion; while the Commons have no other thoughts but to defend themselves against it; and, by consequence, having less hopes to usurp, they have more inclination to live free: so that the conservation of their liberty being committed to the people, it is but reasonable to believe they will be more careful to preserve it; and by how much they are less likely to usurp upon themselves, with the more vigilance will they secure it against the inroachments of others. On the other side, he that defends the *Spartan* and *Venetian* constitution, alleges, that by putting that power into the hands of the Nobility, two excellent things are performed. One is, that thereby they satisfy their ambition who have the greatest interest in the Commonwealth. The other, that they take from the people all opportunity of exerting their natural turbulency and unquietness, which has not only been the occasion of infinite dissensions, but is apt likewise to enforce the Nobility upon such desperate courses as may in time produce unremediable effects. Of this, *Rome* it self is proposed as an example, where the Tribunes being invested with that authority, it was not sufficient to have one Plebeian Consul, but the people must have both, and not content with that neither, they would have the *Censor*, *Prætor*, and the other great Magistrates of the City chosen out of the people. Nor was this enough, but carried on with the same exorbitant fury, they began by degrees to adore such men as they saw likely to confront and beard the Nobility, which humour was the rise of *Marius* his greatness, and his greatness the destruction of *Rome*. All this considered, it is no easie matter, upon impartial deliberation on both sides, to pronounce which of the two is most safely to be trusted with the liberty, because it is no less difficult to determine which is most pernicious to a Commonwealth, he that (not satisfied with what he has) is ambitious of more, or he that is content, and would secure what he has got. He that shall examine it critically, will conclude thus; Either you argue for a Republick, whose aim is to extend and propagate its Empire, as *Rome*; Or one whose designs reach no further than to preserve what they have got. In the first case 'tis necessary in all things to follow the example of *Rome*; in the second, *Venice* and *Sparta* are rather to be imitated for the reasons aforesaid, which shall be reinforced in the following Chapter. But to return from whence we have straggled, and discourse of what men are most nocent in a Commonwealth, they that are impatient to get, or they that are only fearful to lose; I say, that when *Marcus Menenius* was made Dictator, and *Marcus Fulvius* Master of the Horse, (both of them Plebeians) to inquire into certain Conspiracies that were entred into at *Capua*, against the City of *Rome*, authority was given them at the same time to examine and take cognisance of such persons as, by bribery, or any other unlawful means, design'd upon the Consulship, or any other of the great offices in *Rome*: by which the Nobility being highly provoked, (as suspecting it to be done in opposition to them) caused it to be spread abroad, that the Nobility did not by any ambitious or irregular ways affect or design upon those great places; but the Commons, who not daring to trust their preferment to their extraction or virtue, took all extraordinary courses to advance themselves to them. In particular they accused the Dictator, and that with so much vehemence and success, he was glad to call a Council, and (having complained very much of the calumniation of the

the Nobility) to lay down his Dictatorship, and submit himself to the judgment of the people, by whom the Cause being heard, he was fairly acquitted. There it was disputed very hard which was most ambitious; He that would get, or He that would preserve; for a violent appetite either in the one, or the other may be the occasion of great disturbances, which in my judgment are oftner caused by them that are in possession, because the apprehension of losing what they have got, produces the same eagerness and passion, as desire of acquisition does in the other, forasmuch as they seldom think themselves safe in what they have, but by new accumulation; besides, the more wealth or Territory they have, the more power or capacity they have to Usurp as they see occasion: to which may be added that their incorrigible and ambitious deportments, do provoke and kindle a desire in such as have not those dignities, to compass them if they can, and that for two reasons, to revenge themselves upon them, by stripping them of all, and to enrich themselves into the bargain by the wealth and honour which they see others manage so ill.

CHAP. VI.

*Whether in Rome such a form of Government could be established, as should take away the animosities betwixt the Senate and the People.*

WHAT the continued jealousies betwixt the Senate and the People did produce, we have already discoursed; but because the effects of them remained till the time of the *Gracch*, and were the occasion of the destruction of their liberty, it may be demanded whether *Rome* might not have attained that height of Authority and Grandeur under another form of Government that might have prevented those animosities. To resolve this Question, it is necessary to look back upon those Republicks whose Fortune it has been to retain their liberty a long time without those inconveniencies, to examine what was their form, and whether it was practicable in *Rome*. As Examples, we may produce *Sparta* and *Venice*, the first Ancient, the latter more modern, both mentioned before. *Sparta* was governed by a King, and a small Senate; *Venice* did not divide the Government into distinct Names; but all who were admitted to the administration were called *Gentlemen* under one common appellation; and that, more by accident, than any prudence, in the Legislator; for when to those Rocks upon which that City is now seated, many people did repair for the reasons aforesaid, in process of time their number encreasing so fast, that they could not live peaceably without Laws, they resolved to put themselves under some form, and meeting often together to deliberate upon that, when they found they were numerous enough to subsist by themselves, they made a Law to preclude all new comers from the Government: and finding afterwards their numbers encrease, and that there were multitudes of Inhabitants incapable of publick administration; in honours to the Governors they called them *Gentlemen* of *Venice*, and the others but *Citizens*; and this distinction might not only be instituted, but continued without tumult, because when first introduced, all the Inhabitants participating of the Government, no body could complain, and they who came after, finding it firm and established, had no reason, nor opportunity to disturb it; They had no reason, because no injury was done them; they had no opportunity, because the Government restrained them, and they were not employed in any thing that might furnish them with authority; besides those who came after were not in number disproportionable to the Governors, the latter being equally, if not more numerous than they; for which reasons the *Venetians* were able not only to erect, but maintain their Government a long time without any revolution.

*Sparta* being (as I said before) governed by a King and a small Senate, might likewise preserve its Model a long time, by reason the Inhabitants were but few, strangers excluded, and the Laws of *Lycurgus* established with great veneration, so that living by those Laws, all occasion of tumult was taken away, and they might continue united a long time; for though the Offices and Commands were conferred upon a few, yet the revenue of the Country being equally distributed, the people were not Seditious, though they were kept at distance; nor did the Nobility provoke them by any insolence or oppression; and this proceeded from the condition of their Kings, who being environed by the Nobility, had no safer way to secure their dignity, than by protecting the people from injustice and violence, by which means the fear, and the desire of Command being taken from the people, the Emulations betwixt them and the Nobility and the occasion of tumultuating ceased, so that it was not hard for them to enjoy their tranquillity several Ages; Of the length of their

their tranquillity, there were two principal causes; First, The number of the *Spartans* being small, there was no necessity that their Governors should be many; and next no strangers being admited, they were not liable to be corrupted, nor to encrease to such a number, as might grow insupportable to those few who were under their Government. These things being considered, it is plain that the *Roman* Legislators could not have instituted a Commonwealth that should be free from Sedition and Mutiny, any other way, than by imitating the *Venetians* and *Spartans*, that is by not employing the people in their Wars, like the *Venetians*, nor entertaining Foreriners into their City, as the *Spartans*. But the *Roman* Legislators transgressing in both, the people grew strong, and by consequence tumultuous; and if any way the Government were to be rendered more quiet, this inconvenience would follow, it would be rendered also more weak, and all means be taken away that might conduct it to that height of grandeur and authority, at which afterwards it arrived; so that those applications which prevented the tumults in *Rome*, prevented also its enlargement, and the extent of its Empire, as it happens in most humane affairs, the removal of one inconvenience is the contracting of another: For if you arm, and adapt a numerous people for the War, by their means to enlarge your Territory; you put them into a condition of being unmanageable afterwards, and not to be kept down to your Discipline and Government; whereas if you keep them disarmed, and their number but few, though you may make your self Arbitrary, you can never continue it, for your Subjects will grow so poor spirited and vile, you will become a preito the first man that invades you. In all deliberations therefore, the inconveniences are to be considered, and that resolution prefer'd; in which their are fewest; for none can be taken that are absolutely free. The *Romans* then in imitation of the *Spartans*, might have let up a King for his life, and appointed a little Senate; but by so doing, they could never have laid the foundation of so vast an Empire, for an Elective King, and a small Senate would have contributed but little to their unity and peace. He then who would set up a new Commonwealth, should consider whether he would have it (like *Rome*) extend its Dominion and Sovereignty; or keep it self within its own bounds without any dilatation. In the first case it is necessary to imitate the *Romans*, and give way to the tumults and publick dissentions as well as he can; for without his Citizens be numerous, and well disciplin'd and arm'd, he can never extend his Dominion; and if he could, it would be impossible to keep it. In the second, he is to frame to the Model of the *Spartans*, and *Venetians*; but because augmentation of Empire, is commonly the destruction of such Commonwealths, he is by all possible means to prohibu new acquisitions, because depending upon weak Commonwealths, they are always destructive and pernicious, as experience has shown in the Examples of *Sparta* and *Venice*. The first having subdued most part of *Greece*, discovered, upon a slight accident, the weakness of its foundation, for the *Thebans* revolting at the instigation of *Pelopidas*, gave opportunity to other Cities, and quite ruined the Government. In like manner *Venice* having conquer'd the greatest part of *Italy*, more by their Money and Artifice, than Arms; presuming too much upon their force, and coming to a Battel, they were worsted, and in one day lost all which they had got. I should think therefore a Commonwealth that would stand a long time, should model it self within according to the Example of *Sparta* and like *Venice*, fear it self in so strong and inexpugnable a place, that it might not apprehend any sudden insult; nor make it self so great on the other side as to become formidable to its Neighbors; For the common Motives that excite people to make War upon a Commonwealth, are two; either to conquer it themselves, or to secure themselves against it, and by the aforesaid expedient, those two ways are totally frustrated; for if it be hard of access, and well disposed to defend it self, it will seldom or never happen that any Body will attempt it. If it keeps within its own bounds, and by experience be found free from ambition, no body will fear it, nor will any body offend it; and questionless it would be the more safe, if by the Laws and Constitutions it was forbidden to extend, for I am clearly of opinion, that keeping things in this balance and Equilibrium, the Government would be more civil, and the peace of the City more certain. But the affairs of man being mutable, and nothing in them that is durable and firm; there is a necessity that they either encrease or diminish, and that necessity does many times constrain us, to what in reason we should rather decline. Whence it happens, That if a Government be erected apt to defend it self in peace and security without extending its bounds, and necessity enforces it to enlarge, That enlargement takes away its foundation, and ruins it the sooner. So on the other side, when the Stars are so benign to a Commonwealth, as to place it in peace, without any occasion of War, that peace begets idleness, and idleness effeminacy or faction, which two things (and indeed either of them alone) will be sufficient to subvert it. Wherefore, it being impossible, as I conceive, to keep things in this balance and mediocrity; in

the constitution of all republicks, particular care is to be had to what is most honorable; and things are to be so ordered, that if necessity should compel them to enlarge, they might do it in such manner as to be sure to keep it. But to return, a Commonwealth, in my judgment, is better fram'd to the example of *Rome*, than either to the *Venetian* or *Spartan*, it being so hard to hit the exact way between the one and the other; and for the emulations betwixt the Nobility and the People they are to be born as inconveniences, but such as are necessary for a people that would rise to the Grandeur of the *Romans*; against which nevertheless (as I have shewn before) the authority of the *Tribunes* will be some remedy, if invested with the power of impeaching, which was given to the *Tribunes* in other States, as I shall shew in my next Chapter.

CHAP. VII.

*How necessary it is for the conservation of a State, that any Citizen be securely accused.*

There is nothing of more importance to the safety of a State, than that permission be given to such as are set up for the conservation of its liberty, to accuse such persons to the People, the Senate, or other Magistrates, as shall any way offend against the Constitutions thereof; and this practice has two effects very profitable for the Commonwealth: the first is, the Citizens, for fear of being accused, do not attempt any thing to the prejudice of the State; and if they do, they are easily and readily suppress'd: the other is, that thereby a way is opened for the evacuation of such humours as are too frequent among the Citizens of every great City; which humours, without some legal vent, do usually recur to extraordinary ways that are absolutely pernicious: wherefore there is nothing renders a Commonwealth more stable and firm, than the provision of some legal course for the evaporation of those humours which endanger it. This may be demonstrated by several examples, but especially by that which is mentioned by *Titus Livius* in his discourse of *Coriolanus*. He tells us, that the Nobility of *Rome* being exasperated against the people, for that they thought their authority too much increased upon the creation of their *Tribunes*; and it hapning at that time, that in respect of the great scarcity of provisions, the State had sent into *Sicily* for supplies; *Coriolanus* being a great adversary to the popular Faction, advised that this was a fair time to chastise the licentiousness of the people, and to take from them that power which they had assumed to the prejudice of the Nobility, to which purpose he persuaded the Senate against distributing the corn. This counsel coming to the ears of the people, they were so highly incensed, that they set upon him tumultuously as he came out of the Senate, and had certainly killed him, had not the *Tribunes* interposed, and cited him to appear before them in order to his defence. By which accident it is plain how much it is for the interest of a Commonwealth, that a legal way be provided to discharge the choller of the people, which otherwise will be apt to fly to extraordinary courses, and without doubt produce more mischievous effects: for if a single Citizen be cut off, (though possible unjustly) it begets little or no disorder in the Commonwealth, because execution is done without private force, or foreign assistance, (which are mortal things to a free State) and what is done by course of Law, and publick authority, is neither destructive nor dangerous. And as to ancient examples, I think this of *Coriolanus* sufficient; from whence every man may gather what mischief would have resulted to the Commonwealth of *Rome*, had he been cut in pieces by the fury of the people; it would have created private disgusts; those disgusts jealousies; those jealousies provision of defence; that combinations; combinations parties; and parties destruction: but by the interposition of publick authority, all these evils were prevented. We have seen in our time what inconveniences followed in *Florence*, because the multitude had not a legal way of spending their indignations against one of their Citizens. *Francesco Valori* was Prince of that City, suspected by many people, as if he designed to make himself absolute, and by his haughtiness and pride to exceed those limits which the Laws had prescribed: there being in that Commonwealth no way to prevent it, but by setting up a faction in opposition to his, he began to look out himself, and to make a party that might defend him. The people on the other side having no legal way to suppress them, betook themselves to their Arms. And whereas, if any ordinary way had been open to have opposed him, his designs had been obviated by his single destruction; being forced upon an extraordinary, it was effected not only by his, but by the ruine of many other eminent Citizens. To confirm what we have said, another



instance might be produced in the City in the case of *Peter Soderini*, which happened for want of a Law whereby they might impeach any Citizen that aspir'd to the Government. There were eight judges only in that commonwealth, which are not enough to administer justice against a powerful man: in States that are well constituted, 'tis necessary there be more; for where they are so few, their dispatch is but small, and they are corrupted with more ease than where they are many. If therefore there had been any such way allowed, upon his ill Government, the Citizens would have formally impeached him, without calling in an Army of *Spaniards*; and if his Government had been well, they durst not have accused him, lest he should have accused them again; and by that means that emulation would have been prevented which was the cause of so much mischief: from whence it may be concluded, when ever foreign assistance is called in by any party in a City, that it proceeds from the ill constitution of that Government, and that there is no legal way of purging those humours which are so natural to men; against all which, no remedy is more properly applicable, than by authorizing several persons of quality and interest to receive informations; which practice was so well followed in *Rome*, that in all dissentions betwixt the Senate and the people, it was never known that either Senate, or people, or any private Citizen what-ever had recourse to foreign assistance; for having justice at home, what need of fetching it from abroad? To these Examples aforesaid, we may add another out of *Titus Livius*, who tells us, that in *Clusia* the chief City of the *Tuscans*, *Lucamon* having vitiated a Sister of one *Aruns*, and *Aruns* being unable to vindicate her, by reason of the power of the delinquent, he address'd to the *French*, who at that time had the Government of *Lombardy*, and possessing them with the profitableness of the Expedition, he prevail'd with them to bring an Army to revenge him of that outrage and injury which his Sister had received: and doubtless he would never have betaken himself to the relief of a foreigner, could he have hoped for reparation at home. But as liberty of just accusation is great security to a State, so toleration of calumny is as dangerous on the other side which we shall evince in the following Chapter.

#### CHAP. VIII.

*Unjust calumnies are no less pernicious to a Commonwealth, than legal accusations are profitable and good.*

Though the valour of *Furius Camillus* (after he had rais'd their Siege, and driven the *French* from their Leaguer before *Rome*) was so universally venerable, that none of the *Romans* thought it diminution either to their reputation or dignity to give him precedence; yet *Manlius Capitolinus* could not brook that so much honour should be given him, seeing, in his judgment, he had done as much towards the preservation of the City, and deserved as well, in saving the Capital, as *Camillus* had done in the other; and in military experience he thought himself no way inferior: so that full of envy, and unable to bear the greatness of his Competitor, finding he could make no impression upon the Senators, he turned himself to the people, and spread abroad several false reports against him. Among other things, he put it into their heads, that the Treasure which was rais'd for payment of the *French* had not been given, but was continued in the hands of private Citizens; which money, if reassum'd, might be apply'd to publick use, and either lessen the duties, or discharge the debts of the people. These pretences had great influence upon the people, insomuch as they began to talk, to murmur, to meet, to post themselves tumultuously in many places in the City, which being observed, and thought very dangerous by the Senate, they created a Dictator to take cognisance of the business, and restrain the fury of *Manlius*. The dictator cited *Manlius*, and appointed him a day; *Manlius* appeared, and being environed by the people as the Dictator was by the Senate, silence being made, the Dictator asked *Manlius* in whose hands that great Treasure he spake of was detained, for he did assure him the Senators were as desirous to discover it as the people: to which *Manlius* made no positive answer, but by way of evasion, reply'd it was unnecessary (he thought) to tell them what they knew already as well as he; upon which insolence, the Dictator commanded him to prison; from whence it may be observed how detestable such calumnations ought to be, not only in every free City, but in every civil Society, and with what care and severity they are to be suppress'd; and that is done most commodiously, by allowing freedom of accusation; for as calumny is pernicious, information is beneficial to a State.

Accusation and calumny differ in this point, that any man may calumniate another where and when he pleases, without bringing testimony, or any other circumstance to prove it: but in case of accusation 'tis quite another thing, a man must bring his proofs, his witnesses, and other circumstances, to make good his charge. People are legally accused no where, but before the Senates, the Magistrates, or the People: but they are calumniated every where, within doors and without, in the streets and the market-place, and there most where there is least accusation, and the Cities least disposed to receive them. Wherefore he who would lay the foundation State, ought principally to provide that all persons might have liberty to inform against any one, without suspicion or fear; which being solemnly provided, and faithfully observed, his next business is to secure them against scandals, and the calumniator can have no reason to complain if he be punished, when there are publick places appointed to receive the accusations of such as are abused; and if in these things particular care be not taken, great mischiefs will follow; for these kind of aspersions do not correct, but provoke their fellow Citizens, and those who are accused are not so much apt to fear the disgrace, as to hate the authors of the reports. In these cases the Romans had very good Laws, and they stood them in good stead; but we in *Florence* having neglected them, have suffered much by it, and he who peruses the History of our City, will see how subject to calumniation in all times those Citizens have been, who have employed in its most important affairs. One is charged with embezzling the publick treasure; another for being corrupted, and betraying some publick enterprize; a third for ambition, and committing one insolence or another, from whence feuds and animosities do arise on hands; and from thence divisions; from divisions parties; and from parties destruction. Whereas, if in *Florence* authority had been allowed for the accusation of Citizens, many mischiefs had been prevented, which followed for want of it; for those Citizens who were accused (whether condemned or absolved) would have not been able to have molested the State; and the impeachments would have been fewer than the calumniation, because more people would have been calumniated than accused, in respect that the first was so much the more easie (as is said before) than the other. And these calumnies have advanced some Citizens to great dignity; for having great adversaries that opposed their designs, they joynd themselves with the people, and making them their friends, confirm'd the ill opinion which they had of their adversaries before. Several examples might be produced to this purpose, but I shall only instance in one.

The *Florentine* Army was encamped before *Lucca* under the Command of *Giovanni Guiccardini* their Commissary. By his ill fortune or conduct the Town was not taken; which of the two soever it was, *Giovanni* was aspersed, as having been brib'd by the *Luccheses*, which calumny being propagated by his enemies, nettled *Giovanni*, and almost brought him to despair; and though, in order to his justification, he offered to put himself into the hands of the Captain, yet all was to no purpose; for in that Commonwealth there was no body qualified to clear him: from hence arose great contentions betwixt *Guiccardini's* friends, (who were the greatest part of the *Grandees* in that City) and those who studied novelty, which contentions, and others of the like nature, encreasing daily upon their hands, brought that poor Commonwealth into a most deplorable condition. *Manlius* therefore spreading these false reports of the Senators about *Rome*, was a calumniator, not an accuser; and the *Romans* in his case gave manifest instruction how such people are to be punished, that is, that they be obliged publickly to accuse, and when their charge is made good, that they be rewarded or encouraged; but when it cannot be proved, that they be punished like *Manlius*.

CHAP. IX. *XI*

*How much a single person is necessary for the establishment of a new commonwealth, or the reformation of an old.*

IT may seem to some, that I have run too far into the Roman History, having made no mention of the Founders of that Commonwealth, nor of the Orders which they observed either in matters of Religion, or War. To ease them therefore of their suspense; who are desirous to hear something to that purpose, I say, that many perhaps may think it of ill example for the Founder of a State, as *Romulus* was, to kill his own Brother, and afterwards consent to the death of *Titus Tatius Sabinus*, who was chosen his companion in the Government, supposing that according to that president, any of his Citizens that were ambitious

ambitious of Command, might make away their adversaries or competitors, and remove any obstacle that opposed them; and it were reasonable enough, were it not to be considered to what end, and upon what motives that murder was committed.

This is to be taken for a maxim, and general rule, that it is impossible for any Government either to be well founded at first, or well reformed afterwards, unless by a single person, by whose direction all Orders, all Laws are to be made and promulged. He therefore who is the founder of a Commonwealth, if he be an honest man, and aims not at his own interest, and the raising of his Family, more than the advancement of his Country, must endeavour to get the power into his single hands, nor will any wise man ever accuse him for any action extraordinary that he shall do in order thereunto; or if the fact be to be blamed, the effect will excuse it, especially if be good, as it was in *Romulus* his case, for it is destructive and pernicious violence that is to be reprehended, not that which tends to settlement and reformation. He is also to be so prudent and virtuous, as not to leave the authority which he assumed in inheritance to another, because men being more prone to evil than good, his successor may employ that power to the prejudice of the State, which he in his wisdom made use of to its benefit and advantage.

Moreover, though one be fittest to make Laws, yet when once made, they cannot hold long, if left upon the shoulders of a single person, but when the care and execution of them is transfer'd upon many, and many are concerned to maintain them, it is much better; for though many be not so proper in laying the foundations of a Government, because their diversity of opinions keeps them from discerning what is absolutely for its good; yet when things are once settled, and they have found it, that very diversity will be a means to preserve it. And that *Romulus* was excusable for what he did to his Brother and Companion, and that what he did was more for the common good than his own private ambition or revenge, appears by this; that he had no sooner made them away but, he constituted a Senate, by whose advice he acted in every thing, reserving to himself only the power of calling them together, and commanding the Armies when they should resolve of a War: and of this we cannot have better evidence than that which followed after the expulsion of the *Tarquins*, there being nothing innovated or altered by the *Romans*, only in stead of one perpetual King, they treated two annual Consuls; which shews that *Romulus* in his first Institutions aimed rather at the election of a civil and a free, than an absolute and tyrannical State. Many more examples might be produced to fortifie what is said, as those of *Moses*, *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, and other Founders of Kingdoms and Commonwealths, who, by assuming a Monarchical authority, were able to frame and impose such Laws as were for the benefit of the publick; but being so well known, it would be superfluous. I shall add only one, not so famous perhaps, yet worthy to be considered by those who are desirous to be good Legislators; and it is this, *Agis* King of *Sparta* observing his Citizens had lost much of their ancient virtue, and by consequence were decayed both in their power and Empire, imputing it in part to their deviation from the Laws of *Lycurgus*, desired very earnestly to reduce them again, but before he could bring it to perfection he was slain by the *Spartan Ephori*, as one who designed to make himself absolute; but *Cleomenes* succeeding him in the Government, having the same inclination, and perceiving by some Records and Writings which *Agis* had left behind, what was his intention, he found that he could not do his Country that service any way, but by making himself absolute: for by the ambition of some persons, he found that he could not do the good which he designed to the generality, by reason of the malevolence of a few, wherefore he caused the *Ephori*, and who-ever else he thought likely to obstruct him, to be killed, and revived the Laws of *Lycurgus*, which noble act might have recovered that State, and have made *Cleomenes* as venerable as *Lycurgus* himself, had it not been for the power of *Macedon*, and the weakness of other Commonwealths; for not long after that reformation, being invaded by the *Macedonians*, it proved unable to defend itself, and having no body to sustain it, was overcome; and that just and honourable design was unhappily laid aside. Considering therefore what has been said, I conclude, that a single person is best for the institution or regulating of any sort of Government, and that for the death of *Remus* and *Tatius*, *Romulus* was not to be blamed.

## CHAP. X. R

*As they are to be praised who lay the foundations of any Republick or Kingdom, so they are to be condemn'd who set up a Tyranny.*

**A**Mong all Excellent and Illustrious men, they are most praise worthy who have been the chief establishers of Religion and Divine Worship: In the second place are they who have laid the foundations of any Kingdom or Commonwealth; In the third, those who having the Command of great Armies have enlarged their own, or the Dominion of their Country; In the next, Learned Men of all Sciences according to their several Studies and degrees; and last of all (as being infinitely the greatest number) come the Artificers and Mechanicks; all to be commended as they are ingenious or skilful in their Professions. On the other side, they are infamous and detestable, who are contemners of Religion, subverters of Governments, Enemies of Virtue, of Learning, of Art, and in short of every thing that is useful and honourable to mankind; and of this sort, are the prophane, the seditious, the ignorant, the idle, the debauched, and the vile. And although Nature has so ordered it, that there is neither wise man nor fool, nor good man, nor bad, who if it were proposed to him which he would choose of these two sorts of people, would not prefer that which was to be preferred, and condemn the other; yet the generality of Mankind deluded by a false impression of good, and a vain notion of glory, leaving those ways which are excellent and commendable, either wilfully or ignorantly wander into those paths which will lead them to dishonour; and whereas to their immortal honour they might establish a Commonwealth or Kingdom as they please, they run head-long into a Tyranny, not considering what fame, what glory, what affection, what security, what quiet and satisfaction of mind they part with, nor what reproach, scandal, hatred, danger and disquiet they incur. It is impossible but all people, (whether of private condition in the Commonwealth, or such as by their Fortune or Virtue have arrived to be Princes) if they have any knowledge in History, and the passages of old, would rather choose (if private persons) to be *Scipio's* than *Cæsar's*; and (if Princes) to be *Agésilau's*, *Timoleon* and *Dion*, than *Nabis*, *Phalaris*, or *Dionysius*; because they must find the one highly celebrated and admired, and the other as much abhor'd and condemn'd; they must find *Timoleon*, and the rest to have as much interest and authority in their Countries, as *Dionysius* or *Phalaris* had in theirs, and much more security. Nor let any man deceive himself with *Cæsar's* reputation, finding him so exceedingly eminent in History, for those who have cryed him up, were either corrupted by his fortune, or terrified by his power, for whilst the Empire continued, it was never permitted that any man should speak any thing against him, and doubtless had Writers had their liberty, they could have said as much of him as of *Cataline*, and *Cæsar* is so much the worst of the two, by how much it is worse to effect and perpetrate an ill thing, than to designe it; and this they might judge by what is said of his adversary *Brutus*, for not daring to speak downright of *Cæsar*, by reason of his power, by kind of reverse, they magnified his Enemy. After Rome also was grown to be an Empire, and the Government in the hands of a single person, it may be observed how much more happy and secure those Emperors were who lived like good Princes, according to the dictate of the Laws, than those who lived otherwise; for *Titus*, *Nerva*, *Trajanus*, *Adrianus*, *Antoninus*, and *Marcus*; had no need of Prætorian bands, nor multitude of Legions to defend them, their own excellent deportment, the benevolence of the people, and the affection of the Senate, sav'd them that charge: It will appear likewise how to *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Vitellius*, and several other Tyrannical Emperors; their Eastern and Western Armies were not sufficient to secure them against the Enemies, which their irregularity and ill manners had contracted; The History of which persons, if well considered, would enable any Prince to distinguish betwixt the ways of Honour and Infamy, of Security and Fear: For of XXVI Emperors betwixt *Cæsar* and *Maximinus*, XVI were murdered, and but X died in their beds; and though some of those who were slain might possibly be good, (as *Pertinax*, and *Galba*) yet they were murdered by reason of the corruption and ill discipline which their Predecessors had left in the Army; and if among those who died naturally, there were any Tyrannical, (as *Severus*) it is to be imputed to his great Courage and Fortune, which are two things very seldom Concomitant in one man, it is legible likewise in the same History upon what Basis and foundation a Monarchy must be built, to make it solid, and permanent; for all those Emperors who succeeded by hereditary right were ill men, except *Titus* only, and those who came in by Election were good;

good, as *Nerva* and the four which succeeded him; but when the Empire became wholly Hereditary, it ran furiously to destruction. Let the times therefore from *Nerva* to *Marcus* be displayed before your Prince, and let him compare them which went before with those which came after, and then make his choice when they would have been born, or when he would have been Sovereign; He will find when good men were at the Helm, the Prince safe in the security of his Subjects; Peace and Justice flourishing in the world; The Senate in Authority; The Magistrates in Esteem; Rich men enjoying their Estates; Nobility and Virtue Exalted; and all things quiet and well; No rancour; No licentiousness; No corruption; No ambition to be found; the times were golden; Every man enjoyed his opinion, and defended it as he pleased; In a word, He will find the world triumphing in felicity. The Prince happy in the reverence and affection of the people; and the people safe in the generosity of their Prince. If then the Reigns of the other Emperors be contemplated, they will appear full of commotion, discord, and sedition, assassinations in Peace; Cruelty in War; Many Princes murder'd; many Foreign, many domestick embroilments; All *Italy* afflicted; and all its Cities destroyed; *Rome* burnt; The Capitol by its own Inhabitants demolished; The ancient Temples desolate; Religious Ceremonies prophaned; and the whole Citie full of Adulteries; The Sea covered with Exiles, and the Rocks with blood; Infinite Cruelties and Barbarisms committed daily in the City; And Nobility, Riches, Honour, and especially Virtue, grown to be Capital offences. Informers and Calumniators will be found to be rewarded; Servants infligated against their Masters; Children against their Parents; and those few who were so unhappy as to have no Enemies; to be destroyed by their Friends; Then it will appear what mighty obligations *Rome*, and *Italy*, and the whole world had to *Cæsar*; and doubtless if the Prince be endued with the least spark of humanity or good nature, he will detest the imitation of the bad, and be inflamed with an ardent propensity to the good. All which things considered, that Prince certainly which aims at glory, and reputation in the world should desire a Government, where the manners of his Subjects are corrupted and depraved, not to subvert and destroy it like *Cæsar*, but to rectifie and restore it like *Romulus*, than which the Heavens, cannot confer, nor man propose to himself greater honour. And if a Prince who would regulate and reform a City, cannot do it, without depositing his Authority; In that case he is excusable in some measure, if he dispenses; but where he can retain the one, and accomplish the other, he is altogether unpardonable; they therefore to whom the Heavens are so propitious as to present such an opportunity, are to consider that they have two ways before them, one leading to security whilst they live, and an honourable memory when they are dead, the other to continual troubles here, and perpetual infamy hereafter.

## C H A P. XI.

*Of the Religion and Ceremonies of the Romans.*

Though *Rome* should have been founded by *Romulus*, and owe him (as his Daughter) for her Birth, and Education; yet the Heavens foreseeing that the Constitutions of *Romulus* would not be sufficient for so great an Empire, put it into the heart of the *Roman* Senate, to create *Numa Pompilius* for his Successor, to the end that what was left defective by the first, might be completed by the latter. *Numa* finding the people martial and fierce, and being desirous by the Arts of Peace to reduce them to civil obedience, he betook himself to Religion, as a thing absolutely necessary to the maintenance of civil policy; and he ordered things, so that for many ages together never was the fear of God so eminently conspicuous as in that Commonwealth, which was a great promotion to whatever was designed either by the Senate or Princes. And he who shall peruse the infinite actions of that City collectively, or of several *Romans* in particular will find those Citizens more tender of falsifying an Oath, than of violating the Laws, judging an offence against God more heinous, than an offence against Men, and God more able to punish it. Of this we have manifest Evidence in the Examples of *Scipio*, and *Manlius Torquatus*, for after the defeat which *Hanibal* had given the *Romans* at *Cannas*, the people tumultuating, and many of them assembling in great fear to consider of their condition; They resolved among themselves to leave *Italy*, and transplant into *Sicily*. *Scipio* having notice, repaired to them immediately, and coming in suddenly among them with his Sword drawn, he forced them to

recant, and take a peremptory Oath not to abandon their Country. *Lucius Manlius* Father-to *Titus Manlius* (who was afterwards called *Torquatus*) was impeached by *Marcus Pomponius* a Tribune of the people. Before the day arrived for the hearing of the Father, the Son coming to the Tribune and threatening to kill him, unless he would swear to withdraw his accusation, he forced him to his Oath, and he performed as he had sworn; and so those Citizens who could not be retained by either the love of their Country, or Laws; were kept at home by an Oath which they took upon force: and the Tribune laid by his hatred to the Father, passed by the insolence of the Son, and neglected the reflection it would have upon his own honour, to be punctual in his Oath; which proceeded from nothing but those principles of Religion which *Numa* had diffused. And surely it will be found by whoever considers the *Roman* History, how useful a thing Religion was to the governing of Armies, to the uniting of the people, to the keeping men good, and to the deterring them from being bad; so that should it fall into dispute whether *Rome* was most obliged to *Romulus* or *Numa*, I am of opinion, *Numa* would have the prehemence, because where Religion is fixed Military Discipline is easily introduced; but where Religion is wanting, Discipline may be brought in with difficulty, but never in perfection. It is to be seen likewise that for the constituting a Senate, and establishing of Laws both Military and Civil, *Romulus* had no need to pretend Divine Authority; but with *Numa* it was otherwise, he was of necessity to pretend it, and thereupon gave out that he had private Conference with a Nymph, who dictated to him what he was to prescribe to the people; and all was, because he had a mind to introduce new Laws and Customs into that City, which he thought his own private authority would never effect. And certainly never any man brought in new Laws, or set up any Doctrine extraordinary, but with pretence of Religion; because otherwise they would never have been admitted; for a man may be wise and know many things are good, and yet want reasons and arguments to convince other people; wherefore to remove that difficulty, prudent men do make that always their pretence, and *Solon*, *Lycurgus*, and several others who had the same design, practised the same. The people (then) admiring the goodness and wisdom of *Numa*, submitted in all things; True it is the devotion of the age, and ignorance of the people contributed much, for thereby he was able to impress them with what new form he thought good; and questionless, he that would establish a Commonwealth at this day, would find it more easie among the rude people of the Mountains who have not been acquainted with Civility; than among such as have been educated in Cities, where their civility was corrupted; like rude unpolished Marble which is more readily carv'd into a Statue, than what has been mangled already by some bungling workman. So that all things considered, I conclude, That the Religion introduced by *Numa*, was one of the first causes of that Cities felicity, because Religion produced good Laws, good Laws good Fortune, and good Fortune a good End in whatever they undertook. And as strictness in Divine Worship, and Conscience of Oaths, are great helps to the advancement of a State so contempt of the one, and neglect of the other are great means of its destruction. Take away Religion, and take away the foundation of Government; for though perhaps the goodness and fear of their Prince may sustain it for some time, and supply the want of Religion in his subjects; yet because he is mortal, and possibly but very short lived, that Kingdom can hardly out-live the virtue of its Governor: Wherefore those States which depend only upon the piety of their Princes, are of little duration, for commonly one dyes with the other, and the virtue of the Father seldom revives in the Son, as *Dante* has said very wisely,

*Rade volta discende per li rami  
L' tunc ana probitate, et questo vuole  
Quel che la da, perche da lui si chiama.*

Virtue's but seldom to the branches spread,  
He who bestows't, has in his wisdom said,  
Let him that wants, come to the fountain-head.

Things being thus, it is not sufficient for a Commonwealth or Kingdom to have a Prince who Governs it wisely whilst he lives, but he must lay his foundation so, as it may out-live him, and flourish when he is in his grave; and though rude, and uncultivated people are more susceptible of new Laws, or new Doctrines; yet men that are civil, and presume more upon their Education are not altogether impenetrable. The people of *Florence* thought themselves no fools, and they had a good opinion of their breeding; nevertheless they suffered themselves to be deluded by Frier *Girolamo Savonarola* into persuasion that he

had Conference with God. A person of his gravity is not to be mentioned but with reverence, and therefore whether true, or not true, I will not determine, only this I shall say, many believed him, who never saw any thing extraordinary to induce them; his Life, his Doctrine, the subject of his discoursing being in their thoughts enough to convince them. Let no man therefore despair of what another man has attained, for men (as I said in my Preface) are born, live, and dye, in the same method as formerly.

## C H A P. XII.

*How necessary for the preservation of a State it is, that Religion be in esteem, and how much Italy has suffered for want of it, by means of the Church of Rome.*

Those Princes and Commonwealths who would keep their Governments entire and incorrupt, are above all things to have a care of Religion and its Ceremonies, and preserve them in due veneration, for in the whole world there is not a greater sign of imminent ruine, than when God and his Worship are despised. This is easily understood by observing upon what foundation the Religion is placed where every man is born. The Religion of the *Gentiles* ran much upon the answers of Oracles, upon Divinations, and Soothsaying, upon which all the rest of their Sacrifices, Rights, and Ceremonies did depend; for they did not doubt but the same thing that could presage your fortune (be it good, or be it bad) could as easily confer it; and therefore they built their Temples, they made their Sacrifices, they offered up their prayers, and used all other Ceremonies that might signifie their veneration; for the Oracles of *Delos*, the Temple of *Jupiter Ammon*, and such other things had a strange influence upon people, and kept them in most wonderful devotion; but afterwards when they began to speak according to the interest or directions of great persons, and their partiality began to be discovered; the people grew incredulous, and prone to all kind of disturbance: A Prince therefore or Commonwealth ought most accurately to regard, that his Religion be well founded, and then his Government will last, for there is no surer way than to keep that good and united. Whatever therefore occurs that may any way be extended to the advantage and reputation of the Religion which they design to establish (how uncertain or frivolous soever it may seem to themselves) yet by all means they are to be propagated and encouraged, and the wiser the Prince, the more sure it is to be done; This course having been observed by wise men, has produced the opinion of Miracles, which are celebrated even in those Religions which are false: for let their Original be as idle as they please, a wise Prince will be sure to set them forward, and the Princes authority recommends them to every body else. Of these miracles, there were many in *Rome*, as at the sacking of *Uvii*, some of the *Roman* Soldiers entering into the Temple of *Juno*, accosting her Image, and asking it *Vis venire Romam*; will you come to *Rome*; To some of them she seemed to beckon by way of consent, and others fancied she said *Yes*; For those men being more than ordinary religious (as *Titus Livius* infers from the devotion, and reverence, and quietness wherewith they entred) they fancied they heard that answer, which 'tis possible they expected before; and *Camillus* and the other Magistrates of the City promoted their belief: And if this diligent care in Divine Worship were regarded by Christian Princes according to the Precepts and Instructions of him that gave it at first, the States and Commonwealths of Christendom would be much more happy and firm: Nor can any thing portend the ruine of our Church with more certainty, than that those who are nearest the Church of *Rome*, (which is the head of our Religion) should have less Religion than other people: and he who should consider the present practice, with the primitive foundation, would find that either utter destruction, or some great judgment was hanging over our heads. And forasmuch as some are of opinion, that the felicity and welfare of *Italy* depends upon the Church of *Rome*, I shall set down some few reasons to the contrary, which I have fram'd to my self, two of which are in my judgment unanswerable: One is that by the corrupt example of that Court, that Province has lost all its Religion, and all its Devotion, which has been followed by many inconveniences, and disorders; for as the Religiousness of the people presuppose all well, so where they are wicked, it betokens the contrary; so then, we *Italians* have this Obligation to the Church and its Ministers, that by their means we are become Heathenish and Irreligious; besides another (little less pernicious) and that is, that we are grown divided and factious, which must of necessity be our ruine, because never was any Province happy



or united, unless under the obedience of one Commonwealth, or one Prince, as *France* and *Spain* at this time: and the reason is, because *Italy* is not upon the same terms, as having no one Republick or Commonwealth to govern it, but the Church, and though the Pope has assumed a Temporal as well as Spiritual jurisdiction, yet he was never so courageous or powerful as to possess himself of all, and make himself Prince; nor was he ever so weak, but upon any apprehension of losing his Temporal Dominion, he could call in some Foreign Potentate to defend him against any man who was grown too formidable; and this has been seen anciently in many Examples, as when by assistance of *Charles the Great*, he repelled the *Lombards* who in a manner had made themselves Masters of all *Italy*; and when again in our days he retrenched the power of the *Venetians* by the help of the *French*, after which he drove out the *French* by the succour of the *Switzers*. The Church therefore being neither so strong as to conquer all *Italy*, nor so weak as to suffer it to be over-run by any body else, has been the occasion that it never fell into the hands of one person, but has been cantonized into several Principalities, by which means it has been so weak and disunited, that it has been not only exposed as a prey to the power of the *Barbarians*, but to every one that thought good to invade it which is an unhappiness we *Italians* owe only to the Church: If any man suspects what is said, and would by experience inform himself of the truth, it would be necessary he should be so potent as to transplant the Court of *Rome* and all its Authority in *Italy* into the Territories of the *Switzers*, who are the only people at this day which live either as to their Ecclesiastical or Military Discipline, according to the Model of the Ancients; and then he would quickly find that the wickedness and depravity of that Court, would produce more confusion and disorder in that Country than ever befell it by any accident before.

CHAP. XXIII.

*How the Romans pretend dReligion many times to regulate their City, to prosecute their Wars, and to pacifie their tumults.*

AND I hold it not extravagant to produce two or three Examples in which the *Romans* made use of their Religion both in the regulation of their City, and the prosecution of their Wars; and although in *Titus Livius* they be very frequent; yet I shall content my self with these.

After the people of *Rome*, had created their Tribunes with consular power and all of them (except one) from among the *Plebeans*; there hapning that year, a furious Plague, a desperate Famine, and other Prodiges besides, the Nobility in the next creation of Tribunes took advantage of that occasion, and pretended that the Gods were incensed against the people, for that they had debased the Majesty of the Empire, and that there was no remedy to appease them but to reduce the Election of the Tribunes to its primitive institution; upon which the people were so frighted, they chose all their Tribunes that year, out of the *Patricii*. It was the same case in the taking of *Veii* The *Romans* had been before it ten years, and no great likelihood of carrying it; but the Tenth, the Lake of *Albin* being miraculously swell'd; so as to drown a good part of the Country, the great Officers of the Army observing their Soldiers weary of the Siege, and impatient to be at home; feigning to have consulted the Oracles, they pretended that they had received this answer, That *Veii* should be taken that year that *Albin* overflowed; which answer reflecting upon their Devotion, the Soldiers reassumed their Courage, continued the Siege, and (*Camillus* being chosen Dictator) carried the Town; and thus you may see how the *Romans* made use of their Religion to encourage their Army against the fatigues and dangers of a tedious Leaguer, and to fright the people from entrenching upon the privileges of the Nobility in the Election of their Tribunes; without which pretence it would have been a hard matter to have persuaded either the one or the other. There was another example to the same purpose, *Terentillus* a Tribune of the people, would needs make a Law (which was called *Lex Terentilla*, and shall be mentioned hereafter) contrary to the interest, and inclination of the Senate. The Senate resolved to oppose it, and the best means they could think of, was pretence of Religion; of which they made use two ways; they ordered the Books of the *Sybil*s to be look'd over, and this answer to be returned; That that very year the City would be in great danger of losing its liberty, unless civil Sedition was prevented; which artifice, (notwithstanding it was discovered by the Tribunes) put the people into such a fright, they grew cool in the business, and refused to stand by them. After this, they made use of the same pretence another time; *Appius Herdanius* having

having got together of Slaves and Exiles to the number of Four thousand men, seized upon the Capitol in the night, and brought such a terror upon the City, it might very well be feared if the *Aqui* and the *Volsci* (perpetual Enemies to the *Romans*) had taken their opportunity and marched to *Rome*, they would have gone near to have master'd it: However the Tribunes persisted, and nothing could serve their turns, but the *Lex Terentilla* must be promulged; for they affirmed the Stories of being invaded, were but suggestions and fallacies, and not one word of them true: Hereupon one *Publius Rubetius* (a grave Citizen, and of good authority among them) came forth of the Senate, and partly by fair words and partly by foul, remonstrating the danger of the City, and the unseasonableness of their demands, he play'd his part so well, that he constrained the people to take an Oath of fidelity to the Consul; and in testimony of their integrity, the people ran to their Arms, and recovered the Capitol from *Herdonius*; but *Publius Valerius* their Consul being slain in the Conflict, *Titus Quintius* was chosen immediately in his place; who to keep the populace employed, and leave them no time to think of their Law *Terentilla*, Commanded them out of Town forthwith against the *Volsci*, alledging that the Oath which they had taken to be true to the Consul, obliged them to follow him; and though the Tribunes opposed it, and objected that that Oath extended no further than to the Consul that was dead; nevertheless *Livy* tell us, that such was the peoples tenderness and veneration for Religion, that they chose rather to follow the Consul, than to strain and presume upon their Consciences, giving this reason for it.

*Nondum hæc, quæ nunc tenet seculum, negligentia deum venerat, nec interpretando sibi quisque iurandum, & leges aptas faciebat.*

*The neglect of the Gods, which has overspread this Age, was not then come to that height, nor did everyman interpret his Oaths, and accommodate his Laws, to his own interest and advantage.*

Upon which the Tribunes perceiving their danger and that if they persist, they should run a hazard of being utterly extinguish'd; they came to an agreement with the Consul, received his Orders, obliged themselves not to insult upon the *Lex Terentilla* for a Twelve-month, in case the Consuls for the same time would forbear drawing out the people. And thus you see how by pretence of Religion, the Senate overcame a difficulty, which without it, it could never have done.

#### CHAP. XIV.

*The Romans were wont to interpret their Auspices with accommodation to their own pleasures and designs; and when at any time they were forced to transgress they managed it wisely, and pretended to be very precise; and if any body rashly despised them, he was sure to be punished.*

**A**Mong the *Gentiles*, *Auguries* were a great part of their Religion (as I have said elsewhere) and they contributed not a little to the well being of the *Roman* Commonwealth; for which reason the *Romans* had them in particular care, above any other Ordinance, and made use of them in the creation of Consuls, in the undertaking of Enterprizes, in drawing out their Armies, in their Battels and Engagements, and in every other business of importance, whether Military or Civil; nor would they ever begin an Expedition, till they had possessed the Soldiers that the Gods had promised them success; Among the several Orders of *Auspices*, they had one called the *Pullarii*, who were to give their presages before ever they fought with their Enemy; If the pullen, over which they had inspection, Eat, it was a good Omen, and they might with confidence engage; if they did not Eat, It was an ill sign, and they were obliged to forbear; Nevertheless, when reason told them their Enterprizes were practicable, they went roundly about them, though perhaps their *Auspices* were averse, but acted with great nicety and cunning, that it might not seem done in defiance of Religion: This was practised by *Papirius* the Consul before his Battel with the *Samnites* after which they never recovered. For being drawn up with his Army against the *Samnites*, with all visible advantage, and being willing to fall on, he commanded the *Pullarii* to try their Experiment; the Chickens refusing to peck, was a great trouble to the chief of the *Pullarii*, who observed the great alacrity of the Soldiers, and the great confidence of the General; that an occasion therefore of so signal a Victory might not be taken from the Army, he return'd answer to the Consul that the Omen was good; *Papirius* put his Men immediately into Battalia, and advanced against the Enemy; but some of the *Pullarii* having told it up and down among the Soldiers, that the Pullets did not eat, it came to the ears of *Spurius Papirius*

*Papirius*, Nephew to the Consul, who in great haste advertising his Uncle, received this answer, *Spurius* be you diligent, and observe your Orders; to my self and my Army the Auspices are good; if the *Pullarius* has told me false, the misfortune will be to him; and that the event might correspond to his Prognostick, he commanded the *Pullarii* to be placed in the front of the Battel; His Commands being executed, it hapned by accident as they were advancing to the fight, the chief of the *Pullarii* was killed by a dart from one of the Roman Soldiers; which being told to the Consul, Now (said he) all will be well, the Gods are appeased, and the blood of the Author has atton'd for his lye; and so by a discreet accommodation of his designs to the Auspices, he went on to the Combat, his Army taking nonnotice that he had violated their Religion. Had *Appius Pulcher* been so ingenious in *Sicily* in the first *Punic* War, it had fared better with him when he came home, but being to fight the *Carthaginian* Army, he consulted the *Pullarii*, who informing him that the Pullen would not eat, We will see them (said he) if they will drink, and caused them to be thrown into the Sea: and coming afterwards to an Engagement, his Army was defeated, himself condemn'd at his return, and *Papirius* advanced, not so much because one had prevailed, and the other was beaten, as because one had prudently evaded the Omen, and the other rashly defyed it: and these *Auguries* were invented for no other end, but that the Soldiers might go to the fight with more confidence and alacrity; for their alacrity was observed to contribute much to their success; and this practice was so fortunate to the *Romans*, that foreign Governments began to make use of it; as I shall show by one Example in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XV.

*How the Samnites in the extremity of their affairs, as their last refuge, had recourse to Religion.*

THE *Samnites* had long War with the *Romans*, fought several Battels with them, and in the last fight in *Tuscany*, were so utterly broken, that their Army was destroyed, their chief Officers slain, and the *Tuscans*, *Gauls*, and *Umbri*, (their allies) uncapable of giving them any further assistance; so that *Livy* tells us, *Nec suis, nec externis viribus jam stare poterant, tamen bello non abstinebant, adeo ne infeliciter quidem defensæ libertatis te debant & vinci, quam non tentare victoriam Malebant.* That though they were reduced to such a condition, That they could neither support themselves by their own strength, nor the supplies of their Friends, yet they continued the War; so that the unhappiness of their defence could not discourage them, but they chose rather to be conquered, than not to try for the Victory. Hereupon knowing that no Victory is to be expected, where the Soldier is diffident; and that nothing enhances them like a Religious opinion; as their last effort, they concluded (by the Ministry of *Ovius Paccius* their Priest) to revive an old Ceremony, which they did in this manner; Altars being erected, and solemn Sacrifice made, betwixt the flaming Altar, and the bones of the Victims, the Officers having first sworn never upon any distress whatsoever to abandon the fight; the Soldiers were called over one by one, and in the same place (before several Centurions with their naked Swords in their hands appointed to that purpose) required to swear, first, that they would not deride any thing that they should either hear or see; after which, with execrable words, and Verses full of horror, they caused them to take their Oaths to be ready at the Command of their Generals, never to fly, and to kill any of their fellows that offer'd to turn his back: and if ever they broke them, they imprecated a judgment upon themselves, and their race. Some of them being scrupulous, and unwilling to swear, were killed upon the place, which struck such terror into the rest, that none of them refused. And that this Ceremony might be performed with more magnificence, there being 4,0000 Men in the field, half of them were clothed in white, with Plumes of feathers upon their Helmets, in which posture they entamped not far from *Aquilonia*; *Papirius* was sent against them, and in his Speech to his Soldiers, he had this Expression, *Non enim Cristas vulnera facere, & picta, atq; aurata scuta, transire Romanum pilum.* For their feathers made no wounds, nor could the paint or glittering of their Shields protect them against the darts of the *Romans*. And to take off the opinion from his Soldiers, that the solemnity and Nature of their Oath, might make the Enemy desperate; he told them, That that would be rather a terror, than an encouragement to them when they came to consider that by their own folly they had brought themselves in danger of the Gods, the *Romans*, and their Comerades. In short the *Samnites* wear beaten, the

*Roman* virtue, and the memory of their own frequent misfortunes prevailing against all the forc'd courage which either their Oath or their Religion could give them. Nevertheless their sence of it was visible, seeing they made use of it as their last remedy, when they had no other hopes to recover their spirits.

This might possibly have been better brought in among my forein discourses, but depending upon one of the ancientest and most important Ceremonies of the *Roman* Commonwealth, lest I should divide my matter, and give too much occasion to look back, I thought it not improper to insert it in this place.

## C H A P. XVI.

*A people accustomed to the dominion of a Prince, though by accident they may acquire their liberty, yet it is with great difficulty, if they maintain it.*

**I**F the Records of ancient History will serve our turn, it is manifest by many examples, that a people born and bred up in subjection to a Prince, cannot without great difficulty preserve its liberty, if by any accident it attains it, as the *Romans* did upon the expulsion of the *Tarquins* & not without reason; for the people is like a wild beast, (which, though naturally fierce, disposed to live in the woods, and to find out dens and coverts to conceal it self) yet having been always brought up as it were in prison & servitude, if by accident it breaks its bonds and escapes out into the field, it is in a maze, knows not whither to run, where to sustain, or where to conceal it self, as having been accustomed to bondage and confinement; by which means, if worth the looking after, it is easily recovered. It is the same with a people which has lived always in subjection, who, understanding nothing of publick offence or defence, and knowing as little of Princes as Princes do of them, are with the greatest ease imaginable reduced to a yoke which is commonly more grievous than what they escaped from before; and this happens to them where they are not totally debauched (for where the Mass is corrupted, they cannot subsist a moment): I speak now of those where the malignity is not so diffused, but that there are still left more good men than bad; in which case another difficulty does likewise occur, and that is, when ever the yoke of tyranny is shaken off, and liberty set up, it follows continually that many enemies are created, whose interest it is to subvert it, and no friends made that shall have any advantage by supporting it. By enemies I mean all those *privado's* and favourites of Princes who have enjoyed the preferments and wealth of their Master, and cannot but be disgusted to find themselves dispossessed; wherefore they are constantly ready to take any occasion of restoring their old Prince, that they themselves might be restored to their authority and employment. And for friends whose interest it is that (upon the shaking off their Tyrant) their liberty should be preserved, they are not to be expected, because in free States, honours and offices are confer'd upon such as by their virtue, some great atcheivment for the benefit of the Commonwealth, or some other honourable action have seemed to deserve them; and when a man receives no more than what he thinks he has deserved, he ascribes it to his own merits rather than to the liberality of the State, and holds himself not obliged. Besides, the common utility resulting from a free State, though it be in their power, it is not at all in their knowledg; for who is it that considers, or takes care that every man enjoys quietly what God has given him; that their wives be not dishonoured, their children abused, nor their fellows oppressed? For who is it that will think himself bound to any man for doing him no wrong? and things being so, a free State newly acquired, never creates such friends as will be half so solicitous for its conservation, as those enemies who have been dispossessed of their fortunes and preferment. will be to undermine it, and restore their old Master again: and if it be enquired what course is to be taken against the inconveniences and disorders which follow thereupon; there is not a more efficacious, safer, and more necessary remedy, than to kill the Sons of *Brutus*, who (as History tells us) entred into a conspiracy against the State, with other young Gentlemen of *Rome*, for no other reason but because they could not be so loose and licentious under the Consuls as under the Kings; as if their freedoms were incompatible, and the liberty of the people was servitude to them: wherefore he who proposes to govern a people, whether by the way of Monarchy or Republick and does not secure himself of those who are adverse to the change, must never think to effect, or at least to enjoy it long: and on the other side, it is convenient he should know the infelicity of those Princes who cannot secure their Dominion without murder and blood; by which means the multitude is incensed, and become mortally their enemies: he  
who

who has but few enemies may secure it the better; but where the multitude is provoked, no security is to be had; and the more cruelty is used, the weaker the Government; so that when all's done the surest remedy is to indulge the people, and make them your friends. And now (though I may seem something confused and immethodical in speaking sometimes of a Prince, and then of a Republick) I shall take the liberty to do it here briefly, that I may have no occasion hereafter. A Prince therefore who, by usurping upon the liberties of the people, has made them his enemies, (if he desires to reconcile himself) is above all things to consider what the people affect, and he shall find it to consist principally in two things; one is, revenge upon those who have been instrumental in their slavery; and the other is restitution of their liberty. In the first the Prince may gratifie them fully, in the second but in part. Of the first we have an exact instance. *Clearchus* Governour of *Heracles* being banished for his tyranny, a controversie betwixt the Nobility and the Commons hapning afterwards in that Town, it fell out, that the Nobility finding themselves the weaker, addressed to *Clearchus*, and having entred into confederacy with him, they gave him admission and overcoming the people, he took away their liberties. But *Clearchus* perceiving himself in the clutches of the Nobility, and not only subject to their insolence, (which was neither to be satiated nor corrected) but to the rage and fury of the multitude, which could by no means digest his encroachments upon their liberty, he resolved at one blow to rid himself of his Grandees, and reconcile himself to the people, and taking his opportunity, he cut off all his Nobility with great satisfaction to the rest. The other thing which they desire with so much favour is restitution of their liberty in which the Prince cannot totally comply without degrading himself: he is therefore to examine upon what grounds the people are so fond of it, and he will find that some few indeed are zealous for their liberty, in hopes of office and preferment; but the greatest part desire it only to be secure against oppression, and to live comfortably, and at ease. For in all Governments, whether Republick or Monarchical, forty or fifty men go away with all the commands and offices of importance, which number being small, it is no hard matter for a Prince to secure himself against them, by cutting them off, or by such addition to their former advantages as may in some measure oblige them.

The rest, whose aim is only to live quietly, are easily satisfied by constituting such Laws and Ordinances as may make the power of the Prince consistent with the security of the people. If a Prince does this, and be observed upon no accident what-ever to violate their Laws, the people will quickly be contented, and believe themselves safe. And of this the Kingdom of *France* is an example; being quiet, and at peace, because the Kings are bound by innumerable Laws, which comprehend the security of the Subject; for by the first institution of that Monarchy, the Kings have the disposition of their Revenue, and the management of their Armies, but in every thing else they are circumscribed by the Laws. That Prince therefore, or Commonwealth, which at its first erection secures not it self, is obliged to do it at the first opportunity, as the *Romans* did when they murdered the Sons of *Brutus*, and he that slips it will repent when 'tis too late: for the people of *Rome* (not yet entirely corrupted) having recovered their liberty, it was sufficient to maintain it, that they made away the *Bruti*, and extinguished the *Tarquins*, which otherwise was not to have been done, had the whole mass and body of the people been debauched, as I shall shew in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII.

*A people wholly corrupted in their manners, may possibly recover their liberty, but they will find insuperable difficulty to maintain it.*

**H**Ad not Kings been expelled as they were in *Rome*, that City, in my opinion, must of necessity have declined, and its ancient virtue & the authority been lost; for if the corruption of those Kings be considered, had it been propagated but to the third succession, it would easily have diffused it self among the people; and that being infected, nothing could have preserved the City, much less have restored it to its former vigour and reputation; but the trunk being entire, and the distemper only in the head; by taking off that, the members were capable of being preserved, and their liberty recovered. And this may be laid down as a positive truth, that a City accustomed to the dominion of a Prince (if the manners of the people be corrupted) can never make it self free, though the Prince and his whole race be extinguished; for some new Lord or other will always spring up, unless  
by

by accident the courage and fortune of some good Citizen concurs to its preservation; and even then its liberty will be continued no longer than the life of that person; as it hapned in *Syracuse*, which remained free during the lives of *Dion* and *Timoleon*, (though in different times) but when they were dead, it relapsed, and fell under the same tyranny as before; but the most evident example of all was in *Rome* which City having turned out the *Tarquins*, found out a way of setting up, and maintaining their liberty a long time; yet when *Caesar* was slain, and *Caligula*, *Nero*: and the whole race of the *Cæsars* extirpated; the *Romans* were so far from maintaining it, that they could not so much as introduce the least form or appearance of liberty; and the reason of that diversity in the same City was no other, but because in the time of the *Tarquins* the people were not generally so vitious as afterwards in the reign of *Caligula* and *Nero*: for at the expulsion of the *Tarquins*, to possess the people then against tyranny, it was sufficient to tender them an oath, by which they engaged never to admit single person again in *Rome*: whereas afterwards, upon the death of *Caesar* and the rest, neither the authority nor rigour of *Brutus*, with all his Legions in the East was able to dispose the people to the assertion of that liberty which so happily had been set up by the first of *Brutus* his name. So strangely had the Faction of *Marius* diffused their poison among the Commons, of which *Caesar* being head, he had opportunity of blinding the people, and coaxing them into servitude so silyly, they could not perceive the yoke into which they were thrusting their necks. Though this example of the *Romans* be pregnant enough, yet it is not brought in for any want in our own times. For in *Naples* and *Milan* the manners of the people being totally debauched, nothing could do, no opportunity could restore them to a condition of liberty. 'Tis true, upon the death of *Philip Visconti*, the *Milanese*s attempted, but they could never effect it. For which reason it was very happy for the *Romans* that their Kings discovered their depravity so soon; for by that means they were driven out before their wickedness could dilate, and spread it self among the people; which if it had done, the troubles and tumults which succeeded thereupon had never had so good end, as to make rather for the advantage than prejudice of the City: from whence it may be infer'd, that where the multitude is not corrupt, tumults and disorders do no very great mischief; where it is corrupt, Laws may be well constituted and provided, and yet do no good, unless executed by some person so severely, that the people are compelled to observe them, and by strict observation to become good; which is a thing I can neither say has hapned hitherto, or promise it ever will. For it is clear, (as I said before) that a City declining, upon the corruption of the Mass, can never recover, unless it be by the virtue and magnanimity of some active Citizen, who takes the administration of Justice into his own hands, and sees every thing faithfully performed, and even then, that good man is no sooner in his grave, but the people are in their old servitude again. Thus it fell out with the *Thebans*; *Epaminondas*, by his virtue and conduct, enabled them to keep up a form of a Commonwealth whilst he was alive, but, alas, at his death it was quickly dissolved; the reason is, because no man is sufficiently long lived, to reclaim a City that has been long accustomed to licentiousness, and to reduce it to be good. So that though it happens to have such a good man among them, and he lives a long time; nay though there be two successions of good men, if the third (as I said before) be defective, all goes to wrack, it must necessarily be ruined, unless by many dangers, and great effusion of blood it happens to be preserved; because that corruption which renders it so unapt and indisposed to a free life, proceeds from the great inequality in that City and to reduce things to an equality, extraordinary ways must be used which few people know, and fewer will take, as shall be shewn more particularly in another place.

## C H A P. XVIII.

*A corrupt City having made it self free, how its liberty may be maintained; and not having made it self, how its liberty may be procured.*

I Think I shall not be extravagant, if to what has been said already, I add another query Whether, in a corrupt City, a free State may be maintained (if by any accident it be set up); or, if there be no such thing already, how it is to be obtained? I answer, both of them are hard; and though a certain rule cannot be prescribed, (unless we knew the degrees of its corruption); nevertheless, it being good that every thing be fairly discuss, this question shall not be suffered to pass.

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I shall presuppose, that the City of which I speak is corrupt, in extremity, and in that case the difficulty encreases with proportion; for no Laws nor Customs can restrain an universal depravity; because, as good Customs cannot subsist without good Laws, so good Laws cannot be executed without good Customs: besides, the Laws which are made in the minority and innocence of a Commonwealth, are not sutable or efficacious when it is grown wicked and robust; for the Laws of a City do vary upon several accidents and emergencies, but the Statutes and fundamental Orders are seldom or never changed; for which reason new Laws are not so necessary afterwards, as good Statutes at first: but to illustrate it farther. By ancient Statute and Custom time out of mind, the Commonwealth of *Rome* was divided betwixt the Senate and the People, and all authority was derived either from the People, or Senate, or Tribunes, or Consuls; as also their creation of Magistrates, and enacting of Laws: these Customs were little (if at all) changed in all the revolutions of that State; but the Laws for punishing malefactors, and regulating enormities, were enacted or repealed as the exorbitance of the people did fluctuate and require, as the sumptuary Laws, the Law against adultery, ambition, and several others, instituted from time to time, as the Citizens grew corrupter. But the old customs of State being retained, (though tainted, and sharing in the corruption of the people) the reviving of old Laws, or introducing of new, was not sufficient to keep the Citizens good, but it would have contributed much, had the old Customs been reform'd when those new Laws were introduced, and a new form of Government set up: for that those ancient Customs are of no use or advantage where a City is overflown with such a deluge of corruption, is apparent by their methods in the creation of Magistrates, and the exhibition of Laws. The Consulship, nor any other office or dignity was never confer'd by the people of *Rome* upon any body but by formal application, which Custom was originally very good, because none sought for them who was conscious of being unfit; forasmuch as to be repulsed was a dishonourable thing, and to make himself fit, every man chose to be virtuous. But afterwards the manners of the people growing so fatally corrupt, this Custom lost its primitive convenience, and became not only useles but pernicious; for they who had most power, not they who had most virtue and capacity, pretended to the Magistracy; the poor and the virtuous not daring to appear for fear of an ignominious repulse: but this inconvenience (like the City itself) was not the product of a day, it stole into the Commonwealth, lay concealed, encreased, and exerted itself by degrees, as all other inconveniences do. For having conquered *Africa* and *Asia*, and reduced the greatest part of *Greece*, the *Romans* began to hug themselves in their liberty, as not knowing any enemy they ought in reason to fear: this security and unhappy scarcity of enemies was the occasion that in their creation of Consuls the people of *Rome* began to regard riches and favour more than ability and virtue, preferring such persons as could entertain and treat people handsomely, before such as were grave, and could only conquer their enemies; afterwards, from those who were most plausible, they came down, and created such as were most powerful; so that persons of virtue and capacity were totally excluded. In the making of Laws, a Tribune and any one Citizen had power to propose any thing to the people which they thought of importance to the publick; before whom it was canvas'd and discuss'd, every man having free liberty to object, or promote it (as his judgment directed) before it could pass.

And this Custom was good likewise whilst the Citizens were so too; for it was always, and is still convenient, that if any man be wiser than the rest, and can contrive any thing for the security or benefit of the publick, that he have liberty to propose it; and it is as useful on the other side, every man have the same freedom to ventilate and examine it; that all being well argued, and every mans opinion heard, the best may be chosen. But as the Citizens grew corrupt, this Custom grew incommodious: none but great men proposed any thing to the people, and what they did was not for the common, but their own private interest, and which was worse; no man had the liberty to dispute it; so that the people were either circumvented, or forced to consent to their own ruine and destruction. So then, to have maintained *Rome* free in such an age of corruption, it was necessary, as they altered their Laws according to the prevalence of each vice, so they should have altered their fundamentals, in the making of Laws, and creation of Magistrates; for the same Customs are not equally convenient where the people are not equally good, no more than the forms can be alike where the matter is contrary. But 'tis worth our inquiry whether these Customs be to be reform'd at a blow, as soon as their inconvenience is descried, or by degrees, before every body observes them, I say both of them are almost impossible: for to alter them by degrees, requires some wise and sagacious Citizen, that can foresee the dangers at a distance, and trace them to their first causes; but of such persons perhaps a City may never see one, or if it does, how hard is it for him to persuade other people: for people accustomed to a



way are not easily got out of it, especially when the mischief is rather in probability than prospect. And when these old Customs are to be reformed, (as appearing unprofitable and dangerous for the Commonwealth) though they be easily discovered, they are hard to be removed, especially at once; because the common mass being infected, common ways are too weak; and recourse must be had to extraordinary, as violence and arms; for before the fabrick of the Government can be changed and modelled to your desire, 'tis necessary above all things to make your self Master of the City, and to be able to dispose of it at your pleasure: and because to reform a State, and reduce it to a Civil Regiment, presupposes a good man; and to usurp, and make ones self Prince by violence, presupposes an ill; therefore it seldom falls out that a good man makes himself Prince by unjust means, be his ends never so good; nor will an ill man, who has made himself Prince, ever do good: it never falls into his thoughts to employ that authority well which he has unjustly acquir'd. From the causes aforesaid therefore arises the difficulty (or rather impossibility) in a corrupt City, to maintain a free State; much less to erect one; and if there should be any way found out to effect it, it would (in my judgment) be necessary to frame it rather according to a Regal than a Popular State; that those persons whose insolence is incorrigible by the Laws, may be bridled and restrained by some supreme Magistrate in the nature of a King; and to attempt any other way, must be either vain and temerarious, or exorbitantly cruel. For though *Cleomenes* (being a single person) killed the *Ephori*, (as is said before) and *Romulus*, his Brother, and *Titus Tatius*, and afterwards employed their authority to the advantage of the publick; yet it is to be considered, that the subjects neither of the one or the other were so vicious or depraved as those of whom we have treated in this Chapter, and therefore they were able to do what they pleased, and excuse it when it was done.

#### C H A P. XIX.

*Though a weak Prince succeeds an excellent, the Government may stand; but if one weak Prince succeeds another, 'tis impossible.*

**I**F the virtue and conduct of *Romulus*, *Numa*, and *Tullius* (the three first Kings of *Rome*) be considered, it will be found to have been much for the advantage of that City to have its first King martial, and fierce; the second King, quiet and religious; and the third (like the first) active, and war-like again. For, as after the first institution, it was necessary there should be some-body to dispose the people to ways of Religion, and civil conversation; so it was necessary again after that, that the next King should reassume the vigour and magnanimity of their predecessor; otherwise the minds of the Citizens would have grown effeminate, and the City have become a prey to any of its neighbours. Wherefore it is to be considered, that a Prince not altogether so valiant and enterprising, may maintain the Government upon the score of his Predecessor, and enjoy the fruits of his courage and labour; but if it happens he be long lived, and that he is not succeeded by a martial Prince to revive the activity of the Founder, the Government must necessarily be ruined. On the other side, if two Princes immediately succeeding, are martial and heroick, they are observed to do great things, and to advance the Government exceedingly: *David*, without doubt, was a person no less excellent in military experience than in learning and wisdom; and so great was his courage, that he left his Kingdom to his Son *Solomon* in quiet and peace, who by arts of peace rather than war enjoyed it happily his time upon account of his Father; but he could not leave it to *Rehoboam* as he had received it of his Father: for *Rehoboam* being neither like his Grand-father in courage, nor his Father in wisdom, succeeded scarcely to the sixth part of his Empire. *Bajazet* the *Turkish* Scholar, though more studious of peace than of war, enjoyed the labours of *Mahomet* his Father, who having (like *David*) subdued all his neighbours, left him a Kingdom entire, that might be peaceably maintained; but had (*Bajazet's* Son) *Selimus* now reigning, taken after his Father, and not his Grand-father, that Empire had been ruined; but he out-goes the glory of his Grand-father.

From hence may be observed, that after an excellent & magnificent Prince, a pusillanimous may succeed, and the Government stand; but if one poor-spirited Prince succeeds another immediately, 'tis impossible it should subsist, unless (like *France*) it be supported by its old Customs and Laws: I call those Princes weak and pusillanimous, who are not conversant, nor addicted to the exercise of Arms, and do conclude, that the tranquillity of *Numa's* Reign (which continued for many years) was to be attributed to the courage and activity of *Romulus*,

*Numus*, which was revived again in *Tullus* the third King, after whom followed *Ancus*, a Prince of so excellent a temper, that he knew how to comport as well in the calms of peace as the tempests of war. His first practice was gentle, and by methods of peace, but finding he was look'd upon as effeminate, and grew contemptible to his neighbours, he perceived the way to preserve his dignity, was, to betake himself to martial courses, and manage his affairs rather like *Romulus* than *Numa*. From hence an useful example for all Princes may be taken, and it may be observed, that whoever is in the possession of a State, and follows the example of *Numa*, may either keep it, or lose it, according to the different circumstances of fortune, or time. But he who imitates *Romulus*, and is arm'd with wisdom and prowess, shall be sure to keep it, unless some extraordinary and irresistible power intervenes to supplant him. And 'tis in probability to be thought, that had not the third King of *Rome* prov'd a martial Prince, and one who knew by his Arms to recover his declining reputation, he could never (or with great difficulty) have regained it, or performed those exploits which he did afterwards: so that whilst *Rome* was a Monarchy, and under the Government of Kings, it was under a double danger of destruction, either by the mildness, or the tyranny of its Prince.

CHAP. XX.

*Two good Princes, immediately succeeding, may do great things; and well-grounded Common-wealths having always a virtuous succession, their Conquests and Acquisitions must of necessity be according.*

WHEN Monarchy was banished by the *Romans*; their dangers were banished with them, and they lay under no fear of either weak Prince or Tyrant; for the command of the Empire was put into the hands of the Consuls, who came to that authority, not by inheritance, or any indirect or violent ambition, but by the suffrage of the people, and were always excellent persons. The City of *Rome* enjoying from time to time the benefit of their fortune and virtue, might without much difficulty arrive at the highest top of greatness and dignity, (as it did) in the same number of years as it was under the Government of Kings. For we see in the examples of *Philip* of *Macedon*, and his Son *Alexander* the great; that a succession of two martial Princes (without a peaceable interposed) is sufficient to conquer the World. And if it were possible in a Monarchy, 'tis easie in a Common-wealth, in whose power it is to elect, not only two, but an infinite and continued succession of virtuous persons; so that in a well-ordered Common-wealth, the succession is constantly good.

CHAP. XXI.

*How much that Prince or Commonwealth is to be condemned, which neglects to train up Souldiers of its own.*

THE Princes and Commonwealths of our times, if to defend themselves, or offend their enemy, (as occasion serves) they be unable to bring Souldiers of their own into the Field, they may thank themselves, and acknowledge (with *Tullus*) that 'tis not so much want of capacity in their subjects, as want of wisdom in them for neglecting to train them. For when *Tullus* came to the Crown, *Rome* had been forty years together in peace, (during all *Numa's* Reign) and there was not a man to be found who had ever seen the face of an enemy, nevertheless his own designs being martial, he resolv'd to make no use of the *Samnites* or *Tuscans*, or any other Mercenary, but as a wise Prince, to discipline his own; and his art and experience was such, that in a short time he made them excellent Souldiers; and there is nothing more certain, than that where men are unapt for war, the fault is not in the situation or nature of the place, but in the carelessness or defect of the Magistrate; of which we have a fresh and memorable example. There is scarce any body ignorant, that of late years the English invaded *France*, and entertained no Souldiers but their own; and yet though *England* had had no wars of thirty years before, and had neither Officer nor Souldier who had ever seen a Battel, they ventured to attack a Kingdom where the Officers were excellent, the Souldiers very good, having been trained up for several years together in the

*Italian wars.* This proceeded from the prudence of the Prince, and the excellence of that Government, in which (though in times of peace) the exercise of Arms is not intermitted; *Pelopidas*, and *Eparinondas* having relieved *Thebes*, and rescued it from the tyranny of the *Spartans*, finding themselves in the middle of a servile and effeminate people, they so ordered it by their virtue and discipline, that they brought them to the use of Arms, took the field with them against the *Spartans*, and overthrew them. From whence that Historian infers, that there are Souldiers not only in *Lacedemon*, but where-ever there are men, if there be any body to exercise and train them; which *Tullus* performed most exquisitely among the *Romans*, and is most excellently expressed by *Virgil*, in these words.

*Desidesque moribus  
Tullus in arma viras.*

No soft unactive people *Tullus* knows,  
But trains up all promiscuously to blows.

## CHAP. XXII.

*What is to be observed from the Combat betwixt the three Roman Horatii, and the three Alban Curiatii.*

BY Articles betwixt *Tullus* King of *Rome*, and *Metius* King of *Alba*, it was agreed, that whichsoever of the two sides should overcome, that King should have the dominion of the other. The *Curiatii* were all killed; but one of the *Horatii* being left, *Metius* and his *Albans* fell into subjection to the *Romans*.

*Horatius* returning in great triumph into the City, and meeting a Sister of his (who was married to one of the *Curiatii*) lamenting the loss of her Husband, in a great passion he killed her; for which inhumanity being brought to trial, he was, after many arguments, discharged, but more upon his Fathers intercession than his own merits. In which accident there were three things considerable; that we are never to venture our whole fortune upon the success of a Party; another is, that offences and deserts are not equally rewarded in a well-ordered City; the third, that no compact is well-made, where the performance is or ought to be suspected. For to become servile, and in subjection to another City, is a thing of such moment and importance, that it is not to be believed that any Prince or State whatsoever should be content that their liberty should be exposed to the success or courage of three of their Citizens; and this was evident in *Metius*; for though upon the Victory of the *Romans* he seemed to acquiesce, and promised obedience, as by Articles was agreed, yet in the first Expedition the *Romans* undertook against the *Veientes*, 'tis manifest he would have deceived *Tullus*, as one who repented of the covenants which he had made: but because of the third we have spoken largely already, in the next two Chapters we shall speak only of the other two.

## CHAP. XXIII.

*That our whole fortune is not to be ventured upon part of our force, and that for that reason the keeping of passes is many times dangerous.*

IT was never thought discretion to put your whole fortune in danger, unless your whole force was ready to defend it. This error is committed several ways; one is when, like *Tullus* and *Metius*, they commit the fortune and virtue of so many men as either of them had in their Army, to the fortune and virtue of three particular persons, which was but a pitiful part of either of their strength, not considering how, by that agreement, all the pains which their Predecessors had taken to establish their liberty, and enable their fellow Citizens to defend it, was rendered vain and ineffectual, by putting it into the power of three persons to destroy it; than which (in my judgment) those two Kings could not have done worse. Another great error is, when, upon the approach of an enemy, we trust all to the keeping of an avenue, or the defence of a pass, unless it may be done with our whole force: in that case indeed the resolution is good; but if the passage be narrow, and not

room

room enough for your whole power, it is uncertain and dangerous; and that which persuades me to be of that opinion, is the example of such as having been invaded by a potent Enemy, though their Country was environed with Mountains and Rocks, yet they would not attend, and engage the Enemy upon the passes or Mountains, but marched out of their holds to encounter him; or else (which is as bad) they forsook their advantages, and expected him in some plain or convenient place within: And the reason is (as aforesaid) because many men cannot be brought to defend such places as are Rocky, for want of subsistence; and the passage being streight, it can receive but few people, and by consequence is not able to sustain the insult of a very great Army; and the Enemy may bring as many as he pleases to attack it, because his business is not to fix there, but to pass thorow and be gone: whereas he who is to defend it, cannot be in any considerable Body, being (by reason of the uncertainty of the Enemies approach) to lie there continually, though (as I said before) the places are both barren and streight. Having lost therefore that pass which you imagined to keep, and upon which your Army and People did wholly rely, the remainder of your Army, and Subjects are possessed with such a fear, that you can have no farther trial of their courage, but all goes to wrack, and your whole fortune lost, but with part of your Army. With what difficulty *Hannibal* passed the *Alps* betwixt *France* and *Lombardy*, and betwixt *Lombardy* and *Tuscany*, there is no body ignorant; nevertheless the *Romans* chose rather to attend him upon the *Tesin*, and afterwards in the plain of *Arezzo*, where the danger was equal both to the Enemy and them; than to carry their Army up into the clouds upon the Rocks and the Snow, to be consumed by the incommodity of the place, before the Enemy came at them. And whosoever shall read History deliberately, shall find few great Captains that would coop themselves up in such passes and streights, not only for the reasons aforesaid, but because all of them cannot be stop'd the Mountains in that respect being like the fields, having not only their Roads and High-ways, but by-paths and passages, which though not observed by Strangers, are well enough known to the Inhabitants, who will be always ready to conduct the Enemy, to remove them farther off who lie constantly upon them. Of this a late Example may be brought, in the year 1515, when *Francis* King of *France* design'd to pass into *Italy* for the recovery of *Lombardy*, the great objection by those who were against the Expedition, was, That the *Swizzers* would obstruct his passage over the Mountains, which argument was found idle afterwards, for the King of *France* waving two or three places which they had guarded, passed by a private and unknown way, and was upon their backs in *Italy*, before they perceiv'd him; so that being mightily surprized, the Enemy quitted his Posts, and retired into *Italy*, and all the *Lombards* submitted to the *French*; they being deceived in their opinion, who thought the *French* were with more Ease and Convenience to be obstructed in the Mountains.

## CHAP. XXIV.

*In well Ordered Governments, offence and desert, are never set one against the other, but he who does well, is rewarded, and he who does otherwise, is punished.*

THE merits of *Horatius* were very great, having by his own single valor and conduct, overcome the *Curiatis*; after which he committed a most abominable act, in killing his own Sister: which Murther was so hainous in the Eyes of the *Romans*, that he was brought to a Trial for his life, though his deserts were so fresh and considerable; which at first sight seem ingrateful in the people; but he who examines it strictly, and weighs how necessary and sacred a thing Justice ought to be in every Common-wealth, will find them more blameable for discharging, than they would have been for condemning him; and the reason is, because in a well constituted State no man's good actions should indemnifie him for doing ill; for punishment being as due to ill actions, as rewards are to good, having rewarded a man for doing well, he is satisfied for what he did, and the obligation discharged; so as if afterwards he commits a Crime, he is to be punished severely according to the Nature of his offence; by the observation of which Orders, a City may continue free a long time, which otherwise will quickly go to ruine. For if a Citizen having perform'd any great Exploit for his Country, should expect not only honor and reward, for what he has done, but privilege, and impunity for any mischief he should do afterwards, his insolence would in a short time grow insupportable, and inconsistent with Civil Government. So

when it is very necessary for discouragement from ill actions, to recompense good, which was the practice in *Rome*, and though where a Common-wealth is poor, her rewards cannot be great; yet even out of that small stock, she is to be punctually grateful, for a thing (how little soever) given in acknowledgment of ones good Service (let it be never so great) is look'd upon as Honorable, and received as a Magnificent reward. The Stories of *Horatius Cocles*, and *Mutius Scævola* are generally famous. *Cocles* with incomparable courage maintained fight against a great body of the Enemy upon the Bridge over *Tiber*, till it was cut behind him, and their passage obstructed: The other designing against the life of *Porfenna* King of *Tuscany*, and killing his Secretary by mistake, being apprehended and brought before the King, to show the courage and constancy of the *Romans*, he thrust his own hand into the fire, and burnt it off before his face; and how were they gratified? marry each of them had two *Staiora's*, which is as much ground as can be sown with two Bushels of Corn. The History of *Manlius Capitolinus* is no less remarkable: Having relieved the *Capitol* (which the *French* had surprized in the night) and beaten them out again, his Comrades in requital gave him a certain measure of Flower, which (as times went then) was a mighty reward, and esteemed so adequate to the Service, that *Manlius* afterwards either out of ambition or ill nature, causing a tumult in *Rome*, and endeavouring to debauch the people, (his former exploits being as they thought amply rewarded) without farther regard to him, they threw him headlong down that *Capitol*, which he had so gloriously preserved.

## C H A P. XXV.

*Though it is many times convenient to reform the old Fundamental Customs of a free City, yet it is convenient still to retain some shadow and appearance of their ancient ways.*

HE who desires to set up a new form of Government in a Common-wealth, that shall be lasting, and acceptable to the people, is with great caution to preserve at least some shadow and resemblance of the old, That the people may (if possible) be insensible of the innovation; for the generality of Mankind do not penetrate so far into things, but (that outward appearance, is as acceptable to them as verity it self. For this cause the *Romans* at the beginning of their liberty, when their Kings were expelled, thought it expedient to create two Consuls instead of one King, assigning them only XII Lictors, that their number might not exceed what attended upon the King. Besides this, there was an anniversary Sacrifice in *Rome*, in which the Ministry of the King was of necessity required: To save that defect, the *Romans* created a chief of the said Sacrifice with the Title of Royal Priest (but with subordination to the High Priest) by which Artifice the people were satisfied with their Sacrifice, and took no occasion to complain for the expulsion of their King. He therefore who desires to reform the policy of a State, and to introduce a new, is to disguise it to the people by the retention (at least in appearance) of some part of the ancient Customs, that may keep them from discerning it; and if at any time by accident there be a necessity of changing the power, the number and duration of the Magistrates, it will be convenient to continue the Name. This (as I said before) is to be observed by any one who would establish an absolute power either in a Republick; or Monarchical way, but he who would erect such an absolute power, as by Authors is called Tyrannies must unravel the whole bottom, and innovate all.

## C H A P. XXVI.

*A new Prince in a new Conquest, is to make every thing new.*

WHOEVER makes himself Lord of a City or State (and especially if he finds himself weak, and suspects his ability to keep it) if he intends not to continue the Government in the old way, either by Kingship or Common-wealth, the best course he can take is to subvert all, to turn every thing topsie turvy; and make all things as new as himself. To alter the Magistracy, create new Titles, elect new persons, confer new Authorities, advance the Poor, and impoverish the Rich, that what is said of *David*, may be said of him, *Esurientes implevit bonis, & divites dimisit inanis.* He filled the hungry with  
good

*good things, and the rich be sent empty away.* Besides it is his interest to build new Cities, to erect new Corporations; to demolish and uncharter the old; to shift the Inhabitants from one place to another; in a word, so to tofs and transpose every thing, that there be no honor, nor wealth, nor preferment in the whole Province, but what is ownable to him. And for this he need go no farther than *Philip of Macedon* (Father to *Alexander the Great*) for his pattern, who by this practice, of a small Prince, made himself Monarch of all *Greece*, of whom it is said, *That he removed his people, as a Shepheard did his fold.* Those ways are cruel, and contrary not only to all civil, but to all Christian, and indeed human conversation; for which reason they are to be rejected by every body, for certainly 'tis better to remain a private person, than to make ones self King, by the calamity and destruction of his people. Nevertheless, he who neglects to take the first good way, if he will preserve himself, must make use of this bad; for though many Princes take a middle way betwixt both, yet they find it extream difficult and dangerous; for being neither good nor bad, they are neither fear'd nor below'd, and so unlikely to prosper.

CHAP. XXVII.

*Men are as seldom perfectly bad, as they are perfectly good.*

IN the year 1505. Pope *Julus II.* marched his Army into *Bologna* to drive the Family of the *Bentivogli* out of that State, where they had commanded with Supremacy a hundred years. In the same Expedition he resolved to remove *John Pagolo Baglione* out of *Perugia* (where he had Usurped) and in a word, all such Tyrants as had got any Church Lands into their possession. Coming to the Town with the desire and resolution aforesaid, he attended not till he could march in with his Army; but enter'd as it were naked and disarmed (though *John Pagolo* was in person in the City, and many of his party which were got together to defend him) so that transported with the usual vehemence wherewith he managed all his affairs, he put himself (with his bare guards) into the hands of his Enemy; yet he succeeded so well, that he carried *Pagolo* off with him, and put in another Governor in behalf of the Church. Wise men who were then about his Holiness, admiring the temerity of the one, as much as the pusillanimity of the other, could not imagine how it should come to pass, that *Pagolo* having his Enemy as it were naked in his hands, and by consequence an opportunity (with perpetual glory to himself) to have secured him, and pillaged his Equipage (for all the Cardinals were then with him, with the most precious of their Jewels) should so strangely neglect it; especially when they considered that it was neither Conscience nor good nature which restrained him; for neither of those were to be supposed in a man who had been nought with his own Sister, and murder'd several of his Relations, to make his way to the Government; wherefore it was concluded to happen, because it is so provided by providence, that no man can be exquisitely wicked, no more than good in perfection; for where there is any thing great and magnificent in a mischief, they know not how to commit it: So *John Pagolo* who made no bones of either Parricide or Incest, could not (or to speak more properly) durst not make use of his opportunity to perpetrate a thing, which would have filled the world with admiration of his courage, and made his memory venerable to posterity; for he would have been the first who had given his Cardinals to understand how little it is to their reputation to Lord it, and luxuriate as they do; and the greatness of the Fact would have lessened the Scandal, and prevented any danger that might ensue.

CHAP. XXVIII.

*For what reasons the Romans were less ingrateful to their Citizens, than the Athenians.*

WHOEVER reads and observes the passages in Commonwealths, will find a touch of ingratitude towards their Citizens in them all, but less in *Rome* than in *Athens*; and perhaps in any other Republick whatever. The reason (I suppose) was, because *Rome* had not that occasion of Jealousie as *Athens* had: For in *Rome*, from the expulsion of the Kings, to the time of *Silla* and *Marius*, the liberty of the City was never disturbed by any

man within it; so that there being no reason to apprehend, there was no reason to persecute. In *Athens* it was otherwise; for their liberty being invaded and taken away by *Peisistratus* when it was most flourishing, and compleat; and that by a pretence of advancing it; They no sooner recover'd it; but remembering the injuries which they had received, and their pass'd servitude, they flew out into such an exorbitancy of revenge, that they punished not only the faults of their fellow Citizens, but the least umbrage, and appearances of them, from whence followed the Banishment, and Execution of so many excellent persons; Hence came the *Ostracism* Laws, and all the rest of the outrages committed afterwards upon the chief of their City, for as ye Writers of Politicks observe very well, the people are more cruel and vindicative who have lost and recovered their liberty, than they who have preserv'd it, as it was left them by their Fathers. He therefore who considers what is said, will neither condemn *Athens*, nor magnifie *Rome*; but impute all to necessity upon the diversity of accidents which hapned in each City. And certainly, if it be seriously considered, it will appear, that if the liberty of the *Romans* had been oppress'd, as the liberty of the *Athenians* was, *Rome* would have been no better natur'd; or shown more compassion to its fellow Citizens, than *Athens* did: And this may be infallibly deduced by what hapned (after the expulsion of the Kings) against *Collatinus* and *P. Valerius*; for *Collatinus* (though he had been very active in asserting their liberty) was banished for bearing only the Name of *Tarquin*; and the other had like to have ran the same destiny, for building a house only, upon the top of Mount *Celivus*, which they suspected was to command the City. So that it may probably be presumed (by its suspicion and severity in the two cases aforesaid) that *Rome* would have exercised the same ingratitude, had it been injured in its minority, as *Athens* had been. And that I may have no occasion to discourse of ingratitude hereafter, I shall speak of it more largely in the following Chapter.

## CHAP. XXIX.

*Whether the Prince, or the People, is most subject to be ingrateful.*

AND because we have undertaken to enlarge upon this subject, I think it not amiss to examine which are most frequently guilty of ingratitude, the Prince, or the People: For better explication, I say, That men are ingrateful, either out of suspicion, or avarice. For if a Prince, or Republick send out any of their great Captains upon some important Expedition, which the said Captain atchieves, and gains honor to himself, and reputation to his Master, in this case the Prince, or State, is obliged to reward him; but if instead of rewarding, they cashier, or disgrace him, or out of a covetous principle, deny him his pay, the ingratitude is inexcusable; and leaves a scandal behind it that can never be worn out, and yet many Princes are too guilty of it; *Cornelius Tacitus* gives us the reason in this Sentence, *Proclivius est injuria, quam beneficio vicem exolvere, quia gratia oneri, ultio in questu habetur. 'Tis more natural to return an injury, than a courtesie, because courtesies are burthensom, but revenge is sweet.* But if this ingratitude either in Prince or People, proceeds not so much from avarice, as suspicion, in that case it is somewhat excusable, and of that kind we read of good store, as when a General has conquered a Province or Empire for his Master, when he has exterminated his Enemies, enriched his Army, and gain'd himself a great Name, 'tis impossible but he must be so acceptable to his own Soldiers, and so dreadful to his Enemies, as must beget a jealousy in the Prince; for the Nature of man being jealous and ambitious, and not to be confined within the bounds of his fortune, it cannot be but if the Prince has taken a fancy that the glory of his General, is a diminution to his, the General must by some vain-glorious, or discontented action, establish and confirm it; and then what has the Prince to do? but to secure himself either by causing him to be murdered, by taking away his Command; lessening his reputation with the Soldiers and People, and by all ways of industry possessing them, that the Victory was not obtained by any Conduct of his, but by the kindness of Fortune, vileness of the Enemy, or prudence and good management of the rest of the Officers.

After *Vespasian* (being in *Judea*) was declared Emperor by his Army, *Antonius Primus* being at the same time in *Illyria* with another Army, declared for the Emperor, and marched into *Italy* against *Vitellius* who was then Paramount in *Rome*; and having beaten him in two pitched Battels, he enter'd the City in the Name of *Vespasian*: So that *Mutianus* being sent against *Vitellius* by *Vespasian*, he found the Enemy broken, the Town taken, and



and all things done by *Antonius* to his hand. And how was he requir'd? Why *Mutianus* took away his Commission, removed him from the Army, and by degrees so lessened his Authority in *Rome*, that *Antonius* going into *Asia* to make his Complaints to *Vespasian*, was received so coldly, that in a short time he was stript of all kind of authority, and died very miserable: and of this Nature examples are very frequent in History; every body knows how in our times *Gonsalvo Ferrante*, being the King of *Arragon's* General in the Kingdom of *Naples* against the *French*, behaved himself so well, that by his singular Conduct he conquered it, and put it wholly under the obedience of his Master, who coming afterwards to *Naples* himself, took from him the Command of his Army, dispossessed him of many strong places which he held in that Country, and carried him with him into *Spain*, where not long after, he died in obscurity. But there is no remedy; these kind of jealousies are so natural to Princes, that it is almost impossible for them to be grateful to any man, who has performed any great thing for them. And if it be so with Kings, no wonder if it be so with the people, for in a free State, they have always two principal ends, one is to enlarge their Dominions, the other to keep what they have got, and their eagerness to both these, makes them so often guilty of ingratitude. As to the first point, we shall speak elsewhere; the errors in preserving their liberty; to disgust such persons as ought to be rewarded, and to suspect such as ought to be trusted; and though such practices are the occasion of great mischiefs in a corrupt Commonwealth, and Tyranny does many times ensue (as in *Rome* by *Cæsar*, who took that by force, which the ingratitude of the people denied to his merits,) yet in a Town that is entire, and incorrupt, they do very well, and add much to the duration of their liberty, to enforce great and ambitious men for fear of punishment to comport themselves better. In my judgment of all the Commonwealths that ever had Empire, *Rome* was the least ingrateful for the reasons abovesaid, there being never an Example of its ingratitude but in the case of *Scipio*: For *Coriolanus* and *Cornelius* were banished for their injuries to the people, and though one of them remaining obstinate, was never recalled; yet the other was not only recalled, but so restored to the affections of the people, that all his life after, they adored him as a Prince. But their jealousy of *Scipio* was of such a sort, as had never been known before, proceeding from the Ornaments of his body, and the endowments of his mind; His youth, his wisdom, his excellent qualifications had render'd him too admirable; the powerfulness of his Enemy, the danger and tediousness of the War (which he had concluded in a very short time) his deliberation in resolving, and his quickness in Execution, had gained him a greater reputation, than was ever got by any General before him, insomuch as the Senators, Pretors, and all the chief Magistrates in the City began to fear and respect him. This was no pleasing sight to the graver sort, because it had not been formerly the Custom in *Rome*; whereupon *Cato* (a man of great esteem for his piety and justice) took up the Cudgels against him, and complained publicly that the City could not be called free, whilst the Magistrates were in awe of any particular Citizen; if then in a thing so nearly importing their liberty, the people followed the opinion of *Cato*, in my judgment they were in some measure to be excused. In short, my opinion is, as I said before, that it is avarice and suspicion which makes men ingrateful: To the first of which the people are not naturally addicted; and to the last, with much less propensity than Princes, as having less occasion, which shall be proved hereafter.

CHAP. XXX.

*What rules are to be observed by a Prince or Commonwealth to avoid this Vice of ingratitude, and how a General or great Citizen is to demean himself to elude it.*

TO avoid the necessity of living always in suspicion, and being ingrateful to his Ministers, a Prince ought to go personally with his Armies, as was done at first by the Emperors of *Rome*, as the great *Turk* does now, and as all they do and have done that are valiant and courageous; for in so doing, the honor and profit of their Victories accrews to themselves; but where they are not present at their Conquests themselves, the honor redounds upon their Officers, and they have not any compleat enjoyment of their successes, till they have eclipsed, if not extinguished that glory in other people, which they durst not venture for themselves; so that their ingratitude, and injustice to their Officers, does them more mischief, than their Conquests do them good. But when out of negligence, or impru-

imprudence, they lie at home idle themselves, and send their Generals in their stead, know no better precept to give them, than what they know already themselves. As to the General, if he finds that jealousy inevitable, he has his choice of two things. As soon as the War is ended, he is voluntarily to lay down his Commission; and to present it to his Master; before he has occasion to demand it, using great care that none of his actions discover him to be either insolent or ambitious, that his Prince having no cause to suspect him, may have the greater obligation to reward him. If this way does not please, the other is quite contrary; and that is, to declare himself boldly, and try always to set up for himself, cajoling and sweetning his Soldiers and Subjects, making new alliances with his Neighbours, seizing upon the strong Towns, corrupting the Officers, and where they will not be corrupted, seducing them some other way, and by doing thus, he shall be even with his Lord; for his ingratitude designed: And besides these two ways, there is none that I know. But (as I said before) because men can neither be good nor bad in extremity, it happens that great men are unwilling to quit their Commands, and retire after the gaining of a Victory; behave themselves modestly they cannot; and to use rigour in an honourable way is impossible. So that whilst they are in suspense, and uncertain which course to steer, they are many times destroyed. As to a Commonwealth that would preserve and exempt it self from this detestable vice of ingratitude, the same remedy cannot be prescribed, as was prescribed to a Prince; for not being able to manage its Wars in Person as a Prince may do, the command of their Forces must of necessity be committed to some of their Subjects. The best way they can take, is to follow the Example of *Rome*, and that will render them less ingrateful than their Neighbors. In the wars of the *Romans*, by ancient Custom all people were employed, as well Nobles as others, and from thence it came that they were always well furnished with Generals and Officers of all sorts, which kept them from being jealous of any one, having so many of equal merit to oppose him. Besides which, there were express Laws against ambition, and all people so narrowly observed, that no man durst discover the least design or inclination that way; and in the creation of Dictators, he was commonly prefer'd, who debas'd himself most, or discovered least desire to obtain it; by which means preventing the occasion of suspicion, they prevented the ingratitude. That State therefore which would avoid the guilt of ingratitude, is to imitate *Rome*, and that person who would avoid the effects, must observe how the *Romans* defended themselves.

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C H A P. XXXI.

*That the Romans used no extraordinary punishments towards their great Captains, when they committed an Error of ignorance, or malice, provided the Government was not damaged by it.*

**T**he *Romans* (as I said before) were not only less unthankful, than their Neighbors; but they were more human and gentle in the punishment of their Generals, than any other State; if their miscarriage was malicious, they punished it not severely; but if it was by ignorance or mistake, instead of revenging, they did many times reward it; and this they did upon very grave consideration, for the *Romans* understood the charge of an Army to be so great a care, and of such transcendent importance, that whoever undertook it, ought to have his mind free and undisturbed by any other respects or troubles whatsoever, for his thoughts being with his troubles, he would never mind his Army, nor take any advantage. For Example, an Army is sent into *Greece* against *Philip* of *Macedon*, or into *Italy* against *Hannibal*, or those people upon the Frontiers, which had been conquered before, and the Captain who has the General Command, is loaden with all the cares which do commonly attend great and extraordinary Enterprizes. Now if to those necessary cares for his Army, there should be superadded a fear, and apprehension of being punished at his return (if things went otherwise than well) and perpetual reflexion upon those who have been abused and put to death upon the same score, it must needs disturb the tranquillity of his mind, and make him unfit for any great action. The wise *Romans* thought the infamy and dishonour of losing a Battel, punishment enough, without heaping one affliction upon another. And as to those whose errors proceed rather from malice than ignorance, we have another Example. *Sergius*, and *Virginius* had each of them an Army, and were encamped before *Veis*: *Sergius* was posted against the *Tuscans*, and *Virginius* on the other side against any body else. It hapned the *Falisci* having joyned with several

of their neighbours, came to fall upon *Sergius*. *Sergius* had notice, and found himself too weak; yet rather than send to his Companion for supplies, he chose to be routed, and *Virginus* on the other side, though he knew his distress, would by no means relieve him, unless he desired it; so that that *Roman Army* was cut off by the ambition and emulation of their Generals; a thing of very ill example, had it been suffered to pass without punishment.

Nevertheless, whereas other States would have punished them with death, *Rome* inflicted only a pecuniary mulct, but their crime deserved sharper correction, but the *Romans* were unwilling to do any thing against custom, which (as is said before) is very sacred with them. As to the errors of ignorance, we have another example in *Varro*, by whose folly and rashness the *Romans* having lost the Battel of *Cannas* against *Hannibal*, and brought their whole Government in danger, had *Hannibal* known how to use, as well as gain a Victory; yet his offence having in it more of ignorance than malice, when he came back, the Senate went out to meet him in their Formalities, and not being able to congratulate his success, they gave him thanks for his return, and that *De salute reipublica non desperasset*, That he did not despair of their affairs. When *Papirius Cursus* the Dictator would needs put *Fabius* to death, because contrary to orders he had fought with the *Sammites*, among other reasons which the Father of *Fabius* urged against that sentence, this was one, that the people of *Rome* had till that time never been so severe upon any of their Commanders for the loss of a Battel, as *Papirius* would now be upon the Victor for gaining one.

CHAP. XXXII.

*A Commonwealth or Prince is not to defer his beneficence till the necessity of the object requires it.*

THE liberality of the *Romans* to the people succeeded very well when *Porfenna* invaded *Rome* in behalf of the *Tarquins*; for the Senate apprehending the people might be brought to restore the Kings rather than endure the war, to oblige them, releas'd their gabels upon salt, and all their other duties, declaring the people were sufficient benefactors to the publick; in providing, and bringing up their children: all which was done to cajole them into such an humour as might make them endure the siege, and swallow the calamities of the War: but let no man rely upon this example, and defer his indulgence to the people, till the enemy be upon his back; for it shall never succeed so well to him as it did to the *Romans*, because the multitude will think themselves more obliged to the enemy than to him, and believe, that when the necessity is over, they shall be as bad as before. The reason why this way succeeded so happily to the *Romans*, was, because their State was but new, and scarce settled, and the People were sensible that several Laws were made before for their advantage and reputation; as particularly the Law of appeal to the people: so as they were able to satisfy themselves that the benefits which were confer'd upon them by the Senate, proceeded rather from a disposition in the Senate to do them good, than from any apprehension of the enemy: besides, the injuries and outrages of their Kings lay fresh and heavy upon their memories. But these cases hapning very seldom, 'tis but very seldom that such remedies succeed; wherefore it is better for any Commonwealth or Prince to consider the worst before-hand, and what people he is most like to have need of in time of adversity; and to live so with them in time of prosperity, as that they may be encouraged to relieve him upon any distress. And he who acts otherwise, whether Prince or Commonwealth, (but especially a Prince) and presumes, when the danger is hanging over his head, that it is time enough to favour the people, will find himself mistaken, and the people readier to contribute to his ruine than defence.

## C H A P. XXXIII.

*If an inconvenience increases either within a State, or against it; it is better to temporize and comply, than to endeavour to remove it by violence.*

**T**He Roman Commonwealth increasing in Empire, Reputation and Force, their neighbours not having considered it, nor what damage that greatness might pull down upon them, began now (when too late) to discover their error; and being willing to do that now which had been more easie before, forty little States of them confederated against Rome. The Romans, among their usual provisions in case of imminent danger, created a Dictator, who, without any mans advice, might resolve as he pleased, and execute his resolutions without being called to an account. This Magistrate was not only the occasion of overcoming their enemies at that time, but was very useful upon all accidents afterwards when their dominion increased. Which may teach us, that when either at home within, or abroad against a Commonwealth, an inconvenience arises, (whether from an inward or an outward cause it is not material) 'tis better counsel to comply and temporize, than to endeavour furiously to suppress it; for to resist, is to augment it, and to pull down upon our heads what we were but afraid of before. And these kind of accidents fall out in a Commonwealth oftner from intrinick than extrinick causes, where the power and authority of some Citizen is permitted to increase too fast, and more than is convenient for the honour or benefit of the State; or when such Laws are abrogated or neglected as were most for the interest of their State; which error, if suffered to run on, will be more dangerous to oppose than to comply with; for it is so much the harder to find out these inconveniences in the beginning, by how much 'tis natural for all people to favour every thing that is new, especially if introduced by a young man, with the least shew or pretence of advantage; for if a young Gentleman appears in a Commonwealth endued with more than ordinary qualities, the eyes of the whole City are immediately upon him, they run unanimously to respect him, and pay him all the honour that can be imagined; so that if he has the least spark of ambition or vain-glory, he is presently puffed up, and inflamed with the contemplation of his own worth, and the affection of the people: and when he is arrived at such an height, as to be as visible as their error, then 'tis too late; there are but few remedies in the case; and when most of them are applyed, they do but magnifie his power. Many examples might be brought to this purpose, but I shall only instance in one.

*Cosimo di Medicis* (from whom the famous Family of the *Medici* in our City had their first grandeur) was in such reputation for his wisdom; and his fellow Citizens were so ignorant; that he began to be formidable to the State, and the Magistrates began to think it difficult to take him down, but destructive to let him stand. There was at that time in Florence a person of great experience in matters of State, called *Nicolo da Uzano*, who being well advised of the first fault which he had committed in not considering in time the inconveniences which might follow upon *Cosimo's* reputation, resolved to obviate the second; that is, that no force should be used to oppress him, as knowing that course would be the ruine of the State; and so it proved not long after his death. For the Citizens which remained, not following his counsel, began to combine, and fortifie against *Cosimo*, and indeed forc'd him out of Rome. Whereupon, his party being increased, in a short time called him home again, and made him their Prince, to which dignity he could never have arrived, but by the opposition of his enemies.

The same hapned to *Julius Cæsar*, whose great virtue and excellent qualifications recommended him so highly to the favour of *Pompey* and the people, that by degrees he became terrible, and their favour was turned into fear; of which *Cicero* complains, when he says that *Pompey* began to fear him too late; for when his fear prompted him to look out for a remedy, that remedy hastned the ruine of the State. I say then (when this case happens) it is incomparably better to temporize, than to endeavour to repel the mischief which threatens by violence and force. For many times, by that means, it passes as it came, and goes out of it self, or else the damage it brings is the longer a coming. In these cases Princes ought to be very vigilant, lest going about to retrench and lessen the great power of a neighbour, they give him opportunity to increase it, and bring themselves into greater danger: you are therefore to compare your own strength, and your enemies; and if you find your self the stronger, to attacke him couragiously; but if weaker, you had better be quiet, lest it happens to you as it did to those little States who confederated against Rome, to whom (as appeared by the event) it had been much better to have sate still, and endeavoured

voured their friendship, than to have irritated the great power of the *Romans*; and forc'd them to a war; for the *Romans* had never got to that height; if that confederacy had not given them occasion of trying all experiments for their defence, and put them among the rest, upon the creation of Dictators, by which new invention they not only mastered all dangers that threaten'd them, but prevented a thousand mischiefs into which (without that remedy) the Commonwealth would most certainly have fallen.

## C H A P. XXXIV.

*The Dictatorship was useful, not hurtful to the Commonwealth of Rome; and how that Power which is usurp'd, and illegally assumed, is pernicious to a State, not that which is conferred legally by the suffrage of the people.*

There are those to be found who have said that the Dictatorship was the ruine and destruction of that Commonwealth, alledging that the first Tyrant that was ever in that City, set himself up, under the title of Dictator, and affirming that *Cæsar* could not under any other name have justified his Tyranny.

Those who maintain that opinion did not examine it thorowly, and are not for that reason to be believed. For it was not the name or dignity of the Dictator which brought *Rome* into slavery, but the authority assumed by the Citizens upon the perpetuation of that office; and if there had been no such thing as Dictator, *Cæsar* had taken some other Title upon him to compass his designs; for when ones power is absolute, he can assume what name he pleases; but 'tis not a great Title that gives any man power. Whilst the Dictatorship was disposed by publick suffrage, it was very beneficial; those who attained it by ways extraordinary, abused it exceedingly; the rest were never known to have done any injury to the Commonwealth thorow all the Dictatorships: the reason is probable, because a man must be endued with many good qualities before he can usurp such an authority. He must be abundantly rich; he must know how to insinuate with every body; he must have a great party, and make every man his friend; which is not practicable where the Laws are in force; and if he had all those qualifications, they would render him so formidable, that the free voices would ever concur in his election: besides, the Dictator was not perpetual, but created only upon particular exigence, and with limited power, extending no farther than the present danger, during which he had power to dispose of all things at his pleasure, and punish as he thought good without any appeal; but he could do nothing in diminution to the Government, he could not intrench upon the authority of the Senate or People, abrogate their old Laws, or institute new: so that the shortness of his Dictatorship, the limitation of his authority, and the incorruption of the people, made it impossible for him to transgress, and do any mischief to the City; and on the contrary, that Office has been always beneficial, and, in my judgment, the principal in *Rome*, and has contributed more than all the rest to make it Mistress of the World; for without that, that City had never been able to have obviated so many dangers, nor gone thorow so many difficulties, against which their accustomed and ordinary means would have been of little validity; as being too tedious, and slow; (no one Counsel or Magistrate being able to do all things alone but being in a mutual necessity the one of the other) for in cases which require immediate remedy, time passes away, and is often lost whilst they are in their counsels; and when they come to a resolution, 'tis too late, and their remedies dangerous.

Wherefore I think it convenient that a Commonwealth have a certain way to be used only in case of urgent necessity, as the *Signory of Venice*, (which at this day is the best regulated Commonwealth in the World) that State in time of imminent danger has a reserved power to confer authority upon some few of their Citizens, by virtue of which they may order all as they please, without the consultation of the rest; for when a Commonwealth is destitute of some such custom, it must of necessity be ruined by sticking to their old, or break them to preserve it self: and it were to be wish'd that nothing might happen in a Commonwealth that might give occasion for these extraordinary ways; for though those extraordinary ways may sometimes be good, yet the example is ill, and introduces a custom of breaking old orders for good, which afterwards, under that pretence, will be broken for ill: wherefore that Commonwealth can never be perfect, that by its Laws has not provided against every thing; prepared remedies for every accident; and appointed in what manner they shall be managed; which is to be done no better way than by, a Dictator, or some such Magistrate to be created upon extraordinary occasion; for without them they

they must certainly be ruined; and one thing very remarkable in this order, is, the wisdom of the *Romans* in the formality of its election; for the Dictators being introduced with some diminution to the Consuls, (who being from heads of the City brought down to obedience like other people, might possibly relent it, and in time be the occasion of dissension in the City) they committed their election into the hands of the Consuls, to the end that upon any extraordinary emergence, when *Rome* should have occasion of so extraordinary a Magistrate, the Consuls should comply the more willingly, because they had the making them themselves; for the wounds which a man gives himself spontaneously, and of his own election, are not so grievous as what he is forced for to bear. But towards the latter end of their Empire, the *Romans*, instead of a Dictator, invested their Consul with an equivalent authority in these words, *Videat Consul, ne Respublica quid detrimenti capiat; Let it be the Consuls care that the Commonwealth receives no prejudice.* So that to return to our matter, I conclude, that the neighbouring States conspiring against the *Romans*, and endeavouring to oppress them, made them contrive better, not only for their defence, but to put themselves into a posture, with more vigour, and counsel, and authority to repel their invasion, and turn their force upon them.

#### CHAP. XXXV,

*How it came to pass that the Creation of the Decem-virat was prejudicial to the liberty of that State, though it was done freely, and by publick suffrage.*

IN the last Chapter we have shewn that a power legally conferred, and by the suffrage of the people, is not dangerous to the State; but that which is usurped, and gotten by force, to which the election of the *Decem-viri* may seem to be contrary, who were chosen by the people of *Rome* to make their Laws, and reform extravagancies in the Commonwealth, which *Decem-viri* by degrees encroached upon their liberties; and made themselves Tyrants. Wherefore we are to consider what is said, with limitation and restraint; and respect both the manner in which such power is confer'd, as likewise the time it is to continue, whether for longer or shorter: for an absolute power (though granted but for a year) is very dangerous, and produces such effects as are sutable to the mind of the person to whom it is granted. And the power of the *Decem-viri* (if examined) will be found much greater than the power of the Dictators. For notwithstanding the creation of the Dictator, the majesty of the Consuls and Senate remained, together with the authority of the Tribunes, which were as bounds to restrain and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the Dictator; and although the Dictator had power to remove any one out of the Consulship, or take from him his Tribunitial authority; yet he could not vacate or abolish the whole Orders of Senators, Consuls, and Tribunes, make new Laws, nor introduce a new form of Government. So that their eyes being always upon him, he was forced (as it were) to intend only such things as were for the benefit of the Commonwealth. But in the creation of the *Decem-viri* it was otherwise; for the whole power of the people was transfer'd to them, the Consuls and Senate being cashiered, and the power of the Tribunes of the people almost quite laid aside; so that standing alone in the Government, without Consuls, or Tribunes, or appeal to the people, or any other Magistrate to correct or controul them; it was no strange thing that the very next year after their creation, they should become intolerable and intolerant, especially being instigated by the ambition of *Appius*. And for this reason it is to be observed, that when it is said, a Power conferred legally, and by the suffrage of the people, is never prejudicial to the State; it is to be supposed to be confer'd with due circumstances, and for a certain time; but when the people is cheated, and gives it imprudently and rashly, as in this case of the *Decem-viri*, things never go better, which is easily proved by considering what it was that kept the Dictators so good, and made the *Decem-viri* so wicked: and weighing withal the manner which other Republicks that were reputed well ordered, observed, in conferring their authority for a long time, as the *Spartans* to their Kings, and the *Venetians* to their Dukes; both of them prescribing them rules and limits that they were not to exceed, and appointing such guards upon them as should be able (though they were never so ill disposed of themselves) to keep them from employing their power to the detriment of the State.

Nor is it sufficient if this Power be confer'd upon good men; for men are frail, and easily corrupted, and then in a short time he that is absolute may easily corrupt the people, contract friendships, make parties, heap up riches, and commit a thousand extravagancies; nor can the

the poverty of their persons, or the want of relations prevent it, for wealth, and honour, and every thing follows them which are absolute, as we shall show particularly when we speak of the creation of the *Decem-viri*.

CHAP. XXXVI.

*Citizens who have executed the greatest Offices, ought not afterwards, to disdain or scruple the less.*

**M**arcus Fabius and Caius Manlius being Consuls, the Romans obtained a glorious Victory over the *Veientes*, and the *Etrusci*, in which was slain *Quintus Fabius* Brother to the Consul, who was chosen the year before. From whence occasion is offered of admiring the excellence of the *Roman* constitution; and observing how well it was accommodated for the enlargement of their Empire, from whose Model the more the Commonwealths of our days do recede, the more do they wander, and deviate from the best. For though the *Romans* affected glory and command as much as other people, they did not disdain notwithstanding to obey in their Armies, the same persons whom they had formerly commanded; and serve as private Soldiers, where they had formerly been Generals. This is a practice contrary to the opinion and genius of our age so much, that in *Venice* it is provided by a publick Law, that a Citizen who has had a greater command, may refuse to accept of a less (and the City allows it), which Law though it may be convenient for private persons, must needs be prejudicial to the publick; because the publick may with more confidence commit an inferior command to a great Officer, than prefer an inferior Officer to a great command: For to a young Soldier, those places of importance are not safely entrusted, unless persons of experience and wisdom be placed about him, by whose Counsel he may be directed: And if the *Romans* had done then, what the *Venetians* and other Commonwealths do now, and not suffered any man who had ever been Consul, to serve in any other quality, many things had befallen them that would have endangered their liberty; and again, if any young Officers had been admitted to the supreme commands, and no body placed about them to manage and direct them, they would have grown dissolute and careless, and many things have hapned that might have ruined the State.

CHAP. XXXVII.

