INDIAN MUTINY, 1857.

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1 Narratives of Events regarding the Mutiny in India of 1857-58 and the Restoration of Authority, Vol. I (Calcutta, Foreign Department Press, 1881) Pages 1 -- 711

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2 H. of C. Mutiny in the Punjab 1857: Papers. Pages 1 -- 143
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3 133 Mutiny of Native Regiments: Return of Regiments and Corps which have mutinied or Manifested a Disposition to Mutiny Since the 1st January 1957: of the Number of Officers and Men present, &c. Pages 1 -- 70.
NARRATIVES OF EVENTS
REGARDING THE
MUTINY IN INDIA OF 1857-58
AND
THE RESTORATION OF AUTHORITY.

VOL. I.

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NARRATIVE OF EVENTS ATTENDING THE OUTBREAK OF DISTURBANCES AND THE RESTORATION OF AUTHORITY IN THE ALLAHABAD DISTRICT IN 1858.

No. 46, dated Allahabad, 9th November 1858.

From—F. Thompson, Esq., Officiating Magistrate of Allahabad.
To—E. C. Bayley, Esq., Officiating Commissioner, 4th Division.

In reply to your letter, No. 783, dated 8th May last, I have the honor to forward you a statement of occurrences from the first commencement of the mutiny up to the 14th of July last, when the fort of Delhiya was taken, and the district completely cleared of rebels. The statement has been drawn out by Mr. Monteath, Assistant Magistrate, from the records in this office, and from the \textit{viva voce} evidence of several officers, who were in the station from the commencement of the outbreak.

2. The first perceptible excitement in Allahabad was during that eventful period,—the first half of May,—when the British power in India was receiving the great shock which first revealed the gigantic proportions of the storm which had been brewing. An almost simultaneous outburst was taking place in widely separated places. Lucknow, Meerut and Delhi, Ferozepoor and Lahore, and wherever such awful news was listened to, a sympathetic excitement might be expected to arise. The 12th of May, on which day the report of the emeute at Meerut reached Allahabad, is the day from which was dated the commencement of excitement here. Tales of mutiny and outbreak went their rounds in the ranks and the bazar, and along with them was also canvassed another momentous question. The report of the proselytizing intentions of Government was fast becoming a belief, both in the town and barracks; cringing native servants in some instances took Christian names to show their non-resistance to the scheme, and the general panic was indicated by the sudden rise in the price of grain and other articles of food.

3. On the 17th; news of the fearful progress, and the awful character of the mutiny at Delhi arrived, and on the 18th the European community at Allahabad assembled to concert plans for united action, and agreed on an alarm signal in case of sudden disturbance. On the 19th, two troops of the 3rd Oudh Irregulars arrived from Pertabgur, under Lieutenant A. Alexander; and on the following day, a letter from Captain Hardinge, saying that Sir H. Lawrence had despatched these troops to be placed under civil authority here. Twenty-five of these were detached for the protection of the treasury, another twenty for the jail, and night patrols were arranged from Daragunge by the jail up to the treasury. In the fort were a wing of a Sikh Regiment (Ferozepoor Regiment), and one company of the 6th Native Infantry. The rest of the 6th Native Infantry were in their lines between two and three miles from the fort. Soon after this sixty European invalid artillerymen were brought from Chunar, and constituted the only European element in the garrison of the fort at the time of the mutiny. Such was the disposition of troops in this station during the next eventful and anxious fortnight. Sikhs, sepoys, and a few invalid Europeans inside the fort, and sepoys and Oudh Irregulars outside. Some there were, especially officers, who, through all the alarming news and alarming symptoms, trusted to the last the fidelity of the native troops in the station. Others there were, who distrusted the sepoys of the 6th, but who relied still on the Sikhs and Irregulars, and looked to them as the great counterpoise to the other dangerous element. There were others, who looked with equal distrust on all native troops whatsoever, and who regarded the few invalid Europeans as the only safety in case of danger. It was then a question of
great moment whether the treasure should be removed into the fort or not? If it was, the outbreak might be precipitated, and a fresh temptation added to the uncertain fidelity of the Sikhs. This question, we shall see afterwards, was most fortunately decided in the negative. On that decision, which was based on a despatch of Sir H. Lawrence, may be said to have depended the preservation of the fort; for if the Sikhs, who were inside, had had the treasure in their possession, they would in all human probability have seized it, and joined the rebel cause.

4. But at the time we are talking of, this decision had not been arrived at; and magazine carts and bullocks were placed in the treasury compound, ready to remove the treasure to the fort, if deemed advisable. While these precautionary measures were being made, the general excitement among the natives was rapidly increasing. The disaffection of the 6th Native Infantry was openly talked of in the bazar. A report got abroad that Government had fixed the 25th as the day to issue the objectionable cartridges; and for that purpose they were to be paraded on the glacis of the fort, where a commanding fire would enforce obedience to the order; but the sepoy, it was said, had determined neither to use the cartridge, nor to trust themselves on such dangerous ground. It was no use publishing in the bazar, or asserting to the men, that such reports were devoid of the slightest foundation; they too well suited the excited temperament of both people and soldiers to be easily divested of their apparent probability. On the afternoon of the 22nd, Sekundar Khan, Rissaldar, in charge of the irregulars, posted at the treasury, informed Captain Hardinge (commanding irregulars) that he had been asked by the Soubadar of the 6th Guard to join in preventing the removal of the treasure if attempted, and this was soon after confirmed by the Duffadar, informing Alexander (2nd in Command) that he and the sowars had been asked to join. The Magistrate, Mr. Court, reported this to the officer in command, Colonel Simson, who intimated shortly afterwards his intention of repairing to the fort, which he considered his proper place. Mr. Court strenuously opposed this measure, which he considered to be a virtual abandonment of the cantonment, and almost certain therefore to lead to an outbreak of the bad characters in the city, and probably to the rising also of all the out-stations. He was fully persuaded also that the regiment would refuse to march to the fort, and that the attempt to make them do so would only precipitate the mutiny, which it seemed of the utmost consequence to postpone. Small detachments of Europeans were marching up to Allahabad, whose arrival before an outbreak might change the face of affairs, but whose very existence would be perilled by its taking place before. On these objections being made, Colonel Simson abandoned the plan.

5. On the evening of this day (22nd) Mr. Court, Colonel Simson, Mr. Chester (Commissioner), and Captain Hardinge met for consultation, and determined to remove all women and children into the fort early next morning; but that no male should be allowed to enter it, as it seemed of the utmost consequence to postpone any disturbance outside. At 4 on the following morning (23rd), Colonel Simson and Captain Birch informed Mr. Court of the total abandonment of last night's plans. Captain Birch had been appointed commandant of the garrison, and orders had been issued, directing other officers to repair thither. Mr. Court objected, but in vain; and by 10 A.M. his anticipations were fulfilled by a regular flight to the fort of men, women and children, carrying with them all the property they could. Mr. Court again remonstrated, and the orders were at last cancelled. The non-military portion of the community were formed into a volunteer guard, and the city and station were patrolled by them, accompanied by police sowars during the night. On the 24th, Mr. Court stationed a company of the 6th in Khooshru garden, and sent his own tent there. Reports of the agglomeration of the 6th and Sikhs were rife, but the contagion had not yet done its work in full, for in the evening two Mewatis were handed up by the 6th, as having entered their lines to tamper with their loyalty. The 25th was the
Mussulman *Eed,* and many therefore were the fears it brought with it. The day however passed off quietly.

6. In the evening a parade of the 6th Regiment was held, at which the sepoys, who had given up the spies, were presented with the ranks of Naik and Havildar, and the prisoners were removed to the Central prison. On the following day, a sepoy of the 6th complained in a mutinous way of the promotion of the day before by which he had been superseded. Colonel Simson believed he was unsupported by the men generally, and the officers declared their entire confidence in the regiment. The spies, who had been given up, were removed to the fort, as information of an attempt at release by the Mewatis of Sumbadab and Rusoolpoor was received. Mr. Willock, Joint Magistrate, also was posted to the jail along with a company of the 6th.

From the 27th of May to the 3rd of June, everything seemed gradually re-assuming its wonted peace and quietness. Offices were re-opened, and business in all quarters recommenced. Fear began to subside, and those European detachments which arrived were forwarded on to Cawnpore; yet all this was but the lull before the storm; while the feeling of insecurity in the European community was daily lessening, the schemes for their destruction were daily being matured. About this time a telegraphic message was received from Sir H. Lawrence, advising not in any way to trust the Sikhs; and to this advice, as has already been mentioned, is due, in all probability, the preservation of the fort. The intention here had been, in case of necessity, to remove the treasure to the fort, where the Sikhs were stationed; and had that been done, the possession of the treasure would have formed one of the strongest possible temptations to them to join the absorbing tide of mutiny. Sir H. Lawrence's message showed to all the extreme danger of the ground on which they were resting, and the absolute necessity of not trusting too implicitly to any native troops whatsoever. From that date (June 4th) the lull of quiet began to be broken up, and the rising storm to gather rapidly around. Telegraphic communication, with both east and west, was broken off, and the dak coachman hurried back with the news that Benares was in flames. The meditated outbreak had been there precipitated by the energetic measures of Colonel Neill, and both Sikhs and sepoys mingled together in the general *mélée,—*had shared in the general destruction in which it ended. The news that the 13th Irregulars, with the Native and Sikh Regiments, having escaped from Benares, were in full march on Allahabad, gave a more definite shape to the alarm. The storm had long been known to be gathering, but people knew not on which side to look for its bursting.

7. Now all eyes were directed to the Benares road, and even the indefinite fear of mutiny within, gave place in a great measure to what was now considered a certain and definite danger from without.

8. Measures were at once taken by the authorities to meet this supposed danger (June 5th), and so entirely did they regard it as the one imminent danger to be met, that steps were taken, which the result proved to have been very unwise. A company of the 6th Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Hicks, was sent to Daragunge, and two 9-pounders, under Lieutenant Harward, were put into their hands by Colonel Simson's orders, though a strong remonstrance was made against it by Captain Russell of the Artillery. Means were also furnished to the ghat establishment for destroying the passage by cutting away two or more boats, and sepoy pickets were sent out on the Benares road. Every European was ordered to the fort, and there, to the number of sixty-four, they were at once embodied, armed, and placed under a European officer. During the whole of this day (5th) great alarm was felt, but few probably thought how soon, and in what way, the danger would develop itself. The night passed off peaceably, and the morning of the 6th June, dawned in outward quiet on the city and the station of Allahabad. Several Europeans had refused to enter the fort, either from a belief that there was not just cause for such a step, or
from unwillingness to abandon all their property to plunder, and several, this very morning, who had previously gone to the fort, returned to their houses, and to this is owing in a great measure the bloody character which the mutiny was enabled to assume. At 6 P.M. the 6th Native Infantry, who had volunteered with enthusiasm to march against the insurgents at Delhi, were paraded to hear read to them the letter of thanks from the Governor-General in Council. The men seemed highly pleased, and cheered loudly. The European officers were more than ever confirmed in their implicit reliance on the fidelity of their men; yet in three hours and a half this loyal cheer was changed for the shout of mutiny and murder. At 9:15 P.M. the mutiny broke out at Daragunge. Lieutenant Harward in vain tried to stem the tide. The sepoys, who had turned out all accoutred, rushed at the two guns, seized them, and immediately commenced dragging them towards cantonments. Lieutenant Harward then galloped off to Lieutenant Alexander, who was posted with two troops of 3rd Oudh Irregulars at Alopeebagh, between Daragunge and cantonments. The latter officer at once ordered out his men, and they obeyed, though very tardily; and by the time they were ready, the noise of the guns being dragged along the road to cantonments could be distinctly heard. Harward despatched a short note to the fort, informing Brasyer of what had happened, and then set out with Alexander and the irregulars in pursuit of the guns. They soon came up with them, and the order to charge was given. Only three men followed their gallant leader, who fell, shot through the breast in the volley which met them. All but one or two irregulars now joined the mutineers, and Harward had again to escape for his life. This firing was the first intimation, to the fort and station, of the outbreak. It was at first almost universally thought to indicate the approach of the expected enemy from Benares. Harward's note first told the truth to those inside the fort, but it did not so quickly reach those outside. There was a large gathering in the 6th Mess-house that evening of seventeen officers, including eight unposted cadets, who had just arrived. The officers talked of the fight, which had probably commenced, and were eager to share in its success. The bugle at this time sounded at the 6th lines, and thither many an officer hastened. But the call was a treacherous one; as each officer arrived, he was deliberately murdered. Colonel Simson was received with a volley, but managed to escape into the fort, as also did Captain Gordon, Lieutenant Hicks, and Ensign Currie. Of the cadets, only two escaped, Messrs. Pearson and Woodgate. They, together with Lieutenant Hicks, were at Daragunge when the mutiny broke out, as mentioned before. Lieutenant Harward managed to escape, after finding that all attempts to stop it were unavailing. These three, however, were not so fortunate; they were taken prisoners by the sepoys, and marched triumphantly towards cantonments. They had just reached the mess-house compound, when suddenly a shout and noise were heard in the direction of the treasury, and the sepoys rushed off, it is supposed, to secure their share of the plunder; leaving their three prisoners standing alone. They immediately made for Hicks's house, and as they passed along the road, bounding the mess-house compound, they distinctly heard inside, the firing and shouts of murderers and the shrieks of the murdered. They at last got into Hicks's buggy, and drove to the banks of the Ganges at Papphambow ghat, where they swam across the river, and going down its left bank, till they came opposite the fort, they again swam across and landed at the fort walls, inside which they soon managed to get. Meanwhile the work of blood and destruction had no lack of hands to perform it. Early in the morning the jail gates were thrown open, and 3,000 ruffians from its wards, and many thousand Mewaees and other miscreants from the city, rushed eagerly to help in the deeds of that night. Soon the whole horizon, looking north and west from the ramparts of the fort, became one mass of flame and lurid smoke, from which issued the yells and shrieks of thousands of infuriated devils doing the work of murder and rapine. By morning's dawn, thirty-one Europeans had perished, and it may be as well that the details of but few of so many murders are known with any certainty.
Next day saw the green flag of the prophet waving over the cotwalla, in acknowledged harmony with the scenes of blood and atrocity around it. While these scenes were being enacted outside the fort, a crisis of inexpressible danger had passed off within its walls in our favor. When it was certain that the 6th N. I. had mutinied, it became necessary of course to disarm the company of that regiment within the fort. This was accomplished by Lieutenant Brasyer, with consummate courage, temper, and tact, ably supported by Captains Hazlewood and Russell. The company of sepoys was assembled near the main gate; they had their muskets loaded, for they had been ordered to load by Lieutenant Williams, on the first sound of firing, when it was thought to be an attack of the enemy without. The Sikhs were drawn up in front of the barracks, facing the main gate, and before them the guns manned by the European invalid Artillerymen. The Volunteers occupied posts previously assigned to them on the ramparts. One party being over the main gate, looking down upon the sepoy guard. It was an exciting moment when the order to pile arms was given, and the sepoys stood hesitating what to do. Two guns were at this moment brought up in a menacing position; one bore on the flank of the company, the other swept the main gate.

The port-fires were lighted, and the carbines of the Artillerymen, and the rifles of the Volunteers, were all equally ready for the worst, should it come. The disarming was at last accomplished without bloodshed, though not without the most evident desire to resist on the part of the sepoys. One man even cocked his gun, as Lieutenant Williams was taking it from him. After this the two other sepoy guards were disarmed without resistance, and the whole were turned out into the ravelin, whence they were turned outside next day, being allowed to carry off all their private property. The Sikhs after this became steadier and quieter, and the European community in the fort could again breathe freely. During the night the few Irregulars who had remained staunch, came in, bringing with them the body of their officer, Lieutenant Alexander, who had been shot as before related. His body bore witness to the mad cruelty of his enemies, for, besides the shot in the breast, which killed him, were sabre cuts all over his head and face. Great confusion existed inside the fort for some days, owing partly to the absence on duty of the Commissariat Officer, Lieutenant Davidson, and the murder of the Fort Adjutant, Captain Birech. The confusion was greatly increased on the 9th by a party of Volunteers and Sikhs being sent out to bring in stores from the Government Steam Agency premises, &c.,—Messrs. Hamilton's godowns. But first the Volunteers, and then the Sikhs, took to indiscriminate plundering; and as the plunder was principally wine and brandy, the result was very general drunkenness, and insubordination, both then and afterwards, in the fort.

But to return. On the very morning after the mutiny, i.e., on the 7th June, a small party of fifty, 1st Madras Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Arulod, arrived at Jooosee, where the Benares road meets the bridge of boats. They were wearied and exhausted by a forced march; but the bridge was in the hands of the enemy, and no boats could be found. It was not till late at night
that a Government steamer, which was lying at the fort, was despatched to bring them across, though the fact of their arrival was known in the morning. On the 9th June, another small detachment of the same regiment of fifty-seven men, under Lieutenant Beaumont, arrived, and dropped down in boats to the fort. They had been attacked on the road by the villagers of Kutta, and had lost their baggage, though no lives. On the 11th June, Colonel Neill himself arrived with forty more men, and immediately assumed command. He at once set about taking measures for reorganizing the force within the fort, and commencing operations against the enemy without. It was high time that such measures should be taken. The insubordination in the garrison had reached a very dangerous height. The Sikhs were daily more overbearing and unruly. Every thing they could lay their hands on, they considered lawful plunder; and both they and the Europeans went in and out of the fort almost at pleasure. Colonel Neill, with equal caution and promptitude, enforced a more strict discipline, and kept the men occupied by the operations he commenced outside. Up to this time the rebels had been employed in daily burning and destruction. They were closely invested the fort, though doing nothing actively against it. They held the bridge of boats, partially destroyed, and occupied in force the important post of Daragoone at the Allahabad end of it. Nothing had as yet been done to dislodge them from any point, or disturb them in any way. The guns of the fort commanded Daragoone and the bridge of boats, but not a shot had been fired. The morning (June 12th) after Colonel Neill's arrival, fire was opened on that quarter by his orders, and he at the same time attacked it with a party of Fusiliers and Sikhs, drove the enemy out, and secured the bridge. It was at once repaired, and was ready next day for the crossing of one hundred more Fusiliers, under Major Stephenson, who had left Benares at the same time as Colonel Neill's party. On the 13th June, the native parts of Kydungune and Jhooose were attacked, and cleared of the enemy by a party of Volunteers and Sikhs under Mr. Willock, Joint Magistrate. Next day (June 14th) the Steamer Jumna arrived with another detachment of Fusiliers. The Sikhs, who had always been inclined to be unruly, were now removed from the fort much against their will, and cantoned outside on the banks of the Jumna; thus leaving the garrison of the fort entirely European.

On the 15th June, a grand attack was made by a land force, consisting of Fusiliers, Sikhs, and Irregulars, on the suburbs of Kydungune and Moot-teegunge, supported by the steamer moving up the Jumna with a howitzer and some riflemen on board. The enemy were everywhere beaten, and followed up by our troops close to the city. So great was the terror caused by this day's exploits, that, on the following night, the Moulee and all his followers fled, leaving the two guns which had been seized at the outbreak, and a number of prisoners, chiefly native Christians, behind. These were brought into the fort early next day. Among them was poor young Cheek, an unposted cadet, who died the same evening; his body covered with wounds and sores, and his mind wandering. His sufferings from the night of the 6th must have been dreadful; he had escaped with severe wounds from the mess-house, and was picked up by a zemindar of the name of Mohomud Tukee, by whom he was given over to the Moulee, in whose hands he remained exposed and uncared for, until this time. Gopee Nauth Nundee, a native Christian and fellow-prisoner, relates that when the Moulee sought, by threats and wiles, to make him abjure Christianity, this brave young officer would call out to him "Padree Sahib, never let go the faith." Conductor Coleman was another of those brought in. He had escaped destruction with his family on the night of the mutiny, though not without severe wounds, from which he afterwards died. While kept a prisoner in the hands of the mutineers, he recognised several Delhi sepoys among them.

On the 17th June, the Magistrate proceeded to the cotwaloe, and there restored his own authority, and installed his own officers: no resistance was offered, and the whole place seemed deserted. On the 18th June, another expedition was made for the purpose of clearing and re-occupying the station.
The steamer again was sent up the river, and a land force, including twenty mounted volunteers and two guns, penetrated the cantonments. This morning, however, cholera broke out, and in a very virulent form. Eight men were buried in the evening, and twenty next day; and although after this it began to abate, and very rapidly disappeared, it carried off forty out of hundred fusiliers attacked by it. On its first appearance, Colonel Neill ordered all non-combatants out of the fort; he had already sent off two steamers full of women and children to Benares, so that the fort was now left to the troops alone. The European force was now rapidly increasing. Two more detachments of Fusiliers had arrived (one on the 16th by the steamer Coel, another on the 18th June), making at this time a total of fifty-seven men of that regiment. A detachment of Her Majesty's 84th (hundred men), under Captain Snow, arrived on the 20th, and on the 22nd June, the head-quarters of that regiment came up in the Calcutta. The Mirzapore also brought 240 of the 1st Fusiliers. Colonel Neill now began to make every preparation for despatching a relieving column to Cawnpore, with the least possible delay. The call for aid there was urgent, but the greatest difficulty was found in obtaining any of the means of travelling, and at last, on the 30th June, Major Renaud's column started, with but few of those requisites. This column consisted of 400 Fusiliers, 300 Sikhs, 120 Irregular Cavalry, and two 9-pounders manned by the invalid artillerymen.

General Havelock arrived this day (July 1st), and on the following the startling news of the massacre at Cawnpore was received from Sir H. Lawrence. Next day (July 2nd), it was confirmed by the report of some cossids, but seemed yet almost too horrible to be believed implicitly. Havelock immediately halted Renaud's advancing column, and prepared to reinforce it himself with 1,000 Europeans and three guns. On the morning of the 3rd July, he despatched a steamer with hundred Fusiliers and two guns on board, and provisions for Sir H. Wheeler, in case the news received might turn out false.

On the 7th July, Havelock's column left Allahabad; on the 15th, a further reinforcement of 280 men of Her Majesty's 84th, and on the 16th, Colonel Neill followed by dak.

While these preparations and despatches of troops were being made, the work of restoration of order and stern retribution was daily going on. Numbers of those who had taken an active part in the mutiny still lurked behind in the hope of their guilt being undiscovered, and day after day arrests and capture of such were taking place. On the 22nd July, it was deemed advisable to issue the two first Special Commissions (under Government Notification, No. 1124, 16th June 1857) to Mr. Willock, Joint Magistrate, and Dr. Irving. Two days afterwards, two more were issued to Messrs. Palmer and Sandys, and by their aid the sternest justice was quickly and summarily administered. The result of such measures was soon visible in a wholesome fear pervading all classes of natives—plundered property was cast into the fields and roads by those who felt that its possession was unsafe.

The destruction of public and private property was immense, every thing combustible seems to have been burnt, and even the Magistrate's and Sessions Judge's cutcherries, which were fine masonry buildings, were reduced to ruins. The Commissioner's cutcherry, strangely enough, escaped, though it was a thatched bungalow, and all the records in it were saved, but of course the loss of records has been most complete in the others.

As might have been expected, the outbreak in the sudder station was very soon followed by anarchy in the district. The seeds of mutiny had been scattered there, and in many parts the flame burst out with almost equal fury. In some cases the

* List of those killed in the Allahabad District.  
  James Harrow, Toll Collector.  
  William Lunnaceit, Assistant to Contractor, East India Railway.  
  David Thomas, Inspector, ditto.  
  George Robert, Plate-layer, ditto.  
  Julia L., wife of Major Eyres.
One large party of railway officers were at Burwark, about twenty-four miles west of the city. On the afternoon of the 17th they assembled in Major Byres' bungalow, and on seeing a large body of armed men approaching, they betook themselves to the top of a large water tank, where they remained for two days exposed to the threats and insults of the rabble around them, and to the fierce rays of the sun above them. They witnessed during this time the plunder and destruction of all European property in the neighbourhood, which was joined in with fiendish exaltation by all ranks and classes of natives. Mr. Smith, another railway officer, joined them while there; he and Mr. Thomas had started together in flight, but the latter had been murdered in the way, and Mr. Smith himself wounded. On the 9th a party of 3rd Oudh Irregulars, who had remained staunch, arrived to escort them to Allahabad.

Mrs. Byres died immediately on being removed from the tank from exhaustion and exposure, but the rest arrived safely in Allahabad on the morning of the 10th. There were many other small parties or single families, including custom officers, planters, and merchants, who made their escape in different ways.

Two parties came in from Oudh, one on the 14th, under Dr. Grant, escorted by Ajeet Sing, Talookdar of Mattoopoor, from Pertabghur and Sultanpoor, and the other under Major Barrow, escorted by Raja Hunwant Singh, from Salone. This latter party, ten in number.—Major Barrow, Deputy Commissioner; Lieutenant Swanson, and Mr. Carnegy, Assistant Commissioners; Captain Thompson, Commanding 1st Oudh Irregular (mutinied 10th June), Dr. Gayer, Lieutenant Chalmers, Adjutant; Mrs. Barrow, Mrs. Swanson, and two non-commissioned officers. On the mutiny of the 1st Oudh Irregular at Salone, had been allowed to leave the station unmolested, and were taken by the Raja to the fort of Dharoopoor, where they were very kindly treated. On the receipt of satisfactory accounts from Allahabad, they were conveyed by the Raja to the banks of the Ganges. Here, however, he left them, for he was under the insane idea that he would be forcibly converted to Christianity if he ventured any further. It is most strange how deep and strong a hold this monstrous delusion had got upon the native mind.

The extent to which the outbreak in the station of Allahabad was carried out in the district varies very much in different portions of it.

In the Doab, pergunnahs the character of the outbreak was worse, and the extent greater than anywhere else. The zemindars there were chiefly Mussulmen, and with scarcely an exception they joined their brethren, with the object of exterminating the English, and upsetting the Government. Pergunnah Chail was the worst of all; the Moulie was a resident of Mahgaon, one of its villages, and every Mussulman there joined his standard. The Pragwal Brahmans of Allahabad, who were also foremost in the outbreak, carried with them the Hindoo population. The district police went almost in a body, and for a short time the greatest anarchy prevailed. When our power again began to be in the ascendant, and the Moulie, with his followers, had fled, this portion of the district was left almost entirely deserted, and the greatest difficulty was at first felt in doing anything towards its re-settlement.

In the Trans-Gangetic pergunnahs the causes which acted to excite the disturbances were different. Religion had little or nothing to do with it. The villages in these pergunnahs were owned at the cession by large Thakoor families in large taluooks. The old zemindars, habitually extravagant, because, by habit, lived on plunder, became ruined by their extravagance, and were sold up by our rule and by our laws. The cultivators and poorer classes still continued to look upon them with greater regard than the purchaser at auction, however long the latter may have been in possession of the property. The ex-zemindar and his family were still the most influential residents of the village. In most instances they received a kind of tribute from the poorer inhabitants, and helped them in return.
The auction purchaser, on the other hand, was generally a resident of the city, and never visited his village, except for the hateful purpose of collecting his rents, or enforcing his decrees. The people, therefore, naturally sided with the zamindars, to whom the outbreak seemed a grand opportunity of recovering their position. They first set to work to destroy and plunder everything European, and took forcible possession of their old estates. Of course the auction purchasers were our friends, and rendered every assistance in their power for the restoration of order.

In the pergunnahas south of the Jumna the blow was less felt than elsewhere. Bad characters and disaffected individuals here and there assembled men, and burnt and plundered villages, where any person inimical to them lived. Yet the disturbances never took fair root, and as soon as our position at Allahabad began to look more favorable, they in a great measure ceased. This was owing principally to the great influence which the three Rajas of Manda, Dihya, and Barra had in the district.

These men had too much at stake to enter headlong into the first outbreak of disaffection. Their interest, besides, was more on the side of order than disorder, and hence the cautious manner in which they acted. The Manda Raja at first took charge of the district police, and also of the treasure, which last act would evidently secure our favor if we won in the contest, and insure a rich prize to himself if we lost.

The other two Rajas were equally opposed to disorder, and by their neutrality prevented a general rising at the outset. As our position improved at the succer station, their neutrality was of course changed to a more decided co-operation in our favor. Such was the state of the district during the interval immediately succeeding the mutiny at Allahabad. The Doab population, led on by their Mahomedan zamindars, had risen with enthusiasm to take part in a religious war, and had marked their rising with the usual accompaniments of Mahomedan fanaticism. The rising had been quickly checked, and a large proportion of the population had fled, leaving the district partially deserted.

The Trans-Gangetic population, led on by the old talukdar families, had risen to restore the old order of things, and remained in arms against us. The Trans-Gangetic population has, as before mentioned, been restrained by local influences, and never openly threw off our Government.

The Doab and Trans-Gangetic provinces remained to be brought again under our rule by force of arms. In the former the task was comparatively easy. The continual upward march of troops, which for some time took place along the Grand Trunk Road, combined with the flight of all the worst characters, very soon reduced pergunnah Chail to order. In pergunnah Kurra, which was perhaps one of the most disaffected portions, open violence and plundering very soon ceased, and a sullen quietness took its place. In the remaining pergunnah of Utherun, disaffection held for some time its last stronghold in the Doab.

Dhakun Sing, zamindar of Dhurawal, and other zamindars, bordering on the Jamna, continued for some time in open rebellion. They were assisted by Hunnooman Sing, an escaped convict, and Vilayat Hossein, who rendered their assistance for the sake of the plunder and the rapine in which they were thus enabled to indulge. Hunnooman Sing had his headquarters at Koran, close to the line of railway, where, in December 1857, he began to fortify himself. At Mr. Court's request, a force was sent by Brigadier Campbell (15th December 1857), which succeeded in demolishing the fortifications, and dispersing the party. Hunnooman Sing and his followers, finding they could no longer remain in their old haunts, sought an asylum with Dhakun Sing in a small corner of the pergunnah, of which Dhurawal is the centre. Here they were kept by the zealous efforts of Pearsu Mohun, a Bengalee by birth, who had been appointed Moonsiff at Munjibunpoor, and who created a strong Government party in the district. On the re-occupation of Banda (April 19th), the rebels were obliged to desert even this corner, and dispersed in the Rewah territory. From that time the whole Doab has been effectively in our hands.
In the Trans-Gangetic pargunnahs the reign of disorder was much longer and wider spread. Nothing was done to check it till January 1858, beyond sending out a force of Benares Levies, under Mr. Mayne, for the protection of the Grand Trunk Road and its immediate neighbourhood. In January, a force under Brigadier Campbell left Allahabad, and driving the rebels before them, advanced the position held by Mr. Mayne as far as Phoolpoor.

In January 1858, General Franks' column advanced to Soraon, driving the enemy before it into Oudh. Yet for some time they continued to infest the district, plundering and burning wherever they could, and retiring to their forts when pursued. Order cannot be said to have been effectually restored, until Brigadier Berkeley took the stronghold of Delion on the 14th of July last. With that event the disturbances consequent on the mutiny may be said to have been subdued in the district of Allahabad.

APPENDIX.

No. , dated Shahjehanpoor, 7th December 1858.

From—H. D. Willock, Esq., Joint-Magistrate of Shahjehanpoor,
To—C. B. Thornhill, Esq., Commissioner of Allahabad.

I have the honor to forward a narrative of events, occurring during the month of June 1857, and succeeding months, in the Allahabad Division, of which I was an eye-witness, and my subsequent adventures with General Havelock's force.

2. My departure from Allahabad and late indisposition have prevented my transmitting it at an earlier date.

The Mutiny of the 6th Regiment Native Infantry at Allahabad, in June 1857, and subsequent events.

The mutinies, which occurred at Barrackpoor and Meerut in May 1857, placed the residents of Allahabad on their guard against any sudden outbreak of the Native Infantry Regiment stationed in the cantonments, and measures were adopted to prevent any rising on the part of the troops and city men taking place without warning being communicated; and plans were agreed upon and made known to the residents for a general meeting at a fixed spot in case of an outbreak. When the first symptoms of disaffection in the army appeared, the 6th Regiment Native Infantry, with a few Native Artillerymen, were the only troops stationed in Allahabad. In the fort there were no guards, save the usual company of the 6th, on duty at the main gate.

2. As the danger seemed to increase, application was made to the Brigadier Commanding the Division, for detachments of other regiments that could be spared, and accordingly a party of invalided artillerymen, under Lieutenant (now Major) Hazlewood, from Buxar, 200 Sikhs of the Ferozepoor Regiment under Lieutenant (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Brasyer, and a body of irregular cavalry under Lieutenant Alexander, were sent. The artillerymen and Sikhs were quartered in the fort, and the cavalry were posted in parties through the station. As each day passed, some fresh rumour was circulated regarding the state of public feeling in the city. Agents of the rebel leaders were evidently busy poisoning the minds of the people. The domestic servants learnt and believed, for they would not take the trouble to enquire into the truth of the report, that several boat-loads of adulterated flour were moored at the river bank, to be sold forcibly by the Magistrate to the buneahs, and a panic and an outcry was the result. The bazaar was closed, and it was very evident that an outbreak in the city would follow an outbreak of the sepoys, and the sepoys cautioned their officers and the Magistrate against
the city people, protesting against the tales that had been circulated, of their lukewarmness towards Government. They went so far as to give up two Mahomedans, who, they said, had entered their lines and attempted to lead some of the men astray, while at the same time they were sending their own men into the 'cavalry lines to tamper with the troopers. It was evident that a crisis was at hand, and ladies and children were at last removed into the fort.

3. On the arrival of the news of the outbreak at Benares, the sepoy of the 6th Regiment protested their loyalty in stronger terms than before, and induced the Officer Commanding their regiment and the station to post two guns, guarded by a company of their own corps, at the head of the bridge road leading to Benares, to oppose the crossing of a body of mutineers said to be marching from Benares. Captain Hicks, and Ensigns Pearson and Woodgate commanded the infantry, and Lieutenant Harward the artillery. A company had also been posted at the jail, where I had taken up my quarters by the Magistrate's direction. Matters stood thus on the 5th, when a telegraphic message was received from General Wheeler at Cawnpoor to this effect:—“Man the fort with every available European,” and in consequence every resident unconnected with the Native Regiment was directed to repair to the fort, and there take up his residence. A few disregarded the order, believing it to be merely the result of the many panics that had been witnessed lately. Among those who unhappily disobeyed, were Captain Birch, Fort Adjutant, Lieutenant Innis, Executive Engineer, Mr. Archer, Merchant, Mr. Boilard, Merchant, and Mrs. Boilard, and many other Eurasians. The night of the 5th passed by quietly, and on the 6th we again returned to our houses, entering the fort at sunset. By this time the garrison had been organized, and the "Volunteers," one hundred and ten in number, were armed from the arsenal, and told off to their respective posts. At 8 o'clock that evening, the different detachments marched to the batteries, and sentries were posted on the walls of the fort. At 9 o'clock a rocket was seen to be fired from the direction of the bridge, and a corresponding one from cantonments. Shortly afterwards a musket shot from the direction of cantonment was heard; another, some straggling shots; then a peal and roll of musketry, as if a regiment was firing in parade. So many looked-for dangers had passed by, that even now false ideas and hopes were entertained. As the firing was less distinctly heard, it was vainly hoped that the expected Benares rebels had entered the station, and were being driven out across the Phanamow ghat, so regular was the musketry. For some long time nothing was known of the cause of the firing. Not a man was able to leave his post; and it was only when the volunteers were ordered to the main gate that the truth was learnt. The regiment had mutinied, and had murdered the officers whom they had cheered and sworn fidelity to only three hours previously. The two guns stationed at the bridge had been seized by the company posted there, and Lieutenant Harward, after escaping and warning Lieutenant Alexander (in charge of the Irregular Cavalry) returned to relate the fate of that gallant officer, who had been shot by the men of the 6th, while galloping up to cantonment to the scene of the firing. The surviving officers shortly afterwards made their appearance, and recounted the tale of treachery and blood. Thirty-nine Christian souls fell that night. Directly the firing ceased, the work of destruction commenced, and the prisoners of the jail, and bad characters of the city and neighbouring villages, finding themselves free from restraint, broke loose and joined the mutineers, first to plunder the treasury, and then to burn and destroy the station. The sepoy forming the guard at the main gate were at once disarmed, and being placed under charge of a party of volunteers, told off for the service, were turned out of the fort at daybreak. The whole garrison remained under arms that night, in hourly expectation of an attack, but all was quiet, saving the station, which resounded with the cries of the exulting population. In the meantime the men of the 6th, glutted with their plunder, sought to reach their homes with their gains, and accordingly abandoning their guns, left the station, a disorganized body, the following day crossing the Phanamow ghat. On
gaining the country, the villagers, aware of the sums of money they carried, surrounded and attacked them wherever they appeared unarmed, for they had thrown away their firelocks to lighten themselves. They afforded an easy prey, and it is generally believed that few succeeded in carrying away their spoil. So completely scattered were the men of the regiment in consequence, that they have never since been heard of as a body. Of the Irregular Cavalry about one-half remained faithful. These offered their services to the Magistrate, and were directed to proceed to the Railway station of Burwaree, and rescue the party of Railway officials there besieged. They did so, and conducted them to the fort in safety. On Sunday, the 7th, the first reinforcement arrived, consisting of a small party of the 1st Madras Fusiliers. Shortly after a second detachment of the Ferozpoor Regiment, and again other parties of Fusiliers, and by the time that Colonel Neill arrived, a sufficient force was assembled, to enable him to take measures to re-occupy the station. At this time the city and suburbs were held by a body of rebels, under the now well known, Moulakee Lyakut Ali. This man, a weaver by caste, and by trade a schoolmaster, had gained some respect in his village by his excessive sanctity; and on the first spread of the rebellion, the Mahomedan zemindars of pargunnah Chail, ready to follow any leader, placed this man at their head, and marched to the city, proclaiming him a governor of the district, in the name of the King of Delhi. His head-quarters were fixed at the Khoooshroo garden, where the two guns, abandoned by the 6th, were dragged, and there the rebel court was held. The first step taken by General Neill, after restoring order in the fort, was to take possession of the village of Daragunj, which commanded the bridge. A detachment of Fusiliers and Sikhs cleared the position, and it was finally held by a party of the Ferozpoor Regiment. This secured the safety of the bridge over the Gangs. The next step was to clear the city and station of the rebels. One party sent to occupy the station was driven back, the rebels being too strong, and daily encounters took place between the insurgents and detachments told off to protect foraging parties. The insurgents consisted chiefly of followers of the rebel zemindars of Chail, and the bad characters of the city and station, principally low-bred Mussulmans and others, who were induced to take up arms, in the hope of finding sufficient plunder in the station. No active movements were made by the insurgents, who were in fact a mere armed mob; but they were sufficiently strong to hold the city and station, and bid us defiance. They appear to have entertained an idea of attacking the fort, for a white flag, mounted on a long bamboo, was found one morning attached to the palisades below the Flagstaff battery, supposed to be one of the weakest points of the fort. Treachery was doubtless breeding among the natives employed in the fort, for on the eve of the attack on the city, the Ferozpoor Regiment, which marched out to occupy a building in Kydgunj, was received, on passing a walled garden, by a volley from a body of concealed men, which disabled many of the Privates, and fractured the thigh of the Adjutant. The intended movement had evidently been communicated by some one having access to the Order Books. The force now under Colonel Neill being strengthened daily, a final attack upon the city was determined on, and consequently, on the 17th of June, the plans were carried out. A party of fifty men of the Madras Fusiliers, with a company of Volunteers under my command, with two howitzers, under Lieutenant Harward, proceeded up the Jumna, while General Neill, with a detachment of the Madras Fusiliers and the Ferozpoor Regiment, attacked the city by land. The steamer anchored at the north side of the city, while the Volunteers under cover of the guns and Fusiliers' rifles, landed, and co-operating with the main body, drove the rebels from the town. The rebels fled precipitately, and the station was occupied on the following day without opposition. Thoughts were now turned to the situation of the Cawnpoor garrison under General Wheeler, who was known to be closely besieged by the mutineers. A force was accordingly organized by Colonel Neill for the relief. Considerable difficulty was experienced in collecting carriage for the troops, from the state of the station and district; but the relieving force was equipped by the 30th, and started that evening. It consisted
of the following troops:—400 men of the 1st Madras Fusiliers; 400 of the Ferozepoor Regiment, under Lieutenant (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Brasyer; two 9-pounder guns, under Lieutenant Harward; and a party of Irregular Cavalry, under Lieutenant Palliser, composed of the loyal men of two mutinied corps. The column commanded by Major Renaud (Madras Fusiliers) was ordered to reach Cawnpoor by forced marches, in consequence of General Wheeler having named a certain date as the last day the ill-fated garrison could hold out. At the same time a Steamer proceeded up the Ganges, with a hundred men of the Madras Fusiliers, to co-operate with the column. I accompanied the force, having been appointed to do duty with it as Civil Officer by the Commissioner. On the evening of the 1st of July the fourth encamping ground was reached, when a spy despatched by Sir Henry Lawrence from Lucknow, with letters to General Wheeler and the Magistrate of Allahabad, arrived in camp. He was the first man to communicate the tidings of the fate of the garrison. This tale was at first doubted, but his story being corroborated by each successive traveller from the direction of Cawnpoor, this intelligence was communicated to Colonel Neill at Allahabad, who in reply stated his suspicion that the story had been propagated with a treacherous design, but ordered Major Renaud to proceed by short marches, and shew no sign of a halt or retrograde movement, adding that a force under the command of General Havelock would shortly follow. The column accordingly encamped at Khaga on the 11th of July, and being joined by General Havelock's force at midnight, the whole party reached the village of Bilinda, four miles from Futtehpoor, the following morning. No information having been received of the presence of any strong body of rebels in Futtehpoor, the camp was drawn up and tents were pitched. It appears, however, that a force had been despatched from Cawnpoor in the meantime to oppose the progress of the British force, and from papers found in the office of the rebel Deputy Collector Hickmut-oollah, it appeared that the information afforded by the enemy's spies regarding the strength of our column was entirely at fault. Hickmut-oollah was directed to summon the neighbouring zemindars and their followers to oppose the march of the two companies of European soldiers proceeding up the road until reinforcements were sent. This accounts for the bold advance of the rebel force. On taking up a position, a reconnoitring party of the Volunteer Cavalry had been sent forward with Colonel Tytler, Quarter-master-General. The enemy perceiving their approach, took for granted the arrival of the small force expected and acted accordingly. Colonel Tytler, riding back to the camp, gave intelligence of the presence of the rebels. The whole force was under arms immediately, and moved out to receive the enemy. The ground was most favorable for General Havelock's movement, and equally disadvantageous to the attacking force. The ground in front of the camp was firm and dry, while on the other hand the enemy were forced to proceed by the road alone, a morass on each side preventing their deploying into line, or bringing their guns advantageously into action. The consequence was that their first gun was speedily disabled by Captain Maude's fire, and a panic ensuing in front, the whole force was thrown into confusion. The advantage thus gained was quickly followed up and a retreat ensued. The enemy held the city of Futtehpoor and suburbs for a short time, but were unable to stand the steady advance of the Infantry, and were soon forced to evacuate the position. The day was then gained. The whole of their Artillery, consisting of twelve Government guns, was captured with their camp. In this engagement the Irregular Cavalry proved themselves unworthy of the confidence placed in them from their previous good behaviour. On the evacuation of the city the Volunteer Cavalry was ordered to reconnoitre the country to the left, while the Irregulars were ordered to the right. They proceeded some distance, when they came across a party of the 2nd Light Cavalry, amounting to about forty men. Our party (I accompanied the Irregulars) numbered nearly a hundred men. The order was given to charge, when the mutineers rode forward at a gallop to meet us, waving their swords as if to invite the Irregulars to join them, and showed their indisposition to fight by their gestures. The Irregulars pulled up, while the mutineers rode
round them, clashing their swords against theirs, while a few dashed in at the officers, who were however nobly supported by the native officers of the regiment. Some hand-to-hand engagement took place, and in the meantime a strong body of the Light Cavalry appeared in the distance, making for us, when the Irregulars turned their bridles and fled.

4. Nothing remained for the officers to do but to follow, and in a very short time the main body of the force was gained. Seven horses of the Irregulars fell at a ditch, and their riders cut up as they lay. Among those who fell was the Rissaldar of the regiment, a fine gallant man, who had saved Lieutenant Palliser's life in the night when unhorsed, and who was among the last to fly. The men were subsequently disbaned by General Havelock's order. The column halted at Futtehpooor on the 10th, to refresh the men who had suffered great fatigue the day previous. It was then that Lieutenant Brown of the 50th Regiment joined us. He alone had escaped from Cawnpoor, from whence Mr. Loyd, the Collector, Mr. Grant, the Joint Magistrate, and another officer had been forced to fly. He had wandered from village to village for six weeks, well received by the inhabitants of some, and driven on by others, and arrived in camp, much exhausted by fatigue and exposure. He died at Cawnpoor of cholera, shortly after the re-occupation of that station. Several families of Europeans hiding in the district of Allahabad had been rescued by Major Renaud's party previously. The column resumed its march on the 14th, and on the morning of the 15th, reached the village of Oug, in the Futtehpooor district, where a second rebel force were intrenched, ready to oppose our progress. The enemy was quickly dislodged, and was forced to fly, leaving their cannon again. A stand was made by them at the Pandoo river, a strong position, the only passage over the river being, in consequence of its swollen state, the bridge, behind which were the enemy's intrenchment. One of the enemy's guns (two in number) being disabled by Captain Maude, and the infantry making a rapid advance, they soon gave way, and the force bivouacked on their position that night. Information was then received of the position taken up by the rebels at the village of Aherwan, at the entrance to Cawnpoor, where their Chief evidently intended to stake his fortunes. This village is situated about sixteen miles from the Pandoo river, and General Havelock consequently determined to make the march as easy to his men as possible. The column accordingly broke ground at daybreak, and halted and breakfasted half way. At 2 P.M. the enemy's position was gained. Knowing their strength and plan of defence, from the information afforded by spies, the General determined upon turning their flank. This manœuvre completely prevented the enemy using their artillery with the effect that had been intended by their position, and intrenchment by intrenchment being taken in detail, the enemy was, after a hard struggle, forced back. The state of the country now prevented Captain Maude bringing up his gun to the advance, and the temporary check in the progress of the line gave the flying rebels heart. They rallied, and again opened with their guns upon the column, which was now lying down in the open field. The repeated efforts to move the guns were of no avail, and the enemy's artillery remained unanswered. They gained fresh courage, and showed signs of advancing, the band playing in the ranks. General Havelock saw that that moment would decide the battle, and ordering the line to rise, he ordered a final charge. Discharge after discharge of grape swept the ranks; but the line, pressed steadily on, and the enemy, dismayed by the cheers of the gallant line, turned, fled, and abandoned the city and station of Cawnpoor that night. The next morning the force advanced, and encamped on the cavalry parade ground, on which the position held by General Wheeler was situated. As the column left its ground, the earth shook with the explosion of the powder magazine, which was blown up by the guard before retreating. On that day the fate of the unfortunate ladies and children of the garrison was learnt, and their remains were discovered in the well, where they had been thrown after the massacre on the 15th. The first step taken was to secure a position, and on the 19th the force was marched to Nawabgunj, at the extreme west of Cawnpoor, the enemy having fled in that direction. A
detachment was sent to Bithoor, which took possession of twelve guns left in the town, and destroyed by fire the premises lately occupied by the miscreant Nana. The relief of Lucknow was the next object, and with the greatest exertions the passage of the Ganges was effected on the 25th; and General Havelock, with 1,500 men commenced his first advance upon Lucknow. The greatest difficulties had now to be contended against. Supplies were scanty, the weather was most unfavorable, and the troops suffered great hardships from the want of tents, which was not allowed to accompany the force, to enable the column to march lightly, and save the necessity of weakening the force by detaching parties of infantry for baggage guards. On the 29th the village of Oonao was reached, where the advanced body of mutineers was posted. The troops, in their usual gallant manner, drove the enemy back, capturing their artillery. The rebel force retired upon Basseerotgunj, a strongly fortified village, four miles distant from Oonao, and situated on the main road to Lucknow. Here again General Havelock gained a victory, driving the enemy back with a heavy loss, and taking their guns; but disease and casualties had so weakened his force, and the strength of the foe was so apparent, that the idea of a further advance, with the hope of a successful entry into Lucknow with the force in the field, was abandoned, and with heavy hearts the column marched back to the village of Mungrawa, where the troops took up their quarters in the deserted huts of the villagers. I was then summoned by General Havelock to join him, having in the meantime assumed the office of Joint Magistrate of Cawnpoor, to which post I was appointed on arrival. Endeavours were then made to induce the peasantry to return to their homes, and printed proclamations were issued by General Havelock's orders, assuring the people that the force had entered Oudh with the sole object of punishing rebels, and calling upon all well-disposed people to assist the force. These notices had but little effect. The people, well aware of the position of the besieged garrison, and seeing our backward movement, feared the punishment which they knew would await them on the part of the rebels, in case of any expression of loyalty should see be unsuccessful. One family alone came forward, whose members afforded most important services in the time of need. Their headman, Omrao Sing, zamindar of Mungrawa, assisted by his relatives, procured provisions for the camp, workmen for the intrenchments, and information of the movements of the rebels. He removed his family to Cawnpoor for security; but on our recrossing, his house was plundered, and he suffered considerably. He and his relatives have, however, been well rewarded by the Deputy Commissioner of Oonao, in consequence of a representation on my part of his services. In the meantime reinforcements were daily arriving at Cawnpoor, and General Neill, who had reached the station, was enabled to forward additional troops, swelling the force to 1,400 men, with two heavy siege guns. The second advance upon Lucknow was commenced on the 4th of August. The enemy in the interim had once more occupied Basseerotgunj. The column bivouacked that night in the rain, on the plain in front of Oonao, and in the early morning renewed the march. The enemy's position was attacked with the same result as before. Their guns were taken, and they were dispersed. The victory however was dearly gained. The force had sustained a heavy loss from the engagement and effects of the sun, and General Havelock was once more forced to retire. The village of Mungrawa was barely reached, when information was received that a strong body of mutineers had reached Basseerotgunj, and were preparing to follow up our apparent retreat. General Havelock had resolved upon recrossing the Ganges, as no hope could be entertained of reinforcements for some time, the disturbed state of Bengal necessitating the detention, in the lower provinces, of troops destined for Cawnpoor. To secure a safe passage, therefore, General Havelock determined to attack the rebels again, who threatened his rear. All baggage was sent over the river, and two days' provisions found the only burden carried by the column. A third time the force advanced to Basseerotgunj, and defeated the enemy after a severe struggle with overpowering number, capturing two guns. The column renewed their march, and on the 10th of August recrossed the river.
in safety. At this time Bithoor was again occupied by the rebel force, consisting of the mutinied 42nd Native Infantry Regiment and detachments of cavalry, with a large body of artillery, together with a large assemblage of matchlock-men, amounting to 4,000 men, with two Government 9-pounder guns. The Cawnpoor garrison, previous to the recrossing of the force, was too weak to hold the entire station, and the rebels were in consequence emboldened, and made several demonstrations of their power. On one occasion, a party of sowars actually entered the station, and destroyed a police chowkee, situated at the west of Cawnpoor. On Sunday, the 16th, General Havelock marched to Bithoor, and attacked the enemy’s position, which was one of great strength; the city in front, of which the intrenchments were thrown up, being situated on a hill, and surrounded by a deep ditch, then filled by the Ganges. In front, and in rear of this natural defence, were fields of thick sugar-cane, which afforded excellent cover for the enemy. Our Artillery consisted of twelve guns, including several mortars, which were not brought into action; and notwithstanding our superiority in this branch, the enemy made a most obstinate resistance, and it was only when one of their guns was disabled by the treachery of a Sikh, who was fighting in their ranks as an Artilleryman, that they broke from their position. This fact was communicated by the Thanaedar of Bithoor, who had been seized, and who effected his escape on their flight. This man’s heart failed him on perceiving his countrymen advancing, and driving home a round shot without a cartridge, he rendered the gun inoperative, and fled. The gun was found thus loaded by the Artillery Officer in charge of the Park, on examination. A slight resistance was made in the town, but the troops, vowing with each other in the pursuit, drove them rapidly before them. Having only the Volunteer Cavalry, General Havelock was enabled to follow the flying enemy, and the Infantry being too much exhausted to march beyond the town, the rebels were enabled to cross the Ganges at their leisure. The force bivouacked at Bithoor that night, and returned to Cawnpoor the next morning. The camp now pitched on the Cavalry parade-ground waited the arrival of fresh reinforcements under General Outram. These consisted of regiments fresh from England,—the 5th Fusiliers and the 90th, with the addition of batteries of Artillery and heavy guns. A bridge of boats was thrown up, in spite of the attempts of the enemy to oppose our crossing, a position having been taken up by them at Mungrawa. On the 19th of September preparations having been completed the force crossed, and after a short engagement with the enemy, who were driven back to their position, the camp was pitched about a mile from the river. On the 20th the advance was commenced and shortly after leaving ground the action commenced. The enemy, driven back to their entrenchments, had their right flank turned by the Infantry, which threw them into confusion. They fled, and were hotly followed up by the Volunteer Cavalry, headed by Sir James Outram, and were forced to desert two of their guns. The pursuit was continued to Basseerutgunj, and for the first time the enemy suffered severely in their flight. Volunteers from their ranks had joined Major Barrow’s Cavalry, and they now numbered nearly hundred sabres. The troops occupied Basseerutgunj that night. The unexpected movement of the Cavalry caused such a panic in the enemy’s ranks, that the positions at Bunnee and Nawabgunj were abandoned, and the whole force retired upon Lucknow. This march proved the most harassing of the whole campaign. From the day of crossing to the close of the 20th, the rain fell in torrents. Officers and men were unable to change their clothes; servants deserted their masters; and the troops were nigh worn out with the fatigue and privations. On the afternoon of the 23rd the plain in front of Alum Bāgh was reached, where the enemy were drawn up in considerable force in line to meet us. Both armies advanced, and a severe engagement took place. Again the steady and determined front of the British line proved irresistible, and the enemy were driven back into the suburbs of Lucknow, fronting Alum Bāgh. There they stood, and General Havelock forming up his camp in both flanks of Alum Bāgh, halted. The 24th was passed in giving the wearied troops rest, and making arrangements for the
occupation of Alum Bâgh. The whole of the baggage and wounded men, with 250 infantry and two guns, were placed within the walls, and at 9 o'clock in the morning of the 25th, the advance to the Residency was commenced. The usual route to the Residency was abandoned, and a by-road being followed, the force marched forward. Strong positions had been selected at the outskirts of the city, and the first mile was passed through almost literally a sheet of fire. The swamp on each side of the road compelled the force to advance in one long line towards the city, and for some time the whole body of infantry was ordered to lay down in the ground, while Captain Maude, in front, directed his fire against the enemy's artillery. Their guns being silenced, the troops advanced, and driving the enemy into the city, pursued the route laid down by General Outram. This step being unexpected, little opposition was offered until the Kaisur Bâgh was reached, from which point the route lay through the city. After a halt to allow the whole of the force to collect, the advance was again sounded, and after running the gauntlet through streets lined with sepoys, sheltered by loopholed walls, the main body of the infantry reached the Residency as the sun set; the artillery, and a strong body of infantry, in the meantime remained under cover at some distance. The intervening palaces were quickly cleared, and a communication being opened, they joined the garrison. The relieving force was now besieged, with the rest of the garrison, and so remained until the final relief in November. On the evacuation of the Residency I returned to Allahabad.

Shahjehanpoor,  

The 7th December 1858.  

Joint-Magistrate and Deputy Collector.  

H. D. Willock,  

(Sd.)

APPENDIX No. IV.

Memorandum of the particulars of the escape of Mr. Corrigan and family, eleven in number, during the rebellion of 1857 from Futtehpoo to Allahabad.

On the 6th June 1857, about 1 P.M., I heard the report of guns in the direction of Cawnpoor very distinctly, and wrote to Mr. Macnaghten to say that I thought the troops at Cawnpoor had mutinied. The firing continued, without intermission, the whole of the afternoon and night. At 6 P.M. I went to the Collector's and found most of the European residents of the station, and the railway people collected there, busily engaged in fortifying the roof of the Collector's house. After a short stay I returned home, with the intention of taking my family to the Collector's, as soon as I saw any signs of an approaching outbreak. About 10 P.M. my road Jemadar, Bhujun Lall, came to inform me that the news of the Cawnpoor mutiny had reached Futtehpoo, and that the towns-people were arming themselves in every direction, and begged of me to leave the station with my family. I immediately ordered two dak carriages, and in the meantime went to Mr. Sheer's to tell him that I thought the best thing I could do was to proceed to Allahabad, and leave my family in the fort. On my return I found the carriages ready, and after packing up our valuables and some clothing, we started for Allahabad. I must add that my father-in-law, Mr. Lawrence's family were living with me at the time, Mr. Lawrence having proceeded to Agra on leave of absence; he was subsequently massacred at Mynpoory by the Jhansi mutineers. There were eleven of us, viz., Mrs. Lawrence and four daughters, myself, Mrs. Corrigan, and our four children, between the ages of nine months and seven years. We proceeded without difficulty for a few miles; but as soon as we passed Bilinda, word was passed by our servants (of whom we had two stationed on the carriages as look-out men) that a body of sepoys were coming towards us from the Allahabad direction, and on coming closer I looked through the jhilnîs, and recognised them as the detachment which had lately escorted our surplus treasure from Futtehpoo to Allahabad; they were now returning.
towards Cawnpoor. The party consisted of some sepoys of the damnable 2nd Cavalry from Cawnpoor, and sepoys of the—Native Infantry from Banda. Just before leaving home, an aged female servant, who had been about twenty-six years in the service of Mrs. Lawrence, advised the ladies of our family to put on a number of Hindostanee bracelets (choories) which she had brought with her, on each wrist; to take off all European jewellery; and to provide themselves with chudders to cover their heads. This advice was followed, and, as will be seen, saved our lives. Our carriages were stopped by the sepoys, some of whom said—"This is probably the Collector Sahib of Futtehpore running away; let us mar the sala." The coachman protested that it was a native zenana sovarree; and at this critical moment my little girl began to cry, and Miss Lawrence put out her hand below the jhilma, as if unintentionally. The brutes saw the hand and choories, and immediately desisted, saying—"Oh bhaee! they are our own people; let them pass." While this was going on, one of the sepoys pushed his bayonet through the back panel of one of the garees, but fortunately without injury to any of us. We drove on, thankful to God for the interposition of His hand, and blessed the rare foresight which had prompted our old ayah to think of the choories.

2. After we had got about a mile further, we found the road covered with torn letters, books, and newspapers, and further on a heap of mail bags burning, and the mail-cart standing on the side of the road, without horse or driver. The wretches had destroyed the Calcutta mail. I picked up a number of the letters, but lost them subsequently.

3. We passed Khaga about 9 A.M., where all appeared to be quiet, and at 2 P.M. we reached Lohunda, and went into the dak bungalow to obtain some refreshment. I had scarcely entered, ere I was startled by the report of a gun in the direction of Allahabad; several others followed. In an hour we harnessed the horses again, and continued our journey. After driving on for ten minutes, we met a dak garree coming from Allahabad with native passengers. We tried to stop them, but they drove on rapidly, crying out as they passed—"Don't go to Allahabad, there has been fearful work there." I was almost paralysed, for Cawnpoor and Allahabad were both in open rebellion, and I was between them. There was however no time to lose, and we decided that the nearer we go to Allahabad the better. On we went therefore until we came to Synee, where we were to change horses. There was some delay here, and I asked the man in charge of the chowky why it occurred. He coolly told me, his horses were knocked up, and couldn't get on without "mussala." I understood the hint, and told him that I would pay for "mussala," but that I would inform the Agent of his conduct. He looked at me with a fixed stare and said—"Ure jao, toomara uytun juknum ko gya." I had a pair of pistols with me, and was inclined to use them, but on looking round at the large family of helpless ladies and children with me, I felt that it would be prudent to swallow the affront for the present. I paid him for "mussala" accordingly, and had the satisfaction of seeing two fresh horses harnessed and put to. We had got about a mile east of Synee, when we were stopped by a Police Jemadar (?), who told us that the villages on the road side between Allahabad and Synee were full of armed Mahomedans, who had begun the work of plunder and bloodshed, and that they had taken away and released a prisoner he was escorting to Allahabad. He begged of us to return, urging that our lives would be sacrificed to a certainty if we proceeded. We turned the carriages round, and returned towards Futtelpoor, and about 7 P.M. we reached Khaga, one of our Tehseeli and Moonisiffe stations. I knew Rujjub Ali, the Telsildar, well, and had frequently obliged him in many ways. I accordingly drove into the Tehsil compound, and asked him to let me remain there for the night. He reluctantly agreed, and directed me to an empty hut near the gate. We went in, and I borrowed a few charpoys from the amlah, and after getting the children something to eat, we laid down to rest, disheartened and hopeless. I sent one of our servants to Futtelpoor to bring information of how matters stood there, and endeavoured to sleep.
After many weary hours came the morning, and we were discussing all kinds of plans for our escape, when Rujjub Ali sent us some dhal and rice in mutte dishes. We were just about to begin our breakfast, when intimation was received that a body of rebel cavalry (probably some of the 12th Irregulars) had just arrived, and had encamped near Khaga. The tehsildar immediately ordered some of his men to wait on them, and to furnish them with rassud, and sent word to me that our dák carriages should be sent away at once, to prevent the suspicion that he was sheltering Europeans. We sent away the carriages with heavy hearts, for with them all chances of escape by flight were gone. About 9 A.M. we heard that some of the sowars intended to visit the tehsildar, to have the treasure looted, and the tehsildar came shortly after, and directed us to leave the place, telling us he was not going to risk his life for us. I was surprised to see the change which had come over the plant and obsequious Rujjub Ali of former days; but as I was so entirely in his power, I was obliged to maintain a civil tongue. I begged of him to obtain shelter for us in the village of Khaga, feeling certain that he possessed some influence there, but all in vain. He directed us in a peremptory tone to leave the tehsildar. I then sent a man to the Moonsiff of Khaga (Salamut Ali is his name, I believe), begging to be sheltered until the sowars left Khaga, telling him also that if he would only permit the ladies and children to remain in his house (as he had a family of his own), I would take my chance outside. But I had mistaken my man; he, too, was a scoundrel Moslem, true to his creed, and sent word to me that he couldn't assist me in any way; and on my repeating the request, he told my servant to go away, and to trouble him no more. This man is still one of our Uncovenanted Judges at Futtehpore!

4. We prepared to leave the tehsili, and procured some articles of native clothing, and endeavoured to disguise ourselves with the assistance of our servants, and one or two of the Hindu amlah, who appeared to entertain some degree of pity of us. We got enough of chudders, &c., and having completed our disguise, we left the Tehseeltee. Our change of costume was only of service to us in preventing our being recognised as Europeans at a distance: it did not attract the notice of the mob to as great an extent as European garments would have done; but our walk, accent, manners and habits betrayed as wherever we went.

5. At noon precisely we left the Tehseelee gate. We had previously divided our valuables (worth between 5,000 and 6,000 rupees) into several small packets, each one of the party having secreted one. One of the servants who accompanied us, carried a tin cash-box containing jewelry, silver spoons, &c., worth about 1,800 rupees. We were all bare-footed, and before we were many minutes out, the scorching sand (5th June) blistered our feet completely, and we were unable to move without severe pain, especially as our way lay partly through cultivated fields, where the stalks of the last crop were yet standing. A Brahmin (of Sursye, near Khaga) had accompanied us, under the pretence of showing us the way to the railway station, but his power, I was obliged to maintain a civil tongue. I begged of him to ob ..
in large bodies to the scene of loot, armed principally with iron-bound lattes; and shortly after we saw them returning, laden with spoil. We arose from the pyree, and went into a cotton field, about a hundred yards further on, and sat down in a corner. The field was surrounded by a mud wall, about four feet high; the cotton plants were nearly the same height, and rather bushy in the middle of the field. The Brahmin took the cash-box from our servant, telling us he would take care of it for us, and as he had a drawn sword in his hand, we thought it best to be extremely polite. About half an hour after this, a mob of about two hundred villagers, armed with lattes, came towards the field, and we begged of the Brahmin to endeavour to divert their attention, while we went into the thickest part of the field, where we gathered our little ones, and sat down encircling them. The mob came on, and the Brahmin entered into conversation with several of them, and directed their attention to the quantity of loot the Telsil and other places would afford. He appeared to be a man of some influence, for the mob moved on towards the Telsil, excepting a few men, who appeared to be his personal friends, and who came into the field and sat down near him. It was then about sunset, and I begged of the Brahmin to take us to his house for the night, apprehensive that the mob would murder us on their return, if they found us alone. He told us he would, and we arose and followed him to Suraye, surrounded by his friends; and on arriving at his house, we sat down in a cow-house at the entrance, when he coolly took a ring off my finger, and a silver watch which was hanging inside my pyjama, and took these and the cash-box inside to his family. I could hear the females inside talking to him, surprised and overjoyed at the rich booty he had acquired; they talked of it as a ‘God-send!’ It was now dusk, and he came out and told us that his village wasn’t a safe place, and that he would take us to a friend’s house, at a short distance off, where we should be protected. Some of his people led the way, and after another weary trudge of a mile, we arrived at a small poorwa, and were stopped at a house near the middle of it. The Brahmin held a whispered conversation with the owner, and left us, telling us he would call to see us daily. We saw him no more. I have since ascertained that his name is Ramsahai. The owner of the house, accompanied by some others, led us into the courtyard, and asked us if we had any valuables, and on my replying in the negative, he took a bundle from one of our servants and opened it. It contained some children’s clothing and a small bag containing ten rupees, all of which he gave back to us; but about midnight, when the other men were elsewhere, he asked me to give up the bag, and on my replying that I hadn’t it, he made a blow at me with his latte, but I was standing near a wall at the time, and as soon as I saw the latte coming down, I moved to one side, and a projecting timber from the roof caught the blow. He then left me, and went up to Mrs. Corrigan, and holding his club above his head, asked her for the bag; she gave it up, and he retired. Although we had been plundered of the greater part of our jewelry, the ladies had contrived to secrete a couple of gold chains, and some rings, in the folds of their hair, and a packet containing a hundred rupees and a gold watch in their dresses.

6. We were not molested the next day until about 4 P.M., when, as my family were sitting in a cow-shed at the entrance of the house, and I was in the court-yard, I heard a shriek, and the ladies and children rushed in, followed by three armed sepoys in the service of Duriao Sing of Khaga, two Thakoons, and a Brahmin. One of the Thakoons made me strip to the waist, and stand up against a wall, when he presented a matchlock to my breast, and blew the match afresh, to secure a good burning point, telling me “it made his blood boil to see a Feringhee.” The ladies and children surrounded him, and begged my life, offering to give up all they had. The Brahmin took the two gold chains and some of the rings, and persuaded the Thakoor to put off killing me for the present. We were then taken to another village by these sepoys, and thence to Duriao Sing’s gurhee in the evening. Duriao Sing was absent on a marauding excursion in Oudh, and one of his sons, Soojar Sing, directed that we should be taken to the village (Khaga), where we were put into a
small house, and the door locked on the outside. I observed previously that there were about 200 armed men outside the gurhee, and on coming to the village, I saw numbers of them posted about the place. We remained in confinement for thirteen days, during which we suffered a great deal in mind and body. We had some money by us, but it was nearly all eventually taken away by Duriao Sing's people. Ramgolam, the Buxshee of the Khaga Tehsuel, also eased me of my gold watch under false pretences, and a chuprasee, named Deena Sing, fraudulently obtained possession of some rings and cash from us. These have since been recovered.

7. Shortly after we were placed in confinement, I heard that the Nana Sahib was coming downwards, with a large army and forty-four guns, to besiege the fort of Allahabad, and that it was Soojan Sing's intention to make us over to the Nana, on his arrival at Khaga. This I felt sure would have been certain death, and we accordingly prepared to die. A few days were passed in this miserable state of suspense, when, as I was standing near the door of our prison one evening, I heard a pilgrim, who had just arrived from Allahabad, telling the people that the British had re-settled Allahabad, and were hanging the rebels by scores. This reached Soojan Sing's ears, and the next morning he sent us some goat mutton, and shortly after some articles of European clothing, with a message that he would be obliged if I would prepare to go forward to the British camp, when the troops arrived at Synee, and speak in his behalf to the General Commanding. He also sent out scouts in the direction of Allahabad to bring information, and in a couple of days we heard that there was not the slightest chance of the British troops advancing westward; that there were barely enough to garrison Allahabad; and that the country was still in the hands of the natives. A Thanadar, with a whole posse of sowars, matchlock-men, chuprasees, &c., arrived at Khaga at the same time, and established police chowkees along the road for several miles below Khaga, on the part of the Nana. At length intimation was received that the British troops were preparing to march upwards; and on the 22nd of June, Soojan Sing directed us to leave Khaga. We did so on the 23rd, about 1 A.M., and reached Ursrye, a village, a short distance east of the Lobunda toll gate about noon, where we were sheltered by Golab, a Khatee, and kindly treated, and plentifully supplied with food by the village people.

8. On the 24th, a detachment of about forty sepoys of the 12th Native Infantry arrived at Ursrye. The havildar held a certificate signed by Captain Scott, stating that these men remained faithful to their officers when the wing at Nowgong mutinied. They proposed to escort me to Allahabad, and I was only too glad to accept the offer, for several villages between Ursrye and Allahabad were still full of armed Mahomedan budmashes. At one village (Muhungao) the people tried to tamper with the fidelity of my escort, offering them high salaries to give me up, and to join the rebel mob, but to no purpose. They remained true to their salt.

9. On the 27th June at 6 P.M. we reached Allahabad.

10. The sepoy escort is at present stationed as a tehsil guard at Mootee-ka-poora in the district of Allahabad.

11. Want of time has compelled me to omit many details, but the above will be found a correct sketch of the particulars of my escape.

(Sd.) T. H. A. CORRIGAN.

Supplement to the narrative of events, &c., in the Allahabad district.

The following is a detailed account of all that took place in the city of Allahabad during this troublous time, when the wrath of God was visited upon the Nazarene race. The sepoys of the army murdered the English officers, and released the prisoners; and after waiting hopelessly for the fulfillment of their engagement by the Sikhs, of whom there were about 500 in the fort,
they took from the treasury (in which there was about twenty-two lakhs) what was required by them, and plundering the rest, departed. On hearing this, your humble servant, who lived about seven Koss from the city, considered in his mind that, as the ancestors of the people had once lived under the ennobling auspices of this great Government, the fulfilment of the conditions of loyalty and the protection of the people was now incumbent on him. He at once, therefore, along with several champions of the faith, and a number of talookdars (viz., Sheikh Nizamut Ashraf and Gholam Ismael, and Muhammad Hussein and Chowdhri Meenan Buksh and others) went into the city to institute a religious war, and send to hell the English who remained, and with the intention, after sending a congratulatory address to Your invincible Highness, of assuming charge of the zillah until the receipt of supreme orders. The flag of Mahomet was planted in the chouk, and a proclamation was made in the city to this effect:—"The Nazarene race is the enemy of the life and faith, both of Hindus and Mussulmans. This Fukearer having girded his loins to protect the life and faith of the people of God, and to fulfil the conditions of loyalty to the ministers of the kingly Government, it becomes you also to assist with all readiness in the destruction of the English who remain."

On hearing this proclamation, Moulay Syed Ahmed Ali and Moulay Gholam Hyder, and Moulay Amjud Ali and Hossain Khan, Kurum Shere Khan, and the inhabitants of the mohullahs of Russoolpoor and Shumabad, coming to the assistance of this Fukearer, succeeded by the grace of God in beating the accursed ones in the first battle.

In the second battle, from among the great men of the city, Sheikh Latuf Ali, Prime Minister of His Highness Sindia Bahadar, with his followers, and several Chiefs of the mohullahs, viz., Sheikh Futtaah Ali, darogah, Sheikh Nuzuf Ali, Naib Kotwal, and Nuzuf Khan, Naib Thannadar, and others, with a great crowd, having joined this Fukearer, so arranged the battle field, that by the grace of God on that day they sent to hell a number of the accursed ones, who, being entirely routed, took refuge in the fort. Two magazine carts, some English horses, and forty-nine artillery bullocks, fell into the hands of the victors. In this way, on three several occasions a fight took place in this zillah. At last the accursed ones being reduced and vanquished on all sides by the vengeance of God, and the arms of the victors retired into the fort, closed the gates, and remained hopeless. After this the whole Zillah, Suuder, and Mofussil, came under the control of this Fukearer. At this time the accursed ones, and some few who had sided with them, took counsel together. Fear and dread of this Fukeer, so predominated in their minds, that day talked of fleeing from the place. Some Sahibs had on that day started for Calcutta, and the rest now proposed committing their allies to the care of God, and following their companions in a steamer. These evil-minded men, lamenting over the fate that would befall them, urged upon the Sahibs that for some time the fort would be a safe retreat, and that if they would remain in it a few days longer, they would contrive to spread a panic in the city, and cause the people to flee, and that then the Moulay Sahib being left alone, would be powerless. So it turned out by the evil destiny of the people, and by the will of God, that these enemies spread abroad in the city fearful reports, that the English were preparing the artillery of the fort to destroy the city, and that before dawn they would commence bombarding it with shot and shell. To show the sincerity of their advice, these men, with their families, set off, giving out to all that they had left their houses and property to God's protection, and were going to save themselves by flight. On hearing this fearful report, the people, notwithstanding my repeated injunctions, commenced a precipitate flight with their families and goods; so that by nightfall not a house was tenanted, and not a light was to be seen in the whole city. I then, being thus left alone and helpless, went to Cawnpore to the army of Nana Rao Bahadoor, and sent an address to Your Majesty's Ministers, detailing the above events, with a request for a conquering army to be sent to my aid. I do not know whether this ever came before the Illustrious eyes or not. I formed the design of
presenting myself at Court; but owing to the disturbances created by the accused ones, and the blocking up of the road, I remained for some time unable to perform it. At last, in despair, I set out for the capital city of Shahjehanabad, and presenting myself before the ministers of the shrine of your holiness, the shadow of God (may your kingdom prosper!), represented the state of affairs. By reason of the fierce contest then carried on by the army encamped before the city, and the entrance of the army of the accused inside the city of Delhi, the idea of despatching an army, or of rendering me any assistance, was out of the question. However, an order, with the royal signature and seal, addressed to all the Chiefs and Princes, and people of the zillah of Allahabad, was obtained, a copy of which I send with this Narrative for Your Majesty's inspection.

(Sd.)

His Narrative copy of perwannah.


The sound of heavy firing from the direction of Cawnpoor on the afternoon of Saturday, 6th June, distinctly heard by us at Futtehpoor, was our first intimation of the outbreak at the former place. The post had indeed been stopped for two days; but as great irregularities had occurred before this circumstance, though it caused a good deal of alarm, was not considered a decisive proof of the real state of things. Up to this day the district of Futtehpoor had been perfectly quiet; indeed for the fortnight preceding the outbreak a very remarkable diminution in the extent of crime was observed. It appeared as if the bad characters were awaiting the time when they should commit outrages on a larger scale. Notwithstanding the quiet, however, there had been rumors to the effect that certain Zemindars, men of known bad character, were procuring ammunition, and collecting round them bands of retainers.

2. The sound of the guns created great excitement in the town, but the Tehsildar of Kullianpoor, so late as the evening of Saturday, reported that, although a battle was raging at Cawnpoor, his perwannah was tolerably quiet, except for one or two Zemindars, who were looting neighbouring villages.

3. We felt very great anxiety next morning in reference to the return from Allahabad of a treaty party, consisting of seventy sepoys, I think, of the 56th Native Infantry, and about twenty-five sepoys, who had escorted a remittance of coin intended for Calcutta, and were on their way back to Cawnpoor. As their arrival seemed extremely likely to create a disturbance in the town, every precaution had been taken to meet this contingency. A body of 800 matchlock-men had been placed at my disposal by Sjegoyal Singh of Jumrain, and Ahmed Yar; these were to have been sent early in the morning, and to be disposed in concealment, 400 behind the Jail, and 400 in a grove near the treasury, in order to assist the treasury guard. A body of fifty men of the 6th Native Infantry, the Nujeebs at the Jail, were directed to keep their muskets loaded. We had fortunately sent away all the ladies; the gentlemen lived in the large house belonging to Mr. Edmonstone, with the exception of Mr. Tucker, who remained in his own house during the day, and passed the night at the treasury guard. As a precautionary measure, we had barricaded the roof of our own house with furniture, and such other materials as were available, and rendered it to some extent capable of defence. We had also got together as many sepoys as we could for patrolling at night about our house and the treasury. I had sent word to the Burdshikhan to have supplies ready for the expected party, and at the same time despatched
instructions to the Jemadar in command to remain on the encamping ground, which was on the Allahabad side of the city, and not to permit his men to come into the bazaar.

4. This officer became known in the city, and was unaccountably construed into an indication of a design, on my part, to have the men disarmed before they passed through. These arrangements being all made, we passed the night on the roof, in anxious expectation of the morning. At a very early hour the Zemindars fulfilled their engagement by sending in the matchlock-men already mentioned, who were at once disposed in the places I had selected. About 8 A.M., a sower came up at full speed, and told us that the treasure party had arrived, and on receiving the orders to which I have alluded, without even turning towards the encamping ground, proceeded straight into the city, the Infantry at the double, the sowers trotting, and with their pistols in their hands. We were perplexed to find that they seemed to have no intention of exciting any disturbance in the city, but rather appeared to wish to guard against some surprise, which they fancied was prepared for them. They went on through the city straight to the treasury, which was at no great distance from Mr. Edmonstone's house, passing on their way the 400 matchlock-men, whom I have mentioned as being stationed here, and who immediately took to flight. These circumstances naturally caused a good deal of alarm and anxiety on our part. Our suspense lasted, however, only a few minutes, for a messenger came and informed us that the party of the 6th Native Infantry had entirely refused to fraternize with the new-comers, and would not even suffer them to come near the treasury, threatening, if they did so, to fire into them. The Subadar in command of the guard told them that if the money belonged to any regiment, it belonged to the 6th, so they should have nothing to do with it. The new-comers retired to a short distance, and lay down under a grove of trees for a few minutes, and then resumed their march.

5. Upon this, Mr. Tucker and myself rode down to the main guard, and thanked the Subadar for his conduct. He declared his intention of remaining staunch.

6. In the afternoon we heard that this party had, while on their march, destroyed a thanah on the road from Allahabad, and stopped the mail, and thrown out all the letters. I may as well add, in reference to the proceedings of this party, that on their way to Cawnpore they robbed the Telsecles, and carried away all the money.

7. On the arrival of this force great excitement was manifested in the city. The badasheries rose, the shops were closed, and panic universally prevailed. But when the news of the side taken by the treasury guard, and of the departure of the other party became generally known, order was restored, and the city remained pretty tranquil until Tuesday.

8. In the course of the afternoon news reached us of the rising at Allahabad, and though very vague, it was sufficiently alarming. The whole of this afternoon, reports kept coming in from the district of villages being looted, and general confusion prevailing. Escaped prisoners from Cawnpore Jail were also reported to be doing much mischief. Rumour after rumour came rapidly in, deepening the anxiety we felt for our own position, and meantime the noise of the cannonade at Cawnpore assured us; that great as our anxiety might be, others had far more to fear and to endure. But that day and night passed without any serious disturbances; with the Jail still safe, and even with some show of submission to constituted authority. The next day little or nothing occurred to distinguish it from the preceding one, save that then certain intelligence reached us of the rising at Allahabad, and the massacre of the officers of the 6th Native Infantry, and complete revolt of that corps. This news deprived us of whatever confidence we might have previously felt in our treasury guard; and Mr. Tucker, who still continued to sleep at the main guard, informed us that the Subadar had been heard to make use of language so insubordinate and offensive as to make him (Mr. Tucker), though previously inclined to trust him, doubtful of his loyalty and
fidelity. In the course of the afternoon we heard that a large body of escaped prisoners, with a party of irregular cavalry, had arrived at Khaga, and would come into Futtehpore the next morning; and it was apprehended that an outbreak would be the result. It was useless to rely upon the matchlockmen, who had been already tried, and found wanting not only in the ability, but the disposition to assist, and I was consequently compelled to make the best preparation I could with the aid of the ordinary police. I need not say therefore that I was in no small degree perplexed by learning, in the course of the evening, that the Nazir and the Cotwal, on whom I had chiefly depended, as well for intelligence as for preserving order, had both fled, and that the city police were entirely disorganized. Most of the newly-raised sowars also left me that evening, and the few who had been longer in the service I had sent out to give warning of the approach of the party from Allahabad. So! as the night approached, we found ourselves completely deserted. The idea of preserving order, or defending the city from external attack, was now of course definitely abandoned, and we confined our efforts to securing our personal safety. The furniture of the house was all removed into the garden, and from thence to the roof, where it was employed in strengthening the parapet, and in dividing off that part of the roof which we actually occupied, so as to render it more easily defensible. The punkahs were all cut down, and every thing taken away which could have been made use of for the purpose of setting fire to the house. We armed ourselves with all the fire-arms and other weapons which we could obtain, and took turns of sentry duty on the roof of the house. The preparation for our defence occupied the whole of the night, and meantime we could trace the advance of the prisoners and irregulars by the burning of bungalows along the line of the railway. About 4 A.M. a peasant rushed in, wild with terror, to tell us that he had been sleeping in a field a short way off, and being roused by the trampling of horses, had found himself surrounded by cavalry. This proved to be a party of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, which had advanced beyond the main body of the prisoners, and in making a detour to avoid the city had passed through this field near our house. The prisoners also on their arrival avoided the city, and, separating into gangs, went off into the adjoining villages.

9. About 8 A.M. on Tuesday, the city mob rose and went to the treasury, but the guard stood to their arms, and the Soubadar declared that if any attempt were made to plunder, he would fire upon the crowd. There can be no doubt that his motive was to preserve the treasury for his own regiment, which he probably expected to see at Futtehpore on their way to Dehli. The mob then went to the jail, but here again they were opposed by the Njeebs. I had on the previous day praised the Njeebs, and given presents of money to some of them, as they had kept their post at the jail when the treasure party from Allahabad approached. On this occasion they certainly fired at the mob, but I imagine without any serious intention, as no one was hit: it had, however, the effect of making them retire. Mr. Tucker also, with a few sowars, in another direction, drove back a part of the rabble towards the town. The crowd then went to the Mission premises, which they first looted, and then burned, and burning down also the dak bungalow, they returned into the city, where a violent tumult commenced. whilst we had been occupied in watching the movements of the city mob, and our partial successes at the treasury and the jail, we had scarcely observed that from the surrounding villages an innumerable multitude was pouring in, amongst whom doubtless were the prisoners who had arrived in the morning from Allahabad. These occupied all the bungalows in the station, and began looting and wrecking, and finally burning them. The Doctor's bungalow was very near the main guard, and one of the Doctor's servants declared that he had seen one of the sepoys of the guards set fire to the roof of the house. During this time occasional sorties on the part of the gentlemen connected with the railway, attended by a few sowars for the purpose of rescuing their property, had the effect of driving away small parties of the insurgents; but their places were speedily supplied
from the numerous hordes that surrounded us. On the approach of the rabble from the city, Mr. Macnaghten had sent his three horses to a place at some distance, and afterwards his syces had returned, and said that a Zemindar had removed the horses and taken possession of them. All the morning I had seen nothing of the Deputy Magistrate, Hikmut-oollah; but about 2 o'clock he sent to ask permission to wait on me. At 4 he came to the house, but attended by an immense crowd of Pathans and other Mussulmans armed with matchlocks, swords, and other weapons. On seeing this multitude, I sent to the Deputy Magistrate to request him to come alone, and leave his retinue outside of the compound. No attention was paid to this message, and in a moment the compound was filled with the armed mob. My companions, with the exception of Mr. Macnaghten, were then on the roof. I happened to be lying down in one of the rooms when Mr. Macnaghten brought in Hikmut-oollah, and three or four of the leaders of the rabble. On my asking him the reason why he had not been at his post, endeavouring to preserve order all the morning, he stated that he had made several attempts to come to me, but had been confined to his house by the rioters, and that on one occasion he had been thrown out of his palkee, his bearers had been maltreated, and himself forcibly compelled to return to his house. I then asked him what was the object of his visit; and he replied that it was to assure me of the fidelity of the city, and to tender the assistance of the persons whom he had brought with him. Upon this I enquired why, if they were really disposed to assist, they had not come forward in time to save the bungalows; and he answered that they were afraid to come out at that time. Some of his companions, who remained in the verandah, displayed great anxiety to learn the number of our little garrison, and our state of preparation as to arms, provisions, &c. Hikmut-oollah, after expressing himself in a very friendly manner, took his leave, and carried away his retinue with him. When I consider that these loyal Pathans, who were so ready to assist us, were the very men, who, on the following day, murdered my unhappy friend, Mr. Tucker, and that immediately these same loyal subjects despatched a letter to the Nana, tendering their submission to the miscreant's rule; and that Hikmut-oollah, within a week, began to issue orders, and to Banda, accordingly, its officer, would presume to come out at that time. I received intimation in the course of the afternoon that there was treachery at work in the jail, and it was afterwards discovered that the Jail Darogah had written to the Soudbadar at the treasury to say that he awaited his pleasure to set free the prisoners. I need scarcely remark that our future movements had, during the last few days, been the subject of constant and anxious discussion. We had all, with the exception of Mr. Tucker, come to the conclusion that there was no resource but to withdraw for a time from a post which was now become perfectly untenable. But where we were to go, was a point upon which some difficulty still existed, and in truth our position was not a little perplexing: the Nana was besieging Cawnpore; the residents of Allahabad were shut up in the fort, their fate hanging on a hair; Salone, beyond the river, had revolted two days before; Banda alone remained in a state of doubtful allegiance; and to Banda, accordingly, I endeavoured to direct the hopes of my companions as a place where we might perhaps find safety, and should at least in extremity as the event proved, find an exit for further retreat. On the melancholy subject of the disapproval of these plans by one member of our party, I cannot now dwell. Suffice it to say, that every persuasion was used, but all proved unable to shake his fixed determination of remaining; and his firm belief that the treasury guard, notwithstanding the suspicious conduct of its officer, would maintain its fidelity. Having deliberately arrived at the conclusion that our only safety was in retreat, we prepared, as night approached, to retire in as good order as possible. When the rabble appeared to have dispersed for the night, we mounted our horses, and made our way towards the Jumna, passing, as we did so, through villages crowded with liberated ruffians from
the jails, and narrowly escaping, on the bank of the river, a large party of insurgents, who had just carried off some bullocks, placed for the night under the protection of the Ghât police. We found Sirdar Khan, Deputy Magistrate of Banda, on the opposite bank with boats, some of which he sent over to fetch us, and thus we crossed over into the district of Banda.

10. From this point the record of our adventures becomes entirely of a private nature. The history of the insurrection in Banda will be supplied by another officer.

11. The next time I saw Futtehpore, I entered it with the force under General Havelock.

12. As regards Cawnpore, the history of the Nana's usurpation is unhappily but too familiar, and the subsequent history of the district does not seem to fall within my province, being altogether of a military character. I may, however, remark that three distinct phases of feeling were observable in the population. On our first arrival the people seemed perfectly willing to submit themselves to our authority, had we been but strong enough fully to restore it. On perceiving, however, that we were not able to do so, a strong re-action took place; but after the expulsion of the Gwalior mutineers, a desire of quiet at any price again took possession of the populace, and with some exceptions this feeling seems to be still prevalent.

(Sd.) J. W. Sherer.


No. 523, dated Camp Muchleeshahur, 6th November 1858.

From—F. B. Gubbins, Esq., Commissioner, 5th Division,
To—William Muir, Esq., Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces.

In obedience to the instructions contained in General Order, No. 212, of the 30th April last, the officers of the five districts subordinate to this division were called upon to submit an abstract narrative of the events attending the outbreak of the rebellion within the limits of their jurisdiction.

2. Mr. Lind's untimely malady, during the months of July and August, entailed a considerable delay in the preparation of these records, as both the narratives of Benares and Cawnpore were to be compiled by him.

3. On the whole of the Returns being received, they were made by me over to Mr. Taylor, the Officiating Joint Magistrate of Cawnpore, to form into one abstract for the entire division. This having now been prepared, I do myself the honor of submitting it to Government, proceeding myself to record the services performed by the several subordinate officers of the division, as directed in paragraph 7 of the circular, as also to indicate the marked instances of assistance rendered by persons unconnected with the Government of the country.

To commence with Benares, I would beg to enumerate the following officers as having rendered the most important services to the State:—

Mr. F. M. Lind, Magistrate and Collector, contributed, by his coolness and presence of mind, to the preservation of order; stood forward with the Judge to prevent senseless panics, and the abandonment of the station; was occupied during the period intervening between the receipt of the intelligence of the Meerut massacre and the outbreak, in patrolling the city, reassuring the timid, and cowing the turbulent. On the day of the outbreak, commanded along with the Judge at the Civilians' rendezvous, and saved the treasure and records.
Mr. A. E. Pollock, Joint Magistrate and Deputy Collector, showed great energy, zeal, and determination, during the period intervening between the intelligence of the Meerut massacre and the outbreak; took charge of the Trans-Gangetic pergunahs, and remained there unsupported, when most Europeans did not like to live in a house by themselves, and by his presence kept the country quiet; was, with his brother-in-law, Captain Davidson, indefatigable in laying the daks of bullocks and coolies for hurrying the European soldiery up-country.

Mr. E. G. Jenkinson was employed by the Judge and Magistrate in raising and drilling a small body of sowars, half of which were subsequently transferred to Jounpoor on the reoccupation of that district, was most daring and energetic, and always ready for a dash at the enemy.

The Judge, the writer of these remarks, tried to make himself generally useful.

Pundit Gokoolchund, the Nazir of the Judge's Court, being a very high-caste Brahmin, and knowing every body in Benares, was employed to collect information, and proved invaluable in both this and all other branches. His zeal was untiring, and he worked in our interests day and night.

Iamin Shah Khan, Kotwal of the City, behaved well during the whole of the rebellion, and deserves well of Government.

Moonshee Sheo Suhai, Serishtadar of the Magistrate's Court, was very zealous, and assisted greatly in keeping the price of grain down.

Nusser-oollah Khan, Thannadar of Dussorsoomedh, worked hard in our favor, and arrested many rebels. Has been made a Tehsildar in the Banda district.

Meer Ibadut Ali, Darogah of the Jail, behaved well and loyally, and kept the prisoners and jail guard from breaking out by his good example; has been made Tehsildar.

The following are the persons unconnected with Government, who have rendered us valuable assistance during the disturbances:—

Rao Deonarian Singh, a most loyal and devoted subject, who proved invaluable to us during our crisis. A full report has already been submitted about him, and he has been made Raja, as the forerunner of more substantial rewards.

Sirdar Soorut Singh, a gallant Sikh gentleman, who has taken a prominent part in our favor, and whose conduct has been fully reported upon. A pension of Rupees 400 per mensem has already been given him, as well as a khillut of Rupees 5,000.

Meer Ryaet Ali, a Vakeel of the Judge's Court, who exhibited marked loyalty to the State, and formed one of the commanders of the party who proceeded into Oudh to rescue the Sultanpoor fugitives.

Baboo Davee Singh, an influential Rajpoot, who has espoused our cause most warmly, and has been of the greatest use in the intelligence department, and in feeling the pulse of the native community.

Besides this I should add that Mr. Tucker, the Commissioner, as well as the Judge, the Raja of Benares, Raja Deonarain Singh, Baboo Gooroo Dass Mitter, Baboo Hurruk Chund, Baboo Narain Dass, Baboo Dabeedyal Singh, and Baboo Ramkissen Dass, son of Baboo Hunooman Dass, all of them contributed horses, of which they made a free gift to Government, wherewith to horse the guns which accompanied General Havelock's forlorn hope, as it advanced from Allahabad to Cawnpoor. The two Rajas that I have above mentioned have, besides this, furnished us according to their respective means, with horses wherewith to mount our cavalry, elephants, camels, and matchlockmen.
In the Joumpoor District, the following officers have made themselves most conspicuous for the services they have rendered:

Messrs. F. M. Lind, E. G. Jenkinson, and P. Carnegie, the Magistrate, Joint Magistrate, and Deputy Magistrate, were, from September 1857 to February 1858, doing the duties of soldiers, as well as those of Civilians. They accompanied the Gorkhas throughout the campaign that ensued on the reoccupation of the district, exhibited great gallantry in the field, and were most indefatigable in the performance of their duties. Their conduct presented a striking contrast to that exhibited by the representative of Government, when abandoning the district in the month of June 1857, on which occasion the European gentlemen composing his party were persuaded by him to leave their arms behind them, lest their sight should irritate the natives. The consequence of this was, that an armed party of their countrymen had to sally out from Benares, and escort them into that station, they being unable to protect themselves.

Of the persons unconnected with Government, who rendered it valuable assistance, I would beg to enumerate the following:

Mr. A. Waleski, Senior, and Mr. A. Waleski, Junior, both of them Indigo Planters; who, out of pure loyalty, accompanied the authorities on their return to Joumpoor, and then shared in the whole of the subsequent Gorkha campaign, without receiving any salary or support from the State.

Hingun Lall, of Korkut, who gave shelter from the Dobhee Rajpoot to the Joumpoor fugitives, and has since been made a Deputy Collector.

Madho Singh, Zamindar of Bisheruthpoor, who sheltered a considerable party of Indigo Planters, until they were escorted into Benares by Sirdar Seorut Singh’s party, and has ever since proved a loyal subject to Government.

Raja Ilveshnarain has ever since the reoccupation of the district been a warm partisan of ours, giving us a number of matchlockmen to assist our police, and rendering every other assistance in his power.

Raja Sheoghulam Doobey is well spoken of by Mr. Lind.

In the Mirzapoor District, the following gentlemen have particularly distinguished themselves:

Mr. Saint George Tucker, Magistrate and Collector, was the only person who refused to abandon the station in the panics that occurred in the months of June and July, when all the other officers and European residents fled to Chunar. Besides this, Mr. Tucker headed many expeditions made against the enemy, in which he exhibited great gallantry.

Mr. Elliott and Mr. P. Walker, the former Assistant, and the other Deputy Magistrate, likewise distinguished themselves by gallantry in the field when accompanying the expeditions made against the rebels. Mr. Elliott joined Mr. Tucker at Mirzapoor from Benares during the panic, in which the rest of the European residents fled to Chunar, volunteering for the service as one of danger.

The Raja of Kuntit and his brother are also reported to have behaved well, and to have supplied matchlockmen for the protection of the city; who were, however, paid by Government.

Messrs. Venables, Dunne, and Legge, in the Azimgurb District, particularly distinguished themselves immediately after the mutiny. Although in no way connected with the Government, they volunteered to return to the station, and held it in the most gallant manner when the authorities themselves did not venture to join. Of Mr. Venables I need say nothing, as he has made himself a well earned Indian reputation, and I would that he were alive to enjoy it. Mr. Dunne’s services have as yet received no acknowledgment from Government, and yet it was he who first persuaded Venables to return to Azimgurb; and his courage and daring on every occasion in which the enemy have had to be met, is spoken of by every one with admiration.
Mr. Legge, since made Deputy Magistrate, has done invaluable service to the State, accompanying every Military expedition that has been undertaken against the enemy, and being the Civil Officer in charge of one of the detachments of Brigadier Douglas's Force when Koour Singh was hunted from Azimgurh to Arrah.

Subsequently, Messrs. A. R. Pollock, R. H. Davies, G. H. Freeling, J. Simson, and H. G. Ross, did good service to the State by accompanying the Military in all expeditions made against the enemy, in which they displayed both zeal, energy, and gallantry. I would particularly mention Mr. H. G. Ross, who, while a student at Benares, attached himself to Major Cotter's battery, and perfected himself in gunnery, so as to be able when he joined at Azimgurh to make himself of the very greatest use. Mr. Pollock accompanied Colonel Longden through his campaign on the frontier, and was foremost where danger was to be found. Messrs. Davies and Freeling displayed great gallantry during the siege of Azimgurh, and the former accompanied Brigadier Douglas in his pursuit of Koour Singh, where he greatly distinguished himself. Mr. J. Simson was present at the first battle fought against the Pulwars at the station, and was the only official then present, who voted with Venables and Havelock for holding their ground against the enemy.

Of the Native officials, those who have prominently distinguished themselves are—

Ali Buksh Khan and Usgr Alee, the first, Nazir of the Magistrate's Court, the second Thannadar of Nuggra, displayed the most marked and undoubted loyalty on the occasion of the outbreak; and on the abandonment of the station held it on the part of Government, till the return of Mr. Venables and his party. They have on several subsequent occasions behaved most gallantly in the field, and the former has made a Deputy Collector for his good conduct, while the latter has been promoted to a Tehseeldarship.

Second to these I would put—

Sufdur Hosein and Mahomed Tekkee, the first, Serishtadar of the Magistrate's Court, the second Naib Tehseeldar of Mohammedabad. There is no doubt but that it was principally owing to the good management and loyalty of Sufdur Hoeen-in that the gallant Venables was able to hold his own during the months of June and July 1857, while Mahomed Tekkee at Mohammedabad took the place of his rebel superior the Tehseeldar, and maintained order in the town throughout the whole of the rebellion, by organizing a force with which he repelled all attempts of plunder on the part of the Pulwars.

I now come to the last of the five districts which compose this Division, Ghazeepoor, which, in company with Benares and Mirzapoor, have the proud distinction of having passed unscathed through the late rebellion, and of having stayed the torrent of insurrection. I would in this district particularly notice the conduct of—

Mr. A. Ross, whose prudence and firmness as Magistrate, had a great effect in preserving the peace of his jurisdiction.

Mr. J. Box, the Joint Magistrate, who accompanied Major V. Eyer to Arrah, is perhaps the most brilliant passage of arms that has been witnessed on this side of India during the rebellion.

Mr. L. Probyn, the present Joint Magistrate, who has made himself conspicuously active at Bulleah during the latter part of this year, and whom I consider a most valuable young officer.

Mr. Duane, of Azimgurh, again appears in the field as accompanying Brigadier Douglas's Column, and remaining in the neighbourhood of Bullah with Mr. Probyn to assist him in his opposition to the rebels. It was at this time that both Messrs. Probyn and Dunne were besieged in Byreah by the rebels for four or five days.
Sheikh Khyr-ood-deen and Abdool Rahman Khan, the first, Deputy Collector, and the second Moonsiff of Bulleah, have both of them made themselves conspicuous for good conduct and loyalty.

Raja of Huldoo, the head of an ancient family, which used to hold large estates in the south-eastern division of the district. This old gentleman has still great influence in the country, and though urged to side with the rebels, all along refused to do so, and prevented his kinsmen from withdrawing their allegiance from the British Government.

THE REBELLION OF 1857 IN THE PROVINCE OF BENARES.

It has fallen to my lot to write the general narrative of the events of the rebellion of which the Benares Division was the scene; and though that Province was not the theatre of any of those fearful or heroic deeds, whereby the name of Hindoostan has been made to stink in the nostrils of the whole world, while the fame of the Imperial race has gained yet greater lustre, yet is my tale far from devoid of interest. The general reader may find exciting incidents, and certainly will see events fraught with like danger, like terror.

1. Meerut Province was not the theatre of any of those fearful or heroic deeds, whereby the name of Hindoostan has been made to stink in the nostrils of the whole world, while the fame of the Imperial race has gained yet greater lustre, yet is my tale far from devoid of interest. The general reader may find exciting incidents, and certainly will see events fraught with like danger, like terror.

2. The wide territory of Goruckpoor was, after no long time, entrusted to a Commissioner of its own, and the events of which it was the scene he will record: those of the remaining five districts are chronicled below. Of these five, Azimgurh, garrisoned as it was by the 17th Native Infantry, was considered far from safe; but it was hoped that the Sikhs of the Looidianah regiment, and the Sowars of the 13th Irregular Cavalry, would overawe the ill affected 37th Native Infantry at Benares, that the 65th Native Infantry would stand fast at Ghazeepoor, that the Poroopoor Corps of Sikhs would hold Mirzapoor against any foe from within or from without, and that whatever might happen in the District of Joumpoor, the authorities, with their guard of Sikhs of the Looidianah regiment, would still be able to hold the station in peace and safety. How far these expectations were fulfilled, how far disappointed, official records tell; and those records have supplied the matter for the brief chronicle which I have thus begun.

3. On this state of things the month of May opened, finding all fearfully expecting troublous times rather than able to state the ground of their belief; and quietly counting the strength which should enable them to weather the storm, whose beginning, not whose end, they clearly foresaw.

4. The month begun thus gloomily, brought gloomier warning in its course. About the middle of the month the news arrived of the Delhi and Meerut massacres. Yet excepting that rendezvous in case of need were agreed on, it was only in Benares that the evil news produced a marked effect. The city, always the most turbulent in India, was now the more dangerous from the severity with which the high price of corn pressed on the poorer classes; the Poorbeah sepoys, who had been more or less restless since the beginning of March, now publicly called on their gods to deliver them from the Feringshees; clubbed together to send messengers westward for intelligence; and finally sent away their Gooroo Jest, as they said, in the troubles which were coming, he should suffer any hurt.

5. At this junction the 13th Irregulars were summoned in from Sultanpoor, in the hope that their different faith would make them a counterpoise to the power of the sepoys; and great hopes were entertained that they would prove true to their salt. The Magistrate and Judge (Messrs. Lind and Gubbins) exerted themselves with great skill to maintain the peace of the city;
now patrolling with parties of sowars, now persuading bunyas to lower the price of corn, now listening to the tales of spies who reported clearly the state of feeling in the city, and told the minds of the sepoys far more truly than the officers in command.

6. Yet in spite of this insecurity, there was neither weakness nor affected confidence. A proposition to retire to the strong fort of Chunar was rejected; but at the same time it was arranged that, in case of need, all the Christian residents should congregate at the Mint. On June 3rd, however, it was further decided that the Civilians should assemble at the Collector's Kutcherly, and hold it till a party of Europeans should be sent to escort them to the Mint. For this last arrangement there were many reasons. The roof of the Kutcherly, a lofty pukka building, is approached by a single winding staircase, and close alongside is the treasury, which at this time, besides stamp paper of great value, contained four and a half lakhs of treasure, and the jewels of the Ranee Chunda of Lahore, which were valued at twenty lakhs. Thus from a post of complete temporary security, the little party of Civilians could completely overawe the Treasury guard, and save this great wealth from falling into the hands of the mutineers.

7. The importance of Benares in the times of which I speak was so great, that it were almost impossible to pass on without enquiring who could have suggested so false a step as retreat to Chunar. A step, indeed, the principal result of which would have been to occupy with the tale of the siege and defence of Chunar, that page of history now so much more grandly filled with the story of Lucknow. And on this point Mr. Lind speaks so explicitly, that I cannot do better than tell the tale as he tells it, and without any comment of my own.

8. As soon as the news of the outbreak at Meerut reached Benares, a Council debated as to the best rendezvous for non-combatants in case of alarm; and next day Captain Olpherts (Commanding Artillery) with Captain Watson (of the Engineers) called on Mr. Lind, suggesting the propriety of an immediate retreat to Chunar. Although the proposer implied that the plan had Colonel Gordon's sanction, Mr. Lind, without discussion, simply replied that he would not leave his post; and as soon as his visitors took their departure, hurried to Mr. Gubbins. They both returned to Mr. Lind's house to discuss the best means of opposition, and were soon joined by Mr. Tucker (the Commissioner) and Colonel Gordon. When the former alluded to the plan, in terms which seemed to imply that he approved it, Mr. Lind condemned it most strongly; and on this Colonel Gordon asked Mr. Gubbins his opinion. The reply was brief enough: "I will go on my knees to you not to leave Benares." Nor was Colonel Gordon's answer less quick and clear: "I am very glad to hear you say so, for I was persuaded against my will in favor of the scheme." Never was so false a move more happily prevented.

9. Thus May passed away, but on its last night, the first open evidence of the coming disturbances appeared; for at 1-30 A.M. the lines vacated by the 67th Native Infantry were seen to be in flames. Yet this was not wholly unexpected; for Major Guise (Commanding the Irregular Cavalry) had been warned that it was intended, and also that the 37th Native Infantry meant to seize the guns in the confusion.

10. This brought to light an earlier step in the plot; for next day some men, who were seen consulting near the spot where the fire had broken out, were tracked, and one party traced to the "Shiwalla," where most of the Delhi Princes lived. These men, a branch of that wretched family which had died from Dahi some fifty years before and taken refuge at Benares, who ever affected all the state of royalty, and treated Englishmen with lordly scorn, now thought they did no wrong to the Government, which had saved their lives and cherished them with lavish care, in concerting with its mutinous retainers the ruin of that very Government, in daily, nay in hourly interviews, of the most familiar character, which they gave freely to any who might ask.
11. None could now doubt that a crisis was near at hand; and on June 4th, a Council (both Civil and Military) was called to debate the question of disarming the 37th Native Infantry. It was still sitting, when a sowar arrived with the news of the mutiny at Azimgurh. This decided the question, and it was arranged that next morning the Civilians should assemble at the Collector's Kutchehry while the 37th was paraded and disarmed. The debate had been very full, and the decision deliberate; yet the Civilians had scarce reached their homes, when they were alarmed by the roar of the guns on the parade ground. The whole plans were in vain; they had been frustrated by the following circumstances.

12. It appears that as Brigadier Ponsonby was returning home after the Council, he met Colonel Neill, who recommended him to disarm the corps at once. Disregarding all other consideration, on the spur of the moment he hurried to the parade ground. The troops turned out: on one side were drawn up Captain Olpherts with his three bullock guns and thirty European gunners in charge of the two hundred of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, who had just arrived; opposite to them were the 37th Native Infantry, and on either side the 13th Irregular Cavalry and the Loodianah Corps of Sikhs. The 37th was ordered to pile arms, and replied with a volley, to which the guns gave a speedy and efficient answer; but at this unhappy moment, Captain Olpherts perceiving a movement among the Sikhs on his right, promptly turned the guns and opened fire on them. For some minutes the event was doubtful; thrice the rebels charged the guns, thrice were driven back with grape; the guns continued their destructive play, the mutineers wavered, and then broke and fled. Never was rout so complete: a thousand armed men were flying from two hundred, who did not dare stir; and that with such abject terror, that they flung down their loaded muskets, their accoutrements, every thing that could hinder their flight, and flying for dear life, did not stop to touch the few Europeans who fell in their way. 'Aflavit Deus et dissipati sunt.' Had now the 13th Irregulars stood firm, scarce a man of the Benares mutineers would have escaped to tell how, at the Holy City, the God of the Christian had shown himself more powerful than all their grim Valkalla. But no, even thus early in the day they preferred threatening those who tried to keep them faithful, to firing on the mutinous crowd they affected to hate and to despise.

13. It would be impossible to write of the mutiny at Benares, without saying a few words as to the much vexed question of the loyalty of the Loodianah Sikhs: the facts are simply these. They were brought out not knowing what was going to be done; suddenly the guns on one side opened on the 37th, men, officers and all; and on the other side, the irregular cavalry began firing into and abusing the Sikhs, then a bad character stepped forward and tried to shoot Colonel Gordon. The corps then mutinied; first fired into a group of young officers standing behind them, and then charged the guns. The fact of the mutiny is indisputable. The only question is, whether any other course could be expected. The parade, the firing, the attack on themselves, were all a surprise: they saw the 37th mown down, and could not know that the irregulars were not obeying orders previously given. To expect them to stand firm under such circumstances is, I think, to expect a great deal more than could be hoped for from Europeans. On the other hand, some did stand even this rude test; the mutiny at Jounpoor surprised the natives even more than the Europeans residents. The Treasury guard at Benares, even in the first burst of their surprise and rage, were kept firm by the interference of two well-known natives. I contend then, not that there were no bad characters in the regiment; not that the loyalty of none was tainted; but that, as a corps they were loyal, and would have stood any test less rude.

14. In three hours the mutiny was over, and the mutineers cleared away in the full rush of their terror-stricken flight. And the whole affair was so sudden that the roar of the guns on the parade ground was almost the first
notice the Civil residents had that anything was going to happen. But then the Missionaries fled to Rammuggur, and thence to Chunar, while the Civilians, in number about twelve, all armed to the teeth, and guarding some four or five ladies, took their stand on the roof of the Collector's Kutchery. Strong as their position was, so great was the agitation of the Sikhs on hearing the fate of their Regiment, that the Europeans on the roof, though safe from capture, would not have been safe from attack, had not Sirdar Soorot Singh and Pundit Gokool Chund (at their own great peril) gone amongst them, and succeeded by many words in calming their rage at the treachery they suspected, and burned to avenge. So the little party remained in safety, till at 2 A.M., on June 5th, it was escorted to the Mint by a party of Europeans.

16. In summoning this guard one event occurred, which I cannot pass over in silence. It is an act of no common heroism. Messrs. Gubbins Caulfield, and Demomet went in a buggy to the Mint, and Mr. Jenkinson, Civil Service, accompanied them on horseback. As the party was crossing the bridge, Mr. Jenkinson saw some ambushed sepoys aiming at the party in the buggy. There was no time for warning or for hesitation, and he at once reined back his horse, covering with his own body his companions in danger. It were far easier to praise such an act than to praise it worthy; and I praise it best, by not praising it at all.

16. And now, as though this night had not been full enough of trial, the party had scarce reached the Mint House when news was received that some Mussulmans had determined to raise the green flag, in the temple of Bissessur, the most holy of the many holy places in the city of Shiva. Yet this, which was fraught with the greatest danger, was turned into a source of strength by Mr. Lind, who called on the Rajpoots of the city to prevent this insult to their faith. So the Mussulmans retired peaceably, and the rest of the night was quiet.

17. Next day the treasure was removed to the Magazine; the Mint House was slightly fortified; and for the moment the worst of the storm was over. And tranquillity was the more assured, that every day small parties of Europeans were passing through on their westward journey, being pushed forward by Mr. Pollock (Joint Magistrate), who had been sent out for that purpose to nowbutpoor the day before the mutiny.

18. I must now turn to tell of an event earlier in point of time, and really accelerating the one I have been describing,—the Mutiny at Azimgur; and here I must make a slight retrospect in order to represent clearly the real state of affairs.

19. The 17th Native Infantry had been brigaded at Lucknow, with the 19th and 34th Native Infantry. The Regiment at the station was numerically weak, not mustering above five hundred men; but it was vehemently suspected, and not without ground, for it was known that men of the disbanded 19th Native Infantry were entertained in its lines. On May 24th, too, when some men impudently rejected extra cartridges which were served out to them, and afterwards violently assaulted a Native Officer, Major Burroughs (the Commanding Officer) found himself too weak to punish, and the Brigadier at Benares had enough to do in keeping his own troops quiet, without thinking of sending help to out stations.

20. However, threatening as was the aspect of affairs, there was every reason to hope that, if the gun guard stood firm, a long and successful resistance to any attack of the mutineers might be made. The fortification of the Collector's Kutchery, begun before, was now speedily completed; the verandahs closed with loopholed walls, the parapets crowned with sand bags, the entrance gate swept by the two post guns, covered with a trench, in charge of the native gunners, and the best men of the 17th Native Infantry, as a gun guard. Would they stand fast? If so, the Europeans were safe; if not,—
21. The trial soon came. On June 1st, the Regiment held a seditious meeting; on June 2nd, an attempt was made to tamper with some of the 13th Irregulars, who had come with Lieutenant Palliser to escort to Benares the spare treasure of Goruckpoor and Azimgurh. Orders for this despatch had been given; all the warnings and entreaties of Mr. Horne (the Magistrate) were in vain; and on the morning of June 3rd, a company of the 17th Native Infantry, and some eighty sowars of the 12th and 13th Irregulars, marched in from Goruckpoor with five lakhs of rupees in charge. The 17th Native Infantry hesitated no longer, but openly declared that the treasure should never leave the station. However, by mingled threats and promises, the same guard was induced to march again that night, and under their escort the Goruckpoor treasure, with two lakhs from Azimgurh, was sent on to Benares.

22. So far all went well; and though the excitement of the sepoys had hastened the despatch of the treasure, still that excitement seemed to have exhausted itself in words; and it was hoped that, for the time at least, the danger was escaped. But at 8 P.M., some three hours after the treasure left the station, a musket shot was heard. On the instant the sepoys armed themselves, shot down Lewis (the Quarter-master Sergeant), ordered their officers to fly to Ghazeepoor, and hurried down towards the city. The Magistrate and Joint Magistrate (Messrs. Horne and Simson), who were in the lines, saw that all was lost, and galloped back to the station, only staying to bid the Kotwal with his increased police and the doubled jail guard do what he could to check the advance of the sepoys through the city. But it was all in vain; the Kotwal could do nothing, and the jail guard, releasing the prisoners, at once joined the advancing rebels.

23. At the Treasury the gun guard had mutinied: Lieutenant Hutchinson was shot while trying to harangue his men; but all the rest, both ladies and gentlemen, escaped to the roof of the Kutchery. Their position was desperate enough; but the sepoys caring less for murder than for plunder, suddenly took the guns and hurried off towards Benares. But it was clear they meant to return, for their lines were still strongly guarded; so the Civilians taking advantage of their absence fled to Ghazeepoor. That place they reached in safety about the same time as the mutineers, who, having captured the treasure, and returned with it, to the station, left Azimgurh in haste, but with all the pomp of war, en route for Fyzabad.

24. The events of the mutiny at Jounpoor are few, and easily told. It had long been felt that if there were any serious disturbances anywhere, this zillah would have its share; for in none are auction purchasers more numerous, old zamindars more powerful, or the present landholders on worse terms among themselves. Still the planters had all crowded in the city as a place of safety; and when the outbreak did take place, the native inhabitants seem to have been even more surprised and alarmed than the Europeans.

25. Thus on the morning of June 5th, all the European residents were assembled at the Collector’s Kutchery well armed and prepared for the worst. They had not long to wait. The news of the rising at Benares and the slaughter of the Sikhs arrived; the Sikh guard (a part of the Lodzianah Regiment) was roused to fury: here was no Soorut Sing to throw himself into the breach; they shot their Commanding Officers; they murdered Mr. Cuppage, (the Joint Magistrate), as he was galloping down to the jail; and then, each with a bag of treasure and all his arms marched off to Lucknow. The Europeans at once fled. The Doobey Rajpoots drove them from their refuge in the house of Rai Hingun Loll. Then they hurried to Pussewah Factory, and on June 9th were brought in safety to Benares by a party of volunteers who had gone out for that purpose.

26. Meanwhile a strange scene was enacted at Jounpoor. The plunder of the Treasury had been completed by decrepit old women and wretched little boys, who had never seen a rupee in their lives; and the houses of all the
officers were thoroughly gutted, and nearly all destroyed. A committee of public safety was formed in the city, but though the refusal of Raja Sheogholam Doobey to act, removed the chief cause of religious discord, still the Mussulmans could not agree even to save their own lives, and the city was left to anarchy till Mr. Fane (the Collector) returning to Jounpoor for a day to take some Europeans to Benares, formally made over charge of the district to Raja Sheogholam Doobey.

27. This appointment produced but little good even in the city: in the district, not a semblance of authority was left to any one. Those who had lost their estates under our rule, thought this a good time to regain them; those who had not, thought they could make a little profit by plundering their weaker neighbours; the bolder spirits thought to secure more brilliant advantages by intercourse with the rebel powers in Oudh; and in this state of anarchy (the normal state of every eastern province) they remained till the arrival of the Goorkhas on September 8th restored a semblance of authority to the British Government.

28. While these events were passing, it must not be supposed that Mirzapoor or Ghazeeoor were left in perfect peace. And indeed Ghazeeoor was far from being without ground of alarm. On all sides of the district, itself always most troublesome, were disturbances real or reported; in the station was the 65th Native Infantry and in the Treasury five lakhs of rupees. Still no very pressing danger was apparent; and on June 3rd, a hundred men of H. M.'s 10th, who had just arrived by steamer, were hurried on to Benares. But after the outbreak at Azimgurh a great change took place. The fugitives indeed were brought safely to the station, but the country seemed to rise behind them; and by June 6th the whole district was raging in civil war. The police were helpless, and robberies were perpetrated to the very door of the Court-house itself. But severe summary punishment was inflicted by the European officers, with small parties of the 65th and some of the districts; the treasure was sent to Benares by steamer; martial law was proclaimed; a hundred Europeans stationed at Ghazeeoor for the time; and the influence of these soothing measures was such that by June 16th, when Messrs. Dunne and Venables went out to Azimgurh, the district seemed nearly to have regained its former state.

29. Mirzapoor had much less cause of alarm. Its guard was half of a Sikh Corps, and its Treasury only contained two lakhs of rupees; but the greatest misery of the time was the complete uncertainty of the real source of peril, and so of the real source of safety. Thus when on May 21st, firing was heard to the eastward, the residents retired (with the Sikhs) to the Kutcherries; and though on the discovery that the firing was only at a marriage procession, the civilians returned to their own houses, it was thought advisable for the Sikhs still to remain on the spot.

30. News of the outbreak at Benares and Jounpoor greatly increased the uneasiness of the European residents; nor did the arrival of part of the 47th Native Infantry under Lieut.-Colonel Pott at all tend to restore confidence, even though that officer allowed very many of his men to go away on leave.

31. Nor were the events of the next day (June 8th) more inspiring. The Sikhs were called away to Allahabad in such haste, that, though advantage was taken of their escort to send Rupees 60,000 away, they were not able to take with them their spare arms, or to remove or destroy the large quantity of ammunition in their magazine. Now, too, neither road or river was safe from armed plunderers; large bodies of armed men were reported at Mandah on the Allahabad frontier; rebels were hourly expected to attack the station itself, and the fidelity of the 47th Native Infantry was far from assured.

32. For the time, however, all stood firm; the nipples of the spare muskets and the ammunition of the Sikhs were thrown into the river by Colonel Pott's order, and the remaining treasure was despatched to Benares by steamer. But on June 9th the rumours of an attack from Mandah assumed a form so
definite, that all the inhabitants of the station, with the exception of the Magistrate (Mr. St. George Tucker), and a few others, fled to Chunar. Mr. Tucker, however, did not flinch; the Mandah men never came; and when on June 10th, the property of the East India Railway was plundered in broad daylight, some four miles from the Kutcherry, he went out with fifteen of the 50th Native Infantry (who had just brought in a prisoner from Nagode, and have ever been doing excellent service), and dealt out a severe retribution.

33. Thus the week which had destroyed the name of civil government in Jounpoor and Azimgurh, had left the remaining zillahs in little better state. The police was paralyzed, not a road was safe, and the Rajpoots generally returned to their normal state of plunderers and plundered; and there was no force to check them. Lieutenant Palliser and his sowars (in Mr. Jenkinson's charge) had scarcely begun to punish some of the worst villages in the Benares district, when he was recalled to join a party of Europeans in an attempt to re-open the communication with Allahabad, cut off by a raid of men from Bhadoee (Zillah Mirzapoor), who had cut the telegraphic wire and carried off the dak bullocks. The expedition was of course successful, but the execution of some of the criminals at Gopeegunge was only too speedily avenged by the murder of Mr. Moore.

34. Soon, however, the punishment inflicted by Lieutenant Palliser in the Benares district was forgotten, dacoities became commoner than ever; and it was speedily apparent that the Civil Officers would cease to possess even a vestige of authority, unless some procedure were adopted, more speedy and severe than the regulation allowed. A report to this effect made to Government speedily bore fruit in the now well-known XVI, 1857; and the permanent gallows, and a few instances of a crime committed after breakfast and avenged before dinner, reduced a large part of the district to comparative tranquillity.

35. Mr. Jenkinson (Civil Service) was now directed to raise a corps of police sowars, and speedily found work ready to his hands; for the Rajpoots of Dobhee (Zillah Jounpoor) waxing bold from impunity disturbed the peace of Benares, and cut off communication with Azimgurh. Mr. Chapman went out against them with a force of Europeans, Sikhs, and Sowars; but though he only returned in June 30th, after inflicting a punishment which seemed sufficient to have crushed the Dobhee people for years, they regained confidence to such an extent, that early in July they marched to attack Benares itself. Nine miles from the station, however, they were met by a force, which supplied whatever was wanting in their former chastisement; and on July 17th, they most gladly came in and have behaved well ever since.

36. These endless disturbances, however, caused an uneasy feeling at Benares. This was the last point where the river was really safe; here the trunk road crosses the Ganges; here was the chief depot of the Commissariat; and the loss of Benares would have left us the whole country to reconquer almost from the gates of Calcutta. Messrs. Lind and Gubbins then pressed earnestly on the military authorities the importance of erecting a post at Rajghat to command the landing-place, on the very site, indeed, of an old Hindu castle, whose existence was little more than traditional. Convict labour was freely offered; the last difficulties on the score of expense were removed by orders for the construction of a fort received from the Supreme Government, and so originated that extensive and irregular, but strong fortification which now dominates over the city of Shiva.

37. As the date at which I have now arrived in my narrative of events at Benares (July 15th) is also the date of the return of the civil authorities to Azimgurh, I am by this reminded how much in arrear is my history of that district. On June 16th Mr. Dunne, himself a fugitive from Azimgurh, determined to fetch in those who saved by the sepoys' hasty flight, were living under the protection of friendly zemindars. He was accompanied by Mr. Venables and some sowars given him by the Magistrate of Ghazeepoor, and
accomplished his march without opposition. At Azimgurh he found a small party of the 13th Irregulars, who seemed not quite to have resolved on their line of action, but soon left the place. The Europeans hastened from their retreats, and were anxious to leave at once. On June 20th the majority of the party with the sowars started for Ghazeeepoor (which they reached in safety); but Mr. Venables, yielding to the entreaties of the omilah and the chief citizens, stayed (with Messrs. Dunne, Legge, and Dodsworth) at Azimgurh, and was at once invested by the Commissioner with full Magisterial power.

38. Among the Europeans thus rescued was Mr. Nisbett, the Head Clerk of the Collector's Office, who after the outbreak had obtained shelter in the house of Alee Buksh, the Nazir. In his presence a council was held to discuss the chance of the return of the English, and to decide on the proper course to be pursued. Here too all concord was prevented by the religious differences, here no doubt politically aggravated by the efforts of the faithful Nazir, who with a few of the omilah assumed the office of a committee of public safety, and reported proceedings daily to the Commissioner at Benares.

39. Mr. Venables had fallen on no bed of roses. Though his authority was unquestioned in the eastern and larger half of the district, the Rajpoors of the west had enjoyed a fortnight's license far too keenly to tolerate willingly the slightest check. The police helpless with terror, the provisional council at Azimgurh unable to rule even the neighbouring villages, had not tried to cope with these audacious plunderers; and Mr. Venables soon found he must try his power against them in the field, or be forced ignominiously to save his own life by again abandoning the station.

40. Yet was the debate an anxious and important one. There could be no doubt as to the proper objects of attack; for the Pulwars, a powerful clan living on the borders of Oudh, had been pre-eminent among the freebooters. But they were far from the station; they were not at all wanting in military stores; there were many forts on their lands; and there were but a hundred and fifty sepoys (of the 65th Native Infantry), seventy-five sowars, and the old post gun, which Mr. Venables had mounted, to form a column of attack.

41. Still on June 26th (the day on which Moozuffur Jehan seized and proclaimed himself Raja of Mahool), Lieutenant Havelock moved out against the Pulwars, but returned after three days, not very profitable fighting. Mr. Venables had meanwhile made a little doubt on his own account, and with a little more success; and on the 30th he moved again with a larger force to attack Mohubbutpoor, a village but a few miles from the city, which had been conspicuous in the marauding. The attempted resistance was a mere feint, and several noted scoundrels were carried off and consigned to safe custody in the Kotwalee. But on July 23rd, one Rujub Allee attacked the Kotwalee with some four hundred followers in broad daylight; the Police made no prolonged resistance, and the prisoners were rescued with little loss in conflict, and as little in Mr. Venables' hasty pursuit.

42. I am now compelled by my duty as compiler to make a digression, in order to reconcile discordant narratives, before I can tell of the further proceedings of the Pulwars, who now rapidly gathered head.

43. There are two accounts of affairs at this time; one written by Mr. Astell (the Judge), chiefly from the verbal information of Mr. Venables; the other by the Magistrate, which may have been placed in the office even in that stirring time; and the discrepancies of these two records are far too striking to be passed over in silence. Mr. Astell speaks of Baineep Madho of Atrowlia, as from the first ill-disposed; as having early busied himself in making preparations for war; as having refused to admit any messenger of Mr. Venables into his fort, though keeping up a show of loyalty; and as having assumed the title of Naib Nazim of Azimgurh. Mr. Davies, on the contrary, speaks of this man as uniformly well conducted, and as having protected the Thanaahdar, &c., of Atrowlia; and says that Madho Pershad, the head of the Pulwars,
whose fort and chief estates lie beyond the Oudh frontier, assumed the title of Chuckladar, and entered the district with a large force early in July.

44. It seems to me evident that the similarity of name has caused this confusion. Baineer Madho, by caste a Koormie, bad in quieter times been on very bad terms with his neighbours the Pulwars, and spoken of his warlike preparations as being only prudent precautions against them. But when Lieutenant Havelock went out on that June dour of which I have spoken above, he found many Pulwars in this man's service, and was not allowed to enter the fort though food was served to his men outside. And for the protection he is said to have given to the flying Thannahdar, it was believed at the time (and his own urzee confirmed the tale), that he himself had forced the officers to enter his fort, and was taking care of the records, &c., in the way popular among strong Zemindars at that time. His nominal loyalty would seem thus to have been veering round to open hate, even as his blood feud with the Pulwars was changing into the more amicable relations of leader and partisan.

45. Madho Pershad, on the other hand, had sheltered and kindly treated the fugitives from Fyzabad; he never appeared against us till the battle of Koilsa (to be spoken of below), where he said the few men who had come as his personal attendants for an interview with the Tubseeldar (an interview which was really taking place when the battle begun), were by accident mingled with the enemy, and so fell under the undiscriminating bullets of our men; and when at the great attack of the 18th on the city itself, a message was received from him, saying that the attack was none of his making, the message was believed; and a reply sent through his own messenger, advising him to attack the enemy in the rear, when the fight begun in front. It is evident then, that at this time nothing was known of his having accepted a title from the rebels' chancery, and that he was looked on rather as a doubtful friend than as a decided enemy. Nor is it a point of no weight that very recently his estates have been exempted from confiscation by Government, while no 'Deus ex machina' has interposed in favor of Baineer Madho. To this evidence I am inclined to give more weight than to scanty memoranda, which may have accumulated in the Office afterwards, and to assert that, decidedly hostile as the part he afterwards took, early in July he was still wavering, and was far from taking a step so decided as the assumption of chief authority in a district where he had little property, and where the perwannahs of a Government which was not, even nominally, a fortnight old, which was struggling not to be strangled by its own partisans, and which (above all) was nearly two hundred miles away, would not meet with much respect.

46. About July 12th, then, Mr. Venables found it necessary to go out with all his force (which now comprised about three hundred of the 65th N. I.) to attack the Pulwars at Koilsa. The attempt was unsuccessful; the enemy lost very few men; the gun carriage broke down, and the sepoys, clamouring for the furlough, which many claimed as then their due, retreated so precipitately that even the cowardice of the enemy could scarce save the gun from falling into their hands. Still, emboldened by their retreat, the rebels began their march on the city of Azimgurh; but advanced so slowly, that at noon on July 18th, they were still two miles from it, when Mr. Venables moved out to meet them. Fortunately he had that morning been reinforced by the return of the Civil Authorities to the station, accompanied by some ten officers marching to join the Goorhka force at Goruckpoor, twenty-five sowars of the 12th Irregulars, and Captain Catania with his hastily-raised, half-drilled, half-armed levy of 350 men from Benares; but the larger portion of the 65th N. I. who had been with him at Koilsa had returned to Ghazeepoor. At noon then he moved out, leaving Mr. Simson, the Joint Magistrate, with Captain Catania's levy to protect the Kutcherries and the breast works he had thrown up commanding the roads through the city; and posting some 800, recently entertained, matchlockmen under Native officers in different parts of the city to prevent any attack on that quarter. They found the enemy in great force
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strongly posted in groves, with his front covered by the high crops of season; then the Cavalry were useless, the effect of the fire was imperceptible; and at last (after the enemy had for a full hour from a distance of two hundred yards poured a thick hail of bullets on the exposed place, where the gun, &c., were posted without hitting a man) it was perceived that our right flank was rapidly being turned, and the retreat was sounded. The retreat soon became a flight; and had the city been a little more distant, there would have been as much apparent discipline in the pursuing rabble as in the flying troops. Order however was so far restored, that a vigorous street fight (in which the matchlock-men with the Tuhseeldar took no part) was maintained, and the Kutcherry was reached without loss. The rebels had suffered severely in the passage of the town; the grape tore ceaselessly through their dense array; the sepoys fought well behind the earth works; but not till after three hours' hard fighting, when a flank movement had been defeated by a charge of sowars, did they think of retreat. Still none felt confidence enough to leave his post, and the question of retreat to Ghazeepoor was discussed in a Council of War; but at last it was agreed, that till morning dawned no plan should be decided on; and morning brought with it the welcome news that the rebels were far away.

47. Welcome indeed was the news. No supplies were to be found; the whole country was up; and the sepoys, never over-fond of fighting, and at this time inclined against rather than for the side on which they were marshalled, positively declared they would not fight without being fed. Indeed had the Pulwars held their ground, it would have been difficult even to retreat safely to Ghazeepoor; and the question for the Council was, whether it was not absolutely necessary to retreat at once, rather than whether it was proper to retreat at all.

48. The flight of the enemy, and the distribution of some opportunely discovered grain, raised the spirit of the sepoys rapidly; and they were quite ready in the afternoon to assist at the execution of some of the rebels who were taken prisoners by the men of a village they had attempted to plunder in their flight. Our loss in that long battle was but seventeen men; the rebels lost at least 250. The Pulwars themselves at this time retreated quickly into their own country; but the roads on all sides were closed by the villagers, who would reap the profit of a battle, whose dangers or whose losses they had not dared to share.

49. In the ten days which passed between this attack and the second evacuation of Azimgurh (on July 28th) little was done. The eastern portion of the district, as before, obeyed passively; the western was in open rebellion; but the ill-will between the sowars and sepoys seemed likely to prevent any danger from within; and all were well contented to await the arrival of the two regiments of Gorkhias, who were to be sent to Azimgurh from the force which was expected to reach Goruckpoor by July 27th. News of their having reached Goruckpoor was expected on July 28th; but that day brought far different tidings. Two messengers arrived in hot haste, with the news that the 12th Irregulars had "gone" at Sigowlee; and as now none could doubt that the sowars of that Corps who were at Azimgurh would follow the example of the main body as soon as they heard of it, it was speedily decided to retire on Ghazeepoor.

50. Next morning a letter from Mr. Tucker arrived, telling also of the mutiny at Dinapoor, and bidding the officers act as might best ensure their own safety. An immediate departure was ordered, and the district formally and completely entrusted to the Raja. But the news that the city was again to be left to the mercy of any villains who might choose to plunder it, caused the deepest consternation; and when the march began, the troops were accompanied by a long line of carts in which the flying citizens were carrying away their most valued possessions. And this haste was not unreasonable. Scarcely had the troops turned their backs, when their lines were plundered: nay more, some of the officers' stores were violently taken by
the bad characters of the city from a strong guard of Catania’s levy in whose charge they were left. And some who took their part in that dreary march have told how evident the feelings of the people were as they stood by the roadside gazing on that long line, and looking like vultures who are not quite sure that their prey is dead enough to be attacked.

51. Arrived at Cheria Kote, where they were to halt awhile, the Europeans with the sepoys entered the pucka serral, barred the gate, and placed the loaded gun in front, leaving the sowars outside. When they resumed the march at 1 A.M., only thirty sowars were present; the rest said, these had gone away, but would, no doubt, return if Lieutenant Havelock would go to them. Happily this specious proposal was rejected, for we have since learnt from different sowars how coolly the wretched traitors had planned thus to get the Europeans from the bright bayonets which were then so ready and so secure a retreat, in order that they might enjoy the safe luxury of murder and of torture.

52. The march however was not to be accomplished without further trouble. A dāk from Ghazeepoor was opened, and a number of sepoys’ letters which it contained were without consideration distributed to the men. These brought them the news of the mutiny at Dinapoor. Their manner instantly changed. It had long been known that their Corps had determined to be guided by events at Dinapoor; but up to this moment their manner had been nearly as respectful as of old, but now they openly boasted that they would mutiny as soon as they reached Ghazeepoor, that they might join their friends from below. But the march was accomplished peaceably and happily. At head-quarters better counsels prevailed.

53. I have spoken above of the murder of Mr. Moore, of Mirzapore; and it is now time I should relate the events in that zillah, of which this murder is the most striking and important part.

54. On June 13th, a party of the 1st Madras Fusiliers arrived at Mirzapoor, and then it was proposed to disarm the 47th Native Infantry. Colonel Pott however did not think it necessary, and a party of them (with the Fusiliers) attacked and destroyed Goura, a village on the right bank of the Ganges near the Allahabad frontier. The inhabitants had been peculiarly daring, and now too prepared for resistance; but finding themselves attacked both by land and water (for the 47th had landed to take them in the rear), they fled. Still some of the leaders were taken and handed over to the Magistrate.

55. This little expedition and the destruction of a band of river dacoits by Mr. Walker (Deputy Collector) made the right bank of the river safe: the left bank was a far more difficult subject. Here in Pergunnah Bhadoee the Raja of Benares had inherited from his fathers large estates, from which the former Rajpoot owners had never been wholly uprooted. Early in June the head of this clan, Udwan Singh, assumed his ancestral title of Raja of Bhadoee, and appointed two Dewans. On the strength of this newly regained nobility, he collected a body of men of his own tribe, took “benevolences,” plundered his weaker neighbours, and soon grew strong enough to close the Trunk Road. I have above related how Mr. Chapman with some Europeans and Lieutenant Palliser’s sowars were sent to reopen it; and when they were at Gopeegunge, Moonshee Durshun Lall (the Agent of the Raja of Benares in those parts) delivered up this titular Raja and his Dewan, who had been captured by the Moonshee in some quiet, and probably not very creditable, way. They were of course at once tried by court-martial and hanged. Their people vowed vengeance. Unfortunately they argued that Mr. Moore, Joint Magistrate of Mirzapore, and so official Superintendent of the Raja of Benares’ wide domains, must for this very reason have been the chief cause of the execution; and so they chose him as the proper victim of their revenge.

56. On July 4th, he made a raid from Gopeegunge and arrested some prisoners, whom he brought to an indigo factory at Palee; the house was soon
surrounded by Joorthye Singh and a large body of men. Mr. Moore and the two managers of the factory were murdered in attempting to escape, and Mr. Moore's head carried off to be sold to the widow of Udwan Singh for the Rupees 300 she had promised for it. The bodies, however, were recovered by Lieutenant Woolhouse, and some of H. M. 's 64th, who hurried out from Gope-gunge that night. The Magistrate and some of the 47th N. I. arrived from Mirzapoor, and next day attacked the rebels; but the real murderers escaped both from him and also from an expedition of European troops, who went with Mr. Chapman to search them out.

57. Now the district was comparatively tranquil, and there are few events to chronicle; indeed the arrival of the fugitives from Nagode, of one hundred European troops from the eastward, and the return of the muskets of the 47th N. I. into store, are all that are thought worthy of mention even in the district report.

58. In the meanwhile (i.e., between the 16th June and 25th July) nothing of importance had occurred at Ghazeepoor; two or three villages behaved badly, and one was punished. This one (Chaura) had on June 21st attacked Mr. Matthews in his factory; and while he barely escaped with life, his property was plundered and destroyed: but after Mr. Bax with a party of Europeans and sowars had destroyed the village on July 7th, everything settled down to its usual state. Revenue came in as usual, and the chronic panic of the Ghazeepoor residents was subsiding, when on July 14th it was reported that Koour Singh was defying the Magistrate of Arrah, and carrying on intimate correspondence with the sepoys at Dinapoor. On July 27th, news of the Dinapoor mutiny was received, and every one at once prepared for the worst. And though the presence of an European detachment gave a little confidence to the officials of the station, their situation was far from pleasant; for the 65th Native Infantry, who had declared their intention of joining the Dinapoor men as soon as they should mutiny, were nearly all of them inhabitants of the district, so that a rising among them would be the signal for rising in the district, for active hostility to Government, and not mere quarrelling among villages as elsewhere. Still they stood in unstable loyalty: why, no one knows. And the news of the relief of Arrah (whither Mr. Bax had proceeded with Major Eyre's force), and the flight of Koour Singh, soon removed all ground of alarm. Here ends for the year the peaceful chronicle of Ghazeepoor. The quiet disarming of the 65th Native Infantry took away the last source of anxiety; the intrenchment of the opium factory provided a retreat in time of need; European detachments stationed there were an efficient guard; and nothing was left to the authorities but to devote themselves to their ordinary duties, and (a far more important business) the collection of stores and carriage which were all hurried westward to supply the European troops.

59. The mutiny at Sigowlee, which had caused the evacuation of Azimgurch, caused some alarm at Benares, and the prisoners were removed into a strong-walled enclosure near the College. The danger, however, soon passed away, and gave place to a more threatening one; for the Dinapoor mutineers were in full march on Benares. Their defeat at Arrah had not, however, at all increased their confidence; and having narrowly escaped from the force sent to prevent their passing the bridge at Nowbutpoor, they marched with all speed westward, doing what damage they could in their hasty flight. Unopposed by the cowardly servants of the Raja of Benares, they traversed the narrow defiles of Chuckea; and on August 11th poured down on the fair fields of Mirzapoor. Here feeling themselves safe from pursuit, they lingered several days; the plundering and ravaging with which they busied themselves made their progress very slow; and it was not till August 20th that they drew near to Mirzapoor. On that day, however, about seventeen miles from the city, they found themselves face to face with some three hundred of Her Majesty's 6th, who had been sent out against them. At the first fire, without noticing that their assailants were but a fourth their number, the rebels broke and fled; their
loss was not worth mention, and after plundering all the villages in a most
leisurely manner, they entered the Allahabad district on August 25th.

60. Slight as was the loss of the first body of mutineers in their
attempted advance on the city of Mirzapore, it sufficed to deter all others from
a similar attempt. The district, however, was less for unate. On August 14th
the little party of mutineers from Hazareebagh entered that pargannah which
lies south of the Soane. The passage of the Rahind they effected with the
aid of the Baja of Singrowlee; and after doing all the injury in their power
to the coal mines at Kotah, marched with a similar intention to those in
Rewah; but a rising of the country people prevented such wanton mischief.
Nor did Kouor Singh himself meet a more hospitable reception in that little
principality; for when (September 8th) on his plundering march through
Mirzapore he mounted the Rewah Ghats, he was forced to make a hasty
retreat, and continuing his march along the Deccan road, quitted the con-
fines of Mirzapore.

61. I have now reached a point of time when it becomes an easy task
to close my narrative, as far as Benares itself is concerned. From this date
there is nothing to relate. Months after this date one event occurred, to which
I shall have occasion to refer; meanwhile there was less to mark the flight
of time even than in common years. Benares assumed the appearance of a
vast military storehouse, and the chief
were forwarded, and the best means of
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near the eastern end of the city, caused the Pulwars to seek safety in
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I will proceed to tell of events in
Messrs. Venables and Legge. The southern and eastern parts
of time even than in common years. Benares assumed the appearance of a
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were forwarded, and the best means of
collectors.

62. Thus my task now centres on the three Zillahs of Azimgurh,
Jounpoor, and Mirzapore. This history of the third I have already brought
up to the beginning of September; the history of the second only recommences from that date; and, as the first was re-occupied a few days sooner,
I will proceed to tell of events in that district from July 25th. Then all was
confusion. The old material for a committee of safety no longer existed, as
the Nazir and Sershtadar had gone to Ghazepoor with or soon after the
European Officers. The police, save at Nagra and Mohomdabad, left their
posts, and soon after the hurried advance of the Sigowlee mutineers had
taken them beyond the limits of the district, the Pulwars under Pirtheepal
Singh came down in great force on the city. Here they levied a contribution of Rupees 10,000, and remained from the 9th to the 25th August, when the
arrival of the Goruckpoor Officers with Colonel Wroughton, and the Goorkhas
near the eastern end of the city, caused the Pulwars to seek safety in flight.
During all this time the thannah and Tehsil business at Nagra and
Mohomdabad was most creditably conducted by the native officers of those
places, but their example was not imitated at any other post.

63. The Goorkhas then arrived in Azimgurh in August 26th; and on
September 3rd, the Judge and Magistrate of Azimgurh joined them with
Messrs. Venables and Legge. The southern and eastern parts of the district
speedily settled down; the northern and western demanded more active
measures. And indeed though Moozuffur Jehan and his Rajoomars remained
quiet at Mahool, the Pulwars of Atrowlia had no idea of patiently awaiting
attack. Accordingly, after hovering about for some days, their leader,
Bainee Madho, announced on September 15th his encampment with a large
force at Mudonee, but nine miles from the station, by firing a salute.

64. This insolence was not long unpunished; for on the 20th, Mr.
Venables with a large force of Goorkhas, under Captain Boileau, surprised and
routed the rebels, killing some three hundred of them, and capturing three
guns. Bainee Madho himself took refuge in his own fort at Atrowlia; but
hearing a few days later that the Goorkhas were again advancing, fled precipi-
titely into Oudh, and his stronghold was for the next two months occupied
by the native officers whom he had before taken there as prisoners.
65. Nor were the Pulvars the only rebels who made trial of the Goorkha power; for Mr. Bird, Joint Magistrate, led them out against Mahool, on his way burnt the forts of Shumshabad and Baranudpoor (the property of Moozaffur Jehan and Pirtheepal Singh), and finding Mahool evacuated, put the police in possession; and this second expedition, nominally at least, restored the sovereignty of the British Government over the whole district of Azimgurh.

66. Affairs in Jounpoor progressed less rapidly. The Goorkhas arrived on September 8th; next day they were joined by Messrs. Lind, Jenkinson, and Turner (Magistrate and his Assistants), and a few days later by Messrs. Astell and Carnegy (the Judge and Deputy Collector). The first care of course was the reorganization of the Police force. The Thannah of Julalpoor alone had held out without intermission, and that of Kerrakut had been re-established by Rai Hingun Lall immediately on his recent appointment as Deputy Magistrate of Jounpoor. The force of all the other Thannahs was considerably increased, and arranged as seemed most prudent; but with strict orders not to advance beyond their posts. The Thannahdar of Khutgurh saw fit to disobey these orders, but was speedily driven back with some loss.

67. Several days of quiet working now ensued, varied only by the despatch of a reinforcement for the threatened garrison of Azimgurh; but at midnight of September 27th, a strong force marched on Mobarukpoor, the stronghold of the rebel Raja Iradut Jehan, the would-be Naib Nazim of Jounpoor. Nor did they find him unprepared. His house had been strengthened; his retainers summoned, and he opened the contest by firing on the advancing troops. The guns were at once brought to the front, and their persuasive eloquence soon induced a surrender. Iradut Jehan and another Chief (Fusahut Jehan) were taken, tried by court-martial, and hanged.

69. Next day about half the force was sent to Adumpoor to destroy a little fort, the home of Umur Singh. Fortunately this individual (who shortly after Mr. Lind's arrival was reported to be preparing a combined attack on Jounpoor itself) had just returned to send his valuables to a safe place; and in the fight which now ensued he was killed with some fifty of his men. Two of the chief rebels of this district had just been cut off, and the others who had assembled in the neighbourhood escaped a battle by flight.

70. Though Mulik Mehndee Buksh had driven in the Police of Kutgurh, the Magistrate had promised to pardon him on his surrender; but as he had not seen fit to accept these terms, on October 2nd his property was confiscated. The Magistrate did not loiter at Munihur, but leaving a small party of Roostum Sah's levy in charge, at once returned to camp; but hearing that an attack on the little garrison was being planned, he hastened back with a reinforcement. The report was false; he again returned to camp, and on October 5th, the whole force moved back to Jounpoor.

71. A few days after these events, Colonel Wroughton was ordered to proceed with the larger part of the force to aid in attacking some rebels in the Allahabad district; but he had scarce left the station, when news so alarming arrived that Mr. Lind urged him to return. He at once complied, and on October 15th again the force marched toward the Oudh frontier. Some rebels of little note had been attacking the frontier police stations, and the country was wholly disorganized; but the most threatening news was that the Nazim, Mehdeez Hussain, had collected some 5,000 men near Sultanpoor, and was meditating an attack on Jounpoor.
72. Encamping at Singra Mow on October 19th, the army was met by the intelligence that Hussun Yar, the Chuckladar, had invaded the district with some 1,500 men (of whom 600 were new levies and the rest matchlock-men), and was then encamped some four miles off at Koodhooa, in the hope of coercing Dewan Ranjeet Singh of that place. Orders were at once given for an attack; but Rundheer Singh of Singra Mow had assembled a large force in the rear, with very questionable intentions. He was seized after a good deal of trouble, but a large body of his followers continued hovering on the left flank. The force advanced cautiously through the high crops, but the enemy had not expected to be attacked so speedily, and had only commenced his preparations for defence on hearing of the advance from Singra Mow. He therefore offered little serious resistance, was routed with great slaughter, and after a flight so precipitate that even the fort of Chanda was left empty, joined Mehdoo Hussun in his camp at Hussunpoor.

73. On the march to Singra Mow many sepoys going on leave had been seen, and among the slain at Koodhooa were some of these very men. Of their willingness to co-operate with the rebels then there could be no doubt; and as it was well known that the rebel Nazim was doing his utmost to rally his forces, Mr. Lind considered it necessary to hasten in person the advance of Colonel Longden's force from Jounpoor. Scarcely had Mr. Lind left the camp when news arrived that the rebels, were collecting in great force beyond Chanda, their vanguard holding that fort. Further delay was deemed unadvisable; and early on the morning of the 30th, 1,100 Goorkhas and two guns moved out against them. A march of eleven miles brought them to Koeripoor, only a mile or so from the enemy; but the frequent topes and high rain crops covered his front so completely, that the attack was planned solely on native reports of his position. These proved most accurate; a heavy artillery fire of half an hour was followed by a charge of the Goorkhas; the enemy's guns were taken, and the battle was won. Then only was it apparent how great the odds had been; for the Goorkhas, accustomed to an entirely different style of fighting, had met an enemy four times their number covered with heavier and more numerous artillery in the hands of trained gunners. Yet the victory was not dearly purchased; the enemy had suffered heavily, had lost their chief leaders and their guns; twelve men killed, and fifty-nine wounded, was all the price the victors had to pay.

74. This period at Mirzapoor had been less eventful. Lieutenant Buckley, who had evacuated Goopunge when the Dinapore mutineers entered the district, returned after a single night's absence; and early in September, when Koour Singh was marching down the Deccan road, the parts of Allahabad and Mirzapoor, on the left bank of the Ganges, were entrusted to Mr. Mayne, late Magistrate of Banda. This appointment, though unprecedented, was rendered necessary by the position of affairs; the energy of Mr. Elliott, an unsurpassed civilian, who had been posted at Goopunge, and indeed was not removed, could ill make up for his want of experience, and the overburdened Magistrates of Allahabad and Mirzapoor were thus relieved from a part of their charge, which was very troublesome from the restlessness of its inhabitants, and very important from being traversed through its whole length by the Great Trunk Road.

75. The Dinapore mutineers, after leaving Mirzapoor, threatened Nagode. On their nearer approach, Major Hampton (on September 15th) destroyed the magazine, and sent the ladies away. Next day the regiment (60th Native Infantry) mutinied, but without violence, and 240 of the men accompanied their officers to Rewah. The position of the fugitives at this place was critical: threatened on all sides by powerful enemies, there was no place to which they could look for help. Happily none of the rebel force advanced; a small party of volunteers from Mirzapoor escorted the fugitives to that station in safety; a strong reinforcement of Madrassees arrived; and when on September 28th the remainder of the 50th Native Infantry reached Mirzapoor, they were at once ferried over to the northern bank, disarmed, and sent on leave.
76. The district was now rapidly settling down. October passed tranquilly. A rumoured advance of Madras-sees from Mirzapoor drove some mutineers who had crossed the Sone in a hasty flight to the southward: an attack (by Mr. Elliott) with some Sikhs and the Benares Police levy, on two notorious villages in the north-west of the district, was completely successful. Some slight movements of the Madras-sees overawed the restless spirits of Rewah; and on October 27th, the Madras troops were recalled. Still comparatively peaceful was the state of affairs; it was thought more prudent to send the guns and stores of the intrenchment to the complete security of Chunar.

77. But little space is now required in order to bring up the history of events in the district of Azimgurh to the end of 1858.

78. The newly-recovered authority over the whole of Azimgurh (of which I told above) was rudely threatened by powerful enemies on two sides. Mr. Pollock (then officiating as Magistrate) made private overtures to the one party (the Pulwars); and, while they were hesitating in surprise, hurried to meet the other. The latter (the Gourkpoor rebels) had collected in great force at Burhel, and was preparing a descent on Azimgurh; but when a vigorous cannonade from gun under Mr. Ross, C.S., drove the enemy from his strong position on the northern bank, a party crossed and cut out the flotilla there collected for the passage of the Goora. The broad river was a better rampart for his district than any engineer could build; so having charged the leading Zemindars with the protection of Douree Ghaut, Mr. Pollock returned well satisfied to Azimgurh.

79. Here learning that the hesitation of the Pulwars was chiefly caused by a doubt of their reception, he determined on a tour through their country. Thus, marching with a force sufficient to crush any attempt at resistance, he passed through the Rajkoomar country, punishing these people on his road, and destroying their chief holds; and then at Koilsa met the Chiefs of the Pulwars in a friendly manner. The fruits of this policy have been conspicuous ever since; for neither when the rebels came down early in November, nor when Koor Singh besieged Azimgurh in April last, did a single Pulwar Chief raise a hand for their aid.

80. With the former of these two events I will close my tale. Early in November the rebels in great force occupied the fort of Arowlia. A call for aid from Jouinpoor met a speedy response in the march of Colonel Longden with a strong force on that place. Night fell on November 9th, before an attack was considered prudent; and by next morning the enemy had evacuated the fort, removing their wounded, but leaving behind three guns. Three days sufficed for the destruction of the fort; Colonel Longden returned to Jouinpoor, and Azimgurh was quiet for the year. Even the alarm caused by the threatening attitude of the rebels in the end of November did not cause the frontier police to quit their posts, though the civil officers were in readiness to leave the district, and the Raja of Gopalapoor was quite able to defend the marches of Oudh till the arrival of Colonel Longden with his little army in the last days of December, took away all fear of attack from that quarter.

81. Once more the scene changes to Jouinpoor. After the battle of Chanda (of which I told before) the force at Singra Mow was amused with reported dissension among the rebels. The only apparent effect of this dissension was to cause them to assemble again more rapidly. Roostum Sah was compelled to join the rebel force; but all the efforts of the Rajpoor Chiefs could not stir the cowardly nature of the Nazim to a speedy attack.

82. On November 22nd Colonel Longden returned from destroying Arowlia, and the whole army marched out to Singra Mow. Here all sorts of rumours reached them; an official from Uldemow was in the rebels' camp; an attack was to be made in force at night; an attack was to be made in two columns by day; Moozaffur Jehan, Mullik Mehndee Buksh, and every rebel of note was lending his aid to the Nazim. At all events the rebel army
(which had increased from 10,000 on November 22nd to 16,000 on November 28th) now began to advance cautiously; and the English army, after the question had been fully debated in a Council of War, retired on Jounpoor. The budmashes at once flocked together; the frontier police were driven in; the Rajpoot levies were able to do but little against dacoits, whose leaders were in the service of the chief rebels. Still Pandit Kishen Narain did good service in the north in checking the progress of the enemy, till on December 24th Mukundoom Buksh (Agent of Irudut Jehan) attacked him with a large force at Tighra. The treasure and the records had previously been removed from the Tehsildare; and the Pandit, after resisting bravely for some days, was obliged to retreat by night to Jounpoor.

83. On January 4th news was brought that part of a large body of rebels, who had collected near the frontier of Oudh, were threatening the newly re-established thanannah of Badlapoor, ever a favourite point of attack with the rebels of Oudh as being the furthest outpost of the English power. As General Franks was now planning a simultaneous advance from three points into Oudh, no aid was to be got from him; but the rebels were thoroughly kept in check by Raja Moheshnarain and his levies, and no further occasion for military support occurred till after General Franks' final departure from the Jounpoor district on February 19th.

84. A few days before this last date an event occurred in Benares, which requires a brief record in this report. Twenty-six sepoys, under sentence of transportation for life, were confined in the Benares Jail, and under the pressure of circumstances were employed in grinding corn. On February 8th, two of them having taken the ground corn to the storehouse, seized one a sword, the other a lattee, which had been lying there for many years. Thus armed, they marched past the sentries into the outer court; but having cut down the Jemadar, who tried to seize them, ran back to their comrades. The whole twenty-six now rushed out with three other prisoners, and made their escape. The Europeans and sepoys were now summoned, and search and pursuit was carried on so vigorously and successfully that all the sepoys and one of the other run-aways were captured and shot, or hanged, the same night or the next morning. Apathetic and cowardly as natives in general are, yet in this instance, the Jail Guard of Benares showed these noble qualities so eminently, that it is hard not to suspect on their part that fellow-feeling for the criminals which is said to make us wondrous kind.

85. The little band of rebels, who had from time to time been traversing the Mirzapoor district, met neither resistance nor aid from the people. The supplies which were necessary for their support, the valuables which excited their cupidity, the horses which could facilitate their march, they ever took without scruple; but they were guilty of no wanton destruction of private property, though all Government property and schools were fair game.

86. On December 16th, a Thannadar and Jemadar were murdered at Marwar, a village on the borders of Rewah. Though he seems to have provoked his fate, it was necessary to make on example of the criminals. The murderers themselves had escaped into Rewah, but a heavy fine was levied on the village before the Magistrate left it to proceed to Bijeygurh.

87. The condition of this pergunnah requires a brief retrospect. The Raja of Bijeygurh, Chief of a family of Chaudel Rajpoots long seated in that district, died, leaving a Ranee and a daughter. The latter was betrothed to a brother of the Raja of Kuntit; and when in October 1837, a portion of the property had been transferred to this child, the marriage was completed. Luchmuan Sing, the nearest male heir of the deceased Raja, who had unsuccessfully contested, first the succession to the Raj, and then the division of the property, looked with no favour on the interference of his new relative in the pergunnah. Accordingly he called to his aid some mutineers from Shalubad, proclaimed himself Raja, and began collecting revenue; the Tehsildar, going to summon him to Mirzapoor, was obliged to fly for his
life; but when the Magistrate approached, the mutineers with about a hundred others retired to a jungle near Rohatsgurh. At dawn on January 9th, after a long night march, Mr. Tucker attacked them in their retreat with complete success; several were killed, several more captured and hanged at Benares; considerable booty recovered, and the remainder of the mutineers driven across the Soane.

88. Their Chandel leaders, however, had escaped into Rewah, and again with the help of a Raja of their own caste, made an incursion into the territory of their successful rival. Again, Mr. Tucker came out against them, and having driven them back into Rewah moved to Gahurwar, the fort of the Raja of Singrowle. This noble was at this time at his Rewah residence, whether he suffered no messenger to come; and his professions of loyalty were rather belied by the reports constantly received of the warlike preparations in which he was engaged, of the fortifications of his house, and of his intercourse with the rebels of Pergunnah Bijegurh.

89. So leaving the fort of Bijegurh in the charge of the servants of the Raja of Benares, Mr. Tucker returned to Mirzapoor to quit it again after no long interval for a Commissionership in Oudh. Mr. Mayne also left to resume his charge at Banda, so that the district was left in its former state. The departure of the 47th Native Infantry for China, leaving behind in their lines arms never issued to them by Government, and the brief raid of Jodihye Sing on the north-western portion of the district, are the only other events I have to record.

90. My task draws to a close. Of Goruckpoor I have said nothing; its history employs the able hand of its own Commissioner. The events in this division up to the final restoration of peace may employ some other pen after no long period. I would hope meanwhile I have told as briefly as might be of the early days of the mutiny; and I have carried on my tale, for Benares and Mirzapoor to the middle of the present year, for the peace of these districts seems for the present established. I have told of Jounpoor up to the times when its great garrison marched out to other fields and other victories, leaving it (not indeed at peace but) untroubled by foes from without. But of Azimgurh and Ghazeepoor what is there not left to tell? At the end of 1857, they were resting in full assurance of peace to be awakened suddenly to an anarchy more lasting and more trying than in the gloomy months which had passed away—an anarchy which seems no nearer an end than it did when it had just begun.

91. Thus I commenced the history of this division, from those days in 1857 when stations though "going" were not yet "gone." I bring it to a close when four acts of that great drama "The rebellion in India" have been played out, and the fifth, "The Retribution," may speedily conclude with the punishment of the guilty head, and the pardon of the erring hands.

JOUNPOOR,

The 16th October 1858.

(Sd.) ROBERT TAYLOR,


SUPPLEMENT TO THE NARRATIVE OF EVENTS, &C., IN THE BENARES DIVISION.

In commencing (willingly enough) a supplement to the narrative I have already prepared, I must remark that my task, though apparently of much less magnitude, is really no less laborious. Before I had furnished to me from each district a separate narrative, carefully arranged, compiled from the best authorities, and illustrated by any subsequent information the passing months had brought to light; now I have merely disjointed weekly notices, undigested and uncorrected. Nor is it the least of any difficulties that I must prepare this paper in a space of time barely sufficing for a careful perusal of the reports I have to condense. Little pretensions as my former narrative
had to any grace of style, the present one will have even less; and I shall have done my work well if the reader do not find any important event misstated or omitted. Nor can I leave unnoticed the fact (and it adds much to the difficulties under which I labour) that more than one important paper is alluded to (in the notes I have at hand) as submitted in original to Government, and not returned.

But to proceed. To the history of Mirzapoor and Benares, I have no more to add. A few lines in their proper place will tell all there is left to tell of the history of Jounpoo; and my work is mainly confined to the unsatisfactory annals of Azimgurch and Ghazeepoor,—annals which tell rather of a flame dying out, than of a flame extinguished.

The beginning of the year, then found Mr. Brereton, Magistrate of Ghazeepoor, in Jung Bahadoor's camp, threatening the rebel force in Goruckpoor. The speedy flight of the Nazim from that station, and the consequent abandonment by the rebels of several posts they had hitherto held, relieved Azimgurch for the moment of any pressure from that quarter; but before the end of the month the steps taken to facilitate the advance of our forces into Oudh, and the steps taken by the rebels to oppose this advance, had had the singular effect of leaving the marches of Azimgurch threatened by strong bodies of rebels, and unprotected by any British force. In the face of this more pressing danger, the descent of the vassals of Oodrake Singh and Mozuffer Jehan on their old lands excited no attention. Sunday brought a rumour that Mehddee Hussun, the would-be Nazim of Jounpoo, would gather in Azimgurch the laurel he had not dared to seek at home. On Tuesday it was Mahummud Hussun would try whether the open field were more favourable to his genius than the earthworks of Goruckpoor. Wednesday again came news that Mân Sing was coming down to sweep Azimgurch into the Ganges.

On Friday Mân Sing had preferred the less daring task of defending the passage of the Gogra against the Goorkhas from the east: and Sunday at last dawned with the soothing news that, though in very truth Mân Sing had come to Fyzabad, it was not to oppose our Nepalese allies, but to find (if it might be) among their ranks one who would plead to the British Government that the English folk he had saved in the early days of the mutiny were a fair set-off against the many noble hearts which through his treachery had found a grave in Oudh. But aided by the first steamer that ever plied on the waters of the Gogra, the army crossed safely, and for the time we hear no more that Azimgurch is threatened. A month later, the authorities of that district, instead of being threatened from the frontier, are beleaguered in their own jail.

Kooer Sing, flying from Lucknow, entered the northern part of Azimgurch. Colonel Milman, moving out to oppose him, drove his advanced guard out of Atrowlia, and carried on the pursuit up to the main body. But he subsequently fell back, abandoning both baggage and stores, on Azimgurch. Mr. Davies urged Colonel Dames, but without success, to defend the passage of the town, a plan the adoption of which had caused the Pulwars so severe a loss in July, and the value of which he himself found when after many delays on Saturday, March 27th, he attempted a sortie, and had to retire, leaving one of the best officers of his Corps behind him on the field.

The reliefs thrown in from Ghazeepoor warned the sepoys of the advantage they were letting slip in not destroying the bridge over the Tonse. The Madras Rifles hindered this work one day, and the next Lord Mark Kerr forced his way into the intrenchments, inflicting on the rebels a chastisement so severe that they suffered Colonel Cumberlege to bring in a convoy without opposition, though they had made great preparations to prevent his advance.

The siege of Azimgurch was now at an end. On April 15th, Sir E. Lugard arrived to its relief. After a brief resistance at the bridge, the enemy fled hastily along the Burhul road. They were closely followed up, and in this pursuit Mr. Venables received the wound which cost him his life. Down the
right bank of the Gogra via Byrecah to the Ganges, the flight and pursuit continued with unabated spirit. At Ameer Khas on the Gogra, Brigadier Douglas chastised the rear guard severely, capturing much carriage. But the main body far out-marched the British force, and Colonel Cumberlege's slow advance, the boats supplied by the loyal zemindars of Shahabad, and the shallowness of the water, made the Ganges but a slight obstacle to their flight. Indeed, they would have effected the passage without any suffering, but for the timely presence of the Megna gun-boat, whose well directed guns caused no small loss among the fugitives, and above all inflicted on Koour Singh that wound which speedily rid us of the only foeman worthy of our steel, and deprived the enemy of the only leader who has displayed throughout the rebellion either skill or courage.

The sepoys were safe away in the jungles of Jugdeespoor. But they had left a wide wake behind. Eastern Ghazeepoor was up. Far from the Sudder station, unpierced by roads, bounded by two great rivers, by crossing either of which the fugitives would be in another province, and under another law, that district seemed marked out for an Alsatia. But a few years back at one time twenty proclaimed offenders were living openly in a single village. From another, did any evil chance lead thither any servant of Government, he thought himself happy to escape with a broken head. Did fickle fate at length give up any inhabitant of a third to the strong grasp of the law, he might with perfect truth write in the first line of his defence that river dacity was the trade whereby he earned his daily bread. Why such a country had not risen before, is one of the most perplexing and not least interesting problems the mutiny has left us to solve. There, too, were the homes of many sepoys who had fled back to their hearths with halters round their necks. These men served as rallying points and leaders to their neighbours and clansmen. Still the gathering at Jugdeespoor for the time relieved Ghazee­poor, and the rebellion was a passive rather than an active one. In the middle of May, Mr. Probyn succeeded in persuading Colonel Cumberlege to advance on the village of Burragaon without waiting for a siege train. It was found empty, and the victorious General, having destroyed the houses of those who had been chiefs in the revolt, marched back to Ghazee­poor.

Azimgurh, meanwhile, continued much disturbed. Seriously threatened, as it was time after time, from Tanda; conterminous to a very large extent with Goruckpoor, which contained more rebels than faithful subjects; traversed night after night by larger or smaller parties of sepoys flying from Oudh to their new rallying point in Shahabad; that the district should remain peaceful or in good order, was not to be expected. Twice did Furgun Sing successfully attack the Thannah of Maharajgunge, and it was only after a long and hard fight that he retired from the Tehsildaree of Koelsa. But matters were still worse when the sepoys, driven from their refuge at Jugdeespoor, were flying back to their old haunts in Oudh. A fourth plundering of Maharaj­gunge, a third attack on the Tehsildaree of Koelsa, and the murder of the Thannadar of Bhurowlie, are hardly events we should expect to see recorded as having happened in so central a district twelve months after the mutiny broke out, and four months after the great focus of disaffection had fallen again into our hands.

Ghazee­poor fared much worse. Azimgurh was but a district to fly through; Ghazee­poor a district to plunder. Every building south of the Ganges, which belonged either to Government or to any European, was plundered and burnt; every person who had served either was tortured and murdered. Then they crossed to the northern bank, and the Tehsildaree of Sydpoor on the Benares road was soon the only post un­abandoned and undes­stroyed. Colonel Cumberlege and his force were unable to offer any effectual check. A threatened attack on Sydpoor in the end of June was prevented by a force sent from Benares, and the rebels driven northward. Still little was gained by a momentary dispersal of the mutineers. The sepoys themselves were residents of the district; wherever they went they found followers ready
to their hand, who disappeared again the moment their leaders moved away. The cruelties inflicted on the police who fell into the hands of the rebels had thoroughly cowed a body never over brave. In short, no language can describe too strongly the utter disorganization of the whole district at the end of June.

Early in July Mr. Bax, the Magistrate, marched out to Bulliah. The rebels had broken down a bridge on the road, but did not venture to contest the advance. Bulliah too was found empty, and Mr. Probyn was left there with a garrison of Sikhs; soon dividing his troops he marched towards the confluence of the Ganges and Gogra. The rebels, coming down in great force, besieged the little party at Bhyreeah; but finding themselves no nearer success after a siege of several days had marched off to surprise Bulliah, when Brigadier Douglas' advance raised the siege and drove the rebels northward. And as Major Havelock's rapid advance drove the rebels for a time out of the zillah, the Cis-Gangetic pergunnahs gradually settled down, but on the southern bank the Tehsildaree of Zamaniah was the only post left in our hands. Meanwhile (i.e., up to August 14th) Azimgurh was tolerably tranquil. Purgun Sing still kept hovering about the northern portion frontier, and when the Sikhs marched from Nagra to raise the siege of Bhyreeah, the Tehsildaree of Koelsa was again abandoned. A week later, a party of rebels marched to Nagra, and threatened the peace of Ghazeepoor. Finding themselves powerless, they doubled back to Ghosee, and fled into Goruckpoor (the only path left open to them) just as the remnants of Sidha Sing's party managed to escape observation and fly into Shahabad.

Henceforth the history of Azimgurh is perfectly eventless. The northern frontier, constantly threatened, was never actually crossed, and the advance of Colonel Kelly, in the middle of October, relieved it even from the apprehension of danger. Nor is the history of Ghazeepoor much more interesting. Bulliah still unsettled; the Trans-Gangetic pergunnahs still in revolt; the steamer Benares doing good service; is the sum of every weekly report up to the middle of October; but before the end of the months, a strong party was posted at Burragaon, and the enemy driven from Ghazeepoor.

The Jounpooor supplement is brief and simple enough. Some large parties of rebels (under Gholam Hossein and Mehndee Hossein), who collected in the northern and western parts of the district after the fall of Lucknow, were attacked and dispersed by Sir E. Lugard. A raid made by Joorhye Sing in May on the Muchleeshuhr and Mirzapoor districts, was defeated by combined movements made against him from all sides, the people of Muchleeshuhr themselves defending their houses till he fled. There is no more to tell. The bands of robbers collected by Dirgpaul Sing, near Badshapoor, are not worthy of the name of rebels; and that leader himself, like Sungram Sing, his Murreeahoo brother in arms, though terrible enough to the unsuspecting peasantry, and troublesome enough from perpetually re-appearing, evinced no wish to face even a Thannadar.

At last my work is done. The brief time allowed me permits no corrections or improvements: the paper must go forth as it sprang first from the pen. Had I had more time, my tale, though not more polished, had surely been more terse.

CAMP GHISWA,  
The 19th November 1858.  
(Sd.)  R. TAYLOR,  
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS ATTENDING THE OUTBREAK OF DISTURBANCES AND THE
RESTORATION OF AUTHORITY IN THE DISTRICT OF GORUCKPOOR, IN 1857-58.

No. 196, dated Goruckpoor, 5th July 1858.

From—C. WINGFIELD, Esq., Commissioner of Goruckpoor,

To—WILLIAM MUIR, Esq., Secretary to the Government, North-Western Province.

I HAVE the honor to forward the Narrative of the Outbreak of Disturbances in this district as called for in your Circular No. 212.

2. It has been compiled from an official Narrative or rather Journal by the former Magistrate, Mr. Paterson, kept up to the 30th June 1857, from a memorandum of events extending over the same period drawn up at the time by Mr. Wynyard, the Judge, and from a history of events subsequent to the above date, furnished by the present Officiating Collector, Mr. Bird, and from what my personal knowledge has enabled me to add. These authorities have been much abridged by me, for many circumstances which had importance at the time possess too little interest now to deserve to be placed on record.

3. The Chief European Civil and Military authorities at Goruckpoor, when the mutinies began at Meerut and Delhi were:

Mr. W. Wynyard, Judge.
Mr. W. Paterson, Magistrate.
Mr. F. Bird, Joint-Magistrate.

Captain Steel, Commanding detachment 17th Native Infantry. The troops consisted of 2½ Companies 17th Native Infantry, 1½ Resales 12th Irregular Cavalry.

4. Mr. Wynyard early assumed the powers of a Commissioner, that the Magistrate might be enabled to act with promptitude, and this proceeding on his part was approved by the Commissioner Mr. Tucker.

5. It appears that up to the 25th May the district remained tranquil, and the only cause of anxiety arose from the conduct of the 17th N. I. at Azimgurh, of which corps many men had refused to take the old cartridge. The authorities of this station being desirous of getting rid of as many of the sepoys as possible, decided on sending off the surplus treasure (that was already under orders for remittance) with an escort of 125 men of the 17th Native Infantry to Azimgurh. It left on the 29th and reached safely.

6. By the end of the month several precautionary measures had been taken. The Jail guard and district police were strengthened, and the Government proclamations on the mutinies were widely distributed.

7. At this time the ill-affected and turbulent began to commit acts of violence. The zamindars of the notorious village of Fynah plundered boats on the Gogra, and the Nurhurpore Raja's followers drove the police from the Burhul Ghat station, and liberated a gang of fifty prisoners working there. They also took possession of the ferry, and stopped the Azimgurh post.

8. On the 5th arrived the news of the head-quarters 17th Native Infantry having mutinied at Azimgurh, seized the treasure, and burnt the station. The Civil and Military authorities immediately assembled and harangued the troops at this station. Those who wished it were offered their discharge, but all refused, and expressed their readiness to die for the Government.

9. From this date to the 15th all communication ceased with Benares and the North-Western Provinces.

10. On the 7th the convicts made a desperate effort to break out of Jail, but were repulsed by a volley from the Jail guard, which dropped twenty of them.

11. On the 8th a decided attempt was made by the infantry to seize the treasure. The Soobadar of the treasury guard, on pretence of being
afraid of the zemind'aree levies, called out for the protection of the station, sent, without intimation, to Captain Steel, to the lines, for a reinforcement. The sepoys got under arms, their drums beating the advance, when Mr. Wynyard, who had been forewarned, arrived on the scene with the Irregular Cavalry, whose firm attitude overawed the sepoys, and made them abandon their design.

12. On the 9th a cunningly devised scheme was frustrated. The Soobadar of the treasury guard denounced a Mohurir of the Judge's Court as having proposed to him to release the prisoners. But the authorities saw this was a device to enable the Mohurir to get access to the prisoners and arrange another outbreak, which, aided by the sepoys, should be more successful than the last. He reckoned on being sent to Jail, and as certainly on a speedy release; but he was disappointed, for he was confined in a separate building. The authorities, however, did not feel strong enough then to dispose of him as he deserved. I have never doubted the denunciation of spies, which, with the sepoys in Oudh, invariably preceded breaking out into mutiny, was a device to throw dust in our eyes, which too often succeeded.

13. On the 10th six European officers, who had escaped from Fyzabad, were inhumanly murdered by the Mahomedan population of Mahooa Daber, a village in the Nuggur pergunnah: the village was subsequently burnt to the ground by Mr. Peppe, Deputy Magistrate, and a party of the 13th Irregular Cavalry; at the same time Colonel Lennox and family, fugitives from the same place, were sheltered, and probably saved from destruction, by Mahomed Hussun, the same who afterwards set himself up as ruler of this district. Two patrols near Amorha were also saved by Mirza Ali Hussun, who has since gone into open rebellion against us.

14. A small detachment of the 17th Native Infantry at Bustee plundered the opium treasury there, and went off without injuring the European residents.

15. About this time it was in contemplation to send Mr. Bird, Joint-Magistrate, to recover Azimghur, which was represented to be perfectly free from disturbances, and the population anxious for the return of the British officers, but the plan was dropped, owing to increasing disorder in this district.

16. On the 19th Captain Boileau and four other officers, who had escaped from Gonda and Secora, in Oudh, and passed a few days at Bansee, arrived at Goruckpoor, and next day proceeded to Ghazeepoor with the ladies of this station, under an escort of sowars and matchlock men furnished by the Bansee Raja.

17. About this time martial law was proclaimed throughout the district, and several European gentlemen engaged in commerce were made Deputy Magistrates: two police battalions of 360 men each were ordered to be raised. On the 30th, 200 Goorkhas from Palpa, in the Nipal Terai, arrived at the station.

18. The northern and western pergunnahs were at this time utterly disorganised. The Gyoutum Rajpoots, under the instigation, and some times under the personal command of the Raja of Nuggur, everywhere rose and dispossessed the present proprietors of all the lands tradition assigned to their race. Most of the Amorha zemindars openly defied the Government officials, and proclaimed that our rule had given place to the "Nawabee;" while the Rajpoots of Pynah and the neighbouring villages, by their piracies, closed the navigation of the Gogra. At the same time it was known that frequent meetings were being held by the Rajas of Nurhurpore, Nuggur, Suttassee, and the Baboos of Pandepar and others, in which it had been decided to obtain assistance from Oudh.

19. On the 26th news reached of the murder of Major Holmes, by men of his regiment at Segowlee, and fearful of the effect this might have on the men of that corps here, Colonel Wroughton, who was within three marches of
the station with six regiments of Goorkhas, was requested to send one regiment on by forced march, which he did at once.

20. On the 29th he entered the station with the remaining regiments, and it was at once decided to disarm the remnant of the 17th Native Infantry, which was quietly effected on the 1st August. The senior Ressaldar of the 12th Irregulars, Mahomed Bux, who had accompanied Captain Wroughton from Segowlee, undertook, with the men on whom he could rely, mostly Punjabi Mussulmen, to disarm the suspected portion of his corps, deprecating the interference of the Goorkhas. He was allowed to have his way, and but for an unforeseen accident would have succeeded. Fifty men rode off on their horses, but were pursued by the loyal portion under the Ressaldar and Adjutant, who killed eight, besides wounding more, the heavy jungle that lies close to the station alone saved the mutineers from severer loss. The conduct of the Ressaldar was beyond all praise.

21. The troops from Segowlee, after murdering Major Holmes, marched by Seleimpoor, where they plundered and burnt the house of the Opium Agent, and attempted to carry off the treasure, but were prevented by the guard of fourteen men of the 17th Native Infantry, who brought it into the station.

22. Notwithstanding the arrival of the Goorkha troops, disorder spread rapidly through the district. On the 10th the Tehsil of Khuleelabad was plundered by rebels of this district, assisted by a party from Oudh, and on the same day the Baboo of Bukra expelled the police from that thanna, a crime which he has since expiated on the gallows. The Tehsil of Captaininguno similarly fell on the 12th into the hands of the rebels, among whom, Mahomed Hussun, made his appearance for the first time. On this occasion forty troopers of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, who had been sent for the protection of the Tehsil, went over to the rebels.

23. The Goorkha officers were most averse to detaching any portion of their troops into the interior of the district, and pleaded the necessity for giving them repose after their long and harassing march, generally ankle deep in mud and water from Segowlee. And in truth their sufferings had been great. Cholera, of which 150 died, having accompanied their camp the whole way, and great numbers besides being prostrated with fever. The Commander publicly stated that his force was reduced to the strength of four effective regiments.

24. The insurgents in the district and from Oudh were well aware of this state of things, and therefore the presence of so considerable a body of troops at the Sudder station failed to check them at all. Besides they stood in no great awe of the Goorkhas.

25. The reasons that led the civil authorities to decide on evacuating the district have been given at length. It will be sufficient to say that they declined to remain with less than four regiments, and the instructions of the officer in political charge of these troops did not warrant his leaving more than two.

26. The Europeans residing in the interior having been previously summoned into the station, the entire Goorkha force marched out on the 13th, taking the treasure six lakhs with it, and encamped on the road to Azimgbur; all the European and some Native officials accompanying.

27. By a resolution come to on that day, the management of the district was entrusted to a committee of five Rajas noted in the margin, of whom the Raja of Gopalpoor alone attended in person, Mr. Bird, the Joint-Magistrate, however, remained behind, hoping by the aid of the well-affected zemindars to preserve the district for Government, which everyone foresaw was a vain hope.

28. The prisoners were liberated from Jail on the 15th, agreeable to a previous resolution of the authorities. On the same day the Tehsil of Mun-
soorgunge was plundered by a party of rebels, and several thannas fell at the same time.

29. The insurgents under command of Mahomed Hussun followed the Goorkha army on the road to Azimghur, and at daybreak on the 18th attacked it while encamped at Gugha, about ten miles from the Gogra. The Goorkhas as soon as they could be formed up charged the enemy, and soon put them to flight, with a loss of at least 200 killed. Mahomed Hussun's palanquin was captured on this occasion.

30. After this the Goorkha army continued its march unmolested, and on the 22nd had crossed the Gogra into Azimghur.

31. Mr. Bird soon found how little dependence was to be placed on the men whom he had most relied on to support him, for of the whole Toman or Jail guard, a disciplined body of 150 men, only 17 would accompany him to break down a bridge-of-boats two miles from the station, over a branch of the Raptee, by which the rebels must cross.

32. The helplessness of the Raja of Gopalpoor soon became apparent also. He first attempted to enlist his relatives of the Nuggur family on the side of order, but failing, and meeting with no support in any quarter, left the station for his residence at Gopalpoor. He wished to take the treasure and Mr. Bird with him, but both these propositions, were rejected by Mr. Bird, unwisely, as I think, for it was plain he could not hold out many days, and it was the only way of saving the treasure from falling into the hands of the rebels. I dwell the more on this point, because I have always blamed the Raja for not taking away the treasure to Gopalpoor, and thus preserving it for the Government. But now Mr. Bird has openly stated in his narrative that he alone prevented this being done.

33. It must be observed that none of the other members of the committee of Rajas repaired to the station or entered upon the duties entrusted to them. The Committee, in short, never had practical effect. The Raja of Suttassee has since proved an active rebel, and was known to be deep in rebel counsels, but it was thought safer to admit him than to exclude him.

34. After the departure of the Raja of Gopalpoor, Mr. Bird did not long enjoy even the semblance of authority. The leading rebels at Goruckpoor insulted him with offers of protection, and of their good offices with Mahomed Hussun, while the Nuggur Raja's uncle placed a guard over his house. On the 20th Mahomed Hussun arrived at the other bank of the Raptee, opposite the city, and was welcomed by the agent of the Raja of Suttassee and the leading Mahomedan inhabitants. The Jail guard also joined him in a body. Mr. Bird saw it was time to consult his own safety, and on the same day retired into the forest to a distance of five miles. On the following day Mahomed Hussun made his public entry into the station.

35. Mr. Bird remained in his retreat the whole of the 22nd, when receiving information that Mahomed Hussun had set a reward of Rupees 5,000 on his head, he set out for Mootharee, which he reached in safety.

36. The first act of Mahomed Hussun after his assumption of power was to order all Government employes to enter his services on pain of punishment. None of the Deputy Collectors and only one Tehseeldar obeyed, but several Thannadars accepted him as their master. He maintained the existing fiscal and criminal jurisdictions to the great disgust of many of his partizans among the landholders, who objected that Thannadars were unknown under the "Nawabee" as the district had become. The decrees of the Civil Court were even executed on payment of half the amount adjudged.

37. The records were preserved, though his disorderly soldiery stripped off the cloth bundles and bindings of books for their own uses. From these documents, and the Canungoes who mostly joined him, he obtained full information of the demand due from each landholder.

38. The great proprietors, who early made their submission to him in person, received dresses of honor, salutes of guns, and were permitted to exercise
full civil and criminal authority within the limits of their respective estates, or what they claimed as such for obsolete titles, were revived. In return they furnished contingents to his army. The chief among these were the Rajas of Suttassee, Nuggur, Nurhurpoor, Burhyapoor, Nichloul, Shahpoor, the Babbos of Tigra, Pandepar, Khudowlee. The wealthy Mahomedan families of the town naturally were among the first to welcome him, and from them his officials were mostly selected. There was a Judge, a Collector, and Naib Nazim, Mooshurruf Khan, who, perhaps, enjoyed more real power than Mahomed Hussun himself.

39. Most of the bungalows were set on fire, but none of the masonry houses were injured except for obsolete titles, were revived. In return they furnished contingents to his army. The chief among these were the Rajas of Suttassee, Nuggur, Nurhurpoor, Burhyapoor, Nichloul, Shahpoor, the Babbos of Tigra, Pandepar, Khudowlee. The wealthy Mahomedan families of the town naturally were among the first to welcome him, and from them his officials were mostly selected. There was a Judge, a Collector, and Naib Nazim, Mooshurruf Khan, who, perhaps, enjoyed more real power than Mahomed Hussun himself.

40. Large sums of money were extorted by violence or threats of it from the merchants and bankers of the city, and the female members of many families were dishonored by his lawless and licentious soldiery. In the district those who had lost their estates through the agency of the Civil Courts, now ousted the purchasers and re-entered on possession; great search was also made for deeds and decrees. The strong preyed everywhere on the weak.

41. The Raja of Gopalpoor beat off a party of the rebel troops sent to demand revenue from him, but an overpowering force being despatched against him, he was compelled to abandon his home and seek shelter in Azimgurh, where he remained from October up to the re-occupation of the district.

42. The Raja of Bansee also refused to recognise the so-called Nazim's authority, or give up the Government treasure at the Tehseel, and on one occasion defeated a large rebel force sent to coerce him; but on still more formidable preparation being made to subdue him, and discouraged by the fate of the Raja of Gopalpoor, he felt constrained to submit and receive a rebel Tehseeldar at Bansee. The Rani of Bustee held fast by her allegiance, and would not allow the rebel Thannadar to enter her town. But being a woman and niece of Koor Singh, great latitude was permitted her.

43. The Raja of Tumkhoe, who also remained loyal, was too remote to attract immediate attention; but the Raja of Mujhowlee or Suleimpoor, at the south-eastern extremity of the district would most assuredly have succumbed before Hurkishun Singh, brother of Koor Singh, who, with 500 sepoys and other rabble, had entered the district at Fyzabad, and advanced close to Suleimpoor, with the view probably of ultimately making his way to Arrah, but that he was saved by the arrival of the Saran Field Force under Colonel Rowercroft, at Myrwa.

44. This force defeated Hurkishun Singh, who had been reinforced by a large body of sepoys and irregulars under Mooshurruf Khan from Goruckpoor, and advanced towards Burhul. Simultaneously the Goorkha army under Maharaja Jung Bahadoor crossed the Gunduk at Peepra, and moved on Goruckpoor. There was a slight skirmish with the rebels on the banks of that river, another at Pipraich, fifteen miles from the station, which was occupied by the Goorkha army on the 6th.

45. The rebels attempted to make a stand in the forest, but were soon driven from their position, and being quickly followed up through the town of Goruckpoor, many perished in attempting to cross the Raptee. Mahomed Hussun and his principal officers fled early in the morning, and made such speed, that by the evening they were across the Gogra at Tandab.

46. With reference to the 7th paragraph of the Government circular, I can but say that Mr. Bird does not bring a single native officer to notice. He would, however, I am sure, name the Nazir who served the Government with zeal and devotion, and whom I have recommended for reward. With this exception, I know of no one whose conduct calls for commendation. Most of
the native officials, though they refused office under the rebel government, continued to reside in the district. But one Tehsildar and one Native Judge have been reinstated in their situations.

47. I have, in reply to another circular, dwelt on the loyalty and services of the Rajas of Basseen and Gopalpoor, and the Kani of Bustee, and recommended them for rewards, which in the case of the first named Raja have been liberally accorded.

48. I should perhaps have mentioned earlier that the Raja of Gopalpoor endeavoured to form a league of loyal Rajas against Mahomed Hussun, but the scheme failed, from the apathy or timidity of most of them. Also that he gave shelter and assistance to several ladies and gentlemen escaping from Fyzabad. I know of no other similar instances except the two noticed in my paragraph 13, which there is no use reverting to now.

49. The Raja of Tumkhoore protected Government servants, and now makes loud boasts of his loyalty and resistance to the rebel government, on which subject he would do more wisely to be silent, for though he never went in person, I can prove he sent his agent with a petition to the usurper.

50. The Raja of Mouhlowlee did throughout refuse to recognise the rebel authority, and also protected Government servants, but his failure to attend as a member of the Committee of Rajas, to whom the district was made over, and to co-operate with the Raja of Gopalpoor in his scheme of expelling Mahomed Hussun, shew that his loyalty was not sufficiently strong to induce him to run any risks.

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**Narrative of Events Attending the outbreak of disturbances and the restoration of authority in the Agra District, in 1857-58.**

No. of 1858.

From—A. L. M. Phillips, Esq., Magistrate of Agra,
To—Commissioner of Agra Division.

I have the honor, in obedience to the directions contained in circular from Government, No. 212, dated the 30th of April last, to forward Narrative of Events which occurred in the Agra District, from beginning of the outbreak till order was completely restored.

2. From the 11th May to the battle of July, record has been compiled from the following sources:—

I. A memorandum furnished to me by the Financial Commissioner, Mr. E. A. Reade.

III. Contemporary issues of the Mofussilite newspaper.

IV. Memoranda furnished by Mr. Parsick, Deputy Collector, Lieutenant Noble, Lieutenant Newmarch, Lieutenant Henderson, and Mr. Lane.

3. All I have done is merely to arrange the matter in a continuous form; I have not therefore thought it necessary to mark the same as "quotations."

4. Information of the outbreak at Meerut, the commencement of the Mutiny, was received at Agra on the 11th of May 1857.

5. The European military force, stationed at Agra, was as follows:—the 3rd European Bengal Regiment; one battery of Artillery (Horse) under the command of Captain D'Oyley.
7. The Native force was— the 44th and 67th Regiments of Bengal Infantry, a company of one of which also garrisoned the fort.

Fort garrisoned by detachment of Europeans.

8. On the 13th of May a company of Europeans was ordered into the Fort by Brigadier Polwhole, professedly to support, but in reality to overawe, the sepoys who formed the garrison.

9. On the 14th May the news of the massacre at Delhi reached Agra. The Lieutenant-Governor had made up his mind to direct all Christian families to repair to the fort from which the Native garrison was withdrawn. This measure was propounded at a Council of War, held at Government House. It was strenuously opposed by the Honorable R. Drummond, the Magistrate; Mr. Harington, the Member of the North-Western Provinces, and other officials; the order was recalled, and a plan of patrolling was organized, the effects of which were in a few days to cause those residents who had taken refuge in the fort to leave it and its discomforts, for their homes.

10. The officers who were employed in patrolling were, besides Mr. Drummond, Mr. Lowe, Mr. Chase, Lieutenant Fraser, and Mahomed Mobeen, Deputy Collector.

Patrols organized.

11. To overawe the Native Regiments whose fidelity was suspected, as an agency for keeping open communications and repressing any exhibition of turbulence among the clans and tribes of the district, detachments were brought from Gwalior, of cavalry and artillery, from the Contingent and Scindia’s Body Guard.

12. Mr. Drummond had little confidence in the fidelity of these Contingents, and employed officers to ascertain their real feeling. These were Ahmad Buksh, the leading Vakeel of the Sudder Court, the Deputy Collector, and Kour Kalka Pershad, a pensioned Deputy Collector. These were unanimous in declaring that no faith whatever could be placed on these men.

13. On the 21st of May intelligence of the mutiny of the 9th Regiment of Native Infantry at Algygur was received at Agra; great alarm was felt by the Christian population, and hundreds rushed in a panic to such houses as were considered capable of defence. Under Mr. Colvin’s directions, a plan of defence was drawn up by Mr. Reade (of the Sudder Board of Revenue), assigning certain points of rendezvous, posts of defence, and outposts. The memorandum on the subject will be found in Appendix No. 1.

14. About this time Mr. Drummond, with the sanction of Government, armed a number of the city police from the arsenal, greatly increased the number of police, both foot and horse, and called in a large number of chowקeedars from the surrounding villages. The new levies thus raised, of whom nearly all were foot, were armed with muskets, and side-arms, and supplied with ammunition.

15. In some portions of the district a disposition to create disturbances showed itself; Mr. Drummond having little faith in Contingents, obtained permission from Mr. Colvin to raise a new levy.

16. Syedolla Khan had formerly been Deputy Collector in Rohilkund, and had been selected from his character and abilities to be Special Deputy Collector at Kerowlee; from this post he was promoted to a higher salary in the District of Bhurtpoor. There then arose antagonism between him and Captain Nixon, and it was ultimately resolved that he should revert
to his former post as Deputy Collector in these provinces. Before this arrangement could be completed the outbreak occurred, and he was selected by Mr. Drummond to raise a levy of 400 Kerowlee matchlockmen, and 200 Blurtpoor horse; this was afterwards greatly increased, and the whole put under command of Lieutenant Henderson, H. M.'s 10th Foot.

17. The Kotah Contingent and detachments of the Gwalior Contingents were also summoned to Agra, and employed as occasion required, under the command of Lieutenant Noble, Lieutenant Newmarch, and Captain Tonnochy.

18. On the 30th of May a company of the 44th Native Infantry and another of the 67th Native Infantry were despatched from Agra to Muttra to take charge of treasure, and escort it into Agra. On their arrival these companies and the company of the 44th stationed at Muttra mutinied, and marched for Delhi, taking with them the treasure.

19. By midnight the news arrived in Agra; Mr. Colvin promptly warned the inhabitants of the Civil Lines to repair to their places of rendezvous, and in concert with the military authorities it was decided that the dawn should behold the disarmament of the 44th and 67th Regiments of Native Infantry.

20. I believe I am correct in stating that the influence of Mr. Drummond instigated and bore down all opposition to this measure.

21. The 3rd Europeans were ordered under arms at two on Sunday morning, the 31st of May; at four they marched with the grand parade with loaded fire-arms; there the European Battery quickly joined them, and formed ground on the right; the 44th and 67th Native Infantry shortly came up and formed line opposite; the Brigadier and Brigade Major now came on the parade, and informed the regiments of the order of the Lieutenant-Governor. The word "Pile arms" was given, and sullenly obeyed; and the men were marched back to their lines.

22. In the Civil Lines a less successful manoeuvre was being executed. A detachment of the 3rd Europeans was marched suddenly in front of the company of sepoys, as guard in the jail; and stood for a short space of time, at the attention, without any orders being given to the sepoys; these imagined an attack was intended, and ran in every direction, carrying with them their arms, and threatening to shoot all whom they met. On their way they encountered Lieutenant Williams, they surrounded him, levelling their muskets at him, abusing and threatening to shoot him; he quietly told them to do their worst, and they departed. On their arrival at Cantonments, finding the rest of the regiments disarmed, they quietly gave up their arms.

23. The sepoys were allowed to go on leave to their homes, and quietly dispersed in a few days; some remained.

24. Early in June it was projected to form Militia bodies, both horse and foot; after much delay in the organization, it was arranged that two separate bodies should be organized, one for the Civil Lines, and one for Cantonments; for the safety of the former, a body of Volunteer horse, to the amount of sixty men, had already been raised by Mr. Raikes, Judge of the Sudder Nizamat Adawlut, the com-
mand of them, with the full consent of that gentleman, was now given to Major Prendergast, with Lieutenants Oldfield and Hugo James under him.

25. The operations of the Auxiliary forces, noted in paragraphs 16 and 17, may be now briefly noticed. Lieutenant Noble, with a detachment of the 1st Gwalior Contingent Cavalry, was ordered to Juggery to guard the borders against incursions on the part of the Goojurs of the Bhurtpoor territory. Mr. Lane, Assistant to the Magistrate, accompanied this force. There assistance, promised by the Political Agent of Bhurtpoor, was awaited; but this not coming, and the force being too small to act on the offensive, it returned to Agra through Futttehpoo Sikree.

26. At the beginning of June Lieutenant Henderson, of Her Majesty's 10th Foot, who had been placed under Mr. Drummond for duty with the force of Syfoolla Khan, joined and brought with him two 9-pounder guns; their first proceedings were towards the coercion of the disorderly villages in the Furrah Pergunnah; by Lieutenant Henderson some eighty cart loads of confiscated grain were sent into Agra from the pergunnah. It may be here remarked that Mr. Drummond proposed to victual the fort with these supplies, a measure which was afterwards found too tardy for adoption. Syfoolla Khan's force was subsequently ordered towards Kheraghur and Shumshabad on the mutiny of the Gwalior rebels. Intelligence of their movements and afterwards of the Neemuch rebels was chiefly obtained by spies from this force.

27. Mr. Parsick, Deputy Collector, under Regulation IX of 1833, had been stationed at Futttehpoo Sikree, and was under orders to proceed to Mirzapoor. Under the sanction of the Lieutenant-Governor, he was detained, and on the 15th of May remanded to Futttehpoo Sikree; he found everybody alarmed, and the disorderly characters preparing for an attack on the town, which the police, the Nujeeds having been withdrawn to strengthen the station guards, were quite unable to resist. Mr. Parsick, taking the Tehseeldar with him, rode through the town, and by talking to the better-disposed among the Mewatee zemindars influenced them to organize an armed opposition in case of any outbreak of the disorderly. So effective were his measures that the quiet was restored, and dread of an outbreak averted. Mr. Parsick was incessant in his visits to any village which showed signs of any intention to disturb the peace. His intimate knowledge of the inhabitants of the pergunnah (during his long residence as Tehseeldar) enabled him to call in the well-disposed zemindars to his assistance. The following were those to whom he expresses himself more particularly obliged:

1. Buldeo, zemindar of Dabur.
2. Girwur, ditto of Nagle Serne.
4. Ram Seane, zemindar of Busseyra Raja.
5. Kishen Singh and the zemindars of Santha.

28. By these men the road to Agra from Futttehpoo Sikree was kept perfectly secure, and remained so even after the withdrawal of the Government officials. They also watched the borders to resist incursions from the Gojurs of the Bhurtpoor district, and presented a large body of the disarmed 44th and 67th Regiments of Native Infantry from advancing on Futttehpoo Sikree. In his untiring exertions, Mr. Parsick was zealously assisted by the Tehseeldar, Irshad Alee; as regards this officer, it will cause confusion in the Narrative if I do not complete my notice of him in this place.
29. This officer comes of a race which, in the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, has given the most signal proofs of loyalty, his uncle having been there killed by the rebels; while his cousin in Jubbulpore, and another cousin in Bijnore, Toorab Alee, have received valuable rewards and promotion for eminent loyalty. When the near approach of the Neemuch rebel force compelled Mr. Parsick to fly to Agra, the Tehseeldar remained behind to secure, if possible, the safety of the records; he was seized by the mutineers, grievously ill-treated, plundered, and forced to walk on foot in their train, from Futtehpoor Sikree to Furrah, where he was on the 7th July released. During the battle of the 5th of July at Sucheiftya he was a prisoner in the rebels' camp. From Furrah he went to his home in Bhurtpoor, till his recovery from the effects of the treatment he had received, long doubtful, was assured; he then rejoined his appointment.

30. The mutiny at Gwalior occurred on the 15th June, and the fugitives thence arrived in a few days after; this event caused great anxiety for the safety of the officers who commanded detachments of the contingent in the Allygurh and Agra districts. It may be adduced as a sign of the times that, although these detachments had up to this time behaved generally in a satisfactory and occasionally in a highly creditable manner, no one doubted they would mutiny as soon as news of the outbreak at the head-quarters of their contingent reached them; urgent appeals were sent, with the knowledge of Mr. Colvin, by different Mahomedans of rank in the city, urging them to spare and protect their officers: none of these officers were attacked. Captain Burlton in command of a detachment of his own Regiment, the 2nd Cavalry, by whom he was much beloved, was civilly dismissed, the men declaring that they must join their brothers, but would not injure him, if he went quietly away. They escorted him up to the neighbourhood of Agra and then departed.

31. The approach of the rebels of the Neemuch and Nusseerabad Contingents from Neemuch had long been foretold, and was most anxiously watched. Their march was leisurely, as they were encumbered by a vast amount of baggage plundered of the cantonments of Neemuch and Nusseerabad. These consisted of the force (roughly computed) as follows:—

Foot ... ... ... ... ... ... 2,000
Guns ... ... ... ... ... ... 10
Horse ... ... ... ... ... ... 600

32. The Kotah Contingent being considered loyal, had been cantoned on the left bank of the Jumna for about a fortnight.

33. On the 2nd of July the rebel army had reached Futtehpoor Sikree.

34. On the near approach of the rebels, Syfoolla Khan's force was called in and cantoned in the neighbourhood of Shahgunj. The Kotah Contingent was also brought into cantonments; it was intended that these forces should act on the flank of the English.

35. On the morning of the 3rd July, Mr. Colvin was threatened with an apoplectic attack, and by warrant made over the government to a Committee, consisting of Brigadier Polwhele, E. A. Reade, Esq., and Major MacLeod.

36. A copy of the Resolutions of the Government on the 4th is contained in Appendix No. 2. The measures thus carried out were as follows:—

I.—The release of a large number of prisoners from the jail, who were put across the river.

II.—The admission of Native Christians into the fort.
III.—The breaking of the Pontoon bridge to prevent the mutineers crossing in the rear.

IV.—The removal to the magazine of two guns lent to the force of Syfoolla Khan.

V.—The orders for advance to the Kotah Contingent.

On the evening of the same day, Mr. Colvin resumed charge and retired into the fort.

37. The Kotah Contingent, on receiving the orders to advance, mutinied at once. Store Sergeant Carr was shot by a Havildar, and the whole body made off to join the rebels’ camp.

38. Their guns were, as is said, spiked by a gun-classip, named Muthra, and the powder, ammunition, and case shot dispersed in the sand by Dr. Mathias, the medical officer in charge. No further injury was attempted to their officers.

39. The ammunition and baggage of the fugitives were captured, and some of the fugitives cut down by a gallant charge on the part of the volunteers led by Major Prendergast.

40. On the 3rd July, the Neemuch rebels were reported at a distance of eighteen miles, and Lieutenant Henderson officially reported his guns to be unsafe, not considering his undisciplined matchlockmen capable of protecting them against the enemy’s numerous cavalry. After some difficulty, great risk from the mutinous sepoys of the Kotah Contingent, who passed close by the camp, and the desertion of all the bowars of the force, 300 in number, in a body, the guns were brought into Agra.

41. During the night, Syfoolla Khan reported unfavorably of the disposition of his levies, stating that the Bhurtpoor Horse had deserted, that his matchlockmen were useless to oppose the advance of the rebels, and much discouraged at the guns having been taken away. He received orders to move immediately back to Kerowlee, which he did that night.

42. The Brigadier had determined to give battle to the rebels; on their approach, a strong picket of the Volunteer Cavalry had been posted beyond Shahgunj, and on the afternoon of the 5th July, intelligence reached the Brigadier of the approach of the rebel force. The force commanded by Brigadier Polwhele was as follows:

- 3rd European Bengal Bayonets...
- Volunteer Cavalry Sabres...
- D’Oyley’s Battery Guns...

manned with English gunners and native drivers.

43. The force moved on the road to Futtehpore Sikree, till they arrived at the Begum Sumroo’s walled gardens; then they left the road, and formed in order, moving to the right over sandy plains. The enemy were then in sight, and soon opened fire from guns planted directly in our front. Our force advancing opened fire, and the enemy, after a short exchange of shots, retired to the distance of two miles, to the village of Sucheyta, when the firing recommenced; then the 3rd Europeans were ordered to lie down behind a slightly rising ground, which did not however protect them from the fire of the Rifle Company of the 72nd, posted on the tops of houses and in trees. In this position the 3rd remained, and numbers were thus killed by this concealed and destructive fire.
44. The three guns commanded by Captain Pearson took ground on the left, while Captain D'Oyley commanded on the right; nineteen of the Volunteer Cavalry covered the flanks of the right, and twenty of the same with the mounted officers the left.

45. The artillery of the enemy was also divided to meet the two fires. Their guns were screened by rising ground, forming natural breast-works, and by thickly-growing trees. Their infantry at first were posted behind the village, while their cavalry in great force formed behind and on our right flank.

46. Owing to the position of the guns of the enemy, our artillery could do little, but fire into the village and the grove of trees. Their infantry emboldened by impunity, advanced and occupied the village; their artillery which had first fired high, acquired the exact range, two tumbrils on our left half-battery were exploded. On this a cloud of sowars poured with yells from behind the village, and made a resolute attempt to charge the hampered gun; they were met by a discharge of grape and a volley from a company of the 3rd, and retreated in confusion.

47. Soon a sowar whose red chupkun marked him as one of the Kotah Contingent, approached the right half-battery at a hand gallop, and halted at the distance of 200 yards from the front of the handful of Volunteer Cavalry. Having satisfied himself as to their number, he turned his horse and galloped away; now the enemy's cavalry was observed to form on our right, and advanced with the evident intention of charging the half-battery. Their number could not have been less than 200. Major Prendergast, who commanded the eighteen Volunteer Cavalry on the right, ordered an advance, which accelerated to a charge brought this small number soon into the midst of a crowd of the rebel horsemen, the ranks of the volunteers were broken by the impetuosity with which they advanced, the enemy closed round, and but for their remarkable cowardice, not one of the eighteen could have returned; as it was, six were killed, one desperately and five slightly wounded; the remainder formed again as before.

48. The word was at last given for the Europeans to advance, and they occupied the village with complete success; had this order been given earlier in the action, who can say how much slaughter might have been spared? For now it was discovered that the artillery ammunition was exhausted, and nothing remained but to retire into the fort. Fortunately the enemy were as ill provided as ourselves; for though their guns opened on our retreat, they did not follow, to any distance; the last discharge unfortunately killed three men in the 3rd Europeans.

49. The entire loss on our side was as follows:—

**Artillery.**

| 1 Officer, Captain D'Oyley | ... | ... | Killed. |
| 9 Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates | ... | ... | Wounded. |

**3rd Europeans.**

| 1 Officer, Major Thomas | ... | ... | Killed. |
| 65 Ditto ditto | ... | ... | Wounded. |
6 Volunteers ... ... ... ... ... killed.
9 Ditto ... ... ... ... ... wounded.

Civil Lines Foot Militia.

| 1 | ... ... ... ... ... killed. |
| 5 | ... ... ... ... ... wounded. |
| 4 Unattached officers ... ... ... ... ... ditto. |

Total 41 killed.
99 wounded.

50. On the approach of the retiring force to cantonments they were met by the Foot Militia, who formed across the road, and exchanged shots with the pursuing sowars, by which fire some loss was sustained.

51. Before the English troops had reached the fort, the Normal School for native education was in flames, the first of the Holocaust; Mr. Drummond's bungalow was the next; but the rebel troops did not follow the retreating British force beyond Shahgunj; indeed, properly speaking, there was no pursuit at all.

52. The rebels procured a hasty meal at Shahgunj, and that very night they marched for Furrah in the direction of Delhi, where they arrived on the 8th July, and were received with a grand salute in celebration of the victory of Shahgunj.

53. The march of the insurgent rebel army had been accompanied by general plunder of the hordes of villagers, ready to take advantage of a reverse on either side, and to plunder the vanquished; they were seen before the battle, by many, to the amount of some thousands near the European lines. The entry of the British force into the fort was a signal for a general onslaught and plunder.

54. All that night the fires of the blazing bungalows lit the sky, watched with bitter feelings from the ramparts by the occupants of the fort.

55. On Monday morning an immediate attack on the fort was fully expected. The guards of Militia and the 3rd Europeans stationed at the outposts fired without ceasing at every native who approached their posts, thereby cutting off communication entirely with those in the city, who were anxious to send information, stopping the entry of supplies and servants, and placing us perforce in a state of self-constituted siege.

56. Inside the fort great confusion prevailed—loose horses were fighting and galloping about, artillery cattle lying wounded, and dying with thirst; drunken soldiers, bivouacking in the rain, while all day and all night the bungalows of the station blazed incessantly. It is lamentable that this waste of property and (as will be hereafter seen) of life, resulted solely from the supineness of those in military command.

57. On Tuesday a note was conveyed into the fort by means of a native employed at the Delhi Gate, written and despatched by Rajaram, resident of Peepul Mundee in the city, and Tehseeldar of Kundowlee in this district, to the effect that no rebel troops remained, that the disorder which reigned was merely caused by the rabble of the city, and that the entry of the Magistrate with a competent force into the city would completely restore order.
58. On Wednesday morning, the 8th July, Mr. Drummond, accompanied by a company of the 3rd Europeans and two guns, made a circuit of the principal streets in the city and station, and the restoration of order and the British rule was proclaimed.

59. From this moment, rape, murder, and outrage ceased.

60. The state of affairs in the city was as follows:

On Saturday, the 4th July, Busharut Ali, as stated by him, after communication with Mr. Drummond, had gone round to the different police stations, in the kotwalle, and given the different officials orders to the effect that they were by the Magistrate’s orders to consider themselves discharged, and go to their homes.

61. The company of the 3rd Europeans had been withdrawn from the Jail on Sunday shortly before midday. At the first sound of the firing, the prisoners broke out of the Jail; they were not indeed at all coerced by their guards, who joined them with mutinous outrages, and compelled the darogah of the Jail to share among them all the money in his Treasury, under pretence of arrears of pay. The prisoners stayed in or about the station till next day, and then departed to their separate homes, without doing any great mischief.

62. At the same time Mr. Browne, Deputy Collector, was employed in conveying the remains of the treasure from the Collector’s Gutcherry to the fort; in this work he persevered after the battle had begun, and did not cease till the whole was safely stowed there: the amount is noted in the margin. For this service personal allowance of Rupees 100 a month.

63. The first victim to the fanatical hatred against all Christians, was Mr. F. C. Hubbard, Professor of Literature, Agra College. At the first sound of the guns, he proceeded from the College to the fort, when in passing by the chowkee of Kalay Khan Durwaza, he was fired on, and wounded by the police there stationed, and was followed and killed by one of their number.

64. On the morning after the battle the town-crier, at the order of Morad Alee Kotwal, proclaimed the reign of the King of Delhi, through the city. The armed procession that accompanied the crier was composed of most of the leading Mahomedan Police Officers, attached to the Kotwalee, headed by the kotwale himself, and followed by a crowd of inferior grades and rabble; there is no reason to suppose that a single Mahomedan of any respectability was in any way engaged or accessory to this proceeding.

65. The other principal police officials at that time in Agra were Mahomed Moobeen, Deputy Collector, Vikar Ali Baig, Tehseeladar, and Busharut Ali, Superintendent of Police. Mahomed Moobeen seems to have preserved a strict neutrality. Of the conduct of Vikar Ali Baig I cannot well speak, as his case is under investigation by the Special Commissioner, but there are, to say the least, strong grounds of suspicion against him of active complicity with the rebels.

Busharut Ali has been proved to have been the main channel of communication between the rebel camp and the traitorous police of the city.

66. Mr. Parsick who, while at Futtahpoor Sikree, had good opportunities of judging, is of opinion, that so early as the arrival of the rebel troops at Beeannah, twenty-four miles beyond Futtahpoor Sikree, and forty-one miles from Agra, communications passed between them and the disaffected of the police, which
induced the rebels to alter their proposed route to Delhi and Bhurtpoor, for that to Agra. The mutiny of the Jail-guards, and the murder of Mr. Hubbard by the police, simultaneously with the battle, and the proclamation of the Delhi King, the next day (an act spontaneous on the part of the Kotwal and the Police), fully to my mind prove the complicity of the heads of the police, while I am as strongly of opinion that, as a rule, the leaders of the Mahomedan citizens stood aloof from the whole conspiracy.

67. From the time of the proclamation, the property of Christians wherever they could be found in the city, was plundered, and themselves, both man, woman, and child, ruthlessly murdered.

68. All the Christian population who lived outside the city, in the civil lines and cantonments, had, without exception, taken refuge in the fort; but there were many, whose habit of life, native in every way, made them adverse to the society of Europeans, and whose confidence in the friendship of their neighbours in the city, induced them to remain in their houses.

69. In these murders the leaders were the police, who had been, in great numbers, armed with muskets, ammunition, and side-arms; these were joined by the butchers, and Mewatoes of Waeeerpoorah and other places, and by the low Mahomedan rabble.

70. From Monday, the 6th July, to morning the 8th, these scenes of plunder and bloodshed continued without intermission. The number of Christians who were thus murdered were altogether:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Appendix No. 3 I have noted the particulars of each crime, and the result of the investigations into each case.

71. Some circumstances, worthy of remark, occurred during these scenes of horror. Generally speaking, the inhabitants of the city showed if not utter indifference, at all events no disposition to oppose the marauders by force.

72. The head of a Mr. Christie, murdered near the Kotwalee, was placed on the Chubootra of the Kotwalee itself, after having served as a plaything for the boys of the Mobulla.

73. Mr. and Mrs. Derridon and their three children were murdered at the door of their house, while the Mahomedan nurse, herself severely wounded, took two other children to that same Kotwalee, where they were safely preserved till delivered to Mr. Drummond; and the third a boy, aged twelve years, escaped by creeping through the legs of the murderers, and alone traversed the city in safety, till he arrived at the fort.

74. In the Mullah of Hukeemon-gulle, a Mr. Butterfield was preserved by the Mahomedan inhabitants, though his life was repeatedly demanded by the rabble from without the gates of the Mullah.

75. Mr. Hare, an old and paralytic man, was murdered by two Najeebs; his wife and two children, who had fled, were found on the banks of the river by a Bluungee, and by him concealed for two days in his house, and ultimately conducted to the fort.
76. When the fort was first re-opened, reports that the city would be visited with general and condign punishment, were actively spread by parties, of whom Fureedoolah, Sudder Vakeel, was the principal, who professed to have heard the same openly threatened by officers high in the civil service. In some instances, these rumours too readily believed; in others, the consciousness of having been implicated in treasonable practices, induced many Mahomedanis, both servants of Government and others, to fly the city.

77. On the 9th July a proclamation was issued by Mr. Drummond, desiring the burkundazes of the police to present themselves at Mr. Browne, the Deputy Collector’s bungalow, and give up all the arms and ammunition in their possession.

78. This produced a hundred stand of arms. A Persian proceeding was also recorded by that officer, calling on the principal inhabitants of the city to assemble to deliberate on the means best adapted for restoration of order.

79. This document also contains the sanction of four months leave to Moorad Alee, Kotwal, and Busharat Alee, Superintendent of the city (as therein stated), by order of the Lieutenant-Governor.

80. On the 10th of July Mr. Drummond was appointed Civil and Sessions Judge of Banda, and I was appointed to the office thus vacated.

81. On the 11th of July a meeting of the principal inhabitants of the city was held, over which Mr. E. Beade, the Financial Commissioner, presided. At this Session the wishes of the head of the Government were conveyed to them that they should all unite to preserve order and peace, each in the Mohullas in which they lived. They were instructed, in concert with the Punches of the city, to raise guards for this purpose, pending the re-institution of regular police machinery, and they were called upon to use their utmost influence to support Rajaram in his authority as Kotwal.

82. At the same time Mr. Colvin appointed Rajaram to the office of Kotwal of the city; this was done, I believe, after communication with the most respectable inhabitants of the city, and at their urgent request it was a marked proof of the confidence reposed by them equally with the head of the Government in his integrity and influence—a trust which his subsequent conduct in that onerous and dangerous post fully justified. Mr. Lowe was also appointed Joint Magistrate, and Mr. Chase continued his office as Assistant.

83. The state of the district outside the city was, in one word, anarchy. The repulse of British troops—and the entry into the fort joined to the inaction of the three days, wherever reported, everywhere gave the signal for combined attacks on the Tehseelies and Thanss.

84. The Tehseelie of Furrah had been plundered on the 8th of July. In Fergunnah Furrah, Tehseelie deserted. When the rebel troops arrived there on their way to Delhi, Mahomed Ishaq, the Tehseelie of Furrah, the nephew of Mahomed Moobeen, Deputy Collector, joined the Sudder Ameen of Agra, and went to their homes in Shahjahanpoor.

85. The Thanadar, Shunkur Sabie, went away, and has not been heard of since.

86. The Naib Daroga of Achnerya, in the Furrah Fergunnah, Wazzer Mahomed, joined the rebel army and went to Delhi. The Tehseelie and Thana buildings were plundered by the butchers of the town.
87. **Iradutnugur.**—Moazzamul Ace Khun was Tehseldar, the Thanasdar was Baneer Persbad. Although some considerable disorder prevailed in the pargannah before the 6th of July, still the Government officials had not been threatened up to that time.

88. The news of the battle of July had no sooner reached the country, than the Tehseeldar was attacked on the 6th of July by the inhabitants of the villages as follows:

Iradutnugur, on the 14th of July, Newull, Zemindar of Posya, brought assistance and took the Tehseeldar with him to his own village, where he kept him in safety and comfort till he was able to return to Agra.

90. In the meantime the Goorulls had been joined by some of the followers of Deohunse Gooruj, Sooba of Dholepoor. I have already in my letter, dated the 17th of April 1858, detailed the atrocities committed by this monster, but I may here repeat the particulars. On the 9th of July the Sooba advanced to Jajow; he had some three thousand people with him and two guns; he commenced proceedings by plundering the town, blowing down the fine old arch, way to the semi, an ancient edifice, and finished by killing three bunneesahs, and setting fire to the town; no resistance was offered to him.

91. On the 14th of July, Buham of Rajoopora at the request of the bunneesahs of Iradutnugur, came with about 300 of his own followers, to protect the town. On the news of his approach, the Goorulls sent for Deohunse; and on his prompt arrival, Buham was killed in Iradutnugur with three of his men.

92. Deohunse then gave up the town of Iradutnugur to plunder; he summoned to his assistance Bhawany Shunkur, Tehseeldar of Raja Khera, who came as far as Mayhown, in Pargannah Iradutnugur, with one gun. The Sooba himself stayed at Iradutnugur for one day only; and then returned to Dholepoor; but his men and chief officers stayed at Iradutnugur and superintended the plunder of the town up to the 3rd August.

For five weeks, carriages laden with spoil of the plundered villages continually passed along the road to Dholepoor. The value of this property is certainly not over-estimated at two lakhs of rupees.

93. The cases, as I have before mentioned in my letter to your address, have been fully investigated. Agreeably to directions contained in the letter from the Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, dated the 30th of April 1858, the cases, forty-one in number, were made over to Major Macpherson, Political Agent at Gwalior, and there the matter has rested.

94. **Mahomed Hussun** was Tehseeldar of Bah Pinahut, a man of resolution and integrity. The Pargannah, the furthest removed from the Sudder Station, early fell into disorder. To subdue the same the Tehseeldar received all the assistance that the Raja of Bhudawur was able to afford. Bah was attacked and plundered by surrounding villages, headed by Luchmun Singh, and the Thana attacked and put to flight.
Proprietors of estates bought at auction were ejected by the former owners. Anarchy prevailed, and plunder on all sides. The Tehseeldar at Pinahut was surrounded by a horde of Thakoores from across the Chumbul, headed by the men of Lukhunpoora Busona, on the 14th June; but they were not attacked.

The villages of Oodypoora and Oothur were plundered by the forces under Doohunse, Soobah of Dholepoor, who set up his Thanah at Sumona, in Pinahut.

95. On the 3rd July the Tehseeldar went at the summons of the Raja of Bhaudawur to Nygaon on the 11th and 13th July. Rebel forces of the Gwalior Contingent crossed at Hubyna, with the intention of plundering the Treasury at Pinahut; in this design they were prevented by Dowlutram, in whose charge the Treasury had been left, and finally crossed the Chumbul; they were joined by several Nujeebs and chuprassees.

96. On the 27th July, what remained of the Treasury, after deducting pay of Government servants, Duffer and Government servants arrived at the Nygaon. Thence the Tehseeldar came to Agra, but was plundered on the way.

97. At Ferozabad, Kasim Husun Khan, brother of the Principal Sudder Ameen at Agra, was Tehseeldar, Mohzun Alee was Thanahdar. Some assistance was derived from Lieutenant Tonnochie, who commanded a detachment of the Gwalior Contingent, but they were not of sufficient strength to effect permanent good. On the 50th June, these sowars mutinied, and Mr. Tonnochie and the Tehseeldar left for Agra. After their departure the town and tehseelee were attacked by the neighbouring villages; but their attack being resisted by the Thanahdar, aided by some sowars who remained, it was repulsed; ultimately the sowars departed having looted the treasure. The town was again attacked by the Chohan tribes from Mynpoory and the Mullahs from the river side, who plundered most part of the town except the Mullaha where the Mahommadas lived. These last attacked and drove back the assailers with great slaughter; another attack was made, ultimately also repulsed. In these affairs, Khakurun of Mulikpoor, and Bushurat Alee, pensioner, greatly distinguished themselves. Plunder became general.

98. Goordyal Singh was Tehseeldar of Khyragurb, found it impossible to control the turbulent tribes in the direction of Jugnayr, the Thanahdar of which place had been compelled to leave for Agra. On the 2nd July some sowars of the rebel force arrived from Futchpoor Sikree; intelligence of the ill-treatment of the Tehseeldar of that place being known, the burkundaz and Tehseelsch chuprassees rapidly deserted, and finally the Tehseeldar left for Agra. After their departure, the zamindars of Oontgir, Belovwee, and Lukhunpoora plundered the Treasury.

99. In this Pergunnah the conduct of the servants of Government was less creditable than in the neighbouring Pergunnahs. The Thanahdar had early left for his home in Bareilly; the Tehseeldar also left for Agra stating, as his reasons, fears of an attack by Luchmun Sing Goojur, zamindar of Khera. This individual, however, on the departure of the Tehseeldar, occupied the Tehseeldar, preserved the records, and protected the town. There was an old grudge between him and the Tehseeldar, which probably gave rise to the Tehseeldar's panic.

100. In the Pergunnah of Etmaadpoor the disturbances headed by Zurawur Singh of Himmatpoor, as in Ferozabad, the Nujeebs of the guard had been withdrawn. The Tehseeldar left to procure assistance from Agra on the 4th July. On the 5th July the Thanah was attacked by a vast concourse of the surrounding
villagers. The town was plundered, and the Thanaedar obliged to take refuge with the Zemindars of Sitholi; from thence he reached Agra with great difficulty.

101. On the 15th of July, at Mr. Harington's recommendation, Baboo Ramnarain appointed Thanaedar of Huzoor Tehseel; he was a person of great zeal and energy, and willingly accepted a post of responsibility and risk. I shall find occasion to observe on his services in the sequel.

102. The thanahs and chowkees belonging to the kotwalce were speedily organized; the next step was to re-establish the district thanahs. So great was the disorganization consequent on the entry into the fort, that it was considered necessary that an armed demonstration should be made with as little delay as possible. At Futtehpore Sikree the rebel thanahdar and Thaseedar still held office; an expedition thither was therefore contemplated, and after a delay of two days, a force as noted in the margin started on the 20th of July. It was commanded by Captain Eaton, and accompanied by Lieutenant Griffin, of the artillery, and Lieutenant Salmon of the Gwalior Contingent, as volunteers. I attended as civil officer. The river Kharee at Kerowlee was successfully crossed, and Futtehpore Sikree reached soon after daybreak. After a long search, two Mahomedans against whom full proof of complicity* were apprehended.

103. The delay of two days had allowed the Thaseedar, left by the rebels, to escape.

104. The next day intelligence was brought that the Mewatees of South-ke-munde had transported and lodged in the houses of the Mewatees outside the town of Futtehpore Sikree vast quantities of plundered property from the Cantonments and Civil lines; a search was instituted there, and on return thence, I myself with five of the Volunteer Cavalry, were entering the narrow streets of the town of Futtehpore Sikree, when we were met by a large body of Mewatees, armed with guns, &c., who commenced a sharp discharge of matchlocks at us. We turned back to the open ground, and on the arrival of reinforcements from above, charged and pursued the flying enemy for a considerable distance till stopped by a morass. In this affair Lieutenant Salmond was wounded in three places, and about fifteen of the enemy killed; a police orderly, by name Sirshad Alee, was also desperately wounded by the Mewatees, and two seces killed. The expedition returned the same evening.

105. The two prisoners were tried by Mr. Harington, as Special Commissioner, on a charge of high treason, and sentenced to be hung.

106. The Mewatees of Futtehpore Sikree entirely evacuated the country, and effectual measures were taken to prevent their return; a Thaseedar and a Thanadar were left installed in their offices, and suffered no further molestation.

107. On the 1st of August, the demolition of the houses in the immediate vicinity of the fort was commenced and carried out. The memorandum on this subject will be found in Appendix No. J.

108. On the 10th of August an expedition, consisting of the force noted in the margin, under Mr. Lowe, Joint Magistrate, visited the Ferozabad and Etimadpoor pargannahs. They were fired upon by the village of Oholhowlee, which was carried without further resistance; a Thanadar and Thaseedar were left at the Teheelee Etimadpoor, and the police speedily organized.
109. At this time the mutinous proceedings of Tej Singh, the titular Raja of Mynpoory, and the head of the Choohan tribes in that district, gave great uneasiness as to the safety of our eastern borders. At Mr. Harington's recommendation Sheikh Inayut Hoossein appointed Deputy Collector of Ferozabad. Sheikh Inayut Hoossein, the Sudder Ameen of Mynpoory, then residing at Agra, was offered the post of Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector at Ferozabad, the pargunnah bordering on the Mynpoory district. This offer he accepted. Gunga Pershand, WaR Bakes' Nuzees of the Sudder Office, accompanied him as Tehseeeldar. Raheen Khan, an old prisoner, though still hale, and a zemindar of the Ferozabad pargunnah, who had behaved very well when Ferozabad had been attacked before, was appointed Thanadar.

110. On the news of their purpose, Hookum Singh, Talookdar of Jarkee, came himself to Agra for the purpose of escorting the Government officers to their posts; and ever since, they supplied men, guns, and ammunition whenever danger threatened.

111. I have ere now in my letter, dated the 18th of February 1858, to the address of the Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, entered into the meritorious services of Inayut Hoossein. They will bear further notice here. On his arrival he found the pargunnah had been thrown into great disorder by the robberies and aggressions committed by Zorawur Singh of Himmutpoor; but the Deputy Collector found the feeling of the country decidedly on the side of order, and in his favor; of this he availed himself, and soon forced Zorawur Singh to disband his rabble and fly. Under authority from Agra, he raised levies of armed men to resist expected attack of the Mynpoory rebels, who had advanced as far as Shekhopabad, six coss off; prepared guns, and got together a small body of well-mounted sowers; in fact so successful were his measures, that in a very short space of time, without any military demonstration from Agra, order had been completely restored in the pargunnah, and the threats of invasion on the Mynpoory side ceased.

112. In these proceedings the proximity of the Raja of Awah, then in charge of the Juleysur and Sydabad-pargunnah, whose powerful influence was exerted zealously on the side of our Government, was of great assistance; the northern borders of the pargunnah were protected, and kept in quietness chiefly through his means.

113. The accounts given by Hurnarain, the Tehseeeldar of Futteecabad, as to the conduct of Luqman Singh Gojjar, zemindar of Khera, were proved to have been greatly exaggerated. A private quarrel had existed between him and the former Tehseeeldar, and it may be that that officer entertained some doubts of his own safety in his hands. But after the departure of the Tehseeeldar, Luqman Singh had preserved the Tehseelees and Thanah records from injury, and the rest of Government property remained untouched.

114. The Moonsiff of Futteecabad, Alee Buksh, expressed his readiness to return to his post; with him were sent as Tehseeeldar Gooryal Singh, and a Thanadar, Noor-oolab. The Tehseelees at Futteecabad, an old Mahajta fort, was a place of considerable strength. Luqman Singh was eager to efface the remembrance of any misdeeds he had committed, and he and his clan were able and willing to hold the post against any hostile claim of villagers in the district. Under these circumstances the Tehseelees and Thanah officials were established in security, and the roads were also safe for travellers. It could not, however, be said that the authority of the police carried any weight.

115. The Pargunnah of Furrah, in the same manner was occupied by a Tehseeeldar, Petum Singh, and a Thanadar, Buldeo Buksh. These were both determined men, but
they found it advisable not to use compulsory measures to enforce obedience beyond the town itself. In both the Pergunnahs of Furrah and Futeeababa the Government servants and authority existed by sufferance.

116. To the Pergunnah of Kheragurh, Hurnarain went as Tehseeeldar, and Buldeo Sahaie as Thanadar, and Furzundee Alice to Jugneyr as Thapnadar.

117. In the Pergunnahs of Bah Finahot, the furthest removed from the station, with a turbulated population and by position exposed to the aggressions of the disorderly tribes inhabiting the Dhuleepoor territories, the support of the authority of the servants of Government was especially committed to the Raja of Budawur, Mehendur Singh. This Chief, the head of the Thakoor tribe of Badawurases, of an ancient and well-connected family, and a jagirdar of considerable property in this district, lives at Nyagad in Pergunah Bah, is himself of not sufficient force of character to have acted decidedly and consistently on the side of the British Government; but the influence of his chief adviser, Hukeem Meber Alice, and his brother, Hukeem Nuseeroodeen, resident of Agra, was exerted to the utmost to keep the Chief in the path of loyalty.

118. The Pergunnah of Iradutnagger was also confided to him, as far as related to the protection of the borders.

119. During the months of August and September, as the Chumbul and Jumna rivers subsided, the rebel forces then occupying the District of Etawah, made frequent attempts to cross into the Pergunnah of Bah, while the Toumur and other Rajpoot tribes of marauders menaced it from the other side of the Chumbul. Aggression from the direction of Etawah was resisted by open force by the Raja; considerable levies were collected, the Ghats strongly guarded and vigilantly watched; and though shots were frequently exchanged, the rebels never succeeded in effecting a landing on this side. To avert incursions from across the Chumbul, the influence of the Raja's position, as head of the Badoureëa Thakoors, of whom great numbers live on the borders of the Chumbul, and are nearly connected with the Toumurs, was used; precautions being at the same time taken of guarding the Ghats. This good service performed at a most critical period cannot be very easily over-rated. The strength of the garrison in the fort at Agra, originally consisting of only a weak English Regiment, six guns weakly manned, and about thirty Volunteer horse, had been greatly weakened by the dispatch of a detachment of all arms to occupy Allygurh. What remained in the fort was not sufficient for the garrison alone, and not a man could have been spared to act outside. If the rebels had crossed and acquired a footing in this district, the consequences must have been increased confusion, and have disorganized all the neighbouring pergunnahs on the right bank of the Jumna. Two guns were under Government orders sent by the Raja to the assistance of the authorities in the District of Etawah, and were taken by the rebel force. No remuneration has been made to the Raja for these losses.

120. Such being the paucity of armed force in the station, it was necessary to trust almost entirely to the assistance of loyal zemindars, and the force of armed levies, obtained through their means, and paid by Government for the security of the Tehseelees and Thanas, and the protection of travellers on the high roads in the district. About this time I also directed the different Tehseeeldars to make such arrangements as would render their post defensible against a rebel force unarmed with guns.

121. The zemindars, who particularly distinguished themselves in assisting the officers of Government, have been already mentioned by me in the list furnished to the Government.
122. In the beginning of September the pontoon bridge was completed in its new site, under the guns of the fort. Matters continued in this semi-quiet state till 14th of September, when the city of Delhi was entered by our troops. On the 25th of September, a large force of rebels with many guns were reported on their way from Delhi to Muttra, which they reached on the 26th of September, and commenced building a bridge to cross the Jumna. The Thana of Furrah, distant 14½ miles from Muttra, was withdrawn to Roorkootra, and measures taken to enforce a vigilant watch on the road. Some rebel fugitives were captured, who were convicted and hung.