*What troubles and offence was created in Rome by the Agrarian Law; and how dangerous it is to make a new Law opposite to an old Custom, with too much retrospection.*

**I**T is observed by most ancient Writers, that as men are afflicted in adversity, so they are satiated in prosperity; and that joy and grief have the same effects: For when men are not necessitated to fight, they fight for ambition, which is so powerful in our minds, that let us arrive at what height of good fortune we can, we are never contented, but are still labouring for more; and this happens to us, because we are naturally capable of desiring many things, which we are unable to compass; and therefore our desire being greater than our power to acquire, our minds are never at rest with what we enjoy. And this is the occasion of all our varieties of fortune, for when we are always driving at more, and fearful of losing what is already in our possession, we are apt to fall into suspicions, from thence into quarrels, and from thence into Wars, which do usually bring after them the ruine of our Country. This we have discoursed, to give you a better contemplation of the People of *Rome*, which by a kind of necessity was forced by their Tribunial power to fortifie themselves against the oppressions of the *Patricii*; but when they had obtained what indeed necessity impelled them to desire, being instigated by their ambition, they went on further, and contended with the *Patricii* both for Honor, and Estate; which was the occasion of the Seditions about the *Agrarian Law*, and by degrees the destruction of the Commonwealth. And because it is necessary in every well order'd State, that respect be had rather to the enrichment of the Publick, than particular Citizens, the people of *Rome* could not (in what belong'd to this Law) but erre against the Fundamentals



metals of their Government, if they were so constituted, that process of time could give no occasion of difference, unless we will rather affirm that at first all things were so well, that it was beyond the power of time to disorder them: Be it which way it will, it is certain this Law was never mentioned in *Rome*, but with great controversy, and tumult. This Law consisted principally in two heads. One was, That no Citizen of *Rome* should be permitted to possess more than a certain proportion of Land. The other, that what Land should be taken from the Enemy, should be divided equally among the people; both of which Articles were against the interest of the Nobility; for most of them having more Land than was allowed by this Law, their fortunes by it were to be confiscated, and half of them taken away; and then by the distribution of what they should take from the Enemy, they should lose all opportunity of enriching themselves for the future; which being certainly true, and this Law so perfectly pernicious to the interest of the Nobility, it was never mentioned by the Tribunes, but the *Patricii* opposed it, and with all the eagerness imaginable; yet not always by force, but sometimes by evasion, either commanding out their Armies upon some pretended design, or by setting up another Tribune in opposition to him who proposed the Law, that thereby they might dissolve it, or else by sending new Colonies. And so it hapned when the Colony was sent to *Antium* at the time when the difference was so high betwixt the *Patricii* and the *Agrarians*, that no other expedient could be found to keep them from blood. *Livy* tells us, That there were very few that would list themselves upon that account, to fill up the number of that Colony, so much more did the people prefer an allotment about *Rome*, than in any other place. But afterwards the quarrel grew higher, and to appease their Seditious, the *Romans* were glad to send their Armies sometimes to the extreamest parts of *Italy*, and sometimes beyond them. But afterwards it falling out that the Lands which they took from the Enemy were remote, at great distance from *Rome*, and not to be cultivated with any convenience, the people grew weary, and insisted not so fiercely on their *Agrarian Law*: They began also to be more moderate in those kind of confiscations, but when any Country was seized, they sent Colonies to plant them: With these Arts they skin'd over their animosities till the time of the *Gracchi*, who reviving them again, gave occasion to the ruine of their Government: for the Nobility having encreased their strength, the quarrel advanced so far, that they came to blows; and the Magistrate being unable to restrain them, the fury of the Faction encreasing, each party began to look out for a head. The people chose *Marius*, and made him four times Consul, (with some little interval) which authority he managed so well to his own advantage, that by the power and interest which he had got in that time, he made himself thrice Consul afterwards. The Nobility having no other remedy against so growing a Plague, applyed themselves to *Sylla*, and having made him their chief, they fell to downright Wars, which were carried on with much blood and variety of fortune, till at last the Nobility prevailed. The same faction revived again in the days of *Cæsar*, and *Pompey*, and was attended by the destruction of the State: For *Cæsar* espousing the *Marian* party, and *Pompey* the *Syllan*; *Cæsar* overcame, and was the first that set up a Tyranny in *Rome*; after whose time that City could never recover its liberty. This was the beginning, and this was the end of the *Agrarian Law*, which may seem to contradict what we have said elsewhere. That the discords and enmity betwixt the people and Senate of *Rome* conduced to the enlargement of their Empire, and the conservation of their liberty, by giving opportunity for the making of such Laws, as were great corroboration to their liberties and freedom; but I answer, That the effects of the *Agrarian Law*, does not hinder, but that what we have said may be true; for so great was the ambition of the Nobility, that had it not been curb'd and check'd several ways, it would have usurped upon the City, and got the whole power into its hands. And if we observe that the *Agrarian* dispute was three hundred years together in *Rome*, before it could subvert it, we may easily imagine, the ambition of the *Patricii* would have done it much sooner, had it not been ballanced and depressed by the people with their *Agrarian Laws*, and some other inventions. From whence likewise we may observe that wealth is more estimable among men, than honor; for when the *Patricii* were in controversy with the people about Titles and Honor, they never went so high as to give them any extraordinary disgust: But when their Estates and Fortunes were at stake, they defended them with such zeal, that they chose rather to put the whole Commonwealth into a flame, than to part with them quickly. The great authors of that Conflagration were the *Gracchi*, whose good will and intentions towards the people, was much more to be commended than their wisdom. For to remove an inveterated inconvenience, and to that purpose to make a Law with too much retrospection, is ill Counsel (as I said before) and hastens that ruine which it was designed to prevent; but with Patience and

Compliance, the mischief is either delayed, or spends it self in time, before it does any great hurt.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

*Weak Commonwealths are generally irresolute, and ill advised, taking their measures more from Necessity, than Election.*

**T**He *Volsci*, and the *Equi* understanding that *Rome* was sadly visited with a Contagion, concluded it a fair opportunity to conquer it, and having betwixt them raised a powerful Army, they invaded the *Latini*, and *Hernici*; over-ran most of their Country, and forced them to send to *Rome* for assistance. The *Romans* returned answer, that they should put themselves in Arms, and make as good defence as they could; for the Sickness was so raging, they could give them no relief. which shows the generosity and wisdom of that Senate, That in all conditions, and under the greatest of their Calamities never receded from its Majesty and Grandeur; but at all times would have the disposal of the affairs of its Subjects, and when necessity required, made no scruple to command things contrary to their old ways of proceeding. This I say, because formerly the Senate had forbidden them to arm, upon any occasion, whatever; and perhaps another Council would have thought it derogatory to their Grandeur, to permit them to defend themselves: But this Senate was endued with admirable prudence, understood how things were to be taken, and rejected; and of two evils, how to make choice of the least. It troubled them much that they were not in condition to protect them; and it troubled them no less, That they would be forced to defend themselves, upon their own score without succours from *Rome*; yet finding there was a necessity of it, the enemy being at their Gates, and threatening them with death, they retained their authority, and with great gravity sent them word to defend themselves and raise what forces they could. This may seem but a common resolution, and what any other Commonwealths would have taken as well as that; but weak and ill ordered Commonwealths cannot come off with so much honour. Duke *Valentine* having taken *Faenza*, and overrun most part of *Bologna*, demanded passage of the *Florentines* to march his Army to *Rome*. The *Florentine* Council met, and consulted, and there was not one man who thought it convenient to grant it. This was not according to the discretion of the *Romans*; for the Duke being very strong, and the *Florentines* but weak, it had been more for their honour to have granted him passage, when they could not obstruct it; that what they could not resist, might have been imputed to their courtesie. But there is no remedy, 'tis the property of weak States to do every thing amiss, and never to do well but in spite of their teeth, for there is no such thing as prudence amongst them. And this *Florence* has verified in two other cases.

In the year 1500. when *Lewis XII.* had repossessed himself of *Milan*, he had an inclination to restore *Pisa* to the *Florentines* upon the payment of 50000 *Florens*: To this purpose he sent thither his Army under the Command of Mounseur *de Beaumont* in whom (though a *French* man) the *Florentines* had great confidence. *Beaumont* came up with his Army betwixt *Cassina* and *Pisa*, and lodged it conveniently for the battering the Town: having been two or three days before, it and all things ready for the assault, Commissioners came out, and offered to surrender to the *French*, upon condition that he would engage upon the honor of his Master that it should not in four months time be delivered to the *Florentine*; to which the *Florentines* not consenting, the Commissioners returned. The cause why the *Florentines* refused it, was their jealousy of the King, though they had put themselves under his protection. They did not consider that the King could better have put the Town into their hands when he was Master of it himself (and if he had refused it, it would have discover'd him) than promise to do it when he was not in possession, and yet they be forced to purchase that promise at a very great rate. Two years after, *Arezzo* revolted, and the King sent Seigneur *Jubals* with supplies to the *Florentines*, who had besieged the Town. *Jubals* was no sooner arrived, but the Inhabitants of *Arezzo* made him the same proffer, and the *Florentines* could not be brought to consent: *Jubals* resented it, and knowing it to be a great fault, he practised privately with the *Aretines*, without Communicating with the *Florentine* Commissaries: An agreement was clapt up betwixt them, by virtue of which *Jubals* entred the Town, and reproached the *Florentines* by their indiscretion, as people wholly inexperienced in the

affairs of the world. He told them, if they desired to have it, they should signify it to the King, who would be better able to gratifie them in the Town, than without. The *Florentines* were highly offended, and spake very hardly of *Jubalt*, till they considered that of *Beaumont* had done the same at *Pisa*, they had both as well as one I say therefore, that weak and irresolute States, do seldom take good Counsels, unless they be forced; for their weakness suffers them not to deliberate, where any thing is doubtful; and if that doubt be not removed by a violent necessity, they never come to a resolution, but are always in suspence.

## C H A P. XXXIX.

*Divers People have many times the same Accidents.*

Whoever compares past things with the present, will find that in all Ages men have had the same humours and appetites as now. So that 'tis an easie matter by consulting what is pass'd, not only (in all common-wealths) to see what will follow, but to provide such remedies as their Predecessors did apply; or if there be no Presidents, to invent new remedies according to the similitude of the accidents. But because these considerations are neglected, History not read, or not understood at least by him who governs, it comes to pass that all Ages have their miscarriages and troubles. The City of *Florence* after the Government had stood 94 years, having lost a good part of its Territory, as *Pisa*, and other Towns, was forced to make War upon those who possessed them; and the Inhabitants being strong, and unwilling to restore them, much was spent in the War; to very little purpose. Their great expence, occasioned great Taxes, and their impositions upon the people, made them mutinous, and inquiet. These affairs were administr'd by a Magistracy of ten Citizens, who were called the *Dieci della Guerra*: The people began to repine and to complain that the said Council was the cause of the War, and that they embezled their Money. That the best way would be to remove them from that Office or when their time was expired to choose no more, but let the Government fall back into its old channel again. These grave Persons who had the superintendancy of the War, were no sooner discharged, but things grew worse and worse, and instead of recovering *Pisa*, and the rest of the Towns in dispute, they lost *Arezzo*, and several other places. The people finding their mistake, and that their malady was rather from the Fever, than the Physitian, they restored the ten *Commissaries* which before they had cashier'd. The people of *Rome* had the same fancy against the Consuls, and would not believe but they were the causes of all their distractions, and that to settle all things, and preserve themselves in peace, the best way would be to remove them entirely, and provide that there should never be any more, or else to restrain and limit their authority in such manner, that they should have no power over them, either within the City or without. They believed that all proceeded from the ambition of the Nobility, who not being able to chastise the people in the City, because they were protected by their Tribunes, contrived to carry them out of Town under the command of their Consuls, to correct them where they should not be capable of any redress. The first man who had the confidence to propose it, was *Terentillus* a Tribune, who moved that it might be committed to five persons to consider the power of the Consuls, and to appoint limitations. The Nobility opposed it, and (it is probable) employed all their interest against it, for it was no less than to debase the Majesty of the Government, and leave themselves no dignity in the commonwealth. Nevertheless the obstinacy of the Tribunes was such, that the Name of Consul was laid aside, and after several experiments, the people chose rather to create their Tribunes with Consular power, than to create new Consuls again, shewing thereby that their quarrel was not so much against the authority, as Name: But they found their error at length, and restored their Consuls, as the *Florentines* did their Council of ten.

## C H A P. X L.

*The creation of the Decem-virat in Rome; what things are most remarkable in it; and how far such a Constitution may be useful or pernicious to a Commonwealth.*

**B**Efore we discourse of the troubles and commotions which hapned in Rome by means of the *Decem-virat*, it will not be amiss to give a short history of its Creation, in which there are many things well worthy our remark, as well for the preservation as destruction of a State; and this discourse will remonstrate the errors both of the Senate and People in prejudice to the liberty, and of *Appius* (chief of the *Decem-viri*) against that tyranny which he design'd to erect. The Romans therefore after a long debate betwixt the Nobility and People about the Constitution of such Laws as might settle and establish the liberty of their State, by common consent, sent to Athens *Spurius Posthumus*, with two other persons, for exemplifications of such Laws as *Solon* had made there, that thereby they might model their own. As soon as they were returned they chose certain learned and grave men to peruse the said Laws, and select such as they thought convenient for the Romans. The persons created for this office were ten of the principal Citizens (with Commission for a year) among whom, *Appius Claudius* was one, a witty, but a turbulent man. And that they might act freely, without any awe or impediment in their affairs, they laid aside all the other Magistrates, (in particular the Tribunes and Consuls) and forbad all appeal to the people; so that this Magistracy were compleat Sovereigns in Rome. Not long after *Appius* assumed the whole authority of the ten, his Companions paying a reverence, as their Superior, by reason of his interest with the people; for he had made himself so popular on a sudden, it was almost a miracle to consider how soon his nature was changed, and he of their only cruel and fierce adversary become their greatest Courtier and Favourite.

The first year all went very well, and he who presided marched only with twelve Lictors before him; when any Citizen was to be tried for murder, they framed the Process, but appointing a day, left it to be judged by the people, though their jurisdiction was Sovereign, and without any appeal. They writ their Laws in ten Tables, but before they were ratified they exposed them to the people that every man might see them at his pleasure, and approve or object as he saw occasion. When *Appius* perceived the end of his Commission approaching, he caused it to be rumoured among the people, that to compleat all, and give perfection to their designs, it would be convenient to add two Tables more to their Ten, in order to which the common people consented that the *Decem-virat* should be continued for a year; and they did it with the more readines, that neither the Consuls nor Tribunes might be restored, but Causes be left to their own judgment, as is said before. A day being appointed for a new creation, tis not to be imagined how all the Nobility stickled, and endeavoured to gain that honour which they had so stiffly impugned by their applications to the people; whom they had so highly provoked. But among them all, none was so solicitous for the continuation of the *Decem-virat*, as *Appius Claudius* who pressed it of the people with so much instance and humanity, that he began to be suspected by his associates, *Credebant enim haud gratuitam in tanta superbia Comitatem fore; They could not imagine a person of his pride would stoop to such flattery without some great design*: that they might defeat neatly, and with cunning, what they could not do by force; though he was the youngest of them all, they committed the nomination of the next ten to him, supposing he would have observed ancient rules, and not named himself, which was a practice of no use nor reputation in Rome. *Ille verb impedimentum, pro occasione arripuit* he spoil'd their Plot made advantage of their impediment, and named himself among the foremost, to the amazement and displeasure of all the Nobility.

This Creation was no sooner over, but both Nobility and People began to be sensible of their error; for, as was said of him, *Finem fecit serendæ alienæ personæ*, *Appius began to shew himself, and lay aside the disguise he had put on*: he began to act according to his own natural pride, and in a little time had made his Collegues as bad as himself. To terrifie the Senate and people both, the first day of their Magistracy they multiplied their Lictors to 120, whereas formerly they had but 12, which were carried before every one of them by turns, but now every one of them had as many. This terror for some time was equally diffused, but afterwards they began to favour the Nobility, and insult upon the people only; and if any of the people that had been injured by any of the *Decem-viri*, and had no right done him by the first, to whom he address'd, if he appeal'd to another, he was sure to be worse;

inſomuch, as the people finding their error, began in their affliction to look upon the Nobility; *Es inde libertatis captari auram, unde ſervitutem timendo, in eum ſtatum rempublicam adduxerant;* and from thence hope for their liberty, from whence their apprehenſion of ſervitude had brought their Commonwealth into the condition in which it was.

And this affliction in the people was no little ſatisfaction to the Nobility, *Ut ipſi ſædio præſentium, Conſules deſiderarent;* that the tediousneſs of their ſufferings might make them reſtore their Conſuls. By this time their years was expired, and the two Tables to be added to the ten, both ready, and wanted nothing but publication; the *Decem-viri* had no mind to lay down, but began to think of continuing their authority by force, to which end they raiſed themſelves Guards out of the young Nobility, and paid them out of the Eſtates of thoſe who were condemned. *Quibus donis juvenus corruppebatur, & malebat licentiam ſuam, quam omnium libertatem;* by which preferment the youth were debauched, and choſe rather to be licentious themſelves than that their Country ſhould be free.

Whilst things were in this poſture, the *Sabini* and the *Volſci* made War upon the *Romans* and invaded them with a great Army. The *Romans* were in great conſternation and the *Decem-viri* began to find the weakneſs of their Government, for without a Senate they were at a loſs to manage their War; and with it their authority would be ſupplanted. But being neceſſitated at laſt, they came to a reſolution, and reſembled the Senate. Many ſpeeches were made againſt the *Decem-viri*, in particular by *Valerius* and *Horatius*; and doubtleſs their authority had been utterly exploded, but that the Senate, in ſpight to the people, choſe rather to continue them, leſt, if they were depoſed, the people ſhould ſet up their Tribunes, and the Conſuls be quite laid aſide; whereas, if afterwards the *Decem-viri* could be brought fairly to lay down, by degrees the Conſuls might be reſtored, and the Tribunes be caſhiered. Hereupon the Senate ſilently, without further proſecution of them, prepared for the War, and ſent forth two Armies under the Command of ſeveral of the Ten, but *Appius Claudius* was left behind for the Government of the City. Whilst his Collegues were abroad, it was his fortune to fall in love with a Plebeian's daughter called *Virginia*, and not being able to perſuade, he would take her away by force; *Virginus* the Father of the Virgin was willing to defend the chaſtity of his Daughter, and knowing no other way to ſecure it, he got *Appius* to be imprifoned: whereupon great tumults ſucceeding in *Rome*, and in the Army, the Souldiers returned, and joyning with the people they encamped upon the holy Mountain, where they reſolved to continue till the Ten had reſigned, Tribunes and Conſuls were reſtored, and the Commonwealth had recovered its old liberty and freedom. This is the ſtory of the *Decem-virat*, as ſhortly related as could be, in which it may be obſerved, that the people of *Rome* fell into ſubjection and ſervitude upon the ſame cauſes as other Commonwealths very frequently do; that is, by the too great deſire of the people to be free, and the too great ambition in the Nobility of Command: when theſe two Factions cannot agree, they are forced to refer all to ſome third perſon in whom they conſide; and then begins the Tyranny. The *Decem-virat* was erected in *Rome* by conſent both of the Nobility and People, and inveſted with ſo much power, out of a hatred which the Nobility bare to the Tribunitial, and the people to the Conſular authority: as ſoon as the *Decem-viri* were choſen, *Appius* pretended highly for the people, and promiſed to be their Champion, whereupon they favoured him exceedingly. And (be it in what City it will) whenever the people are brought to extol and applaud a perſon, for no other reaſon, but becauſe it is in his power to puniſh their enemies; if that perſon be cunning and induſtrious, their liberty is loſt, and he can uſurp when he pleaſes; for by the aſſiſtance of the people he may maſter the Nobility; and when they are down, it will be no hard matter to ſubdue the people, who will have no body to fly to, nor no body to ſupport them: but before the Nobility be ſuppreſſed, he is by no means to meddle with the people. And this has been the method of all thoſe who have laid the foundation of Tyranny in any Commonwealth; which if *Appius* had followed, he had not loſt his ill-got authority ſo ſoon: but he went quite contrary, and with as much imprudence as was poſſible, ran himſelf into the diſpleaſure of the ſame perſons which advanced him; and ingratiated with thoſe who were againſt his preferment, and were no way able to ſuſtain him, whereby he loſt his old friends who were powerful, and endeavoured to get new that could do him no good. For though the Nobility have naturally no averſion to Tyranny; yet that part of the Nobility which ſhares not in the profits is always an enemy to the Tyrant, and their ambition and avarice is ſo great, all the riches and honours in the Tyrants diſpoſal are too little to take them off. Hence it is that the aggreſſor in any enterprize is of neceſſity to be ſtronger than his adverſary; and he who in the eſtabliſhment of a Tyranny makes the people rather than the Nobility his friends, will be ſtronger and more ſecure than he who goes the other way, cajoles with the Nobility, and diſobliges the People:  
for

for the people being always stronger in the City, by their friendship, a Tyrant may subsist without any foreign supplies. This was visible in the case of *Nabis* the Tyrant of *Sparta*, who having the affections of the people, and secured himself of some of the Nobility, defended himself against all *Greece*, and the whole power of the *Romans*, which without the hearts of the people he could never have done. But he who makes his interest with the Nobility, cannot maintain himself without foreign assistance; for he will want Guards for the security of his person, Souldiers to do the Office of the Militia in the Country, and Confederates and Allies to succour him in his distress; whereas if he could be supplied in these three defects, it might be possible for him to subsist without the friendship of the people. But *Appius* failing in these, miscarried in the very beginning of his Tyranny.

In the creation of the *Decem-virat* the Senate and the People were guilty of very great error; for though in our discourse of Dictators we have said before, that those Magistrates only are pernicious to the publick liberty, who set up themselves by force, not they who are legally chosen and by the suffrage of the people; yet the people are to take special care in the election of their Magistrates, that they may not easily usurp. But the *Romans* instead of placing Guards about their *Decem-viri* that might have kept them in order, they not only took their Guards away, but displaced all the rest of their Magistrates, and made them absolute for that year, and all out of a design to countermine one another; the Nobility to suppress the Tribunes, and the people the Consuls. So that it hapned to them, as *Ferdinand* King of *Arragon* was wont to say it hapned to men that hated one another; that is, that they acted like birds of prey, all of them pursuing the quarry with equal rapacity; but the little birds not regarding the greater over their heads, are easily interrupted, and made prey themselves. But we have said enough to demonstrate the ill Counsel of the *Romans* in thinking to preserve their liberty by the creation of the *Decem-virat*, and the errors of *Appius* in driving at the Sovereignty, and miscarrying so soon.

CHAP. XLI.

*For a mean man to grow immediately insolent, or a meek man immediately cruel, without just steps of gradation, is both imprudent and unprofitable.*

**A**Mong the rest of *Appius* his faults in the management of his Tyranny, it was of no little ill consequence that he changed his humour so suddenly: his cunning in cajoling the people, and pretending to be of their party, was good: his invention to renew the creation of the Ten was no worse; his boldness in presenting himself contrary to the expectation of the Nobility was well enough, and his creating Collegues for his turn was not amiss. But having gone thus far, (as is said before) to change his nature in a moment; of a friend, to become an enemy to the people; of an humble and affable man, to shew himself proud; of a mild man, to become difficult and perverse; and all this with so little circumstance, that the whole World might see it was either the falseness or levity of his temper, was high indiscretion: for he that has ever pretended to be good, and is willing for his advantage to become otherwise, must not do it at a leap, but by degrees, and upon occasion, that before the diversity of his deportment deprives him of his old friends, he may have gained himself new, without diminution to his authority; otherwise being discovered and deserted, he is certainly ruined.

CHAP. XLII.

*How easily mens manners are corrupted.*

**I**T is remarkable likewise in the passages of the *Decem-viri*, that men are easily corrupted, and become wicked, be their education never so good. The youth which *Appius* debauched, and took for his Guards, is sufficient to prove it; who, though of honourable extraction, and brought up with all possible advantage, suffered themselves to be corrupted by their preferments, became favourers of tyranny, and perfer'd their own licentiousness before the liberty of their Country. *Quintus Fabius* did the same, who, though an excellent person at first, and one of the *Decem-viri* of the second creation, blinded with ambition

and enveigled by the cunning of *Appius*, changed his good humour into bad, and grew as intolerable as he; which things, if seriously considered, should make all Legislators (either in Commonwealths or Kingdom) the more careful and diligent to restrain the ambition of mankind, and take from them all hopes of impunity when they offend in that kind.

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C H A P. XLIII.

*Those Souldiers which fight for their own honour are the best, and most to be trusted.*

FROM the same History it may be observed how much it imports the prosperity or adversity of affairs to have the minds of the Souldiers quiet, and ready to engage upon a principle of honour, rather than to have them turbulent, and disposed to fight upon every mans ambition: for whereas the Roman Armies were always Victorious under the conduct of the Consuls; under the *Decem-viri* they were always unfortunate: from hence likewise it may be collected how unsafe it is to commit the defence of our affairs to a mercenary Army who have nothing to encourage or oblige them but their pitiful pay, which is not considerable enough to make them so faithful as to lay down their lives in your quarrel. For in an Army where the Souldier is not bound to the person for whom he fights by some particular obligation, or the expectation, of more than ordinary advantage by the Victory if the enemy be strong, they will make but little resistance; and this kindness and affection of the Souldiers to the General cannot be but where they are subjects fighting under a good Prince or a lawful Magistrate in defence of their Posterity and Religion: so that it is necessary for every King or Commonwealth who desires to defend himself well, to train up his own Subjects in Military Discipline, that he may safely depend upon them in time of distress; and it has been the practice of all those who have done any great things. The Roman Armies under the *Decem-viri* had doubtless the same courage as under the Consuls: but not being so well affected towards the one as the other, they would not put it forth, nor give such testimonies as formerly: but when the tyranny of the *Decem-viri* was extinguished, and their liberty was recovered, having then the same tenderness and affection to their Country, they fought as well as before, and their enterprizes had the same happy success.

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C H A P. XLIV.

*A multitude without an head is altogether unserviceable; nor is any man to threaten that has any thing to desire.*

UPON the accident of *Virginus*, the people having taken Arms, and retir'd to the holy-Mount, the Senate sent to them to know upon what account they had abandoned their Officers, and betaken themselves to that Mount: and the authority of the Senate was so venerable among the people, that having no head among them, there was no body durst return an answer: *Titus Livius* tells us, *Non desuit quid responderetur, deerat qui responsurum daret; They wanted not what to say, but who to deliver it.* For having no certain Commander, every private person was unwilling to expose himself to their displeasure. From whence we may understand how useless a thing the multitude is without a head, which being observed by *Virginus*, he caused twenty Military Tribunes to be made, with power to treat and expostulate with the Senate instead of a Head.

The people insisting to have *Valerius* and *Horatius* sent to them, to whom they would communicate their grievances, *Valerius* and *Horatius* refused to go till the *Decem-viri* had laid down their authority; which being at length obtained with much concertation; *Valerius* and *Horatius* repaired to the people, and understood that they would have new Tribunes to be chosen; they would have appeals from every Magistrate to the people; and they would have the *Decem-viri* to be delivered up into their hands, that they might burn them alive: the Embassadors liked the first of their demands, but refused to consent to the last as impious, telling them, *Crudelitatem damnatis, in crudelitatem ruitis: You condemn cruelty, and practise it your selves:* and before you will be free, you will tyrannize over your adversary;



adversaries; advising them to lay that Article by, and mention the *Decemviri* no farther, but to address themselves to the re-assumption of their power and authority, after which they would not want ways of receiving satisfaction; for then every man's life and fortune would be at their disposing. Hence we may learn how weak and imprudent it is to desire a thing, and before we receive it, declare to what ill uses we intend it, especially if we mean to do mischief, 'tis just as you should say, pray give me your Sword, that I may run you thorow. 'Tis sufficient to borrow the Sword, and when you have it, you may do as you please.

CHAP. XLV.

*'Tis a thing of ill Example to break a new Law, especially for the Maker; and 'tis no less dangerous to the Governor of a State, to multiply injuries, and repeat them every day.*

THE Commotions about the Tyranny of the *Decem-viri* being composed, and *Rome* restored to its old form of Government again; *Virginus* cited *Appius* before the people to answer what he had attempted upon his Daughter. *Appius* appeared with his Nobility about him; *Virginus* commanded him to Prison: *Appius* cryed out, he appealed to the people: *Virginus* replied, That he who had taken away those appeals from the people, ought not to have any benefit by them, nor be permitted to implore their protection, whose Laws and Liberties could receive no protection from him: *Appius* insisted, that they ought not to violate a thing which they had urged with that eagerness, and ordained with that zeal. And though indeed the life of *Appius* was wicked enough, and there was no punishment that he did not deserve; yet it was inhospitable and contrary to all civil Society, to violate their own Laws, which were but newly made, and passed with so much importunity: for in my judgment there is nothing so indecorous, nor of so ill example in a Commonwealth, as the infraction of a new Law, by the Legislator himself.

When in the year 1494. the State of *Florence* was restored by the assistance of a Frier called *Hieronimo Savonarola* (whose writings give sufficient testimony of his Learning and integrity) having among other things for the security of the Citizens, obtained a Law for appeals to the people in matters of State, both from the Senate and the Council of Eight (which Law he had a long time solicited, and got with much difficulty at last) It hapned that not long after, there were five persons condemned to death by the Senate, which persons endeavouring very earnestly to appeal to the people, they were denied that liberty, and could not have the benefit of that Law; which was greater diminution to the reputation of the Frier, than any thing that had ever hapned before: For if that Law was of such importance as he had pretended, it ought to have been observed; if not, why was it solicited so earnestly? And it was the more remarkable in the Frier, because in his many Sermons and Discourses afterwards to the people, he neither blamed the breaking of that Law, nor went about to excuse it, for being to his purpose, he would not condemn it, and excuse it he could not, having nothing to say; which action having discovered the ambition and partiality of his mind, took much off from his repute, and loaded him with scandal. It is of great inconvenience likewise in a State, to revive, and ferment the humours in the minds of the Citizens, by a daily renovation of their injuries upon one person or other, as it hapned in *Rome* after the *Decem-virat*, was dissolved, and the Tribunitial authority re-established by the people: For all the *Decem-viri*, and several other considerable Citizens were Accused, and Condemned, in so much as there was a General consternation among the Nobility, who thought there would be no end of their condemnation, till they were utterly extinct: Which proceeding and apprehension, would doubtless have produced great troubles in the State, had not they been prevented by *Marcus Duellius* the Tribune, who published an Edict, That for a twelve-month it should not be lawful either to cite or accuse any man that was Citizen of *Rome*; by which act of Moderation, he secured the Nobility. From whence we may discern how unsafe it is for any Prince or Commonwealth to keep the minds of their Subjects in perpetual fear and suspense; and without doubt nothing can be more pernicious; for men being insecure, and jealous of being questioned for some Capital offence, will look out for protection, and not only so, but are provoked to more boldness, and become less scrupulous of doing great mischiefs. If therefore such Commotions happen, it is better if possible to compose them without

without blood, but if Example must be made, it is to be done at once, that afterwards the people may be reassured, and recover their old security, and tranquillity of mind.

## C H A P. XLVI.

*How men leap from one passion to another, and how they who at first aim at nothing but self-preservation, when secured of that, grow oppressors of other People.*

AFTER the people of *Rome* had recovered their liberty, and had by so much improved their former condition, by how much they had made many new Laws to fortify their power; one would have expected they should have been quiet, and after so much trouble and embroilment, enjoyed some time of repose; but it fell out quite contrary, they were more perplexed than before, every day producing some new Sedition or Disturbance: Of which, *Livy* giving the reasons so clearly, I do not think it amiss to insert them in this place. These two Orders (says he) were in perpetual opposition; when the people were humble, the Nobility was proud, when the populace was quiet, and content with their bounds, the young Nobility took their time to be insolent; and when the Tribunes interposed in their behalf, they made little progress at first, and at length were as much injur'd themselves. The graver sort of the Nobility on the other side, though they thought their own youth to be too furious and insolent, yet they had rather if one side must transgress, that it should be their own, than the peoples: So that their immoderate desire of preserving their privilege, was the cause that when either party was prevalent, it employed its whole power in oppressing the other. It is common among men, when they would secure themselves, to injure other people; they begin first to do mischief, to revile, or to beat, or what other outrage they are able, as if the injury they would avoid themselves, was to be thrown upon their Neighbour, and there was no Medium betwixt doing, and suffering of wrong. From hence we may see after what manner (among other things) Commonwealths are dissolved, and how suddenly men pass from one ambition to another, according to that true saying which *Salust* put into the mouth of *Cæsar*. *Omnia mala exempla, bonis initiis Orta sunt. All disorders and abuses, are good in their beginnings.* The first thing an ambitious Citizen endeavours, is so to fortifie, that he may defend himself not only against his private adversary, but against the publick Magistrate, if at any time he would offend him; to which end he makes what friends he can, by furnishing them with Money or supporting them against their Oppressors; and this seeming very honest in appearance, people are easily deluded, and no body goes about to prevent it; so that no obstacle being given, he grows insensibly so great, that not only the private Citizens, but the Magistrate begins to apprehend him; and then there is no resisting him without manifest danger, for the reasons (which I have mention'd before) of the dangerous contending with inconvenience that has got that growth and maturity in a City. What is then to be done? Let him alone in his prosperity, and he enslaves you for ever, unless death or some other kind accident delivers you: If you think to remove him on a sudden, you do but add to his power and hasten your own ruine; for finding himself in such a posture that his Friends, his Enemies, the Magistrates, and all people are afraid of him, he will then begin to domineer, and dispose of all things according to his own judgment and pleasure; If there be any way to prevent it, it is by watching in time, by having a diligent eye over your Citizens, that under colour of doing good, they may not be able to do mischief; and that they may have as much reputation as may serve, not ruine their liberty: but of this more hereafter.

CHAP. XLVII.

*Though the people, in things that are discours'd in general, are many times mistaken, yet when they are reduced to particulars, they are more sensible and judicious.*

THE Name of consul (as we said before) being grown odious to the people of Rome they resolv'd to have them created for the future out of the Populace; or else to limit and circumscribe their authority with such rulers as they should think fit. The Nobility, to prevent both inconveniences, took a way betwixt both, and was contented that they should create four Tribunes with consular authority, to be chosen indifferently out of the people, and Senate. The people were well enough satisfied, as thinking by that means the Consulship would extinguish, and that they should have a share of the supream dignity themselves. But observe what followed when they came to the creation of their Tribunes, and it was not only in their power, but expected, that they should have been all made out of the people, they chose them all out of the Nobility, which gave occasion to *Livy* to say, *Quorum Comitiorum eventus docuit, alios animos in Contentione libertatis & honoris, alios secundum deposita Certamina in incorrupto iudicio esse.* The success of that Election did show, That when their honour and liberty were in controversie, the people were of one mind; when they were secure and free, they were of another. Considering with my self what might be the reason, I suppose it is because men are more apt to be mistaken in generals, than in particulars. The people thought themselves more worthy of the Consulship than the Nobility, because they had the greatest interest in the City; They underwent the greatest difficulty in the Wars, and it was their Arms which defended its liberty, and propagated the Empire of Rome: according to which argument, their desires seeming but reasonable, they resolv'd they would have them in spite of all opposition: But when they came to particulars, and to examine their own private Capacities for Government, they found themselves so weak and defective, that though altogether they thought themselves able enough, yet they could not find one man they judged proper for the employment; ashamed therefore of their incapacity, they gave their voices for such as they found were more really worthy; which *Titus Livius* admiring, has these words, *Hanc modestiam, equitatemq; & altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno voveris, que tunc populi universi fuit? Where will you find now-a-days, that Modesty, that Equity, that Magnanimity in one man, that was then obvious in the whole body of the people?* To the same purpose there hapned another notable Example in *Capua*, after *Hambal* had defeated the Romans at the Bartel of *Cannus*. After that defeat, the Inhabitants of *Capua* began to mutiny against the Government (as indeed all *Italy* did at that time), the grounds of their discontent, was an old pique betwixt the people and Senate, which the first thought then to improve to the destruction of the other, *Pacuvius Calanus* being a very wise man, and at the Helm at that time, considering with himself of what dangerous consequence a tumult might prove in so populous a City, resolv'd to find out some way to accommodate their difference. To this end, he assembled the Senate, and in few words remonstrated to them the implacable hatred which the people had to them; That they were in great danger of being murdered by them, and the City deliver'd up to *Hambal*, by reason that the condition of *Rome* was become so deplorable; and at length he concluded, that if they would commit the whole matter to him, he would find out an expedient to unite them, and his expedient was to lock up the Senate in the Palace, and by putting them into the peoples power, to preserve them. The Senate submitted, were lock'd up in the Castle, and having assembled the people, he told them, That the hour was now come for redeeming their liberty, and chastising the insolence of their Nobility, who had so often abused them. He told them he had them all lock'd up in his Custody, to be disposed of as they pleas'd; but because he could not think it was their desire to leave the City without a Government, before they proceeded to the execution of the ancient Senators, it would be necessary, as he conceived, to think of creating a new one; to that purpose he had brought the Names of the old Senators in a Purse, would draw them out one by one, and as they resolv'd upon another to succeed in each place, he would see the old one deliver'd out to execution. The people were content, and *Pacuvius* drew one, and nam'd him aloud, upon which a great noise was rais'd, some said he was cruel, others he was proud, and others that he was arrogant: Then says *Pacuvius*, he is unfit to be continued, pray will you make choice of another in his stead. Silence was commanded, and one of the people was named; He was named no sooner, but some began to him, others

others to laugh, and all to revile; and so proceeding from one to another, they were all concluded unfit for so honourable a degree. *Paccucius* taking the occasion, told them, since you are sensible it is unfit that the City should be without a Senate; and since you cannot agree about the Election of a new; it would be expedient in my judgment, that you propose some way of reconciliation; for doubtless the fear in which the Senators have been, must of necessity have so humbled them, that that gentleness and humanity which you have sought for elsewhere, may now be found in them. The people began then to discover in particular, the fault which they had committed in judging in general, and declared they were ready for any reasonable reconciliation. And in this manner it is that most people deceive themselves in judging generally of things and their accidents, which upon particular examination they do easily discover.

After the year 1414. the chief of the *Florentines* being driven out of the City, it was left wholly without order or government, over-whelm'd with licentiousness and ambition, and the interest of the publick running headlong to ruine. Many of the popular party foreseeing the inevitable destruction of the City, and not knowing to what else to impute it, they charged it upon the ambition of some persons among the Nobility; which (as they pretended) fomented their disorders, to take away their liberty; and model the State according to their own fancies, and designs. And these Mutineers were in all places; in the Streets, in the Houses, in the palaces, declaring publickly, and threatening that if ever they came to the government, they would look farther into the business; and punish all those which they should find conscious of it. It hapned afterwards that some of these Citizens were advanced as they desired; but when they were at that height, and saw things nearer than before, they became sensible of their error, and found that it was not the ambition of the Nobility, but the malignity of the times, which was the occasion of all their trouble and commotion; so as they became new men, and exercised a new way of administration; insomuch that those who had heard them complain and threaten when they were in private capacity, seeing them now at the helm, and performing nothing that they had promised, did not look upon it as conviction of their judgment, so much as corruption of their minds. Which thing being frequent among them, gave occasion to the Proverb, *Costoro hanno un animo in Piazza, et uno in Palazzo. They are of one mind in the Town, and another in the Throne.* Thus, by serious consideration of what has been said we may see how to open the eyes of the people, and reduce them to a sense of their errors, if we take them from their general and abstracted notions, and fix them upon particulars, as in the case of *Paccucius* in *Capua*, and the Senate in *Rome*. Again, I am of opinion that no wise man is to decline the judgment of the people in the distribution of Offices and Honours, and such particular affairs; for in those things they are almost infallible, and when they do mistake, it is rather to be attributed to the obstinacy of some few, to whom that business is referred, than to the ignorance of the whole body; which being certainly so, I think it not superfluous to shew in my next Chapter the Order which the Senate observed to over-reach the people in those kinds of distributions.

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#### C H A P. XLVIII.

*To prevent the advancement of mean people to the Magistracy, it is particularly to be contrived that the competition be, betwixt the best and most Noble, and the wickedest and most abject.*

**W**hen the Senate began to apprehend, that the Tribunes would be chosen out of the people, and invested with Consular power; they had two ways, one of which they constantly made use of. They put the best and most honorable persons to stand, or else by their Money they foisted in some sordid and ignoble Plebeian, among those of the better sort which pretended to the Magistracy, and demanded it for him: The last way made the people ashamed to confer it: the first made them ashamed to remove it; which reinforces what I have said so often before, that though in generals the people may be mistaken, in particulars they are provident enough.

## C H A P. XLIX.

*If those Cities which have been free from their foundation (as Rome) have found it difficult to contrive such Laws as might maintain them so. Those which have been always servile, will find it almost impossible.*

THE Government of *Rome*; and its affairs abroad and at home, do sufficiently show how hard it is to establish such Laws in a Commonwealth as may preserve it always in a good and quiet Estate. It had first *Romulus*, then *Numa*, *Tullus Hostilius*, *Servius*, and others, who employed their industry and capacity to regulate it well, and prescribe good Laws; after which, ten Citizens were created on purpose, and yet new difficulties arose every day, which required new remedies: One of their great expedients (which indeed contributed much to the incorruption of that City) was the creation of the *Censors*, to correct the exorbitances, splendor, and ill husbandry of the Citizens; and although in the beginning it was with some inconsideration decreed that those Officers should be created for five years, yet by the prudence of *Mamercus* the Dictator, that error was afterwards rectified, and the time of their continuance reduced to 18 months, which disgusted the then *Censors* so highly, that they found means to turn *Mamercus* out of the Senate, to the great regret, both of the Senators and people. And because the History does not show how *Mamercus* defended himself, it must needs be the neglect of the Historian, or the defect of the Laws; for it is not to be thought that in a perfect Commonwealth, a Citizen should be so ill treated for promulgating a Law so much for the security of their liberty, and his innocence left without sanctuary or protection. But to return to my design, I say, it is not to be admired, if Cities conceived, and born, and brought up all along in servitude, find so much difficulty to regulate, and preserve themselves in tranquillity and peace (as was to be seen in *Florence*) when *Rome* and other States (which have been free from the beginning) have scarce been able to do it. *Florence* was in Subjection to the *Roman* Empire, and governed by other people, so long that it had scarce any hopes of ever being free. Afterwards having time to breathe, it began to look up, and make Laws for it self, but mingling them with their old Laws, which were bad, they did them no good. For two hundred years together their Government was in this manner, so that it was scarce worthy the name of a Commonwealth. And the same inconveniencies have been incident to all Cities whose beginnings have been servile like that. And though the *Florentines* did many times by publick and free suffrage transfer an Authority upon a few of their principal Citizens, to examine and reform all things; yet those few regarded not so much the common interest and liberty, as their own private design and advantage in the whole manner of their proceedings; which was so far from producing any order or settlement as was intended, that it augmented the disorder, and made things worse than before. To pass by other things which are likewise to be observed, I say that in every Commonwealth it is particularly to be considered in whose hands the Cognizance of Capital offences is placed, and who has the execution of the Sanguinary Laws: This was well ordered in *Rome*, an appeal lying to the people from all the courts and Magistrates of the City; and if at any time by that appeal, the delay of execution became dangerous to the State, they had recourse to the Dictator, who commanded execution immediately; but they never made use of their refuge, but in extream necessity.

But *Florence*, and other Cities born in servitude and Subjection, had not the benefit of such an Officer, but were governed by strangers upon whom the Prince had transferred his Authority; which Custom they kept up, after they had made themselves free, and continued the same Authority in a Foreigner, whom they called their *Captain*, which was a dangerous thing, considering how easily he might be corrupted by the better sort of the Citizens: Afterwards the Custom changed with the revolutions of State; and eight Citizens were created to do the Office of the Captain, which alteration proved much for the worse, for (as I said before) a few men prefer'd to the government, are always liable to be caressed and cajoled by the Nobility, to the prejudice of the people. Against which inconvenience, *Venice* provided very well, where there is a Council of Ten, which can punish any Citizen whatever without any appeal; yet for fear they should not be sufficient (though they have authority enough) for the punishment of persons of more than ordinary quality, they have constituted the *Quarantia* to assist them, and the Council of *Prepui* besides, which is the highest Council of that City; so that if any man will accuse, there are judges enough ready to hear him. If therefore in *Rome* which was originally free, and

model'd and govern'd by the Counfels of fo many wife men, new faults were daily difcovered, and fresh occasions for new Laws, to be made for the prefervation of their liberty; it is not to be admir'd, if in other Cities it was worfe, where their Original was not fo free, nor fo many wife men to model, and instruct them.

## C H A P. L.

*No Magistrate or Council ought to have power to check or controul the publick acts of the City.*

**T**hus *Quintius Cincinnatus*, and *Cneus Julius Mentus* being Consuls together in *Rome*, but at perpetual odds, the affairs of that State was at a stand, their Laws were not executed, their Wars were not profecuted, nor any thing managed as it should be. The Senate observing it, persuaded them to make a Dictator, by whom the State might be reformed, and their differences compos'd, which had hitherto hindered the reformation: But the Consuls, how contrary so ever in other things, consented not to do it, the Senate having no other remedy, address'd to the Tribunes, who by the Authority of the Senate required, and compell'd the Consuls to the Creation of a Dictator: In which place it is remarkable how beneficial the assistance of the Tribunitial power was, not only to defend the people against the insolence of the Nobility, but to controul and restrain the emulation and difference among themselves. And here it is carefully to be provided in the settlement of a Commonwealth, that it be not in the power of a few persons to whom the Government is entrusted, to quash or obstruct any Customs or Acts that are necessary to its subsistence: For Example, If you authorize a Council, or any other persons to distribute Honours, dispose of Offices, or execute any other of your commands, you must either lay a strict injunction or necessity upon them to do as you appoint, or provide, so that if it be neglected by them, it may be done by some body else; otherwise things are ill managed, and the order is defective, as is manifest by that example in *Rome*, if the perverseness of the Consuls had not been oppos'd by the Authority of the Tribunes. In the Republick of *Venice*, the grand Council (or Senate) has the distribution of Honours, and the Election of Magistrates, both abroad and at home; and it hapning one time, that the Senate either upon some disgust, or false suggestion omitted to creat Successors to the Magistrates at home, or to their Officers abroad, there followed great disorders immediately; the Territory and City wanting their lawful judges, could have no justice in any thing, till the Senate was appeas'd. And this inconvenience would in time have brought the City into an ill condition, had it not been prevented by the wisdom of some Citizens, who taking the opportunity obtained a Law, That there should be no vacancy of Offices, either within the City or without, but the old Offices should be continued till their Successors were chosen, by which Law they deprived that great Council of a power to interrupt the course of Justice, which could not have been suffered without hazard to the State.

## C H A P. LI.

*A Prince or Commonwealth that is constrained to do a thing, is to seem to do it frankly, and without any compulsion.*

**A** Wise man orders his affairs so, that whatever he does, seems rather voluntary and gracious, than done by force and compulsion, be his necessity of doing it never so great, which point of wisdom being well observed by the *Romans*, got them great reputation among the people, especially when they decreed stipends to the Soldiers out of the publick Treasury, who before were oblig'd to serve at their own proper charges; for seeing their Wars were like to be tedious, and their Armies to be carried into far Countries, before they could be finished, they found neither the first could be continued, nor the latter perform'd but at the publick expence, wherefore the Senate was forced and necessitated to pay the Soldiers out of the publick stock; yet they did it so slyly, and with that artifice, that though compell'd by necessity, it was received as a grace, and gain'd them exceedingly the affections of the people, who had never so much as mention'd it by their Tribunes, or thought of it themselves: So that never any thing was received with more demon-

demonstration of joy. But the Tribunes were not so well satisfied, but endeavoured to possess the people that it was not an act of that grace as they imagined; and that if they looked closely into it, it would appear rather a grievance, than a benevolence; for how was this Money to be rais'd, but by Taxes and Impositions upon the people? so that if the Senators were bountiful, it was out of other mens purses. But all would not do, let the Tribunes say as they pleased, the people believed themselves highly obliged; and then the manner of raising the Money made it much the more grateful, for it was done with more than ordinary equity, the greatest part of it being levyed upon the greatest men, and the poor favoured as much as was possible.

CHAP. LII.

*The best and most secure way to repress the insolence of an ambitious and powerful State, is to preclude and stop up those ways by which he would come to his greatness.*

BY what has been said before, it appears what affection the Senate conciliated among the people, not only by the frankness of their bounty, but by their kindness in collecting it; which order, if continued to the people, would have prevented all the tumults which hapned afterward in that City, and deprived the Tribunes of their great credit and authority. And indeed there is not a better or more secure way to suppress the insolence, or cross-biteth the designs of an ambitious Citizen, than to take the same ways to prevent, which he takes to advance them; which course, if it had been followed by the adversaries of *Cosimo de Medici* would have been much more for their advantage than to have forced him out of the Town. For had they applied themselves to caressing and insinuating with the people, (which was the way he took to fortifie himself) they had disarm'd him without any tumult or violence, and taken from him the only arms upon which he depended for his defence. About the same time *Piero Soderini* by his extraordinary beneficence got himself a great interest and reputation among the people, and was publickly esteemed the great Champion and Protector of their liberties: and doubtless his adversaries, who began to grow jealous of his greatness, had done much more wisely, and honourably, and safely, to have gone the same way to work, and countermined him by their indulgence to the people, than to oppose themselves downright, and ruine him and their whole Country together; for could they by any art or insinuation have gained the affections of the City, they had taken from him the only thing upon which he relyed, without noise or confusion, and they might have opposed in all his counsels, without fear of the people: if he be urged here, that if the Citizens which were enemies to *Piero* committed an error, in not taking the same course to retain as he had done to debauch the people, *Peter* committed the same fault by not making use of the same instruments which his adversaries employed against him; it is answered, that *Soderini* indeed might have tryed; but he could have done it neither with honour or ease; for the way that his adversaries took was to set up the *Medici*, by whose assistance they bearded him exceedingly, and ruined him at last; and it had been dishonourable for *Soderini* to have deserted the liberties of the people, which he had undertaken to defend, and gone over to the party of the *Medici*; nor could he have done it so secretly or suddenly, but the people would have smelt it, and have turned the violence of their affection into as furious an hatred, which would have made his destruction much more easy to his enemies, for who-ever was but suspected to be a favourer of the *Medici*, was thought, *ipso facto*, an adversary to the people. It is necessary therefore in all deliberations to weigh all things, to consider what danger and what advantage every thing will yield, and make choice of what is least dangerous: otherwise it will happen to you as it did to *Marcus Tullius*, who raised and augmented the greatness of *Mark Anthony* by the same way which he intended for his destruction; for when *Mark Anthony* was declared an enemy by the Senate, having a great Army attending him, and most of them of *Caesar's* old Soldiers, *Cicero* to draw them off from him, perswaded the Senate to put *Octavius* at the head of their Army, and sent him (with the Consuls) against *Antonius*, pretending that the very name of *Octavius* (being Nephew to *Caesar*) would bring over all his Uncles party to him, whereby *Antonius* would be so weakned it would be no hard matter to reduce him. But it hapned quite contrary; for *Antonius* having gained *Octavius* to his side, they joyned their Forces against *Tully* and his Senate, and ruined their whole Party. Which might have been easily foreseen; nor ought *Cicero* so imprudently to have reviv'd the name of *Caesar*, by whom



whom the whole world was brought into servitude; and especially *Rome*; nor have persuaded himself that a Tyrant or any of his race would ever restore that liberty which his Predecessor had suppressed.

CHAP. LIII.

*The people (deceived with a false appearance of good) do many times desire that which turns to their destruction: and how great hopes and large promises do easily debauch them.*

**A**fter the taking of *Veii* by the *Romans*, a report being spread of the convenience and pleasantness of the Town, and richness of the Country about it, the people of *Rome* began to fancy that it would be much for their advantage to transplant one half of their City, and send them thither to inhabit, for there were many fair houses to receive them; and it could be no weakning or diminution to *Rome*, seeing the distance betwixt the two Cities was so small, *Veii* would be taken rather for a member of *Rome*, than a distinct and particular City: The Senate and graver sort of Citizens had so little inclination to this design, that they resolved to die before ever they would consent to it. The people were so mad upon it on the other side, that when it came to a debat, and it was to be resolved what was to be done, the dispute was so hot, they had proceeded to blows, and the whole Town been engaged in blood, had not the Senate interposed certain ancient and eminent men, who by their interest and veneration among the people defended the blow, and appeased them for that time. In which passage there are two things considerable: the first, that the people being deceived with a false imagination of good, do many times solicit their own ruine, and run the Commonwealth upon infinite dangers and difficulties, unless some person in whom they have great confidence strikes in to instruct them which is the good, and which is the evil; and when by accident it falls out that the people (having been formerly deceived either by persons or things) cannot repose that confidence in any one, then of necessity all goes to wrack, and nothing can prevent it: to this purpose *Dante* in his discourse about Monarchy, tells us,

*Il popolo molte volte grida  
Viva la sua morte, & muoia la sua vita.*

*The enraged multitude do often cry  
Give us our death, our life we do desire*

This incredulity is many times the occasion that good counsels are neglected, as it hapned to the *Venetians* when invaded by several enemies at one time, they could not take off any one of them, by restoring what they had taken wrongfully from other people; which was the occasion of the war, and almost of their ruine. From whence we may consider the easiness and difficulty of persuading the people, and make this distinction, if the affair proposed be in appearance either magnanimous, or profitable, though at the bottom it be never so destructive, the people are always easie to be persuaded; on the other side, if any thing be offered (how honourable, how useful soever) with the least shew or glance of cowardize or inconvenience, they are never, or with great difficulty to be wrought to it. To confirm this, we have many examples both modern and ancient in *Rome* and other places. From hence sprang their jealousies against *Fabius Maximus*, who could never beat it into the heads of that City, that it was better for their Commonwealth to protract, and spin out the war, than to push things on, and bring all to the hazard of a Battel; for the people looking upon it as cowardly and base counsel, and not discerning the utility at the bottom, would by no means admit it; and *Fabius* wanted rhetorick to enforce it upon them: and so strangely are they blinded sometimes with their bravery and courage, that though the *Romans* had committed the same error once before, and given authority to *Fabius* his Master of the Horse to fight when he saw occasion whether *Fabius* would or not; (which authority had like to have ruined the whole Army, had not *Fabius* with his prudence prevented it) yet that experiment doing no good, they were guilty again, and invested *Varro* with the same power, upon no other account, but because he had swagger'd up and down the Town, that when ever they qualified him

him with such a Commission, he would fight *Hanibal*, cut him to pieces; they believe what he said, give him authority; and what followed? Why they were beaten at *Cannas*; the Roman Army cut off; and the Roman Empire almost extinguished. And not unlike this was the example of *Marcus Centenius Penula*, (a mean person, and considerable for nothing but some small command in the Army) who presented himself one day to the Senate, and offered if they would give him power to raise an Army of Volunteers where he pleased all over *Italy*, he would undertake in a short time to beat *Hanibal* out of it. The Senate was sensible the proposition was rash, yet (considering withal that if they should deny him, and report should come of it afterwards to the people, it might dissatisfie them; beget some tumult in the City; and be the occasion of envy and animosity to themselves) they granted his request, choosing rather to expose all those who were so ill advised as to follow him, than run the hazard of new dissentions at home. Having got his Commission, and afterwards his Men, with a confused and disorderly Army he marches against *Hanibal*, and fought him, but he failed of his promise, for he was killed himself, and most of his Forces. In *Greece* in the City of *Athens*, *Nicias*, a grave and wise Citizen, could never persuade the people against an Expedition into *Sicily*; but persuing it against all sober advise, they miscarried, and their own Country was ruined. *Scipio*, when he was made Consul, desired that he might have *Africa* for his province, and he would undertake to demolish *Carthage* but the Senate being averse upon the judgment of *Fabius Maximus*, *Scipio* threatned to propose it to the people, as knowing very well how grateful it would be to them. We might produce examples of the same nature out of our own City of *Florence*, as when *Hercules Benivoglio's* General of the *Florentine* Army, with *Antonio Giacomini*, having defeated the Forces of *Bertolomeo* at *San Vincenti*, they went to besiege *Pisa*, which enterprize was debated and concluded by the people, upon the great promises which *Hercules* had made, though indeed the wiser sort of Citizens were against it; but the multitude were possessed with great matters that would be done, and nothing could dissuade them. I say then, there is not an easier way to ruine a State where the authority is in the people, than to put them upon some gallant, but desperate enterprize; for where there is any thing of magnanimity in their nature, it is sure to be embraced, and it is not in the wit of men to dissuade them: but as this is many times the ruine of the State, so it is more often and more certainly the destruction of those Citizens which promoted and commanded it, for the people full of expectations of victory, when they find they have miscarried, never impute it to an ill accident or fortune, but throw all upon the ignorance or treachery of their Commanders, which seldom escape without being banished, imprisoned, or killed; as has hapned to several of the *Carthaginian* and *Athenian* Captains. Nor does it avail that they have been victorious before; for their present misfortune drowns all, as it fell out to *Antonio Giacomini* our General, who not taking *Pisa* as he promised, and the people expected, fell into so great disgrace with them, that notwithstanding the many great things which he had done, he was permitted to live, more by the favour and humanity of the Governours, than by gratitude or good nature of the people.

CHAP. LIV.

*How great the authority of a grave man is, to assuage the tumultuousness of the people.*

THE second thing remarkable, that was mentioned in my last Chapter, is, that there is nothing more certain to appease a popular tumult, and reduce the people to reason, than the interposition of some wise person of authority among them; as *Virgil* has told us with very good reason.

*Tum pietate gravam, ac meritis si forte virum quem  
Conspexere, silent, arreptisque auribus adstant.*

*If in their tumults, a grave man appears,  
All's whist, and nothing stirring but their ears.*

He therefore who commands in a mutinous Army, or in a seditious City, and desires to appease either the one or the other, is in my judgment to present himself with the most grace and advantage that he can; adorned with all the ornaments of his dignity, and whatever

else may make him venerable to the people. Not many years since *Florence* was divided into Factions, the *Frateschi* and the *Arabiati*; and their animosity was so great, they came to blows, and the *Frateschi* were overthrown, and *Papolantonio Soderini* slain among the rest, who was as eminent a Citizen as most of his time; upon the strength of this Victory the people ran in a tumult to his house, with intention to plunder it; but his Brother *Francesco* (then Bishop of *Volterra*, and Cardinal now) being accidentally there, as soon as he understood how things were, and perceived the rabble to increase, he called for the richest of his Robes, and having put them on, and his Episcopal Rochet over them, he marched out into the croud, and by the Majesty of his person, and the efficacy of his language, prevailed with them to forbear, and to return peaceably to their houses; such action was so grateful to the City, that it was celebrated publicly many daies after. I conclude therefore that there is not a surer, nor more necessary way to compose the distractions of the people, than the appearance of some grave person in such a posture as may make him venerable to them. To return therefore to what we said before, it may be seen from hence, with what obstinacy the *Romans* accepted of that proposition for transplanting to *Vesii*, because they thought it profitable, and did not perceive the inconvenience that was in it; for as there hapned many tumults thereupon, so much more mischief had followed, had not the Senate and some other grave persons interposed, and by good fortune restrain'd them.

## C H A P. LV.

*How easily things are managed in a City where the Commons are incorrupt; how hard it is to erect a principality where there is an equality; and where it is not, a Commonwealth is impossible.*

THOUGH we have declared before what we thought was to be expected from a City whose inhabitants were totally corrupt; yet that will not hinder us from considering the subtilty of the Senate in relation to a vow which *Camillus* had made to consecrate the tenth part of the spoils of the *Veientes* to *Apollo*; which spoils being fallen into the clutches of the Common people, the Senate had no way but to publish an Edict, requiring all of them at a certain time and place to bring in the tenth part of their gains. 'Tis true, that Proclamation had no great effect, because another expedient was found out to satisfy the vow; yet it is remarkable, the confidence the Senate had in the good nature and compliance of the people; and the great opinion that they would punctually bring in what-ever they were comman'ded. On the other side it is observable, that the people went not about to shuffle or defraud the Edict by bringing in less than their due; but declared frankly against it, as a thing illegally required. Which example, with many other which I have mentioned before, are brought to shew the probity and religion wherewith that people was endued, and what good might be expected from them: and certainly where there is not that submission and conformity, no confidence is to be had; as in those Provinces which are corrupted at this day, in *Italy* above all the rest, and I may say in *France* and in *Spain*, which are likewise in some measure under the same corruption; for tho' they are not perhaps subject to so many, and so dangerous disorders as we are in *Italy*; yet it proceeds not from the meliority of the people, but from the excellence of their constitution, being governed by a Monarchy, which keeps them united, not only by the virtue and example of their Prince, but by the Laws and Customs of each Kingdom, which are preserved to this day. *Germany* is the place of the whole World where the footsteps of the old *Romans* virtue and fidelity is conspicuous; and that fidelity is the cause why so many Cities live happily in liberty; for they are so careful and studious of their Laws, that that very one thing keeps them from servitude, and being over-run by their enemies; and if any instance be desired of this more than ordinary probity in the *Germans*, I shall produce one, not unlike that before, betwixt the Senate and the people of *Rome*. It is the custom in those States when they have occasion for money upon the publick account, for the councils and Magistrates in authority to lay a tax of one or two *per cent.* upon all the inhabitants under their jurisdiction, according to their respective Estates; at the day and place appointed for payment, every man appears with his money, and having taken his oath first that the sum he pays is according to the full of his Estate, he throws it into a chest provided for that purpose, and no notice taken what it is he throws in; from whence we may conclude that there is still some sparks left in that people of their old ingenuity and religion; nor is it to be doubted but every man pays his due, for otherwise the sum would not amount to the imposition, nor

to what they formerly paid; whereby the fraud would be discovered, and they become liable to a new tax: which integrity and justice is the more admirable in our days, because it is to be found no where but in *Germany*, and the reason (as I conceive) is twofold; one because they have had little or no commerce with their neighbours, neither trading into foreign parts, nor admitting foreigners into theirs; contenting themselves with their own diet, and clothes, and commodities, and thereby preventing all occasion of evil conversation, which is the corruption of good manners, especially among the *French*, the *Spaniards* and *Italians*, which are wicked enough to debauch the whole World. The other reason is; because those Commonwealths who have preserved their liberties, and kept themselves incorrupt, do not suffer any of their Citizens to live high, and at the rate of a Gentleman; but they live all in an equality and parity; as those few Nobles or Gentlemen who are there are very odious to the people; and when ever any of them fall by accident into their hands, they die without mercy, as those who are the fountain of all their luxury, and the occasion of their scandal. I call those Gentlemen who live idly and plentifully upon their Estates without any care or employment; and they are very pernicious where ever they are; but above all, they are most dangerous, who, besides their great revenues, have their *Castellanies*, their Jurisdictions, and their Vassals, which pay them fealty and homage: of these two sorts the Kingdom of *Naples*, the Territories of *Rome*, *Romagna* and *Lombardy* are full; for which reason there is no such thing as a free State in all those Countries, because the Gentry are mortal enemies to those constitutions; and it would be impossible to erect a Republick where they had the dominion; if any alteration be to be wrought, it is by reducing them into a Monarchy; for the matter being so corrupt, that the Laws are become ineffectual to restrain them, there is a necessity that force be applyed, and that by a regal power the licentiousness and ambition of the Grandees be reduced into order: this may be illustrated by the example of *Tuscany*, which is a small Territory, and yet has three considerable Commonwealths in it, as *Florence*, *Sienna* and *Lucca*; and the rest of the Cities of that Province, though they depend upon them, yet their minds and their laws shew a strange propensity to freedom; all which proceeds from the scarcity of Gentry in those parts, especially with such power and jurisdiction as aforesaid. On the contrary, there is so great an equality among them, that if a prudent and publick man should happen among them, who had any knowledg of that kind of Government, he might easily form them into a solid Commonwealth: but hitherto it has been their misfortune to have no such man: I conclude therefore, that he who would establish a Commonwealth, where the Country consists most of Gentlemen, will find it impossible, unless he ruins them first; and on the other side, he who would set up a Monarchy or Principality where the equality is great, must select the most considerable and unquiet amongst them; give them Castles, and Lands, and Preferments, and any thing that may oblige them to his side: by which means they shall not only maintain the power of their Prince, but their own insolence and ambition, and the people be forced to submit to a yoke, to which nothing else could compel them: for whilst there is a due proportion betwixt the Prince and the Subject, all things go well, and every man enjoys his Estate: but to settle a Republick in a Country disposed to Monarchy, or to erect a Monarchy where the condition of the people have a tendency to a Commonwealth, requires a person of more than ordinary authority and brain: Many have tried it, but very few have succeeded; the greatness and difficulty of the enterprize confounding them so at first, that they know not where they are, and give over as soon as they have begun. But it may be objected, that the constitution of the *Venetian* Government confutes my position, *That no Commonwealth can be established where the Gentry are considerable*; for under that State no man is admitted to any office but those who are Gentlemen. I answer, that the *Venetian* Gentry are nothing but name; for their Lands and Possessions are very few, the principal part of their Estates lying in their merchandize and goods: besides, none of them have any Seignuries or Jurisdiction over the people, so that a Gentleman among them, is but a title of honour and preheminance, founded upon none of those things which in other places make them so considerable. For as in other Commonwealths the Citizens are distinguished into several Orders, so *Venice* is entirely divided into two, the Populace and the Gentry, the Gentry having, or being capable of all honours and employments, from which the Populace are utterly excluded; which for the reasons aforesaid, it has produced no disturbance in that State. These things being considered, let him who desires to erect a Government, settle a Commonwealth where there is a party among the inhabitants; and a Monarchy where there are many great men, and the Gentry numerous: Otherwise his Government will be incongruous, and of little duration.

## C H A P. LVII.

*Great accidents, before they happen to any City or Province, are commonly prognosticated by some sign, or predicted by some men.*

**H**OW it comes to pass, I know not; but by ancient and modern example it is evident, that no great accident befalls a City or Province, but it is presaged by Divination, or Prodigy, or Astrology, or some way or other; and that I may not go far for my proof, every one knows what was foretold by Frier *Girolamo Savonarola* before the Expedition of *Charles viii* into *Italy*; besides which it was reported all over *Tuscany*, that there were arm'd men seen fighting in the air over the Town of *Arezzo*, and that the clashing of their arms in the conflict was heard by the people,

It is generally known in *Florence*, that before the death of the old *Laurence de Medici* the *Duomo* or chief Church in that City was struck with lightning, and the people destroyed: and before *Piero Soderini* (who was made *Gonfaloniere* for his life by the people) was banished and degraded, the Palace was burn'd by lightning likewise: many other instances might be produced, which I omit for brevity sake: I shall only add one which is mentioned by *Livy* before the coming of the *French* to *Rome*. *Marcus Ceditius* a Plebeian acquainted the Senate, that passing one night about twelve a clock thorow the *Via-nova*, he heard a voice ( bigger than a mans) which advised him to let the Senate know, the *French* were upon their march to *Rome*. How these things could be, it is to be discoursed by persons well versed in the causes of natural and supernatural events; for my part I will not pretend to understand them, unless ( according to the opinion of some Philosophers) we may believe, that the air being full of intelligences and spirits, who foreseeing future events, and commiserating the condition of mankind, gives them warning by these kind of intimations, that they may the more timely provide and defend themselves against their calamities. But what-ever is the cause, experience assures us, that after such denuntiations, some extraordinary thing or other does constantly happen.

## C H A P. LVIII.

*The multitude united, is formidable and strong, but separated, is weak and inconsiderable.*

**T**HE *Romans* being overthrown, and their Country much wasted, upon the coming of the *French*; many of them ( contrary to an express Order and Edict of the Senate) transplanted to *Vesii*, and left *Rome*. Whereupon, by a new Proclamation, the Senate commanded, that by a precise day, and upon a certain penalty, they should return to their old habitations: when the news of this Proclamation was first brought to *Vesii*, it was despised and laugh'd at by every body; but when the day appointed for their return arrived, there was not a man but pack'd up his goods, and came back as was required, and as *Livy* says in the case, *Ex ferocibus univcrsis, singuli metu suo obedientes*; Not one of them who were so contumacious together, but apart began to fear, and that fear made him obedient. And certainly nothing can give us a more lively description of the nature of a multitude than this case. They are bold, and will speak liberally against the decrees of their Prince; and afterwards when they see their punishment before their faces, every one grows fearful of his neighbour, slips his neck out of the collar, and returns to his obedience. So that it is not much to be considered what the people say, either of their Princes good management or bad, so they be strong enough to keep them in their good humour when they are well disposed, and provide ( when they are ill) that they do them no hurt. But this ill disposition of the people, I mean all ill dispositions but what arise either from the loss of their liberty, or the loss of some excellent Prince still living, upon whom they had setled their affections.

For the evil dispositions proceeding from these causes are transcendently dreadful, and strong remedies are to be applied to restrain them.

In other cases their anger is nothing, especially having no body to head them; for as there is nothing so terrible as their fury in one case, so there is nothing so vain and inconsiderable in the other, because, though they have betaken themselves to their Arms, they

are easily reduced, if you can but avoid the first heat of their fury; for by degrees they will cool, and every man considering it is his duty to return, will begin to suspect himself, and think of his security, either by making his peace, or escape. Whenever therefore the multitude is in a mutiny, their best way is immediately to choose themselves a Head, who may correct, keep them united, and contrive for their defence, as the *Romans* did when leaving *Rome* upon the death of *Virginia*; for their protection and security, They created twenty Tribunes from among themselves: and if this course be neglected, it happens to them as *Livy* prefaged in the foregoing Sentence, *That as nothing is more courageous than the multitude united, so nothing is more object when they are separate and divided.*

C H A P. LVIII.

*That the multitude is wiser, and more constant than a Prince.*

**T**HAT nothing is more vain and inconstant than the multitude, *Titus Livius* and all other Historians do agree. You shall many times find them condemning a man to death, and lamenting him when he is dead, and wishing for him again. This hapned in the case of *Manlius Capitolinus*, who being suspected to design against their liberty, was by the people thrown headlong down the rock, and in a short time exceedingly regretted. The words of our Author are these. *Populum brevi, posteaquam ab eo periculum nullum erat, desiderium ejus tenuit. When their fear of him was over, their affection revived.* And in another place where he shows the accidents which hapned in *Syracuse* after the death of *Girolamo* Nephew to *Hierone*, he says, *Hæc natura multitudinis est, aut humiliter servit, aut superbe dominatur. The nature of the Multitude is, to be servilly obedient, or insolently Tyrannical.*

Things being thus, I know not whether I shall not seem too bold; to undertake the defence of a thing, which all the world opposes; and run my self upon a necessity of either quitting it with disgrace, or pursuing it with scandal; yet methinks, being to maintain it with arguments not force, it should not be so criminal. I say then in behalf of the multitude; that what they are charged withal by most Authors, may be charged upon all private persons in the world, and especially upon Princes; for whoever lives irregularly, and is not restrained by the Law, is subject to the same exorbitancies, and will commit as bad faults as the most dissolute multitude in the world: And this may be easily known, if it be considered how many Princes there have been, and how few of them good, I mean of such Princes as have despised, and broke thorow those Laws which were intended to restrain them. The Kings in *Egypt* were not anciently of this sort, for they were govern'd by Laws in those Provinces from the very beginning; and the Kings of *Sparta* were the same: Nor need we look back so far for examples; we have the Kings of *France* in our own days, whose Kingdom in my judgment, is at this time the most regular, and best govern'd in the world. Those Princes therefore who are born under such Laws and Constitutions, and obliged to live by them, are not to be reckoned or compared with the dissolute and mutinous multitude; but they are to be considered with a multitude under the same Laws and restrictions; As the people of *Rome* were whilst their Commonwealth was incorrupt, and they were found neither to be insolent in authority, nor slavish in their subjection; but by their Laws, and their Magistrates, they kept up their dignity with honour: And if at any time necessity required that they should appear against the power of any particular person; they did it effectually, as in the cases of *Manlius*, the *Decem-viri*, and others who designed to enslave them. On the other side, when it was for the interest of the Publick, they were as obsequious and dutiful to the *Dictators* and *Consuls*, as they had been obstinate before. Nor was their regret for *Manlius* when he was dead, at all to be admired; it was the memory of his virtues that caused it, which are commendable even among Enemies. The same thing might have hapned to the best of Princes; for all writers agree, that virtue is laudable wheresoever it is to be found. And I am of opinion, that could *Manlius* have been raised again, and presented to them in the height of their sadness, they would have served him as before, discharged him of his imprisonment, but condemned him to death. Nor are Princes (and those held very wise) exempt from this kind of inconstancy. They have put many to death, and lamented them afterwards; as *Alexander* for *Clito*, and other of his friends, and *Herod* for *Mariamne*. But what *Titus Livius* says of this subject, is not intended of a multitude regulated by Laws, as the *Romans* were; but a loose and disorderly multitude, like the people of *Syracuse*, who behaved them-

selves like mad-men, and committed the same faults that *Herod* and *Alexander* had committed before them. The multitude therefore is no more to be accused of fury and inconstancy, than a Prince; for they are both subject to extravagance, when they have no Laws, nor no rules to restrain them. And of this (besides what I have said) there are many examples, not only among the *Roman Emperors*, but among other Princes and Tyrants, which have been guilty of more giddiness and inconstancy, than any multitude whatever. I conclude therefore against the common opinion; that the people are no more light, ingrateful, nor changeable than Princes; but that both of them are equally faulty, and he that should go about to excuse the Princes; would be in a very great error; for a people which governs by Law, and is well ordered, shall be as stable, as wise, and as grateful as a Prince, and perhaps more, though he be never so wise: And on the other side, a dissolute and irregular Prince shall be more mutable, imprudent, and ingrateful, than any multitude whatever, and that not so much from any diversity in his Nature (for they are much at one, and if there be any excellence, 'tis on the side of the people) as from their greater or lesser respect to the Laws under which they are to live: And he who shall consider the people of *Rome*, will find that for 400 years together, they hated the very name of a King, were ambitious of honour, and studious exceedingly for the good of their Country, as may be justified by many examples. If it be objected that the *Romans* were ingrateful to *Scipio*, I refer them to what I proved so largely before, that the people are less ingrateful than Princes. And as to prudence, and constancy, I affirm, They have much the advantage, and are more wise, more steady, and more judicious than Princes; for which reason the voice of the people, is resembled to the voice of God, because by some occult and singular quality it does often presage things that are wonderful, and relating to their own welfare or calamity. In giving their judgment about dubious things, you shall seldom find them mistake; if at any time two eminent Orators equally excellent in their profession, do controvert and discourse a thing *pro* and *con* before them, they will assuredly take the most rational side; which shows they are no less capable of truth, than other people. And if in matters of honour, or enterprize which carry an appearance of publick utility, they be sometimes mistaken, (as is said before) the Princes are more, by reason of their passions, and perturbations of mind; to which they are much more obnoxious than the people. In the election of Magistrates they are more dexterous, and judicious than Princes, nor shall the people be ever persuaded to advance a corrupt, and infamous man, which among Princes is easie and common. If it takes a disgust or abhorrency to any thing, 'tis not readily removed, but sticks by them for several ages, which among Princes is not so; both which points may be evicted by the people of *Rome*, who in so many hundred years, and so many elections of Consuls, and Tribunes, never made four elections that they repented of afterwards; and for the name of a King they abhorred it so perfectly, that no virtue, no former service to his Country could excuse any man whom they suspected to aspire to it. It is evident likewise that those Cities which are governed by the people, have enlarged their Territories in a short time, and extended their Empire farther; than those who have been subject to Princes; as *Rome* after the expulsion of Kings, and *Athens* after they had rescued themselves from the tyranny of *Pisistrates*; which can proceed from nothing, but that the Government by a free State is intrinsically better, than the Government by a Prince: Nor can *Livy's* expression about the levity of the *Syracusans* oppose my opinion; for let all the good and ill qualities of the Prince and people be compared, and it will be found, That the people are less extravagant, and more honourable of the two. And if in the instituting of good Laws, the ordaining of new Statutes, and the making new Orders for civil conversation and Society, Princes have the better, yet the people preserving, and executing them better than they, are doubtless as worthy of praise, as the Founders themselves. To be short, Principalities and Republicks have both of them subsisted several years, and both of them had occasion to be regulated and reformed; for a Prince that is licentious, and does what he has a mind to; has a mind to that which does him hurt, and is a weak man for his pains; and the people which takes the same liberty, is as mad on the other side. And if the comparison be made betwixt mix'd Principalities, that are circumscribed, and bounded by Laws, and popular Governments under the same ties and restrictions; the people will be found more virtuous than the Princes; but if it be betwixt loose and dissolute Governments both of the one kind, and the other, the errors on the side of the Princes will appear more great, more numerous, and more incapable of redress: for in popular tumults, a sober man may interpose, and by fair words reduce them to reason; but to an enraged Prince, who dares intercede; or what remedy is there to repair to, but violence, and the Sword? From whence we may judge and distinguish betwixt the inconvenience of the one and the other: The people are appeased with gentleness; and  
good



good words; and the Prince not to be prevailed upon, but by violence and force; and if it be so, who is it that will deny, That the Disease is more dangerous, where the Cure is most difficult? Moreover when the people tumultuate, there is not so much fear of any present mischief that they are likely to commit, as of the consequences of it, and that it may end in a tyranny. But with ill Princes it is quite contrary, the present misery is the most dreadful, because they hope when he dyes, their liberty may be recovered. You see then the difference betwixt them; one is more dangerous at present, and the other for the future; the cruelty of the people extends only to such as (in their opinion) conspire against the common good. The severity of the Prince, is more against them who design against his particular interest. But this opinion of the people goes daily down the wind; for every man has liberty to speak what he pleases against them (though even the Government be popular:) But against a Prince no man can talk without a thousand apprehensions, and dangers. Nor will it seem to me incongruous (the matter having drawn methus far) in my next Chapter to discourse what Confederacies are most safe, those which are made with Princes, or those which are made with Commonwealths.

C H A P. L I X.

*What Leagues or Confederacies are most to be trusted; Those which are made with Princes, or those which are made with free States.*

BECAUSE Princes with Princes, and free States among themselves, and many times with Princes do enter into leagues of friendship and confederacy, I thought it not amiss to enquire in this place, whose faith is the most firm, and in whose amity the greatest confidence is to be reposed. Having considered it diligently with my self, it seems to me that in many cases they are alike, and in some they differ. And first, when necessity of State requires, and there is any visible danger of losing the Government, neither the one nor the other are so precise, but they will make bold with their engagements, and behave themselves ingratiously: *Demetrius Poliorcetes* had obliged the *Athenians* by many good Offices; but his Army being afterwards defeated, and himself flying to them for refuge, as to his Confederates and Friends, he was repulsed, and not admitted into the City, which troubled him more than the loss of his Army. *Pompey* being beaten in *Thessalia* by *Caesar* fled likewise into *Egypt* to *Ptolomy*, whom he had formerly restored to his Kingdom, and was murdered by him for his confidence. In both these Examples the ingratitude seems to be the same; yet the inhumanity was greater on the Princes side, than on the Commonwealths; but be it as it will, when the State is in danger, they are neither of them scrupulous. And if there be any Prince or Commonwealth so punctual as to preserve their league, though with destruction to themselves; it may proceed from the same cause. It may very well happen that a Prince may confederate with some other great Potentate, (who though unable to defend him at that time, may give him hopes notwithstanding of restoring him some other) and persevere in his Confederacy, as thinking that by having made himself of that Princes party, he has rendered his accommodation with the adversary impossible. This was the case of all the *Neapolitan* Princes who sided with the *French* in their Expedition into those parts: And as to the free States, they suffered of old something in this Nature, as *Saguntum* in *Spain*, which City chose rather to expose its self to direption, and all the Calamities of War, than forsake its confederacy with the *Romans*, and in the year 1512. *Florence* did almost the same to continue its amity with the *French*. So that computing every thing, and considering what both parties have done upon such imminent and irresistible danger, I believe there is more constancy and firm friendship to be found among Commonwealths than among Princes; for though perhaps they may have the same sentiments and inclinations as Princes; yet their motions, and resolutions being slower, they are longer before they violate their faith. But when their leagues and confederacies are to be broken, upon the bare prospect of advantage; in that case your Commonwealths are much more religious and severe; and examples may be brought where a small gain has tempted a Prince, when a great one could not move a Commonwealth. *Themistocles* in an Oration to the *Athenians*, told them, That he had something to advise that would be infinitely to their advantage, but durst not communicate it in publick, because to publish it, would hinder the Execution; whereupon the people deputed *Aristides* to receive it; and act in it afterwards as he should think convenient. *Themistocles* acquainted him, That the whole *Grecian* Fleet (though under their passport and parole)

parole) were in a place where they might be all taken or destroyed, which would make the *Athenians* absolute Masters in those Seas; and *Aristides* reported to the people, That the Council of *Themistocles* was profitable; but would be a great dishonour to their State; upon which it was unanimously rejected. But had the same occasion been offered to *Philip* of *Macedon*, or some other Princes, they would not have been so tender; for it was a practice among them (and especially with *Philip*) who got more by breaking his faith, than by all his other designs. As to the breaches upon the non-observance of Articles, they are ordinary things, and I have nothing to say of them: I speak only of extraordinary occasions, and am of opinion from what I have said, That the people do transgress less in that Nature, than Princes, and may therefore with more confidence be trusted.

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C H A P. LX.

*How the Consulship, and other Dignities in Rome were conferred without respect of age.*

IT is manifest in the History of the *Roman* Commonwealth, that after the people were made capable of the Consulship, the Citizens were promiscuously prefer'd without respect either of age or extraction; but any man was advanced for his Virtue, whether he was a young man, or an old: and this was evident in *Valerius Corvinus*, who was created Consul in the 23 year of his age; upon which consideration in one of his Speeches to the Army, he told them that the Consulship was, *Premium Virtutis, non Sanguinis. The reward, not of Nobility, but Virtue.* Whether this was prudently done, or not, may admit of dispute: But as to the receiving all sorts of persons to that dignity without consideration of their blood; there was a necessity of that, and the same necessity that was in *Rome*, may happen in any other City that desires to do the same great things which were done in *Rome*, of which we have spoken elsewhere. For men are not to be persuaded to suffer, but in hopes of reward; and that hope cannot be taken away, without manifest danger. It was but equitable therefore that the people should be capable of the Consulship, that being nourished a while with only the hopes, they might at length be so happy as to have it in effect. A City that employs not its people in any great affair, may order them as it pleases; but if it designs to extend its Empire, and do as the *Romans* did, there must be no distinction. And that no regard ought to be had of any man's age, appears by this, That in the election of a young man to a degree, in which the wisdom of an old man is requisite, the multitude being to elect, it is necessary that the young man be recommended by some extraordinary Exploit; and when a young man is so happy, as to have made himself conspicuous in the City by some honourable Achievement, it were not only hard, but inconvenient if the said City might not receive the benefit of his virtue immediately, but be forced to attend till his mind as well as body was super-annuated, and all that vigour and promptitude lost, which at that time might have been so serviceable to his Country: at which age *Valerius Corvinus*, *Scipio*, *Pompey*, and many others did great things, and were permitted to triumph for their pains.

THE

THE  
DISCOURSES  
OF  
Nicholas Machiavel,  
CITIZEN and SECRETARY  
OF  
FLORENCE,

Upon The  
First Decade of *LIVY*  
TO  
*ZANOBI BUNDELMONTI,*  
AND  
*COSIMO RUCCELLAI.*

LIBER II.

*The Preface.*

**I**T is the common practice of Mankind, to commend the ancient, and condemn the present times; but in my judgment not always with reason; for so studiously are they devoted to things of antiquity, that they do not only admire what is transmitted by old Authors, but applaud and cry up when they are old, the passages and occurrences in their youth. But my opinion is, This their way of computation is many times false, and that upon several accounts. First, because of such very ancient things we can have no absolute knowledge; for most commonly in the Narrative of affairs, what is infamous, or ill done, is pretermitted in silence, whilst what is well done, and honourable, is related with all the Arts, and amplifications of Rhetorick; for so much are Historians accustomed to attribute to the fortune of the Conqueror, that to encrease his praise, they do not only expatiate upon his Conduct, and Exploits, but they do likewise so magnifie and illustrate the very actions of the Enemy, That they who come after beholding things at a great distance, have reason to admire those times, and those men, and by consequence to love them. Besides it being envy or fear which disposes people to hatred; neither of those passions extending to what cannot possibly hurt them, two great causes are wanting of finding fault with Antiquity; for as things so long passed cannot any way prejudice; so they cannot provoke

provoke to envy or discontent: But present things which are obvious to our own sense, are universally known, and no circumstance that passes (whether good or bad) that can be totally conceal'd; from whence it proceeds, that observing with the excellence and virtue of our present affairs, whatever is concomitant of imprudence or vice, we are in a manner compelled to postpone them to things of antiquity, where the good only is displayed, and the bad passed by, though perhaps the present things are more worthily glorious. I do not intend anything hereby of the Arts and Sciences of our predecessors, so highly improved and illustrated, that 'tis not in the power of time either to add any thing, or subtract. I only speak of the manners and civil conversations of men; in which indeed we have not so many virtuous examples, as were to be found among our Ancestors: So that it is not altogether unjustly if antiquity be prefer'd; yet are not our present transactions to be always condemn'd as worse than the former, as if antiquity had no errors at all. Humane affairs are in perpetual fluctuation, and have their times of decrease, as well as advancement. A City or Province founded by some excellent person upon good Principles and Laws, not only stands, but flourishes and increases a long time in honour, authority, and wealth; and those persons whose happiness it is to be born under those governments whilst they are glorious, and powerful, are apt to prefer their old Customs, to the disparagement of the new; yet they are in an error, and for the reasons aforesaid. But those who are born when the State is in its declension, do not so much transgress when they commend what is pass'd, and decry what is present; which things (having seriously considered with my self) I conceive to be caused, because the world has been always the same, and made up promiscuously of good things and bad; yet these good and bad things have varied sometimes, and as it were transmigrated from one City, and one Province to another; so that in those places where virtue has been a long time predominant, vice has stoln in by degrees, and supplanted it; which is evident by the revolutions of Kingdoms and Empires, where virtue and justice has had its time, and been transfused afterwards into other Countries. However the world was the same, though its virtue and magnanimity was unstable, removing and shifting from the *Assyrians* first, to the *Medes*, from the *Medes* to the *Persians*, and from them to the *Romans*; and if after the *Roman* Empire, there has been no government so great as to comprehend and ingross the virtue of the whole world; yet the same virtue that was of old among the *Romans* is not extinct, but dispersed and branched out into several Kingdoms and Provinces, as the Kingdom of *France*, the Kingdom of the *Turks*, the Kingdom of the *Soldan*, the Empire of the *Germans*, and the Sect of the *Saracins*, which conquered so many Provinces, and committed such devastations, as were the ruine of the Empire of the East. In these Kingdoms rent and divided from the Empire of the *Romans*, the old *Roman* virtue is diffused, and retains still something of its pristine lustre, so that it may without injustice be admired in some places: Which being so, he who is born in those Provinces where the *Roman* virtue and discipline is still in being (but declining) if he applauds his old Country-men, and blames his Contemporaries, his error is not great: But he that is born in *Italy*, and is not in his heart a *Tramontan*, or in *Greece*, and is not a *Turk*; must needs bewail his own times, and cry up his Predecessors, in which he will find many things well worthy his admiration; whereas in these there is nothing but wickedness and obloquy, no Religion, no Laws, no Discipline, but all things impure and brutish, and they are the more detestable and deplorable, by how much the same persons who would be imitated, and are set aloft to command all, and correct those that are vitious, are most dissolute, and most vitious themselves.

But to return to our discourse, I say, That though humane judgment is frail, and may be mistaken in its Character of such things as by reason of their antiquity, cannot fall so perfectly under ones Cognizance; yet that will not excuse old men for preferring the transactions in their youth, because both the one and the other were equally liable to their knowledge; nor would they be of that opinion, if men had the same sentiment and appetite as long as they lived; but our affection altering, and our rational Soul being otherwise disposed than formerly, we judge otherwise of things, though the times be the same; for how is it possible the same things should please in our youth and old age, when their Studies, and delights are so different and remote? For (to say no more) as the quickness and vigour of the body decreases in old men, so their judgment and prudence increases proportionably; and thence it follows that the same things which seemed tolerable in their youth grow insupportable when they are old; so that the fault is more in their judgment, than the age, for supposing those things to be good, which, being wiser, by experience, they find to be otherwise. To which it may be added, that the desires of mankind are immense, and unsatiable; that naturally we are covetous of every thing, whereas fortune allows us but little; That from thence it happens that no man is contented; every man despises what he

is already possessed of, commends what is passed; condemns what is present, and longs for what is to come, though induced by no reasonable occasion. Things being thus, I cannot resolve my self whether ever I may not be of that number, who in these my discourses have so highly magnified the old times and exploits of the *Romans*, to the diminution of our own: and truly, were not the vertue of that age as clear as the Sun, and the wickedness of ours as manifest as that, I should have been more moderate, and feared to have run into the same error which I have condemned in other people.

But things being so evident, I may with boldness deliver my opinion of both times, to the end that the minds of such young persons, as shall peruse my conceptions, may be admonished to avoid those vices which are so prevalent now, and prepared to imitate the virtue of our Ancestors, when-ever occasion shall be offered. For it is the office of a good man to recommend that to other people which he thinks for the interest and honour of his Country, though perhaps the adversity of his fortune, and the malignity of the times will not suffer him to practise it himself; that by his instructions so many, at least some one may be so fortunate as to be able to follow him.

Wherefore having in my first Book done with what I proposed about the original institution of Government, and what was in my judgment necessary to preserve them: I shall now in this second, discourse of what the *Romans* did abroad for the enlargement and augmentation of their Empire.

CHAP. I.

*Whether the vertue or fortune of the Romans was the occasion of the greatness of their Empire.*

Many have thought, and *Plutarch* (a grave Author) among the rest, that the people of *Rome* were more beholding to their fortune than virtue, in the acquisition of their Empire; and among other reasons, he infers it from their own silent confession, in having erected more Temples to Fortune than to any of their Gods. *Livy* seems to be likewise of the same opinion; for he seldom introduces a Roman speaking any thing of virtue, but immediately it is followed with fortune, with which nevertheless I can by no means comply, nor believe it will hold water; for though no Commonwealth be to be found that has made such progress as the Roman, why should it be rather imputed to their good Fortune than the solid constitution of their Laws? the courage of their Armies, and the excellent conduct of their Emperors, extended their Empire; and then their own just measures, and the wise institutions of their first Legislator preserved what they got, as we shall hereafter more largely discover. It is objected, that the *Romans* were never at one time involved in two considerable wars, (which is imputed rather to their fortune than wisdom) for they had no quarrel with the *Latins* till they had subdued the *Sammites*; and were forced to make war in their defence; they had no controversy with the *Tuscans* till they had beaten the *Latins*, and with their frequent victories almost extinguished the *Sabines*, whereas if two of these States had confederated, and joyned their powerful Armies against them, no doubt but the affairs of the *Romans* would have been in very great danger. But be it as it will, this is most certain, they never had two great wars upon their hands at a time; but they began one when they ended the other, or the end of the first was the beginning of the second; and this may be observed in the series of their wars, for (to pass by their quarrels before *Rome* was taken by the *French*) whilst the *Equi* and *Volsci* were powerful and strong, they had no enemies but they; when they were conquered, their war broke out with the *Sammites*; and though before that was perfectly concluded, the *Latins* rebelled; yet before it could be brought to a war, the *Sammites* had made their peace, and joyned their Army with the *Romans*, to reduce the *Latini*. That war being finished, the war with the *Sammites* revived, and was the occasion of much mischief to the *Sammites*; after which, the *Romans* began with the *Tuscans*, and that being composed, the *Sammites* broke out again upon the passage of *Pyrrhus* into *Italy*, who being repulsed into *Greece*, they had opportunity for their wars with the *Carthaginians*, and their first war with that State was no sooner determined, but the *French*, and the inhabitants on this and the other side of the *Alps* conspired so effectually against them, that betwixt *Popolonia* and *Pisa* (where the Tower of *St. Vincent* is at this day to be seen) the confederates were routed with a very great slaughter.

This war being concluded, for twenty years together they had no considerable war, for they had no body to fight with but the *Ligures*, and the reliſts of thoſe *French* who were remaining in *Lombardy*. In this poſture they continued till the ſecond Punick war, which laſted 16 years, and perplexed them exceedingly. That war being ended with a great deal of honour, their next enterprize was againſt the *Macedonians*; after which their war happened with *Antiochus* in *Aſia*, and when he was overcome, there was not a Prince or State in the whole World, which by it ſelf, or conjunction with the reſt, was able to contend with the Romans. But before this laſt victory, who-ever conſiders the method of their wars, and their manner of proceeding, ſhall find great virtue and wiſdom intermixed with their good fortune, ſo that the reaſon of their good fortune is eaſily diſcovered; for this is moſt certain, when a Prince or Commonwealth arrives at that height of reputation that no neighbour-Prince or people dares venture to invade him, (unleſs compelled by indiſpenſible neceſſity) he may do what he pleaſes, 'tis in his Election with whom he will make war, and with whom he will be at peace; for his neighbours being afraid of his power, are all glad to be his friends; and thoſe Potentates who are fartheſt off, and have no commerce with them, look on as unconcern'd, as if the conſequence could have no reflexion on them; and in this error they do many times continue till the calamities be brought home to their own dores; and then, when 'tis too late, they have nothing but their own private force to oppoſe, which is too weak when the enemy is grown ſo ſtrong. I will not enlarge upon the *Sammites*, nor recount how they ſtood ſtill, and look'd on, while the *Romans* conquered the *Aqui* and the *Volſci*; but to avoid prolixity, I ſhall paſs to the *Carthaginians*, who were of great power and authority when the *Romans* were at war both with the *Sammites* and *Tuſcans*; they had the command of all *Africk*, and were ſupreme in *Sicily*, *Sardinia*, and great part of *Spain*. Blinded with their power, and (as they thought) ſecure in their diſtance, it never, came into their heads to invade them at that time, or to give any aſſiſtance to the *Sammites* or *Tuſcans*; but (according to the practice of the World with things that are new, and encreasing) they rather ſided with them, and deſired their friendſhip, not ſo much as perceiving their error, till the *Romans* had conquered all the intermediate States, and began to contend with them for the Empire of *Sicily* and *Spain*. And what hapned to the *Carthaginians*, hapned likewise to the *French*, to *Philip* of *Macedon*, and to *Antiochus*; each of them believing (while the *Romans* were employed in their wars with other people) that they would either be overcome, or that they themſelves ſhould have time enough to make peace or war with them, as they ſaw it moſt for their advantage: ſo that conſidering what is good, I am of opinion that the ſame fortune and proſperity may be expected by any Prince or State which exerciſes the ſame virtue and induſtry as the *Romans* have done before them. And here we might very properly diſcourſe of the *Roman* method in the invaſion of other Provinces, but we have done that at large in our Treatiſe called the Prince; yet this I ſhall ſay in ſhort, that the *Romans* made always ſure of ſome friend or other in the Provinces againſt which they deſign'd, that might be a means to admit them, and gave them entrance, and help afterwards to keep what they had been inſtrumental in getting. So by intelligence with the *Capuans* they invaded *Sammium*; by the help of the *Camertines* they got into *Tuſcany*; by the *Mamertines* into *Sicily*; by the *Saguntines* into *Spain*; *Maſſinſſa* gave them entrance into *Africk*, the *Etoli* into *Greece*, *Eumenes* and other Princes into *Aſia*, and the *Maſſilienſes* and *Hedai* into *France*; and as by their correſpondence they conquered moſt of thoſe Countries, ſo by their intereſt they preſerved them; which way, if diligently obſerved by other people, it will be found that their proſperity depended leſs upon fortune than thoſe States who obſerved not that courſe: but to illuſtrate what we have ſaid, and make it ſo plain and perſpicuous that every one may ſee how much more their virtue than their fortune contributed to their Empire; in our next Chapter we will conſider what thoſe people were whom the *Romans* ſubdued, and with what obſtinacy they defended their liberty.

## C H A P. I I.

*With what Nations the Romans contended, and with what obstinacy those Nations resisted.*

Nothing made it so difficult for the *Romans* to conquer their Neighbours, and some other remoter Provinces, as the love which the people of those times did bear to their liberty: for in defence of that, they were so indefatigably studious, that nothing but singular and extraordinary virtue could have subdued them: and this is demonstrable by the many and great dangers to which they exposed themselves, sometimes to preserve, and sometimes to recover it; as also by the severity of their revenge upon those who had usurp'd it. 'Tis evident likewise in History what detriment the People and Cities have suffered whilst they were in servitude and subjection; and whereas now a-days there is but one Province which can boast of free Cities, in ancient times there was not one Province but had plenty. In *Italy* from the *Alps* (which divide *Tuscany* and *Lombardy*) to the extremest part of that Country, there were many free States; as the *Tuscans*, the *Romans*, the *Samnites*, and others; nor is there mention of any King (but what reigned in *Rome*) besides *Porfena* King of *Tuscany*, the extinction of whose Line, though not set down in History, yet it is manifest that *Tuscany* was free at the time when the *Romans* encamped before *Ven*; so well satisfied with their liberty, and so abhorring from the very name of a King, that the *Venetes* having for their better defence created one in their own Town, and sent to the *Tuscans* to implore their assistance against the *Romans*, after a grave and solemn debate, it was resolved, no assistance should be sent whilst they were under the dominion of a King; as thinking it unfit to engage in the defence of a Country that had betray'd it self, and prostituted to the dominion of a single person. Nor is this universal affection to liberty so wonderful in the people.

Experience tells us, that no Cities have augmented their Revenues, or enlarged their Territories, but whilst they were free and at liberty: and certainly 'tis a prodigious thing to consider to what height and grandeur in an hundred years time the City of *Athens* arrived, after it had freed it self from the tyranny of *Pisistrates*; but much more to consider the greatness of *Rome* upon the expulsion of her Kings; and the reason of all is, because in Common-wealths private wealth and emolument is not so much aim'd at, as the improvement of the publick; nor is there any where so much care of the publick as in free States, where what-ever is equitable, and for the common advantage, is decreed and executed, without respect to particular persons, who may perhaps be sufferers thereby; whereas in Cities that are governed by a Prince it falls out quite contrary; for there, what makes commonly for the advantage of the Prince, is prejudice to the publick; so that when a free-State degenerates into a Tyranny, the least mischief that it can expect, is, to make no further advancement in its Empire; and no farther encrease either in riches or power; but for the most part it goes backward, and declines: and if it should so happen that the Tyrant should be a virtuous man, and one who by his courage and military discipline should enlarge his Dominions; yet what-ever he took would be converted to his own private use, without any benefit to the publick. For he dares not advance any of those Citizens (how worthy and honest soever) lest he should have occasion to suspect them afterwards. Nor can he make those Cities which he subdues, dependant or tributary to that where he is absolute; for 'tis not the interest of a Tyrant to make his Subjects powerful or united; but to keep them low, and divided, that every Town, every Province may depend wholly upon himself; so that the Conquests of an Usurper may turn to his own profit, but never to the publick; to which purpose many things are very handsomely written by *Xenophon* in his Treatise of Tyranny; and things being thus, no body is to admire if our Ancestors had so great a zeal for their liberty; and the very name of a Tyrant was so odious to them, that when long since news was brought to the Army of the assassination of *Hieronimo* the Nephew of *Hiero* of *Syracuse*, and the whole Camp was in an uproar against the Conspirators; yet when it was told them that they had proclaimed Liberty, and a free Government, they laid by their indignation against the Tyrannicids, and being pacified with the very name of Liberty, fell into consultation how it was to be preserved. Nor is it to be wondered at then, if their revenge be so violent and extraordinary upon those who would violate it; of which, though there be many examples, I shall instance only in one, but that most remarkable and horrid; and hapning in *Corcirca* a City in *Greece*: for all *Greece* being divided, and consisting of two Factions, one of them under the protection of the *Athenians*,



nians, and the other of the *Spartans*; and in *Corcirca* the Nobility prevailing, and having usurped upon the liberty of the people, it hapned that the people being reinforced by the assistance of the *Athenians*, overpowred the Nobility, and conquered them again. Having restored their liberty, and shaken off their servitude, they clap'd up all the Nobility in a large prison, and bringing them forth by ten at a time, as if they were to be banished, they put them to death with most-exquisite torments; which severity coming by degrees to the ears of the remainder, they resolv'd to do what was possible to defend themselves against it, upon which they stood upon their guard, and would suffer none of the Officers to come in; whereupon, in a great fury, the people ran thither, pull'd off the covering of the house where they were, and throwing down the walls, buried them all in the ruines; and of this sort of cruelty there were many other examples in that Province; for the people are usually more impetuous in revenging the loss of their Liberty, than in defending it.

But it may (not unfitly) be admir'd in this place what should be the cause that the ancients should be more zealous for publick liberty than we in our days: if my opinion may pass, I think it is for the same reason, that in those times men were more robust, and stronger than now; which proceedeth much from the diversity betwixt their Education, their Religion and ours: for whereas our Religion gives us a just prospect and contemplation of things, and teaches us to despise the magnificence and pomp of the World; the Ethnicks valued them so highly, and believing them their chiefest happiness, it made them more fierce and busie to defend them. and this may be collected from several of their customs; for if the sacrifices in their days be compared with the sacrifices in ours, theirs will be found magnificent and horrid; ours delicate and neat, but neither so magnificent nor cruel. They wanted not pomp nor formality in those ceremonies, and yet to make them the more venerable and solemn, they added blood and slaughter to them, offering up infinite numbers of beasts, which being slain before the people, made them more hard-hearted and cruel. Moreover the Religion of the Gentiles did not place their beatitude any where but upon such as were full of worldly glory, and had done some great action for the benefit of their Country. In our Religion the meek and humble, and such as devote themselves to the contemplation of divine things, are esteemed more happy than the greatest Tyrant, and the greatest Conquerer upon Earth; and the *summum bonum*, which the others placed in the greatness of the mind, the strength of the body, and what-ever else contributed to make men active, we have determined to consist in humility, abjection, and contempt of the World; and if our Religion requires any fortitude, it is rather to enable us to suffer than to act. So that it seems to me, this way of living, so contrary to the ancients; has rendred the Christians more weak and effeminate; and left them as a prey to those who are more wicked, and may order them as they please, the most part of them thinking more of Paradise than Preferment, and of enduring than revenging of injuries; as if Heaven was to be won rather by idleness than arms: but that explication of our Religion is erroneous, and they who made it were poor and pusillanimous, and more given to their ease than any thing that was great: for if the Christian Religion allows us to defend and exalt our Country, it allows us certainly to love it, and honour it, and prepare our selves so as we may be able to defend it. But that lazy and unactive way of education, and interpreting things falsely has been the cause that there are not so many Commonwealths as formerly in the World, nor so many Lovers and Champions for their Liberty: and yet I believe the greatness of the *Roman* Empire contributed something, by reducing all the free States and Republicks under their Dominion.

Nevertheless when that great Empire was broken and dissolved, very few of those poor States could recover their liberty: but when it began first to encrease and extend it self, no Country was without them, and where-ever the *Romans* carried their Arms, they found little Commonwealths banding and confederating against them, and defending their liberties with all imaginable constancy; which shews that the *Romans* were a people of more than ordinary courage, or they could never have subdued them. The *Sammites* alone will be example sufficient, who (as *Livy* reports) were so powerful, and so hearty defenders of their liberty, that for 46 years together they maintained War with the *Romans*; and though they had received many losses, and such devastations had been committed in their Country, yet they could never be wholly reduc'd before the Consulship of *Papyrius Cursar*, the Son of the first *Papyrius*. But 'tis a spectacle worthy of any mans pity, to see a Country so full (formerly) of brave Cities, and brave men, and all of them free; now desolate and uninhabited, and scarce any body left; to which condition it could have never been reduced but by the discipline, and diligence, and courage of the *Romans*: but all this proceeded from diversity of Constitution, for all Cities and free States whatsoever, encrease not only

only in riches and authority, but in the numbers of their men: for who is it that had not rather procreate and have children where he may marry and enrich himself freely, than where there is danger that what he gets painfully, and lays up carefully for his children, may be ravished from them by a Tyrant.

In a free State you may be sure your children shall be no slaves, and that if they behave themselves virtuously, they shall be sure of preferment; and perhaps come to be Princes; riches encrease there faster, and that not only by tillage and agriculture, but by traffick and arts; and people do naturally throng to those places where they may get what they lawfully can, and keep securely what they have got. The quite contrary happens in Countries that are servile, and their condition is worse, as their servitude is greater: but there is no servitude so severe as to depend upon a Commonwealth, and that for two reasons; first because it is more durable, and less hopes of recovering their liberty; and secondly, because it is the practise of all Commonwealths to impoverish and weaken what ever they conquer, to fortifie themselves; which with Princes is not the way, unless they be very barbarous indeed, and like the Eastern Princes, who not only ruine whole Countries, but destroy all human conversation: but where Princes are well instituted, they know better things, and do many times indulge their new Conquests as much as their own Territories, leaving them the exercise of their Arts, and the enjoyment of their Laws; so that though they cannot encrease their wealth as where they are free; yet they are not so subject to be ruined as where they are slaves: I speak now of servitude to a foreign Prince, for the usurpation of a Citizen I have spoken before. All which being considered, no wonder if the *Sammites* whilst they enjoyed their liberty were so couragious and strong, and when it was once lost grew so abject and contemptible. *Titus Livius* tells us in his History of the *Punic War*, that the *Sammites* were so overlaid and cowed by one single Legion of the *Romans* at *Nola*, that they sent Embassadors to *Hanibal* to beg his assistance, and that the said Ambassadors in their Oration to *Hanibal*, the better to move his compassion, had this expression, *We are the People who for an hundred years together waged War with the Romans with our own private Forces, and bore up many times against two Armies and two Consuls at once; but now our misery is so great, and our spirits so low, we are unable to defend ourselves against one pitiful Legion.*

C H A P. III.

*It contributed much to the grandeur of the City of Rome, that they ruined the neighbouring Cities, and admitted strangers to their own dignities and priviledges.*

**C***Rescit interea Roma, Alba ruinis; The ruine of Alba was the rise of the Romans.* 'Twas the saying of *Livy*, and 'tis true; for who ever would make any City great; and apt for dominion, must endeavour with all industry to throng it with inhabitants, otherwise it will be impossible to bring it to any great perfection. And this is done two ways, by love and by force: the first by giving passage and security to all persons that will come and inhabit there, that every man shall be free; the second by destroying the neighbour Cities, and forcing the people to come and dwell in yours. The *Romans* observed both ways, and grew so numerous upon it, that in the time of their sixth King they had 80000 men in the Town able to bear Arms, proceeding in some respects like the Country-man, who to make his plant larger, and more fruitful, cuts off its first shoots, that the juyce and virtue which otherwise would dilate into the branches, being kept close to the trunk, might break out with more vigor afterwards, and make it more beautiful and fertile. And that this way is necessary for the propagation of the strength and authority of a City, appears by the example of *Athens* and *Sparta*, which Cities, though they were both free, numerous Men, and happy in their Laws; yet they could never arrive at the grandeur of the *Romans*, though *Rome* seemed more tumultuous, and not so well governed as they, and all for the reason above said: for *Rome* having by both those ways encreased the number of their Citizens, was able to set out an Army at one time of 280000 men, whereas *Sparta* and *Athens* could never exceed 20000. which is not to be attributed to the excellence of the situation of *Rome*, but to the diversity of their Conduct; for *Lycurgus* the Founder of the *Spartan* Commonwealth, conceiving nothing could be more pernicious to it, no more easily abrogate his Laws, than intermixing with new inhabitants, he provided with all possible industry that his Citizens should have no commerce or conversation with strangers. To that

that end he not only prohibited the admission of foreigners, and their marrying with them, but that there might be no encouragement or occasion of intercourse betwixt them, he put out a certain Mony of Leather, so pitifully inconsiderable, that he presumed no Merchants would trouble themselves to import any foreign Commodities for it; by which means that City was never in a capacity of being very populous: And because all human affairs do hold some proportion and analogy with Nature; and it is impossible that a slender trunk, should bear vast and ponderous branches, it is not to be expected that a small Commonwealth consisting of a small number of Citizens, should subdue, or at least keep and maintain greater and more populous States than themselves; and if it should happen that they should conquer them at any time, upon every slight accident they would be subject to lose them, like the tree it would be too weak for its boughs, and every puff of wind apt to blow it down. And thus it fell out with *Sparta*, though it had conquered all *Greece*, made it self absolute thorow that whole Province; yet *Thebes* no sooner rebelled, but all the rest of the Cities revolted, and having lost its great Empire in a moment; it remained like a Tree destitute of its Branches. But with *Rome* it was otherwise, its Root and Trunk was strong enough to support its Branches how heavy and spacious soever; and this was the great cause of the greatness of the *Roman* Empire, which *Livy* expressed in two words, when he said, *Crescit interea Roma, Abusæ ruinis.*

#### CHAP. IV.

*There are three ways which Commonwealths have taken to enlarge their Territories.*

HE who has read and observed the History of our Ancestors must find, That Commonwealths had generally three ways of enlarging their Empire. One is that which was observed of the *Tuscans* of old, who entred into a League of Confederacy with several other Commonwealths, with condition of Equality, that no particular should have any degree or authority above the rest, and that comprehension should be left for all their new Conquests to come in, not much unlike the practice of the *Swizzers* in our times, and the *Achaians*, and *Ætolians* of old. And because the *Romans* had in those times much controversie with the *Tuscans* and their Confederates, I shall enlarge my self something in the explanation of their affairs, of which, though there be but little Monument in History, yet we are assured, that before the greatness of the *Romans*, the *Tuscans* were very powerful both by Sea, and by Land; of which power it is no small argument, their sending a Colony into the *Mare superum* to a place called *Adria*, which grew so considerable and famous, that it denominated that whole Sea, and it has been called the *Mare Adriaticum* ever since. It is known likewise that their Empire extended from the *Tyber* to the foot of the *Alps*, which comprehends the greatest part of *Italy* at this day; though 200 years before the *Romans* came to any considerable strength, the *Tuscans* received a great defeat by the *Gauls*; who under the Command of *Bollovesus*, either in quest of new quarters, or tempted by the pleasantness of the Country, having passed the *Alps*, possessed themselves of that Province called *Lombardy*, and gave it the name of *Galha Cisalpina*; after which they turn'd out the Natives, settled themselves there, and built several Cities, which they enjoyed, till in process of time, they also were supplanted by the *Romans*. And this was the method of the *Tuscans* proceeding, and the manner of their confederating with their Neighbours, which was no less than XII Cities; of which *Clusium*, *Veii*, *Felsina*, *Arretium*, and *Volterra* were the chief; but yet with all their assistance they could not exceed the limits of *Italy*, nor indeed conquer all that, for reasons which we shall mention hereafter. Another way of extending your Empire, is by associating with several Cities, but so as that the dignity of the Command, the seat of the Empire, and the honour of the Enterprize may remain with you; which was the way observed by the *Romans*. The third is the way of the *Spartans* and *Athenians*, who entertained no Confederates, but what ever Territories they Conquered, they annexed them to their own: which way is undoubtedly the worst of the three, as appeared by the two said Republicks, who were ruined upon no other account, but because they had grasped more Dominion than they were able to hold. For it is a thing in it self very arduous and difficult, to keep a City in subjection by a continued force, especially if ever it was free; wherefore unless your Citizens be very numerous, and your associates very considerable, by whose assistance you may be able to keep what you conquer, it will never be in your power to enlarge your dominion very much, and

and the *Spartians* and *Athenians* miscarrying in their way, miscarried likewise in their end, and all their great conquest came to nothing: The *Romans* took the second way, and succeeded to that vast and extraordinary power, by associating equally in many things, with many States, but reserving always to themselves the Seat of the Empire, and the chief command in their Wars, by which means it came to pass, that their Confederates (ere they were aware) subjected themselves to the *Romans*, at the expence of their own labour, and blood. For after they had carried their Arms out of *Italy*; reduced several Kingdoms into Provinces, and the Inhabitants being accustomed to live in subjection, without much difficulty submitted, the *Romans* bearing the name of the War; and the Nations that were conquered knowing nothing of their Allies, submitted to their dominion, and would own no body else: whereby it happen'd that their associates in *Italy* being over-powred by the multitude of provinces which had submitted to the *Romans*, and by the strength and populousness of *Rome*, began to find their error by degrees, but too late, and when they had no way left to defend themselves; for if any of them conspired, they were quickly suppressed, and made Subjects of Associates. This way of administration, and enlarging their Empire was peculiar to the *Romans*; no other people observed it, and certainly no better is to be found. The next way of confederating (which was practised by the *Tuscans*, *Achaians*, and *Ætolians* in old time, and by the *Swizzers* of late) is the best way next to that of the *Romans*; for though it cannot arrive at any great Empire, the Confederacy consisting of so many free Cities, which being all to be consulted, makes their resolutions very tedious, besides, the Citizens are not so vigorous in a War, where the prize is to be divided into so many parts; yet for these reasons it has two advantages of the third. First, whatever it gains, it keeps a long time, and loses very hardly; and secondly, it engages not so rashly in War, but enjoys with more ease and felicity the blessings of peace: for they are longer in their consultations and debates, where there is to be a general Dyet and Convention, than where things are to be dispatched within the Walls of one City, Besides experience tells us that this way has certain bounds, which have not been exceeded by any example we can find. For after XII or XIV Cities have confederated, they admit no more into the League, as holding themselves enough, and sufficient for their defence, nor are they much solicitous of extending their Empire, because they are under no necessity of making themselves stronger; and their conquest would be of little advantage to every particular State, for they would be forced upon one of these two rocks, either to incorporate them into their League, and then the multitude would breed confusion, or make them their Subjects which they will hardly continue: When therefore they are got to such a number in their association, as that they seem safe against foreign invasion, and strong enough to defend themselves; They take one of these two ways, either they receive their Neighbour States or Cities into their protection (by which means they draw vast sums of Money sometimes, that are easily distributed) or else they fight for other people, and receive pay from this or that Prince, as the *Swizzers* do now, and other Nations have done of old. To this purpose *Titus Livius* gives us an account That at a conference betwixt *Philip* of *Macedon* and *Titus Quintus Flaminius*, an *Ætolian* Prætor being present, there happening some words betwixt the said Prætor and King *Philip*, King *Philip* reproached him by the avarice, and inconstancy of his Country, as a people that were not ashamed to take pay on one side, and send supplies to the other, by which means it was frequently seen that in both Armies the *Ætolian* Colours were displayed; from whence we may conclude that this way of proceeding by League and Confederacies, has been always the same, and has had the same effects. The third way of subjecting your conquests and annexing them to your own dominions, is very incommodious, and instable; and if it were so to a Commonwealth well constituted and armed, it must needs be much worse to a Government that is weak, as most of the *Italian* States are at this day; but the *Roman* way is the best, and most to be admired; for there is no example of any body that made use of it before them, nor has any body imitated them since; and as to the practice of the *Tuscans*, and *Ætolians* in their Confederations, there is no body follows it now a days, but the *Swizzers*, and the *Suevians*: Which being so, and so many brave things performed by the people of *Rome* as well for the conservation, as the augmentation of their Empire, it is not strange our affairs succeeded no better, and that we have been a prey to whoever would invade us; for (to say nothing of the rest) it has doubtless becom'd the *Tuscans* if they could not have imitated the *Roman* Discipline, nor followed their measures in extending their Empire, at least to have follow'd the example of their own Ancestors, who though they brought not their Empire to that Grandeur and immensity as the *Romans*; yet they enlarged it as far as they thought good, and as far as consisted with the Nature of their Government; and by doing so, they kept it a long time, with immortal honour to

their memory, till they were first shaken by the *Gauls*, and afterwards so totally ruined by the *Romans*, that there is scarce the left token left, that there was ever any such thing; which having brought it into my mind to consider what may be the causes of this oblivion of things, I shall discourse of them in the following Chapter.

## C H A P. V.

*The variation of Religions and Languages, with the accidents of Deluges and Plagues have been the cause that many great things have been forgotten.*

**I**N my judgment it may be objected to those Philosophers who hold the world to be Eternal, that if so long a course of antiquity was true, it would be but reasonable that the memory of some of their affairs should have lasted above five thousand years: yet there may be some reasons given for that oblivion of things, and they seem twofold, partly from the Nature of Man, and partly from the influence of the Heavens; the memory of great things are abolished from the nature of Man, by the variation of their Religion, or Language; for when a new Religion is introduced, the first care of him that would propagate it, is to explode, and extinguish whatever was memorable in the old, to give the greater credit to his new innovation; and if it fall out that the introducers of this new Sect, be of a different language, all goes to wreck, and whatever was before, is easily forgotten. And that this is so, appears by the institution of the Christian Religion, whose first establishers did principally intend the cancelling and extirpation of all old Ethnick Customs, Ceremonies, and Theology; and if there remained any memory of their affairs, it was because there was no new language introduced with it, the Christians being constrain'd to explain themselves in *Latine*; whereas could they have done it in a new tongue (considering their other persecutions) we may conclude there would have been no memory left of their Religion or Worship: For so diligent and zealous was Saint *Gregory*, and other Moderators of the Christian Religion, in abolishing the superstitions of the Gentiles, that they caused the works of all the Poets and Historians to be burn'd, which made any mention of them; they threw down their Images and Idols, and destroy'd all that might afford the least memory of Paganism; to which diligence of theirs, if a new language had been added, in a short time all would have been utterly forgotten; what therefore was done by the Christians for the extirpation of Gentilism, it is not improbable but the Gentiles might have done of old for the extirpation of the Religion before. And because in five or six thousand years, Religion may be twice or thrice changed, no wonder if what was before be so entirely lost, that if there remains any thing of it, it is looked upon as fabulous and incredible, as it hapned to the *Histories of Diodorus Siculus*, which gives an account of 40 or 50000 years, and are not unworthily accounted false. As to the Coelestial causes from the influence of the Heavens, they are such as destroy mankind in general, or reduce it to a very small number, as great Mortalities, Famines, and inundations of Water, but especially the last, because the mischief is more universal, and if any be saved, it is only the Mountaneers, which being commonly barbarous, have no knowledge of antiquity, and by consequence can convey nothing of it to their posterity; and if it so happens that among them which are preserved, some one man may be more learned than ordinary, and have some knowledge of affairs, to give himself a name and reputation afterwards, he conceals, perverts, and transmits them as he pleases; so that there remains to posterity no more than he thought fit to communicate. Nor do I believe it is doubted but these accidents happen, and Famine, and Pestilence do sometimes rage in the world, seeing all Histories mention them, and this oblivion of things is a certain effect of them: Nor is it unreasonable to think that the great Universe has its way of evacuation, as well as the Microcosm; for as in that, when the humours are redundant, and the body unable to digest them, Nature exerts, and finds out some way to throw them off, without which the person must certainly miscarry; so it is in the other, when all Countries are repleat, and no room left for those that are to come; when the Cunning and Malignity of mankind is at the height, there is a necessity the world should be purged by some of those three ways, that men being reduced in their numbers, and humbled under the consideration of their Mortality, may (if possible) become better: which being so, no wonder if the *Tuscans* formerly so famous for their administration both in War and in Peace, so eminent for their Courage, and so venerable for their Religion, should be oppressed by the *Romans*, and so totally abolished, that (as is said before) there remains nothing of them but the name.

## CHAP. VI.

*How the Romans proceeded in making of War.*

WE have already discoursed of the way of the *Romans* in extending their Empire; we shall now speak of their Customs in the management of their Wars, by which it will appear with what wisdom they deviated from the common ways of the world, and by what easie methods they arrived at that Supremacy and Grandeur. He who makes War at his own choice (and is under no constraint) or else by ambition, has doubtless this end; To get what he is able, and to keep it whilst he can, and rather to enrich than impoverish his own Country: for such a one it is necessary to have regard to his charge, and to see that neither the conquering nor maintaining are more expensive to him, than will consist with his revenue. This the *Romans* observed very strictly, by coming strong and suddenly into the field; for by that one practice, all their Wars with the *Latini*, *Sammites*, and *Tuscans*, were dispatched in a short time. And whoever considers their Wars from the beginning of *Rome*, to the Siege of the *Veientes*, will find that they were determined in a very short time, some in six, some in ten, and some in twenty days. For their Custom was, upon the first appearance of a War, immediately to draw out their Army, and seeking out the Enemy, they did what they could to bring him to a Battel; having beaten him (by reason of the surprize.) The Enemy (that his Country might not wholly be harassed) for the most part proposed an agreement, in which the *Romans* were sure to insist upon some part of their Territory; which either they converted to their particular profit, or consigned to some Colony which was to be placed there for the security of their Frontiers; by which means the wars being ended in a short time, their Conquests were kept without any considerable expence, for the Colony had that Country for their pay, and the *Romans* had their Colonies for their security. Nor could there be any way more advantageous and safe; for whilst there was no enemy in the field, those guards were sufficient; and when any Army was set out to disturb them, the *Romans* were always ready with another in their defence, and having fought them, they commonly prevailed, forced them to harder conditions, and returned when they had done: by which means they gained daily upon the enemy, and grew more powerful at home; and in this manner they proceeded till their Leaguer before *Vesii*, where they altered their method, and allowed pay to their Souldiers for the better continuation of the war, whereas before that, their wars being short; there was no necessity of paying their Armies. Nevertheless, though they paid their Souldiers from that time, and maintained war at greater distance, (whereby they were obliged to continue longer in the field) yet they left not their old custom of dispatching it as soon as they could, with respect to the circumstances of place and time; for which reason they continued their Colonies: and besides their old custom of shortning their wars as much as they were able, the ambition of their Consuls contributed exceedingly; for their Consulships being but for a year, and six months of that to be spent in their employments at home, they were as diligent and vigorous as possible, because they were not capable of triumphing till the war was concluded: and then for continuing their Colonies; the great advantage and convenience that resulted from them, was sufficient to prevail. This practice therefore was observed perpetually among the *Romans* in the management of their wars; only they varied something about the distribution of the prey, in which formerly they were more liberal than in after-times; either because they thought it not so necessary when the Souldiers were paid; or else because their spoils being greater than before, they thought convenient that the publick should have its share; that upon any new enterprize they might not be constrained to lay new taxes upon the people; and by this way their Coffers were filled in a short time. So that by these two ways, by the distribution of their prey, and the settling of Colonies, *Rome* grew rich by its wars, whereas other Princes and States (without great discretion) grow poor: and so great was every mans ambition of enriching the *Aerarium*, that by degrees it came to that pass, no Consul was permitted to triumph, unless he returned with a vast quantity of silver or gold, or some other inestimable commodity, and put it into the treasury. So that the designs of the *Romans* tended wholly to this, to finish the war quickly, by forcing the enemy to a Battel; or else to harass and tire them with frequent excursions, that thereby compelling them to dishonourable conditions, they might make their advantage, and become more powerful and rich.