123. The rebels crossed the Jumna into the Allygurh district on their way to Rohilkund on the 6th of October, and the Thana of Furrah was immediately re-established.

124. Early in the month of August a rebel force, consisting of whole or parts of the Mehidpoor, Malwa, and Bhopal Contingents, and the regular troops stationed at Indore (23rd Native Infantry), with large additions of the Vilayutees and others in the pay of the Bhopal and Indore States had reached Gwalior; there they remained till about the end of August, and in the beginning of September these forces joined by part of the Gwalior Contingent, both horse and foot, but not by any of the artillery, marched to Dholepoor, on the road to Agra; there the head-quarters of the force remained till the 6th of October. The advanced guard and sowars had, however, as early as the 11th of September, advanced much nearer, the Teluseedar and Thanahdar of Khareegurh, who were ultimately released. They spread over the Perganahs of Kheragurh, Futtehpoo Shir, Radutnugger, and Futtceabad, and up to the Kharee Nuddee, compelling the withdrawal of all the Government establishments from the southern parts of the district.

125. The main body of the rebel fugitives from Delhi, as I have mentioned above, crossed the Jumna at Muttra; but a force of all arms, led by Heera Singh, Subadar of the 72nd Regiment Native Infantry, formerly stationed at Agra in 1856, and afterwards at Neemuch, who had commanded the Neemuch rebel forces in July 1857, joined the rebels at Dholepoor; with him came a Shahzadah of Delhi, who went by the name of Feroza Shah,* and almost immediately afterwards, on the 6th of October, the whole body began their march for Agra, with the avowed intention of attacking the fort of Agra. They took with them two brass guns of enormous size, belonging to the Dholepoor State, drawn by elephants, of which one broke down and remained immovable just out of Dholepoor. Their numbers were very considerable, and they had thirteen guns.

Column, commanded by Colonel Grestedh, marches by the left bank of the Jumna to Aligurh.

126. Every arrangement to procure speedy and certain intelligence of the movements of the rebels in our power had been effected; we could only act by spies. Myself, Mr. Muir, and Major Macpherson had each different channels. Over mine was Bhyan Singh, Jemadar of Meenas; his men, seven in number, kept up a string of unbroken intelligence from the beginning to the end. This was all communicated to Mr. Muir.

127. Intelligence of the movement of the head-quarters of the rebel camp from Dholepoor on the 6th of October reached us on the evening of the same day. A

* Note.—Feroza Shah joined the Mutineers at Gwallor, on his return, it is said, from Mecca.—Ed.
communication by order of the Chief Commissioner was sent to Colonel Greathed, urgently requesting the speedy presence of his column at Agra. As day by day the rebels approached, urgent messages were despatched to the same effect, till on the 9th of October the two following letters were addressed by Mr. Muir to Colonel Greathed then at Hattrass:

"The enemy is encamped on the other side of the Kharee, and professes to intend a passage of that river to-day. They will probably find it a more difficult matter than they fancy to transport their heavy guns (of which they have got three or four from Bhulepoor) across the stream, which is deep. But the main body of their force may, if they choose to risk the thing, cross over to-day, and to-morrow bear us in our fort, and plunder the city. Hence our urgent anxiety to be provided with cavalry and another troop of horse artillery. We want this in advance for a day or two. You or more, by bullock train crossed the Kkaree, and our military authorities will be found in fancied security. They were expected, either towards the evening of the 9th or in the morning of the 10th. As day by day the enemy enters the country, and will spread over the country, and will be committing all kinds of excesses and outrage, you have therefore every inducement to hurry on.

"Arrangements can be made to assist your infantry the last stage, or more, by bullock train wagons, if you will give us details as to your period of reaching each stage. This letter, enclosing Colonel Fraser's despatch, goes by mail cart, and the coachman will have instructions to bring back your reply in the same manner."

(Agra) 9th October 1857.

(Sd.) W. Muir.

* Many of the spies said, Saturday (i.e., the 10th.) P.S.—They have given out that they wish to fire their first five shots at the fort on Sunday next (i.e., the 11th).

"I send a line in case it may catch up the mail cart before it starts.

"Our reconnoitring party has come in; numbers of the cavalry have crossed the Kharee, and our party was fired on. About 300 infantry had crossed.

"This all looks as if they meant to come.

"The cavalry are spreading over the country, and will be committing all kinds of excesses and outrage."

"Come on quickly."

(Sd.) W. Muir.

130. The note on the system of intelligence received and given to the military authorities will be found in Appendix No. 4.

131. I have entered so far into the circumstances which attended the approach of the rebels, because the subsequent surprise which they effected on Colonel Greathed's column has been imputed as reflecting great discredit on the civil authorities at Agra, and has been, in a letter from the late Colonel Cotton, officially described as such.

October 10th, Colonel Greathed's column enters Agra.

132. In the 73rd page erroneous statement in Mr. Raikes' book.

Erroneous statement in Mr. Raikes' book.

On the morning of the 10th October, Colonel Greathed's column crossed the bridge, and encamped on the old Parade ground in Cantonments, in fancied security.

Of "Notes on the Revolt of the North-Western Provinces of India," written by Mr. Raikes, it is stated that "the Magistrate and other Govern-
ment officials assured Colonel Greathed that the enemy had fallen back." On this point I can only state that certainly no such information was either received or communicated by me, and the following note appears in a memorandum by Mr. Muir on the same subject:

133. "There was no intimation given to Colonel Greathed by any of the authorities on the morning of the 10th, that the enemy were re-crossing. The city rumour to that effect, brought in by the Sikh Gooroo, Jotee Pershad, Eesree Pershad, and other men whose loyalty has not been doubted, was unquestionably occasioned by the march through the town of Greathed's imposing column. The townsmen never dreamt that the Dholepoor rebels would have the audacity to run their heads against such a rock as that splendid force."

134. In the meantime the rebel army were advancing with all rapidity up the road to Agra; and concealed by the high crops of Indian-corn, and adjacent buildings, had full license to get into position opposite to the British camp before any notice was taken of their presence. From the evidence of captured sepoys, it has now been ascertained that until they were actually in the field of battle, the rebels had received no intimation of the reinforcements which had reached Agra.

135. The first intimation received of their approach was a party of ghazees, some five in number, who entered the camp, playing tom-tom, and, entering a tent, killed two men of the 9th Lancers, and desperately wounded a third. The guns of the enemy opened immediately after, and the rebel sowars dashed through and round the camp, when the alarm was thus given. The British force had not long dismounted, and had only partly dispersed; the artillery and some of the cavalry to the left flank had been aware of suspicious bodies of men moving in their front. Such was the promptitude with which the different arms formed themselves into position, that the artillery on the right flank replied to the fourth gun fired by the enemy; it was on this flank that Captain Green and Lieutenant Jones of the 9th Lancers, at the head of only 25 men, charged a large body of the rebel sowars, who were preparing to charge the battery, and completely dispersed them, riding through, and returning to, another charge. In this exploit Captain Green was killed, and Lieutenant Jones desperately wounded. Gun after gun came into action, and the clouds of cavalry formed on the flanks; the rebels found out their mistake too late, for 1½ hours they retreated, answering to our artillery at intervals, but their retreat became a flight, and by the time that they reached the Kharee Nuddee, a distance of eight miles, every gun was captured, including the big gun of Dholepoor; and the force totally routed and disorganized.

136. The villagers on the other side of the Kharee collected to plunder the fugitives. Many rebels were thus killed, and property to the value of upwards of Rupees 4,000 was subsequently recovered by the police, and sent into Agra. During the whole action, the city was completely quiescent.
for which I think no one gave him credit before. It must be remembered that if success had attended the arms of the rebels, he would undoubtedly have been one of the first victims. Undismayed by the peril of his position, he remained steadily at the Cotwalee, and immediately on the issue of the battle being no longer doubtful, caused the success of our arms to be proclaimed through the streets and lanes of the city. My original report on his conduct, and that of Ramnarain, is contained in Appendix No. 5. In November he was transferred to the Collectorate Office, holding his substantial appointment as Tehseeladar; he left his appointment, carrying with him the respect of all respectable citizens, and the good opinion of all his immediate superiors. I may here also be allowed to allude to the services of Ramnarain, Tehseeladar, Huzoor Tehseel. He was appointed Tehseeladar at the same time as Rajaram, and though a man of a private character less popular, most certainly must be entitled equally with Rajaram to the credit of having come forward at the most critical of times to lend his support to our Government. He is entitled, in my opinion, as well as Rajaram, to a valuable acknowledgment from Government.

Since the battle of October, the district has been undisturbed by the presence of any rebels in force.

137. A detachment of the fugitive mutineers from Dehli, which had crossed the Jumna at Muttra, had reached Futtelpoor Sikree, and were there harboured by the Mewatees of the town itself, and the neighbouring villages; the old buildings formed positions of great strength, and it was considered necessary to deal quickly with such dangerous neighbours.

138. In the end of October a force under the command of Colonel Cotton marched to Futtelpoor Sikree, and after a severe resistance, the Tehseelee, where the rebels were established, was carried, some fifty of the rebels were killed there, and about thirty of them, entirely Vilayutees and Mewatees, were killed by the cavalry.

And through the Pergunnah of Furrah.

139. The force marched thence through Pergunnah of Furrah into the Muttra district.

140. The effect of the progress of this column was most beneficial; resistance on the part of the landholders ceased at once, the Thanes and Tehseeel officials were re-established, and assumed the usual control without molestation. If, as did occasionally happen, the country people in the Kheragurh and Jugneypur Pergunnahs showed signs of restiveness, I considered that it was better to leave the remedy to time and conviction than to use the military arm as an instrument of persuasion.

141. In the Pergunnah of Futteebad, two villages remained obstinately and pestilently rebellious, Khanderi and Dhuunola. Every means was tried to induce them to listen to reason; well-disposed zamindars were used as mediators, and promises of forgiveness made, with no effect; finally, when it was ascertained that the proprietors, assisted by a great many fugitive sepoys, were strengthening their gunners and collecting ammunition and guns, I considered it necessary to apply to the military authorities for aid. With great difficulty, on the 26th of November, I obtained the loan of two guns, pitting artillerymen, and two artillery conductors, who were sent under an escort of 100 matchlockmen furnished by Meheender Singh, Dewan of Parma, to Futteebad. These I accompanied; I had before sent Lieutenant Furnell and 100 Sikh sowars to assist the police. On my arrival on the 27th of November I found that Lieutenant Furnell, while reconnoitring the village of Dhuunola, had been found on by parties concealed in the ravines.
142. On sending information of this to Colonel Fraser, C.B., he consented to despatch a detachment of the 3rd Europeans, under Captain Chalmers, and a Howitzer; the whole under command of Major Hennessy.

143. The next day Major Hennessy reconnoitring was fired at. Major Hennessy reconnoitring is fired at.

144. The next day the three Gurrees, which formed the stronghold at Dhuonola, were also carried after considerable resistance.

145. On the 30th idem, Inayet Hossein, the Deputy Collector of Ferozabad, arrived in camp at Futteecabad, with the intelligence received of slaughter of villages on the left bank of the Jumna, had murdered, in cold-blood, forty-five of the police burkundazes of Ferozabad. They had committed this atrocity under the following circumstances:—A highway robbery had been committed at Chundwar; a party of the police, of one Jemadar and forty-five burkundazes, were despatched thither to seize the offenders. These men arriving in the afternoon without proper guides, got entangled among the deep and intricate net-works of ravines, which extend for from three to six miles on the left bank of the Jumna. The Mullahis collected from all the surrounding villages, and attacked the police with overwhelming numbers; they fired on them all through the night, and by the morning had completely exterminated the whole number. Not a single man returned to tell the tale, nor when a search was possible, was any trace of the bodies discovered: it must be supposed that they were thrown into the Jumna.

On receipt of this intelligence, I was most anxious that the force, but a few miles removed from the scene of slaughter, should march thither, and avenge this atrocious crime. In this I was overruled, on the ground that Colonel Fraser's orders were that the force should not delay its return on the fort. I was not even allowed to communicate to Colonel Fraser, and receive his orders. It is known that at that time the "Mullahis" had prepared to resist; thus the opportunity was lost for inflicting punishment. A subsequent visit found every village deserted.

146. The estate of Dhurpoora, Pergunnah Etmadpoor, had been let for arrears of revenue to Jotee Pershad. The Lumberdar, Hurlall, a notorious malefactor, had escaped. On the 19th of December he returned, ejected the servants of Jotee Pershad, and commenced a course of plunder, which stretched far and wide. He was rapidly joined by all the loose and bad characters in the neighbourhood, and no less than twenty-nine villages were plundered by him from that time to the 5th of February.

147. But so utterly destitute of troops were we at that time, that no military expedition could be organized against him. On the 4th of February, an opportunity offering, a force marched against Dhurpoora, and expelled him without difficulty.

148. In the city of Agra, under the directions of Mr. Read, Financial Commissioner, a city barrier, being an encircling wall with gates at the entrances of the principal city barrier erected.
For which I planned and carried out by Captain Munbee, assisted by Mr. Hall. The Memorandum on this subject will be found been one of the first. Half the expense was raised by subscription, and half remained steadily remittance. Experience has now proved that the erection of this, as it is called, has been attended with the very best effects. The doors are closed at 9 P.M., and opened at gun-fire A.M., between which hours all ingress and egress is forbidden, except under express order. Burglaries committed inside the wall are almost unknown.

149. Since that time, although parts of the district have been occasioned by invasions of dacoits from the Chumbul by the passage of fugitive rebels, and by the restiveness of distant villages, all which have been reported to go as they have occurred, but the transition from anarchy to security has been gradual and sure.

Close of Narrative.

It only remains for me to notice those whose services on the part of Government have been of unusual merit. Of the Raja of Budawur, I have already spoken sufficiently, both in this Narrative and in the former, compiled agreeably to the Circular Order, in which notice of all others, whose names have appeared in this Narrative, has also there appeared.

With regard to Rajaram, the late Cotwal, and Ramnarain, late Tehseel-dar, I must be allowed to offer some further remarks. I can write in no stronger words than I have already done, on the nature of their services. They have been acknowledged by those of the highest official rank, who were in Agra during the most critical period. Of these, Rajaram has received no acknowledgment at all, but has been recommended for a "khilut of one piece." Ramnarain has received none, and has been compelled to resign his office of Tehseel-dar, because its duties and the work of a Pleader in the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut were considered incompatible.

151. When high authority has pronounced opinion, it is difficult to speak in opposition without being charged with insubordination.

Ditto.

152. Syfoolla Khan has been promoted in the scale of Deputy Collector, and received a khilut of Rupees 1,000 for services rendered in Agra, while our power was yet firm in the district; and for (as I understand) political services at Kerowlee afterwards.

Ditto.

153. Rajaram, who performed the duties of Cotwal of the city from the time when we had no power at all outside the guns of the fort, to when our power was completely restored, is recommended to be rewarded by a khilut of one piece, a reward which would be considered little less than an insult; and is debarred from the post of a Deputy Collector as being too infirm. While Ramnarain is considered not worthy of any reward at all.

Ditto.

154. It is not too late for the Government to act so as to support its character for generosity and consistency.

APPENDIX No. I.

ALLUDED TO IN PARAGRAPH 13.

MEMORANDUM IN DEFENCE OF THE STATION OF AGRA.

1. As requested by His Honor, I proceed to give in detail the measures I would recommend for the tranquillization and defence of the station and town of Agra,
2. The fort has been secured by the Brigadier’s prompt deputation of a detachment from the European Regiment to guard it; and the requisite orders, I understand, have been issued for placing it in a proper state of defence, and provisioning it for a term of six months.

3. The Magistrate, by his determination and preparedness to act, is fully equal to the task of keeping the populace of the city under control; and if he associate the better classes of the citizens with him, he will with their aid maintain order.

4. Our difficulties are, the uncertain temper of the Native Regiments; the Central Jail, with its large number of convicts; the great and straggling length of the civil and military stations; and the number of schools, institutions, and families, containing an unusual number of helpless females and children.

5. On the subject of the Native Regiments, I will state my opinion in a separate memorandum. At present I confine myself to the suggestion of those measures which, while they maintain an attitude of vigilance (which of itself is half a defence), should give public confidence, and display to the people and Native States around us, unity of purpose and undaunted resolution in trying times.

6. I do not think there is any reason to apprehend at present any sudden attack by disciplined troops in this station. It is impossible that the mutineers and rebels at Delhi, who must be anticipating and preparing for attack on themselves by the military force collecting under the Commander-in-Chief, can have the inclination or hardihood to despatch an expedition. At all events our front is covered by the Bhurtpoor troops under Captain Nixon’s command, and this ought to be efficacious as a political demonstration, and an assurance of early intimation of any such movement.

7. It is quite certain that the 9th Regiment has taken the direction to Dehli, which has been selected by the rebels as the point of contest with the Government.

8. We have therefore, I consider, only to prepare for the possible contingency of marauding bands of the predatory clans—Mewates, Goojurs, and the like, being emboldened by the defection of our military establishments, and the want of confidence necessarily attaching to regiments which have not mutinied to make an incursion, and by letting loose a crowd of prisoners to obtain allies in plunder, massacre, and incendiariaism.

9. The opinion I know has been discarded, which I must, however, retain that an outlay of Rupees 50,000 or 60,000 on a circumvallation of the civil and military station, taking advantage of the mounds scattered through the whole line, and securing the principal thoroughfares with strong entrance and posts of defence, would be more efficacious in preventing incursions than any system of open posts and pickets.

10. It is, I know, the fashion to deride the Le Shahr Punnah system; but the people think differently, and point to localities, where it still obtains as a security from incursion from without, and against successful evasion of pursuit by criminals within.

11. This however having been negatived, the next best arrangement is a system—

1st—Of rendezvous in case of alarm.
2nd—Of defence posts.
3rd—Of advanced pickets.

12. Rendezvous should be buildings of sufficient accommodations for women and children within the interior apartments, the verandahs outside being kept and prepared for defence. They should be terraced buildings, so that there may be no risk of fire.
13. Each rendezvous should be under the charge of one person, whose duty it should be to prevent needless hurry, to regulate the admission of vehicles and the families of houses adjacent, and to have supplies at this season much needed, in case of panic, of water, and other conveniences. To another party, or more than one, according to the extent of the building, should be assigned the charge of conducting the defence, and if the position becomes obviously untenable, of retiring with the whole party under the fort.

14. The places noted above appear to be well suited for the purpose; and if the Magistrate concur in this arrangement, the officer or person in charge should be at once instructed to register the houses, the inmates of which are to resort to the rendezvous, and to furnish tickets to each person or family. The male adults of those houses or families should act as the guard of defence; the aged giving their aid to the families and children.

15. The Government doubtless will not obj.et to the supply of a few fire-arms with ammunition from the magazine to the officer charged with defence of the rendezvous.

16. Defence Posts will be positions, which a few resolute men can maintain against numbers until relieved by the succour of military force.

17. Each of these posts would have its assigned number and detail of advanced posts or pickets, the men of which would retire upon each, or report to each any danger approaching.

18. The alarm at one post would necessarily be taken up by the others, and be the signal for families to resort to their respective rendezvous, which should always be ready for their reception.

19. It would be convenient to arrange, if practicable, to have at each defence post, horsemen to convey intelligence to any point, possibly more frequently to dissipate alarm than to raise it. It will be as well however to send written instead of verbal messages, if this can be done.

20. I note in the margin the points that seem best suited for defence posts, with the strength of each.

21. Advance posts, or pickets, according to locality and distance, should be manned by mounted police or foot. Their duty would be to watch against surprise and to convey, without needless clamour and alarm, intelligence of any suspicion gathering, or approach of parties.

22. It is indispensable to prevent confusion and panic that alarm should be given from the defence posts; the officer posted at which should give the signal to the others.

23. The advanced posts I recommend to be established as noted in the margin.

24. With these arrangements completed, and with the aid of patrolling parties within the circle of posts, the civil and military station should be secure against ordinary danger. That which would arise from a hostile military force advancing against it, would be best encountered in the field.

23rd May 1857.

(Sd.) E. A. READE.
Order by His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor,—26th May 1857.

Captain G. M. Prendergast is appointed to be his representative in the details of all protective arrangements of a military nature for the civil station, from the Ajmore Gate to Poya Ghât.

2. Captain Prendergast will communicate daily with Mr. Boldero, the Joint-Magistrate, so as that they both may be kept informed of all occurrence and arrangements of importance.

3. Captain Prendergast will submit, through the Magistrate, for the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor, a detailed statement of rendezvous, out-posts, and pickets. He will also regulate the employment of the Volunteer Horse in patrolling the civil lines.

4. Captain Prendergast will take up his quarters in the civil lines, so as always to be accessible to the community; and on emergency, will give his own directions as to defensive arrangements, as to the persons to assemble at particular rendezvous.

5. Mr. Boldero, as Joint-Magistrate, will act promptly on his own discretion in enforcing police rule and order, as distinct for the duties of rendezvous, out-posts, and pickets. In the event of emergent necessity, Captain Prendergast, as a military officer, will take the command in all points.

6. An establishment should be maintained solely for keeping up free communication between Captain Prendergast and Mr. Boldero, and the Magistrate, at all hours, day or night.

APPENDIX No. II.
ALLUDED TO IN PARAGRAPH 36.


PRESENT:
Brigadier Polwhele, Commanding at Agra.
E. A. Reade, Esq., Senior Member, Sudder Board Revenue.
Major N. Macleod, Engineer, Military Secretary.

Warrant by the Lieutenant-Governor.

Brigadier Polwhele, Mr. Reade, and Major Macleod, to be a Council to carry on the necessary business of Government during the following twenty-four hours, but it is to be understood that no radical change of policy is to be carried out.

(Sd.)
J. R. Colvin,
Lieut.-Governor, N.-W. P.

Dated 3rd July 1857.

2. The Superintendent of the Central Jail attended the Council. Nothing has been done towards diminishing the number of prisoners, nearly 4,000 in number, or organizing a guard to relieve the European soldiers there, and whose services will be required in the field. Doctor Walker was directed at once to release prisoners sentenced for short time, or whose conduct had been good, and to pass them over the Jumna with a certificate, and subsistence of two rupees each, and the requisite funds were placed at his disposal. He was also authorized to pardon sixty or seventy of the Sikh prisoners, on the condition of six months' faithful services, to take an oath from them, and, together with some Sikhs who have accompanied Major Raikes, to form them into a guard outside the jail, instead of the European soldiers. Full discretion was given to Doctor Walker to liberate as many prisoners as he might deem fit, observing the precautions above mentioned.

3. Mr. Longden and the Reverend Mr. French represented the general distress and anxiety of the Native Christians, in consequence of the order prohibiting their admission into the fort; and it was directed that their admission should be allowed on the condition of their undertaking to perform menial offices and any duty required of them.

4. Mr. Longden also represented the importance of removing the mass of type metal at Secundra, several tons, with some of the more valuable presses, to the fort, which was allowed; and ten of the Commissariat carts authorized to be used for that purpose on the following day.
5. The various accounts of the Gwalior Contingent detachments, which have mutinied in the districts on the opposite bank of the Jumna, render it necessary to adopt effective measures regarding the bridge of boats; the only precaution at present taken being the drawing up of the bridge at night. Orders were therefore simultaneously issued to the Magistrate, and to the Superintendent Mr. Maconnochie to leave a clear space of 150 to 200 feet on either side, and Lieutenant Glover was deputed to see the work done.

6. Two guns, 9-pounders, having been sent to the Magistrate for a temporary use, and the requisitions for their return to the Ordnance Department having hitherto proved unavailing, Lieutenant Henderson was directed to remove these guns from Syfoollah's levy and to bring them to the artillery lines; which, after some opposition, has been effected with the aid of the militia.

7. The Kotah Contingent having been brought into Cantonments from the opposite bank of the Jumna by the determination of a Council of War, the question of their disposal was considered. It was decided that the test proposed by Major Macleod should be applied, viz., that their guns should remain with the reserve of Europeans left for the protection of Cantonment, while their infantry and horse should accompany the force on its march out to meet or attack the mutineers. The arrangement was declared by Captain Dennys to be accepted to the men. To facilitate its adoption, orders were issued to move their camp to the rising ground on the road leading towards Futtelpoor Sikree. The force mutinied on this spot, the cavalry, after killing the Artillery Sergeant, fled towards the mutineers' camp and were followed by the infantry in disorder. Major Prendergast, with his body of militia horse, by a gallant charge cut down some of the latter, and captured their camels and ammunition. An order will be issued by Brigadier Polwele, commending the conduct of the militia on this occasion.

8. Orders were issued, requesting the residents of Cantonments to repair to the rendezvous of the 44th Mess Railway House, or Mofussilite Press, for the night.

9. Lieutenant Henderson having brought Nawab Syfoollah Khan after midnight to the Railway House to report the desertion of the Bhurtpoor Horse, and the Nawab having acknowledged that his matchlock infantry were unfit to fight against mutineer soldiers, he was ordered to quit Shahgunge at once, and to return to Kerowlee without delay. Permission was given by Brigadier Polwele to his levy passing in front of Cantonments, and Mr. Drummond directed to see that this order was at once carried into effect.

(Sd.) Thos. Polwele,
Brigadier, Commanding Agra and Muttra Districts.

(Sd.) E. A. Reade,
Senior Member, Sudder Board Revenue.

(Sd.) N. C. Macleod,
Military Secretary.
### APPENDIX No. III.

**ALLUDED TO IN PARAGRAPH 70.**

List of Murders committed in the City during July 1857, with notes of reward recommended for apprehension of criminals.

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<td>1</td>
<td>Mr. Hubbard, Teescher, Agra Government College.</td>
<td>6th July 1857...</td>
<td>Chowkee Kullan Khan.</td>
<td>Killed by the Police at Chowkee Kullan Khan, by gunshot and latterly by sword.</td>
<td>Kheng Sing ... Released.</td>
<td>Hanged.</td>
<td>1. Madho Khan, Havildar ... 200 Rupees. 2. Hurdial, Naik ... 150</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Mr. Allen, Pensioner ...</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Pay Chowkee ...</td>
<td>Doors broken open by a mob of Police and Mahomet ans, and killed.</td>
<td>Oorzaollah, Fakir.</td>
<td>Transported for life.</td>
<td>1. Secunder's Moonshee ... 200</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Mr. Alexander Derridon, Mrs. Derridon, one girl and one boy.</td>
<td>6th July 1857...</td>
<td>Kala Muhal ...</td>
<td>Killed by fire in his own house, others engaged in the murder.</td>
<td>Lachmun, Rambux ... Released.</td>
<td>Under trial.</td>
<td>1. Durrooa ... 150</td>
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<td>2. Ram Purshed, Moohlat ... 50</td>
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<td>3. Ellie Bux, Butcher ... 150</td>
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<td>4. Molah Bux ... 150</td>
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<td>5. Jan Mahomed ... 150</td>
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<td>6. Ahmud ... 150</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Mr. Christie ...</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Mayee Than ...</td>
<td>Called from his house, chased, and killed by a mob in Mayee Than; his head was put on the Cotwalee Chubotee.—Further enquiry.</td>
<td>Lachmun ... Released.</td>
<td>Under trial.</td>
<td>1. Kullun, Barkundas ... 150</td>
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<td>2. Malley Khan ... 150</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Mr. Lamberer</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Bagh Moorzuflur Khan.</td>
<td>Killed in his own house by gunshot and sword slashes.</td>
<td>Joheroo Khan ... Released.</td>
<td>Under trial.</td>
<td>1. Balkishen, Goojer ... 150</td>
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<td>2. Peerlux ... 150</td>
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<td>3. Rheebeen Khan ... 150</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Major Jacobs ...</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Nowmeela ...</td>
<td>Murdered by the Mewatees of neighbouring bustees, and his servants, also Mewatees, in his own house.</td>
<td>Uker Khan ... Ditto.</td>
<td>Released.</td>
<td>1. Emam Khan ... 150</td>
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<td>2. Khawnee Khan ... 150</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Mr. Piaggoo ...</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Chilee Eeat ...</td>
<td>Mobbed in Chilee Eeat while running away, killed by 34 many others in collusion.</td>
<td>Uker Khan ... Ditto.</td>
<td>Released.</td>
<td>1. Manghoo ... 150</td>
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<td>2. Zehoor Khan ... 60 Bait.</td>
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<td>3. Ruheem Bux ... Hanged.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
List of Murders committed in the City during July 1857, with notes of reward recommended for apprehension of criminals.—(Concluded.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Names of murdered persons</th>
<th>Date of murder</th>
<th>Place of murder</th>
<th>Circumstances of murder</th>
<th>Names of criminals apprehended and convicted</th>
<th>Proposed Reward.</th>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Roostam and Peter</td>
<td>6th July 1857</td>
<td>Kuttra Kummul</td>
<td>Killed in their own houses, by the complicity of the Mohulla Nobels.</td>
<td>1. Isil Khan ... ... 100 Rupees.</td>
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<td>2. Kurram Bux ... ... 100</td>
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<td>3. Boodhu ... ... 100</td>
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<td>4. Runzamoo ... ... 100</td>
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<td>5. Kallamoo ... ... 100</td>
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<td>6. Chotay Khan ... ... 100</td>
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<td>7. Nunmoo Khan ... ... 100</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Mr. Lewis Maxwell</td>
<td>6th July</td>
<td>Gunda Nullah</td>
<td>Followed into his house and killed by 2 Nijeels.</td>
<td>1. Kallo ... ... 100</td>
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<td>2. Sultan ... ... 100</td>
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<td>3. Kurram Bux ... ... 100</td>
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<td>4. Guloo ... ... 100</td>
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<td>5. Mahomed Ania ... ... 100</td>
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<td>6. Mathoo ... ... 100</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>A Drummer ...</td>
<td>7th July</td>
<td>Purta Poora</td>
<td>Went into Chumaries' houses and was killed.</td>
<td>Boolla Chumbar On security.</td>
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<td>1. Osmool ... ... 100</td>
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<td>2. Poorna ... ... 100</td>
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<td>3. Ummoor Siang ... ... 100</td>
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<td>5. Dhiunj ... ... 100</td>
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<td>6. Khooshalee ... ... 100</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Mr. and Mrs. Dennis</td>
<td>6th July</td>
<td>Rekab Gunje</td>
<td>Killed in their own house by a mob.</td>
<td>Mamoo ... ... Released.</td>
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<td>Umurreen Khan Ditto.</td>
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<td>1. Maddoo ... ... Further enquiry.</td>
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<td>2. Guuso ... ... 100 Rupees.</td>
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<td>3. Eladut Khan ... ... 100</td>
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<td>4. Zehoor Khan ... ... 100</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Mr. Anthony</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Kucheere Ghat</td>
<td>Killed while hiding in an Indigo vat.</td>
<td>Uddool Humeed Ditto.</td>
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<td>Kasim Alee Ditto.</td>
<td>1. Wasee ... ... 150</td>
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<td>Daoura Perahad On security.</td>
<td>2. Ishree ... ... 150</td>
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<td>Ditto.</td>
<td>3. Hurdeo ... ... 150</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Mrs. Conlan</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Jat Poora</td>
<td>Killed by Nabboo Chowkedar</td>
<td>Mangloe ... ... Ditto.</td>
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<td>Nuthoo Chowkedar ... ... 150 Further proof required.</td>
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</table>
14. Jansem ... Ditto ... Wunceepora ... Mobbed in Wunceepora, and killed by Mewatoos and butchers.

15. Mrs. Matthews ... Ditto ... Bagh Mozaffur Khan. ... Went and killed in her own house.

16. Mr. Hare and son ... 6th July ... Gutteah ... Mr. Hare was killed in his own house; he was paralytic.

17. Mrs. Thornton ... Baylungus ... Uncertain.

Agra Magistracy,
The 5th June 1858.
APPENDIX No. IV.

ALLUDED TO IN PARAGRAPH 123.

Memorandum, dated the 13th October 1857.

The surprise of Saturday morning may appear to call for some remarks from me, it having been my duty to collect and bring promptly to notice, in a convenient form, all the intelligence regarding the movements of the enemy, furnished by the local authorities and others.

I will begin from the first start by the Indore forces from Dholepoor, and I hope to show that, amidst many difficulties, and the perplexity of conflicting evidence, timely warning was given to, and acted upon by, the military authorities.

The Indore mutineers had been talking of marching on Agra ever since they arrived at Dholepoor, now above a month ago. After the Nenmunch Brigade left Muttra to join them, they gave out every day that they were going to march the next to Agra. "The wolf" had been so often called out, that when it did actually move, it was at first difficult to distinguish fact from mere report.

It is the more satisfactory therefore to find that the very day on which the Indore force broke ground, on the same evening warning was given both by Major Macpherson and myself.

They moved on the 6th October. About 8 o'clock that evening I reported that intimation had been brought to me of the whole Indore force being at Munnia, ten miles this side of Dholepoor, and of a considerable picket being at Jnnow; and at the same time said that there were other and conflicting statements, and that a portion of the Indore force might have been mistaken for the whole. The intelligence was regarded by Major Macpherson and myself as so important that we both (he unknown to me) troubled Colonel Fraser and Colonel Cotton with it, at an unusually late hour of the night.

7th October.—On this day I submitted a memorandum, recounting the conflicting evidence. There was no doubt that a large body was at Munnia, but it was questioned whether the entire force had evacuated Dholepoor. The common talk of the Camp was stated to be an attack in a few days on Agra; and various preparations at the Ghâts leading to Agra,—one or more ladders, stores of pegs and planks, were mentioned, showing unequivocally their intention to cross.

Upon the whole I concluded that, although there might be a doubt as to whether the Indore mutineers had moved with their entire force on Munnia, "at the same time there were so many concurrent testimonies received both by others and myself of the whole force being at Munnia, that we ought to be prepared for that contingency."

On this day successive letters and telegraphic messages were despatched towards Khundowlee, and to Colonel Greathed, stating the dangers in which the town and environs of Agra were placed from the threatened attack of the Indore troops, urging an early advance by the moveable Column, and directing that, in case of any delay, 500 cavalry and a troop of Horse Artillery should be pushed on with the utmost rapidity. These were all despatched between 10 A.M. and 2 P.M.

8th October.—On this day frequent intelligence came in to us. At midday I reported its purport in a Memorandum.

I reviewed the movements of the Indore force on the 6th and 7th.

I stated that the main body of these mutineers, with the Artillery, were believed to be at Munnia, and that a portion of them were expected to move on that day to Jnnow, which is about eighteen miles from Agra.
I stated that parties of sowars had crossed the Ootunghan, and talked of passing over by different Ghâts; that one party was at Kâgarole, about thirteen miles distant, on the banks of the Kharee, and close to the Akbala Ghât, by which they talked of crossing; that Camp equipage was reported to have reached Tehra, about eleven miles from Agra on the metalled road, and close to the Oosra Ghât; "and it is stated," I said, "that they have caught the Zemin- 
dars of Koorâ and Shânshabad (villages on this side the Kharee), and ordered them to have supplies ready for them at Kukoooa, a village a short stage from this on the Jajow road." Kukoooa is only about five or six miles from Cantonments.

The danger appeared to me so imminent that I raised the question of opening the Futtehpoor sluices, and throwing such a volume of water into the Kharee as to render it impassable; and I said I would have recommended the measure "had Colonel Greathed's Column not been so close at hand."

This Memorandum was, as usual, sent to Colonel Fraser and Colonel Cotton, the former of whom regarded the danger as so immediate and pressing that I was directed to forward a copy to Colonel Greathed, which I did at 2½ P.M.—"Again urging on him the necessity of sending 500 cavalry, and a troop of Horse Artillery on at once, so that they may, if possible, reach this to-morrow (the 9th) for if not, we may be compelled to fight the Dholepoor mutineers alone and under great disadvantages."

Thus the danger was anticipated of a not improbable attack on Agra on the 10th, if not on the 9th.

Another letter was written to Colonel Greathed on the same day, in which I said that "the enemy had made preparations for crossing the Kharee to-morrow (9th), and will then be within an easy march of Agra. The whole force declares its intention of attacking the fort, and we must be at once prepared to repel and chastise them." "The speediest movement to Agra was on these grounds again urged, and the Cavalry and Horse Artillery directed to be sent forward with all despatch in advance of the main Column.

More alarming reports and messages can hardly be conceived than those in the afternoon of this day. Huttlee Singh, one of Mr. Phillipps's best spies, was sent to me; I considered his evidence so important that I submitted it (notwithstanding that it was little more than confirmatory of my previous Memorandum) to the Chief Commissioner and Colonel Cotton.

It stated that Shahpoor was quite evacuated, the whole force with all the guns having advanced on us; that the enemy had been joined by the Neemuch Brigade; that the force had left Munnia, crossed the Ootunghan, and were now encamped at Syan, which it reached early in the morning. Syan is some fifteen or sixteen miles from this.

Their intention was distinctly stated of proceeding next to the passage of the Kharee. Their contrivances for the purpose were indicated,—huge ladders to be thrown across the narrowest part of the stream, stores of planks were collected on the border to facilitate the passage, "To-morrow morning (the 9th) they would be at the Kharee;" they were to have store godowns at Tehra on the other bank, and keep their supplies there. "They all talk of coming to Agra, and say they will take the fort in three days."

In submitting this evidence, I stated that I considered it reliable, and regarded the danger as so imminent that I suggested a reconnaissance, or continuous mile pickets, to give us intelligence of our enemy's movements.

9th October.—On this morning a reconnaissance was made under Lieut- 
eman Vere, by the Militia Cavalry. They found, I believe, the enemy's horse in force on this side, for they were fired upon and obliged to turn back, and they were pursued to within two or three miles of Agra.
I considered this as a complete substantiation of all the intelligence and warnings which I had submitted; and, now that bodies of Cavalry were insidiously sweeping this bank of the Kharee, and advancing close even to the Cantonment, I believed that military precautions, as a matter of course, would be maintained to prevent a surprise.

Numerous messengers came in during the day, but they did little more than corroborate the alarming fact already established by the attack and pursuit of our reconnoitring party, that the enemy were already in great force on this side the Kharee river. I would only have misled had I mentioned all the reported intentions of the enemy, for though one witness said that they spoke of having their guns on the 72nd parade ground on Saturday, the most of them alleged that Sunday would be the day, and it may really have been the day originally intended, the mutineers having hastened their passage on the night of the 9th to anticipate our reinforcements.

On the forenoon of the 9th, I wrote as follows to Colonel Greathed:—"The enemy is encamped on the other side of the Kharee, and professes to intend a passage of that river to-day. They will probably find it a more difficult matter than they fancy to transport their heavy guns across the stream, which is deep. But the main body of their force may, if they choose to risk the thing, cross over to-day, and to-morrow bear us in our fort, and plunder the city. Hence our urgent anxiety to be provided with Cavalry and another troop of Horse Artillery. We want this in advance of our reinforcements, and the remaining of them alleged that Sunday would be the day, and it may really have been the day originally intended, the mutineers having hastened their passage on the night of the 9th to anticipate our reinforcements.

At 9 P.M. I wrote again—"Our reconnoitring party has come in. Numbers of the cavalry have crossed the Kharee, and our party was fired on. 300 infantry about had crossed. This all looks as if they meant to come on. The Cavalry are spreading over the country, and will be committing all kinds of excesses and outrages."

Finally, so urgent was the danger felt to be that Captain Patton rode out to Colonel Greathed's Camp, to convey personally the Chief Commissioner's pressing demand for a prompt advance.

On Friday evening (9th) Mr. Thornhill informed me that the Dhol-poor Vakeis came to him when I happened to be out, and reported that 2,000 men had crossed. The circumstances were communicated to the Chief Commissioner at once by Mr. Thornhill.

10th October.—This morning no messenger, nor any report from any quarter, was received by me till 9 or 10 o'clock, that is, till very shortly before the attack of the enemy. This occasioned me, however, no anxiety, as I understood that military precautions were being maintained.

As Greathed's strong column of all arms was also pouring in, and I believe the anxieties of all parties were dispelled by the long wished-for sight of our reinforcements, no one dreamt that the enemy would venture near so well equipped a force; and this, I conceive, naturally lulled the apprehension, and prevented the precautionary measures, which might otherwise have been set on foot. It was never suspected that the enemy would be so foolish as to fall into a trap by walking up to our four-and-twenty guns. The reception they met with even under the disadvantages of a surprise, is some justification of the feeling of security.

It would, no doubt, have been more satisfactory if our people had brought intelligence of the near approach of the Column. But presuming that the guns were being crossed during the night and up to 6 or 7 in the morning, and that they moved onwards, as I believe they did, steadily from the river to the Cantonment, a distance of only 8 or 9 miles, it is quite possible, first, that at the time the start from the river was made none of our spies were on the spot;

*Note.—I had always understood from Colonel Cotton, who examined both the Ooera and Akhala Ghidas, that the passage would be very difficult for heavy, or indeed for any, guns. Hence this sentence.
and that even if they were, they could not without suspicion have hurried on in advance to give the intelligence. The business of the spy is dangerous and uncertain, and when an enemy has come to such close quarters, military precautions are to be trusted to rather than the irregular and furtive reports of unarmed messengers.

In fact our spies were going out to their work early that morning, and I have the consistent depositions of two of them, who met the advancing enemy a couple of miles out of cantonments, that, after considerable danger, they effected their way back, but only in time the one to report to the Chowbee (the blind Tehseeldar) what was coming, almost as the guns were about to open; and the other, to warn a gentleman, whom he met driving in a buggy near the Church, and whose life perhaps he was the means of saving. These messengers describe the guns as coming on at a rapid pace along the road, the big one drawn by one or more elephants.

The report that the enemy hearing of the advance of Greathed's Column had fallen back, doubtless grew out of the probability of such a move. Probabilities often grow into reports. The report came from two sources, much about the same time, 9½ o'clock; one the statement of the Sikh Goroo to Mr. Lane, the other of Eesree Pershaud, Deputy Collector, to me.

* Agra, The 13th October 1857. *

(Sd.) W. MUIR.

APPENDIX No. V.

ALLUDED TO IN PARAGRAPH 134.

No. 1, dated Agra, 19th January 1858.

From—A. L. M. PHILLIPS, Esq., Collector, Agra,
To—Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, Agra.

I have the honor to bring to the notice of the Government, North-Western Provinces, the meritorious conduct and services of Rajaram, late Kotwal of the city, and Ramnarain, Tehseeldar of Pergunnah Huzoor Tehseel.

2. Rajaram took charge of the office of Kotwal on the 9th of July. He was nominated by the late Lieutenant-Governor at the request of the most respectable inhabitants of the city. His real position was Tehseeldar of Bimadpoor; his infirmities and age might well have served as an excuse for refusing so onerous and responsible an office. The city had for three days been traversed by bands of marauders and murderers, headed by the late police, and although they had been driven out, or transformed for the time into quiet citizens by the terror of the armed force which marched through the city on the 8th July, the ferment of the late disorders had not subsided. The city was still without any organized police, excepting a remnant of chowkedars; a great degree of panic prevailed; and the main body of citizens, however respectable, were afraid to come forward in support of Government. To re-organize a police force, to restore confidence to the well-disposed, and to control the evil-minded, so lately in open and armed resistance to authority, was a task of no little difficulty and danger. I consider that the success of the attempt was in a great measure owing to the general respect in which Rajaram was held by the citizens, and the influence he thereby possessed. If the peculiar features of the time be recalled, the recent shock our cause in arms had experienced at Agra itself, and the widespread conviction in the native mind that our rule in this country was drawing to an end, the Government should be, in my opinion, ready to admit the claims of Rajaram to gratitude and liberal compensation.

* Note.—Precautions had been taken to prevent intelligence of the movements of Greathed's Column from getting abroad, so as to reach the enemy and scare them away. The ordinary bulletin of the 9th was purposely silent as to its approach. *
3. Ramnarain took office as Tehseel Dar of the Huzoor Tehseel on the 16th of July. He was up to the date of the outbreak a Pleader of the Sudder Najamat, and not a Government servant. His energy and the cheerful confidence in the success of our arms, which he preserved during the darkest parts of the present conflict, have been remarked on by those holding high office. During the battle of October, both Ramnarain and Rajaram continued at the Kotwalle, and by their presence and confidence undoubtedly prevented any stir among the disorderly part of the citizens. To the hearty co-operation of these two men I must express myself much indebted. The Government, I trust will think fit to acknowledge the services of Ramnarain, as they may think expedient.

4. Rajaram is well fitted for the office of Deputy Collector; his name is already in the list, in the Office of the Sudder Board of Revenue. It is his ambition to arrive at that post. Ramnarain is also anxious to obtain the same appointment. The practice of a Pleader in Sudder Court will necessarily be much noticed under the new system about to be introduced. I believe him to be well fitted in capacity and character for the post.

5. I need only add that, as these two men have come forward in so marked a manner as supporters and servants of our Government during the whole of times, a mark of approval of their services would have a more than ordinary beneficial effect on the native community.

APPENDIX No. VI.

ALLUDED TO IN PARAGRAPH 148.

MEMORANDUM.

I have requested Mr. Macconnochie to submit his report on completing the city barrier to me, as the measure originated in the directions issued me when in charge of the Government under date 22nd September last:

The grounds upon which this measure was adopted are set forth in the Minute of that date. Special mention of it was made in my official note of 30th September, to the Supreme Government, whose approval of the other measures have been received.

It was arranged with the leading citizens of Agra, at the time, that the expense should be repaid by subscription, the advances being made once from the Treasury to ensure the rapid completion of the work.

The plan, as shown in the annexed maps, was laid down by C. Munbee in person, and the agency of supervision selected by him.

I have inspected the work, and so far as an unprofessional person is warranted to give an opinion, it appears to me to have been admirably done and executed. It certainly has been completed in a wonderfully short time, and I think, looking at the magnitude of the undertaking, at remarkably small cost; but this is partly attributed to the skill with which the walls or lofty sides of houses have been united by substantial fences, and ready aid of the towns people in collecting, and often contributing, the raw materials.

The effect of the measure is already more than was anticipated. It is most important that there should be an increased sense of security in which is the seat of Government, it being obvious that the successful defence of the town of Agra would be damaging, not only throughout the Western Provinces, but through Native States. But it is already proving another effect, that of making Agra, within the city wall, a large store of grain and merchandise, and very probably, ere long, a repository of specie. Benares and other places.
Captain Munbee on leaving Agra specially commended to my notice the exertions of his co-adjuditors, and as I have constantly watched the progress of the work, I can bear individual testimony to the energy and devotion of Mr. Macconnchie and Mr. Hall, in superintending the progress of a work, portions of which on the verge of fatal nullahs and the like, rendered such supervision a trying task.

I recommend, from the balance in hand, the reward of Rupees 500 to Mr. Macconnchie, of Rupees 300 to Mr. Hall, and Rupees 150 to Sergeant Dallas.

The total expense of the work will thus be:

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<th>Description</th>
<th>Rs.</th>
<th>a.</th>
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<td>Add proposed above</td>
<td>17,991</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Add to the reserve for repairs, &amp;c.</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>18,139</td>
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Of this amount Rupees 9,500 should be struck out of the Inefficient Balance, and the remainder held to be realized by contributions from the city.

Certain precautions are needed to maintain the effectiveness and durability of this measure, and mutatis mutandis the system which obtains at Benares should be introduced at Agra.

1. No buildings, sheds, or any kind of material, or plantation should be allowed to approach the exterior walls from the outside.

2. There should be a periodical inspection to see that the previous rule is rigidly observed.

3. For each gate there should be selected from the city chowkidars, two, at least, as Phatuckbunds, receiving Rupee 1 additional pay from the chowkidaree collections; their duty should be to open and shut the gates, and to keep an eye on parties going out and coming in.

4. The key of the gate should, after close, be consigned to some respectable resident near, or (as in Benares such an one is styled) to the Mooktar Mohullah, without whose consent the gate should not be opened after the hour fixed for closing it. The Phatubkbund will keep the key of the wicket.

5. The Magistrate will determine the hours of opening and shutting gates, according to the season of the year.

Agra,

The 24th December 1857.

(Sd.) E. A. READE,

Financial Commissioner.

Narrative of events attending the outbreak of disturbances and the restoration of authority in the District of Muttra in 1857-58.

No. 102, dated Zillah Saharanpore, 10th August 1858.

From—M. THORNHILL, Esq., late Magistrate of Muttra,
To—G. F. HARVEY, Esq., Commissioner, Agra Division.

In reply to your letters noted in the margin, I have the honor to submit a Narrative of the events that occurred in the Muttra district, from the commencement of the disturbances till the period of my leaving the district.

2. On the 14th May 1857, I received information from the Magistrate of Goorgaon, that the mutineers were approaching the district; the information was vague, but confirmed in the evening by letters from various European gentlemen on the Customs and Railway Establishments at the north of the district; the ladies and non-combatants were immediately sent off to Agra.
3. During the next and following days, no certain information was received; the European gentlemen and others in Goorgaon and the north of the Muttra district came in, bringing very alarming rumours of the approach of the rebel army; from all that could be learnt the whole rebel army was believed to be marching down with the intention of attacking Agra.

4. On 16th May, Captain Nixon arrived with the Bhurtpoor army and took command of the station. The next day, or the following, it was ascertained that the rumours of the approach of the rebels were false. Captain Nixon then resolved to march towards Delhi, with the view, I believe, of opening the communication between Delhi and Agra, and co-operating with the Commander-in-Chief.

5. The news of the insurrection and the proclamation of the King of Delhi had now become known among the Native population, the country immediately became disturbed. The disturbances were chiefly attacks on bungalows and ejectment of new zemindars by the old.

6. There were six and a quarter lakhs of treasure in the treasury, under a guard of a company of one of the Native infantry regiment at Agra, I forget which. From the manner of the men and the private information I received, I thought them mutinous and wrote so to Agra; I also strongly recommended the treasure being sent in to Agra. I had carts ready waiting at the Office to send it on. Unfortunately my recommendation was not attended to.

7. On the 19th May, Captain Nixon marched out towards Delhi, I accompanied him, we marched slowly making long halts, a detachment was left behind for the protection of the city. A large number of new police had been raised, and I endeavored to raise new sowars, but with very little success. The great protection of the city consisted in the Seths Radha Kishen and Gobind Dass, who raised a large body of men at their own expense, and by their influence kept the other inhabitants quiet. They also lent Captain Nixon two brass guns.

8. Mr. Clifford, the Joint-Magistrate, was left behind in charge of the station, but was compelled almost immediately to leave from illness, his place was supplied by Mr. Dashwood; Mr. Elliot Colvin accompanied him as Assistant.

9. On the 23rd May you joined the army accompanied by several other European gentlemen. On the 25th May the army reached Kosee, and next morning marched on to Hodul, where it halted. Hodul being in the Goorgaon district, I remained at Kosee. A detachment of about 300 Bhurtpoor infantry and two guns were left with me under command of one of the Chiefs named Ruggoonath Sing; the guns were those lent by the Seths.

10. The disturbances in the district had been increasing both in number and enormity. Kuer Dildar Ali Khan, a large zemindar in Pergunnah Moat, was murdered by his villagers. On the 23rd May, Omrow Bahadoor, a relative of his who had estates in Pergunnah Nolijheel, had been besieged in his house, but on the approach of our force, the villagers had retired, and he made his escape. Several other murders were committed and other outrages, the particulars of which I do not remember.

11. On the 29th May I went to Chatta. In the evening Mr. Dashwood, M. Colvin, Mr. Gibbon, and Mr. Joyce, my head clerk, arrived and informed me of the mutiny of the treasury guard. The guard had been relieved by another company from Agra, and orders had been received to send in the treasure under their escort. The treasure was packed, placed on the carts, and the carts ready to start, when a shot was heard outside followed by a rush of sepoys into the office, firing at the European. All however escaped and ran towards the city, where they procured horses and rode out. Mr. Burlton, commanding the detachment, had been outside with the guard, and it was feared had been shot, and two of the clerks (the Mr. Hashman's) had got separated from the rest of the party in the flight to the city.
12. I presumed the mutineers had marched towards Allygurh, but as a precautionary measure, I sent out sowars along the Muttera road to gain intelligence. In about two hours they returned with the intelligence that the mutineers were approaching.

13. We immediately started for Captain Nixon's camp; in passing through Kosee, I sent for Ruggoonath Sing, he refused to come, to admit me into his camp, or to give up the Seth's guns. We reached Captain Nixon's camp about daybreak; Captain Nixon did not credit the intelligence of the approach of the mutineers, he, however, sent out a party to reconnoitre. About 9 o'clock, the intelligence was confirmed; the mutineers were approaching Kosee. Captain Nixon then made preparations for opposing them, on which the whole force broke out in open mutiny and turned their guns upon us; Captain Nixon then ordered us to fly. The rest of the Europeans went with you towards Sonah, I and Mr. Joyce returned to Muttera.

14. We arrived about three in the morning, and found the station burnt and deserted. We proceeded on to Agra in the hopes of obtaining assistance. The news of the mutiny had spread with great rapidity, and the whole country had risen almost instantaneously. We were fired at from several villages, and had several narrow escapes.

15. No assistance could be given from Agra, and we returned the following evening to Muttera. We put up in the Seth's house in the city, who received us most kindly. We found the two Mr. Hashmans there; we arrived at evening, the next morning I visited the office and found it burnt, and Mr. Burlton's body lying in a ditch in the compound; we buried it on the spot as well as we could.

16. The following is an outline of what occurred after the mutiny; I gathered the information from many sources and compared it carefully; I think it may be depended on. On the treasure being laden, Mr. Burlton gave the word to march; The Subadar said "where?" To Agra, of course, Mr. Burlton replied; on which a shout arose "no, to Delhi, to Delhi." Mr. Burlton exclaimed "you traitors" (bey-eman), on this a sepoy standing close by fired his musket at him, the ball passed through his chest; he fell off his horse, and I fancied died instantly.

17. The sepoys then set fire to the office: the flames were the first notice the Europeans in the station had of the mutiny; they instantly left and all succeeded in making their escape to Agra; the office being well on fire, the sepoys marched off with the treasure; they sent a detachment to release the prisoners in the jail. The jail guard at once joined them; they then marched on towards Delhi. They burnt two bungalows besides the office, but did no other damage; they however burnt all the Government buildings on the road, customs chowkies and binaglalows, police chowkies, &c. The zemindars of all the villages along the road joined and assisted them. On reaching Kosee, Ruggoonath Sing, although he had a larger force and two guns, allowed them to pass; he also plundered my property left at Kosee.

18. The sepoys carried off only the five lakhs of treasure packed on the carts. A lakh and a quarter in pice, uncurrenct rupees, &c., besides several thousand rupees in cash and jewels, deposited by the Europeans in the treasury for safety, they left behind from what motive, I am unable to conjecture. As soon as it was known that this money had been left, the whole city headed by the Kotwal and the Bhurtpoor detachment flocked down to plunder it, and continued to do so till the flames drove them out. From plundering they commenced fighting; the greatest confusion followed; about thirty men more or less were killed. Captain Burlton's body was meanwhile stripped and thrown into the ditch, where I found it. The next afternoon all the villagers for miles round poured into the station and plundered and burnt it.

19. As the news spread, the country rose; by the time I returned the whole district was in anarchy. The police and revenue establishments were everywhere ejected, or if permitted to remain, allowed to remain on mere sufferance; the Buniahs were plundered, new proprietors ejected and murdered, and
the King of Delhi proclaimed. Only a person who was there could properly understand the confusion. From the Seth's house I used to see the villagers fighting across the river, and as soon as my return was known, the villagers sent to threaten the Seths if they did not eject me; the villagers on both sides the river were disposed to plunder Muttra, and commenced collecting men from Bhurtpoor and elsewhere for the purpose.

20. As no assistance could be given me from Agra, I endeavoured to make the best defence I could; I had the city barricaded, raised extra police, and adopted various other measures. In all these measures I was ably assisted by the Seths; in fact, but for their assistance and that of some other of the wealthier inhabitants, I could not have remained; the temper of the inhabitants generally was decidedly hostile to the Government; I also as soon as I felt able sallied out, and burnt some of the neighbouring villages and caught several of the men who had been active in plundering the station. The want of any authority to punish them was a serious drawback; I could do no more than sentence to imprisonment, a sentence which could not be carried out, except in a few instances, and which was besides wholly inadequate to the offences; the majority of the prisoners, I was therefore compelled to release.

21. On 14th June, the Kotah Contingent under Captain Dennyss arrived, and next day marched to Rayah on the Allygurh road, where the villagers were in arms under one Daybee Singh, who had proclaimed himself Raja. I accompanied the force; the villagers dispersed on our approach, but by the good management of Captain Dennyss, Daybee Singh was taken and hung.

22. We remained at Rayah for some days tranquillizing the country; about seven other persons were hung and a good many flogged. The outrages committed by the insurgents had been very great; the town of Rayah had been completely plundered; the very houses dug to pieces in search of treasure. The atrocities committed on some of the Buniahs' wives will not bear repetition. The confusion and anarchy of the country exceeded belief; in a circle of a few miles, above five or six zemindars had declared themselves independent, assumed the title of Raja, and proclaimed the King of Delhi. In one instance a single village split into two factions, one-half proclaimed a Rajah, the other half the zemindars; the impression that the English rule had ceased was universal. A month before the country had been in profound tranquillity; the sudden change to anarchy without any apparent cause was very extraordinary, and is a matter worthy of the attentive consideration of the Government.

23. As the residence of the Kotah Contingent was very uncertain, and as order restored only by their presence would not continue after their removal, I submitted a scheme to the Lieutenant-Governor for preserving order through the large zemindars by conferring on them extensive powers, and where practicable appointing them to the situation of Tehseeldars, and the scheme was approved of and carried out, and produced the best effect.

24. The contingent returned to Muttra on 20th June, and on 22nd June marched to Saidabad. I accompanied it, leaving Mr. Dashwood, who had returned from Sonah, in charge of the station. A bungalow having been repaired, we no longer resided in the city.

25. I remained at Saidabad for several days. Owing to the vigorous measures that had been adopted, tranquillity had been tolerably restored in the portion of the district east of the Jumna, with the exception of Nobhheel. The western and northern parts continued disturbed.

26. I found however a passive resistance to the Government in the refusing to pay their revenue which was more formidable, because more difficult to deal with than the former active opposition. As all the ordinary means of realizing it were impracticable, I proposed to the Lieutenant-Governor that contumacious refusal to pay should be treated as rebellion and punished with confiscation. This proposal was acceded to, and several villages were confiscated...
accordingly at various times. The village selected, however, were almost always those guilty of rebellion and outrages.

27. On the 29th June the Contingent were called in towards Agra. On 2nd July the detachment of the Gwalior Contingent stationed in the Allygurh district mutinied, and I was compelled to return to Muttra. On the evening of the 5th July, I received intelligence that the Gwalior Contingent had crossed the Chumbul and were advancing on Muttra, and that the Neemuch mutineers had broken ground from Futtelpoor Sikree, and were advancing on Agra. The former news eventually proved false. Our situation was now very dangerous with rebel armies on both sides the river. We determined to fly to Agra. The rest of the party went by water, Mr. Joyce and I rode disguised in native dresses, and succeeded in making our way to the fort at Agra, through the rebel army. The whole road was lined with escaped prisoners; the glare of the conflagration at Agra was visible three miles from Muttra. The rest of the party came in safety a day or two after. They had been fired at by the villagers on the river sides, and were compelled to leave the boat.

28. The mutineers marched to Muttra, where they were received by the inhabitants with open arms. The Seths had fled leaving their manager, Munghree Loll, behind; through his excellent management the city was preserved from being plundered. After remaining a few days the mutineers went on to Delhi.

29. On receiving news of the burning of Agra, all the country round Saidabad rose, and plundered the Tehselse and Thanna. One Deokurrun headed them. With this exception, owing to the system that had been introduced of governing through the landholders, the district remained quiet, and the revenue was paid till I returned, with the exception of the three pergannahs of Nobjheel, Kosee, and part of Sabar; the villagers in the two latter along the Delhi road were particularly turbulent, and kept the communications so closed that the Tehseeladar of Kosee could only communicate with Muttra by men disguised as fakkeers, &c.

30. On the 5th October I returned to Saidabad, caught Deokurrun and hanged him. I was however almost immediately ordered back by the Chief Commissioner. On the 1st November I returned to Muttra with Colonel Cotton's column, the column proceeded along the Delhi road to Kosee, and punished the insurgent villages. It then returned to Agra, I remained at Muttra. Nothing further worthy of notice occurred till I left the district at the end of December. The Pergannah of Nobjheel and part of the pergannah of Suwar continued disturbed more or less till I left.

31. As directed in your 2nd paragraph, I have the honor to bring to your notice the names of the following persons, both in and out of the Government employ, who distinguished themselves in support of the Government:

IN THE GOVERNMENT Employ.

1. Meer Imdad Ally, Deputy Collector. The particulars of his services are too well known to you to require me to detail them.

2. Dillawur Khan, Jemadar of Sowara; he conveyed Mr. Joyce and myself in safety to Agra through the rebel army. On the night of the 5th July I brought his case to the notice of Government, on leaving the district, but I am not aware that he has received any reward.

3. The Tehseeladar of Saidabad at the time I left, whose name I do not remember; he is a Hindu, and was formerly Peshkar of Saidabad; he was made Tehseeladar by me in July 1857; his exertions in collecting the revenue were beyond praise, and he remained at his post at a time of great danger.

4. Gowree Shunker, Kotwal of Muttra, behaved throughout extremely well.
5. Moiy Lall, Tehsildar of Moat, also displayed throughout great fidelity to the Government, and exerted himself energetically in the collection of the revenue.

There were many other of my subordinates whose conduct deserved great praise, but whose names I do not remember.

PERSONS NOT IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOY.

1. The Seths Radha Kishen and Gobind Doss. You are so well acquainted with their services, that it is unnecessary for me here to detail them. I may state generally, that but for them I could not have remained at Muttra; they preserved the city, took charge of the Government treasure, and they gave throughout the most accurate and earliest intelligence and faithful forewarning of danger. They warned me of the mutinous disposition of the treasury guard at the commencement of the outbreak; they recommended the sending the treasure to Agra, and as you will remember, they forewarned us of the intended mutiny of the Bhurtpoor troops and of the universal disaffection of the whole Bengal army. They were almost the only person on whom I could thoroughly depend. It should also never be forgotten that at the risk of their own lives and property, they protected myself and the Mr. Hashman's in their house at a time when the harbouring any Christians was a service of extreme danger. They are deserving of the highest reward.

2. Their manager, Munngnee Lall, ably and faithfully carried out their wishes, and by doing so, has exposed himself to much odium among the people. He should be rewarded and protected.

3. The Raja Perty Sing of Awa; his services you are also acquainted with; he preserved the peace of the eastern part of the district; his services will be best appreciated by considering the embarrassment he might have caused, had he proved disloyal.

4. Raja Teekum Sing of Moorsan; he preserved the peace of the country about Rayah, and generally gave every assistance.

5. Puchowy Bhullub Sing of Mahabun; he raised men and preserved the peace, and collected the revenue of all the pergunnah of Mahabun, of which I made him Tehseeldar in pursuance of the system adopted.

6. Choty Lall (?) and his cousin, of Sohar; I made one of them Tehseeldar.

7. Sukbasee Lall, formerly a Government Vakeel, who concealed the Sherishtadar in his house when the rebels occupied Muttra, and forwarded constant information of their movements at considerable risk; I made him a Tehseeldar.

8. The Brahmin whose name I forget, who protected the Mr. Hashman's when flying from the office at the mutiny.


No. 268, dated Allahabad, 28th April 1859.

From—C. B. Thornhill, Esq., Offg. Commissioner, Allahabad Division,
To—Secretary to the Government, North-Western Provinces.

In continuation of the Narrative* of my predecessor, I have the honor now to forward the reports which have been received from Messrs. Sherer and Freeing, of the events connected with the mutiny in the stations of Cawnpoor and Humeerpoor.

* No. 2646, dated 15th November 1858.
2. CAWNPOR. I will not attempt to epitomize Mr. Sherer's clear and graphic description of deeds and sufferings, which have stirred every English heart. He has given an historical sketch of Cawnpour, from the commencement of open mutiny on the 16th June 1857, to the final restoration of order in the following May, when Calpee fell before Sir Hugh Rose, and British supremacy was re-established throughout the Doab.

3. With the knowledge we now possess, we may imagine that had a different policy been pursued by the authorities, the subsequent catastrophe might have been avoided. We have not, however, the means of fully ascertaining the grounds upon which they decided, and we know that the course adopted by many natives was such as to render all previous experience and knowledge of their character of little use in anticipating their tactics. We have seen men, who apparently had strong inducements to take part with the rebels, maintain an undeviating fidelity to the British Government; while others, who were certain to be heavy losers by a change of rulers, and had no reasonable grounds for anticipating any personal advantage from the subversion of our dominion, became our most virulent antagonists.

4. General Wheeler acted upon the supposition, that the regiments would mutiny, and at once leave for Delhi, the great centre of revolt, and that the Nana would not take an actively hostile part against us.

5. To a certain extent his anticipations were justified by the event. The regiments did move off at once towards Delhi; and up to the time of their doing so, the Nana does not appear to have had any idea of the position he would hold in a few short days.

6. Had any understanding existed between the Nana and the troops, there would have been no object in the march they made on the Delhi road. It was not until they had gone, that the Nana seems to have finally determined on embarking in an enterprise, in which he staked his life, on the chance of gaining a throne, as the founder of a new Marhatta dynasty.

7. How he brought over the troops to his interests; how he endeavoured, with his newly-acquired army aided by vast stores of artillery and munitions of war, contained in the abandoned Magazine, to annihilate the handful of Europeans in the so-called intrenchments; how, when force could not conquer that devoted band, they were deceived and betrayed by treachery of unparalleled baseness; how the dastardly traitors dare not even approach their unarmed victims, until from a safe distance they had poured deadly discharges of grape into the unsuspecting and helpless crowd; how the crowning atrocity of slaughtering helpless women and infants was perpetrated almost within hearing of the victorious shouts of Havelock's conquering army,—are best told in Mr. Sherer's own words. I would only here observe, that the more searching the investigation into the details of those horrible events, the greater has become the assurance, that the rumours of atrocious indignities upon the persons of our countrywomen, which at one time were so rife are almost without foundation.

8. It is not to be denied that one or two exceptional cases may have occurred, but as a general rule, the extirpation of our race in India was the object by which these murderers were actuated; and in the prosecution of this design, they were swayed by no passion short of the thirst of blood.

9. The investigations recently completed by Colonel Williams appear to place this long-vexed question beyond a doubt; and the hearts of those who have been so tortured with the thoughts of what their dearest relatives may have suffered before death, can now accept with confidence the no small consolation, which the result of these searching enquiries has offered them.

10. HUMEERPOOR. This district has been transferred to the Jhansi Division since the mutiny.
11. The details furnished by Mr. Freeling comprise all the information which has been obtained of the occurrences at the station.

12. The conduct of Mr. Loyd, the Collector, and of Mr. Donald Grant, the Joint Magistrate, claims the highest admiration. From private letters written by Mr. Loyd, and forwarded to Banda, he evidently saw that certain death awaited him if he remained at his post. Yet he felt it his duty to do so; and his colleague would not leave him. As a high-minded Christian gentleman, whose heart overflowed with the warmest love for his fellow-creatures, his memory is preserved in the affections of all who knew him; and the slaughter of such a man, in a place where he was known only as the benefactor of all, is one of the worst of the many black crimes which polluted the rebellion.

Some accounts of the mutiny and subsequent events at Cawnpore.

[N.B.—The paragraphs within the brackets are verbatim from Lieut. G. Watson's Narrative.]

At the time of the revolt at Cawnpore, the European Force, including the reinforcements they had received, consisted of—

Artillery, one Company, fifty-nine men and six guns.

Infantry, 60 men of Her Majesty's 8th,

30 men of Her Majesty's 32nd, invalids and sick.

15 men of 1st Madras Fusiliers.

The native troops consisted of the 2nd Regiment of Light Cavalry, the 1st, 53rd, and 54th Regiments of Infantry, and the Golanduz, or native gunners, attached to the battery. General Sir Hugh Wheeler commanded the Division. There was a large number of Europeans resident in cantonments, many of whom were individuals connected with the Civil, Railway, Canal and other Departments; there were also nearly the whole of the soldiers' wives of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, which was stationed at Lucknow. The whole number of the European population therefore in Cawnpore—men, women and children—could not have amounted to less than 750 souls. News of the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi reached Cawnpore on the 14th of May, and though the mistrust prevailing more or less throughout the Bengal Presidency was felt at Cawnpore, more especially with reference to the Cavalry and the 1st Regiment Native Infantry, who had been cantoned together for one year, and whose seditious feeling had been pretty openly expressed—no precautionary measures were adopted, except that the Artillery was moved up to the European barracks; and this movement was caused by a supposed incendiary fire which occurred in the lines of the 1st Regiment Native Infantry, on the night of the 16th of May.

The ladies, and merchants also, about this time, sought refuge in the barracks. A company of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment arrived from Lucknow, and officers of all corps were ordered to sleep in the lines of their regiments.

Further cause of alarm was given by rumours having been circulated in the city, that the objectionable cartridges were to be served out on the 23rd of May, and that the Artillery were to act against all who refused them. A good deal of excitement prevailed, and on the 24th of May, the Queen's birth-day, it was not considered advisable to fire the usual salute.

There was at this time residing at Bithoor, which is a sacred village on the Ganges, and much resorted to by pilgrims, a Hindoo of rank, named Doondhoo Panth, but commonly called Nana Sahib—a title frequently occurring amongst Mahrattas. He was the adopted son of Bojee Rao, and
inherited his houses, landed property, jewels, &c., but did not succeed to his large pension, which, in default of heirs of his body, lapsed to the Government in 1852.

The Nana lived in comfortable circumstances at Bithoor, in a large mansion not far from the Ganges, with stabling and elephant sheds, and large gardens surrounding, and a massive temple near at hand, which Bajee Rao had built at a considerable expense. Here he was surrounded by a band of wily Mahrrattas, some relations and some friends, who, living up to the time of the mutiny in complete obscurity, have since become perfectly well known wherever English newspapers are read, and their names are now familiar in our mouths as household words.

There were his two brothers, Bala Rao and Baba Bhum, the latter said to be the most influential man in the household; Rao Salib, his nephew; Azimcollab, a young man of low origin, who had had the dubious advantages, in his case, of a trip to London and Paris, but who was undoubtedly talented; and last, but not least, the Nana’s faithful servant Tantia Topee, the present Abdool Kadir of Central India. The Nana was a man of no capacity and of debauched tastes, a fair specimen of the Indian Prince badly brought up, with ample leisure and ample means; strong passions, and no principles to control them. He was known to consider himself aggrieved by being denied Bajee Rao’s pension, as well as to have resented the reduction of the 5 per cents.; but he maintained outward relations of civility with the Europeans, and invited them occasionally to entertainments at his house. As matters grew doubtful and dark at Cawnpoor, the Nana put himself in frequent-communication with the Magistrate, Mr.versdons, and proffered offers of assistance in case of an outbreak. He was allowed by Government a retinue of 500 Cavalry and Infantry, with three guns of small calibre, which were entirely under his own control.

On the 26th of May, therefore, the Magistrate thought it advisable to call in his aid, and he was put in charge of the Treasury, which was near the Nana’s own house in Nawabgunge. To the Treasury he brought two guns, and two hundred armed retainers, and there was there also a company of the 53rd N. I.

(Shortly after, the 2nd Regiment Oudh Cavalry, under the command of Lieutenant Barber, 30th N. I., marched into cantonments, and furnished patrols, together with a picquet of the 2nd Cavalry.

A few days after their arrival, the Oudh Irregulars were suspected, and were accordingly marched out towards Futtelghur. Captain Hayes, 42nd N. I., Military Secretary to Sir H. Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of Oudh, and Captain Cary, 17th N. I., accompanying them; and they were followed, a day or two later, by Lieutenant Ashe, with a half battery of Oudh Horse Artillery.

A few marches from the station the Cavalry Regiment mutinied, and succeeded in murdering all the officers who were with them. Some Seikhs in the regiment, however, returned towards Cawnpoor, and met and brought back Lieutenant Ashe, and the guns. General Wheeler dismissed the Seikhs, and commenced intrenching the barracks of the depot of H. M.’s 32nd, to which all the Europeans at the station were ordered to repair.

On the 4th of June, provisions for a month had been stored, and one lakh of rupees was removed within the entrenchments; but nine lakhs still remained in the Treasury. No steps were taken to remove or secure the ammunition and stores, which were lying in large quantities, both in the Ordnance and Regimental Magazines. It is necessary to mention this fact to show, not only that full confidence was placed in the Nana, but that no very serious view was taken of matters in general. The officers of the 2nd company, and 1st and 56th Regiments N. I., were ordered to discontinue sleeping in their lines.

The mutiny commenced on the morning of the 6th, at 2 A. M., when the 2nd Cavalry and 1st Regiment Native Infantry left their lines, without, however, molesting their officers, who on the first alarm had proceeded to their
lines. The insurgents proceeded first to the Treasury, which was situated in the civil lines, at the western end of the station; they obtained possession of this building without any opposition from the guards placed over it. They then entered the jail, set the prisoners at liberty, and burnt all the adjacent public offices, and the records in them. They afterwards marched out to Kulyanpore, the first halting place on the road to Delhi, and there encamped, being joined before noon of the same day by the 53rd and 56th Regiments N. I.

Seizing the opportunity of the revolt, the Nana possessed himself of a great portion of the Treasury; then repairing to the rebel camp, he persuaded them to return to Cawnpore, to destroy the houses situated therein, and annihilate the British officers and soldiers, and every Christian resident, and then proceed to Delhi, or Lucknow, leaving a garrison behind to retain possession of the city and district of Cawnpore.

Acting on his advice, and placing themselves under his orders, the rebels returned to Cawnpore the same evening. The Nana at once informed General Wheeler that he had returned to attack him.

Intimidating all natives of any standing, or importance, plundering everything in his way, and murdering every European who fell into his hands, the Nana soon made good his words, by bringing into position two of his own guns, and two heavy guns which he had procured from the magazine.

The cannonade from these guns commenced about 10 A.M., on the morning of the 7th June.)

It is necessary, in order to render evident the situation of the besieged, to give a short account of the position that had been selected by General Wheeler, and of such means as had been taken to secure it.

(The depot of H. M.'s 32nd Regiment, consisting of the sick, invalids, women and children of the regiment, was located in two long barracks, in an extensive plain at the eastern end of the station. These barracks were single-storied buildings, intended each for the accommodation of a company of 100 men; one of them was thatched, and both were surrounded by a flat roof, arcade, or veranda; the walls were of bricks, one and a half foot thick. A well, and the usual out-offices were attached to the buildings. Around these barracks, a trench was dug, and the earth thrown up on the outside, so as to form a parapet, which might have been five feet high, but it was not even bullet-proof at the crest: open spaces were likewise left for the guns, which were thus entirely unprotected. It may be imagined what slight cover an intrenchment of this kind would furnish, either for the barracks, or for men in the trenches; while there was plenty of cover, both for musketry and guns, within a short distance of the barracks, of which the mutineers soon availed themselves.

To enclose the barracks, a parapet was required; and it is supposed, that scarcity of labour, and the stiffness of the soil, which at the close of the hot season was nearly as hard as rock, were the causes which prevented the construction of more solid defences.)

This position has been made the subject of much criticism. Without venturing to offer an opinion upon a scientific military subject, I may be allowed to say so much, that I think we must guard against post-facto wisdom and beware lest our experience bias our judgment.

It is clear to me that General Wheeler considered two things certain—first, that the Nana was not in league with our native soldiery; and secondly, that our native soldiery, if they did break out, would make off at once to join the insurgents at Delhi. He apparently considered, therefore, that the only danger to be dreaded was, what might occur in the sudden fury of an outbreak. So long, therefore, as he was sufficiently on his guard against this, all would be well; and the outbreak over, he might choose a strong position. Events showed that he was right in every respect. He weathered the outbreak in safety, the mutineers did make off for Delhi, and the Nana was clearly not
in league, previously, with the native soldiery, or it would not have been necessary for him to pursue them down the road, and entreat them, with lavish promises, to return. The treachery of the Nana disturbed all calculations. Now that we know what the Nana was, it may seem very blind and credulous to have relied upon him at all. But have we not relied on the Nawab of Rampore? Have we not relied on the Raja of Chirkaree, and not been deceived? It has been well said, there are prophets of the past, as well as the future. There is a danger, surely, to be avoided here. But to return.

(The cannonade commenced from the four guns before mentioned, but the enemy's artillery was soon strengthened from the ordnance magazine, and in a few hours they brought a fire on the barracks on all sides, from fourteen guns and mortars in position.

At first the besieged replied briskly to the fire of the rebels, but without any signal success; for the guns in the intrenchments were field guns, and the enemy had not as yet advanced within 1,000 yards from the barracks. The fire of the rebels also had little or no effect, but on the second day of the siege they adopted more energetic measures; the Mahomedan flag was raised in the city; all true Mussulmans were directed to join, and those who demurred were threatened, insulted, or flayed. The Nana's force was soon augmented by large numbers, and reinforced daily.

Having at his command a magazine, stored with every description of ammunition and ordnance, a treasury full, and the city bazaar in his hands, it is not to be wondered at that he soon rendered the situation of the Europeans next to hopeless. An incessant fire of musketry was poured into the intrenchments from the nearest buildings, guns of large calibre, drawing gradually closer and closer, sent their shot and shell, without intermission, against the brick walls of the barracks; and carcasses fired the thatched buildings, in which numbers of sick and helpless women and wounded men were huddled together, many of whom were burnt alive.

The hospital stores were lost or destroyed, and all being now crowded into one building, without medicine, the sick and wounded died without relief. With the greater portion of their ammunition spent, the besieged were also forced to slacken their fire. In short, their position was rendered hopeless and helpless in the extreme; and all this before the firing had lasted for half a week.

There was a nullah or ditch some distance in front of the intrenchments, by which the enemy pushed on a sap towards the barracks, and from this they poured in a near and deadly fire.

On the west of the besieged an entirely new range of barracks had been in the course of construction, and behind the unfinished walls the rebels posted their matchlockmen. They were, however, dislodged by sortie after sortie, and at length two of the barracks were held by picquets from the garrison. But the strength of the garrison was insufficient to prevent the rebels from placing their matchlockmen on the other side. Communications between the barracks became difficult, no one could move out of cover for an instant without drawing on himself the fire of twenty pieces. Water was last drawn under shelter of the parapet at the edge of the wall; but the parapet was knocked over, and soon not a drop could be obtained, save at the risk of almost certain destruction.

The half-destroyed walls of the barracks, or the temporary expedient of piling up tents and casks, formed the precarious but only shelter that could be obtained. Food could only be carried from post to post by day, and the dead were removed at night, and thrown into an adjacent well without the decency of burial. Relief was expected on the 14th June; but day after day brought no succour. Round shot and disease were doing their work, provisions ran short, and the misery endured by all can hardly be imagined.

Yet the besieged in successful sallies, took and spiked the nearest guns, driving away the mutineers, and retiring with little; if any, loss to the
trenches; but the guns were either repaired or replaced by others from the arsenal. Still though the position in the barracks was quite untenable, the mutineers never mustered the courage to assault it.

Nor were the Europeans in the trenches the only sufferers. Besides several Europeans captured in the city, many of the natives suspected of aiding or serving the British force, were put to death. A list was made of all the bankers, who were mulcted of their wealth, and property of every description was plundered or wantonly destroyed by the rebels. Up to the 26th June, however, the British force held their own, though their loss in killed alone was upwards of 100, and the ladies and others were maddened by suffering. It can scarcely be wondered at, that when, on that morning, the Nana offered to treat, his proposition was listened to. It was worded as follows:—

"All soldiers and others unconnected with the acts of Lord Dalhousie, who will lay down their arms and give themselves up, shall be spared and sent to Allahabad."

Captain Moore, commanding the detachment of H. M.'s 32nd, who had from the first directed the energies of the besieged, and invariably led their sallies, seeing the reduced state of the besieged, and relying on the word of the Nana, obtained permission to sign the paper; and, contrary to the advice and remonstrances of many other officers, the treaty was agreed to.

Boats were immediately provided for the conveyance of the remains of the garrison to Allahabad, and to these boats they proceeded on the morning of the 27th of June. And now followed the most dastardly piece of treachery that has perhaps ever been perpetrated. Only a portion of the party had taken their places in the boats, when, by previous arrangement, the boatmen set the awnings of the boats on fire, and rushed on to the bank. A heavy fire of grape and musketry was then opened on the Europeans. Out of thirty boats, two only managed to start; one of these was shortly swamped by round shot, but its passengers were enabled to reach the leading boat. Of those on board the other twenty-eight boats, some were killed, some drowned, and the rest brought back prisoners.

The remaining boat, having fifty of the fugitives on board, proceeded down the river, followed by the rebels, who kept up an incessant fire from both banks. At the distance of six miles the boat grounded; its passengers remained passive until night, when the darkness enabled them to shove her off. They pursued their way without interruption till the boat again grounded at Nujaigurth, eight miles lower down. Here again the rebels attacked the boat, killing many of the passengers; but the assailants were driven off, and retired to Cawnpore. The Nana then immediately despatched two complete regiments in pursuit. At night a violent storm fortunately forced the boat from the sand bank; but from ignorance of the channel, the boat was again allowed to ground further down. When daylight came, it showed the unhappy fugitives that their remorseless enemies had followed them up, and were on the bank. They had now reached Soorajpoor, thirty miles from Cawnpore.

As it was found impracticable to move the boat, a party of fourteen landed to drive back their assailments, which they did most effectually; but proceeding too far inland, they were surrounded, and on their making their way back to the river, lost all sight of the boat. They accordingly followed the bank for about a mile; when being hotly pressed, they were forced to take refuge and breathing time in a small temple.

At the door of the temple, one of the party was killed; the remaining thirteen, after attempting a parley in vain, had recourse to their firelocks, and several of the enemy were killed, or put hors-de-combat. The rebels fearing even to attack this small band of Englishmen, brought a gun to bear on the temple; but finding that it made no impression, they had recourse to heaping up firewood before the door-way. Unfortunately, the temple was round, so that the party within could not prevent their pushing the wood round to the front. The fire however did not have the desired effect; some handfuls of
powder were therefore thrown on it, the smoke of which nearly suffocated the fugitives, who determined to sally out and take to the river. On their charging out of the temple, the enemy fled in all directions. Six or seven of the party who, it was supposed, could not swim, ran into the crowd and sold their lives as dearly as they could; the remaining seven threw themselves into the Ganges; two of these were shot ere long; a third, resting himself by swimming on his back unwittingly approached too near the bank, and was cut up; and the other four swam six miles down the river, three of them being wounded. At last, the leader was hailed by two or three sepoys belonging to a friendly Raja, who eventually proved to be Maharaja Dog Bejah Singh, a Baiswarrar chief in Oudh.

Exhausted by a three days' fast, and fancying from their not having been pursued for the last half mile of the flight that they were safe, the fugitives at once went to the Raja, who protected and fed them from the 29th of June to the 28th of July. He ultimately provided for their escort to the camp by a detachment of Europeans proceeding from Allahabad to Cawnpoor, to join the force under the command of Brigadier-General Havelock.)

Meantime at the Cawnpoor ghat after the partial escape of the two boats, the massacre continued. Musketry was kept up from behind neighbouring garden walls, and sowars made attacks on the helpless crowd by riding in amongst them, and slashing in all directions with their tulwars. There is an old half-caste woman now alive in Calcutta, named Murray, who in this tremendous moment was dropt full length on the sand by a ghastly sword-cut on her back. At last some person in authority, who, there is some reason to suppose, was either Bala Rao, or the Rao Sahib, gave orders for the slaughter to cease, and those who were still uninjured were all collected together and carried off towards a large house, called "Salavadar" or Savada Kotee, in the south-east corner of the parade ground. Here it seems likely the men were at once selected from amongst the women and children, and then and there slaughtered.

The women were all huddled together into an apartment, and kept close prisoners.

The boat which, as we have seen before, ran aground at Sheorajpore ghat, remained immovable. All those who were still in her, were made prisoners and brought on shore, and were afterwards put on country carts and taken back to Cawnpoor. There appears to have been delay in procuring this carriage, for the party was seen at Aherwan by one named Thomas, himself a prisoner, some four or five days, as he says, after the massacre at the boats. Thomas estimates the number of ladies and gentlemen about eighty. This witness also tells me that, when he reached Cawnpoor, he found the Nana in Savada Kotee, and large bodies of the rebel soldiery encamped between that and the Railway. I suspect the males of the Sheorajpore party were killed on arrival, and the women and children added to those already in confinement. About the 7th of July, there appears to have been a general move towards the town. The Nana occupied the then hotel, and the women and children were located in a small house, badly built, partly on a native plan, which was called "Beebeeegurh," from having been erected by an officer, some years ago, for an Indian mistress. Here common matting was provided for them, and chuppatees and water were supplied them. They seem to have been suffering fearfully from disease, if we may judge from a memorandum, found in the house, of deaths during a very few days, kept apparently by a Bengalee Native Doctor. I remember one entry striking me as very touching:

In the "name" column—"ek bebee"—a baby.

In the "disease" column—"ap sa"—of itself.

Here then they remained till the fatal 15th. Before narrating what occurred on that day, I would just touch on two points: First, with regard to the Futtehgurh fugitives. I can only, with distinctness, make out the arrival of two batches, but I have no doubt the Futtehgurh narrative will throw light on the subject. There was the party with whom the Missionaries were,
This seems to have arrived before the capitulation, and I think none escaped.

They were all at once murdered.

The second, which was a larger party, got to Cawnpore early in July.

My reason for thinking this, is that in the list found in the Beebeegurh, apparently written by some guard on taking over charge, after all the other names, he puts in, “from Futtehgurh,” and then occur about seventy names more.

The other subject, I would briefly mention, is the much-disputed question of the treatment of those who suffered death, or imprisonment. I entirely disavow any desire to make out a case, or to take one side of the question, or indeed do anything but speak the truth. The alleged occurrences appear to be torture, mutilation, and dishonor.

1st.—With regard to torture, I simply say I have not heard of a case. Tell me of a case, and I will investigate the evidence and report on it.

2nd.—Mutilation. With regard to this, there appears to have been a great deal of intentional prevarication. If by mutilation, is meant cutting off the hands and feet of corpses, it is well known to be a common practice; and though I do not remember to have seen any dead body at this place in that plight, most undoubtedly they have been so seen in other stations. The other mutilation, viz., that of cutting off the extremities of living persons, is also practised by natives. There are at least fifteen mutilated natives at this moment in the Cawnpore district. A mutilated European in this sense, I have never seen, nor have I heard of an authenticated case of one having been seen by any one else.

3rd.—Dishonor. It is surely most heartless to the friends of those who have perished to argue whether this is a circumstance likely to have occurred or not. The point is, what evidence have we? If the story of the girl in Calcutta brought forward by Dr. Knighton in the Times is authentic, this is clearly one case. With regard to poor Miss W—, if the drummer’s evidence that he saw her at Futtehgurh be true, the other story of her drowning herself in a well here must be false, and vice versa. This case is not as yet so clear. I have not heard of any others.

But we have now to narrate the last scene in the Nana’s rule at Cawnpore.

The battle of Aoung was fought early in the forenoon of the 15th, and the Fandoo Nuddees was forced to the best of my recollection, by about 11 o’clock the same day. There was, therefore, ample time for news of the repulse, and the steady advance of the British troops to have reached Cawnpore early in the afternoon. There is every reason therefore to suppose that the fate of the unhappy captives was immediately made the subject of discussion. The decision arrived at, is now known and execrated throughout the civilized world. It was decided that the captives should be put to death. The order was carried into execution about sun-down. There were four gentlemen, three of them of the Futtehgurh party, who by some mischance, or for some especial reason, had been reserved from the fate which had already fallen upon their male companions. These were first taken out of the Beebeegurh, and murdered on the high road. Then the general massacre commenced. It seems probable that volleys were first fired into the doors and windows, and then that executioners were sent in to do the rest with swords. If the work was anything like completed, it must have taken a considerable time. At length, the doors were closed, and night fell upon what had happened. The Hotel, where the Nana had his quarters, was within fifty yards of this house, and I am credibly informed that he ordered a nautch, and passed the evening with singing and dancing. Early next morning orders were given for the Beebeegurh to be cleared. There must have been near upon 200 corpses. So many, I do not think, could have been thrown into the well. It seems probable, that a portion were dragged down to the Ganges. Considering the smallness of the house, and the crowded condition of the captives, it is next to impossible that all can have been slaughtered the previous night. It is
exercising, therefore, no morbid imagination and pandering to no prurient curiosity to say that I hold no doubt some of the living met a more terrible death than assassination, even by being plunged with their dead companions into the tainted waters of the well.

The small, but determined band under General Havelock, who were destined (I may say, surely without profanity) by God's aid, to avenge the scenes described above, left Allahabad on the afternoon of 6th July. The rain fell with almost tropical violence, for some hours. We pitched the first night, only a few miles out of cantonments, in a sea of mud. The next morning, however, was dry and clear, and the men soon getting into the motion of the march, all spirits rose again, and every heart beat high with the prospect of the work that had to be done. The force consisted of about 1,200 Europeans, 150 Sikhs, and twenty or twenty-five Volunteer Cavalry. The marches were at first only from one encamping ground to another. Throughout the Allahabad district, we found the ruined Burdast Khana well supplied, and the Thannadars and Tehseeldars at their posts. But many of the villages had been burnt by the way-side, and human beings there were none to be seen. A more desolate scene than the country we passed through, can scarcely be imagined. The swamps on either side of the road, the blackened ruins of huts now further defaced by weather stains and mould; the utter absence of all sound, that could indicate the presence of human life or the employments of human industry (such sounds being usurped by the croaking of frogs, the shrill pipe of the cicala, and the under-hum of the thousand-winged insects, engendered by the damp and heat); the offensive odour of the neem trees; the occasional taint in the air from suspended bodies, upon which, before our very eyes the loathsome pig of the country was engaged in feasting: all these things—appealing to our different senses—contributed to call up such images of desolation, and blackness, and woe, as few, I should think, who were present, will ever forget. We were at Khaga, in the Futtehpore district, on the 11th. The village was almost entirely deserted. We experienced no difficulty in obtaining supplies. The Moonsiff of Hutgaon, Salamut Alee, was in attendance, and gave every assistance. A Thannadhar was appointed, and a Thannah established, which was never relinquished since. I presume the General heard during the day that the rebel force was advancing on Futtehpore, for at midnight we marched to catch up Major Renaud, who with 400 Europeans, and about as many Sikhs, two field pieces, and eighty Irregular Cavalry, had preceded our General by a few days, and was then a short march ahead.

The two forces were amalgamated in the middle of the night, and marching on together, reached Belanda, about four miles on the Allahabad side of Futtehpore, by, I suppose, 7 o'clock in the morning. Here, too, we had no difficulties about supplies; Munnoo Lall, the faithful merchant, and zemindar Hunsooa, and Zoolfikar Khan, an old cavalry soldier of the same place, who had made their village the head-quarters of all those well affected to the British Government, were in attendance, and proffered every aid. Aid at Belanda, however, as it turned out, was not necessary, for a reconnoitring party soon brought word that the enemy were advancing in force down the road; and whilst we were yet drinking our morning tea, under the shade of some trees, their guns opened and behold a battle had commenced. Here the enemy advanced their guns in rows of two or three, at a time, in a perfectly infatuated manner down the Trunk Road. How Mande's well-directed shrapnel from the flank drove them in such confusion back into Futtehpor, that they scarcely attempted to hold the strong posts afforded by the garden walls and thick trees in its environs; how the misbehaviour of our Irregular Cavalry nearly allowed the enemy's horse temporarily to turn our right, has all been described by persons qualified to judge of military movements. I need therefore say no more than that by twelve o'clock we found ourselves lying under trees, a mile and half on the Cawnpoor side of Futtehpore, waiting for our camp to come up from Belanda, the town ours, and the enemy miles away.
On that day Futtehpoor was given up to plunder, the country people had the boldness to come in, in crowds, and assist in carrying off property, making themselves our syces and grass-cutters, when interrogated by the soldiers. The inhabitants had fled to a man, so the shops and houses were ransacked without remonstrance, and next morning, when we marched away, the Sikhs were left behind to set the town on fire in several places at once. On the 14th, we were encamped near Kullianpoor, and on the evening of the same day, the Irregular Cavalry were dismounted and disarmed. Early on the 15th, we marched on towards Aoung, where the General had been led to suppose he should meet with considerable resistance. His information was perfectly correct,—the village was occupied in strength.

The enemy had intrenched themselves across the road, "not indeed in a very formidable manner, but the village offered great cover in the walled gardens, thickly grown with trees, which flanked it on either side. From this shelter, a steady fire of musketry was kept up for a considerable time. It was in this engagement that the enemy's cavalry made more than one attempt to get round our force and cut off the baggage. Once or twice, they regularly charged, but as soon as the bullets of the baggage guard began to fly amongst them, they pulled up and galloped away in quite a ludicrous fashion. After a struggle of some little endurance, the village of Aoung was taken, and as it was supposed the enemy would try and injure the bridge over the Pandoo Nuddee, the General pushed on. The rebels had placed two heavy guns on the bank on the opposite side of the Pandoo, one a 12-pounder, and the other an old carronade, I think, of large calibre.

These were fired straight down the high road, but Enfield riflemen were sent on through the fields to the river bank, and from that position, very soon dislodged the gunners, and the whole body then made off leaving the guns. Some miserable attempts had been made to blow up the bridge, but quite ineffectual in their nature, and our troops marched across with perfect ease and occupied the opposite bank. There we remained for the rest of the 15th, but by sunrise the next morning we were again on our march. In passing through the village of Sirsoul, the zamindars came out to receive us, and promised to send on supplies after us to Aheriwan, which they faithfully did. We reached Aheriwan by noon; it was the hottest day I have ever been out before the firing ceased, but no one returned, and the last firing had been the most distant: this we knew indicated advance, and therefore victory, and so we fell to sleep assured; though we had no communication whatever with the main body, till the summons came next morning for the camp to advance.

It was dark before the firing ceased, but no one returned, and the last firing had been the most distant: this we knew indicated advance, and therefore victory, and so we fell to sleep assured; though we had no communication whatever with the main body, till the summons came next morning for the camp to advance.

In obedience to this summons we were proceeding along the road, when suddenly, in the direction of Cawnpoor, a gigantic tongue of flame leapt up as it were to lick the sky, followed by a large cloud of smoke, which preserving somewhat the shape of a balloon, ascended swiftly; we looked at each other, and that moment experienced a slight shock, like a weak electric current, and then the mighty thunder broke in the distance, and seemed to roll towards us and around us. The powder magazine had been exploded.
That day the army was encamped on the parade ground; and we, for the first time, saw the deserted intrenchment which Wheeler had occupied scarcely three weeks before.

That scene of matchless desolation, the monument at once of astounding cowardice on the part of the enemy, and of incredible courage and endurance on the part of those besieged, has been already often described. I will only observe that the cry in all months was, in such a position, and against such odds to have held out a couple of days, seems almost a miracle. The next morning (the 18th) the troops were ordered to march by the Trunk Road to the Mission premises, the most distant buildings to the west in Cawnpoor, and situated close by, where the Cantonment and Grand Trunk Roads join. This wise movement not only protected the station in the direction of Bithoor, but also preserved the soldiers from the temptations of liquor, as well from any desire to take vengeance into their own hands. That day, with the General's permission, I rode with two of the Volunteer Cavalry into the city, having the re-establishment of the British power proclaimed in several places, and meeting almost the whole mercantile population at the Cotwalee where they professed (I cannot say with what sincerity) the greatest delight at our return. We had also the great pleasure of liberating one or two half-caste Christians, who were concealed in remote lanes and alleys. From the city we proceeded to the Hotel, which we found just as the Nana had left it. He slept on one side, and on the opposite had rooms for pooja and cooking, keeping two large centre apartments for Durbar purposes. Thence we were directed to the Beebeegurh, and well. And then broke upon our sight that dreadful spectacle, over the very idea of which there are still broken spirits and widowed hearts mourning terror-striken in distant England. I have no more details to add to what is already too well known, and must dismiss the sad subject with

The only documents I ever heard of being found were:

1st.—A list in Hindee, giving the names of all the prisoners received apparently on the 7th of July, and made over to some other guardian on the 11th. This list I took possession of, but careful copies of it have been taken, and it forms the basis of all lists which have been published.

2nd.—A list of sick and memorandum of deaths, in the Beebeegurh, for two or three days, kept apparently by a Bengalee Native Doctor. This was in the possession at one time of Major Gordon, of the late 6th Native Infantry, and was published in the Phanix newspaper, August 1857.

3rd.—A skeleton diary, believed to have been kept by one of the Lindsay family, made over, I fancy long since, to survivors.

On the 19th, Major Stevenson of the Madras Fusiliers, commanded a party, which went out to Bithoor. This place was occupied without the least resistance, and thirteen guns removed from it, besides a great deal of valuable property. The Nana's palace was destroyed, which was a pity, as any chance of finding treasure has been rendered far more remote. The Nana himself was far away. To the best of my information, he left Bithoor on the evening of the 17th. He found it impossible to get any of the soldiers to rally round him; they had thrown off restraint, and abused him and Baba Bhut in open terms, clamoring with threatening gestures for money, and so off, heller shelter, for Futtehgurh. That evening he embarked himself and the ladies of his family on a large boat. He had given notice that he should drown himself, I suppose as a blind to prevent pursuit, and it was understood the signal was to be, when the light was put out. The Gungaporras were watching on
the shore. About mid-stream the light was extinguished, and with a yell, that must have reached the boat, the mendicant Brahmins rushed up to the palace, and commenced plundering all they could lay their hands on. The crafty Nana was disembarking in the darkness on the other side; but if in so callous a heart any bitter reflections could arise, the ingratitude of his adherents and the falseness of those he had cherished, might well have induced them.

General Neill arrived with some 400 men, I think, on the 20th, and the next day we all moved down to Permit ghaut, from whence the embarkation was commenced to Oude. This took some days; meantime every exertion was made to render the new intrenchment (which had been chosen by General Havelock on the 19th) capable of defence when the forces intended to relieve Lucknow had all crossed. General Neill was left with a garrison of less than two hundred men to hold Cawnpoor. The day I entered the city (viz., the 18th) I appointed a Cotwal, and city police, and a day or two afterwards I sent out a Thannahdar to Sirsoul, with a band of burkundazes. This Thannah is on the Allahabad road, and has never been given up since. I was very anxious also to get outposts to the south and west, that we might, as it were, have police pickets on all sides of us. Two men readily volunteered to go out as Thannaludars, one to Suchendance, about ten miles down the Calpee road, and the other to Sheorajpore, a village on the Grand Trunk Road towards Delhi. They both went out, attended by as many men as could be collected together. This was a most unfortunate undertaking. The 42nd Regiment of Native Infantry (than which no corps showed more courage or greater ferocity) having mutinied at Saugor, crossed the Jumna at Calpee, accompanied by some Irregular Horse, and marched direct upon Akberpoor. Here it was supposed they would turn off towards Bithoor; before doing so, however, they sent a considerable body of men to destroy the temporary bridge over the Pandoor, and these men, advancing rapidly, surprised the Thannah of Suchendance, and capturing the Thannahdar, put him to death, under circumstances of great cruelty. The main body afterwards marching on Sheorajpore, surrounded the Thannah there also, and the Thannahdar, a young Musulman of considerable personal courage, was shot, and his body hung with the head downwards from a tree. General Neill, who on taking command of the intrenchment, told me that as the occupation of Cawnpoor was wholly military, he considered it of great importance that the city police should be in the hands of a military man, that they might be made to co-operate with military movements, had already appointed Captain Bruce, of the Bombay Army, Superintendent of Police, with (as I understood the General to say) the express approbation of Government. The serious gathering at Bithoor, which shortly after the departure of General Havelock, began to draw all our attention for a while, postponed any further attempts to re-establish provincial police stations. The 42nd Native Infantry, which after leaving Sheorajpore, had occupied Bithoor, were soon joined there by men of the 17th and other Regiments, and by sowars of the 2nd Cavalry and 3rd Infantry. General Neill was all activity, constantly marching out in the environs of the town, with a couple of guns and all his available men; keeping the steamer moving up and down the river (it made two warlike visits to Bithoor) and in every way showing that he was on the alert and prepared for emergencies. It is certainly untrue, though it has been often repeated, that the Nana recrossed to Bithoor at this juncture; he has never, since he first left Bithoor, revisited this bank; nor do I think, as I have seen it stated, that Cawnpoor was at this time in any particular danger. The enemy were numerous, but they had only two small pieces of artillery, and though their sowars did, occasionally by night, ride into the suburbs, it was mostly, I fancy, for the sake of bravado. However, General Havelock considered it his first duty on returning from Oude, to turn its rebel occupants out of Bithoor. Accordingly, on the 16th August, a large party, commanded by General Havelock in person, marched on Bithoor, and after an hour's cannonading entirely cleared the town. During the presence of General Havelock's
force in Cawnpore, of course we had a stronger hold on the neighbourhood, and I was commencing an attempt at again establishing police posts, when I received a very kind letter from General Neill, of which the following are extracts:—"Attempting to establish your police, is not only useless, but risking the lives of men well disposed to the State, to no purpose. The capture and murder of your men at Sheorajpore and Bithoor prove this." And again, "Having no soldiers to send out, the common police under military rule, Bruce is getting together, is the best substitute." Then after very highly praising the police on the Allahabad road for having kept open communication so well, he adds "When the sanction of the Government is requested, the reason why, must be fully stated as above; most certainly the grounds for sending the request will not be the inefficient state of the present police." The posts, therefore, of Bithoor, Sheorajpore, and Suchendee, passed into General Neill’s hands, and were garrisoned by degrees under Captain Bruce’s orders with what was then called the "Mahar police." About the same time, General Neill also nominated Captain Young of the 4th Native Infantry to be Superintendent of the Grand Trunk Road for aiding the transit of troops. Both these appointments were sanctioned, and commissions for administering the Penal acts were sent me by Mr. Chester for Captains Bruce and Young. I, being already on the Commission, swore them both in. I merely mention this to show that my partial supercession (of which I have no wish to complain in the least, for I think it was quite proper under the circumstances) was not only known to, but acquiesced in by, the Government under whose immediate orders I was then acting. Had we been strong enough then, to have thoroughly occupied the district, I make no doubt most of the zamindars would have at once given in their adherence, and things would have quieted down. As it was, several large zamindars, amongst them Doorga Pershad of Suchendee, began to feel their way, and to make inquiries as to whether bye-gones stood any chance of being considered bye-gones. To these, we could only guarantee a fair trial. But this did not meet their views. Gradually as it became seen that Cawnpore was only a garrison, when it was clearly known that the troops collecting at Cawnpore had not for their immediate object the pacification of the Doab, but were intended to cross the river, this desire to conciliate died away, and the disaffected began to look towards Gwalior as affording them some hope of a second subversion of the British power, and this time, with a more permanent success. The active part taken by Doorga Pershad and Rajah Suttee Pershad, of Sheorajpore, heads as they were of the Chundel Rajpoots, naturally influenced the conduct of most of the higher class of Thakoors. I am afraid the most I can say of the better specimens, is that they were neutral. The infidelity also of the Omiah, doubtless, had a very bad influence in the district. To a man almost, with the Deputy Collector at their head, they quietly changed sides and acquiesced in the new administration. Ram Lal, the Deputy Collector, took a very active part in attempting to organize the Nana’s government. This mark-d treachery, a treachery which ruined the whole body of officials, I punished with death on my first arrival. At the time then, that Sir James Outram arrived with reinforcements, the state of the district was this: first, as regards police; Captain Bruce held the city, Bithoor, Suchendee and Sheorajpore; had a slight hold on Belhour, and had established one or two smaller posts in the neighbourhood, so that Cawnpore was well surrounded by a series of police pickets. In police I had the Thannah at Sirsoul, and a Thannah at Ghatumpore, and for awhile one also at Bhognneepore. These three perghannahs were under Mr. Griffiths, both in revenue and police. There were no Tehseldars appointed, but he had two Peskhars under him, at Sarh Sulem, and at Ghatumpore. The Pandit, Umr Nauth, was appointed Sudder Tehseldar. We collected in the Hazoor Teheel and Bithoor, and got a little money in from Russoollabad and Sheorajpore. When the force left us on the 19th of October, for the relief of Oude, and when many days passed without any intelligence being received from Lucknow, considerable anxiety was naturally felt in the town; but the glorious news of the capture of Delhi raised our prestige again, and the large preparations which were
being made for carriage and Commissariat stores, re-assured the people that the Gorah log were not so completely run out of soldiers as ill-disposed agitators had tried to lead them to believe. No material change took place in our position. We could not strengthen our hold on the district; Bhogneepore, and Secundra, and Akberpore, were very much under the influence of the trans-Jumna rebels, whilst the large clan of Mew Thakors were to a man in open rebellion, and two malcontents, the Rajah Bhao and Kalundur Gir Gossain, managed to keep the whole of that part of the district in a disturbed state. In Russoollabad there was a strong party, headed by Pem Singh and Durino Singh (since hung at Gwalior), against us, and connected with a rebel party in Etawah; but there were some influential men for us. Shelee and Sheorajpore were subject to inroads from sowars connected with the Nana and Nurput Singh, and were kept in constant disturbance and excitement. Bithoor was strengthened by the proximity of Cawnpore, but still on the Russoollabad side that was to introduce another disturbing element into all plans.

The next morning the enemy again advanced, and turning off the Calpee road crossed by Rawutpore to the Grand Trunk Road, where being joined by a considerable force of rebels, which had crossed from Oude at Sheorajpore, made a joint attack on Cawnpore.

The endeavours to keep them off were not that day, as is well known, altogether successful, and the troops slept at night inside the intrenchment. A sally, however, was made on the 28th, and with considerable success on the left. But the advantages gained could not be sustained with the force available, and when Sir Colin rode into Cawnpore, on the evening of the 28th, he found the entire force within its intrenchments, and the enemy in possession of the whole city and station. It was on the 1st December that Captain Bruce received a Staff appointment, and wishing to be at once relieved of his police duties, he wrote to me to take over charge. I went over to his house, which formed part of the intrenchments; I think the enemy had got
some idea that the Commander-in-Chief was staying there; but however that
may be, they selected this wretched house for a target, and I wrote my letters
with round shot whizzing over our heads. Fortunately the enemy were not
very good shots, but they carried away part of the balustrade of the roof
twice. I should not think it has happened before for a Magistrate to take
charge of a district, a few hundred square yards only of which were then
in British possession, and to sign the usual papers under a heavy cannonade
playing on his predecessor's house.

Here as Captain Bruce's administration ended, let me venture to bear my
tribute to its vigor and its justice. Much has been said, I understand, about
the executions at this place. All I can testify is, that I believe
Azim Alee Khan. In that case
was made Magistrate in
pod. But I draw to the close
of our attempt to benefit them, and if our desire to liberate them from the
yoke of the TaIqokdar,' had subjected them to the ten-times more disastrous
result, it finally succumbed. The Column under Brigadier Walpole, which
marched on the 15th December, was received with apparent pleasure by the
people. Captain Bourchier writes:—"The whole population flocked to see us." The ousted zemindars began to see that their dream of getting rid of auction
purchasers were over, and they must submit to their fate. These men were
made our enemies by circumstances. We ruined them to be sure, but it was
in our attempt to benefit them, and if our desire to liberate them from the
yoke of the Tallookdar, had subjected them to the ten-times more disastrous
yoke of the Borah, still the consummation was one we never contemplated.
The selling up of estates, however, was doubtless one of the principal causes
that gave the rebellion that popular phase it gradually assumed. Bacon has
remarked with rare sagacity, that "it is certain so many overthrown estates,
so many votes for troubles." This must be remembered with regard to
confiscated estates too, as well as those the Civil Court has laid its hand upon.

Opportunity was taken of Brigadier Walpole's column, to re-establish
Thannahs and Tehseelees, at Akberpore, Russoolabad and Derapore, which
have stood ever since. Mr. Griffiths re-established his Thannah at Sirsoul
and Ghatumpore, and when the chief advanced towards Futtehgurh, Sheoraj-
pore and Billour had their establishments restored, which have never since
been disturbed. Bhogneepore and Secundra, continuing under the influence
of Calpee, although they were kept out of active mischief by the movable
column under Colonel Maxwell at Akberpore, were too disturbed to admit of
Government servants being located there, and it was not till the fall of Calpee
in May that by their complete subjugation, I was enabled to report to the
Commissioner, ubique pax.

That peace, with God's blessing, I hope we shall be able not only to main-
tain by armed force, but to ensure gradually on a much firmer ground, by
pressing upon the people the conviction that a Christian rule is synonymous
with a wise and just one.

I do not think I have omitted any thing of importance bearing on the
general aspects of the rebellion in this district. I recall the burning of
Russoolabad Tehseelees by the fugitives, after the battle of Khujwa in Futteh-
pore. I recall a raid of Rao Sahib, from the Ganges to the Jumna, and an
attack on Russoolabad by Etawah zemindars; but these were detached inci-
dents, scarcely calling for notice in a narrative of this kind. I followed but
the other day close upon the retiring footsteps of Feroze Shah, but I found the ploughman in the field; the boy singing at the well as he urged the bullocks down the slope; the old woman sitting at her door, twisting her little cotton gin (I fear with scarcely velocity enough to compete with the New World) and her daughters grinding the millet, all supremely unconscious of the descendant of Timoor, who with somewhat unseemly haste had made but yesterday a royal progress through their fields and villages.

The taste for misrule has clearly for the time departed. The people have seen that neither Rajah nor Nawab can construct a practicable administration, and the old rule seems better than none.

I trust experience may teach us to amend those parts of our administration, which may be oppressive or distasteful to the people, so that they may accept our rule, not only as inevitable, but also as that with which they are best satisfied.

(Sd.)

JOHN WALTER SHEERER,
Magistrate of Cawnpore.

13th January 1859.

Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, Military Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces.

The investigations regarding the outbreak at Cawnpore in June 1857 have been temporarily closed.

Forty-two depositions from individuals of all classes and creeds, Christians, Mahomedans and Hindoos, have been recorded, and valuable evidence obtained from respectable and influential residents in the city. These depositions, together with the native journal of a city resident, have been translated, and relate the first attempts made by the Nana to tamper with the troops; his ready success; the earliest meeting held by the conspirators; and their proceedings on, and subsequent to their mutiny, from the 1st of June, to the advance of the British force in July.

It is proposed to have these printed; and from them to draw up a report cast in the form of a narrative, showing all that the evidence contained in them proves.

The evidence shows the Nana's brother, Bala Sahib, to have taken as (if not more) active and prominent part as even the Nana himself.

There are no traces of any conspiracy prior to the arrival of the Nana at Cawnpore on the 22nd May 1857, with two guns, and 300 horse and foot, for the avowed purpose of aiding in the maintenance of order. But about that time, it would seem, that two sowars, the one named Rahim Khan, of Bishenpore, near Bithoor, the other Muddut Ali, of Banda and in the service of the Nana, were employed by Bala Sahib, to corrupt the fidelity of the troops. The 2nd Cavalry already ripe for mutiny, needed but little persuasion. Subadar Teeka Sing, Havildar-Major Gopal Sing, and Sowars Shumsh-ood-deen Khan, Sheik Boolakie, Sirdar Beg, and Rai Sing, are said to have taken the lead amongst them; and at dusk on the evening of the 1st of June, met the Nana and Bala Sahib at Manjee Ghat, where they had a consultation in a boat that lasted two hours.

Upon this fact being brought to the notice of the Magistrate, the Nana plausibly accounted for it, by stating it to have been held for the adoption of measures, that should keep the troops firm and loyal; whereas on the succeeding day, Sowar Shumsh-ood-deen Khan, with two or three others of the 2nd Cavalry, whilst drinking in the house of a prostitute named Azeezun, informed her that in a few days the Peshwa's rule would be proclaimed, and the Nana paramount at Cawnpore, when they would fill her house not with rupees merely, but Gold Mohurs.
The depositions of those attached to the 53rd and 56th Native Infantry, give a clear account of the outbreak on the 4th June, and the events in the intrenchments.

After the mutiny of the 2nd Cavalry and 1st Native Infantry, on the morning of the 5th of June, a sower of the former, and a native officer of the latter corps, were sent to the Nana, to offer him the alternative of a kingdom, if he joined their (the rebel) party, or death if he cast in his lot with the British.

His decision was promptly accorded, the ready reply being, "What have I to do with the British. I am with you." He then laying his hand on the heads of the mutineers, swore to be their Chief, and to lead to them to Delhi; after which they were dismissed with orders to carry the Government treasure to Kullilpore. A consultation was then held by the Nana, Bala Sahib, and Azeemullah. The latter pointed out the folly of proceeding to Delhi, where their individual power and influence would necessarily cease; and recommended the Nana's recalling the mutineers, taking possession of Cawnpore, and extending his authority, as far as he could to the eastward; adding, that he was thoroughly acquainted with the resources of the British, that the number of Europeans in India was scarce one-fourth that of the Native army, and that the latter having mutinied, the former were powerless.

This being agreed to as the soundest policy, was accordingly carried out; the mutineers were ordered back, and the siege of the intrenchments commenced. The evidence of some of the beleagured parties, chiefly belonging to the 53rd and 56th Regiments, with that of the city people, gave a vivid picture of the state of affairs during that ever memorable period. The mutineers, it would appear, were more intent on plunder and murder, than on fair and open fight, whilst in the city and elsewhere, a reign of terror was established.

The Nana was assisted by neighbouring zemindars and the insurgent populace; finding it, after repeated attempts, impossible to take the intrenchments by fair fighting, a full council was held, and recourse to treachery resolved upon, though some of the mutineers present are said to have deprecated the adoption of foul means; whether this be true or not, one fact is clear, none gave warning of the base impending treachery, involving, though it did, the murder of helpless women and innocent children, but all joined unflinchingly in its perpetration.

The evidence regarding the massacre at the Suttie Chowra ghat, on the morning of the 27th June 1857, is clear and conclusive. A plan will be annexed, showing the positions of the guns and rebel troops held in ambush, but which were withdrawn from their places of concealment when the deputed officers went to examine the boats at the ghat. Nigh ten thousand spectators assembled from the city and neighbouring villages to witness the departure of that gallant little garrison from the intrenchments, amongst whom were many respectable city people, such as bankers, &c., some doubtless came to view the truly novel sight of their late rulers led forth as captives, by those they had but a short time previously commanded. Some few may have been actuated by a better and kinder motive to pay their parting respects to those they had known in happier days; for the more respectable portion of the native community, though prepared for treachery, were not aware the British would be attacked at the ghat, ere yet they had embarked, but imagined it would be lower down the river.

Even before that doomed little band had reached the fatal spot, the real intentions of the mutineers were revealed by some, unable to restrain their malignant ardour, until the stated time and spot were reached. The depositions give a painful account of the murder of Colonel Ewart, who commanded the late 1st N. I., by some four sepoys of his corps, who cut him down with
bitter taunts, regarding the spectacle before him being a fine parade. His poor wife also meeting with a similar fate, almost immediately after. Of the fearful scenes that ensued at the ghat, the evidence of the Manjees who supplied the boats, with that of many who were spectators, gives a clear account.

The most active in carrying out the arrangements, and urging on the slaughter was Teekum, a sowar of the 2nd Cavalry, who having been made a Ressaldar by the Nana, was doubtless anxious thus to exhibit his zeal and devotion in the cause of his benefactor. On a carpet spread on the chabootra of the temple, near the ghat, were seated Bala Sahib, Azemullah, Briga­dier Jowala Pershad, and Tantia Topee, a Captain of the Nana's guard. The first shots were fired from the Oudh bank of the river, where the mutinous 17th N. I. were posted with some guns; three more being stationed with a large force on the right bank; on the boats being set on fire by the former party, many of their occupants leaped into the water on the offside, and notwithstanding the murderous fire poured upon them, some eighty-five or eighty-five women and children effected their escape from present death, only alas! to meet a worse fate hereafter. The wives of drummers, and children, from three to ten years old, passed unscathed not only through the siege, but even this terrible massacre also.

A man of great influence in the city, and a Government official, has related a circumstance that is strange, if true, viz., that whilst the massacre was being carried on at the ghat, a trooper of the 2nd Cavalry reported to the Nana, then at Savada house, that his enemies, their wives, and children, were exterminated. Some one present remarked, "Yes, it was true, for an infant of a month old was seen floating down the stream." On hearing which, the Nana replied, that "for the destruction of women and children there was no necessity," and directed the sowar to return with an order to stay their slaughter.

Reliable evidence, as far as it was procurable, regarding the massacre of the helpless captives in the slaughter-house, has been recorded, from which the following facts have been gleaned: That the mutinous troops refused to carry out the order of their destruction, though one random volley by some was, it would seem, fired; that the real perpetrators of the diabolical deed were chiefly men of the Nana's own guard; and that the cause of their destruction was fear of betrayal should any survive, and be recovered by their countrymen; that on the steady and continued advance of the British, and after the second action, in which Bala Sahib was severely wounded in the right shoulder, a hurried council was held; that fear and consternation filled the rebel camp; and dismay, the hearts of all; that this meeting was attended by many, who by loans of money, and aid in various other ways accorded to the Nana, had implicated themselves in the revolt; that many and various were the projects suggested for checking the advance of the British, and securing their own safety; some of the most timid proposing the abandonment of Cawnpore, the falling back on Futtehgurh, and the conjunction of their force with that of the rebel Nawab there; some suggested making a stand at Bithoor, while others either more courageous or desperate, advised the casting all "on a die" and fighting it out at Cawnpore. Yet, notwithstanding that all felt their hour had well nigh come, and that shortly a stern retribution would be exacted for the innocent blood, already so wantonly shed, such was the fear of detection (by the many who had sided and abetted their Chief), through their recognition by the prisoners, particularly such of them as Mrs. Greenway and other old residents of Cawnpore, that no fear of consequences could stay them from further imbruing their hands in blood, and that of women and children, deeming that thus they secured themselves from further detection; especially those who had even at that early stage resolved, should things continue to go against the rebel faction, they would change sides, and if the evidence recorded be true, many of those present at that council are now again in Government employ. Much valuable evidence yet remains.
untaken. A careful investigation of all procurable would, I think, beyond doubt, implicate many at present supposed to be free from the stain of mutiny.

Adla, by birth and profession a courtesan, born at Mugrasa, resided with the Nana from 1850, and from receiving Rupees 200 per month, becoming a favorite, was, it is said, endowed with the jewels belonging to the widows of the late Peshwa, valued at Rupees 50,000. On the Nana's flight from Bithore, she was sent in a boat some distance up the river; but returning to Cawnpore in August 1857, was secreted in a house in the Butcher-khana, went from thence to Misreepoor, Zillah Humeerpooor, and is now said to be at Mugrasa, near Cawnpoor, under the care of a man named Mundhoo; having promised, she states, to await one year at Cawnpoor, the return of the Nana to that station.

The sister of Mundhoo, named Kareena, resides with Oojagur Dubey, of Dahabey, Zillah Cawnpoor, and the jewels are said to be secreted in his house.

A female spy has been sent to the Nana's camp, to trace this girl.

There is evidence also of the wife of the Toll-keeper at Sheorajpoor, who was spared at the intercession of the widows of Bajee Rao, and was delivered of a child at Bithoor, being alive on the 17th of July, two days subsequent to the murder of the prisoners. On the Nana's flight however from Bithoor, on the afternoon of the 17th, he ordered her and the child to be killed.

A man has been sent to Rampoor, the residence of the sowar who carried of Miss W. ——, as he is said to have returned to his home.

Names of witnesses who have given evidence regarding the Cawnpoor outbreak.

Drummer John Fitchett, 6th Native Infantry.
" William Clarke, ditto.
" William Thomas, ditto.
Isabella Spiers, 53rd Native Infantry.
Eliza Spiers, ditto.
Eliza Bradshaw, 56th ditto.
Elizabeth Letts, 56th ditto.
Thomas Farmon, Railway Department.
Edward Williams, Shopkeeper.
Thomas Maling, Native Christian, Jemadar Cantonment Police.
Sowar Awuz Alee Khan, 2nd Light Cavalry.
Naick Boolund Khan, 53rd Native Infantry.
Seyp Gous Mahomed, 56th Native Infantry.
Musician Elahie Buksh, ditto.
Seyp Rambahush, 23rd ditto.
" Gobind Sing, 56th ditto.
Badree Nath, Commissariat Gomashta, Cawnpoor.
Adjoodia Pershad, Mahajun, Cawnpoor.
Shunker Dass, ditto.
Choonnee Lall, ditto.
Nanook Chund, ditto.
Kunhaie Pershad, ditto.
Shew Pershad Fande, ditto.

CAMP CAWNPoor, The 29th March 1859.

(Sd.) G. W. WILLIAMS, Lieut- Col.,
Mly. Secy. and Comr. of Police,
N.-W. Provinces.


I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Government Orders No. 212, dated 30th April, forwarded with your letter No. 187, dated 5th May, calling on me for a statement of the events during the disturbances.

2. I would premise this report by noticing that it must necessarily be very egotistical to enable me to explain how I, holding the important position of Magistrate, by a wonderful combination of circumstances, became separated from the other Europeans of the station, and thus escaped the sad fate which befell so many of my dearest friends.

3. On receipt, about 14th May, of the intelligence of the mutiny, and frightful atrocities, which had occurred at Meerut and Dehli, a meeting of the principal residents, both military and civil, of the station was convened at my bungalow, to take into consideration the adoption of precautionary measures for the protection of the station and inhabitants. Various suggestions and plans were proposed. The officers of 10th N. I. were most confident of the fidelity of their corps, and it was eventually agreed that a guard of the regiment be sent down to the jail; the treasury guard be increased; the two guns be brought from the parade ground to Colonel Smith's house; and that on the signal of the guns being fired, all the European residents at once repair to that place. Every European in the station was informed accordingly. A few days afterwards, the rendezvous was changed from Colonel Smith's house to the fort; a circular to that effect was issued to the residents. The guns were also (if I remember right) taken back to the parade ground.

4. The district remained very quiet till about 22nd May; I had, however, as a precautionary measure, increased all the thannah and tehsilee establishments. I had also, with His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor's permission, been getting together as many sowars (discharged and leave men, &c.) as I could.

5. During the third week of May, ugly reports regarding the state of the Shahjehanpoor district began to get about; and it was deemed expedient to send out a body of men to the banks of the Ramgunga; and it was hoped that these would be able to prevent any budmahs coming from Robilkund, and would have the effect of keeping the Trans-Gangetic pargannahs of the district in order. Two or three hundred good matchlockmen, with a few sowars, were collected from different zemindars, and on 18th May accompanied by Lieutenant Monckton, Engineers Lieutenant Walcote, N. I., Mr. Louis, Joint-Magistrate, and Mr. James, Sub-Deputy Opium Agent, went out and took up a position at Allygurh on the right bank of the Ramgunga. Everything in that direction proving to be so very quiet, the party remained out only a few days.

6. All this time the 10th N. I. never showed openly any symptoms of disaffection; and when spoken to by their officers on the subject of the mutinies, declared that, happen what might, they would remain staunch. From natives, however, they did not attempt to conceal that, when any outside corps arrived, they would join them; for, argued they, “Can we be expected to fight against our own brethren?” This was the story almost invariably brought me by my spies. One man, whose statement I unhesitatingly believe, told me that on his interrogating the sepoys as to what they would do in case of a rise, they answered, that they did not intend to kill their own officers, but that if they were killed by another corps, it was not their fault. As regarded the other Europeans, of course they would fare the same as at other stations.

7. On 22nd May, I heard from the Joint-Magistrate of Etah of the mutiny of 9th Native Infantry at Allygurh, and of their marching eastwards.
I of course communicated this to Colonel Smith, and I also told him freely the feelings and intentions of his own corps. Both he and his officers however persisted in believing the fidelity of their men; I must confess that from this time I looked on a mutiny at Futtehgurh as unavoidable.

8. On 23rd May Major Phillott and Lieutenant Eckford, 10th N. I., sent off their wives by garree dāk to Allahabad; and Mr. Briant and family, I think, on the same day left for Allahabad by boat.

9. Towards the end of the month a good shower of rain fell, and the river rose. Most people then began to look to it as affording the best hopes of escape, and prepared boats accordingly. The idea of holding the fort was then tacitly abandoned, and by the beginning of June every one had made some sort of an arrangement for a place in a boat if it became necessary to leave the station.

10. After the mutiny of 9th N. I. at Aligurh, the Etah district became in a most disorganized state, and Mr. Phillips, the Joint Magistrate, was driven from his post. Mr. Bramley, who had been many years at Etah, and who knew the country and people well, happened to be at Futtehgurh. He volunteered to go to Ulleegunge, and try his best to establish order in that direction. I accordingly supplied him with ten or a dozen irregular sowars, and he left Futtehgurh on 26th May. Mr. Bramley did much to re-establish order; he was joined by Mr. Phillips, and subsequently by Mr. Edwards, Mr. Gibson, and the Messrs. Donalds, fugitives from Budaun. Messrs. Bramley and Phillips were eventually obliged to retire on to Agra, and Mr. Edwards and the Messrs. Donalds found their way into Futtehgurh; but of that more hereafter.

11. On the morning of 27th May I received an express, dated 26th inst, from Mr. Gubbins, Financial Commissioner of Oudh, to the effect that Sir Henry Lawrence had sent a detachment of irregular cavalry and Oudh irregular infantry, with two guns, towards Cawnpoor, and had asked General Wheeler to let a party go to our aid, and that I was to send word what our necessities were. I at once replied that I thought the 10th N. I. might be depended on as long as no outsiders came, and that I trusted that the force would be detained at or near Goorsahaigunj on the Grand Trunk Road. I wrote to General Wheeler, and to the Officer Commanding the Force, to the same effect. I also deputed Mr. Lowis to Goorsahaigunj to assist the troops with russud, &c., and to do his best in keeping that part of the district in order.

12. On the morning of 29th May the force reached Goorsahaigunj. Captain Hayes, who accompanied it, at once rode into Futtehgurh, and consulted with me as to the most advantageous manner of employing it. We had then heard of the complete anarchy prevailing in the Etah district, and I recommended that the force should move up in that direction along the Grand trunk Road. Captain Hayes adopted my views, and sent out an express to Goorsahaigunj to order the force on to Bewur; he himself joined it at that place in the afternoon. The following day he, with two other officers were most treacherously murdered by his men.

13. On the evening of the same day Lieutenant Henderson, Adjutant, 10th N. I., came to me in a very agitated state, and said that the suspicion thrown on his Corps was enough to make it mutiny; that his sepoys had just heard that an Irregular Cavalry Corps was coming to disarm them, and that if the regiment did break out, it was not the officer's fault, &c. I at once accompanied Lieutenant Henderson to the lines. I found the men standing in groups, and very excited. It appeared that one of their sepoys had just returned from leave, and that on passing through Goorsahaigunj that morning an irregular sowar had told him that they (the irregulars) were on their way to disarm the 10th N. I. I explained to the men that their Corps could not be spared from the station, and that the cavalry were going to punish some budmashes at Etah, and eventually I succeeded in pacifying them. The same
night however they broke out again, seized their arms, and it was only Colonel Smith's great tact that induced the men to return to their duties.

14. On the morning of 30th May I received news from His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor that two squadrons of Regular Cavalry were coming from Lucknow via Mullan to Fategarhur. I immediately sent an express to the Officer Commanding to stop them, and I wrote to Mr. Lowis at Goorsahagunj, begging him to forward an express to the same effect. Major Marryatt received the letter on 1st June, wrote to me that the would not cross the Ganges.

15. On 1st June I received information of the rising of the troops and of the massacre of the European inhabitants at Shaljehanpore. The arrival in the district simultaneously of a number of escaped convicts placed the matter beyond a doubt. Pergunnah Imrartpoor rose at the same time, and the Thannahdar was obliged to fly to the station for his life. I at once had the bridge of boats opened, and sent out an express to Mr. Lowis at Goorsahagunj, ordering him to return immediately. He arrived in the station during the night.

16. On 2nd June news reached me of the arrival, at one of the ghats in pergunnah Kunouj, of a force of mutinous Oudh sepoys: the same evening, or the following morning, I heard of the sepoys having crossed the Ganges and having burnt and plundered the Tehseelee and Dâk Bungalow at Kunouj.

17. The mutinous force, which consisted of part of two Oudh Irregular Infantry and one Irregular Cavalry Corps, arrived at Goorsahagunj on the morning of 3rd June, burnt the Dâk Bungalow and Thannah, and took several of the police prisoners: this news reached me before noon. During the course of the day an advance guard, eight or ten sowars, rode into the station; they were feasted and well received by 10th N. I., and it was arranged between them that the force should march into Fategarhur the following morning, when there would be a general rising. I of course informed Colonel Smith of all this, but he stated that he had perfect confidence in the greater part of his Corps, and determined on throwing up a barricade on the road and opposing the entrance of the mutinous sepoys. It now became necessary to determine, speedily and definitively, what course should be adopted. As noticed above, boats had been prepared (in fact for some time past most of the residents had slept in them at night); it appeared certain that the mutineers would reach the station by the morning, and it was equally certain that they would be joined by 10th N. I. If the boats did not get a good start before the rising took place, there was no hope of escape, as there were parts of the river within a few miles of the station so narrow that half a dozen men with markets hidden behind the high bank could have effectually prevented the progress of the boats. After due deliberation, it was determined that the boats should start about 9 or 10 at night. Arrangements were also made for fifty picked men belonging to Hurdeo Buksh (an Oudh Zemindar) to accompany the fleet in a separate boat. For my own part I considered it my duty as Magistrate not to leave the station until the troops actually mutinied; and with this view I settled with Hurdeo Buksh to remain until the murders actually commenced, when I could cross the Ganges in a dinghy, and with some of his men make the best of my way across country to his fort at Dhurrumpoor, about ten miles distant. Some of my friends had kindly shared their boat with my family, and had promised to take care of them as far as Allahabad. The party were ready to start before 10 o'clock and of course I went down to the ghat to see them off, when several of the gentlemen, including Colonel Tucker, Messrs. Thornhill, Lowis and Fisher, came forward and said that they were all Government servants, and that they would not leave unless I agreed to accompany them. I argued, but to no avail; and as I saw that, humanly speaking, the safety of the whole party depended on my accompanying them, as they would not start without me, I consented to go. I walked over to Colonel Smith's
house to inform him of my intentions, but he was absent; I therefore contented myself with informing him by note. The whole party, consisting of about 140 Europeans, men, women, and children (vide Appendix), in ten or twelve boats, pushed off at 1 A.M., June 4th.

18. We anchored at 10 A.M. about twelve miles down the river, and were shortly afterwards joined by four officers of the 10th N. I., viz., Captain Bignell, Lieut. Fitzgerald, Ensigns Eckford and Byrne; they reported that no mutineers had arrived at the station, but that at a parade held that morning a number of the sepoys had begun firing off their guns. One of the men had stepped out of the ranks and given his Commanding Officer the foulest abuse, while another had pointed a gun at him, but had been prevented firing by a native officer; that the Colonel had then galloped off to the fort (to which place the treasure was being taken), followed by a number of sepoys loading their muskets. The officers had found it impossible to reach the fort, but had succeeded in getting to their boat, but not without being fired at. The officers further added, that they had not seen any one killed, but there was every reason to fear that not one had escaped.

19. We proceeded onwards in the evening, passed through a heavy fire at Koosumkhore, in which one of our party (Mr. Brierly) was wounded, and anchored the following day (5th June), at 9 A.M., a few miles below the confluence of the Ganges and Ramgunga. We there heard that a party of sowars had that morning crossed the river, a few miles lower down. We sent off a man to ascertain the truth of this story, but he returned and reported that the river was quite clear. Hurdeo Buksh's headman at this time came forward and volunteered to give room to myself and a few people in his master's fort at Dhurrumpoor. The matter was well considered; it was argued that, by dividing the party, there was infinitely greater chance of some escaping, and that being so near to Futttehgurh we should be in a position to take advantage of and co-operate with any force sent to our aid from the North-West. It was eventually determined that about forty people, men, women, and children, should go up to the fort. Several others wished also to go, but there would not have been room to accommodate any more inside the fort, and their large boat could never have got up the Ramgunga. The names of the people who went up to Dhurrumpoor, will be found in the Appendix.

20. On the morning of 8th June, the party arrived within a few miles of Dhurrumpoor, and then heard that the 10th Native Infantry after having seized the treasure had been induced to return to their duty. Lieutenant Fitzgerald, Ensign Eckford, and myself at once rode into the station, twelve miles distant. The two officers were on their arrival put under arrest by the Commanding Officer, and I was informed that the district was entirely under Martial Law, and that my services were no longer required.

21. It is necessary now to record what took place at the station during our absence. On my informing Colonel Smith of the very great probability of the Oudh mutineers marching into the station on the morning of 4th June, he, with the assistance of some of his best men, had a barricade thrown up across the road by which the mutineers must come; he also had the two guns put into position. A large party of the mutineers had turned off the Grand Trunk Road, and had reached Kamalgunje, eight miles from Futttehgurh, by midnight; they there heard the preparations that had been made to receive them, and said that the 10th Native Infantry was a Christian Corps (it had been to Burmah), and was playing them false; that they had not leisure then to punish them. They then turned back and went off to Delhi. In the morning a parade was held, and at the same time the treasure (amounting to about two lakhs) was, with the Colonel's orders, being removed from the treasury to the fort—what happened on parade is detailed in paragraph 16. The Colonel with his Adjutant, Lieutenant Henderson, reached the fort just as the treasure was being taken in; they were followed closely by a number of sepoys from the parade: these men insisted on the treasure being taken to the
lines. The Colonel and Adjutant came forward and remonstrated, but they were pushed back, kept against the wall by a party of sepoys with fixed bayonets, until the treasure had been removed out of the fort to the parade ground. The sepoys were eventually pacified by a present of two months' pay in advance, and a promise of six months' batta, and being allowed to retain all the treasure under their own guard on the parade ground. In the evening Colonel Smith addressed the regiment; told them how disgraceful their conduct had been, but that as he was sure the recruits were the only men to blame, the misconduct should be forgiven. The regiment was then pronounced faithful and staunch.

22. On my return to the station, discovering how matters stood, I wrote to the gentlemen at Dhurumpoor, informing them that in my opinion the regiment could not possibly be kept together for more than a few days; that Hurdeo Buksh's fort had better be at once put into a defensible state, and 500 good matchlock-men be entertained, and that I would be responsible for this measure. I urged the necessity for adopting these measures, several times, during the three days I remained in Futttehgurh.

23. On 9th June Mr. Edwards, Magistrate of Budaon, accompanied by the Messrs. Donalds, Indigo Planters, arrived at Futttehgurh; they reported that they had left Budaon about a week before, and had with the greatest difficulty reached Futttehgurh; that one of their party, Mr. Gibson, Deputy Inspector of Customs, had been killed the day previously at Shumsbabad in the Furruckabad District.

24. The following day (10th June), having heard of the great probability of an attack on the fort at Dhurumpoor by a band of Oudh mutineers, and finding myself worse than useless in the station, I, with Messrs. Edwards and Donalds, rode across and joined the party at Hurdeo Buksh's. To our surprise when we arrived there, we found everyone much dissatisfied with the place; it was pronounced most uncomfortable and insecure. Some hints were also thrown out as to the questionable fidelity of Hurdeo Buksh; some proposed returning to the station and going by land to Agra; others again proceeding by boat to Cawnpoor. However, as I had by this time heard of the mutiny at that station, the latter plan was abandoned.

25. On 11th June, or the day after, letters were received from Colonel Smith, earnestly inviting everyone into the station. He stated that, happen what might, he had 150 men that he could depend on, and that if the worst came to the worst, he could with these men fight his way down the river to Allahabad. Almost every one jumped at the proposition. I was begged to accompany the party; but I maintained my old opinion, and said that I felt convinced that not half a dozen men in the corps would remain stanch; that the party had principally by my advice come up to Hurdeo Buksh's; that I still thought it was the wisest plan, and would not move from the place. Mr. Edwards was of my way of thinking, and, with the exception of that gentleman, myself, and family, all the rest of the party left Hurdeo Buksh's for the station at 2 A.M., June 13th. Every thing remained quiet in Futttehgurh for several days. The Europeans all slept together in the fort, and seventeen boats, which had been prepared, were kept ready to take down the residents with an escort of the 150 sepoys, whom all supposed would prove faithful. The idea of holding the fort was never for one moment entertained.

26. On the morning of 18th June, the 10th Native Infantry broke out into open mutiny. A party went down to the city, and put the Nawab on the guddee, &c. He demanded the treasure; this they refused to give, and then went back to the parade ground, divided the treasure amongst the crops and dispersed, not one of them interfering in the slightest manner with the Europeans who were together in the fort. Colonel Smith all this time expected the 150 men who had sworn to remain faithful, but he expected in
vain; out of the whole crops only one man, a sepoy named Kalay Khan, came forward and offered to remain with their officers. The Europeans finding that they had no escort to accompany them to Allahabad, that the river was yet very low, and that they were in undisturbed possession of the fort, began fortifying it and laying in provision.

27. The 41st Native Infantry from Seeapooch marched into the station the same day. They found themselves disappointed of the treasure, and vented their rage by killing any man of the 10th on whom they could lay hands. I have since heard, from very fair native authority, that the 10th had invited the 41st Native Infantry to Futtahgurh, and that they, on their arrival, finding them wronged deceived, took the revenge I have related above. The story is likely enough to be true. A report has got about that the 41st attacked 10th Native Infantry on account of their fidelity to their officers; there is not the slightest foundation for this.

28. The 41st Native Infantry appear for nearly a week not to have interfered with the Europeans. They, however, before the end of the month, commenced the attack in earnest. The garrison made a most gallant and successful resistance for seven days; but finding that the enemy took to mining, abandoned the fort in three boats on the morning of 4th July. One of the boats was found to be very cumbersome, and the passengers were all taken on board Colonel Smith’s boat; this one after having had several of its passengers killed, eventually reached Cawnpoor, where it was seized by the mutineers, and every European, man, woman and child, amounting to about fifty souls, were subsequently, on the approach of our victorious troops from Futtahgurh, murdered by order of the incarnate Fiend, the Nana. The other boat was overtaken by the sepoys before it had proceeded ten miles down the river: most of the passengers were massacred or drowned, two or three were taken prisoners, and afterwards put to death by the Nawab of Farruckhabad, and four, viz., Messrs. Fisher, Jones, Churcher, and Major Robertson, after having been wounded, escaped by swimming down the river; the two former reached Colonel Smith’s boat, Mr. Fisher fell a victim with the rest of the party at Cawnpoor, and Mr. Jones, who was left on shore by mistake, was kindly treated by the villagers, and eventually joined me at Hurdeo Buksh’s. Major Robertson and Mr. Churcher landed at a village, where they were well taken care of; the former, however, died from the effects of his wound and exposure, about 10th September. Mr. Churcher was brought into the station when it was re-occupied by our forces.

29. The large party that went down the river, alluded to in paragraph 17, reached Nawabgunje in perfect safety; they remained there two days, (why it is not clear); the third day they were attacked, made prisoners of by the mutineers, taken to the parade ground, and there deliberately massacred.

30. Our party remained with Hurdeo Buksh till the end of August, when he sent us down to Cawnpoor, which place was by that time in the possession of our troops. Hurdeo Buksh’s noble conduct in protecting us at the risk of his own life, I have reported on separately.

31. Although in this report I have entered fuller into detail on the points in which I was myself concerned, I have not thought it necessary to confine myself entirely to what I saw. I have obtained much information from an account which appeared in the newspapers last October, written by Mr. Jones. I have also referred to a number of original letters, which I still retain, and which can be forwarded if you think proper. What I have written may, I dare say, be very incomplete; but it has the recommendation of being correct, and I have been most careful not to record anything, the truth of which I am not in a position to prove. Being one of the few survivors of the ill-fated Futtahgurh residents, it behoved me to record minutely the feelings and conduct displayed by the Native Corps, as by it the measures adopted by the residents of the station were, or ought to have been, regulated. All honor to the departed heroes! But while we cannot help admiring the
stolid British pluck and determination, which most of the officers of the 10th Native Infantry displayed in trusting to their men even when in an open state of mutiny, let us not throw a reproach on those who did not thus sacrifice themselves; they may have possessed equal courage, and certainly sounder judgment.

32. The Appendix is a list of the Europeans at Futtchghur, and shows the names of those who went down at the commencement of the outbreak to Cawnpoor, those that remained in the fort, &c.

(Sd.) W. G. Probyn,
Late Offy. Magistrate and Collector of Furruckabad.

APPENDIX.

Showing the names of the Europeans at Futtchghur who went down at the commencement of the outbreak to Cawnpoor, those that remained in the fort, &c.

Colonel and Mrs. Smith (10th N. I.), D.
Colonel and Mrs. Goldie and 3 daughters (Military Auditor-General), D.
Colonel and Mrs. Tucker and 4 children (Clothing Agency), BCD.
Mr. and Mrs. Thornhill and 2 children (Judge), BCD.
Miss Nancy Lang (maid servant), BCD.
Mr. Probyn, Mrs. Probyn, and family (Officiating Magistrate), ABC.
Mr. Edward (Magistrate of Budaon), A.
Mr. and Mrs. R. N. Lowis and 2 children (Joint Magistrate), BCD.
Doctor and Mrs. Heathcote and 2 children (10th N. I.), D.
Doctor and Mrs. Maltby (Civil Surgeon), BCD.
Major and Mrs. Robertson and child (Gun Carriage Agency), D.
Miss Thompson, D.
Mr. and Mrs. Fisher and child (Chaplain), BCD.
Mr. and Mrs. Sutherland, 3 daughters, and one boy (Merchant), D.
Mr. and Mrs. Jones, a brother-in-law, and 4 children, (Engr. G. C. A.)
Mr. and Mrs. Rohan and 9 children (Carpenter, G. C. A), D.
Mr. and Mrs. Roach and two children (Road Overseer), BCD.
Mr. and Mrs. Ahem (Clothing Agency), BCD.
Mr. and Mrs. Gibson and family, (Road Overseer), D.
Serjeant Redman and family (10th N. I.), D.
Qr.-Mr. Sergeant and family (10th N. I.), D.
Mr. Best and family (Bridge Darogah), D.
Pensioner Bosco and family, BCD.
Major Munro (10th N. I.), D.
Captain Phillimore (10th N. I.), D.
Major Phillot (10th N. I.), D.
Lieut. Simpson (10th N. I.), D.
Lieut. Swetenham (10th N. I.), D.
Lieut. and Mrs. Fitzgerald and child (10th N. I.), BCD.
Ensign Henderson (10th N. I.), D.
Ensign Eckford (10th N. I.), BCD.
Captain Vibart (2nd Cavalry), D.
Mr. Jones and child, BCD.
Mr. Jones, Junior, ABCD. \{Planter and Merchants.\}
Mr. Donald, Senior, \{Planter.\} D.
Mr. Donald, Junior, \{Planter.\} D.
Mr. Churcher, Senior, BCD. \{Merchants.\}
Mr. Churcher, Junior, ABCD. \{Merchants.\}
Miss Start, BCD.
Mr. James (Opium Department), BCD.
Drummer Knowles and family (10th N. I.), D.
Mr. Wrixen, Sr. \{Band boys.\} D.
Mr. Wrixen, Jr. \{Band boys, (10th N. I.).\} D.
Lieut. and Mrs. Monckton, and child) Executive Engineer), B.
Mr. and Mrs. Freeman (Missionary), B.
Mr. and Mrs. Campbell and 2 children (Missionary), B.
Mr. and Mrs. Johnston (Missionary), B.
Mr. and Mrs. MacMullan (Missionary), B.
Mr. Alexander, B.
Mr. and Mrs. Ives and daughter, (Merchant), B.
Mr. and Miss Maclean (Indigo Planter), B.
Mr. and Mrs. Guise, B.
Mr. and Mrs. Elliott and 5 children, B.
Two Misses Ray, B.
Mr. and Mrs. Palmer and 9 children (Depy. Magistrate), B.
Mr. and Mrs. Macklin and 8 children (Head Clerk, Collector’s Office), B.
Mr. and Mrs. Joyce and 4 children, B.
Mr. and Mrs. R. Brierly and 1 child, B.
Mr. and Mrs. J. Brierly and 2 children, B.
Two Misses Brierly, B.
Miss Finlay, B.
Mr. Finlay and family (Clothing Agency), B.
Mrs. Shepherd and family, B.
Mr. and Mrs. Madden and family (Clothing Agency), B.
Mr. and Mrs. Kew and family (Postmaster), B.
Miss Kew, B.
Mr. and Mrs. Catenea (Inspector of Post Offices), B.
Mr. and Mrs. Sheils and 2 children (School Master), B.
Mr. and Mrs. Cawood and 2 children (Clothing Agency), B.
The Head Tailor and family (Clothing Agency), name unknown, B.
Ensign Byrne (10th N. I.), B.
Mr. Bellington, B.
The Head Blacksmith and family (G. C. A.), name unknown, B.
Pensioner Faulkner and family, B.
Mr. MacDonald and family, B.
Mrs. Stuart and 2 Messrs. Hines remained concealed in the District and escaped, B.

A. Escaped.
B. Left Futtehgurh on 4th June.
C. Left Futtehgurh on 4th June, but returned to Hurdeo Buksh’s.
D. In the Fort when attacked.

(Sd.) W. G. PROBYN,
Magistrate.
The news of the outbreak at Meerut, on the 10th May, spread like wild fire. The most alarming rumours were rife throughout the district of Furruckabad, and much excitement prevailed amongst all classes. The residents of the station of Futtehgurh proposed to make arrangements for their mutual safety and flight in the event of the mutiny of the 10th N. I. which was located at that station. Some wished to go into the fort at once, others to fortify some substantial buildings. The latter plan was partially carried into effect upon Colonel Smith's house; but it was soon abandoned, and all determined upon occupying the fort. Colonel Smith had great confidence in his regiment, and wished to take into the fort some 200 of them. This arrangement not pleasing the residents at large, the plan of going to the fort was abandoned, and each commenced providing for his own safety as best he could. Boats were obtained by degrees, and latterly, with great difficulty, boatmen too were not to be had for love of money, though large advances were given and promises made to the various Manjhees. Time wore on; excitement lulled, thought there were frequent alarms.

About the 28th or 29th of May the advance guard of some cavalry, under Captain Fletcher Hayes, arrived at the station. The sepoys of the 10th N. I. immediately intimated to Colonel Smith that this proceeding was distasteful to them, and requested him to order it away at once; accordingly it was done. The advance guard rejoined the main body of cavalry, which marched on and murdered their officers at Kerowlee, in the Mynpoory District. On the 2nd June a spy, a Bhat, with a Hindee letter from Rao Bhawanee Sing, uncle of the Raja of Mynpoory, was seized and brought to Mr. Probyn, the Magistrate, by the sepoys of the 10th N. I. He was chained to a tree. This annoyed the sepoys; and at Colonel Smith's request, he was despatched to Mynpoory to be summarily dealt with by Mr. Power, the Magistrate. The man was confined in the Jail, and with the rest of the convicts escaped when it was broken open.

On the above date a Cavalry regiment entered the District from Oudh via Meora ghat, and passed through Kunouj without doing much injury, and on to Goorsahainjungje and Chubramow. At these police stations much havoc was committed; and at the latter, where there is also a Tehseeldar, the treasury was plundered to the extent of Company's Rupees 8,456.12, which Mohummud Tukee, the Tehseeldar, had attempted to transport to Bishengurh, the fort of a friendly landholder, Chowdry Jye Chund. The Tehseeldar himself was seized, but through the intervention of a friendly trooper, a fellow-town's man, he was released. The Thannahdar, or head police officer, Mohummud Saeed, hid himself in a most unpleasant locality, and thus managed to escape. Both these officials afterwards served the ex-Nawab; the former as his Mushee Khas, or principal Counsellor, the latter as a Tehseeldar, or revenue collector.

The arrival of the cavalry regiment, whose exploits have been narrated, caused dire alarm and confusion amongst the residents of Futtehgurh.

Previous to this many families had congregated together on the river bank to be near their boats, and to be ready for instant flight. Mr. Probyn had attempted, on the 28th May, to take the treasure to the fort; but the sepoys of the 10th, especially one Shunker Misser, Subadar, opposed the transfer. He had also called Hurdeo Buksh of Dhurrumpoor, a powerful landholder, whose broad domains lie on the left bank of the Ganges, to his aid; and it was Mr. Probyn's intention to have reached Cawnpoor, through the means of this powerful Chieftain. "L'homme propose et Dieu dispose."

Towards evening, information was brought that the cavalry were approaching. This was a false report. All now prepared to start, and soon after nightfall most of the residents of the station had embarked on some
twelve or thirteen boats of various sorts and sizes. Hurdeo Buksh, with his men, accompanied the boats; and the fleet moved away. At daybreak of the 4th June, at Mouzah Dahlia, near Cheasur, it moored: refreshments were served, and shortly afterwards Hurdeo Buksh took leave, leaving his uncle with a strong body of armed retainers to guard the fleet.

It may be well to mention, at this point, the names of the parties on the various boats, as far as it can be ascertained.

1. In Mr. Maclean's boat were:
   Mr. Maclean and two daughters.
   Mr. and Mrs. Guise.
   Lieutenant Monckton, Executive Engineer.
   Mrs. Monckton.
   Lieutenant Byrne, 10th Native Infantry.
   The Revd. Mr. J. E. Freeman.
   D. E. Campbell.
   A. O. Johnson.
   J. McMullin, with their families.
   Mr. Palmer, Deputy Collector.

2. In Mr. Ives' boat were:
   Mr., Mrs. and Miss Ives.

3. In Mr. Brierly's boat were:
   Mr. and Mrs. Brierly, and child.
   Mr. and Mrs. Elliott, and three or four children.
   Mr. and Mrs. Cawood, and three or four children.
   Mr. and Mrs. Macklin, two sons, and five or six daughters.
   Mr. Joyce, a Merchant.
   Mrs. MacDonald, and two children.
   Mr. Faulkner, and three members of his family.
   Mrs. Jennings and family, and some five persons.
   Mr. and Mrs. Kew, and family.
   Mr. and Mrs. Catania.
   Mr. and Mrs. Madden, and two ladies and three children.

4. In Mr. Probyn's boat were:
   Mr. and Mrs. Probin.
   Mr. and Mrs. Thornhill.
   Mr. and Mrs. Jones, and child.
   Mr. Jones (Junior).

5. In Mr. Lewis' boat were:
   Mr. and Mrs. Lewis, and family.

6. In Colonel Tucker's boat were:
   Mr. and Mrs. Tucker, and three children.
   Miss Tucker.
   Miss Humphreys.
   Mr. and Mrs. Abern.
   The Revd. Mr. Fisher, his wife and child.

7. In Mr. Churcher's boat were:
   Messrs. T. and D. Churcher, Indigo Planters.
   Mr. Edward James, Assistant Opium Agent.
Lieutenant and Mrs. Fitzgerald, 10th N. I.
Ensign Eckford, ditto.
Captain Bignell, ditto.
Doctor and Mrs. Maltby, ditto.

8. In Sergeant Roach's boat were:
Sergeant Roach, wife and two children.
Mr. and Mrs. Boscow.

Mrs. Sturt and daughter.

The other boats were filled with guards, servants, &c., &c. It is certain that above 100 of the residents of Futtehgurh were on board this flotilla.

At this point of their course, the fugitives received an addition to their numbers in the persons of Lieutenants Eckford, Byrne, Fitzgerald, and Captain Bignell. It appears that these four officers, in company with Captain Phillimore of the 10th, attempted on the 4th to reach the fort; but finding their way by the parade ground opposed, they, at the instigation of some faithful Sikhs, under their Havildar Abael Sing, tried to reach the fort by the river. Captain Phillimore had a small boat of his own, on which he managed to reach the fort. The others being in a large unmanageable boat, could not make way against the stream, and consequently turning the boat's head, they dropped down the stream, and joined the fugitives of the preceding night.

At the close of the day of the 4th June, the flotilla moved on, and got on well as far as Khoosumkhor, distant some twenty-six miles, on the right bank of the Ganges. Here a heavy fire was poured into them. The river too, at this point, was shallow, and Mr. Brierly's boat, a large heavy one, grounded on a sand bank, and it was only with the greatest difficulty, and by the most strenuous exertions of Hurdeo Buksh's guard, and the passengers, who worked amidst a perfect storm of bullets, that the boat was again launched into the main stream and joined the other boats, some two miles down. In this encounter, Mr. Brierly and a child were severely wounded.

On the morning of the 5th June, the fleet again moved a couple of miles from Meora ghat. A consultation was held as to the expediency of going on, as tidings of the crossing of a large force of cavalry just before them, had been received by the fugitives. Unanimity was wanting; some wished to pass on, others to take shelter in Hurdeo Buksh's fort, some few miles to the rear. Finally the boats, containing the parties of Mr. Macklin, Mr. Ives, and Mr. Brierly, went on; the rest returned, and went up the Gumeree river to Amrowlee Jeithpoor, and the poor fugitives found a welcome shelter in the castle of Hurdeo Buksh, on or about the 7th or 8th June. At Amrowlee, a lady, who, fearing the dangers on ahead, had left Mr. Brierly's boat, and found her way back on foot to this place, was taken in.

The other boats,—sad to relate,—never reached Cawnpoor. To an island in the main stream, four miles above that station, they managed to proceed, after having passed through many dangers, and being heavily mulcted by certain zemindars, who promised assistance, but failed to render it. Here they remained three days, hoping to receive intelligence from Cawnpoor; but, alas! none came. During this time the roar of artillery was almost incessant. On the morning of the fourth day, after reaching this island, a gun was brought to bear upon them, and its fire killed Mrs. Ives, her Ayah, and a child of Mr. Brierly's. On the afternoon of the same day the whole party were taken prisoners by a body of sepoys; and when asked what they intended to do to them, the reply was, "Take you to the Nana Sahib." Money was offered and refused; blood was required. The prisoners were tied two and two, and taken to Cawnpoor, where that incarnate fiend, the Nana, had them despatched by a volley of musketry and with the sword. So ended the career of that little band of Christians, amounting to some fifty or sixty persons, who separated on the 5th June from the other fugitives from Futtehgurh.
On the morning of the 4th June, after the departure of most of the Civilians of the station and some few of the Military, Colonel Smith thought it prudent to attempt the transfer of the treasure from the Collector's Cutcherry to the fort. A portion of the 10th were ordered to escort it; but these loyal and faithful men considered the parade ground a safer and more convenient position for the treasure, and it was accordingly located there, and a guard with two guns set over it. The amount of money in the Treasury amounted to Rupees 2,80,000. Maharaja Dhuileep Sing's jewels were also there.

The sepoy and the Collector's sowars received at this time from Colonel Smith two months' pay. This was to keep the men in good humour. Kulb Hossein Khan, Deputy Collector, proceeded to his Office as usual, and as far as lay in his power, carried on the current business, and restored confidence. The Thannadars and Tehseeldars, who, with one or two exceptions (Hossein Bux, Tehseeldar of Imrutpoor, Syud Mohummed, Tehsildar of Kaemgunje) had left their posts, were ordered to return; and his exertions with the presence of Captain Vibart, who appeared to be the life and soul of all, in some degree allayed the rising storm.

On this day too arrived at Kanouj a mutinous body of cavalry from the eastward. Girdharee Lall was Tehseeldar at that time. The mutineers pressed the old man sorely to give up the treasure; but the greater part, Rupees 4,000, he had previously buried, and the remainder he had hid and would not give up.

Abdul Kureem, Thannadar, showed the spot where it was concealed; and the mutineers possessing themselves of Rupees 2,566, plundered whatever else they could lay hands on, and went on. The remnant of the treasure was finally seized by Abdul Kureem on the 5th June, who, having paid the Thanna officials, appropriated the balance; but this was afterwards plundered from him by other rebels.

The old Tehseeldar made his escape by night from confinement, where he had been placed by Abdul Kureem, to Gungdhurapoor.

The Nawab of Furruckabad on this day issued a proclamation that any bad characters creating a disturbance would be blown away from guns at his order. This excited the wrath of Colonel Smith, and he strongly protested with the ex-Nawab, who, in excusing himself, replied that Mr. Thornhill, the Judge, had told him so to do in the event of a disturbance.

The 5th and 6th June passed away. Nothing particular happened; an intrenchment was thrown up round the guns and the treasure. On the 7th June there was a disturbance in the Jail. The prisoners appointed four amongst themselves, Generals, Colonels, and Lieutenants. One Burriar Sing, a noted dacoit, and a murderer, was of the latter grade; he was very active. Captain Vibart proceeded to the Jail, but was received with abuse, and stones flung at him. One hit him upon the forehead; he returned and informed Colonel Smith, who sent down a company of the 10th, to quell the disturbance. These sepoys fired upon the prisoners, killing seven of them (amongst them Burriar Sing), and wounding eight others. Some of the prisoners jumped down wells. The disturbance was put down, and the 10th Native Infantry received great applause. Then Colonel Smith harangued them. They swore on their colors to be faithful to their salt; he swore to forgive all that was past. What a slender reed was he depending upon! But a few days afterwards these very men, on receipt of a letter from the Subadar of the 41st N. I. calling upon them to murder their officers, showed it to the Colonel, who dictated a reply. Instead of sending that reply, they wrote, "Come, we will not oppose you; you may kill our officers; we have sworn not to do so, but no opposition will be given to you."

After the demonstration of loyal feeling shown by the 10th N. I. in the matter of the uproar at the Jail, Colonel Smith wrote to Mr. Probyn at Dhurrumpoor, asking him and the other fugitives to return, stating his firm dependance in the sepoys of his regiment. Mr. Probyn returned
alone about the 8th or 10th June, and stayed a day or so; but distrust ing the
state of affairs, he returned to Dhurrumpoor, just in time to witness the de
parture of the whole body, (with one exception) of fugitives, who had taken
shelter in the fort. Previous to Mr. Probyn's return to Dhurrumpoor, Lieute
nants Eckford and Fitzgerald and Captain Bignell returned to the station, and
after reporting themselves were put under arrest by Colonel Smith, who was
highly displeased at their having left the station. Captain Vibart and Kulb
Hossein carried on the civil duties as far as it was in their power. The last
day, on which the Cutcherry was open, was the 16th June.

Colonel Smith's letter had unsettled the minds of the fugitives at Dhurrumpoor. They did not like the look of Hurdeo Buksh's fort, and thought it
untenable in the event of a siege, and there was a rumour of approaching
mutineers. They consequently determined to return to the station. Mr. Probyn strove to dissuade them. All started, some on ponies, some on carts,
some on palanqueens, and so reached Futtehgurh in safety on the 12th June,
and located themselves here and there.

Between the 6th and 9th June, Mr. Edwards, and Messrs. Donald, Indigo
Plan ters, arrived from the Budaon district, disguised as natives. The story
of their escape from Shumshabad is curious, showing as it does the variable
turns in the disposition of natives towards the English at the commencement
of the mutiny and afterwards. There were four fugitives from Budaon, Mr.
Edwards, C.S., Magistrate of Budaon, the two Messrs. Donald, and Mr. Gibson;
they reached Kaemgunje, and were hospitably received, and forwarded on in
safety to Shumshabad to the abode of the Jaffrey Begum, a lady of high birth
and married to a man of lower extraction but, from his connection with her,
bearing the title of Nawab Doolah. Arrived at Shumshabad, the fugitives
were received by Punna Lall, the Karinda or Factor of the Jaffrey Begum,
who fed and otherwise entertained them. The Nawab Doolah did not show
himself; the mob outside now became tumultuous, and Punna Lall advised
the gentlemen to go off. Unfortunately, whilst refreshing themselves, they
had laid aside their arms, which were not forthcoming at the time of departure.

Having passed out of the gates, which were shut behind them, the fugi
tives went on for a little distance, when they were opposed by a body of bad
characters and rebels of all descriptions. The three mounted gentlemen rode
right through their opponents, and escaped unscathed to Kaemgunje, when
Ahmud Yar Khan again took them in. Their companion, Mr. Gibson, being
mounted on a camel, was killed before the gate of the Jaffrey Begum's house.
re-entrance having been refused to the fugitives. Mr. Edwards and Messrs.
Donald were now attired in native clothes, and, thoroughly disguised, reached
Futtehgurh, under the care of Mooltan Khan, in safety. Not so fortunate was
another poor lady, who was making for Futtehgurh. Mrs. Eckford had been
sent by her husband to Allahabad when the Meerut mutiny occurred. For
some reason unknown, she determined to return, but perished on the way. It
is supposed that this was the lady who is known to have been murdered by the
Thakoors of Secunderpoo r on the Grand Trunk Road. Soon after these
events, Ahmud Yar Khan became Nazim under the ex-Nawab; and Mooltan
Khan, a noted rebel leader. Messrs. Edwards and the two Donalds proceeded to
Dhurrumpoor; the former remained with Mr. Probyn at the fort of Hurdeo
Buksh, the latter returned to Futtehgurh, on the 12th June, with the other
fugitives. Time wore on. The sepoys appeared loyal, but it was the stillness
that precedes the storm. On the 16th June, a man was to be hanged by order
of the Sudder. Colonel Smith, who was invested with plenary powers, was
to carry the sentence into effect. But there was a stronger power at hand,—the
sepoys of the 10th. These loyal men considered it unsafe to hang a man
at that period, and thought he had better be released, and he was released.

Between the 14th and 16th June, the mutineers from Sectapoo r, the 41st
N. I., Oudh Local Cavalry, and 10th Oudh Local Infantry, arrived at Allahgunj e on the side of the Ramgunga, and were well received, fed, and
feasted by one Likha Sing, a noted rebel, and Zengindar of that village. These men it was who sent the Hindee letter, above referred to, to the native officers of the 10th Native Infantry. On the 17th June the Jemadar of the Collectory sowars, Azeem Khan, the two Duffadars, Dost Mohammad Khan, and Manzoor Ali, with all their sowars, with the exception of one man, went over to pay their compliments to the rising power. With them went Agshur Ali Khan, Hussan Mohammad, Wuzu Khan, Shubratee Khan, on the part of the ex-Nawab of Furruckabad. On this day too, the native officers of the 10th Native Infantry Dalail, Ahmud Khan, Girwur Sing, Amir Khan, Imambox Khan, Sheikh Imambox, Mudarbux, Boo Ali Khan, intimated to their officers that time was up, and that they had better retreat into the fort. On that night all the residents, with few exceptions, went into the fort. The mutiny had begun in earnest.

On the first tidings of the approach of the Seetapoor mutineers, Colonel Smith had broken the bridge of boats, and sunk as many boats as he could lay hands on, and this too through the instrumentality of the 10th Native Infantry. The mutineers consequently had some difficulty in crossing, but Likha Sing of Allahgunje and Poolundur Sing of Bhowanepoor, managed to procure boats and to convey them across the Ganges, a little to the north of the City of Furruckabad, on the morning of the 18th June. The rebels encamped that day at Bhirrah Bagh, not far from the city. The 10th Native Infantry, aware that the Seetapoor mutineers would cross during the day of the 18th, very early in the morning sent two companies, the Grenadier and the Light Company, to the city to place the Nawab upon the throne before the arrival of the Seetapoor men, and thus have the glory of having so done all to themselves. These two companies installed the Nawab under a royal salute; and having so done, returned to the parade and saluted their own colors, with another royal salute. This done, they proceeded to the Jail, broke it open, released the prisoners, and plundered whatever was there. The Njeebs and bad characters of the vicinity came in for the fag ends of the spoil. The cantonment was now plundered and set on fire. The residents were all in the fort, with the exception of Mr. D. Churcher, Mrs. Sturt, Mrs. Collins, and her daughter, and Messrs. W. and A. Hine, Clerks in the Magistrate and Collector's Office.

Mr. Churcher, on the 18th, was concealed all day under a large heap of hides in a godown, which was broken open, and the hides tossed about; but there being many of them, he escaped detection. In the evening one Chotay, a Chumar, conveyed him to his village Mahroopoor, and secreted him five days. The zemindars of that village, on the fifth night, managed to convey him into the fort. Mrs. Sturt secreted herself in a stack of jhow (Tamarix Indica) which was near her bungalow, and during the night of the 18th was conveyed across the Ganges by some mullahs (boatmen) to Kachwa Gara, where she remained.

Mrs. Collins met with a sad fate: she was a rich old lady, had much jewellery, and had secreted it with other valuables in her house. On the 18th the mutineers and bad characters quickly sought her out, and refusing to show her treasure, she was cruelly murdered, and her daughter taken off by a tailor. Next day the poor girl was brought back to the house, and her murdered mother shown to her. The Messrs. Hine escaped in disguise to different villages.

About 3 P.M. of the same day, two companies of the 41st and the 10th Oudh Locals came over from Bhirrah Bagh to the Parade ground, and wished to share the treasure and the jewels with the 10th Native Infantry; these latter refused, and a skirmish ensued, in which some sepoys on either side were killed. The 41st and the 10th Oudh Locals retired; reinforcements came up to their aid, and a battle between the regiments was very nearly taking place. Words took the place of blows, and it was agreed to share the treasure in the morning.
The 10th gave up their colors and their ammunition as a pledge. During the night the 10th, faithful to their promise, plundered the treasure in the most indiscriminate manner: it was a regular rush to see who could get most. The guard of the 10th at the fort now absconded, and joined in the plunder. The sepoys with their plunder separated here and there, the greater number crossed the Ganges. On this night too, Captain Bignell of the 10th swam across the Ganges and joined Misr Sunker Soobadar, and the main body of the 10th. From their camp he sent word by his bheesty (water-carrier) that the garrison had better follow his example, and that the 41st, under Misr Shunker, would protect them. How cruelly was he deceived! The presence of an Englishman, the treasure with the regiment, drew upon it many enemies; the villagers attacked, and it was opposed on all sides, particularly by the men of Uncha Tela and the Gailwar Thakoors of Doorgaganje. The services of these latter villagers were purchased, and they conveyed the mutineers across the Ramgunga. Finally the remnant of this corps recrossed the Ganges at Meora Ghat into the Doab. Here it was that finding Captain Bignell a burthen, he was pushed over the boat into the river, and had to swim to land in the limits of the village of Sireapoor. There he died from exhaustion; some say, sun-stroke.

On the 19th, the 41st and the 10th Oude Locals found that the 10th had outwitted them. Enraged at this, they set fire to every bungalow yet standing, plundered the bazars, and committed every iniquity. Likha Sing plundered Maharaja Duleep Sing’s splendid house on his own account, taking boat-load after boat-load of valuables of all descriptions. It appears that two companies of the 10th remained behind in the station. These men, early on the 19th, went to the Nawab, and afterwards located themselves in one of the city gardens. The Sireapoor men now wished the Nawab to compel the 10th Native Infantry to lead the assault on the fort. The 10th did not like the task; a dispute ensued, and finally a severe fight took place, in which many or nearly all the 10th were killed; and on the 22nd June the Nawab ordered them out of the city. The Sireapoor men were now urged to the attack, but they replied that the proper hour had not arrived, that the augurs had fixed the 25th for the commencement of the siege.

To return to the garrison in the fort:—Provisions, but in small quantities, had been laid in, every exertion was now made to collect grain, sheep, and every description of provision; very high prices were given for everything: but the necessaries of life came in but slowly. Mulloo, durwan (door keeper), and Sheopursahad, Jemadar of Major Robertson, exerted themselves very greatly in this respect. Jaipal, too, a sepy of the 11th Native Infantry at Meerut, and who was purchasing sheep for the officers of his regiment, made over to the garrison all he had, some forty or fifty. This man, with Kalay Khan, and Soorut Sing of the 10th Native Infantry, went into the fort with the garrison, and remained throughout the siege, doing good service. Jaipal left when the Fort was evacuated, but Kalay Khan and Soorut Sing went with the boats. The garrison had likewise a little beer and wine; so, with regard to provisions, they were not badly off.

There were seven guns on the fort walls, the largest an 18-pounder howitzer; ammunition was very scarce. Mulloo and Sheopursahad managed to bring in some 5 or 6,000 cartridges, which had been plundered from the 10th Native Infantry, and a few round shots. In the fort were found twelve boxes of ammunition, but half were blank cartridges; a few old shots were also found: the garrison had perhaps thirty round shots in all. There were now in the fort fully 120 Christians, and native servants in numbers. These all shrank away by degrees, except one Ghureeb, a cook of Lieutenant Fitzgerald, who behaved nobly to the very last. Out of this large number of almost, helpless persons, there were some thirty-six or thirty-seven males, the rest were women and children. Of the males, only thirty-two were capable of bearing arms; but these were all brave men. Right gallantly did they fight till their ammunition failed them.
The Seetapoor mutineers now moved to the Sheeshun Bagh. The ground was cleared for action, and on the 25th, the day fixed by omens, the first gun was fired on the devoted garrison. The besiegers appear to have had only two guns; one was placed opposite the gate of the fort, at a distance of 4 or 500 yards, the other at Eesher Chunder's Kotee. Upon this house, too, marksmen were placed. The Nawab exerted himself to the utmost in obtaining ammunition, ladders, and other munitions of war for the besiegers. The siege lasted nine days. The besieged made use of screws, hammers, and whatever could be found, wrapped up in gunny bags, in place of grape. The killed and wounded whilst loading, the gun went off, and the ball going into the hand was cleared for action, and immediately the 3rd assault was made against Colonel Smith's picket. The assailants were beaten off with loss. Another assault was made a day after without success. The besiegers now set to work to undermine Colonel Smith's bastion; the miners were hard at work close by. This bastion was the key of the fort; if this was blown in, all would have been at the mercy of the besiegers. A council of war was held, and it was determined to evacuate the fort on the night of the 3rd July. The garrison were divided into three parties; there being only three boats, for one of which (Major Robertson's, there were no boatmen. The boats were under the command of Colonel Smith, Colonel Goldie, and Major Robertson. Mr. Jones and Mr. Churcher acted as steersmen for the latter. At 2 A.M., on the morning of the 4th July, this brave garrison, compelled to leave the fort (which they had gallantly held nine days against two regiments of infantry, with two guns and a host of marksmen from amongst the surrounding villages), for want of ammunition, embarked on their perilous and calamitous voyage.

Thus ended the second act of this dreadful tragedy.

In Appendix No. I will be found a list of those who were in the fort when the siege commenced. All these, excepting those who had been killed, including two families of Native Christians (Enoch's and Dhowkul Purshad's), crowded into three boats.

The fugitives reached Soondurpoor, about 8 A.M., of the 4th July. At this point of their course the rudder of Colonel Goldie's boat was damaged, and it was consequently abandoned, being unmanageable; whilst attempting to repair it, the villagers annoyed them much by a sharp fire. A most successful and brilliant charge was made on the assailants by Captain Vibart, Major Munro, Lieutenants Eckford, Swetnam, and Henderson, against some 300 of the enemy, who were beaten back to the village. In this attack Mungul Seift, of Ghyanpoor, a notorious rebel, was wounded, and his nephew, Bhujjum Sing, of Soondurpoor, killed. Doolah Raie, of Sutotkpoor, was also wounded.
The party on Colonel Goldie's boat now embarked on Colonel Smith's boat and moved on. A gun was at this time brought to bear on the fugitives; it was placed at Bhojepoor, on the right bank of the river. The Mahomedans of this village were very inveterate. They with the sepoyos now pushed off on boats, and a hot pursuit was kept up; the fugitives were fired upon from all sides, but principally from the left bank of the stream. The gun at Bhojepoor did no harm; it was too far off. At Soondurpoor, Enoch and his family, Native Christians, were left behind in the boat that was abandoned. Enoch eventually reached Lucknow safely, but was well plundered, ere he left Soondurpoor, by one Bankay Rohun, that is, Rohun the dandy. Not finding a resting place at that station, he travelled to Cawnpoor and Allahabad, and finally was appointed to the cavalry police at that station.

The chase was kept up, and a constant fire poured upon the fugitives.

Opposite Singharampooor and close to Manpoor, Major Robertson's boat grounded on a sand-bank; all hands jumped into the water, and strove to shove her off. All their efforts were unavailing. The pursuers rapidly approached in a large covered boat, the enemy from the bank keeping up a hot fire.

The enemy came nearer and nearer, firing volleys as they approached; on they came, their boats touching the stranded boat. A scene of horror followed. The sterner portion of the crew implore the weaker sex to jump over board with their children and infants, rather than fall into the bands of a ruthless, cruel foe. The call is obeyed:—men, women, and children are soon in the stream. Some are cut down in the water, some are drowned, some shot, some taken prisoners. Let us cast a veil over the dreadful tragedy. Suffice to say that out of this party but three escaped—Major Robertson, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Churcher, the former two badly wounded.

In the meantime the other boat had gone on to Singharampooor, to which place a boat of the river brought it. Here a severe fire from grape and musketry assailed them; the rudder of the boat was smashed; Mr. Roban, Miss Goldie, and a child were killed; Lieutenant Swetenham, Dr. Maltby, and two others were wounded.

The stream, however, carried the boat on for some five or six miles, when it, too, grounded on a sand-bank.

At this point Mr. Jones, who had swam and floated down the stream, was taken into the boat. After some time the rudder was partially repaired, and the boat got off the bank. Early on the morning of the 5th July a voice was heard from the left bank of the river; it was the Reverend Mr. Fisher's who had escaped the massacre at Manpoor; he was taken in. Further down the river at Mouzah Tehra, the boat again grounded; there were no boatmen on board. Mr. Jones acted as steersman, badly wounded, though he was naked to the skin; he suffered much from the fierce rays of a July sun. The villagers of Tehra called out to them, to beware of the Koosumkhoore men,—noted rebels,—and offered them protection if they would accept it. It was accepted, and the party landed. Refreshments, such as the village could provide, were offered to the weary fugitives. Mr. Jones, perfectly exhausted went to the village, and there fell asleep on a charpoy. Colonel Smith wished to engage boatmen to convey the boat to Cawnpoor, and offered Rupees 2,200, one-half to be paid at once, the remainder on reaching that station. About 4 or 5 P.M., the villagers from Chouchpoor hardly came up. These appear to have been bad characters, robbers and plunderers; and hearing that money had been given to the Tehra people, they determined to share it. A dispute arose; the money was divided, the Chouchpoor men obtaining the lion's share. Colonel Smith and party fearing for their lives, shoved the boat off, having only secured three boatmen. Mr. Jones was left behind, and that which appeared a great calamity to him, turned out, under God's Providence, to be the means of saving his life.
Colonel Smith managed to secure three boatmen, but these men afterwards deserted. At Bihloor the fugitives were fired upon, and one gentleman wounded. Opposite to Puttehpoor Chourasee, Jussa Sing, the Zemindar, fired heavily upon them: between this place and Bithoor all the passengers in that unfortunate boat were captured, and miserably perished in the general massacre at Cawnpoor on the 10th July.

Mr. Jones remained the night of the 5th July with Bhabootee Sing and Bummur Sing, Thakoores and residents of Tehra. On the morning of the 6th they made him over to the care of Balgobind, a shareholder in the village. This man took great care of him, fed him, and clothed him (he was destitute of clothing), and secreted him for a month, and finally conveyed him to Dhibrumpoor, and thence to Kussourah, where Mr. Probyn, C.S., was at the time concealed with his family and Mr. Edwards. The whole party were, comparatively speaking, comfortably lodged in Kussourah; they had servants, and a few books. The month of August was closing; the rebels had been defeated for the second time at Bithoor. Hurdeo Buksh now proposed to convey the whole party to Cawnpoor. Mr. and Mrs. Probyn and his children, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Jones, four servants and a Sikh Christian, embarked in one boat, with a strong guard, and reached Cawnpoor on or about the 1st September.

Mr. Churcher’s escape was wonderful. He, with the others, when the massacre commenced at Singeerampoor, committed himself to the mercy of the waters, rather than fall into the hands of the blood-thirsty assailants. He managed to obtain an oar, and with the help of this he floated down the stream and overtook Major Robertson and Kalay Khan, who likewise had an oar. On his arrival Kalay Khan took the oar to himself and swam to land. He was made prisoner, and afterwards blown away from a gun. Major Robertson was very severely wounded. He and Mr. Churcher kept floating down the river till near midnight of the 4th July, when utterly exhausted, they landed upon an island which belonged to the village of Kurbar; there they lay till the morning, when they were rescued by one Baltshen, a sepoy of the 4th Native Infantry, Ramdeen, also a sepoy, and some few villagers. These men escorted them to Lulloo Sing, Zemindar of Kurbar, who, though he gave them protection, did not treat them very kindly. At this time he appeared uncertain how to act. The loyal conduct of Hurdeo Buksh most probably influenced him and his brethren. For a long time a feud had existed between the Kurbar people and Hurdeo Buksh. The former appear to have had an idea that the English would return, in which case Hurdeo Buksh being at feud with them, would doubtless expose their conduct if they acted unkindly or murdered the fugitives. Their estates might be confiscated and given to Hurdeo Buksh. This feeling prompted them to preserve the fugitives.

When first brought to Luljoo Sing, they were placed in a sugarcane field, and after twenty-four hours removed to a Gurhee (small fort) outside of Kurbar. Here they remained three days; but the position being exposed, Major Robertson was removed to Baramow, and Mr. Churcher took to the fields. The latter was naked, excepting a towel round his loins; the former had a pair of pantaloons. The reason of their being naked appears to have been that, during the passage down the river, they, as well as others, were constantly in the water, shoving forward the boat, and having no change of clothes, stripped when it came to their turn to labor. Mr. Churcher states that at first food was thrown to them, as it would be to a dog. Bhownees, i.e., small unroasted cakes made of flour, were given them to eat, and sometimes milk to drink. Mr. Probyn heard of their state, and sent over Rupees 50, with a bottle of brandy to Major Robertson, who was now at Baramow. This made a great difference. Luljoo Sing appears to have been a very stingy character; he did not like the expense of keeping the fugitives. Servants were now appointed for Major Robertson, who attended him constantly. About the 15th July, Choonnee Lall, an old servant of Mr. Churcher’s, found out his retreat, and brought Rupees 1,500 (£150) in gold, sewn up in his clothes. Out of this £20 was immediately given to Luljoo Sing, and all
his expenses to that date paid. After this period Mr. Churcher got whatever could be procured, and was clothed. He generally remained in the fields, now and then resorting to the Gurbee when the country around was clear, but at the slightest alarm returned to the sugarcane fields, his home for many a month. A price, Rupees 500 (£50) had been set upon each of their head; but the Kurhar people remained staunch, evading every inquiry and placing the blood-thirsty pursuers upon the wrong track. For this they deserve all praise. On the 17th September, Major Robertson died from the effects of his severe wound, and other causes; he was buried by Mr. Churcher at Baramow on the morning of the 18th September. The Thakoors of Baramow at first wished to throw the body into the Ganges, but at the earnest entreaties of Mr. Churcher they permitted him to be buried.

When Mr. Probyn was leaving for Cawnpoor, about the end of August, he sent word to Major Robertson and Mr. Churcher, asking them to accompany him and his party. The state of Major Robertson's wound prevented his being moved, and he implored Mr. Churcher not to leave him. This gallant hearted, kindly feeling man could not make up his mind to leave him alone; so determined to share his fate. Mr. Churcher remained in the Gurbee of Karhar, and in the fields when danger was near, until January 1858, when Futtehgurh was re-occupied by the English troops. Mrs. Sturt, who had escaped to Kuchwagara on the 18th June, had been brought at the instigation of Mr. Churcher by the Kurhar people to a village called Koondpoora; she too remained there till the above period. Thus closes the history of the fates of the many gallant hearts who went into the Fort of Futtehgurh on the 18th June. It will be seen that but seven persons (including two children) of pure European blood have escaped out of the many who were either residents of, or who had come into Futtehgurh in the beginning of June 1857.

In the Appendices will be found the narratives of Messrs. Churcher and Jones.

Before noticing the events which took place during the period that the rebel Nawab of Furruckabad reigned, it will be well to narrate the fate of the unfortunates who were taken prisoners by the sepoys on the 4th July at Manpore.

It will be remembered that the attack of the sepoys was fierce, that many were killed, many drowned, and some taken prisoners. Amongst the latter, were Mrs. and Miss Sutherland and a child, Mr. Jones' native family, a child of Conductor Jones. These were carried to the Nawab; those who were wounded were attended by a native Doctor, by name Bukshoo; they were fed, and as far as can be learnt, did not suffer any great privations directly at the hands of the Nawab. Besides these prisoners, other Christians from in and about the station were also seized and confined. They were Mr. and Miss Gaumisse, Mr. and Miss Atkins, and a young boy. Mr. W. Russell, Mr. Kew, Mr. E. Tarton, and another young man, name unknown; Dhowkul Purshad, his wife, and four children, Native Christians. It does not seem to have been the wish of the Nawab to kill these Christians; but there were certain evil spirits about him, who plotted their destruction in this wise:—A letter was written as if from the captives to the English; this was said to have been intercepted. Upon this there was a great clamour made by the sepoys, who insisted upon the death of the Christians. The Nawab finally gave way, fearing that if he longer opposed their execution, his brother Sukhawut Hossein would be installed by the sepoys in his place.

On the 19th or 23rd July (the report of the date differs), the unfortunates, some twenty in number, were drawn upon the Parade ground; the women separated from the men, and either blown away from guns or cut down with swords. One poor woman and two children, whom the cannon twice spared, having missed fire each time, were cut down by the ruthless ruffians. Their bodies were flung into a well hard by the place, where the fearful tragedy took place. There does not appear to have been a proclamation that the poor un-
fortunates were to be blown away. The day too was rainy, yet there was a very great assemblage of the people on the Parade ground to witness the dreadful spectacle. The administration of the ex-Nawab, civil and military, now demands attention.

Soon after the residents of the station were shut up in the fort, a noted rebel, Ashrut Khan, in company with Ahmud Yar Khan and Moultan Khan, came to Futtehgurh from Shumshabad, Kaemgunje, and Mohow. Ashrut Khan is a native of Delhi, and brother-in-law to Ahmud Yar Khan; both were pensioners of the British Government; the former, as a reward for his father's services in Lord Lake's time, was in receipt of Rupees 700 a month. Ashrut Khan was styled Nawab; he laid claims to the Futtehgurh Musnud (throne), and was in some way related to the Bungush family. This man was the soul of the mutiny. He with Bighga Begum, the wife of the Nawab, had great influence, and did what they pleased, was appointed Musheer Khas (Principal Councillor) to the Nawab.

The district was divided into two grant divisions, the east and the west. To the former, which included Kumalgunje, Chubramow, Kunouj, Tirooa, Mohsun Ali, Zemindar of Sooltangunje Khareta, was appointed as Nazim. To the west, which comprised Kaemgunje, Shumshabad, Allygunje, Puttialee, Khassgunje, was appointed Ahmud Yar Khan. Both these men were unfit for the great position they filled. Mohsun Ali Khan was an habitual drunkard, and of a very common order of intellect; but he was apparently of less stern material than the Nazim Ahmud Yar Khan, who appears to have given great dissatisfaction by his ruthless acts, and decisions which were utterly devoid of sense and justice.

Besides these Nazis, there was a council of two, who appear to have exercised plenary powers, and to have had the power of reversing any decision and calling for any case. They formed a kind of Appellate Court, in which original suits of all kinds were also instituted.

This Court was composed of Captain Gunga Sing, a Subadar of the 41st Native Infantry, and Sheo Ghulam Deechet, likewise a Subadar of the Setaapoor Local Infantry. The latter had a Naib Deputy, one Pundit Peetumber Doss, in whom he placed great confidence, and from whom he received an opinion in all cases connected with the Hindu law, which came before him. The accounts written at the time and since, describe these two men to have been invested with the same powers as the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces had under the British rule.

The next Court to this appears to have been that of the Moostees, of whom there were three:—

Ahmud Ali (before the outbreak), Criminal Record-keeper, under the Magistrate of Futtehgurh.

Abdul Wahid, an officer attached to the Dewanny Adawlut, for attaching property (a Koork Ameen).

Cazee Ahmad Yar Khan. These men received a salary of Rupees 700 each, and fees to the amount of 10 per cent. on the amount decreed in any suit; also one anna in the rupee on every execution served out.

This Court was not composed of men of any talent; one alone, Ahmud Ali, amongst them, was a man of average abilities. These men were the Civil and Sessions Judges of the City of Furruckabad.

The Nawab Tuffuzool Hoosein Khan of Furruckabad was supposed to look down from his lofty throne, and watch and guide the proceedings of these various Courts; but in truth he had very little power shortly after the commencement of his reign. He was a man of quiet habits, more given to painting and gliding, and the society of immoral characters than fitted to rule and direct a turbulent soldiery, and a rural population not over well inclined to his rule or to any system at all, except what their own ideas and wishes suggested.
The division of the district, with six Tehseels and ten Thannas or police stations, remained as under the British Government. The pay of the Tehseeldars was the same as previous to the outbreak, viz., Rupees 200 per mensem; that of the Thannadars ranged from Rupees 50 to 70 per mensem. The burkundazes (policemen) received Rupees 5 a month, but were in much greater numbers.

On the accession to the throne, the Nawab issued a Code of Procedure for the Criminal and Revenue Departments, which closely resembled that in force under the British Government. For the Government revenue he at first fixed eight instalments; it was afterwards reduced to five.

For the Khureef, four monthly instalments, commencing from beginning of the month of Kuwar (September 5th) to the end of Foos (January 10th).

For the Rubbee, four monthly instalments, commencing from 1st of Falgoon (9th February) to end of Jact (7th June).

If the revenue was not paid into the Tehseeldarree by the 15th of each month, the Tehseeldar was empowered to issue a dustuck (summons) by a piadha (footman) at two annas a day. After the lapse of a week if the instalment still remained unpaid, he was to issue another dustuck by a sarwar, bearing a charge of eight annas or one shilling a day, upon the defaulting party or parties. One quarter of this tulubana, that is daily pay, was to be entered in the accounts, when realized, to the credit of Government; the remainder was divided amongst the men who served the dustucks. If the amount due was still unpaid, he was to issue a proclamation to the effect that, if within one week the balance was not paid into the Government Treasury, the movable and immovable property, such as trees and gardens of the defaulter, with the exception of implements and cattle for agricultural purposes, would be attached and sold. If the demand still remained unpaid, a similar proclamation was to be issued, that the landed property of the Zemindar, or the share of the Putteedar (shareholder), as the case might be, would be farmed to the highest bidder for three, seven, or twelve years. The papers in the case, with good security, and an account of receipts and balances, were then to be sent to the Nawab for approval and sanction.

The Tehseeldar had it likewise in his power, after the issue of the two dustucks, to imprison the defaulter in the Tehseelee for fifteen days in lieu of attaching his property. After this if the demand was unpaid, he was to be sent to the Nawab for further imprisonment.

In the event of the Assamees, or the cultivators, not paying their rents to their landlord, the Tehseeldar was empowered to go in person to the village, and before the Putwaree (village accountant,) and the headman to realize the Government portion of the rent from each cultivator separately.

Summary suits too were instituted, and the procedure was the same as in our Courts. The Tehseeldar, however, gave judgment in the case, keeping a copy of his decree in his own Office, and sending the Misl (proceedings) to the Nawab, to whom an appeal was open; and for this purpose the Tehseeldars were forbidden to execute their decrees till one month after the date of decision, thus giving ample time for an appeal.

Petitions of all kinds were filed on plain paper, but a fee of eight annas was taken by the Court before whom the petition was filed.

Kharij Dakhil petitions, i.e., petitions for transfer of property, under every form, were to be presented to the Nawab alone, who, having passed orders on them, sent them to be carried into effect by the Tehseeldars.

The procedure for the Criminal Courts was as follows:—

Tehseeldars were empowered to take petitions in trivial cases, and to pass final orders upon them, but a report was first to be written in the daily Register of occurrences by the plaintiff; he was then to file his plaint. In cases of assault, and wounding without bone fracture, or not very severe wounding, the Tehseeldar could imprison for five years, fine Rupees 200, and
In more severe cases, the Thannadars was to investigate the case and send it direct with his opinion to the Huzzoor, that is, to the Mufties.

Cases of burglary and theft, in which property to amount of not more than Rupees 100 was stolen, the Tehseeldars would decide and punish to the extent of their powers. Heavier cases were to be prepared by the Thannadars and sent to the Huzzoor, that is, to the Mufties.

In cases within the powers of Tehseeldars, and when the defendants had absconded, the Tehseeldars were empowered to attach and after one month to sell the property, and to proclaim the offender; but if a reward was to be offered for his apprehension, the sanction of the Nawab was required.

A monthly report from the Thannadars was ordered to be sent in this form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of case.</th>
<th>Name of village</th>
<th>Name of parties</th>
<th>Crime and date of occurrence</th>
<th>Amount of property stolen</th>
<th>Amount of property found</th>
<th>Date of instituting case in Thanna.</th>
<th>Date of despatch.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

From the Tehseeldars, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of parties</th>
<th>Crime.</th>
<th>Date of institution.</th>
<th>Date of seizure of defaulter.</th>
<th>Order and date.</th>
<th>Number of persons under investigation.</th>
<th>Remarks.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The Register of daily occurrences (Roznamcha) was to be despatched each evening from the Thannas.

The Thannadars were empowered to grant leave of absence for one month to call Chowkeedars, and Tehseeldars held the same power with reference to Chuprassees, Burkundazes, and Jemadars, whether in the Police or Revenue Department.

Such was the Code of Procedure ordered by the Nawab; but how little it was attended to, how little carried into effect, the sequel will show.

The conduct of the officials serving the British Government at the time of the outbreak, was not praiseworthy. Out of the six Tehseeldars employed in this district at the period of the outbreak, three took service with the Nawab.

Out of eleven head Police officers (Thannadars), six accepted situations under the new Government.

Amongst the nine Peshkars (an officer next in rank to the Tehseeldar), five gave in their adherence to the Nawab. The Canoongoes were all, save one, employed.

All the Collectory sowars, with the exception of one, went over to the Nawab en masse.

Of the other officials, such as Record-keepers, Mohurrirs, Nazirs, &c., whether in the Revenue or Criminal Department, the Burkundazes and Chuprassees, all or nearly all, tendered their services to the Government of the time.

The Sheristadars of the Criminal and Revenue Departments, and the Nazir of the former, did not accept appointments. The latter official got rather severely handled by the rebels; he was fined and plundered of a portion of his property.
The following were among the Chief officials of the Nawab’s Court, such as it was:

Mohammud Tuckee became Musheer Khas, or principal Councillor, in conjunction with Ashrut Khan; Hidayat Ali, formerly Tehseeldar of Mohumdedab, became Dewan.

Tarut Ali, a servant of the Nawab’s, before the outbreak, on Rupees 4 or 5 a month, became Sheristadar of both Departments; Biskarut Ali was his Nisib, and Beharwadeen became Nazir; both these men had held responsible appointments under the British Government.

The men about the Nawab tried to inculcate moderation and justice. In one case, the Thannadar having reported that in a petty case of assault committed by a sepoy on a Buniya, he had sent a Duffadar and thirty Burkundazes to call the offender to the Thanna to be reprimanded,—the following order was passed on the report:—

"ORDER.

"Why did the Thannadar interfere in such a case? If he wished only to reprimand the offender, he would not have sent such an army on an expedition to arrest him. It is hence clear that the Thannadar had some covetous motive in sending so many men; for, according to the procedure of the present Government, he ought only to reprove in such a case, and prevent any further violence, so that plaintiff may obtain justice, and the offender be terrified from committing further evil. For the future he must be careful to act by these instructions, that the subjects of the Government may not be oppressed and ruined for nothing. Had he been as active in a serious case, he would have been all right."

The Nazims,—Mobsan Ali, of the Eastern Division, Ahmad Yar Khan, of the West, Moorad Ali Khan, of Etawah,—very soon upset the arrangements of the Nawab for the administration of justice. Each man ruled as he liked; the Tehseeldars under them became nonentities; police and revenue matters they took into their own hands, and complete havoc they appear to have made. Criminal and civil suits belonged especially to the Mooftee’s Court.

The procedure in this Court was much the same as under the British Government. There was much writing; there was the Urzee-dawa, petition of plaint, Jawab-dawa, reply; Rudjawab, &c., &c, as in our Civil Courts.

A copy of the decree was given to the party, in whose favor a decree was given. In lieu of the stamp paper, varying according to the amount of the suit, fees at the rate of 10 per cent. upon the amount of the decree were taken by the Mooftees as a portion of their emoluments; also one anna in the rupee, when execution of decree was served out.

One of the Mooftees, Abdool Wahid, did not decree any interest to the party in a case, in whose favor he gave a decree; the other two did so: the former paid more attention to the principles of the Mahomedan Law than his coadjutors.

Some of the decisions are curious enough. In one case of murder, the murderer was a Hindu; he was released on promising to become a Mahomedan.

The Nawab sometimes gave the final sentence. In a case of murder, he ordered the heads of the three murderers to be cut off, and stuck up over the Loil-Mudar and Gunga Gates of the City, at the same time issuing a proclamation that such would be the fate of all murderers under his rule. In a case of rape, the defendant was fined Company’s Rupees 2 and dismissed. This was the decision of Yakub Ali Naib, for the time, to the Nawab.

In a civil case brought before this Court, the plaintiff was nonsuited because he could not show the original decision of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut. The Mooftee declaring that the decision of that Court would have
caused a decree in his favor, but that they could not accept the unauthenti-
cated copy. Many parts of their procedure were truly oriental in character;
the following is a perwannah to the Thannadar of Allygunge, in the case of
A goofy, plaintiff, versus Lochna, &c., charged with murder of Mussummat
Khusli.

"In this case you are ordered to go in person to the village where the
event has occurred, and collecting fifty of the most respectable residents there-
of, write their depositions in the following manner:—'We have not killed the
deceased, nor are we aware who were her murderers.' Thus shall you take
the depositions of those who profess ignorance of the affair; but if they
know who the criminals are, you shall write their depositions thus:—'We have
not killed the deceased, but certain other persons have killed her. We say
this by our faith, and on our oath.' And when writing their depositions, you
must administer the oath in the following manner:—'We swear by the God
Almighty, who has made us and the universe.'"

"If there are not fifty such men in the village, then assemble all resi-
dents and other people you can get hold of, and write their depositions a second
and a third time, on oath administered as above; have the depositions of
full fifty men, and carry out this order and report within three days from the
issue of this perwannah."

The Thannadar, in his reply, reports having carried out these instruc-
tions completely.

The civil suits instituted before the Mooftee were very few; criminal
cases, other than petty thefts, and cases of ouster were numerous; for the
stronger oppressed the weaker, and too frequently dispossessed him of his bit
of land, of his shop, or other property.

The decisions of this Court in those descriptions of cases appear to have
given satisfaction, more particularly after the Nazims of the two divisions en-
tered upon their functions.

Many of the decisions of the latter were upset by the Mooftees, when
this was once known to the people at large. The cases instituted before the
Nazims were but very few; but these rulers did what they pleased, and had
cases brought before them and decided, nolens volens, quoad the plaintiffs.

The decisions of this Court in criminal cases were very severe; the punish-
ment of theft was the loss of the right hand. Cases of theft were, however,
very few; thieves appear to have found the times too hard for small thefts,
and much more favorable for plunderings on a grand scale, which went ri pe on
the great lines of road, and in the district. Kafilas were the order of the
day,—single travellers, or travellers in single byelies (a cart drawn by
bullocks), seldom attempting a journey.

In a case where the bundle of little value of a traveller was stolen from
one of the greees in the city, the offender lost his hand. The petty thieves
consequently left the city.

After the receipt of the firman from the King of Delhi, in which he
confirmed the Nawab of Furruckabad upon the Musnud, and highly praised
the sepoys to whose bravery so much was due, the pride and haughtiness of
the sepoys became greater than ever. In a case of murder, in which a
Koormee had murdered a Mahommedan, the Mooftee had given orders that
the murderer was to give up his property to the plaintiff, or to be killed by him;
if neither sentence was carried into the effect, that the Nawab was to have
him blown from a gun. The friends of the Koormee objected to this, appeal-
ed to Gunga Sing and Sheoghoolam Deechet. These men made a great stir
about the matter, and the Koormee, the murderer, got off. After this the the
Nawab issued a proclamation that the officers of the 41st were to be obeyed
in every respect, seeing that they had expelled the English.

Verbal orders were frequently passed in matters of great import. The
41st Native Infantry prevented the killing of cows, and the lading of oxen
with refuse, ordering that such matter was to be loaded and taken off on donkeys. The rule of the sepoys became stronger than ever; the Nawab was a puppet in their hands.

Soon after the evacuation, if not during the siege, of the fort, the Nawab established a system of “octroi,” upon every article going into or out of the city; the proceeds of this tax and of the Akbarree of the city went to his own private purse. Every article of food, with the exception of wheat and ghee (and these were at first taxed, but the sepoys not approving of it, the tax was remitted), and every description of merchandise had to pay a certain duty. On articles of small value, such as wood, ooplah (peat), four cowries in the piece was charged; thus, if the load was worth a rupee, a duty of one anna was charged upon it at the gate of the city. On articles of value 7 per cent. was taken. The trade in iron from Chandosse, sugar and cotton from Khasgunje, and Huldee from Shahjahanpoor, was very brisk.

The prices of every article doubled and trebled, except wheat, and the exportation of this was prohibited. At the time of the outbreak it is computed that there were twelve lakhs of cotton manufactures in the city; a good deal of this was sold at high prices in the district, and when the British reoccupied the country, and before the influx of fresh cotton manufactures, the large traders in these articles made immense fortunes by the sale of, and the high prices laid on, cotton cloths of all descriptions.

The average income from the duties imposed on all articles of trade averaged above Rupees 500 a day, or at the rate of two lakhs a year. The newspapers of the time show an income on some days above Rupees 1,700. Every thing was taxed. The vegetable market in the city was farmed out for Rupees 200 (£20) a year. The octroi of Kumalgunje, a little town about ten miles east of the city, was farmed for Rupees 700 a year; the contractor realizing the duties at the same rate as that imposed on articles going into and out of Furruckabad. The same rule obtained throughout every town in the district.

The proceeds from all, except Furruckabad and Kumalgunje, went to the sepoys, who paid themselves arrears of pay, &c.

This duty on articles appears not to have caused the slightest vexation or annoyance to the people at large; in fact it was taken, as a matter of course, as the most, in fact the only, equitable tax that could be imposed: it was little felt by the people, and brought a large revenue to the Government. Under the British rule such a revenue would be doubled and trebled from the immense increase of trade of every description. Trade with foreign parts, with the exception of the trade mentioned above, was almost entirely closed: still this revenue amounted to a large sum.

The arrangement for the sale of spirituous liquors and drugs appears to have failed.

The spirit shops were farmed out separately, but the profits realized were hardly one-half of those realized now. The city farmer certainly paid what he paid to the English Government, as likewise did the drug vendor; but both absconded after a time, and this part of the revenue, which was likewise allotted to the Nawab, was of little value. Spirit shops there were throughout the district, but the profits from this branch of the revenue were nothing, compared to that realized by the British Government. The Nawab obtained a large quantity of opium from the Government stores when they were plundered; this was sold for his benefit. The cultivation of the poppy was interdicted—why, is not exactly known, except that the Nawab wished to sell to advantage the large stores he had obtained.

The ferry arrangements appear to have been left out of consideration; nothing can be learnt respecting them further than that the soldiers exercised their own power, and did what they pleased at the ghats. As to the repairs of the roads, such a thing was not thought of.
The rule of the Nazims was, as has been stated, tyrannical. Mohsun Ali Khan was a great drunkard; he was a brave man in his way, but useless as a governor. Common report stated that he was invaluable, and this was one of the reasons, if not the only reason, why he was appointed Nazim. A battle, which will be spoken of hereafter, and in which he was wounded, dissipated this vain delusion. Mohsun Ali was unable to collect the rents; neither the Ranee of Tirwa, or Chowdhry Jyecbund would pay a fraction; he was consequently removed, and one Thakoor Panday, a Subadar of the 41st, was appointed in his room, and that division made over to him and to the soldiery, to realize the rents as best they could. Previous to the removal of the Nazim Mohsun Ali, he (the Nazim) had a pitched battle with Chowdhry Jyecbund, in which the latter came off victorious: this fight took place on the 15th October at Bishengurh, a very strong fort belonging to the Chowdhry.

He had a second fight near Secunderpoor, on the Grand Trunk Road, with a party of sepoys returning from Delhi. He heard that they had much plunder with them, which he wished to possess. But he was defeated in his attack, and by a wound he received in the fight lost all the fair fame he had enjoyed of invulnerability.

The Nawab appears to have received little or nothing from his Nazims in the way of revenue. These governors either spent the same upon their troops, or nominally having done so, placed the proceeds in their own private coffers.

Ahmud Yar Khan realized his rents at the cannon's mouth. One village, Bohilla, in the Mahombadab District, would not pay up; he accordingly proceeded there, and fired three shots into the village. This brought the zamindars to their senses, and they paid up; but in addition they paid a fine of Rupees 100 for each shot!

Now comes on the scene:—The Collector Thakoor Panday, an individual, whose greatest forte was in drinking biung, of which he took an immense quantity, and in eating pehra (a native sweetmeat). He was likewise big in words. His proclamation, when appointed "Collector," is worth recording:—

"Let it be known that to-day Thakoor Panday is Collector. Let all the umlah, the rich and poor, come to me: if any one goes to any other Hakim, (i.e., authority) than to me, he will be fined Rupees 100. If a man files a petition before me, he must pay a nuzzur (present) of Rupees 5: if he will not pay it, he will be put in the Quarter Guard."

(The perwannah, which accompanied this, is in the Magistrate's Office, Futtahgurh).

He had a seal: engraved on it was—"The seal of the Royal Collectory Court, by order of Hunnoomanjee."

This worthy heard that a Tehseeldar had turned out a Putwaree (village accountant). The Putwaree told his story plaintively, and the Tehseeldar was abused and fined.

It will be recollected that the "Collector" was placed in the room of Mohsun Ali Khan, at the desire of Captain Gunga Sing and Sheogholam Deechet, in order that the Eastern Division might be made to pay up its revenue. Well, the Collector determined to be severe; so he issued a new system and rate for dustucks (summons). If a man would not pay, then were to be issued upon him these kinds of summons:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The dustuck of the Collector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The dustuck of a Sowar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto of a foot soldier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The city people began to fly: his tyranny was excessive, and he was an arrant knave, and a great fool.

An attempt has been made to give a general outline of the civil administration of the Nawab of Furruckabad after the departure of the English.
Let us now take a short glance at the military arrangements which obtained, and the feuds and fights which took place during the same period.

The Seetapoor mutineers, viz., the 41st N. I., and a levy raised at that station, styled "Ghalas," and to whom Feeroz Shah gave the designation of the "10th Regiment," because they had taken the standards of the 10th N. I. during the month of June, with some local Horse. Under Agha Hossein were the regular troops of the Nawab.

_Besides these he had newly-raised Levies, as follows:_

1st Regiment of Nujeeb's, under Sheobrataee Khan.

2nd Ditto ditto Asghur Ali Khan, styled the "Hyde-reees," on account of their bravery.

3rd Ditto ditto styled the "Bumarons," or skilful marksmen.

4th Ditto ditto called the "Alee Ghol," composed of men of all classes, castes, and ages.

5th Ditto ditto styled the "Shahabadee Regiment," principally raised with men from the town of Shahabad.

6th Ditto ditto, called "Mahomed Meer Khan's."

_Cavalry, as follows, newly raised:_

1st Regiment, Shibsing's.

2nd Ditto Shah Noor Khan's.

3rd Ditto Abmud Yar Khan's.

4th Ditto Wulleedad Khan's (not the Malaghur man).

5th Ditto Mohsun Ali Khan's.

The pay of the sepoys of the Seetapoor force was Rupees 12-8, and of the sowars, Rupees 40 a month. Captain Gunga Sing, Sheoghoolam Deechet, and Agha Hossein, received Rupees 400, 1,000, and 500 a month, respectively.

The nominal pay of the new levies was Rupees seven a month, but they seldom, if ever, got full pay; it was the general custom to give them two or three times a month, at the rate of one anna a day, for current expenses. These, new levies nominally numbered from 6 to 700 men, but one-half were never present on pay day; they presented themselves and clamoured for their rights.

Their Commandants got Rupees 150 a month; and the Captains, over 100 men (Tumandares), Rupees 30 per mensem. There was a third grade of officer, styled "Oolasdar," who received Rupees 15 a month.

The Seetapoor force numbered, horse and foot, about 2,200; but Agha Hossein increased the number of his cavalry very greatly.

The Seetapoor mutineers appeared to have kept up all the forms and customs established by their English officers. Sunday, for instance, was always a holiday; they would have no parade on that day; they compelled the Nawab to pay them, (that is to say, when he had the money; and when he had not, they paid themselves by imposing fines on this or that rich man, or village) regularly, according to the dates fixed for issue of pay by the English Government.

The Nawab had about 200 newly-raised artillerymen, who received per man Rupees 6 a month. His artillery numbered some twenty-four guns, of large and small calibre; these were distributed between the Nazims and himself. It does not appear that he cast any guns, but he made a quantity of ammunition at the workshops in the fort.
His levies appeared to have been well armed. A species of weapon (a formidable instrument) called a Guurrásah, was in much use; these were carried along with the musket and sword, which each man had.

The blunderbuss too was much in vogue; it was styled a "Shair-bachcha" (child of the tiger) from its destructive properties. Though sufficiently armed, the new levies appear to have been so badly paid and disciplined that not a man would move when ordered out on a foray, unless he got a certain sum for expenses by the way; thus a foot soldier always got, on these occasions, Rupees 1; a sowar, Rupees 2; and to each man were given ten bullets and powder in proportion. As to a magazine or commissariat, the thing was not thought of, except when the regular troops, i.e., the Seetapoor force, marched out. The new levies and the artillery were continually exercised on parade by the officers of the Seetapoor force. The force was divided; a portion being located with each Nazim, and a portion in and about the City of Farruckshah.

When Bakht Khan arrived from Delhi after the capture of that city, he brought four regiments of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and seven guns with him. He remained till the 25th December with the Nawab; his men formed part of the force sent against the British at Puttialee. There was a zemindar in the district, who exercised much sway in the eastern and southern portions of the district—Pokhur Sing. This large zemindar had a splendid castle at Thutteea; there he revelled in the delights of being lord of all he surveyed, and much more too. His power for the time was great; he dispossessed and usurped authority in every direction that he could; he had newly-raised levies, each with a separate uniform; he had guns, at the outbreak, and made one, and bought two others for Rupees 900. Powder he made in quantities inside his fort. This man was the prince of robbers; he plundered on every direction, and was present at Cawnpoor during the fearful scenes enacted at that station. Report says that he is dead. The Nawab's troops encountered the English forces four times; first at Kunouj on the 23rd October, then at Khassgunje, and at Puttialee, and finally at Khoda­gunje on the 2nd January, where a part of the 41st (the new levy), and the troops of Agha Hossein, disputed the passage of the Kalee' Nuddee. At this last battle the renowned Thakoor Panday was killed, with some 300 of the rebel army. The British forces entered Futtehgurl on Sunday, the 3rd January 1858. It is a difficult task to discover what was the real feeling of the people at large during this rebel Nawab's reign. To unveil their deeply-hidden thoughts is almost an impossibility. Every man is now a well-wisher to the British Government; but, perhaps, a short exposition of the behaviour and conduct of the people at large may enable us to form an appropriate opinion on this weighty subject. In the commencement of the Nawab's reign, plunder, rapine, and every description of villainy was rife; but through the exertions of the Nawab, who appears to have done his best to rule well, and by the severe punishment and execution of the Nazis, some sort of order was effected. Amongst the classes most conspicuous for their lawlessness and utter contempt of all authority, may be enumerated the Pathans of Kaemgunje, Shumshabad, Mhow, and the Gailwar and Gour Thakoors; the Jhojhas (a caste of Hindus converted, centuries ago, to Mahomedanism), and Bhuttees (Puthans), immigrants from Bhutteena. In June there was a tremendous battle between the Jhojhas, Bhuttees, on one side, and the Gailwars, Gours, and Nykombs, Thakoors, on the other. The former possessed some twenty-four villages in the pargannah of Bhopepoor; but being men of predatory and lawless natures, attempted to oust the Koormees, and to usurp all authority in the pargannah. In this squabble a Gailwar Thakoor was killed; upon this the great Thakoor Man of Gour, Gailwar, and the Nykomb, collected an immense force, and plundered, and burnt the property and villages of their opponents. This was a very renowned affair, and is much spoken of by all classes at the present moment. The Nawab was powerless in the matter. After this the Gailwar and Gour Thakoors plundered on their own account.
About the close of July, these intestine fights were brought to an end, that is, they did not take place on such a grand scale as formerly. Affrays and plundering were rife during the whole period of the administration of the Nawab.

On the Grand Trunk Road, no traveller could travel with safety, particularly near Chubramow and Jagnua-ka-Talab (or the Tank of Jagnua). The latter place has a very wide celebrity, as being the gathering place of all the bad characters and lawless spirits of this and other districts. The Futtehgurh and Shahjehanpoor road too was particularly unsafe. The strong oppressed the weak; and who were the strong?—the Thakoors and the Puthan of Kaempunjee. Pokhur Sing alone forcibly possessed himself of sixty-four villages.

It will thus be seen that fiery spirits were not displeased at the turn which affairs had taken. They were gainers by the change; but the great traders in cloth, grain, the vendors of English manufactures of every description, the indigo planters, and traders in indigo seed, all the small traders, except perhaps the makers of fire-arms and other munitions of war, and the Sonars (silversmiths) were decidedly losers by, and deplored the change of Government. There were certain classes, such as small retailers of grain and other stores (Purchunias), vendors of vegetables, fruit, carpenters, druggists, tobacco vendors, and the like, who cared little what was the Government, Mahomedan, Hindu, or English, so long as they sold their commodities, and were not disturbed. There is little doubt that the change was unfavorable, and against the wishes of many of the quieter classes of landholders. They were frequently ousted; their lands were left uncultivated. Why?—because the cultivators not being able to get the necessary advances for seed, &c., from the money-lenders, took to the road, a very profitable living. The klucreef harvest of 1857 was good, in so far as the produce from each acre was plentiful; but many broad acres were left uncultivated. The same may be said for the rubbee, or spring harvest. There was one class of men who, doubtless, cursed the change of Government—the cultivators of potatoes. This article of food is very largely produced in this district, but during 1857 the potato crop was a complete failure. One great reason for this was the great demand for cattle by the sepoya for the transport of their ill-gotten gains to their homes.

The demand was so great at one time, and the distress so wide-spread, that the news-writers of the day mentioned the fact; but perhaps in this matter they were not much worse off than now, when the demand for carriage is certainly as great if not greater, but then each sepoys seized for himself: there was no redress—the sepoys was the real "master."

It may be inferred that the people at large were not desirous of the subversion of the British power. All or most of the customs and laws in force under the English Government were upheld by the Nawab. Instance the Civil Courts: the system in force under his reign differed not in the slightest from that which now obtains. Executions of decrees were served in the same manner: the procedure in the Revenue and Criminal Department was the same. Stamps were abolished and plundered, but a fee of eight annas (one shilling) was charged on every plaint. The 10 per cent. for fees taken by the Moosfees upon their decrees, and one anna in the rupee upon the execution of the same, were heavier taxes than that imposed by the British Government by: the compulsory purchase of stamped paper. One great difference under the Nawab's rule, and that of the British Government, was the difference in the position of the Tehseeldars: under the former, he was a Judge as well as an administrative officer; under the latter, he is merely an administrative officer, and cannot decide any case upon his own authority.

If there had been any great grievance to the people from our rule, surely during the seven months that the Nawab held the reins of Government, or at all events nominally held them, changes would have been made on these
points which pressed heavily on the people. But such was not the case; and previous to the fall of Delhi, there were not many who believed that the English would return to this country with redoubled power. The fall of that stronghold made a great change in men's mind, and particularly in the Nawab's: but as it was more the rule of the rough, lawless soldier than of the statesman, it may not be fair to infer that our rules and ordinances, and general routine, are good, because the Nawab followed them. They may have been taken, as no others could be devised, on account of the exigency of the times, and the little administrative faculties possessed by the Nawab himself or his advisers.

The octroi duties, however, show that a large revenue may be realized from this district, and probably in the same way throughout India, without the slightest murmur from the people, and without apparently the slightest trouble. The newspapers of the time do not contain a single line of animadversion on its introduction, and it is spoken of at the present time as a very equitable tax.

During the reign of the Nawab, some notable personages arrived and remained at Futttehgurh. Amongst the first, came Bukht Khan from Delhi. This man exercised a good deal of power, and was cordially detested by all classes; he was styled "Kum-bukht" (the unfortunate), and wherever he stirred out, he was abused by the lower classes. He appears to have been a great boaster, and fond of big words. After him, Khooshak Sultan came flying from the scene of his-hopes, and fears, and joys. Then arrived Feroze Shah, another Prince of the Delhi line. After him Wulleedad Khan, and the Raja of Mynpoory. The Princes Khooshak Sultan and Feroze Shah remained at Futttehgurh till the 2nd January 1858, when they fled with the Nawab at the approach of the British forces after the battle of Khodagunge. Appa Sahib likewise visited Futttehgurh before the fall of Delhi; but a dispute on matters of ceremony having arisen between him and the Nawab, he left the place abruptly for Delhi.

The 3rd of January 1858 saw the restoration of the British supremacy on the western side of the Ganges. Tranquillity was not restored to the eastward for some time afterwards. The English troops were to have marched to Lucknow across the Ramgunga via Sandee, but their progress was opposed at that river at a place called Bischporeera. They returned and went via Cawnpoo. On the 17th or 18th January, the rebels having come down from Bareilly and Budaon, and having crossed the Ganges at Soorajpoo, encamped at Thannah Khar. Their leader was the Nazim Neexz Ali Khan of Budaon. Brigadier Hope was sent against them, and fought them before Shumshabad. The defeat was complete; their baggage, guns, &c., all taken.

The enemy later took up a strong position at Kankur on the borders of the Shahjehanpoooor district, conterminous with this district.

On the 7th April the British forces again marched out under Brigadier Seaton, and gave the rebels a most complete defeat at Bangaon, near Kankur.

The Tehseelee of Imrutpoor, one of the divisions of this district, was now nominally re-occupied; but it was not till May that the native officials could reside there with safety, there being constant raids on the part of the enemy. On the 15th May a large body of rebels, numbering 3,000, of all sorts and kinds, moved quietly through this district from south to north; they came from Shisirgurh on the Jumna.

After plundering and burning what they could, and after having laid siege to the Kaemgunje Tehseelee for some three hours, they moved off, and crossed the Ganges at Soorajpoo ghat. Appendices are attached showing the names of Europeans and others who lost their lives during the outbreak at this station, or during their flight from it; also the names of those who behaved well and nobly towards the English in the time of their distress.

This narrative has been written during an exciting time, and under a heavy pressure of current official work; it is hoped that errors in style or composition will be overlooked.
Names of Persons in the Fort at the commencement of the siege.

Colonel and Mrs. Smith (10th N. I.) ... Massacred at Cawnpoor.
Colonel Goldie, and 3 daughters ... Ditto ditto, and one daughter killed at Singeerampoor.
Colonel T. Tucker, 3 children, Miss Tucker and Humphreys ... Colonel Tucker killed in the fort, the rest massacred at Cawnpoor.
Major and Mrs. Robertson and child, and Miss Thompson ... All killed at Singeerampoor, excepting Major Robertson, who died of his wound at Khurar.
Major Munro (10th N. I.) ... Killed by a round shot, near Bithoor.
Major Phillott (ditto) ... Killed at Singeerampoor.
Captain Phillimore (ditto) ... Ditto at Cawnpoor.
Captain Vibart (2nd Cavalry) ... Ditto ditto.
Lieutenant Simpson (10th N. I.) ... Ditto at Singeerampoor.
Lieutenant Fitzgerald and child (10th N. I.) ... Ditto ditto.
Lieutenant Swetenham (10th N. I.) ... Ditto at Cawnpoor; wounded severely at Singeerampoor.
Lieutenant Henderson (ditto) ... Ditto at Cawnpoor.
Ensign Eckford (ditto) ... Ditto at Singeerampoor.
Mr. and Mrs. Thornhill, 2 children, and maid servant ... Ditto at Cawnpoor.
Mr. and Mrs. Lowis, and 3 children ... Ditto ditto. But Lowis drowned near Bithoor.
Doctor and Mrs. Heathcote, and two children ... Killed at Cawnpoor.
Doctor and Mrs. Maltby ... Ditto ditto.
Mr. E. James (Asst. Opium Agent) ... Ditto ditto.
Mr. T. H. Churчер (Indigo Planter) Ditto at Singeerampoor.
Mr. D. G. Churчер (Ditto) ... Escaped, with Major Robertson, to Kurhar.
Mr. and Mrs. J. M. Jones, and child (Planter) ... Mr. J. killed in fort; the others taken prisoners from Singeerampoor, and blown from guns by the Nawab of Futtehgurh.
Mr. G. S. Jones (Planter) ... Escaped to Tehra.
Mr. and Mrs. Sutherland, 2 daughters and a boy (Merchant) ... Mr. S. and one daughter killed at Singeerampoor; Mrs. S., one daughter and son taken prisoners and blown from guns.
Mr. and Mrs. Jones, and 4 children, (Engineer) ... Killed at Singeerampoor.
Mr. Jim, his son-in-law ... Ditto ditto.
Mr. and Mrs. Fisher, and child (Chaplain) ... Two latter drowned at Singeerampoor; and former killed at Cawnpoor, having escaped from Singeerampoor to Colonel Smith's boat.
Conductor and Mrs. Ahern (Clothing Agency) ... Former killed in the fort, latter at Cawnpoor.

Conductor and Mrs. Rohan, and 9 children (G. C. Agency) ... Former killed at Singeerampoor, the rest at Cawnpoor.

Sergeant Roach, wife, and 2 children (Road Overseer) ... Killed at Cawnpoor.

Sergeant and Mrs. Redman, and two children (10th N. I.) ... Killed at Singeerampoor.

Sergeant and Mrs. Best, and 3 children, Ditto at Cawnpoor.

Mr. Donald, Senior (Planters) ... Ditto ditto.

Mr. Donald, Junior (Budaon) ... Ditto ditto.

Mr. Anderson, and mother (Clothing Agency) ... Ditto at Singeerampoor.

Mr. Wixor, Senior Band, 10th N. I. Ditto at Cawnpoor.

Drum Major Knowles, and son (10th N. I.) ... Escaped.

Mr. and Mrs. Boxoi (pensioner) ... Killed at Cawnpoor.

Miss Sturt ... Ditto ditto.

Mr. and Mrs. Gibson, and 2 children ... Ditto ditto.

5 Enoch Burge, and family ... Native Christians. Escaped; behaved excellently.

6 Dhowkulpurshad, ditto ... Taken prisoners and blown from guns.

(Sd.) C. R. LINDSAY,
Magistrate.

Dated Futtehgurh, 19th May 1858.

From—MR. GAVIN S. JONES,
To—C. R. LINDSAY, Esq., Magistrate, Futtehgurh.

According to your request, herewith I beg to hand you a brief statement of what I know of the manjees and boatmen, who were engaged by the Europeans of Futtehgurh previous to the mutiny. I have also mentioned the names of a few men, who are deserving of rewards for their valuable services and good conduct.

With a few exceptions, most of the boats provided had been seized by Colonel Smith (10th Native Infantry) and others, and the manjees and boatmen secured from wherever they could be found; and, as far as I recollect, I believe upwards of twenty boats had been collected, provisioned, and anchored under the fort walls, and along the village of Hooseinpoor. Most, in fact all, the boatmen were advanced very largely, and still larger sums of money were promised them as rewards, with a view to prevent their deserting; but this had not the desired effect, for no sooner was the fort attacked, the boats began gradually to disappear, till only three remained. No. 1, belonging to a native of Bareilly of “Ramghat,” name unknown to me, who, with his son, was killed opposite Singeerampoor. No. 2 was owned by “Satawan,” a tailor by profession, but the boatmen were from the village of Nowkhurra, six or eight miles down the river, on the opposite shore. I am sorry to say, I am not acquainted with the names of the owner, nor the boatmen of boat No. 3, for all had left some days before us.

The two men of boat No. 2 left us on our approaching their village, under pretence of getting others to assist them. We were consequently
obliged to abandon the boat, and take all who were on board into boat No. 1. Considerable delay was thus caused, which enabled the rebels to bring up a gun to bear on us, and several round shots were fired, but without effect. Two ferry boats full of sepoys were also sent after us, but ere they could come up we had got the start of them. But from the shallowness of the channel, and want of good management, we were constantly sticking, which the sepoys observing, they determined to follow us up, and after being reinforced by two more boat-loads of men, they continued their pursuit by land; but finding we gained ground, they got into two large boats and kept up the chase.

The rudder of boat No. 1 having been damaged; we were unable to proceed, so were obliged to put to shore to repair it. Here the villagers annoyed us much with their matchlocks, killing the son of the manjee of boat No. 1. However we succeeded in repairing the rudder, and started again about 3 P.M., but we had scarcely proceeded one-fourth of a mile, when boat No. 3 ran aground, and the two boats above referred to, with the sepoys masked by the Chupper, were observed approaching. Every haste was made to get off, but our efforts were in vain, the boats coming within twenty yards of us brought to our view a multitude of bristling bayonets; a heavy fire was instantly opened upon us. Several of our party were killed at once, or mortally wounded. Major Robertson, who had command of the boat, seeing no hope of escape left, begged the ladies to come into the water, rather than fall into the hands of the sepoys. They, one and all, leaped into the river, with their helpless children and babes; some were instantly shot, and others were carried down by the strength of the current, and drowned. The boat was boarded, and the unfortunate wounded and old, who were unable to move, were cut to pieces; and the few who were left in the water, after the boat was captured, were carried prisoners to the Nawab of Furruckabad, who, sad to relate, after having kept them under close confinement for a time, gave them up to the blood-thirsty sepoys, for an ungrounded suspicion of their having invited the Europeans to rescue them. They were in all about thirty Europeans and Native Christians, who were taken and most barbarously murdered on the parade ground, and their bodies thrown in a dry well within a few yards of the spot, where the bloody deed had been done.

Boat No. 1, having cleared the bank, escaped; but in passing under Singeerampoor, a heavy fire of grape and musketry from two guns were poured into her. The only manjee and three Europeans were killed, and several others wounded severely. I, having escaped with a slight wound from boat No. 3, managed to swim down the river, and reached boat No. 1, which had run aground seven or eight miles below the place of attack, at about 9 P.M., and found, as above stated, the manjee and three Europeans (viz., Mr. Rohan, Miss Goldie, and a child) had been killed, and several others wounded. The tiller of the rudder had also been smashed; we repaired it tolerably, and continued our voyage, and on the following day (4th July 1857) reached the village of Tehra, opposite Koosumkhore, where we grounded, and were unable to extricate ourselves from the sand bank. The villagers of Tehra observing our distressing position, came forward, assisted us out, previously swearing by the Ganges, not to molest us. Colonel Smith, finding the men well disposed and friendly, determined to take advantage of the opportunity of engaging a crew for the boat, and a guard. The sum of Rupees 2,200 was agreed to be paid for six boatmen, and eight or ten matchlock-men, and it was proposed to stop there for the night, and to leave early next day. The boat being excessively crowded, there was little room for rest; I therefore left it, and went up to the village to rest, and get some food—invited by Bheema Sing and Bhabootee Sing: Thakoors. During my absence the inhabitants of Chouchpooor, a neighbouring village, becoming aware of the presence of our party, collected towards it, and observing our helpless condition and the inability of the Tehra men to afford us much assistance, conspired to plunder us. Colonel Smith, however, saw their intentions, and frustrated their plans by ordering an immediate start, previously sending for me; but being perfectly
exhausted, and in great suffering from the wound, and the previous prolonged exposure, I was unable to rejoin, and the boat went off, leaving me in the village.

The Tehra people had received Rupees 1,100, in part payment of the amount agreed upon; but the sudden start in consequence of the arrival and designs of the Chouchpoor villagers, only three of the boatmen and none of the matchlock-men were in time to go on board. The Tehra people were deprived of upwards of Rupees 600 of the money advanced. I was concealed in Tehra for upwards of a month by Balgobind, Brahmin, who on several occasions saved me from being murdered, and supplied me daily with food, and such clothing as his means admitted of, and attended me most assiduously, never varying in his kindly manner to me in the slightest degree, during the time I was under his protection. Subsequently he assisted me in escaping with safety to Dhurrumpoor, where Mr. Probyn and his family and Mr. Edwards were concealed by Hurdeo Buksh, and along with whom I escaped to Cawnpoor, where on our arrival we learnt the sad fate of Colonel Smith and his unfortunate party, who had been taken prisoners by the Nana, and most barbarously massacred.

The following is a list of the villages who fired upon the fugitives on their way down the river:

- Arjoonpoor
- Subbasee
- Singeerrampoor
- Gurreelah
- Gianpoor
- Guddunpoor
- Soonderpoor
- Seetapoor
- Boosowrah
- Mainpoor, Koosumkhore, and a few others, the names of which are unknown to me.

Dated Futttehgurh, 18th March 1858.

From—Mr. David G. Churchill,
To—Geo. B. Robertson, Esq., Edinburgh.

Your kind letter, dated the 7th January, has been duly received through Messrs. Gilmore, Mackilligin and Co., Calcutta; and I will now narrate all that befell your poor brother, and our weak garrison that were compelled to abandon the Fort of Futttehgurh.

After having held the fort for ten days, during which many of our assailants were killed, our weakened band were compelled to evacuate it on the 4th of July, at about 2 A.M., when our party, consisting of about thirty able men, were told off to three boats. My brother and self being the party, of which Major Robertson had charge. We had not however proceeded far down the river, when the villagers commenced annoying us with their matchlocks, and assembled in vast numbers on the shore. When so engaged the rudder of Colonel Smith's boat was injured by its accidentally falling on a sand bank, whence we were obliged to push in for shore for the purpose of getting it repaired. Shortly after our landing, the villagers threatened us with a charge; but before they could carry their design into execution, a small party from each of our boats joining in one column, made a desperate rush against their great numbers, and drove them back to their very habitations, whence we thought it most prudent to return to our boats. As we had no boatmen to manage them, Colonel Smith considered it advisable, if possible, to procure some, and accordingly sent a servant on shore for that purpose, which caused considerable delay. Nothing of much consequence just at this time took place, and it being now several hours since the servant was despatched, and he had not returned; it was deemed the best course to start without him. While we were arranging to do so, we were surprised at hearing the report of
two guns, which had been brought to bear upon us from the opposite shore, and now continued to keep up a brisk fire upon our devoted band; but when we had got fairly out of their reach, they next continued to approach us by filling a large boat with armed men, and floating down the stream: before leaving, we were obliged to abandon Colonel Smith's boat, and got into the other two. At this time a very strong wind was blowing, and having no boatmen to assist us, our boat ran upon a sand-bank, about twenty or thirty yards from the shore, and all our endeavours to get her out of this dangerous situation proved fruitless. The enemy taking advantage of our perilous position, soon assembled in considerable numbers on the adjacent shore, and commenced a sharp fire of musketry, being assisted by the villagers in perpetrating this cowardly massacre. Against such an overwhelming force as we now had to contend with, our little band, not now numbering more than thirteen, having by this time had to mourn the loss of several (amongst whom was my elder brother, who was killed by a musket shot in his chest), it was impossible to resist longer, and we were under the necessity of exposing ourselves to their heavy fire while trying to extricate the boat. It was here that your poor brother was wounded whilst assisting to get her off, and disabled from further exertion; he floated down the stream, and managed to keep swimming till I overtook him. Soon after this every soul threw themselves over board: when nearly all were drowned, and I grieve much to say that I saw poor Mrs. Robertson, her little girl, and Miss Thompson amongst the number, who shared the same fate, as the rest of our unfortunate countrymen and countrywomen, of whom there were several amongst the victims. There were three women and a child from our boat taken prisoners to the Nawab of Furruckabad, who, it is said, treated them kindly for a short time, but ultimately had them blown away from guns, along with a great many Native Christians, who had also been seized at Futtteghur; and in its neighbourhood.