## C H A P. VII.

*What proportion of Land the Romans allowed to every man in their Colonies.*

I Think it no easie matter to set down the exact proportion of Land, which the *Romans* assigned to every single person in their Colonies; for I believe they gave more or less according to the barrenness or fertility of the soil; and that in all places they were sparing enough. And the first reason that induces me, is, that thereby they might send more men and by consequence their frontiers be better guarded: another is, because living at home indigent themselves, it is not to be supposed they would suffer those whom they sent abroad to grow too opulent and rich: and in this I am much confirm'd by *Livy*, where he tells us that upon the taking of *Veii*, the *Romans* sent a Colony thither, and in the distribution of the Land allotted every man no more than three acres, and a little more according to our measure.

They might consider likewise that their wants would not be supplied by the quantity so much as the improvement and cultivation of their Land. Yet I do not doubt but they had publick Pastures and Woods to sustain their Cattel, and supply themselves with firing, without which a Colony could hardly subsist.

## C H A P. VIII.

*What it is that disposes some people to leave their native Countries, to dispossess other people.*

SEeing I have spoken already of the Military Discipline of the *Romans*; and how the *Tuscans* were invaded by the *French*; it follows properly enough that we say something of their several kinds of War, which are two: one sort of commenced upon the ambition of some Prince or commonwealth, in hopes to extend, and enlarge his Empire; as those wars which were made by *Alexander* the Great, by the *Romans*, and by one Prince against another; which wars, though dangerous, are not yet so pernicious as to supplant the inhabitants, and drive them out of their Country; for the Conqueror contents himself with his Victory, and the submission of the people allows them their own Laws, and many times their Estates. The other kind of war is much more dangerous and destructive, and that is when an entire Nation with their Wives and their Children, compelled either by hunger, or war, leaves its own Country, to fix themselves somewhere else, not to extend their dominion, or exercise any authority, (as in the other) but to kill or expel all the Natives, and possess themselves of their Estates.

This war indeed is most bloody and dreadful, as *Salust* shews very well in the end of his *Bellum Jugurthinum*, where, after *Jugurtha* was beaten, speaking of the invasion of the *Gauls* he tells us, *Cum cæteris Gentibus a populo Romano de imperio tantum fuisse dimicatum, cum Gallis, de singulorum hominum salute; With other Nations the Romans fought only for Empire and Dominion, with the Gauls they fought for their Country and Lives.* For when a Prince or Commonwealth invades a Country according to the first way, it is sufficient, if those who are at the Helm be removed or destroyed; in this every mans life is in danger; for when a whole Nation transplants, and invades a new Province, not only the Colonies, but the Natives must be extinguished, that they may fix themselves upon their Lands, and possess themselves of their Goods: and by these kind of people the *Romans* were three times invaded. First by the *Gauls*, who took *Rome*, and (as I said before) drove the *Tuscans* out of *Lombardy*; of which invasion *Titus Livius* gives two reasons: one was the pleasantness of the Country, and the delicacy of the Wine, wherewith (being then but ill provided in *France*) they were infinitely taken: the other was, the Country was grown so exceedingly populous, that it was not able to sustain its own natives; wherupon the Princes of those parts judging it necessary to find them new quarters they appointed which were to transplant, and putting *Bellovesus* and *Sicovefus* (two *French* Princes) at the head of them they sent one part of them into *Italy*, and the other into *Spain*: it was *Bellovesus* lot to invade *Italy*, and he did it so effectually, that he possessed himself of all *Lombardy*, and made the first war upon the *Romans* that was ever made upon them by the *French*. The second

time



time they were invaded in this manner was likewise by the *French*, and it was after the first *Punic* war, in which invasion the *Gauls* lost above 200000 men betwixt *Pisa* and *Piorabino*: the third and last was by the *Germans* and *Cimbrians*, who having defeated several Armies of the *Romans*, were at last themselves defeated by *Marius*. From whence we may observe the great courage and constancy of the *Romans* of old, that could not only bear up against three such dangerous invasions, but overcome them at last; whereas afterwards their courage began to fail, and they were not able to resist the inundation of those *Barbarians*; for when the *Goths* and the *Vandals* invaded, they possessed themselves of the whole Western Empire, without any considerable opposition. The reasons which move these Nations to transmigrate (as I said before) is necessity, and that necessity proceeds either from famine, or from wars and disturbances at home; and when they undertake these Expeditions with vast and innumerable numbers, they invade with irresistible violence, put all the Natives to the sword; possess themselves of their Estates; establish a new Kingdom, and change the very name of the Province, as *Moses* did of old, and the *Barbarians* since, who possessed themselves of the *Roman* Empire.

From hence are all the new names in *Italy* and elsewhere imposed by their several Conquerors: *Lombardy* was called anciently *Gallia Cisalpina*, *Francia* (from the *Franks*) was called anciently *Gallia trans Alpina*, *Sclavonia* was called *Illyria*, *Hungaria*, *Pannonia*, *Anglia*, *Britannia*; *Moses* gave the name of *Judea* to that part of *Syria* which he conquered; and many other Countries have changed their names upon the same occasion, which would be too long to recount. And because I have said before, that sometimes these kind of people are forc'd out of their Country by intestine troubles and disturbances, I shall present you with one example of the *Maurusians*; an ancient people of *Syria*, who foreseeing the invasion of the *Hebrews*, and knowing themselves unable to oppose them, thought it more wisdom to forsake their Country betimes, and preserve themselves, than to expect their coming, and lose both; whereupon they pack'd up their goods, and with their wives and children removed into *Africk*, where they drove out the inhabitants, and settled in their Country: so that they who were too weak to defend their own Province, were strong enough to force out another people. To this purpose *Procopius* who writes the wars of *Bellsarius* against the *Vandals* (who had settled themselves in *Africk*) tells us, that upon certain pillars in the houses where these *Maurusians* had lived, he himself read these words, *Nos Maurusii qui fugimus a facie Jesu latronis filii Navæ; We Maurusians fled hither from Jesus the Usurper, who was the son of Navi*. By which we may perceive the occasion of their departure out of *Syria*. And certainly these Nations forc'd out of their own Country by irresistible necessity, are more than ordinarily dreadful, and not to be opposed but by a potent and well disciplin'd people: but when they move in small numbers, their danger is not so great, because they dare not use that violence, but are put to their wits, and to possess themselves of some quarters by cunning and insinuation, which they are to keep afterwards by ways of amity and friendship, as *Aeneas* did, and *Dido*, the *Massilians* and others, who by the assistance and friendship of their neighbours, made good what they had possessed. But the people that came out of their own Countries the most numerous and strong, were the *Scythians*; for their Country being barren and cold, and the natives too numerous to be sustained in it, they were forced abroad, as having nothing to preserve them at home. And if now for five hundred years and upwards we have not heard of any such transmigration, I conceive the reasons may be several: the first may be the great evacuation in those Countries, from whence the *Roman* Empire was invaded. A second may be, because *Germany* and *Hungaria* (from whence those inundations came) is better cultivated and improved, so as they can live plentifully at home, without rambling abroad: another reason may be, that the *Germans*, *Poles*, *Cimbrians*, and other Nations which border upon the *Scythians*; being martial people, and continually at wars with them, are as it were a Bulwark to these parts, and keep the *Scythians* from all new invasions. The *Tartars* likewise have been many times upon their march with very great Armies, but they have been always encountred and repulsed by the *Poles* and *Hungarians*, which has given them occasion frequently to boast, that were it not for their arms and resistance, not only *Italy*, but the very *Roman* Church had been many times sensible of the barbarity of the *Tartars*.

## CHAP. IX.

*What those occasions are which do most commonly create War among Princes.*

THE occasion of the War betwixt the *Sammites* and the *Romans*, who had been a long time in league together, was the common cause betwixt all Princes and Governments, and was either fortuitous, or designed: The war betwixt the *Sammites* and the *Romans* was fortuitous; for when the *Sammites* made war upon the *Sidicins*, and afterwards upon the *Campani*, they intended not any controversy with the *Romans*; but the *Campani* being beaten, and betaking themselves to the *Romans* for relief, (contrary to the expectation both of the *Romans* and *Sammites*) the *Romans* being in league with the *Sammites*, could not, without violence to the said league, give them protection; upon which (having no other way to secure themselves) the *Campani* submitted to the *Romans*, and made themselves their subjects; and the *Romans*, how unjust soever they thought it before to assist the *Campani* (whilst they were but associates) against the *Sammites*, their old friends, yet now they were become their subjects, and had incorporated with their State, the case was altered, and they thought it very reasonable, supposing, that if they should refuse to defend them, they should discourage all others that had an inclination to do the like, which would have been contrary to the great design of the *Romans* to propagate their Glory and Empire. The same accidental cause gave occasion to their first War with the *Cartaginians*, upon the *Romans* protecting the *Messinenses* in *Sicily*. But their second war with the *Cartaginians*, was designed; for *Hanibal* the *Cartaginian* General fell upon the *Saguntins* in *Spain*, (who were in alliance with the *Romans*) not so much out of malice to the *Saguntins*, but that the *Romans* being provoked to their defence, should give the *Cartaginians* occasion to transport the war into *Italy*.

This way of provoking and hedging in a War has been always practised among Potentates, especially where they had any faith or respect for other people; for, that the peace which has been a long time betwixt them upon articles of alliance may seem firm and inviolate, they will not meddle with him against whom they do principally design, but turn their arms upon some of his friends and confederates that he is most particularly obliged to receive into his protection, knowing, that if he appears in their defence, they must have occasion to fight him; if he does not, but disowns his allies, they publish his weakness and infidelity to the World, and by either of those ways they do their business. This example of the *Campani* is of singular importance, as well to those who would make war upon any body, as those that are in distress; for when you are unable to defend your self, and unwilling to fall into their hands that invade you, the best and most safe way is to put your self in subjection to some neighbouring Prince, as the *Campani* did then, and the *Florentines* afterwards when they found themselves too weak to support against the power of *Castruccio of Lucca*; for finding that *Robert King of Naples* would not protect them as friends, they threw themselves into his arms to be defended as his subjects.

## CHAP. X.

*That, according to the common opinion, money is not the sinews of War.*

BECAUSE it is easie to begin war as a man pleases, but harder to end it; every Prince before he undertakes an enterprize is obliged to consider his own strength well, and to regulate by it. But then he must be so wise too as not to make a wrong judgment, and that he will certainly do as oft as he computes it by his Bags, by the situation of his Towns, or the affection of his Friends, rather than by his own proper Power and Arms. Money, and Towns, and Friends are all good, when in conjunction with a strong Army of your own, but without it they do nothing: without Men, to what purpose is either Money or Towns? and the affection of your subjects will hold no longer than you are able to defend them. There is no mountain, no lake, no streight inaccessible, where there is no force to defend it. Vast sums of money are not only incapable of protecting you, but they expose you to more danger; nor can any thing be more false than that old and common saying, *That money is the sinews of the war*: *Quintus Curtius* was the first author of it in the war betwixt *Antipater of Macedon*, and the King of *Sparta*, where he tells us, that for want of monies the *Spartans*.

ans were forced to fight, and were beaten; whereas, could they have protracted but some few days, they had had the news of *Alexander's* death, and got the victory without fighting a blow; but wanting mony, and apprehending their Army would moulder, they were constrained to come to a Battel, and were defeated; which was the occasion of that Apophthegm, *That mony is the sinews of war*: which saying is now a-days in every Princes mouth, but improperly, in my judgment: for relying wholly upon that Maxim, they think their treasure is sufficient to defend them, not considering that, if that would have done it, *Darius* would have conquered *Alexander*; the *Grecians* the *Romans*; Duke *Charles* the *Swizzers*: and of late the Pope and *Florentines* united, would not have found it so hard to have mastered *Francesco Maria* (Nephew to *Julius* 2d.) at the Battel of *Urbino*. But these whom I have mentioned, presuming more upon the multitude of their bags than the goodness of their men, were all beaten and overcome. *Craesus* the King of *Lydia* carrying *Solon* into his Treasury, and shewing him an immense quantity of riches, ask'd him what he thought of his power; to which *Solon* replyed, I think it never the greater for this; for War is carried on, and Battels are fought more with iron than gold; and it might happen for ought he knew, that some body might come with his iron and take it all from him. Again, when after the death of *Alexander* the Great, a great Army of *Gauls* transplanted into *Greece*, (from whence they passed afterwards into *Asia*) before they began their march, the *Gauls* sent Embassadors to the King of *Macedon* to treat an accord; which being almost concluded, to make the Embassadors more plyable, the said King shews them his treasure, which consisted of a vast quantity of silver and gold, which the Embassadors had no sooner seen, but longing impatiently to be at it, they broke of the treaty, and brought their Army into his Country; so that that very thing in which he had reposed his great confidence and security proved his ruine and destruction. The *Venerians* not long since had their Coffers well stor'd, yet they lost all; and their wealth was not able to defend them. So that I do affirm 'tis not mony, (as the common opinion will have it) but good Souldiers that is the sinews of war: for mony cannot find good Souldiers, but good Souldiers will be sure to find mony; had not the *Romans* done more in their wars with their iron than their gold, the treasure of the whole World would not have been sufficient for them, considering their great enterprizes abroad, and their no less difficulties at home; but fighting with iron, they had no want of gold, for those who were afraid of their Armies supplied them. And if the King of *Sparta* was forced to run the hazard of a Battel, and was beaten for want of monies, it was no more than what has hapned to others, and might have hapned to him upon other occasions: for it falls out many times that for want of provisions an Army is forc'd either to fight or to starve; in which case there is no General so weak but he will choose that which is most honourable, where fortune has some power to befriend him. Again, a General having news of supplies that are coming to the enemy, considers with himself whether he had not better engage them as they are, than attend till their recruits come up, and then fight them with more disadvantage: sometimes likewise it falls out, (as it did to *Asdrubal* in the Country of the *Pisens*, when he was surprized by *Claudius Nero*, and the other *Roman* Consul) that a General is either forc'd to fight, or to fly, in which case it is incomparably more safe to hazard all in a Battel, than to lose all in a Flight. Which being so, we see there are many causes that constrain a General to fight upon disadvantage; among which, if want of mony be one, there is no more reason we should therefore call that *the sinews of war*, than any of the rest which do the same thing: so that mony is not so much the sinews of war, as good souldiers; 'tis true, mony is requisite for the carrying on of a war, but not principally, and in the first place; for good souldiers have many times been contented without it, though it is but seldom they want it, for 'tis as impossible for good souldiers to want mony, as it is for mony alone to make good souldiers. And this is clear by the testimony of Historians in a thousand places. *Pericles* persuaded the *Athenians* to a war with all *Peloponnesus*, and assured them of success, upon consideration of their industry and riches; the *Athenians* undertook the War, and for some time prospered with their industry, but at last it appeared that the conduct and discipline of the *Spartans* was too hard for the *Athenians* industry and treasure. *Levy* desires this controversie the best of any man, where, in his comparison of Commanders, enquiring what would have been the event if *Alexander* the Great had turn'd his Arms against the *Romans*; he declares that in war there are three things fundamentally necessary, good Souldiers, good Officers, and good fortune; and then arguing whether *Alexander* or the *Romans* were more considerable in those three points, he concludes, without the least mention of mony. It is not improbable but the *Campani*, (of whom we have spoken in the former Chapter) when they undertook the assistance of the *Sidicins* against the *Samnites* measured their power more by their mony than their men; from whence it hapned that

being

being defeated in two Battels, they were forced to submit, and become tributary to the Romans.

### CHAP. XI.

*'Tis not discretion to enter into strict amity with a Prince, whose reputation is greater than his strength.*

**T**He *Sidicins* were in a great error to desire the assistance of the *Campani* against the *Sammites*, as being (by reason of their luxury) unable to assist them, but the error of the *Capuans* was greater, in not knowing their own weakness and incapacity to defend them: both their errors *Livy* has very well described in these words, *Campani magis nomen in auxilium Sidicinorum, quam vires ad presidium attulerunt; The Capuans made a great noise, but they brought no force to the relief of the Sidicins.*

And here it is not unreasonable to consider, that the leagues which are made with Princes whose distance is too great, or power too little to relieve one, are more honourable than safe, and give more reputation than security to the person that desires them. This was experienced by the *Florentines* in the year 1489, when the Pope and King of *Naples* invaded them; for they were at that time confederate with the King of *France*, yet they had more reputation than assistance thereby. The same would happen likewise to such of the *Italian* Princes as should confederate with *Maximilian* the Emperor, and in confidence of his alliance, undertake any great enterprize, because that alliance would be one of those that bring more reputation than relief. So then, as it was a great error in the *Capuans*, when they were unable to defend themselves, to undertake the protection of the *Sidicins*, so it is and will be the same in whoever follows their example. It was the same case with the *Tarentini*, who would needs interpose betwixt the *Sammites* and the *Romans*, to mediate a peace: for when both *Romans* and *Sammites* were in the field, and their Armies preparing for an engagement, the *Tarentini* sent Embassadors to the Consul, to let him know from the Senate of the *Tarentini*, that they would have peace betwixt them and the *Sammites*, and that they were resolved to take Arms against them which refused it. But the Consul smiling at their imprudence, in the presence of the said Embassadors, caused a charge to be founded, and immediately marching his Army against the enemy, he let them see by his proceedings what answer they deserved.

Thus you have seen to what errors Princes are subject, who undertake the protection of other States; I shall now in the next Chapter remonstrate what ways are most convenient for their own proper defence.

### CHAP. XII.

*Upon an apprehension of being invaded, whether it be better to make war, or expect it.*

**A**Mong wise men, and very good Souldiers, I have heard it often disputed, whether when two Princes are of equal strength, and one of them designing war (visibly) against the other) it be better for that Prince which is like to be invaded, to sit still, and expect him at home; or to begin with him, and make the first inroad himself? There are arguments on both sides, and they who think it best to be the aggressor, and fall upon the Enemy first, may alledge the Counsel which *Crasus* gave to *Cyrus*, when being with his Army upon the Frontiers of the *Massageti*, *Thamyris* Queen of that Country sent to him to take his choice whether she should fight him within her Country, or upon the Frontiers: if he desired to advance, she would stand still and expect him; if he had rather fight where he was, she would be with him immediately: when it came to be debated in Counsel, *Crasus*, contrary to the opinion of the rest, was for marching to her; and the reason he gave, was, because if she should be beaten at any distance, *Cyrus* would get but little of her Country, for she would have time to recruit, whereas, if she were beaten at home, he would be able to sit so close upon her skirts, that she being never capable of rallying, or bringing another Army into the field, must of necessity lose her whole Kingdom: *Hambal* gave the same Counsel to *Antiochus*, assuring him that if the *Romans* were any way to be conquered,

conquered, it was by carrying the war into *Italy*, for by so doing he might have the benefit of their Arms, their Wealth, and their Allies; but whilst the war was abroad, and *Italy* undisturbed, he would leave the man inexhaustible magazine that would supply them with what and wheresoever they had occasion; and at last *Hambal* concluded that *Rome* was to be taken more easily than the Empire, and *Italy* it self, than any of its Provinces. *Agathocles* being unable to resist the *Carthaginians* at home, invaded their borders, and forc'd them to a peace; and *Scipio* in the same manner to remove the war out of *Italy*, transported it into *Africa*. Those who are on the other side do argue as stiffly, that there can be nothing more dangerous than to hazard an Army in an enemies Country, at a great distance from their own; and they produce the *Athenians* for an instance, who, whilst they kept themselves upon the defensive part, and expected their enemies at home were always victorious, but when they began to make war at a distance, and send Armies into *Sicily*, they lost their liberty, and every thing else. They produce also the Fable of *Antus* King of *Lybia*, who being invaded by *Hercules* the *Egyptian*, was invincible whilst he kept himself within his own borders but being inveigled out by the subtilty of his enemy, he lost both his Kingdom and Life; upon which occasion that story was raised of *Antus*; that being born of the earth, (as they pretended) so oft as he touch'd it, so oft he received new vigour from his Mother, which *Hercules* perceiving, got him up in his arms, crush'd him to death.

They produce likewise more modern examples. Every body knows that *Ferrand* King of *Naples* was esteemed a wise Prince in his time, and hearing two years before his death that King *Charles* viii of *France* was preparing to invade him, he let him alone; but falling sick afterwards, as he lay upon his death-bed, he called his Son *Alphonso* to him, and among other things, charged him that he should expect the King of *France* upon his Frontiers, and fight him there, but that by no means he should be tempted beyond them; and it had been better for *Alphonso* to have follow'd his Counsel, for neglecting it afterwards, and sending an Army into *Romagna* he lost both Army and Kingdom without striking a blow: But besides these arguments on both sides, it is urged in behalf of the Aggressor, that he invades with more confidence and courage than his Adversary receives him (which is a great advantage and enhancement to his Army) That he brings many inconveniences upon the person whom he invades, to which he would not be liable, if he expected him at home. For when the enemies Country is wasted, and their Houses plunder'd, his Subjects are not much to be trusted, nor can any more Taxes be laid upon them, without great difficulty, by which means (as *Hambal* said) their Magazines will be spent and their fountain dried up that was to supply them with all Provisions for War. Besides, if your Army be in the Enemies Country, it will be under a greater necessity of fighting, and by consequence will fight more desperately than at home. But to this it is answered on the other side, That it is more for your advantage to attend your enemy in your own Country, than to seek him abroad; for thereby you may furnish your self with Victuals and Ammunition, and all other necessaries without any inconvenience, and distress him by driving the Country. You may likewise with much more ease incommode and frustrate his designs, by your better knowledge of the Country, and what places are more proper to attack him in; as also you may attack him with your whole force at once, or give him battel as you please, which out of your own Confines is not to be done: Moreover if Fortune should be adverse, and it be your chance to be beaten; more of your Men will escape where their refuge is so near, and you will sooner rally them again: In short, if you fight at home, you venture your whole force, and not your whole fortune: but if you fight abroad, you venture your whole fortune with but part of your force: Others there have been, who with design to weaken the Enemy, and fighting him afterwards with more ease and advantage, have suffered him quietly to march several days Journey into their Country, and possess himself of several Towns; but whether they did well or not, I will not determine, only I think this distinction is to be considered, whether my Country be strong in Fortresses, and Men; as the *Romans* were of old, and as the *Swizzers* at this day; or whether it be weak and unfortified, as the Territory of the *Carthaginians* formerly, and *France* and *Italy* now. In this case the Enemy is by all means to be kept at a distance, because your chief strength lying in your Money, and not in your Men, whenever you are interrupted in raising or receiving of that, your business is done; and nothing interrupts you so fatally, as an Enemy in your Country. And of this the *Carthaginians* may be an example, who whilst they were free at home, were able by their Revenue and Taxes to wage War with the *Romans* themselves; whereas afterwards when they were assaulted, they were not able to contend with *Agathocles*. The *Florentines*, when *Castruccio* of *Lucca* brought his Arms into their Country, could not support against him, but were forced to put themselves under

der the Dominion of the King of *Naples*, to procure his protection; but *Castruccio* was no sooner dead, but they were agog again, and had the confidence to invade the Duke of *Milan*, and attempt the beating him out of that Province; so courageous were they in their foreign War, and so abject at home. But when Countries are in a posture of defence, and people Martial and well disciplin'd (as the *Romans* of old, and the *Swizzers* at this day) 'tis better to keep off; for the nearer they are to their own Country, they are the harder to overcome, because they can raise more force to defend themselves, than to invade another people. Nor does the opinion of *Hanibal* affect me at all; for though he persuaded *Antiochus* to pass into *Italy* he did it as a thing that would have been more for his own, and the *Carthaginian* than for *Antiochus* his advantage; for had the *Romans* received those three great defeats which they received of *Hanibal* in *Italy*, in the same space of time, in *France* or any where else, they had been ruined irrecoverably, for they could neither have rallied, nor recruited so soon. I do not remember any foreign Expedition by the *Romans* for the Conquest of any Province, in which their Army exceeded the number of 50000. But upon the invasion of the *Gauls*, after the first *Punick* war, they brought 118000 Men into the Field for their defence: Nor could they beat them afterwards in *Lombardy*, as they did at first in *Tuscany*, because it was more remote, and they could not fight them with so much convenience, nor with so many men. The *Cimbri* repulsed the *Romans* in *Germany*, but following them into *Italy*, they were defeated, and driven out again themselves; and the reason was, because the *Romans* could bring more forces against them: The *Swizzers* may without much difficulty be over-powered abroad, because they seldom march above 30 or 40000 strong; but to attack and beat them at home, is much more difficult, where they can bring into the field 100000 and more. I conclude therefore that that Prince whose people are in a posture, and provided for War, does wisely if he expects a Potent and dangerous Enemy at home, rather than to invade him in his own Country: But that Prince whose Country is ill provided, and whose Subjects are ill disciplined, does better if he keeps the War as far off as he can: and by so doing, each of them (in his several degree) will defend himself best.

### CHAP. XIII.

*That from mean to great fortune people rise rather by fraud than by force.*

I Have found it always true, that men do seldom or never advance themselves from a small beginning, to any great height, but by fraud, or by force (unless they come by it by donation, or right of inheritance). I do not think any instance is to be found where force alone brought any man to that Grandeur, but fraud and artifice have done it many times, as is clear in the lives of *Philip* of *Macedon*, *Agathocles* the *Sicilian*, and several others, who from mean and inconsiderable extraction, came at length to be Kings. *Xenophon* in his History of *Cyrus* insinuates the necessity of fraud when he represents (in his first Expedition against the King of *Armenia*) how all *Cyrus* his actions and negotiations were full of fallacy and deceit, and that it was that way he conquered his Kingdom, and not by bravery and force, by which he implies that no Prince can do any great matters without that art of dissembling Besides he represents him juggling, and playing of tricks with his own Uncle by the Mother-side, the King of the *Medes*, and shows that without that excellence, he had never been King; and indeed I am of opinion that from a mean and base fortune never any man came to be very great by down-right generosity and force; but by fraud alone there have been many, as particularly *John Galeazzo*, who by that alone wrested the Government of *Lombardy* out of the hands of *Messer Bernardo*, his Uncle. And the same courses which Princes are forced to in the beginning of their authority, the same courses are taken by Commonwealths at first, till they be settled in their government, and have force sufficient to defend themselves. *Rome* (which either by change or election took all ways to make it self great) was not without this; and what greater cunning or artifice could it use in the beginning of its greatness, than what it did take, and is mentioned before. For by their fair carriage and insinuation, they got several Cities into consideration, and under that name, they subjected them insensibly, and made them their slaves. The *Latins*, and other Neighbouring people were of this sort, by whose Arms and Alliance, the *Romans* having conquered their Enemies, they were rendered so powerful that they began to handle them now, not as Associates, but Subjects; nor could the *Latini* be

be convinced of their ferityté, till they saw the *Sammites* twice over-thrown, and forced to accept of their Conditions. Which Victories, though they gain'd the *Romans* great reputation abroad, among remote Princes, who understood more of the name, than the power of the *Romans*, yet they created envy and jealousy among those who were nearer and more sensible of their greatness; and this jealousy and apprehension was so great, that not only the *Latins*, but the Colonies in *Latium* and *Campagna* (which had been sent thither not long before) confederated against the *Romans*, and resolv'd to make War upon them. And this War was commenced in the same manner (as I have said before) most other Wars are commenced. Not by down-right denunciation of War against the *Romans*, but by defending the *Sidicins* against the *Sammites*, who made War by allowance from the *Romans*. Nor was there any other reason of their Conspiracy, but because the Confederates began to smell out their cunning, and to be sensible that under that false title of Allies, they were in great danger of being made slaves, which *Amnius Selinus* (a Latin Prætor) in an Oration to the Council expressed very properly in these words, *Nam si etiam nunc sub umbra fœderis æqui, servitutem pati possumus, quid obest quin proditis Sidicinis, non Romanorum solum, sed Samnitium dictis pareamus? For if even now under the shadow of an equal Confederacy, we can endure servitude: What hinders but that we betray the Sidicins, and put our necks under the feet not only of the Romans, but the Samnites.* Which things being so, it is manifest the *Romans* wanted not at the beginning of their rise, that dexterity of cheating that is so necessary to all people that are ambitious of raising themselves to a great height, from an inconsiderable beginning; which artifice is always the less scandalous, by how much he that does practise it, understands better how to disguise it by some honorable pretence, as the *Romans* did very well.

CHAP. XIV:

*Many People are mistaken, who expect with meekness and humility to work upon the proud.*

IT falls out many times that humility and modesty towards such as have any picque or prejudice to you, is so far from doing good, that it does a great deal of mischief and of this the debate and consultation of the *Romans* about the preservation of their peace with the *Latins*, is an example, from whom they were in expectation of a War. For the *Sammites* complaining to the *Romans* that the *Latins* had invaded them, the *Romans* (unwilling to exasperate them more, who were already too prone to be quarrelling) return'd this answer, that by their league with them, the *Latins* were not tyed up from making War as they pleas'd. The *Latins* were so far from being satisfied by the mildness of their answer, that it made them more insolent; inso much that not long after they profess'd themselves their Enemies, as appears by that speech of the aforesaid *Amnius* in the Council aforesaid, where he tells the *Latins*, *Tentâstis patientiam negando militem: Quis dubitat exarsisse eos? Pertulerunt tamen hunc dolorem. Exercitus nos parere adversus Samnites, fœderatos suos audierunt, nec moverunt se ab urbe. Unde hæc illis tanta modestia, nisi a conscientia virium, & nostrarum, & suarum.* You tried their patience before, in refusing them supplies; who doubts but they were nettled? yet they swallow'd it: They had notice of our preparations against the *Sammites* their Confederates, and stirr'd not in their defence. Whence comes this mighty modesty, and good nature? from nothing but a sence of the disparity betwixt our strength, and their own. From hence it is clear, the patience and civility of the *Romans*, augmented the arrogance of the *Latins*: and that it is the interest of all Princes to be very cautious of condescending from their dignity, or stooping willingly to any thing that may give the Enemy an opinion of his weakness or pusillanimity; for it is better to lose any thing bravely and by open War, than to part with it poorly in hopes to prevent it; and it many times happens that those who part so easily with their Lands or Monies to prevent a War, do rather excite, than satisfy the Enemy, whose nature commonly is such, that upon the discovery of their impotence or fear, his desires encrease, and new things are successively demanded; nor will your friends be so ready to assist, if they find you timorous and irresolute. But if as soon as you have notice of the designs or insolence of the Enemy, you immediately prepare to correct him; he will not invade you so boldly, though he be stronger than you, and then your friends will come in more freely to your assistance, who, had you abandoned your self, would certainly have forsaken you. This is intended only where you have but one Enemy; where you have more, the best way is to give



and promise what you think fit, that if possible, you may draw off some or other of them from their Confederacy, and so break their League by dividing them.

## C H A P. XV.

*Weak States are irresolute and uncertain in their Councils, and slow Councils are most commonly pernicious.*

From these occasions and beginnings of the War betwixt the *Latins* and the *Romans*, we may observe, that in all consultations, it is best to come immediately to the point in question, and bring things to a result, without too tedious an hesitation and suspense. And this we may learn from the Council which the said *Latins* took at that time when their war with the *Romans* was in debate. For the *Romans*, suspecting the defection of the *Latins*, for their better information, and that they might reduce them (if possible) without blows, sent to them to send over eight of their Principal Citizens to *Rome*, to consult with them about keeping of the Peace. The *Latins* being conscious to themselves of many things which they had acted against the pleasure of the *Romans*, call'd a Council to consider of the persons that were to go, and what their Commissioners should say when they came there. The Council being divided, one man proposing one thing, and another man another, *Annius* the Prætor had this expression, *Ad summam rerum nostrarum pertinere arbitror, ut cogitetis magis, quid agendum nobis, quam quid loquendum sit, facile erit explicatis Consiliis, accommodare rebus verba. I conceive it more pertinent to our business, That you consider rather what is to be done, than what is to be said; for when you are come to a resolution, it will be no hard matter to accommodate your words.* Which saying was doubtlesly true, and ought to be regarded by all Princes and Commonwealths. For whilst we are ambiguous, and uncertain what is to be done, we cannot tell how to adapt and accommodate our language; but when we are come to a resolution, and have decreed what is to be done, it is not so difficult. I have inserted this passage the more willingly, because I my self have known this irresolution do much mischief, to the detriment and dishonour of our State; and it is a fault peculiar to all weak and improvident Princes and Governments to be slow and tedious, as well as uncertain in their Councils, which is as dangerous as the other, especially when the debate is about the relief or protection of a friend; for your slowness does no good to him, and exposes your self. These uncertain or tedious resolutions proceed either from want of courage and force, or from the crossness and malevolence of the Counsellors, who carried away by some private passion of their own, will rather ruine the State, than not accomplish their revenge, so that instead of expediting and pushing things to a conclusion, they impede and obstruct whatever is before them. For your good Citizens (though the vogue of the people runs the more dangerous way) will never hinder the coming to a result, especially in things that will not dispense with much time. *Girolamo* a Tyrant in *Syracuse* being dead, and the War betwixt the *Romans* and *Carthaginians* very hot, a Council was called by the *Syracusans*, and it was debated which side they should take. The question was canvass'd with such order by both parties, that it remained in *ambiguo*, and nothing was resolv'd, till at length *Appolomides* (one of the Principal in that City) in a grave and prudent Oration remonstrated, That neither they were to be blamed who had spoken for the *Romans*, nor they who adhered to the *Carthaginians*, but the length and uncertainty of their debate; for that irresolution would be the occasion of certain ruine; but if they came to a conclusion, with which side soever they joyn'd, they might hope for some good. *Titus Livius* could not better have displayed the danger of this kind of suspense, than in this case of the *Latins*; whose assistance against the *Romans* being desired by the *Lavinians*, they were so long in their debate, that when at last they came to a resolution, their supplies were scarce gone out of their Gates, before they had news that their Confederates were beaten. Whereupon *Milonius* the Prætor said very wittily, This little ground which we have marched, will cost us very dear to the *Romans*; and this hapned to them for the tediousness of their Councils; for they should either have assisted, or denied them out of hand; had they denyed them, the *Romans* had not been disgusted; had they complied, they might have supported their Associates, and have kept them from being ruined; but doing neither, they destroyed their friends, and hazarded themselves. Had this precept of bringing things to a speedy resolution, been followed by the *Florentines*, they had prevented many mischiefs and damages which they met withal upon the coming

of *Lewis XII* into *Italy* against the Duke of *Milan*; for the said King *Lewis* having resolved upon the said expedition, he proposed to their Embassadors in his Court, that the *Florentines* should not interpose or concern themselves in the quarrel, upon which terms, he would receive them into his protection, and defend them from any harm; the Embassadors agreed, and a Months time was allowed for ratification from the City. But the ratification was deferred (by the imprudence of some persons who favoured the Duke of *Milan's* interest) till the *French* had almost conquered all, and being offered then, it was refused by the King of *France* (who knew well enough that the *Florentines* were then forced to what they did; and desired his amity more out of fear, than affection) which piece of delay cost the *Florentines* a good round Sum of Money, and might well have been their ruine; as just such an accident was afterward. And this indiscretion of theirs was the greater, because they were no way serviceable to the Duke of *Milan*; who, if he had prevailed, would doubtless have shown himself a greater Enemy to them, than the King of *France*. Of this slowness, and uncertainty of Councils, I have spoken before, but new occasion presenting it self, I have discoursed of it again, as a thing worthy the observation of all Commonwealths, especially like ours.

CHAP. XVI.

*How much the Soldiers of our times do differ from the Discipline of the Ancients.*

**T**HE Battel which the *Romans* fought with the *Latins*, in the Consulships of *Manlius Torquatus*, and *Decius*, was the greatest and most important that ever they had in any War, with any other Nation. For as the *Latins* lost all by losing the Victory, and the *Romans* got the Dominion of them: So the *Romans* had they lost the Battel, must have lost their liberty with it, and turn'd Subjects to the *Latins*. *Livy* tells us the same thing, for (says he) the *Latin Army* was in nothing inferiour to the *Romans*; their courage the same, their constancy the same, and their numbers the same; if the *Romans* had any advantage, it was in their Generals, which indeed were better than the *Latins*, and it is expressed by several, both *Latins* and *Romans* who have left an account of that Battel to posterity; that where-ever *Manlius* had been, that side would certainly have conquered. In this Battel there were two things very exemplary and remarkable: One of the Consuls, to keep his Soldiers firm in their obedience, and preserve their Military Discipline, caused his own Son to be slain for transgressing his Orders, though he gain'd the Victory by the means. The other devoted himself freely to death, for the good of his Country; for the dispute was like to be very hard, fighting against the *Latins*, who (as *Livy* tells us) had the same Language, the same Customs, the same Arms, the same Discipline with the *Romans*; the Soldiers, the Captains, the Tribunes both in one Army and the other, had been Comrades and served formerly together, not only in the same Army, or Garison, but in the same Company and Band. It was necessary therefore, being equal in their numbers, and equal in their courage, that something extraordinary should be done, that might render the Soldiers fiercer, and more obstinate to overcome, upon which fierceness and obstinacy the whole hopes of the victory did depend; for whilst there is any such in the breasts of the Soldiers, they never think of running, but press still on for victory and prize; and because there was more of this constancy and fortitude in the breasts of the *Romans*, than in the breasts of the *Latins*, partly the destiny, and partly the bravery of the Consuls effected that for the good success of their Army, and the preservation of their Discipline, *Torquatus* killed his Son, and *Decius* himself. *Titus Livius* in his description of the equality of their force, gives us an exact account of the Orders which they observed in their Armies and Fights, and he has done it so largely, I need not repeat it all, but shall only select what I think most particularly remarkable, and what, if observed by the Generals of our days, might have prevented very great disorders. I say then that according to *Livy's* description, their Armies were divided into three principal *Schieri* or Squadrons. The first consisted of their *Hastati*, which were most of them young men in the flower of their age digested into *Manipuli* or small parties, and disposed at a certain distance with Pikes or Darts in their hands; from whence they were called *Hastati*. The second Squadron was as numerous as the first, and divided into as many *Manipuli*, but their distance was something greater, and it consisted of choice men, from whence they were called *Principes*. The third and last Squadron was the biggest of the three, and had almost as many in it as both the other: and

this was made up of the ancientest and most experienced Soldiers, whom they called *Triarii*. They too had their certain distances, but something greater than in either of the other. In their Battels, the *Hastati* were in the Van; the *Principes* behind them, and the *Triarii* in the Rear. To every one of these Squadrons there was a body of Horse, which being drawn up in two divisions, and disposed one of the right, and the other on the left hand of the Army, represented two wings, and were therefore called *Ala*. These three Squadrons preceded and followed one another exactly, but the *Hastati* in the first Squadron were drawn up closer, That, being to receive the first *impetus* of the Enemy, they might endure it the better. The *Principes* that followed them was not in such close order, but were disposed at more distance, to the end that if the *Hastati* should be forced to retire, they might be received into that Squadron without disorder or confusion. But the *Triarii* were drawn up with greater spaces and intervals than both the other, and for the same reason, that if they were repulsed, that might fall back among them, and make an entire Body together: Being drawn up in this order, the *Hastati* began the fight; if they were over-powered by the Enemy and forced to give ground, they fell back to the *Principes*, and uniting with them, renewed the fight in one body; if they were both of them too weak, and unable to bear up against the Enemy, they retreated gradually into the spaces betwixt the *Triarii*, and then all the three Squadrons being joyned, the whole Army charged in a body, and if they were beaten, farewell, there was no more reserves, but the Battel was lost; and because whenever the *Triarii* was engaged, the whole Army was in danger, this Proverb grew very frequent, *Res reducta est ad Triarios. Things are now at the Extremity*. The Generals of our times, having laid aside all the old discipline of the *Romans*, have neglected this among the rest, to their no little prejudice. For he that draws up his Army in a posture with two such reserves, must be beaten three times before he can be utterly defeated; whereas once beating will do the Enemies business. But he that trusts only to the first shock (as the Christian Armies do generally now) may easily be broken, the least disorder; or relaxation of courage, putting all to the rout. And that which is the reason why our Armies are so quickly defeated, is, because they have lost the old way of falling back one body into another, and rallying three times. For whoever draws up his Army according to Modern Custom, does it with one of these two inconveniences, He either draws up his several Squadrons shoulder to shoulder, and by enlarging his Ranks, makes his Files very thin (which weakens his Army very much by leaving the distance so small betwixt the Front, and the Rear) or else he draws them up deeper, according to the manner of the *Romans*; but then their Files are so close, that if the Front be beaten (there being no spaces in the Battel to receive them) they entangle and confound one another; so as the Front being repulsed, falls foul upon the middle Squadron, and both of them upon the third, whereby they are embarrassed, and hindred from advancing or receiving the Enemy in any order, and the whole Battel is lost. The *Spanish* and *French* Armies at the Battel of *Ravenna* (where *Monsieur de Foix* the *French* General was slain) fought very well, being drawn up according to the mode of our times, with their Fronts so extended, that their Battalions were much more in wideness than depth and his was done in respect of the ground, which in that place was very spacious and large; for being sensible that retreats are more difficult where the Files are too deep, they drew them up large in the Front to prevent it as much as possible: But when they are straightned for room they are forced to be contented, and draw up as well as they can, for there is no remedy. They are subject likewise to the same disorders in their Marches and IncurSIONS into the Enemies Country, whether to forrage, or upon some other design. In the War betwixt the *Florentines* and *Pisans* (upon their Rebellion after the King of *France's* passage into *Italy*) coming to a Battel at *Santo Regolo*, the *Florentines* were defeated by their own Horse, which being drawn up in the Front of the Army, and charged smartly by the Enemy, were put into disorder, and forced to fall foul upon their Foot, which broke the whole Army. And I have been many times assured by *Monsieur Griacus de Burgo* (an old Officer of Foot in the *Florentine* Army) that their Foot had not fled that day, but for the disorder of their own Horse; The *Swizzers* (the best Soldiers of our times) when they are drawn up with the *French*, will be sure to be drawn up in the Flanks, that if their Horse should be beaten, they may not be driven in among them. And though these things seem easie to be understood, and more easie to practise, yet there has not been one of our late Generals that has found the way of imitating this old method, or correcting the new; for though they also have their Armies divided into three Squadrons, which they call the Van-guard, the Body, and the Rear; yet they use them only in their Marches, and Incampments; but when they come to a Battel, it is seldom seen but they are drawn up as abovesaid, and altogether run the

the risk of one shock, and no more. And because some people to excuse their ignorance, pretend the Execution of the Cannon, will not suffer them to make use of the old order, I shall examine in the next Chapter whether that can be a just impediment, or not.

CHAP. XVII.

*How the Armies of our times are to judge of Artillery, and whether the general opinion of it, be true.*

WHEN I consider with my self how many Field Battels were fought by the *Romans* in several times, it falls into my thoughts to examine what many people have believed, that had there been great Guns in those days, as there are now, the *Romans* could never have over-run Provinces, nor made them tributary so easily, nor have done so many great things as they did; for by reason of these fire-arms, Granadoes, and such kind of Engines, people are sooner terrified, and cannot show their valour so freely as heretofore; To which it is added, that Armies come with more difficulty to a Battel, and that their Orders and Ranks are not so easily kept, so that in time the whole business of War will be dispatched by the Cannon. Not thinking it improper to enquire into these opinions; to examine whether Artillery have added or subtracted from the strength of our Armies, and taken away, or given more occasion to our Captains of doing brave things; I shall begin with their first opinion, that the *Romans* would not have made those vast Conquests, had there been Artillery in those days: In answer, I say; that War is twofold, defensive, or offensive; and it is first to be considered, which of these Wars it does most mischief or good; and though it may be said it does great mischief both, yet I am of opinion, it is much more prejudicial to him that is upon the defensive than him that is upon the offensive part. The reason is, because he who defends himself either blocked up in some Town, or straightned in his Camp: If in a Town; it is either small (like your Citadels) or large: In the first case the besieged is lost; for the force of those Guns is such, that no wall is so thick, but in a few days they will beat it down: so that if he has no retreat, nor time to stop up the breaches, or throw up new works within, the Enemy enters pell mell at the breach, and the Cannon of the Town does the Garrison very little good; for this is a Maxim, where people can fall on in a crowd, and run headlong in their fury to a storm, great Guns do never repel them. Wherefore the fierce assaults of the *Tramontani* are not so easily sustained, as the attacks of the *Italians* who fall not on with that fury and impatience as the other, but march up coolly and quietly to the Battel, and do rather skirmish, than storm. Those who enter a breach in this gravity and state, are sure to go to pot, for the Artillery does certain execution upon them: But those who fall on briskly, and crowd one another into the breach (if there be no new works or retrenchments thrown up within) enter as they please without any great prejudice by the Cannon; for though some of them may be killed, yet they cannot be so many as to hinder the taking of the Town. That this is true, we find by many instances in *Italy*, and among the rest in the Siege of *Brescia*, the Town revolted to the *Venetians*, only the Castle stood firm for the *French*: That the Town might receive no prejudice from the Castle, the *Venetians* fortified the great Street that comes down from the Castle with great Guns in the Front, Flanks, and every where, so that they thought themselves secure not only from sallies within; but from relief without: But *Monsieur de Foix* made no reckoning of them; for marching thither with a Body of Horse, he alighted, and charging boldly thorow the said Street, relieved the Castle, without any considerable loss. So that he who is shut up in a small place, his walls battered down, and has nothing left but his Artillery to defend him, is in very great danger, and can hardly escape: If the place you defend be a large Town, where you have room enough to retire, and throw up new works; yet your disadvantage is great, and the Enemies great Guns shall do more mischief upon you, than yours upon him. For first you must be forced to advance your Cannon, and raise them to some higher place; for whilst they are level with the ground, every blind, or small work that the Enemy throws up, is sufficient to secure him; and being forced to plant them higher, either upon the top of some Wall, or Church, or Mount (erected on purpose) you fall under two inconveniences; One is, that you cannot bring such large Guns upon those places, as he can bring without, because in those little places, great Guns are not to be managed; The other is, that if you could get them up, they cannot be so easily

easily secur'd, because they cannot have the convenience of works or baskets to defend them, as the Enemy has whose Guns are planted as he pleases. So that it is almost impossible for him that is besieged, to keep his Cannon long upon a high place, without being dismounted, if the Enemy without has any store of Artillery; and to keep them upon the ground, is to have little or no use of them, as I said before: so that when all is done, the best way to defend a Town is as they did of old, by their small shot, and the courage of the Soldier: And yet though small shot be of some use to the besieged, it cannot counter-vail the damage which they receive from the Enemies great shot, for by them their walls are battered, and beaten down into the Ditches, so that when the Enemy comes to storm (which he may do with more ease when the Ditches are filled up with the ruines of the walls) the besieged are under great disadvantage. Wherefore, as I said before, those Guns are more beneficial to the besieger, than the besieged. And if you do not defend your self either in a great Town or a little, but shall choose rather some strong and convenient place, where you may encamp and entrench, so as not to be forced to an Engagement, but with advantage to your self; I say that in this case you have no better way now, than the Ancients had of old, and that many times your great Guns are more inconvenient, than otherwise; for if the Enemy falls upon your back, with any advantage of ground, as may easily happen; That is, if he gains by accident any eminence that commands your Camp, or surprizes you before your intrenchments are finished, he quickly dislodges you, and compels you to fight. This was the case with the *Spaniards* before the Battel of *Ravenna*, who entrenched upon the River *Roncus*, but made their Trenches too low, whereupon the *French* having the advantage of the ground, with their great Guns played so furiously over them into their Camp, that the *Spaniards* were glad to dislodge, and forced afterwards to give them Battel. And if you shall choose such a place to entrench in, as commands the whole Country, and fortifie it so well, that the Enemy dares not attack you, yet the Enemy will have the same ways of provoking and dislodging you, as were practised of old, that is, by making inroads, and plundering your Country; by infesting your Roads, and intercepting your Convoys, and a thousand other distresses and incommodities which he will put upon you, against which your Artillery will give but little relief. So that considering what has been said, and that the *Roman Wars* were most commonly offensive; they would have had advantage by them, and in probability have augmented their conquests, had there been any Artillery in their times. As to the second allegation, that by reason of those great Guns, men could not show their valour so much as in ancient times; I answer, it is true, and the danger is greater when they come to place their Ladders, and make an assault dully and heavily, and rather one by one, than in a body; their Officers being in the same hazard, and liable to be killed at greater distance, nor can the strongest guards, nor choicest men about them, secure them; yet for all these great dangers, no memorable instance can be produced of any great damage that ever was received. For Towns are not taken usually by storm, or assault; but by way of Leaguer as formerly; and in those that are taken by storm, the danger is not much greater than it was then; for even in those times, whoever undertook the defence of a Town, had his Machines and instruments of War, which though not discharged with such force, did the same execution. And as to the reaching of Commanders at a distance, and killing them in the midst of their Reserves, there have been fewer of them slain (since great Guns came up) in 24 years Wars in *Italy*, than there was in any ten years in the time of the *Romans*; for unless it were *Count Lodovic della Morandola* (who was killed in *Ferrara*, when the *Venetians* invaded that State) and the Duke of *Nemours* who was killed at *Cirignuola*, there has not been one great Officer slain; for *Monsieur de Foix* at *Ravenna* dyed by the Sword. So that if men show themselves not so courageous as formerly; it is from the weakness and ill order of their Armies, rather than the Artillery: And whereas it is said that these great Guns are an impediment to their fighting, and that the decision of Battels will by degrees be left to the Artillery; I reply, That that opinion is clearly a mistake, and has been judged so by all those who are for the old way of Discipline. For he that would have his Soldiers good, must exercise them well, and with frequent Alarms (true or false, 'tis no matter) accustom them to the Enemy, bring them to handy-stroaks, and as it were to take one another by the beards; by which means they will come to a greater dexterity in handling their weapons, and grappling with the Enemy; and for the same reason, the Foot are rather to be relied upon than the Horse; for if your Foot be nimble and good, you may fall with more security upon an Enemy perplexed and embarrassed with a train of Artillery, than you could of old when they had their Elephants, their Chariots with Cythes, and such other devices. And if the *Romans* could find out remedies daily against such daily inventions, no question but they would have found out some or other against great Guns; and so much

the more easily, because the danger of the Guns is sooner over, than the danger of the other: for the execution which is done by the Cannon, is done before the engagement begins; The execution by the Chariots and Elephants, during the whole fight; besides the Cannon is easily avoided by the Infantry, either by posting themselves behind some bank, or clapping down upon their bellies; and yet of this so easy and obvious an evasion, experience tells us there is seldom any necessity; for it is a hard matter to point your great Guns so exactly, but that either they will be mounted too high and shoot over you, or too low, and never come at you: And when the Battel is joyn'd, 'tis as clear as the day, that neither great nor small shot is of any advantage; for if the Artillery be placed before the Army, 'tis odds but it is taken; if behind, the execution it does, is upon themselves; and on either side it can gaul you but little, before you get to it, and either cloy, or secure it; and if an example be required, we have one ready in the *Swizzers*, who at *Navarre* in the year 1513. without Horse or Artillery, or any such thing, fell upon the *French* Camp, and overcame them, though they were as strong as Trenches and Artillery could make them; and another reason is (besides what has been urged before) because Artillery ought to be guarded (if you would have it do service) with walls or ramparts, or some such thing as may secure it from being taken, otherwise it will be of no use, as when in field fights, it has nothing to defend it, but the Bodies of men. In the Flanks they are of no use, more than the old *Roman* Engines in those days who were placed out of their Squadrons, that they might be managed with more dexterity, and (when-ever overlaid by the Horse or any thing else) they were received into their Legions: and if there be any way of making advantage of Artillery in a field fight, it is this; He that uses it otherwise, understands not very well, and puts his confidence in that which may easily deceive him: The *Türk* indeed by the help of his great Guns obtained two or three Victories against the *Sophy*, and the *Soldan*; but if produced more from the novelty of the noise, and the terror it brought upon their Horse, than any great execution they did. I conclude therefore that Artillery may be good, in an Army that is stout; but where they are used in an Army that is raw and inexperienced, they are of little advantage, if the Enemy be either courageous or strong.

C H A P. XVIII.

*How by the authority of the Romans, and the universal Discipline of the Ancients, the Foot are more serviceable than the Horse.*

BY many Arguments and Examples, it may be proved that the *Romans* in their Military exploits had greater estimation for their Infantry, than their Horse; and how all their principal designs were executed by their Foot: This appeared in their Wars with the *Latins*, when the *Roman* Army being over-powered, and giving ground in that great Battel near the Lake of *Regillum*, the *Roman* General caused his Cavalry to dismount, and fight on foot, and by so doing, they recovered their ground, and got the Victory; by which it is manifest the *Romans* thought them more serviceable on foot than on horse-back, and in that posture placed more confidence in them. The same thing they practised in many other fights, and always with good success: nor can the raillery of *Hanibal* be objected against this, who when news was brought him at the Battel of *Canas*, that the Consuls had caused all their Horse to dismount, resolving to fight it out on foot, cryed out in derision, *Quam malleo victos mihi traderent Equites. They might as well have bound them, and delivered them to me.* Which expression though coming out of the mouth of an excellent person, yet his single authority is not to be put in the ballance against the judgment of the whole *Roman* Commonwealth, and the experience of so many brave Captains as had been educated under it; and if it were, there are reasons to defend it; The Foot can get into several places, where the Horse cannot get: The Foot keep their ranks better than the Horse, and in any disorder, are sooner rallied, and in a posture again, whereas the Horse are more unmanageable, and when once out of order, with great difficulty to be rallied. Besides (as it is among men) so it is among Horses, some are high spirited and courageous, others are untoward and dull; and it frequently happens, that a mettled Horse, has a cowardly Rider, or a mettled Rider a dull Horse; be it which it will, the disparity is inconvenient. A body of Foot well order'd and drawn up, will easily be too hard, for the same number of Horse; but the same number of Horse, will have hard service to break a Body of Foot, if there be any thing of proportion betwixt them; and this

opinion is confirmed not only by ancient and modern examples, but by the relations and constitutions of Legislators, and whoever else have left any rules and directions for the Government of an Army; for though they tell us, indeed, That at first, Horse were in greatest reputation, because the way of ordering of Foot was not known; but as soon as the way of managing them was found out, and their usefulness was discovered, they were preferred to the Horse. Not but that Horse are very necessary in an Army to scout abroad, make incursions into the Enemies Country, pursue the Enemy when he runs, and confront their Horse when they come to a Battel, yet the hopes and strength of an Army lies more especially in the Foot, and if any one error in the Conduct of our *Italian* Princes has contributed to the enslaving of their Country, it is their neglecting to improve themselves in the management of Foot, and addressing themselves wholly to the Horse. And this fault proceeded from the malignity of the Officers, or the ignorance of those who govern'd the State: For this last 25 years, the Commands of the *Italian* Militia being in the hands of Reformades and Soldiers of fortune, who had no settled Estates, they made it their design to preserve their Commands by all possible means, though with never so much prejudice to their Masters: And because a great Body of Foot, was not like to be long paid (nor would there always be occasion to use them) and a little one would not turn to account; they applyed themselves wholly to the Discipline of Horse; for 200 or 300 Horse was a fair Command, and maintained the Officers in a good reputation; nor was the charge so great, but their Governors could pay them. For the better insurance therefore of their places, they began to undervalue and decry the Foot service, in such manner, that by degrees, they were almost wholly laid aside; so that in the greatest of their Armies, there were very few Foot; the unhappiness of which practice, with other irregularities in our days, has made the *Italian* Militia so weak, it has not been able to defend it self against the insults, and depredations of foreigners. So then the Foot is with more confidence to be rely'd upon, than the Horse; and that this was the judgment of the *Romans*, appears by another example. The *Romans* were encamped before *Sora*, and a party of Horse falling out of the Town to beat them from some post, was met by a *Roman* Captain at the Head of his Troop, who charging his adversary, it was their fortune both of them to be slain. However, their Troops continued the fight, though their Officers were dead, and the *Romans* to facilitate their Victory, dismounted in the middle of the fight, and forced the Enemy to do the same, if they had a mind to defend themselves; so that the nature of the fight was changed; the Foot service was preferred, and the *Sammites* were routed. Nothing can be more plain, that the Foot were preferred, than this case; for though upon other occasions the Consuls many times dismounted their Troops, yet it was to reinforce and bring off the Foot, that were overlaid by the Enemy; but here they dismounted not to relieve their own Foot, or to engage with the Enemies, but fighting Horse against Horse, and finding their Victory doubtful, they thought, though they could not master them on Horse-back, they might do it on foot, and accordingly they alighted: I conclude therefore, that a Body of well ordered Foot is very hardly to be broken, but by another Body of the same. *Crassus* and *Marcus Antonius*, with a small Body of Horse, but a good Army of Foot, over-run and harrassed the whole Country of the *Partians* for several days together, though the *Partians* had a vast Army of Horse to defend it. *Crassus* 'tis true miscarried in the Expedition, but it was more by the falshood, than gallantry of the Enemy; for relying too much upon their promises, he was reduced to such distress for Provisions, that he and his whole Squadron were lost; nevertheless in the midst of these exigences, being in an open and Champian Country, where there were no Mountains, no Woods, no Rivers to shelter or ease them, far from all relief, and nothing left to sustain them, the Foot brought themselves off under the command of *M. Antiochus*, and behaved themselves so well in the opinion of the *Partians* themselves, that their vast Army of Horse durst not venture upon them: But to what purpose do we trouble our Reader with examples so remote, we have testimony nearer home that will do it effectually. We have known in our time 9000 *Swizzers* at *Novara* attack 10000 Horse, and as many Foot (being most *Gascoignes*) they never regarded: After this 26000 *Swizzers* set upon the King of *France* in *Milan*, who had with him 20000 Horse, 40000 Foot, and a hundred pieces of Artillery, and though they did not vanquish him, as at the Battel of *Novara*, yet they fought him bravely for two days together, and though worsted at last, yet the greatest part of them got off. *Marcus Regulus Attilius*, placed such confidence in his Foot, that he not only opposed them to the Enemies Horse, but to their Elephants; and though his success did not answer his expectation, yet it hindered not, but that as great matters might have been expected from his Foot. So then whoever would defeat a Body of Foot well ordered, must do it with another Body better ordered than they, or it is never to be done.

In



## Book II. *The Discourses of* Nicholas Machiavel. 357

In the time of *Philip Visconti* Duke of *Milan*, 16000 *Swizzers* having made a descent into *Lombardy*, *Carmignuola* the said Dukes General marched against them with about 1000 Horse and some Foot; for not being acquainted with their way of fighting, he thought they would have been sufficient, but having fallen upon them with his Horse, and been repulsed with loss, being a wise man, and one that knew how to frame himself to every accident, he recruited very well, marched against them again, and coming to an engagement, caused all his Cuirassiers to dismount, and at the Head of his Foot, fall on upon the *Swizzers*, who were not able to resist them. For the Cuirassiers being compleatly arm'd, forced their way into the Body of the *Swizzers* without any loss, so as their whole Army was defeated, and cut off, and none left alive, but what were preserved by the humanity of *Carmignuola*. I do not doubt but many people are well enough satisfied in their judgments, that Foot are more serviceable than Horse, yet such is the infelicity of our times, that neither ancient nor modern examples, nor the confession of those who have tryed them are sufficient to prevail with our Princes to correct this Error; or to believe that to give reputation to the Arms of a Province, it is necessary to revive this Order, countenance their Foot, and see them well pay'd; and then doubtless they will repay him by their noble Exploits. But they deviate from this way, as they do from the rest, and therefore no wonder if their Conquests be more to the detriment, than augmentation of their State.

### CHAP. XIX.

*The Conquests of Commonwealths that are ill governed, and contrary to the Model of the Romans, do conduce more to the ruine, than advancement of their affairs.*

THESE false opinions of the use and excellence of Horse and Foot, are so rooted in the minds of men, and so confirmed with all Examples, that no body thinks of reforming our late errors, or restoring the old Discipline of the *Romans*. Thirty years since who could have persuaded an *Italian* that 10000 Foot could have assaulted 10000 Horse, and as many Foot, and have beaten them? Yet this was done by the *Swizzers* at *Novara*. For though all Histories ring of it, yet none of our people will believe that it is possible to do now, what was anciently done. They object the excellence of our Horse, and say they are so well arm'd, that they are able to repulse not only a Body of Foot, but even a Mountain or Rock; and by these kind of fallacious Arguments, they deceive themselves, not considering that *Lucullus* with a few Foot defeated 150000 of *Tigranes* Horse, and yet they had a sort of Cuirassiers among them like ours. This Exploit of *Lucullus* we have seen acted over again by the *Germans* in *Italy*, as if on purpose to convince us of our error. Which if Princes and Common-Wealths could be persuaded to believe, they would commit fewer faults, be more strong against the insults of the Enemy, and not place all their hopes in their Heels, as they do at this day; and those who had the Government of any Civil State, would know better how to conduct and manage themselves, either as to the enlargement, or conservation of their Dominion, and find, that Leagues and Confederacies, rather than absolute Conquests; sending Colonies into what they had conquered; making publick feuds of the spoils of the Enemy; to infest and perplex the Enemy rather with Excursions, and Battels, than Sieges; to keep the publick rich, and the private poor, and with all possible caution to keep up the Discipline of the Army, are the ways to make a Common-Wealth formidable and great. These are the true ways of enlarging, an Empire; all the rest are uncertain, or pernicious; and if thereby any to whom these ways are not pleasing, they are by any means to lay aside all thoughts of extending their Dominion; to think only of regulating their Laws at home and providing for their defence, like the little States in *Germany*, which by so doing have lived in peace and tranquillity for many years together. But how industrious and careful soever we are, in abstaining from injury, or using violence to our Neighbour, some body or other will be injuring us, and it will be impossible to live always in quiet; from which provocation will arise, not only a desire in us, but a necessity of vindicating out selves, and retaliating upon them; and when this desire is once kindled, if our Neighbors do not supply us, with occasion, we can find it at home, as will inevitably fall out where Citizens are opulent and strong. And if the Cities of *Germany* have continued free, and at peace a long time, it proceeds from a peculiar disposition in that Country, which is scarce to be found any

where else. That part of *Germany* of which I now speak (like *France* and *Spain*) was subject to the Empire of the *Romans*: But when afterwards that Empire began to decline, and the title of the Empire was removed into that Province, Those that were the wealthiest and most powerful of the Cities (taking advantage of the pusillanimity or distresses of their Emperors) made themselves free, paying only a small annual Rent for the redemption of their Liberties; which being permitted, by degrees all those Cities which held immediately of the Emperour, and had no dependance upon any body else, redeemed themselves in that manner. Whilst these Cities were employed in this Traffick with the Emperour, it fell out that several Corporations that belonged to the Duke of *Austria*, rebelled, and having established their Liberty, they encreased so fast in reputation and wealth, that instead of returning to their subjection to the Duke, they became terrible to all people about them. From hence it is, that in our days this Province is said to consist of the *Swizzers*, the free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperour. And if in the diversity of their constitutions, no Wars do arise, or at least continue any time, it is from their universal respect and defence to the Emperour, who, though his force be not great, has such reputation among them, that upon any controversie betwixt them, he can easily compose it, and this it is that has kept them quiet so long, that in man's memory they have had little or no troubles, but what hapned betwixt the *Swizzers* and the House of *Austria*; and though for many years past, the title of Emperour, has been in the said House; yet has it not been able to reduce the pertinacy of the *Swizzers*, though it has attempted it very solemnly. Nor did the rest of the Princes and free Towns in *Germany* contribute their assistance against the *Swizzers*, partly because they were favourers of Liberty, and partly because being poor themselves, they had no mind the House of *Austria* should be rich. *Germany* being constituted in this ballance, and equilibrium, it rather reverences than fears the Authority of the Emperour, and is quiet and at peace, because the particular Princes, and States being contented with their own moderate Dominions, and in awe one of another, do forbear those injuries and encroachments which are common in other places; whereas if its constitution was otherwise, the people would certainly think of enlarging as well as their Neighbors, and by consequence interrupt that happy tranquillity which at present they enjoy. In other Countries where there is not that exact proportion and equality of power betwixt the Princes and free Towns, 'tis not so easie to preserve them in peace; so that those Commonwealths which have an ambition of extending their Empire, must do it by confederation, or by the ways of the *Romans*, and whoever takes any other course, rather ruins, than advantages himself; for new Conquests are prejudicial a thousand ways, and, especially when your force does not encrease with your Territory, and you are not able to keep what you conquer; and this happens when the expence of an Enterprize is greater than the profit, though it succeeds. This was the case with our *Florentines*, and the *Venetians*, who after they had conquered *Lombardy* and *Tuscany*, were much weaker than before, when one of them was contented with the Dominion of the Gulf, and the other with a territory of six miles about. We all think of getting what we can, but take no care which way we shall keep it; which is the more inexcusable, because we have the *Roman* example before our eyes, which we may follow if we please, whereas they had no such advantage, but wrought all out by their own industry, and wisdom. But there is another way by which new Conquests do a great deal of mischief, and especially to a well ordered Commonwealth; and that is when the City or Province that is conquered, is voluptuous, or effeminate; as hapned first to the *Romans*, and then to *Hannibal* in the Conquest of *Capua*, where the contagion of their ill manners spread it self so suddenly among the Soldiers, that had *Capua* been farther off, the remedies not so near, or the *Romans* in the least measure corrupted themselves, that Conquest would have been the ruine of their State: For it was true what *Livy* told us in these words, *Jam tunc minime salubris militari disciplina Capua; instrumentum omnium voluptatum, delinito militum animos avertit a memoria patriæ.* *Capua at that time was no place for Military Discipline; for being the instrument and contriver of all sorts of sensuality, it debauched the minds of the Soldier from the memory of his Country.* And certainly such Cities and Provinces do revenge themselves of their Conqueror without effusion of Blood; for diffusing their ill manners among his people, they become so weak and enervated thereby, that they are at the mercy of whoever assails them: which *Juvenal* has excellently well expressed, when he tells us that by their conversation among strangers, the *Roman* manners were so changed, that instead of their old temperance and parsimony, they were given up wholly to luxury and excess.

—*Sævis armis*—  
*Luxuria incubuit, victumq; ulciscitur Orbem.*

What by the Conquer'd world could never be  
Reveng'd by force, is done by luxurie.

Things being thus, and even the people of *Rome*, notwithstanding the excellence of their constitution and discipline, being subject to suffer, and be corrupted by their new acquisitions; what will become of those who have no such virtue nor education to defend them? but besides all the errors above-mentioned, are guilty of another as dangerous as the rest, and that is, by making use in their Wars, not of their own Subjects or Soldiers, but of Auxiliaries, and Hirelings.

C H A P. XX.

*No Prince, or Commonwealth without manifest danger, can employ foreign Forces, either Auxiliary, or Mercenary.*

**H**AD I not discoursed at large in another place about the inconvenience of Auxiliary or Mercenary Forces, in respect of ones own, I would have taken the opportunity to have spoken more of it here, than I shall do now: but having done it already, I shall only touch upon it at present, which I cannot forbear, upon a new occasion which I have met withal in *Livy*. I call those Forces Auxiliaries, which a Prince or Confederate sends to your assistance under his own Officers, and pay. Of this sort were the two Legions, which after the defeat of the *Sammites*, upon the importunity of the *Capuans* were left with them for the security of their City. But those Legions which were intended for the defence of that City, languishing in ease, and wallowing in luxury, began to forget the Discipline of their Country, and their Reverence to the Senate, and contrive how they might make themselves Masters of the Town, conceiving the Inhabitants unworthy to enjoy those possessions which they were unable to defend. But this Conspiracy was discovered in time, and not only prevented, but punished by the *Romans*, as we shall shew more largely hereafter: At present I shall only say this, that of all Soldiers, none are employed with so much hazard, as your Auxiliaries. For first, neither Soldiers nor Officers receiving pay from you, but from the Prince or State by whom they are sent, they have but little regard either to your interest or authority; but when the War is done, give themselves wholly to pillaging and mischief, and that not only with the Enemy, but their Friends; moved sometimes by their own, and sometimes by the avarice of their Prince. The *Romans* when they left those Legions at *Capua*, had no thoughts of breaking their league, or offering them any injury; but the Souldiers being depraved by the licentiousness of the place, and encouraged by the pusillanimity of the Inhabitants, took occasion to conspire, and doubtlesly had they not been prevented, had seized upon the Town. This we could enforce with several other examples, but the case is so plain, I shall content my self with this, and that of the *Regini*, whose Inhabitants were not only rob'd and dispossessed, but murder'd by a Legion which the *Romans* sent to them for their security. So then in prudence a Prince or Commonwealth is to take any course, rather than to bring himself into a necessity of employing Auxiliaries, especially when he is to rely wholly upon them; for no treaty or accommodation can be made with the Enemy, but shall be more for his advantage, than to entertain such Forces. And if old passages be consulted, and considered together with the new, it will be found that for one time in which they ever did good, there are hundreds in which they have done harm: Nor can an ambitious State or Prince have a more commodious occasion to possess himself of a City or Province, than when he is invited in this manner for its assistance and defence. Wherefore, he whose indiscretion is so great as to make use of such Armies, not only for his defence, but his conquests of other people, takes a course that must necessarily undo him; for he aims at the acquisition of what he cannot keep any longer than his Auxiliaries will give him leave; for they can take it from him when they please: But such is the unhappiness of human ambition, that fixing their eyes only upon present satisfaction, they never think of inconveniences that will follow, whereas if they would reflect upon ancient examples, they would find that the less injurious they

were to their Neighbours, and the more generofity they fhew towards them, the more ready would they be to throw themfelves into their Arms, as fhall be fhewn in the next Chapter, by the example of the *Capuans*.

## C H A P. XXI.

*The firft Prætor which the Romans ever ſent out of their own City, was to Capua, and that was 400 years after they began firſt to make War,*

**T**He People of *Rome* (as we have ſaid many times before) in the management of their Wars, and the enlargement of their Empire differed much from the methods of our times: For the Cities which they conquered (if they did not think fit to demolish them) were left free, with the exerciſe of their own Laws, as before, and that without any other mark of ſubjection, than the ſubſcribing certain Articles of Agreement, and whiſt they kept them, they kept their old Priviledges and Dignity. And this Cuſtom they obſerved till they carried their Arms into Foreign Countries, and began to unravel the Governments where they conquered, and reduce whole Kingdoms and States into Provinces: This will be clear'd, if we conſider that the firſt *Prætor* which was ever ſent abroad by the *Romans*, was to *Capua*; not out of any ambitious deſign, but at the requeſt of the ſaid *Capuans* to rectifie and compoſe ſome differences, which they could not do among themſelves. The *Antiates* following the example of the *Capuans*, and moved by the ſame neceſſity, deſired a *Prætor* likewise, becauſe at that time, as *Livy* tells us, *Non ſolum arma, ſed jura Romana pollebant. Not only the Arms, but the Laws of the Romans were victorious.* And this way of lenity in their Government, contributed exceedingly to the enlargement of their Empire; for thoſe Cities or States which have been accuſtomed to their own Liberty and Laws, do more eaſily ſubmit to a Dominion that ſeems remote and at a diſtance (though indeed it may have ſomething of ſervitude in it) than to that which is always before their Eyes, and keeps them in perpetual apprehenſion of ſlavery; and there is this advantage beſides, That if in the adminiſtration of Juſtice, or the management of publick affairs, any thing be acted to the diſpleaſure of the people, it has leſs infamous reflection upon the Prince who leaves them to their own Cuſtoms and Laws, than upon him who ſets up Magiſtrates of his own, and diſpatches all things by them; and this way takes off a great deal of hatred and calumny from the Prince, which would otherwiſe fall heavily upon him. Of the certainty of this opinion, we have a freſh inſtance in *Italy*; every body knows that *Genova* was oftentimes in the poſſeſſion of the *French*, and that that King (excepting of late years) uſed always to ſend thither a Governor of his own; at preſent, (the neceſſity of his affairs requiring it) he has given them the election of their own Governor, and it is conſtantly a *Genouefe*. No body queſtions but this way is moſt pleaſing to the City, and by conſequence their affections muſt be much enlarged to the King. For it is the Nature of Mankind (and inſeparable from it) to truſt thoſe with more frankneſs, who are leaſt like to oppreſs them; and to fear thoſe leaſt, who are moſt merciful and humane. This gentleneſs and familiarity in the *Romans* prevailed ſo far upon the *Capuans*, that they made it their ſolemn requeſt, that they would ſend them a *Prætor*, which if the *Roman* auſterity had but pretended to have done, they would not only have reſuſed, but uſed all means to have freed themſelves from them. But what need we go to *Rome* and *Capua* for examples, when we have them at home? Every one knows how long it is ſince *Piſtoia* threw it ſelf voluntarily into the Arms of the *Florentines*: Every one knows the jealousies and emulations that were betwixt them and the *Florentines*, *Piſans*, *Luccbeſi*, and *Saneſi*: and this diverſity of humours proceeded not from any neglect in the *Piſtoians* of their affairs, or from any diſteem they had of their liberty, more than the others; but from an ancient experience they had had of the affection and tenderneſs of the *Florentines*, and that was the true cauſe why they threw themſelves under their protection; whereas carrying themſelves more ſeverely to the reſt, they were ſo far from coming in, and ſubmitting to their juriſdiction, that they did what they could, and tryed all ways poſſible to diſclaim it. And doubtleſs had the *Florentines*, by their Leagues, or ſupplies compoſed themſelves with more kindneſs to their Neighbors, and not incenſed them by their auſterities, they had been Maſters of all *Tuſcany* at this hour; Not but that Arms and Severity are to be uſed upon occaſion, but mild ways are to be tryed firſt, and extremities only in extremity.

## CHAP. XXII.

*How uncertain the judgments of most People are; in things of greatest importance.*

HOW false and erroneous the opinions of men are, all persons can testify who have any conversation in their Counsels; which unless managed by persons of more than ordinary sagacity, are for the most part contrary to the truth. And because men of these excellent qualifications, in corrupted States (especially in times of peace) by reason of the envy or ambition of other people, are subject to be hated; such Counsels are frequently followed, as the deluded Commons think best, or such as are recommended by those who are more solicitous of the favour, than the benefit of the people: But their errors being discovered in the time of their adversity, necessity directs them to those persons whom in the time of prosperity they despised, as shall be shown at large in convenient place. Moreover humane consultations are subject to certain accidents by which men are frequently deluded; unless their experience be more than ordinary, which accidents are apt by their likelihood and probability to persuade people to whatever they desire. This I mention, in consideration of the advice of *Numisus* the *Prator* (after the *Latins* were defeated by the *Romans*) and of what was not long since generally believed when *Francis I.* of *France* invaded *Milan*, which was defended by the *Swizzers*. For *Lewis XII.* being dead, and *Francis d'Angolessme* succeeding in that kingdom, he had a great design of recovering *Milan*, which not many years before had been taken from them by the *Swizzers*, at the encouragement of *Julius II.* To facilitate his Enterprize, he made it his business to gain a party in *Italy*, and having made sure of the *Venetians*, he addressed himself to the *Florentines*, and *Pope Leo X.* conceiving it would be a great corroboration to his affairs if he could make them, seeing the Forces of the King of *Spain* were in *Lombardy*, and the Emperours at *Verona*. *Pope Leo* could not be brought to consent, being persuaded (as is said) by his Council, that if he kept himself Neuter, he should be certain of Victory; for it was not for the interest of the Church, that either the King of *France*, or the *Swizzers* should be too potent in *Italy*; but he who would restore it to its ancient Liberty, must deliver it from the servitude both of the one and the other. And because both of them together were not to be dealt withal, nor indeed either of them apart, as things stood then; occasion was to be expected, and they were to attend till the King of *France* and *Swizzers* had fought, and one of them beaten the other; and then before the Conquerour had recruited, or recovered what he had lost in the Battel, the *Pope* and his Friends should fall upon him, and so both of them be expelled. It was impossible he should ever have a fairer opportunity; for the Enemy were both of them in the Field, and the *Popes* Army strong upon the borders of *Lombardy* (under pretence of securing the Territories of the Church) where it might attend the event of the Battel, which the vigor, and strength of both Armies portended would be bloody, and when they had destroyed one another, and were both of them weaken'd, then might his Army fall securely upon them, possess it self of *Lombardy*, and govern all *Italy* as he pleased himself. These were the Counsels which were given his Holiness, and at first they seemed solid enough, but how vain they prov'd afterwards, the event did clearly demonstrate; for the *Swizzers* after a long and bloody Fight being defeated the *Pope* and the King of *Spain*'s Forces were so far from taking that opportunity of falling upon the *French* (as they had promised themselves) That they prepared to run away, nor would that have secured them, had not they been befriended by the humanity (not to say laziness) of the King of *France*, who contenting himself with one Victory, never regarded a second, but strook up a Peace with the *Pope*: And truly at a distance these Counsels seem'd not unreasonable, though in reality they were irrational and idle; for the Conquerour seldom loses many men, what he loses is in the Fight, and the greatest part of the execution is in the pursuit; but grant a Battel is a long time before it be decided (which notwithstanding happens but seldom) and that many are slain and disabled of the conquering side, yet the reputation of Victory gives the Conquerour such esteem, and strikes such awe and terror into all people, as transcends the consideration of any loss he can sustain: so that he is in an egregious error, who thinks a victorious Army may be the more easily overcome by reason of the prejudice it received in the Fight; for 'tis madness to attempt such an Army with a less number, than you would have engaged it before; because their late fortune will add to their courage. This appeared by the

the experience of the *Latins*; by the Counsel of *Numisius* the *Prator*; and by the losses of the people who followed it. For the *Romans* having beaten the *Latins* with much ado, and such slaughter of their own men, that they seemed to have got nothing of a Victory but the Name; *Numisius* proclaimed it up and down, that then was the time to recover their liberty, and that if with new Forces they fell suddenly upon the *Romans*, before they were recruited, or had any expectation of being invaded, they would certainly be overthrown; Upon which the *Latins* believing him, raised a new Army, and fell upon the *Romans*, but they were presently defeated, and suffered the inconvenience, to which all people are subject that follow such Counsels.

## CHAP. XXIII.

*How the Romans upon any accident which necessitated them to give judgment upon their Subjects, avoided always the mid way.*

*I*Am *Latius* is status erat rerum, ut neq; bellum neq; pacem pati possent. The *Latins* were now in such a condition, that they were neither fit for War nor Peace. And what *Livy* said of *Latium*, is true every where else; That Prince or Commonwealth is at the highest pitch of unhappiness, which is in such a condition, as that he can neither receive Peace, nor maintain War. And this happens, when people are conquered, and necessitated to submit upon such hard terms as in their hearts they disdain, or else (to go on with the War) are constrained to implore their assistance, who will make them a prey. The ways by which we are brought into so sad a condition, are commonly ill Counsels, for want of just consideration of our affairs, both as to Money and Men. For that Commonwealth or Prince who takes right measures in those, shall very hardly fall into the distresses of the *Latins*, who accepted the condition of the *Romans* when they should have refused them; and declared War against the *Romans* when they should have desired a Peace; so that as they ordered the matter, the enmity and amity of the *Romans* did equally afflict them. The first that overcame them was *Manlius Torquatus*, and after him *Camillus*, who seized upon all their Cities, and putting Garisons in them, return'd to *Rome*, and in his account to the Senate acquainted them, that the whole Country of the *Latins* was then in their hands. And because the Sentence and Judgment of the Senate at that time upon the *Latins* is more than ordinarily remarkable; That it may be readier for the imitation of Princes when occasion is offered, I shall set down the words which *Livy* makes *Camillus* speak, which confirm what we have said about the ways which the *Romans* observed in the enlargement of their Empire; and shows, that in their determinations in matters of State, they left the middle ways, and followed only the extremes. For Government is nothing but keeping Subjects in such a posture as that they may have no will, or power to offend you. And this is done either by taking away all means from them of doing you any hurt; or by obliging and indulging them so, as they may not in reason hope to better their fortune; all which will appear, first by *Camillus* his Speech to the Senate, and then by their resolution upon it. His words were these, *Dii immortales ita vos potentes hujus Consilii fecerunt, ut sit Latium, an non sit, in vestra manu posuerint. Itaq; pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet, parere in perpetuum, vel serviendo, vel ignoscendo potestis. Vultis crudeliter confidere in debitos victosq; licet delere omne Latium. Vultis exemplo Majorum augere rem Romanam, victos in civitatem accipiendo? Materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppetit. Certè id firmissimum imperium est; quo obedientes gaudent. Illorum igitur animos dum Expectatione stupent, seu pœnâ, seu beneficio preoccupari oportet.* The Gods have put it into the power of this Reverend Council, to determine whether the *Latins* shall be a people, or not. As to them, your peace will be perpetual, which way soever you take; Are you disposed to severity, and will destroy those poor people that are conquered, and your Prisoners? They are at your mercy, and you may extinguish their very name. Are you disposed according to the example of your Ancestors, to propagate your interest by receiving them into your City? You have an opportunity of doing it with the biggest advantage and glory. Certainly no Empire is so firm, as where Subjects exult in their obedience. It will be expedient therefore, whilst they are in amazement and suspense, to settle their minds one way, either by punishment or pardon. According to the Consuls proposal, the Senate came to an issue, and gave sentence Town by Town, according to the Nature of their deserts; but all in extremes, without any mediocrity; for some they not only pardoned, but loaded them with benefits, made them free of their own City, and gave them many other priviledges, and exemptions, and thereby secured

secured them not only from Rebelling, but from ever conspiring again. The rest whom they thought fit to make examples, were brought Prisoners to *Rome*, punish'd with all kind of severity, Their Houses destroyed, their Lands confiscated, their Persons dispersed, so as it was not possible for them any way to do any mischief for the future. This was the way the *Romans* took in the settlement of *Latium*, which ought to be observed and imitated by all wise Princes and States; and if the *Florentines* had followed it in the year 1502. when *Arezzo* and the whole Valley of *Chiana* rebelled, they had continued their Authority, augmented their State, and supplied themselves with those Fields which they wanted for their subsistence. But they took the middle way (betwixt the extreams of rigour and remission) which is always most dangerous; they kept the City, removed the Magistrates, degraded the great Men, banished some, and executed others. If any in their Councils advised to have the City demolished, it was answered, It could not be done without dishonor and rexection upon their own; as if *Florence* was so weak and inconsiderable, it was not able to keep a Garrison in *Arezzo*. This Argument was of that sort which carry some appearance, but are not really true. 'Tis much as if we should argue a Parricide or Felon, or other egregious Malefactor, is not to be put to death, lest it should be thought the Prince or Republick was too impotent to restrain them any other way. But those who are of that opinion are to consider, that when a private person, or whole City, offends so highly against his Prince, or his Government; To make them examples to other people, and bridle them so as they may be sure to be no more guilty for the future, the surest way is utterly to destroy them; and it is more honourable for a Prince to extirpate them quite at once, than to endeavour to preserve them with a thousand difficulties and dangers. For whoever he be that knows not how to punish his delinquents according to the merits of their offences, and so as to secure himself for the future, is either a weak, or a poor-spirited Prince. To confirm what is said, we may produce another example of the *Romans*, in their Sentence upon the *Privermates*; from whence (as *Livy* says) two things are to be concluded; one is, that Rebels are to be pardoned frankly, and obliged; or utterly extinguished. The other that generosity of mind, and steddiness and constancy in our answers when given to wise men, make strangely for our advantage. The *Roman* Senate was assembled to give Sentence upon the *Privermates* who had been in Rebellion, and being reduced by force of Arms, had sent several of their chief Citizens to implore the mercy of the *Romans*; being brought into the Senate (where every body was persuading according to his inclination, some for mercy, and some for severity) one of the Senators (before they could come to a resolution) ask'd one of the Petitioners, *Quam penam meritis Privermates censeret. What punishment he thought his fellow Citizens deserved: To which he replied, Eam quam merentur: qui se libertate dignos censent. The same that they deserve, who desire to be free.* The Senator continuing, *Quid si penam remittimus vobis, qualem nos pacem vobiscum speremus? If we should pardon you this time, what peace could we hope for from you?* To which he answered, *Si bonam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam: si malam, haud diuturnam. If it be upon good terms, it will be firm and perpetual; if upon ill, it will hardly last long.* Upon which the better part of the Senate (though some opposed it) declared, *Se audivisse vocem liberi & viri; nec credi posse illum populum aut hominem deniq; in ea conditione cuius eum pariterat, diutius quam necesse sit mansurum. Ibi pacem esse fidam, ubi voluntarii pacati sint, neq; eo loco ubi servitutem esse velint, fidem sperandam. That he had spoke like a man, and like a Free-man. That it was not to be imagined any people or private person would submit to a condition that oppress'd him, longer than by necessity he was constrained. That if any peace be lasting and inviolable, it is where the parties do voluntarily subscribe, not where servitude and slavery is imposed.* And thereupon it was decreed, that the *Privermates* should be Civitate donati, and enjoy all the Priviledges of the *Romans*, concluding, *Eos qui nihil praterquam de libertate cogitant dignos esse qui Romani fiant. That they deserved to be Romans, whose liberty was the greatest part of their care.* And this frank and generous way of answering, took mightily with those grave men, as knowing that whatever they had said otherwise, would not have been from the heart, but with compliance and submission to their fortune and distress. And this is most certain, whoever speaks otherwise (especially if either he has been, or but thought himself free) does but equivocate, and he that believes him, takes wrong Counsels, such as are neither good for himself, nor satisfactory to them, which many times produces Rebellion, and the ruine of the State; And things being so, we conclude, according to our proposition in the beginning of our discourse; That upon any great Sentence to be given against a people or City that has been formerly free, the surest way is, to wave all moderation, and either to carese or extinguish them. He that proceeds otherwise, will find himself in an error, as the *Sammites* were, when having enclosed the *Romans ad Turcas Caudinas*, they neither discharged them freely, nor



put them to the Sword, as one of their grave Citizens advised; but abused them, and pillaged them, and dismissed them *sub jugum* when they had done. But not long after, they were made sensible of their error, and that the old Citizen was in the right; as we shall show more at large hereafter.

## C H A P. XXIV.

*That in the generality, Castles and Citadels, do more mischief than good.*

TO the States-men of our times, it may perhaps seem indiscretion or inadvertancy in the Romans, that being desirous to keep *Latium*, and *Præverniam* in subjection, they built neither Castles nor Citadels to secure them; and indeed they differed exceedingly from our *Florentine* Politicians, who are of opinion that not only *Pisa*, but all other Cities whatever are to be kept under that way, and surely had the Romans been like us, they would have been of the same opinion; but differing in their courage, their judgment, and their power, they differed likewise in their resolutions. Nor during all the time of their liberty, were the Romans known to build any Castle or Citadel to keep any City in awe, or any Province in peace; only some indeed which were fortified before, they garrisoned, and continued; which being so, and quite contrary to the Sentiment of our times, I think it not amiss, if in this place I inquire whether such things be profitable or unprofitable to the persons who build them. It is therefore to be considered, that such Fortresses are erected, either to repel an Enemy, or restrain a Subject, and keep him in obedience. In the first case I do pronounce them unnecessary; in the second dangerous. They are dangerous, and do rather obstruct than promote obedience in the Subject; because the great danger of Rebellion proceeds from hatred which the people have conceived against their Prince, that hatred proceeds from his injustice to the people; and he is said to be unjust when he governs them arbitrarily, and by force, which is never so manifest, as when he builds such Castles and Citadels among them, that no man might be able in any manner to oppose him. Which being so, those kind of Fortifications are not only useless and improper to keep the Subject in subjection; but dangerous, seeing by presumption upon them, Princes are encouraged to treat their Subjects worse than otherwise they would do, by which they contract the odium of the people; and what is the consequence? Rebellion and Blood, and Confusion: Neither when troubles arise, and Wars break out, is there that defence or security in them, as is now adays imagined; for there are only two ways of keeping a conquered people in obedience, you must either have a standing Army (as the Romans had) always ready to subdue them; or you must divide, disperse, or destroy them in such manner, that they may never get together again to disturb you: For though you impoverish and plunder them never so much, *Spoliatis arma supersunt, They will find Arms to revenge themselves*; and if you disarm them never so carefully, *Furor arma, ministrat. Their fury will supply them*. If you cut off their Commanders, like *Hydra's*, others will succeed, and do as much mischief: If you build these Castles, in time of Peace they may be serviceable, and make you more bold, and secure against your Subjects; but when War comes, and both your Subjects and Enemies infest you, it is impossible they should defend you against both. And if ever they were usefless, it is now since the use of Artillery is known, against the fury of which no little Fort (from whence other Guns cannot play with security again, and where they want ground for repairing their breaches, or making new retrenchments upon occasion) can possibly stand: and being so, consider seriously with your self whether these kind of Fortresses are like to keep your old Subjects, or your new Conquests in obedience? If your Territory be hereditary, and you have received it from your Ancestors, to build Castles to keep your own natural Subjects in obedience, will be to little purpose, for the reasons abovesaid, seeing they will be but a means to make you and your posterity the more Tyrannical, and by consequence expose you to the hatred of the people, against which they will be afterwards unable to defend you. So that for these reasons, that neither he himself nor his heirs may have occasion to entrench too much upon the people; and the people have no occasion to abhor him, a wise Prince will never build Citadels; and though *Francesco Sforza* Duke of Milan was reputed a wise Man, and built a Citadel at Milan to secure his Usurpations, yet his wisdom did not appear in that, for it proved afterwards the ruine of his posterity. For presuming upon that, they took the more confidence to oppress the people, which incensed them so highly, that they revolted upon the first approach of an Enemy, and turned their Prince out of that Province.

So

So that that Citadel did him no good in time of War against the incursions of the Enemy, and in time of Peace, making him more insolent, it did but expose him to the hatred of the people; whereas if no Citadel had been built, and yet they had been so indiscreet as to have behaved themselves insolently to their Subjects, some or other of them who had been injured would have remonstrated to their Prince, the danger of his courses, before he had contracted the general odium; by which there would have been a possibility that he might have reform'd, and reconciled himself to his Subjects; and had he done so, he would have better defended himself against the *French* with the affections of his people, and no Citadel; than with a Citadel, and no affections of the people. Besides there are many ways of losing these Citadels; by force, by fraud, by corrupting the Governour, by starving, and by storm. And if you have lost a City, which you are in hopes of recovering by the favour of the Citadel, which still holds out for you; it will require an Army as much as if there were no Citadel at all; and so much the stronger; by how much the probable the people may be more incensed from the mischief which they have received out of the Castle, than they would have been, had there been no Castle at all. Experience it self has since taught us that that Citadel of *Milan* was of no advantage, either to the Dukes of *Milan*, nor *French* in time of their adversity; but in time of Peace did them much prejudice, by hindring them from taking such ways as might have obliged the people, and rendered them well affected to their Government. *Gusdo Ubaldo* Son to *Frederic*, Duke of *Urbino*, was a great Captain as any in his time, being driven out of his Country by *Cesar Borgia* (Son to *Alexander VI.*) and recovering it afterwards by an accident, he caused all the Fortresses in the whole Province to be dismantled, and destroyed; as things which he had found by experience were more to his prejudice than security. For being beloved by the people, he would not do them the injury to put Garisons in them; and if he had, upon any invasion from the Enemy, he could not have kept them without a field Army to relieve them. *Julius* the Pope, having driven the *Bentivogli* out of *Bononia*, built a Citadel there, and put in such a Governour as partly by his own ill nature, and partly by the instructions of his Master, killed many of the Citizens; and committed several cruelties, which provoked the *Bonomians* so exceedingly, that they rebelled, and recovered the Citadel, which had the Governour been more moderate, might have been longer in his power. *Nicolo de Castello* Father of the *Vitelli*, (returning into his Country, from whence he had been banished by the Popes) immediately demolished two Fortresses which had been raised by *Sixtus IV.* as judging the hearts of the people more like than those Castles, to secure him. But of all, there is no example, evinces the usefulness of these kind of Garisons, and the convenience of taking them away, more than that which hapned lately at *Genoa*; for the said City revolting from *Lewis XII.* of *France*, in the year 1507. *Lewis* came with a strong Army into *Italy*, and having reduced it, built a Castle of greater strength and capacity than any of that time; for it was built upon a promontory that Commanded the Sea called *Godefa*, the Harbour, and the Town, so that by all people it was held inexpugnable. But the *French* being driven out of *Italy* in the year 1512. *Genoa* rebelled (notwithstanding the Castle) and *Ottavio Fegosa* taking the Government upon him, in sixteen months brought the Castle to such extremity, that it was forced to surrender; whereupon, though he was advized to keep it as a refuge in case of any disaster; yet being a wise man, and knowing well that a Prince is in nothing so safe, as in the affections of his Subjects, he caused it to be demolished, and he found the benefit of that Counsel, for by it he has held that Government to this day; and that so strongly, that whereas before, the appearance of a thousand Foot was sufficient at any time to have carried it; his adversaries assaulted it with ten thousand; and could do him no wrong. So that we see the demolishing of *Fegosa* no hurt, and the making it did the King of *France* no good; for when he was able to bring an Army into *Italy*, he was able to recover *Genoa* without the help of the Castle; but when he could bring no Army, he could not keep it, though the Castle was for him: From whence it follows, that as the building of it, was a great expence, and the loss of it a great dishonour to the King of *France*; so the taking of it was great glory to *Ottaviano*, and the ruining it, a great advantage. And it is the same thing with those who build them in their new Conquests, to keep their new subjects in obedience, which if the example of *Genoa* and the *French* should be insufficient to prove, the Cities of *Florence* and *Pisa*, will do it effectually. The *Florentines* built a Citadel at *Pisa*, and several other Fortresses to keep it in awe; not considering that a City which had been free, and in continual emulation of the *Florentine* greatness, was not any other way to be kept to its duty, unless (according to the practice of the *Romans*) they made a fair and honourable league with it, or utterly subverted it. But how much those Fortresses answered their designs, appeared when *Charles VIII.* made his Expedition into *Italy*, to whom

whom they were generally surrendered, either thorow the fear or falshood of their Governours. So that had not they been built, the *Florentines* had never relyed so much upon them for the keeping of *Pisa*, but had thought of some safer way to have secured it against the King of *France*. I conclude then, that to keep ones own Native Country in subjection, Fortresses are dangerous, and to keep new Conquests, they are ineffectual: To prove that the authority and practice of the *Romans* ought to be sufficient, who whenever they had a mind to restrain the power, and bridle the fury of the people, did it not by erecting new Fortresses, but by demolishing the old. If it be objected that *Tarentum* of old, and *Brescia* of late years were recovered by the fidelity of the Castles, when the Towns had revolted. I answer, that as to the recovery of *Tarentum*, the Castle contributed nothing, for the Consul *Quintus Fabius* was sent thither with an Army strong enough to have retaken it, had there been no Castle at all: and, what advantage was it to the *Romans* that the Castle held for them, if the recovery of the Town required a Consular Army, and the presence of so great a Soldier as *Fabius Maximus*; and that they might have retaken it without the help of the Castle, is clear in the example of *Capua*, which they recovered, when there was no Castle to befriend them. In the case of *Brescia*, the circumstances were very extraordinary; for it seldom happens that when a City revolts, and the Castle holds out for you, That the Castle has a field Army hard by, and ready to relieve you. *Monsieur de Foix* General for the King of *France*, being with his Army at *Bologna*, and understanding the defection of the *Brescians*, marched immediately to recover it, and in three days time (by the help of the Castle) was Master of it again. So that it was not wholly by the benefit of the Castle that *Brescia* was recovered, but by the presence and dexterity of *Monsieur de Foix* and his Army. And this example may be sufficient to ballance all others to the contrary; for we see daily in our times, multitudes of Castles taken and retaken, and following the fate of their Cities, and that with no more difficulty or variety of fortune, than when there are none at all; as has been visible in *Lombardy*, *Romagna*, the Kingdom of *Naples*, and all other quarters of *Italy*. And as to those Citadels which are built in your new Conquests, to defend you from your Enemies abroad; they also are absolutely unnecessary, where you have an Army in the field; and where you have none, they are of no use. A good Army without any such Forts, is sufficient to defend you. And this has been found by experience by all those who have been thought excellent in the Arts of War, or of Peace; and particularly by the *Romans* and *Spartans*: The *Romans* never erected any new Castles, and the *Spartans* never suffered any old; but what Cities soever they conquered, down went their Walls; nay, even in their own Cities they would not permit any fortification, as believing nothing so proper to defend them as the virtue and courage of their Citizens. A *Spartan* being demanded by an *Athenian*, Whether the Walls of Athens were not very beautiful? Yes, says the *Spartan*, if it was but inhabited by Women. A Prince therefore who has a good Army in the field, may have some benefit by his Castles, if they be upon the Frontiers of his Country, or in some places upon the Coast, where they may retard and entertain an Enemy for some time till the Army can come up: But if the Prince has no Army on foot, let his Castles be where they will, upon the Frontiers or elsewhere, they are either unserviceable or dangerous: dangerous, because they are easily lost, and made use of by the Enemy against you; or if they be too strong to be taken, yet the Enemy marches on, and leaves them unserviceable behind him. For an Army that has no Enemy in the field to confront it, takes no notice of Cities or Castles, but passing by as it pleases, rambles up and down, and ravages the whole Country; as may be observed both in ancient History and new. *Francesco Maria* not many years since invaded the Duchy of *Urbino*, nor concern'd himself at all, though he left ten of his Enemies Cities behind him. Wherefore that Prince who has a good Army, need not stand upon Castles; and he that has no Castles, need not trouble himself to build any; all that he is to do, is, to fortifie the Town of his own residence as well as he can, and accustom the Citizens to Arms, that he may be able to sustain an Enemy, at least for a while, till he can make his conditions, or procure relief; All other designs are expensive in times of Peace; and unprofitable in time of War; so that he who considers what has been said, must acknowledge that as the *Romans* were wise in every thing else, so more particularly in their affairs with the *Latins*, and *Privernates*, in not thinking of Castles and Fortresses, but of more noble and generous ways of securing their allegiance.

C H A P. XXV.

*To attempt a City full of intestine divisions, and to expect to carry it thereby, is uncertain and dangerous.*

**T**He divisions in the Commonwealth of Rome were so great betwixt the People and the Nobility, that the *Veientes* and *Hetrusci*, taking the opportunity, conspired its destruction, and having raised an Army, and harrassed their whole Country, the Senate sent out G. *Manlius*, and M. *Fabius* against them; whose Army encamping near the Enemy, were so provoked by the insolence of their language, that the *Romans* laid aside their private animosities, and coming to a Battel overthrew them; by which we may observe how easily we erre in our Counsels, and how we lose things many times the same way by which we intended to gain them. The *Veientes* thought by assaulting the *Romans* whilst they were embroil'd in their intestine divisions, they should certainly overcome them; and their invading them at that time, united the Enemy, and ruined themselves; and not without reason; for the Occasion of discord and faction in a Commonwealth is idleness, and peace; and there is nothing unites like apprehension, and War. So that had the *Veientes* been wise as they should have been, they should have forbore making War upon them at that time, and have tryed other artificial ways to have destroyed them. The surest way is to insinuate, and make your self a Mediator betwixt them, and to take upon your self the arbitration, rather than they should come to blows. When it is come to that, you are privately and gently to supply the weaker side; to foment and continue the War, till they consume one another; but be sure your supplies be not too great, lest both parties begin to suspect you, and believe your design is to ruine them both, and make your self Prince. If this way be well managed, it will certainly bring you to the end which you desired; for when both sides are weary, they will commit themselves to your arbitration. By these Arts, the City of *Pistoia* returned to its dependance upon *Florence*; for labouring under intestine divisions, the *Florentines* favouring first one side, and then the other (but so slyly that no occasion of jealousy was given to either) brought them both in a short time to be weary of their distractions, and throw themselves unanimously into their arms. The Government of the City of *Siena* had never been changed by their own domestick dissentions, had not the *Florentines* supplied both parties under-hand, and fomented them that way, whereas had they appeared openly and above board, it would have been a means to have united them. I shall add one example more, *Philsp Visconti* Duke of *Milan* made War many times upon the *Florentines*, hoping by the dissentions of the City to have conquered them the more easily, but he never succeeded. So that complaining one time of his misfortunes, he had this Expression, *The follies of the Florentines have cost me two millions of Money, to no purpose.* In short, as the *Veientes* and *Tuscans* found themselves in an error (when they thought by help of the differences in *Rome*, to have mastered the *Romans*) and were ruined themselves for their pains. So it will fare with whoever takes that way to oppress or subvert any other Government.

C H A P. XXVI.

*He who contemns or reproaches another person, incurs his hatred, without any advantage to himself.*

**L**ook upon it as one of the greatest points of discretion in a man, to forbear injury and threatening, especially in words: neither of them weakens the Enemy, but threatening makes him more cautious, and injury the more inveterate, and industrious to revenge it. This is manifest by the example of the *Veienti* (of which I discoursed in the foregoing Chapter) for not contenting themselves with the mischiefs that they brought upon them by the War, they added contumely and opprobrious language, which so provoked and enflamed the *Roman* Army, that whereas before they were irresolute, and seemed to decline it, they now fell upon them unanimously, and over-threw them. So that it ought to be the principal care in an Officer that neither himself nor his Soldiers do incense and exasperate his Enemy by ill language; for that makes him but the more so, does not at all hinder him from revenging himself, but does the Author more mischief than the Enemy. And

of this we have a notable example in *Asia*. *Gabades* the *Persian* General having besieged *Amida* a long time, without any considerable progress; weary of the tediousness of the Leaguer, and hopeless of success, he resolved to draw off and be gone; but as he was raising his Camp, the Garrison perceiving it, got all upon the Walls, and with the basest and most provoking circumstances imaginable upbraided them with Cowardize; which nettled *Gabades* in such manner, that he changed his Counsels, fate down again, and ply'd it with that industry and indignation, that he took it in few days, and gave it up to the fury of the Soldier. The same thing hapned to the *Veienti* (as I said before) who not contenting themselves to make War upon the *Romans*, went up under their very Noses to reproach them; and what followed? they irritated them so, that they ferted the courage, and united the animosities of the *Roman* Army, and put them into so high a fit of impatience, that they forced the Consul to a Battel, in which the *Veientes* received the reward of their contumacy. He therefore who is General of an Army, or Governour of a Commonwealth, and commands or governs discreetly, takes particular care that such ill language be not used either in the City or Army, to one another, nor to the Enemy: For to an Enemy, they make him but worse, unless such remedies be applyed, as are practised by wise men. The *Romans* having left two of their Legions at *Capoua*, they conspired against the *Capouans* (as shall be described more largely hereafter) which occasioned a great sedition, but it was afterwards appeased by *Valerius Corvinus*, and among other things necessary in that juncture, an Act of Oblivion was passed, with great penalty to any man that should upbraid any of the Soldiers by their Sedition. *Tiberius Grachus* having the command of a certain number of Servants (in the time of *Hanibal's* Wars) which the scarcity of men, had forced the *Romans* to Arm, made it no less than death for any man to reproach them by their servitude. So mindful were the *Roman* Officers always of preventing such exprobration, as knowing that nothing provokes and incenses a man so highly as to have his imperfections rip'd up, whether in earnest, or in jest, 'tis the same thing. *Nam facietæ asperæ, quando nimium ex verò traxere, acrem sui memoriam relinquunt*; for biting, raillery, especially with a tincture of truth, leaves an ill impression upon the Memory.

## C H A P. XXVII.

*Wise Princes; and well governed States ought to be contented with victory; for many times whilst they think to push things forward, they lose all.*

THAT we use our Enemy with rude and dishonorable language, proceeds either from insolence upon some victory past or extraordinary confidence of obtaining it, which being false, perplexes our understanding, and makes us err not only in our words, but our actions. For from the time that error seizes upon our judgments, it makes us many times lose the occasion of a certain good, in hopes of a better that is but uncertain, which is a point not unworthy our consideration, seeing thereby our reason is disturbed, and our State many times brought in danger of ruine; and this I shall demonstrate by examples both ancient and modern, because arguments cannot do it so distinctly. *Hanibal* after he had defeated the *Romans* at *Cannas*, sent Messengers to *Carthage* with the news of his Victory, and to desire Supplies. The Senate was a long time in Counsel what was to be done, *Annon*, a grave and solid Citizen being present, advised them to make wise use of their Victory, and think of making Peace with the *Romans*, which they might do upon better conditions, now they were Conquerors, than they were in reason to expect upon any disaster. That the *Carthaginians* had satisfied the whole world that they were able to balance the *Romans*; for they had fought with them, and beaten them; and having gone so far with honour and success, they ought not (at least in his judgment) expose what they had got, and by hoping for more, run a hazard of losing all: But this Counsel was not followed, though afterwards, when too late, it was found to be the better.

*Alexander* the great had conquered all the East, when the Commonwealth of *Tyre* (a great Town situate like *Venice* in the water) amazed at the grandeur of *Alexander*, sent Embassadors to him to offer him their obedience and subjection upon what terms he pleased, only they were unwilling either himself, or any of his Army should come into their Town. *Alexander* disdainig to be excluded by a private City, to whom the whole world had opened their Gates; rejected their offers, sent their Embassadors back, and went immediately to besiege it. The Town stood in the Sea, and was well provided both with

Vitual

Victual and Ammunition; infomuch as at four months end *Alexander* began to consider that that single Town had deprived his glory of more time, than many other of his Conquests of much greater importance: Whereupon he resolv'd to come to an agreement with them, and to grant them the conditions which they demanded at first; but the *Tyrrians* transported with pride, not only refused his proffers, but put his Messengers to death; upon which in a rage *Alexander* caus'd it to be assaulted immediately, and it was done with that fury, that the Town was taken and sack'd, and part of the people put to the Sword, and the rest made slaves. In the year 1512, a *Spanish Army* came into the Dominions of the *Florentines* to restore the *Medici* in *Florence*, and tax the City; and they were called in, and conducted by the Citizens themselves, who had promised, that as soon as they appeared in those parts, they would take Arms, and declare for them; being entered in the plain, and finding no body to joyn with them, or supply them, scarcity of provisions prevailed with the *Spaniards* to think of a Treaty, and propose it to the Enemy, but the *Florentines* were too high, and refused it, which was the loss of *Prato*, and the ruine of their State. So then a Prince that is attack'd by another Prince more potent than himself, cannot be guilty of a greater error, than to refuse an agreement, especially when it is offered; for it can never be so bad, but it shall have in it something of advantage for him who accepts it; and perhaps contribute to his Victory: It ought therefore to have satisfied the people of *Tyre*, that *Alexander* accepted of the conditions which he had formerly denyed them; and it had been Victory enough for them, that with Arms in their hands they had forced so great a Conqueror to condescend. It was the same case with the *Florentines*; they ought to have been contented, and thought it honour enough that the *Spanish Army* complied, and was reduced to a condition of granting part of their desires, though they would not gratifie them in all; for it was plain, the design of that Army was to change the Government; to break their league with the *French*; and to raise what Money upon them they could. Though of these three points, they had obtained the two last, and the first alone had remained entire to the *Florentines* (that is to say, the Government of the City) every Citizen (besides the security of his life) would have had some honour and satisfaction, without concerning themselves so much for the loss of the other two. And though by the posture of their affairs their success seem'd to be certain; yet they ought not to have expos'd things to the discretion of Fortune, seeing their all was at stake, which no wise man will hazard but upon inevitable necessity. *Hanibal* having left *Italy*, where he had been sixteen years together with a great deal of honour, being called home to the relief of his own Country, found *Asdrubal* and *Sipha* defeated; the Kingdom of *Numidia* lost; The *Carthaginians* retired, and coop'd up within the circumference of their own walls, so as they had no hopes but in *Hanibal* and his Army. *Hanibal* being sensible that this was the last cast, and that if he miscarried, his Country was quite lost, resolv'd to put nothing to a hazard, till he had tryed all other ways; and was not ashamed to make the first overture of a Peace, as knowing that if there was any hopes left for his Country, it was in that, rather than War; but being refused, he resolv'd to fight (though with very little hopes) supposing he might possibly win the day, or if he did lose it, it should not be without leaving some testimony of his courage and generosity. If then *Hanibal*, a person of that great Experience and Conduct, at the head of a great Army, chose rather to have had things determin'd by treaty and accommodation, than Battel; upon the loss of which, the wealth and liberty of his Country depended: what is he to do, who has not his courage nor experiencé? But men are subject to strange and imaginary hopes, upon which reposing with too much confidence, they take their measures amiss, and are many times ruined.

CHAP. XXVIII.

*How much it is for the interest of all Governments that all injury be punished, whether against the publick, or particular persons.*

IT is easily known to what men are often transported by choler and indignation, by what hapned to the *Romans*, when they sent the three *Fabii* Embassadors towards the *Gauls*, who were entered into *Tuscany*, and had laid siege to *Clusium*. For the *Clusians* being besieged, sent to the *Romans* to relieve them, and the *Romans* sent to the *French* to require them in the name of the people of *Rome*, to withdraw their forces out of *Tuscany*; The *Roman* Embassadors arriv'd at the Army, but being better Soldiers than Orators; when

when the Armies came to engage, they put themselves at the head of the *Clusians*, to fight against the *French*, which being observed by the *French*, turn'd all their former hatred to the *Tuscans*, upon the *Romans*, which was much encreased after they had sent Embassadors to complain of it at *Rome*, and to require that those who had committed that fault, might be delivered up into their hands, to make satisfaction for their offence. But instead of granting their demands, or punishing their delinquency themselves, they were created Tribunes with Consular authority. Which coming afterwards to the Ears of the *French*, finding those persons advanced; who ought rather to have been punished, they interpred it as done in affront to them, and being enflamed with anger and disdain, they marched directly to *Rome*, assaulted and took it, all but the Capitol, which hapned to them for nothing, but that the *Romans* (when their Embassadors had *contra jus gentium*, fought against the *French*) had been so far from doing them justice, that the said Embassadors were advanced and preferred. For which reason, a Prince and Commonwealth is to take care that no such injury be done, not only to a Nation, or Commonalty, but to any particular person; for if a man be highly offended either by a State, or private person, and has not the satisfaction he desires, if it be in a Republick, he ceases not to pursue his revenge, though with the ruine of the State. If it be under a Monarchy, and he finds himself touched in point of honour, if he has the least spark of generosity in him, he will never be quiet till he be revenged, though with never so much prejudice to himself, of which case we cannot have an apter and truer example, than in *Philip of Macedon*; the Father of *Alexander* the great. *Philip* had in his Court a young Gentleman of very exquisite beauty called *Pausanias*, with whom *Attalus* (a great favourite of the said *Philip*) was enamoured; having tempted and solicited him many times to satisfy his passion, and found him always averse, he resolved to do that by force or surprize, which he could not do otherwise: To this purpose he made a solemn feast, and invited *Pausanias*, and several other great persons: when they had filled themselves with their good cheer, he caused *Pausanias* to be taken from the Table, and carried to a private place, and not only satisfied his own lust, but caused him to be vitiated by several others. *Pausanias* complained heavily to King *Philip*, who having kept him for some time in hopes of doing him justice, instead of performing, he advanced *Attalus* to the Government of a Province in *Greece*: Which *Pausanias* resenting; in great anger that his adversary against whom he had so long, and so earnestly solicited, should now be preferred, he began to turn his indignation upon the King, who had refused to right him, rather than upon the person who had done him the wrong; Insomuch that the very morning his Daughter was married to *Alexander* of *Epirus*, as *Philip* was going to the Temple to celebrate the Nuptiality with his Son *Alexander* on one hand of him, and his new Son-in-Law on the other, *Pausanias* assaulted and slew him. This example is much like that of the *Romans*, and is to be observed by any man that governs; who is never to despise any body: so as not to believe but he who is injured will revenge himself some time or other, though with never so much danger and detriment to himself.

## C H A P. XXIX.

*Fortune casts a mist before peoples eyes, when she would not have them oppose her design.*

IF the course of humane affairs be considered, it will appear, that many accidents arise; against which the Heavens do not suffer us to provide: And when this hapned at *Rome*, where there was so much Virtue, and Piety, and Order, well may it happen more frequently in those Cities and Provinces where there are no such things to be found. And because the place is remarkable, to show the influence which the Heavens have upon human affairs, *Titus Livius* has discoursed of it largely and efficaciously, telling us, That the Stars to make us sensible of their power, first disposed the said *Fabii* (who were sent Embassadors to the *French*) to fight as abovesaid, to the end that upon that occasion, they might make War upon *Rome*. In the next place, they befotted the *Romans* so, as they did nothing worthy of the name of *Romans* in order to their defence, having banished *Camillus* (the only person capable of standing them in stead) to *Ardea*. Again, when the *French* were upon their march towards *Rome*, those who to repel the inroads of the *Volsces*, and other bordering Enemies, had made Dictators many times, and with very good success, made none upon the approach of the *French*. They were so slow likewise, and so remiss in the



theraising of Men, and so tedious in furnishing them with Arms, that they could scarce draw out any considerable force against them, till the Enemy was as far as the River *Allia* which is within ten miles of *Rome*, and when their Army was come thither, it was not encamped by the Tribunes with the usual diligence and discretion, they having neither chosen a good place, nor drawn their line, nor fortified themselves with Trenches, nor Stoccadoes as formerly, nor done any thing for their security, either humane, or divine: When they came to fight, they drew up their men so awkwardly and untowardly, that neither Soldier nor Officer did any thing worthy of the Discipline of the *Romans*, so that the Battel was lost without any effusion of Blood; the *Romans* running at the very first charge, the greatest part of them to *Vei*, the rest to *Rome*, and in such consternation, that they fled directly to the Capitol before they went home to their houses. So that the Senate without so much as thinking to defend their City, any more than the rest, never caused the Gates to be shut, but part of them fled away, and part into the Capitol. There, it is true they began to observe better orders than before, and managed things with less confusion; They discharged all those that were unserviceable, and furnished themselves with what provision they could get, that they might be able to hold out. The greatest part of those useles people which were turn'd out of the Capitol, as old Men, Women, and Childrea, fled into the Neighbouring Cities; the rest continued in *Rome*, and were a prey to the *French*. So that if a man should have read their Exploits in former times, and compared them with their actions then, he would not have believed them to be the same people; and *Titus Livius* gives the reason after he had described all the disorders aforesaid in these words, *Adeo obscuro animos fortuna, cum vim suam ingruentem respiciens non vult. So strangely does fortune blind other people, when she would not be obstructed in her designs*; and there can be nothing more true. Wherefore men are not so much to be blamed or commended for their adversity or prosperity; for it is frequently seen, some are hurried to ruine, and others advanced to great honour by the swing and impulse of their fate, wisdom availing little against the misfortunes of the one, and folly as little against the felicity of the other. When fortune designs any great matter, she makes choice of some man of such courage and parts, as is able to discern when she presents him with an occasion: and so on the other side, when she intends any great destruction, she has her Instruments ready to push on the wheel, and assist to her designs; and if there be any man capable of obstructing them in the least, she either rids him out of the way, or deprives him of all authority, and leaves him without any faculty to do good. And this is abundantly cleared by this place, where Fortune, to amplify *Rome*, and bring it to that Grandeur to which it arrived afterwards; thought fit to debase it, (as we shall show at large in the beginning of our third Book) but would not utterly destroy it: For which reason, though she permitted *Camillus* to be banished, she would not suffer him to be killed; though she let *Rome* be taken, she preserved the Capitol: Though she intimidated the *Romans*, and would suffer them to do nothing wisely for the safety of the City, yet she left them so much wisdom as secured the Capitol: That *Rome* might be taken, she caused the greatest part of the Army that was defeated upon the *Allia*, to retire to *Vei*, thereby cutting off all ways for the defence of *Rome*: But in the midst of her Career, when she seem'd in such haste, and so impatient of its destruction, she prepared every thing that was necessary for its preservation; having conveyed a good Army to *Vei*, and *Camillus* to *Ardea*, that once again they might make head under a General whose reputation was never sully'd with the ignominy of such a loss, but stood clear and entire for the recovery of his Country: And here we might bring store of modern examples to prove what is said, were not this sufficient without them. Yet this I shall assert again (and by the occurrences in all History here is nothing more true) That men may second their fortune, not resist it; and follow the order of her designs, but by no means defeat them: Nevertheless men are not wholly to abandon themselves, because they know not her end; for her ways being unknown and irregular, may possibly be at last for our good; so that we are always to hope the best, and that hope is to preserve us in whatever troubles or distresses we shall fall.

## C H A P. XXX.

*Princes and Republicks that are truly magnificent, do not make their Leagues and Alliances with Money, but by their virtue, reputation, and force.*

**T**He Romans were besieged in the Capitol, and though they were in expectation of relief from *Vais* and *Camillus*, yet Famine constraining them, they proposed a parley with the *French*, and were to pay a certain Sum of Money for their liberty; The Articles were sign'd, all things concluded, and Commissioners sent in to receive the Money; when on a sudden *Camillus* appears with his Army, as if fortune had done it (says *Livy*). *Ut Romani auro redempti non viverent.* That it might not be said the Romans had ever been ransom'd; Which point is not only observable in this place, but in the whole progress of the affairs of that Commonwealth, where it may be seen that they never got Town, nor never made Peace with their Money; whatever they did, was bravely, and with their Arms, which I think is more than can be said of any other State in the world. One of the great marks of the puissance of this Commonwealth, was the manner of her living with her Neighbors. When things are so managed in a Government, that the Neighbors purchase its amity, and make themselves its Pensioners; 'tis a certain sign of the potency of that Government. But when the Neighbors on the contrary receive Money from it, 'tis as infallible a sign of its weakness. If one reads the *Roman History*, he shall find the *Massilians*, the *Edui*, the *Rhodians*, *Hiero* of *Syracuse*, and *Massinissa*, as they were Neighbors, so they were Tributaries to the *Romans*, contributing to their expences, and Taxes, as there was occasion, without expectation of any other recompence, but protection. Where a Prince or Commonwealth is weak, it is otherwise, as it appeared by our own City of *Florence*, which in former times when it was in its greatest reputation, paid annual stipends to most of the little Governments in *Romania*, besides what was received by the *Perugians*, *Castellans*, and all their other Neighbors; whereas had it been strong, and well Arm'd, it would have been quite otherwise; and all the rest would have given *Florence* Money for her protection. Nor were the *Florentines* singular in this case, the *Venetians* did the same, and so did the King of *France*, who notwithstanding the greatness of his Kingdom, was tributary to the *Switzers*, and the King of *England*, which proceeded from his having disarm'd the people, and preferring a present opportunity of squeezing them, and avoiding an imaginary danger, before the doing those things that might have secured his State, and made it happy for ever; which practice though for some time it may produce quiet and repose, yet the end is troubles, and losses, and ruine without remedy.