I had fortunately secured an oar, which enabled me to come up with Major Robertson while he was in the river, and which helped to sustain us while swimming for so long a time (from 4 o'clock p.m. till near midnight), when being quite exhausted, we made for the shore, where we lay till morning, when we were discovered by some villagers, who took us to their homes and treated us very kindly.

When Mr. Probyn left for Cawnpoor, we might have gone with his party, as we were not above six miles from the place where he was secreted; but all attempts to get your poor brother to accompany them were unavailing, and when he heard of Mr. Probyn's intention to leave, he would grasp my hand, saying, "Churcher, will you leave me? I cannot blame you, if you do." I might possibly have persuaded him to go, but that his wound was so painful to him that he would not allow himself to be touched. The ball had passed through his thigh joint, and shattered the bone. Shortly before his death he suffered a good deal from dysentery, or some disease that resembled it. He died late in the evening of the 17th September, and his remains were interred by me the following morning, and a small mound of earth raised over them. I recollect his having once told me, before his decease, that he had Government paper to the amount of Rupees 70,000, which had been destroyed. I saved his ring, a likeness of himself, and one of Miss Thompson's, all which I made over to Captain W. Tod Browne, and Mr. Power, the Magistrate of Futtteghur; and hope in due time to hear that they have reached you safely. I did, what little lay in my power, to alleviate your poor brother's sufferings, and got such simple remedies for him as the villagers are in the habit of using; but he seemed quite broken-hearted, and considering the bodily pain he was also constantly suffering, I think his death was a merciful release to him, for if he had continued to live on in the state he had been for some time, he could never have escaped by anything short of a miracle: for a month or so, after his decease, the mutineers from Futtteghur were constantly going about the villages on the Oudh side of the river to collect the land revenue for the Nawab of Furruckabad, and many
solitary days and weeks did I pass in sugar-cane fields, which, if even the villagers had found out, I could hardly have escaped, for the Nawab offered a reward for my head: but I defied him, and looked up to a Greater than him as my Guardian and Protector.

P.S.—It was not until the 4th January 1858, that I joined the Commander-in-Chief's camp at Futtahgurh, first six months after our escape from the fort, that I was out of danger.

(Sd.) D. G. C.

After our abandoning the fort of Futtahgurh, the villagers that first commenced the attack on our boats, were Urjoonpoor, Gianpoor, and Soonderpoor, villages across the river.

The people of these three villages mustered 4 to 500 armed men, and kept a sharp fire on our boats. It was here that Mungul Sing, one of the leaders of this gang, was wounded; besides him many other zemindars of the above-named villages had lent a hand in this cowardly massacre.

After being delayed opposite these villages for three to four hours, we again managed to get all our boats together, and made a second start, and left unmolested for a short distance when the attack commenced again, joined with a number of other villages.

Sixteen villages across the river that had assisted in the massacre.

Urjoonpoor, Gianpoor, Soonderpoor, Chutapoorn, Rusoolpoor, Suntookpoor, }


Urjoonpoor, } Muttapoor, of Urjunpoor.

Gianpoor, Surrica Kuttiaaree. Manpoor.


Rusoolpoor. Suya Kuttiaaree.

Suntookpoor.

Mungul Singh, of Gianpoor.

Chuttoo Singh, of Subbulpoor.

Thirra, and his sons, of Thirrah Purwah.

Banka, of Tillia.

Marajaha, of Guddunpoor.

Mahurman, of Surrica.

Chuttoo Sing, of Subbulpoor, a village on our side of the river, received a reward of Rupees 200 for taking, as a show, all the Europeans' heads he could bring together to the Nawab of Furuckabad.

Banka, of Tillia, received from Colonel Smith, in the fort of Futtahgurh, Rupees 500 to take to Hurdeo Buksh to send him 200 armed men, which either one or the other never did.

Thirra Sing and his sons are said to have taken a great deal of plunder from our boat.

Mahurman, of Surrica, is reported to have done the same.

Singeerampoor, a village on our side of the river, was crowded with sepoys and the Nawab's followers, who had placed their guns to bear upon our boat on the opposite side, from which it appears they are not so much to blame.

Kasarie, Bohun, and Bhabootee, Zemindars of Manpoor, are said to have had nothing to do with the plunder and massacre of our boats, and had tried
their best to prevent the people of their village, Manpoor, not to have hand in the plunder or aid in the attack; but they refused to listen to the proposal of their zamindars.

FUTTEHGURH,
14th July 1858.

(Sd.) D. G. CHURCHER.

List prepared by Messrs. Churcher and Jones.

Sheopershad, Jemadar; Mooloo, Durcan; assisted in providing the fort, and brought in a small supply of ammunition, and were very useful during the siege.

Sookh Lall, and Munsee, Majees; assisted in providing us with provisions.

Gurreeb, Cook; was most useful and attentive in preparing our food, and serving it to us at the several bastions, thereby risking his life.

Jyepal, Sepoy of the 11th N. I.; brought in a supply of sheep, and continued with us till the fort was evacuated.

Bhyro Kuhur (since dead), of Dawoodnuggur, in the Arrah District; behaved excellently throughout the rebellion, rendering great assistance in loading our muskets; had two bullets pass through his pagree. Accompanied us in our boat, and was last seen trying to save Mr. Jones' child when he was taken prisoner; he subsequently escaped and fell a victim to cholera, the very day he had made arrangements to cross to my assistance, having heard of my escape.

Choonee Lall, Brahmin, Jemadar of Mr. Churcher; was very active throughout the rebellion in assisting us, and was instrumental in providing for the safety of Major Robertson and Churcher, who had escaped to Kurhar from Singeeampoor. Advancing large sums of money to Luljew Sing, Zemindar of Kurhar, and provided them with servants, arms, and clothing.

Luljew Sing, and other shareholders of Kurhar; provided Messrs. Robertson and Churcher, sheltered after they had escaped from Singeeampoor, and protected them till our troops re-occupied Futttehgurh.

Balgobind, Brahmin of Tehra; protected me at the imminent risk of his life for upwards of a month, and was instrumental in preventing the plunder of Colonel Smith's boat by the Chouchpoor villagers when anchored opposite Tehra. I was well fed and clothed during the time I was at Tehra.

Bhadee Sing, and Bhana Sing, Thakoor's of Tehra; were the people who took me to Tehra and made me over to Balgobind, by whom I was concealed and protected.

Gunesh Kuhur, Bearer of Mr. Churcher; was the first to carry the intelligence of the escape of Mr. Churcher to Agra, to his brother and parents, and ever after was useful in keeping up a regular communication, carrying letters backwards and forwards, thus risking his life.

Choteb, Chumar, Maroopo; concealed Mr. D. Churcher for five days in his house, and conveyed him in safety to the fort.

Hyder Khan, suye of the late Mr. J. M. Jones; was very useful in the fort during the siege, from whence he escaped after it was abandoned. He subsequently fell in the battle of Bangaon whilst in attendance on Mr. Power in the field, leaving an aged widow and an adopted child quite unprovided.

Loik, Manjee; at imminent risk to himself conveyed Probyn and family, Edwards and Jones, to Cawnpoor in August 1857. Boat sunk by order of the authorities, and no compensation given. Besides those enumerated above, there are others worthy of mention.

Hurdeo Buksh, the saviour of Messrs. Probyn and Edwards.
Sheo Buksh Sing, uncle of Hurdeo Buksh; whose fidelity equals that of his relative.

Chowdry Jye Chun; who defeated Molisun Ali.

Ranee Gourun, of Tirraca; whose influence exerted for Government, has been most beneficial for the interests of Government.

(Sd.) C. R. LINDSAY,
Offg. Magistrate.

List of Government Servants who rendered distinguished service to Government during the Mutiny.

There is no one who has borne any active part in this district.

Usghur Hossein, Deputy Inspector of Schools, has been rewarded for saving his records, and the zeal with which he sent news to Agra. Others thus rendered service in the same way as Dabee Purshad, Deputy Collector, Muhammad Saeed, Head Clerk, Judge’s Office, and Eshun Chunder Deb tried to send assistance to Major Robertson, endangered his life by refusing to serve the Nawab. Kulb Hossein Khan’s (Deputy Collector) services have been noticed in the Narrative at length.

(Sd.) C. R. LINDSAY,
Offg. Magistrate.

APPENDIX.

The following decisions, by Mr. H. D. Robertson, Deputy Commissioner, for the trial of rebels, are added as illustrative of the progress of events at Furruckabad.

No. I.

Date of order—6th November 1858. Names of Parties—Golam Ali Khan, rebel Cotwal of Furruckabad. Nature of offence—1st, rebellion; 2nd, as being a principal in the murder of the Europeans and Native Christians at Futtehgur; 3rd, permitting and encouraging the infliction of indignities on the European ladies. Nature of punishment—to be hung, with confiscation of all his property. Remarks.—Golam Ali Khan, prior to the outbreak, was Thannahdar of Mohumabad, Zillah Furruckabad. By the Magistrate’s orders, in conjunction with the Peshkar, he escorted treasure from the Tehseeleg to the Sudder station, early in June, and was then sent back to his Thannah; when the Europeans retired into the fort, abandoning his Thannah, he made his appearance in Furruckabad. About the 19th of June, in the Nawab’s name, he was sent Cotwal of the city, on a salary of Rupees 100 per mensem, by the sepoys of the 41st Native Infantry. The sepoys did not commence their attack on the fort till the 24th of June, from which date Golam Ali Khan was unremitting in his endeavours to supply the besieging forces with provisions and other necessaries, such as sulphur and ladders for the assault. Everything that could possibly be done in furthering the views of the mutineers, was carried out by him. On the 3rd of July, the Europeans abandoned the fort, and Golam Ali Khan had a considerable share in organizing the pursuit. The Europeans proceeded at first in three boats, but one becoming unmanageable, all were divided between two boats, about 8 A.M. on the 4th July. During this operation the pursuing party kept up a constant fire; some 200 men in boats, now also joined in pursuit. Colonel Smith’s boat happened to be considerably ahead of Major Robertson’s, when the latter stuck opposite Singheerampoa, about mid-day, on the 4th July; making up to this boat, the sepoys managed to kill or capture all except three, who escaped by swimming. This pursuing party, accompanied by Golam Ali Khan, consisted
of two companies of the 41st, two of the Gulla (new Levy), and two guns, with about 150 coolies. Amongst those taken prisoners were Mrs. and Miss Sutherland, with a child; Mrs. Jones, wife of an Indigo Planter, and a child; European child, and native family of Mr. Jones of the Gun Carriage Agency, and apparently one other lady. After the capture of the boat, all the prisoners were at once marched back by the direct road from Singheerampoor to Furruckabad. During the night, they seem to have halted a short time at a village on the road; Mrs. Sutherland and Mrs. Jones and child being wounded and unable to walk, were carried on a charpoy. The heat of an Indian July must have rendered a march of fourteen miles a hard task to delicate ladies, who seem to have been treated harshly by the sepoys when pressing them on. Ali Jan, a sepoy of the 41st, native infantry, was permitted to separate one lady from the party, and he did not bring her into Futtugurh till long after the others had arrived. Golam Ali Khan, being present, was responsible for this conduct. The ladies on arriving at the Parade ground, when the 41st were encamped, were detained about two hours, and thence Golam Ali Khan took them to the Nawab’s house in Furruckabad, distant about three miles, which they reached about 11 A.M. on the 5th July. On arriving they were placed in a small out-house ordinarily used for horses, but they do not seem to have been in any way bound. They daily received from the Nawab’s Zananah an allowance of gram and barley. Their arrival gave rise to a more pleasing feature in the case. A Native Doctor was sent for to attend the wounded ladies. He was the only person, except Golam Ali Khan and the guard, that ever obtained admittance, and according to his own account was placed under a separate guard to prevent his becoming a medium of correspondence. This may have been the case, for though he was a servant of Tuffuzool Hosein, Hidayut Ali, Golam Ali Khan, and the sepoys seem to have acted much as they liked. This Native Doctor was last February seized and tried by me, but released on examination of the attention he had doubtless shown to the wounded ladies. Mrs. Sutherland was wounded by a musket shot; the bullet entered one thigh, passing out through the other. With Mrs. Jones a bullet-entering just under the ribs, passed through her body without injuring any vital spot; the same bullet broke her child’s arm. Golam Ali Khan through his police had ever since his appointment been very active in apprehending Eurasians and Native Christians. In one house he secured three Eurasians; being a father, mother, and daughter; the last was some twelve to fourteen years of age, and being good-looking was taken possession of by the Nawab. The Eurasians and Native Christians, thus seized, constituted the major portion of those executed on the Parade ground. About a fortnight after the Singheerampoor affair, Golam Ali Khan, who had been in constant attendance on the Nawab, and in conjunction with Hidayut Alee, was still supreme, introduced an English letter into the place where the ladies were confined. This letter brought to the Nawab, and insisted that the execution of the ladies alone would put an end to such correspondence. He is reported to have been in the habit of informing the ladies of their impending fate, when one remarked, “that by killing them, England would not be cleared of Englishmen.” At any rate this letter formed the ostensible justification for an execution that had already been determined upon. Some of the witnesses refer to the general impression existing at the time regarding the conduct of the sepoys to the ladies while under their charge. But it is clear that, with the exception of Golam Ali Khan, and occasionally the Native Doctor, the guard most jealously excluded even from the vicinity of the out-house all not of their own number. It is impossible therefore to place much confidence on this stamp of evidence whatever probabilities might exist in its favor, as Indian sepoys under the control of their own impulses alone would hardly be superior to an European soldiery similarly circumstanced. Mrs. Sutherland’s wound was much better, when on the morning of the 23rd of July the ladies were placed in a keranchee and taken to the Parade ground. Ali Jan, sepoy of the 41st, hero
interfered, and wished to save the life of the lady he had taken possession of on the march, but was not permitted to do so. The men amongst the prisoners, who consisted entirely of Eurasians and Native Christians, had been confined in a separate portion of the Nawab's out-houses, and were now marched up from another direction. On arriving at the parade ground, the male prisoners were taken inside the late Mr. Meen's close to the huts, and cut down with tulwars. The women and children were then assembled under the huts, and shot down with grape. All were killed, except Miss Sutherland, who said, "That as the Almighty had protected her, they might do the same." Several witnesses now heard Golam Ali Khan give the order to cut her down, which was accordingly done with tulwars. The bodies, according to some, remained on the spot till 3 P.M.; others state till next morning, when they were thrown into a well, a little behind the huts. Altogether about twenty-two men, women, and children were killed on this occasion. Amongst these were Dhoulki Pershad, Native Christian, with his family, and a native woman who, though a Mahomedan, was killed in consequence of her son, a Mr. Anderson, being a Christian. Ten days after, this Golam Ali Khan, as Cotwal, attended at a brick-klin, the execution of Kalay Khan, a loyal sepoy of the 10th Native Infantry, who had accompanied the Europeans. On both occasions, particularly the first, the assemblage of people from the city and surrounding villages is described as having been very great, but no public proclamation on the subject seems to have been issued. All the evidence speaks of these executions as if the prisoners had been blown from guns. But this was not the case. They were killed by discharges of grape. This mode of expression doubtless originates in a false impression, as to the manner in which such executions are carried out; of the sepoys even, none had probably ever actually seen a man blown from a gun, though they had often heard of it, and when they came to try their hands at it themselves, the effect of powder alone was probably unknown to them. From this date executions of men supposed to be in correspondence with the English were of frequent occurrence, but Golam Ali Khan's influence now gradually diminished, and in about four months after his first appointment he was imprisoned. On being released he went to his father-in-law's house at Attaeepore, and on the advance of the English forces fled to Allygurh and Shahabad. The documentary evidence in this case consists chiefly of replies to references in the ordinary decision of disputes during Golam Ali Khan's tenure of office. In this respect the old English-office routine seems to have been maintained. There are a few of the prisoners' notes to the Nawab, mentioning the successful collection of sulphur and the sums realized by sales of English property; also under his signature a proclamation, levying a tax on butchers with the evident view of winning the good-will of the Hindus. Notifications to the Nawab, intimating appointment; and one peculiar order, dated the 19th July, to a certain Ahmed Hoosein Khan in charge of the Mow-Gate of the city commanding him not to admit the fugitive sepoys from Cawnpoor, who had fled in this direction after General Havelock's occupation of that place. These documents are of some importance, as assisting to illustrate the extent of power and influence possessed by Golam Ali Khan. Golam Ali Khan in defence denies all the charges, and states that he was forcibly placed in the Cotwalship under a guard of sepoys. To prove this he rather over-reaches himself. In spite of imprisonment, flight, and wanderings, he kept his word without being demonstrably an important document. It is a request made to Tuffuzul Hossein to be relieved of the Cotwalship. It is dated the 25th June 1857, or the day after the fort of Futtehgurh was invested by the sepoys; not till the 16th of July 1857, is it returned to him, with an order refusing to grant the request. Had there been ample proof in other directions; this paper would simply be valuable in showing the rapidity with which Golam Ali Khan abandoned his Thannah at Mahomgabad to accept the Cotwalship in the city, and that he was supreme Police Officer of the district, when some of the worst features of the rebellion at Futtehgurh were developed. The prisoner, when Cotwal, was decidedly popular with the
wealthy Mahajuns and Buniahs. He evidently in an underhand-way tried to protect from the plundering expeditions of the sepoys; when the sepoys, through whose influence he had been appointed, discovered this fact, he was imprisoned. In his defence he has taken advantage of the good-will of many of this wealthy class, whose gratitude enables them to view the rest of his conduct with exemplary charitableness. They all admit that Golam Ali Khan was Cotwal of the City. Of such trifling irregularities, however, of the execution of a few English ladies, children, and Native Christians, they know nothing. Probably many of them were present at the time on the parade ground. But this might be expected, as the natural recognition of a substantial service, the preservation in fact of all their wealth which, had Golam Ali Khan not been Cotwal, they would have been unable to secrete and secure.

The charges against Golam Ali Khan being clearly proved, and the prisoner being "convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects, under atrocious circumstances, I sentence him to be hung by the neck until he be dead, with confiscation of all his property to the State. Golam Ali Khan surrendered himself to the Magistrate of Shahjehanpoor, and was sent here for trial; but not being a "political prisoner," the case referred to in Circular No. 1752 of 1858, I order the sentence to be carried into execution at once. Though in all important points this case is very clear, yet the treatment of the minor details has been beset with more than ordinary difficulties. Satisfactory evidence of any kind is very difficult to procure. The wealthier classes, many of whom are well acquainted with all that occurred, look on this man as a patriot;—nothing will induce them to implicate him. Men of the class of servants employed by natives are never very intelligible in their definition of time, distance, or numbers; and where all was actually confusion, their contradictions are almost insolvable; still as much information on these points has been gradually collected in the cases tried by me since February last, the Narrative and dates here given are probably correct.

No. II.
GOVERNMENT

CHARGES.—1st. As being leaders and instigators of revolt.
2nd. As being leaders in an attack on the English boats at Belooee.
3rd. As being leaders in an attack on Kunouj, when several British subjects were killed.

Towards the end of May 1857, no dependance being placed on the 10th N. I., at Futteghur, it was determined to send down in boats to Allahabad the majority of the women and children, a few gentlemen forming the escort.

Very early on the 4th of June, upwards of 150 men, women, and children left Futteghur in some twelve to fourteen boats. This party met with no opposition till they neared the junction of the Ramgunga with the Ganges, when they were fired on by the villagers of Koosumkhore. Mr. Brierly's boy was here slightly wounded in the thigh. At the suggestion of Hurdeo Buksh's followers, the boats halted at the mouth of the Ramgunga. Hurdeo Buksh now appeared and offered protection to the whole party. Mr. Probyn, with a small number, alone accepted it, and at once proceeded pp the Ramgunga to Hurdeo Buksh's fort at Dhurrumpoor. The majority, some 125 in number, distrusting Hurdeo Buksh, continued their voyage down the river, on the night of the 6th of June. As they approached Belooee and Putora Ghat, the river being shallow, the boats were surrounded from all directions by the Thakoors of Belooee and Mahadeew, under the command of Gungoo and Chuttur Sing of Mahadeewa, and Aman Sing of Belooee. Shots were fired
during the night by the Thakoors, but more it would seem with the view of intimidation than of inflicting injury. All the boats now halted at one spot till daylight. In the morning, messengers were sent to the Thakoors to ascertain their intentions.

After much discussion, terms were agreed to. The Europeans were to be furnished with a safe escort as far as Cawnpoor, on the receipt of a thousand rupees in cash, and the promise of another thousand on arriving at Cawnpoor. The thousand rupees were given to the Thakoors, about 4 P.M., on the 7th of June, when all dispersed. A few Thakoors only, forming a portion of the promised guard, remained with the boats, but these men also left during the night. Of the six boats possessed by this party, on their arrival at Belooee, one had been wrecked and plundered by the Thakoors, and one was abandoned during the night of the 7th.

Of the remaining four, the one belonging to Mr. Brierly, was large; to it almost all the party removed for mutual protection. The second and third boats were small; and were each occupied by two or three gentlemen only. The fourth boat contained the provisions and property of the party. Thus distributed, the party proceeded down the river in the four boats, leaving Belooee early on the morning of the 8th June. The Thakoors kept their promise, and the boats were not again molested, till passing Bithoor. They arrived at this place early on the morning of the 10th of June, when the Nana's followers opened fire on them, but none in the boats were injured, though the return fire from the Europeans killed several of the enemy. The boats continued their course till about 8 A.M. the same morning, when they all halted at a small island, partially covered by the river in the rains, and situated considerably above the old Cawnpoor Magazine. From this point they saw the bungalows in the station on fire, and heard heavy firing. It was thought the boats of the enemy might be in the possession of the enemy, and their further progress impracticable; to halt and obtain information was consequently necessary. Mr. Brierly's chowkedar and khitmutgar, with Kashee, a boatman, were now sent to procure information, the last being entrusted with a letter. The chowkedar and khitmutgar returned unsuccessful, having found it impossible to pass the sentries. Kashee was seized, and imprisoned for some time in the compound of the house from which the Nana was superintendent of the attack on Colonel Wheeler's intrenchment. On the 11th of June, a party of rebels crossed over in boats with guns to the left bank of the Ganges, and opened fire on the boats. Each of the first three shots struck the largest boat, one round shot killing an ayah and child. All now abandoned the boats, and took shelter under a bank of sand. Some ten or twelve shots were fired by the Europeans, but all intention of resistance seems soon to have been abandoned as hopeless, and only endangering the lives of the ladies and children. This party had apparently little idea that all would share the same fate. The native servants, who up to this period seem to have behaved well, now scattered over the sands, or took to the river. Shortly after, a large force, both Cavalry and Infantry, landed on the island. The Europeans gave themselves up, were bound, transferred to the right bank of the river, and marched to Cawnpoor during the night. The next day, the 12th of June, all were executed on the parade ground. Of this execution I have been unable to procure any eye-witnesses. The native witnesses are totally ignorant of dates; but the narrative of each day's events being given with clearness, has supplied this deficiency, as the starting point,—the 4th of June is known.

The success attending Gungoo and Chutter Sing's attack on the English boats, induced more extended efforts.

After plundering their own neighbourhood, they attacked Kunouj with a considerable force, towards the end of June 1857. Kunouj defended itself successfully, inflicting a rather severe loss upon its assailants. Several of the town's people were however killed.
Both in the attack on the boats and at Kunouj, Gungoo was the most prominent, though both prisoners were leaders of their respective clans on those occasions. These attacks were the more rebellious, in consequence of their having taken place whilst British authority was still represented in the person of Colonel Smith, then in Civil and Military charge of the district of Farruckhabad.

In defence the prisoners deny all the charges; but their notoriety seems to over-reach even the plastic consciences of their own witnesses, who acknowledge the presence of both in the attack on Kunouj, excusing that unfortunate move, by insisting that a certain Ajeet Sing of Oudh had forcibly made the prisoners accompany him.

Convicting the prisoners on all the charges, I sentence Gungoo to Gangoo, transportation for 21 years, and Chutter Sing to fourteen years' transportation, with confiscation of all their property to the State. The good faith evinced by the prisoners to the party in the boats, at a time when treachery was supreme, has been taken into consideration in passing this mitigated sentence.

FUTTEHGURH, The 11th December 1858. (Sd.) H. D. ROBERTSON, Deputy Commissioner.


No. , dated Eta, 16th November 1858.

From—A. COCKS, Esq., Special Commissioner, To—WILLIAM MUIR, Esq., Secretary to the Govt. of North-Western Provinces.

I HAVE the honor to furnish a short narrative of my impressions, or recollections of the past year, as far as Mynpoory is concerned.

I only received instruction yesterday, that anything of the sort was required from me; so I trust the meagre nature of the subjoined remarks will be forgiven.

The news of the outbreak at Meerut, and excitement at Agra, reached us at Mynpoory on the 12th of May, on which we had a consultation as to the best policy to be pursued, and it was agreed that it would be advisable to get rid of the ladies and children; but with the exception of my own family, all the rest remained.

Mr. Power, the Magistrate, with the assistance of Rao Bhowany Sing, commenced enlisting Chohan Thakoors, in the hopes of being able to resist any attack by mutinous sepoys.

On the following Wednesday, the 19th, at 10 P.M., that gentleman rushed into my room, where I was sleeping, and informed me that he had heard of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry, at Allygur, breaking out in open mutiny; that they had murdered their officers, and had sent an expedition of camels to desire their Mynpoory brethren to follow their example.

The Tehseeldar of Bhoegaon, Munsoor Ali, also rode in, and confirmed this intelligence. I at once dressed, and proceeded with Mr. Power to different families, whom we desired to get ready, and proceed to Agra, taking, at the same time, some dak carriages for their conveyance.

After this we proceeded to Captain Crawford, who commanded the station, and that Officer, with Lieutenant DeKantzow, walked to where desired their men to march towards Bhoegaon, thus putting them to the test.
It was now about 4 A.M., Mr. Power had read a council at his house, consisting of the Rao, the Deputy Collector, the Jail Darogah, Dr. Watson and myself.

We asked our native friends what was to be done in case of the troops returning.

The Rao said, his followers were stat tunch, but could not be assembled before evening. The Darogah considered his guard, consisting of fifty well-drilled sepoys, would imitate the conduct of their brethren belonging to the Regulars, and altogether the prospect, being case of mutiny, was cheerful, and apparently hopeless. We however were much relieved by getting rid of the helpless portion of the community, and it was agreed by the rest of us, that if the sepoys did not obey their officers, there had nothing for it but to make our escape.

At this moment Captain Crawford galloped in, and informed us that his men had broken out into open mutiny, had probably killed Lieutenant DeKantzow, whom they had taken prisoner; he added, when the question was put to him, that nothing more could be attempted, and that he was about to ride into Agra.

I asked Mr. Power if he had any plan to suggest, and on his replying in the negative, it was agreed, as I thought, that we were to be guided by the Commanding Officer's opinion,—which is to retire on Agra.

The sepoys were now approaching the station, and firing off their muskets, and shouting like mad men. Mr. Power seemed to hesitate what he would do. I considered it no time for hesitation. I fairly told him, I did not consider anyone bound to remain; so soon after which I ordered my buggy, and with the Reverend P. Kellner, drove leisurely away, having told the people about that I hoped to return in a day or so with a force.

On reaching Agra I asked for a small force, and it was sent from Gwalior; at the same time I was deputed to accompany some volunteers to Aligarh.

What occurred after my departure has been doubtless recorded by Messrs. Power and De Kantzow.

These gentlemen, supported by Doctor Watson, Major Raikes, and his Gwalior Cavalry, and others, chivalrously and nobly held out till the end of June, when the 12th Regiment Native Infantry, and some Irregular Cavalry from Jhansie, advanced on the station, and it was abandoned.

Every house and building was burnt and plundered, and anarchy prevailed.

Two unfortunate clerks were cut down by these scoundrels; their names were Richards and Lawrence.

Mr. Power, previous to leaving, made over two and a half lakhs of treasure to Rao Bhowany Sing, and the general charge of the district to Tej Sing.

For my opinion of the conduct of these Chiefs, I must refer to my letter dated July last.

We finally resumed our position at the commencement of this year, and without difficulty have restored order and confidence; and it would be difficult to imagine there had been any confusion.

It is satisfactory to feel that our rule has been appreciated by the mass of the population of this district.

The governing class,—the Whohan Thakoors,—were carried away for a short time by the folly and ambition of their drunken young Chief; but when once there was a glimpse of a white face, they have shown every desire to cooperate in restoring order, and there never was a year so free from crime or acts of violence as this has been.

The merciful proclamation of Her Majesty will be thoroughly appreciated by the foolish individuals who have absconded, none of whom, I believe, will come under the denomination of those excluded from this gracious pardon.
Not a Christian, besides those referred to above, was put to death; on the contrary, those who would not leave the station were protected and cherished by Muhundur Sing, and other Zemindars of villages adjoining the town of Mynpoory.

Dated Mynpoory, 12th June 1858.

From—J. POWER, Esq., Collector and Magistrate,
To—Commissioner of the Agra Division.

The outbreak at Mynpoory occurred on the morning of the 23rd May of last year, and is detailed in my letter to Government, dated May 25th, 1857.

2. The officers who remained in Mynpoory, after we were able to take repossession of the Kutcherry, were Lieutenant DeKantzow, Dr. Watson, the Civil Surgeon, and my brother, Mr. J. W. Power, the Assistant Magistrate; Sergeants Mitchell, Scott, and Montgomery, of the Road and Canal Departments; and Mr. McGlone, Head Clerk of the Magistrate’s establishment, also joined us, together with Mr. Richards, the Treasury Clerk, and Mr. Donovan, a writer attached to the Jail.

3. We took up our abode in the Kutcherry, which was well fortified by the Sergeants who understood the work. They collected also some old guns of different sizes, which were made useful, and were well mounted. A large quantity of rifles, swords, and ammunition was supplied to us from Agra.

4. The Government Treasure, amounting to nearly three lakhs, I placed in the Raja of Mynpoory’s fort, under the charge of Rao Bhowany Sing, Raja Tej Sing, at that time, was absent from Mynpoory.

5. On the evening of the 29th May I was joined by Major Hayes, Military Secretary to Sir H. Lawrence, and by Captain Carey, of the 17th N. I.

6. Major Hayes had come by forced marches from Lucknow, to be under the orders of the Lieutenant-Governor. He had under his command three or more troops of an Oudh Irregular Regiment, and the officers with him were Captain Carey, before named, Lieutenant Barbor, of the 20th Native Infantry, and Mr. Fayrer, a Gentleman Volunteer, brother of Dr. Fayrer, Residency Surgeon at Lucknow.

7. Major Hayes had intended ordering this force into Futtahgurh, whether he had proceeded from Goorsahaigunge with Captain Carey, but was dissuaded from doing so by Colonel Smith, of the 10th Native Infantry, and Mr. Probyn, the Magistrate, at the instance of the sepoys of the 10th Native Infantry themselves.

8. Major Hayes therefore sent orders to Lieutenant Barbor to march to Bhowgaon on the 30th May, and to meet him at Kerowlee on the 31st.

9. The troopers arrived at Bhowgaon on the 30th, but Major Hayes received early intimation that they had not marched on the 31st. He wrote to Lieutenant Barbor to know the cause, but received no reply. It was not known then that the troopers had mutinied, but I subsequently learnt that the men had shown strong signs of mutiny on the 30th May; that they had broken out into open mutiny on the 31st May; and that their conduct had been reported by Lieutenant Barbor, but that his report had been seized by the mutineers, and purposely kept back.

10. This would appear to be true, for it is impossible to suppose that an officer of Lieutenant Barbor’s standing, left in a responsible position, should, when within an easy reach of Mynpoory, have left his Commanding Officer’s letter unanswered, and not have reported the mutiny, which, beyond doubt, had broken out among his men.

11. Late on the afternoon of the 31st May Munsoor Ali, Tehseldar of Bhowgaon, arrived. His report of the state of the troopers was made with hesitation, and was by no means clear.
12. He merely stated that the men were grumbling at the long marches they had made; at the same time he gave an accurate description of the de-responding and dejected state of the two young officers at Bhowgaon.

13. Major Hayes prepared to go to Bhowgaon, but as he was leaving, several of his troopers arrived. They reported that the force had halted at Bhowgaon, as the men were tired, and that they were then proceeding to SooJtangunge, the next encamping ground, to halt there for the night. They brought also a letter from Lieutenant Barbor to Major Hayes. This letter has always appeared a mystery to me. It appeared like the continuation of a letter previously despatched, and as if the writer were unable fully to express his meaning.

14. Lieutenant Barbor stated that the men were then proceeding in an orderly way to SooItangunge, and requested Major Hayes not to join the force till the following morning, the 1st June.

15. Major Hayes delayed his departure. I despatched Munsoor Ali to SooItangunge, which is only five miles from Mynpoory, to ascertain the state of the troopers. Munsoor Ali returned to me after an absence of three hours or so. He reported that the troopers were quiet and contented, but he brought no letter from Lieutenant Barbor.

16. I afterwards learnt, beyond doubt, that Munsoor Ali had never proceeded to SooItangunge, and that his story was a mere invention.

17. Had he gone there and made enquiries, he would have learnt that the troopers had forcibly compelled their officers to accompany them; that a guard was placed over them; and that the party sent to Mynpoory were merely intended to deceive Major Hayes, and decoy him to Kerowlee.

18. Major Hayes and Captain Carey left me early on the 1st June to join their force. They found the troopers drawn up on the plain at Kerowlee to receive them. As they approached, some Native officers rode out to warn them off. They saw their danger and turned to escape, and rode for their lives. The troopers spread over the plain in pursuit. Major Hayes was overtaken, and receiving a deep sword-cut across the face, which penetrated to the brain, fell dead from his horse. Captain Carey, though closely pursued, was enabled to escape, and got safely back to Mynpoory.

19. About the same time that Major Hayes was thus killed, the troopers murdered also Lieutenant Barbor and Mr. Fayrer.

20. The bodies of the three unfortunate gentlemen (fearfully mutilated) were conveyed to Mynpoory by Luchmun Sing, Talooqdar of Kerowlee, and were buried by me in the Church-yard at Mynpoory.

21. I have given this statement in detail, as a demi-official report of the event was only made by me last year to Government.

22. The murder had unquestionably been planned at Lucknow, and Kerowlee selected as a favorable spot for the perpetration of it. After the murder the troopers made off towards Delhi.

23. On June 1st, Major Raikes joined us with seventy troopers of the 1st Regiment Gwalior Contingent Cavalry. Captain Carey placed himself as second in Command under Major Raikes. Some Sekis of the disbanded 19th N. I., and of other Corps, altogether six or eight in number, joined us, and were placed under the command of Major Raikes and Captain Carey. Ten or more sepoys of the 9th N. I., who had behaved most faithfully to Lieutenant DeKantzow, were also allowed to remain with us.

24. At the commencement of June, a Telegraph Office was opened at Mynpoory by the Lieutenant-Governor's order; it was found to be the greatest convenience and comfort to us. Mr. Boodrie was sent as signaller, and Mr. Collins as artificer.

25. About this time I was joined by Mr. George Lawrence, formerly Clerk in the Judge's Office at Futtehpour, who was desirous of taking employment with me. He was a willing and excellent man.
26. I was enabled also to rescue Sergeant Swan, of the Canal Department. At this time, from concealment in the district, who reached the Kutcherry safely, and joined heartily in all the work of the other Sergeants. Sergeant Swan spoke highly of the conduct of the Zemindar in whose house he had been secreted.

27. After the mutiny of the sepoys, I received the Lieutenant-Governor's orders to raise a strong body of mounted police. I collected more than 100 men together, most of them of the Irregular Cavalry, well mounted and armed. Three Native officers were appointed to the force—Dumber Sing and Chutter Sing, Resaldars, on leave from some Irregular Corps in the Punjab, Pylad Sing, a Duffadar of the 8th Irregular Cavalry.

28. Lieutenant DeKantzow was gazetted as Commandant of the force. They promised well at first, patrolled the station with great regularity, and readily attacked, by my directions, some insurgent villages.

29. In the early part of June, a large body of this force, with some of the troopers of the Gwalior Contingent, were sent to reconnoitre at Bhoggaon, under the command of Lieutenant DeKantzow. They fell in with a party of the 7th Regular Cavalry, and a severe engagement occurred. The rebels were the stronger party, and had the advantage of being better mounted and armed. Lieutenant DeKantzow received a severe sword-cut on the head, and several of the Gwalior troopers, and of the Police levy, were killed. The rebels then attacked the Thannah. The Thannahdar ran off, but the rebels were bravely met by Balkishun, a Jemadar of the Thannah, who fell at his post with some burkundazes who stood by him.

30. Shortly after this a cruel attack was made on Sergeant Wells, at the Toll bar at Nubbeegunge. Sergeant Wells bravely remained at his post, which at this period was one of extreme danger, and refused to leave without orders. He was attacked by a large body of Infantry soldiers, who were passing up the road, and received a mortal wound. His wife had hid herself with her children in a garden. An Assistant Toll-keeper (a Hindu, whose name I unfortunately forget) saved the children, and would have saved Mrs. Wells, but that she was pointed out by a villainous abkar to the rebels, who shot her down; but she has fortunately, I believe, recovered from her wound. I managed to get the whole party into Mynpoory, but Sergeant Wells shortly afterwards died of his wounds.

31. In the early part of June our position became extremely precarious, as all the surrounding districts broke out into open rebellion, and Mynpoory remained the only small spot in which authority was upheld.

32. We were hourly kept in anxiety. The worst information reached us from Cawnpore, Futtehgurh, Lucknow, and Jhansi. The Trunk Road swarmed with mutineers proceeding to Delhi, whose spies intrigued about us, and whose pickets reconnoitred our position at Kutcherry. The Thannahs, Telseelees, Schools, Bungalows and Chowkies along the Etah branch of the Grand Trunk Road were burnt, and all Moostufabad was in rebellion, influenced by the state of the adjoining district of Etah. Every night villages were to be seen burning in all directions around us, and every hour brought notice of some heavy affray having occurred, or the commission of some fearful murder.

33. We had to contend with the treachery of Raja Tej Sing, on his return to Mynpoory. We knew that they held nightly meetings in the fort at Mynpoory, and plotted against us, and that their emissaries were sent in all directions to draw some mutineer force to Mynpoory.

34. We momentarily expected an outbreak in the Jail, and I had constantly to hear that the police had been overthrown, or had grossly misconducted themselves in different parts of the district.

35. These troubles hourly increased throughout the month of June. During this trying time, however, nothing could exceed the cheerful energy with which each gentleman at Mynpoory, and the European Sergeants and Clerks, labored to uphold our position.
Major Raikes and Captain Oarey were unremitting in their attention to their men, and never left them. Dr. Watson had numerous sick and wounded to attend to, to whom and to ourselves he showed the utmost consideration and kindness. Lieutenant DeKantzow did his best to organize the levies under his charge, and undertook any other work entrusted to him. Mr. J. W. Power had the charge of the Jail and of the Treasury, and all the miscellaneous work belonging to the Office.

In addition to this work, all these gentlemen patrolled the station and town in all directions at night, at uncertain hours. They were always accompanied by the Sergeants or Clerks of the Office, whose aid in all matters was of the very greatest advantage to us. The watchfulness thus evinced, and the constant preparation to resist attack, enabled us in fact to keep our position.

We were also materially assisted by several faithful Zemindars, and by those Native officials who remained at their posts, and whose services I shall particularize hereafter.

I was occupied at this time by carrying on extensive correspondence with various officers, whose letters were most interesting. Mr. Colvin wrote daily, and his letters were of the greatest value to me; but all this correspondence has, I great to say, been lost, with the exception of three letters I have saved from Captain Vibart. I enclose copies of these letters, which may be thought of value, as being perhaps the last written by that brave and high-spirited officer.

I also enclose the books kept up at Mynpoory which contained the telegraphic messages sent to us from Agra, many of which, as containing particular orders and appointments, may be still useful.

Towards the end of June, it became manifest that our authority was drawing rapidly to an end. The mounted police were insolent and disobedient. The telegraph was nightly cut. The whole district was influenced by the rebellion then raging on all sides, and all was faithlessness and defection around us.

On June the 25th, people flocked in from Kurhul, and informed us that the Jhansie force had reached that place, and, on the 29th June, the advanced guard of this force had reached Mynpoory itself. The force consisted of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, of the 12th Native Infantry, a large body of other mutinous sepoys, and four or more guns. It was deemed absurd our facing them, owing to the state of feeling then existing in Mynpoory.

The Jail broke loose on the morning of the 29th, and this was effected with the aid of Rao Bhowany Sing's men, the Jail guard, and Jail officials. Nothing could be more disgraceful than their conduct. The place then swarmed with every description of villain, who with the Collectory Sowars and mounted levies commenced plundering our property before our eyes.

After consigning the Government treasure to the joint care of the Raja of Mynpoory and Rao Bhowany Sing, I left Mynpoory in company with Major Raikes and Captain Carey, the Sergeants who had joined me, Mr. McGlone, Mr. Collins and Mr. Boodrie. We were guarded by the troopers of the Gwalior Contingent, but for whose faithful conduct at that time we should not have escaped with our lives. The other officers, not above named, proceeded to Agra in advance.

We reached Shekabad early on the morning of 30th June, and there remained for four days or more. It was not my intention to go beyond this place, but I received Mr. Colvin's urgent orders to proceed to Agra, as he required the services of Major Raikes' troop of Gwalior horse.

On the morning of the 3rd, the Gwalior troopers, though they had behaved so faithfully throughout the period of their service at Mynpoory, left Major Raikes at Ferozabad, and proceeded direct to Gwalior. They mutinied quietly, and did not attempt any harm to their officers.
48. If it had not been for Major Raikes' excellent management of these men, the knowledge he showed of them, his consideration for their wants, and the confidence he placed in them by which he won their regard and fidelity at Mynpoory, there is no doubt we should have lost their support.

49. Captain Carey evinced the same interest as Major Raikes in the welfare of the Gwalior troopers, and ably supported Major Raikes in the management of the men.

50. I beg to be permitted to record the services of these two officers at Mynpoory, which have not before been brought to the notice of Government.

51. I have in my previous report I hope given due credit to Dr. Watson, Lieutenant DeKantzow, and Mr. J. W. Power, for their conduct at the beginning of the mutiny, and I trust that their conduct, up to the period of their remaining at Mynpoory, may be duly noticed and approved of.

52. On the day after our departure from Mynpoory, June 30th, the Jhansi force arrived.

53. They plundered and burnt every bungalow, and attempted to ransack the town, but they appear to have been beaten out by some of the better disposed among the inhabitants, and many of them were killed.

54. Mr. Richards, Mr. Lawrence, and Mr. Donovan, unfortunately remained behind us, being anxious to save their property. They were discovered by the mutineers, and barbarously killed.

55. Mr. Richards had been for nearly fifty years a most meritorious servant of Government, and if he has left any heirs, they deserve every patronage and support.

56. Mr. Lawrence's case I have previously reported to you, and again urgently beg that his widow and children's condition may be brought to the notice of Government.

57. The case of Mr. Donovan I beg may be enquired into by the present Acting Magistrate of Mynpoory, as I am unacquainted with the circumstances of his family.

58. The conduct of these three unfortunate writers was deserving of every praise.

59. In accordance with paragraph 7 of the Government Circular No. 212, I beg that the truly excellent conduct of Sergeants Mitchell, Scott, Montgomery, and Swan, of the Road and Canal Department,—of Mr. McGlone, of the Mynpoory Magistrate's Office, and of Mr. Boodrie and Mr. Collins, of the Telegraph Department, may be prominently brought to the notice of Government. After leaving Mynpoory they all served in some capacity in the fort at Agra, and Mr. McGlone afterwards joined the Volunteer Horse, and was present in various actions at Allygurh. All are men of excellent character, and have the highest testimonials from officers with whom they previously served.

60. I trust that the Toll man at Nubbeegunge, and the Zemindar who housed Sergeant Swan, may be duly sought for and rewarded. The Toll man will be able to mention the name of the Abkar who betrayed Mrs. Wells.

61. Of Native officials who rendered me aid at Mynpoory, I beg to notice Willayut Ali Khan, Principal Sudder Amin of Mynpoory. Of his qualities as a Native Judge, I cannot give an opinion, but I can bear ample testimony to his loyalty, and to the excellent service he rendered me. Being an inhabitant of Futtehgurh, he was able to engage spies well acquainted with the place, and to convey daily intelligence from me to Colonel Smith and Captain Vibart, and the replies of these officers to myself. I obtained promotion to the highest grade in June last for Willayut Ali Khan, but he died in August last without enjoying his honors. I would therefore beg that some favor may be bestowed on his family, who perhaps might be permitted to receive the pension, which would have been awarded to the Principal Sudder Ameen himself.
62. Ahmud Hossein Khan, Deputy Collector, continued his duties to the last at Mynpoory, and I can speak of his conduct with the greatest praise. I obtained for him full promotion on the 4th of June 1857. He left Mynpoory by my directions. His conduct at Agra, in conjunction with that of his brother, the Principal Sudder Amin of Agra, has been open to some suspicion; but I understand Mr. Money, at Shahjehanpoor, has now no doubt of his loyalty, and has taken him into favor.

63. The conduct of Prag Dutt, Tehseeldar of Shekoabad, must be well known to you. He held Shekoabad to the last, and his influence kept the per-gunnah faithful to the Government, though the rebellion was at its height in all surrounding directions. As long as it was possible, he also kept the road open to Mynpoory, and preserved the Telegraph, and he only retired from his post when the Raja of Mynpoory brought his force to Shekoabad, which the Tehseeldar had no means of opposing. In a telegraphic message, dated 4th June, the late Lieutenant-Governor sanctioned the promotion of Prag Dutt to a Deputy Collectorship, which I trust he may receive.

64. It will be in your recollection, that it was intended that a new Tehseeldar should be made at Gihror, including the Thannah of Beebamow, and that a Huzzoor Tehseel should be made at Mynpoory, under the charge of a Peshkar. Fuzl Ahmud, Serishtadar of Futtahgur, of whom I have separately reported, was sent for by me, with your sanction, to hold the former appointment; and Seetaram, formerly Darogah of the Jail at Lahore, was by your sanction placed in the latter appointment. Seetaram not being allowed leave, resigned his place at Lahore. Up to the time I left Mynpoory, Seetaram was most useful and attentive, and never left me; and if his subsequent conduct has been good, he is entitled to every favor, and arrears of pay. Fuzl Ahmud behaved to my entire satisfaction at Gihror, and was of the utmost assistance to Prag Dutt, at Shekoabad. He remained at his post till the last, and is entitled to every favor, and arrears of pay from the date of his appointment as Tehseeldar.

65. Rabm-ood-deen, Tehseeldar of Moostufabad, behaved well, and remained at his post as long as it was possible, and afterwards joined Prag Dutt.

66. The Thannahdar of Padhum's conduct deserves particular notice. His Thannah was fiercely attacked by some Aheers, whom he repulsed, but from whom he received a severe wound in the leg, which has greatly disabled him. I trust he may receive promotion.

67. The Kotwal of Mynpoory remained at his post and behaved well.

68. The Thannahdar of Shekoabad was newly appointed, being recommended to me by Mr. Philips, and I am unaware how he behaved; but his conduct can be spoken to by Prag Dutt, at Mynpoory.

69. With the above exception all the other Thannahdars of the Mynpoory district behaved infamously. The Thannahdar of Kerowlee, a relation of the Treasurer's, left his Thannah early in the rebellion, and afterwards became Thannahdar of Gihror, under the Raja. The Thannahdar of Bhonggaon hid himself, and, as I heard, sided with the rebels. He might have been most useful in his important post. The Thannahdar of Kurhul went off early in the rebellion, and was not heard of again.

70. The conduct of the Jail Guard is deserving of the severe condemnation of Government. With the exception of a few men on guard at the Raja's fort over the treasure, the whole of the rest assisted in the escape of the prisoners. They had been handsomely rewarded by the Lieutenant-Governor's order, for their good conduct at the beginning of the rebellion, and received a large increase of pay. They had therefore no temptation to misbehave themselves. Among those who were faithful, I particularly remember one named Munwunt or Munbhawunt Pandy, whom I beg to bring to your notice.

71. The conduct of all the Collectory Sowars and of the mounted police levies was equally as bad. They were the first to begin and plunder the station, and, when I left Mynpoory, not one offered to remain faithful.
72. Of faithful Zemindars, Luchmun Singh, Talooqdar of Kerowlee, is a man who deserves the highest praise.

73. He was exposed to the greatest danger, as the rebels passed hourly by his abode. He kept for me the Thannah of Kerowlee, and assisted me in keeping the villages on the roadside deserted, to harass the mutineers on their journey. By his help almost the villages on the Grand Trunk Road, in the Mynpoory district, were forsaken, and the mutineers were unable to obtain supplies. There was no assistance I asked from Luchmun Singh which he did not cheerfully and readily afford. He has previously received rewards from Government.

74. Golab Sing, of Sumaon, also at this time held the Thannah of Kurhul and did good service, and kept the whole country about his estates quiet. He also kept the communication to Etawah open. He corresponded with me long after my departure from Mynpoory, and I was grieved to hear he had subsequently joined the Raja.

75. I can speak in the very highest terms of the Zemindars of Burrowl; during the time I was at Mynpoory. They guarded the Telegraph, the bungalows and the road, and there was no work required of them which they did not well perform. Their conduct subsequent to this period, and the loss they have met with, will be well known to you. The Government have no more faithful adherents than these Zemindars, and their loyalty has been marked since the introduction of British rule.

76. Many other Zemindars behaved most faithfully, and gave me their best aid, but I am obliged to omit their names which I cannot recollect in my absence from the district, and owing to the loss of all my memorandums.

77. I beg that the case of Balkisheen, the Zemindar at Bhowgaon, may be inquired into, and his relatives provided for, and the relatives of the other Barkundazes who fell at their posts on the occasion before referred to.

78. The case of Mrs. Wells was previously referred by me last year to the Government at Agra, and I trust it may be ascertained whether relief has been afforded to her.

79. I would beg that inquiry may be made at Mynpoory regarding the sepoys of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry who behaved so faithfully to Lieutenant DeKantzow. They are named, and their conduct specially referred to, in a report dated May 26th, of last year, and the highest rewards were given them by the Lieutenant-Governor, in accordance with the General Order of the Governor-General in Council, No. 698, of the 19th May 1857. When I left Mynpoory, the Raja requested these men to join him, but they came to me for orders, and I directed them all to go to their homes. Since then they have not been heard of; but if they can be found, and their conduct can be proved to be blameless, they fully deserve the rewards which was previously awarded to them.

80. I make no mention of the conduct of Rao Bhowany Sing and the Raja of Mynpoory, having, in accordance with previous directions, given an opinion regarding them.

Dated 19th June, noon.

From—E. C. Vibart (demi-official),
To—J. Power, Esq., Mynpoory.

The regiment has mutinied. All Europeans in the fort. No natives. Prepared to defend it to the last. But we must have assistance. Two Squadrons 9th Cavalry, and two guns, or as much less as you can afford.

This is my third note to-day. Let no time be lost. More than fifty women and children.
From E. C. VIbART, Esq., (demi-official),
To—J. POWER, Esq., Mynpoory.

RECEIVED your telegraphies. We are shut up in this fort, but mean to defend ourselves. We have run up guns and take watch, and watch day and night. Nous n'avons pas à manger que pour quinze jours, et il y-a bien pen de poudre. Nous entendons des nouvelles à Gwalior nous empêchent d'esperer que vous nous donnerez de secours. We are writing to Cawnpoor and Lucknow. Perhaps the Lieutenant-Governor could spare us some men; and this is a good opportunity for the Agra Volunteer Horse, whom we have heard so much about. I trust you yourselves are safe. The 10th has dispersed, but the 41st, from Sectapoor, are here, and brag of being ready to attack us; but if they are wise, they will let us alone. We have been in expectation of an assault for the last two days and nights, but it has not yet come. Remember me to Carey most kindly.

We have here of more or less able-bodied men, besides women and children, entre trente et trente cinq. The bearer is promised Rupees 12 from you.

From E. C. VIbART, Esq., (demi-official),
To—J. POWER, Esq., Mynpoory.

RECEIVED your extras. I have nothing to add to my note of this morning. Our fortifications are nearly completed, and si nous avons plus de force, we should be secure enough. J'ai écrit à Cawnpoor et à Lucknow et puis à Hurdeo Buksh pour du “russud.” The ladies are our worst circumstance. I trust in God that you may succeed in keeping your people with you. The villagers and bazaar people are greatly exasperated against the sepoys. The latter are said to be starving, and in want of ammunition. We hope for the best, and trust in the chapter of accidents.
Write daily.

No. 4025, dated Agra, 25th June 1857.

From C. B. THORNHILL, Esq., Officiating Secretary to Govt., N. W. Provinces,
To—Register, Sudder Dewany Adawlut, North-Western Provinces.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 981, dated the 19th June, and in reply to inform you that, in accordance with the information contained in the telegraphic message sent by the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor to the Magistrate of Mynpoory, Wilayut Ali Khan, the Principal Sudder Ameen of that district, is promoted to the senior grade, as a special case, to mark the sense entertained by Government of his services at the present juncture, as reported by the Magistrate.

Telegram, dated 15th June, 2-45 P.M.

From—Lieutenant-Governor, Agra,
To—Magistrate of Mynpoory.

The Principal Sudder Ameen at Mynpoory shall be raised to the highest grade, as a special case, on your sending in a recommendation to the Sudder Court for the purpose.
NARRATIVE OF OCCURRENCES IN THE DISTRICT OF ETAWAH FROM THE COM-
MENCEMENT OF THE OUTBREAK TO THE COMPLETE RESTORATION OF PEACE
AND ORDER.

ELSEWHERE, perhaps, the shadow of the coming calamity may have
preceeded it and diffused a vague sense of insecurity and alarm; not so in
Etawah; there the fatal month of May opened in hopefulness and peace.
Never apparently had the prospects of the district been so cheering; crime
was, and had been for the previous two years steadily decreasing, the revenue
flowed in without the necessity of recourse to a single coercive process; public
libraries and numerous schools gave rich promise of future progress; new
lines of communication were being rapidly opened out; the railroad was fast
ripening; the great canal with its daily multiplying branches steadily
diffusing fertility through an ever widening area; and all classes of the
community, though—of course not without their minor grievances, on the
whole singularly happy and contented.

Suddenly the mutiny burst upon us, effacing apparently in a day the
labours of years. More fortunate than elsewhere, the State had in Etawah
good and faithful native servants and loyal subjects, who maintained a
struggling existence amidst the waves of anarchy. Supported by the people
there is an inextinguishable vitality in Governments. “Merses profundo,
pulchrior event;” and storms like these, but serve, though for a time they
shake, to strengthen and develop them. The tide turned; and then popular
good-will blossomed out and gave fruit in the speedy restoration of peace and
order; and now, though here and there blackened and desolate villages and
bands of rebels, too desperate or too bloodstained to listen to our gracious
Queen’s late message of mercy, remind us of the past, our people are once
again quiet and contented, our fields are rich with heavy crops, and we can
look forward hopefully to the future, and cheerfully to the labours that shall
make that future, all and more, than in the past we ever dreamt of.

On the night of the 10th of May the Meerut mutiny occurred; on the
11th that at Delhi. Authentic intelligence of the first reached us vid Agra
on the morning of the 12th, and on the same day patrolling parties to watch
all the roads were organized, and every possible precaution adopted to ensure
the apprehension of fugitive mutineers. Three days passed quietly away;
about midnight of the 16th of May one of the patrolling parties arrested seven
mutineers of the 3rd Cavalry; these in being disarmed resisted desperately.
But four of them were killed in the struggle; small, but of great
moment. Mr. Daniell and some troopers of the 8th Irregulars behaved exceedingly
well, but several men of the 9th Native Infantry (so soon to
mutiny) did their
duty unhesitatingly.

Early in the morning of the 19th of May a number more of the 3rd
Cavalry mutineers were stopped at Juswuntnuggur, about ten miles from the
Sudder Station. On an attempt being made to disarm them they shot one
and wounded three more of the police, and then took up a position in a neigh-
bouring temple, small, but of great strength. Mr. Daniell and myself pro-
cceeded to the spot and did our best to carry the place, but could obtain no
support, owing to the extreme danger attending storming; at last, after a
final attempt to force it by ourselves, in which Mr. Daniell was shot through
the face and the only man who accompanied us killed, I thought it advisable
-especially as the whole body of the townspeople, mustering some 2,000 low
caste Mussulmans, were becoming actively hostile, and the police proportionally
timorous) to return to Etawah, leaving the police
to watch the temple. That night during a storm
the mutineers were suffered to escape. We had,
however, killed one and mortally wounded another.
All went on as usual for some days; we received no regular intelligence, but "reports of new disaster, followed fast and followed faster," till on the 22nd of May it was determined in council that it would be best (our detachment of the 9th Native Infantry being apparently staunch and ignorant of the mutiny of the rest of the regiment at Allygurh and Mynpoory, though reports of our being likely to be attacked by large bodies of mutineers had reached them) to move the sepoys to a position where we could prevent their hearing of the defection of their comrades till reinforcements (which I had applied for) should reach us, and where they would feel that they could defend themselves with advantage. Accordingly Burpoorah, an out Thannah in the Jumno Chumbal Doab on the main Gwalior road, was selected, and thither the troops were with their officers and the ladies of the station to be marched, I remaining behind to guard the station with the police. The men showed no outward signs of distrust, but just at the last moment when they reached the ghat (about two miles from the station), the greater portion of them mutinied and turned back. The officers, ladies, and those of the soldiers who remained staunch crossed the river and reached Burpoorah safely. Later when the mutineers returned and attacked the treasury the police disappeared (at that time the teelngas inspired an universal dread), and I also, with Mr. Parker of the Railway, who had remained with me, fell back on Burpoorah. From what we have since learned, there is no doubt that had this move not been made, the troops would have mutinied at gun-fire next morning. At Burpoorah we remained for two days, and being joined there on the night of the 24th by Major Hennessy and the First or Grenadier Regiment of the Gwalior Contingent re-occupied the station at daybreak on the 25th. We found that the Treasury, the Huzoor Tehseel, and all the bungalows (except mine) had been plundered; the Cutchery, the Session's Court house, Post Office, and two bungalows burnt, and that both the Magistrate's and Thuggee Officer's Jails had been broken open, and the prisoners released by the sepoys, the budmashes of the neighbourhood, and the inhabitants of various Aheer and Lodhee villages. Numerous cases of highway robbery had occurred in our absence; as if by magic, huge bands of dacoits had sprung into existence and were prowling about everywhere; energetic measures were however adopted, much property and Rupees 40,000 of the plundered money was recovered. Martial law was proclaimed on the 27th of May, in accordance with Government notification No. 278 of the 26th. Koour Luchmun Sing, Deputy Collector of Banda (formerly one of my Tehseeldars) who happened to be on leave, joined me; and in a few days the most perfect order was re-established in the district. One village fort at Sumptlier, where the old zemindars who had ousted the proprietor pertinaciously, refused to surrender, though offered pardon, and fired on our emissaries of peace, was carried by storm, burnt and the garrison put to the sword. Very soon the whole country round us was up in arms; the Cawnpore, Furruckabad, Mynpoory and Agra districts, where they bordered on ours, gradually fell into an indescribable state of anarchy, but within our boundary all was peace. The zemindars, at first altogether taken by surprise, were beginning to come forward in support of the Government, our officials quite rallied and in several instances showed a proper manly spirit. I doubted the Grenadiers, but this did not deter me from making such arrangements as should enable me to take the fullest advantage of their remaining staunch, should they prove so. We sent the whole of the ladies of the station into Agra, pushed the best of the police into the neighbouring gunernahs of Cawnpore, and began collecting supplies at the nearest point on the canal in the hopes of being able ultimately to assist General Wheeler. We commenced raising local Thakoor levies, on the same principle that has since proved so successful here, and began almost to hope that we might weather the storm. But all in vain, whilst the most trustworthy of our police and the most loyal of our zemindars were 60 or 70 miles distant; east and
west: at Agra escorting the ladies, at Secundra and Dera Mungulpoor busy attempting to restore order, long before even I expected it the Grenadiers mutinied. On the 16th of June news came of the Gwalior mutiny and massacre; the Native Officer of the Corps refused in my presence to obey their Commanding Officer, and though then perfectly respectful, before night, the most faithful of my servants told me that men in the regiment had agreed to rise and murder us. Lieutenant Span in my house overheard two of the sepoys saying the same; Major Hennessy himself overheard enough in the lines to convince him that our lives would not be safe for another day, and early in the morning of the 17th June it was agreed that we should make the best of our way out of the station to the nearest point of the Agra District, the more so, as we were aware that the Jhansi mutineers were within a day or two's march of the district. Arrived at Kutchorah, we found it impossible to halt there. Bah, where we were joined by fugitives from Calpee and Jaloun (amongst them two ladies), proved no less dangerous, and we were therefore compelled to fall back upon Agra. After our departure the Grenadiers plundered the property of the residents which had been recovered and the little money that remained in the treasure chests. They next attacked and began to plunder the new town of which they burnt a few shops, but the townspeople turned out, killed twenty-six, wounded several, and ultimately forced the whole regiment across the river.

On my arrival at Agra, I immediately sent Koour Zohr Sing of Pertabnere, who had accompanied the ladies thither, back to Etawah with instructions to protect the city, make the best arrangements he could for the neighbourhood, and communicate regularly with me. Throughout the district the people seemed well affected; at any rate the Tehseel and Thana officers maintained their position.

On the 24th of June the Jhansi brigade crossed the river Jumna at Sheregurh, and on the 25th forcibly plundered the Oreyah Tehseel, the Tehseeldar, Rambuksh, managing to save the records. When the mutineers who had arrested him passed on and released him, he returned, and for a time restored order in the pergunnah, ultimately dying at his post from the effects of the ill-treatment he had received. This man was a Buneab, but his passive fidelity to the trust reposed in him was truly heroic.

The Jhansi mutineers passed on to Luckna, but the Tehseeldar Ishureepershad with the assistance of Rao Juswunt Rao removed his treasure and records to Duleepnuggur, that gentleman's ancestral fort, and they were baffled. They next moved to Etawah, where on their arrival the Mewates of the town, usual, committed many acts of violence; they burned the rest of the bungalows in the station, and then passed on to Mynpocrisy. The district, though for a short time the bushmashes congregating around the desperadoes, who had escaped from the Thuggee and neighbouring jails, prowled about in formidable bands, became once more tranquil. Here was clearly no latent disloyalty in the people; three times had bands of mutineers disturbed the peace of the district and let loose the lawless ruffians, who even in the most peaceful times have ever infested its innumerable ravines, each time (the mutineers once beyond its borders) the people rallied round the Government officers, all of whom they had protected to the utmost during the disturbances, and relapsed in a few days into quiet. I felt that the mass of the people were not at enmity with me at any rate. Directly I arrived at Agra, I addressed the most pressing private letters and public orders to all the Talukdars whom I thought trustworthy, as well as to my Tehseeldars, urging them for once really to exert themselves, and prove their fidelity to Government and friendship to myself, and from that time till I rejoined my appointment (with the short break caused by the battle of the 5th of July and my subsequent severe illness), I continued steadily to write to these (as well as many others who appeared to be behaving well) encouraging letters, to decide for them all difficult points referred to me, and to furnish them with correct
summaries of news. I never allowed the rebels to have all the talk on their side, but by proclamations and private communications to influential persons, perseveringly endeavoured to let every one hear our statements of the case and to keep alive every feeling of loyalty to the State and good-will towards myself.

All was so quiet at Etawah (for up to that time not one zemindar had turned against us) that I was thinking of returning to the district, when the Neemuch Brigade neared Agra. Then came the battle of the 5th of July, in which I served on the right-half battery. The same night I was told off to No. 6 battery, where I was on guard for several nights, till laid up with cholera; then very prevalent. When I recovered I found that the district had been comparatively quiet, but that several of the Talukdars were inclined to quarrel as to their respective jurisdictions, while all were in doubt as to what their powers really were. These points I settled summarily, and a few days later, on the 8th of August, drew out with the sanction of Government a more detailed scheme assigning portions of the district with certain monthly stipends to each of the most respectable and competent Talukdars and Tehseeldars. Previous however to the receipt in the district of the orders in this matter, three separate bodies of mutineers had for the fourth time disturbed its peace, one on the 26th July attacked Phuppoond and plundered the Tehseel, the records however being saved; a second a little later, passing the already plundered Tehseel of Oreyah, advanced advowedly to plunder that of Lukna (now called Bhurtenah), but being baffled as before, went off to Mynpoory disappointed; a third made a dash at Beylah, which they took, but not before the Tehseeldar had managed to secure the treasure and records at Chutter Sing's fort at Sehar.

Our continued want of success at Delhi, the universal anarchy that prevailed everywhere around, my long absence, and the intermission (during illness) of my letters, were beginning at last to show their effects. Rana Mahunder Sing of Secrolie with Nirunjun Sing of Chukkernuggur attempted to eject Zohr Sing and the Government officers from Etawah; the Rajah of Rooroo in Pergunnah Beylah (now Bidhoonah) with his kinsmen, Kamul Singh and Inderjeet, collected revenue, molested the Government servants, took forcible possession of numerous villages and looted two or three. Roop Sing, the uncle of the minor Rajah of Bhurrey, did likewise in Oreyah (now Dulleenuggur). The rest of the Talukdars, however, and the mass of the people remained quiet and faithful, regularly reporting to me all that occurred, and some of them exerting themselves to send camels, horsemen, and supplies of different kinds into Cawnpoore.

Even the rebels above mentioned, were kept within bounds (at first by the letters I addressed to them, and subsequently by the advance of Grant's Column to Mynpoory) till towards the end of October; when however that Column had passed on without visiting our district, and it began to be rumoured that we were holding even Cawnpoore and Lucknow with difficulty, the mutineers and dacoits, especially the latter (all of whom had fled on hearing of the approach of the Column), returned in greater numbers and more determined on mischief than before, while the refractory zemindars began to collect forces and entertain mutineers with unmistakeable energy, and mauvaise entente. Just at this juncture the Gwalior forces loomed upon the south-east horizon. Raja Bhow of Sekundra commenced a bridge at Calpee, where an advanced guard of the mutineers had arrived, and threatened the Government officials of our neighbouring pargunnah of Oreyah. Simultaneously Roop Sing, who had collected about 1,000 men, commenced, at the request of the mutineers, a bridge at Sheregurh. Urgently pressed for assistance by the officers of the pargunnah and authorized by me to do what they could, Rao Juswant Rao and Moonshee Ishureepershad marched down, broke the bridge, and though at first surrounded by Roop Sing, who had been joined by Nirunjun Sing and the noted dacoits, Rampershad and Peetum
Sing, on the 1st of November, having received reinforcements from other loyal zemindars, defeated and routed the enemy, killing Rampershad himself (the real leader in the field) and seven others. In Etawah, too, matters began to improve, the vernacular proclamation which I then issued, and which Government later had printed for general circulation, produced a most marked effect and strengthened Koor Zohr Sing’s hands most materially. Once more, although the rebel leaders still maintained a menacing attitude, the district was at peace. On the 1st of December, however the Nazim of the Nawab of Fatehghur, summoned by the Raja of Rooro and the Rana of Secrolie, with a force of some 5,000 men and twelve guns, entered the district and reached Etawah on the 3rd; the same day the Rana attacked Koor Zohr Sing, who had procured the loan of two guns from the Bhadoreea Raja, and by a surprise seized the guns and killed the principal men with them. Zohr Sing was compelled to fall back on Pertabnur, and the Mewatees as usual set to work, plundering every one they could. The Government servants of Beylah were now unable to venture outside Chutter Sing’s Guhree at Sehar, those of Phuppoond had to seek refuge in Lala Laik Sing’s fort at Hurchundpoor; Roop Sing took possession of the Dullehuggur Pergunnah, but Justwant Rao and Ishureepshad held their own in the huge pergunnah of Bhurtanah, and though the Nazim sent there, as elsewhere, his Tehseeldars and Thannahdars, the total result of their labours was the realization of the sum of Rupees 7-8 from an unfortunate Akbar.

Their triumph was short-lived. Brigadier Walpole’s Column on the 25th December entered the Oreyah Pergunnah, the rebels fled in confusion everywhere, only at Etawah Zohr Sing surrounded Taj Khan and other Mewatees in the Tehseel, and kept them there, till on the 28th the force arrived and after three men of the Rifles had been wounded in an ineffectual attempt to storm, the place was mined, blown up, and some at least of the most notorious of the Mewatees disposed of. All this time I had been most anxious to rejoin my appointment, but the Government declined allowing me to do so till they could support me with some force. On the 30th December, the Chief Commissioner having directed Brigadier Walpole to leave two guns and 200 Europeans at Etawah, authorized my proceeding thither with Mr. G. B. Maconochie, under an escort of fifty of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Sheriff; en route we learnt that no detachment had been left, but we determined to push on and re-occupied Etawah on the 6th of January. That the people were really glad to see us I cannot doubt, the unmistakably spontaneous rejoicings at our arrival with so insignificant a force were convincing. The district was all quiet except towards Oreyah, where Roop Sing had returned with a large force the day Walpole’s Column left Etawah, viz., the 30th of December. Foreseeing that it might be long before I received assistance, I commenced raising the Etawah local levies, and before the end of January had about 200 Infantry, 150 Cavalry, five guns, and fifty gunners. Our position was undoubtedly a very critical one; my trust was in the accuracy of my information which never failed me. Whilst we grew stronger, so did Roop Sing and the mutineers at Oreyah, and twice they marched to attack us in great force, once they arrived within thirteen and once within fifteen miles, and each time hurriedly fell back owing to our determined attitude and the rumour of an advance from Cawnpore in the direction of Calpee. Towards the end of the month we were strengthened by a detachment of Alexander’s Horse. On the 7th of February, Captain Alexander and myself with detachments of his horse and the Local Cavalry, and a number of matchlockmen supplied on the spot by loyal zemindars, attacked a large force of the enemy in a strong position near Anuntram and utterly defeated them, killing as we have since learned more than 150 (125 were counted at the time), taking their only gun and all their baggage.
Pergunnahs Etawah and Bhurtaiah were now entirely tranquil. In Bidhoonah our authority was re-established, and though the Rajah of Rooroo retained a number of mutineers in his fort and furnished supplies to wandering bodies of rebels, who at that time continually passed through the pergunnah, he abstained from further overt acts of rebellion, and ultimately, after planning an expedition to attack us, his heart failing him, committed suicide on the 7th of March, since when the pergunnah has remained undisturbed, except by trifling raids of mutineers from outside. At Shereghur there was always a strong guard of regular troops from Calpee, and there they had a swinging bridge of boats. This continued to be the chief obstacle to the entire tranquillization of the district; we might have defeated the rebels in Oreyah, but they could at a few hours' notice be reinforced from the other side of the river. As it was, by this bridge large predatory bands of mutineers used to cross, and after a few days plundering in Phuppoond or Oreyah return, to enjoy their spoils in safety. I am thus particular, because this was the turning point of the reorganization of the district, and the neglect of my earnest representations prolonged the trouble in it six months. I applied in vain, to various authorities, who had the power, to break or seize this bridge, and had determined to attempt to do it myself when Brigadier Seaton, considering us too weak, absolutely forbade my moving any of the regular troops towards Oreyah; thereby, as my levies were then only armed with matchlocks, utterly crippling me and precluding the possibility of my moving my guns against the enemies' regular infantry. So Roop Sing and friends remained in possession of the Oreyah pergunnah. I may add, that though every opportunity was given them, Rajah Koosal Sing and his son, Nirunjun Sing of Chukkanuggur, refused to come in, and remained in defiant possession of that portion of the Jumna Chumbul Duab till September. The rest of the district was quite quiet, but it was kept so partly by forbearance and tact; not being sure of being able to enforce them, I issued as few orders as possible, and none that I thought would provoke resistance. When we were firmly established, I felt that no one would resist; it would have been folly by seeking prematurely to exercise full authority (when as the people well knew we were weak) to embroil myself with any who had not hitherto been openly disloyal.

Early in March I re-occupied Ajeetmul with 600 matchlockmen; placing another similar body, with fifty sowars of the local levies, at Anuntram, with a view to check the advance of Roop Sing, whose force was very materially increasing. The desired effect was produced, and on Colonel Riddell's arrival at Etawah on the 13th with his column, most of the mutineers, who in considerable numbers had flocked to Roop Sing's standard, re-crossed the Jumna.

Up to this time I had collected no money, but what was required for immediate use; now however that the presence of Europeans ensured its safe custody, the zemindars of Bhurtaiah and Etawah were directed to pay up the revenue. In the Oreyah pergunnah the rebels were actively engaged in collecting the same, and on the 16th of March they attacked Phuppoond in great force, plundered the place, killed several of the townspeople and one of the police. Throughout March the pergunnah of Oreyah was held by the mutineers, whose strength varied with the movements of Colonel Maxwell's column in the Cawnpore district. At last about the close of the month, I received permission to move out with a force as per margin. I was accompanied by Koour Zohr Sing and Rao Juswant Rao. On the 3rd day, early on the morning of the 30th, we arrived at Ajeetmul, about two hours stormed, burned and looted by a large body of mutineers and rebels, who had driven out our garrison of matchlockmen after killing four and wounding several. We however followed the
offenders up sharply, burnt their three strongholds, killed five of them, and drove the whole body in confusion into the ravines.

We occupied that position for some time, being prohibited from moving any nearer to Oreyah. Our not advancing, as I begged we might be allowed to do, gave the enemy confidence and moreover time to obtain large reinforcements from Calpees, so that by the 11th April, finding our levies surrounded on three sides by an overwhelming force, and Colonel Riddell assuring us that he would send us no supports under any circumstances, we fell back most reluctantly, after sundry skirmishes, to Bukewar. Immediately the whole of Phuppoon and Oreyah (Dullelnuggur) were occupied by the rebels, while bands of plunderers made their appearance everywhere in Bidhoona (Beylah). Nirunjun Sing, who had for some time past been very active at Churkharee, and later in the attack on Colonel Maxwell's column near Bhogneepoor, now reappeared with a force in the Oreyah pergunnah; and Gunga Sing, the famous dacoit, who had joined Roop Sing, made his appearance there with Peetum and Bunkut. Having, however, the enemy only on one side now, we endeavoured to check his advance by sudden attacks on his outposts. On the 21st we made a most successful cavalry attack on a party of Roop Sing's at Ajeetmul, and though the enemy were in great force all round, drove them with the loss of seven men helter-skelter into the ravines. The audacity of this attack, for the time, completely frightened the rebels; the western half of the Oreyah pergunnah was cleared, and Nirunjun Sing fell back to Chukkernugger with a small party of about 150 mutineers and the usual crowd of matchlockmen. The ghât of the Jumna opposite Bukewar is Dibhoulee, and during the night of the 25th a party of his men crossed over, beat off the weak zemindaree guard placed over the boat, and made off with it to their side. Next day, by a very pretty combined movement from two directions, we surprised the enemy, cut up fifteen, took prisoner and hung three, recovered the boat, and entirely dispersed the force on the other side of the river; we had, however, Mr. C. Doyle, who acted under me as Commandant of the local horse, shot through the right shoulder.

By the beginning of May the district began to feel the advance of Sir H. Rose's column, numbers of mutineers crossing into the Dullelnuggur pergunnah. Reverting to our former tactics, we had on the 2nd a cavalry skirmish near Ajeetmul, in which Roop Sing's dewan, and some other of his followers who were stationed there to collect rusud for their force, were killed. The enemy, however, were growing rapidly in strength, and going into Etawah, to escort the treasure and endeavour to induce Colonel Riddell to move out; I was taken ill; the enemy increased in strength hourly, and threatened our camp; Lieutenant Sherriff fell back two miles to a strong position. Anuntram was taken and burnt; Lieutenant Chapman going out thither found himself opposed to a strongly posted force of some 600 cavalry, from 1,000 to 1,200 regular infantry, with five or six guns, and most judiciously fell back after a thorough "reconnaissäce." On the 6th, as the mutineers still kept advancing and increasing in numbers, and Colonel Riddell's instructions would not, he informed me, allow him to move out, I authorized Lieutenant Sherriff to fall back on Etawah. This he did with the whole of the Tehselsee records (on eighty sowars) and almost all the respectable zemindars of the neighbourhood; and the Lukna pergunnah passed into the hands of rebels. The inhabitants having always been eminently loyal, fled in thousands and tens of thousands, our force escorting their valuables. Nirunjun Sing crossed the Jumna at Dibhoulee, and taking up his quarters at Vandong on this side, burnt and plundered several villages and attacked Lukna, but was beaten off by Rao Juswant Rao's men. Phuppoon being utterly in the rebels' hands, they seized and murdered two unfortunate chuprassies, sent by the Government officials to us.
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the district (except across across the 2n ofuly eft on our Jumna expedition, in which Koour Lutchman Singh and Rao Juswant Rao accompanied us. Of this it is sufficient here to say, that in an open boat, raised (often from under the enemies' fire) thirty-six boats, and after many skirmishes and a pitched battle at Beejulpore Silowah (in which we defeated a far superior force of the mutineers, taking the whole of their guns (six), all their baggage, and killing eighty-one regular sepoys), safely conveyed them sixty-three miles down the river, though the whole of the villages on the right bank were hostile to us, and many forts and strong positions on the left were occupied by an enemy intent on arresting our progress. On the 18th of May having arrived at Sheregur, Colonel Riddell desired us to go across and burn the enemies' standing camp, which we did in their very face, falling back later in good order before a large force, and re-crossing in comparative safety under a very heavy fire. This was a service of considerable danger and difficulty in which a rebel of some importance was killed. For several successive days the enemy (Colonel Riddell considering it inexpedient to attack them) continued to fire at us across the river, and succeeded in killing and wounding a few horses, goats, and camp followers, but news of the fall of Calpee having reached, they disappeared on the 24th, and on the 25th some 3,000 of the Calpee fugitives crossed at Beejulpoor and made off northwards for the Ganges; but Colonel Riddell considered it inexpedient to pursue them, and still having the boats in charge I was not permitted to do so (though on my own responsibility I did despatch a few cavalry to watch them), or indeed to move into the Phuppoond or Beylab pergunnahs, where bodies of mutineers were still moving about. At last orders arrived, the boats were safely conveyed to Calpee; the district (except across the river at Chukkernuggur) being evacuated by the large bodies of mutineers for about the sixth time, became immediately tranquil, and on the 2nd of June we marched into Etawah, and Lieutenant Sheriff with his gallant Seiks left us to rejoin his regiment. During June, though the adjoining territory of Gwalior fell into indescribable confusion, though Gunga Sing, Nirunjun Sing, and other dacoit leaders continued threatening us in various directions, and parties of mutineers here and ther had fights with the villagers, order prevailed; the whole of the Tehseels and Thannahs of the district were in full play, the revenue collections went on quietly everywhere; Inderjeet of Rooroo and several sepoys and absconded convicts were arrested, and Raja Tcj Sing of Mynpoory surrendered himself to me. I fell ill, and on the 2nd of July left on sick leave, making over charge of the district to Mr. G. E. Lance, and command of the Etawah Local Levies, as per margin, to Lieutenant L. Forbes of the 2nd Grenadiers. All honor to the levies, they had done their duty faithfully and gallantly, and since then, under Lieutenant Forbes, they have nobly sustained their reputation in many a hard struggle. The day I left, Roop Sing appeared with a large force on the borders of the district, and on the 4th of July commenced crossing the Jumna into the Oreyah pergunnah opposite Bluurray. On the 6th, Peetum Sing and Bunkut Sing, dacoit leaders in his train, attacked Ajetmul, but though in considerable force, they were driven back on the same day to the ravines, with the loss of several men, by a detachment of Cavalry under Messrs. Maconochie and Lieute-
nant Graham, who had preceded the main force under Lieutenant Forbes and Mr. Lance, as a kind of advance guard; after defeating the enemy these fell back to Anuntram, where the main body joined them the next day by a forced march, but they were too much fatigued to push on at once, and during the day Ajeetmul was again attacked and a second time thoroughly burnt and gutted (even to the gates).

On the 8th, Messrs. Lance, Forbes, Maconochie, and Graham, with levies as per margin, attacked the rebels at Ajeetmul, where they still were, and drove them in confusion into the ravines, whence they fled across the river to their still beld court, surrounded by their mutineer and dacoit allies, and that nightly small parties of picked marksmen used to swim the river, creep up through the ravines, and fire at our picquets, one Nnik Singh, of the Agra Police, 100 Infantry of the Mynpoory levy, and an 18-pounder carrosse, Mr. Lance and Lieutenant Forbes, though vigorously opposed between the 28th of August and 5th of September, brought down the convoy safely, took and destroyed the very strong fort of Bhurrey, and on the 6th of September, a road having been made to it from the latter place, attacked and took Chukkernuggur. The whole of the district south of the Jumna was then occupied by us in force. Subson on the Chumbul, where the Chukkernuggur rebels at first fled, being immediately after taken, and 200 of the levies, under an European officer, stationed there, where they still remain; since then all has been tranquil in our district. The southern frontier still requires to be most carefully watched, as Roop Sing and other rebels are continually endeavouring, but hitherto without success, to make good plundering expeditions; the most important of these was signally defeated at Parlee on the 23rd of October by the levies under Lieutenant Allan (lately appointed to do duty with them), the rebels losing above 30 men, the whole of their camels, horses, baggage and magazine.

Persons deserving notice.—All is now peaceful, and we trust that at length order has been finally restored. Of those who contributed to this result, Mr. Maconochie (Deputy Collector, Regulation IX of 1833), present in every engagement and always to the front, deserves prominent mention. In regard to Lieutenant Sherriff, who left us in June, I have already submitted a separate report; a gentleman and a soldier in the highest sense of the words, it is

200 Infantry.
120 Cavalry.
5 Guns, 60 Artillerymen.

Bhurrey. On the 11th July the enemy re-occupied Ramnuggur, one of the strongholds that we had burnt on the 30th March, but Mr. Lance with the rest of the force drove them out, and though later in the day they returned in great force and attacked our position, they were signally defeated with considerable loss, ours being only one sepoy killed, and one sowar badly wounded. Mr. Lance continued to hold Ajeetmul, and cowed by the last defeat, the rebels across the river remained perfectly quiet till the 7th of August, when they suddenly crossed and surprising the Thannahdar near Joheeka killed two of the peons who were with him. After some ably conducted operations, Mr. Lance succeeded in obtaining possession of all the rebels' boats, and crossing to Nimree, one of the chief rebel strongholds of the Jumna Chumbel Doab, took up a position there, repelling on the 13th a well organized attack under Gunga Sing, Peetum Sing, and Bunkut Sing, in which the rebels again suffered considerably.

On the 14th our force destroyed the place thoroughly, and re-crossed into the Dullelnuggur pargannah. Throughout the district all was quiet, except that at Bhurrey and Chukkernuggur, Roop Singh and the Rajah and his son still held court, surrounded by their mutineer and dacoit allies, and that nightly small parties of picked marksmen used to swim the river, creep up through the ravines, and fire at our picquets, one Naik of the levies was the only victim. Late in August the Agra fleet of merchant boats arrived, and reinforced by Lieutenant Gordon with his company of Sappers and Miners, 50 Seiks of the Agra Police, 100 Infantry of the Mynpoory levy, an
unnecessary to say more of him here. Lieutenant Forbes since he joined in June, has been all that his high previous reputation and intellectual acquirements led us to expect. The very favorable opinion I entertained of Mr. C. J. Doyle, Commanding the local horse, who has only lately recovered from the severe wound he received on the 26th April, was on that occasion reported to Government; and I have since then only had additional causes for respecting and esteeming him. Lieutenants Allan and Graham since they joined the levies, have ever done their duty manfully, and on several occasions greatly distinguished themselves. Mr. Lance’s achievements speak for themselves; his energy, courage and decision need no praise from me, his junior.

Koor Lutchmun Sing’s (Deputy Collector, Regulation IX of 1833) exemplary loyalty from first to last, his ability in the office, and his bravery in the field, have been repeatedly noticed and acknowledged. Lalla Dabeeshaud, Tehseeladar of Bidhoona (late Beylah), and Moonshee Ishureepersaud, Tehseeladar of Bhurtanah (late Lukna), have been both equally and persistently loyal, adhering through all the troubles and dangers of the past eighteen months to their respective posts, while the latter has also, in several smart fights, exhibited an amount of courage and daring scarcely to be paralleled in a man of his age and caste.

Moonshee Shambehareeloll, Tehseeladar of Etawah (and Superintendent of Police throughout the disturbances), is a right good and faithful servant of the State.

Conspicuous for their loyalty amongst the native gentlemen of Etawah stand Rao Juswant Rao of Duleepnuggur, Koor Zohr Sing, the Manager and uncle of the Raja of Patabner (already so often mentioned in the Narrative), and Laik Sing of Hurchundpore, who, though less powerful than the former two, was as thoroughly and essentially loyal as it was possible for man to be. In him from first to last there has been no shade of vacillation; to each and all, mutineers and loyalists, he (for he is a travelled and experienced man) had but one reply, “it may be months, it may be years, but sooner or later the English Government will get the upperhand, and every man will eat the fruit of his deeds.”

One more, Lalla Chutur Sing of Sehar, was conspicuous for his good feeling towards Government, and continuous protection of Government servants, records and treasure, but he was unfortunately led astray by private feelings into two or three irregularities, and cannot, though deserving of reward, be put on the same footing as the above.

Rao Jawahir Sing, who managed the Barpoorah Hagua; Bhowane Sing, factor of the Chondrayen of Binsae, himself a considerable zemindar in this district, and who was wounded at the battle of Anuntram; the little Rajah of Mubhajunee; the Bajpaees of Lukna and its neighbourhood; the Koorkertkote brothers, the Raees of Takab, and Baboo Ajoodeha Persaud of Etawah, deserve also favorable mention.

There are a crowd of less important zemindars who would elsewhere perhaps be designated eminently loyal, but they have done so little, compared to the above-named, and are so little distinguished from the mass of the population, that it is unnecessary to name them here.

Finance.—As to the financial results in the district. It will be necessary to add only a few words. There were plundered on the 23rd of May from the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudder Treasury</td>
<td>Rs. 4,75,500 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huzoor Tehseel Treasury</td>
<td>385 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th June, from the Sudder Treasury</td>
<td>350 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huzoor Tehseel Treasury</td>
<td>246 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th June, Oreyah Tehseel Treasury</td>
<td>13,000 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th July, Phuppoond Tehseel Treasury</td>
<td>3,142 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total | Rs. 4,92,604 0 0 |
of this amount about Rupees 50,000 has been recovered from first to last. The Tehseeeldars of Beylah and Lukna saved their treasure, amounting to Rupees 8,000 and 17,600 respectively. Soon after the outbreak I, on my own responsibility, suspended the Government demand. Money was safer in the hands of a thousand zamindars than in a treasury guarded by sepoys too likely to mutiny. When I returned to the district, there was therefore a portion of the May and all the June, November and December kists (of 1857) to collect, and before it became safe to commence regularly collecting once more, the February, May and June Kists of 1858 had fallen due, making a total demand of ...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Rs.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14,05,331</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,32,611</td>
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of the balance, viz., ...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Rs.</th>
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<tr>
<td>1,72,720</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

only Rupees 44,750 is a real balance, the rest is suspended under orders, and to be paid out of grants hereafter to be made, or is nominal, or on account of villages of rebels confiscated or attached, which will be made good directly the method of their disposal is settled, or for which engagements to pay by instalments have been taken, or on account of Court of Wards' Estates in which the wards have collected during the disturbances, and whose accounts have not yet been adjusted. This too without my having recourse to a single coercive process, and notwithstanding all the villages that were burnt and plundered, and the crops that were destroyed.

**Records.**—The whole of my Sudder Office records were destroyed; a selection of some of the most valuable escaped till the Nazim's advent, when they too were lost. All my Tehseeel and Thannah records, with the exception of a portion of those of the Etawah Tehseeel, were saved, and have been completely re-arranged.

**Education.**—One word as to education. It has been asserted that the imposition of the 1 per cent. school cess has tended greatly to make us unpopular. It may have done so elsewhere, here I do not think the proposition holds good. This district was pre-eminent as regards education. In two years I opened 188 schools, which contained no less than 7,000 scholars at the time of the outbreak; yet has this district also been pre-eminent for loyalty, and not only have the schools remained open in many instances through all these troubles, but in some cases the zamindars have themselves paid the masters, saying they would take credit for the amount when they next paid up the school cess, and long before I thought it safe to collect the revenue, the little lads were everywhere humming away at their lessons, as if all was quiet, and the fate of empires was not quivering in the scale. Of course the number of pupils was, and still is, less than formerly, as many parents are averse just as yet to let their little ones go by themselves to any distance, and we have only one school to every five or six villages. However, on the 1st of November there were present, at the 179 schools now open, 3,883 scholars.

**Causes of the loyalty of the people of Etawah.**—It may be asked to what is to be attributed the loyalty† that, compared with others, the people of this district certainly erinced.

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* The real balance is almost exclusively on account of these.

† As further evidence of the good feeling prevailing in the district, I must mention that no customs line being in existence, I established in October 1857 a temporary one. There were several advantages in this: 1st, it kept the people in mind of our Government; 2nd, it enabled them to supply their daily wants without becoming habit smugglers; 3rd, it afforded a clue to the amounts of salt and goor respectively imported and exported during the disturbances; 4th, it secured a certain small revenue to Government that would otherwise have been entirely lost. Though we had no establishment to enforce obedience, no less than 15,000 mounds of salt and 30,000 mounds of goor (in round numbers), mostly in small quantities, were brought by the people to the Government officers, and paid the small duty that I had fixed; a heavy one would have driven them to smuggling.
1st.—Lightness of assessment.* This district is, compared as a whole with all others that I know of, lightly assessed. The heaviest assessments are in the least loyal pargunnahs, Dullelnuggur.

2nd.—The very fortunate appointments that had been made during the few years previous to the mutiny, not one single man drawing a salary of Rupees 15 and upwards whom I had nominated proving false.

3rd.—The personal influence of Koour Luchman Sing over Koour Zohr Sing of Pertabnere and his brother Thakoors, the kindly feelings entertained towards myself by the majority of the Talookdars, and the persevering efforts that both Lutchmun Sing and myself made, from the very day I reached Agra, to keep alive those feelings, encourage loyalty, and counteract the effect of the false reports spread by the ill-affected.

A few closing words as to the policy which I have pursued, since my return to the district, may not be misplaced. No district in the North-Western Provinces has, I believe, been more completely restored to order. None in which so few severe punishments have been inflicted. Mercy and forbearance have, I think I may justly say, characterised my administration. This has been attributed by Europeans to want of firmness, by natives to indulgence exercised over me by other loyal natives, whom I am not ashamed to call friends. Both interpretations erred. We had before us then a great and glorious problem to solve, viz., how to restore peace and order and the authority of Government with the least possible amount of human suffering. I was no advocate either for severity or clemency, there is a time and place for both. The case of this district seemed to me to call for the latter. The wounds were neither very deep nor festering, and I thought that soothing treatment rather than the knife or cautery was requisite. Long before I returned to the district, I had determined on the general line of policy that I intended to pursue; from the very day I first at the borders of the district received the congratulatory visits of hundreds of our well-wishers, I gave it generally to be understood that I had no feelings of animosity to gratify, no desire to inflict a single punishment not forced upon me, and that especially was I willing to forget the past in regard to all (who had not been conspicuous for their crimes) who then ceased to disturb the peace, and made due reparation to their fellow subjects for the injuries they had done them.

The enemies of order had, even in the worst of times, always been in a minority numerically speaking, but from the time that my intentions became generally known, they certainly on the mainland pargunnahs (excluding Dullelnuggur) scarcely exceeded 1 per cent. of the population. In this lay our strength; any surprise by the ill-affected and their mutineer friends was impossible, every move, every accession of strength was reported at once from a dozen different quarters: men, nay whole communities who had been plunderers, were, instead of being goaded into rebellion, led to return to their peaceful pursuits, and to submit to arbitration the adjustment of the cost of their transgressions. I will admit that innumerable criminals thus escaped far too cheaply, if their offences be viewed in the same light as similar ones committed in ordinary times, but I think that the exceptional circumstances that encouraged, if not gave rise to these crimes, invalidate any such objection, the sufferers in very many cases have had their losses made good, and the victims, of whom the gallows have been, as many hold, defrauded, are become peaceable and useful citizens, whose brethren too are at peace with us. We have not roughly torn up the noxious weed, heedless how we scattered the seed.

* Give the Rajput and fighting men reasonable means and happy homes, free from those instruments of torture, the civil courts and the native warper, and they will fight for order and the Government, under whom they are well off. Make it easier for your Gooraj Ahers and thief classes to grow rich by agriculture than crime, and besides making criminal administration cheaper, most of these will, for their own sakes, side with Government. Tax the Ben,Fuls, Khans, Banyers and such like, who growing rich by the pen, cast their betters from their ancestral holdings, and then are too great cowards to wield a sword, either to protect their own acquisitions or aid the Government that has fostered their success.

† There have been 550 such punchayet cases; some of which included the whole of the inhabitants of one or more villages; for, as noticed in the Narrative, whenever large bodies of mutineers entered the district, considerable disorder prevailed. Four hundred of these have been settled; about 126 are still pending.
of future troubles, we have trimmed and tended it, and now it bids fair well to repay our care.

It was not leniency however alone that enabled us to hold the district, without so to speak, any force for so long; care was taken to do nothing, and issue no order in regard to any not openly against us, calculated or likely to provoke opposition or disobedience; many measures distasteful to individuals or communities (not in arms against us) had ultimately, I foresew, to be carried out; weak as we were, premature attempts though successful, would in many instances have led to resistance, and committed to rebellion; it was time enough I thought for these measures when by the tacit acquiescence of these very men (amongst others) in our authority (which nothing tempted them to question), we had had time so to strengthen ourselves as to render all thoughts of resistance out of the question.

Of course dealing with men, no one who would rule successfully can neglect the passions and private feelings that sway the different leaders. Well acquainted (I had been two years in the district) with the private friendships, enmities, and aspirations that more or less influence the conduct and opinions of even the best of my native coadjutors and subordinates, I have continually had to play these against each other, and by maintaining a sort of balance between contending interests, strengthen by the support of both, the Government I served; but this however has, I think, I may assert, ever been fairly and honorably done, as becomes an English gentleman, who instinctively appreciates the difference between diplomacy and intrigue.

Such have been the chief characteristics of my policy in a time of no ordinary difficulties, and if on the one hand my hurriedly penned* Narrative ill establishes the fact, or on the other a review of the past convinces myself as well as others, that with my present experience I might have done far better, still I venture to hope that the district itself as it now is affords some grounds for believing that my solution of the great problem has not proved altogether unsuccessful.

Etawah, The 18th November 1858.  
(Sd.) ALLAN HUME,  
Magistrate and Collector.

APPENDIX I.

Extract from letter of Magistrate of Etawah, to Commissioner of Agra Division, No. , dated 16th May 1857.

"On the night of the 16th of May the policemen stationed at a road guard house about six miles from Etawah saw seven men armed with swords and cavalry pistols pass them, one of the police making a circuit got in front of them, and running into Etawah gave information to the Kotwal (head police officer) Mohamed Allyjan who commanded a small patrolling party. The other two policemen followed the armed party slowly and at a distance. The Kotwal rode out at once and met the seven men; their arms and answers to his questions were alike suspicious, and he directed them to accompany him to my house, on this they cooked their pistols and threatened to shoot him if he came near; he however talked quietly to them and induced them to come to me, and I, as their story seemed improbable, sent them away to Captain Corfield, the Officer Commanding the Station, directing the Kotwal to strengthen his patrol (which consisted of only three men) en route, in order to guard against any attempt at escape.

"Scarcely twenty minutes had elapsed before I was roused by a smart firing, as I thought at the treasury; all arrangements for a surprise had been made beforehand, and within three minutes I was at the treasury armed and dressed. There I found the soldiers all on the qui vive, muskets loaded,

* It had to be written in 24 hours; having a vast amount of work still to do, I had deferred writing about what had been done till some season of leisure. A sudden call from the Secretary of Government necessitated its immediate preparation.
in good spirits and manifestly ready to fight anyone or everyone. They thought the firing was at the lines; I ran home and drove to Captain Ross, which was on my way, took him up and dashed off to the lines; we were immediately joined by Mr. Volk and Daniell, on horseback and armed; and I suppose ten minutes from the firing of the first shot had not elapsed before we were all at the quarter guard. There we learnt that, as directed, the Kotwal had gone from my house to Captain Ross, where he was joined by three other sepoys; Captain Ross, who happened to be awake, got up and questioned the men. They repeated as before, that they belonged to the 2nd Cavalry, had gone with remounts from Cawnpore and were then returning from Agra; they had however no uniform, were armed to the teeth, had no certificate of any kind with them and no money.

"Captain Corfield then came up, and on questioning them, considered their story so very suspicious, that he directed them to accompany him to the lines, this they did, though somewhat unwillingly; when near the quarter guard he, Lieutenant Allan, the Kotwal and Meer Hussun Ali, the Duffadar of the Irregulars, dismounted and ordered them to give up their arms, this one did, but on Captain Corfield handing the weapons to the Duffadar, their owner snatched them away violently, one man then shot Captain Corfield, who fell instantly with a severe pistol wound in the right shoulder, another man dashed at Lieutenant Allan (who had a double barrelled gun in his hand, the stock of which arrested the pistol bullet of a third fired point blank at that officer's chest), knocked him down, and kneeling on his chest would have murdered him in a minute, when the Kotwal and one of the sepoys killed him. By this time, Lieutenant Corfield had sprung up and ordered the guard to turn out, the sepoys in the lines (only fourteen or fifteen) rushed up (they had not before been able to fire as the parties were all mixed up together) and poured in a volley, two of the mutineers were shot, one killed as above, two more cut down by the sepoys, and two escaped at the time, but of these one was subsequently captured by the police.

"Of the men cut down by the sepoys, one man, though he had received seventeen sword cuts, still lived; he stated that his name was Shere Andaz Khan, and that he was a Pathan of Garra Kote, Zillah Futtehpoor, a lance Naik of the 1st troop, third Cavalry, and engaged in the mutiny at Meerut, that his six companions were also all Pathans of the same place and fellow mutineers. At first he stated that his party came here hoping to induce the 9th to mutiny, but he afterwards declared that in reality they were only trying to sneak home unobserved; which was the true account it is impossible to say. This man's further history is curious; when a few days subsequently the 9th Native Infantry mutinied and released the prisoners in the jails, he was too severely wounded to escape, and on our return from Burpoorah with the Gwalior Grenadiers, he was replaced in jail; later when the Grenadiers mutinied he was still unable to move and remained in the city till, when the Nazim of the Nawab of Furruckabad, in December, occupied the place in force, he having by that time recovered, disappeared finally."

APPENDIX II.

Extract from letter of Magistrate of Elawah, to Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, dated 20th May 1857.

"Early on the morning of the 19th, a large cart, full of the mutineers of the 3rd Cavalry, entered the Juswuntwagur jurisdiction, armed with swords, pistols, and some two or three with carabines also. They were followed by the road guards to the Thannah where they were stopped, and their replies being utterly unsatisfactory, their arms demanded, one tendered his arms,
and whilst all eyes were turned on him and every one put off his guard by their apparent submission, the others, springing suddenly up poured in a volley, killing one and wounding three men; they then rushed through the town, and took up their quarters in a "mutder" or Hindoo temple at one end of a walled grove. Intelligence reached us 9 A.M., Mr. Daniell and myself armed, despatched five men of the 8th Irregular Cavalry (of whom altogether about twenty men were stationed here) and ourselves started at once, reaching Juswuntunggur about 10½. The day was an excessively trying one: a burning wind, such as I have hardly ever experienced, raged the whole time. We had left without having tasted any food, and so remained out in the sun and wind fasting vainly endeavouring to get any one to support us in an attack, till Mr. Daniell about 3 P.M. became so faint that we were obliged to retreat to an empty railway bungalow which happened to be near.

"The position of the mutineers was a wonderfully strong one, the only way they could be got at was through a narrow doorway leading to some steps, which were completely commanded from within. The whole building, which stands on an elevated platform of pukka masonry, as well as the walls of the platform itself are full of loopholes, and the wall for many yards on each side of the doorway containing arches filled up with a brick work screen made by leaving out every other brick. It is not possible to get in except through this door, and to get at this door we were exposed for thirty yards, come which way we would, to a point blank fire from men whom we could not see. Inside the door there were steps, also surrounded by the trellis work through which shots could be fired. These steps lead to a very small court-yard surrounded by "kotrees," small cells like those in a serai pierced with loopholes for air. This court-yard is again commanded by the portico in front of the mutineer itself, which also consists of pierced brick work, and is only accessible by steps leading out of the court-yard. Mr. Daniell and myself first got inside the grove and explored the whole of the back of the building, the mutineers firing steadily at us all the while, and we returning the fire from our double barrels, whenever we could see any portion of a man. We could not get the police well within fire, and though we went more than once within fire yards of the building, the firing was heavy that no one would make a rush. This went on till 3 o'clock, up to which time I suppose that we had 150 shots fired at us, only very few of which, by the way, came at all near us; we then went to the bungalow, and got some chuppatees and a loaf of bread, which luckily one of our men had brought. At 5½ P.M., we were again upon the ground; we learnt that the townspeople had shown unequivocal signs of sympathy with the mutineers, and had succeeded, notwithstanding the line of patrols and guards that I had established all round the garden, in supplying them with food and ammunition. There seemed every prospect of the townspeople, of whom there are some 2,000 adult males, low caste Mussulmen (camel-drivers and jullahers), soon taking an active share in the matter, if it was much longer pro¬longed. What sort of a place Juswuntunggur is, is well known; the Mohurrum preceding the disturbances was the first, for many years, at which troops had not been necessary to restrain the lawless violence of the population. Seeing that none of the police, of whom, including burkundazes, sowars, choukedars and bullahers, there must have been eighty present, would do anything but fire up in the air at a safe distance, I had early in the day sent in for reinforcements (as I had only five of the Irregulars), and had received a note saying that six more of the Irregulars and ten sepoys would be sent. The former galloped on and reached about five, but the latter did not make their appearance. It turned out when they did arrive that they had gone (I now believe purposely) some two miles down the Kutchhoora road, which branches off the Juswuntunggur one. Time was passing, the people of the town were very excited, and it seemed very doubtful, if it would be possible, to retreat even if we wished it, unless we carried the place at once, so we determined to attempt to storm the temple. The Irregulars dismounted and agreed that I and a few
of the sowars should suddenly run to and jump upon the platform of a pukka
well, distant about fifteen or twenty feet from the doorway of the building and
exactly in front of it; that we should pour in a volley, and that at the same
time Mr. Daniell, with the duffadar of sowars and any one else who would go,
should run swiftly along the face of the temple and brick work screen and
dash in, we following. Had we met the support that we expected, we might
have succeeded I doubt not; as it was, the firing was so heavy from within
that I found myself alone on the platform, while Mr. Daniell, the Duffadar
of sowars (who immediately fell back), and a chowkeedar who was knocked over,
were all that reached the doorway; to get in was impossible; Mr. Daniell
tried to shoot through the brick work screen; I jumped off the platform
towards the doorway; one man fired, quicker than one could count, five pistols
(handed to him by others I suppose) aiming at arms-length at Daniell, he all
the while perfectly cool and poking about with his revolver, trying to shoot
some one through the brick work screen. The man however was shooting
during the doorway, and without leaning outside the doorway could not
touch Daniell, though the balls went within a very few inches of him. To
fire the sixth pistol he leant out of the doorway; the pistol was hardly off
before I shot at him and he fell back, but down went Daniell with, I am sorry
to say, a bad wound in the face. Every one bolted, and I hope I shall never
hear such a fiendish shout, as the whole town, which to a man
saw that I did not care for them, numbers of them slunk
into the temple and brick work screen. The man
had however was shooting
towards the doorway, and without leaning outside the doorway could not
touch Daniell, though the balls went within a very few inches of him. To
fire the sixth pistol he leant out of the doorway; the pistol was hardly off
before I shot at him and he fell back, but down went Daniell with, I am sorry
to say, a bad wound in the face. Every one bolted, and I hope I shall never
hear such a fiendish shout, as the whole town, which to a man
saw that I did not care for them, numbers of them slunk
to an eminence
with their heads down, and looking about with his revolver, trying to shoot
some one through the brick work screen. The man however was shooting
for some hours, the murmurs amongst them ceased. I then made the
sowars remount and recommence patrolling round, replaced the sentinels,
couraged every one to believe that we should certainly catch and do for
the mutineers next morning, washed Mr. Daniell’s wound, and supporting him
(he was just able to walk) walked through the town to where on the other side
our buggy was; as we went, the people poured out of the side alleys, and soon
became a threatening mob; we did not look back or of course quicken our
pace.
We had not taken any sowars or burkundazes with us because,
required as every man was to surround the spot, to take them away when
none of them made any offer or show of going, would have been to admit
that we were afraid to go through the town and ensure an attack, which all
the police and troops collected would not have withstood; only my Nazir, a
Buncab, who came out after me of his own accord, and whom I never before
saw with anything more dangerous than a pen in his hand, followed us, and
as the mob pressed on drew his sword, and quite good humouredly said that
it was very hot, and that he could not have them crowd so about us; if they
did, he must hit some one, and what with his manifest good humoured deter-
mination, and our appearing in no sort of way to notice their proceedings, we
got safely into the buggy. Immediately on reaching Etawah, I sent out
Muhammad Ikram Hossein, the Deputy Collector, with instructions to main-
tain a vigilant guard over the temple, till arrangements could be made to take
the place; but in the event of the Muhammadan population of the place
making any unequivocal demonstration of being about to release the
mutineers by force, rather than allow so formidable a body to commit them-
selves irretrievably against us, to afford the besieged, by relaxing the strictness
of the watch, an opportunity for escaping out of the temple; in this event,
however, he was to follow and attack them in the open directly they got some
distance from Juswuntnugur. That night a violent storm came on, during
which the mutineers escaped; we had it appeared killed one and seriously, if
not mortally, wounded another, whom however they carried off with them."
"The Lieutenant-Governor had received the account of the gallant conduct of Mr. Daniell and yourself at Juswunmugur with the greatest admiration; he thinks the attack was perfectly justifiable, although it was unsuccessful."

APPENDIX III

Extract of report by Captains Ross, Corfield and Mr. A. O. Hume, addressed to Secretary to Government of North-Western Provinces, dated 25th May 1857.

"On the 22nd instant, after we had received information from three different sources of the approach of large bodies of mutineers from Shekoabad, an express arrived from Mr. Power announcing a mutiny of the ninth at Allygurh and Mynpoory, that Mr. Cocks, Crawford and Kellner had ridden off to Agra, and that he and others were confined in the fort. We were in hopes that, up to that time our troops were well affected, although we saw no prospect of their remaining so, if assailed by emissaries from the mutineer companies of their corps, we had lately learnt that considerable disaffection existed amongst the people of the neighbourhood, who might be expected to rise en masse on the exhibition of any want of loyalty on the part of the troops. We arrested three men, on their way from Mynpoory, obviously sepoys, whose account of themselves was most suspicious. We believed it to be a matter of importance to prevent at this critical juncture an open mutiny of the troops here, and thought it incumbent on us to take every possible precaution for the preservation of the lives of the women and children in our charge.

"Under these circumstances, we considered it advisable to withdraw the troops to Burreypoorah, one of the Jumna Chumbal Doab Thannahs of this district on the main Gwalior road. Burreypoorah is, in the first place, from its situation, an easily defensible locality; is one march nearer to Gwalior, and troops stationed thereat can be almost entirely secured from the machinations of any of the mutineers, who had ascertained that our men could not be expected to resist in earnest any serious attack made by their disaffected comrades, while the District Police was amply sufficient, we considered, to protect the station and treasury against any ordinary thieves or robbers. It was therefore agreed that the troops and the European inhabitants of the station should proceed across the Jumna to Burreypoorah, Mr. Hume and Mr. Parker remaining behind to ensure the due custody of the treasure, and the preservation of order and peace. It had been originally intended to remove the treasure at the same time; but it was subsequently considered inexpedient so to expose the soldiers to temptation, and the idea was therefore abandoned. Due arrangements were made in accordance with this plan; the men agreed, apparently cheerfully, to the proposed movement, and the treasury guard was removed and replaced by one composed of four sowars of the Irregular Cavalry, a few trusty Nujeebs of the Thuggee Department, a number of chupprassies and burkundazes, and a number of chowkidars, the whole being put under the charge of the Kotwal. Unfortunately the spirit of disaffection had already spread amongst the sepoys, and more than half of them refused, or for some reason neglected, to obey the order to march; and of those so remaining a party of from twenty to thirty came down in a body to the treasury, which they occupied. Later in the evening Mr. Parker was obliged to leave, and Mr. Hume escaped with difficulty from the place in the disguise of a native. Every Police Officer of every grade absolutely disappearing the moment the soldiers presented themselves.

"The mutineer sepoys during the night plundered the treasury, and carried off a large amount of treasure on camels provided for loading the magazine."
Immediately (as it was previously supposed might be the case) the whole budmash population of the neighbourhood of Etawah led by the Mewatees Jullahas, and we are sorry to say a few Thakoors, rose in large bodies, and during the next day plundered the sepoys’ lines, besides the Sessions Court house and Post Office, broke open the Zillah and the Thuggee Jails, to which extra, and it was believed, faithful guards had been lately appointed, carried off the remaining portion of the treasure, in all more than four lakhs, and burnt the roof and records of the Collector’s Office. On our side of the river, we did all that was possible to induce the Thakoors to aid in maintaining peace, but until certain news of the arrival of the Gwalior force reached us, with small success; no great violence as yet appears to have been done to the private property of the natives, beyond that involved in petty highway robberies, which appear to have been committed by the villagers on all the roads of the district; but gangs of a hundred and two hundred dacoits are everywhere abroad, and may possible succeed in effecting their objects some where, if cavalry reinforcements do not speedily reach us.

“Energetic measures are however, with the assistance of one or two well affected zemindars, being adopted; numbers of persons have been already arrested with property stolen from the lines and bungalows in their possession; much more has been given up by persons who profess to have forcibly regained it from the robbers, or to have originally taken it under their protection; a portion of the treasure has also been recovered, and more will, it is believed, be traced out before night-fall. Some seven and twenty men of a body of dacoits, captured red-handed, have just been brought in.”

Extract of letter of the Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 277 A, dated 26th May 1857.

“The Lieutenant-Governor does not doubt that the decision taken for the temporary drawing off of the detachment of the 9th Native Infantry from Etawah was as wise a one as could be formed under such difficult circumstances.”

APPENDIX IV.

Extract paragraph 4 of Magistrate of Etawah’s Memorandum of the 25th October 1857.

Soon after our return from Burpoorah, as we were greatly hampered by an unusual number of ladies and children, it was decided to send these to Agra. I must do the Grenadiers the justice to say that (though they must, as we subsequently learnt, have already arranged to mutiny) they met this proposition with the greatest delight, and the civility and attention of the Havildar, Naik, and twelve sepoys who helped to escort the ladies to Agra was beyond all praise. At the same time the Tehseels of Phuppoon and Oreyah were repeatedly threatened by parties of plunderers, and that of Beylah by 300 sowars from the Cawnpoor district, whom the Tehseeldar, Dabeepershaud, most courageously beat off. The Lieutenant-Governor’s messages to the Governor-General were at that time daily forwarded to me for transmission to Calcutta, but the state of the southern portion of the Cawnpoor district, intervening between us and Banda and Futtiepoor (the only routes by which I could despatch them), was such as to preclude any certainty of their reaching safely. With the view therefore of protecting my own district and opening the line of communication, I took advantage of a demonstration then necessary, i.e., the despatch of 200 of the Grenadiers to Oreyah (intended to overawe some zemindars of that pargannah, and relieve the European Officers of Jaloun and Oraee) to push all the best of my remaining Police Officers with my most trusty zemindars and their adherents into the Cawnpoor
district, and thus took possession of the three neighbouring parganahs, Secundra, Rusoolabad, and Dera Mungul Khan; this brought me within some twenty miles of Cawnpoor itself, and at the nearest point along the canal, the Tehseelbar of Beylah, under my instructions, commenced collecting supplies, which we hope to be able to throw into the entrenchment.

**APPENDIX V.**

*Extract from Magistrate of Etawah's Memorandum of the 25th October 1857.*

Suddenly the news reached of the mutiny and massacre of Gwalior and the Grenadiers mutinied. I had expected and reported to Government that this would be the end of the matter, but I certainly had no idea that we were so near a crisis. At first the Grenadiers only said that they could not obey orders, but by midnight (the 16th of June) it became apparent, not only to me, but to their own officers, who till the last placed the greatest confidence in them, that, though probably the majority were averse to any violence, they yet were not prepared to risk their lives to prevent it, while the remainder were arranging to murder some at any rate of the party. Nothing could have been more ill-timed for us. The best native officer in the district, Koour Luchmun Sing (Deputy Collector), with the Raja of Pertabner and his men, the elite of the sowars and police at Agra, whether they were escorting the ladies, all the other Races, Rao Juswant Rao, Koour Chuttur Sing, and the best of the police remaining between fifty and sixty miles distant in the Cawnpoor District, and the only two forts, Dullip Nuggur and Pertabner, in which we might have taken refuge, closed against us by the absence of the owners. At dawn (June 17th) it was arranged that we were all to get out of the station as best we could, and make for Kutcherah across the Jumna. Having reached that place we found the Agra district (or at least the southern portion of it) in such a state as to render it impossible for us to halt, and we therefore pushed on to Bah. Here matters were, if possible, worse: large bands of matchlockmen openly paraded the country, two or three nights before our arrival Bah had been completely plundered, and even during the few hours we rested, the matchlock firing round us was incessant, and some kutchha houses adjoining the pukka gunj, on the top of and inside which we were posted, were burnt before our eyes. At Bah we were joined by Jourden's company and others from Jaloun and Oraree. We had no option but to proceed to Agra.

*Extract from a Memorandum by Major Hennessy.*

On the evening of the 16th instant just before the sun set, Mr. Hume, Collector of Etawah, communicated to me that a rising of the Gwalior troops had taken place; very soon after this I was told that the native officers of the regiment were at my door; they came in, and Subadar-Major Meer Amanut Ally read portions of a letter from his nephew at Gwalior, giving a detailed account of the rising and massacre. Some portions of that letter the Subadar-Major would not read. The whole of the native officers expressed deep sorrow for what had occurred.

I was informed that the mutineers had invited the Grenadier Regiment to Gwalior to receive charge of the families of the regiment, for whose sake the mutineers had duly cared; that in the event of the Grenadier Regiment not coming to Gwalior, the mutineers would march to Etawah with twelve guns, bringing the families with them.

I was then asked what course I should think of following. I replied that I must remain at Etawah, and would permit a reasonable number of men to go to Gwalior to try and extricate their families; that if the mutineers...
came over in force with twelve guns, which I could not withstand on an open plain, I should retreat towards Agra.

The Subadar-Major at once stated that no movement towards Agra could take place, as the fact would cause them all to be called Feeringhees, and their families would be killed.

He said we ought to proceed to Gwalior or its vicinity. I replied this could not be, that I would not accompany them towards Gwalior, which would end in their joining the mutineers, and murdering their officers or permitting them to be murdered, for the same reasons I would not wait the arrival of the mutineers at Etawah; the Subadar-Major, speaking for all, said no retreat upon or towards Agra was to be thought of; I said the command of the regiment then is no longer in my hands. I then asked the Subadar-Major if he considered the men still staunch; he said he could not answer for any one, that he had no confidence in any one.

I then desired the native officers to communicate to their men the news from Gwalior. This was after Roll call; two-thirds of the men at once ran to their arms, and great excitement prevailed. I went to the lines, ordered the men to fall in and addressed them; upon some it produced a good effect, but the whole broke their ranks, crowded around me, and voices called out, what is the use of talking to us, the whole army has turned, and the Raj has ceased; at length I got them back to their tents.

That night we slept as usual on the open plain in front of our men; a picquet, which had been thrown out to the left of their own accord, formed a semi-circle round us, which, with my night guard, very completely enclosed us. Between 12 and 1 o'clock, when it was supposed that all of us were asleep, some person came to my guard, an emissary from the 4th, probably whom we had intercepted and turned back in the evening, and whispered conversation took place, of which the following caught my ear: What has happened at Gwalior? They have given themselves a bad name, said one of my guard; true, said the emissary, but all the world knows that for the last three or four years these Feeringhees exercised great zoolm; they have ruined and taken the lands of all respectable zamindars, and have given them to baneahs. They have exercised great zoolm, it is time to get rid of them. There is no issue in their Government; they will not make a Badshah themselves, neither will they allow any one else to be Badshah, now too they attempt to destroy our religion. Thus much I heard of a long conversation to which my men eagerly assented; a few of them followed this emissary to the corner of a building close by, and before parting I heard them say Doctor Sahib ko deel dega. For the first time I was seriously alarmed; this conversation proved that some of the men at least were inclined to treason and murder: after remaining perfectly quiet half an hour to lull suspicion, I sent for the native officer of the day, to whom I desired to give some order; he attended, and I communicated to him what with my own ears I had overheard. He partook of the alarm I felt, but assured me his own company were true, and that if anything happened, he would die with me. I must here remark that the men surrounding us, and more especially the sentry of my own night guard, continued hawking and spitting in a noisy and offensive manner, for the purpose, I thought, of drawing down reproof, and having an excuse for violence; the men have never conducted themselves in this manner before. During the night I observed several of the men around us quietly loading their muskets; this was also observed by Mr. Pool; in the morning we observed the ends of numerous cartridges on the ground. I am quite convinced it needed but one word, one excuse for excitement, and on that night the cry would have been raised for our destruction.

In the morning, instead of the guards around us going away as usual soon after gun-fire, they loitered about us until sunrise, keeping a narrow watch upon us. They did not however oppose our slowly walking towards Mr. Hume's house, followed by our horses, although men still followed our foot-
steps at a distance. I was informed that the gentlemen in Mr. Hume's house
(where the whole station was residing) being all alarmed for their own safety,
had determined upon any outcry from my lines to fly forthwith; but as they
apprehended opposition from the strong guard over their house, they opened a
bathing room door, hitherto closed; it was at once detected by the guard, and
without orders a sentry was planted over it, thus cutting off that chance of
escape. Mr. Span of the 62nd had, during the night, overheard men of the
guard saying: "They would murder all in the house in their sleep;" the
attitude of the guard was offensive and threatening.

During the night I had heard several remarks of a very significant nature,
such as the following, by men of the quarter guard: "Brother, there will
be no more three days' drill" (an ordinary punishment of mine for dirty
men), and a man of our own guard being warned for sentry duty asked, "is
there to be anything else at 3 o'clock?"

I must also remark that concurrent testimony from many quarters satisfi-
es me that there had been an entire understanding between the Gwalior
mutineers and the Grenadier Regiment; in its ranks there are still a great
numbers of good and faithful men. I was the last to believe in the possibi-
ity of mutiny in the Grenadier Regiment, but the effect of the rise at Gwalior
was instantaneous; the senior native officer, who had been among the loudest
in professions, at once changed tone, had no faith in any one, could promise
nothing, but steadily adhered to his own plan of going to Gwalior, and the
impossibility of falling back upon Agra.

APPENDIX VI.

No. 11, dated Camp Allahabad, 22nd February 1858.

The Right Hon'ble the Governor-General has great satisfaction in pub-
lishing, for general information, the subjoined reports of an action fought
with the rebels at Anuntram, on the 7th instant, by Alexander's Horse, and a body
of Zemindaree troops led by Mr. A. O. Hume, Magistrate of Etawah, the
whole under the command of Captain Alexander.

The Governor-General entirely concurs with His Excellency the Com-
mander-in-Chief in considering this affair to reflect the highest credit on
Captain Alexander and Mr. Hume, as well as Mr. Maconochie, who, with con-
spicuous bravery and cool determination, led their men against the very
superior numbers of the rebels, and obtained a signal victory over them.
reconnoitre the enemy's position at Anuntram, I proceeded yesterday morning at day light, with a party of thirty sowars of my regiment, and accompanied by Mr. Hume, the Magistrate, and Mr. Maconochie, the Deputy Magistrate of Etawah.

Ordering the picket of thirty rank and file of my regiment, and eighty sowars of the Etawah Local Horse, stationed at Bukewar to fall in, we proceeded to Anuntram, distant six miles. We arrived there about ½ past 9 A.M., and found about 700 matchlockmen, belonging to different loyal zemindars, ready to receive us.

We moved on at once to the enemy's position, which was about a mile from Anuntram, and found them very strongly posted, stronger than we were led to believe from reports. Their right resting on the Cawnpoor road, occupied a large tope of mango trees with a wall of six feet all round and a small ditch in front; their left, on a village (Phoolpoor), and every grove and field between occupied by them. Their right was the chief position, and looked most formidable, the enclosure swarming with the enemy and one gun facing down the road towards us. Having reconnoitred and having been offered the loan of a gun from Anuntram, we came to the decision of attacking the place; having shown ourselves to the enemy, it appeared to us that the effect on the country around would be very bad, did we retire without attempting something, so I formed the cavalry into three troops; my own men I took opposite the right rear of the enemy's entrenchment, and within 300 yards; one troop I directed to go to the right, and the third to remain in the centre as a support for the gun, which had by this time come up, and was planted, as near as we could judge, opposite the enemy's.

Mr. Hume having with some difficulty collected about 2 or 300 matchlockmen out of the 700, advanced most gallantly with them towards the entrenchment; the fire of the enemy had been directed towards my troop, but seeing the advance of our matchlockmen, turned it towards them; our gun then opened, advancing nearer each discharge; about the fifth discharge our gun was close up to the wall, and a rush being made, headed in the most gallant manner by Mr. Hume, the enemy began to retreat.

Having already got to their right rear with my troop of sixty men, the time came for us to act, the word charge was given by me, and in a few seconds we were in the midst of them sweeping round the rear of the entrenchment to the village on the enemy's left; many of the enemy escaped owing to the height of cultivation and the villages, where it was impossible for cavalry to follow, and had the Local Horse acted on the right, when they saw my troop come round, the victory would have been most complete, but they rendered no assistance at first. However, the enemy were completely routed, their only gun with a quantity of ammunition, baggage, ponies, matchlocks, swords, &c., captured, and about 125 killed in the field and six hung. We followed them up for about three miles, and then gave up further pursuit. The enemy dispersing in all directions, and my party of cavalry being too small to detach after them, besides we had then come about twenty-five miles and had to return to Etawah the same evening, which we reached about 7 P.M.

The number of the enemy could not certainly have been under 12 or 1,300 men, including a few sowars.

Our casualties were:

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<td>Killed</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>matchlockmen: 12</td>
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Wounded.

2 sowars, both severely,
4 horses, three severely, one slight,
1 sowar of Local Horse, slightly.
4 horses do. severely,
15 matchlockmen.
2 horses missing.

A copy of Mr. Hume's report to Government is enclosed for the Brigadier's information, and shows the active and gallant part taken by that officer and his matchlockmen.

I now beg to bring to the notice of Brigadier Seaton, C.B., the able assistance I received from Mr. Hume, who gallantly led the assault, and Mr. Maconochie, who accompanied my troops of cavalry throughout the day, and was always to the front.
Fought Feby. 7th 1858:

Enemies Dead, found and counted 125

Hurt: ........................................... 6

One gun and whole baggage captured.

(Signed) A. O. Hume,

Feby. 8th 1858.
The conduct of my men was admirable, and many individual acts of gallantry were performed. Some of the sowars of the Local Horses did their duty well, and the conduct of the matchlockmen who went to the assault after they once got in at the enemy, Mr. Hume reports to have been excellent.

I beg to bring all parties concerned to the favorable notice of Brigadier Commanding, and trust he may deem the affair worthy of being reported to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

I trust the Brigadier will not consider I exceeded my duty in attacking a position I had previously reported as being too strong for the whole of our force. I think, however, Anuntram will be free from Roop Sing and his followers for some time to come.

The information regarding the enemy's regular troops at Ajeetmul, and mentioned by Mr. Hume, was only brought to-day; and it is fortunate as things have turned out, for we should not have gone out, and this victory would not have been gained.

Dated 8th February 1858.

From—A. O. Hume, Esq., Officiating Magistrate and Collector, Etawah,
To—Secretary to Government of the North-Western Provinces, Agra.

I have the honor to report that we yesterday obtained a signal success over the enemy near Anuntram. At 6 A.M., the 7th of February, Captain Alexander, Mr. Maconochie, and myself left Etawah with thirty sowars to visit the picket at Bukewar and reconnoitre the enemy's position beyond. At Bukewar we were joined by the picket, viz., thirty of Alexander's Horse and about eighty of the Etawah Local Horse; we then pushed on to Anuntram, a small town on the main Oreyah and Cawnpoor road, distance about twenty-one miles from our camp at Etawah. At Anuntram I called out about 700 of the matchlockmen posted there to keep the enemy in check, and taking a small gun of Rao Juswant Rao's advanced along the main road. About a mile from Anuntram we found the enemy posted in several dense mango topes surrounded by high earth banks, and occupying the intermediate aruhur and castor oil plant fields in skirmishing order. As we drew near, the enemy concentrated themselves in the two enclosures, C and B (see Sketch), still keeping however some hundreds of men out as skirmishers in the fields immediately surrounding their position. As the banks surrounding the enclosure were not less than six feet high from outside, as there were no approaches, and the branches of the trees came down to within two feet of the top of the bank, Captain Alexander, finding that his cavalry could not attack them with any reasonable chance of success, halted them at D. After consulting him I posted the Local Horse at E, and then leaving them there with orders to cut up any fugitives, drew the men up in a sort of line at G G with the gun in the centre. The enemy by this time had opened a smart fire on us, and Captain Alexander, to whom I reported what I had done, as well as the nature of the position which I had closely inspected from N, desired me to advance with the gun and matchlockmen. By dint of thrashing and threatening to shoot them, Koour Lutchmun Singh and three or four of my own sowars assisting me manfully, I succeeded in bringing up about 350 of the matchlockmen into a position K K K, still keeping the gun in the centre G. Our matchlockmen nevertheless were no cowards; they fought bravely a little later hand to hand, but they were new to the system of going straight ahead at an enemy, were immensely outnumbered, and were obliged to advance under a very heavy fire, which, as they could under the most favorable circumstances see only the heads of their opponents, they could not return with any effect.

By degrees, taking advantage of a number of small ridges, intervening between us and the point which I had chosen for the attack, I pushed the men on to within twenty yards of the entrenchment, keeping up, as we advanced, a fire from the Rao's gun in answer to that of the enemy; I then ran the gun
up to the little knoll A, which, distant about five yards from the entrenchment, gave me the command of the interior. By this time some 300 or 400 of the enemy ran out of the opposite side of the enclosure in the direction NN, and were promptly pursued by Captain Alexander and his sixty troopers, who cut up a considerable number of them, though not without some casualties, as even single fugitives almost without exception turned and fought. The Local Horse did not assist; they had no European Officer (I have applied in vain for one), and either would not, or thought they ought not to move without an order to do so. At A we fired one round, and all the men lining that particular portion of the "Moorchha" beginning to run, the matchlockmen made a rush, and to the number of 160 or 200 got in. Just as they did so the enemy fired their gun in our faces, doing however no damage, and then for the most part throwing away their guns, both parties went at it with swords. In less than a minute the main body of the enemy, some 600 strong, ran out in the direction S S S, a few still stood by the gun; these in a very short time were dispersed, and as I thought either cut up or driven out; in this I was mistaken (without uniform it was difficult to distinguish foes from friends), and we had not proceeded fifty yards in pursuit, when we were stopped by shouts from the rear, and found that the enemy had retaken and loaded the gun; we retook it however before they could fire it; Lutchmun Sing and I then pushed on with some half dozen sowars, but the rebels were too far ahead, and we picked up only a few stragglers. Captain Alexander then returned from the pursuit in the direction NN; the Local Horse came up at last; the enemy was pursued some three miles, and a number more accounted for, one and all however fighting to the last; nine prisoners were also taken, of whom six were hung. I ought to add that the enclosure C was evacuated directly we took the gun.

The enemy was certainly not less than 1,200 strong when we advanced from the position K K K, and probably numbered not less than 2,000. They had a few irregular cavalry, and it is reported about fifty sepoys (but I saw none of the latter); the former as usual kept well out of range, and ultimately disappeared without showing fight. They lost 125 men killed, their gun (an iron one) and limber, matchlocks, swords, bundles of clothes, burtons, poneys, &c., in fact their whole baggage; our loss was not severe, twelve matchlockmen were killed, a few (amongst them the brave leader of the Choudrayan of Binsa's men, Bhowanee Sing) wounded; two of Alexander's men and three of the horses, one of the local horsemen, and four of the horses badly wounded, and several other men and horses, scratched more or less.

The pursuit over, we returned with the captured gun to Etawah, having accomplished the whole affair, including the fifty miles ride in twelve hours. It may be worth mentioning that at the very time we made the attack, Lopporee Goosain, the Nana's Pirohit, with a considerable force of regular mutineers, was at Ajeetmul, scarcely more than six miles from the battle-field, so that we rather stole a march on him.

I having been chiefly with the matchlockmen, my account is necessarily a one-sided one, but it must not be supposed that I wish to ignore the services rendered by the rest of the force. It is true that owing to the nature of the position, the brunt of the assault fell upon the footmen, but the great loss sustained by the enemy is chiefly owing to the energetic pursuit by Captain Alexander and his horse; about twenty were killed in the entrenchment and within a few yards of it, by the matchlockmen; eleven were killed by the small party with me, but the rest were, I believe, to a man cut up by Alexander's Horse; the fugitives, be it remembered, fighting most resolutely, and using swords, spears, and matchlocks, but too successfully.

The gallant conduct of Koour Lutchmun Sing, my Deputy Magistrate, of Raheem Buksh, a Duffadar, formerly of the Gwalior Contingent, now of the Etawah Local Horse, and of Bhowanee Sing, the leader of the Binsa's men, deserves special notice.
APPENDIX VII.
Extract from Mr. A. O. Hum's (Magistrate of Etawah) official diary, March 30th.

About 4 a.m. of the 13th April we reached Ajeetmul; we found it looted, deserted, and with the exception of two or three large houses, burnt as far as it consisted of combustible materials. We ascertained that four of the garrison had been killed, and four or five wounded; that the place, though surrounded by pukka walls, had been stormed by a large body of men including regular sepoys, and that the whole of the matelockmen, officials and inhabitants (except the Zemindars, whose house also was spared, and whose connivance is probable) had utterly fled the place. As morning dawned we found numbers of cartridge papers, and numbers of Enfield rifle bullets sticking in the walls, gates, &c., where the assault was made. We perceived that a considerable body of cavalry had been present, and we learnt that, besides the regular sepoys, some large number of Bundookchees belonging to Shahpore, Rajpooreeh, Ramnuggur, and Ayanah had been comprised in the band of plunderers. Now the three former of these villages, especially Shahpore, have been for now many months the habitual residence of large bands of dacoits, who protected by the Zemindars and assisted in all their expeditions by the inhabitants of the place have made themselves the terror of the neighbourhood. This was bad enough, but to take upon themselves to attack and oust the Government servants the very first night of the re-establishment of its authority, was more than could be permitted to pass without signal punishment. At daylight therefore we marched in the direction of Shahpore, up to which we could trace, by a band of foot-steps some hundred yards wide, the return path of the insurgents. The place itself we found deserted, but from a faqueer and an old woman who still remained, we learnt that every single man belonging to the village had been engaged in the fray, that they had returned in triumph about 3 a.m., but had fled on hearing our approach to Rajpoorah, which is nearer the ravines, on which the village was evacuated before they could do them any injury, and so only five of them are known to have been killed. We had one sowar of the Local Horse seriously wounded in the left arm.

APPENDIX VIII
Extract as above.

April 21st.—Having been reinforced yesterday with the 6th Troop, Agra Police Battalion, I made a reconnaissance with about 250 horse (54 Alexander's
of an attack upon Rusoolabad. In the afternoon Roop Sing's headman and about 150 of his men had just succeeded in escaping. Unfortunately we were misled and pursued in the direction of Phuppoon; after going a short distance I was convinced that such must be the case, and we turned round and went due south toward Shahpoor (one of the villages we burnt the other day), and came up with the enemy retreating; just as we reached the edge of the ravines, they were still about 600 yards ahead of us, and opened fire directly they saw us. I drew the main body of the cavalry upon the edge of the ravines, and Messrs. Chapman, Doyle, and Parker, and myself, with a few sepoys, who were armed with firearms, pushed carefully into the ravines; at first they seemed inclined to stand, and fired at us smartly with Enfield rifles and matchlocks, but on our dismounting and making after them, they began to run, and we chased them almost to the Jumna, knocking over as we afterwards learnt seven of them; some of their rifle bullets dropped in amongst us, but had no one hit. We then halted a short time at Ajeetmul and returned. Before noon there was not a mutineer we understand outside the ravines, within ten miles of Ajeetmul.

APPENDIX IX.

Extract as above.

April 26th.—The Oreyah Pergunah having been pretty nearly cleared, Koour Nirunjan Sing (the eldest son of the Raja of Chuckernuggur), one of the two chief rebel leaders of the district, fell back with about 150 sepoys, sowars, and a number of Bundookchees to Gohanee, in the Jumna Chumbal Doab. Yesterday night a large party of his retainers crossed at the Debhollowee Ghat and beating off our guard, took away with them the boat, and established on the other side of the river a number of Moorchas, between Gohanee and Debhollowee, from which they fired at and annoyed other boat guards on this side of the river. As we have possession of every other Jumna ghat boat in the Etawah and Lucknow Pergunnahs, it was arranged that to recover this Mr. Doyle with 150 Cavalry should cross above Debhollowee, and making a detour take the Moorchas in the rear, and then push on and surround Gohanee from the south, while we with infantry, cavalry and two light guns made our way to Dullepnnuggur, and crossing there attacked Gohanee from the north. The operation was most successfully carried out. The enemy taken by surprise fled, several (fifteen we subsequently found) were cut up, some taken prisoners and hung, the boat was recovered, and accessibility to us of any place, no matter what its natural advantages of position demonstrated. Mr. C. J. Doyle, Commanding the Etawah Local Horse, was, however, I regret to say, severely wounded in the right shoulder.

APPENDIX X.

Extract as above.

May 3rd.—Last evening it appears a person calling himself the Nana's Tehseeldar with about 700 men, of whom about 300 are regular mutineers, made their appearance at Phuppoon, and took possession of the Tulseel and Thannah; a portion of this force is said to have been engaged in an unsuccessful attack upon Bausoolabad. In the afternoon Roop Sing, Lalpooree Goooshaeen, and others with 200 sowars (lancers said to be), 300 Telingsahs, and from 500 to 800 Bundookchees, with four or five guns, one a large one said to have come from Chirkhara, arrived at Ajeetmul. It appears that Sham Lall, whom with some of his companions we killed there, earlier in the day (and on whose person we found sundry orders of Roop Sing authorizing him to collect revenue) had come to collect rassud. Simultaneously, Nirunjun Sing with a great crowd of Cutchwayeeghar rebels made a demonstration near
Joheka Ghat. I personally reported the above, with my views of what it indicated to Colonel Riddell, but he told me that his orders were still explicit, and that he could not move in that direction. We learnt that the force at Ajeetmool up to that moment amounted to between 4 and 500 sowars, from 6 to 800 Telingabs, a crowd of Bundookchees, and four guns, three small and one large. Lieutenant Sherriff reported that he had fallen back two miles nearer to Etawah to a very strong position. I brought in with me yesterday all the revenue we had collected to the Sudder Station. Colonel Riddell was duly advertized by me personally, and by Lieutenant Sherriff by letter of the state of affairs. During the night almost the whole of the Zemindaree garrison of Anuntram left their posts, and fell back on our camp. Koonjheharee, the proprietor, and a few of his men remaining firm; at dawn the enemy attacked; and though the garrison did their best, drove them out and burnt the place. Lieutenant Sherriff sent Chapman with the whole of the cavalry (300) to Anuntram; when he reached the place he found the enemy with their right in a very strong walled grove south of Anuntram; their left in a village further south, the intermediate space occupied by cavalry. They opened when he got within 1,000 yards, and fired eighteen rounds from their four guns during the time that he took to get within 400 yards, but they were in too great a hurry, and only wounded one man and one horse; Lieutenant Chapman had then edged away, so as to get opposite their cavalry, and thinking to decoy him, the enemy's guns ceased firing, and their cavalry (of which they only showed about 270, the rest being hidden behind the grove) fell back; had he advanced, they would have annihilated him, the other squadrons of the cavalry would have taken him in rear, those that fell back in front, while the cross fire from the grove and village would have been tremendous, as there were from 1,000 to 1,200 regular infantry, beside the guns. He therefore contented himself with thoroughly reconnoitering, and sent back to Lieutenant Sherriff for reinforce-ments. Lieutenant Sherriff marched out with the guns, and the rest of the force reporting to us here, and Colonel Riddell sent out Captain Alexander with the whole of his cavalry (126) to support. However it was too late. Before Lieutenant Sherriff could get out he met Chapman returning, and returned with him to our position on this side of Bukewar, where he was joined by Captain Alexander soon after.

APPENDIX XI.

Extract as above.

May 6th.—Our force came in late last night. The whole pergunnah has been deserted. Etawah and its neighbourhood are crowded with fugitives. Several villages have been burnt. Latchmun Sing brought in with him, on eighty sowars, the whole of the Luckna Tehseel Duftur. As yet we have not heard of Luckna or Bukewar being burnt. Our force escorted in the valuables of the whole pergunnah nearly. The rebels will find little or nothing to plunder, though they may burn and destroy the villages. All the principal ghats of the Jumna from Choora, near Calpee to Nand Jowan in the Luckna Per-gunnah, appear to be held by the mutineers, who have patrolling parties at each.

APPENDIX XII.

Extract as above.

May 16th.—At daylight we started, but there being absolutely no current, and the wind being dead against us, it was 11 o'clock before we neared Pegulpoor; as usual our Local Horse, with the camels, &c., was a little in advance on the left bank, and when we were still some half mile off the enemy's main

Δ25
position, which was in Silowa (a village of the Juggumunpoor illaqua, opposite Bejulpoor), they (the cavalry) drew up in front of it. We halted to reconnoitre, the enemy at once opened with guns and musketry on the cavalry and musketry on us, a party of their skirmishers having crept up along the cliffs of the right bank close to us; we had ascertained that the force opposed to us consisted of between two and three hundred regular sepoys, with a crowd of Bundookhebes, that the were mostly posted in an almost inaccessible village by the river bank, entirely commanding the channel (though they had also several outlying moorchas defending the approaches); and that they had six guns in position and a number of immense wall pieces. Lieutenant Sherriff determined (as it was impossible to get the boats down without doing so) to attempt to drive the enemy out of their position strong as it was. We therefore leaving about seventy Etawah levies, and twenty-four artillerymen to guard the boats, landed on the right bank, and at once threw out a few skirmishers, who occupied the heights in our immediate proximity. In the meantime the enemy crossed about forty sepoys lower down opposite their main position, who attacked the cavalry, one-half of the latter fell back on the boats covering the camels, our riding horses, &c., &c.; the other half wheeled right and left, fell back and advanced and kept them in check till we sent twelve of the Sikhs and about twenty of the new levies to support them, and these very soon drove the sepoys back across the river with a loss of eleven men: whilst this was taking place, Lieutenant Sherriff, myself, and Serjeant Purcell with the rest of the force, viz., ten of the 2nd Punjab Infantry and fifty of the new levies, advanced in skirmishing order along the river bank, and the heights covering the bank. Lieutenant Sherriff's arrangements were admirable, and he so led us that after driving the enemy from crag after crag, and moorcha after moorcha, he and his men forced the rear of the main position, while the attention of the enemy was engaged in front by the new levies; some of the sepoys fought desperately (Sherriff killed a havildar in hand to hand fight, but they were soon overpowered, and the main body fled in utter confusion, leaving six guns, wall pieces, papers, plunder, &c. While we were engaged on land, Mr. Maconochie, Dr. Sheetz, and Serjeant Edmonds brought up the boats also to a certain extent diverting the enemy's attention, but the attack of the infantry was so rapidly made good that our two light guns on board the boats never had occasion to open, as Lieutenant Sherriff had arranged that they should in support of the land attack. The operation was most successful, great as the disadvantages were with which we had to contend. The victory was complete, the whole force behaved admirably, but the men of the 2nd Punjab Infantry especially displayed the greatest gallantry, and a havildar of my new levies distinguished himself much; about seventy sepoys were killed on the right bank, eleven on the other, whereas we had only one sowar and two sepoys wounded, and one horse killed.

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APPENDIX XIII.

Extract as above.

May 18th.—Colonel Riddell was desirous of having the standing encampment of the enemy (which was on the other side of the Jumna) burnt, as also one or two villages near the same, which appeared also to afford shelter to, and have been frequented by, the mutineers. This he ordered to be done by Lieutenant Sherriff's detachment of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, and the three companies of my new infantry levies, supported by a company of 3rd Europeans. Accordingly at daylight the said company having marched to the river bank, Lieutenant Sherriff and myself crossed our men, Serjeants Purcell and Edmonds of the levies accompanying. On landing I was met by scouts, who informed me that the enemy, some 2,000 strong, were about one-half miles inland, and therefore scarcely half a mile from the furthest village which Colonel Riddell had pointed
out for destruction to Lieutenant Sherriff. I therefore returned to report this to Colonel Riddell in the boats that were going back for the Europeans; on hearing the news he said that he still wished us to proceed, but that he had rather not send any Europeans with us, though he himself would go up to a
very high place from which he could see the country we were to traverse, and that if he saw any movement of the enemy, he would fire three muskets in succession. I therefore re-crossed and joined my men; we advanced in skirmishing order, and in about an hour had completed our task, when some of the enemy's cavalry (about 100), superbly mounted, came galloping down on us; we fell back slowly for some little distance till we had got our line into broken ground full of short Kekur trees, then Lieutenant Sherriff and myself with thirty riflemen ran forward to within 150 or 200 yards of the cavalry and opened on them. I am happy to say I knocked over a swell in gold and red who was leading, and three more saddles were emptied. They behaved well; some of them dismounted and picked up their dead and wounded, and they moved slowly off; as we were falling back I caught sight of a line of perhaps 100 bayonets glittering just above the crest of the plateau on our left (as we were falling back facing the enemy), showing that some of the infantry were trying to get round us and cut us off from the boats. Lieutenant Sherriff then extended our line in that direction, our left (we still falling back towards the river facing the enemy) becoming at once engaged; as we fell back very slowly the enemy showed all along our front, and firing became general from right to left. Nothing could be more admirable than the behaviour of the men; the enemy could not have numbered less than 500 regular infantry and 1,000 Bundookchees. On the southern side of the river there is a belt of level sand about 500 yards wide before the country rises; when we reached the edge of this, we drew up our men in light infantry order along the crest of the broken ground, intending to let the enemy get pretty close up with their gun, which they had opened in the distance, and then to charge, take it, and disperse them; we sounded for supports to double up, and saw a company of Europeans embarked, landed, and drawn up in our side of the river. Then the bugles sounded our recall; we thought it a mistake abandoning a very strong position, but concluding that we were intended to unite with the Europeans and turn the enemy's flank, instead of attacking the centre, as we should have been compelled to do from the position we held, fell back very slowly in skirmishing order to the water's edge. We were not little astonished, when still about 200 yards distant from the river, to see the Europeans quietly re-embark, so that when we did get down we found ourselves without boats, without a particle of cover, exposed to a very heavy, though distant, fire from rifles, muskets, muschetlocks, and a gun. The men were very angry but perfectly steady, and the fire that we kept up, and that Lieutenant Angelo on his own motion, opened from one of my light guns (in a boat moored in the opposite side), soon after taken up by Major Walcot with a 9-pounder Royal Artillery, kept them in check; and the boats arrived and we re-embarked all the party in perfect order, with only my Serjeant-Major of Artillery wounded (in the head with a rifle bullet), one of my infantry ditto, and one of the 2nd Punjab Infantry bheestees slightly wounded.

APPENDIX XIV.

Extract as above.

May 19th.—The enemy have fired at intervals (they have now got two guns) during the whole night and day at us, or rather at that portion of the force near the river bank, for, as Colonel Riddell deemed it inexpedient (though he has now, with the Honorable Major Bourke's detachment and mine, 650 European Infantry, 300 Sikh Infantry, 150 Local Infantry, 500 Cavalry, three 9-pounders, one 24-pound howitzer, one 12-pounder carronade, three 3-pounders, about sixty Europeans, and fifty native artillerymen) to
attack the enemy, I saw no advantage to be gained by sitting in the boats; to be fired at, day and night, and moved with my cavalry, artillery and part of the infantry away nearer towards Oreyah, though not till I had one horse and a loosey killed. One hundred of my infantry I left, at Colonel Riddell's request, to guard the boats. I don't know what may be the ultimate results of our exemplary patience, but at present the whole country round about, and especially the enemy, who look us up every half hour or so with a round shot (such pad:ly many little shots too), and half a score of rifle bullets, consider that they have completely licked and cowed our whole force.

May 20th.—Enemy have three little guns now, but are short of shot I fancy; they fired muskets, &c., as usual, but treated us very sparingly to shot; no one killed or wounded during the course of the day. The men are pretty well under cover, and keep tolerably close.

May 22nd.—Things much as usual; enemy made a most desperate demonstration; blew bugles; beat drums; fired away their guns in great style; a number came skirmishing up to the banks of the river; firing smartly for some hours; no body hit.

May 23rd.—Enemy日益 active all the morning, fired some four or five rounds of round shot, and some 500 rounds of musketry. Kept the fire up all day; towards evening one of the 2nd Punjab Infantry was slightly wounded in the head by a stray bullet, which had first perforated the cap and pugree of one of the 3rd Europeans.

APPENDIX XV.

Extract as above.

May 25th.—At about noon some 3,000 rabble, mutineers, Bundookcheers, men, women, and children, with a great number of elephants, reported variously at from thirty to fifty, crossed the Jumna at Bejulpool; they were obviously flying from Calpee, were foot sore, hungry and utterly disorganized; they were making for the Ganges; they had four small guns on four of the elephants. Colonel Riddell considered that we could not move any part of the force at present, so they got pretty well off, though here and there the villagers have plundered a few of their tattoos loaded with odds and ends, a few cattle, &c. They called themselves the Nana army.

Colonel Riddell says that if I withdraw with my locals from here, to attack and expel the rebels at Rooroo or elsewhere, he must sink the boats, as he considers the presence of a large police force here requisite for their safety.

APPENDIX XVI.

Extract from Mr. G. E. Lane's (Ophi. Magistrate of Etawah) official diary.

Yesterday morning, the 11th of July, heard that the rebels had again crossed to the number of about 500, and were going along the ravines in the Oreyah direction. Sent out sowars to watch them, and reinforced the Oreyah detachment with 50 sowars. About 2 P.M., heard that Bunkut Sing with about twenty-five men was in the village of Singanpoor on the edge of the ravines. Lieutenant Forbes and I went on with fifty sowars with the hope of being able to cut them off from the ravines, Lieutenant Graham following us as fast as he could with sixty of the Infantry Levies. On reaching Ramnuggur, a Gooroo village destroyed by Mr. Hume, we found it occupied by the rebels in force, and were met with a heavy and not ill directed fire, and were forced to withdraw the cavalry till the arrival of the infantry. I then took cavalry round to the other side of the village to distract their attention, and cut up any that crossed in that direction, while Forbes and Graham attacked with infantry, crossing a ravine charged the village and driving them out followed
them some distance into the large ravines bordering on the Jumna. The heat being excessive we returned to Ramnuggur intending to march back in the evening.

Subsequently the rebels returned with a much larger force, and driving in our pickets attempted to recapture the village. They were allowed to advance through the ravines to within hundred yards when our infantry charged them; and then, extending into skirmishing order, drove them back to near the banks of the Jumna. In those two affairs we lost one sepoy killed and one dismounted sowar wounded; both those casualties occurred in hand to hand conflicts. The loss of the enemy was fifteen or sixteen. The infantry were principally engaged and behaved extremely well, the ground being very difficult, and being opposed to 250 or 300 men well armed with muskets, the half of them being Gwalior rebel sepoys.

APPENDIX XVII.

Extract as above.

August 10th. Mohews.—On the 7th the Thanadar, with a few sowars and burkundazes, went down to Tatapoor, Joheka notoriously disaffected villages, to enquire into some old boat plundering cases; the villagers must have sent information to Barhee of his arrival, for on his return he was intercepted by a small body of rebels who attacked his party and killed two burkundazes. I received the information on the morning of yesterday, and immediately marched out with 200 infantry, 100 sowars, and guns, but met with no rebels who had recrossed the river in the night. There was a rebel boat opposite this, which we tried to capture by sending across mallahs on guras under the fire of our guns; but, on arriving close to the boat, it was found to be occupied by armedmen, who, together with some sepoys on the bank, opened a sharp fire and prevented the mallahs bringing it over.

August 11th.—Took two boats at Joheka and brought up to Tatapoor, which is at the junction of the Koaree Nuddée, crossed over 200 infantry under a heavy fire of musketry, and matchlocks to the right bank of the Koaree Nuddée; the villages of which were friendly, marched up that side to a point above the place where three boats were fastened, and then occupied and captured the boats, all of which had been plundered, and were in the possession of rebel sepoys. The infantry were disembarked and marched down the left bank to the village of Gurréa at the point of junction of the two rivers, in which there was a strong pukka temple which had been held for several months by the rebels. It was found to be deserted they had left the place, and in it was found a large quantity of plundered European property that they had taken out of boats, such as crockery, dresses, furniture, also several matchlocks, swords; and some powder—the five boats were brought up to Mohews in the night.

APPENDIX XVIII.

Extract as above.

About noon of the 13th received information that a large body of rebels had crossed the Chumbal; and about 3 P.M. heard that they were within a short distance of Neemree, Lieutenant Forbes immediately got the men ready and sent them down to the river, as we had not intended to remain at Neemree that night; Lieutenant Forbes with the pickets was almost overtaken before he reached the bank, the rebels coming down very fast with about thirty sowars in advance; hundred men were on the sand waiting to embark, and on re-joining them Lieutenant Forbes advanced to the high bank and took up a position. The rebels advanced from all sides, and at one time almost surrounded them. After sharp firing for more than an hour, the rebels advanced to a garden about 150 yards in front of our men, and on another company being sent from this side, Lieutenant Forbes attacked it and drove them out,
pursuing them for some distance. After this they made no stand, their fire slackened, and eventually ceased. We then sent over boats and brought the men back. Mr. Maconochie worked the artillery from the left bank, and till dark kept up a heavy fire, sending some well directed shots amongst the rebels, one of which killed a sowar; although the enemy could not have been less than 400, owing to Lieutenant Forbes’ admirable arrangements, we had no casualty.

APPENDIX XIX.

Extract as above.

On the 27th August we left Etawah with Lieutenant Gordon’s Sappers, fifty Sikhs Agra Police Battalion, 100 Mynpoorie Levies, two 3-pounders Etawah Battery, and one 18-pounder carronade; as we anticipated considerable opposition, all the merchant boats and the one in which was a European woman and her children were left behind. On passing Kutureea Ghat, about 1½ miles from Chukker Nuggur, we were stoutly opposed by Nirunjun Sing and his men, many of whom were sepoys. As it was nearly dark Lieutenant Forbes thought it better not to land and attack them. So we forced our way down replying to the enemy’s fire with our guns only. We had one artillery-man dangerously wounded in the head. On reaching Dulpeep Nuggur, where we remained for the night, Lieutenant Allan, with 260 Etawah Infantry, joined us.

The next morning, the 28th, we started at daylight for Bhurree the whole way down, we met with very great opposition from Nirunjun Sing’s force, who followed us down the river, keeping up a heavy fire. On reaching Gurha Kasdar, a strong position on the banks of the river about three miles from Bhurree, and considered by Roop Sing the key of his position, we found nearly the whole of his force with one small gun ready to resist us; we immediately opened upon them with considerable effect from the 18-pounder and Lieutenants Forbes and Allan and myself with the Sikhs and Etawah Levies landing, drove them from their position, chased them through the ravines, killing one of their leaders, Domrao Sing, and about twenty-five men, and captured the gun-carriage; they, however, managed to carry off the gun. We then re-embarked and dropped down to Gohane, a village opposite Bhurree, where we were joined by the remainder of the Etawah Levies under Lieutenant Graham and Mr. Maconochie. We then crossed the river, but found the fort had been evacuated, in which large supplies of grain, ammunition, &c., were discovered. Mr. Collet, District Engineer, East Indian Railway, was, I regret to say, severely wounded, also two men of the Etawah Levies. On the 29th Lieutenant Graham, with the Sikhs and some of the levies, started to clear the Jumna on the Joheka direction of all boats; he returned on the 31st having completely effected this without opposition; the same day Lieutenants Allan and Gordon and Mr. Maconochie started with a strong force of infantry and two guns to bring down six boats Roop Sing had collected opposite the village of Muhawa Soonder on the Chumbul. The expedition met with considerable opposition, the rebels lining the heights and keeping up a sharp fire of musketry; on coming, however, opposite the boats, the infantry crossed under cover of the guns, drove them out of their position, and carried off the boats. We had one man slightly wounded, the enemy had fifteen men killed by shell from the 18-pounder alone, and lost many more; the party returned the same night to Bhurree with the boats.

APPENDIX XX.

Extract of a letter from the Officiating Magistrate of Etawah to the Officiating Secretary to the Government, North-Western Provinces, dated Etawah, 15th June 1858.

I hasten to report that Lieutenant Span of the Canal had just this morning come in from the Cawnpoor district. He was stationed at Ghuratee
on the Jumna, the terminus of the Etawah Branch Ganges Canal, distant about ninety miles from here. On the 6th it became known that the jail at Cawnpoor had been broken open, and the prisoners released, as if by a preconcerted signal, the former proprietors all over the district rose *en masse*, and dispossessed or attempted to dispossess the present incumbents. Budmash villages turned out their 2, 3, or 400 bundookchees; and looted every other village not strong enough to resist them, and all travellers as a matter of course. After a time his chupprassies and guard mutineed, at least refused to fight, and people made arrangements for attacking him; warned of this by some of his canal friends, and finding himself alone in a scene of indescribable anarchy, in which neither the person or property of any human being was respected for a moment, he started by the canal for Etawah. Throughout he had the gratification of meeting with the most unbounded hospitality and kindness from every Zemindar of any consideration along the line of the canal. Fighting hard amongst themselves in the Cawnpoor district no doubt they were, but even when he passed between bands of armed men fighting with each other, the Zemindars were civil and kind to him, and every man, that had the means of so doing, offered to protect him in his fort. He also says that the moment he entered this district he found perfect peace prevailing everywhere, and one native gentleman, Kour Laik Sing, simply on his requisition for assistance to proceed to me, sent him his factor, and a guard of four sowars and forty bundookchees. The same Zemindar, the day before on hearing of the arrival of the sowars at Beylah, had sent off at once 200 bundookchees towards the Tehseel.

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**APPENDIX XXI.**

- *Ashaar* -


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جس پر رحم میں ایک بہت سی اور زندگی اور میرے زخمی ہونے کے سے تحفظ کے لئے کسی بھی کامیابی کا نقش کرنا۔

ار ہیم کے دور میں نئے اور جدید اور نئی منظرات کے لئے کہا گیا کہ ہماری کوششاں نے باہر میں بھگی نہیں کیا۔

دن بدوخا بھی موجود ہے، ہر ہمیشہ پہچان کے کوئی اور کوئی کہا گیا ہے۔

کیوں کہ ہماری کوششاں نے باہر میں بھگی نہیں کیا۔

کیوں کہ ہماری کوششاں نے باہر میں بھگی نہیں کیا۔
As first arranged the scheme stood thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>Name of Managers</th>
<th>Monthly allowance for establishment</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pergunnahs Bidhoonas, Phuppoond.</td>
<td>Kour Chatter Sing, of Schar. Lalla Dabee Pershad, Tehsildar of Bidhoonas, Deputy Magistrate, Sp. Pr.</td>
<td>Rs. 1,200</td>
<td>Dabeepershand to draw a salary of Rupees 250, and Tahsildar of Phuppoond subordinate to him to draw Rupees 180.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thannah Burporah</td>
<td>Rao Jawahir Sing</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakkeruggur and trans-Chumbul ilassa.</td>
<td>Raja Koosul Sing</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thannah Juswantnuggur, and Agra road as far as Shekoabad.</td>
<td>Kour Zohr Sing</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pergunnah Dullehuggur</td>
<td>Lala Rambukba, Tahseldar, and Deputy Magistrate.</td>
<td>Rs. 1,000</td>
<td>To draw Rupees 200.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When, however, the scheme was promulgated, Rao Juswant Rao declined the office; he said he would help Isheuree Pershad as much as he could, but would not himself undertake the management. Isheuree Pershad declined interfering beyond his pergunnah, and pointed out that Zohr Sing had already ably managed Etawah; moreover, Chatter Sing had in the interim committed himself; his office was only satisfying some of his neighbours, but still he had become a partisan, and was unfit to be a ruler; I therefore modified the scheme, which in practice was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pergunnah or Ilissa.</th>
<th>Manager</th>
<th>Allowance</th>
<th>REMARKS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Salaries as before.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phuppoond Bidhoonas</td>
<td>Lalla Dabee Pershad</td>
<td>Rs. 1,200</td>
<td>Phuppoond directly managed by Tahseldar subordinate to Dabee Pershad. Chatter Sing, Lalk Sing to assist when required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burthanah</td>
<td>Lalla Isheuree Pershad</td>
<td>Rs. 800</td>
<td>Rao Juswant Rao to assist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etawah</td>
<td>Kour Zohr Sing</td>
<td>Rs. 1,600</td>
<td>Kotwales, specially under Shambeeree Lall, Superintendent of Police, subordinate to Zohr Sing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakkeruggur</td>
<td>Raja Koosul Sing</td>
<td>Rs. 200</td>
<td>Turned rebel later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burpoorah</td>
<td>Rao Jawahir Sing</td>
<td>Rs. 200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dullehuggur</td>
<td>Lala Rambukba, Tahseldar.</td>
<td>Rs. 1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. 61, dated Agra, 9th June 1858.

From—A. L. M. PHILLIPPS, Esq., Magistrate of Agra, late Joint-Magistrate of Etah,
To—G. H. HARVEY, Esq., Commissioner, Agra Division.

In conformity with the instructions of Government, contained in circular No. 212, dated 30th April 1858, I have the honor to forward the following Narrative of my operations before leaving the district of Etah.

2. Mr. Hall was the Assistant in the Etah district. There was at that time no uncovenanted Deputy Collector, either native or other.

3. News of the outbreak at Meerut and the occupation of Delhi by the rebels reached me about the 18th of May. The road chowkees were doubled, Jemadars appointed, and other precautions taken to procure intelligence, and arrest suspicious stragglers, which, it perhaps, is not necessary now to dwell on. Daily communication was opened with Allygurh, Mynpoory, Agra, and Furruckabad. All Zemindars of influence and character were written to, or verbally warned, that they were to exert themselves to the utmost to keep the country quiet, and to give the earliest intimation of any attempt at outbreak or disorder on the part of the villages. Almost all the treasure, leaving only a sum for ordinary expenses, was sent to Mynpoory.

4. On the 21st of May no communication was received from Allygurh.

Outbreak at Allygurh on the 21st May, and approach of the mutineers; arrival and departure of, &c.

On the same day, about 10 p.m., Jumshere Khan, Jemadar of one of the road chowkees, about ten miles from Etah on the Allygurh side, came to my house and reported as follows: He had observed a large body of sepoys marching down the road, and had joined them in the hope of learning their intentions; he had discovered that the troops at Allygurh had broken out into open mutiny, that their officers had gone to Agra, and that the main body of the regiment had started for Delhi. This body of men were on their way to warn the companies of the same regiment, which were on detached duty at Mynpoory and Etah. In a few minutes he was called for by the Havildar, or Soubadar, who commanded. This person joined us, and confirmed in full the story before told by Jumshere Khan; after some more conversation, I dismissed him. The whole body ultimately left Etah early in the morning without making any disturbance.

5. I immediately despatched a camel sowar with a note by a by-road to warn the Magistrates of Mynpoory and Etawah. This he succeeded in doing.

6. It was nearly certain that the detachment at Mynpoory and Etawah would rise at the news of the mutiny of the headquarters of the regiment; and quite certain that, if they did so, they would march via Etah and Allygurh to Delhi, thereby avoiding the hostile fort of Agra, they might be expected the next day, the 22nd, or the day after. It was, therefore, necessary for me to consider the course I should take. There was very little money in the Telseeslee Treasury (there was no Sudder Treasury at Etah). There were about twenty-five Nujeebs at the jail; but these men had displayed a very unsatisfactory disposition for several days, murmuring for arrears of pay, which they falsely said were owing to them. There was no place of strength whence I could expect to offer resistance with any hope of success. I therefore determined to leave the station at the approach of the mutineers from Mynpoory, and if possible to return after their passage through.
7. On the night of the 22nd, word was brought to me that the detachment from Mynpoory, joined with that from Etawah, had reached Mullawn, about fourteen miles off, where they had halted. At about 5 A.M., on the 23rd, they arrived at Etah, and I left it simultaneously. My escort consisted of eight sowars. I halted about eight miles off at the village of Nudraee, and there waited for tidings. About 3 P.M. these were brought me by Jumshero Khan that all public buildings and my own house had been burnt and entirely looted, that the Raja had taken no measures to preserve order, that the gunj had been looted, and all was anarchy. Hearing this I continued on my way, and reached Bilram, the residence of Lahoree Mull, and his younger brother, Dilsookh Rae, whither Mr. Hall had gone before early in the morning. I was most hospitably received by these gentlemen; the latter of whom is well known to you, the former is since dead. I desire here to record my sense of the loyal conduct of both, and to express a hope that such reward as might have been deemed fit for Lahoree Mull be now given to his son, Kashmeeree Mull, who has long been known to me, and is now in the service of the Gwalior Government. The remainder of this Narrative would be more conveniently arranged by dates.

May 24th.—The country was in great disorder; all the roads were swarming with looters, and Kasgunj was reported as threatened. I sent the Jemadar of sowars out to collect as many sowars as he could of the police, and as many as he could trust from villages.

Disorder of the country.

I collect sowars and go to Kasgunj. Have a fight with dacoits. Return to Bilram.

May 25th.—The Jemadar returned about 7 A.M. with fifteen sowars, making twenty-two in all including myself. After being decoyed by a false alarm in other direction, I reached Kasgunj. Mr. Hall remained at Bilram.

I found that a body of plunderers had already made an attack on Kasgunj, and were said to be meditating another; this news was being told us at the Bara Durree, a large building, where the four broad straight roads, intersecting Kasgunj, meet. While thus engaged, a cry was raised that the “Bulwa” was returning. I saw a compact body of men advancing up the street, filling it from side to side; the first rank marching in order, dressed in a kind of uniform with cross-belts, and carrying some guns, some latties held as muskets: the whole could not be less than 500 men. As soon as they saw us, there was some hesitation apparent; on which calling on the sowars to follow, I and the jemadar charged them. They fired some shots as we advanced, but broke before we reached them, and the whole body took to flight. We followed for some distance outside the town, and killed many, but the ground was difficult for following dispersed footmen, and we were too small a body to separate far. Indeed, with the exception of the jemadar and two other sowars, the rest showed little inclination to get forward. On this occasion the jemadar behaved with undoubted gallantry. I saw him kill two men. The two sowars who also distinguished themselves, were Mahomed Alee and Jevun Beg. They accompanied me afterwards to Agra; but I do not know how they have since behaved.

I regret that the subsequent conduct of the jemadar was such that I cannot now recommend him for reward. We counted the killed at ten persons, among whom one was a Zemindar of a neighbouring village. Two prisoners were also taken, who were presently hung. Soon after this, I was joined by the Nazir, Nuzumoodeen Hyder; the Tehseeldar of Etah, Daoure Alee; the Darogah of the Etah Jail, Shah Zaman Khan; the Peshkar of the Etah Tehseele, Ferok Shah Khan. With about ten of the Jail Nujeeb and some burkundazes they had left Etah, having met with no personal ill-treatment from the Rajah, but they had found him surrounded by a crowd of blackguards, whom he was unable, or did not care to control, and they had been in fear of being plundered themselves. I ascertained personally that the plunderers had entirely dispersed from the neighbourhood of Kasgunj, and then returned to Bilram. The Tehseeldar of Etah also came to Bilram with his family.
May 26th.—Considering it necessary in every respect to protect the town of Kasgunj from plunder, I left Bilram and established myself at the Tehseele of Kasgunj. We heard to-day of a dacoity committed in the town of Soron, in which the Thannahdar had been wounded. All night patrols, and constant watchfulness, were maintained. There were continual alarms through the night, but all groundless.

May 27th.—This day the Nujeebs were murmuring among themselves. The sowars too, as I was informed, were much discontented, saying it was not their duty to fight; all excepting the Jemadar, a sowar named Choonnee Singh, and the two sowars whose names were mentioned before. On the night watch I frequently found the sowar sentries absent from their post, and perceived a general tone of insubordination, and resistance to authority.

May 28th.—Under the circumstances above detailed, I determined to leave Kasgunj for Budaon, hoping to procure from Bareilly the assistance of some sowars of the Irregular Cavalry there stationed. I reached Suhawur by the evening.

May 29th.—I left Mr. Hall at Suhawur and reached Budaon, travelling on horseback. Despatched an express to the Commissioner of Rohilkund at Bareilly for assistance.

May 30th.—Answer returned from Mr. Alexander that absolutely no such assistance must be expected from Bareilly. I received a note from a zemindar of Etah, stating that Mr. Bramly had arrived at Putteelesee with a large body of troops.

June 1st.—I started for Putteelesee by daybreak. At starting we heard that the troops at Bareilly had mutinied. On reaching Putteelesee, I met Mr. Bramly, who was accompanied by sixty Irregular sowars on leave, belonging to different regiments, collected from the Furruckabad district, and under the command of an old Resildar, named Amir Khan. Mr. Bramly informed me of the tragedy in which Captain Fletcher Hayes and other officers had met their death at the hands of the 7th Irregular Cavalry. This was discouraging us: it greatly shook our faith in the loyalty of the sowars who accompanied Mr. Bramly.

June 2nd.—We were joined by Mr. Edwards, Collector of Budaon; Mr. Gibson, Customs Patrol, and Mr. Donnelly and his son, Indigo Planters, all from Budaon. They reported that the detachment of Native Infantry had plundered the treasury of Budaon, and that from the presence of some Irregular sowars, they inferred that their regiment had joined in the mutiny. I established communication by sowar dak with Futtehgurh. Mr. Edwards' Sikl servant begged his master not to place confidence in the Irregular sowars, that they had heard some of them speaking approvingly of the conduct of the murderers of Captain Hayes. I sent expresses to hasten Mr. Hall's journey from Suhawur to Putteelesee, two days before. All the Bunyahs of Gunj Doondwarra, a large and very wealthy village, had been utterly looted by connivance of the Zemindar, a Mahomedan. To-day a vast mob of Hindoos, Thakoors, Jat, and Aheers collected, and completely looted the Zemindar in revenge for his conduct. The sowar who brought a dak from Furruckabad, reported that he had escaped with great difficulty from the villagers on his road. In the night some of our Irregular sowars were found in the act of going off without previous leave.

June 3rd.—Joined early in the morning by Mr. Hall from Suhawur. News from across the Ganges that the King of the Delhi's Raj had been proclaimed on Budaon and Bareilly. We held a council, and agreed that to stay in the district without means of coercing the rebellions, or of protecting ourselves, was futile. We therefore resolved to make for Mynpoory, and from thence to be guided by
circumstances as to proceeding to Agra or not. About 4 P.M. I received an anonymous note from Kasgunj, stating that a large body of rebel sepoys had arrived at Kasgunj that morning, that they had enquired if any European were near, and would march to Putteelee early in the afternoon. This note was, as I afterwards ascertained, sent by Soondursun Choube of Kasgunj. We therefore lost no time in starting; marched all night, and arrived at a village called Roopdhunee, about three miles from the Grand Trunk Road at Kerowlee, belonging to Narain Singh, Aheer, about 3 A.M., in whose gurree we stayed till daybreak.

June 4th.—We sent out scouts to ascertain whether all was clear in front.

We turned back by rebel sowars and reach Putteelee. They returned with the disagreeable news that the road was occupied by a regiment of sowars, who had mutinied at Lucknow, and who were going to Delhi: the place we were in was too close to such neighbours. We therefore started back to Putteelee, narrowly escaping a body of sepoys on our way, who had encamped half-way between Kasgunj and Allygunj. We reached Putteelee by the evening.

June 5th.—This morning Mr. Edwards, and the other gentlemen who joined us from Budaon, determined on leaving us, and making for Nynce Tal across Budaon. They said we were altogether too large a party to go through the country undiscovered. They accordingly started for Kadergunge, where they however received such accounts of the state of the country, the other side of the Ganges, that they changed their minds and made for Futtehgurh, where they arrived after the loss of one of their party. We on our part dismissed the sowars, Mr. Bramly had brought, to their homes. I then determined to make for Agra by another route; we accordingly marched to Suhawur, the property of Chowdree Mahomed Alee Khan, where Mr. Hall had stayed before. I cannot say that his welcome was very cordial; but I feel indebted to him for the shelter he gave my servants and some property for many months. I understand he has since been shot for treason. Our party then consisted of Mr. Bramly, Mr. Hall, and myself, the Jemadar, and about ten sowars.

June 6th.—We started from Suhawur early, and crossing the Karee Nuddee, made for Maharra. On the way we halted at Manota, a gurree belonging to Mr. William Gardener, an English gentleman. There we ascertained that there was a large body of sepoys and sowars at Maharra. Mr. Gardener only two days before had been attacked by a body of sepoys, and had repulsed them, killing one. We therefore halted at Manota.

June 7th.—Remained at Manota to learn the movements of these sowars. Having ascertained their departure, we started for Awah, a strong fort, belonging to the Rajah of Awah. On the way being overtaken by a sandstorm, we got separated, and the Jemadar deserted, taking my gun with him. We were very hospitably received by the Rajah, and lodged in his fort.

June 8th and 9th.—After travelling all day and all night, we arrived at Agra early in the morning of the 9th of June.

I now have the honor to bring to the notice of Government the good services rendered by the following persons, Zemindars, and others:—

1. Jamshere Khan, Jemadar, was the first to warn me of the approach of the sepoys. It is true their intentions were not hostile, but that was by no means certain, when he gave me the information. He afterwards joined me at Bilram, and stayed with me the whole time I was in the district; but having met with an accident, which lamed him, went to his home, where he stayed in a disabled state till December, when he came to Agra, where he is now employed. During his absence with the sepoys, his whole property was stolen.
by another burkundsiz. I have entered his name in the list of those who have done good service to Government.

2. Lahoree Mull and Dilsookh Rae. Besides the shelter and protection so readily given to Mr. Hall and myself, Davur Alee, the Tehseeldar of Etah, found a secure asylum in their house from May to October, when the advance of the Nawab of Furruckabad's troops forced both the Tehseeldar and Dilsookh Rae to abandon their home and take refuge in Allygunj. Lahoree Mull was then just dead; but I trust that such reward as would have been deemed suitable for him, may be given to his son. Lahoree Mull was the elder brother, and though the important services afterwards rendered by Dilsookh Rae has a little thrown his into the shade, they should not be forgotten.

3. Davur Alee, Tehseeldar of Etah. This officer's behaviour I consider to have been of a nature meritng the marked approval of the Government. When he was forced to leave the Town of Etah, he stayed in the house of Lahoree Mull and Dilsookh Rae, about five miles from Kasgunj. His endeavours were constant and zealous to maintain order, and afford protection to that important town. In his efforts to do so, he subjected himself to great personal risk, and had several narrow escapes of his life. He kept up a constant communication between Agra, and by his means with those legally disposed in the adjacent parts; and gave much valuable information as to the movements of the rebels. He did not leave the district till the advance of the Nawab of Furruckabad forced himself and Dilsookh Rae to fall back on Allygunj.

4. Rugnath Dass, Tehseeldar of Allygunj. This officer likewise has distinguished himself. He is a Kayut by caste, and the last person apparently to deal with warlike arrangements; but after I had left the district he remained at his post, and succeeded in repulsing one if not two attacks on the Tehseelce from insurgent villagers. He remained thus till the advance of the Nawab from Furruckabad, when in despair at any other means of preserving the records of the Government, he took service with that rebel; at the same time informing me by an anonymous and mysterious note, of his conduct and the reasons which actuated him. Subsequently, I think about January, he was suspected by the Nawab of double-dealing, and put under restraint, from which he escaped with great difficulty to Agra. The exact circumstances of his conduct are better known to Mr. Cocks, who was Special Commissioner at Etah, than to me, none of them having occurred under my own observation.

5. Pirthee Sing, the Rajah of Awah, received us with as great respect and politeness as had he would have done before the disturbances. It is hardly necessary to observe further on this topic. The eminent services and unchanging loyalty of the Rajah are so well known, that the mere shelter of officers for a night can add but little to his claims on Government.

6. Choube Soondursun Dass, and his father Rugnath Dass, were wealthy Sowkars of Kasgunj. I had long been well acquainted with them. After my departure from Kasgunj they did their very best to maintain order and security in the town. Soondursun Dass sent me the anonymous letter alluded to in paragraph 10, dated 3rd June; and since my arrival at Agra, sent constant and accurate intelligence of the doings of the rebels at Futtehgur. They were both obliged to fly when the rebels reached Kasgunj, and came to Agra. The elder, Rugnath Dass, since died; but the younger, Soondursun Dass, has a strong claim on the Government for his unswerving loyalty.

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SKETCH OF OCCURRENCES IN THE ETAH DISTRICT DURING THE REBELLION OF 1857, BY C. J. DANIELL, ESQ., OFFG. JOINT-MAGISTRATE, ETAH, DATED CAMP PUTTEHGAUR, 22ND APRIL 1858.

On May 23rd, Mr. Phillipps, the Magistrate of the district, after the station of Etah had been plundered by the sepoys, left for Kasgunj. He stayed four or five days in Bilram with Dilsookh Rae, the Zemindar. Whilst
in Bilram, Rung Baladoor, Cheha of Dumber Sing, the Etah Rajah, plundered what was left by the sepoys in Etah, and the houses and public buildings with the records were at this time destroyed. He was assisted in this by the Sadhs of a village adjoining the station.

2. On June 20th Dumber Sing began to collect revenue, having set himself up as a Rajah independent of the British Government.

3. On June 16th Lal Ruttun Singh, Surburakar of the estates of the Rajah of Rujor, went to Suckeet, having usurped an illegal authority, and in all the parts of the country where the Rajah of Rujor's influence extended, collected revenue from the Zemindars and ryots, enforcing his claims by digging down the houses of those who refused payment, hanging them up by the heels, and various other coercive measures. Doorjun Sing, a brother of Tcj Sing, the Mynpoory Rajah, here came to his aid with nearly 500 followers, and in the middle of August they went to Manikpoor and burnt and plundered it.

4. In the end of July, Hussan Mirza came as Tehseeldar on the part of the Nawab of Furruckabad to Allygunj, and took the Tehseelee records under his protection. About the 15th of July Azeemoollah Khan, who had been dismissed from his office of Thannahdar by Mr. Bramly in June for refusing to stay in Puttealee, the head-quarters of his "illaqua," came there as Thannahdar for the Nawab of Futtehgurh. In August, Asad Ali Khan, the Zemindar of Saraval, came to Kasgunj, where he was appointed Tehseeldar by the Nawab of Furruckabad, and remained until the end of September, or beginning of November, when the force, under General Greathed, coming to Akrabad, frightened him away. He did not return again until the 2nd of December, when he inaugurated his entry by killing Gunseeam Dass, the blind Choube.

5. In the end of August, Mr. Cocks sent Daood Khan of Bheekumpoor to hold the neighbourhood of Kasgunj for the British Government. He came to Kasgunj, and from all that can be discovered now, appears to have made common cause with the Nawab's adherents, and deceived Mr. Cocks by pleading his inability to turn out Asad Ali Khan, who I really believe was considerably weaker in followers and influence than this double-dealing Khan of Bheekumpoor.

6. About the 18th of November Mr. Cocks, the Special Commissioner for Etah, came with a small force under Major Eld to Kutelba Ghat by way of making a demonstration. The Nawab of Furruckabad's force were at that time in occupation of Puttealee.

7. On 18th October, Mr. Churcher came into Etah as Deputy Collector to take charge of the district, and with the help of Tcj Sing, of Pithumpoor, and other loyal Zemindars, held his own for some weeks, occupying the Gar­hee of Dumber Sing, the Etah Rajah, who by this time began to see the folly of his defection in May. This Rajah died about the beginning of December.

8. On 18th November, Mr. Wilson, C.S., with Captain Makenzie of the 8th Irregulars, and a few foot soldiers under Captain Gowan, who had recently escaped from Rohilkund, marched to Soron, with a view of getting information of Christian refugees, who were known to waiting for an opportunity to escape from confinement in Rohilkund. The advance of the rebels from Puttealee to Suhawur obliged him to fall back upon Gunseeere; and it was from here that Choube Gunseeam Dass, a blind and paralytic pensioner of the British Government, who during the whole of the disturbances had shown the most unflinching fidelity to Government, and aided the district officers in Algygurh in every way that the wisdom of his advice, his personal influence, and personal courage could be employed in to the utmost of his ability, set out to get information of the rebels, and was murdered by them in Kasgunj, with
the connivance of men who pretended to be well-wishers of Government. Among his murderers, it has since transpired, were some of the retainers of Mahomed Daood Khan. This Rases of Bheekumpoor's duplicity and double-dealing have been but too evident to those who have had opportunities of seeing how he bore himself towards the Government servants at Alloogurh, and towards the inhabitants of Kasgunj and Suhawur.

9. On the 14th of December the force that Colonel Seaton of the 1st European Fusiliers had brought down from Delhi, engaged the enemy under Ismail Khan, son of Wulleedd Khan of Malagurh at Mulsee, near Junggeer; and after a brief action, entirely routed them, taking their three guns and killing about 150 or 200 of the enemy. They fled through Kasgunj to Suhawur, and our force marching to Kasgunj the next morning, they evacuated Suhawur and fled to Patteealée, where another action took place, in which they again lost all their artillery (thirteen guns), camp and baggage. The rebel force was completely dispersed, and the remains of it retreated to Furruckabad. Colonel Seaton returned to Kasgunj, and crossing the Kalee Nuddee, marched by Etat to Mynpoory, which was occupied after a brief resistance by the force about the 26th of December.

10. I received orders to take charge of the district about the 9th of January, and arrived in Etat on the 12th, since which time the usual official reports will furnish any information that may be desired on what has happened in the district.

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No. 11, dated Alloogurh, 17th November 1858.

From—W. J. Bramly, Esq., Magistrate and Collector of Alloogurh,
To—A. Coeks, Esq., Special Commissioner.

News of the Meerut outbreak reached Alloogurh May 12th. The troops then in the station were about 300 men of 9th Native Infantry, and headquarters of the Regiment, commanded by Major Eld. A period of the usual uncertainty and dismay occurred, but the troops appeared quiet and orderly. Beyond the burning of an empty bungalow, no overt act of dissatisfaction appeared to have been committed till the day of mutiny.

2. At that time Mr. Watson was Magistrate and Collector, assisted by the officers noted in the margin. What Mr. Watson's views were at that time I have no means of determining. No record remains here. They were probably in every detail communicated at the time to the late Lieutenant-Governor.

3. The troops on the 19th were reinforced by a detachment, and on the 20th by the remainder of the right wing of the 1st Gwalior Cavalry, under Captain Alexander. On the same day a Brahmin named Narsen, resident of a village close to Alloogurh, who had an uncle in Nujjeeb Jail Guard, made proposals of mutiny to two sepoys of the 9th Native Infantry, promising, on the part-of villagers, support in the work of plunder. These men informed their Commanding Officer, who directed them to seize him. He was accordingly apprehended by them, tried by a Native Court Martial, and by its sentence hung at the Collector's Cutcherry on evening of 20th, about sunset. The execution had hardly terminated when the 9th broke out into open mutiny. Their officers were allowed to escape. They and the Civil Officers, with some ladies, who were still in the station, were able to retire in safety to Hattrass, under escort of the 1st Gwalior Cavalry. The sepoys then set fire to the Collector's Cutcherry.

* A town on Agra road.
and Post Office, plundered the cash in both places, and left the station for Delhi by 9 or 10 p.m., without doing further mischief. From the Collector’s Treasury they carried off about three lakhs, and left the other four for the rabble.

4. On the next and few following days, the prisoners were set free by the Jail Guard; the large number of bullock train carts collected there, containing property to an unknown amount, also all the houses, the property of the Europeans, with the property contained in them, plundered,—the houses belonging to natives alone partially escaping with loss of wood-work, &c. In this work Russool Khan, khansamah to the Dak bungalow, and Meer Khan, mail coachman, distinguished themselves.

5. In the hurried departure of the European residents on evening of 20th, Messrs. Connor and Hine, clerks, and their families, were left behind. On the 22nd, in retreat to Agra, they had reached Sawamye in company with Mr. Nichterlein, an Indigo Planter, and his family, when they were attacked, stripped, and plundered by a party of Meewatcens and others. Mr. Nichterlein, junior, an Eurasian, was killed by them. In this state the party remained all day, when they were released and brought into Sasnee by a party of police and others sent by Punnaholl, a banker of Sasnee. On their arrival in Sasnee they were kindly treated by Punnaholl, and finally escorted to Hattrass by a party of the 1st Gwalior Cavalry under Lieutenant Cockburn.

6. On the 24th, about 100 mcn of the 1st Gwalior Cavalry mutinied at Hattrass, and went off to Delhi. Their officers, with those of 9th Native Infantry and Civil Officers, retired to Khundowlee.*

7. On May 26th, a body of volunteers, Europeans and Eurasians, above forty in number, arrived at Khundowlee, and went to Hattrass to effect the release of Messrs. Booth, Saunders and party in durance at Mulloee Factory. This was effected on the 29th. Allygurh was occupied by them the same day, Mr. Watson, the Magistrate, accompanying them. The volunteers, in varying numbers, continued with Mr. Watson till July 2nd, when that officer, on the advance of the Neemuch mutineers on Agra, and the mutiny of the two bodies of Gwalior troops stationed at Hattrass and Susnee, was compelled to leave the district.

8. However, to continue the narrative:—On Mr. Watson’s return some degree of order was established at Allygurh itself. The people made haste to throw out from their houses plundered property in great quantities. Doctor Clark, Postmaster, who accompanied Mr. Watson, was enabled at once to re-establish mail cart communication with Meerut, and maintain it for eight or nine days.

9. On June 1st, the volunteers made a successful attack on Khyr, a town fourteen miles west of Allygurh. One Rao Bhopal Sing, of an old Chohan Rajpoot family, had immediately after Mr. Watson’s departure from Allygurh, May 20th, gone to Khyr with a large following, deposed the Tehseeladar, and taken possession of the Tehseel building. Mr. Watson found him with but few attendants, and had him summarily hung. The party returned to Allygurh the same day.

10. Before the middle of the month the Chohans of the pargunnah, intent on revenge, called in the Jats to their help, attacked Khyr, plundered and destroyed nearly all the Government buildings, as well as the houses of the Bunyahs and Mahajuns. The Government Tehseel, a strong masonry quadrangular building on the Board’s plan, might have held out long, had the defenders had more heart and gunpowder. It was besieged for several days in vain, when the Tehseeladar and the rest of the officials, hopeless of relief, withdrew in the night.
11. During the first half of June, Mr. Watson and the volunteers continued at Allygurh and its neighbourhood, making demonstrations continually in different directions, with a view of preserving some semblance of order, and keeping open the communications between Agra and Meerut; they had continually to be on the alert, as well to avoid surprise by district rebels as also by rebel troops, who were passing continually up the Trunk Road en route to Delhi. On the 5th June, the 7th Cavalry mutineers passed through, and plundered or destroyed all the property the volunteers had collected.

12. From about the middle of June the Magistrate, with the volunteers, made the ruined Indigo Factory Mudroc, situated about seven miles from Allygurh on the Agra road, their head-quarters. About the same time Major Burtle took up a position at Sassee, seven miles in rear of Mudroc, with a force of cavalry, guns, and I believe infantry. Captain Alexander with his men remained at Hattrass, and did good service on several occasions.

13. About June 21st, the Lieutenant-Governor recalled most of the volunteers to Agra; there then remained with Mr. Watson the eleven gentlemen noted in the margin.

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<tr>
<th>Mr. Hind.</th>
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<tr>
<td>S. Clark, Esq., Postmaster.</td>
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<td>J. O. Tandy, Esq.</td>
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<td>P. Saunders, Esq.</td>
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14. On June 30th, 2 P.M., Mr. Watson and party still at Mudroc; information was sent them by the Deputy Postmaster of Allygurh, that the Mewatees and other Mahomedans of the City Coel had raised a green flag, and proposed to attack Mr. Watson's party in large numbers. The news was shortly after confirmed by the approach of the attacking party, 500 to 1,000 strong. This party had boastfully declared they would fix the heads of the Europeans on the city gates before night; they fled however at the first charge of the twelve gentlemen above mentioned, and lost some fourteen of their party killed. The small party of Nujjees and sowars with Mr. Watson were of no use, and fired in the air. It is credibly said that the villagers plundered this formidable body of "Jehadees" on their retreat to Coel.

15. With the City of Coel in his front, and Major Burtle's force at Sassee in a mutinous state in his rear, Mr. Watson, July 1st, thought best to retire to Iglas, where he was informed next day of the mutiny of the Gwalior troops at both Hattrass and Sassee. Mr. Watson and party then left for Agra.

16. I should have mentioned above, that a few days before their mutiny Major Burtle's force proceeded to Iglas, to protect the Tehseel building threatened by a large body of Jats of that pergunnah. These Jats, in their stupidity, absolutely thought to possess themselves of Captain Pearson's battery, and advanced against Major Burtle with that view. A shower of rain put their "puleetahs;" Major Burtle's sowars charged, utterly overthrew and scattered them in all directions.

17. I wish here to remark on the good services performed by the Agra volunteers, and especially by the body of gentlemen who stood by Mr. Watson till the last. The Post Office authorities were thus enabled to keep open communication with Meerut. It delayed the establishment of a rebel Government in Coel, so that no time was left for its organization, before Mr. Cocks, with Major Montgomery's force, appeared on the scene in August. Besides, the moral effect of a small body of Europeans living in the open field; marching, halting, and attacking when they pleased, must have had a good effect on the population, and shown them how vastly inferior they were to the men they were attempting to crush.

18. On Mr. Watson's departure in beginning of July, a punch was formed to preserve order, and save the city from plunder by the Mewatees, butchers,
and other low Mahomedans. One Nusseem-oollah, a Wakeel of the Judge’s Court, took umbrage at his exclusion from the Punchayat, and invited Mahomed Ghous Khan to come to Coel. With Nusseem-oollah was Neyaz Ahmed, Zillah Visitor, both able men. Mahomed Ghous Khan, a Zemindar of Secundra Rao, of this district, arrived July 15th, and began to entertain men, with the view of usurping power. The Punchayat however refused to abdicate, whereupon Ghous Khan and Nusseem-oollah repaired to Wuleedad Khan, of Malagurh (who derived his title of “Soobah” from the King at Delhi), who granted a Sunnud of “Naib Soobahship.”

19. Armed with this they returned, declared their titles, and were allowed to assume power.—Nusseem-oollah became Ghous Khan’s Naib, Mahboob Khan was created Tehseeldar, and Hussun Khan, Cotwal. A large number of men were enrolled to support the new power. Many of the police chuprasies and Jail guard took service, and he was supported generally by all the Mahomedans of the town. Ghous Khan had but little time in which to consolidate his power. He had no money beyond what he could obtain by plunder, nor artillery. He had little authority beyond the limits of the town. He collected no land revenue.

20. On August 20th, Mr. Cocks, with a force under Major Montgomery, was sent from Agra to succour Hattrass, supposed to be threatened by Ghous Khan. At this time Hattrass was the only town and Tehseel in which British authority could be said to exist. This town lies on the direct road from Agra to Allygurh, twenty miles distant from the former. Its inhabitants, for the most part wealthy Hindu traders, had with the assistance of the neighbouring Jat Rajah of Moorsan, Tekum Sing, and also Thakoor Gobind Sing (now Rajah), been able to preserve order in the town, and ward off every threatened attack from plunderers. But the mainstay of Hattrass was the blind ex-Tehseeldar of that place, Choube Ghunsam Doss, who on many occasions proved himself a most wise, brave, and zealous partisan of Government.

21. Major Montgomery’s force occupied Hattrass 21st August, and advanced on the morning of August 24th to attack the rebel force, which under Ghous Khan and Moulavee Abdool Juleel, &c., was assembled at Maun Sing’s garden near Coel. The Moulavee had lately arrived in Coel from Chitaree, and been most active and zealous in stirring up the religious bigotry of the Mahomedans; mainly through him were the Mahomedans encouraged to meet the British force. As is well known, the rebels were defeated, and the Moulavee himself killed. All the Mahomedans fled the city.

22. For the reasons stated in the despatch, the city was not occupied till the 28th. Mr. Cocks, in his advance, had been joined by Thakoor Gobind Sing, the followers of Rajah Tekum Sing and other friendly persons. It was considered best to leave the City of Coel in charge of Thakoor Gobind Sing, who agreed to undertake the duty with such forces as he could raise, and that Major Montgomery’s force should retire on Hattrass. This was carried out September 4th. With Thakoor Gobind Sing was associated a Council, Aftab Baisee, a wary and experienced old Tehseeldar, well acquainted with the district, was left to fill that post. All the Tehseeldarees were at this time re-occupied, though the authority of the officers was necessarily but weakly established.

23. This arrangement answered very well till September 25th, when Nusseem-oollah, at the head of a Mahomedan rabble, surprised the Thakoor, and turned him out of the city. On the same day (September 25th) the Mahomedan rabble of Atrowlee rose and murdered the Tehseeldar, Mahomed Alee. They attacked the Tehseel building, but were unable to take it.

24. September 26th.—Major Montgomery’s small force was obliged to fall back from Hattrass in the direction of Agra, to avoid the very large force of
rebels in retreat from Delhi via Muttra, which threatened Hatrass. This body of rebels eventually arrived at Hatrass October 3rd, and Secundra Bay on 4th, where they halted on 5th, and marched on 6th, while Colonel Greetham's Column arrived at Coel on 5th, and at Akbarbad on 6th (one march from Secundra Rao), and then proceeded to Agra, where it arrived October 10th.

25. After the action of the 10th at Agra, Coel was speedily re-occupied on the 19th by a force of 150 Europeans and two guns under Major Eld, Mr. Cocks again being deputed as Special Commissioner and myself as Magistrate. The old fort of Allygurh was cleared up and taken possession of. This fort, which had cost Lord Lake so severe a struggle in 1803, and which in the old times of confidence and security had been left to the care of a Noik and four sepoyos, was now found to be a valuable possession.

26. With its aid the above small force and 100 Sikhs kept the whole district in check with ease. The police at the different Tehseel and Thannah posts were strengthened by levies of horse and foot raised within the district; for these purposes any number of men required were available. The City of Coel, being two miles from the fort, was held by Thakoor Gobind Singh: a strong force of police was necessary there to give confidence to the people, who had been so often plundered by friends as well as foes.

27. The collection of the revenue proceeded steadily, with the returning confidence in the stability of our Government. Payment, except in a very few instances, was withheld only where there was really inability to pay.

28. During the month of November we were continually harassed by flying parties of rebels from across the Jumna going eastwards; but these did little or no harm in their passage, though they caused a great feeling of insecurity at our police and revenue posts. It was then felt of what consequence it was that our police posts should be of a defensible character, and guarded by a few trained men, who would not run at the first summons of an enemy. As it was, one could not but feel that they were completely at the mercy of the smallest bodies of the enemy; the mere cry of "baghees" was enough to put to flight the raw police levies.

29. In December we were threatened by a body of the Fatehghur rebels, who advancing by Ullegunge, Putteealee, Sahawur, and Kasgunge, gave out their intention of annexing the country up to Coel. It took them long however to occupy the above ground; their extreme slowness and want of enterprise lost them their opportunity. By December 11th, Colonel Seton's Column arrived at Allygurh, and proceeded by regular marches towards Kasgunge. On the morning of 14th December Colonel Seton having made his march found the enemy close by, marching to attack him; the result is known. It is sometimes said that our information of the enemy's movements is bad, but it would be difficult to match the gross blunder of the enemy on this occasion.

30. After Colonel Seton's triumphant march via Kasgunge and Putteealee to Mynpoory, this part of the Doab was thoroughly cleared of the enemy. Our only danger then was from the Rohilkhund side. For our escape from inroad by the swarms of irregular cavalry in Rohilkhund, we must thank the want of enterprise of the enemy; for even after the occupation of Fatehghur, the whole river face between it and Allygurh was at his mercy. In March General Penny's force marched down and took up a position at Putteealee and afforded some show of protection.

31. In further explanation of the parties in this district, who have done good service to Government, I beg to append certain paragraphs of a letter addressed to Mr. Cocks, Special Commissioner.

† No. 54 dated 4th May 1858.
32. Two persons who particularly distinguished themselves, Choube and Mahomed Ali, both of whom lost their lives in the service of Government, are not mentioned in my letter. One I never saw; the other I knew but slightly. Mr. Cocks himself reported their service to Government, as also those of Choube Jaikisen Doss and Dhunput Rai, brothers of the former. Punnah Lall of Sasnee (vide paragraph 5 of this letter), Hotee Lall, a leading banker of Hattrass, have also been reported by Mr. Cocks for good service.

33. Events.—The old Rajpoot and Jat feud raged strongly in the western parts of this district, and towards Saidabad in the Mutra district, and was only stopped by the fall of Delhi. The feeling of animosity between Hindus and Mahomedans was also generally bitter in the towns of this district, especially after the excesses of Nusseem-oollah, and the elevation by us of Thakoor Gobind Singh.

34. Behaviour of Government Officers.—No officer of Government above the rank of Jemadar of Police has been proved guilty of any overt act of rebellion, excepting the Zilah Visitor and Jail Darogah.

35. Behaviour of people to Christians generally.—Only one Christian in this district was murdered. His name was Nichterlein, mentioned in paragraph 5. "The whole party was stripped and plundered, and might, if not rescued, have been murdered; but again they were rescued by natives, and entirely at the suggestion of natives. Mr. Hoggan and family, five persons, were kept concealed in a Bhungee's house at Coel, for six days after the departure of the European residents. Serjeant Ryan, of the Nanow Toll bar, was plundered and stripped by villagers; but the Zemindar, a small man, the owner of but one village, though certainly a man well known for humanity, made the plunderers disgorge, and sent the Serjeant safe into Hattrass. At the same time little trust can be placed in the humanity of the lower classes, whether Hindus or Mahomedans. They have, I think, proved themselves little better than savages. All that can be said, is, that they treat us not worse, perhaps better, than they treated one another.

36. Of Indigo Factories.—The property of Europeans; one large one was plundered and burnt by the villagers, i.e., Mr. Nichterlein's, and three others were plundered by mutineer troops; the other considerable ones were saved by the Zemindars, who had the sense to perceive that their destruction would benefit no one.

37. Behaviour of people towards Government Officers.—The records of the Suffurd Gutcherry, and those of four out of eight Tehselds, were destroyed; of these, one act of destruction only was purely the work of villagers, i.e., the case of Khyr above mentioned, paragraph 9. In the other cases the populace took a share after order had been first upset, or plunder commenced by mutineer troops. As elsewhere, the people plundered one another freely. Two towns of importance were plundered,—Khyr to the amount of one lakh of rupees, and Hurdooah Gunge, four lakhs; these estimates are moderate. Coel also was a good deal plundered by Mewatees, &c., of the town, also by passing rebel troops, by Nusseem-oollah during his eleven days' reign, also by our own troops.

38. The attack on Mr. Watson at Mudroc by the Coel Mahomedans, June 30th, and the attack of the Jats on Major Burlton at Iglash, have been already mentioned. The rise of the Mahomedan Zemindars, and other inhabitants of Atrowell, September 25th (vide paragraph 23), and the murder of Mahomed Ali, Tehseldar, was a case of the worst description. The influential inhabitants, chiefly converted Mahomedans of old, bore turbulent character. During the disturbed months they took the management of the town into their own hands. Early in September, Mahomed Ali was deputed by Mr. Cocks as Joint-Magistrate, with Daood Khan as Nazim; but the Zemindars refused to acknowledge him, and on September 25th, when the Mahomedans (at the time unaware of the fall of Delhi) broke out into open
rebellion; he unfortunately left the Tehseel building, and was murdered. I never saw him, but I have little doubt that Government had a better servant.

39. The behaviour of Ghaus Khan, of Secundra Rao, and of the Mahomedans of CoCt, has been mentioned in paragraph 21. The only other case of marked rebellion among men of consideration is that of Mungul Sing and Mahatb Sing, Rajpoot Zemindars of Akabab, who after the plunder of Akabab Tehseel treasury by sepoys, permitted the destruction of the records by their own people, refused all aid to the Tehseeeldar, and generally lived a life of open rebellion.

40. Though aid in the struggle has been in many instances rendered us by the natives, especially by the Hindoos, after they had received a foretaste of a Mahomedan Government, still their general attitude must be characterized as apathetic. The large number of persons who had so much to gain from the overthrow of our Government were content to annex their lost estates, and await the result of the struggle.

41. That the people plundered, when they suddenly found authority overthrown by the mutinous troops, and anarchy ready made for them, was natural. What people would have done otherwise? But to take an active part, and assist the mutineers, the small Mahomedan section excepted, they showed in this district little desire. Much as they love plunder, they love life and security more.

42. And the same with the sepoys. A hard contest, even though successful, formed no part of their programme. The treacherous and easy slaughter of their officers and other Europeans, accompanied with the certain plunder of Treasuries,—the wiping out of debts, and the prospect of a new regime, in which they must necessarily play a leading part, was the pleasing picture they had before them, when they shouted "Deen! Deen!" The storming of forts and intrenchments, though held by a few Europeans, and they worn and exhausted, was a service of danger to meet, which there was no sense of duty or spirit or patriotism,—no sense of injuries to be avenged—to spur them on. In such a cause they could not meet death.

43. The plundered villages will soon recover. The only other result of the mutiny, nearly affecting the people, that I can observe, is that money is scarcer, and zemindars especially have to pay higher interest for accommodation,—a fit retribution on them for plundering the bankers.

APPENDIX A.

Copy of paragraphs of letter No. 54, dated 4th May 1858, from W. J. Bramly, Esq., Collector and Magistrate, Allygurh, to A. Coeks, Esq., late Special Commissioner of Allygurh, Mynpoory.

Paragraph 3. First of all I would mention Thakoor Gobind Sing, Jat, son of Thakoor Dyaram, former Talookdar of Hattrass. Dyaram's history is well known. Up to 1816 he exercised almost an independent rule within the Fergunah of Hattrass. His misconduct then brought down upon him a British force. His fort was taken, and his property confiscated. Dyaram himself was pardoned, and pensioned upon Rupees 1,000 monthly. His son, Gobind, now receives Rupees 750, and other relatives Rupees 225, from Government.

4. With such antecedents, it would perhaps have been no matter of surprise if Thakoor Gobind Sing had, on the occurrence of the mutiny, like others in his situation, taken part against the Government. However, his conduct has been eminently loyal. I am not aware that he at any time wavered.

5. On the first call of the Magistrate and Collector of Muttra, he came with his personal followers and servants to the assistance of that gentleman, and was shortly afterwards sent for by Mr. Watson, then Magistrate and Col-
lector in his district. He had remained throughout the disturbed period, ready to perform any service within his power. After Mr. Watson's final departure for Agra, about 3rd July, Gobind Sing, with his followers, remained at or in the neighbourhood of Hattrass. That this very important town was saved from plunder by the surrounding population, is, in a great measure, due to him. When you were deputed into this district in August last, with a force under Major Montgomery, Gobind Sing accompanied you in your advance on Coel; and was present with his men in the action fought with the rebel followers of Muhammad Ghous Khan, at Maun's Bagh, 24th August. On the flight of the rebel Governor of Coel and his people, Gobind Sing was put in charge of the town of Coel, and allowed to raise a body of men for this service. He held the town of Coel, assisted in collecting revenue, and recovering plundered property till 25th September, when he was surprised by a body of Mahomedan rabble under Nusseem-oolla, and forced to leave the town, with some loss of men. This service was one, I presume, of very considerable danger. There he was surrounded by a low and incensed Mahomedan population, and on the high road of retreat of the Delhi rebels, while the support of Major Montgomery's force at Hattrass was distant, liable itself to be called away on any exigency occurring at Agra.

On the re-occupation of the Allygurh district, till the present time, Gobind Sing has held his post in the city. By his good example he has rendered most important aid in the work of restoring order in the district. His followers have at all times been ready for any service, and have been extremely useful in police duties, and in escorting treasure to Agra and Boolundshaheer, in guarding Ghats, and watching the advance of rebels,--in performing, indeed, the duties of regular troops.

8. Rundheer Sing, nephew of Gobind Sing. This man was with Gobind Sing throughout, always at his command. He was in action on August 24th, and behaved well.

9. Khurruk Sing, of Beswan, a relation of Gobind Sing's, remained with him throughout the disturbances, and behaved remarkably well on August 24th, when he received both a sword and bullet wound.

10. Kesree Sing, also a nephew of Gobind Sing. His services have not been so conspicuous; but he is deserving, I understand from you, of notice.

11. Bhurth Sing, Jat (tribe Dagur), of Nugla Dagur, happened to be at Coel at commencement of disturbances, and at once joined Mr. Watson, and remained with him till that officer retired to Agra, to which place he escorted him. He assisted Choube Ghunsyam Doss in keeping order at Hattrass, and brought off treasure, Rupees 3,300, from Hattrass Telseedaree, threatened by retreating rebels from Delhi, and while doing so was pursued by the rebels.

12. Duryou Sing, Jat, of Jowan. This man has done good service also. In September last he escorted Mr. W. Gardner and family from Minota, near Kasgungte, to Hattrass, a hazardous enterprise. He has also on other occasions made himself highly useful.

13. Shib Sing, Jat, of Pisawah, has shown his loyal feeling very decidedly. He has been at all times ready to assist me with all the men at his disposal. Many of Gobind Sing's best men were Shib Sing's followers.

14. Bulrum Sing, Jat, of Kajrot, has shown decided loyalty.

15. Nund Kishore, Brahmin, Hattrass. This man and his family have been old servants of Thakoor Gobind Sing and his family. Throughout the disturbances no one has behaved better than Bukshee Nundkishore. He has been paymaster to Gobind Sing's forces, and in all matters his chief manager, and councillor. His services have been most valuable.

16. Heera Sing, of Beerpoo, Jadon Rajpoot.

17. Chunmun Sing, of Goobanah, Jadon Rajpoot.

18. Bulwunt Sing, of Sornah, Jadon Rajpoot.
Nos. 1 and 2 are own brothers. No. 3, a nephew. These men are now considerable landholders; but their property, though some of it was acquired by their ancestors, has been all obtained from the surrounding Chohan Rajpoots, and most of it during our rule. Consequently they lost it all at the first outbreak, and had good reason to be loyal. They were, I understand, of extensive assistance to you in sending information of the movements of rebels, and assisting us as far as lay in their power.

19. Raja Tekum Sing, of Moorsun (Jat). The Raja has throughout assisted the authorities to the utmost of his power, by obtaining intelligence, watching rebels, keeping the peace in his own villages. Tekum Sing is nearly connected with Thakoor Gobind Sing.

20. Tej Sing and Jowahir Sing, Poorer Rajpoots, of Akerabad. They possess, with other landed property in their own right, half of village Akerabad; the other half was owned by Mungul and Mehtab Sing, rebels, who were killed at Akerabad by a portion of Colonel Greated's Column in October last. Failing direct heirs to Mungul and Mehtab, Tej and Jowahir would be their successors. Both men have behaved well;—Tej Sing in refusing to join his brethren, Mungul and Mehtab, in their rebellious proceedings, or to send assistance to Mahomed Ghous Khan, the rebel Governor of Coel;—Jowahir Sing was an officer in the 17th Irregular Cavalry, and exerted his influence to the utmost in keeping the men loyal. His late Commanding Officer had the highest opinion of him.

21. Koondun Sing, of Naice, Pergunnah Secundra Rao, also a Poorer Rajpoot. Poorers are very strong in this pargannah, but a great many of their estates have passed into other hands. Koondun Sing's estates are small, but his influence in his clan is great. His presence in the neighbourhood of Secundra Rao continually served as a check to the Mahomedan population of that town, who never dared to do any overt act of rebellion without the help and screen of rebel troops, on whom they could afterwards throw the blame. During the month of June, and a portion of July, the Tehseeldar, though his functions were entirely in abeyance still, was allowed to live in the town without molestation. During this time the only two men who visited him, or showed him any countenance, were Koondun Sing, and Devee Pershaud, Bunya. After the departure of Mr. Watson for Agra, the Tehseeldar being no longer safe in the town, took shelter with Koondun Sing. In the end of August, after the defeat of Ghous Khan's followers near Coel, Koondun Sing having been made by you Nazim of the pargannah, entered the town of Secundra Rao with a body of some 1,500 of his own followers, reinstated the Tehseeldar, and maintained him in that position till our authority was thoroughly established. I have always heard Koondun Sing well spoken of as an upright man. He is one of the best specimens of the home-bred, untravelled Rajpoot I have ever met.

22. Devee Pershaud, Bunya of Secundra Rao. I mention him next as he is mentioned in connection with Koondun Sing. He sent information to Agra on several occasions; he gave information to the Tehseeldar of Secundra, while in a state of semi-imprisonment in the month of June, and helped to escort him on one or two occasions as far as his means would allow. In consequence of his conduct his house was pointed out to the rebel troops, when they visited Secundra, and plundered; but to no great amount.

23. Motee Sing, of Abk, Pergunnah Coel; a Chohan Rajpoot, and a man of acknowledged courage and activity. At the call of Choube Ghunsyam Doss, in December last, he followed that officer to Kaungunge with forty to fifty sowars of his own following, when that place was threatened by the rebels from Futtehgurh. Ghunsyam Doss was surprised and killed by the rebels. With him fell many of his men, and among them Motee Sing.

24. Dowlut Sing, a follower of Motee Sing's, was also killed.

25. Basit Acee, and the rest of the Saiyud Zemindars of Julalee, preserved order within their bounds, which are extensive, and protected the Kusbah from plunder.
26. **Pundit Aftobrae**, Cashmeere, is an old servant of Government in this and other districts, was receiving a pension at time of mutiny, but at the end of August was selected by you for the most responsible post of Tehsildar of Coel. His duties have necessarily been most arduous, and at times involving him in considerable personal risk. The duties of collecting revenue, supplying troops with food and carriage, apprehending rebels, and keeping up a perpetual watch upon the movements of the enemy near home and abroad, have afforded an ample field for the display of his industry and acuteness. I know no one in the district who could have filled his place so well.

27. **Sawunt Sing**, of Bissanah, Gahlot Rajpoot. This village is on the boundary of Pergannah Hattrass, and of Saidabad in Muttra District. In the beginning of the disturbances the neighbouring Jats threatened Saidabad, and the people applied to Sawunt Sing, as a leader of the Rajpoots in those parts, for help. Sawunt Sing, mindful of the old Jat and Rajpoot feuds, responded, and came to Saidabad with a large body of men, and fought the Jats for several days, eventually without success. The Jats in revenge attacked his village in force, burnt it, and killed several of his men. The Tehsildars of Saidabad and Hattrass speak most highly of Sawunt Sing.

29. **Mahomed Alee Khan**, of Chitaree, in the Boolundshahur District, also possessing estates in this district, is entitled to the thanks of Government. For some months he lent a body of fifty sowars to assist the authorities in this district. Muzhar Alee Khan, who commanded, and most of his men, have taken service with Captain Murray, the former obtaining a Ressaldarship.* Both deserve notice.

30. **Netram**, Brahmin, Agent to Rance of Bijehgurh, is also entitled to the thanks of Government for having preserved the peace to the utmost of his power, and for supplying troops.

31. **Bishunloll**, Kayeth, Nazir of the Magistrate’s Court, went in disguise to the rebel camp at Muttra in September last,† and sent daily reports to yourself I understand.

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**APPENDIX B.**

No. 922, dated Allahabad, 30th July 1858.

From—**Lieutenant W. H. Greatheed**, Deputy Consulting Engineer to Government,

To—**William Muir**, Esq., Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces.

I have the honor to avail myself of your invitation to submit, for the information of the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General, a report of the services of the Agra Volunteer Horse in their first days; and to solicit His Lordship’s favorable consideration of such claim as those services may be held to establish to the honor of recommendation for the War Medal.

On the 25th May 1857, Mr. Paterson Saunders brought information to the Hon’ble Mr. J. Colvin, that a party of six or seven Englishmen, with several women and children, who had been some days beleaguered in the Factory of Mullroe, sixteen miles east of Hattrass, were in imminent danger of being destroyed on failure of food and ammunition.

The Hon’ble the Lieutenant-Governor was unable to afford any assistance; for the Blurpore lèvies had already failed,—the men of Captain Pearson’s Gwalior battery could not be moved,—the Maharaja Scindiah’s body-guard declared themselves unable to cross the Jumna,—and the remnant of the squadron of Captain Alexander (Shore’s) first Gwalior Cavalry, from which eighty men had just defiantly gone off to Delhi, in open day, declined to advance beyond Hattrass without Europeans and guns.

† Remaining there ten days or so.
It was considered inexpedient to divest Agra of any portion of the third European Regiment, or Captain D'Oyly's battery.

On learning the state of affairs, Mr. Paterson Saunders expressed his belief that, if supported by Mr. Colvin's authority, he could raise a body of thirty or forty European horse, sufficient to effect the rescue of the people at Mullooe.

The necessary authority was immediately given, and a Circular issued by order of the Lieutenant-Governor, inviting all classes to join, on the understanding that they were liable to be kept under arms a month, and to be called upon for such service as might be requisite.

The call was answered with spirit: arms were furnished from the arsenal, horses were purchased at the expense of Government for such volunteers as required them, and on that very evening thirty-seven volunteers rode out of Agra on the way to Hattrass.

Next day, by Mr. Colvin's order, I overtook the party and assumed command, with instructions, after relieving Mullooe, to re-occupy Allygurh if possible, and maintain the Magistrate there as long as I could.

At Hattrass we were joined by a party of first Gwalior Cavalry under Lieutenant Cockburn, who accompanied us to Mullooe, which was relieved on the 27th without opposition.

Lieutenant Cockburn's party returned to Hattrass according to their orders; the volunteers, recruited by three of the Mullooe party, advanced to Allygurh, and re-occupied it, May 28th, without opposition.

From that day to the 2nd June, when I left the volunteers, they were employed in watching the approaches to Allygurh, and in visiting neighbouring villages, whose inhabitants had taken an active part in the plunder of the station. On the 1st June the force, accompanied by Captain Stewart, 9th Native Infantry, and Dr. Clarke, suddenly moved seventeen miles to Khyr, where a Thakoor, Rao Bhowanee Sing, had deposed the Tehseeldar, and proclaimed his independence.

Whilst the town of Khyr was being surrounded by videttes, to prevent the rebel Chief's escape, the late Mr. Watson, Magistrate of Allygurh, with a few of the volunteers, gallantly rode straight through the town to the Tehseeleer, where Bhopal Sing was surprised and captured, with sixteen attendants.

On the 2nd June I made over command, by the Lieutenant-Governor's orders, to Captain Stewart, of the 9th Native Infantry, and my connexion with the volunteers ceased.

During the eight days, above described, the Agra horse were never under fire; but they came forward in the hour of greatest need, and when no troops were available, performed services considered important at the time, which were cordially acknowledged by the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor.

I do myself the honor of appending a list of the troop as it stood on the 30th May, and recommending its members to the protection of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General.

AGRA VOLUNTEER HORSE.

Lieutenant W. H. Greathed, A.D.O., Commanding,

1. Mr. Saunders ... Second in Command.
2. " Williams ... " Officers.
3. " Cocks ... "
4. " Page ... "
5. " Harington ... "
6. " Tandy ... "
APPENDIX C.

Dated Camp Landour, 5th October 1858.

From—A. COCKS, Esq., Special Commissioner,
To—WILLIAM MUIR, Esq., Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces.

I have the honor to acknowledge your letter No. 624, dated the 12th August 1858, and to furnish a continuation of the proceedings of the Allygurh Volunteer Horse.

2. After Captain Greathed's departure, Captain Donald Stewart, now Assistant Adjutant-General, assumed command; but he was shortly afterwards deputed to take despatches to Delhi, and was succeeded by Mr. Paterson Saunders.

3. This gentleman gave great satisfaction, both to the volunteers themselves as well as to the district authorities; he set an excellent example of self-denying patience, never-failing energy, and daring courage.

4. Until about the middle of June, our party was composed of the volunteers (40 in number) mentioned by Captain Greathed. It was sufficiently strong to overawe the Mahomedan population of the town of Coel, as well as the refractory villages, which were ever ready to take advantage of the state of anarchy.

5. On several occasions we were obliged to saddle at a moment's warning, and descend on these villagers, who met us with matchlocks, swords, and bludgeons, but were, on every occasion, well punished.

6. Our greatest danger, however, arose from the frequent arrival at Coel of large bands of mutineers from Oude and the districts which had been abandoned.

7. When we felt unable to face these in the open field, we occasionally harassed their movements, by firing at their advanced guards, and then making an orderly retreat, to some position, capable in a certain measure of defence.

8. We were never attacked by these parties, owing to their anxiety to reach Delhi; but the excitement was great, and from this cause, as well as from the desponding reports from Agra, and the inevitable mutiny which was about to occur amongst the Gwalior troops at Hattrass, the majority of the volunteers became disgusted, and obtained permission to return to their families and homes.
9. Our military duties were very heavy; not a night passed but we were
told off for either sentry or patrol; and during the day, when not employed on
some expedition, we were without the convenience or even necessaries of life;
and it was considered a luxury to get a thatch or tree to sleep under.

10. I consider myself bound to remark here that, so long as the volun­
teers remained in the district, their conduct was soldier-like and creditable,
and many displayed a dashing courage, which was afterwards memorably
proved at Agra on the 5th of July, and at Allygurh on the 24th of August.

11. I would especially bring to the notice of the Right Hon'ble the
Governor-General, the names of Messrs. Doyle, Blackburne, Catania, White,
Carrol, Polites, and O'Connor afterwards killed. No veteran dragoons could
have shown greater contempt for danger, or more anxiety to press to the
front, when an enemy was to be seen. Mr. Page, now Sub-Adjutant of Meade's
Horse, was very useful as a drill instructor, and in teaching the rudiments of
cavalry manœuvres.

12. It is now my pleasing duty to name the few (ten in number) who
remained with Messrs. Watson and Outram to the last. Many of them were
totally disconnected with Government, and only impelled by an Englishman's
dislike to desert a countryman. They remained by Mr. Watson to the last.

1. Mr. Burkingyoung... Music seller.
2. Mr. Castle, of Messrs. Dalziel
   and Co.'s, Merchant.
3. S. Clarke... Civil Surgeon.
4. A. Cocks... Civil Service.
5. H. Harington... Electric Telegraph Department.
6. Hinde... Railway.
7. Marsh... Cadets.
8. Olivant... Planters.
9. Saunders... Planters.
10. Tandy... Planters.

13. Our numbers being thus reduced to ten, it was considered expedi­
ten to take up a stronger position, capable in some degree of defence against
a mob.

14. This was the compound of an Indizo Planter, at a place called
Mudraek, about six miles from the town of Coel on one side, and the same
distance from Hattrass on the other. From this point we were in the habit of
visiting the towns, and keeping a sharp look-out after the Gwalior troops at
Hattrass, who were daily expected to mutiny; and so passed the weary month
of June, the monotony of our existence being occasionally broken by the
arrival of a cossid from Lucknow, Fattebgurh, or Mynpoory, giving details
of a fresh mutiny, and sometimes of a party of Native troops, who had escaped
from their mutinous brethren, and reported the murder of their officers.

15. We daily felt that our position was getting less tenable. A Jehad
had been preached at the mosque at Coel.

16. The Gwalior troopers had positively refused to obey their officers,
and on the afternoon of the 2nd of July, numerous messengers came in to report
that the whole population of Mahomedians and budmashes (loose characters)
of the town were in daily communication with the Gwalior troops, the object
being to surround Mudrack, and annihilate our little party. Fifteenth;—On
that date at 3. P.M. we sat down to our mess dinner. In the midst of it,
we heard the buzz of an enraged populace;—soon tom-toms were beating, flags
flying, and country swarming with white clothes,—each Government Chowkee
in a blaze added to the excitement of the scene.

17. Scarcely a word was spoken, but each seemed to understand his
neighbour's thoughts, saddled his horse, and drew his sword. We rode forth,
the gallant Watson at our head. On reaching the road, we were met by a salute
from a hundred matchlocks;—a hundred more were aimed, but missed fire,
owing to the damp state of the atmosphere. "Charge!" was the order, and well was it obeyed. Stirrup to stirrup, and man to man, we dashed through the mass of cowards, scattering them like so many sheep, and not stopping till nearly fifteen corpses remained as trophies of our victory. Watson was wounded, as was his horse, and two or three got contusions.

18. When we charged, I believe not one expected to have come back alive; and when darkness compelled our return, it was with feelings of intense satisfaction and thankfulness that we finished our repast, and talked over our escapes and adventures.

19. On the 2nd, the Gwalior troops broke out into open mutiny, and their officers were obliged to fly into Agra.

20. We also felt there was nothing further to be done, and accordingly steering clear of Hattrass, we rode in the broiling sun fifty miles, and reached Agra in time to take part in the battle of the 5th of July; where, I may be permitted to remark, the Allygurh Volunteers did their duty. Out of forty, six were killed, six wounded, and ten horses killed or lost.

21. In conclusion, I would pay a short tribute to the devotion to his duty, and chivalrous courage of the late Mr. W. Watson. Naturally of weak constitution, he exerted his powers, both mental and physical, to such a degree, that, on reaching Agra, he was taken with cholera, and died. I fully believe he had, from the commencement of the outbreak, made up his mind to be killed, or die in the defence of the district, in which he took so much interest.


No. 406, dated 15th November 1858.
FROM—F. WILLIAMS, Esq., Commissioner, 1st Division,
TO—WILLIAM MUIR, Esq., Secretary to Govt., North-Western Provinces, Allahabad.

I HAVE the honor to forward a Narrative, compiled from the reports of the District Officers noted in the margin, regarding the occurrences in their jurisdiction, from the commencement of the outbreak to the re-taking of Delhi.

2. No special report has been received, nor is one required, from Deyrāh.

3. Protected by the Jumna and Ganges and the Sewalic range, and safe as long as Seharunpoor was kept in order, the little valley has remained perfectly quiet, and free from disturbances, with the exception of the appearance of some mutineers from the Punjab at Ramghāt, on the Jumna, when a party was promptly got together from Landour, and sent in pursuit. They however made no stay, and were not to be stopped, but passed on to Delhi.

4. The only other event deserving of notice that occurred in the Dhoon, was a case of cattle-theft, with murder, which was successfully worked out; the offender punished with the utmost severity of the law, and part of the property recovered.

5. Mr. Keene has, owing to the hearty co-operation of the Officer Commanding at Landour, Colonel L'Estrange, and the readiness of those under that officer's command, to move whenever and wherever their services were required, and with the loyal aid of the Government servants and the residents
of the Dhoon, whose good conduct has been before brought to notice, had the satisfaction of keeping his district in good order. The revenue was punctually collected, and the prisoners in the jail kept in perfect order.

6. Mr. Keene has reported the promptitude with which Mr. J. C. Robertson, his Assistant, acted on the receipt of the news of the outbreak, when Mr. Keene was in the interior.

7. The inhabitants of the Dhoon and the hills behaved very well. Great apprehensions were entertained regarding the crowd of people from the plains, who accompany, or are attracted to the Sanatarium by the Europeans resorting to it; but they remained quiet. Occasionally individuals showed the evil spirit which elsewhere broke out.

SEHARUNPOOR.

8. The news of the outbreak at Meerut reached Seharunpoor on the 12th of May. The intelligence was forwarded to Umballa.

9. On the 13th, Mr. Spankie very properly ordered all the ladies and children of the station to be sent to the hills.

10. The news of the massacre at Delhi soon arrived.

11. The Goojurs and Ranghurs at once commenced plundering; and when the disturbances began in the Moozaffernuggur district, disquiet spread through that of Seharunpoor.

12. At first bankers were robbed, or had to pay for exemption from plunder: money-lenders and traders were forced to give up their books of accounts, and vouchers for debts; old feuds were renewed; the first outbreaks were to pay off old feuds, or to clear off accounts, or for the sake of plunder.

13. It was not till the prospect of the immediate suppression of the mutiny disappeared, that open rebellion against Government was thought of.

14. The force of soldiers in the district at this time was a Company of the 29th Native Infantry.

15. Mr. Spankie commenced to disperse the disturbers of the peace on the 21st of May. Similar expeditions were undertaken on the 22nd and 23rd. The insurgents did not face these small parties.

16. On the 23rd of May, in consequence of repeated robberies on the Mohun road, Mr. Robertson, Joint-Magistrate, proceeded to Kheree with some twenty Foujdaree sowars. They caught two Chumars that morning in the act of plundering the dak; and under an escort supplied by the Hurowra Zemindars, a band of twenty-six men, captured with plundered property, were forwarded to Seharunpoor. As the village of Gokulwalah had attacked parties passing near it, it was determined to seize the Zemindars; but Mr. Robertson not considering himself strong enough to attack the village with sowars alone, should resistance be offered, called on Deedar Sing and the Kheree Zemindars to supply him with men. The former at once brought about a hundred, the latter some fifty men, many of whom were well armed; they started at night and by daybreak. The village was surrounded and the Zemindars quietly seized. All the Chowkees were then doubled, by enlisting a portion of the men who had so willingly come forward, and since that date there has not been any disturbance on this road. Throughout it was painful to observe the totally deserted state of the road; still the loyalty of the majority of the villagers was very encouraging. Mr. Robertson reported that he received much assistance from Mr. Hyde, of the Judge's office.

17. About this time disquiet extended to the town of Seharunpoor. The head Police officer was exciting dissatisfaction, while pretending to be actively loyal. The shop-keepers got alarmed, and a disturbance seemed probable. Aid from Umballa was solicited. A party of the 4th Cavalry under Captain Wyld, and of the 5th Native Infantry under Captain Garstin, accompanied by Mr. Plowden, C. S., crossed from the Umballa District, and confidence was for a time restored.
18. On the 26th of May, Mr. Robertson returned to the station, and started the same night, accompanied by Major Williams, 29th Native Infantry, Captain Wyld, a troop of the 4th Lancers, and thirty men of the 29th Native Infantry, to Deobund, on approaching which place they were met by all the respectable inhabitants, who accompanied them into the city, where the whole population greeted them with the most hearty demonstrations of loyalty. This town, as all others of any importance in the district, invariably was found to be decidedly loyal to Government. On the 27th of May, after carefully examining several cases, it was determined to punish the villages of Baboooor, Futtehpoor, and Sunplah Bukal. These villages had united in an attack on a Ressaldar, and thirty armed men, travelling with their families on the Bijnoor road. The aged Ressaldar, with several of his men, were severely wounded; their property plundered, themselves and wives deprived of their clothes, and the whole party driven back to Deobund. During the day notices were issued to the Zemindars to appear and answer the charge; but ascertaining that they had no intention of doing so, and had despatched horsemen to all the neighbouring Gojur villages to collect reinforcements, it was determined to attack them at once,—the force being very small, as a guard for the camp was necessary. On approaching Baboooor they found some 400 men drawn up, and being in plantations, mere cavalry were useless; it was for some time doubtful whether the sepoys would be up to the mark. This delay emboldened the villagers, who came forward into the open ground. Major Williams then advanced with the men of his own Regiment, and Captain Wyld shortly after charging with the Lancers, the whole were put to flight. Seven of the villagers were killed, and fifteen or sixteen wounded. Some of the latter were sent into the hospital at Seharunpoor. Only one sower on the Government side was hit, when far to the rear, the villagers, as usual, firing very high. The three offending villages were burnt down, and their cattle seized. It had been Mr. Robertson’s intention to punish other villages to the westward, but being informed of the preparations made to receive his party throughout the Khata, where there were several old mud forts, it was determined not to proceed without a stronger force, as the slightest reverse would have disorganized the whole district, at a very critical time. It was trusted that the example already made would keep them quiet, till an attack, with certainty of success, could be made. On the 29th May this party marched to Naugul, to act in concert with Mr. Spankie. On the 30th May Mr. Spankie went down towards Munglour, accompanied by Messrs. Trench, Plowden and Edwards, and by Captain Garstin, joined at midnight by Mr. Robertson and Captain Wyld. The intention was to attack the village of Manuckpoor, in the hope of apprehending the head man, Oomrao Singh, for whose apprehension a large reward had been offered. This man had been very forward, calling himself Rajah, and levying money from the surrounding villages. His intelligence was too good, and they found the village all but deserted. It was burnt, and the party captured a few prisoners.

19. After Mr. Spankie’s return to Seharunpoor, while encamped at Kheree, the 29th Native Infantry became extremely excited regarding a missing man, who, as far as could afterwards be ascertained, was killed by a Brahmin, while plundering a temple. As the 5th Native Infantry were also very excited, notwithstanding the long night march and work of the morning, it was determined to move again in the evening, so as to engage the minds of the men. This had the desired effect with the 29th; but a few days subsequently, viz., on the 2nd of June, an outbreak occurred in the Company of the 5th under Captain Garstin. Several of the men had been unsteady, and on the evening of the 2nd, sixteen were allowed to cut their names. They managed to secure their muskets, and when ordered to receive their pay, refused to take it, fell back to the gate of Mr. Spankie’s compound, close to which they were encamped, and commenced firing on Captain Garstin, and the men who remained with him. One of the mutineers was shot, it is believed, by a Havildar. Messrs. Brownlow and Home, Engineers, and Plowden of the
4th Cavalry, who had been out for a drive, and on returning had met with an accident, were fired upon; but happily the shot missed. Captain Wyld in his endeavour to reach his own men, was also fired at thrice. Mr. Spankie went (having been at the spot when Captain Wyld was paying the men) to make his sowars, ten of them, stationed in the compound, follow the mutineers, but he found they had run on the first shot towards the city. The evening was gathering in fast, and the villains escaped.