It would be too tedious to recount how often the *Florentines*, the *Venetians*, and the Kingdom of *France* have bought off their Wars, and submitted to such dishonorable terms, as the *Romans* could never be brought to but once. It would be too tedious to recount how many Towns the *Florentines*, and the *Venetians* have bought with their Money, which have been the occasion of great disorders afterwards, and prov'd that what is gotten by gold, is not to be kept with iron.

This point of generosity, and this manner of living the *Romans* observed very punctually whilst they were free; but after they fell under the Government of Emperors, and those Emperors grew bad, they began to degenerate too, and prefer the shadow before the Sun. They began to be Pensionaries first to the *Partians*; then to the *Germans*, and by degrees to all their Neighbors, which was the first step to the ruine of that great Empire; and all these inconveniences proceeded from the disarm'ing of the people, and neglecting to train them up to Military Discipline, from whence a greater mischief does arise; and that is, That the nearer the Enemy approaches, the weaker, and more unable he finds you; and therefore not being strong enough of your self to repel the Enemy from your borders, you are forced to pay tribute to your Neighbors to undertake it for you; which being to be raised and extorted from your Subjects, renders them more feeble, and impotent. By which means it happens sometimes that those States which are in this condition, may perhaps make some little resistance upon the Frontiers, but if the Enemy passes that, all is gone without remedy. But all this is disorderly, and unnatural; for as nature in all animals has fortified the vital and principal, and not extream parts of the body, because the body can subsist without the one, but not without the other. So 'tis in all Governments, the heart and center is to be fortified, rather than the Frontiers: But this was very ill observed by the *Florentines*, for whenever an Enemy had past our borders, and took his way towards the City, there was no body in a condition to oppose him. It was the same with

with the *Venicians* not many years since, and had not their City been as it were swaddled with the Sea, it had been certainly destroyed. This indeed has not been seen so frequently in *France*, because it is so great a Kingdom, and too strong for most of its neighbours; nevertheless when in the year 1513 they were invaded by the *English*, the whole Kingdom trembled, and the King of *France* himself, and many others were of opinion, that if he lost one Battel, the whole Kingdom was gone. With the *Romans* it was quite contrary; the nearer the Enemy approached the City, the stronger he found it: this was evident in *Hanibal's* invasion, though he had forc'd his way into *Italy*, fought three great Battels with the *Romans*, and beat them in every one, though they had lost so many brave Souldiers and Officers, yet they were not only able to continue the War, but to conquer them at last, and all by fortifying the heart and center of their Country, and leaving the extremities to shift for themselves: for the vitals and fundamentals of their State was the People of *Rome*, the Country of the *Latins*, the neighbouring Cities that were in League, and their Colonies from whence they drew so many Souldiers as were able to fight, and entertain the whole World. And this *Hanno* the *Cartaginian* understood very well: for when after the Battel at *Cannas* *Hanibal* sent *Mago* to *Cartage* to give them an account of the particulars of the Victory, *Mago* having exceedingly magnified the exploits of his Brother, and debased the Condition of the *Romans*, *Hanno* interrupted him, and enquir'd whether any of the *Roman* Cities, or any of their Confederates had revolted? whether any of their Senators were come in to *Hanibal*? or whether they had sent any Embassadors to him to treat? and when *Mago* denied that any thing of all this had passed, *Hanno* replied, *Hostium ergo multum superest. & bellum tam integrum habemus, atque habuimus quae die Annibal Italiam est ingressus; There is work enough behind, and the War is as entire as when Hanibal passed first into Italy.* It is apparent therefore, both by what is said in this Chapter, and what has been said often before, that there is great difference betwixt the present and ancient methods of the *Romans*; and if we seriously consider it, we shall not wonder that so many Towns are taken and lost, and so many Governments subverted, as we have seen in our days: for where discipline is neglected, and military virtue laid aside, all things are committed wholly to Fortune, which being various and unconstant, produces various mutations; and this vicissitude and unconstancy of affairs will continue till some excellent person arises to restore the ancient discipline, and restrain fortune from giving such evidences of her power every hour of the day.

C H A P. XXXI.

*How dangerous it is to believe Exiles too far.*

I Think it not amiss in this place to shew how much it imports all persons not to give too much credit to those who are banished, for many times they are but the practices and stratagems of Princes and States. We have a memorable example of their inconstancy in *Livy*, though something improper. When *Alexander* the Great passed into *Asia* with his Army, *Alexander* of *Epirus* his Kinsman and Uncle passed with another into *Italy*, invited by the Exiles of *Lucca*, who put him in hopes that by their means he should be Master of that whole Province: but when he was come into *Italy*, instead of assisting him, they conspir'd against him, and slew him upon promise of indemnity, and restitution of their Estates. From whence we may learn what faith is to be given to such as are banished out of their own Country: for as to their engagements, they are nothing; it is not to be doubted but when ever they can return by any other means, they will leave you, and betake themselves to any body else, notwithstanding any promise or engagement to you; and that which makes their promises and confidence the less to be trusted, is, because their extreme passion and desire to come home, make them believe many things that are impossible, and pretend many things that they do not believe: so that betwixt what they believe, and what they pretend, they feed you with fair hopes, but if you depend upon them, you are undone, your expence is all lost, and your whole enterprize miscarries; I shall only give you an instance in the foresaid *Alexander*, and *Themistocles* the *Arbenian*; *Themistocles* being in rebellion against the *Arbenians*, fled into *Asia* to *Darius*, whom he solicited with large promises to an expedition into *Greece*, *Darius* was persuaded, and passed into *Greece*, but *Themistocles* being unable to make his promises good, either for shame of what he had done, or fear of punishment for what he had not, he poisoned himself; and if *Themistocles* a man of that Excellence and Virtue could delude the King, and promise more than he could perform,

perform, how little are they to be trusted, who having no such thing to restrain them, give themselves up wholly to their passion and desires? Princes therefore and States ought to be very tender of undertaking any enterprize upon the encouragement of an Exile, for they seldom succeed. And because it seldom happens that Towns are taken by intelligence within, I shall discourse of it in my next Chapter, and add what variety of ways the Romans used to come by their Conquests.

## C H A P. XXXII.

*How many several ways the Romans used to Conquer their Towns.*

**T**He Romans being a martial people, and given wholly to war, they considered every thing very diligently that might any ways conduce to the facilitating their designs; whether it was matter of charge, or any thing else: for this reason they seldom attempted any Town by the way of siege, because they thought the expence and incommodity of that way would be more than could be recompenced by the taking it; so as they never tried that whilst there was any other hopes; and in all their great Wars, there are but very few examples of any long Leaguers by them. The ways which they took were commonly either by storm, or surrender: when they took a Town by storm, it was either by open force, or stratagem. Open force was, when they made their attack without battering the walls, which they called *Aggredi urbem cum Corona*; To besiege a Town, because they drew their whole Army round the Town, and fell on in all quarters, and in this manner it happened sometimes that they carried very considerable places at one Storm, as when *Scipio* took new *Carthage* in *Spain*. If this way was ineffectual, they battered down the walls with their Rams, and other engines of War. Sometimes they min'd, and entred the Towns under ground, as they did at *Vesii*; sometimes that they might fight with the Enemy upon equal terms, they built wooden Towers, or raised Mounts to the height of the walls from whence they might plague and molest them within their Works. The besieged were in most danger in the first case upon a general assault, for their walls were to be made good in all places at once, and it fell out many times, that there were not men enough to supply and relieve all parts; or if they had men enough to do that, they were not all of an equal courage, and when any gave ground, the whole Town was like to be lost, and by this means that way was often successful. When this way miscarried, they seldom sate down before a Town, or went formally to beleaguer it, because it could not be done but with greater hazard to their Army, for their quarters being to be extended, and their guards round about the Town, they must of necessity be thinner and weaker in some places, and unable to make any considerable opposition, if the Enemy should make any considerable eruption, so that the sudden and brisk way was prefer'd: when their walls were battered with their Engines, those who were in the Town defended themselves much as we do now against great Guns, by repairing their breaches as well as they could. Their way of defeating their mines was by countermining, and opposing themselves personally against the Enemy, or disturbing them with their inventions, as particularly, putting of feathers, and oyls, and other stinking stuff into batrels of wood, they set them on fire, and then tumbled them among the Enemy, that what with the fire, the smoak, and the stench, they might not be able to endure them. their Towers of wood, they destroyed commonly by throwing fire into them; and then for the mounts which were raised against the walls, their way was to dig under the walls, and steal away their earth, or by loosening the foundations of the mount, till it all fell to the ground. But these ways of taking a Town are not long to be tried; if they carried it not quickly, they raised their siege, and sought out some other way of prosecuting the War, as *Scipio* did when he went over into *Africk*, for having assaulted *Utica*, without any success, he altered his Counsels, raised his Siege, and addressed himself wholly to the bringing the *Carthaginian* Army to an engagement; yet sometimes they continued their Siege, as they did at *Vesii*, *Carthage*, and *Jerusalem*: as to their way of taking of Towns by fraud and intelligence, (as they took *Palepolis*) the Romans and others attempted many places after that manner, but they seldom succeeded; for those secret correspondencies are easily discovered, and the least discovery spoils the whole design, because the conspiracy is commonly discovered before it comes to execution, it either being unpracticable in it self, or betrayed by the infidelity of some of the Conspirators, there being a necessity of meeting and discoursing with such persons, as it is not lawful to discourse with, but

upon

upon some specious occasion, But suppose it be not discovered in the management, there are so many difficulties in putting it into action, that it is almost impossible to overcome them; for if you come too soon, or too late, all is spoiled: if any noise be made, (as by the geese in the Capitol) the least disorder, the least error or mistake destroys the whole enterprize. Besides, these things being executed in the night, the darkness strikes a terror into the instruments, and the more, because they are commonly unacquainted with the place or people which they are to attack, and therefore every little noise or accident is sufficient to confound them, and every trifling imagination will make them turn their backs; but no body was so daring and successful in these fraudulent and nocturnal designs as *Aratus Sicionius*, though in the day-time he was but like other men, which was rather from some secret virtue in him, than any excellence in the way. And as to the taking of Towns by surrender, they either surrender freely, or by force. When they do it freely, it is done out of some extrinick necessity, (as when *Capua* surrendered to the *Romans*, for fear of falling into the hands of the *Sammites*) or else out of desire to be well governed, as being taken with the administration of that Prince to whom they surrender; and thus it was with the *Rhodians*, the *Massilians*, and other Cities which gave themselves up to the *Romans* upon no other inducement, but that they might live more happily under the *Roman* Laws, and be under a better Constitution. But there are many Cities which surrender by force, which force proceeds either from the fatigues and calamities of a tedious Siege, or from continual excursions and depredations to which they are subject; and against which they have no other way to secure themselves. And then all the ways we have mentioned, the *Romans* made more use of this, carrying on their wars with their neighbours 450 years together, in this manner for the most part; for though they tried all the other, they found this the more profitable and safe. In Sieges there is delay and loss of time, in storms, hazard and danger; and uncertainty in conspiracies: but in bringing things to a Battel, it has been seen that by beating the enemies Army, they have got a whole Kingdom in a day, whereas an obstinate Town has cost them several years.

C H A P. XXXIII.

*How the Romans upon any Expedition, gave their Generals general Commissions.*

I Am of opinion, that to read the History of *Livy*, with any profit and advantage we must consider not only the actions, but the whole means and process both of the People and Senate of *Rome*. Among other things, it is very remarkable with what authority they invested their Consuls, Dictators and Generals of their Armies, and it was so great, that the Senate reserved to it self only the power of making Peace, or new Wars as they saw occasion; all the rest was left to the discretion of the Consul, who might fight, or not fight, assault this Town or that Town as he pleased, without any contradiction.

This may be proved by many examples, by more especially by what hapned in an Expedition against the *Tuscans*; for *Fabius* the Consul having defeated the Enemy at *Sutri*, resolving to pass the Forrest of *Gimina* with his Army, and invade *Tuscany*, he was so far from receiving Orders from the Senate, or consulting them in the business, that he gave them not the least notice, though the War was to be removed into another Country, and like to be very dangerous; which appeared by the resolution of the Senate in that very case; for having heard of his Victory at *Sutri*, and apprehending that he might fall upon such counsels, and pass his Army into *Tuscany*, thorow that dangerous Forrest, they sent two Embassadors to him to advise him from that Expedition; but they came too late, for he was gone before, and having over-run the whole Country, and routed the Enemy, instead of hindering his design, the Embassadors went back with the news of his Victory. This custom of the *Romans*, if it be seriously considered, will be found to be very solid and wise. For should the Senate have been consulted by their Generals upon every particular occasion, and have expected all their Orders from them, it would have made their Generals less circumspect, and vigorous, because the honour of the Victory would not accrew totally to them, but they must participate with the Senate. Besides, the Senate understood very well that Fortune is various, and that many accidents and advantages happen which cannot

cannot be known or improved by any but those who are present ; so that if they should desire to be consulted in things of which they can have no knowledge, they must of necessity err, though they were persons of never so much experience and wisdom. Wherefore they gave their General absolute power of disposing all things at his own will, and the whole honour of the Expedition was to be his, that it might be a spur to prick on his diligence, and a bridle to regulate his rashness. And this I have thought fit to insert, that I might shew how much the famous Commonwealths in our times do differ from the Romans, particularly the *Venetians* and *Florentines*, who are so strict with their General, that if a great Gun be but to be planted against a Town, the Senate must be advised, and give order how, and from whence it is to play. But this custom deserves commendation as much as the rest, which all together, have brought their affairs into that sad condition in which they are at present.

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THE

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THE  
DISCOURSES  
OF  
Nicholas Machiavel,  
CITIZEN, and SECRETARY  
OF  
FLORENCE,  
Upon the  
First Decade of TITUS LIVIUS.

## LIBER III.

## CHAP. I.

*That a Sect or Commonwealth be long-liv'd, it is necessary to correct it often;  
and reduce it towards its first Principles.*

**T**IS a certain truth, that the things of this World are determined, and a set time appointed for their duration; but those run thorrow the whole course which is assigned them by their Stars, who keep their body in such order, that it may not alter at all, or if it does, it is for the better. I speak now of mixt bodies, as Commonwealths, and Sects, and I say, that those alterations are salutiferous, which reduce them towards their first principles; and therefore the best ordered, and longest liv'd are they, who (by their own orders) may be often renewed, or else by some accident (without the help of the said orders) may tend to renovation: 'tis as clear as the day, that no bodies of men are of long duration, unless they be renewed; and the way to renew them (as is said before) is to reduce them to their principles. For the Fundamentals of all Sects, Commonwealths and Kingdoms have always something of good in them, by means of which they recover their first reputation and grandeur. And because in process of time that goodness corrupts, that body must of necessity die, unless something intervenes that reduces it to its first principles. The Physitian speaking of the body of man, tell us; *Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid, quod quandoque indiget curatione; That there is not a day passes, but it contracts something which afterwards will require to be cured.* 'Tis the same with the Body Politick; and as to them, I say that they are to be cured, by being renewed; and they are renewed, partly by external accident, and partly by internal prudence. The first happens as it were by destiny or fate, as that *Rome* should be taken by the *French*, that thereby it might reassume its old customs and virtues, and revive its ancient Worship, Religion



ligion and Justice, which were superannuated and decayed, as appears very plain by the description of their preparation against the *French*, in which it is declared by *Titus Livius*, that upon the marching out of their Army, and investing their Tribunes with Consular power, they observed no religious ceremony: at the same time they not only refused to correct the three *Fabii*, who *contra jus gentium* had fought against the *French*, but created them Tribunes. And it is easily to be presum'd that they made less account of the good Laws and Constitutions ordained by *Romulus* and other wise Princes, than was reasonable and (perhaps) necessary to preserve the liberty of their State. This foreign invasion hapned to them therefore, that all the obsolete Laws of that City might be revived, and that the people might be taught that it was necessary not only to maintain Religion and Justice, but to respect their good Citizens, and esteem their vertue above the advantages which they seem'd to want, for want of their assistance. And it fell out exactly, for *Rome* was no sooner taken, but they began to renew the Orders of their old Religion: they punished the *Fabii* who had fought against the Law of Nations, and conceived so great a value for *Gamillus*, that the Senate and People both laid aside their old animosity, and plac'd the whole burden of the Commonwealth upon his single shoulders. 'Tis necessary therefore (as was said before) that men which live together under a Government, be often reminded by these exterior or interior accidents. The interior way is when there is a Law which takes an account of all people in that Corporation; or else when there is some excellent person among them who by his virtuous example does the same thing, so that this happiness results to a Commonwealth either by the virtue of some great person, or the authority of some Law. And as to this last, the Orders which reduc'd the Commonwealth towards its first principles, were the Tribunes of the people, the Censors and all the other Laws against the ambition and insolence of man; which Laws have need to be revived and quickned by the virtue of some Citizen; who with great courage and generosity shall put them in execution in despite of all the power of the delinquents. The most remarkable executions before the taking of *Rome* by the *French*, were the death of *Brutus* his Sons, the punishment of the *Decem-viri*, the execution of *Sp. Melius*: after the City was sack'd by the *French*, the most considerable were the death of *Manlius Capitolinus*, the death of the Son of *Manlius Torquatus*, the prosecution of *Papirius Cursor* against *Fabius* the Master of his Horse, and the accusation against *Scipio*; which things being extraordinary, were the more remarkable, and when ever any of them hapned, they reminded the people of their beginning, and that they were to live according to Law. But when these examples began to be more rare, men took occasion to grow worse, and their exorbitancies were with more danger and tumult; for if in ten years space no examples be made, nor no execution done, people begin to forget and despise the Laws, and unless something happens that may remember them of the punishments, and infuse something of fear into them, the Delinquents will grow so numerous that it will be dangerous to punish them. To this purpose they who governed the State of *Florence* from the year 1434 to the year 1494 were wont to say, that it was necessary every five years to review the State; for otherwise it would be very hard to maintain it: They call'd *reviewing the State*, reducing the people to the same terror and awe, as they had upon them of old, when every man was punished according to his crime, let his quality be what it would. But when the memory of these punishments are lost; and suffered to go to decay, men take the confidence to attempt any thing, and speak ill of whom they please, against which no remedy is so proper as reducing them towards their first principles, which is to be done by the example of some excellent person, inciting you to such executions; without dependance upon any Law; and they are many times of so great reputation, that good men desire to imitate them, and bad men are ashamed to live contrary to them. Those who in *Rome* liv'd after this manner were *Horatius Cocles*, *Scævola*, *Fabritius*, the two *Decii*, *Regulus* *Attilius* and some others, whose rare and virtuous example had the same effect in *Rome*, that good Laws, and good Customs would have had; and if every ten years some of those examples or executions aforesaid had hapned in that City, the minds and manners of the people could never have been so corrupted, but as those virtuous examples, and heroick punishments grew seldom, and scarce, so corruption began to multiply, for after *Regulus* his time, there was not any such example to be seen; and though the two *Cato's* succeeded, yet there was such great distance betwixt them, that their examples could do but little good, especially the last of the *Cato's*, who finding the greatest part of the City debauched, could not work any considerable reformation upon them. And so much for Civil Governments; as to the conservation of Sects, the same renovation is necessary, as may appear by the example of the *Roman Religion*, which would doubtless have been lost before this, had it not been reduced towards its first principle by *St. Francis* and *St. Dominick*, who by their poverty,

and Christian-like examples revived it in the minds of men, where it was almost effaced; and prevailed that the looseness and depravity of the Prelates and Cardinals did not ruine it; for men seeing them live in that indigence and poverty; by confessing their sins to them, and hearing them preach, they began to learn meekness, and charity; and obedience; not to upbraid people by their vices, but to leave them to God, whereas their lives must necessarily be bad, who neither see nor feel what punishment is. So then it is this renovation and reduction to its first principles, that has, and does still maintain our Religion. And as to Kingdoms, they as well as Commonwealths have occasion to reform, and reduce as the other; which course has been of no small advantage to the Kingdom of *France*; for that Kingdom living under Laws and Customs more than any other, the said Laws and Customs are preserved and executed by Parliaments, and especially by that of *Paris*, which revives them every time it makes out process against any great Person, or opposes the King in its arrests: and hitherto it has preserv'd it self by its severity against Delinquents, without regard to the greatness of their quality, whereas should they pass unpunished, they would multiply so fast, that they would become incorrigible in a short time, and not to be reform'd but with the disorder, if not the dissolution of the whole Government. We may conclude therefore, that there is no safer way of preserving a Commonwealth, Kingdom or Sect, than by reforming and reducing them to their primitive reputation, which is to be done rather by good Laws, and examples at home, than foreign force; for though that way be effectual sometimes, (as it was in *Rome*) yet it is so uncertain and dangerous, it is not to be desired. And to demonstrate how much particular examples have conducted to the grandeur of *Rome*, and what great effect they have wrought, I shall make them the subject of my discourse in this third Book; and although among them some great examples might be produced, which have been exhibited by Kings, yet History having spoken of them so largely, I shall pass them by without speaking any thing of them but what belongs to their own private advantage. And begin with *Brutus* the Father of the liberty of the *Romans*.

CHAP. II.

*'Tis the part of a wise man sometimes to pretend himself a fool.*

NO man was ever so commendable for his wisdom and prudence, as *Junius Brutus* for counterfeiting the fool. For though *Levy* gives us but one reason why he did so, and that is, that under that contempt he might live quietly, and enjoy his patrimony in peace; yet it is probable by his ways of proceeding, that he did it, that thereby he might be less under the observation of the Kings, and have fairer advantage of expelling them, and delivering his Country, when occasion should be offered. And that this was in his thoughts, may be presumed from his interpretation of the Oracle of *Apollo*; to which when the *Tarquins* repair'd to understand which of them, should succeed in the Government, it being answered that the Government should come to him who first kissed his Mother, the *Tarquins* thought it not to be accomplished till they came to *Rome*; but *Brutus* pretending to slip, fell down upon the ground, and kissed it, as the common Mother of us all. And afterwards upon the death of *Lucretia* in the presence of her Father, and Husband; and Kindred, he was the first that drew the dagger out of the wound, and conjured all the standers by, that for the future they should never suffer a King in *Rome*. This example may be followed by those who are disgusted with their Prince; but so as first to consider their own power exactly, and if they find it sufficient; they may profess themselves publicly, and declare open War; and it is the most safe, and most honourable way: but if their force be but small, and they find themselves that way too weak, they are with all industry to endeavour to insinuate with the Tyrant, serving him in his pleasures, applauding him in all his actions and words, and imitating him in every thing he does. By this means you shall be secure from danger, enjoy all the pleasures and delights of the Court; and be ready for any occasion of effecting your designs. Others are of opinion that you keep such a distance with the Prince, as that you be neither so near him as to be covered with his ruines, nor so remote, but that you may take the advantage of his destruction to advance your self; and this middle way was certainly the best, if it were easie to be kept, but because I think it impossible, it is necessary to take to one of the other two; and either to remove your self quite, or get in as near him as you can; he who does otherwise, is in a great deal of danger, especially if he be a man of any Eminence and Estate: for it is not enough

enough to say, I expect nothing, I desire neither honour nor preferment, I had rather live at ease, without any controverſie or trouble; for thoſe ſayings are oftner heard than believed: nor can great men, if they did really deſire it, continue in that condition, becauſe no body believes them, and no body will ſuffer them. A man is therefore rather to play the fool like *Brutus*, and he does it abundantly that flatters and applauds every thing his Prince ſees, or ſpeaks, or does, how contrary ſoever it be to his own judgment and mind. And as *Brutus* was wiſe in pretending that folly; till occaſion was offered for the deliverance of his Country, ſo he was a ſevere aſſertor of its liberty, when obtained, of which ſeverity we ſhall ſpeak in the next Chapter.

## C H A P. III.

*The liberty newly acquired, could not have been preſerved, but by the execution of Brutus his Sons.*

**T**He ſeverity of *Brutus* in maintaining that liberty which he had procur'd in *Rome*, was no leſs neceſſary than profitable. 'Tis an example well worthy to be tranſmitted to poſterity, to ſee a Father ſitting in judgment upon his Sons, and not only ſentence them to death, but be preſent, and a ſpectator of their execution. But ſo it is decreed, and it will be found ſo by all that are converſant in Antiquity, that upon any alteration of Government, (whether from better to worſe; or worſe to better, it is the ſame thing) it is neceſſary ſevere example ſhould be made of ſomebody that oppoſed it, if you deſire the new form would be preſerved. In ſhort, this I affirm, that whoever ſets up a Tyranny, cannot hope to maintain it, but by cutting off *Brutus*; and whoever ſets up a free State, is as unlike to continue it, but by taking off *Brutus* his Sons; and of this we have diſcourſed ſo largely before, there is no need of enlarging here, I ſhall add only one example which hapned in our Country and times. *Piero Soderini* having reſtored the liberty of *Flarence* believed that by his patience and moderation he could have mollified their minds, who like the Sons of *Brutus* were impatient of reviving the old tyranny again. But he was highly miſtaken, and ſo much the more to blame, by how much he was a wiſe man, and knew well enough that there was a neceſſity of removing ſuch perſons as by their ambition oppoſed themſelves againſt him; yet though there was a neceſſity to do it, and he had ſo fair an occaſion, he let it paſs and never made uſe of it: for beſides that, he believed his patience and good nature would have wrought upon ſome, and his munificence and bounty upon others (as he often declared among his friends) he had an opinion, that to make a ſtout and vigorous oppoſition againſt his Enemies; it would be neceſſary for him to take upon him an extraordinary authority, which would not only be a breach of the Laws, but of the civil equality of the City; and if he ſhould aſſume ſuch a power, and perhaps exerciſe it well himſelf, yet the people would be ſo terrified thereby, that after his death they would never agree to the making their *Gonſaloniere* for life, which office he thought fit to have augmented and maintained: this conſideration, though wiſe and good in it ſelf, was not prudent at that time, becauſe we are never to entertain a preſent miſchief in hopes of a future good, eſpecially when, for ought we know, that good may be oppreſſed by that miſchief: he ought rather to have had a care that the end of his intentions might have appeared for the good and benefit of his Country, and not out of any particular ambition; and to have provided that whoever ſucceeded him afterwards in his dignity, ſhould not be able to employ that authority to the ruine of the State, which he was forc'd to take upon him to preſerve it. But the good man was miſtaken in his firſt opinion, as not underſtanding that the malice of mankind is not to be extinguished with time, nor appeaſed with preſents; for could he have imitated the ſeverity of *Brutus*, he had preſerved his own dignity, and the liberty of the State. But as it is a difficult thing to preſerve the liberty of a State, ſo it is no leſs difficult to preſerve the authority of a King, as ſhall be ſhewn in the next Chapter.

C H A P. IV.

*A Prince is never safe in his new Conquests, whilst they are in being whom he dispossessed.*

**T**He death of *Tarquinius Priscus* by the Sons of *Ancus*, and the death of *Servius Tullius* by *Tarquinius Superbus* shews how dangerous it is to dispossess any man of a Kingdom, and for him to live, though you endeavour by all means possible to care for him: *Tarquinius Priscus* thought his Title unquestionable, being made King by the People, and confirmed by the Senate; nor could it enter into his thoughts that the malice and indignation of the Sons of *Ancus* should be so great, as to keep them from submitting to that wherewith the whole City of *Rome* was contented. *Servius Tullius* was mistaken in the same manner, in thinking with new favours and obligations to have pacified the Sons of *Tarquin*. So that from the first example, a Prince may take warning, and not delude himself with an opinion he is safe, whilst any of them are living whom he dispossessed; and from the second he may inform himself, that old injuries are never cancelled by new favours, especially if the favours be not equivalent to the injury. And without doubt *Servius Tullius* was ill advised to believe that the Sons of *Tarquin* would be content to be his Sons-in-Law, when it was their due to be his King. And this ambition, and impatience to govern, is so great and insatiable in mankind, that it not only affects those persons who have some right and expectation to govern, but those likewise who in reason can have no such expectancy, as in the example of *Tullia* the Daughter of *Servius*, but married to one of the *Tarquins*: which *Tullia* was so enflamed with a desire of governing, that not contented with being a King's Daughter, transported with rage, contrary to all filial duty and affection, she incited her Husband against her Father, and forc'd him into a conspiracy, not only against his Kingdom, but Life. Whereas if *Tarquinius Priscus* and *Servius Tullius* had known how to have secured themselves against those they had supplanted, they had neither lost their Kingdoms nor Lives. But *Tarquinius Superbus* was expell'd for not observing the Laws and Practices of the ancient Kings his Predecessors, as shall appear in the next Chapter.

C H A P. V.

*How a King may lose his Kingdom, though he comes to it by inheritance.*

**T***Arquinius Superbus* seemed to have secure possession of the Kingdom upon the death of *Servius Tullius*, who dying without heirs, left him nothing of that trouble and vexation which his Predecessors encountred. For although the way, by which he came to the Government was irregular and abominable; nevertheless had he followed the steps of his Predecessors, and observed their old rules, he would not have run himself so fatally in to the displeasure of the Senate and People, nor have provoked them to have been so diligent in his expulsion. Nor is it to be believed, that his Son *Sextus* his deflowring of *Lucretia* was the chief cause that he lost his Kingdom, but his infraction of the Laws, his tyranny, his usurpation upon the Senate, and his ingrossing all authority to himself: for he had brought things to that pass, that those affairs which were formerly debated publicly by the Senate, and according to their sentiment and order were put in execution, were now transacted and determined privately in his own Palace, with great dissatisfaction and offence; so that in a short time *Rome* was deprived of the liberty which it enjoyed under other Kings: nor was it enough for him to disoblige the Senate, but he run himself into the odium of the people, harassing them out by mechanick and servile employments to which they had never been used in the days of his Predecessors; by which cruel and insolent actions he had so incensed and inflamed the minds of the *Romans* against him, that they were ready for rebellion the first opportunity that offered it self; and if that accident had not hapned to *Lucretia*, as soon as any other had fallen out, it would have had the same effect. And if *Tarquin* had governed, and lived according to the example of his Ancestors, and his Son *Sextus* had committed that error, *Brutus* and *Collatinus* would have addressed themselves to *Tarquin* (and not to the people of *Rome*) for justice against his Son. Let Princes therefore observe that they begin to ruine their own dignity and power, when

they first go about to transgress and violate the old Laws and Customs of their Ancestors: and if after they are removed, and dispossessed of their authority, they should grow so wise as to understand the felicity of governing a Kingdom with good Counsel, their loss would be more insupportable, and they would condemn themselves to a greater punishment than any body else would condemn them; for 'tis easier to be beloved by good people, than bad, and to obey Laws, than to command them; and to understand the way by which this is to be done, they have no more to do, but to observe the lives of good Princes, as *Timoleon the Corinthian*, *Aratus Sicionius* and others, in which they will find so much ease and security to him that governs, and them that are governed, that they will be tempted to imitate them, if for nothing but the easiness of it. For when men are governed well, they desire no other liberty; as it hapned to the people who were governed by the two persons above named, whom they compelled to continue their Princes whilst they lived, though they endeavoured several times to have laid down, and betaken themselves to a private condition. And because in this and the two precedent Chapters, we have discoursed of the hatred contracted against Princes, and the Conspiracy of the Sons of *Brunnus* against the State; and others against *Tarquinius Priscus*, and *Servius Tullius*, I think it not amiss to speak of Conspiracies more largely in my next Chapter, as being a subject well worth the observation both of Princes and private Persons.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Of Conspiracies.*

I Did not think it inconvenient in this place to discourse something of Conspiracies, seeing they are things of such consequence and danger, both to Princes & private Persons; for by them more Princes have lost their States and their Lives than by open War; and the reason is, because few persons are qualified to make War, but every body can conspire. On the other side, for a private person, no enterprize is more dangerous and rash; for let him manage it as wisely as he can, it is full of difficulty, and uncertainty of success; and from hence it is that among so many Conspiracies there are so few which arrive at the end that was designed. To the end therefore that Princes may learn how to defend themselves; and private persons might be more cautious of engaging themselves in them, but may rather be contented to live quietly under the Government where they are placed, I shall enlarge upon the subject, and leave nothing behind that is considerable for the document either of the one or the other. It is a certain truth, and well said of *Cornelius Tacitus*, that men are to pay an honour and respect to things past, and obedience to things present: that they ought to desire good Princes, but when they are once in authority, they are to be endur'd, and those who go about to conspire against them, do most commonly ruine themselves or their Country.

To come therefore to the point, we are first to consider against whom these Conspiracies are made, and we shall find them either against their Country, or Prince: and of these two sorts of Conspiracies we shall discourse at present, because of those which are entred into, to deliver up a besieged Town to the Enemy, or upon such occasion, we have spoken amply before. And first of the Conjurations against a Prince, and the occasions of them, which are many, but one of more importance than all the rest, and that is the hatred of the people; for that Prince who has contracted the universal odium of the people, may with reason believe that some of those whom he has offended will study to revenge themselves; and they will be the more industrious in it, by how much they observe the general discontent and animosity against him. A Prince therefore is by all means possible to prevent the hatred of the People, (but having spoken of it before, I shall not enlarge upon it again.) For by keeping himself from the general hatred, particular offences will not be able to amount to a War; first, because all men have not the same resentment, and will not put themselves in danger to revenge an injury; and then because if the discontented were all of a mind, and had power to do it, yet they are discouraged by the affection which they observe in the multitude towards their Prince. The injury done by the Prince, is either upon the Estate, Blood, or Honour of the Subject: where the injury extends to Blood, threatening is very dangerous, and much more than down-right execution; for when a man is kill'd, he is past thinking of revenge, and those who are alive will quickly forget him; but when a man is threatned, and finds himself under a necessity of suffering, or do-  
ing

ing something extraordinary, he becomes immediately dangerous, and ought to be regarded by the Prince, as I shall shew hereafter. Next to this necessary for the preservation of ones life, Honour and Estate are the two tenderest points in which men are soonest offended; and of which the Prince is likewise to have a particular care, for no man can be pillaged so perfectly, but he will have a Knife left to revenge himself; nor no man can be dishonoured to such a degree of debasement, but he will have courage enough left to attempt something in revenge; and in point of honour, no injury goes so near a man as what reflects upon the woman; and next to that, is to be despised. This was it, that arm'd *Pausanias* against *Philip* of *Macedon*, and many other Subjects against many other Princes. In our times *Julius Belanti* had never conspired against *Pandolfus* Tyrant of *Siena*, had he not first given him his Daughter to Wife, and then taken her from him again, as we shall shew more at large hereafter. The great motive of the Conjurati<sup>o</sup>n of the *Pazzi* against the *Medici* was the Patrimony of *Giovanni Bonromei*, which was given from them by the award of the *Medici*. But there is another motive (and that no small one) which makes people conspire against their Prince, and that is a desire of rescuing their Country from tyranny and usurpation. This was it which set *Brutus* and *Cassius* at work against *Cæsar*. This was it which excited others against *Phalaris*, *Dyemsius*, &c. and against this there is no remedy, but depositing their usurpations, and because there are few will do that, there are but few which escape the ill consequence.

*Ad Generum Cereris, sine caede, & sanguine paucis  
Descendunt Reges, & sicca morte Tyranni.*

*Slaughter and Blood pursues, he seldom sees  
Dry in his Coffin that a Tyrant dies.*

But in Conspiracies, as I said before, the dangers are so great and various, that there is not only a hazard in the designing, management, and execution, but even after the execution is done. The Conspirators are either one or more; one cannot properly be called a Conspiracy, but a firm resolution in a single person to make away his Prince; this way of Conspiracy is more secure than the other, because till it comes to execution, it can never be known, no body being privy to his secret, and therefore no danger of coming to the ears of the Prince. These kind of resolutions may fall into the heart of any man, great or small, noble or ignoble, favourites or strangers: no man but some time or other may have access to his Prince, and he that has opportunity to speak with him, has opportunity to do worse. *Pausanias* murdered *Philip* of *Macedon* as he was going to the Temple attended with a thousand of his Guards, and walking betwixt his own Son and his Son in Law; but *Pausanias* was a Gentleman, and very conversant at Court, but there was a poor contemptible Spaniard who stabb'd *Ferdinand* King of *Spain* in the Neck, and though the wound was not mortal, yet it was enough to shew us that there is no man so inconsiderable, but if he has courage to undertake, he may have opportunity to it: *Dervis* a Turkish Priest drew his Sword upon *Bajazet* Father to this Present Emperor, and though he did not kill him, yet it was not for want either of courage or opportunity. Nor is it to be doubted but there are many ill enough disposed, who wish from their hearts to be revenged on their Tyrants, but there are few that dare venture, and scarce one of those few but dies in the attempt, and no man will expose himself where there is no hopes to escape. But enough of this pertinacious malevolence in a single person, we will speak now of Conspiracies betwixt a number: I say that in History all Conspiracies are found to be acted by great Persons, and such as have familiarity with their Prince; for others, unless they be mad men or fools, will never attempt it, because people that are weak, & remote from the Court, are destitute of all those hopes and conveniences that are requisite for the execution of such a design. First, men of slender fortune or interest cannot impart themselves freely, no body will be true to them, because no man can concert with them upon any of those hopes which do usually encourage men to the undertaking of any great danger; so that they can hardly communicate to two or three persons, but one of them is an Informer, and the other are ruined. But if they should be so happy as not to be betrayed, the execution is attended with so many difficulties by reason of the difficulty of their access, that it is impossible but they must miscarry: and if great persons, and such as are very conversant with their Prince are subject to such hazards, those doubtless must be much more who are under none of those qualifications. Wherefore, when men of mean fortune, or little access at Court consider their own weakness and inability, they are discouraged from any such designs; and if at any time they be offended, and would do their Prince a mischief, they content themselves

with libelling and railing, and expect when persons of greater access and capacity should revenge them upon his person, and if any of these persons are so far transported, as to attempt any thing of this nature, their good will is more to be commended than their discretion. We see then, where any great Conspiracy has been made, it has been by great persons, and such as have been familiar with their Prince, and that as often upon the score of benefits, as injuries received; so it was in the Conspiracy of *Perennius* against *Commodus*, *Plautianus* against *Severus*, *Sejanus* against *Tiberius*, all of them preferred by their several Emperors, and advanced to such Honours, Authority and Estates, that their power seem'd to want nothing of perfection, but the Imperial Ensigns, and that they might have them as well as the rest, they conspired every one of them against their Prince, and their Conspiracies had such ends as their ingratitude deserved. However, in the memory of our Fathers the Conspiracy of *Giacopo d' Apiano* against Messer *Piero Gambacorti* Prince of *Pisa* had a better end; for the said *Giacopo* having been brought up, and carested, and advanced by the said *Piero* deposed his Benefactor, and took away his Government for his pains. Another of the same nature was that of *Coppola* in our days against *Ferdinand* of *Arragon*, though it had not the same success; for *Coppola* being arrived at that height of Authority, that there was nothing but the bare name wanting to make him King, he attempted for that, and lost his life in the business. And certainly if any Conspiracy might have succeeded, it was his, being a person as powerful as the King himself, and seconded with all the conveniences he could desire: but the same greediness of dominion that blinded him in the undertaking, blinded him in the prosecution of his design; for had it been managed with the least prudence, it would have been impossible to have miscarried.

A Prince therefore who would preserve himself against Conspiracy, is to have an eye rather upon those he has obliged, than those he has offended; for they that are offended have not those frequent opportunities that the other have; and for the disposition, it is much alike, the desire of dominion being as great if not greater than the desire of revenge; so then authority is to be given to his friends with that caution, that there be always some space or interval left betwixt the preferment of the Favourite, and the sovereignty of the Prince, lest if his ambition should not be satisfied, he should aspire immediately at the Crown. But to return to our design, I say, that Conspirators being to be great men, and such as have easie access to the Prince, we are now to enquire into the successes of their Plots, and see what have been the causes of their prosperity or miscarriage. And because (as I said before) the danger is considerable in the management, execution, and afterwards; for that reason there are very few of them that arrive at their proposed end. In their contrivances and consultations there is such extraordinary danger, that unless they be carried on with singular caution and prudence, they will be easily discovered; and they are discovered two ways, either by down-right impeachment, or by conjecture and presumption. Impeachment proceeds either from infidelity or folly in those persons with whom you have communicated; infidelity is easily found, for you cannot communicate in that nature but with such of your Confidants as you suppose will venture their lives for you; or else with such persons as are dissatisfied with the Government: of such kind of Confidants, one or two may possibly be found, but when you begin to multiply them, and commit your secret to more, you must necessarily be betrayed; for their affection to you must be very great, if the apprehension of the danger, and the fear of the punishment do not deter them: besides, men are many times mistaken in the affection of their friends; for they can never be assured of them till they have made experiment, and to make experiment in such ways as this, is exceedingly dangerous, and if perchance you have had trial of them in some other matters of importance in which they have behaved themselves faithfully and well, yet you can take no true measures from that, because this surpasses all other dangers whatsoever. If you presume upon his discontent, animosity to his Prince, you may be easily deceived, for as soon as you have discovered your design, you have given him a power to reconcile himself, and his rancour must be very great, or your influence extraordinary to keep him faithful: hence it is that many Conspiracies are discovered, and as it were nipp'd in the Bud; and when any of them are kept private where many persons are privy, 'tis look'd upon as a miracle, as that of *Piso* against *Nero*, and in our times that of the *Pazzi* against *Lorenzo*, and *Giuliano de Medici*, in which though fifty were concerned, it was never discovered till it came to execution; for discoveries by indiscretion, they happen when one of the Conspirators talks carelessly, so as some servant or third person picks it out, as it hapned to the Sons of *Brutus*, who in their Negotiations with *Tarquin's* Embassadors, were over-heard, and accused by one of the Servants: another way is when out of levity you communicate with some Child or Woman that you love, or such other incontinent person, as *Dimus* did, who being (with *Philotas*) entred into a Conspiracy against *Alexander* the Great,



Great, imparted it to a Boy that he loved, called *Ficomachus* who told it to his Brother *Cibalinus*, and *Cibalinus* discovered it to the King. As to discoveries by circumstances and conjecture, we have an example in the *Psonian* Conspiracy against *Nero*, in which *Scævius* one of the Conspirators having the day before *Nero* was to have been murder'd, made his Will, ordered *Milichius* his Freeman to furbish up his old rusty Sword, enfranchised all his Slaves, distributed Money among them, and caused Plagets and Ligatures to be made to bind up Wounds, he gave occasion of conjecture to *Milichius*, who accused him thereupon to *Nero*, and Order being given for his apprehension, *Scævius* was taken into custody, and with him *Natalis* another of the Conspirators, who had been observed to have talked privately with him a long time the day before, and not agreeing about their discourse, they contradicted one another, and were forced to confess all.

From these occasions of discovery it is impossible to be secur'd, but either by malice, imprudence, or inadvertency, all will out when ever the Conspirators exceed the number of three or four. For if more than one of them be taken, 'tis impossible but they must interfere, because two people cannot hang together so exactly in a Story. If there be but one apprehended, and he be a stout man, perhaps he may have that constancy and resolution as to conceal his Confederates; but then his Confederates must have as much courage as he, and not discover themselves by their flight; for whose heart soever fails, whether his that is apprehended, or his that is escaped, 'tis the same thing, for the Plot is discovered. That example which is mentioned by *Titus Livius* is very rare and unusual, where in a Conspiracy against *Girolamo* King of *Syracuse*, he speaks of one of the Conspirators called *Theodorus*, who being seized, concealed his accomplices with incomparable constancy, and accused all the Kings Friends; and his Companions were so confident in his courage, that none of them fled, or made the least discovery by their fear. These are the dangers which are to be pass'd in the conduct or management of an Enterprize, before it comes to execution; and as there are dangers, so there are ways of evading them.

The first, the surest, and indeed the only way is not to give your Confederates time to discover you, but to communicate the business to them when it is just ready for execution, and not before. Those who take that course, are free from the danger of Threatnings and Negotiations, and commonly from all the rest, and have been observed frequently to come to good end, and there is no man that is wise, but would carry it so if he could. I shall give you only two Examples. *Nelmatus* being unable to endure the Tyranny of *Aristotimus* King of *Epirus*, got several of his Friends and Relations together into his house, and exhorting them to the deliverance of their Country, some of them desired them to consider, and prepare themselves; whereupon *Nelmatus* caused his Servants to make fast the doors, and protested to all the whole Company, that they should swear to go immediately about it, or he would deliver them up Prisoners to *Aristotimus*, upon which they all took the Oath, and falling incontinently to the work, they effected their design, as *Nelmatus* had contriv'd it. One of the *Magi* having by fraud possessed himself of the Kingdom of *Persia*, and *Orphanus* a great Person of that Kingdom, having discovered the cheat, he had a conference with six others of his own quality, to contrive how they might rescue their Country from the Tyranny of that Usurper, and (as in the case before) when some of them desired time, *Darius* (one of the six) stood up and declared boldly, That if they would not execute it presently, he would accuse them every one, and doing it forthwith, they prospered accordingly. Not unlike these two, was the way which the *Aetolians* used in the Assassination of *Nabis* the Tyrant of *Sparta*: They sent one of their Citizens called *Alexamenes* to him with 30 Horse, 200 Foot under a pretence of a supply, commanding the Soldiers to be obedient to the orders of their chief Officers, but acquainted nobody with the design but *Alexamenes* himself. *Alexamenes* marched to *Sparta* with his Forces, but communicating nothing of his instructions, till they were fit to be executed, he did his business, and the Tyrant was slain; by which reservedness they avoided the first dangers of being discovered, which are obvious in the management, and whoever takes the same course, shall avoid them as well as they. *Piso* (whom I have mention'd before) was a man of honour and reputation, a great intimate of *Nero's*, and one in whom he placed a great deal of confidence. *Nero* visited him often, and was many times treated very magnificently in his Garden. *Piso* by virtue of this intimacy was able to make choice of such Complices as were stout and courageous, and disposed to such an Exploit (which for great men to do, is no difficult matter) and when occasion was offered, to break the business to them so suddenly, that having no time either to deliberate or deny him, he must necessarily succeed; and he who examines all the other Examples that are mentioned, will find very few, but have been managed the same way: But men of little experience in the affairs of the world, do many times commit great errors, and more, when their designs

are extraordinary, as in this. A Plot then is never to be imparted, but upon necessity, and when it is ripe for execution; and when you do communicate, do it but to one, and that a person of whom you have had long experience, or one that is prompted by the same interest and provocation as your self; and to find one person so, is much easier than to find many, and by consequence that way is nothing so dangerous. Besides, if you should be mistaken in your confidence, you have more remedy and defence, than where the Conspirators are several; for I have heard wise men say, that to a single person a man may say any thing; (for if nothing be to be produced under your hand) your no, will be as good as his yea: But writing is to be shun'd as a rock, for nothing is of so much conviction, as a note under a man's own hand. *Plautianus* desiring to murder *Severus* the Emperor, and his Son *Antoninus*; committed the execution to *Saturnius* a Tribune, who had more mind to betray, than obey him; but suspecting that when he came to accuse him, *Plautianus* should have more credit than he, he desired a Warrant under his hand to confirm his Commission, which *Plautianus* granted, being blinded with ambition, whereby it happen'd that he was accused, convicted, and condemned, whereas without that Note, and some other circumstances, *Plautianus* would have been acquitted, and his accuser been punished, so obstinately did *Plautianus* deny all. In the *Psossian* Conspiracy, there was a Woman called *Epicaris*, who had been formerly one of *Nero's* Mistresses. This *Epicaris* thinking it of importance to bring in a Captain of certain Gallies which *Nero* kept for his Guard, she communicated the Plot, but conceal'd the Conspirators, and the Captain betraying her, and accusing her to *Nero*, *Epicaris* maintained the contrary with such constancy, that the Emperor was amaz'd, and discharged her. So then, he that communicates a thing of this Nature to one, runs but these two dangers, either of being spontaneously accused, and proof brought to make it good; or else being accused by accident and of force, as when his Confederatè is apprehended upon suspicion, and impeaches him upon the Rack, in both which cases there is something to be said; for in the first he may pretend malice, in the second fear, and that the extremity of his torture constrained him to say false: So that it is great wisdom to communicate with no body, till your designs be ripe but to proceed according to the examples aforesaid; but if you must communicate, to do it but to one alone, and by himself; in which though there be some danger, yet there is much less than where you communicate with many. Another way, and not unlike this, is when the fury or violence of a Tyrant necessitates you to do that to him, which otherwise he would be sure to do to you; and sometimes it is so sudden and fierce, it leaves you scarce time to think of securing your self. This is an exigence and necessity that has most commonly a good end, and to prove it, I will produce two examples, and no more. *Commodus* the Emperour had two Captains of his Guards (one of them called *Lettus*, and the other *Elettus*) particularly in his favour, and *Martia* was the most intimate of his Concubines. They having taken the liberty to admonish him of his ill Courses, and the reflection his ill conversation had both upon his Person and Government, he resolv'd to rid himself of his Monitors, and to that end writ down the names of *Martia*, *Lettus*, *Elettus*, and others (who he designed should be put to death the next night) and put the Note under his Pillow. Being gone out into a Bath, a Child that he lov'd exceedingly, being rummaging about the room, happened upon this Paper, and going out with it in his hand, *Martia* met him by accident, took it from him, read it, sent it immediately to *Lettus* and *Elettus*, who being sensible of their danger, resolv'd to prevent him, and without more ado, killed *Commodus* in the Evening.

*Antoninus Caracalla* the Emperor, was with his Army in *Mesopotamia*, and having made *Macrinus* his General (a better Statesman than Soldier) it hapned (as it does to all Princes that are wicked) that he began to apprehend (what he knew he deserved) that some body conspired against him. To be more certain, he writ privately to a friend (called *Materianus*) in *Rome*, to consult the Astrologers, and give him notice whether any body was contriving against the Empire. *Materianus* writ him word he had consulted them, that there were those who did aspire at the Empire, and that *Macrinus* was the man. This Letter coming by accident to the hands of *Macrinus*, before the Emperor saw it, he found the necessity that was upon him either to kill or be kill'd; and thereupon committed the execution to a confidant of his call'd *Martialis* (whose Brother *Antoninus* had slain not many days before) who kill'd him accordingly. We see then that this necessity which allows us no time, has the same effect in a manner with the course which was taken by *Nelmatius* of *Epirus*, as I have mentioned before. We see likewise, that (as I said in the beginning of these discourses) that Commination and threatning does a Prince more mischief, and are the occasion of more Plots, than violence it self. A Prince therefore is to have a care of that; to care for those that are about him, and keep them in their Allegiance by

by his courtesie and kindness ; if that will not do, he is to secure himself otherwise as well as he can, but never to bring them into a condition of thinking themselves under a necessity of killing or being kill'd. As to the dangers which attend the execution of a Plot, they proceed either from a sudden alteration of Orders ; a sudden defection of courage in him that is to execute ; some imprudence in the attempt ; or some imperfection in the act, as when all are not killed that were intended. And first we must understand that there is nothing gives so much Embarrassment, and distraction to the action of men as new and contradictory orders to be executed in an instant: and quite contrary to what was determined before. And if in any thing this variation be dangerous, it is in Martial affairs, and in such things as we have now spoken of ; for in those cases there is nothing so necessary as that every man may know certainly his part, that beforehand he may contrive with himself, and conclude upon all the circumstances of the Fact ; whereas if they have fram'd their designs, and fix'd upon their way, and immediately new Orders are brought repugnant to the former, it disturbs all, and the whole Plot must be ruined ; so that it is better to execute it according to the first Order, though there be something of inconvenience, than to vary your Orders, with a thousand times more : But this is meant only where the variation is sudden, for where you have time enough, it is not so dangerous. The Conspiracy of the *Pazzi* against *Lorenzo* and *Giuliano de Medici* is very well known. Their first Orders were ; That an entertainment should be made for the Cardinal of *St. George*, to which the *Medici* should be invited, and killed. Every mans Office was assigned ; some were to kill them ; some were to secure the Palace ; and others to ride up and down the City, and proclaim liberty to the people : It happened when the *Pazzi*, *Medici*, and Cardinal were altogether in the Cathedral in *Florence* at Divine Service, news was brought that *Julian* would not be at Dinner : Hereupon the Conspirators consulting again, it was resolv'd to alter the Plot, and do that in the Church which was designed in the Chamber : This sudden alteration, discompos'd the whole order ; for *Giovan battista da Montesecco* would not consent to add Sacrilege to his Murther, and commit it in the Church ; upon which they were forced to appoint another in his place, and shift all their Agents from one Office to another, and their time being too short to fix their resolutions, they committed so many errors in the execution, that all of them miscarried. And among the Conspirators, when things come to be executed, their heart many times fails them, either out of sudden reverence, or sudden fear ; for the presence and Majesty of some Princes is so awful, it either mitigates or frightens the fury of the Executioner ; *Marius* being taken and kept Prisoner by the *Minturnenses*, they sent a Servant to kill him ; but the poor slave was so terrified at the sight of his Person, and the Memory of his Name, that his courage fail'd, and he was not able to go thorow ; and if the consideration of his quality, and the Majesty of his Countenance could do so much, in a person that was a Prisoner, and in distress ; how much more are they effectual in a free Prince, magnificently adorn'd, and as nobly attended. Certainly such a sight is able to strike terror into the boldest person, and work compassion in the most cruel miscreant.

Some there were who conspired against *Sitalcis* King of *Thrace* : The day was appointed for the execution ; they met at the place, where the Prince was ; but when the stroke was to be given, no body durst venture, they departed as they came, every body blamed one another, but no body knew what was the impediment, and having attempted it often with the same intimidation, they were discovered at last, and received punishment for an offence which they might, but would not put in execution. *Alfonso* Duke of *Ferrara* had two Brothers, who conspired against him, and employed *Giannes* a Priest and Chantor in the said Dukes Chappel, to bring the Duke to them, which he did many times, and it was in their power to have killed him ; but yet not any of them durst strike him, so that at length they also were discovered, and received their reward. This remorse can proceed from nothing but the terror of his presence, or the influence of his behaviour and humanity, which compels them to mercy. But the defects and disappointments in these kind of executions, proceed either from imprudence, or terror, with either of which, the minds of the Conspirators being disturbed, they become so confused and distracted, they can neither say, nor do any thing as they should. And that men are subject to those confusions and surprizes, cannot be better demonstrated than by *Livy's* description of *Alexamenus* the *Etolian*, of whom we have spoken before : For when the time was come for the execution of his design against *Nabis* the *Spartan*, having imparted it to his friends, *Livy* tells us, *Collegit, et ipse animum, confusum tanta cogitatione rei. He recollected his mind, which was in some measure confounded with the contemplation of the Enterprize.* For there is no man, how resolute and bloody soever he be, but must be surprized and discompos'd in such cases as those, wherefore for such Exploits, experienced men, and such as have been

been used to those kind of affairs, are to be chosen, and no other, though never so stout; for he that has had no tryal of himself in that nature, ought not to presume barely upon his courage; nor can he promise himself any certain success, by reason that the terror and perturbation of his mind is many times so strong, that it makes his Weapon fall out of his hand, or words fall from his Mouth, which discover the whole Plot. *Lucilla* the Sister of *Commodus*, ordered *Quintianus* to kill her Brother: *Quintianus* waited for *Commodus* as he came into the Amphitheater, and meeting him when he came, he ran at him with his naked Sword, crying aloud, *Questo ti mando il Senato, The Senate sends you this*; but those words gave an alarm, and he was seized before he could lift up his arm to give the blow. *Messer Antonio da Volterra*, deputed (as is said before) to kill *Lorenzo de Medici*, when he advanced to assault him, cried out, *Ab Traytor!* but that exclamation was the preservation of *Lorenzo*, and the ruine of the Conspirators. But these Enterprizes are difficult, when directed only against one person, for the reasons abovesaid, yet when they are bent against two, they are much more, because in several places it is impossible any design should be well executed at once; so that to conspire against a Prince in that way, is a doubtful, dangerous and imprudent thing. Were it not for the reverence I bear to the Author, I should scarce believe what *Herodian* says of *Plautianus*, that he committed to one single Centurion called *Saturninus*, the killing of *Severus* and *Antoninus* who lived in several places; for 'tis so irrational a thing, that nothing but his Authority could have persuaded me to it. Certain young Gentlemen of *Athens* conspired against *Diocles* and *Hippias*, two Tyrants in that City. They killed *Diocles*, but *Hippias* escaped, and revenged his death. *Chionos* and *Leonides* of *Heraclea*, two of *Plato's* Disciples, conspired against *Clearchus* and *Satirus*, two Tyrants of that place; *Clearchus* was murdered, but *Satirus* survived and revenged it. The *Pazzi* (whom we have so often mentioned) killed only *Julian de Medici*, his brother escaping; so that from these Conspiracies against several persons, all wise people will abstain, as things that are fatal to themselves, their Country, and every body else; for those who escape are thereby render'd the more cruel and Tyrannical, as appears by the abovesaid examples in *Florence*, *Athens*, and *Heraclea*. And therefore the Conspiracy of *Pelopidas* against the Tyrants of *Thebes* was admirable, in respect of the success, seeing not only one, but ten of them were to be murdered; and that he was neither a favourite, nor had easie access to them; but was a Rebel, and in banishment; yet he overcame all these difficulties, got into *Thebes*, killed the Tyrants, and delivered his Country; but with the assistance of *Caron* one of the Tyrants great Counsellors who gave him admission, and contributed much to his success. But let no man presume upon this example, for it is looked upon not only as a rare thing, but as a miracle. The execution of such a design may be interrupted likewise by a false imagination, or some unexpected accident happening in the very act. The very morning that *Brutus* and his Confederates were to murder *Cæsar*, it hapned that he had a long discourse with *Cn. Popilius Lenas* one of the Conspirators, which the rest of the accomplices observing, concluded that *Popilius* had discovered all to *Cæsar*, and was giving him an account; whereupon it was proposed to kill *Cæsar* presently, and not to defer it till he was in the Senate; and doubtless they had done it, but that their discourse broke off, and *Cæsar* went away without any Commotion. These imaginations are sometimes very considerable, and to be regarded with a great deal of prudence, and the rather, because they are easily taken up; for he who is conscious to himself, is always apt to suspect that they are talking of him; and it may so fall out, that a word spoken to another intent, may gaul and disturb you as much as if it were spoken on purpose, and either forte you to fly, or so hasten and precipitate the execution, that you run your self upon many inconveniences, especially where many are privy to the Plot. As to the accidents, because they are unexpected and occasional, no directions can be given against them, but examples by which men are to regulate and be cautious. *Julius Belanti* of *Siena* (whom we have mentioned before) being incensed against *Pandolfus*, who had given him his Daughter in Marriage, and taken her from him again, conspired his death, and laid his design thus, *Pandolfus* went almost every day to visit one of his Relations that was sick; and in his passage went commonly by *Julius* his house: upon this consideration, *Julius* got all his accomplices together into his house, with intention to assault him as he went by; to which purpose he armed them all, and disposed them into the Porch, that they might be ready upon a signal to be given from a Window above: It hapned that *Pandolfus*, being just by, the person at the Window gave the signal, when by accident in the very nick of time *Pandolfus* met a friend, and stopt to salute him: Some of his Attendants passing on, heard a noise of Arms, took the Alarm, and discovered the Ambuscade; so that *Pandolfus* was miraculously preserved, *Julio* and his Companions forced to fly from *Siena*, and all by the accident of this encounter,

counter, which not only hindred the execution at that time, but defeated the whole enterprise.

But against these accidents no remedy can be prescribed, because they happen so rarely; however it is necessary to think of as many, and provide against them as well as we can. It remains now that we say something of those dangers which we incur after execution is done; of which sort there is but one, and that is, when somebody is left alive that may revenge it: as his children, brothers, kinsmen, and such others to whom the sovereignty may descend by right of inheritance, and these may be left to revenge the death of their Predecessor, either by your negligence, or by some of the accidents aforesaid, as it hapned to *Giovanni Andrea da Lampognano*, who conspiring with other persons, killed the Duke of Milan, but they left two of his Brothers and one of his Sons behind, who revenged it in due time. But in these cases the Conspirators are to be excused, because there is no remedy to be provided; but where by their own imprudence or negligence they suffer any such to escape, there it is otherwise, and they are highly to be condemned: At *Forum Livii* some there were who conspired against Count *Girolamo*, slew him, seized upon his wife and children, (which were very young) and clap'd them in Prison; a great mind they had to the Castle, but the Governour was refractory, and would not admit them; the Councils (called *Madonna Caterina*) made them a proposition, that if they would suffer her to go into him, she would prevail with the Governour to surrender, and that in the mean time her children should be left as hostages in their hands. The Conspirators believed her, and let her go in, but she was no sooner in the Castle, but she began to upbraid them by the death of her Husband, and threaten them with all possible revenge; and to convince them that her care and compassion for her children should not restrain her, she shew'd them her genitals thorow the windows, to let them know, that if they killed those, she had wherewithal to have more: so that perceiving their error too late, and being destitute of all counsel, their indiscretion was punished with their perpetual banishment. But of all dangers after the fact is committed, none is so fatal as the affection of the people to their Prince whom you have slain. For their revenge is not possible to be prevented. Of this, the murder of *Cæsar* may be an example: for the people of *Rome* being his friends, his death was thorowly revenged upon the Conspirators, who afterwards (though in several times and places) were all of them slain. Conjurations against ones Country are not so dangerous as Conjurations against ones Prince; for in the contrivance and management the dangers are not so many; in the execution they are but the same; and after the fact is committed, they are nothing at all. In the management and preparation the dangers are not so many, because a Citizen may make his parry, and put his affairs in a posture without discovery; and if his orders be not interrupted, bring his designs to a very good end; or if they be interrupted by some Law, it is in his power to adjourn the execution, or find out some other way that may be more commodious; but all these (it is to be understood) are to be done only in Commonwealths, where the manners of the people are beginning to be corrupted; because where the City is incorrupt, such designs will never come into any of their thoughts; but in a corrupt Republick where the dangers are not so great, there are many ways for private Citizens to make themselves Princes; because a Commonwealth is not so quick and dexterous as a Prince, their suspicion is less, and by consequence their caution: besides, they are commonly in more awe of their Grandees, and therefore the Grandees are more bold and couragious against them. Every body has read *Catulus's* Conspiracy written by *Salust*, and can tell how *Catiline* (after it was detected) not only continued in *Rome*, but came audaciously into the Senate, and had the confidence to talk insolently both to the Senate and Consul; so great reverence had that City, for its Citizens. And when things were gone so far, that he had left the City, and was got to the head of an Army, *Lentulus*, and the rest of the Conspirators had never been seized, had not there been Letters produced against them under their own hands.

*Hanno* a great Citizen in *Carthage* had a mind to usurp; and in order thereto; he had contrived at the Wedding of one of his Daughters to poison the whole Senate, and then make himself Prince: when his plot was discovered, the Senate troubled themselves with no farther provision against it, than by making a Law against exorbitant feasting upon such kind of occasions, so great was their respect to a Citizen of his quality! But in a Conspiracy against ones Country, the greatest danger lies in the execution; for it seldom happens that a particular Citizen is strong enough to subdue a whole Country; and every man is not General of an Army, as *Cæsar*, *Agathocles*, *Cleomenes*, and others were, who had their Armies ready to back their designs. To such the way is easy and secure; but they who want those advantages must manage their business with more cunning, or employ foreign assistance: this cunning and artifice was used by *Pisistratus* the

*Athenian*; for having overcome the *Megarenses*, and thereby got himself great reputation among the people, he came forth of his house one morning, and shew'd himself wounded to them, complaining that the Nobility had abused him, and desiring that he might be permitted to have a guard for the security of his person; which being granted inconsiderately, gave him opportunity by degrees to make himself absolute. *Pandolfus Petrucci* (with other Exiles) returned to *Siena*, and by way of contempt was made Keeper of the Palace, which was a mechanick employment that others had refused. Yet those few arm'd men who were under his Command by virtue of that place, by degrees gave him such reputation, that at length he made himself Prince. Others have taken other ways, and by time, and their industry, arrived at the same dignity without any danger: but those who have endeavoured to make themselves Masters of their Country by their own force, or foreign supplies, have had various events, as fortune was pleased to befriend them! *Cataline* was ruined: *Hanno* (of whom we have spoken before) failing in his poison, arm'd many thousands of his Partisans, which were all slain with him. Certain of the principal Citizens of *Thebes*, by the help of a *Spartan* Army, made themselves Masters of that City, and tyranniz'd over it: so that if all conspiracies against their Country be examined, there will none, or but very few be found to have miscarried in the management; but the whole stress of their good or bad fortune has layn upon the execution, which being once pass'd, they are subject to no more dangers than what depend upon the nature of the Government; for when a man usurps, and makes himself a Tyrant, he exposes himself to those natural and inseparable dangers which are the consequences of Tyranny, against which he has no other remedies than what have been described before.

This is what I have thought convenient to write upon the subject of Conspiracies; and if I have discoursed only of those which are executed by the sword, and not by poison, it is because they have the same orders and methods. True it is, the way of poison is the most dangerous, as being the more uncertain; because every one has not convenience, but is forc'd to confer with other people, and the necessity of that Conference is much to be feared: besides, many things happen which makes your potion ineffectual, as it fell out to those who killed *Commodus*; who having disgorg'd his poison, forc'd the Conspirators to strangle him. Princes then have no Enemy to which they are more dangerously exposed, than to these Conspiracies, because they are never undertaken against any of them, but they take away his life, or reputation. If they succeed, he dies; if they miscarry, and the instruments be put to death; it is look'd upon as a pretence and invention of the Prince to satiate his avarice or cruelty upon the blood or fortunes of his enemies. My advice therefore is (both to Prince and Commonwealth, that upon the discovery of a Conspiracy, (before they think of revenge) seriously to consider the quality of it, and to compare the condition of the Conspirators with their own: if they find them potent and strong, till they have furnished themselves with a proportionable force, no notice is to be taken; if notice be taken, they are unable to defend themselves, and certainly ruined; for the Conspirators finding themselves discovered, will grow desperate, and be under a necessity of venturing, let the success be what it will. The *Romans* may be an example of this way of dissembling; for having (as we said before) left two of their Legions at *Capua* for the security of that City against the *Sannites*; the Commanders of the said Legions conspir'd to make themselves Masters of the Town. The *Romans* having notice of their designs, committed the prevention of it to *Rutilius* their new Consul, who to lull and delude the Conspirators, gave out that the Senate had confirm'd that Station to those Legions for another winter, which the Legions believed, and thinking then they should have time enough, they neglected to hasten their design, till at length observing the Consul to draw them away insensibly, and dispose them into other parts, they began to suspect, and that suspicion made them discover themselves, and put their plot in execution. Nor can an example be brought more properly for either sides; for by it we may see how cool and remiss people are when they think they have time enough; and how sudden and vigorous when necessity presses them. And the Prince or Commonwealth which would defer the discovery of a Plot, cannot do it with more advantage to himself, than by giving the Conspirators some handsom occasion to believe that they may execute it with more ease and security another time; for thereby the Prince or Commonwealth will have more leisure to provide for their defence: they who have proceeded otherwise, have but hasten'd their own ruine, as we have seen in the case of the Duke of *Athens*, and *Guiselmo de Pazzi*. The Duke having made himself Sovereign in *Florence*, and understanding there were Conspiracies against him; without enquiring farther into the business, caus'd one of them to be apprehended, which giving an alarm to the rest, they immediately took arms, and turn'd the Duke out of his Supremacy. *Guiselmo* being Commissary for that City in the

*Val di Chiana* in the year 1501, having news of a great Plot in *Arezzo* in favour of the *Vitelli*, and that their design was to renounce the dominion of the *Florentines*, he marched thither directly, without considering the power of the Conspirators, or his own, or so much as furnishing himself with what Forces he might have done; and by the advice of the Bishop his Son, causing one of the Conspirators to be seized, the rest fell presently to their arms, disclaim'd the *Florentines*, and took their Commissary prisoner. But when Conspiracies are weak, and in their infancy, if they be discovered, they are to suppress them out of hand, without any suspense, and not to follow the example either of the Duke of *Athens*, or *Dion of Syracuse*, of whom the first caused a Citizen who had discovered a plot to him, to be put to death, that the rest observing how unwilling he was to believe any thing of them, might be the more secure, and hold themselves obliged. *Dion* on the other side suspecting the affections of some people, caused one of his Confidants called *Calippus* to pretend a Conspiracy, and see if he could draw them in; but both these practices succeeded very ill, for by the first, all people were discouraged from making any discovery, and all Conspirators confirmed; and by the other, a way was recommended for the murdering of himself; for *Calippus* finding he had an opportunity to practice without danger, he did it so effectually, that it cost *Dion* both his Government and Life.

CHAP. VII.

*How it comes to pass that in the changes of State, from liberty to servitude, and from servitude to liberty, some are very innocent, and others very bloody.*

SOME people perhaps may wonder how it should come to pass that Governments should be changed from one form to another, sometimes easily, and without blood, and sometimes with great difficulty and slaughter, be the variation as it will, either from liberty to tyranny, or from tyranny to liberty. And this diversity of mutations is so strange, that as History tells us, they happen sometimes with infinite effusion of blood, and at other times without the least injury to any body: as in *Rome*, when the Government was taken from the Kings, and put into the hands of the Consuls, no body was expelled, or so much as molested but the *Tarquins*; but in other alterations it has been otherwise, and the cause of this diversity may (in my judgment) be deduced from the manner in which that State was acquired; if it was obtained by force, it could not be without injury to many people, and then when ever it is destroyed, it will necessarily follow that all those who were injured before, will endeavour to repair and revenge themselves; which is not to be done without great tumult and slaughter. But when a Commonwealth is fix'd gradually, and by universal consent of the people, when it comes to be changed, there is no need of disturbing any body else; for the bare removal of those who are then in authority, will effectually do the business. Of this sort was the revolution at *Rome* upon the translation of the Government from the Kings to the Consuls; and the accident at *Florence* in the year 1494, when the *Medici* were expelled without the least prejudice to any body else; for they having been advanced by the general vote of the people, there was no need of doing more than turning them out of the City. Such mutations are not therefore so dangerous; but those others where many have been injured, and as many are to be revenged, have been so dreadfully destructive, that the very History of their consequences is enough to terrify the Reader; but all Books being full of them, I shall speak no more of them in this place.



## O H A P. VIII.

*He who would change the form of a Government, is to consider seriously upon what grounds he does it, and the disposition of the Subject.*

IT has been said before, that an evil disposed Citizen can do no great hurt but in an ill disposed City, which conclusion (besides my former arguments) is much fortified by the examples of *Spurius Cassius*, and *Manlius Capitolinus*; *Spurius* was an ambitious man, and being desirous to procure to himself extraordinary authority in *Rome*, by favouring the people in the sale of such Lands as the *Romans* had conquered from the *Hernici*, the Senate discovered it, and grew so jealous of him, that when in a speech of his to the people he proffered to give them the money which had been received for corn that the Senate had sent for out of *Sicily*, the people absolutely refused it; supposing that *Spurius* intended that their liberty should make it good: but had the people of *Rome* at that time been corrupt, or ill disposed, they had taken his money, and opened him a way to the making himself absolute; but the example of *Manlius Capitolinus* is greater than this, for by that we may see how the courage and integrity which he expressed to his Country in their wars against the *Gauls*, was afterwards clouded and extinguished by an insatiable desire of authority arising from an emulation of *Camillus*, whom the *Romans* had advanced to a greater degree of honour; and so strangely was he blinded with this passion, that not considering the state and incorruption of the City, or how indisposed the people were to any such enterprize, he began to make parties, and raise tumults in *Rome* both against the Senate and Laws. In which passage it was evident how well that Government was constituted, and how well that people was disposed; for in this case (though the Nobility and he were great friends, and fierce defenders of one anothers interest) none of them, nor his very relations appeared in his behalf; and whereas at other Trials the friends of the criminal used to accompany him to the Bar in mourning, and with all other circumstances of sadness that they could think of, to work (if it were possible) the Judges to compassion; *Manlius* went alone, without so much as one friend to attend him: the Tribunes of the people who were in other things always opposite to the Nobility, and created on purpose to balance their power; when they found the design tending to the ruine of them all, they joyn'd heartily with them to remove so common a destruction: and the people of *Rome*, who were zealous in any thing that made for their advantage, and lovers of any thing that crossed the Nobility, (though they also had their kindness for *Manlius*;) nevertheless when the Tribunes cited him, and referred him to the judgment of the people, they condemned him to death, without any consideration of his former services. Wherefore I am of opinion, that in the whole tract of this History there is not an example that with more efficacy demonstrates the justice of that Commonwealth in all its orders and degrees of men than this; seeing there was not one Citizen appeared in the defence of *Manlius*, who was a person of known virtue and endowments, and had done many honourable things both in publick and private, and the reason was, because the love to their Country had a greater influence upon them than any other respect; and the consideration of the present danger of their affairs, being stronger than the memory of his past merits, they chose to free themselves by decreasing his death. *Titus Livius* tells us, *Hunc exitum habuit vir nisi in libera Civitate natus, esset memorabilis*; This was the end of a man who had been very memorable, had he been born any where but in a free State. And in his case there are two things very remarkable; one, that in a corrupt State glory and authority is acquir'd a quite contrary way, than where they live exactly according to the true rules of policy and justice; the other, (not much unlike the former) that men in their affairs, especially of greatest importance, are to consider the times, and accommodate thereunto; and those who by the unhappiness of their election, or their natural inclination do otherwise, live always unfortunately, and are more unsuccessful in all their enterprizes than they who comply with the times. And doubtless, by the fore-mentioned expression of the Historian, had *Manlius* been born in the days of *Marius* and *Sylla*, when the Mass was corrupt and depraved, and susceptible of any form his ambition would have imprinted, he had had the same success that they had when they aspired to be absolute. So again, had *Marius* and *Sylla* come into the World in the time of *Manlius*, they had miscarried as he did, and been lost in their first attempt. For one man by his ill customs and conversation may indeed give a touch and tincture of corruption to the people, but 'tis impossible his life should be long enough to debauch them so totally that he may expect any advantage of it in his time; or if he should

should be so happy, and live long enough to infect a whole City; yet so impatient are the desires of man, that they cannot restrain their passions; or attend an opportunity of pursuing them wisely; but they circumvent and delude themselves in those very things of which they are most eagerly ambitious; so that sometimes for want of patience; and sometimes for want of judgment they venture rashly upon things before the matter be prepared, and are ruined in their designs. He therefore who would alter a Government and set up himself, must attend till time has corrupted the Mass, and by degrees brought all into disorder, which of necessity must follow, when it is not (as we said before) purged and refined by the Examples of good Men or good Laws, that may reduce it towards its first principles. *Manlius* then had been a great and memorable person, had he been born in a corrupt City; for whoever designs any innovation in a State, whether it be for the restoration of liberty, or the erection of Tyranny, is particularly to regard the manners of the people, and to consider how far they are disposed to submit to his ambition; and by so doing he may be able to judge of the success of his Enterprize. For to endeavour to make a people free, that are servile in their Nature, is as hard a matter, as to keep them in servitude, who are disposed to be free. And because we have said before, That in all their operations men are to consider and proceed according to the quality of the times; we shall speak of it at large in the following Chapter.

CHAPTER IX.

*How he that would succeed, must accommodate to the times.*

I Have many times considered with my self that the occasion of every mans good or bad fortune consists in his correspondence and accommodation with the times. We see some people acting furiously, and with an *impetus*; others with more slowness and caution; and because both in the one and the other they are immoderate, and do not observe their just terms, therefore both of them do err; but their error and misfortune is least, whose customs suit and correspond with the times; and who comports himself in his designs according to the impulse of his own Nature. Every one can tell how *Fabius Maximus* conducted his Army, and with what carefulness and caution he proceeded, contrary to the ancient heat and boldness of the *Romans*, and it hapned that grave way was more conformable to those times; for *Hanibal* coming young and brisk into *Italy*, and being elated with his good fortune, as having twice defeated the Armies of the *Romans*, that Commonwealth having lost most of her best Soldiers, and remaining in great fear and confusion, nothing could have happen'd more seasonably to them, than to have such a General who by his caution and cunctation could keep the Enemy at a Bay. Nor could any times have been more fortunate to his way of proceeding; for that that slow and deliberate way was natural in *Fabius*, and not affected, appeared afterwards when *Scipio* being desirous to pass his Army into *Africa* to give the finishing blow to the War, *Fabius* opposed it most earnestly, as one who could not force or dissemble his Nature, which was rather to support wisely against the difficulties that were upon him, than to search out for new. So that had *Fabius* directed, *Hanibal* had continued in *Italy*, and the reason was because he did not consider the times were altered; and the method of the War was to be changed with them: And if *Fabius* at that time had been King of *Rome*, he might well have been worsted in the War, as not knowing how to frame his Counsels according to the variation of the times. But there being in that Commonwealth so many brave men, and excellent Commanders of all sorts of tempers and humours, fortune would have it, That as *Fabius* was ready in hard and difficult times, to sustain the Enemy, and continue the War; so afterwards when affairs were in a better posture, *Scipio* was presented to finish and conclude it. And hence it is, that an Aristocracy or free State is longer lived, and generally more fortunate, than a Principality, because in the first they are more flexible, and can frame themselves better to the diversity of the times: For a Prince being accustomed to one way, is hardly to be got out of it, though perhaps the variation of the times require it very much. *Piero Soderini* (whom I have mentioned before) proceeded with great gentleness and humanity in all his actions; and he and his Country prospered whilst the times were according; but when the times changed, and there was a necessity of laying aside that meekness and humility, *Piero* was at a loss, and he and his Country were both ruined.

Pope *Julius XI.* during the whole time of his Papacy carried himself with great vigour and vehemence; and because the times were agreeable, he prospered in every thing; but had the times altered, and required other Counsels, he had certainly been ruined, because he could never have complied. And the reason why we cannot change so easily with the times, is twofold; first, because we cannot readily oppose our selves against what we naturally desire; and next, because when we have often tryed one way, and have always been prosperous, we can never persuade our selves that we can do so well any other; and this is the true cause why a Princes fortune varies so strangely, because she varies the times, but he does not alter the way of his administrations. And it is the same in a Commonwealth, if the variation of the times be not observed, and their Laws and Customs altered accordingly, many mischiefs must follow, and the Government be ruined, as we have largely demonstrated before; but those alterations of their Laws are more slow in a Commonwealth, because they are not so easily changed, and there is a necessity of such times as may shake the whole State, to which one man will not be sufficient, let him change his proceedings, and take new measures as he pleases. But because we have mentioned *Fabius Maximus*, and how he kept *Hanibal* at a Bay, I think it not amiss to enquire in the next Chapter whether a General who is resolved upon any terms to engage, can be obstructed by the Enemy.

## C H A P. X.

*A General cannot avoid fighting, when the Enemy is resolved to Engage him upon any terms.*

**C** *Neus Sulpitius Dictator (says Livy) adversus Gallos bellum traherebat, nolens se fortuna committere adversus hostem; quoniam tempus deterrorem induit, & locus alienus, faceret.* *Cneus Sulpitius the Dictator declin'd fighting with the French, because he would not expose himself unnecessarily against an Enemy, who by the incommodity of the season, and inconvenience of his Station was every day in danger to be undone.*

When such a fault happens as deceives all, or the greatest part of Mankind, I think it not improper to reprehend it over and over again; and therefore though I have formerly in several places shown how much our actions in great things, are different from those in ancient times; yet I think it not superfluous to say something of it here.

If in any thing we deviate from the practice of the Ancients, it is in our Military Discipline, in which we are so absolutely new, that there is scarce any thing us'd that was preferred by our Ancestors; and the reason is, because Commonwealths and Princes, being unwilling to expose themselves to danger, have shifted off that study and charge upon other people: And when in our times any Prince goes in person into the field, no extraordinary matter is to be expected, for he takes the command upon him to show his grandeur and magnificence, more than for any thing else. Yet they commit fewer faults (by reviewing their Armies sometimes, and keeping that command in their own hands) than Republicks are wont to do, especially in *Italy*, where trusting all to other people, they understand nothing of War themselves; and on the other side, in their Counsels and determinations (which to show their superiority they reserve to themselves) they commit a thousand times more errors than in the field, some of which I have mentioned elsewhere, but I shall speak here of one of them, and that of more than ordinary importance, when these unactive Princes, or effeminate Commonwealths send out an Army, the wisest thing which they think they can give in command to their General, is to enjoyn him from fighting, and above all things to have a care of a Battel, supposing that therein they imitate the wisdom of *Fabius Maximus*, who preserved the State, by deferring the combat; but they are mistaken, and do not consider that most commonly that injunction is either idle, or dangerous; for this is most certain, a General who desires to keep the Field, cannot avoid fight when the Enemy presses, and makes it his business to engage him. So that to command a General in that Nature, in as much as to bid him fight when the Enemy pleases, and not when he sees occasion himself. For to keep the field, and avoid fighting, is to be done no way so securely as by keeping 50 miles off, and sending out store of Spies and Scouts that may give you notice of the Enemies approach, and opportunity to retreat. There is another way likewise to secure your self, and that is to shut your self up in some strong Town, but both the one and the other are dangerous. In the first case, The Country is exposed to the depredations of the Enemy, and a generous Prince will sooner run the

the hazard of a Battel, than spin out a War with so much detriment to his Subjects. In the second, your ruine is evident; for cooping up your Army in a City, the Enemy will block you up, or besiege you, and then the multitude of your men will quickly bring a scarcity of provisions, and supplies being cut off, you will be forced to surrender; so that to avoid fighting either of these two ways, is very pernicious. *Fabius* his way of standing upon his guard, and keeping his Army in places of advantage, is laudable and good, when your Army is so strong, that the Enemy dares not attack you: Nor can it be said that *Fabius* declined fighting, but that he deferred till he could do it with advantage; for had *Hanibal* advanced against him, *Fabius* would have kept his ground and engaged him, but *Hanibal* was too cunning for that; so that *Hanibal* as well as *Fabius* avoided fighting; but if either of them would have fought upon disadvantage the other had only three remedies; that is, the two foresaid, and flying. That this which I say is true, is manifest by a thousand examples, but more particularly by the War which the Romans made upon *Philip* of *Macedon*; *Philip* being invaded by the Romans, resolved not to come to a Battel; and to avoid it, he (as *Fabius* did in *Italy*) encamped his Army upon the top of a Mountain, and entrenched himself so strongly; that he believed the Romans durst not have ventured to come at him: But they not only adventured, but removed him from the Mountain, forced him to fly with the greatest part of his Army, and had it not been for the unpassableness of the Country which hindered the pursuit, the *Macedonians* had all been cut off. *Philip*, then, being unwilling to fight, and having (as I said before) encamped upon the Mountains not far from the Romans, durst not trust himself to his advantages; and having found by experience that he was not secure there, he would not pin himself up in a Town, but made choice of the other way, and kept himself at a distance; so as when the Romans came into one Province, he would remove into another, and what place soever the Romans left, he would be sure to come to: At length finding this protraction of the War, made his affairs but worse, and that his Subjects were harrassed by both Armies, he resolved to try his fortune, and bring all to the decision of a Battel: But it is convenient to avoid fighting when your Army is in the same condition as those of *Fabius*, and *Sulpitius*; that is, when it is so considerable that the Enemy fears to attack you in your entrenchments; and though he has got some footing in your Country, yet not so much as is able to supply him with provisions; in this case 'tis best to decline fighting, and follow the example of *Sulpitius*; *Nolens se fortuna committere*, &c. But in all other cases it is not to be done, but with dishonour and danger; for to fly (as *Philip* did) is as bad as to be routed, and more dishonourable, because he gave no proof of his courage, and though he escaped by the difficulty of the Country; yet whoever follows his example, without that convenience, may chance to be ruin'd. No man will deny but *Hanibal* was a great Soldier, and of more than ordinary experience; when he went into *Africa* against *Scipio*, if he had seen it for his advantage to have protracted the War, he would have done it, and perchance (being a great Captain, and having as good an Army) he would have done it the same way as *Fabius* did in *Italy*; but seeing he did not do it, it is probable he was diverted by some extraordinary occasion. For that Prince who has got an Army together, (if he perceives that for want of pay, or supplies, he is not likely to keep them long) is stark mad if he tries not his fortune before his Army disbands, for by delaying, he is certainly lost; by fighting he may possibly overcome: And above all things, whether we are victorious or beaten, we are to behave our selves honourably, and 'tis more honourable to be overcome by force, than by some error to run your self into incommodities that ruine you afterwards. 'Tis not unlikely but *Hanibal* might be impelled by some such necessity; and on the other side *Scipio* (if *Hanibal* should have deferred fighting) might have chose whether he would have attacked him in his Trenches, because he had already conquered *Syphax*, and got such footing in *Africa*, that he was as safe, and with as much commodity as in *Italy*; but it was otherwise with *Hanibal* when he had to do with *Fabius*; and with the French when they had to do with *Sulpitius*. And he who invades an Enemies Country, avoids fighting with more difficulty, as being obliged (when ever the Enemy appears to obstruct him) to give him Battel; and if he sets down before any Town, he is obliged so much the more, as in our times it happen'd to *Charles*, Duke of *Burgundy*, who was beaten up in his League before *Morat* by the *Swizzers*, and defeated. And the same thing fell out to the French at the Siege of *Navarra*, where they were attackt and beaten by the *Swizzers*.

## C H A P. XI.

One person that has many Enemies upon his hands, though he be inferiour to them, yet if he can sustain their first impression, carries commonly the Victory.

**T**He power of the Tribunes of the people was great and necessary in the City of Rome to correct the ambition of the Nobility, who otherwise would have debauch'd the said City much sooner than they did: But as it happens in other things, so it happened in this; in the best and most beneficial thing to the Commonwealth, there was an occult, and more evil that lay snug, which required new Laws, and new methods to suppress. For the insolence of the Tribunitial authority grew so great, that it became terrible both to the Senate and people, and had doubtlesly produced some great mischief to the Commonwealth; had not *Appius Claudius* by his great wisdom, found out a way to temper and ballance their fury, by the intercession of their Colleagues, and the way was by choosing out some person among the Tribunes, whom either out of fear, or corruption, or love to his Country they could dispose to withstand the designs of his Brethren, and oppose himself against them, whenever their resolutions were tending to the diminution of the Nobility, or prejudice of the State. Which way of restraining the petulancy of the Tribunes was for a long time of great advantage to the Romans, and may give us occasion to consider, whether a combination of several great persons, against one less powerful than they (whilst united) is like to be successful against him that is alone; or whether the single person has the advantage against the Confederacy. I answer, That those whose Forces are united, are many times stronger, but their performances are seldom so great, as the single persons, though he be nothing so strong, for committing an infinite number of other things (in which the single person has the advantage) he will be able with a little industry to break, and divide and enfeeble them. To this purpose there is no need of going to antiquity for examples (where there is plenty enough) the passages of our own times will furnish us sufficiently. In the year 1484, all Italy confederated against the Venetian, who, when they were so over-powr'd and distress'd that they were unable to keep the field, found a way to work off Count *Lodovic* (Governor of *Milan*) from their League, by which means they not only obtained a Peace, and restitution of what they had lost; but they got a good part of the Duchy of *Ferrara*; so that they whose Forces were too weak to appear before the Enemy; when they came to treat, were the greatest gainers by the War. Not many years since, the whole Christian world seemed to conspire against France; yet before the end of the War, the Spaniard fell off from the League, made his Peace with the French, and forced the rest of the Confederates, one after one, to do the same. And from hence we may easily collect that as often as many Princes or States are confederated together against any single Prince or Commonwealth, if the single Prince and Commonwealth be strong enough to withstand their first impression, and spin out the War, he will certainly prevail; but if his force be not sufficient to do that, he is in extraordinary danger, as it happen'd to the Venetians; for had they been able to have sustained their first shock, and protracted the War, till they had debauched some of the Confederates, the French had never done them so much mischief, and they had preserv'd themselves from ruine. But their Army being too weak to confront them, and their time too little to divide them, they were undone; and this is evident by what happen'd afterward; for as soon as the Pope had recovered what he had lost, he reconciled himself, and became their friend; the Spaniard did the same, and both of them would have been glad to have continued *Lombardy* to the Venetians, rather than the French should have got it, and made himself so considerable in Italy. The Venetians at that time might have prevented a great part of their calamities, had they given some small part of their Territory to the Enemy, and thereby have secured the rest; but then they must have given it in time, and so as it might not have appeared to have been done by necessity, as they might well have done before the War was commehced; when that was begun, it would have been dishonourable, and perhaps ineffectual. But before those troubles, there were few of the Venetian Citizens that could foresee a danger; fewer that could remedy it; and none at all that could advise. To conclude therefore this Chapter, I do pronounce, that as the Roman remedy against the ambition of their Tribunes, was the multitude of them, out of which they always found some or other, that they could make for the interest of the Publick; so it is a ready remedy for any Prince that is engaged against a confederate Enemy, when he can break their League, and work any of the Confederates to a separation.

## C H A P. XII.

*A wise General is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own Army, but to prevent it to his Enemies.*

WE have formerly discoursed of what use and importance necessity is in humane Exploits, and shown how many men, compelled by necessity, have done glorious things, and made their memories immortal. Moral Philosophers have told us, That the Tongue, and the Hands are noble Instruments of themselves; yet they had never brought things to that exactness and perfection, had not necessity impelled them. The Generals therefore of old, understanding well the virtue of this necessity; and how much more desperate and obstinate their Soldiers were rendered thereby, made it their care to bring their Soldiers into a necessity of fighting, and to keep it from their Enemies; to which end, they many times opened a passage for the Enemies Army, which they might easily have obstructed; and precluded it to their own, when they might as easily have passed. Whoever therefore, desires to make his Garrison stout and courageous, and obstinate for the defence of a Town, or to render his Army pernickious in the Field; is above all things to reduce them into such a necessity, or at least to make them believe it: So that a wise General, who designs the besieging of a Town, judges of the easiness or difficulty of the expugnation, from the necessity which lies upon the Citizens to defend themselves. If the necessity of their defence be great, his enterprize is the more difficult, because the courage and obstinacy of the besieged is like to be the greater; but where there is no such necessity, there is no such danger. Hence it is that revolted Towns are much harder to be recovered, than they were to be taken at first; for at first having committed no fault, they were in fear of no punishment, and therefore surrendered more easily: But in the other case having the guilt of their defect up their Spirits, they are fearful of revenge, and so become more obstinate in their defence. These are not unusual, and yet there are other causes which render the minds of people obstinate in their defence, and one of them is the natural hatred and animosity which is frequently betwixt neighbouring Princes and States, which proceeds from an insatiable desire of Dominion in Princes, and as zealous an inclination to liberty in Commonwealths, especially if they be constituted as in *Tuscany*, where that emulation and jealousy has made them refractory both on the one side, and the other. Hence it is, though that the *Florentines* have been at greater charges than the *Venetians*, yet their acquiescence are not so much, because the Towns in *Tuscany* were most of them free, & by consequence more difficult to be brought to subjection; whereas the Towns which the *Venetians* conquered, having been most of them under Princes, and accustomed to servitude, it was indifferent to them under whose dominion they were; and they are so far from resisting a change, that they do many times desire it. So that though the Cities upon the Frontiers of the *Venetian*, were generally stronger, than those upon the Frontiers of the *Florentine*, yet they were reduced with more ease; because being not so free, they were less obstinate in their defence: when therefore, a wise General resolves upon a Siege, he is with all diligence to take away that necessity from the Citizens which may make them inflexible, either by promising indemnity, if they have deserved to be punished; or if it be only their liberty of which they are fearful, by assuring them that his designs are not against that, but only against the ambition and exorbitancy of some particular persons; which kind of promises have had strange effects in the facilitating of Enterprizes, and the taking of Towns; for though wise men will easily discover the fraud, yet the multitude are commonly so impatient of War, and so mad to be at quiet, that they shut their Eyes against any thing of mischief that comes to them under propositions of peace, by which means many Cities have lost their liberty, as it happened to *Florence* not long since; and to *M. Crassus* and his Army heretofore, who though he was sensible that the promises of the *Partians* were fraudulent, and made only to keep his Soldiers from that necessity of defending themselves, yet he could not convince them, nor prevail with them to stand bravely upon their Guard, but being blinded with their overtures of Peace, both Army and General were cut off, as may be seen by the History. The *Sannites*, put on by the ambition of some of their Citizens, brake their Peace with the *Romans*, and invaded their Country; but being afterwards sensible of what they had done, they sent Embassadors to *Rome* offering restitution of what they had taken, and to deliver up the Authors of that Counsel into their hands, to be punished as they pleas'd; but being rejected, and their Embassadors sent home without any hopes of agreement, *Pompeius* their General used

it as an argument to encourage his men to fight more obstinately, that the Romans having refused their fair overtures of Peace, were resolved upon War; and therefore there was no other course, but of necessity they must fight. And (says he) *Iustum est bellum, quibus est necessarium & pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis spes est.* That War is just that is necessary, and Arms are piously taken up by him, who has no other hopes to secure himself. Upon which necessity he founded the hopes of his Victory. C. Manlius was at the head of an Army against the Veientes, and part of the Army of the Veientes being got into his Camp Manlius to cut off their retreat, doubled his Guards at the gates, and fortified all the Passes by which they were to retreat; but the Veientes perceiving they were desperate, fought with so much courage and fury, that they killed the Consul, and had cut off his whole Army, had not one of the Tribunes very wisely opened them a way to be gone: In which action we may observe that whilst the Veientes were under a necessity of fighting, there was no resisting of their courage; but when a way was opened for their retreat, they chose rather to fly. The Volsci and the Equi were entered upon the confines of the Romans, who sent their Consuls against them with an Army; and coming to a Battle, it happened that in the heat of it, the Volsci were inclosed by the Romans, and as it were shut up in their own Camp. Vettius Mescius their General, finding their exigence, and that there was a necessity of being killed, or making their way by the Sword, *Ite mecum* (says he to his Soldiers). *Non murus, non vallum, armati armatis obstant, virtute pares, (quæ ultimum & maximum telum est) necessitate superiores estis.* Follow me then courageously, you have no Wall, no Rampart, nothing but armed men to withstand you: you are equal to them in valour, and being under necessity, have the same advantage of the Weapon. For Livy calls it in this place the highest and heaviest of weapons.

Camillus one of the wisest of all the Roman Generals (having stormed and entered Veii with some part of his Army) to facilitate his Victory, and take away from the Enemy that last necessity of fighting; gave Orders (and so loud that the Veientes might be sure to hear) that no Soldier should dare to touch any man who had thrown down his Arms; by which Proclamation every man was encouraged to throw down his Arms, and the City was taken with so little loss, that since that time, that Stratagem has been used by several Commanders.

### CHAP. XIII.

*Whether we are more safe in a good General with a bad Army, or a good Army with a bad General.*

M. Artius Coriolanus being banished from Rome, retired to the Volsci, where having got an Army together, he returned to Rome to revenge himself for the injury his fellow Citizens had done him, and he had done it effectually, had not the Prayers and Piety of his Mother prevailed more upon him, than all the power of the Romans. From which passage Titus Livius observes, that the Roman Commonwealth increased more by the virtue of their Commanders, than by the excellence of their Soldiers; because though the Volsci had been always beaten before; yet when they got a Roman General, they were too hard for the Romans: But though Livy was of that opinion in that place, yet in many parts of his History there are instances, where the private Soldiers have done great things, and sometimes fought better and in better order, after their Consuls were killed, than they had done whilst they were living. Thus it happened in the Army which the Romans had in Spain under the Command of the two Scipio's, which, when both their Commanders were slain, behaved it self so well, that it not only defended it self, but defeated the Enemy, and preserved that Province to the Romans. So that in the whole, there are examples on both sides, where the Soldiers have done bravely, and got the Victory by their valour, and where the Conduct of the General has done as much as a whole Army; from whence it may be concluded that they are mutually useful, and that the Soldier is as much advantaged by the excellence of his General, as the General by the courage of his Army. However, this I think will not be unworthy our consideration, whether is most formidable, a good Army under a bad Commander, or a good Commander with a bad Army. In the opinion of Caesar neither of them was considerable; for when he went into Spain against Afranius and Petreius, who had a good Army under their command, he went with much confidence; because, as he said himself, *Ibat ad exercitum sine duce.* He went against an Army without a head; reflecting thereby upon the insufficiency of their Generals. Again when



when he went into *Thessaly* against *Pompey*, his expression was *Vado ad ducem sine Exercitu. I go now against a General without an Army.* It remains now that we consider whether it be most ealie for a good Captain to make a good Army, or a good Army to make a good Captain. But to this, in my opinion, it is easly answered; for many good men in an Army can sooner select one out of their number, and instruct him so, as that he may be fit to command the rest, than the best General in the world can make an Army expert and ready. *Lucullus* when he was sent against *Mithridates*, was utterly unexperienced in matters of War, yet being in a good Army, where his inferior Officers were good, he quickly became a good General. The *Romans* for want of men, were forced to arm their Servants, and having referred them to be disciplin'd by *Sempronius Gracchus*, in a short time he made them excellent Soldiers. *Pelopidas* and *Epaminandas* after they had rescued their Country from the Tyranny of the *Spartans*, in a short time made their Country-men so good Soldiers, that they were not only able to contend, but to conquer the *Spartans*. So that the case is equal, and which soever is good, may make the other so too. Nevertheless a good Army, without a good Commander, grows insolent and dangerous, as it hapned in the *Macedonian Army* after *Alexander* was dead, and as it is in civil Wars among all old Soldiers; so that I think if there be more confidence to be reposed in the one than in the other, it is to be rather in the General, than the Army, especially if he has time to instruct and discipline his Men; for an Army without a head, is insolent and mutinous. Those Captains therefore are worthy of double honour, who have not only the Enemy to overcome; but are to instruct, and prepare their Forces, before they bring them to engage. And in doing so, they do highly recommend the Conduct of their General, which is so rare a thing, that if the trouble were laid upon many, they would be much less esteemed and respected than they are now.

CHAP. XIV.

*What strange effects new inventions have sometimes in a Battle, and how new Noises have the same.*

WHAT strange consequences have succeeded from sudden and unexpected accidents that have been seen or heard in the heat of the Battel, appears by several examples in History, but especially in the conflict betwixt the *Romans* and the *Volsca*, where *Quintus* observing one of the wings of his Army to stagger and give ground, cry'd out to them to stand firm, for that in the other wing the Victory was theirs; with which words he not only reencouraged his own men, but put such a terror upon the Enemy, that they fled in good earnest. And if in a well ordered Army those unexpected vociferations have such wonderful effect, in a tumultuous and ill governed Army they have much more, where everything is more subject to the agitation of such winds. and of this we have a memorable example of our times. The City of *Perugia* not many years since was divided into two parts, the *Oddi*, and the *Bagliani*. The *Bagliani* prevailing, the *Oddi* were banished. But the *Oddi* having got an Army together, and brought them privatly to a place not far from *Perugia*, by the favour of their friends they were let one night into the Town, and possessed themselves as far as the *Piazza*. And because the Streets were chained up from one side to the other to hinder the passage of the Horse, the *Oddesche* had a man who went before them with a great engine of Iron wherewith he brake the chains; and he had done his work so effectually, that he had broke all the chains, but what opened into the *Piazza*, the alarm being taken, and every body crying out *Arm, Arm*, he who broke down the chains being pressed so close by the throng that was behind him, that he had not room for his blow, cryed out to those that were next *Back, Back*, intending only to have made more room for his arm: But they who were next him calling *back* to those who were behind them, by degrees the word went through the whole Army, and they who were in the Rear not knowing the reason, began to run, and being followed by those who were next, the whole Army retreated by little and little, till at last they brake out into an absolute flight, by which inconsiderable accident, the *Oddi* were defeated of their design. So that it is to be considered; that in a Battel, order is not only to be taken that the Army be well drawn up, and put in a good posture to fight; but that no such trifling accident be able to discompose it: For if for any thing the popular multitude be unfit for the Wars, it is because every noise, rumour, or alarm, distracts them, and puts them to the rout. Wherefore it ought to be a principal care in a good General to appoint such persons as are to receive

all orders and words of command, and derive them to the rest, that by so doing the Soldiers being accustomed to their Officers, may not receive any such orders, but from such persons as are commissioned thereunto, the want of which custom has many times produc'd very great confusion. As to apparitions, and such things as are many times seen, it is the part of a good General, to contrive and exhibit (in the very height of the Battel) such sights as may incourage his own men, and discourage the Enemy; for among many accidents which conduce to your victory, this may be especially effectual. To this purpose is that invention of which *Sulpitius* made use against the *French*; being drawn up, and ready to engage the Enemy, he caused all the Servants and refuse of his Army to be armed and mounted upon the Mules and Horses belonging to the Baggage; and having furnished them so formally with Colours and Trumpets that they appeared a compleat body of Horse, he disposed them behind a hill, where they were to continue, till in the heat of the fight, they were to come forth and shew themselves to the Enemy; which stratagem being as well executed as devised, struck such a terror into the *French*, that it lost them the day. So that a good General has a double care upon him, to contrive by these new surprizes to intimidate the Enemy; and to provide that if any such practices be used upon him, he may discover, and defeat them. Thus an *Indian King* served *Semiramis*, who observing the said King to be very strong in the number of Elephants, to fright and persuade him that she was as strong as he, she caused several of her Camels to be dress'd up, and covered with the Skins of Bufaloes and Bulls, that they might look big, and carry the representation of Elephants; and having done so, she marched them in the Van of her Army, but her design did not take; for the King having intelligence of it, perverted it into her prejudice.

The *Fidenates* being besieged by *Mamorcus* the dictator, to terrifie the *Roman Army* contrived to have several of the Townsmen in the heat of the Engagement to come suddenly out of the Town with Fire-works at the end of their Launces, hoping that the newness of the fight might be a means to disturb them; And here it is to be noted, that when such stratagems have more of reality than pretence, they may very well be made use of, because having something of solidity in them, their weakness is not so soon discovered, but where they have more of appearance and fiction than truth, it is best either not to use them at all, or if you do, to keep them at such a distance, as that their fallacy may not be discerned; as *Sulpitius* did with his Muletiers; for when they are intrinsically weak, their vanity appears upon their approach, and they do more mischief than good, as the Elephants of *Semiramis*, and the false fires of the *Fidenates*, which fires though at first, they gave some disturbance to the *Roman Souldiers*; yet the Dictator coming in, and questioning them aloud whether they were not ashamed to be smoaked like Bees out of their Huts; encouraging them to turn again, he cryed out, *Suis flammis deletere Fidenas quos vestris beneficiis placare non potuistis*, Go to, destroy the *Fidena* with their own fires, seeing all your kindnesses have not been able to oblige them; and by so doing, he defeated the *Fidenates*, and made their project unprofitable.

## CHAP. XV.

*One General is best for an Army, and that to govern it by Commissioners, is not so good.*

THE *Fidenates* having rebelled, and cut off that Colony of the *Romans* that was amongst them; the *Romans* created four Tribunes, and invested with Consular power, whereof one being left behind for the security of the City of *Rome*, the other three were sent against the *Fidenates* and *Veientes*; but disagreeing among themselves, they came off with dishonour, though their loss was not much: That they gain'd no more honour, they may thank themselves; that they received no more loss, they may thank their good Soldiers. However the *Romans* finding the inconvenience, returned to their old way of Dictators, that what three persons had disordered, might be remedied by one. From whence we may discern the inconvenience of many Commanders either in an Army or Town, which *Livy* has expressed very clearly in these following words, *Tres Tribuni potestate Consulari, documento fuere, quam plurimum imperium bello inutile esset, tenendo ad sua quisq; Consilia, cum alii aliud videretur, apperverunt ad occasionem locum basti*; These three Tribunes with Consular power, gave us to understand the usefulness of multiplicity of Commanders, for each of them adhering to his own Counsels, whilst one was for

for one thing, and another as positive for another, nothing was done, and they gave the enemy an advantage. And though this be example enough to prove the inconvenience of many Commanders, yet for better illustration I shall add some others both ancient and modern. In the year 1500 King Lewis XII of France having taken Milan, sent his Army to Pisa to recover it for the Florentines; who to command it had sent thither two Commissaries, one of them called Giovan-battista Roldi, and the other Luca d' Antonio de gli Albizzi. Giovan-battista was a person of reputation and gravity; and being ancients than Luca, Luca left the whole administration to him; but though he shewed no ambition in opposing him; he did it abundantly by his silence, and sullenness; neglecting, and undervaluing every thing that was done; so that he was so far from assisting his Colleague either with his counsel or person, that he appeared as if he had been utterly ignorant in matters of war: but it proved otherwise afterwards, when upon some accident Giovan-battista was recalled, and Luca remained behind with absolute Command; for then he gave ample testimony both of his courage and conduct, which before, whilst he had a Colleague, no body could have believed. To this purpose I shall add another saying of Livy, who giving an account how Quintus and Agrippa (his Colleague) being sent against the Aequi, Agrippa would needs have the whole management of the war to be committed to Quintus, for (says he) *Saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est, summam imperii apud unum esse; In the administration of great affairs it is best that the Sovereign power be invested in one person.* Which is contrary to the present practice of our Princes and States, who do often depute more than one Commander both to their Armies and Towns; which (however they think it for the best) must needs breed inconceivable confusion. And if the cause of the ruin of so many Italian and French Armies in our times, be enquired into, it will be found to be the multitude, and emulation of their Commanders, and it may safely be concluded, that it is better to send a man of ordinary prudence, and experience, upon any expedition, than two of the wisest and best Soldiers they have, with equal commission.

C H A P. XVI.

*That in times of difficulty, virtue is in esteem; in times of ease and luxury, men of riches and alliance, are in greatest request.*

IT always was, and always will be the fortune of persons of more than ordinary endowments, to be laid aside and neglected in times of peace, especially in a Commonwealth; for that envy which is contracted by their virtue, sets up many Citizens against them, who will not only be their equals, but superiors. To this purpose Thucydides (a Greek author) has a place in his History, where he shews how the Republick of Athens, having had the better in the Peloponesian War, depressed the pride of the Spartans, and subdued the greatest part of Greece, was so inhaunted and elated with their success, that it was proposed to fall upon Sicily.

It was seriously debated in Athens whether the said enterprize should be undertaken or not; Alcibiades and other Citizens of his party promoted it highly, not so much in respect of the publick good as their own private advantage; expecting that the management of that war would be placed in their hands. But Nicias (a person of the greatest reputation in Athens) dissuaded it; and his great argument to make the People believe he spoke his judgment, and more for the benefit of the Commonwealth than any interest of his own, was, that he advised rather contrary to his own advantage, because in time of peace there were many of his fellow Citizens before him, but in time of war he knew he should be the first: by which we may see it has been an ancient infirmity in Commonwealths not to value persons of worth in time of peace, which disoblige them doubly; to see themselves deprived of their dignities, and to see others preferred to them of less sufficiency than they, which error has been the occasion of much confusion; for those persons who find themselves neglected, and know the reason of all is, the tranquillity of the times, make it their business to embroil them, and put their Country upon war, though never so much to its prejudice. And thinking sometimes with my self what remedies were most proper, I could light but on two, one was to keep the Citizens from growing too rich, that wealth without virtue might not be sufficient to advance any man, or able to corrupt other people, or themselves: the other, so to prepare and adapt themselves for war, that they may never be surprized, but have always employment for the bravest of their Citizens, as Rome had in the time of her prosperity. For that City having Armies always abroad, there was constant

stant exercise for the virtue of their Citizens: nor could a man of worth be degraded; nor an improper man be prefer'd in his place, because when ever such a thing was done, (whether by way of error or experiment, it was the same) the disorders and dangers which followed, were so sudden and great, that they quickly found their mistake, and return'd to their old method again. But other Cities and States not so well constituted as that, which make war only in cases of necessity, cannot defend themselves from those inconveniences but are always in trouble and disorder, when ever that excellent Citizen which is neglected is vindicative, and hath any reputation or part in the City. And though for some time *Rome* kept her self free from these inconveniences, yet after she had conquered *Carthage* and *Antiochus*, (as has been said before) and seemed to be past all fear of war for the future, she chose several Commanders for her Army, not so much for their conduct or virtue, as for those qualities which were likely to recommend them to the people. *Paulus Aemilius* stood many times for the Consulship, and was repulsed; nor could he ever be made Consul till the *Macedonian* war, which was committed unanimously to his conduct, because they saw it was like to be dangerous and difficult. After the year 1494 our City of *Florence* being engaged in several wars, in which none of our Citizens had perform'd any great matter, at last the City hapned upon a person who shewed them after what manner an Army was to be commanded, his name was *Antonio Giacomini*; whilst the war was dangerous, and there was any trouble or difficulty to manage it, *Antonio* was free from the ambition of his fellow Citizens, and had no competitor in his election to be Commissary, and General of their Armies: but when those were past, and new wars that were more easie and honourable were to be undertaken, he had so many competitors, that when three Commissaries were to be chosen for the reduction of *Pisa*, *Antonio* could not obtain to be one: and though it be not manifest what inconveniences accrued to the Commonwealth by the waving of *Antonio*, yet it may be easily conjectured, for the *Pisans* being distressed for want of provisions, and having nothing left wherewithal to defend themselves, (had *Antonio* been there) would have been forc'd to have surrendred at discretion; but being besieged by such Officers as knew not how to streighten or press them, they held out so long, that the *Florentines* were glad to buy them out at last, whereas they might as well have had them by force. No question but *Antonio* resented it highly, and he had need be a good man, and of mote than ordinary patience not to think of revenging himself, though with the subversion of the whole City, (if he could) and the ruine of every private Citizen, which is to be carefully prevented by every State, as shall be shewn in the following Chapter.

#### CHAP. XVII.

*A man is not to be disoblighed, and employed afterwards in any matter of importance.*

A Commonwealth is diligently to provide that no Citizen be entrusted in any weighty affair, who has received any remarkable injury; *Claudius Nero* (who divided the Army which was designed to confront *Hanibal*, and marched away with a strong party into *la Mara* to joyn with the other Consul, and engage *Asdrubal* before he got up with his supplies to *Hanibal*) having formerly commanded the *Roman* Army in *Spain* against the said *Asdrubal*, had come off with dishonour; for though he had enclosed *Asdrubal* and his whole Army, and so possess himself of all passes, that he must either fight with disadvantage, or perish with hunger, yet he was over-reach'd with the subtilty of the *Carthaginian*, who drill'd him on with pretended overtures of peace, till at length in the night he stole his Army thorow the woods, and got of where he was safe. This passage being known in *Rome*, was no small diminution to *Nero's* reputation both with the Senate and the People: but being afterwards made Consul, and sent with an Army against *Hanibal*, he ventured upon that desperate counsel of dividing the Army, which was a thing so doubtful and uncertain in the opinion of the *Romans*, that the City was in strange anxiety and suspense till they had the news of his Victory. It is reported that when *Claudius Nero* was questioned afterwards by his friends what it was that mov'd him to so hazardous an enterprize, in which, without necessary provocation, he had ventured the whole liberty of their Country, he answered, he had done it, because he knew if he succeeded, he should recover that honour which he had lost in *Spain*; if he miscarried, and his design should have a contrary end, he should have had the satisfaction to have been revenged of the City and Citizens, by whom he had been so ingratefully, and so indiscreetly calumniated. And if the  
indigna-

indignation arising from these kind of provocations could work so strongly upon a *Roman* Citizen, in those times when *Rome* was in its innocence, we may easily imagine what prodigious effects it may have upon persons in a City not so well constituted as that, and because against these kind of disorders (to which all Commonwealths are subject) no certain remedy can be prescrib'd, it follows that no Commonwealth can be possibly perpetual, forasmuch as a thousand unexpected accidents fall in, to hasten its destruction.

C. H. A. P. XVIII.

*Nothing is more honourable in a General, than to foresee the Designs of his Enemy.*

IT was the saying of *Epaminondas* the *Theban*, that no one quality was more useful and necessary in a General, than to be able to know the resolutions and designs of his Enemy, and discover that by conjecture, which he could not do by any certain intelligence. Nor is it difficult only to understand his designs, but his actions; and of those actions not only such as are perform'd privately, or at a distance, but such as are done (as it were) before his Face. For it many times falls out, that when a Battel continues till night, he who has the better, believes he has the worst; and who has lost all, supposes he has the Victory. Which mistakes has put the Generals many times upon pernicious counsels, as it hapned betwixt *Brutus* and *Cassius*; for *Brutus* having defeated the Enemy with his Wing, *Cassius* supposing he had been lost; and his whole Body dispers'd, killed himself in despair. In our times, at the Battel of *S. Celsicia* in *Lombardy*; *Francis* King of *France* coming to an engagement with the *Swizzers*, the Fight continued till night: a body of the *Swizzers* remaining entire, and hearing nothing of the defeat and execution of their Comrades, concluded the Victory was theirs, which error was the occasion that they marched not off as they might have done, but kept their ground till the next morning, at which time they were charged again, and overthrowen.

The same error had almost ruined the Armies of the Pope and King of *Spain*, who upon a false alarm of the Victory of the *Swizzers*, passed the *Po*, and advanced so far, that ere they were aware they had like to have fallen into the mouths of the victorious French. The like fell out of old in the Camps of the *Romans* and *Equi*; *Sempronius* the Consul being commanded out with an Army against the enemy, and forcing him to a Battel, it continued till night without any visible advantage on either side. Night coming on, and both Armies sufficiently spent, neither of them retir'd to their Camps, but betook themselves to the neighbouring hills, where they believed they should be more safe. The *Roman* Army divided into two parts, one went with the Consul, and the other with *Tempanium* the Centurion, by whose courage the *Roman* Army was preserved that day. The next morning the Consul hearing no more of the enemy, retreated towards *Rome*; the *Equi* with their Army did the same, for both of them though they had been beaten, and marched away without regarding the loss or plunder of their Camps, it hapned that *Tempanium* being behind with his Squadron, and marching off as the rest, he took certain of the wounded *Equi* prisoners, who inform'd him that their Generals were gone out of the field, and had quitted their Camps. Upon enquiry finding it to be true, he entred into the *Roman* Camp, and secured it, but the enemies Camp was given in prey to the Soldier, after which he returned with Victory to *Rome*, which Victory consisted only in having the first intelligence of the enemies disorder; from whence it is observable that two Armies engaged, may be each of them in the same distress and despair, and that the Army goes away with the Victory which has first notice of the necessities of the other; and of this I shall give a pregnant example of late days, and at home. In the year 1498 the *Florentines* had a great Army in the Country of *Pisa*, and had besieged that City very close. The *Venetian* having undertaken its protection, and seeing no other way to relieve it; to divert the enemy, and remove the war, they resolv'd to invade the Territory of the *Florentines*, to which purpose they raised a strong Army, marched into their Country by the *Val di Lamona*, possessed themselves of the Town of *Marradi*, and besieged the Castle of *Castiglione* which stands above upon an hill. The *Florentines* upon the alarm resolv'd to relieve *Marradi*, and yet not weaken their Army before *Pisa*, whereupon they raised a new Army both Horse and Foot, and sent them thither under the Command of *Jacopo Quarto Appiano* (Lord of *Piombino*) and the Count *Rinuccio da Marciano*. The *Florentine* Army being conducted to the hills, the *Venetian* raised his siege before *Castiglione*, and retreated into the Town:

Town: the Armies being in this posture, and facing one another for several days, both of them suffered exceedingly for want of all manner of Provisions; at length neither of them being very earnest to come to a Battel, and each of them being ignorant of the others distress, they resolved the next morning to break up their Camp, and each of them to retire, the Venetian towards *Berzigbella* and *Faenza*, and the Florentine towards *Casaglia* and *Mugello*. The morning being come, and the Baggage sent away before, a poor Woman hapned to come into the Florentine Camp, from *Marradi* to see some of her Relations who were in the service of the Florentine: by this Woman the Florentine Generals had notice that the Venetians were gone; whereupon reassuming their courage, they altered their counsels, pursued the enemy, and writ Letters to *Florence*, that they had not only beaten the Venetians, but made an end of the War. Which Victory proceeded from nothing but because they had the first news of the retreat of the Enemy, which if it had come to the other side, as it did to them, the consequence would have been the same, and the Florentines have been beaten.

## CHAP. XIX.

*Whether for the Government of the multitude, obsequiousness and indulgence be more necessary than punishment.*

THE Roman Commonwealth was perplexed with the dissensions betwixt the Nobility, and the people; nevertheless, their foreign Wars requiring it, they sent forth with their Armies, *Quintius* and *Appius Claudius*: *Appius* being tough, and cruel in his commands, was so ill obeyed by his Soldiers, that he was defeated, and fled out of his Province. *Quintius* being more gentle and benign, was better obeyed, and carried the Victory where he was; from whence it appears more conducing to the well governing of a multitude, to be rather obliging, than proud, and pitiful, than cruel. However *Cornelius Tacitus* tells us, (and many others are of his mind) *In multitudine regenda plus pena quam obsequium valet*, That to the managing of a multitude, severity is more requisite than mildness. And I think both may be true to this distinction, of Companions and Subjects; if those under your command be Companions and fellow Citizens with you, you cannot securely use them with that severity, of which *Tacitus* speaks; for the people of *Rome* having equal authority with the Nobility, was not to be used ruggedly by any man that was put over them for but a while. And it has been many times seen that the Roman Generals, who behaved themselves amicably towards their Souldiers, and governed them with mildness, have done greater things than those who used them with austerity, and kept them in perpetual fear, unless they were endued with more than ordinary virtue, like *Manlius Torquatus*. But he whose command is over his Subjects, (of whom *Cornelius* speaks) is to have a care they grow not insolent, and contemn him for his easiness, and there, is rather to use severity than gentleness with them; yet that is to be done (too) with such moderation, that they may be kept from abhorring him; for the hatred of the Subject is never good for a Prince, and the best way to prevent it, is by not interrupting the Subject in the quiet enjoyment of his Estate; for blood (unless there be some design of rapacity under it) no Prince does desire it, but upon some extraordinary necessity, and that necessity happens but seldom. But when cruelty and rapine meet together in the nature of one person, there never wants desire, nor pretences for cruelty, as I have demonstrated largely in another Treatise upon this occasion. *Quintius* therefore deserved more praise than *Appius* deserved: and the saying of *Tacitus* is true enough with the aforesaid restriction, but not in the case of *Appius*: and because I have spoken of kindness and severity, I will give you one example, how mildness prevailed more upon the *Falisci* than violence could do.

C H A P. XX.

*One instance of humanity wrought more upon the Falisci, than all the force of the Romans.*

**C**amillus having besieged the *Falisci*, and attempted many things against them but in vain, a School-master who had the tuition of several of the principal young Gentlemen of that City, thinking to gratifie *Camillus*, and ingratiate with the people of *Rome*, carrying them out of the walls, under pretence of exercise and recreation, he conveyed them all into the Camp of *Camillus*, and presenting them to him, told him, that by their means he might become Master of the Town: *Camillus* was so far from accepting his present, that he caused the Pædagogues to be strip'd, and his hands tied behind him, and then putting a rod into every one of the young Gentlemen's hands; he caused them scourge him back again into the Town: which piece of humanity and justice when the Citizens understood, they resolved to defend themselves no longer, and so immediately surrendred: a great example doubtless, and by which we may learn, that many times kindness and generosity moves an Enemy more than all the force and artifice of war; for 'tis frequently seen that those Provinces and Cities which no violence or stratagem have subdued, have been melted and wrought upon by one single act of pity, chastity, or liberality: and of this History is full of many other examples besides. *Pyrrhus* could not be got out of *Italy* by all the power of the *Romans*; and yet *Fabritius* sent him packing by one act of generosity, and that was giving him notice that some of his intimates would poison him, and had made overtures to the *Romans* to that purpose. Again, *Scipio Africanus* got not so much honour by the taking of *Carthage*, as he did by one act of chastity; when he sent home a young beautiful Lady (that was taken prisoner, and presented to him) untouched to her Husband; for at the news of that one act, all *Spain* was astonish'd, and began to admire the virtue and innocence of the *Romans*, which virtue is a thing so universally celebrated, that there are no great persons endued with it, but are highly esteemed by all people, as appears by all Ethicks, Politicks, and History, among which, the History of *Xenophon* is abundantly copious, in demonstrating what Honours and what Victories accrued to *Cyrus* upon the bare account of his affability and mildness; and how he was never guilty of the least pride, or cruelty, or luxury, or any other vice that defiles the conversation of man. Nevertheless, seeing *Hanibal* did the same things, and by a contrary way, it will not be amiss in the next Chapter to enquire the reason.

C H A P. XXI.

*How it came to pass that Hanibal by methods quite contrary to what were practis'd by Scipio, did the same things in Italy that the other did in Spain.*

**I** Doubt not but it may seem strange to some people, that other Captains who have taken a quite contrary way to what is prescribed in my last Chapter, should notwithstanding have had the same success; for from thence it seems to follow, that Victory does not depend either upon humanity or justice, when we see the same praise and reputation acquir'd by quite contrary habits: and to prove this, we need not go far for examples, the same *Scipio* whom we mentioned before, being with an Army in *Spain*, carried himself with so much piety, and justice, and liberality to all people, that he got the love of the whole Province: on the other side we see *Hanibal* in *Italy* acting quite contrary, and with violence, cruelty, rapine, and all manner of infidelity persecuting the people, and yet with the same laudable effects as *Scipio* had in *Spain*. And considering with my self what might be the reason, they seem'd to me to be several. The first is, because men are studious of novelty, and that not only those who are under slavery or subjection, but those who are free, and in peace; for (as is said before) men are as well satiated with happiness, as afflicted with misery.

This desire (therefore) of change opens a doore to any man that invades a Province with any considerable force: if he be a foreigner, they all follow after him; if a native, they attend him, assist him, and encourage him: so that let him take which way he pleases, he must needs make great progress in those places. Again, people are generally excited



two ways, either by love, or by fear; so that he that is feared, is often times as readily obeyed as he that is beloved, and sometimes more. It is not material therefore to a Commander which of these two ways he takes; for if he be a virtuous person, and of any extraordinary faculties, he will be admired by the people, as *Hanibal* and *Scipio* were, whose great worth effaced, or covered all the faults that they committed. But in either of these two ways, great inconveniences may arise, and such as may ruine a Prince. For he who desires to be beloved, upon the least excess or immoderation in his Courtship, is subject to be despised; and he on the other side who affects to be feared, upon the least extravagance makes himself odious: and to keep the middle way exactly, is not possible to our nature; wherefore it is necessary to those who exceed in either kind, to atone for it with some extraordinary virtue, as *Hanibal* and *Scipio* did, who though persons of great prudence and conduct, yet it appeared that both of them, suffered by their manner of living, as well as they were advanced. Their advancement is mentioned before; their sufferings (as to *Scipio*) was the rebellion of his Army, and part of his friends in *Spain*, which proceeded from nothing but want of being feared, for men are naturally so unquiet, that every little door that is opened, to their ambition sets them agog, and abolishes all that love which they owe to their Prince for his humanity towards them, as in this example of the Friends and Army of *Scipio*; wherefore *Scipio* was constrained to make use of that severity in some measure, which he had always declined. As to *Hanibal*, there is not any particular example where his cruelty or infidelity did him hurt; only it may be supposed that they were the occasion why *Naples* and several other Towns stood so firm to the *Romans*. It is plain likewise that his bloodiness and impiety made him more odious to the people of *Rome*, than all the Enemies that ever that City had: for whereas when *Pyrrhus* was with a great Army in *Italy*, they gave him notice of a design on foot to have poisoned him, they were so inveterate against *Hanibal*, that they never forgave him, but when they had defeated and disarm'd him, they pursued him to the death. And these sad inconveniences hapned to *Hanibal* from no other causes, but because he was impious, unfaithful, and cruel: but then on the other side he had the advantage of being admired of all Writers for keeping his Army without any mutiny or dissension either against him, or among themselves, though it consisted of so many different Nations, which could be derived from nothing but the awe and terror of his person; which terror was so great, (considered with the reputation and authority that he received from his valour) that thereby he kept his Souldiers united and quiet. I conclude therefore, it imports not much which way a General takes, so there be any great excellence in him to recommend it; for (as is said before) both in the one and the other there is danger and defect, if there be not some extraordinary virtue to balance it. And if *Hanibal* and *Scipio*, one by laudable, and the other by ignominious and detestable ways arrived at the same end, and had the same effects, I think it convenient in my next Chapter to discourse of two *Roman* Citizens, who by divers ways (but both honourable) arrived at the same pitch of glory and renown.

## C H A P. II.

*How the austeritie of Manlius Torquatus, and the humanity of Valerius Corvinus gain'd each of them the same honour and reputation.*

Here were two famous Captains contemporary in *Rome*, *Manlius Torquatus*, and *Valerius Corvinus*, both of them equal in courage, equal in their triumphs, and each of them (as to the enemy) acquir'd all with equal virtue and terror; but as to their own Armies, and manner of discipline, it was quite different. *Manlius* commanded with all kind of severity, excused his Souldiers from no labour, nor no punishment. *Valerius* on the other side used them with as much gentleness and familiarity: *Manlius* to keep his Souldiers strictly to their discipline, executed his own son; which *Valerius* was so far from imitating, that he never offended any man: yet in this great diversity of conduct, the effects were the same, both as to the Enemy, the Commonwealth, and themselves; for none of their Souldiers ever declin'd fighting; none of them rebelled, or so much as disputed their commands, though the discipline of *Manlius* was so severe, that afterwards all excessive and extravagant commands were called *Manliana imperia*: in which place it is not amiss to enquire how it came to pass that *Manlius* was constrained to so rigorous a method; what it was that made *Valerius* comport himself so mildly: how it was that this different way of proceeding should have the same effect; and last of all, which of the two is most worthy

thy to be imitated. If *Manlius* be considered as he is represented by the Historian, he will be found to be very valiant, carrying himself with great piety to his Father, and Country, and with great reverence to his Superiors, which appeared by his defence of his Father with the *Gaul*, in the behalf of his Country, which notwithstanding he would not undertake without orders from the Consul; for when he saw a vast man, of a prodigious proportion, marching forth upon the Bridge, and challenging any of the *Romans*, he went modestly to the Consul for leave, and told him, *Injussu tuo adversus hostem, nunquam pugnabo, nisi si certam victoriam videam; Without your permission I will never engage with the enemy, though I was sure to overcome:* and the Consul giving him leave, he conquered his enemy. When therefore a man of his constitution arrives at such a command, he desires all men may be as punctual as himself; and being naturally brave, he commands brave things, and when they are once commanded, requires that they be executed exactly; and this is a certain rule, when great things are commanded, strict obedience must be expected, otherwise your enterprize must fail. That therefore those under your command may be the more obedient to your commands, it is necessary that you command aright; and he commands right, who compares his own quality and condition with the quality and condition of those they command; if he finds them proportionable, then he may command, if otherwise, he is to forbear; and therefore that saying was not amiss, that to keep a Commonwealth in subjection by violence, it was convenient that there should be a proportion betwixt the persons forced, and forcing; and whilst that proportion lasted, the violence might last too, but when that proportion was dissolved, and he that was forced grew stronger than he that offered it, it was to be doubted much his authority would not hold long. But to return; great things therefore, and magnificent, are not to be commanded but by a man that is great and magnificent himself; and he who is so constituted, having once commanded them, cannot expect, that mildness or gentleness will prevail with his subjects to execute them: but he that is not of this greatness and magnificence of mind, is by no means to command extraordinary things; and if his commands be but ordinary, his humanity may do well enough, for ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince, but to the Laws and Customs of the place: so that we may conclude *Manlius* was constrained to that severity by his natural temper and complexion; and such persons are many times of great importance to a Commonwealth, because by the exactness of their own lives, and the strictness of their discipline, they revive the old Laws, and reduce every thing towards its first principles.

And if a State could be so happy to have such persons succeeding one another in any reasonable time, as by their examples would not only renew the laws, restrain vice, and remove every thing that tended to its ruine or corruption; that State would be immortal. So then *Manlius* was a severe man, and kept up the *Roman* discipline exactly, prompted first by his own nature, and then by a strong desire to have that obeyed, which his own inclination had constrained him to command. *Valerius Corvinus* on the other side might exercise his gentleness without inconvenience, because he commanded nothing extraordinary, or contrary to the customs of the *Romans* at that time; which custom, being good, was sufficient to honour him, and not very troublesome to observe; whereby it hapned that *Valerius* was not necessitated to punish offenders, because there were but very few of that sort, and when there were any, their punishment (as is said before) was imputed to the Laws; and not to the cruelty of the Prince; by which it fell out that *Valerius* had an opportunity by his gentleness to gain both affection and authority in the Army, which was the cause that the Souldiers being equally obedient to one as well as the other, though their humours and discipline were different, yet they might do the same things, and their actions have the same effects. If any are desirous to imitate either of them, they will do well to have a care of running into the same errors as *Scipio* and *Hannibal* did before, which is not to be prevented any other way, but by singular virtue and industry. These things being so, it remains now that we enquire which of these two ways are most laudable to follow, and it is the harder to resolve, because I find Authors are strangely divided, some for one way, and others for the other. Nevertheless, they who pretend to write how a Prince is to govern, are more inclinable, to *Valerius* than *Manlius*, and *Xenophon* in his character of *Cyrus* jumps exactly with *Livy's* description of *Valerius*, especially in his expedition against the *Sammites* when he was Consul: for the morning before the Fight he made a speech to his Souldiers with that mildness and humanity, that the Historian tells us, *Non aliis militi familiarior dux fuit, inter infimos militum omnia baud gravate muma obeundo. In ludo præterea militari, cum velocitatis, viriumque inter se æquales certamina incunt, comiter facili vincere, ac vinci, vulis eodem; nec quinquam aspernari parem qui se offerret; factis benignus*

*prore; dictis, haud minus libertatis alienae quam suae dignitatis memor, & (quo nihil popularius est) quibus artibus petierat Magistratum, isdem Gerebat. No General was ever more familiar with his Soldiers; no Soldier too mean for him to converse with, no office too base for him to undertake. In their Military recreations when they ran, or wrestled for a prize, he would not only run or wrestle, but win or lose, be overcome, or conquer, with the same evenness, and unconcernment; nor did he ever disdain or refuse any man that challenged him. In his actions, he was bountiful, as occasion was offered; in his words, he was as mindful of other peoples liberty, as of his own dignity, and (which is the most grateful thing to the people in the world) the same arts which he used in the obtaining, the same he exercised in the management of his Magistracy.*

*Lucy speaks likewise very honorably of Manlius, acknowledging that his severity upon his Son, made the whole Army so obedient, and diligent, that it was the occasion of their victory against the Latins; and he goes so far in his praise, that after he has given an exact account of the Battel and victory, and described all the dangers and difficulties to which the Romans were exposed, he concludes that it was only the Conduct and courage of Manlius that got the victory that day; and afterwards comparing the strength of both Armies, he does not scruple to say, that on which side soever Manlius had been, that side would certainly have had the day. Which being so, makes my question very hard to determine, nevertheless, that it may not be altogether unresolved, I conceive that in a Citizen brought up under the strictness of a Commonwealth, the way of Manlius would be best, and least subject to danger, because it seems most for the interest of the publick, and not at all proceeding from private ambition; besides to carry ones self severely to every body, and pursue nothing but the benefit of the Publick, is not a way to make parties, or friends, without which there can be no troubles in a State. So that he who proceeds in that manner, must needs be very useful, and not at all suspicious to the State. But the way of Valerius is quite contrary; for though the Commonwealth reaps the same fruits as in the other; yet jealousies will arise, and people will be fearful that in the end his great favour among the Souldiers will be employed to set up himself, with very ill consequences upon their liberty. And if in Publicola's time these ill effects did not happen, it was because as then the minds of the Romans were not corrupt, nor had he been long enough in authority. But if we consider a Prince, as Xenophon did, in that case we must leave Manlius, and follow Valerius clearly; because a Prince is by all means to endeavour the obedience of his Subjects and Soldiers by ways of amity and kindness. They will be obedient, if they find him virtuous, and a strict observer of his Laws; they will love him, if they see him courteous, and affable, and merciful, and endued with all the good qualities which were in Valerius, and which Xenophon attributes to Cyrus. For to be particularly beloved, and have an Army true to his interest, is *instar omnium*, and answers to all other policies of State. But it is otherwise when an Army is commanded by one who is a Citizen of the same City with the rest of his Army; for he is subject to the same Laws and Magistrates as well as they. In the Annals of Venice we read, that in former times the Venetian Gallies returning from some expedition, and lying near the Town, there happened a quarrel betwixt the Citizens and the Seamen, which proceeded so far, that it came to a tumult, both sides betook themselves to their Arms, and neither the power of their Officers, the reverence of the Citizens, nor the authority of the Magistrate was able to quiet them. But as soon as a certain Gentleman appeared, who had commanded them the year before, remembring with what courtesie he had behaved himself, their kindness to him prevail'd above all other courtesies, and they gave over the combat, and retir'd; but that affection, and ready obedience to his commands, cost the poor Gentleman very dear; for thereby he became so obnoxious to the Senate, that not long after, they secured themselves against him, either by imprisonment or death. I conclude then, that a Prince may better follow the example of Valerius; but to a Citizen, it is dangerous both to himself, and the State; to the State, because that way leads directly to Tyranny; to himself, because (let his intentions be never so innocent) he will certainly be suspected, and bring himself in danger. So on the other side, the severity of Manlius is as pernicious in a Prince, but in a Citizen it is convenient, and particularly for the State; for it never does hurt, if the hatred which follows your severity be not encreased by a jealousie of your great virtue and reputation, as it happen'd to Camillus.*

C H A P. XXIII.

*Upon what occasion Camillus was banished from Rome.*

WE have concluded in the Chapter before, that to imitate *Valerius* may prejudice your Country, and your self; and that to imitate *Manlius* may be convenient for your self, and prejudicial to your Country; which opinion is much confirmed by the case of *Camillus*, whose proceedings were more like *Manlius*, than *Valerius*; for which reason, *Livy* speaking of him tells us, *Ejus virtutem milites oderant, & Mirabantur. His virtus was both odious, and admirable to his Soldiers.* That which made him admired was his Diligence, Prudence, Magnanimity, and Conduct: That which made him hated was, that he was more severe in punishing, than liberal in rewarding. And of this hatred *Livy* gives these following reasons: First, because he caused the Money which was made of the goods of the *Vejentes* to be applied to publick use, and not distributed with the rest of the prey: Next, because in his Triumphal Chariot he caused himself to be drawn by four white Horses, which was accounted so great a piece of arrogance, that it was thought he did it to equalize the Sun. A third was, that he had devoted a tenth part of the spoils of the *Vejentes* to *Apollo*, which (to keep his Vow) was to be taken back again from the Soldiers who had got it in their clutches: From whence it may be observed, that nothing makes a Prince more odious to the people, than to deprive them of their possessions; which is a thing of so great importance, that it is never forgotten, because upon every little want, it comes fresh into their Memories, and men being daily subject to those wants, will daily remember it; and next to this is, being insolent and proud, which is likewise extremely odious to the people, especially if they be free. And although perhaps no detriment accrues to them from his pride, yet they are observed always to detest him that uses it. So that a great person is to avoid it as a rock, because it begets hatred, and that without any advantage, which makes it a very rash, and imprudent thing.

C H A P. XXIV.

*The prolongation of Commissions brought Rome first into servitude.*

IF the dissolution of the *Roman Commonwealth* be accurately considered, it will be found to proceed partly from the differences about the *Agrarian Law*, and partly from the prorogation of their Magistrates, which errors, had they been known in time, and due remedies applied, would not have been so pernicious, but *Rome* might have enjoyed her freedom longer, and perhaps with more quiet. For though from the prolongation of Offices, there were no tumults nor seditions to be seen in that City; yet it was clear, that those Magistrates which were continued took much upon them, and by degrees their power and authority became a great prejudice to the liberty of the State. Had all the Citizens who were continued, been wise, and honest like *L. Quintius*, they would not have incurred this inconvenience. The goodness of *Quintius* appeared in one thing very remarkably; a meeting being appointed for accommodation of the differences betwixt the Nobility and the People; the people continued their authority to their Tribunes another year, as believing them very proper to resist the ambition of the Nobles; The Senate, to retaliate upon the people, and show themselves as considerable as they, continued the Consulship to *Quintius*; But *Quintius* refused it absolutely, alledging that all examples were to be stifled, and not increased by others that were worse, and therefore pressed them to the election of new Consuls, and prevailed with much importunity and contention. Had the rest of the *Roman* Citizens imitated this person, they had never admitted that custom of proroguing, of Magistrates, and then the prolongation of their Commands in the Army had never been introduced, which very thing was at length the ruine of that Commonwealth. The first person whose Commission was continued in *Rome*, was *P. Philo*, who having besieged *Palaopolis*, and by the time his Consulship was to expire, reduced it to such extremity, that the victory seemed already in his hands. The Senate would not send another to succeed him; but continued his authority with the Title of *Proconsul*, which thing (though done then upon grave consideration, and for the benefit of the publick) proved afterwards of such

ill consequence, that it brought that City in servitude and slavery: For by how much their Wars were more remote, by so much they thought these prorogations convenient; from whence it hapned, that fewer of the *Romans* were prepared for Military Commands, and the glory of their Victories redounded but to few: and besides, he whose Commission was renew'd, and had been a long time accustomed to the Army, might insinuate so, and gain such an interest in it, as might make it disclaim the Senate, and acknowledg no Head but their General. This it was that enabled *Marius* and *Sylla* to debauch the Army; this was it that enabled *Cesar* to conquer his native Country; which miseries had never hapned, had not that custom of continuing Magistrates, and Commanders been introduced. If it be objected, that their great affairs could not have been managed at so great a distance, without that prorogation of commands; I answer, That 'tis possible their Empire might have been longer before it came to that height; but then it would have been more lasting, for the adversary would never have been able to have erected a Monarchy, and destroyed their liberty so soon.

## C H A P. XXV.

*Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and several other Citizens of Rome.*

WE have said elsewhere, that nothing is of more importance to the conservation of the liberty of a State, than to keep the Citizens low, and from being too wealthy. Whether there was any Law to that purpose, or what that Law was, I must acknowledge my ignorance, (especially when I consider with what zeal and passion the *Agriarian* was opposed) yet 'tis clear by experience, that for 400 years after the building of *Rome*, that City was in very great poverty: And it is probable the great cause of it was, that poverty was no impediment to preferment: Virtue was the only thing required in the Election of Magistrates, and the distribution of Offices; and wherever it was found, let the person or family be never so poor, it was sure to be advanced; which manner of living, made riches contemptible. And this is manifest by the following example. *Minutius* the Consul being circumvented, and he and his whole Army, as it were block'd up by the *Equi*, the *Romans* were so possess'd with the danger of their Army, that they betook themselves to the creation of a Dictator, which is their last remedy in their greatest afflictions: They concluded upon *L. Quinctius Cincinnatus*, who was then (when they sent for him) in a little Country farm at Plough, which *Livy* magnifies exceedingly, and says; *Opera pretium est audire, qui omnia præ divitiis humana spernunt, neque honori magno locum, neque virtuti putant esse, nisi effuse affluant opes!* It is pleasant to hear some people talk of riches, as if nothing in this world were comparable to them; as if all honour and virtue depended only upon the Estate. *Cincinnatus* (as I said before) was at Plough in his Farm, (which consisted only of four acres of ground) when the Embassadors came to him from the Senate to salute him Dictator, and to remonstrate their distress. Having received their message, he made no delay, but call'd immediately for his Robe, came directly for *Rome*, and his Army, and march'd away for the relief of *Minutius*: having defeated the Enemy, and pillaged their Camp, he would not suffer the Army of *Minutius* to participate in the prize, telling him, *I do not think it reasonable that you should have share in the prey, who would so near being a prey your self!* After which he degraded *Minutius* of his Consulship, and made him only a Legate with this expression; *You shall continue here in this Station, till you learn to behave your self more like a Consul.* The same Dictator, in the same expedition, made *L. Fabius* his Master of his Horse, though he had none to be Master of his own; for his poverty was luck; he was forced to serve on foot. 'Tis remarkable how in those days poverty and honour were not so inconsistent as now, and that to an excellent and worthy person as *Cincinnatus* was, four acres of Land was a sufficient Estate. In the days of *Virgilius Regulus* poverty was in the same reputation; for being at the head of an Army in *Africa*, and having conquered the *Carthaginians*, he made it his request to the Senate that he might be permitted to come home, and husband his own Farm, which his Servants had neglected. And this frugality of the *Romans* is exceedingly wonderful; for looking for nothing but praise and honour from their Victories, they brought all their prize into the publick Treasury: and doubtless had *Regulus* propos'd any thing of advantage to himself by that War, he would never have been concerned to have had his four acres neglected by his Servants. Not was the modesty and magnanimity of the *Romans* less remarkable, who being put into command, and placed at the head of an Army, thought

themselves above any Prince; no King, no Commonwealth was able to dismay them: But when their Commissions expired, and they were returned privately to their houses; no body so frugal, no body so humble, no body so laborious, so obedient to the Magistrates, nor respectful to their superiors as they; insomuch that one would have thought it impossible the same minds should have been capable of such strange alterations. And this poverty continued till the time of *Paulus Emilius* (which was the last age of that Commonwealth's happiness) for though he by his Triumph enriched the whole City, yet not regarding his own fortunes, he continued poor himself, and poverty was in that esteem, that *Paulus* to gratifie and encourage one of his Sons-in-Law who had behaved himself bravely in those Wars, gave him a silver Cup, which was the first piece of Plate that was ever seen in his family. And here I have a fair occasion to enlarge upon poverty, and show how much more useful it is to Mankind than riches, and how many excellent Arts it has produced and improved, which riches and luxury have destroyed: But this having been treated of so amply by other people before, I shall mention it no farther at this time.

C H A P. XXVI.

*Women are many times the destruction of States.*

IN the City of *Ardea* there was a great controversie betwixt the *Patricii* and the People about the Marriage of a young Lady; who being a great Fortune, had a great many Servants, but more especially two, one of them a *Patrician*, the other a Plebeian. Her Father being dead, her Guardian would needs bestow her upon the Plebeian; her Mother was for the Nobleman; not agreeing among themselves, it came to a tumult, and by degrees to blows; insomuch as the whole Nobility appeared in Arms for the one, and all the people for the other. The result was, the people being beaten out of the Town, and sending to the *Volsci* for aid, the Nobles sent to *Rome*. The *Volsci* were readiest, and coming first to the assistance of the Plebeians, they clap'd down before the Town. They had not entrench'd themselves long, but the *Roman* Army came upon their backs, and shut them up betwixt the Town and them; insomuch that they were quickly distressed, and forced to surrender at discretion. The *Romans* entred the Town, killed all that were accessary to the sedition, and settled their affairs. In which passage there are many observable things. First, we see Women have been the occasion of much desolation, prejudice, and dissention: The Rape of *Lucrece* lost the *Tarquins* their Government; the attempt upon *Virginia*, was the ruine of the *Decem-viri*. And *Aristotle* in his Politicks imputes the abomination of Tyranny to the injuries they do to people upon the account of Women, by their Debauchments, their Violences, or Adulteries, as we have shew'd at large in our Chapter about Conspiracies. So that in the Government of any Kingdom or Commonwealth, those things are not to be reckon'd as trifles, but as the occasions of much mischief, and are by all means to be prevented, before the rancour has taken too deep root, and is not to be cured, but by the destruction of the State: as it hapned to the *Ardeates*, who let it go so long among their fellow Citizens, that at last they came to an absolute division not to be composed nor settled, but by foreign assistance, which is always the forerunner of servitude and slavery.

C H A P. XXVII.

*How the civil discords in a City, are to be composed, and of the falsity of that opinion, That the best way to keep a City in subjection, is to keep it divided.*

IN the reconciliation of a City that is labouring under civil dissentions, we are to follow the example of the *Roman* Consuls, and observe their method in composing the distractions among the *Ardeates*, which was by cutting off the chief Actors, and confiscating their Estates. And to compose the distractions of a City, there are three ways; either by cutting off the chief actors (as the *Romans* did) by banishing them the City, or by forcing them to an accomodation upon such penalties as they shall be afraid to incur: of these three ways the last is most dangerous, uncertain, and unprofitable; because it is impossible where

where much blood has been shed, or much injury done, that that peace should last long, which was made by compulsion; for seeing, and hearing, and conversing with one another daily, their animosities must of necessity revive, and provoke them to new outrage, by presenting them with new occasions of indignation and revenge; and of this we cannot have an apter example than in the City of *Pistoia*, which 15 years since (as it is now) was divided into the *Panciaticchi*, and *Cancellieri* (only then they were at open defiance, which now they are not.) After many contests and disputes among themselves, they proceeded to blood, to the plundering and demolishing one anothers houses, and committing all other hostilities imaginable: The *Florentines* whose business it was to unite them, used this third way, which rather encreased, than mitigated their tumults; so that weary of that way, and grown wiser by experience, they made use of the second; banished some of the Ring-leaders, and imprisoned the rest, whereby they not only quieted their differences then, but have kept them so ever since. But doubtless the safest way had been to cut them off at first, and if those executions were forborn then by us, or have been since by any other Commonwealth, it is for no other cause, but that they require a certain generosity and greatness of Spirit, that in weak Commonwealths is hardly to be found. And these are the errors, which as I said in the beginning, are committed by the Princes of our times, when they are to determine in such great controversies; for they should inform themselves how others have comported in the same cases before them; but they are so weak by reason of the lightness of our present education, and their unexperience in History, that they look upon the examples of the ancients as inhumane, or impossible: So that our modern opinions are as remote from the truth, as that saying of our wise men was upon a time, *Che bisognava tener Pistoia con le parti, & Pisa con le fortetze: That Pistoia was to be kept under by factions, and Pisa by a Citadel;* but they were mistaken in both. What my judgment is about Citadels, and such kind of Fortresses, I have delivered elsewhere; so as in this plate, I shall only demonstrate how unpracticable it is to keep Towns in subjection by fomenting their differences and factions, and first it is impossible to keep both parties true to you (be you Prince, or Commonwealth, or whatever) for men are naturally so inconstant, it cannot be that those parties which favour you to day, should be affected to you always; for they will still look out for some new Patron, and Protector: so that by degrees one of the parties taking some disgust against you, the next War that happens, you run a great hazard of losing your Town. If it be under the Government of a State, the City is in more danger, than in the other case, because each party looks out for friends among the great ones, and will spare no pains nor money to corrupt them. From whence two great inconveniences do arise: One is, you can never make them love you, because by reason of the frequent alteration of Governors, and putting in sometimes a person of one humour, and sometimes another of another; they can never be well govern'd. And then the other is, by this fomenting of Factions, your State must be necessarily divided. *Blondus* speaking of the passages betwixt the *Florentines* and *Pistoians*, confirms what we have said in these words, *Mentre che i Florentini disognavano de riunir Pistoia, divisono se Medesimi. Whilst the Florentines thought to have united the Pistoians, they divided themselves.* In the year 1501: *Arezzo* revolted from the *Florentines*, and the Valleys di *Tevere*, and *Chiana* were entirely over-run by the *Vitelli*, and Duke *Valentine*. Whereupon *Monsieur de Lant* was sent from the King of *France* to see all that they had lost, restored to the *Florentines*. Wherever *Monsieur de Lant* came observing the persons that came to visit him, did still profess themselves of the party of *Morzocco*, he was much dissatisfied with their factions, and more that they should declare themselves so freely; for (said he) if in *France* any man should pronounce himself of the King's party, he would be sure to be punished, because it would imply that there was a party against the King, and it was his Masters desire, that his Kingdom and Cities should be all of a mind: If therefore a Prince believes there is no way for him to keep his Towns in obedience, but by keeping up Factions, it is a certain argument of his weakness; for being unable by force and courage to keep them under, he betakes himself to these pernicious arts; which in peaceable times may palliate a little, but when troubles, and adversity come will assuredly deceive him.



C H A P. XXVIII.

*A strict eye is to be kept upon the Citizens, for many times under pretence of Officiouſness, and Piety, there is hid a principle of Tyranny.*

The City of *Rome* being distressed for want of provisions, and the publick stores being unable to supply it, it came into the thoughts of *Spurius Melsus* (a rich Citizen of those times) to furnish the Common people *gratis* out of his own private stock, whereby he wrought himself so far into the favour of the people, that the Senate suspecting the ill consequences of his bounty, began to conspire his destruction before his interest became too great, to which purpose they created a Dictator, who put him to death: from whence it may be observed, that many times those actions which seem charitable and pious at first sight, and are not reasonable to be condemned, are notwithstanding cruel and dangerous for a State, if not corrected in time. To make this more clear, I say a Commonwealth cannot be well governed, nor indeed subsist without the assistance and ministry of powerful and great men: and yet on the other side that power and reputation of particular Citizens is the occasion of tyranny. To regulate this inconvenience, it is necessary, that seeing there must be great men, things should be so ordered that they may have praise and reputation by such things as are rather useful than prejudicial to the State. Wherefore it is carefully to be observed what ways they take to acquire their reputation; and they are usually two, either publick or private. The publick way is when they arrive at their reputation by some good counsel, or some great exploit which they have achieved for the benefit of the publick; and this way of reputation is not only not to be precluded to the Citizens, but to be opened, by such promises of reward for their good counsels or actions as may both dignify and enrich them; and when a reputation is gained by these plain and sincere ways, it is never to be feared. But when their courses are private, (which is the other of the two ways) they are dangerous, nay totally pernicious. Those private ways are by obliging particular persons, by lending them money, by marrying their relations, by defending them against the Magistrates and doing several other particular favours which may encourage their Clients to violate the Laws, and vitiate the Commonwealth; for which cause it ought to be so well fortified with good Laws, that the endeavors of such ambitious men may be either discouraged or defeated; and on the other side rewards proposed to such as arrive at their greatness by any extraordinary exploit. In *Rome* the highest reward of those persons who behaved themselves gloriously for the good of their Country, was a triumph besides which they had other inferior honours, for more inferior services, &c. to restrain or punish the ambition of those who went about by private and clandestine ways to disturb the peace of their Country, their greatest remedy was to accuse them to the people, and when those accusations were insufficient, (the people being blinded by some specious pretence of benefit, and advantage) they created a Dictator, who with a kind of regal authority, was to reduce the delinquent, from his aberrations, or punish him as he did *Spurius Melsus*; and the leaving of one such fault unpunished, is enough to ruine a Commonwealth, for a single example afterwards will hardly be effectual.

C H A P. XXIX.

*That the transgressions of the people do spring commonly from the Prince.*

Princes cannot reasonably complain of the transgressions of their subjects, because it is necessarily their negligence, or ill example that debauches them: and if the people of our times are infamous for thefts, and robberies, and plundering, and such kind of enormities, it proceeds from the exorbitance and rapacity of their Governors, *Romania* (before Pope *Alexander VI* exterminated those Lords who had the command in those parts) was a place of all kind of dissoluteness and iniquity, every day, and every trivial occasion producing notorious murders and rapines; which was not so much from any depravity in the nature of the people, (as some persons would have it) as from the corruption of their Princes; for being poor of themselves, and yet ambitious to live in splendor and magnificence, they were forced upon ill courses; and indeed refused none that could supply them.

To pass by several others, one of their detestable ways was to make Laws against such and such things, which after they were published, they themselves would be the first that should break, to encourage others to do the same; nor was any man ever punished for his inobedience, till they saw enough involved in the same *premunire*; then (forsooth) the Laws were executed most strictly, not out of any true zeal to justice, but out of a desire to be fingring the Fines; from whence it followed, that by grievous mulcts and expiations the people being impoverished, were constrained to use the same violences upon those who were less potent than they; by which means men were not so much corrected, as instructed to do ill; and all these mischiefs proceeded from the iniquity of their Princes. *Livy* has a story to this purpose, where he tells us, that the *Roman* Embassadors (passing with a great present to *Apollo*, which was taken out of the spoils of the *Venerians*) were taken by the Corsairs of *Lipari* in *Sicily*, and carried with it into that Island. *Timasitheus* Prince of that Town understanding what the Present was; whither it was going, and from whom it was sent, (though born at *Lipari*) behaved himself in that like a *Roman*; and remonstrated to the people the impiety of the fact, which he prest upon them so home, that by common consent the Present was restored, and the Embassadors dismissed; the words of the Historian are these, *Timasitheus multitudinem religionis implevit, quæ semper regenti est similis*: which agrees with that saying of *Lorenzo de Medici*.

*Et quel ch'è fa li Signor fanno poi molti,  
Che nel Signor son tutti gl'occhi volti.*

*A Prince does nought (or regular, or rude,)  
But's followed straight by th' gaping multitude.*

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### CHAP. XXX.

*A Citizen who would do any great matter by his own authority, must first extinguish all envy. In what manner things are to be ordered upon the approach of an enemy, and how a City is to be defended.*

**T**He Senate of *Rome* having intelligence that the *Tuscan*s had made new levies of men to make a new inroad into their Country; and that the *Latins* and *Hernici* (formerly in amity with the *Romans*) had confederated with the *Volsi*, (implacable enemies to the very name of a *Roman*) they concluded that War would be dangerous. *Camillus* being Tribune at that time; and invested with Consular authority, they thought he would be able to defend them, (without creating a Dictator) if the rest of his Colleagues would intrust him with the chief Command; to which they readily condescended, *Nec quæquam* (says *Livy*) *de majestate sua detractionem credebant, quod Majestati ejus concessissent*; Nor did they think any thing subtracted from their authority that was added to his. Upon which *Camillus* (taking their paroles for their obedience) caused three Armies to be raised. The first he designed against the *Tuscans*, and commanded it himself. The second was to continue about *Rome* to attend the motions of the *Latins* and *Hernici*, and was commanded by *Quintus Servilius*. The third was left in the City, as Guards for the security of the Gates, and the Court, and to be ready upon any accident that should arise, and the Command of this Army was committed to *Lucius Quintius*. The care of his Magazines was refer'd to *Horatius* one of his Colleagues, who was to see them furnished with such arms and provisions, and other things as were necessary in times of War. He caused another Tribune of his Colleagues (called *Cornelius*) to preside in the Senate, and publick Counsel, that he might be present in all their debates, and ready to advise in all their daily transactions. So excellent were the Tribunes in those times, that when the safety of their Country was at stake, they were equally disposed either to command or obey. And here may be observed the great ability which a wise and good man has to do good, by the suppression of envy, which is many times a great impediment to the good which some persons would do, could they but get up into such authority as is requisite in affairs of importance. This envy is extinguished two ways; either by some great and difficult accident, in which every man foreseeing his own ruine, lays his ambition aside, and submits himself voluntarily to the obedience of some person from whose virtue he may hope to be delivered: such a person was this *Camillus*, who having been three times Dictator, and acted in all his administrations more for the good of the publick, than any benefit of his own, and given

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Many excellent testimonies of his integrity and conduct besides, his Colleagues were not scrupulous to transfer their authority, nor the people at all apprehensive of his greatness, nor any (how great soever) ashamed to be inferior to him.

Wherefore it was not without reason that *Livy* used that expression, *Nec quicquam, &c.* The other way of extinguishing envy, is, when either by violence, or the course of nature your competitors die; that is, such persons as envying your reputation and grandeur, and disdain that you should be above them, cannot contain themselves, and be quiet, but rather than not satisfy the perversity of their minds, will be contented their Country should be ruined, especially if they have been brought up in a corrupt State, and not been meliorated by their education.

Against this sort of envy there is no remedy but in the death of the Subject. And when an excellent person is so happy as to have these impediments removed by the course of nature, without any machination or concurrence of his, he becomes great and honourable without obstacle, and may exercise his virtues without any offence. But when he has not this good fortune, and nature is so unkind as to suffer them to live, it is necessary he remove them some extraordinary way, and make it his whole business to find one; yet with that caution and deliberation, that he be sure his way be practicable before he ventures upon it. He who reads the Bible soberly, and considerately, will find *Moses* (for the promotion and establishment of his Laws) was forced to put several to death, for no other reason but because out of envy they opposed his designs: and this necessity of removing Competitors was not unknown to *Groolamo Savonarola* the Frier, and *Pietro Soderini* Gonfalonere of *Florence*. The Frier could not Master it for want of authority; and those of his followers who could have done it, had no true knowledge of his mind; yet that was not his fault, for his Sermons were full of declamations against the wisdom of this World, and invectives against the wise men, by whom he intended such envious persons as opposed his Doctrines and Institutions. *Soderini* was in hopes by the goodness of his conversation, and his beneficence to all people, that he should have been so fortunate as to have out-lived and worn out the envy of his adversaries, seeing he was but young, and found new Clients coming in daily to his party, whom his excellent deportment had drawn over. So that he abstain'd from all kind of severity and violence, not considering that time is not to be lost; that goodness is ineffectual; that fortune is changeable; and that envious persons are not to be obliged by all the presents and good offices in the World. So that both these persons were ruined at last, one of them because he had not authority enough to master the envy of his adversaries; the other because he did not do it (though he had authority) in time. The other thing remarkable in that Story, was, the order taken by *Camillus* for the safety of *Rome*, both abroad and at home. And certainly it is not without reason that good Historians (as ours is) set down certain distinct and particular cases, that posterity may learn upon such accidents in what manner to defend themselves: it is to be observed likewise, that the most dangerous and unprofitable defence is that which is made by tumult and disorder; and this is apparent by that third Army, which *Camillus* left as a Guard to the City, which many would have thought unnecessary, because the Citizens were generally arm'd, and martial; so that their needed no more than to have arm'd the rest upon occasion, without troubling them with an Army. But *Camillus* (and any other wise man would have done the same) was of another opinion; for a multitude is not to be trusted with arms but in an orderly and regular way. For which reason, and according to which example, he who has the Government of a Town, is above all things to avoid arming the people in a confused and tumultuous way; but is rather to cull and select such as he dare trust with arms, and such as he is satisfied will obey him, let him send or command them wheresoever he pleases. The rest are to be required to keep at home, and every man look to the defence of his own house. He who is besieged, and observes this course, may defend himself well enough; he that does otherwise, does not follow the example of *Camillus* and will hardly defend himself.

## C H A P. XXXI.

*Powerful States, and excellent Persons, retain the same mind and dignity in all kind of conditions.*

**A**Mong the rest of the great actions and words which our Author commemorates, and mentions as certain arguments of the great virtue and excellence of *Camillus*, in a speech of his to his Souldiers, he brings him in with this expression; *Nec mihi Dictatura apertus fecit, nec exilium admisit; I was neither elated with my Dictatorship, nor dejected with my Banishment.* From whence we may observe that great men are never discompos'd; let fortune vary as she pleases, let her advance them sometimes, and depress them at others, they are in the same settlement and tranquillity, so quiet and firm in their minds, that every man may see it's not in the power of fortune to disorder them; whereas pusillanimous and mean spirited persons, inebriated with their good fortune, and attributing all to their own virtue and good conduct, make themselves odious and insupportable to all that are about them, and that arrogance exposes them to many revolutions, which coming upon them on a sudden, do so terrifie and dismay them, that they run into the other extreme, and become as abject and vile. Hence it is that in time of adversity such Princes think more of their escape than defence, having made themselves incapable of that by their ill management before. And as this diversity of temper is many times to be found in particular Persons, and Princes; so it is incident to Commonwealths, as may be seen by the example of the *Romans* and *Venetians*. The first were never dejected by any ill fortune, nor transported by any good; as appears by their defeat at the Battel of *Cannas*, and their Victory against *Antiochus*: their defeat at *Cannas* was the third which they had received, and for that reason was very considerable; yet they were not so terrified, or cowed, as to commit any thing contrary to the old dignity of the *Romans*; for they resolv'd to continue the war; they rais'd more forces; they refus'd to redeem their prisoners upon any new terms; and could not be brought to make any overtures of Peace, either to *Hannibal*, or the Senate at *Carthage*; but for want of others, they arm'd their old men, and their servants, and resolv'd wholly upon war; for which obstinacy and refractoriness, when *Hanno* was told, he made a speech to the Senate, and remonstrated how little they were to presume upon their Victory at *Cannas*: we see then the *Romans* were not to be terrified or discouraged by any adversity of fortune; we shall shew now how far they were on the other side from insulting in their good. *Antiochus*, before he came to a Battel, sent Embassadors to *Scipio* to desire a Treaty: *Scipio* sent him these Conditions, that he should return with his Army into *Syria*, and leave the rest to the *Romans*. *Antiochus* thought that unreasonable, fought him, and was beaten, and afterwards sent Embassadors again to *Scipio*, with instructions to accept of whatever terms the Conqueror should give: *Scipio* never thought of altering his first propositions, though made before the Battel was won, but told them, *Quod Romani si vincuntur, non minuantur animis, nec si vincunt insolentescere solent; That the Romans were never dejected by ill fortune, nor elated by good.* The *Venetians* acted quite the other way, who having got a little good fortune, (ascribing it to a wrong cause, as if it had proceeded from their own power and virtue) had the insolence to call the King of *France* Son of *St. Mark*, and talking a fancy that they should bring their Commonwealth to as great a condition of grandeur and power as the *Romans*, they despis'd the Church, and all the Princes of *Italy* besides. Afterwards, when their fortune began to change, and they received a small defeat at *Vaila* by the *French*; they lost their whole Empire in a day; part revolted, and part they gave up themselves to the Pope, and King of *Spain*; and so much had they abandoned themselves to fear and consternation, that they sent Embassadors to the Emperor to make themselves his Tributaries; and writ poor and mean Letters to the Pope to move him to compassion, and to this extremity of dejection they were brought in four days time, by the loss but of one half of their Army; for the other of their *Proveditory* retreated, and came off safe to *Verona* with more than 25000 horse and foot; so that had there been any courage either in the Citizens or Senate, they might quickly have recruited, and shewn their force again; and if they could not have conquered, they might at least have lost all with more reputation, or possibly have brought the enemy to some honourable accord: but the poornefs of their spirit, and the illness of their military discipline took from them at one time both their courage and state: and so it will be with whosoever follows the example of the *Venetians*: for this insolence in good fortune, and dejection in bad, proceeds from their manner of education; which if vain and idle, will make you so too; whereas if it be otherwise, it will give you a better notion of the World, and teach you in both fortunes to behave your self with more moderation: and as this is true in single persons, so it is in

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Commonwealths, which are good or bad according to their manner of living. We have often said it before, and think it not amiss to repeat it again, that the foundation of all Governments consists in their Military discipline; and that where that is defective, neither their Laws, nor any thing else can be good; for thorow the whole tract of this History, it appears that there is a necessity your Militia should be good, and that cannot be good, but by continual exercise, which you cannot be sure of unless it consists of your own Subjects. and because you are not always in War, and it is impossible you shall be, therefore it is necessary that they be exercised in times of Peace, which is not to be done by any but your own Subjects, in respect of the charge.

*Camillus* (as is said before) marched out with his Army against the *Tusicans*, but his Soldiers having had a fight of the Enemy, found their Army so great, that they were discouraged and dismay'd, and thought themselves so much inferior, that they were not able to fight them. *Camillus* understanding this terror in his Camp, went up and down among the Soldiers, and having reprehended their fear, and said many things to encourage them, and drive that fancy out of their heads, at last without further directions, Come (said he) Courage! *Quod quisque didicit aut consuevit, faciat.* Do what you have been taught and accustomed, I desire no more. From whence it may be collected that he would not have used those words, had not his Army been exercised before, and that in times of Peace as well as War: For no good is to be expected; nor no General to trust himself to an unexperienced or undisciplined Army, which will certainly be his ruine, though he were as good a Commander as *Humbal* himself. And the reason is, because when an Army is engaged the General cannot be present in all places, to supply all defects, and remedy all errors; so that he must necessarily miscarry, unless he has such persons disposed up and down in the Army, as are capable of understanding his mind, and executing his Orders. Which being so, the *Roman* discipline is to be followed, and the Citizens of every City are to be inured to their Arms in times of Peace as well as war, that when they are brought to fight, they may not be at a loss, or meet with any thing new, or unaccustomed to them; by which means it will come to pass, that they will not be surprized or terrified in any condition, but retain still the same courage and sense of their dignity; But where the Citizens are undisciplin'd, and rely more upon their fortune, than experience, their hearts will change with their fortune, and they will give the same testimony of themselves, as the *Venetians* have done.

CHAP. XXXII.

*The ways which some people have taken to prevent a Peace.*

THE *Circei* and the *Velitrae* two of the *Roman* Colonies, revolted, in hopes the *Latines* would have been able to defend them. The *Latines* being defeated, and they frustrated of their hopes, it was the advice of several Citizens, that they should send Embassadors to *Rome* to reconcile themselves to the Senaté; But those who had been ring-leaders in the defection, apprehending the punishment would fall heavy upon their heads, perverted that design; and to run things beyond all possibility of Terms, they incited the people to arm, and invade the Frontiers of the *Romans*. And doubtless when Prince or Commonwealth are desirous to prevent an agreement, there is no safer, nor surer way, than by running the people into some unpardonable offence, that the fear of being punish'd may keep them averse from all overtures of Peace. After the first War betwixt the *Carthaginians* and *Romans*, those Soldiers which had been employed by the *Carthaginians* in *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, as soon as the Peace was concluded, went over into *Africa*, where being denied or delayed in the demands of their pay, they took Arms, and putting themselves under the command of two of their Officers, *Matho*, and *Spendio*, they plundered several of the *Carthaginian* Towns, and possessed themselves of others. The *Carthaginians* (to try all ways, before they came to extremity) sent *Asdrubal* (son of their Principal Citizens) Embassador to them; who having been formerly their General, it was probable, might have some Authority among them. *Asdrubal* being arrived, and *Matho*, and *Spendio* desirous to put the Soldiers beyond all possibility of pardon, persuaçed them that the best and most secure way would be, for them to kill all the *Carthaginians* that were Prisoners with them, and *Asdrubal* among the rest. Whereupon they killed them all, with a thousand circumstances of cruelty and torture; to which piece of wickedness they added another by publishing an Edict importing, That all the *Carthaginians* which should

should be taken for the future, should be treated the same way. And thus they prevented all propositions of Peace, and rendered their Soldiers obstinate and implacable to the Carthaginians.

## CHAP. XXXIII.

*To the obtaining a Victory, it is necessary your Army has a confidence not only in one another, but in their General.*

TO win a Battel, and overcome an Enemy, it is necessary to give your Army such a confidence, as may make them believe that nothing is able to withstand them; and the way of infusing this confidence is, by Arming, and exercising them well, and giving them a knowledge and acquaintance one with the other, which confidence and acquaintance is not to be expected, but where your Soldiers are your own Subjects, and have been brought up together. The General is to be so qualified, that the Soldiers may have confidence in his Wisdom, and Conduct; and they will always have such a confidence if they see him careful, and regular, and courageous, and one who preserves the majesty of his command with discretion and reputation; which he will do, if he punishes strictly, and put his Soldiers upon no over-hard and impertinent duty; keeps his promises; represent victory easie, either by concealing or extenuating the dangers, or by encouraging them bravely against them; and these things rightly observed, are of great consequence both to the Authority of the General, and the obtaining the Victory. The way which the Romans took to give this assurance to their Armies, was, by pretence of Religion; for which cause before the creation of their Consuls; the raising, or marching, or engaging of their Armies, their *Augures* and *Auspices* were consulted: and without some of these, no wise General would undertake any great Enterprize, believing they should certainly miscarry, unless the Soldiers were thorowly convinced that the Gods were on their side. And when any of their Consuls or other Commanders fought in defiance of these *Auspices*, he was punished, as *Claudius Pulcher* for despising the Omen of the Chickens. And although this is obvious in every part of the Roman History; yet it is better prov'd by the complaint of *Appius Claudius* to the people, against the insolence of their Tribunes, where he tells them that by their means, the *Auspices*, and other religious Customs were neglected or corrupted, His words are these, *Eludant nunc licet Religionem; quid enim interest si pulli non pascentur, si ex corvea tardius exierint, succinuerit avis? Parva sunt hæc, sed parva ista non contemnendo, Majores nostri maximam hanc Rempublicam fecerunt.* Let them laugh at Religion as they please, and cry, what are we concerned if the Pullets won't eat, if they come lazily out of their Pennes; or if a bird be disposed to sing? 'Tis true they are but trifles, yet by not despising those trifles, our Ancestors brought this Commonwealth to be Grandeur, it is at. And it was true; for those little things were sufficient to keep the Soldiers confident and united, which are two things go very far in a Victory, though without virtue and valour, they are not always successful. The *Prenestini* being in the Field with their Army against the Romans, they went and lodged themselves upon the River *Allia* (in a place where the Romans had been beaten by the French) that the consideration of the place might be an encouragement to their own men, and a terror to the Romans. And though this design was not improbable for the reason abovesaid, yet it appeared by the success, that true courage is not disturbed by every little accident, as was well expressed by the Dictator to his Master of the House, *Vides tu, fortuna illos fretos, ad Alliam consedisse, at tu fretus armis, animisq; invade mediam aciem.* You see, by their posting themselves upon the *Allia*, they rely wholly upon Fortune; do you trust to your Arms, and your courage and attack their main Battel. And he was in the right; for true courage, good discipline, and a confidence arising from so many Victories, cannot be discomposed by such frivolous stratagems; light things will not dismay them, nor every disorder distract them. For even in the absence of their Officers, Soldiers that are expert, and accustomed to Arms, are not easily beaten. As appeared by the two *Manlii* (both Consuls, and making War upon the *Volsces*) who having indiscreetly sent part of their Army to forrage, it fell out, that both the commanded party, and those which were left behind, were encompassed by the Enemy, and as it were besieged both at a time, out of which danger the Soldiers were delivered, more by their own courage, than any conduct in the Consuls; whereupon *Livy* tells us *Militum, etiam sine Rectore stabilis virtus tutata est.* The steadfast courage of the Soldiers defended them, without any help from their General. *Fabius* had likewise an excellent

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## Book III. *The Discourses of Nicholas Machiavel.* 419

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excellent way to confirm his Soldiers and possess them with a confidence; which I cannot omit: Having invaded *Tuscany* with a new Army; supposing the novelty of the Country, and their inexperience of that Enemy might have some influence among them, to give them a confidence, he called them together before the Battel, and having in a grave Oration given several reasons why they might hope for the Victory, he told them, That he had another reason behind, more certain than all of them, but in that he must be private; for to discover it, would be to defeat it: A wise way; and deserves well to be imitated.

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### CHAP. XXXIV.

*What vogue, fame or opinion disposes the people first to favour some particular Citizen; and whether they, or a Prince distributes their Offices with most prudence and judgment.*

WE have shown before, how *Titus Manlius* (called afterwards *Torquatus*) preserved his Father *L. Manlius* from an accusation which *Pomponius* the Tribune had exhibited against him to the people. And although the way which he took to preserve him was violent and irregular; yet his filial affection to his Father was so grateful to the people, that they not only not reprehended him for what he had done, but advanced him to honour; for being not long after to choose Tribunes for their Legions, *T. Manlius* was the second that was made. And here I think it not amiss to consider the way which the people of *Rome* took in the distribution of their honours, and election of Magistrates; and to inquire into the truth of what I asserted before, That the distributions of the people are better, and more exact than the distributions of a Prince; for the people follow the common and publick character of every man, unless by some particular notion of his actions, they presume, or believe otherwise. There are three ways by which a man may gain esteem and reputation with the people. The first is by extraction; when the Parents having been great men, and serviceable to the Commonwealth, the people take a fancy that their Children must of necessity be the same, until by some ill act they convince them of the contrary. The second way is to associate with grave persons, of good esteem, and such as are reputed discreet and sober by every body; and because nothing indicates and discovers a man so much as the Company which he keeps; he who keeps good Company, may be concluded to be good; for of necessity persons so conversant together, must have something of similitude. But there is another way of gaining the favour of the people, which exceeds them both; and that is by performing some extraordinary action, whether publick or private, it matters not, so you come honourably off. And the judgments which are made in this case, are much better than the other: For the arguments taken from the virtue of the Parents, are doubtful and fallacious; nor can any man conclude any thing, till experience resolves him. The presumptions of the second from their conversations and Company, are much better than the first, but not comparable to the third; for reputation from Ancestors or Company depends barely upon opinion, and hopes, till some great action be performed that testifies your virtue, and determines the doubt; and then if this action be performed when you are young; it makes the impression much deeper, and so fixes your reputation, that you must commit many ill actions before you can expunge it. These therefore who would advance themselves in a Commonwealth, are to take this course, and endeavour to do some remarkable thing at first; which was done at *Rome* very frequently by several young persons, either by the promulgation of some Law for the benefit of the publick; or by the accusation of some great person for transgressing the Law; or doing some other great or new thing that may make you be talk'd of. Nor are these things necessary only to recommend you at first; but they are necessary likewise to maintain and augment your reputation; so that they are to be renewed and repeated often as long as you live; as *Manlius* did; for after he had defended his Father so honourably, and by that noble action laid the foundation of his esteem, many years were not past before he fought singly with a French man; and having slain him very bravely, he took a Gold Chain from his neck; which gave him the name of *Torquatus*; and having given these testimonies of his courage in his youth; when he came to riper years he made himself as famous for discipline and justice by the example upon his Son, whom he caused to be put to death for fighting contrary to Orders; though he defeated the Enemy; which three great instances of his courage and virtue; made



made his name so honourable both then and ever since, that no Victory, no Triumph could have done more. And good reason, for in victories, many equalled, and some exceeded him; but in these three very few came near, but no body exceeded him. *Scipio* the elder was not so glorious by all his triumphs, as for having in his youth so manfully defended his Father at the Battel upon the *Tesin*; and after the Battel of *Cannas* forced certain young *Romans* with his Sword drawn to take an Oath not to desert their Country as they had resolved to do before; which two actions were the foundations of his following reputation, and served as steps to his Triumphs both over *Spain* and *Africa* which favour and good opinion of him was highly encreased, by his returning a Daughter and a Wife (both of them great Beauties, and both of them his Prisoners) immaculate and untouched, one to her Father, and the other to her Husband, in his Wars in *Spain*. And this way of proceeding is not only necessary for such as would gain honour and promotion in a Commonwealth; but for Princes likewise and Kings who are desirous to retain their reputation with their subjects. For nothing recommends a Prince more efficaciously to the people, than in his youth to give them some taste or specimen of his virtue, by some remarkable act, or proposal for the benefit of the publick; especially if it has any tendency to justice, magnanimity, liberality, or the like; for things of that nature that are extraordinary, whether acted, or spoken, are transmitted to posterity with so much reverence, that they even come to be Proverbs among the people: But to return, I say then, when the people designs to confer honour upon a Citizen, upon one of these three accounts, they go upon very good grounds, but especially upon the last, when several and reiterated examples make him more known; for then 'tis not possible they should be deceived, and in young persons they are certain presages of their deportment for the future. I speak only of those degrees which are given at first, before any firm experience has made them better known, or that they pass from one action to a contrary, in which, both as to mistakes, and corruption, the people do not erre so often as Princes. And because it may happen that the people may be deceived by report or opinion, or perhaps the actions of a man, as believing them more considerable and estimable than they are (which cannot easily happen to a Prince, by reason of his Council which are by, and always ready to inform him) that the people may not want such Monitors; those who have laid right foundations for a Commonwealth, have provided that when the great and supream Offices of a City are to be supplied, where it would be dangerous to entertain any incapable persons, if they find the people disposed to the creation of any man who is known to be improper, it may be lawful for any Citizen; nay, an honour to any one that shall publicly discover his defects, that thereby the people understanding him better, may be better able to choose. That this was the practice in *Rome* appears by the Oration of *Fabius Maximus*, which he made publicly to the people in the second *Punic* War, when at the creation of the Consuls, the people were inclined to create *T. Ostacilius*, whom *Fabius* conceiving an unfit man for those times, remonstrated his thoughts so effectually to them, that he put him by that degree, and prevailed with the people to give it another person that deserv'd it much better. Which being so, the people in the election of their Magistrates do judge according to the best and truest tokens that they can observe; and could they be as well counselled in these affairs as Princes, they would commit fewer errors than they do. So that that Citizen who would work himself into the favour of the people, must do some great matter, or express some great instance of his virtue or parts, that he may seem to imitate *Manlius*, and get as much honour as he.

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CHAP. XXXV.

*What dangers they incur, who make themselves authors of any Enterprize, and the more extraordinary the design, the greater the danger.*

IT would be too long, and difficult a task to discourse at large of the danger there is in being the head in any new enterprize; what hazards there are in the Conduct; and how impossible to maintain it. Reserving that therefore for a more convenient place; I shall speak here only of the dangers to which such Citizens, or other persons are subject who advise a prince to make himself head of any important design; and do it with that eagerness and impetuosity, that the whole enterprize may be imputed to him. The first thing I would recommend to their observation is, that Counsels are commonly judged by their success; if their success be unfortunate, the whole scandal of the miscarriage falls upon

### Book III. *The Discourses of Nicholas Machiavel* 421

upon the author. If it prospers, and the event be good, he is commended, but at a distance, and his reward is not commensurate with the danger. The present Emperor of the Turks *Sultan Selimus* (as it is reported by some that came late out of that Country) having made great preparations for an Expedition into *Syria* and *Egypt* changed his design upon the persuasion of one of his *Bassas*, and with a vast Army march'd against the *Sophie* of *Persia*. Arriving in an open and large Country, but for the most part Deserts and dry and no Rivers to supply them, many Diseases were contracted in his Army, insomuch as with hunger and sickness, it dwindled away (as many of the *Romans* had done in that Country before) till at last (though he had the better of the War) he had lost most of his men; upon which the Emperor being highly enraged, caused the *Bassa* who had counselled him thither to be slain. We read likewise of several Citizens advising and Enterprize, upon the miscarriage of which they were all of them banished. At *Rome* certain Citizens proposed and promoted very earnestly the making one of the Consuls out of the people, and having prevailed, the first of them which went out with their Army being beaten and over-thrown, the authors would doubtless have found the inconvenience of their Counsel, had not the people (in whose favour it was given) appeared in their protection. So that this is most certain, all Counsellors of this kind (whether to Princes or Commonwealths) are betwixt those two rocks; if they do not advise what in their judgments they think profitable for their Masters, and that frankly and without respect, they fail in their duties, and are defective that way; again if they do counsel freely, they bring their lives and fortunes in danger, because such is the natural blindness of Mankind, they cannot judge of the goodness or badness of any thing, but by the success; and considering with my self, what way was most likely to avoid this infamy or danger, I can find no better than to take all things moderately, to assume and impropriate no enterprize; to deliver your opinion frankly, but without passion, and to defend it so modestly, that if it be followed by your Prince or Commonwealth, it may appear to be their voluntary act, and not done upon your importunity; in that case it will not be reasonable to complain of your Counsel; when executed by the concurrence of the rest; for if there be any danger, it is where things are done in contradiction of the rest of the Counsel, who upon any miscarriage will be sure to combine against you, and procure your destruction: and though perhaps in this case there may want something of that glory which accrues to a single person, who carries a design against the opposition of the rest; especially if it succeeds; yet there are two advantages on your side; for first you will not run so great a hazard in the miscarriage, and then if you advise a thing modestly, which by the obstinacy and contradiction of the rest is carried against you, the miscarriage of their Counsel, will make much more to your reputation. And although a good Citizen is not to desire to raise his credit upon the misfortunes of his Country, nor indeed to rejoyce in what happens of it self; yet when a thing is done, it is more satisfaction to have your Counsel applauded, than to be in danger of being punished. Wherefore I am of opinion, in these doubtful and difficult cases, there can be no better way for the Counsel either of a Prince or State; than to deliver themselves modestly and freely; for to be silent and say nothing, would not only betray your Country, but expose your self, because in time you would become suspected; and perhaps it might befall them as it did to one of the Counsel of *Perseus*, King of *Macedon*, who being defeated by *Emilius Paulus*, and escaping with some few of his friends; one of them (in discourse of his Master's misfortune) began to find fault, and blame several passages in his Conduct, which as he pretended might have been managed much better. At which the King being enraged, turn'd to him, told him, *And do you (like a Traytor as you are) tell me of it now, when 'tis past remedy?* and killed him with his own hands; so that he pay'd dear for being silent, when it was his duty to have spoke, and for speaking when it was discretion to have been silent; nor did his forbearing to give his advice secure him from danger; so that I am confirmed in my opinion that the best way is to observe the directions above said.

## C H A P. XXXIV.

*The reason why at the first Charge, the French have been, and still are accounted more than Men, but afterwards less than Women.*

**T**He arrogance of that French man who challenged the stoutest of the Romans to fight with him upon the Bridge of the Arrien, and was afterwards killed by *T. Manlius Torquatus*, puts me in mind of what *Livy* says in many places, of the French, that in their first attack they are more fierce and daring than men, but afterwards more fearful and pusillanimous than Women. And many people enquiring into the cause, do attribute it to the peculiarity of their temperature and nature: I am of opinion that there is much of that in it; yet I cannot think but that Nature which makes them so furious at first, may be so invigorated and improved by art, as to continue their courage to the last. To prove my opinion, I do affirm there are three sorts of Armies. In the first there is courage and fury, joynd with order and discipline; and indeed their courage and fury proceeds from their discipline. And of this sort were the Armies of the Romans, for all Histories do agree that there was always good order by reason of their long discipline and experience. Nothing was done in their Armies, but with great regularity, and express order from their General. They neither eat, nor slept, nor bought, nor sold, nor did any other action either military or civil, but by permission of the Consul; and therefore these Roman Armies, who by their discipline and courage subdued the whole world, are the best example we can follow; they who do otherwise, do ill, and though perhaps they may do something extraordinary sometimes, yet 'tis more by accident than judgment: But where well ordered courage meets with good discipline, and is accommodated to the circumstances of manner, and time, nothing dismayes them, nothing withstands them; for the goodness of their order giving new life and courage to their men, makes them confident of Victory, and that confidence never suffers them to give ground, till their whole order be broken. There is another sort of Armies which are acted more by fury than discipline (as in the Armies of the French) and there it is quite otherwise, because not succeeding in their first charge, and not being sustained by a well ordered courage, that fury upon which they wholly rely'd growing cold and remiss, they are quickly overthrowen. Whereas the Romans fearing nothing of danger, by reason of their good order and discipline, without the least diffidence or question of the Victory, fought on still obstinately, being animated with the same courage, and agitated by the same ardor at last as at first, and the more they were press'd, the better they resisted. The third sort of Armies is where there is neither natural courage, nor discipline and order, as in our Italian Armies now adays, which are so useless and unserviceable, that unless they fight upon an Enemy who runs by some accident, they are never like to have a Victory; and this is so obvious every day, it needs no example to prove it. But because by the testimony of *Livy* every one may know what is the right discipline, and what is the wrong, I will give you the words of *Papirius Cursor* in his reprimand to *Fabius* the Master of his Horse. His words are these, *Nemo hominum, nemo Deorum verecundiam habeat. Non edicta Imperatorum, non auspicia observentur: Sine Com-meatu, vagi milites in patata, in hostium errent; immemores Sacramenti, se ubi velent exau-toremur; infrequentia deserentur signa; neque conveniatur ad eadum: nec discernatur interitum, noctu; a quo, iniquo loco, jussu, injussu Imperatoris pugnetur; Non signa, non ordines serventur; atrocium modo, caeca & fortuita, pro solemnibus & sacra Militia, sit. Let them have no respect or reverence either to God or man: Let neither the orders of the General, nor the directions of the Auspices be observed; Let the loose and vagabond Soldier infect his own Country as much as the Enemies; Let them forget their Oaths, and abandon as they please: Let them run from their Colours as they think good, and not come back when they are required: Let them fight hand over head, without consideration of time, or place, or order of their Officers: Let their ranks be confused, and their Colours deserted: In a word, Let their whole Conduct, be blind and fortuitous like thieves, rather than the solemn and sacred Militia of the Romans. By this we may easily see whether the Militia of our times be blind and fortuitous or whether it be solemn, and sacred, how far is it short of the old discipline of the Romans, which consisting in exact order, produced courage and constancy in the Souldiers; and how far behind the French, among whom though their is not that just order and constancy, yet there is courage enough.*

CHAP. XXXVII.

*Whether fighting in small parties, or pickeering before a Battel be necessary, and how the temper of a new Enemy is to be found without them.*

IN humane affairs (as we have said before) there is not only a perpetual and unavoidable difficulty in carrying them to their perfection, but there is always some concomitant mischief so inseparable from it, that it is impossible to arrive at the one without the other. This is visible in all the actions of mankind, so that that perfection is acquir'd with much difficulty, unless you be so favoured by fortune, that by her force she overcomes that common and natural inconvenience: and of this, the duel betwixt *Manlius Torquatus* and the French-man put me in mind, where, as *Livy* tell us, *Tanta ea dimicatio ad universi belli eventum momenti fuit, ut Gallorum exercitus, relictis trepidè Castris, in Tiburtem agrum, mox in Campaniam transferit; The success of that duel was of so much importance to the success of the War, that thereupon the French Army drew off in a great fear into the Tiburtine Country, and afterwards march'd away into Campania.* From whence I infer, on the one side, that a good General is to avoid any thing that (carrying but small advantage with it) may have an ill influence upon his Army; to fight therefore in parties, and venture your whole fortune upon less than your whole Army, is rash and imprudent, (as I have said before, where I dissuaded the keeping of passes.) On the other side, I observe, when an experienced General comes against a new enemy that has the reputation of being stout, before he brings him to a Battel, he is obliged to try him by slight skirmishes and pickeerings, that by so doing he may bring his Souldiers acquainted with their discipline, and way of fighting, and remove that terror, which the fame and reputation of their courage had given them. And this in a General is of very great importance, and so absolutely necessary, that he who engages an unknown enemy with his whole Army, before he has made an essay of his courage, runs himself and his Army into manifest danger. *Valerius Corvinus* was sent by the Romans with an Army against the *Samnites*, a new enemy with whom they had never had any conflict before; and *Livy* tells us he sent small parties abroad, and caused them to entertain light skirmishes with the enemy, *Ne eos novum bellum, ne novus hostis terreret; Lest his Souldiers should be terrified with a new war, and a new enemy.* But then the danger is, that your men being overcome, their terror should be encreased; and that which you intended to animate, should discourage and dismay them: and this is one of those good things which have so near a conjunction with evil, that 'tis no hard matter to take one for the other. My advice therefore is, that a wise General abstains from any thing that may strike a terror into his Army; for then the Souldiers begin to apprehend, when they see their Comrades kill'd before their face. For which reason those pickeerings and slight skirmishes are to be avoided by all means, unless upon great advantage, or some more than ordinary hopes of success. Again, it is not his interest certainly to defend any pass, where he cannot upon occasion bring his whole Army to engage: neither are any Towns to be made good, but such as are of importance to the subsistence of his Army, and without which both that and himself must be ruined; and no such Towns are to be fortified, but where not only a good Garrison may be disposed and supplied, but where in case of a Siege your whole Army may be brought to relieve it: other Towns are rather to be quieted than kept; for to abandon a Town whilst your Army is in the field, is no disgrace to you, nor discouragement to your Souldiers: but when you lose a place that you undertook, and every body expected you would defend; that abates much of your credit, and is a great prejudice to you; so that it will be with you as it was then, with the French, a trifling loss will endanger the whole war.

*Philip of Macedon* (the Father of *Perseus*) a martial Prince, and of great reputation in his time, being invaded by the Romans, quitted and destroyed a great part of his Country, which he supposed he should be unable to defend, as judging it better, and more consistent with his honour to suffer it to be possessed by the enemy as waste and neglected, than to undertake, and not be able to defend it. The affairs of the Romans being in a very ill condition after the battel at *Cannas*, they refused their assistance to several of their friends and allies, giving them leave to defend themselves if they could: which resolutions are much better than to attempt to defend that which is not in our power; for in the first case we lose only our friends; but in the last, both our friends and our selves. To return therefore to our skirmishes, I say, that when ever for the discovery of the enemy, or acquainting his Souldiers with the way of their fighting, a General is constrained to make use of them, he is to do it with that art and advantage, that he may run no hazard of being worsted; or else to follow the example of *Marius*, (which is the better way of the two)

who marching against the *Cimbri*, a fierce and numerous people which had invaded *Italy* for prey, and beaten one *Roman* Army already; observing his Army to be afraid, he thought it would be necessary before he came to a general engagement, to contrive some way or other to dispossess them of their fear; whereupon, as a wise Officer, he disposed his Army (more than once or twice) in some secure place upon the road by which the *Cimbrian* Army was to pass, from whence his men might have a view of their march, and accustom themselves to the sight of them; to the end that seeing them to be nothing but a confused and disorderly multitude, incommoded with baggage, and either very ill accoutred, or utterly unarm'd, they might recover their spirits, and grow impatient to be at them; and this prudent invention of *Marius* ought to be diligently imitated by other people, lest they fall into the dangers aforesaid, and come off like the *French*, *Qui ob rem parvos ponderis in Tiburtem agrum, & in Campaniam transferunt; Who upon a trifling accident, desponded, and retired:* And because I have mentioned *Valerius Corvinus* in this Chapter, I shall make use of his words in the next, to shew how a General should be qualified.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

*How a General is to be qualified, that his Army may rely upon him.*

AS we have said before, *Valerius Corvinus* was gone with his Army against the *Samnites*, a new enemy, with whom the *Romans* had had no contest before. To encourage his Souldiers, and acquaint them with the discipline of the *Samnites*, he inured his men to them, by several small skirmishes, but lest that should not do, he made a speech to them before the Battel, remonstrating with all possible efficacy of words, how little they were to value the enemy; and how much they might expect from their own valour, and his conduct: *Livy* brings him in with these words in his mouth, which gives us an exact character of a General in whom his Army may confide. *Tum etiam intueri cujus ductu auspicioque incunda pugna sit; utrum qui audiendus, duntaxat magnificus adhortator sit, verbis tantum ferax, operum militarium expertus; aut qui & ipse tela tractare, procedere ante signa, versari media in mole pugnae sciat. Facta mea, non dicta vos milites sequi volo, nec disciplinam modo, sed exemplum etiam a me petere, qui hac dextra mihi tres Consulatus, summamque laudem peperit;* Then you may see under whose Conduct you fight; whether he that speaks to you be only a magnificent boaster, valiant in words, but ignorant in whatever belongs to a Souldier; or whether he be one that knows how to manage his Arms, lead up his Men, charge in the head of them, and behave himself manfully in the very heat of the Battel; I would not (fellow Souldiers) that you should follow my words more than my deeds; or take only my precepts, and not my example, who with this hand have gained three Consulships, and immortal reputation. Which words, if well considered, are sufficient to instruct any man what course he is to take to make himself reputed a great General; he who acts otherwise will find in time that that command (however he came by it, whether by ambition or fortune) will rather abstract than add to his honour, for it is not titles that make men honourable, but men their titles: and it is to be observed likewise, that if great Captains have been forced to such unusual language to confirm the hearts of an old veteran Army, when it is to fight with a new enemy; how much more care and art is to be used in a new inexperienced Army, that never saw an enemy before. For if a strange enemy be terrible to an old Army, well may he be so to an Army that is new raised, and was never engaged: nevertheless all these difficulties have been overcome by the prudence of several Captains, as by *Gracchus* the *Roman*, and *Epaminondas* the *Theban*, who with new raised men defeated old veteran Troops, that had been long experienced in matters of war; and their way was to prepare them for some months by continual exercise, and counterfeit battels; by using them to their ranks, and holding them to strict discipline and obedience; after which, they advanced against the enemy, engaged with great confidence, and performed very well. Let no man therefore (that is any thing of a Souldier) despair of making his Army good, if he has but men enough; for that Prince who abounds with men, and wants Souldiers, is rather to complain of his own laziness and imprudence, than of their incapacity and dulness.

C H A P. XXXIX.

*A General ought to know the Country, and how to take his advantage in the ground.*

**A**Mong the many things that are necessary in a General of an Army, the knowledge of Coasts and Countries is one, and that not only in a General, but in an exquisite and more particular way, without which he shall not be able to do any great thing: and because all knowledge requires use and exercise to bring it to perfection, so is it in this knowledge of places; and if it be enquired what use, and what exercise is required in this case, I answer; Hunting, and Hawking, and such like recreations; and therefore it is that the Heroes which anciently govern'd the World, were said to be brought up in woods and forests, and accustomed to those kind of exercises; for hunting (besides the acquaintance which it gives you of the Country) instructs you in many things that are necessary in war; *Xenophon* in the Life of *Cyrus* tells us, that when *Cyrus* went to invade the King of *Armenia*, assigning several offices and places to the several parts of his Army, he told them that, *Questæ, non era altro ch'una di quelle caccie le quali molte volte haveno fatto seco; That this expedition was no more than one of those Chaces which they had taken frequently with him.* Those whom he placed as Scouts upon the Mountains, he resembled to them who set their nets upon the hills; and those who were to make excursions upon the plain, were like them who were employed to rouse the Deer, and force them into the Toyls. And this is said by *Xenophon*, to shew the resemblance and similitude betwixt hunting and war: for which cause those kind of exercises are not only honourable, but necessary for great persons; and the rather, because nothing gives a man so true a knowledge of the Country, or imprints it more deeply and particularly in the memory: and when a man has acquainted himself thorowly with one Country, he may arrive more easily at the knowledge of other, because all Countries and Coasts have some kind of proportion and conformity betwixt them; so that the knowledge of the one contributes much to the understanding of the other. But if before you have acquainted your self with your own, you seek out new Regions, you will hardly without great labour, and long time, come to the knowledge of either. Whereas he that is well vers'd and practis'd in one, shall at the first cast of his eye give you an account how that plain lies; how that mountain rises; and how far that valley extends; and all by his former knowledge in that kind. To confirm all this, *Titus Livius* gives us an example in *Publius Decius*, who being a military Tribune in the Army which the Consul *Cornelius* commanded against the *Samnites*, and finding the said Consul and Army fallen by accident into a Vale where they might have been encompassed by the enemy, and cut off, *Vides tu Aule Corneli (said Decius to the Consul) vacuum illud supra hostem? Arx illa est spei salutisq; nostræ; si eam (quam cæci reliquere Samnites) impigre capimus; Do you see, Sir, that hill which hangs over the enemies Camp; there lies our hope; the blind Samnites have neglected it, and our safety depends upon the seizing of it quickly.* For, said *Livy* before, *Publius Decius Tribunus militum, unum editum in salu Collem, imminentem hostrum Castris, aditu arduum impedito agmini, expeditis baud difficilem; Publius Decius the military Tribune observed a hill over the enemies Camp not easily to be ascended by those who were compleatly arm'd, but to those who were lightly arm'd, accessible enough.* Whereupon being commanded to possess it by the Consul with 3000 men, he obeyed his orders, secur'd the Roman Army, and designing to march away in the night, and save both himself and his party; *Livy* brings him in speaking these words to some of his Comrades, *Ite mecum, ut dum lucus aliquid superest, quibus locis hostes præsidia ponant, qua pateat hinc exitus exploremus. Hæc omnia sagula militari amictus, ne Ducem circure hostes notarent, perlustravit; Come along with me, that whilst we have yet light, we may explore where the enemy keeps his Guards, and which way we may make our retreat: and this he did in the habit of a private Souldier, that the enemy might not suspect him for an Officer.* He then who considers what has been said, will find how useful and necessary it is for a General to be acquainted with the nature of the Country; for had not *Decius* understood those things very well, he could not so suddenly have discerned the advantage of that hill, and of what importance it would be to the preservation of the Roman Army; neither could he have judged at that distance whether it was accessible or nor, and when he had possessed himself of it, and was to draw off afterwards, and follow the Consul, (being so environed by the *Samnites*) he could never have found out the best way for his retreat, nor have guessed so well where the enemy kept his Guards. So that it must necessarily

family be that *Decius* had a perfect knowledge of the Country, which knowledge made him secure that hill, and the securing of that hill was the security of the Army. After which, by the same knowledge (though he was as it were besieged by the enemy) he found a way to make his own retreat, and bring off his whole party.

## C H A P. XL.

*How fraud in the management of War is honourable and glorious.*

THOUGH fraud in all other actions is abominable, yet in matters of War it is laudable and glorious; and he who overcomes his enemies by stratagem, is as much to be praised as he who overcomes him by force. This is to be seen by the judgment of those who write the Lives of great Persons, especially of great Commanders; for they command and applaud *Hanibal* and the rest in all their inventions of that nature. There are many examples in them to this purpose, which I shall not repeat here; only this I must advertize, that I do not intend that fraud which consists in betraying a trust, or breaking an agreement, to be honourable; for though by them you may acquire Power, and 'tis possible a Kingdom, (yet, as I said before) it cannot be with honour; but by fraud, I mean that artifice which is shewn in stratagems and circumventions, against an enemy that is not only in hostility, but a state of defiance, (for where he reposes any confidence in you, it alters the case) and such as I mean, was the artifice of *Hanibal* when he pretended to fly, only to possess himself of some passes, and so block up the Consul and his Army; as also when to clear himself of *Fabius Maximus*, he found out the invention of binding fire-brands and other combustible matter about the horns of the Cattel, and turning them out upon the enemy. And much of this nature was that of *Pontius* General for the *Sammites*; which he used to circumvent the Roman Army *ad Turres Caudinas*. *Pontius* having disposed his Army privately upon the mountains; sent several of his Souldiers habited like Shepherds with several herds of Cattel thorow the plain: being all taken and examined by the Romans where the Army of the *Sammites* was, they unanimously concurred in the story which *Pontius* had put into their mouths, that it was gone to besiege *Nocera*; which being credited by the Consul, he brake up from his post, and marching thorow the plain for the relief of *Nocera*, he ran himself into the trap, and was no sooner entred, but he was block'd up by the enemy. This exploit was fraudulently performed, yet it would have been very honourable to *Pontius*, had he followed his Father's advice, who would have had him either dismissed the Romans frankly, that they might have been obliged by their usage, or else have put them all to the sword, that they might have taken no revenge; but he took the middle way, *Quæ neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit*; Which neither multiply'd his friends, nor lessened the number of his foes. Which way, has always been pernicious in matters of state, as has been shewn elsewhere.

## C H A P. XLI.

*That ones Country is to be defended by all means, and whether honourable or dishonourable it imports not, 'tis well defended.*

THE Roman Army and their Consul (as is said before) were block'd up by the *Sammites*, who having proposed terms to them which were very dishonourable, as that they should be dismissed *sub jugum*, and disarm'd (in token of bondage,) and then sent back again to Rome. The Consuls were amazed at the motion, and the whole Army was in despair; when *Lentulus* the Roman Legate stood up, and told them that in his judgment no conditions were to be scrupled at that time when their Country was at stake; for the safety of Rome consisting in the safety of that Army, the Army was to be preserved, and that Country which is defended, is well defended, let the way be as it will, honourable or not honourable, it matters not: for if that Army was preserved, in time Rome might work off that disgrace; but if it were lost, (though it perished never so bravely) Country, and Liberty, and all would be lost with it; and so his Counsel was followed. And this ought to be considered and observed by every man whose office it is to advise for the good of his Country; for where the safety of that is in question, no other consideration ought



## Book III. *The Discourses of Nicholas Machiavel.* 427

to be coincident, as whether the way be just or unjust; merciful or cruel; Honourable or dishonourable; but postponing all other respects, you are to do that which shall procure the safety of your Country, and preservation of its liberty. And this is effectually imitated by the *French* both in their words, and deeds, whenever the Majesty of their Prince, or the interest of their Country is at stake. For there is nothing they bear with less patience, than to hear a man say such a thing is dishonourable for their King; for they believe their King incapable of dishonour, be his Councils or his fortune what they will, because whether he wins or loses, or whatever is done, all makes for the King.

### CHAP. XLII.

*That fore'd Promises are not binding.*

THE Consuls being returning to *Rome*, with their Army disarmed, and a scandal upon them for the dishonourable conditions to which they had submitted; the first who spake against the keeping them, was *S. Postumius* the Consul, who persuaded the Senate that only himself, and those who accepted them, were obliged thereby; and that they did not extend to the people of *Rome*; wherefore if the people of *Rome* would be never so exact, the most that could be expected from them, would be but to deliver up him; and all those who had engaged themselves into the hands of the *Sammites*; and this he maintained with so much obstinacy and zeal, that the Senate was convinced, and sent him and the rest back Prisoners to the *Sammites*, with a protestation against the Peace, as not extending to them; and fortune was so favourable to *Postumius* in the business, that the *Sammites* not retaining him, he return'd to *Rome*, and was in greater reputation there after his loss, than *Pontius* was among the *Sammites* after his Victory. And here there are two things more particularly remarkable: One is, That there is no action, but is capable of producing honour and renown; in victory there is nothing more frequent: In loss, it is possible, by making it appear that it came not by your fault; or else by doing some action presently after, that may recompense and repair it. The other is, That it is not scandalous to break such promises as are extorted by force. For in promises relating to the publick, if they be obtained by force, when the force ceases, the promise ceaseth with it, and may be neglected without any disgrace. Of this, all History is full of examples, and there is not a day but presents us with new: For as we see Princes make no Conscience of performing any thing that they are obliged to by force, especially if the force be removed; so they are as little tender of their promises in other things, when the cause which press'd them to promise is taken away: which whether commendable or not in a Prince, or binding or not binding, I shall not determine in this place; having spoken of it so largely in my Treatise called *The Prince*.

### CHAP. XLIII.

*Those who are born in the same Country, retain almost the same Nature, thro' all the variety of times.*

WHEN men were wont to say (and perhaps not unworthily) That he who would know what will be, must consider what has been already, because there is nothing in the world now, nor will be hereafter, but what has; and will have conformity with the productions of former times; and the reason is, because proceeding from men who have, and have had always the same passions, they must necessarily have the same effects. 'Tis true indeed their actions are sometimes better and more virtuous in this Province, than in that, and in that more than in another, according to the difference of their Education, for from the manner of their breeding, people take the first rudiments of their conversation; and it makes it more easie to conjecture future events, by what is passed, when we see some Nations retaining their humours and peculiarities a long time: So one Nation has been always covetous, another fraudulent; and so on the other side, one has been constantly famous for one virtue, and another for another. He who peruses the passages of old in our very City of *Florence*, and compares them with our modern, will find that it has been all along exposed to the avarice, pride, cruelty, and falshood of the *German* and *French*:

*French*; Every one knows how unfaithfully we have been dealt withal: How often *Charles VIII. of France* received our Money, and promised to restore the Citadels at *Pisa*; but never perform'd, which was a great instance of his infidelity, and avarice. But to wave such recent examples, every one knows what hapned in the War betwixt the *Florentines*, and the *Visconti* Dukes of *Milan*. The *Florentines* being destitute of other expedients, resolv'd to bring the Emperor into *Italy*, to fall upon *Lombardy* with all his power and reputation. The Emperor engag'd to bring a great Army into *Italy*; to make War upon the *Visconti*, and to defend *Florence* against them, upon condition the *Florentines* pay'd him 100000 Ducats by way of advance, and as much more when they came into *Italy*. The *Florentines* agreed, paid their first Money down, and the rest when they enter'd *Italy*; yet when he had march'd as far as *Verona*, he turned back without doing any thing, complaining of the *Florentines* for want of performance: So that had not *Florence* been under some extraordinary necessity, or passion, or had they ever read and considered the ancient customs of those Nations; they would never have been so often over-reach'd, seeing they have been always alike, and us'd the same practices in all places, with all people. Thus they serv'd the *Tuscans* of old, who having been many times over-power'd and routed, and dispers'd by the *Romans*, and finding their own force unable to defend them; they articul'd with the *French* on this side of the *Alps* to give them a Sum of Money, for which the *French* were to joyn their forces with the *Tuscans*, and march with them against the *Romans*: But when the *French* had got their Money, they refus'd to perform the conditions on their part, alledging that they received it not to make War upon the *Romans*, but to forbear infesting them themselves: by which infidelity and avarice in the *French*, the poor *Tuscans* were at once defeated both of their Money and assistance: From whence we may conclude that the *Tuscans* were formerly of the same nature as now, and especially the *Florentines*, and the *French* and other foreign Nations had always the same inclination to deceive them.

#### CHAP. XLIV.

*Confidence and boldness does many times obtain that which would never be compassed by ordinary means.*

The *Sammites* were invaded by the *Romans*, and their Army so weak, it durst not meet them in the field: whereupon it was resolv'd, That all their Garisons should be reinforced, and with the rest of their Troops they should pass into *Tuscany* (which was then at peace with the *Romans*) and try if they could tempt them to take up Arms, and break their Peace; and in the *Harangue* which was made by the *Sammites* to the *Tuscans* to remonstrate upon what occasion they had taken up Arms themselves, they had this expression, *Rebellasse quod pax servientibus gravior, quam liberis bellum.* They had rebelled, because Peace was more insupportable in servitude, than War to men that are free. And so partly by persuasions, and partly by the presence of their Army, they prevailed with them to take Arms against the *Romans*; which they had refus'd to their Embassadors before. From whence it is to be observ'd, that when a Prince desires to obtain any thing of another (if occasion permits) he ought not to give him time to consider, but is to act so as he may see a necessity upon him of resolving immediately; and this is done when the person to whom the demand is made sees that in either denying it absolutely, or delaying his answer, he runs a manifest danger. This way was us'd very handsomely in our days by Pope *Julius* with the *French*; and *Monsieur de Foix* (the King of *France's* General) against the Marquess of *Mansqua*. Pope *Julius* resolv'd to drive the Family of the *Benivoglio* out of *Bologna*; and judging that to do it, he should have need of the assistance of the *French*, and that it would be convenient the *Venetians* should stand Neuter; To this purpose he sent Embassadors to them both, but could get nothing but uncertain and ambiguous answers; wherefore to surprize them, and bring them that way to his lure whether they would or no, he got what Forces he could together, and marching directly to *Bologna* sent to the *Venetians* to let them know he expected they should stand Neuter; and to the *French* to send him Supplies: Both of them finding themselves under a necessity of answering immediately, and that there was no time allowed to consider, fearing the displeasure and indignation of his Holiness, they both of them complied; the *Venetian* did not meddle; and the *French* sent him assistance. *Monsieur de Foix* being another time with his Army in *Bologna*, and understanding the defection of *Brescia*, he resolv'd to go immediately, and endea-

endeavour to reduce it. There were but two ways that he could possibly pass; one was thorow the Dominions of his Master; but that was tedious and about; the other was a shorter cut, thorow the Territories of the Marquess of *Mantova*; but then he was not only to force his way thorow that Country, but, he was to pass certain Sluces betwixt Rivers and Lakes (with which that Country abounds) and that was not to be done without great difficulty, in respect of several Forts which were upon them, and all well guarded by the Marquess: However *de Foix* resolved upon the shortest, in spite of the difficulty; and that the Marquess might have no time to deliberate, he marched with his Army, and at the same moment sent a Messenger to the Marquess for the Keys of such Castles as stood in his passage; and the Marquess surprized with the suddenness and confidence of the demand, sent them immediately, which he would never have done had they been more modestly desired; the Marquess being in League with the *Venetian* and *Pope*, in whose hands he had likewise a Son at that time; all which, had he had time to have considered, would have been very laudable reasons to have denied it: But being pers'd of a sudden, he sent them (as is said before.) Just so it was betwixt the *Tuscans*, and the *Sammites*; the presence of the *Sammian* Army having forced them to take Arms, which they had refused before; and had scarcely done then, had they had liberty to have advis'd.

CHAP. XLV.

*Whether in a Battel it is best to give or receive the Charge.*

**D***ecius*, and *Fabius* two Roman Consuls, were in the field with two Armies against the *Sammites*, and *Tuscans*; and being come to a Battel, it is observable that they took two several ways in the manner of their fighting, and it is worth our enquiry which of them was the best. *Decius* charged the Enemy with all imaginable fury, and engaged his whole Army at once: *Fabius* received the charge, and (judging that way the most safe) reserved his effort till the last, when (as we say) the Enemy had spent their fire, and the heat of their fury was over. By the success of the Battel, it appeared that the design of *Fabius* was better than that of *Decius*, who tired with the vehemence of his first charge, and seeing his men engaged farther among the Enemy, than otherwise they would have been, to gain that honour by his death, which he could not hope for by the Victory, in imitation of his Father, he sacrificed himself for the Roman Legions. Which when *Fabius* understood, that he might not gain less honour by living, than his colleague should do by his death, he advanced with his Reserves, and charg'd the Enemy so briskly, that he overthrew them, and gained a happy and most memorable Victory. By which it appears that the way of *Fabius* was more imitable and secure.

CHAP. XLVI.

*How it comes to pass that in a City the same Family retains the same manners and customs a long time.*

**I**T appears that not only one City has its manners and institutions different; and produces men more austere, or effeminate than the rest; but in the same City Families are frequently found to have the same difference. Of this there are multitude of Examples, and particularly in *Rome*. The *Manli*s were always rigid and severe: The *Publicol*s benign, and lovers of the people: The *Appi*s ambitious and enemies to the people, and so in several other Families they had their peculiar qualities that discriminated them from the rest; which cannot proceed barely from their extraction and blood (for that must of necessity have been altered by the variety of their Marriages) but rather from the diversity of their Education, in the several Families; for it is a great matter when a man is accustomed to hear well of all of any thing from his infancy; and makes such an impression in him, that from thence he many times regulates his conversation as long as he lives; and if this were not so, it would have been impossible that all the *Appi*s should have been agitated by the same passion and ambition, as *Levy* observed in most of them; and particularly in one of the last, who being made *Censor*, and to depose his Office at the expiration of 18 months according to Law, refused it absolutely (though his Colleague resigned) insisting upon an

old Law made by the *Censors* to continue their Magistracy for five years: and though there were many meetings, and great contention and tumult about this; yet in spite both of Senate and People he could not be brought to depose. And he who reads the Oration which he made against *P. Sempronius* the Tribune of the people, will discern the insolence of that Family, and the bounty and humanity of several other Citizens expressed by their obedience to the Laws, and their affection to their Country.

## C H A P. XLVII.

*A good Citizen is to forget all private injury, when in competition with his love to his Country.*

**M***anius* the Consul being employed in the Wars against the *Samnites*, received a wound that disabled him for executing his charge; upon which the Senate thought fit to send *Papirius Cursor* for the Dictator to supply his place, and the Dictator being by the Laws to be nominated by *Fabius*, who was then with his Army in *Tuscany*, they were fearful (in respect of an old quarrel betwixt them) that *Fabius* would not name him. Whereupon the Senate dispatched two Embassadors toward him, to intreat that (laying aside all private animosity) he would name *Cursor* for Dictator, which *Fabius* did out of love to his Country; though by his fullness and silence, and several other signs he signified his reluctance, and that that Election went against the hair: From hence therefore all good Citizens are to take example, and learn to prefer the publick good, before any private quarrel of their own.

## C H A P. XLVIII.

*When an Enemy commits any grand fault, 'tis to be suspected for a fraud.*

**F***ulvius* being left Lieutenant of the *Roman* Army in *Tuscany*, upon the Consuls going to *Rome* to be present at some Ceremony, the *Tuscans* to draw him into a trap, lay'd an Ambuscade for him not far from his Camp; and having disguised some of their Soldiers in the habit of Shepherds, they caused them to drive certain Cattel within sight of the *Romans*; and the Shepherds were so exact in their obedience, that they came up to their very Stoccardoes: The Lieutenant wondered at their confidence; and the unreasonableness of the thing gave him occasion to suspect; whereupon he found out a way to discover the fraud, and frustrate the whole plot: From whence we may observe that a General is not to presume upon any gross error that his enemy commits; because it is not rational to believe he would be so sottish, and inconsiderate, were there not some stratagem at the bottom; yet many times men are so blinded with desire of Victory, that they see nothing but what makes for themselves. The *French* having overthrown the *Romans* not far from the *Allia*, and pursuing them to *Rome*, found the gates open, and without any guards to defend them: They apprehended it a design, and stood drawn up all that day and the next night, without daring to enter, not imagining the *Romans* could have been so abject and imprudent as to have abandoned their Country. In the year 1508. when the *Florentines* besieged *Pisa*, *Alfonso del Matolo* a considerable Citizen of that Town, being Prisoner in the Camp, promised that if they would give him his liberty, he would deliver one of the Gates into their hands; the *Florentines* believed and discharged him; but coming afterwards to negotiate more particularly with certain Commissioners deputed to that purpose, he was so far from coming privately, that he was always accompanied with several of the *Pisans*, only when they came to treat, he desired them to withdraw. Forasmuch therefore as he came publicly, and attended by several *Pisans*, the *Florentines* had good reason to suspect the performance of his promise: But the *Florentines* were so blinded with a desire to have the City, that following the direction of *Alfonso*, they came up to the Gate towards *Lucca*, expecting to be let in; but all things being prepared for them, they received a great loss, and left many of their best Officers and Soldiers behind them.

C H A P. XLIX.

*A Commonwealth which desires to preserve it self free, has need of new provisions every day; and upon what score Fabius was called Maximus.*

IT falls out of necessity (as has been said before) that in a great City there is not a day but some accidents occur that have need to be remedied; and as they are of more or less importance, so their Physician ought to be more or less expert. And if strange and unexpected accidents ever hapned in any City, it was in *Rome*: one of which sort, was the general conspiracy of the *Roman* Women against their Husbands: some had poysoned their Husbands already, and all the rest had their materials ready to do as much by theirs: Of the same sort was the conspiracy of the *Bacchanals*, discovered during the time of the *Macedonian* War, in which many thousands of Men and Women were engaged; which would have been very dangerous for that City, had it not been discovered; for the *Romans* had not a custom of punishing whole multitudes when they offended. And here we cannot but admire the fortitude, the severity, the magnanimity of the *Romans* in punishing offenders; which (if there were nothing else to evince it) would be a great testimony of their virtue and power. For so great was their justice, they made no scruple to execute a whole Legion, or City at a time: sometimes they banished 8 or 10000 men together with such conditions as would have been insupportable to a single man: so it hapned to those who escaped from the Battel at *Cannus*, they banished them all into *Sicily*, forbidding them to Quarter in any Town, or to commit any disorder. But the most terrible of all their executions was the decimation of their Armies, in which every tenth man was put to death by lot quite thorow their Army; nor for the punishment of a multitude can any way be found more formidable; for where a multitude transgresses, and no certain Author is known, to punish the whole with death would be too severe; and to punish one part, and excuse another would be unjust to those who were punish'd, and encourage the other to commit the same offence again: But where all are alike guilty, to execute every tenth man by lots, gives him who is to be punished, occasion to complain only of his fortune; and makes him who escapes afraid against the next time. The good Women then who would have poyson'd their Husbands; and the Priests of *Bacchus* were punished as they deserv'd; and though these maladies in a Commonwealth have many times very ill Symptoms; yet they are not mortal, because there is still time enough for the cure. But where the State is concern'd, it is otherwise, and time may be wanting; and therefore if they be not seasonably and prudently redressed, the whole Government may miscarry. And this may be clear'd to us, by what hapned in *Rome*. The *Romans* having been very free in bestowing the freedom and priviledges of their City upon strangers, the strangers grew so numerous by degrees, and to have so great a Vote in the Councils, that the whole Government began to totter, and decline from its old, to its new Inhabitants; which being observed by *Quintus Fabius* the *Censor*, he applyed a remedy in time, by reducing all the new Citizens into four Tribes; that being contracted into so narrow a space, they might not have so malignant an influence upon the City; and this so timely and so useful expedient, was taken so thankfully from him by the people, that they gave him the addition of *Maximus*, and he was called *Fabius Maximus* ever after.

THE  
A R T  
OF  
W A R,  
IN SEVEN  
B O O K S.

By *NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL.*

Newly Translated into *ENGLISH*; and for the  
benefit of the Reader divided into

C H A P T E R S



L O N D O N,

Printed for *John Starkey*, *Charles Harper*, and  
*John Amery*, in *Fleetstreet*. 1680.

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THE  
TRANSLATOR  
TO THE  
READER.

Kind Reader,

**I** *may seem strange to you at first, that I have divided the Books of Machiavel, and disposed them into Chapters, contrary to the order of his Dialogues; but I am assured when you consider my intention, you will rather applaud than condemn me. I was always sensible that no man could blame me, if I kept exactly to my Author; nevertheless I thought this way more beneficial, the length of a Discourse being commonly tiresome to any man who affects brevity; besides that in all sorts of Books, these kind of breaches and sections are very helpful to the memory. For this reason the Works of Aristotle, Vitruvius and Pliny, which were originally in another method, have been reduc'd since into this manner of division. I have presum'd to do the same in this my Translation, having had more regard to the ease and advantage of the Reader, than to the exact order of the Author, whom I have not followed verbatim, by reason of the diversity of the Languages, yet his sense I have observed as strictly as would consist with the propriety of our own Language, assuring my self that your bounty will dispence with some faults, seeing nothing can be done so accurately, but will be subject to many.*



THE  
P R E F A C E  
O F  
NICOLÒ MACHIAVELLI,

TO

Lorenzo the Son of Philippo Strozzi, Gentleman  
of FLORENCE.

**M**Any have been, and are still of opinion, that in the whole world no two things are more incongruous and dissimilar than a Civil, and a Military life; insomuch that many times when a man designs himself for a Soldier, he not only takes upon him a new habit, but he changes his Customs, his Company, his manner of Discourse, and leaves off all ways of civil conversation; for he who would be light and nimble, and ready for the execution of all sort of violence, looks upon a civil habit as improper and cumbersome, civil customs are unsuitable to him who thinks them soft and effeminate, and inconsistent with the life he proposes; and indeed it would be undecent if a man whose business it is to look big, and Hector, and fright the whole world with his Oaths and his Blasphemies, should carry himself demurely, and behave himself with the usual gentleness and complacency of other men; and this is it which in our days makes this opinion true: But if we consider the condition and method of old times, we shall find no two things more united, more conformable; nor more necessarily amicable than they. For all the Arts which are contrived in a City for the common good; all the courses invented to keep men in fear of God and the Laws would be useless and vain, were not force provided for their defence; which force (if well ordered) will be able to make them good, though perhaps the Laws are not so exact in themselves; for this is most certain, good Orders without Military coercion will quickly moulder to nothing, and run to decay like a Noble and Princely Palace that is uncovered at the top, and has nothing but the splendor and richness of its furniture to defend it from the weather. And if anciently Kingdoms and States employ'd great industry to keep people in peace, and in the faith and fear of God; certainly in the regulation of their Military Discipline they employed much more;

for where can ones Country repose greater confidence, than in him who has promised to die for it? Where can there be greater inclination to Peace, than in him who is not capable of molestation or injury, but by War? Where can there be more fear of God, than in him who being obnoxious to hourly dangers, has more need of his divine assistance. This necessity being well considered by those who gave Laws to Kingdoms, and those who had the Command of their Armies, was the cause that the life of a Souldier was in great reputation with all people; and much imitated and follow'd. But Military discipline being now totally deprav'd, and degenerated from the practice of the ancients; that depravity hath been the occasion of several ill opinions, which have brought that Discipline into contempt, and made all people hate and avoid the conversation of a Souldier. But considering with my self both from what I have seen and read, that it is not impossible to revive the discipline of our Ancestors; and reduce it to its primitive excellence, I resolv'd (to keep my self from idleness) to write what I thought might be to the satisfaction of such persons as were studious of the art of War; and lovers of Antiquity; 'tis true, 'tis more than ordinary boldness to treat of this Subject, where others have been so scrupulous and wary; yet I cannot think it an error to write of what others have professed and exercised with much more audacity and presumption; For my faults in writing, may be corrected without prejudice to any body; but those faults which they commit in the execution, cannot be repair'd, but by the destruction and ruine of several people; consider then (Sir) the quality of my labours, and according to your judgment let them be approved or reject'd, as you think they deserve: I send them to you as a testimony of my gratitude, though my abilities are not in the least commensurat with the greatness of your favours: besides it being the custom to address things of this nature to persons that are Illustrious for their Birth, wealth, parts, or generosity: I knew you had not many equals in your Nobility and Fortune, fewer in your parts; but in Generosity and Liberality, none at all.

THE  
**A R T** of **W A R**  
 IN SEVEN  
**B O O K S**

LIBER I

CHAP. I.

*How the Seignear Fabritio Colonna being refreshing himself one evening with some other Gentlemen in a beautiful Garden, took occasion to enter upon this discourse of War.*

**S**eeing I am of opinion, that after a man is dead, it is lawful for any body to commend him without danger of reproof, (because there can be no occasion nor suspicion of flattery) I shall make no difficulty to speak something in praise of our renowned and true friend *Cosimo Rucellia*, whose name I cannot remember without tears in my eyes, having known in him all the good qualities, which one good Friend or good Citizen would desire in another; for I know not any thing so dear to him, that he would not have sacrificed for his friend; nor any thing so dreadful, that he would not have undertaken for his Country: and I confess freely among all with whom I have had any acquaintance and conversation, I do not know any man whose heart was more disposed to great and magnificent things. At his death nothing troubled him so much (as he complained often to his friends) as that he should die young, and in his own house without honour, or the satisfaction of having been serviceable to any man as he desired, for he was sensible that no more could be said of him than that he died a good friend. However it follows not but we who were acquainted with him, may bear testimony of his virtues and good qualities, seeing there is nothing left of his works or actions to recommend him to the World; and yet fortune was not so much his enemy but she suffered him to leave a short monument of the dexterity of his wit, which appears in certain Sonnets, and amorous Verses of his composition; in which way (though he was not amorous) he entertained himself at idle times in his youth, till his Stars had conducted him to higher thoughts, by which Verses it may easily be discerned with what comeliness and felicity he could have expressed his conceptions, and how honourable he would have made himself by his Poetry, had he made it his business. But fortune having deprived us of such a friend, it seems to me that no better remedy can be applyed, than for us (as far as is possible) to make as much of his memory as we can, and recollect such of his sayings, or arguments, as were either witty or solid. And because there is nothing of him more fresh than the discourse which he had lately with *Fabritio Colonna* in his Garden, (where the said *Fabritio* gave a large account of all the mysteries of War one the one side, and *Cosimo* proposed, and objected, and argued with as much gravity one the other) being then present by accident with other of our friends, I have thought fit to put in writing, that by reading it, such of *Cosimo's* friends as were there may, renew the memory of his Virtues; such as were not there, may be

troubled for their absence, and learn several things profitable not only for military, but civil conversation.

I say then *Fabritio Colonna* returning from *Lombardy*, where for a long time he had done very honorable service for the King of *Spain*, passing by *Florence* to repose himself some time in that City, visit the Duke, and enjoy the company of certain Gentlemen with whom he had had a former acquaintance, *Cosimo* held himself obliged to invite him to his Gardens, not so much to shew his own liberality and magnificence, as to have larger opportunity of discoursing with him, and informing himself of such things as might be expected from a person of his experience, and spending a whole day in discoursing of what might be to the satisfaction of his mind. *Fabritio* accepted his invitation, came to his house, and was entertained very nobly by *Cosimo*, with several other of his more particular friends as *Zanobi Buondelmonti*, *Barrista dalla Palla*, *Luigi Alamanni* and others, all of them young Gentlemen, his intimate friends, and ardently studious of the same things, of whose qualifications I shall say nothing in this place, because being still living, their own actions do recommend them every hour of the day.

*Fabritio* was regall'd with as much pomp and magnificence as were consistent with the time and the place: but dinner being ended, the tables taken away, and all the formalities of the Feast over, which among persons of great minds, whose thoughts are employ'd upon more honourable things, are not so tedious as with other people, the day being long, and heat excessive, *Cosimo* thought it convenient for the better satisfaction of his designs, under pretence of avoiding the heat, to carry *Fabritio* into a close and shady Arbour in the Garden, where they might discourse with more leisure and privacy; and having brought him and the rest of the Company to the place, some of them disposed themselves upon the grass, (which was very pleasant and green) and others upon seats under the shadow of those lofty trees; *Fabritio* began to applaud the delightfulness of the place, and then looking particularly upon the trees, and not knowing of some of them, he stood still, as it were in suspence, which being observed by *Cosimo*, he told him, 'tis possible, Sir, you may not be acquainted with those trees, but 'tis no wonder, for some of them were in more request with our fore-Fathers than they are with us, and having told him their names, and what delight *Signor-Bernardo* his Grand-father took in planting, *Fabritio* replied, I thought they were as you say; but the pleasantness of this place, and the innocence of that employment puts me in mind of some Princes in the Kingdom of *Naples* who delighted themselves exceedingly in those kind of diversions, and would plant, and make delicate Arbours to keep themselves from the heat; and thereupon breaking off short in his discourse, he stood still for a while, as in some serious suspence, but presently he told them if I thought I should not misbehave my self, (which among my friends I suppose is not easy) I would give you my opinion of it, not to traduce or calumniate them, but for discourse sake, and to pass away the time; for doubtless those Princes (under correction) had done much better to have imitated their Ancestors in great and heroick, rather than in soft and effeminate things; to have followed their examples in the heat of the Sun, rather than to have retir'd and withdrawn themselves into the coolness of a shade; and rather to have personated their fore-Fathers in what was solid and perfect, than in what was delicate, and corrupt; for since these kind of entertainments have been pleasing to our Country-men, our Country has gone to ruine, and all things declined.

*Cosimo*. You have opened a way to a discourse which I desire exceedingly, and therefore I beg of you that you would speak of it frankly, without respect to any body, seeing I intend to interrogate you with the same freedom, and if in my demands or replies I excuse, or accuse any man, it will not be barely to excuse or accuse him, but to understand the truth.

*Fabritio*. I shall be well pleased to inform you of any thing I know, and shall leave it to your discretion to judge whether what I say be true or false, expecting to learn as much from your demands, as you will do from my answers; for a wise question makes a man consider many things which perhaps he regarded not before; and understand others, which without interrogation he had never understood.

*Cosimo*. I will return to what you said first, that my Grand-father, and your fore-Fathers would have done more prudently to have imitated their Ancestors in difficult and generous things, rather than in what was delicate and soft; and in this I will excuse my part, and leave the other to be defended by you. I am of opinion that there was not a man in his time who detested all kind of effeminacy more than he, and who was a greater lover of that kind of activity and vigour which you so much commend, nevertheless he found that he could not make use of it either in his own person, or in the persons of his Children, being born in so corrupt an age, that a man who should have deviated from the common

common practice of those times, would have made himself contemptible to every body. For if a man in the heat of Summer should have lien basking upon the sands; or in the midst of Winter should have taken up his quarters in the snow, (as *Dioegenes* did) he would have been thought a fool, or a mad-man: should a man have followed the *Spartan* way, brought up his children in some cottage, taught them to sleep in the fields; to run about bare-foot and bare-headed; wash in cold water to inure them to hardship, and by making them less fond of life, to make them less sensible of death, he would have been despised for his pains; and have been thought rather a bruit than a man. Again should a man have been observed to starve his own carcass, and to live only upon beans and pease, and such kind of pulse, and have made as small account of money as *Fabritius* did of what was offered him by the *Samnites*, 'tis possible he might have been commended by some few, but he should have been followed by no body: being discouraged therefore by the practice of the present age, he followed not the example of his Ancestors exactly, but followed them as much as he could, with as little notice and admiration to the World.

*Fabritio*. You have excused your Grand-father very handsomly on that particular; and what you have said is doubtless true; but I did not speak so much of that hard and rustick way of living, as of other ways that are more soft and effeminate; have greater conformity and correspondence with our present times, and are (in my judgment) easily to be introduced by any man who has the government of affairs: and in my discourse of this matter I shall not need to straggle into other Countries for examples, for the *Romans* (my own Country-men) will furnish me abundantly; whose Practices, and order of Government, if well considered, will not be found so impossible to be introduced in any other City where there is but the least spark of virtue and goodness.

*Cosimo*. What are those things that you would introduce according to the example of our Ancestors?

*Fabritio*. To honour and reward virtue; not to despise poverty; to value order and discipline of war; to constrain Citizens to love one another; to live without factions; to postpone all private interest to the publick; and several other things that may easily accommodate with our times; and these things are not difficult to be introduced, provided it be done deliberately and by right means, because in them the truth is so manifest and apparent, that the commonest capacity may apprehend it. He therefore who orders his affairs in this manner, plants himself trees which will afford him a happier and more pleasant shelter and protection than these,

*Cosimo*. I will not reply to what you have said, but referring it to the discretion of the company, (who can easily judge of it) I shall address my discourse to you, who seems to find fault with all those who in their great and weighty affairs do not follow the examples of our Ancestors, supposing thereby I may be more easily satisfied in my intention. I would know therefore how it comes to pass that, on one side you condemn all those who do not imitate the practice of our Ancestors; and yet on the other, in your wars (which is your profession, and excellence) it does not appear that you have made use of any thing of the ancient method and discipline, or done any thing that resembled it.

*Fabritio*. You are now come to the point where I expected you, and indeed my discourse deserved, and I my self desired no other demand. And though I might save my self the labour, with a very plausible excuse, yet I will satisfy both your desire and my own, and that the more largely, because both time and place coneurs to our convenience. Men who are desirous to do any great action, are first to prepare themselves with all diligence and industry, that when occasion is offered, they may be ready to execute and complete it. And because where those preparations are made cautiously, they are not to be discovered, no man is to be accused of negligence, unless occasion discovers him first, to which if he be remiss, and makes not use of his time to execute his design, it gives us to understand, that either he has not prepar'd as he ought to have been, or that he had not thought of it at all; and therefore no occasion having presented it self to me to discover the preparations which I had made to reduce our Militia into the form of the ancients; if I have not yet reduced it, I conceive I cannot justly be condemned, either by you, or any body else: and this I think is a sufficient answer to your accusation.

*Cosimo*. It would be sufficient indeed, could I be assured that you never had any occasion.

*Fabritio*. But because I find you may doubt whether ever such occasion were offered or not, I am content to discourse more largely (upon condition you will have the patience to hear me) what preparations are necessary to be made; what occasion is necessary to be had; what difficulties obstruct our preparatives, and hinder our occasion; and how this is easie and hard to fall out at the same time, which seems a contradiction.

*Cosimo*.

*Cosmo.* You cannot do me and the whole company a greater favour; and if it will be no trouble to you to enlarge, it will be none to us to attend: but because the discourse is like to be long, I desire I may have the assistance of my friends, yet with your licence and permission; wherefore they and I do make it our request, that you would not take it amiss if we interrupt you sometimes with some importunate demand.

*Fabritio.* I am very well contented, that you (*Cosmo*) and these young Gentlemen your friends, ask any thing of me, because I believe the heat of your youth makes you inclinable to arms, and by consequence more apt to give credit to what I shall say: and these other Gentlemen shall have the same liberty, because their grey heads, and their cold blood, makes them commonly enemies to warfare, and incorrigible, as people possessed with an opinion that it is the times, not the ill customs which constrains men to live at that rate. Question me then freely, as you please; 'tis the thing I desire, because I shall thereby have some respite, and repose; and withal, the satisfaction of clearing your doubts, and leaving nothing unanswered in your minds.

## CHAP. II.

*A person of honour and condition is not to make War his profession.*

*Fabritio.* I Will begin my discourse with what you said, that in matter of War (which is my profession) I never made use of any thing of the ancients, To which I answer, that War being a profession by which men cannot live honourable at all times, it is not to be taken up as a trade, unless it be by a Commonwealth, or a Kingdom, and if they be well constituted, they will neither of them suffer any of their Citizens or Subjects, or any other good man to make it his business; for he will never be thought a good man who takes upon him an employment, by which if he would reap any profit at any time, he is obliged to be false, and rapacious, and cruel, and to entertain several other qualities that are not consistent in a good man; nor can any man (great or small) who makes war his profession, be otherwise than vicious; because that that trade being not to be followed in time of peace, they are necessitated either to prevent or obstruct peace; or in time of war to provide so for themselves, that they may subsist in time of peace; and neither of those two ways are practicable to an honest man; for from the desire of providing for themselves against the evil day, when the wars should be ended, proceed the robberies, and thefts, and murders which are committed daily by such kind of people, and that upon their friends as well as enemies. And from the desire of obstructing the peace, proceed all the frauds and juggling which the Officers use with those who pay them, and all to continue the war; but if by accident peace be concluded contrary to their endeavours and design, it is to be feared that the Officers finding themselves destitute of pay, and their old liberty and licentiousness, will get together such Soldiers of fortune as have nothing to subsist upon, and falling into some Province, plunder and rife it without any compassion. Do you not remember that here in *Italy* we had several of these disbanded Souldiers, which got together when the wars were done, called themselves *the Companies*, and went up and down ransacking Towns, and pillaging the Country, and all without remedy? Have you not read how after the first *Carthaginian War*, disbanded Souldiers united under the command of *Marbo* and *Spendius*, (two of their Officers) and in a tumultuous manner made a more dangerous War upon the *Carthaginians* than that which they had had with the *Romans*; In the days of our Predecessors *Francis Sforza* not only betrayed the *Milanois* who had made him their General, but usurped upon their liberty, and made himself their Prince, and for what, but that he might live in the same splendor when the Peace was concluded. And all the rest of the great Officers in *Italy* were like him, (especially if War was their profession) and though *de facto* they did not all make themselves Dukes of *Milan* by their treachery, they were the more to be blamed, because without the temptation of so great advantage their lives and exorbitances were as bad. The Faith of *Francis Sforza* being in the service of *Queen Jane*, constrained her to cast her self into the protection of the King of *Arragon*, having deserted her on a sudden, and left her disarm'd in the midst of her enemies, and all to satiate his ambition, to satisfy his revenge, or to have got her Kingdom for himself. *Braccio* with the same industry endeavoured to possess himself of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and had he not been defeated and slain at *Aquila*, he had certainly effected it; and these confusions proceeded from nothing else but from the employing of such men as were mercenary, and had nothing to subsist upon but their pay? Have you not

not a Proverb which confirms what I say, and tells us, that *War makes Thieves, and Peace brings them to the Gallows*; the reason is, for that those persons who have no other way of livelihood, not so much temper and ingenuity as to take to any other course that may honestly sustain them, are forced by necessity to rob upon the high-ways, and then justice is forced to dispatch them,

*Cosimo.* You have represented this trade and profession of a Souldier so vile and contemptible, that to me it seems now to be worse than none at all, whereas before I thought it one of the most noble and excellent things in the World: so that unless you satisfy me better, I shall never be contented; for if it be so as you say, I cannot imagin how it should come to pass that *Cæsar*, and *Pompey*, and *Scipio*, and *Marcellus*, and so many other great Captains of the *Romans* should become so famous as to be worshipped like Gods.

*Fabritio.* I have not yet thorowly examined those two things which I proposed in the beginning; one is, that a good man cannot take up that calling as his profession: the other is, that no well constituted Government (whether Commonwealth or Kingdom) will suffer its Subjects or Citizens to make War their whole business. To the first I have spoke what I thought fit; it remains now that I speak to the second, in which I shall have occasion to reply to your last demand.

### CHAP. III.

*How a Commonwealth ought not (in prudence) to permit any of its Citizens to make War their profession.*

*Fabritio.* **T**ouching the *Romans* which you mentioned, it is true *Pompey* and *Cæsar*, and most of the great Captains who were at *Rome* after the last *Carthaginian* War, arrived at great reputation; but it was rather as brave and generous, than good and virtuous men; whereas those who were before them, were famous as much for their virtue as conduct, and the reason was, because these made not War their profession, and the others did.

Whilst the *Roman* Commonwealth was incorrupt and immaculate, there never was any Citizen who presumed by means of this profession to make his own fortune or party in time of Peace; by breaking the Laws, exacting upon the provinces, usurping and tyrannizing over his Country, and using all means to make himself rich. No man of inferior condition ever thought of violating his Oaths; maintaining of Parties; disrespecting the Senate; or promoting of tumults or any tyrannical sedition with design of making himself a fortune by the profession of Arms. But those who had the command of their Armies, contented with their triumphs, returned joyfully to their private affairs; and the Officers who were under them laid down their Arms with more alacrity than they had taken them up; every man returning to his former course of life, without any hopes of advancing himself by plunder and rapine. And of this we have strong and evident cause of conjecture from the example of *Regulus Atilius*, who being General of the *Roman* Armies in *Africa*, and having in a manner conquered the *Carthaginians*, desired leave of the Senate to return, that he might look to a Farm of his in the Country which his servants had neglected. From whence it is as clear as the day, that had he made War his profession, or designed to have raised his own fortune out of the ruins of other people having so many Provinces at his mercy, he would never have been so careful of the improvement of a Cottage, when every day would have brought him in more than his whole Patrimony was worth. But because good men, and such as are not desirous to make a trade of War, are unwilling to reap any other fruit therefrom but labour, and danger, and glory; when they are arrived at a sufficient proportion of the later, 'tis their ambition to return quietly to their houses, and live upon their old professions in Peace. As to the common and private Soldiers, it's clear they were of the same humour, and declin'd any such profession; for though when they were at home, they desired many of them to be in the wars, yet when they were in the wars, they were as willing to be dismissed. This is manifest by several arguments, but especially by the priviledg which the *Romans* granted to their Citizens, that none of them should be constrained to the wars against his own inclination. So that *Rome* whilst it was well governed (which was all the time of the *Gracchi*) had never any Souldier who made it his profession to be so, by which means few of them were dissolute, and those who were, were punished severely. A City then well constituted



constituted and governed is to take care that this Art of War be used in time of Peace only, as an exercise, and in time of War only for necessity, and the acquisition of glory; leaving the constant practice and profession of it to the State, as the *Romans* did anciently to the Commonwealth of *Rome*: That Citizen who has any other design in the profession of Arms, let him be what he will, is no honest man; and that City which is governed any other way, is as much in the wrong.