20. On the 3rd of June the Goorkhas under Major Dagott arrived, bringing the cholera with them. However their arrival was of great importance. All confidence in the remaining portion of the 5th, and also in the 4th Light Cavalry, had ceased. The news of the mutiny of the 29th Native Infantry at Moradabad had also been received on the same evening. The Magistrate took a portion of the Goorkhas, and some of the 4th Light cavalry, to attack and disperse a body of Goorjus, which was assembled near the Treasury, with intent to plunder it. The rebels, on seeing the force, retreated. They had withstood the Kotwal and Police during the day. The cavalry pursued them for some distance. On this occasion there were, on the Government side, a few men of the 15th and other Irregulars on leave belonging to the district. A few men were cut up, and some prisoners made. Two villages were burnt. In this affair Lieutenant Brownlow, and most of the residents of the station, and the District Officers, joined; all could not go, though they were willing to be useful.

21. On the 5th June Mr. Robertson proceeded to Roorkee, after visiting some refractory villages, seizing some offenders, and making arrangements regarding the collection of the revenue. He returned to Saharanpoor on the 8th.

22. On the 16th of June a party of Goorkhas was detached to meet a body of the Jullunder mutineers, some 300 strong. Lieutenant Bolisragon and Mr. Edwards accompanied the party. The mutineers however lost no time in traversing the district; in fact they almost ran through it, marching from the foot of the hills to the south border in thirty hours. On the 17th or 18th June a second party, under Major Bagot, with thirty of the Irregulars under Captain MacDougall, of the Stud Department, accompanied by Mr. Robertson, went on a similar expedition, but they were unable to catch the mutineers.

23. On the 20th June, about 4 P.M., Mr. Robertson proceeded to Nukoor which had been threatened by dacoits. Thirty Goorkhas, forty Seikh (Puteeala) sowars, Mr. Colledge, the Assistant Magistrate, Mr. Willcocks, Canal Overseer, and Mr. Hyde, of the Judge's Office, accompanied him. He arrived at Nukoor with the Horse about 11 P.M., in time to see the Tehseelee and Thannah in flames, though not a vestige of the dacoits. The infantry came in much later; but being convinced that much of the plundered property could not have been removed very far, Mr. Robertson started in pursuit at daybreak. Sending the Goorkhas, with Mears, Colledge and Willcocks, due west, so that their probable position might be known, he himself secured the country with troopers, and when almost despairing of success, came upon a large body of men and women, removing the plunder into the village of Futtelpoor. The plunderers and their property were seized, and the village burnt. It was not till late that their party got back to camp, and shortly after information was received that the whole country round had risen to release the prisoners, on hearing of the small force opposed to them. A sowar was sent into Saharanpoor for reinforcements, but being attacked and obliged to return, two others were despatched via Leisawâh, and a fourth to Muleetah to call in the Irregulars there stationed. To be the more prepared for a night attack, the camp was removed to the top of a large brick kiln, nearly surrounded by water. Parties, with drums beating, were assembled.

* This was a critical time for Saharanpoor. Had Captain Wyld or Mr. Spankie been shot, the station would most probably have been destroyed.
in the neighbouring gardens throughout the night. In the morning file-firing was heard at no great distance, which, from its direction and regularity, it was concluded must be the Goorkhas under Lieutenant Boisragon, who shortly after made their appearance in high spirits, reporting that they had been attacked by some 250 Goojurs, whom they had dispersed. The party hardly exchanged greetings, when an outpost of Irregulars brought information of the advance of the villagers, and shortly after, on hearing their drums, preparations were made to attack them. Lieutenant Boisragon's report to Major Bagott regarding the affair at Nukoor, is to the following effect:—

"About 6 A.M., on the 22nd, we reached the camp, where our arrival was heartily welcomed. I had just fallen out, my men warning them to be ready at a moment's notice, when we heard the dhols* and shouts of a large body close to our camp. I was sure the arrival of my detachment was unknown to the insurgents, and therefore fell in the men by word of mouth; told off a party of thirty under the Sergeant-Major to advance skirmishing; sent a party of twelve under Mr. Willcocks into a heavy tope of trees, to protect our flank on that side, and detached the cavalry (consisting of about forty sowars) under Mr. Robertson to the open ground on the right, while I brought up the rest of my men through a very heavy mango tope. With the assistance of the cover from the trees, and a deep ditch, the whole party sneaked up to the skirmishers, and in concealment. During this time the insurgents only having seen about thirty men, advanced boldly. Unfortunately, however, before we had all got properly into position, the order was given (they say by the Sergeant-Major) to commence firing, the enemy having been peppering at us the whole time. As they were still about 180 yards off, and not wishing to warn the enemy by bugle sounds, I went out in front to stop the firing on our side. While trying to do this, three shots fell close to me, on seeing which the men rushed out of the ditch and fired, and with a cheer went on, despising numbers or distance, quite forgetting that, with forty rounds of ammunition, and an eighteen miles march, they had no chance in running with the enemy. While this was going on to my front, Mr. Robertson was attacked by a large body on the right, and had some narrow escapes from their bullets, one man (an amateur city sowar) being killed close to him. As soon as the party in front gave way, the whole 600 or 700 took to their heels. We pursued for about five miles, overtaking numbers, and finding many concealed in trees. The loss on the enemy's side must have been between fifty and sixty, while we escaped without a scratch, with the exception of the city man alluded to. We took several prisoners, from whom we obtained much information, and also the names of the lumberdars, one of whom was among the killed. We burnt four of the principal villages, where I first collected the charpoys, and we returned to camp about 10 o'clock."

24. On the 23rd the party attacked and burnt the village of Sundowlee and Rundelwah which had been abandoned. In examining the extent of the damage inflicted by the dacoits at Nukoor, it appeared that all the Mohullas had been attacked and gutted, with the exception of that inhabited by the Mahomedans, where the Thannahdar, with his Police, and the Tehseeldar, took refuge during the assault. Not the slightest attempt at resistance seems to have been made by the Police. All the Government records, with the Mahajuns' accounts, bonds, &c., were torn up and scattered over the neighbouring gardens; some three or four city people were killed, and several wounded, but the assailants seem to have suffered the most severely.

25. Although Geetampoor and several villages in the vicinity of Muleetah were principals in these disturbances, there was not time to punish them, as it was necessary to push on before the rains commenced, and to attack the Banghrs, reported to be assembled in the khadir of the Jumna, which would become inaccessible the moment the rain fell; so the party marched at once for Gungoh, intending, if possible, to surprise "Futtaah," the proclaimed King of the Goojurs, at Boodah Khersee.

* The Indian drums.
The following is from Lieutenant Boisragon's report:—

"The next morning (June 24th) we started at 2 A.M., and marched along quietly until near 'Nyagaon,' one of the villages that we burnt down the first day; and there, we were informed, a large body were waiting in ambush for us. All night we moved along cautiously, a reconnoitring party going on under Mr. Robertson, while I brought my men right under the walls on all three sides. After some little delay, owing to the intense darkness rendering everything invisible, I got through the village, empty as usual, but showing symptoms of very late occupation; in fact Mr. Robertson had a shot at some fellows bolting. With daylight came rain, but the men were all anxious to push on to meet 'Puttuah,' for whose apprehension, with Mr. Robertson's sanction, I offered Rupees 200. During our arrangements of observation at Nyagaon, Mr. Robertson had gone on a mile or so in advance, with thirty of my men and some sowars, and we did not overtake them until we got to Mohunpool, where their further progress was disputed in the shape of a few bullets fired at Mr. Robertson, who seeing a large collection of men, demanded of the lumbardars to account for the gathering. They however sent word back, that if the Sahib wanted them, he might go into the village and fetch them himself. On my arrival we made arrangements to attack the village, out of which we drove them in a very few minutes; pursued them a short distance, and killed six, one of whom was recognized as an escaped prisoner from the Meerut Jail, and who had only two days previously murdered a bunyah at Gungoh. We took several prisoners, who corroborated the statements of those taken at Nukoor, that Boodah Kheree was the leading village in the rebellion. We now went straight to Boodah Kheree, where we were informed there were two small guns mounted on the towers of a fort in the village. This was my first point of attack, and the parties were told off for either of these towers. But the place had been abandoned, so with the elephants I demolished the 'would-be King's' palace, and then burnt the village. We then marched into Gungoh, another seven miles, which we reached about 2 P.M., having marched fully twenty-one miles."

26. In consequence of the constant heavy work lately, it was determined to give the men a day's rest at Gungoh;—in the meantime, by high offers of reward, what afterwards turned out to be very correct information, was obtained regarding the position and numbers of the Kondah Ranghrs. Early on the 26th June the party started to attack them, and the following is from Lieutenant Boisragon's account:—

"On the morning of the 26th we started at 1½ A.M. As it was a good road, I took the Goorkhas down on the hackeries, which I intended to make use of as barricades, should necessity compel me. During the 25th we had most unpleasant reports regarding the Irregulars. I will however give the Irregulars the credit to say, they had hitherto done their work thoroughly, though they were very troublesome in camp about supplies. However, I kept them between the Sikhs (than whose conduct throughout nothing could have been more satisfactory) and the Goorkhas. When nearing the place, where we expected to find the insurgents, I dismounted my sepoy's from the hackeries, and detached reconnoitring parties under Messrs. Robertson, Colledge, and Willcocks. Mr. Robertson's party had not left me five minutes, when we heard some six or eight shots, and Mr. Robertson galloped in to say that a large party were in front, and that he had been fired at by a number of men amongst the trees. We all got together, and advanced as quickly as we could. About 150 yards on, we came in sight of the villages Omerpoor (to our left), Shahpooor (on raised ground in the centre), and Manpooor (on our right). All round and close to Omerpoor was an extensive tope of mango trees, with underwood and plantain groves. From Omerpoor to Manpooor must be about half a mile, and the whole of this extent was covered with human beings; in some places ten and twenty deep. We saw a goodly party of horsemen, and the whole force could not have numbered under 3,000 men. The extent of ground covered by the insurgents prevented my attacking them in line, so I divided
the whole force into two divisions, flanking each with cavalry, and a party of cavalry in the centre. Mr. Hyde took the cavalry on the left flank, and I detached the Sergeant-Major and Mr. Willcocks to assist Mr. Robertson with the left division. Mr. Colledge accompanied me with the right. The two divisions attacked them on either flank, beating them up towards Shahpoor. This was very soon done, and they all amassed between Shahpoor and Omerpoor, where they kept firing at us until the party under Mr. Robertson gave them a volley, followed by several successful shots from our side. As soon as we saw the enemy wavering (we had all met by this time), we gave a cheer, and charged, when they scattered. We found a good many had been killed by the volley, and as we wanted to give them a good lesson, I allowed my men to follow as they liked. Mr. Robertson had galloped off with the cavalry in pursuit, and gave a first-rate account of them. We chased them for some two miles, when coming on an extensive thick jungle, I sounded the Assembly, and from the accounts of the officers with the various parties we calculated their killed to be upwards of 150. The main body of the runaways having turned towards ‘Kondah Kulan,’ we marched on to it, coming across numbers of dead bodies and men concealed in wells and trees. On arriving before Kondah, we saw a large body behind trees and walls, who immediately began firing on us. Mr. Robertson on one side, and Mr. Colledge on the other, went off with the cavalry to prevent their escape from the rear of the village, but this large party effected, though numbers were driven back into the village and plantain gardens. It was here that a Sikh trooper was wounded by a bullet in the arm, and another’s horse killed. Several men were concealed in their houses, and attacked our Goorkhas as they went through, but they paid dearly for their rashness, as our men spared none of them, and upwards of seventy were killed near and about the village. We then burnt the village.”

27. The object of the Ranghur gathering was to attack the towns of Laknowtee and Gungoh, and their total defeat saved those important places.

28. Mr. Robertson had been for two days pressed to return to Seharunpoor, and the force accordingly started the following morning via Rampoor, which had been threatened, arriving at Seharunpoor on the 28th June. Mr. Robertson remarks, that from the almost universal opinion expressed by all classes of natives, with whom he had an opportunity of conversing, it would seem that the extensive rising in this part of the district was attributed entirely to the influential Mahomedans of Muleetah and Nukoor. They had excited the Goojurs generally by hopes of plunder, destruction of bunyahs’ accounts, bonds, &c., and the more influential amongst them, such as “Futtah,” with the chance of regaining the consequence tradition had assigned them in this part of the country, once the principality of their ancestors. With the Ranghurs, as being fanatic co-religionists, there was little difficulty in procuring their assistance. The fact, that neither at Muleetah or Nukoor were the mohullahs of the Mahomedans attacked, and that they did not unite with the townspeople in measures of resistance, tends much to confirm this general impression of the well-affected. The Ranghurs in this part of the district seem decidedly hostile to anything short of Mahomedan supremacy; unlike improvident Goojurs, their villages are generally populous and wealthy, so that plunder could hardly be their inducement to dissipation. It was impossible not to admire their bigotted daring, never deigning to ask for quarter, but turning at once upon their pursuers, though perhaps only wretchedly armed with a gundasah,* or some such weapon. The extracts from Lieutenant Bolaragon’s report will show the active and intelligent assistance invariably given by that officer to the civil authorities, as also the hearty co-operation of all the Europeans present. Mr. Robertson says, it was a pleasure to accompany troops that were invariably game, day after day, to undertake the very heavy work imposed upon them at this trying season of the year.

* A rude kind of half club, half battle-axe.
29. When Nukoor was plundered, Sirsawah was also. Mr. Plowden punished several villages in that neighbourhood.

30. On the 9th of July the Company of the 29th Native Infantry, on duty at the Treasury, decamped from the station. About 8 P.M. it was reported that the twelve men over Captain McDougall’s treasure chest had deserted their post, and Major Bagott instantly turned out his men, and all started for the Treasury, distant near a mile from the barracks, Messrs. Trench, Edwards, Robertson, Brownlow, of the Canals, &c., accompanying. After arresting the guard at the Post Office, whose muskets were loaded, and who evidently intended to have gone also, when opportunity offered, the party passed on to the Treasury, and found the barrack deserted, the office lights burning, but no guard present; all the seals and locks were right, but the guard had fled in such a hurry, that they left their cooking utensils, blankets, &c., behind them. Captain McDougall had remained to bring up the Putteelah horse, forty of whom relieved the 4th Light Cavalry detachment left at Seharunpoor, when Captain Wyld returned with Mr. Plowden to Jugadree, but as these men had only matchlocks, and it was raining hard, they did not like turning out. It was necessary to place a guard over the Treasury and buildings, and on so dark a night, and in the pouring rain, it was not considered advisable to detach any men in pursuit. The Police sowars, however, were ordered to follow up the mutineers and catch them. The Jemadar brought in a musket the next morning, which had been dropped on the road to Delhi sid Rampoore, seventy-nine men got off.

31. On the 11th July, Mr. Robertson went again to Roorkee, in order to visit, in conjunction with Captain Reid, Commanding at Roorkee, the Khadir of the Ganges, and put down the Bunjaras, who had been committing great excesses. On arriving at Roorkee, he received information that the Bunjarahs had assembled in considerable force, and as Captain Reid considered it advisable, if possible, to procure the assistance of some Gorkhas, an application was made to Seharunpoor, but being unsuccessful, Captain Reid ordered a gun, accompanied by Europeans, with as many Suppers as could be spared, to proceed with Mr. Robertson, under the command of Captain MacLagan. On the 14th they arrived at Jowalapoor. It was raining the whole day, 15th. They marched, intending to attack “Futtuah,” but were unable to cross the Bangungah, about five miles from their destination, they therefore encamped near its banks; at a place called Ranceh Majrah, which had been plundered and abandoned. During the march through this lonely country, it was distressing to observe the desolation caused by these rascals. For miles the villages were burnt down, and not a living soul remained in the neighbourhood. On the 16th the river was still higher. The boats did not arrive till late in the day, but even had they made their appearance earlier, the party could not have crossed, on account of the large amount of timber in this rapid stream.

32. While at breakfast, some firing was heard towards the river, and shortly intelligence came in that the Bunjarahs had crossed. While the troops were getting under arms, Mr. Robertson and another officer went down to see the actual state of affairs, and were fired at from the opposite side by a body of from seventy to 100 men. They returned the compliment with their rifles, when the rebels retired into the grass jungle, and the gun coming up, drove them off altogether. On the 17th the river had considerably fallen; the party crossed in about four hours, and in the long grass came on a Bunjarah, whose leg was broken by a rifle shot. He stated that six had been killed, and nineteen wounded, on the previous day (amongst the former were the uncle and nephew of Sehrah, their leader), and that 400 men had been present, concealed in the grass. On reaching Futtuah, it was found that the Bunjarahs had made a precipitate retreat to an island on the Ganges. A number were however intercepted, and others shot in crossing. Some grape was also fired whenever any number were seen on the island, but with what effect it was impossible to discover. The party burnt Futtuah, and six Tandahs, or temporary villages; drove off from three to four hundred head of cattle, and
allowed the Jawalapoor Rao, who had accompanied, and were considerable sufferers, to remove the plundered grain, which was stored round Futtuah in large quantities. On July 18th and 19th, the camp marched and returned to Roorkee.

33. The great enemy during this trip was the constant rain, for had the party been able to cross the Bangungha on the first day, the prisoners asserted that the Bunjarahs would have fought, but having time to remove a considerable portion of their plundered property to the island, it was not thought worth the risk. It was not proper to risk the lives of the Europeans and natives, by continuing long enough encamped in this low swampy land, to procure boats from the canal. All those on the banks of the Ganges had been sunk. Though the results were not so satisfactory as they might have been, had the weather been more favorable, still the Bunjarahs seem to have felt the loss of their cattle, as the following day eleven gave themselves up, offering to betray all the ringleaders, if a sufficient force would accompany them. The news from Deobund, however, rendered necessary a move in that direction. The prisoners taken in the Khadir were tried at Roorkee, when eleven were hung, the remainder being released, after receiving corporal punishment.

34. On the 21st, Mr. Robertson moved to Mahomedpoor with the same force, and there heard that the dacoits assembled before Deobund had scattered, and returned to their respective villages. On the 22nd the force marched to Deobund, visiting certain villages in the vicinity of Poor, in the Mozzaffernuggur District, who had joined in the attack on Deobund. Here they made prisoners of the lumbardars, and some notorious characters. Further on, at Chota Sample, they surprised a party of Goojurs in the act of dividing plundered property, and in the ravines below, another party at the same work. All this property was subsequently recognized in Deobund. In the evening Mr. Robertson examined the city, and found that in the mohullahs inhabited by the mahajuns, bunyahs, and other wealthy men, all property not removed by the plunderers had been broken up. There was, however, little appearance of digging, so there was reason to suppose that the actual cash and valuables possessed by the Deobund men escaped. In fact the resistance seems to have been so determined, that there could have been but little time at the disposal of the rebel villagers to dig for treasure. The attack had been most systematically carried out, certain villages confining their operations to certain mohullahs. The mohullahs inhabited by the Goojurs, Mahomedans, and Chumars, were uninjured, though actually on the outskirts of the city, from which it might be suspected that these parties had some interest in the attack, but no plundered property could be found in their houses.

35. Bhugwan Sing, an important person there, with almost all his relatives, was severely wounded in defending his house, and his son carried off by the dacoits. The village Sullahpoor, where Bhugwan Sing's son was concealed, was surrounded at daybreak by the Sikh Horse and Captain Drummond's Canal sowers. As Bhugwan Sing had expressed considerable alarm that the child would be killed, if the village was attacked, a reward of Rupees 100 was offered to any one who might succeed in bringing him out safely. This had the desired effect, and most of the men of the village being secured, the party advanced to Bunhera, the inhabitants of which had been the original captors of the boy, and from whom the village of Sullahpoor had taken him after a fight. Here also the party seized the men, and burnt a portion of the village.

36. While Captain Drummond and Mr. Robertson were engaged in this direction, Captains Bead and Boisragon burnt the village of Dookosha and Mankie, from which the inhabitants had fled. During the 24th and 25th the officers were engaged in examining the prisoners, and bringing them forward for recognition by the residents of Deobund, and in the evening received
orders to return to Seharunpoor, in consequence of reports of an intended attack on that place. This recall was unfortunate, as many of the leading villages were left unpunished, in consequence of the unceasing rain during the 24th and 25th: still so severe was the punishment on those attacked, that the Katah remained quiet.

37. While the party was at Deobund, forty-five men were hung, and seventeen sentenced to ten years' imprisonment,—the remainder being released, some on security.

38. Mr. Spankie recalled the party to Seharunpoor, having received intelligence of a proposed attack on the station and jail by the Goojurs, Rajpoots, and Ranghurs, aided by the lower Mahomedans of the city. He disarmed the jail guard, some of the men in which had listened to overtures from the city, and replaced the guard by forty men of the Goorkhas. Colonel L'Estrange, Commanding at Landour, to whom an express was sent, ordered down forty Europeans, who arrived on the 27th, the evening before the proposed attack, which, in consequence of the reinforcements, did not come off. The Europeans remained until after the Mohurrum, which passed off tranquilly, as did a large fair, which was held (at the same time that the Tazeeas were carried) within three miles of the town. Before the Mohurrum, two six-pounder guns sent from Meerut arrived at Seharunpoor. Previous to the great day of the Mohurrum, the Kotwal was removed into the district, to Nukoor, where he could do no harm. There not being evidence against him at the time, it was premature to try him, and he could not be got rid of, as his home was in Shahjehanpoor, to which place he could not be sent.

39. After he went to Nukoor, evidence was obtained, of a satisfactory character, against him; he was arrested, and according to arrangement previously made with Mr. Barnes, deported to Umballa. Mr. Colledge, Assistant Magistrate, and Lieutenant Boisragon, arrested him, and took him to the Jumna. Mr. Colledge escorted him from the river to Umballa.

40. This party, on its way to Nukoor, surprised Sudowlee, seized Futwah, a head man, and about twenty prisoners.

41. Mr. Lowe, C.S., who was appointed to act as Assistant in the district on 28th July 1857, volunteered to do duty, leaving the hills, to which he had gone on medical certificate, and was employed in collecting the revenue in Deobund. Mr. Melville, appointed Extra Joint-Magistrate on the 14th August 1857, was on the same duty in Roorkee Tehseel. A portion of Captain Hughes' Regiment of Punjab Irregulars was ordered to Seharunpoor, in order to give cavalry, the want of which had been felt;—fifty of these men were sent to Mozuffernuggur to Mr. Edwards, fifty-five with Mr. Lowe to Deobund, and thirty with Mr. Melville to Roorkee. When the disturbances at Thannah Bhowun broke out, Mr. Lowe at once joined Mr. Edwards, and Captain Hughes sent him twenty more men. Mr. Spankie also sent Mr. Melville, with his thirty sowars, to Mozuffernuggur. Both Messrs. Lowe and Melville were present at the attack on Thannah Bhowun. The former was severely wounded, and was therefore ordered in, though he wished to join the stronger force that subsequently went to Thannah Bhowun.

42. The only event of any importance that remains to be noticed was the invasion of some rebels from the Bijnour District into Hurdwar in January 1858. The Electric Telegraph signaller was taken away prisoner by them, but has been well treated, and is alive up to date. On receipt of this news Lieutenant Boisragon, with seventy Sikhs and Goorkhas, and two guns, with ten Europeans, started, and happily came up with about 1,000 of these rebels. The little party attacked the mass gallantly, and utterly routed them, killing a considerable number. The Ganges Canal was most happily turned into the river before the fugitives could re-cross it, and a great number were drowned: altogether, the rebels confessed to a loss of between four or 500. This creditable little affair occurred on the 10th of January.
43. The foregoing Narrative shows that Mr. Spankie had to deal with disaffected Mahomedans in the city, with desertion and mutiny of native troops in the station, with threatened attacks on it by rebels, which however did not take place, and with serious disturbances in the district.

44. The Government will doubtless observe with approbation, the firm energy with which the Magistrate and the European residents of the station met the emergency, and how, notwithstanding mutinies and desertions, they held their own, till strengthened by the arrival of the Goorkhas, and afterwards of two guns from Meerut, they were relieved from the dangers through which they bravely stood at their posts. The seditious inclinations of the villagers near the station were checked by small parties of the native infantry, with the district police sowars and other cavalry, headed by Mr. Spankie and the European officers and residents of the station.

45. Though no opposition was ever met with, it was doubtless the manful readiness of the Europeans in the early part of the outbreak, and after that the promptitude with which Mr. Barnes, the Commissioner of Umballa, and Colonel L'Estrange at Landour, met requisitions for aid (which must have co-operated to awe the disaffected), and the unceasing watchfulness of Mr. Spankie and his native subordinates in the town, whose conduct has been separately reported, that saved the station.

46. In the district, order was to a great extent preserved, and altogether restored, under Mr. Spankie's general superintendence, by the untiring energy and gallant conduct of the Joint-Magistrate, Mr. H. D. Robertson, and the ready zeal of Messrs. Melville, Colledge, and Lowe, C.S., Assistants to Mr. Spankie.

47. It has been seen that Mr. Robertson having cleared the road to the hills, next with Mr. Plowden, C.S., who crossed over from Jugadree to aid Lieutenant Boisragon and his party of Goorkhas, who throughout rendered excellent service, chastised insurgents on the west part of the district, and again with a small party of sowars, reinforced by Europeans and some native Sappers and Miners from Roorkee, under Captain MacLagan and Captains Drummond and Read, of the Canal Department, put a stop to the plundering of the Banjarahs in the Ganges Khadir, and with the same force, and again joined by Lieutenant Boisragon, punished the villagers who had attacked Deobund. Mr. Spankie was fortunate, first, in having such officers to assist him; second, in getting over troops from Umballa, though most of them proved eventually untrustworthy; third, in having them at once replaced by the Goorkhas and Punjab Cavalry; fourth, in having most efficient aid from every officer at Roorkee; and fifth, in being so thoroughly supported by the officers and residents, military and civil, of Seharunpoor.

48. But great credit is due to him for the manner in which he availed himself of these means of upholding authority in the district, and that through much danger and difficulty. He did so to such an extent, that he was able to continue throughout, in some parts, and soon to re-enter upon, where it was suspended, the work connected with the revenue settlement.

49. The Seharunpoor Jail is one of the very few that has been preserved.

50. Mr. Spankie has concluded his report with the best proof of the firm efficiency with which he has managed his district, the statement that nearly all the revenue has been collected; and the Courts kept open.

51. I need hardly recommend to the favorable notice of Government the officers and European residents, whose names and good services are fully detailed in Mr. Spankie's report, from which the following paragraphs are extracted:

"Paragraph 31.—The thanks of the Government are due to the whole of the residents of the place, all of whom are officers of Government, Covenanted or Uncovenanted. I have always received the most cordial co-operation from all. Mr. Robertson, Joint-Magistrate, has particularly distinguished himself throughout, being always ready for any duty, and energetically carry-
ing out what he was sent to do. Mr. Edwards, though posted as Joint-Magistrate to Mynpoory, gave me every assistance that his long experience and local knowledge of the zillah could suggest. He was subsequently posted to Mozuffernuggur as Officiating Magistrate. Lieutenant Brownlow, Superintendent of the Eastern Jumna Canal, before his departure to camp at Delhi, and in the earlier part of the disturbances, inspired all with confidence. To me he was an excellent counsellor, indefatigable in organizing our resistance and always ready for duty outside. He received a letter of thanks from our late lamented Commissioner, Mr. Greathed; so did Mr. Robertson, of whom I should say more, did I not feel that his own report best illustrated the service he performed.

"Paragraph 32.—It was owing to Captain McDougall that our troops were able to make rapid marches, as carriage was difficult to obtain, and Captain McDougall was always ready to supply us with stud carts and cattle, at great inconvenience, as they were much required for stud purposes. Captain McDougall moreover took upon himself the entire charge of the irregulars on leave, who have done well. Having been in this service himself, he knew how to deal with these men, which was of great advantage to me.

"Paragraph 33.—I am also much indebted to Mr. Plowden, who twice entered the district to assist me, and both near Nukoor and at Sirsawah did good service. It would be difficult to speak with sufficient praise of the way in which Captains Wyld and Garstin managed their men whilst here. Deser-tions took place from the former force, and the mutiny occurred in the latter's Company. Nothing but their constant watchfulness kept the men together. Both regiments, as is well known, have since been disarmed.

"Paragraph 34.—Since the Goorkhas came here there has been a long continuance of quiet, to which Lieutenant Boisragon's treatment of the rebels in Pergunnah Gungoh greatly contributed. This officer received from Mr. Greathed a warm letter of thanks for his good service on this occasion and on others. My thanks are also due to Major Baggot for his constant assistance and support since he joined the station.

"Paragraph 35.—But all the residents are deserving of praise for their ready co-operation when required. It is impossible to name all, though all were ever eager to be of service. Amongst the Uncovenanted body, I think Mr. Hyde did useful service, accompanying Mr. Robertson on several occasions, and distinguishing himself when out on duty.

"Paragraph 36.—Mr. Willcocks, Deputy Superintendent of the Eastern Jumna Canal, was very useful also on several occasions, but we soon lost his services, as he proceeded to join the camp at Delhi.

"Paragraph 39.—I am particularly indebted to Captain Read, and to Captain Drummond of the Canal Department; their services were brought to your notice when I submitted Mr. Robertson's report, No. 213, dated 4th August 1857. Captain Read has been extremely anxious to assist me, and preserve peace and order. It is also well known to the Government that in the first instance Lieutenant-Colonel Baird Smith's energetic measures secured order at Boorkee and the surrounding villages.

"Paragraph 41.—I beg to submit a return* showing the names and number of our community, who were here before the relief from Umballa was obtained."

52. I trust that the fact that this district was thus held, will be consi-dered to merit the highest praise and acknowledgments of Government, and that I shall be allowed to communi-cate the same to every officer brought to notice in this Narrative.
To these remarks of Mr. Spankie the attention of Government is solicited. Every officer of every rank in the Seharunpoor District deserves the special thanks of Government.

MOZUFFERNUGGUR.

The reports from the Mozuffernuggur District refer to two different periods. The first, that between the outbreak of the mutiny at Meerut and Mr. Berford's departure from the place on leave; the second, subsequent to Mr. Edwards' taking charge of the district.

At Mozuffernuggur the outbreak was not met as it was at Seharunpoor; the Magistrate and Collector, Mr. Berford, was not equal to the emergency.

The excuse for this,—I believe solitary instance of the civil officers of an out-station succumbing to danger, in this case at first more imaginary than real,—was the physical inability of Mr. Berford to take the active and energetic measures, which it would certainly appear would have saved the treasure and station. Without a head of course the other officers and the residents of the place were paralyzed. This preamble is required to introduce the following Narrative of events.

The 9th and 10th May being holidays, Mr. Berford went over to Seharunpoor, where, on the afternoon of the 11th, a letter from the late Mr. Johnston, Officiating Magistrate of Meerut, reached him, giving intelligence of the mutiny at that place. Mr. Berford left in a few hours for Mozuffernuggur, and on arrival there, was told by the native officials the most exaggerated, indeed wholly false reports of the arrival of mutineer regiments, and, of the immediate presence, on the outskirts of the city, of large bands of dacoits. Mr. Berford at once ordered that all public offices should be closed for three days. Rumours of the rapid approach of mutineer regiments gathered ground, and in the absence of all letters, official or private, from Meerut, appear to have been pretty generally believed.

It appears that on the evening of the 12th, Mr. Berford received information, which he considered accurate, that the convicts in the Jail would rise that night, and that the town would be plundered. Everything was however, at the time, perfectly quiet. He repaired to the bungalow of Mr. J. Dalby, Head Clerk, and from there went out to the jungle, towards the village of Surwut, where he remained till morning.

Nothing occurred that night.

On the 13th Mr. Grant, Joint-Magistrate and Deputy Collector, who had been in camp at Shamlee, arrived, having been called in by Mr. Berford.

Mr. Grant states that that day Sergeants O'Farrell and Taylor were sent for, and plans for the future discussed, the result of which was that the party, accompanied by Mrs. O'Farrell and her sister, Mrs. Hussy, and the Office clerks and their families, went to the Tehsul. The movement was hurriedly carried out, in consequence of the gentlemen learning from Mr. Butterfield, Jail Darogah, that the Jail guard were in collusion with the prisoners, and both intended to attack the bungalows. This turned out to be utterly without foundation.

That night Mr. Grant and Sergeant Stewart's bungalows were burnt by the villagers, and Mr. Berford's attacked; but the assailants were kept off by the guard.

Property to a trifling amount was plundered in the city during the night. There was also a slight disturbance in the jail among the prisoners, but successfully repressed by the guard. Mr. Berford, for their conduct that night, gave them a present of a month's pay. The party next morning, May 14th, returned to Mr. Berford's bungalow.
63. The Tehseeldar asserts that the disturbance in the city might have been prevented, but he, and all the rest of the Government servants, were strictly prohibited by Mr. Berford from leaving the Tehseel, where all the gates and doors were secured.

64. Between 10 and 11 A.M. of the 14th, the party, for what reason is not known, suddenly returned to the Tehseel.

65. The Tehseeldar, Imad Hossein, also states, that his intention was, if possible, to get the treasure into the Tehseel, and that both Mr. Berford and he spoke to the Havildar on the subject, who agreed to bring it at 2 P.M. that day (May 14th). This, when the time came, the sepoys refused to do. They broke into the treasure chests, and subtracted as much as they could remove, having first placed sentries all round the premises, to prevent any person arriving or interfering with them when thus employed. The Subedar who commanded the party, which was composed of twenty-eight sepoys* of the 20th Native Infantry, sent an abusive message to the Tehseeldar, saying that he had believed him a Mahomedan, but that he had proved himself a Kaffir; had eaten pig, &c.; and that he and his men intended paying him a visit, and squaring accounts with him.

66. The plunder of the Treasury, and the report sedulously spread, that a large party of the 20th from Meerut had joined their comrades, and that a body of dacoits was rapidly advancing on the town, caused considerable consternation to those collected in the Tehseel, and to the Government officials generally. They were persuaded that the Tehseel was no longer safe, and Messrs. Berford and Grant proposed proceeding to Jowlee, the residence of the Tehseeldar's cousin, Syud Kasim Ali, and Mr. and Mrs. O'Farrell for Roorkee. But these latter abandoned their intention on hearing that the road was closed about Chuppar. Mr. Grant had actually started for Jowlee, accompanied by the Tehseeldar; But Mr. Berford not joining them, they returned, and found that officer had left the Tehseel by a back entrance, and gone to the residence of some Syuds in Aboopoorah, a suburb of the city, where, Mr. Grant states, they were treated extremely well. They slept there that night, guarded by half the Jail guard, thirty in number, and returned to the Tehseel next morning.

67. The amount of money plundered from the Treasury was Rupees 85,000. The Treasury guard amounted, including officers, to thirty-five men. It is clear that they, wholly unprovided with carriage, and encumbered with their arms and ammunition, could not have removed more than one-third of the whole, as not a single sepoy of their regiment had arrived; nor were there any villagers present with them. They took away as much as they could carry, and the remainder was plundered by the townspeople and Mr. Berford's private servants. The latter lived in the adjoining outhouses, saw what was going on, and immediately on the departure of the sepoys, commenced on their own account. The sepoys left quietly and un molested.

68. The remainder of the Government money was just as quietly plundered. The people were allowed to pour into the Treasury and help themselves. Not one single official,—high or low,—raised a finger to prevent it. Everybody seems to have been paralyzed.

69. Towards evening, on the 14th, Mr. Berford, considering that his force, which was solely composed of his own and the Joint-Magistrate's guard, numbering twelve men, armed with muskets and bayonets, and the Thannah and Tehseel burkundazes, was insufficient, determined on drawing off the Jail guard, and letting the prisoners loose. Ragnath Singh, Jemadar of the Tehseel, was sent to the Jail, with orders to the Native Officer commanding the guard, to at once release the prisoners, and bring away all the sepoys for the protection of Mr. Berford and the other Europeans. This was at once done, and the men marched to the Tehseel, where thirty were retained, and thirty sent to

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* This was the whole military force employed in the whole district.
Aboopoorah to Mr. Berford. The villagers subsequently came in and destroyed the Jail barracks, carrying off the doors, shutters, and iron rails, &c., &c.

70. This measure Mr. Grant at the time considered a grave mistake, though he says he may not have sufficiently opposed it. If anything had been wanting to convince the people that the Government rule at Mozaffarnuggur had ceased to exist, this release of the convicts supplies it. The inhabitants saw that they could with impunity commit any excesses; that nobody interfered or meddled with them; and that even the few individuals who had been captured by the sowars in the city on the night of the 13th had been set free with the others. The Civil, Criminal and Collectorate records were burnt by the people that night (May 14th). On the 15th, or following day, information was received that the people of the neighbouring villages were collecting in great numbers round the city, and proposed attacking and plundering it. On this the Kotwal and Duffadar of sowars, whose conduct throughout these disturbances shows in a favorable light, went with a party of district sowars, attacked and completely dispersed the dacoits, bringing in some fifteen or twenty prisoners, several of whom were wounded.

71. For want of a jail, these dacoits were ordered to be flogged and released. The prisoners were caught, with arms in their hands, in open resistance to Government authority, and should one and all have been hung on the spot.

72. From this time to the mutiny of the 4th Irregulars on the 21st June, no attack or dacoity was committed or attempted in the town, though reports of intended attacks were frequent.

73. About this period letters containing instructions were received from the Commissioner, which appear to have been wholly carried out by Mr. Grant; indeed all the arrangements for the district seem to have been made by that officer. These arrangements were the establishment of chowkees on the main line of communication, the enrolment of sowars and burkundazes, and the despatch of letters of encouragement to the several extensive landholders and native gentlemen throughout the zillah. These measures, which were well and carefully carried out by the Joint-Magistrate, would have proved far more successful than they did, had it not been for the utter supineness of the Police, who throughout literally did nothing. They appear to have come to an understanding with the people, that neither should interfere with the other;—that if the villagers permitted the Police to remain quietly at their stations and draw their pay, the villagers might commit what crimes they pleased, without any attempt at prevention on their part. The natural result was, that violent crimes of all kinds were daily, almost hourly, committed throughout the district, not secretly or by night, but openly, and at noonday.

74. It is needless naming the chief crimes; it is sufficient to remark that here, as in other parts of the country, the bunyahs and mahajuns were in the majority of cases the victims, and fearfully have many of them been made to suffer for their previous rapacity and avarice.

75. On the 18th or 19th, a party of the 3rd Light Cavalry, under a native officer, arrived from Meerut, and at first caused no slight consternation, as it was not known whether they were friends or enemies. On the day of their arrival, one of the troopers shot a bunyah, with whom he had a quarrel. Mr. Berford seems to have been satisfied with the man's explanation.

76. Nothing particular seems to have taken place for several days, but towards the end of the month, it was deemed advisable to send Mrs. O'Farrell and her sister, Mrs. Hussy, into Meerut. Arrangements were made for their departure, and Mr. Berford determined to accompany them, which he did, taking the whole of the cavalry with him, and leaving Mr. Grant, who refused to quit the district with Mr. Dalby, Head Clerk, his family, and that of Mr. Butterfield, Jail Darogah. Mr. Berford, after proceeding some miles, returned to the station, and the cavalry were the next day reinforced by a party of
the same regiment, under Lieutenant Clarke. Arrangements were now made
for patrolling the roads, and some of the most refractory villages were visited
and punished.

77. On the 29th, Lieutenant Smith arrived with eighty troopers of the
4th Irregular Cavalry and relieved Lieutenant Clarke.

78. Mr. Grant received orders from the Commissioner to proceed to
Shamlee, and make arrangements for keeping open the dak communication
between Meerut and Kurnaul. In accordance with these instructions, Mr.
Grant, after the lapse of a few days, went to Shamlee, and having effected the
object of his journey, returned two days after to the station, having written a
full account to the Commissioner of the arrangements made by him, and the
state of the country about Shamlee.

79. Mr. Grant received in reply a communication from the late Com­
mmissioner, Mr. Greathed, transferring him to Boolundshahuf, because he had
in the first instance delayed to carry out the instructions, and secondly, because
he had left Shamlee without his, the Commissioner's, orders. Mr. Greathed’s
letter has been lost, but such, Mr. Grant states, was its purport. Though
there certainly appears to have been unnecessary delay in proceeding to Sham­
lee, neither Mr. Berford nor Mr. Grant seems to have understood the Com­
mmissioner to intend the latter to remain at Shamlee, after the dak arrange­
ments had been completed.

80. Mr. Grant reports that he found the state of affairs at Shamlee
most satisfactory, owing to the exertions of Ibraheem Khan, Tehseldar, since
murdered by the insurgents of Thannah Bhown, under Inayut Alee Khan.

81. Shortly after the return of the Joint-Magistrate from Shamlee, the
villages of Puraee and Bijopoorah were visited and punished. Matters were
improving, and a little revenue was collected in the Huzoor and Khatowlee
Tehseels, when, on the 21st June, the troopers of the 4th Irregular Cavalry
mutinied and murdered their officer, Lieutenant Smith.

82. Several days previous to the mutiny of the 4th Irregulars, informa­
tion was given at Seharunpore, by Dooley Chund, an extensive landholder
in that and the Mozuffurnuggur Districts, that the Irregulars were in a dis­
affected state, and not to be depended upon. Mr. Grant was informed of this.
Similar rumours had reached him, but Lieutenant Smith, to whom he had
communicated them, was satisfied of the staunchness of his men. The event
proved the rumours only too well founded.

83. The troopers were billetted in the Magistrate's Kutcherry, only part
of which had been destroyed by fire. Their horses were picketed on either
side the road leading from the Kutcherry to Mr. Berford’s bungalow. The
space between is rather less than 100 yards.

84. The account of the mutiny, as given by the different individuals
who witnessed it, varies considerably. The following is a pretty correct de­
scription of what occurred:-

85. About 3 P.M., on the 21st June, a Shootur sower* arrived from
Shamlee. He did not come in by the direct road, but passed round by the
Public Offices, and entered the lines of the 4th, and no doubt brought some
letter or message to the men from their comrades stationed at Shamlee. He
left again in a short time, and soon after his departure a trooper went into
Mr. Berford's bungalow, apparently to call Lieutenant Smith, as that officer
accompanied him into the lines. Mr. Dalby, Head Clerk, who was in a tent
outside the bungalow, saw the arrival and departure of the Shootur sower,
the trooper go to the bungalow, and Lieutenant Smith return with him; and
the same time noticed that Lieutenant Smith was going to his men at an
unusually early hour. Shortly after the report of a shot was heard, and the
natives called out that a dog had been shot. This was however almost imme­

* Czeka rider.
They then demanded the treasure. He said he had brought it in there by some dooley bearers, and was being attended by the Native Doctor. Mr. Grant was accompanying the Ressaldar, when Mr. Butterfield went forward and prevented his doing so. The sepoys of the Jail guard now said that the whole party should at once repair to the Tehseel, which they did by a short and unfrequented road, as the sowars were evidently preparing to mount, and were beginning to surround the bungalow. Mr. and Mrs. Butterfield, when half-way, returned to the bungalow, to procure some clothes, &c., forgotten in the hurry of departure. These they managed to secure, and had proceeded some distance towards the Tehseel, when he was shot by one of the troopers. His wife begged them to shoot her also, but though they threatened her, she was left uninjured. Mr. Butterfield's body was slashed with sword-cuts, and a hand cut off on account of the ring upon it.

86. The party reached the Tehseel only just in time, as several of the troopers galloped down the main road, with the evident intention of cutting them off, but returned on seeing them enter the Tehseel gate.

87. There seems to be little doubt that the Ressaldar's object was to get the party back into the bungalow, where they would all have been murdered.

88. Lieutenant Smith, whose first wound was not mortal, was put into a dooley, and was being taken to the Tehseel, when he was followed by some sowars, dragged out and murdered. The body was much disfigured by sword-cuts, and one of the hands cut off for the sake of the ring. Lieutenant Smith's and Butterfield's bodies were removed that night by Mr. Dalby's younger brother, and Mr. Kelly, brother of Mrs. Butterfield, to their bungalow. They lay there unburied for two days and two nights, and were eventually interred by these two men close to the house. The bodies have since been removed to consecrated ground.

89. About 8 o'clock the same evening the whole of the 4th came over to the Tehseel, asked the sentry what regiment he belonged to, called out to all true Mahomedans to come over and join them, and demanded that the "Kafirs" should be given up.

90. They at first insisted that the Tehseel should be opened, in order that they might rob the Treasury, and murder the Christians. Imad Hossein, Tehseeldar, behaved extremely well, and stoutly refused to listen to the troopers, though taunted, threatened, and abused by them. Daood Khan, Duffadar of sowars, went out to the mutineers, and asked them what they wanted. They replied, the lives of the Christians. He answered, that though the Europeans had certainly come to the Tehseel, they were no longer there; if they were, he would not give them up. They then demanded the treasure. He said he had nothing to do with the money, and no power over it, and re-entered the Tehseel, when it was settled to give up the amount in the chest, about Rupees 6,000. On receiving it, the sowars left in a body, going round by Aboopoorah, with the intention apparently of discovering whether the Europeans had again sought refuge there, and passed on to Shamlee, where they were joined by their comrades.

91. Before their departure they burnt Mr. Berford's bungalow, and carried off Messrs. Grant's and Berford's horses. The staging bungalow and Mr. O'Farrell's bungalow were burnt the same night.

92. Lieutenant Smith's men were disaffected for some time previous to the actual mutiny and murder of their officer, which may have been hastened by the intelligence the Shutur sowar brought from Shamlee, or of the trifling altercation in the lines, of which two distinct accounts are given.
93. One says that a Pathan, who had been a short time before in the Mozaffernugger Jail, and a thorough reprobate, was constantly with the troopers; that this man had gone on the previous night to the grog shop in the town, where he made a disturbance, and severely beat the Abkar. The man next day complained to Mr. Berford, who said the offender should be punished. On Lieutenant Smith's going to the lines, as already described, one of the sowars came forward, and said the man was a relative of his, and should not be punished; that his horse had been ill the previous night, and that he had sent him to obtain some native spirit to administer to the animal, but the Kulal had refused to give him any, and abused him, and that the man was not to blame. On this Lieutenant Smith is reported to have said,—"If you try and shield such a known bad character, and claim him as a relative, it is evident that you are yourself as bad," or words to that effect, when another trooper came up behind, and shot him in the side.

94. The other account is, that Lieutenant Smith was finding fault with a "bargeer" of the troops for having appropriated some Government iron, when the man replied angrily, and there and then shot him.

95. Lieutenant Smith's life might probably have been saved, had the rest of the party known at once that his first wound was not mortal, as they might, in that case, have taken him along with them to the Tehseel, guarded, like themselves, by the Jail sepoys, who appear to have behaved well throughout, with the exception of one or two black sheep, who assisted in plundering the Treasury.

96. The conduct of the Tehsildar, Imad Hossein, on the occasion of the 4th Irregular troopers appearing before the Tehseel, seems to have been particularly good, but fully equalled by that of Daoood Khan, Duffadar. Had either of these two men wavered in the slightest, or shown any inclination to agree to the demands of the sowars, nothing could have saved the lives of the Europeans. They would, one and all, to a certainty, have been murdered. To these two individuals, the Europeans concealed in the Tehseel owe their lives.

97. The Tehsildar, who is an educated and clever man, had the sagacity, throughout to perceive that the British Government must eventually win the day, and all along told the people, that whatever might be the loss inflicted on the European force in this country, large and irresistible reinforcements would, without doubt, be sent from Europe. But Daoood Khan is a wholly uneducated and illiterate man. His conduct is especially worthy of notice. He had himself been a trooper in that very regiment. He not only did not join them when they mutini-d, but used all his influence to get them away from the Tehseel, and when he failed, declared he would defend his officers to the last. The whole body of district sowars resolutely refused to have anything to say to the mutineers, though many were old Irregular Cavalry men, and from first to last, in these disturbances, not one man has deserted.

98. The Jail guard were quite prepared to resist the troopers, and Mr. Dalby states, that not a single man, of their number, in any way responded to the call of the troopers, when summoned in the name of the Prophet. It is indeed said that they offered to fire on the mutineers, but were prevented, as the authorities did not think they could be fully trusted, and that the townspeople might rise and side with the sowars, and attack the Tehseel in the rear. This suspicion seems to have been unfounded, as they remained perfectly quiet, and save three or four known bad characters, none of the city people left with the troopers.

99. About 9 next morning (the 22nd), the villagers collected in very large numbers round the town, but were completely dispersed by a party of district sowars and Jail guard sepoys sent against them.

100. On the 26th, Lieutenant Clarke arrived with a party of the 3rd Light Cavalry, and on the morning of the 2nd July, Mr. Edwards marched
in with 130 Goorkhas of the Nusseree Battalion, under command of Lieutenant Chester. Lieutenant Chester was next day recalled by Major Bagott, and eighty of the Goorkhas, thus leaving only fifty men.

101. Mr. Berford, the Magistrate and Collector, left on the night of the 4th along with the Goorkhas. Mr. Edwards, therefore, in accordance with the instructions received by Mr. Spankie, from the late Commissioner, Mr. Greathed, assumed charge of the district in both departments.

102. It will be clearly perceived from the foregoing statement, that the authorities at that time at Mozuffernuggur had great difficulties to contend with, and no real force to aid their efforts at preserving the peace of the station and district,—though there is no doubt that some of Mr. Berford's acts, such as closing the Public Offices, and releasing the prisoners, were far more calculated to increase than to repress the disturbances; and though it is evident that much could have been effected which was not even attempted, still great credit is surely due to those who in such trying circumstances never left their district.

103. The chief error committed by the authorities was, in not going themselves, and examining into the amount of truth, in the alarming reports brought to them—in placing matters really in the hands of the natives, instead of acting promptly and energetically on their own judgment. Firmness, decision, and self-reliance, were absolutely necessary for the crisis, and were unfortunately not sufficiently displayed.

104. The total absence of any intelligence from Meerut, during the first few days of the outbreak, is greatly to be regretted. It gave a color of truth to the greatly exaggerated tales, which were circulated by the natives, and prevented their being satisfactorily refuted or denied.

105. It is also a matter of surprise and regret that no force, however small, was sent from Meerut, to assist the authorities in holding the district. Had this been done, the great loss to Government and to private individuals would certainly have been prevented. Even without such force, there can be little doubt that if the district sowars had been made to patrol the station on some regular plan, and the Police generally had been made proper use of, the plunder of the Treasury by the townspeople, and the burning of the Government offices, might also have been prevented.

106. On his arrival, Mr. Edwards found the district much disorganized; all work seemed to have been suspended; and some Government servants, with whom had been found large sums of money, plundered from the Treasury, had not only remained unpunished, but had been permitted to retain their appointments. The Tehseels were certainly in existence, but not the least attempt was made to collect the Government revenue. The Thannahs were also nominally at work, but the occupants, as in the Tehseels, did nothing but clamour for their pay, and there was no money wherewith to settle their claims.

107. His first efforts were principally directed to,—1st, the restoration of confidence in the town of Mozuffernuggur; 2nd, the re-establishment of the Jail; 3rd, keeping open the communication along the several lines of road, and insisting on the Police, posted at the several Chowkies, regularly patrolling along their several beats; 4th, the security of the Government and District Daks, in their progress through the district; and 5th, the realization of the revenue for May and June. Of these the latter was, as might be supposed, by far the most difficult. Mr. Edwards insisted on the collections being at once renewed, and on the Tehseeldars and Peshkars ceasing to shut themselves up in their Tehseels, but proceeding to the villages, and in person collecting the revenue, providing at the same time for the prompt punishment of those who dared to show resistance or contumacy.

108. The people generally regarded the payment of the Government demand as a decided proof of allegiance; the idea was fostered and worked out. Payments commenced at once in the Mozuffernuggur, Khatowlee, and Thannah
Bhown Tehseels, and after a few days in Poor; but not a rupee was collected in Shamlee till a considerably later date.

109. The city of Mozuffernuggur was, when Mr. Edwards arrived, in a greatly perturbed state. The shops were all closed, and the townpeople were accustomed to fly on hearing any report of an intended attack on dacoits. These reports, as well as others, stating that our forces at Delhi had been driven from their position, the ships carrying European troops from England wrecked, and others of a similar nature were so frequent, and evidently spread with the view of doing mischief, and unsettling men's minds, that deeming it necessary to put a stop to them at once, the Magistrate proclaimed through the city, by beat of drum, his intention of hanging, then and there, the first person caught propagating such falsehoods. This had the desired effect. Dacoites and other heinous crimes almost entirely ceased throughout the district; order was in a great measure restored; the revenue was being rapidly collected, and all going on quietly and satisfactorily till the beginning of September, when the disturbances arose in Thannah Bhawun.

110. Throughout the Doab, owing to the protraction of the operations against Delhi, dissatisfaction was spreading widely and rapidly. The rebels of the Burrouth Pergunnah, in the Meerut District, were getting bolder, and the men of the south-west part of the Mozuffernuggur district began to join them.

111. On the 2nd of September, Mr. Grant, Joint-Magistrate, with a party of the 3rd Cavalry under Captain Galloway, proceeded from Shamlee, where they were at the time stationed, to the village of Purasowlee, in the Kandlah Pergunnah, with the object of apprehending Khyratee Khan, Pindaree, a shareholder in the village, and a man of considerable influence, from whose village a number of men had joined the Burrouth rebels, and who was reported to have gone to Delhi, to obtain aid in troops from the King, and to have returned, having failed in his object.

112. Mr. Grant's party met with resistance and some loss. The cavalry were of course useless against walls, and the party retired on Shamlee, having altogether failed in their object. This successful opposition to Government troops gave encouragement to all rebels in that and the neighbouring pargannah. Jowla, a royal village adjoining, made common cause with Purasowlee. The force of Khyratee Khan being rapidly joined by the disaffected, not only of the district, but from Burrouth and Bijroun in that of Meerut, proceeded to Boodhanah, where they ousted the Government Police, and took possession of the fort.

113. Mr. Edwards, anxious to move out against the insurgents at once, as each day's delay served but to strengthen their bands, and render them bolder, was unable to do so, as more than half the Goorkhas, the only infantry he had, were on their way to Meerut with treasure. Previous to their return, Mr. Grant's representations were so strong as to the almost certainty of an immediate attack on Shamlee, that Mr. Edwards detached to that place every man of the Punjab Cavalry then in Mozuffernuggur, recalled Mr. Palmer and the twenty-five troopers with him from Meeranpore, and those attached to the Tehseeladar of Poor, and as Mr. Grant's requests for reinforcements became each time more urgent, on the arrival of the party from Meerut with two mountain train guns, moved out direct to Shamlee.

1131. Khyratee Khan, with Bhugtah and Lajjah of Bijroun, purposed attacking in force the party at Shamlee. They met, however, with an unexpected difficulty in the Goouras, who assembled to oppose their passage through their villages. This, and the fact of their discovering that the force at Shamlee had been strengthened, made them retire on Jowlah.

114. There were considerable bodies of men collected in several villages, whose intention was to concentrate their force at a stated time at one common rendezvous, and from there assume the offensive. Their designs were
however temporarily abandoned, by the retirement of Khyratee Khan and his allies, as already mentioned. Mr. Edwards then determined to punish the Rangurh village of "Hurhur," lying directly on the road between that place and Thannah Bhowun.

115. The people of this village had, since the commencement of the disturbances, waged war against all comers, and by robbing or murdering every traveller that passed along, had succeeded in completely closing the road.

116. No opposition was met with, though probably such was at first intended, as loaded matchlocks, with the matches lighted, were discovered.

117. All arms found in the village were secured, and the cattle driven away.

118. Large quantities of plundered property, consisting of sugar, gum, dyes, birch bark, &c., amounting to about twenty-five cart loads, were found. These had formed consignments from firms in Bhowanee, in the Robtuck District, to mercantile houses in Shamlee, and had been robbed, when passing the village. As much of this property as could be removed was taken to Shamlee, and one of the captured Zemindars released, on security, for the purpose of bringing in the remainder, which, for want of carriage, was left behind. The village was not burnt.

119. When the force was about to return, a man arrived from Thannah Bhowun, and reported a Mahomedan rising in that town, headed by Enayut Ali Khan, nephew of Qazee Myhboob Ali, and brother of Abdool Raheem Khan, who had been shortly before executed at Seharunpore by Mr. Spankie. By the most gross misrepresentations, this act of justice was made the cause of an extensive Mahomedan insurrection, in which all the plundering tribes of the neighbourhood joined. The Tehseel and Thannah were plundered and destroyed, the officials escaped, the principal part of them to Shamlee.

120. As the men had then been out twelve hours, and required rest and food, it was deemed advisable to return to Shamlee, instead of proceeding at once to Thannah Bhowun, as recommended by the Tehseeldar. It was fortunate this was done, for the small and fatigued force would certainly have failed in getting into the town, and the inevitable result would have been the loss of the camp at Shamlee, which had been left with a very small and wholly inadequate guard.

121. Information was received during the 12th that the sowars, chuprasies, &c., collecting the revenue in Pergunnah Jhinjaneh, had been expelled from the villages, while some of those employed, on a like duty in Pergunnah Kandleb, had been robbed of everything they possessed, and barely escaped with their lives.

122. Disaffection generally prevailed from the line of the Rindun, going westward, including portions of the Pergunnahs of Boodbaneh, Shikarpoor, Bugrah, and Churhawul, with the entire Pergunnah of Thannah Bhowun, and the Jat villages of Shamlee, while the Kandle Pergunnah, as far as the Jumna Canal and part of Jhinjaneh, was also disturbed.

123. The Tehseeldars of Thannah Bhowun and Shamlee were decidedly of opinion that the main danger to be apprehended was from the combination of the Jats. Both were satisfied that for four or five days at least, the Qazee and his people would not move out of their town, but confine themselves to levying men and making preparations, and Mr. Edwards determined to attack Jowlee and Purasowlee, giving the following reason: "That blow, if successful, would in all probability be the means of breaking up the combination, and removing our chief difficulty, would enable us to replace the Government Police in Boodbaneh, and return to Shamlee, to keep in check the Thannah Bhowun insurgents. By this means also I should be enabled to re-open the direct communication between Kurnaul and Meerut, one of the main objects for which I had been directed to proceed to Shamlee."
124. The severe illness of Lieutenant Cayler, Commanding the Detach-
ment, prevented any movement on the 13th. The force started at 2 A.M., on
the 14th, with the intention of proceeding direct to Boodhancli, and taking
possession of the fort, said to be garrisoned by about 150 men, leaving the
baggage there, and after the men had taken their food, proceeding against
Jowiah and Purasowlee. The original plan was, however, prevented by the
force being attacked on the line of march by the men assembled at the former
place. They were at once driven back with great loss, and the village entered
at the point of the bayonet. The main body escaped among the high crops,
but the number of dead outside, and in the village, were estimated at 200.

125. This little affair took so much time, that it was determined to go on
at once to Boodhancli, as the force might there meet with serious resistance
from the men in the fort: however the fort, which is of considerable size and
strength, was evacuated, on their approach. Some time elapsed before an
entry could be made, as the gates were closed, and had to be blown in, which
was effected by Mr. Palmer with the mountain train guns. Camp was not
reached till 4½ P.M., the whole party being thoroughly exhausted from fatigue
and exposure to the sun.

126. Of course constant information of all that was passing was received
in Meerut; indeed, apparently better than the Magistrates could get in their
districts. Warning of the rising of Thannah Bhowun was sent to Mr. Spankie,
who however at first discredited it, and so Mr. Edwards, but owing to the
state of the country, it was difficult to get any communication to him without
great delay. Mr. Spankie was urged to co-operate, to the utmost of his power,
with Mr. Edwards, to crush the insurrection in Thannah Bhowun, and all the
reinforcements that could be spared from Meerut, viz., 100 Seikli Infantry
and two Horse Artillery guns, were sent to the latter by the direct road to
Shamlee on Siruhaneh, and joined Mr. Edwards at 7 P.M. on the 13th, and
the whole party marched to Shamlee that night.

127. But the Tehseel of Shamlee had been surrounded, and the Teh-
seelbar of that place, Ibraheem Khan, who had behaved excellently from
the commencement of the disturbances; the Tehseeldar of Thannah Bhowun, who,
driven out by the insurgents, had taken refuge in the Shamlee Tehseel, and
nearly the whole of the subordinate officials, with a party of the 1st Punjab
Cavalry, who behaved most loyally, were overwhelmed; and after having, under
the most solemn promises of safety, given up their arms, were massacred in
the Musjid in the Tehseel by the Thannah Bhowun rebels, who, pretending
to be fighting for their religion, thus treacherously murdered Mahomedans
infinitely better than themselves. Rupees 8,483-1-3 of Government treasure
were plundered from the two Tehseelars.

128. Owing to the disaffection of the inhabitants of this part of the
country, the only intelligence Mr. Edwards received of this attack, was an
urzee from Mohur Singh, Zemindar of Shamlee, telling him that the Tehseel
was attacked. This urzee was, there is every reason to believe, written some
time after the massacre had taken place. No report was received from any of
the Thannah or Tehseel people; nor till his arrival at Shamlee did he learn the
full extent of the massacre. Even those who had escaped, had been rendered
so helpless from fear, that they had not even sent notice of the outrage which
had been committed.

129. The following is a list of those killed and wounded at Shamlee:—
Ibrahim Khan, Tehseeldar of Shamli, Bukhtawur Singh, Tehseeldar of Thannah
Bhowun, Bhownay Saboy, Thannahdar of Shamlee, and nine men of the 1st
Punjab Cavalry, besides inferior native officials, chuprasies, burkundazes, &c.
A separate application has been made in the statement of Natives who have
distinguished themselves by good services,—regarding Ibrahim Khan's family
and those of the other native officers who were killed at Shamlee.

130. Ibrahim Khan behaved most nobly. Himself a Mussulman, he
resisted the Mahomedans, and directed the men with him to fire on the green
flag. He was nobly supported by the men of the Punjab Cavalry, who shot the standard bearer dead.

131. The heirs of all who perished will of course be provided for by Government, but for those of Ibrahim Khan, who showed great energy and marked loyalty throughout, a handsome provision should be made by the grant of landed property in Robilkund, where a near relative, Abdoollah Khan, who has also distinguished himself by his loyalty, can assist the family to manage it.

132. The Tehseel was a place of considerable strength, and previous to Mr. Edwards' departure, both Tehseeldars declared their conviction that it could be held against all comers;—that there was not the least danger to be apprehended, and that the garrison left in it was well able to resist successfully any attack.

133. Mr. Edwards intended proceeding at once to Thannah Bhowun, and attacking the insurgents in their stronghold; but receiving repeated letters from Mr. Grant, that Mozuffernuggur was threatened, and hearing also that vast crowds of Mahomedans had joined the Qasee's party, he deemed it advisable to fall back on Mozuffernuggur, as in the event of receiving any check at Thannah Bhowun, the almost certain result would have been an attack by the rebels on the Sudder station; whereas, by advancing on Thannah Bhowun from Mozuffernuggur, the station would be secure from any such danger.

134. Urgent orders were sent from Meerut to Mr. Edwards not to attempt an attack on Thannah Bhowun till he had been further reinforced, and he had a force sufficiently strong to ensure success; but those orders did not reach him in time, and with some reinforcements of cavalry from Scharunpore, he marched against the rebel town. He laid the best information he could procure before the Military Officers, and left it with them to decide, whether they had a sufficient force to attack the place, declaring at the same time his own belief, that it would be keenly defended. Captain Smith determined to attack it. On approaching the place, large bodies of men were seen drawn out in the "Baghs" (plantation of trees), and behind the high standing crops. The artillery opened fire, and speedily dispersed them. The guns however could not do much, owing to the view being obstructed by trees, up to the very walls. Some Goorkhas and Seikhs were next sent out as skirmishers, to clear the cultivation, which they effected; but Lieutenant Johnstone, Commanding the Seikhs, was wounded by a musket ball in the arm, and obliged to go to the rear.

135. After a time, finding that the skirmishers were unable to keep down the fire of the town, the rebels firing from behind walls, the skirmishers were directed to be withdrawn. The force then moved more to the left, where the ground was clear, and the horse artillery again opened fire; but finding after a few rounds that little or no effect was produced, the rebels keeping under cover, the guns were withdrawn.

136. A storming party of the Seikhs and Goorkhas, the former under Captain Smith, who commanded the whole force,—the latter under Lieutenant Cayler, advanced to storm the town, which they did under a smart fire of musketry, and after clearing and taking possession of several detached buildings, which were well defended, charged over the wall into the town, and got possession of two guns, which they held for some time; but losing a number of men, and the supports failing to come to their aid, they were at length obliged to retire, leaving the captured guns behind, as there were no means of removing them. The artillery fired a few shots into the town, which were not replied to, and the force retired towards Mozuffernuggur. The line of baggage, when en route, was attacked by a large party of horse and foot, near the village Kheaooree. They were at once charged in gallant style by two detachments of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, one led on by S. S. Melville, Esq., C.S., and the other by M. Lowe, Esq., C.S.;—the latter was severely wounded, receiving three sword cuts, while his horse was also much cut. The insurgents
bled in utter disorder, and were cut up by the cavalry to the number of about 100. The rest escaped through the high crops. No further opposition was met with.

136½. Mr. Edwards observes:—"The semi-official letter, telling me on no account to attack Thannah Bhowun, as it was far too strong for our small force, reached me just as we retired. Had it arrived earlier, as it certainly should have done, your order would have been acted up to; but your previous communication had directed me to proceed at once to crush the rebels, if, after the arrival of reinforcements, we considered ourselves strong enough."

137. Though the attack on Thannah Bhowun failed, and the officers, Captain Smith, and Lieutenants Cayler, Johnstone, and Fraser, have consequently not obtained the praise, which success would have secured to them, their gallant conduct deserves honorable mention. Lieutenant Fraser could not, of course, leave his guns, and Lieutenant Johnstone was wounded in the first attack. Captain Smith and Lieutenant Cayler forced their way into the town, under circumstances which should entitle them to reward for distinguished bravery. Captain Smith was severely wounded, and has lost the use of his hand. Lieutenant Cayler escaped in a most wonderful way. Mr. Edwards says, that Lieutenant Cayler was under such a hot and close fire, that his clothes were even burnt in many places. Storming a strong place, as it was subsequently ascertained Thannah Bhowun was, obstinately defended as it also was with only about seventy or eighty Goorkhas, and fresh Seikh soldiers taking two guns, and holding their own, under a withering fire, though they were eventually obliged to retire, because the rest of the small force could not be persuaded to advance, though Messrs. Edwards, Palmer and Lowe did all that could be done to induce them, was a desperately gallant piece of work. Lieutenant Cayler, moreover, distinguished himself by another act of heroism, which alone, under more favorable circumstances, would have won for him the Victoria Cross. After calling in vain on his men to go and bring in the body of a wounded Goorkha, who was lying in an open space, much exposed to the enemy's fire, Lieutenant Cayler himself, with one brave Seikh, afterwards killed, went through a heavy fire, and picked up and brought the wounded Goorkha in, and thus saved his life, for the man recovered.

137½. It was most unfortunate, that when Mr. Spankie did credit the rising in Thannah Bhowun, he was only able to send his assistants, Messrs. Melville and Lowe, with about 100 of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, to help Mr. Edwards, and that Major Bagott, Commanding the Nusseeree Battalion, who had, including recruits, who might have guarded the station for the time, above 450 Goorkhas of all ranks, though urged by Mr. Spankie to assist, could not detach a man to aid in the suppression of this outbreak, and that aid was not called for from Landour, till, from the failure of the Mozuffer-nuggur party, danger to Seharunpore was apprehended, when the most urgent requisitions were sent. Had this been done earlier, and bad assistance been secured from Roorkee, there is little doubt that a force sufficient to destroy the Thannah Bhowun rebels might have been collected.

138. Major Bagott has given his reasons for not weakening the force at Seharunpore; and Mr. Spankie has shown that he did all that it occurred to him he could do, and I do not mean to impugn the correctness, in a military point of view, of the Commanding Officer's decision, or Mr. Spankie's efforts to assist the Mozuffer-nuggur authorities, when I repeat that it was unfortunate that the co-operation from the Seharunpore side was not more effectual, for on receipt of the intelligence of the return to Mozuffer-nuggur of Mr. Edwards' party, it became necessary to call in the only troops available—those that had been watching the Malagurh rebels, whereby they eventually escaped. This small column, under Major Sawyer of the 6th Dragoons, reached Mozuffer-nuggur by forced marches, and being joined by the troops there, went against Thannah Bhowun, which was evacuated by the rebels. The leaders of the insurrection escaped down the Burouth Fergunna, and by Malagurh into
Rohilkund. The column marched through the western peripheries of the Mozuffernuggur and Meerut districts, putting down all rebels. Delhi was taken, and all opposition to Government authority ceased; and under Mr. Edwards' management, the district was restored to order, in which it has been maintained up to the present time, with the exception of a few petty invasions of the Bijnour rebels.

139. Once they came across the river Ganges, which was fordable, in many places, and burnt the Thannah Bokhurhere on the 3rd of December 1857, doing no other damage.

140. Once they crossed in considerable force, and burnt the Thannah at Meeranpoor on the 5th of January, when the movable column was about two marches off; only a very small body of troops with Mr. Edwards, about a march off, went against the rebels forthwith, but not in time to catch them before they crossed the river.

141. On another occasion, a small party came over and plundered a merchant of the village of Ferozpoor, on the 31st March, to the extent of Rupees 1,000, and disappeared again before morning.

142. With a very inconsiderable number of troops to guard a long line of river, it was impossible to prevent these petty raids; and it is highly creditable to Colonel Baird Smith, who had command of the troops, and to the officers under him, and to the Magistrate, that a large rebel force of about 8,000 men, with a number of guns, were by such a small column kept so effectually in check, with the exception of the very dregs who were summarily punished. The people showed no inclination to join them, at which the rebels loudly expressed their disappointment.

143. All the revenue of the district has been collected, with the exception of Rupees 2 or 3,000, the realization of which it has been thought proper to suspend for the present, as the villages were completely plundered during the disturbances, and the cultivators, Goorjurs, had joined the rebels on the east of the Ganges.

144. Mr. Edwards has been deservedly rewarded, by being appointed to the permanent charge of the district he restored to order.

145. For what happened previous to Mr. Edwards' arrival, Mr. Grant cannot be considered to be responsible. He could not, while Mr. Berford was in the district, without orders of superior authority, take upon himself the control of affairs. Mr. Greathed ordered the removal of Mr. Grant to another district, and therefore was not likely to have sanctioned his interfering with Mr. Berford.

146. Mr. Grant fully accomplished what he was deputed to Shamlee to effect; the Kurnaun road was kept open, and was, with the exception of a few days, during the Thannah Bhowun insurrection, an unfailing line of communication. Mr. Grant was, with the sanction of Government, retained at Mozuffernuggur, and has since been working well in the district, in which he steadily remained throughout all the dangers with which, beyond all doubt, the officers of this out-station were eventually surrounded.
Mr. G. Palmer, Joint-Magistrate of Bijnour, who was temporarily posted to this district, when driven from his own, was for some time posted at Meerunpoor, in the south-west corner of the district, where he did good service, keeping the discontent in check and realizing revenue, and restoring order, and keeping up communication with the loyal landholders of Bijnour. He was with the force that fought at Joulah, and took the Bhoorhanee Fort, as mentioned above, and at Thannah Bhowun. He took the two mountain train guns under his own charge, as has been separately reported.

Lieutenant Melville Clarke, with the 3rd Light Cavalry troopers, did good service in this district; at a time when few officers trusted Hindustanee soldiers, he trusted his men and kept them at their duty.

When the column from Roorkee was about to cross into Rohilkund, the Magistrates were required by the military authorities to disarm the districts of Scharunpoor and Muzzuff-ruggur, as a precautionary measure to make the rear secure. A large number of arms were taken by Messrs. Spangie and Edwards, and the officers under them; but I question whether the districts have been thoroughly disarmed.

MEERUT.

All the rumours by which the minds of the native soldiers were prepared for revolt, were industriously disseminated at Meerut, especially those regarding the use of polluting grease in the preparation of the new cartridges, and the mixture of ground bones in flour, by which, it was said, Government desired to destroy the religion of the people.

One of the many emissaries who were moving about the country, appeared at Meerut in April, ostensibly as a futeer, riding on an elephant with followers, and having with him horses and native carriages. The frequent visits of the men of the native regiments to him attracted attention, and he was ordered through the police to leave the place. He apparently complied; but it is said, he stayed some time in the lines of the 20th Native Infantry.

The Officer Commanding the 3rd Native Cavalry, commenced testing the readiness of his men to use the new cartridges.

A trooper of the name of Brijmohun announced to the regiment that he had used them, and they would all have to do so.

All Hindus and Mahomedans bound themselves by an oath, not to use them.

The burning of Brijmohun's house on the 13th of April was the first of the incendiary fires which then became frequent.

On the 23rd of April, the skirmishers of the 3rd Cavalry who were paraded for the purpose of practising the new drill, to a man refused to use the old cartridges, which they had been using for years. They were tried by court-martial.

On the 9th of May, at a parade of all the troops at the station, the sentence was announced to these mutineers, by which eighty were condemned to ten years' imprisonment, and five to five years.

Their uniform was stripped from off them, fetters were fastened on their legs before the assembled troops, and they were marched off to the new Jail, under a guard from Her Majesty's 60th Rifles, and made over to the Magistrate, who applied for an extra guard. One was sent from the 20th Regiment Native Infantry.

A native official reported on the 10th that the natives had fully expected a serious disturbance on this occasion, and that the Goojurs of the neighbouring villages, and bad characters generally, were ready in thousands to take advantage of it, and plunder the city. But all went off quietly, and the crisis was evidently considered to be past.
161. A rumour that the Europeans were going to take possession of the magazines of the Native regiments, evidently prevailed on the 9th.

162. A note was received by the clerk of the Judge's Court, about 6½ p.m., from his brother in cantonments, saying he had better come home, as there was a disturbance going on in cantonments, the Rifles having come to take the native magazines. There was no foundation for this; all was quiet, but the rumour gained strength evidently with another, that 2,000 setters were being forged for the native soldiers.

163. Between 5 and 6 p.m., on Sunday, the 10th of May, the cry that "the Europeans were coming to take the magazine," rang through the Sudder Bazar and the 20th Native Infantry lines; the sipahees rushed to their arms, and the mutiny commenced. The men of the 20th regiment began the butchery; shooting Colonel Finnis of the 11th, who had approached to pacify them; Captain Macdonald of the 20th, who tried to control them, and Mr. Tregear, Inspector of Schools, who had unfortunately gone to the lines.

164. The rest of the officers of both regiments were shot at and driven off the parade, or urged by their men to leave, who were excited by ill-designing men, and false rumours into a revolt, for which they were ready, or frightened into it by pure dread. The two regiments, the 20th and 11th, fair specimens of the feelings of the whole native army, prepared for their further depredation.

165. Before a shot had been fired, the inhabitants of the Sudder Bazar went out, armed with swords, spears, clubs, any weapon they could lay hands on, collected in crowds, in every lane and alley, and at every outlet of the bazaars; and the residents of the wretched hamlets which had been allowed to spring up all round it, and between it and the city, were to be seen similarly armed, pouring out to share in what they evidently knew was going to happen.

166. The European soldiers who were at the time in the bazar, were at once savagely attacked by crowds, in many instances headed by the police in uniforms.

167. The officers who first hurried to report what was going on, to higher authorities, were with difficulty able to pass through the crowds, who scowled upon them, some partly concealing, some showing their weapons, as if they were eager to use them. Many of those who came a little later were mobbed and butchered.

168. In the meanwhile, a large party of the 3rd Cavalry, a few in uniforms with their horses fully accoutred, but most in undress and many with their horses, just as they had been hastily taken from the stables, with watering bridle and blanket, but all armed with sword and pistol, rushed round to the new Jail, into which they were allowed to enter without the slightest opposition from the Jail guard, or that of the 20th.

169. They dug out of the wall the gratings of some of the windows of the ward, in which the eighty-five mutineers were confined, and took their "comrades away, the guard of the 20th accompanying, and the armed guard of the Jail soon followed. None of the other convicts in this Jail, in number about 800, were released by the cavalry troops, nor was any injury done by them to the buildings. The jailer's house and property were left untouched, and the jailer himself and his wife, though Europeans, were not molested. It would appear that the forbearance towards Europeans, in this instance, was owing to the jailer having behaved as kindly, as consistently with his duty he could, to the convicted mutineers.

170. Small parties of cavalry troopers, with cries of "Yah Ullah," and "Deen Deen!" rushed into the city, and called upon the people to join in a religious war against the infidels. Having got together some of the butchers and bad characters of the city, they attacked and destroyed the Teheeseelees and the Judge's Office.
171. About 300 or 400 sipahies released the convicts from the old Jail, which is between the city and the native lines, and which contained about 720 prisoners altogether.

172. In less than an hour, from the first alarm, numerous bodies of the mutinous soldiers had swept into the enclosures of the officers’ quarters, and crowds of the low denizens of the Sudder Bazar and its environs, hangers-on of the native soldiery, low Mahomedan rascals and thieves, but only such from the city; many of the prisoners released from the old Jail with men of the guard; all parties always headed and urged on by mutineers. Troopers and sipahies were plundering, burning and destroying in every direction, and savagely hunting to death every European, every Christian, man, woman or child they could find.

173. Owing to the straggling arrangement of the cantonments and station, and the distance of the Native Infantry and Cavalry lines, from the other end, more than an hour elapsed before what had occurred, and was going on, was generally known.

174. In part of the civil lines, at 6½ P.M., the quiet stillness of a Sunday evening was unbroken, and the European community of that part of the station were on their way to Church, and only learnt on the road what had happened from people flying to their houses, or officers hurrying to their posts, along the mall, where groups of native servants were collected, looking at the volumes of smoke which began to rise above the trees, in the direction of the native cantonments.

175. It has been assumed that the detached parties of the native troops, posted in different parts of the station, mutinied at the same time as the main body on the parades of their regiment.

176. In the east end of the station, such guards, even later than 6½ P.M., allowed officers to pass unhurt, and in some instances saluted them. Two guards listened quietly to the request of the Judge and Magistrate, to the General and Brigadier, to send guards to the Treasury and Jail; these immediately afterwards commenced firing on every one that passed, and then by round-about roads, moved off to join their comrades. But some remained steady to their duty; most of those at the Treasury, the place of the greatest temptation, behaved admirably, though some deserted; the native officers and men made over the treasure safe to the European guard, which was happily ordered to defend it.

177. The Deputy Paymaster’s guard faithfully kept their treasure for many days.

178. Both these last-mentioned guards were from the 11th Native Infantry, one from the 20th stood firm at the Cantonment Joint-Magistrate’s.

179. In the midst of the tumult, one troop of the 3rd Cavalry was ordered out, made to accoutre themselves and their horses fully, paraded and marched off to prevent, if possible, the rescue of the mutineers from the new Jail, led by Captain Craigie, and Lieutenant now Captain Melville Clarke. This troop passed under the walls of the town when the uproar was at its height, and so round to the Jail, but found the mutineers had been taken away. Lieutenant Clarke actually rode out from the head of this troop, and run his sword through a trooper of this regiment, who was insulting a European lady, and Captain Craigie gave the wretch the finishing stroke. It is probable, that owing to the confusion and dust, the troopers did not know that the officers were so disposing of one of their own men, and that had they known it, the officers’ lives would have been taken at once. But as it was, these gallant Englishmen handled this troop, as if mutiny was a crime unknown to their men, and took them back in order to their own parade ground; and later, a party of the men of this regiment escorted some of their officers into the Dragoon lines, and another party guarded Captain and Mrs. Craigie and a young lady, staying with them throughout the night, and took them safely
to the European cantonments at daylight. Altogether about eighty or ninety
men of this regiment remained throughout staunch.

180. Many an anxious eye and ear were strained that night, watching
for the expected approach of British soldiers, or for sounds of their having got
at the mutineers, and gangs of plunderers and murderers, whose destructive
advance could be distinctly traced, as it progressed from house to house, by
the upward rush of flame, as roof after roof fell in, but in vain.

181. It was hardly known whether the tramp of horses and clang of
steel scabbards, once heard passing rapidly, not into the midst of the tumult,
but away from it from the Dragoon lines to the east end of cantonments and
thence towards the Jail, was that of the Carabineers, or of the Native Cavalry.*

182. At last, but after some time, the booming of guns gave hopes
that the punishment of the mutineers and suppression of the mutiny had
commenced. But the firing stopped, and all was again as quiet as, with
flames roaring and murderers yelling, the night could be. A happy few,
hearing the voices of the riflemen, came out of their hiding places and were
saved.

183. The salvo of artillery was as it were a parting salute shotted, it is
true, but innocuous to the mutineers, who drew off and commenced their
march to Delhi, there to mature their mutiny into a general rebellion, and
to seize, in that unprotected but nobly defended Arsenal, the means for a
protracted opposition to Government, and there to exceed by the number of
victims, and the relentless violence of the murderers, the massacre at Meerut.

184. They went not, as has been supposed, in military array, but in
straggling disorder, some along the main road, but most along bye-roads, for
fear of the pursuit they expected; some dispersed to their homes, some stop-
ped in villages near the station, some went other roads altogether. A number
of the troopers were well down the Haupur road next morning.

185. Many of the Sudder Bazar and city ruffians, and the camp follow-
ers, went off with the mutineers; and the remainder having spread fire and
destruction nearly up to the Treasury, stopped when they found it guarded by
riflemen, and retired with their plunder.

186. The European troops were withdrawn, and a close line of sentries
posted round their barracks and lines.

187. About midnight, the Goojurs crowded in thousands to attack
those parts of the station which had been hitherto spared. They set fire to
the Sapper and Miner lines. A fine barrack for Europeans, and the native huts
were destroyed and the Sergeant's bungalow. The only occupants of this
quarter, a Conductor and his family, fell into the hands of these savages; the
father and some of the children were cut to pieces, the mother with the rest of
the children; each individual dreadfully wounded and ill-treated, reached the
Artillery Hospital, where another of the children died soon after admission.

188. Repeated attacks were made on the house of the Deputy Superin-
tendent of the Ganges Canal, where there were some valuable plans, accounts,
&c.; the servants repulsed the first, and Mr. Parker himself with a double-bar-
relled gun kept off about 200 or 300 assailants, till the appearance of a picket
of Rifles and Carabineers put a stop to all further attempts on that house.

189. Other houses in this neighbourhood were saved, by the good con-
duct of the Police sowars, and the guards and private servants of the Judge
and Magistrate.

190. The Goojurs also attempted to burn, and did plunder a part of the
Artillery lines, but were prevented from doing further mischief by the picket.

191. The new Jail was attacked about 2 A.M. Nearly all the guard had
marched off with their arms to Delhi with the mutineers; the rest of the pri-

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* It was a party of Carabineers.
soners, about 800, were released; the Jailer's house burnt; a number of gratings were wrenched out of the barracks; a quantity of iron and wood collected for new buildings was stolen or burnt; altogether about Rupees 22,000 worth of damage was done. But there being nothing in the barracks to pile up, the roofs escaped, as did also a number of valuable roof timbers, lying about in different parts of the enclosure.

192. The invereterate animosity with which the work of destruction was carried out in other places may be judged of by the fact, that houses built entirely of masonry, with nothing inflammable, except the doors and the beams which a considerable height from the ground supported the roof formed of cement, resting on kiln-burnt bricks, were as effectually destroyed as the thatched bungalows. Property, which the miscreants could not carry off, was thrown out and smashed into fragments, evidently pounded to pieces with heavy clubs.

193. The escapes of some of the residents from the midst of these wretches were truly marvellous; and where fiendish barbarism was rampant, some individual natives behaved nobly. It would take too much time and space to detail all; but that of the late Commissioner is a good instance, both of the good conduct of natives and of almost miraculous preservation.

194. Situated near the city, the native lines and the Sudder Bazar, the premises were immediately surrounded; and escape was impossible. The Sirdar Bahadur, Syud Meer Khan Sahib, a pensioner receiving Rupees 600 a month, for aid rendered to the Cabool prisoners, and good conduct in Afghanistan, who had, on hearing the disturbance, immediately joined the Commissioner, offered to escort him to the European lines; but it was decided that there was no hope of the lady escaping through the crowd. He then went out to hold back the mob, and was shot through the thigh, and his horse mortally wounded. This fine Afghan was obliged to retire to the city.* When the mob attacked the house, the Commissioner and his wife, with the wife of one of the residents of the station, retired to the roof; when asked where their master and mistress were, the servants said they had gone to Church; though drawn swords were put to his throat, the Jemadar, Goolab Khan, persisted in this statement, and the other servants were faithfully silent, regarding their master's presence. The house was fired, the flames spread, and longer continuance on the roof became impossible; suffocated with smoke, with feet scorched by the heat of the roof, the party was about to descend, when for a short time the whole body of murderers left to hunt for the Europeans in other places, and directed their attention to the stables and horses, and to the Public Office on the estate. The servants seized the moment to put a ladder to the roof, at the back of the house, got the party down, took them to the garden, and there concealed and guarded them all the night.

195. Two sipahies of the 11th Native Infantry most carefully escorted two ladies with children to the Dragoon Barracks.

196. A Mahomedan in the city sheltered two Christian families, when the act was not only a singular deviation from the general conduct of his sect, but one full of danger to himself.

197. A female servant and washerman succeeded in saving the young children, of a lady, whom also they were attempting to save, veiled in native clothes, when a ruffian drew open the veil, and saw the pale face, and cut the poor mother to pieces.

198. The firm bearing of the Deputy Assistant Commissary-General who stood by his office, till his house was in flames, and a young officer rushed in with his lower jaw shattered by a musket ball, and it was evident the mutinous guard would abstain no longer; the gallant resistance of the Executive Engineer, Grand Trunk Road; the courage with which at least one

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* He came to the Duma Dum the next morning, notwithstanding his wound; and was at the battle of the Hindoo.
woman attacked and wounded her assailants,—these and many other instances of the fortitude with which our countrymen and women met the unexpected onslaught, deserve notice, but cannot be detailed in such a Narrative.

199. If the fact is realized that on many minds the fearful conclusion pressed, that if less than 2,500 native troops dared such an outbreak in the face of an equal number of European soldiers, a fearful trial awaited every Christian in the length and breadth of Hindoostan, some idea will be formed of the horror of that night.

200. A telegram was sent to Agra on the outbreak of the mutiny, but the wire was cut before it could be finished. Expresses were sent off during the night to Mozaffernagar, with instructions to forward the news, and at least one to Delhi, with orders to the Police sowars to ride their horses to death, if necessary, but to get ahead of the mutineers and deliver the letter, high rewards being offered if the message were delivered.

201. At daybreak on the morning of the 11th, a strong force of all arms proceeded to reconnoitre.

202. It is a marvellous thing that, with the dreadful proofs of the night's work in every direction, though groups of savages were actually seen gazing over the awfully mangled and mutilated remains of the victims, that Column did not take immediate vengeance on the Sudder Bazar and its environs, crowded as the whole place was with wretches, hardly concealing their fiendish satisfaction, and when there were probably few houses, from which plundered property might not have been recovered. But the men were restrained, the bodies were collected and placed in the Theatre, in which a dramatic tragedy would have been that night enacted, but for the real and awful one which occurred the night before.

203. The corpses were found grossly mutilated, and in a state which showed they had been exposed to the most wanton insults.

204. Such matters could not be made the subject of judicial enquiry and proved by depositions on oath, without reference to names, and putting on record individual instances, which in mercy to the feelings of relatives should be buried in oblivion. But the fact that the most atrocious indignities had been inflicted after death is as fully proved as anything in this world can be by credible European eye-witnesses, whose accounts have been elicited and confirmed by repeated enquiries through different channels.

205. Generally the ruffians seem to have been too intent upon the destruction of Christians, too eager to kill, to think of any other atrocities till life was extinct, but in one case there is no doubt of the infliction and repetition of the deepest dishonor, and acknowledgment was publicly made that this was attempted in another case on a Christian female, though these were exceptional cases.

206. The European guard having been removed, the line of pickets and sentries being confined to the portion of the station occupied by European troops; on the 11th, the whole of the community withdrew to within the line, and all whose houses were destroyed, or who lived out of the line of sentries and could not get accommodation elsewhere, went into the Dumduma, i.e., the Artillery School of Instruction.

207. In the course of the day, the treasure was removed from the Collector's Kutcherry to the Dumduma, with the exception of some small silver coin and copper pieces, for which conveyance could not be obtained, and which were in the course of the night plundered.

208. The villagers and scoundrels were plundering in all directions openly all day. At night one of the Artillery stables, close to the Dumduma, was burnt down by some incendiaries.

209. In the district, the commission of some of the most heinous crimes began at once. In fact, the Goojurs and released convicts immediately took to way-laying and robbing travellers, and the roads were closed, and the posts were all stopped.
206. Ramdyal, a prisoner confined in the Civil Jail under a decree for arrears of rent, hastened to his village, Bhojpoor, in the Mooradnuggur Tehseelee, during the night of the 10th, and the next day, at daybreak, collected a party and attacked a money-lender, who had a decree against him, and murdered him, and six of his household.

211. On the 11th and 12th, the Tehsee at Sirdhanee was attacked by Ranghrs and Rajpoots; they were beaten off from the Tehseelee, but plundered the bazar. One Kulundar Khan, a Havildar, at once proclaimed himself Ruler, in a village called Nirpoora, in the northern part of Pergunnah Bunawur.

212. On the 12th, fugitives from Delhi came in, with news of the mutiny and massacre there. With the first party were Captain and Mrs. DeTeissier of the Artillery, Major Abbott, Captain Wallace with his family, Captain Hawkey, and Mr. Elton, all of the 74th, and Mr. Murphy, Collector of Customs.

213. Captain Osborn, of the 54th Native Infantry, severely wounded, and who had on that account solicited his companions to leave him behind, and make the best of their way to Meerut, and thence, if possible, send assistance to him, was the only one of another party, which consisted of the gallant Lieutenant Willoughby, by whose order the Delhi Magazine was blown up; Lieutenant Butler and Ensign Angelo, of the 54th Native Infantry; Lieutenant Hyslop, of the 74th Native Infantry; Mr. Stewart, of the Delhi College; and an officer in uniform, name unknown, that reached Meerut. All the others were murdered by the inhabitants of Kombera, a village near the Hindun river, in the Mooradnuggur Tehseelee.

Appendix.

214. The remaining gallant defenders of the Delhi Magazine subsequently reached Meerut.

215. With the exception of Lieutenant Willoughby's party, all these fugitives from Delhi were more or less kindly received by the villagers on the road, whose names deserve to be recorded in this Narrative, and are given below:

216. Daisraj and Dhunah, residents of Sankrood, assisted Colonel Knyvett, Lieutenants Wilson, Gambier, Vibart, Salkeld, Procter, Mr. Marshall, merchant, Captain Forrest and family, and Mr. Fraser, in reaching Meerut, and protected them against the Goojurs.

217. Desraj, resident of Doula, assisted Mrs. Brew and Mrs. O'Brien, sheltered them in his village, and brought them in safety to Meerut.

218. Gholam Mustuffa Khan, Usruf Alee, Kasim Alee, Mahomed Beg, Haibut Alee, Nujujuf Alee, and Shuffaiut Alee, Syud, residents of Mouzah Dhourree, sheltered Lieutenant Osbourne and two other Delhi fugitives, and provided a guard to escort them to Meerut.

219. Dewan Sing, son of Toolsee, a resident of Dhourree, sheltered and assisted Mr. Ryley, Head Clerk of the Delhi Collectorate.

220. Hurnam Bhartee, resident of Dhouroria, saved the infant son of Mr. R. H. Roberts, of the Customs Department, Delhi Division, and brought him into Meerut.

Bhoora Mukmool, Jungarani, and Hurchain, residents of Rutowl, assisted Mr. F. Lumley, Toll Collector of the Delhi road.

Gunga Daas, fakeer of Gunowlee, sheltered and protected for several days Mr. Buckley, D.A.C., and Lieutenant Raynor and family.

Pursah and Sowah, Sunths, residents of Khaikura, assisted and protected Dr. Batson, of the 74th Native Infantry.

Haridyal Goojur, and Golob Brahmin, of Duggurpoor, assisted Mr. Buckley and Lieutenant Raynor and family, refugees from Delhi.

Francis Cohen, Zemindar of Mouzah Hurchundpoor, and his grandsons, assisted and kept in their house Colonel Knyvett, Lieutenant Procter, Adjutant Gambier, Lieutenant Holland, of the 38th Native Infantry; Lieutenant Vibart, 54th Native Infantry; Lieutenant Wilson, Artillery; Lieutenant
Salkeld, Engineers; Mr. Marshall, Merchant of Delhi; Captain Forrest and family, and Dr. Batson, of the 74th Native Infantry.

Runjeet, Fyzbuksh, and Nubbee-buksh, residents of Nogpoor, assisted Captain Osborn and five other refugees from Delhi.

Sheo Sing and Gunga Suhoe, of Bulaquer, sheltered and actively assisted Captain Wallace, 74th Native Infantry, his family, and a large party of European fugitives from Delhi.

Soookholl and Nanoo, residents of Khekura, assisted Captain Forrest and Mrs. Fraser.

Naoul Sing and others, of Doula, assisted the Delhi fugitives on their way to Meerut.

Bultun Sing, of Bagonathpoor, assisted Mr. and Mrs. Voss, Delhi refugees.

221. The news of the mutiny and massacre at Delhi added to the consternation at Meerut. The fact that one of the largest magazines in the upper country had fallen into the hands of the mutineers, and open rebellion had supervened, and that in so short a time such an addition was made to the number of victims was quite sufficient to cause dismay, without reference to the rumour of an immediate attack on Meerut by the reinforced mutineers, against which great precautions were taken.

222. On the 13th, the officers and men of the Hauppur Stud establishment came into Meerut, but Major Thatcher and Captain D'Oyly continued to exert themselves to secure the preservation of the Stud property, the former going out repeatedly at much risk.

223. On the 14th, Martial Law was proclaimed by General Hewitt and Mr. Greathed, and the first judicial example was made. One of the murderers of the wife of Captain Chambers of the 11th Native Infantry, caught by Lieutenant Moller of that Regiment, was hanged.

224. On the 15th, a telegram, appointing the Judge, Mr. Fleetwood Williams, Commissioner of Delhi, and directing him to take a strong escort and push on to Delhi, was received.

225. On that day six Companies of the Sappers and Miners arrived at Meerut from Roorkee.

226. On the 16th, some of these men either took alarm at a most reasonable order about their ammunition, or were prepared to mutiny on any pretence, or what is most probable, were really in great alarm at having been brought into such propinquity to European soldiers. One of them shot the Commanding Officer, Major Fraser, in the back, and all that could rushed frantically away from their encampment. A party of the Carabineers and a troop of the Horse Artillery were soon after them, but only succeeded in getting up with about forty or fifty of them on the sand hills and pits just outside cantonments; although in a capital position for infantry to resist cavalry, they were cut up to a man. The Companies who were at work when this mutiny took place, were disarmed and put to work on the fortification of the Dum-duma. Colonel Hogg was wounded by a musket ball through the thigh on this occasion.

227. On the 21st of May, the ladies came in from Boolundshuhur. The Sirmoor Battalion passed down the canal, punishing some of the plunderers on their way to Boolundshuhur, and showing thus how much might have been done to maintain and restore order, had the troops been energetically employed.

228. On the 19th, Electric Telegraph received, directing Mr. Williams, formerly appointed Commissioner of Delhi, to proceed to Bareilly with escort where orders would be found waiting. The Magistrate of Mooradabad was out that day, half-way between that town and the Ganges, and was requested to make arrangements for the escort, none being procurable at Meerut. But he that

* The Telegraph wire was repeatedly cut and mended.
† Of course this could be done; the escort was not granted.
day received intelligence of the Mooradabad Jail having been attacked by some sipahies of the 29th N.I., and the prisoners having been released. This put the whole country between Mooradabad and the Ganges into a state of anarchy; and no intelligence was received from that direction till the 22nd, when the most urgent remonstrances against any attempt to pass beyond the Ganges, except with a very strong escort prepared to move fifty or sixty miles in the twenty-four hours, were received. This was impossible. One answer was given to all requests for a military escort—"not a man."

229. On the 24th of May, after a fortnight of insurrection, a small party, the Carabiniers, was sent out to punish the village of Iktearpoo, which had become notorious for stopping dâks, and other acts of rebellion. This was the first time the people had an opportunity of learning, by the actual appearance of a few, that the stories widely spread of the utter destruction of the Europeans at Meerut were false. The people of the village fled, and except the burning of the place, little was effected beyond the proof of the existence of English troops, which more frequently displayed, would have checked much evil.

230. Mr. Johnston, the Officiating Magistrate, who accompanied the party, while galloping home to get to other work, was severely injured by his horse falling, and died on the 27th. This was the first occasion on which Mr. Johnston was aided with troops, without which it was impossible for the Magistrate to make any head against plunderers and incipient rebels, deserted as he was on the 10th of May by nearly the whole of the Jail and trained guards, and left only with the ordinary police of the district, which was utterly unable to cope with the wide-spreading anarchy. This lamented officer only trusted with the charge of the district just before the mutiny, had been able to do little more than restore confidence in the city.

231. Mr. Turnbull, formerly Magistrate of Boolundshur, and at the time Judge of Cawnpore, but unable to join, took charge of this district on the 26th.

232. On the 27th, the force* under Brigadier now General Sir Archdale Wilson, K.C.B., marched from Meerut towards Delhi, consisting of the troops detailed in the margin, the Commissioner Mr. Grench tall accompanying the force.

The glorious actions on the Hindun were fought on the 30th and 31st May 1857.

233. Sah Mull, a Muwee Jat, of Bijroul, in Perganaha Burough, a man of previous bad character, at this time commenced his career by seizing 500 head of laden cattle, travelling with merchandise through the country, and proceeded to collect escaped convicts, and the worst of his own brotherhood, to form a gang for more daring exploits. The Goojurs also were getting bolder daily.

234. The men of the 11th Native Infantry, about 125, most of whom had remained staunch, and a few of whom had not gone to Delhi, but had returned from the neighbourhood of Meerut, under the proclamation issued by the Military authorities, were kept in the Native Infantry lines, which are a considerable distance from the part of the station near the Dumdums, in which the European troops were concentrated. It is not to be wondered at that the European Officers of the Regiment, who were ordered to stay with their men, had ceased to have implicit confidence in the sipahies after what had occurred, and this led to the men being disarmed, and ordered to go to their homes, with six months' leave,—a measure to which they respectfully submitted.

235. Some of them, in a conversation with one of the civil officers, while acknowledging the justness of the order, represented that the state of the country, which swarmed with plundering Goojurs, prevented the possibility of unarmed men reaching their homes alive, and that if they escaped the dangers that threatened them, they should have nothing to live upon, as by the
rules regarding leave, they could get no pay till they returned to their duty. The option given of serving in the police on full pay was so gratefully accepted, that a request for the restoration of their arms, with a view to their being employed in the interior of the district, was made and acceded to by the General.

236. Without uniforms, without European officers, with their muskets and a few rounds of ball cartridge, they were distributed in parties of twenty-nine or thirty men under native officers in the different Tehseeles and Thannahs. A portion of one party, eleven men, were taken out by a Thannadar with some police, and left to bear the brunt of a fight with an overwhelming body of Googurs, in which three out of the eleven were killed, and the rest so hard pressed that they had to retreat precipitately. This discouraged about thirty, who accepted the offer of leave with all its risks as preferable to the chance of repeated fights against such odds. The rest, ninety-nine in number, it may be here mentioned, continued to do good service, collecting revenue, guarding it, escorting it into the station, having sometimes as many thousand rupees as there were men, when they might have marched off with it all to Delhi, or where they liked, fighting or threatened constantly, openly scouted and abused, latterly as often as they came to Meerut with treasure, by the Seikh soldiers, these men remained firm to the last, and earned the reward they deserved; honors to some, promotion to all, and the gratification of forming the nucleus of one of the very few old native regiments of the line.

237. It is needless to say they were invaluable to the civil power at a time when staunch policemen and revenue subordinates, very rare articles, were at an immense premium. Their presence enabled the out-stationed native officials to act, and checked in some degree the gangs of plunderers, who were at least deterred from attacking the places where they were posted.

238. Prevented hitherto by the impossibility of getting any escort, without which in the disturbed state of the country, he was assured, there was no chance of passing safely. On the night of the 1st of June, Mr. Williams started for Bareilly, with Captain Craigie, who had with difficulty raised, horsed, and armed a body of about forty sowars.*

239. About noon on the 3rd June, at the end of the second march, about half-way between the Ganges and Mooradabad, and about forty-six miles from Meerut, further progress was stopped by the intelligence that the mutiny at Bareilly had taken place, and that large bodies of escaped convicts from the Bareilly prison were then at Umroha, a most ill-disposed town, about five or six miles north of the halting place, making the best of their way to the west. As it was almost certain that the rise at Bareilly would be followed by a similar move at Mooradabad, and to proceed with forty freshly raised and doubtful men to face one whole brigade of mutineers would have been insanity, it was at once determined to return to Gurumookteesur and break the bridge of boats there, and thus prevent any of the Rohilkund miscreants getting across to swell the ranks of the rebels about Meerut or at Delhi. Starting at 1 p.m., this was done by nightfall.

239a. At daybreak, the next morning, while arrangements were being made to render the post taken up defensible, the picket at the bridge announced that a large body of cavalry was approaching. This proved to be the escort of the civil officers of Mooradabad,—Mr. Wilson, Judge; Mr. Saunders, Collector and Magistrate; Mr. J. S. Campbell, Joint-Magistrate, and Dr. Cannon, Civil Surgeon, with their wives; who having nobly held out at Mooradabad for three days after the news of the mutiny at Bareilly, and distinguished themselves by the most intrepid and energetic conduct, from the mutiny at Meerut, on the 10th of May till the 3rd of June, were obliged on the afternoon of that day to fly for their lives, after the muskets of the muti-

* Of whom about one-fourth were Irregular Cavalry men, who, though promoted and encouraged in every way to act loyally, eventually deserted and went to Delhi, and the rest nondescripts of the neighbourhood of Meerut, who subsequently ran away from sheer cowardice from rebel villagers.
neers loaded and cocked had been presented at the heads of Messrs. Wilson and Saunders (those holding them being with difficulty induced not to fire by an appeal made by a native officer to a solemn oath they had taken not to kill the European officers), and after the artillery guns had been laid against the house in which the whole party resided. Two of the ladies had ridden nearly the whole distance, forty-two miles, and the other two a considerable portion of it.

240. During the day most of the troopers of the escort showed a strong disinclination to go on to Meerut, and were with difficulty persuaded to agree to do so; still as there seemed some doubt whether, when the time came, they would, it was resolved that the Meerut escort should accompany the ladies to cantonments. In the afternoon, a considerable crowd of men, generally armed, collected. As greater numbers than would have been attracted even by the spectacle, unusual to villagers, of ladies riding, gathered, it became evident they came to prevent the destruction of the boats which belonged to people in the town, which was contemplated. The Police Officer of the place was publicly told to take to pieces the remaining portion of the bridge, and have all the boats hauled up high and dry, under the village on the sand; and was promised a handsome reward if this was done.* The ladies mounted, and the party moved off; still for some time the Moorunugur escort did not make its appearance, but at last persuaded by Mr. Wilson, the troopers came out, and the march of twenty-six miles was commenced.

241. By papers found after the fall of Delhi, it is proved that one of the head native officers of the party at the time mediated treachery, but at least twenty-five men and two native officers subordinate to him, were firm in their loyalty to the Europeans, and the Meerut escort was separate; so loyalty appeared the best policy to all. The fact that the seven male Europeans of the party were fully armed, may have influenced the would-be traitors.

242. The conditions insisted on by the part of the escort that was adverse to going to Meerut, deserve notice. The station was not to be approached till after daybreak, and all the Europeans, including the ladies, were to form the first ranks of the Column to guard the native soldiers from the evidently dreaded contingency of the European troops at Meerut firing on them.

243. After such a journey of nearly seventy miles, in June, of which part by two and the greater part by the other two ladies was performed in about forty hours on horseback, they were glad to be among their countrymen at Meerut.

244. On the 3rd of June, a party of Carabiniers, the second instance in three weeks of the employment of European troops to restore order, were sent out with the Magistrate, to punish the villagers of Gagoul, Sisaree and Moorunugur, south of Meerut, the inhabitants of which had been stopping the Agra road. The Kotwal of the city, Bishen Sing (a relative of Toolsee Ram, of Rewaree, a town, south-west of Delhi, notorious subsequently for rebellion), was told to be ready at a certain hour to guide the party, Mr. Turnbull being quite unacquainted with the district. The Kotwal had professed more than he acted up to, but was not suspected before. But on this occasion, he apparently purposely delayed joining the Column, and day broke before the villages were surrounded. The inhabitants all escaped, the villages were burnt, the Kotwal was verbally reprimanded for his delay by Mr. Turnbull; and that night, having posted a notice on the city gate to the effect, that after having served faithfully, he was now unjustly suspected, and was therefore flying to escape the punishment, which he and all faithful natives might expect at the hands of the perfidious Englishmen, and recommending all to take warning from his fate, disappeared. There is satisfactory reason to hope that he was subsequently killed at NarnouI, after having joined Toolsee Ram in open opposition to the forces of Government.

* He was also ordered to secure all the boats he could get possession of up and down the river, and repeated orders to this effect were sent by the Magistrate.
245. On the 12th of June, Mr. Dunlop, the Magistrate of Meerut, who had been obliged to proceed on leave, on sick certificate, a short time before the mutiny, and who received the intelligence when far in the interior of the hills near the snowy range, having made forced marches through the hill tract, and travelled with the utmost expedition, returned via the Head-quarters Camp at Delhi, and resumed charge of the district;—a notable example of the devoted zeal which actuated all ranks and classes in this emergency, and of the influence of that spirit on the body. Though then in bad health, he worked and fought the whole of the rest of the year.

246. On the 18th of June, a party* of Carabiniers, riflemen, with two Horse Artillery guns, and the Military and Civil Officers of Boolundshohur, who had been obliged to fall back to Baboogurh, under the command of Major Thatcher of the Stud, proceeded to Gulowtee, and drove back, utterly discouraged, the rebels. Wulleedad Khan, of Malagurh, who had pushed forward to that place.

247. Mr. Wilson, Judge of Moorabad, with a party of Carabiniers went out to Gurhmoottesur to destroy the boats, and thus prevent the crossing of the Bareilly mutineer Brigade, which was approaching. Mr. Wilson took money to pay for the boats,—a very proper precaution to overcome the objections of the owners. He found the boats all drawn up, according to the orders given previously to the Police Officer. Mr. Wilson contented himself with having planks knocked out of the bottoms of the boats, so as to render them utterly useless, without repairs, which would take a considerable time.

248. The Bareilly Brigade, however, contrived to find some boats at other ghats, which had been concealed, or could not be secured, owing to the dissatisfaction of the Goojurs, and similar villains on the banks of the river, and commenced slowly and with difficulty to effect a passage.

249. Opinions at Meerut as to the proper course of dealing with this Brigade were divided.

250. One party was for opposing the passage at Gurhmoottesur, which might unquestionably have been successfully done by a force which could have been well spared from this station. But this would only have caused a delay of a few days, for the Brigade could have moved down and crossed below, where no force from Meerut could have dared to go and meet them.

251. Another was for allowing the mutineers to cross and attacking them midway between the Ganges and Delhi.

252. For this, the force at Meerut was not sufficient. The Brigade consisted of a Light Field Battery, the 8th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, and the 18th, 28th, 29th and 68th Regiments of Native Infantry, besides a number of rebels of all sorts, en route to Delhi; while not more than 500 really effective European soldiers of all arms could be detached from Meerut. But this party trusted that the advantages of taking the mutineers in flank on their line of march, encumbered as they were with about 700 carts laden with women and plunder, instead of leaving them to devastate Rohilkund, to enter Delhi in triumph, and swell the formidable force of mutineers already collected there, would be recognized in the Head- quarters Camp, and timely and earnest requisitions for the loan of 500 European soldiers to reinforce the troops at Meerut were sent to Head-quarters. It was not proposed to withdraw them from the Camp at Delhi. There were 500 men actually at the time at Rai, opposite Baghput, who might have been at Meerut in two marches. The position before Delhi, which was never forced, even when the number of rebels in Delhi had been trebled, had been seized. The mutineers, discouraged by defeat, had been driven into the city. The Head-quarters Camp was quite strong enough to hold its own for a few days, even without the reinforcement referred to, as the actions on the Hindun and at Badlee Serae had fully proved.
253. An intercepted letter from Delhi to the Bareilly mutineers showed how anxiously the arrival of the Rohilkund Brigade was looked for. The phrase used "if you eat your food there, wash your hands here," being one meant to suggest the greatest haste, and indicated that they thought much more of being attacked than of attacking.

254. The effect of the news of the destruction of the Rohilkund Brigade by troops from Meerut,—a station said by the rebels to have been annihilated,—would have been as favourable to the Government and ruinous to the rebel cause as the triumphant entry into Delhi of such a body of mutineers was to every open and hesitating rebel most encouraging, and to every European in the country, and every native who was looking for a display of the British power, depressing.

255. In the Head-quarters Camp, however, other Councils prevailed; the requisition was negatived, and peremptory orders were sent to the Officer Commanding at Meerut, prohibiting any offensive measures, and directing him to confine himself entirely to the defensive.

256. The Bareilly mutineers passed and marched most leisurely across the Doab. They appeared to have entertained an idea of attacking Meerut; but if they had, they gave it up and proceeded by the direct road from Gurha-mooktesur to Delhi, destroying in their way the Stud at Baboogurh, and every Government building they came across.

257. The arrival of the Rohilkund Brigade was the signal for open rebellion.

258. Wulleedad Khan, of Malagurb, became master of the Boolundshuhur District.

259. Kuddum Singh, of Purreechutgurh; proclaimed himself King of Purreechutgurh and Mowanah, dug up five guns which had been buried at the cession of the country in 1803; and his tribe, the Gooyurs, commenced plundering throughout the tract, east and north-east of Meerut.

260. The villagers in all directions up to within a few miles of the cantonment had become so bold, that the necessity of more active measures for their coercion, and for the restoration of authority and order, became palpable to all.

261. Major Williams, the present Superintendent of Police Battalions, had arrived at Meerut on his way to Agra, but it was impossible for him to proceed. Between him and the Magistrate it was arranged to enrol a body of volunteers.

262. Major Williams was elected to be Commandant; Captain D'Oyly, Deputy Superintendent of the Hauppur Stud, 2nd in Command; Captain Tyrwhitt, of the 4th Irregular Cavalry, Adjutant.

263. The Corps consisted of Civil and Military Officers, whose ordinary functions had ceased for the time, and other European residents of Meerut who were unemployed. These, with a few Native Christians, some Seikhs and a few loyal Irregular Cavalry men, formed the mounted portion.

264. Two Sergeants and some Christian Drummers of Native Infantry Regiments, with a few Seikhs, and about twenty of the Magistrate's trained Native guard, who had stood firm to their duty, formed the Infantry.

265. Two Mountain train guns, i.e., one 3-lb. and one 12-lb. Howitzer, worked by two Sergeants and some native Artillerymen, formed the Artillery. The strength is given in the margin; a Muster-
266. The first expedition of this Volunteer Corps was in company with one hundred men of H. M.'s 60th Rifles, sixty of the Carabineers, and two H. A. guns, against a number of Gooruj villages, about six miles from Meerut, of which the chief were Panchlee Ghât and Nugla, the inhabitants of which having committed a great number of most heinous crimes were doomed-by the General to destruction.

267. The principal villages were successfully surrounded, a little after daybreak, by different parties told off. A considerable number of the men were killed, forty-six taken prisoners, forty of whom were subsequently hung, a large quantity of cattle carried off, and the villages were burnt, women and children alone were left unmolested; this was on the 4th of July, for which day the following entry appears in the Magistrate's précis of events:—

"The Gooruj of Panchlee Ghât and Nugla punished by the Khakee* Ressalah and a Military detachment."

"Collection of revenue recommences.† Mr. Williams, Judge of Meerut,‡ appointed Commissioner, vice Mr. Greathed on duty at Delhi."§

268. From this time daily abstracts of the reports received by the Commissioner were submitted to the General.

269. On the 6th of July, intelligence was received that the Jats of Burthona§ had beaten off Wulleedad Khan's rebels, who attacked their village, and taken three of his guns, killing a number of his men, and wounding three of his leading men; his General, Ismael Khan, among the latter. These gallant Jats stood out for themselves and for Government throughout the rebellion, and thenceforth particular care was taken to support them and render them assistance when seriously threatened.

270. One result of the punishment of Panchlee Ghât and Nugla was immediately reported, viz, that Kuddum Singh, mentioned above as having proclaimed himself Rajah of the Gooruj of Pureechutgurh, &c., retreated to Blysombah, and his men dispersed. Petitions began to come in from different quarters, in which the petitioners tried to prove their loyalty or excuse themselves, showing the wholesome effect of the fear of punishment, at least within easy distance of Meerut.

271. But further off, the rebels, evidently alarmed, applied for assistance from Delhi.

272. Sah Mull attacked and plundered Baghput,|| and destroyed the bridge of boats on the Jumna, the direct and only communication between Meerut and the Head-quarters Camp.

273. General Hewitt was superseded; Brigadier Jones of the Carabineers took command of the station.

274. Reports having been received that the Gooruj of Seekree and other villages intended to attack a neighbouring village, Begumabad, about fourteen miles from Meerut on the Delhi road, it was determined, if possible, to prevent them, and the District Volunteers, as per margin, marched very early on the 9th with this object. Begumabad had been plundered before they reached it, but they proceeded at once to attack Seekree, where a considerable body of rebels were collected. The mounted volunteers taking up positions under Captains D'Oyly and Tyrwhitt, to prevent the insurgents escaping, were fired on but drove them into the village, killing about thirty of them;

* The District Volunteers were locally called the Khakee Ressalah, from the earth-colored dress.
† Up to this time not more than a few thousand rupees of revenue had been collected, though lacs were overdue; there were only about 70,000 left in the Treasury, which would have been entirely expended in a few days, and except with a strong force, no Government officer could move five miles from Meerut.
‡ This was a mistake; Mr. Williams was Commissioner of Delhi ordered on special duty to Rohilkund.
§ A village in the Boolundshuhur District, just beyond the Meerut boundary, and about a mile from the Agra Grand Trunk Road.
|| The Thannahdar of which place was carried off prisoner to Delhi.
the outskirts of the village were cleared by a few rounds from the Mountain train Howitzer, but the main body of the rebels barricaded themselves in a large native house with high walls, a sort of small fort, and offered a determined resistance.

275. While one party sought access to the top of the walls along the roofs of adjoining houses, Captain D'Oyly headed an attack upon the gate under a heavy fire of matchlocks. Attempts were made to force it, but it resisted all efforts, even the Mountain train guns failing to have the desired effect, and Captain D'Oyly was wounded in the neck by a ball, fortunately almost spent, from having been fired through the wood work of the gate. But the other party succeeded in their object, Mr. (subsequently Lieutenant) Furnell was handed up to the top of the wall, and was soon followed by Mr. Nuthall and Mr. Dunlop, and others; the roofs of the fort were carried by the party, and a smart fire opened on the rebels down below. The gate was burst open at last, and after allowing women and children to come out, and having them placed in safe position under a guard, the party entered by the gate and the rebels inside were disposed of, upwards of seventy were killed in the enclosure. In clearing the rest of the village, many more fell fighting desperately; altogether above 170 rebels were disposed of, among them some mutineer troopers and sipahees, one of the former particularly made a desperate resistance.

276. The village was fired, and the gallant little band returned to cantonments, 7 P. M., having marched sixteen miles, fought for four hours, killed more than double their own number, and countermarched sixteen miles in soaking rain between 2 A. M. and 7 P. M. The District Volunteers received the cordial thanks of Government for this service.

277. The inhabitants of Dhoulanah, aided by some rebels from Delhi, turned out the Police Officers, and destroyed the records and buildings. The Thannaedar was received and sheltered by the landholders of a neighbouring village, Solaneh, who protected him and his people, prepared to resist the rebels stoutly till order was restored.

278. Many of the people of the north and south-west parts of the district began openly to transfer their allegiance to the King of Delhi.

279. Repeated accounts of the spread of rebellion in the Burouth Pargannah, and of the collection and transmission of supplies from thence to the rebels at Delhi, were received about this time; but it was not thought prudent to send the District Volunteers out, without more trustworthy infantry than the corps could boast of. Earnest recommendations were sent to Head-quarters Camp, that some Jheend or other troops should be employed to keep open the direct communications by Bhagput, and prevent the rebels drawing their supplies from that quarter; and a memorandum showing the state of the district was also sent, begging that no more Europeans might be removed from Meerut, and that the prohibition, supposed to be in force, since the passage of Rohilkund mutineers, against detaching troops from the station, might be removed. A favorable reply was received to the last requests; Brigadier Jones consented to send forty of H. M.'s 60th Rifles with the District Volunteers, and it was determined to attack Sah Mull and the Burouth rebels.

280. On the 16th of July, the force, as per margin, started at 2 A.M. On arriving at the Hindun river, thirteen miles west of Meerut, heavy firing ahead was heard. Those sent out for information reported that Sah Mull with 3,000 men was close to, and intending to attack Deolah, a loyal village eight miles further on, which had assisted European travelers and remained firm to their allegiance.

* Neither the Beguneshad Jats, who had joined in numbers to pay off their enemies, nor the infantry part of the volunteers had to face this opposition, and the mounted branch of the corps had to dismount, and set to work on foot.

† The orders were interpreted to prohibit the employment of the troops on any duty which would keep them out more than a few hours.
to Government. The ford in the Hindun was barely practicable, and it was necessary to have it carefully marked off. This was done, and the little force crossed, between 1 and 2 A.M., on the 17th, and marched to Deola; and the mounted volunteers were pushed on to Busodh, about two miles north of Deola, where Sah Mull was said to be, but on arrival they found he and his men had fled during the night, leaving large cooking pots, and all the signs of a large body of men having been there, and having left in a hurry.

281. The inhabitants of Busodh had leagued with and given assistance to Sah Mull, and they resisted the force. Immense stores of grain collected for the Delhi rebels were found in the village. Every male that could be found in the village was killed, among them two Ghazes, i.e., Mahomedan fanatics from Delhi. After fighting desperately in a mosque, the village was fired, and as all the Commissariat carriage procurable would have sufficed to remove only a very small portion of the grain, attempts were made to burn it; but this was a difficult and dangerous work, the rains had soaked all the thatches by which the grain was protected, and in some of the stocks there was a quantity of gunpowder concealed, and repeated explosions rendered caution necessary.

282. After the main body of the Rifles and Volunteers had been drawn out of the village a short distance, a number of rebels rose from some fields near, and came on to attack Dr. Cannon, and the men left with him, about ten of Craigie's horse. The Doctor supported by only one man, as he ought to have been, faced about and went at the rebels to check them, and the main body of the force coming up, took a sweep through the fields, and killed about 180 more men, all that could be found, and then returned to Deolah, having been marching and at work ten hours.

283. On the 18th, at daybreak, the force marched along the left bank of the eastern Jumma canal, for the town of Burouth, a distance of about fourteen miles. The Magistrate and Collector, Mr. Dunlop, with rather rash zeal, diverged from the line to visit villages, with the view of collecting revenue; but soon found a host coming against him, and had to fight for his life like a man, and rejoin the force. The whole country was rising; native drums, the signal to the villagers to assemble, were being beaten in all directions, and crowds were seen moving up to the gathering place ahead.

284. On reaching Burouth, the advanced guard was attacked, the mounted volunteers drove back the insurgents, killing upwards of thirty of them in the skirmish. An advance was then made on the force by a large body, commanded by Sah Mull himself, who took up a position in an extensive orchard of large trees, with a tank in front. The Rifles advancing beautifully, drove them out of that, killing many, into the fields of Indian corn behind, and the mounted volunteers on each flank swept round the orchard, and on the enemy breaking into the fields, charged them. Those on one flank coming on a party of mounted men, went at them, and after a hand-to-hand fight, in which many of the rebels were killed, it was found that Sah Mull himself was one of the slain, having been killed by Mr. A. Tonnochy, aided by two of the native troopers.

285. The little force had hardly collected together again, when a third attack from a fresh quarter was made by the rebels, but feebly sustained. The news of the death of Sah Mull having spread, a few rounds from the Mountain train guns, and another advance of the Rifles and mounted volunteers, sufficed to disperse this body, and this gallant little band remained masters of the field, having beaten off at least 3,500 men with considerable slaughter of
the rebels,* the loss on our side being only one killed and a few wounded; among the latter was Mr. Tonnochy, who had a narrow escape, having a spear thrust at him while engaged with Sah Mull. One of the volunteers, Mr. Lyall, C.S., had a valuable horse killed under him, in a personal combat with one of the insurgents.

285A. Though Serjeants Anderson and Readie did all good soldiers could do, the Mountain train guns, save in the third attack, were of no use.† Dr. Cannon had actually to seize and press some of the enemy to carry the ammunition. The success, indeed the safety of the whole party, must be ascribed to the men of that noble Corps, Her Majesty's 60th Rifles, under Lieutenant Mortimer, particularly, and to the mounted volunteers. Some of the Nuejebbs, i.e., the Magistrate's trained guard, behaved very well; the rest of the infantry were hardly equal to guarding the baggage. But the simple fact that 149 men entirely defeated at least 3,500 after fighting for more than three hours, speaks for itself; all must have behaved nobly.

286. The force encamped that night on the right bank of the canal at Burouth; the head of Sah Mull was exhibited, that none might doubt his death.

287. Major Williams, the Officer Commanding the party, had authentic information, before night, that a still more extensive gathering of the Jats would be made with a view of a still more desperate attack on his party next day. The country between him and Meerut was flooded, and the rivers were rising, and when reporting this day's success, he requested that reinforcements might be sent to cover the passage of the Hindun, beyond which he determined to encamp the next day.

288. The little force moved a little before midnight, and after a most trying march through a country covered with water, and crossing two rivers, the Kursunnee and the Hindun, halted at Harrah.

289. The reinforcement sent from Meerut, consisting of two H. A. guns, fifty Carabiniers, and twenty more Riflemen, were guided to a ghât on the Hindun, a little below where Major Williams crossed and encamped, and as there appeared to be no chance of the rebels attacking, for though there had been considerable beating of drums during the night, and other symptoms of gathering, none were visible, and it was thought better to trust to the lesson already inflicted than to harass the Europeans by further exposure, the two parties by agreement marched from their respective camps next morning, the 20th, to Sirdhanbeh, and there joined forces and halted.

289A. On the 21st, the headmen of Gurhee, the inhabitants of which had early in the outbreak attacked the Tehseelee and plundered the Gunj at Sirdhanbeh, having sent a most rebellious answer to a summons from the Magistrate, the force marched on the 22nd, to inflict punishment. All males found in the village were killed, among them the leader of the attack on Sirdhanbeh on the 11th of May.

On the 23rd the force returned to Meerut.

290. The effects of this activity and necessary severity were speedily visible over the greater part of the district,—the revenue came in freely. In this, Mr. J. Cracroft Wilson, the Judge of Mooradabad, gave most valuable assistance with about twenty-five of the men of the 8th Irregular Cavalry, who had come over with the civil officers from Mooradabad, and remained staunch. This most energetic officer, without another European, with only natives, whom few would have trusted, went out day after day, having two sets of horses that the animals might get rest, in every direction collecting revenue, suppressing anarchy, and (having been made a Special Commissioner with powers for the purpose) punishing rebels and plunderers. Over a flooded

* In both affairs, i.e., at Basoth and Burouth, about 410 of the rebels were killed.
† They were carried on elephants, and much time was required to get them down and up.
country, under a burning sun or through rain, Mr. Wilson would make his nearly daily march of about thirty miles, including going and returning, besides occasional chevies after conscience-struck scoundrels, who fled on seeing him.

291. On one occasion, between early morning and dark, he with his men made a march of twenty-six miles out and back, in all fifty-two miles, having sent on a change of horses, with merely the groom, to a notorious village,—two of the head men and two inhabitants of which he had been obliged to hang for a most atrocious case of highway robbery and murder; among other heinous crimes, a place where in June it would have been rash to have sent the horses with their riders.

292. But in the neighbourhood of Delhi and towards Malagurh, rebellion was spreading, being encouraged by constant detachments of mutineers from those places.

293. On the 30th of July, a party of 300 Cavalry and 300 Infantry with two guns suddenly advanced from Ghazeeodeenuggur, where, since General Wilson marched to the Delhi Camp, there had always been a rebel force, and seized the Tehseelee of Mooradnuggur. The Tehseeldar, happily for him, was out collecting revenue, or anticipating the attack; but twenty-eight men of the Tehseelee were taken prisoners to Delhi. There was no Government property left in the Tehseelee. It was destroyed by the mutineers on the night of the 10th of May. The property of the Tehseeldar, and Aha Hossein Khan, Police sowar, in whose house it was concealed, was carried off.

294. The Tehseelee and that part of the country remained in the hands of the rebels. The Tehseeldarce was established in Mahadooodeenpoor, a village on the Delhi road within eight miles of Meerut. Officials appointed by the rebel King, spread over the Mooradnuggur, Dasnah and Dhoulana country. But still the Tehseeldar contrived to get in some revenue.

295. In the Hauppurr Tehseelee, the neighbourhood of Wulleedad Khan’s men kept up a good deal of disaffection; but by moving about in his peregrination with all his men, and taking circles of villages, one after another in hand, this Tehseeldar also collected a good deal of revenue.

296. When at Dhutteeanah, about five miles south of Kethor, on the Gurhmooktesur road, thus employed, he received intelligence that a party of Wulleedad Khan’s men were coming to attack him, and plunder the money he had realized, about Rupees 14,000. Immediately on receipt of this intelligence, Mr. Wilson, who was out at Pureetchutgurh with his 8th Irregular men, was requested to push over to save the treasure, and a troop of Carabineers was sent off from Meerut with the Joint-Magistrate to join Mr. Wilson’s party at Kethor. Both parties joined and proceeded to Dhutteeanah, and found the treasure all right: the Malagurh men had come, but owing apparently to some misunderstanding between the Gojurs and Wulleedad Khan, the Gojurs for once took the side of Government and assisted the Tehseeldar’s men to resist the attack, and defended the Government money, which was brought safely in by Mr. Wilson the next day.

297. A party of rebels from Mooradnuggur pushed up to Dhoulree, and attacked and took away the Police Jemadar, two burkundazes, and a sowar stationed there.

298. On the 23rd of August, troopers and Government servants sent to bring in revenue from the Burouth villages were attacked, and some killed and wounded. In one case the villagers had the impertinence to send in to say their money was all ready, and they only wanted Government servants to come and fetch it. The boldness of the villagers was caused by the return of Lujja Ram, grandson of Sah Mull, from Delhi, who had commenced making intrenchments at Burouth.
299. Wulleedad Khan, about this time, began to advance in the direction of Hauppur, emboldened by the hope of at least getting some mutineers from Delhi. He had pushed his pickets up to Gulowtee, and the Jat village Burtbona was threatened. It was determined to drive these rebels back. Accordingly, on the 27th of July, a detachment of the strength noted in the margin started for Hauppur.

300. On the 28th, it was ascertained that Wulleedad Khan had posted 400 sowars and 600 of his infantry, with about 1,000 insurgent Goosjurs and Rajpoots at Gulowtee, about nine miles from Hauppur on the Agra road; an immediate attack on their position was decided on. An Officer, two Sergeants and twenty Musicians being left to guard the baggage, the rest of the force marched at 2 A.M. on the 29th for Gulowtee. On the way information was received from the Jats, that a picket of the rebels was posted at a bridge about four miles on the Hauppur side of Gulowtee; a surprise was arranged and admirably carried out by Captain Wardlaw of the Carabineers, commanding the advance. The Jats being placed in front enabled the Dragoons to get close into the rebels, just as day was breaking. The rebel picket, consisting of sixty sowars, some of them mutineers of Irregular Cavalry Regiments, on the Jats opening out and the Dragoons charging them, fled; but they were so hard pressed by the Carabineers, gallantly led by Captain Wardlaw and Lieutenant Bird, that they suffered the heavy loss of upwards of 40 men; few or none would have escaped but for orders not to approach Gulowtee till the day had fully dawned. Captain Anderson of the 54th Native Infantry, doing duty with the Carabineers, aided in the destruction of the rebels, killing many himself.

301. The whole force then advanced on Gulowtee, the Rifles clearing the rebels out of the high crops on each side of the road, in which they had taken up their position, the guns and cavalry advancing along the road. About one mile from the village, a body of the enemy's horse appeared on the road; a couple of rounds from the Horse Artillery guns, under Lieutenant T. P. Smith, sent them flying. The force again advanced, and found Gulowtee had been evacuated. The Carabineers and Volunteer Horse were sent in pursuit of the flying rebels, but with instructions not to approach Malagurh, which were issued in obedience to orders received from the supreme Military authority up the country, at that time at Lahore.

302. The restrictions that were perpetually imposed on the local authorities are much to be regretted. The appearance of the two rebel leaders, Ismail Khan and Mooneer Khan, with severe sword cuts on the face, and a number of wounded, caused a panic in the fort of Malagurh, during which many of Wulleedad's men deserted him; and Mohun Lall (of Cabool notoriety), who stated he had been kept a prisoner in the fort, managed to escape.

303. According to the native reports of the action, the rebels even fled from Boolandshuhur, and Major Williams, who commanded the British troops, and all under him, bitterly grieved that they could not go at the fort, which was said to be nearly empty;—Wulleedad, a fat drunkard, being left nearly alone.

304. In this gallant little fight seventy-two of the rebels were disposed of on the spot, the bodies having been counted, and many were wounded. The rebels acknowledged afterwards to a much more serious loss. Our loss was only four or five wounded.

305. The rebels had intended evidently to hold Gulowtee. Trees had been cut down to form barricades across the Grand Trunk Road, and there were breastworks in the Thannah; these last, and the gates were destroyed.

306. Two singular guns made of the iron screw sockets of the Electric Telegraph posts, mounted on rude carriages, were seized with a box of
artridges for them, composed of Telegraph wire, cut into pieces, put into bags with the powder, portfires, a barrel of powder marked "Delhi," and a quantity of Telegraph wire. Furniture belonging to the Dak Bungalow and Road Sergeant's house were found in the Thannah, and brought into Meerut, with the two guns, which last afforded considerable amusement to the soldiers in the Dum Duma.

307. The principal work in this fight was done by the Carabineers, who pursued the rebel picket for three miles, and left very few of them alive,—and by the Rifles under Captain Austen and Lieutenants Young and Blackburne. The force returned to Meerut on the night of the 30th of July.

308. The thanks of Government were awarded to all engaged on this occasion.

309. Notwithstanding the punishment which had been administered to the rebels in Pergunnah Burouth, encouraged by the continued rebellion of Suja and Bhugta, grandson and nephew of Sah Mull, and their combination with rebels in the Mozaffernuggur District, the people of Pergunnah Bunawur began to show fresh signs of disaffection, and the inhabitants of Nugla opposed and drove out the Government servants posted to collect the revenue; and in Panchlee Buzoorg, on the borders of the pergunnah, the police were resisted, and a prisoner rescued. Due warning was given, that nothing but an immediate return to allegiance could save them from a visitation by the Khakee Bessalah, by which name the District Volunteers were now well known among the people, but without effect; and on the 13th of August, a party proceeded to punish them and restore order. The rebellious portion of Panchlee was destroyed, as were also the villages of Nugla and Bhupra, a few of the rebels were killed, but sufficient to strike terror into the inhabitants of the whole pergunnah, who immediately recommenced paying their revenue, which just before they openly declared they would pay only to the King of Delhi.

310. It was intended that the force should cross the Kirsunnee river and punish the people of Binnowlee, Bijroul, and other villages, still excited to rebellion by Suja and Bhugta; but the conviction that they would fly on the appearance of the force, and that the Europeans would be therefore only unnecessarily harassed, and the difficulty of crossing the guns experienced at the Hindun, on entering Bimawus, where one of Lieutenant T.P. Smith's guns nearly sunk in a quicksand, and was with the horses extricated only by the energy of that officer and his men, led to the return of the force to cantonments, the main object of the expedition was effected;—a wholesome dread was restored, and much revenue was collected.

311. With the exception of the Burouth Pergunnah on the west, for the occupation of which a larger force was required than could be spared, and Mooradnuggur on the south-west within the reach of Delhi, and the Hauppur boundary on the south, constantly threatened by Wulleedad, the whole of the district was again for a short time well under control; but Wulleedad having been strengthened by the Jhansie Brigade of mutineers* from Delhi, hoping with their aid and a levy en masse of rebels in those parts, to succeed again, became bold and declared his intention of plundering Hauppur, and even attacking Meerut.

312. The state of affairs required a good deal of consideration. Unopposed, Wulleedad certainly might have collected a large body and pushed up to Meerut. The Mohurrum was going on, and during the excitement of it, a rising of all the evil-disposed in and about the place might have been concerted; such a movement would probably have been helped by further reinforcements from the mutineers at Delhi, and all the rebels between that city and Meerut; while the Burouth people would certainly have joined from the west, and the Goojurs from the east would, under such circumstances, have certainly swelled the mass.

* 6 Companies 12th Native Infantry, 14th Irregular Cavalry, 5 guns 9-pounders, 500 Irregular Infantry.
313. Just at this juncture, when a storm appeared to be gathering, orders were received to despatch 200 more of H. M.'s 60th Rifles, all the available Artillery recruits, and a number of officers to the Delhi Camp, reducing the Europeans at Meerut to about one-sixth of the force, which in May, when there really were no enemies who might not have been suppressed by a little energy, was considered barely sufficient to defend the station. No objection could, of course, have been made to increasing at any sacrifice the Army at Delhi for the assault; but it was known that that would not take place for a fortnight at least; the detachment from Meerut which could reach Delhi in three days, viz.: Baghpur, was ordered first to march via Seharunpoor and Kurnaul. Notwithstanding earnest remonstrances and solicitations that instead of these valuable soldiers being exposed to a long tedious march up the country, and down again where they were not wanted, they might be kept to drive back the enemies that were threatening Meerut, and notwithstanding the fullest assurances, that they should be sent by the direct road and be at Delhi before they could possibly reach by the long route selected, they were taken away.

314. Under these circumstances, after due consideration, it was happily decided that the only way to meet the crisis was to face it manfully by taking the offensive, instead of waiting to be surprised. It was assumed, and as events proved perfectly justly, that nothing was so likely to deter the seditious from any attempt as the movement of a compact little Column, and that the appearance of one at Hauppur would check Wulleedad's advance and thereby all the probable consequences of it.

315. Accordingly the force noted in the margin,* marched on the 27th August, the last and great day of the Mohurrum, the first halting place being in the orders selected, so that while the news of the actual movement of troops should reach and frighten Wulleedad,† the Column might be within hearing of the firing, should anything occur at Meerut. The force left in Meerut was as per margin.‡

316. In accordance with the restriction still in force, the Column had orders not to go near Malagurh, indeed not to advance beyond Hauppur, unless attacked or pursuing. It therefore took up a position at Hauppur. Mr. Wilson, who accompanied it, took advantage of the presence of troops to get in revenue from villages, which had hitherto withheld it, and was very successful;—one bit of treachery calling for severe punishment led to a part of the Column moving to Pilkooh on the 8th of September. The Zemindar of this village sent in to say their revenue was all ready, and they would bring it in, but they begged for two chuprassees to be sent to accompany them. Two chuprassees were sent accordingly, but they were, after being received in the village, murdered.

317. The portion of the Column sent to punish the villagers for this crime, was fired on the line of march, and about fifty of the rebels were killed; but when the village was reached, it was found empty; only a few Chumars were left, and they were not touched. The houses of the rebellious Rajpoots were destroyed.

318. In the afternoon of the 10th of September, intelligence was received at Hauppur that the Malagurh rebels were advancing. Major Sawyer
(Commanding the Column at Hauppur), of the 6th Dragoons, took the Carabiniers, mounted District Volunteers, and two Horse Artillery guns to reconnoitre. An outlying picket was driven down the road towards Gulowtee. The rebels had the impertinence to make a stand once, but on the guns opening on them again retired, and the cavalry and guns followed them up at the gallop to within about 250 yards of the main body, and just as the guns were being again unlimbered, the rebel guns opened, and a smart fire was kept up for about twenty minutes. Fortunately, the dashing approach of the reconnoitring party disturbed the range of the enemy, and their four guns were in that short time silenced by the two Horse Artillery pieces, under Lieutenant T. P. Smith, though the latter were only 6-pounders, while the former were 9-pounders.

319. Though the Carabiniers were drawn up on one side of the road with the District Volunteers on the other, and the guns on the metal in the centre, and shot and shell fell thickly around the small party, the only damage received by them was a spoke of the wheel of one of the limbers smashed.

320. The last few rounds were fired after dusk, and as the main body of the enemy was above 1,000 strong, it was not considered prudent to advance upon them with only 100 Cavalry and two guns, and the reconnoitring party returned to camp.

321. It was subsequently ascertained that the rebels really had fled bodily, leaving all their guns, one with the carriage smashed to pieces on the road the whole night; and that had the cavalry pushed on, or had the whole Column advanced from Hauppur, so as to reach Gulowtee before daybreak, the next day the four guns would have been taken. But not even previous successes would have warranted the advance of the reconnoitring party in the dark, into what looked so very like a trap, and it was considered too much for the men and horses to take them out again nine miles in the middle of the night, after they had just returned from their reconnoitring of nearly eighteen miles. The news of the flight of the rebels was not received till too late, and so the gallant little party had not the satisfaction of bringing away the guns they so boldly silenced,—a feat for which great praise is due to Lieutenant T. P. Smith and his men. This was the first time the District Volunteers had been exposed to a smart cannonade; their coolness and steadiness was the admiration of their brave comrades, and again the thanks of Government were awarded to all concerned in this dashing little affair.

322. Burthona, the village of our Jat allies, was attacked by the Malagurh rebels, the Jhansie Brigade and the guns of which they resumed possession when they recovered from their panic; notwithstanding that the Jats could not use their guns, being attacked at points, on which the guns by some arrangement immovable, did not bear, they beat off their assailants most gallantly, with a loss to themselves of only twenty-five killed and wounded.

323. The news of the attack did not reach the Hauppur force in time for them to assist the Jats.

324. The Hauppur Column had no further opportunity of distinguishing itself. If remained out, fully accomplishing the object for which it was detached, till hastily summoned to Thannah Bhowun.

325. On the 17th of September, an attempt was made to surprise the rebel Tehseeidar at Mooradnuggur.

326. The small force noted in the margin, under the command of Major Stokes, 59th Native Infantry, marched on that night and got to the ground about 6 A.M. The rebels' position was a good one. Mooradnuggur has a brick wall on three sides, and is surrounded with mango orchards, and at the time was almost concealed by high crops. The Column was fired at on approaching the wall, and a body of about 200 Cavalry came out on one side. A part of the cavalry was sent after them. The enemy attempted a charge, but their hearts failed them, and they turned and fled, pursued by the Mooltan Cavalry, led by Lieutenant Armstrong.
the 59th Native Infantry, so closely that they had not time to shut the gate, and Lieutenant Armstrong and his men drove them before them, cutting up a number, through the village into the high cultivation on the other side, in which, after many had been killed, the rest got off.

326. Subsequently, while Lieutenant Armstrong was engaged in clearing the village, he was suddenly attacked by a rebel trooper of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, who rushed at him, and having him at a disadvantage, cut him down. An Afghan with Lieutenant Armstrong dismounted and killed the rebel, and thus saved his officer's life. In the meantime, Captain Craigie tried with his party to intercept another body of rebels. His men, newly raised since the mutiny, wanted confidence, and he himself with his Native Adjutant and one or two men outstripping the not-over zealous main body got engaged with the enemy. The Native Adjutant, formerly a Havildar, in the 11th Native Infantry, who had remained firm to his duty, not being a good horseman, was mortally wounded before Captain Craigie could save him, but the rebels found this well-trained Cavalry Officer and the few men near him more than they liked, and when the rest of the troops approached, fled.

327. Though the rebel Tehsildar escaped, the result of this expedition was most satisfactory; the rebels were driven completely out of the pergunnah, and across the Hindun river, and from a large tract collection of revenue commenced. The road from Meerut to Delhi was opened; fifty-seven of the enemy, among them many of the 9th Irregular Cavalry men, were killed, and seventeen prisoners were taken. The loss on our side was one of Captain Craigie's men killed and one severely wounded; one Ressaldar and two Daffadars, and three sowars of the Mooltan Horse slightly wounded.

328. The whole affair reflects great credit on Major Stokes, and all the officers engaged, among whom was Lieutenant (now Captain) Melville Clarke of the 3rd Cavalry.

329. Major Stokes, in his report, mentions Lieutenant Armstrong most deservedly with great praise. It will be seen in the Boolundshuhur Narrative how untiringly and successfully Major Stokes with his men, subsequently for many months, watched the rebels of Rohilkund on the Ganges.

330. This little affair at Mooradnuggur was the last there is to relate.

331. With the fall of Delhi, which occurred immediately afterwards, all hopes of the rebels and the rebels themselves disappeared, and all fighting ceased. The Magistrate, with a party of mounted and foot Police, made a tour of the district, seizing and summarily disposing of rebels. On the evacuation of Malagurh, after the fight at Boolundshuhur, mail carts and dàk carriages began to run, traffic recommenced, and soon the only signs of the deadly strife were the blackened ruins of public and private buildings, the sad row of tombstones, recording the dreadful deaths of those who were massacred, and the little intrenchment where, with numbers decreasing as the danger increased, a little band of Europeans amidst thousands and thousands of rebels and within reach of Delhi, maintained the name of their country and the authority of Government.

332. The Rohilkund rebels kept a large force with artillery on the east of the Ganges, opposite the north-east part of the district; but the presence of a small party of mounted and foot Police, and when they threatened invasion, two Horse Artillery guns, and a small body of troops sent on requisition by the Military authorities, checked them effectually, and though mustering above 7,000 with eight guns, they were never able to enter the district.

BOOLUNDSHUHUR.

333. The subjoined report from Mr. Sapte, Magistrate of Boolundshuhur, is so full and interesting, that I have nothing to add to it; but an earnest hope that Government will acknowledge the gallant and valuable services of all the officers mentioned in it.
334. On first hearing of the mutiny of the troops at Meerut, I called on all the Talookdars of the district to show their attachment to the Government, by furnishing me with men and horses, and by preventing the villagers on their estates from rising.

335. Rao Golab Singh, of Rocheur, immediately responded to my call by sending a small body of horse and foot, armed and equipped. Mahomed Ali Khan, of Chitarree, Moorad Ali Khan, of Pulhasoo, Abdool Luteef Khan, of Khanpoor, Luchmun Singh, of Shikarpooor, also sent me such men as they could spare; and I strengthened my police posts to the best of my power.

336. To Inayut-oolah Khan and Abdool Bahman Khan, of Chundeeroo, on the road between Boolundshuhur and Secunderbad, to Ruttun Singh, Shadee Ram, Nowbut Singh, Jats of Sehere and Syudpoor, I offered permanent employment under Government, on condition of their furnishing me in a given time, each, a troop of mounted men. By the 20th May, I had nearly 200 men, many of whom I distributed over the district, in those places where the population seemed more inclined to mischief.

337. Mr. Turnbull, who had not left the district, but whom I had only relieved three weeks prior to the outbreak, gave me the aid of his services, which from his intimate local knowledge were invaluable. He in company with Messrs. Melville and Lyall, my Joint and Assistant Magistrates, made several excursions in the Dadrees and Secunderbad Pergunnahs, the most turbulent part of the district, inhabited principally by Goor us, who, on hearing of the events at Meerut and at Delhi, at once commenced plundering in all directions, burning Dak Bungalows and destroying the Telegraph.

338. On one occasion, the above gentlemen with a detachment of the 9th Regiment Native Infantry captured forty-six Goor us, belonging to some of the worst villages, and brought them in and lodged them in Jail. I should mention that I had applied to the Officer Commanding at Aligarh, for an European Officer and men sufficient to make up the strength of my Treasury guard to a full company, which Major Eld very kindly did; and deputed Lieutenant Ross, who rendered himself most useful. This force was, however, insufficient to be of use in keeping anything like order at any distance from the station.

339. I was disappointed in not receiving aid from Bareilly, from which station a detachment of the 8th Irregular Cavalry had been ordered to our assistance; but Colonel Troup, Commanding there, could not spare them—a fortunate circumstance for us, as their villainous acts of treachery have subsequently proved. The Rampoor Nawab also failed to send a body of horse, which he had been requested to do by the Lieutenant-Governor. I had also been led to expect that two Companies of the Sirmoor Battalion would join us, but was again disappointed in this our last hope of aid, though we did not hear the cause of their non-arrival, notwithstanding we had been informed of their having started to our relief.

340. I made frequent applications to General Hewitt for a few Europeans to enable me to send my treasure into Meerut, but that officer refused to comply with my request, though I still think it would have been worth while to have incurred a little risk to save upwards of two lakhs of rupees, besides other valuable Government property.

341. About 16th May, a man arrived with a slip of paper, signed by Mr. Drummond, the Magistrate of Agra, and Major McLeod of the Engineers, directing all officers to fall back at once upon Agra, as the rebels were reported to be in full march on that station, and the fort was considered the only safe place. I arrested the man as a spy; but on referring the case, I found out he had been sent as he stated; the object of his mission was not apparent; all I can say is, we all scouted the idea of giving up Boolundshuhur on vague rumour of attack reaching us. From the very first we fully expected an attack from Delhi, but providentially none was attempted, though we must have been a tempting bait to the rebels, and were within such an easy distance.
342. Matters went on getting worse and worse till the 20th, on the night of which I received positive information that we should be attacked in the morning; but as the sepoys of the 9th had not shown any signs of disaffection, but on the contrary had behaved very well, we felt tolerably secure against any attack the Goojurs might make on us, provided they were unassisted from Delhi.

It is worthy of remark that up to this time no man of any consequence in the district had joined the rebels. In fact, all the Talookdara were apparently sincere in their professions of loyalty to the Government.

343. On the morning of the 21st, I received an express from the late Mr. Watson, the Magistrate of Alloogurh, that the 9th Regiment had mutinied, and that the Europeans had been obliged to fall back on Agra. As there could be no doubt but that our detachment would also go, the moment they heard of the Head-quarters having done so, I at once decided on sending off the ladies and children to Meerut, and they left escorted by several officers who had been detained at Boolundshuhur on their way up the country, by some Irregular Cavalry sowars, and a few men from the new levies.

344. The strength of our garrison was now reduced to seven Englishmen, viz., Lieutenant Ross, 9th Native Infantry, Messrs. Turnbull, Melville, Lyall and myself, with my Head Clerk, Mr. Knight, and his son. About 2 P.M., a man came in from Dadree, with the information that we were to be attacked by the Goojurs in force at 5 in the evening. At 4.30 P.M., I heard of the arrival at Khoorja (twelve miles off) of the Head-quarters of the 9th Native Infantry from Alloogurh; we then thought it time to make an attempt to move the treasure towards Meerut.

345. I accordingly went over to the Treasury to Lieutenant Ross, and asked him to pack the treasure in the carts, which I had ready for the purpose. The keys not being at hand we broke open the boxes, and with the aid of the sepoys commenced packing the treasure, and I then returned to my own house for Messrs. Turnbull, Melville and Lyall, and called on the men of the Irregular Cavalry and my own Collectorate sowars to join us on our march to Meerut. About twenty-five complied, and we started to the Treasury.

346. In my compound were ninety Remount Arab horses, which had arrived a few days previously en route to Meerut, escorted by a small guard, composed of men from 9th and 44th Regiments Native Infantry, and I feel convinced that the guard would at that time have taken them safely into Meerut; but General Hewitt, to whom I reported their arrival, positively forbade my sending them on, and they consequently were lost; and horses were very much wanted.

347. But to return. On reaching the Treasury, Lieutenant Ross informed me that his men (who I should mention were acquainted with the fact of their Head-quarters having mutinied) had already begun to help themselves to the money; he however ordered them to fall in, and start for Meerut. Just as his order was issued, and before the men had time to refuse or comply, we saw a dense cloud of Goojurs pouring down the road towards the city; so leaving the treasure in the hands of the guard, we charged right at them, dispersing them in all directions.

348. Messrs. Turnbull, Ross, and Lyall took the road to the city, which had already been reached by a large party of the mob, and aided by some troopers succeeded in killing and wounding a good number. The Jail guard, on the first approach of the mob, opened the Jail gate, and allowed the prisoners to pass out, firing on them as they got outside, without however doing them much damage.

349. Mr. Melville and myself took an opposite direction, and went across the fields, accompanied by seven Collectorate sowars, and a Rassadar and trooper of the 4th Irregular Cavalry and a private servant of my own, whose horse was severely wounded with a sabre cut; we succeeded in dispersing the body, and killed and wounded a few; the main body spread over the country...
and concealed themselves in the neighbouring villages. We then tried to fall back on the Treasury, not knowing what had become of the other Europeans, but were fired at by the guard, as a warning to keep off. This reluctantly compelled us to retreat, and we made off for Meerut about 6-30 P.M., and reached Hauppur about 10 P.M., being fired at only once as we passed a village close to the station. We reached Meerut about 9 A.M. of 22nd May, reporting ourselves to the General Commanding.

350. About 12 o'clock of the same day I was gladdened with the sight of Messrs. Turnbull and Lyall, who reached Meerut with Lieutenant Ross about 11 A.M.; they could give me no information of Mr. Knight or his son, from whom they had got separated. Mr. Turnbull informed me that he with Messrs. Ross and Lyall had gone through the city, and returned fighting every inch in the way, and after having cut down and shot several of the rioters, reached the Treasury in safety. Lieutenant Ross having received a contusion, which for the time rendered his sword arm useless.

351. They had ordered the guard to start for Meerut and to bring the treasure with them; they started, but on reaching the cross road leading to the Grand Trunk Road, told the officers to go and join their friends as they intended to do. So the three left for Meerut, experiencing considerable difficulty in avoiding the villagers, who were on the look-out for them in every direction.

352. As the Goojurs had entered the station they fired each house, commencing with the Dak Bungalow; and during the four days we were absent, the station was completely destroyed,* and all property, private and public, was carried off or burnt. The city people and those of the neighbouring villages taking a very active part in the work of demolition.

353. Our departure from Boolundshuhur, and the authorities having been compelled to leave Allygurh, left the road from Meerut to Agra completely at the mercy of the ill-disposed, and a great number of travellers were murdered, and all communication with Agra was closed, except by cossids. It was therefore a matter of the greatest consequence to re-occupy both these places.

354. The Sirmoor Battalion under Major Reid, which had left Deyrah some days previously for Boolundshuhur by the canal, was unable to get beyond Dasneh, owing to the destruction of the locks by the villagers, and they had sent into Meerut for carriage; but the General and the Brigadier both refused to send an escort, so that the regiment was still further delayed, and was left to its own resources. But by unwearied exertions they managed to get on, and reached Boolundshuhur on the 22nd May, though we did not become aware of this till on our way down to re-occupy Boolundshuhur on the 25th, on the morning of which day I started from Meerut with Mr. Lyall, Lieutenant Ross, and Captain Tyrwhitt, of the late 14th Irregular Cavalry, who had been ordered down to command at Boolundshuhur.

355. I should mention here that the escort furnished us by the General consisted of some men enlisted by Captain Craigie subsequent to the outbreak; they were of course completely raw, badly mounted and worse armed, having as little confidence themselves in their horses, as we had in the riders: their subsequent conduct showed what they were worth, and besides them we had the few men who accompanied us on our retreat from Boolundshuhur.

356. On our arrival at Hauppur, we heard the Sirmoor Battalion had reached Boolundshuhur, and we arrived early on the morning of the 26th. We found the posts and wire of the Telegraph had been entirely removed between Hauppur and Boolundshuhur, a distance of twenty miles.

357. A body of about 200 horsemen, furnished by the Nawab of Rampoor, had arrived the same day as the Goorkhas; so we had now quite a strong

* The Kutcheries were gutted and all the records destroyed.
garrison, but felt much the want of artillery. Parties of these horsemen were employed in patrolling the Grand Trunk Road as far as Khooja.

358. On the 27th we searched a village, Chandpoor, close to the station, and found a large quantity of public and private property concealed therein; so we burnt the village and seized the head man, who, after having been tried by a Drum-head Court-Martial, was hung with two other men of the city, in whose houses plundered property was found. During the night Captain Tyrwhitt and Mr. Lyall left for Belaspoo, the residence of the Skinner's, where a number of Christians where reported to be beleaguered. Mr. Melville also rejoined us from Meerut, where he had been left behind sick.

359. The next morning, the Rampoor Horse showed mutinous symptoms, and declined to obey orders; thirty marched straight off for Delhi, so Major Reid ordered the rest to quit the station, and they re-crossed the Ganges into Rohilkund. On the 30th, Captain Tyrwhitt and Mr. Lyall returned from Belaspoo; the party there preferred remaining, as the fort was strong and well provisioned.

360. On the evening of the same day, Major Reid marched with the whole of his regiment to join General Wilson's Column, which had gone out from Meerut to Ghazeeooddeenmugur. I expressed my fears to Major Reid, that his departure would give confidence to the ill-affected, and that the consequences would be very serious; but that officer considered the body of cavalry at our disposal sufficient to guard the station, which I admitted: but I knew it would be insufficient to check any rise on the part of the villagers, and stated my opinion to that effect. The result proved I was correct, for the very next day Secundrabad, a rich and populous city, about eight miles from Boolundshuhur on the Delhi road, was attacked and plundered; vast numbers of the inhabitants of both sexes and of all ages were brutally ill-treated and murdered. The assailants consisted of men from almost every village of the Dadree and Secundrabad Pegunnaus, who had collected and joined in a simultaneous attack, tempted by the hope of much plunder. The town fell into the hands of the mob; the Police, who behaved well, escaping with much difficulty. We were unable to send out a man to assist the unfortunate inhabitants, who left the city in thousands, and came flocking into Boolundshuhur and neighbouring villages.

361. It was very distressing not to be able to respond to the repeated calls for assistance, but our hands were completely tied by the presence of Nawab Wulleedad Khan, who had a strong mud fort, Malagurh, about four miles from the station. This man was a near relation of the ex-King of Delhi, with whom he was staying when the outbreak occurred; but he had returned to Malagurh, about 26th May, deputed by the ex-King as Soobah of the Provinces of Boolundshuhur and Allygurh, which fact he himself admitted to me, but excused himself by saying, unless he had come out under some such pretence, he would not have been able to escape from Delhi, where he had been detained an unwilling guest of the King.

362. Notwithstanding his profession of loyalty, I suspected him from the very first, as he had brought with him a considerable number of mutinous sepoys and Nujeebs, and had, I knew, several guns; and I heard on all sides he was meditating treachery. His presence at Malagurh completely paralysed us; the moment we moved out any way from the station, we felt convinced he would at once have come down, and with his guns would easily have prevented our return, and thus cut off communication with Allygurh and Agra,—the sole object of our holding Boolundshuhur.

363. We managed to increase our guard of Irregular Cavalry men to seventy-five, belonging to various regiments; much tact was required in their management at such a critical period, when we heard daily of fresh regiments going, to most of which some of our men belonged; but we were most fortunate in having such an officer as Captain Tyrwhitt, who, by his sound judgment and firm bearing, kept them together, in a manner highly creditable to himself.
We were but seven Englishmen, and we took our turn of duty the whole time we remained at Boolundshuhur; every sentry was visited at least once every hour during the night, so that had treachery been meditated, a surprise would have been next to impossible.

364. We heard about this time of the movements of the rebel troops in Rohilkund, who were reported to be in full march on Delhi via Anoopshuhur; I accordingly ordered the bridge of boats to be broken up, and the boats secured on this side.

365. We were joined on 1st June by the late Mr. W. Clifford and Mr. Young of the Revenue Survey. These two gentlemen had been with Messrs. Harvey and Money of the civil service with the Bhurtpoor troops, and were on their way to Delhi up the right bank of the Jumna; but the mutiny of the troops compelled them to fly. Messrs. Clifford and Young were at Hodul, a few miles from the main body, when they received intimation from Mr. Ford, the Magistrate of Goorgon, who told them to make the best of the way to Boolundshuhur; so they crossed the Jumna at once, and arrived at Boolundshuhur late in the evening.

366. Reports from the interior of the district showed that order was passing away. Former proprietors now took the opportunity of ousting the present possessors of their estates; in some instances, this was effected by force and large bodies of armed men. The principal Talookdars all this time had remained quiet. In fact, with the exception of the Malagurh man, no person of consequence then gave us any uneasiness, while they all continued professing extreme loyalty.

367. The continuous stream of mutinous troops up the Grand Trunk Road had of course a very bad effect upon the minds of all, disharmonizing the well-affected, and giving confidence to those who were ill-disposed; while the sacking of the town of Secundrabad, being permitted still to go on with impunity, led the people to suppose our power had really ceased.

368. Allygurh was held by a few British one day, and by a large band of rebels the next; the former being so few in number that they had to fall back on the approach of the latter; still we held our own as far as Khoorja.

369. There were about Rupees 1,500 in the Telseel at Khoorja; these Mr. Melville brought off safely. He went down on a mail cart, and returned in a very short time: his object in going to Khoorja was kept a secret, and he deserves great credit for the manner he performed this duty, which was accompanied with very considerable risk. The greater part of this money was, however, eventually carried off by the sowars that deserted a few days after.

370. On the evening of the 8th, I got reliable information that the station was to be again attacked by the villagers, backed up by the followers of Wulleedad of Malagurh, towards which place I moved out with Captain Tyrwhitt, and patrolled for some hours in the neighbourhood. If an attack had been intended, our move had the effect of stopping it, for the night passed off quietly.

371. On the morning of the 10th, however, we heard of the arrival at Khoorja of a large body of mutinous cavalry from Oude, who had murdered their officers on the road. Their arrival so worked on the feelings of our men, that the greater part of them instantly deserted, and we were left with little more than twenty men, most of whom were Non-Commissioned Officers, besides Captain Craigie's new levies. Finding our force so very much reduced, we deemed it expedient to fall back on Gulowtee, a town about twelve miles to the north of Boolundshuhur towards Meerut, on the Grand Trunk Road, where we remained that night. Early the next morning we heard the rebel cavalry had left Khoorja and gone on to Delhi, which decided us on returning to Boolundshuhur; when about half-way we heard that Wulleedad had taken possession of the station in the name of the British Government, and that everything was quiet.
372. At Captain Tyrwhitt's request I went ahead with Messrs. Lyall and Clifford, and Lieutenant Anderson of the 3rd Europeans, to let the people know we had returned. On entering the station I met Ismael Khan, Wulleedad's head man, who at once came up to me and reported all right. I told him I was going into the city, that our return should at once be known. He accompanied us, and when near the city said he had better go ahead, as there were a number of desperate characters in the city, who might oppose us. I saw a large body of men collected at the further end of the street, close to the Kotwala. While Ismael Khan went to parley with them, we rode a little way down the street, and then pulled up, awaiting his return: finding he did not come back, I sent Mr. Clifford to Captain Tyrwhitt, to let him know how matters stood, and requesting him to come on as quickly as he could, while Mr. Lyall, Lieutenant Anderson, and I retraced our steps leisurely.

373. Within a quarter of an hour Captain Tyrwhitt arrived; and on my telling him how the city was occupied, he expressed his determination to drive them out, and giving the word charge, we went at a gallop towards the city. On our reaching the last turn near the Jail, which enabled me to see into the city, we found the rebels had moved up to the entrance, and the moment we came in sight they opened on us from three guns, and a heavy musketry fire. Captain Tyrwhitt most gallantly led us within thirty yards of the guns, the first discharge from which disabled and killed three men and horses: only about fifteen men had followed; Craigie's levies fled on the first shot being fired, and were never seen again. Being entirely unsupported, we were reluctantly compelled to retreat towards the open, where we could have acted better than in the narrow road in which we were, but we were not followed.

374. I should mention here that we had previously set up a small gun, but as it was moved by bullocks it could not be brought up in time for the action. We brought it off however with us; Mr. Young, under whose charge it was, displaying much coolness on the occasion.

375. Finding ourselves unmolested we retraced our steps to Gulowitz. As we passed Malagurh we found Wulleedad had sent out a small body of cavalry to oppose our retreat; but these fled on our approach, and as we pursued them, took shelter in a village close under the walls of Malagurh, from which they opened a fire upon us, but without effect. Thus were we step by step driven out of the Boolundshuhur District. We reached Hauppur late that night, having halted the day at Gulowitz, where we fully expected an attack; but our orderly retreat, so well conducted by Captain Tyrwhitt, had evidently had a wholesome effect on our cowardly enemy.

376. The next day Wulleedad Khan threw a strong picket into Gulowitz, our Police of course having to fly. Our little party went to Baboogurh, the Stud station, about four miles from Hauppur towards the Ganges, and from which we could watch the ghât at Gurhmookeesur, for which we now had ascertained for a certainty the rebel troops from the Kohilkund station were making.

377. On the 18th June, a force under Major Thatcher came out from Meerut, with which we proceeded to Gulowitz, and drove out the rebel pickets and dispersed the followers of Wulleedad, who however again re-occupied the post as soon as we had retired.

378. On 23rd June, the advance guard of the Bareilly Brigade crossed at Gurhmookeesur, only twelve miles from Baboogurh, which compelled us to retire on Meerut: this they were allowed to do entirely unmolested. Owing to the immense number of hackeries laden with treasure and plunder, the crossing took them several days, and nothing could have been easier than to have attacked and cut them up, encumbered as they were with so much baggage; but they were allowed to cross at their leisure, and reach Delhi without the slightest attempt being made to stop them.

379. The authorities at Allygurh having been compelled to give up their post, the road between Meerut and Agra was now completely in possession of
the rebels; Malagurh became the resort of all the disaffected far and near; Allugurh and Khoorj were occupied by the followers of the rebel Nawab, to whose standard many of the fanatic Mussulmen of the Barrah Bustee hastened to flock. The fort of Malagurh is about 900 yards, removed from the road, which is consequently commanded by its guns, of which Wulleedad possessed six at the commencement of the outbreak. Communication with Agra, even by possi, was effected with extreme difficulty, for so well was the whole line of road and its vicinity watched that scarcely a man could pass without being intercepted. Various expeditions were planned against this impudent rebel, but from various causes were never undertaken until he had got such reinforcements, and his followers had increased to such numbers that he had really become a formidable foe.

380. I remained with my Assistants at Meerut, doing duty as troopers in the Meerut Volunteer Cavalry until the end of August, when we were ordered down to form part of a force under Major Sawyers to keep this very Wulleedad in check. The whole of the Jhansi Brigade, consisting of 12th Native Infantry, the 14th Irregular Cavalry, and a 9-pounder battery had been sent from Delhi to his assistance, and he was now threatening Hauppur, which but for the timely arrival of our force would in all probability have shared the fate of Secundrabad. We remained encamped at Hauppur till 20th September, the date of the fall of Delhi. While at Hauppur we were one day surprised by hearing firing in the neighbourhood of our camp. This proved to be the Jhansi Brigade attacking the Jat village of Bhurthona, the inhabitants of which village had some weeks previously captured three of Wulleedad Khan's guns in a fight with his followers. We went down the next morning early, and found the Jats had succeeded in beating off their assailants, who had retired on Malagurh.

381. On another occasion, we had a sharp artillery fight at Galowtee with the guns of the Jhansi Brigade, which we succeeded in silencing; but night coming on they were enabled to carry them off, not without however having suffered considerably both in men and horses.

382. On the 20th September we returned to Meerut, and on 25th I joined Colonel Greathed's Column at Gazeeooddeennuggur, which had been sent out from Delhi to pursue the flying enemy.

383. We reached Boolundshuhur on the morning of the 28th. It would be useless for me to describe the action which was fought on that day, and which ended in the complete rout of the Jhansi Brigade, posted in a strong position to oppose our entrance to the station.

384. After the fight, which lasted about three hours, we were in possession of the station and town, and the enemy fled, leaving behind them two guns and a large quantity of magazine stores.

385. Mr. Lyall distinguished himself during the fight, having attached himself to Watson's Horse, and joined in a charge against a large body of the rebel cavalry, and I am most happy to say his name was honorably mentioned in the despatch of Major Ouvry, Commanding the Cavalry portion of the force.

386. In the course of the day we discovered that the Nawab of Malagurh had evacuated his fort during the fight, and fled across the Ganges with the greater part of his followers, leaving a number of guns, stores, and much plunder in the fort, which was occupied that night by a body of Cavalry under Lieutenant Baker. Our men encamped on the east side of the city, where we remained till 3rd October, when we marched to Khoorj. A party of Sappers were employed for some days in blowing up the fort of Malagurh, and on 1st October the mines were exploded by Lieutenant Home of the
Engineers in person, when that most gallant officer lost his life,—a spark from the port-fire accidentally ignited the train, and he was killed by the explosion.

387. On the day the Column marched to Khoorja, I went with a party of cavalry under Lieutenant Watson to the village of Jhajjuur, about fifteen miles from Khoorja, as I had received information of a Christian girl being concealed in the house of a rebel trooper of the 15th Irregular Cavalry. Though we arrived at the village before daybreak, they were ready for us. A large body of sowars arrived, and many of them in full uniform came out to oppose us; several were killed in actual fight, and some few were taken prisoners with arms in their hands, were tried by Drum-head Court-Martial, and shot on the spot. After a long search we discovered the girl; she turned out to be the daughter of an Eurasian, a clerk in some Deputy Commissioner's Office in Oudh, whose life, as also that of the father, had been saved by the trooper, Khooda Buksh, in gratitude to whom she turned Mussulmanee and married him; as she expressed a strong desire to be allowed to remain, I did not force her away, but left her with the assurance that her husband would be hung whenever he was caught.

388. The next day the Column marched towards Agra, and I returned to Boolundshuhur, which had been occupied by a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Farquhar, consisting of the right wing of 1st Belooch Battalion, two Horse Artillery guns, and a body of Pathan Horse under Major Stokes.

389. I lost no time in re-establishing the police posts, strengthening those I thought necessary. The greater part of the burkundazes had deserted and joined the rebels, and I filled up their places mostly from the Jats, only one Thannahdar, Sabibbad Khan, of Shikarpooor had deserted; but I did not think it advisable to re-appoint Peer Mahomed Khan of Aoopshuhur, nor Khooshed Alee, the Kotwal of Boolundshuhur. With the above exceptions all the Thannahdars were confirmed in their posts. The turbulent Pergunnahs of Dadree and Secundrabad required a strong body of police, which I kept up till the close of the year.

390. The revenue began to come in the very day we returned. Abdool Luteef Khan, Talookdar of about 150 villages, and who had refused to pay a farthing before, though repeatedly called upon by me to do so, sent in his kist about two days after my return.

391. This man, the head of the Barrah Bustee, was subsequently convicted by a Military Commission of having aided the rebels in every way in his power, and sentenced to transportation for life.

392. His uncle, by name Azeem Khan, had taken a prominent part against us, having joined the rebel, Wulleedad. Khooshee Ram, Thannahdar of Aoopshuhur, caught him trying to escape to the Ganges, and he was brought in, tried, and executed. The conduct of the Thannahdar and his men on this occasion was deserving of all praise, as Azeem Khan I knew offered him any sum to let him off; but the honest Jat of Bhurthona was deaf to all persuasion, and brought him in, in triumph.

393. Having set everything going in the station on 17th December, we moved into camp towards the Ganges to arrange for the safety of the boats at the various ghat's; but we had no sooner reached Ahar, twenty-five miles from the station, than I heard the Goojurs were meditating an attack upon the jail to rescue their captured brethren.

394. With the recollection strong upon me of what these men had been capable of in May last, I begged of Colonel Farquhar to make a forced march back to Boolundshuhur, which we reached the next morning, and I am confident from my subsequent information, that had we not returned, the attack would have taken place.

395. We remained in the station for a week, during which time Lieutenant Smith of the Horse Artillery put the jail into a state of defence, capable
of holding out against any body of Goorjurs; I provisioned it for ten days, strengthened the guard with Golab Singh's men and a few Beloochees, and again on 27th marched to the Ganges.

396. We went via Syanah to Pooth, and thence down the right bank of the Ganges, visiting each ghaut. I collected the whole of the boats at Anoopshuhur, where I posted a body of 200 Jats, and the sequel will show how well these men behaved.

397. The ghauts of Pooth, Bussee, Ahar, between Gurhmooketeesur and Anoopshuhur, I put under charge of Rao Golab Singh of Koochesur. From Anoopshuhur we followed the course of the river by Kurumbas to Ram ghaut, having secured every boat of which we could find any trace. The rebels not showing on the opposite side we marched to Debae, intending to return to Bhoolundshuhur, preparatory to beating up the quarters of the Goorjurs who still set the police at defiance, and refused to pay any revenue. But on reaching Shikarpoo we heard the rebels had appeared in force opposite Ram ghaut, we hurried back to that place. As we neared it, we heard heavy firing, the rebels having attacked Gunour, a friendly village, a few miles inland in the Budaon District; they looted Gunour and then commenced plundering in all directions. The Aherias, a numerous tribe, at first showed some opposition, but finding themselves unsupported, compromised matters, and finally joined the rebel ranks, and as they inhabit all the villages on the left bank, we had to keep a very sharp look-out on all the ferries and fords, the latter becoming daily more shallow; but though on several occasions the rebels have attempted to cross, and once in force, they never succeeded.

398. We remained at Ram ghaut six days and then returned to Anoopshuhur, where we remained a week, and returned to Bhoolundshuhur on 30th November, but were again obliged to march on 5th December.

399. There were constant rumours prevalent, that Wulleedad with all the disaffected fugitives from Bhoolundshuhur and its neighbourhood intended to make an attempt to re-occupy Malagurh, though he would not have found his old residence very comfortable, as the work of demolition had considerably progressed. The people were, however, becoming very excited, and the disaffected took care to spread the alarm.

400. We marched to Debae, when I found that the rebels reinforced by Bukhte Khan, and the Bareilly Brigade, with several guns, had taken up a strong position at Kasgunghe, on which town, invited by the Mussulmen of the place, they had made a sudden attack, killing Chobey Ghunsam Dass, a blind man, but a faithful adherent to the British Government, who had been placed at Kasgunge by the Aligurh authorities. The rebels gave out their intention of looting Soron, a large and populous Hindoo town, a few miles from Kasgunge; but were bought off by the inhabitants, paying a fine of Rupees 20,000.

401. On consulting with Colonel Farquhar, that officer deemed it advisable to make a move in the direction of Kasgunge, with a view to holding the rebels in check, if possible, until the arrival of the Column, which was being formed at Delhi and Meerut, under Colonel Seaton, C.B., to convey a quantity of stores and ammunition for the use of the troops at Cawnpoor, and we decided on going the next day to Atrowli; but hearing that Hoormut Khan of Fendrawul, a fort belonging to Fheemoolnissa, a near relation of the rebel Ruheem Alee Khan, son of Nazliur Alee Khan of Khyleea, was laying in stores for the use of the rebel troops, we changed our line, and sending my tent to Atrowli as a blind, marched to Fendrawul, much to the surprise of Hoormut Khan, and we there found an immense quantity of supplies, evidently collected for the above purpose. He was also busily engaged in putting his fort into a complete state of repair. I had previously deprived this man of two guns, and I now lost no time in disarming adherents, and dismantling his fort, and Hoormut Khan is now under trial before the Special Commissioner, for carrying on a correspondence with the Malagurh rebel.
From Pindrawul we marched to Atrowli, a large disaffected town in the Allygurh District, and from thence to Churra, a small village close to the residence of Daood Khan, Talookdar of Bheekumpoor.

This man's conduct towards us was throughout most suspicious. He refused to furnish us with any kind of supplies, and for two days we were put to great inconvenience, and his personal bearing towards us was disrespectful in the extreme. Of the movements and intention of rebels at Khasgunge he feigned complete ignorance, though his house was but a few miles from Khasgunge; and if he had been as he professed, a well-wisher of the British, he must have felt anxiety for himself if the rebels had advanced; but his conduct plainly showed he was under no apprehension from them.

While we were at Churra, we heard from Colonel Seaton that he intended to march on Khasgunge via Akberabad and Secundra Rao, so as to take Khasgunge in flank, and he requested us to keep the attention of the rebels towards our little force, so as to divert their suspicion of any approach of a large army. This of course left us rather exposed, but Colonel Farquhar, to carry out his instructions, the next day marched to Gungeeree, ten miles from Khasgunge. We sent Colonel Seaton word of our move, and informed him the rebels meant to advance to meet us, so Colonel Seaton changed his route and came down straight on Gungeeree by Jullalee.

The conduct of the head men of Gungeeree attracted our special notice; on our reaching their village, they came out to meet us, and then after waiting but a few minutes wished to leave, and kept asking us to allow them to go. We thought it better to keep them in camp, but I have every reason to believe, it was from this village that news was sent to the rebels of the smallness of our force, the villagers being then in ignorance of the proximity of Colonel Seaton's Column.

Early the next morning Colonel Seaton arrived, and encamped on the east side of the Neem Nuddee, two miles in advance of our camp. About noon of that day we were surprized by the sudden appearance of a cloud of cavalry close to the camp. The men turned out, and after a splendid charge from the Carabineers, in which three gallant officers of the Carabineers lost their lives, succeeded in driving the rebels before them at all points, capturing three of their guns and killing some three hundred. The cowards thought to have been opposed to Colonel Farquhar's small detachment, and great was their astonishment at finding a large army ready to receive them; they soon found out their mistake, and thought to save their worthless lives by an ignominious flight. We went with Colonel Seaton's Column the next day to Kasgunge, which we found evacuated. Colonel Seaton followed the enemy up on 15th, and directed us to march up the bank of the river from Kuchla ghâât, and destroy every boat we could find; Major Stokes and Lieutenant T. P. Smith, Horse Artillery, succeeded in burning four boats at Kuchla, notwithstanding the presence of a large rebel force on the opposite side.

We continued marching up the river bank, visiting each ghâât and destroying the boats at Deenapoor, about four coss below Ram ghâât, and which is in Daood Khan's Ilaka. We discovered four boats on the opposite side, guarded by a strong party of matchlockmen, who opened fire on us as soon as we showed ourselves; but our guns were quickly brought up, and under cover of them, some men swam across and brought over one boat, when a party of Beloochees, under Lieutenant Nicholletts and Knight, crossed and burnt the village which sheltered the rebels. It then being dark the party returned. Early the next morning Colonel Farquhar crossed himself and destroyed all the boats. The guard and the villagers were found to have decamped during the night. Having performed all that Colonel Seaton had required of us, we retraced our steps to Boolundshuhur, revisiting Pindrawul on our way. We had been out of the district for a fortnight, but during our absence all had been quiet, and we reached Boolundshuhur on 20th December.
408. On 2nd January, Khooshee Ram reported that a large body of rebels had arrived at Chaoopoor, opposite Anoopshuhur which they were threatening; Mr. Lyall started off with a body of mounted police, and arrived just in time to see the conclusion of a very smart affair between the rebels and the Jats under Khooshee Ram.

409. I had collected 187 boats at this ghat, a short way above which was an easy ford; the rebels brought down two guns below the ghat so as to rake the boats and the men who guarded them. The Jats, no way daunted, returned their fire from two small iron pieces I had recovered from the district. A body of horse and foot now came down and commenced crossing the ford. Khooshee Ram wheeled his men round, and gave them two volleys in quick succession, which at once decided the day, for the rebels turned and fled, and not one man succeeded in crossing. Several of our boats were considerably damaged after the enemy's fire, none of our men were hit, the enemy's range being too high. Colonel Farquhar on hearing what had happened, marched to Anoopshuhur, as it was very necessary to hold these rebels in check.

410. On 17th January they again came down, but in much greater force than before; they brought with them six guns, two of which they planted opposite the centre of our position, and the others on each flank. Lieutenant T. P. Smith with his two 6-pounders returned their fire, which he succeeded in silencing after three hours. The manner in which this gallant and active officer manoeuvred his guns on this occasion was the admiration of all present,—his practice too was perfect. Our loss was—two men wounded, and one killed, while the enemy lost at least fifty killed, and had Colonel Farquhar not received the strictest injunctions not to cross, our detachment might have gone over and destroyed the enemy. Since that date the rebels have made but one attempt to cross, and that only in very small number. A few horsemen came over and carried off some cattle feeding on this bank, but fled on approach of our patrols.

411. The rebel, Ruheem Alee, came about this time from Bareilly, having got the farm of that part of the district, but he did not hold it long, and I heard that he was only watching his opportunity to escape; I knew he would not be able to cross into the Boolundshuhur District, but imagined, through the friendly influence of Daood Khan, he would find no difficulty in making his escape through the Allygurh District, as he has indeed lately done.

412. Owing to Colonel Farquhar being compelled to remain watching the ghats, no measures have yet been taken against the Goojurs, who have hitherto, comparatively speaking, escaped scatheless for the atrocities they committed against the town of Secundrabad. Though tardy, these men should be taught that the punishment for such an offence is sure. It would be however useless to attempt anything against them without a large force of cavalry and the co-operation of the authorities on the opposite side of the Jumna. They have mostly deserted their villages and taken to the Khadir of the Jumna. They have, however, paid up their revenue, which they have sent in by Brahmans and others not concerned in their misdeeds.

413. I was very successful in recovering cannon, having got nearly sixty pieces, some of them of very large calibre, before I left the district. There are undoubtedly still many concealed, but in process of time, it is hoped, they may be brought to light, three with a large number of Juzails having been dug up in the course of the last few days.

414. I am under great obligation to Colonel Farquhar and the officers of his detachment for their kind support on all occasions. We had upwards of fifty miles of river to watch, and so effectually has this been done, that no body of men has been able to cross. The work has however been most trying to the officers and soldiers; they have had to sit quietly down, while others more fortunate have been called into active warfare; and so have obtained their share of honors from which their less fortunate brethren have been
debarred; though the duties they have performed have been of the first importance, and I venture to hope you will bring this to the notice of Government. Mr. Lyall, my Officiating Joint-Magistrate, though but a young officer, has been of great use, evincing a sound judgment and discretion seldom to be met with in men even of far greater experience.

415. I left the district on my transfer to Meerut on 21st April, and by that time it had resumed its wonted quiet. The revenue had been all paid in, serious crime was unknown, and even offences of slight and trivial nature were of unfrequent occurrence; several mutineers, both cavalry and infantry, had been brought to justice, while many who had not been in Government employ, but who had taken a very active part in the rebellion, had been caught and received the reward for their crimes, while those who have distinguished themselves by their loyalty have been recommended for special rewards.

416. I will now conclude, with the hope that the manner in which I have performed the duties of the difficult charge entrusted to me, will have met with the approbation of Government.

417. Mr. Sapté, naturally, has hardly put in a sufficiently strong light the conduct of himself and the officers who enabled him to hold the district, when, receiving no support from Meerut, they were hard pressed. The zeal and energy of Mr. Turnbull, who immediately set to work to assist Mr. Sapté, in attempting to maintain order in the district, the gallant efforts of Mr. Sapté to retain his position, zealously seconded by Messrs. Melville and Lyall, and the noble gallantry with which all whose names are mentioned in the report, with the military aid of that excellent officer, Captain Tyrwhitt, faced their enemies, not hesitating even to charge guns, firing grape upon them in a narrow road, deserve high praise.

418. Indeed, the Narrative of this division abounds with instances of firm devotion and unflinching bravery. In the history of each district, Seharunpoor, Mozuffernuggur, Meerut, and Boolundshuhur, many such are to be found.

419. The zeal with which officers stuck to their posts, which induced one in bad health even to return to the plains, and the cheerful courage with which officers and men of every rank and grade, of every service, encountered hosts of rebels; the extraordinary success which, with the blessing of Providence, crowned daring attacks upon overwhelming numbers, should win not only the approbation of Government, but the admiration of their countrymen at home, and secure the belief that men who behaved so nobly in fight could not behave otherwise than nobly in all their conduct.

420. But besides the active courage which appears in this record of gallant deeds, there was much to admire which cannot be so apparent. The patient endurance and cheerful spirit of the English women, the never-failing confidence and faithful conviction of ultimate success of all, the admirable discipline and excellent behaviour of the soldiers, all deserve to be brought to notice, and to be acknowledged by Government,—and I trust this Narrative will show, that from the time the Officers Commanding, Brigadier Jones, Her Majesty’s 6th Dragoons, and the much lamented General Penny, had power to act, so far from there being any cause of complaint of inactivity at Meerut, throughout the division there was a succession of stirring exploits; and through the length of the Doab from Hurdwar, where Lieutenant Boisragon defeated twenty times his number, to Allygurh, where some nine or ten Englishmen charged and dispersed about 1,000 rebels, the name of Anglo-Saxons was nobly maintained.

421. In the districts in which the authority of Government was throughout maintained, even before the fall of Delhi, so much revenue was collected as to suffice to meet all demands, with only the exception of the salary of the higher-paid servants of Government, that is, all drawing above Rupees 10 a month; these cheerfully agreed to put up with only a portion of their pay, which was given according to a graduated scale; by which those
receiving Rupees 100 got ¼ths; the amount granted gradually descending till those entitled to Rupees 2,000 and upwards, got ¼th;—a suspension of allowances readily submitted to for about a year.

422. After the fall of Delhi, the administration equalled, if it did not surpass, that of the most peaceful and creditable periods in the history of the division.

At the end of the year, that is, at the end of April 1858, there was even in Boolundshuhur, which was not reoccupied till October, if not less, at least as small, arrears as are usually reported.

From the restoration of order, crime was almost entirely suppressed, showing the beneficial effects of a simple but stringent penal code, to an extent which should recommend the continuance of that temporarily adopted, of course, divested of severity.

423. The district of Aligurh was separated from the Meerut Division and placed under a Special Commissioner, and not restored till order had been re-introduced by Mr. Cocks, who took charge of this district, and nobly held it, and who has, I believe, submitted a report to Government.

424. With the following general remarks this Narrative of Events in the Division may be concluded.

425. That the rebellion had been planned by the Mahomedans, I have no doubt. It is not the province of a local officer to trace this, but one or two indications may be mentioned.

426. Though there was no apparent sympathy, the idea of the restoration of the Moslem religion to power has been repeatedly kept alive. Invitations to join in a war against Infidels, emanating from the Swat country, have circulated through the upper part of Hindoostan.

427. The anxiety of the Rohilkund Puthans, particularly the members of the family of Hafiz Rehmut Khan, that Government should not suffer anarchy and oppression to continue in Oudh, but should interfere and introduce the just administration with which they were blessed, seemed at the time to be the loyal desires of enlightened men. Late events show they anticipated the long-hoped-for opportunity, which the cry of annexation and the decreased importance of the native soldiers in Oude, under British rule, afforded.

428. The march of the mutineers from Meerut to the Arsenal at Delhi might be the policy of soldiers, but the re-exaltation of the Mogul King, and the immediate submission of the Hindoo sepoahes to the head of the Mahomedans, had a deeper source.

429. The recorded conversation in March 1857 of the Bijnowr Nawab and his friends,—“Is there any security now for Islam?” and “that Islam was formerly the dominant religion,” is a specimen of the movement among the Mahomedans. An earlier conversation than this could be traced, I believe, between one of the family of Hafiz Rehmut Khan and a Rajpoet in Rohilkund, in or about December 1856, when the Puthan recommended the Thakoor to look to his weapons as he would be wanting them soon.

430. The tone of the Mahomedan portion of the native press, and the readiness with which, not the impoverished and discontented only, but the well-to-do Mahomedans in every rank and station, staked their all upon the issue and with few exceptions joined in rebellion, their extraordinary association with “idolaters” to exterminate “the Children of the Book” in opposition to the laws of their Prophet, and the Putwehs of the few Moolves, who dared to speak out, even the exceptional loyalty of that portion of the Mahomedans whose views on the matter of proselytism differ from those of the majority; the, happily, unavailing endeavours of the Mahomedan leaders to make the mass of the population join them, and the bitter complaints of the Hindoo mutineers that they have been deeply deceived:—all these indicate that, though a spirit of mutiny may have prepared the native army, the real movers were Mahomedans.

47.
431. Even at Meerut, the first move was made by Mahomedans. A Hindoo said he had fired off the new cartridges, and that all would have to do it. But two Mahomedans spread the story about cow's and pig's fat being used in greasing the cartridges, saying that all would be polluted, that it did not so much matter for the Mahomedans since they could remove the pollution, but the Hindoos would irrecoverably lose caste, and at the instigation of these Mahomedans, the troopers of both sects bound themselves by an oath not to use them.

432. There is no doubt that all the native soldiers retired from the parade, where their comrades were disgraced, muttering "Mutiny."

433. The rumour that the Europeans were coming to seize the Magazines, which issued from the Sudder Bazar, and on which the sepahs rushed to arms, may have been an accident or mistake.

434. But that there were secret agents, and those Mahomedans, watching, if not guiding events, it seems impossible in this part of the country to doubt.

435. The mutiny was apparently unpremeditated, yet the Sudder Bazar people were ready before a shot was fired in cantonments.

436. The outbreak immediately assumed a Mahomedan character. A holy war against the Infidels (the Europeans and Christians) was proclaimed, and eventually in the upper Doab and in Rohilkund, the mass of the Mahomedan population rose against Government. I believe that in Rohilkund the Nawab of Rampoor, and a few of his own trusted friends (among them the chief being Hukeem Saadut Alee), and the Nawab's own trusted personal attendants; in Bijnour, the Deputy Collector and Sudder Ameen; Wullaout Hossein Khan in Mooradabad:; the family of Hukeem Khan, and Busheer Khan in Pillibheet; Mahomed Noor Khan in Shajehanpoor; and a few Government officials were the only Mahomedans who from the first stood out for Government.

437. In Seharunpoor it was remarked that the extensive risings were attributed entirely to the influential Mahomedans.

438. In Mozuffernuggur is a class of Syuds, who do not go the lengths the followers of the false Prophet generally do in matters of proselytism by the sword.

439. These Syuds even wavered, but their loyalty was happily fixed by remonstrances conveyed to them by some of their headmen, though in this district the Mahomedans were late in rising against Government; eventually a vast multitude gathered under the "Green Flag," and displayed the bitterest animosity, massacring in the Musjid men of their own religion, after the most solemn promises of safety, because they were faithful to their Rulers.

440. In Meerut, though there were some good exceptions, Mahomedans were generally ill-disposed, and most joined in the rebellion.

441. In the whole district of Boolundshuhur, I can only bring to mind one exception, that of the family of Moorad Alee Khan of Chitaree, and Puhasso, who took the side they had taken in Lord Lake's time, that of the British Government.

442. Everywhere in this part of the North-Western Provinces, as a general rule, the antagonism of the Moslems showed itself in every place, from the open rebellion of multitudes to the scowling impertinence of individuals, from the public proclamations of rebel leaders to the muttered imprecations of bigots in the mosques; the very fact that the few who shone out as loyal subjects, or merciful men, were stigmatized as Christians, Infidels, Apostates from the true faith, should show what the belief and feeling of the Hindoo-Mussulman is.

443. There was a marked difference between the conduct of Mahomedans and other rebels in this part of India.
444. The first warred against Government and Europeans, the others plundered.

445. The first from the beginning and throughout abstained from injuring the inhabitants of the country, assured them to win them to Mahomedan rule, and urged them to join against Government.

446. The plundering tribes, almost the only Hindoos, who in these parts decidedly and thoroughly misbehaved, turned their hands against every one that had property, their enemies and creditors first. The Muwai Jats of the Burouth Fergunnah were almost the only Hindoos who showed unmitigated disloyalty, and they were urged to it by a notorious bad character, Sah Mull. The Gojurs even were in some instances against us, and sometimes took the side of Government.

447. Vast numbers even of these plundering tribes, who bear Hindoo names, Gojurs, Rajpoots, Thuggahs, &c., are Mahomedans, forced proselytes, when the Moslem power was paramount in Delhi, and like all such proselytes intensely bigotted.

448. It was not a national movement against Government.

449. With the exception of the immediate neighbourhood of Meerut, it was generally some time before Government offices and Government property were attacked.

450. In Deyrah, the people remained orderly and showed loyalty.

451. In Seharunpoor, the towns of Deobund and Nukoor were attacked and plundered, and of course the Government offices in them were not excepted. A mob collected to attack the Treasury at Seharunpoor, but was easily dispersed.

452. These were the only instances in which most extensive plundering assumed the type of rebellion.

453. Mozuffernuggur must be treated as an exception, the best disposed populace in the world would have been tempted to let loose the innate wickedness of human nature by the disappearance of all authority.

454. In Meerut the widely spread report that all the Europeans had been destroyed (which was not contradicted as it should have been by their appearance in every direction); the uninterrupted passage of the Bareilly Mutineer Brigade; the total surrender of the Boolundshuhur District to Wulleedad Khan, who should have been seized by a small force, and hung within three days of his breaking out into open rebellion; the propinquity of Delhi and the constant hope of assistance from the mutineer force there—by which concatenation of circumstances every bad character in the district was encouraged to evil, induced a tendency to rebellion, which was favored by the retention in the lines of the troops who ought to have been enforcing order and checking insurrection. But even in this and in the Boolundshuhur District, till, in the latter, the refusal of aid from Meerut, the approach of mutineers from below and the hope of rescuing the prisoners the District Officers had made, incited the people to it; the outbreak was characterized by aggressions of the lawless part of the population on the better condition;—the prevalence of crime, in consequence of a conviction that authority had ceased, rather than by rebellion against the State.

455. The last offence, as a general rule, spread among the people slowly, as delay at Delhi brought conviction that the British power was passing away, and even then only broke out here and there, when notorious bad characters flushed by success in plundering, led their followers to greater enterprizes.

456. The normal state of the ordinary mass of the people, i.e., those not either Mahomedans or thieves, was waiting events; and their conduct depend-
ed on the amount of their good sense or of their credulity. There were some
who from the first felt that, though the few Englishmen in India might be
ruled by the rebels and hastened to separate from the foreigners, and
secure favor from the native rulers; these were more in numbers than the first
class considerably, but still the many wavered between the two extremes.

457. There were some who believed the false or exaggerated rumours
circulated by the rebels and hastened to separate from the foreigners, and
secure favor from the native rulers; these were more in numbers than the first

458. But all feared—all were employed in an anxious endeavour to
ascertain what would be their own individual interest. The unfailing con-
deration of the natives of Hindoostan;—this their sole consideration, and
cowardice, both moral and physical, made mutineers of half the native army,
and a percentage of the population (the said percentage fluctuating according
to circumstances, but never very large) rebels.

459. Had there been European soldiers and Non-Commissioned and
Commissioned Officers to the extent of 10 per cent. in each native regiment, a
nucleus for good men to fall back upon, with a firm front to face the fire of
mutineers, half the men of the mutinous regiments would not have gone,
and half the regiments in the service would have stood staunch to their duty,
but bodily fear and mental weakness, the absence of all principles of the all
controlling sense of duty, and a dastardly dread of being killed, made well
intentioned men follow the majority of their comrades, and peaceable subjects
seek safety in disaffection.

460. Those who have lived in the midst of it, and who should be the best
judges, cannot but feel that the theory that it was a purely military revolt,
and the other that it was a national effort to shake off tyrants, are equally far
from the truth.

461. Had not the mass of the people awaited the issue, had any large
proportion of them joined, what would have become of the small but gallant bands that in different
parts of the country stood out against the active enemies, may be concluded from the marginal
table, showing in round numbers the population of the districts of this division, and the strength of
the troops which maintained Government authority.

462. Neither can people on the spot be persuaded to believe that efforts
to christianize the Natives led to rebellion.

463. Had this been the case, how is it that Benares, the largest city in
India, to Hindoos the holiest, and where Mahomedan bigotry is sharpened by
its peculiar position, the place where Missionaries have worked more exten-
sively than in any part of India, where the Bible is openly studied and read
by hundreds of students in many schools, did not send some of its 150,000 to
save the Mutineer Brigade from the 200 British soldiers.

464. Beyond all doubt the secret movers of the revolt disseminated widely
the wildest and most false reports that Government was going forcibly to con-
vert the people, and during the outbreak these rumours were spread abroad
to such an extent that many ignorant men believed them, and when peace
was restored, some have stated their readiness to become Christians, and were
astonished when told, no man could make another a Christian. But here,
round Meerut, where the mutiny commenced, Missionaries have been more
successful in one year than they had ever been, and I have been told by a native
deserving of all confidence that in Bareilly Mahomedans and Hindoos agreed
that to be all of one, and that the Christian religion would be better than to
be exposed to the tyranny of Khan Bahadoor Khan, and his Moslem miscre-
ants.

465. It is difficult to believe that the efforts of Government to give edu-
cation to the people can have caused the mutiny and rebellion; when in some
districts the only public institutions maintained during the anarchy,—when doctors were driven out, and dispensaries were destroyed,—were village schools; the only public buildings saved—were village school rooms, and the people when asked to account for this, stated their intentions to have maintained their schools, even if the rule of India had changed hands.

466. During the outbreak, as far my experience goes, the most loyal, the most trustworthy, were young men who had received an advanced English education in the Government institutions. I have known such of the writer class, not a fighting race, generally become brave soldierly men. I have seen English letters from such men, the matter and composition of which would have done credit to any Englishman writer from the midst of fanatic rebels conveying full and useful information, openly and boldly given, though the writer stated he knew he was suspected and watched, and immediate death would be the certain result of discovery.

467. The only approach to the sense of duty, which has animated Anglo-Saxons through this struggle, was to be found among such educated men.

468. Having given my ideas of what were, and what were not, the causes of the mutiny, I may, I trust, give my opinion of what should be the result of it. I would put first the spread of a sound English education, the use of the English language, the employment, only in time of course, of those who were masters of the English language, and of Englishmen and Christians in the offices now almost entirely filled by natives, till the proportions of English or East Indians, of Hindoos and Mussulmen were equal instead of having, as before, a great majority of Mahomedans. The substitution of a simple system of administration, superintended by English officers even in the smallest sub-divisions of districts, for the Anglo-Indian combination of the quibbles and technicalities of the laws of England and the Mahomedan code, administered through the corrupt native amlah. The introduction of Englishmen and English capital; the energetic prosecution of public works, especially the improvement of our means of communication; the construction of Rail roads, and application of locomotives to our existing roads, the introduction of suitable steamers on our rivers; the extension of Electric Telegraphs in this division and along its whole length, more perfect navigation of the Ganges canal, the head work and locks of which should be fortified;—for all which, if necessary, the portion of the population who have hitherto contributed nothing to the support of Government should be made to supply the funds; and, lastly, the amalgamation of European soldiers and Non-Commissioned Officers with natives in the army, and of Englishmen, East Indians, and Christians in the Police, to the extent of at least 10 per cent.

469. I would conclude with recommending most strongly to the notice of Government the conduct of all the officers of districts, of all the gallant officers of the army whose deeds have been recorded in this Narrative;—it is difficult, and would be invidious to select any, where all have behaved so well.

470. With one exception, and that owing to physical unfitness, the officers of the districts have distinguished themselves by their firm bearing and all of every service by their gallant deeds against overwhelming numbers; after the first few days of inactivity, they proved the invincibility of Englishmen, and prevailed so completely that immediately on the fall of Delhi, and expulsion of the rebels from Boolundshuhur, the whole division returned to a state of peace and order, surpassing that of any time previous to the mutiny; so complete has been the re-establishment of order, that the division has been able to spare soldiers for the tranquillization of the rest of India.

471. The force of the regular army now in it is much less than it was when the mutiny broke out.

472. By the exertion of the Military Police Officers in the division, large numbers of men have been raised for service in other quarters.

A 48
473. A large body of mounted and foot Police,* the first excellently horsed, and all so armed and trained under the superintendence of the energetic Commandant of Divisional Police and the zealous officers under him, that they have not only been able to take the duties of other districts, but to vie in appearance with and beat in fight the old Irregular Cavalry, and to distinguish themselves on service within a marvellously short time after being raised, have been sent down the country, while with the exception of the troops at Meerut, and a few soldiers at Algygurh, the whole division is now guarded only by the new Military Police.

474. Two strong troops of European Cavalry, also raised and equipped here, after checking the rebels of Rohilkund, have since the re-occupation of that province been employed there.

475. I believe that the Meerut Division, where the mutiny first broke out, was also the first division in the North-Western Provinces restored to order, and the one where the authority of Government was maintained throughout over a larger tract than in any other division on this side of Benares, and that under circumstances which reflect great credit on all the officers concerned, and I trust that the exertions of all will be rewarded by the approbation of Government.

476. The services of the Military Officers in the Division, during the mutiny, have been separately brought to notice; as also those of the District Volunteers. A detailed list of all the persons that have aided Government or Europeans, or done good service, follows this report.

(Sd.) F. WILLIAMS, Commissioner.

MEMORANDUM ON THE MUTINY AND OUTBREAK AT MEERUT IN MAY 1857, BY MAJOR WILLIAMS, COMMISSIONER OF THE MILITARY POLICE, NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES.

At the close of 1857, I was directed by the Chief Commissioner of the North-Western Provinces to enquire into the conduct of the Native officials and Police of the Agra District; when I also, in my capacity of "Superintendent of Cantonment Police, North-Western Provinces," investigated the proceedings of the Police in that Department at Meerut, on the night of the outbreak.

Although six months had elapsed, sufficient evidence even then was obtained to prove their culpable negligence and wilful disregard of their first duty as Policemen, i.e., to afford every assistance in quelling the disturbance, and saving life and property.

The investigations moreover proved that Europeans were murdered in the Sudder Bazar, in many instances in close proximity to Police stations; and also by depositions Nos. 28 and 30, with those of all the European soldiers, that others were assaulted by men in the Police uniform; and all concur in stating that no assistance whatever was afforded by the Cantonment Police. These facts, even though the individuals attacked were unable to recognize their assailants (which is not surprising, from the suddenness of the outbreak, the numbers simultaneously assaulting them, and their being personally

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* Memo.—Showing the number of mounted and foot Police enlisted in the Meerut Division, and despatched to other divisions.

| Strength of Troop | Strength of Company | Twenty-one Troops of mounted Police and seven companies foot Police, as marginally stated, have been at various times despatched to other divisions from this.
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<td>1 Naib ditto.</td>
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<td>1 Jemadar.</td>
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Memo.—75 Seikhs enlisted in the Punjab were likewise passed on from this division to others at different times.
unacquainted with individual members of that force) strongly prove, to say the least, the culpable negligence of the establishment as a whole. Yet all were not equally guilty: there were some attempts made at the commencement, even by the Police, to quell the outbreak; and plundered property was recovered from the rioters. More might possibly have been accomplished, had not their endeavours been checked in the bud, by the then officiating Kotwal, who being himself a Goajur, and moreover fearing the vengeance of the mob, would allow no further seizures to be made either of persons or property. (Vide deposition No. 66.)

The whole of the Cantonment Police have been tried and punished, according to their respective demerits; and every endeavour has been made to apprehend those who deserted from fear of consequences, either because they had been actively engaged in riot and plunder, or had failed in the discharge of their duty.

Whilst engaged in these investigations much information was obtained regarding the outbreak at Meerut, which, though foreign to the chief purport of my enquiries, was recorded, as being likely to afford some clue to the causes of the mutiny at that station.

I am aware of the necessity for great caution in receiving evidence from men who possibly may have themselves been implicated in the mutiny, or in a guilty knowledge of it. But the statements of the men of the 3rd Light Cavalry, and 11th and 20th Native Infantry, were freely made, not drawn from them; moreover, I seldom rely on mere formal depositions, or cross-examination in Court; for having had to deal with informers of the Dacoitee Department, a class of men whose evidence I was always obliged most carefully to sift, I adopted the same plan with these men, conversing with them apart and in their unguarded moments. But every endeavour to break down their evidence only served the more firmly to fix in my mind the conviction of its truth; and this in the face of a strong preconceived opinion, that a deep seated conspiracy had existed.

Whatever the worth of the evidence may be, a careful scrutiny of the depositions proves, I think, as follows:—

Digest of the evidence regarding the mutiny at Meerut.

First, as regards facts, in favor of the supposition, that a preconcerted mutiny existed among the Native troops at Meerut:—

Deposition No. 1 shows the prior existence of an ill-feeling, on the part of Mahomedans, against their Christian Rulers; of an impression that their religion was being powerfully shaken, and that steps should be taken for the remedy of the evil; and also that the cartridge question, as connected with religion, was frequently discussed by them.

Depositions Nos. 4 and 5 state that rumours were afloat on the committal of the eighty-five sowars to prison, that the sepoys were in a dissatisfied state and would probably mutiny.

Deposition Nos. 6 to 11, regarding the fakeer, prove nothing of a seditious nature against him; yet the circumstances stated of his appearance at the Umbala Depot, and subsequent intimacy with the men of the 20th Native Infantry, shortly before the mutiny, may be considered somewhat suspicious.

Depositions Nos. 32 to 35 show that a Cashmerian girl, named Sophie, received warning from a sepoy that a mutiny was about to take place; but the intimation thus given (the only glimpse obtained of an intended revolt being made known to others) refers only to that day, and does not imply the existence of any combination prior to the confinement of the eighty-five sowars.

Depositions Nos. 38, 65 and 66 prove that the Kotwalee Guard, about half an hour previous to the outbreak, were apparently warned; but this doubtless was only in a similar manner to that of the Cashmerian girl, Sophie.
Deposition No. 56 states a strange fact, that the Gojurs exclaimed to the then officiating Kotwal "Thou hast summoned us," &c. This however being mentioned by one individual only may be deemed somewhat doubtful.

Secondly, as regards evidence against the supposition of a pre-existing conspiracy:—

Depositions Nos. 2 and 3 of officials high in Government employ, if they may be considered reliable, prove that to even men of their class no signs of the impending revolt were visible; but that both in city and district affairs bore the usual peaceable and orderly aspect they had ever done; that the circulation of the chuppatties had to them no ill insignificance;* and that their conviction was that evil reports in the first instance caused, and the uncontroverted boast of the extermination of all Europeans, rapidly spread, the revolt.

From depositions Nos. 10 to 19 of the sepoys and troopers it would appear that no general warning was given to the whole body, nor any unanimous plan of action concerted amongst them. Although some days before the outbreak two Mahomedan Naiks of the 3rd Light Cavalry swore in the men of their regiment to refuse the cartridges, said by a Magazine Classic, to be greased with cow's and pig's fat, until their use was sanctioned by the whole native army; and though the evidence of others shows that some few were prepared to act for the liberation of their comrades, yet that they must have consisted of a portion of the men only, since many of the sepoys undressed and unarmed were, according to their usual wont, lounging about the bazars, totally unprepared to the last moment, and only when the cry was raised "the rifles and the artillery are coming" fled precipitately to their respective lines; more it would seem from some undefinable dread of something about to happen, than to carry out any preconcerted plan of action, for amongst them were some who sided with and defended their officers to the last; that alarming reports, in the first instance, of polluted food to be forced upon all, and subsequently of sets of irons sufficient to confine the whole force being in course of preparation; and finally, on the evening in question, of the start of the rifles and artillery for the purpose of disarming all the native regiments circulated by a cook boy of the rifles and the bazar-people, and confirmed by a sowar coming from the direction of the Brigade-Major's house, were the immediate cause of the mutiny; that a recruit of the 20th Native Infantry, who fired the first shot (and is said to have been killed by his comrades for thus involving them in ruin and disgrace), implicating them in their estimation beyond recall; and the death of Colonel Finnis sealing their doom, nothing but flight and desertion could save their lives; that the detached guards did not break out simultaneously with the regiments, but that some even remained at their post a day or two after, and that the others hearing rumours of the cause of the firing hastened to stand by, or fall with their brethren in arms; that moreover such was their unpreparedness that their wives and families were left behind unheeded and uncared for, who roved about the town for some days, seeking food and shelter, and from thence disposed of themselves as best they could.

Depositions Nos. 20, 21, 56, and 57 prove that the sowars contented themselves with releasing their comrades only; that the rest of the prisoners in that Jail were subsequently let loose by a mob of villagers; and those of the old Jail, by sepoys of the 11th and 20th Native Infantry.

Depositions Nos. 38, 39, 41, and 55 bear witness to the friendly conduct of some cavalry troopers, who, in one instance, dispersed the mob that attacked Mrs. Courtney's carriage, and that in others, warned soldiers walking in the bazar to fly.

* The chuppatties were not circulated among the alleged conspirators, the sepoys, but among the rural population. A Hurkara's stick was passed on in the same manner, through the Delhi territory, at a time of profound tranquillity; none being able to tell from whence it came, nor where it went; but being merely passed on from village to village, each being directed to make it over to the next.
Depositions Nos. 22 to 26 show that the mutineers fled as a disorganized mob in bands varying in numbers, and in different directions, many towards Delhi, but others in totally opposite quarters; as also that the Jail guard on being met and questioned stated they had fled in dismay from fear of being involved in the consequences of the revolt. The depositions of all the Europeans prove the total inaction of the Police as regards the murdering and plundering by the mobs; and in many instances the actual murder and attempts at murder of Europeans by mobs and Policemen, the former being often headed and incited by the latter, and in some few instances, of the bad characters being accompanied and assisted by sepoys and sowers.

The depositions of the city and bazar residents, as also those of all the Europeans, testify to the total want of preparation on the part of the inhabitants of both, as evidenced by the shops being open, trade carried on as usual, travellers journeying unarmed to and fro, realizing money, &c.; some of whom were plundered and maltreated by the mobs, to whom all concur in chiefly ascribing the plundering, burning, and murdering that occurred.

The depositions of the native residents also show that they ascribed the mutiny to the evil rumours that were afloat, and the fears cherished in consequence by the sepoys for the safety of their caste and religion; also their conviction that the excesses committed by the mobs resulted from the prevailing belief that the Europeans had been exterminated by the native troops; and the withdrawal, in consequence, of all fear of retribution, as the re-action that took place the next morning clearly proves; for when they found the Europeans were still alive and in force, they rapidly disgorged their ill-gotten plunder, and many fled.

Depositions Nos. 28, 29 and 30 prove how much loss of life and property might have been avoided. And now much good effected by a little energy and decision, by the presence of even a handful of Europeans patrolling the streets during that ever memorable night.

Depositions Nos. 31, 48 and 50 prove the mutilation of European corpses, but only of those away from the sepoy lines, and which must have been perpetrated by the mobs; while those apparently killed by the troops were left as they fell.

Depositions Nos. 54, 56, 59, and 60 prove that at first, attempts were made by some of the Police to check the excesses of the mobs; that the officiating Kotwal on one occasion headed a party and succeeded in dispersing a band of plunderers; but that subsequently he prevented any seizures being made either of persons or property, fearing the personal revenge of the mob; and protected his own fraternity, the Goojurs.

Depositions Nos. 36 to 38, 50 to 53, 65, and 69 to 71 furnish proofs of fidelity, not only on the part of servants and dependants, but other natives likewise, and even of two Policemen; all willing to risk life and limb on behalf of their masters, acquaintances, or even of strangers, as in the instance of the Policemen.

Having thus given a brief digest of the evidence, I will now proceed to furnish an outline of the events that occurred at Meerut as detailed therein.

Whatever may have been the state of the Bengal Army in the beginning of 1857, an ill-feeling was evidenced at Meerut against the Government by the incendiary fires that commenced there in April of that year.

The introduction of the new cartridges appears to have been frequently canvassed among the native population, and in some instances (vide deposition No. 1) in a spirit of bitter hostility against Europeans and their religion. Rumours of polluted food to be forced upon all were also very prevalent; and the reputed prophecy that the British rule was to last 100 years (of which 1857 was the close) was called to mind. These idle rumours, acknowledged by native officials to have been prevalent in the Meerut District, were, we can imagine, circulated by evil-disposed men, ready to take advantage of any
change that might arise. The circulation of chupatties so shortly before the outbreak, though appearing to us most mysterious and suspicious yet, if we may credit the statements of those I have questioned on the subject, both high and low, was not regarded by them as an ill omen, but supposed to have originated in some vow. Many of those thus interrogated, I have no reason to doubt, being individuals who from the first cast in their lot with ours and perilled their lives for our cause, nor have I in consequence any just grounds for believing they concealed aught they knew. This mystery, notwithstanding every effort made to solve it, remains unravelled still.

In the beginning of this ever memorable year, being on special duty, as Joint-Magistrate, in four divisions, I passed through most of the districts, shortly afterwards in open revolt. I had to deal with the worst of characters, being engaged in breaking up gangs of highway robbers; and though only attended by a small guard of the 8th Irregular Cavalry, yet I found all as submissive and respectful as in former years and witnessed not one sign nor symptom of the coming storm. I am aware that however intimate Europeans may be with natives, however qualified by experience and long residence amongst them to form some estimate of their character, but few thoroughly understand them: we float as it were on the surface, and if in official power, know even less than the Missionary and Planter who mix more unreservedly amongst them. Yet surely if there had been a wide-seated conspiracy, of which the chupatties were a sign or symbol, some change in demeanour would have been apparent amongst the population of the many districts I passed through. Or if the secret had been so carefully concealed from Europeans (save a few favored ones said to have received hints) that not a shade of suspicion crossed their minds, yet would it not have been detected by Natives, even though clothed with official power? whereas their evidence (if credible) proves that they, with ourselves, were alike ignorant of what was so shortly to be.

The fukeer's appearance at the Umballa depot, his residence at the Soorujkoon tank and in the lines of the 20th Native Infantry, so shortly before the outbreak, and his great intimacy with sepoys, are certainly suspicious facts; but every endeavour to trace out his history, the object of his journeyings and his ultimate fate have failed, and nothing of a seditious nature has been elicited against him.

Taking for granted that the statements of the men of the 3rd Light Cavalry are correct, it would appear that the first act of open and decided mutiny in their Corps took place on the 22nd of April 1857, when the men were sworn in on the Ganges and the koran to refuse the cartridges, until the whole Bengal Army had consented to accept them. This was done by two Mahomedan Naiks who incited the men by stating they were now sworn to defend their religion, and promising to set them the example, adding that a Magazine classic had averred the obnoxious cartridges were prepared with hog's and cow's fat. Those however served out to the troopers could not of course have been of the new sort that were objected to; and though we can fairly allow for suspicion having entered the minds of some, yet this fact is significant of a hostile feeling against Government and a determination to make the worst of matter by extending the prejudice originally incited by, and hitherto confined to, the Enfield Rifle cartridges, to those of the same kind as had been used by them for generations past.

Then followed the trial of the eighty-five sowars, and their imprisonment on Saturday, 9th of May, in the new jail near the Soorujkond tank, the guard of which was strengthened by the addition of a Native officer and twenty-four sepoys from the 20th Native Infantry. All was thus supposed to have been quietly and peaceably settled, but alas! not so.

Since the evidence was printed, Resuldar J. Hares has deposed that whilst with the 3rd Light Cavalry at Meerut, some two or three men of that Corps came to him on the afternoon of the 10th May 1857, and said that the
men of the regiment intended next morning to give in a petition to the Colonel soliciting the release of the eighty-five prisoners; that if Government again employed these men, or permitted them to return to their homes, the men of the regiments would obey any orders whatever.

From a statement made to me by Vuzeer Ali Khan, Deputy Magistrate of Meerut (but not recorded, as I failed to discover the Vakeels in question), it would appear the troopers first thought of obtaining legal redress for their comrades, and with that view applied to the Vakeels of the Court to learn what steps should be taken for an appeal against the sentence of the Court Martial. If this be true, it proves that the last alternative of rescuing their companions by force of arms had not then been resolved on, at least by all the regiment. I have also been informed that the men were taunted by the disreputable inhabitants of the Sudder Bazar for allowing their brethren to suffer on account of their religion, and the cry of "Deen deen" was even thus early raised.

However, whether the foregoing be true or not, the decision of an appeal to arms most probably was arrived at on Saturday or Sunday; as the depositions prove that the Cashmerian girl, Sophie, received an intimation of the coming outbreak from a sepoy at about 2 P.M. on the day of the revolt, which passed on to the mother of Mussumat Golab Jaun; it, through the latter, reached the ears of the late Dr. Smith; but he, as many others would have done, treated it merely as an idle bazar report such as prevailed even before sentence was passed on the scoundrels; as, for instance, the Head Clerk of the Sessions Judge received a letter from his brother stating the sepoys were determined to mutiny. This was also discredited. The warning given to the girl Sophie is the first glimpse we have of an intention to mutiny; and one other is furnished by the evidence, though in a very different quarter. Deposition No. 63 proving that a sepoy came to the Sudder Bazar guard at about half-past 5 P.M. and apparently bid them hold themselves in readiness, adding aloud: that they must permit no one to detain them; that upon his departure they immediately loaded their muskets, and at the first shot vacating their post joined their comrades, shooting two Christians by the way.

The general belief that all the detached guards broke out into revolt, as in this instance, simultaneously was proved incorrect; it having been advanced as a striking proof of a preconcerted mutiny, questions to elicit the truth were put to all the sepoys; and not only from them, but from other and private sources also, ample testimony was borne to the contrary. Many on hearing the firing (being acquainted with the rumours afloat regarding the disarming of the Native troops) naturally hastened to the support of their regiments, and evidently prepared to resist any such measure by force. The above is the only known instance of a guard being warned, and it occurred but half an hour before the outbreak.

The deposition of Syed Meer Khan, Sirdar Bahadoor, was taken to disprove a very prevalent notion, that he also had warned the civil and military authorities of that which, according to his own showing, he was himself entirely ignorant.

Another strong proof of there being no prearranged plan of action is the fact of their wives and children being left totally unprovided for, who wandered about the city for some days, houseless and homeless, and at last scattered in various directions in search of food and shelter; whereas it is well known that on any expected emergency a Native's first care is to place his family in a place of security.

Again the evidence shows the mutineers fled precipitately, as a disorganised rabble, without a head to guide or control them. All these facts militate, I think, against the supposition of an organised conspiracy, at least as respects the Meerut troops. And with regard to the city and bazar residents; their ignorance of, and unpreparedness for, coming events, is palpably evident from the following facts: their shops were all open and 'goods' unpro-
ected; men were passing to and fro, paying, realizing, and carrying about with them money; vendors of goods hawking about their wares as usual, and travellers journeying unarmed both to and from the city and district; in fact, the usual routine of business and of pleasure flowing on in apparent peace and security.

It is evident that the minds of the Native soldiery were kept in an agitated and inflamed state by false and malicious reports busily circulated; of bones being ground down with atta, which they would be forced to eat; of their being shortly disarmed, and of sets of irons sufficient to confine the whole force being in course of preparation. But that all were not aware of anything being about to transpire is plain from many of the sepoys being in the bazaars lounging about as usual undressed and unarmed, when suddenly the cry is raised, “the Rifles and Artillery are coming to disarm all the Native Regiments;” and instantly they hurried to their respective lines, accompanied by a large mob, who evidently expected something would happen. As far as could be ascertained, the report was raised by a cook boy attacked to the Rifles, and confirmed by a soldier coming from the direction of the Brigade-Major’s house. As regards the former, it must be borne in mind that the Rifles were present at the scene on Saturday morning, and would doubtless amongst themselves discuss the probability of having eventually to disarm all the Native troops; the cook boys have a smattering of English, and may have caught up some expressions used by the soldiers, and hence originated the report; that when the regiment was drawn up to proceed to Church, they may have concluded that their destination was the native lines, and in consequence gave the alarm. Thus a wretched cook boy lit the first spark, that so speedily set the station in a blaze.

The evidence of the men of the 3rd Light Cavalry and 11th and 20th Native Infantry show what followed; how well the officers of those regiments behaved, seeking by every means in their power to reassure the minds of their misguided men, whom they trusted to the last, as every officer who knew and loved his men would have done; how nobly Colonel Finis acted, leaving his own men who were devoted to him, and whom up to the moment that he fell, he had succeeded in restraining to pacify the sepoys of the 20th, by whose hands he lost his life. Then come the scenes of mutiny and murder that took place on parade: the men having lost confidence in their officers were no longer to be guided or controlled by them. The first shot is said to have been fired by a recruit of the 20th Native Infantry, who, incredible as it may appear, is stated to have paid with his life for his temerity, having been shot by his comrades for thus involving them in ruin and disgrace.

The bad characters of the city and bazar already assembled (and like the brotherhood in every part of the world, ready to reap the fruits of any disturbance that might arise) were at once up and doing (the Sudder Bazaars of Meerut and Cawnpore have long been noted for their swarms of vagabonds); arms being ready at hand, the shops of native armourers affording an ample supply. Butchers, whose trade is blood, seem to have promptly taken the lead; the first man who attacked Major Taylor was one, and he was allowed to escape through that officer’s intervention. Bungalows were rapidly plundered and set on fire, those nearest the sepoys lines doubtless by the mutineers; but the evidence of Mrs. Macdonald’s servants and others show that the bad characters of the Sudder Bazar took a prominent part in these acts of riot.

The scene, as described by eye-witnesses, must have been appalling. In an instant all order subverted: raging mobs of marauders roving about in search of plunder; loud yells and cries of “Ali Ali” (for the Muhammadans soon took the lead, raising above all other sounds this the watchword of their religion), bungalows blazing in all directions; Europeans, the objects of popular fury, flying in haste and confusion; and the bodies here and there of our poor countrymen, and helpless women and children, weltering in their blood, must indeed have formed sights once seen, never to be forgotten!
Meanwhile, at the very commencement of the outbreak, a party of the 3rd Light Cavalry hurried off to the new Jail and released their comrades, no opposition being offered by the men of the 20th Native Infantry that had been sent to strengthen the Jail Guard. Having effected this, they returned in company with their brethren, leaving the rest of the prisoners in confinement. According to Mr. Dorrit's (the Jailor) statement, these amounting in number to 839 (desperate characters) were let out by a mob of villagers, who emboldened by impunity attacked, broke open, and set fire to the Jail about midnight. The inmates of the old Jail, according to the Darogah's deposition No. 21, were released about an hour after the outbreak by a small band of sepoys, who were thus permitted, unmolested, to let loose upon the station a number of the worst and vilest characters to commit havoc and destruction, and who, in all probability, were the chief perpetrators of the atrocities committed on helpless women and innocent children, for the bodies found in this neighbourhood were the most mutilated and by sword cuts; whereas those by the parade grounds were evidently shot, and lay as they fell.

In tracing the route taken by one unfortunate lady, who, with her children, fled in disguise towards the city; I felt convinced that, as she emerged from the narrow lanes of the Hroossainee Bazar on to the high road, she must have fallen in with a band of these wretches, and by them have been so cruelly murdered.

The statements of Lieutenants Eckford and Furnell show how the dastardly mob quailed before European energy and decision. And how much one undaunted Englishman could effect in saving life, single handed, and almost unarmed. Who can tell what might not have been accomplished, had the gallant Furnell's offers of service been accepted, instead of coldly rejected! Surely the noble gallantry of these two individuals merits no less distinguished a reward than the Victoria Cross.

It would seem the mutineers made no stay in the station, but fled on the first opposition, and in various directions; some, after holding a short and hurried consultation towards Delhi, thus proving they at least had no settled plan of action; the rest, in different and opposite directions, but all as disorganized mobs, with no acknowledged leader. Some of them (vide deposition No. 25) threw away their arms and property as they fled, fearing doubtless a pursuit; which alas was never attempted, and others (sowars) abandoned their horses, which were caught in the direction of Galoutie on the Boolundshahur road and brought in.

Depositions Nos. 22 and 23 show that a small party of eight sowars, dressed in uniform, were met on the Delhi road, some four miles in advance of the main body, who, from the time and place at which they were seen, must have started from the above named Council. This is the only intimation we have of any arrangement being made to prepare the native troops at Delhi. These depositions also show how rapidly the troops became disorganized, even thus early taking to plundering all they came across, whether high or low, leaving their countrymen their lives only. We find likewise the crusade against Christians already commenced; had the occupants of the Gharrie been Europeans, instead of Natives, they would undoubtedly have perished.

The statement here mentioned as being made by the Jail Guard to Moonshee Hursurun Dass is one instance out of many, where a fear of being implicated in the punishment of the mutineers led numbers to fly or join their cause.

The astonishingly rapid rise of the Goojur population (a race of thieves by birth and profession) in consequence of the news of the revolt spread far and wide by the released convicts, and the prompt advantage they took of the outbreak to plunder and ill-treat all they came across is startling.

It is not quite clear when these people entered the station to share the carnage and spoil; but it would seem not before 8 P.M., and according to the
statement of the chowkeedars about 10 P.M., by which time almost all the troops must have fled.

The readiness also with which the villagers fell in with the existing state of anarchy and disorder, plundering each other, and avenging wrongs, real or imaginary, shows how completely they associated our power and stability with the native army; so that seeing they had turned against us deemed our overthrow already accomplished. Thus all continued acting, according as their evil passions swayed them, until demonstrations of English power, on the morning of the 11th in the city and bazars, and sometime later in the district, showed them the falsity of their notions, and sufficed to restore order.

The above evidence does, indeed, bring out strange facts and inconsistencies, more especially so, if we are to consider the revolt as the outbreak of an united people against its rulers and oppressors.

For instance, European soldiers (vide deposition Nos. 38, 39, and 40) are warned by a 3rd Light Cavalry trooper to fly and save their lives; others of the same corps interpose between Mrs. Courtney and a mob, from whom they succeed in saving her, though alas but for a time, as very shortly after she and her children are brutally murdered at the gates of the house of the Deputy Magistrate of Meerut, cruelly closed against her when seeking shelter within them, and this but a few yards from a Police station.

In opposition to the friendly conduct of these troopers, we find the Cantonment Police at best looking indifferently on, and often themselves assisting in the destruction of that, for the preservation of which they drew their subsistence.

But let us again turn to the bright side of the picture. Baktawur chowkeedar (vide deposition No. 36) perils his own life in the attempt to save that of his mistress. I earnestly sought for this man to reward him, but failed to obtain any traces of him; and the Ayah never leaves the children entrusted to her, but secures them a place of refuge. Matadeen, another servant, with a sword touching his throat, refused to say aught that could betray his master. Sadhee, a gardner, conceals his master, mistress, and two other ladies. Juggernath, a chupprassie, with other fellow servants, boldly defends his master's property, and forcibly recovers some from the hands of a plunderer. And last, but not least, Asgur Ali, a descendant of the Prophet, as also his Christian tenants at the risk of his own life, and notwithstanding the loss of all his property in consequence, nobly continues firm to his self-imposed trust, and for days provides them with food and shelter in his own house. Others, on the contrary, displayed acts of base cruelty and treachery. Such instances were however of rare occurrence, and though with regard to some of the former, a far-sighted prudence may have furnished interested motives for fidelity, yet such could not have been the case with all, as a careful perusal of the facts will show.

The mutiny at other places, and at subsequent periods, affords similar instances of strange incongruity; and though not connected with the outbreak at Meerut, from the incidents of which the foregoing observations are drawn, I may perhaps be justified in inserting here, as collateral proofs of the same thing, and links in the great chain of events that have rendered the year 1857 one of the most memorable in the annals of our history.

A few days after the outbreak at Meerut, a small guard of the 8th Irregular Cavalry, with a party of Dacoitee Police, of their own accord and for greater safety, escorted the office records and treasure chest in their charge, from Meerut to Agra, fighting their way down, and when attacked by insurgent villagers, beating them off with heavy loss. They were well rewarded for their fidelity; yet in less than two months after, deserted almost to a man.

Two sowars of the same regiment accompanied an officer in every expedition he undertook throughout the revolt; being at times for days alone with
him, when his life (humanly speaking) lay entirely at their mercy. They were promoted for their uniform good conduct; yet deserted shortly previous to the fall of Delhi, when even natives acknowledged the Mahomedan cause a hopeless one.

A small body of Dacoitee Police, all Mahomedans, displayed rare fidelity, the only guard by day and night: they remained true to their trust during the revolt. When communication by post was closed, they carried letters and despatches, running the greatest risk, for it is well known what treatment our messengers met with if discovered by the rebels, who then covered the country; and this not for reward such as was given to special kossids, but in their proper tour of duty, and for their ordinary pay, and with one exception (an important despatch to Lucknow, the fate of the messenger of which has never transpired) all reached their destinations safely. Moreover, the fidelity of these men was put strongly to the test, when one of their comrades found plundering, received eighty lashes and his dismissal. This severe punishment inflicted in the height of the revolt in no way affected their behaviour; but some two months afterwards, when Delhi had fallen, most of them deserted.

The mutiny, even amongst the native soldiery, affords similar contradictions in the conduct of various individuals; some evincing unconquerable and unfounded distrust, others clinging to our cause under most discouraging circumstances, and in spite of our evident mistrust; for example, Soobadar Bhowanie Singh, 2nd Light Cavalry, defends most gallantly the colors and treasure chest of his regiment, until wounded and left senseless by his own men, and subsequently sacrifices his life for the State, fighting to the last against his rebel brethren in the intrenchments at Cawnpoor.

How striking also the fidelity of those sepoys of the 56th Native Infantry admitted within those same intrenchments, as proved by the statement of Lieutenant Moubray Thomson, 53rd Native Infantry, one of the few survivors, according to whom, more would have joined had they been permitted; and still more surprising was the conduct of some of his own Corps and others, who, though being mistrusted and hence denied admittance within the enclosure, would not join the enemy, but, as suggested, occupied the Hospital outside, which they defended against their mutinous comrades, while it remained tenable. If we may trust those sepoys who freely shared the pains and hardships of their officers, fear and distrust caused many to fail us; as for instance, the firm impression the troops entertained, that the ditch around the intrenchments, where they were desired to assemble for the purpose of receiving their pay the day before the outbreak, was mined, with a view to blow them all up; and that in consequence they refused to attend as requested.

Again, as the reverse of this, we have witnessed the wonderful fidelity, through taunts and hardships, and loss of life and limb, of the Lucknow Garrison. At Meerut likewise the men of the 11th Native Infantry, who remained true to their Officers when permission was given them to visit their homes, because the Military authorities mistrusted them, declined availing themselves of it, and preferred engaging in the Police, in which they did the State good service.

The Meerut Police also, bad and worthless though they proved as a whole, furnished some individuals who behaved remarkably well, fought in the ranks of the District Volunteers, and having proved themselves excellent servants of the State, were eventually taken into and formed the nucleus of the present North-Western Police raised at Meerut on the 27th of June 1857. Many other instances might doubtless be adduced, of which I am unaware.

The distrust of Europeans, extended even to their officers with whom they had passed years in friendly intimacy, was a powerful engine of mischief in the hands of the evil-disposed, by whom it was assiduously implanted and nurtured. This was the main cause of the mutiny of the 29th Native Infantry, as is plainly evidenced from a narrative of occurrences by one of its officers, confirmed by the statements of the Native Doctor and Moolvie, who,
true to our cause, were carried prisoners to Delhi, and from thence made their escape. From them it would seem the Corps would have accompanied their officers to Meerut, but that their firm conviction was, by doing so they would gain nothing but a certain and speedy death.

I was forcibly convinced of the real existence of this feeling, from the difficulty I experienced in getting two sowars (my escort) to follow me into Meerut, which at length they only did on my pledging my life for theirs. Again the Sikhs who left the 2nd Oude Irregular Cavalry when they mutinied, entered Meerut with fear and trepidation, but subsequently joined the Meerut District Volunteers, and did excellent service.