*Cosimo*: I am very well satisfied with what you have said hitherto, and do acquiesce in your conclusion as far as it relates to a Commonwealth, but as to Kings I am apt to dissent because I am apt to think it convenient a King should have those about him who make Arms their profession.

#### CHAP. IV.

*That a King ought not to permit his Subjects to make Arms their profession, for the mischiefs which do frequently ensue.*

*Fabritio*. A Kingdom well govern'd ought the more carefully avoid people of that condition, because it is they who debauch their King by being the only Ministers of his Tyranny. And do not object to me any of our present Kingdoms; for I shall deny absolutely that they are as well governed as formerly, when Kings had no Sovereignty, nor absolute power, but in the Armies, because there (and no where else) there is a necessity of speedy resolutions; and that such a power should be reposed in a single person; in other cases they ought to do nothing without their Counsel, and it is to be the particular care of all that are of Counsel to a Prince, to keep off such persons from about him as promote War in time of Peace, because they cannot frame themselves to any other way of subsistence. But I will discourse something more largely of this matter, not standing so much upon a Kingdom that is perfectly good according to the model of the Ancients, but supposing such a one as is like the Kingdoms of our days; in which likewise a King ought to be fearful of such as live wholly by War, because the Nerves and strength of all Armies lyes certainly in the Infantry.

Wherefore if a King orders his matters so ill, that his foot be not content to return to their several callings in time of Peace, and live as formerly by their labour, he must necessarily be ruined; for of all the Soldiers in the world none are so dangerous as those who make War their profession; and the reason is, because you must be always at War, or keep them always in pay; otherwise you will run a great hazard of being turn'd out of your Kingdom; and because it is impossible either to maintain War perpetually, or keep them in continual pay, you will be in great danger of being driven out of your Kingdom. My Country-men the *Romans* (as I said before) whilst they were wise, and honest, never suffered their Citizens to make that exercise their calling, though in respect of their perpetual Wars, they were able to have pay'd them perpetually: But to avoid the inconveniencies which might follow thereupon, seeing the condition of their times did not alter, they altered their Men, ordering their affairs in such manner, that every fifteen years their Legions were renewed, and filled up again with young men in the flower of their age; that is to say, betwixt eighteen and thirty five years of age; during which time their legs their hands, and their eyes do correspond one with the other, and are in the same disposition; for they did not keep them till their strength and vigour decayed, and their frowardness, and insolence increased, as they did afterwards when the times were more corrupt.

For *Octavian* first, and afterwards *Tiberius* (preferring their private power before the profit of the publick) began to disarm the people (that thereby they might have them more easily at command) and to keep standing Armies upon the Frontiers of their Empire. But because they thought them insufficient to curb the people, and awe the Senate of *Rome*; they established another Army (which they called the *Pretorian*) which was quartered always about the City, and intended as a guard. But when afterwards the Emperors permitted them who were lifted in those Bands, to lay aside all other professions, and devote themselves to War, they grew insolent immediately, and became not only terrible to the Senate, but pernicious to the Emperor, insomuch that many of them were put to death by the fury and insolence of those Soldiers, who created, and disposed their Emperors as they pleased; and sometimes it fell out that at the same time several Emperors were created by the several Armies, which occasioned the division first, and by degrees the destruction of the Empire. Those Kings therefore who are desirous to live in safety  
and

and peace, ought to have their Armies composed of such persons, as when there is a necessity of War, will take up Arms freely for the defence of their Country; and when Peace is concluded, will as readily acquiesce, and return to their old habitations and callings; which may easily be done, if they make their Levies of such men as have professions before: A King is likewise (upon the publication of Peace) to command his Generals and great Officers to their respective charges and governments elsewhere; the Reformades and Gentlemen to their own Houses and Estates; and the common Soldiers to their Original Trades and Occupations. And by the election of such men, they will fight stoutly to procure Peace, but never disturb Peace to create a War.

*Cosimo.* I must confess your discourse to me seems very considerable; yet being so contrary to what I fancied before, my mind is not so well satisfied but there remains some doubt behind which is still to be clear'd: for I observe several Lords and Gentlemen who in time of Peace maintain themselves wholly by the profession of Arms; as several great Commanders of your acquaintance and quality, who are in pay under several Princes and States; besides most of the men at Arms are continued in pay for the guard and security of such Cities and Castles as are requisite to be kept; so that in my judgment there is employment enough for them all in time of Peace.

*Fabritio.* I do not believe that you can think that in time of Peace there is entertainment for them all; for if no other reason was to be alledged, the smallness of the numbers requir'd to the furnishing the Garrisons, would be sufficient to refute it. What proportion is there betwixt the Bodies of foot which are to be raised for carrying on a War, and those which are required for supplying the Garrisons in time of Peace: for those Cities and Castles which in time of Peace are kept with a few men, are reinforced with great numbers in time of War; besides which, great Levies are made for the Field Armies, which upon the conclusion of Peace are constantly disbanded. And as to such as are retained in the nature of Guards to the State, Pope *Julius* and you, have demonstrated how much those are to be apprehended who will not entertain any other vocation but War; having turned them out of your Guards for their insolence, and entertained *Swizzers* in their places, as people born and brought up under Laws, and chosen by the Communalty by a more regular election; so that tell me no more there is employment for them all in times of Peace. As to the men at Arms, and their being continued in pay in times of peace, the answer I confess is more difficult; yet upon closer examination it will not be found impossible, because this custom of keeping men at Arms in pay is corrupt, and inconvenient; the reason is, for that they are people who having no other Vocations, are occasions of daily disorders in the State, especially where their numbers are great; but where they are not so numerous as to make an Army of themselves, the danger of them is so much the less. Yet many times they have done mischief enough, as I have said before in the cases of *Francis Sforza*, his Father and *Braccio da Perugia*. So that I cannot approve this Custom of keeping men at Arms in constant pay, having seen so much experience of their corruptions, and the inconvenience which has followed thereupon.

*Cosimo.* Would you have no such Forces in pay at all? or if you would have them, how would you have them entertained?

*Fabritio.* Not as the men at Arms in *France*, for they are as dangerous and insolent as ours, but rather according to the method of the ancients, who raised their Cavalry out of their own Subjects, whom they sent home again to their houses when Peace was concluded to follow their old Callings, as shall be shown more largely before we end our discourse; so that if these kind of Soldiers do now (even in times of Peace) receive pay, and live under that profession, it proceeds from corruption in their customs. And as to the Pensions which I, and my fellow Officers receive, I say that that also is a corrupt custom; for a wise, and well ordered Government ought not to entertain any such Pensioners, but is rather to employ their own Citizens for Generals in time of War, and when that is done, dismiss them to their own private affairs. And with a wise King it is the same; he is either to give no such Pensions at all, or if he does, it ought to be in recompence of some signal exploit, or to oblige some excellent person in time of Peace as well as War. And because you have instanced in me, I am content to stand for an example; and therefore I say I never made War my profession. My business is to govern my subjects, to defend them, to prefer Peace, but yet to know how to manage my self in War; and if I have received honour or reward from the King, it is not for my understanding or experience in War, so much as for my integrity and counsel in times of Peace. A wise Prince ought not therefore to have any about him, but such as are so constituted; for if they be too zealous either for Peace or for War, they will draw him into inconvenience. This (according to my proposition at first) I could not but say as to the first point; if it be insufficient, you must apply your self

self elsewhere for farther satisfaction. But by what is said, you may perceive the difficulty of reviving the customs of the Ancients in our present Wars: What preparations are requisite to be made by any man that is wise, and what opportunities are to be expected to bring them to perfection; But you will understand them better if your patience will give me leave to discourse them from point to point, and compare all the customs of the ancients, with the particular practices of our times.

*Cosimo.* If we desired at first to hear you discourse of these things, certainly what you have discoursed already, has much encreased our desire; wherefore as we give you thanks for what you have done, so we do earnestly beg of you that you would proceed to the remainder

## CHAP. V.

### *In what Countries the best Soldiers are to be raised.*

*Fabritio.* Seeing you are hitherto so well pleased, I will deduce my discourse of this matter from the fountain, that thereby you may comprehend it the better, and I be enabled to demonstrate it more copiously. When War is resolved, every man's chief business is to put himself into a condition of giving the Enemy Battel, and fighting him fairly in the field. To enable himself for this, it is necessary to raise an Army; to raise an Army, there is a necessity of men, of arming them, disciplining them, exercising them, (and that in great as well as small bodies) of teaching them to encamp, and acquainting them with the Enemy by degrees, either by frequent facing or confronting him, or by encamping somewhere near his march, where they may have the prospect of his Army as he passes by. In this the whole address and industry of a Campania, or field War consists; which doubtless is more necessary and honorable than any other; and he who understands well how to draw up an Army, and present his Enemy Battel, may be excused for all his other errors in the management of the War; but if he be ignorant or defective in that, though in other things he be sufficient enough; yet he shall never bring his War to any honourable conclusion. For win a Battel, and you cancel all your former miscarriages; lose one, and all that ever you did well before evaporates, and comes to nothing.

It being so necessary then to find men, the first thing to be done, is to know how to make our choice (which the ancients called *Delectus*, and we Levies) of which I shall give you some light.

They who have given us rules of the management of War, have recommended to us to make our Levies in temperate regions, that our Soldiers may be both valiant, and cunning. For hot Countries are observed to produce wise and subtle people, but not courageous; cold Countries on the other side do afford stout men, and hardy, but then they are seldom discreet. This Rule was proper enough for a Prince that was Monarch of the whole world, and might make his Levies where he pleas'd: But to give a rule that all may follow, I must needs say that all Commonwealths, or Kingdoms, are to make their Levies in their own Countries, whether hot or cold, or temperate, it's the same thing; because by ancient experience we find that in any Country, Exercise and Discipline makes good Soldiers; for where Nature is defective, industry will supply; and in this case it's the better of the two. And indeed to raise men in other Countries cannot be call'd properly a *delectus*, for *delectum habere* is to pick and cull the best men in a Province, and to have power to choose those who are unwilling as well as those who are willing to the War; which kind of *delectus* cannot be made exactly but in your own dominion; for in Countries belonging to another Prince, you must be contented with such as are willing, it being not to be expected that you should have liberty to choose as you please.

*Cosimo.* Yet among those who are willing, you may pick and choose, take and leave what you think good, and therefore it is not so improper to call that a *delectus*.

*Fabritio.* You are in the right as to one way, but if you consider the secret defects of such an Election, you will find that in strictness it is not an Election; and that for these following reasons. First, those who are not your Subjects, but are willing to the Wars, are none of the best; but generally the lewdest and most dissolute persons in the Province; for if any be scandalous, idle, incorrigible, irreligious, disobedient to their Parents, Blasphemers, Cheats; and altogether ill bred, they are those who are most likely to list themselves for the War, and there is nothing so contrary to good and true discipline, as such kind of humors: When of such kind of Cattle you have more offer themselves, than the number you design to entertain, you may take your choice indeed, but the whole mass being

ing bad, your choice can never be good. But many times it falls out, that there being not so many of them as you have occasion to employ, you are glad to take all, and in that case you cannot not be said *habere delectum* so properly, as *milites conscribere*: And of such kind of disorderly people, the Armies of *Italy* and most other places do consist at this day; only in *Germany* it is otherwise, because there, no man is press'd or list'd barely upon the Emperor's command, but as he stands willing and disposed to the Wars himself; you may judge then what part of the ancient discipline of the *Romans* can be introduced into an Army made up of such a medly of wickedness.

*Cosmo.* What way is to be taken?

*Fabritio.* That which I recommended before, which is to choose out of your own Subjects, and to exercise your authority in your choice.

*Cosmo.* If your election be made in that manner, can any ancient form be introduced?

*Fabritio.* You know it may, if it be in a Kingdom, and he who command be their Prince, or lawful Sovereign; and if in a Commonwealth it is the same, so he be a great Citizen, and made General for that time, otherwise it is no easie matter to do any thing that shall succeed.

*Cosmo.* Why Sir?

*Fabritio.* I shall tell you that hereafter, at present this may suffice, that no good is to be done any other way

*Cosmo.* Well then, these Levies being to be made in your own Territory, is it best to make them in the Cities or Country?

## C H A P. VI.

*Whether it be best to choose you men out of the Cities, or Country.*

*Fabritio.* THOSE Authors who have writ any thing of this Nature, do agree unanimously that the best choice is in the Country where they are inur'd to difficulty and labour; acquainted more with the Sun than the shade, accustomed to the Spade and the Plough, and to carry burdens, without any shifting, or mutiny. But because our Armies do consist of Horse as well as Foot, my advice is, that the Horse be raised in the Cities, and the Foot in the Country.

*Cosmo.* Of what age would you choose them?

*Fabritio.* Were I to raise a new Army, I would choose them betwixt seventeen, and forty; were I only to recruit an old one, I would have them always of seventeen.

*Cosmo.* I do not well understand your distinction.

*Fabritio.* I will tell you, were I to raise an Army, or settle a Militia where there was none before, it would be necessary to make choice of the most apt and experienced that I could find (provided their age was suitable to the War) to instruct them as I shall direct. But if I were to raise men to recruit and reinforce an Army that was grown weak, I would take none above seventeen, because those who are there already will be able to teach them.

*Cosmo.* You would order your Militia then, as ours is ordered with us.

*Fabritio.* You say well but I would Arm, and Officer, and exercise, and Order them in a way I know not whether you be acquainted with in your Country.

*Cosmo.* Then you are for Train'd Souldiers.

*Fabritio.* Why would you have me blame them?

*Cosmo.* Because several wise men have always condemn'd them.

*Fabritio.* I think you are in a mistake to say a wise man can be against training of Souldiers: a man may be thought wise, ('tis possible) and be no such thing.

*Cosmo.* The ill success which those Trained-bands have always had, is a great argument of the truth of that opinion.

*Fabritio.* Have a care the fault was not more in you, than in them; of which perhaps you may be convinced before I have done my discourse.

*Cosmo.* You will do us a very great favour. But I will tell you first, in what it is this Militia is condemn'd, that you may afterwards justify it the better:

D H A P. VII.

Of the inconvenience, and convenience of Trained-Bands  
or a settled Militia.

*Cosimo.* IT is objected that either they are experienced and useless, and then to rely upon them is to ruine the State. Or else they are ready and skilful, and strong, and then, he who has the command of them may do what he pleases. They instance in the *Romans*, who lost their liberty by these kind of men. They instance likewise in the *Venetian*, and the King of *France*; the first of which makes use only of foreign Arms, lest some time or other, they should fall under the subjection of some of their Citizens: and the latter has disarm'd his Subjects, with the more ease to keep them under command; But those who are against these Trained-Bands, are more fearful when they are raw, and inexperienced than otherwise, and to this purpose they give two considerable reasons. One is, because they are unskilful, the other is, because they are unwilling, and they say, that people any thing in years, never learn any thing well; and a man never does good when he is forced to the Wars.

*Fabrizio.* The reasons which you have alledged, are produced only by persons who understand things at a distance, as I shall demonstrate plainly. And first as to their unserviceableness, I say, there are no Souldiers more useful than ones own Subjects, and no Subjects can be ordered a better way. And this being clear, and indisputable, I will not spend time in proving it farther, because I have the concurrence of all ancient History to confirm it. As to the inexperience and force, wherewith they are charged, I say (and it is true) that, inexperience makes a man cowardly, and force makes a man Mutinous; but courage and experience both are infused into them by arming, and exercising, and accommodating them well, as shall be shown in my following discourse. But as to the point of force, you must know that such persons as are raised by the command of a Prince, are neither to be altogether press'd, nor altogether Voluntiers; because to have them altogether Voluntiers, would be to incur the inconveniences which I have mentioned before; it would not be a fair election, and there would be very few go a long with you, and wholly to force them, would be as dangerous on the other side: therefore a middle way is to be taken, neither too forcible on the one side, nor too frank on the other, but such a one as may tempt them to the War out of their respect to their Prince, whose displeasure they fear above all other punishments; such a course as this, tempered so cunningly betwixt fair means and foul, cannot be dangerous, nor produce that discontent and mutiny which occasions so much mischief. I do not say that an Army so chosen and exercised, is absolutely invincible, for the *Roman* Armies were many times overcome; and *Hannibal's* Army was defeated; wherfore an Army cannot be so ordered and disciplin'd, that one may promise himself it shall never be broken. The wise men therefore of whom you speak, are not to calculate the usefines of an Army, from the loss of one Battle, but are rather to believe that having miscarried once, they will be more cautious afterwards, and do something (as occasion offers) to expiate their disgrace: and if the business should be thorowly examined, it would not be found to be the defect of the form so much, as want of perfection in their Order. And this (as I said before) is to be provided against, not by blaming, or exploding the way of train'd men, but by improving and correcting it where it shall be found amiss; and how that is done, I will show you particularly. As to your doubt that such an order of Souldiers, meeting with an Officer equally disposed, may usurp upon you, and turn you out of your Government; I answer, that Arms put orderly and legally into the hands of Citizens or Subjects never did, nor will do any harm. And Cities are kept longer innocent and incorrupt with those, than any other forces, nay than they are commonly without them. *Rome* had its Citizens in Arms four hundred years together, and yet kept its liberty intire; *Sparta* preserv'd its liberty 800 years in the same posture; several Cities have been disarm'd, and kept their liberties: but how long? Not forty years any of them, and the reason is, because great Cities have occasion for Soldiers, and when they have none of their own, they are forced to entertain Strangers which commonly do much more mischief than their own, for they are more easily debauched, and a popular Citizen may more easily corrupt and employ them as Instruments of Usurpation and Tyranny, when they have nothing but naked, and unarmed people to destroy. Besides, a City ought in reason to be more fearful of two Enemies than one. For in entertaining of Strangers, a City is to have an eye over her Mercenaries and her Natives; and to prove that this jealousy is natural and reasonable,

remember

remember what I said before of *Francis Sforza*; whereas a City which employs only her own inhabitants, fears nobody else. But to use one reason for all, let me tell you, no man ever established a Commonwealth, or Kingdom, who did not believe that the inhabitants (if arm'd) would be willing to defend it.

And had the *Venetians* been as wise in this, as other Counsels, they would have set up a new Monarchy in the World; and they are the more inexcusable that have not, because their first Legislators put arms into their hands, and gave them ability to defend themselves. But their territory being little at land, they employed their arms only at Sea, where they performed many great things, to the enlargement of their Country. But in process of time, being forced to take arms by land for the relief of *Vicenza*; they entertained the Marquess of *Mantoua* into their service, and made him their General, whereas they should rather have committed that charge to one of their own Citizens, and sent him to have engag'd the enemy at land. This unhappy resolution was that which clip'd the wings of their success, and kept them from extending their Empire; if they did it out of an opinion that their experience was not so great in Land as in Sea affairs, their diffidence was imprudent; for a Sea Captain accustomed to the conflicts of the Winds and the Water, and the elements, and the enemy, shall sooner make a good Land-Officer, where he has nothing to fight with but men; than a Land-Officer shall make a good Captain at Sea. My Country-men the *Romans* who were so knowing at Land, being at wars with the *Carthaginian* that was so potent at Sea; never troubled themselves to entertain either Grecian or Spaniard into their service, though they were both so good Souldiers at Sea, but they committed that charge to their Land-Officers, who fought the *Carthaginians*, and beat them. If the *Venetians* did it to prevent the usurpation of any of their fellow Citizens, I think it was an unnecessary fear; for (besides the reasons aforesaid) if a Citizen with his Sea-forces never made himself Master of any Sea Town, he could have done it much less with any Land-force. So that hence it may be seen that is is not putting the Citizens in arms, that is the cause of tyranny; but ill order, and ill management in the Government; for whilst good order is preserv'd, there is no danger of their being arm'd, wherefore their resolution in that point being imprudent, has rob'd them of much reputation and happiness. And as to the King of *France's* error in not keeping his subjects in discipline, and prepared for the Wars, which is by you urged for an example, there is no body (laying aside his private passion) but must conclude that single neglect to be a great weakness to his Kingdom.

But my digression has been too great, and perhaps beyond my design, yet I have done it the more willingly to demonstrate to you that foreign force is not to be relied upon so much as ones own subjects; nor can ones own subjects be prepared and adapted for the Wars any way so well, as by training and exercise. Nor can there be any better way of forming an army, or establishing a Militia in any place than that which I have prescribed. If you have read the orders of the first *Roman* Kings, especially of *Servius Tullius*, you will find his orders like ours, and driving at nothing more than putting the Citizens into such a posture, that upon any emergence they might be brought suddenly together, and form'd into an army for the defence of the City.

## C H A P. VIII.

### *Of what sort of people an army is to be composed.*

*Fabritio.* **B**ut to return to our levies, I say again, that being to recruit an old Army, I would choose my men of about seventeen; but to raise a new one that might be made fit for service in a short time, I would take in any betwixt seventeen and forty.

*Cosimo* Would you in your election make any difference of their trades?

*Fabritio.* Many Authors which have written on that subject, have made a difference of their trades, and will not allow of Faulconers, Fowlers, Fishers, Ruffians, or any persons who make sports their profession, or are in any manner subservient to pleasure: those who they recommend to be chosen, are Labourers, Husband-men, Smiths, Farriers, Carpenters, Butchers, Huntsmen, and the like. But for my own part, I should not so much consider the quality of the profession, as the goodness of the man, and which way he may be employed with most advantage. For this reason I think your Plough-men, and Day-labourers in the Country are more useful Generally than any other; for they take more pains

pains, and do more service in an Army than all the rest. After them are your Smiths, Farriers, Carpenters, Joiners, and such people to be chosen; of which sort it is convenient to have good store, because their arts are usefull in an Army upon several occasions: and 'tis a good thing to have Souldiers who have two strings to their bow, and yield you double advantage.

*Cosimo*, How are those who are fit, or unfit for the Wars, to be distinguished and known?

*Fabritio* I shall speak of the manner of choosing a Militia to form it afterwards into an Army, because we shall have occasion again of speaking of the election to be made upon the recruiting of an old Army. I say therefore that the fitness of a person to be chosen for the Wars, is to be known by experience, (in some great atchievement) or by conjecture.

This proof and tryal of their courage is not to be found among new raised men, it is necessary therefore where this experience is not to be had, to have recourse to conjecture, which is to be deduced from their age, arts, and stature. Of the two first we have spoken before; it remains that we speak now of the third, and tell you, that some persons (as *Pyrrhus*) have been altogether for large and tall men. Others (as *Cæsar*) would have them strong, well knit, and vigorous, which is to be judged by the composition of their members, and the quickness of their aspect. Wherefore those who treat of that subject, have recommended a lively and quick eye, a nervous neck, a large breast, a muscous arm, a long finger, a small belly, round and firm thighs, and thin feet, this kind of contexture does always import activity and strength, which in a Souldier are two things principally to be desired. But above all respect is to be had to their manners and that they be indued with honesty, and modesty, otherwise you choose an instrument of scandal, and a beginning of corruption; for no body can expect, that with brutishness and dishonesty, any laudable virtue should consist. Upon this occasion it seems to me not impertinent (for your better understanding the importance of this way of election) to let you know the manner in which the *Roman* Consuls in the beginning of their Magistracy made their elections for the *Roman* Legions. In which levies (by reason of their continual Wars) being mix'd of new and Veteran Souldiers, they could proceed in the Veterans by experience, and by conjecture in the new. You must know then, these levies were made either for present service, or to exercise them first, and employ them afterwards as occasion was offered. And although I have spoken already of what is to be observed in the election of such as are to be disciplin'd and employed afterwards, yet my intention being to shew how an Army may be ordered in a Country where there is no military discipline, and where men are not to be raised for immediate service, I shall speak of it further. But in those Countries where it is the custom to raise Forces by the Princes command, there they may have them always ready for present service, as it was anciently in *Rome*, and is among the *Swizzars* at this day. For if in these kind of levies there be new Souldiers, there are many which are old and experienced, which mingled with the new, will make a good Army. Norwithstanding this, the Emperors (after they began to keep standing Forces and Garisons upon the Frontiers) appointed Masters for the training and instructing their new men whom they called *Tyroness*, as may be seen in the life of *Maximus* the Emperor. Which custom was not practis'd in the Armies whilst *Rome* enjoyed her liberty, but only in the City in which those military exercises being much used by the youth, it came to pass, that being drawn out for the Wars, they were so well versed and experienced in that counterfeit discipline, that when afterwards they came to it in earnest, they behaved themselves very well. But when by degrees the Emperors disused or abolished that custom of training, they were constrained to these ways which I have shewn you before.

## CHAPTER IX

### *How the Romans raised their Legions.*

TO proceed therefore to the manner of the election of the *Roman* Legions, I say, that after the *Roman* Consuls (in whose hands the administration of the war was wholly deposited) had taken upon them the Magistracy, being to raise an Army according to custom, which gave to each Consul two Legions of the Best men, (who were esteemed the strength and flower of their Army) they created four and twenty military Tribunes, (six for each Legion) and invested them with the same authority as we do our Captains. After



ter this they assembled all the Romans who were able to bear arms, and place the Tribunes of each Legion a part; after which they drew lots in which Tribe they should begin their election, and where the lot fell, out of that Tribe they chose four of the best, and out of them four, and one was chosen by the Tribunes of the first Legion; and out of the other three, one was chosen by the second Legion; and out of the remaining two, another was chosen by the third Legion; and the fourth person belonged to the fourth Legion: these four being disposed in this manner, they proceeded to the election of four more, the first of which was chosen by the Tribunes of the second Legion, the second by the Tribunes of the third; the third by the fourth, and the fourth by the first Legion. After which they had a third election; the first chose the third; the second the fourth; the third the first; and the fourth the second: and in this manner they varied their elections, till at length all the legions became perfect and equal, and were then united. As we said before, the Romans had the convenience of making this election for present service, because a good part of such as were chosen, were old Soldiers, well experienced in their trade, and all of them well disciplin'd and train'd; so that their elections were made by experience, and conjecture both; but where an Army is to be new raised, and chosen, not so much for present as future service; the election in that case is to be made by conjecture only, and that from the age and person of the man.

*Cosimo.* I believe what you have said to be true; but before you pass to another discourse, I would be satisfied in a thing of which you put me in mind, by saying that levies to be made of such persons as have not been trained up in the wars, are to be made by conjecture; and of this I am the more curious, because I have observed in many places our Militia's to be condemned, and especially as to our numbers; for many are of opinion a less number were better, in respect that the fewer there were, the better they would be taught, and by consequence the elections would be better, the confusion less, and they would be more capable of reward, (which is that which keeps them content) and to be sure be under better command. I would know therefore your opinion, whether you are for a great number or a small, and what measures you would take in your elections both of the one and the other.

## CHAP. X.

### *Whether it is best for a Militia to consist of a great number or a small.*

*Fabr.* Seeing it is your desire to be satisfied, which is best, a great number or a small; without doubt a great number is best, and not only more necessary, but (to keep frankly) a compleat & perfect Militia is not to be had in any place where there is not great plenty of men; and as to your observation in other places, it is easily refused. For first, the smallness of your number does not better your souldiers; (where plenty is to be had, as in *Tuscany*) nor mend your election; because men being to judge by experience, in that Country few people would be found whose experience would recommend them; forasmuch as few of them have been actually in the wars; and of those few, fewer have given such testimony of themselves as to deserve to be chosen before the rest; so that he who makes his election in such places, is to lay aside his experience, and to choose by way of conjecture. Other people therefore being in this perplexity, I would know, if twenty young persons of good aspects were brought before me, by what rules or method I was to choose or reject. I do not doubt but every man would confess the best way, to take, and arm, and exercise them all, (it being impossible to judge till then, which will be the best) and to reserve your election, till having all had the same exercise, and instruction, it be easie to discern which is most vigorous, and likely to do service: so that upon the whole, to desire but few in this case, that your election may be better, is without question an error. As to the objection of being less inconvenient to the Country, and to the people, I answer that a Militia (be it as little or imperfect as it may) is no prejudice to either; because it takes away no man from his employments, obliges no man from his business; for to appear on idle days to exercise, is rather a recreation to the People, and advantage to the Country, than otherwise. Whereas if they had no such diversion, and young men would be apt on those days to run out into some debauchery, or extravagance, which would be much worse than those innocent recreations, which being a handsome spectacle, gives great entertainments to young people.

Whereas

Whereas it is alledged that a less number is easier paid, and by consequence kept in better order and obedience; I answer, That no Levies can be made of so few, as that they will be paid always to their satisfaction. For example, a Militia is to be established of five thousand foot: To pay them to their content would require at least 10000 Ducats a month. First, 5000 Foot is not a competent Army, and 10000 Ducats a month would be insupportable to a State, and yet insufficient to satisfy them, or to oblige them to any extraordinary enterprize. So that in so doing, your expence would be great, your force but small, and unable to defend you, much less to make any vigorous attack. If you encrease their pay, or their number, it would be the more impossible to pay them; if you gave them less, or lifted less, they would be so much the more dissatisfied, and unserviceable.

They therefore who talk of raising Soldiers, and paying them whilst they are not in service, talk ridiculously, and of things either impossible or useless. 'Tis true, when they are to be raised for immediate Service; they are always to be paid; yet if in times of Peace they be the occasion of any disorder or inconvenience, (which I cannot believe) the advantages of a well disciplin'd and ready Militia does abundantly recompence it; for where there is no such force, there is nothing secure.

I conclude then, That he who would have a small number, to pay them the better, or for any other of your reasons, is mightily ignorant: for though it agrees with my opinion, that let your number be what it will, it will lessen upon your hands, (by the many accidents that are not possible to be avoided) yet a small number would quickly dwindle to nothing: Besides, a great number is of more real service and reputation. To this it may be added, That if in order to the exercising, you select a few persons in Countries where plenty is to be had; they are so remote, and at such distance from one another, that you cannot bring them to a Rendezvous without great inconvenience; and without exercising, Militia's are useless, as shall be shown in due place.

*Cosmo.* You have satisfied me as to my former demand, but I desire you would resolve me another doubt? and that is whether such great numbers do not produce more confusion and disorder in the Country.

*Fabritio.* That opinion is as idle as the other, and for the reasons I shall give.

## CHAP. XI.

### *How the inconveniencies, which follow great Armies may be prevented.*

*Fabritio.* Those who are designed for the Wars, may occasion disorder two ways, either among themselves, or with other people; but the remedy is easie, though their discipline should not prevent it (for as to quarrels and mutinies among themselves, their discipline will obviate them) If the Country where your Levies are to be made, be so weak, that they have no Arms among them, or so unanimously united among themselves, that they have no head, this Order and Militia will make them more fierce and courageous against Strangers, without any impediment to their unity. For men who are well disciplin'd, are as tender of breaking the Laws when they are Armed, as much as when they are disarmed, nor can they be any ways altered, unless the Officers which you set over them debauch them, and which way that is to be done, I shall shew you presently. But if the Country where your Levies are to be made, are in Arms, and disunited, this way will be sufficient to unite them; for though they had Arms and Officers of their own before, yet they were such Arms as were useless in War, and such Officers as rather bred and provoked mutinies; than prevented or suppress'd them. And the reason is, because in those Countries as soon as a man is offended, he repairs immediately to the head of his party, who to maintain his own reputation, encourages him to revenge; whereas a publick General proceeds quite contrary. So then by this way Seditions are prevented, Unity established, Provinces united (but weak) continue their union, and are freed of their weakness; Provinces disunited and mutinous, are reconciled and composed, and their ferocity which was employed formerly in disorders, is employed now to the advantage of the publick. As to the provision that is to be made that they injure not other people, it is to be considered that that is not to be done, but by the fault of their Officers; and to prevent the Officers from occasioning such disorders, it is necessary that care be taken that they do not usurp too great an authority over their Soldiers, which authority is to be gained two ways either by nature, or accident; the way by nature, is to be prevented by providing that he

who

who is born in a place, be never put to command the Forces raised in the same place, but be put at the head of such Troops as are raised in other Countries, with whom he has no natural converse. As to the accidental way, things are to be so ordered; that the Commanders in chief be changed every year; for the continuation of a command over the same men, contracts such a friendship and intimacy betwixt them, as is many times perverted to the prejudice of the Prince. Which changes, how useful they have been to those who have used them, and how much the omission of them have been prejudicial to other people, may be observed by the example of the Kingdom of *Assyria*, and the Empire of the *Romans*; for that Kingdom continued a thousand years without Tumult or civil War, which proceeded from the annual changing of the Officers of the Army. And in the *Roman Empire*, after *Julius Caesar* was killed, all the civil Wars, and Conspiracies which hapned betwixt the Officers and the Emperors, proceeded from nothing but holding the Officers continually in command. And if any of the first Emperors, or those who rul'd afterwards with any reputation (as *Adrianus*, *Marcus*, *Severus* and the like) had had the providence to have introduced that custom into their Armies, without doubt their Empire would have been more quiet and durable; for their Generals would not have had so much opportunity to rebel, the Emperors would not have had so much occasion to stir, and the Senate (in default of succession) having more authority in the election of a new Emperor, would undoubtedly have chosen better. But ill customs (either thro' the ignorance, or inadvertancy of mankind) are not to be eradicated by examples either good or bad.

*Cosmo.* I fear my demands have drawn you from your intended discourse, for from speaking of Levies and Militia's, and such things, we are got clear upon another Subject; so that had I not excused my self before, I should think I deserved reprehension.

*Fabritio.* Let not that trouble you, all that we have said is pertinent enough, for being to treat of the way of Militia's (which is condemned by many people) and I to defend it, was convenient that we should begin with the way of Election; and first as to the Cavalry.

## CHAP. XII.

### Of the Cavalry.

*Fab.* The Cavalry anciently was raised out of the richest and most considerable of the City, but with respect to the age, and quality of the person. Of these there were only three hundred to a Legion, so that in each Consular Army, the *Romans* had never above six hundred Horse.

*Cosmo.* Would you have a standing Militia of Horse to exercise them at home, and employ them afterwards in the War?

*Fab.* To do well, you cannot do otherwise, if you would have Soldiers of your own and not rely wholly upon such as make War their profession.

*Cosmo.* How would you choose them?

*Fab.* I would imitate the *Romans*, choose them out of the wealthiest, give Officers as they do at this day, and see them well armed, and well exercised.

*Cosmo.* Would it be well to allow them any pay?

*Fab.* Yes truly it would, yet it should be no more than would keep their Horse; for otherwise lying continually upon them, they would become grievous to the Subject, and give them occasion to complain of you.

*Cosmo.* What numbers would you have, and how would you Arm them?

*Fab.* You are too quick, and pass from one thing to another. I'll answer you to that in another place, when I have told you how the Foot are to be Armed, and prepared for a field Battel.

# THE SECOND BOOK.

## CHAP. I.

*What arms were most used by the Ancients in their Wars.*

*Fabr.* **W**hen you have raised your men, the next thing is to furnish them with Arms, and before you do that, I think it not amiss to examine what Arms were most used by the Ancients, and choose the best. The *Romans* divided their Infantry into those who were compleatly, and those who were slightly armed. Those who were slightly armed, were called *Vehites*, under which name all were comprehended who carried Bows, and Slings, and Darts; the greatest part of them had Casques upon their heads for their defence, and a kind of Buckler upon their arm. They fought in no order, and at distance from those who were arm'd compleatly; Their Arms consisted of a Head-piece or Morrion which came down to the Shoulders, a Brigandine down to their knees, their legs and arms were covered with Greeves, and Gauntlets, a Buckler covered with Iron, about two yards long, and one broad, an Iron ring about it without to keep off the blows, and another within to keep it from the dirt when it was lay'd upon the ground. Their offensive Weapons were a Sword at their left thigh, about a yard and half long, with a Dagger on their right side. They carried a Dart in their hand which they called *Pilum*, which upon a Charge they darted at the Enemy.

These were the Arms with which the *Romans* conquered the whole world. And though some of their ancient Writers do give them a Spear in form of a Spit; I do not see how such a Weapon could be handled by one that carried such a Buckler, for it was too heavy to be managed with one hand; besides (unless it were in the Front where they had room to make use of them) it was impossible to use them in their ranks; for the nature of Battels is such (as I shall show hereafter) that they do always contract and keep close, as being in much less danger, than when they are drawn up looser and at a distance: So that in that close order, all Arms that are above two yards long, are not to be used, for having a Spear that is to be managed with both hands, if your Buckler were no hinderance, it could not hurt your Enemy when he was near. If you take it in one hand, and manage your Buckler with the other, you must take it in the middle, and then there will be so much of it behind, that they who come after you will hinder you from handling it: So that it is true, either the *Romans* had no such *Hastæ*, or if they had, they made but little use of them. For if you read the History of *Livius Livius*, in the description of all his Battels, you will scarce ever find he mentions those *Hastæ*, but tells you all along that having darted their *Pila*, they fell to the Sword. My opinion therefore is, that this *Hastæ* be lay'd aside, and that in imitation of the *Romans* we make use of their Sword and Buckler, and other Arms, without troubling our selves with that.

The *Greeks* for their defence did not arm so heavily as the *Romans* but for offence, they relyed more upon the Spear, than the Sword, especially the *Macedonian Phalanx*, who carried of those Javelins which they called *Sarissæ*, with which they brake the Enemies Battels, and kept their own firm and entire. And though some Writers say that they also had their Bucklers, (yet I know not (for the reasons above said) how they could consist. Besides, in the Battel betwixt *Paulus Emilius* and *Perseus* King of *Macedon*, I do not remember that any mention was made of any Bucklers, but only of their *Sarissæ*, and yet the *Romans* had much ado to overcome them. So that my opinion is, the *Macedonian Phalanx* was just such a Body as the *Switzers* Battalion, whose whole force lyes in their Pike. The *Romans* were likewise accustomed to adorn their Soldiers with Plumes of Feathers in their Caps, which renders an Army beautiful to their Friends, and terrible to their Enemies.

Enemies. In the first beginning of the *Roman Wars*, their Horse used a round Shield, a Helmet upon their Heads, and all the rest of their body naked; their offensive Arms were a Sword and Javelin with a long thin spike at the end of it; and so being incumbered with Shield and Javelin, they could use neither of them well, and being unarmed, they were more exposed to the Enemy.

Afterwards they came to arm themselves like their Foot, only their Shield was a little shorter, and squarer, their Launce or Javelin thicker, with pikes at each end; that if by accident one of them should miscarry, the other might be serviceable. With these Arms both for Horse and Foot, my Country-men the *Romans* went thorow the whole world, and by the greatness of their successes; 'tis likely they were as well accounted as any Army ever was. And *Titus Livius* in many places of his History makes it credible where comparing the Armies of the Enemies, says, But the *Romans* for courage, fashion of their Arms, and discipline were before them all. And for that reason I have chosen to speak particularly rather of the Conqueror's Arms, than the Arms of the Conquered. It follows now that I say something of the way of Arming at present.

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## C H A P. II.

*Of the Arms which are used at present, and of the invention of the Pike.*

*Fabritio.* **T**He Soldiers of our times do wear for defensive Arms, Back and Breast, and for offensive a Launce nine yards long, which they call a Pike, with a Sword by their side rather round than sharp. These are generally the Arms which they wear at this day, few wear Greaves and Gantlets, and none at all Head-pieces. Those few who have no Pikes, do carry Halbards, the staff three yards long, and the head like an Axe. They have among them Musquetiers, who with their Fire Arms do the same Service which was done formerly by the Bows and Slings. This manner of arming with Pikes, was found out by the  *Germans* , and particularly by the *Swizzers*, who being poor, and desirous to preserve their liberty, were and are still necessitated to contend against the ambition of the Princes of *Germany* who are rich, and able to entertain Horse, which the *Swizzers* are not able to do. So that their Force consisting principally in Foot, being to defend themselves against the Enemies Horse, they were obliged to revive the old way of drawing up, and find out Arms that might defend them against them. This necessity put them upon continuing, or reviving the old Orders, without which (as every wise-man knows) the Foot would be useless; for which cause they make use of Pikes not only to resist and keep off, but to attack and sometimes to disorder the Horse. And by vertue of these Arms, and these Orders, the  *Germans*  have assumed the confidence with 15 or 20000 of their Foot to attack a vast Body of Horse, of which 'tis not above 25 years since we had a most signal experiment; and so many great examples there are of their courage (founded upon their Arms, and their Order) that after *Charles VIII's* Expedition into *Italy*, all Nations made use of them, inasmuch as thereby the *Spaniards* grew into great reputation.

*Cosmo.* Which manner of arming do you prefer, the *German*, or the ancient *Roman*.

*Fabritio.* The *Roman* without doubt, and I will tell you the usefulness and inconvenience of them both.

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## C H A P. III.

*Whether the ancient, or modern is the best way of Arming.*

**T**He *German* Foot are able not only to sustain, but to beat the Cavalry, they are better for expedition, and can draw themselves up better, because not over pestered with Arms. On the other side Foot are more exposed to wounds both at hand and at a distance. They are not so useful likewise in Storming of Towns, and are in great danger where there is vigorous resistance. But the *Romans* were so well armed, they could encounter and baffle the Horse as well as the  *Germans* , and were secure against their blows by vertue of their Arms, could manage themselves better in an engagement with their Swords, than

the *Germans* with their Pikes, and assault a Town better, under the shelter of their Targets. So that the only inconvenience was the weight of their Arms, and the trouble of carrying them along, which they easily surmounted by accustoming themselves to all kind of difficulties and hardships, and you know custom is a second Nature. You must know likewise that Foot are many times to engage both against Horse and Foot together, and consider also that these kind of Soldiers would be altogether unserviceable, and could never stand against Horse; or if they could bear up against them, yet they would still be afraid of the Foot, lest they should be better armed, and better ordered than they. Now if you consider the *Romans* and *Germans* together you will questionless discover that the *Germans* had much the advantage in charging and breaking a body of Horse (as we said before) but to engage a Body of Foot armed, and ordered like the *Romans*, they have much the disadvantage. So that by this you see what advantage and disadvantage, the one has of the other, the *Romans* were able to fight Foot and Horse both, and the *Germans* are able to deal only with Horse.

*Cosimo*. I would desire you to give us an example, that we may understand it the better.

*Fabritio*. I say you will find in many places of our History, the *Roman* Foot have overcome great Bodies of Horse, and you shall never find that they were overcome by Foot, by reason of any defect in their Arms; or any advantage which the Enemy had in theirs. For had their way of arming been found inconvenient, one of these two things would have followed, they would not have advanced with their Conquests so far (their Enemy being better arm'd,) or else they would have arm'd as the Enemy did, and left their own way; and because neither the one nor the other was done, it follows probably that their way of arming was the best. With the *Germans* it was otherwise as appears by the ill success which they have had whenever they have been engaged with Foot that were well ordered, and as valiant as they; which proceeded from the advantage the Enemy had of them in their Arms. *Philippo Visconte Duke of Milan* being assaulted by 18000 *Swizzers*, sent against them the Count *Carmignuola*, who was his General at that time. *Carmignuola*, with 6000 Horse, and a few Foot went to encounter them, and coming to an engagement, was beaten for his pains. *Carmignuola* being a wise man, quickly discovered the advantage which the Enemy had in their Foot over his Horse, having rallied and recruited his Army, he advanced against the *Swissers* again, and when he came near them, he caused his Horse to dismount, and engaging them smartly in that posture, he put them all to the rout, and most of them to the Sword, only 3000 were left, who finding themselves past remedy, threw down their Arms.

*Cosimo*. How comes that great disadvantage?

*Fabritio*. I told you before, but since you did not regard it, I will repeat it again. The *German* Infantry have little or no defensive Arms, and for offensive they have the Pike and the Sword, and with these weapons, and in that order they attack the Enemy. But if the Enemy be well provided for his defence (as the Cavalry were which *Carmignuola* caused to dismount) and receives them in any good order, they may deal well enough with the *Swizzers* if they can but come to the Sword; for when they once get within them, the length of their Pikes make them useless, and falling then to their Sword, they have the disadvantage of wanting defensive Arms, with which the Enemy is provided. So that considering the advantage and disadvantage on both sides, it will appear that they who have no defensive Arms are without remedy if the Enemy charges but home, and passes their Pikes; for Battels do always advance (as I shall show, when I have told you their manner of drawing up) and pressing on perpetually, they must of necessity come so near as to reach one another with their Swords, and though some few perhaps may be killed or tumbled down with their Pikes, yet those that are behind pressing still on, are sufficient to carry the Victory, and this was the reason why *Carmignuola* overcame with so great slaughter of the *Swissers*, and so little of his own Army.

*Cosimo*. Considering that *Carmignuola's* Forces were men at Arms, and (though on Foot) yet armed compleatly, in my judgment it would be convenient upon any great enterprise, to arm your Foot in that manner.

*Fabritio*. Had you remembred what I told you before about the way of the *Romans* arming themselves, you would not have been of that opinion: For a Foot Soldier with a Head-piece, Breast-plate, Shield, his arms and his legs covered with Iron, is better able to defend himself against the Pikes, and break into them, than one of the men at Arms dismounted.

I will give you a modern example. Certain Companies of *Spanish* Foot were transported out of *Sicily*, and landed in the Kingdom of *Naples*, being to supply *Gonsalvo*, who was besieged

besieged in *Barletta* by the *French*. *Monsieur d'Aubigny* had notice of their march, and went to meet them with his men at arms, and some 4000 *German* foot, who pressed upon them with their pikes, and opened the *Spanish* body, but by the help of their bucklers, and the agility of their bodies, having got under their pikes, and so near as that they could come at them with their swords, the *Spaniards* had the day with the slaughter of most of the *Swisses*. Everyone knows how many of the *Swisses* foot were cut off at the battle of *Ravenna*, and all upon the same account, the *Spanish* foot having got to them with their swords, and had cut them certainly in pieces, had they not been rescued by the *French* horse: and yet the *Spaniards* drawing themselves into a close Order, secured themselves. I conclude therefore, a good Infantry ought to be able not only to sustain the horse, but to encounter the foot, which (as I have said many times before) is to be done by being well arm'd and well ordered.

*Cosimo*. Tell me therefore, I beseech you, how you would have them arm'd?

#### • CHAP. IV.

*How foot should be arm'd, and of the force and convenience of men at Arms.*

*Fabritio*. I Would take both of the *Roman* and *German* arms, and half my men should be arm'd with the one, and half with the other; for if in 6000 foot (as I shall explain to you hereafter) I should have 3000 with bucklers like the *Romans*, 2000 pikes, and 1000 muskets, like the *Swiss*; I think I should do well enough; for I would place my pikes either in my front, or where-ever I suspected the *Enemies* horse might make any impression; my bucklers and swords should second my pikes, and be very conducing to the Victory, as I shall demonstrate. So that I think an Infantry thus ordered would be too hard for any other.

*Cosimo*. What you have said about the Foot, is sufficient: I pray let us now hear what you judge of the horse, and which way of equipping them is the best, the ancient, or modern.

*Fabr*. I think the present way is the best, in respect of the great saddles and stirrups, (which were not in use among the ancients) and make men sit stronger and firmer upon their horse. I think our way of arming now is more secure, and a body of our horse will make a greater impression than a body of the old. Yet I am of opinion that Cavalry are not to be more esteemed now than of old, because (as I have said) they have in our days been oft worsted by the foot, and so they always will be, if the foot be arm'd and ordered as above said. *Tigranes* King of *Armenia* came into the field against the *Roman* Army, under the command of *Lucullus*, with 150000 horse, many of them arm'd like our men at arms, (which they called *Catafracti*) the *Romans* consisting only of 6000 horse, and 15000 foot. Whereupon, in contempt of their number, when *Tigranes* saw them, he said, *That they were liker the Train of an Ambassador than an Army*. Nevertheless when they came to fight, he was beaten, and he who writes the story, blames the *Catafracti*, and declares them unserviceable; for (says he) having Beavers over their faces, they cannot so well see how to offend the *Enemy*, and being laden with arms, if by accident their horse be killed, or throws them upon the ground, they cannot get up again, nor help themselves in any manner. I say then, that Nation or Kingdom which prefers their horse to their foot, shall always be weak, and in danger of ruine, as *Italy* has experimented in our time, having been exposed to ruine and depredation by strangers, for want of foot, which has been very much neglected, and all the Souldiers set on horse-back. Not but it is good to have horse too, yet not to make them the strength of their Army, but sufficient to second the foot; for they are of great use for scouting, making inroads into the *Enemies* Country, raising Contributions, infesting the *Enemy*, and cutting off Convoys and supplies of Provisions; nevertheless when they come to a Field-fight, which is the main importance of a War, and the very end for which Armies are raised they are not so serviceable as foot, though indeed in a rout they are better to pursue.

*Cosimo*. I cannot concur with you in this for two reasons, one is, the *Parthians* used nothing but horse, and yet they had their share of the World as well as the *Romans*; and the other is, because I cannot see which way the Cavalry can be sustained by the Foot, and from whence proceeds the strength of the one, and the weakness of the other.

*Fabr*. I think I have told you, or else I will tell you now, that my discourse of military affairs shall extend no farther than *Europe*. Being intended no farther, I do not think my self



self obliged to give a reason for their customs in *Asia*, yet this I may say, that the *Parthian* discipline was quite contrary to the *Roman*; for the *Parthians* fought always on horse-back in confusion and disorder, which is a way of fighting very uncertain. The *Romans* fought generally on foot, in close and firm order, and they overcame one another variously, as the place where they fought was open, or streight: in streight places the *Romans* had the better; in champion, the *Parthians*, who were able to do great things in respect of the Country, which they were to defend, it being very large, a thousand miles from the Sea, not a River sometimes within two or three days march, and Towns and Inhabitants very thin. So that an Army like the *Roman*, pestered and incumbered with their arms, and their order, could not pass thorow the Country without great loss, by reason the strength of the Enemy consisted in horse which were nimble, here to day, and to morrow fifty miles off. And this may be a reason why the *Parthians* prevailed with their horse, ruined the Army of *Crassus*, and put *Marc Anthony* into so much danger. But as I said before, my intention is not to speak any thing of the Armies out of *Europe*, and therefore I shall insill only upon the *Romans*, the *Grecians*, and the  *Germans*.

### CHAP. V.

*The difference betwixt men at Arms and foot, and upon which we are most to rely.*

*Fabr.* WE come now to your other demand, in which you desire to understand what order, or what natural virtue it is that makes the foot better than the horse.

I say in the first place, horse cannot march in all Countries as foot can; they are not so ready to obey orders when there is any sudden occasion to change them: for when they are upon their march, if there be occasion to wheel, or face about, to advance, or stop, or retreat, they cannot do it with that dexterity as the foot. Upon any rout or disorder, horse cannot rally so well, ( though perhaps they are not pursued ) which is not so with the foot.

Again, it is frequently seen, a brave and a daring man may be upon a bad horse, and a coward upon a good, and that inequality is the occasion of many disorders. Nor let any one think strange that a body of foot can sustain the fury of the horse, because an horse is a sensible creature, and being apprehensive of danger, is not easily brought into it. And if it be considered what forces them on, and what forces them off, it will be found that that which keeps them off, is greater than that which pricks them on; for that which puts them forward as but a spur, whilst that which keeps them off, is a pike or a sword. So that it has been many times seen both by ancient and modern experience, that a body of foot are secure, and insuperable by horse. If you object, that coming on galloping to the charge, makes the horse rush furiously upon the Enemy, and to be less careful of the pike than the spur. I answer, that though a horse be in his career, when he sees the pikes, he will stop of himself; and when he feels them prick, he will stop short; and when you press him on, will turn either on the one side or the other: and if you have a mind to make the experiment, try if you can to run a horse against a wall, and you shall find very few that will do it. *Cæsar*, when he was in *Franch*, being to fight a battel with the *Swizzers*, caused all his horse to dismount, and send their horses away, as being fitter to fly than to fight upon. But though horse are naturally subject to these impediments, he who commands the foot is to march such ways as are likely to be most difficult for horse, and he shall scarce come into a Country but such ways are to be found. If you march over mountainous and hilly places, the very situation will secure you against the fury of the horse; if your march be in a plain, you will seldom march any where but you will have plow'd-fields, or hedges, or woods to secure you: for every ditch, every bank, how inconsiderable so ever, takes off from the fury of the horse, and every plow'd-field or vineyards retards them. And if you come to a battel, it will be the same as in a march; for every small accident that happens to a horse, dismays him, and takes off his courage. However, I will not omit to tell you one thing that the *Romans* trusted so much to their orders, and arms, that had it been in their power to have chosen a place that had been steep, and convenient to secure them against horse, ( though they had not been able to draw themselves up ) or an open place ( more obnoxious to the horse ) where they might put themselves handsomly in Battalia, they chose

those always the last, and rejected the first. But it being time to come now to their manner of exercise, having arm'd our foot according to the ancient and modern way, let us see what exercise the *Romans* gave them before they brought them to a Battel.

### CHAP. VI.

#### *How the Souldiers were exercised.*

**T**Hough they be never so well chosen, and never so well arm'd, Souldiers are carefully to be exercised, for without exercise they are good for nothing. And this exercise ought to be three-fold, one is to inure them to labour and hardship, and make them dexterous and nimble; another to teach them how to handle their arms; and the third to teach them to keep their ranks and orders in their marches, battels, and encampments: which are three great things in an Army. For if an Army marches, is drawn up well, and encamps regularly and skilfully, the General shall gain reputation, let the success be as it will. Wherefore all ancient Commonwealths provided particularly for these exercises by their Customs and Laws, so that nothing of that nature was omitted. They exercised their youth to learn them to be nimble in running, active to leap, strong to throw the bar, and to wrestle, which are all necessary qualities in a Souldier, for running and nimbleness fits them for possessing a place before the enemy; to fall upon them on a sudden in their quarters, and pursue with more execution in a rout; activity makes them with more ease avoid their blows, leap a ditch, or climb a bank; and strength makes them carry their arms better, strike better, and endure the shock better: and above all to inure them to labour, they accustomed their Souldiers to carry great weights, which custom is very necessary; for in great expeditions it happens many times that the Souldiers are forced to carry (besides their arms) several days provisions, which without being accustomed to labour, would be more tedious to them, and by this, great dangers are many times avoided, and great victories many times obtained. As to their way of accustomed them to their arms, they did it in this manner. They made their young men wear head-pieces twice as heavy as those which they were to wear in the field, and instead of Swords, they gave Cudgels with lead run into them, much heavier than their Swords. They caused each of them to fix a pale into the ground three yards high, and fasten it so strong that no blows might be able to batter or shake it: against which pale or stake the youth were accustomed to exercise themselves with their cudgel or buckler, as it had been an Enemy; striking it sometimes as it were on the head, sometimes on the face, then on the sides, legs, before and behind; sometimes retreating, and then advancing again: and by this way of exercise they made themselves dexterous and skilful how to defend themselves, and offend an enemy. And for the heaviness of their counterfeit arms, they did it to make the true ones appear more light. The *Romans* taught their Souldiers rather to thrust than to cut with their swords, because thrusts are more mortal, more hard to be defended; and he that makes it is not so easily discovered, and is readier to double his thrust than his blow. Do not admire that the ancients concerned themselves in such little things, for when people come to handy strokes, every small advantage is of great importance; and this is not my own opinion only, but is taught by many Authors. The ancients thought nothing more beneficial in a Commonwealth, than to have store of men well exercised in arms; for 'tis not the Splendor of their gemms, not their gold, that makes the enemy run, but the fear of their arms.

The faults which one commits in other things may be repaired, but those which are committed in war are never to be redressed; besides, experience in this kind makes men more audacious and bold, for no man fears to do that which he thinks he understands: the ancients therefore would have their Citizens exercise themselves in all military actions, and made them cast darts (much heavier than the true ones) against their pales: which besides that it taught them dexterity, it was a great strengthener of their arm. They brought up their youth likewise to the bow and the sling, in all which exercises there were professed Masters, so that when afterwards they were drawn out to the wars, they were perfect Souldiers both in courage and discipline, nor were they defective in any thing but keeping their ranks in their marches, and receiving orders in their fights, which was quickly learn'd by mixing them with such as had serv'd a long time.

*Costanzo.* What exercises would you recommend at present?

*Fabritio.*

*Fabritio.* Several of those which I have mentioned, as running, leaping, throwing the bar, accustoming them to heavy arms, teaching them to shoot in the cross, and long bow, and musket, which is a new engine, (as you know) but very good. And to these exercises I would accustom all the youth in my Country, but with more industry and solicitude those exercises which are useful in war, and all their musters should be in idle days. I would have them learn to swim likewise, which is a very useful thing, for they are not sure of bridges where-ever they come, and boats are not always to be had. So that your Army not knowing how to swim, is deprived of several conveniencies, and lose many fair opportunities of action. The reason why the *Romans* exercised their youth in the *Campus Martius*, was, because of its nearness to the *Tyber*, where after they had tired themselves at land, they might refresh, and learn to swim in the water.

I would have also the Cavalry exercised as of old, which is most necessary, for besides teaching them to ride, it teaches them to sit fast when they come to a charge. To this end they had horses of wood upon which they exercised, vaulting upon them sometimes with their arms, and sometimes without, very neatly and exactly, without any assistance; so that upon a signal from their Captain they were immediately on horse-back, and upon another signal as soon upon the ground. And as those exercises both for horse and foot were easie in those times, they would be the same now to any Prince or Commonwealth that would employ their youth that way, as is to be seen in several Cities in the West, where they are continued. They divide their Inhabitants into several parties, and every party is denominated by the arms which they wear; and because they use pikes, halberds, bows, and harquebusses, they are called Pike-men, Halbardiers, Bow-men, and Harquebussiers: every inhabitant is to declare in what Company he will be listed; and because some for their age and other impediments are not apt for the wars, there is a choice made out of every order, of such persons as are called, the *Giurati* being sworn to see the rest exercised in their several arms, according to their respective denominations, and every one of them has a certain place appointed where their exercises are to be made; and all that belong to that Order (besides the *Giurati*) repair thither with such monies as are necessary for their expence. What therefore is done actually by them, we may do as well, but our impudence will not suffer us to imitate any thing that is good. By these exercises the ancients Infantry were very good, and at this day the western foot are better than ours, because the ancients exercised them at home, (as in the Commonwealths) or in the field (as by the Emperors) for the reasons aforesaid. But we will not exercise them at home, and in the field we cannot, they not being our subjects, are not to be compelled but to what exercises they please: and this want of authority to exercise them has caused our Armies to be first negligent and remiss, and afterwards our discipline; and has been the cause that so many Kingdoms and Commonwealths (especially in *Italy*) are so weak and considerable.

But to return to our order, and the business of exercising, I say, that it is not sufficient to make an absolute Souldier, to intuse a man to labour, to make him strong, swift, and dexterous, but he must learn likewise to keep his ranks well, to obey orders, and the directions of the trumpet and drum; to know how to do right, standing still, retiring, advancing, fighting, and marching; for without this discipline be observed with all accurate diligence, your Army will never be good. And without doubt men who are furious and disorderly, are much more unserviceable than towards; for order drives away fear, and disorder lessens a mans courage.

## C H A P. VII.

*Of what number of men, and of what arms a battalion is to consist; and of exercising in Companies to make them ready either to give a charge, or receive it.*

AND that you may the better understand what is said before, you must know what there is no Nation, which, to put in order its men of war, has not constituted a principal member, which member, or body, though they have altered it as to their name, yet it is not much altered as to the number of their men; for in all places they consist of betwixt six and eight thousand. This body among the *Romans* was called a *Legion*, among the *Grecians* a *Phalanx*, among the *French* *Caterve*; the same thing by the *Swizzers* (who are the only people which retain any thing of the discipline of the ancients) is called that in their

their language, which in ours is called Battalion. True it is, that afterwards every one divided it into companies, and ordered them as they pleased. My advice is, that we found our discourse upon the name which is most known, and range it as well as we may, according to the order both of the ancients and moderns. And because the *Romans* divided their Legions which consisted of betwixt 5 and 6000 men, into ten *Cohorts*, I think fit that we divide our Battalions into ten Companies, and the whole consisting of 6000 men, allot to every company 450, of which 400 may be compleatly armed, and the remaining fifty slightly. The compleatly arm'd may be 390 with swords and bucklers called *Sauvages*, and an hundred with pikes called *Pike-men*. Those which are lightly arm'd may be fifty foot, carrying Harquebusses, Cross-bows, Partizans and Halbards, which according to the old name may be called *Velites*; so that all the ten Companies make 3000 bucklers, 1000 ordinary Pikes, and 500 ordinary *Velites*, which in all will amount to 4500 foot. But because we say that our Battalion is to contain 6000 men, 1500 more are to be added, of which 1000 are pikes, which we will call Pikes in extraordinary, and the other 500 are to be slightly arm'd, and called *Velites* in extraordinary. So that my foot (as is said before) will be composed half of Bucklers, and the other half of Pikes, and other Arms. I would have every Battalion have a Commander in chief, four Centurions, and forty *Capidecti* or Corporals, and over and above, a Commander in chief of the *Velites* in ordinary, with five File-leaders. I would assign to the *Velites* in extraordinary two Officers in chief, five Centurions, and fifty Corporals, then make a General of the whole Battalion. I would have every Constable to have his Colours and Drums, by which means the Battalion would consist of ten Companies, 300 Bucklers, 1000 Pikes in ordinary, 1000 extraordinary, 500 *Velites* in ordinary, and 500 in extraordinary; so as they would amount in all to 6000 foot, among which there would be 600 Corporals, 15 Constables, 15 Drums, 15 Colours, 55 Centurions, 19 Commanders of the *Velites* in ordinary, and one General of the whole Battalion, with his Standard and Drum.

I have repeated this order the oftner, that afterward when I shew you the way of ordering a Battel, or Army, you may not find your self confounded. I say therefore, that a King or Commonwealth is to order his subjects, which he designs for the wars, with these arms, and into these divisions, and raise as many Battalions as his Country will afford. And when he has disposed them so, being to exercise them in order, he is to exercise them in their several divisions. And, although the number of each of them cannot bear the form of a just Army, yet thereby every man may learn what belongs to his own duty, because in Armies there are two orders observed, one what men are to do in every battel, or division distinctly; and the other what they are to do when united with the rest; and those men who know the first well, will easily learn the other; but without knowledg of the first, they will never arrive at the discipline of the second.

Every one (then) of these Companies may learn by it self to keep the order of their ranks in all motions and places, to open and close, and understand the direction of their Drums, by which all things are commanded in a battel; for by beating of that (as by the whistle in the Gallies) every man knows what he is to do, whether to stand firm to his ground, to advance, or fall back, and which way they are to turn their faces and arms. So that understanding the order of their files in that exactness that no motion, nor no place can disorder them; understanding the commands of their Officer, derived to them by his Drum, and how to advance, & fall back into their places, these Companies (as I have said before) as soon as joyned, may easily be taught what an united body of all the Battalions is obliged to do when they are drawn together into an Army. And because this universal practice is of no slight importance, in time of peace it would be convenient once or twice in a year to bring them to a general *Rendez-vous*, and give them the form of an Army, exercising them for some days as if they were to fight a battel with an enemy, drawing them up, and disposing them into front, flank, and reserve. And because a General orders his Army for a battel, either upon the sight or apprehension of an enemy, he is to exercise his Army accordingly, and teach them how to behave themselves upon a march, and how in a battel, and how upon a charge, either upon one side or other. When they are exercised as if an enemy was before them, they are to be taught how they are to begin the fight, how they are to retreat upon a repulse, who are to succeed in their places; what Colours, what Drums, what words of commands they are to obey, and so to train them up, and accustom them to these false alarms, and counterfeit battels, that at length they become impatient to bear it in earnest. For an Army is not made valiant and courageous for having brave and valiant men in it, but for the good order which is observed; for if I be in the forefront, and know, being beaten, whether I am to retire, and who are to succeed in my place, I shall fight boldly, because my relief is at hand. If I be of the second body that is to engage

engage, the distress, or repulse of the first will not fright me, because I considered it might happen before, and perhaps desired it; that I might have the honour of the Victory, and not they. Where an Army is new, this way of exercising is absolutely necessary, and where it is old, it is convenient; for we see the *Roman* Captains before they brought them to fight, continually exercised their men after this manner, though they had been brought up to their Arms. *Josephus* tells us in his History, that this continual exercising in the *Roman* Army was the cause that all the multitude of idle people which followed the Camp either for Traffick or gain, were made useful and serviceable, because they understood their orders and ranks, and how to preserve them in time of Battel. But if you have raised an Army of young men never in the Wars before, whether you intend them for present Service, or to establish them as Militia, and engage them afterwards, without this way of exercising by single Companies, and sometimes a conjunction of them all, you do nothing. For order being perfectly necessary, it is convenient with double industry and labour to teach such as are not skilful already, and practise such as are; as we have seen several excellent Commanders, to practise and instruct their Soldiers, take extraordinary pains without any respect to their dignities.

*Cosimo*. It seems to me that this discourse has a little transported you, for before you have told us the way of exercising by Companies, you have treated of entire Armies, and the managing of a Battel.

*Fabrizio*. You say right, and the true reason is the affection I bear to those orders, and the trouble I am under that they are no more used; yet do not think but I will recollect my self and return. As I told you before, in the exercising of a Company, the first thing of importance is to know how to keep your ranks; to do this, it is necessary to exercise them in that order which they call *Cbiocciolo*, or the Snail order. And because I have said that one of these *Battalies* or Companies is to consist of four hundred Foot compleatly armed, I will keep to that number.

These four hundred men (then) are to be reduced into 80 files, five in a file, after which they are to be carried forward upon a quick march, or a slow, wheeling, and doubling, charging or retreating, which indeed is more demonstrable to the eye, than the understanding. But this *Snail way* of exercising a Company is not so necessary, because every one that knows any thing of an Army, knows how 'tis to be done; and indeed it is not considerable in any respect, but to teach Soldiers how to move their files; but let us now draw up one of these Companies and dispose them into their ranks.

### CHAP. VIII.

#### *Of three principal ways of drawing up a Company, and putting them into a posture to fight.*

I Say that there are three principal forms of drawing up men; the first and most useful is to draw them up close, in the figure of two Squares. The second is to draw them up in a square with two wings. The third is to draw them up with a vacuity in the middle, which they call *Piazza*. To draw them up in the first figure, there are two ways. One is to double their files, that is, the second file entering into the first, the fourth into the third, the sixth into the fifth, and so successively; so that whereas they were 80 files of five in a file, they may become forty files of 10 in a file. After this you are to double them again in the same manner, thrusting one file into another, and then they will be 20 files, and twenty men in a file. This makes two squares, or very near; for though there be as many men on one side as the other, yet towards the head they joyn together, so as one flank may touch the other; but on the other side, their distance is at least two yards one from the other; so that the square is longer from the Rear to the Front, than from one flank to another. And because we are to speak often of the fore part, the hinder part, and the sides, of this *Battalia* or Company, and of the whole Army when joyned; you must know that when I say the head of the front, I mean the fore part of the Battel; when I say the Shoulders, I mean the hinder part; and when I say the flanks, I mean the sides. The fifty *Velites* in ordinary, do not mingle with the rest of the files, but when the *Battalia* is formed, they are disposed by its flanks. The other way of drawing up a Company is this, (and because it is better than the first, I resolve to describe it so plain, that you shall understand it as well as it were before your eyes) I suppose you remember of what number of men, of what Officers it is composed, and what Arms it is to carry. The form therefore

of this *Battalia* is of twenty files, twenty men in a file, five files of Pikes in the front, and fifteen files of Bucklers in the rear. Two Centurions in the front, and two in the rear, which the ancients called *Tergiductores*. The Constable or Captain with his Colours and Drum is to stand in the space betwixt the five files of Pikes, and the fifteen files of Bucklers. Corporals, upon the flank of every file one; so that each of them may have his men by his side; those who are on the right hand, will have them on their left, those on the left on their right; the fifty *Velites* are to be drawn up on the flanks and rear. Now that your Soldiers may put themselves into this posture in their ordinary march, it is to be done in this manner. You are first to reduce your *Battalia* into 80 files, five men in a file, leaving your *Velites* either in the front or the rear, but they must be sure to be placed without this order. Every Centurion is to be at the head of twenty files, five of Pikes are to be immediately behind him, and the rest Bucklers.

The Constable or Captain is to stand with his Drum, and Colours in the space betwixt the Pikes and the rest of the Bucklers belonging to the second Centurion, and may take up the place of three of the Bucklers. Of the *Capiduci* or Corporals, twenty are to stand in the flank of the files of the first Centurion, upon the left hand, and twenty upon the flank of the last Centurion upon the right hand. And it is to be observed that every Corporal who leads the Pikes, is to have a Pike in his hand: and they who lead the *Scudi* are to have Bucklers in theirs.

Having put your files into this order, and being desirous upon their march to reduce them into a *Battalia* to make head against an Enemy, you must cause the first Centurion with his first twenty files to make a halt, and the second Centurion to continue his march to the right all along by the sides of those twenty files which stand firm, till he comes cheek by jole with the first Centurion, where he also makes his stand, and then the third marching on likewise on the right hand by the flank of the said files, advances till he be even with the other two Centurions, and then he making his stop, and so the rest; which being done, two of the Centurions only are to depart from the front into the rear of the *Battalia*, which by this means is in the same order as I said before. The *Velites* are to be drawn up by the side, as they are disposed in the first way, which is called *redoubling by a right line*, for the second way redoubles them in the flanks. The first way is more easie, this is more orderly and useful, and may be better corrected and reformed to your mind, for in the first you are obliged to conform to your number, for five doubled, make ten, ten twenty, twenty forty; so that if you would double your files in a right line, you cannot make a front of fifteen, five and twenty, thirty, nor thirty five, but you must go where the number will carry you. And therefore it happens every day upon particular rencounters, that it is necessary to make head with 7 or 800 foot, and in so doing to double in a right line would undo you. For these reasons this way pleases me best, and the difficulties therein, are easily removed by exercise and practice. I say then that nothing is of greater importance than to have Soldiers which can put themselves instantly into their ranks, and to learn that it is necessary to exercise them in these Companies at home, to teach them the quick and the slow march, to advance or retreat, and to pass thorow streights, and difficult places without disturbing their order: For Soldiers that can do that well, are good Soldiers, and may be called old Soldiers, though they never looked an Enemy in the face; whereas on the contrary, if a man has been in a thousand Battels, and understands not that, he is but a Novice, and a fresh-water Soldier. This is only as to closing their ranks upon a march when they are in small files; but having closed their files, and being afterwards broken by some accident (either from the place, or the Enemy) to rally, and recollect themselves then, there lies the difficulty and importance which requires great exercise and practice, and by the ancients was endeavoured with much industry. In this case it is necessary therefore to do two things.

#### CHAP. IX.

*The manner of rallying Soldiers after a rout, and to make them face about a whole Company at a time.*

*Fabr.* **W**hen a Squadron is broken, to rally and bring them again suddenly into order, two things are convenient; first, that several Colours or Countermarks be assigned to every *Battalia*: and secondly to observe this rule, that the same Foot stand still in the same Files. For example, if a Soldier's place was formerly in the second File, let him

continue in that File, and not only in that File, but in the same place; and in order to that, as I said before, several Countermarks are necessary. And first it is convenient that the Ensigns and Colours of each Company be so handsomely distinguished, that being joyned with other Squadrons, they may know one another. Next, that the Captains and Centurions have Plumes of Feathers or Scarfs, or something that may make them conspicuous and remarkable; and last of all (as being of more importance) the *Capidieci* or Corporals are to be so accoutred that they may be known; and of this the ancients were so extraordinarily curious, that their numbers were written upon their Helmets in great Characters, calling them the first, second, third and fourth, &c. And not content with this, every Soldier had the number of his File, and the number of his place in that File engraven upon his Buckler. Your Companies being in this manner made distinguishable by their Colours, and accustomed to their Ranks and Files by practice and experience, it is no hard matter though they be disordered, to rally, and reduce them suddenly again; for as soon as the Colours are stuck down in the ground they are immediately visible, and the Captains and Officers knowing which are their own, repair themselves, and dispose their Soldiers immediately to their places, and when those on the left have placed themselves on the left hand, and those which belong to the right hand on the right; the Soldiers directed by their rules, and the difference of their Colours fall immediately into their Ranks, as easily as we put together the Staffes of a Barrel when we have marked them before. These things if learned with diligence and exercise at first, are quickly attained, and hardly forgot; for your raw men are directed by the old, and in time a Province by these exercises might be made very fit for the War. It is necessary therefore to teach them how to turn all together, when to face about in the Rear, or the Flanks, and make Rear and Flank of the first Ranks when occasion is offered.

And this is no hard matter to do, seeing it is sufficient, that every man faces to that side he is commanded, and where they turn their faces, that is the Front. True it is, when they face to the Flank, their Ranks do not hold their proportion, because the distance betwixt the Front and the Rear is thereby much lessened, and the distance betwixt the extremity of the Flanks is much encreased, which is quite contrary to the genuine order of a *Battalia*, for which cause great practice and discretion is required to rectifie it, and yet this may be remedied by themselves. But that which is of greater consequence, and which requires more practice, is when an Officer would turn his whole Company together, as if it were a single man, or a solid and massy body of itself. And this requires longer experience than the other. For if you would have it turn to the left, the left corner must stand still, and they who are next them, march so leisurely, that they in the right may not be put to run; if they be, it will breed confusion.

But because it always happens that when an Army marches from place to place, that the Companies which are not in the Front, are forced to fight in the Flanks, or Rear, so that one and the same Company is many times compelled to face about to the Flanks and Rear at one and the same time, that these Companies therefore may in this exigence hold their old proportion, according to what is said before, it is necessary that they have Pikes in that Flank which is most likely to be attacked, and *Capidieci* Captains, and other Officers in their proper places.

## CHAP. X.

*To range a Company in such order that it may be ready to face the Enemy, on which side soever he comes.*

*Fabr.* **W**hen you have marshalled your fourscore Files, five in a File; you are to put all your Pikes into the first twenty Files, and place five of your Corporals in the head of them, and five in the Rear. The other 60 Files which follow, are Bucklers all, and consist of 300 men. So then the first and last File of every Company, are to be Corporals; The Captain with his Ensign and Drum, is to stand in the midst of the first hundred of Bucklers, and every Centurion at the head of his Division. When they are in this order, if you desire to have your Pikes on the left hand, you are to double the Company by Company from the right Flank; if you would have them on the right, you are to double from the left; and this is the way by which a Company turns with the Pikes upon one Flank, with their Officers at the Head and the Rear of them, and their Captain in the midst, and it is the form which is observed in a march. But upon the approach of an Enemy, when



when they would make a Front of a Flank, they have no more to do but to command that all of them face about to that Flank where the Pikes are, and in so doing the whole Battalia turns with its Files and Officers at the same time in the manner aforesaid; for (unless it be the Centurions) they are all in their old places, and the Centurions can quickly be there. But when a Battalia marches in the Front, and is in danger to be engaged in the Rear; the Files are to be so ordered, that the Pikes may be readily behind; and to do this there needs no more, but whereas usually in every Battalia, every Century has five Files of Pikes in the Front, those five Files may be placed in the Rear, and in all other places the same order to be observed as before.

*Cosmo.* If my memory fails not, you said that this way of exercise is in order to the uniting these Battalia's into an Army, and that this practice is sufficient to direct them in that. But if it should happen this Squadron of 450 Foot should be to fight singly, and by its self, how would you order it then?

*Fabritio.* He who commands them is to judge where his Pikes are to be disposed, and place them as he thinks fit, which is not at all consistent with what I have prescribed before; for though that be a way to be observed in Battel upon an union or conjunction of several Squadrons, yet it may serve as a rule, in what ever condition you fall into. But in showing you the two other ways which I recommended for the ordering of a Battalia, I will satisfy you farther.

## CHAP. XI.

*To draw up a Company with two horns, or another with a Piazza,  
or vacuity in the middle.*

TO come to the way of drawing up a Battalia or Squadron with two horns or points, I say you must order your 80 Files, five in a File, after this manner.

In the midst you must place a Centurion with 25 Files, two of Pikes to the left, and three of Bucklers to the right: when those five are disposed, bring up the other twenty, with twenty Files and File-leaders, all of them to be placed betwixt the Pikes and the Bucklers, only those who carry Pikes are to stand with the Pikes. After these twenty five Files are so placed, draw up another Centurion with fifteen Files of Bucklers; after which the Constable or Captain is to draw into the middle with his Drum and his Colours, with other fifteen Files of Bucklers. This being performed, the next to march up is the third Centurion, who is to be at the head of 25 Files, of 5 in a File, three Bucklers to the left, and two Pikes to the right; and after the 5 first Files, let there be twenty File-leaders placed betwixt the Pikes and the Bucklers, and after these the fourth Centurion. Having drawn your men into this order; to make Battalia consisting of two horns, the first Centurion is to make a stand with his 25 Files at his heels; then is the second Centurion to advance with his 15 Files of Bucklers, and place himself on the right hand of the 1<sup>st</sup>. Centurion, and marching along by the side of the 25 Files, he is to advance till he comes to the 15 File, and there he is to stop. The next that marches is the Captain with his division of 15 Files of Bucklers behind him, and advancing on the right hand by the flank of the other 15 Files, he is to march up to their front. After him the third Centurion is to move with his 25 Files, and the fourth Centurion after him, and passing along by the right flank of the last 15 Files of Bucklers, they are not to stop at the front of the said Files, but to advance till the last of the twenty five Files be parallel with the Files which are behind them. As soon as this is done, the Centurion at the head of the 1<sup>st</sup>. 15 Files of Bucklers, is to remove into the left angle in the rear, and by this means you shall form a Battalia of five and twenty firm Files of twenty men in a File with two horns, on each side of the front one, each of them consisting of ten Files of 5 in a File, with a space betwixt the two horns, sufficient to receive ten men a breast. Betwixt the two horns the Captain is to be placed, and a Centurion at each point or angle; there are likewise to be two Files of Pikes, and twenty Corporals on each Flank. These horns or wings are useful to receive and secure Carriages or Artillery, when they have any with them; The *Velites* are to be drawn up along the flanks under the shelter of the Pikes. But to reduce this horn'd Squadron into another Figure, with a space in the middle, no more is to be done, than out of the 15 Files of twenty in a File, to take eight, and place them upon the point of the two horns, which will make a good rear, and turn it into a Battalia *della Piazza*, or a Battalia with a space in the the midst; in this space or Area, the Carriages are disposed, and the Cap-

tain and his Colours, but not the Artillery, for they are placed either in the front, or along the flanks. These are the forms to be observed in a Battalia or Squadron when it marches alone thorow dangerous places. But the single Battalia without horns or vacuity is better, though to secure such as are disarmed, the horned figure is convenient. The *Swisses* have several forms of drawing up their Battalia's, one is the fashion of a Cross, placing their Harquebussiers betwixt the Arms of the said Cross to secure them from the Enemy. But because those figures are proper only when Squadrons fight singly and by themselves, and my intention being to show they may fight united and in conjunction, I shall not trouble my self with them.

*Cosimo.* I fancy I do sufficiently comprehend the way that is to be observed to exercise men in these Battalia's; but (if I mistake not) you told us that to the ten Battalia's, (which united, make a Battalion) you would add a thousand extraordinary Pikes, and four hundred of the extraordinary *Velites*. And these would you not advise should be exercised?

*Fabritio.* I would, and with very great diligence, exercising the Pikes with the same care as the rest; because I would make more use of them than the rest upon all private occasions, as in conducting convoys of provisions, depredations, and such like. But my *Velites* I would exercise at home without bringing them together; for it being their office to fight loose and confused, it is not necessary that they should be always exercised as the rest; for it is enough if they understand their own business well. They ought then (as I said before) and I am not troubled to repeat it again) so to exercise their men in these Battalia's, that they may know to keep their ranks, understand their places, wheel readily, and shift handsomely either upon sight of an Enemy, or inconvenience of the place. For when they can do this well, they will easily learn which are their places, and what are their duties in a Batfel. And if a Prince or Commonwealth grudges not to take pains, and employ themselves in seeing their Subjects thus exercised, they would have always good Soldiers, be always too hard for their Neighbours, and would be in a condition rather to give, than receive Laws from other people. But (as I have said before) the disorder in which we live, is the cause that we do not only neglect, but despise those things, and that is the true reason our Souldiers are no better; and though there may be Officers and Soldiers too that perhaps are both valiant and skilful; yet they have no occasion or encouragement to show themselves.

## C H A P. XII

*Of the Baggage and Train belonging to a Company; How necessary it is that they have several Officers, and of the usefulness of Drums.*

*Cosimo.* I Would ask you now, what Carriages you would allot to each of these Battalia's?

*Fabritio.* In the first place I would not allow that either Centurion or Corporal should march on Horseback, and if the Captain must ride, I would allow him only a Mule. I would allow him two Carriages, one to every Centurion, and two betwixt every three Corporals, because we quarter them together in our Camp, as shall be shown in its due place; so that to every Battalia there should be 36 Carriages, which I would have carry the Tents, and Utensils for their Cookery; their Hatchets, and other Iron Instruments to set up their Huts, Tents, and Pavilions; and if there be afterwards any place left, let them carry what they please.

*Cosimo.* I am of opinion that the Officers which you have appointed in every of these Battalia's are necessary, yet I should be afraid so many Commanders should confound them.

*Fabritio.* What you say would be true, were they not subordinate to one; but depending still upon one person, they proceed very regularly, nay without them, they could not possibly be governed. For a wall that is tottering in all places, requires that its Buttresses and Supporters be rather many than strong, because the strength and goodness of one, will not hinder the ruine which will follow. And therefore in all Armies, and among every ten men, it is convenient to have one of more life, more courage, and more authority than the rest, who with his alacrity, and language, and example, may encourage the rest, and dispose them to fight. And to prove the necessity of these things in an Army, (*viz.* Ensigns, Officers and Drums) it appears by our Armies, where there are of them all,

but

but none of them do their office, according to the intent of their establishment. First your *Capideci* or File-leaders, if they answer the end for which they were established, are to have their men a-part, lodge with them, charge with them, and be always in the same file with them; for being kept to their due places, the File-leaders are a rule and temper to the rest, keeping them firm and straight in their files; so as it is impossible almost that they be disordered, and if they be, they are quickly reduced. But in our days we make no other use of them but to give them greater pay, and enable them to make particular factions. 'Tis the same with our Ensigns; for they are used more for pomp and parade, than any military service; whereas formerly the Captains employed them as guides, and directions in case of disorder; for every man, as soon as the Ensign was fix'd, knew his place immediately, and immediately return'd to it. They knew likewise thereby how they were to move, or to halt; it is necessary therefore in an Army that there be several of these small Bodies; that every Body has its Colours, and Ensign, and Guide; for where there are many Bodies, there ought to be many Arms, and many Officers. The Souldiers (then) are to follow the motion of their Colours, and their Colours the direction of their Drum, which (being well ordered) commands the Army, and advertizes how they are to march with a motion suitable to the time which it beats, which is a great preservation to their order. For this cause the ancients had their flutes and pipes which made an excellent harmony; and as he that dances, keeps himself exactly to the time of the musick; and whilst he does so, is not capable of erring: so an Army that in its motions observes the beating and direction of its Drums, cannot be easily disordered. For this reason they varied their sounds when they would excite, or assuage, or continue the courage of their men. And as their ways of beating were various, so they gave them several names. The *Dorick* way provoked to constancy and firmness; the *Phrygian* inflam'd the Souldiers into a martial fury and violence. It is reported that *Alexander* being one day at dinner, and hearing a Drum beating suddenly, the *Phrygian* way, was transported with so great a vehemence and commotion, that he clap'd his hand upon his Sword, and drew it, as if he had been going to fight. So that in my judgment it would be very convenient to revive the ancient dialects of the Drum, and practices of our Ancestors, and if that should prove too difficult, yet those persons should not be despised and laid aside, who would teach and instruct the Souldier how to obey them; yet those ways may be changed and varied as every man pleases, provided he enures his Souldiers ears to understand the variety; but now a-days the greatest use of the Drum, is to make a great noise.

*Cosmo.* I would fain know of you (if you have ever considered it with your self) how it comes to pass that such military exercises are in our times grown so low and contemptible.

*Fabr.* I shall tell you freely what I think may be the cause.

### CHAP. XIII.

*A discourse of the Author about military Virtue; and how it is become so despicable in our days.*

*Fabr.* YOU know *Europe* (according to the testimony of several Authors) has afforded many excellent Captains; *Africk* has had some, and *Asia* fewer: and the reason (as I conceive) is, because those two quarters of the World have had but one or two Monarchies among them, and very few Commonwealths; but *Europe* has had several Kingdoms, and more Commonwealths; and men are industrious, and by consequence excellent, as they are employed and preferred by their Prince, or their State. Where therefore there are many Princes, there are many brave men; where there are but few of the first, there are fewer of the other. We find in *Asia* there was *Ninus*, *Cyrus*, *Artaxerxes*, *Mitridates*, and some few others of that rank. In *Africa* (besides the *Egyptian* antiquity) there were *Massinissa*, *Jugurtha*, and those great Captains which were trained up in the *Carthaginian* Wars, which notwithstanding in respect of the numbers which have been produced in *Europe*, were very few; for in *Europe* their brave Generals are innumerable in History, or at least they would have been, had the Historians (with those they have already recorded) made mention of such as are now forgotten by the malignity of time. For there people are more virtuous, where there have been frequent revolutions of State, and where the Governments have favoured virtue either out of necessity, or compassion.

As for *Asia*, it has not produced many extraordinary men, because that Province was wholly under a Monarchy; which (by reason of its greatness, the greatest part of it being always at peace) could not produce such excellent men, as where there was action and war.

In *Africa* it was the same; yet there they were more numerous, by reason of the Carthaginian Republicks; for Commonwealths do furnish the World with more brave men than Kingdoms; because in States, virtue is many times honoured and advanced; in Monarchies and Kingdoms it is suspected; from whence it proceeds that in the one it is encouraged, in the other exploded. He then who shall consider *Europe*, shall find it full of Commonwealths, and Principalities, which in respect of the jealousies and animosities betwixt them, were constrained to keep up the old military discipline, and advance those who in it were any ways eminent; for in *Greece*, besides the *Macedonians*, there were many Republicks, and in each of them, several excellent men.

The *Romans*, the *Sannites*, the *Tuscans*, *Cisalpine Gauls*, *France* and *Germany* were full of Republicks and Principalities; and *Spain* was the same. And though in respect of the *Romans*, the numbers which are mentioned of them in History, are but small; that proceeds from the emulation and partiality of the Historians, who following fortune, content themselves with commending the Conqueror; but 'tis unreasonable to imagine that among the *Sannites* and *Tuscans* (who waged war with the *Romans* 150 years together before they were totally subdued) there were not many brave men; and so in *France* and in *Spain*; but the virtue which Authors do not celebrate in particular men, they impute generally to the whole people, whom they exalt to the skies for their constancy, and adherence to their liberty.

It being true then, that where there are most Principalities and Governments there are more excellent men; it follows, that when those Governments and Principalities extinguish, their brave men and virtue extinguish with them; there being less occasion to exert it. After the *Roman Empire* had dilated it self so strangely; and subverted all the Commonwealths and Principalities in *Europe*, and *Africa*; and the greatest part of those in *Asia*; virtue declined in all places but in *Rome*. Whereupon virtuous men began to grow thinner in *Europe* and *Asia*; and by degrees came afterwards to a total declination; for the virtue of the whole World being as it were inclosed in the walls of *Rome*, when it grew depraved and corrupted there, the whole World became corrupt, and the *Scythians* were encouraged to make their inroads and depredations upon the Empire, which had been able to consume and extinguish the virtue of all other places, but was not able to preserve it at home. And though afterwards by the foundation of those Barbarians it was divided into several Cantons; yet for two reasons their virtue was never restored; one was because when Laws and Orders are once neglected and disused, it is with no little pain that they are reassumed: the other, our way of living in these times (in respect of the Christian Religion) imposes not that necessity of defending our selves, as anciently it did: for then those who were overcome in war, either killed themselves, or remained in perpetual slavery, in which they lived afterwards in continual misery. The Towns that were taken were either totally demolished, or the Inhabitants banished, their Goods plundered, their Estates sequestred, and themselves dispersed all over the World; so that he who was overcome, suffered such miseries as are not to be expressed. People being terrified by these insupportable cruelties, kept up the reputation of military discipline, and advanced all those who were excellent therein.

But at present we are under no such apprehensions: no man kills himself for being conquered: no man is kept long a prisoner, because it is more easie to set him at liberty. If a City rebels twenty times, it is not immediately razed, and demolished; the Citizens are continued in their Estates, and the greatest punishment they fear, is a mulct or a tax; so that men will not now submit to military orders, nor apply themselves to those labours to avoid a peril which they do not apprehend. Besides; the Provinces of *Europe* are under few heads in comparison of what they were anciently: for all *France* is under one King; all *Spain* under another; *Italy* is divided into four parties, so that the weaker Cities that are unable to maintain war of themselves, defend themselves by alliances with the Conqueror; and those who are strong (for the reasons abovesaid) are in no fear of ruine.

Conf. And yet within these five and twenty years, several Cities have been sack'd, and several Kingdoms subverted which example should teach others to reassume, and live according to the custom of our ancestors.

Fabr. 'Tis true as you say, yet if you observe what those Towns were which have suffered in that nature, you will find that they were no capital Cities, but subordinate, and depending

pending: so we see though *Tortona* was demolished, *Milan* was not, though *Capua* was destroyed, *Naples* was not: *Brescia* was sack'd, but *Venice* was not: *Ravenna* was pillaged, but *Rome* was not. These examples do not make him who governs recede from his designs, but makes him rather more refractory and obstinate, and pursue them with more vehemence, to recompence himself with taxes and new impositions. This it is that makes men unwilling to expose themselves to the trouble of military exercises, looking upon it partly as unnecessary, and partly as a thing which they do not understand. Those who are subjects, and ought to be affrighted with such examples of servitude, have not power to help themselves; and those who are Princes, having lost their dominion, are unable, as having neither time nor convenience: Whilst those who are able, either cannot, or will not; choosing rather to run along with fortune, without any disquiet, than to trouble themselves to be virtuous; for believing that all things are governed by fortune, they had rather follow her swing, than contend with her for mastery. And that you may believe what I have said to be really true, consider the Country of *Germany*, where, by reason of their several Principalities and States, their discipline is good, and depends upon the example of those people, who being jealous of their States and Seigneuries, maintain themselves in honour and grandeur, as fearing to fall into a servitude, out of which they could not so easily emerge.

This I suppose is sufficient to shew the reason of the vileness and depravity of our present discipline; I know not whether you may be of the same opinion, or whether my discourse may not have raised some scruple in your mind.

*Cosmo.* Not at all, I am rather perfectly satisfied, only I desire (returning to our first subject) to know of you how you would order your horse with these Battalions, in what numbers you would have them, how you would have them arm'd, and how officer'd.

## C H A P. IV.

*What number of horse are to be put into a Battalion, and what proportion is to be observed for their baggage.*

*Fabr.* YOU may think perhaps I forgot it, but do not wonder, for I shall speak of it but little for two reasons. One is, because the nerves and strength of an Army is the Infantry; the other is, because the horse are not so much debauched and degenerated as the foot; for the Cavalry is equal, if not better at this day than in ancient times. Yet I have said something before of the way how they are to be exercised, and as to the manner of arming them, I would arm them according to our present fashion, both light horse, and men at arms. But the light horse (if I might prescribe) should carry cross-bows, with some few harquebusses among them, which (though in other affairs of war they are but of little use) are here very necessary, to frighten the Country people, and force them from their passes, which perhaps they have undertaken to defend: for one harquebus will scare them more than an hundred other arms. But to come to their number, having undertaken to imitate the *Roman* Militia, I would take but 300 good horse for every Battalion, of which 150 should be men at arms, and 150 light horse; and I would appoint a Captain to each of these squadrons, 15 Corporals to each, and 2 Trumpet and Ensign. I would allow every ten men at arms five Carriages, and every ten light horse, two; which Carriages (as with the foot) should carry the Tents, Utensils, Hatchets, and other Instruments and Harnes. Think not that what I say would be any disorder, seeing their men at arms had each of them four horses in their equipage, which is a thing much corrupted; for now in *Germany* you shall see men at arms with but one horse, and themselves, and twenty of them are allowed but one Wagon to carry their necessities. The *Roman* horse were likewise alone, but the *Triarii* were lodg'd always by them, who were obliged to assist them in the looking to their horses, which may be easily imitated by us, as shall be shewn in the distribution of our lodgments: what there the *Romans* did of old, and what the *Germans* do at this day, we may do likewise, and we do very ill if we do not.

These horse being listed and called over, may be mustered sometimes with the Battalion, at a general Muster of all the Companies, and be appointed to make charges, and counterfeit skirmishes with them, rather to bring them acquainted, than for any thing else. What we have said already is sufficient for this part: let us now come to marshal our Army, and draw it up in a posture to fight, and with hopes of success, which is the great end of all kind of military discipline, in which men employ so much study and diligence.

# THE THIRD BOOK.

## CHAP. I.

### The Order observed by the Roman Legions when a Battel was presented.

*Cosimo.* Seeing we change our subject, I shall yield my place of expostulating to another man; for presumption being a thing which I condemn in other people, I would not be too much guilty of it my self, therefore I dismiss my self of that office, and will transfer it to which of our friends will vouchsafe to accept it.

*Zanobi.* It would have been very grateful to us all, had you pleased to have continued, but seeing 'tis not your pleasure, tell us at least which of us it is you will depute to succeed you.

*Cosimo.* I shall leave that to the election of Signor *Fabritio*.

*Fabr.* I am content to undertake it, and do desire that we may follow the Venetian custom, by which the youngest of the company has the liberty to speak first, and in this case not without reason; for this being the proper exercise of young men, I persuade my self young Gentlemen are the fittest to discourse of it, as being most ready to follow it.

*Cosimo.* 'Tis then your province *Luigi*, and as I do much please my self in my successor, so you may be as well satisfied with his interrogation. But that we lose no time, let us return to our business.

*Fabritio.* I am certain, that to demonstrate how well an Army is to be marshall'd and prepared for a Battel; it would be necessary to declare how the *Greeks* and *Romans* ordered The Troops in their Armies: but because these things are sufficiently obvious in History, I shall pass by several particulars, and address my self only to such as I think most useful for our imitation, and fittest to give perfection to the discipline of our times, which will be the occasion that at once I give you a prospect how an Army is to be ranged in order to a Battel; how they are to confront and charge one another in a real Engagement; and how they may be exercised in a counterfeit. The greatest disorders committed in the drawing up an Army for a Battel, is to give it only a front, because they leave them and their fortune to the success of one charge: and this error proceeds from nothing but from having lost the old way of closing their ranks, and thrusting one into another. Without that way there is no relieving of the front, no defending them, nor no supplying their places in the heat of their Engagement, which among the *Romans* was most accurately observed. To the end therefore that you may comprehend this way, I say, that the *Romans* divided each Legion into three Bodies.

The first were *Hastati*, the second *Principes*, the third *Triarii*. The *Hastati* were in the front of the Army, in thick and firm ranks. The *Principes* behind them, but their ranks not altogether so close: and after them the *Triarii* in so loose an order, that they could receive both *Principes* and *Hastati* into their body upon any distress. Besides these they had their Slingers, their Bow-men, and their *Velites*; not drawn up in this order, but placed at the head of the Army, betwixt the Cavalry and the Foot.

These light arm'd Souldiers began the Fight, and if they prevailed, (which was very seldom) they followed the Victory; if they were repulsed, they fell back by the flanks of the Army, or thorow certain spaces appointed on purpose, and retired among those who had no arms. When they were retir'd, the *Hastati* advanced against the enemy, and finding themselves overpowered, they retir'd softly to the *Principes*, and fell into their ranks, and together with them renewed the Fight; but if they also were too weak to sustain the fury

of the Battel, they retreated all into the spaces of the *Triarii*, and all together being consolidated into a firm mass, they made another effort more impetuous than before; if this miscarried, all was lost, for there was no farther reserves. The Horse were plac'd at the corners of the Army, like two wings to a body, and fought sometimes on Horseback, and sometimes on foot, as occasion was offered. This way of reinforcing three times, is almost impossible to be master'd, because fortune must fail you three times before you can be beaten, and the Enemy must be so valiant as to conquer you as often.

## C H A P. II.

*The form observed in their Battels by the Macedonian Phalanx.*

**T**he *Grecians* ordered not their Phalanx, as the *Romans* did their Legions, and thought they had many Officers among them, and several ranks, yet they made but one body, or rather one front. The way which they observed to relieve one another, was not to retire one rank into another, like the *Romans*, but to put one man into the place of another, which was done in this manner. Their Phalanx being reduced into Files (and let us suppose each File to consist of fifty men) being afterwards with the front towards the Enemy of all the Files, only the six first could charge, because their Launces (which they called *Sarisse*) were so long, that the six first rank charged with the point of his Lance throw the first rank: In the Fight therefore, if any of the first rank was either killed or disabled, he who was behind in the second rank supplied his place; and the vacancy in the second rank was filled up out of the third, and so successively, and on a sudden the ranks behind, supplied what was defective before; so as their ranks remained always entire, and no place left void but the last rank, which was not reinforced, because there was no body behind to supply them: So that the loss in the first rank, exhausted the latter, and yet it self was continued entire. So that these Phalanxes were sooner consumed and annihilated than broken, because the closeness and grossness of the body made them impenetrable. The *Romans* at first used these Phalanxes, and instructed their Legions in that way: Afterwards they grew weary of that order, and parted their Legions into several divisions, viz. into *Cohortes* and *Manipuli*, judging (as I said before) that body to be most vigorous and fullest of life, that consisted of most members, so constituted as that they could subsist and govern themselves.

## C H A P. III.

*How the Swisses ordered their Battalions.*

**Fab.** **T**he *Swisses* at present do use the same method with their Battalions, as the *Macedonians* did anciently with their Phalanxes, both enraging them entire and in gross, and in relieving one another. When they came to a Battel, they disposed their Squadrons one in the Flank of another, and not behind. They have not the way of receiving the first into the second upon a repulse; but to relieve one another; they observe this order; they put their Battalions one in the flank of another, but somewhat behind it, towards the right hand; so that if the first be in any distress, the second advances to relieve it: The third Battalion they place behind the other two, but at the distance of the shot of a Harquebus, that if the two Battalions should be worsted, the third might advance in their rescue, and that which advances, and the other which retire may have space to pass by one another without any clashing or collision; for gross bodies cannot be received so commodiously as little; and therefore small bodies, disposed at a distance (as they were in the *Roman* Legions) might better receive, and relieve one another upon occasion. And that this order of the *Swisses* is not so good as the ancient order of the *Romans*, is demonstrated by many examples of their Legions when they were engaged with the *Macedonian* Phalanxes; for these were still worsted by the other: The fashion of their Arms, and their way of Reserves being more effectual, than the closeness and solidity of a Phalanx.



## C H A P. IV.

*How the Author would make use of both Greek and Roman Arms for his Battalion; and what was the ordinary Army of the Romans.*

BEING therefore according to these Models to range and marshal an Army, I think it best to retain something of the Arms, and Orders both of the Phalanx and Legion. For this reason I have said in a Battalion I would have 2000 Pikes (which were the Arms of the *Macedonian Phalanx*) and 3000 *Scudi* or Shields and Swords, which are the Arms of the *Romans*. I have divided a Battalion into ten Battalions or Companies, as the *Romans* divided their Legions into ten *Cohorts*. I have ordered the *Velites* or light-arm'd to begin the fight, as they did formerly. And because as the Arms are mix'd, they participate of the one Nation and the other; that they may participate likewise in their orders, I have appointed that every Company may have five files of Pikes in the front, and the rest of Bucklers, that the front may be enabled to keep out the Horse, and break more easily into the Foot, having Pikes in the first charge as well as the Enemy, by which they may be fortified to sustain it bravely, till the Bucklers come up, and perfect the Victory. And if you consider the strength and vertue of this Order, you will find how all these Arms perform their office exactly. For Pikes are very useful against Horse, and against Foot too, before the Battels be joyned, but after they are joyned, they are utterly useless. For this reason, behind every third rank of Pikes, the *Swissers* put a rank of Halbards, which was to make room for their Pikes, though indeed it was not enough. Placing therefore our Pikes before, and our Bucklers behind them, they are enabled to sustain the Horse, and when they come to charge, they do open and press hard upon the Foot; but when the fight is begun, and the Battels are joyned, the Bucklers succeed with their Swords, as being manageable more easily in the crowd.

*Luigi.* We desire now to understand, how with these Arms and Orders you would manage your Army to give the Enemy Battel.

*Fabritio.* I shall show you nothing at present but this: You must know that in an ordinary Army of the *Romans* (which they called a Consular Army) there were no more but two Legions of Citizens, consisting in all of 600 Horse, and about 11000 Foot. They had besides these as many more Horse and Foot sent them in by their Friends and Confederates: These Auxiliaries were divided into two parts, the right wing, and the left; for they would never suffer them to exceed the number of the Foot of their Legions, though their Horse indeed they permitted to be more. With this Army consisting of 22000 Foot, and about 2000 Horse, a *Roman* Consul did all his business, and attempted any thing. Yet when they were to oppose a greater power, they joyned two Consuls together, and their two Armies. You must know likewise that in the three great Actions of an Army (their march, their encampment, and engagement) they placed the Legions in the middle, because the force in which they reposed their greatest confidence they thought fit should be more united and compact, as I shall show you more at large when I come to treat of those things.

These Auxiliary Foot by vertue of their conversation with the Legionary Foot, grew to be as Serviceable as they, because they were train'd and disciplin'd with them, and upon occasion of Battel, drawn up in the same figure and order. He therefore who knows how the *Romans* marshalled one single Legion in the day of Battel, knows how they disposed of them all: When I have told you therefore how they divided a Legion into three Squadrons, and how one Squadron received another; I shall have told you how a whole and entire Army is to be ordered, when it is to be drawn up for Battel.

## CHAP. V.

*The way of drawing up a Battalion, according to the intention of the Author.*

**B**Eing to prepare for a Battel according to the method of the *Romans*, as they had two Legions, so I would take two Battalions, and by the ordering of them, you may guess how to order a compleat Army: For to add more men, is only to multiply their ranks. I think it unnecessary to repeat what foot there are in a Legion, what Companies, what Officers, what Arms, what *Velites* in ordinary, what in extraordinary, what Pikes, and what other things. For it is not long since I told you distinctly, and press'd it upon your memories as a thing very necessary for the understanding all other Orders; wherefore I shall pass on without farther reflection.

It seems to me best that one of the ten Battalions, or Companies of a Battalion be placed in the left flank, and the other ten of the other Battalion on the right. Those on the left are to be ordered in this manner: Put five Battalia's (one on the side of the other) in the front, so as there may remain a space of four yards betwixt each, draw them up so as they may possess in breadth 140 yards of ground, and in depth forty: behind these five Battalia's, I would place three others, distant in a right line from the first about forty yards; of these three, I would have two follow directly the Companies which are upon the two extremities or corners of the five first, and the third should be disposed in the midst; by which means these three Companies should take up as much ground both in breadth and depth as the other five, which have only five yards distance betwixt the one and the other, whereas the three last should have thirty three. This being done, I would cause the two Companies remaining to advance, and place themselves behind the three former in a right line, and at the distance of forty yards; but it should be in such a fort, that each of these two Companies should be ranged directly behind the extremity of the three precedent Companies, and the space left betwixt them should be 91 yards: By these means all the Companies thus disposed should extend themselves in front 161 yards, and in depth 20. After this I would extend the Pikes extraordinary along the flanks of all the Companies on the left hand, at about twenty yards distance; and I would make of them 140 ranks of seven in a rank, so that they should secure all the left flank (in depth) of the ten Battalia's, drawn up as I said before; and I would reserve forty files of them to guard the Baggage, and the unarmed people in the rear, distributing their Corporals and other Officers in their respective places. The three Constables or Captains I would place one at the head of them, another in the midst, and a third in the rear, who should execute the Office of a *Tertius*, who was always placed in the rear of the Army. But to return to the front of the Army; I say, that after the Pikes extraordinary, I would place the *Velites* extraordinary (which are 500) and allow them a space of forty yards. By the side of these on the left hand I would place my men at Arms, with a space of 150 yards; after them I would advance my light Horse, at the same distance as I allowed to my men at Arms. As to the *Velites* in ordinary, I would leave them about their Battalia's, which should take up the space which I left betwixt each Company; unless I found it more expedient to put them under the Pikes extraordinary, which I would do or not do, as I found it more or less for my advantage. The Captain General of the Battalion should be placed in the space betwixt the first and second orders of Battalia's, or else at the head of them; or else in the space betwixt the last of the first five Battalia's, and the Pikes extraordinary, as I found it most convenient: he should have about him 30 or 40 select men, all brave and experienced, and such as understood how to execute their Commission with prudence, and how to receive and repel a charge; and I would have the Captain General in the midst of the Drums and the Colours.

This is the order in which I would dispose my Battalion on the left wing, which should contain half the Army, and take up in breadth 511 yards, and in depth as much as I have said before (without reckoning the space that was possessed by the Pikes extraordinary, which should be as a Shield to the people without Arms, and take up a space of about a hundred yards;) The other Battalion I would dispose on the right side, leaving betwixt the two Battalions a distance of about 30 yards, having order'd it as the other: At the head of that space I would place some pieces of Artillery, behind which should stand the Captain General of the whole Army, with the Drums, the Standard or chief Ensign, and two hundred choice men about him (most of them on foot) and amongst them ten or  
more

more fit to execute any command. The General himself should be so mounted, and so arm'd, that he might be on Horseback, and on foot as necessity required. As to the Artillery, ten pieces of Cannon would be enough for the taking of a Town. In the Field I would use them more for defence of my Camp, than for any Service in Battel. My smaller pieces should be of 10 or 15 pound carriage, and I would place them in the front of the whole Army, unless the Country was such that I could dispose them securely in the flank, where the Enemy could not come at them.

This form and manner of ranging an Army, and putting it in order, may do the same things in a Battel as was done either in the *Macedonian* Phalanx, or the Legion of the *Romans*; for the Pikes are in the front; and all the foot placed in their ranks; so that upon any charge or engagement with the Enemy, they are able not only to bear and sustain them, but (according to the custom of the Phalanx) to recruit and reinforce their first rank, out of those which are behind.

On the other side if they be over-power'd, and attack'd with such violence that they are forced to give ground, they may fall back into the intervals of the second Battalia behind them, and uniting with them, make up their body, and charge them briskly again: And if the second Battalia is not strong enough to relieve them, they may retire to the third, and fight all together in conjunction; so that by this order (as to the business of a Battel) we may supply and preserve our selves according to the *Grecian* and the *Roman* way both.

As to the strength of an Army, it cannot be ordered more strong, because the two wings are exactly well fortified with Officers and Arms; nor is there any thing weak but the rear, where the people which follow the Camp without Arms are disposed, and they are guarded with the *Pikes extraordinary*; so that the Enemy cannot assault them any where, but he will find them in very good order; neither is the rear in any great danger, because an Enemy can be hardly so strong as to assault you equally on all sides; if you found he was so strong, you would never take the Field against him. But if he was three times as many, and as well ordered as you, if he divides, and weakens himself to attack you in several places, beat him in one, and his whole enterprize is lost. As to the Enemies Cavalry, though they out-number you, you are safe enough; for the Pikes which encompass you, will defend you from any impression from them, though your own Horse be repulsed. The chief Officers are moreover plac'd in the flank, so as they may commodiously command, and as readily obey; and the spaces which are left betwixt one Battalia and the other, and betwixt one rank and another, serve not only to receive those who are distressed, but gives room for such persons as are sent forward and backward with orders from the Captain: Add as I told you at first, as the *Romans* had in their Army about 24000 men, I would have our Army consist of the same number; and as the Auxiliaries took their method of Fighting, and their manner of drawing up, from the Legions; so those Soldiers which you would joyn to your two Battalions, should take their form and discipline from them. These things would be very easie to imitate, should you have but one example, for by joyning either two other Battalions to your Army, or adding as many Auxiliaries, you are in no confusion, you have no more to do but to double your tanks, and whereas before you put ten Battalia's in the left wing, put twenty now; or else you may contract, or extend them as your place and Enemy will give leave.

*Luigi.* In earnest, Sir, I am so well possess'd of your Army, that I fancy I see it drawn up before my eyes, which gives me an ardent desire to see it engaged: I would not for any thing in the world that you should prove a *Fabius Maximus*, and endeavour no more than to avoid Fighting, and keep the Enemy in suspense; for I should blame you more, than the *Romans* did him.

## CHAP. VI.

### *The description of a Battel.*

*Fabr.* DO not question it, Hark, do not you hear the Artillery? Ours have fired already, but done little execution upon the Enemy; the *Velites* extraordinary, together with the light Horse advance to the charge in Troops, with the greatest shout and fury imaginable; The Enemies Artillery has fired once, and the shot passed over the head of our Foot, without any prejudice at all. That it might not have time for a second Volley, our *Velites*, and our Cavalry have marched up in great haste to possess it, and the Enemy

Enemy advancing in its defence, they are come so close, that neither the Artillery of one side or the other can do any mischief. See with what courage and bravery our Souldiers charge; with what discipline and dexterity they demean themselves; thanks to the exercise to which they have been used, and the confidence that they have in our Army: See our Battalions marching up, with their Drums beating, Colours flying, and men at Arms in their wings in great order to the charge: Observe our Artillery, which (to give place, and make room for our men) is drawn off by that ground which was left by the *Velites*: See how the General encourages his men, and assures them of Victory: See how our *Velites* and light Horse are extended and returned to the flanks of our Army, to see if there they can find any advantage to make an impression upon the Enemy; Now, now they are met, See with what firmness our Battalions have received the charge without the least noise or confusion: Observe the General how he commands his men at Arms to make good their ground; not to advance upon the Enemy; nor desert the Foot upon any occasion whatever. See our light Horse marching to charge a Body of the Enemies Harquebussiers that was firing upon our flank; and how the Enemies Horse come in to their rescue; so that being enclosed betwixt the Cavalry of one side and the other, they cannot fire, but are forced to retreat behind their Battalions: See with what fury our Pikes address themselves to the Fight, and our Foot advanced already so near, that the Pikes are become unserviceable; so that according to our Discipline the Pikes retire by little and little among the Shields: See in the mean time how a Body of the Enemies men at Arms, has disordered our men at Arms in the left wing; and how according to our Discipline, retiring under the protection of our *Pikes extraordinary*, by their assistance they have repulsed the pursuers, and killed most of them upon the place. See the Pikes in ordinary of the first Battalions, how they have sheltred themselves under the *Scudati*, and left them to make good the fight: See with what courage, with what security, with what leisure they put the Enemy to the Sword. Behold how they close their ranks in the Fight, and are come up so near they have scarce room left to manage their Swords. See with what fury the Enemy flies, because being armed only with Pike and with Sword, both of them are become unserviceable; one because of its length, the other because the Enemy is too well armed. See how they throw down their Arms, how they are wounded, killed or dispersed. See how they run in the right wing; see how they fly in the left. So now we are safe, and the Victory our own.

## CHAP. VII.

*The Authors reasons for the occurrences in the Battel.*

*Fabr.* **W**Hat do you think now, have we not got the Victory very fortunately; but we would have had it with more advantage, had I been permitted to have put all things in execution. You see there is no necessity of making use either of the second or third order; because our Van was sufficient to overcome the Enemy; so that I am enclined to speak no farther upon this Subject, unless it be to resolve any doubt that may arise in your mind.

*Luigi.* You have gain'd this Victory with so much courage and gallantry, that I fear my transport will not give me leave to explain my self, whether I have any scruple or not. Nevertheless presuming upon your quickness, I shall take the boldness to tell you what I think. First, therefore let me desire you to inform me, why you made use of your Artillery but once? why you caused them to be drawn off into your Army, and made no mention of them afterward? It seems to me that you placed the Enemies too high, and ordered them as you fancied; which might possibly be true; but if their Cannon should be so placed (as I do not question but many times they are) as that they should play among your Troops, I would fain understand what remedy you would prescribe; and since I have begun to speak of the Artillery, I shall propose all my scruples in this place, that I may have no occasion to mention them hereafter. I have heard many persons find fault with the Arms and orders of the ancients, as things of little or no use in our days, in respect of the fury of our Cannon; because they break all ranks, and pierce all Arms at such a rate; that it seems to them no less than madness to oppose any ranks or orders of men against them, and to tire your Souldiers with the carriage of Arms that will not be able to defend them.

*Fabritio:*

*Fabr.* Your demand consisting of many heads, requires a large answer. 'Tis true, I caused my Artillery to play but once, and I was in doubt whether they should do that; and the reason is, because it concerns a man more to keep himself from being hurt, than to mischief his Enemy. You must understand, that to provide against the fury of great Guns, it is necessary to keep where they cannot reach you, or to place your self behind some wall or bank that may shelter you, for there is nothing else that can secure you; and then you must be sure that either the one or the other are able to protect you. Those Generals who put themselves into a posture to give battel, cannot place their Armies behind a wall or a bank, or at a distance where the Enemies Cannon cannot reach them; and therefore seeing they have no way to defend themselves absolutely, the best course is to secure themselves as well as they can, and that is by possessing their Cannon with as much speed as is possible.

The way to possess themselves of it, is to march up to it suddenly, and in as wide an order as is convenient; suddenly, that they may fire but once; and wide, that the execution may be the less. This is not to be done by a band of Souldiers in order; for if they march any thing wide, they disorder themselves; and if they run on in a huddle, it will be no hard matter for the Enemy to break them. And therefore I ordered my Battel so, that it might do both the one and the other; for having placed 1000 of the *Velites* in the wings, I commanded that as soon as our Artillery had fired, they should advance with the light Horse, to seize upon their Cannon; for which reason our Artillery was shot off but once, and that the Enemy might not have time to charge the second time, and fire upon us again; for we could not take so much time our selves, but they would have had as much to do the same; wherefore the reason why I fired not my Cannon the second time, was, that if the Enemy fired once, they might not have leisure to fire any more. To render therefore the Enemies Artillery unserviceable, the best remedy is to attack it with all possible speed; for if the Enemy deserts it, 'tis your own; if he undertakes to defend it, he must advance before it, and then being betwixt it and us, they cannot fire but upon their own men. I should think these reasons sufficient without farther examples; yet having plenty of them from the ancients, I will afford you some of them. *Ventidius* being to fight the *Partians*, (whose strength consisted principally in their bows and arrows) was so subtil as to let them come up close to his Camp before he would draw out his Army, which he did, that he might charge them on a sudden, before they had leisure to shoot their arrows. *Caesar* tells us, that when he was in *France*, being to engage with the enemy, he was charged so briskly, and so suddenly by them, that his men had not time to deliver their darts according to the custom of the *Romans*. You see therefore that to frustrate a thing in the field which is to be discharged at a distance, and to prevent its doing you any hurt, there is no better way than to march up to it with all speed, and possess it if you can. Another reason moved me likewise to fire my Artillery no more, which may seem trivial to you; yet to me it is not so contemptible. There is nothing obstructs an Army, and puts it into greater confusion than to take away, or hinder their sight; for several great Armies have been broken and defeated by having their sight obstructed either with the dust or the Sun: now there is nothing that causes greater obscurity, or is a greater impediment to the fight, than the smoke of Artillery; and therefore I think it more wisdom to let the Enemy be blind by himself, than for you to be blind too, and endeavour to find him. These things considered, I would either not fire my Artillery at all, or else (because that perhaps would not be approved, in respect of the reputation which those great Guns have obtained in the World) I would place them in the wings of my Army, that when they fire, the smoke might not fly in the faces of my front, which is the flower and hopes of my Army. And to prove that to trouble the sight of an Enemy, is a thing of more than ordinary advantage; I need bring no more than the example of *Epaminondas*, who to blind the eyes of his Enemy, before he advanced to charge them, caused his light horse to gallop up and down before their front to raise the dust, and hinder their sight; which was done so effectually, that he got the Victory thereby. As to your opinion that I placed the Enemies Cannon, and directed their bullets as I pleased, causing them to pass over the heads of my Foot, I answer, that great Guns do without comparison oftner miss the Infantry, than hit them, because the Foot are so low, and the Artillery so hard to be pointed, that if they be placed never so little too high, they shoot over; and never so little too low, they graze, and never come near them. The inequality of the ground does likewise preserve the Foot very much; for every little hill or bank betwixt the Artillery and them, shelters them exceedingly. As to the Horse, especially the Men at arms, because their order is closer than the order of the light horse, and they are to keep firmer in a body, they are more obnoxious to the Cannon, and are therefore to be kept in the rear of the Army, till the Enemy has fired his

his Cannon. This is most certain; your small Field-pieces, and your small Shot does more execution than your great pieces, against which the best remedy is to come to handy-blows as soon as you can; and though in the first some men fell, (as be sure there always will); yet a good General and a good Army are not to consider a particular loss, so much as a General; but rather are to imitate the Switzers, who never refused a Battel for fear of great Guns, but punished them with capital punishment who for fear of them forsook their ranks, or gave any other sign or expression of fear. I caused my Artillery to be drawn off as soon as I had Fired them, that they might leave the Field clear for my Battalions to advance; and I made no mention of them afterwards, as being quite useless when the Armies were joyned. You have said likewise, that in respect of the violence and impetuosity of those Guns, many do judge the arms and the orders of the ancients to be altogether useless; and it seems by that, that the people of late have found out arms and orders which are sufficient to secure them; if you know any such thing, you will oblige me to impart it; for as yet I know none, nor can I believe that there is any to be found: So that I would know of them why the Infantry of our times do tarry Corlets of Iron upon their breasts, and the horse are arm'd *Cap & pied*; for seeing they condemn the ancient way of arming as useless in respect of the Artillery, they may as well condemn what is practis'd now-a-days. I would understand likewise why the *Switzers*, according to the custom of the ancients, make their Battalions to consist of six or eight thousand foot; and why other Nations have imitated them, seeing that order is expos'd to the same danger (upon account of the Artillery) as others are: I think it cannot easily be answered, yet if you should propose it to Soldiers of any judgment and experience, they would tell you first, that they go so arm'd, because though their arms will not defend them against great Guns, yet they will secure them against small Shot, and Pikes, and Swords, and Stones, and all such things. They would tell you likewise, that they keep that close order like the Switzers, that they may more easily engage the Enemies Foot, that they may better sustain their Horse, and put fairer to break them.