A letter from a trooper in concealment, lately brought under my observation, reveals a strange state of things, and is very probably in some respects a sample of many similar cases. He writes to one from whom in brighter days he received much kindness, to a son of whom he is indebted for the knowledge of writing, by means of which he makes known his circumstances, and from whom he evidently conceals nothing, even confessing to his having taken rebel service from dire necessity. In his letter he states that, "after hearing of the Meerut mutiny" his Corps, the 2nd Cavalry, began plotting, and that he related all he learnt from them to the Adjutant. Although his letter cannot, strictly speaking, be considered evidence, yet being written under the circumstances, and in the manner already mentioned, may be taken as another proof, that the mutiny spread through the Bengal Army (already in a highly excited and dissatisfied state) like any infectious disease in a vitiated atmosphere. The contagion being allowed to spread from Meerut unchecked, and without the prompt and stern retribution the exigencies of the case required, even the cutting off root and branch of the deceased member, Corps after Corps caught the infection, excited and encouraged by the uncontradicted boast of the extermination of all Europeans, and the overthrow of the British Rule by the native troops at Meerut; and when this was at length controverted, still lured on by the glowing accounts of unbounded wealth obtained from the plunder of Europeans and Government Treasuries, and the honors and promotions expected from the rebel King.

Caste also, that great bond of union and engine of evil, attached thousands to the ranks of its (so deemed) martyrs and defenders; for unfounded though the report was, yet numbers did believe that Christianity was to be forced upon all ranks and classes of natives; and to many a Hindoo, the preservation of his caste (his only security for eternal happiness hereafter) is dearer to him than life. Fruitless were all endeavours to shake the general belief in this opinion, for natives like children are swayed by unfounded sacrifices and sufferings of those who through all have remained true to us.

The cry of "religion" that was so early raised in support of their cause is maintained still, and the taunt of having become "Christian," yet hurled at our allies. But the other day a detachment of newly-raised Police, attacking a party of rebel sepoys, were jeeringly received with a shout of "Come on Christians!" The reply was a bullet that laid the utterer low, ere yet the words had died away upon his lips. Whatever a man's creed may be, due credit should be accorded him for sincerity, until at least he prove the reverse. Again every allowance should be made, considering the sudden and complete gloom that overshadowed the country, through the dark folds of which but a few far-sighted individuals could penetrate. Let us picture it to ourselves awhile.
A few native troops suddenly mutiny—burn, plunder, and murder; release prisoners, and completely subvert all order and authority, and this with scarce any opposition, in the face of a large European force. Thence passing on unchecked to a large and important city, with the uncontradicted boast that they had exterminated the British and overthrown their rule; gain possession of it; winning over their fellow soldiers cantoned there; enact over again the same scene of anarchy, bloodshed and riot; proclaim a rebel King, issue proclamations and exact revenue in his name; cut off all communication and overrun the surrounding country. Their example is rapidly followed: whole regiments tread eagerly in their steps; entire districts pass away from our hold; petty Chiefs and Princes exercise, undisputed, the rights of sovereignty; while their late lordly Rulers are no where seen, or beheld only as way-worn travelers, soiled, famishing, and often sore-wounded fugitives; pleading for food, shelter and concealment, and at times repulsed as the offscouring of earth, by those who lately would have kissed the dust under their feet! The few provinces still held by us, kept only by the self-devotion of their civil and Military officers, and gallant bands of Volunteers, here and there assisted by a handful of troops. Seeing us powerless to help or protect our friends, or to chastise our foes, can we wonder that the timid, wavering, and weak fell in with those who, for the time being at least, best made the weight of their vengeance known; or can we wonder that the masses of people, losing sight of all signs of our power and authority, and witnessing only the evidences (temporary though they were) of the rule of our enemies, should readily credit their reports of our subversion and utter annihilation; and all this occurring at the end of the foretold 100 years, during which our rule was to last, should fancy they saw the finger of God in the exact fulfilment of the prophecy!

I must here observe that the foregoing remarks (regarding the nature of the mutiny as to whether it were preconcerted or not) and conclusions only refer to and are deduced from the evidence taken regarding the Meerut outbreak, and refer only to the declared fact of a wide-spread mutiny throughout the Bengal Army, as evidenced by the occurrences at that station where first the storm broke.

I am aware that many statements exist of signs and warnings previously, and information of a conspiracy subsequently, to the outbreak having been given to various individuals. Such reports were current at Meerut; but on taking them, and individually sifting and attesting them, they vanished ghost-like into thin air, and not one of all the parties said to have furnished them, would acknowledge any acquaintance with the alleged facts. Those therefore who have received any information regarding such a conspiracy should undoubtedly come forward and have the same attested, both for the punishment of the guilty, and for the security of the public hereafter.

If any such plot throughout the native army existed, the Meerut troops were indeed rash and insane to mar the whole, simply that they might hasten the release of their companions, which a short time subsequently could have been effected with far greater chances of success, less risk to themselves, and with infinitely grander results to the cause they had at heart. Granting the existence of such a conspiracy, how can we account for such mad rashness on the part of these conspirators? Nor that after thus hastily releasing their comrades, doing all the injury they could by the way, they should flee without an acknowledged head or guide, or any plan of operations; and then only (finding themselves unmolested) hold a hurried council to decide upon their future operations. *(Vide deposition No. 4.)*

Being deeply interested in the fate of many who fell at Cawnpoor, and having collected all the evidence procurable up to the present time, of atrocities committed, or said to have been committed, by the rebels there (and which from the number of the victims and the cruelty of their fate, rank pre-eminent among all the tragedies of this ever memorable revolt), I have anxiously and carefully sifted the whole.
The statement of Lieutenant Moubray Thomson, Commandant of Military Police, the depositions of Mrs. Bradshaw, and Letts of the 56th Regiment Native Infantry, of Elizabeth and Isabella Speirs, 53rd Regiment Native Infantry, and of Peer Bux, camel sowar, give perhaps a correct account of the fearful massacre at the Choura Suttee Ghāt on the 27th June 1857. They afford some insight into the horrors of that terrible day, which require no false coloring to make them almost surpass conception. Mrs. Murray, on cross-examination, denies the ladies and women having been stripped, and receiving but a piece of scant blue cloth instead.

The evidence of Drummer John Fitchett, 6th Regiment Native Infantry, and of the sepoys, 56th Regiment Native Infantry, who were confined with the poor sufferers in the Savada House, prove that they retained their own clothing; and moreover that on the removal of the prisoners to the Beobegurh, or slaughter-house, clothes belonging to the ladies and left with the washermen when they went into the intrenchments, were recovered and returned to them. Fearful assuredly have been the scenes enacted during this revolt, but they exceed only in a small degree those of other revolutions in far more civilized, and, be it remembered, professedly Christian nations; and are consequences such as ever must occur, when the evil unbridled passions of men are allowed full sway. When the history of the Bengal Army shall be written in a just and candid spirit, it will be cleared of many of the sweeping charges at present hurled against it. It will be seen that while many base acts of cruelty and treachery have attended it, not a few noble acts of devotion and fidelity redeem the hideous darkness of the picture.

APPENDIX.

ROLL OF MEN OF THE DISTRICT VOLUNTEER FORCE RAISED AT MEERUT.

No. Name. Remarks.

Staff Commandant.
1. Major G. W. Williams ... ... Assistant General Superintendent and Joint-Magistrate. On Special Duty.

Second in Command.
2. Captain D'Oyly ... ... Stud Department.

Adjutant.
3. Captain E. Tyrwhitt ... ... Commandant, late 14th Irregular Cavalry.

Surgeon.
4. Assistant Surgeon H. Cannon ... ... Civil Surgeon, Moradabad.
5. Mr. F. Williams ... ... Commissioner of Meerut.
6. R. Dunlop ... ... Magistrate of ditto.

Volunteers.
Mr. G. Turnbull ... ... Judge of Cawnpoor.
" B. Sapte ... ... Magistrate of Boolundshahr.
" F. Wigram ... ... Joint-Magistrate, Meerut.
" S. Melville ... ... Ditto ditto, Boolundshahr.
5. A. C. Iyall ... ... Assistant Ditto.
Lieutenant Anderson ... ... 3rd European Regiment.
" Johnson ... ... 18th Regiment, N. I.
Cornet Robinson ... ... 1st Light Cavalry.
Ensign Blair ... ... 31st Regiment N. I.
10. Mr. Parker ... ... Canal Department. His own horse.
" Nuthall ... ... Ditto ditto Ditto.
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(Sd.)  G. W. WILLIAMS, Major, Commanding District Volunteer Force.

Depositions taken at Meerut, by Major G. W. Williams, Superintendent of Cantonment Police, North-Western Provinces.

No. 1.—Statement of Francis Shester, Native Christian of Sirhaha.—On the 29th of March 1857 I was at Bijnour, and went to pay my respects to the Collector and Magistrate of the district; whilst waiting in the verandah, a native, whom the chupprassic called Nawab, also came, I heard he had a
brother, who was a tehsildar in the district; a jemadar in the Canal Department was present; we were all seated. The Nawab commenced the conversation by observing that two regiments to the eastward had taken their discharge, because the kafirs had mixed pigs' and cows' fat with the new cartridges, that the kafirs had determined to take away the castes of all Mahomedans and Hindoos, and that these infidels should not be allowed to remain in India, or there would be no difference between Mahomedans and Hindoos, and whatever they said we should have to do. I replied, that Europeans had nothing to do with other people's caste, and that in every way the inhabitants of India were living at ease. The Nawab answered, what ease have we, they are always inventing new laws to trouble us, and to overturn religion, teach out of their religious books, which are also distributed, is there now any security for Islam, as it used to be? The jemadar of the Canal Department remarked, that Islam was formerly the dominant religion, but there was great injustice.

The Nawab was about thirty-five years age, slightly built, but the jemadar was a powerful man.

No. 2.—Statement of Mohur Singh, Deputy Collector.—In the months of January and February 1857 it was reported that cakes had been distributed through the chowkedsars, the reason of which was not known, but it was stated that they had come from the east, and that if not distributed, severe punishment would be inflicted.

On coming to Meerut, a week previous to the outbreak, I heard that the Government wished to make the sepoys use the new cartridges, but that they declined doing so, on account of their being greased with fat; but though this was commonly talked of, no mutiny was apprehended. Up to the 8th of May, when some sepoys were imprisoned for disobedience of orders, no danger was anticipated.

On the 10th of May, after 6 P.M., while sitting in my house, Shamboonauth, ameen, came accidentally by, from the Sudder Bazar, stating that a fight had taken place between the English and native troops, on hearing which, the inhabitants began shutting up their houses. I however did not believe what he stated, but came out and saw the people flying to their houses for protection.

It was now dark, and fires could be seen raging on all sides. I observed three sepoys with drawn swords in their hands coming out of the compound of the Custom House, after setting fire to it, and followed by a crowd of low people shouting "Yah! Ali! Ali! ek nara Haidari;" amongst them, I heard the clanking of iron chains. I heard the sepoys saying they had burnt the Cantonments, murdered the Europeans, broken the Electric Telegraph, and overturned the British Rule, and boasting that they had committed these atrocities for the cause of religion.

These sounds were heard till 10 P.M.

During the night nothing was known about the mutineers, but the next morning it was learned that the native troops had really mutinied, and had fled confusedly towards Delhi.

The butchers, pulladars, &c., joined the rebels in murdering and plundering.

According to the directions of the Magistrate and Commissioner, on the 11th Koor, Wuzer Ali Khan, Deputy Collector, Gunga Pershad, tehsildar, and myself, collected the respectable people of the city, and gave them good advice; none of them seemed unfriendly to the British; we encouraged the tradesmen, who re-opened their shops on the 12th, and carried on their business as usual, but for the space of three days no supplies were brought into the city on account of the disturbance, though flour was sold at fourteen seers for the rupee, yet the bunmeaks continued to keep the Dumduma regularly supplied with grain. The villagers roved about the city for many
days, the disturbance in its vicinity continued for about a week, but was quelled by the judicious plans adopted by the British.

Previous to the outbreak, rumours to the following effect very generally prevailed:

1st.—That 2,000 sets of irons were being made for the sepoys.
2nd.—That by order of Government, attah mixed with bones was to be sold.
3rd.—That the sepoys were to be deprived of the charge of their arms and ammunition.

These reports caused the disturbance.

No. 3.—Statement of Wussar Ali Khan, Deputy Collector.—I have long resided in cantonments. On the evening of the 10th of May, at dusk, I shut up my compound gate and spent the night in fear and trembling; but the next day went to the house of Mahomed Ali Khan, where I stayed till the fall of Delhi.

When the mutiny broke out, the sowars and bad characters went roving about, but as it was dark, and they were a good way off, I could not recognize any of them. I was however told that syces, poor beeas, and bad characters of the city and cantonments joined the rebel troops; my own men remained with me: during the night nothing but shouts of Yah! Ali! Ali! was heard. I learnt nothing more when going to the city (being much terrified from fear of the bad characters), but that with the sowars, there were butchers and pulladars, all active in murdering and plundering; and also the released prisoners.

I do not know any engaged in the rebellion, as I had no opportunity of ascertaining anything.

Property was, without doubt, being plundered all night by the convicts and bad characters; the sepoys did not touch any; they only set fire to the bungalows, and murdered Europeans, at least it was so rumoured in the city and sudder.

That night the sowars set it about that no Europeans remained; hearing which the evil disposed having no fear committed great havoc and destruction. I am inclined to think no respectable people joined them in this. As I could not distinguish any individuals I cannot say who the mobs were; I only heard the shouts of Yah! Ali! Ali! but do not know whether the Mahomedans only uttered the cry, or whether the Hindoos also joined in it.

When on the 11th, I walked about the city I found the respectable inhabitants in great sorrow and alarm; I heard that the butchers, pulladars, and released prisoners committed great atrocities. I held no intercourse with the low classes, but only with respectable men; though the bad characters, from their conduct and joining with the rebels at Delhi, showed they did not behave uprightly, yet even they were not all alike bad.

I heard that on the 10th of May the police were unable to maintain order, but on the 11th the civil administration resumed its usual course; many of them fled, and thus escaped; but the rest, who remained, again began carrying out the orders of Government.

Nothing was preconcerted; though the new cartridge question was generally discussed in the districts, yet the mutiny was not plotted beforehand, and no one conceived such a thing would ever come to pass.

As it is probable that the Goorjurs, being robbers by profession, aided by others, took an active part in murdering and plundering, every one of them, being aware of the heavy retribution that they deserved, tried earnestly to promote the success of the rebel King's cause.
I also heard that in the evening the neighbouring villagers rushed into cantonments to share the spoil; and for many days made attempts to plunder the city and houses of the rich merchants, but the civil administration having regained full power, they succeeded only in carrying away a quantity of small coins from the Collectorate.

Q.—How long did the disturbance continue after the 11th of May?

A.—After the 11th of May there was no disturbance; the zemindars of the neighbouring villages lurked about the city for four or five days, but the patrolling of policemen, the vigilance of the inhabitants, and the vigorous administration of the British authorities deterred them from doing any mischief within the city. Whether the plundered property was deposited in any one spot has not been ascertained. The villagers carried off what they took to their villages; the butchers, pulladars of Khorja, and bad characters, threw their booty opposite the doors of respectable men's houses, and in bylanes and streets, whence it was conveyed into the Dumdumma.

No. 4.—Statement of Mahomed Moweezoodeen, Sheristadar.—Before final orders were passed on the insubordinate sowars of the 3rd Light Cavalry, and while they were still under trial by Court Martial, it was rumoured in the office that afternoon that the Head Clerk of the Session's Office had received a letter from his brother stating the sepoys had determined to mutiny. I believed this, until finding that nothing occurred I concluded the report was groundless.

After the Court Martial was over, and the eighty-five sowars were committed to prison, we had no reason to apprehend a rise on the part of the sepoys.

On Sunday, the 10th of May last, at about 4 P.M., I met Ahmed Buksh, Naib Nazir of the Magistrate's Office, who told me he had been to the jail by the Magistrate's order to write down the names of the sowars and their places of residence, as they were about being sent to other district jails, and had found all right and quiet, with no indications of sedition.

At about 6 P.M. on the same day it was noise abroad in the city that the sepoys of the 20th Native Infantry had risen to oppose the rifles who had come to deprive them of the charge of the bells of arms, as they feared they would now be dealt with in the same manner that the sowars had been, and had murdered Europeans, burnt bungalows, and destroyed property. The Cavalry and 11th Regiment followed their example, committing great atrocities, and were joined in this by most of the detached guards. About sunset, the sowars of the 3rd Light Cavalry attacked the jail; some passing through the city by the Qumbab gate with drawn swords, galloping towards the jail, much alarmed the inhabitants, the respectable portion of whom, fearing loss of life or wealth, and honor, closed the doors of their houses. When dark, fires were seen, the tumult rose to its height, the bad characters of the city and cantonments with villagers from the neighbourhood, and about 1,500 convicts from the jail joined the mutineers. Till 10 o'clock my doors were shut, after that I saw from the roof of my house numbers of bullocks straying about, which on enquiry I found were Government ones; I also learnt that the Engineer's Office camel and elephant sheds had been plundered; on hearing which I sent for Ahmed Buksh, Naib Nazir, living in my neighbourhood, and urged him to collect the bullocks in one place with the help of his chaprassies, and tried to encourage him by saying that there were numbers of European soldiers in the station, and that in the course of an hour or two, they with the artillery would attack and annihilate the mutineers, and he would shortly see their names effaced from off the face of the earth; that if he now evinced his gratitude and attachment to the Government he would procure a great name; but he replied, he had no chaprassies with him, and could not help in the matter.
Whilst we were thus talking, other men of the neighbourhood came round us in surprise. Just then a man of bad character brought two horses, but the mohaulla men would not allow him to tie them up there, so they were roving about loose. It was now rumoured that the bad characters of the city had determined to create as much disturbance and confusion as they could, so that they might revenge themselves on their enemies, and plunder the rich. The tuzmabazies, convicted by Major Williams, were looking out for Moonshi Tuffuzal Hossein, Sheristadar of the Dacoitee Department; meanwhile a man came to Ahmed Buksh, Naib Nazir, stating that, agreeably to the directions of the tehsedlar, he went to the Deputy Collector's to inform him of the plunder of the treasury; on seeing that gentleman's bungalow in flames and a dragoon standing there, he asked him where the gentleman was, and was told not there; he also heard that a Company of the Rifles and two guns had been ordered to the Collectorate; other men also came saying guns had likewise been placed on the Begum's bridge, the bad characters were carrying off the plundered property, the prisoners were looking out for native officials, and the mutinous sepoys were holding a consultation by a branch of the canal adjoining the village Rethanee, the subject of which was not known; all those at the time near my house said to Ahmed Buksh, no arrangements could be made for putting down the city rioters, as no trace could be found of the Kotwal, and it was supposed he had hid himself. But that, without doubt, the Europeans with guns would shortly be sent to take account of the bad characters, and that on the morrow the insurgents would be seized and be made to restore all the plundered property carried away by them, recommending us to take care of our houses, and keep watch; we accordingly closed our doors at about 11 P.M., and watched all night.

The next day I learned that the Jail Guard had assailed the house of Bahadur Singh, treasurer of the Dewany Adalut, but on receipt of Rupees 25 refrained from plundering him; they acted in the same manner with the Collectorate treasurer; all that occurred subsequently is known to the authorities. I did what in me lay in favor of the Government, and tried to find out whether the city people joined the sepoys in the mutiny or not, and whether the respectable portion of them were aware of any conspiracy or not, but failed in discovering this; thus much only was ascertained that the sowars and sepoys had concocted the mutiny among themselves. Had respectable men been aware of this the loyal sepoys would never have kept it secret, it would in all probability have been divulged before the outbreak. One thing is certain, the bad characters of the city and cantonments were active in plundering and destroying, and many of them in consequence, fled with the mutineers; those who remained received condign punishment.

No. 5.—Statement of Gunga Pershad, Tehseledar of Meerut.—About the end of 1856, or beginning of 1857, chapatees found their way into this district, and were distributed over the country. They first came from the south-east boundary; village chowkedaras circulated them, telling those of the neighbouring villages to make and pass on the same number from village to village. The people of the city and sudder now began talking of the greased cartridges, said to be prepared with cow's and pig's fat, ordered for all the Native Corps. Just then the news of the Barrackpoor mutiny reached this, and confirmed the belief of the sepoys in the rumour; as also in that of attah mixed with bones having arrived at Cawnpoor, and being sent on to Meerut, upon which the sepoys took only rice for their food. In the end of April, a fakeer appeared at Soorujkund, the sepoys constantly took him to dine with them in their lines. He was ordered to leave by the late Mr. Johnstone, then Magistrate. About the end of April some of the 3rd Cavalry barracks were set on fire. On the 9th of May, when the sowars of 3rd Cavalry were confined in jail, it was rumoured that the sepoys would mutiny. On Sunday, 10th, at about 5 P.M., while in tehsedel, my guard told me the sudder bunneabs were coming in great haste, and talked of all the native regiments having mutinied. I
came out and saw multitudes coming from the sudder into the city, and heard firing. I immediately closed office, and taking up my sword and rifle stood with a few tehsil peons at the gate. Soon after, a 3rd Cavalry squad with naked sword passed in full gallop towards the jail, crying out "Brothers, Hindoos and Mussulmans, haste and join us, we are going to a religious war. Be assured we will not harm those who join us, but fight only against the Government." In a short time some fifty others followed him towards the jail, and a great number of sepoys. After sunset I heard of the mutineers having broken open the jail and released the prisoners. Soon after, I saw hundreds of them coming from the sudder shouting Ali! Ali! They set fire to the Civil Court and the house occupied by Major Williams, plundering them and burning the records, &c., and being joined by a party composed of prisoners, jail nujjees, and others, made a rush on the tehsil, firing and shouting; as they were coming I killed two of the 3rd Cavalry squads, but was soon pointed out and on the point of being killed, when I jumped over the wall and got on to the roof of another house. On their coming to this, also, I succeeded in escaping through the peshkar's house and concealing myself in the one, to which I had conveyed the females. The cries of Ali! Ali! lasted till midnight, when hearing all the mutineers had left for Delhi I visited the tehsil, and found the whole a mass of fire. I was informed that the butchers, pulladars, khaticks, weavers, dureewallas, khansamas, khidmat-gars, syces, and grass-cutters were active in plundering, aided by people from the surrounding villages, as also, that the khaticks and pulladars murdered European men and women, but no names were mentioned. In the commencement of the attack I only recognized a few of the dureewallas, two of whom have since been hung and the rest have fled, also a few others, residents of that part of the city where the Kambohs live, with two dyers, none of these latter have I seen since; they were all Mussulmans. Reports were current that night, of all the magazine, guns, &c., having been taken by the mutineers to Delhi, and of the British authority being at an end. From the 11th, both city and sudder remained quite, though for four or five nights the latter was surrounded by village budmashes seeking to plunder it. On the 11th, I began enquiring into the doings of the past night, and searched houses for plundered property, every night stolen European goods were thrown out in most of the mohullas and empty compounds of houses in the civil lines. The few caught doing this were sent to the authorities and punished, but most fled to Delhi and thus escaped. I have also seen at nights, when going round the city, heaps of goods and woolen clothes burning in the ditch of the city and other spots. When, after the outbreak, I and Mungulsein went to ticket the houses we generally found those of Mussulmans, especially weavers and dureewallas, empty. I also heard that on the 11th, Hafiz Ruheem Moulvie went with some jehadees to Delhi.

No. 6. Statement of Narain Doss, Gomashah.—With reference to the queries of Major Williams, Superintendent of Police, I beg to state that the fakeer alluded to arrived here perhaps about a month (I cannot exactly recollect) previous to the 10th of May 1857, and put up, he said, at Soorujkund tank; in the course of his stay at Meerut, he came to me twice, first he asked me to supply him with one day's provisions for his while followers, who numbered, he said, about sixty men, one elephant and bullocks belonging to his ruth; I paid very little attention to his request, and he sat before me for about half an hour, praising my ancestors, and when he found it was in vain, he went away; after an interval of about four days he came to me again for the last time, and requested me the same, as on the previous day, to which I replied that I could not afford to meet his demands in full, more than one rupee, which I presented him with; he accepted it, though unwillingly, and going away, I saw him no more.

As much as I knew of him I can confidently say that he was an inhabitant of somewhere near Benares, or in the vicinity of Oudh. I had seen him also in Kalka, at the foot of the Kussowlee Hills.
No. 7. Mungul Sain, Moonshi, states that the fakeer came with an elephant, a rath and horses; he pitched his camp near the Soorujkund about the 10th or 11th April, sepoys flocked to him, and he visited them in their lines. He was turned out by the order of the Magistrate.

No. 8. Mirchgee and Juggnunath Doss, residents of Soorujkund, depose that the fakeer came about a month before the outbreak, and pitched his camp near the tank; he had a melancholy appearance, and was a resident of Ajuddeah. The sepoys of the 20th Native Infantry often visited him, and he, them in their own lines, where he took up his abode when turned out from the Soorujkund.

The Kotwal of the Sudder Bazar reports that the fakeer was at Meerut on the 24th of April 1857, and told him, he was a resident of Ajuddeah.

No. 9. Sagur Brahmin, who lived in the Regimental Bazar of the 20th Native Infantry, deposes that about twenty-five days before the mutiny, this fakeer, a Hindoo, who had an elephant, a rath and horses, and about twenty or twenty-five followers, came and took up his abode in the 20th Native Infantry lines, in the huts of the 4th Company.

No. 10. Moulah Bux, Havildar, 20th Native Infantry, deposes that about fifteen days before the outbreak he heard of a fakeer of this description; he had an elephant, a rath and horses, and about ten followers; he came to the 20th Regiment Native Infantry lines, 4th Company, and remained a few days; he appeared to be a Hindoo, and a resident of Ajuddeah.

No. 11. Ussudullah, Jemadar, 20th Native Infantry, deposes that in February he was at the Rifle Depot, Umballs, and remained four months, during which time a fakeer, who had an elephant, a rath and horses, and a few followers, was there, he saw him on the road.*

No. 12. Deposition of Kooman Singh, late Havildar in the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, now Wazee Major in the Mounted Police.—On the 1st or 2nd of May, Brijmohan, a sowar of the 3rd Cavalry, told the men, he had fired off the new cartridge, and though they all called him a mean fellow, yet on the morrow, when they would all have to do the same, it would be seen who would dare to refuse. On this, Peer Ali and Kudrut Ali, Naiks, told their comrades a magazine classic had averred on oath that these new cartridges had been greased with cow's and pig's fat, and that, as they would have to touch them with their hands, they would be inevitably polluted; that for the Mahomedans it did not so much matter, since they could remove the pollution, but for the Hindoos it would be a sad business, as they would irrecoverably loose caste. Now, we officers of the 1st troop stand on the right hand of the column, you shall see how decidedly we will refuse the cartridges. Do you all likewise take courage, and tell your Captains you will not use them, until every regiment has consented to do so. To this proposition, both Mahomedans and Hindoos bound themselves by oath on the Koran and Gunga; consequently, the next morning on parade, the cartridges were refused, and on the 9th of May, eighty-five of the men were committed to jail. A rumour spread to the effect that 2,000 sets of irons were ordered to be prepared in two nights and a day for the rest of the men. On the afternoon of 10th, it was reported that the Rifles were coming down to deprive 20th Regiment of their charge of the magazine, in consequence of which the 11th and 20th Regiments assembled on parade and armed themselves. The officers of the 3rd Cavalry ordered the regiments to assemble on their parades, and sent a squadron to the civil jail, which soon returned, as it had already been broken open and the troopers and prisoners released. The Colonel of the 11th, coming forward to try and pacify the 20th Regiment was shot; great confusion and uproar now ensued, firing of muskets commenced, bungalows blazed, and great was the destruction of life and property, all Christians coming across their way being put to death.

* Information concerning this fakeer has been sought for at Agra and Umballah. He is supposed to have gone to Delhi with the sepoys.
The mutineers then took to the Delhi road, headed by the Cavalry and accompanied by many of the convicts. The Artillery coming up fired grape upon the crowds, who all dispersed and ran away. About thirty-nine troopers remaining staunch to their officers, the latter with four flags were brought by them into the European lines. Sheikh Ali Bux, Havildar Major, came to me at about 11 p.m. and asked me if I would prefer being blown up or hung or would go to Delhi, strongly advising my choice of the latter alternative, to which I replied, I could not be guilty of such ingratitude as to leave my officers, but must stay and see them safe to the European lines. The bad characters of the city and sudder, and more especially the mean fellows, were roving about in search of plunder, while hundreds of bungalows were burning.

On going into the city on the second day after to buy some food I met there my nephew, Shewa Singh, and upon asking him, he said he could not go to Delhi, but if his life were pledged to him, he would return to serve the British, if not, he would live where best he could. He further asserted, that two parties of bad characters had caused the disturbances in the city, set fire to the neighbouring bungalows, burnt the Judge’s kutcherry, and killed all the Christian writers. The one party was headed by Mahomed Ali Khan, resident of the Naie Bazar in the city, who, with about 500 men traversed the streets all night, shouting out Ali, Ali, our religion has revived. The other party attached itself to a Moolvi, whose name I do not remember, and was acting in the same way.

Q.—Did the regiments preconcert this rebellion?
A.—The said regiments did not plot anything beforehand. Had they done so, they would not have kept their wives and children with them as they did; these bad to wander about the town for several days, and afterwards went wherever they could.

Q.—Did you recognize any of the rioters?
A.—As it was dark, I could not distinguish any amongst the crowds who committed all the havoc, but most likely they were composed of butchers, labourers, and Mahomedans. Rundheer Singh, trooper, knows many of the bad characters concerned, and if questioned, could doubtless give much information.

No. 13. — Deposition of Bundheer Singh, Trooper of the 3rd Light Cavalry, now with the Mounted Police at Meerut.—On the day of the mutiny I was on duty at the quarter-guard, the firing commenced in the 20th Regiment Native Infantry, and shortly afterwards I saw bungalows burning; I was with the officers of my Corps, and accompanied them to the European lines.

Q.—Do you know whether the mutiny was preconcerted?
A.—No, the men objected to the cartridges, two Naiks, Koodrut Ali and Peer Ali, persuaded the men to take an oath to refuse them, till every regiment had consented to use them. After the eighty-five were sent to jail a report circulated, that two thousand sets of irons were being prepared for those who might still persist in refusing them.

Q.—Where did you first hear this report?
A.—I cannot tell; it was spread abroad everywhere.

Q.—Was the mutiny planned for the 10th May?
A.—No, nothing of the kind.

Q.—How did it then commence?
A.—I was on duty, and therefore did not see all that took place, but I heard that the report of the Artillery and Europeans coming to take the arms of the native regiments, caused the mutiny.

Q.—Who set this report about?
A.—I cannot tell.
Q.—Was there any rumour in your corps of attah mixed with bones being sold?

A.—Yes, three or four days before the mutiny, it was rumoured that attah mixed with bones had reached the European bazar.

Q.—Did the men leave off taking it in consequence?

A.—No, they did not, they took it as usual, but the rumour was prevalent.

Q.—Can you give any information regarding the men who plundered the houses in cantonments, and murdered Europeans on the night of the 10th May?

A.—About five or six days after the mutiny, I was in the city, near the Shrine of Haji Gung and saw Kulloo, formerly a burkundaz in the jail guard, Sekunder Raheem Khan, and Malla Khan, who was killed at Delhi with others, whom I did not recognize, and heard them boasting, that they had killed many Europeans, burnt and plundered bungalows, and were going to Delhi with a Moulvie, whose name I did not hear.

Q.—How was it that they so freely stated this in your presence?

A.—I had known some of them before.

Q.—Are these men still in the city?

A.—I do not know.

Q.—Could you recognize them?

A.—Yes, I could.

No. 14.—Deposition of Zalim Sing, Trooper 3rd Light Cavalry, Drill Instructor in the Mounted Police.—On the 30th of April or 1st May, a sowar of the 3rd Light Cavalry, called Brijmohun, came into the lines and said, I have used the new cartridges, and to-morrow you all will have to fire them, who will refuse to do so. Koodrut Ali and Peer Ali, Naiks, said to the Mussulman and Hindoo sowars, the cartridges had been greased with pigs' and cows' fat, adding the former could regain their purity, but the latter would irrecoverably lose caste, that they, the Naiks, being posted in the right of the column, would refuse to bite the cartridges, and bid them tell all the men to do likewise, also to report to their Captains that till every regiment had agreed to use the cartridges, they would not take them. Thereupon the Mussulmen swore by the Koran, and the Hindoos by the Gunga, to abide by this resolve. The next day on parade, Peer Ali, Koodrut Ali, and others refused to use the cartridges until the whole army had decided on doing so. Upon which eight-five who refused were tried and sent to jail. A report spread in our lines, and in those of the other native regiments, that they all would be put in irons, as orders had been given to prepare 2,000 sets of irons to be ready within a couple of days. On the following day, the 10th of May, it was reported among the 20th Regiment Native Infantry that the Rifles were coming to take away their magazine. In consequence, this corps and the 11th assembled on parade, taking their arms with them. The officers tried to pacify them, assuring them they would not lose charge of the magazine, but without effect, as the men began firing upon them, and some of them were thus killed.

The officers of the 3rd Light Cavalry having ordered the bugles to sound for parade, the men fell in; a squadron under two officers was sent to the jail, but returned, as it had already been broken open and the prisoners released. By this time it was dark, and the two native regiments came towards the cavalry parade. The artillery now appeared, firing grape, upon which the mutineers fled, some of the sowars, however, remained. I took refuge first in the Riding Master's house, and then hid in a village near the lines, and early next morning presented myself to the Commanding Officer. I had not had time to get my horse or arms when the mutiny broke out.
Q.—As the troops did not remain, who committed the murders, and burnt and destroyed houses and property?

A.—The confusion was very great that night, but it was certain that policemen, with convicts, butchers, and pullers were plundering and burning bungalows and murdering all Europeans (men, women, and children); they came across, shouting Ali, Ali, the Mahomedan religion has again risen!

Q.—Did you recognize any of the people?

A.—The night was dark and the uproar great, so that I could not recognize individuals, but I saw with my own eyes the Police engaging in the riot.

Q.—Where did you see these policemen?

A.—On the road between the sudder and the cavalry lines, or rather between the sudder and the Police station, near the cavalry lines.

No. 15.—Deposition of Duljeet Singh, late Pay Havildar, 11th Regiment Native Infantry, resident of Mouzaa Sarwarah, Zillah Lucknow.—On the 10th of May, Sunday, at about 5 P.M., the mutiny broke out. I was in the quarter-guard, and heard the European soldiers were coming to take away the magazine. This rumour was raised by the sepoys of the 20th Regiment and bazaar people; seeing this I told the Naik to go and inform the Commanding Officer. Meanwhile, the Colonel of our regiment and other officers came and ordered the sepoys to fall in by companies, without arms, talking to them cheerfully, saying, no one would carry away the magazine without the Colonel's orders; he then went towards the men of the 20th, who shot at him, his horse being wounded; he returned towards his own lines, the sepoys of the 20th pursued, and fired at him; when the men of our regiment saw them doing so, they broke the locks of the bells of the arms, and took their arms.

The officers then went to their bungalows. When our sepoys heard of the murder of the Colonel, they were much afraid, thinking they would not be spared, and consequently fled, meanwhile three sepoys of the 20th approached near our quarter-guard, saying, take away the flags and treasure, which we did and ran; they fired at us, but missed. I being alone, left the flag and ran to the Colonel's bungalow, but as he was murdered, I went on to that of Captain Owen, and remained the whole night there, going on the following morning to Captain Scott's.

Q.—Was any revolt plotted before the outbreak in your regiment?

A.—Nothing was conspired beforehand had there been, I, as Pay Havildar, must have heard it; only at about 5 P.M. was it rumoured in the 20th Regiment and in the Sudder Bazar that the European soldiers were coming to take away the magazine; this rumour occasioned the disturbance.

Q.—Do you know how this report originated, and who first spread it about?

A.—I do not know how this rumour originated, nor who first set it about. The Colonel's murder embarrassed the men, so that they fled and commenced firing, which caused the sedition to rise to its height.

Q.—Had there been no conspiracy arranged with the 20th Regiment previously?

A.—No communication of the kind had been held with the 20th previously.

Q.—How did they then at once unanimously decide on going to Delhi?

A.—Nothing was preconcerted before the outbreak, after which they went off wheresoever they liked.

Q.—If there was no precombination, how was it that the several detached guards, at good distances from each other, broke out in revolt, at precisely the same time?

A.—I think they must have heard of the mutiny, and at once joined.
Q.—Did you see or hear anything of the way in which Europeans were killed and bungalows burnt?

A.—I did not see or hear anything, but was told the bad characters of the Sudder Bazar burnt the bungalows, and created the disturbance. In the night, eight or ten bad characters rushed into Captain Owen's bungalow to plunder, but I turned them out by threatening them.

Q.—What sort of men were they?

A.—I could not distinguish them.

No. 16.—Deposition of Bukt Singh, late Pay Havildar of the 11th Regiment Native Infantry, son of Munshaw Singh, Chatree, resident of Goury, in the Province of Lucknow, age forty years.—When the mutiny occurred on the 10th of May, I was opposite the store-house, making up the pay accounts, a report spread that the European soldiers were coming to take away the magazine stores. It originated with the 20th Regiment, who raised a tumult, our regiment being confused, ran to the bells of arms, which I immediately locked up, and sent to inform the Captain. The sepoys of the 20th now came to our regiment firing ball. By the Colonel's orders (who was present) the sepoys were mustered. He himself took charge of the keys of the bells of arms, and ordered the Captains to see if the muskets were in them or with the sepoys. Then going to the 20th, he asked them what they were about, they fired upon him, and wounding his horse, he rode back to his own lines, the sepoys pursuing.

Our men now ran towards the bells of arms, where my Captain and myself were standing. He told them to keep quiet, but they would not listen, and broke open the doors. I then advised his going away; when we approached the rear-guard, the Havildar-Major told us of the Colonel's death, upon which I urged his departure, myself accompanying him a long way. On returning to my regiment, I found my nephew crying, and took him to Mouzah Kathour, where, after staying a couple of days, I accompanied a Canal Moonshie to the Adjutant, Mr. Chambers, and Captain Bird. I was detained unavoidably two or three days from having account papers with us, and the road being infested with plunderers. All I saw and heard, I laid before my officers.

Q.—Did the sepoys of your regiment preconcert the mutiny?

A.—Nothing was premeditated, or I should have known it; the mutiny occurred from hearing that the soldiers were coming to take away the magazine.

Q.—How did this rumour originate?

A.—I do not know how it first arose. Our sepoys (fearing from the Colonel having been murdered, they would all be hung on the morrow) raised a disturbance.

Q.—If the mutiny was not previously plotted, how was it possible for all to agree unanimously to go to Delhi?

A.—Nothing was preconcerted; after the mutiny, they made off wherever they wished.

Q.—If the mutiny was not preconcerted, why did the distant guards break out at the same time?

A.—There was no precombination; on hearing of the revolt they must have broke up and fled.

Q.—Do you know anything regarding the plundering of property and burning of bungalows?

A.—The sepoys soon went off, but the bad characters of the city and town were roving about in crowds.

Q.—Could you recognize who they were?

A.—I could not distinguish them, there being great confusion.
Q.—What did you see whilst going to Kathour?

A.—The convicts were flying into the villages, and spreading the news about, which encouraged the villagers to beset the road for plunder.

No. 17.—Deposition of Jeygopal Singh, Sepoy of the 11th Regiment Native Infantry, Raja Poot, son of Thakoor Singh, resident of Mouzah Jota, Pergunnah Gopalpoor, Zillah Azimgur, age forty years.—On the evening of the 10th of May last, hearing a great noise and bustle, I came out of the hospital, where I was on leave attending my sick brother, and saw all the sepoys assembled on the parade without arms. The Colonel and officers came on the parade (the keys of the bells of arms were in the hands of the officers). On the 20th regiment firing on our men, they appealed to the Colonel, who instantly proceeded towards the 20th sepoys, although we begged him not. A bullet bringing down his horse, he returned on foot to our lines. Pirtee Singh, Havildar, and others entreated him to delay no longer, and took hold of him to force him away, when another bullet struck him down. Our sepoys now broke open the bells of arms, and took away the arms; some twelve or thirteen went to the officers and told them of the Colonel’s death, and urged their flying; upon their not listening they forcibly took them home. By this time it was dark, and firing commenced from all quarters; I returned to the hospital.

Q.—Was there nothing preconcerted in your regiment?

A.—I have told the truth; our regiment never conspired, nor intended to mutiny.

Q.—Did you never hear anything about the outbreak previously?

A.—I never heard anything of the kind, only that some sepoys were confined for disobedience.

Q.—Did you see or hear anything of Europeans being killed, or houses burnt?

A.—Beyond what I have stated, I saw and heard nothing, as I did not leave the hospital. But the next day was told, the Sudder Bazar butchers had been murdering European women.

No. 18.—Deposition of Punchum Singh, Havildar of the 20th Regiment Native Infantry.—On Sunday, 10th of May, at about 5 P. M., some sepoys of the 11th and 20th Regiments, who were in the Sudder Bazar, returning hurriedly to their lines, stating that the European soldiers were coming to deprive them of their arms and the magazines. They were followed by a crowd of bad characters of the Sudder Bazar, such as butchers, pulladars, and others. Hearing of this, the officers assembled on the parade, and quieted their men, who returned to their lines. I heard a sepoy of the 11th calling out that the rifles and artillery were coming to take away the muskets. Shortly after this, an orderly trooper, I think of the Brigade-Major’s, galloped past, raised his hand and shouted out that the rifles and artillery were coming to deprive us of our arms; hearing this, the men rushed out, seized their muskets and broke open the magazine. The Colonel of the 11th Regiment rode up and spoke kindly and cheerfully to the men of the 20th, telling them that the magazine would not be taken from them, but they warned him off, and as he still remained they fired at him, when he returned to his regiment. Captain Macdonald of my corps also spoke kindly to the men, and tried to re-assure them, but they would not believe him, and fired at him also. Lieutenant Henderson was also fired at and wounded. I got him into the hospital, put him on a cot, and gave him water to drink. Some sepoys of the 11th Regiment, wishing to kill him, concealed him in a back room. The mutineers went off to Delhi, leaving their families and property behind them.

Q.—Did you hear of any conspiracy in the regiment?

A.—No, there was no conspiracy beforehand; had there been any, the men would not have left their wives and property behind.
Q. — If there was no precombination, how was it that the several detached guards, some at a good distance off, such as the Collector's guard, &c., broke out into mutiny at the same moment?

A. — Nothing was plotted beforehand; the rumours brought by the sepoys and the bad characters of the Sudder Bazar, on the evening of the 10th, caused the revolt, the disturbance spreading quickly, the different guards joined their comrades. But all did not leave, for instance, the Cantonment Magistrate's guard remained a couple of days, and then dispersed on that officer dismissing them.

Q. — Who committed the murders on the night of the 10th of May, the sepoys or the mob?

A. — The sepoys soon left the station for Delhi. The bad characters of the Sudder Bazar, the butchers, pulladars, chowkedars, and policemen; caused all the havoc and destruction that occurred, in the burning of bungalows and murdering of Europeans, men, women and children.

Q. — Could you recognize any of these men?

A. — There was great confusion, and it was dark, so that I could not recognize any of them, but I saw with my own eyes crowds of bad characters' and policemen dressed in blue uniforms doing the mischief.

No. 19. — Deposition of Sheikh Moula Bux, Havildar, 20th Regiment Native Infantry. — After the parade on the 9th of May, when 85 troopers were sent to jail, I went to Major Taylor's house with the morning report book; he asked me why the sepoys looked up and down and wept? I said these troopers were comrades. The Major assured me that there was nothing wrong in the cartridges, and told me to comfort the men; this I did by telling them what the Major said, at which they appeared pleased and satisfied. On the 10th of May, about 5 o'clock, I went to the dyer's in the sudder, and whilst standing at a pedlar's shop, I was surprised at seeing sepoys of my own corps, and the 11th, running hastily to their lines. I stopt a musician named Darea, and asked him what was the matter? He said, he had just heard from a cook boy, of the rifles, that the artillery and rifles were coming to take away the arms and ammunition of the native regiments. I immediately returned. The Sudder Bazar was then quiet, but the bad characters, with the butchers, pulladars, &c., followed the sepoys to their lines, calling out that the rifles and artillery were coming. I met Major Taylor and the Doctor at the rear guard, and accompanied them to the magazine of the regiment. I there saw some seventy bumashes of the Sudder Bazar. The Major told me to take four sepoys and drive them away. They only retreated a few paces, and kept near the magazine. The 11th Regiment had assembled on parade; Major Taylor ordered the men of the 20th to remain quiet in their lines, which they did. A trooper of the 3rd Cavalry galloped past from the direction of the Brigade-Major's, holding up his hand and shouting out, that the rifles and artillery were coming to deprive the men of their arms and ammunition. The bad characters of the sudder took up the cry, and kept shouting out the same. Upon this, the sepoys of the right wing began to leave their huts, and assembled at the magazine. Captain Macdonald and the officers with myself tried to pacify the men, telling them that the rifles and artillery were not coming, but they would not believe us. The Colonel of the 11th Regiment also came to the magazine, and spoke kindly to the men, telling them not to be afraid; that the magazine would not be taken from them, and there was nothing in the cartridges that would harm them; that they were made with ghee, but the men would not listen to him, and told him to be off; the Colonel not leaving, the men commencing firing, when he went back to his regiment. There were about forty or fifty sepoys at the magazine; they fired at Captain Macdonald and myself, the Captain was shot, but I got him into the Sergeant-Major's bungalow. Major Taylor then came up; in passing through the lines, a sepoy presented his musket at him, but I restrained him, by saying that the Major was ready to die for the men.
butcher of the Sudder Bazar made a cut at Major Taylor, but he knocked the butcher down. I took away the sword and would have killed the butcher, but the Major told me to let him go; seeing a number of bad characters about, I got the Major into the Baboo's house, and hid him there, sepoy Banees Misser and myself watched at the door. The Major said it was very hot, and wished to get to his own house; this we managed to do. I then escorted another officer to the Major's house; seeing some troopers of the 3rd Cavalry approaching, I got into the Doctor's house and hid myself. When it was dusk, I went to the lines of my regiment. I saw the sepoys weeping, they were very sad; and said the recruits had ruined them, but they had killed the sepoy who fired the first shot. I then secreted myself with my wife and family, but lost all my property.

Q.—State the truth, was there any conspiracy amongst the men?
A.—No, there was no conspiracy.
Q.—How soon did the detached guards at some distance from the lines at once join the mutineers?
A.—The uproar and confusion was very great, and immediately it reached the guards, they joined their regiments.
Q.—What did you see of the Sudder Bazar?
A.—The bad characters of the Sudder, butchers, pulladors, koonjras, fishermen, &c., were roving about murdering and plundering.
Q.—Did you remark any of the Police?
A.—I did not.
Q.—Could you recognize the butcher who attacked Major Taylor?
A.—Yes, if I saw him again.

No. 20.—Statement of Mr. James Doorit, Jailor.—I was in charge of the Meerut Central Prison in May last. On the 9th of that month, 85 troopers of the 3rd Light Cavalry were committed by the sentence of a general Court-Martial, eighty for ten years, and five for five years, with irons and hard labour. At 5 P.M., I gave orders to the jemadar of the jail guard (Bhowanee Sing) to go with the turnkeys to count the prisoners inside their different wards, and to prepare to lock them up for the night; shortly after I went inside the jail myself, to see that all was correct and secure, when I received the keys from the jemadar, and on coming outside, I stopped to give orders to the native officer of the guard at the main gate (that had been sent down with twenty-four sepoys from the 20th Regiment Native Infantry by General Hewett), when I observed heavy clouds of smoke rising in the direction of the Cavalry lines, at the same time I heard great shouting towards the city, and shortly after I saw a large body of mounted cavalry galloping up at full speed with drawn swords towards the jail. I immediately gave orders to turn out all the guards, and ran round to the jail guards, to send them to reinforce that at the main gate, when firing commenced, but the men at the main gate, belonging to the 20th Regiment Native Infantry, made no resistance, and allowed the cavalry to ride into the jail and take possession of it. On seeing this, I proceeded and reported what had taken place to the Magistrate (Mr. Johnstone), who wrote to the Brigade-Major for assistance; the sepoa who took the note returned very quickly, stating, that he had been attacked on the road by the 3rd Cavalry men, and one of them had taken the letter from him. I remained with Mr. Johnstone all that night; he had sepoys bringing reports to him every half hour or so, and a little after 2 o'clock A.M., one of them came and informed him that the villagers had gone in a body and attacked the jail, set fire to it, and destroyed my house and property, with all the buildings outside, and released 839 prisoners. that were locked up the evening before in the new jail, and 720 at the old, near the city, which the sepoys of the 20th and 11th Regiments Native Infantry attacked, plundered and attempted to set fire to. On going down to the jail the next day, I found the house built for me much destroyed.
and burnt; the whole of my property cleared out and taken away, the jail godowns plundered of all the bar, flat, and sheet iron, carpenters', blacksmiths', masons', and other working tools, nails, screws, bolts, and hinges, brass and iron cooking utensils, millstones, with a large stock of saul timber taken away, and most of the door frames in the barracks inside the jail with iron bars in them pulled out, what they could not move, they burnt and destroyed to the extent of Rupees 23,832.

No 21.—Deposition of Mahomed Ashruf Beg, Jail Daroga of Meerut, son of Mirza Rujub Beg, Mogul, resident of Ghazeabad, age thirty-five years.—On the 10th of May at about 6 p.m., some sowars of the 3rd Light Cavalry bare-headed, with drawn swords, came on horseback before the jail, and rode off towards Komboh durwaza. I and Farzand Ali, jemadar of the jail toomun, first of all tried to shut the gate, then securing the prisoners in barracks, locked up the doors and served out ammunition to the men on guard; about 7 p.m. nearly 300 or 400 sepoys came with muskets, and seeing me standing at the gate demanded the key, which I refused to give up; one of them firing at me; I had a narrow escape and went up into the jail. The European soldiers posted in the cutchery compound would not allow any to pass that way, we returned by the mundee chowkee (where the Jemadar and burkundazes were present) to the jail, and saw the gates and malkhana burning. I spent the night in the city, and next morning went to the Magistrate's who sent me to assist the tehsedlar.

Q.—When the sepoys attacked the jail, who else were with them?
A.—No others were with the sepoys at the jail. But when going to the Magistrate's I saw hundreds of common people roving about, such as butchers, koenjras, &c., with staves and some with swords.

Q.—Did you recognise any of them?
A.—It was dark, and I had to fly hurriedly, besides I am a stranger in the station, so could not recognise them.

Q.—About what number of sowars passed first of all, and were any bad characters with them?
A.—When before the jail, no bad characters were with them, but many had joined them further on, they were about thirty or forty in number.

No. 22.—Statement of Baboo Hursarun Das.—I left Delhi for Meerut on the night of the 10th of May 1857, about 10 o'clock, with my son and three other natives, in one of Gunga Ram's dâk carriages. Just after crossing the Hindun and getting on to the Meerut road, between 12 and 1 o'clock, we met eight sowars in uniform.

A shot fired by one of them cut the harness, they asked the driver what European (Feringees) was inside; he replied, only a Moonshi with other natives, the sowars went on to Delhi, allowing us to proceed; about four miles further on we fell in with another party of twenty-five sowars; they were also armed, and some had their swords drawn, but were not habited alike, some few being in uniform, but most without. Two or three shots were fired at us unsuccessfully. Hearing from the sound of hoofs that a body of sowars were coming up, I and my son secreted ourselves in some jungle on the road side, and saw the sowars plundering the carriage and take the horse with them. I heard them say they had destroyed Meerut. I then proceeded along the fields to Mooradnaggur, reaching it about sunrise. I found the tehsedal had been burnt by the mutinous troops, and no conveyance was to be had. With difficulty I procured a bullock cart (tanga), the driver of which objecting to go by the
highroad, we proceeded along by-paths to Mooree. On reaching this village, I saw some armed men at a distance, who proved to be a party of the Meerut jail guard, with muskets and pouches; I asked them where they were going, one of them sorrowfully replied, the troops at Meerut have mutinied, the sowars joined by the city budmashes, and those of the Sudder Bazar, have broken the jail, and released prisoners; had we remained at Meerut we should have been punished, we have therefore joined the rebel troops, and must now take whatever Providence has “in store for us.” I remained at Mooree a short time, and then attempted to proceed, but after going six miles met some travellers, who had been plundered and ill-treated, from whom I heard that some 2 or 300 Goojurs were on the road ahead and had just plundered a wedding procession, a party of some seventy men, and wounded some of them. I was consequently obliged to return to Mooree, and it was only on the 19th, that having hired an escort of twenty-five men, I could get into Meerut.

No. 23.—Deposition of Ram Lall, coachman, son of Ram Singh Khateck, resident of Begumabad, age twenty-five years.—The night the mutiny at Meerut occurred I brought over from Delhi Moonshi Hursaran Dass, his son a servant, and two other men, and at about 1 o’clock A.M. reached the Meerut road by the Gazeeooddeennuggur bridge, when we met eight sowars in Cavalry uniform, one of whom firing at the carriage cut the harness across, and asked me if any Feringees were inside. I replied “no, only a Moonshi;” they opened the door, looked in and went off, about five miles from Mooradnuggur, we met about thirty sowars, some in uniform and some not, but all with pistols and naked swords; some of them struck the carriage, without however, doing any harm, meanwhile the passengers got out, the sowars examined it, and then went away, it sounded as if other sowars were coming behind, the Moonsbi offered to give me Rupees 10 if I would convey his things to Mooradnuggur, but I said I could not leave the carriage; he replied, if you will save the papers, no blame shall attach to you about my property. The Moonsbi, his son, and servant, then went into the jungle, and the other two passengers to Gazeeabad; after a while a number of sowars and sepoys came up to the gharee, smashed it to pieces, and plundered the things. I being helpless left the road, fled eastwards, and arrived in the evening at Meerut, while coming to it I saw parties of tens and twenties passing along the road, some with and some without arms, the sycs and grass-cutters riding horses. This I saw till 1 o’clock midnight, as far as village Bhorbhoral. The sowars and sepoys were going on ponies, which probably they obtained by plunder.

No. 24.—Deposition of Dowlut, a Jat, resident of Mouza· Bessokur, a Zeminadar.

Q.—At what time and in what state did the sowars pass through your village on their way to Delhi?

A.—I was in my house about 10 in the night, I heard the clatter of horses’ hoofs on the road. A short distance from the village there is a well and a chowpal erected for travellers, there the sowars went; they appeared to be about 2 or 300 men; they staid a short time; set fire to the chowpal and went away. They were heard to say that they had cut down the Electric Telegraph, they burnt a few of the posts in the fire near the well. After this, horsemen and sepoys were constantly passing through the village during the night.

Q.—What direction did they go after passing through Bessokur?

A.—They went straight to Delhi. I heard in the morning that a bungalow at Begumabad was burnt by them. I also heard that about 4 or 5 o’clock in the morning two or three sowars came and went away without interfering with any one. A short time afterwards eight or nine men arrived; they are said to have wounded a European near Mouza Guoree’s garden, who afterwards escaped to Bahadoorpoor; he was coming from Delhi, and was murdered by Jhangeera, Goojur, and others.
No. 25.—Bidhee Singh, Chowkeedar of Mulliana, Luchminer, Khoshiallee and other residents of Keshunpoor, depose that on the day of the outbreak the sepoys and sowars, some with their uniforms on and some without, in little bands, consisting of about twenty or thirty, passed through Mulliana to Delhi and by Bagput. They were evidently in a hurry, for they threw their arms and property all along the road. Kulloo and Hossain Buksh, and the Cotwal of Hauper, state that on the 10th of May 1857 two of the sowars' horses were brought into Hauper, and on the 11th May sixteen more from the Goolathoe road, from which it would appear that the sowars went from Meerut through Goolathoe.

No. 26.—Depositions of Thundie and Behai, Zemindars of Seekree.—The village Seekree is on the road to Delhi. About midnight, sowars from the direction of Meerut passed; the sepoys about five hours afterwards. In the morning they were all gone. Both sowars and sepoys entered the village and took whatever they could lay hands on; they also cut down the Electric Telegraph Posts.

No. 27.—Statement of Syed Meer Khan, known as the Sirdar Bahadoor.—On the 10th of May 1857 (it was the Ramzan, and consequently a fast) I suddenly heard a great uproar, and on enquiry learnt that the native troops had mutinied. It is the duty of a soldier to die bravely and not cowardly; he should fight and die as a martyr. I mounted and rode to the house of General Hewett. I found it on fire, and the mob plundering. I then went to the house of Mr. Greathed, the Commissioner, and tried to persuade him to accompany me to cantonments, but he would not leave the house.

The mob appearing, I attacked them with great ferocity like a terrible lion, wounded fourteen or fifteen, and drove them to the ice pits, here some mutineers came to their assistance; they fired at me and I was wounded, but I still drove them back, killed one and wounding others, two balls pierced my horse, who died as I passed the camel sheds. I with some difficulty reached Mahomed Ali Khan's, who lent me a horse and sent me home. The next morning, my brother came and told me that the Commissioner and his wife, after having been concealed in the garden all night, had got safe to cantonments. I immediately went to see them, the Commissioner embraced me and said you have served me well; you have saved my life. I provided sowars and cossids; of the latter, one was sent to Agra, the second to Dehra Dhoon, the third to Umballa, and the fourth to Hansie. With the exception of the first to Agra, all were murdered. My brother, Syed Jaun, took the sowars to Bagput, and brought in four ladies and four gentlemen who had escaped from Delhi. By the favor of God, I fought many actions with the mutineers. Out of fifty sowars, twenty-five have been killed and fourteen wounded. What more can I say, the above is but a short account of my doings; if I were to detail them, it would be immense.

No. 28.—Deposition of Lieutenant W. H. Furnell, of the mounted Police, taken by me at Meerut on the 23rd of December 1857. Lieutenant W. H. Furnell being sworn, deposes as follows:—On the night of the 10th of May 1857 I was standing at the door of my bungalow, waiting for the dak gharee to convey me to Delhi; hearing sharp firing in the direction of the Native Infantry lines, and seeing natives hurrying in all directions, I hastily took my sword, which was on my baggage, mounted a horse with only a blanket and watering bridle, and rode towards the Sudder Bazaar; near the wooden bridge I met several European soldiers (one was wounded) flying from some police peons and others who were pursuing them with naked swords, but fled on seeing me approach armed. The soldiers begged me for God's sake to go
back or I should be murdered, all the sepoys and bazar people having mutinied. I urged them to hasten to their lines, and pushed forward myself in the hopes of saving some others.

On the other side of the bridge I met two artillerymen beset by a gang of natives, who also fled as I charged up; one poor fellow was severely cut across the face and was evidently faint from loss of blood; I made him mount my horse, and we all three returned to their lines, and reached them in safety, my single weapon being alone enough to deter the mob from advancing. I left the artillerymen on their parade and crossed to the foot artillery lines, beyond the hospital. I saw the rifles drawn up as I passed on, arriving at the battery lines, I was accosted by some fifty or sixty women and children, praying me to go and get assistance for them, there not being one European left to protect that side of the station, only Goolundazes, who, they stated, had been using threatening language to them, and the fire was fast approaching their long range of quarters; whilst listening to their story a wretched woman was brought in by a Sergeant, who had picked her up on the road nearly mad, and severely wounded, with a bleeding infant in her arms; she wildly stated that her husband and three children had been butchered before her eyes but a short distance from where we stood; this determined me, and I started for the rifle picquet which I expected would be placed on the mall. I had not proceeded many paces on the road leading to the Brigadier's house, where I came across the murdered corps of Mr. Phillips, the Veterinary Surgeon of the 3rd Light Cavalry. I reined up, but the quantity of blood that had issued from a deep sword cut at the back of his head told me all was over, I recollect hearing a faint blow as I approached the spot, but no cry was uttered. On turning to pursue my way, four men in the police uniform rushed upon me, armed with drawn swords, the first stumbled and fell, the second I cut across the face and got clear off; passing I was fired upon from the Brigadier's compound, but fortunately escaped! At the angle of the road near the artillery mess, where I expected to find a picket, I was again cut off by a mob of natives, with sticks, and had to turn off to the left by the road at the back of the mall, which I was prevented from gaining until I reached Mr. Gibbon's stores, I then only succeeded by charging through a mob armed chiefly with latties, but the sudden turn that brought me on them dispersed them, as they raised a cry, "the Dragoons are coming," to this mistake I attribute the safety of all the houses from that point to the mall, as they fled precipitately. Mrs. Ferguson's house was the only one burnt.

I saw and warned Larke, the pensioner, who was standing at his gate. My road being now clear, I made for the Carabinier's lines, a trooper lent me a saddle, on hearing of the unprotected state of the poor artillery women and children, a Captain of the Dragoons offered to accompany me with thirty men. We started, but near the Horse Artillery lines, he and his men were ordered back. I pushed on to the hospital, where I succeeded in getting five volunteers, who accompanied me to the women's barracks. A Sergeant joined us, but he had no arms. I lent him my sword, and carried a child, we all then retired to the hospital. I then remembered that my money, watch, and some treasury drafts had been left on my table, I again took to my saddle and succeeded in reaching my bungalow, and fortunately secured my little all just in time, as I was obliged to make a precipitate retreat, and was pursued by two mounted men, I believe of the 3rd Cavalry, who chased me across the Begum's Bridge, over which I turned to the right; and on the road to Elahie Buksh I passed two dead bodies, one a man's, the other a woman's, dreadfully mutilated, and could distinctly hear cries for help, and of 'murder' near O'Brien's Castle. In my flight I was several times cut at by the Police; and on my returning by Elahie Buksh's I passed a gang of Mahomedans, shouting 'maro, maro;' they were headed by a tall man, with strongly marked narrow features, but my pursuers, being taken for our Dragoons, were my protection, and I passed on taking the broken ground to the left, and pushed into the nullah. I found the Dragon bazar nearly deserted; on both occasions, when I neared the Sudder Bazar, I
observed the Police with drawn swords, and men who looked like the Mahomedan butchers, the majority of the mob had spears and iron bound lates; bricks and stones were hurled at me; seeing the terror cavalry inspired, I the next morning canvassed for volunteers, and in a few days succeeded in procuring the signatures of thirty-six who were willing to serve. The offer was first gladly accepted, but afterwards coldly declined, these very men were subsequently enrolled in the gallant little band of "khakees," who behaved so well to the last, and to the second division of which, after the Sekree affair, you appointed me Commandant; had they been sanctioned earlier many a poor man might have been saved.

Q.—Do you know the names of the men you brought in?
A.—No, but I imagine some of them must be here.

Q.—What is the name of the poor woman the Sergeant brought in?
A.—Mrs. Law.

Q.—Where was the fire when you were at the battery lines?
A.—The Sapper and Miner lines were on fire.

Q.—You state you saw the Police actively engaged in riot, and that you were repeatedly attacked by them. How do you know that they were the Cantonment Police?
A.—From their uniforms, and the belts round their waists, they must have belonged to the Cantonment Police, for I was passing near their chowkies and beats, my route on this plan of the cantonment shows it.

Q.—Did you meet with assistance from any of the Police?
A.—Quite the contrary as I have already stated, I was attacked by them.

Q.—The tall Mahomedan who headed the mob near Elahie Buksh's, could you recognize him?
A.—Certainly, I imagined he was the Kotwal, or some official; I have since seen him in the Joint Magistrate's Court, and pointed him out to Mr. Wigram.

No. 29.—Statement of Lieutenant J. Eckford.—About 6 o'clock on Sunday afternoon, the 10th of May last, I heard a great uproar in the direction of the Native Infantry and Cavalry lines; it increased, and I heard shots fired. On enquiring from my servants and chuprassies, they said the Native troops had mutinied, and were setting fire to the lines and officers' houses. I sent a man to find out what was going on, and he returned and said the sepoys were murdering their officers. From the compound of my house I saw crowds of natives in front of the bazars, and also some European officers and gentlemen gallop past on horseback, and drive furiously away towards the European lines in buggies, &c. At this time a number of the bungalows were on fire, and the noise and musket shots seemed to approach. I therefore (although momentarily expecting succour from European troops of the station) prepared to defend the house (an upper roomed pukka building, in which were my office and treasury, as well as my place of residence). At about 7 o'clock, a man came running to me and said that the mob having killed Dr. Smith (my next door neighbour whose house was on fire) were coming into my compound. I therefore, after having the body of the man I had shot removed, posted the
burkundazes in and over the Treasury room and office, and having closed and barred all the doors, made ready to defend the building, I also shortly after determined to send my family away to hide in the garden.

In about twenty minutes after the disappearance of the first mob, the noise of a great number of men approaching was heard. Taking a brace of pistols I went up to the flat roof of the portico (which was on a level with the upper rooms) to the side nearest the Treasury room, in order that I might deter any one from getting at it.

An old European pensioner and a Private of the 60th Rifles, who had been pursued by the mob, and sought shelter in my house, were told off by me, after being armed, to remain inside the building. The servants, &c., had begged of me to send these men away, as the mob particularly sought their lives, but to this suggestion I would not for a moment listen. I had hardly reached the portico to be on the look-out (it was now dark) when a very large mob of sepoys and others entered the compound and made for the house; when they saw me, they commenced firing, but none of the shots took effect on me.

Almost simultaneously I heard a heavy battering downstairs at the back of the house, a party having turned the rear of it, I rushed downstairs, armed with a brace of double-barreled pistols, and found about twelve or fourteen men in the large centre room, who had effected an entrance from the back, I dashed at them and fired two barrels at those on the right. All ran away, except one man, who from his appearance, I should say, was a 3rd Light Cavalry trooper; he made a rush at me with his sword, and although I gave him a pistol shot (which at the time appeared to take no effect, but as my servants afterwards saw him dragged out of the burning house by the legs, I conclude he must have been very hard hit), he cut me over the head with it (a severe wound); I tried to close with him, and gave him a blow over the head with my left hand pistol (the second barrel of which had missed fire), and he gave me sundry other cuts with his sword. The rifleman, who had been in the adjoining room, hearing the struggle came in, and my assailant staggered out of the door way. I was bleeding profusely and much stunned. I therefore determined again on going up to the portico and making a stand there.

When I got up I found myself so weak that I was obliged to sit down, I told the rifleman if he wished to go away and try to make his escape, that he might do so. I made over to him my double-barreled gun which had been reloaded, and he accordingly ran down stairs. I heard two shots in rapid succession, and was told afterwards that he got out of my compound, but was killed by a party of men on the other side of the wall, out on the road. This man's name was, I believe, Fitzpatrick of the G. Company of the 60th The old pensioner (Chapman), whom I had armed with a spear, made his escape previously, during the mêlée, to the gardener's house, where he lay concealed, and ultimately escaped in safety to the artillery dépôt. I lay on the portico for about two hours and more, sometimes sensible, and at other times in a faint. The miscreants searched everywhere for me; they more than once came close to where I was lying, but the shade of a tree (it was bright moon-light) most providentially was the means of screening me from their view. They looked up along the roof of the upper story, against which a small ladder was placed, and they evidently thought I had gone up there, but were afraid to ascend. They, however, gutted the house, broke open the treasure chests and boxes, and having heaped up the furniture, both in the lower and upper rooms, set fire to the whole; I saw the entire building, before long, in a blaze.

They also, for a time, placed sentries round the house in the hopes of capturing me.

I lay on the portico, as I have before described, for more than two hours, and then, when I was conscious, and on hearing no noise or voices of the mutineers I commenced crawling and staggering, and by the outer pukka steps, which led from the front verandah and portico, I got down below, and
there met my tent pitcher, who conducted me to where my wife, sister, and child were hiding. In about half an hour afterwards a litter having been made up for me by my servants, &c., we made our way to the right picquet of the carabineers along the bed of a dry nullah, and got to the officer's bungalow, where my wounds were dressed.

With very few trifling exceptions, everything in the house was plundered and burnt.

No. 30.—Statement of Mr. Joseph Chapman, pensioner.—Being employed at the house occupied by Captain Eckford, Executive Engineer, near the Native Infantry lines, about half past 5 o'clock, I heard the sepoys commence firing, my people all ran from their work, the mistree excepted; about ten minutes after I saw coming down the road at the back of the Sudder Bazar one of the 60th Rifles running for his life, with the back hair of his head laying on his shoulders, and about sixty yards behind another of the 60th, as he passed close by me, I saw his face was covered with blood, whether these two had escaped from the Sudder Bazar or the sepoys lines I cannot tell. In about a quarter of an hour I saw another of the 60th running out of a bye-street out of the bazar, sharply followed by one of the Police, who knocked him down with a lattice, about nine feet long (this was near where I stood, a wall only between us); on the policeman returning to the bazar, he met another of the 60th at the entrance of the same street, and knocked him down in like manner, his blows were repeated with latties by two of the bazar people several times, and I thought the poor men were killed. I thus saw four knocked down in the space of a few minutes; they, however, soon after got up and ran away, apparently being only stunned; the fifth man, by name Fitzpatrick, escaped into the compound where I was standing; the sleeves of his white jacket all saturated with blood; he would have fallen had not the mistree and myself taken hold of him; as I saw a mob coming after him, we made the best of our way to the house where Captain Eckford seated the man on a chair, and went out with his double-barreled gun (by this time it was dark), and the mob had come in by the corner of the godown towards the house, led by a man with a musket, whom Captain Eckford shot, and discharged the other barrel among the crowd, who then ran away; Captain Eckford returned into the house and reloaded the gun, we then fastened every door; when it became quite dark a large mob entered the compound with lighted torches, some of them had guns, others swords. Captain Eckford gave his gun to the 60th Rifleman, and to me a spear and sword, keeping for himself a pair of double-barreled pistols; the mob flocked to the rear of the house, smashed the door, then entered and commenced rummaging, we three were standing close to the door of the large room below, which was filled with the mob; by the help of a ladder (which was at the back of the house) they scaled the verandah of the upper rooms; on hearing which Captain Eckford went on the top of the portico under the shade of two tall trees, the man of the 60th Rifles and myself going upstairs, also stood at the door, watching for a chance to get at them; by this time the upper rooms were filled with the mob, Captain Eckford then told us to escape, if we could; I passed through a large room and got to the bath-room, and from thence to the verandah by means of some steps; I heard the pistol shots fired by Captain Eckford; going down these steps I met a man, but he no sooner saw my sword in my hand than he ran away and entered the room filled with the mob, I leaped the remaining stairs and escaped into the garden; I was followed by some of the mob, but being dark and having dark clothes on, I jumped into a large clump of bushes, and by that means was not seen. I then went to the gardener's house, who wrapped me up and hid me in his house; the mob now set fire to the house, which was soon in flames; they then collected at the gardener's house, at which were eight burkundazes, one khansama, and two khidmatgars, a dhoby, the mally and his two sons, in the stables were six syces, one coachman, besides grass-cutters, about twenty-two in all, but not one came to our assistance, the sirdar bearer excepted, who stuck close to us, and was, I believe, the chief means of saving the two ladies and
We picked up the body of Captain Taylor close to Elahie Buksh's me in front of near his shop, who ran towards them, thus giving me time to escape. I was going too fast but I was going too fast for him to do me any harm. I was not molested until I got in front of Shunker Dass's gate; I was here pelted with bricks or stones by a number of natives who came out of his compound. One man rushed at me with a drawn sword, but my horse was going too fast for him to do me any harm. Who these men were I do not know, but they came out of Shunker Dass's compound; a little further on, I was again attacked by a crowd at the corner of the compound of the bungalow of the late Dr. Smith. The men came from the Sudder Bazar, and were, I was told, Kahars, who lived in the uddah close by; at this place I was fired at by a native, and a guard (when I was some distance off) fired a volley over my head, some half a dozen men ran after me with swords and lattices, one succeeded in catching hold of the strap on the right side of the buggy, but I was going too fast for him to do me any harm. A crowd was coming down the road which runs from Elahie Buksh's shop to the Begum's bridge, but they were prevented from attacking me by some men who were standing near his shop, who ran towards them, thus giving me time to escape. I was not after this molested, with the exception of a few stones being thrown at me in front of Mr. Fergusson's house. I saw several of the Cantonment Police in my progress, but I am perfectly certain none of them molested or attacked me, at the same time, I must say, none attempted to dissuade the crowd from attacking me.

I joined the European troops on the mall, and proceeded with them to the native lines. The body of Lieutenant Macnab, 3rd Light Cavalry, was found in the ditch between the houses occupied by Mrs. Hobson and the late Surgeon Smith. The face was frightfully cut; it had at least four long deep cuts across the face and head; an European soldier's body was also found here. We picked up the body of Captain Taylor close to Elahie Buksh's shop; he had apparently been killed by an iron bound lattice, the back of the head was smashed; all these had their clothes on. Early next morning Mrs. Chamber's body was found in her compound; I saw the body covered up, consequently cannot say in what state it was; just by the old jail we found the bodies of some fourteen or fifteen European soldiers and their wives; all these were perfectly naked and frightfully mutilated. One man had one of his hands entirely cut off, and another had the whole of his stomach laid bare with the entrails hanging out. Mrs. MacDonald was so much disfigured from the cuts about her face that, although I had known her intimately for upwards of nine years, I did not recognize her. The body of a soldier was also found (naked) on the road in the rear of the house occupied by Lieutenant Eckford. We found Dr. Smith's body in his own compound, naked and frightfully mutilated by sword cuts. Captain MacDonald, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, and Mr. V. Tregear were killed in the lines by the sepoys, 20th Native Infantry: both these gentlemen were shot; when the bodies were found next day, they were dressed.

Q.—Which house of Shunker Dass's do you allude to from whence you were attacked?

A.—The house near Peter's, the tailor.
Q.—Could you recognize the native who fired at you?

A.—He was a dirty-looking man; he fired a pistol at me, and then threw it at my head; my syce, who has now left me, told me he was kahar of the udda, close to the place; where I was attacked.

No. 32.—Deposition of Mussumut Golab Jaun, Cashmerian, residing in the Sudder Bazar.—At the time of the outbreak, I was residing with the late Dr. Smith; was on that day in his house, and informed him of the intended outbreak, of which I heard from my mother; she learnt it from a Cashmerian girl, named Sophie, who was told by a sepoy, at about 2 P.M. on that day, that the troops would mutiny and massacre the Europeans. Dr. Smith replied, I always brought him bazar reports void of foundation, and took no notice of it.

I therefore quietly sat down; at about 5 or 6 P.M., sound of musketry was heard from the infantry lines, and all at once I saw hundreds of men running towards the parade, after a while people began to rush into the bungalow. I begged my master to fly, but he refused, asking where we could go to, and we then stood by the garden hedge; meanwhile, my mother sent a dooly for me from the Sudder Bazar, in which I left my master remaining behind; the mob had not then entered the compound, though crowds surrounded it. As I passed they wished to kill me, but hearing I was a woman, allowed me to pass. The girl, Sophie, was turned out of the bazar, and her house knocked down.

No. 33.—Deposition of Mussumut Zeenut, Cashmerian, residing in the Sudder Bazar.—On the day of the outbreak, I was residing in the Sudder Bazar. About 2 P.M. on that day, I heard from Mussumut Mehree, mother of Sophie, that there was to be a disturbance that day, and that she had heard it from the sepoys; I did not believe it, still mentioned it to my daughter, Golab Jaun. At 6 P.M., when I heard firing, I sent a dooly for her. I can give no information of the disturbance in the Sudder Bazar. I do not know where the Cashmerian girl, Sophie, is.

No. 34. Deposition of Mussumut Sophie, Cashmerian, residing in the city of Meerut.—At the time of the outbreak, the date of which I do not remember, I was residing in the Sudder Bazar; on the day it occurred no one was in my house, but Gooram Hossain, my servant. At 4 o'clock Pundit Dhurm Narain, who was formerly in the office of the Meerut Cantonment Joint-Magistrate, came to my house, but left, when the outbreak commenced, to return home, I then closed the doors; my mother is named Mehree; she left for Lodhiana some two months before the outbreak. I reported her departure at the Kotwali. I never heard of the outbreak before it commenced. The sepoys did not frequent my house.

No. 35. Report of Bukhtawur Singh, Officiating Kotwal of the Sudder Bazar, Meerut.—Agreeably to orders received, I made enquiries of the neighbours of Mussumut Sophie, and learned that sepoys were in the habit of visiting the house, and that her mother had left previous to the outbreak; her house, with others in that neighbourhood, was razed to the ground.

No. 36. Deposition of Nusseebun, nurse, in the service of the late Mrs. MacDonald.—On Sunday, the 10th of May, about 5 o'clock, I had dressed the children to go out. Captain Chambers, the Adjutant of the 11th Regiment, came to my master and spoke to him. Captain MacDonald put on his sword, and went to the parade ground, and told my mistress to go to Mrs. Chambers; she was putting on her bonnet when we heard a great noise; she sent to enquire what it was, but could not learn. My mistress then went to the room
where the children were; just then, Moozarick, son of Zahoorun, came in crying, and said, Captain MacDonald had been shot. Mrs. MacDonald was greatly agitated and said, I will go to my husband. I replied, how will you go, when every carriage and buggy is attacked by the bad characters. The bungalow was then on fire; I took my mistress to Aliyar, the Bhistee's hut, and there with the three children secreted ourselves. Zahoorun Ayah went to the house to try and get some clothes for the children; when she returned, we were obliged to take refuge in the hut of Buktabur Chowkeedar, as the stables were on fire. The Chowkeedar's family were just leaving the house, and my mistress asked where they were going; they told her to a new house they had built near the city. Mrs. MacDonald asked to be allowed to accompany them, so that she and her children might be saved. Mrs. MacDonald said to the ayah, I and my children will go with the Chowkeedar's family as we may be saved, and I will take the nurse with me, but, for God's sake, do not accompany me, as some one may recognize you, and then I shall be discovered. We dressed her up in native clothes, and left her clothes in the hut. The Chowkeedar took one child, the dhobee another, and I took the third. We then started, had passed the elephant sheds, and through a lane on to the road, where we met a crowd of people, about seventy in number; they told us to stand, one man looked at my face, then into the face of the Chowkeedar's wife; on this, the Chowkeedar said one is like another, why do you look into their faces; one man approached Mrs. MacDonald; the Chowkeedar said, she is my sister-in-law, what are you looking at, but he would not mind; he looked into her face, pulling aside the chudder, and said to the Chowkeedar, you rascal, this is your sister-in-law, now I will cut off your head, and laid his sword on the Chowkeedar's neck. Another man then went to Mrs. MacDonald, and asked her who she was; she did not answer; he again asked her, but she made no reply; he asked her the third time, and she said, it is (hum haie); on this he cut her down. The dhobe and Chowkeedar took the children, but I remained where my mistress was slain; after a short time, the mob dispersed; I then ran towards the Chowkeedar's house, and met another mob; they asked me who I was; I told them the house I lived in had been burnt, and I had the Captain's child; they enquired where the parents of the child were; I told them that the father had been shot on parade, and the mother killed near this; they said the men were wretches to kill a woman. They told me to go, or some one else would kill me and the child. A little further on, a native Christian pensioner, who was standing at his door, took us into his house. The Chowkeedar's house was next to his, and he had left the other two children with the pensioner. We remained there during the night, and the next morning were taken to the Dum-dumma.

Q.—Can you describe the people who met Mrs. MacDonald?
A.—There was much confusion, so that I could not make them out; they appeared to be rustics, meanly clothed, armed with swords, and some with latties.

Q.—Were there any Police amongst the mob?
A.—I did not see the Police; I could not distinguish them, whether they were or not.

Q.—Where is the Chowkeedar, and do you know his mohullah?
A.—I do not know where he is, or where he lives.

Q.—Who were about the bungalow when it was set on fire?
A.—I was in the dhobe's house at the time. They were not sepoys, but appeared to be bazar people.

No. 87.—Deposition of Sookha Dhobe, in the employ of the late Captain MacDonald of the 20th Regiment Native Infantry.—On the day of the mutiny, I was busy with my work about 5 o'clock, when I heard a great uproar and firing in the direction of the native lines. My master mounted his horse, and
rode off towards the parade; shortly afterwards, I saw the bungalow was on fire. My mistress first went for shelter to the bhister's hut, and then to the chowkeedar's. Being much alarmed, she told the ayah to remain, and that she would put on a native dress, and with the nurse and children try to escape with the chowkeedar's family, who were going to their house near the city. I took one of the children, and we started; we got past the elephant sheds, and coming out of a lane on to the road, we met a large crowd, armed with swords and latties; they looked at the faces of the women, and when one went to my mistress, the chowkeedar told him, not to look in the face of the women, adding, this is my sister-in-law, but the man would not mind, and then cut her down. The nurse remained a short time, but the chowkeedar and myself fled with the children to Poorwa, near the gate of the city. The children were taken by the chowkeedar to the house of a Christian pensioner, where they remained all night, and next day were taken to the Dum Dumma.

Q.—Did you recognize anyone of the mob who killed Mrs. MacDonald?
A.—I did not.

Q.—Did you see who set the house on fire?
A.—No, I did not, there was a great crowd about.

Q.—Do you know where the chowkeedar is?
A.—No, I cannot tell; he lives near the Christian pensioner.

No. 38.—Deposition of Jorawun, coachman in service of the late Mrs. Courteney.—On Sunday, the 10th of May last, in the evening after 5 o'clock, when the firing commenced in the regimental lines, Mrs. Courteney was alarmed; by her orders I made ready the carriage, and took her towards the city; near the gate of the city, I saw a great crowd of people standing with swords and latties; they struck the carriage with their latties, when Mrs. Courteney said—coachman, take me to the Deputy Collector's house, then I shall be saved; so I turned the carriage towards the Sudder Bazar, the mob followed; we met some of the 3rd Cavalry; they told the mob not to touch Mrs. Courteney, so they went away; I then took her in the carriage to the Deputy Collector's gate. The gate of the compound was shut by a jemadar, a Mussulman, who would not allow the carriage to enter. Mrs. Courteney spoke to him, but I do not know what she said; the jemadar told me to take away the carriage; as I turned it round, a man knocked me off the coach box; I ran away, and hid in a heap of timber; Mrs. Courteney and her two children were killed at the gate.

Q.—What is the name of the jemadar?
A.—I do not know.

Q.—Describe his appearance?
A.—A Mahomedan, grey beard, colour tawney, short and old.

Q.—Can you recognize him?
A.—Yes, if I saw him, I could recognize him.

Q.—Could you recognize any of the mob at the gates of the city?
A.—I saw a crowd, but I could not recognize any of them.

Q.—Could you recognize any of the party who attacked Mrs. Courteney?
A.—I was flurried, and therefore could not recognize them; they appeared to be butchers, coolies, &c., from the Sudder Bazar.

Q.—Were there any policemen amongst the mob?
A.—Yes, there were a great number of men in blue coats with brass plates, and armed with swords; the place where Mrs. Courteney was killed is about twenty yards from a Police chowkee, and all the men of that chowkie were present. I saw them. The Deputy Magistrate's jemadar must know the men who killed Mrs. Courteney, for they all assembled round him at that time.
Q.—What became of the horse and carriage?

A.—The horse was wounded and ran away, and the carriage was left in the same spot; the horse ran to the house, and after eight days died; they burnt the carriage. The iron from the two front wheels was found in the ditch at the Kyurnugger gate, and the body of Mrs. Courteney, with those of the children, were on the following day found behind the camel sheds. The Deputy Magistrate's men must have thrown them there.

Re-examined in the presence of jemadar.

Q.—Do you recognize this man?

A.—Yes, I do. When Mrs. Courteney reached the Deputy Collector's gate, he closed the gate, and would not admit Mrs. Courteney; he told me to turn the carriage and drive away; he said something to Mrs. Courteney, which I did not hear; after this, he went into his house; I turned the carriage; Mrs. Courteney was then killed; it is the same man. No doubt about it.

No. 39.—Deposition of Gunner Hugh McCartney, 4th Company, 2nd Battalion Artillery. Gunner Hugh McCartney being sworn, deposes—On the evening of the 10th of May 1857, about 5 o'clock, I was in the Sudder Bazar of Meerut with two of my comrades (since dead); when near the Kotwalli, where there is a flag and a guard of sepoys, I heard shots fired. The guard immediately turned out and fixed bayonets. The police chupprasies ran down the street with drawn swords. A little further on we met a trooper of the 3rd Cavalry, who warned us to our lines, as there was a robbery, and all the Europeans in the bazar would be killed; we turned towards the Kotwalli, and were fired at by three of the sepoys, who, however, missed us. We then ran; my two companions, who were behind, were knocked down; I got to an open spot, clear of the streets, when two parties of natives tried to stop me; one party on my right, headed by two policemen, attacked me. The policemen with drawn swords, and a man with a stick came forward. I had a stick in my hand; I put it up to save my head, but it was cut through by a blow from a sword, and my cap also cut; I received two wounds on the head; I then struck a man a blow, and tried to wrest a stick out of his hand, when I was struck senseless, and left for dead; on coming to my senses, I got over a wall into a compound, and there found a Dragoon, who had been wounded, and also three Artillerymen; I received four wounds on my head, and was severely beaten about the body.

Q.—Could you recognize the policemen who attacked you?

A.—No, I could not. I was so taken by surprise, and engaged defending myself.

Q.—How do you know that they were policemen?

A.—From their uniforms; they had blue coats and belts round their waists.

Q.—Did you receive any assistance from the police?

A.—No, none of them came to my assistance.

No. 40.—Deposition of Gunner James McAlroy, 3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery. Gunner James McAlroy being sworn, states—On the evening of the 10th May 1857, I was in the Sudder Bazar of Meerut, between 5 and 6 o'clock; I saw the natives running towards the Kotwalli, a place where was a guard and a large flag. A trooper of the 3rd Cavalry, who had two or three stripes on his arm, rode up to me, and said, 'juldee', I turned round, but a mob of natives rushed at me, and knocked me down with sticks and bricks. They then followed some other Europeans. I got up and ran. When I came near the pop shop, a chupprassie struck me on the head with a sword or club and fell senseless. I was shortly afterwards picked up by some of my comrades and taken to the hospital.

Q.—Could you recognize the chupprassie, or any of the men who attacked you?

A.—No, I do not think I could.
Q.—How do you know that he was chupprassie or policeman who attacked you at the pop shop?
A.—By his blue coat and red turban.
Q.—Did any of the police assist you?
A.—No, I got no assistance from any native.
Q.—Were the shops shut or deserted as you passed?
A.—The shops were open, I saw natives leaving them with clubs.

No. 40½.—Deposition of Gunner Williams Caldwell, of the 3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery.—Gunner Williams Caldwell being sworn, states—I was in the Sudder Bazar with Gunner McQuade on the evening of the 10th of May 1857, between the hours of 5 and 6 o'clock, it was nearer 6. We saw a crowd of natives running and shouting ayah, ayah, we thought they meant fire and looked about us. A Trooper of the 3rd Cavalry galloped past us and said something which I did not clearly hear. A European also past us, and told us to run for our lines, as the sepoys had turned out. We were then in about the centre of the bazar. We ran as hard as we could, but immediately we turned we were attacked by the natives; passing through a lane I was knocked down with a stone or piece of kunkur by a native. I then ran about twenty yards, after I got over the blow, and was attacked by a chupprassie, I was wounded in the hand. I was behind Gunner McQuade, and saw another policeman attack him, making a cut at him with a sword whilst passing him. I did not see more, as I was then knocked down by the policeman, who wounded me. I got a brickbat, and then none of them ventured near me.
Q.—Could you recognize the chupprassics or policemen who attacked Gunner McQuade and yourself?
A.—No, I could not, I was in a hurry to get away from them.
Q.—How do you know they were chupprassies?
A.—By their uniform.
Q.—Describe it?
A.—Blue coat and yellow pantaloons, a dark leather belt round their waist, with a brass buckle in front, they had red turbans.
Q.—Did any of the police come to your assistance?
A.—No, not one.
Q.—When you first entered the bazar, was everything quiet and orderly?
A.—Yes, it was, and we had got up nearly to the centre of the bazar where there was a sepoy guard, when I observed natives running and shouting.
Q.—When did they commence closing their shops?
A.—Immediately the people began shouting, ayah, ayah.

No. 41.—Deposition of Gunner James McQuade, of the 3rd Troop 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery—Gunner James McQuade being sworn, states—On the night of the 10th May 1857, between the hours of 5 or 6, I was in the Sudder Bazar with Gunner Caldwell, the bazar was then quite quiet, the shops open as usual. About ten minutes after we had entered the bazar, near the middle of it, and had just purchased some things at a shop, on leaving it we saw a large crowd of natives armed with sticks. A sowar of the 3rd Cavalry in uniform overtook us, and said “Jao sahib, sepoy bobbery kurta” we went towards the kotwally, where there was a flag, but were opposed by a crowd of natives in that direction, there were four sepoys with fixed bayonets; we therefore turned round and broke through the crowd in our rear; we were repeatedly struck with sticks, but managed to get clear. We had gone about 300 yards when we met a policeman armed with a sword; I passed next to him, he drew his sword and made a cut at me; I was running, and threw myself down to avoid the blow; I sprung up and ran, he followed me, and made another blow, which I again avoided, then an old man with a stick interfered and kept the policeman back. We then got clear of the bazar, and made our way to the lines by the Roman Catholic Chapel.
Q. Could you recognize the policeman?
A. Yes, I think I could, if I saw him again.
Q. Can you describe him, and how he was dressed?
A. He was tall and had a long thin face, was dressed in a blue coat, and light-yellow pantaloons, a belt round his waist, and sort of red turban round his head.
Q. Did any of the policemen give you assistance?
A. No, not one, though I saw many of them, but this was the only policeman that attacked me.

No. 42.—Deposition of Gunner Thomas Crawford of the 3rd Company 6th Battalion of Artillery.—Gunner Thomas Crawford being sworn, states—I was in the Sudder Bazar of Meerut; on the night of the 10th May 1857, between 5 and 6 o'clock, Gunners Dunn and Conolly were with me. Conolly was killed in the Sudder Bazar that evening; Dunn was wounded and is now at Delhi. We had passed through the bazar and were returning, when we saw natives rushing out of their houses shouting, we had got about thirty yards when they commenced throwing bricks, but we managed to get about half way through the bazar; when I was knocked down by a native with an iron, bound stick my companions were then ahead of me. I got about thirty or forty yards, when a chupprassie standing on the side of the street made a cut at me with his sword. I had lost my cap when I was first knocked down, and was thus wounded in the head, and again fell. I was battered about with clubs till they thought I was dead and left me. When I came to myself I got up, and after going about 100 yards or more I saw Dunn attacked by a number of natives, but could not see Conolly, the natives kept throwing stones at me, and did not follow me beyond the bridge, near the Roman Catholic chapel; Dunn had just got to the bridge and waited for me.

Q. Could you recognize the man whom you call a chupprassie and who wounded you?
A. No, I was too much stunned to do so.
Q. How do you know he was a chupprassie?
A. By the long blue coat, and he had a black belt with a brass plate; I do not recollect the colour of his pantaloons or his turban, but remarked the blue coat and brass plate.

No. 43.—Deposition of Gunner James Butler of the 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion Artillery.—Gunner James Butler being sworn, deposes as follows:—On the evening of the 10th May 1857 I was in the Sudder Bazar at Meerut. I am not quite sure of the time, but I think it was near 6. Gunners Cairns, Benson, and Corrigan were with me; we had passed the pop shop when we met a Christian Drummer of the Native regiment who told us to make to our lines as quick as we could, as the Native regiments had risen; we turned back, and Benson, who was leading, turned down a lane, thinking it would take us out of the bazar, but we found we could not get past, returned to the main street, and found it lined with natives armed with clubs, who struck at us when we passed. I soon missed my companions; I was often knocked down, but managed to get away, till I was attacked by two men, one was a policeman, the other I do not think was one, as he had no uniform on, the policeman I recognized, and he has been hung.

Q. Did any of the police come to your assistance?
A. No, not one.
Q. What became of your companions?
A. Cairns and Benson were killed in the bazar, and Corrigan was killed at the siege of Delhi.
No. 44.—Deposition of Mrs. Emma Markoe, widow of Pensioner John Markoe, of Meerut.—Mrs. Emma Markoe being sworn, states—That on the evening of the 10th of May, at a little after sunset, just about dusk, a mob of about 100 or more of natives, some armed with swords, weapons, and daggers, others with iron bound lates, rushed into my house, seeking a poor wounded artilleryman, who had taken refuge there, having received three severe wounds on the head and shoulders. I hid him in the corner, the mob seeing the bloody clothes, which had been taken off the poor man laying on a chair, took them up and threw them on me, saying he is hid here, show us the kafirs, we will kill the Feringees, enquiring also for my husband. They seized me, knocked me down, and tried to ill-treat me, on which I called out to my husband, seeing him rush out with a stick they fled. I got another stick, and we went out to shut the gate; whilst I was doing this, a man with a sword wounded me twice on the head, my husband put up his stick to save me, and his hand was cut; we then went back to the house, and hid in the bed-room, the mob broke open the gates and again entered the house. I persuaded my husband to get through the window and hide in the garden, the artilleryman followed him, the mob by that time got into the bed-room, I was knocked down by sticks, and so severely beaten, I fainted, away, how long I remained insensible I cannot say, but when I came to my senses I opened my eyes and saw the mob plundering my house; on their leaving the bed-room, I took the opportunity of getting out at the window; I could hardly walk, but went in search of my poor husband, and in a garden close to the wall of the house occupied by Mangul Sain, the portrait painter, I found his body; he had one leg hanging there till the next morning.

Q.—Could you recognise any of the party who attacked you?
A.—If I saw the pox marked chupprassie I think I could swear to him; he caught hold of my hand saying I only get four rupees as a chupprassie, is that enough to feed and clothe me, but we will now kill all the kafirs, making use of dreadful abuse against Christians.

Q.—Did you see any of the Cantonment Police with the mob?
A.—I could not swear to any, though I saw men dressed in blue coats with black belts, and I think reddish turbans.

Q.—Did you receive any assistance from the Cantonment Police?
A.—No, not one came to my assistance.

No. 45.—Deposition of Mrs. Elizabeth Cahill, widow of pensioner M. Cahill, of Meerut.—Mrs. Elizabeth Cahill being sworn states.—Between 5 and 6 o'clock of the evening of the 10th May 1857 I heard firing in the direction of the cavalry lines; a little after sunset, just as it was getting dusk, a large mob of natives, I should say more than 100, some with swords, others with iron bound lates, rushed into Mrs. Markoe's compound, where I was residing in one of her houses. I ran toward the gate to escape, but was met by the mob, and was seized by a chupprassie, who threatened to kill me with a dagger he had if I attempted to proceed further; he dragged me from the gate to my house about ten yards, and told me to give him up my keys. I replied my drawers were open, the mob rushed in, and commenced plundering; another chupprassie, who was with the mob, asked me if I would become a Mahomedan; to save my life I said I would; he tried to drag me into an empty room, but on my struggling against him, he ran me through the thigh with his sword; he then made a rush at Mrs. Markoe, and I ran out to try and get over the wall of the compound. A sikelgur made a cut at me and wounded my shoulder. A blacksmith, who lived close to me, took hold of my hand and helped me over the wall with Mrs. Millar, and hid us both in his house, where we remained till the next morning.
Q.—Could you recognize the two chupprassies?
A.—Yes, I could, the first man who attacked me was a short stout man, with very dark complexion; the second man, who stabbed me was pox marked, and of a lighter colour than the first.

Q.—Have you been able to trace these men?
A.—I went to Mr. Gee's and Mrs. Ludlam's to see their chupprassies, as they reside close at hand, and heard that Mr. Gee's Moonshee and two of his chupprassies had run away.

Q.—Did you see any of the cantonment police with the mob?
A.—I saw two or three men with blue coats, black leather waist belts, and red turbans, but cannot tell whether they belonged to the cantonment police.

Q.—Did the cantonment police afford you any assistance?
A.—No, not one, though a number of them are stationed within 100 yards of the place.

Q.—Where is the blacksmith that gave you shelter?
A.—He was hung for setting fire to Mrs. Markoe's house.

Q.—Has the siklegur, who wounded you, been recognized?
A.—No, there was, I hear, a number of them flogged and turned out of cantonments, if I saw him I would have him hung.

Q.—What has become of Mrs. Millar?
A.—She died twenty days after of her wounds.

No. 46.—Deposition of Mrs. E. Law, widow of the late Overseer James Law, of Meerut—Mrs. E. Law being sworn, deposes as follows:—On the night of the 10th May 1857, at a little past ten o'clock, just as my husband and myself had finished prayers, all of a sudden our house was broken into by a mob of some two or three hundred natives, armed with swords, spears, and clubs. We attempted to escape, they surrounded my husband, but I managed to get away, with a baby in my arms and fled towards cantonments. As I was escaping two men, both chupprassies in Government employ, one the son of the man who supplied us with milk and butter, and the other, chowkeedar of the school, debated about killing me, the first man said they had got quite enough in the house and was for allowing me to escape, but the other, who had on a red turban, was for killing me. Another mob of natives coming up at the time, these two men left me and returned to the house; they repeatedly struck and kicked me. In making my escape I received three wounds on the head, and a cut on my right arm. I met Sergeant Foster of the artillery, who took me to the artillery hospital.

My husband was murdered in the house and my youngest girl; the eldest girl was almost cut to pieces, but lived till the next morning, a boy was wounded, but recovered.

Q.—Did you see any of the cantonment police with the mob?
A.—When I first came out, I saw three men dressed in blue coats and red turbans that I thought were cantonment policemen, but I was so agitated at the time that I could not swear to them.

Q.—Did any of the cantonment police give you assistance?
A.—No, not one.

No. 47.—Deposition of William Foster, Drill Sergeant of the Artillery—Sergeant William Foster, being sworn, states—On the night of the 10th May I found Mrs. Law and escorted her into the artillery barrack; she was wounded—this was between 10 and 11 o'clock; about 1 or 2 A.M. of the 11th, I heard the noise of a large mob advancing from the sapper lines towards the
foot artillery barracks. They fired Drill Sergeant Storey's bungalow, and came towards the foot artillery barracks with torches. I called on five goolandazes recruits to aid me and beat the mob back; there were, I should say, about sixty or seventy natives, some of them had torches; they were armed with spears and clubs, except the men who headed them, about six, who were dressed in the police uniform. They had on blue coats, light yellow pantaloons, waist belts and plates; these had swords in their hands. The goolandazes shouting out, as if a reinforcement was at hand, made the mob throw down the property they were plundering from Sergeant Storey's bungalow and run. The policemen called on them to stay, and a man who was not in the police uniform dressed in clean white clothing, was very active and appeared to command; I should have taken him for a cotwal, or bazar chowdry. I took two prisoners, and made them over to Captain Light, who had come up by this time with some carabiniers and rifles. Captain Light ordered them to be made over to the native non-commissioned officers of the quarter-guard, until he had time to see about them.

Q.—Could you recognize and swear to the police that were with the mob?
A.—It is a hard thing to swear to men whilst engaged in a bustle, but the man in white, who appeared to command, and one of the men in police uniform, a tall awkward man, pox marked and swarthy, I could swear to, if I saw them.

Q.—What made you distinguish these two from the rest?
A.—The man in white spat at me and abused me, calling me ferringee soor; he cut at me with his sword, and the tall man in police uniform cut at me three or four times, but I being armed with a fursee, a long kind of battle-axe, taken in the Santhal war, he could not get at me.

No. 48.—Deposition of Sergeant William Harwood of H. M.'s 60th Rifles. Sergeant William Harwood states—On the night of the 10th May, I accompanied the troops to the sepoy lines, when the native regiments mutinied; on returning through the bazar, we found two bodies much mutilated; they still had their clothes on, but was almost cut to pieces.

The following morning, I accompanied the party sent out to reconnoitre; we moved down in the direction of the sepoy lines before we reached them; we found four bodies much disfigured by severe cuts, and wounds all over their bodies; they were partly dressed. After passing the lines, we went towards the jail, and found some eight bodies; one of them was a female; she was much cut about the body and breast, and in returning through the sudder bazar, two more were, I believe, picked up.

As we passed through the sudder bazar, it appeared partly deserted, but the city was densely crowded.

No. 49.—Deposition of John Green, a Native Christian, resident of Sirdhana.—On Sunday, the 10th of May, when the mutiny broke out, I was in the Meerut Sudder Bazar; about 6 p.m., suddenly the sounds of musketry and of a great uproar was heard from the lines of the native regiments; large volumes of smoke rose up; the people appeared amazed; I was also much astonished and moved on towards my house. A little beyond the Bisautee mosque, I saw four Europeans, two of them were in front, and two about forty paces behind; the former managed to get clear, but a police chowkedar stationed at the chowk, called out "kill the Europeans," stept forward, and struck one of them with his stick, on which hundreds of Koonjras and others followed his example, and he fell; the shop-keepers now commenced shutting up their shops; I saw the other European struck with sticks, but left the place immediately from fear; all night long I heard cries of "the Mahomedee flag has been raised, let all the Europeans be slain." Thrice the mob attempted to force my door, but were unable to do so, it being a strong one.
Q.—Could you recognize the police showkeeper, who first struck the European?
A.—Yes, I think I could; he was a Mahomedan of middling height, dark, with beard, wore a red turban, and had on a Government badge or churpash.
Q.—Is there any one else you recognized in the mob?
A.—I particularly noticed the showkeeper, but do not think I could recognize any of the mob. The shop-keepers were closing their shops.
Q.—Did you see anything more of the police?
A.—No, I remained in my house; I do not think I saw any of them.

No. 50.—Deposition of Joseph Henry Jones of Meerut.—On the 10th of May 1857, about half past 5 p.m., I left my house, which is situated near the old jail bungalow, No. 165, for evening divine service. I marked from the very moment I was out of my gate, that people were running from all directions towards the city, however, I did not take any notice, until I came near the Begum's bridge, where I asked a native, where and why people were running about, the man answered me in a most impertinent manner, saying, "what are we running for, the sepoys are killing the European soldiers, and no Feeringhee will be allowed to exist on the earth;" on hearing this, and the firing of musketry from the direction of the native infantry lines, I galloped back to my house; no body molested me, or said anything during my retreat. When I reached home, I found Bebee Lane there, a poor old woman, living near the Chamar Gate of the Meerut city, and her bylee in my compound. I told the sad news that brought me back to the people or my house. Bebee Lane on hearing me, offered to take all the females of my family in her bylee, saying, she would be responsible for their safety. I agreed, and thanked her for the kind offer, and she immediately took my wife, my wife's grandmother and aunt to her house, where they were quite safe. I remained at home to see the result of the outbreak. No sooner had my family left the compound, than I saw a great number of troopers galloping towards the new jail; some had their uniforms and accoutrements on, some without, and drawn swords in their hands; on seeing this strange and sudden outbreak, I at once left my house for the garden attached to it, thinking I might be able to conceal myself under some tree, but this plan was soon interrupted by my seeing a trooper and some natives chasing an European, very likely a soldier, who took his way towards the jail; when the jail guard also rushed out, exclaiming "maro kafir ko," he was at last surrounded and killed; I saw his body, the head was separated. I then took refuge in a sweeper's house in my neighbourhood; the headman Seeta was absent at his village in the Boolundsher district some days before the outbreak, but his wife very kindly gave shelter to me and my brother; we remained there till it got dark, then we got out into our compound again; my brother sat for a short time in the garden, and then one of our gardeners (a Jeypoor Chamar) took him to a man's house of his own caste; there he was safely kept for the whole night. About 7 o'clock, a party consisting of jail guards and escaped convicts, the former about six or seven in number, and the latter about fifty, came in the compound, making a great noise and firing muskets; the jail guard were all armed with firelocks and headed by one Namdar Khan, Duffadar of the same guard, saying to the prisoners, their fetters were cut by my seeing a trooper and some natives chasing an European, very likely a soldier, who took his way towards the jail; when the jail guard also rushed out, exclaiming "maro kafir ko," he was at last surrounded and killed; I saw his body, the head was separated. 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Namdar Khan questioned my servant, Mafadeen, who only kept for the whole night. About 7 o'clock, a party consisting of jail guards and escaped convicts, the former about six or seven in number, and the latter about fifty, came in the compound, making a great noise and firing muskets; the jail guard were all armed with firelocks and headed by one Namdar Khan, Duffadar of the same guard, saying to the prisoners, their fetters were cut by the brave fouj (army), it were better to do something before going to their respective homes. Namdar Khan questioned my servant, Mafadeen, who only kept for the whole night. 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Q.—Did you see anything more of the police?
A.—No, I remained in my house; I do not think I saw any of them.
the house. The party then went inside, and took what suited them. Namdar Khan had a bundle under his arm, rode my mare himself, and offered my carriage horse to another Nujjeeb of his guard, setting fire to my carriage worth Rupees 400 and to my bungalow. Both my horses were valuable, the mare worth Rupees 300, and the horse Rupees 200. Another mob followed them; I recognized them as Khoormaah, and other people with some policemen, nearly all Mahomedans, shouting “Ali, Ali, aj marlia haie kafron ko;” in them were recognized Mungul Khan and Peer Khan, chowkedars; my faithful servant went again near them, and assured them that I was not at home; these plunderers also robbed my property and set fire again to the house, which was not burnt down when fired by the jail party; a third mob also came; they were Lodhas mostly; among them was recognized Munphoolla, a converted Moosulman; he had a sepoys musket with bayonet on, and one Bussunta, Lodha, and some people, chowkedars; they committed the same depredation as the two first mobs did. I at last thought best to leave my compound, and go where my family had gone, as there was no end of the insurgents coming into the compound. I jumped over my compound wall, disguised by my servant’s “chudder.” I wanted to go and see the fate of my relation, Mr. John Arot, horse merchant, but when I came near the bungalow of Bebee Parbuttee, I saw almost every Lodha, both of Boolaki Mundee and Uthtaraghur, standing armed near the police chowkee. I saw a corpse lying there, which I believe was that of Mrs.———; the natives were laughing, and about seven paces from there was poor Mr. Hughes, a Government pensioner (formerly clerk of the Mouzaffernugger Magistracy), lying dead in native clothes, which Moonshi Usur Ali gave him, that he might be saved. Mr. Hughes had cuts on his hands and neck. I could not go any further, and seeing the case of Mr. Hughes, that he was murdered even in native clothes, I took my way to the city, passing the compound of the kotee called elephant sergeant’s; near it I saw the corpses of two women and a man, all Europeans; I believe he belonged to the Engineering Department; the women were shamefully treated, their clothes were burnt. I remained there till day light, when my chowkees came and asked me to accompany him to his village for a day. I consented and went with him to his house, in the village of Panchlee, where I remained three days; he was a servant of mine of course, but other men of the village also treated me with kindness and supplied my wants. The Meerut police acted most shamefully throughout; in no case was life saved or property secured by them; they themselves were as deeply engaged in acts of riot as the mutineers and insurgents. Mr. John Greson, of Sirdhana, who happened to be here on the 10th May, told me that he saw some sudder kotwalle chowkedars beating European soldiers with clubs, and he thinks killed one of them in his presence. The police failed to exert themselves in recovering plundered property, for I know I lost all I had, but nothing has been recovered.

No. 51.—Deposition of Angelina Hughes, widow of the late pensioner Hughes, resident of Cantonment Meerut, Chowkee No. 5.—On the 10th of May about 7 P.M., upwards of 300 men (Lodhas, Chumars, Pulladars, butchers, rebel sepoys, and policemen) attacked my house, situated near the elephant sheds, seized Usur Ali, owner of the house, and used violence to make him point out the Christians; a little before the attack, he had disguised and concealed us. Upon his replying, none were there, they searched the house; my husband had fled; I afterwards heard he had been murdered by the tomb of Aboe. They plundered property to the amount of Rupees 1,200, and burnt the bungalow. Notwithstanding his heavy loss on our account, Usur Ali, at my request, took me with his wife to the city, and kept us there.

Q.—Did you recognize any of the police engaged in the attack on your house?

A.—I only recognized Mohiboolla, who lived in our neighbourhood.

Q.—Did none of the police give you any assistance?

A.—No, none of them helped us at all. Usur Ali fed and protected us, to the best of his ability.
No. 52.—Deposition of Usgur Ali, son of Syud Akber Ali, resident of Meerut Cantonment, age thirty years.—On the 10th of May last, when the insurrection commenced, 3 or 400 Lodhas, Chamars, Pulladars and sepoys attacked my bungalow, caught me, and asked where the Christians were, who lived in my house. I replied, none live there, upon which one of them, whose name I do not know, struck me with his stick, and another drew his sword, but I would not point out the Christians. I disguised them in native clothes, hid them in a field, and myself separately; they robbed me and burnt my bungalow. At the request of Mrs. Hughes, I took her to the town, not knowing where her husband was, but heard three days after that he had been murdered near the tomb of Aboo.

Q.—Amongst the mob did you see any of the police?
A.—Yes, I saw two men in police uniform, but do not know their names; if the police were not implicated would they not assist us.

Q.—Describe the two men.
A.—Amongst the plunderers, I recognized two in police uniform; I do not know their names, but can describe their persons, and also that of another, named Mohiboolla, who lived near my house, and broke my iron box, with the assistance of others; if he were taken, he would give you full information of all that occurred.

Hindoo, age about twenty-eight years, fair, broad forehead, wide eyebrows, long nose, corpulent, middling height, small mustachos; wore a blue coat, had on a dhotee, armed with a sword.

Mussulman, tawney complexion, broad forehead, lean cheeks, long nose, whisker with a beard, thin, age about thirty-five years, were a blue anga, yellow trowsers, with a doputta on head, and staff in his hand.

Mohiboolla, yellowish colour, broad forehead, wide eyebrows, tall and fat, age about twenty years.

No. 53.—Deposition of Sudasook, Malie.—On the 10th of May 1857, I was on the top of Usgur Ali's house, in which Mrs. Angelina Hughes lived; about 6 o'clock twelve or thirteen sowars, and a mob consisting of Chamars, Lodhas and Police chuprassies, came and took Usgur Ali prisoner, and asked him who lived in the house; he told them that there were no Europeans there, only natives; they then set fire to the house and let Usgur Ali go. He and two ladies were hid in the garden under a tree.

Q.—Did you recognize any policemen in the mob?
A.—No, but I saw Chadie, Punsarie, and Mumpholla, Chamar, and Chudda, Bunia.

Q.—How far is the police chowkee from your house?
A.—I do not know.

Q.—How did you know that there were policemen in the mob?
A.—Because there were men who had on the police uniform and breast plates.

Q.—What did they do, and how many of them were there?
A.—I do not know; there was a great crowd of them.

Q.—Were any of the Lodhas that lived before your house in the mob?
A.—Being frightened, I went and sat down a good distance off, and could not distinguish any of them.

No. 54.—Deposition of Baboo Cylash Chunder Ghose, resident of Jakanabad.—I was in my shop behind the Cotwalie, in the Sudder Bazar, about 6 o'clock in the evening; hearing a great uproar I went into my shop, shut the door and sat down, warning the chowkeldars of my house to be on the alert.
In the middle of the night, a mob of about 150 men came to my house, broke open the lock and entered, where I, Prosono Coomar Baboo, and Issan Singhee, since returned to Cawnpoor, Kulian (chowkeedar) a Lodha, who is in the city, another bearer, a Brahmin, my servants (now gone home) were present; as the mob entered, I ran out and went to a tailor's, who lives in the Sudder Bazar; Prosono Coomar went up a tree and concealed himself. The mob burnt the roof of one house, set fire to the office, spilt the wine, and burnt the cases in which it was kept, plundered the plates and money, and smashed all the glass doors; when my chowkeedar went and reported it to the Cotwal, Dhumna Sing, he with about twenty-eight men came to the gate and called out, who are there, upon which the mob immediately dispersed. The Cotwal did not make any prisoners, nor take any further notice of it. This I heard from my chowkeedar when I returned.

Q.—Did you hear of what persons the mob consisted?
A.—I heard from my chowkeedar that they were Goojurs.

No. 55.—Deposition of Kulian Chowkeedar, in service of Coylash Chunder Ghose, a resident of Meerut.

Q.—Where were you on the 10th of May, when the mutiny broke out?
A.—I was at Baboo Coylash Chunder's, for I was his chowkeedar.
Q.—State truly what you saw on that day?
A.—At 6 o'clock the mutiny broke out, I was in the house, shut the gate and went inside; at midnight, a mob of about 150 men broke open the gate, entered the compound, they then commenced plundering the property. I saw a very large mob, and was, therefore, unable to do anything. I went and reported it to the Cotwal, who sent four men with me, and himself following a short time after with about twelve more and turned the mob out, who had, however, plundered the property before he arrived.

Q.—What sort of men did the mob consist of?
A.—Goojurs, Jats, and other villagers.
Q.—Could you recognize the policemen that came with the Cotwal?
A.—I recognized Bahar, a Mussulman, but no others.
Q.—Did the Cotwal rescue any property and return it to you?
A.—None.

No. 56.—Deposition of Hurnam Singh, Mahajun, resident of Meerut.

On Sunday, the 10th of May, at about 6 P.M., I, Kulian Sing, and some others, whose names I do not remember, were sitting as usual in front of my door, when all at once, some sowars of the 3rd Light Cavalry rode up without saddles, bare headed and armed with drawn swords and pistols, crying out, "Babas, this war is in the cause of religion, whoever likes to join, come along with us," uttering which, they passed on to the Shahrah gate.

Observing this with fear and dread, I went inside, locked up the doors and got on the roof of my house; the noise and disturbance now became tremendous; every one shut up their houses and went on the roofs.

We now-heard the sounds of musketry from the direction of cantonments and the jail, and it was rumoured that the sepoys had mutinied. At sunset, fires were seen, and we heard of the customs house being burnt. By this time the sowars that had gone towards the Shahrah gate, returned with about seventy or eighty convicts in prison uniform; on the arrival of whom a great uproar ensued; meanwhile, came a mob of bad characters, comprising Mahomedans, Pulladars from the gunge, and another of butchers with stones, came from the Goorzeey-shouting, Yah Ali! Yah Ali! part of whom went through the Kamboh gate towards the Sudder Bazar, and part to the tehsil; great noise and tumult now arose on all sides, and fires appeared in every direction.
The sowars were roving about, saying they had burnt cantonments, destroyed the Electric Telegraph, and the British dominion had ceased to exist, which declaration caused great alarm in the city. After two hours, the same bad characters, who had accompanied the sowars, returned laden with booty, the butchers taking bullocks along; this continued all night.

The next morning it was found that the Europeans were all in the Dumdumma, and making arrangements for restoring order; this frightened the rioters, so that two or three days after they threw out all the plunder they had acquired, easing some before the doors of respectable men's houses; all property thus recovered was carried into the Dumdumma. A few days afterwards, some of the bad characters went off to Delhi, some escaped, and others remained here.

Q.—Did you recognize any of the bad characters.
A.—I looked attentively at them, but do not remember all their names. I could, however, recognize by their faces, Chunda, Mussulman, Boolakée, Ghessa, Chunda, Nathooa and Nunoah, butchers of the city, with moodas and dhotees round their loins, together with several others, composing a large multitude, roving about shouting Yaub All1 These very bad characters wounded the Mahajuns, Lalla Nund Ram and Rahtoo Mull (while coming from a village) with sticks and swords; they reached their houses with the greatest difficulty.

All these things Kalyan Singh and myself saw from the top of my house.

Q.—Did you hear anything more about the mutiny?
A.—After the mutiny it was disclosed that a little before it occurred, a sowar of the 3rd Light Cavalry rumoured it about that 2,000 sets of iron chains had been prepared for the sepoyos, and that the European soldiers and artillery would come to imprison them; this report caused the revolt, and made the sepoyos fly without any previous preparation.

Q.—When and how did you hear this?
A.—One or two days after the revolt occurred it was much talked of, that rumours without foundation had ruined the sepoyos, but I do not know who mentioned this.

Q.—Could you recognize any of the bad characters, Pulladars and butchers?
A.—Yes, I could recognize them, if they were here; many of the respectable city people saw them, but are afraid to disclose who they were.

No. 57.—Deposition of Kalyan Singh, Mahajun, resident of Meerut.—On Sunday at about 6 p.m., while sitting before my shop, all at once some five or six cavalry sowars came on horseback with drawn swords and pistols, calling out in a loud voice, "this war is in the cause of religion, whoever wishes to join, may come along with us," uttering which, they went towards the Shahrah gate; getting alarmed, I closed up my shop and went to the roof. Great confusion now arose in the city, the inhabitants shut up their houses, and got on the flat roofs. After a while, the sound of musketry came from the direction of cantonments, and it was rumoured that the sepoyos had multiplied; fires were also seen in the same direction, and the customs house was burning. The sowars who had just previously gone to the Shahrah gate now returned with a large multitude of prisoners and bad characters; the noise and disturbance lasted all night.

Q.—Give particulars of what you saw, and how you recognized the prisoners?
A.—They wore the usual prison uniform, and those who accompanied them were Mahomedans, butchers, Pulladars, &c., of the city, shouting, Ali! Ali! Our religion has revived. The Pulladars were chiefly those of Khoorja. I, moreover, heard that the cantonment had been reduced to ashes; the telegraphs destroyed, and the British rule overthrown.
Q.—What did the mobs do?

A.—Some were running towards the tehsil, and some towards the Sudder Bazar; after two or three hours they returned, the Pulladars of Khoorja, carrying loads of plundered property on their heads, and each of the butchers driving five or six bullocks.

Q.—Did you recognize any of them?

A.—I saw numbers of bad characters, but do not recollect their names; many of them are not now in the city. I might, however, recognize some of them, if they were brought forward. Chanda, Mussulman, Gheesa, and Boola-khee, butchers, frequently passed by the place where I was standing. They had sticks in their hands, wore moondasas, and were walking about, making a great noise.

The next day the civil administration resumed its usual course; the bad characters, getting alarmed, began throwing out the plundered property into bye-lanes and streets, all which was collected and taken before the authorities.

Some of the bad characters fled to Delhi, and others went wherever they best could. We were much alarmed at this sudden revolt, but happily some four days after, the Commissioner came and talked encouragingly to the inhabitants, who as usual derived much comfort and assurance from his conversation.

Q.—Did you hear anything before the outbreak?

A.—No, nothing, but that the sepoys had shouting refused to bite the cartridges, and were in consequence imprisoned. After the mutiny, I heard that a few hours previously a sowar had set it about that 2,000 sets of irons were being prepared for the sepoys, and that the European soldiers and artillery were coming to deprive them of their arms and ammunition. Hearing which, the sepoys broke out into mutiny; all this I learnt after the outbreak.

No. 58.—Deposition of Buttun Lall, Mahajun, resident of Meerut.—On the day of the outbreak, I was at my zamindaree village, called Sullapore, about fourteen miles from this, and about 5 P.M. went in a bullock cart; we reached Mouzah Galahur about 7 P.M., and near a well met a number of men, chiefly camp-followers of the 3rd Cavalry flying precipitately; we enquired what had happened, and why they were flying; some of them replied that the troops at Meerut had mutinied, fighting was going on, and the station burning, and advised us not going there. We tried to stop some one, from whom to obtain information, but none would stay nor return to bring us news, so fearing the destruction of my house, I went forward, and shortly after saw a long way off prisoners hurrying away with irons on; I knew them to be such by the jingling of their fetters. I hurried on and reached Meerut, and saw numbers of persons flying, but could not recognize any of them.

When I reached Smithgunge, I saw great confusion and excitement, and observed about twenty or twenty-five sowars, some dressed and others not, going out of the city. I also saw a crowd of about 300 men, consisting of bad characters, Mussulmans and Pulladars of Koorja, shouting Ali ! Ali! They bid me stop the cart, and when I would not, seized the bullocks, and began using their swords; I received a cut on my left arm, another which took off the great toe of my right foot, and a third that struck me on the head; Nund Ram also received some blows from sticks, the driver now hurried us home.

We found the doors of all respectable people’s houses shut, and the bad characters roving about the streets. I lay unconscious all the night, but had my wounds dressed the next day by a Native Doctor.

Q.—Could you recognize any of the bad characters?

A.—I recognized many of the Pulladars, but do not know their names.
No. 59.—Deposition of Ram Nath, son of Binda Mull, resident of Sudder Bazar, Meerut.—On the 10th of May, Sunday, at about 5½ o'clock, I was realizing my money as usual; all at once the sepoys ran from the Sudder Bazar, and it was noise that the native regiments had mutinied; hearing this, I ran to my shop in the gunge, as I had money with me, and closed the doors; at about 6 o'clock, eight or ten sepoys passed over the Begum's bridge (two of them were in uniform but had muskets) to their lines from the direction of lutha guard; meanwhile, the sound of firing was heard, and conflagrations were seen; I was much surprised. The bungalow of the European leather dealer was set on fire. The tumult increased; I saw a crowd of about 150 budmashis coming from the direction of the Sudder Bazar, headed by two or three sepoys, with torches in their hands; eight or ten rushed into the gunge, and passed through the south gate; seeing this, I went inside of the shop. I recognized Mowla Buksh, butcher, Kalunder, dyer, and Khoda Buksh, Pulladar, who were shouting, maro, maro, breaking to pieces the lanterns they met with; I kept quiet and sat in my shop. At about 10 o'clock I was going to my house; outside of the gunge I met Deen Mahomed, jemadar of the kotwali, and requested him to take me to my house; he said, go, I am watching you; moreover he mentioned that just then a gang of plunderers had rushed into the Baboo's house, situated near the old chukla; the kotwal with Deen Mahomed and some 30 chowkedsars went to the house and turned out the plunderers. I heard the next day from Ausud Ali, Duffadar, that the budmashes took Rupees 200 from the Baboo, and that Beharee Chupprassie wounded one of them.

Q.—Did any one else recognize the budmashes that were plundering in the Sudder Bazar?

A.—That day the budmashes treated some of the natives so disgracefully that it is well known to almost all. All the police must have recognized the plunderers, who staid a long while at the Baboo's place, and took money from him. Jumna, goldsmith, whose house is situated close to the Baboo's, knows the matter. I also heard a Moonshee was killed at the camel sheds.

Q.—Did you hear anything of how the revolt commenced?

A.—After the outbreak, I heard that some one came from the direction of the bridge, calling out that the Europeans were coming to take away the magazine; hearing this, the sepoys ran from the Sudder, and great was the confusion and bustle.

No. 60.—Deposition of Babee Sahay, Mahajun, resident of Meerut, Sudder Bazar.—On Sunday, 10th of May, between 5 and 6 o'clock, four sowars came from the direction of the lutha guard, shouting out, they had broken open the jail, and burnt the cantonments, and then galloped on towards the Sudder Bazar; shortly after, four or five sepoys came from the direction of the Pay Master's Office, crying out they had burnt all the bungalows; they were followed by a crowd of fifty or sixty men, shouting, Ali! Ali! On seeing this, I put out the light of my shop, closed it up, and sat inside.

I could not recognize of whom the crowd was composed, but it appeared to consist of Goojurs, butchers, Pulladars, and others, and was headed by Kulun, alias Kulunder, a dyer. I do not know where he at present may be.

Q.—Were the policemen present at their posts?

A.—Up to 9 o'clock I saw none of them, after which, on going home, I found them patrolling as usual. The next morning I heard that some bad characters assembled at the house of a Bengali during that night, and created great disturbance; on hearing of which, the kotwal and policemen went there, so they might perhaps have recognised some of them.

No. 61.—Deposition of Bhuywan Dass, resident of the Sudder Bazar, Meerut.—On Sunday, 10th of May, at about 6 o'clock, I was sitting in my shop, when suddenly a great noise arose, and I heard that fighting had taken place between the European and native troops.
Meanwhile, a sound of firing was heard from the direction of the native infantry lines, on which I closed my shop; at about 7 P.M. fires were seen, and I observed two or three sowars coming from the direction of the lutchi guard, with drawn swords and in uniform, shouting, “our fight is for the cause of religion,” they then went off.

At the same time, four or five sepoys with a mob of bad characters appeared in the direction of Begum’s bridge, shouting Yah! Ali, Ali, maro, maro, and breaking off all the lamps along the road, a great many fires now broke out on all sides. The bungalow that stands in the rear of the gunge being set on fire, I informed its owner of the same, fearing it might approach the gunge; but he replied, he must remain quiet, as he could not help it.

Q.—What class of men were these bad characters?

A.—They appeared to be low people, such as pulladars, milkmen, cobblers, &c.

Q.—Did you recognize any of them?

A.—I saw Molla Buksh, Musulman, resident of the old bazar, Khoda Buksh, pulladar, and several others, whom I recognized at the time, but whose names I have forgotten, having, however, once seen them I could mark them again.

Q.—Were policemen present in the gunge at the time?

A.—Only one policeman was posted at the gunge, and he was absent.

Q.—Did you hear of anything having been plotted before the outbreak?

A.—I heard nothing of the kind.

Q.—Did you see anything more?

A.—After 10 P.M. I saw Deen Mahomed, jemadar, and some burkundazes coming towards the gunge patrolling.

No. 62.—Deposition of Boodh Singh, resident of Sudder Bazar, Meerut.—On the 10th of May I was sitting at the shop of my master between 5 and 6 P.M., at once it was noised about that the native regiments had mutinied; hearing this, the sepoys who were walking in the bazar ran towards their lines; I heard also that the Kotwally guard made off to their regiment; after a while, a sound of firing was heard from the direction of the native lines, and the budmashes were running about; seeing this I quietly sat on the chaboota of my shop. About 7 P.M., some sepoys and two or four sowars of the 3rd Light Cavalry, accompanied by a crowd of budmashes, rushed out of the bazar, shouting, Ali, Ali! The sepoys were saying that they had murdered the Europeans, burnt the cantonment, cut the electric telegraph wire, broke open the jail, released the prisoners, and cut off their fetters, and whoever wished could go and help them; uttering this, they passed on towards the bridge through Dal-ki-mundee; after a while they returned the same way they had gone, and made a rush towards the Kotwally through the Sudder Bazar. The whole night the budmashes were carrying away bundles of things on their heads.

Q.—Where did these budmashes come from?

A.—The budmashes were chiefly pulladars, koonjras, butchers, and cobblers of Sudder Bazar.

Q.—Besides them who else were concerned in the riot?

A.—After 9 or 10 P.M. the villagers of the neighbouring villages rushed in.

Q.—Did you recognize any of them?

A.—Nanno, pulladar, a great scamp, was at the head of the crowd; he has since been hung, and his father, Lushkerry, and Munwa and several others, whom I recognized, but I do not know how many of them fled; if they were here, I should be able to recognize them.
Q.—What did the police do that night?
A.—Nothing was done by them, they were equally running about.
Q.—Were the police present as usual in Dal-ki-mundee?
A.—None were present there.
Q.—Did you see anything more?
A.—From fear I did not go out of my shop; however, I heard that in
rear of the Deputy Collector's house, opposite the door of Mohun, cobbler,
Mrs. Courtney was murdered, many such matters occurred, and many bunga-
lows were set on fire, even the bungalow situated near the gungé was set on
fire; the tenants sent word to the owner that the bungalow was burning, and
probably the fire would approach our gungé, I replied it could not be helped.
Q.—Has any one else recognized those budmashes?
A.—Many must have seen them. I heard the following day that a crowd
of budmashes went over the house of a Bengali, living behind the old chukla.
At the same time Ussud Ali (I do not know whether he is an officer or a
chowkedar), being accompanied with other policemen, went after them. The
said Bengali offered Rupees 200 to the budmashes. The police will be able to
describe it fully, as they were eye-witnesses of the fact. Moreover, Jumna,
goldsmith, resident of the same mohalla, has seen them all, as they passed his
house. The inhabitants in that direction must have recognized them; for the
budmashes stayed a long while there.
Q.—Did you hear how this disturbance commenced in the Sudder Bazar?
A.—After the outbreak, I was told that some sepoys or sowars came
running from the direction of the Regimental Bazar; they cried out that Euro-
peans and guns were coming to take away the magazine Cram the native
regiments; hearing this, as many sepoys as were walking in the Budder Bazar, pre-
cipitately ran towards their lines, and at once the disturbance commenced.
Q.—Where is Mohun, cobbler, in front of whose door Mrs. Courtney was
murdered?
A.—Mohun, cobbler, and his son, Mya Ram, are living in Naipoora.

No. 63.—Deposition of Soondur Dass, merchant, resident of Meerut.—On
Sunday, the 10th of May 1857, I was in my shop in the Sudder Bazar, when
the guard of the kotwally ran away, at about half past 6 o'clock. I then took
my family to our house in the city, where we shut ourselves up.
Q.—Did you lose anything by the mutiny?
A.—Yes, a house (No. 173) was burnt and a good deal of property, about
5 or 6,000 rupees worth plundered, and besides two banghies or clotb, which
were with Eshur, son-in-law of Buddree Dass, my partner.
Q.—At what time, in what place, and by whom, were these four bundles
plundered, and who saw them taken?
A.—On the 11th May 1857, at about 8 o'clock in the morning, they were
plundered behind the camel shed. I believe the plunderers were goojurs,
chamars, and bad characters. Eshur Buldeo, a tailor, and Kuloo and Bul-
dewa, two bearers, who carried the bundles, saw them seized, one of the bearers
has gone away, and the other may have obtained employment in the city since
then.
Q.—Did you report this to the Kotwal?
A.—No.
Q.—Why not?
A.—Because I knew others must have lost their property, and yet had not
reported it, therefore I did not.
Q.—Do you know any other person who lost his property?
A.—No.
No. 64.—Deposition of Eshur, a merchant, resident of Puttealla.—On the 11th of May 1857, the day after the mutiny, about 8 o'clock in the morning, I took four bundles of clothes from my shop in the Sudder Bazar to the city; Buldeo tailor was with me; when we arrived behind the camel sheds, a mob consisting of about 150 men, chiefly Mahomedans and Goorjurs, met us and plundered all that we had; both myself and my bearers, who carried the bundles, were struck two or three times by them; I ran away to the city.

Q.—Did you recognize any person in the mob?
A.—I was frightened and could not recognize any one.

Q.—Did the bearers remain, or did they run away also?
A.—They both accompanied me to the city.

Q.—Did you report this to the Kotwall?
A.—No, I did not.

Q.—Why?
A.—Because I knew other men must have lost their property, yet did not report it.

Q.—Tell the names of those who lost their property?
A.—I do not know the names of any.

Q.—Name the bearers and where they now are?
A.—Kuloo is in the city, but I do not know where Buldeo is.

No. 65.—Deposition of Sauta Singh, chupprassie, being sworn, he deposes. That on the 10th of May, Sunday, at about 5½ P.M. a sepoy came to the guard in the Sudder Bazar, talking with them quietly and gently, but on returning to his lines told them aloud, should anybody detain them, not to mind; very soon after his going the sepoys of the guard began to load their muskets. The men of the Kotwally and neighbourhood were surprised at this, but ventured: not to ask them the cause of it; meanwhile, firing commenced, and it was noticed that the native regiments had mutinied, the sepoys of the guard made off to their lines, bidding salam to the Kotwal, saying they were going away, and whosoever wished to accompany them, should not let the opportunity slip; two or three prisoners convicted for some crime lost no time in doing so. meantime, great tumult and uproar rose around. Dhuuna Singh, ordered his subordinates to be on the alert, as there was a disturbance, so nearly thirty or forty men prepared themselves. We heard that the sepoys who had just left the guard, shot two Christians near the adda of bearers, but none went to see them; also this time crowds of budmashes, consisting of butchers, koornjas, and pulladars, &c., in dirty clothes began to rush out of their houses, and moved on towards the lines. Dhuuna Singh ordered all the chowkeedars to sit under the tiled roof and not to stand outside, we acted accordingly; at about 8 or 9 P.M. a man came from the house of a Bengali, situated at the back of the Kotwally, behind the chukla of prostitutes, and said that the budmashes and village people had set fire to the Bengali's house, and were plundering his property; hearing this, Dhuuna Singh called as many as were present there, and ordered them to accompany him to the house of the Bengali, they all went with him, met with opposition, and swords were drawn on both sides Dhuuna Singh asked them who and what they were, they contemptuously asked him who he was, he replied, he was Dhuuna Singh; they said, he was in the rifle bazar, why did he come here, Dhuuna Singh told them that the Kotwal had been suspended for bribery, and he was acting for him, Dhuuna Singh then told them to be off; they said, if their man who was put in the stocks at the Kotwally were released and allowed to go away with his things, they would be off. Dhuuna Singh strictly prohibited his police from drawing swords against his friend, and sent a man to the Kotwalie; after a while, the prisoner came with his things, e.g., one horse, one inkstand, one sword, Dhuuna Singh made over his things to them and liberated the prisoner. They went towards the shootor khana, and Dhuuna Singh returned to the Kotwally and sent guards consisting of four chowkeedars and one officer to patrol the bazar.
Q.—Who was the prisoner liberated by Dhunna Singh, and why was he apprehended?

A.—I do not recollect his name, he was apprehended on the evening of the revolt, and was brought by an officer and some chowkideers to the Kotwally; he was put in the stocks by order of Dhunna Singh, and his property kept in the Kotwally.

Q.—Do you know who he was, and what was his caste and profession?

A.—As it was dark, I was unable to know who and what he was.

Q.—Who else followed Dhunna Singh to the Bengali's house?

A.—Juswunt Khan, jemadar, Deen Mahomed, jemadar, Assud Ali, duffadar, these three deserted; Mooktar Khan, duffadar, Sheechurun Sookul, duffadar, these are present in the Kotwally, Punchum Singh, and Beharee Singh, chupprasses, Sewa Singh, Binda Singh, Dabee Singh, Babee Ali, and Kauta Singh, chowkideers, deserted and several others, whose names I do not remember, followed Dhunna Singh to the house of the Bengali.

Q.—Can you trace out the man who was imprisoned in the Kotwally?

A.—I will endeavour to trace him out.

Q.—Who else do you think can describe the prisoner?

A.—I think Mooktar Khan, duffadar, will be able to give you particulars regarding the man, as he generally had charge of all the prisoners in the Kotwally, and most probably Kunhya Lall, mohurir, who is now transferred to the artillery bazar chowkey, knows about him.

Q.—Who attacked the Baboo's house and took the prisoner from Dhunna Singh?

A.—I could not recognize them, but they appeared to be budmashes and goojurs of the surrounding villages; had they not been goojurs, how could they recognize Dhunna Singh, who was of the same tribe.

Q.—It is said that the Baboo gave some money to the plunderers, and that Beharee Singh wounded one of them, they also staid a long while talking with Dhunna Singh, can you not give a minute account of the above circumstances?

A.—I know nothing of the offer of money to the plunderers, but I heard from Assud Ali, jemadar, that Beharee Singh, chupprasee, wounded one of them with his sword.

Q.—Can information regarding those plunderers be obtained from anyone?

A.—Information regarding them could have been had from the goojur police, as they must have recognized them, but I regret to say, that all of this tribe have deserted.

Q.—Why did you not state all this in your reply taken on the 4th of January 1858?

A.—For fear I did not state the truth, besides all of us unanimously decided to depose to the same things, that is to say, that we were all patrolling and knew nothing of the disturbance, therefore I was also obliged to state in my reply what they had deposed, so that no discrepancy might appear.

Q.—During the night that the budmashes were plundering, did you recognize any of them?

A.—At about 11 p.m. all was over at the Baboo's place, we, viz., Mookhtar Khan, duffadar, being accompanied with some chowkideers, proceeded towards the Nai Bazar, there we met Luchman Singh, chupprasee of abukary, who told Mookhtar Khan, duffadar, that a European leather dealer and his wife were hid in his house, therefore I took great care of this part of the bazar, the duffadar whispered in my ears the above circumstance, ordering me to take great care of them and let nobody know about it, and that he would also now and then patrol to this side. The whole night I took care of them, did not stir from my place, therefore I was unable to seek out any of the budmashes during the night. On the morrow I apprehended about 16 men with plundered property near the kothee of Mahomed Sadig, and brought them to the Kotwally.
Q.— Were they punished?
A.— The Cotwal appropriated the plundered property, and let the plunderers go.

No. 66.—Deposition of Laik Ram, chowkeedar, at Chowkie No. 4.—I do not recollect the precise date when the mutiny occurred, about nine months ago, some Sunday after 6 P.M. Sounds of musketry were heard in the direction of the infantry lines; hearing the firing, the sepoys ran away with their pouches and muskets, leaving behind their bedding. A little before this, a sepoy came to the Cotwally guard, and after he left the sepoys armed themselves. News came on of the mutiny of sepoys; Dhunna Singh ordered the chupprassies not to stir from their places.

Meanwhile, two sepoys without uniform came to the shops of Sahib Singh and Hoolas Roy with arms accompanied by a crowd of 200 men, and demanded money from the shop-keepers (the owners went up-stairs); the servants told them that they had no money; at last Nund Ram, son of Sahib Singh, gave them seven rupees, then the sepoys went to the shop of Ram Hoolas, but I do not know what they got there; they demanded from other tradesmen by the help of the butchers, Palladars, &c., of the Sudder Bazaar; at this time Dhunna Singh concealed himself close to the house of Hingun Khan, Cotwal, who called him out. The sepoys made off, but the budmashes continued plundering. At about 9 P.M., only twenty men were present in the Cotwally, the others were absent; Dhunna Singh ordered them on patrolling duty; Ram Narain, Dabee Singh, chowkeedars, Juswunt Khan, jemadar, and myself came to the chowk, where we met a butcher galloping past. The horse was valuable, and appeared to have belonged to some European; we took them to the Cotwali (Dhunna Singh), who made them over to Mookhtar Khan, duffadar (now jemadar); the horse was tied up under a peepul tree, and the rider was placed in custody. Dhunna Singh said, why are you making arrests, what will you have me struggle up. After a while, we caught a Goojur; he had a horse of some European, a sword, an inkstand, a bundle of papers. At about 10 P.M. a crowd of Goorjurs, armed with swords and gundassa and lathees, came in through the kutra gate, although the tradesmen, Juswunt Khan, jemadar, and his police, who were eight in number including myself, tried to prevent them; we followed them; they came first to the shop of Sadiq, merchant, and wished to break off the doors. We asked the chowkeedars of the said merchant, where their pistols and matchlocks were, and to call their masters; hearing this, the Goorjurs drew their swords against us; one of us ran to call Dhunna Singh; the Goorjurs returned towards the bazar, and came to the house of BIBOO Beerbul; we returned to the Cotwally; meanwhile a servant of the Baboo Beerbul came into the Cotwally and reported that the Baboo's house had been set on fire, and his property plundered; hearing this, Dhunna Singh having taken eighteen or twenty men with him, went over to the house of the Baboo, and saw it burning on one side and plundering going on at the other; Dhunna Singh forbade them, on which swords were drawn on both sides; two of the Goorjurs were wounded; one was wounded by B-sharee Singh, chupprassie, and the other received a cut by Dabee Singh, since deserted. The Goorjurs retreated and said to Dhunna Singh, thou hast called us, and now turn us out, very well, release our man now in confinement, and we will go away; Dhunna Singh made him over to them, and they retreated; with the exception of the sword, everything was delivered to them. Likewise, the other prisoner was also released with the horse, on which Ramnarain chowkeedar remonstrated with the Cotwal, saying, we with great difficulty arrest the bad characters, and you set them free; about midnight, the bad characters went out of the sudden, and the disturbance subsided; whatever occurred, I have laid explicitly before you.

Q.—Tell the truth, where were the policemen, &c., during the riot?
A.— At that time about twenty men were present in the Cotwally, and the rest were absent; I do not know where they were and what they were doing.
Kadir Buksb, chowkeedar, now a duffadar, was absent for three days, after which he returned, laid his turban at the foot of Dhusna Singh, calling him his father, and entreated to be forgiven; Dhusna Singh reprimanded him and excused his fault; this matter is well known to almost all Hindoos, Mahomed ans and chupprassies of the Cotwally; Sibba Singh, chowkeedar, Juman Singh, chowkeedar, Moolie Singh, chupprassie, orderlies of Captain Cookson, Phewkwa, chowkeedar, and Debee Singh, chowkeedar, will detect the above matter. Wazeer Khan and his brother, deserters of Agra, are full-brothers of Mudeh Khan, duffadar of the Cotwally. Wazee Khan is employed in the Cotwally, and his brother, whose name I do not know, is either in the bazar of the rifle or artillery. I have never seen them, however it is no secret, it is well known at the Cotwally. Hingun Khan entertained them both. Mudeh Khan was also absent during the night of the disturbance; every one knows it. Yusuf Mussulman, whoabsented himself for a while during the uproar, received a sword-cut in his hand, has been discharged, and is residing with Uzuher Khan, Puthan. He was turned out of the cantonment police for laughing at a lady, who was riding.

Q.—Who were the two men arrested during the night of the disturbance?  
A.—They were Goojurs, but I do not know their names and residence.

Q.—Were their names not entered in the police diary?  
A.—As they were released during the night, I do not think their names were noted down in the diary after the riot. I apprehended plunderers and secured plundered property, but Dhusna Singh and Mudeh Khan released the prisoners.

Q.—Can you prove it?  
A.—It cannot be proved.

Q.—Did you recognize any of the budmashis?  
A.—Qalunder Buksh, dyer, Elai Buksh, Pulladar, Hoosain Buksh, Pulladar, &c.; amongst many, I do not recollect the names of them all, but will be able to recognize them, if I see them again.

Q.—Why did you not state all these things in your deposition taken on a previous occasion?  
A.—All the chupprassies and officers of police unanimously determined to depose alike.

Q.—Which of the officers conspired thus?  
A.—Mookhtar Khan, jemadar, Behary Singh, jemadar, Raheem Khan, jemadar, and Mudeh Khan, duffadar; these arranged to say alike, thinking, that if discrepancies were found in their depositions, they would be liable to suffer death.

Q.—Is the above deposition true?  
A.—It is all correct; make any enquiry you like.

No. 67.—Deposition of Dabee, a Lodha.—When the mutiny broke out, I was at Nuthun's, in the Sudder Bazar, between 1 and 2 in the morning; Nuthun told me that there was a great disturbance in the sudder, and asked me, and Goolabi Lodha, to accompany him to the Deputy Collector's house to bring some grass that was there for his cattle, and told us he would pay us for doing the same. As soon as we came on the wall, we saw butchers, chupprassies and coolies, some with arms, and some without, running here and there, and a short distance on, under the walls of the Deputy Collector's compound, near Sher Khan's house, I saw three bodies of Europeans lying, one was a lady's, and two gentlemen's; after this we entered the compound, and were returning with the grass, when I saw Sher Khan pass with a box under his arm, and a bundle on his head; he was bringing it evidently from the Commissioner's house; I then went to the sudder.
Q.—Did you see any one else besides Sher Khan carrying away plundered property?
A.—There was a very large crowd, and I was unable to make out any one else.

Q.—After the outbreak, why did you go to the city?
A.—I lived in the udda, but when it was afterwards deserted, I went to the city; I am still earning my livelihood in the Sudder Bazar.

Q.—Did you recognize any one else besides Sher Khan in the mob?
A.—I did not.

Q.—How long have you known Sher Khan?
A.—For many years.

Q.—Do you know where he is now?
A.—Two or three days after the mutiny he went to Delhi.

Q.—Did you and Sher Khan ever have a quarrel?
A.—Never.

No. 68.—Deposition of Goolabee.—On the day the troops mutinied, Dabee and myself were present at Nuthun chowkeedar’s, about three o’clock in the morning; he told us to follow him to the Deputy Collector’s compound, to bring some grass for his cattle, promising to pay us for doing so; we did so, and were returning with the grass, when I saw under the walls of the Deputy Collector’s house, and near that of Sher Khan’s three bodies, one woman’s and two men’s; I heard also a great noise. The coolies, chupprassies and butchers were plundering. I saw Sher Khan, with a box under his arm, and a bundle on his head; he was evidently bringing them from the Commissioner’s house; I then returned to udda.

Q.—Did you see any one else besides Sher Khan plundering and carrying away property, and could you recognize them?
A.—There was a very large crowd, I was therefore unable to recognize any one; after that night I went to the city, but am still earning my food in the suuder.

Q.—Since when did you know Sher Khan?
A.—Before the outbreak I was employed in mending the wall, and it was there where I saw him.

Q.—Had you and Sher Khan ever quarrelled?
A.—No.

No. 69.—Deposition of Sadha Singh, gardener.—About eight or nine months ago, on a Sunday night, at 6 o’clock, suddenly I heard a great uproar; my master, the late Mr. Greathed, Commissioner of Meerut, was in his house. About 8 o’clock, a number of sowars came from the new jail; they set fire to the house; my master went up to the roof; I told Punchum, sirdar bearer, to get my master down, which he did, by a ladder, and brought him to the garden; I there secreted him with the memsahib and two other ladies, and in the morning accompanied them to the cantonments.

Q.—Did you recognize any of those who burnt and plundered the house?
A.—No, there was a great crowd; they shouted Ali, Ali, Mohomdee! I for fear remained in the garden, watching over my master, and prevented any one from coming in; one attempted to enter, but I drove him out.

No. 70.—Deposition of Baboo Bunseedhur, writer in Major Williams’ Office.—On the 10th of May 1857, about 6 o’clock, on Sunday evening, I was
at Major Williams' house, which is situated near the Session Judge's Court; all at once I heard a great uproar, and saw a number of men running from the sudder to the city, and from the city to the sudder; a little afterwards, I heard firing in the direction of the native cavalry lines; I also overheard the men that were passing say, that the sepoys had killed the Europeans. I now heard that the old jail had been broken open, and the prisoners let loose, hearing which I got up and went to the roof of the cook-house, from which I saw the sowars of the third Cavalry going on the Soorujkoond road towards the new jail; some had on their uniform; they had drawn swords; they were about thirty or forty of them; I heard them say, 'come along brothers with us to the holy war.' When night set in, these sowars with the convicts came and set fire to the Session's Court. They then pointed to my master's house, said that the Thuggee Officer lives there; let us let loose the prisoners from there also, saying which, they went away, but the bad characters, with latties and swords about fifty or sixty in number, came in and asked for the prisoners; all of them joined the mob with their fetters; about fifty bad characters plundered the house; Juggun Nath, chupprassie, took by force a clock, which one of the mob was making away with; they then set fire to the house; all the property we could manage to take out, we did, and saved it, but the rest was either burnt or plundered.

**No. 71.—Deposition of Juggun Nath, chupprassie in service of Major Williams, a Brahmin, resident of Doodpoor, elaka Lucknow.—** On the 10th May 1857, at about 6 o'clock on Sunday evening, I was at my master's house, which is situated near the city of Meerut. At once I heard a great uproar, and saw a great number of men running from the sudder to the city, and from the city towards the sudder; a little afterwards about forty or fifty sowars came, some with uniforms on, on horseback from the direction of their lines; they took the road to the Soorujkoond; they went along calling out, 'come along brothers to the holy war.' In the meantime my master's house was set on fire; I then told Somaie; sirdar bearer, to take out the property; we were preparing ourselves to do so, when a mob consisting of about forty or fifty men with latties and swords came in; they asked, who lived in the house; we told them that the master was not in it; both Somaie and myself began to take out the property, and to carry it to my house, which was about fifty or sixty paces off; by this time the house was in a blaze; all the property I could take out and save, I did; I took by force a clock from one of the mob; the rest was either burnt or plundered. The convicts I did not see, therefore I do not know anything about them.

**Deposition of Resaldar J. Hawes, of the Military Mounted Police.—** "On the afternoon of the 10th of May 1857, the day of the outbreak of the troops at Meerut, two or three men of the 3rd Regiment of Light Cavalry to which I belonged, told me that the men of the regiment in a body were going to give in an application the next morning to the Colonel, and request him to forward it to the General Commanding, to beg the release from confinement of the eighty-five prisoners, and that if Government would employ them again, or let them go to their homes free, they would be willing to obey any orders whatever that might be given to them. To this I made answer, that I thought it would be a very good plan."  

**Narrative of Events Attending the Outbreak of Disturbances and the Restoration of Authority in the District of Mozuffernuggur in 1857-58.**

The 9th and 10th May 1857 being holidays, Mr. Berford, Magistrate and Collector of Mozuffernuggur, went over to Saharanpoor to visit Mr. Spankie. At 5 P.M. on the 11th, an express sowar, sent by the late Mr. Johnstone, Officiating Magistrate of Meerut, arrived, giving intelligence of the mutiny at that place on the previous day.
Mr. Berford left for Mozufternuggur that night; and on arrival was, as far as I can discover, told by the native officials the most exaggerated, indeed false, reports of the approach of the mutinous regiments, and of the immediate presence on the outskirts of the city of large bands of dacoits.

Mr. Berford at once ordered that all the Public Offices should be closed for three days. They were never again opened.

I cannot tell Mr. Berford's reason for issuing this order. I can imagine none more likely to produce what as a District Officer he must have been most anxious to prevent. It could only tend to unsettle men's minds, to produce doubt, confusion and suspicion, make the people believe that we felt ourselves unable to cope with the outbreak, even at that early stage. The reports from Meerut were of course incessant, and of the most ridiculously exaggerated nature, and were eagerly swallowed by the hangers-on about the Public Offices. The cutcherry is the usual place of gossip: all who want news go there to seek for it, and the numbers crowding to learn the latest intelligence from Meerut were that day great. Plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, and idlers of all classes were told, not only of the mutiny at Meerut, but of the total destruction of the Europeans there, and the overthrow of the Government. They were assembled from all parts of the district, and went to their homes, telling, in addition to the Meerut tales, the fact of all the Government Offices at Mozufternuggur being closed, which produced a general impression that the Government rule was suspended throughout the district.

This impression, which had been industriously circulated by escaped convicts and other disaffected persons from Meerut, was very generally echoed by the people at Mozufternuggur.

Rumours of the rapid approach of mutineer regiments gathered ground, and in the absence of all letters, official or private from Meerut, appear to have been pretty generally believed.

On the evening of the 12th Mr. Berford received information, which he considered accurate, that the convicts in the jail would rise that night, and the town be plundered. Everything was, however, at the time perfectly quiet. He repaired to the bungalow of Mr. J. Dalby, Head Clerk, and from there went out in the jungle towards the village of Surwut, where he remained till morning. Nothing occurred that night.

On the 13th Mr. Grant, Joint Magistrate and Deputy Collector, who had been in camp at Shamlee, arrived, having been called in by Mr. Berford. In the course of the day, Mr. Grant informs me, Sergeants O'Farrell and Taylor were sent for, and plans for the future discussed; the result of which was that the whole party, accompanied by Mrs. O'Farrell and her sister Mrs. Hussey, and the Office Clerks and their families, went to the tehsil. This movement was hurriedly carried out, in consequence of the gentlemen hearing from Mr. Butterfield, Jail Darogah, that the jail guard were in collusion with the prisoners, and both intended to attack the bungalow. This turned out to be utterly without foundation.

The removal into the tehsil, Mr. Grant now sees, was unnecessary, and only gave confidence to the evil-disposed.

That night, Mr. Grant's and Sergeant Stewart's bungalow were burnt by the villagers, and Mr. Berford's attacked; but the assailants were easily kept off by the Magistrate's guard.

Mr. Grant is of opinion that the impoverished Syud zemindars of Mozufternuggur instigated the villagers to commit these excesses.

Property to a trifling amount was plundered in the city during the night. There was also a slight disturbance in the jail among the prisoners, but successfully repressed by the guard. Mr. Berford, for their conduct that night, gave the jail guard a present of a month's pay. The party next morning returned to Mr. Berford's bungalow.
The Tehseeldar asserts that the disturbances in the city might have been prevented, but that he and all the rest of the Government servants were strictly prohibited by Mr. Berford from leaving the tehseel.

Between 10 and 11 a.m. the party, I know not for what reason, again left the bungalow and returned to the tehseel.

The Tehseeldar, Imdad Hossein, also states, that his intention was, if possible, to get the treasure into the tehseel, and that both Mr. Berford and he spoke to the Havildar of the guard on the subject, who agreed to its being taken at 2 p.m. that day (May 14th). This, when the time came, the sepoys refused to do, broke into the treasure chests, and extracted as much as they could remove, having at first placed sentries all round the premises to prevent any person arriving and interfering with them when thus employed. The Soobadar, who commanded the party, which was composed of thirty-five sepoys of the 20th Native Infantry, sent an abusive message to the Tehseeldar, saying that he had believed him to be a Mahomedan, but that he had proved himself a kaffir, had eaten pig, &c., and that he and his men intended paying him a visit and squaring accounts with him.

The plunder of the treasury and the report sedulously spread that a large party of the 20th from Meerut had joined their comrades, and that a body of dacoits was rapidly advancing on the town, caused considerable consternation to those collected in the tehseel, and to the Government officials generally. They were persuaded that the tehseel was no longer safe, and Mr. Berford and Mr. Grant proposed proceeding to Jowlie, the residence of the Tehseeldar's cousin, Casim Ali; and Mr. and Mrs. O'Farrell were on the point of starting for Roorkee, but abandoned their intention on hearing that the road was closed about Chuppar. Mr. Grant had actually started for Jowlie, accompanied by the Tehseeldar; but Mr. Berford not joining them, they returned and found that officer had left the tehseel by a back entrance, and gone to the residence of some Syuds in Aboopoorah, a suburb of the city, where Mr. Grant states they were treated respectfully and well. They slept there that night, guarded by half the jail sepoys, thirty in number, and returned to the tehseel next morning (15th).

The amount of money plundered from the treasury was Rupees 85,000. The treasury guard amounted to only thirty-five men. It is clear that they, wholly unprovided with carriage, and encumbered with their arms and ammunition, could not have removed much more than one-third of the whole, as not a single sepoy of their regiment had arrived, nor were there any villagers present to assist them. They took away as much as they could carry, and the remainder was plundered by the townspeople and Mr. Berford's private servants. The latter lived in the adjoining out-houses, saw what was going on, and immediately on the departure of the sepoys commenced on their own account. The sepoys left quietly and un molested. I am of opinion that they might have been successfully attacked, when straggling in small parties along the road, encumbered with their plunder; and it is reported that Daoood Khan, Duffadar of sowars, volunteered to charge them with his men, but was prevented by his superior officer, the Jemadar.

The remainder of the Government money was just as quietly plundered. The people were allowed to pour into the treasury and help themselves. Nobody raised a finger to prevent them; everybody seems to have been paralysed. This indiscriminate plundering might, I think, undoubtedly have been prevented. Had the Kotwallee burkundazes, tehseel chuprassees, or the thirty-five district sowars been taken or sent to the treasury, they would have proved ample for its protection, or the safe removal of the money, stamps, &c.

It is very generally reported that the native officials received their share of the spoil, and benefited largely by the robbery of the treasury. Their utter supineness and non-interference gives colour to the story, but I have been able to prove it against only three individuals, a sepoy of the jail guard, the compounder of the jail, and a tehseel chuprassee.
Towards evening on the 14th, Mr. Berford, considering that his force, which was solely composed of his own and the Joint Magistrate's guard, numbering twelve men, armed with muskets and bayonets, and the thannah and tehsil burkundazes, amounting to about seventy men, was insufficient, determined on drawing off the jail guard, and letting the prisoners loose. Rugho-nath Singh, Jemadar of the Tehseel, was sent to the jail with orders to the Native Officer Commanding the guard to at once release the prisoners, bring away all the sepoys for the protection of Mr. Berford and the other Europeans: this was at once done, and the men marched to the tehsil, where thirty were retained and thirty sent to Aboopoorah to Mr. Berford. The villagers subsequently came in and destroyed the jail barracks, carrying off the doors, shutters, and iron rails.

This measure, Mr. Grant at the time considered a grave mistake, though he says he may not have sufficiently opposed it. If anything had been wanting to convince the people that the Government rule at Moziffernuggur had ceased to exist, this release of the convicts supplied it. The inhabitants saw that they could with impunity commit any excesses, that nobody interfered or meddled with them, and that even the few individuals, who had been captured by the sowars in the city on the night of the 18th, had been sent free with the others.

The Civil, Criminal, and Collectorate Dufturs were burnt by the people that night (May 14th), and Mr. Grant is decidedly of opinion that the destruction of the records was brought about by the Syuds, and that these individuals had spread the false tales of approaching mutineers and dacoits, and had induced them to take shelter in Aboopoorah, with the sole object of getting them out of the way, and burning the office papers in their absence. Mr. Grant also suspects the Tehsildar, Imad Hossein, himself a Syud, and Aghmud Hossein, Kotwal, of conniving at such destruction.

The Syud zamindars are almost universally accused of having procured the destruction by the villagers of the Government Offices and bungalows: they are still under trial on these charges before Mr. Grant. I cannot, however, agree in the idea that the Syuds' object in inducing the Magistrate and Joint Magistrate to take shelter in their houses, was with the sole view of getting them out of the way, and burning the records in their absence. Such object would have been far more simply attained by these gentlemen carrying out their intention of leaving the station, which they were on the point of doing, when the Syuds offered to shelter them. Moreover they could have burnt the Government Offices equally well with the authorities in the tehsil as at Aboopoorah, the tehsil being a considerable distance from the cutcherries.

The burning of the cutcherries at Moziffernuggur is not a solitary instance. On the contrary, we see that throughout the rebellion the first thing the bumdashes have done on getting a footing in a station has been to burn the Government Offices.

On the 15th or following day, information was received that the people of the neighbouring villages were collecting in great numbers round the city, and proposed attacking and plundering it. On this the Kotwal, the Duffadar of sowars, whose conduct throughout these disturbances shows in a very favorable light, went with a party of district sowars, attacked and completely dispersed the dacoits, bringing in some fifteen or twenty prisoners, several of whom were wounded.

In the absence of a jail, these dacoits were ordered to be haggled and released; but as far as I can learn even this very lenient sentence was not carried out: in this instance, I am unable to perceive the necessity for a jail. The prisoners were caught with arms in their hands in open resistance to Government authority, and should one and all have been hung on the spot. When we see how effectually a few district sowars without the presence of a single European drove back and thoroughly dispersed this large body of dacoits,
one cannot help regretting that the plunder of the main portion of the
Government treasure by the townspeople, far fewer in number, and at the
time unarmed, was not attempted to be prevented.

From this time to the mutiny of the 4th Irregulars on the 21st June, no
attack or dacoity was committed or attempted on the town, though reports of
intended attack were frequent.

About this period letters containing instructions were received from the
Commissioner, which appear to have been wholly carried out by Mr. Grant; indeed
all the arrangements for the district seem to have been made by that
officer. These arrangements were the establishment of chowkees on the main
lines of communication, the enrolment of sowars and burkundazes, and the
despatch of letters of encouragement to the extensive landholders and native
gentleman throughout the zillah. These measures, which were well and care­
fully carried out by the Joint Magistrate, would have proved far more success­
ful than they did, had it not been for the utter supineness or the
police, who throughout did literally nothing. They appear to have come to an under­
standing with the people that neither should interfere with the other; that
if the villagers permitted the police to remain quietly at their stations and
draw their pay, the villagers might commit what crimes they pleased without
any attempt at prevention on their part. The natural result was that violent
crimes of all kinds were daily, almost hourly, committed throughout the dis­
trict, not secretly or by night, but openly and at noon day.

It is needless naming the chief crimes; it is sufficient to remark that here,
as in other parts of the country, the bunyabs and mahajuns were, in the
majority of cases, the victims, and fearfully have many of them been made
to suffer for their previous rapacity and avarice.

On the 18th or 19th a party of the 3rd Light Cavalry under a native
officer arrived from Meerut, and at first caused no slight consternation, as it
was not known whether they were friends or enemies. On the day of their
arrival one of the troopers shot a bunyab of the town with whom he had
a quarrel. Mr. Berford seems to have been satisfied with the trooper's explana­
tion, and no investigation to have been made.

Nothing particular seems to have taken place for several days, but
wards the end of the month it was deemed advisable to send Mrs. O'Far­
rell and her sister Mrs. Hussey into Meerut. Arrangements were made for
their departure, and Mr. Berford determined to accompany them, which he
did, taking the whole of the cavalry with him, and leaving Mr. Grant, who
refused to quit the district, with Mr. Dalby, Head Clerk, his family, and that
of Mr. Butterfield, Jail Darogah. Mr. Berford after proceeding some miles
returned to the station, and the cavalry were the next day reinforced by
a party of the same regiment under Lieutenant Clarke. Arrangements were
now made for patrolling the roads, and some of the most refractory villages
were visited and punished.

On the 29th Lieutenant Smith arrived with eighty troopers of the 4th
Irregular Cavalry, and relieved Lieutenant Clarke.

Mr. Grant received orders from the Commissioner to proceed to Shamlee
and make arrangements for keeping open the dak communication between
Meerut and Kurnaul. In accordance with these instructions, Mr. Grant after
the lapse of a few days went to Shamlee, and having effected the object of his
journey, returned two days after to the station, having written a full account
to the Commissioner of the arrangements made by him; and the state of the
country about Shamlee.

Mr. Grant received in reply a communication from the late Commissioner,
Mr. Greathed, transferring him to Boolundshubar, because he had in the
first instance delayed to carry out the instructions, and secondly, because
he had left Shamlee without his, the Commissioner's, orders. I have not seen
Mr. Greathed's letter, which has been lost, but such, Mr. Grant informs me,
was its purport. Though there certainly appears to have been unnecessary
delay in proceeding to Shamlee, neither Mr. Berford nor Mr. Grant seems to have understood the Commissioner to intend the latter to remain after the dak arrangements had been completed. Had he done so his life would assuredly have been sacrificed.

Mr. Grant reports that he found the state of affairs at Shamlee most satisfactory, owing to the exertions of Ibrahim Khan, Tehsildar, since murdered by the insurgents of Thania Bhowun under Enayut Ali Khan.

Shortly after the Joint Magistrate's return from Shamlee, the villages of Purass and Bijjoparah were visited and punished. Matters were improving, and a little revenue was being collected in the Huzoor and Khatowlee Tehseels, when on the 21st June the troopers of the 4th Irregular Cavalry mutinied and murdered their officer, Lieutenant Smith.

Several days previous to the mutiny of the 4th Irregular Cavalry, I had been informed at Saharanpoor, of which place I was the Joint Magistrate, by Doolychund, an extensive landholder in that and the Mosuffernuggur district, that the irregulars were in a disaffected state, and not to be depended on. I wrote to Mr. Grant informing him of what I had heard, who replied that similar rumours had reached him, but that Lieutenant Smith to whom he had communicated the same was satisfied of the staunchness of his men. The event proved the rumours only too well founded.

The troopers were billeted in the Magistrate's Cutcherry, only part of which had been destroyed, their horses were picketed on either side the road, leading in a direct line from the Cutcherry to Mr. Berford's bungalow. The space between is, I should say, rather less than hundred yards.

The accounts of the mutiny, as given by different individuals who witnessed it, vary considerably. The following is, as far as I can discover, a pretty correct description of what occurred:

About 3 p.m. on the 21st June, a Shootur sowar arrived from Shamlee; he did not come in by the direct road, but passed round by the Public Offices, and entered the lines of the 4th, and no doubt brought some letter or message to the men from their comrades stationed at Shamlee. He left again in a short time, and soon after his departure a trooper went into Mr. Berford's bungalow, apparently to call Lieutenant Smith, as that officer accompanied him into the lines. Mr. Dalby, Head Clerk, who was in a tent outside the bungalow, saw the arrival and departure of the Shootur sowar, the trooper go to the bungalow, and Lieutenant Smith return with him,—and at the time noticed that Lieutenant Smith, who was in the habit of visiting the lines every evening, was going to his men at an unusually early hour. Shortly after the report of a musket was heard, and some natiyes called out that a dog had been shot. This was, however, almost immediately negatived by one of the Magistrate's chuprassees, Bishen Singh, rushing into the bungalow, saying that the Adjutant had been shot by his men. The party then, viz., Messrs. Berford and Grant, Mr. Dalby and Mr. Butterfield, with their families at once left the bungalow, and went to the out-houses in the rear of the house, where the jail guard were stationed. The Ressaldar of the 4th Irregular Cavalry came to Mr. Grant, told him that he had put the man who wounded the Adjutant into confinement, and asked that officer to go to the bungalow and see Lieutenant Smith, who had been brought in there by some dooly bearers, and was being attended by the native doctor. Mr. Grant was accompanying the Ressaldar, when Mr. Butterfield went forward and prevented his doing so, saying the man meant treachery. The sepoys of the jail guard now said that the whole party should at once repair to the tehseel, which they did by a short and unfrequented road, accompanied by the guard, as the sowars were evidently preparing to mount, and were beginning to surround the bungalow. Mr. and Mrs. Butterfield, when half-way, returned to the bungalow to procure some clothes, &c., forgotten in the hurry of departure. They this managed to secure, and had proceeded some distance towards the tehseel, when he was shot by one of the troopers; his wife begged them to kill her also, but though
they threatened her, she was left uninjured. Mr. Butterfield's body was slashed with nine cuts, and a hand cut-off on account of the ring upon it.

The party reached the tehsell only just in time, as several troopers galloped down the main road, with the evident intention of cutting them off, but returned on seeing them enter the gate.

Lieutenant Smith, whose first wound was not mortal, was put into a dooly, and was being taken to the tehsell, when he was followed by some sowars, dragged out and murdered. The body was much disfigured by sword cuts, and one of the hands cut off for the sake of the ring. Lieutenant Smith's and Mr. Butterfield's bodies were removed that night by Mr. Dalby's younger brother, and Mr. Kelly, brother of Mrs. Butterfield, to their bungalow. They lay there unburied for two days and two nights, and were eventually interred by these two men close to the house. The bodies have since been removed to consecrated ground.

About 8 o'clock the same evening the whole of the 4th came to the tehsell, and asked the sentry what regiment he belonged to, called out to all true Mahomedans to come over and join them, and demanded that the kaffirs should be given up.

They at first insisted that the tehsell be opened, in order that they might rob the treasury and murder the Christians. Imdad Hossein, Tehseelddar, behaved extremely well, Mr. Grant informs me and distinctly refused to listen to the troopers, though taunted, threatened, and abused by them. Daood Khan, Duffadar of sowars, went out to the mutineers and asked them what they wanted. They replied, the lives of the Christians. He answered that, though the Europeans had certainly come to the tehsell, they were no longer there, and if they were, he would not give them up. They then demanded the treasure. He said he had nothing to do with the money and no power over it, and re-entered the tehsell, when it was settled to give up the amount in the chest about Rupees 6,000. On receiving it, the troopers left in a body, going round by Aboopoorah, with the intention apparently of discovering whether the Europeans had again sought refuge there, and passed on to Shamlee, where they were joined by their comrades. Nobody attempted to stop or interfere with them.

Before their departure they burnt Mr. Berford's bungalows, and carried off Messrs. Grant's and Berford's horses. The staging bungalow and Mr. O'Farrell's bungalow were burnt the same night.

I am of opinion that Lieutenant Smith's men were disaffected for some time previous to the actual mutiny and murder of their officer, which may have been hastened by the intelligence the Shootar sowar brought from Shamlee, or by the trifling altercation in the lines of which two distinct accounts are given.

One says that a Pathan, who had been a short time before in the Mozaffernagur jail, and a thorough probate, was constantly with the troopers; that this man had gone on the previous night to the grog-shop in the town, where he made a disturbance and severely beat the Abkar. The man next day complained to Mr. Berford, who said the offender should be punished. On Lieutenant Smith's going to the lines, as already described, one of the sowars came forward and said the man was a relative of his and should not be punished; that his horse had been ill the previous night, and that he had sent him to obtain some native spirit to administer as a remedy, but the Kulal had refused to give him any, and abused him, and that the man was not to blame. On this Lieutenant Smith is reported to have said, "If you try and shield such a known bad character, and claim him as a relative, it is evident that you are yourself as bad," or words to that effect, when another trooper came up behind and shot him in the side.

The other account is, that Lieutenant Smith was finding fault with a "Bargeer" of the troop for having appropriated some Government iron. when the man replied angrily, and there and then shot him.
Late

Lieutenant Smith's life might probably have been saved, had the rest of the party known at once that his first wound was not mortal, as they might on that case have taken him along with them to the tehsedal, guarded like themselves by the jail sepoy, who appear to have behaved well throughout, with the exception of one or two black sheep who assisted in plundering the treasury.

The conduct of the Tehseldar, Imad Hossein, on the occasion of the 44th Irregular troopers appearing before the tehsedal, seems to have been particularly good, but fully equalled by that of Daood Khan. Had either of these two men wavered in the slightest, or shown any inclination to agree to the demands of the sowars, nothing could have saved the lives of the Europeans. They would one and all, to a certainty, have been murdered. I have no hesitation in saying that to these two individuals and to Ghouse Mahomed, Jemadar of the Jail guard, the Europeans concealed in the tehsedal owe their lives. The Tehseldar, who is an educated and a clever man, had the sagacity throughout to perceive that the British Government must eventually win the day, and I am informed all along told the people that whatever the loss inflicted on the European forces in the country, large and irresistible reinforcements would without doubt be sent from Europe; but Daood Khan is a wholly uneducated and illiterate man. This conduct of Daood Khan, I consider, specially worthy of notice. He had himself been a trooper in that very regiment; lie not only did not join them when they mutinied, but used all his influence to get them away from the tehsedal, and when he failed, declared he would defend his officer to the last. The whole body of District sowars resolutely refused to have anything to say to the mutineers, though many were old Irregular Cavalry men, and from first to last in these disturbances not one man has deserted.

The jail guard were, it is said, prepared to resist the mutineers, and Mr. Dalby assures me that not a single man of their number in any way responded to the call of the troopers when summoned in the name of the Prophet. It is, indeed, reported that they offered to fire on the sowars; but they were prevented, as the authorities did not think they could be fully trusted, and as it was thought probable that the towns-people might rise and side with the troopers, and attack the tehsedal in the rear. They however remained perfectly quiet, and save three or four known budmashes, none of the city people left with the troopers.

About 9, next morning (22nd), the villagers collected in very large numbers round the town, but were completely dispersed by a party of District sowars under Daood Khan, and Jail guard sepoy's, sent against them.

On the 26th Lieutenant Clarke arrived with a party of the 3rd Light Cavalry, after which no event of any importance occurred at the station, and on the morning of the 1st July I marched in with 130 Goorkhas of the Nusseer Battalion under command of Lieutenant Chester. Lieutenant Chester with eighty of the Goorkhas was next day recalled by Major Bagot, thus leaving me with only fifty men.

My appointment to the Mozuffernuggur district occurred thus:

On the 24th June Mr. Spankie, Magistrate and Collector of Saharanpoor, received orders from General Hewitt, Commanding the Meerut Division, to take charge of the district of Mozuffernuggur in addition to his own, and send a party of the Goorkhas there. Mr. Spankie, on the receipt of further orders from the late Commissioner, Mr. Greathed, on the 28th, directed me to proceed to Mozuffernuggur, and take charge in the event of Mr. Berford leaving the district; but should that officer continue at his post to examine into the state of affairs and report thereon, Mr. Berford on my arrival determined to bow to the orders of the General, and left on the night of the 3rd July. I therefore, agreeably to the instructions I had received, assumed charge of the district in both Departments.
It will be seen from the foregoing statement that my predecessor had great difficulties to contend with, and no real force to aid him in preserving the peace of the station and district. The total absence of any authentic intelligence from Meerut during the first few days of the outbreak caused confusion and anxiety, and gave a colour of truth to the greatly exaggerated accounts circulated by the natives as to what had taken place in cantonments. It did worse;—it prevented their being satisfactorily refuted.

It is a matter of surprise and regret that no force was sent from Meerut to assist in the maintenance of order. Had this been done the great loss to Government and to private individuals might have been prevented.

On my arrival I found Messrs. Berford and Grant located in the tehsel. All the houses, with the exception of the Head Clerk's bungalow, had been utterly destroyed; but on examining the cutcherry, I discovered that the roofs of four of the rooms, though considerably charred, were still safe. I therefore removed into them, retaining two, and making over two to the Goorkhas. Mr. Grant joined me on the departure of Mr. Berford.

On my arrival I found the district much disorganized, all work seemed to have been long suspended, and even Government servants with whom had been found large sums of money plundered from the treasury, were not only unpunished, but had been permitted to remain in Government employ. The tehsels were certainly in existence, but not the least attempt was made to collect the Government revenue. The thannahs were also nominally at work, but the occupants, as in the tehsels, did nothing but clamour for their pay; and there was no money wherewith to settle their claims.

My first efforts were principally directed:—1st, to the restoration of confidence in the town of Mozuffernuggur; 2nd, the re-establishment of the jail; 3rd, keeping open the communication along the several lines of road, and insisting on the police posted at the several chowkees, regularly patrolling along their several beats; 4th, the security of the Government and district dakhs in their progress through the district; and 5th, the realization of the public instamuls. Of these the latter was, as might be supposed, by far the most difficult. I insisted on the collections being at once renewed, and on the Tehseldars and Peishkars' ceasing to shut themselves up on their tehsels, but proceeding to the villages, and in person collecting the revenue, providing at the same time for the prompt punishment of those who dared to show resistance or contumacy.

Knowing that the people generally regarded the payment of the Government demand as a decided proof of allegiance, I fostered the idea and worked upon it. They were unable, I was well aware, to borrow in this as in former years from the mahajuns, but had to make their own arrangements for settling the claims against them. Though the money was not so rapidly paid, yet I felt that the security for good conduct subsequent to payment would be greatly enhanced, and the result showed that I was not mistaken.

It was necessary to watch closely and constantly the work of the revenue officials, to make them report daily the villages visited, and the arrangements made in each, and to pass immediate orders thereon, stringent where there were but vague promises of payment at some future day, encouraging where the village "Baach" was started, and the people showed themselves willing to meet their engagements. Payments commenced at once in the Mozuffernuggur, Khatowlie and Thannah Bhovun Tehsels, and after a few days in Panw; but not a pice was collected in Shamlee till a considerably later date.

The city of Mozuffernuggur was, when I arrived in a greatly perturbed state;—the shops were all closed, the towns-people were accustomed to fly on hearing reports of an intended attack by dacoits. These reports, as well as their stating that our forces at Delhi had been driven from their position that the ships conveying European troops from England had been wrecked, and others of a similar nature were so frequent, and so evidently spread with the view of doing mischief, and unsettling men's minds, that deeming it nece-
sary to put a stop to them at once, I proclaimed through the city by beat of
drum, my intention of hanging there and then the first person caught, propa-
gating such falsehoods. This had the desired effect, and I found that by visit-
ing the town myself, a few times by night as well as by day, that the patrolling
which I had started immediately on my arrival was well carried out, and con-
fidence restored among the people.

The District appeared to me to be in a sad state, and European supervi-
sion very lax. This struck me most forcibly coming as I did direct from
Saharunpoor, so well and energetically kept in hand by Mr. Spankie. All
officials and people were watching the progress of events before Delhi; and I
found it most difficult at first to make all employees understand that I would
have my orders implicitly and unhesitatingly obeyed.

The Tehseeldars declared that it was useless attempting to collect the
revenue until the fate of Delhi was decided. I was determined to
get it in
at once, and seeing that they must exert themselves or make way for others,
they set to work, and the result was, that after paying all district expenses, as
well as several thousand rupees borrowed for pay of establishment by my
predecessor, I was enabled to send a large remittance of treasure to Meerut on
the 2nd of August, and another of Rupees 96,000 towards the close of the
same month.

It was a very difficult matter starting the office afresh with every official,
a total stranger, and everything in such a disorganized state, not a paper or
record left to show how matters stood when the outbreak took place or subse-
quent to its occurrence;—verbal information was alone available, it was most
contradictory, and it was impossible to know whom to trust.

Mr. George Palmer arrived on the 19th of July as an Extra Joint Magis-
trate, and Mr. Grant, who had been transferred to Boolundshuhur, was at my
request permitted to remain, as his knowledge of the district, in the absence
of all records, was likely to be very valuable.

On the 14th of July, I sent Mr. Grant, Joint Magistrate, to Shazplee,
with the

detachment of the 3rd Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant Clarke. My

object was to get in the revenue of that part of the district, and to repress any
small emeutes, as the Tehseeldar reported the people to be in a restless unsatis-
factory state of mind, and ready to break out into disturbance on slight pre-
tence. The presence of a regular force was therefore likely to prove of use.

After the lapse of a fortnight, Messrs. Grant and Clarke returned, having
accomplished satisfactorily the object desired, and bringing in Rupees 1,400 of
revenue.

Mr. Palmer shortly after moved down into the Pergunnahs bordering on
the Ganges, being accompanied by twenty-five troopers out of fifty of the 1st
Punjab Cavalry sent as a reinforcement from Saharunpoor. His object was more
closely connected with Bijnour than with this district, but he exerted himself
successfully in the collection of the revenue, and his presence was of great
and permanent advantage. The depredations and excesses of the Goorjurs
were checked, and life and property rendered more secure.

Things went on very quietly for sometime. I had to visit a few recusant
villages in person with a few Goorkhas, but only in one instance met with any-
thing like opposition. By the end of August, I had, after paying all district
expenses amounting to about Rupees 25,000 per mensem, remitted Rupees
2,70,535 to Meerut, the whole of which was collected without the sacrifice of
a single life, without maltreating in any way a single soul, and consequently
without exciting the feelings of the people against the Government.

On the 27th of August I was reinforced by the arrival of fifty Goorkhas
of the Nusseeree Battalion, under Lieutenants Cayler and Horsford, and on
the morning of that day I sent Mr. Grant again to Shalme, with the detach-
ment of the 3rd Light Cavalry, under Captain Galloway, who had succeeded
Lieutenant Clarke.
This visit of the troops to Shamlee was called for by the Tehseeldar and the chief Zemindar of that place having quarrelled. The former accused the latter of being at heart a rebel, and preventing the people paying their revenue; he had deprived him and his people of their arms, and Mohur Singh was said to be bent on revenge, and to be exciting the people to revolt.

Mohur Singh, who was a man of great influence, had undoubtedly done good service in keeping order in the town of Shamlee, but the Tehseeldar declared his firm belief that he was disaffected and doing mischief. Mr. Grant was to enquire into, and, if possible, settle the matter or report to me.

The result of the investigation was at the time inconclusive; but the end proved that the Tehseeldar was right, and that Mohur Singh was at the time in correspondence with Delhi, and using his utmost to get some of the Royal troops sent to Shamlee, his petitions to that effect to the King were found in the palace on our taking the place.

About this time disturbances recommenced. I received information to the effect that the people had, at the instigation of the king's emissaries, agreed to waive private and family feuds and no longer prey upon one another, but that all their energies should be levelled against the Government, in the persons of its servants. The revenue collections, which had been progressing very favourably, were suddenly checked by the people ejecting from their villages the men sent to collect, depriving them of their horses, weapons, &c., and, in some instances, severely wounding them. The scenes of these outrages were too distant from the station to admit of my at once visiting the places and punishing the people, as half my Goorkhas had been sent into Meerut with treasure.

On the 2nd September, Mr. Grant, Joint Magistrate, with a party of the 3rd Cavalry, under Captain Galloway, proceeded from Shamlee to the village of Purasowlee, in the Kandhlah Pergunnah, with the object of apprehending Khyratee Khan, Pindaree, a shareholder in the village and a man of considerable influence.

Khyratee Khan was reported to have gone to Delhi to obtain aid in troops from the King and to have returned, having failed in his object.

This information was, however, conveyed by Khyratee Khan's avowed enemy, and was not to be certainly relied on. He had, should also be mentioned, sent on the previous day to the Tehseeldar saying that his revenue was ready and would be paid to any person the Tehseeldar should send. The truth of such intention to pay was discredited, and the party already mentioned, accompanied by the Tehseeldar and a posséd of Tehseld and Thannah people, went to the village. They met with resistance. The Cavalry were of course useless against walls, and the party retired on Shamlee, having altogether failed in their object.

The movement on Purasowlee was an unfortunate one. It was hurriedly determined on, and was carried out without my sanction or knowledge, was indeed in opposition to my previous instructions not to engage in any rash attack on villages with Cavalry alone, where if the least resistance is offered, the force is perfectly helpless and must retire.

The consequence of this successful opposition to Government troops was, as might have been expected, general disturbance, through that and the neighbouring Pergunnah. Purasowlee made common cause with Jowlah, a royal village adjoining. The forces of Khyratee Khan being rapidly joined by the disaffected, not only of this district, but from Burout, and Bijroul in that of Meerut, proceeded to Boorhanah, where they ousted the Government Police and took possession of the fort.

I was particularly anxious to move out against these insurgents at once, as each day's delay served but to strengthen their hands and render them bolder, but I was unable to do so, as more than half the Goorkhas (the only Infantry I had) were on their way to Meerut with treasure. Previous to their return, Mr. Grant's representations were so strong, as to the almost certainty of an
immediate attack on Shamlee, that I detached to that place every man of the Punjub Cavalry then in Mozaffernugger, recalled Mr. Palmer and the twenty-five troopers with him from Meeranpoor, and fifteen whom I had placed with the Tehseeldar of Puur; and as Mr. Grant’s request for reinforcements became each time more urgent, I on the arrival of the party from Meerut with two mountain train guns moved out direct to Shamlee.

My wish was to have gone round by Boorhanah, taken possession of the Fort, and replaced the Government Police, to have them punished Jowlah and Purasowlee (these villages being on the road), re-opened the dakh route between Meerut and Kurnaul which these disturbances had again closed, and proceeded to Shamlee; but my original purpose was necessarily abandoned on the receipt of Mr. Grant’s letters, and as I dared not risk the loss of Shamlee, I was obliged to repair there without an hour’s delay.

On arriving at Shamlee the report of the Jats’ gatherings were constant, and there is no doubt that Khyratee Khan with Sujjah and Buktah, son and nephew of the famous Sah Mull of Bijroul, purposed attacking in force the party there. They met, however, with an unexpected difficulty in the Goojurs, who assembled to oppose their passage through their villages.

This and the fact of their discovering that the force at Shamlee had been strengthened, made them retire on Jowlah.

I experienced great difficulty in procuring anything like certain information regarding the movements and intentions of the insurgents. The statements of the men employed by myself and the Tehseeldars of Thannah Bhowun and Shamlee were contradictory.

I had no sooner learnt of a party of the rebels being collected in a village and had arranged to go and disperse them, than other intelligence was brought that there was a still larger gathering in another direction.

The truth I believe to have been that there were considerable bodies of men collected in several villages, whose intention was to concentrate their force at a stated time at one common rendezvous, and from there resume the offensive. Their designs were however temporarily abandoned by the retirement of Khyratee Khan and his allies as already mentioned.

Taking advantage of my position at Shamlee, I determined to punish the Rangurh village of Hurbur, lying directly on the road between that place and Thannah Bhowun.

The people of this village had since the commencement of the disturbances waged war against all comers, and from robbing and murdering every traveller that passed along had succeeded in completely closing the road.

We met with no opposition, though such was probably at first intended, as we found loaded matchlocks with the matches lighted.

All arms found in the village were secured and the cattle driven away.

I was anxious to secure the person of Gyndah, Lumberdar, the instigator and leader in most of the crimes committed by the inhabitants, but failed in doing so.

Large quantities of plundered property, consisting of sugar, gum, dyes, birch, bark, &c., amounting to about forty cart loads, were found. These had formed consignments from firms in Bwanany, in the Rohltuck District, to mercantile houses in Shamlee, and had been robbed when passing the village. As much of this property as could be removed was taken to Shamlee, and one of the captured Zemindar released on security for the purpose of bringing on the remainder, which, want of carriage, obliged us to leave behind. The village was not burnt.

When the force was about to return, a man arrived from Thannah Bhowun, and reported a Mahomedan rising in that town, headed by Enayut Ali, nephew of Oazee Myhboob Ali Khan, and brother of Rehman Ali Khan, who had been shortly before executed at Saharanpoor by Mr. Spankie.
As the men had then been out twelve hours and required rest and food, it was deemed advisable to return to Shamlee instead of proceeding at once to Thannah Bhowun as recommended by the Tehseeldar. It was fortunate we did so, for with our small and fatigued force we should certainly have failed in getting into the town, and the inevitable result would have been the loss of our Camp at Shamlee, which had been left with a very small and, in my opinion, wholly inadequate guard.

As risings were reported all round us, and matters were getting hourly more serious, I addressed a letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes, whose troop of Horse Artillery was then passing through the district, and requested that officer to detach two of his guns and a small party from Mozafferunnuggur to Boorhanah, drive Khyratee Khan's men out of the fort, and thus enable my Police to take repose, then destroy the adjoining village of Jowlah which had joined Khyratee Khan, and crossing over the Nugwah Ghát, the detachment would arrive in Meerut only one day after the troop.

Colonel Dawes' instructions to proceed without delay to Meerut precluded him from complying with my request.

Had it been granted I intended to have remained at Shamlee, watched the Thannah Bhowun people, and encountered them had they left their walls, have prevented as far as possible any spreading of disaffection through the Ramghur villages, and by my presence have secured from all risk the town and Tehseel of Shamlee.

From information received during the 12th, I learnt that my sowars, chuprassees, &c., collecting the revenue in Pergunnah Jhinjanah, had been expelled from the villages, while some of those employed on a like duty in Pergunnah Kandhlah had been robbed of everything they possessed, and barely escaped with their lives.

Disaffection generally prevailed from the line of the Hindun going westward, including portions of the Pergunnahs of Boorhanah, Shikarpoor, Bughrnat, and Churtbawut, with the entire Pergunnah of Thannah Bhowun and the Jat villages of Shamlee; while the Kandhlah Pergunnah, as far as the Jumna Canal, and part of Jhinjanah was also disturbed. Bodies of insurgents were collected at certain places throughout all these pargunnahs.

The Tehseeldars of Thannah Bhowun and Shamlee were decidedly of opinion that the main danger to be apprehended was from this combination of the Jats. Both were satisfied that, for four or five days at least, the Cazee and his people would not move out of their town, but confine themselves to levying men and making preparations. As their knowledge of the people and the state of this part of the country was far greater than mine, it being the first time I had visited it, and their means of information also better, I went a good deal by what they advanced, and as the Jats were on all sides regarded as the main difficulty, and as their main body was undoubtedly at Jowlah and Purasowlee, it seemed advisable to strike a blow there, and return to Shamlee. That blow, if successful, would in all probability be the means of breaking up the combination, and removing our chief difficulty, would enable us to replace the Government Police in Boorhanah and return to Shamlee, to keep in check the Thannah Bhowun insurgents. By this means also I should be enabled to reopen the direct communication between Kurnaul and Meerut, one of the main objects for which I had been directed to proceed to Shamlee. This movement was determined on; we were to be back at Shamlee the second day.

The severe illness of Lieutenant Cuyler, commanding the detachment, prevented our marching on the 13th, as I proposed, and we started at 2 a.m. on the 14th.

Our intention was to proceed direct to Boorhanah, and having taken possession of the fort, said to be garrisoned by about 150 men, leave our baggage there,—and after the men had taken their food proceed against Jowlah and Purasowlee. Our original plan was, however, prevented by our being attacked on the line of march by the men assembled at the former place.
They were at once driven back, with great loss, and the village entered at
the point of the bayonet. The main body escaped among the high khets, but
the number of dead outside, and in the village, were estimated at 200.

This little affair took so much time that we determined to go on at once
to Boorhanah, as we might there meet with serious resistance from the men in
the fort.

The fort, which is of considerable size and strength, was evacuated on our
approach. Some time elapsed before we got inside, as the gates were closed
and had to be blown in, which was effected by Mr. Palmer, with the Mountain
Train guns.

We did not reach our camp till 5½ P.M., the whole party being thoroughly
exhausted from fatigue and exposure to the sun.

In the course of the night, I received an azeez from Mohur Singh, Zemin-
dar of Shamlee, already alluded to, telling me that the tehseel was attacked.
This azeez was, I have reason to believe, written some time after the massacre
taken place. No report was received from any of the thannah or teh-
seel people. On the morning of the 15th, I received a note from Lieutenant
Fraser, reporting his arrival at Muleerah on the Hindun, with two Horse Arti-
illery guns and 100 Sikhs.

This was the first intimation I received of any reinforcements being sent.

Lieutenant Fraser arrived with his detachment at 7 P.M., and we marched
back to Shamlee that night.

Not until our arrival there did I learn the full extent of the massacre;
even those who had escaped had been rendered so helpless from fear, that they
had not even sent me notice of the outrage which had been committed.

The tehseel was a place of considerable strength, and previous to my
departure, both Tehseeldars declared their conviction that it could be held
against all comers, that there was not the least danger to be apprehended,
and that the garrison left in it was well able to resist successfully any attack.

The garrison consisted of the following:—ten Punjab Cavalry armed
with carbines, nine troopers, and a Duffadar; twenty-eight Jail sepoys
armed with muskets and bayonets; upwards of fifty Rampoor men entertained
by the Tehseeldar, and all well armed.

The whole of the tehseel and thannah establishment, sowars, and new
levies upwards of fifty men.

Almost every man had fire-arms, and just before leaving, I made over 500
rounds of spare ball cartridges. Had the ammunition been properly used, it
would have proved more than sufficient.

Ibrahim Khan, Tehseeldar, fought so gallantly in defence of his charge,
that I should regret saying anything which could detract from the credit he
undoubtedly deserves; but I only echo the general opinion in saying that, had
he instead of cooping up every one in the tehseel, acted on the advice repeated-
edly tendered by the troopers of the Punjab Cavalry, the result would have
been very different.

I proposed immediately after the above tragedy, that the estates of the
Cazee of Thannah Bhowun should be presented to Ibrahim Khan’s son. The
reward would at the time have had the very best effect, and would have proved
to the people that the Government could and would reward those who served
it faithfully. The Tehseeldar’s family however begged that lands in Rohilkund
might be bestowed instead, and that province was then in the hands of the
rebels.

Bakhtawur Sing, Tehseeldar of Thannah Bhowun, who had requested per-
mission to remain at Shamlee, his tehseel having been taken possession of by
Enayut Ali Khan, was also killed. He has left no family, and his widow
died shortly after; I therefore have proposed that his aged parents should be
pensioned handsomely.
Bhowany Suhai, Thannaabdar of Shamlee, was also killed. His son has been rewarded by the grant of a village, near his home, in the Meerut district.

The heirs of those killed on lower grades, and those wounded at Shamlee, have been recommended for pension.

One hundred and thirteen men were killed at Shamlee when defending the tehsil and thannah. The ferocity of the Mahomedans, especially against Government servants, was shown by their slaughtering all who, on the place being taken by assault, fled for refuge into the Musjid and Shewallah, which have always hitherto been regarded as sanctuaries. They were there to a man cut to pieces, even little children slaughtered.

The inner walls of both Musjid and Shewallah, which are within the tehsil compound, were crimsoned with blood.

I would prominently notice the conduct of Sundul Khan, Sais, and nine troopers of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, who had been left as an additional guard at the tehsil. These men, one and all, did their duty nobly, and in doing so submitted to every species of insult from those of their own faith among the assailants. The Mahomedan flag was waved before them, and when others deserted and found safety underneath its folds, they shot the standard bearer dead.

Of the ten men of the 1st Punjab Cavalry left at Shamlee, nine were killed, and one is missing.

I intended proceeding at once to Thannah Bhowun and attacking the insurgents in their stronghold, but receiving repeated letters from Mr. Grant, who had returned to the station on my going to Shamlee that Mozuffernuggur was threatened, and hearing also that vast crowds of Mahomedans had joined the Kazee's party, I deemed it advisable, after consulting with Captain Smith, who now commanded the detachments, to fall back on Mozuffernuggur; as in the event of our receiving any check at Thannah Bhowun, the almost certain result would have been an attack by the rebels on the Sudder Station, whereas if we advanced on Thannah Bhowun from Mozuffernuggur, the station would be secure from any such danger.

After receiving the reinforcements from Meerut and Saharanpoor, we marched against the rebel town. I laid the best information I could procure before the military officers, and left it with them to decide whether we had a sufficient force to attack the place, declaring at the same time my own belief that it would be keenly defended.

Captain Smith determined to attack it; we did so, and failed to do more than get a very small way into the town.

On our approaching the place, large bodies of men were seen drawn out in the baghs, and behind the high standing khets; the artillery opened fire and speedily dispersed them. The guns, however, could not do much, owing to the view being obstructed by the gardens and trees up to the very walls.

Some Goorkhas and Sikhs were next sent out as skirmishers to clear the cultivation, which they effected. It was at this period that Lieutenant Johnstone, Commanding the Sikhs, was wounded by a musket ball in the arm, and obliged to go to the rear.

After a time, finding that the skirmishers were unable to keep down the fire of the town, the rebels firing from behind walls, the skirmishers were directed to be withdrawn, the force then moved more to the left where the ground was clearer, and the Horse Artillery again opened fire, but finding after a few rounds that little or no effect was produced, the rebels keeping under cover, the guns were withdrawn.

A storming party of the Sikhs and Goorkhas, the former under Captain Smith, the latter under Lieutenant Cuyler, were directed to advance and storm the town. The party did as directed under a smart fire of musketry, and after clearing and taking possession of several detached buildings which were keenly contested, charged over the wall into the town, and got possession of
two guns, which they held for some time, but losing a number of men, and the supports failing to come to their aid, they were at length obliged to retire, leaving the captured guns behind as there were no means of removing them. The artillery fired a few shots into the town which were not replied to, and we then retired.

As the conduct of the infantry in this affair has been already reported to the military authorities, it will be unnecessary for me to say more than that they failed to display that gallantry and daring, for which the names of Goorkha and Sikh have lately been so justly famous. The officers did all that men could do, but they were not supported by the majority of their men; it may, however, be remarked that the greater portion of both the detachments were composed of young and untried soldiers, who have never before been under fire.

The musketry fire from the walls of the town and loop-holed houses was very heavy, and our men dropping all around, shot by enemies whom they could not even see, became dispirited; we were engaged for nearly seven hours, and the men thoroughly exhausted. The town which was surrounded by a wall and ditch, and has eight gates, is naturally a strong one, and the great number of its defenders, elated with their late success at Shamlee, rendered all our efforts vain.

Our loss was heavy—seventeen killed and twenty-five wounded, including Captain Smith and Lieutenant Johnstone.

An act of gallantry on the part of Lieutenant Cuyler, Commanding the Detachment of the Nusseereea Goorkhas, deserves prominent notice. One of his men when crossing an open space was knocked over, and so badly wounded that he could not rise; Lieutenant Cuyler called on his men to go and bring him off, but as the enemy opened an excessively heavy musketry fire on the spot, all declined. He then said he would go himself if they would follow him, a few did so, including an old Sikh Jemadar with Captain Smith's detachment.

When they came to the open space which was completely commanded by the fire from the town, all deserted him save the old Sikh, and they two alone, and unassisted, succeeded in bringing off the wounded Goorkha.

The Sikh was shot dead shortly afterwards. Lieutenant Cuyler was unwounded, though more than one bullet passed through his coat.

The line of baggage when we were retiring was attacked by a large party of horse and foot near the village of Kheoree; they were at once charged in gallant style by two detachments of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, one led on by S. S. Melville, Esq., and the other by M. Low, Esq., who was severely wounded, receiving three sword-cuts, while his horse was also much cut. The insurgents fled in utter disorder, and were cut up by the cavalry to the number of about hundred, the rest escaped through the high khets.

We met with no further opposition on the road.

A letter from the Commissioner, telling me on no account to attack Thanannah Bhowun, as it was far too strong for our small force, reached me just as we retired. Had it arrived earlier in the day, as it certainly should have done, the orders would have been acted up to, but my previous instruction had directed me to proceed at once and crush the rebels, if after the arrival of reinforcements we considered ourselves strong enough.

The question of sufficient strength was one for the military to determine, it was settled in the affirmative, and we did our best, but failed.

From what I have seen since of the strength of the place and the means of defence, I cannot but consider that our being driven out of the town at first and before getting entangled in the narrow streets was a fortunate thing. Had it been otherwise and we had got well into the city, the numbers of the defenders were so great, and the place so extensive, and so well prepared by barricades, &c., for defence, that I verily believe our small force would have been annihilated.
On the arrival of the column from Meerut under Major Sawyer, we marched at once against Thannah Bhowun, and found it evacuated by the insurgents.

I was anxious to destroy the place, but this could not be done, owing to its great extent, and the artillery being unable to spare any gunpowder.

The force after a halt of one day which was employed in taking grain out of the city, moved on to Shamlee, and destroyed on the road the villages of Hurkur, Herudh and Sikkah, which had been the leaders in the attack on the Shamlee Tehseel.

At the request of Major Sawyer, who from information received, considered it probable that we might meet with opposition at Bijroul, and was consequently indisposed to divide the force, we accompanied that officer to that village and Burouth and from there returned to Candilah, where we halted for three days, and succeeded in collecting a large amount of revenue.

On the 3rd and 4th October the camp remained at Kyrranah, where more revenue was obtained, and on the 5th marched to Jhinjanah, where the force halted during the 6th, and on the 7th moved again to Thannah Bhowun. The city was deserted by every Mahomedan, and so great was the fear with which the Sheikhzadahs are regarded, and so general the Mahomedan disaffection, that nobody would come forward to give evidence. I got however ample proofs against the head of the rebellion. The wall of the town and the eight gates have been destroyed, a work of great time and labour.

To prevent the Sheikhzadahs returning to the city and revenging themselves on the Government servants, and as it was necessary to at once re-establish tehsell and thannah, I appointed Mahomed Alee Khan, son of Munsoor Alee Khan, the chief Raees of Jellalabad, Tehseeladar. His family’s power and influence in that part of the district is great, and throughout the rebellion they maintained their good name, and remained faithful to the British Government.

Mahomed Alee Khan having been before in the Government employ in the Revenue Department, was by knowledge and experience fitted for the position.

Having filled up the vacancy at Shamlee by the appointment of Mahomed Wuzeer Khan as Tehseeldar, who, for distinguished ability and loyalty, had just been appointed Kotwal of Delhi by Colonel Burn, the Military Governor, and having made all necessary arrangements for the peace and order of the western pargunnahs, I turned my attention eastwards, and moved out with all the available force towards the Ganges, the left bank of which was held by the rebel troops of the Nawab of Nujeebad.

Lieutenant Fraser’s two Horse Artillery guns (European) had been recalled to Meerut and had been succeeded by two Horse Artillery (Native) under command of Lieutenant Evans.

Although disaffection had, I am well aware, for months existed at Thannah Bhowun, yet there is no doubt that the immediate cause of its breaking out into open rebellion was the execution of the Cazee’s nephew at Saharanpoor. Had it not been for that, I am decidedly of opinion that no recourse to arms would have been made, especially as a few days after, the news of the fall of Delhi and the utter discomfiture of the mutineer army of the king would have reached Thannah Bhowun.

It would render this statement far too lengthy and tedious were I to detail our daily movements, during the months of November and December 1857, and January, February and March 1858.

It will be sufficient to say that we were continually kept on the move, marching and countermarching up and down the river, by the rapid movements of the masses of rebels on the opposite bank. Their numbers were so greatly superior to ours that we were obliged to be constantly on the watch, as the Ganges had become so low that fords were very numerous, and the river line was so extensive that our forces had to be divided into very small detachments.
Our chowkies and outlying posts were several times attacked and destroyed, but the rebels so rapidly recrossed the river that we never could catch them, though every exertion was made to do so. These attacks became so frequent, that I removed all the Police posts out of the Kadir, withdrawing them to the high land. The jungle in the Kadir was burnt by order of Colonel Brind, who had been appointed to command in the district. This deprived the enemy of the power of approaching our posts in any numbers without being perceived.

Not a week passed that I did not obtain intelligence of the intention of the enemy to cross and make a night attack, and large numbers of them would frequently assemble on the river bank, but either their courage failed them or these were mere demonstrations got up with the view of harassing and annoying us.

On the night of the 4th February they crossed in force with guns, and before daylight appeared at the town of Meeranpoor, attacked and burnt the thanah, murdered an Afghan trooper and killed two men, supposing them to be burkundaezes. Our camp was then at Jowlee, twelve miles north of Meeranpoor, while Colonel Brind with the Horse Artillery guns and 1st Punjab Cavalry were at Toghulpur, sixteen miles further up the Ganges canal.

The town of Meeranpoor had been, in my opinion, all along the place which the rebels in the event of their crossing would attack, but contrary to my repeated objections the place was left with only ten Afghans under a Duffadar. I hastened down from Jowlee with Captain Sage’s detachment, but the rebels, though greatly outnumbering us, fled in the greatest haste on our approach, their retreat being covered by 250 Cavalry mutineers, as one could see by their steel scabbards and saddles. A little skirmishing took place, but with only one man wounded on our side, and three of the rebels killed and two taken prisoners. We never got near their Infantry. They never again crossed in any force, though several night raids were made by them, with more or less success against our outlying posts.

They expected the Syud Z-meendars to join them, but not a man of any importance did so. The conduct of the Syud Raees was all along most creditable. They would have nothing to say to the rebels and were ready to oppose them in arms.

During these five months the troops were so constantly changed, that it would only cause confusion were I to detail them. From the Officers one and all I ever received cordial assistance, and though the duties were harassing and movements necessarily sudden and frequent, I never heard a murmur from the men.

In March I disarmed the district, and in the middle of the following month, the Meeranpoor detachment crossed into Rohilkund, and from that time all has remained in profound peace.

The Civil Officers attached to the district were Messrs. C. Grant and J. Palmer. The former had charge of the Sudder Station, where a Civil Officer was necessary, and Mr. Palmer’s services were required in the district, as he had charge of the two Mountain Train guns, also Kour Doorga Pershad, Deputy Collector and Deputy Magistrate. Mr. Grant relieved me of by far the greater portion of the criminal work, which became very heavy as order was restored, and which I could not have possibly got through, moving about as I was obliged to do with the troops. The amount of district work performed by that officer is highly creditable to him. He was here from the first breaking out of disturbances, and refused to leave his post when Mr. Berford started for Meerut. Mr. Grant’s information regarding the district and people was very valuable and of great assistance to me, and it was always most cordially afforded.

Mr. Palmer, as already mentioned, did good service in the eastern Fergunans in August, in the collection of the revenue and in the repression of crime. His presence at and in the neighbourhood of Meeranpoor proved of great
benefit, it encouraged the good and restrained the bad. From the time of his return from there until his departure to his old district of Bijnour, he was so taken up with the Mountain Train Guns and their arrangements, drilling Goorkhas and Sikhs as artillerymen, &c., &c., that his time thus occupied, prevented his getting through much work in his civil capacity. My wishes were always cordially responded to by Mr. Palmer, who invariably carried them out ably and well. Nothing could exceed the interest he took in the Mountain Train Guns, which on their arrival from Meerut I made over to him, he being the only individual who understood anything about artillery practice. He instructed a party of Goorkhas in gun drill, and was indefatigable in rendering them efficient. Having served in the Artillery division of the West Essex Yeomanry and studied gunnery; he thoroughly understood the work and was able to instruct others. His guns were at Thannah Bhowun and made some capital practice.

Kour Doorga Pershad is an old and faithful Government servant thoroughly acquainted with the district, and very hardworking. During the disturbances he was always anxious to do his utmost, and exerted himself in procuring information. After order was restored he set to work with his usual zeal and energy, and I have to acknowledge valuable assistance received from him, chiefly in revenue work.

Saadoollah Khan of Sahareo, Syud Goolam Hossein of Jowlee, Talib Ali of Sambulherah, Khoorshyd Ali of Jansuth, Ummur Sing of Boorhanah, Syud Tofuzool Hossein of Meeranpoor, Munsoor Ali Khan of Jellalabad, all extensive landholders, and Chundah Chowhan (shikaree) were in their several degrees very useful in keeping order and showing an example of loyalty to their people, in assisting in the collection of the revenue and in supplying information. Chundah, though a poor shikaree, was from first to last indefatigable in watching the Ghats, and in bringing intelligence of the enemy’s movements.

He had a chain of Chowhan’s at certain points along the river bank, who night and day watched the rebels.

A large sum was set on his head, and several attempts made to seize him, but he and his men were so familiar with the jungle, that they invariably escaped. All the above have been already reported for loyalty, and recommended for reward.

MOZZUFFERNUGGUR

Magistracy,
The 16th November 1858.

R. M. EDWARDS,
Magistrate.


During the months of April and May various reports were in circulation throughout the district, all tending to incense the minds of the people against the English Government, and to impress them with the idea that attempts were about to be made to destroy their caste, and ultimately compel them to embrace the Christian religion. The native regiments at Bareilly were kept in order for some time by the skilful management of their officers; but on the 31st May 1857 they rose in open mutiny. The ladies and children had previously been sent to Nainee Tal, but some of the merchants and clerks had delayed to send off their families, and most of the women and children, who were here at the time of the outbreak, were murdered by the mob.

It was thought that the 8th Irregulars were loyal, and their lines had been fixed on as the place of rendezvous, in the event of the sepohis mutinying; accordingly on the 31st May, many of the officers and some of the Civilians assembled there. However, it soon became apparent that the irregular
cavalry had joined the mutineers; and therefore seeing no hope of being able to do good by remaining where they were, the officers who had met there determined to try and force their way to Nainee Tal. They succeeded in reaching that place in safety, with the exception of Mr. Wyatt, Deputy Collector, who left them after they had gone a short distance, and was afterwards murdered. Mr. Raiks, Sessions Judge, Mr. Robertson, Judge, Dr. Hay, Mr. Buch, and Mr. Orr took refuge in the houses of some natives of rank in the city, where they were murdered by the mob as soon as their places of concealment were discovered. Most of the other persons who were in the station on the day of the mutiny were murdered, see Appendix A.

The leading Mahomedans of the city were fully aware of the intention of the troops, and had prepared the people to join in the rebellion against the British Government.

There were two men in Bareilly whom the Pathans of Rohilcund looked up to as leaders, one was Mobarek Shah Khan, the other Khan Bahadoor Khan. Mobarek Shah Khan had great hopes of being able to secure the chief authority for himself; his wealth and influence with the clan of the Pathans, of which he was the chief, seemed to warrant his hopes; he thought that by at once declaring himself he might secure the musnud before Khan Bahadoor Khan, who was a man of very little personal energy, though of much influence among the Pathans, from his descent from Hafiz Remut Khan, the Pathan ruler of Bareilly, and uncle of Mahomed Ali Khan, the founder of the Mahomedan rule in Rohilcund or Kuthair, as it was then called. Mobarek Shah Khan, an energetic decided man, on hearing the firing in cantonments, left his house accompanied by about 500 of his friends and relations, and took the road to the Cotwalli, with the intention of declaring himself Nawab Nazim of Bareilly under the King of Delhi; he had previously intrigued with Bukt Khan, the leader of the mutinous sepahis, with this object. On his way he met Khan Bahadoor also going to the Cotwalli. Khan Bahadoor was supported by the Syuds of the Naomela, a very influential body of men, and by the Mahomedans of the old city; his claims also by descent were far superior to those of Mobarek Shah Khan, and the latter at once saw that he must yield. He therefore gave up his intention of seizing the Government for himself, and became one of Khan Bahadoor's most active supporters. An impromptu musnud was erected at the Cotwalli covered with shawls, &c., and Madar Ali Khan, speaking in the name of the Pathans of Rohilcund, called upon Khan Bahadoor to seat himself upon it, and declare himself ruler under the King of Delhi. A Mohumdi jhunda or flag was then set up in front of the Cotwalli, and a pucka choboota built in front of it, on which inscription was burnt.

As soon as Khan Bahadoor was installed proclamations notifying the event were issued throughout the city. The records in the Cotwalli were burnt. The Government uniform was taken from the burkundazes, and the money in the Malkhana plundered. About this time information was given to Khan Bahadoor that some English gentlemen were concealed in the houses of Hamid Hussan Moonsiff and Aman Ali Khan; he at once ordered a party to be sent to kill them; before these men got there, the mob of the city headed by Fuzloo, a well known bad character, had broken into the houses and murdered the English gentlemen. Khan Bahadoor then issued a proclamation, directing that every European should be put to death, and threatening death to anyone who should give shelter to them. Hamid Hussan was then appointed Cotwal in the place of Budr-o1-deen, who had gone away with the Commissioner and other gentlemen to Nainee Tal.

At 3 o'clock P.M. Mr. and Mrs. Aspinall with their children were brought to the Cotwalli and put to death by order of Khan Bahadoor; the little children were first murdered and then the parents. The bodies of Mr. Raikes, Mr. Robertson, Dr. Hay, Mr. Buch, and Mr. Orr, after having been dragged naked through the streets of the city, were now brought to the Cotwalli and thrown down in front of the Mohumdi flag; they remained there till the next morning when they were flung into a tank outside the city.
Khan Bahadoor about 4 p.m. accompanied by Mobarek Shah Khan, Ahmed Shah Khan, and a number of his supporters, now made a procession through the city, with men in front of their elephants, proclaiming that the Government of the English was at an end, and that the King of Delhi was now the ruler of India. The people were also directed to return to their houses and re-open their shops, which had been shut since the morning. Fuzl Huq, Tehseeldar of Nuwabgunje, Jaffir Ali, Thannadar, and many other Government employees, came in this evening, and tendered their allegiance to Khan Bahadoor.

On the morning of the 1st June, Khan Bahadoor issued orders for all the Amlahs to attend at the Cotwalli, and proceeded to take measures for securing the authority he had usurped; all the Government officials were ordered to continue at their posts and carry on their duties under pain of severe punishment in case of their refusal.

Mr. Hansborough, the Superintendent of the Jail, was now brought to the Cotwalli by the Souds of the Naomehl; he had defended himself most gallantly during the whole of the 31st May on the gateway of the Jail, but was seized on the morning of the 1st June, and brought before Khan Bahadoor; when placed before him, Mr. Hansborough said, in a loud voice that was heard by all the people, “I am in your power, and you can kill me, but do not think for a moment that by murdering me and all the other Englishmen here, you will be able to put an end to the British Government.” Khan Bahadoor then ordered him to be cut to pieces. Muneeb Khan was now appointed Naib Cotwal, and the Tehseeldar was ordered to make arrangements for supplying the sepahis in cantonments with provisions.

A Durbar was appointed for 2 o'clock p.m., and all the chief men in the city were ordered to attend. The Cotwal was directed to see to this. After holding Durbar in the city, Khan Bahadoor, accompanied by Mobarek Shah Khan, Ahmed Shah Khan, Akbar Ali Khan, Soba Ram and many others of the chief men, mounted on elephants, with a great crowd of the mob, on foot and horseback, proceeded in state to the cantonment to pay a congratulatory visit to Bukt Khan, Mahomed Shuffi, and the leaders of the rebel troops. On their arrival at the edge of cantonments near the Collector’s Cutcherry, the sepahis, being uncertain of their purpose, fired at them. Khan Bahadoor then stood up in his howda, and waved his handkerchief in sign that he came as a friend. After some delay a message was sent to him from Bukt Khan, saying that he could not be allowed to enter cantonments attended by all the rabble of the city, but that he and a few of his chief supporters must come alone if they wished to come. On this the crowd was sent back, and Khan Bahadoor, attended by Mobarek Shah Khan, Ahmed Shah Khan, Madar Ali Khan, Karamut Khan, and Soba Ram went on; he was received with a salute of eleven guns. Bukt Khan at first received him with great coolness, and refused to receive his nuzzer of Rupees 1,000, but was prevailed to do so by Ahmed Shah Khan. After sitting for a short time, Khan Bahadoor took his departure leaving presents for the leaders of the troops.

On reaching his house in the city, Khan Bahadoor held a Council composed of Madar Ali Khan, Mobarek Shah Khan, and Karamut Khan, to take into consideration the measures necessary for restoring some kind of order in the city and the district. This matter was forced on his attention by the reports that came in from the district, which was now one scene of anarchy and violence. The minds of the native population had been prepared for the outbreak, by the rumours sedulously circulated throughout the district during May. The news of the mutiny of the troops spread like wild fire, and wherever the intelligence reached, the people as once rose, not so much in rebellion against the British Government, as against all Government of any kind; every man prepared to wreak his vengeance on his private foe, or to take violent possession of land to which he considered he had a claim.—To give one instance out of many that occurred. The Thakoors of Akka had had a dispute about a wall, had fought among themselves, and had been punished by imprisonment. They had been released before the
mutiny. On the day of the outbreak the party, who conceived themselves injured, attacked the others, killed the four sons of the leader on the other side, cut off the hands and feet of the father, and placed him in a cart with the dead bodies of his sons and flung them all into the Ramgunga.

After much discussion it was determined to appoint a Dewan under Khan Bahadoor, whose duty it should be to look after the police and revenue of the district. Through Madar Ali Khan's influence Sobha Ram was selected as the Dewan; his knowledge acquired in the service of the British Government in the Commissariat, added to his influence from his wealth, also operated in his favour.

In the evening Fuzloo, the man who had headed the attack on Hamid Hassan's house, and the murder of the English gentleman concealed there, was brought before Khan Bahadoor, charged by Fasaat Olah Khan, and several other Mahomedans, with having broken into their houses and plundered their property; he was found guilty, and in accordance with a Fatwa pronounced by Mooftee Mayet Ahmed, his right hand and left foot were cut off; he was a man of great pluck and energy, and immediately after the punishment was carried through the city seated in a Tonjon, by the mob, who were his devoted admirers; he remained at Bareilly during the rest of Khan Bahadoor's reign, and is said to have been killed in the flight at the Nurtuttea bridge on the 5th May 1858.

On the morning of the 2nd June, Sobha Ram attended Durbar, and was appointed Dewan by Khan Bahadoor; his allowance was to be a share of whatever remained after payment of the expenses of the Government; other appointments were made at the same time; Madar Ali Khan and Neaz Mahomed Khan were appointed Generals with salaries of Rupees 1,000 a month; Moulvie Khan was appointed Komedan and given the farm of the Shahi Pergunnah; Moolchand was appointed Naib to Sobha Ram on Rupees 500 a month; Hoori Lall, son of Sobha Ram, was appointed Paymaster on Rupees 1,000 a month; Ali Hossain Khan, son of Madar Ali Khan, was made Commander of Cavalry on Rupees 500 a month; Deen Dyal, Superintendent of Roads, was made Darogah of the Gun Foundry on Rupees 200 a month. Syfoolu Khan, Jailer, was made Superintendent of Jails, on Rupees 500 a month; and many other inferior appointments: any man promising to bring 50 or a 100 men was appointed Komedan. Ruja-ol-dowlah, a singer of the Court of the King of Oudh, and now residing at Bareilly, was appointed A.-D.-C. to Khan Bahadoor, and Master of the Ceremonies: his experience in the Court of Oudh made him an authority in these matters; he regulated all receptions, Durbars, &c.; he advised that an urzee should be sent at once to the King of Delhi by Khan Bahadoor, narrating what had been done, and soliciting the appointment of Nazim of Kotah; the urzee was accordingly drawn up by Ruja-ol-dowlah and sent off.

The next day Khan Bahadoor went to visit Bukt Khan accompanied only by one of his family and a few attendants; his object was to beg the loan of two guns from Bukt Khan, to enable him to overawe the mob of the city. Bukt Khan declined lending the guns, but promised assistance if it was required. The same night Sobha Ram went secretly to Bukt Khan and presented him with a pair of shawls worth Rupees 2,000.

While the mutinous regiments remained at Bareilly, Khan Bahadoor had little authority; the sepahis acted as they pleased; they plundered many houses in the city, and seized any good swords or horses they took a fancy to. On the 7th June, some of the sowars of the 5th Irregulars surrounded the Sowbara Mohulla and demanded that Miser Bijnath, a banker, and Kunjet Lall, the Government Treasurer, should be given up to them; they concealed themselves for a short time, but were afterwards discovered and taken before Khan Bahadoor; he was in Durbar with Ahmed Shah Khan, Kussul Mund Brahmin, Mabarek Shah Khan, Moulvi Shah Khan, Ruja-ol-dowlah, Syfoolu, Amanut Hossain, Sobha Ram, and others; Miser Bijnath was
ordered to pay up at once all the money he had in his hands belonging to English officers, and the Treasurer was ordered to produce whatever money he had; on their refusal, they were heavily ironed and made over to Bukt Khan; they were taken into Cantonments, shamefully ill-treated, being made to stand for two days in the sun, and were threatened to be burnt alive or blown away from a gun if they continued obstinate; at last Rupees 54,000 was got from them, when they were released; this arrangement was brought about by their paying Rupees 4,000 privately to Mohamed Shuffe Rissaldar, one of the leaders of the troops. About the time that Miser Bijnath was taken before Khan Bahadoor Khan, Ali Khan, Tehseeladar of Shahi, arrived at Bareilly bringing with him Rupees 14,000 which he intended to present to Khan Bahadoor; some sepahs who happened to be at the Cotwalli seized it, and carried it away to Bukt Khan.

On the 11th June the sepahs marched from Bareilly to join the rebels at Delhi; they committed great outrages before they started, and on the road, Mobareek Shah Khan accompanied them the first march out, and sent an urze by Bukt Khan to the King of Delhi soliciting the appointment of Nazim in Rohilcund.

After the troops left, Khan Bahadoor made some attempt to regulate the disorders prevailing in the city and the district; he called a council composed of Soba Ram Dewan, Madar Ali Khan, Ahmed Shah Khan, and Mobareek Shah Khan, who had returned from Futtuhgunge. After some discussion it was decided to appoint a committee for the trial of all cases in the first instance. The members were—

Karamut Khan,—a descendant of Hafiz Rehmat Khan, and relative of Khan Bahadoor.

Akbar Ali Khan,—a relative of Khan Bahadoor, formerly Sudder Ameen of Matta, dismissed for taking bribes; he was head of the committee and received a salary of Rupees 1,000 a month; all revenue matters were made over to him.

Cazy Cholam Hamza,—Cazy of the City of Bareilly.

Pundit Ojhar Tegh Nath,—a friend of Soba Ram, appointed head Pundit.

Mozufer Boosain Khan,—descendant of Hafiz Rehmat, subsequently appointed Sudder Ala.

Jaffir Ali Khan,—a wealthy Zemindar.

Jynal Singh,—Thakoor of Keora, sat on the committee for about two months.

Kulb Ali Shah,—an influential Mahompedan of the old city.

This committee continued to carry on business during the whole of Khan Bahadoor’s reign.

Khan Bahadoor after settling the committee, proceeded to appoint Tehseelars and Thannadars for the district, and officers for the army he was raising; for list of those appointed see Appendix B.

The next day the council met again; the state of the finances forced itself on their attention; all the money in the Treasury had been taken away by the mutineers, as well as some that had been brought in from the Moofsil, and also the sums that had been extorted from Miser Bijnath and Kunnyah Lall. The Treasury was consequently empty; part of the rabbi kists had been collected before the outbreak, and what was due could not be reckoned on. The council therefore determined to levy a tax on the city; to give some shew of legality to this, Khan Bahadoor called for a Bywasta from some Pandits and for a Fatwa from the Moofsil. The question propounded to them was, “If a Raja or Nawab is in want of money for public purposes, how much of his subjects’ moveable property may be take?” Pandit Ojhar Tegh Nath, Mooftee Enayat Ahmed and Moollie Amanat Hoosain, having considered the question, replied that a ruler in such circumstances might call upon his subjects for 1-10th of their wealth.
On receipt of this answer Khan Bahadoor appointed a committee under
Khoshi Ram to assess the tax; the committee was composed of—
Kummoo Mull, Banker,
Ram Pershaud, Mahajan,
Ram Lall do,
Doorga Pershaud, Karinda of Raja Ruttun Sing,
Doorga Pershaud, Gomashita of Muttra Dass.

The committee sat in the house of Kunnyah Lall, and after taking an es­
imate of the property possessed by the Mahajuns and others, sent in a state­
ment fixing the amount of the tax at Rupees 1,07,000 to be paid in four instal­
ments, one in June, one in July, one in August, and the last in September. On
this Khoshi Ram was appointed to collect the first instalment at once; he was
afterwards dismissed and Bam Am Ali and Syfoolah Khan were ordered to
collect the remaining portion; they proceeded to do this by the most violent
measures, cows bones were placed before the Hindoos, plates of iron were
heated and those who refused to pay were scared on them; by these means
they collected in all, with the first instalment, Rupees 82,000. The balance
was remitted, on the people bribing Sobha Ram; the money thus obtained was
applied to the expenditure on account of guns and powder.

On the 21st of June a Firman from the King of Delhi was received by
Khan Bahadoor in reply to the petition sent by him on the 2nd; he was ap­
pointed ruler of Kutehr with full authority in all revenue and Police matters.
Copies of this Firman were sent to all the Tehseelis and Thannahs, and one was
set up at the Cotwali. Many persons however doubted whether the Firman
was a genuine paper from the King of Delhi. They thought it was impossible
that a reply to the petition of the 2nd of June should have been received
so quickly, now that all the daks were stopped. It had however an effect
with the mass of the people and brought many adherents to Khan Bahadoor.

Shortly after this Khan Bahadoor again seized Misl Bijnath and extorted
some money from him; he also seized Lutchim Naiain, Treasurer, and made
him pay Rupees 8,000, being a balance in his hands belonging to Mr.
Berkeley.

The money obtained by the tax on the city, by fines from Bunkers and
others, and by plunder, was soon expended, and Khan Bahadoor was again
obliged to consider measures for obtaining funds for the payment of the troops
he had enlisted, the salaries of the men he had appointed to various situ­
tations, and the expenses of the Gun Foundry, &c.

Khan Bahadoor's authority was pretty well established in the city, and
the Mahomedan parts of the district, but in the Pergunnahs of Besulpoor,
Fureedpoor, and Nawabgunge, was scarcely acknowledged. He and his
council considered that it would be politic to negotiate with the Thakoors who
were the chief landholders in those parts, and through their agency keep that
part of the country quiet, and collect the revenue. Khan Bahadoor accor­
dingly began to act on this plan; he took every opportunity in Durbar of speak­
ing in praise of the Thakoors, and expressing his admiration of their great
qualities; he had also two men, already supporters of his, through whose in­
fluence and address he had reason to believe that he should be able to succeed
in his wishes. One of them, Jymal Sing, Thakoor of Kears, had intrigued
with Bukt Khan and Mahomed Shulfi before the mutiny; on this coming to
the knowledge of the Commissioner of the Division, he had been sent for;
Khan Bahadoor on this occasion volunteered to be answerable for Jymal Sing's
loyalty; there was consequently a friendly feeling between them. The other
agent was Surnam Sing, a Jemadar of General Parsons, when Sobha Ram was
employed in the Commissariat; between Sobha Ram and Surnam Sing there
was a long-standing friendship and alliance. Surnam Sing joined Khan
Bahadoor heartily and was of essential service to him in bringing over the
Thakoors to his side.
Jymal Sing had at once declared for Khan Bahadoor; he waited on him in Durbar on the 2nd June, presented a nuzzler and received permission to raise a regiment from among his clan of Jhangara Rajpoots. Through his influence Thakoor Davi Sing, Ilquadar of Douzuteya, now joined Khan Bahadoor and presented his nuzzler. The next day Thakoor Rugonath Sing of Bodowlee came and joined Khan Bahadoor; after presenting a nuzzler he was directed to raise a regiment, and ordered to collect the revenues of the Furreepdoor Pergunnah. The Thakoor of Sheohghur, the Thakoors of Nugeria, Thakoor Koombheli Sing of Keuria, Thakoor Nundoo Sing of Entgaon, and other large landed proprietors among the Thakoors also came in and tendered their allegiance. Jymal Sing for his services on this occasion received a salary of Rupees 1,000 a month and the title of Collector. He continued for some time a steady supporter of Khan Bahadoor, and was of essential service to him on many occasions.

At the end of June, Thakoor Rugonath Sing of Bodowlee having enlisted 400 men brought them to Bareilly, where they were inspected by Khan Bahadoor and stationed near the city. At this time Hakeem Saadut Ali went once from Rampoor to Aowlah, to settle a dispute between the Hindus and Mahomedans there; Khan Bahadoor was afraid of his influence, and ordered Rugonath Sing to march with his men to Aowlah; he was dismissed in full Durbar, after having been invested with a khiltut, the title of Raja, and having received pan from Khan Bahadoor himself; before he reached Aowlah the dispute there had been adjusted and Hakeem Saadut Ali had gone back to Rampoor, he therefore returned to Bareilly.

Khan Bahadoor's success with these Thakoors established his authority in some measure in the district of Bareilly and part of Shahjehanpoor; but in Budaon the power of his Nazim, Abdul Rahman Khan, was merely nominal. A large landed proprietor, Thakoor Hur Lall of Bukshiena, commonly called the Dhabo Dham Thakoor, collected his clan, and declared himself independent of the King of Delhi and his Nazim, Khan Bahadoor; he refused to acknowledge Abdul Rahman Khan, and collected the revenues of Pergunnah Saleempoor on his own account; he was joined by numbers of his clan, and by other Rajpoots, and advanced to Budaon to attack Abdul Rahman Khan; all the inhabitants of the place, however, Hindu and Mahomedan, knowing that if there was a fight, they should be plundered, whichever side won, joined Abdul Rahman to oppose him. On this he returned to Saleempoor, but continued to hold the country in his own name. Khan Bahadoor fearing that his example might be followed by other Thakoors, determined to send a strong force to put him down; Nez Mahomed was, therefore, sent with some guns, cavalry, and infantry; on reaching Budaon he was joined by Abdul Rahman Khan, and they proceeded together to attack Hur Lall; he was defeated and fled, but the whole country being in his favor, they were unable to put him down effectually; they therefore applied to Khan Bahadoor for reinforcements; he had none to send, and therefore determined to try what could be done by negotiation. Accordingly Jymal Sing was sent to Hur Lall; he succeeded in inducing Hur Lall to acknowledge Khan Bahadoor, and returned to Bareilly.

The money from the Besulpoor Treasury had not yet been brought in; Khan Bahadoor therefore sent a force to escort it to Bareilly; the money was brought in safety to the old city, but was there met by some men of Chotan Khan's regiment and the Risalas of Surub Jung Khan and Tufuzul Hossain Khan; they took Rupees 5,000 of it and sent the remainder on to Khan Bahadoor.

Rugonath Sing's Regiment, which was stationed at Bareilly, began at the end of July to be clamorous for some pay. Khan Bahadoor having no funds at hand, issued an order for the amount due on Surub Sukh Raie, Tehseeldar of Furreepdoor, and gave it to Rugonath Sing. Between Rugonath Sing and Surub Sukh Raie there was an old-standing grudge; he was consequently annoyed at the latter being appointed Tehseeldar of Furreepdoor where his estates lay. On Rugonath Sing's presenting the order, Surub
Sukh Raie told him that he had no money to pay it, and that he must wait till the khureef kists came in. Rugonath Sing went to Bodowlee, and having collected all the men of his clan, to the number of 8 or 10,000, returned to Fureedpoor, and on the 31st July attacked Surub Sukh Raie, and killed him with many of his men. Rahat Olah Khan, Bessaldar, happened at this time to be encamped on the Shahjanpanoor road near Fureedpoor, with about 500 men; on hearing what had occurred, he marched on the 1st August to attack Rugonath Sing, and was defeated, being killed with about fifty of his men. When information of this was received at Bareilly it caused considerable excitement among the Pathans, and Khan Bahadoor saw that it was necessary to put down the Rajpoots at once; he accordingly marched himself at the head of all his forces towards Fureedpoor; after he had gone a short distance he was prevailed upon to return by his attendants, but sent his troops on under Madar Ali Khan, Syfoolah Khan, and Tufuzul Hossin Khan. The Thakoors having no guns were unable to oppose them and therefore retreated. Madar Ali marched to Futtchunge plundering and burning all the Rajpoot villages he came across; he also sent Ali Khan with a small force to Bodowlee, which was burnt and plundered. Madar Ali Khan then returned to Bareilly, Rugonath Sing having fled to Bhurraoli.