So that we see Soldiers are afraid of many things besides Artillery, against which they are to provide by their arms, and their orders: from whence it follows, that the better an Army is arm'd, and the closer and stronger it is drawn up, the safer it is. So that whoever is of that opinion, is indiscreet, or inconsiderate: for if we see that a small part of the arms of the ancients which is used at this day, (as the Pike) and a small part of their order (which are the Battalions of the Switzers,) have been so serviceable, and contributed such strength to our Armies, why may we not believe that the other Arms and orders which are laid aside, might have been as beneficial and useful? Again, had we no regard to the Artillery in placing our selves in that straight close order like the Switzers, what other orders could make us more fearful? No order certainly can make us more fearful of the Artillery, than that which keeps men firm and close together. Besides, if I be not frighted by the Artillery of the enemy when I encamp before a Town, where they can fire upon me with more security, because I cannot come at them by reason of the wall, nor hinder them, but by my own Cannon, which will be a business of time; if I be not afraid, (I say) where they can multiply their Shot upon me as they please, why should I fear them in the Field where I can run upon them, and possess them immediately? So that I conclude Artillery, in my opinion, is no sufficient impediment why we should not use the methods of our ancestors, and practise their virtue and courage. And had I not discours'd formerly with you about this subject, I should have enlarg'd more; but I shall refer my self to what I said then.

*Litt.* We have heard (or at least it is our own faults if we have not) what you have discours'd about the Artillery; and that the best course that can be taken against it, is to make our selves masters of it with as much expedition as we can, if our Army be in the Field, and drawing up ready to engage. Upon which I have one scruple, because to me it seems possible that the Enemy may place his Artillery in the flanks of his Army, so as that it might offend you more, and yet be more capable of being defended. You have made (if you remember) in the ranging of your Army for a Battel, a space of four yards from Company to Company, and another space of twenty yards from the Battalia's to the Pikes extraordinary: if the Enemy should draw up his Army in your own way, and place his Cannon in those intervals, I believe from those places they might gaul you exceedingly, and with great difficulty, because you could not enter into the Enemies body to possess them.

*Fabr.* Your scruple is rational, and I will endeavour to discuss it, or apply a remedy. I have told you that those Battalia's are in continual motion, either for a battel, or a march, and do naturally so straighten and close themselves, that if you make your intervals narrower where you place your Artillery, they will be closed up in a short time, so as they will

not be able to do any execution. If you make your distances large, to avoid one danger, you incur a greater, by giving the Enemy opportunity not only to possess himself of your Cannon, but to roll your whole Army. But you must understand it is impossible to keep your Artillery among your Squadrons; especially those which are upon Carriages, because being drawn one way, and their mouths lying the other, it is necessary to turn them before you can fire upon the Enemy, and to turn them takes up so much space, that fifty of those Carriages are enough to disorder a whole Army. So that it is necessary the Artillery be placed without their Squadrons; and being so, they may be attacked, as is said before. But let us suppose it might be placed within the Squadrons, and that a way might be found out of retaining it in the middle, and that it should not hinder the closing of their bodies, nor leave a way open to the Enemy. I say that even in that case the remedy is easie, and that is by making spaces and intervals in your Army for the bullets to pass; by which means the fury of their Artillery will become vain, and it will be no hard matter to do this; because the Enemy being desirous that it may be secure, will place it behind in the farthest part of the intervals, so that to prevent their shot from doing mischief among their own men; it is necessary that it pass always in a right line, so that by giving place on your side, it is easily avoided. For this is a general rule, we must give place to any thing that we are not able to resist; as the Ancients did to the Elephants, and forked Chariots. I believe, and am assured that you think I have ranged the Armies, and won the day; yet let me tell you, (if what I have told you already be insufficient) it would be impossible for an Army so armed and ordered, not to beat in the very first encounter any other Army that should be arm'd and ordered according to the method of our times; which many times affords but one front, without any bucklers, and so all arm'd, that they are not able to defend themselves against any Enemy that is near them.

And for their way of drawing up, they do it in such manner, that if they place their Battalions in the flank one of another, they make their Army too thin; if they place them behind one another, not having the way of receiving them into one another, they are all in confusion; and their ranks easily broken. And though they give three names to their Armies, and divide them into three Bodies, the Van-guard, Battail, and Rear-guard, yet they serve only upon a march, and for distinction of quarters; but in a Fight they are all at the mercy of fortune, and one small charge defeats the whole Army.

*Luigi.* I have observed by the description of the Battel, that your horse were repulsed by the Enemies Horse, and retired to your Pikes extraordinary, by whose assistance they not only sustained the enemy, but beat him back again. I believe as you say, the Pikes may keep off the Horse in a close and gross body like that of the *Swizzers*; but in your Army you have but five ranks of Pikes in the front, and seven in the flank, so that I cannot see how your Foot should be able to sustain them.

*Fabr.* Though I told you formerly that in the *Macedonian Phalanx* six ranks of Pikes could charge at one time, yet you must understand, that if a Battalion of *Swizzers* should consist of a thousand ranks, there could charge at once not above four or five at the most; because their Pikes being nine yards long, a yard and an half is taken up betwixt their hands; so that in the first ranks they have five seven yards and an half. In the second rank (besides what is taken up betwixt their hands) a yard and half is consumed betwixt one rank and the other, so as there remains but six yards that can be used. In the third rank for the same reasons there remains but four yards and an half; in the fourth, three yards; and in the fifth but one and an half. The other ranks therefore are not able to reach the Enemy, yet they serve to recruit the first ranks, as we have said before, and are as a rampart and bulwark to the other five. If then five of their ranks are sufficient to sustain the Enemies horse, why may not five of ours do as much, having other ranks behind to reinforce them, and give them the same support, though their Pikes be not so long? And if the ranks of extraordinary Pikes which are placed in the flanks should be thought too thin; they may be put into a square, and disposed in the flank by the two Battalions which I place in the last Squadron of the Army, from whence they may with ease relieve both the front or the rear, and give assistance to the horse as occasion requires.

*Luigi.* Would you always use this order when ever you were to give the Enemy Battel?

*Fabr.* No by no means; for the form of your Army is to be changed, according to the situation of the place, and the strength or number of the Enemy, as I shall shew by example before I finish my discourse. But this form or model is recommended to you not as the best, (though in effect it is so) but as a rule from whence you may take your other orders, and by which you may understand the other ways of drawing up an Army; for every Science has its Generalities upon which it is most commonly founded. Only one thing I would



would press upon you to remember, and that is, That you never draw your Army up so, as that your front cannot be relieved by your rear; for whoever is guilty of that error, renders the greatest part of his Army unserviceable, and can never overcome, if he meets with the least opposition and courage.

*Luigi.* I have a new scruple that is risen in my mind. I have observed that in the disposing of your Battalia's, you make your front of five Battalia's drawn up by the sides one of another; your middle of three, and your rear of two; and I should think it would have been better to have done quite contrary; because in my opinion an Army is broken with more difficulty, when the Enemy which charges it finds more firmness and resistance the further he enters it; whereas it seems to me, that according to your order, the farther he enters it, the weaker he finds it.

*Fabr.* If you remembered how the *Triarii* (which were the third order of the *Roman Legions*) consisted only of 600 men, you would be better satisfied, when you understood they were placed always in the rear: for you would see that I, according to that example, have placed two Battalia's in the rear, which consist of 900 men; so that I choose rather in my imitation of the *Romans* to erre in taking more men than fewer. And though this example might be sufficient to content you, yet I shall give you the reason, and it is this: The front of the Army is made thick and solid, because it is that which is to endure the first shock and insult of the Enemy; and being not to receive any recruits from elsewhere, it is convenient that it be well man'd, for a few would leave it too weak, and the ranks too thin. But the second Squadron, being to receive its friends into it, before it is to engage with the Enemy; it is necessary that it has two great intervals, and by consequence must consist of a less number than the first: For should it consist of a greater number, or be but equal to the first, either there must be no spaces or intervals at all, which would occasion disorder; or by leaving of spaces, they would exceed the proportion of the first Squadron, which would make your Army look very imperfect. As to what you say touching the impression of the Enemy, That the farther he enters your Army, the weaker he finds it, it is clearly a mistake; for the Enemy cannot engage the second body, before the first is fallen into it; so that he finds the middle Battalion rather stronger than weaker, being to fight both with the first and second together. And it is the same thing when the Enemy advances to the last Squadron; for there he has to encounter not only two fresh Battalia's, but with all the Battalions united and entire: And because this last Battalion is to receive more men, it is necessary the distances be greater, and by consequence that their number be less.

*Luigi.* I am very well satisfied with what you have said; but pray answer me this; If the five first Battalia's retire into the three Battalia's which are in the middle, and then those eight into the two Battalia's in the rear, I cannot conceive it possible that the eight Battalia's first, and afterwards the ten, can be comprehended (when eight or ten) in the same space as when they were but five.

*Fabr.* The first thing I answer is this, That the space is not the same; for the five Battalia's in the front were drawn up with four spaces in the middle, which were closed up when they fell in with the three Battalia's in the middle, or the two in the rear. Besides there remains the space betwixt the Battalions, and that also which is betwixt the Battalia's and the Pikes extraordinary; which space altogether, do give them room enough.

To this it may be added, That the Battalia's take up another place when they are drawn up in order before their retreat, than they do after they are pressed; for in their retreat, they either contract or extend their Orders. They open their orders, when they fly: they contract them when they retreat; so that in this case it would be best to contract. Besides the five ranks of Pikes in the Van, having received the first charge, are to fall back thorough the Battalia's into the rear of the Army, and give way to the *Scudavi* or Shields to advance; and those Pikes falling into the rear of the Army, may be ready for any Service in which their Captain shall think fit to employ them; whereas, did they not retire after the Battal was joyned, they would be altogether useless. And by this means the spaces which were left to that purpose, are made big enough to receive all forces that are remaining. And yet if those spaces were not sufficient, the flanks on both sides are men and not walls, which opening and enlarging their ranks, can make such distances as will be able to receive them.

*Luigi.* The ranks of Pikes extraordinary which you place in the flank of your Army, when the Battalia's in the front fall back into the Battalia's in the middle, would you have them stand firm, and continue, as two wings to the Army, or would you have them retire with the Battalia's? If you were willing they should, I do not see how it was possible, having no Battalia's (with intervals) behind them to give them reception.

*Fabr.* If when the Enemy forces the Battalia's to retire, he does not press them too hard, they may stand firm in their order, and flank the Enemy when the Battalia's in the front are retired. But if they be charged (as may be reasonably expected) and the Enemy be so strong as to force the other, they may retire with them, and that without difficulty, though there be no Battalia's behind with spaces to receive them; for the Body in the midst may double to the right, and thrust one File into another, as we shall show more at large when we speak of the manner of doubling of Files. 'Tis true, to double in a retreat you must take another way than what I have described, for I told you the second Rank was to enter into the first, the fourth into the third, and so on: But here in this case we must not begin in the Front, but in the Rear, to the end that by doubling our Ranks we may retreat, and not advance.

### CHAP. VIII.

#### *The Exercises of an Army in general.*

*Fabritio.* TO answer now to whatever may be objected against my Battel, as I have drawn it up before you, I must tell you again that I have ordered and engaged it in that manner for two reasons; one to show you how it is to be drawn up; the other to show you how it is to be exercised. As to the drawing up of an Army, I doubt not but you understand it very well; and as to the exercising, I must tell you, it ought to be done as often as is possible, that the Captains may learn to keep their Companies in these orders; for it belongs to every particular Souldier to keep the orders exact in every Battalia; and to every Captain to keep his Company exact with the order of the whole Army, and know how to obey the Command of the General. It is convenient likewise that they understand how to joyn one Battalia with another, how to take their place in a moment; and therefore it is convenient that the Colours of each Company may have its number of Soldiers described, in it; for the greater commodity of commanding them, and that the Captain and Soldiers may understand one another with the more ease; and as in the Battalia's, so it is convenient likewise in the Battalions, that their numbers should be known, and described in the Colonel's Ensign: That you should know the number of the Battalion in the left or right wing; as also of the Battalia's in the front, or the middle, and so consequently of the rest. It is convenient likewise that there be degrees of Offices and Commands to raise men as it were by steps, to the great honours of an Army. For example, The first degree should be File-leaders, or Corporals; The second should have the command of fifty ordinary *Velites*; The third of a hundred, with the title of *Censurion*: The fourth should command the first Battalia; the fifth, the second; the sixth, the third; and so on to the tenth *Battalia*, whose place should be next in honour to the Captain General of the *Battalion*, to which command no person should be advanced, but he who has passed all those degrees. And because besides these Officers, there are three *Constables* or Commanders of the Pikes extraordinary, and two of the *Velites* extraordinary, I did not much care if they were placed in the same quality with the Captain of the first *Battalia*, nor would it trouble me if six men more were preferred to the same degree, that each of them might put himself forward, and do some extraordinary thing to be preferred to the second *Battalia*. If then each of these Captains understands in what place his *Battalia* is to be ranged, it must necessarily follow, that at the first sound of the Trumpet (the Standard being erected) the whole Army will fall into its place. And this is the first exercise to which an Army is to be accustomed, that is to say, to close and fall in one with another, to do which, it is convenient to train them often, and use them to it every day.

*Luigi.* What mark and difference would you appoint for the Standard of the whole Army, besides the number described as aforesaid?

*Fabritio.* The Lieutenant General's Ensign should have the Arms of his General or Prince; and all the rest should have the same Arms with some variation in the Field or Colours, as the Prince shall think best, for it imports not much what their Colours are, so they distinguish one Company from another. But let us pass to the other exercise, in which an Army is to be train'd; that is in its motions, to be taught how to march, advance, or fall back with exact distance and time, and to be sure that in their marches a just order be observed. The third exercise is, Teaching them to manage their Arms, and charge, in such a manner, as that afterwards they may do both dexterously when they come to fight; teaching them how to play their Artillery, and how to draw them off when there

is occasion ; Teaching the *Velites* extraordinary to advance out of their places, and after a counterfeit charge, to retreat to them again. Teaching the first *Battalions* (as if they were over-powered) to fall back into the intervals of the second ; and all of them afterwards into the third, and having done so, to divide again, and return to their old posts ; in short, they are so to be accustomed in this exercise, that every thing may be known and familiar to every Soldier, which with continual practice is easily obtained. The fourth exercise instructs your Soldiers in the usefulness of the Drums, and Trumpets, and Colours, informing them of the Commands of their Captain, by the beating of the one, the sounding of the other, and the displaying and flourishing of the third : for being well used to them, they will understand what they are to do by them, as well as if they were directed by word of mouth : And because the effects of these Commands depend altogether upon these kind of sounds, I shall tell you what kind of Instruments the Ancients made use of in their Wars. The *Lacedemonians* (if we may believe *Thucydides*) in their Armies made use of the Flute, conceiving that Harmony more apt to infuse gravity than fury into their Soldiers. Induced by the same reason, the *Carthaginians* sounded their charges upon the Harp ; with which Instrument they began the Fight. *Alatte* King of *Lydia*, in his Wars made use of them both : But *Alexander* the Great, and the *Romans* used Horns and Trumpets, supposing the clangor and noise of those Instruments would enflame the courage of their men, and make them more valiant in Fight. But as in the arming of our Army, we have followed the way both of the *Greek* and the *Roman* ; so in the choice of our Instruments of Intelligence, I would follow the Customs both of the one Nation and the other. I would have therefore the Trumpets placed by the Lieutenant-General as Instruments not only proper to excite and enflame your Army, but fitter to be heard, and by consequence apter to derive your Commands than any of the other. The rest of those kind of Instruments I would have placed about the Captains and Colonels of the Battalions : I would have also a smaller sort of Drums and Flutes, which should be beaten and played upon not as we do now in our fights, but as our *Tabours* and *Flagelets* do in our Feasts : The General with his Trumpets should signify when his Army is to make a stand, when to advance, when to wheel, when to retire, when to make use of the Artillery, when the *Velites* extraordinary are to move, and by the variation of the sounds, to direct his Army in all the Marches and Counter-marches that are generally used ; and I would have the Trumpets followed afterwards by the Drums. And because this exercise is of great consequence in an Army, it imports very much that it be frequently taught. As to the Horse, they should have Trumpets too, but of a lesser and different sound from those about the Lieutenant-General. And this is all that has occurred to my memory in the ordering, and exercising of an Army.

*Luigi*. I beseech you Sir, let me not trouble you too much, if I desire to be satisfied in one thing more ; and that is, for what reason you caused your light Horse and *Velites* extraordinary to advance against the Enemy with great shouts and clamours, and cries ; and when afterwards the Body and remainder of the Army came to charge, they did it with extraordinary silence ? I confess I cannot comprehend the reason, and therefore I beg your explanation.

*Fabr*. The opinions of the Ancient Generals have been different in that point, whether an Enemy was to be charged silently and without noise, or with all the clamour could be made : The silent way is best to keep your men firm in their orders, and to signify the Commands of the General : but the obstreperous way is best to excite the courage of your Soldiers, and dismay the Enemy : and because I thought in both cases there was something of advantage, I made use of them both, and caused those to advance with clamour, and these with silence ; for I cannot think that an universal and perpetual noise can be any advantage, because it hinders orders from being derived, which is a most pernicious thing : nor is it likely that the *Romans* used those shouts after the first shock, for History tells us, that many times by the exhortation and encouragement of their Officers, the Soldiers which were flying, were stopped, and rallied, and disposed immediately into new Orders, which could not be, where the Officers could not have been heard.

# THE FOURTH BOOK.

## CHAP. I.

*The considerations and subtleties to be used in the drawing up  
an Army to fight.*

*Luigi.* **S**eeing the Victory has been so honourably obtained under my Conduct, I think it discretion to tempt fortune no farther, knowing how much she is variable, and inconstant. Wherefore my desire is to resign my Authority, and that *Zanobi* may take it upon him according to the Order proposed of transferring it to the youngest: and I know he will not refuse that honour, (or rather trouble) both in complacency to me, and as being naturally the more courageous of the two; for he fears not to engage in these kind of conflicts, though there be as much likelihood of his miscarriage as conquest.

*Zanobi.* I shall refuse no Office into which you shall put me, though I must needs say, I could more willingly have been an auditor; for your scruples and demands have hitherto given me more satisfaction, than any thing I could have objected my self. But I think, *Seigneur Fabritio*, it would be better if you proceed (provided your patients will serve, and that we do not tire you with our Ceremonies.)

*Fabritio.* You rather oblige me Sir, for this variety of Interrogators, gives me to understand the vanity of your judgments and appetites. But is there any thing behind that you would have added to what has been spoken before?

*Zanobi.* There are two things of which I would willingly be satisfied before we pass any farther. One is, whether you have any other way of drawing up an Army: The other is, what reflections or considerations a General is to have, before he comes to a Batel; and when any accident intervenes, how it is to be avoided.

*Fabr.* I shall endeavour to satisfy you, but not by answering distinctly to your demands; for whilst I answer to one, it happens many times that I seem to answer to the other; I have told you how I would have my Army drawn up, that according to that model, any other figure may be taken, as the number of the Enemy, and the nature of your ground does require; for in that case, one is to act according to the condition both of the one and the other.

But take notice of this, That there is no way more dangerous, than to extend the front of your Army too much, unless it be very numerous and strong: Otherwise you are to draw it up close and thick, rather than wide and thin. For when your Forces are few in respect of the Enemy, you must look out for other remedies: as by drawing your Army up, so as it may be fortified by some River, or Fen, that may secure you behind; or fortified in the flanks by some Ditch or Entrenchment, as *Cæsar's* was in *France*; and this ought to be a general rule to you, that you extend or contract your front according both to your own number, and the number of your Enemy. If the Enemy be not so numerous, and your men as well disciplin'd as they, you are to make choice of an open place, where you may not only encompass the Enemy, but defend your own ranks: For in streight and narrow places, not being able to make use of your orders, you cannot make use of your advantage. For this reason the *Romans* did most commonly make choice of open and clear places, and avoided such as were difficult and close. But if your Army be small, or your men inexperienced, you must do quite contrary (as I said before) and must find out some place where your few men may defend themselves, or where their inexperience may do you no hurt: In that case you are to choose some hill or eminence from whence you may come down upon the Enemy with more force; yet must you have this caution not to draw up your Army upon any Strand or Sea-coast, nor under the command of any Hill,

of which the Enemy may possess himself, because you will be exposed thereby to the Enemies Cannon without remedy, and be unable to do them mischief with any convenience. In the drawing up an Army for Battel, great regard is likewise to be had to the Sun and the Wind, that neither the one nor the other be in your face, for they are great impediments to your sight, one with its beams, and the other by raising the dust, and carrying the powder into your eyes; besides, the wind being contrary, is a great disadvantage in rendering the blows which they give the Enemy more languid and weak; and as to the Sun, you must not only take care that it be not in your face, nor does you no prejudice in the beginning of the Fight, but that it does you no injury when it gets up, wherefore the best way is when you draw up your men, to have it if possible on their backs, that many hours may pass before it can come about into their faces.

*Hanibal* knew this advantage very well, and made use of it in the Battel of *Cannae*, and *Marius* did the same against the *Cimbrians*. If you be weaker in Horse, it is your best way to draw up among the Vines or the Woods, and such other impediments, as in our times the *Spaniards* did when they beat the *French* in the Kingdom of *Naples* near *Grignuolo*. And it has been many times seen that the same Soldiers which have been worsted and baffled before, by only changing their order, and shifting their ground, have recovered the Victory; Thus it was with the *Carthaginians*, who having been many times worsted by *Marcus Regulus*, were afterwards Victorious by the Conduct of *Kantippus* the *Lacedaemonian*, who caused them to come down into the plain, where they might have room for their Horse, and their Elephants, and by so doing they were too hard for the *Romans*.

According to the practice of the Ancients, I have observed, That all great Generals when they have known which quarter of the Enemy was the strongest, and where they have fortified most; they have not opposed the strongest part of their Army against it; but have chose rather to confront it with the weakest of their divisions, and with their strongest attack the weakest of the Enemies. When afterwards they came to engage, they commanded the strongest of their Squadrons that they should not only stand firm, and receive the charge without making any advance, whilst the weaker parts had orders to suffer themselves to be overcome, and by giving ground gradually, to fall behind the rear of the Army. The Artifice procures two great disorders to the Enemy. The first is, that the strongest part of his Army is environ'd insensibly; the other is, that imagining their Victory certain by the retreat of their Enemy, they fall frequently into disorder, which many times robs them of that Victory of which they thought themselves so certain. *Cornelius Scipio* being in *Spain* against the *Carthaginians*, under the command of *Asdrubal*; and knowing that *Asdrubal* understood very well that in the drawing up his Army, he put the *Roman* Legions (which were the strength and flower of his Army) in the midst, and that *Asdrubal* in probability would do the like. When they came afterwards to Fight, he changed his order, put his Legions in the Wings, and his light arm'd men in the Body; When the Battel was joyned, he commanded his Body to slacken their march on a sudden, and the Wings to double their pace; so that only the Wings on both sides engaged, and the Bodies on both sides being at a distance one from the other, came not up to one another, and the strongest part of *Scipio's* Army, fighting better than the weakest of *Asdrubal's*, he overcame them. In those days that stratagem was well enough; but in our days by reason of our Artillery, it is unpracticable; for the pace which would be left betwixt the two Bodies would give opportunity to the Artillery to play, which as we said before, would be very dangerous. So then that way is to be laid aside, and the way which I recommended before is to be used, which is to charge with your whole Army, and let your weakest Squadrons retire. When a General finds his Army stronger than his Enemies, if he would encompass it insensibly, and that the Enemy may not prevent him, let him draw up his Army to an equal front with the Adversary; afterwards in the heat of the Fight let him order by little and little to retire in the front, and let the Wings advance as gradually, and it will always happen that the Enemy shall be encompassed before he is aware.

When a General would fight, and be sure not to be routed, let him draw up his Army near some place of retreat or security, as either Fens, Mountains, or some strong inexpugnable Town; for in that case he may pursue the Enemy, but the Enemy cannot pursue him. *Hanibal* made use of this cunning when his fortune began to decline, and he began to apprehend the Conduct of *Marcellus*. Some Generals to disturb the orders of the Enemy, have commanded their light armed men to begin the Battel, and when it is once joyned, to retire among the ranks. When afterwards it grows hotter, and both sides are thorowly engaged, they have had orders to draw forth out of the flanks of the Army, and having flanked the Enemy unexpectedly, they have disordered and broke him. If any

one finds himself weaker in Horse, besides the ways proposed before, he may place a Battalion of Pikes behind them, and draw them up in such manner, that in the heat of the Battle they may open, and give way for the Pikes to pass thorow them, and by so doing, he shall be sure to prevail. Several have accustomed their lightarmed men to fight among their Horse, and they have been found to give the Horse very good assistance.

Of all those who are famous for drawing up Battels, *Hannibal* and *Scipio* are the most renowned for the great skill that both of them expressed in their conflict in *Africa*; but because *Hannibal's* Army was composed of *Carthaginians*, and Auxiliaries of several Nations, he placed 80 Elephants in his front; behind them he placed his Auxiliaries, next then his *Carthaginians*, and last of all his *Italians*, in whom he could not safely confide; and the reason why he ordered them so, was because the Auxiliaries having the Enemy in their faces, and finding themselves closed up with *Carthaginians* at their backs, should not think of flying, but being under a necessity to fight, he did hope they might either overcome, or so harass the Enemy, that when he came up with his fresh men, he might the more easily overthrow them. Against this order *Scipio* placed his *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii* in his accustomed manner, so as upon occasion they might be received one into the other.

The front of his Army he made up with great spaces, but that it might appear close and united to the Enemy, he filled them up with his *Velites*, with order that as soon as the Elephants come upon them, they should retire, and entering among the Legions by the ordinary spaces, leave a way open for the Elephants to pass, by which means the fury and execution of the Elephants being evaded, they came presently to handy-blows, and the *Carthaginians* were overcome.

*Zenobi*. In your description of this Fight, you have caused me to remember how *Scipio* in the Engagement caused not his *Hastati* to retire into the ranks of the *Principes*, but divided them, and caused them to retire into the Wings of the Army to give place to the *Principes* when they were to advance against the Enemy: I would know therefore for what reason he differed from the ordinary custom.

*Fabritio*. I will tell you: *Hannibal* had placed the strength of his Army in the second division; so that *Scipio* to oppose them with equal courage, united the *Principes* and the *Triarii* together, inasmuch as the intervals of the *Principes* being filled up by the *Triarii*, there was no space left for the reception of the *Hastati*; wherefore he caused the *Hastati* to open to the right and left, and fall in with the Wings of the Army. But you must observe that this way of dividing the first Squadron, is not to be used but when the other is Superior; for then you may do it conveniently, as *Scipio* did; but being inferior or under any repulse, it is not to be done without manifest danger, and therefore it is necessary that you have spaces behind in your other Squadrons that may be ready to receive you.

But to return to our discourse. The ancient *Asians* among other contrivances to mischief their Enemy, made use of certain Chariots with Sythes fastned to the Sides of them, which served not only to open the Squadrons of the Enemy with their forces, but to cut and kill them with their Sythes. Against these Chariots, they had three ways to defend themselves; either by the closeness of their ranks, or by receiving them into their ranks (as they did the Elephants) or by some other vigorous resistance, as *Silla* the Roman did against *Arbelans*, who had some of these Chariots; to repel them *Silla* caused several stakes to be pitched into the ground before his first Squadron, which putting a stop to the career of the said Chariots, prevented the execution which they would otherwise have done. And it is observable the new method that *Silla* used in ranging his Army; for placing his *Velites* and light Horse behind; and all his compleat armed Soldiers before, he left intervals sufficient to receive them which were behind when they had occasion to march up; so that the Fight being begun, by the assistance of the Horse (who had room to pass thorow the first Squadron to the charge) he obtained the Victory.

## C H A P. II.

*The Arts which are to be used during the Fight.*

*Fabr.* **T**O disturb the Army of the enemy when the Battel is joyned, it is necessary to invent some way or other to affright them, either by spreading a report of supplies that are hard by, or counterfeiting some representation of them that may dismay the enemy, and facilitate their defeat.

*Minutius Ruffus*, and *Acilius Glabrio* two of the Roman Consuls were skilful in this art. *Caius Sulpitius* caused all the boys and refuse of his Army to mount upon mules and other beasts that were unserviceable in fight, and placed them at a distance upon a hill, and drawn up in such order that they appeared like a compleat body of horse; when he was engaged with the French, and the enemies apprehension of that body got *Sulpitius* the Victory. *Marius* made use of the same stratagem when he fought against the *Germans*: if then these false alarms and representations are of such use and advantage in time of Battel, true ones must needs be more efficacious, especially if they fall upon the enemies flank or rear whilst the battel is joyned: which indeed is not easy to be done, unless the nature of the Country contributes; for if it be open and plain, you cannot conceal any part of your Forces, as is necessary to be done in those cases; but in woody or mountainous Countries you may conceal some of your Troops in such manner as they may fall suddenly and unexpectedly upon the enemy, which will give you a certain Victory. It is many times of great importance to spread a rumour abroad during the Fight, that the enemies General is slain, or that he is beaten in another part of the Army, which (as the other) has many times been the cause of a Victory. The enemies horse are often disordered by the representation of strange figures, or the making of some unusual noise, as *Cresus* did, who opposed camels against horse; and *Pyrrhus* when he confronted their Cavalry with his Elephants; the strangeness of which sight affrighted them so, that nothing was strong enough to keep them from disorder. In our days the Turk defeated the *Sophs* of *Persia*, and the *Soldans* of *Syria* only with the noise of his Guns, which being unusual to their horse, disordered them in such manner, that the Turk got the Victory without any great trouble. The Spaniards to distract the Army of *Amilcar*, placed in the front of their Army certain Chariots filled with flax, and drawn by oxen, to which flax (when the enemy came up to charge) they put fire, and the oxen running from the fire, rush'd furiously into the Army of *Amilcar*, and put it to the rout. It is an unusual practice (as we have said before) to surprize and disturb the enemy with ambuscades where the Country is convenient: but where it is open and large, many have made great holes in the ground, and covered them with straw and earth lightly, leaving certain spaces solid and firm for their own retreat; over which having retired cunningly in the heat of the fight, the enemy pursuing, has fallen in, and been ruined. If during the fight any ill accident happens that may discourage your Souldiers, 'tis prudence to dissemble it, and turn it to advantage, as *Tullus Hostilius* did, and *Lucius Sylla* who observing in the heat of the Battel a party of his Troops go over to the enemy, to the great disheartening of the rest, caused it to be published quite thorow his Army that it was done by his order, which not only dispelled the apprehension that was among them, but encouraged them in such manner that it got him the Victory. *Sylla* having commanded out a party upon some enterprize, and all of them being killed in fight of his Army, that the rest might not be terrified, told them he sent them on purpose, because he had found them unfaithful. *Sertorius* fighting a battel in *Spain*, slew one of his own men, who brought him news that one of his great Officers was killed, and the reason was, lest telling it to the rest, it might possibly have discouraged them. It is no easy matter to detain an Army, (if it be once tottering and inclining to run) and to bring it to fight again: but you must consider it with this distinction, either it is wholly disordered, and then it is impossible to recover it; or else it is disordered but in part, and there is some remedy. Many of the Roman Generals have stop'd the flight of their Armies, by putting themselves at the head of them, and as it were upbraiding them by their cowardize. *Lucius Sylla* seeing part of his Troops routed, and pursued by the forces of *Mithridates*, rode up to the head of them with his sword in his hand, and cryed out to them, *If any body ask you where you have left your General, tell him you left him fighting in Boetia.* *Attilian* the Consul opposed those who fought bravely against those who ran away; telling them that if they did not face about, they should be killed by their friends as well as their enemies. *Philip King of Macedon* understanding that his Souldiers were afraid of the *Scythians*, placed be-



hind his Army certain of the faithfulest of his horse, with commission to kill any man that fled; so that his men choosing to die rather fighting than flying, overcame their adversaries. Several of the Roman Generals have wrested an Ensign out of the hands of their Souldiers, and throwing it among the enemy, promised a reward to him who should recover it; and this they did not so much to hinder the flight of their own men, as to give them occasion of doing some greater exploit upon the enemy.

### CHAP. III.

#### *Stratagems after the Fight.*

*Fabr.* I Do not think it impertinent to add to this discourse such things as happen after the Fight, especially seeing they are but short, and not to be omitted because they are conformable to the matter which we have in hand. But since one of these two things must happen, either that we gain the Victory, or lose it; I say, that when we gain it, we are to pursue it with the greatest diligence we can, and rather imitate *Cæsar* in this case than *Hanibal*, who for not following his Victory, and pushing it on after he had defeated the *Romans* at *Cannas*, lost the whole Empire of the *Romans*, which fortune had almost thrust into his hands. *Cæsar* on the other side never rested after a Victory, but followed the enemy with greater fury than he attacked them at first. But when the day is lost, a wise General is to consider the best that he can make of it, especially if there be any thing of his Army remaining.

The advantage that may arise, is from the inadvertency of the enemy, who many times transported with his success, grows negligent and remiss, and gives opportunity to the enemy to revenge himself, as *Martius* the Roman did upon the Carthaginian Army, who having slain the two *Scipio's*, and routed their forces, not valuing those which remained, were suddenly assaulted and broken; for it is frequently seen, nothing is perpetrate so easily, as what the enemy fancies you can never attempt; for commonly men suffer most, where they are most secure. A General therefore, when he cannot carry the Victory, is to endeavour with all possible industry that his loss may be as little as may be; and to do this, it is necessary to order things so that the enemy may not easily pursue, or be in a capacity to retard you.

As to the way of hindering the pursuit of the Conqueror; several Generals, as soon as they found their condition, and that it was not possible to continue the Fight, have ordered their inferior Commanders to separate, and fly in several parties, and meet again at a place which he assigned; and the enemy not daring to divide his Army for fear of a design, has let all, or the greatest part of the conquered escape. Others have thrown the best of their goods in the way, that the enemy following might be delayed by the prize, and suffer them to get off. *Titus Dimius* used no small art to conceal the loss which he had sustained in the fight; for having endured the burnt of the Battel from morning till night with the loss of many of his men; when night came, he caused most of them to be buried privately: the next morning the enemy finding so many of their own men dead, and so few of the *Romans*, concluded themselves beaten, and fled. And now I suppose (though confusedly) I have in some measure satisfied your demands.

### CHAP. IV.

#### *Two other ways of ranging an Army to fight.*

*Fabr.* **I**s true, as to the form and model of drawing up an Army to fight, it remains that I let you know that sometimes some Generals have drawn them up in the figure of a wedge pointing in the front, supposing it the proper way to pierce, and make an impression upon the enemy. In opposition to this, the way was for the adversary to draw up in the figure of a pair of shears, which being opened, were to receive the point of the wedge, enclose it, and charge it on all sides. And about this, let me recommend to you this General rule, that the best remedy to be used against the design of an enemy, is to do that bravely of your self, to which you perceive he would endeavour to force you: for doing it voluntarily you do it orderly, and to your own profit and advantage; whereas if

if you do it by constraint, you do it to your ruine. I will not repeat any thing that I have said before, to confirm my discourse. But this is most certain, if your adversary thinks to open, and as it were cleave your Army with his wedge, if you keep your Army open in the figure of the shears, and receive them in the middle, you cut them to pieces, and they can do you no hurt.

*Hanibal* placed his Elephants in the front of his Army, thinking thereby to have pierced the Army of *Scipio* with more ease; but *Scipio* ranging his men in the form of a pair of shears, and receiving him in an open posture, gain'd the Victory, and *Hanibal* was lost.

*Adrubal* placed the best and strongest of his men in the front of his Army to make the better charge upon the Enemy; *Scipio* commanding his middle men in the front to retreat insensibly, and give place, was so cunningly obeyed, that the Enemy was drawn in, and defeated: so that you see those designs are many times the occasion of his Victory against whom they are designed.

## C H A P. V.

## Of the constraint and advantage a man may have to Fight.

*Fabr.* IF my memory does not fail, it remains yet that I say something touching the things which a wise General is to consider before he comes to an engagement. And the first thing I shall say upon this subject is, that a General is never to come to a Field-fight unless he be constrained, or has some more than ordinary advantage. His advantage may lye in the nature of the Place, in the discipline of his Army, or the number or excellence of his Men. And his necessity consists in finding his condition such, that without fighting he must be certainly destroyed: as where money is wanting, where victuals are defective, and where the Enemy is in expectation of supplies: in these cases a General is always to venture, though he fights upon disadvantage; for 'tis better fighting where fortune may favour you, than not to try her at all, and be certainly ruined; and in this case it would be as great a fault in a General not to fight, as it would be if he had an opportunity of defeating his adversary, and was either too ignorant to know it, or too cowardly or delatory to make use of it. The advantages which occur in the conduct of war do many times proceed from the Enemy, and sometimes from your prudence. Many have been surprized and routed in their passage over Rivers, by the dexterity of the Enemy, who having forborn them till half of them were over, have fallen suddenly upon them, and put them to the rout, as *Cæsar* served the *Swizzer*, when he cut off a fourth part of their Army, by reason that they were separated by a River. Sometimes it happens that your Enemy is tired, and weary, having followed you with too much haste and inconsideration; and in that case finding your own Army vigorous and strong, you are not to lose your opportunity. Besides, if your Enemy presents you Battel in the morning betimes, you are not immediately to draw out your Army and fight him, but are rather to protract and spin out the time for some hours, (still offering and pretending to come forth) that their impatience of delay, or standing so long to their Arms, may rebate the fury with which they came; and as soon as you find them cool, and off of their first ardor, then you may come forth, and charge them as smartly as you can. *Scipio* and *Merellus* made use of this way in *Spain*; the one against *Adrubal*; the other against *Sertorius*. If the Enemy has lessened his power by dividing his Army, (as *Scipio* did in *Spain*) or by any other occasion, then also a good General may try his fortune with credit.

The greatest part of the gravest Generals have chosen rather to receive than give the charge, because the fury of an Enemy is easily sustained by those who stand firm and close in their station; and being once check'd, it turns into cowardize. *Fabius* being sent against the *Samites* and the *Gauls*, received their fury with that indiscomposedness and tranquillity, that he conquered them both, but *Decius* his Colleague not following his example, miscarried, and was slain. Some who have been possessed too much of the courage of their Enemy, have chose to begin the Fight in the Evening towards night, that their Army being worsted, might get off, or defend themselves by the benefit of the darkness. Others understanding the superstition of the Enemy, and that on certain days they devote themselves wholly to Religion, and will not endeavour to fight, have chosen that time to attack them, and have carried the Victory. *Cæsar* made use of this way against *Ariovistus* in *France*; and *Vespasian* did the same in *Syria* against the *Jews*, who upon their Sabbath would not so much as defend themselves against the *Romans*.

## C H A P. VI.

*Directions for a General.*

*Fabius*. There is nothing of more importance to the General of an Army, than to have about him persons that are faithful, experienced in war, and prudent in Counsel, with whom he may constantly advise, and confer both about his own Men, and the Enemy; as which is the most numerous, which the best arm'd, which the best mounted, which the best exercised, which the most patient of labour and distress, and whether the Horse or the Foot are to be relied upon most.

The next thing to be considered is the place where he is, whether it be more advantageous for the Enemy than for him; which is most easily supplied with provisions; whether it be best to fight presently, or protract; and what he may gain or suffer thereby: for many times the Souldiers disgusted at the tediousness of the war, grow lazy and remiss, and coming at length to be weary, they either grow mutinous, or run away. But above all things, I would advise a General to inform himself of the nature and qualification of his adversary the Enemies General, whether he be rash, or wary, and what counsel he has about him. The next thing he is to consider, is, whether he can confide in his Auxiliaries or not: and be sure never to bring his Army to a Battel, if he finds them under any apprehension, or with the least distrust of the Victory; for the greatest sign of miscarriage, is despair, and when they think it impossible to prevail. In this case therefore you are to avoid fighting either by following the example of *Fabius Maximus*, (who encamped his Army in places of such advantage, that *Hannibal* durst not attack him) or else if you suspect the Enemy will venture upon you in your entrenchments, and that you shall not be able to defend them, your best way will be to remove, divide your Army, and dispose them in parties into several Towns, that the tediousness of a siege, and length of time, which will be required, may discourage the Enemy.

*Zanubi*. Is there no other way of avoiding a Battel, but to divide your Troops, and to dispose them into several Towns?

## C H A P. VII.

*Which way a Battel is to be avoided, though pressed never so earnestly by the Enemy.*

*Fabius*. If I be not mistaken I have discoursed to some of you before, how he that is in the field cannot avoid fighting when pressed by an Enemy who will fight upon any terms; and that the best way he can take, is to keep himself at fifty miles distance, that he may have time to remove when he hears of his advance. *Fabius Maximus* did not refuse fighting with *Hannibal*, but would fight at his own time, and advantage; and *Hannibal* was too wise to attack him, where he was sure he could do no good; for had he believed he could have conquered him, *Fabius* would have been constrained to have fought him, or fled. *Philip* King of *Macedon*, Father of *Perseus*, being at war with the *Romans*, posted his Army upon an high mountain, that he might not be compelled to fight; but the *Romans* assaulted, and defeated him. *Cingetorix* General of the *Gauls* to avoid fighting with *Cæsar* who had passed a river contrary to his expectation, quitted the Country, and march'd away with his Army. The *Venetians* in our times, if they had had no mind to have fought the *French* King, they should not have staid till his Army had passed the *Adda*, but have removed farther off, as *Cingetorix* did before them; but they staid so long that they had time neither to draw up handsomely to fight, nor to make their retreat; for the *French* were so near before the *Venetians* dislodged, that the *French* fell upon them, and put them to the rout. So then by what I have said, it is manifest that a Battel cannot be avoided, when the Enemy presses it upon any disadvantage; and let not any body tell me of *Fabius*, for *Hannibal* refused to fight in that case as much as he.

## CHAP. VIII.

*How Souldiers are to be encouraged to fight; and how they are to be cooled and asswaged when their courage is too high.*

*Fabr.* IT many times happens that your Souldiers are impatient to be fighting, but if you do not find it convenient in respect of the number of your Army, the disadvantage of the place, or some other consideration, you would do well to turn them from that inclination. It happens again that necessity or occasion constrains you to fight when your Souldiers are diffident or adverse: in one case it is necessary that you affright them, in the other that you excite them. In the first case, when remonstrances and exhortations will do no good, the best way is to suffer some of them to be cut off by the enemy, that those who have fought, and those who have not, may believe you another time. What *Fabius Maximus* did by accident, may be done on purpose, and by art. You know the Army of *Fabius* was very fierce to be fighting with *Hannibal*, and his Master of the Horse was of the same mind with the Army: *Fabius* was of another opinion, and thought it better to protract; and this diversity of opinions occasioned the dividing of the Army: *Fabius* kept his division in his trenches, the Master of the Horse went out, fought, was worsted, and had certainly been cut off, had not *Fabius* relieved him; by which example, the Master of the Horse, and the whole Army were convinced that their wisest way was to have obeyed the orders of *Fabius*. As to the other point of animating your Souldiers, and raising their courages to a pitch, it is good to incense them by possessing them of the contumacy and insolence of the enemy: by pretending intelligence among them, and that you have corrupted a considerable party; by posting your Army so near them, that they may see one another, and skirmish with them slightly every day, (for things which are done daily, we easily despise) by counterfeiting your self angry, and in a solemn and grave oration reprehending and upbraiding their backwardness, and telling them, that if they leave you, you will charge the enemy alone. But to make your Souldiers bold and courageous, you are by no means to permit any of them to send any thing to their own houses (or to deposit it any where else) till the war be done, that they may know that though in running home they may save their lives, yet it must be with the loss of their prize; the love of which renders people commonly as valiant as the love of their lives.

*Zanobi.* You say that Souldiers may be encouraged, and disposed to fight, by a speech or oration: do you intend it should be delivered to the whole Army, or only to the Officers?

## CHAP. IX.

*A General ought to be skilful and eloquent to persuade or dissuade as he sees occasion.*

*Fabr.* IT is an easie matter to persuade or dissuade any thing with a small number of persons, because if words will not do, you have force and authority to back them: but the difficulty is to remove an opinion out of the heads of the multitude when it is contrary to your own judgment, or the interest of the publick; for there you can use nothing but words, which must be heard and understood by every body, if you would have every body convinced. For this reason it is requisite an excellent General should be a good Orator, to inflame or assuage the courage of his Souldiers as he has occasion; for unless they can tell how to speak to a whole Army, there is little good to be expected; and yet in our times this way of haranguing them is quite laid aside. Look over the Life of *Alexander the Great*, and see how often he was put to it to speak in publick to his Army; and had he not done it, he would never have been able to have conducted it (when laden with so much riches and prey) thorow the deserts of *Arabia*, and in *India*, where it endured so much misery and distress; for there is scarce a day but something or other happens that causes confusion and ruine to an Army where the General is either ignorant or careless of speaking to them. The way of making speeches to them takes away their fear, quickens their courage, augments their confidence, discovers their cheats, secures their rewards, remonstrates their dangers, and the ways to avoid them. In short, by those kind of Orations a General reprehends, entreats, threatens, encourages, commends, reproaches, and

and does every thing that may either enhance, or depress the passions of his men; wherefore that Prince, or that Commonwealth that should design to establish a new Militia, and give it a reputation, is to accustom his Souldiers to the harangues of their chief Officers, and to chuse such Officers as know how to accost them.

### CHAP. X.

*Certain considerations which encourage Souldiers, and make them as virtuous as valiant,*

*Fabritio.* **T**He worship which the antients paid to their Gods (though they were false) Religion, and the Oath which was taken before they were listed in the Army, was in those days sufficient to keep their Souldiers to their duty; for upon every misdemeanour they were threatned not only with such punishments as they were to expect from their Officers, but such as could be inflicted (as they thought) by nothing but their Gods; which opinion being tempered with other religious ceremonies and superstitions, made all enterprises easie to the Generals of those times, and would do so still, were we as careful and observant of our Religion as they were of theirs. *Sertorius* knew how to make his advantage that way, pretending conference with a white Hart, which (as he gave out among his Souldiers) came from Heaven to assure him of Victory. *Sylla* to make his designs the more credible, pretended to discourse with an Image that he had taken out of the Temple of *Apollo*, which directed him how he was to steer. Others have pretended dreams and visions that have commanded them to fight: in the days of our Fathers, *Charles* the Seventh of *France* during his wars with the English, pretended to be advised by a maid that was sent from Heaven to give him instructions, which maid was called the *Pucelle d'Orleans*, and gained him many a Victory. There are other ways of making an Enemy contemptible; *Agésilas* the *Spartan* having taken several *Persians*, strip'd them naked, and shew'd them to his men, to the end that seeing the delicacy and tenderness of their contexture, they might have less occasion to fear them. Some have by design brought their men into extremity, that they might be necessitated to fight, as having taken from them all hopes of preservation, but in Victory; which indeed is the surest and best way to make your Souldiers fight, and to infuse courage into them, and then this courage and obstinacy is highly encreased by their confidence in their General, and their love to their Country. Their love to their Country is natural; their confidence in their Captain is more from his experience and conduct, than from any thing else. There may be many other obligations, but none so strong as that which binds you either to conquer, or flye.

THE FIFTH  
BOOK.

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## C H A P. I.

*How the Romans marched in an Enemies Country, and in what manner they are to be imitated.*

*Fabr.* I Have shown you how an Army is drawn up and marshalled in order to a Battel; I have told you how an Enemy is overcome, and several circumstances which occur therein. So that it is time now to inform you how an Army is to be ordered, which has not an Enemy in view, but is in continual probability of an assault: This may happen when an Army marches in an Enemies Country, or at least a Country that is suspected. And first you must understand the *Roman* Armies had always some Troops of Horse which were scouting abroad in order to the discovery of the Roads: After which followed the right Wing, and after them the Carriages which belonged to that Squadron: Then followed a Legion, and after them their Carriages. Then another Legion and their Carriages; and after them the left Wing, and the remainder of the Cavalry after them. This in short was the manner in which the *Romans* marched most commonly; and if it hapned in their march that their Army was assaulted either in the front or the rear, they caused all their Carriages to withdraw to the right wing or the left, as they found it convenient, and most agreeable with the nature of the place; and then when they were cleared of their Baggage, and disincumber'd, all of them unanimously make head against the Enemy. If they were assaulted in the flank, they drew their Carriages on that side where they were like to be most safe, and then address'd themselves against the Enemy.

This way being good and well govern'd, ought in my judgment to be imitated, by sending your light Horse to scout about the Country, and having four Battalions of Foot, they are to follow one the other successively, each of them with its Carriages in the rear: And because Carriages are of two sorts, one belonging to particular persons, and others for the common use of the Camp, I would divide the publick Carriages into four parts, and assign one to every Battalion; I would likewise divide the Artillery, and the followers of the Camp into four parts, that each Battalion should have equal share in their impediments and Carriages. But because it happens many times that you march thorow a Country not only suspected, but so openly your Enemy, that you expect every hour to be assaulted; it will be necessary, that to secure your self, you change the form of your march, and put your self into such a posture, as that neither the Passants, nor the Enemies Army may be able to offend you, though they come upon you never so suddenly. In these cases your Generals of old, were wont to march in a square order, which they called a square; not that it was exactly of that figure, but because it was ordered so, as it was able to fight in four places at once, and by that means they were always ready either to march or to fight. I shall follow this model for ordering my two Battalions which I have chosen to that purpose in stead of a compleat Army.

## C H A P. II.

*How an Army is to be Marshalled to march in an Enemies Country.*

*Fabr.* **T**O march (therefore) securely in an Enemies Country, and to be able to make good every part when surprized, and assaulted by the Enemy, I am to reduce my Army into a square according to the model of the ancients; I would have a square whole area, or vacuity within, should consist of 212 yards, in this manner; I would first place my flanks distant one from the other 212 yards; I would have five Battalia's in each flank marching length ways in files, and at three yards distance the one Battalia from the other; so that each Company taking up forty yards, all of them together (with the spaces betwixt them) shall take up 212 yards. Between the front and the rear of these two flanks, I would dispose the other ten Companies, in each of them five; ordering them so, that four of them should be placed in the front of the right flank, and four in the rear of the left flank, leaving a space of four yards betwixt each Company, and of the two Companies that are left, I would have one placed at the head of the left flank, and the other in the rear of the right. And because the space betwixt one flank and the other consists of 212 yards, and these Battalia's drawn sideways in breadth rather than length, will take up (intervals and all) 134 yards, there will remain a space of 78 yards betwixt the four Companies in the front of the right flank, and the same space will be possessed by the four Companies in the rear; nor will there be any difference but that one space will be behind towards the right wing, and the other before towards the left. In the space of 78 yards before, I would put my ordinary *Velites* in the space behind, my *Velites* extraordinary, which would not amount to a thousand for each space. But to contrive it so, that the great space within should consist of 212 yards square, it would be convenient that the five Companies which are placed in the front, and the five Companies in the rear should take up none of that space which belongs to the flanks; wherefore it is necessary that the five Companies behind should with their front touch the rear of the flanks, and those five Companies in the Van, with their rear should touch the front of the flanks; so that there should remain on each side of the Army, a distance sufficient to receive another Company. And because there are four spaces, I would take four Ensigns of the Pikes extraordinary, and place one in each of them, and the two Ensigns which would remain, I would place in the midst of the space of my whole Army in a square Battalion; at the head of which, the General of the Army should stand with his Officers about him: But because these Battalia's thus ordered, do march all of them one way at once; but do not so when they fight; when they are drawn up, those sides are to be put into a fighting posture, which are not guarded by other Battalia's: And therefore it is to be considered that the five Battalions in the front are defended on all sides, but just in the front; so that they are to be drawn up in great order with the Pikes before them. The five Companies behind are guarded on all sides but behind, so as they are likewise to be ordered with Pikes in their rear, as we shall show in its place.

The five Companies in the right flank are guarded on every side but only on the right flank. The five in the left flank are the same, only on the left flank they are open; and therefore in the managing your Army, you must observe to place your Pikes so as they may turn about to that flank which is naked and exposed; and your Corporals are to be in the front, and in the rear, that (being to fight) the whole Army, and every Member of it, may be in their proper places, and the manner of doing it, we have declared before, when we discoursed of putting the Companies in order; I would divide my Artillery, and place part of it without my right flank, and the other without my left. My light Horse I would send before to scour the Country; my men at Arms I would dispose part behind my right wing, and part behind my left, at about forty yards distance, from the Battalia's. And this general rule you are to observe by all means in the drawing up your Army, that your Horse are to be placed either in the rear, or upon the flanks; for to place them before, at the head of the Army, would occasion one of these two things, either they must be placed at such distance, that upon a repulse they may have space and time enough to wheel off without falling foul upon the foot; or else draw up the foot with such intervals, that the Horse may pass thorow without putting them into disorder: Certainly no body ought to look upon this as a thing of small importance; for many have been ruined and routed by their own men, for want of timely consideration.

But



But to return to our business, the Carriages, and the people unarmed are placed in the void place of the Army, and so disposed, that there is passage left for any to pass from one part of the Army to another. These Companies (without the Horse and Artillery) do take up a space of 282 yards: And because this square consists of two Battalions, it is convenient to let you know what part of them makes one Battalion, and what the other. Now because Battalions are denominated from the number, and each of them (as you know) consists of ten Battalions (or Companies) and a Colonel, I would have the first Battalion place five of first Companies in the front, the other five in the left flank, and the Colonel in the left angle of the front. The second Battalion should place its five first Battalions upon the right flank, and the other five in the rear, with the Colonel in the right corner to secure the rear, and perform the office of him whom the Romans called by the name of *Tergiductor*.

### CHAP. III.

*How to put an Army presently into order, and draw it up, so as if upon a march it should be attack'd, it may defend it self on all sides.*

**Fabr.** HAVING put your Army into this posture, you are to cause it to march, and in its march observe the same order, for without doubt it is safe enough against the tumults and incursions of the Peasants, against which, it is sufficient if the Colonel commands out parties of Horse, or certain Companies of his *Velites* to repel them. Nor is there any danger that those kind of people will ever come to handy strokes with you; for men without order, are always fearful of men in order, and 'tis the practice of such people to alarm you with great shouts and crys, but never to come near; like little Curs that bark at a Mastiff, but keep far enough off. When *Hannibal* invaded *Italy* with so much detriment to the *Romans*, he passed thorow *France*; was frequently infested by the Bores, but he valued them not. But it is not sufficient to have your Army in this order, but if you intend to march, you must have Pioneers, and such kind of people to plain the ways, make your intrenchments, &c. and these Pioneers are to be secured by the Horse which you send up and down the Country. In this order an Army may march ten miles a day, and be time enough at their journeys end to Sup, and take up their Quarters by daylight; for many times an Army will march in one day twenty miles. But if it happens to be attacked by a formed Army, it cannot be so sudden, but you will have time to put your self into a posture of defence, because an orderly Army marches slowly, and you will have leisure to draw your self up in Battalions; and put your Army either into the same figures I have prescribed, or into such another. If you be assaulted in the Van, you have no more to do but to bring your Artillery thither out of the flanks, and bringing your Horse out of the rear into the Van, to put them into the same place and distance as I have directed: The 1000 *Velites* which are before, may advance, divide themselves into two parties of five hundred a piece, and enter into their own place betwixt the Horse and the wings of the Army; and then into their place are to succeed the two Companies of Pikes extraordinary which I placed before in the great vacuity of the Army. The 1000 *Velites* in the rear are to remove from their post, and dividing themselves, repair to the two flanks and fortifie them, and by the space and chasm which they leave at their departure, the Carriages may march out, and all those who are unarmed, and put themselves behind in the rear: The space in the middle being now void, and every man in his place, the five Battalions which I ordered behind the Army may advance by the void space betwixt the two flanks, and march towards those in the Van. Three of them may march up within 40 yards (with equal intervals betwixt the one and the other) and the other two may remain behind at the same distance of forty yards. This is a form that may be ordered on a sudden, and has some resemblance with the first model of an Army which we recommended before; for though it be straighter in the front, it is firmer in the flanks, and by consequence stronger. But because the five Battalions in the rear have Pikes with them for the reasons above said, it is necessary to cause them to advance to fortifie the front of the Army, and therefore either you must cause your Companies to turn Company by Company as they were solid bodies; or else pass them into the front thorow the files of the Bucklers, which way is a better way, and less disorderly, than to cause them to wheel in whole Companies like a solid body: and the same thing is to be done with those in the rear upon any assault, as I have shown before. If the Enemy presents himself in the rear; you have no more to do

but to face about with your whole Army, and immediately the figure is altered, the rear becomes the front, and the front the rear; after which you are to observe all the ways of fortifying your front, as I have directed before. If the Enemy appears upon your flank, your Army is to face about to that side, and do the same things to strengthen your front; so that your Horse, your *Velites*, your Artillery may be in such places as are convenient for the making up that front; and if there be any difference in this variation of fronts, it is only this, that some of those who are to remove, have farther to advance than others. Nevertheless, in making a front of your right flank, your *Velites* are to enter into the intervals betwixt the wings of the Army, and the horse should approach to the left flank, into whose place the two Companies of Pikes extraordinary (which were placed in the middle) should succeed: but the carriages should remove, and the unarm'd people, (by the great space and overture that is made) and retire behind the left flank, which is now become the rear of the whole Army: and the other *Velites* who were placed in the rear at first are not to budge in this case, because that place should not remain open, being of the rear become the flanks: all other things are to be done as in my first directions for the making of a front.

What is said before of making a front of the right flank, will serve for making a front of the left flank, for the same order is to be used; if the Enemy comes upon you so strong that he is able to attack you on both sides, you must fortify the places where you suspect he will charge, by doubling your ranks from the place where he does not appear to fall on; by dividing your Artillery, your *Velites*, and your Horse, & distributing them equally in both places. If he assaults you in three or four sides at once, you or he must be very imprudent; for had you been wise, you would never have put your self into a place where an enemy could have come at you on so many sides, especially with a form'd and well ordered Army. For to ruine you securely, it is necessary the Enemy be strong enough to attack you on all sides and with as many men in every place almost, as in your whole Army: and if you be so indiscreet to march into his Country, or put your self into the power of an enemy whose men are three times as many, and as well experienced as yours, if you miscarry, you can blame no body but your self; but if misfortune happens not by your fault, but by accident of war, no body will condemn you, and it will fair with you as it did with *Scipio* in *Spain*, and *Asdrubal* in *Italy*. But if the Enemy be not much stronger than you, and yet ventures to assault you in several places, the rashness will be on his side, and the success in all probability on yours; for of necessity he must so weaken himself, that you may receive him in one place, and charge him briskly in another, and then you will easily ruine him. This way of ordering an Army against an enemy that is not in sight, but is hourly expected, is very necessary: and it is very useful to accustom your Souldiers to close, and change, and march in this order, and in their march to shew them how to fight according to my first front, and then falling into their march again, upon a new alarm in the rear, to turn that into a front; and then each of the flanks, and so in their first posture again: and these exercises are very necessary, if you would have your Army ready and well disciplin'd. For which cause I would recommend it to all Princes and great Captains to restore these practices of the ancients; for what is military discipline, but to know how to command and execute these things well? what is a well disciplin'd Army, but an Army train'd up well in these kind of exercises? and he who in our times would but frame his discipline to this, I am confident could never be worsted. But to continue our discourse; if this square figure be difficult, it is not to be laid aside for that, for that difficulty is necessary: nevertheless exercise will make it easy; for having learn'd how to draw your self up, and preserve your figure, you will easily understand afterwards how to maintain other figures in which there is not so much difficulty.

*Zanohi*, I am of your mind, that those orders are necessary, and cannot tell (as to my self) what can be added or subtracted. Yet I would willingly be satisfied in two things. One is when you would make a front of your rear, or one of your flanks, and would have your men face about, how you do signify your commands, whether by word of mouth, or sound of trumpet? The other is, whether those you send before to plain the ways, and make them passable for your Army, are to be Souldiers drawn out of your Battalions, or other Country people designed on purpose for that work.

## C H A P. IV.

*Of Commands derived by word of mouth, by Drums, and Trumpets, and of the nature of Pioneers.*

*Fabr.* YOUR first demand is of very great importance, for many Armies have been ruined when the Captain's orders have been mistaken, or not heard: for which reason the words of Command in such great dangers ought to be clear and intelligible: and if you would signify your commands by the sound of your Trumpets or Drums, great care is to be taken, that the sounds be so different and distinguishable one from the other, that they cannot be mistaken. If your commands are by word of mouth you must use particular, and be sure to avoid general terms, and in your particular words you must be cautious to use none that may be liable to an ill interpretation. Many times the crying *back, back*, has been the loss of an Army: wherefore that word is to be avoided, and instead of it you are to say *retreat*. If you would change your front, and make it either in the flank or the rear, you must not say *turn*, but *face about to the right or the left, to the front or the rear*: and in like manner all the words of command are to be plain and intelligible, as *march on, stand firm, advance, retreat*: and what ever may be done by word of mouth clearly and distinctly, is to be signified that way: what cannot be done that way, is to be done by the Trumpet and Drum. As to the Pioneers, which is your second demand, I would have that office performed by my own Souldiers, as well because it was the practice of ancient times, as because thereby I should have fewer idle persons in my Army, and by consequence fewer impediments. I would command out of every Battalia what number I thought necessary; I would furnish them with Pickaxes, and Spades, and cause them to leave their arms with their next ranks, who should carry them for them; so that when the enemy appeared, they should have no more to do but to fall back to their ranks, and take them again.

*Zanobi.* But who should carry their Pickaxes and Spades?

*Fabr.* There should be Waggon on purpose.

*Zanobi.* I fear you would never prevail with your Souldiers to work.

*Fabr.* We will talk of that in its proper place; at present I shall lay it aside, and discourse of the way how they are to be supplied with provisions; for having tired them thus long, 'tis but reasonable to refresh them with victuals.

## C H A P. V.

*Of the Provisions that are necessary for an Army.*

*Fabr.* YOU must know, a Prince is to keep his Army as free, and as fit for expedition as possible, and to rid it of all encumbrances that may make his enterprizes difficult: The first difficulty to be removed, is want of provisions, and therefore he is to take particular care that they be furnished with bread and wine. The ancients did not think of providing of wine, for when they wanted wine; they made use of water with a little vinegar to give it a taste, so that among the provisions for the Army, vinegar was provided, but not wine. Their bread was not baked ready to their hands, as in the Towns, but every Souldier had his proportion of meal, which he ordered as he pleased, with a certain quantity of Bacon, and Seam, which gave their bread a gust, and rendered them strong. So that the provision for the Souldiers was meal, vinegar, bacon, and suet or seam, and barley for the horses. They had commonly herds of Cattel great and small which followed the Armies, which being driven, and not carried, were no great encumbrance. By reason of this order, of old, an Army marched many days journey thorow difficult and solitary places without want of provisions, because they lived upon such things as might easily be carried with them. But in our Armies now a-days we find it quite contrary; for the Souldiers cannot subsist without wine and bisket, as when they are at home; of which, provision cannot be made for any considerable time, insomuch as they are many times famished; or if provision be made, it is with much trouble, and vast expence. I would endeavour therefore that my Army might not be supplied at that rate; nor would I have them have any bread but what they make themselves. As to wine, I would not hinder their drinking it, nor prohibit

hibit that any should come into the Army; but I would take no pains, nor use no industry to supply them: and for other provisions, I would follow exactly the model of the ancients: which way, if rightly considered, will shew what difficulties are removed, what wants and distresses are prevented to an Army and General, and what convenience is added to any enterprize that shall be undertaken.

*Zanob.* Since we have routed the enemy, and marched afterwards into his Country, 'tis but reasonable to believe that we have made our depredations, tax'd his Towns, taken several Prisoners: I would know therefore how the ancients proceeded in these cases.

## CHAP. VI.

*How the ancients divided the spoil, and of the pay which they gave to their Souldiers.*

*Fabr.* I will satisfy you as to that: I do not question but you have considered (because I have discoursed it formerly with some of you) how our present wars do impoverish not only those Princes which are overcome, but those two are Conquerors; for as one looses his Country, so the other looses his Money: which was otherwise in ancient times, because the Conqueror enriched himself by the war. The reason of this difference is, because in our times no publick account is taken of the prizes, (as formerly) but all is left to the discretion of the Souldier, which occasions two very great disorders; the first is, as before; the other, it renders the Souldier more desirous of plunder, and less observant of order and military discipline. And we have heard of many instances, where their impatience to be pillaging has wrested the Victory out of their hands who had almost perfectly obtained it. Whilst the *Romans* had the command of their own Armies, they provided very well against both these inconveniencies, appointing all the prizes to be delivered in, and appropriated to the publick, and that afterwards the publick should distribute as it pleased. To this purpose they had their *Questores*, (which were like our Chamberlains) in whose hands all their prizes and taxes deposited, of which the Consul or General of their Army disposed as he thought good; for the payment of his Souldiers, the curing of the wounded, or sick, and discharging the other necessities of the Army.

'Tis true, the Consul had power to give the plunder of a Town to his Souldiers, and he frequently did it, but that liberty never bred any disorder; for when a Town was taken, or an Army defeated, all the prize was brought into a publick place, and distributed man by man; according to every ones merit.

This custom made the Souldiers more intent upon victory than plunder: the practice of the *Roman Legions* was, to break and disorder an enemy, but not to pursue; for they never went out of their ranks upon any occasion whatever. Only the horse, the light arm'd men, and what other Souldiers were not of the Legions, followed the chase: whereas if the plunder of the field had belonged to any man that could catch it, it would have been neither reasonable, nor possible, to have kept the Legions to their ranks, or to have exposed them to so many dangers. Hence it was, that upon a Victory the publick was always enriched; for when a Consul entred in triumph, he brought with him great riches into the Treasury of *Rome*, and they consisted of Taxes, Contributions, Ransoms, and Plunder. The ancients had likewise another custom that was very well contrived, and that was, out of every Souldiers pay, to cause a third part to be deposited with the Ensign of their respective Companies, who never restored it before the War was ended. This they did for two reasons; first, that every Souldier might have a stock of his own; for most of them being young, and profuse, the more they had, the more they would have squandered. The other reason was, that knowing their stocks were in their Ensigns hands, they should have the more care of him, and defend him with the more courage; and this custom contributed much to their valour; and is necessary to be observed by any man who would reduce his Souldiers to the discipline of the *Romans*.

*Zanob.* I believe it impossible for an Army not to meet with several ill accidents whilst it marches from one place to another, and that it requires great industry in the General, and great courage in the Souldiers to prevent or avert them: you would oblige me much if you would tell me what has occur'd to your knowledg in the case.

## CHAP. VII.

*To know the surprizes which are contriving against you upon your march.*

*Fabr.* I shall satisfy you willingly, as being particularly necessary to any man who is desirous to give a perfect scheme of this discipline.

Whilst an Army is marching, the Generals are above all things to be vigilant that they fall not into any ambushments, which may be done two ways; one when you fall into it bluntly of your self: the other when you are drill'd and wheedled into it by the enemy before you perceive it. To prevent the first way, it is convenient to send out strong parties to discover the Country, who are to be the more diligent, by how much the Country is more apt and proper for such things, as where it is woody or mountainous, for ambushments are commonly laid behind some hill, or under the shelter of some wood, and, as if you do not discover them in time, they are very pernicious; so, if your care be sufficient, they are as easily prevented. The birds and the dust have many times discovered the enemy; for when ever the enemy approaches in any great number, he will be sure to raise the dust, which will give you the alarm. Several Generals observing the Pigeons to rise in some place where they were to pass, (or other birds that fly together in flocks) and to hover over their heads without falling again, have thereby discovered the ambushments of the enemy, and either prevented or defeated them.

As to the second way of being drawn in by the artifices of the enemy, you must be cautious of believing any thing easily, that is not reasonable to be supposed: as it would be, if an enemy should leave something for you to pillage on purpose, you must suspect there is some design at the bottom, and be careful it does not succeed. If a great number of the enemy be beaten, and pursued by a few of your men, if a few of the enemy attacks a greater party of yours, if the enemy runs unexpectedly, and without any visible occasion, in those cases you must always suspect; and never fancy your enemy so weak as not to understand his own business: on the contrary, if you would be less exposed to his stratagems, and run your self less into danger, the weaker and more careless you observe him to be, the more you are to apprehend him. In this case you are to comport your self in two different manners, you are to fear him in your own thoughts, and order your affairs accordingly; but in your words and outward behaviour you are to seem to despise him; this last way makes your Souldiers more confident of Victory, the other makes you more cautious, and less apt to be circumvented. And you must know, that to march thorow an enemies Country is more dangerous than to fight a field Battel.

## CHAP. VII.

*One is to know the Country perfectly well thorow which he is to pass, and keep his enterprizes secret.*

*Fabr.* The marching thorow an Enemies Country being so extraordinarily dangerous, it is necessary that a General doubles his diligence; and the first thing he is to do, he is to have a Cart made of all the Country by which he is to pass, that he may know the Towns, their number, and distance, the roads, and mountains, the rivers, the fens, and the nature and qualities of them all: and to better his knowledg, it is convenient that he discourses and interrogates some body who understands the places, objecting, and asking them several questions, and observing their answers. He is likewise to send some parties of his light Horse before, under the command of prudent Officers, not so much to face the enemy, as to speculate the Country, and see whether it agrees with his Map, and the description which he has received. He is also to send out spies and guides with good guards, promising them rewards if they tell true, and threatning them with punishment, if false. But above all he is to have a care that his Army knows nothing of his design; for in the whole Art of War there is nothing so useful, as to conceal the enterprizes that you are about.

## C H A P. IX.

*Of certain things which are requisite upon a march.*

*Fabr.* **T**Hat no sudden attack may be able to disorder your Soldiers, you must command them to stand ready with their arms, for things that are foreseen and expected, are less terrible and hurtful. Many persons to avoid confusion in their march have disposed their Carriages, and unarm'd people near the Colours, with command to follow them close, that upon a halt, or retreat, (if there should be occasion) they might do it more easily, which is a good way, and I like it well. A General is likewise to have a great care that his men do not straggle in their march, or march unequally, some too fast, others too slow, which would weaken his Army, and expose it to great disorder. It is convenient therefore to place their Officers in the flanks, that they may keep them uniform in their motion, restraining those who are too hasty, and soliciting those who are too slow, and that cannot be done better than by the Trumpets and Drums. The ways are likewise to be enlarged and repair'd, so as one Company at least may always march in order. Besides this, the custom, quality and humour of your enemy is to be considered, whether he be like to assault you in the morning, at noon, or at night. Whether he be strongest in horse or in foot, and as you are inform'd of that, you order your men, and provide every thing necessary. But to come to some particular accident.

## C H A P. X. :

*How to avoid fighting near a River, though pressed by the enemy; and in what manner you may pass it.*

*Fabr.* **I**T falls out sometimes that you are forced to decline the enemy, as thinking your self too weak, and are therefore unwilling to engage him: the enemy follows you what he can to stop you, or cut you off in your passage over the river, to which you are marching to that purpose; and your passage will take up so much time, that in probability the enemy will reach you. Some who have been in that dangerous condition, have drawn a trench round the rear of their Army; fill'd it with faggots, and other combustibles, and set them on fire, whilst in the mean time their Army passed over without any impediment from the enemy, by reason the fire that was betwixt them hindred their designs.

*Zanobi.* I cannot easily believe that such a fire as that could hinder them, because I remember I have heard how *Hanno* the *Carthaginian* being besieged by an enemy; on that side where he designed to escape, caused store of wood and faggots to be laid, and then set them on fire: so that the enemy not observing him so strictly on that side, he passed his Troops thorow the flames, only by ordering them to hold their Targets before their faces.

*Fabr.* You say well, but consider a little what I told you, and what *Hanno* did; I told you that the Generals I mentioned caused a trench to be digg'd, and filled with combustible matter; so that when the enemy was to pass, he was to encounter with two great difficulties, the trench and the fire. *Hanno* made his fires without any ditch, and because he designed to pass over them, he commanded that they should not be made too violent; for without a trench, that would have stop'd him. Do you not know the story of *Nabis* the *Spartan*, who being besieged in *Sparta* by the *Romans*, he set part of the Town on fire to hinder the advance of the *Romans*, who had already entred in some places; and by that fire he not only hindred their advance, but repulsed them.

But to return to our business. *Quintus Lutatius* the *Roman*, having the *Cimbri* upon his heels, and being arrived at a river; that the enemy might give him time to pass, he pretended a resolution to fight them, pitch'd his Camp, entrench'd himself, set up his Standard, and sent out parties of horse to provide forrage. The *Cimbrians* conceiving he would encamp there, came and encamped by him, and divided themselves into several parties, to supply them with provisions; of which *Lutatius* having notice, slip'd over the river before they could have time to disturb him. Some have turned the course of a river, and by a cut carrying the water on the back-side of the Army, have made the river fordable,

dable, and passed it with ease. When the waters are rapid and the stream strong, to facilitate the passage of the Foot, they put the strongest of their Horse betwixt the stream and the Foot, to keep of the torrent; and another party below to bear up the Foot, if the water should be too strong for any of them. Rivers that are unfordable, are likewise to be passed with Bridges and Boats; so that it is good to carry in your Army materials for all these things. It happens sometimes that when you would pass a River, the Enemy is got on the other side, and opposes. To remove this difficulty, I know nothing you can do better, than to follow the example of *Cæsar*, who having brought his Army to the side of a River in *France*, with design to have passed it, but finding *Vercingetrix* with his Army on the other side ready to obstruct him, he marched down the River several days journey on one side, whilst *Vercingetrix* did the like on the other.

But *Cæsar* having made a place in a Wood convenient for the concealing of some of his men, drew out three Companies out of each Legion, caused them to stay behind there, and when he was gone, commanded that they should set up a Bridge over the River, and fortify it; and in the mean time he followed his march. *Vercingetrix* observing the same number of Legions, not suspecting that any part of them were left behind, followed him on the other side; but *Cæsar* when he judged the Bridge finished, faced about on a sudden, and finding every thing as he expected, he passed the River without any difficulty.

*Zanob.* Have you any rules whereby you may discover a ford?

*Fabr.* Yes, we have: wherever in a River you see the water trebble, and carry certain streaks betwixt the place where it stagnates, and the current; you may be sure the bottom is good, and the place fordable, because the gravel and sand which the River does commonly carry along with it, is more fixed there, as has been often seen by experience.

*Zanobi.* Suppose the flood should have loosened the earth at the bottom of the ford; so as the horse should sink in; what remedy then?

*Fabr.* You must make grills or lattices of wood, sink them into the River, and let them pass over them. But to follow our discourse.

## CHAP. XI.

*How to make your passage thorow a streight though you be pressed by an Enemy.*

*Fabr.* IF a General by accident be conducted with his Army betwixt two Mountains, and that he has but two passages, one before, and the other behind, and the Enemy has got possession of both, he can have no better remedy than to do as has been done before; that is, to dig a deep Trench behind him, and make it as unpassable as he can, that the Enemy may believe he intended to stop him there in the rear, that with his whole force he might make his way thorow the passage in the Van: Which being observed by the Enemy, he concluded according to appearance; sent what strength he could make to the other end of the pass; and abandoned the Trench, whereupon the other clap'd a wooden bridge over the Trench immediately (which he had prepared on purpose) and passed back again without any obstruction. *Lucius Minutius* a Roman Consul was in *Liguria* with an Army, and was shut up by the Enemy betwixt the Mountains, so as he could not disengage himself: being sensible of his condition, he sent certain *Numidians* which he had in his Army upon small scranrel Horses towards the places where the Enemy had their Guards, At first sight the Enemy put themselves into a posture to defend the Passes, but when they observed the *Numidians* in ill order, and ill mounted in respect of themselves, they began to despise them, and to be more remiss in their Guards; which was no sooner perceived by the *Numidians*, but they clap'd spurs to their Horses, and charging suddenly upon them, they passed on in spite of all their opposition; and being passed the mischief and devastation that they made in the Country, constrained the Enemy to give free passage to the whole Army. A certain General being infested by a numerous Enemy, drew up his Army so close, that the Enemy was able to encompass him round, and afterwards he fell so smartly upon that Quarter where the Enemy was weakest, that he not only worsted them, but disintangled himself; *Marcus Antonius* in the retreat from the *Partians* observed



served that every morning by break of day they were upon his back as soon as he moved, and continued skirmishing and molesting him quite thorow his march; whereupon he resolved not to remove before noon. The *Partians* observing, concluded he would not stir that day, and returned to their Posts, insomuch that *Marcus Antonius* had opportunity to march all the rest of that day without interruption. The same person to avoid the Darts of the *Partians*, commanded his Men that when the *Partians* came near them, the first rank should fall down upon their knees, and the second rank clap their Bucklers over the heads of the first rank, the third over the second, the fourth over the third, and so on; so as the whole Army lay as it were under a Shield, and was defended from their Arrows. And this is all I can remember about the accidents to which an Army is subject upon a march. I shall pass now to another thing, unless you have something else to demand.

## THE SIXTH BOOK.

### CHAP. I.

*What kind of places the Greeks and the Romans chose out for their Camps, with a short recapitulation of what has been said before.*

*Zano.* I Think it very convenient that *Battista* takes upon him the Office of demanding, and that I lay it down; by doing so we shall seem to imitate the good Generals of old, who (as I have been taught by *Signor Fabritio*) did usually place the valiantest of their Soldiers, in the front, and in the rear of the Army; conceiving it necessary to have those in the Van who would begin the fight bravely, and such in the rear as would bravely maintain it. And as *Cosimo* began this discourse with a great deal of prudence, so *Battista* may finish it with the same; *Luigi* and I having born the brunt in the middle as well as we could; and seeing hitherto every man has taken his part willingly, I do not think *Battista* will refuse.

*Battista.* Hitherto I have suffered my self to be governed, and am resolved to do so for the future; let me desire you therefore *Signor Fabritio* to pursue your discourse, and hold us excused if we interrupt you with these kind of demands.

*Fabr.* As I told you before, you do me a very great kindness, for this interruption, and changing of persons, rather refreshes than troubles my fancy; But to follow our business, I say, that it is now high time that we dispose our Army into its quarters, for you know every thing desires rest, and security; for to repose without security, is not properly to repose. I do fancy you would rather have had me lodg'd my Army first, and march'd and fought them afterwards, but we have done quite contrary, and indeed not without necessity; for being to show how an Army in a march was to quit that form, and put it self into a posture to fight, it was necessary first to show how they were to be drawn up for a Battel. But to return, I say, that if you would have your Camp safe, you must have it strong, and well ordered: The discretion of the General puts it in good order, but it is art or situation that makes it defensible and strong. The *Grecians* were so curious in this point, that they would never encamp but where there was some River, or Wood, or Bank or other natural rampart to defend them. But the *Romans* stood not so much upon the strength of the situation, as their own ways of fortification, nor would they ever encamp, but where according to their own Discipline they could draw up their Army. For this reason the *Romans* observed one constant form in their encampments; for they would rather make the situation of the place comply with their methods, than permit their customs, to comply

comply with the situation; but with the *Greeks* it was otherwise, because following the condition and form of the place, it was necessary that they varied the manner of their encampment, and the form of their Camp. The *Romans* therefore where the situation was weak, supplied it by art and industry; And because in this discourse I have proposed the *Romans* for a President, I shall not leave them in my manner of encampment, nevertheless I shall not follow their practice in every thing, but picking and selecting such parts as I think most agreeable with our times. I have told you often how the *Romans* in their Consular Armies had two Legions of *Romans*, consisting of about 11000 Foot, and 600 Horse; they had moreover about 11000 more Foot, sent in by their Friends and Allies to their assistance: but this was a rule, their Auxiliaries never exceeded the number of the Legions, unless it were in Horse, and in them they were not so curious. I have told you likewise how in all their battels their Legions were placed in the middle, and their Auxiliaries in the flanks, and it was the same in their encampments, as you may read in such Authors as make any mention of their History: I will not therefore be so exact in my relation, I shall content my self, only to tell you in what order I would lodge my Army at present, and you will understand by that what I have borrowed from the *Romans*. You know that in imitation of their Legions I have taken two Battalions consisting of 6000 Foot, and 300 Horse of service for the Battalion; you know into what Companies, into what Arms, and into what names I divided them. You know how in ordering my Army to march and to fight, I have said nothing of more men, only what was to be done, was to be done by doubling their ranks, not by any reinforcement of men. But being now to shew you the manner of encamping, I think it not convenient to stick to my two Battalions, but to unite our whole Army, composed according to the model of the *Romans* of two Battalions, and as many Auxiliaries, which I do the rather, that the form of our Camp may be the more compleat, by the reception of a compleat Army; which in my other demonstrations I have not thought altogether so necessary. Being therefore to lodge a compleat Army of 24000 Foot, and two thousand Horses of service, to be divided into four Battalions, (two of Natives, and two of Strangers) I would take this way,

## C H A P. II.

*The form of a Camp.*

*Fabr.* **H**AVING found a place convenient for my Camp, I would set up my Standard in the midst of a square of fifty yards deep. The four sides of that square should respect the four quarters of the World, and look East, West, North, and South. In this square I would set up the General's Pavilion: and because I think it discreet, and in part the practice of the Ancients, I would divide my men which carry arms, from them who have none; and those who are free, from those who are incumbred. All or the greatest part of my arm'd men I would lodge towards the East; my men that were disarm'd and incumbred, I would lodge towards the West, making my front towards the East, and my rear towards the West; and the North and South should be my flanks. To distinguish the quarters of those which bore arms, I would take this course, I would draw a line from the Standard towards the East of 680 yards long. Then I would draw two other lines, (with the first in the middle) of the same length, but each of them at a distance of fifteen yards from the first; at the end of these lines I would have my Eastern Port, and the space betwixt the two outward lines should make a Street which should go from that Gate to the General's quarters, and take up a space of thirty yards in breadth, and 630 in length, (for the General's quarter would take up fifty,) and this should be called the General's street. Then I would cause another street to be drawn out from North to South, and it should pass by the end of the General's street, not far from the General's quarter towards the East, which should contain in length 1250 yards, (for it should take up all the breadth of the Camp) and be called the Cross-street. Having design'd the General's quarters, and these two Streets, I would mark out quarters for the two Battalions that were my own Subjects, and one of them I would dispose on the right hand of the General's street, and the other on the left. And then passing over the Cross-street, I would assign 32 lodgments on the left hand of the General's street, and as many on the right, leaving betwixt the sixteenth and seventeenth lodgment a space of thirty yards wide, as a travel way to pass thorow all the lodgments of the Battalions. I would lodge the Captains of the men at Arms at the front of those two orders of lodgments which joyn to the Cross-street, and their men at Arms in

the fifteen lodgments that are next them; so as every lodgment should contain ten men at Arms, the whole number that I have allotted to each Battalion, being an hundred and fifty. The Captains lodgments should be forty yards wide, and ten in length; and you must take notice that when I say *wide*, I mean from North to South; and when *long*, from East to West. The lodgment for the private men at arms should be fifteen yards long, and thirty wide. In the other fifteen lodgments which follow on both sides of the street, (which begin at the traverse way, and should have the same allowance of ground as I have given to the other) I would dispose my light horse. And because there are likewise of them belonging to each Battalion 150, I would put ten of them into each of the fifteen lodgments, and the sixteenth I would reserve for the Captain with the same space of ground as is allowed to the Captain of the men at arms; and so the lodgments of the horse of the two Battalions should come down to the middle of the General's Street, and be a direction to the quartering of the foot, as I shall shew. You have seen how I have lodged the 300 horse of both Battalions, with their Officers in 32 lodgments set up near the General's Street, and beginning at the Cross-street; and how betwixt the sixteenth and the seventeenth there was reserved a space of thirty yards to make a cross-way. Being therefore to lodge the twenty Battalions or Companies in the two ordinary Battalions, I would appoint lodgments for every two Battalions behind the lodgments of the horse, and they should each of them contain in length 15 yards, and in breadth thirty, according to the dimensions of the horse-lodgment, and they should be so close that they should touch one another.

In the first lodgment on each side butting upon the Cross-street, I would lodge the Captain of each Company over against the lodgment of the Captain of the men at Arms; and this lodgment alone should be twenty yards wide, and ten long. In the other fifteen lodgments which succeed on both sides as far as the traverse way, I would quarter a Company of foot, which being 450, should be disposed 30 to a lodgment. The other 15 lodgments should be set up on each side by the lodgments of the light horse, with the same dimensions of ground; and on each side I would place a Battalia of foot.

In the last lodgment on each side I would place the Captain of the Company (right over against the Captain of the light horse) with a space of ten yards in length, and twenty in breadth: and so these two first ranks of lodgments would be half horse, and half foot: but because (as I said before) these horses are all horses of service, which have no proper persons either to dress or to feed them, I would have the foot which are quartered behind, obliged to look to them, and for so doing they should be exempt from other duties in the Camp; and this was the method of the *Romans*. After this I would leave a pace of thirty yards on each side, which should make streets, and be called, one of them, the first Street on the left hand, and the other the first Street on the right. I would then in each side set up another row of 32 lodgments, with their backs one to the other, with the same spaces as I assigned to the other; and having separated sixteen of them, (as with the rest) to make a traverse way, I would dispose in each side four Companies with their Captains at the head of them, and other Officers in the rear. After I had left on both sides a distance of thirty yards for a way, which on one side should be called the second Street on the right hand, and on the other side the second Street on the left hand; I would set up another rank of 32 lodgments with the same distances and separations, where I would lodge on each side four Companies with their Officers: and by doing this, all the Cavalry, and the Companies of both the Battalions would be lodged in three rows of lodgments, and the General's quarter in the middle. The two Battalions of Auxiliaries (having made them to consist of the same number of men) I would quarter on both sides of the two ordinary Battalions, with the same number of rows, and in the same order as they, placing first one order of lodgments consisting half of horse, and half of foot, distant from the next order thirty foot, which distance should make a Street, and be called on one side, the third Street on the right hand; and on the other side the third Street on the left hand. And thus I would make on each side two more rows of lodgments with the same distances and distinctions as in the lodgments of the other Battalions, which should make two other Streets, and be called according to their number, and the hand on which they are placed; so that this whole Army will be lodged in twelve double rows of lodgments, and there will be thirteen Streets, reckoning the General's Street, and the Cross-street: when I have design'd my circumference, and appointed my lodgments for my four Battalions, I would leave a space betwixt the lodgments and the trenches of an hundred yards broad, which should go round my Camp: and if you compute all the spaces, you will find that from the middle of the General's lodgment, to the East Gate, are 680 yards. There are two other spaces, one from the General's quarter to the South Gate, and the other

other from the same place to the North Gate, each of them 635 yards commencing at the Center. Subtracting afterwards from each of these spaces fifty yards for the General's quarter, and five and forty more on each side for a *Piazza*, and thirty yards for a Street that divides each of the said spaces in the middle; and an hundred yards round betwixt the lodgments and the trenches; there remains on all sides for lodgments a space of four hundred yards wide, and an hundred long, measuring the length with the space which is taken up by the General's quarter; then dividing the said length in the middle, there will be on each side of the General forty lodgments, in length fifty yards, and twenty wide, which in all will be 80, in which the general Officers of the Battalions should be quartered; the Treasurers, the *Maîtres de Campe*, and all such as have any Office in the Army, leaving some spaces empty for strangers, or such Volunteers as follow the Wars meerly out of affection to the General; on the back-side of the General's quarters I would make a Street from South to North thirty yards broad, and it should be called Front-street, and run along all the 80 lodgments abovesaid. From this Front-street, by the General's quarter I would have another Street that should go from thence to the West Gate, thirty yards wide, answering both for situation and length to the General's Street, and it should be called the *Piazza*-Street. Having settled these two Streets, I would order a *Piazza* or Market-place, and it should be at the end of the *Piazza*-street over against the General's lodging, and not far from the Front-street. I would have it square, and every square to contain 121 yards: on the right and left hand of this Market-place I would have two rows of lodgments, each of them double, and consisting of eight lodgments, in length twelve yards, and in breadth thirty: so that on each side of the *Piazza* I would have sixteen lodgments; with that in the middle, so that in all they would be 32; in which I would place those horse which remain undisposed of, that belong to the Auxiliary squadrons: if these would not be sufficient to receive them, I would assign some of the lodgments about the General's quarters, especially those which look towards the trenches. It remains now that we lodge the Pikes, and the *Velites* extraordinary which I have assigned to each Battalion, which as you know consisted (besides the ten Companies) of a thousand Pikes extraordinary, and five hundred *Velites*: So that the two Battalions had 2000 Pikes extraordinary, and 1000 *Velites* extraordinary, and the Auxiliaries had the same, so that we have still 6000 foot to lodge, which I would dispose in that part toward the West, and along the ditch. From the end of the Front-street towards the North, leaving a space of 100 yards betwixt that and the ditch, I would have a row of five double lodgments, which should contain in length all of them 75 yards, and 50 in breadth: so as when the breadth is divided, there shall belong to each lodgment 15 yards in length, and thirty in breadth; and because there will be but ten lodgments in this rank, there shall be lodged 300 foot, 30 in a lodgment. After that, leaving a space of 31 yards; I would set up in the same manner, and with the same distances another row of five double lodgments, and after that another, till they came to be five rows of five double lodgments, in all fifty, placed in a right line from the North, all of them ten yards from the fols, and should entertain 1500 foot. Turning then towards the West Gate, in all that space from them to the said Gate, I would have five other double orders, in the same manner, and with the same spaces, (but with a distance of but 15 yards from one row to another) where I would lodge 1500 foot more. And so all the *Velites*, and Pikes extraordinary of both the proper Battalions should be lodged from the North Gate to the West Gate; according to the turning of the trenches, and should be distributed into 100 lodgments in ten rows, ten lodgments in a row. The Pikes and the *Velites* extraordinary of the two Auxiliary Battalions should be lodged in the same manner betwixt the West Gate and the South, as the trenches incline in ten rows, ten lodgments in a row, as I said of the other: the Captains or their Lieutenants may take such quarters as they think most convenient on that side towards the trenches. The Artillery I would dispose every where upon the banks of the trenches, and in all the other space which remains towards the West I would bestow all the baggage, and servants, and impediments of the Army. By impediments you must understand (and you know it very well) the ancients intended all their train, and whatever else was necessary for an Army, besides the Soldiers, as Carpenters, Smiths, Shoemakers, Engineers, and Cannoneers, (though these indeed might be numbred among the Soldiers) Butchers with their Beefs and their Muttons, Cooks, Pastry-men, and all that prepared meat for the Army; and in short, all other professions which followed the Camp for subsistence: they reckoned likewise among them all the carriages for publick provisions, and aratts. I would not make any particular distinction of lodgments, only I would order the Streets so as that they might not be taken up by them. As to the other spaces betwixt the Streets, which would be four in all, I would assign them in general to all the said impediments, that is, one to the Butchers, another to

the Artificers and Masters of several Professions; a third to the carriages for Provisions; a fourth for the carriages for Arms. The Streets that I would have left free, should be the Street to the *Piazza*; the Front-Street, and another Street called the middle Street, which should begin in the North, and pass thorow the middle of the Market-street (or Street to the *Piazza*) towards the South, which on the West side should do the same service as the Traversè-street does on the East. And besides this, I would have another back-street along by the lodgments of the Pikes and the *Vahres* extraordinary, and I would have all these Streets thirty spaces wide. The Artillery I would place afterwards upon the trenches on the hinder part of the Camp.

*Battista.* I do acknowledge my ignorance, nor do I think it reproachful where it is not my profession to be otherwise; nevertheless I am very well pleased with your order, only I would desire you to resolve me two doubts; one is, why you make the Streets and the spaces about the lodgments so large; the other (which troubles me most) is, how you would employ the spaces which you design for the lodgments.

*Fabr.* You must understand I assign 30 yards to the breadth of the Streets, that a Battalia of foot may march together a breast; for (if you remember) I told you often that each Company took up in breadth betwixt 25 and 30 yards. That the space betwixt the trench and the lodgments should be 100 yards broad, is very necessary for drawing up the Battalia's, managing the Artillery, conveying and disposing of the booty, besides the convenience of retiring upon occasion, and making new Ramparts, and new Intrenchments within. Moreover, the lodgments are better at that distance from the trenches, as being farther from fire-works and other things which an enemy might cast in among them: as to your second demand, I do not intend that every space that I have designed for a lodgment should be covered with one Tent, or one Pavilion only, but that it should be employed as is most commodious for those who are to lodge there with more or fewer Tents as they please, provided they do not exceed their allowance of ground.

To make a just distribution of these lodgments, you must have persons that are well vers'd and experienced in that affair, and good Architects, who as soon as the General has made choice of his place, can immediately put it into form, distribute the lodgments by dividing the Streets, and distinguishing the places for the several lodgments with a cord and pikes thrust into the ground, with so much dexterity, that all things shall be presently in order. And if you would prevent confusion, you must turn your Camp always one way, that every man may know in what Street, and in what quarter he may find his Tent. This must be observable in all times and places, and in such manner that it may seem a moving City, which, where-ever it moves, carries with it the same Gates, the same Streets, the same Houses, and the same Figure; which is a thing that cannot be practis'd by those who make choice of places of natural strength, for they must frame their Camp according to the variety of the situation. But the *Romans* fortified their Camps with Trenches, and Ramparts, and Mounds; for they left a good space round about their Camp, and before it they made a ditch commonly six yards wide, and three yards deep. They made these spaces greater or less, according to the time which they design'd to stay there, or according to their apprehension of the Enemy: for my own part I would not enclose my Camp with Soccado's, unless I intend to winter in it: I would have my Trench and my Parapet not less than theirs, but bigger upon occasion. Upon every corner and side of the Camp I would raise a kind of half-moon, from whence my Artillery might play, and flank any Enemy that should attempt the ditch. In this exercise, to understand how to mark out a Camp, your men are to be trained frequently, and your other Officers are by practice to be made ready in designing, and your Soldiers as dexterous in knowing their own quarters, nor is there any great difficulty in it, as I shall shew else-where, for at present I shall pass to the Guards of the Camp, because without them all the other pains and punctilio's would be vain.

*Battista.* Before you proceed to the Guards, I would be informed when you would pitch your Camp near your Enemy, what method you would use; for I cannot imagine that you should have time enough to do it, without manifest danger.

*Fabr.* You must know no man incamps near an Enemy, but he who is desirous to fight when ever the Enemy will give him opportunity; and when the Enemy is disposed to it as well as he, the danger is no more than ordinary; for two parts of the Army are drawn out to fight, and the third orders the Camp. In this case the *Romans* committed the fortification and ordering of their Camp to the *Triarii*; whilst the *Principes* and *Hastati* stood to their Arms. And thus they did, because the *Triarii* being to fight last, had time (if the Enemy advanced) to leave their work, stand to their Arms, and fall every man into his place.

You,

You, if you would imitate the *Romans*, must cause your Camp to be made by the Battalia's in your Rear, which are instead of the *Triarii*; but now to the Guards of the Camp.

## CHAP. III.

*Of the several Watches and Guards about the Camp.*

*Fabr.* I Do not remember in History to have found that the Ancients for the security of the Camp in the night, did ever make use of out Guards or Sentinels without the Ditches, as we do now. The reason, as I take it, was because they thought the Army thereby might be easily surprized, by the difficulty of discerning their Sentinels, and Scouts; besides their Sentinels might be over-powered or corrupted by the Enemy; so that to rely upon them either in part or in whole, they concluded would be dangerous: wherefore all their Guards were within their Trenches, placed with such diligence and exactness, that it was no less than death for any man to desert his post. How these Guards were disposed by them, I think it unnecessary to relate, because if you have not seen it already, you may do it when you please; only this I shall tell you in short what I would do in the Case. I would have every night one third of the Army in Arms, and of them a fourth part upon the Guard, distributed all along the works, and in all convenient places quite thorow the Camp; with a main Guard in each of the four quarters of your Camp, of which a party should remain constantly upon the Guard, and another party should Petrole from one quarter to the other. And this order I would use likewise in the day time, if my Enemy was near. As for giving the word, and changing it every night, and other things which are observable in the like cases, I shall pass them by as notorious and known. One thing only I shall mention, as being of importance, and that which brings much advantage to any man that uses it, and as much disadvantage where it is neglected.

## CHAP. IV.

*To observe who goes and comes to the Camp.*

*Fabr.* HE who would be secure in his Camp, is to require notice with great exactness of all strangers that lodge in his Camp, and to have a strict account of all goers and comers; and this no hard matter to do, if the Tents be but viewed all along as they stand in their orders; because every lodgment has its precise and definitive number, and when you find them more or less than their proportion, let them be examined and punished. He who observes this course exactly, shall keep the Enemy from practising your Officers (at least without great difficulty) or from having knowledge of your affairs. Had not the *Romans* been very exact observers of this course, *Claudius Nero* (when *Hanibal* lay so near him) could never have stole so privately from his Camp in *Lucania*, and have marched into *la Marca*, and back again, before *Hanibal* had missed him.

## CHAP. V.

*Of Military Justice, and the methods used by the Ancients in the punishment of Offenders.*

*Fabr.* BUT it is not enough to contrive good orders, unless they be strictly observed, for severity is no where so requisite as in an Army: wherefore to keep your Soldiers to their duty, strict and severe Laws are to be made, and they are to be executed as strictly: The *Romans* punished it with death to be absent from the Guard, when it was a mans duty to be there. It was no less capital to abandon the place assigned him in Battel. To carry any thing privately out of his Quarters. To boast and appropriate to himself some great exploit, which he never did. To fight without the General's order. To throw away ones Arms in fear. If at any time it happened a whole Troop or Company had of-

fended in that nature, they were all put to death, but an imbursement was made of their names, and drawing them out by lots, every tenth man was executed. And this way of Decimation was used, that though all were not actually sensible, yet all might be affrighted. But because where the punishments are great, the rewards ought to be proportionable, that men may be as well encouraged as deterred, they ordain'd recompences for every remarkable exploit. As to him who in the fight, saved the life of a Citizen. He who first scal'd the Walls of an Enemies Town. He who first entred into the Enemies Camp. He who wounded or killed the Enemies General, or dismounted him from his Horse. By this means no signal act was performed, but it was recompensed by the Consul, and applauded publickly by the rest: and those who received any of these prizes for any generous act, (besides the glory and fame which they acquired among their fellow Soldiers) when they returned home into their Country, they exhibited them to the view of their Relations and Friends, and were received with great acclamation. It is not then to be admired if that people extended its Empire so far, being so far in their discipline, and in the observation of their punishments and rewards, towards such as by the generosity of their actions had merited the one, or by their offences the other; of which things I am of opinion the greatest part should be observed now. I think it not amiss to mention one of their punishments, and it was this; The Criminal being convict before the Tribune or Consul, was by him strook gently over the shoulders with a rod, after which the Malefactor had liberty to run, but as he had liberty to run, so the rest of the Soldiers had liberty to kill him if they could; so that immediately some threw stones at him, some darts, some strook him with their Swords, some with one thing, some with another, so that his life was but short, for seldom any escaped, and those who did escape could not return to their houses, but with so much ignominy and scandal, that they had much better have died. This sort of punishment is in some measure used still by the *Swissers* who cause those who are condemned, to pass thorow the Pikes, which is a punishment well contrived, and most commonly well executed; for he who would order things so that a man should not side, or defend a Malefactor, cannot do better, than to make him an instrument of his punishment; because with another respect he favours, and with another appetite he desires his punishment, when he is Executioner himself, than when the execution is committed to another. To the end then that a Malefactor may not be favoured by the people, nor upheld in his offence, the best remedy is to refer him to their judgment. To confirm this, the example of *Manlius Capitolinus* may be brought, who being accused by the Senate, was defended by the people, till they were made his Judges; but when his case fell once into their Cognizance, and they were made Arbitrators in the business, they condemn'd him to death. This then is the true way of punishing, to prevent Seditions, and execute Justice. But because neither fear of the Laws, nor reverence to men was sufficient to keep Soldiers to their duties, and to a just observation of their discipline, the Ancients added the fear and authority of God. For this cause they made their Soldiers to swear with great Ceremony and Solemnity to preserve their discipline, that if they transgress'd they might be in danger not only of humane Laws, but divine Justice, endeavouring by all industry to possess them with principles of Religion, however they were false.

*Barrist.* I pray satisfie me whether the *Romans* permitted any Women in their Armies, and whether they suffered their Soldiers to game, as we do now adays in ours.

## CHAP. VI.

*The Ancients had neither Women, nor Gaming in their Armies; and of the manner how they discamp'd.*

*Fabr.* **T**HE *Romans* allowed neither the one nor the other, and indeed it required no great difficulty to prevent them; for to speak truth, the exercises to which they kept the Soldier constantly, either in parties, or together were so many that they had no time either for dalliance or play, nor for any thing else that could make them mutinous or unserviceable.

*Barrista.* What you say pleases me very well: But pray tell me when your Army Discamps, what orders do you observe?

*Fabritio.* The General's Trumpet sounds three times: The first sound they take down the Tents, and the Pavillions, and pack them up: The second sound they load their Sumpters; and the third they march in the same order as I said before, with their Baggage and



and Train behind every Battalia, and the Legions in the midst. Then the Auxiliary Battalion moves, and it's Baggage and Train after it, and a fourth part of the common Baggage and Train, which should consist of all those who were lodged in either of the quarters, which I have shown before in the description of my Camp. Wherefore it was convenient that each of the said quarters should be assigned to a Battalion, that upon the motion of the Army every man might know in what place he was to march. So that every Battalion was to march with its own Baggage, and a fourth part of the common Baggage behind it, and this was the manner which the *Roman* Army observed in its march, as you may understand by what we have said.

*Battista.* Tell us I beseech you, in the placing of their Camps, did the *Romans* use any other customs besides what you have related?

## CHAP. VII.

*The safety and health of a Camp is to be regarded, and it is by no means to be besieged.*

*Fabr.* I Must tell you again that the *Romans* in their Encampments, were so constant to their old method, that to retain that they applied themselves with incredible diligence, nor regarding what pains, or what trouble it required: But two things they observed with a curiosity more than ordinary; one was to place their Camp in an Air that was healthful and fresh. And the other was to place it where the Enemy might not easily besiege them, or cut off their provisions. To avoid the unhealthfulness of the place they avoided all fenny and boggy places, or where the wind was cold and unwholsom, which unwholsomness they did not so much compute from the situation of the place, as from the complexion of the Inhabitants, and when they found them swarthy or blowsy, they never encamped there. As to the other thing, never to be besieged or streightned by an Enemy; you must consider the nature of the place both where your Friends are placed, and where your Enemies; and then to make your conjecture whether you can be besieged or no. It is necessary therefore a General be very skilful in the situation of the Country, and that he have those about him who understand it as well as he. Besides this, there is another way of preventing diseases, and that is by providing that no disorder be used in your Army; for to keep it sound and in health, the way is that your Army sleep in Tents, That they be lodged as often as may be under Trees that are shady, (where they may have firing to dress their meat) that they may not be obliged to march in the heat. So that in the Summer time you must dislodge them before day, and have a care in the Winter that they march not in the snow, nor upon the ice, without the convenience of fires. That they want not necessary cloths, nor be constrained to drink ill water; you must command the Physicians of the Army to have a particular care of those who are sick, for a General will find himself overlaid, when he is at once to contend with an Enemy and a Disease. But of all remedies, nothing is so powerful as exercise, and therefore it was a custom among the Ancients to exercise them continually. Think then of what importance exercise is, when in the Camp it keeps you sound, and in the Field it makes you Victorious.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Directions as to Provisions.*

*Fabr.* AS to Famine, you must not only have a care that the Enemy cannot cut off your Provisions; but you must consider from what place you may be supplied, and see that what you have already be not imbezled. It is convenient therefore that you have with you always a months Provision before hand, and then you are to oblige your Neighbours and Friends to furnish you daily with more. You must likewise have a good Magazine for Ammunition, in a strong place, which is to be distributed with great care, giving every man a reasonable proportion every day, and keep such an eye over it, that want of it may occasion no disorder; for in matters of War every thing else may be repaired in time, but hunger the longer it lasts, will the more certainly destroy you. Nor will any Enemy  
that

that can master you with Famine; ever seek to attack you with his Arms; because though the Victory be not so honourable, it is more easie and secure.

That Army therefore in which Justice is not observed: That Army which squanders and consumes lavishly as it pleases, cannot so well barricado, or fortifie its Camp, but that Famine will find the way in; for where Justice is neglected, Victuals is not constantly supplied; and where Soldiers are lavish and profuse, though they have plenty, it is quickly consumed: For this cause among the Ancients it was commanded that the Soldiers should eat what was given them, and at a prefixed time, for no Soldier durst eat but when the General went to dinner; but every body knows how little this is observed in our days, and if then the Soldiers might be justly term'd sober and orderly, they may now with as much justice be said to be licentious and debauched.

*Battista.* When you began first to order your Camp, you told us you would not confine your self to two Battalions, but take four, that you might shew us how a just and compleat Army was to be lodg'd: I desire therefore that you would satisfie me in two things: One is, when I have either more or less than four Battalions, how I am to dispose of them. The other is, what number of Soldiers would suffice you, to expect, and engage any Enemy whatever.

### CHAP. IX.

*How to lodge more or less than four Battalions, and what number of men is sufficient to make head against an Enemy, be he as numerous as he may.*

*Fabr.* TO your first demand I answer, that be your Army composed of more or less than four of six thousand men you may increase or lessen their lodgments as you please, and in the same manner, you may proceed to less or more *in infinitum*: Never, theless when the Romans joyn'd two Consular Armies together, they made two Camps, and turn'd the place of the unarmed men one against the other.

To your second demand I reply, That the ordinary Roman Army consisted of about 24000 men, but when by accident they were over-pressed with numbers, they never exceeded 30000, with this number they opposed 200000 Gauls which assaulted them after their first War with the Carthaginians; with this number they opposed themselves against Hannibal: and you must observe that the Romans and the Greeks, always carried on their Wars with a few men, fortifying themselves with their good order, and the excellence of their discipline; whereas the Eastern and Western Nations did all by their multitudes, but the Western people performed all by their natural fury, and the Eastern by their submission and obedience to their King. In Greece and in Italy where their natural fury, and their natural reverence to their King was not so great, it was necessary to apply themselves to discipline, which was of such efficacy, that it has made a small Army prevail against the fury and natural obstinacy of a greater. I say therefore that if you would imitate the Romans and the Greeks, you are not to exceed the number of 50000 men, but rather to be fewer, because more do but breed confusion, and hinder the order and discipline that you have learn'd. Pyrrhus used ordinarily to say, that with 15000 men he would go thorow the world.

But let us pass now to another part of our discipline.

### CHAP. X.

#### *Certain Artifices, and Advertisements of War.*

*Fabr.* WE have gained a Battel with our Army, and shown most of the accidents which may happen in it: We have caused it to march, and discour'd with what impediments it might be incumbered in its march, and at length we have brought it to its Camp, where it is to take not only a little repose after its travel and fatigues, but consider and deliberate how it is to finish the War. For in the Camp many things are to be considered, especially there being an Enemy in the Field, and Towns to be suspected, of which it is good to secure your self, and to reduce such as are in hostility. It is necessary therefore

therefore to come to some demonstrations, and pass these difficulties with the same glory and honour with which we have proceeded thus far. To descend therefore to particulars, I say, that if many people or persons have any thing in controversy betwixt them to your advantage, and their own detriment, (as if they should beat down the walls of their City, or send several of their Citizens into banishment) you must cajole them in such manner that none of them may think it has any relation to them, to the end that neither of them relieving one another, they may all of them be oppressed without remedy; or else you must command all of them what they are to do the same day, that each of them believing himself particularly commanded, may think rather of obeying than looking out for a remedy; and by that means your commands be executed without sedition or disorder. If you suspect the fidelity of a people, and would assure your self of them, and surprize them unawares, you cannot do better than to communicate some design with them, desire their assistance, and pretend to some farther enterprize, without the least ombrage or suspicion of them: and by doing so, (not imagining you have any jealousy of him) he will neglect his own defence, and give you opportunity of effecting your designs.

If you suspect that there is any body in your Army that gives advice of your designs to the enemy; the best way to make your advantage of his treachery, is, to impart some things to him which you never intend to do; and to conceal what you intend; to pretend doubts where you are perfectly resolved; and to conceal other things that you have absolutely determined: by this means you will put the Enemy upon some enterprize (upon presumption that he knows your designs) in which you may easily circumvent and defeat him.

If you resolve (as *Claudius Nero* did) to lessen your Army, and send relief to your friend so privately that the Enemy should not perceive it; you must not take down your Tents, nor diminish the number of your Huts; but keep up your Ensigns and preserve your ranks intire, with the same fires and guards as before. If any supplies come up suddenly to your Army, and you would not have your Enemy perceive you are reinforced, you must not augment the number of your Tents; for nothing is more useful than to keep such accidents secret. *Metellus* being in *Spain* with his Army; one took the confidence to demand of him what he intended to do the next day: He replied, *That if he thought his shirt knew, he would burn it.* *Marcus Crassus* being asked by one when he would discamp, answered him, *Are you the only man that think you that will not hear the Trumpets?*

If you design to understand the secrets of your Enemy, and to know his order and condition; you must do as others have done, send Embassadors to him, with wise and experienced Soldiers in their Train, who may take their opportunity to view his Army, and consider his strength and weakness so; as may give occasion to overcome him. Some have pretended to banish some one of their Confidants, and by that means had information of his Enemies designs. They are discovered likewise sometimes by the taking of prisoners; *Marinus* whilst he was at War with the *Cimbrians*, to feel the fidelity of the *Gauls*, (who at that time inhabited *Lombardy*, and were in League with the *Romans*) sent to them two sorts of Letters, one open, the other seal'd. In the Letters that were open, he writ that they should not open those which were sealed till such a time as he directed, before which time he sent for them again, and finding them open, he found he was to repose no confidence there.

## CHAP. XI.

*How to rid ones self of an Army that is pressing upon ones heels.*

*Fabr.* Several Generals have been invaded, and not marched their Army immediately against the Enemy, but made an inroad into his Country, and constrained him to return to defend it; and this way has many times succeeded, because yours are flesh'd with victory, and loaden with plunder, whilst the Enemy is terrified, and instead of a hopeful victory, like to go by the loss: so that they who have used this kind of diversion, have many times prospered. But this is practicable only to those whose Country is stronger than the Enemies Country; for if it be otherwise, that diversion is pernicious. If a General be block'd up in his Camp by the Enemy, he cannot do better than to propose an accord, or at least a truce with him for some days, for that makes your Enemy the more negligent in every thing; of which negligence you may take your advantage, and give him the slip. By this way *Silla* disintangled himself twice, and cleared himself of his Enemies: by the same

same Artifice *Asdrubal* extricated himself in *Spain* from the forces of *Claudius Nero* who had block'd him up; it would likewise contribute much to the freeing a man from the power of the Enemy, to do something (besides what has been said already) that may keep him in suspense. And this is to be done two ways, by assailing him with part of your forces, that whilst he is employed upon them, the rest may have time to preserve themselves. There is another way likewise, and that is by contriving some new thing or other that may amuse or astonish the Enemy, and render him uncertain which way he is to steer: so *Hanibal* served *Fabius Maximus* when he had shut him up on the mountains; for causing little wisps of brush-wood to be tied to the horns of several Oxen, he set them on fire; and *Fabius* not understanding the depth of the stratagem, supposing it worse than it was, kept upon his guard within his Camp, and suffered him to pass.

## C H A P. XII.

*How a man may make a Princes Favourite suspected, and divide his Forces.*

A General above all things is to endeavour to divide the Enemies Forces, either by rendering his Confidents suspicious; or by giving him occasion to separate his Troops, and by consequence weaken himself. The first is done by preserving the Estates or Goods of those he has about him; as in time of War, to spare their Houses, or Possessions; and returning their Children or Relations safe, and without ransom. You know when *Hanibal* burned all about *Rome*, he exempted what belonged to *Fabius Maximus*. You know how *Coriolanus* coming with a strong Army to besiege *Rome*, preserved the Possessions of the Nobility. *Metellus* being at the head of an Army against *Jugurtha*, moved it to the Embassadors which the Enemy sent to him, to deliver up *Jugurtha* Prisoner, and writing Letters to them afterwards to the same purpose, he continued his Correspondence till *Jugurtha* got the alarm, suspected his whole Counsel, and made them away after several manners.

When *Hanibal* was fled to *Antiochus*, the Roman Embassadors practised so cunningly, that *Antiochus* grew jealous, and trusted him no farther.

As to the way of dividing the Enemy, there is not any more certain than to cause an incursion to be made upon his Country, that he may be constrained to leave the War, and go back to defend himself. This was the way which *Fabius* used when he had an Army against him of *French* and *Tuscans*, *Umbrians* and *Samnites*. *Titus Didius* having a small Army in respect of the Enemy, expecting another Legion from *Rome*, which the Enemy was desirous to intercept; he gave out in his Army that the next day he would give the Enemy Battel, and ordered it so, that certain Prisoners which he had in his Camp at that time, took their opportunity to escape, and gave intelligence to the Enemy that the Consul had given orders to fight; upon which news, that they might not lessen their Forces, they did not march against the other Legion, and by that means it was preserved; some there have been who to divide or weaken the force of their Enemy, have suffered him to enter into their Country, and possess himself of several Towns, that by putting Garrisons into them, he may lessen his Army, and give them occasion to attack and defeat him. Others designing against one Province, have pretended to invade another, and used such industry in the business, that being entred unexpectedly into that Country, they have conquered it before the Enemy had time to relieve it: for the Enemy being uncertain whether you will return back and invade the Country which you threatned before, is constrained to keep his Post, and not to leave one place to secure another, and it falls out many times that he is unable to defend either the one or the other.

## C H A P. XIII.

*In what manner seditions and mutinies in an Army are to be appeas'd.*

*Fabr.* BESIDES what has been said already, it is of great use and reputation to a General, if he knows how to compose mutinies and dissentions in his Army. The best way is by punishing the Ringleaders, but then it is to be done so neatly, that they may have their reward before they have news that it is intended. The way to do that is, if they be at any distance, to summon both nocent and innocent together, that they thinking themselves safe, and not in danger of any punishment, may not be refractory, and stand upon their guard, but put themselves quietly into your hands to be punished. If they be present, and at hand, the General is to make himself as strong as he can with those who are innocent, and others in whom he can confide, and then punish as he thinks fit. When the quarrel is private, and among themselves, the best way is to expose them to danger, and let them fight if they think good; for the fear of that does many times reconcile them. But above all things, there is nothing that keeps an Army so unanimous as the reputation of the General, which proceeds principally from his courage; for it is neither birth nor authority can do it without that.

The chief thing incumbent upon a General is to pay well, and punish well; for whenever the Soldiers want pay, 'tis but reasonable that they should want punishment; for you cannot in justice chastise any exorbitance in a Soldier, when you disappoint him of his pay; nor can he forbear stealing, unless he be willing to starve: but if you pay, and do not punish them, they are insolent again; and you will become despicable in holding a Command that you are not able to manage, and by not maintaining your dignity and authority, of necessity tumults and disorders must follow, which will be the utter ruine of your Army.

## C H A P. XIV.

*How the Ancients relied much upon their auguries, and other accidents.*

*Fabr.* THE Generals of old were subject to one molestation, from which in our days we are exempt: and that is how to pervert an ill augury, and interpret it to their advantage: for if an Arrow fell down in an Army: if the Sun or the Moon was Eclipsed: if there hapned an Earth-quake, or it was the General's fortune to fall down, either as he got up on horse-back, or dismounted, it was look'd upon by the Soldiers as an ill omen, and was the occasion of such fear in them, that coming afterwards to a Battel they were easily beaten: and therefore the Generals in times past when such an accident hapned, immediately gave some reason for it, and referr'd it to some natural cause, or else wrested and perverted it to their own profit and advantage.

*Cæsar* passing over into *Africa*, tumbling down upon the ground as he came out of the Ship, grasping the grass in his hands, he cryed out, *Teneo te O Africa; Africa you are mine, for I have you in my hands.* And several others have given reasons (according to their own interest) for the Earth-quakes and Eclipses of the Moon: but in our days these artifices cannot pass, because our men are not now so superstitious, and our Religion explodes such opinions as heathenish and vain: but whenever we should be so blind as to reassume those superstitions, we must revive the custom of the Ancients.

## C H A P. XV.

*That we are not to fight with an Enemy reduced to despair; and several arts that may be used to surprize him.*

*Fabr.* **W**hen famine, natural necessity, or human passion has brought your Enemy to such despair, that impelled by that, he marches furiously to fight with you, you must keep within your Camp, and decline fighting as much as possibly you can. The *Lacedemonians* acted in that manner against the *Messeni*; *Cæsar* did the same against *Africanus* and *Petresus*. When *Fulvius* was Consul against the *Cimbrians*, he caused his horse to attack the Enemy for several days together; and observing in what numbers they came forth to engage them, he placed an ambush one day behind their Camp, caused them again to be assaulted; and the *Cimbrians* issuing forth in their old numbers to encounter them; *Fulvius* fell in the mean time upon their Camp, entred it, and sack'd it. Some Generals have made great advantage (when they lye near the Enemies Army) to send out parties with the Enemies Colours to plunder their own Country; for the Enemy supposing them supplies sent to relieve them, have issued forth to meet them, and assist them to plunder, whereby they have been put to disorder, and given opportunity to the adversary to overthrow them. *Alexander* of *Epirus* did the same against the *Sclavonians*: and *Leptene* the *Syracusan* against the *Carthaginians*, and both with success: many have been too hard for their Enemies by giving them opportunity of eating and drinking too much, making a shew of being afraid, and leaving their Camp full of wine and provisions; with which the Enemy having gorg'd himself without measure, the others have fallen upon them with advantage, and put them to the sword. *Tomyris* provided such an entertainment for *Cyrus*; and *Tiberius Gracchus* regall'd the *Spaniards* in the same manner: others have poisoned their meat and their drink, to ruine the Enemy that way the more easily. I said before, that I did not find it in any History that the *Romans* did ever in the night place any Centinels without their Camp, supposing they omitted it to prevent the mischiefs that might ensue; for it has been often seen that the Centinels which are placed abroad in the day time to hear and descry the Enemy, have been the destruction of those who have sent them; for being often times surprized by the Enemy, they have been forced to give the signal with which they were to call their own men, and they coming immediately according to the sign, have been all killed, or taken prisoners.

To over-reach and circumvent an Enemy, it is good sometimes to vary your custom, that the Enemy depending upon it, may be disappointed and ruined. Thus it happened with a General, who being accustomed to give the signal of the approach of the Enemy in the night by fire, and in the day time by smoke; commanded that they should make smoke and fire together without intermission; and that when the Enemy came, they should put them both out; the Enemy supposing he was not perceived, (because he saw no signal given) marched on in disorder, and gave his Adversary the victory.