Rugonath Sing had thus compromised himself with the Pathans by the defeat and slaughter of Rahat Olah Khan and his men; and with Soba Ram by the murder of Surub Sukh Raie and his relations who where Kayaths; other causes of disagreement had also arisen; a friend of Thakoor Jymal Sing's had been seized and confined notwithstanding his entreaties; Soba Ram had blown away two Thakoors from guns on hearing of the business at Fureedpoor, and quarrels about the payments of the revenue had taken place.

Khan Bahadoor seeing the feeling among the Thakoors, and being aware that he had no chance of successfully opposing the English without the assistance of the Hindoo population, attempted to re-attach them to his interests. He released Jymal Sing's friend, who was still in confinement; he sent Soba Ram to Kaira to induce Jymul Sing to return to Bareilly and attend his Durbars which he had given up doing; by these measures an apparent friendship was patched up between them, but the Thakoors henceforward only waited for an opportunity to declare against Khan Bahadoor.

The Syuds of the Nao Mehla being displeased at the influence possessed by Soba, and disliking the Hindoo element mixed up with the Government, through his means, were anxious to ruin him. One day in August while he was in Durbar, they reported secretly to Khan Bahadoor that an English gentleman was concealed in Soba Ram's house, and obtained permission to search it; they took with them a Regiment and a Risalah of Cavalry and surrounded the place, broke open the doors, and began plundering the property. This was told to Enayet Olah Khan, Buksheesh Ali, and some friends of Soba Ram's, who went to the place and put a stop to the plunder. Soba Ram was in Durbar while this was going on; when he was informed of what had happened he went home, shut himself up, and refused to attend Durbar again. After a few days, through the agency of Madar Ali Khan, who was an intimate friend of Soba Ram, and by the apologies and regrets lavishly expressed by Khan Bahadoor, he was appeased and again took charge of his duties. A few days after this a body was found in a well in the Public Gardens; it is supposed by many that Mr. Wyatt was really concealed in Soba Ram's house, until the attack on it by the Syuds; that Soba Ram was then alarmed at the consequences to himself, should Mr. Wyatt's residence there be discovered, and that he therefore had him killed and thrown into this well, at a distance from his house, to avert suspicion from him.

Khan Bahadoor and his advisers felt that as long as the English held Nainee Tal his authority could not be firmly established in Rohilcund; he feared that they might raise troops there and come down to attack Bareilly, and he knew that the fact of their being there would always be an element of weakness in his Government and would induce many to plot against him.
Accordingly in July, as soon as he found himself in a position to do so, he had collected a force to attack the place; he appointed his grandson, Bunni Meer, to the command, and he had accordingly marched as far as Behari, on the road; he delayed there however and did nothing beyond plundering that part of the country.

On the 18th of August, Khan Bahadoor by the advice of Ruja-ol-dowlah determined on sending a nuzzer to the King of Delhi in the hope of obtaining a dress of honor in return, accordingly Ruja-ol-dowlah having drawn up the letter and arranged the nuzzer, the following presents were sent:—

1 elephant, with gold howda and trappings.
1 Horse, with jewelled trappings.
1 Koran.
1 Crown.
101 Goldmohours.

The Crown and Koran were supplied by Ruja-ol-dowlah, who had received them from the King of Lucknow, and brought them with him to Bareilly. The nuzzer was sent under charge of Ahmed Shah Khan, Ali Yar Khan, and Akbar Khan, with fifty horsemen, and 200 foot. Ahmed Shah Khan returned after going as far as Rampoor, but the rest went on to Delhi.

All this time Bunni Meer who had started in July to attack Nainee Tal had loitered at Behari, plundering the country. In October, Ali Khan Mewatie and Hafiz Kullan Khan were sent with a regiment and some cavalry to join him and urge him on. Bunni Meer made some objections to proceeding at once, on which Ali Khan told him that he might go back to Bareilly if he liked, that all he wanted was his guns; accordingly Bunni Meer returned to Bareilly and Ali Khan went on to Huldwanee and Kat Godown, both which places he plundered and burnt; the next day he was attacked by a force sent from Nainee Tal and defeated with considerable loss.

Khan Bahadoor having been informed that intelligence of the intended attack on Nainee Tal had been sent from Bareilly, ordered every man who could read or write English to be imprisoned; they were kept in confinement for two days and then released, under threats of punishment in case they were detected corresponding with the English; all the Bengalis were ordered to leave the city at once.

Rugonath Sing and the other Thakoors after the fight at Fureedpoor and their subsequent flight had remained at Kumraolie. No revenue was received by Khan Bahadoor from that part of the country, he therefore in October determined to send a strong force under command of Madar Ali Khan to Besulpoor, to collect the kists due, as well as from Powain and Deuria. Surnam Sing went with Madar Ali Khan, and through his influence with the Thakoors induced many of them to meet him. After some time Rugonath Sing of Bodowelie, Koshan Sing and Konjbehari Sing of Deuria, Nundoo Sing of Entgaon, Kaher Sing of Kumraolie, and Lakan Sing of Kothar, agreed to accompany Madar Ali to Bareilly, where they presented their nuzzers to Khan Bahadoor; they then entered into an agreement together. The Thakoors swore on Ganges water, in which salt had been mixed, to be faithful subjects to Khan Bahadoor, and in return he conferred on them the farms of the following Ilaquas:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ilaqua</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To Lakan Sing, the farm of Kothar for</td>
<td>62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Nundoo Sing, Kaher Sing, Konjbehari Sing, and Roshan Sing, Besulpoor</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugonath Sing and Bylas Sing, Bodowelie</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rugonath Sing and Bylas Sing, however, feeling that they could never be secure under Khan Bahadoor's government, owing to their concern in the murder of the Kayths at Fureedpoor, by which they had made Soba Ram their enemy, and the subsequent defeat and slaughter of Rahat Oolah Khan
and his men, by which they had offended the Pathans, took the first opportunity of leaving the district and flying to Bashipoor, whence they went up to Nainee Tal to have an interview with the Commissioner, and where they afterwards remained until the re-occupation of the country, when they joined the English force at Moradabad, accompanied it to Bareilly, and have since done good service.

Notwithstanding his arrangements with the Thakoors, and the tax he had levied from the city and the confiscation of the property of everyone suspected of being favourable to the English Government, Khan Bahadoor found himself again in want of money. Although the revenue from the villages was rigorously exacted, and in many cases a great deal more than the Government demand, a very small portion of it found its way into his Treasury. By plunder and confiscation Khan Bahadoor had managed to collect a great quantity of silver ornaments, &c.; this was useless to him in its present form, and he therefore determined by the advice of his council to issue a coinage of his own; after much discussion it was determined to issue rupees of the coinage of Alum Shah, but with a change of date; accordingly a mint was set up in Rampershand's house, which had been confiscated on his refusing to serve as Treasurer. A small quantity of silver money was issued; it was good silver and full weight, and passed readily for 16 annas the rupee.

The mint not producing money as quickly as Khan Bahadoor wished, he again seized Misr Bijnath with the intention of getting some money from him; he refused to pay anything, and after being kept in confinement for a few days was released on bribing Syfoola Khan.

The farm of the Dataganje Ilaqua had been given by Khan Bahadoor to Bhooor Khan; this brought him into collision with Neaz Mahomed Khan and Syfoola Khan, who had charge of the Soorajpoor Ghát. On some dispute regarding the dues collected by them, they attacked Khoori Khan; he and his son were badly wounded and came into Bareilly, where they shortly afterwards died.

These quarrels among the Pathans, and disagreements with the Thakoors, added to the reports that gradually got about of the successes of the English troops, had a depressing influence on the minds of the people. Khan Bahadoor therefore determined to try to raise their hopes, and renew their first excitement, by investing himself publicly with a dress of honor, said to have been received from the King of Delhi. Accordingly on the 1st October, notices were issued throughout the town, that a khiltut sent by the King of Delhi was on its way to Khan Bahadoor, and that it had come as far as Aowlah; four Sandni sowars and some cavalry were sent to meet it, and bring it with suitable state to a garden outside the city, where it was notified that Khan Bahadoor would be invested with it. On the morning of the 2nd October, Khan Bahadoor attended by all the leading men among his followers dressed in their best, and mounted on elephants, proceeded, followed by an immense crowd to the garden of Deep Chand, where the khiltut had been halted. After his investiture a salute of twenty-one guns was fired, and all in attendance presented nuzzars; a khiltut was then given to Soba Ram, on which eleven guns were fired. It is said that at this moment Ali Yar Khan, who had just come from Delhi, whispered to Khan Bahadoor that the tidings of the fall of Delhi were true, and that the King was then a prisoner in the hands of the English; his countenance at once fell, he went straight to his house, and afterwards took very little part in the government of the country, all business being carried on by Soba Ram, Syfoola Khan, Neaz Mahomed, and Ruja-ol-dowlah.

The news of the fall of Delhi, and of the defeat of the troops sent to attack Nainee Tal, spread rapidly through the country, though every means was taken by Khan Bahadoor and his advisers to mislead the people; false Akbars were published; Sandni sowars were sent out secretly, and received
in public Durbar on their return, as having come from Lucknow, Delhi and Furrackabad, with news of victories gained over the English troops. Many doubted these tidings of constant victories, but no one ventured to express his opinion openly; the distrust in the intelligence of success published by Khan Bahadoor was increased by the arrival at Bareilly of several leaders of the rebellion in other parts of the country. Among others Walid Khan made his appearance. He came by a small number of followers. On his reaching Bareilly on the 21st October, Khan Bahadoor sent him a present of Rupees 400, and fixed his allowance at Rupees 15 a day. He had several interviews with Khan Bahadoor, and in hopes of raising the spirits of the people, who were getting very much depressed, they determined that he should set up a Mahomdi Jhunda or holy flag, and invite all true Mahomedeans to join him in waging war against the unbelievers. The flag was carried through the city with great pomp and ceremony, and afterwards set up in the Hosainee garden; food was given to all who would enroll themselves; about 200 of the lowest class joined, and remained as long as food was distributed; when this was discontinued they left the holy banner. Ismael Khan and Raheem Ali Khan also reached Bareilly at this time; their arrival as fugitives confirmed the people in their belief of the reports that were now beginning to spread of the uniform success of the English forces.

In October, Meer Alum Khan, a relation of Khan Bahadoor, was informed by a spy that a lakh of rupees was concealed in the house of Baldeo Geer Gosbain, a resident of Mouza Nara, Pargunah Douka. The Gosbain was a man of considerable repute, and of great influence among the Hindus. Meer Alum, the night after he had received this information, left Bareilly taking with him Akbar Khan, Naib Peshkar, and twenty so wars. He reached Nara about daybreak; Baldeo Geer having received information of his coming, shut the doors of his house, and seated himself on the roof with a few of his most trusty followers. Meer Alum tried to force open the gateway, but without success; after some time he got in through a court-yard at the back of the house. Musammut Joola, the Gosbain’s wife, attempted to fly. Meer Alum, seizing her by the hair, and threatened her with ill-treatment unless she pointed out where the money was buried. The Gosbain, seeing the indignities to which his wife was being subjected, fired at Meer Alum; he had loaded his gun with copper pice, and by one discharge killed both Meer Alum and Akbar Khan, who were standing together. Habiboolah Khan, Tehsildar of Shahi, hearing of what had happened, went to Nara, seized the Gosbain, his wife, and some of his relations, and sent them into Bareilly to Khan Bahadoor, with the dead bodies of Meer Alum and Akbar Khan. The case was made over for trial to Mooftee Syud Ahmed. On the 10th December he released the Gosbains, as they had been unjustly attacked by Meer Alum. This decision caused great excitement among the Pathans, and Moullvie Khan, brother of Meer Alum, taking with him some of the men of his regiment, seized Baldeo Geer and cut him to pieces with their swords.

As long as the English held Nainee Tal, Khan Bahadoor could never feel secure; it was consequently his constant object to get possession of the place. The first expedition under Ali Khan had been repulsed; another was now got up. Guolam Hyder Khan was sent to Buheri with three guns, and a large force of cavalry and infantry; he was joined by Fuzl Huq with the whole of his troops from Pilibeet. They remained a few days at Buheri and then marched on to Bundee. While there a man came to Fuzl Huq and told him that he had been imprisoned at Nainee Tal by the English, that he had just made his escape, and would guide him by an undefended road, if he would reward him well. Accordingly the force marched in the night; after they had gone some distance they were fired at by a picket, and at once fled, thinking that they had been led into an ambush. Fuzl Huq fled to Bareilly, but Ali Khan still remained at Buheri. Shortly after this Feroze Shah came to Bareilly for the first time; he had only a few men with him, and after a halt of three days went on to Lucknow.
Although Moharik Shah Khan had been disappointed in his hopes of obtaining the musnud for himself, he had remained a steady supporter of Khan Bahadoor; he now became anxious to obtain a more independent position than that which he now held, and having bribed Soba Ram heavily, succeeded in getting appointed Nazim of Budaon in the room of Abdool Rahman Khan, who was removed to make way for him. On receiving the appointment he presented a nuzzar of Rupees 5,000 to Khan Bahadoor. He ill-treated the people, and plundered to such an extent that after nine weeks Khan Bahadoor was obliged to recall him, and re-appoint Abdool Rahman Khan.

Khan Bahadoor and his Council now thought that they might get some more money from Misr Bijnath; a guard was sent to search his house, on the pretence that some Europeans were concealed there. Misr Bijnath and his sons were seized and taken before Khan Bahadoor, money was demanded from them; on their refusal they were sentenced to be imprisoned on the charge of corresponding with the Commissioner at Nainee Tal; they remained upwards of a month in jail, heavily ironed, and subjected to great indignities. They at length obtained their release by paying a bribe of Rupees 2,600 to Syfoola Khan.

Mooftee Syud Ahmed, to whom the case against the Goshain and his wife had been made over for trial, was now removed from his situation in consequence of the dissatisfaction his judgment had given to the Pathans; Ahmed Ali Khan was appointed Mooftee in his place.

The murder of the Goshain by Moulvie Khan and the sowars, after he had been pronounced guiltless by the Mooftee, greatly exasperated the Hindoos. They had been treated almost from the first as slaves to the Mahomedans: their prejudices regarding cow-killing had been disregarded; in fact they soon found that in the place of the English rule, giving equal justice to all, they had assisted in raising a Mahomedan government intolerant and bigoted to the last degree. Khan Bahadoor from motives of policy had attempted to attach the Thakoors, and Hindoos to him, and had succeeded for a short time; but the bulk of his Mahomedan followers took little trouble to conceal their contempt and hatred for the Hindoos. To allay this growing irritation, and if possible band the two races together again against the British Government, it was determined that a Pathakar, or holy flag under which all Hindoos might rally, should be raised, and that at the same time a Mohumdee Jhunda should be set up. Accordingly, on the 20th January, Soba Ram, accompanied by Gopal Nund, Newal Nund, and Ishurmund, Brahmans, and Gunesh Rai, Hursukh Rai, Beem Sen, and Teka Ram, Kayaths, went in procession mounted on elephants with a large following, carrying the Pathakar, which they set up on the banks of the Ramgunga, calling on all Hindoos to rally under it, and join with the Mahomedans in opposition to the English, who were the enemies to all the religions of Hindoostan.

On the same day a Mohumdee Jhunda was set up by order of Khan Bahadoor in a garden near the city, and food distributed beneath it. Very few men came to either place of gathering, and the flags after being left standing for a few days were removed. In fact the people began to see that the contest against the English was hopeless. The Hindoos and Mahomedans were enraged against one another, as much as the latter were against the English. This feeling of distrust in the ultimate success of Khan Bahadoor was increased by the reports circulating through the district, and by the daily arrival of fugitives from various parts of the country. The people had found out the dodges attempted by Khan Bahadoor to keep them together, and placed little reliance on any report circulated by his orders. In the beginning of January a Sandani sower arrived, it was said, from Furruckabad, bringing accounts of a victory obtained over the English there; two days afterwards this intelligence was contradicted by the arrival at Bareilly of Nawab Bungush, the Races of Furruckabad.
Hubeeboolah Khan, who had remained at Baheri when Fuzl Huq fled to Bareilly, now made a Chupao on the Government thannah at Kale Dongee. He succeeded in surprising the place, and killed the Thannadar, whose head was cut-off, and sent to Bareilly; three days after Hubeeboolah came himself to Bareilly, and received a dress of honour for his exploit; he afterwards applied for one of the confiscated houses, and this being refused, he left Bareilly and went to Lucknow.

Khan Bahadoor now organized another attack on Nainee Tal; he collected all his available forces, and sent them to Baheri under Mahomed Ali Khan, who had been a short time before appointed Nazim of that part of the country. After Mahomed Ali had collected his forces he marched to Bundea, and from thence to Churpoorah, where he was attacked by a force sent from Nainee Tal, and utterly defeated on the 3rd February 1858 with the loss of three guns and a number of men; he himself being killed, as was also Hafiz Nizam Ali, his Naib; the troops fled in the greatest disorder; some of them halted at Baheri, when Mahmood Khan assumed the command, but the greater number did not stop till they reached Bareilly, where they were received by Khan Bahadoor with abuse and reproaches; he said to them, "You worthless cowards, you take ten days to march from Bareilly to Churpoorah, but only one to come back after seeing the English forces."

Khan Bahadoor after the defeat of his troops at Churpoorah gave up all idea of attacking Nainee Tal, and turned his attention to defending himself from an invasion from that quarter. Ghaus Mahomed Khan was accordingly sent with some guns and men to join Mahomed Ali Khan at Baheri, where they entrenched themselves. They remained there until the re-occupation of Rohilcund in May, when they fled to Oudh. At the same time Khan Bahadoor hearing that an attack from Almorah was in contemplation, ordered Fuzl Huq to Burumdeo with some guns and a force of cavalry and infantry.

Khan Bahadoor at this time, seeing how hopeless it was to attempt to put an end to the divisions among the Hindoos and Mahomedans of Rohilcund, and knowing that unassisted he had no chance of being able to hold the country against the English, determined to try whether he could induce the Sikhs to join him. Accordingly, on the 6th February, after the defeat at Churpoorah, he and his council determined to send a messenger to the Itaja of Pualala, and to Maharajti, Golab Sing of Cashmere, to urge on them the duty they owed to their faith to unite with him in opposition to the English. A Mahunt was sent the next day with valuable presents for each, and a good sum for his own road expenses, what became of him is not known.

About the end of January a Sandhi sawar arrived at Bareilly bringing letters from Lucknow giving intelligence of the complete defeat of the English army under the Commander-in-Chief. This good news was proclaimed throughout the city and district. In a few days another letter was received from Nana Rao saying that he was on his road to Bareilly, and requesting that a place might be prepared for him to live in with his women; he arrived on the 25th March, and remained at Bareilly till the end of April; he found himself in a false position here, where the rebellion had by this time assumed an entirely Mahomedan character; he made some attempts to put a stop to cow-killing in the city, and also to induce the Hindoos to join the Mahomedans in opposing the English, but without success. When the Commander-in-Chief had arrived at Jalalabad, Nana Rao solicited and obtained command of the force sent to Furreedpoor to oppose him. This proposal was merely a subterfuge to conceal his intention of deserting; he took with him all his women, and whatever treasure he possessed, and on reaching Furreedpoor turned off towards Besulpur and fled into Oudh.

After the fall of Lucknow, Feroze Shah returned to Bareilly with about 1,000 men; he remained at Bareilly a few days, and then marched suddenly by Sumbhul to Moradabad, where he attacked the forces of the Nawab of Rampoor, and got possession of the town for one day; he at once issued orders
for a tax on all the Hindoos, but on the next day being attacked by some troops sent from Rampoor by the Nawab, and also hearing of the approach of the English force from Roorkee, he left Moradabad and fled to Bareilly, and ultimately accompanied Khan Bahadoor to Oudh.

Mahmood Khan of Najeebad arrived at Bareilly in April, and afterwards fled to Oudh with Khan Bahadoor, a son of his who had come to Bareilly previously was killed at the Nurkuttea bridge on the 5th May 1858.

Khan Bahadoor and his Council were now at their wits' end; they felt that they could oppose no effectual resistance to the forces marching to attack them. The plans determined on to-day were changed tomorrow, and all was confusion. At one time it was decided on to erect entrenchments on the roads leading from Shahjahanpoor, Moradabad, and Budaon, and portions of the forces were sent out to the places fixed on, where some works were thrown up. This idea was then abandoned, and it was determined to make the final stand at Bareilly, but no measures were taken to put the city in a state of defence. All this time the English troops were rapidly concentrating; the Commander-in-Chief reached Bareilly on the 5th May, and defeated the force sent to oppose him at the Nurkuttea bridge close to the city and cantonments. That evening Khan Bahadoor with the greater number of his adherents fled to Phillibeet, and from thence to Oudh. Some few remained and attempted to oppose the column from Moradabad which reached Bareilly on the 6th May, on the opposite side to that on which the Commander-in-Chief had come.

On the 7th May Bareilly was in the possession of the Commander-in-Chief and the rebels were flying to Oudh. The authority of the British Government was at the same time restored throughout the district.

Bareilly, 30th November 1858.

(Sd.) J. F. D. INGLIS.

APPENDIX A.

List of European residents and Native Christians at Bareilly on the 31st May 1857.

CIVIL.

R. Alexander, Esq., Commissioner
J. Guthrie, Esq., Collector and Magistrate
D. Robertson, Esq., Judge
G. D. Raikes, Esq., Sessions Judge
G. B. Pasley, Esq., Joint Magistrate
C. Currie, Esq.,
C. P. Carmichael, Esq.,
Mrs. Carmichael and child,
Dr. J. M. Hay, Civil Surgeon
Dr. Hansborough, Superintendent of the Jail
Dr. Buch, Principal of the College
G. Wyatt, Esq., Deputy Collector
R. Orr, Esq.,
H. Berkeley, Esq.
H. Templeton, Esq.
Mr. J. Beale
Mrs. Beale and child
Mr. Watts and sister
Mr. Beddy
Revd. L. Poynder

... Escaped.
... Do.
... Killed.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Do.
... Escaped.
... Do.
... Escaped.
... Do.
... Killed.
... Escaped.
MILITARY.

Staff.

Brigadier H. Sibbald, C.B. ... ... ... Killed.
Captain S. G. Brownlow, Brigade-Major ... ... ... Escaped.
Captain J. Hume, Executive Engineer ... ... ... Do.

Artillery.

Captain G. Kirby ... ... ... ... Escaped.
Lieutenant Fraser ... ... ... ... Do.
Serjeant Walden ... ... ... ... Do.
" Staples ... ... ... ... Killed.

8th irregular cavalry.

Lieutenant A. M. MacKenzie ... ... ... ... Escaped.
" D. W. Becher ... ... ... ... Do.

68th regiment, N.I.

Colonel O. Troup ... ... ... ... Escaped.
Captain P. A. Robertson ... ... ... ... Do.
" A. H. Patterson ... ... ... ... Do.
" J. I. Gibbs ... ... ... ... Do.
Lieutenant O. Warde ... ... ... ... Do.
" H. H. Christian ... ... ... ... Do.
" J. T. Stanton ... ... ... ... Do.
" B. Rogers... ... ... ... Do.
Ensign R. G. Tucker ... ... ... ... Killed.
" W. Jacob ... ... ... ... Escaped.
Surgeon J. Bowhill ... ... ... ... Do.
Serjeant-Major Jennings ... ... ... ... Do.
Quarter-Master Serjeant Henry ... ... ... ... Killed.

18th regiment, N.I.

Major H. C. Pearson ... ... ... ... Killed.
Captain T. C. Richardson ... ... ... ... Do.
" H. B. Hathorn ... ... ... ... Do.
" J. Y. Gowan... ... ... ... Escaped.
Lieutenant M. Hunter ... ... ... ... Do.
" H. H. Stewart ... ... ... ... Killed.
" J. C. Dyson ... ... ... ... Do.
" W. Barwell ... ... ... ... Escaped.
Dr. Oakely ... ... ... ... Do.
Serjeant-Major Belcham, wife and family ... ... ... ... Do.
Quarter-Master Serjeant Cross and child ... ... ... ... Killed.

Assistants and clerks in the Commissioner's office.

Mr. J. A. Fenwick
" H. Alone
Mrs. Alone and two children ... ... ... ... Killed.
Mr. S. G. Nicholas

Collector and Magistrate's office.

Mr. Phellan
Mrs. Phellan and four children ... ... ... ... Killed.
Mr. H. Phellan ... ... ... ... Escaped.
" Davis ... ... ... ... Killed.
Mrs. Davis and two children ... ... ... ... Do.
" Wilkinson ... ... ... ... Escaped.
JUDGE'S OFFICE.

Mr. Fanthome
Mrs. Fanthome and five children ...

EXECUTIVE ENGINEER'S OFFICE.

Mr. W. Porter
Mrs. Porter ...
Mr. Porter, Junior ...

JAIL ESTABLISHMENT.

Serjeant S. Wilson
Mrs. Wilson and 4 children ...
Serjeant Worrell ...
Mrs. Worrell ...
" Cruizer, Senior ...
Mr. Cruizer ...
Mrs. Cruizer, Junior, and 2 children ...

MERCHANTS, &C., &C.

Mr. J. Bolst ...
Miss Bolst ...
Mr. Lawrence ...
Mrs. Lawrence and 4 children ...
Mr. H. Aspinall ...
Mrs. H. Aspinall and 2 children ...
Mr. Aspinall, Senior ...
Mr. Stears and 2 children ...
Mrs. DeCamp and 3 children ...
Mr. W. Roberts, in the Adjutant's Office ...
Mrs. Roberts ...
Mr. S. Roberts ...
Mr. R. Richie ...
Mr. Jaques, in the Insane Hospital ...
Serjeant J. Hardy ...
Mrs. Hardy and 5 children ...
Mr. W. Hardy ...
Mr. Matthews, Church Clerk ...
Mrs. Matthews and 1 child ...
Mrs. Monks and 2 children ...
Benjamin Luke and Charlotte, an adopted daughter ...
Serjeant Cameron, wife and 2 children, Barrack Department ...
Mr. Healy ...
Luke, wife, and 6 children ...
Simeon ...
Simeon and 5 children ...
Phillip, wife, and 4 do.
John ...
John ...
Paul ...
Paul ...
Peter, wife, and 5 children ...
Peter ...
Yacoob, wife, and child ...
Mutter, do., and do. ...
Thoman, do., and 4 children ...

These escaped at the time, but are since missing

Escaped.
MR. D. ROBERTSON, DR. J. M. HAY, AND MR. R. ORR.

These gentlemen went to the house of Hamid Hussan Moonsiff of Bareilly, who promised to protect them, but were there killed. Nyz Ali, a Chupprassy of Hamid Hussan's Court, killed Mr. Robertson, whilst Ahmud Hussan, late Cotwal, Fuzulwa, and other budmashes attacked and murdered Dr. Hay and Mr. Orr.

MR. G. D. RAIKES AND DR. BUCH.

Had been promised protection and assistance by Aman Ali Khan of Bareilly in case any disturbance took place; went to his house on the mutiny breaking out, but were seen and followed by Shahamut Ali, Abdoolah and others, who surrounded the place. Kuramut Hoosen, a nephew of Aman Ali Khan's, assisted the people over the wall, and pointed out where these gentlemen were concealed, when they were both murdered.

MR. H. ASPINALL, MRS. ASPINALL, AND 2 CHILDREN, MRS. ASPINALL, SENIOR.

Went to the house of Zaker Ali (a karinda of Mr. Aspinall's), who promised them protection, but afterwards treacherously, in connivance with Yacooab Ali, Meer Khan and others, gave them up to Khan Bahadoor Khan at the Cotwallee, by whose directions they were all murdered.

MR. PHELLAN, MRS. PHELLAN, AND 4 CHILDREN, MR. DAVIS, MRS. DAVIS, AND 2 CHILDREN, MR. BEALE, MR. WATTS, AND SISTER.

On the mutiny breaking out, they left their houses, and assembled near the Neel-ki-Chowkee, where they were surrounded and murdered by the mob, headed by Bilhur, Sawah Raee, Ali Khan and other budmashes of the town.

MR. LAWRENCE, MRS. LAWRENCE, AND 4 CHILDREN.

Went to the house of Fyzoollah Syud, a resident of the Noh Mohulla, who protected them for a short time, but afterwards took their property from them, and turned them out; they then returned to their own house and remained in concealment during the night in the garden, and in the morning were murdered by Fyzoollah and others. The eldest daughter of Mr. Lawrence is said to have been detained by Fyzoollah, and has not been heard of since.

MR. BOLST AND MISS BOLST.

Mr. Bolst was killed near the "Puchperah" by some mutinous sepoys of the Jail Guard. Miss Bolst concealed herself near Mr. Berkeley's house, but was discovered and murdered.

SERJEANT CAMERON, WIFE, AND 2 CHILDREN.

These had concealed themselves in a Bhoosa Godown near their own bungalow, but were discovered by Shums Ahmud and others, who murdered them.

MR. ALONE, MRS. ALONE, AND 2 CHILDREN.

Mr. Alone and his family were attempting to escape towards Fureedpoor, but were seen and followed by Ahmud Shah Khan and others, and murdered near Bholanath's garden.
MR. FENWICK

Was murdered by Ali Khan and others near his own house.

MR. R. RICHIE

Was killed by Gholam Russool and others, in the city near the Tibreebagh.

MR. NICHOLAS

Was seized by some budmashes and taken before Khan Bahadoor Khan, who ordered him to be murdered.

DR. HANSBOROUGH

On the mutiny breaking out went to the room over the gateway of the Jail, where he remained till evening with three of the sepoys who continued faithful. After all the prisoners had been released, and the mob had dispersed, Dr. Hansborough came down and concealed himself, for the night, in one of the large drains of the Jail; but in the morning was seen by some of the residents of Noh Mohullab, and taken before Khan Bahadoor Khan at the Cotwalee, who ordered him to be murdered.

MAJOR PEARSON, CAPTAINS RICHARDSON AND HATHORN, LIEUTENANTS DIXON AND STEWART, 18TH REGIMENT NATIVE INFANTRY

These officers are said to have been protected by the men of the regiment for a short time and concealed in the quarter-gard, and at night accompanied on to the Shahjehanpoor road. They were afterwards surrounded and murdered by the villagers of Ram Puttee.

BRIGADIER SIBBALD

The Brigadier is said to have ridden away in the direction of the Irregular Cavalry Lines, followed by his two mounted orderlies. He is believed to have received the first shot from one of his orderlies, and was subsequently fired at and killed close to the camel shed.

LIEUT. TUCKER, 68TH REGIMENT

Was killed in the mess compound, while mounting his horse, by the mutinous sepoys of his Corps.

MR. G. WYATT

Is said to have remained concealed in Sobha Ram's house till the month of August, but on information being given to Khan Bahadoor Khan, the house was surrounded and searched, and Mr. Wyatt, it is supposed, killed afterwards by Sobha Ram's order, and his body thrown into the well in the public gardens.

MR. JAQUES

Was endeavouring to escape in the disguise of a fakeer, but was seized and taken before Khan Bahadoor Khan who ordered him to be murdered.
SERJEANT WORRALL, MR. CRINGER.

These two left Mr. Williams' party near the Jail, and in company with two men who had promised to show them a place of safety where the whole party might go, but they never returned and have not been heard of since.

SERJEANT STAPLES, ARTILLERY,

Was killed at Ruperee, on his way up to Nynce Tal.

QUARTER-MASTER SERJEANT CROSS AND CHILD, 18TH REGIMENT,

Supposed to have been killed along with some of the officers of the Corps at Ram Puttee.

QUARTER-MASTER SERJEANT HENRY, 68TH REGIMENT,

Killed at Bareilly.

List of gentlemen who escaped to Nynce Tal when the mutiny broke out on the 31st May 1857.

R. Alexander, Esq.
J. Guthrie, Esq.
G. B. Pailey, Esq.
C. Currie, Esq.
H. Berkeley, Esq.
Berkeley Esq.
H. Templeton, Esq.
Revd. L. Poynder.
Mr. Hardy.
Capt. Brownlow.
Capt. J. Hume.
Col. C. Trupf, 68th Regt.
Capt. P. Robertson.
Capt. Patterson.

Capt. Gibb.
Lieut. Warde.

Lieut. Christian.

Lieut. Stanton.

Capt. Rogers.

Ensign Jacob.

Dr. Bowhill.

Lieut. Hunter, 18th Regt.

Lieut. Barwall.

Dr. Oakeley.

Capt. Kirby, Artillery.

Lieut. Fraser.

Capt. Mackenzie, 8th I. C.

Lieut. Becher.

C. P. CARMICHAEL, ESQ., AND FAMILY

Were at Pilibueet, but escaped to Nynce Tal on hearing of the mutiny at Bareilly.

MR. H. PHALLON

Accompanied his family when they assembled near the Neel-ki-chowkee, but hid himself in a house when the mob surrounded them, and escaped. Was afterwards protected by Hubeeb Shah, with whom he remained till the re-occupation of Bareilly.

MRS. BEALE AND CHILD

Found refuge in the house of a native and ultimately reached Agra in safety.

MR. AND MRS. WILKINSON, MR. AND MRS. PORTER, AND MR. W. F. PORTER

On the first alarm escaped to the village of Shirreeab, about two miles from cantonments; from this village they wandered about the country staying
a few days in different villages, where they received every kindness, but finally were taken charge of by the Zemindars of Duttooreelah and Sootha of the Shahjehanpoor district, who kept and protected them for six months; after this they were escorted by a party of Thakoors across the Ganges, and conveyed to Mr. Wilson's camp at Gungeeree.

SERJEANT S. WILSON, MRS. WILSON AND FAMILY, MR. WARRELE, MR. CRINGER, SENIOR, MRS. CRINGER, AND TWO CHILDREN.

Serjeant Wilson was on duty at the jail when the mutiny broke out; but on the prisoners being released by the mutinous sepoys, and finding it not safe to remain, he rode off in the direction of Choubaree, but there the zemindars advised him not to remain; he then took the direction of the Nynee Tal road, skirting the cantonments and town, at some distance, and came into the road about the 8th mile-stone; at a police chowkee near Buheree he was attacked, but managed to escape, and again on approaching Buheree, he had another narrow escape for his life; about two miles from Buheree he was again attacked by four sowars, who took his horse from him, after which he hid himself in the jungles, and at night proceeded on his road, and reached Nynee Tal on the 2nd June 1857. Mrs. Wilson and family, Mrs. Cringer and Mrs. Cringer, Junior, and child were protected for a short time by Khodabux, a Duffadar of the jail, but eventually found their way to Suraece, where they were kindly received by Chada Sing, the Zemindar. They remained under his protection till the 18th January 1858, when Khan Bahadoor Khan hearing of their being there, sent for them and kept them in confinement in the town, till the arrival of the troops.

SERJEANT HARDY, MRS. HARDY AND FIVE CHILDREN, W. HARDY.

On the mutiny breaking out in the cantonments, the whole party went to Kyarah, where they remained with Jymall Sing, the Zemindar, for four days; after this they took a boat and dropped down the River Ramgunga to the village of Raokunpoor; but not being in safety there, they were obliged to come back. Remaining in one of Jymall Sing's villages, and eventually where they were kept and protected by Zalim Sing for six months. They were afterwards escorted across the River Ganges, and joined Captain Gowan.

MR. MATTHEWS, WIFE AND FAMILY.

Concealed themselves for the first day of the mutiny in General Parson's compound, and at night escaped to Kyarah, about six miles from cantonments; there they remained six months in Jymall Sing's care; and afterwards joined Mr. Hardy's party, and arrived at Captain Gowan's camp.

MR. DE-CAMP AND THREE CHILDREN, MR. AND MRS. STEARS AND TWO CHILDREN.

Mr. De-Camp had accompanied Mrs. Raikes up to Nynee Tal, on the 14th May leaving her family in charge of Mr. Stears (her son) and a native servant. On the disturbance breaking out, Mr. Stears with his party escaped to the village of Shirria, where they remained for 2½ months. About this time Mrs. De-Camp had returned from Nynee Tal and joined them there. Shortly after hearing that Khan Bahadoor Khan was searching for them, Mr.
Sears, wife and two children escaped to Kyarah, while Mrs. De-Camp and her children were seized and taken before Khan Bahadoor Khan; he detained them for one day and then released them, when Mrs. De-Camp returned to her house in the Sudder Bazar; but afterwards left and resided in Bholepoor, where she remained till the re-occupation of Bareilly.

All the Native Christians left in one party and went to Kingena, but not being kindly treated there, they dispersed in different directions. Luke and a party of twenty-nine persons remained in Bholepoor Buhereen. Another party of seven went to Chotch Barring; while six of them went across to Meerut. Mutter, his wife and child are missing, and have not been heard of since.

Mr. Fanthome, Mrs. Fanthome and five children.

About ten days previous to the mutiny Meer Jan and Meerun Jan, Syuds of Noh Mohullah, asked Mr. Fanthome and family to go over to them. They went and remained till the 31st May, when Mr. Fanthome and his eldest son left the family with Meer Jan, and went to Bakur Khan's house; here they remained but a short time, and then left for Rampoor, where they lived for a couple of months, when the eldest son returned to Bareilly, in disguise, to take back his mother and family; these were allowed to go except the eldest daughter, who was forcibly detained by Meer Jan; she has since been restored to the family. Mr. Fanthome lived at Rampoor till the troops entered Bareilly.

Captain Gowan, 18th Regt. N. I.

Escaped from cantonments when the mutiny broke out, and was eventually protected by the zemindars of Kherah Bujberah of the Shajehanpoor district. He afterwards joined Mr. Wilson's camp on the other side of the Ganges.

Serjeant-Major Belsham, wife and family, 18th Regt. N. I.

Escaped into the district and were protected by the zemindars of different villages; subsequently joined Captain Gowan's party and proceeded to Mr. Wilson's camp.

Serjeant Waldo, Artillery,

Was wounded at Buheree in company with Serjeant Staples; escaped to Nynce Tal.

Serjeant Jennings, 68th Regt.

Escaped to Nynce Tal.

Mr. Healy.

An insane, discovered in confinement when the troops entered Bareilly.
## APPENDIX B.

**List of persons who served under Khan Bahadoor Khan, rebel.**

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<td>Name of Office</td>
<td>Name of the head of the Office</td>
<td>Names of the subordinate Amlahs</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pundit</td>
<td>Leknath, of Choudree Mohulla</td>
<td>Paul Imam</td>
<td>Served as Mohurrir.</td>
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<td>Kasim Ali</td>
<td>Do. do.</td>
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<td>Taj Rae</td>
<td>Do. as Perwana Navees.</td>
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<td>Sulamut Ali</td>
<td>Do. as Mohurrir.</td>
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<td>Goopershad</td>
<td>Do. as Nukli Navees.</td>
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<td>Phoolchund</td>
<td>Do. as Perwana Navees.</td>
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<td>Ruttanall</td>
<td>Do. as Nazir.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nazim</td>
<td>Kooshiram</td>
<td>Hurpershad</td>
<td>Seristadar under Leknath.</td>
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<td>Burteeram</td>
<td>Served as Mial Navees.</td>
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<td>Bahadoor Sing</td>
<td>Do. as Izar Navees.</td>
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<td>Rughbureel</td>
<td>Do. as Nazir.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Magistrate's Office</td>
<td>Chirag Ali</td>
<td>Ihsreepershad</td>
<td>These were Mohurrirs under the Nazime.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Hurpershad</td>
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<td>Khyrat Ali</td>
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<td>Gobind Pershad</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
|               |                                | Kooredun Tall | A Mohurrir of the Bareilly Criminal Office; was appoint-
|               |                                | Insetools of Gurheo | ed Seristadar in the above. |
|               |                                | Ahmud Hoosin, of Chowdhy Mohula | Served as a Nukli Purwana Navees. |
|               |                                | Mehrban Ali | Do. Purwana Navees. |
|               |                                | Mahomed Hoosin Khan | Do. Record-keeper. |
|               |                                | Bakur Ali | Do. Izar Navees. |
|               |                                | Busunt Rai | Do. Mohurrir. |
| Magistrate's Office | Mahomed Shah | | Vakool of Sudder Ameen's Court; was offered the situ-
|               |                                | | ation of a Magistrate which he at once refused; would
|               |                                | | not take service in any capacity; on his refusing the
|               |                                | | situation was given to Yakooob Ali. |
List of persons who served under Khan Bahadoor Khan, rebel.—(Continued.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Office</th>
<th>Name of the head of the Office</th>
<th>Names of the Subordinate Amlahs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magistrate's Office</td>
<td>Yaqoob Ali of the old City</td>
<td>Chotey Lall, Durzee Chowk</td>
<td>After the refusal of Mahomed Shah Vakel as second Magistrate in June 1857; he held his office in the library building. In July this office was abolished.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mooftee</td>
<td>Syed Ahmed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Served as Serishtadar in the second Magistrate's Court.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>Mouvie Ahmed Ali Khan, alias Dunna of Rampoor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Was appointed on the 3rd June 1857 as Mooftee; he decided cases of both departments Civil and Criminal. In December 1857 he fled owing to his decision in a case of the murder of Meer Alam Khan in which he had acquitted the defendants; Mouvie Khan and others attacked him and he went to Rampoor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do.</td>
<td>Ujmal</td>
<td>Abdool Ghunee</td>
<td>Was appointed Mooftee in the room of Syud Ahmud; he performed his duties for three months, after which he left this station and went home to Rampoor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal Court</td>
<td>Mouvie Torab Ali of Lucknow</td>
<td>Thakoordas</td>
<td>In February 1858 was appointed as Mooftee; he held his place till the arrival of the British forces, he held his office in the Kotewalee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudder Ameen</td>
<td>Mahomed Ameen Khan of Bareilly</td>
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<td>Served as Serishtadar.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudderool Suddoor</td>
<td>Moonzufur Hosein Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td>A Mohurrir of the Moonsiff's Court was appointed in the same capacity during outbreak.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chief Tehseeldar</td>
<td>Akbur Ali Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td>In the month of August was appointed as Superintendant to decide appealed cases on Rupees 150 per mensem; he held his situation until the arrival of the British forces, he conducted his business at the Kotub Khana.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>In September 1857 was appointed as Sudder Ameen on a salary of Rupees 400 per mensem and held office at this own house.</td>
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<td>In September 1857 was appointed as Sudder Ameen, on a salary of Rupees 1,000 per mensem; previous to this appointment he was a member of the Committee; he held his office at his own house.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>In September was appointed as chief Tehseeldar on Rupees 1,000 per mensem; he was a member of the Committee before this.</td>
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<td>Bytool Ura</td>
<td>Kabeer Shah Khan</td>
<td>Pemraj Ali, Cheda Lall, Misree Lall, Jafur Ali and Basharat Ali</td>
<td>Appointed as Serishtadar.</td>
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<td>Appointed as Mohurris.</td>
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<td>Attee Hoosein</td>
<td>Appointed officer for examining the forces, and received a salary of Rupees 500 per mensem from September 1857.</td>
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<td>Ali Mahomed Khan, son of Kabeer Shah</td>
<td>Moonahsee.</td>
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<td>Ditto.</td>
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<td>Appointed Moonsiff in September 1857; he held half month, and was transferred as Naib Nazim to Pilibheet.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Moosooner Khan of Beharee poor</td>
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<td>Was appointed on the 28th September 1857 in the room of his brother on Rupees 100 per mensem; he remained till the arrival of the British forces, and held his office at home.</td>
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* * *
List of persons who served under Khan Bahadoor Khan, rebel.—(Concluded.)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Office</th>
<th>Name of the head of the Office</th>
<th>Names of the Subordinate Amlaha</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moonsifce</td>
<td>Husain Rosul Khan of Rampoor.</td>
<td>.....</td>
<td>In September 1857 was appointed as a Moonliff of suburbs on a salary of Rupees 100 per menense; he remained in the same capacity till the end of the outbreak; he held his office in the Dewankhanas of Cheda Lall and Moona Lall.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Bholanath</td>
<td>.....</td>
<td>Appointed Superintendent over this Department; he appointed one man in the Sudder and several Qonash tas throughout the district, through whose means he received all the news, and every day laid them before the Khan Bahadoor. In July he had a dispute with a man by name Moula Meah, who was a nephew of Khan Bahadoor; this being brought to Khan Bahadoor’s notice he ordered that Bholanath’s nose should be cut off; hearing this he hid himself and made his escape.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ikowain Subei.</td>
<td>.....</td>
<td>A relation of Soba Ram was appointed on a salary of Rupees 200 per menense; he drew his pay from the collections of the Akbari Department.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Alief Hossain</td>
<td>Seriastadar.</td>
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<td>Nuthun Lall</td>
<td>Moonshee.</td>
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<td>Goiplaree Lall</td>
<td>Mohurrir.</td>
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List of Tehseldars in the employ of Khan Bahadoor Khan.

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<tr>
<th>Name of Tehseldar</th>
<th>Name of Tehseldar</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crore Bareilly</td>
<td>Mahomed Yar Khan</td>
<td>Late Paishkar; was appointed Tehseldar of Crore by Khan Bahadoor Khan on the day of the outbreak, and held the appointment till middle of August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Mehdsee Ali Khan of Rampoor.</td>
<td>Appointed in the room of the above on a salary of Rupees 500, and held the appointment till the re-establishment of the British Government; the reason of his drawing so large an allowance was that all the villages belonging to the inhabitants of the city, situated in different pargannahs, were made over to him for the collection of the revenue.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fureedpoor</td>
<td>Ragonath Sing</td>
<td>Khan Bahadoor Khan ordered him to take care of the pargannah and to collect the revenue; he held the appointment only twelve days.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Akwurfi Beg</td>
<td>Held the appointment 25 days as Tehseldar.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Surubsook Rai</td>
<td>A resident of Fureedpoor; was appointed through Soba Ram’s influence, to whom he gave a heavy bribe; was killed on the 1st August by Ragonath Sing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Alief Beg</td>
<td>A resident of Puttehengue; was appointed in the beginning of August; about the latter end of the month he was transferred to a regiment as Koosdan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Kafaitoolla</td>
<td>Appointed in the room of the above; he held appointment till the arrival of the British forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abudlah</td>
<td>Shihbouei; resident of Mouzah Puttehoopur.</td>
<td>Appointed on the 18th June and was dismissed on the 3rd July.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ahmed Ali Khan</td>
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<td>From 3rd July to end of September.</td>
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<td>Name of Tehseel</td>
<td>Name of Tehseeldar</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beulpour</td>
<td>Poormanund, late officiating Tehseeldar.</td>
<td>Before the outbreak he held the officiating appointment in this pergunnah, and was appointed by Khan Bahadoor Khan; he remained 1½ months in this situation, and was dismissed in July on a complaint from Himatulla Khan, Thanadar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ali Mahomed Khan, late Tehseeldar of Aoulah.</td>
<td>Tehseeldar of Aoulah under the British Government; was appointed to Beulpore by Khan Bahadoor Khan; held in this situation for four months. In the month of November the pergunnah was given in farm to the Thakoors of Bumrohlee and Deoria, and he was dismissed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Heera Sing</td>
<td>Appointed by the Thakadar in November; he continued there till the arrival of the British forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawabgunj</td>
<td>Hoolas Roy</td>
<td>Brother of Brij Lall, Peshdust of Soba Ram; was appointed on the 18th June and transferred to Sheahi at the end of July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Mulloo Khan, of Mouza Bulla, Pergunnah Doonka.</td>
<td>Appointed on the 6th August, and remained there till the arrival of the British troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheahi</td>
<td>Ameer Ali</td>
<td>Appointed at the commencement of the outbreak and continued until July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Hoolas Roy</td>
<td>Appointed on the 1st August, served for fifteen days, and was then dismissed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Hubeebola Khan</td>
<td>Appointed on the 15th August and remained till the end of the month, when the pergunnah was given in farm to Moulvie Khan of Rampoor; he was then dismissed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chowmahlah</td>
<td>Kala Khan</td>
<td>On the outbreak he took possession of the pergunnah and collected the revenue to the end of June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Mahomed Khan</td>
<td>Appointed by Khan Bahadoor Khan in July, and worked for about a month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Nuujf Khan</td>
<td>Appointed in August and dismissed in September; served about a month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Mahomed Mooneer</td>
<td>Late Mohurir of the Fonzaree Court; was appointed in September, and remained there till the arrival of the British force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilibheet</td>
<td>Farkroodeen</td>
<td>Late a visitor of schools; he served as a tehseeldar, he was appointed on the 1st July and remained till the 10th December, and was dismissed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Shanahool Hoq</td>
<td>Appointed in December, and remained there till arrival of the British troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehansabad</td>
<td>Ahmed Yar Khan</td>
<td>Appointed on the 1st June and dismissed on the 16th.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Fukroodeen</td>
<td>Appointed on the 18th and dismissed on the 30th June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Zufur Yar Khan</td>
<td>Appointed on the 1st July and dismissed on the 31st August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ayoob Khan</td>
<td>Appointed on the 1st September till the arrival of the British troops.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Native Judges, Tehsildars, and Thanadars who were employed in the Government service previous to the outbreak.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name of Officer</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudder Ameen</td>
<td>Dewanee Court. Enait Ahmad, resident of Kakooree.</td>
<td>Joined the rebels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Sudder-cool-Sudder</td>
<td>Rasee-cool-deen Khan of Kakooree...</td>
<td>Died during the late outbreak...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudder-cool-Sudder</td>
<td>Kasum Ali Khan, of Lucknow...</td>
<td>Did not join the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudder Ameen of Pilibheet</td>
<td>Russee Boz Khan...</td>
<td>Served under the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moonajif of city</td>
<td>Amanat Hassan...</td>
<td>Joined the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto of suburbs</td>
<td>Haidi Hussain...</td>
<td>Did not join the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto of Beesulpoor</td>
<td>Mirza Ali...</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Pergunnah</th>
<th>Name of Officers</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crore</td>
<td>Moulun Lala-cool-deen</td>
<td>Tehseldar</td>
<td>Doubtful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawabgunj</td>
<td>Mahomed Yar Khan</td>
<td>Paibakdar</td>
<td>Served under the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beesulpoor</td>
<td>Fuzul Haq</td>
<td>Tehseldar</td>
<td>Served under the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purrawa</td>
<td>Ramperhad</td>
<td>Paibakdar</td>
<td>Served under the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aoula</td>
<td>Poornanund</td>
<td>Tehseldar</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilibheet</td>
<td>Fuzul Paishkar</td>
<td>Tehseldar</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furedooi</td>
<td>Mahomed Yakoo Khan</td>
<td>Paibakdar</td>
<td>Did not join the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakhroo</td>
<td>Ameer Ali</td>
<td>Tehseldar</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aoula</td>
<td>Mahomed Husain</td>
<td>Paibakdar</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boondi</td>
<td>Ilyal Chund</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Stood faithful...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chowsabul</td>
<td>Khan Ali Khan</td>
<td>Tehseldar</td>
<td>Served under the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koodurpoor</td>
<td>Ali Hussein Khan</td>
<td>Paibakdar</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fuzul Ahmad</td>
<td>Tehseldar</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hooree Lall</td>
<td>Paibakdar</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Thanah</th>
<th>Name of Officers</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kotwale Barilley</td>
<td>Shaik Buder-cool-deen</td>
<td>Kotwal...</td>
<td>Stood faithful...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beesulpoor</td>
<td>Himait-oolla Khan</td>
<td>Thanadar...</td>
<td>Served under the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aoula</td>
<td>Hadi Yar Khan</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nawabgunj</td>
<td>Jaafur Ali Khan</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furedooi</td>
<td>Atta Ali</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakhera</td>
<td>Golam Mobi-cool-deen</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Did not serve under the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahi</td>
<td>Nissar Hussein</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meengunj</td>
<td>Kedur Boz</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilibheet</td>
<td>Abdulla Khan</td>
<td>Kotwal...</td>
<td>Remained faithful...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehanbad</td>
<td>Koottu Khan</td>
<td>Thanadar...</td>
<td>Served under the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ritcha</td>
<td>Vuzeez Ahmed</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sattargunj</td>
<td>Jumal-cool-deen</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto ditto...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koodurpoor</td>
<td>Ram Dyal</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Served under the rebels...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent's Office</td>
<td>Baha-cool-deen Khan</td>
<td>Superintendent of Police.</td>
<td>Served under the rebels...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BAREILLY,  
The 27th November 1858.
Memorandum showing the pay of the whole force under Khan Bahadur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of service</th>
<th>Number of men</th>
<th>Average rate of pay</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Total amount for one month</th>
<th>Total amount spent in ten months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAVALRY.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowars</td>
<td>4,618</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Rs. 92,960</td>
<td>Rs. 0</td>
<td>Rs. 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residars</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Different rates</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naib do.</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vakeela</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neshanburdars</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFANTRY.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepoys</td>
<td>24,330</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,45,980</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koomadans</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oolusdars</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toomundars</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6,075</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baxees</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vakeela</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,944</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total spent in ten months: 26,55,990 0 0

There being no regularity in the payment of the salaries to the troops, a Chundee was allowed to those who were resident of Rampoor and other parts of the country; Rupees 2,000 or more were paid daily in part of their wages. In some of the regiments a sepoy got one anna per diem and some two annas; a Koomadan received one rupee; a Oolusdar eight annas; Toomundar four annas; and some sowars received eight annas and some four annas.

Some of the regiments received orders every month or every 2nd month on the Tehseeldars or Thekadors of the different pergannahs for their pay; they generally went and plundered the Tehseelees of more than the amount of the order.

Some of the Commanding Officers of the Infantry and Cavalry furnished lists of their men, and orders were passed for the payment, though the number entered in the list was generally more than the number of men actually in service.

More or less, Rupees 2,000 were paid daily from the month of July 1857 on account of Chundee, making a total of 6,08,000 Rupees to the end of April 1858.

STATEMENT OF THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

Three guns were cast under the superintendence of Deendyal, and thirty-seven under Nezamahmed Khan of Rampoor, and Wuzoer Khan, Sub-Assistant Surgeon of Agra.

Besides the above eleven “Goordas” were received from different places.

Of the forty guns made at Bareilly six were drawn by horses, and the remainder by bullocks.
### Statement showing the expense incurred on account of the Artillery Department.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of expenditure</th>
<th>Amount spent for one gun</th>
<th>Total amount spent in one month</th>
<th>Total amount spent in ten months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeding of 4 bullocks @ Rs. 7-8 each</td>
<td>30 0 0</td>
<td>288 0 0</td>
<td>960 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Drivers @ 4 do.</td>
<td>8 0 0</td>
<td>8 0 0</td>
<td>8 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Gunners @ 10 do.</td>
<td>20 0 0</td>
<td>20 0 0</td>
<td>20 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Do. @ 8 do.</td>
<td>16 0 0</td>
<td>16 0 0</td>
<td>16 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Do. @ 6 do.</td>
<td>24 0 0</td>
<td>24 0 0</td>
<td>24 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>96 0 0</strong></td>
<td><strong>288 0 0</strong></td>
<td><strong>960 0 0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Horses.**

| Feeding of 4 horses @ Rs. 4 each | 16 0 0 | 16 0 0 | 16 0 0 |
| 4 Sycamores @ 4 do. | 16 0 0 | 16 0 0 | 16 0 0 |
| 8 Gunners as above | 60 0 0 | 104 0 0 | 1,040 0 0 |

**Establishment.**

| Wazee Khan, Daroga @ Rs. 100 per month | 100 0 0 |
| Naib Do. @ 50 do. | 50 0 0 |
| 2 Mohurrirs @ 15 each | 30 0 0 |

**Grand Total** | **180 0 0** | **1,800 0 0** |

**Total expenditure of 40 guns** | **4,136 0 0** | **41,360 0 0** |

**Statement showing the state of the magazine.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTICLE</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Rate per maund</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gunpowder</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>750 Maunds.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns (large)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>4, ca. 15 Mds.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. (small)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>16, &quot; 12 &quot;</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. do.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>14, &quot; 8 &quot;</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. do.</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>6, &quot; 5 &quot;</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 Guns</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Total 394 Mds.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition carriage for 40 guns</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>100 Rs.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600 Small balls, 1 seer weight</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>15 Maunds.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,700 Middle size balls, 2 seers weight</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>135 &quot;</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600 Large, 3 seers weight</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>45 Mds. Sr.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small balls, 1 ch. weight</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total weight</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead for bullets</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>175 Mds.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Tufanul Hosen Khan</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Nuzurf Ali Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jafur Ali Khan</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Golam Hyder Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Syed Imdad Hussen</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Mahomed Shah Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vales Mahomed Khan</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Khan Bahadoor Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kurramut Hussen...</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Imdad Hussen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Masoom Ali</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Allah Noor Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Waheed Yar Khan...</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Sabezada Inail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mirza Ameer Beg...</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Rusool Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gooram Mohyoddeen</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Shafi Khudabux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sudik Ali Khan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Nasir Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ameer Shah Syad</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Mahomed Ali Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Niaz Ali Khan</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Abdool Rahman Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ahmed Hussen Khan</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Hussun Ali Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Omran Vallee Khan</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Monzurfur Ali Shah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Mahomed Dullab Khan</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Syad Mazbur Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mobarick Shah Khan</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Ali Shere Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Muluk Golam Mahomed</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Mahomed Anees Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Shuffi Khan</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Ali Hussen Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Nizam Ali Khan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Mahomed Ubker Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Meer Ahmed Hossein</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Kala Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mahomed Ubker Khan</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Syad Band Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Surfuraz Khan</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Mahomed Ali Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Kurreen-odeen</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Mirza Alif Beg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Mahomed Hussen Khan</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Vulla Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Rampersaud</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Golam Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Imadaddeen</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Golam Hussen Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Moenodeen</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Ali Bahadoor Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Zaffur Yar Khan</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>Mahomed Roeseh Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ali Ahmed Khan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Kiffitolia Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Salajung Khan</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Meer Imdad Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Shabtaine Khan</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Shabtaine Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Mahomed Ameer Khan</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Ahmed Ali Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Hafiz Mahomed Yakoob Ali</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Gooram Nubes Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Wazoodeen</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Ahmed Ali Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Mohsun Khan</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Nasir Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Ahmed Ali Khan</td>
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Total ... 4,618
**List of Infantry Regiments under Khan Bahadoor with the name of their Commanding Officers.**

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<tr>
<th>No. of Begt.</th>
<th>Name of Koomadan.</th>
<th>Number of men in each Pultun or Regiment.</th>
<th>No. of Begt.</th>
<th>Name of Koomadan.</th>
<th>Number of men in each Pultun or Regiment.</th>
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**Total** ... 24,330

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**Statement of Khan Bahadoor's Army.**

**Infantry Regiment.**

A band of 10 sepoys was called Dusta.

- 100 " Toomun.
- 500 " Oolus.
- 1,000 " Pultun or regiment.

Each Dusta had a Jumadar on 10 per mensem.

A Toomun had a Toomundar on a salary of 25, and a Naib Toomundar on 15 per month.

A full regiment had two Oolusdars on 50 each and a Koomadan (Colonel) or Commanding Officer on a salary of 100 or 200 per month. Each Toomun had a Vakeel on 8 per mensem, and every regiment a Buxee (Pay-master) on 50 Rupees.

The salary of the sepoys varied from 5 to 8 Rupees per month.

The duty of the Vakeel was to write out petitions for the sepoys and for their officers.

A Buxee had to prepare muster rolls and to distribute the pay of the regiment.

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**Cavalry.**

A band of 100 sowars (troopers) was termed a Resalah. A Resalah had a Resaladar on 100 Rupees; but if the number should be less, the salary was decreased to one Rupee for each sovar. No Resaladar drew less than 30 Rupees.

A Naib Resaladar was allowed for every full Resalah on a salary of 50 Rupees, and none for a less number.
A Duffadar had the command over ten sowars on a salary of 25 Rupees per mensem.

A Vakeel was attached to each Resalah on 30 Rupees; but in those Resalabs that had a less number of sowars, the salary was 15 Rupees per mensem.

The salary of sowars varied from 15, 20 to 25 Rupees a month.

A list of Khan Bahadoor's army is given in a separate statement.

Appendix to the Narrative of Occurrences, &c., in the District of Bareilly, Being a Narrative of Events at Pilibheet, Prior to the Outbreak of the Rebellion of 1857, in the Rohilkund Division.

When the outbreak took place at Meerut, I was absent from the station on a few days' leave to Nynee Tal, having gone up there to see my brother Lieutenant-Colonel Carmichael, then Private Secretary to the late Mr. Colvin, who was also up there on sick leave. A letter from Mr. Colvin to my brother gave the first intimation at Nynee Tal of the occurrences at Meerut. I immediately hurried down the same afternoon to Pilibheet, and, whilst riding in the next morning, was met by a sowar with a letter despatched by Mr. Guthrie, then Officiating Magistrate of Bareilly. The letter informed me briefly of the state of affairs at Bareilly, and left me unfettered to act to the best of my own judgment for the maintenance of order in the subdivision under my charge. I, in common, I imagine, with the other Magistrates of the Division, strengthened my police, and subsequently on a requisition of the Commissioner, raised a few irregular horse, some twenty-five in all. These men were to have gone into Bareilly, to have been despatched thence, I believe, to Meerut, but the mutiny had the start of them. No outrages of any kind took place in the district; but for the ten days previous to the outbreak at Bareilly, the Mahomedan portion of the population of the town of Pilibheet was in a most excited state, and on the festival of the Lesser Eed in particular, seditious placards were posted both on the mosque and the Eedgah, but were pulled down by the police under the instructions of the Tehseldar and Kotwal, than whom no two native officers could have behaved better during this crisis. An order also was issued by me forbidding the open carrying of arms in the streets by any but Government servants, as the Pathans of the city had begun to wear them to an extent partaking almost of an ostentatious display.

The mutiny at Bareilly took place, as is well known, on Sunday, the 31st May. In the confusion and disorder attendant on a scene where each man had to ride for his life, no reader mode could be contrived of sending the news of the outbreak to Pilibheet than by confiding to a sowar, who was entrusted with the duty, an old letter to his own address which Mr. Guthrie happened to have in his pocket, and which the sowar was directed to deliver to me as a voucher, at the same time to report verbally what had taken place.

The man, native like, carried the letter to the first chowkee, and there handed it to another sowar, and he again to a third, and so on, so that the man who delivered the letter to me at dusk on the evening of the day, naturally enough concluded that the letter gave all particulars, and could give no satisfactory reply to the interrogatories which, not being able to make any thing of the letter, I put to him.

The very fact however of my receiving a letter by a sowar at such a period was in itself sufficient to excite suspicion that something had gone wrong, and at the instance of my Tehseeldar, whom I took into my confidence, we despatched a trustworthy messenger to Bareilly for information. The reply was received the next morning early, being couched in the few but
sufficiently significant words "hâl Bareilly misl i Mecrat o Delhi ust." Almost simultaneously with the receipt of this reply, a sowar came in with a letter despatched by the Thannadar of Richa, which is close to Buherrie on the Nynee Tal road, and in which the Thannadar stated that a number of European gentlemen, escorted by a few sowars of the Irregular Cavalry, had passed through Buherrie on midnight on their way to Nynee Tal. I, as soon after this as possible, sent off my wife and family under a guard of some twenty-five men, sowars and burkundazes, the latter of whom I mounted on an elephant, and we made an ineffectual attempt to persuade a Serjeant's wife (Mrs. Bremner) to be of the party, but she refused. To her and her husband's subsequent captivity and escape I make no allusion in this narrative, as a very full narrative of his sufferings was furnished by Serjeant Bremner himself to the Commissioner of the Division, and it was also published in the pages of the Lahore Chronicle newspaper. Before leaving the town, in the early morning, after receipt of the intelligence from Bareilly, I had settled with my Tehseeladar and Kotwal that we should, after I had arranged for the despatch of my family, be guided in our future movements by circumstances. We were, however, soon saved all trouble on this point, by the decision come to by the Mahomedan population of the city and its suburbs to plunder the Tehseel Treasury. It would appear that men had arrived from Bareilly either during the night or early in the morning bringing intelligence of everything that had occurred there, and I had left the Tehseel and Kotwalle but a short time before symptoms of insubordination began to exhibit themselves amongst the Government servants. It was the 1st of the month, and some pay was, if I remember right (for I was not present at the spot), being distributed. A Naik of the Kotwalle went up to the Bukshee, and deliberately took up a bag of a thousand rupees. The Kotwal ordered him to put it down, he refused, and the Kotwal, a determined man, and who has since proved his loyalty, would have shot the rebel dead, but for the remonstrances of the Tehseeladar, who very truly told him that the commencement of bloodshed would probably result in all our lives being sacrificed. Whilst this was going on within, the space between the Tehseel and Kotwalle, at the entrance of Drummondgunj, was filled by a surging multitude of Mahomedans, and the Tehseeladar seeing that there was every chance of the Treasury being plundered, and the majority of the police and tehsil people being in a state of insubordination, sent the Kotwal to me to report matters; I was just on my way back to the Tehseel, having indeed got as far as the school-house, when I was met by the Kotwal who refused to let me go further, merely remarking at the time, as others were, present, that there was no use in my going into the town. Arrived at my house he told me the exact state of affairs in the city, and added that he considered that the Tehseeladar, who was not at all a favorite with the Mahomedans in the city, was in danger of his life. An idea then occurred to me by which I thought, that in the event of the emeute being only of a temporary nature, I might obtain some kind of security for the repayment of the treasure which I expected momentarily to hear had been plundered, as well as be the means at the same time of getting the Tehseeladar away safely from the press by which he was thronged at the Tehseel. Ever since the early morning of the day the principal Mahomedans of the town had been with me, making great professions of loyalty to the State, and offering to give me all the assistance in their power on my requiring it. I proposed now to these men to make over charge of the treasure at the Tehseel on the part of Government to them, for them to render an account of it hereafter. They readily assented to this proposition, and also undertook to see that the Tehseeladar was allowed to come safely out of the mob. The rabble that were clamouring at the Tehseel were all adherents or dependents of one or other of these men, and as I felt sure that the treasury would in any case be plundered within the hour, in which case the event would probably have been attended with the...
murder of the Tehseeldar, I thought it the better course to make over to these men, as a trust on the part of Government, for them to hold what in any case could not be retained by any force which I had at my command. These men then proceeded to the Tehseeltee, and entered into occupation of it, and the Tehseeldar was allowed to leave the city and join me at my house, which he did with, if I remember right, but two attendants. The rebels however, for they proved themselves to be such hereafter most thoroughly, had hardly been in possession of the money above twenty minutes when they proposed to remove it to their house. During this proceeding, as might have been expected, a tumult ensued amongst them, and several of the bags were carried off by men in the crowd, and one man was cut down by some one of his fellow rioters. I was at my house whilst this took place, and until a desultory firing and uproar commenced in the town. The Kotwal then recommended that we should leave, which we did, some twenty men in all, sowars and burkundazes who rode on ponies; at this stage many men who had received no particular kindness at my hands behaved remarkably well in standing by and accompanying me, whilst others, from whom the same might have been expected in a higher degree, behaved shamefully. I overtook my family who were traveling by palkee, at a village about eight miles from Pilibheet, Burha Peroze-poor was, I think, the name, the zemindars of which provided shurbet for all our party, for which act of hospitality their village was on the subsequent day plundered by the Pathans of Umuriya. This large Mahomedan village on the high road from Pilibheet to Nynee Tal was, I should state, in open insurrection, and we had to make a detour from the main road to avoid it. We proposed to stop that night at the partially fortified tehsel and thannah of Sitargunj. We made our point at nightfall, and starting again early the next morning reached Huldwane at the foot of the Nynee Tal hills at 5 P.M. of the same day after the most distressingly hot march through the forest. I went up the hill for a day, and returned at Major Ramsay's request to Huldwane and stopped there for a week in company with an officer (Lieutenant Beecher) of the Irregular Cavalry. The Burkundazes who had accompanied me were dismissed, their services being no longer required. But it was considered advisable to keep as many sowars together as possible for patrolling purposes. For this purpose I hoped by remaining in person at the foot of the hills to induce my men to continue there, but they evidently most of them considered that they had done their duty when they had conducted me to a place of safety and regardless alike of threats or remonstrances deserted by fives or sixes every day until I had but a handful of men left. These however did good service both then and hereafter, and have severally, together with my Tehseeldar, Sheikh Ameer Ali, and my Kotwal, Abdoollah Khan, been recommended for reward to Government.

The Peshkar also of Juharabad, Zichariah Khan, who accompanied me, would have been similarly recommended, had he not unfortunately, when promoted on the restoration of order to a Tehseeldarship, been killed in his Tehseel Kutcherry by a rebel Mahomedan. His family have therefore been recommended to the favorable consideration of Government. It only remains to notice the conduct of one man at Pilibheet, whose name may not have come before the superior authorities, Devee Doss, a native merchant. This man, at great personal risk to himself, corresponded regularly with me during the whole time I was in the hills, and when the force under Brigadier McCausland moved down to the foot of the hills, he entered similarly into correspondence with the Commissioner of Kumaon, supplying regularly information of the rebel movements. Devee Doss is well deserving of the favor of Government, and I trust that mention of his loyalty in this report may not be considered as out of place, but simply as his due.

BUDAON,
The 23rd Nov. 1858.}{(Sd.) O. P. CARMICHAEL,}
{Offg. Magistrate of Budaon.}

Dated Camp Calcutta, 24th December 1858.

From—J. C. Wilson, Esq., Commissioner on Special Duty,

To—G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to Government, Allahabad.

In compliance with the express commands of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General, I beg to submit the following narrative of the events which came under my personal cognizance during the mutiny and rebellion.

2. You are aware that during the commencement of the year 1857 I held the position of Judge and Sessions Judge of Moradabad, and that consequently I had nothing to do with the executive of either the province or the district itself. But shortly after the outbreak at Meerut, seeing that a fearful mutiny and revolution were imminent, that the Magistrate and Joint Magistrate had only been recently appointed to their respective posts (Mr. C. B. Saunders had joined, I think, in February, and Mr. J. S. Campbell in March 1857), and feeling that my standing in the service, my long incumbency at Moradabad, and the regard which all the really good citizens bore me, might benefit the State, and be the means of averting the shedding of Christian blood, I applied to the Officiating Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, Agra, begging, in the event of my services being required, for an expression of implicit confidence and carte blanche to do as I liked. An answer having been received by electric telegraph in the affirmative, I did my utmost,—with what result, will be unfolded in the following pages.

3. Having premised thus much, I proceed with my narrative. Carefully collating oral information with facts as they occurred, I am convinced that Sunday, 31st May 1857, was the day fixed for the mutiny to commence throughout the Bengal army; that there were committees* of about three members in each regiment, which conducted the duties, if I may so speak, of the mutiny: that the sepoys, as a body, knew nothing of the plans arranged; and that the only compact entered into by regiments, as a body, was that their particular regiment would do as the other regiments did. The committee conducted the correspondence and arranged the plan of operations, viz., that on the 31st May, parties should be told off to murder all European functionaries, most of whom would be engaged at church, seize the treasure, which would then be augmented by the first installment of the rubgee harvest, and release the prisoners, of which an army existed in the North-Western Provinces alone, of upwards of twenty-five thousand men. The regiments in Delhi, and its immediate vicinity, were instructed to seize the magazine and fortifications; but the massacre being complete and thoroughly carried out, and all opposition being thus rendered impossible, it was arranged that all other brigades and outposts should remain at their respective stations.

4. From this combined and simultaneous massacre on the 31st May 1857, we were, humanly speaking, saved by Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth, Commanding the 3rd Regiment of Bengal Light Cavalry, and the frail ones of the Meerut bazaar. Colonel Smyth had been engaged at the Hurdwar fair as President of a committee for passing remounts into the public service. On his return to the head-quarters of his regiment, he found that some dissatisfaction had been expressed by some of the troopers as to taking the same pistol cartridges which had been served out to the regiment for the two previous years. He insisted upon their being served out to and taken by the men. His order was obeyed. The men refused. A court-martial was convened. Eighty-five men of the 3rd Light Cavalry were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, and, having been put in fetters, were escorted to the Meerut jail, which is situated on the

* Note.—I have reasons for believing that most of these committees men, being leading spirits, were killed at Delhi. Bhole Singh, Pay Haridwar of the 5th company, 39th Regiment, was assuredly one of the committees, and I know that he was killed at Delhi.
road to Delhi. And now the frail one's taunts were heard far and wide, and the rest of the regiment was assailed with words like these:—"Your brethren have been ornamented with these ankles and incarcerated; and for what? Because they would not swerve from their creed; and you, cowards as you are, sit still indifferent to their fate. If you have an atom of manhood in you, go and release them." The mine had been prepared and the train had been laid, but it was not intended to light the slow-match for another three weeks. The spark which fell from female lips ignited it at once. Meerut was in a blaze, and the night of the 10th May 1857 saw the commencement of a tragedy, never before witnessed since India passed under British sway.

5. Rumours, that not an Englishman was left alive in Meerut, reached Moradabad, which is seventy-one miles west of Meerut, on the 12th; but on the morning of the 13th, positive and authentic information of the massacre and outbreak was received. That day, with the consent of the officers, I went into the lines, and conversed freely with the Native officers and men of the 29th Regiment Native Infantry. They listened attentively, and it was easy to see that there was a great majority of the regiment in favor of peace and order. Notice was served to all soldiers on leave to come in, and do duty with the Moradabad authorities. The next difficulty was the Rampoor jaghire. You are aware that sixteen miles east of Moradabad, there is a colony of Pathans, the head of which is the Nawab of Rampoor, who holds a jaghire, the rental of which varies accordingly as it is managed, from Rupees 6,00,000 to 8,00,000 per annum. In 1794, while Rohilkund belonged to the Nawab Vuzeez, these Pathans assassinated the Nawab Mahomed Ali Khan, and placed his younger brother, Ghulam Mahomed Khan, on the guddee. The Nawab Vuzeez called upon the British for aid, and a desperate battle was fought with the Rampoor Pathans at Futtuhgunj, twelve miles west of Bareilly, in which a Queen's regiment of foot was almost annihilated, and Ramsay, the Cavalry Commandant, was never seen, till he was discovered years afterwards in America. One or two companies of the Queen's regiment however stood firm,—victory sided with the British, and Ahmed Ali, the infant son of the murdered Nawab, was installed in the jaghire, but its area was considerably diminished. This Ahmed Ali died without male heirs in 1841, leaving a daughter, whose mother was a sweeperess; and the British Government placed on the guddee Mahomed Saeed Khan, the eldest son of Gholam Mahomed Khan, the murderer of Ahmed Ali's father in 1794. Mahomed Saeed Khan had been educated with his brothers at Benares, under the care of the chief civil authorities of the time, and in 1841 he was Deputy Collector of Budson, a district in Rohilkund, bordering upon Moradabad. He was a thorough well-wisher of the British, and bringing his education and the administrative experience acquired in our service to bear upon the jaghire, he soon brought it into exceedingly good order. Mahomed Saeed Khan died in 1855, and he was succeeded by his eldest son, Yoosuf Ali Khan, the present Nawab. He too has a younger brother, Kazim Ali Khan, and it struck me as being highly probable that the scenes of 1794 might be enacted over again. Then there was Ahmed Ali's daughter by the sweep-ress, and her husband, for Mahomed Saeed Khan had caused her to be married to his nephew, Mehdnee Ali Khan, who is consequently first cousin to Yoosuf Ali Khan. This youth had frequently claimed the jaghire in virtue of his wife being the daughter of Ahmed Ali Khan, and he was at the time of the outbreak in London with the party from Oudh, having gone to England ostensibly with a view to induce the Home Government to interfere in his case. Accordingly at 3 o'clock A.M. of the 14th I rode over to Rampoor, and had separate interviews with the Nawab Yoosuf Ali Khan and his brother Kazim Ali Khan. Both appeared loyal and true, and, as far as they were personally concerned, I was under no apprehension; but the well known villany of the whole Pathan race, as a body, utterly constitute as it is of any religious principle, was a source of the greatest anxiety. To try and give confidence, on my return from Rampoor, I went to Court and held a Sessions trial.
6. On the 15th the Meerut dāk of the 13th did not arrive, and the cause assigned was that the Gorajurs of the Meerut district had closed the high road between Meerut and Gurmoontaisur. On the same day pressing letters were received from the Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, Agra, to the effect that 300 Irregular Cavalry kept up by the Rampoor Nawab, solely to please the British Government, had been ordered over to clear the road between Boolundshuhur and Meerut, and begging that a party should be sent from Moradabad to clear the road between Gurmoontaisur and Meerut.

7. On Saturday, 16th, a letter from Bareilly, addressed by the Commissioner of Revenue to the Magistrate, was received, stating that he had ordered the Nawab of Rampoor's 300 Irregular Cavalry, and also the 66th Gurkhas from Almorah to Bareilly, and that all the ladies and women at Bareilly had been sent off to the sanatorium of Nainee Tal. We also resolved that a party should go and clear the road between Gurmoontaisur and Meerut, and it was first agreed that the Magistrate and myself should lead the party. Subsequently the Magistrate represented to me that he did not like leaving the district under the sole care of the Joint Magistrate, and I consented to remain in Moradabad. Detailed accounts of the Meerut massacre and intimation of the murder of Mr. Simon Fraser, and of the appointment of Mr. Fleetwood Williams, Judge of Meerut, to succeed him, were also received.

8. Sunday, the 17th. The Meerut mails of the 14th and 15th arrived, and intelligence was received through the police that a party of Sipahies had crossed the Ganges and were marching for Moradabad.

9. Monday, the 18th. The party for clearing the road between Gurmoontaisur and Meerut, consisting of Irregular Cavalry leave men, men of the Jail guard, and new levies, having been organized, it was resolved that the Magistrate and Civil Assistant Surgeon should head the party, starting at 9 o'clock p.m. At 8 o'clock p.m., when the party was assembled, news was brought that the party of Sipahies alluded to above, had encamped for the night on the banks of the River Ganggun, distant four miles from Moradabad, on the Meerut road. Deeming it absolutely necessary that these men should be arrested, I proposed that the party, prepared for the duty on the Meerut road, should be strengthened by a detachment of the 29th Native Infantry, and that after the Sipahies had been secured, the party should proceed on its way towards Meerut. Accordingly a detachment, under Captain Faddy and Lieutenant Clifford, two very superior officers, was placed at our disposal, and we marched for the spot. En route we were warned by the Kotwal, who had been sent on to reconnoitre, that the men of the 29th Regiment would not fire at the Sipahies. This caused us to alter our line of march, and to make the detachment bring up the rear, while the sowars were placed in front. On reaching the spot, the sowars were spread out so as to surround the Sipahies on three sides, and I went up to them. I demanded to be informed who commanded the party. Upon this a Jamadar sprung to his feet, and saluted me, saying that he and his party were on detachment duty. I called for his command certificate, upon which he fumbled among his baggage, and I then observed that he quietly awakened the Sipahies who were sleeping. In a few seconds he put a piece of paper into my hands, which, in consequence of the darkness of the night (it was starlight), I could not read. By this time the Sipahies were thoroughly aroused, and considering that there ought to be no further delay in seizing them, I called upon Captain Faddy, who had halted about 100 yards off, to advance. He did so, and a scuffle ensued; I think the Sipahies fired two shots only; one of them was shot dead, while running away, by a small-arms, and eight or ten of them were seized with, to the best of my belief, Rupees 13,000 in bags of Rupees 1,000 each. The men of the 29th then behaved exceedingly ill; and ever and anon, to create confusion, they untied in the dark the string of a bag of rupees, and then a general scramble for the money took place among them. At length the prisoners and the cash were placed upon elephants and made over to the Magistrate and the Civil Assist.
ant Surgeon, with a view to their being taken to Meerut. About 1 o'clock A.M. the party destined for Meerut proceeded towards Rujubpoor; and Captain Faddy, Lieutenant Clifford, and myself returned to Moradabad with the corpse of the mutineer who had been shot. The corpse was deposited in the dispensary for the night, the jail, for obvious reasons, not being deemed a proper place for it. On reading the command certificate, it appeared that the mutinous Sipahees consisted of a party of one Jemadar, two Havildars, two Naiks, and twenty-four Sipahees of the 20th Regiment Native Infantry, which had been ordered to relieve at the Mozuffernugger treasury a similar party of the 15th Regiment Native Infantry. Hence it was clear that the cash found upon them had been plundered by them from the Mozuffernugger treasury.

10. Tuesday, May 19th. At the following dawn, five more of the mutineers of the above party, who had escaped us over night, entered cantonments. Three were seized by a Sikh Sipahie of Captain Davidson's night guard, and some two or three hundred rupees were found upon them. The remaining two entered the lines direct; one of them was shot by a Sikh Sipahie of the 29th, and the other was arrested, after receiving a slight scratch from a bayonet in the thigh. Unfortunately while I was asleep, these four men and the corpse of the man shot, were sent by the Adjutant to the criminal jail. Shortly after this occurrence, it might have been 7 o'clock A.M., Sirdar Bahadoor Deen Mahomed Khan, Commandant of the Rampoor Irregular Cavalry Regiment, came to my house, and I was awakened to receive him. He had come on in advance of 200 men of his regiment, and he begged me to point out to him the best grove for him to encamp, adding, "I wish to reach Boolundshuhur by forced marches." I directed him to proceed to the grove west of cantonments on the road leading to Meerut and Hussunpoor. He accordingly left me for that purpose attended by three or four orderlies. I then visited the jail and the lines, and having returned to my house, I was engaged in bathing, when all the officers of the 29th Regiment rode up and called me outside. It appears that the Sipahie of the 29th Regiment, shot that morning in the lines, was the brother of the wife of one Soonsar Singh, a Sipahie of No. 7 company of the 99th Regiment, and he having collected together about 160 or 170 men of the Light, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th companies, rushed to the jail; and as the Jail guard, under a villain named Surrubsookh, Jemadar, fraternized* with the Sipahiees, they released not only the men of the 20th Regiment, but every prisoner; and it was to inform me of this circumstance that the officers had come to my house. I got upon my horse and accompanied the officers, taking the road to the jail. About 100 yards short of the jail, we found that the prisoners were running around us in all directions; and as the mischief had been done, it appeared madness to proceed to the jail, incurring the most deadly risk, without the slightest chance of doing any good; and remembering that the Sirdar Bahadoor's Rampoor Cavalry must be in the vicinity, I galloped off in the direction of the Ram Gunga. In about ten minutes I found them, and I offered to lead them in a charge against the Sipahiees who had released the prisoners. I was met with insolence, and something worse than a positive refusal. I then returned to the lines, and finding that the Adjutant had gone with a number of good Sipahiees to the westward in search of the runaway prisoners, I entreated some of the men of the 29th to accompany me also. Upon this Buldeo Sing, Pay Havildar of the Grenadier company, induced eight or ten men of his company to join me. With these men, and aided by three men of the Rampoor Irregulars, I managed to arrest a considerable number of convicts; but at one time having outridden the sowars, and finding my elf alone among a batch of twelve prisoners, who had armed themselves with sticks, I was compelled to shoot three of them. The report of my revolver restoring confidence to the inhabitants of an adjacent village, they came to my assistance, and the nine surviving convicts were secured on the spot. By the exertions of

* I subsequently learnt that the Sipahiees of the 29th fired four shots in the air, and that the jail-guard did the same. Surrubsookh is still at large. It was well known that he was in the Rampoor Nawab's service, and the moment my list of offenders was placed in the hands of the Nawab's brother, notice was given to Surrubsookh.
the Adjudant, including the prisoners secured by me, some 150 men were re-
captured and lodged in jail. That day all the ladies from cantonments, save
two, and the wife of one Civilian, took refuge at the court-house; the other
ladies and the Joint Magistrate went to the house of the Nawab of Rampoor,
situated in the town of Moradabad, and to his honor Jawad Ali, the pen-
sioned Serihtadar of the Collectorate, stood sentry with his sword under his
arm at the door of the room in which they remained. I ought to mention
that it is currently believed that the Rampoor Irregular Cavalry proposed to
the Infantry and Artillery guard over the treasury to share the treasure with
them; but the latter declined the offer, saying that they were quite strong
enough to take the treasure whenever they thought fit. Be this as it may,
when I visited the Sirdar Bahadoor Deen Mahomed Khan in the afternoon at
his encamping ground, with a view to insure his marching at 4 o'clock P.M., in
reply to a question from me, he admitted that the whole of his men were in
a state of mutiny, and that he had no control over them. It was about 1
o'clock P.M. when I returned from the pursuit of the convicts and reached the
lines: not a soul was to be seen. All the bazaar people and the menials had
quitted the lines, and an ominous silence proclaimed that a crisis was at hand.
Not an atom of food was that day cooked in the lines. I first proceeded to the
court-house, and proposed to Captain Whish, the Officer Commanding the 29th,
that the corps should be paraded, and that I should address the men at 5
o'clock P.M. This proposal having been agreed to, and an undress parade
ordered, I went off to the Rampoor Nawab's house in the city. I found the
ladies and the Joint Magistrate uninjured; but a panic prevailed throughout the
town, and every shop was shut. At a little before the appointed hour I went
from my own residence towards the court-house, escorted by two or three sowars,
with a view to pick up the officers of the 29th Regiment. As I approached,
the artillerymen rushed to the guns, which were loaded with grape, and laid
towards me, with a lighted slow-match prepared to fire. I waved my hat and
rode straight up to them, and they then slunk back into their former positions.
The officers joined me, and we rode to the quarter-guard. Not a man of the
29th had turned out, and on the Commanding Officer informing me that the
men, suspecting treachery, would not come out of their huts, I suggested that
balled cartridge should be served out, and that the men should assemble armed.
This was done, and the men appeared on parade. A hollow square was formed,
and I addressed the regiment. I spoke of the enormity of the offence which
had been committed that morning! that I knew it had been committed by
about 150 young scamps of the corps; and that it was not just that men like
myself, who had been at work thirty years, and had grown grey in the service,
should be ruined, because a set of young boys ("budmash") had perpetrated a
gross crime; that if every man in the corps would swear upon salt and water
that they would behave well in future, I would on my part solicit the Govern-
or-General not to call the corps to account for an offence committed by less
than one-fourth of their whole number. The native officers then asked, if I
would swear on the Bible to perform what I had promised. I agreed, and the
corps and myself mutually took the oath as pledged. The shops in the town
were opened, the ladies came forth from their place of refuge, and all of us,
I believe, were relieved of a weight of care, such as few would like to undergo
again. As for myself I felt sure that we were safe until the Bareilly brigade
should mutiny. That same night the Magistrate and the Civil Assistant
Surgeon hearing at Rujjubpoor, a spot distant twenty-five miles, where they had
halted for the day, that the jail had been broken open, and that the 29th had
mutinied, having made over the treasure and the prisoners of the 20th Regi-
ment Native Infantry to the Tehseldar of Amroha, returned to Moradabad.
Every ill-disposed person (budmash) however, seeing that the only means which
we possessed for keeping them in order, viz., the troops of the line, had them-
selves turned against us, thought their harvest was at hand, and the Goojurs of

* Still unrewarded.
Loodoulee, &c., distant eight miles, on the Bijnore road, stopped the Bijnore dak, and opened the ball by plundering a number of carts laden with sugar. At length this trying day came to an end.

11. The following day (Wednesday, May 20th) the 29th Regiment was in a very feverish state, and the majority were anxious to go off to Delhi. The native officers however restrained them. The Adjutant advanced money to the bunneeha of the city to enable them to send supplies into the lines. Food was cooked, the menials of the bazar returned to their occupations, and everything assumed its wonted appearance, so much so, that in the evening Lieutenant Clifford went with a party of sipahees, aided by sowars, to attack the Loodoulee Gojurah. This party returned the following morning with eighty Gojour prisoners, having burnt that village and one adjacent. I observed that many of the sipahees' havresacks were full of the plundered sugar.

12. Thursday, May 21st. Moulvee Munnoo, a noted blackguard of Moradabad, had written over to Rampoor to Aboo Khan (par mobile) to bring over the Rampoor mob to Moradabad, raise the green flag, and plunder the town. All this was duly reported to us, but they did not approach Moradabad till about 11 o'clock A.M. A company of the 29th Native Infantry was ordered out under Captain Faddy, and I accompanied it with some sowars. We crossed the river Ram Gunga at the Bareilly Ghat, and seeing a man dressed in green on foot, I advanced towards him. While speaking to him I knocked up the pan of his blunderbuss; he put it down. I then laid hold of the muzzle of the blunderbuss, and held it firmly, pointing upwards. The fellow then drew a pistol from his belt, when a sipahee, by name Kalka Sing* of the 5th Company, who had followed me unperceived, knocked him down, and then the Darogah of the bridge-of-boats, by name Taj-oob-deen,† gave him two sword-cuts across the back of the neck. Ten or twelve more leaders were then seized by the sowars, the martyr mob fled, and the prisoners and the wounded man were escorted to the quarter-guard.

13. The wounded leader was named Khan Bahadur, and he was a burkundaz in the Rampoor Cotwalee. I must do the Nawab the justice to say, that although he did not report to us the plans of his mob (they had resolved to come down upon us in two columns of 1,000 men each), he induced one of the leaders (Imam) by bribes to return, and thus his column was broken up; and it is said that he offered to raise Khan Bahadur's pay one rupee per mensem, provided he would desist from carrying his design into execution. This he refused to do, and he was shot on the breast, and his hood was thrown off his head. That same night, a body of police went to the house of Moulvee Munnoo, and ordered him to appear at the Cotwalee. He resisted, and a fight ensued, in which Moulvee Munnoo and his slave (gholam) were killed.

14. Friday, May 22nd. The Deputy Magistrate of Rampoor, at our request, came with a party of horse and foot, and took away from the quarter-guard the wounded man and the Rampoor prisoners; but up to this hour none of these men have been punished. Intelligence was received of the murder of Mudud Ali, Thannadar, and of the Jemadar of Amroha; that the tehseeldaree had been plundered of Rupees 14,000; that both the thannah and the tehseeliee had been burnt, and the prisoners, arrested at the Gangun river, released. Some time before the rebellion took place, a number of Amroha blackguards, headed by one Mihrban Ali, had insolently opposed the police of Amroha, while going their rounds. One of the burkundazes drew his sword, and slightly wounded one of the villains, when the rest of them ran away. The case came before the Joint-Magistrate, who sentenced some ten or twelve of the offenders to imprisonment and fine. An appeal was preferred to my Court, and the decision of the lower Court was confirmed. When the jail was broken open on the 19th, these Amroha blackguards fled to Amroha. The Thannadar, who

* This man subsequently joined the mutineers, and took his share of the treasure, when he decamped quietly to his home.

† Taj-oob-deen has not yet been rewarded.

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had been opposed in his duty, was Aziz Ali, a Syud, a very first-rate police officer. When the Goorjurs and Mewatee of the Bijnore border commenced plundering right and left, under Mookhaa Goorjur, and Peer Bukhs, Mewatee, (Toonta), it was deemed advisable to recall Aziz Ali from Amroha, and to give him, as his special duty, the task of putting down those plunderers; and his father, Mudud Ali, also a first-rate police officer, and a noted pulhwan, was sent to govern Amroha in his son’s stead. There is a notorious villain in Amroha, of the name of Goolzar Ali; he is one of the Amroha Syud maufe-dars; but having wasted his paternal property in gambling, extravagance, and other vices, he has long been one of the worst characters in a town notorious for all kinds of villainy. Acting under the guidance of this Goolzar Ali, the ten or twelve escaped prisoners, above alluded to, committed the crimes above detailed. Goorsahaee, a Jat of great influence, and who had been often employed both under the Magistrate and the Judge, was then sent out to take charge of the thannah and tehsilee of Amroha, and nobly has he, from that hour to the time of the Nawab of Rampoor making over charge of the district, to the new Magistrate and Collector in June 1858, done his duty.

15. Some days previously some companies of the Sappers and Miners, who had been sent for from Roorkee to Meerut, shot their Commanding Officer, and were in their turn cut down by a troop of the 6th Dragoon Guards. This intelligence had caused a great sensation in the lines of the 29th Regiment Native Infantry, and it was with no envious feelings that we heard from Bijnore, that two other companies of that once distinguished corps having mutinied at Roorkee, had crossed the Ganges, and were marching towards Moradabad by the Hurdwar road, plundering some of the tehsileeens en route. About 12 o’clock midday, these two companies were distinctly visible from the top of the court-house, and at the same time a number of their camp-followers, such as barbers, &c., entered the lines. Captain Whish ordered out 200 men of the 29th, and the two 9-pounders, and we all joined the party with the Irregular Cavalry, which we had been able to collect since the 13th, and the district sowars. Immediately this column marched out to oppose the Sappers and Miners, intelligence of our movements was conveyed to them. At this time they were about two miles from the station, and instead of continuing their march, they turned to the left, and crossed the Ram Gunga at the village of Kafibad. To counteract this movement of the rebels, we crossed the Ram Gunga at the upper Nainee Tal ghát. One of the tumbrils got fixed in a quicksand, and as it was immovable, until the infantry should come up, the cavalry went forward, accompanied by the Magistrate and Joint-Magistrate, in hopes of discovering the line which the mutineers had taken. Shortly afterwards the infantry came up, and the tumbrils were extricated. When the guns and infantry had gone about half a mile from the left bank of the river, notice was brought us by a sowar, that the Joint-Magistrate with a few sowars had headed the Sappers and Miners in the north. I, distrusting the artillery-men, who, from the commencement of our troubles, had displayed the most mutinous spirit, had accompanied the guns all day, urged them on by the high road to Kasheepoor, thus hemming in the mutineers on the east. At this time a number of the sowars had gone in among the Sappers and Miners, endeavouring to induce them to lay down their arms, but in vain. The guns were loaded with shrapnel, the port-fire was lit, the sowars had been ordered to retire, but two district sowars still lingered among them. A second time was a warning given to these two horsemen to retire, and no sooner had they turned their horses’ heads, than the mutineers flung down their carribes, and ran into the arms of the men of the 29th Regiment, which by this time had come to within 200 yards of the scene from the southward. Knowing the danger of taking these men as prisoners into the lines, and seeing the good feeling which existed between the mutineers and our own troops, we resolved to strip them of every­thing, but one suit of clothes, and to turn them adrift. This we did, and they to
a man ran off in the direction of Bareilly. In this affair we got sixty-three carbines, ammunition, regimental clothing, cash, and plunder of various kinds, thus depriving the villains of their means of doing mischief. We afterwards learnt that they reached Bareilly in a pitiable plight. It was evening before we reached the station. There must have been 150 of the Sappers and Miners, when first seen from the top of the court-house; but owing to the inequalities in the land in the vicinity of the Ram Gunga, we never sighted them again till the party, which we stripped, were stopped by the Joint-Magistrate and his small party of sowars. During this interval, eighty or ninety of them must have escaped by throwing away their arms.

16th, Sunday, the 24th. News arrived from Bijnore that the prisoners had escaped from the Bijnore Jail. Disorder reigned supreme;—every one plundering the wheat from the thrashing floors of the villages adjacent. A detachment of the 8th Irregulars, consisting of a Jemadar's party* under Quaem-ood-deen arrived.

17th, Monday, the 25th. A demonstration being required to assist Goor-sahsee in Amroha, and the Goojurs having positively stopped the road to that town, an expedition was organized, and at 11 o'clock P.M. 100 men of the 29th Regiment Native Infantry, under command of Captain Faddy, mounted on elephants and ponies, accompanied by about fifty Irregular Cavalry under myself, and the Civil Assistant Surgeon, marched for Amroha. Ensigns Tucker and Graham were also of the party. Although Amroha is only twenty-one miles from Moradabad, we did not, in consequence of the great heat and stillness of the atmosphere, reach the town till 5 o'clock A.M. of the next day. The column was marched through the principal streets of the town, and we then drew the infantry up in line opposite Goolzar Ali’s house, while it was being knocked to the ground. All the leading mahfeedaris were present. I took a phourah in my hand, and commenced the work of destruction, and each mahfeedar was made to follow my example. After giving the men a little refreshment, the Civil Assistant Surgeon and myself started with the cavalry to punish the Goor-jurs and others who had been engaged in plundering and stopping the road. This was done so effectually, that up to the date of our retreat from Moradabad, a single traveller might go from Moradabad to Amroha unmolested. We did not reach cantonments till late in the afternoon.

18th, Wednesday, the 27th. A most cruel attack was made on the 26th by some Syuds, Goshains, and Mewatees, on a wealthy bunneeaah, in the village of Mudhun, distant about eight miles from Moradabad. The head of the family was absent, and thus escaped; but one brother was killed, other relatives were wounded, and one was tortured by tying cotton to his arm and igniting it. To try and arrest some of the perpetrators, Qoorban Ali,† Jemadar of the district sowars, was deputed with a party of horse. He returned unsuccessful.

19th, Thursday, the 28th. A letter arrived from the Brigadier-General at Bareilly, praising the men of the 29th Regiment Native Infantry for their good and loyal conduct against the mutinous Sappers and Miners. This letter was translated and read to the corps on the parade. I remember well going to Court this day. Crime had decreased, and everything began to look promising. All eyes were turned towards Delhi, and the general belief was, that the fall of that fortified town would save us all.

20th, Friday, the 29th. The Goojurs from the Meerut district having crossed over to the left bank of the Ganges, had as usual commenced plundering in the pargunnah of Hussunpoor. To punish these Goojurs, and those Goojurs of the Moradabad district who had invited their brethren from the Meerut side, the Joint-Magistrate went out to Hussunpoor with fifty Irregular Cavalry. In fact, with the exception of the Hussunpoor pargunnah, order had been restored, and I went to Court this day also.

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* 1 Jemadar; 2 Duffsadars, 25 Troopers.
† This villain is still at large.
‡ This man continued loyal; his son was killed at Delhi by a grape shot on the 16th September 1857. The father has been pensioned on the full pay of his rank, and he has received a present of Roupies 1,000.
21. Saturday, the 30th. Letter received from the Joint-Magistrate, saying that he had attacked the Goorjurs, that his only casualty was one horse badly wounded, that the greater part of the Goorjurs had escaped by swimming the Ganges, and that after punishing the offending villagers of the Hussunpoor pargannah, he would return to the station. Went to Court, and all was quiet. In the afternoon I talked for a long time with the men in the lines. Not that I did not talk with them every day, and frequently several times in the day; but on this date I talked with them several hours.

22. Sunday, the 31st. This was the day of the massacre and outbreak at Shahjehanpoor and Bareilly. Service was performed by the Magistrate at 6 o'clock A.M., and I remonstrated with the officers, who all came to Church unarmed. The 200 Rampoor Irregular Cavalry, under Sirdar Bahadur Deek Mahomed Khan, this day encamped outside the town of Moradabad. They had disgraced themselves, and their master the Nawab, by mutinous conduct at Boolundshuhur, so much so, that Major Reid, the Commandant of the Goorkhas, would have disarmed them, had they not retreated before he could carry out his intention. Instead of returning by the direct road, they had gone out of their way to visit the town of Amroha, where they spread all kinds of reports detrimental to the British cause, and instigated the Syuds and their followers to rebel. The same course they pursued this day in the town of Moradabad. It was impossible not to perceive that the minds of the sipahies were again very much unsettled, and I believe this was owing to the circumstance that the 31st May had been fixed for the general rising and massacre of all who professed Christianity. Still they committed no act of violence; and I remember well, translating and reading to them the General Order of the Commander-in-Chief, assuring the Army on His Honor, that there was no intention on the part of Government to interfere in any way with their religious feelings. The post from Bareilly arrived as usual, bringing the daily doleful letter from the Commissioner of Revenue to the Magistrate. It was, however, dated the day previously, and it was the last which we received. The news of the victory gained by the Meerut troops over the Delhi and Meerut mutineers, near the river Hindun, reached Moradabad, at least I think so, on this day; and I well remember affecting to congratulate the corps upon the success of our arms, which I ventured to predict would be the forerunner of the taking of Delhi. Most of the men received the announcement in moody silence, and the Adjutant, than whom a braver man does not exist, suggested to me, that the less said about the victory and the slaughter of the mutineers, the better.

23. Monday, June 1st, 1857. No Sunday post from Bareilly. This was ominous, because it had been agreed upon that nothing should cause the suspension of correspondence, save the fact of the rising of the Bareilly brigade, I went into the lines early to speak to the men, and to gather, if possible, some information relative to Bareilly. I then went to Court. There even rumours, that the Bareilly brigade had mutinied, reached me.

24. Tuesday, June 2nd. I was called up from my b-d at 2 o'clock A.M., by a confidential servant of the Nawab of Rampoor, who told me that he had been sent by his master to make known to me the outbreak at Bareilly, the death of Brigadier Sibbald, Mr. Robert Orr, Deputy Collector, Mr. Robertson and Mr. Raikes, of the Civil Service, and of Doctor Hay; and to beg me to quit Rohikund. On my saying that my honor would not permit me to do so, he replied in these emphatic words:—"The Nawab desired me to say, that he had fulfilled all the conditions which our long-standing friendship demanded, and that having warned me in time, whatever fate befell me, he would be free of blame." I got up and went to the Adjutant, and at dawn all the native officers were called in. Captain Whish, the Commandant, Captain Faddy, and the Adjutant were present. I explained to the native officers the state of affairs, and I pointed out the only honorable course left for us, viz., to hold the district until the Bareilly brigade came to a distance of twenty miles of us, and that then we should march to Meerut with colours flying, taking our guns and treasure with us. The native officers agreed, and begged that the proposal
should be paid before the men in the lines. We all accordingly adjourned to the lines, and, as we expected, the proposal was met with derision. Bholah Singh, above alluded to in note to paragraph 3, instantly charged me with a wish to bring them under the muzzles of the rifles of the 60th and the sabres of the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers), and treat them in the same way as the Sappers and Miners had been treated at Meerut. To this insolent villain I replied that he lied; and moreover, that he knew that he was lying. He rejoined by saying, that the Company had ordered the corps to be posted at Moradabad, and that come what might, it would remain there. It was now evident that the corps, having received authentic information of the rising at Bareilly on the previous Sunday, had resolved to mutiny also. There was the treasure, some Rupees 2,70,000, hanging like a millstone around our necks. The mutinous demeanour of the regiment had caused about a thousand bad characters of the town of Moradabad and its environs to surround the court-house, at a distance of about 200 yards, waiting for the time when they might pounce upon a portion of the treasure. All night long some of the non-commissioned officers of the treasury guard came and roused me up, stating that these bad characters were threatening to attack the guard and plunder the treasure. This was doubtless a ruse to harass us, but it was perfectly true that the bad characters were there.

25. At last the day of Wednesday, the 3rd of June, dawned; and I went to the Commanding Officer, and suggested to him that it would be far better, instead of keeping a Captain and a company, besides the Artillery Officer and his two guns day and night on duty at the treasury, to make over the treasure in the tumbrils to the Officer Commanding the treasury guard, and to draw them up on the parade-ground in front of the quarter-guard. This proposal was approved of, and it was resolved to carry it into effect as soon as the treasurer made his appearance. About 9 o'clock A.M. I found that some of our elephants, which had gone out as usual for fodder, had been forcibly brought back by a sipahhee of the treasury guard. The treasurer, though sent for, did not make his appearance, and I went to the treasury alone, having received the keys from the Collector; but as there are always two locks on the treasury chests, the key of one of which remains with the treasurer, it was impossible, without violence, to open the chests. It was during this time that a young sipahhee addressed me in a most insolent manner, asking why the treasure was not made over to them at once, so that they might return to their lines to cook. I replied, that the treasure chests had double locks, the key of one of which was kept by the treasurer; that he had been sent for, and would doubtless shortly arrive. He rejoined, "You are always fooling us in this way." The Magistrate and Collector then joined me, and we proceeded to destroy the second lock by sledge hammers. In this we had partially succeeded, when the treasurer arrived. While I was passing out the bags of rupees, the Magistrate and Collector was tearing up all the most valuable stamp papers, concealed from the sight of the men of the guard by a door. All this time Runjeet Singh, Soubadar (who had for good conduct some years previously been presented by all the European officers of the regiment with a sword, who had been sent to the Rifle Instruction Depot at Umballa, and who had frequently, in my hearing, spoken to the sipahhees of the regiment on the folly of supposing that there was any thing in the cartridges to injure their castes) sat at the door of the treasure room, silent and gloomy. At the time I thought he thirsted for our blood, but I now believe that he sat there hoping thereby to save the Collector and myself from being assassinated in the small treasure room. His brother, Buldeo Singh, Pay Havildar of the Grenadier Company, also came down from the lines in undress, and seated himself on the steps of the eastern verandah of the Court, close to the spot at which the tumbrils were being filled. When

* The Order of Merit, with the title of Bahadoor, has since been conferred on him by the orders of Government.
† Since made a Soubadar.
about a fourth of the treasure was still in the treasury room, Bhawanee Singh, Soubadar, came with about thirty sipahpees in undress, and mixed with the rest of the men forming the treasury guard. It was hardly a time for jesting, but I jokingly said to Bhawanee Singh, "What, Soubadar sahib, was not one company under a Captain and a Soubadar sufficient to escort two or three laks of rupees to the lines, without your taking the trouble to come down yourself, bringing thirty more men with you?" He replied, "A few more hands will do no harm." I little thought at the time how much I was about to be indebted to him. When all the treasure was placed in the tumbrils, the Collector, myself and the treasurer came out into the eastern verandah, and then began murmuring as to the amount of treasure. The artillerymen forcibly carried off the treasurer towards the guns, and were in the act of tying him to one of them, when Captain Gaddy, who is deservedly a favourite with his men, rescued him. By this time the Collector and myself had mounted our horses, when four young sipahpees of the treasury guard levelled their muskets at us. At this instant Bhawanee Singh, Soubadar, and Buldeo Singh joined Hayvildar of the Grenadier Company, stepped between the muskets and our persons, and the former raising his hand said in an authoritative tone, "What do you wish to see the flesh rot from your bones? Did you not take a most solemn oath not to hurt a hair of their heads, and are you now firing at them?" The muskets were lowered, and the Collector and myself rode off to the house where we were all living together, satisfied that it was high time to be off. On reaching home we wrote a note to the officers stating that we should start for Meerut in an hour, and invited them to join us with their wives and families. The messenger was allowed by the sipahpees to deliver the note, but not to bring us back an answer. Seeing this, Captain Whish and Captain Gaddy came over to our house, and said that they could not start for an hour or so. We agreed that we would wait for them at the bridge over the River Gangun, distant four miles from the station. The sipahpees, instead of taking the treasure tumbrils to the quarter-guard, took them to the gun-shed, and the two 9-pounders, loaded with grape, were laid so as to command the Meerut road. Suspecting that this would be the case, I had resolved to lead our party out of the station by the Bijnore road, turning off to the Meerut road through a kuroudah jungle; but fearing lest the groom, to whom I gave charge of a buggy and horse, with orders, half an hour before we started, to take them to the 3rd mile-stone on the Meerut road, should inadvertently betray me, if I entrusted him with my designs, I told him to go by the regular road. The man was compelled by the sipahpees to turn back. He did so, but instead of returning to the house, he took the very line which I had determined to take. It was a little after 3 o'clock P.M. when our party started. It consisted of nine Europeans—four ladies, four gentlemen, and one discharged artilleryman. At the moment of departure all the district sowars, but Qoorban Ali, Jennadar (his son killed at Delhi on the 14th September 1857), Buhar Buksh, and Buldeo Singh Bhudowreea, deserted us; so did all the new levies but one, who is now a duffadar in the Delhi police sowars. Some of the Irregular cavalrmen on leave accompanied us. Three men out of the twenty-eight men of the 8th Irregulars also deserted us, but the

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* This Bhawanee Singh, Soubadar, had frequently talked to me, between the 12th May and the 3rd of June, on the ruin which the mutiny would cause him. He had been forty years in the service, and he used to weep over the anticipated loss of pay, position, pension, &c. When I tried to rouse him to fight, saying that the bad men were only as 200 to 500, he replied by saying, "What can we do against the artillery, who are more martial than any of us?" When to this I rejoined, "Let all the good men join the officers and myself, I will then dispose of the artillerymen, and take the guns on our sides." He continued weeping, and replied, "You will be the first killed." "What do I care," I said, "you are going to disgrace me, and I had rather lose my life than be disgraced." It was all in vain. Nothing more could I get out of him than the old tale,—"You will be the first to be shot, the moment you try to separate the good from the bad men." What material for making a soldier of? This faithful old servant of the Government saved my life at the risk of his own, but he distinctly refused to follow me, when I wished to risk that life in saving for him all that men, generally speaking, held dear in life,—honor, pay, position, pension, &c. A moral coward, he refused to fight against his brethren. He subsequently marched with the mutineers against Delhi, a weak victim to circumstances. Where he is now I know not. Would that I could find him; he was always designated "Amathaier," 8d set, of or belonging to Amathiers, and was by case a Chobad Rajpoot.

† Buldeo Singh has been made a Soubadar by the Governor-General, and he is now with me. A noble specimen of a pure Rajpoot does not exist.
Marching out, as above mentioned, by the Bijnore road, and cutting across the kurundah jungle, we reached the Gungan bridge, the appointed rendezvous. I forgot to mention that before the ladies quitted their rooms, the men of the jail guard commenced plundering the furniture, bedding, &c. Having waited half an hour at the bridge, we proceeded to the 8th mile-stone, to a large village called Packhurah. It is customary for those who have cursorily run through India, to state that the British officers are hated, and that this hatred led to the rebellion. That some officers may be hated is very true, but that such is generally the case I deny. When we reached Packhurah, we had an escort of fifty horsemen. We were fugitives, flying from a corps belonging to a mutinous, over-panpered, spoilt army. What induce ment existed, at such a time, for a native to show sympathy? Yet whence came the tears which were shed, and the milk which was offered by the villagers of Packhurah, during the hour which we remained there, waiting in vain for the officers and their party? It is not for me, who have held authority in the Moradabad district since the year 1841, to answer this question. Let those who without knowing even a smattering of the language, presume to write and dictate upon Indian affairs, answer it. When we reached Rujubpoor, distant twenty-five miles from Moradabad, we halted to bait our horses. Here we learnt that Mr. Fleetwood Williams, who had been on the 13th May gazetted to be Commissioner of Delhi, vice Mr. Simon Fraser, murdered, and who on the 19th May had been ordered to take charge of the Bareilly Commissionership from Mr. Robert Alexander, had arrived early that morning; but hearing from the police of Rujubpoor of the Bareilly massacre, and of our difficulties in Moradabad, he had retraced his steps at 3 o'clock P.M. for Gurmooktaisur. We also found emissaries from Delhi in the serai. These began tampering with our escort, and succeeded in seducing some of the sowars from us, Buldeo Singh Bud howreea among the number. We had still eighteen miles further before us, and the Ganges to cross, ere we could reach Gurmooktaisur. We reached the river about 3 o'clock A.M., and as some rain had fallen in the mountains, it was rising. The consequence was, that the bridge was on the point of being rendered useless, and it was with difficulty that we all got safely over. On the bridge we met Mr. Fleetwood Williams. He conducted us to a dhurrumsalah, a masonry building erected by a Goshain, and here we passed the day of Thursday, the 4th June. In the evening we again started for Meerut, distant twenty-seven miles. We arrived there about 5 o'clock A.M. of Friday, 5th June, and were most hospitably received by the inmates of the Dumdumah. That evening the General Commanding the Meerut Division promoted every one of the Irregular cavalrymen, both those on leave and those on duty, who had escorted us over; and as the former entreated me to get them eight days' leave, to enable them to put their wives and families in a place of safety, I induced the General to grant them that indulgence, on their promising me most solemnly to return within the given period. Alas! not one returned. They deemed us all doomed men. Quam-ood-deen, the Jemadar of the 8th Irregulars, was raised to the rank of a Rissaldar, and how gratefully he repaid us for the indulgence will appear hereafter. This man on the journey, while conversing with a lady of our party, told her that on the 23rd of the month the British would be masters of India for one hundred years; that astrologers had foretold that on that date the British would lose India, or that in the following September their power would be greater than ever. When it is remembered that this conversation took place on the 3rd or 4th of June, and that Delhi was re-taken on the 20th September following, it will be admitted as something extraordinary.*

* Mr. Fleetwood Williams left Meerut on the afternoon of the 2nd June, escorted by Captain Craigie and some newly raised sowars. They were joined in the outskirts of Meerut by a fawn-coloured piahead, half-grown dog, a perfect stranger to the whole party. They relate that at frequent intervals he used to go in front of the column and howl in the most melancholy way; that he did this during the night of the 2nd June as far as Gurmooktaisur; that he did the same on the morning's march of the 3rd June as far as Rujubpoor; but that when they retraced their steps towards Meerut at 3 P.M. of the 3rd, the dog ceased to howl. I myself, on being told the tale at Gurmooktaisur, made a point of watching the animal on the march from Gurmooktaisur to Meerut during the night of the 4th, and the morning of the 5th June. I can solemnly declare that the dog not only did not howl, but that he ran along evidently in high spirits. It is perhaps fortunate for me that I am well known to be free from the slightest taint of superstition, otherwise I should not have dared to pen this note.
26. It is high time to return to the officers of the 29th Regiment, whom we left in cantonments between 3 and 4 o'clock P.M. on the afternoon of Wednesday, June 3rd. Instead of proceeding to Meerut, they took the road to Nainee Tal. I cannot state with certainty the causes which led to this change of plan, but I believe the following reasons are nearly correct: 1stly, they knew that although they were secure for the time being from any violence on the part of their own men, the artillerymen thirsted for their blood; that there were two 9-pounders loaded with grape laid on the Meerut road, and that it was highly probable their party might be fired at, if they took that road; 2ndly, on the road to Nainee Tal, there were no guns laid to annihilate them; 3rdly, Nainee Tal was much nearer to Moradabad than Meerut; 4thly, some officers of the 29th were already there. Accordingly they started between 4 and 5 o'clock P.M., for Nainee Tal with the ladies and children. The Adjutant of the Corps, Captain Gardiner, stung almost to madness by the thoughts of quitting the regiment, left the party, and rode back again into the lines; and whilst there, Kur- rum Ali, Soubadar, well knowing that in the present state of the regiment no European's life was safe, gently forced him to remount. He then rode after the other officers. When the party were passing the court-house premises, they were joined by a Naik and six men of the regiment, who nobly followed their officers. I ought to mention that Runjeet Singh, his brother Buldeo Singh, Pay Havildar of the Grenadier Company, and his son Ramchurn Singh, went up to the Commanding Officer, and requested their discharge, saying that they would not join the mutineers. The families of these men were present with the regiment, and had these three men not remained behind to secrete them in a place of safety, their families would have been very probably sacrificed. The officers reached Kaladoongee on the morning of the 4th, and with the exception of an infant, which died of want of food, in consequence of the desertion of its nurse, the whole party arrived at Nainee Tal by the morning of the 5th in safety.

27. It will be observed that I have made no mention of the clerks and other Christian residents of Moradabad. But it must not be supposed that they were forgotten. All the fifers and drummers were asked, a few days before the final scene took place, whether they would accompany their officers or stay with the corps. Two only agreed to go with the officers; the rest said, "that the corps was their home, and that where the corps was, there they would stay." There was an invalid officer, of the name of Lieutenant Warwick; he was of pure European descent, and of very unwieldy form. In the end of May I went to his house, and at my earnest entreaties he consented to go to Nainee Tal; I actually went security to a native banker, who advanced him two months' pay, and I promised him an escort. He had married twenty years previously a Native Christian, and she was averse to going to the hills. She accordingly induced her husband to send a spy along the Nainee Tal road, and to defer his departure until the spy's return should prove whether the road was safe or not. At the time in question the road was perfectly safe, but she tutored the spy to report that it was unsafe, and Lieutenant Warwick resolved not to go. I again went to his house; and urged the necessity of his immediate departure. He made frivolous excuses as to carriage, when I pointed out that his palanquin carriage and Mr. Powell's elephant would be ample carriage for all of them, including his daughter-in-law and her children. He persisted in not going, and my parting words were:—"As you have resolved to remain, get plenty of powder and ball; sell your life dearly, and die like an Englishman." There was the head clerk of the Collectorate, of the name of Hill. He was a first-rate clerk, but his energies, away from the desk, were 'as nothing. He had a very large family, and when I proposed to him to get ready, and be

* This man was subsequently killed at Delhi.

† Mr. Powell was Deputy Inspector of Post Offices, and he had shortly before arrived at Moradabad on duty.

Lieutenant Warwick had been formerly Postmaster of Moradabad, and Mr. Powell was living in Lieutenant Warwick's house. Mr. Powell had brought with him a very fine elephant, on which I believe he was in the habit of performing all his journeys as Post Office Inspector.
prepared to start with his wife and children at a moment's warning, he declared that it was utterly impossible that he could leave Moradabad with such a large family. There was a Christian Deputy Magistrate, of the name of Kitchen, who had also a wife and large family. So far from wishing to accompany us, when he was sent for on duty by the Magistrate and Collector, three days before we were compelled to fly, he sent back word that he had burnt all his Europe fashioned clothes, and could not make his appearance. With the exception of Lieutenant Warwick, who was very fair, every other Christian trusted that their color or their insignificant position would save them. How cruelly they erred in their calculation the sequel will show.

On the 3rd June, all the clerks with their families had assembled at the house of Lieutenant Warwick, and when the officers, on their road to Nainee Tal, passed by his door, some of them upbraided the officers with being devoid of feeling in deserting them. The officers stopped, and even then invited them to accompany them, but in vain. That same evening the bad characters of the town and the jail guard surrounded the house, intent upon plundering it; shots were fired by the garrison, and the villains were kept off. It was at this time that a gun in the hands of Mr. James Warwick, the son of Lieutenant Warwick, a head clerk, in the Judge's Office, accidentally went off, and killed the eldest son of Mr. Hill, a lad of fifteen years of age. Partly to avoid the reproaches of the mother, and partly because he knew that men who openly avowed an accidental homicide, were punished very mildly, he, in the belief that I had gone to Nainee Tal, rushed out of the house, and succeeded in reaching the hills on the 6th June. This clerk was the only one of all the Moradabad clerks present on that occasion who was saved. But to return to Lieutenant Warwick, and his ill-fated garrison. They held their own against their assailants throughout the night of the 3rd; but on the morning of the 4th, their assailants induced the Soubadar-Major to send a company and a gun. Seeing the gun, the whole of the garrison fled by the back of the house towards the eastward, in the direction of Mr. Hill's house. Lieutenant Warwick was too unwieldy to run; he was overtaken, and cut down on the road. His wife, looking back, saw what had occurred. She immediately returned to the spot, and entreated the murderer, as he had killed her husband, to kill her also. The wretch granted her prayer, and she instantly fell a corpse at his feet. It is said that one of the jail guard thrust his bayonet into her, and insulted her person. Some time during the day of the 3rd of June, Mr. Hill's son, whose accidental death has been recorded above, seeing a Pathan stealing his father's buggy, shot him on the spot. Shortly after the death of Lieutenant Warwick, some relatives of the Pathan, who was shot the day before, seeing young McGuire, a clerk in the Magistrate's Office, and mistaking him for young Hill, cut him down. Mr. Powell, the Deputy Inspector of Post Offices, Mr. Hill, the head clerk of the Collectorate, Mr. McGuire, senior head clerk of the Magistrate's Office, Mr. Dorrington, junior clerk in the Collectorate, and Mr. Phillips, 2nd clerk in the Judge's Office, were carried off to the lines, and there compelled, on pain of death, to repeat the kalimah, or formulas of the faith of Islam. At this time Mr. Kitchen, the Deputy Magistrate, his son, a lad of fifteen years of age, and his brother-in-law, Mr. Carberry, with the family, were concealed in the city by some of the amlah of the Kaeth* caste.

28. To return to Meerut. On the 6th June, the General Commanding the Division asked me to undertake the Intelligence Department to the eastward, using the detachment of the 8th Irregulars; but it was not until the 10th that I could get any information about Bareilly or Moradabad. On the 9th we heard of the glorious victory at Delhi of the 8th, which victory caused notice to be sent by the Delhi rebels to Bareilly, to urge the advance of the Rohilkund regiments as quickly as possible. One intercepted letter ran

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* Bal Gobind Nair, Shunkur Suhee, and Sheo Suhiee, were the men who acted thus nobly. They have not been rewarded.

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thus:—"The King is dying with anxiety to see you all. Come, come; eat your dinner at Moradabad, and wash your hands in the Jumna. As the night is long to him who expects the advent of his mistress, so long is the time which shall intervene ere you arrive." No mention was made of the defeat of the 8th, nor of the real cause which led to their being so urgently required at Delhi. On the 10th I learnt that the 8th Irregulars, a corps which had always been considered staunch, had joined the Bareilly mutineers, and that a great many of the European functionaries of Bareilly had reached Nainee Tal in safety. It was on the 10th also that the 18th, 23th, 68th Native Infantry Regiments, and 8th Irregulars, with four guns of Major Kirby's battery and two Shahjehanpoor post guns under Bukht Khan, Soubadar of Artillery, marched from Bareilly for Delhi vid Moradabad.

29. Friday, the 12th June. At 5 P.M., I went with Captain Bott's troop of the 6th Dragoon Guards to destroy the boats at Gurhmooktisar. We arrived on the banks of the Ganges about 3 o'clock A.M., the next day. Three planks were cut out of the bottom of each boat, for which injury a compensation of Rupees 100 was given to each of the boat owners. I rode back to Meerut by 10 o'clock A.M. of the 13th, having relays of horses. The Dragoons halted at Shahjehanpoor, eighteen miles short of Meerut, returning at 9 o'clock P.M. On Sunday, 14th June, heard that the rebels had attacked our position at Delhi on the 12th, and had been repulsed with great slaughter.

30. Monday, the 15th June. A detachment of the 4th Light Cavalry (Lancers) had been sent on duty to the bridge-of-boats at Bagbput, our only means of communication with our troops before Delhi, and suspicions arose that they too were going to play us false. Accordingly the General Commanding sent fifty of the 6th Dragoon Guards to watch them. With these fifty Dragoons I sent, he having particularly requested me to do so, Quaem-ood-deen, the newly-created Rissaldar of the 8th Irregulars, and six men of the detachment of his regiment, directing them to return in eight days, bringing back with them all the irregular cavalymen, who were on leave in the vicinity of Rohtuck, and whom they could collect together. Not one of these seven ungrateful villains ever returned to Meerut. It was on this day that Bukht Khan, Soubadar, with the force detailed above, marched into the Moradabad cantonments. That same evening Mr. Kitchen, the Deputy Magistrate, his son, a lad of fifteen years of age, and his brother-in-law, Mr. Carberry, having been dragged from their place of concealment by Aiyooob Khan, Attorney of Nuijoo Khan, Ch'hootan alias Ameen-ood-deen, and other miscreants, were ignominiously hurried towards cantonments. When they came opposite the mosque, situated to the west of the western gate of Nirputgunj, they were assassinated, their offence being that they professed Christianity and refused to repeat the formula of the faith of Islam.

* This man is the Quaem-ood-deen mentioned in paragraphs 16 and 25. I sent in charges against him to Major-General Penny, C.B., Commanding at Delhi, in the month of October 1857. He was arrested at his home in Rohlock, and he then feigned sickness so well, that he induced Doctor Curhan to give him a certificate to the effect, that he must have been unable to rejoin me for the space of two months at least. Whereas the truth is, that he had not been ill an hour. His indisposition arose from a knowledge that I would bring him to account for desertion before the enemy. He was sent before the Delhi Commission, no notice having been served upon myself, or any of the numerous witnesses, who were ready to come forward to give evidence against him. The Commission consequently acquitted him, and directed his rejoining his regiment. The faithful men and some recruits formed the corps. Quaem-ood-deen made his appearance at our camp at Allygarh. The native officers, who had done their duty nobly, and who had been superseded by my kindness towards this wretch on the 8th June 1857, expressed their indignation in no measured terms. I sent in fresh charges against him for disgraceful conduct, and he was ordered back to Meerut to await his trial. In the meantime Brigadier Chamberlain, C.B., was walking on the glacis at Delhi, near the spot where the Rohilkund mutineers had been encamped, when he found some Oordoo papers. These proved, on being read, to begeries from Quaem-ood-deen, addressed from Rohlock to the leading rebels at Delhi during the siege, alleging that he had killed Mr. Fleetwood Williams and Doctor Cannaan at Gurhmooktisar, and pledging himself that if he was sent for, and entrusted with a force, he would proceed to Meerut and take the Dumdumaah, for that he had got shot "like a musk in a trap, and he had seen all the guns and the whole of the fortifications there." I proceeded to Delhi, and a court-martial was convened, and he was sentenced to be hanged. This sentence was carried out in the month of May 1858.

† Aiyooob Khan is a native of Rampoor, and he is now concealed in that town, to the disgrace of the Nawab and the Agents of the Governor-General, who, instead of encouraging the Nawab in sheltering the miscreant, should insist upon his being handed over. Nuijoo Khan, alias Ameen-ood-deen and two other assassins have been hanged by this Commission. The mosque now stands uninjured (though the Christian church is still in ruins), a sad memorial of the foul murder.
31. Tuesday, June 16th. A Sikh, one of the ten Sikhs who had fled from the Oudh Cavalry when the two squadrons murdered Captains Barber and Hayes near Mynpoory, and who had joined us two or three days previously at Meerut, was this day sent by me across the Ganges towards Moradabad, in the hope that he might succeed in inducing the 200 Sikhs of the 29th Regiment to separate themselves from their mutinous brethren, and to join us at Meerut. This day also the Irregular Cavalry, under Captain Tyrwhitt, formerly of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, which had done such good service in holding the Boolundshuhur district, were obliged to fall back upon Hauppur. A cossid arrived towards the close of the day, with a letter dated the 12th June, from Mr. Kitchen, Deputy Magistrate, in which he laments, urged the necessity of our holding Gurhmooktaisur, and opposing the mutineers crossing the river. Little did the writer know that in three short days he would be a lifeless corpse. Little did I, when that day reading his letter, know that the writer had ceased to exist twenty-four hours before those lines met my eyes.

32. Thursday, June 18th. This day Bukht Khan, Soubadar of Artillery, marched from Moradabad towards Gurhmooktaisur, his force having been increased by the 29th Regiment Native Infantry, taking with him Mr. Powell, Deputy Inspector of Post Offices, Mr. Hill, head clerk of the Collectorate, Mr. Dorrington, junior clerk of ditto, Mr. McGuire, clerk in the Magistrate's Office, and Mr. Phillips, 2nd clerk in the Judge's Office; and our troops at Delhi took a brass 12-pounder gun, and destroyed an earth-work of the mutineers, which they had erected at Trevelyangunj.

33. Saturday, June 20th. Daks going to and from Delhi plundered by the Mouway Jats; and a man of the 8th Irregulars, posted at Gurhmooktaisur, came into Meerut, to report to me that the Rohilkund mutineers were approaching Gujroulah. I acquainted the military authorities with the fact, and urged the necessity of our holding Gurhmooktaisur, and opposing the mutineers crossing the river.

34. Sunday, June 21st. All the police and ferry officials at Gurhmooktaisur, and two men of the 8th Irregulars, came in from the ghat, and they announced that the first division of the mutineers was at Gujroulah, and that the advance guard was trying to make some arrangements for crossing the river. I again urged the General to oppose the passage, volunteering to accompany the party. A council of war was held, which I was not permitted to attend, probably because my sentiments were known, and because my intimate knowledge of the strength of the town of Gurhmooktaisur might influence the members of the council. After the council had risen, I again went to the Assistant Adjutant-General, urging that a party should go that evening to oppose the passage. I was silenced with the information that Delhi would be assaulted and taken before the Rohilkund troops could reach Delhi!!! I replied, well and good; it is better that we should have the villains between two deep rivers, than on the further side of one of them.

35. Monday, June 22nd. Information received from Gurhmooktaisur that some men and two guns have succeeded in getting across the river. I again represented how easy it would be, in one night march, to annihilate these men, and take the guns. I also represented, that though there were only 2,300 fighting men, they were encumbered with 1,000 carts laden with plunder,—such as sugar, otah, &c.,—and that the firing off the first gun on our side would be the signal for the Jats and Mewates of the left bank of the Ganges to plunder the mutineers of every particle of their baggage. But I was again silenced as before.

36. Tuesday, June 23rd. Captain Tyrwhitt, who had retreated from Boolundshuhur to Hauppur with his irregulars, returned to Meerut, and the whole of the European community became aghast at the news of Lieutenant

* The four first, after experiencing brutal treatment, and suffering much privation and want, were, I fear, killed, in ignorance of their real state, by our troops at Delhi, on the 20th September 1857. The latter was shot at Gujroulah, on the charge that he had taken a light to blow up the tumbrils.
Smith, Adjutant of the 4th Irregulars, having been foully assassinated by some of his men at Mozufferunngur. Up to this time those blessed with sanguine tempers had hopes that a few of the Irregular Cavalry would remain faithful; but from this date not an European officer in Meerut would serve with any of the old native soldiery.

37. Wednesday, June 24th. There was a general belief throughout Meerut that Delhi would be assaulted this day, and every one of us felt certain, that if the assault was made, it could not but be successful. No news whatever of the Sikh emissary sent to seduce the 200 Sikhs of the 29th Regiment from the cause of the mutineers, and I began to feel very anxious as to his fate. Rohilkund mutineers still crossing the Ganges.

38. Thursday, 24th, and Friday, 26th June. Good news from Delhi, that in the attack made by the mutineers on the British position on the 23rd, 1,000 of them had been killed. Bad news from Gwalior, that the Contingent had mutinied, and having murdered Blake, Dr. Kirk and others, were thinking of marching on Delhi.

39. Saturday, June 27th. The Rohilkund mutineers have started from Gurmoottaisur for Delhi by the direct road. Rains commenced this day at Meerut. Baghput bridge carried away by the rising of the Jumna. Rain poured in torrents, and the dampness of the low situation in which our small tent was pitched in the Dumdumah anything but pleasant.

40. Sunday, 28th, and Monday, 29th June. I received letters from the bankers of Moradabad, and also from the Nawab of Rampoor, to the effect that he had, under orders from the Commissioner, taken charge of the district of Moradabad.

41. Tuesday, June 30th. Authentic news that the Rohilkund mutineers would march this day to Ghaeez-oed-deen Nuggur, one short stage from Delhi; that my Sikh emissary had been betrayed to Mahomed Shuffee, the mutinous Rissaldar of the 8th Irregulars, by a villain of the 8th, whom I had sent to find out everything about the corps, and hanged at Gujroulah, where the mutineers also murdered the Urum Major of the 68th Regiment Native Infantry, and Mr. Phillips, 2nd clerk in the Moradabad Judge's Office, on the plea that they had taken a light to the tumbrils, intending to cause them to explode.

42. About the 1st July, I was appointed President of a Commission for trying, under martial law, persons committed for acts of violence and rebellion; and I performed the duties of that office up to the 11th July, on which date the Brigadier, Colonel Richmond Jones, thought fit to dissolve the Commission, and to substitute for it a Commission composed of the Judge Advocate, the Cantonment Magistrate, and the officer holding the position of Provost Major! During this interval, the regiment originally termed the "Meerut Khakees," but subsequently designated the "Meerut District Volunteers," was raised. The command was vested in Major Williams, but the real working men were Captain D'Oyly of the Stud, who was 2nd in command, and Captain Tyrwhitt, of the late 14th Irregulars, who was Adjutant. I was asked to join these Volunteers, but I refused to do so for many reasons, the principal reason being, that I believed I could do much more good by myself, if I could retain the command of the detachment of the 8th Irregulars, which had accompanied us from Moradabad, and which, though much reduced by desertions during the transit of the Rohilkund mutineers, still contained some good men. At this time the Commissariat Officer, Captain Simpson, a man who did his duty nobly in these troublous times, had contracted debts in the Meerut bazar, for the purchase of articles required for the troops at Delhi, to the amount of £30,000, whereas there was only £3,000 in the Treasury,—a sum not sufficient to cover the expense of one European Infantry Regiment for a single month. It was very evident that a public bankruptcy was at hand; and to obviate this calamity, the local fiscal authorities tried to induce the monied men of the Meerut district to
advance money to Government as a loan. I ought to mention that Mr. R. W. Dunlop, who was absent on sick leave in the hills beyond Kashmir, as soon as the news of the mutiny reached him, nobly returned to his post as Magistrate and Collector of Meerut, travelling every night by any conveyance which he could find, and was present in Meerut, not only conducting the duties of his office, but acting as a private in the cavalry of the Meerut Khakee Regiment; and that Mr. Fleetwood Williams, Judge of Meerut, had been appointed Officiating Commissioner. But so utterly was the British prestige lowered in the eyes of the monied interest of the Meerut district, that no one would come forward with a loan. Coercion in one instance was resorted to; but the practice being deemed objectionable, the money was very properly restored to the parties from whom it had been taken. This transaction led me to enquire how much revenue was due by the zemindars of the Meerut district, and finding that the arrears amounted to £70,000 sterling, I resolved, that come what might, I would try my hand at making the zemindars pay their instalments, and thus stave off the bankruptcy, which was threatening us. Under permission from Captain Mackenzie, Commandant of the 8th Irregulars, who had escaped from Bareilly with twenty-three faithful native officers to Nainee Tal, I had sent perwannahs to all the men of the regiment who were on leave, and I was joined on the 16th July by Boolund Khan, Rissaldar, his son, and another sowar of the regiment. This addition brought up the detachment to the strength of nineteen men. The 18th July was the first day on which I acted as the leader of sixteen mounted men (I always left three at home to rest themselves), sallying forth at two o'clock A.M., three times a week, and returning to the Dum Dumah sometimes at 8, at other times at ten o'clock P.M., and on some occasions not till past midnight, the distance travelled every day varying from forty to fifty miles. In this duty I was nobly seconded by Gunga Purshad, the tehseeldar of Meerut, now made Deputy Collector of the Furruckabad district. I hold a letter from the late Major-General Penny, C.B., Commanding at Meerut, to the effect, that the prosperous state of the finances was owing to my exertions; and here let me place on record my obligations to the military authorities at Meerut, and to the men of the detachment of the 8th Irregulars. No sooner did the military authorities see the good effects of my exertions, than they placed at my disposal the horses of the 4th Light Cavalry. Had they not done this, our own horses could not have stood the work for one week, much less for six weeks. And as for the noble conduct of the men of the detachment, words cannot express what I feel with regard to them. Sixteen hours, three times a week in the saddle, is no trifling exertion in a good climate, with food available at every halting place, but when that exertion is made in the midst of the rainy season of India, the men being wet through more or less every day, and where the only thing to be procured to ward off the gnawing pains of hunger was molasses and water, a cloying beverage, which would make most Europeans sick, and which we shared alike, it is no ordinary feat sustained, as it was for so long a period.

43. But not only were the finances recruited by our exertions, but peace and order were restored at the same time. In paragraph 6, I mentioned that the Lieutenant-Governor had requested the Moradabad authorities to clear the road from Gurhoocktaisur to Meerut. First and foremost among the plunderers of this line of road were the Goojurs of the village of Solda, distant fourteen miles from Meerut. Whilst I had charge of the Intelligence Department to the eastward, the Solda Goojurs had assembled in such numbers, that four sowars of the 8th Irregulars had been driven back by them; and just before the Rohilkund mutineers had crossed the Ganges, they had murdered a Brahmín inhabitant of Gurhmoocktaisur for the sake of his clothes, and his corpse was seen shortly after by the men of the 8th. In this village the zemindars, all the inhabitants save about thirty (who were all Chumars), and

* Since made Sirdar Bahadoor.
the chowkeedar, were Goojurs. This murder, like many others, had never been reported, although the police darogah was still at his post; in fact the extra Gojur chowkeedar, who had been appointed in consequence of the troubles to live at the watch-house (Murhelah) east of Solda, and to guard travellers, was the principal murderer. I first sent to the tehseldar for a list of the revenue defaulters of his pergunnah, and I ordered him to meet me on the confines of his pergunnah, on the 20th July. I fancy he suspected that I intended visiting some of the Goojur villages, and having no taste for fighting, he did not meet me as directed.

44. I had been collecting revenue in the Meerut pergunnah, and Gunga Purshad, the Meerut tehseldar, was with me, accompanied by a few tehsellee peons. His jurisdiction ceased about four miles short of Solda, but he did not hesitate to follow me. When within one and a half miles of Solda we passed through Hussunpoor, also a Gojur village, and there we saw a man, apparently a Gojur, on horseback, coming through a dhak jungle, from the direction of Solda, about half a mile south of the high road. As he evidently wished to avoid us, I pursued him, and, after a chase of two miles, we succeeded in capturing his mare, but he himself got away, secreting himself in some sugarcane. We then made the best of our way towards Solda from the southward, thus preventing the Goojurs from attempting to escape from the village into the jungle. On reaching the village, we found that Gunga Purshad had collected all the villagers, and was demanding the revenue due. I commenced by questioning the chowkeedar and three of the lumberdars (one was absent), why they had not reported the murder of the Brahmin. All four denied that any Brahmin had been murdered within the limits of the village. The Chumars were taken, in compliance with my orders by Gunga Purshad, to a distance of 200 yards, and there questioned as to the perpetrators of the murder, and the chowkeedar was then tied up and flogged (stripes were always inflicted for neglect of duty on chowkeedars, previously to the promulgation of Act II. of 1834), and during the flogging he mentioned the names of four Goojurs as being the murderers. The Chumars' statement, given to the tehseldar out of hearing of the chowkeedar, corroborated the account given by the chowkeedar and when they were confronted with the lumberdars, the latter also gave a corresponding account, and attempted to shelter themselves from being accessory to the murder, by saying that they had remonstrated with the murderers, but in vain. One of the murderers was present, and he and the three lumberdars were put on their trial for the murder, and being accessory to the murder of the Brahmin, whose name I have now forgotten. The court consisted of Boolund Khan, Rissalder, Tuhawur Khan, Jemadar, and myself. We unanimously agreed in our verdict, viz., that all four prisoners should be put to death. They were accordingly shot, and their bodies were suspended to some sheeshum trees by the side of the road, as a warning to the fraternity. From that hour no crime was committed on the Gurmookhtaisur road, which had been unsafe from the 11th May, a period of more than two months. I did not destroy the village, for fire does not discriminate between the house of a Gojur and of a Chumar; but I warned the Goojurs, that if they removed the bodies of their four brethren without my sanction, I would return and punish them as never Gojur had been punished before. So effectual had been the measures which I adopted to bring these hereditary murderers and plunderers to their senses, that when a thousand Goojurs, relatives of the deceased, assembled at Solda to eat the funeral feast, they proposed to take the bodies down, and burn them according to custom, before they sat down to dispose of the food prepared for them; but the Solda Goojurs said, "No; if you will agree to remain in Solda till Mr. Wilson returns, then take down the bodies and burn them; but if you will not consent to this arrangement, then leave the bodies alone, and partake of the feast and go your way." The melancholy meal was eaten with the bodies hanging before their eyes,—a solemn warning that the British rule was not yet at an end, and that Goojurs might not murder, in open day, Brahmin travellers, passing through the limits of their village with impunity.
Fourteen days after, learning from the tehsildar of Momanah that the revenue of Solda had been paid up, I sent word to the Goorjurs that they might take down the bodies and burn them; and the bodies were burnt accordingly.

45. I omitted to mention some occurrences, which, as they illustrate the painful position of the Meerut garrison, I will here relate. About the 9th of the month, news of the lamentable action, which took place at Agra on the 5th July, reached us. Our communication with the south-east had for some time past only extended twenty miles, and all eyes were turned for succour on that direction. Native rumours had previously raised our hopes, reporting that General Wheeler had been reinforced, and that he was on his way to Delhi, viz. Agra, by forced marches; and when we received positive information, that not only the whole of the Europeans of Futtehgurh and Cawnpoor were cut off, but that Sir Henry Lawrence had been killed, the Lucknow garrison besieged, and the Agra force defeated in open fight, the stoutest hearts had grounds for thinking that, ere long, we too should be besieged in our wretched Dum-dumah, crowded with women and children, and suffering the same horror which had been enacted lower down the country. The Goorjurs were at this time reigning supreme, and no road, save those to Mozuffernuggur and Hauppur, was safe even four miles from cantonments. But matters with respect to these miscreants were about to improve, for on the 9th July, a party of Rifles and 6th Dragoon Guards, accompanied by the Meerut Volunteers, went out and killed 170 Goorjurs of Sikree, and three or four other Goorjur villages, situated about five miles west of Meerut. The party also brought in some eighty prisoners, the greater part of whom were hanged by the Military Commission appointed on the 11th of July. The pergunnah of Burot, which lies on the left bank of the Jumna, was at this time in open rebellion. The King of Delhi sent his emissaries throughout this pergunnah, and also to Saharanpore, to stir up the people. He constituted Sah Mull, a Jat of the Mauway tribe, Governor of the pergunnah of Burot, with the title of Raja, and he authorized his informing the zemindars, that the revenue for 1857 had been remitted. It was the possession of this, and three or four other pergunnahs on the left bank of the Jumna, which enabled the people and the garrison of Delhi to live during the siege; and had the attempts of our Engineers to destroy the Delhi bridge succeeded, the garrison must have been starved.

46. On the 22nd July, a curious circumstance occurred, which, as it proves how thoroughly our prestige had fallen in the eyes of the natives, I will here relate. I was collecting revenue in a village on the Burot road, when the tehsildar whispered in my ear, that the nephew of the lumberdar had been sentenced, for the homicide of his uncle, to fourteen years' imprisonment, and that he was now in the village, having made his escape from the Bareilly Central Jail on the 31st May 1857. I told the lumberdar to bring his nephew to me. He did so, and liking the appearance of the young man, I told him to borrow a pony and follow me. He did so, and remained with me, riding all over the country till 10 o'clock p.m. On enquiry I found that he had fought his uncle about a trespass upon his fields on the part of the uncle's cattle, and that the young man had outlived the injuries on his head, from his uncle's stick, whereas the uncle had succumbed to the effects of the stick of the nephew. No moral stain in the eyes of an Asiatic attaching to the lad, I asked him if he would take service as an Irregular Cavalry soldier. He agreed, and I promised not only to advance him money to pay for a horse, but if he behaved well, to endeavour to procure a remission of his sentence. I parted with him at 10 o'clock p.m., because I knew that his pony could not keep up with our horses (we were riding the 4th Light Cavalry horses that day), and I was afraid lest lagging behind, he might be shot by the rifle pickets. On parting with him, he promised that he would join me in the morning. But he never came. In ordinary times, a solow of the 8th Irregulars sells his situation with his horse &c., for Rupees 300; and yet this man, convicted of felony, and under a sentence of fourteen years' imprisonment, bribed by a promise of a loan to the amount required, and of a conditional pardon, refused to enter the British
service. Doubtless that night the probabilities of our eventual success were discussed in the village, and the assembled elders gave it as their opinion that we were all doomed men. Hence the lad changed his mind. Poor fellow! He is now undergoing, I believe, his original sentence in the Meerut Jail.

On the 24th July we heard that General Neill had defeated the Nana, and re-taken Cawnpoor and Bithoor.

47. August commenced with the Eed-ooz-zoha (the Mahomedan festival to commemorate the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham), and the desperate attack of the mutineers upon our position on the hill west of Delhi. I was employed the whole of the month in collecting and bringing in arrears of revenue and treasure from the Momahan pergunnah, which is full of Goojur villages, and also from pergunnah Hauppur. But to prove how much better behaved these villains had become, it is only necessary to mention the occurrences of the 21st and 22nd August. I was on the former day at Pureechhutgurh, the residence of the Goojur Raja (the present heir to the title is a minor in the Saharanpoor district, but Quddum Sing, now a fugitive rebel, resides there, and is called Raja by the fraternity), and I received an express in the evening from the officiating Commissioner, to the effect, that the tehseddar of Hauppur had for security's sake made Duttiacee his head-quarters; that he had collected a large sum of money; that he was threatened by a large body of Irregular Cavalry from Malagurh; that a troop of the 6th Dragoon Guards would march that evening; and that he (the Commissioner) wished that I would march across country during the night to Shahjehanpoor, eighteen miles distant from Meerut, on the Gurhmooktaisur road, and there taking charge of the Dragoons at 4 o'clock A.M., proceed with them to Duttiacee, and escort the cash to the Meerut Treasury. I did as requested, and reached Shahjehanpoor at 11 o'clock P.M. of the 21st, and at 4 o'clock A.M. of the 22nd the Dragoons arrived. We at once proceeded across country to Duttiacee, a village which had been fortified against cavalry by a wall. Here we found the tehseddar of Hauppur with nearly Rupees 15,000, to assist him in protecting which he had collected around him an armed mob, amounting to about 1,500 men, the greater part of which were Goojurs! The cash was brought away in safety, and the Dragoons returned to Meerut with more than Rupees 22,000, the extra 7,000 and odd rupees having been collected by me from other zemindars. I then proceeded to Gurhmooktaisur, and in two trips performed between the 24th and 25th August, I collected and carried into the Meerut Treasury a sum little short of Rupees 21,000. At this time I kept a relay of twenty Government horses half-way between Meerut and Gurhmooktaisur in Hussunpoor, a large Goojur village adjoining Solda, the inhabitants of which are closely connected by blood and marriage with the Solda Goojurs, and never were horses better cared for than these Government horses, by the recently hostile and plundering Goojur zemindars of Hussunpoor.

48. On the 31st August a column of all arms of the service was sent out to Hauppur. The object was twofold; one to watch the high road from Delhi to Moradabad and Bareilly, the other to overawe Waleedd Khan, the rebel Nawab of Malagurh, who was threatening the Bhitonnah Jats, who had all along remained faithful, and who had defeated Waleedd Khan on a former occasion, taking three small guns from him. I was placed in civil charge of this column, having been appointed a Special Commissioner under Act XIV of 1857. We remained at Hauppur three weeks, and during that time I was engaged in collecting revenue, punishing rebels, restoring order, &c., &c. At half-past 1 o'clock A.M. of the 21st September, we received an express, ordering the column to proceed by forced marches to thannah Bhowun, in the Mozuffer-nuggur district, where a force had been beaten back. By half-past 9 o'clock A.M. the column had marched twenty miles into Meerut, and on the morning of the 24th it reached thannah Bhowun, distant from Hauppur some seventy-two miles. The place had been evacuated by the rebels a few hours before we arrived. Only thirty of them were killed by the cavalry, and a few guns were
discovered secreted in the town. The house of Cazee Inayet Ali, the murderer of two of our tehsildars at Shamlee, was burnt, as well as those of three or four leading rebels, and the town was given up to plunder. On the 26th the column marched to Shamlee, and I found the walls of the mosque, in which the two tehsildars had been treacherously murdered by Cazee Inayet Ali in the early part of the month, still covered with blood. From that day to the 3rd of October the column was engaged punishing the Mouway Jats of Baolee, Bujrout, Johuree, Bazeedpoor, Lohurra, Hulwaee, and Mullukpoor, who had in August opposed a small force sent out from Meerut, and compelled it, after it had killed Sah Mul Jat, the newly-created rebel Governor of Burot, to retreat. In one week these Mouway Jats paid up arrears of revenue to the amount of 20,000 pounds sterling.

49. In the beginning of October I gave myself and the men of the 8th Irregulars a little rest. On the 18th I started for Agra on the mail cart, and reached the fort the same evening. At 9 o'clock a.m. of the 20th I quitted Agra by mail cart, and on my arrival at Allygurh I found at the tent of Mr. Bramley, the Magistrate, two messengers, with two letters from Captain J. Y. Gowan, Adjutant of the 15th Regiment Native Infantry; one of them was addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor of Agra, the other was addressed to the Chief Civil Authority of Meerut. The latter I read; it contained a touching appeal for the rescue of himself and thirty other Christians, refugees, survivors of the Bareilly massacre. I suggested to Mr. Bramley to send the former letter by post to the Lieutenant-Governor, retaining the two messengers at Allygurh till he heard from me, and I promised to make up my mind, and send by return of post a reply to Captain Gowan from Meerut. The mail cart had not proceeded many stages before I had resolved, come what might, to attempt to rescue Captain Gowan and the other Christian refugees lying hid in Rohilkund. I accordingly wrote on the 21st October a letter to Captain Gowan, principally in the Greek character, saying that I would be at Kuch'hlah ghat on the 28th, with a few horsemen, en route to rescue him; that he must collect together as many refugees as he could find; that I had detained one of the messengers to show me the road, and that the other would convey to him my reply. This letter I enclosed in another letter to Mr. Bramley, begging him to send off my reply, and the reply of the Lieutenant-Governor, to Captain Gowan, by one messenger, and to retain the other in Allygurh till my arrival. The 22nd was employed in getting the Brigade-Major's sanction to my taking with me ten men of the 4th Irregulars,* who had remained faithful and loyal; in getting tents for the men of the 4th and the 8th; in borrowing Rupees 1,000 and three elephants from the Commissariat, &c., &c. I beg to place on record my obligations to Colonel Whish, the Brigade-Major, and Captain Simpson of the Commissariat Department. I told these officers my plans; and I informed them that if my designs were known, the Government would prohibit my attempting the undertaking, and that unless they could assist me, sub rosa, I could do nothing. To the honor of these officers they not only kept my secret, but they, on their own responsibility, granted all my requests without demanding orders from the Brigadier Commanding. On Friday, the 23rd, twenty-five men of the 8th, and ten men of the 4th Irregular Cavalry, marched with orders to reach Allygurh in four marches. On Sunday, the 25th, I started by the mail cart, and reaching Soomna about 12 o'clock at midnight, I rejoined the cavalry, and marched with them into Allygurh on the morning of the 26th. Here I found Captain Gowan's cossid,† who had been purposely detained, and I learnt that there were 200 of Khan Bahadoor Khan, the rebel Nawab of Bareilly's Cavalry, posted at Kuch'hlah ghat on the left bank of the Ganges. I also learnt from Mr. Bramley that the

* These men had been detached from the head-quarters of the regiment to do duty at Meerut, under Gholam Nuber Khan, Naib Rissaldar, a man who, in 1832 and 1833, had ridden many a mile in my company catching thugs. Though several of his men deserted him, he retained a small number. This good faithful old soldier has been made a Rissaldar, and is now with his regiment.

† Messenger.

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Lieutenant-Governor had sent a reply to Captain Gowan, to the effect "that no assistance could be sent him, but that he was authorized to promise a reward of Rupees 10,000 to any native who would escort him and all the other Christian refugees to Allygurh;" that he, Mr. Bramley, had done as directed, and that he had sent my reply, and that of the Lieutenant-Governor, to Captain Gowan, by the hands of one messenger, retaining the other messenger in Allygurh. I have mentioned above that I was obliged to make known my plans to Colonel Whish and Captain Simpson, and it is clear from this narrative that I could not conceal anything from Mr. Bramley, who, I think, must have acquainted Mr. A. Cocks, his official superior. Up to the date of my reaching Allygurh, my secret was known only to four persons. I am quite certain that it was not known to any of the Irregular Cavalry men. All they knew was, that they were to reach Allygurh in four marches, and that I should overtake them at that place. At each encamping ground as they went along, they were joined by many Irregular Cavalry men, who were, at the time the mutiny broke out, at their homes on leave, and instead of finding myself at the head of thirty-five faithful men of the 8th and 4th Irregulars, I found myself in Allygurh at the head of at least 150 mounted soldiers. It is true that many of them were sneaking poltroons, who had remained at their homes, watching to which side victory would turn; probably some of them, from the sore state of their horses' backs, had been doing duty in the rebel camp at Delhi, and certainly had they known the dangerous errand upon which I was going, few of them would have joined me till my return at least. But it suited my views to be at the head of a squadron instead of a Naeb Rissaldar's party, and hence I was glad of their company. I consequently ordered them to remain in camp, and to do duty; but I told the men of the 8th and the 4th that they were always to be in my rear, and in advance of the new-comers. I have mentioned above that my designs, after I left Allygurh, were known to only four British officers, and to deceive every one completely, and to make the natives believe that we were a party of rebels, I resolved to make a march of forty-five miles. Accordingly we started at 2 o'clock A.M. of the 27th from Allygurh, taking the high road to Kasgunj. We reached the encamping place of the town of Jullalee at dawn, and so well had we enacted our assumed character of rebels, that a tragical scene was prevented, solely by the presence of mind of one of the 8th Irregulars; but to the right understanding of the matter, it is necessary that I should refer back to Sunday, the 25th, the day on which I quitted Meerut on the mail cart. That morning the faithful native officers of the 8th Irregulars, who had accompanied on the 31st May 1857 their British officers to Nainee Tal, having marched by themselves across Rohilkund, while their British officers were going through the mountains via Mussooree to Meerut, reached the Meerut cantonment, and two of them came to pay their respects to me. One of them was Rissaldar Willayut Hossein, a Syud of Jullalee. He told me that on the 31st May so little did he, though a Rissaldar of the 8th Irregulars, know what was about to happen, he mounted one of his country-bred mares, leaving in the lines a large bay Arab, which Colonel Scobie, the Remount Agent in Bombay, had bought for him for Rupees 800 three or four months before the mutiny; that one of his bargeers, a Sheikh of Jullalee, had taken possession of the horse, and had by means of it become a Khoodaspa,* that he also took possession of a valuable mule belonging to him; that he had taken both animals to Delhi; that after the fall of Delhi he had followed the rebel Rissaldar of the 8th Irregulars, Mahomed Shuffee, to Muttra, and thence to Hattrass; that when Mahomed Shuffee marched from Hattrass to Kuchhlah ghat en route to Bareilly, his bargeer had brought his Arab and mule to Jullalee, and made them over to his relations; that I was going to Allygurh, whence Jullalee is distant only eleven miles, and that he would be exceedingly obliged to me, if I would look at the horse, and let him know in what state I found him. The

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* Men who own their troop horses are styled Khoodaspa, and draw the whole salary. Bargeers are those who ride the horse of a second party, drawing only Rupees 7 per mensem, the remaining Rupees 13 being drawn by the owner of the horse.
town of Jullalee is situated about half a mile north of the road, and in compliance with the above request of Willayut Hossein, I ordered the column to halt on the road, while I went with a few men into the town to see Willayut Hossein's Arab horse* and his mule. I had not been in the village above ten minutes, when a sowar came galloping up, begging me to return as quickly as possible to the column, for that there were some British gentlemen on the road. I had entered the village from the west, and was on my way to rejoin the squadron, quitting the town from the east end of it; I consequently re-entered the high road one mile east of the spot where I had quitted it; and this it was which caused me to arrive in the rear of two dog carts, near which four men, armed with American revolver, rifles, and pistols, and dressed in European clothes, were standing, the column being drawn up some four hundred yards east of the dog carts. I immediately recognised one of the party as being Mr. Paterson Saunders, who distinguished himself by his bravery and cool courage during the rebellion. The party was proceeding from the Indigo Factory of Mr. Booth to Allygurh, and seeing a squadron of Irregular Cavalry in front of them, they presumed they must be mutineers, and were preparing to sell their lives dearly, when one of the 8th Irregulars rode quickly up to them, and asked for a cheroot, the whole corps having learnt to smoke cheroots in Burmah. He added that they were led by Mr. Wilson, the Judge of Moradabad, who had gone into the town of Jullalee, and who would shortly make his appearance. The threatened hostilities were suspended, and my timely arrival saved the Englishmen from the dilemma in which they were so unpleasantly situated. That evening at 7 o'clock, we reached Soron, distant from Allygurh forty-five miles. That night the rich Brahmins of Soron, believing us to be rebels, continued firing heavy juzails every five minutes. As it suited my plans to enact "the Loyal" for some time, I sent them word that I was an Englishman, and they at once ceased firing. Early on Wednesday, the 28th, I rode down to Nogureea, a village on the right bank of the Ganges opposite Kuch'hlah, and there I fell in with a Rajpoot proprietor of the village, who had been for many years a prisoner in the Moradabad Jail, for having plundered a boat laden with grain, during the famine of 1837-38. A mutual recognition took place, and from him I learnt how dangerous a task crossing the Ganges at Kuch'hlah would be. It then struck me, that if I succeeded in forcing a passage, the whole of the rebel forces located at Suheeswan and Budaon, would unite and endeavour to cut us off on our return, and that encumbered as I should be with women and children on elephants, any serious opposition would endanger their lives, and thus my plans would utterly fail. On my way back to Soron, I met with a bunneeah of the Budaon district, who had come across with rice, and who was returning with salt. I made myself known to him, and he willingly agreed to tell the sowars at Kuch'hlah, that Mr. Wilson had arrived at Soron, and was on the point of crossing over with a strong force. The ruse succeeded, for the sowars fled, it is said, leaving their dinners half cooked, as far as Suheeswan; and I have since found in the records of Khan Bahadur Khan, the rebel Nawab of Bareilly, urzees sent in daily during this expedition, by the rebel authorities of Budaon, the first of which makes out that I had a tremendous force with me. On my return to my camp at Soron, I wrote a letter to Captain Gowan, telling him that the ght at Kuch'hlah was guarded by rebel sowars; that I would endeavour to cross; and asking him to come as near to the Ganges as he

* The history of this Arab horse illustrates clearly some of the difficulties which have beset our cavalry, when pursuing mutineer sowars during this rebellion. In November 1857, Willayut Hossein, Rinsalaria, sold him to Captain Mackenzie, his Commanding Officer, who rode him in the affair at Hurbur, near Oomoo in Oudh, on which occasion the horse lost an ear. Captain Mackenzie falling sick, sold him a short time ago to Dr. Currie of the same regiment. Dr. Currie entered him under the name of "Bedonin," at the late Cawnpoor Races; and he beat every other horse, on one occasion giving, I believe, in a handicap, three stone to the best horse on the handicap; and yet this Arab was ridden by a rebel sowar of the 8th Irregulars throughout the siege of Delhi. How could a Dragon riding eighteen stone, and mounted on a stud-bred horse, hope to overtake an Irregular Cavalry man weighing ten stone, and mounted on such a horse as "Bedonin," and this is not a solitary instance. Hundreds of first-rate Arabs are still in the hands of the rebels on the left bank of the river Ghagra, and the Nana, who is at Churkha, has in his possession the Arab horse "Wahbees," who ran his two miles in three minutes fifty-three seconds in Calcutta, he having plundered him from the stables of the Nunha Nawab of Cawnpoor.
possibly could, without endangering the lives of his party; and to let me know where I might hope to meet him. This letter I delivered to the remaining messenger, originally sent by Captain Gowan, and who had accompanied me from Allygurh, with orders, if he met any messenger with a letter from Captain Gowan, to return with Captain Gowan's reply to my letter written from Meerut, and to send the other messenger back with my letter written at Soron.

50. It is now high time that I should revert to Captain Gowan and his party. Not far from the right bank of the River Ram Gunga, and about equally distant from Tilhur and Meeranpoor Kuthra, the town near which Haifz Rehmut Khan, the Rohilla Chiefstain, was killed by a round shot in 1774, lies the village of Kheirah Bujeirah. In an obscure cow-shed in that village were seated, dressed in native Hindoo costume, two men, one delicate woman, and four young children, the eldest eight years, the youngest three months old, all seven being of pure Anglo-Saxon descent, and more than ordinarily fair. A messenger, one of the two alluded to above as having arrived at Allygurh on the 20th October, entered that cow-shed, and delivered to them a thin envelope. Hastily was that envelope opened, and what was at first deemed the sole contents, was anxiously read. "Who shall point the despair which at the moment overwhelmed that sorrow-stricken party, when Captain Gowan read aloud, "The Chief Commissioner authorizes you to offer to any native who will escort in safety to Allygurh all the Christian refugees now lying concealed in Rohilkund, the sum of ten thousand rupees." Gracious God! and was that all the Government of the North-Western Provinces of India could do for them? They had with the greatest difficulty procured two messengers to convey to Allygurh two notes, written upon the thinnest bank post paper, and measuring four inches by three; how was it possible then that the offer of an attempt at, and the consummation of, deliverance.

* Khan Bahadur Khan, the rebel Nawab of Bareilly, is the pensioned grandson of Hafiz Rehmut Khan.

† Captain Gowan, Adjutant, Sergeant-Major Belcham, both of the 18th Regiment Native Infantry. Mrs. Belcham and four children, the youngest born three months after their flight from Bareilly, on the 31st May 1857.

‡ Sixty-four were the number eventually rescued; but at the time of which I am writing, viz. the 27th October 1857, Captain Gowan knew of only thirty Christians in concealment.

§ Far be it from me to throw any blame upon the memory of a brave and noble soul, whose flight to realms of peace was not only hastened, but caused by the anxiety and care engendered by the mutiny and rebellion, and by his painful position at Agra, first as Superintending Engineer, and subsequently, after the Lieutenant-Governor's death, as Chief Commissioner. He could not help himself, much less send help to refugees lying hid in the centre of Rohilkund, and distant from Agra more than 100 miles. Personally brave, and more than ordinarily humane and gentle, doubtless the late Colonel Fraser, C.B., felt bitterly his inability to respond to Captain Gowan's appeal in any other way, than by offering a large pecuniary reward to those who would effect the deliverance of him and his co-refugees. But this bitterness did not soften the blow to the applicants for aid. They, poor creatures, could only see that their hopes were dashed to atoms.
eyes saw not that chasm; and if they saw it, fair hope* instantly bridged it, and told them that they were already free. Captain Gowan, after consulting his faithful protectors, wrote me a reply, principally in the Greek character, to the effect that I had not allowed him time to collect many refugees, but that he would do his best; that it had been resolved that they should go in the first instance to Meeaoon,† where he hoped to see me on the 29th. Meeaoon is about thirty miles from Kuch’hlah Ghát, and is situated in the Budaon district. This note was delivered to me at 7 o’clock P.M. of the 28th. At 8 o’clock P.M., having selected 100 of the best men and horses, rejecting all horses likely to knock up, I started, leaving my camp standing, and taking nothing with me but three fast elephants, and a spare horse, ridden by a little urchin of a boy,—my intention being to cross the Ganges at Kuch’hlah Ghát, and to push on to Meeaoon. It was at this time that I entrusted my secret to Bolund Khan, Rissaldar of the 8th Irregulars, mentioned in paragraphs 42 and 44, and cordially did he second my views. It was 11 o’clock P.M. when we reached an island in the river, having crossed one branch of the Ganges, some three feet deep. I had been told that I should find twelve boats; but what was the fact, there were four boats only, and those of the class lately constructed in India to let to Magistrates for making boat-bridges; that is to say, five feet high at the sides; and consequently it is almost impossible, without a platform, to force a horse to leap into them, and when this consummation is effected, the unfortunate animal is generally useless from severe injury in the hocks or hind-legs. I need hardly say that on the island on which we were then standing there was no platform. To add to my difficulties, two fresh evils appeared. The Ganges at Kuch’hlah was divided in October 1857 into three streams, neither of which was fordable, each being separated from the other by sand banks. The transit to and fro of one set of boats could not but consume many hours, even if the horses were forced into the boats. There were barely six hours of darkness before me, and light was death to my hopes. There were four boats to convey 100 horses, and three different streams to cross. Despair began to stare me in the face, and when the boatmen positively refused to guide the elephants across the river before daylight for fear of the quick-sands, my misery was well nigh complete. But there was a noble end to be gained, and five minutes’ reflection sufficed for the formation of new plans. There were twenty-five boats which the rebel troops had seized and moored under the village of Kuch’hlah, and I resolved, as I could not hope to get my party across the river that night, mounted and fit for the march to Meeaoon, that I would at any rate take away from the rebels the means of crossing over and annihilating me, and at the same time retain the ferry in my own hands. Captain Gowan’s cossid was at once despatched to Meeaoon to tell him what had occurred, to assure him that I would occupy the enemy’s attention at Kuch’hlah, while he on his part must induce his Rajpoot escort to get him and his party over the river at any friendly ferry available, and to inform him that I would make a forced march to any ferry which he might name, and bring him away in safety. We all dismounted; half of the party proceeded in one of the four boats across the river, while the other half held the horses on the right bank. The cold was intense, but before day dawned, the whole of the twenty-eight boats, above alluded to, were safely moored in a creek on the right bank of the river. A horseman was despatched to Soron to order our camp to Nugureea, the nearest spot to Kuch’hlah Ghát, on which we could pitch our tents; and leaving a strong picket at the river side to keep up the alarm which I had established among the rebel troops located in the Budaon district, I returned to Nugureea to breakfast. There was in Kuch’hlah that night about Rupees 20,000 worth of sugar, rice, grain, &c. &c., which the rebel Governor of Súheswan had accumulated by the plunder of boats, and of the zamindars supposed to be favorable to the British, and it was with an aching heart that I reflected that if I had been accompanied by the faithful men of the 11th Regiment Native Infantry, then deserted by their

* Bella Speranza. † Meeaoon, pronounced something like the mewing of a cat.
officers, and doing the work of peons and burkundazes in the Meerut district, not an atom of that plunder should have again fallen into the rebels' hands. During the day of the 29th I sent for a Rajpoot zemindar of the Budaon district, who was well inclined to us, but who was at the time holding the post of Superintendent of Ferries under the rebels. He came to my camp, and I told him that I required more boats, for that a bridge must be speedily prepared at Kuch'lah with a view to crossing over artillery, &c., and I affected to consult him as to the best point where the river could be bridged. Doubtless that night the rebel Governor was made acquainted with all I had said, for it is inserted in an urzee forwarded by him to the rebel chieftain, Khan Bahadoor Khan of Bareilly.

51. Early on the morning of Friday, 30th, I went down to the bank of the river with elephants and a large cavalcade. It was barely possible that Captain Gowan's party might make its appearance; but no signs of it, or of the rebels, being visible, I returned to my tents, where I passed the day, receiving visits from the zemindars of the Budaon district, most of whom gave me correct information as to the panic which my appearance at Kuch'lah GhAt had created among the rebel troops on the left bank of the Ganges. During the day I also received a letter from Mr. A. H. Cocks,* Special Commissioner of the Allygurh district (he was not at Allygurh when I passed through), to the effect that Captain Murray, hearing of the errand on which I was engaged, had volunteered to join me. I wrote back in reply stating how gratified I was at the receipt of Captain Murray's offer; that had it come earlier, I would have gladly availed myself of it; but that the business in hand would not admit of the delay required to enable him to join me; and that in fact the matter would be decided one way or the other before my answer could reach Allygurh.

After a day of the greatest anxiety, at 8 o'clock p.m. a messenger arrived with a note from Captain Gowan, telling me that he would that very night cross the Ganges at a friendly village called Jatee, very low down the river, and that if I would come as far as Qadirgunj to meet him, he hoped that all would be well.

In an instant horses and elephants were saddled, and leaving our camp standing under charge of fifty sowars (my party by this time had increased to about 200 men in all), we started for Qadirgunj, which is a town of some size, about forty miles higher up the river than Futtehgurh. As the whole country was in the hands of the rebel Nawab of Futtehgurh, it was advisable to march quickly and quietly, without calling at different villages for guides. Hence I procured a guide at Nugureea, who professed to know the road well, Qadirgunj is only twenty miles south-east of Nugureea, and yet we lost our way so completely, that it was 3 o'clock a.m. of Saturday, the 31st October, before we reached our destination. Apart from the town there is a fort in which the zemindar, who is a Pathan, and is styled "Nawab Sahib" by the villagers, resides with a considerable number of his Pathan brethren. Between this fort and the town we marched, and took up a position on the road leading to the ferry, thus pretending that it was our intention to proceed towards Rohilkund. It wanted but two days to the full moon, and as it was light as day, our appearance created a great sensation both in the fort and in the town. A single sowar was sent to summon the zemindar ("Nawab Sahib"), but instead of coming himself, he sent his manager. I pretended that I could not speak the Hindostanee language, and I addressed him in Persian. He could not understand Persian, so an educated sowar was ordered up to interpret, and he translated what I said in Persian into Hindostanee for the manager, and he translated the manager's Hindostanee into Persian for me. After inquiries as to the number of the boats at the ferry, I assured him, that though I had a large force, no injury would be done to any one, but that we had come a long way, and must have refreshment for ourselves and horses before we continued our march; and then

* Mr. A. H. Cocks, one of the most brave and noble-minded members of the Bengal Civil Service. He carries with him to his grave a lingering leg, the result of his gallantry in the Punjaub, and his distinguished conduct during the mutiny and rebellion, both at Allygurh and Hatras, will long he remembered. Captain Murray now commands the 34th Horse, and has lately been doing good work at Kuch'lah GhAt.
pretending that I could not depend upon the promises of a manager, I dismissed him with orders to bring the "Nawab Sahib" to me. Shortly after the zemindar himself came. Being an educated man, we conversed, surrounded by my men, in Persian, without the medium of an interpreter. Finding that he was convinced that we were mutineers, and seeing that he was greatly alarmed lest we should plunder his fort and the town, I at length disclosed to him who I was, and the purpose for which I had come, telling him at the same time that if he sent word of my arrival to any of the forces of Tufuzzool Hoosein, the rebel Nawab of Futtehgurh, I would shoot him on the spot. He fell at my feet, declared that he had given shelter at the commencement of the mutiny to Mr. Edwards, the Magistrate and Collector of Budaon, and that so far from betraying me, he would take care that no Pathan should leave the town until my object had been effected. By this time day had dawned, and the zemindar proposed to me to breakfast with him in his fort. I consented, and at 8 o'clock, leaving all our horses in the grove saddled, I proceeded, accompanied by ten sowars, on foot to the fort. At 9 o'clock I returned with the zemindar to the grove, taking care not to lose sight of him myself. A villager of the Shahjehanpoor district was sent with a note on the road towards Jatee, announcing to Captain Gowan my arrival at Qadirgunj, and begging him to come and join me with as little delay as possible. And then the suspense endured during the next three hours? With my eyes watching the "Nawab Sahib," and my mind contemplating the fate of Captain Gowan and his party, if they fell into the hands of the retainers of the rebel Nawab at Futtehgurh, who had systematically murdered all the native Christians even whom he could find, my position was as wretchedly painful as could be conceived. In fact the whole week had been one of perpetual anxiety, and now that the hour of success or failure was at hand, it was as much as I could do to appear cool and collected, and assume an indifference, which was a total stranger to my feelings. At length the villager returned saying that the party concealed as women was at hand. I communicated the fact to a few men of the 8th Irregulars, but I would not allow any of them to move. I went alone to the entrance of the town, and there I saw a native cart (hackery) covered over with cloth, drawn by the well-known breed of bullocks which prevails in the Shahjehanpoor district, and escorted by about sixteen matchlockmen. I went near it, and finding all was right, I rode by the side of the hackery, until it arrived at the (charpoy) native bedstead, on which I had been sitting all the morning. The cloth in the front of the hackery was raised, and out walked Captain Gowan, dressed in nothing but a dhotee and a turban. He was followed by Sergeant-Major Belcham, his wife, and the children alluded to above, one an infant at the breast. It was a sight to move the sternest soul that ever dwelt on earth. I was obliged to turn my face aside, and old Bolund Khan, a man who had been present in almost every campaign which has taken place during the last forty years, wept like a child, exclaiming, "And it is infants like these that the mutinous kafirs have been slaughtering! "God's curse rest upon them." The cloths which had concealed the refugees in the hackery were fastened to trees, to make a temporary room for Mrs. Belcham. Food was handed round, and all the escort of matchlockmen, &c., having been rewarded, at 1 o'clock P.M. we all started for Nuguree. The sun was setting as we came in sight of the tents, and thus happily ended the eventful day of Saturday, the 31st October 1857. But Nugureea was not at that moment a very safe place. Four days had passed since I had deceived the rebel forces into deserting their post at Kuch'Ilah Ghat, distant only two miles from Nugureea, and into retreating upon Suheeswan. The real state of my little column must have become known. In fact from verse found in Khan Bahadoor Khan's records in Bareilly, it is clear that an exact account had by this time been taken of it, and hence I resolved to proceed the next morning twenty-five miles to Gungheeree. This was Sunday, the 1st November; and it was as well I made this move, for on the afternoon of that day, a rebel force of four thousand men and four guns reached Kuch'Ilah from Suheeswan and Budaon, with a view to annihilate my party. When I encamped that day at Gungheeree, I little thought that ere six weeks could elapse, the
vicinity of our encampment would be the scene of an action, in which three
officers of the 6th Dragoon Guards were killed, and one officer of the 9th
Lancers very dangerously wounded. On Monday, the 2nd November, we
marched another twenty-five miles into Allygurh. On my arrival I arranged
to take the refugees to Meerut that same evening in the Government shigram,
but I could not resist the gratification of introducing Captain Gowan to some of
his old friends in the fort. Accordingly we went in the first instance to the
tent of A. H. Cocks, Esq., the Special Commissioner. That gentleman had
formerly been my Joint Magistrate, and we had met about eighteen months
previously. I was dressed as a Native officer of the Irregular Cavalry, and
leaving Captain Gowan outside the tent, I entered it. The tent was about ten
feet square, and as I stood facing Mr. Cocks, that gentleman looked for a while
earnestly at me, and then muttered in English, "What does the old Rissaldar
want? Why does he not speak?" I then asked him in Persian if he under­
stood the Persian language (Dur zubane Farsee huruf mee zurnee). At this
Mr. Cocks's countenance assumed such an appearance of astonishment, that I
fairly burst out laughing. He then recognized me at once. I then called to
Captain Gowan to come in. He, too, was in a very humble native costume;
and I doubt if such a trio ever met before. The following morning, Tuesday,
the 3rd November, we reached Meerut. By the assistance of the samaritans
of Meerut, the refugees were speedily clothed in English costume, and here let
me thank them all for what they did on the occasion.

52. But there were more Christian refugees sheltered by the good Hindu
zemindars of Rohilkund to be rescued, and to all of these perwannahs were
issued, offering pecuniary rewards to all who would bring over Christian refu­
gees from Rohilkund into the Doab, where we would be ready to receive them
by the 27th of the month. Accordingly, on Monday the 23rd, another expedi­
tion started from Meerut. This time, however, I had the sanction of Govern­
ment to the undertaking, and I was accompanied by Captain Gowan, who had
been put by General Penny, C.B., in command of the 110 faithful men of the
11th Regiment Native Infantry; Belcham, who had been made officiating
Serjeant-Major of the same; Captain Mackenzie, Commandant; Lieutenant
Woodcock, Adjutant; and Dr. Currie, Assistant-Surgeon of the 8th
Irregulars; and in addition to the sowars who went with me on the first
occasion, were twenty-two first-rate native officers of the 8th Irregulars,
who had on the memorable 31st May 1857 escorted their British officers from
Bareilly to Nainee Tal. I accompanied this column to Haupper, and being
anxious to see the Chief Commissioner, I started in the mail-cart that same
evening for Agra. The cavalry of the Jodhpur Legion, which had been
shortly before defeated at Narnoul with the loss of its guns, during the night
and the following morning, crossing the road from Allygurh to Agra, near the
village of Meetnee, about three miles south of Hatrass, en route to Mynpoory,
Futtehgurh, and Oudh, and I had a narrow escape, having been saved by the
mail-cart driver refusing to drive me beyond Hatrass, for fear that I should,
from excessive drowsiness, fall off the mail-cart, and insisting, as he was two
hours in advance of his regular time, that I should sleep during that period in
the Dak Baboo's hut in Hatrass. In the meantime the cavalry having crossed
the road, the mail-cart proceeded on its way un molested. I reached Agra at
9 o'clock A.M. of Wednesday, the 25th November, and at 11 o'clock that day
the infantry of the Jodhpur Legion crossed at the same spot where the sowars
had crossed during the previous night, causing all travellers and the up-country
Agra mail-cart to be turned back towards Agra. My object in going to Agra
was to urge the Chief Commissioner to send a column to drive back the forcés
of the rebel Nawab of Futtehgurh, which had taken possession of the greater part
of the Etah district, and which were under orders, as we afterwards learnt from
records found on the battle-field at Puttealaee, to gradually invest the fort at
Allygurh. I quitted Agra on the night of Wednesday, the 25th November,
and rejoined my camp at Allygurh on the morning of the 26th. That day after
a long consultation with Mr. A. H. Cocks, we sent a joint telegram to the Chief
Commissioner at Agra, telling him that unless he ordered Major Riddell's
column, then at Hatrass, to hold Kassgunj, and to attack the rebel forces in the vicinity, the whole district of Allygurh would speedily be again disorganized. I offered, in the event of the measure being sanctioned, to join Colonel Riddell with our little column. In the evening a reply was received negative of the proposal; and disgusted beyond measure, I ordered my own party to march that night to Jullalee, resolved that I would rescue as many Christian refugees as might come over, and bring matters to a crisis with the Futtteghur rebel forces. During Friday, the 27th, we encamped at Jullalee. On Saturday, the 28th, we reached the Gunghee'ree, and here we had the gratification of rescuing eight Christian refugees who had been brought over by the zemindars of Budaon. All accounts agreed in saying that there were five different columns of the rebel forces threatening Soron and Kassgunj. I wrote to the Chief Commissioner telling him the real state of affairs, and in reply received a letter urging me to retreat upon Allygurh. But I wanted to bring matters to a crisis, and I accordingly marched on Sunday, the 29th, to Soron, distant twenty miles. Here I was joined by Ghunsyam Dass, a blind Brahman Tehseeldar of the Allygurh district, who was placed by Mr. Cocks in charge of the fiscal and criminal duties of several pergunnahs bordering upon the Ganges, with the powers of a Superintendent. I found that there were the following rebel forces of the Nawab of Futtteghurh posted as follows:—Wuleedad Khan, the rebel Nawab of Malagurh, was at Suhawur, distant nine miles, with 1,000 men and two guns; Mohsin Ali was at Qadirgunj, distant twenty miles, with 2,000 men and artillery; Ahmed Yar Khan was at Futttealee with 4,000 men and artillery; there were 1,000 men and four guns at Mohunpoor, and there were 1,000 men at Surrawah. It was evident that a few hours were sufficient to concentrate five or six thousand men at Gunghee'ree, and thus our communication with Allygurh would be cut off. Directing Chowbe Ghunsyam Dass to follow, we started at one o'clock A.M. of Monday, the 30th November, for Gunghee'ree. During the day the Thannahdars of Soron and Kassgunj, and also the Tehseeldar of the latter place, quitted their posts, and came to our camp in a state of alarm. Chowbe Ghunsyam Dass volunteered to go back with the Tehseeldar to Kassgunj, which is about eight miles from Gunghee'ree. I consented to this arrangement for several reasons. Firstly, I knew that it was not the policy of the Futtteghur rebel Nawab to maltreat any official, not a Christian. Secondly, I knew that the natives of India regard the blind with feelings of great tenderness. Thirdly, Ghunsyam Dass promised me to keep a picket off Kassgunj, on the road to Suhawur, and that he would at once retreat upon Gunghee'ree in case of alarm. Fourthly, it was generally believed that Soron, not Kassgunj, would be attacked first, both being equi-distant from Suhawur. Fifthly, I had resolved to remain at Gunghee'ree to afford Ghunsyam Dass support in case he was obliged to retreat. I wrote again to Mr. Cocks for the information of the Chief Commissioner, telling him all that had been done.

53. Tuesday, December 1st. I received an urzee from Chowbe Ghunsyam Dass reporting that ten Christians had arrived from the Budaon district, and I ordered him to forward them at once, as I knew that their presence would compromise the Chowbe with the rebels.

54. Wednesday, December 2nd. I resolved to judge for myself as to the state of affairs at Kassgunj, and sent a saddle horse with four sowars half-way, intending to gallop there and back again very quickly, not liking to be absent from my own camp for any length of time. I was detained with important matters all the morning. About 1 o'clock p.m. the ten Christian refugees arrived, and reported that when they left Kassgunj all was right. Half an hour later some of the Chowbe’s sowars rode up, and reported that Kassgunj had been attacked, and taken possession of by the rebels. I was actually on horseback when these sowars arrived, and it was resolved that we should go out with fifty sowars and reconnoitre. Leaving Captain Gowan in command of the camp, we went about four miles on the road to Kassgunj, and there we learnt that the rebels had occupied Kassgunj in force, and it was whispered that
the Chowbe himself had been killed. This whisper proved, alas! too true. I was aware that the joint representations of Mr. Cocks and myself had caused orders to be issued at Delhi, that a column should march as soon as Colonel Gerard's column returned to Delhi from Narnoul, for Allygurh and the Etah district; and it struck me that the only thing to be done was to proceed to Delhi and hasten, if possible, the departure of the said column. Accordingly we marched the same night to Jullalee. Thence I rode into Allygurh, directing Captains Gowan and Mackenzie to await my return at that place. At 12 o'clock midnight of Thursday, December 3rd, I started on the mail-cart for Delhi, and I reached that city at 9 A.M. on Friday, the 4th. General Penny, with his usual alacrity, ordered the column, under the command of Colonel Seaton, C.B., to proceed by forced marches to Allygurh on Monday morning, the 7th December. On Saturday night, the 5th, I proceeded to Meerut, and having procured a second in command† for Captain Gowan, I started with him at 3 P.M. of Tuesday 8th on the mail-cart for Allygurh. Leaving him at Allygurh, I went on to Agra to obtain final orders from the Chief Commissioner, and, if possible, to get permission for Colonel Seaton's column, after defeating the divisions of Mohsin Ali and Ahmed Yar Khan, to push on to within twenty miles of Futtehgurh, and thence to operate against that place from the north-west, in combination with the Commander-in-Chief's army, which we knew was advancing from the south-east. The Chief Commissioner did not approve of this plan, being alarmed lest the strength of the column should not be equal to it. Ill-health had, I fear, a great deal to do with his decision. Had the plan been sanctioned, the bridge-of-boats might have easily been destroyed, and Tuffuzzool Hoosein, the rebel Nawab of Futtehgurh, Wulleedad, the rebel Nawab of Malagurh, Feroze Shah, and two other Princes of the house of Delhi, Bukht Khan, Soubahdar of Artillery, Commander-in-Chief of the rebels at Delhi, Ismael Khan, the nephew of Wulleeed, Ahmed Yar Khan, Mohsin Ali Khan, and many other leaders of note, would in all probability have been seized. I rejoined my camp at Allygurh on the night of Thursday, the 10th, and Colonel Seaton's column arrived the following morning.

55. On Sunday, the 13th, the column marched to Jullalee, and here we received the joyful tidings that the rebel forces had concentrated at Kasgunj and Putteealee, and that they had resolved to fight at the former place. On Monday we marched to Gungheeree, a place so often mentioned in this narrative, and this narrative, otherwise the narrative of the action which ensued will not be intelligible. Gungheeree is situated on the right bank of the River Neem, which is spanned by an iron suspension bridge. On the Allygurh side of this bridge, the road to Kasgunj runs somewhat north of east, but on the Kasgunj side of the bridge it turns to the right, and assumes a direction slightly south of east. We had all along been in communication with Mr. Sapte, the Collector of the Booulundshuhur district, who had for some time past been watching the Anoopshuhur Ghut with a force under Colonel Farquhar. He moved down from Anoopshuhur, almost due south-west upon Gungheeree, at which place he arrived about 4 o'clock P.M. on Sunday, the 13th. Colonel Farquhar selected his ground with great judgment. He encamped on the right bank of the Neem river, about a mile below the iron bridge, his front being intersected with ravines, and his rear being protected by the village. News of his arrival, and of the exact number of his troops, was that very evening conveyed to Mohsin Ali Khan, who commanded the rebel troops at Kasgunj, distant about eight miles, and the rebels resolved to attack him the following morning. But, as

* Government have done ample justice to this faithful servant. His only child (a daughter) and his widow have been amply provided for on the representations of Mr. Cocks, and his brothers have been promoted to offices of trust and emolument.

† Lieutenant Robert Campbell, who has lately distinguished himself in Oudh.

‡ Colonel Farquhar had under his command a wing of the Bombay Bushew Corps, 400 strong, 200 Afghan Horse under Major Stokes, and 2 Horse Artillery guns under Lieutenant Smith. Colonel Farquhar has lately lost a leg in consequence of a wound from a matchlock ball in the knee, received at the late attack upon the fort of Jengoor Kassar in Oudh.
detailed above, Colonel Seaton's column also reached Gungheree about 8 o'clock A.M. on Monday, the 14th, and at my suggestion the column marched across the suspension bridge, and the camp was pitched on the left bank of the Neem river, about a mile from the bridge, and near the village of Mumassoo. In other words, the river and the ravines intervened between the camps of Colonel Farquhar and Colonel Seaton, which were about a mile and a half apart, and the latter column was to the same extent nearer to Kassgunj than the former. Of the arrival of Colonel Seaton's column the rebels appear to have been in complete ignorance, and about 11 o'clock A.M. our pickets brought in word that the enemy was marching down upon us in full force. The infantry were drawn up in line, Hodson's Horse on the left, and a squadron of the 6th Dragoon Guards was on the right under Captain Wardlaw. I offered my services to Colonel Seaton as aide-de-camp, and accompanied that officer with his staff to the front. The action commenced on the part of the enemy with two, 9-pounders and a howitzer, originally belonging to the British artillery, stationed at Bareilly and Moradabad, when the mutiny commenced. They had been procured from Bukht Khan, Soubadar, who was at the time at Puteehgurh. These three guns were placed so as to be sheltered by sand-hills, and so well were they served that for a considerable period it was supposed by the staff that there were six guns on the part of the enemy. The British artillery, under Colonel Kindleside, galloped to the front, and a brisk cannonade began. The enemy's cavalry then showed themselves, and they were in such numbers that it appeared as if they had only to advance to ride over the staff and our artillery. Colonel Seaton seeing this, first ordered me to direct Captain Wardlaw to bring up his squadron in support of our guns. Having done this, I was again ordered to bring up two more battery guns. Having pointed out the spot at which the guns were required, I rejoined Colonel Seaton; and I was waiting for fresh orders, when Captain Light, Colonel Seaton's orderly officer, rode up and reported that three guns had been taken, and that Captain Wardlaw had been killed. The Dragoons under Captain Hodson, of the 6th Dragoon Guards, who succeeded to the command, and the artillery, advanced in pursuit of the enemy, now retreating upon Kassgunj, and I was ordered back to bring up a Surgeon. I conduct him to the spot. The squadron (it was a very weak one) under Captain Wardlaw, assisted by a few men of the 9th Lancers under Lieutenant Head of that Corps, then on his way down to rejoin the regiment at Cawnpore, had charged the guns and had taken them. In that charge Lieutenant Vyse was killed; Lieutenant Head of the 9th Lancers was dangerously wounded in two places by grape, and some men and horses were killed and wounded. Captain D'Oyly of the Stud, then on his way to Buxar, had a narrow escape in this charge. Immediately after this gallant feat, Captain Wardlaw saw, at a distance of about 100 yards, some twenty or thirty men; I fancy they were artillerymen sneaking away behind some sand-hills. He ordered the charge, and he fell of his horse lifeless, a matchlock ball having entered the forehead. Captain Hodson and the artillery pursued the enemy for two miles, through a plain covered with the urhur plant, which was about three-feet high, and he himself was shot by
one of the enemy, who was lying hid in this urbar; thus making the third Dragoon Officer killed that day. We then returned to our tents, the infantry and the heavy guns not having been brought into play at all. That evening Captain Wardlaw's tent disclosed a melancholy scene. On three beds were lying three brave officers, who at breakfast were the gayest of the gay. One noble-looking Dragoon stooping over the bed on which Lieutenant Vyre was lying, raised the corpse towards him, and pressing it to him, said, “See, sir, he is but a boy,” while the tears trickled down his sun-burnt face. By torch-light we buried them under a babul tree, and four Dragoons and two Lancers were buried in a grave close adjoining.

56. The next morning, Tuesday, 15th, the column marched to Kassgunj, and here we learnt that the enemy in his flight did not halt at Kassgunj, but went straight on twelve miles eastward to Suhawur. The head of the blind Chowbe Ghunysam Dass was here found suspended to a peepul tree at the entrance of the tehseldaree. It was immediately taken down and given over to his relatives, who forwarded it to Muttra for certain funeral rites.

57. Wednesday, the 16th, the column marched to Suhawur, which we found evacuated. On the following morning, Thursday, the 17th, we started for Puttealee, and when we came to a Gunj, three miles short of it, we received positive information that the enemy would really fight. The troops were placed in line, and grog was served out. Soon the order to advance was given. The enemy's line was due east of us, and the rising sun prevented our seeing it at first, but doubtless the enemy saw us, for they opened a cannonade on us from twelve guns. The line continued to advance very steadily, and when we came within a reasonable distance, our guns went to the front, and returned the enemy's fire. After some time I remarked to Colonel Seaton that I thought their fire had ceased. With a cheer, Colonel Seaton, the staff, and the artillery galloped up to the enemy's camp. A general pursuit with artillery and cavalry was ordered, and away we went, taking the road to Mhow Shumsabad. Outside the town of Puttealee there is a deep sandy lane, narrow in width, and enclosed by banks, and on the side of which the long grass, known by the name of surput, was growing. In the midst of this lane the enemy had placed a laden hackery filled with miscellaneous articles of all kinds, principally inflammable, and touching which were three tumbrils filled with records, loose papers, powder, and ammunition. The contents of the hackery had been purposely ignited, and the crackling of the grass at a little distance from the lane proved that it too had been set on fire. Colonel Seaton and the staff stopped at the entrance of the lane, but thinking an explosion imminent, I resolved to extinguish the fire on the hackery, and jumping off my horse, I took an empty basket off the hackery, and began filling it with sand, and throwing the sand on the flames. To their honor let me put on record that I was at once joined by Colonel Seaton's bugler (a man of the 1st Fusiliers), and Tahawur Khan, Jemadar of the 8th Irregulars, and by our united exertions the flames were extinguished. Shortly afterward the Sikh Sappers and Miners came up, and the tumbrils were dragged away to a place of safety. The enemy were pursued for five miles, and some five hundred of them were killed. Neither sepoys nor irregular cavalrymen were killed in the pursuit. One man, a native of Jounpoor, who was formerly a Vakeel in the Court of the Moonsiff of Qaemgunj, and who was Ahmed Yar Khan's Prime Minister, was killed, and his elephant taken. The enemy never stopped till he reached Mhow Shumsabad!

58. It was now that I urged Colonel Seaton to advance on Shumsabad, and to destroy that town; but he pleaded orders, and he resolved to march upon Mynpoory. I then asked him to march direct upon Mynpoory, and I offered to dam up the Kalee Nudde for forty-eight hours, provided he would

* Mr. Cooks, Special Commissioner, quitting the staff, rode up at the commencement of this operation, and entreated me most earnestly to desist.

† One man of the 10th Native Infantry was found near the guns, all twelve of which were taken, his leg having been carried off by a round shot. A sepoy of the 3rd Regiment was also seized in the town, and shot by the faithful sepoys of my escort.
do so. This proposal he rejected, and after halting three days, the column marched back on Monday, the 21st, to Suahur. At this place we received intimation that the Hardy family and others, twenty Christian refugees in all, would shortly arrive at the left bank of the Ganges. These* were all safely brought into camp on the 22nd, on which day Colonel Seaton marched to Kassgunj. Within two miles of Kassgunj, the Kalee Nuddee is spanned by a bridge, and Colonel Seaton’s column marched across it to Etah on the Grand Trunk Road, whence he proceeded to Mynpoory by the regular marches. Vexed at this retrograde movement (all retrograde movements being considered by Asians as denoting defeat), and knowing that Mr. Cocks, Judge, and Sessions Judge of Mynpoory, was present with the column, I retraced my steps towards Agra, and eventually reached Meerut on the 27th December. Colonel Seaton eventually joined the Commander-in-Chief’s column, and accompanied it to Futtehgurh, where His Excellency remained a considerable time, before he commenced operations against Lucknow. In this interval the Nana was at Neemkhar Misrick, a place of pilgrimage for Hindoos, situated about half-way between the old city of Kanouj and the cantonment of Seetapoor, and about forty or fifty miles from Futtehgurh.

59. While the Commander-in-Chief was engaged in arranging his plans for retaking Lucknow, he directed General Penny, C.B., Commanding at Meerut, to guard the river Ganges from Hurdwar to the borders of the Futtehgurh district, and to see that no rebel forces crossed over, and plundered the villages of the Doab. I am not aware what the distance by water from Hurdwar to Qadigunj is, but it cannot be less than 500 miles. After January there must have been 500 fords at least in that interval, and what was the force at General Penny’s disposal?—Two thousand five hundred men, or thereabouts! Much military knowledge is not required to prove that effectually to watch, in the face of 50,000 rebels, 500 miles of a river frontier with 2,500 men, is an impossibility. There was, however, one feasible course, viz., for 2,500 brave men ever and anon to cross over the river, and beating the enemy wherever he appeared particularly active and troublesome, to return to their own side of the river. But this course was prohibited; the river was to be guarded without assuming the offensive, and the river was in no wise to be crossed. Under these circumstances, it is easy to conceive what a load of responsibility thus fell upon General Penny. On the 15th February 1858, Brigadier Coke, C.B., was ordered to take command of a brigade at Roorkee, and orders were issued by the General at Meerut for a movable column to be held in readiness to march at a moment’s warning. At General Penny’s request I agreed to join this column, believing that it would be the first to enter Rohilkund, and march upon Moradabad by the Gurhmooktaisur ghat. On the 26th February 1858, having left orders that my tents and horses were to march with the moveable column, I proceeded to Allahabad, the head-quarters of the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General, where I remained till the 12th March. At 7 o’clock that morning I left Allahabad, and reached Allyghur at 7 P.M. on the 14th, having been exactly thirty-six hours on the road. General Penny, C.B., marched from Allyghur on the following morning, and on the 15th March we encamped on the same ground as that occupied by Colonel Sir T. Seaton’s column, on Monday, the 14th December 1857. The grave of the four Dragoons and two Lancers had been disturbed, but those of Captains Wardlaw and Hudson and of Lieutenant Vyse were untouched. I am satisfied, however, that the desecrators of the grave of the former were jackals, it having been a very shallow grave. We reburied the remains in a deep grave, dug close by, and I have visited the spot several times since, and it has not been touched. A public monument should, I think, be raised on the spot, for a braver or a better officer than Captain Wardlaw never led a cavalry charge.

60. On Tuesday, the 16th, we marched to Kassgunj, and here we found Captain Murray, Commanding the Jat Horse, and Mr. C. Daniell of the Civil

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* This brought the number of Christian refugees rescued up to forty-five.
† Colonel Seaton has since been made a Knight Commander of the Bath, and well he deserves the honor.

\[\text{A 84}\]
Captain Murray* and Lieutenant Hennessy, charged a body of Irregular Cavalry, which had crossed over from Kuch’i’lah and driven them back, and thus saved the Kassgunj Pergunnah from pillage.

61. On Wednesday, the 17th March, a telegram, announcing the melancholy tidings of the escape of the mutinous sipahees and Irregular Cavalry from Lucknow, was received. A drawing of the river was made, and information was given to the Commander-in-Chief that General Penny intended to cross the river, and attack the rebel force at Kuch’i’lah, distant twelve miles, as soon as we were joined by a wing of Her Majesty’s 64th Regiment. The wing arrived on the morning of Friday, the 19th, and those acquainted with the General’s plans were looking forward with delight to punishing the Kuch’i’lah rebel force, when a telegram arrived, positively prohibiting the crossing of the river, and ordering the wing of Her Majesty’s 60th Rifles to return to Meerut and Roorkee, and the whole of the 5th Sikh Regiment to Lucknow. We were thus left at Kassgunj with only 1,300 men, viz., one Wing Her Majesty’s 64th Regiment under Colonel Bingham, one Wing of the Bellooch Battalion under Captain Beville, a squadron of the 6th Dragoons Guards under Colonel Richmond Jones. The Moontanee Horse under Captain Lind, and three 18-pounders and four 9-pounders under Captain Hammond. The column remained inactive at Kassgunj till Monday, 29th March, on which day it marched to Suhawur, where it halted till the morning of April 12th, when it marched to Puttealee. In the interim the 22nd Sikh Regiment joined us, and on Friday, the 9th, whilst at Suhawur, we received news of the defeat of the rebel force at Bangaon by Colonel Sir T. Seaton, K.C.B., with a small force from Futteghurgh, and of the flight of Taij Singh, the rebel Raja of Mynpoory, who crossing the Ganges, had forded the Kalee Nuddee at Toosaia, and had taken the road to Etawah. The Nana, on hearing of the defeat of the mutineers at Lucknow, retreated from Neemkhar Misrick to Shahjehanpoor, where he remained eight days, in which interval his eldest son was born. He then proceeded to Bareilly, where he took a very active part in the government and actually caused a proclamation to be issued by Khan Bahadur, prohibiting the slaughter of kine.

62. At Puttealee it was resolved to get up sport for the Europeans and Sikhs, and I believe that the games which lasted for about a fortnight, and occupied the men’s thoughts for about a fortnight after their occurrence, were the cause why, notwithstanding the intense heat in tents, we had so few Europeans in hospital. Our forced inactivity continuing as it did for so lengthened a period, gave the rebel forces at Kuch’i’lah and other ghats confidence, and at length, on the 19th April, they came across the river Ganges, and burnt the town of Qadirgunj. The zemindar, my old friend, “Nawab Sahib,” galloped over to bring the news, and the Moontanes Horse started at once; but the distance being eight miles, when they arrived not one of the enemy was visible, all having retraced their steps to the left bank of the river.

63. About this time General Walpole, leaving Roorkee, where Nirput Singh contrived to kill Brigadier the Hon’ble Adrian Hope, had defeated the rebels under Ahmad Yar Khan at Bich’hpoooree ghât, and he was halting at Allahgunj, distant twelve miles from Futteghurgh. The Commander-in-Chief was on his way from Cawnpore to that cantonment with some of the Highland Regiments; and the Nana was at Bareilly, organizing arrangements for opposing the British troops, which he knew would soon be approaching that city. On Thursday, the 22nd April, orders were received by General Penny to proceed to Futteghurgh to meet His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. We accordingly started the same evening with a small escort for Shumsabad, distant twenty miles. Here we passed the heat of the day of Friday, 23rd, and very early on Saturday morning, the 24th, we reached Futteghurgh. His Excellency arrived the same day, and he at first directed General Penny, to bring his column to Jullalabadd; but upon my representing to His Excellency that, to the best of my

* Captain Murray is the officer alluded to in para. 61. Lieutenant Hennessy was very severely wounded in this action.
belief, Jullalabad would be evacuated before he reached the fort there; that Putteealee was the apex of an isosceles triangle of forty miles, of which Jullalabad and Futtehgurh were the base, which base was only twenty miles; so that while His Excellency was marching that distance, we should have to march eighty miles, with the Ganges and Ramgunga to cross; that even at Shahjahanpoor his large force would not be opposed, and that I felt certain I could conduct General Penny's column straight across Rohilkund, and cause it to join His Excellency at Meeranpoor Kutrah, twenty miles south of Bareilly. He consented to the proposal, and directed General Penny to join him at that place on the 3rd May. That same night the General started for Putteeealee in two marches as before; I only accompanied him ten miles, and then rode direct to Putteeealee, with orders to despatch the wing of the Belooch Battalion and the Mooltanee Horse early the next morning to the ghat. This they did, and the General and his Staff also reached Putteeealee shortly after their departure. On Tuesday morning, the 27th, the General reached the Ganges, and the artillery, the wing of the Belooch Battalion, the 22nd Sikh Regiment, the Mooltanee Horse, and Captain Gowan's* Infantry, at once crossed the river, and driving off the enemy's picket, took possession of the village of Neolee. The General and Staff, and the Dragoons, crossed later in the day. No sooner had the guns crossed, say 12 o'clock midday, than the river began to rise, and when the staff crossed, an ordinary horse was compelled to swim for three or four yards in the centre of the stream.

64. Wednesday, the 28th, we were engaged all day getting over Commissariat stores. A letter received from the Chief of the Staff, to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief would be most probably opposed at Shahjahanpoor; that he could not be at Meeranpoor Kutrah on the 3rd; and that General Penny was at liberty to use his own discretion. I shall not easily forget the delight which this letter caused the brave old General. He sent for me, and communicated to me the contents. I replied that it was highly gratifying, because it evinced proof of the confidence which His Excellency entertained of him; but that two things militated much against his making any very great use of the discretionary powers granted, viz., that though the rebel forces under the Fyzabad Moulvee might threaten to oppose the Commander-in-Chief’s entry into Shahjahanpoor—a threat which he personally, being a brave man, would doubtless carry out—still the rebel leaders acting under him would never consent to fight such a force as that under His Excellency, and that consequently not being opposed, he would be at Meeranpoor Kutrah on the day appointed; that very probably he would be annoyed, if the General did not arrive there at the same time; and also that the river Ganges by rising so suddenly, already threatened to consume one of the two spare days allowed us, and might possibly consume the second. Pecuniary rewards were promised to the mahouts, if they would bring over all the stores quickly, and the Commissariat Officer, Lieutenant Briggs, exerted himself to the utmost. Seeing that we could not possibly march that evening with the consent of the General, Captain Gowan’s Infantry and my Irregular Cavalry escort were sent to a Mahomedan village, about four miles off, on the road to Kukralah, with orders, if possible, to capture the picket posted there. Captain Gowan returned in the afternoon, and reported that they had been able to kill only one man of the picket, the rest having fled to Kukralah. That same evening the rebel force at Kukralah becoming panic-struck, fled to Budaon, distant ten miles from Kukralah. This was duly reported to General Penny, and he agreed that he would march vid Oosaith, where were posted a thousand men with one gun, and having defeated that body, he would encamp at Kukralah, and march the next day and attack the rebels at Budaon; and having done this, he would proceed to the rendezvous by forced marches during the 2nd and 3rd of May. A messenger noted for his experience and tact was procured, and both the General

* 110’t men of the 11th Regiment Native Infantry and about 150 recruits.
† I think the name of this messenger was Killoo. He was, I think, a Chumar by birth. His widow is deserving of a pension; the present Magistrate and Collector of Budaon can easily find her out.
and myself wrote to the Chief of the Staff, detailing the above plan. Up
to midnight were the elephants engaged bringing over Commissariat stores, and
yet all had not been brought over. Thursday, the 29th, saw the elephants
again at work, crossing and re-crossing the river, and it was not till 5 o'clock
P.M. that all the stores were safely landed at Neolee; and here, before I relate
the sad occurrence which the next twenty-four hours brought forth, it is
necessary, to the right understanding of the matter, that I should enter into
the following detail, and that the annexed map* should be consulted.

65. The high road from Budao to Futteghur runs via Kukralah, Osath, and
Kutrah, and crossing the Ganges at Soorujpoor ghaut, enters the district of
Furruckhabad, the ghaut being about half-way between the two towns. At Kut-
rah, which is on the left bank, and about three miles from the river, the Bareilly
rebels had all along kept up a considerable force, and it was at this ghaut the
force which was defeated at Shumsabad in January, and also the force which
plundered the town of Kumpil in March, crossed over the river. No sooner
had General Penny crossed the Ganges and encamped at Neolee, than the Kut-
rah force retreated upon Osath and Kukralah. What became of the Kutrah
portion of the Kutrah force has been detailed, viz., that it fled panic-struck
into Budao on the evening of Wednesday, 28th. The Osath force remained
to be disposed of, and it was resolved that a column, composed of the four
battery guns under Captain Hammond, the Squadron of the 6th Dragoon Guards
under Colonel Richmond Jones, a wing of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment
under Colonel Bingham, half the Mooltanee Horse under Captain Lind, and a
portion of the 92nd Sikh Regiment, should march for Kukralah via Osath at
9 o'clock P.M. on Thursday, the 29th; and that the baggage protected by
three 18-pounders, a portion of the 22nd Sikh Regiment, half the Mooltanee
Horse and Gowan's Infantry, should march for Kukralah direct at daylight of
Friday, the 30th April. Doubtless it was a great violation of military rules
to march at the early hour of 9 o'clock P.M.; but General Penny was in the
habit of marching, so as to reach his camp always by 6 o'clock A.M., with a
view to avoid exposing his European troops to the effect of the sun; and when
it was suggested that we were in an enemy's country, he replied: "Nothing shall
induce me to expose 'my Europeans' to the sun." It was full moon on the
29th, so that during the night of the 29th, it was bright moonlight. The
column started, as ordered, at 9 o'clock P.M., and every military precaution
was adopted. I was asked to accompany the advanced guard, which was com-
manded by Lieutenant Weatherby of Her Majesty's 6th Dragoon Guards. I
did so, and when we arrived at a village one mile short of Osath, the zemin-
dar reported to me that the picket had been withdrawn from the village about
4 o'clock P.M., and that he believed that the rebel force had decamped, taking
the road to the north. He added: "Did you send a messenger with despatches
last night? If so, he approached Osath too nearly, and was seized by the
picket, and he was beheaded this morning in the grove at Osath." This
zemindar accompanied the advanced guard on foot; and when we reached
Osath, we found all he said was too true, and the Osath people said that
they believed that the rebels had retreated by the Datagunj road.† We halted
at Osath for an hour to rest the infantry. We then resumed our march
for Kukralah, distant about eight miles, and, as nearly as I can recollect, it was
about midnight. The line of march was as before, and as the road was very
sandy, the artillery and cavalry out-marched the infantry. When the advanced
guard reached a little hamlet four miles from Osath, the halt was sounded,
and we waited one hour for the infantry. Here it was that General Penny, I
believe, personally told Colonel Bingham not to hurry the men, but to let them
take their time. It was this fatal order which led eventually to the General's

* In the accompanying map, almost all the places mentioned in this narrative, are underlined with red ink.
† The despatches were found in Khan Bahadoor's house after the occupation of Bareilly, and they are now
in my possession.
‡ The Kukralah and Datagunj roads leave Osath by the same exit, but separate a short distance from Osath;
the former going almost due north, the latter towards east of north.
Hammond occasionally fired a round. "Imagine," injured by—through the trees, in the direction he had taken, and though have galloped to the place where the zemindar took place. I cried out in a loud tone, "Look out, there's a gun!" The Staff and the advanced guard wheeled round in an instant to enable our guns to open, and in a second, three guns loaded with grape were fired at us, succeeded by a fourth; but by a miracle not one of us was hit,—I fancy because the guns did not admit of their muzzles being sufficiently depressed for the short distance which intervened between us and them. The road was sandy, and our guns were turned with great difficulty. Hence Captain Hammond could not return the fire of the enemy, till they had fired four rounds at us. Our guns then opened, and down came a body of Ghazees (martyrs for the faith of Islam), each brandishing two swords upon our guns, and the troop of Dragoons led by Captain Forsters. Nobly did the artillery and the Dragoons do their duty; the latter charged the Ghazees, and personal conflicts became the order of the day; one Ghazee was cut down by the side of one of our guns by a Lieutenant of the Artillery, whose name I cannot now remember, and their bones even now whiten the plain, at the spot where the Dragoons went at them. One of the enemy's cavalry, mounted on a bay horse, rode for a second close beside the Dragoons. He came up with a salam, and it was not till he began to use his sword, that he was discovered to be a rebel. His bones and those of his horse up to this day mark the spot where he fell.* The Ghazees having been driven back, the enemy taking his three guns with him, retreated to a considerable distance to the right of the road, and it was imagined that he proposed to attack our right flank. Our guns and the Dragoons were faced to the right, and Captain Hammond occasionally fired a round shot through the trees, in the direction he had taken, and though no execution was done, the firing these shots prevented the attack on our flank being attempted. It was at this time that General Penny was missed, and for some while no trace of him could be found. At length his corpse was discovered near the village, about 100 yards on the left of the road, and 300 yards in advance of the spot where the hand-to-hand conflict between the Dragoons and the Ghazees took place. His left arm had been broken by a musket bullet, and I imagine that the reins dropping from his hand in consequence, his pony must have galloped to the front; that he fell off, and then some of the Ghazees see-

* Lieutenant Eckford, of the Quarter-Master-General's Department, was severely wounded by the Ghazees, he having fallen, I believe, from his horse, when the Staff wheeled round. Captain Forster's left hand was severely injured by a sword-cut, inflicted while he was warding off cuts with his steel scabbard.
ing him on the ground, killed him with two sword-cuts. The command now devolved upon Colonel Richmond Jones, of the 6th Dragoon Guards, and anxiously were all eyes turned towards Oossait, for the advent of the infantry. At the time the first shot was fired, Colonel Bingham and Captain Beville must have been about three miles or more in the rear. I need hardly add that both Her Majesty's 64th, and the Biloochees, the moment that the gun was heard, started to join us at the double. At length they made their appearance, and we resumed the offensive. A few Ghazes attempted to renew the attack, but it was a very feeble effort, and then away the enemy fled towards Budaon. Had Colonel R. Jones taken the high road to Budaon, which road runs straight through the village of Kukralah, much time would have been saved, and the enemy would have been seen more clearly in the pursuit; but it was supposed that the houses might be filled with matchlockmen, and hence we followed in the line taken by the enemy, viz., to the right of the village. For two miles after the pursuit commenced, the dust was so great, that though riding close in the rear of the Dragoons, it was impossible to see the man in front. At length the soil became less sandy, and we saw that the enemy's cavalry had divided,—the larger body taking the left of the road, the smaller taking the right of the road. The Dragoons followed the larger body, and the Mooltanees under Captain Lind followed the smaller. Our artillery horses now began to feel the effects of the sandy fields through which they had been going at speed for two miles, and Captain Hammond very wisely kept his guns on the high road between the two bodies of our cavalry; but of course his horses could no longer keep pace with the cavalry. At length one of the enemy's guns became visible on the high road, and I saw the artillerymen trying to make the bullocks, which were dragging it, increase their speed. The Dragoons were at this time half a mile to the left of the road in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, but one or two of the Mooltanees catching sight of the gun, gave chase. As we neared the gun, all the rebel artillerymen but one fled, and concealed themselves in a stack of the urkar plant. The solitary artilleryman was despatched, and a Mooltanee taking the place of the bullock driver, we turned the bullocks round, urging them with the point of the sword to retrace their steps to Kukralah,—a proceeding to which, in their blown state, they seemed particularly averse. At this time the main body of the Mooltanees having overtaken some of the enemy, were fighting in the right, and the Dragoons were using their sabres with good effect on the left. At length some of the leading files of Her Majesty's 64th came up, and the artillerymen in the urkar stack were disposed of. The heat at this time was intense, and men and horses being completely knocked up, the halt was sounded. We gradually retraced our steps towards Kukralah, where we hoped to find our tents. We reached our camp, pitched on the Budaon side of Kukralah, between 12 and 1 o'clock of Friday, the 30th April, and the heat may be conceived, when I state that, to the best of my recollection, seven horses, all stud-bred, born and reared in the country, died from the effect of it. Eighty dead bodies were counted between the spot where the action commenced and our tents, and as many more must have been killed in the pursuit; and yet the affair at Kukralah was designated by the Commander-in-Chief in the Gazette a "skirmish." The official account of the action was drawn up by Major Harriott, of the Judge Advocate's Department, and doubtless it was difficult to write a despatch of the occurrences of the day, without attributing blame to some one. Now that General Penny was no more, I was the sole surviving depository of the said voce instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, and I deemed myself justified in asking permission to read the

* This brave and noble officer fell a victim to his tender regard for the European soldier. His horror of exposing a British soldier to the sun, may be conceived from the following anecdote:—He subscribed most liberally towards the fund raised for the sports at Putteals; but one day, fancying that they did not commence early enough, he addressed me as a steward of the sports, and begged me to go to the Officer Commanding the different Arms of the Service, and tell them that if the men were not on the ground at the grey dawn, he would prohibit the games altogether. He was the only man killed that day, though one of the Dragoons died the next day of his wounds. General Penny was a stern disciplinarian, but there was not a man in the whole column who did not deplore his loss.
despatch of the copy of it. But this was denied, and the answer given was, that I could read it when it was published. In it, Major Harriott states that I was misled; and it is made to appear that I was the cause of the misadventure. How much I was to blame will appear hereafter.

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66. And now a few words as to the blame which ought to attach to me. I have before stated that the messenger despatched with letters from General Penny and myself, to the Chief of the Staff, on the evening of Wednesday, the 28th, was seized that same night, and executed by the Oosathif force early on Thursday, the 29th, and that both the letters are now in my possession, having been found among the papers in the house of the rebel, Nawab Khan Bahadur Khan, at Bareilly. Those letters were sent by the leader of the Oosathif force on Wednesday night to Budaon, and these being translated, all General Penny's plans became known. The Oosathif force quitted its position on the afternoon of the 29th, and passing through Kukralah, was met late at night half-way between Kukralah and Budaon by a body of Ghazees and cavalry, with two guns drawn by horses. This body had been despatched from Budaon under the command of Wuzeer Khan, the Agra Native Doctor, and Zamin Ali, the Imam of the Ghazees, a resident of Chubramow near Futtteghur, with orders to unite with the Oosathif force, and to oppose us at Kukralah. A part of the Oosathif force refused to return with Wuzeer Khan and Zamin Ali, and continued their march, but some of them and the artillery did return, and it was the Oosathif gun which we took. Wuzeer Khan and Zamin Ali's party, thus constituted, reached Kukralah about 11 o'clock of the night of Thursday, the 29th April, and of this fact I was ignorant at 4 o'clock the following morning. I never however advocated marching at night in a country occupied by the enemy; but still passing this by, was it any fault of mine, that when we halted 1½ miles short of Kukralah, we did not prolong our halt for an additional half hour? Was it any fault of mine, that the infantry was permitted to stay so far in the rear? Was it any fault of mine, that the whole of the staff joined the advanced guard,—a post which had been assigned to me at 9 o'clock the previous evening? Had the ordinary precautions of war been adopted, what harm could have occurred from the enemy's occupation, during the night, of Kukralah? I may safely answer, that but few of the enemy would have lived to return to Budaon, and all their three guns would have been taken.

67. But to return to my narrative. It was given out that we should march the following morning to Budaon, but when Colonel Jones, Major Harriott, and Captain Simeon, were consulting as to what was to be done, I entered the tent, and told them that I had pledged my word to His Excellency that I would conduct the column, so as to join him at Meeranpoor Kutrah on Monday, the 3rd May; that there were only three days left for a march by cross country roads, and by which regular troops had never marched, of some 35 miles, with the Ramgunga river intervening; that it was true that His Excellency, under the impression that he would be opposed at Shahjehanpoor, and consequently would be unable to reach Meeranpoor Kutrah at the appointed time, had in a measure absolved both the General and myself from the pledge given at Futtteghur, but that I was sure His Excellency would not be opposed at Shahjehanpoor, and that he would consequently adhere to his part of the engagement; that though General Penny had intended, under the conditional release from his engagement above alluded to, had he not been opposed at Kukralah, to march to Budaon, and defeating the enemy there, to make two forced marches, and join His Excellency, if possible, on the 3rd at Meeranpoor Kutrah, or failing in that, to join him on the 4th at Furreedpoor, yet that the enemy, after the defeat of the morning, believing that we would march on Budaon, would assuredly evacuate that place; that under no circumstances could we remain to hold possession of it; that the troops were knocked up

* Zamin Ali was the leader of the Ghazees, who drove the Sikhs at the battle of Bareilly out of the grove near the Irregular Cavalry lines, and eighty of whom were in their turn killed by Her Majesty's 42nd Royal Highlanders. Zamin Ali was killed, and I believe Wuzeer Khan, Native Doctor, also fell at the same time.
with the night's march, and the action of the morning; and that under all the circumstances of the case, we had better march the following morning to Buksainah, keeping our intention secret. These arguments prevailed. In the evening we buried our good old General* under a large solitary mango tree, and at 1 o'clock A.M. of the 1st May we marched to Buksainah, where the good and loyal zemindars of the neighbourhood for miles around, who three different times attempted during the rebellion to throw off the Mahomedan yoke, and who sheltered some sixty-four Christian refugees, vied with one another in supplying in a few hours' notice, everything required by our column. I here learnt, from native sources, that the Nana had, under a pledge that he would oppose His Excellency at Meeranpoor Kutrah, obtained money and ten thousand men in addition to his own column, at that time consisting of nearly 2,000 men, and had marched to Furreedpoor for the purpose, and that His Excellency had not been opposed at Shahjehanpoor. This intelligence made it absolutely necessary that we should be punctual in keeping our time at Meeranpoor Kutrah. Accordingly we resumed our march at 2 o'clock A.M. of Sunday, the 2nd May. About an hour after sunrise we reached the banks of the Ramgunga, and nearly the whole day was occupied in crossing that treacherous river. But our object was gained, and we encamped on the left bank, at a village called Manpoor, close to Khairah Bujarrah, the village mentioned in paragraph 50, as being the asylum of Captain Gowan and the Belcham family. We were now only eight miles from Furreedpoor, and the same distance from Meeranpoor Kutrah. It was barely probable that the Nana, hearing of the approach of His Excellency's army, might prefer attacking our column, to waiting to be annihilated by the said army and our column united. We had, too, a river in our rear; but I believe had the Nana, who is at heart an arrant coward, ventured to attack us, he would have been assuredly defeated. Moreover, although it was known to every one, from the report of the guns, that we had gained a victory at or near Kukralab, the fact of our having turned our faces due east, and having marched across country, was a secret, and had the Nana kept his word, and marched on Meeranpoor Kutrah, I believe he would not have known, till 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 2nd, that we were so close to him. All the zemindars around us were friendly to us. There was no occasion to send on any armed party beforehand. Two zemindars on horseback, quitting camp at 10 P.M., were sufficient to ensure our having all our wants supplied by 10 A.M. the following day. Immediately on our arriving at the Ramgunga, messengers were sent to Furreedpoor and Meeranpoor Kutrah. They returned about 12 o'clock. The former reported that the Nana, with his own column, had marched from Furreedpoor to Khodagunj en route to Koothar, and that the 10,000 men supplied by Khan Bahadur Khan had returned to Bareilly. The latter reported that there was a picket of fifty sowars sent by the Nana from Furreedpoor, posted in the mango grove at Meeranpoor Kutrah, and that the Commander-in-Chief had commenced his march from Shahjehanpoor to Bareilly. Late in the evening letters were received from the Chief of the Staff, to the effect that His Excellency would be at Meeranpoor Kutrah at sunrise, and expected us to meet him there. We did so, and His Excellency did me the honor to thank me in a very flattering manner for the manner in which the column had been conducted to the spot at the hour agreed upon.

68. On the 4th His Excellency reached Furreedpoor, and a little after sunrise of Wednesday, the 5th May, the enemy fired their first shot from their guns drawn up at the Nukuteea bridge, close to the Bareilly Cantonment. Our Artillery very soon silenced them, and then the old Rohillah Cavalry tactics were tried, viz., to get into our rear, and make havoc among our baggage; but our Cavalry were alert on the flanks, and both attempts failed. The line moved on, and some Sikhs (I think there were 200 of them) were ordered to hold a grove, intervening between the new Irregular Cavalry lines and the Bareilly parade-ground. They had not been long in this grove when they were attacked by 300 Ghazee foot and 100 Ghazee horse, under Zamin Alee. Taken by surprise,

* His body has been removed since, and reintered at Meerut.
at least I fancy so, they fled before the Ghazees. His Excellency ordered Her Majesty's 42nd Royal Highlanders to their support, and this noble corps made short work of them, killing eighty of them, among whom was Zamin Ali himself. It is believed that Vuzeer Khan, the Agra Native Doctor, was also killed, for a case of surgical instruments and a revolver were taken from the person of one of the slain. The Ghazees on the left having been disposed of, a curious incident occurred in the front. A little to the right of the road were placed Colonel Remington's guns, and in rear of them were Her Majesty's 93rd Highlanders. In front of the guns, at the distance of 150 yards, was a grove, the fence of which was composed of a slight bank, on which there was some surport grass; a man, with a gun on his back and his sword by his side, putting aside the grass, coolly entered the plain, and began walking in the direction of His Excellency and myself. I remarked to His Excellency that the fellow was a Ghzee, and that unless prevented, he would make mischief. At this moment the fellow bringing his right shoulder slightly forward, made for Colonel Remington's guns. I immediately addressed the Commander-in-Chief and said, "See, he is making for the guns; pray dispose of him." His Excellency cried out, "Here, four Highlanders from the left." Instantly eight men of the 93rd ran up, and His Excellency said, "Shoot that fellow." The Ghzee was now about eighty yards from us. Eight minie rifles were fired, but not a bullet touched him. He now drew his sword; and a horseman (he might have been the Serjeant-Major of Colonel Remington's Artillery, or he might have been one of the Meerut or Lahore Light Horse) rode to the front to meet him. At a distance of about twenty yards, the Ghzee levelled his musket and fired at him, but missed him. His Excellency ordered the horseman back, but he remained where he was. The Ghzee commenced re-loading his musket, and the horseman was joined by three or four other horsemen. They then went at him. He, after firing at them a second time, got among them, and with his sword he made their horses dance, before he was ultimately disposed of. Instead of following up the enemy the line was halted, the 24-pounders were brought up, and the empty groves intervening between us and the city were shelled for a considerable period. Orders were about 5 p.m. issued for the troops to bivouac where they stood. Khan Bahadur, Sobha Ram, and all the leading rebels, with guns drawn by horses, and a considerable column, took advantage of our inactivity, to retreat by the metalled road to Pilibheet. The following morning we were ordered to move a mile to our left, and to encamp on the Bareilly parade-ground. In the meantime Brigadier Jones, C.B., of Her Majesty's 60th Rifles, having defeated the enemy at Meergunj, twenty miles north-west of Bareilly, had encamped on the north side of that city, and while we were shifting our ground, his column was engaged in occupying the town. The result of the action at Bareilly was a bitter disappointment to me. One of the most influential zemindars in the neighbourhood had promised me, that as soon as all their guns had been taken, and they had been thoroughly beaten, he and his brethren would arrest Khan Bahadur, Sobha Ram, and all the leading rebels. The allowing them to get away with their guns of course was a violation of the contract on my part, and all my plans for seizing the Chiefs fell to the ground. In fact the zemindars did not consider that Khan Bahadur had been defeated, and until I gave them an escort led by an European, they would not come into camp. Two unfortunate Christians, who had been in Jail, and who were released by the Hindoos on the morning of the 5th, were killed by the low Mahomedan budmah population of Bareilly, even while our guns were at work; but I had the satisfaction of recovering from the zemindars, and in other ways, eighteen Christians, making in all sixty-four Christian Rohilkund refugees, from first to last, rescued through me, and those associated with me in the work.

69. On the 10th May I marched with Captain Gowan, Serjeant-Major Belcham, William Hardy, Private in Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, the faithful men of the 11th Regiment Native Infantry, some recruits, and about sixty Irregular Cavalry, for Moradabad, which place we reached on the 12th. Here we remained for more than a month, without a single soldier drawing British
pay, save the party above mentioned, and in the interval many rebels and mutineers were sentenced capitally, among them two Princes of the house of Delhi, who were arrested, sneaking about, disguised as Faqueers.

70. This long narrative has now come to a close. It has been compiled from notes and a diary regularly kept up, and it contains a simple narrative of what I am personally cognizant. I feel certain that it will draw down upon me the charge of egotism; but it is difficult to conceive how such a charge can, with any justice, be brought against me. More than thirty years have elapsed since I sold my time, my life, my intellect, such as it is, everything save my honor, to Government, and hence all I did was the act of Government through one of its humblest servants. Moreover, my narrative is not a voluntary effusion. It has been written, as stated in the commencement, by the express orders of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General.


No. 21, dated Shahjehanpoor, 9th September 1858.

From—G. P. Money, Esq., Magistrate and Collector of Shahjehanpoor,
To—R. Alexander, Esq., Commissioner of Rohilkund.

In compliance with your Circular No. 20, dated 13th May, forwarding a Government Circular No. 212, dated 30th April 1858, I have now the honor to submit a narrative of events attending the outbreak of disturbances in this district, and of the subsequent progress of events until its re-occupation.

2. Intelligence of the Meerut and Delhi outbreak reached Shahjehanpoor towards the middle of May 1857, and about that time one or two incendiary diaries occurred, which clearly showed the Civil and Military authorities that the Native troops sympathised with the mutinous acts at other stations, and the attention of the authorities was keenly roused by the reports which continually reached them of the manner in which the sepoys talked of the new cartridges that had been served out to the men. There were also idle stories circulated about the "atta" which they were using for their food, and which was said to be mixed with pounded bones.

3. On the 17th May, Mr. Ricketts, the Magistrate and Collector of the district, returned from leave, and relieved Mr. Bramley, who had been acting for him the last three months. On his taking charge, he issued strict orders to the principal Ministerial Officers to be on the alert, and keep him well acquainted with anything that might come to their knowledge regarding the sepoys. On the 20th May, the first day of the Еed festival, the sepoys told their officers that they had heard a rumour that the next day, being the occasion of a large annual fair called "Cheenour ka mela" (which was held near Cantonments by a village of that name and close to the burial-ground of some of the principal Pathans), the city people intended to plunder the Government Treasury. The Officer Commanding the Regiment thinking it would show the sepoys that they still put confidence in them, ordered the several station guards to be increased, and the sentries to be doubled.

4. This order appears to have had quite a contrary effect to that intended, for the sepoys immediately caught hold of it as a grievance, and said that they were being punished for refusing to bite the cartridges. Mr. Ricketts, hearing this, went to the Officer Commanding, and suggested that the extra sentry should be taken off; but he was told in reply that the order could not then be cancelled, as it had been entered in the Order Book, but that the following day, as the fair would be over, the extra sentries should be removed. It is possible that the sepoys, who clearly were then plotting mutiny, were annoyed at not being able to get to the fair, owing to their extra duty, and vented their
ill humour in remarks about the cartridges. The report made to the officers of the intention to plunder the Treasury was perhaps an exaggeration of some half-conceived design, and may have been brought to the notice of the officers by some sepoys not implicated in the intended mutiny. It was generally believed among the officers of the 28th Regiment that in case of a mutiny, about 500 of the sepoys would remain faithful, and this confidence was strengthened from the fact that out of that number there were about 150 Sikhs.

5. Two or three days previous to the outbreak, the following circumstance occurred, which plainly showed the state of feeling among the sepoys. A bill to the amount of Rupees 2,000 was cashed, and as the money was being taken out of the Treasury, the sentry was heard to say, "I will let the money go this time, but no more shall be taken out." The above was brought to the notice of the Magistrate by the Deputy Collector, Hamid Hussun Khan, but it does not appear that any further notice was taken of the matter, probably from the fear of precipitating events. This state of things went on until the eventful morning of Sunday, 31st May, when the regiment broke out into open mutiny, and commenced the murderous attack upon the Europeans who were, at the time, assembled in the church. This circumstance has been fully related by the late Mr. Jenkins in his letter to Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, written from Mohomdee on 2nd June, and consequently I have not thought it necessary to enter again into the particulars; but a copy of the letter is sent as an Appendix for reference.

6. The Tehseeldar of Shahjehanpoor, Mohomud Umjud Ulee Khan, who has remained faithful throughout the disturbances, has stated before me, that on the morning of the 31st hearing from the city the noise of people shouting in the direction of cantonments, he at once rode off to the house of Mr. Ricketts, but hearing he had gone to church, he went there, and saw about nine or ten Europeans assembled outside the church. Some of them had guns, and their servants were bringing others; he also observed several sepoys taking the part of the Europeans. It will be observed in Mr. Jenkins' letter that only six or seven sepoys formed the attacking party on the community assembled in the church; this fact coupled with the speedy arrival of a body of sepoys (about 100) apparently with the intention of preventing the shedding of innocent blood, renders it probable that the idea of murdering the Europeans was not with the unanimous consent of the whole regiment. The Tehseeldar learnt from Mr. Jenkins what had happened, and he then saw the lifeless body of Mr. Ricketts lying near the church, with a severe sword wound almost severing his head from the body. Mr. Jenkins desired him to fetch the sowars, saying that with the assistance of the sepoys who were faithful, he hoped to quell the disturbance; but if he could not succeed, he and the rest of the party would start for Powayan.

7. Out of the four sowars on duty at the Magistrate's house, two remained with Mr. Jenkins, and, as stated in his letter, accompanied the party the whole way to Mohomdee. One of these men afterwards joined the rebels; but the other steadily refused to accept any service with them, and has received a reward from Government of Rupees 300, and been promoted by me to the rank of Duffadar.