*Memnon* the *Rhodian* desiring to draw his Enemy out of his strong hold, sent one by the way of a fugitive into their Army, with news that *Memnon's* Army was in a mutiny, and that the greatest part of them were gone from him; and to confirm it the more, he caused disorders and tumults to be pretended in his Camp; whereupon the Enemy taking encouragement, advanced out of his hold to attack *Memnon*, but was cut off himself.

Besides the things above-mentioned, great care is to be had never to bring your Enemy to despair. *Cæsar* was very cautious of this in his War with the *Germans*, and opened a way for them, when he saw that not being able to fly, they must of necessity fight, and that more courageously than otherwise; wherefore he chose rather the trouble of pursuing them when they fled, than the danger of fighting them when they were forced to defend themselves. *Lucullus* observing a party of his horse going over to the Enemy, caused a Charge to be sounded immediately, and commanded other parties to follow them; whereupon the Enemy believing *Lucullus* intended to fight, sent out a party to charge those *Macedonians* who were running away; and they did it so effectually, that the *Macedonians* were glad to stand upon their guard, by which means of fugitives intended, they became good Subjects in sight of their teeth.

## CHAP. XVI.

*How a suspected Town or Country is to be secured, and how the Peoples hearts are to be gained.*

*Fabr.* IT is a great thing in a General to secure a Town that you suspect; either after a Victory or before; as several ancient examples do demonstrate: *Pompey* being jealous of the *Capinenses*, beg'd of them that they would give entertainment to some of his sick men, and under the disguise of sick, sending stout and valiant men, they surprized the Town, and kept it for *Pompey*. *Publius Valerius* was diffident of the *Epidauri*, and caused a General indulgence to be given in one of the Churches without the Town, the people thronging thither for pardon; he shut the Gates upon them, and received none back again but such as he could trust. *Alexander* the great being to march into *Asia*, and by the way secure himself of *Thrace*; carried along with him all the principal persons of that Province; giving them commands in his Army, and leaving the people to be governed by those of their own condition; by which means he satisfied all parties; the Nobility by paying them, and the Populace, by leaving no Governor that would oppress them. But among all the ways wherewith the people are to be cajoled; nothing goes so far as examples of chastity and justice, as that of *Scipio* in *Spain*, when he returned a beautiful young Lady to her Parents, and Husband untouched, a passage that contributed more than his Arms to the subduktion of that Country. *Cæsar* only for paying for the wood which he caused to be cut down to make *Stoccardoes* about his Camp in *France*, got such a name for his justice, that it facilitated the Conquest of that Province. I know not now that there remains any thing to say further about these accidents; or that there is any thing which we have not already examined. If there be any thing, it is the way of taking and defending of Towns, which I am willing to show, were I sure I should not be tedious.

*Battista.* Your civility is so great, that it makes us pursue our desires without the least fear of presumption; for you have offered us that frankly, which we should have been ashamed to have requested. We do assure you therefore you cannot do us a greater favour than to finish this Discourse; but before you proceed, let me entreat you to resolve me; whether it be better to continue a War all Winter long (as they do now adays) or carry it on only in the Summer, and in the Winter go to their Quarters.

## CHAP. XVII.

*War is not to be continued in the Winter.*

*Fabr.* O Bserve Gentlemen, had it not been for the prudence of *Battista*, a very considerable part of our Discourse had been omitted: I tell you again that the Ancients did every thing with more prudence and discretion than we, who if we be defective in any thing, are much more in matters of War.

Nothing is more imprudent and dangerous for a General than to begin a War in the Winter; and he who is the aggressor is more liable to miscarry, than he that is invaded. The reason is this, all the industry employed in Military Discipline, consists in preparing your men and putting them into order for a Battel. That is it, at which a General is principally to aim, because a Battel does commonly decide the business, whether it be lost or won. He therefore who knows best how to put his Army in order, and he who knows best how to prepare and equip them, has doubtless the advantage, and is in most hopes to overcome. On the other side, nothing is more inconsistent with good order than steep places, or cold rainy weather; for steep places will not suffer you to open or extend your ranks according to discipline; cold and wet weather will not permit you to keep your men together, nor present them in close order before the Enemy, but constrains you of necessity, to lodge them up and down, asunder without order, at the mercy of all the Castles, and Towns, and Villages that receive you; so that all the pains you have taken to discipline your Army, is (for that time) utterly useless.

Do not admire, if now adays we make War in the Winter, for our Armies being without discipline, it is not to be imagined what inconveniences they suffer by not being quartered



tered together; for it troubles them not, that they cannot keep those orders, and observe that discipline which they never had. Yet it ought seriously to be considered what prejudice has followed upon encampments in the Winter: and it ought likewise to be remembered that the *French* in the year 1503. were broken and ruined near *Garigliano*, rather by the extremity of the weather, than the magnanimity of the *Spaniards*. For as I told you before, the Invador is under greatest incommodity, as being more exposed to the weather in an Enemies Country, than at home: for to keep his men together he is necessitated to endure the cold and the rain; on to avoid it, to divide his men, which is mightily to expose them. But he who is upon the defensive part can choose his place and his way, attend him with fresh men, which he can joyn in a moment, and fall upon some party of the Enemies with such fury, as they will not be able to endure the shock. It was the weather therefore which disordered the *French*, and 'tis the weather that will always ruine any man that begins War in Winter, if his adversary have any share of discretion. He therefore who would have his force, his order, his discipline, and his courage of no use or advantage to him, let him keep the Field, and carry on his War in the Winter: For the *Romans* (who desired all those things in which they employed their industry and diligence should be useful to them) avoided the incommodities of Winter, as much, as the asperities of the Alps, the difficulty of places, and whatever else might hinder them from showing their dexterity and courage. And thus much as to your demand, we will discourse now of taking and defending of Towns, and of their Natural, and Artificial strength.

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## THE SEVENTH BOOK.

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### C H A P. I.

#### *How Towns, or Castles are to be fortified.*

*Fabr.* **Y**OU must understand that Towns and Castles are strong two ways, by Nature or by Art. They are strong by Nature which are encompassed by Rivers or Fens, (as *Manua*, and *Ferrara*) or seated upon some Rock, or craggy Mountain (as *Monaco*, and *Sanleo*) for other places seated upon Mountains, if not difficult of access, are in our days rather weaker than otherwise, in respect of our Artillery and Mines; and therefore at present being to build a City, or erect a Fort that may be strong, we choose to do it in a Plain, and fortifie it artificially with Ramparts and Bastions, and our first care is to make the Walls crooked and retort, with several Vaults and places of receipt, that if the Enemy attempts to approach, he may be opposed and repulsed as well in the flank as the front: If your Walls be made too high, they are too obnoxious to the Cannon; if they be too low, they are easily scaled; if you make a Ditch before the Wall, to make the *Scalado* more difficult, the Enemy fills it up (which with a great Army is no hard matter) and makes himself Master immediately. My opinion therefore is this, (but with submission to better judgments) that to provide against both inconveniencies the best way will be to make your Wall high, and a Ditch on the inside rather than without; and this is the strongest way that you can build, because it keeps you both from their Artillery and assaults, and gives the Enemy no capacity of filling up the Ditch. Your Wall then is to be of the best height you can contrive; three yards thick at the least to resist their Batteries; it is to have Towers and Bulwarks at the distance of every 200 yards. The Ditch within is to be thirty yards broad at least, and twelve in depth; and all the earth which is taken out of the Ditch is to be thrown towards the Town,

Town, against a Wall which is to be brought for that purpose from the bottom of the Ditch, and carried up a man's height above the ground, which will make the Ditch more deep and secure. Towards the bottom of the Ditch every two hundred yards, I would have a Casemat from whence the Artillery may scour, and play upon any body that shall descend. The great Guns which are used for the defence of a Town, are to be planted behind the Wall on the inside of the Ditch; for to defend the first wall, Falcons and such small Pieces are easier managed, and do as good Execution. If the Enemy comes to scale you, the height of the first Wall defends you easily: If he comes with his Artillery, he must batter down the first Wall, and when he has done that, it being Natural in all Batteries for the Wall and rubbish to fall outward, there being no Ditch without to swallow and receive it, the ruines of the Wall will encrease the Depth of the Ditch, in such manner as that you cannot get forward, being obstructed by the Ruines, hindered by the Ditch, and interrupted by the Enemies great Guns within the Walls that do great slaughter upon you. The only remedy in this case is to fill up the Ditch, which is very hard in respect of its dimensions, and the danger in coming to it, the Wall being crooked, and Vaulted, and full of Angles, among which there is no coming without manifest hazard, for the reasons above said; and to think to march with Faggots over the ruines, and to fill it up that way is a chimerical thing; so that I conclude a City so fortified is not to be taken.

*Battista.* If one should make a Ditch without, besides that within the Wall, would not your Town be the stronger?

*Fabr.* Yes, without doubt; but my meaning is, if one Ditch only be to be made, it is better within than without.

*Battista.* Would you have Water in your Ditch, or would you rather have it dry?

*Fabr.* Opinions are divided in that point; for Ditches with water are more secure against Mines, and Ditches without are harder to be filled up: But upon consideration of the whole, I would have them without water, because they are more secure; for it has been seen, that the freezing of the Ditch in the Winter has been the taking of many a Town, as it hapned at *Mirandola* when Pope *Julius* besieged it: And to prevent Mines, I would carry my Ditch so low, that whoever would think to work under it, should come to the water. Castles I would build (as to my Ditches and Walls) in the same manner, that they might have as much trouble who stormed them. But let me give one caution to any man who defends a City, and it is this, that he makes no redoubts without, at any distance from the Wall, and another to him that builds and fortifies a Castle, and that is, that he makes no works within for retreats in case the first Wall be taken.

The reason that makes me give this Counsel is, because no man ought to do that which may lessen his reputation at first; for the diminution of that makes all his other orders contemptible, and discourages those who have undertaken his defence. And this that I say will always happen when you make Bastions without, and oblige your self to defend them, they will certainly be lost, for such small things being now adays to contend with the fury of Artillery, 'tis impossible they should hold out, and the loss of them being a lessening to your reputation, the lessening of your reputation will be the loss of the place. When *Genoa* rebelled against *Lewis* King of *France*, he caused certain Bastions to be erected upon the Hills which were about the Walls, which Bastions were no sooner lost (and they were lost presently) but the City was taken.

As to my second advice, I do affirm that there is nothing so pernicious to a Castle as to have those works of retreat; for the hopes that men have of preserving themselves by deserting their Posts, makes them abandon them often, and the loss of their Posts, is afterwards the loss of the Fort. We have a fresh example of this in the taking of the Castle at *Furli*, when the Countess *Catharina* defended it against *Cæsar Borgia*, the Son of *Alexander VI.* who had brought the *French* Army before it. This Castle was full of those retreats; for first there was a Citadel, then a Fortress, and betwixt both a good Ditch with a draw bridge. The Castle within was divided into three parts, and each part strongly separated from the other with Ditches and Water, and Draw-bridges by which they communicated. As soon as the Duke had made his approaches, he with his great Guns battered one part of the Castle, and laid open a good part of the Wall; whereupon *Giovanni da Casale* who had the command of that quarter, never stood to make good the breach, but left it to retire into another part, so that the Enemy having entered the first quarter with little difficulty, it was not long before they made themselves Masters of all, by securing the Draw-bridges (in the hurry) which conveyed them one to another: This Castle therefore which was thought inexpugnable was lost by two faults; one was for having so many Redoubts, the other was because none of them commanded the Bridges; the ill contrivance therefore of the Fortress, and the imprudence of him that defended it, was a shame and

and disappointment of the magnanimous enterprize of the Countess, who had the courage to expect an Army which neither the King of *Naples*, nor the Duke of *Milan* had the confidence to attend. Yet though she miscarried in her designs, she reaped the honour which her magnanimity deserved, as appeared by many Epigrams composed in those times in her praise. If then I were to erect a Fort, I would do it with as strong Walls, and with as good Ditches as I have prescribed; and within it, I would build only houses for habitation, and those low and weak, and such as should not hinder the prospect of all the Walls, from those who were in the *Piazza*; that the Commander might have the advantage to discern with his eye from the main guard, whither he was to direct his supplies, and that every man might understand when the Wall and the Ditch was lost, the Castle was not to be kept. And when I made any redoubts and retrenchments within, I would do it in such manner that they should each of them command the Bridges which should be rais'd upon Pillars in the middle of the Ditch.

*Battista.* You have said that small places are not to be defended in our days, and I suppose I have heard quite contrary; that is to say, the lesser a place is, the better it is defensible.

*Fabrizio.* You were then misinformed, for no place can be now adays strong, where the defenders have not room for new Ramparts and Retrenchments to retire to; for such is the fury of the Artillery, that he who presumes upon the protection of one Wall or one Rampart, will find himself deceived. And because Bastions or Forts (provided they do not exceed their just measure, for in that case they will be rather Castles and Towns) are not made in such manner that there is space to retreat, they must presently be lost. It is wisdom therefore to place these Bastions without, and to fortifie within, especially the entries into the Towns, and to secure the Gates with Ravelins, so as that no body may come in or go out in a direct line, and that from the Ravelin to the Gate there may be a Ditch with a Draw-bridge. The Gates are to be fortified with Portcullisses, to receive their men back again into the Town when they have gone out to engage the Enemy, and when it happens that they are repulsed, and the Enemy pursues, that they may distinguish betwixt their own men and the Enemy, and prevent their entering Pell-mell amongst them. To this purpose Portcullisses (which the Ancients called *Cateratta* or Pigion-holes) were invented, which being let down excluded the Enemy, and preserved their Friends, whereas without them, neither Bridges nor Gates would be of any use, being possessed by the multitude.

*Battista.* I have seen these Portcullisses of which you speak in *Germany*; and they were made of bars of wood in the fashion of Iron Gates, whereas ours are made of massy Rafter of Girders all of a piece, now I would willingly be informed from whence this difference proceeded, and which is most effectual.

*Fabr.* I tell you again, that the ways, and customs and orders of War are laid aside all the world over, in respect of what was used among the Ancients, but in *Italy* they are utterly forgot, and if there be any thing better than other, we have it from the *Ultramontani*, or Northern Nations. You may have heard, and perhaps some of these Gentlemen may remember how weakly we fortified before the coming of *Charles 8.* into *Italy*, in the year 1494. The battlements of our Walls were made but half a yard thick; the Port-holes for our great Guns, and Musquets or small Shot were made narrow without, wide within, with many other defects which I shall forbear to mention, lest I should become tedious; for those thin battlements were quickly beaten down, and our Guns were as easily dismounted,

But now adays we have learn'd of the *French* to make our Battlements large and thick, and our Port-holes large within, close again in the middle, and wide again without; by which means our Artillery are not so easily dismounted, nor our Soldiers beaten from their Works. Besides these the *French* have several other good ways, which our Soldiers have not seen, and so have not so much as considered; and among the rest those open Portcullisses like grates is one, and they are much better than ours, for if to defend and fortifie your Gate, you have a close Portcullis, when you let it down to keep out the Enemy, you shut up your selves, and cannot afterwards do him any hurt, so that with Pick-axes, Hatchets, Petards, or Fire, he may do what he please without any interruption. But if your Portcullis be made Lattice-wise and transparent, when it is let down thorough the holes and intervals you may defend it with your Pikes, small Shot, or any other kind of Arms.

*Battista.* I have observed in *Italy* another Northern invention, and that is to make the wheels of your Carriages for your great Guns with spokes crooked or bending towards the Axel-tree; Now I would gladly know the reason of that way, because to me the straight-spokes seem stronger.

*Fabr.*

*Fabr.* Do not imagine that things which deviate from common use, are done by accident; or if you fancy they were made in that fashion for beauty, you are mistaken; for where force and strength is required, they never stand upon beauty; but the reason why they were changed, was because these kind of spokes are much more secure and strong; and the reason they are stronger is this; when a Carriage is loaden, it is either equally poiz'd, or hang'd too much on one side. When it is equally poiz'd, the wheels bear equally, and the weight being equally distributed, does not burthen them much: But when it inclines to one side, the weight lies all upon one of the wheels: If the spokes be made straight, they are easily broken, for when ever the wheel bends, the spokes bend with it, as being unable to keep up the weight, so that when the weight is well poiz'd, or is otherwise but moderate, your straight spokes are strong enough, but when your Carriage goes awry, and enclines to one side, they are too weak to support it. On the contrary, the spokes of your *French* Carriages that are made bending, are made so with great reason, for when a Carriage enclines to one side, the spokes on that side being made bending, will come to be straight, and will be able to sustain the whole weight better, than when it hangs equal, and (being crooked) bears but half. But to return to our Towns and our Castles. The *French*, besides what we have mentioned, have another way of securing their Gates, and for the falling and retiring of their Soldiers during a Siege, than I have yet seen practis'd in *Italy*: and it is this, On the outward point of the Draw-bridge they set up two Pillars, and upon each of them they fasten a beam in such manner that one half of it hangs over the Bridge, and the other half without. Then that part which is without the Bridge, they joyn together with Cross bars like a grate, and to the end of each of the beams that hang over the Bridge, they fasten a chain: when therefore they would shut up the Bridge, so as no body should come in from without, they loosen the chains, and let down that part of it that is made with cross bars, which shuts up the Bridge; when they would open the Bridge, they draw the chains, and that part comes up again, and it is to be raised gradually, so as to receive a man on Foot, and no Horse, or a Horseman as they please, and it is raised or let down with unimaginable dexterity. This way is better than your Portcullisses, because they can hardly be hindered by the Enemy from being let down, not falling in a direct line as your Percullisses do, which are easily stop'd by putting any thing under them. They then who would make a Town strong, are to do it in the same manner as I have prescribed.

Moreover they are to prohibit Cultivation or building within a Mile round; all should be a plain without any Hills, Houses, Banks or Trees to hinder the prospect of the besieged, or give any shelter to the Enemy in his approaches. And you must know that where the Duch is without the Walls, and there are eminencies above the level of the Country, that Town is but weak; for those eminencies are blinds to the Enemy in their approaches, and when they are possess'd, they are convenient for their Batteries: But let us pass on and come into the Town.

## CHAP. II.

*What order is to be observed by him who shuts himself up in a Town, with resolution to defend it.*

*Fabr.* I Will not lose so much time as to shew you how convenient it is (besides what has been said before) to have your Stores of Ammunition and Victuals, because they are things that every body knows cannot be wanted, and without them all other Provisions are vain. Two things then are generally to be observed, you are to secure what you can possibly to your self, and to prevent the Enemy of any Commodity, especially in your own Precincts. Wherefore if there be any Straw, or Corn, or Cattle that you cannot carry off into the Town, you must be sure to destroy it. He who undertakes the defence of a Town is likewise to observe this order, not to suffer any thing to be done tumultuously and disorderly, and to provide that upon every accident, every man may know what he is to do, and the way is by causing the Women, Children, old, lame and infirm to keep within their Houses, and leave the Town to be defended by those who are vigorous and strong, who being armed as is requisite, are to be distributed into all places, some upon the Walls, some at the Gates, some in the principal places of the City, to relieve their Companions upon any distress; another party there should be likewise, not obliged to any particular place, but always ready to succour where necessity is required; and things being thus ordered,

scarce any Sedition can happen to disorder you. Again, there is one thing I will recommend to your memories, both in the besieging and defending of a Town. And that is, that there is nothing animates an Enemy so much, or gives him such hopes of carrying a Town, as when he knows his adversary has not been used to the sight of an Enemy; for many times fear only without any experiment of their strength, has caused a Town to be surrendered: He therefore who comes before a City so qualified is to make all the shows and ostentations of terror that he can; and on the other side, he who is assaulted, is to oppose men of resolution and courage, and such as are not to be terrified with shows, nor any thing but force and violence of Arms; for if the first brunt be sustained, the besieged are encouraged, and the besiegers will have no hopes left but in their reputation and valour.

The Ancients had several instruments of War with which they defended their Towns, as Rats, Scorpions, Bows, Slings, Clubs, &c. Again, they had several Engines which they used in their Leaguers, as Rams, Towers of wood, *Vinea*; They had also their *Fals*, their *Pluteum*, *Testudo*, and others; instead of which, we now make use of Artillery which is useful both for him that is besieged, as well as him that besieges. But to return.

### CHAP. III.

*Advertisements for such as are distressed for Provisions within a Town, and for such as besiege them, and would reduce them to that necessity.*

*Fabr.* HE who takes upon him the defence of a Town, is to see such provision made both of Victuals and Ammunition; that he may be in no danger of losing it, either by Starving or Storm. As to Starving (as is said before) it is necessary before the siege be laid, that you furnish your self well with Victuals; but because such provision cannot be made, but a long siege may exhaust it, you must betake to extraordinary ways, and look out for friends that may relieve you, especially if you have a River running thorow the Town. Thus the *Romans* did when their friends were besieged by *Hambal* in the Castle of *Catalino*, for not being able to relieve them otherwise, they flung great quantities of Nuts into the River which were carried down by the stream in despite of the Enemy, and gave the Garrison very good relief. Some who have been besieged, to make their Enemy believe that they had plenty of Corn, and render them desperate of carrying them by starving, have thrown bread over their Walls; or else given Corn to some of their Cows, and suffered her afterwards to be taken by the Enemy, that when they kill'd her, they might find Corn in her paunch, and conclude that Corn was as plentiful in the Town as in the Camp. On the other side, wise Generals have used as much Art and Stratagem for the reduction of Towns: *Fabius* permitted the *Campani* to sow their ground, that presuming upon it, they might make no other provision, and he came afterwards and utterly destroyed it.

*Dionysius* having besieged *Rhegium*, pretended a Treaty, and whilst things were in transaction, he provided himself with Victuals with all possible diligence, but when he had effectually supplied himself, he brake off the Treaty, block'd them up again, and constrained them to surrender.

*Alexander* the great being desirous to reduce *Lucadia*, he took, plundered, and destroyed all the Castles about it, but gave the Garrisons safe Conduct to *Lucadia*, by which Policy he so throng'd them with men, that their numbers quickly distress'd them, and they were forced to surrender.

### CHAP. IV.

*Other Advertisements both for the Besiegers and the Besieged.*

*Fabr.* IN matters of assault, I say, the first thing to be provided against, is the Enemies first Effort; for by that way the *Romans* gain'd many a Town, assauking it suddenly, and in all places at once, and this they called *Aggredi urbem Corona*, or to make a general assault, as *Scipio* did when he took new *Carthage* in *Spain*. But if the Besieged can stand the first shock, it gives him such courage, he will hardly be taken afterwards.

And

And if things should go so far, that a breach should be made, and the enemy enter; yet the Citizens have their remedy if they will stand to one another: for many Armies have been repelled and defeated after they have entered a Town. The remedy is this, that the Inhabitants make good the highest places of the City, and fire upon them from the windows and tops of their houses. But against this the Assailers have made use of two inventions, one was to open the Gates of the City, and give the Inhabitants opportunity to escape; The other is, to make Proclamation, that whoever throws down his Arms, shall have quarter, and none put to the Sword but such as are taken in Arms; and this artifice has been the taking of many a Town. Moreover a Town is taken with more ease, when it is so suddenly attacked, as when an Army keeps at such a distance, as that the Town believes either you will not at all, or cannot attempt it before they shall have the alarm of your motion, because it is at present so far off. Wherefore if you can come upon them suddenly and secretly, not once in twenty times but you will succeed in your design.

I speak very unwillingly of the occurrences of our times, because it must be done with reflection upon me and my friends; and if I should discourse of other people, I should not know what to say. Nevertheless I cannot pass by the example of *Cæsar Borgia* (called Duke *Valentino*) who being with his Army at *Nocera*, under pretence of making an inroad into the Duchy of *Cambrin*, turned suddenly upon the State of *Urbis*, and master'd it without any trouble in one day, which another man would not have been able to have effected in a much longer time.

## CHAP. V.

*A man is not to depend upon the Countenance of the Enemy, but is rather to suspect what even he sees with his eyes.*

**Fabr.** Those who are besieged, are to be very careful of the tricks and surprizes of the Enemy, and therefore they are not to relye upon the countenance that he carries, but are rather to suspect there is some fraud or deceit that will fall heavily upon them, if they suffer themselves to be deluded.

*Domitius Calvinus* besieging a Town, made it his custom every day to march round about the Walls with a good part of his Army; The Garrison fancying by degrees that it was only for his recreation, began to slacken their Guards, of which *Domitius* having notice, fell suddenly upon them, and carried the Town.

Other Generals have had intelligence of relief that was expected in the Town, and having habited a certain number of their Soldiers, and disposed them under counterfeit Ensigns, like those which the besieged expected, they were received into the Gates, and possessed themselves of the Town. *Cimon* an Athenian General having a design to surprize a Town, in the night set fire on a Temple that was without it, and the Inhabitants flocking out to extinguish the fire, they fell into an Ambuscado, and lost their Town. Others having taken some of the Servants, and such people as came forth for forrage, put them to the Sword, and disguising their own Soldiers in their Cloths, have entered the Gates, and made themselves Masters of the Town.

## CHAP. VI.

*How to disarmish a Garrison of its men, and to bring a terror upon a Town.*

**Fabr.** The Ancients have (besides these) made use of several Stratagems and Artifices to unfurnish the Enemies Garrisons of their men: When *Scipio* was in *Africa*, being desirous to possess himself of some of the Garrisons, which the *Carthaginians* had in their custody, he made many offers to besiege them, but pretending fear, he not only drew off on a sudden, but marched away with his Army to a great distance. *Hanibal* supposing our apprehension real, to follow him with a greater force, drew out his Garrisons, which *Scipio* understanding sent *Massinissa* to surprize them, and he did it with success. *Pyrrhus* making War in *Sclavonia*, advanced against the chief Town in that Province, in the defence of which Town, several people having got together, he pretended

to despair of carrying it by force, and turning his Arms against other Towns which were not visibly so strong, he prospered so well in his design, that the said Town drawing out a good part of its Garrison in relief to their Neighbours, left it self so weak, as it became a prey to the Enemy. Many have corrupted and defiled the waters, and turned Rivers out of their Channels, to make themselves Masters of a Town; and have miscarried when they have done. It is a way likewise that contributes much to the taking of a Town to affright them with reports, as of some great Victory that you have obtained, some great supplies that you have received, and an obstinate resolution if they do not surrender quickly to put them all to the Sword.

### CHAP. VII.

#### To corrupt a Garrison, and take it by Treachery.

*Fabr.* Some Generals of old have endeavoured to take Towns by treachery, by consisting some of the Garrison, and they have done it several ways: Some have sent of their own men as fugitives into the Town, thereby to put them into credit and Authority with the Enemy, and give them opportunity to betray them. Some by this means have discovered the strength of the Garrison, and by that discovery have taken the Town. Some under feigned pretences have stopped the Gates of a Town from shutting, with a Cart, or beam, or such kind of thing, and given their party the convenience of entering. *Hambal* besieging the Town of *Tarentum* in *Calabria*, which was defended by the *Romans* under the Conduct of *Levius*, corrupted a person in the Garrison called *Eoneus*, and ordered him that he should go out a hunting in the night, and pretend he durst not do it in the day for fear of the Enemy. *Eoneus* observed his directions, went out and in several nights together, and the Guards had not the least suspicion; at length *Hambal* disguizing some of his men in the habit of Huntsmen, sent them in after him, who killed the Guards, possessed themselves of the Gates, and let *Hambal* into the Town. A Garrison is likewise to be cheated by drilling them a good distance out of Town, and pretending to fly when they come to charge you. Many (and *Hambal* among the rest) have suffered their Camps to be possessed by the Enemy, that they might have opportunity to clap between with their Army, and get into the Town. Again, they are sometimes deluded, by pretending to raise the Siege as *Formio* the Athenian did, who having plundered and harried the Country of *Calcedon*, received their Embassadors afterwards with propositions of Peace. He gave them very good words, and sent them back full of security and fair promises, upon which the poor people presuming too much, *Formio* fell suddenly upon them, and overcame them. Those who are shut up in a Town, are to keep a strict eye upon such as they have any reason to suspect; but they are sometimes to be secured, and obliged to you by preferment as well as by punishment. *Marcillus* knew that *Lucius Baucius* the *Nolan* was a great favourer of *Hambal*, yet he carried himself to him with so much kindness and generosity, that of an Enemy, he made him his intimate Friend.

### CHAP. VIII.

#### Good Guard is to be kept in all places and times.

*Fabr.* Those who are in any fear of being besieged, are to keep diligent guard as well when the Enemy is at a distance, as at hand: and they are to have most care of those places where they think themselves most secure; for many Towns have been lost by being assaulted on that side where they thought themselves impregnable; and this miscarriage arises from two causes: either because the place is really strong and believed inaccessible; or else because of the policy of the Enemy, who with great clamour and noise pretend to storm it on one side; whilst on the other he does it as vigorously, but with all the silence imaginable. And therefore it concerns the besieged to be very careful, and keep good Guards upon the Walls, especially in the night, and that as well with Dogs as with Men, for if they be fierce and watchful, they will give an alarm (if the Enemy approaches) as soon as any thing. And not only Dogs, but Birds have been known to have preserved a Town; as it happened to the *Romans*, when the *French* besieged the Capitol: when the *Spartans*



*Spartans lay before Athens, Alcibiades to discover how his watches were kept, commanded that in the night when ever he held up a light, each of the Guards should hold up another, and great punishment was to be inflicted upon any that neglected it. Isocrates killed a Centinal that he found a-sleep, with this expression, I leave him as I found him.*

## CHAPTER IX.

*Ways to write privately to ones Friends.*

**Fabr.** Those who have been besieged have contrived several ways of conveying intelligence to their friends, not daring to trust their affairs to the tongue of a messenger, they write in cyphers many times, and conceal them several ways. The cyphers are made according to every mans fancy and the ways of concealing them are divers: some have writ on the inside of a scabbard of a sword, others have put their Letters up in Paste, baked it, and then given it for sustenance to the messenger that is to carry it: some have hid them in their privities, some in the collar of the messengers dog.

There is another very useful and ingenious way, and that is by writing an ordinary Letter about your private affairs, and afterwards betwixt every two lines to write your intrigues with a certain kind of water that will never be discovered but by dipping it into other water, or by holding it to the fire; and by so doing the Letters will be visible. And this trick has been very subtilly practised in our times, in which a certain person having a desire to signifie a secret to some of his friends, and not daring to trust it to a messenger, he sent out Letters of Excommunication written very formerly, but interlined as above-said, and caused them to be fixed to the doors of the Churches, which being known to his friends by some private marks, they understood the whole business: and this is a very good way, for he who carries it may be deceived, and he that writes it is in no great danger.

There are a thousand other ways invented according to every mans fancy and wit. But it is much easier to write to those who are block'd up in a Town, than for those who are besieged to write to their friends abroad, because these Letters cannot be conveyed but by somebody who must pretend to run away out of the Town, which is a hard and a dangerous thing, if the enemy be anything careful. But tis otherwise with Letters to be sent into a Town, for a man has a thousand occasions to come into a Leaguer, where he may watch his opportunity, and slip into the Town.

## CHAPTER X.

*How to repair a breach, and the way to defend it.*

**Fabr.** But let us come now to the present way of beleaguering of Towns: I say, that if you be assaulted in a Town that is not fortified with ditches on the inside; (as I have mentioned before) that your enemy may not enter at the breaches which the Artillery make, (for against other breaches there is no remedy) it is necessary whilst the Artillery is playing, to cut a new ditch behind the breach of at least thirty yards wide, and to throw all the earth that comes out of it towards the Town, that it may make a good Rampart, and add to the depth of the ditch; and this work is to be carried on with such diligence, that when the wall falls, the ditch may be at least five or six yards deep; and whilst they are at work to make this ditch, it is necessary that they be secured with two Casemats, that may flank the Enemy in case he should endeavour to disturb them: and if the wall be so strong as to give you time to make your ditch and your casemats; that part which is battered will be the strongest part about the Town; for that Rampart will be of the same form and model which we proposed for the ditch within. But where the wall is so weak as to allow you no time; then you must show your courage, and present yourself bravely at the breach, your shouldiers well arm'd, and with as much cheerfulness as is possible. This way of throwing up new works was observed by the Pisans when you besieged it, and they might do it well enough; for their walls were strong, which gave them time, and the earth good and proper for Ramparts; whereas had they wanted either of those conveniences, they must of necessity have been lost. It is wisdom therefore to make these ditches round about the Town before there be any necessity, as we said before; for in that case you may expect the enemy without fear.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XI.

*Of Mines.*

*Fabr.* **T**HE ancients took several Towns by mining under ground, and that two ways, either by carrying their mines under ground into the Town, and entering thereby, (as the Romans did when they took the City of *Vejentum*) or by undermining only the walls, and so tumbling them down. At present this latter way is more used than the other, and renders those Towns which stand high, weaker than the rest, because more subject to be min'd, and then adding but a good quantity of powder, which takes fire in an instant, you do not only ruine the wall, but you open the very mountain, and cleave the works into pieces. The way to prevent this, is to fortifie in a flat Country, and make the ditch which encompasses your Town so deep, that the enemy may not dig under it without coming to the water, which is the best defence against mines. But if you be to defend a Town upon an eminence, your best way will be to make several deep holes in the wall, that may give vent to the powder when the enemy sets in on fire.

There is another way likewise to prevent them, and that is by countermining, if you find where the enemy mines, but 'tis a hard matter to discover them, especially if you be besieged by a cautious enemy.

## CHAP. XII.

*Good guards are always to be kept, and your Souldiers not to be divided.*

*Fabr.* **H**E who is besieged is to take extraordinary care that he be not surprized in time of repose, as after a storm; after the Guards are set, (which is either at break of day, or at the shutting in of the evening) or especially whilst you are at dinner, in which time many Towns have been taken, and many sallies have been made to the destruction of the besiegers. Wherefore it is necessary to be upon the Guard in all quarters, and your men generally arm'd: and here I cannot omit to tell you that nothing makes a Town or Camp harder to be defended, than the dividing of your forces; for the enemy being able to attack you when he pleases with all his power at once, you must be ready on all sides, and having parted your Forces, you will be forced to defend your self with a part, and to keep the same guards with the remainder when ever the enemy assails you, as you should have done when your whole Garrison was together; which is a great disadvantage, for he can attack you with his whole power, when you have but a part of yours to defend your self.

## CHAP. XIII.

*That when ones sees himself block'd up on every side, it is good to expose ones self now and then, and of the advantages which have ensued.*

*Fabr.* **I**F he who is besieged be beaten considerably, he is certainly lost; but the Besieger can only be repulsed: for which reason many who have been besieged (either in Camp or Town,) though they have been inferior in number, have nevertheless sallied with their whole force at a time, and been too hard for the enemy. Thus *Marcellus* did at *Nola*; thus *Cæsar* did in *France*, when his Camp was encompassed with a vast number of *Gauls*, for finding he was not able to defend it, because he must divide his men into parties, and distribute them round; and finding also that standing within his stoccado's he could not do so much execution upon the enemy as he desired, he opened his Camp on one side, and issuing out of it with his whole force, charged the enemy with such fury and courage that he put them to the rout. Besides, the obstinacy and resolution of the besieged does many times astonish and terrifie the enemy. *Pompey* being encamped against *Cæsar*, and *Cæsar's* Army in great distress for provisions, *Pompey* had presented him a piece of *Cæsar's* bread which was made of herbs, and look'd upon as a very strange thing; *Pompey* having

having viewed it, commanded that it should not be shewn in his Army, lest it should discourage them to consider the obstinacy of their Enemy. Nothing was more honourable to the Romans in their War with *Hanibal* than their constancy, because in the greatest of their distress, and in the worst of their fortune, they never demanded peace, nor discovered any token of fear: on the contrary, when *Hanibal* was under their Walls, they sold the ground in which he was encamped, at an higher rate than it would have been sold at another time: and they were so true and firm in their enterprizes, that they would not draw off from *Capua* to defend their own City, though they had an Army before that, when *Hanibal* appeared before *Rome*.

I am sensible that I have told you several things that you understood, and perhaps considered already; yet I have done it (as I said before) by that means to give you a better comprehension of the quality of this Army; and to satisfy such (if there be any such here) as have not had the opportunity to understand it so well as you. I suppose now, there remains nothing but that I give you some general rules which are very obvious and common.

## CHAP. XV.

### *General Rules, to be observed in Military Discipline.*

*Fabr.* **T**HAT which is beneficial to you, is prejudicial to your Enemy, and that which is beneficial to him, is prejudicial to you.

He who in War is most vigilant to observe the designs and enterprizes of the Enemy, and takes most pains in exercising and disciplining his Army, shall expose himself to less danger, and have greater probability of victory.

Never bring your men to fight till you have some just confidence in their courage, till you have seen them well arm'd, and well ordered; and never let them engage but when you find them cheerly, and hopeful of success.

It is better to conquer an Enemy by hunger than fighting, in which last victory, fortune has more share than virtue or courage.

No resolution is so likely to succeed, as that which is concealed from the Enemy till it comes to be executed.

Nothing is of more importance in the whole art of War, than to know how to take advantage when it is offered.

Nature produces few persons strong; but industry and exercise makes many.

Order and discipline is more available in War, than valour or force.

When any come over to your service from the Enemy, they are of great advantage to you, provided they be faithful; for it is more diminution to the Enemies strength to have Soldiers revolt, than to have so many slain, though the name of a fugitive is suspicious to new friends, and abominable to old.

It is better in the drawing up your Battalions for a Battel, to draw them up with reserves, and place such behind the front as may supply it upon occasion; than to enlarge your front, and make as it were but one rank of your whole Army.

He who understands his own Forces and the Enemies too, can hardly miscarry.

The courage of Soldiers is better than their number.

The situation of the place is sometimes more effectual than the courage of your men.

New and unexpected things are an astonishment to some Armies.

Your Soldiers despise things that are common, and are weary of any thing that is tedious, I would advise therefore that by pickeering and little skirmishes you acquaint your men with your Enemy before you bring them to a Battel.

He who pursues an Enemy that is disordered, in disorder himself; shall lose the victory he had gained, and perhaps give it to the Enemy.

He who makes not provision of Victuals, will be beaten without a blow.

He who relies more upon his Horse than his Foot, or his Foot than his Horse, must accommodate himself to the place.

If you would know at any time whether you have any spies in your Army, you have no more to do but to command every man to his Tent.

If you find the Enemy has any knowledge of your designs, you must change them. What you are to do, you may advise with many; what you are resolved to do, communicate with few.

When Soldiers are in their quarters, they are to be kept in order by fear and by punishment; when in the field, with hopes and reward.

A good General never comes to a Battle but when necessary requires, or some great advantage invites him.

You must endeavour that your Enemy may not know how you intend to draw up your Army when you come to fight; and let your figure be what it will, be sure your first Companies be so ordered as that they may fall back into the second, and both into the third.

When you are engaged, never employ any of your Battalia's about any thing but that to which you deputed them at first; if you would avoid putting things into disorder.

Sudden accidents are not easily prevented; but those which are foreseen, are prevented without difficulty.

Men, Arms, Money and Provisions are the nerves of War; but the first two are most necessary, because Men and Arms will find Money and Victuals; but Money and Victuals can never find Men.

The Rich Man unarm'd, is but a prey to the Soldier.

Use your Soldiers to abominate luxury either in diet or cloths.

This is as much as I can think fit to speak of in general, though I am sensible other things would have fallen in well enough with my Discourse. As how and in what manner the ancients ordered their Squadrons; how they were habited, and how they exercised them in several other things, and I could have added several particulars, which I have not thought necessary at this time, because you may know it your self, and likewise because it was not my intention at first to shew you exactly how the ancient Militia was constituted, but how it was to be done in our times.

For this reason I have thought unnecessary to speak any farther of those kind of antiquities, than what might be servicable to this introduction. I know likewise I might have enlarged myself more about the exercising of Horse; and come afterwards to discourse of Sea-fights, for to distinguish Militia's, their Armies at Sea, and Armies at Land; Armies of Foot, and Armies of Horse: but of Sea discipline, I shall not presume to say any thing, because I know nothing of it: I shall leave that to be treated of by *Genoveses* or *Venetians*, who by their experience in that kind, have done very great things formerly. Nor shall I speak any farther of Horse than what I have said before, because they are not so corrupt and disorderly. For if your Foot (which is the strength of an Army) are well disciplin'd, and in good order, your Cavalry must be good of necessity.

## CHAP. XV.

### The way to have many Horse in your Country.

**Faber.** I would however remember him who is desirous to settle and establish a good Militia in his Country, that to furnish it handsomely with Horse, he should do two things; one is, that he should distribute a certain number of good Stallions up and down that the Country-men may breed, and drive a Trade with Foles and Colts, as you do in this Country with Calves, and young Mules. The other is, that there might not want Chapmen for the Colts, I would oblige every man that keeps a Mule, to keep an Horse; and he that would keep but one thing for his Saddle, should be enjoyned to have it an Horse; besides, I would constrain every man that wore Cloth-clothes, to keep an Horse in his Stable.

This order was taken not long since by a Prince of our times, and succeeded so well, that in a short time he had a most excellent Cavalry. As to other things relating to Horses, I refer you to what has been said this day, and what has been practis'd of old.

## CHAP. XVI.

*A General is to invent of himself, and not follow altogether the practices of his Predecessors.*

*Fabr.* **B**Ut perhaps you would desire to know what parts and qualifications there ought to be in a General; and I will satisfy you in short, for I cannot make choice of a properer man, than he who understands all those things which I have recommended this day; and yet that would not be sufficient, unless he had abilities to invent some thing of his own; for never any man was Master of a Trade, who had no invention of his own; and if invention be honourable in any thing, it is most certainly in this: This is manifest in all Authors who have constantly applauded all sorts of inventions, how slight and inconsiderable soever, as appears by the great Character they bestowed on *Alexander the great*, for his wisdom in appointing a Cap to be put upon the top of a Lance as a signal for the dislodging of his Army, rather than to do it by sound of Trumpet as formerly, because it imported him much that they should remove privately. He was commended likewise for ordering his Soldiers upon a charge to fall down upon their left knee, as an expedient that would make them receive the charge with the more strength and firmness, which invention got him the Victory, and occasioned him so much honour, that all Statues erected afterwards in his honour, were erected in that posture. But because it is time to conclude our discourse, I will leave where I began, to avoid the reproach which is incident to such persons as when once straggled know not how to return.

## CHAP. XVII.

*The Author returns, and with a short Discourse concludes his Book.*

*Fabr.* **I**F you remember (*Cosimo*) you told me, that you could not imagine the reason why in one place I should commend Antiquity, and blame those which would not imitate it in great things; and yet I have not imitated it my self in my Martial affairs, in which I have taken much pains, and spent a great deal of my time.

To which I answer, That men who are to execute any thing, are first to learn which way it is to be done, that they may be afterwards the more able, when it comes to operation. Now whether or no I understand how to establish a Militia according to the method of the Ancients, I leave you to judge, who have heard me discourse of it so long; from whence you may imagine how much time has been spent in those thoughts by me; what great desire I have had to bring them to effect, and whether I have already, or ever may have occasion to do it. But to satisfy you farther, and justify my self, I will give you the reasons, and thereby observe my promise in some measure, by shewing you the conveniencies and inconveniencies in such imitations. I say then that no action this day among men is more easily executed according to the method of the Ancients, than Military discipline; but it must be among such Princes as are able to bring together 15 or 20000 of their own Subjects, against an Enemy. On the other side, there is nothing more difficult to such Princes as have not that convenience: And that you may comprehend it the better, you must understand that Generals are commended upon two several accounts some are famous for that with an Army ordered and prepared by their own natural discipline, they have performed great things; so it was with most of the *Roman* Citizens, and others who had the command of Armies; whose only task was to keep their Soldiers good, and Conduct them securely. Others have been not only to contend with and conquer the Enemy, but they were first to instruct and exercise their Army; and these doubtless were worthy of more praise than they who with their old and well experienced Soldiers performed such Exploits: Of this sort was *Pelopidas*, *Epaminondas*, *Tullus*, *Hofstius*, *Philip of Macedon*, *Cyrus King of Persia*, and *Gracchus the Roman*: All those were forced to model and discipline their Armies before they ventured them to fight; and all these were able to do it in respect of their own experience, and that they had other persons which were able to exercise their Soldiers as they desired. Nor would it ever have been possible that any of those Generals, how good and excellent soever, could ever have done any great thing in another Province full of corrupt men, unless it had been accustomed to some honest obedience. It

is not sufficient then in *Italy* to understand how to manage a Veteran Army; but you must first know how to make and prepare it, and then how to govern and conduct it. Again, those who do this, must be such Princes as have great revenues, and many Subjects, in which number, I am not to be reckoned, as one who never commanded, nor never can, unless it be foreign Forces under some other Prince, into which foreigners, whether it be possible or not to infuse any of these things of which I have discoursed, I leave you to judge. How could I persuade a Soldier of our days to carry more Arms than he was accustomed, and besides his Arms, two or three daies Provision at his back, and a Spade or Pickaxe at his girdle? How could I prevail with him to work or digg all day; to stand all day to his Arms in counterfeit exercises, that I might rely the more confidently upon him when he came to it in good earnest? How could I work upon him to abstain from play, lasciviousness, blasphemy, and insolence, which is their practice every day? How long would it be before I could reduce them into such order, such discipline, and awe, that if an Apple tree was never so full, and stood in the middle of their Camp, none of them should venture to touch it? as is many times read of the *Roman* Armies. What is it that I can promise them that may make them either fear me, or love me, when the War being ended, I shall have no farther to do with them? How can I make them sensible of shame who have been born and bred without any? How should they pay me a respect whom they do not know? By what God, by what Saint shall I conjure them? By the Gods which they adore, or by the Gods which they blaspheme? Which it is that they adore I cannot tell, but am sure they blaspheme them all. How can I expect they should keep their promise, which they do hourly despise? How can they who pay no honour to God, express any to men? What good discipline then are we like to imprint upon so depraved a Mass? If you object that the *Swizzers* and *Spaniards* are good Soldiers, I confess them much better than the *Italians*; but if you consider what I have said, and the manner of proceeding of both those Nations, you will find them come short in many things of the perfection of the Ancients. The *Swizzers* are become good Soldiers by natural practice of those things which I have recommended; and the *Spaniards* by necessity; for their Wars lying in Foreign Provinces, where they are constrained either to overcome or dye (because they can never hope to get off by flying) are grown good, and yet their goodness is in many things defective; for their excellence is only to stand and receive the Enemy at push of Pike, and the Swords point; besides, there is not any man among them fit to instruct another in what is necessary, much less if he be not of their own Country. But to return to our *Italians*, who having wanted wise Princes, have not been capable of good orders; and having wanted that necessary which was incumbent upon the *Spaniards*, they have not taken it up of themselves, so that now they are the very scorn and contempt of the world, not for any fault in the people, but in their Princes, who thereby have been chastised for their ignorance, and justly punished for losing their Territories so ignominiously, without any considerable resistance. Will you see that what I say is true? Consider what Wars we have had in *Italy* since the Expedition of *Charles* 8th. to this day: and although other Wars rendered Soldiers formidable and martial; these Wars by how much they were more great, and more furious, by so much both Officers and Soldiers became more dissolute and cowardly: And this must necessarily proceed from ill orders which are not much better at this day, and the misery is, there was nor is none able to reform them: Do not think that there is any way to recover reputation to the Arms of the *Italians*, but by this way that I have proposed, and by means of such Princes as have great Territories there; for this form may be imprinted in men that are simple, and plain, and ones own Subjects, much sooner, than in such as are lewd, and disorderly, and strangers. A good Sculptor never expects to make a good Statue out of a piece of Marble that is mangled and has been ill handled; but he will do well enough if it has never been touched. Our Princes in *Italy* before they were sensible of their Wars with the Northern Nations, believed it was enough for a Prince to know how to write a civil answer; how to direct a Letter with all its Punctilio's; how to show himself witty and quick in his *reparties*; how to juggle, and dissemble; how to dress himself handsomly, and dispose of his Jewels to the best advantage; how to eat, and sleep in more state and magnificence than other people; to have a thousand dalliances and pleasures about him; to behave himself haughly and extort from his Subjects; to live in idleness and ease; to dispose of Military commands to their Parasites; to despise those who proposed any thing of Virtue; to require that their words should be like Oracles, and of as much authority, as if spoken by God himself; to employ such as had no knowledge in affairs; to commit great things to those who durst attempt nothing; to believe every thing immediately without pondering and debating either their words or arguments that spoke them; and several other imperfections which hindered them from seeing that at last they

they must become a prey to any that would attack them. These things in the year 1494. were the occasion of those flights, and fears, and depredations by which three of the most potent States in *Italy* were frequently destroyed. But the worst is, they which remain, continue in the same errors, and live in the same disorder, without any consideration that those who formerly desired to preserve their Dominions, did all that I have prescribed this day; and that their whole study was to accustom themselves both minds and bodies to labour, to trouble, and despising of danger, And this was the cause that *Cæsar*, and *Alexander* and all the valiant and brave Princes were always at the head of their Armies, compleatly arm'd and on foot, and rather than lose their states they would lose their lives; so as they lived and dyed with a great deal of honour: And though perhaps some of them might be condemned for their ambition, and exorbitant desire to Reign; yet they could never be accused of effeminacy, or doing any thing that might render them delicate and unmanly. Which passages if they were read and believed by the Princes of our times, it would be impossible but they must alter their course of life, and their Provinces their fortune. But because in the beginning of our discourse you complained of your Militia, I tell you that if you have ordered it according to my abovesaid direction, and it has not answered your expectation, you have reason to complain; but if it be not ordered and exercised according to my rules, the complaint lies more properly against you, who has made it rather an abortion, than a perfect production. The *Venetians*, and the Duke of *Ferrara* began very well, but they did not persevere, and it was imputable rather to themselves, than their Soldiers. And let me affirm this to you for a truth, and among all the present Princes of *Italy*, he who takes his way first, and observes these rules and these orders, shall make himself greater than any Prince in that Country, and it shall happen to his Subjects as to the Kingdom of *Macedon*, which falling under the Dominion of King *Philip*, was improved to that height by this order and exercise (whilst the rest of *Greece* were idle, and if employed at all, it was in following Plays and Balls, and such effeminate entertainments) that in a few years time he was able to conquer the whole Country, and leave a foundation to his Son to make himself Monarch of the whole world. He then who despises this Doctrine, if he be a Prince despises his own Principality; and if a Citizen, his own City. And in this I cannot but complain of Nature, who should either have not suffered me to have known these things; or have given me power to have executed them, which is a thing I can never hope for now, as growing old, and towards the end of my days. For this reason I have discoursed the more frankly with you who are young, and so qualified that you may be able (if you be satisfied with what is said) to give the same Council to your own Princes when occasion shall be offered, and I hope with success; and of this I beg you would not dispond; for this Province seems to have a peculiar faculty of reviving things that are dead, as it has done Poetry, and Painting, and Sculpture, though for my own part I cannot expect to see it, as having one foot already in the grave. Certainly had fortune indulged me in my young days, so far as to have afforded so much Territory as such an enterprise required, I believe in a short time I would have demonstrated to the world the power and efficacy of the orders of the Ancients, by means of which I should have enlarged my Dominions with honour, or lost them without shame.



THE  
MARRIAGE  
OF  
BELPHEGOR.  
BY  
Nicholas Machiavel.

**I**T is recorded in the ancient Chronicles of *Florence*, that a certain holy Person, whose life was the admiration of that age, falling one day into a Trance, had a very strange apparition: it seemed to him, that the souls of married men that came trooping in great numbers to Hell, cried out all of them as they passed, that their Marriage was the cause of their misery, and their Wives the occasion of their coming thither: *Minos Radamant*, and the whole infernal Priy-Council were amazed at the clamour; at first they could not believe there was any thing in the business, but at last observing the same complaints continually multiplied, they thought it fit to make *Pluto* acquainted: *Pluto* understanding the report, without imparting any thing to his wife, (who had taken Physick that week, and kept her Chamber) resolved the matter should be accurately examined, and such course be taken, as was likeliest to make the speediest discovery of the truth: he issued out his Writs immediately, and assembled his Courts; his Princes, Dukes, Counts and Barons were all present; never was Senate so full, nor never was affair of that importance before it: the holy Father that beheld all, affirms positively, that *Pluto* delivered himself in this manner.

Right Trusty and well-Beloved,

*Though our Kingdom was assigned us, from Heaven, and the fatal decree has anciently determined our Dominion: though that sentence, be irrevocable, and above the cognisance of any humane Power; yet seeing his prudence, is most safe, that is dictated by Laws; and his judgment most solid, that is fortified with others; we are resolved to take your counsels, along with us, which way we are to steer in an affair; that otherwise may prove (in time) of great dishonour to our Government. The souls of married men, that are continually flocking into our Dominions, do unanimously exclaim against their Wives, as the only persons that send them tumbling hither; to us it seems impossible: yet forasmuch as a peremptory and determinate sentence upon their bare allegations, would not suite with our Satanical mercy; so a careless pretermission on the other side, could not be without reflexion on our Justice: that matters of such importance therefore may have their due disquisition, and our administration be defended from obloquy or scandal, that no inconveniency may follow for want of deliberation, and that some better expedient may be found out, than our selves have happily thought on, we have thought good to call you together, being confident, and assured by the assistance of your counsels, the honour and reputation of our Empire will be continued as unquestionable for the future, as it has been preserved hitherto, by our own proper care and sollicitude.*

There was not one present, but acknowledged it a business of importance, and well worthy an exact consideration: it was the opinion of the whole Board, that all imaginable means was to be used to find out the truth, but what means that was, could not be agreed on; some were of opinion, a single person was to be dispatch'd into this World, and no more; others judged it better to send several, and that the discovery would be more certain from the experience of many, than of one; a third sort, more brisk and severe in their counsels, thought that clutter unnecessary, and that clapping good store of them together upon the rack, would be enough doubtless to extort a confession. However it was at last carried by the plurality of voices, that a single person only should be sent, and in  
this

this resolution the whole company acquiesced. nevertheless there being no body found that would voluntarily undertake the employment, it was concluded the election should be by lot; and that the same time, having made their billets, and shuffled them, the lot fell upon *Belphegor*.

One may say, and say true, that fortune never decided any thing so justly; for *Belphegor* was no ordinary Devil; and *Pluto* having made him formerly Generalissimo of his Armies 'tis to be presumed he was no novice; for all this he had a months mind to be quit of his embassy; but the order being unalterable, he was forced to submit, and accept these conditions that were solemnly decreed, *That an hundred thousand Ducats should be paid him immediately, to defray the expences of his journey; that he should assume the shape of a man; that he should take a woman to his wedded Wife, and live with her (if possible) ten years; that at the end of the term, (pretending to die) he should give her the slip, repair immediately to his old quarters, and make affidavit upon his own experience of all the pleasures and calamities of Matrimony.* It was declared to him also, that during this metamorphosis, he was to be subject to the pains and misfortunes of humanity, as sickness, imprisonment, and poverty: but that if by his cunning or dexterity he could disintangle himself, it should be allowed him and not imputed as any scandal or reproach. *Belphegor* accepts the conditions, receives his Ducats, and having drawn a spruce party of horse out of his Guards, and furnished himself with Pages and Footmen good store, he set out immediately for this World, and arrived at *Florence* in a very fair equipage: he chose that place above all other, for the conveniency of improving his monies, and putting it to interest with greater advantage. He called himself *Don Roderick* of *Castile*; he took a very noble House in the Fauxburg of *All-Saints*; and that his quality might be undiscovered, he gave out that he was a Spaniard, that being young he took a Voyage into *Syria*, that he had dwelt some time in *Aleppo*; where he had got most part of his Estate: but being weary there, he was come into *Italy*, as a Country more agreeable with his humour, with intention (if any fair opportunity was offered) to marry: *Don Roderick* seemed to be a very handsome man, about thirty years of age; and in short time after his arrival, he made it evident enough that he was rich, and by his liberality, that he knew how to make the best use of them; insomuch as several Gentlemen of *Florence*, that had more Daughters than money; took all possible pains to ingratiate how welcome he should be into their alliance. *Don Roderick*, that had choice of Mistresses, prefer'd one that was transcendently handsome before them all, the story says, she was called *Honest*, and was the Daughter of *Americ Donati*, who had three more also to marry, and three Sons between twenty or twenty five years of age: but though *Seigneur Americ* was of one of the noblest Families of *Florence*, yet he was look'd upon as down the wind, and one that was overlaid with too many children, and the unavoidable charges of his Nobility: but *Don Roderick* took an order for that, defraying the whole expence of his Wedding; out of his own purse managing all things with that splendor and magnificence, that there was nothing omitted that was desirable upon such an occasion. It was mentioned before, as one of the conditions proposed to *Belphegor*, that as soon as he was out of the Infernal dominions, he should be subject to all the passions of mankind; and accordingly he began immediately to take delight in the honours and gallantry of the World; and as cunning a Devil as he was, to be wheedled with the flatteries and applauses of men; but that which delighted him so much, cost him dear; besides that he had not been long with *Honest*, but he fell stark mad in love with her, and finding something or other extraordinary in her, that I cannot think of, he was so far enamoured, he never thought himself happy before; insomuch as when she was melancholy, or out of humour, he would curse his Commission, and take his corporal Oath his very life wasted. On the other side it was not to be forgot, that *Honest* marrying *Roderick*, and bringing him Beauty and Nobility instead of a Portion, she thought it not fit to leave her pride and untractableness behind her; these two good qualities were so eminently in her, that *Roderick*, who had been used to *Lucifers*, and had more than once had experience of it, swore point-blank his Wives insolence was beyond it: for when she once found the fondness and passion her Husband had for her, believing she could manage him with a switch, and order him as she pleased, she carried her self like his Sovereign, and handled him without pity or respect; and if it happened he denied her any thing, she gave him immediately to understand, that she was also as eloquent in scolding, as others of her quality. By this you may Judge what a cooler this was to *Don Roderick*; nevertheless the consideration of his Father-in-Law, his Wives Brothers, the Kindred he had by that blessed Marriage, but above all the passion and tenderness he had for her, made him endure all patiently. I shall not mention the expence of his clothes, which though never so rich, he was forced to change every week, according to the ordinary vanity of the Ladies in *Florence*. Besides these, there were

were other things were of no less inconvenience; he was forced (to preserve the peace) to assist his Father-in-Law in the Marriage of his other Daughters, which cost him a good round sum: moreover that all things might go well, and his correspondency continue with his Consort, he was glad to send one of her Brothers into the *Levant* with woollen Stuffs, another into *France* and *Spain* with Silks, and to furnish the third with wherewithal to set up a Goldsmith's-shop in *Florence*: all which afflictions together were sufficient to discompose any Devil of a thousand; yet he had other thrown into the bargain: there is not any Town in all *Italy* more extravagant in their expences, in their Carnivals and Feasts of *St. John*, than *Florence*; and *Honestas* upon that occasion must needs have her *Roderick* out-do all people of his Rank, in the sumptuousness of his Entertainments, in the magnificence of his Balls, and other diversions that are usual at those times: he suffered all these calamities for the same reasons he endured the rest; and though perhaps these difficulties were very hard and unpleasant, he would have thought them supportable, could he have been satisfied, his patience would have procured any quietness in his Family, and that he might have peaceably attended the hour of his destruction. But *Don Roderick* found the clear contrary; besides the expence you have heard she occasioned, her insolence was accompanied with a thousand other, inconveniencies, insomuch as he could keep neither officer nor servant in his house above three days together. This was severe trouble to him to find it was impossible for him to keep any body about him, though never so well experienced or affected to his affairs: nor indeed could any body blame them for taking their leaves, when the Devils themselves that he brought along with him, did chose rather to return, and toast the bottoms of their feet against the fire of Hell, than live in this World under the dominion of so super-devillish a woman. *Roderick's* life being thus miserably uncomfortable, and his stock that he had reserved, exhausted by her extravagant expences, he was reduced to that pass, he subsisted only upon the hopes of the advantage he should make by the return of some Vessels he had sent into the East and West. And whereas before he had very good credit in that Town, to continue it, and keep up his Port, he borrowed money of such as are used in that place to put it out; but those kind of people being such, as are not usually sleepy or negligent in their affairs, they took notice immediately he was not over-punctual to his day: his purse being already empty, and he reduced to the highest extremity, at one dash he receives news of two as disastrous accidents as could possibly befall him. The first was, that one of *Honestas* Brothers had lost at Hazzard all that *Roderick* had intrusted in his hands; and the other was no more welcom, which was, that his other Brother-in-Law returning into *Italy*, was himself cast away, and all his goods. The business was no sooner known in *Florence*, but his Creditors had a meeting, where giving him over for one that was irrecoverably lost, and not daring to discover themselves, because the time of payment was not yet come, they concluded he was to be watch'd very close, lest he should chouse them, and shew them a light pair of heels. *Don Roderick* of *Castile* on the other side, considering with himself his affairs were past remedy, and also the term he was obliged to by the infernal Law, resolves to take horse and be gone without more ado, which he performed without much difficulty, living conveniently for that by the Port *del Prato*: yet he was no sooner march'd off, but his alarm was taken by his Creditors; they repair immediately to the Magistrates, and pursue him not only with Post and Officers, but lest a certain number of Ducats should debauch that kind of Cattle, who are no better in *Italy* than other places, and prevail with them for an abatement of their speed, they follow him themselves in a full body, with impatience of hearing some tidings of him. *Roderick* in the mean time was no fool, but considered very well what he had to do; as soon as he was gallop'd about half a league from the Town, he leaves the high-way, and his horse with it; (the Country being inclosed, and full of ditches on both sides) and was forced to make the rest of his journey on foot, which he did very successfully; for wandring up and down under the shelter of the Vines and Reeds that abound much in those parts, he arrived at last at *Perfola*, at the house of *Jean Matteo del Bricca*, Bailly to *Jean del Bene*.

By very good fortune he meets *Matteo* carrying fodder to his Cattle; he accosts him immediately, and promises him as he was a Gentleman, that if he would deliver him from the Catchpoles that were in pursuit of him, with design to clap him up, and starve him in Prison; he had an invention in his pate would make him rich out of hand, and of this he would give such evidence before he departed, as should assure him of his truth and fidelity; and if I do not, says he, with a damn'd imprecation, I will be content to be delivered up into their clutches that persecute me. Now you must understand, that though *Matteo* was an Hinde and a Peasant, yet the fellow had cunning enough, and knew on which side his bread was buttered; he considered, if he undertook him, and miscarried, he had nothing to

to lose; and that if he succeeded, he should be made for ever; without any more ado therefore he promises him protection, and clapping him close upon a dunghill that was before the gate, he covered him over with brush-faggots and reeds, and such other fuel as lay there in readiness for the fire: and indeed he was no sooner in his retirements, but in came the Creditors with full cry; they swaggered and laid about them like Lords, but all to no purpose, *Matteo* could not be persuaded to confess so much as that he saw him; inso-much as marching on still in the pursuit, but with as little success as they came thither, they gave *Roderick* and their Money over for lost, and returned to *Florence* every jot as wise as they were before: The Coast being clear in this manner, and the alarm over, *Matteo* steals to the closet where he had left *Roderick*, gives him a little fresh air, and conjures him to be as good as his word: *Roderick* was very honest in that point, and I dare say never any Devil, as to matters of gratitude, had more of a Gentleman; he gave him thanks for the great obligation he had received: he swore over and over again, he would do what ever lay in his power to discharge himself of his promise, and in the heat and height, of his compliments, to convince him that he meant as he said, he gives him the whole story as you have had it, and at last told him the very way that he had pitch'd upon to make him a Prince: know then, says he, that whenever you hear of any Lady that is possess'd, 'tis no other Devil but I that have possess'd her; and be sure I will never leave her, till you come your self and force me from my quarters, after which you have wit enough to make your own terms for your payment. They had very few words more, he only gave him the Summerfet once or twice, and shewed him two or three juggling tricks, and vanish'd.

A while after there was a great noise about the Town, that *Mes. Ambrosia Amides's* Daughter, that was Married to *Bonaculo Thebalducci's* Son, was possess'd; her Father and Mother did not fail to use all the remedies are usual in so deplorable a case; they brought before her *St. Zambes* Head, and *St. J. Galbert's* Cloak, which was nuts to *Belphegor*, and made him nothing but laugh: There was no body in her but *Don Roderick de Casfile*, who was as ingenious a Gentleman-devil as one would wish, and that the world might take notice that this was no fantastick imagination, nor fit of the Night-mare, nor any such trifle, but that she was really possessed, she spake Latin better than *Tully* ever Writ, disputed in Philosophy, and discovered the secrets and sins of several people that were there, who were very much surprized to find the Devil concern himself with those kind of affairs.

Amongst the rest there was one holy Father he did a great discourtesie to, in blurring out before the whole company, as if he had kept a young Lass four years together in his Cell, in the habit of a young Monk; and after all this, let any body judge whether the profession was not like to be true; *Ambrosia* in the mean time was in great affliction for his Daughter; he had tryed all the ways that Physick or Religion could propose, but to no purpose; so as he was brought to the highest point of despair, when *Matteo* came to him, and undertook the cure of his Daughter, if he would give him five hundred *Florins*, which he designed to lay out in Land at *Peretola*: In short, *Matteo* was an honest fellow, and would have done the miracle gratis, and like a Gentleman, but his pockets were hollow, and he had great occasion for Money at that time; Seignior *Ambrosia* accepts the conditions, and *Matteo* falls to work; he began very civilly with certain Masses and other Ceremonies, that he might appear the more formal in the business; at length he stole to the Ladies ear, calls *Roderick*, and tells him he was come thither to him, and did require him to be as good as his word. Content says *Roderick*, and that you may see I shall deal with you like a person of quality, take notice, that because this expedition is not enough to enrich you, and do your business, I will befriend you more than once, for which reason as soon as I am departed from hence, away I'll march into the Daughter of *Charles* the King of *Naples*, and don't fear but I'll stick to her, till you come to exorcise me, so as there you may make up your markets at a blow, and become considerable for ever, but be sure after that I be troubled with you no more; and as soon as he had said so, whip says he out of the Lady, and was gone to the great joy and astonishment of whole Town.

*Belphegor* in the mean time was as good as his word, as he promised *Matteo*; away he goes, and in two or three days time it was all over *Italy*, that the Daughter of *Charles* King of *Naples*, was in the same condition; which was good news for *Matteo*, who was at this bout to gain the Philosophers-stone: In short, he tryed all means possible; the Monks went to work with their prayers, and their crosses, but to no purpose; The Devil would not budge till *Matteo* came himself, who had formerly obliged him. The King had news of what had happened at *Florence*; and sends away immediately for *Matteo* to his Court, who came accordingly, and after some few ceremonious formalities, counterfeited for concealment of the mystery, he cures his Daughter. However *Roderick* before his departure, as is reported in the Chronicle, accosted him in this manner. You see, *Matteo*,

I have been as good as my word; you see you are become rich in a trice, and may take your ease for the future; so as if I be not mistaken, I have discharged my self as to you very honestly, hereafter have a care how you come near me; for as hitherto I have done you knights-service, henceforward I will do you as much mischief as I can. *Matteo* being returned to *Florence* very wealthy, (for the King of *Naples* had given him above five thousand Ducats) he thought of nothing now but enjoying that peaceably he had got, never imagining *Roderick* would do him any harm; but his designs were much frustrated by a report out of *France*, that *Lewis* the seventh's Daughter was possess'd as the former: *Matteo* was in great trouble, on the one side he was not ignorant of the power of that Prince, on the other he remembered *Roderick's* late words; the King used all means possible, but without any success; he was told what feats *Matteo* had done, and dispatched a Post to him immediately, to desire his Company at *Paris*; but *Matteo* pretending I know not what indispositions, that rendered him incapable of serving his Majesty, the King was forced to write to the Magistrates, who sent away *Matteo* immediately.

Being arrived at *Paris*, he was in great affliction, because he knew not which way for his life to perform what was expected from him. At last he goes to the King, and tells him, that true it was indeed, he had formerly wrought some cures in that kind, but that it was not in reason to be expected he could dispossess all people he met with, seeing there were some Devils so refractory and cross-grain'd, neither threats nor enchantments, nor devotion it self would do no good on: That he said now this out of any repugnancy or unwillingness to do as he was desired, but that in case his endeavours were ineffeual, he might have his Majesties pardon. The King was stark mad at the story, and told him in plain terms, if he did not rout the Devil out of his Daughter, as he had done out of others, he would hang him forthwith; for he saw no reason why Miracles were not as feasible at *Paris*, as at *Florence* and *Naples*: These words toucht *Matteo* to the quick, he thought there was no pleasure to be taken in being hang'd in that manner, and that what the King had said, was without any equivocation: However he recollected himself little, or at least pretended so, and calling for the Princess that was possess'd, he makes his approaches, and whispering her in the ear, told *Roderick* he was his very humble servant, and put him in mind of the good office he had done him, when he delivered him out of the talons of the Law; adding withall, that if he leit him in the lurch, in the extremity of danger he was then in, the whole World would cry out on his ingratitude; *Roderick* heard him with no more patience than needs must, he swaggers, swears, storms, and lays about like a Devil in good earnest, gives him a thousand and a thousand ill words, but they could distinguish only these few at the last: How now, you Rascally Traitor, have you the impudence to come near me again? have you forgot it was I that made you your fortune? but I'll make all the World see, and you too, with a pox to you, that I can take away as well as give; besides which, you shall not fail to be hang'd before you get away from *Paris*: Poor *Matteo* seeing no other remedy for his misfortunes, he fell a thinking of some other way, and having sent back the Lady to her Chamber, he made this speech to the King. Sir, I have told you before, that there are certain ill-natur'd capricious Spirits, one knows not which way to deal withal, and of this sort is that which possesses your Daughter; if what we shall administer might be sufficient, your Majesty should be happy in your desires, and mine also; but if things prove otherwise, and your Majesty be not satisfied with my endeavours, I shall submit, and your Majesty may deal with me as I deserve: in the mean time, I desire your Majesty would give order a Theatre be erected in the Church-yard of *Notre Dame*, big enough to receive all the Nobility and Clergy in the Town. Let this Theatre, if your Majesty think good, be hung with Cloath of Gold, and other rich Stuffs, and an Altar set up in the middle on Sunday next; I would desire your Majesty to be there, with all the Princes and Nobility in *Paris*, and after a grand Mass is sung, let the Princess be brought also: Besides this, it is necessary there should be twenty persons at least, with Trumpets, Horns, Drums, Hoboys and Symbals, ready in some by-place, when I throw up my Cap into the air, to advance towards the Theatre with all the noise they can make; which Musick, with some other ingredients that I have, will I hope send the Devil packing from the Princess: the King gave order all things should be done as *Matteo* requested; and Sunday being come, and the Theatre throng'd with a multitude of persons of quality, and the Church-yard of *Notre Dame* full of people, the Princess was led in by two Bishops, and followed by several Lords of the Court; *Roderick* was in a terrible amaze, to behold so magnificent a preparation, and pondering with himself, was over-heard to pronounce these words: I would fain know what this rascally Peasant means to do; I have seen many places, I have more than once seen the whole pomp of Heaven, nor am I ignorant of what is most formidable in Hell, yet can I not tell what to make of this: but I'll handle him like a Rogue, as he is, and if I fail, *Pluto* requite me; *Matteo* came up close to him, and desired him very civilly to depart; but *Roderick* cried out, Oh the wonderful cunning that is in you! do you think by this whimsie to save your self from my power, and the indignation of the King? but think what you will, you scoundrel, I am resolved you shall hang for't, or else let me pass for the most miserable poor-spirited Devil in the World; *Matteo* persisted in his request, but *Belphegor* gave him worse Language than before; but all that frighted not *Matteo*, for without losing more time, he threw his hat up into the air, and at an instant the Trumpets, Horns, and all the rest of the Musick struck up, and advanced towards the Theatre; *Roderick* was startled at the noise, and made it manifest that there are some Devils as fearful as men, and not able to imagine the reason, he called out to *Matteo*, and asked what was the matter? *Matteo* being a cunning Rogue every inch of him, as if he had been terribly frighted, informs him thus: Alas! poor *Roderick*, says he, 'tis your Wife *Honestia* is come to seek you at *Paris*; he said no more, but it is not to be imagined what disorder these four or five words put the Devil into; they took away his wit and judgment, so as without any consideration, whether the news was possible or not, without speaking one word, away he stole from the Princess; choosing rather to go back into Hell, and give up his accounts there, than to return again into the thralldom of Matrimony, that had already cost him so many sorrows and dangers. As soon as he arrived, he demanded audience, and in the presence of *Pluto*, *Æacus*, *Mincus*, and *Radamanthus*, all of them Counsellors of State, he declared that the Souls of Men were in the sight on't, and that 'twas their Wives that sent them to Hell, *Matteo* that had been too crafty for the Devil, returns to *Florence* in great triumph; the Chronicle mentions not any great matter the King gave him, but it says, that having gained sufficiently by the two former, he esteemed himself very happy that he had escaped hanging at *Paris*.

F I N I S.

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THE  
PUBLISHER  
TO THE  
READER  
Concerning the following  
LETTER.

*Courteous Reader,*

IT hath been usual with most of those who have Translated this Author into any Language, to spend much of their time and paper in taxing his impieties, and confuting his errors and false principles as they are pleased to call them, if upon perusal of his Writings I had found him guilty of any thing that could deceive the simple, or prejudice the rest of Mankind, I should not have put thee to the hazard of reading him in thy own Language; but rather have suffered him still to sleep in the obscurity of his own, than endanger the world; but being very well assured of the contrary, and that the Age will rather receive advantage than damage by this Publication, I did yet think that it was fit to say something in a Preface to vindicate our Author from those Slanders which Priests, and other byass'd Pens have laid upon him; but still I thought, that it might prove a bold and presumptuous undertaking, and might excite laughter, for a person of my small parts and abilities, to Apologize for one of the greatest Wits and profoundest Judgments that ever lived amongst the Moderns: In this perplexity, I had the good fortune to meet with this Letter of his own writing; which hath delivered me from those scruples, and furnished me with an opportunity of justifying this great person by his own Pen. Receive then this choice Piece with benignity, it hath never before been published in any Language, but lurk'd for above 80 years in the private Cabinets of his  
(\*) own

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*The Preface to the Reader.*

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own Kindred, and the Descendents of his own admirers in *Florence*, till in the beginning of the *Pontificat* of *Urbanè* the 8<sup>th</sup>. it was procured by the *Jesuits* and other busie-bodies, and brought to *Rome* with an intention to divert that wise *Pope* from his design of making one of *Nicholas Machiavel's* Name and Family *Cardinal*, as (notwithstanding all their opposition) he did, not long after. When it was gotten into that City, it wanted not those who had the judgment and curiosity to copy it, and so at length came to enjoy that privilege which all rare Pieces (even the sharpest *Libels* and *Pasquils*) challenge in that Court, which is to be sold to Strangers, one of which being a Gentleman of this Country, brought it over with him at his return from thence in the year 1645. and having translated it into *English*, did communicate it to divers of his friends, and by means of some of them, it hath been my good fortune to be capable of making thee a present of it, and let it serve as an Apology for our Author and his Writings, if thou thinkest he need any, I must confess I believe his Works require little, but rather praise and admiration; yet I wish I could as well justify one undertaking of his not long after the writing of this Letter; for we find in the Story of those times, that in the Month of *August* following, in the same year 1537. this *Nicolo Machiavelli* (except there were another of that name) was committed Prisoner to the *Bargello*, amongst those who were taken in Arms against *Cosimo* at the Castle of *Montemurli*, notwithstanding all his Compliments in this Letter to that Prince, and profess'd Obligations to him; if this be so, we must impute it to his too great zeal, to concur with the desires of the universality at that time, in restoring the liberty of their Country, which hath so far dazeld the judgments even of great and wise men, that thou seest many grave Authors amongst the Ancients have even commended and deified the ingratitude and Treachery of *Brutus* and *Cassius*. But certainly this crime of his would have been much more unpardonable, if he had lived to see his own Prophecie fulfilled in the Persons and Descendents of this great *Cosimo*, for there was never any succession of Princes since the world began, in which all the Royal vertues and other qualities necessary to those who rule over men, were more eminently perspicuous than in every individual of this line; so that those people have as little cause as ever any had to lament the change of their Government; their great *Dukes* having been truly Fathers of their Country, and treated their

Subjects



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*The Preface to the Reader.*

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Subjects like Children, though their power be above all limitation, above all fundamental Laws; but they having no Law, are a Law to themselves, I cannot chuse, but instance in some few of their benefits to their people, first the making the River *Arno* Navigable from *Pisa* to *Florence* in a year of Dearth, that so the Poor might be set on work and have Bread, and the Traffick of both Cities infinitely facilitated, their making at their own charge a *Canal* from *Livorne* to *Pisa*, their erecting at *Pisa* a famous University, paying the Professors, who are eminent for Learning, and discharging all other incidencies out of their own Revenue, besides the raising stately Buildings for Schools and Libraries, their founding a renowned Order of *Knighthood*, and keeping the Chapter in the same City, and ordering a considerable number of Knights constantly to reside there, both which were intended and performed by them, to encrease the concourse, and restore the wealth to the once opulent Inhabitants of that place. Their new Building fortifying and enfranchizing *Livorne*, that even by the abolishing their own Customs they might enrich their Subjects; and make that Port (as it now is) the Magazine of all the *Levant* Trade. And lastly, Their not having in 140 years ever levyed any new Tax upon their people, excepting in the year 1642. to defend the Liberties of *Italy* against the *Barbarini*. These things would merit a Panegyrick if either my parts, or this short Advertisement would admit it, I shall conclude then after I have born a just and dutiful testimony, to the merits of the Prince who now governs that State, in whom (if all the Princely vertues and endowments should be lost) they might be found and restored again to the world: As some ingenious Artists in the last Age, retriev'd the Art of Sculpture by certain *bas relievos* remaining on some Pillars and Walls at *Rome*; The Prudence, Magnanimity, Charity, Liberality, and above all the Humanity, Courtesie, and Affability of this Prince, though they exceed my expressions, yet they are sufficiently known, not only to his own Subjects (the constant objects of his care and goodness) but even to all Strangers, more particularly to our Nation, he having undertaken a troublesome Journey to visit this Kingdom, and to make it witness and partaker of his transcendent generosity and bounty, which he hath continued ever since, as can be testified by all who have had the honour to wait upon him in his own Country. or the good fortune but to see him in ours. I my self who have been so happy to be ad-

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*The Preface to the Reader.*

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mitted into his presence, and have been honoured since in having his Highness my customer for many choice Books to encrease (not his knowledge, for that is beyond receiving any addition by Books) but his curiosity, and his Library, do think my self bound in Duty to take this poor opportunity of testifying my gratitude and devotion to this excellent Prince. As to this Letter I have nothing more to say, but that thou mayest see how right this Author was set in Principles of Religion, before he could have the information, which we have had since from the Pens of most learned and rational Controversists in those points, and therefore thou maist admire the sagacity of his Judgment. Read him then, and serve God, thy King, and thy Country, with the knowledge he will teach thee. Farewel.

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NICHOLAS MACHIAVEL'S

LETTER

TO

ZANOBIUS BUNDELMONTIUS

IN

VINDICATION

Of himself and His

WRITINGS.

**T**HE Discourse we had lately (dear *Zenobia*) in the delightful Gardens of our old deceased Friend *Cosimo Rusellai*, and the pressing importunity of *Guislo Sabotari*, that I would use some means to wipe off the Many aspersions cast upon my Writings, gives you the present trouble of reading this Letter, and me the pleasure of writing it; which last would be infinitely greater

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## Nicholas Machiavel's Letter.

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greater, if I were not at this day too old, and too inconsiderable, and by the change of our Government wholly incapable of performing, either with my brain or my hand, any further service to my Country; for it hath ever been my opinion, that whosoever goes about to make men publickly acquainted with his actions, or apologize to the world for imputations laid upon him, cannot be excused from vanity and impertinence, except his parts and opportunities be such, as may enable him to be instrumental for the good of others, and that he cannot achieve that excellent end, without justifying himself from having any indirect and base ones, and procuring trust from men, by clearing the repute of his justice and integrity to them. But although this be far from my case; yet I have yielded (you see) to the entreaty of *Guilio* and the rest of that Company, not only because I am sufficiently (both by the restraint of our Press, and the discretion of the person I write to) assured that this Letter will never be made publick; but for that I esteem it a Duty to clear that excellent Society, from the Scandal of having so dangerous and pernicious a person to be a member of their conversation; for by reason of my Age, and since the loss of our Liberty, and my sufferings under that Monster of lust and cruelty *Alexander de Medeci*, set over us by the Divine vengeance for our sins, I can be capable of no other design or enjoyment, than to delight and be delighted in the company of so many choice and virtuous persons, who now assemble themselves with all security, under the happy and hopeful Reign of our new Prince, *Cosimo*, and we may say, that though our Common-wealth be not restored, our slavery is at an end, and that he coming in by our own choice, may prove (if I have as good Skill in Prophefying as I have had formerly) Ancestor to many renowned Princes, who will govern this State in great quietness, and with great clemency; so that our Posterity is like to enjoy ease and security, though not that greatness, wealth, and glory, by which our City hath for some years past (even in the most factious and tumultuous times of our Democracy) given Law to *Italy*, and bridled the ambition of foreign Princes. But, that I may avoid the Loquacity incident to old men, I will come to the business. If I remember well, the exceptions that are taken to these poor things I have published, are reducible to three.

*First, That in all my Writings, I insinuate my great affection to the Democratical Government, even so much as to undervalue that of Monarchy in respect of it, which last I do, not obscurely in many passages, teach; and as it were, perswade the People to throw off.*

*Next, That in some places I vent very great impieties, slighting and vilifying the Church, as Author of all the misgovernment in the world, and by such contempt make way for Atheism and Profaneness.*

*And Lastly, That in my Book of the Prince I teach Monarchs all the execrable Villanies that can be invented,*

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## Nicholas Machiavel's Letter.

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*invented, and instruct them how to break faith,  
and to oppress and enslave their Subjects.*

I shall answer something to every one of these ;  
and that I may observe a right method, will  
begin with the first.

Having lived in an Age when our poor Country and Government have suffered more changes and revolutions, than ever did perhaps befall any people in so short a time, and having had till the taking of *Florence*, my share in the managing of affairs, during almost all these alterations, sometimes in the quality of *Secretary* of our *City*, and sometimes employed in Embassages abroad, I set my self to read the Histories of Ancient and Modern times, that I might by that means find out whether there had not been in all Ages the like vicissitudes and accidents in State affairs, and to search out the causes of them, and having in some sort satisfied my self therein, I could not abstain from scribbling something of the two chief kinds of Government *Monarchy* and *Democracy*, of which all other forms are but mixtures, and since neither by Parts nor Learning could arrive to follow the steps of the *Ancients*, by writing according to Method and Art, as *Plato*, *Aristotle*, and many others have done upon this Subject, I did content my self to make slight observations upon both ; by giving a bare Character of a *Prince*, as to the *Monarchical* frame, and as to the popular choosing the perfectest and most successful of all Governments of that kind upon earth, and in my Discourses upon it, following the order of my Author, without ever taking upon me to argue problematically, much less to decide which of these two Governments is the best ; if from my way of handling matters in my discourses upon *Livy*, and from those incomparable virtues, and great Actions we read of in that *History*, and from the observations I make, men will conclude (which is, I must confess my opinion) that the excellency of those Counsels and Atchievements, and the improvement which Mankind, and as I may so say, humane nature it self obtained amongst the *Romans*, did proceed naturally from their Government, and was but a plain effect and consequence of the perfection of their Common-wealth ; I say if Readers will thus judge, how can I in reason be accused for that ; it would become those who lay this blame upon me to undeceive them whom my Papers have misled, and to shew the world to what other causes we may impute those admirable effects, those Heroick qualities and performances, that integrity and purity of manners, that scorning of riches and life it self, when the publick was concerned ; If they please to do this, they will oblige my Readers, who will owe to such the rectifying their Judgments, and not at all offend me, who have reasoned this matter impartially and without passion, nor have positively affirmed any thing. But what if this part of my accusation had been true ? Why should I be condemned of Heresie or indiscretion for preferring a *Common-wealth* before a *Monarchy* ? was I not born, bred, and employed in a *City*, which being at the time I writ, under that form of Government, did owe all wealth and greatness, and all prosperity to it ? If I had not very designedly avoided all dogmaticalness in my observations (being not willing to imitate young Scholars in their Declamations) I might easily have concluded from the premises I lay down, that a *Democracy* founded upon good orders is the best and most excellent Government, and this without the least fear of confutation ; for I firmly believe, that there are none but Flatterers and Sophisters would oppose me, such as will rest *Aristotle*, and even *Plato* himself, to make them write for *Monarchy*, by misapplying some loose passages in those great Authors, nay, they will tell their Readers, that what is most like the Government of the world by God is the best, which wholly depends upon his absolute power ; to make this comparison run with four feet, these Sycophants must give the poor Prince they intend to despise, a better and superior Nature to humanity, must create a necessary dependance of all Creatures upon him, must endow him with infinite wisdom and goodness, and even with omnipotency it self. It will be hard for any man to be misled in this Argument by proofs wrested  
from

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## Nicholas Machiavel's Letter.

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from *Theology*, since whoſoever reads attentively the *Hiſtorical* part of the *Old Teſtament*, ſhall find that God himſelf never made but one Government for men, that this Government was a *Common-wealth* (wherein the *Sanhadrim* or *Senate*, and the Congregation or *popular Aſſembly* had their ſhare) and that he manifeſted his high diſpleaſure when the rebellious people would turn it into a *Monarchy*; but that I may not ſtrike upon the rock I profeſs to ſhun, I ſhall paſs to that which is indeed fit to be wip'd off, and which if it were true, would not only juſtly expoſe me to the hatred and vengeance of God, and all good men, but even deſtroy the deſign and purpoſe of all my Writings, which is to treat in ſome ſort (as well as one of my ſmall parts can hope to do) of the *Politicks*; and how can any man pretend to write concerning Policy, who deſtroys the moſt eſſential part of it, which is obedience to all Governments. It will be very eaſie then for *Guilio Salvati*, or any other member of our Society, to believe the Proteſtation I make, that the animating of private men either directly or indirectly to diſobey, much leſs to ſhake off, any Government how deſpoticall ſoever, was never in my Thoughts or Writings; thoſe who are unwilling to give credit to this, may take the pains to aſſign in any of my Books, the paſſages they imagine to tend that way, (for I can think of none my ſelf) that ſo I may give ſuch perſon more particular ſatisfaction; I muſt confeſs I have a diſcourſe in one of my Books, to encourage the *Italian Nation*, to aſſume their ancient valour, and to expel the *Barbarians*, meaning (as the ancient *Romans* uſed the word) all Strangers from amongſt us; but that was before the *Kings of Spain* had quiet poſſeſſion of the Kingdom of *Naples*, or the *Emperor* of the *Dutchy of Milan*; ſo that I could not be interpreted to mean that the people of thoſe two Dominions ſhould be ſtir'd up to ſhake off their Princes, becauſe they were *Foreigners*, ſince at that time *Lodovico Sforza* was in poſſeſſion of the one, and *K. Frederick* reſtored to the other, both *Narves of Italy*; but my deſign was to exhort our Country-men not to ſuffer this *Province* to be the Scene of the Arms and ambition of *Charles the 8th.* or *K. Lewis* his Succeſſor, who when they had a mind to renew the old Title of the Houſe of *Anjou* to the Kingdom of *Naples*, came with ſuch force into *Italy*, that not only our Goods were plundered, and our Lands waſted, but even the liberty of our Cities and Governments endangered; but to unite and oppoſe them, and to keep this *Province* in the hands of *Princes* of our own Nation, this my intention is ſo viſible in the Chapter it ſelf, that I need but refer you to it. Yet that I may not answer this imputation barely by denying, I ſhall aſſert in his place what my principles are in that which the world calls *Rebellion*, which I believe to be not only riſing in Arms againſt any Government we live under, but to acknowledge that word to extend to all clandestine Conſpiracies too, by which the peace and quiet of any Country may be interrupted, and by conſequence the Lives and Eſtates of innocent perſons endangered. *Rebellion* then ſo deſcribed, I hold to be the greateſt crime that can be committed amongſt men, both againſt Policy, Morality, and *in foro Conſcientiæ*; but notwithstanding all this, it is an offence which will be committed whiſt the world laſts, as often as Princes tyrannize, and by enſlaving and oppreſſing their Subjects make Magiſtracy, which was intended for the benefit of Mankind, prove a Plague and Deſtruction to it; for let the terrour and the guilt be never ſo great, it is impoſſible that humane Nature, which conſiſts of paſſion as well as virtue can ſupport with patience and ſubmiſſion the greateſt cruelty and unjuſtice; whenever, either the weakneſs of their Princes, the unanimity of the people, or any other favourable accident, ſhall give them reaſonable hopes to mend their condition, and provide better for their own intereſt by inſurrection. So that Princes and States ought in the Conduſt of their Affairs, not only to conſider what their people are bound to ſubmit to, if they were inſpired from Heaven, or were all Moral Philoſophers, but to weigh likewiſe what is probable *de facto* to fall out, in this corrupt age of the world, and to reflect upon thoſe dangerous Tumults, which have happen'd frequently not only upon oppreſſion, but even by reaſon of Malverſation, and how ſome *Monarchies* have been wholly ſubverted and changed into *Democracies* by the Tyranny of their Princes, as we ſee (to ſay nothing of *Rome*) the powerful *Cantons of Swiſſerland* brought by that means a little before the laſt age, to a conſiderable *Common-wealth*, Courted and ſought to by all the *Potentates* in *Chriſtendom*. If Princes will ſeriouſly conſider this matter, I make no queſtion but they will Rule with Clemency and Moderation, and return to that excellent Maxim of the Ancients (almoſt exploded in this Age) that the intereſt of *Kings*, and of their people is the ſame, which truth it hath been the whole deſign of my Writings to convince them of.

## Nicholas Machiavel's Letter.

I am charged then, in the second place, with impiety, in vilifying the Church, and so to make way for Atheism. I do not deny but that I have very frequently in my Writings, laid the blame upon the Church of Rome, not only for all the misgovernment of Christendom; but even for the depravation and almost total destruction of Christian Religion it felt in this Province; but that this Discourse of mine doth, or can tend to teach men impiety; or to make way for Atheism, I peremptorily deny: and although for proof of my innocence herein, I need but refer you and all others to my Papers themselves, as they are now published. (where you will find all my reasons drawn from experience, and frequent examples cited, which is ever my way of arguing) yet since I am put upon it, I shall in a few lines make that matter possibly a little clearer; and shall first make protestation, that as I do undoubtedly hope, by the merits of Christ, and by Faith in him, to attain eternal Salvation; so I do firmly believe the Christian profession to be the only true Religion now in the world: Next, I am fully persuaded, that all Divine verities, which God then designed to teach the world, are contained in the Books of Holy Scripture, as they are now extant and received amongst us. From them I understand that God created man in purity and innocence, and that the first of that Species, by their frailty, lost at once their integrity and their Paradise, and intail'd sin and misery upon their posterity; that Almighty God to repair this loss, did out of his infinite mercy, and with unparalleled grace and goodness, send his only begotten Son into the world, to teach us new truths, to be a perfect example of virtue, goodness, and obedience, to restore true Religion, degenerated amongst the Jews into Superstition, Formality, and Hypocrisy, to die for the salvation of Mankind, and in fine, to give to us the Holy Spirit, to regenerate our Hearts, support our Faith, and lead us into all Truth. Now if it shall appear, that as the lusts of our first Parents did at that time disappoint the good intention of God, in making a pure world, and brought in by their disobedience the corruptions that are now in it; so that since likewise the Bishops of Rome, by their insatiable ambition and avarice, have designedly, as much as in them lies, frustrated the merciful purpose he had, in the happy reformation he intended the world by his Son, and in the renewing and reforming of humane Nature, and have wholly defaced and spoil'd Christian Religion, and made it a worldly and a Heathenish thing; and altogether incapable, as it is practis'd amongst them, either of directing the ways of its Professors to virtue and good life, or of saving their Souls hereafter. If, I say, this do appear I know no reason why I, for detecting thus much, and for giving warning to the world to take heed of their ways, should be accused of Impiety or Atheism, or why his Holyness should be so enraged against the poor Inhabitants of the Valleys in Savoy, and against the Albigesi for calling him Antichrist; but to find that this is an undoubted truth, I mean that the Popes have corrupted Christian Religion, we need but read the New Testament (acknowledged by themselves to be of infallible truth) and there we shall see, that the Faith and Religion Preach'd by Christ, and settled afterwards by his Apostles, and cultivated by their Sacred Epistles, is so different a thing from the Christianity that is now profess'd and taught at Rome, that we should be convinc'd, that if those Holy men should be sent by God again into the world, they would take more pains to confute this Gallimaufry, than ever they did to Preach down the Tradition of the Pharisees, or the Fables and Idolatry of the Gentiles, and would in probability suffer a new Martyrdom in that City under the Vicar of Christ, for the same Doctrine which once animated the Heathen Tyrants against them. Nay, we have something more to say against these Sacrilegious pretenders to Gods power; for whereas all other false worships have been set up by some polittick Legislators, for the support and preservation of Government, this false, this spurious Religion brought in upon the ruines of Christianity by the Popes, hath deformed the face of Government in Europe, destroying all the good principles, and Morality left us by the Heathen themselves, and introduced instead thereof, Sordid, Cowardly, and impolittick Notions; whereby they have subjected Mankind, and even great Princes and States, to their own Empire, and never suffered any Orders or Maxims to take place where they have power, that might make a Nation Wise, Honest, Great or Wealthy; this I have set down so plainly in those passages of my Book which are complained of, that I shall say nothing at all for the proof of it in this place, but refer you thither, and come to speak a little more particularly of my first assertion, that the Pope and his Clergy have depraved Christian Religion. Upon this subject I could infinitely wish, now Letters begin to revive again, that some Learned Pen would employ it self, and that some person vers'd in the Chronology of the Church (as they call it) would deduce out of the Ecclesiastical Writers, the time and manner how these abuses crept in, and by what arts and Steps this Babel that reaches at Heaven, was built by these Sons of the Earth; but this matter as unsuitable to the brevity of a Letter, and indeed



## Nicholas Machiavel's Letter.

deed more to my small parts and Learning, I shall not pretend to, being one who never hitherto studied or writ of Theology, further than it did naturally concern the *Poltricks*; therefore I shall only deal by the New Testament as I have done formerly by *Titus Livius*; that is, make observations or reflections upon it, and leave you and Mr. *Gualdo*, and the rest of our Society to make the judgement, not citing like Preachers, the Chapter or Verse; because the reading of Holy Scripture is little us'd, and indeed hardly permitted amongst us. To begin at the top, I would have any reasonable man tell me, whence this unmeasurable power, long claim'd, and now possess'd by the *Bishop of Rome*, is derived, first of being Christ's Vacar, and by that (as I may so say) pretending to a Monopoly of the Holy Spirit (which was promised and given to the whole Church, that is, to the Elect or Saints) as is plain by a Clause in *St. Peter's* Sermon, made the very same time that the miraculous gifts of the Spirit of God were first given to the Apostles, who says to the *Jews* and *Gentiles*; *Repent and be Baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of Sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, for this promise is to you and to your Children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call.* Next, to judge infallibly of Divine Truth, and to forgive Sins as Christ did. Then to be the Head of all Ecclesiastical persons and causes in the world; to be so far above *Kings* and *Princes*, as to Judge, Depose, and deprive them, and to have an absolute jurisdiction over all the Affairs in Christendom, *in Ordine ad Spiritualia*; yet all this the Canonists allow him, and he makes no scruple to assume, whilst it is plain that in the whole New Testament there is no description made of such an Officer to be at any time in the Church, except it be in the Prophecy of the *Aposalyps*, or in one of *St. Paul's* Epistles, where he says, who it is that shall sit in the Temple of God, shewing himself that he is God. Christ tells us his Kingdom is not of this world, and if any will be the greatest amongst his Disciples, that he must be servant to the rest, which shews that his followers were to be great in sanctity and humility, and not in worldly power.

The Apostle *Paul* writing to the Christians of those times, almost in every Epistle commands them to be obedient to the higher Powers, or Magistrates set over them, and *St. Peter* himself (from whom this extravagant Empire is pretended to be derived) in his first Epistle, bids us submit our selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King, or, &c. and this is enjoyn'd although it is plain, that they who govern'd the world in those days, were both Heathen, Tyrants, and Usurpers, and in this submission there is no exception or proviso for Ecclesiastical immunity. The practice as well as Precepts of these Holy men shews plainly that they had no intention to leave Successors, who should deprive Hereditary Princes from their right of Reigning for differing in Religion, who without all doubt are by the appointment of the Apostle, and by the principles of Christianity, to be obeyed and submitted to (in things wherein the fundamental Laws of the Government give them power) though they were *Jews* or *Gentiles*. If I should tell you by what Texts in Scripture the *Popes* claim the Powers before mentioned, it would stir up your laughter, and prove too light for so serious a matter; yet because possibly you may never have heard so much of this Subject before, I shall instance in a few: They tell you therefore that the Jurisdiction they pretend over the Church, and the power of pardoning Sins, comes from Christ to *St. Peter*, and from him to them. *Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church. I will give thee the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind on Earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on Earth, &c.* From these two Texts ridiculously applyed, comes this great Tree which hath with its Branches over-spread the whole Earth, and kill'd all the good and wholsom Plants growing upon it; The first Text will never by any man of sence be understood to say more, than that the Preaching, Suffering, and Ministry of *Peter*, was like to be a great foundation and Pillar of the Doctrine of Christ; the other Text (as also another spoken by our Saviour to all his Apostles, *whose sins ye remit they are remitted, and whose sins ye retain they are retained*) are by all the Primitive fathers interpreted in this manner, wherefoever you shall effectually Preach the Gospel, you shall carry with you Grace, and Remission of Sins to them which shall follow your instructions; but the people who shall not have these joyful Tidings communicated by you to them, shall remain in darkness, and in their Sins. But if any will contest, that by some of these last Texts, that Evangelical Excommunication, which was afterwards brought into the Church by the Apostles, was here praesignified by our great Master, how unlike were those censures to those now thundered out (as he calls it) by the *Pope*? these were for edification, and not destruction, to afflict the flesh for the salvation of the Soul; that Apostolical ordinance was pronounced for some notorious Scandal or Apostacy from the Faith, and first decreed by the Church; that is, the whole Congregation present, and then denounced by the Pastor,

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## Nicholas Machiavel's Letter.

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Pastor, and reached only to debar such person from partaking of the Communion or fellowship of that Church, till repentance should readmit him, but was followed by no other prosecution or chastisement, as is now practised. But suppose all these Texts had been as they would have them, how does this make for the Successors of St. Peter or the rest? or how can this prove the *Bishops of Rome* to have right to such succession? But I make haste from this subject, and shall urge but one Text more; which is *The spiritual man judgeth all men, but is himself judged of none*; from whence is inferred by the Canonists, that first, the *Pope* is the *Spiritual man*; and then, that he is to be Judge of all the world, and last, that he is never to be liable to any judgment himself; whereas it is obvious to the meanest understanding, St. Paul in this Text means to distinguish between a person inspired with the Spirit of God, and one remaining in the state of Nature, which latter he says cannot judge of those Heavenly gifts and graces, as he explains himself when he says, *The Natural man cannot discern the things of the Spirit, because they are foolishness unto him*. To take my leave of this matter wholly out of the way of my Studies, I shall beg of you *Zenobio* and of *Guisio*, and the rest of our Society to read over carefully the new Testament, and then to see what ground there is for Purgatory (by which all the wealth and greatness hath accrew'd to these men) what colour for the Idolatrous worship of Saints, and their Images and particularly for speaking in their hymns and prayers to a piece of wood (the Cross I mean) *Salve Lignum* &c. and then *fac nos dignos beneficiorum Christi*, as you may read in that Office, what colour, or rather what excuse for that horrid unchristian, and barbarous Engine called the *inquisition*, brought in by the command and authority of the *Pope*, the Inventor of which, *Peter* a Dominican Fryer having been slain amongst the *Albigesi*, as he well deserved, is now Cannoniz'd for a Saint, and stil'd *San Pietro Martire*: In the dreadfull Prisons of this Inquisition, many faithful and pious Christians (to say nothing of honest Moral *Moors* or *Mahometans*) are tormented and famish'd, or, if they out-live their sufferings burnt publicly to death, and that only for differing in Religion from the *Pope*, without having any crime, or the least misdemeanor proved or alledged against them, and this is inflicted upon these poor Creatures, by those who profess to believe the Scripture, which tells us, that *faith is the gift of God*, without whose special illumination no man can obtain it, and therefore is not in reason or humanity to be punished for wanting it: And Christ himself hath so clearly decided that point in bidding us let the tares and the wheat grow together till the Harvest, that I shall never make any difficulty to call him Antichrist, who shall use the least persecution whatsoever against any differing in matters of faith from himself, whether the person so dissenting, be *Heretick*, *Jew*, *Gentile*, or *Mahometan*: Next, I beseech you to observe in reading that Holy Book (though Christian fasts are doubtless of Divine right) what ground there is for enjoying fish to be eaten (at least flesh to be obtained from) for one third part of the year, by which they put the poor to great hardship, who not having purses to buy wholsom fish, are subjected to all the miseries and diseases incident to a bad and unhealthfull dyet; whilst the rich, and chiefly themselves and their *Cardinals*, exceed *Lucullus* in their Luxury, of *Oysters*, *Turbats*, *tender Crabs*, and *Carpioni* brought some hundreds of miles to feed their gluttony, upon these penitential days of abstinence from *Beef* and *Pork*. It may be it will lye in the way of those who observe this, to enquire what St. Paul means when he says *That in the latter days some shall depart from the faith forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving*; but all these things, and many other abuses brought in by these Perverters of Christianity, will I hope ere long be enquired into by some of the Disciples of that bold Fryer, who the very same year in which I prophecied that the scourge of the Church was not far off, began to thunder against their Indulgencies, and since hath questioned many tenets long received and imposed upon the world. I shall conclude this discourse after I have said a word of the most Hellish of all the innovations brought in by the *Popes*, which is the *Clergy*; these are a sort of men under pretence of ministering to the people in holy things, set a part and seperated from the rest of mankind (from whom they have a very distinct, and a very opposite interest) by a humane Ceremony called by a divine name, *viz.* Ordination; these wherever they are found (with the whole body of the Monks and Fryers, who are called the regular Clergy) make a Band which may be called the *Fanizaries of the Papacy*, these have been the causers of all the Solœcisms and immoralties in Government, and of all the impieties and abominations in Religion, and by consequence of all the disorder, villany, and corruption we suffer under in this detestable Age; these men by the Bishop of *Rome's* help, have crept into all the Governments in *Christendom*, where there is any mixture of *Monarchy*, and made themselves a third estate; that is, have, by their temporalities (which are almost a third part

## Nicholas Machiavel's Letter.

of all the Lands in *Europe* given them by the blind zeal, or rather folly of the *Northern* people, who over-ran this part of the world) stept into the throne, and what they cannot perform by these secular helps, and by the dependancy their vassals have upon them, they fail not to claim and to usurp, by the power they pretend to have from God and his Viceroy at *Rome*. They exempt themselves, their Lands and goods from all secular jurisdiction; that is, from all Courts of Justice and Magistracy, and will be Judges in their own Causes, as in matters of tithes, &c. and not content with this, will appoint Courts of their own to decide Sovereignly in testamentary matters, and many other causes, and take upon them to be sole Punishers of many great Crimes, as Witchcraft, Sorcery, Adultery, and all uncleanness; to say nothing of the fore-mentioned judicatory of the Inquisition: in these last cases they turn the offenders over to be punish'd (when they have given Sentence) by the secular arm, so they call the Magistrate, who is blindly to execute their decrees under pain of Hell fire; as if Christian Princes and Governours were appointed only by God to be their Bravo's or Hangmen. They give Protection and Sanctuary, to all execrable offenders, even to Murderers themselves (whom God commanded to be indispensably punish'd with death) if they come within their Churches, Cloysters, or any other place, which they will please to call Holy ground; and if the ordinary justice, nay, the Sovereign power, do proceed against such offender, they thunder out their Excommunication; that is, cut off from the body of Christ, not the Prince only, but the whole Nation and People, shutting the Church doors, and commanding divine offices to cease, and sometimes even authorizing the people to rise up in Arms, and constrain their Governours to a submission, as happened to this poor City in the time of our Ancestors, when for but forbidding the servant of a poor Carmelite Fryer (who had vowed poverty, and should have kept none) to go arm'd, and punishing his disobedience with imprisonment, our whole Senate with their *Gonsalons* were constrained to go to *Avignon* for absolution, and in case of refusal, had been massacred by the people. It would almost astonish a wise man to imagine how these folks should acquire an Empire so destructive to Christian Religion, and so pernicious to the interests of men, but it will not seem so miraculous to them who shall seriously consider, that the Clergy hath been for more than this thousand years upon the catch, and a form'd united corporation against the purity of Religion, and the interest of mankind, and have not only wrested the Holy Scriptures to their own advantage (which they have kept from the laity in unknown languages, and by prohibiting the reading thereof) but made use likewise first of the blind devotion and ignorance of the *Goths*, *Vandals*, *Huns*, &c. and since of the ambition and avarice of Christian Princes, stirring them up one against another, and sending them upon foolish errands to the Holy Land, to lose their lives, and to leave their Dominions, in the mean time, exposed to themselves and their Complices. They have besides kept Learning and Knowledge among themselves, stifling the light of the Gospel, crying down Moral virtues as splendid sins, defacing humane policy, destroying the purity of the Christian faith and profession, and all that was vertuous, prudent, regular and orderly upon earth; so that whoever would do good, and good men service, get himself immortal honour in this life, and eternal glory in the next, would restore the good policy (I had almost said with my Author *Livy* the sanctity too) of the *Heathens*, with all their valour, and other glorious endowments; I say, whoever would do this, must make himself powerful enough to extirpate this cursed and apostate race out of the world, and that you may see this is lawful as well as necessary, I shall say but one word of their calling and original, and then leave this subject. The word *Clergy* is a term, wholly unknown to the Scriptures, otherwise than in this sense; a peculiar People or Gods lot, used often for the whole Jewish Nation, who are likewise called a Kingdom of Priests in some places. In the New Testament the word *Cleros* is taken for the true Believers, who are also called the Elect, and often the Church, which is the Assembly of the faithful met together, as is easily seen by reading the beginning of most of *St. Paul's* Epistles, where writing to the Church, or Churches, he usually explains himself, *To all the Saints in Christ*; sometimes, *To all who have obtained like faith with us*; sometimes, *To all who in all places call upon the Name of the Lord Jesus*, &c. by which it appears, that neither the word Church nor Clergy was in those days ever appropriated to the Pastors or Elders of the flock; but did signifie indifferently all the people assembled together; which is likewise the literal construction of the word *Ecclesia*, which is an assembly or meeting; in these Congregations or Churches was performed their Ordination, which properly signifies no more than a decree of such Assembly; but is particularly used for an Election of any into the Ministry. The manner was this, sometimes the Apostles themselves in their Perigrations, and sometimes any other eminent Member of the Church, did propose to the Society (upon vacancy, or

## Nicholas Machiavel's Letter.

other necessity of a Pastor, Elder, or Deacon) some good Holy man to be Elected, which person if he had parts or gifts, such as the Church could edifie by, was chosen by the lifting up of hands, that is by suffrage, and oftentimes hands were laid upon him, and Prayer made for him. These men so set apart did not pretend to any consecration, or sacredness more than they had before, much less to become a distinct thing from the rest of mankind, as if they had been metamorphos'd, but did attend to perform the several functions of their calling, as prophesying; that is, Preaching the Gospel, visiting the sick, &c. and never intermitted the ordinary business of their Trade or Profession, unless their Church or Congregation was very numerous, in which case they were maintained by alms or contribution, which was laid aside by every member, and collected the first day of the week by the Deacons, this was said to be given to the Church, and was employed by suffrage of the whole Collective Body to the poor, and to other incidencies, so far was it from Sacredge in those days to employ Church goods to Lay uses. From these words, *Church, Clergy, Ordination, Pastor,* (which last hath been translated of late years *Bishop*) you see what conclusions these men have deduced, and how immense a structure they have raised, upon so little a foundation, and how easily it will fall to the ground, when God shall inspire Christian Princes and States to redeem his truths, and his poor enslaved Members out of their Clutches, to bring back again into the world, the true original Christian faith, with the Apostolical Churches, Pastors, and Ordination, so consistent with moral virtue and integrity, so helpful and conducing to the best and most prudent Policy, so fitted for obedience to Magistracy and Government, all which the world hath for many years been deprived of, by the execrable and innate ill quality, which is inseperable from Priest-craft, and the conjuration or spell of their new invented ordination; by which they cry with the Poet,

*Jam furor humanum nostro de pectore sensum  
Expulit & totum spirant praeordia Phœbum.*

which makes them so Sacred, and Holy, that they have nothing of integrity, or indeed of humanity left in them. I hope I shall not be thought impious any longer; upon this point, I mean for vindicating Christian Religion from the assaults of these men, who having the confidence to believe, or at least profess themselves the only instruments which God hath chosen or can choose to teach and reform the world (though they have neither Moral virtues, nor Natural parts equal to other men for the most part) have by this pretence prevail'd so far upon the common sort of people, and upon some too of a better quality, that they are perswaded their salvation or eternal damnation depends upon believing or not believing of what they say. I would not be understood, to dissuade any from honouring the true Apostolical Teachers, when they shall be re-established amongst us, or from allowing them (even of right, and not of alms or curtesie) such emoluments as may enable them cheerfully to perform the duties of their charge, to provide for their Children, and even to use hospitality as they are commanded by *St. Paul*. But this I will prophesie before I conclude, that if Princes shall perform this business by halves, and leave any root of this Clergy or Priest-craft, as it now is, in the ground; or if that famous reformer, fled some years since out of *Picardy to Geneva*, who is of so great renown for learning and parts, and who promises us so perfect a reformation, shall not in his model wholly extirpate this sort of men, then I say I must foretel, that as well the Magistrate as this Workman, will find themselves deceived in their expectation, and that the least *fibra* of this plant will over-run again the whole Vineyard of the Lord, and turn to a diffusive Papacy in every Diocess, perhaps in every Parish: So that God in his mercy inspire them to cut out the core of the Ulcer, and the bag of this imposture, that it may never ranckle or fester any more, nor break out hereafter, to diffuse new corruption and putrifaction through the body of Christ, which is his Holy Church, nor to vitiate and infect the good order and true policy of Government.

I come now to the last branch of my charge, which is, that I teach Princes villany, and how to enslave and oppress their Subjects, in which accusation I am dealt with as poor *Agnollo Canini* was, who, as they report, being a very learned Practiser of the Laws, and left the only man of this profession (one Autumn) in our City, the rest of the Advocates being fled into the Country for fear of a contagious Disease which then reigned, was commanded by our Judges to assist with his Counsell both parties, and to draw Pleas as well for the Defendant as the Plaintiff, else the Courts of Justice must have been shut up. In the same manner my accusers handle me, and make me first exhort and teach Subjects to throw off their Princes, and then to instruct Monarchs how to enslave and oppress them; but I did  
not

## Nicholas Machiavel's Letter.

not expect such ingratitude from mine own Citizens, or to be served as *Moses* was, when he was upbraided for killing the *Egyptian*, by one of his own people for whose sake he had done it, whereas he believed they would have understood by that action, that he was the person whom God intended to make use of in delivering them from the horrid slavery they were then under. If any man will read over my Book of the Prince with impartiality and ordinary charity, he will easily perceive, that it is not my intention therein to recommend that Government, or those men there described, to the world; much less to teach them to trample upon good men, and all that is sacred and venerable upon earth, Laws, Religion, Honesty, and what not; if I have been a little too punctual in designing these Monsters, and drawn them to the life in all their lineaments and colours, I hope mankind will know them the better to avoid them, my Treatise being both a Satyr against them, and a true Character of them; I speak nothing of great and honourable Princes, as the Kings of *France*, *England*, and others, who have the States and Orders of their Kingdoms with excellent Laws and Constitution to found and maintain their Government, and who reign over the hearts as well as the persons of their subjects; I treat only of those vermin bred out of the corruption of our own small Common-wealths and Cities, or engender'd by the ill blasts that come from *Rome*, *Olivaretto da Fermo*, *Borgia*, the *Baglioni*, the *Benivogliu*, and a hundred others; who having had neither right nor honourable means to bring them to their power, use it with more violence, rapine, and cruelty upon the poor people, than those other renowned Princes shew to the Boars, the Wolves, the Foxes, and other savage beasts which are the objects of their chase and hunting: whosoever in his Empire over men is ty'd to no other rules than those of his own will and lust, must either be a Saint to moderate his passions, or else a very Devill incarnate; or if he be neither of these, both his life and reign are like to be very short; for whosoever takes upon him so execrable an employment as to rule men against the Laws of nature and of reason, must turn all topsie turvy, and never stick at any thing, for if once he halt, he will fall and never rise again: I hope after this I need say little to justify my self from the calumny of advising these Monsters to break their faith, since to keep it is to lose their Empire, faithfulness and sincerity being their mortal enemies, an *Uguccione della Faggrvola* to one who upbraided him, that he never employed honest men; answered, *Honest men will cut my throat, let the King use honest men*, meaning the King of *Naples*, who was established in his Throne, and had right to it. But that I may have occasion to justify my self against a little more than I am accused of, I will confess, that in a work where I desired to be a little more serious, than I was in this Book of the Prince, I did affirm, that in what way soever men defended their Country, whether by breaking or keeping their faith, it was ever well defended, not meaning in a strict moral sense, or point of honour, but explaining my self that *de facto* the infamy of the breach of word, would quickly be forgotten and pardoned by the world, which is very true, Nay, what if I had said that good success in any interprize (a far less consideration than Piety to our Country) would have cancell'd the blame of such perfidy as *Cæsar* (whom I compare to *Cataline*) us'd toward his fellow-Citizens not only not detested by posterity, but even crown'd with renown and immortal fame; inasmuch as Princes to this day (as I have observed elsewhere) think it an honour to be compared to him, and the highest pitch of veneration their flatterers can arrive at, is to call them by the name of one who violated his faith, and enslav'd his Country. I hope that in shewing as well these Tyrants as the poor people who are forced to live under them, their danger, that is by laying before the former, the hellish and precipitous courses they must use to maintain their power, by representing to the latter, what they must suffer, I may be instrumental, first, to deter private Citizens from attempting upon the liberties of their Country, or if they have done it, to make them lay down their ill gotten authority; and then to warn the rest of the Nobility and people, from these factions and malignancies in their several common-wealths and Governments, which might give hope and opportunity to those who are ambitious amongst them, to aspire to an Empire over them. However it prove, I hope I am no more to be blamed for my attempt, than that excellent Physician of our Nation is, who hath lately taken so much pains to compose an excellent Treatise, of that foul Disease which was, not long since, brought from the new world into these parts; wherein though he be forced to use such expressions as are almost able to nauseate his Readers, and talk of such Ulcers, Boils, Nodes, Botches, Cankers &c. that are scarce fit to be repeated, especially when he handles the causes of those effects, yet he did not intend to teach or exhort men to get this Disease; much less did he bring this lamentable infirmity into the world, but describes it faithfully as it is, to the end men may be bettered, and avoid the being infected with it, and may discern and cure it, whenever their incontinence and folly shall procure it them. I shall say no more in this matter; but to conclude all make a protestation,

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## Nicholas Machiavel's Letter.

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testation; that as well in this Book, as in all my other Writings, my only scope and design is to promote the interest and welfare of mankind, and the peace and quiet of the world, both which I am so vain as to believe, would be better obtained and provided for, if the principles I lay down were followed and observed by Princes and People, than they are like to be by those Maxims which are in this Age most in vogue. For my self I shall only say (and call you all to witness for the truth of it) that as by my Birth I am a Gentleman; and of a Family which hath had many *Gonfalomers* of Justice in it; so I have been used in many employments of great trust, both in our City and abroad, and at this hour I am not in my Estate one peny the better for them all, nor should I have been, although I had never suffered any losses by the seizure of my Estate in the year 1531. for my carriage it hath ever been void of faction and contention; I never had any prejudice against the House of *Medici*, but honoured the persons of all those of that Family whom I knew, and the memory of such of them as lived before me, whom I acknowledge to have been excellent Patriots and Pillars of our City and Common-wealth. During the turbulent times of *Piero*, and after his expulsion out of *Florence*, though my employments were but Ministerial, my advice was ask'd in many grave matters, which I ever delivered with impartiality and indifference, not espousing the heady opinions of any, much less their passions and animosities; I never sided with any Party further than that the Duty of my charge obliged me to serve the prevailing Party, when possess'd of the Government of our City; this I speak for those changes which happened between the flight of the said *Piero de Medici*, and the horrid Parricide committed by *Clement* the 7<sup>th</sup>. upon his indulgent Mother, joyning with his greatest enemies, and uniting himself with those who had used the most transcendent insolence to his own person, and the highest violence and fury the Sun ever saw to his poor Courtiers and Subjects, that so accompanied he might sheath his Sword in the bowels of his own desolate Country. At that time, and during that whole Siege, I must confess I did break the confines of my Neutrality, and not only acted as I was commanded barely, but rous'd my self, and stir'd up others haraunging (in the Streets and places of the City) the People to defend with the last drop of their blood, the Walls of their Country, and the Liberty of their Government; taking very hazardous Journeys to *Ferruccio*, and then into the *Mugello* and other parts, to bring in Succours and Provisions to our languishing City; and acting as a Soldier (which was a new profession to me) at the age of above sixty, when others are dispensed from it. For all which, I had so entire a satisfaction in my mind and conscience, that I am perswaded this cordial made me able to support the sufferings which befell me after our Catastrophe, and to rejoyce in them so far, that all the malice and cruelty of our enemies, could never draw one word from me unsutable to the honour I thought I merited, and did in some sort enjoy, for being instrumental to defend (as long as it was possible) our Altars and our Hearths. But all that I have undergone, hath been abundantly recompenced to me by the favour and courtesie of the most excellent Signior *Cosimo*, who hath been pleased to offer me all the preferments the greatest ambition could aspire to, which I did not refuse out of any scruple to serve so incomparable a Prince, whose early years manifest so much Courage, Humanity, and Prudence, and so Fatherly a care of the publick good, but because I was very desirous not to accept of a charge which I was not able to perform, my years and infirmities having now brought me to a condition in which I am fitter to live in a Cloyster than a Palace, and made me good for nothing but to talk of past times, the common vice of old Age: So that I did not think it just or grateful to reward this excellent person so ill for his kindness, as to give him a useles Servant, and to fill up the place of a far better. This is all I think fit to say of this matter, I chuse to address it to you *Zenobio*, for the constant friendship I have ever entertained with you, and formerly with your deceased Father, the companion of my Studies, and ornament of our City. And so I bid you farewell.

Chief Magi's  
strate.

The first of April,  
1537.