8. Whilst the party were outside the church, the mutinous sepoys kept firing at them from some distance, but did not make any advances upon the small number of Europeans assembled. Their chief object, after the first outbreak, apparently being the plunder of the Government Treasury, and in which direction they were seen hastening in separate parties. As soon as the bungalows were set on fire, and there being no longer any hope of successful opposition, Mr. Jenkins told the Tehseeldar that he purposed proceeding to Powayan with the rest of the party; and desired him to go to the city and make the best arrangement he could for restoring order, and that when the regiment had marched from the station, he was to let him know. With the exception of the Tehseeldar, no other Government official or any person of influence in the city proceeded to the assistance of the authorities.
9. About this time, the sepoys went to the Jail and let the prisoners loose. The Government property is said to have been chiefly plundered by the Jail guard and burkundazes.

10. It appears that Mr. Arthur Smith, the Assistant, was not one of the party in church; he was ill with fever and in his bungalow at the time the mutiny broke out; his idea seems to have been to avoid cantonments, and make for the city, and it is said he attempted to get admittance into the house of Hamid Hussun Khan, Deputy Collector; but not succeeding, and being told by the servants that Hamid Hussun had gone to the house of Abool-raouf Khan, he went direct to the Tehseeldar and Cotwaltee, from which place it appears he was taken by Munzur Kureem (Fouzadree Sherishtadar) to the house of Mohomud Hussin Khan (Bukhshee of Chowkeedars), who left him there by himself. It is stated that this person turned him out; Mr. Smith seems to have forsook ejected, again proceeded to the Cotwaltee, and concealed himself in a small hut where a Hindoo chuprasee, belonging to the Moonsiff's Office, joined him and remained with him to the last.

11. His hiding-place was shortly after discovered by the sepoys, who had by this time entered the city; they killed him and his faithful and voluntary attendant. I have been credibly informed that after he was shot by the sepoys, his body was hacked with swords by some of the city people.

12. After this, the sepoys proceeded to the house of the treasurer for the sake of plunder. It so happened that this morning about Rupees 6,000 had been sent in by the Tehseeldar of Tilhur, and the chuprasees in charge hearing of the outbreak, as they were entering the station, conveyed the money straight to the treasurer's house.

13. After the sepoys entered the city, they proclaimed Nizam Ali, formerly Cotwal and then a pensioner of Government, to be Cotwal of the city; his favorite son-in-law (Hedaut Hossein) had this day been released with the other prisoners from the Jail. Among the city people who joined the sepoys in the work of plunder, the most conspicuous were Mungul Khan and Uzzoo Khan, both noted bad characters, the latter of whom had been imprisoned several times. The sepoys then set up Kadir Ali Khan and Gholam Hossein Khan to be Nawabs of the city; that same evening the former of these went in procession towards the Cantonments to pay their respects to the Subadars of the Regiment, among whom Ghunsam Sing appeared to take the leading part.

14. Whilst the bungalows in Cantonments were being plundered, the people of the villages in the neighbourhood of Rosa Factory, together with the budmashes from the city, were actively employed in plundering the valuable works connected with the Sugar Refinery and Rum Factory of Messrs. Carew and Co., and the two dwelling houses adjoining. The factory was afterwards set fire to, and no less than 70,000 gallons of rum, together with a large quantity of loaf-sugar and other produce were destroyed. The villages, which are said to have been chiefly concerned in this work of destruction, are as follow: Dillawurpoor, Rusruthpoor, Zein-oodeen-nugur, Nubbeepoor, Surrowra, Misreepoor, Rosur, Azeezgunj, Ullarpoor, Sehramow, Dhuneesapoor, Shhabaz-poor, Bijlapoor, Nuvada, Eendapoor, Oodopoor, Karee, Mukrundpoor, and Choundeira.

15. The two persons in charge of the Factory, Mr. G. Carew and Mr. Brand, managed to escape with their lives from the place; but both subsequently perished, the former is said to have been one of the party with Sir M. Jackson, who were sent on to Lucknow by the Raja of Methoulee, and there cruelly murdered; the latter, after having undergone all kinds of privations in the Oudh jungles, at last fell a victim to fever on 6th January 1858.

16. This evening the sepoys went off in a body towards Bareilly, and a Molvee by name Surguraz Ali, a resident of Goruckpoor, accompanied them; it appears that this man had arrived at the station about twenty days before the mutiny, and doubtless was chiefly instrumental in exciting the sepoys to revolt;
Surfuraz Ali was frequently in the habit of coming to Shahjehanpoor, where he had several disciples in the city, among the number Koodrut Ali (Naib Fouzdar, Sherishtadar) and his brother Neaz Ali, both of whom are with the rebels. This Surfuraz Ali afterwards went to Delhi with the Bareilly Brigade, and was appointed Chief of the Ghazees.

17. On the day of the mutiny, there were seven Europeans massacred at the station, viz., Mr. Ricketts (Magistrate and Collector), Mr. Arthur Smith (Assistant to Magistrate and Collector), Captain James (Commanding 28th Regiment), Dr. Bowling (Surgeon to 28th Regiment), Revd. J. MacCallum (of the additional Clergy Society), Mr. Lemaistre, clerk in Magistrate's Office, and Mr. Smith, head clerk in Collector's Office. Of this number, Mr. Ricketts and Mr. Lemaistre were killed by the sepoys in their first attack upon the party assembled at church. Dr. Bowling was shot by the sepoys as he was driving up to the church in his carriage. Captain James was killed on the parade ground, in attempting to reason with his men. Mr. Arthur Smith was killed in the city by the sepoys. Revd. Mr. MacCallum, after making his escape from the church, was murdered by some villagers in a melon field within a mile of the station, and Mr. Smith (clerk) was killed near Mr. Rickett's house by some of the city budmashes. It is a satisfaction to add that with reference to the last two victims, the principal murderers have been seized and convicted. In the case of Mr. MacCallum, seven persons have been hung, and four transported for life, and two out of the three murderers of Mr. Smith have been apprehended, and capitally sentenced.

18. On the day following, two or three natives, amongst whom the names of Nasir Khan and Ameer Ali are most prominent, caused the dead bodies of our poor fellow countrymen to be collected and interred in one spot, near the church, but in separate graves. A plain masonry slab covers the whole, on the surface of which parallel lines indicate each separate grave.

19. On the following day (1st June) the Nawab Kadir Ali Khan and Nizam Ali, Cotwal, began to make their own arrangements for nominating the subordinate officers, first appointing as many of the former servants of Government as they could muster, and whom they found willing to take service. Hamid Hussun Khan (Deputy Collector) and Nizam Ali Khan (formerly Tehseeldar) gave their advice in the different arrangements to be carried out. These two men took possession of the sum of Rupees 4,900, which was part of the amount which had arrived the day of the mutiny from the Tehseele of Julalabad, and divided it among several Government servants as their pay for the past month. The money was paid away in public at the Cotwalee, and the sowars and burkundazes, who were willing, were kept in their former situations. As soon as the news of the mutiny at Bareilly reached this place, the Nawab Kadir Ali Khan headed a procession through the town proclaiming the overthrow of the British rule, and proclamations were put forth by order of Nizam Ali, Cotwal, stating, that for the future the name of the English should not be mentioned, and any one being heard to do so, should lose his life.

20. About twenty-two days after these arrangements had been made, there were some turbulent villages in the neighbourhood, who assembled together, with a view of making an attack on the city, and plundering it. One of the most foremost of the villages in this matter was "Buttehlee," about five or six coss distant, the inhabitants of which are chiefly Rajpoots. With a view of putting a stop to this, and making an example of the leaders, Nizam Ali Khan sent out some armed retainers, and attacked the village of Buttehlee and killed some of the inhabitants, and brought back three of their heads, and had them exposed in the city. The inhabitants of the following villages, Uthburra, Sehramow, Khanpoor, Bunturra, Shahgunj, Sirtoolee, and Umorra, were chiefly noted for plundering, and for committing all kinds of violent crime; these people were a terror to the inhabitants of the city and to the neighbouring villages.
21. Kadir Ali Khan, during the short time he held the office of Nazim, committed great oppression one instance of which is I hear of his having caused the death of a "Sonar" who refused to give up the jewels, which had been pledged to him by the Nawab. On being superseded by Gholam Kadir Khan, he proceeded to Bareilly to lay his case before Khan Bahadoor Khan, and remained there about two months.

22. About the 8th June, the mutinous 41st Regiment from Seetapoor passed through the station en route to Futtehgurh, and encamped at Azeezgunj; the sepoys attempted to extort money from Hamid Hussun Khan. A party of them surrounded his house, and demanded the sum of Rupees 5,000. The request was refused, and Hamid Hussun Khan managed to muster on his side a large force of both Mussalmans and Hindoos, and together with some men of the town, he went down to the "Gurra" river, on the other side of which the 41st were encamped, prepared to prevent their entrance into the city; the sepoys finding the whole of the townspeople against them, went off in the direction of Futtehgurh, and did not further attempt to commit any depredations in the city.

23. On the first breaking out of the mutiny, the Nawab Gholam Kadir Khan was absent in Oudh, at a place called "Bansee," and he was speedily informed of what had occurred through Muhzur Kurreem (Foujdarree Serishtadar), and invited to come and assume charge of the district. He arrived at Shahjehanpoor about 15th June, and the following day proceeded to Bareilly in company with the following persons: Abdool-raoof Khan (formerly Deputy Inspector of Education), Nukhshbund Khan, Fyzab Khan, Willaut Ali Khan (son of Fyzab Khan), Gholam Ali Khan (Mohurrir, Magistrate's Office), Nasir Khan (resident of Mohulleh Khulleel), Nizam Ali Khan (of Shahbaznugur), Nizam Ali Khan (Cotwal), Seetul Singh, Doulut Raee, Zahoor Khan, Mahomed-Hossein Khan (Bukhseee of Chowkeesdars), Fuzul Khan, Hukeem Muhrz Ali Khan, and Wajid Ali (formerly Nazir in Munisiff's Office). They presented themselves before Khan Bahadur Khan, and petitioned that Gholam Kadir Khan might be appointed Nazim of the district of Shahjehanpoor.

24. Their request was granted, and in addition the following appointments were made: Nizam Ali Khan (of Shahbaznugur), Naeb Nazim; Khan Ali Khan (Tehseeldar of Beesulpoor in Bareilly District), who had taken the treasure from the Shaee Tehseelee, and presented it as a nuzurana, was also appointed Naeb Nazim; and Hamid Hussun Khan (formerly Deputy Collector) a third Naeb Nazim; the salary of each Naeb Nazim was fixed at Rupees 500 per month. Abdool-raoof Khan was made Commander of the forces, on a salary of Rupees 400, and Seetul Singh (Dewan) on Rupees 200.

25. The party returned to Shahjehanpoor on 23rd, and commenced to make arrangements for carrying on the government. Several regiments of cavalry and infantry were raised. The following are the names of those who were most active in raising the cavalry and after whom the Risalahs were named: Zahoor Khan, Usrar Khan, Koodruthoolah Khan, Mehndee Ali Khan, Nawab Hushmut Khan, Hydur Khan, Utaaf Khan, Fuji Khan and Rujub Ali Khan. The following, who are noted characters, also had command of Regiments of Infantry: Willaut Ali Khan (son of Fyzab Khan), Nasir Ali Khan (afterwards killed at the battle of Ullagunj), Ali Hussun Khan and Mungul Khan (brother-in-law of Abdool-raoof Khan).

26. Besides these, Zahoor Ahmud and Raoof Ahmud (brother) and both in Government employ, the former being Peishkar of Hattras in the Allygurh District, and the latter a Mohurrir in the Foujdarree Office at this station, took a most active part in the rebellion; they were in constant attendance on the Nawab, and had unlimited power; they are both of them now with the rebel force in Oudh.
27. Nawab Gholam Kadir Khan now turned his attention to casting guns, and made eight brass pieces; there were also four others constructed by Nizam Ali Khan (Naeb Nazim), who had a manufactory at his house for the purpose. The gun factory was entrusted to Nawab Hushmut Khan, who had also charge of one of the Risalahs, and had formerly been in Government employ, and was on the receipt of a pension, in one of the Irregular Cavalry Regiments.

28. Abdool-raoof Khan is said to have held the post of Commander of the forces for about two months, and to have resigned, on hearing of the fate of Ram Sahai, Deputy Collector of Cawnpoor, who was hung on the arrival of the force under General Havelock, and who was well known in this district, from having held several important offices, and was promoted from being Tehseeladar of Shahjehanpoor to the office of Deputy Collector of Banda, from whence he was transferred to Cawnpoor; several others also are said to have resigned their offices about that time for the same reason. Among whom are Seetul Singh (Dewan), and Shummoo Khan (Naeb Foujdar Serishtadar).

29. On the resignation of Abdool-raoof Khan, Wajid Ali (formerly Nazir of Moonsiff’s Office) was appointed to the chief military command, which he continued to hold until the arrival of the British forces.

30. Hamid Hussun Khan (formerly Deputy Collector) held his post, as one of the three Naeb Nazims, for about one and a half months, and during the time he was in office, is said to have seldom attended the Kuchehree, where his colleagues were to meet, and to have done as little duty as he could help. On the arrival of his brother Mohomud Hussun Khan, Principal Sudder Ameen of Agra, who had been allowed to return to his home, and who himself would take no part with the rebels, he was easily persuaded to relinquish his duties altogether.

31. On the resignation of Hamid Hussun Khan, orders were received from Nawab Khan Bahadoor Khan to appoint Nujeeb Khan Naeb Nazim in his stead. This man had some years previously held the situation of Naeb Foujdar Serishtadar under the Oudh Government, and was now residing at his house in Jululabad, twenty miles south-west of Shahjehanpoor. Soon after his accession to office, he was appointed to collect the revenue from the villages in the direction of Kant, and which, up to that time, had not attended to the demands made upon them by the officials under the rebel government. One village (Ladhpoor) inhabited by Thakoors steadily resisted payment, notwithstanding they were overpowered by the force sent against them under Nujeeb Khan, and after several of their number had been killed, they were compelled to give in.

32. Another village (Sehramow) was also attacked by the rebel forces under Nizam Ali Khan, but they were compelled to get assistance from Bareilly, when a force under the immediate command of Murdan Ali Khan (Commander-in-Chief to Khan Bahadoor Khan), came and overpowered the Thakoors, several of whom were killed, and their heads cut off, and exposed over the gateway of the fort. The village was afterwards plundered, and also several others. It was on this occasion that a large quantity of property belonging to the Rosa Factory was found in Sehramow, and carried off to the fort to the Nawab.

33. In the place of Seetul Singh (Dewan), whose resignation has been noticed above, Enayet Hossein, resident of Bareilly, was appointed, and appears to have remained in office about three months.

34.—The following lists are appended to this report:—

I.—Government servants who took service with the rebels.

II.—Ditto who did not take service.

III.—Principal persons not in Government employ, who joined the rebels.

35. I would now proceed to advert to the events which occurred in the several pergunnahs.
Tilhur.—The news of the mutiny of this station reached Tilhur towards the evening, whereupon Gholam Mohomud Khan, one of the "Ruees," went to the Tehseeldar, and told him he had better quit the place, and he then caused the gang of prisoners, which were there employed in building the Government school, to be released. After this, Gholam Mohomud Khan turned out the Thannahdar and the Police, and destroyed the records, and overthrew all Government authority. The following morning (1st June) the mutinous sepoy arrived on their way to Bareilly, and were entertained by Gholam Mohomud Khan; they made an active but fruitless search for the Tehseeldar, who was concealed in the house of one of the Puthans, but they failed to discover his retreat.

36. Goolam Mohomud Khan was appointed Nazim of that part of the district by Khan Bahadoor Khan, which appointment was obtained through his friendship with Syfoola Khan (formerly Jailor at Bareilly), and who had great influence with the Nawab. He was further directed to raise troops of horse and foot; he made the following appointments: Abdool Gufoor Khan (Naeb Nazim and Oolushdar), Gholam Rusool Khan, resident of Bareilly (Oolushdar), and Nussuroololah Khan, Commandant of the forces. Gholam Mohomud Khan continued in power for about six months, when Kefautoollah Khan and Hedautoollah, who had been appointed Tehseeldars under him, proceeded to Bareilly, owing to some disagreement, and made an offer of a farming lease of the Tilhur Pergunnah to the Nawab Khan Bahadoor Khan, which was accepted, and Gholam Mohomud Khan superseded. He still continued, however, to hold the office of local Commander, and as such took a most active part; he accompanied the troops on their expedition to Hulwanees at the foot of the hills, and was with Fuzul Huq on the occasion of the fight with the British troops. He also headed his troops at the battle of Bichporeea.

37. Kefautoollah and Hedautoollah continued to hold the lease of the pergunnah until the re-occupation of the district, when they fled the place, and are said to be still in company with the rebels. In this pergunnah there were two other men of some notoriety among the rebels: Wuheedoolah Khan and Reaautoollah Khan, residents of Umarpoo (a suburb of Tilhur). These persons both went to Bareilly to the Nawab, the former accompanied the troops to Hulwanees, where they went with the purpose of attacking Nainee Tal, but on his return to Tilhur, in the month of October, he died of fever.

38. At Kutra, the chief persons who joined in the rebellion were Fyz Mohomud Khan and Gholamee Khan, both of whom commanded regiments of infantry, the former was assisted by his son, Mohomud Hussun Khan (who, before the mutiny, held the office of Itlaq Nuwees in Tehsleelee Jelalabad).

39. In this pergunnah several of the Thakoors in the neighbourhood of Khera Bujhieerch showed their fidelity and loyalty to the British Government in protecting Captain Gowan of the late 18th Regiment Native Infantry, and several other fugitives from Bareilly. The following have already received suitable rewards from Government for their faithful conduct: Blikho Singh, Bhooreh Singh, Hurkoo Singh, and Sheghholam (sons of Bhooreh Singh), Gungaram Misser, and Cloundun Purshad. The names of others have been entered in the statement of persons "eminent for loyalty," submitted by me to Government.

40. Jelalabad.—At Jelalabad when the news of the mutiny reached that place, the prisoners were released by order of Ahmudhyar Khan (Tehseeldar), but no further open demonstration of rebellion then took place; this was probably owing to the fact of the mutiny not having spread to Futtughrur, from which Jelalabad is only twenty-four miles distant. As soon as Nawab Gholam Kadir Khan arrived from Bareilly after being appointed Nazim, Ahmudhyar Khan came to Shahjehanpoor to pay his respects, and requested to be allowed to remain as Tehseeldar of Jelalabad; this being granted, he returned to his post, and about a month after he forwarded a nuzurana to Nawab Khan Bahadoor
Khan, and petitioned to be made Nazim of the pergunnah; he obtained a
sunnud of appointment, which was afterwards found among the papers in the
tehsildar of Jellalabad on the arrival of the British force towards the end of
April.

41. Ahmudhyar Khan was most attentive in collecting the revenue from
the zemindars, and committed several acts of oppression and tyranny; this
was chiefly I hear in the treatment of the Thakoors of Khundur, whom not
being able to bring into submission with the force at his command, he got the
assistance of some more rebel troops from Bareilly under the command of
Ishmail Khan, and plundered and destroyed their villages, and killed several
of the inhabitants.

42. As soon as the advance of the British troops upon Futtehgurh was
known at Shahjehanpoor, Nizam Ali Khan proceeded at once with a force
of cavalry and infantry said to amount to about 2,500 and four guns to Bich-
pooreea on the River Ramgunga, and throw up some earthen defences; he was
joined from Bareilly by a force of 2,000 men and two guns and Ishmail
Khan, and here the rebel force remained until their defeat at Allagunj by the
British troops under General Walpole on 22nd April, in which engagement
Nizam Ali Khan, their leader, was killed.

43. The rebel, Ahmudhyar Khan, on the arrival of the Rohilkund force
at Jellalabad on 28th April, finding the game was up, presented himself before
us; he was at once placed upon his trial for aggravated rebellion, and having
been found guilty on the fullest proof was sentenced to be hung, and the
execution was carried out on the spot. On this occasion the neighbouring
zemindars, who were on attendance at my camp in large numbers, gave
expression to their feelings by saying "jaisa keeja waisa paya."*

44. The Thakoors of Khundur and Bangaon in this pergunnah showed
themselves loyal throughout the disturbances, and being a powerful and numer.
ous tribe were able to hold out against the continued oppression of the Musul-
mans. After the defeat of the rebels at Bangaon, the latter end of January,
the Thakoors of that part attacked them as they were retreating, and cut up a
good many of them.

45. Powayn.—I would now turn to the state of affairs in the pergunnah
of Powayn. It has been stated by the late Mr. Jenkins in his public letter
written from Mohomdee on 2nd June to Mr. Thornhill that, on his arrival at
Powayn with the other fugitives from Shahjehanpoor, Raja Jugurnath Singh
received them but coolly, and rather showed a wish to get them away as soon
as he could, and with this view he assisted the party with means of conveyance
to take them on to Mohomdee, and sent some of his people to accompany
them. The Raja, from what I have seen of him, is evidently of a most timid
and nervous temperament, and appears to have no will of his own, being
guided almost entirely by his brother "Buldeo Singh." I believe, therefore,
that his not showing any desire to keep the fugitive in his house at Powayn,
is to be ascribed to the fear he had of not being able to protect them, and also
from the dread that his own life might be sacrificed.

46. Just after the outbreak the Raja proceeded to make his own
arrangements for the management of the pergunnah. He commenced raising
a large force of horse and foot, and cast some ten guns, and set about strength-
ening his "gurhee" at Powayn by digging a broad deep ditch the whole
way round the boundary of the town. He collected the rents of the several
villages in the pergunnah on his own account. After he had gone on for a
few months, Khan Bahadur Khan sent a force from Bareilly to demand the
revenue from the Raja, upon which his brother, Buldeo Singh, moved out with
his men to oppose the troops; but no engagement came off, and a compromise
was effected by the Raja agreeing to give on the spot a nuzzarana of Ruppes

* i.e., "he has been rewarded according to his deeds."
30,000, and afterwards to pay this sum annually, and also one lakh of rupees from the revenue collections of Pargunnahs Powayn, Poorunpoor, and Khotar.

47. Lahkun Rao (son of Raja Khoshial Singh, formerly a large Talookdar) hearing of the arrangement proceeded to Bareilly, and is said by means of a bribe given to Sobharam to have managed to get the pargunnahs of Poorunpoor and Khotar transferred to him. Lahkun Rao, according to a narrative drawn up by Mr. Bremmer, attached to the Superintendent of Irrigation and Embankment in Rohilkund, who for sometime was taken care by Mahomed Noor Khan, Z-minder of Sheirpoor, showed himself anything but a loyal and faithful subject. Mr. Bremmer states that on the occasion of a force being detached from Bareilly under Beharee Lall to seize him, that Lahkun Rao joined his force to that of Beharee Lall, and they made a combined attack upon Sheirpoor, but were beaten back, and Beharee Lall's troops were utterly routed.

48. Lahkun Rao wholly denies the part attributed to him by Mr. Bremmer, and the fact of his presence is not proved in any way; still there is very little doubt that he sent his own troops to assist those of Khan Bahadoor Khan.

49. Another charge is brought against Lahkun Rao by Mr. Lillemand, 2nd Clerk in the Collector's Office, who states that, whilst he and his family were under the protection of the Ranee Indulkoomer of Narainpoor, he did his utmost to compel her to give them up, and that they were at length compelled to flee to another place of safety.

50. When the report of the fall of Delhi reached Shahjahanpoor, there was considerable consternation among the principal rebels; and to allay this feeling, Qazee Sufauraz Ali, who held the office of Moonsiff, attempted to hoist the Mussulman flag, but he could not find sufficient supporters. This plan failing, he, together with the Mooftee (Mauzur Kurzem), assembled at the Bedgah, and for three successive days prayers were offered up that the British rule might not be restored.

51. Some days after this, the noted Subadar Bukht Khan arrived from Delhi on his way to Lucknow; his force consisted of about 400 sowars (chiefly Irregulars), 1,500 sepoys, and four guns; he had also thirty elephants and seventy-five stud colts from Haupper, and there is said to have been with his camp no less than 1,200 women from D-lili; he remained only a day or two, and was feasted by the Nawab.

52. When our troops got possession of Futehgur, the Nawab of Furruckabad, together with Feroz Shah and Ishmail Khan, came to Shahjahanpoor with a small force, and remained with the Nawab for a few days, and then proceeded to Bareilly.

53. About the time of the capture of Lucknow, the rebel Nana Rao Doondee Punt arrived, and had with him a force of about 500 cavalry and some infantry, and remained some ten days encamped in the mango grove near the Church. He was accompanied by Ushruff Ali (brother of Mahomed Ishak, formerly a thannahdar in the Cawnpoor district, and who joined Tantra Tope), and also by Baba Bhutt, his chief personal attendant. From here the Nana went to Bareilly and joined Khan Bahadoor Khan.

54. During the period of the rebel power, the following servants in Government employ in this district were in the habit occasionally sending information to Mr. Alexander, the Commissioner of the Division, residing at Nynee Tal:—Umjud Ali (Tehseedar of Shahjahanpoor), Jupurnatir (Mohurrir of Kotwale), Guneish Rao (Mohurrir in the revision of settlement records), Kasim Ali Khan (Tehseedar of Powayn), Lakhpeth Rao (Kanoongo of Poorunpoor), Wazeer Singh (Naib Darogah of Goohreea), Ladlee Dass (Kanoongo of Buragaon), Kishun Chund (Mohurrir, Deputy Collector), Wazeer
Ali (Jemadar), Omrao Singh (Kanoongo of Jellalabad), and Kifautoolah Khan (nephew of Ali Ahmad Khan), Naib Rissaldar of 8th Irregulars, who showed his fidelity and loyalty in accompanying the officers from Bareilly to Nynee Tal. Of the above Government servants, Omrao Singh (Kanoongo of Jellalabad) is the only one who proved to have taken service with the rebels.

55. In addition to those whose names are abovementioned, there were others who were in the habit of sending letters to the civil authorities at Agra, and elsewhere, amongst whom was Hamid Husan Khan (the person who at the commencement of the outbreak held the office of Naib Nazim for a short time), and his brother Mahomed Husun Khan (late Principal Sudder Ameen of Agra). This fact becoming known to the Nawab Gholam Kadir Khan towards the end of January, by one of their kossids having been seized with a letter, he summoned both these persons to his presence, they at first declined to attend; but on the solemn assurance of Nawab Kadir Ali Khan and Zaboor Khan that no harm would happen to them, they consented to attend, and, accordingly, accompanied them. After the interview had taken place, and they were leaving the fort, they were treacherously attacked by the Nawab's soldiers, Hamid Husan Khan and one of his servants were killed on the spot, and Mahomed Husun Khan was so severely wounded that he died a few days afterwards.

56. Having, I believe, touched upon the several points of interest connected with the narrative of events attending the outbreak and disturbances at this station, I would, in conclusion, remark on the fact of the rebels, when organizing their government, retained very much of the routine of our own system, and adopted the official designation of the several subordinate employés.

57. Our civil law authorizing the sale of landed property in execution of decrees for debt, being so much opposed to the idea of the people, led, as might have been expected on such an opportunity, to the dispossession of many purchasers. It is to be hoped that this fact, which I believe is a marked one in every district, may attract the attention it deserves, and lead to a careful consideration of our Civil Code.

58. On 30th April the Rohilkund force under the Commander-in-Chief advanced upon Shahjehanpoor, the place was found deserted, the rebels having fled, the previous day towards Mohomdee, the troops encamped at Azezzgunj, about a mile short of the city, and strict orders were issued by His Excellency to prevent plundering. Two companies of 79th Highlanders were sent to occupy the fort, which had been the residence of the Nawab, and which commands the approaches to the city.

59. On the 2nd May the Commander-in-Chief proceeded with the rest of his force towards Bareilly, leaving a wing of Her Majesty's 82nd Regiment and a detail of artillery under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hale, C.B. The following day, however, the rebels in considerable force, headed by the Moulvee Ahmudoolla Shah, made an attack and obliged our small garrison to retire within the walls of the jail, which was invested by the rebels for a space of nine days, at the end of which time we were relieved by a force under Brigadier-General Jones, C.B. On this occasion the rebels having offered opposition to the advance of the troops, the town was given up to plunder, but the loss of life among the inhabitants was very small owing to the place being nearly deserted.

60. In consequence of the rebels having still possession of that part of Oudh which bounds the eastern side of this district, they have been frequently able to enter it; and burn and plunder several villages, more especially in the northern pargannahs of Poorunpoor, Powayn, and Khotar, and also to drive in some of the police chowkees; and until our troops again take the field; and the dispersion of the rebels is complete; one cannot expect the perfect restoration of peace.
APPENDIX A.

Dated Mohomdee, 2nd June 1857.

From—Charles Jenkins, Esq.
To—Secretary to the Government, North-Western Provinces.

I have the honor to report on the lamentable occurrences at Shahjehanpoor on 31st ultimo. Mr. Ricketts and myself, together with most of the officers and ladies of 28th Native Infantry, were attending Divine Service, when, with a yell, six or seven sepoys, armed with tulvars and lathies, rushed in upon us. Ricketts received one tulvar wound as he stood by my side, when he ran through the vestry door, and must have been cut down by some mutineers who were waiting outside; Captain Lysaght, with some other officers and myself, succeeded in closing the church doors against our murderous assailants, who ran on the approach of a single man (Captain Sneyd) with a gun. About 100 sepoys rallied round us, and our servants brought us guns and pistols, &c.

We placed all the ladies in the turret, and for rather less than an hour held our position, and were joined by all the officers of the 28th Native Infantry, except Captain James, who was shot on the parade. Dr. Bowling was shot dead, while driving up to the church to join us; I found poor Ricketts’ body about thirty-five yards from the church vestry door. I then strongly advised the whole party to escape to Powayn, the post guns having been taken by the insurgents, and all the bungalows in a blaze; this they agreed to, and started off, the ladies all in a carriage and buggy; I then accompanied by two sowars, whose names I will hereafter forward, for their fidelity and courage deserve no mean reward, went down to Mr. Ricketts’ house, and took a horse from his stable; I then went and met some twenty of the sepoys who stood by us at the church, and told them I was going to Powayn, and those who were faithful could follow; I then accompanied by two sowars rode down by the church of the river, and about two miles from the station, came up with the fugitives; after accompanying them some miles, I rode on ahead to make arrangements with Bajinath Singh, the Raja, for their reception. He received me but coolly, and though I think he himself is true in heart to the British Government, yet his conduct on the following day, in almost forcing us to leave his place, though he supplied us with carriage and an escort, showed me but too truly the animus of his people. His excuse to me was, he was unable to protect so large a party, and that in the event of the insurgents coming up, what could he do? He further refused to take charge of the tehsel treasury; under such circumstances, and in consequence of the flight of most of the tehsel chuprassees, through fear of the released prisoners, who were fast coming in, I could do nothing but advise our party, and myself accompany them, over to Mohomdee, as Mr. Thomason had, in reply to a note I sent him from Powayn, stated that they were still safe there, and we accordingly reached there in safety yesterday morning at 11 A.M. I have this morning despatched two sowars with a letter to Ahmad Hussun Khan, the Deputy Collector, to immediately despatch to me all the available sowars and a full and true account of the state of the district and city; should such be favorable, I will myself return to the district. From what Mr. Thomason has heard, it appears that some Nawab has set up as King there. Immediately on receipt of further information, I will send a further report. The treasury was looted, and the insurgents, I hear, afterwards went to Delhi via Bareilly. I enclose a list of the killed, missing, and escaped. Mr. Thomason has already sent a list from me to Mr. Christian. The jail, I forgot to mention, was broken open.

The following is the list of killed.

Mordaunt Ricketts, Esq., C.S.
Dr. Bowling, Civil Assistant Surgeon.
Captain James, 28th Native Infantry.
Mr. Lemaistre, Clerk, Magistrate’s Office.
Mr. Smith, Head Clerk.
The fate of the following is doubtful.

Rvd. Mr. MacCallum.
A. C. Smith, Assistant Collector.
Mr. Sheilds, Timber Agent.
Mr. Brand, Sugar Boiler.
Miss Lemaistre.

* Just reached in safety.

The following officers and ladies escaped.

Captain Lysaght.            Mrs. Lysaght.
Captain Sneyd.               Mrs. Key.
Lieutenant Key.              Mrs. Bowling, Mrs. Pereira's servant.
Lieutenant Robertson.        Mrs. Scott.
Captain Salmon.              Miss Scott.
Lieutenant Rutherford.       Lieutenant Pill.
Ensign Scott.                Ensign Spiers (wounded.)
Ensign Johnston.             Ensign.

Miss Lemaistre. Just reached in safety.
The following officers and ladies escaped.

Captain Lysaght.            Mrs. Lysaght.
Lieutenant Key.              Mrs. Key.
Lieutenant Robertson.        Mrs. Bowling, Mrs. Pereira's servant.
Captain Salmon.              Mrs. Scott.
Lieutenant Rutherford.       Miss Scott.
Lieutenant Pill.             Lieutenant Spiers (wounded.)
Ensign Johnston.             Ensign.

Miss Lemaistre. Just reached in safety.
The following officers and ladies escaped.

Captain Lysaght.            Mrs. Lysaght.
Captain Sneyd.               Mrs. Key.
Lieutenant Key.              Mrs. Bowling, Mrs. Pereira's servant.
Lieutenant Robertson.        Mrs. Scott.
Captain Salmon.              Miss Scott.
Lieutenant Rutherford.       Ensign Spiers (wounded.)
Ensign Johnston.             Ensign.

Ensign Scott.                Ensign.

Serjeant Grant.              Mrs. Sheilds, wife of Lieut. Sheilds.
Ensign Johnston.             Mrs. Grant and two children.

(Sd.) CHARLES JENKINS.

2nd June 1857.

APPENDIX B.

No. I.

List of Government servants who took service with the rebels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office held under the British Government</th>
<th>Office held under the Rebel Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kudrut Ali</td>
<td>Naiq Seri'shahdar</td>
<td>Peishkar of Tilhar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Abid Ali</td>
<td>Nazir</td>
<td>Nazir, and lately Thannahdar of Kutra.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Abul Bineen</td>
<td>Ditto, Powain</td>
<td>Taseelaar, Pillibheet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kalkapurshad</td>
<td>Munasirin Nilaam</td>
<td>Commandant of Infantry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Khureisha Hossain</td>
<td>Naib Nazir</td>
<td>Not, known, a resident of Bareilly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hubeeb-ool-Rahman</td>
<td>Mudshtar</td>
<td>Sowar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Itquad Ali</td>
<td>Do., Roznamchah Nuvres</td>
<td>Do., went to Delhi to join in the &quot;jehad.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shab-ool-deen</td>
<td>Ditto, Mehrabad</td>
<td>Not known.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Fyz-ool-deen</td>
<td>Ditto, Tilhar</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Krishn Sabas</td>
<td>Ditto, Powain</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ahmad Khan</td>
<td>Duffuru</td>
<td>Held the same situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Fyz-oolah Khan</td>
<td>Mohafiz Dufar</td>
<td>Dismissed, and whilst his case was under investigation fled to the rebel camp, and is reported to have been killed as a spy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ali Mahomed</td>
<td>Duffuru</td>
<td>Jemadar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Esma-oolah</td>
<td>Mohurrir Dufar</td>
<td>Not known.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Moo Chund</td>
<td>Do. do.</td>
<td>Mohurrir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Doorgapharshad</td>
<td>Do. do.</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DEPUTY COLLECTOR, REGULATION, IX.**

1833.
List of Government servants who took service with the rebels.—(Continued.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office held under the British Government</th>
<th>Office held under the Rebel Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Bhajan Lall</td>
<td>Wazir Bakes Nuvees</td>
<td>Held the same situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Churan Beharee Lall</td>
<td>Seea Nuvees...</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Jankepurshad...</td>
<td>Kanoongo...</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Buldeo Sahae...</td>
<td>Ditto...</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ram Sahae...</td>
<td>Peshkar...</td>
<td>Held the same office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Moonnoo Lall...</td>
<td>Seea Nuvees...</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Giradhara Lall...</td>
<td>Kanoongo, Nephee...</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Shankur Sahae...</td>
<td>Do., Kheira Bajheireh...</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Buldeo Sahae...</td>
<td>Ditto, Julalpoor</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Ahmudyar Khan...</td>
<td>Tebeddar...</td>
<td>Naism of Jelalabad district, executed on 28th April 1858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Omrow Singh...</td>
<td>Kanoongo...</td>
<td>Held the same office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Chaim Ram...</td>
<td>Peishkar...</td>
<td>Ulushdar in one of the regiments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Muhzur Kureem...</td>
<td>Serishtadar...</td>
<td>Muftee; reward of Rupees 1,000 proposed for his apprehension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Shumru Khan...</td>
<td>Naib ditto...</td>
<td>Serishtadar Muftee's Court.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Khub Chand...</td>
<td>Nazir...</td>
<td>Naib Dewan; reward of Rupees 200.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Gouree Shunkur...</td>
<td>2nd Naib Serishtadar...</td>
<td>Serishtadar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Rauff Ahmed...</td>
<td>Izhur Nuvees...</td>
<td>Son-in-law to Muftee, held several offices; reward of Rupees 200.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Fuzul Emam...</td>
<td>Perwanah Nuvees...</td>
<td>Perwanah Nuvees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Doorgapursah...</td>
<td>Nakhsha Nuvees...</td>
<td>Perwanah Nuvees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Vuseer Khan...</td>
<td>Naib Nazir...</td>
<td>Muhurrir, ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Raheem Baksh...</td>
<td>Kulundur Nuvees...</td>
<td>Muhurrir, ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Hidrat-oollah Khan...</td>
<td>Naib Perwanah Nuvees...</td>
<td>Mohurrir, Muftee's Court.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Fuzul Iossed Khan...</td>
<td>Mohurrir...</td>
<td>Mohurrir, Muftee's Court.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Muthapursah...</td>
<td>Mohafiz Durtur...</td>
<td>Mohafiz Durtur, ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Saleem-oollah Khan...</td>
<td>Naib ditto...</td>
<td>Izhur Nuvees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Gholam Nube...</td>
<td>1st Mohurrir...</td>
<td>Mohurrir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Roostum Khan...</td>
<td>Jemadar...</td>
<td>Jemadar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Yar Mahomed Khan...</td>
<td>Jemadar...</td>
<td>Ilaq Nuvees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Nutthoo Khan...</td>
<td>Jemadar...</td>
<td>Thannahdar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Shabbaaz Khan...</td>
<td>Mohurrir...</td>
<td>Sowar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Unur Ali...</td>
<td>Jemadar...</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Uleem-oollah...</td>
<td>Mohurrir...</td>
<td>Yakeel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Shirundas Khan...</td>
<td>Jemadar...</td>
<td>Sowar.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THANNAHS.

Pathra.

Kotwali.

16 Yar Mahomed Khan... Jemadar... Ilaq Nuvees.

Kanti.

17 Nutthoo Khan... Jemadar... Thannahdar.

Tilak.

18 Shabbaaz Khan... Mohurrir... Sowar.

19 Unur Ali... Jemadar... Ditto.

Kotrek.

20 Uleem-oollah... Mohurrir... Yakeel.

21 Shirundas Khan... Jemadar... Sowar.
List of Government servants who took service with the rebels.—(Concluded.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office held under the British Government</th>
<th>Office held under the Rebel Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Hassan Khan</td>
<td>Jemadar, Chookee Khuda-gunj.</td>
<td>Jemadar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Lullapershad</td>
<td>Mohurrir, Chookee Jounra</td>
<td>Tamundar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Karamut Khan</td>
<td>Jemadar</td>
<td>Daffadar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Saad-ullah Khan</td>
<td>Mohurrir</td>
<td>Ursez Nuvees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Burkut-ullah Khan</td>
<td>Mohurrir</td>
<td>Ulusbhed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Abdool Rehme Khan</td>
<td>Jemadar</td>
<td>Jemadar of Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Meerbaz Khan</td>
<td>Do, Chookee Sharamow</td>
<td>Sowar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ouseeree Singh</td>
<td>Naib Jemadar, Guard</td>
<td>Commandant of Najeebs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Gholam Mohoo-ood-deen Khan</td>
<td>Jemadar, Chookee</td>
<td>Daffadar of Sowars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Matadeen</td>
<td>Daffadar, Najabut</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Mohomud Rosein Khan</td>
<td>Bukhshee</td>
<td>Bukehshee of the forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JAIL ESTABLISHMENT.

29 Ouseeree Singh     Naib Jemadar, Guard
30 Gholam Mohoo-ood-deen Khan Jemadar, Chookee
31 Matadeen           Daffadar, Najabut

BUKHSHEE KHANEH.

22 Chotey Lall  Mohurrir

(Sd.) G. P. Money, Magistrate and Collector.

List of Government servants who did not take service with the rebels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Babu Denobund Mokurjee</td>
<td>3rd Clerk, Coll.'s Office</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reez Hur Suhaee</td>
<td>Seriatsadar</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Iahrespurshad</td>
<td>Wasil Bakes Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kalkapurshad</td>
<td>Perwanah Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mutapershad</td>
<td>Rozameecheh Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mohun Lall</td>
<td>Ahlmudh, Shahji-anpoor</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sree Kishan Suhaee</td>
<td>Mῦdugeer, do.</td>
<td>Serving at Basulpoor of Zillah Bareilly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Birj Mullas</td>
<td>Ahlmudh, Tilhur</td>
<td>Now appointed Munsurim Nīlam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chotey Lall</td>
<td>Ahlmudh Putwarnees</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Lullapershad</td>
<td>Itlaq Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mykka Lall</td>
<td>Nuqul Pur. Nuvees</td>
<td>Owing to old age and blindness his nephew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kalkapurshad has been nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Jummyuth Raee</td>
<td>Naib W. B. Nuvees</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ajudeepurshad</td>
<td>Nagvoes Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Banker Beharee</td>
<td>Naib Perwanah Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Kuramuth Ali</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Teekithth Raee</td>
<td>Naib Muhafiz Dufter</td>
<td>Now appointed Ahlmudh, Tilhur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Dupugpurshad</td>
<td>Mohurrir Dufter</td>
<td>Promoted Naib Muhafiz Dufter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kulleen Mull</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Golab Raee</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Choonso Lall</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Hindrabun</td>
<td>Naib do.</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Chun Lall</td>
<td>Jumma Khurche Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Kishan Chung</td>
<td>Seea Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Cheida Lall</td>
<td>Stamp Vendor</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Soobn Lall</td>
<td>Naib Seea Nuvees</td>
<td>Promoted to Naib Nazir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Mohun Lall</td>
<td>Mohurrir, Foudaree</td>
<td>Attached to the Treasury Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Amanauth Khan</td>
<td>Daffurees</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Government servants who took service with the rebels.—(Concluded.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office held under the British Government</th>
<th>Office held under the Rebel Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hussain Khan</td>
<td>Jemadar, Chokoe Khusanguj</td>
<td>Jemadar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lallupershad</td>
<td>Mohurrir, Chokoe Jounra</td>
<td>Fowagon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karamut Khan</td>
<td>Jemadar</td>
<td>Duffadar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saad-oollah Khan</td>
<td>Mohurrir</td>
<td>Itar Nuvees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burhut-oollah Khan</td>
<td>Mohurrir</td>
<td>Khadar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdool Raheem Khan</td>
<td>Jemadar</td>
<td>Jemadar, Chale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meerbaz Khan</td>
<td>Do, Chokoe Behramow</td>
<td>Jemadar of Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gholam Moheeooddeen Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matadeen</td>
<td>Duffadar, Najbut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Name | Office held under the British Government | Office held under the Rebel Government |
|------|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|

REMARKS.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Babu Denobund Mokurjee</td>
<td>Sed Clerk, Colr.'s Office</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bae Hoo Suhase</td>
<td>Serahdar</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imsheeruprashad</td>
<td>Waalil Bacocks Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalkapraprasad</td>
<td>Perwanah Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matapurprashad</td>
<td>Roznameh Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohun Lall</td>
<td>Abluim, Shulperpooor</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See Kishon Suhase</td>
<td>Medulgaas, do</td>
<td>Serving at Basulpooor of Zillah Bareilly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brij Bills</td>
<td>Abluim, Tihur</td>
<td>Now appointed Munsoorim Niamu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chotey Lall</td>
<td>Abluim Patwraas</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lallupershad</td>
<td>Isaa Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myki Lall</td>
<td>Nogul Furan Nuvees</td>
<td>Owing to old age and blindness his nephew Kalkapraprasad has been nominated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jummysynt Race</td>
<td>Naib W. B. Nuvees</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajuseeprasrad</td>
<td>Nagree Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baneck Belasce</td>
<td>Naib Perwanah Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuranstoo Ali</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teekelth Race</td>
<td>Naib Mahazat Duffter</td>
<td>Now appointed Abluim, Tihur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durgupraprasad</td>
<td>Mohurrir Duffter</td>
<td>Promoted Naib Maheza Duffter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kollion Moll</td>
<td>Duffter</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golab Race</td>
<td>Duffter</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chumee Lall</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bintaralum</td>
<td>Naib do</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churn Lall</td>
<td>Jumma Khurch Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiosun Chond</td>
<td>Seega Nuvees</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheida Lall</td>
<td>Stamp Vendor</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuch Lall</td>
<td>Naib Seega Nuvees</td>
<td>Attached to the Treasury Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohun Lall</td>
<td>Mohurrir, Fowagon</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanaut Khan</td>
<td>Daftaroo</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(St.) G. P. Money, Magistrate and Collector.

No. II.

List of Government servants who did not take service with the rebels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bade Denobund Mokurjee</td>
<td>Sed Clerk, Colr.'s Office</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bae Hoo Suhase</td>
<td>Serahdar</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
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<td>Abluim, Shulperpooor</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See Kishon Suhase</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Duffter</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Duffter</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chumee Lall</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bintaralum</td>
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<tr>
<td>Churn Lall</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ditto</td>
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<td>Shuch Lall</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohun Lall</td>
<td>Mohurrir, Fowagon</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanaut Khan</td>
<td>Daftaroo</td>
<td>Reinstated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Daarkapurbad</td>
<td>Sudder Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gungadpurshad</td>
<td>Second Naib Nazir</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ramdeen</td>
<td>Mohurrir, Chowkidaree</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Zeen Ali</td>
<td>Rezatbaneeh Naib Nazir</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Fida Ali</td>
<td>Madudgar ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dewan Ram</td>
<td>Mohurrir Dak</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Raj Koomar</td>
<td>Ditto, Deputy Magistrate's Court.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sheikh Sunna Ali</td>
<td>Cotwal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Jugurnath</td>
<td>Mohurrir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Huftee Ali Khan</td>
<td>Thannahdar</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sheoraj Singh</td>
<td>Madudgar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Man Singh</td>
<td>Thannahdar</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Manu Lal</td>
<td>Mohurrir</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kalleen Singh</td>
<td>Jemadar</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Nazim Ali</td>
<td>Jemadar, Chokes Kulan</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hur Sahaeec</td>
<td>Mohurrir, ditto</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Jhow Lall</td>
<td>Ditto, Thannah Khas</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Sheikh Alumud Hussen</td>
<td>Thannahdar</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Schun Lail</td>
<td>Jemadar, Chokes Negobes</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Oldfush Racee</td>
<td>Mohurrir</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Budur-ood-deen Khan</td>
<td>Jemadar, Chokes Jounra...</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Shunker Sahaece</td>
<td>Mohurrir</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Vuseer Singh</td>
<td>Naeb Daroga, Chokes Gallurree.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Kamu Khan</td>
<td>Thannahdar</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Durga Singh</td>
<td>Jemadar</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Ghoman Nubee Khan</td>
<td>Ditto, Chokes, Mahdo Tandeel.</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Dya Shunker</td>
<td>Doo, Chokes Juteharez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Cheida Khan</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>Hazaree Lall</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>Mohurrir, Chokes Pulleea.</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<td>Mohurrir, Chokes Schramsow.</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>Shah Karamath Ali</td>
<td>Daroga</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>First Mohurrir</td>
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<td>Mohurrir</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Zahur Khan</td>
<td>Sowar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sd.) G. P. Money, Magistrate and Collector.
### List of principal persons not in Government employ who joined the rebels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Nature of service taken, and subsequent order.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nawab Kadir Ali Khan</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Vide report, paragraph 21. Reward of Rupees 1,000 proposed for his apprehension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gholam Hosein Khan</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Vide report, paragraph 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gholam Kadir Khan</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Vide report, paragraph 23. Reward of Rupees 3,000 proposed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 4      | Nezam Ali Khan | Town of Shahjanpoor | Naeb Nazim; was killed at the battle of Bichpurree.
Commandant; killed at the battle of Bichpurree. |
| 5      | Kasim Ali Khan | ... | Tehseeldar, Shahjanpoor. Reward of Rupees 100; presented himself on the strength of the G. C. O. No. 1068, dated 28th April 1858. |
| 6      | Nezam Ali Khan | ... | Rissaldar of Cavalry. |
| 7      | Bajub Ali Khan | ... | |
| 8      | Nujeeb Khan | Julalabad | Naeb Nazim. Pending investigation. |
| 9      | Uzar Ali Khan | ... | Rissaldar. |
| 10     | Kudruith Ali Khan | ... | Presented himself on the strength of G. C. O. No. 1068, dated 28th April 1858. |
| 11     | Usmuth Ali Khan | ... | Ditto ditto. |
| 12     | Fuzul Ali Khan, wrf Fuju Khan. | ... | Commandant. Reward Rupees 100. |
| 13     | Villaut Ali Khan | ... | Rissaldar. |
| 14     | Zahur Khan | Town of Shahjanpoor | Ditto. Vide paragraph of report. |
| 15     | Nawab Hushmuith Ali Khan | ... | Commandant. Vide Magistrate's report No. 16, dated 23rd June 1858. Reward of Rupees 1,000 proposed. |
| 16     | Mungul Khan | ... | Rissaldar. |
| 17     | Gholam Ali Khan | ... | Commandant. |
| 18     | Ali Hosun Khan | ... | Ditto. |
| 19     | Villaut Ali Khan | ... | Ditto. Reward of Rupees 500 proposed. |
| 20     | Shahjehan Khan | ... | |
| 21     | Mehndee Ali Khan | ... | |
| 22     | Gholam Mohomud Khan | ... | Naeb and Commandant. Reward Rupees 500 proposed. |
| 23     | Khadim Hosein Khan | ... | Tehseeldar, Tilhur. Reward Rupees 500 proposed. |
| 25     | Hedaeth Ali Khan | ... | Ditto. |
| 26     | Gholam Hosein | ... | Ditto. |
| 27     | Abdul Guflur Khan | ... | Naeb. |
| 28     | Reesh Ali Khan | ... | Naeb and Ulasbdar. Still at large. |
| 29     | Vahud Ali Khan | ... | Nazim Tilhur. Reward Rupees 200 proposed. |
| 30     | Fyz Mohomud Khan | Kutreb | Headed the forces to Nalince Tal. Since dead. |
| 31     | Gholamsee Khan | Lechnseepoor | Commandant. Still at large. |
| 32     | Beharee Shah | Town Shahjanpoor | Ditto ditto. |
| 33     | Ahmudyar Khan | Mahulla Bhurgson | Ditto Shahjanpoor. |
| 34     | Mohomud Hosein Khan | ... | Presented under G. C. O. No. 1068, dated 28th April 1858. |
| 35     | Syud Nez Ali ... | ... | Ditto ditto. |
| 36     | Rampurshed | ... | Serahbadar. Reward Rupees 100 proposed. |
| 37     | Seetal Singh | Town | Presented under G. C. O. No. 1068, dated 28th April 1858. |
| 38     | Doulat Rae | ... | Presented under G. C. O. No. 1068, dated 28th April 1858. |
| 39     | Gholam Husun Khan | ... | Bukhshee. Killed at Bichpurree. |
| 40     | Ahmudjan Khan | ... | Daroga of Pillibheet. |
| 41     | Surfanas Ali | ... | Naeb of Julalabad; since hanged. |
| 42     | Syud Mohomud Hossein | ... | Moonsit; since transported for 14 years. |
| 43     | Nusr Ali Khan | ... | Mafiess Pillibheet; case pending. |
| 44     | Allah | ... | Commanding at Tilhur. Still at large. |
List of principal persons not in Government employ who joined the rebels.—(Concluded.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name.</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Nature of service taken, and subsequent order.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Fyzab Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Khan Ali Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shahjehanpoor,
The 9th September 1858.

(Sd.) G. P. Money,
Magistrate and Collector.

Narrative of events attending the outbreak of disturbances at Budaon,

25th to 27th May 1857.—The news of the outbreak at Meerut, and of the simultaneous disturbances in the country circumjacent to that station, would appear to have become known in the Budaon Zillah about the 15th of the month. Men's minds became excited and unsettled, and it may be presumed that there were not wanting either bad or ambitious characters who hoped by the introduction of “the good old rule, the simple plan that he may take who has the power, that he may keep who can,” to better their existing condition, and to attain either to power and eminence as well as more generally to gratify their individual love of cupidity or desire for revenge from a new and disordered state of society. The seeds of anarchy are easily sown, and the Magistrate to arrest the popular agitation, which he doubtless saw was progressing, strove both by politic as well as defensive measures to ward off the storm of rebellion from his district. For this purpose conciliatory and reassuring letters were addressed to very many landholders, and the police of the district, horse and foot, was also largely augmented.

The first sign of the approaching tempest showed itself in the village of Bihtah Goosaieen in the Bisee Pargunnah. A hackery load of melons was plundered there, and on the Thannadar and his myrmidons proceeding to the spot to make enquiries, they were sent, like Macaulay’s Appius Claudius of unhappy memory, “with shivered fasces home.” The Magistrate’s hands would not appear to have been sufficiently strong to punish this outrage, and it consequently led to others. About the 21st of May, the inhabitants of Neora Beora and other villages in the Goonour Thannah adjacent to the high road commenced plundering travellers, whilst those of Mouzahs Futtehpoor, Goonour and others plundered the boats laden with grain belonging to Beoparees, which were moored on the ghats of the Ganges.

The Aheers of Nundpoor, Lawur and others banded together and murdered Heera Singh and Kulloo Singh, Zemindars of Putheria, and wounded Gopal Singh, the brother of the above, plundering their property at the time. The Aheers of Mouzahs Azeexpoor, Dhuneepoor and other villages formed a gathering, and sacked and burnt the village of Joona Maiee, murdering Pursram and Kullion Singh, the Zemindars, and one Buldeo, Goshaiene of Futtehpoor, robbed and wounded a police peon of Thannah Goonour.

At Suheswan, the Thakoors of Kumurpoor robbed a Government sowar of his horse, and a police peon of his property, and at Binawur, the Thakoor murdered Yusuf Khan, the Kendahal of Mohoun Ally, the Zemindar of the village.

28th May.—Mr. Phillips, the Joint-Magistrate of Etah, crossed over from his own district on the right bank of the Ganges, and came first to Sheikhoopoor and afterwards into Budaon.
1st June.—Intimation was received on the morning of this day in Budaon of the march of a portion of the Bareilly mutineers for Budaon. Mr. Phillips left to join Mr. Bramley at Puttialee, and in the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Edwards the Magistrate determined upon evacuating the station. The Sepoy Guard stationed at the Treasury had meantime broken into open mutiny (their conduct had been most insubordinate for some days previous), seized the treasure under their charge, released the prisoners in the jail, and commenced a desultory fusillade with their muskets. They were joined as a matter of course by all the bad characters in the city, and all kinds of excesses were committed.

The Magistrate, in company with Mr. Alexander Donald and his son, and Mr. Gibson, a patrol in the Customs, retired from the Sudder Station by the Futtehgurh road, being escorted on their way by Sheikh Shurfooodeen, Zemindar of Sheikhoopoor, and a body of his retainers, and passing through Sheikhoopoor they went and stopped for the night at Kukora, a village situate on the banks of the Ganges, and belonging to the Sheikhoopoor Zemindar.

2nd June.—The mutineers from Bareilly then reached Budaon, and sent fire to the bungalows, and took possession of the Government treasure. The Magistrate and Collector and party set out for Puttialee, leaving Kukora for that purpose, and crossing over to Kadirgungo in the Etah District, by the Zemindar of which place, Gholam Nubee Khan, they were well and hospitably received. One Bijjee Singh, a Thakoor of Kukora, deputed by Sheikh Shurfooodeen for that purpose, saw them safe across the Ganges. Most of the inhabitants of Budaon meantime had joined with and entertained the mutinous troops from Bareilly. Others again, the better disposed, wishing to get rid of their presence, disseminated a report that a European force was at hand, and this had the desired effect of causing the sepoys to march immediately back to Bareilly with their treasure. After their departure Mr. Stewart, the Treasury Clerk of the Budaon Collector’s Office, who had up to this time been hiding about the suburbs of the city, went to Sheikhoopoor with his family; Sheikh Shurfooodeen immediately gave them protection, and had the family conveyed in safety to a neighbouring village of his, Sookhee, where he protected them notwithstanding the threats and demands of the rebels for many months, and eventually succeeded in seeing them conducted safely to Allygurh. Mr. Erith also, the Head Clerk, went to the village of Nugla Shurkee and obtained protection from the Koormees of the place, and afterwards moved to Gudhouli, the Zemindar of which, Hemmut Singh, gave him every protection and assistance, Mr. J. Peters, the Foujdarre Clerk, Mr. T. Peters, the Road Superintendent, and Mr. M. Peters, another brother, also about the same time obtained protection from the zemindars of Mouzas Doondrie, Pergunnah Budaon, and Bichoula Nizamabad, Pergunnah Osbhanee.

When the mutineers came to Budaon from Bareilly, the inhabitants of Surai Jullundi, Surai Miran, Naee Surai and Surai Nahr Khan and Mohulla Brahempoor, all Mohullas in the City of Budaon, and those of Nugla Shurkee, Rusoolpoor and of other adjoining villages, united with them in plundering the furniture and property in the bungalows of the European officers and residents in the station, and one Mirza Munsoor Beg, who afterwards became a noted Rissaldar under the rebels, plundered the Government Dispensary and the College, both situate in the city. The villagers of Nugla Shurkee, also in union with the residents of the Brahempoor, Puttialee Surai and Naee Surai Mohullas of Budaon, plundered and destroyed the records of the two Moonsiffes as also those of the Kotwalle.

On the news of the outbreak at the Sudder Station becoming known in the pargannahs of the district, disturbances broke out in every direction, and anarchy and misrule completely obtained the upper hand. The roads were no longer safe for travellers, and opportunity was taken by the bands of armed men who scoured the country in all directions, not only to satiate their lust of plunder, but to settle old feuds by an appeal to arms, or more frequently by the committal of cruel murders.
In the Pergunnahs of the Goonour Tehseel, the Aheers; in Pergunnahs Kote, Bilsee Khass, Oojhanne Budaon, Duttgunje and Ooseith, the Thakoors; in the villages of Pergunnah Bissowlee, the Mahomedans and Thakoors; and in those of Suheswan, the Aheers, Thakoors, and Mahomedans banded themselves together and made raids upon one another’s villages. The lives of many innocent persons, as well as those of the combatants, were sacrificed on these occasions, and the combats themselves were often of a most sanguinary character; to instance which, the case of the attack by the united Aheer communities on the Thakoor village of Bhois, in the Suheswan Pergunnah, and that of the same tribe on the Thakoor village of Bhois, in the Goonour Pergunnah, may be cited as instances. In the former case, Goolab Singh, the Thakoor of Bhois, was besieged in his fort in his village, and after a most desperate resistance; killed with upwards of forty of his retainers; while in the latter, Deep Singh, the old Thakoor Zemindar of Dhnaree, was murdered with many others of his village, and his head severed and brought in triumph into the Aheer villages of Bhiraoothee. Black-mail also was freely levied by the rioters from all the bunniyahs and muhajans in their neighbourhood, and the valuable Indigo Factories of the Messrs. Donald, situate at Budaon, Bilsee, Oojhanee, and Bissowlee, not only plundered, but completely gutted, at Bilsee and Budaon in particular nothing but the bare walls being left, the iron boilers moreover being taken out of the works, and shot cast therefrom. The town and rich mart of Bilsee was deliberately plundered, for upwards of a fortnight, by the Thakoors of the neighbourhood, the very foundations of the houses in the bazar being dug up in search of treasure. Bands of marauders from the north-western pargunnahs of the district also went up to, and shared in the plunder of, the town of Chundousee in Mooradabad.

In the scenes of rapine and violence which took place at this period, the following individuals and villages would appear to have been conspicuous in their own respective localities:

**In Goonour.—** The Aheer Zemindars of Neora Beora, Bhiraoothee and other adjacent villages of the same brotherhood, Shurfoodeen of Nugla Ajmeree, and Seetarm Aheer of Budrowlee.


**Budaon.—** Bhaee Singh of Khunuk, Dhunjee Singh of Rufeabed, Jaimul Singh, Sooburn Singh of Rusoolpoor, Tulfe Singh and others of Nuggla Shurkee.

**Datagunje and Ooseith.—** Surday Khan, Muhrab Khan and other Pathans of Kukrala, and the Thakoors of Datagunjo under Keeruth Singh, Bekhtawur Singh and others.

**Bissowlee.—** Futtah Singh and others, Zeminders of Rehria, Nubbee Khan of Hutra, the Thakoor Zeminders of Leekree, and Uzeez Khan of Bissowlee, and Nehal Singh, Zeminder of the same place.

**Suheswan.—** Hydur Khan and Futtah Ally Khan of Suheswan, Ramanund Hissoodar of Kurria Maiee, Soomer Singh of Bubrala, Shere Singh of Murkkoole, Narain Singh of Peepree, Goolab Singh and Luchmun Singh of Bhois.

**Islamnugur.—** Shahamut Ally, Meer Khan, Nasar Ally, Dhun Singh, Budan Singh, and others.

In the town or rather Kusbash of Datagunje, the Thakoors first purposed to plunder the Tehseelee, but were kept in check by the remonstrances of the
Tehseeldar Cheyt Singh. He, in the meantime, had sent into Budaon to his friends for assistance. These persuaded ten of the late Magistrate’s sowars to set out for Datagunge. On their arrival the Tehseeldar packed the treasure, partly on a light country cart, and gave sundry bags to the sowars to carry. The latter decamped with these on the road in, and the Tehseeldar, to avoid, it may be presumed, a demand from the rebels, or from what other pretext it is not known, divided, on his arrival at Budaon, the balance amongst the Tehseel Chupprassies who had accompanied and escorted him in.

About the same time in the north-west portion of the district, one Azeez Khan proclaimed himself Soobah of Bissowlee, being joined by the Paishkar of the Government Tehseel there, and other servants of Government. He again was dispossessed for a time by Thakoor Nehal Singh, but he succeeded eventually in obtaining possession of the greater portion of the money in the Tehseel, and making off with it to Khan Bahadoor Khan at Bareilly. The Thakoors of the neighbourhood also, about this same time, banded together to plunder Bissowlee and came as far as the village of Nijra on the banks of the Sote, about a mile from Bissowlee, destroying wantonly during their stay there the Government bridge over the river; but Chundun Singh, Zemindar of Bhanpoor in Kote, interfered and made peace between the parties, that in Bissowlee at this period being under the command of Azeez Khan. In the neighbourhood of Budaon, Khaee Singh of Khunnuck led a band of Thakoors against the city, but was repulsed.

17th June.—The Thakoors of the adjoining villages attacked Shekoopoor, but were repulsed by the zemindars of that place. On the same date the Nazim Abdool Ruheem Khan arrived in Budaon from Bareilly with Fussahut Oollah as his Naib. He immediately set about organizing his establishment. Zoolfekar Oodeen, the former Foujdaree Sherishtadar, took office under the rebels as Deputy Magistrate, and Tufussul Hoosein, a former, but pensioned, Tehseeldar as Deputy Collector; Ruzee Oollah, Tehseeldar of Bissowlee under Government, became Tehseeldar of Budaon under the rebels. Mahomed Hoosein, another pensioned Tehseeldar, also became a Deputy Collector, and his brother, Ahmad Hoosein, formerly Naib Revenue Sherishtadar, became Sherishtadar under the rebels. Those two men, the latter particularly, were most inveterate in their hatred to us.

The Nazim now issued perwannahs to all the former Sudder Oomlahs, calling on them to attend to their respective duties. All, with one or two exceptions, complied for fear of the consequences of a refusal, but many took an early opportunity to throw up their appointments.

July.—Majid Ally, Tehseeldar of Goonour, left his Tehseels early in this month and came to Budaon, bringing with him certain important papers relating to the revenue collections of his pergunnah, which he made over to the Nazim. Wuezee Singh, the Thannadar of Goonour, with majority of his police, and the Tehseel Oomlah under their Peshkar Perbhow Lall, still held out however at their posts at Goonour.

The Nazim now commenced to demand money from the villages adjacent to Budaon; some of the zemindars paid while others again refused. The Nazim upon this sent sowars and peyadhahs to enforce his demands, and burnt, as a punishment, the refractory Thakoor villages of Khunnuck and Rufesabak. He then commenced to collect any Government treasure which had been left in the district, and for this purpose Ruzzeesoolah, the Tehseeldar of Budaon, was sent to Cheyt Singh, late Tehseeldar of Datagunge, and the latter made to furnish a list of the chupprassies to whom the treasure from his Tehseel had been disbursed. Such of these men as had not absconded were
apprehended, and made to refund what had been paid to them by their late Tehseeldar. A force also was sent to Suheswan to collect the money there, but Hydur Khan would only give up a small portion of it, retaining the larger share for himself.

Omrao Singh, Talookdar of Hutoolee, and the Zemindar of Rudoolee of Datagunge, were appointed Managers of Datagunge by Khan Bahadoor Khan. The zemindars of the pergunnah, however, refused to acknowledge their authority, and collecting together in a large body under their own leaders with one Hurrioll Singh of Buksainah at their head, under the title of Dhapoodham, advanced with the intention of attacking Budaon. A combat ensued on the skirts of the city, in which the Thakoors were worsted, and they fell back.

August.—The zemindars of the Bissowlee Pergunnah refusing to acknowledge the authority of Nubee Khan of Huthra, the Tehseeldar of Bissowlee under the rebels, a gun, which had arrived from Bareilly, was despatched with troops, the whole under command of Fussahut Oollah to coerce them. A fight took place near Wuzeergunge with the Thakoors of Rehria under Futtah Singh, in which the Mahomedans were worsted, and Fussahut Oollah wounded; but being shortly after reinforced by another gun and fresh troops under Niaz Mahomed Khan from Aonlah, they returned to the charge, and this time overpowered their late victors.

The village of Rehria was sacked and burnt, and proceeding onward to Bissowlee after his victory, Niaz Mahomed Khan levied a fine of Rupees 3,300 from the Bunyahs of that place, and Rupees 2,000 from those of the town of Wuzeergunge. Measures also were adopted by the rebels for collecting the revenue of the Bissowlee Pergunnah, Ruzez Oollah, who had been formerly Tehseeldar there, being sent for with this end from Budaon.

About this same period Azeez Ahmad of Rampoor, having obtained from Khan Bahadoor Khan the farm of the Suheswan Pergannah, came and established himself there with a couple of guns and an armed force, and assumed the title of Chuckladar of Suheswan.

The Thakoors of Datagunge purposed to make a second attack on Budaon, but were awed by a force with guns sent out against them.

Captain Gowan crossed over into Suleympoor from Khera, Rujhera in the Shajehanpoor district, and was well cared for and protected by Keeruth Singh and other zemindars of the Datagunge Pergunnah, as were also other European and Eurasian fugitives from the Bareilly district.

September.—Mahomed Yar Khan came to Budaon in this month as Naib Nazim, and Ruhm Ally Khan also arrived there, a fugitive from the country across the Ganges, and proceeding from Budaon to Bareilly, obtained from Khan Bahadoor Khan the farm of the Bissowlee and Islamnugur Pergunnahs. He appointed one Ashruf Ally as his Naib Chuckladar, and Hoosain Ally as Tehseeldar, and these commenced forthwith to realize the revenues of the Pergunnahs.

Ahmud Oollah Khan of Kumbhul, in the Mooradabad district, also took about this time the contract for the farm of the Goonour pergunnahs; but, having no force of any strength with him at the time to enforce his demands, and the Aheers of the Pergunnah, who had assembled in vast numbers, being adverse to his projects, he was obliged for the time to defer entering into occupancy of the territory.

October.—Early in this month Niaz Mahomed Khan, the rebel General, marched to Oseith. On the road a Rissalah of his under command of Bedar Khan plundered the village of Khurkooloo, having murdered first, in return for some supposed slight, the son of Zalim Singh, the Thakoor Zemindar of the place. Early in this month also, fugitive rebels, horse and foot, under command of Bala Rao, the nephew of Nana Rao, crossed over into the district from Malagurh by Anoopshuhur Ghát on the Ganges, and passed onwards to Shahjehanpoor.
The rebel General Niaz Mahomed Khan paid a visit to Suheswan, and levied fines from the merchants there.

Bhooreh Khan obtained from Khan Bahadoor Khan the lease of the Dataganje Pergunnah and commenced, with the assistance of the Thakoors, to collect the revenue there.

Wuleedad Khan of Jalagurh and Ismael Khan came to Budaon from Bareilly, and obtaining funds from Suheswan, proceeded onwards to Futteghur.

Towards the close of the month Mr. J. C. Wilson, the Special Commissioner, came to Koolia Nagra in the Soron Pergunnah of Etah to arrange for the escape from this side of the river of Captain Gowan. Abdool Ruhman Khan, the Nazim of Budaon, hearing of his being in that neighbourhood proceeded with troops to Kuchla Ghât and remained encamped there for some fifteen or twenty days.

As the Pergunnah of Goonour had not up to this period been taken possession of by the rebels, their General marched with troops and guns and encamped at Islamnugur with the view of making arrangements from thence for attacking the Aheers.

November.—Early in this month the rebel General with his troops attacked Bhiraoothee, the head-quarters of the Aheers in Goonour, being assisted by the zemindars of Bijhoee in the Moradabat district, who were longing to revenge the death of Deep Sing, the Thakoor of Dhanaree, whose murder by the Aheers of Bhiraoothee has already been alluded to in this narrative. A fight took place at Bhiraoothee on the 5th November between Niaz Mahomed Khan's force and the Aheers of Pergunnah Goonour, in which the latter were readily worsted. Wuzzer Sing, the Thannadar of Goonour, who with his police had held out till now, finding the rebels approaching them, crossed over into the Boolundshuhur district and joined Mr. Sapte, the Magistrate, there; he was followed by the Tehseelee Omlah of Goonour. The Thannah records were secreted by the zemindars of Goonour, and the rebels took possession of those in the Tehseeel.

About the 10th of this month Abdool Ruheem Khan was either dismissed from his post of Nazim of Budaon, or threw it up from some cause, of his own accord. He was succeeded by Mobaruck Shah Khan as Nazim, and Ahmud Shah Khan as Naib Nazim. Mooneer Khan was appointed Superintendent of the Ghât, and Ferukh Khan Ressaldar.

On or about the 20th of the month shots were exchanged with the British troops on the opposite bank of the Ganges, and those of the rebels stationed at Kuchla Ghât. Ahmud Shah Khan and Mooneer Khan fell back from Kuchla to Ojhanee, and some of their followers fled into Budaon.

December.—A portion of the rebels who had been defeated by our force at Gungeeeeree crossed over into this district, and came into Budaon. About this same time the Nazim stationed troops at all the principal ghâts on the Ganges to watch for the approach of any force from the opposite bank.

About the 20th of this month Abdool Ruheem Khan, the former Nazim of Budaon, obtained from Khan Bahadoor Khan the farm of the pergunnahs of Datagenge and Budaon; Ahmud Shah Khan and his brothers, large and influential Mahfeedars in this district, being securities for Abdool Ruheem Khan. The expedition to Futteghur being just about this time contemplated, a fine of Rupees 40,000 was levied by the rebel General from the mahajuns, bunyahs, and others of Budaon to meet the expenses of it.

January.—Early in this month Abdool Ruheem Khan proceeded to Datagenge, to enter into occupancy of that pergunnah. He was accompanied by the rebel General Niaz Mahomed Khan, and some troops from Bareilly under Safoolah Khan, formerly Jail Darogah at that place. First a dispute and afterwards a fight took place between the new-comers and the former farmer of the Pergunnah, Bhooreh Khan. In this affair Bhooreh Khan was mortally wounded, and his son killed.
About the 20th of the month the General Niaz Mahomed Khan with all the troops stationed at Budaon, as also a large number of men from Bareilly, and some from Suheswan, marched out of Budaon with the view of proceeding to Futtehgurh, and taking possession of that place in the Nawab's name. His force passing through Kukralah, by the Pathans of which it was augmented, crossed the Ganges at Soorujpoor Ghât, and reached Jhunna Khar, situated between Ahmudgunje and Shumshabad, plundering on the road the thannahs of Kaimgunje and Allygunje, cutting off the Thannadar's head at the latter place. On receipt of the news of this slight success at Budaon, numbers of persons set out to join the rebel camp, imagining that this was but the prelude to the capture of Furruckabad; Fussahut Oollah and other influential rebels also set out to make arrangements at Futtehgurh.

On the 27th of the month the rebels were surprised at Shumshabad by the force under General Sir Hope Grant from Furruckabad, and utterly defeated with the loss of all their guns and baggage. They fled with such precipitation across the Ganges as to reach, many of them, Budaon on the evening of the same day. On his return to Budaon early in February from this ill-starred expedition, the rebel General Niaz Mahomed Khan made several arrests of Hindoos. One Mithoo Lall, formerly Thannadar of Datagunge, he had blown away from a gun, after subjecting him to great indignities. This man had shown great kindness to Captain Gowan when in concealment, and a purwanah was found on his person which led to his death. Bukhtawur Singh, Thakoor of Belah Dandee, was also tied by his two arms to a tree, and flogged to that extent as to be left for dead. Himmut Singh of Girdhoul and Keeruth Singh of Sulempoor escaped similar or worse fates by paying heavy ransoms contributed by their brotherhood. Shortly after this Niaz Mahomed Khan again crossed the Ganges and burnt the village of Oorer in the Soron Pergannah, he then proceeded to Suheswan, and plundered several villages in that neighbourhood also.

February.—No event of any importance would seem to have occurred in this month save that the rebel troops stationed at Kadirchouk, crossed the Ganges, and plundered the village of Kesal in the Etah district.

March.—The Chuckladar of Suheswan with a force crossed the Ganges at Dhaupper ghât into the Allygunje Doab; but retired after burning the village on that side after which the ferry take its name.

Towards the close of the month some of the rebel troops crossed over into Kadergunje in Etah and sacked the place, the Zeminder Gholam Nubee Khan having assisted Mr. Wilson in rescuing Captain Gowan.

2nd April.—Wuzeer Khan, the Wahabee, the former Sub-Assistant Surgeon of Agra, was appointed Naib General, and placed in charge of Soorujpoor ghât. Mohsun Ali Khan crossed over from Shahjehanpoor into the Budaon district after his defeat at Surgeon by General Seaton, and proceeded thence to Bareilly.

18th April.—Some 300 Jahadees, or fanatic Mahomedans, came into Budaon from Bareilly.

27th April.—The British force under General Penny, with Mr. J. C. Wilson, the Special Commissioner as Civil Officer, crossed the Ganges at Noulée ghât, and encamped on this side the river. Their onward march to Kukralah, and the surprise, and subsequent action at that place, are too well known to require more than a passing mention in this narrative. The rebel infantry and guns were on that occasion commanded by the ex-Sub-Assistant Surgeon and traitor Wuzeer Khan of Agra, and their cavalry by Munsoor Beg of Budaon. The rebels were eventually driven back and dispersed with good slaughter, a number of the fanatics who had accompanied Wuzeer Khan being killed. On the same day on which this action was fought, Major Gordon's column from Moradabad surprised the rebels at Bissowlee, in the north-west portion of the district.
The rebels at Budaon, learning of these simultaneous reverses, fled to Bareilly, first setting fire to their records. The detachments of troops stationed in different parts of the zillah speedily followed the example set them by their leader. The old records of the Budaon Tehseelee which had not been touched by the rebels were destroyed by the people of the city.

Mr. Wilson, when passing through the district, appointed two Thakoor zemindars, Hur Lall Sing and Beeckum Sing, Managers, respectively, on the part of Government, of the Pergunnahs of Datagunj and Ooseith. Dara Sing of P-o-proul was also appointed Thannadar of Oojhanee, and Bhace Sing of Khunnuk deputed for the same purpose to Bilssee.

May.—On the 12th of May Bukhtawar Sing of Beta Dandee, appointed by Mr. Wilson Cotwal of Budaon, came with a large following of Thakoors, and took possession of the city.

On the 18th of May Shaikh Shurf Oodeen of Sheikoopoor entered at the request of the Commissioner of the Division temporarily on the duties of Tehseeedar of Budaon.

About this same time also Ruheem Ali and his band crossed the Ganges near Suheeswan, and broke across the Doab, making for Gwalior, and murdering Major Waterfield on the Grand Trunk road on their way.

The Officiating Magistrate of Budaon, who had by this time returned to Bareilly from Shahjehanpoor, then appointed two Thakoor Zemindars, Het Sing and Dal Sing of Sertole, to the management of the Suheeswan Pergunnah, and these were assisted by Roodur Sing, from Etah, with a large following of Thakoors. Chundun Sing of Banpoor was also appointed simultaneously to the charge of the Kote and Bissowlee Pergunnahs.

In this month also one Baboo Ramnarayun, formerly a Government Vakeel, and Mukdoom Bhosh, a butcher of Chandousee, collected a large body of rebels with guns, and stationing themselves at Islamnuggur, plundered for some days the country side round.

The Thakoors under Dara Sing of Oojhanee tried to attack and disperse them, but were driven back. They were eventually disposed of by the troops of the Rampoor Nawab under Hukeem Saadut Ali Khan, and dispersed with the loss of one of their leaders, namely, the Baboo.

On the 27th of this month (May) some 2,000 rebels, horse and foot with some fifteen elephants, after breaking across the Doab, crossed the Ganges at Jathee ghat near Khyra Julalpoor, in the Ooseith Pergunnah of this district, and though closely pressed by two columns sent after them for that purpose from Shahjehanpoor, succeeded in making good their passage into Oudh. They gave themselves out as Tantia Toppee’s followers, and are supposed to have been a portion of the fugitive rebel force from Jhansee.

3rd to 7th June.—Brigadier Coke’s column from Shahjehanpoor arrived at Ooseith on the 3rd of this month, and moved into Kukralah on the 5th, burning three rebel villages on the road. The column reached Budaon on the 6th and large number of arrests took place, on that and following day, under the direction of Mr. Ricketts, the Civil Officer accompanying, several important rebels being apprehended.

8th June.—The Officiating Magistrate of the district arrived from Bareilly with a column under Colonel Wilkinson, consisting of a wing of the 42nd Royal Highlanders, a squadron of the Carabineers and a heavy battery. This force marched the following day for Moradabad via Bissowlee, whilst the Officiating Magistrate attached himself to Colonel Coke’s column, which left also for the same destination, but via Suheeswan.

The 10th and 11th of the month were spent at Suheeswan, the column having halted there for the second day. Two notorious rebel villages were burnt on the road by the force, as on the advance from Ooseith, and many arrests also took place.
On the 12th the force left for Islamnuggur, which was reached on the 13th, and several rebels, who from their wounds had evidently been engaged in the late conflict with the Nawab of Rampoor’s troops, were apprehended and shot. The column then left for Moradabad via Chundousee, whilst the Magistrate proceeded to the Pergunnah of Goonour, after a circuit of which and that of Suheswan he eventually returned to Budaon early in August.

The district had by this time become well settled, and the revenue was coming in rapidly.

A table is subjoined showing the weekly collections of revenue for the first three months, from the time of our setting foot in the district, as illustrative of the gradual restoration of order and government.

**Budaon**, 
*The 23rd November 1858.*

(Sd.) C. P. Carmichael, 
Officiating Magistrate.

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Statement showing the weekly collections of revenue in Zillah Budaon during the first three months of the reoccupation of it, or from June to August 1858.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Rs.</th>
<th>a.</th>
<th>p.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st June</td>
<td>49,131</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd June</td>
<td>48,320</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd June</td>
<td>40,874</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th June</td>
<td>85,860</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st July</td>
<td>26,693</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd July</td>
<td>42,558</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd July</td>
<td>42,255</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th July</td>
<td>23,346</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>16,893</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Aug.</td>
<td>20,839</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Aug.</td>
<td>31,212</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Aug.</td>
<td>19,275</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total collections up to end of August 1858: **4,47,291** 8 11

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**Budaon**, 
*The 23rd Novr. 1858.*

(Sd.) C. P. Carmichael, 
Off. Collector & Magistrate.

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**NARRATIVE OF EVENTS ATTENDING THE OUTBREAK OF DISTURBANCES AND THE RESTORATION OF AUTHORITY IN THE DISTRICT OF SAHARUNPOOR IN 1857-58.**

No. 84, dated Saharunpoor, 26th September 1857.

From—R. Spankie, Esq., Magistrate, Saharunpoor,

To—F. Williams, Esq., Commissioner of the 1st Division, Meerut.

BEING about to leave the district in anticipation of sick leave, I have the honor to submit the following report of events in this zillah from the 12th of May up to the 26th September.

2. The news of the outbreak at Meerut reached Saharunpoor on the 12th May. The intelligence was at once forwarded to Umballa. The next day I ordered all the ladies and children out of the station to the hills.

3. The news of the massacre at Delhi soon followed.

4. It was not to be expected that this district could remain quiet for any length of time. The plundering tribe of Goojurs was the first affected, and the Rangurs were not far behind them. There was, however, no general outbreak until the disturbances at Mozuffarnuggur occurred. Then wave after wave of disquiet rolled through the district.

5. For the protection of the district, station, and town of Saharunpoor, extra police were raised. The extent and nature of the increase are noted in an Appendix to this report. I also raised fifty sowars.
6. When our disturbances commenced, the only troops in the station were eighty-five men of the 29th Regiment N. I. in charge of the Treasury.

7. The Officers of Government, Covenanted and Uncovenanted, united for their own protection, and established themselves in the Magistrate's house, keeping watch and ward.

8. The assemblies of Goojurs and others became more and more frequent. Ancient tribe or caste feuds were renewed; village after village was looted; bankers were either robbed of their property, or had to pay fines to protect it. The zamindars and villagers took advantage of the general anarchy to obtain from mahajuns and buneahs their books of business and bond debts, &c.

9. It would appear as if the disturbances in the commencement were less directed against Government than against particular people and castes. When the fall of Delhi ceased to be looked upon as imminent, the agricultural communities began to turn their eyes towards the local treasuries, and did not scruple to oppose themselves to Government officers and troops.

10. The local authorities did their best to put down the disturbances in their earliest stage.

11. On the 21st May a large assemblage of Goojurs and Rangurs took place on the south and south-west of Pergunnah Saharanpoor. The village of Mullypoor was looted close to the station and Treasury. Some signal example was necessary. All the Europeans of the place accompanied me with the district sowars and twenty men of the 29th, with a view to disperse the assembly. The villagers would not meet us, and scattered, deserting their villages, three of which were burnt; property plundered from Mullypoor was strewn in the fields and roads of the villages; a number of prisoners were captured and brought into Saharanpoor.

12. As the Roorkee road was much infested and the dâks were delayed, and as highway robberies occurred, and a buneah's house had been looted in Mouza Gurhow, accompanied by Messrs. Robertson, Joint-Magistrate, Henderson, Veterinary Surgeon, attached to the Stud, and Messrs. Lamb and Sheels of the English Office, I determined on the 22nd May to march to the village of Gurhow some seven miles from the station. I found it deserted. We were told that there was a large assemblage up the road, and I went on to Nagul, three miles further, and thence to a round of villages on the right; they were all deserted. I managed, however, to find the Lumberdars of Mouza Kunkuri and Phoraur. These men had refused to pay their revenue. I brought them into Saharanpoor, and they eventually did so.

13. On the 23rd May I visited several villages on the Deobund road, and off it. On this occasion I was also accompanied by several gentlemen of the station. I burnt one village, the inhabitants of which had been concerned in the murder of a Cashmeeree on the Munglour road.

14. At this time the Mahomedan feeling in the city was not satisfactory; such a feeling naturally arose from the delay which necessarily occurred in dealing with the mutineers. The Cazee, however, and others behaved well, and, I believe, did their best to keep order. The Hindoo bankers and buneahs completely lost heart and alike dreaded invasion from without, and sedition from within. They shut up their shops, buried their valuables, and business was all but suspended. The close of the "Roza" was approaching. I looked for serious disturbances. The Cotwal of the city, as it afterwards turned out, was playing a double game, and inciting dissatisfaction, whilst he continued to act as if he had been a thorough adherent to the cause of Government. I felt that I required help from without, and I wrote to Mr. Barnes, the Commissioner of Umballa, who did all he could; and Mr. Plowden, the Assistant Commissioner of Umballa, then quartered at Jugadhree, crossed the Jumna with a party of the 4th Light Cavalry under Captain Wyld, and a company of infantry (5th Regiment Native

*Ramadan or fast.*
Infantry) under Captain Garstin. The appearance of the troops was most opportune, and confidence for a time was restored.

15. On the 30th May I went down towards Munglour accompanied by Messrs. Trench, Plowden, and Edwards, and by Captain Garstin. We were joined at midnight at a given point by Mr. Robertson and Captain Wyld, who had been on duty to Deobund. Our intention was to attack the village of Manuckpoor in the hope of apprehending the headman, Omrow Singh, for whose apprehension a large reward had been offered. This man had been very forward, calling himself Raja, and levying money from the surrounding villages. His intelligence was too good for us, and we found the village all but deserted. It was burnt, and we captured a few prisoners. I took with me on this occasion some thirty of the 29th and Captain Garstin's company, and was joined, as stated above, by Mr. H. D. Robertson, Joint-Magistrate, and Captain Wyld, with a portion of the 4th Light Cavalry.

16. I had detached Mr. Robertson and Captain Wyld to Deobund, which was threatened by the people of the Khatah, a notorious part of the district. Of their proceedings I submit Mr. Robertson's own report, vide Appendix. Major Williams gave valuable assistance on this occasion.

17. On the 2nd of June an outbreak occurred in the company under Captain Garstin. Several of the men had been unsteady, and on the evening of the 2nd, sixteen were allowed to cut their names. They managed to secure their muskets, and when ordered to receive their pay, refused to take it, and fell back to the gate of my compound, close to which they were encamped, and commenced firing on Captain Garstin and the men who remained with him. One of the mutineers was shot, I believe, by a Havildar. Messrs. Brownlow and Home, Engineers, and Plowden, of the 4th Cavalry, who had been out for a drive and on returning had met with an accident, were fired upon, but happily the shot missed. Captain Wyld in his endeavour to reach his own men was also fired at thrice. I went (having been at the spot where Captain Garstin was paying the men) to make my sowars, ten of them stationed in the compound, follow the mutineers, but I found that they had run on the first shot towards the city. The evening was gathering in fast, and the villains escaped.

18. On the 3rd of June the Goorkhas under Major Bagot arrived, bringing the cholera with them. However the arrival was of great importance. We had lost confidence in the remaining portion of the 5th, and also in the 4th Light Cavalry. The news of the mutiny of the 29th Native Infantry at Moradabad had also been received.

19. On the same evening I took a portion of the Goorkhas and some of the 4th Light Cavalry to attack and disperse a body of Goojurs assembled near the Treasury with intent to loot it. The rebels on seeing the force retreated. They had withstood the Cotwal and police during the day. The Cavalry pursued them for some distance. On this occasion we also had a few men of the 5th and other Irregulars on leave belonging to the district. A few men were cut up, and some prisoners made. Two villages were burnt. In this affair I was joined by Mr. Brownlow and most of the residents, and of course by my own officers. All could not go, though they were willing to be useful.

20. Mr. Robertson, Joint-Magistrate, had all along been repeatedly employed on detached duty. For instance, on the 23rd of May, he cleared the road to the hills, returned on the 26th, and left for Deobund the same evening. He was also at Roorkee in the beginning of June, looking after the collections.

21. On the 16th of June a party of Goorkhas was detached to meet a body of the Jullunder mutineers, some 300 strong; Lieutenant Boisragon and Mr. Edwards accompanied the party. The mutineers lost no-time in traversing the district; in fact they almost ran through it, marching from the foot of the hills to the south border in thirty hours.

22. On the 17th or 18th of June a second party under Major Bagot with thirty of the Irregulars under Captain MacDougall of the Stud Department,
accompanied by Mr. Robertson, went on a similar expedition, but they were unable to catch the mutineers.

23. On the 20th of June Mr. Robertson started on the receipt of intelligence from Nukoor, reporting that that place was threatened. It was attacked by Goojurs before he could reach it. The Tehsee and the police chowkay were burnt and the records were destroyed. Mr. Robertson's report is submitted. Sirsawah was also looted. Mr. Plowden punished several villages in this neighbourhood.

24. On the 9th of July the company of the 99th Native Infantry at the Treasury decamped from the station. We were all at dinner about 8 p.m., when it was reported that the twelve men over Captain MacDougall's treasure chest had deserted their post; and Major Bagot instantly turned out his men and we started for the Treasury, distant near a mile from the barracks, Messrs. Trench, Edwards, Robertson, Brownlow of the Canal, &c., accompanying us. We arrested the guard at the Post Office, whose muskets were loaded, and who evidently intended to have gone also when opportunity offered. We then passed on to the Treasury, and found the barracks deserted, the office lights burning, but no guard present. All the seals and locks were right; but the guard had fled in such a hurry that they had left their cooking utensils, blankets, &c., behind them. Captain MacDougall had remained to bring up the Putteeha Horse, forty of whom relieved the 4th Light Cavalry Detachment left here when Captain Wyld returned with Mr. Plowden to Jugadhree. But as these men had only matchlocks, and it was raining hard, they did not like turning out. We had to place a guard over the Treasury and buildings; besides on so dark a night and in the pouring rain it was not considered advisable to detach any men in pursuit. The Foul'dary sowars however were ordered by me to follow up the mutineers and catch them. The Jemadar brought in a musket the next morning, which had been dropped on the road to Delhi via Rampoor. Seventy-nine men got off.

25. On the 11th July Mr. Robertson went again to Roorkee in order to visit, in conjunction with Captain Read, Commanding at Roorkee, the Khadir of the Ganges, and put down the Bunjarahs, who had been committing great excesses. A copy of Mr. Robertson's report on this attack was forwarded with my letter No. 69 of 7th August 1857. The tour was eminently successful. I instructed Mr. Robertson to return via Deobund, where very signal punishment was inflicted on the insurgents, who had looted one-third of the town.

26. I was compelled to recall the party to Saharanpoor, for I had received intelligence of a proposed attack on the station and Jail by the Goojurs, Rajpoots and Rangurs, aided by the lower Mahomedans of the city. I disarmed the Jail guard, some of the men in which had listened to overtures from the city, and replaced the guard by forty men of the Goorkhas. Colonel L'Estrange, Commanding at Landour, to whom I sent an express, ordered down forty Europeans, who arrived on the 27th, the evening before the proposed attack, which in consequence of our reinforcements did not come off. The Europeans remained until after the Muhurrum, which passed off tranquilly, as did a large fair which was held (at the same time that the Tazeeas were carried) within three miles of the town. Before the Muhurrum we received two 6-pounder guns from Meerut.

27. I had previous to the great day of the Muhurrum removed the Cotwal into the district to Nukoor, where he could do no harm. Not having evidence against him at the time, I could not try him, and I could not get rid of him, as his home is in Shahjehanpoor, to which place I could not send him. After he went to Nukoor, I obtained evidence of a satisfactory character against him, had him arrested, and, according to arrangements previously made with Mr. Barnes, deported him to Umballa. This case will engage a separate report. Mr. Colledge, Assistant Magistrate, and Lieutenant Boisragon arrested him. Mr. Colledge's report is one of the Appendices.
28. I have not attempted to describe the doings of Messrs. Robertson, Plowden, or Colledge, as I was not present with them. I was unable to leave the Sudder Station for any time together. Any hint of doing so, acted like a panic on the Hindoos in the city, and the late Commissioner was of opinion that I could superintend all matters best in the station. But besides the events described by others there was a gallant defence of Kunkhul by the townspeople, Brahmins and others, who rolled down boulders and stones on the heads of the dacoits. Kunkhul is a very wealthy place, and I think although the Brahmins and residents can afford to pay for the extra police I made them entertain there, the Government might take a share of the expense. This might be separately reported on. In Deobund too the Mahomedan population made a gallant defence on two occasions against the Khatah villagers. For this, two chowkedar's were rewarded by me. They were wounded in a night attack. On the first attack the Thannahdar, Epipahan, Shistan, deserted his post and fled to Saharanpoor. I replaced him by Man Singh of Gungoh, who has done well up to date.

29. Since these events occurred in the district, Mr. Lowe, who was appointed on the 28th July 1857, on his own volunteering to do duty here, leaving the hills to which he had gone on medical certificate, has been employed in collecting the revenue in Deobund. On receiving this valuable young officer's report I shall submit it to you. Mr. Melville, my extra Joint-Magistrate, since 14th August 1857 has also been collecting in Roorkee Tehsil.

30. A portion of Captain Hughes' Regiment of Punjab Irregulars was ordered here in order to give me sowars, the want of which has been felt. I sent fifty of these men to Mozufferunuggr to Mr. Edwards, fifty-five with Mr. Lowe to Deobund, and thirty with Mr. Melville to Roorkee. When the disturbances at Thannah Bhowan broke out, Mr. Lowe at once joined Mr. Edwards, and Captain Hughes sent him twenty more men. Both Messrs. Lowe and Melville were present at the attack on Thannah Bhowan; the former, I regret to say, was severely wounded. I ordered him in, though he wished to join the force now preparing to go to Thannah Bhowan. Mr. Melville, being no longer required at Mozufferunuggr, has returned to his duty and is at Munglour, but the sowars with a few exceptions have been left with Mr. Edwards.

31. The thanks of the Government are due to the whole of the residents of this place, all of whom are Government Officers, Covenanted or Uncovenanted. I have always received the most cordial cooperation from all. Mr. Robertson, Joint-Magistrate, has particularly distinguished himself throughout, being always ready for any duty, and energetically carrying out what he was sent to do. Mr. Edwards, though posted as Joint-Magistrate to Mynpoorie, gave me every assistance that his long experience and local knowledge of the zillah could suggest. He was subsequently posted to Mozufferunuggr as Officiating Magistrate. Lieutenant Brownlow, Superintendent of the Eastern Jumna Canal, before his departure to camp at Delhi, and in the earlier part of the disturbances, inspired all with confidence; to me he was an excellent counsellor, indefatigable in organising our resistance, and always ready for duty outside. He received a letter of thanks from our late lamented Commissioner, Mr. Greathed. So did Mr. Robertson, of whom I should say more did I not feel that his own reports best illustrate the service he performed.

32. It was, owing to Captain MacDougall that our troops were able to make rapid marches, as carriage was difficult to obtain, and Captain MacDougall was always ready to supply us with Stud carts and cattle, at great inconvenience, as they were much required for Stud purposes. Captain MacDougall moreover took upon himself the entire charge of the Irregulars on leave, who have done well. Having been in this service himself, he knew how to deal with these men, which was of great advantage to me.

33. I am also much indebted to Mr. Plowden, who twice entered the district to assist me, and both near Nukoor and at Sirsawar did good service.
It would be difficult to speak with sufficient praise of the way in which Captains Wyld and Garstin managed their men whilst here. Desertions took place from the former's force, and the mutiny occurred in the latter's company. Nothing but their constant watchfulness kept the men together. Both regiments, as is well known, have since been disarmed.

34. Since the Goorkhas came here there has been a long continuance of quiet, to which Lieutenant Boisragon's treatment of the rebels in Fergusannah Gungoh greatly contributed. This officer received from Mr. Greatest a warm letter of thanks for his good service on this occasion and on others. My thanks are also due to Major Bagot for his constant assistance and support since he joined the station.

35. But all the residents are deserving of praise for their ready co-operation when required. It is impossible to name all, though all were ever eager to be of service. Among the uncovenanted body, I think Mr. Hyde did useful service, accompanying Mr. Robertson on several occasions and distinguishing himself when out on duty.

36. Mr. Willecocks, Deputy Superintendent of the Eastern Jumna Canal, was very useful also on several occasions. But we soon lost his services, as he proceeded to join the camp at Delhi.

37. I propose shortly to submit a list of the villages, the headmen and inhabitants of which particularly misconducted themselves, and I would propose that their rights should be confiscated.

38. I also submit with this report returns showing the number of villages burnt, and the total number of offenders punished by Court-Martial since the 30th May, both here, at Roorkee, and at Deobund, and elsewhere in the district.

39. I have asked Captain Read to submit a brief report from Roorkee. I am particularly indebted to this officer and to Captain Drummond of the Canal Department; their services were brought to your notice when I submitted Mr. Robertson's report No. 213, dated 4th August 1857. Captain Read has been extremely anxious to assist me and preserve peace and order. It is also well known to the Government that in the first instance Lieutenant-Colonel Baird Smith's energetic measures secured order at Roorkee and the surrounding villages.

40. I submit a memorandum showing the number of days in which Mr. Willecocks, and Messrs. Hyde and Fox, were employed in the district, and consider that they are entitled to deputation allowance whilst so employed.

41. I also beg to submit a return showing the names and number of our community, who were here before the relief from Umballa was obtained.

42. I have already brought to the favorable notice of Government the good conduct of some of the native officers. I shall shortly bring that of others to your notice.

43. In conclusion, I have only to add that from the 12th May up to the present time Government offices have been open, and the demand and collections on the 15th September were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demand for May and June—</th>
<th>Collections—</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rs. 5,18,772-2-11</td>
<td>Rs. 4,44,436-0-6.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The balance is in the course of realization.

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**RETURN OF EXTRA POLICE AND HORSE.**

*For Sudder Office.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sowars</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>50</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkundazes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cotwalcs Saharanpoor.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jemadars</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th>2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burkundazes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names of Community</td>
<td>Saharanpoor</td>
<td>Relief Obtained</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemadars</td>
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<td>Burkundazes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jemadars</td>
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<td>Burkundazes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compd. - C. B. H.</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Return showing the names of the community at Saharanpoor who were here before the relief from Umballa was obtained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Covenanted</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mr. P. C. Trench</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. R. Spankie</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. R. M. Edwards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. H. D. Robertson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. G. W. Collidge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. J. Hutchinson</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uncovenanted</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Mr. J. Morgan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. C. B. Hall</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. J. Lamb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. W. Hyde</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. H. C. Bradford</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. J. Sheels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. R. E. Powell</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stud Department</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14. Mr. J. Thompson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canal Department</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. Captain MacDougall</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Mr. Henderson</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. Mr. E. W. Morrissey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. R. V. Freander</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Fox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Return of persons punished by Court-Martial.

At Saharanpoor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punishment</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imprisoned for life</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. for 22 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. for 14 do.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. for 10 do.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. for 7 do.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. for 5 do.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. for 3 do.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. for 2 do.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. for 6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On bail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flogged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Total: 314
### At Roorkee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hung</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisoned</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fined</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On bail</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flogged</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### At Deobund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hung</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisoned for 10 years</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. for 5 do.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fined</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On bail</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flogged</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>138</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>504</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sd.) R. Spankie, Magistrate.

---

**Return showing the number of villages burnt.**

**Teheel Saharanpoor.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landhora</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murree Khoord</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahurpoor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Teheel Deobund.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuglee</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baboopoor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samplah</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Teheel Nakoor.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tabbur</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmudpoor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majree</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avanhera</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadirgurh</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koondha</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suudoulee</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boodah Kharah</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowagaon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naimpoorah</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Teheel Roorkee.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manuckpoor</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Sd.) R. Spankie, Magistrate.
I have the honor, in continuation of my report of the 26th September 1857, No. 84, to forward, having received it to-day, the copy of Mr. W. C. Plowden's report on his proceedings in this district, during the time that the zillah was eminently disturbed, and our hold over it precarious.

2. This report forms a portion of the proceedings already communicated. I have already expressed my great sense of Mr. Plowden's energy and assistance to me.

Dated Umballa, 3rd February 1858.

From—W. C. Plowden, Esq., Assistant Commissioner,
To—R. Spankie, Esq., Magistrate, Saharanpoor.

It was on the night of the 19th May that I first became aware of the danger to which the Saharanpoor district was exposed. I had that evening been despatched from Umballa with a squadron of Native Regular Cavalry and two Companies of Native Infantry, to preserve order to the west of the Jumna. Finding from your letter to the Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej States, which I had opened, that you were in want of assistance, I put myself in communication with you, and on 21st May marched with the Cavalry to Sirsawa, where, as you will remember, several petty robberies on the highway had already occurred, and where more serious crimes were anticipated. At the same time I requested Captain Garstin to despatch a Company of the Native Infantry under his command to your aid at Saharanpoor.

2. The appearance of troops at Sirsawa had its effect. Confidence was in some degree restored amongst the townspeople. The shops which had been closed were re-opened, and the Thannah Police was augmented by an addition of twenty Sikh matchlockmen under the Dyalgurb Sirdars. The headmen of Chowree, the inhabitants of which village had rendered themselves conspicuous by several acts of impudent criminality, were severely flogged. Their houses were also destroyed. The punishments thus inflicted brought about a temporary diminution of crime in the immediate neighbourhood of Sirsawa.

3. The instructions I had received from Umballa were explicit, and I was unable to stop longer than a day at Sirsawa. But I did not return to the Umballa District till Captain Garstin's company had crossed the river on their way to Saharanpoor. We met them on the march, and it was then I discovered the probable value of the assistance they would render you. They had behaved most insolently whilst at Jugadlu-ee. But it was too late to order them back. In fact it was a question whether the order, if given, would be obeyed.

4. Shortly after my return to the right bank of the river, I received orders to break down the bridge of boats over the Jumna. But as the Umballa District towards the Jumna was perfectly quiet, whilst Saharanpoor was very unsettled, and your position there for the time precarious, it became a matter of necessity to be prepared to give you immediate assistance should you call for it. I therefore decided on allowing the bridge to remain. Nothing could have had a worse moral effect than the proposed measure, which would have entirely cut off our best means of communication with Saharanpoor and Meerut.

5. On the 23rd May Mr. Barnes authorized me to use my discretion in crossing the river to your assistance, and at your request I marched with the cavalry on the 26th to Saharanpoor. It was considered not improbable that the Mahomedans might take advantage of the Eed, which occurred on the 26th, to create a disturbance. But whatever may have been their intentions, that festival passed away without an outbreak. All apprehensions on this score being allayed, you arranged to improve the opportunity afforded by the presence of cavalry, and to punish both the dacoits about Deobund and the disaffected towards Nuckoor. With the operations near Deobund I was not concerned, but a portion of the cavalry under Captain Wyld was despatched to that town.
with Mr. Robertson. A second portion consisting of thirty troopers was left at Saharunpoor, and with the remainder under Lieutenant Plowden I proceeded to Tarpah. There, as you remember, a man named Bukshee had assembled a large body of followers with whom he threatened to attack Nuckoor or Sirsawa. He had become the terror of that portion of the district. Nor was his influence less noxious in Thaneysur. We were not so fortunate as to capture him, for though the dacoits came out to the walls of the village with confidence and fired a few desultory shots, yet they broke and dispersed as soon as the troopers drew near, the neighbouring jungle affording them shelter, and the deep fords of the Jumna a means of escape into Thaneysur.

But though Bukshee remained at large, the object of the expedition was in a measure attained. The village of Tarpah was burnt to the ground. The headmen were secured, and a quantity of cattle was captured. It was made evident to the people that dacoity could not be practised with entire impunity, and the influence of Bukshee was for a time considerably diminished.

6. On our return to Saharunpoor both the parties under Captain Wyld and Lieutenant Plowden united, and on the 29th proceeded in concert to attack Nanuckpoor. As this expedition was conducted under your eyes, I need not do more than allude to it.

7. The Nusseeree Battalion was expected on the 3rd June, and the troops under Captain Wyld and Captain Garstin were directed to march that morning. This order excited discontent amongst the men of the 5th Native Infantry, and on the evening of the 2nd, disaffected spirits in the company broke out into open mutiny. Captain Garstin's personal influence with his men was successfully exerted, and out of seventeen mutineers who made off, one was shot by his more loyal comrades. It was in consequence of this outbreak, I believe, that large bands of Goojurs assembled on the 3rd to attack Saharunpoor. You were present with the troops when we moved out against the rebels. I shall not therefore make any remarks on the matter.

On the 5th we returned to Jugadree, leaving twenty-five troopers under the command of a Jemadar at Saharunpoor.

It was not till the 16th that there was any necessity for our return to your side of the river. Having heard from you that the Jullundur mutineers, who had passed through the south-western portion of the Doon, were on their way to Chilkana, Captain Wyld at my request marched from Dadoooor to intercept them, at the same time I proceeded with 150 Putteela Irregular Horse to Chilkana. But the mutineers had gone through the place the day before our arrival. Their march through the district had the effect of again unsettling that portion of the country, and on the 21st of the month I received intelligence that dacoits were assembling round Sirsawa with the intention of looting the town. A troop of cavalry under Lieutenant Wise at once marched by the fords to that place, while I accompanied Captain Garstin and his men by the road. The dacoits on hearing of our approach took to their heels, but the mischief had already been done. The four villages which had been the gathering places of the dacoits I burnt, and the few prisoners I was able to seize were sent to you for punishment.

I have omitted to mention, that on my return from Chilkana I sent fifty of the Putteela Irregulars to your aid at Saharunpoor.

The looting of Sirsawah was the last occasion on which there was any necessity for my entering your district. Could I have been of any assistance to you at any other time, I should have considered it good fortune.

No. 51, dated Saharunpoor, 6th March 1858.

From—R. Spankie, Esq., Magistrate of Saharunpoor,
To—F. Williams, Esq., Commissioner of the 1st Division, Meerut.

I have the honor to acknowledge your Circular No. 13 of the March, enclosing correspondence regarding the transmission of weekly narratives.
2. I have already submitted a narrative of events up to the 25th September 1857.

3. There was nothing of any importance which happened during my absence in October. Mr. Robertson ably conducted affairs, and the large fair at Peeran Kulliar in the Roorkee Tehseel passed off quietly.

4. The annoyance which commenced before my return has been in existence to the present hour, namely, the gathering of rebels on the Bijour bank of the Ganges with occasional raids across, in one of which a police chowké was burnt and some Irregular Cavalry horses, &c., carried off.

5. To prevent these raids, Lieutenant Colonel Baird Smith, Commanding the Districts of Saharunpoor and Muzaffurnugur, established a moveable column, which as you know has done good service.

6. The most decisive blow however to this system of irritation, was the defeat of some 1,000 rebels who crossed at Mayapoorn above Kunkhul. These men, as you are aware, burnt a bungalow and a chowkee at Mayapoorn, which is the canal head, but they injured neither any part of the town, nor the people. They carried off a signaller of the name of Ross, but when I last heard of him, four weeks ago, he was well and kindly treated. The details of Captain Beisragon’s action with the enemy are no doubt well known to you and need no recapitulation from me.

7. Since the action at Kunkhul, I have been engaged in the district (Pergunnah Fyzabad Behut) testing measurements. No one unacquainted with the circumstances of the past year could have guessed from the demeanour of the people that anarchy had existed during 1857. They go about unarmed and are civil and respectful in their bearing. I was seldom less than six hours a day in the fields with them, and my escort was a couple of sowars. It is, however, only right to mention that the people of this pergunnah did not in any way interfere with the Jullundur mutineers and others who passed through it, but this possibly was more from fear than from any decided sympathy with them, for the pergunnah to the north of the district was on the whole well behaved. The actual disorders did not extend so far. There was a restless feeling of insecurity on the north of the district, followed by some dacoities, but nothing more.

8. In December I was for some time in the Roorkee Tehseel in Pergunnahs Roorkee and Jowallapoor. The people were also civil and respectful, and showed no outward indisposition towards us. Mr. Melville continued until lately in this Tehseel reporting on the condition of Jowallapoor, and he had but a small escort. But in point of fact there can be no confidence placed in the demeanour or bearing of the people. They would always be respectful and submissive until it is in their power to be otherwise. The people of this district, and in all others in the country I suppose, have no sympathy with Government, British or Native. Separate castes and communities have separate ends and desires to attain, and the weakness of Government is their strength, as I stated before in my report up to 25th September. Revenge and loot in the first instance led the agricultural communities here astray. The burning of records, &c., in Tehseel Nuuckoor was the crowning result of a determination to have no obligations towards any one.

9. The common brotherhood of all Mahomedans is a very different matter, and I think it would be impossible to deny that they were in heart and soul against us. They had everything to gain, and little to lose as a general rule. They were in arms against the excesses of the Goorjurs, simply because their time here had not come. The Goorjurs and others were out for a temporary gain and to make the best of the present. The moment they found theirs a losing game, they stopped it; and they bow to the strong hand as long as it is strong. The Mahomedan population is ever against us. I am told that in this and the Muzaffurnugur districts they are bound by oath not to give decisive evidence against each other.
10. Of the temper of the people in Deobund and Nuckoor Tehseels I will speak hereafter. I am now in the Deobund Tehseel.

11. Since the Hurdwar and Kunkhul affair nothing of importance has occurred. I have already reported the disarming of Saharanupoor, and that I am engaged in disarming the district.

12. Of the conduct of Government officers, I have spoken in separate reports. There is no doubt that considerable lukewarmness was exhibited in reporting the intended passage of the Cazee at Hurdwar by the townpeople, (enquiry into this is now going on), and the Rais of Jowallapoor and other Mahomedans came under suspicion, and the towns of Kunkhul, Jowallapoor and Hurdwar were disarmed at the time. One Thannadar, dismissed from his post, joined the Delhi rebels in the earlier stage of the mutinies, and one Jemadar of police is supposed to have done the same thing. The Cotwal of the town and Acting Tehseeldar of Nuckoor was, as you are aware, hung. The Moonsiff of Shamlee was also executed. Burkundazes and sowars were lukewarm from time to time in conveying messages, but on the whole I should say that Government servants behaved very well, and in these I include the Mahomedans also, some of whom have particularly distinguished themselves by practical loyalty.

13. Regarding the general condition of the country, I should say that it is so far satisfactory, that there is no reason to apprehend any serious loss of revenue to Government. The suspension of business, and generally felt insecurity, at first will have caused inconvenience to individuals, but I do not think that the agricultural interests have suffered in this district. The land is well covered with winter crops. The autumn harvest, though not as good as might have been, was on the whole satisfactory, whilst the sugar crops have been abundant. During the disturbances, though undoubtedly some grain was burnt, I do not believe that much was destroyed. I am told that in many instances what was carried off was given back by private arrangement, when it was found that Government still held its own; whilst at the same time in a great many cases, as I should conceive, if A robbed B and B was strong enough to rob C, he did so—and that matters adjusted themselves in that way. It should also be remembered that there has been of late a great market for grain of all kinds.

14. For the last five or six months, however, the Courts have been filling, and numerous cases of violence which occurred in May and June, are under investigation now by the Magisterial authorities and special Commissioner. These late enquiries were of course unavoidable. You will have seen from the returns formerly submitted to you that there was severe punishment ten months ago, and I must say, I feel considerable anxiety regarding the complaints of dacoity, now investigated, lest injustice may be done. Dacoity is at all times an offence difficult to prove against individuals, but I conceive that evidence is far more open to suspicion now, so many months after the occurrence of the crime. I greatly fear that the tendency to punish may lead to much perjury, and malicious but successful prosecution. It may be that I ought to have taken up all these cases myself, but I have a great deal of work of all kinds to do. I do not mean to say that other officers would not do the cases justice. What I mean is that I perhaps know more about the villages themselves than any of the officers now present in the district.

15. I am inclined to think that this point deserves your consideration, and if it be found that the Hawalats of the different Magistrates are filled with persons charged with dacoity and violence committed in the earlier part of the disturbances, it would be well to fix some period after which no charge of dacoity and violence should be taken up for such offences committed prior to September 1857.

16. It would be far safer to punish the villages than particular villagers, by a severe fine or confiscation. I am preparing a list of all villages engaged in dacoity, which I hope to submit before long.
17. Regarding the condition of the country with reference to criminal statistics since August last, I should say that there has been far less crime than usual. This has probably arisen from fear of retribution to come, from an indisposition to hear appeals, and from the nearly total eclipse of the Sudder Court. There has been exceedingly wholesome and severe punishment exhibited, and with this there has been no chance of escape after sentence.

18. I will now add in round numbers a statement showing the progress in collections up to 28th February.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tehseels</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sabarunpoor</td>
<td>407 2 10 5,420 1 0</td>
<td>115 4 6</td>
<td>116 0 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deobund</td>
<td>18,236 8 2 2,555 11 0</td>
<td>58 6 0</td>
<td>165 0 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuckoor</td>
<td>12,904 12 1 2,026 11 0</td>
<td>161 3 3</td>
<td>659 11 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roorkee</td>
<td>12,730 7 10 8,553 8 5</td>
<td>4,712 8 1</td>
<td>1,713 2 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. My presence in the Deobund and Nuckoor Tehseels will probably quicken the realization of balance. The most uncertain portion of the Roorkee balance will be found in Jowallapoor, regarding which I hope I shall shortly submit a separate reference, as this pergunnah has suffered considerably by the abandonment of the lands and the misbehaviour of some of the tribes. I entertain a confident expectation of getting in all my balance with the above exception.

20. Before finally concluding this letter, I venture to suggest that it would be far wiser, with reference to the interest of Government and with regard to due enquiry for the protection of individuals, not to hurry on confiscations of estates; where no promise of pardon has been made, there has been no condonation of offences. A crop is still in the ground, and our object should be to secure the May and June kist of 1858, and to obtain as far as possible all balance before we confiscate. I see no reason to believe that there will be any readiness to take confiscated estates, on condition of paying the balance due on them; and I doubt whether the late disturbances will not have diminished the value of landed property, and from purchase money Government would look to recovery of balance. I think it not at all improbable that capitalists will hang back from investment in land, partly from a feeling of insecurity at present, and chiefly because they entertain an expectation that Government will make some grand changes, and they want to see what these changes will be.

No. 152, dated Saharunpoor, 9th June 1858.

From—R. Spankie, Esq., Magistrate of Saharunpoor,
To—F. Williams, Esq., Commissioner of the 1st Division, Meerut.

In continuation of my letter No. 84 of the 26th September last, I have the honor to request that you will forward to Government the statements accompanying this letter, illustrating the advantage to the State which the happy preservation of this district afforded to the Delhi Field Force, and to the communities of Landour and Mussooree, and the Government Treasury at Deyrah.

2. The statements now submitted are:

1. The number of Kahars (Bearers) forwarded to the Commissariat officers from May to December inclusive, with the amount of advances made to them.

2. The number of carts supplied for Government stores from May to December, and other transport and amount advanced.

3. The number of sand-bags, blankets, &c., &c., sent to Delhi for the Engineer’s park, and amount advanced.

4. The stores supplied to the Commissariat officer at Landour from May to December, with amount of Rupees advanced.

5. Number of Rupees and date of sending them to Deyrah from May to December 1857.

6. Number of advances made to Government servants and others from May to December 1857.
### No. 1.

**Statement of the number of Kahars forwarded to Commissariat Officers from May to December 1857.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount advanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To 1,298 Kahars</td>
<td>Rs. 7,775 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 Carpenters</td>
<td>Rs. 200 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Co.'s Rs.**

- Rs. 7,975 0 0

### No. 2.

**Statement of carriage supplied for Government Stores from May to December 1857.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount advanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>397 Carts</td>
<td>Rs. 458 12 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228 Ponies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72 Mules</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>457 Camels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Bihlies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,504 Bullocks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Elephants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Co.'s Rs.**

- Rs. 458 12 0

### No. 3.

**Statement of Sand-bags, &c., supplied to the Engineer Park at Delhi by order of Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Smith from May to December 1857.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount advanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20,039 Sand bags</td>
<td>Rs. 4,196 0 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For blankets</td>
<td>Rs. 2,799 13 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuwar or coarse tape</td>
<td>Rs. 58 1 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Co.'s Rs.**

- Rs. 7,051 15 3

### No. 4.

**Statement of Stores supplied to the Commissariat Officer at Landour from May to December 1857.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount advanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat, gram, &amp;c.</td>
<td>Rs. 4,867 8 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash to Contractors</td>
<td>Rs. 7,345 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Co.'s Rs.**

- Rs. 12,210 8 3

### No. 5.

**Statement of Treasure remitted to Dehra and Muzaffernuggur from May to December 1857.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th July to Muzaffernuggur</td>
<td>Rs. 4,000 0 0 in Gold Mohurs (291).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th do. Dehra Doon...</td>
<td>Rs. 15,000 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd do. do.</td>
<td>Rs. 35,000 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Sept. do.</td>
<td>Rs. 30,000 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th do. do.</td>
<td>Rs. 30,000 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Dec. do.</td>
<td>Rs. 4,857 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Co.'s Rs.**

- Rs. 1,18,857 5 6
No. 6.

Statement of advances of every other description to Government Establishment, to Officers of Government, and in payment of Troops, &c., &c.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rs. a. p.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From May to December 1857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abstract of Advances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rs. a. p.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kahars and artificers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For carriage of Government stores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the Engineer's Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissariat Officer at Landour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasure to Oeyrah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. to Muzzafarnuggur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances of every other description to officers, &amp;c., in payment of troops...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Co.'s Rs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX.

No. 213, dated 4th August 1857.

From—H. D. Robertson, Esq.,
To—R. Spankie, Esq., Collector of Saharanpoo.

As requested, I have the honor to furnish you with the following account of a tour from which I have just returned. On July 11th, according to your instructions, I left Saharanpoo with thirty Seikh Horse for the purpose of punishing certain Bunjarahs and Goojurs assembled at Futtuah in the Khadir of the Ganges, who had been committing depredation on the villages to the south of Jowallapoo. On arriving at Roorkee I received information that the Bunjarahs had assembled in considerable force, and as Captain Read considered it advisable if possible to procure the assistance of some Gurkhas, an application was made to Saharanpoo, but being unsuccessful, Captain Read ordered a gun accompanied by Europeans, with as many Sappers as could be spared, to proceed with me under the command of Captain MacLagan. On the 14th, arrived at Jowallapoo, raining the whole day; 15th, marched, intending to attack Futtuah, but were unable to cross the Ban Gungah about five miles from our destination, we therefore encamped near its banks at a place called Ranee Majara which had been looted and abandonend. During the march through this lovely country it was distressing to observe the desolation caused by these rascals. For miles the villages were burnt down, and not a living soul was in the neighbourhood. 16th, the river still higher. The boats did not arrive till late in the day, but even had they made their appearance earlier, we could not have crossed on account of the large amount of turns in the rapid stream. While at breakfast some firing was heard towards the river and shortly intelligence came in that the Bunjarahs had crossed. While the troops were getting under weigh two of us went down to see the actual state of affairs, and were fired at from the opposite side by a body of from seventy to one hundred men. We returned the compliment with our rifles, when they retired into the grass jungle, and the gun coming up drove them off altogether. 17th, the river considerably fallen; crossed in about four hours. In the long grass came on a Bunjarah, whose leg was broken by a rifle shot. He stated that six had been killed and nineteen wounded on the previous day; amongst the former were the uncle and nephew of Sherah, their leader; and that 400 men had been present concealed
in the grass. On reaching Futtuh we found that the Bunjarahs had made a precipitate retreat to an island on the Ganges. A number were, however, intercepted, and others shot in crossing. Some grape was also fired wherever any number were seen on the island, but with what effect it was impossible to discover. We now burnt Futtuh and six tandahs or temporary villages, drove off from three to four hundred head of cattle, and allowed the Jowalporee Raos, who had accompanied us and were considerable sufferers, to remove the plundered grain which was stored round Futtuh in large quantities. July 18th and 19th, camp returned to Roorkee. Our great enemy during this trip was the constant rain; for had we been able to cross the Ban Gunga on the first day, the prisoners assured us the Bunjarahs would have fought, but having time to remove a considerable portion of their plundered property to the island, it was not thought worth the risk. Nor could we afford to risk the lives of the Europeans and Natives by continuing long enough encamped in this low swampy land to procure boats from the canal, all those on the banks of the Ganges having been sunk. Though the results were not so satisfactory as they might have been had the weather been more favourable, still the Bunjarahs seem to have felt the loss of their cattle, as the following day eleven gave themselves up, offering to betray all the ringleaders if a sufficient force would accompany them. The news from Deobund however made us move in that direction. The prisoners taken in the Khadir were tried at Roorkee, when eleven were hung, the remainder being released after receiving corporal punishment. 21st, moved to Mahomedpoor with the same force as formerly, and here heard that the dacoits assembled before Deobund had scattered, and returned to their respective villages. 22nd, marched to Deobund via certain villages in the vicinity of Poor in the Muzzafurnuggur district, who had joined in the attack on Deobund. Here we made prisoners of the Lumberdars and some notorious characters. Further on at Chota Sampala we surprised a party of Goojurs in the act of dividing plundered property, and in the ravines below another party at the same work; all this property was subsequently recognized in Deobund. In the evening I examined the city and found that in the Mohullahs inhabited by the mahajuns, bunyahs, and other wealthy men, all property not removed had been broken up. There was, however, little appearance of digging, so that I suspect the actual cash or valuables possessed by these men escaped. In fact the resistance seems to have been so determined that there could have been but little time at the disposal of the villagers to dig for treasure. The attack had been most systematically carried out, certain villagers confining their operations to particular Mohullahs. The Mohullahs inhabited by the Goojurs, Mahomedans, and Chumars, were, uninjured, though actually on the outskirts of the city, from which it might be suspected that these parties had some interest in the attack, but I could find no plundered property in their houses. Bagwan Singh, an important person here, with almost all his relations, was severely wounded in defending his house, and his son was carried off by the dacoits. During the night I obtained exact information of the village Sulahpoor, where Bagwan Singh's son was concealed, and surrounded it at daybreak with the Scik Horse and Captain Drummond's Canal Sowars. As Bagwan Singh had expressed considerable alarm that the child would be killed if the village was attacked, I offered a reward of Rupees 100 to any of our men who might succeed in bringing him out safely. This had the desired effect, and most of the men of the village being secured, we advanced to Bunhera, which had been the original possessor of the boy, and from whom the village of Sulahpoor had captured him after a fight. Here also we seized the men and burnt a portion of the village. While Captain Drummond and myself were engaged in this direction, Captain Read and Boisragon burnt the villages of Dookhcharah and Mankee, from which the inhabitants had fled. During the 24th and 25th we were engaged in examining our prisoners, and bringing them forward for recognition by the residents of Deobund, and in the evening received orders to return to Saharunpoor, in consequence of reports of an intended attack on that place. This recall was unfor-
tunate, as many of the leading villages were left unpunished, in consequence of
the unceasing rain during the 24th and 25th. Still so severe was the punish-
ment inflicted on those attacked, that we may entertain hopes of the Khatah
remaining quiet for some time. While at Deobund forty-five men were hung
and seventeen sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, the remainder being released,
some on security.

In the line of country from Roorkee to Deobund and thence to Saharan-
poor we were surprised at the amount and luxuriance of the khureef crops,
indicating tolerable agricultural prospects in spite of the disturbances.

Captains Read and Drummond are entitled to the warmest acknowledg-
ment from the civil authorities, on account of the interest they have taken in
keeping the eastern portion of this district in order.

No. 241

From—H. D. Robertson, Esq.,
To—R. Spankie, Esq., Collector, &c.

In reply to your demi-official letter, I have the honor to forward the follow-
ing account of my transactions in the interior of the district since the com-
 mencement of the disturbances.

2. On the 23rd of May, in consequence of repeated robberies on the
Mohun road as ordered, I proceeded to Kherees with some twenty Pundaree
sowars. We caught two Chumars that morning in the act of plundering the
dak, and under an escort supplied by the Harourah zemindars, a band of twenty-
six men captured with plundered property were forwarded to Saharanpoor. As
the village of Gokulwalla had attacked parties passing near it, I determined
to seize the zemindars, but not considering myself strong enough to attack
the village with sowars alone should resistance be offered, I called on Dedar
Singh and the Kherees zemindars to supply me with men. The former at once
brought about a hundred, the latter some fifty men, many of whom were well
armed. We started at night, and by daybreak the village was surrounded and
the zemindars quietly seized. All the chowliies were then doubled by enlisting
a portion of the men who had so willingly come forward, and since that date
there has not been to my knowledge any disturbance on this road. Throughout
it was painful to observe the totally deserted state of the road; still the loyalty
of the majority of the villages was very encouraging. I here received much
assistance from Mr. Hyde of the Judge's Office.

3. Returning to Saharanpoor on May 26th, I received your orders to pro-
cceed to Deobund, for which place I started the same night accompanied by
Major Williams, Captain Wyld, a troop of 1st Lancers, and thirty men of
the 29th Native Infantry. On approaching Deobund we were met by all the
respectable inhabitants, who accompanied us into the city, where the whole
population greeted us with the most hearty demonstrations of loyalty. This
town, as also all others of any importance in the district, I have invariably
found throughout these disturbances decidedly loyal to Government.

On the 27th of May after carefully examining several cases, I determined
to punish the villages of Baboopoor, FuttehpooI, and Simplah Bilkal. These
villages had united in an attack on a Russaldar and thirty armed men travel-
ning with their families on the Bijourn road. The aged Russaldar with several
of his men were severely wounded, their property plundered, themselves and
wives deprived of their clothes, and the whole party driven back to Deobund.
During the day notices were issued to the zemindars to appear and answer the
charges, but ascertaining that they had no intention of doing so, and had dis-
patchd horsemen to all the neighbouring Gojur villages to collect reinforce-
ments, it was determined to attack them at once, our force being very small,
as a guard for the camp was necessary. On approaching Baboopoor, we found
some 400 men drawn up and being in bogs where cavalry were useless, it was
for some time doubtful whether the sepoys delay emboldened the villagers, who came forward with the men of the Seikhs, Mr. Colledge, Assistant Magistrate, Mr. Willcocks, Canal Overseer, and the men of his own regiment, and Captain Wyllie of the 30th N. I., became extremely excited regarding a missing man, who was killed by a Brahmin while plundering and exciting the village, who, as far as we could afterwards find out, was the plotters, and marching towards the village, we determined to move as quietly as possible and carry out our orders. We trusted that the example already made would keep them quiet till we could attack with certainty of success.

5. On the 29th May we marched to meet you with some additional troops early next morning, to attack the village of Manickpoor. The villagers had been threatened by the lancers, the 29th, at a very critical time. We trusted that the example already made would keep them quiet till we could attack with certainty of success.

6. On the 5th of June I was ordered to proceed to Roorkee. After visiting some refractory villages, seizing some offenders, and making arrangements regarding the collection of the revenue, I returned to Saharunpoor on the 8th.

7. On the 17th June I accompanied Mr. Bagot’s party in pursuit of 300 sikhs; thirty Goorkhas, forty Seikhs (Putteelah) and the men of his own regiment, and Captain Wyllie of the 30th N. I., became extremely excited regarding a missing man, who was killed by a Brahmin while plundering and exciting the village, who, as far as we could afterwards find out, was the plotters, and marching towards the village, we determined to move as quietly as possible and carry out our orders. We trusted that the example already made would keep them quiet till we could attack with certainty of success.

8. On the 20th June about 4 p.m. I received orders to proceed to Nuckoor which had been threatened by dhows, Mr. Colledge, Assistant Magistrate, Mr. Willcocks, Canal Overseer, and the men of his own regiment, and Captain Wyllie of the 30th N. I., became extremely excited regarding a missing man, who was killed by a Brahmin while plundering and exciting the village, who, as far as we could afterwards find out, was the plotters, and marching towards the village, we determined to move as quietly as possible and carry out our orders. We trusted that the example already made would keep them quiet till we could attack with certainty of success.

9. The plunderers and their property were seized, the plundered property could not have been discovered at daybreak, sending the Goorkhas under a very critical time. We trusted that the example already made would keep them quiet till we could attack with certainty of success.
had been attacked by some 250 Goojurs whom they had dispersed. We had hardly exchanged greetings when an outpost of Irregulars brought information of the advance of the villagers, and shortly after hearing their dhols we prepared to attack them.

9. For an account of the military operations in this quarter, I have taken advantage of Lieutenant Boisragon's report to Major Bagot. The following is an extract from it regarding the affair at Nuckoor:

"About 6 A.M. on the 22nd we reached the camp, where our arrival was heartily welcomed. I had just fallen out my men, warning them to be ready at a moment's notice, when we heard the dhols and shouts of a large body close to our camp. I was sure the arrival of my detachment was unknown to the insurgents, and therefore fell in the men by word of mouth, told off a party of thirty under the Sergeant-Major to advance skirmishing, sent a party of twelve under Mr. Wilcock into a heavy copse of trees, to protect our flank on that side, and detached the Cavalry (consisting of about forty sowars) under Mr. Robertson to the open ground on the right. While I brought up the rest of my men through a very heavy mangoop tope, with the assistance of the cover from the trees and a deep ditch, the whole party sneaked up to the skirmishers and in concealment. During this time the insurgents, having only seen about thirty men, advanced boldly. Unfortunately however before we had all got properly into position, the order was given (they say by the Sergeant-Major) to commence firing, the enemy having been 'peppering at us the whole time. As they were still about 160 yards off, and not wishing to warn the enemy by bugle sounds, I went out in front to stop the firing on our side. While trying to do this, three shots fell close to me, on seeing which the men rushed out of the ditch and fired, and with a cheer went on despising numbers or 'distance, quite forgetting that with forty rounds of ammunition and an eighteen miles march they had no chance in running with the enemy. While this was going on to my front, Mr. Robertson was attacked by a large body on the right and had some narrow escapes from their bullets, one man (an amateur city sowar) being killed close to him. As soon as the party in our front gave way, threw hole 6 or 700 took to their heels. We pursued them for about five miles, overtaking numbers and finding many concealed in trees. The loss on the enemy's side must have been between fifty and sixty, while we escaped without a scratch with the exception of the city man alluded to. We took several prisoners, from whom we obtained much information, and also the names of the Lumberdars, one of whom was among the killed. We burnt four of the principal villages, where I first collected the charpoys for my sepoys. We returned to camp about 10 o'clock."

10. On the evening of the 22nd I hung in the arch of the Tehseelee gate one of the zamindars of Sudoulee taken a prisoner by Lieutenant Boisragon, and flogging the rest within an inch of their lives, released them. On the 23rd we attacked and burnt the villages of Sudoulee and Rundhewah which had been abandoned.

11. In examining the extent of the damage inflicted by the dacoits at Nuckoor, it appeared that all the Mehals had been attacked and gutted with the exception of that inhabited by the Mahomedans where the Thannahdar with his police and the Tehseeldar took refuge during the assault. Not the slightest attempt at resistance seems to have been made by the police. All the Government records, with the Mahajuns' accounts, bonds, &c., were torn up and scattered over the neighbouring gardens. Some three or four city people were killed and several wounded, but the assailants seem to have suffered the most severely.

12. Although Ghatampoor and several villages in the vicinity of Umbotolah were principals in these disturbances, we were unable to punish them at present, as I was extremely anxious to push on before the rains commenced and attack the Ranghurs reported to be assembled in the Khadir of the Jumna, which from my knowledge of the country I knew would become inaccessible the moment the rain
fell. So we marched at once for Gungoh, intending if possible to surprise
"Futtabah," the proclaimed king of the Goorjurs at Boodha Kheree. The
following is from Lieutenant Boisragon’s report:—

"The next morning (June 24th) we started at 2 A.M., and marched along
quietly until near ‘Nayagaon,’ one of the villages that we burnt down the
first day, and where we were informed a large body were waiting in ambush
for us. All night we moved along cautiously, a reconnoitring party going on
under Mr. Robertson, while I brought my men right under the walls on all
three sides. After some little delay owing to the intense darkness rendering
everything invisible, we got through the village, empty as usual, but showing
symptoms of very late occupation, in fact Mr. Robertson had a shot at some
fellows bolting. With daylight came rain, but the men were all anxious to
push on to meet ‘Futtabah,’ for whose apprehension, with Mr. Robertson’s
sanction, I offered Rupess 200. During our arrangements of observation at
Nayagaon, Mr. Robertson had gone on a mile or so in advance with thirty of
my men and some sepoys, and we did not overtake them until we got to
Mohanpoor, where their further progress was disputed in the shape of a few
bullets fired at Mr. Robertson, who, seeing a large collection of men, demanded
of the Lumberdars to account for the gathering. They, however, sent word
back that, if the Sahib wanted them, he might go into the village and fetch
himself. On my arrival we made arrangements to attack the village, out
of which we drove them in a very few minutes, pursued them a short distance,
and killed six, one of whom was recognized as an escaped prisoner from the
Meerut Jail, and who had only two days previously murdered a bunyah at
Gungoh. We took several prisoners, who corroborated the statements of those
taken at Nuckoor that Bhooda Kheree was the leading village in the rebellion.
We now went straight to Bhoda Kheree, where we were informed there were
two small guns mounted on the towers of an old Mahratta fort in the village.
This was my first point of attack, and the parties were told off for either of
these towers. But the place had been abandoned, so with the elephants I
demolished the ‘would-be-king’s palace, and then burnt the village. We then
marched into Gungoh another seven miles, which we reached about 2 P.M.,
having marched fully twenty-one miles."

13. In consequence of the constant heavy work lately, we determined to
give the men a day’s rest at Gungoh, which also enabled me by high offers of
reward to obtain what afterwards turned out to be very correct information
regarding the position and numbers of the Koondah Banghurs. Early on the
26th June we started to attack them, and the following is from Lieutenant
Boisragon’s account:—

"On the morning of the 26th we started at 1½ A.M. As it was a good
road, I took the Goorjurs down on the hackeries, which I intended making
use of as barricades should necessity compel me. During the 26th we had
most unpleasant reports regarding the Irregulars. I will, however, give the
Irregulars the credit to say they had hitherto done their work thoroughly,
though they were very troublesome in camp about supplies. However, I kept
them between the Seikhs (than whose conduct throughout nothing could have
been more satisfactory) and the Goorjurs. When nearing the place where we
expected to find the insurgents, I dismounted my sepoys from the hackeries, and
detached reconnoitring parties under Messrs. Robertson, Colledge, and Willcocks.
Mr. Robertson’s party had not left me five minutes when we heard some six or
eight shots, and Mr. Robertson galloped in to say that a large party were in
front, and that he had been fired at by a number of men amongst the trees.
We all got together and advanced as quickly as we could. About 150 yards
on we came in sight of the villages Oomerpoor (to our left), Shalpoor (on
raised ground in the centre) and Manpoor (on our right). All round and close
to Oomerpoor was an extensive top of mango trees with underwood and
plantain groves. From Oomerpoor to Manpoor must be about half a mile, and
the whole of this extent was covered with human beings, in some places ten
and twenty deep. We saw a goodly party of horsemen, and the whole force
could not have numbered under 3,000 men. The extent of ground covered by
the insurgents prevented my attacking them in line, so I divided the whole
force into two divisions, flanking each with cavalry and a party of cavalry
in the centre. Mr. Hyde took the cavalry on the left flank, and I detached
the Sergeant-Major and Mr. Willecocks to assist Mr. Robertson with the left
division. Mr. Colledge accompanied me with the right. The two divisions
attacked them on either flank, beating them up towards Shahpoor. This was
very soon done, and they all amassed between Shahpoor and Oomerpoor, where
they kept firing at us until the party under Mr. Robertson gave them a volley
followed by several successful shots from our side. As soon as we saw the
enemy wavering (we had all met by this time), we gave a cheer and charged
when they scattered. We found a good many had been killed by the volley,
and as we wanted to give them a good lesson, I allowed my men to follow as
they liked. Mr. Robertson had galloped off with the cavalry in pursuit, and
gave a first-rate account of them. We chased them for some two miles, when
coming on an extensive thick jungle I sounded the ‘assembly,’ and from the
accounts of the officers with the various parties, we calculated their killed to
be upwards of 160. The main body of the runaways having turned towards
‘Koondah Kullan’ we marched on to it, coming across numbers of dead
bodies and men concealed in wells and trees. On arriving before Koondah, we
saw a large body behind trees and walls, who immediately began firing on us.
Mr. Robertson on one side and Mr. Colledge on the other went off with the
cavalry to prevent their escape from the rear of the village but this a large
division, though numbers were driven back into the village and plantain
gardens. It was here that a Sikh trooper was wounded by a bullet in the
arm and another’s horse killed. Several men were concealed in their houses,
and attacked our Goorkhas as they went through, but they paid dearly for their
rashness, as our men spared none of them, and upwards of seventy were killed
near and about the village. We then burnt the village.”

14. The object of the Ranghur gathering was to attack the towns of
Suknoutee and Gungoh, and their total defeat has up to this date saved those
important places. On our return to Gungoh I hung a Chowkeedar and a
Ranghur, both taken in arms, and as I had been for two days pressed to return
to Saharunpoor, we started the following morning via Rampoor, which had
been threatened, arriving at Saharunpoor on June, the 28th.

15. The threatening state of affairs elsewhere, which necessitated the
early return of our force, prevented me from entering on many investigations
which would have made the result of our expedition more satisfactory, but
the constant necessity for active exertion night and day during the month
of June made this an impossibility. From the almost universal opinion
expressed by all classes of natives with whom I had an opportunity of
conversing, it would seem that the extensive rising in this part of the district
was attributed entirely to the influential Mahomedans of Umbehatah and
Nuckoor. They had excited the Goojurs generally by hopes of plunder,
destruction of bunnahs’ accounts, bonds, &c., and the more influential amongst
them, such as “Futuaah,” with the chance of regaining the consequence
tradition had assigned them in this part of the country, once the principality
of their ancestors. With the Ranghurs as being fanatic co-religionists, there
was little difficulty in procuring their assistance. The fact that neither at
Umbehatah or Nuckoor the Mehals of the Mahomedans were attacked, and that
they did not unite with the townspeople in measures of resistance, tends
much to confirm this general impression of the well-affected. The Ranghurs
in this part of the district seem decidedly hostile to anything short of Maho-
medan supremacy; for unlike the improvident Goojur, their villages are gener-
ally populous and wealthy, so that plunder could hardly be their inducement to
disaffection, and I could not but admire their bigoted daring, never deigning
to ask for quarter, but turning at once upon their pursuers, though perhaps
only wretchedly armed with a Gundasah or some such weapon. The 14th and
other Irregular Cavalry Regiments have been, I believe, largely recruited from
these, and the neighbouring villages in the Muzuffurnuggur District.
16. The extracts from Lieutenant Boisragon’s account will show better than any remarks of mine the active and intelligent assistance invariably given by that officer to the civil authorities, as also the hearty co-operation of all the Europeans present; while it was a pleasure to accompany troops that were invariably game day after day to undertake the very heavy work imposed upon them at this trying season of the year.

17. The report of my transactions in the eastern portion of the district was sent in on the 7th of August.

APPENDICES.

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS AT ROORKEE DURING THE DISTURBANCES OF 1857 AND 1858, BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL R. BAIRD SMITH, C.B.

The following narrative is prepared in conformity with the orders of the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General as given in Circular No. 212, dated 30th April 1858.

The state of feeling in the Native Army out of which the mutinies grew was first brought directly under my personal notice at the instance of certain enterprising merchants of Meerut and Delhi who, availing themselves of the facilities for transit supplied by the Ganges Canal, had entered into large speculations in grain for the supply of the Military Bazaars at Futtelghur, Cawnpoor, Mympoor, &c. The grain was ground into flour at the Canal mills, and transported in boats to the points nearest to the stations mentioned. Under date the 24th April 1857, the Native Agent of the Navigation Department at Cawnpoor forwarded to Mr. James Finn, the Superintendent, a report stating that provision had been made for the transport of 1,000 maunds of flour to Cawnpoor, of which 200 maunds had arrived and been offered for sale, that evil-disposed people had however spread a report among the sepoys that in grinding the grain at the Canal mills the bone dust of cows and swine had been mixed with the flour by order of Government, and with the object of defiling Hindoo and Mahomedan alike, that much excitement had been created and none of the flour sold, he therefore requested instructions how he was to act. He was informed in reply, that the Canal Officers had no concern either with the mills or the grain ground in them; that they were entirely in the hands of Native contractors, with whom the proprietors of the grain made their own arrangements, and that the report of any interference of Government with the purity of the flour was false; that he might give this assurance to all requiring information, but no further steps need be taken in the matter.

On the same date that the above circumstances were reported to me, I sent details of them to the late Mr. Colvin, who concurred with me in thinking that any further official interference would not be expedient. I certainly did not attach much significance to the occurrence at the moment, and as it was known to me that the merchants had themselves superintended the grinding of the corn, I considered them to be the best agents to trust so for the removal of the prejudice against it. It was all disposed of ultimately, but not to the sepoys.

As the merchants engaged in these transactions had meant to carry grain to all the important cantonments in the Doob, and had actually made considerable purchases for the purpose, I think it is a fair inference that they were entirely ignorant of any organized or extensive conspiracy against the Government. Considering the ordinary caution of Native traders, it seems incredible that they would have staked eight or ten thousand rupees in speculations of which the failure was inevitable in the event of such a conspiracy breaking out. Although therefore these men may have been conscious of the general feeling of distrust and alienation between the Government and the European community on the one hand, and the Native army on the other, yet it has always been my impression that the actual outbreak of the mutiny took them and their class almost as much by surprise as it did ourselves.
In relation to the same point, I may mention here that almost up to the
date of the outbreak, village communities along the line of the Ganges Canal
were spontaneously entering into contracts for water to extend over three years,
and taking upon themselves considerable pecuniary obligations connected there-
with. After much enquiry among Native officials whose subsequent conduct
has placed their fidelity to Government beyond all question, I have been wholly
unable to discover any satisfactory proof that the agricultural classes with which
this Department is so intimately connected had any knowledge that so terrible
a convulsion as the mutiny was impending.

So far therefore as the conduct of the commercial or agricultural classes
came under my own observation, or was open to my enquiries, it has led me to
believe that as great classes they had no share in the machinations out of which
the outbreak arose, but to the day of its occurrence were occupied with their
own interests and work.

It was before daybreak of the 12th of May 1857, that the first intelligence
of the mutiny of the 10th at Meerut and its disastrous results reached this
station. It came in the form of an express message from Major Waterfield,
Assistant Adjutant-General, to Captain E. Fraser, Commandant Sappers and
Miners, directing the latter officer to proceed with his regiment by forced marches
to Meerut, as the whole of the Native troops were in open mutiny, and
were then supposed to have marched to Delhi with their arms. The message
was communicated to me at daybreak, and I then suggested to Captain Fraser
that instead of proceeding to Meerut by forced marches and thus arriving with
officers and men fatigued, it would be both quicker and better to drop down the
Ganges Canal. This being agreed to, measures were at once concerted with
Mr. James Finn, the Superintendent of Navigation for collecting the boats re-
quired, and by this officer's indefatigable exertions the whole number necessary
for the regiment was equipped by noon.

Meanwhile, a second message had arrived from Major Waterfield convey-
ing Major-General Hewitt's orders for two Companies to be left in the Canton-
ments at Roorkee, which was accordingly done, and at 2 P.M. of the 12th, the
head-quarters and six companies embarked with all their baggage and reached
their destination in due course.

After seeing the preparations for the Sappers fairly in progress, I wrote to
Major Charles Reid, Commanding at Deyrah, to give him the intelligence of the
mutiny, and to say that as I thought it probable his corps would also be ordered
into Meerut, I would have boats sufficient for the transport of 1,000 men with
their baggage ready within forty-eight hours, and begged him, if so directed, to
march on Roorkee and proceed from thence by water carriage to Meerut. This
letter sent express gave the first intelligence of the mutiny at Deyrah, and Major
Reid at once agreed to the arrangements proposed should the Sirmoor Battalion
receive orders to march.

Having thus disposed of matters connected with the movement of the only
two regiments in this neighbourhood, it was necessary next to consider the posi-
tion of the European community at Roorkee and the best means of providing for
its security. Though far from anticipating at that moment the universality of the
revolt, it was impossible to consider the successful mutiny of three regi-
ments, the march of the mutineers upon Delhi, with its probable results, and
the events of the preceding three months at almost every large military station
in this part of the country, without feeling the gravest apprehension for the
issues that might follow. It seemed to me, therefore, prudent and right that
the worst should be anticipated and provided for, though possibly enough it
might never happen.

The condition of the community here at the time of the mutiny was certain-
ly as defenceless as it well could have been, numbering in all about 200 souls,
of whom about ninety were males fit to bear arms, and the remainder females
and children, it did not include more than about thirty trained soldiers, of whom
not one-fifth had ever seen any service. The rest of the men were assistants

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and clerks in the Civil offices at the station or connected with the Thomason College; all lived in houses scattered over a large area forming the Military Cantonment and Civil Station as shown in the accompanying plan, and the only arms and ammunition available at the moment were thirty stand with thirty rounds for each which had been supplied to Captain MacLagan by Captain Fraser for the use of the soldier students of the Thomason College on the departure of the Sappers and Miners for Meerut.

Considering the circumstances above described, it seemed that the safety of the community would be best secured by providing a defensible post sufficiently large to contain the whole; by arming and strengthening the same, in such ways as were possible; by supplying it with provisions; by organizing a good system of intelligence, and having the different roads of approach to the station watched; and by obtaining a reserve supply of arms and ammunition sufficient for the whole of the male inhabitants at the place.

In the workshops at Roorkee we possessed a place with considerable capability for defence against infantry, or against any coup de main. They were quite untenable against artillery, as the enclosing walls were too weak and thin to stand the fire of even the lightest field guns, but it was hoped that artillery would not be brought against them, and on the whole they formed a far better post than any other large building at our disposal. I determined therefore at once to prepare them for the reception of the community.

The annexed diagram will show the general plan and arrangements of the shops, and reference to it will save the necessity for any detailed description of them. There was ample room and verge enough within the walls for the decent accommodation of even a larger party than ours, and it was only necessary to have the rooms cleared out and filled with some conveniences required for families and children.

From a desire to avoid any unnecessary or premature alarm, I gave my instructions confidentially to Lieutenant Baillie, Superintendent of the Workshops, and Mr. James Finn, Superintendent of Materials, to whom the charge of the Commissariat and Intelligence Departments was entrusted; and most admirably were they carried out by both these gentlemen.

Among the materials for the use of the foundry in the shops were some old Sikh guns, the spoils of the Punjab campaign, much the worse for wear but still not unserviceable. Three of these were selected, and Lieutenant Baillie proceeded at once to construct carriages for them. They were of old French pattern and just too small for six-pounder balls, but this difficulty was got over in the first instance by preparing only grape and canister, and afterwards by casting balls specially for them.

By night-fall of the 12th all needful arrangements had been decided on, and a beginning made in carrying them into effect. The 13th passed quietly over without our receiving any further intelligence from any quarter of the progress of the mutiny, and with no signs of disturbance or bad feeling among the sepoys in cantonments.

But about 1 A.M., on the 14th, I was roused from my bed to receive a report that one of the barracks for the soldier-students of the College was on fire, and I proceeded at once to the spot. By the time I arrived, the roof was burning fiercely. Happily there was little or no wind, and the light gusts that occasionally rose came from the east and carried the flames and sparks away from the mass of buildings, all thatched, forming the barrack square. It was doubtless to this circumstance that the escape of the other buildings was due. The fire engines were in full work when I arrived; the Sappers had been brought down from their lines and were working the engines apparently with good will and zeal. All efforts to extinguish the fire were, however useless, and the main object was to prevent its spreading. This was effected, and the damage done was limited to one barrack.
On considering the circumstances connected with this fire so far as they could be ascertained, it was quite clear to me that it was not accidental, and the painful conviction was felt that we had among us the same destructive and mutinous spirit that had shown itself in like forms at other stations. All sense of security for property was at an end, and it only remained for us to take instantly such precautionary measures as were in our power. In the course of the 14th, therefore, the soldier students of the College were armed and formed into a guard having its head-quarters at the Model Room in the workshops. A party of officers undertook mounted patrol duties, and from that time forward the station was traversed at uncertain hours of the night by guards of horse or foot. No further attempts at arson were ever made, and the single barrack destroyed represents the whole loss to Government from the mutiny at this station.

On the 15th, I received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to assume Military command of the place and to detach at once to join his camp one of the two companies of Sappers left here, forwarding with them a considerable convoy of Engineer stores. Measures were at once taken to give effect to these orders.

It had now become necessary to obtain, by some means or other, arms and ammunition for the main body of the community who were found to be almost entirely destitute of them. If our guns were to be of any use to us, powder for them, of which we had not a grain, must also be obtained. In the Magazine of the Sappers about 200 stand of spare arms, considerable quantities of spare musket ammunition, and about 211 barrels of ordnance powder used for mining practice were stored, and of these I determined to take possession. But before doing so, and with reference to the conviction which the recent case of arson had created regarding the state of feeling among the men, it seemed to me expedient first to attach some officers to the detachments, on whose firmness, discretion, and personal influence I could rely. With this view I appointed Captain Drummond, Superintendent, Northern Division Ganges Canal, who formerly had charge of one of the companies and knew all the older soldiers in it, to command the detachment, and Lieutenant Bingham, Headmaster of the Thomason College, who had been for twenty years in the corps, and was universally respected by the Native Officers and soldiers to act as Adjutant. Both officers moved into the lines and resided there permanently.

Orders were then sent to Mr. Conductor Smith in charge of the Magazine to send down the arms, ammunition and ordnance powder to the workshops, and Lieutenant Baillie was instructed to despatch carriage at once for them. The first set of carts were loaded and despatched without the slightest difficulty. The men seemed at first to consider the matter as one with which they had no concern, and a fair supply for the garrison was securely lodged in a temporary Magazine that had been prepared in the shops.

On the second set of carts being loaded, however a change had come over the feelings of the men. They turned out tumultuously, and refused to allow any more arms or ammunition to leave their Magazine. As night had fallen, I directed the carts to be left at the quarter guard, and next morning I rode up to the lines unarmed; and accompanied by a considerable body of sepoys, we sat down in the quarter guard and explained the objects for which I wanted the arms and powder. By this time rumours of large gatherings of Goojurs and other marauding tribes, of which this neighbourhood is a principal seat, had become very rife, and I placed my desire to have arms for the Europeans chiefly on the ground of necessity for being prepared against such attacks. The men were all perfectly civil and respectful, and the conversation ended in their withdrawing all opposition to the removal of the carts, which accordingly reached the workshops in the course of the morning, and all anxiety regarding a sufficient provision of arms and ammunition was at an end.
Satisfactory progress had by this date been made in preparing the workshops for occupation, arrangements for supplies of provisions had been completed, and every road leading to the station was well watched.

On the 16th, the intelligence of the occupation of Delhi by the Meerut mutineers and its terrible consequences was received here, and it seemed quite clear that the proper time had arrived for taking the only step that remained for us by moving the whole community into the workshops.

In considering the details of this move, it was suggested to me by Captain MacLagan that it would be a good plan to place the whole of the College buildings under charge of the sepoys on the withdrawal of the Europeans from them, and as this seemed to me an excellent idea, orders were at once issued for giving effect to it. The sepoys were informed that it had now become necessary to arrange for the defence of the station, and that relying on their conduct and loyalty I placed the cantonments and college under their charge, and directed them to protect the same from all injury. Circular instructions were at the same time sent to all the inhabitants of the station directing them to move into the workshops in the course of the day, taking with them such articles only as were indispensably necessary for them and their families.

Much excitement and alarm naturally prevailed, but the movement into the shops was effected with wonderfully little confusion, and by about 8 P.M. the whole European community, with the exception of the officers attached to the Sappers, who remained with their men, had been collected within the walls, and quarters moderately comfortable and perfectly safe were occupied by the women and children.

A strong sepoy guard under Lieutenant Fulford of Engineers occupied the hall of the Thomason College. The men were obedient, but their excitability was shown on the first rounds of the European night patrol, on hearing which approaching they suddenly flew to their arms, began loading, and seemed to think they were about to be attacked. Finding however that the patrol was friendly, the excitement soon subsided and was not again shown.

The collection of stores to accompany the detachment under orders to join the Commander-in-Chief’s camp having been completed, the company marched on the morning of the 18th to Secunderpoor, it being intended that it should proceed via Saharanpoor and Juggadrie. There were no difficulties made by the men about marching, and they seemed all quite content to proceed to Delhi. The day passed quickly over, and the garrison of the workshops was organised and distributed at its different posts. Entrenchments in front of the gateway were completed, and a gun was mounted on the roof of the sheds near the gate, whereby the main street of the Native town of Roorkee was completely commanded, and could if necessary be swept with grape. The bridge also was secured by the same means. The carriages for the two other guns were completed, so that by the 18th our force consisted of about ninety Europeans armed with carbines, and three guns. The men were of course wholly undisciplined, but they were all in excellent heart and quite prepared, if need were, to defend themselves and their families as vigorously as Englishmen usually do.

The 18th was a day of intense anxiety and great risk. About noon a messenger arrived from Meerut in the lines, and his arrival was followed by an outburst of weeping and wailing among the women of the regiment, and of excitement and agitation among the men, the effects of which were soon perceived by the European officers. About 3 P.M. Captain Drummond and Lieutenant Bingham reported to me that a rumour was current in the lines of the whole corps at Meerut having been destroyed by grape, and that so great was the excitement in consequence that they conceived an outbreak possible at any moment. I stated that rumours of this kind were among the most likely means of agitation to be used by ill-disposed men among them, that I had myself a letter of the 16th from the Adjutant, in which no allusion whatever was made to any catastrophe or that date; the letter was given to Captain Drummond, and he carried it to the lines with him, and explained its contents to the men.
His personal influence and that of Lieutenant Bingham were sufficient to prevent any disturbance at the moment, but matters were so evidently near a crisis that I quietly warned the officers of the garrison, and had all needful arrangements made to meet any sudden attack.

All was still however till about 10 p.m., when a sowar arrived from Secunderpoor and reported to me that the detachment there was in open mutiny, had insisted on returning to Roorkee to rejoin their comrades. They were now about four or five miles distant. With this detachment there were two officers, Lieutenants Pemberton and Jeffreys of Engineers, one Warrant Officer and two European Non-Commissioned Officers. The sowar informed me that he had seen the whole of the Europeans marching back with the men. The town of Roorkee was greatly agitated, many of the inhabitants were flying, and general alarm prevailed among the natives. I immediately sent men out on the road by which the detachment was approaching to watch its movements. About half a mile from Roorkee a side road diverges from the main line and, leading to the Guneshpoor bridge across the Ganges canal, gives a direct communication with the cantonment without passing through the town of Roorkee. That the mutinous detachment should have left all its European Officers unharmed and should be returning with them and the whole of the public stores under their charge seemed to indicate but little virulence of spirit and I concluded that probably no attempt would be made that night, at any rate, to disturb the peace of the place. It seemed farther probable that if the men were thus disposed, they would avoid the workshops and take the direct road to their lines. The videttes sent out to watch the detachment were instructed to forward instant intelligence of the line the company should take, and meanwhile the garrison was held in readiness for service according to circumstances.

About midnight information was brought to me from the advanced posts that the detachment had turned off from the main road and was marching direct to cantonments so that all immediate risk of a collision was postponed.

On this I returned from the gate guard to the Esplanade of the workshops, and found there Captain Drummond, Lieutenant Bingham, and all the Europeans from cantonments. Shortly afterwards Lieutenant Pemberton with his party reported themselves to me, and somewhat later Lieutenant Jeffreys arrived in garrison. From these gentlemen I received statements of the progress of events outside the garrison during the night of the 18th.

Captain Drummond and Lieutenant Bingham slept in the quarter guard. Before midnight they were visited by the Native Officers and a party of the men who told them that they were certain of the destruction of the corps at Meerut, and that they determined generally no longer to serve Government, but that many among them, and the party then present in particular, were anxious to save the European Officers from harm, and had come to entreat them to leave the lines at once, that all remonstrance was a waste of time and added greatly to the risks of mishap, as there were bad men among them who were then doing all in their power to provoke a collision in which the Europeans might be destroyed, but that they were prepared to conduct them in safety to the workshops. After some conversation it became quite evident to Captain Drummond and Lieutenant Bingham that their longer presence was merely provocative of evil, and they accordingly stated their readiness to leave. Collecting from the barracks all the Europeans there, the small party, consisting of ten or twelve in all, was escorted by the Native Officers and men, who were observed to form a complete circle round them, beyond the college grounds and there they separated, the sepoys returning to their lines. Throughout, the bearing of the men was described as more than respectful, and no doubt was entertained by the officers that if they had been attacked the men with them would have protected them at the risk of their own lives. The party of Europeans as already mentioned reached the workshops in safety about midnight.

From Lieutenant Pemberton I learned the course of events with the detachment that had marched back from Secunderpoor. The same messenger
that had brought tidings of the collision at Meerut to Roorkee continued his
progress to Scunderpooor and communicated the intelligence to the detach-
ment there. On receiving it the men seem to have taken their decision at once
to return to Roorkee, having probably been requested to do so by their com-
rades there. The Native Officers communicated this decision to Lieutenant
Pemberton, and, in reply to his remonstrances, only said that the detachment
had determined to return and would obey no orders to the contrary. The men
immediately commenced to get the store carts ready for the march. They
maintained a perfectly inoffensive manner towards the Europeans and between
6 and 7 P.M. commenced their retrograde march. On reaching the lines about
midnight the Native Officers requested Lieutenant Pemberton and the other
Europeans to leave at once, which they accordingly did and joined us in the
workshops, beyond the walls of which no European now remained.

I had a watch kept on the movements of the men in the lines throughout
the night, and just before daybreak one of the scouts brought me intelligence
that a good deal of firing had been heard, that he thought some disturbance had
broken out among the men themselves and that some were running away.
I at once took measures for organising as strong a party as could safely be
spared from the garrison, about forty men, and attaching one gun to it, placed it
under command of Captain Maclagan and sent it at daylight to clear the lines
and drive out any men who might be found there. On reaching the lines
Captain Maclagan found that the main body of the mutineers had fled before
daylight toward the Ganges, that about fifty, including several Native Officers,
had remained in the lines, and it was their determination to remain, and the
collision this gave rise to, that had caused the confusion reported to me by the
scout. The mutineers had seriously maltreated them, had fired into them,
slightly wounded the old Subadar whose property to the value of Rupees 2,000
they had plundered, tearing his gold necklace from his neck and his many
medals from his breast. The other officers had been only less harshly used, the
Magazine had been broken open, some camp equipage destroyed, but the bar-
racks were untouched. Strange to say the sentry at the quarter guard main-
tained his post throughout the collision, and was found upon it when the
garrison detachment occupied the lines. The man was promoted to the rank
of Havildar by the order of the Commander-in-Chief on the matter being re-
ported to him.

Thus passed what I have ever considered as the real crisis of the mutiny
for the station. Three hundred trained soldiers like the Sappers might have
been very dangerous foes to a body of about ninety men hampered by the charge
of upwards of a hundred helpless women and children. They would never
have taken the workshops, I believe, but so much cover existed outside the
walls for them that they would doubtless have caused many deplorable casual-
ties. The station of Roorkee with all its public and private property outside
the workshop walls was also temporarily at their mercy. Happily however
they were considerably more afraid of us than we of them.

The men who were left, informed me that they fully expected us to attack
them on the morning of the 19th, and knowing we had three guns with abun-
dance of "grape," their hearts failed them and they fled.

During the progress of the mutiny I had been in frequent communica-
tion with the residents of Saharanpoor who were watching events here with
deep and natural anxiety and was glad to be able to send intelligence early on
the 19th that for the moment at least our position was perfectly secure.

The mutinous sepoys having been traced across the Ganges and found to
be making apparently for Oudh, there seemed little probability of their giving
us any farther trouble, and attention could be given to the condition of the
district around us which we had hitherto been compelled to neglect. Almost
simultaneously with the arrival here of the news of the mutiny at Meerut,
there arrived rumours of risings of the Goorjs and other marauding tribes.
Their old instinct of plunder sprung up strong and active, the moment it was
conceived that our repressive influence had passed away, and several instances of petty attacks on canal posts had been reported. On the 15th an attempt was made to sack the large town of Munglour, and constant rumours of designs against Roorkee were brought in. The object in all these attacks seemed to be merely plunder; they were in no way specially directed against Europeans or against the Government, but every large town having property or wealth was threatened. It was quite impracticable to take any active measures against the marauders while our small force was paralysed by the presence of the mutinous Sapper sepoys. So soon however as they were disposed of, means were at once taken to re-establish order in the neighbourhood. The plan adopted, and followed throughout the period of the disturbances, was immediately to follow up any rumour of gatherings of marauders at particular places by a visit of part of the garrison to such places. Collisions were very rare and, the plunderers having been made to feel the effects of such as took place as severely as possible, it was not long before we enjoyed comparative immunity from even the reports of their rumoured descents. The system was commenced on the 19th the same day that relieved the Sappers, and scarcely a day passed during the ensuing month that some part of the district was not visited by our patrols. In some instances the townspeople themselves beat off the marauders, as on the 21st at Kunkull when eleven of the assailants were reported to have been killed, and on the 26th at Jowalla-poor, both considerable towns near Hurdwar. About the same time a strong body of dacoits attacked the Ganges Canal Regulators at Myapoor, with the evident object of possessing themselves of the wood and iron work to make weapons. They were very gallantly repulsed and a few of them killed by a party of canal beldars led by the head mistree of the section, "Moollah" by name, and were effectually prevented from doing any mischief. Had they succeeded in their attempt, we must have lost all command over the floods of the Ganges and it is scarcely possible to exaggerate the disastrous results that would have followed the unrestricted entrance of such vast volumes of water into the Canal Channel. I have always considered this feat of Moollah and his party to have been one of the most valuable that could have been performed, as it obviated the risk of the gravest damage being done to works which had cost Government nearly a million sterling, and of deplorable consequences to life and private property besides.

On the 23rd, communication was opened with Saharanpoor by a party from the garrison riding over to that station. The road, usually covered with travellers of different classes, was found utterly deserted. On the 27th a party of eight or ten officers and volunteers, with some armed canal beldars and a few mounted followers, accompanied me on a patrol to the neighbourhood of Hurdwar. This was the first visit made by Europeans to those localities since the outbreak of the mutiny, and the reception given to the party by the inhabitants of Jowallpoor, Kunkull, and Hurdwar, was to all outward appearance enthusiastic, and their professions of loyalty to the Government were earnest and profuse. I have never seen any reason since to question their perfect sincerity, and to the best of my knowledge and belief they have always behaved well. Our visit had an excellent effect in re-assuring the population, and satisfying them that the machinery of Government was not wholly out of gear among them.

It being considered very desirable to visit the southern portion of the district, and if possible to communicate with the isolated station of Mozaffernagur, where it was known that two or three officers were maintaining a most precarious position, a patrol left Roorkee on the 1st June, and proceeded down the Ganges Canal to Jowlee about thirty miles. For about six miles north of this point the villagers had been actively destructive, and had done considerable injury to the canal works, chiefly however by carrying off all the iron and wood they could, doubtless as in other instances to provide themselves with weapons. Two villages had made themselves conspicuous in this plundering, and various articles of Government property having been found in them both were burned. The immediate effect was to lead to very large quantities of iron that had been plundered by other villages from a fleet of canal boats, being
brought back secretly during the night and deposited close to the canal station house. The party proceeded from Jowlee to Mozaffernagur, and returned to Roorkee on the 4th, having made a circuit through the Saharanpore and Mozaffernagur districts of about seventy miles without meeting the slightest obstruction, though being forced to observe that in the latter district the people gave them no welcome but showed so far as they dared that their feelings were hostile and bad.

Some anxiety was felt during the Eed, which was celebrated at this place on the 27th of May. A foolish or malignant report had been circulated in the town that when the Mahomedans had all assembled at prayer it was my intention to open the guns on them and destroy them. And a counter report was current among the European community that the Mahomedans meant to rise that day. The first report I took means to have summarily contradicted and personally assured some of the most influential Mahomedans in the place that, if they conducted themselves loyally and quietly as they had hitherto done, they need have no fear of any bad treatment from the garrison; while to satisfy them that we were able to protect ourselves against any rising, advantage was taken of the Queen's Birthday to shew them the guns and garrison in action by firing a royal salute and a *fue-de-joie*. The Eed passed over with more than usual quietude.

On the 6th of June intelligence was received here of three Europeans Mr. Sub-Conductor Stephens, his wife, and Corporal Bruce attached to the Forest Department, having made their escape from the Patlee Dhoon, and being then in the hands of the Nawab of Najjubbad who was represented as treating them with much kindness and hospitality. As Bijnore was at the time believed to be occupied by the Civil authorities no immediate anxiety regarding the safety of the party was entertained. But on the 11th, the whole of the Europeans from Bijnore having arrived in Roorkee, the position of Mr. Stephens and his companions become very isolated and dangerous, and it was determined to make an effort to relieve them from it. This duty was undertaken by Captain A. C. Robertson, H. M.'s 8th Regiment, and Mr. H. B. Medlicott, Professor of Geology in the Thomason College. The 13th of June was fixed for their departure, and they were to have been escorted as far as Hurdwar by a party of Rohilkund horse about thirty strong which had accompanied Messrs. Shakespeare and Palmer, C.S., from Bijnore. On the afternoon of 13th, however, Mr. Palmer reported to me that, on warning the men for the expedition, the Native Officer in command informed him that they refused to move without an advance of two months' pay! As they had very recently before received pay and were only required to proceed to a place a single march off, Mr. Palmer who intended to accompany them very naturally concluded that an unreasonable demand of this kind indicated the prevalent spirit of mutiny among the men and sought my instructions. A number of ladies occupying my house at the time and the party being at dinner, I did not disturb them, but despatched a note to Lieutenant Ballie in command of the artillery requesting him to get a gun ready for service, and to warn the garrison day guard with such other Europeans as might be in the workshops, for duty. Allowing sufficient time for preparation, I then joined the detachment with Messrs. Shakespeare and Palmer, marched into the sowar's camp, disarmed them all, and made them prisoners. No disturbance was created and the station generally was not aware of the event till it had passed, so all alarm was avoided. The matter was subsequently investigated, and some blame was attached by the Court Martial to Mr. Palmer for prematurely reporting the men in mutiny. I thought however that Mr. Palmer had acted very properly and had quite sufficient grounds for his belief that the men were just trying how far they could go. It was no time to trifle with any symptoms of a mutinous spirit, and I thought it right to order the whole of the men out of the station within twenty-four hours.

The defection of the expected escort was not allowed however to interfere with the expedition of Captain Robertson and Mr. Medlicott, who started the same evening for Hurdwar provided with letters for Mr. Stephens and a verna-
cular demand from myself addressed to the Nawab requiring him to deliver
the Europeans to the officers sent to them.

The party crossed the Ganges on the afternoon of the 14th. Some armed
Canal Beldars were posted at the ghat on the left bank of the river, and a
stronger body of the same occupied a point in the forest about ten or eleven
miles in advance, where a bivouac was established on the night of the 14th till
the moon rose. Then pushing forward with a personal escort of twelve Canal
sowars, Captain Robertson and Mr. Medlicott reached the vicinity of Najeebabad
about 8 A.M. I had instructed them to halt about two miles from the town and
to send forward a couple of sowars with the letters. This they did, and the
demand was instantly complied with by the Nawab. At 2 P.M. Mr. Stephens
and his companions joined Captain Robertson on an elephant provided by the
Nawab, and the whole party retraced their steps towards Roorkee which they
safely reached on the 17th. Up to the last the Nawab had behaved with
uniform kindness, and on their entire route the party had received all possible
help from the villagers and such native officials as they came in contact with.

The whole expedition was admirably conducted by Captain Robertson and
Mr. Medlicott. Their movements were so rapid that no time was left to the ill-
affected party among the Nawab's advisers to raise any obstacles to the delivery
of the prisoners, and it was most satisfactory to have had them rescued in this
way.

From very nearly the commencement of the disturbances it became neces-
sary to rely on our own exertions for the collection of money from the district
for the support of the garrison and the maintenance of the works. I was very
anxious that the latter should not be wholly stopped, as bodies of men would
then have been thrown loose on the country without any legitimate means of
subsistence, and providing them with at least partial employment promised to
be the best means of keeping them in order, and also of giving to the people
generally the impression that the machinery of Government has still maintained
among them. This end was attained in all the public establishments at this
place, none of which ever wholly suspended work. Captain MacLagan carried
on the duties of the College, Captain Drummond those of the Canal, the Work-
shops under Lieutenant Baillie, and Mr. J. Watson gave employment to con-
siderable numbers of mechanics; and, though in all the amount of work done
was necessarily contracted, it was still found to be sufficient for the object in
view. No measures more rigorous than occasional visits to defaulting villages
were found necessary for the collection of the revenue, and the sums so col-
lected with the occasional assistance of remittances from the Collector, Mr.
Spankie, sufficed for all our wants.

The defences of the workshops had been steadily extended and in-
creased as time and means permitted. A new entrenchment was made in
front of the main guard, and in it were mounted on garrison carriages
three old 18-pounders and an 8-inch mortar. The defect of flanking
fire in the long walls of the shops was supplied by projecting musket-
proof platforms as shown in the diagram. Loopholed walls were built
where required, and palisades closed all open points. Shot and shells were cast
for the guns and mortars, and for field purposes two brass and two iron mountain
train guns with two 12-pounder Howitzers were very successfully cast and
bored in the workshops. The iron guns were, I believe, the first of the kind cast
in India. A small body of sowars, forty in number, were raised among the
well-disposed villages, and was very useful in escort and patrol duties. The
Beldars of the Ganges Canal having shown an excellent spirit throughout,
a company 100 strong was formed of selected men from among them, drilled,
and armed with carbines. About as many more were armed with spears and
formed into cantonment and city guards for ordinary police purposes. The
garrison guards were regularly organised and permanent posts allotted to each.
Such interior arrangements as the comfort and health of the community re-
quired were made and maintained. Finding the most usual and pernicious causes
of alarm among the garrison were unfounded reports of attacks from without
and groundless apprehensions of treachery within, it appeared to me that if information as accurate as circumstances would permit were circulated to all, a sedative effect would be produced. It was at first intended to do this merely in manuscript, but as means and labor were both available from the College Press, and at the time unemployed, they were made use of. Out of these circumstances arose the little paper called The Roorkee Garrison Gazette designed solely for the limited object above referred to, and of which only sixty copies were printed. The general management was placed in Captain MacLagan’s hand, but the proofs were invariably read, and the local articles almost as invariably written, by myself so long as I remained at Roorkee. I was made aware of but one indiscretion in the management, the giving of certain information relative to the actual strength of the force before Delhi, which should not have appeared, otherwise, I believe, the information circulated was not only inoffensive but useful, and certainly the local object contemplated was well served by it, as, when people knew regularly what was going on about them, we were singularly free from everything like panics or extravagant alarms. I have thought it right to allude briefly to this matter, as I had of course no authority for the act of establishing a paper of the kind, and if there was any impropriety in it, responsibility must be exclusively mine.

Between June and October but little occurred to vary the ordinary tenor of garrison life. On the 22d June a party of about 200 Goojurs gathered at Mungloir to plunder that town. Captain Robertson, Her Majesty’s 8th, and Lieutenant Pemberton of Engineers were sent with a small detachment of Sappers to disperse them. The marauders began to retire the moment they heard of the approach of the detachment, but Captain Robertson and Lieutenant Pemberton pushing on with only four Canal sowars as escort, dashed in among them, slew three, and captured eight. The Goojurs were rudely armed with old matchlocks, spears and the like, but the whole body fled in confusion then as they ever did before even the smallest of our parties. The eight prisoners were tried and hanged. On the 28th I received orders to proceed to Delhi, and left on the 27th with a large convoy of stores for the Engineer park, and 600 Beldars to serve as Pioneers. The command of the garrison devolved on the next senior officer, Captain H. E. Reid, 50th Native Infantry.

No active movements of any importance were made until the 14th July, when a party of officers and volunteers with a detachment of Sappers, a gun, and some Seikh Horse proceeded under command of Captain MacLagan of Engineers to Futooab, a village in an island between the Bangunga and Ganges, where a large body of marauding Binjarris and others had concentrated, and from whence they issued to plunder the villages of the Ganges, Khadir, carrying off cattle and grain, and driving the inhabitants away from their homes. The detachment was entirely successful, dispersed the plunderers, recovering large stores of grain, and about 300 head of cattle, with a number of prisoners, the ringleaders among whom were executed.

The party returned on the 18th, and next day another detachment under Captain Read with two guns proceeded to the relief of the town of Deobund, which had been kept for some time previous in a state of siege by hordes of Goojurs and was in great danger. A detachment of the Nusseeree Battalion from Saharanpoor reinforced the Roorkee party and a combined attack ended in the utter dispersion of the plunderers. With this affair terminated the necessity for active operations on the eastern side of the district. The country continued perfectly quiet, revenue was paid in freely, and, on my return to Roorkee on the 29th September, I saw no necessity for continuing longer the organisation of the garrison. It was accordingly broken up on the 1st October, its members resumed their ordinary duties, and the station was fully re-occupied. Precautions however were taken to keep all defensive arrangements in efficient order in case of further disturbances. The Europeans retained their arms. A month’s supply of provisions was kept within the workshops, and the ordnance was carefully kept in condition for immediate service. It was thus possible at any moment, if need should be, to resume our defensive position.
The conduct of the whole garrison was throughout self-reliant, cool, resolute, and most exemplary. Officers and men were alike ever ready for active work; and, weak though their numbers were, the maintenance of the peace throughout a large section of this district, the salvation of public property considerably above a million sterling in value, of private property of material amount both in the station itself and in the native towns around it, and the support of the authority of the Government were among the results of their activity, courage, and devotion.

In compliance with the instructions contained in paragraph 7 of Circular No. 212, I have the pleasure to submit the names of the following officers for active and meritorious service during the period of disturbances at this place:—

Captain H. E. Read, 50th Native Infantry.
Captain R. MacLagan, Engineers.
Captain H. Drummond, Engineers.
The late Captain F. Spring, Her Majesty’s 24th Regiment.
Captain A. C. Robertson, Her Majesty’s 8th Regiment.
Lieutenant G. Baillie, Artillery.
Lieutenant E. L. Earle, Artillery.
The late Lieutenant T. E. Dickens, Artillery.
Lieutenant R. C. B. Pemberton, Engineers.
Lieutenant H. W. Jeffreys, Engineers.
Lieutenant R. F. Angelo, 41st Native Infantry.
Lieutenant H. Bingham, Head Master, Thomason College.
Mr. H. B. Medlicott, Professor of Geology, ditto.
Mr. H. Martin, Assistant Superintendent General of Irrigation, N.-W. P.
Mr. Conductor J. Finn, Superintendent of Navigation.
Mr. James Watson, Practical Engineer, Roorkee Workshop.

I may also be allowed to express here in a few words my grateful sense of the constant, cordial, and most effective assistance given to the community of this station by the Magistrate and Collector of the district, Mr. Robert Spankie, during the whole period of the mutinies.
Nominal Roll of Officers of all grades attached to the Irrigation Department, North-Western Provinces, the Thomason College of Civil Engineering, and the Forest Agency in May 1857, with notices of their services during the mutinies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions</th>
<th>Names of Officers</th>
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<th>Head-quarter Stations</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Irrigation Department, N.-W. P. (General.)</td>
<td>Lieutenant-Colonel R. Baird Smith</td>
<td>Superintendent General of Irrigation, N.-W. P. and Visitor, Thomason College</td>
<td>Roorkee ...</td>
<td>Commanded at Roorkee from 12th May to 27th June 1857; proceeded to Delhi as Chief Engineer of the Force there; returned to Roorkee, 30th September 1857, and placed in command of the troops in the Saharanpur and Musafirnuggur Districts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>Mr. H. Martin ...</td>
<td>Assistant ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Mounted patrol; employed on district service; proceeded to Delhi, 27th June, and served there throughout the siege.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganges Canal, Northern Division</td>
<td>Captain H. Drummond</td>
<td>Superintendent ...</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Commanded detachment of Sappers and Miners at Roorkee between 13th and 18th May 1857; brought to notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for courage and conduct during the mutiny of the detachment; constantly employed on Field service in Saharanpur District between May and September; maintained complete order in his division. Served as Commanding Field Engineer with General Jones' column in Rohilkund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditto ditto ...</td>
<td>Captain A. C. Robertson, Her Majesty's 8th Regiment</td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent ...</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Commanded Reserve Guard till 27th June 1857. Constantly employed on Field service in Saharanpur District; conducted successful expedition in June; for rescue of three Europeans from Nujebabad; attacked and dispersed marauders at Junglour; proceeded to Delhi to rejoin his regiment, 27th June, and actively employed there and at Lucknow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>Mr. W. Phillips ...</td>
<td>Supervisor ...</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Mounted patrol; Field service in the district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>Mr. Thomas Martin</td>
<td>Assistant Supervisor ...</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Main guard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>Mr. James Finn ...</td>
<td>Superintendent ...</td>
<td>Ditto ...</td>
<td>Commanded West Guard; in charge of Commissariat and Intelligence Departments; rendered services of the highest merit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>Sergeant Ogle ...</td>
<td>Overseer ...</td>
<td>Cawnpoor ...</td>
<td>Killed there, with his family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>Lieut. G. Baillie, Artillery</td>
<td>Officiating Superintendent ...</td>
<td>Roorkee ...</td>
<td>Commanded artillery; equipped the guns for service. Superintended all interior work in the workshops; constantly employed in district field service; proceeded to Delhi, 18th June; served there and in the Districts of Saharanpur and Musafirnuggur up to present date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Division/Location</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. J. Watson</td>
<td>Ditto ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>West Guard; Officiating Superintendent after Lieutenant Ballie's departure to Delhi; superintended casting of guns, shot and shell; equipped three 18-pounders, two 8-Mortars and four Mountain Train Guns for service; was indefatigable in his exertions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. J. McArthur</td>
<td>Assistant Supervisor</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Attached to Artillery and Store-keeper.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Wilson</td>
<td>Overseer</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Gate Guard.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ainsworth</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trooper Cummings</td>
<td>Assistant Overseer</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Main Guard.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. James Parker</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Bolundshahur</td>
<td>Employed constantly on active service in the Meerut and Bolundshahur Districts, and engaged repeatedly with marauders; restored order in his divisions with much energy, and throughout did excellent service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. C. Anderson</td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent</td>
<td>Futteghur Branch</td>
<td>In camp alone when the mutiny broke out, and escaped to Meerut with great risk of life; actively employed in maintaining order; proceeded to Delhi in August, and served there as Local Ensign with the Punjab Sappers; wounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. H. Nathall</td>
<td>Ditto ditto</td>
<td>Camp</td>
<td>Actively employed in Meerut District; proceeded to Delhi in August, and served there as Local Ensign with the Punjab Sappers; continued service in the Doab, at Lucknow, and in Rohilkund to present date.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. W. H. Macrone</td>
<td>Ditto ditto</td>
<td>Alleegur</td>
<td>Actively employed in district service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munnoo Lall</td>
<td>Assistant Superintendent and Deputy Magistrate</td>
<td>Bolundshahur</td>
<td>Actively loyal and energetic throughout the whole period of the mutinies; recovered large quantities of public property, and materially aided in restoring order and confidence in his charge.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant G. Price</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Cawnpore</td>
<td>Proceeded to Calcutta, 4th June.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd F. Angalo</td>
<td>Officiating Superintendent</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Killed in entrenchment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Tonnochy</td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent</td>
<td>Mynpoorees</td>
<td>On separate duty.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutumber Sing</td>
<td>Assistant Superintendent and Deputy Magistrate</td>
<td>Secandra Rao</td>
<td>Actively loyal throughout the mutinies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhoo Ram</td>
<td>Ditto ditto</td>
<td>Cawnpore</td>
<td>Escaped to Agra, and did duty in the fort-there.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Swan</td>
<td>Assistant Overseer</td>
<td>Camp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nominal Roll of Officers of all grades attached to the Irrigation Department, North-Western Provinces, &c.—(Continued.)

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Head-quarter Stations</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sergeant Burton</td>
<td>Assistant Overseer</td>
<td>Camp</td>
<td>Killed, or died naturally under circumstances unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Fullerton</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etawah Terml. Division</td>
<td>Captain F. Whiting</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Mynpoory</td>
<td>Escaped towards Agra. Killed on or about the 27th June 1857.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant O. Span</td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent</td>
<td>Camp</td>
<td>Escaped to Agra; died in the fort there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sergeant R. Kelly</td>
<td>Overseer</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Killed under circumstances unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Mitchell</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Escaped to Agra; and did duty in the fort there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Jumna Canal</td>
<td>&quot; Scott</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mudsooden</td>
<td>Assistant Supervisor</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Actively loyal throughout the mutinies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant H. A. Brownlow</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Saharanpoor</td>
<td>Actively employed in maintaining order at Saharanpoo; proceeded to Delhi, and served throughout the operations; dangerously wounded; served in Rohilkund with General Jones' force; restored order in his division with energy and tact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; R. Home</td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>In hands of Goojura with his wife and family for some time; treated by them with much kindness, and brought to Saharanpoo; actively employed in district service; proceeded to Delhi and served there as Adjutant of Pioneers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. W. Willcock</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Surrowlee</td>
<td>Employed in district service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Jumna Canal</td>
<td>Sergeant Brown</td>
<td>Assistant Overseer</td>
<td>Camp</td>
<td>Also in hands of Goojura. Employed in district service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant Stewart</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>In camp at time of mutiny at Delhi; escaped to Kurnal; joined Delhi Field forces and served throughout the siege. Active and energetic in the restoration of order in his division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Thomason</td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Escaped from Delhi on 11th May; and, after much suffering, reached Kurnal; served at Delhi throughout the siege.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. H. Rigby</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Camp</td>
<td>Served at Delhi as Local Ensign with Punjab Sappers; died of fever.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Service Details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitzpatrick</td>
<td>Assistant Supervisor</td>
<td>Hansee, Dadoopoor, maintained his post throughout the period of the mutinies, and showed great gallantry and judgment in doing so.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duncan</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Killed there.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Martin</td>
<td>Assistant Overseer</td>
<td>Ditto, aided Sergeant Duncan and did excellent service.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corcoran</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Kurnal, served with artillery at Delhi during the siege; wounded.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Delhi, killed there on 11th May.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Duncan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant E. Walker</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Deyra, left Deyra, 15th May, with Simoor Battalion; district service in Bolundabuhur District; present in the actions on the Hindun; joined at Delhi, and was severely wounded there; died of cholera in July 1857.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. R. Forrest</td>
<td>Deputy Superintendent</td>
<td>Ditto, employed on active service at Nynae Tal; repeatedly engaged with the mutineers from Bareilly.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Maxwell</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Bareilly, killed with his family at Bareilly.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Aspinal</td>
<td>Assistant Superintendent</td>
<td>Ditto, prisoner from May to February when he escaped to Nynae Tal.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Bremner</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Pilibheet, escaped after great danger and suffering to Cawnpoor with his wife; died there of cholera.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant E. Battle</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Nowgong, killed with his family at Jhansee.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Kirchhoff</td>
<td>Overseer</td>
<td>Mahoba, escaped after great danger and suffering to Cawnpoor with his wife; died there of cholera.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant J. Powys</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Bundelkund Works, did duty in fort and district.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. E. Battle</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Agra, staff officer of the garrison; constantly employed in Field service in the district; commanded successful detachment against a strong body of marauders at Futooah, and aided in all measures of internal defence at the station.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain R. Maclagan</td>
<td>Principal</td>
<td>Boorkee, at Umballah when the mutiny broke out; proceeded with Commander-in-Chief's force to Delhi, and served there as Brigade-Major of Engineers throughout the whole of the operations. Severely wounded.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant G. T. Chesney</td>
<td>Assistant Principal</td>
<td>Ditto, commanded Gate Guard and attached to Artillery. Employed in district service; proceeded to Delhi, 10th June, and served throughout the siege.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant E. L. Earle</td>
<td>Professor of Surveying</td>
<td>Ditto, employed in district service; proceeded to Delhi, 10th June, and served throughout the siege.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nominal Roll of Officers of all grades attached to the Irrigation Department, North-Western Provinces, &c.—(Concluded.)

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<th>Notes of Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. H. B. Medlicott</td>
<td>Professor of Geology</td>
<td>Roorkee</td>
<td>Mounted Patrol; constantly employed in Field service in the district; accompanied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Captain Robertson to Najeebabad for rescue of Europeans there; engaged with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant H. Bingham</td>
<td>Head Master</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>insurgents at Deobund. Act ing Adjutant of Detachment Sappers and Miners;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain F. Spring, II. M.'s 24th Regiment</td>
<td>Senior Department</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>brought to notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for courage and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lieutenant R. F. Angelo</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>conduct during the mutiny; proceeded to Delhi and served throughout the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. W. Scotland</td>
<td>Drawing Master</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>operations there as Commandant of Pioneers; also in the Deob, at Lucknow, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sergt. Gilchrist</td>
<td>Assistant Master</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>in Rohilkund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Captain H. E. Read</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Commanded Main Guard; of the greatest assistance in organising the garrison,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and distinguished by his zeal and professional intelligence on all occasions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Sub-Condutor P. Stephens</td>
<td>Forest Overseer</td>
<td>Patari Dhoon</td>
<td>Proceeded to join his regiment 29th June 1857, and killed at Jhelam by the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sergeant H. Bruce</td>
<td>In charge of Saw Mills</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>mutineers of the 14th Native Infantry.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The students of all Departments of the College were embodied for military service.*

- Commanded at Roorkee from 27th June; constantly employed in the districts; commanded successful expedition for the relief of Deobund, and defeated a large body of insurgents there. Most active and energetic throughout the whole period when service was required.
- Prisoner at Najeebabad; rescued with his wife 12th June; commanded garrison artillery, after all the artillery officers left for Delhi.
- Prisoner at Najeebabad; rescued as above; attached to garrison; employed in district; in charge of Engineer's Park with General Jones' force in Rohilkund.

No. 106 (without date).

From—A. Shakespear, Esq., Magistrate and Collector,
To—R. Alexander, Esq., Commissioner of Rohilkund, Bareilly.

I HAVE the honor to supply the Narrative of events attending the outbreak of disturbances in this district, as required by the Government Circular Order No. 212 of the 30th April last.

2. Although only forty miles from Meerut, we remained in profound ignorance of the startling occurrences at Meerut of the 10th of May 1857 until the 13th, and even then it was only by native report we learnt that some frightful calamity had befallen our countrymen at that station. To put an end to the trying state of uncertainty and alarm which pervaded all classes, I despatched sowars to Meerut, and such was the condition of the country, between Bijnour and that place, that the first communication, which the Jemadar of the Police station of Bysoomah had with his head-quarters, was by means of the sowars despatched by me at this time. The whole of that part of the country was swarming with Goajurs and escaped convicts, who stopped and plundered every one, not even sparing the meanest traveller, and fortunate it was for us that they had at this time plenty to occupy them nearer home, and that the river, which during the first few days following the outbreak, was fordable at many points, suddenly rose, for before the vast numbers of these marauders, who shortly afterwards appeared on the opposite bank, eager to pillage the rich marts of Daranuggur and Dhunourah, could cross, I had been enabled to collect and guard the boats on the Bijnour side, and make arrangements for preserving this district from the threatened inroad.

3. On the 16th, the sowars returned from Meerut, bringing me letters confirming the native accounts and the tales told of all they had seen, and of the state of things in the "Dumdumah." The news was immediately followed by overt acts of violence which until then had been averted. The first case of highway robbery occurred on this day, being committed by the Goajurs of Jhal and Oleynda in open day, eight miles from Bijnour, and this was immediately followed by an attack on Shabazpoor Khudder, a village inhabited by Rowahs, a class of first-rate cultivators, which was likewise pillaged by Goajurs.

4. On the 17th a Surburah, sent forward to lay a dak for Mr. Robert Currie, who was on his way to the hills, was attacked and the money taken from him within a few miles of Bijnour, and although measures were taken which resulted in the immediate seizure of the parties concerned in this and in the case of highway robbery, it was quite evident the evil was growing upon us, and it was necessary to adopt stringent measures if we hoped to retain our authority. I accordingly required the principal landholders to aid me to the best of their ability, and I also circulated a notice calling upon all military men on leave at their homes in this district to come in and do service. To these requisitions the Chowdrees of Huldour and Tajpoor instantly responded; and as the Police had been considerably strengthened and a few Non-Commissioned Officers and men, chiefly belonging to the Irregular Cavalry, had come in, we felt pretty certain of being able to keep the district in hand.

5. But during this eventful month when the minds of men were so unsettled that the slightest thing affected them, alarm was taken at circumstances which in ordinary times would have passed unheeded. Thus when on the 18th a company of the 29th Native Infantry, en route to rejoin their corps from duty at Saharanpoor, suddenly made their appearance without any intimation having been received, the fears of the people were greatly excited, more especially as the sepoys did not care to conceal their anger at two untoward circumstances which had occurred in the Saharanpoor district whilst on their
The first of these was the unfortunate encounter with the Sirmoor Battalion on its way down the Ganges Canal to Meerut, and the second, the loss of their baggage, upon which a band of Goojurs made a sudden descent, wounding some of their rear-guard.

6. Notwithstanding the dangerous mood in which they were, our position at this time was such that it was simply a choice of evils, and as an inroad of the Goojurs was hourly expected, I was urgent with the Soobadar to retain his company at Bijnour for the usual halting period of twenty-four hours to enable me to obtain from Moradabad the sanction of the Commanding Officer of the 29th Native Infantry, to their remaining for a few days to assist us in our need. At first I induced them with considerable difficulty to agree to this, but they suddenly changed their minds, and when the permission from Moradabad reached me, they were well on their way to join their comrades at that station. One of the excuses they made for not remaining was that they were short of ammunition, and with the temper they were in, it was extremely fortunate for us that such was the case.

7. On the 19th, the Moradabad Jail was broken, and as the worst prisoners connected with the Bijnour district were imprisoned there, the return of many of them to their villages caused the greatest alarm and the roads became immediately extremely unsafe, and to add to the sense of insecurity, about 300 of the Sappers and Miners after mutinying at Roorkee, suddenly made their appearance at Nujeebabad. With these a negotiation was opened by Mahmood Khan (known as the Nawab of Nujeebabad), who, though he was anxious to avoid any disturbance at that place, was favorable, as appeared subsequently, to an attack being made on us at Bijnour, and we so fully expected their arrival that we began to put the upper story of my house into

8. Fortunately for us the Sappers came to the determination of making straight for Moradabad, where they hoped to obtain ammunition and the assistance of the disaffected men of the 29th Native Infantry. With this view they marched on the 21st to Nugeenah, where they pillaged the Treasury of all it contained in cash, stamps, and opium, and after throwing the whole town into confusion and joining the bad characters of the place in looting the bazar and principal mahajuns, they proceeded on to Dhampoor, where they hoped to repeat the outrage. Here, however, news of their approach had been received, and the tehsel being well adapted for defence, they were compelled to go away without securing any treasure. In fact, the want of ammunition appears to have increased their anxiety to join, as they supposed, the mutinous 29th Native Infantry at Moradabad, but this corps had not up to this time altogether thrown off its allegiance, though it had been guilty of gross excess in releasing some men of the 20th Native Infantry, who had been confined in the jail at that station. Unfortunately for the Sappers, the 29th was on its good behaviour, and apparently anxious to make amends when the fugitives from Roorkee arrived, and the result was that I had the satisfaction of learning that they had not long enjoyed their ill-gotten spoil; two companies of the 29th with some sowars and two guns having gone out against them, and after stripping off their regimentals and relieving them of all their property, had sent them adrift.

9. Whilst these events were occurring elsewhere, at Bijnour itself we had much cause for anxiety, our jail having broken on the day when the Sappers entered Nugeena. The jail, miserably insecure and most inadequately guarded by sixteen men, contained at this time 341 prisoners including those under trial. I had just finished raising the outer wall three feet, and inside alterations were in progress which armed the prisoners with missiles, and about midday of the 21st they attacked the main gate, which they soon succeeded in removing from its hinges. It was clearly a preconcerted affair, in which the prisoners were encouraged by the breaking of the Moradabad Jail two days previously, whilst the
extreme alarm which prevailed consequent on this and the presence of the muti-
nous Sappers in the district made the guard acquiesce quietly in the attempt, which they believed it useless to oppose. The consequence of this feeling was that many of the guard were absent at the time of the outbreak, having left their muskets and ammunition in the guard room, near the gate of the jail. Of this circumstance the prisoners were evidently well aware, for they at once broke into this place, and there secured eleven muskets and several pouches full of cartridges. When I arrived on the spot, which I did almost immediately, all further egress was stopped, some of the prisoners being shot in the attempt, and Mr. G. Palmer, my Joint-Magistrate, coming up shortly afterwards mounted, I despatched him with the few sowars, who had by this time assembled to pursue the fugitives, and the result would have been most satisfactory, had not the prisoners succeeded in getting on a sandbank in the river before a reinforce-
ment sufficient to secure them could arrive, night favoring their escape.

10. On this occasion 215 prisoners escaped, seven were killed, and 126, of whom twelve were wounded, were re-captured or prevented breaking out.

11. This preconcerted plan had, I have no doubt, for one of its objects the
tooting of the Treasury, which was within a short distance, and I therefore at once decided to throw all the coin, except what was actually necessary for cur-
rent expenses, down a well close at hand, the mouth of which could be defended from the top of the Treasury building, and this I accordingly did, whilst Mr. Palmer was in pursuit of the prisoners, and had the satisfaction of finding that this measure had a mostquieting effect, for all felt that we were altogether un-
able to guard the treasure so long as it remained above ground.

12. After this the Goojurs of the Mundawur Pargunnah commenced sys-
tematic plundering, and great excesses were committed all round Bijnour, which I was utterly unable to prevent. I had already called upon the principal men of the district to assist me in preserving the peace, and to send me trustworthy men into Bijnour, but before any of these arrived, on the very day the jail broke and fortunately after the money was down the well, Mahmood Khan arrived with a number of empty carts to carry off (as he told the Deputy Magis-
rate) the treasure to Nujeebabad, and he was much disconcerted when he learnt what had been done with it. As we were ignorant of the change of plan which had led the Sappers to go direct to Moradabad, it may readily be conceived what great cause we had for anxiety at this time, for as the Chowdrees of Hul-
dour and Tajpoor had not then arrived, I had no force to set off against the Pathans, who were evidently in an unsettled and dangerous state of mind. The next two days passed off well, and then I had retainers of the chief Hindoo zemindars round me, and having raised some horse and made arrangements for the safety of the station, I felt myself in a position to act on the offensive. Bunjaras had to be dealt with in the neighbourhood of the jungles, Goojurs were swarming all along the river and committing all sorts of atrocities in con-
cert with their brethren of the opposite bank, and the very troublesome and powerful classes of Mewaties and Bilochees were in large numbers along the boundary of this and the Moradabad district.

13. To check the outrages daily occurring, I at this time appointed some of the most influential Mahomedans to responsible posts, hoping thus to retain them on the side of order, and as it was very necessary to strike a blow some-
where, I sent out all my available sowars under a Naib Ressaldar of the 1st Bengal Irregular Cavalry to save the town of Chandpoor, which was seriously threatened; but the village at which the Mewaties had collected having been burnt, the attack was averted and the south of the district restored to compara-
tive quiet.

14. All this time I had been urging on the authorities at Meerut, Bareilly, and Moradabad, to send me a trustworthy force, however small; for the new levies I had got together would clearly be of no use in the event of a deter-
mined attack, and on the 28th an efficient party of fourteen sowars, nearly all leave men, under command of a Ressaldar of the Gwalior Contingent, made
their appearance and were followed by twenty-five sowars on the new Moradabad Levy, and forty sepoys of the doubtful 29th Native Infantry.

15. The arrival of these men enabled me to depute my Joint-Magistrate, Mr. G. Palmer, with the Teluseedar of Bijnour and the whole of the above sepoys, and thirty sowars under Bahadur Ali, the Gwalior Contingent Ressaldar, to coerce a large gathering of marauders in the Mundawur Pergannah, and ward off an attack which was threatening the town of Mundawur and a large village, Mahomedpoor, inhabited by wealthy Bishnoees. I annex copy of the report of Mr. Palmer's successful operations on this occasion. The blow struck was a very important one, and brought the disturbers of the peace in that part of the district to their senses, and would have assisted materially in effecting a diversion in our favor, had not the occurrences at Bareilly and Moradabad necessitated the sudden recall of the party as noted below.

16. After the Nawab found his plans had miscarried, and that the loyal Hindoos were ready to check any overt act of his, he was most urgent to be allowed to return to Nujeebabad. He consequently left on the 23rd, but on the 1st of June he re-appeared unbidden, and accompanied by at least 200 well armed Pathan matchlockmen, and it was quite evident he felt it was merely a matter of a few days, and then he would be in possession of the district. As his presence in this mood was far from agreeable, I induced him after some trouble to go to settle a matter with some Mewates, a few miles off, and I fully anticipated during his absence to be able to do much towards restoring confidence, but all these hopes were blighted by the serious occurrences elsewhere which followed quickly on each other at this time.

17. The first authentic report of the outbreak at Bareilly reached me on the 3rd of June, but it had been rumoured since the 1st, the bad news having flown with its usual rapidity. I immediately sent out to recall Mr. Palmer and we at this time had a most gloomy prospect with a force of Pathans in the compound, against which we could not hope to stand, whilst a new danger existed in the presence of the sepoys of the 29th Native Infantry, in whose fidelity we could have no trust, as the regiment had distinctly given out that they could only remain loyal so long as the Bareilly Regiments did. When communicating this important intelligence, the Magistrate of Moradabad informed me that their party would probably have to fly on the night he wrote (the 2nd), and recommended me to make for Roorkee without attempting to hold on longer, as doing so would be utterly useless. Mr. Palmer came in at once, and on the arrival of the sepoys, I got rid of them immediately before they had become aware of what had occurred at Bareilly. Their departure on the morning of the 5th was a great relief, for though we had others ready and willing to work us ill, there was some hope of talking them fair, and restraining them from proceeding to extremity, but against a rise of disciplined troops we should have been altogether helpless.

18. During these last days, in addition to urging the Meerut authorities to send assistance, I had pointed out that there was treasure which they could have if they would send for it, and accordingly there being a great want of money at Meerut at this time, Lieutenant Gough with nineteen sowars of the 4th Irregulars escorting twenty-two camels, arrived for this purpose at Bijnour on the 2nd of June.

19. At this time the direct road between Bijnour and Meerut was in the highest degree unsafe, and I was satisfied that this small party would never have been allowed to pass unmolested by the Goojurs, if they had not calculated upon pillaging the treasure on the way back. It was well known to all the country round for what purpose this party had come, and had it been attempted to employ this string of camels in the transport, I am quite sure there would have been opposition and nearly certain loss on the road. I accordingly determined to substitute elephants for camels, and in this manner, by making a forced march, Rupees 50,000 was safely conveyed to Meerut, and at the same time I wrote to the Assistant Adjutant-General to the effect that, when I reported
a few days previously the danger to which my treasure was exposed, I had received no aid from any quarter, but that since then assistance had reached me from Bareilly and Moradabad, which had made me feel much more at ease, but that I should be ready to make over the rest of my available cash, when a sufficient force was sent for it. The fact was that when I wrote this, I was in great hope we should be able to weather the storm, in which case money would have been of great importance to us on this side, and thinking I could keep it safely, I was indisposed to run the risk of sending it laden on camels insufficiently guarded.

20. Mr. Saunders' letter of the 2nd of June was the last communication I had from him. The dâks in every other direction had been for some time closed, and now we were entirely cut off from all knowledge of what was occurring at Moradabad, though from what Mr. Saunders had written, we could not but feel that Moradabad must have met the same fate as Bareilly. The first positive information was conveyed in Major Waterfield's of the 5th, which reached me on the following day, and informed us that the Moradabad Civil Officers had reached in safety, but that we were not to look for any assistance from Meerut, as they would have enough to do to hold their own.

21. Whilst matters were in this state, Mahmood Khan suddenly returned from Jahanabad, in consequence of a report having reached him that I intended to make over the treasure to the Chowdrees of Huldour. The idea had been started, but never seriously entertained, for the Rajpoots had expressed themselves unable to protect it, and such a measure would at once have produced the crisis which it was of such vital importance to postpone as long as possible.

22. The animus shown by the Nawab in this instance, taken in connection with all that was passing around us, proved clearly that he and his retainers were not to be trusted for a moment, and that an outbreak might be precipitated by the smallest accident. It was, therefore, highly necessary to keep him in good humour, and in effecting this the Sudder Ameen of Bijnoun, Syed Ahmed Khan, afforded me the most valuable assistance. This officer's belief is that the Nawab had been so worked upon by the representations of his advisers that when in great alarm he hastened to see him on his sudden return; he (the Nawab) was fully prepared to commit himself openly, and even after he had been pacified and assured that there was no intention to make over the treasure to the Haldour Chowdrees, he remained for the rest of the day in a very dogged and perverse humour, refusing to come to me though twice sent for.

23. This was on the 7th of June, and in the evening of that day Chowdree Purtab Sing received authentic intelligence from Moradabad of what had occurred there and at Bareilly, and it became clear that every Christian's life was sought for. I also obtained information of an intended rising on the part of the Pathans on that night, whilst it was confidently believed by the officials about me that the sepoys of the 29th, of whom we had got rid on the 5th, having been refused any share in the treasure pillaged at that station (Moradabad), and being twitted with having allowed the Bijnoun Europeans and money to slip out of their hands, were on their way back to rectify their mistake.

24. As this was probable enough and the distance was not great, I determined to send off Mrs. Shakespear and the rest of the party that night across the river. I and Mr. Palmer remaining to see what turn things would take; but as it was clear that to attempt to do this, without the knowledge and consent of the Nawab, would not only be impossible but probably occasion an outbreak, about midnight I sent the Sudder Ameen to Mahmood Khan to tell him what was in contemplation. On his asking to speak with the Nawab apart, the reply was that those about him were all Pathans, and had no secrets from each other, but on being pressed he went aside, and when the Sudder Ameen told him of our intentions to send the rest of the party off at once and follow ourselves afterwards, he replied that he could not longer answer for his followers, and that all must leave together, and he refused to come to me, saying he had already
advised our going, and had nothing more to say. On hearing this I was satisfied that there was nothing to be done but to quit the district, and as a last resource, I asked the loyal Hindoo Chowdrees of Huldour and Tajpoor whether they could not manage to hold the district against the Nawab, and eventually, on their expressing their utter inability to do so, I prevailed upon the Nawab to come to me about 2 A.M. of the 8th of June, and then informed him that I had decided to see my wife and the rest of the party across the river. But on my looking round for an escort, I found that, though the compound was full of armed men, none would accompany us, except a small party of sowars under Kootub-ood-deen, the Ressaldar, who had been sent to our aid from Bareilly. A few of my own sowars started with us, but turned back from the river. The Thannadar of Bijnour with all the rest of the Bareilly and Moradabad men, had already quitted the station before we left. The Christian portion of our party consisted of the following individuals:—

Mr. Shakespear, Magistrate and Collector.
Mrs. A. Shakespear and child.
Mr. G. Palmer, Joint-Magistrate and Deputy Collector.
Dr. Knight, Civil Surgeon; Mrs. Knight.
Mr. Robert Currie, C.S.
Mr. Lemaistre, Head Clerk, Collector's Office.
Mrs. Lemaistre and three children.
Mr. Johnson, Clerk, Collector's Office.
Mr. Murphy, Clerk, Magistrate's Office.
Mrs. Murphy and four children.
Mr. Cawood.

26. My object was to reach Roorkee, distant about forty-three miles, before nightfall, but we were seriously delayed in getting across the river, as our departure was so sudden that I had been unable to make any previous arrangement about boats, which, to allow of their being more easily guarded, had been run up a creek, and the consequence was that we were obliged to make for Muzaffernugger instead, at which station we arrived after a most trying march. Here doubts arose as to the fidelity of our escort, and consequently, after resting one day, we marched to Roorkee with our party strengthened by twelve sowars of the 4th Irregulars, a party of whom were at this time stationed at Muzaffernugger under the command of the Adjutant Lieutenant Smith. We arrived safely at Roorkee on the night of the 11th of June; and within a few days afterwards, Lieutenant Smith was murdered by his men, whilst our party of sowars were tried for mutinous conduct in refusing to obey orders, disarmed, and turned out of the cantonment.

27. As my only chance of being able to re-occupy my district, I now applied for a hundred of the Goorkhas, stationed at Saharanpoor, but it was not
found possible to spare a single man, and thus all hope of an immediate return was at an end. I need not here notice all the attempts that were subsequently made to organize a sufficient force, or how the unexpected length of the campaign and the magnitude of the operations before Delhi, entirely frustrated all our plans. It will suffice to notice in the continuation of this narrative the most prominent events which occurred in the Bijnour district during our absence from it.

28. But before doing so, it may be as well to give in this place a brief account of the antecedents of the family of Mahmood Khan, the so-called Nawab of Nujeebad, to whom the district was made over at my departure.

29. The grandfather of Mahmood Khan was Nujeeb Khan, who was a retainer of Doondeh Khan, one of the Sirdars of the Kuthair Pathans, and in 1748 A.D. held charge of the Darranugger portion of the district as a kind of Tehseeldar, and having married his patron’s daughter, obtained possession of what is now comprised in the Bijnour District. Within a few years after, he increased his influence by the capture of a noted dacoit in the Saharunpoor District, and obtained the title of Nujeeb-ood-Dowlah Ameer-ool-Oomrah. In 1755 he built the town of Nujeebad and the neighbouring fort of Putthurgurh.

30. Nujeeb-ood-Dowlah was succeeded in 1774 A.D. by his son, Zabita Khan, but this individual was soon compelled by the Nawab Vizeer, Soojah-ood-Dowlah, to quit this side of the Ganges, and having subsequently obtained a portion of the Saharunpoor district in jaghire from Alumgeer II, he took up his residence at Ghausgurh in that zillah. The son of Zabita Khan was Abdool Quadir, who put out the eyes of Shah Alum, and having been caught by the Mahrattas was imprisoned in an iron cage and put to death by being deprived gradually of his limbs. On this occurring, his brother, Mooen-ood-deen, better known as Bumboo Khan, fled to the Punjab, from which, on the occupation of the Delhi territory by the British in 1803, he returned and obtained a pension of Rupees 5,000 per mensem, with orders at first to live at Bareilly, but on the recommendation of the local authorities he was allowed in 1812 to make Nujeebad his place of residence.

31. After the death of Bumboo Khan, his sons, Mahmood Khan and Jallal-ood-deen Khan, with whom we have now had to do, received a pension of Rupees 1,000 a month for the support of the family, many members of which attained to responsible posts under Government.

32. I now return to my narrative, which until our re-occupation of the district is founded on the most trustworthy native information I have been able to obtain.

33. On the 8th of June, the day of our departure, Mahmood Khan proclaimed himself in the following terms:—“The people are God’s, the country the Padshah’s, and the order (or Government) Nawab Mahmood Khan’s,” in which his own name was substituted for the “Company,” the usual proclamation running thus. The people are God’s, the country the Padshah’s, and the order (or Government) the Sirkar Company Bahadoor’s.” And with reference to this, I would here remark that it is strange such a style of proclamation should have been allowed to have obtained throughout the country for half a century (as I believe, will be found to have been the case) without any of our native officials having brought to notice the misuse of the term “Padshah,” which must undoubtedly have tended to keep alive in the minds of the people the idea that an Emperor at Delhi was still their ruler and the Company only Teekadars or farmers of the Government. The announcement to which I refer is made on all occasions on which any notice has to be given in public places, and would naturally pass unnoticed by an European even should he happen to be in a position to hear it.

34. One of the first things done by the Nawab was to take up the treasure from the well and dispatch it to Nujeebad, and then, having stopped the dakas placed guards at all the ferries, and increased his forces as much as
possible, he proceeded to dispatch a confidential servant to Delhi to obtain authority from the ex-King to his holding the district in his name. These proceedings naturally alarmed the Hindus, but matters did not reach a crisis until Uhmud-oolah, the Nawab's nephew and Tehseeedar of Nujeebad, came to open feud with the Chowdrees by marching in force upon the town of Sherekote, with a view to punishing Oomrao Sing of that place.

35. At this time amongst other acts of direct treason towards the British Government, the Nawab directed the abolition of the established weights throughout the district, ordaining that in future instead of the seer being held to weigh 80, its equivalent should be 100 tolaas, the form of the weight being altered, and a stamp with these words “Mohur-i-Shahce” (imperial stamp) being placed on each.

36. The Nawab's party, however, found a dangerous opponent at the commencement of its rule in March Khan, who being a noted Budmash had collected a large number of bad characters, and lost no time in pillaging a wealthy Mahajan of Sherekote. All classes, except the worst, were at first unanimous in their wish to deprive March Khan of this dangerous power, but Uhmud-oolah soon found it more to his advantage to make a friend of him, as with his assistance the fall of the Hindus would be more speedy.

37. On this coalition being effected, there remained no hope for the Hindus except absolute submission or direct opposition, and the fate of Chowdree Oomrao Sing at Sherekote, who towards the end of July was compelled to fly, losing a large amount of property, clearly foreshadowed what they must all come to unless they stood by each other. A plan was, therefore, formed for attacking the Muslims and turning them out of Sherekote, and this was so successfully managed that Uhmud-oolah after sustaining a complete defeat fled to Nujeebad during the night of the 5th of August.

38. Whilst this was occurring at Sherekote, Mahmood Khan remained at Bijnour with only a few followers, and the youngest of the Huldour Chowdrees taking advantage of this, suddenly made his appearance on the morning of the 6th August, and with the assistance of the Chowdrees of Bijnour attacked the Nawab, who, finding himself unable to hold his own, fled precipitately to Nujeebad. The result was that though the town of Bijnour was saved, all public and private property outside fell into the hands of the rabble, who had joined the Chowdrees simply with the hope of plunder, and were altogether beyond control.

39. For some time after quitting the district I attempted to keep the Nawab to some extent straight, but eventually from the bad accounts which reached me from time to time, and in consequence of the Nawab's determined silence, I came to the conclusion that it only remained to put the Nawab's authority aside by a written order, and consequently on the 7th August, I addressed the Chowdrees directing them to consider themselves responsible for their respective properties, and the quiet of the district, forwarding an intimation to the Nawab, and prohibiting him from leaving Nujeebad or interfering any further in the management of affairs, as he had so grossly exceeded the authority given him on my departure. My object in this was to strengthen the hands of the loyal Hindus and leave the Nawab without excuse. At the time of writing I was of course not aware of the events of the 5th and 6th, which had given temporary success to the Hindus, but on this favorable change being known, it became desirable to delegate the entire management of the district to Mahmood Rahmut Khan, the Deputy Collector, and Syed Uhmud Khan, the Sudder Ameen, two officers who throughout had proved themselves conspicuously loyal, and not having succeeded in quitting the district were available on the spot. Under the authority thus conveyed, these officers assumed charge on the 16th of August, and the daily reports forwarded by them showed that they acted with zeal and judgment; but circumstances had just occurred at Nugeena, which so much aggravated the ill feeling between the Hindus and Muslims that the Mahomedan flag was raised by the Nawab,
and this attempt to recover our lost prestige was brought to a sudden close by
the advance of the Musulmans to within a few miles of Bijnour on the 23rd
of August. A large Jat village was then burnt and plundered by them, and as
there was no sufficient body of Hindoos at Bijnour to oppose them, the greater
portion having gone to Nugeena, it was considered hopeless to attempt to hold
the place, and the Government officials above noted retired to Huldour, where
they continued until after the fall of that place on the 27th idem. In the
meantime, the Musulmans under the order of Ahmed-oollah had been to
Nugeenah to punish the Hindoos there, and on this occasion the entire Mohullah
of the Bishnoees was sacked and burnt; after which an advance was made on
Huldour, where the Hindoos having gone out to meet their opponents sustained
a complete defeat, and after retiring to the town were only saved from total
destruction by the breaking out of fires in all directions, which prevented the
Musulmans from following up the blow. Ahmed-oollah then marched to Bijnour
of which he took possession without opposition, the Jat Chowdrees having fled
across the river. The Chowdree of Tajpoor, Pertab Sing, also at this time
quitted the district and went to Kant in Zillah Moradabad and subsequently
to Meerut, where his followers did excellent service in taking out-post duty;
and the Deputy Collector Rahmut Khan and the Sudder Ameen, Uhmud Khan
likewise took advantage of the opportunity to effect their escape across the
river.

40. On the departure of the Musulmans, the Hindoos again collected in
force at Huldour and retaliated on their enemies by killing all that fell into
their hands, but on the Musulmans again attacking the place, they were driven
to take shelter in their dwelling-house which was fortunately strong enough to
enable them to hold out, though by this time they had lost two out of three of
their own guns and one belonging to the Kant Chowdree. On the Musulmans
retiring, the Chowdrees took refuge for a few days in the large village of Pheena
belonging to their brethren, but they subsequently returned to their own town
where it suited the rebels to leave them unmolested pending an attempt which
was now made to induce the Hindoos to acknowledge their authority.

41. In the hope of effecting an adjustment, it was proposed to appoint Jul-
lal-oool deen Khan, the younger Nawab, Plenipotentiary, but Ahmed-ullah was so
opposed to this as detracting from his authority that it was finally arranged on the
13th of September that a Council should be appointed consisting of Uhmud-
oollah, Uhmudyar Khan (better known as Kullun Khan), Shuffee-oollah, Akhoon-
ub-dooll Rahman, and Uhmud Shah of Nujeebad by whom matters were to be
referred for final orders to Mahmood Khan, and an attempt was made by Sad-
oollah Khan (late Moonsiff of Umrohah and father-in-law of Julal-oool deen) to
induce the Chowdrees to meet him and come to settlement, but this fell to the
ground, as the principal Hindoos would not meet him.

42. The fact was, the Hindoos were still bent on trying their strength once
more with the Nawab and accordingly another fight took place on the 18th of
September, which ending unfavorably as before, the Hindoos were again obliged
to take refuge in Pheena. This was followed by another attempt at reconcilia-
tion, and Chowdree Rundheer Sing of Huldour met the Nawab's eldest son, but
nothing could tempt the younger Chowdrees to put themselves in the power of
the Musulmans, and eventually in the end of September these two latter
made their escape across the Ganges to Meerut.

43. About this time a most wanton massacre of unoffending Hindoos,
chiefly Putwalees, was committed at Sherekote, and the Musulmans so
completely asserted their supremacy that they were now all powerful throughout
the district. As was to be expected, however, disputes immediately arose as
to the division of authority, the notorious Mareh Khan, backed by all the pad
characters of the district, wishing to supersede Uhmud-oollah Khan's authority
altogether; but it was at last arranged that Mahmood Khan should have an
allowance of Rupees 12,000 a month, that the Nugeena, Dhanpoor, and Chand-
poor Tehseels should be made over to Mareh Khan and Ghuzunpur Ali Khan,
the Nawab's eldest son; and Nujeebabad and Bijnour Tehseels put under Uhmud-oollah; Rupees 8,000 of the allowance to the Nawab being contributed by the former and the remainder by the latter. This arrangement continued in force until the 22nd of February 1858.

44. In the meantime Bhod Sing of Huldour, having reached Meerut, most urgently pressed the feasibility of a re-occupation of Bijnour, and as we had at this time no force available it was determined to send some troops belonging to Rao Goolab Sing, a powerful zamindar of Kooteyser in the Bulundshahr District, who with the aid of Goorsahae, Nazim of Hussunpoor in Zillah Moradabad, would, it was hoped, be strong enough to recover Bijnour for us.

45. It was in the end of October, when this move was decided upon, but the Musulmans collecting at Chandpoor in great strength, the Hindoos were never bold enough even to enter the district, whilst the rebels, encouraged by this, surrounded Rundheer Sing at Huldour, and after a gallant defence on his part took him prisoner and sent him off to Nujeebabad, where he was kept, until our arrival in April, enabled him to effect his escape and join our camp.

46. The prospect of the Musulmans was now considered so favorable that several noted rebels of the Moozuffernuggur and Meerut Districts came over and joined them, and amongst the rest came the noted Gooruj Chiefs, Kuddum Sing and Dulail Sing, the Cazee of Thannah Bown, Inayat Ali, and the outlaw Ruza Hussun, otherwise known as Chootun. Three of the Delhi Princes (so called) also came over, and the rebels now took it into their heads to make raids across the river, which they did with some success on several occasions. Chootun burnt the Chowkee of Dhurumpoora, killing four Burkundazes and carrying off two horses; Sirdar Khan and Dulail Sing Gooruj surprised a picket of our cavalry at Runjeetpoor, and took away horses and accoutrements; Dalail Sing burnt the Chowkees of Allahabas and Bhookurharee; Cazee Inayat Ali pillaged the Police outposts of Nijabutpoor seizing two Burkundazes, one of whom was killed, and the other made a Musulman; and, being encouraged by these petty affairs, a considerable force with two guns under Inayat Ali, Dulail Sing, and Chootun crossed on the 5th of January 1858, and burnt the Thannah at Meeranpoor proclaiming the Nawab, and retreating to their own side of the river before our troops could intercept them. Two days after this the rebels made a similar move in the extreme north of the district, surprising the Ganges Canal Chowkee at Myapoor and carrying off a lad employed in the Electric Telegraph Office and other Government servants. After burning the Bungalow, and proclaiming the Nawab at Kunkhul and Hurdwar, they recrossed the river, but when on the 9th emboldened by their success they were again rash enough to come over under Shuffee-oollah they were met and signally defeated by a small party sent out from Roorkee under Captain Boisragon.

47. This failure had the effect of dispersing the rebels considerably, and Uhmudoollah to regain his influence gave out on the 16th of January that all rent-free holdings resumed under our rule would be released, but this does not appear to have helped him much, and the disputes between the several leaders were still so great, that a fresh arrangement became absolutely necessary. This was accordingly made on the 22nd of February, and by it Mahmood Khan's eldest son, Ghuzunfur Ali Khan, was declared heir-apparent, the Nawab's own allowance was reduced to Rupees 8,000 per mensem; Uhmudoollah was nominated to represent the Nawab; Shuffee-oollah and March Khan were made Generals and a jaghire in the Sherekote Pergunnah valuing Rupees 8,000 per annum was assigned to the latter with an allowance of Rupees 600 a month, and a promise of further reward on the conquest of the Doob being completed. Kulunn Khan was appointed Commander-in-Chief, and stipends set a part for all members of the Nawab's family, and an engagement taken from Uhmud-oollah that he would not aspire to the Musulnud or interfere with Ghuzunfur Ali Khan's succession on the Nawab's death.

48. But these idle dreams were not destined to remain long unbroken, for at this very time when in his wilful blindness and crass ignorance the Musul-
man was flattering himself in the belief that his power had the element of stability, a British force was collecting at Roorkee which in a few short days was to send high and low flying for their lives from the district in which they had presumed to exercise their usurped authority.

49. On the 17th of April 1858, all the arrangements being completed we crossed from a little below Kunkul near the head of the Ganges Canal into the Bijour District, and within five days all their bright visions were dispelled and the rebels driven homeless wanderers from the scene of their short-lived misrule.

50. Since the fight at Nuqeena on the 21st of April there has not been the smallest show of opposition, and, though of course cruelly shaken by what they have undergone during ten months of violence and disorder, the people are gradually regaining their confidence in our rule, but it will be long indeed before they can altogether recover the shock they have sustained.

51. Having brought down the narrative to the date of our re-entering the district, it does not appear necessary for me to do more than refer to the several reports noted in the margin which contain full particulars of every important occurrence from that date until the district had resumed its former state of quiet and good government.

(Sd.) A. SHAKESPEARE,
Magistrate and Collector.

APPENDIX.

Dated Zillah Bijour, Camp Mundawur, 2nd June 1857.

FROM—G. PALMER, Esq., Officiating Joint Magistrate,
TO—A. SHAKESPEARE, Esq., Magistrate of Bijour.

I HAVE the honor to report to you the details of an expedition yesterday to the village of “Fuzulpoor,” which I am happy to say was completely successful.

2. I left this place with the force under my command as per margin about 3 P.M. yesterday, with the intention of proceeding against the village of “Timurpoor;” but from information I received on leaving Mundawur, I changed the direction of my march and arrived at the village of “Sheikhopoorah,” distant about half a mile from “Fuzulpoor,” about 4 P.M.; finding that it was a Goorj village, I took the Pudhan as a prisoner with me; his village was quite empty.

3. I had taken care that the troops should be at the head of the column well in advance of the multifarious crowd who followed nominally to aid, but in reality to look on and plunder.

4. When about 700 yards from “Fuzulpoor” I dispatched a Duffadar and eight sowars to a point on the extreme left of the village to reconnoitre, with orders to intercept fugitives in that direction. Immediately after they left me the alarm seems to have been given in the village: a large number of men, about 400 or 500, turned out with drums-beating, and from the flashing of their weapons apparently well armed: their line extended along the whole length of the village, and a tope of trees on its right.

5. When we were about 350 yards distant they began to fire upon us, I immediately deployed the sepoys who advanced steadily supported on the right flank by the Cavalry in a column of threes. When we got within 250 yards of the village, I received intelligence from my reconnoitering party on the flank that the rioters were beginning to run; and by the time the sepoys were within 70 yards of the tope (when I gave them the word to go in with a rush) there was not a man to oppose them.

6. As soon as I perceived that the Infantry no longer required immediate support, I directed the Rissaldar to gallop round the village to the right with
his sowars, which he did very smartly taking up the reconnoitering party sent there in the first instance; and by the time I emerged with the sepoys (who skirmished through the tope) on the other side after firing the village, he met me having made the circuit of the whole and taken several prisoners.

7. I then pushed on with as many sowars as I could muster after the groups of armed men flying in all directions; and succeeded in securing a good number. Meanwhile the sepoys had fired the two Jat villages of “Bhojpoor” and “Tehangeerpooor” on either side of “Fuzulpoor” and stragglers in the rear the two Gooré villages of “Shekkopoora” and “Hossinpoor.”

8. Getting togeéher what force I could I pushed on to the Chohun village of “Narainpoor” for which many of the fugitives made in the first instance; by the time we reached it, was deserted both by them and by its inhabitants. These circumstances together with the quantities of grain and cattle in and about it satisfied me that its inhabitants had been sharers with their neighbours in the recent maraudings, and I accordingly burnt it down.

9. The sun was then setting, and it was with the utmost difficulty that our scattered forces were collected together; but we returned without accident by moonlight reaching Mundawur about 9 p.m.

10. I have reason to believe that about twenty of the rioters were killed chiefly by the sepoys. The whole number of prisoners taken was thirty-two including the Pudhan of “Shekkopoora” and the two Pudhans of “Fuzulpoor.”

11. On our side the only serious casualty was the loss of a sowar’s horse which was disabled by a blow from a tulwar. One sepoy of the 39th, “Mohumud Ali,” received a slight tulwar wound on the fore-finger, and the Subadar an injury on the forehead, not serious, from the rearing of his horse.

12. I am much indebted to Rissaldar “Bahadur Ali Khan” to Subadar “Sheikh Didarubuz” to “Torab Ali,” Tehseeldar of Bijnour, who accompanied the force, for their exertions on this and all occasions since we left Bijnour; and last but not least, to “Monsoonee, Mir Amanut Ali” of Mundawur, whose exertions in providing our Commissariat were of the utmost use.

13. I annex a list of the prisoners, of the villages burnt, and of the arms taken; the latter I have allowed to remain in the hands of the captors with the exception of the guns and a “drum” which I have retained for Government service, as also a pair of “Zumbooruka” which I took from the Pudhan of “Kheree” on the previous day.

14. The exposure and fatigue to which both men and horses were subjected yesterday, and the consequent illness of the Tehseeldar, the Rissaldar, and the Subadar have rendered it impossible to do anything to-day. But I trust that this severe but well merited punishment will have taught the Jats (who have been the principal disturbers of the peace of this district) a lesson which they will not easily forget.

15. I very much regret that the absence of any compact force after the dispersion of the rioters at Fuzulpoor rendered it impossible for me to proceed regularly to examine the other villages; or to prevent indiscriminate pillage.


No. 258, dated Nynne Tal, 22nd July 1858.

From—Major H. Ramsay, Commissioner of Kumaon,
To—William Muir, Esq., Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces.

I have now the honor to submit the report required by your circular, No. 212, dated 30th April.
Mr. Colvin’s letter is enclosed.

2. The news of the Meerut mutiny reached me, then in the snowy ranges of Gurhwal, on 22nd May. I hastened back to Almorah, made what arrangements appeared advisable with Colonel McCausland, and then proceeded to Nainee Tal to do what was possible for the preservation of order at the foot of the hills, to get funds and procure supplies.

3. My applications to Bareilly and Moradabad for money were too late, the sepoys having determined upon protecting the treasuries for themselves, and no larger sums could be taken out of them. The Buheree Tehseel Officers had helped themselves, and I got no money. The Bunjarahs, collected in large numbers, had closed the roads in Rooderpoor, and all trade was at a stand-still. I secured as much grain as I could in the Bhabur, and awaited the course of events.

4. On the 1st June the Bareilly refugees reached Huldwanee, and those of Moradabad, who came to Nainee Tal, arrived at Kala Doongee on the 4th June. All who started, except Sergeant Staples from Bareilly, reached the hills in safety, and from the 6th June we were, for nearly a month, cut off from all communication with the plains. Early in July a dák line was established across the hills through Mussooree.

5. Soon after the 10th June, the most complete disorder prevailed in the plains, and large hordes of dacoits from Rampoor and the Moradabad district filled the Bhabur villages of lower Kota; they stole the cattle, removed thousands of maunds of grain, and did as much damage as possible. Our strength at that time was not sufficient to protect the whole of the Bhabur; I therefore confined my efforts to the Chukhata district in the vicinity of Huldwanee. The hill-cultivators of the Bhabur returned to the hills after a few attempts at resistance, in which about twenty rebels were killed. I could not offer any efficient resistance, and the rebels having in a few days plundered the villages, the country was left a desert.

6. On 27th June, the rebels again collected below upper Kota. I sent a party under Dhun Sing to defend the place, but Mustoo Khan of the Rampoor territory came with an overwhelming force of horse and foot. Dhun Sing and some others were killed, the Tehseel was plundered of the few rupees (about 400) in deposit, and the rebels at once retired without destroying the villages.

7. About the middle of June the evil-disposed of the hill people, especially on the borders of the plains, began to show that they were sensible of our weakness, and as I had no district Police, I felt the necessity of resorting to extreme measures to preserve order; for I foresaw that if any part of the province became disorganized, our position at Nynee Tal would be most critical, and if one pergunnah got into disorder, the probability was others would soon have followed the example.

8. As soon as I saw the danger alluded to above, I proclaimed Martial-Law in Kumaon. In the first few cases of dacoity, I sentenced to long terms of imprisonment: this was not sufficient, and I gave longer sentences, but without success, and at last I sentenced some dacoits to capital punishment. This was made known throughout the province; the bad characters were frightened, the good men felt safe, and the country remained as peaceful as in former years.

9. It soon became evident after the arrival of the Rohilcund refugees, that there was no prospect of immediate relief. Our funds were alarmingly small, and we had then no prospect of assistance. Mr. Colvin and I drew up a scale of allowances, by which we paid every European monthly. Advances were made on receipts, and nearly all have been adjusted.

10. The Rampoor Navab did all in his power to preserve order in his own territories, and assist us; but from the information we received, it appeared quite possible, and even probable, that at the “Bukr Eed,” in the end of July, a disturbance might take place at Rampoor, and if the Navab had been killed, the victorious party would at once have attacked us. The presence of many
ladies and children would have hampered us a good deal in the event of being attacked, and though that was only a chance, contingent on other events, I preferred a timely, though it might be an unnecessary, retreat to the chance of a discreditable flight. I accordingly sent over the ladies and children, about 200, to Almora, and when the Eid festival passed over they all returned to Nainee Tal; this was the only occasion on which any body had to leave Nainee Tal from first to last.

11. The Police sowars and burkundazes (belonging to the plains) ran away on 9th September, and only hill burkundazes remained, but the Police stations at and near Huldwanee were maintained till 17th September, when a party of rebels, mustering about 1,000 horse and foot, took possession of the place. On the 18th, Captain Maxwell with a party of Goorkhas, and about forty Cavalry, composed of Officers and 8 Irregulars, defeated the rebels, killing about 150 of them. Up to the beginning of September the 66th Goorkhas and 8th Irregular Cavalry had protected Huldwanee; but the climate became so dangerous after the rains ceased, I thought it imprudent to risk the lives of such valuable men, and recalled them.

12. The Police after this retired to the entrance to the hills, and kept parties moving about the lower part of the Huldwanee district. On the 6th October the rebels, in number about 5,000, again took possession of the place; it was not deemed advisable to attack them, and an attempt was made to entrap the cavalry portion of the force. Although we failed in securing the cavalry, we created such an alarm that the rebels fearing an attack, were seized with a panic during the night, cut their heel-ropes, and went off helter-skelter, leaving their grain and some other property behind them. One sowar was caught next morning and hanged.

13. The unhealthy season had passed away, and as we expected to hear of a force entering Rohilcund, I urged on Colonel McCausland the necessity of taking up a position at Huldwanee, to protect that part of the district, and be ready to assist in the destruction of the rebels, or at any rate to create a diversion. The arrival of the Nipal Contingent, and advanced state of the Kumaon levies, enabled us to occupy Huldwanee, and leave at Nainee Tal a party strong enough to protect the passes on the Rampoor side; while Lieutenant McIntyre's young regiment was available to take some of the Almorah duties, and, if necessary, guard the eastern passes.

14. On the 1st January the rebels hearing of a supply of grain coming for our camp, made a night march from Rooderpoor and appeared before Huldwanee about 9 A.M. The force under Captain Baugh defeated them, killing about fifty.

15. The impossibility of procuring more supplies of grain, and my store having become exhausted, most of Captain Crossman's cavalry had been ordered to Kasheepoor. In the end of January they returned, and Colonel McCausland came down with the Head-quarters of the 66th Goorkhas, and on 1st February we had about 1,000 infantry, 250 cavalry, two 6-pounders, and two mountain train guns.

16. Fuzil Huq's army of 4,500 with four guns moved up from the east Kala Khan with 4,000 men and four guns advanced from Buheree. Fuzil Huq's army encamped at Sanda, thirteen miles east, and Kala Khan's took up a position sixteen miles south of Huldwanee. They first intended attacking us in front and flank, and the ground was so much in our favor we remained quiet. They then determined upon uniting forces and attacking us in front; this was not desirable, and on 10th February, Colonel McCausland attacked Kala Khan's force at Churpoora. The result has been noticed at length in Colonel McCausland's despatch. After the Churpoora flight the rebels lost heart, and never again settled down in the Terrai Pergunnahs.

17. A party once came to collect revenue in Kilpooree, and put up at the Setargunge Tehseel. Captain Baugh was sent immediately out with 250 infantry and cavalry. Mr. Carmichael, who had formerly charge of these
pergunnahs, accompanied the detachment as Civil Officer, and by judicious management the rebels were surrounded and destroyed.

18. In January, it became known that a few of the Kali Kumaon people had joined the rebel camp, and I deputed Mr. Colvin to that part of the district. Mr. Colvin prevented the contagion spreading—if it had any tendency to become more general, and kept the passes so well guarded that the rebels never attempted to approach the hills in the direction of Burmdeo.

19. When the artillery company at Almorah showed symptoms of dissatisfaction in June, so many of them were sent to jail that there was no room. At the same time there was such a panic among the Natives at Nainee Tal, that coolies were very scarce. I took forty hill prisoners from the jail, knocked off their irons and used them as coolies, without guards, on the promise that if they behaved well they should be released at the end of the year. They worked on the roads; carried loads; on one occasion attacked a body of dacoits near Kala Doongee, killing several of them, and throughout behaved admirably. I therefore released them at the end of the year. I considered it desirable that Mr. Colvin should be present at Almorah, and sent him there in June; his presence maintained confidence among the people of the town, and he was ready to proceed in any direction where an officer's presence might be required.

20. Mr. Beckett kept the passes into the hills from Bijnor well guarded, and at once proceeded in any direction where attack was threatened. In consequence of some evil-disposed plain's men attempting to create a disturbance at Sreenuggur, a company of Goorkhas was sent over for a short time from Almorah, but with the exception of some dacoities in the early part of the mutiny, Mr. Beckett's district,* like Kumaon, remained perfectly well-conducted and loyal. In fact, with the few individual exceptions, the people of Kumaon and Gurhwal have behaved very well. They supplied coolies, grain and men, to protect the by-passes; and the best evidence I can offer of their loyalty and honesty is the fact of remittances of Rupees 10 to 50,000 having passed through the hills from Mussoorie to Almorah in charge of a few Chuprassees.

21. Mr. Batten was detained by me at Nainee Tal, as it was uncertain where I might go to, and the presence of one Civil Officer at the station was absolutely necessary to keep order, and carefully dispose of the numerous applications from all sides without delay.

22. Mr. Alexander by applying to the Nawab of Rampoor received Rupees 64,000 in Gold Mohurs; he also received about a lakh of rupees in the payment of revenue, and by granting bills on Moradabad. The Raja of Gurhwal lent a lakh of rupees, and we managed to pay our way on a limited scale, until better times admitted of treasure being sent us through Deyra.

23. I consider it proper to mention that I felt it incumbent on me to cancel an order given by the late Lieutenant-Governor, requiring all villagers to keep cattle out of their houses. This created great disgust, and was so offensive to the hill people that I took upon myself to cancel it. I wrote to the late Mr. Colvin explaining the circumstances, and he approved of my proceeding. I got no official approval, but it was conveyed (by kossi) in a small note from Mr. Thornhill, then Secretary to Government, and I think subsequently in a letter written in Mr. Muir's hand-writing, signed by the late Mr. Colvin. I have noticed this matter in order that I may not appear to have acted disrespectfully in having interfered with the late Lieutenant-Governor's orders.

24. In conclusion, I would observe, that the facts specified for report in the Circular under acknowledgment had no place in this province, which happily has no history to record; but I have in the absence of such facts given a brief account of what has occurred from the sad tidings of the mutiny—first reaching Kumaon, to the defeat of the rebels by the Huldwanee force at Churpoor, from which date we were never molested by any one.

Part I.

Dated Allahabad, 11th September 1857.

From—F. O. Mayne, Esq., Magistrate and Collector of Banda, To—C. Chester, Esq., Commissioner, Allahabad Division.

I HAVE the honor to report officially, for the information of the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor of the Central Provinces, the measures taken by myself for the protection of the Banda District, and the circumstances which ultimately compelled me to abandon the station and districts.

2. On the news reaching me of the mutinies of Meerut and Delhi, the necessary orders were issued to ensure the apprehension of the mutineers, who, it was supposed, would be endeavouring to reach their homes. I also received from Mr. Collector Loyd lists of the disbanded sepoys of the 19th and 34th, belonging to the Banda and Humeerpoor Districts, and ordered a strict watch to be kept on any who returned to their homes.

3. As the rebellion spread, I found it necessary to strengthen the police of the several thannals, in order that the main roads of the district and all the ghāts on the Jumna might be strictly guarded, and mutineers and other disaffected parties be prevented from entering the district to stir up the spirit of rebellion in Banda.

4. At all the entrances of the town of Banda strong bodies of police were stationed, and on the roads from Humeerpoor and from Futtehpoor, strong horse patrols were established.

5. At the bridge-of-boats at Chilla Tara Ghāt on the Jumna, I stationed Mahomed Sirdar Khan, with orders to co-operate with Hikmutoolla Khan, Deputy Collector of Futtehpoor, who had been stationed by the Magistrate of Futtehpoor midway between Futtehpoor and the Jumna, and to prevent the crossing of any armed bodies, and to apprehend all suspected bad characters or mutineers.

6. The roads from Humeerpoor and Chilla Tara, as also the town, were nightly patrolled by Mr. Assistant Magistrate Webster and myself, in which duty we were assisted by Dr. Clarke, Mr. Bruce, and certain influential native gentlemen. I further gave permission to native gentlemen residents in the town, whom I would trust, to raise bodies of armed retainers for their own defence. I also allowed the tradesmen and shopkeepers each to entertain one or two men for the defence of their shops in case of an attack from without.

7. About the end of May, I took the further precaution, with the consent of Major Ellis, Assistant Political Agent for Bundelkund, of inviting Rajdhur Killadar, who lives at Gouriar, about ten miles from Banda, and the Rajas of Adjygurh and Chirkaree, to send each a small force or guns, matchlockmen and cavalry to assist in the protection of the town and district. Rajdhur sent me 125 men and one gun, and the Ranee of Adjygurh sent two guns and about 200 matchlockmen and cavalry. The Raja of Chirkaree expressed his inability to afford any aid without raising new levies, which I of course declined. The Gouriar and Adjygurh troops made themselves very useful in feeding the Police Chowkees of the town, and their presence (especially of the guns) served to keep our Native Infantry detachment somewhat in awe, and did good service in restoring confidence to the townpeople.

8. Everything went on quietly, the Courts were open and public works carried on as usual, until we left Banda, in spite of constant alarms and false reports, and very great excitement among the people.
9. I believe that, that people in the district knew nothing whatever of what was going on around them in other districts, and the first intimation they received of the rebellion was through the proclamations issued by the North-Western Government. Those proclamations set people enquiring, and they very soon learned the truth.

10. The insurrection commenced in the Banda District in the villages Commencement and spread of the of Murka, in Pergunnah Buberoo in Mow on the of the rebellion in the Banda District.

Jumna, and in the Dursenda Pergunnah. I first heard of the assembling of armed men, of secret councils, and loudly uttering threats from the Pergunnnahs. This was in the beginning of June, and they were soon followed up by the mutineers at Cawnpoor and Allahabad, before which no actual outbreak or even a dacoitee had taken place in the Banda District. The released convicts from Allahabad and Cawnpoor however soon spread over the country and forced the Ghats on the Jumna, notwithstanding my previous precautions which had been more for the purpose of apprehending fugitives, than to resist armed masses, and the insurrection of the whole country followed too soon upon the disasters of Allahabad to allow of my strengthening the Ghats even if I had been able to do so. The released convicts found the Banda people only too ready to join them. The Tehseelee of Mow was first attacked and plundered by the Zemindars of Mow and the neighbouring villages, and the records torn up and distributed to the winds, in order, as they said, that no record of their liabilities might remain to the new Government. The Tehseelee and Thannah establishments did their best; but were overwhelmed by thousands, and compelled to seek safety in flight. The loss of the Kumasin, Buberoo, Simoonnee, and Pylane Tehseelees soon followed in a like manner. I saw Tehseelee after Tehseelee going, and the waves of the rebellion rapidly approaching Banda itself, and was totally helpless to prevent it. The whole district went to the bad in less than a week. The town and bazar of Rajapoore was saved from plunder by the merchants themselves, who assembled a large force and repelled the repeated attacks of the surrounding villagers. Mr. Cockerell, Joint Magistrate, was stationed at Kirwee, and gallantly did he, single handed, maintain his post, assisted in some measure, although lukewarmly, by Narain Rao and Madho Rao. He saved the Tehseelee of Tirhowan. The Tehseelee of Budousa in the south of the district was saved by the good conduct of the Thanahdar, Oosman Khan, who stood by his post, although abandoned by the Tehseeedar, until relieved by the Kirwee Raos. The Tehseeeldar of Seonda being on the south west corner of the district remained intact, as also the Tehseelee of Pergunnah Banda, until the time of our abandoning the district.

11. I must say in defence of the district, Police and Revenue Establishment of Banda generally, that they remained at their posts to the very last, and many of them were killed and wounded in defence of Government property. As for the people, ruined as they were by over assessment and bad seasons, and half starving; still they would I think not have risen in rebellion, if they had been left to themselves. It was only when excited by the reports from other districts, and hearing of the excesses committed elsewhere, and of what was then supposed the total massacre of all Europeans at Allahabad, that they too came to the conclusion that the British rule was at an end, and every man had best take care of himself.

12. Banda Pergunnah and town still remained quiet for a few days, Measures taken to prevent mutinies and rebellion at the Station of Banda, and for the safety of the treasury. after the district had slipped from my grasp. In the commencement of the rebellion I had in my treasury upwards of eight lakhs of rupees, including two lakhs subscription to the 5 per cent, loan by Narain Rao and Madho Rao of Kirwee, which had just been paid. Wishing to hold out as little inducement to the Native Infantry (3 Companies of the 1st Native Infantry) stationed at Banda, as possible, I took advantage of the return detachment of the 56th Native Infantry to Cawnpoor, to send, under orders of the Accountant, North-Western Provinces, all my spare cash to Futtchpoor.
(two lakhs and a half), and I also transmitted by the same opportunity two lakhs and twenty odd thousand old coins to Allahabad for the Calcutta Mint. For these sums I duly received receipts from the Collectors of those districts. I shortly afterwards, also under orders of the Accountant, North-Western Provinces, transmitted 50,000 to Nagode, under an escort of the 1st Native Infantry. It is a curious feature in the mutinies that these detachments under Native Officers only should have so honorably acquitted themselves of their trust only a few days before the outbreak at Cawnpore. By the above means, and by paying up all pensions and salaries to the end of May, I reduced my treasury to two lakhs and about Rupees 7,000; and hoping thereby to hold the detachment of the 1st Native Infantry true by an exhibition of confidence, and at the same time to protect it from the bands of insurgents who were surrounding bands, I placed the two lakhs in tumbrils and sent it up to the Native Infantry lines. It was under their guard at the Treasury, and I was entirely in their power. They could have taken it away at any time, and I thought it just as well to try the only chance of keeping the treasure at Banda by placing it more directly under their charge. The report of Lieutenant Bennett, the Officer Commanding the detachment at that time, in spite of mutinous conversation and spirit shown by individual sepoys in the town, was that he could most assuredly depend on his men and that they were staunch.

13. One difficulty at Banda was that we had no place of refuge; and even if we had such a stronghold, we had no men to defend it. I had chosen the Jail, mounted two cannons, and stored grain and atta there for the purpose; but secret agency was at work, and we narrowly escaped a mutiny of our own Nujees; they were told that the grain was only stored to be mixed with cow-bones for their food. I immediately paraded them, and told them any one was at liberty to resign, who assuredly depend on his men and that he could most assuredly depend on his men and that they were staunch.

14. Two Mussulman proclamations were fixed up in the City, calling for the massacre of the Christians; but no serious alarm was given at the station of Banda until the Futtehpoor residents were compelled to take refuge with us. On the occasion of their reaching the Jumna on Monday, the 8th June, a verbal message was sent in by Mohamed Sirdar Khan, Deputy Collector, that the mutinous cavalry were crossing the river. This verbal message was given to me in open Cutcherry by the sowar, and spread like wild fire. The budmashes rose in the city, and plundering commenced. I immediately removed the ladies to Nawab Ali Bahadoor's palace, and with the aid of my police quickly quieted the town. The same evening the Futtehpoor gentlemen came into Banda, causing no little curiosity among the people. Unfortunately Mohamed Sirdar Khan returned with them to Banda, bringing in all the police and sepoys, thus abandoning his post at Chilla Tara, and leaving the line of communication entirely open to the disaffected, and causing the villagers immediately to rise in his rear; fortunately having first by my order broken up the bridge of boats.

15. As it was of the utmost importance to guard Chilla Tara Ghát, with the greatest difficulty I induced the Gouriar troops to consent to re-occupy the post. They only proceeded however one march, and then precipitately retreated marching through Banda back to their homes, without communicating with me at all. I never saw them again.

16. Meanwhile a few sowars had crossed the river at Chilla Tara and set up the green flag in the Mahomedan village of Chilla, which, with Muddenpoor and others and the villages of Lulowlee on the opposite bank in the Futtehpoor District, were most conspicuous in the rebellion and plundering of defenceless travellers. Numerous reports, apparently well founded, also
reached me of mutineers marching to assist their brethren at Banda. A different tone was soon manifest in the Police; they no longer obeyed orders with their usual alacrity, and not a single man, horse or foot, could be obtained for extra levies.

17. The ladies having been hurriedly placed in the Nawab's palace, and the rebellion thickening, in the absence of any more secure place, I thought it better to leave them there, half of our party proceeding there for their protection, and half remaining with me in my house. Mr. Sherer and the gentlemen from Futtehpoor also eagerly assisted me in patrolling the city at nights, and all other measures adopted for the maintenance of order. Unfortunately in going to the Nawab's, although he was staunch enough himself, we went into a nest of bigotted Mahomedans and bad characters belonging to the Nawab, whom he was unable to control, and who only waited their opportunity to murder us. Still we imagined we could depend on his sepoys and some of our Nujeebs, of whom we kept our own guard. On the night of Friday the 12th, two bungalows were fired; and meeting the general wish to be together, I also with the remainder of the party took up my quarters at night at the Nawab's house, returning to my bungalow during the day. In that house we were entirely in the hands of the Nawab, or rather of his followers; and on looking more closely over the walled defences of the place, we found it utterly untenable against any force of the enemy. However once having sought his protection we could not withdraw, and as the plot thickened we did our best to repair the walls and loophole bastions and such like; but it was useless—our enemies were within the walls, even more numerous than those outside; and we were obliged ourselves to keep nightly watch over our little band.

18. Matters remained apparently quiet until Sunday the 14th, by which time the detachment of the 1st Native Infantry had obtained correct information of the doings at Cawnpoor, and of the black treachery of the Head-quarters of their regiment, with orders, I have no doubt, to do likewise. It was on this very day also at 2 P.M., that the detachment of the 53rd Native Infantry at Humeerpoor, rose and murdered the Christians of that Station. At Banda the same day, the sepoys of the 1st Native Infantry showed open mutiny and insubordination. I was in need of cash, and my application to the Officer Commanding for one of the tumbrils under his guard was met with the reply, that the sepoys had insolently refused to give up a single rupee. They also sent word to my Jail Darogah that the grain and atta stored in the Jail, and my two guns, which I had ordered to be taken to the Nawab's palace, were not to leave the place, but were to be kept for their Soubadar's orders, who was marching with troops to occupy Banda. The secoundrel of a Jail Darogah and the greater part of the Nujeebs were also proved to be in league with them. The Toomandar remained true; I had two days previously requested the Adjigurh force to take up their quarters around the Jail for its protection: they verbally consented, but failed to attend to the requisition. They were evidently waiting at Banda, merely to see which band got the uppermost, and to act accordingly. The 1st Native Infantry had also possession of the Magazine, containing some 80,000 rounds of ball cartridge, and three times that number of blank cartridge. Lieutenant Bennett reported his men as being utterly beyond control and refusing to obey any orders.

19. On consultation we resolved to try, with the aid of the Nawab and his troops, 125 in number, to proceed that evening (Sunday the 14th) first repossess ourselves of the guns at the Jail, and then, with the assistance of the Adjigurh troops, force the sepoys of the 1st Native Infantry to give up the treasure and ammunition, and disarm them. There was not much hope of the plan succeeding, but it was our only chance. The gentlemen of Banda and Futtehpoor divided, half to accompany the force, the others remaining with the ladies.
20. The troops were drawn up in the Nawab's court-yard, and we were all ready to start, when Mr. Benjamin, Commanding the Nawab's forces, was found to be in an unfit state to proceed, and at my request the Nawab acquiesced in Lieutenant Bennett's taking the command. A large and tumultuous assembly of rabble and townspeople had meanwhile assembled in the court-yard, and we were surrounded on all sides. The moment was a critical one. The Nawab's sepoys, when first paraded, had exhibited a sullen and disorderly disposition; and when Lieutenant Bennett assumed the command, broke out into open mutiny and attacked that officer with their bayonets, shouting and vociferating in the most outrageous manner. Lieutenant Bennett's coolness and courage at that moment alone saved us from an insurrection inside of the court-yard. Had a shot been fired, or blood spilt, it would have been a signal for a general massacre of all the Christians therein assembled. Lieutenant Bennett faced the mutinous sepoys, and stood his ground and reasoned with them, until I forced the Nawab in person to interpose between them and Lieutenant Bennett. The Nawab had been about to retire; but I let him know, in unmistakable terms, that he was responsible for our protection within his own walls, and that whatever happened afterwards he must at least release us from his own sepoys, and clear the palace yard of the tumultuous assembly therein collected. Thus warned, with the aid of his Moosahibs, partly by force and partly by reasoning, he managed to induce the sepoys to leave the palace, and then speedily clearing away the crowd closed the gates. I must here bear witness that nothing could have been better than the behaviour of the Nawab and his Moosahibs up to this time. The Nawab's sepoys marched straight off to the Cantonments of the 1st Native Infantry, singing the Jawad, and calling upon all Musselman to join them in exterminating the Ferringhees. The sepoys of the 1st, forewarned of what had been going on by a sowar, rose and armed themselves, sounding the alarm. Ensign Clerk rode down to the parade ground, and it was a mercy he was not killed on the spot. The men told him to be off, asking jeeringly where Bennett Sahib and the Collector were, who were going to disarm them. Ensign Clerk and Lieutenant Fraser then joined us at the Nawab's telling us of the outbreak of the sepoys.

21. It was hopeless for us to try any longer to resist. We were in a palace surrounded by traitors, and unable to defend the place. The Nawab's sepoys, upon whom he had avowedly depended for our protection, had mutinied and joined the 1st Native Infantry also in open mutiny. They had possession of two guns and the Magazine and Treasure. The Nujeebs sided with the sepoys. I could no longer depend on my sowars or police, as was proved immediately afterwards by those men with me, leaving me to a man. There only remained the Adjutant's troops, who had, as noticed above, already given signs of their disinclination to serve actively against the insurgents. We were quite helpless, and were accompanied by seventeen ladies, women, and children. I appealed to the Nawab, who replied he could do no more for us, that his sepoys had deserted and mutinied, that he would himself stand and fight with us, but that he could not answer for our lives, or for the conduct of his followers and dependants. To add to our difficulties, it was reported that troops had been detached from Cawnpore to occupy Banda, and had crossed the Jumna. The whole country round us was known to be in arms. Cawnpore, Futtapoor, Allahabad, Humeerpoor, Mahoba, and Nowgong were all in the hands of the insurgents.

22. Under these circumstances it would have been madness to have remained at Banda and exposed our party to almost certain death. We could do nothing to stay the revolt, and opposed as the course was to my own feelings, I was compelled to beat a retreat. In less than half an hour we were in the saddle. There was not a moment to lose. Mr. Webster, Assistant Magistrate, with a few Volunteers, cleared the road from the palace, whilst I was collecting the women and
children, and we escaped with nothing but the clothes on our backs. We left at 8 p.m. on the night of the 14th of June, and marched the first night to Kallinger, thirty-six miles, and the next night to Nagode, thirty-six miles. The people were in two places inclined to resist our march, but we were too strong a party for villagers to attack with impunity, and they made no actual attempt. We were hardly out of the town when the whole cantonments were in a blaze, which lighted us on the road for the first ten miles.

23. I had previously written to the Lieutenant-Governor, N.-W. Provinces, that unless speedily reinforced by staunch troops, we should not be able to hold our own at Banda. The crisis came sooner than we anticipated.

24. I deeply regret to record the murder the next morning, 15th June, of Mr. Cockerell, my Joint Magistrate, on his arrival from Kirwee, and of Mr. Benjamin, Mr. Bruce, and Mr. Loyd (Eurasians), and their families by the sepoys and followers of the Nawab. The latter gentlemen had refused to accompany us, thinking the Nawab would protect them.

25. In the previous week I had repeatedly written to Mr. Cockerell to come into Banda, but he refused to abandon his post. All honor and praise be due to him. At last perceiving the utter hopelessness of his being of service at Kirwee, and the imminent danger to which he was exposed, I ordered him to return, but had received no reply. On the Sunday afternoon I wrote, warning him of what was going on at Banda, and telling him to be very careful how he approached the place. This letter unfortunately appears not to have reached him. At the moment of flight I had no one to send to warn him, and my letter to him the next morning from Kallinger was too late. He rode into Banda the next morning with treasure, and hearing we had left he went straight to the Nawab, and was killed at the Nawab's gateway. I refrain from expressing any opinion as to the guilt of the Nawab himself in the Banda murders; leaving it for full enquiry when Banda shall be re-occupied.

26. From Nagode I went to Rewah, and was arranging with Lieutenant W. Osborne to return to Banda with the Rewah troops, but received orders to join the Head-quarters of the Division. A second of a similar nature has been lately failed by disturbance in the Raja's own elaqua. I am most anxious to re-establish myself in the district, and am ready to do anything to promote that end; but without some kind of force to back my authority, and to reduce the turbulent zemindars to order, I should be able to retain no hold on the district, and unable to issue the prompt punishment which so many rebels richly deserve.

27. I may add, that since leaving Banda I have heard occasionally from Nawab Ali Bahadour; but I consider that his conduct for some days after we left to have been of so questionable a nature, and is, I may say, still so doubtful, that I have purposely refrained from holding any communication with him.

28. The burning of Cantonments and Civil lines was accompanied by plunder of all the property they contained. The stamps, opium, &c., in the treasury were plundered, and the Collector and Magistrate's and Judge's records thrown into a mass of confusion, but I believe not entirely destroyed. I had previously taken the precaution of removing all Settlement Misls of Regulation IX. of 1833, and the last year's Huftgainah papers, as also the English records of Commissioner's correspondence from the year 1852 downwards, into the Nawab's palace, where I believe they still are under the Nawab's protection. The few odd thousands of rupees which remained in the treasury under a Burkundaz guard, I also removed on the Sunday afternoon, and the treasurer verbally reported to me that he had deposited the money in the Nawab's Jamadarkhana.

P.S.—I omitted to mention in the body of my letter, that the prisoners were relieved at the Jail by the sepoys of the 1st Native Infantry on the 15th June.
PART II.

No. 496, dated Banda, 10th November 1858.

From—F. O. MAINE, Esq., Magistrate of Banda,
To—E. C. BAYLEY, Esq., Offg. Commissioner for the 4th Division.

AGREEABLY to the Circular Orders of Government, No. 212, dated 30th April last, and in continuation of my report, No. —, dated 4th September 1857, of the events attending the outbreak of disturbances in the district of Banda, I have the honor now to furnish a narrative of the subsequent progress of events until the restoration of peace.

2. In order to make the narrative as complete as possible, I have been obliged to sift the contents of a large mass of papers; and I trust, therefore, the delay which has occurred in furnishing my report will be pardoned.

3. My former report, which the Honorable the Lieutenant-Governor of the Central Provinces has already noticed in Lieuten­tenant-Colonel Strachey's letter, No. 260, dated 11th September 1857, closed with the withdrawal of the British officers from Banda on the night of Sunday the 14th June, and an allusion to the reported events at Banda of the following day. I resume the tale from that point, and shall divide my narrative into two parts;—I. Relating what took place in the district from the 15th June 1857 up to the date of our re-occupation of the district on the 19th April 1858; and II. Showing the measures adopted for the restoration of order, and their result.

4. As it proved, we did not leave Banda too soon, for we had not been gone twenty minutes when a detail of the 1st Native Infantry marched down the lines and posted themselves at the Nawab's Cheeta Khanah, which we were obliged to pass on our road from the Nawab's palace; their object was to fire on us as we passed, and intense was the rage they exhibited when after waiting there a few minutes, they were told we were gone. The Magistrate's Clerk, Mr. Duncan, was concealed in a drain close by, and saw what I now relate.

5. On the same night that the British officers left Banda all the bungalows in Cantonments were plundered and burnt to the ground, and Nawab Ali Bahadoor proclaimed his own rule,—"Khulluk Khoda Muluk Badska hukum Nawab Ali Bahadoor;" and through the Government police arrangements, which saved the town from being plundered. He gave out that the Collector and Magistrate had entrusted the district to his care, and desired all Government servants to remain at their posts.

6. The next morning, 15th of June, a company of mutineers marched to the Jail, released the prisoners, and took possession of the two guns and ammunition, and the Commissariat stores which had been placed in the Jail for our use in the event of being compelled to stand a siege. The Adjulgurh Chiefs, who had been sent by their Rance to our assistance, and who had at my request undertaken to protect the Jail, joined in releasing the prisoners. Many of the leading bunyas of the town were also present on this occasion, and sweetmeats were distributed by them to the mutineers. The sepoys then proclaimed their own Raj,—"Khulluk Khoda Muluk Badsah hukum Subhadar Sepoy Bahadoor," in opposition to that of Nawab Ali Bahadoor issued on the previous night, at which they were much incensed. The Nawab however managed to appease their wrath by giving them a great dinner of sweetmeats, and by acknowledging their authority. They then called the Amlah and told them they would be maintained in their several
appointments; and Mahomed Sirdar Khan, the Deputy Collector, an old and much trusted servant of the British Government, was appointed by the sepoys "Nazim of Banda," with full powers of life and death. The slaughter of cows and bullocks was then forbidden throughout the town. It was on the morning of this day that Mr. Cockerell, the Joint-Magistrate, rode into Banda from Kirwee, and was murdered at the Nawab's gateway. The followers and sepoys of the Nawab only have to answer for this outrage. No mutineers of the 1st Native Infantry were near the spot at the time of the foul deed. It does not appear however that the Nawab himself was an accomplice in the murder. He was, I believe, asleep at the time that Mr. Cockerell came to his gateway and demanded an interview. He afterwards paid no honor to the corpse, but allowed it to remain stripped and exposed all the day before his gateway, and at night it was dragged away by the sweepers and thrown to the dogs. A few of those principally concerned are—

Ukber Beg, Golundaz.  |  Kaley Khan, Sowar.
Fyaz Mahomed, brother of Niaz Mahomed,  |  Sheede Bilal Hubshe, Chela of Shumshere Bahadoor.
Dabeeedeen, Toork Sowar of Nawab.  |  Sheikh Abbo.
Bankey Beharee, Sowar.  |  

The Tehseeldar Meer Furhat Ali was then seized and taken to the mutineers and Adijygurh leaders, and made to give an account of his stewardship; and sentries were placed over the Tehseel Treasury. The capture of Mr. Thomas Passanah, an East Indian, a pensioned Clerk of the Collector's Office, shortly followed; but the mutineers released him on his pointing out his property, which had been seized and taken possession of by one Madhoram, a budmash of Cawnpoor.

7. On the morning of the 16th June, Mr. Bruce, in charge of the Nawab's villages, and his aged mother; Captain Benjamine, who commanded the Nawab's guards, and his wife, and Mr. Loyd, brother of Mrs. Benjamine, all East Indians, who refused to leave Banda with the British officers, thinking that the Nawab would protect them, were discovered by the mutineers in the house of an old Arab, called Mugrisee Sahib. The mutineers however left them, on their giving up their arms and their money. Shortly afterwards a lot of bad characters and Mahomedans belonging to the Nawab came and dragged them out of the house, and murdered them on the Nawab's parade ground. Some of our mutineers also joined in the dastardly deed, but the guilt lies principally at the door of those attached to the house of the ex-Nawab of Banda. Their bodies were stripped, thrown into a field, and left a prey to the vultures and jackals. The Nawab never attempted to save them; and that he might have done so, is proved by the fact of his having saved the party of fugitives from Nowgong only a few days afterwards. It is not proved however that he was a consenting party to their murder. The names of a few principally concerned are—

Son of Mahomed Ali Beg.  |  Futteh Khan.
Son of Lal Mahomed.  |  Kalloo.
Husmut Khan.  |  Rahumoo and Imam Ali, sowars.

Bund Ali and Debeedeen.
Mr. Duncan, Magistrate's Clerk, was also captured by the mutineers. Some wanted to put him to death, but others preserved him and let him go. The riot and disturbance in the town all this time was beyond description. The people were still conveying to their own houses the property they had acquired by plunder from the Government Offices, the Jail, and the private bungalows. Mutineers of the 1st Native Infantry, the Adjygurh Auxiliary Levies, our own Jail Nujeebs, and Chuprassees, and several townspeople, all joined in the revel, and great was the anarchy of the season. Government stamped paper was lying all over the place, and opium was to be had for the trouble of picking it up. As much property was destroyed as plundered, and the robbers were often robbed again by their stronger companions. The records both of the Collector's and Judge's Cutcherries however on this occasion sustained but little damage, and the Government buildings were not injured. The mutineers were also busy in levying a tax of cash and goods on every shop in the town, and in collecting carriages to convey their ill-gotten gains to Cawnpoor.

8. In the pergunnahs the news spread like wild fire, and the villagers rose in every direction and plundered and murdered each other promiscuously. Old enmities and the long smothered wish for revenge were with the satisfaction. Auction purchasers and decree-holders were ousted, travellers and merchandise plundered, and the servants of Government compelled to fly for their lives; and in all instances Government buildings and property of every description were plundered and destroyed. Every man's hand was against his neighbour, and the natives revelled in all the license and madness of unchecked anarchy and rebellion, in a manner such as only Asiatics can revel in those pleasures. Tulwars and matchlocks were scarce in Bundelkund; but armed with spears and scythes, and iron-bound latties, and extemporary axes, formed of chopping knives fastened on sticks, they imagined themselves to be warriors, chose their own Kings, and defied all comers. Never was revolution more rapid—never more complete.

9. On the 17th of June the chief officers of the mutineers paid a state visit to Nawab Ali Bahadoor, and held a council of war. The right of sovereignty of the Nawab was disputed by Dhowa, a Chieftain of Adjygurh, whose ancestors held this part of the country before the bastard family of the Nawab were thought of, and it was determined that pending a reference to the Nana of Bithoor the Nawab should assume charge of the country on the departure of the sepoys. They left on the 10th, with their plundered treasure (2 lakhs), guns and ammunition, accompanied by some of the Nawab's sepoys and his agent, and also by an agent from the Chief of Adjygurh; and the Adjygurh people retired to their fortress, situated in a small strip of independent territory adjoining the town of Banda, called Nimnee Carp, in which to the present day they continue to exercise sovereign rights.

10. Meanwhile the Nawab and his advisers were busy in reassuring the people, in re-establishing the Offices, and in securing the cash in the Government Teselee, amounting to Rupees 3,462, which had been very considerately left by the mutineers in settlement of the pay of the old establishment. The Police and Revenue Chuprassees were most clamorous for their pay, and were with difficulty prevented from adopting violent measures. They were almost all re-employed by the Nawab; many of them on increased salaries. They changed masters as they would change their clothes, and thought nothing of it. Their conduct was disgraceful. The Nawab's own sepoys, who had attacked us in the palace and joined and
murdered Mr. Cockerell and others, were all re-entertained by the Nawab. A Council was formed of Mirza Willayut Hussun, Mirza Imdad Ali Beg, Meer Inshalla, Mahomed Sirdar Khan, Deputy Collector, and Meer Furhut Ali, Tehseeldar, and Seth Oodey Kurn, the great Banker, who were ordered to carry on the government. Of these Mahomed Sirdar Khan was the most active member. Mahomedan dates were introduced, and a Hindustanes amuldeere commenced.

11. At this time I give Nawab Ali Bahadoor credit for good intentions at heart. He had from his youth upwards courted English society, and was always devoted to field sports and manly exercises. He is a good shot with both rifle and pistol, a first-rate whip and a good plucky rider, and can undergo immense personal fatigue. He possesses therefore many of the attributes, which would make a good leader in the rebel cause; but he is utterly wanting in brains and judgment. We could indeed have no better proof of his being a fool than that, notwithstanding the above propensities and the possession of a good and extensive Stud and other establishments, and his enjoying an annual pension of £40,000 sterling, he should still have turned rebel. He thought of nothing but his women, his horses and his English fowling-pieces and rifles, and was ever a mere tool in the hands of others. Essentially a man of pleasure, and incapable of transacting the most trifling public business, he was entirely in the hands of those about him, and he acted by their advice.

His desire to do the best he could for himself under the circumstances. There were naturally great doubts to all at that time, whether the British Government would ever again be restored, and the Nawab did the best he could to secure his own interests and the sovereignty of the country, which his ancestors had usurped. But I do not believe he was himself at that time actuated by actively hostile feelings to the British Government. He possessed no resources, and had no power in the country. He was threatened by the Rajas of Bundelkund, and by the surrounding villagers. He had to make a power for himself and to re-establish order, and with that view he re-entertained all the old establishments, sent for the Government treasure from the Modha Tehselee Rupees 18,000, and appropriated it to his own uses, and commenced raising troops and to cast guns. I believe he would have been glad at that time to have seen us return.

12. It was different however with his people, and his immediate advisers, Mirza Willayut Hussun, Mirza Ghohlam Hyder Khan, Bunneh Sabih, and Meer Inshalla. Their hearts from the first were leagued with the cause of the mutineers, and they by their influence and power soon gave a different aspect to the proceedings of the young Nawab. A few of the Government Omleh consequently resigned office, and many altogether refused to be entertained.

13. After the departure of the mutineers of the 1st Native Infantry, Mahomed Sirdar Khan appointed Nazim by Nawab on increased salary, and other appointments and proceedings.

Mahomed Sirdar Khan, Deputy Collector, caused himself to be appointed Nazim on an increased salary of Rupees 1,000. Meer Inshalla was made Sipah Salar; Mirza Willayut Hussun, Naib Resaut; Mirza Imdad Ali Beg Moontezzim of the Finance Department; and Meer Furhut Ali, Tehseeldar, was appointed Moonserim or Assistant to the Nazim on Rupees 400. The latter however refused to exercise the duties of his new office. Men were called from pergunnah Jais in Oudh, the native place of Meer Inshalla Sipah Salar of the Nawab’s army.

Proclamations were issued in the Nawab's name, forbidding plundering and dacoity, and some sort of imperfect order was established in the precincts of the town. All people of the town and all local officers attended, and presented nuzzur to the Nawab, and all were kindly received.

14. On the 30th of June a portion of Captain Scott's party from Nowgong were brought prisoners into Banda by the zemindars of Goera Mooglee, and were most kindly and hospitably treated by the Nawab and by
the Begum, his mother, and sent on under escort to Nagode, which they reached on the 12th of July. The others of this party were hunted from village to village through Pergunnahs Seonda and Budousa, and plundered of all they possessed, and many were killed by the villagers. The greatest hostility was shown to them on all sides, and very few were those who befriended them.

15. Meanwhile, Narayun Rao and Madho Rao at Kirwee had proclaimed seizure of the district by various rebel Chiefs. Jolou Pundits took possession of Pergunnah Khundeh to the west of Banda; and emissaries and rebels from the States of Punn, Chirkaree, Adijgurh, and Berouna took possession of portions of Pergunnahs Seonda and Budousa. All power of the British Government had been subverted throughout the district except at Kallinjur in Pergunnah Budousa. Here stands the old fort of Kallinjur, impregnable and of immense historical importance in the eyes of the natives. The Raja of Punn held this fortress for us, and he was shortly joined by Lieutenant Remington of the 12th Bengal Native Infantry, who at great risk, and almost entirely cut off from the world, retained command there throughout the rebellion. At Banda and in its neighbourhood the right of sovereignty was still disputed between the Nawab and Dhowa of Adijgurh, and they both sent out their officers with troops to collect the revenue, who committed much oppression and injury. Great disorder still prevailed, and little or no revenue was collected. A narrative of the rebellion in each Pergunnah is appended.

16. On the 1st of August the Nawab wrote to me, laying all the blame of the rebellion on the mutineers, and saying that he was trying to restore order, but could not make head for want of men and coin. Up to this date those well disposed to our Government were expecting us back, and some of the works of improvement in the town were carried on, and the Tehseeldar and Kotwal had collected a good deal of Government and private property, which was afterwards plundered by our own troops. The Nawab also repaired the roof of the Collector’s record room which had begun to leak.

17. The influence of the Nawab’s bad advisers however soon began to tell as he gained more power, and as parties of fugitive rebels and mutineers flushed with success continued to pour into Banda, and when the news of the prolonged success of the rebels at Delhi and Lucknow reached him, the Nawab began to think that he might possibly retain his assumed position. His council and all Mahomedans of Banda, especially those of the Lushkur, were rank rebels, and they regarded the scene as a holy war to result in the extirpation of the Kafirs and their own eternal beatitude, and they fanned the idea which was dawning on the Nawab’s mind. Hurkaras and spies used to return with the most exaggerated accounts of the successes of the rebel Emperor and the Nana, and were rewarded with great bounty; and any reported victory gained by the British was concealed or disbelieved, and the unfortunate narrator was deprived of his liberty and his ears, often of his life. The people about the Nawab studiously concealed the truth from him.

18. Two or three East Indian clerks, who had managed to conceal themselves up to this time, were now ordered to quit the place, and they were plundered and much ill-treated. The Mahajuns were made to contribute to the Royal Treasury by forced and unacknowledged loans, and all supposed to be friendly to the English were apprehended and imprisoned.

19. About this time (the 7th August) an order was received by the Nawab from the Assistant Political Agent of Bundelkund, residing at Nagode, to seize Mahomed Sirdar Khan, Deputy Collector, who had been charged with rebellion. It appears that Mahomed
Sirdar Khan then took fright, and would not stay any longer at Banda, and he fled across the river Kane. He was there plundered, and remained for some time concealed; but at last returned again to Banda, and lived a loyal subject of the rebel Nawab up to the date of the latter's defeat and flight before the British troops. He then absconded, and did not present himself at Allahabad till the 12th of May.

20. About the middle of August the dispute between the Nawab and the Adjygurh Chieftains, Battle between the Nawab and the Dhowa of Adjygurh took an open form, and their first battle took place for the possession of Bhooargurh fort, which ended in favor of the Adjygurh people. Next day they fought again at Nimneepar, and the fight was continued for some days.

21. On the 2nd September, the 7th and 8th Regiment Native Infantry arrived at Banda from Dinapoor, bringing with them many wounded comrades. The men were in sorry condition, and were badly supplied with ammunition. They committed a great deal of oppression and injury on the villages through which they passed on the way to Banda, plundering and shooting all who opposed them. They were full of savage madness against the English, and were heartily welcomed by the Nawab and his people. About this time the Principal Sudder Ameen, Tusud-duk Hussun Khan, died. He had, as far as I have been able to ascertain, in no way mixed himself up in the rebellion. Soon afterwards a proclamation was issued, forbidding the use of the name of the English to be taken.

22. On the 3rd of September emissaries came from Nagode, and on the 12th a large party of mutineer sepoys and of the Nawab's followers and troops marched from the 27th with the 50th Native Infantry and the Nagode, and returned on plunder and guns from that place, and with what was more valuable to them than anything else, a large supply of ammunition. Had the Punna and Adjygurh Chiefs really been attached to our interests, as they professed to be, it is impossible that these mutineers could ever have marched to Nagode through the many intricate hill passes on the road. There are several places, where three or four hundred determined men might have held their ground against any odds.

23. On the 29th September, Koer Sing with 2,000 men, including the 40th Native Infantry, reached Banda, and were received with great honor and hospitality by the Nawab. The people of the town were again called upon to supply the Nawab's wants; and if any one refused to pay, his house was levelled to the ground and himself tortured and imprisoned. A great many people left Banda. One Soubdar of the 50th Native Infantry, a well educated man, who could read and write English, by name Sheololl Tewaree, was most bitter in his animosity to anything English. Other detachments of mutinous corps continued to arrive at Banda, and also armed men called from Oudh.

24. The mutineers endeavoured to effect a compromise between the Nawab and the Adjygurh Chief, on the ground that there should be no internal strife until their common enemy the English had been entirely destroyed, but Dhowa of Adjygurh would not be persuaded; and on the 8th of October the forces of the Nawab and the mutineers made a joint attack on the Adjygurh fortress at Nimneepar. The Adjygurh matchlockmen bravely defended themselves against the superior and trained forces of their adversaries, but on the third day, owing to a lack of provisions and ammunition and want of water, they were compelled to surrender, and the three Chiefs were imprisoned in the Nawab's palace, until the day of his defeat by the British on the 9th April 1858, when they were cruelly murdered in their prison, and
their mutilated corpse left for our edification. The fortress and buildings in Nimneepar belonging to the Adijgyurgh and Gowriar Chiefs have since been completely destroyed by the Nawab.

25. On the 15th October, the 5th Irregular Cavalry, upwards of 500 strong, reached Banda from Bhogulpoor, and proved to be far worse than any of the regiments which preceded them. It was they who caused all the subsequent mischief and destruction at Banda.

26. On the 18th October Koer Sing and his men went away towards Calpee, and on the 25th, the 7th and 8th Native Infantry and other mutineers with three guns marched for Chilla Tara. The latter were afterwards met by our troops, and defeated at Kudjooa in the Futtelpoor district.

27. Soubadar Myhtab Ali, of the 8th Native Infantry, remained at Banda, commanding detachments of different corps which he formed into one regiment, and recruited up to its full strength. The 5th Irregulars also remained at Banda. The Nawab besides these had about 1,000 Infantry of his own and 600 Cavalry, some 15 guns, and 10,000 matchlockmen.

28. The Nawab's troops and establishment were, according to his old custom, always deeply in arrears of pay, and it was with difficulty he could satisfy them. Further demands were made on the townpeople, and revenue was forced from the zemindars at the point of the bayonet, and all suspected of siding or corresponding with English were mulcted and cruelly treated.

29. Loan negotiations were then opened by the Nawab, through Seth Oodey Kurn, with Narayun Rao at Kirwee, and on the 18th November he marched himself for Kirwee at the head of 2,000 men. He was there joined by two companies of the 32nd mutineers. He succeeded in getting two lakhs out of the Raos, with a promise of more; and they came to a compact, dividing the district between them, and agreeing to assist each other against all enemies. Narayun Rao retained Pergunnahs Chiboo, Dursenda, Tirohan, Budousa, and half Buberoo, and the Nawab kept Pergunnahs Pylance, Simoume, half Buberoo, Banda, and Seonda. Collections of revenue were carried on very vigorously by both parties, and their armed bands of retainers forced money from the zemindars and cultivators by every species of torture and oppression.

30. On the 3rd December the Nawab returned to Banda, and found two more Companies of the 32nd mutineers, who had reached with 18 guns during his absence. On the 26th December, the 32nd left Banda for Calpee. On the 31st the old Kotwal was seized and murdered by the sowars of the 5th Irregulars, on suspicion of corresponding with the Magistrate. This gentleman had been playing a double game throughout, and only met with his this time took possession of Pergunnah Khandeh and turned out the Jaloon people. He also took possession of part of Pergunnah Mohda, Zillah Humeerpoor, and garrisoned a fort he owned at Mowdha proper. In February the Church and Christian Burial-ground, and the public offices, records, and the Jail were all destroyed, and of the timbers and materials some were burnt, and some taken to the Nawab's palace.

31. The Nawab, egged on by the counsel and lies of those about him, had long become a thorough rebel, and was in close communication with all other rebel Chieftains of note in the North-Western Provinces. They told him he was sure to be hanged.
if caught, and that there were but few English left in the country, and he became convinced that it would be better to fight to the last. All the ghats of the Jumna were most zealously guarded to prevent the British troops from crossing, and he commenced to fortify Bhoragurh on the River Kane. The Nawab was shortly afterwards joined by the traitor Wuzee Khan and a large portion of the Raja of Chirkaree's force. Several Shahzadahs also came about this time from Delhi. A force was sent to assist Tantia in the attack on Chirkaree, and another force was sent to take the Fort of Kallinjur, which was still gallantly held by Lieutenant Remington with a party of matchlockmen and guns furnished by the Raja of Punna.

32. It was not till the beginning of April that a possibility of a British force advancing to Banda across the Continent of India, dawned on the minds of the Nawab and his rebel crew. Then to their grief and utter astonishment they heard of the Madras Column, and discovered that it was not from across the Jumna that they might expect the penalty of their misdeeds. In the beginning of April a force was sent towards Mahoba to meet this audacious Madras Column.

33. The Nawab however still maintained his former character for vacillation and indifference, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the mutineer leaders and the rebel faction kept him up to the mark as their leader and chief. He recalled his forces from Kallinjur, and great preparations were made to dispute the advance of the English troops. Meanwhile, the less valiant portion of the population began to make themselves scarce. They saw that the day of retribution so long delayed had at last arrived, and great was the terror in the land.

34. The first action was fought on the 17th April at Kubraee, twenty-four miles west of Banda. The Nawab's army was of course driven back, but they succeeded in making a masterly retreat, and brought in all their guns with the addition of a native gun they had found at Kubraee. This was distorted into a victory, and the British troops were misrepresented as being very few in number and unable to fight.

35. Still, however, they found the British troops coming on to Banda, and the whole of the Nawab's forces moved out to oppose them at Goera Mooglee, about eight miles west of Banda. The Nawab himself was present. They took up a very strong position, but soon discovered their miscalculation of the British strength and pluck. On the morning of the 19th of April, they were attacked by the Madras Column under Major-General Whitlock, and driven from post to post, and pursued up to the banks of the Kane, with very little loss on our side. They left 800 of their number dead on the field, and nine guns fell a prize to the victors.

36. The main portion of the rebel column retreated towards Humeerpoor by a moro northerly road, and the Nawab passed through the town of Banda, without again visiting the halls of his ancestors. They say he was weeping bitterly. He had been the duped fool of those about him, and bitterly he now rued the consequences of his folly. With a few followers he and the female portion of his establishment crossed the river Kane by a ghat some miles lower down, and rejoined the main body of his troops at Jelalpoor.

37. Our force entered Banda on the 20th of April, and found the town totally deserted. Evident traces were found of a most precipitate flight on the part of the enemy, and for weeks afterwards abandoned horses and property were brought in by
the surrounding villagers. The station was found a heap of ruins, and dismantled of even the trees which had ornamented the road sides. The Church roof had been blown off, and the tower made a target by the rebel artillerymen. The walls had also been undermined, with the intention of blowing the whole edifice to the skies. Fortunately we arrived in time to stop it. The monuments in the burial-ground had been defaced, and the stone and marble tablets abstracted and turned into curry-stones. In fact, nothing had been left undone, which could be construed into an insult to the Christian religion, or which tended to exterminate the smallest vestige of their former masters. I must add, however, that throughout the rebellion, certain of my old Omlah at Banda, continued from time to time to keep me informed in great detail of all that went on during my absence, and many of them joined me at Allahabad after September.

38. In a district in which our prestige had suffered so considerably, from which we had been nearly a whole year absent, and where so many different bands of mutineers from time to time had congregated, and where the rebel Government had been so long supreme, and the capital of which had been the scene of the public murder and dishonor of our countrymen and women, it was necessary that our return to the district should be accompanied with a force sufficient to make a strong demonstration, to overawe all opposition, and at once to disarm and disperse the disaffected. Such it was my good fortune to find at Banda.

39. I reassumed civil charge of the district on the 29th April, with the powers of Special Commissioner, just ten months and sixteen days from the night of our ignominious flight; and I found Major-General Whitlock with the Madras Column encamped at Banda, strong in artillery.

The Settlement records of Regulation IX of 1833, and the last Putwarree's papers, and latest English correspondence, which before we left Banda had been placed in the Nawab's house, were recovered. But I had no Kutcheries, no police, no omlah, and a population to deal with, all more or less concerned in the rebellion, or in marauding and plundering expeditions, and who still held aloof, fearing to meet the just penalty of their misdeeds. Moreover, the conduct of our own troops for some weeks after they entered Banda was not such as to re-assure the frightened and doubting natives.

40. At the same time the rebel Chiefs with their larger armies still stood defiant in the next districts at Calpee, Humeerpoor, and Jelalpoor; and the people felt by no means assured that our stay at Banda would be of any permanence. On the other side, Narain Rao and Madho Rao, calling themselves "Peshwa" at Kirwee, with an army of forty guns and 15,000 men, still retained possession of the eastern half of the district, and refused to surrender.

41. In order to re-establish authority and order, it was necessary to make a prompt and severe impression, which would strike terror into the minds of the evil-disposed; and at the same time discrimination was required, in order to secure those who were well affected to our side, and to re-assure those who still doubted. In a district where so many had so deeply committed themselves, it was impossible and undesirable to punish all offenders. There was not a village marked in the map that had not more or less committed itself. All Government servants had lived passive subjects, and almost all zealous servants under the rebel Government. The latter have of course been hunted out and prosecuted with all severity; but in dealing with the villages I determined, 1st, to select three or four in each pargannah, the inhabitants of which had most grossly and generally committed themselves, in rising in rebellion,
and showing direct hostility to the British Government before we left Banda in June 1857, or who had distinguished themselves in the pursuit and maltreatment of European fugitives, or who refused to submit after our return, and to make the most severe example possible of them by burning their villages, destroying the houses of the headmen, hanging and transporting the ringleaders, and flogging others less deeply concerned; 2ndly, in all other cases unless attended with murder, or great violence, it was desirable to encourage a compromise between the prosecutor and defendants, and to accept restitution and compensation from the defendants.

42. Before I reached Banda, Major-General Whitlock had sent out into the district a strong Field Detachment of European and Native Infantry, with Cavalry and European Horse Artillery, under the command of the late lamented Major Dallas, of the 1st Madras Native Infantry, a most determined and intelligent officer, who fully understood the nature of the duty on which he was deputed, and who feared not responsibility. This column of demonstration marched by long and rapid marches via Buberoo, Tindwaree, and Chilla Tara, back to Banda. The villagers who presented themselves were re-assured, and every precaution taken against plunder and unnecessary molestation. The people flocked into the British camp, bringing poultry and supplies, and showed a manifest pleasure in seeing us back again. They bitterly rued the reign of anarchy and military despotism under the Nawab, and the generality were doubtless tired of their own excesses and the life of insecurity they had lived for so many months. As soon as the novelty of being their own masters had passed away, I believe the majority prayed for our return. At Hurdowlee, a large Mahomedan village, belonging to the rebel Nawab, in which the spies said many rebel leaders were concealed; Major Dallas surrounded the village, but allowed only a certain number of men to accompany him inside. He thoroughly searched the place and captured a few rebels, one of whom, the Nawab's private Moonshee, who was riding a stolen officer's horse, was hanged on the spot; and the others were brought into Banda for trial. The villagers were not molested. The villages of Banda and Johurpoor on the banks of the Jumna were next pointed out to Major Dallas, as the terror of the surrounding country. All complained of their exactions and marauding, and all prayed for their punishment. They were said to be still in force in their villages, not yet convinced of our superiority. Major Dallas, with his usual good judgment, selected this as an opportunity for making an impression on the evil-disposed. He accordingly, by a night surprise, surrounded the village of Johurpoor. The rebels immediately took to their boats on the river, and as they tried to gain the opposite bank, they were well punished with grape from the Horse Artillery guns. A few men were caught in the village, one of whom their leader, who had set himself up as Raja of the country, was hanged forthwith, and the others were released after corporal punishment. The village was then burnt, and this nest of robbers dispersed. Great were the manifestations of delight in the surrounding villages at this just and summary punishment of Johurpoor and Banda; and combined with the conciliatory measures of Major Dallas in all other places, it had the very best effect, and that portion of the district was conquered. I passed along the road from Chilla Tara to Banda, a few days afterwards, with only four Native sowars, and went into every village near the road, and talked with the zemindars and people, and found not a sign of opposition or insult, in a country where ten days previously the sight of a white face would have been the signal for the instant death and dishonor of its owner.

43. For a month I was busy in organizing a new Police, in tracing the concealed rebels, and making a few salutary examples of those who had been more prominent during the disturbances in the vicinity of Banda itself. Major-General Whitlock was waiting for his second brigade before he could march on Kirwee, and
the public were anxiously watching the advance of Sir Hugh Rose on Jhansee and Calpee. By that time I had re-established the Tehseeldars and Thannadars at Pylance, Tindwaree, Buberoo, Seouda and Budousa, and had accompanied a Field Detachment under Captain Macintyre of the Hyderabad Contingent, and visited with summary punishment three or four of the worst villages in Pergannahs Pylanee and Tindwaree.

44. On the 1st of June, Narrayun Rao and Madho Rao still refusing to present themselves at Banda, or to allow our establishments to occupy that portion of the district, March upon Kirwee.

Major-General Whitlock joined by his second brigade marched from Banda for Kirwee. Great was the sensation caused by such a large force of Europeans, and guns and cavalry passing in the height of the hot winds through a country, where no European soldiers had been seen for nearly half a century.

Flight of the army of Narrayun Rao, and surrender of himself and his brother, with forty-two guns, treasure and jewels.

Despair seized the large rabble army of Narrayun Rao and its leaders, and they made a precipitate retreat into the hill tracts south of Tirohan; and Narrayun Rao and Madho Rao, the heirs of the old Peshwa, surrendered unconditionally with all their guns, forty-two in number, and their treasure and jewels of fabulous amount. This fortunate circumstance placed the whole district in our possession. The dispersion of the rebels at Calpee, by Sir Hugh Rose, about the same time, completed the discomfort of the rebels, and destroying the hopes of the disaffected, tended much to tranquilize this district.

45. Our main force, after leaving a garrison under Brigadier Carpenter at Kirwee, returned to Banda with all the treasure, Fate of Narrayun Rao.

jewels and captured guns, and the prisoners. The latter have since been tried and convicted of rebellion, and their estates and property confiscated to the State, and Narrayun Rao was sentenced to transportation for life; but the sentence was remitted by the Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Special Commissioner. Narrayun Rao will henceforth live under surveillance at Hazareebagh, on an allowance of Rupees 700 per mensem.

46. From Kirwee, Major-General Whitlock kindly placed at my disposal a movable column under Major Dallas, which accompanied me round the district to Bhowree and Mow, and then up the right bank of the Jumna, passing through Pergannahs Tirohan, Chiboo, Dursenda, Buberoo, Tindwaree and Banda. I established the Revenue and Police posts as we went along, and carried out my intention of making a most severe example of three or four selected as the worst villages in each pergunnah. Captain Metge, Commanding the Banda Military Police, with his Adjutant, Lieutenant Dick, subsequently did what was required in Pergannahs Seonda and Budousa. I particularly selected those villagers for punishment, who had assaulted and hunted European fugitives. All opposition was disarmed, and all those well disposed were re-assured and encouraged to return to their usual occupations. All those who had befriended us in our need, were most liberally rewarded.

Tour round the district: punishment of refractory villages, and conciliation of others.

Rewards distributed to friends.

Villages which called for special punishment.

47. The villages selected as special objects for punishment are—

Pergannah Banda, Goera, Mooglee—Where Captain Scott's party were taken prisoners.

Pergannah Pylanee Mudunpoor—Who rose in hostility to our Government before 14th June, and who plundered and attacked the fugitive officers from Puttehpoo.

Pergannah Pylanee, Pipree, ditto—Who stopped the road, set up their own King, and committed universal plundering, and showed great rancour against Government.
Pergunnah Pylane, Lusenda—Ditto ditto ditto, and who continued to communicate with the rebels at Calpee, and refused to submit after our return.

Pergunnah Pylane, Chundwara—Ditto ditto.

Pergunnah Pylane, Juspoora—Ditto ditto.

Pergunnah Simounee, Puchneyee—A Kham village, of which the zemindars rose and plundered the Government cash-box, destroyed the records and Cutchery, and maltreated the Government Ameer.

Pergunnah Simounee, Jokurpoor, and Banda—Mentioned above (para. 42).

Pergunnah Simounee, Simree and Waslipoor—Who attacked and plundered and destroyed the Government Tehseeline, records and treasure, and turned out the Government servants, and now refuse to attend.

Pergunnah Buberoo, Murka, and Buberoo—who rose in rebellion before we left the district, and plundered and destroyed the Government Tehseelee and records, and who plundered all the surrounding villages, and refused to submit on our return.

Pergunnah Dursenda, Kumasin—Ditto ditto.

Pergunnah Dursenda, Paharee—Ditto ditto.

Pergunnah Chiboo Mow, Munkwar, Poorubputtas—Ditto ditto.

Pergunnah Tirshan—None.

Pergunnah Badousa, Lorehta—who attacked and murdered British fugitives.

Pergunnah Budousa, Surha—who rose in rebellion and plundered before we left the district, and turned out the Police.

Pergunnah Badousa, Goorha—who rose in rebellion and plundered before we left the district, and turned out the Police.

Pergunnah Seonda, Sonta, Kherowa, and Madhopoor—who attacked and maltreated, and plundered European officers and ladies.

48. Mr. Carne, Deputy Collector under Regulation IX of 1833, with the powers of a Special Commissioner, was stationed as Civil Officer in charge with the garrison at Kirwee. In September the rebels, who under Radha Gobind, Narrayun Rao’s Kamdar, and the instigator of their rebellion, had fled from Kirwee, and some of the rebel Rewa Sirdars again became troublesome in Pergunnahs Tirohan and Chiboo, using the name of the Nana and proclaiming his rule. The conduct of the petty Chiefs of the independent States of Bundelkund, bordering on the district, too, added much to the general disorder. They secretly assisted the rebel bands both with supplies and men. Brigadier Carpenter however marched from Kirwee, and after punishing them three several times drove the rebels beyond Nagode and restored order. Captain Griffin with the Chutterpoor auxiliary levies cleared the Pergunnah of Chiboo.

49. Since then the district has been as quiet as I could wish; the revenue is being paid up, and not an armed rebel band remains in the district, and the last rebel Chief, Goomna, an escaped convict, has lately been sent in a corpse by a rebel zemindar, who sought his own pardon. Unless therefore we are again disturbed by outsiders, we shall have no more rebellion in Banda.

50. The greater part of the British force left Banda in September, under Major-General Whitlock, for other districts. Meanwhile, the public offices, the church and the jail, and the Christian burial-ground have been restored, and the expenses of the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General, are being defrayed by suitable fines levied on rebel villages and the town of Banda. The cost of repairs and reconstruction of Thannahs and Teh-
secees and Police Chowkees, destroyed or injured by the rebels, will be realized in the same way. The roads are under repair, and an efficient Military Police, ready to move upon any point it is wanted, is in course of organization. There is once more security of life and property, and the people have been taught a lesson, which they will not, I think, quickly forget.

61. I cannot but attribute the speedy tranquillization of a district, so long full of anarchy and rebellion, in a great measure, to the unusual powers which are now allowed to be exercised under the new Acts by the District Officers. Backed by an irresistible military force, and associated with a General, who has ever been ready to afford his cordial co-operation, with the ordinary regulations virtually suspended, and possessed of the confidence and support of the Supreme Government, I have had little to hamper my proceedings, and have been able to carry out unchecked the policy assumed in conformity with the instructions of the Governor-General. And I am confident, that no greater boon could be bestowed on these provinces than to dissolve the Regulations and Acts altogether, and introduce a Code similar to that of the Punjab.

52. We can afford now to deal leniently with all offenders, except those who have committed murder, or hunted, or maltreated Europeans, or who have been active leaders and promoters of the rebellion; and such is the policy now pursued.

53. The financial state and prospects of the district have furnished the subject of a separate correspondence.

54. It is my pleasing duty to bring to the notice of Government the individuals who have done marked good service to the State.—Vide Appendix B.

P. S.—Since closing the report, the Queen's Proclamation assuming the government of the country has been issued, and the terms of amnesty made known; and all prisoners on trial, who came under the amnesty, have been released, to the number of upwards of 300 men.

God save the Queen.

BANDA, 10th November 1858. F. O. MAYNE, Magistrate and Collector.

APPENDIX A.

PERGUNNAH CHIBOO.

On the 8th of June, the escaped convicts from Allahabad entered this district by the Mow ferry, and first spread the news of rebellion and bloodshed. The cry was quickly taken up by the Boondelas, and the zemindars of villages Mow, Poorubputae and Munkwar and a few others assembled and attacked the Tehseeldaree at Mow, and were joined by the Thannah Police. The Tehseedar, Thannadar, and their Omla, after being besieged for some days were gallantly rescued by Hingun Khan, Zemindar of Deea Oohukwa, Pergunnah Fuchim Sureera, Zillah Allahabad. But the buildings were dismantled and the Treasury containing Rupees 1,200 and all Government property were plundered, and the records torn up and distributed to the winds. The three villages above noted have been only partly punished. The collections were made by Narain Rao's Government through their Tehseedar Nazir, Nubbee Khan, and their troops committed much havoc in the pergunnah, which also suffered severely from repeated passages of mutineer sepoys.
The Rajapoor Roopoleas behaved well and will be rewarded; they preserved the Government Thannah and records, and also those of the Post Office. The zemindars of Mouzah Murroor also behaved well in supporting the Tehseeldar.

A band of rebels, under Punjab Sing and Deer Sing, Rewan Sirdars, a second time accompanied by zemindars of Mow, Munkwar and Poorubputtee, took forcible possession of this Tehseelee in September, after our return, but were quickly driven back by the Chutterpoorn auxiliary levies, under Captain Griffin, who is now stationed at Rajapoor. The villages in the southern portion of the pergunnah suffered very much from the ravages of bands of rebels for the rainy season of 1858, but it is now quite free from such vermin.

PERGUNNAH DURSEND.:

The Tehseeldar of this Pergunnah, Shaikh Khadim Hossein, a resident of Oudh, had long been attached to this pergunnah, and he had been excessively kind to the people, especially to the men of Kamasin, whom he had assisted with charitable works in hard times and built a well, and dug a tank at his own cost in the village.

When the waves of the rebellion approached Kamasin, he naturally looked for aid from his old friends, and they responded to the call, and came to protect the Tehseeldaree. Men of Sanda also came to assist. On the 11th of June, the Kamasin men turned traitors, drove off the Sanda Zemindars, and themselves attacked and plundered the Thannah and Tehseeldaree, robbed the Treasury containing about Rupees 4,000, destroyed the record, and dismantled the Government buildings. They drove out the old Tehseeldar and his Omlah. The Tehseeldar fled to Sanda, where he found protection, and with the assistance of the zemindars of Sanda, and that of Chilowlur he returned to Kamasin, fought the traitors, drove them out and burned their village. Several Government servants were killed and wounded in the fight. He then went to Kirwee to ask the aid of Narain Rao, which being refused, he went to Banda, and after remaining there quietly for some time, finally joined me at Allahabad. The Kamasin zemindaree has been confiscated, and the zemindars well punished. I made a most severe example of this village: The Paharee zemindars also behaved very badly, and plundered the Thannah and turned out the Police. They have also been punished. The Chillee Mull Zemindars gave succour and shelter to the fugitives from Kote Ekdalla.

The Sanda and Chilowlur people have been rewarded.

The collections in this pergunnah were made by Narain Rao, whose forces committed much devastation in the villages; they were opposed by the Surdoaa and Kamasin people, and both villages were destroyed. Other villages were also plundered and burned by Narain Rao.

Surdoaa, a large kham village, behaved very well to the Government Ameen; but they and the surrounding villages moved in a body to attack and plunder the wealthy bazar of Rajapoor, but were brought off.

This pergunnah suffered from the repeated passages through it of bands of mutineer soldiery.

PERGUNNAH OUGASEE:

On 9th of June, the Murka and Sungurra people rose in rebellion, and when the Tehseeldar went to restore order, they attacked him and drove him away. He fled to Ougasee, and on 11th, returned to Buberoo, the headquarter of the Tehseelee. He found it surrounded by Murka Sungurra and Buberoo Zemindars. On the 12th, they plundered the Tehseelee and Treasury...
containing Rupees 5,000 and some hundred, destroyed all the records, and dismantled the building, and killed the Karinda of the village. The Tehseldar and Police fled to Banda.

The Murka men remained in rebellion till our return, and committed plundering expedition in every direction, on both sides of the river, in connection with the Surkundee people of the Futtehpoor district. They were always notorious for their turbulence and contumacy, and maintained their old name in 1857-58. Both they and the Baberoo men have been well punished. This pergannah was divided by Nawab Ali Bahadoor and Narain Rao, and the collections were made by both parties, under their respective Tehseldars, Morey Punth and Jwalapershau.

The family of the Cazee of Ougassee behaved well, in protecting and supporting the Tehseldar, to the best of his ability.

PERGUNNAH SIMOUNEE.

Till the 10th of June 1857, this pergannah was undisturbed. The Johurpoor and Banda people then commenced open plunder. The men of Simree Wasilpoor followed suit. The latter, however, came and offered their services to the Tehseldar, which were accepted. No sooner, however, had they arrived at Tindwaree, the head-quarter of the Tehseel, than they sent messengers to the Johurpoor people, telling them to come and aid in plundering the Tehsellee and village of Tindwaree. Some three or four thousand men of Johurpoor, Banda, Simree and Wasilpoor, on the 11th June, assembled at Tindwaree. They surrounded the Tehseldaree, and breaking into it, plundered the treasure to the amount of Rupees 3,500, destroyed the records and burnt and sacked the village. The Tehseldar and Omlah and the Police were compelled to conceal themselves. The Tehseldar and a few Chuprassees, however, remained at Tindwaree till the 12th, when he was compelled to fly and retreated to Banda. The zemindars of Puchneyee, a large kham village, behaved in an exactly similar manner to the Government Ameen and his office at that place. The men of the above villages remained in open rebellion, until our return in April 1858, and they have committed incalculable mischief and injury on other villages in the pergannah. They have all been well punished, and their zemindar rights confiscated.

Muttra Pershaud, ex-Canoongoe, and the zemindar of Jhaaree stood by the Tehseldar, and have done good service. They will be rewarded. These collections in the pergannah during the rebellion were made by Nawab Ali Bahadoor, through his Tehseldar, Mahomed Tuckee, a resident of Jais-Oudh. All the Government Offices have been totally destroyed.

PERGUNNAH PYLANEE.

Puraree, Murjha, Nanda Deo, Pipreree, and Pylanee threatened to attack the Tehseelee in the first instance, but were overruled by others. Muddunpoor, Lasendra, Chandwara, and Juspoora, and Pipreree commenced the rebellion, and were first and foremost in all marauding and plundering expeditions, in supporting the rebel Nawab and Nana of Bithoor, and in protracting hostility after our return. They have all been severely punished. Omrao Sing of Sindhan Pullan and Sumud Khan of Badeygaon alone joined friendly to our Government and supported the Tehseldar. They have been rewarded. The collections in this Tehseelee were made by Nawab Ali Bahadoor, through his Tehseldar Mahomed Mosem.

The records have been almost all preserved, and but little damage was done to the Government buildings. This was owing to the friendly offices of some of the resident and zemindars of Pylanee. A few of the Omla also remained at Pylanee and looked after the dutfur.

The Tehseldar was driven out by his own Chuprassees, who forced him to pay them all the money he had in the Government Treasury amounting to Rupees 379-12.
PERGUNNAH TIROHAN.

In this pergunnah is situated Kirwew, the head-quarter of the rebel Government of Narain Rao and Madho Rao, who directly they heard of Mr. Cockerell's death, and of the British officers having left Banda, assumed the government, and imprisoned Akbar Ali, the Government Tehsildar. They then proclaimed themselves to be Pezhkees. The instigator and supporter of the rebellion was their Kamdar, Radha Gobind. They of course collected all the revenue; but owing to the presence of their large forces, the various villages of this pergunnah remained quiet, and suffered less than in other pergunnahs. Abdool Shukoor was appointed their Tehsildar. On the surrender of Narain Rao and Madho Rao, and the flight of their brave army under Radha Gobind and Golab Raez before the British forces, we took possession. All their property has been confiscated, and the Tehsildee has been removed from Tirohan to Kirwew, which are about half a mile apart. And the old fort of Tirohan, commonly known as the fort of the Soorkees has been blown up. The palace of Narain Rao is a fortified building, and is now garrisoned by British troops. Subsequently to the retreat of Narain Rao's rebellious forces, the villages on the south of pergunnah Tirohan suffered very considerably from their ravages, and the plundering expedition of the rebel Sirdars, who joined Radha Gobind from Rewan. The pergunnah is now, however, quite clear of those bands, who have been driven out by Brigadier Carpenter. The records of this pergunnah have been partially preserved. The treasure was partly taken by Mr. Cockerell with him to Banda, where it was plundered to the amount of about Rupees 1,500. The remainder, about Rupees 443, was left at Kirwew, and appropriated by Narain Rao, from whom it has been recovered.

PERGUNNAH BUDOUSA.

This pergunnah was first taken possession of by the Raja of Beronda, who yielded to the superior forces of Narain Rao. The latter made the collection, through his Tehsildar, Sooraj-ood-deen. The Government Tehsildar fled, and the Thannadar was turned out by Narain Rao's people. The Adjygurh and Punnah and Chukwa Rajas also made collections in this pergunnah. The fort of Kallinjur was bravely held throughout by the Punnah troops, under command of Lieutenant Remington. The old fort of Marpa is also situated in this pergunnah, but no one took permanent possession. The fugitive officers from Nowgong were pursued and persecuted in this Pergunnah. The villages of Jamwara and Lorehta have paid the penalty. Goorha and Surha were also prominent in rebellion. They both rose long before we left the district. Some few people sheltered the European fugitives for a day or two, and have been named for reward.

The pergunnah records have been partially preserved, and the Government buildings but little injured. The treasure, amounting to about Rupees 500, was taken by Mr. Cockerell to Banda, and was there plundered.

PERGUNNAH BANDA.

The history of this pergunnah is included in the general report of the occurrences at Banda khas. The collections were made by the Fundits of Jaloun, by Nawab Ali Bahadoor, and by Dhowa of Adjygurh. The Tehsildar, Meer Furhut Ali, held on in his office until the Nawab became undoubtedly a rebel. He then resigned, and was succeeded by Mohamed Abbass, ex-Government Tehsildar of Mowdha. Meer Furhut Ali, however, preserved all the records, and kept a diary of events, which I have found very useful. He also preserved a strict account of all collections made by the Nawab.

The Nowgong fugitives passed through Pergunnah Banda. Many villages proved hostile, and turned out to attack them; but others again behaved very well, and have been rewarded. The Goera Mooglee zamindars distinguished themselves by taking prisoners four British officers, and bringing them to the Nawab. They have been heavily fined. The Muttanud zamindars were pre-eminent in their loyalty and protection of Europeans, and they have
received a liberal reward in the reduction of one-third of their jumma, and other presents. The Gooreh and Jouroha zemindars also supported the Government, and a portion of their revenue for the past year have been recommended for remission.

The decisive action was fought in this pergunnah between the British forces and the rebels at Goera Mooglee.

The chief refractory villages are Ladar, Kunna, Bhumbane, Gvbbara, Goera Mooglee, Kurbye and Chinderae, but they all settled down immediately on our return, except the Ludar people, of whom the Chief is one Futtah Sing, a most contumacious rascal, known to me as such long before the rebellion.

PERGUNNAH SEONDA.

The collections in this district were made during the rebellion by the Government Tehseeldar, Chirounjeelall, and paid to Nawab Ali Bahadoor up to the date of the battle of Banda. The Tehseeldar and his Omla then absconded. This pergunnah made itself chiefly remarkable for the hostility exhibited to the fugitive British officers from Nowgong. At Madhopoor they were attacked, and an unfortunate lady, who fell behind, was stripped of her clothes and plundered, and the zemindars disputed among themselves who should be her husband. In the midst of this rivalry, she was rescued by Nawab Ali Bahadoor, taken to Banda, and very kindly treated both by him and his mother, the Begum, and sent under escort to Nagode. The villagers of Loatah and Kherawah and Nusseynee and Goreepoorwah, also pursued and assaulted this unhappy band of fugitives; they have all been severely punished. The large kham village of Utturra also rose in rebellion, plundered the Government cash box, severely maltreated the Ameen, and destroyed the Government Kutchery. They also joined the Adjyghur rebels and plundered in other villages. They have met with their reward. Lallah Jadoram and Kishen Chund Sett are the only landholders in this pergunnah who behaved well. They are Mushtrees and live in Banda khas.

The Adjyghur people disputed the right of this pergunnah with Nawab Ali Bahadoor, and also collected revenue. The Rajas of Chirkaree and Funnah also made collections.

The Government treasure was looted by the Seonda, Nebalpoor, and Kullaundryeepoor people, to the amount of Rupees 598.

The Government buildings are not much damaged, and the records have been almost all preserved.

There is an old fort, situated in an island, in the river Kane, by name Ranghu, which might prove a shelter for any band of desperadoes.

ZILLAH BANDA, } (Sd.) F. O. MAYNE,

The 10th November 1858. } Magistrate and Collector.

APPENDIX B.

GOVERNMENT SERVANTS.

Lalla Debee Pershad.—This lad, a resident of Banda, has only just left school, and a few days previously to the rebellion been appointed to officiate as Mudutgar at the Jemadar’s Chokee of Kallinjur. He and the two men, whose names follow, were the only men of the district who accompanied the British officers in their retreat from the district. They made themselves of the greatest assistance, and remained and did excellent service with the Magistrate of Banda in the Allahabad district, throughout the rebellion. Debee Pershad has been rewarded with a permanent appointment in the Magistrate’s Court, on a salary of Rupees 20 per messem. The two burkundazes have been made sowars, and horses have been presented to them free of cost.

Sheo Churn Brahmin, Burkundaz.—Vide above remarks.

Rumzan’ Ali Sheikh, Burkundaz.—Ditto. ditto.
Mahomed Oosman Khan.—Thannadar of Budousa. This officer stood at his post until forced to leave by Narain Rao's men, who took possession. He joined me at Allahabad, as soon as he possibly could, and did good service in the Allahabad district. He deserves a good reward. He is now at his former post.

Sheik Khadim Husun.—Tehseldar of Dursenda. His good conduct has been narrated in the Appendix, under Pergunnah Dursenda.

Syud Akber Ali.—Tehseldar of Tiroh. This officer was imprisoned by Narain Rao, and very badly treated. He used to send me detailed and correct information of all that occurred at Kirwee, and as soon as ever he could effect his release, he joined me at Allahabad, and did good service in that district. He returned to his former post on our re-occupation of the district of Banda, and has subsequently done excellent service with the force under Brigadier Carpenter, in September and October 1858. He is deserving of a good reward.

Mahomed Azim Khan.—Thannadar of Kirwee. This man did excellent service with poor Mr. Cockerell, the Joint-Magistrate at Kirwee, and has a certificate to that effect. He was afterwards compelled to take small service under Narain Rao's government. In consideration of his former service, I restored him to his appointment.

Kalee Churn.—Tehseldar of Budousa. This man deserted his post before he was absolutely obliged to do so, but subsequently did good service with some of his Omla, under Lieutenant Remington at Kallinjir.

Mr. J. A. Lisle.—Clerk of the Judge's Office at Banda, joined me at Allahabad, and did good service in that district, going disguised into the rebels' camp and bringing correct information of their strength and intentions. Since my return to Banda, I made him Kotwal of the town of Banda, and he has exerted himself in a most praiseworthy manner in hunting out concealed rebels, and discovering hidden treasure and valuable property, and in getting information of the rebel forces. He has now reverted to his old post of Clerk in the Judge's Office. He should be rewarded.

Gholam Aheea Khan.—This man did good service as Thannadar of Kirwee, after our return, and has been honorably mentioned by Brigadier Carpenter, attached to whose camp he gave great satisfaction. He has been promoted to be Kotwal of Banda.

Pransookk Ram Seth.—Treasurer of the Collector's Office. Has done good service in sending me information from Banda during the rebellion, and in getting excellent and trustworthy information regarding the proceedings of the rebels under the ex-Nawab of Banda and Tantia Topee, before the fall of Calpee.

PERSONS NOT IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF GOVERNMENT.

Chundoo Lal.—Vakeel of Dewanny Court at Banda. Has done since our return excellent service as a volunteer under Captain Griffin, in command of the Chutturpoor Levies, and has been rewarded with a present of Rupees 200; and being one of the most able Vakeels at Banda, I have been able to promote him to the vacant post of Government Vakeel.

Doorgapershad and Sheopershad.—These two men have also done good service as volunteers under Captain Griffin, and have been rewarded with presents of Rupees 50 each.

Munnee Lal Chowdry.—Of the town of Banda. Has been very useful in establishing daks and getting information of the movements of the rebels in Zillah Humeerpoor, immediately after our return to Banda. He also assisted in the escape of some Government servants.

Doorgapershad Mookhtyar.—Has also exerted himself in getting good information of the rebels and their movements.

Lalla Jado Ram.—A zemindar in this district, who has stood by the Government and been of the greatest assistance in re-establishing order in Pergunnah Seonda. He will be rewarded with villages.

Kishen Chund Seth.—Ditto ditto.
Moorlee and other Zemindars of Multound.—Concealed and treated most hospitably four European refugees for some weeks, and steadily refused all attempts of the Nawab and his people to give them up. They afterwards escorted them on their way to Nagode. They have been liberally rewarded by Government with a permanent reduction of one-third of the Government jumma and with other pecuniary rewards.

Sheikl Perookh Khan and Mohungoor Choukeedar.—Of Odyeepoorwa, Pergunnah Banda, concealed and behaved well to Captain Scott and party when hunted by the rebels. They have been rewarded with pensions.

Mohamed Ibrahim.—Protected the unfortunate Captain Benjamin and Mr. Bruce and party for four days after the mutiny. They have been rewarded with a village paying Rupees 1,000, and a present of Rupees 500.

Lalla Pande.—Several times at great risk came from Banda to Allahabad and brought most detailed information of all that was going on. He also gave information to the authorities of the rebels advancing to Kudjooa and of the rebels moving on Cawnpoor.

Ishree Sing and others, Zemindars of Sanda.—Stood by the Tehseldar of the pergunnah and fought in his aid at Kasain, and protected him and his Oma at the commencement of the rebellion. Since our return they have also supported the Tehseldar. They have been rewarded with the gift of Mouzah Bunthwree, paying a jumma of Rupees 708.

Indul Sing and others, Zemindars of Mouzah Chilouler.—Ditto ditto. They have been rewarded with the gift of Mouzah Jammoo, paying a jumma of Rupees 2,050.

Muthra Pershad, Maafseedar.—This man was of the greatest assistance to the Tehseldar of Simounee, both at the rebellion and since our return. He has been rewarded with the post of Canoonoo.

Dhooree Sing and others, of Injhoree, Pergunnah Simounee.—Stood by the Tehseldar at the rebellion and fought on his side, and have also supported him since our return. They will be rewarded with a village.

Nyn Sing and Jowahir Sing, Zemindars of Bhandeepoor.—Protected Mr. Lisle and his family during the rebellion. They will be rewarded.

Zemindar of Kimar, Pergunnah Bhudousar.—Protected and sheltered one-third of fugitive officers from Nowgong. Will be rewarded.

Zemindars of Bhattaopora, Pergunnah Bhudousa.—Ditto ditto.

Jaoram Patuck Taraput, of Naraynee, Pergunnah Seonda.—Protected and sheltered European fugitives. Will be rewarded.

Hingun Khan and Salar Khan, Zemindars of Deea Choukwa, Pergunnah Utkurthun, Zillah Allahabad.—Gallantly rescued the Tehseldar and Thannadar and Oma of Mow, when attacked and surrounded by rebels, and protected them throughout the rebellion.

Beneeram and others, of Roopoleea of Bajapoor, Pergunnah Chiboo.—These men protected the Thannah and its records, and Post Office records throughout the rebellion.

Zillah Banda,
The 10th November 1858. 
(Sd.) F. O. Mayne, Magistrate and Collector.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE MUTINY AT HUMEERPOOR.

Introduction.—All records of every kind having been destroyed, it is very difficult to give more than an outline of what happened; but it is sufficiently evident that there had been a very uneasy feeling in the place for some time previous. There had been outbreaks elsewhere, and news of them had arrived here, disturbing men's minds, until at last we see in a most affecting memorandum left by the late Mr. Loyd, written a few days before he fled, that he with the rest having heard false reports concerning Allahabad, where it was said, by sepoys who came thence, that every European was slaughtered, had made up their minds that their race too was nearly run, and they were prepared for the worst.
2. Christian inhabitants at outbreak.—The Christian inhabitants at that time in the place consisted of those shown in the margin, Mr. Crawford having sent his wife and children to Mr. Mayne at Banda on the first news of the coming storm; of all these but one, the eldest Miss Anderson, a girl of twelve or thirteen, escaped, and she as will be seen not without injury.

3. Preparations made.—Mr. Loyd, on hearing of the disturbances elsewhere, sent to the Chiefs of Chirkaree, Behree, and Baonee, for assistance, and received and collected in a place to prevent any armed men from approaching: the real danger, however, was from within, consequently these arrangements were unavailing.

4. Signs of evil.—The Zemindars of Romeree which forms part of Humeerpoor are Thakoors, and many sepoys, relatives of theirs, came in relating terrible tales of mutiny and bloodshed, which caused the zemindars of the two thokes, Danda and Manjkhore, to band themselves together for plunder, which they commenced early in June. Some security, however, seems to have been felt from the preparations made by the Collector, but on the 12th there was a meeting at the large house occupied by the Chirkaree troops, attended by the headmen of each band of auxiliaries, the Subadar of the 56th Regiment on duty at the Treasury, and I believe by one or two of our own officials. The result was seen on the morrow, when the guard refused to give up the keys when called on to do so, and tightened their waist bands for action. The chuprassee who brought this intelligence to Mr. Loyd, had his badge taken away for spreading such a report, though promised a reward if it should prove true. That day, however, passed quietly.

5. The outbreak.—Next morning some troopers arrived from Baonee, and a headman of the Nawab's, Ruheem-ood-din by name, who had come over-night, withdrew the guns which were posted in Mr. Loyd's compound, and turned them on the house, saying it was by his master's orders, at the same time the news was brought that the prisoners at the Jail had been released by some six or seven sepoys, their guard being faithless: and the gentlemen saw that the crisis was come. In the early morning two officers of the 1st Regiment, Messrs. Raikes and Browne, whose detachment had mutinied en route to Orai, had arrived as fugitives, and they with Messrs. Loyd and Grant, who up to that time had refused to quit their post, although asked by the Collector of Banda to join him there, called for their horses, these were ready saddled under the charge of two sepoys, who had also had some money made over them for the expenses of the road, but the wretches at this moment of extremity turned traitors, and themselves carried off the cattle, crying out to the mutineers then approaching that the "Sahib log" were escaping.

6. The flight.—There was now not a moment to be lost, and the fugitives hastened down the bank where an iron boat with a lad as boatman was ready, they with Mr. Loyd's bearer, "Poorun Kharar," two orderly chuprassees, "Jug-bundun" and "Debee Sing," and "Ajoobhin" Burkhandaz got in and pushed off, when half across the Jumna they were fired into from the bank, and the balls coming thick amongst them jumped into the water and swam to shore. Here they met with more bad treatment, for the men of Rampoor, near which village they landed, fell on them, plundered them of all they had and severely beat some. They then got separated; the natives managed at night to return to Humeerpoor, where they concealed themselves with friends until they could escape; the two officers of the 1st wandered towards Allahabad; Browne reached Futtehpoor in time to accompany Havelock in his glorious march (after which he too fell a victim to cholera), but Raikes perished from want on the way.
7. **Messrs. Loyd & Grant’s movements.**—Messrs. Loyd and Grant hid themselves in the castor fields till evening, and then swimming with the current reached the Humeerpoor bank, near the junction of the Betwa with the Jumna, three miles below the town; there they stayed for five days from the 14th to the 19th, spending the day standing up to their necks in water amidst reeds, and by night only daring to come to the shore. During this time it seems many were aware of their being concealed, and two men, Mr. Loyd’s sycy “Pultoo” and shepherd “Munniah,” went and told Hurreemohun, a Bengal writer in the Office, who through them and Milaff, a Zemindar of Tirhose Romerec, kept them supplied with food, and, I believe, also sent them some clothes. This action of his performed at some risk of his own life, at such a time, and for which he afterwards got ill-treated at the hands of the rebels, is deserving of all commendation, and I would recommend a grant of a handsome sum of money as a reward to the Baboo for his conduct; and another to be divided among those who were instrumental in carrying his merciful schemes into execution.

8. **Fate of those left.**—Meanwhile at Humeerpoor much blood had been shed. Messrs. Murray and Crawford at the first outbreak had with the Anderson’s made for the house where the Chirkaree troops were, trusting to find shelter at their hands, but were instead butchered in cold blood. Mr. and Mrs. Bunter seeing this fled and hid in a garden where they were discovered, taken to the Subadar, but on consenting to apostatize were given their lives, and going to the hospital, where the Sub-Assistant Surgeon was, they found with him the eldest Miss Anderson with her arm severely cut; they remained there till the 19th. All the bungalows were meanwhile plundered and burnt.

9. **The death of Messrs. Grant and Loyd.**—On the evening of the 18th three Ahirs, Gungadeen Kulloohah and Chitala discovered Mr. Loyd’s place of concealment, and by Kullooch he sent his ring to Gunga Sahib, his Serishtadar, but the miscreant took it instead to the Subadar “Ali bux,” who had proclaimed the Delhi dynasty, and himself its agent; on thus receiving news of the officers being yet alive and near, some of the sepoys went down (there were in all sixty-six in Humeerpoor) and escorted them up, barefooted to a tree without the Cutchery compound; they were there bound and made to kneel, a volley followed, Mr. Grant received a bullet in his brain and died instantly; Mr. Loyd three in his chest; and called out “Are not the English troops yet come?” when another volley completed the tragedy.

10. **Slaughter of the Bunter. Miss Anderson saved.**—As, however, the officers were being marched by the hospital, Mr. Bunter came out and made a bow, he with his wife were immediately cut down and Miss Anderson would have shared the same fate, but the rough hold they took caused the sewing of her wound to give way, and she fainted, so was left for dead. “Ramdeen,” “Muthra Chowbe,” “Gobra Thakoor” zemindars, and “Buddia Keree,” “Munsookha,” and “Kashi,” cultivators, hid her in a field, and carefully tended her till she was recovered, and on the 15th September forwarded her in safety to Beharee Sing, the Zemindar of Burreepal, whence she was sent to Cawnpoor, and eventually to her relatives at Monghyr. For the zemindars I have separately requested that the proprietary rights in the other Thokes be made over to them as a reward. I would also request some pecuniary acknowledgment of the services of the cultivators.

11. **Anarchy and more blood.**—After the murder of the Europeans, anarchy was the order of the day; the mob and sepoys rushed up to the town, plundered every one they could lay their hands on; old scores were wiped out in blood, and the Christian preacher, Jeremiah, with his whole family were slaughtered unresisting. The Bengalee Baboos as writing English were next attacked, and though they begged their lives, lost everything they possessed. To show to what an extent the lust of plunder ruled, there were three boats of unarmed sepoys of the 44th and 67th Regiments, those I believe who were disarmed at Agra, passing by on the 18th June, the guns were turned on them and opened,
many were killed, the boats taken and the goods found in them made over to men of the auxiliary chiefs, the sepoy being left to get on their way as they best could.

12. Treasury plundered.—The sepoy and their auxiliaries now fell out about the money in the Treasury, which appears to have been Rupees 1,49,695-3-11, and on the Subadar stating he meant to take it to Delhi, the Chirkaree leader declared it should not go without the Raja’s leave; this, however, seems to have been anticipated by the Subadar, as he had written for aid to Cawnpoor, and on the 20th a body of troopers came from the Nana, and silenced all opposition; they too had their turn of plundering the place, and on the 21st took the proceeds with the treasure to Cawnpoor with them.

13. Rule of Sheik Waheedoozuman, Amla’s conduct.—The Native Deputy Collector, Waheedoozuman, now tried to restore some sort of order, in virtue of directions received, I believe, from the late Lieutenant-Governor, North-Western Provinces, but in a few days an Akbar Navis, or news-writer, came from the Nana with an order to the Deputy to manage in his name, which was fully acted up to, for on the 1st July the Peishwa’s rule was proclaimed; on the 3rd another proclamation issued that Poona and Satara has fallen and the English been exterminated, and on the 4th, all landholders were ordered to pay their revenue to the Nana’s accredited agents. The Amlahs, or native officials, almost to a man accepted the new order of things until the 15th, when hearing of the British advance on Fattehpore, they thought it time to look to their own interests, and many left for their homes; on the 21st or 22nd, hearing of Cawnpoor being re-taken, and the rebel Nana fled, the Deputy Collector also absconded, and many others at the same time. A few had left at the first outbreak, and so are clear, but the only one who remained and distinctly refused to serve the Nana was Bakee Lall, Tehsildar of Humeerpoor, and even he was persuaded to do so temporarily as a measure of safety, but his papers and the Nana’s orders show how unwillingly he did so.

14. Conduct of the Zemindars.—Once more anarchy reigned in Humeerpoor, the Romeree Zemindars levying blackmail on whom they pleased, and committing all kinds of violence; these men with the exception of Thoko Terose were the leaders in everything bad, and were well backed up by those of Serowlee, Buzoorg and Khoord. The Humeerpoor Zemindars seem to have behaved decidedly well, but are so weak and poor as to have been able to do little. On the 18th September, Beharee Sing, the Chowdry of Burreepal, came over to establish order, but finding it a hopeless task, returned to his own village on the 20th.

15. Baocene management.—The Baocene Nawab who lives at Kudowra near Humeerpoor itself had been asked to take charge of the one pergunnah of Humeerpoor Khas, and he now did so, appointing his own officers and managing it on behalf of Government; his collections amounted to Rupees 26,751-1-11, of which he spent Rupees 17,333-1-2, and has since remitted the balance, Rupees 9,916-0-9, to me. The place was again visited I believe by sepoy in the autumn, but they found little to repay them for their trouble, the town at all times very small having been nearly deserted.

16. Chirkaree management.—While this was going on at the Sudder Station, the pergunnahs were better off. Mr. Carne, the Assistant at Mahoba, had fled to Chirkaree, after a series of adventures with the Nowgong fugitives, during which the inhabitants of Bareegurh and Jeoraha fired on them, and compelled a change of route; Mr. Carne himself, however, can give a far better account of this than I can, so I merely mention the general effect on the district; he with the sanction of higher authorities requested the Raja to take charge of it with the exception of the Humeerpoor Pergunnah which was across the Betwa, and he did so. The Pergunnahs of Raat, Jelphoor, and Poonwarae, were held by him throughout, and the northern ones also for some time, but Mahobs he never seems to have got possession of, the Chief of Goorserei took it without any one’s orders, and managed it for his own
benefit; he was probably led to do so by its having formerly belonged to Jalown, but his doing so was an act of gratuitous rebellion on his part. I am not prepared to say what amount the Chirkaree Raja realized during the term of his management, as he has not yet furnished his accounts. I believe, however, it was altogether about two and half lakhs, and that he is prepared to bring in a further bill against Government, notwithstanding all the establishments were reduced, and most had received no pay on my taking charge since January.

17. The Northern Pergunnah.—In the end of January and beginning of February, the fort of Chirkaree was itself beleaguered, the town plundered and burnt by the force of Tantia Topee aided by Despath; from that time till the battle of Banda, the Banda Nawab held Mowdha, the Mahattas Jellalpoor, realizing Rupees 24,683-6-0 there, and each in turn ravaged Soomeerpoor and the neighbouring lands. The Nana's flag was hoisted in most villages, and every one again helped himself to what he could get at Serowlee Buzoor on the Jumna; batteries were thrown up and all passing boats plundered, and they even fired into the British troops on the other side the river who came from Cawnpoor.

18. Rance of Jeitpoor.—I must not forget to state that at the very commencement, the widow of Parceehut, the former rebel Raja of Jeitpoor and a pensioner of Rupees 1,200 a month from Government, set up herself again at Jeitpoor and appropriated the Tehseeldaree funds, being joined by Despath, a notorious murderer, and I believe a connexion of hers, as also by many other Takoors of the pergunnah; the Chirkaree troops, however, after eight days made her retire, and she is now I hear a fugitive at Tehree. Her associate Despath is still in the Jeenjhun jungles near Jeitpoor, the leader of a band of dacoits.

19. Auction purchaser is ousted.—I need scarcely say that the great feature in the rebellion here has been the universal outing of all bankers, buniyas, Marwarees, &c., from landed property in the district, by whatever means they acquired it, whether at auction, by private sale or otherwise, and also that the larger communities have profited immensely by the time of anarchy, while many of the smaller ones have been ruined and dispersed: those who were strong enough to plunder with impunity did so, the others were the victims. This, however, must have been equally the case all over the country; but it is strange that in no instance do the class so favored appear to have been able to keep their own in the struggle.

20. Conduct of the Chirkaree Raja.—As the neighbouring Native Chiefs had so much to do with the district, some notice of their behaviour seems to be called for here. The Chirkaree Raja managed the greater part as said for Government; that he is loyal there is no doubt; he has cast his all with us, and must be considered so; at the same time it is equally certain that the great accident of Mr. Carne being there that made him so; that he was seriously displeased with Subdul Dowa for the leading part he took in the murder of the officers at Humeerpoor is a fact, as also that he ultimately hung him for the same, but his doing so was for a long time doubtful, and when the Subadar Ali Bux proclaimed the King of Delhi, the Raja sent a letter to him giving in his allegiance, and requesting that all the domains formerly held by his ancestor Chuttersal might be confirmed to him by royal Sunnud. There was, however, no immediate pressure on the Raja from without, and he must soon have seen that the British Star had not yet set; he was managing a paying district with the sanction of Government and the good counsel of Mr. Carne, an old friend of his, with the knowledge that having so long given him shelter had marked him as well inclined to our rule, must all have had their effect; on Mr. Carne's first application he refused to take him in, saying he would finally answer in a fortnight; he was then undoubtedly wavering, and it was that gentleman's forcing himself on his hospitality that must be considered the turning point to this Chief.
21. **The Nawab of Baonee.**—Of the Nawab of Baonee, I cannot say as much; he sent Mr. Loyd the aid required under one "Khuda Bux," who with his Vakeel Kirparam seems at once to have begun intriguing, and on the morning of the outbreak, another officer, Rahemoollah, came from Kudowra (the Nawab's residence), and after holding consultation turned the guns on the bungalow.

22. **Rao of Bheree.**—Of the Rao of Bheree it is difficult to speak; his men shared in the atrocities with the rest, but his leader, Mudaree Dowa, has been killed fighting for the Raja of Chirkaree; that this petty Chief realized at first; I doubt not; but he also afforded an asylum to some of our officials, and save this, and his having been plundered himself I know little of his conduct. Since my taking charge on the 26th of June, he has been in every way actively loyal.

23. **Other petty Chiefs.**—Of the other small semi-independent Jaghirdears, I believe there is nothing to say, save that they all collected what revenue they could, and joined different sides as it seemed to their advantage at different times: the Sareelp. man, however, as I was told by Mr. Carne, sent a message to the Chirkaree Raja to divide the district with him; this Mr. Carne said he heard himself, and reported the fact to the Agent and the Commissioner.

24. **British rule re-established.**—I would state that after the battle of Banda, Mr. Carne managed the Pergunnahs of Mowdha and Soomeerpoor from Banda, until after the taking of Calpee I was appointed Magistrate and Collector, and on the 25th with Mr. Griffith, the Deputy Collector, accompanied a force over and re-occupied the station again. Mr. MacMagliten from Futtehpoor had previously been there a day but left again.

25. **Reward to a lad recommended.**—In closing this report, I would recommend for reward in addition to those mentioned in paragraphs 7 and 10, the lad Binda, who ferried the officers across the river; there is some doubt what he afterwards did and what became of Mr. Loyd's box left on the boat, which can never be cleared up; but the service was one of much danger and, as any others performed in those times in aid of Englishmen, is deserving, I think, of recognition.

(Sd.) **GEORGE H. FREELING,**

**Collector and Magistrate.**

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**Narrative of Events Attending the Outbreak of Disturbances and the Restoration of Authority in the Division of Jhansie in 1857-58.**

On the death of Gungadhur Rao, the late Raja, in A.D. 1854, that State was annexed, and it and the Jaloun and Chundeyree districts were formed into the Jhansie Superintendency under Captain Skene.

2. A pension of Rupees 5,000 a month was granted to the Raja's widow, Musumat Luchmee Baee, known as the Ranee of Jhansie. This sum she at first refused to receive, but eventually did so. Ten lakhs worth of property, belonging to her late husband, was also made over to her; but she considered herself seriously aggrieved, in not being allowed to adopt a son to succeed Gungadhur Rao as Raja, appealed against the arrangements made for her support, and sent an agent to England to plead her cause, but without effect.

3. At this time, however, the Ranee was obliged to smother her ill-will, but it was increased by (what she conceived to be) various petty grievances and annoyances, as follows:

4. Previous to November 1854, the slaughter of cattle was not permitted in Jhansie. On the country coming under British rule, this restriction was of course removed, upon which the Ranee petitioned against the practice, and caused the inhabitants of Jhansie to do the same. The matter was referred to Government, and the slaughter of cattle was authoritatively allowed.
5. Frivolous as it may appear, the establishment of public necessaries was much objected to by the people of Jhansie, and the Ranee and her adherents took advantage of this to create further ill-feeling, by endeavouring to make it appear that the measure tended to interfere with religion.

6. The temple of Luchmee, situated outside the walls, to the east of Jhansie, had long been supported by the Native rulers of the country, and an ancestor of Gungadhur Rao had made over the revenue of two villages for its support. When he died, Captain Francis Gordon, Deputy Commissioner, recommended that this arrangement should continue, but it was ordered that the villages should be resumed. This was strongly objected to by the Ranee, and the case again referred to Government, with the same result. But before the resumption order could be carried out, the outbreak at Jhansie took place.

7. An order was passed, that the rents of the village of Sumburah which was given rent-free for the repair and support of a tomb of a mistress of the late Gungadhur Rao, should be paid to two of the late mistress' female connections, named Motee and Nouruttun, instead of to the Ranee herself. This order, although strictly just, greatly irritated her, and on coming into power, she revenged herself by imprisoning two men, named Mulharee and Gunput, in whose keeping Motee and Nouruttun were; and the night before she (the Ranee) fled from the fort, at the taking of Jhansie by our forces, she put these men to death. I myself saw them lying dead in irons, soon after they had been murdered.

8. The Puar Thakoors and Obareedars of Oddgaon Nonere and Jigna, who are men of influence, had lost their Obaree rights in several of their villages, and were naturally discontented. It is said the Ranee took advantage of this to procure a promise from them to join her, should opportunity offer. This much is certain, that they did join her, and fought on her side, against our Government.

9. It will thus be seen that the Ranee was in a state of mind, which made her ready to take advantage of any opportunity of gratifying her revenge and of recovering what were, in her opinion, her just rights; and, as her after-career shows, she, like many other Mahratta women of rank, possessed a masculine spirit, well fitting her to carry out her designs.

10. In May 1857, there was a report spread in Jhansie, as in many other places in India, that Government had caused ground bones to be mixed in the flour sold in the bazars; the cow's and pig's fat had been used in making up the cartridges served out to the troops; and that two regiments of sepoys had been blown away from guns at Calcutta. Although every means was taken by the civil and military officers to contradict these reports, yet, there is no doubt, but that they had their effect in unsettling people's minds.

11. About this time a man named Chotajoo (agent or a Native Chief), informed Captain F. Gordon that an adherent of the Ranee, named Jholanath, used to hold long private conferences with the Native officers of the Jhansie troops, who frequently visited the Ranee's palace, and that some treachery was intended. No reliance however seems to have been placed on this information, and shortly after the troops having used the cartridges without demur, confidence in the sepoys appears to have been restored, for a time, amongst the civil and military officers.

12. However Mr. Scott, head writer in the Deputy Commissioner's Office, who lived near the lines, and mixed much with natives, had much better information of what was going on, and placed his property in the keeping of a loyal native in the town of Jhansie. He persisted in avowing that he had good reason to know that a mutiny was intended, and that the Ranee and the troops were one. His assertions appear to have had some weight, as great endeavours were made by the civil and military officers to ascertain the true feelings of the sepoys, who of course made great professions of loyalty; notwithstanding which a feeling of uneasiness arose, and three clerks of the Civil establishment fled towards Saugor, but were ordered back, and returned to Jhansie.
13. At this time the Ranee obtained permission to entertain a number of armed men, as she said, for her protection.

14. Whilst the above was the state of affairs at Jhansie, the Chundeyree district was fast getting into disorder.

15. About 200 years ago, the Bundelahs appear to have succeeded in overthrowing the Mussulman authority in the part of the country now known as the Chundeyree district. The first Raja was Ramsheh. In the time of the 9th Raja, Ramchund (about A.D. 1764), the Peshwa wrested from the Chundeyree State the districts of Serai, Dukrani, and Balabehut, and in A.D. 1802, Raja Ramchund, being incapacitated from age and ill-health, went on a pilgrimage, and made over the country to his eldest son, Pirji Paul, who was murdered the following year, and succeeded by his brother, Raja Moor Pylad. This prince was a debauched sot, and the Bundelah Thakoors did what they liked, and possessed themselves of the greater portion of the kingdom. Continued acts of aggression on the neighbouring State of Gwalior, for which no redress could be obtained, at last stirred up Dowlut Rao Scindia to hostilities, and his army, under Colonel Baptiste, took the fort of Talbehut. Raja Moor Pylad, who was hated and despised, fled to Jhansie in A.D. 1812, and a negotiation was opened with Gwalior, and at first Moor Pylad was allowed Rupees 25,000 a year; but subsequently, in A.D. 1831, Colonel Baptiste, with the approval of the British Resident at Gwalior, made the "Buttotah," or partition, and, to speak generally, gave two shares of the former Chundeyree State to Scindia, and one share to Moor Pylad, who was henceforth styled the Raja of Banpoor, from a town in his share. Moor Pylad then proceeded to take possession of all independent jaghires in his share, which so exasperated the Thakoors of Palee, Jacklone, Nanickpoor, and others, that they rose in a body, devastated the country, and then preferred their complaint to Scindia, who decided that Moor Pylad's one share should be divided into three, two of which were to be given to Moor Pylad, and one to the Thakoors. The Raja agreed to this fresh sub-division, but disturbances again broke out, and a new "Buttotah" was made, which, however, was much the same as the former one. At last, in A.D. 1843, the worthless Moor Pylad died, leaving his remnant of a kingdom to his son, Murdun Sing.

16. In A.D. 1844, Scindia's portion of the Chundeyree State was ceded to the British, as part security for the payment of the Gwalior Contingent, and a Deputy Superintendent was appointed, who also had criminal jurisdiction in the Banpoor State.

17. About April 1857, Thakoor Jhoojar Sing, of Nanickpoor, died, and agreeably to the orders of Government, his tenure was resumed, and a settlement made with his heirs, instead of the third part being given to the Raja of Banpoor, as it appears had been the custom agreeably to the "Buttotah." Upon this Raja Murdun Sing, of Banpoor, sent for the heir, Jowahir Sing, invested him with a "pugree," and advised him to collect his relations and retainers, and to go into rebellion, as the surest way to induce our Government to restore him his tenure, on the same terms as his father held it.

17½. It also appears that the Raja was irritated, by being refused by the Government certain honors, to which he considered himself entitled.

18. It will thus be seen, that, like the Ranee of Jhansie, the Raja of Banpoor had, what he considered, injuries to be redressed, and no doubt he also had the hope of regaining, on the expected overthrow of our Government, the entire kingdom of Chundeyree, the ancient possession of his ancestors, of which, as stated above, his father had been dispossessed by Scindia.

19. During April, and part of May 1857, the Chundeyree district was, from unavoidable circumstances, in temporary charge of Zainool-Abdeen Khan, Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector,—a man of lazy and feeble character and unfit for any post of responsibility.
20. Early in May 1857, Guneshjoo, son of Jowahir Sing, Thakoor of Nanilpoor, presented a petition to Zain-ool-Abdeen Khan, stating that his father was about to go into rebellion, but the Deputy Magistrate, with inconceivable folly, refused to receive the petition, because it was not written on stamp paper. Guneshjoo remained for two or three days about Zain-ool-Abdeen's Court, endeavouring to get a hearing, but in vain. A few days after Jowahir Sing and other Thakoors went into rebellion, and commenced plundering.

21. Lieutenant Hamilton took charge of the district from Zain-ool-Abdeen Khan on the 24th May 1857, and Captain A. C. Gordon took charge from Lieutenant Hamilton on the 7th June 1857, and found the district in great disorder.

22. We must now return to Jhansie. On the 30th or 31st May, the two Mr. Andrews went to Captain F. D. Gordon, and recommended that precautionary measures should be taken regarding the fort and magazine, as they were convinced the troops would mutiny. Captain F. Gordon told them that he had represented all this to Captain Skene, who was of opinion that any move of the kind would bring on the mutiny at once, if such was to take place.

23. On the 1st June 1857, Captain Francis Gordon, Deputy Commissioner of Jhansie, reported to Captain Skene, Superintendent, that he had obtained trustworthy information of an intended rising among some of the Paur Thakoors of the Kurrira Pergunnah, and that they intended making an attack on, and plundering the town of Kurrira,—the day fixed for which was the 2nd June, the Dussehra. In consequence of the above information, a detachment under Lieutenant Ryves, of the 12th Bengal Native Infantry, of the strength noted in the margin, was marched from Jhansie on the 1st June, to take possession of the abandoned fort of Kurrira, which step caused the Paur Thakoors to put off their attempt for a time.

24. On either the 1st or 2nd June, about 4 P.M., two bungalows in the cantonments of Jhansie were set fire to, and destroyed. No trace of the actual incendiaries could be obtained, but the occurrence tended to increase the uneasy feeling regarding the disposition of the sepoys.

25. On the 5th June, at about 3 or 4 P.M., firing suddenly took place at the Star Fort, in which were kept the magazine and treasure, and the alarm was spread that the sepoys had mutinied. Upon this, with the exception of Captain Dunlop, Lieutenants Taylor and Campbell, of Lieutenant Turnbull, attached to the survey, of Quarter-Master Sergeant Newton and family, and of Conductor Reilly, all the Europeans and Anglo-Indians proceeded to the fort, to place their families in safety. Captain F. Gordon ordered the police to garrison the fort, which they did. Shortly after, twelve sowars of the Irregular Cavalry came to the fort, with a message from Captain Dunlop to the effect that only thirty-five, not all, of the sepoys had mutinied, and that those in the fort might return to their houses. This, however, was not done. Captain Gordon then sent two orderly Jemadars to the Vakeels of the Tehree and Duttia States, desiring them to write to their respective Governments for help. At about 8 P.M., another letter was sent by Captain Dunlop to Captain Gordon, upon receiving which, Captains Skene and Gordon, and Doctor MacEgan, returned to the cantonments, where Captain Dunlop was, and found that thirty-five men of the 12th Bengal Native Infantry were in open mutiny, and held possession of the Star Fort, which contained the magazine and treasure. Upon this they returned to the fort at about 11 P.M.

26. On the morning of the 6th June, Captains Skene and F. Gordon again visited Captain Dunlop in the lines, but what passed between them is unknown. Captain Skene then returned to the fort, as also did Captain Gordon, after breakfasting in his own house, and writing letters to the Tehree
and Dutia States, and to the Rao of Goorserai for assistance. To none of these applications was any answer sent, although the Tehree and Dutia States being close at hand, might easily have afforded it. Captain Gordon also wrote to different Thakoors to make arrangements for holding Pichore, and to the Tehseeldar of Jhansie to raise men, which the latter did, and twenty-four were posted at the gates of the fort. About 2 P.M., a note was received in the fort from Captain Dunlop, stating that he required some powder and cannon balls; that the mutiny of his men was only partial; and that he could quell it with the men who remained faithful. Captain F. Gordon refused to send any cannon ammunition, and, as the result proved, he was right in doing so, for it would afterwards have been used by the mutineers against the Jhansie fort. In the meantime Mr. Robert Andrews, Deputy Collector, who had been sent to the Jail to bring the ammunition there into the fort, returned with but a small quantity, as the Jail guard, headed by Bukshish Ali, Jail Darogah, having joined with the mutineers, refused to allow him to remove more.

27. About this time a great number of people, amongst whom were the Ranee's principal adherents, viz., Jhirroo Koour, Khoda Buksh, &c., and bearing two flags, proceeded from the town of Jhansie towards cantonments, and on their arrival at the lines, a man named Ahsan Ali, called all the Mussulmans to prayers, after which the whole force mutinied. Two Havildars of the 12th Bengal Native Infantry, names unknown, alone remained true, and stood by Captain Dunlop, and Lieutenants Taylor, Campbell and Turnbell. A body of mutineers advanced against this small party, which defended itself, with a body of the mutineers, excepting Lieutenant Taylor, who, although severely wounded, escaped on horseback to the Jhansie fort. On his arrival there the fort gates were shut, and the walls manned by the Europeans, Anglo-Indians, some sepoys belonging to the Thakoor of Kuttelba, and a few Burkundazes, who had not joined the mutineers. Rughonath Sing, Oobareedar of Nonere, a powerful Paur Chief, who receives a pension from Government, who was at that time present with Captain F. Gordon, although called upon by that officer to stand by him, refused to do so, and marched away with his men abandoning the garrison to their fate. Conductor Reilly, who was in cantonments at the time of this first massacre, escaped to Burwa Saugor, and ultimately to the North-Western Provinces. The Quarter-Master Sergeant and his family were also in the lines, but it is not clear whether they were murdered at the same time as Captain Dunlop, or subsequently: however not one escaped.

28. After this the mutineers and rebels released the prisoners from the Jail, and being joined by them and by the Jail guard headed by Bukshish Ali, Jail Darogah, set fire to the Kutcherry, and some of the bungalows in cantonments. They then entered the town of Jhansie, without being opposed, and seized all Government servants they could lay hands on,—amongst the rest Ahmad Hussein, Tehseeldar of Jhansie, who had rendered the Europeans every assistance in his power. The mutineers, police, Custom's Burkundazes, prisoners, and adherents of the Ranee, then proceeded to attack the fort, taking with them one gun. Firing lasted till the night of the 6th June, when the mutineers drew off, leaving a strong party of the Ranee's followers to surround the place till morning. With them were a few mutineer sepoyos.

29. During the night of the 6th June, a meeting was held between the mutineer Native officers and the Kamdars of the Ranee of Jhansie, to settle to whom the government of the country of Jhansie was to be made over, and what was to be done with the European officers and others in the fort. Some were for letting the Europeans, &c., go, but this was overruled by Bukshish Ali, Jail Darogah, and their death was decided on. The question of the government of the country was not settled, as the Ranee and mutineers could not come to terms. The latter therefore invited over from Oonoo,—a village about twelve miles from Jhansie,—Sadashee Rao Narain Parolywala, a relation of the late Raja of Jhansie and a claimant of the Jhansie Raj, with a view to
setting him up in opposition to the Ranee, or of being enabled, by his com-
petition, to drive a better bargain with her. He reached Jhansie on the 8th
June, the date of the massacre, and encamped in the mutineer lines, close to
the Star Fort.

30. Between the night of the 6th and morning of the 7th June, the Bur-
kundrauzes and Thakoors who were protecting the Europeans deserted, either
through fear or disaffection. A few servants and others remained. The gar-
rison proposed to escape from the fort during the night, but daylight approach-
ing, the attempt was given up.

31. On the morning of the 7th June, Mr. Scott and the two Mr. Purcells
were sent by Captain Skene to the Ranee of Jhansie to request protection from
her on their arrival outside the fort. They were met by the Ranee's troops,
and taken to her palace, from whence they were sent, by the Ranee's orders, to
the lines of the mutineers, where they were put to death. Subsequently Mr.
Andrews, Principal Sudder Ameen, having left the fort, was seized; and
killed by the Ranee's own servants at the palace door. In the meantime the
Ressaldar of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, Faiz Ali, wrote to the garrison
to say that if they vacated the fort, they would not be injured; but no notice
was taken of this communication. Various letters were also exchanged
between the Ranee and Captains Skene and F. Gordon, but to what effect,
cannot be ascertained.

32. About 2 P.M., an attack was again made on the fort, which lasted
till evening. None of the garrison were hurt, and some of the rebels were
killed.

33. During the night the Ranee gave the mutineers and rebels some
guns, and the fort was again attacked by them on the morning of the 8th June.
Their escalade failed, the assailants being shot down by the garrison.

34. The mutineers, &c., still continued their attack, and towards the after-
noon, got possession of the lower works of the fort. Upon this some of the
natives, who still remained inside, attempted to open one of the gates, and let
in the mutineers. The men most prominent in this treachery, and who be-
longed to the Survey Department, were immediately shot, or cut down by
Captains F. Gordon and Burgess, but not before they had mortally wounded
Lieutenant Fowis. Shortly after an irreparable misfortune befell the garrison
in the death of Captain Francis Gordon, who was shot through the head, while
looking towards the rebels through a small window over the fort gate. This
gallant gentleman and excellent officer, more fortunate in his death than were
his unhappy companions, had from the first been
the "life and soul of the garrison," and his loss
had a very injurious effect on the survivors.

35. Captain Skene having made a sign that the garrison wished to treat,
the rebels and mutineers collected near the gate, and promised, by the most
sacred oaths, through the medium of Saleh Mahomed, Native Doctor, that the
Europeans and Anglo-Indians should be allowed to depart in safety, on the
condition of vacating the fort, and laying down their arms. These terms were
unhappily agreed to, and the gates being thrown open, the garrison left the
fort, and were immediately made prisoners by the rebels, &c., who bound the
men. The whole party were then taken from the fort gate through the town,
towards the Star Fort, but on reaching the Jokhun Bagh, just outside the city
wails, some sowars brought a message from the Ressaldar, ordering that all
should be put to death. The servants, who had until then accompanied their
masters, were upon this put aside, and the gentlemen being separated from the
ladies and children, a general massacre took place. Bukshish Ali, Jail Daro-
gab, first cut down Captain Skene with his own hand. Mrs. McGean, attempt-
ing to save her husband, threw her arms round him, but was beaten and
pushed aside, and Doctor McGean was cut down and killed. Mrs. McGean
cast herself on his body, and was there killed also. Miss Browne fell on her
knees before a sepoy, and begged for life, but was immediately cut down by
him. I have no particulars regarding the deaths of the rest of our unfor-
tunate countrymen, and their wives and children, but all were at once put to death in the Jokun Bagh, with the exception of Mrs. Mutlow, who had concealed herself in the town, disguised in Native apparel. She was subsequently rescued at the taking of Jhansie. Mr. Crawford, an Anglo-Indian clerk, escaped out of the fort during the night of the 7th June, and ultimately made his way to the Sumptur State, from whence he was forwarded to Cawnpore.

36. The bodies of our country people were left exposed on the high road, where they were murdered, for three days, and were then thrown, the men into one gravel pit, and the women and children into another, and covered over.

37. On the evening of the day of the massacre, proclamation was made that—"The people are God's; the country is the King's (Padshah's); and the two religions govern."

38. In the meantime the detachment at Kurrara had also mutinied, and joined their comrades at Jhansie. Lieutenant Ryves escaped to Gwalior.

39. On the 9th June, there was a dispute as to who was to possess the Jhansie territory, the Ranee and Sadasheo Rao bidding against each other. At last, on the Ranee paying down a large sum, and promising much more, the mutineers made it over to her, and proclamation was made that—"The people are God's; the country is the Padshah's; and the Raj is Ranees Luchmee Bae's." She governed however on the part of her adopted son, a child of eight years, named Damodhur Rao.

40. On the 11th June the mutineers left Jhansie for Delhi, accompanied by Bukshish Ali, Mahomed Buksh, Police Tomandar, many zillah and Customs Burkundazes and others.

41. On failing to get the mutineers to espouse his cause, Sadasheo Rao left Jhansie, and assembling some 300 men, on the 13th June, seized the fort of Kurrara (thirty miles west of Jhansie), where he was joined by some Puar Thakoors. He turned out the British native officials, appointed his own, levied money, and issued a proclamation, to the effect that "Maharaja Sadasheo Rao Narain has seated himself on the throne of Jhansie, at Kurrara." Shortly after the Ranee sent some troops against him, and he fled to Nurwur, in Scindia's territory, from whence he was inveigled by the Ranee into her power. He was made prisoner at the taking of Jhansie, and has been transported for life.

42. The Ranee having secured Jhansie and Kurrara, the other parts of the Jhansie district acknowledged her authority with very unimportant exceptions. Mr. Thornton, Deputy Collector, and Mr. Andrews, who were at Gurrota, however, managed to escape to Sumptur, through the assistance of the Malgoozar of Ashta, who assembling some forty men, escorted them there in safety, for which they have been rewarded.

43. The Ranee then sent agents to the Nana Sahib, levied troops, established a mint, and began strengthening the fortifications of Jhansie and Kurrara. At the same time she endeavoured to keep terms with our Government, by writing to the Commissioner of Jubbulpoor and to others, lamenting the massacre of our countrymen, stating that she was in no way concerned in it, and declaring that she only held the Jhansie district till our Government could make arrangements to re-occupy it. Her chief adherents and supporters were Moro Bulwunt (her father), Lulloo Bukshee (pay master), Jurroo Koor, Kashenath, Tehseeldar of Punwaho, Gungadhur, Luchmun Rao, Dewan, and Jowahir Sing of Kuttele, a Bondela Chief. The two first have been hanged; the third was killed at the storm of Jhansie; and others are still living and in rebellion.

44. Whilst the above events were taking place at Jhansie, affairs were rapidly approaching a crisis in the Jaloun district. On the 6th June an express was received by the Officer Commanding the two Companies of the
53rd Bengal Native Infantry at Oraie, stating that the artillery, and some of the infantry at Jhansie, had mutinied, and seized the Star Fort. At this time the above two companies were about to be relieved by two others of the 56th Bengal Native Infantry from Cawnpoor, regarding which regiment the gravest suspicions were abroad. The Deputy Commissioner, Captain Browne, therefore at once sent off the bulk of his treasure (four half lakhs) to Gwalior, under the guard of Lieutenant Tomkinson, and one hundred men of the 53rd Bengal Native Infantry, called in two Companies of the 1st Gwalior Regiment from Etawah, which, with some Mahratta horse, reached Oraie at 1 A.M. of the 7th June, and directed the Officer Commanding the two Companies of the 56th Bengal Native Infantry to retrace his steps towards Cawnpoor forthwith, which he did, and reached Kalpee that night (6th), on which same night also the Deputy Commissioner received intelligence of the outbreak at Cawnpoor. About this time also the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Browne, received a note from Sheo Pershad, Deputy Collector at Kalpee, in which he expressed a desire to desert his post. As Kalpee was a most important point of communication over the Jumna, it was of the greatest importance to hold it, and Lieutenant Lamb, Assistant Commissioner, volunteering to go there, Captain Browne sent him, and at the same time sent an express to the Brigadier at Gwalior, to send aid to Jhansie.

45. On Captain Cosseratt’s detachment joining him, Captain Browne intended to proceed with it, and some Sumpter troops and guns, to the relief of the Europeans at Jhansie, leaving the police at Oraie; but on the 9th a letter was received from Mote, stating that all the Europeans in Jhansie had been killed; consequently Captain Browne gave up his intention of proceeding there. The same day the men of the 53rd Bengal Native Infantry, remaining at Oraie, deserted their officers; the Burkundazes of the Customs Department mutinied; and Captain Cosseratt, who was at Koonch, received orders from his Commanding Officer to return to Etawah. On the 10th, the two sons of the Goorseraie Chief, who had offered Captain Browne aid, which he had accepted, arrived at Jalou on with a force of several hundred men, and a few guns, and on the same day Captain Browne and Lieutenant Lamb also proceeded to that place, where the former having met the sons, and assured himself of their good intentions, addressed a letter to their father, requesting him to afford every assistance in preserving order in the district.

46. Captain Browne, Lieutenant Lamb and Captain Cosseratt’s party left Jalou on the 11th or 12th June, and next day perwannahs were addressed in the name of the Goorseraie Chief, to the different Tehseeldars of the district, stating that the management of the district was entrusted to him, to whom all reports were to be sent. On the Tehseeldar referring the matter to Captain Browne, that officer passed on order, that the Jaghiredar was not to have control of the district, which was to remain under Mr. Passanah, Deputy Collector, who still remained at Oraie. A copy of this order was sent to Mr. Passanah by Lieutenant Browne, who also stated that some words had been interpolated in his Oordoo letter to the Goorseraie Chief. After this Captain Browne left the district, and proceeded with his Assistant, Lieutenant Lamb, to Etawah, having ascertained on his way that Kuchwagurh and the northern part of Jalou had become quite disorganized,—the Customs Burkundazes having mutinied, the police loudly calling for their pay, and the petty Chiefs ready to rise.

47. As stated above, the Jhansie mutineers left that place for Delhi on the 11th June. On the 13th they reached Mote (thirty-five miles north-east of Jhansie), and having plundered the Treasury, took away with them as a prisoner Neaz Ali, Deputy Collector. On the 15th June, their advanced guard, consisting of six or eight sowars, reached Oraie, and Messrs. Passanah and Griffiths, Deputy Collectors, who until then had remained there, left it in the night, and passed through Jalou, where they met Sheo Ram Tantia, eldest son of Goorseraie Chief, who shortly after assumed entire authority.
over the Jaloun district. From Jaloun, Messrs. Passanah and Griffiths made for Gwalior; but on the 17th June they fell in with the hundred men of the 53rd Bengal Native Infantry, who had faithfully taken the Jaloun four-half lakhs of treasure to Gwalior. The men, it appears, had now mutinied, for they plundered the above two gentlemen, made them prisoners, and marched to Jaloun, where, Mr. Passanah says, they (the mutineers) were received with great cordiality by Sheo Ram Tantia, the Goorseraie Chief's eldest son, who made over to them Rupees 1,400 of Government money, from the Telseelee Treasury, and bought from them Messrs. Passanah and Griffiths' horses, guns, &c. From Jaloun, the above two gentlemen were taken to Oraie, where they were released by the mutineers on the 21st June, the latter marching thence for Cawnpoor. They were however detained by a Sibundy guard of the Goorseraie Chief, and the headman made them over to the Gwalior Contingent, and 14th Cavalry mutineers from Lullutpoor, who reached Oraie the same day. These mutineers however did not molest them, and let them go.

48. The two gentlemen remained at Oraie, and Kesho Rao, the Goorseraie Chief, coming in person to Jaloun, sent them a kind letter and some money.

49. Kesho Rao took upon himself the whole government of the country, save Kuchwagurh, which was taken possession of by Scindia, and Duboh taken by the Duttia State, collected revenue, gave villages in jaghire for military service, and established a mint. It was also said that he intended placing one of his sons on the guddee of Jaloun, but of this there is no proof. He at the same time wrote letters to the Commissioner of Jubbulpoor, stating that Captain Browne had made him over the district, to take care of for the British Government, and that he (Kesho Rao) was acting accordingly.

50. Messrs. Passanah and Griffiths remained about three weeks at Oraie unmolested; but on the 14th July, a few mutineers having reached Oraie, they were placed in great danger, as the Jaghireda's men would not assist them. But they were ultimately rescued by some of the well-disposed inhabitants of Oraie. On the 17th July Mr. Passanah received a letter from the Goorseraie Chief, stating that a force of the Nana's was about to proceed from Cawnpoor to Jhansie, and advising him to keep out of the way; but the same day a party in the employ of Sheo Ram Tatia, the Chief's son, who was at Kalpee, seized the two gentlemen and Mr. Passanah's family, placed them in two carts and took them all to Kalpee, to be forwarded to the Nana at Cawnpoor. On their way they met Sheo Ram Tatia, who would not listen to their remonstrances, and said he must obey the Nana's orders. They were kept prisoners at Kalpee till Sheo Ram's return, who then ordered them to be taken to the Nana at Cawnpoor; but on the 19th July, intelligence of the Nana's defeat and flight from Cawnpoor reached Kalpee. Sheo Ram Tatia then changed his tone and affected great kindness towards them, and Kesho Rao himself came over from Jaloun to visit them. In the meantime, the 52nd Bengal mutineers arrived at Kalpee from Sauger, and wished to get the gentlemen and their families into their hands, but Sheo Ram Tatia placed them in the fort and protected them, and when the mutineers had gone, provided a suitable conveyance and sent them to a village named Choorkee, fifteen miles from Kalpee. Mr. Passanah having found means to communicate with General Neill at Cawnpoor, the General wrote to Sheo Ram Tatia to send the party to him; but the latter put off sending them for some time, under the excuse of the dangers of the road. At last General Neill becoming peremptory, and the Nana having been defeated at Bithoor, Kesho Rao, the Goorseraie Chief, having furnished them with money and conveyances, and having restored two horses belonging to Messrs. Passanah and Griffiths, the whole party started on the 2nd September 1857 for Cawnpoor, where they arrived in safety.

51. As stated above, the Goorseraie Chief, Kesho Rao, took the management of the whole of the Jaloun district (save Kuchwagurh and Perguannah Duboh), retaining all our district establishments. He and his family fixed their head-quarters at Jaloun. The mutineers of the Gwalior Contingent,
accompanied by Tantia Topee, arrived at Jaloun about the 29th October. The Goorseraie Chief received them—indeed he had not sufficient force to resist, and prepared to treat for the possession of the Jaloun district; but Tantia Topee espoused the cause of the Tace Bace, daughter of a former Chief of Jaloun, and the mutineers at his instigation displaced Kesho Rao from the government, seized him and his sons, threw them into prison, inflicted on them severe bodily chastisement and plundered them of all their wealth. Tantia Topee caused the infant son of the Tace Bace to be placed on the Jaloun Guddee, with Biswas Rao as Manager, on the condition of the Tace Bace acknowledging the Nana, and of her paying down a large sum, it is said one fakh, and liquidating the remainder, two lakhs, from the Jaloun revenues.

52. In the meantime Koee. Sing of Jugdeespoor and the 40th Bengal Native Infantry had reached Kalpee on the 19th October; they were in communication with the Gwalior mutineers at Jaloun, and on the 3rd November seized and imprisoned Sheo Ram Tatia, and on the 7th November were joined by the mutineers from Gwalior and marched to attack Cawnpore.

53. The outbreak at Jhansie was of course soon known at Lullutpoor, and the Chundeyree district rapidly fell into greater disorder than ever. The Thakoors rose in all directions, commenced plundering, collected in large bodies, principally at Chundeyree and Talbehet and around Lullutpoor, and the Banpoor Raja who had been invited to Lullutpoor by Captain A. C. Gordon's predecessor, Captain Hamilton, played a double game; for, while ostensibly professing loyalty to Government and blaming the rebellious Thakoors, he was in reality at the head of the rising, and by the 11th and 12th June had occupied the district; Baee acknowledging Jaloun Guddee. with Rosselope, Serloobaa, Sheikh Intebels and some guns, and then sent a strong force and two guns towards Boondelas and some guns, and then sent a strong force and two guns towards Chundeyree, although Captain A. C. Gordon had forbidden him to do so.

54. After the Raja's departure Captain A. C. Gordon was in hopes, that as the sepoys seemed loyal, a stand might be made till succour arrived, and intended garrisoning the jail; but as the detachment had no guns, whilst the rebels had many at Mussowrah, which they could bring against the jail, the idea was given up.

55. The Deputy Commissioner considering that with the rebels so close the Treasury was in an unsafe situation, determined to show his confidence in the sepoys, by having it removed into their lines for security, which was done on the 11th June, and the treasure lodged in the quarter guard.

56. On the morning of the 12th June, after a consultation with the Officer Commanding, Captain Sale, it was determined that the detachment could not hold Lullutpoor, and that the best plan would be to fall back on the Gwalior territory towards Esaugurh. The police had deserted their posts, and there was no hope save in the sepoys, some of whom however on this day, for the first time, showed a mutinous disposition, to which they are supposed to have been incited by forty sowars of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, who this morning arrived from Nowgong, agreeably to a requisition of Captain Skene. The native officers were sent for by Captain Sale and made acquainted with
the plan of falling back to Gwalior, to which they seemed to agree. As the amount of money in the Treasury was small (Rupees 25,000), as it was not desirable that it should fall into the hands of the Raja, and as an inducement to the sepoy to abandon everything but their ammunition, and to confirm wavering, Captain A. C. Gordon proposed to distribute it among the detachment, which was done in Captain Sale’s presence, and it was explained to the sepoy that they were to consider it as a compensation for their loss of property.

57. As the officers and the detachment were to start in the afternoon of the 12th June, leaving the station empty, and as the Raja’s men had pushed on to the bazar, Captain A. C. Gordon considered it advisable, for the purpose of preventing plunder, to make over the district to him (the Raja), who still professed friendship, to be held until our Government could re-establish their rule, and he gave the Raja a perwanna to that effect.

58. Shortly after this, when all the officers were assembled at Captain Sale’s quarters, they were informed that there was great excitement in the lines, and that the men refused to march; the officers immediately proceeded to the lines and found two bodies of men collected, but without native officers; these were the bad men of the regiment, the rest kept out of the way. Captain Sale and Doctor O’Brien went to one party, and Captain Irwin and A. C. Gordon, Deputy Commissioner, to the other. At first the men pretended that they could not march on account of want of carriage, upon which Captain A. C. Gordon promised them carriage, and every endeavour was made to induce them to march, but without avail, and at last they broke out into open mutiny; and when reminded that the treasure had been given to them as compensation for loss of property, they replied that they considered it a gift from the King, and shouted—“We are servants of the King of Delhi, not a man of us will go with you; however we wont take your lives, but you must be off.” Being thus compelled to leave, Captain Sale and Doctor O’Brien went on ahead, the remainder of the officers and ladies* proceeded by the Saugor road, but at the end of the bazar they fell in with some of the Raja’s men and were taken to Mussowrah, near which they were met by the Raja’s Kamdar, Doolaree Lall, with a paper guaranteeing them protection, which had been procured by Dr. O’Brien. The Raja would not, however, see Captain A. C. Gordon.

59. On the 13th June the Raja moved into Lullutpoor, with a large force and some guns, and the officers and ladies were kept in the fort of Mussowrah as prisoners, although well treated in other respects. On the evening of the 14th June, Doolaree Lall, Kamdar, and Sheikh Hidayet Ali (also called Mota Sheikh) came to Captain A. C. Gordon from the Raja, and read him a paper in the vernacular, telling him he must write and sign a similar one in English. The paper was to the following effect:—“Owing to dacotties, bloodshed, &c., and the mutiny of the sepoy, I was unable to manage the district, and consequently I handed over charge to the Raja of Banpoor. I affirm, agreeably to my religion, that I have written this of my own free will. Any British troops arriving in the district are to assist the Raja.” As Captain A. C. Gordon was completely in the Raja’s powers, and as he felt that his refusal would probably lead to the sacrifice of the whole party, he complied with the Raja’s demand; but as soon as he had an opportunity he communicated the facts of the case to Major Gaussen, who commanded the nearest military post.

60. During all the above transactions, Captain A. C. Gordon received no assistance from either of the Deputy Collectors, Nissar Ahmed, or Zenoolahdeen Khan, nor from any other native official: they all deserted him.

61. On the 15th June the party were sent from Mussowrah to Banpoor, where they arrived on the morning of the 16th, and were visited in the course of

* The Lullutpoor party consisted of Captain A. C. Gordon, Deputy Commissioner; Captain Sale, Commanding 6th Regiment Gwalior Infantry; Captain Irwin, 6th Biv.; Mrs. Irwin and 2 children; Doctor O’Brien, 6th Regiment; Gwalior Infantry; the Sergeant-Major and his wife; Mr. Verrier, Customs Department; Captain Gordon’s two Madras servants.
of the day by the Raja's Moookhtar, Mahomed Ali, who, in consequence of his opposition to his master's rebellious schemes, had fallen into disgrace. At 2 a.m. of the 17th, the party were forwarded to Tehree, under a guard of Banpoor men, and accompanied by a servant of Mahomed Ali. The guard left the party at the Tehree boundary,—the Jamnee river,—notwithstanding their remonstrances, and the Europeans proceeded towards Tehree, accompanied only by Mahomed Ali's servants. They had barely gone a mile, when they were stopped by a party of Tehree troops, and peremptorily ordered to recross the river into Banpoor; these matchlockmen stated that they had been expressly ordered to prevent the Europeans entering the Tehree State, and had been waiting at another ford. After some delay, leave was obtained for the Europeans to send Mahomed Ali's servant to Tehree, to endeavour to procure permission for them to proceed there. After a delay of some hours this was granted, and shortly after the party arrived at Tehree; they were invited to take up their quarters in the house of Prem Narain, the tutor of the young Raja, to whose good offices Captain A. C. Gordon thinks they owe their admission to Tehree, as the Ranee's Minister, Nuthay Khan, and others were strongly opposed to it. The Tehree authorities stated that they had received no intimation from the Banpoor Raja of the approach of the Europeans; but this, Captain A. C. Gordon is of opinion, is untrue, and he thinks that there was a treacherous plan, previously arranged, between the Tehree and Banpoor authorities, for the destruction of the party, which was frustrated by the good faith of Mahomed Ali and Prem Narain. Both these men have been rewarded by Government.

62. The party remained in Tehree in the house of Prem Narain till the 2nd July; they were well treated, but never officially noticed by the Ranee, or her chief adviser, Nuthay Khan, and all information, as to what was going on, was carefully kept from them. Captain A. C. Gordon repeatedly requested that the party might be forwarded to Saugor, but he was continually put off by one excuse or other. On the 30th June, a letter written by me* to the Ranee reached Tehree, on which the Tehree authorities promised to send the Europeans to Saugor by the Shahgurh road, under a strong guard. At last, on the 2nd July, the party started under a Tehree guard for Shahgurh, deserted by all the Omla and attendants, save Captain A. C. Gordon's Madras servants, who still kept with their master. They arrived at Shahgurh on the 5th July, and the Raja of that place came out to meet them, received them in a most hospitable manner, and supplied all their wants. In the afternoon the Europeans returned the Raja's visit, on which occasion he was profuse in his offers of service, and appeared to wish them to remain his guests for some days. On the 7th July, the party had made every preparation for proceeding to Saugor, but on that day the Raja informed them of the mutiny which had taken place, and of the impossibility of their proceeding thence. He made great professions of friendship to our Government, but said that he expected Government would give him the Gurrakotta district as a reward. He left Shahgurh a day or two after, to join his troops at Kutowra. On the 10th July the Europeans were informed by one of the Raja's servants, Girdharee, that the Saugor mutineers were rapidly advancing to Shahgurh, and that their lives would be in danger if they did not immediately leave the place. Shortly after, some of the mutineer Irregular Cavalry arrived, accompanied by the Raja, whom they had met at Kutowra, and compelled to come with them. The rest of the Saugor mutineers arrived in the course of the day. The Europeans were immediately sent to a garden house of the Raja, and moved about from village to village till the mutineers left, when they returned to Shahgurh.

63. By this time the Raja of Shahgurh had already invaded the British district of Saugor, and was a rebel, like the Banpoor Raja, with whom he

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* I was then at Saugor on official duty.
was in constant correspondence; but he still continued his professions of loyalty to Captain A. C. Gordon, provided our Government would give him the Gurrakotta Pergunnah.

64. On the evening of the 18th July, the Raja fired a salute for the supposed fall of Delhi, and next morning the Europeans were told they were to start at once for Saugor. Until then they had received great kindness from the Raja, who no doubt saved them from the Saugor mutineers; but from this time they experienced nothing but ill-treatment. They were hurried off without seeing the Raja, and made over as prisoners to a guard, under his brother, Dewan Luchmun Sing, and occasionally exposed to very insulting treatment, being threatened with hanging and flogging. Thakoor Luchmun Sing, of Narhut, however, who pretended to have joined the rebels, but who had come into their camp to communicate with Captain Gordon, on the part of Major Western, Deputy Commissioner of Saugor, prevailed on Dewan Luchmun Sing to apologize, and treat them better. Shortly after Dewan Luchmun Sing left to attack the British troops at Benaika, by whom he was defeated, with the loss of a cannon, he himself being severely wounded. Upon this, the Europeans were sent to a place called Papeete, confined in a cow-shed, and insulted in every way. On the 25th July, Captain A. C. Gordon was sent for by the Shahgurh Raja, who stated that his troops had attacked our forces contrary to his orders, and that he was still anxious to be our ally, but on the old condition, the gift of the Gurrakota Pergunnah, and that his gun should be restored to him: he added that he gave our Government eight days to consider his terms, and if he received an unfavorable reply, he should join the rebels. He also promised to send the Europeans direct to Saugor, one of their party remaining with him as a hostage for the return of his gun, and he finished by apologizing for the hardships they had suffered. Upon this, Captain A. C. Gordon gave the Raja a certificate, in which he mentioned the Raja's kind treatment of the party at first, and that he had saved their lives from the mutineers, &c.

65. On the morning of the 27th July, the party started with a guard for Benaika, a town in the Saugor district. Their arms, of which they had been deprived, had been restored to them. After they had proceeded some distance, a Saugor hurkara, who accompanied them, told Captain A. C. Gordon that he suspected some treachery, as they were being taken off the proper road. When about a coss from Benaika, they were met by three sowars, who demanded their weapons, saying they had been sent by the Raja to bring the party back, and had been ordered to kill them if they did not obey. The Shahgurh guard, consisting of thirty men, made no objection, indeed assisted the sowars. On their way back, they halted at Jalimpoor, where the sowars again threatened the Europeans, and one of them drove his spear into the cheek-bone of Mr. Verrier, of the Salt Department, inflicting a deep and dangerous wound. On reaching Papeete, they met a party of the Raja's troops, and the sowars immediately made off. The Commander of these troops declared that the sowars had not been sent by the Raja to recall them, and sent off a messenger to him to state what had occurred. The Raja ignored the whole proceeding, stating that the sowars were inhabitants of the Saugor district.

66. I may here remark that Captain A. C. Gordon states, that all through the Banpoor, Tchree, and Shahgurh States, the feeling against the people of the Salt Department is bitterly hostile.

67. On the 29th July, the whole party was removed to Baretta, a fort in the middle of the jungle, and they were informed that the Raja could not send them to Saugor, owing to the disturbed state of the country. They remained at Baretta until the end of their captivity, the 12th September 1857, during which time their treatment was worse than they had before experienced. They were confined in two low, leaky rooms, sometimes ankle-deep in mud, situated in a small courtyard, one side of which was occupied by the guard. They had no change of clothes, were not permitted to go any where without a
detail of the guard. Their food was of the coarsest description—atta, rice and dal; like the usual fare of prisoners in jail, the daily sum allowed to support fifteen people, being one rupee and two pice. Captain A. C. Gordon wrote to the Raja, representing that their health was suffering from this treatment, but no notice was taken of his letter, and no change took place until very shortly before their departure. In the meantime several of the party, particularly Doctor O'Brien, who nearly died, suffered severely in health.

68. On the 7th September 1857, Colonel Millar's Madras Column having advanced to Dumoh, the Shahgurh Raja became alarmed, and he sent for Captain A. C. Gordon to Shahgurh, and, stating that he had made up his mind to send the whole party into Saugor in safety, expressed a wish to be friendly to our Government, on the former conditions, and insisted on giving 200 rupees as compensation to those who had been deprived of their arms; which sum Captain A. C. Gordon afterwards lodged in the Saugor Treasury with some other articles, which had been forced on him by the Raja.

69. The party left Baretta on the 12th, and reached Saugor in safety on the 14th September 1857. They had a most fortunate and narrow escape, for the Madras Column, to whose advance to Dumoh they owe their release, was obliged, in consequence of the mutiny of the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry at Jubbulpoor, to fall back from Dumoh towards Jubbulpoor on the 21st September, only seven days after Captain A. C. Gordon and his party reached Saugor.

70. As stated above, the Raja of Banpoor with a large force and some guns went from Murrowrah to Lullutpoor on the 13th June, the day after the Europeans took shelter in the former place. A quarrel arose between him and the 6th Regiment Gwalior mutineers and sowars, regarding the treasure which Captain A. C. Gordon had distributed to the latter; the Raja demanding a share which the mutineers refused. The mutineers marched from Lullutpoor in the evening, and almost immediately after they left the place were attacked by the Raja's followers and other Boondelas, but beat them off with little loss to themselves, the Boondelas suffering severely. These attacks were continued by the Boondelas until the mutineers crossed the Betwa river, north of Tahbul, into the Jhansi district, the Boondelas always getting worsted. The mutineers passed through Jhansi, where they were well received by the Ranees, feasted by her for three days in the Jokun Bagh, and, as stated above, they reached Oraie on the 21st June, from which place they proceeded to Kalpee and joined the other mutineers already there.

71. The Raja of Banpoor was now in full possession of the Chundeyree district, and appears to have been obeyed as well as Native Princes usually are. He plundered all who were supposed to favor our Government, extorted money from the trading classes, raised revenue, and established a cannon foundry on the European principle, with an excellent boring apparatus, at Banpoor. The Tehseeldar of Lullutpoor, Hyat Ali the Serish tadar, Ali Hosein, and Hidyat Ali, writer, all took service under him.

72. Major Erskine, Commissioner of Jubbulpoor, having received a letter, dated 7th June, from Captain F. Gordon, written from the fort at Jhansi, stating the danger he and the other officers were in, and another letter, dated 10th June, from Captain A. C. Gordon from Lullutpoor, stating that it was reported that all the Europeans at Jhansi had been killed, ordered me on the 20th June to proceed on special duty from Jubbulpoor to Saugor, and, joining Major Gauussen's detachment of the Saugor force then at Malthone, to proceed to Chundeyree and take general charge of that district, and should Captain Skene be alive and at liberty, to communicate with him and place myself under his orders; but should he have been killed or made prisoner, I was to take his place as Officiating Superintendent, and make the best arrangements to restore order in the Chundeyree, Jhansi, and Jalouin districts, and release the Europeans, &c.

* On the occupation of Banpoor by Sir H. Rose's force, it was destroyed.
73. I reached Saugor on the 24th June, and there met a horse-keeper of Captain Skene’s, who had seen the massacre at Jhansi; and I also received authentic intelligence of the mutiny at Lullutpoor and flight of the Europeans from that place to Tehree. On the 25th June I saw Brigadier Sage, Commanding Saugor Division, and it was settled with him that I should at once join Major Gaussen’s detachment (which had been reinforced, and was about 600 strong with two guns), that it should advance straight on Banpoor, and then proceed to Lullutpoor, and afterwards be guided by circumstances. I also wrote to the Banpoor Raja, that if he at once came in to me without committing any act of hostility, no harm should befall him, that these were the only terms that would be offered to him, that the march of the detachment would not be stayed for any further negotiation, and that if he did not come in he would be considered a public enemy.

74. On the evening of the 26th June intelligence was received at Saugor that part of Major Gaussen’s detachment had mutinied and released some Boondela prisoners. I accordingly delayed my departure, and on the 29th June Brigadier Sage, considering that the Saugor force was in a mutinous state, ordered all the Europeans into the fort, and I accompanied them. On the 3rd July the Saugor troops broke out into open mutiny, and on the 12th July the part of Major Gaussen’s detachment which remained faithful reached Saugor from Malthone, having left the latter place on the 7th or 8th July.

75. On the 7th or 8th July, the Banpoor Raja took possession of the Saugor Pergunnahs of Khemlassa and Korae, and plundered the treasure in the latter place, where he was joined by our Tehseeldar, who is still in rebellion. The garrison of Saugor having been severely crippled by the mutiny of the greater part of it, the Banpoor Raja remained in possession of the northern part of the Saugor district, until the arrival of Sir H. Rose’s force at Ratgurh and Saugor in January 1858.

76. Having been appointed to other duties, I left Saugor on the 13th July, and did not return till February 1858.

77. As stated above, the Ranee of Jhansi’s authority was established throughout the Jhansi district, very shortly after the massacre of the Europeans and departure of the mutineers. The Tehree or Oorcha State, however, conceiving that the British authority might possibly be overthrown, never to be re-established, thought a favorable opportunity had arrived, certainly for plunder, and probably for aggrandizing itself from the former territories of our Government. It is to be observed also, that the greater part of the Jhansi territory had, generations ago, formed part of the Tehree or Oorcha State, which was then probably the most powerful State in Bundelkund; but the Raja of that time having been defeated by the Mahrattas, was obliged to cede to them the part of his territory now included in Jhansi, which was formed into a petty Mahratta sub-State, dependent on the Peishwa.

78. On the 10th August 1857, therefore, a Tehree force took Mhow Ranee poor, and overran the three Pergunnahs of Mhow, Fundwano and Gurrota, situated between the Betwa and Dessan rivers, plundered the mahajuns and cultivating classes to a great extent, drove off cattle, and in many instances burned down villages. The Tehree troops then moved against Burwa Saugor, which they took, and on the 3rd September 1857 sat down before and besieged Jhansi, under Nutteh Khan, the Minister, in person. The siege continued till 22nd October 1857, when, having been outwitted by the Banpoor Raja, who came to Jhansi and introduced provisions which were much needed, and having heard of the fall of Delhi, and knowing that the affairs of the British Government were improving, Nutteh Khan raised the siege. His troops, however, had in the meantime inflicted great injury on the agricultural population, to the east and south of Jhansi, plundering and driving off cattle as usual. During all these proceedings, the Tehree State represented itself as our ally, and acting against the rebel Ranee of Jhansi, but at the same time its Agents collected all the Government revenue of those parts of the Jhansi...
district of which it held possession, namely, Mhow, Pandwaho, Gurrota, and
the east and south of Jhansie, to the amount of about two lakhs of rupees,
which it has not yet repaid. The injury inflicted on the population by this in-
vasion by the Tehree State was very great, and it will be long before they re-
cover from it, particularly the loss of their cattle.

79. In January 1858 the Ranee of Jhansie's troops, under Jnnuoo Bae, began to gain the ascendency about Pandwaho and Mhow Raneeepoor, and
on the 1st March the Tehree troops were defeated, and expelled from all the
Jhansie territory between the Betwa and Dessan rivers. The Ranee entered
into close relations with the Nana, Tantia Topee, and the Banpoor Raja.

80. Thus at the beginning of 1858, the Jhansie Superintendency was held
by the under-mentioned rebels:

Jhansie district (with few exceptions), by the Ranee of Jhansie.

Jaloun (save Pergunnahs Duboh and Kuchwagurh), by the Taeo Bae for
her son.

Chundeyree, by the Banpoor Raja, who also held the north-west part of
the Saugor district.

The Pergunnah of Duboh was held by the friendly Native State of Duttia
and Kuchwagurh, by Scindia.

81. Sir H. Rose having taken Rtagurb and defeated the rebels at
Banodia in January 1858, the Banpoor Raja abandoned Korae and Khemlassa
in the Saugor district, and withdrew into the districts of Chundeyree and
Banpoor. Having taken Gurrakotta, Sir Hugh advanced from Saugor on the
27th February; Captains Maclean, Ternan, and myself, having joined his
force at that place on the previous day, agreeably to the order of Major Erskine,
Commissioner, Jubbulpoor, for the purpose of taking up our appointments in
the Jhansie Superintendency.

82. The British force reached Rajwas on the 1st March, and Sir Hugh
Rose having ascertained that the Raja of Banpoor with a strong force held
the Narhut pass, determined to make a feint in his direction, and to force the
easier pass, that of Muddunpoor, which was held by the Shahgurh Raja's
troops and the 52nd Bengal mutineers. This was done on the 3rd March, the
enemy being defeated with severe loss. Upon this the Raja of Banpoor
abandoned the Narhut pass and fell back towards Banpoor and Talbehut, both
of which places were abandoned on the approach of our forces, the advance of
which under Major Orr reached Talbehut on the 13th March. The adminis-
tration of the Chundeyree district, including Banpoor, was made over tem-
porarily to Captain Maclean, who established thannes of Tehree troops in
different places. Meanwhile the siege of Chundeyree was being carried on by
the 1st Brigade of Sir H. Rose's force, under Brigadier Stewart of the Bombay
army, which retarded the movement of the second Brigade. Chundeyree
having been taken, the 2nd Brigade under Sir H. Rose in person advanced on
Jhansie, which its cavalry reached and surrounded on the night of the 20th
March, the remaining part of the brigade arriving next day.

83. Sir H. Rose having reconnoitred the enemy's defences, opened three
attacks to the south and east of the town, which with the fort he completely
invested with his cavalry. The other brigade from Chundeyree joined him
before Jhansie on the 25th March. On the 29th March intelligence was re-
ceived that Tantia Topee and the Banpoor and Shahgurh Rajas were advanc-
ing from Mhow Raneeepoor, at the head of upwards of 15,000 men, with
the intention of relieving Jhansie. On the night of the 31st March, Tantia Topee
crossed the Betwa, and on the 1st April at dawn attacked Sir H. Rose, who
himself with the disposable portion of his 2nd Brigade (about 1,200) was drawn
up in rear of his camp. He had sent a portion of the 1st Brigade under Bri-
gadier Stewart, Bombay Army, to take Tantia Topee in flank should opportunity
offer. The remaining part of our force kept up the siege and investment of
Jhansie. Tantia Topee was completely defeated, losing upwards of 1,000 men.
94. As stated above, the enemy's loss could not have been less than between 3,000 and 4,000 men, exclusive of the battle of the Betwa.

95. On Jhansi falling, the fort of Kurrara, which until then had been held for the Ranee by a garrison of 2,000 men, was abandoned by them.

96. Captain Maclean was put in charge of the district, and proceeded to establish garrisons of men furnished by Native States and friendly Thakoors, in that part of the district to the west of the Betwa. Shortly after Major Orr's Hyderabad Contingent was sent to the east of the Betwa to clear out the country between that river and the Dessan, which that officer effectually accomplished, and Captain Maclean then established his garrisons in that direction also.

97. Sir H. Rose was detained at Jhansi some time, in consequence of its being supposed that the Kota rebels, who had been defeated by General Roberts, were on their way towards this part of the country; but this being found not to be the case, Sir H. Rose with the greater part of his force marched from Jhansi in the Koonch direction on the 26th April, leaving Colonel Liddell with a small force to hold Jhansi.

98. It not having been possible to spare any regular troops to occupy the Chundeyree district, disturbances soon broke out there, and before our forces advanced from Jhansi, large bodies of rebels had assembled under the Rana and attacked our Techelee at Talbebut. They were, however, beaten off.

99. On the 7th May, the force under Sir H. Rose attacked the mutineers and rebels at Koonch, where they had taken up a strong position. By a flank march he succeeded in turning their defences, and took the old fort, which rendered their position untenable. They were completely defeated, and lost about 350 killed, all mutineers, and nine guns, and fell back in great disorder to Kalpee. Koonch was occupied for us by 300 of the Gooreraie Chief's troops, and Sir H. Rose again advanced towards Kalkee on the 9th May. Captain Ternan assumed charge of the Jaloune district at Koonch.

100. The Tae Bae and her followers came in and submitted to Captain Ternan, Deputy Commissioner of Jaloun, and to Sir R. Hamilton, Agent, Governor-General at Oraie, on the 10th May; and Koonch was occupied for us by friendly Thakoors.

101. On the 10th May, the Mhow Raneepoor district was added to the Jhansi Superintendentship, and the whole formed into a Commissionership.

102. On the 15th May, Sir H. Rose's advanced brigade reached Goolowlee on the Jumna, four miles below Kalpee, where it was joined by the other brigade three days after. On the 20th, the garrison of Kalpee made an attack on our right, but were easily driven back. On the 22nd May, however, the enemy made a very determined attack along our whole line, their infantry attacking our right in the ravines with great pertinacity, and their cavalry and some guns endeavoring to turn our left. By about 1 p.m., however, they were entirely driven off, and suffered a heavy loss.

103. On the 23rd May, Sir H. Rose attacked Kalpee which the enemy abandoned, and suffered a loss of about 400 killed, and all their guns. They made off in the direction of Gwalior, accompanied by the Ranee of Jhansi, Rao Sahib, and the Banda Nawab; but although a pursuing column was sent after them, they were not overtaken.

104. As stated above, when Sir Hugh Rose advanced through Bundelkund to Kalpee, he had no troops he could spare to occupy any of the country and
positions he had passed through, save Jhansie itself. This unfortunate circumstance soon produced its natural fruit. The rebels, who for a time had as it were been stunned by the heavy blow at Jhansie, seeing no troops, soon recovered confidence. The rebel Rajas of Banpoor and Shagurh, having shortly before the affair at Koonch on the 7th May, doubled round Sir H. Rose's right flank, reached their own territories, which by the end of May were in open rebellion, and the fort of Chundeyree was recaptured by the rebels. Burjore Sing, a rebel Thakoor of the Jaloun district, was in full activity, plundering around Koonch; Mote, thirty-five miles from Jhansie, on the Kalpee road, and a Tehseelee station was taken, plundered and partially burned by the rebel Thakoors, Gumbeer Sing and Debey Sing, on the 23rd May, the very day Sir H. Rose took Kalpee; and even earlier than this, the Paur Thakoors, around Kurrara, had attacked Dinars, only sixteen miles from Jhansie. In Kuchwagurh plundering had never altogether ceased.

95. On the 28th April, having received intelligence of Burjore Sing's outrages, I applied to Sir H. Rose for a military detachment to proceed against him, and he detailed Major Orr's Hyderabad force for that purpose. Major Orr surprised Burjore Sing at Belawan on the 31st May, killed about 150 of his armed followers, took all his baggage and dispersed his band, and in consequence other disaffected Thakoors of Bheyr, Ameta, and Baroda came in and submitted to me. I then accompanied Major Orr's force to Mote, with the intention of proceeding against Gumbeer Sing and Debey Sing, between the Dessan and Betwa, which part of the country was in great disorder; but on the 5th June we received news of the revolution at Gwalior, and the flight of Scindia to Agra, and on the 6th Major Orr received orders from Sir H. Rose to proceed towards Gwalior via Jhansie, towards which latter place he marched on the 7th June; Sir H. Rose having in the meantime marched direct on Gwalior, leaving a garrison in Kalpee.

96. The revolution in Gwalior had a ruinous effect on our endeavors to restore peace in the Jhansie division; within a week of the fact getting generally known, nearly the whole of the country between the Betwa and Dessan was up, and that to the south and west of Fichore and Kurrara shortly followed. As Sir H. Rose's force passed through Jaloun and Kuchwagurh on its way to Gwalior, that part of the country remained quiet a short time longer; but when the troops left, it rose like the rest.

97. At this time, the middle of June 1858, there were in the whole Jhansie division, including Chundeyree, Jhansie, Jaloun, and Humeepoor, only two military posts, one at Jhansie under Colonel Liddell, consisting of 557 Rank and File, 3rd Bombay European Infantry, 538, 24th Bombay Native Infantry, 3½ Bhopal Native Artillery with three guns, 113 Hyderabad Cavalry and 83 Sappers—total 1,325 Rank and File, but amongst these were included the whole of the sick and wounded up to the taking of Jhansie of Sir H. Rose's force; and as the fort and town of Jhansie had to be guarded, there only remained for duty 591 Rank and File of all arms. The other post was at Kalpee, consisting of 124 Royal Artillery, 417 Rank and File of H. M.'s 5th Fusiliers, and 353 Rank and File of the 19th Madras Native Infantry—total 894 Rank and File, but of these there only remained 644 Rank and File for duty, and as Kalpee was an important post, not much more than half of these were disposable. In the Chundeyree and Humeepoor districts we had not a man.

98. On the 6th June Captain Maclean, who had been sent from Jhansie to take charge of the Chundeyree district, and who had with him only 150 Gond police and some Tehree troops, finding that his position at Lullutpoor was not tenable, fell back to Banpoor and from thence to Tehree. Shortly after the whole of the district of Chundeyree, save the fort of that name which, having been re-occupied, was held for us by Scindia's troops, and Banpoor, fell into the hands of the rebels; and I placed Captain Maclean in
charge of the Jhansie district, as until regular forces were disposable, it was useless making any more attempts to reduce the Chundeyree district to order.

99. The country between the Betwa and Dessan in the Jhansie district was overrun by about 2,000 rebels and 500 mutineers, part of whom had come from the Humeerpoor district. The Rais of Goorseraie, Kesho Rae, alone held out for us at Goorseraie in the north, while the Tehseeladar and Thannadar of Mhow held out in the fort of that place in the south. The rebels under Chuttur Sing, Bukht Sing of Alipoora, Kasheseth, &c., besieged the Tehseeladar in the fort of Mhow on the 21st June. On the 24th June the Tehseeladar and Thannadar having been treacherously given up by their own men were put to death by the rebels three days after in cold blood. I applied to Colonel Liddell for troops, but he stated that he could spare none from Jhansie. I then, as Gwalior had fallen, applied to Sir H. Rose, who at first stated that none were available, but shortly after he sent a reinforcement as noted in the margin to Jhansie, which reached that place on the 10th July. On the 2nd July a military detachment under Captain Montriou, which I accompanied, proceeded to occupy Mote, which step was rendered necessary by the rebels of Jaloun under Burjore Sing, Dowlut Sing, and others, and mutineers from beyond the Jumna having again collected in great force and taken the large town of Koonch, which until then had been held for us by the son of the Rais of Goorseraie, with 500 matchlockmen. On the arrival of Captain Montriou's detachment at Mote the Goorseraie troops again re-occupied it (Koonch), and the rebel Burjore Sing took up a strong position at Mhow Mahoni.

100. On the 5th July 1858, the Banpoor Raja having previously opened negotiations with Captain Maclean, gave himself up to Mr. Thornton, Assistant Superintendent at Murrowra, but was shortly after allowed to return to the Chundeyree district, where he continued intriguing and collecting revenue till early in August, when he finally came in, and with the Shahgurh Raja proceeded under an escort to Gwalior.

101. Owing, notwithstanding frequent requisitions on the part of the civil authorities, to no active military operations being undertaken from Kalpee, Kuchwagur, and the west of the Jaloun district fell almost entirely into the hands of the rebels headed by Burjore Sing and Dowlut Sing.

102. On the 19th July, Colonel Liddell sent 150 of the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, fifty of the 3rd Bombay Europeans, and one gun across the Betwa to garrison Burwa Saugar for the purpose of holding in check the rebels about Mhow Raneepoor, amounting to about 6,000 men or more, headed by Junnoo Bae, Chuttur Sing, and Bukht Sing of Alipoora. The Desput of Jeitpoor had also brought them a considerable reinforcement from the Humeerpoor district. The Goorseraie Chief, however, still held out for us at Goorseraie.

103. About this time, although the station of Humeerpoor was held by a small detachment, yet there were no other troops in the district, and Mr. Free­ling, the Deputy Commissioner, reported that in Pergunnah Mahoba, most of the Talookdars and Obareedars were in arms against us; the collection were little or nothing, and that in Jeitpoor the case was much worse, the presence of the troops of the Raja of Chirkaee alone enabling the Tehseeladar to remain at his post; but that his being there was useless, as even the neighbouring villages would not obey his orders. The Desput also made an irruption from Mhow Raneepoor, and placed a garrison in Kashipoora.

104. On the 26th July 1858 an express arrived from the Tehseeladar of Pichore (thirty-four miles south-west of Jhansie), stating that the rebels under Munsaram (an adherent of the late Rane of Jhansie), after taking the fort of Myapoor, and hanging some of our police there, were advancing on the fort of Pichore, round which their cavalry had placed pickets, and that he (the Tec-
Ireland), expected to be attacked next day. I immediately applied to Colonel Liddell for military aid, which he gave, and on the same evening a detachment, as noted in the margin, and accompanied by Captain Maclean, Deputy Commissioner, marched against the rebels and saved Pichore. This rebels detachment was subsequently reinforced, drove the altogether out of the west of Jhansie district, and having enabled Captain Maclean to settle that part of the country, shortly after returned to Jhansie.

105. On the 25th July, I received an express from Captain Ternan, saying that the rebels were closing round Jaloun, that no troops would be sent to it from Kalpee, and asking me to apply for a force from Jhansie to save it. As Jaloun is seventy-six miles from Jhansie, and out of the radius of operations of the Jhansie Brigade, which had already enough on its hands, this could not be done; but I immediately reported the state of affairs to Government, with the view of getting troops ordered there from Kalpee, which was afterwards done; but in the meantime, the rebels under Burjore Sing, with some mutineers growing bold, from no military operations being undertaken against them, again attacked Koonch, only thirty-eight miles from Kalpee, drove out of it and defeated the 500 men who, under the son of the Goorseraie Chief, held it for us, killing upwards of thirty of them, including two officers, and taking two guns. This had a very bad effect on the Jaloun district, and also on the northern part of the Jhansie district; its northern Thannah Pandokhur being driven in; and the Puares and other malcontents collected in small parties preparatory to a rise.

106. On the 2nd August, Jaloun was taken by the rebels; but hearing of the approach of a party of troops, as noted in the margin, which had at last moved from Kalpee, they again abandoned it on the 3rd August; but not before they had deliberately put to death the Thansadar there. The above detachment, under Major Synge, remained in garrison at Jaloun.

107. Colonel Liddell having organized a Field Force of 700 men of all arms moved across the Betwa river, towards Mhow Raoneepoor, on the 11th August. As Captain Maclean, the Deputy Commissioner, was still employed settling the country about Pichore and Kurra, I accompanied Colonel Liddell. On hearing of Colonel Liddell's force having reached Burwa Saugor, the rebels (save about 200 under Bukht Sing of Alipoors), abandoned Mhow Raoneepoor, and under Kashmiri made for Gurrota. When Colonel Liddell arrived at Bijingurh fort, which he destroyed on the 14th August, the rebels having abandoned it. Kashmiri's force broke up, and the greater part fled across the Dessan into the Humerepoor district. In the meantime, Kesho Rao of Goorseraie getting bold on our approach, attacked and dispersed the rebel bands of Debyey Sing and Gumbeer Sing, and the Tehree troops (then acting as our allies) drove Bukht Sing's small party out of Mhow Raoneepoor. Within seven days after Colonel Liddell had crossed the Betwa, there was not an armed band of rebels left between the Dessan and the Betwa.

108. When the first amnesty proclamation was originally published, the country between the Dessan and Betwa was in the hands of the rebels, and it could not be made known so extensively as was desirable. I therefore directed the Tehsildars to have it again published in every village, and to report to Government that the order was carried out; this had a very good effect, for very shortly all the rebels of that part of the country, save proclaimed offenders, were induced to come in by Captain Maclean (who joined Colonel Liddell's camp a few days after), and that officer was enabled by great good management to settle that part of the country which, notwithstanding the neighbourhood of large bodies of rebels in the Humerepoor district, has remained quite peaceful up to this day.
109. On the rebels breaking up, Colonel Liddell divided his force into two parties; one under Captain Thompson, 14th Dragoons, took post at Gurrota, which it reached on the 26th August, and the other under Colonel Liddell himself encamped at Mhow Raneepoor, where it arrived on the 24th August with a view to intercept the rebels whom, it was supposed, General Whitlock’s expected advance from Banda would drive back on Colonel Liddell’s force.

110. About the time that Colonel Liddell advanced from Burwa Saugor, (13th August) Chuttur Sing with a large party of rebels advanced against and attacked Raat in the Humeerpoor district, which he took through the treachery of those defending it, who gave up to him; the Tehseeldar, and Thannadar, and Canoonge, all of whom he caused to be put to death the next day.

111. In the middle of August, a strong detachment of the three arms was sent under Captain Ashburner, 3rd Bombay Cavalry, towards Mhow, Mahoni, and Koonech, to act against Burjore Sing and to co-operate with the Kalpee force. He effectually cleared the Bandere and Mote Pergunnahs of Jhansie of rebels. On the 4th September, Captain Ashburner attacked and drove Burjore Sing out of Mhow Mahoni, killed forty of his men, and took his two guns and all his ammunition; and on the 5th September, Brigadier McDuff, who had moved out of Kalpee, attacked and defeated a large body of rebels and mutineers at Surawun, ten miles north of Jaloun, killing about 150 and taking one gun. Captain Ashburner subsequently entered Kuchwagur, and his and Brigadier McDuff’s force effectually broke up for a time the bands of rebels in the Jaloun district, and Captain Ternan was enabled to get the eastern part into something like order; he had already most satisfactorily settled the eastern part.

112. General Whitlock having advanced from Banda, was at Mahoba on the 4th September, from which place he advanced to and destroyed the abandoned fort of Sreenuggur. In the meantime, the rebels in the Humeerpoor district, being unopposed in the central pergunnahs, plundered and committed outrages unchecked, and extended themselves along the east bank of the Dassan, from its junction with the Betwa to about Kashipoora. On the 22nd September, Captain Thompson, 14th Dragoons, having agreeably to order moved nearer to Colonel Liddell, was encamped at Simerda, when Chuttur Sing with about 1,200 matchlockmen, some sowars and two guns suddenly forded the Dassan, which was very deep, and marching rapidly round Captain Thompson’s left flank, took possession of the town and fort of Gurrota, seven miles from Simerda. On the 23rd September, Captain Thompson finding the roads so flooded and muddy that he could not move his guns, left them in camp with a guard, and taking with him fifty of the 3rd Bombay Europeans, fifty of the 24th Bombay Native Infantry and fifty of the 14th Dragoons, forded the Lackara river, and attacked and drove Chuttur Sing out of Gurrota, killing about sixty men, and taking his two guns, all his ammunition and much baggage. Chuttur Sing immediately fled over the Dassan into the Humeerpoor district, towards Jignee; but as Brigadier Munsey was at Raat on the 21st, his band totally dispersed, and he himself went into concealment, it is not known where. General Whitlock had in the meantime advanced in the direction of Punwaree, and all the rebels of the Humeerpoor district made towards Jeitpoor in the south.

113. At the end of August, Lieutenant Fenton, Deputy Commissioner of Chundeyree, left Jhansie to take charge of his district. He had with him only a few police, under Captain Sneyd, but was to meet some 100 Bhupal sowars and 180 Bhupal Infantry, near Banpoor, at which place I left it to his discretion to remain, until he had further reinforcements, which I shortly expected, or to proceed to Lailutpoor. On reaching Banpoor, Lieutenant Fenton procured from the Tehree State 700 matchlockmen and two guns, and feeling himself strong enough, pushed on with his united force to Lailutpoor, which he reached on the 28th August 1858, without opposition, although the rebels under the rebel Thakoors of Jacklone, Palee, and Nanickpoor, were assembled...
in considerable numbers some miles to the south of Lullutpoor. He made known to them the terms of the first amnesty, but no one took advantage of it. However he succeeded in re-establishing his thannahs in all parts of his district, save in the country around Jacklone, where the above Thakoors and their adherents still held out, and he was not strong enough to attack them.

114. About the 22nd September, being probably incited by the emissaries of Tantia Topee, who was approaching Chundeyree, the rebels, in the north of Chundeyree, attacked, drove out and cut up several of the police in the thannahs of Talbehut and Bansee, making prisoner the Thannadar of the former place, whom they afterwards put to death. On the 25th September Captain Fenton received intelligence that they intended moving on Banpoor to Bar, and, knowing that in case the rebels got possession of Banpoor his retreat would be completely cut off should Tantia Topee enter the district, he determined to leave the Bhopal Infantry, 140 men, to hold Lullutpoor and march with the rest of his force, taking with him all the office records, on Banpoor, against the rebels. The Bhopal Infantry, however, who were new levies, refused to remain behind at Lullutpoor, which, under the circumstances, was in truth a very dangerous position, and ultimately Captain Fenton entirely evacuated Lullutpoor and marched on Banpoor with his whole force. It was the monsoon, and towards evening heavy rain fell. On arriving at Kullianpoor at 8 P.M., the whole country was a sheet of water, and all the rivers between Kullianpoor and Banpoor became impassable. Under these circumstances, Lieutenant Fenton determined to march back to Lullutpoor, but a fresh difficulty occurred; the Theree force refused to do so, and Captain Fenton was obliged to return to his original intention of going to Banpoor. Next day the rear guard arrived and reported that the rebels had occupied Lullutpoor. The Bhopal Infantry also became disordered, and a Jemadar and twenty men deserted. Captain Fenton was detained at Kullianpoor by the river three days; it became fordable on the morning of the 29th September, and he and his party under Captain Sneyd crossed it, but shortly after they had reached the other side they were attacked by the rebels who, however, were beaten off with a loss on their (the rebels') side of twenty or twenty-five men killed, who were cut up by the Bhopal sowars under Captain Fenton. The same day Captain Fenton with his party reached Banpoor, and was there joined by Lieutenant Turner with 100 sowars and 150 foot of the military police, whom I had sent to his assistance.

115. After taking Esagurh in Scindia's territory, Tantia Topee divided his force into two nearly equal parts, of which one under the Nana's nephew, the Rao Sahib, amounting exclusive of followers to 2,000 mutineers and 8 or 9,000 armed rebels, a great proportion of whom were mounted, entered the south-west of the Jhansie district near Mypoor, and took Pichore on the 6th October, from which place all the Government establishments escaped, save some eight military police who fell into the hands of the rebels. From Pichore the rebels pushed on a party half-way to Kurrrara, from which our Thannah and Tehseeladar were withdrawn, but getting some intelligence supposed to have been regarding the approach of Colonel Seudamore's detachment from Gwallor, the rebel Rao suddenly marched his whole force to Sirrus Gaht on the Betwa, thirty miles south-west of Jhansie, and crossing the river there, a difficult operation, which took him four days, occupied Talbehut, where he was joined by all the Boondelas of the northern part of the Chundeyree district. Although a favorable opportunity for attacking the rebels presented itself while they were engaged in the passage of the river, yet Captain Ashburner's detachment being far north in Kuchwagurh, the garrison of Jhansie was not strong enough to take advantage of it.

116. On the entry of the rebels into the Jhansie district, as it was supposed they might try and pass through it or threaten Jhansie, the Brigadier directed Colonel Liddell to concentrate his and Captain Thompson's detachments at Mhow Raneeepoor and to move with them towards Burwa Sauger, leaving 100 of the 24th Bombay Native Infantry in the fort at Mhow. On
the withdrawal of the military detachment from Gurrota, I directed Captain Maclean to concentrate the 150 military police, which were divided between Gurrota and Punwaho, at Goorserai, and sending Lieutenant Turner, Police Adjutant, to take command of them. I ordered him to keep his detachment moving about the two Tehseeles of Gurrota and Punwaho in one body, to give confidence to the well-affected, and to at once attack and disperse any armed rebel body that should dare to assemble. This plan was very well carried out by Lieutenant Turner, and perfectly succeeded, for although there are many disaffected Thakoors in those parts, not a man ventured to rise, and on the occasion of Bukht Sing’s band venturing to cross the Dessan from the Humeerpoor district, from which all General Whitlock’s force had moved southwards, towards Shahgurh, Lieutenant Turner attacked and defeated him on the 18th October, killing thirty-three of his men.

117. On the 7th, 8th and 9th October, Tantia Topee, at the head of his division of the rebels, attacked Chundeyree, which was garrisoned by Scindia’s troops, but was beaten off with some loss, and retreated to Serae, ten miles south of Chundeyree, with the intention of crossing the Betwa to Lullutpoor, for the purpose of attacking Tehree.

118. On the 7th October, when the rebels under Rao Sahib were crossing the Betwa at Sirus Ghât, I received intelligence that it was the intention of Tantia and the Rao to unite their forces and fall on Tehree. I therefore sent an express to Lieutenant Fenton, who it will be remembered was at Banpoor, desiring him to march with all his police and civil establishments towards Burwa Saugor, where it was probable he would meet Colonel Liddell’s detachment. This latter officer however was delayed, and Lieutenant Fenton reached Burwa Saugor on the 10th October. On the 11th October, agreeably to an arrangement with Brigadier Ainslie, I, accompanied by Major Davis and some horse and foot military police, joined Captain Fenton at Burwa Saugor, with the intention of proceeding to Moggarpoor to unite with Colonel Liddell. On 12th October a detachment, under Captain Blyth, also joined us. Our total strength at Burwa Saugor was then as per margin.

119. On reaching Burwa Saugor, I procured intelligence, that both the Rao Sahib and Tantia were still some distance from Tehree, and proposed to Brigadier Ainslie that Colonel Liddell’s force* should march direct on Pirteepoor, and there join the military police under Major Davis, and both united under the command of Colonel Liddell, advance and protect Tehree. Brigadier Ainslie approved of my proposition, and directed Colonel Liddell to move on Pirteepoor, where he arrived on the 14th October; Captain Blyth’s detachment, the military police, under Major Davis, and myself, having arrived there the previous day, the 13th October. On the 16th October Colonel Liddell reached Dogoro, eighteen miles from Tehree, having headed the Rao Sahib and Tantia Topee, and rendered any attempt of theirs against Tehree hopeless, and on the 17th I rode in and visited the Raja, who with his minister was in great alarm, to reassure them. I also prevailed on them to send out their forces and close the fords over the Janmee river, along the southern part of its course, which indeed they had already partially done. Colonel Liddell had already made his arrangements most effectually for watching the northern course of the Janmee from Tehree to the Betwa. Tantia Topee’s escape eastward was therefore cut off.

120. In the meantime, 136 military police and 110 Sikh police sowars, and seven camel guns, under Captain Owen, military police, accompanied by Captain Maclean, Deputy Commissioner, occupied Sirus and Jirraz ghâts over the Betwa, north of Tailbehut, and were supported by Colonel Scudamore’s detachment at Duckrai, fifteen miles in their rear, which detachment, however, afterwards marched to Sirus ghât, and thus rendered the escape of the rebels-
northward impossible. Brigadier Smith watched the left bank of the Betwa towards Chundeyree to the west.

121. Tantia Topee with his division, after having failed against Chundeyree, and been beaten by part of General Michel's force near Mugrowlee, crossed to the east of the Betwa and joined the Rao Sahib at Lullutpoor, about the 14th October, having been joined by all the Thakoors and Boondelas of the Chundeyree district. Tantia and the Rao having halted there two or three days, then marched with their united forces and a large following of Boondelas, in a south-easterly direction towards Shahgur; but on the 18th October were met by General Michel and defeated at Kujooria, near Sidwahlo, with heavy loss in men and of all their guns. The rebel army then fled north to Talbehut, where part arrived on the 20th October, but finding their escape both east, north, and west cut off, again doubled back to the south through the difficult and jungly country along the east bank of the Betwa, and escaped into the Sauger district between that river and General Michel, who had in the meantime advanced to the neighbourhood of Lullutpoor. General Michel marched in pursuit, and on the 7th November Colonel Liddell, accompanied by Lieutenant Fenton, entered the Chundeyree district, which he is now engaged in reducing to order. Some of the insurgents have submitted; but the Jacklone, Palee and Nanickpoor Thakoors still hold out in the difficult country towards Jacklone and Palee.

122. General Whitlock, after Tantia's defeat by General Michel, again marched into the Humeepoor district, where he is now operating against the rebels about Jeitpoor, but the south of the district is still in great disorder. The northern part, however, is well in hand.

123. In the western part of the Jaloun district, in consequence of the Kalpee force undertaking no active military operations, the rebel leaders, Burjore Sing and Dowlut Sing, are still in full activity, and occasionally threaten the northern part of the pergunnah of Bandere, belonging to the Jhansie district. The eastern part is completely reduced to order.

124. The Jhansie district is perfectly quiet, all orders are obeyed, and travellers can go anywhere unmolested.

125. Her Majesty's Proclamation and Amnesty has been extensively circulated throughout the Jhansie division, and every effort is being made to induce those concerned to take advantage of it. As yet, however, sufficient time has not elapsed for it to have had any marked effect.

126. From the foregoing narrative it will be seen that the conduct of the natives of the country in the three districts of Chundeyree, Jhansie and Jaloun, was very different. In Chundeyree the Thakoors and their followers broke out into rebellion before the troops at Lullutpoor showed any sign of disaffection. In Jhansie the adherents of the Rance and some of the Thakoors rose simultaneously with the sepoys. In Jaloun, on the contrary, the inhabitants of the country remained generally peaceful, even after the troops had mutinied and the Deputy Commissioner had left the district, and for a time submitted quietly to the Rais of Goorseraie, Kesheerao, to whom that officer had made over the charge of keeping the district in order.

127. The conduct of the amia and subordinate native officials was generally either bad or neutral. In Chundeyree, the Seriabtadar and Teeseedlar joined the Banpoor Raja, and became his chief officers for the administration of the district—and the police with their officers, customs peons, the orderly chuprassees, and many others joined the insurgents. The two native Deputy Collectors, Zeinoolabdin Khan and Nissarahmed, through fear rendered Captain A. C. Gordon no assistance, and finally abandoned him. In Jhansie the Teeseedlar, Ahmed Hossein, exerted himself greatly, and rendered every assistance in his power to our officers: unfortunately he was for a time suspected and imprisoned, but his conduct has now been cleared, and he has

* The Kalpee force has since taken the field.
been restored to his appointment. The criminal Serihtadar, Gopal Rao, also did good service, and has been rewarded. All the amla, both in the Superintendent's and Deputy Commissioner's offices, quietly looked on, and took part neither one way or other, while Kasheenath, Tehseeldar of Punwaho, was, and is one of the leaders of the rebels. The police generally with their officers, and Bukshish Ali, Jail Darogah at their head, the Customs peons, and most of the Chuprassees all joined the mutineers. In Jaloun, the amla with few exceptions, do not appear to have behaved disloyally to the Government, but no opportunity of taking an active part presented itself to them, as the country was as it were made over to Kesho Rao of Goorseraie. Mahomed Hossein, Tehseeldar of Oraie, and Chiragh Ali, Tehseeldar of Duboh, appear to have behaved well; the latter assisted Mr. and Mrs. Martin to get away from Duboh. Narain Rao Kishnoo, Tehseeldar of Lahar, ultimately joined the rebels, Sheopershad, Deputy Collector at Kalpee, although well affected to our Government, behaved with great cowardice.

128. I beg to bring to the notice of Government, the Rampooa Raja and the Ranee of Lahar in Kuchwagarh, and Rao Sinaput of Kuttena in Jhansie; the last gave both Captain Maclean and myself invaluable assistance, in inducing the rebels to accept the first Amnesty, and in settling the country between the Dessan and Betwa. The loyal conduct of all three will form the subject of a separate report.

129. I would also direct the favorable consideration of Government to the good services of the following officers:—

Of Captain Ternan who, with the assistance of the military, has reduced the greater part of his district to order; of Captain Maclean, through whose exertions the Jhansie district is now, and has been, for some time, perfectly peaceful; this result could not of course have been obtained without the zealous and hearty co-operation of the Jhansie force; of Mr. G. H. Freeling, who, though from want of troops and police he has not been able to reduce his whole district to order, has been untiring in his exertions; and of Lieutenant Fenton, who, although obliged to abandon his district for a time, made every effort with but very inadequate means to maintain his hold on it.

Jhansie, the 20th November 1858.

(Sd.) J. W. Pinkney, Captain, Commissioner.

APPENDIX A.

List of the Europeans and Anglo-Indians murdered at Jhansie.

Captain Alexander Skene, Superintendent; Mrs. Skene, and two female children.

Mrs. Browne, wife of Captain Browne, Deputy Commissioner of Jaloun; and Miss Browne, his sister.

Captain F. D. Gordon, 10th Madras Native Infantry, Deputy Commissioner of Jhansie.

 Lieutenant Burgess, Revenue Surveyor, Bundelkund.

" Turnbull, Assistant ditto, ditto.

" Powis, Assistant Surveyor, Irrigation; Mrs. Powis, and one female child.

Dr. McEgan, and Mrs. McEgan.

Mr. T. Andrews, Principal Sudder Ameen, Jhansie.

" Robert Andrews, Deputy Collector and Magistrate; Mrs. Andrews, two female and two male children.

Mr. W. S. Carshore, Collector of Customs; Mrs. Carshore, and four children.

n19
Mr. D. C. Wilton, Patrol; Mrs. Wilton, one child, and two sisters of Mrs. Wilton.

Mr. D. D. Blyth, Assistant Revenue Surveyor; Mrs. Blyth, and her mother; three male children and one female child.

Sergeant Millard, Sub-Assistant Revenue Surveyor; Mrs. Millard, and three children.

Mr. Bennett, Sub-Assistant Revenue Surveyor.

" J. Young, ditto, and Mrs. Young.

" G. Young (apprentice).

" Palfreyman (ditto).

" Munrow, Sub-Assistant Revenue Surveyor.

" A. Scott, Head Clerk, Deputy Commissioner's Office.

" C. Parcell, ditto, Superintendent's Office.

" J. Parcell, Clerk, Deputy Commissioner's Office.

" Mutlow, ditto, Superintendent's Office.

" Mutlow (2nd). Unemployed.

" D. G. Elliot, Clerk, Deputy Commissioner's Office.

" Elliot

" Mrs. Elliot

" Parents of the above.

Mr. Flemming. Unemployed.

" Crawfurd.

Captain Dunlop, 12th Bengal Native Infantry, Commanding at Jhansie.

Lieutenant Taylor, 12th Bengal Native Infantry.

" Campbell, Commanding Detachment of the 14th Irregular Cavalry.

Quarter-Master Sergeant Newton; Mrs. Newton, and two children.

Total murdered ... 66

JHANSIE, (Sd.) J. W. PINKNEY, Captain,
The 20th Nov. 1858. Commissioner of Jhansi.


No. 18, dated Calpee, 12th June 1858.

FROM—CAPTAIN A. H. TERNAN, Deputy Commissioner of Jaloun,

To—CAPTAIN F. W. PINKNEY, Commissioner of the Jhansi Division.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your Circular No. 153 of 1858, and beg to forward now, as annexed, a full and detailed account of events in this district, from the 11th of June, the date on which disturbances first broke out.

2. The account is furnished by Mr. Passanah, Deputy Collector, who himself underwent many hardships, his life being also often threatened.

3. You will remark that the conduct of Amlah, Police, Customs peons has also been touched upon, thus including, I believe, every subject of importance.
4. The principal local actors in the disturbances of this district were the Goorsurai Chief, and the Taece Bace of Jaloun, Mahrattas of great influence.

5. At first the villagers appear to have taken little interest in the rebel movements, but gradually several leaders sprung up from among the Kuchwahagar and other Thakoors of the district (the most notorious being Dowlut Singh of Indookee), and at length general anarchy prevailed. Among other rebel Chiefs were the Raja of Bhudeck, and the Thakoor of Bellawan.

6. After noticing such rebels, I am glad to be able to bring to your notice the loyalty of the Rampoora Raja, and of the Ranee of Lahun; their conduct will furnish subject for a separate report.

7. The Amlah, with few exceptions, appear to have been passive spectators of the rebellion,—some few again openly joining the rebels. The police behaved shamefully, and from the commencement took an active part against the Government they served.

8. The principal agent in these parts, or Nazim of the Nana of Bithoor, Mohumud Ishack, was stationed at Calpee. He appears to have had jurisdiction also over this place, and of many villages round Cawnpore. He was formerly, I am told, a Thannadar under our Government at Bithoor.

9. Upon the rebels being driven out of Calpee, many papers were found showing that our own forms were observed in Civil Department as they were also kept up in appearance in the Military. Many of the papers thus taken relate to villages of Bhognee, Akburpore, Sheikpoora, all villages in the Cawnpore district.

10. All these documents are being sorted, and will be sent to the Magistrates of the districts to which they refer: they contain information of purely local importance.

11. In conclusion, I enclose a translation of Lieutenant Browne’s letter to the Goorsurai Chief, making over the district to him.

12. The words in brackets “in all departments” are said to have been interpolated, and are written above the line.

13. It was upon the strength of this document that the Goorsurai Chief made himself for a time master of nearly the whole district, governing this through his own people, though retaining the district establishments till 14th October 1857.

14. The district was later invaded by Tanteeah Topee, who supported the claims of Taece Baee of Jaloun, and her agent Biswas Rao, to the detriment of the Goorsurai Chief. Tanteeah Topee proclaimed the Peshwa as Chief Ruler of this part of India.

No. 41, dated Calpee, 29th May 1858.

From—G. Passan, Esq., Deputy Collector of Jaloun,
To—Captain A. H. Ternan, Deputy Commissioner of Jaloun.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 38, dated 28th instant, calling for a report on the conduct of the Amlah and Police of the Jaloun district at the time of the outbreak.

2. There is a peculiarity in the case of the Jaloun district that no local insurrection took place. The Jaghiredar of Goorsurai was requested to afford aid in maintaining order, and his sons arrived after the mutiny at Jhansi with an armed force at Jaloun, and took advantage of a letter addressed to him by Lieutenant Browne, the Deputy Commissioner, to give out that the entire management of the district was made over to the Jaghiredar. Lieutenants Browne and Lamb left Orai on the 11th June last, and on the approach of the Jhansi mutineers, whose advance guard had arrived during the day, I and Mr. Griffiths, the Settlement Deputy Collector, left on the night of the 15th, but
we unfortunately fell into the hands of a company of the 53rd Native Infantry, which mutinied after escorting treasure from Orai to Jaloun.

3. We were brought prisoners to Orai on the 19th June, but released on the 21st. Previous to my arrival the mutineers from Jhansi and Nowgong had passed through Orai, plundering, burning, and destroying all Government treasure, public buildings, and the houses and property of the European and Christian inhabitants.

4. On being released by the mutineers of the 53rd Native Infantry, my party was seized by the servants of the Goorsural Chief, and made over to the mutineers from Lullutapore, who arrived the next morning. These also released us, and we went into a house in the town, entirely destitute. Many of the Sudder Amlah then came to me, and proffered assistance in clothes and small sums of money, which we were fain to accept, to relieve our present wants. Those foremost in thus assisting my party were Reotee Ram, Naeb Serishtadar of the Revenue Court; Kalka Pershaud, Serishtadar; Reez-ood-deen, Naeb Serishtadar of the Foujdaree, and Fyez-ood-deen, Nazir.

5. A few days after my return to Orai, several of the Amlah came and told me that the Chief had sent for them all, and as they were afraid of incurring his displeasure by a refusal, and the roads all round were infested by robbers, they were preparing to go to Jaloun, as British authority was entirely subverted, and Kesho Rao had established himself, and enlisted some thousands of armed men. I did not attempt to dissuade the Amlah. All the Sudder Amlah went over, with the exception of Oomed Alee, Roznamcha Nawees, and Roznuck Alee, Nukul Nawees, who started for their houses in Oudh;—the former was murdered, and the latter robbed. Ramnaraen, Ishar Nawees, who had obtained leave previous to the disturbance, also went away.

6. In October last, I heard from Lieutenant Browne that Kesho Rao would be treated as a rebel. I then warned the Amlah from Cawnpore that their remaining in Kesho Rao's service would render them liable to punishment. They then left Jaloun; some went to Rampore, some to the villages near about Jaloun, and Reez-ood-deen went to me at Cawnpore. Others, as they found opportunity, followed; and Hurbelas Rae, Revenue Serishtadar, went to his home at Mynpoory, accompanied by his son Pearee Lall, Mohurir.

7. Under the above circumstances, I do not consider that the Amlah generally were guilty of disloyalty to the British Government; the opportunity of taking an active part on the side of Government did not offer. The exception, as far as I am aware, are Fuzul Ahmed, Foujdaree Mohafiz Dufur, who, I frequently heard, expressed satisfaction at the subversion of British rule; and Moolchuud, Mohurir, who took service under Taee Beee; also Naraen Rao, Roznamcha Nawees, who was made Naeb Tehseeldar of Orai by Taee Bae.

8. Vilayut Alee, a Mohurir of the Calpee Deputy Collectorship, was, I heard, known to speak against Government. He never came to me, though he had several opportunities when I came to Calpee.

9. I now proceed to state what I know regarding the Tehseeldar of the district.

10. Mohumud Hossein, Tehseeldar of Orai, was very active before the outbreak at Orai, and was much trusted by Lieutenant Browne, who made over some valuable property to his keeping; and after leaving Orai, addressed him a perwana, if I recollect right, to try his utmost to save the Cutcherry and records. Mohumud Hossein told me that he would supply russud, meet the mutineers, and with the view of saving the records, represent to them that they would be of great service in the reign of the King of Delhi. He met the mutineers, but was plundered by them, and had to hide himself. He started next day for Kooedaree, but was stopped by the zamindars of Etowrah, who plundered a great part of his property. He however managed to save the property entrusted to him by Lieutenant Browne. He received an advance of Rupees 2,000 for pay of the Seebundees enlisted by him. He is
employed as Tehseelidar in the Futtelpore district. Lieutenant Browne, from Agra, expressed his great satisfaction at Mohumud Hossein's conduct.

11. Enayet Hossein, Tehseelidar of Jaloun, behaved in a very spirited manner in opposing the occupation of the Fort of Jaloun by the sons of the Chief, and when I passed through Jaloun on the night of the 15th June, he followed next morning, and met me at Surawan. He went back, promising to join me again with as many churpasees and burkundazes as would come with him, and I have no doubt would have done so, but he was made prisoner by the Chief's eldest son, Tanteelah, and made over by him to the mutineers of the 53rd Native Infantry, who took him to Cawnpore. He then went and joined his father, Sudder Khan, who was Deputy Collector at Banda, and remained with him till the arrival of British troops at Banda. Sudder Khan's conduct was considered disloyal.

12. Humeed-ood-Zuman, Tehseelidar of Attah, on the approach of the mutineers, went and hid himself at Orai, and soon after went off to Hameerpore, to join his father Waheed-ood-Zuman, Deputy Collector. The latter was proclaimed a rebel, and both found their way to Rampore, in Rohilkund, from which place the Tehseelidar sent me several urzees, and himself came over a few days before my leaving Cawnpore, but was apprehended under orders of Mr. Sherer. I am not aware of the charge against him.

13. Gholam Hossein Khan, Tehseelidar of Madhogurth, behaved, to the best of my opinion, in a loyal manner, and exerted himself to prevent the people from rising in insurrection. He opened a correspondence with me when I was in the district, and shortly after my arrival at Cawnpore he arrived there. He has been appointed a Tehseelidar in the Cawnpore district.

14. Mohumud Hossein, Tehseelidar of Madareepore, behaved, loyaly, and left the district shortly after the insurrection, calling on me at Orai. He is at Benares, from which place I received several urzees from him at Cawnpore.

15. Cheragh Alee, Tehseelidar of Duboh, behaved well, and assisted Mr. Martin in getting away with Mrs. Martin from Duboh. When the Ranee of Jhansi established her authority in the pargunnah, he went away to a village named Chakee, then to Bhundere, after which he joined his brother Nasir Ahmed, Deputy Collector of Chundeyree, and resided for some months at Kudowra. On reaching his home in the Futtelpore district he wrote to me, and also came to Cawnpore. He is now here.

16. Sheo Persbould was acting Tehseelidar of Koonch. Since the insurrection he never communicated with me, and I have not heard of his whereabouts. He was called to account by Kesho Rao for Rupees 8,000, embezzled from the tuhveel previous to the insurrection. Sheo Persbould must have been guilty of gross neglect on the matter, if not worse.

17. Narain Rao Vishnoo, who was Tehseelidar of Luhur, is a Mahratta Pandit; he took service both under Kesho Rao and Taee Bace, and from all accounts was no well-wisher of Government. I hear he has now absconded.

18. Of the Thannadars I know personally only about a few, but I have ascertained from enquiry how the rest behaved. They generally showed no hostility towards our Government, but, like the Sudder Amlah, the greater number remained under the Goorsurai Chief, and those in Kuchwahagar under the Gwalior Government.

19. Torab Ali, Thannadar of Jaloun, was in disfavor with Kesho, Rao, from the opposition he offered. Kunhya Lall, Thannadar of Surawan, sent his resignation to Kesho Rao, and remained at Surawan; he frequently came to me during my stay in the district, with proffers of service on the part of the Jaghiredar. In August 1857, when I crossed the Jumna at Sarainee ghat, he was with me, but I was obliged to return; he however soon followed me to Cawnpoor, and has been with me since. Bussunth Rao, Thannadar of Calpee, is said to have shown a disposition to disloyalty before the arrival of the mutineers at Calpee; but he was seized by the mutineers, and severely punished.
and had a very narrow escape for his life; he went to Moradabad, and the Magistrate of Cawnpoor has, on the information of Mr. Griffiths, applied for his apprehension. Kurrum Ahmed, Thannadar of Orai, was plundered by the Jhansi mutineers, and went off with Mohumud Hossein, Tehseldar, to Kudowra, and thence to his home to Oudh.

20. Mohumud Adil, Thannadar of Bungra, turned a rebel, having, as stated in my letter of the 26th instant, seized my nephew, and made him over to the mutineers, who had captured me and my family. Application has been made by you for his apprehension at Gwalior, where he was last seen.

21. The remarks contained in the 18th paragraph of this letter apply generally to the subordinate Tehseel Amlah and Thannah Mohurreer and Jendarers.

22. Of the burkundazes and chuprasees, some of those at Orai joined the mutineers in plundering the town; a few gave me all the assistance in their power, and the generality entered the service of Kesho Rao. The burkundazes of Thannahs Attah and Bungra behaved violently in demanding their pay from the Tehseldar.

23. There were some seventy or eighty burkundazes of the Bagree tribe, formerly dacoits by profession, employed in the district; these, after the outbreak went off in a body to follow their old occupation.

24. The chuprasees of the Customs line, which ran from Luhur to Jhansi, turned rebels, and many of them joined the mutineers; some took service under Kesho Rao, and his son Tanteen, who was at Calpee.

No. 12, dated Calpee, 9th June 1858.

From—G. Passanah, Esq., Deputy Magistrate of Jaloun,

To—Captain A. H. Terran, Deputy Commissioner of Jaloun.

Having been desired by you to furnish a narrative of events attending the outbreak and disturbances in this district, with reference to Mr. Secretary Muir's Circular letter No. 212, dated 30th April 1850, I have the honor to state, that an account of the outbreak, with my personal adventures, and the conduct of Kesho Rao, Jaghiredar of Goorsurai, and his son Sheo Ram Tanteen, who assumed possession of the district, will be found in the accompanying copy of my letter, dated 27th March last, to the address of Major Ellis, Political Assistant for Bundelkund.

2. I also had the honor of reporting to you, in my letter, dated 29th ultimo, the conduct of the Sudder and Mogussil officers of the district.

3. To complete the narrative up to the time of expulsion of the rebels and mutineers from the district, I shall state what occurred after my leaving it for Cawnpoor, with some other particulars.

4. Kesho Rao, and his fourth son, Scetaram Nana, continued to manage the greater portion of the district, comprising the pergunnahs of Jaloun, Kunnar, Orai, and Koonch, from their station at Jaloun, while his eldest son, Sheo Ram Tanteen, remained at Calpee, in occupation of that portion which comprised the former pergunnahs of Calpee and Atta.

5. The pergunnah of Duboh was first taken possession of by the rebel Ranee of Jhansi, immediately after the inscription at Jhansi in the month of June 1857; but after the lapse of nearly two months, the Raja of Dutteea expelled her servants, and took possession of it, appointing his own amil, and occupying it with his own troops, until the fall of Jhansi. Your presence with the army at Jhansi will have made you acquainted with the particulars of the evacuation of Duboh by the delegates of the Dutteea Baja.

6. The pergunnahs of Indoorkee and Madhoguril, called Kuchwahagar, having formerly belonged to the Gwalior State, were, on the breaking out of the war.
the insurrection, taken possession of by the Maharaja Scindia. I am now well acquainted with the occurrences in that part of the district, but the statement of Oomur Duraz Ali, Deputy Collector and Deputy Magistrate of Luhur, forwarded to you with Captain Pinkney's letter No. 50 of the 23rd March last, gives some information.

7. The mutineers of the Gwalior Contingent, accompanied by Tanteea Topee, the active emissary of the Bithoor Nana, arrived at Jaloun on or about the 29th October last. Both Kesho Rao, and Taee Baee, granddaughter of a former Chief of Jaloun, were prepared to treat with them. Tanteea Topee, it appears, had taken offence with the Goorsurai family, and favored the cause of the Baee. The mutineers, at his instigation, displaced Kesho Rao, and seizing him and his sons, put them in confinement, and treated them with great indignity, subjecting them to severe bodily chastisement. They placed the infant son of the Baee on the guddee, and proclaimed her authority throughout the district. I hear she had promised the Nana three lakhs of rupees, of which she made up one lakh in cash and jewels, and promised to liquidate the remainder from the collections of the estate. Biaoo Biswas Rao was appointed Kamdar or Minister, and assumed the functions of that office.

8. Previous to the arrival of the Gwalior mutineers at Jaloun, Koore Sing of Jugdeespoor, and the 40th Native Infantry, came to Calpee via Banda on the 19th October. They had communication with the Gwalior mutineers, and on the 3rd November seized and imprisoned Sheo Ram Tanteea at Calpee. On the 7th November the Gwalior mutineers came in and coalesced with Koore Sing and the 40th Native Infantry, and marched to attack Cawnpoor a short time after.

9. Biswas Rao also came to Calpee with the mutineers, and remained here till the rebels returned after their defeat at Cawnpoor on the 6th December last, since which a Pandit, named Tanteea Gungoley, and one Mohumud Ishaq, exercised joint authority on the part of the Nana, but the Tehseeldar Narain Rao, appointed by Biswas Rao, remained in office.

10. The rebels were joined by the Ranee of Jhansi and Nawab of Banda, and the united forces are said to have amounted to about 10,000 men, horse and foot, when Sir Hugh Rose defeated them, and put them to flight, occupying Calpee on the 23rd ultimo.

11. I left Cawnpoor on the 17th, and joined the British camp near Calpee on the 22nd ultimo.

12. I have only to add that when Lieutenant Brown, Deputy Commissioner, and Lieutenant Lamb, Assistant, left Orai on the 10th June 1857, a sense of duty prevented me from doing the same. I anticipated that, after the Gwalior mutineers had passed through, I should be able, with the aid of the newly-raised levies, and of the Goorsurai Chief, to restore order in the district, and hoped to escape the mutineers by moving towards the Gwalior frontier, as we had every assurance that the Gwalior Contingent would not join in the mutiny; but unfortunately my designs were frustrated, and myself and family, with Mr. Griffiths, the Settlement Deputy Collector, had on several occasions the narrowest escape imaginable for our lives.

13. I lament to state that my poor mother, whom, from her inability to bear fatigue, I left concealed at Orai, was, by the pusillanimity of some of my servants, brought back to my house, where she was discovered, and cruelly murdered by the Jhansi mutineers on the 17th June 1857.

14. Mr. Heming, the Sub-Assistant Surgeon, who had come to Calpee in the hope of being concealed by some native of his acquaintance, was so hard-pressed by some budmashes of the town, that he wandered back to Orai in a state of distraction, was discovered by the mutineers, and put to death at the same time with my unfortunate mother.

15. Mr. Double, the Head Clerk of the Jaloun Office, also fell a victim, with his wife and one female child, and his mother-in-law, Mrs. Pilkington.
They disguised themselves as natives, and were concealed in the village of Kooceh, and sought shelter in the ravines of the village Khurka; close to the Betwa. He was however discovered by some Mahomedans residing at Khurka, and betrayed by them. On the requisition of the mutineers a party was sent out by the Goorsurai Chief's son, and the whole family being captured, were made over to them. From all accounts it appears that the mutineers, after bringing them to a short distance of Calpee, released them; they went a short distance off the road, and perished from heat and thirst.

16. Mr. Double's son, about five years of age, was found alive by a villager, who brought him within a short distance of Calpee, and there left him; he was picked up in the town by a woman servant, and taken by her to Jhansi, where, after the capture of the city, the boy was found with Mrs. Mutlow, and sent to Agra. I am trying to trace out the villagers who betrayed and seized this unfortunate family, and hope to succeed.

From—STUD OOMUR DURAZ ALI, Deputy Collector and Deputy Magistrate of the district of Jaloun.

States he was a Deputy Collector and Deputy Magistrate of Lulur, in Jaloun. He remained there in durance during the insurrection, and owing to the general revolt of the country, he could not secure a trustworthy man to convey the account of that place to the British authority. He did send one Khoda Buksh, Burkundaz, belonging to the Court of Saugor and Jaloun, with some letters, but the man was made a prisoner by the Shagur Rajas people, and was deprived of the papers he had in his possession, and none of his messengers have returned. He also sent representations to Cawnpoor, but received no reply. Lastly, he forwarded several petitions to the Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces, and received an answer, the copy of which is herewith enclosed for your inspection. States his ability to furnish all the facts respecting the revolt and insurrection in Jaloun, as soon as his Honor the Lieutenant-Governor shall call on him for a report, thinking that Government has little occasion at present to require it. He avoids from entering into a detailed account, and contents himself with a concise narrative as follows:—

"Subsequent to the insurrection at Jhansi, the men attached to the Customs Department assaulted the patrols, demanding their pay. On my interfering to prevent them, they prepared for resistance, and threatened to revenge themselves on me as well as the patrols, and to raise the Mahomedan flag. The servants attached to the Criminal Court and to the Tehseel Office had also fallen from their allegiance to the British Government, which induced me not to take any forcible measure against them. They collected together, and were about to set fire to my bungalow in open daylight, but I was prepared to oppose them with armed burkundazes, which put a stop to their proceeding. The Patrol Officers of my district narrowly escaped to Agra. On the 14th and 15th of June (last), Lieutenant Browne, the Deputy Commissioner, and his Covenanted Assistant, accompanied by a company of sepoys of the Gwalior Contingent, passed through my district on their way to Gwalior. I waited on them during the day, and found the sepoys who were with them in a mutinous state, and much annoyed at the recent occurrence at Jhansi (as having been unable to join with the mutineers at Jhansi). I could not give a whole account of the insurrection to the aforesaid officers, as they were surrounded by the sepoys, in whose presence I did not think it advisable to reveal the whole matter. The aforesaid officers sent a roobkaree and two letters to the Kamdars of Gwalior, directing them to afford me every assistance, and ordered me not to leave the place. They proceeded to Agra via Etawah. Subsequent to this the rebels of Jhansi visited Jaloun, committed depredations on Orai, seized Mr. G. Passanah, set fire to the records and bungalow, and killed one or two gentlemen. The Kuchna, a tribe, had given it out that the men belonging to various regiments had informed them of the existence of the British Courts, records, bungalows, thannahs, and
Tehseelee Offices at Lea(?), and expressed their intention of proceeding to plunder them. In the night time they set fire to the Magistrate’s Office, plundered the Tehseele Office, and pulled down the bungalows. On the 23rd of June, one Rao Luchmun Rao Raja Ram came out as Subadar from Gwalior, but without any troops, and entertained the Kuchnahas, and ordered me to hold the Criminal Court, but made no promise of any remuneration. The people of the place were in the habit of coming about me, with the evil intention of attacking me. This Soubah’s coming out to Jaloun proved to be beneficial for me, so that I was able to remain at my post at Luhur up to the 3rd of June; but neither nor the Soubah could take any proper measure to restore the country to order, owing to general insurrection, as I had insisted in upholding the British supremacy, and always told the people that the rebels would be punished on the arrival of the British troops in a short time. I was considered by them in the light of an enemy. In the month of October, when the mutineers set out for Cawnpoor, they determined to lay hold of me, consequently I was obliged to fly towards Gwalior with my family. The Soubah was also obliged to abscond. The mutineers and Kuchnahas issued a notification, promising a reward for my apprehension; but I had the good luck to escape in safety. Now I am at Gwalior. If Government be pleased to send me any order, it will safely reach me through the Cotwall of Old Gwalior. The petitioner further expresses his readiness to go to any place to which Government my think fit to send me. Further, states his willingness to furnish Government with different accounts of the acts of the insurgents in pillaging the villages, and plundering on the roads, at various times assaulting him, and in hoisting the Mahomedan flag, whenever they may call on him for a report. Hoping for a reply.  

(True copy.)

(Sd.) A. H. TERNAN,
Deputy Commissioner of Jaloun.

Dated Cawnpoor, 27th March 1858.

From—G. PASSANAH, Esq., Deputy Collector and Deputy Magistrate, Jaloun,
To—MAJOR R. R. W. ELLIS, Political Agent for Bundelkund.

I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 93, dated 16th instant, forwarding copy of a vernacular roobkaree from the Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, and of a petition from the Moorabtar of Kesho Rao, Jaghireedar of Goorsurai, and requesting information regarding the conduct of the Jaghireedar during the insurrection.

2. To enable the Governor-General to judge of the conduct of Kesho Rao, I shall narrate the circumstances under which he took possession of the Jaloun district, and his subsequent proceedings.

3. When the troops at Jhansi mutinied at the commencement of the month of June last, Mr. S. Thornton, Deputy Magistrate of Mow Baneepoor, took refuge in the fort at Goorsurai, whence he wrote me a letter, saying that the Chief of Goorsurai was willing to afford assistance in preserving order in the Jaloun district, if his aid would be acceptable. This letter I showed to Lieutenant Browne, Deputy Commissioner of Jaloun, who immediately addressed a letter to the Jaghireedar, requesting his aid.

4. On the 10th of June, two sons of the Jaghireedar arrived at Jaloun, with a force of several hundred men and a few guns. Their passing within a few miles of Orai, without communicating with the District authorities, looked suspicious, but Lieutenant Browne marched the same day to Jaloun, and the Jaghireedar’s sons having assured him of their good intentions, Lieutenant Browne addressed a letter, requesting the Jaghireedar to afford every assistance in preserving order in the district.

5. The next day perwannahs were addressed in the name of the Jaghireedar, or one of his sons, to the different Tehseeelars, stating that the management of the district was entrusted to him, and that in future they should send
their reports to him. Lieutenant Browne having marched from Jaloun, the Tehseldar of that pergunnah referred to him for orders. The order passed on the Tehseldar's urzee was to the effect that the Jaghiredar was not authorized to control the district, and that in his (Lieutenant Browne's) absence, all the officers of the district should act under my orders, and that a letter to that effect be addressed to the Jaghiredar. The Tehseldar's urzee was sent for my information by Lieutenant Browne, who also stated that some words had been interpolated in his Oordoo letter to the Jaghiredar.

6. As I remained at Orai, the Jaghiredar's younger son, Seetaram Nunha, came to me on the 13th June. The mutineers were advancing from Jhansi, and he said he would endeavour to come to some terms with them, to induce them to spare the records and buildings.

7. When the advance-guard of the mutineers, consisting of six or eight sowars, arrived at Orai, I and Mr. Griffiths, Deputy Collector, left that station, on the night of the 15th, and passed through Jaloun, where Sheo Ram Tantea, the Rao's eldest son, met me, and spoke very fairly; but the next day I heard that he expelled the Tehseldarce establishment, and took possession of the Jaloun fort, and assumed entire authority in the district.

8. Having escaped the Jhansi mutineers, I was on the road to Gwalior, but on the 17th June unfortunately fell in with a company of the 53rd Regiment Native Infantry coming from that side, who plundered our property and made us prisoners. The next day the mutineers marched with us to Jaloun, where they were received with great cordiality by Sheo Ram Tantea, the Jaghiredar's eldest son.

9. As the mutineers declared that, with the exception of cash, they would return the rest of our property on payment of Rupees 2,000, I entreated Sheo Ram Tantea to advance the money, and make arrangements with the mutineers for our release, as they consisted of only one company, and he had a large force under his command; but he refused to do so, though he made over about Rupees 1,400 of Government money, which was in the Tehseldarce Treasury, to them, and bought our horses, guns, &c., for Rupees 1,200 from them.

10. From Jaloun the mutineers brought us on to Orai; luckily for us, the blood-thirsty party from Jhansi had passed through, and we were released on the 21st June, when our captors started for Cawnpore. It was then about 2 A.M., and we intended to proceed southward; but having to pass by a guard of Seebundees in the service of the Goorsurai Jaghiredar, we were intercepted by them, and by order of the headmen, detained in the serai under a guard of about 50 men. That same day another party of mutineers, consisting of four companies of the Gwalior Contingent, and some sowars of the 14th Irregular Cavalry, arrived at Orai, and we were made over to them by the Jaghiredar's people. Some of the sowars who first came into the serai levelled their carbines at me and Mr. Griffiths, but were restrained by others, who proposed taking us to their Jemadar. This man happened to be of a mild disposition; he spoke to us kindly, and persuaded the rest, that having spared their own officers, they should not take their lives after we had been released by another party.

11. After we had been again set free we remained at Orai, not knowing where to go, and having no means of travelling. Some days after Kesoo Rao, who had arrived at Jaloun, sent me a kind letter and some money; but though he appointed a Mookhtar to see me daily, he would not give a guard for our protection.

12. It was generally known that the Jaghiredar intended placing one of his sons on the guddde as Raja of Jaloun, but was afraid of the opposition of Tae Baoo, whose pretensions were favored by a strong party of the Jaloun Fundits. He however commenced collecting the revenue, and levying contributions from all monied men by means of duress and intimidation. He established a mint at Jaloun, employed his own officers, and gave villages in
jaghiere to a number of his supporters, chiefly Pundits, who enjoyed pension from Government.

13. We were left unmolested for above three weeks, but on the 14th July heard from several persons that a few mutineers had put up at the serai, who, having heard of our living at Orai, talked of attacking and murdering us. Next morning these men, who appeared to be Golundazes, six in number, accompanied by two men in the Jaghiredar's service, named Shaadut Khan and Meea Khan, came to the door of the house we were living in, and threatened to kill us. The doors however were secured, and we were well armed. The two men above named and a few others were exciting the mutineers to force the door, or set fire to the house; but a number of people gathered round, who were well disposed towards us. We had sent to the Thannadar a Pundit appointed by the Jaghiredar for assistance, but received none from him, or any other of the Jaghiredar's men, though some two or three hundred were present in the town. The mutineers kept threatening us for four hours, till our friends, seeing they could not be persuaded by entreaties, made a rush at them, brandishing their lattices and pelting them stones, and so drove them away.

14. On the 17th July I received a letter from Kesho Rao, saying that a force of the Wauhas was about to proceed from Cawnpoor to Jhansi, and advising me to go to some village off the high road; but on the same day a party of about 300 men, in the employ of his son, Sheo Ram Tanteea, who was at Calpee, came and seized me, Mr. Griffiths and my family, saying that they were servants of the Peshwa, and had been sent by him to take us to Cawnpoor. Our whole party, including my wife, sister, five children, and two nephews, was placed upon two common carts, and marched off in the night towards Calpee, to be sent on to the miscreant Nana, at whose hands we expected no mercy.

15. At Attah, half-way to Calpee, which we reached in the morning, we met Sheo Ram Tanteea, who was going to Orai. We begged hard not to be sent to the Nana, but he said he must obey the Nana's orders; so we were sent on in the afternoon, and reached Calpee in the evening.

16. Sheo Ram went on to Orai; the Thannadar there had got the names of seven of the men, who were foremost in beating off the mutineers who came to murder us. Sheo Ram ordered them to be apprehended, but only one, a cloth merchant, named Gunesh, was found, the rest having hid themselves on being threatened by the Thannadar that they would be sent to Jaloun for having taken our part and assaulted the mutineers. Gunesh was fined Rupees 60 for the imputed offence.

17. At Calpee we were confined in the serai, and numerous guards placed over us, and at the gate, to prevent any one communicating with us. Sheo Ram returned from Orai in the night, and sent orders to the Subadar, commanding the escort, to take us on next morning to Cawnpoor. This man, who appeared well disposed towards us, told us that he would not proceed until he got a tent and more suitable conveyance for us; he even said that if he could possibly do so, he would take us to a place of safety.

18. Our march from Calpee being thus put off, on the 19th July intelligence was received during the day of the Nana's defeat and flight from Cawnpoor. This brought about a total alteration in the conduct of Sheo Ram Tanteea, who called upon us, professing great friendship, but still acting with duplicity, concealed the defeat of the Nana, but said that he had persuaded the Nana's emissary to leave us for the present under his charge. Kesho Rao also came over from Jaloun, and spoke very kindly to us. We were thus, by an unexpected turn of destiny, saved from a frightful doom.

19. While we remained prisoners in custody of Sheo Ram, the mutineers of the 42nd Native Infantry arrived from Saugor on the 22nd July. They made enquiries about us, and we had great fear of falling into their hands, but Sheo Ram got us into the fort and protected us. The mutineers
having remained at Calpee, Sheo Ram provided us with suitable conveyance, and sent us off to a village fifteen miles from Calpee.

20. While in the Calpee fort, though strictly guarded, and prevented from writing, we managed to send off a man to give intelligence regarding us to General Neill at Cawnpoor. The General, on hearing of our circumstances, very kindly sent a letter to Sheo Ram, desiring him to send us with a suitable escort to Cawnpoor, and also sent a letter to us, after which I kept up a correspondence with him.

21. For a long time the Jaghiredar objected to send us off, alleging the dangers of the road; but on receiving several peremptory letters from General Neill, he agreed to let us go, and on the 11th August, we left the village of Choorkee, and arrived at Calpee. Sheo Ram detained us, saying there were parties of mutineers at Bara and Chuchendee on the road side; but three of our emissaries having returned from Cawnpoor on the 11th, 13th, and 14th, and informed us to the contrary, we resolved on starting on the 16th. Sheo Ram appeared to assent, but on the evening of the 15th sent word to us that the British forces at Cawnpoor and Allahabad were annihilated, and the Nana’s rule again established; that he could not attend to the General’s requisitions, and acknowledged no other authority but that of the Nana, and that, instead of going to Cawnpoor, we must go back to Choorkee.

22. Some emissary of the Nana had arrived, and magnified the strength of that miscreant’s adherents, and Sheo Ram gave too willing an ear to his representations.

23. Soon after our return to Choorkee we heard that the mutineers and rebels, who had assembled at Bithoor, were beaten and dispersed. General Neill again wrote peremptorily to Kesho Rao not to delay sending us over, and he also received your letter regarding us. Kesho Rao then made up his mind to let us go, furnished us with money and conveyances, and restored two horses belonging to myself and Mr. Griffiths, which he had purchased from the mutineers, and without further hinderance, we started from Choorkee on the 31st August last, and, after halting two days at Calpee, came on to Cawnpoor.

24. Kesho Rao was evidently playing a double game; his object was to secure the Raj of Jaloun, by adhering to the interest of the diabolical Nana, but at the same time not to compromise himself with our Government, having a latent fear that British rule might again be paramount, in which case the assistance he rendered my party would tell in his favor. The conduct however of his eldest son, Sheo Ram Tanteea, to whom Calpee has been assigned, was most flagrant.

25. While pretending that the guards, who had us in custody, were servants of the Nana, Sheo Ram had the impudence to present Cor mine and Mr. Griffith’s signature a document, purporting that he had rescued us from the Nana’s hands, and also from the mutineers. Being completely in his power, we were constrained to sign the paper, as it would have been impolitic at the time to let him see that his villainy was detected.


No. 368A, dated Jabulpoor, 10th August 1858.
From—Major W. C. Erskine, Commissioner of the Jabulpoor Division.
To—William Muir, Esq., Secretary to Government, North-Western Provinces.

With reference to your Circular Order No. 212, dated 30th April 1858, requiring an historical narrative of the events attending the mutinies and rebellion in 1857-58 in my division, I have the honor to report as follows:
2. Previous however to entering on the particulars, it will be proper for me to state that, when the mutinies broke out, I was Commissioner and Agent to the Lieutenant-Governor in the Division, then known as the Saugor and Nerudda Territories, consisting of twelve districts, as per margin, with an area of 42,600 square miles, and yielding a land revenue of upwards of 46,00,000 Company's Rupees; but, as the whole of these districts were under survey and settlement, the work was too much for one Commissioner, and at my own request, just before the Jhansi mutiny broke out, the three first named districts, though not actually separated from my division (as they have since been by Government Orders No. 493 of the 10th May 1858), were placed under the supervision of Captain Skene, then Superintendent of Jhansie, to whom nearly the full powers of a Commissioner were given; and as the 4th district was, by General Order Governor-General, No. 37, dated 15th February 1858, transferred to the Political Department, I shall confine myself as much as possible to events which occurred in my present division, consisting of eight districts, with an area of about 33,000 square miles, leaving the Commissioner of the new or Jhansi Division to report on the districts transferred to him.

3. It will be proper here to state what troops garrisoned the headquarters stations of my division when the mutinies broke out at Meerut, and I therefore give them for easy reference in the margin.

4. Till the mutinies at Delhi and Meerut occurred in May 1857, no country could have been in more profound peace than my division (now officially styled the Jubbulpore Division) was. The whole was under survey, and everything was progressing for a new and light settlement of the land revenue, which was promised to the people.

5. It is true that, so far back as January 1857, small wheaten cakes (chupatties) were passed in a most mysterious manner from village to village in most of the district, and although all took it as a signal that something was coming, nobody in the division, I believe, knew what it portended, or whence it came, and it appeared to have been little thought about, except that in the money-market of Saugor it is said to have had some slight effect in bill transactions. I reported the matter to Government at the time, but even now it is a matter of doubt if the signal was understood by any one, or if it referred to the coming rebellion, though such is now the general opinion.

April 1857.

6. In April there was some excitement amongst the Bengal troops regarding the introduction of the new cartridges at certain stations in the Presidency; but none of these cartridges reached my division, and the agitation was confined to the soldiers, to whom many false reports came by dak, that the Government had a design on their religion, &c., and there can be no doubt emissaries were going about and letters passing between regiments, boding no good.

May 1857.

7. Target practice went on at Jubbulpore as usual, even to the end of May, long after the Delhi mutiny; and though some fancied they saw a change in the manner of the Natives, so far back as the middle of May, I cannot say I did, nor do I believe such existed.

8. Every care was taken by the military authorities to disabuse the soldiers of the stories they heard, and it was early in May that stories were spread in Saugor, Dumoh, and Jubbulpore to the effect that the ghee, atta, and
sugar had been adulterated by order of Government with pig’s and cow’s blood and bone-dust, in order that all Hindoos and Mahomedans partaking of them might lose their caste or religion.

9. I issued a proclamation explaining that all reports of the kind were false, and I recommended Commanding Officers to have their men’s provisions purchased and examined by Committees of Native Officers, and the atta to be ground in their presence. This had a good effect, and two or three persons having been caught spreading false reports were well flogged.

10. On the 17th of May news reached Saugor and Jubbulpore, and the next day Dumoh, of the distressing mutinies, &c., at Meerut and Delhi. It did not appear to create any great excitement amongst the Natives, but a good deal of horror at the cruelties was expressed by the sepoys and townspeople, and much alarm was, felt by many of the Europeans at all the stations. Nothing however occurred and the target practice of the 52nd went on as usual.

11. At 2 in the morning of the 19th I was awoke by Mr. Sleeman, Superintendent of the Thuggee Department, who informed me that the 52nd would rise at daybreak and murder every European. He had heard this from Captain Vanrenen, Revenue Surveyor, to whom it had been told by a Mr. Campbell, one of his Unconvenered Assistants. I hastily dressed and went over to Major Sleeman’s, where I was told all the European residents of the Station of Jubbulpore were assembling ready for flight; but disbelieving the story, I counselled delay till some sign, at any rate, should be shown by the sepoys, who were perfectly quiet in their lines. The officers of the regiment brought their wives and children to Mr. Sleeman’s, and then went to their lines. Target practice took place as usual, and by sunrise most of us were back in our houses.

12. As the sepoys expressed extreme annoyance at the report, the Native Officers begged an enquiry might be made, and it was agreed that it should be conducted at my house. It was so on the 20th, and it was proved that there was not the slightest foundation for the report.

13. On the 22nd May, there was a good deal of excitement at Jubbulpore, and it was considered advisable that some place of rendezvous should be appointed, and a public building be selected as shelter in case of danger, and the Thugs’ Jail was talked of, and some arrangements for loopholing it and provisioning were made; but it was found too hot and too confined, and the idea was abandoned.

June 1857.

14. At all the stations everything was pretty quiet till the 5th of June, when there was another panic at Jubbulpore amongst some of the Europeans in consequence of Mr. Campbell again spreading a false alarm. I ordered this person out of the station, and recommended more caution to others.

15. Captain Pinkney, the Deputy Commissioner, and I resolved, that whatever occurred we would not leave our posts, but all ladies and children were recommended to leave the station and go to Calcutta or Nagpoor.

16. I reported everything to Government, North-Western Provinces, and in reply received a note from Mr. Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor, dated the 30th May 1857, of which the Appendix marked A is an extract.

17. On the 8th of June news of the mutiny at Jhansie reached Saugor, and the next day I received a note by express from Captain F. Gordon, Deputy Commissioner of Jhansie, dated the 7th, written from the fort but cheerfully, and hoping soon to be released. Poor fellow, he fought bravely, but was shot dead by a sepoy, and the next day the whole of the Europeans and Eurasians (in all seventy-six, see Appendix marked B) were most foully and treacherously murdered by the order of the Rani.
18. This sad news, coupled with the intelligence that the Raja of Banpoor had assembled men at Lullutpoor, caused much excitement amongst the sepoys and Thakoors near Saugor, and at Jubbulpoor the sepoys were very uneasy, not apparently inclined to mutiny, but expressing a fear of being disarmed; and I therefore applied to Nagpoor for troops to come towards this as far as Seonee, but not to advance on Jubbulpoor without my order.

19. After some delay a force was ordered up, but in consequence of the discovery of a plot at Nagpoor, the troops were recalled from the first march (13th June).

20. The two companies of the 31st Native Infantry on command at Dumoh were relieved about this time by two of the 42nd, and the latter were said of be disaffected. Both the sepoys at Jubbulpoor and Dumoh expressed great fears of being disarmed, and stated they were sure Europeans were marching up for the purpose. They were told to send out men and see if such was the case, which they did, and after a time the 52nd men begged that Europeans might be sent to aid them in quelling any disturbances that might occur.

21. The Deputy Commissioner of Chundeyree had reported that the Conduct of Raja of Banpoor at Lullutpoor.

22. On the 13th June, one company of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, Troops march towards Lullutpoor.

23. On the 14th some of the men of the 42nd Regiment reported that four of their sepoys had endeavoured to prevent the detachment proceeding on its march. First sign of mutiny in the 42nd Regiment.

24. The excitement was so great amongst the men of the regiments that the Deputy Commissioner, very wisely, quietly sent the prisoners under a Police guard" of Chundeyree to Sahgurh, whose principality borders on the north and west of these two districts, was raising soldiers and evidently making preparations for war.

25. Brigadier Sage posted mounted troopers of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry round the cantonment of Saugor, and made them patrol night and day to prevent the sepoys attempting a rescue.

26. The detachment intended for Lullutpoor reached Malthone, and more than once the European officers who accompanied it were informed that the sepoys were counselling their murder.

27. On or about the 15th, whilst Lieutenant Miller, Adjutant of the Attempt on the life of the Adjutant of 52nd Native Infantry. 52nd Regiment, was inspecting the guards of his regiment at Jubbulpoor, a sepoy in the ranks brought his musket down to the charge and made a thrust at the Adjutant, who fortunately escaped with a slight scratch. The Subadar-Major, who was standing in the rear, threw his arms round the man, and after a severe struggle, in which the Subadar-Major was wounded and risked his own life, the rascal was secured and confined in the guard-room. There was some show of assistance towards the Adjutant, but more of sympathy with the prisoner. The Subadar-Major was rewarded by Government.
28. The sepoy was said to be mad, and, being pronounced so by the medical officer of the regiment, he was sent, under a guard of his own corps, to the Lunatic Asylum at Benares, which he safely reached, and where, I believe, he was pronounced *not mad*, for he was hanged at Benares!

29. There can be no doubt that, had this wretch succeeded in his object of killing the Adjutant, the greater part of the regiment, if not all, would have joined in a massacre of the Europeans. It was one of those many extraordinary escapes that have occurred in this mutiny.

30. No attempt was made to release the prisoner, and the regiment remained quiet.

31. About the middle of this month plundering commenced in the Saugor district.

32. The Deputy Commissioner of Mundlah, Captain Waddington, who had for several years been Adjutant of the 52nd Regiment, was said to have great influence with the regiment, and as the Lieutenant-Governor had permitted Captain Waddington to reside at Jubbulpoor, during the hot weather and rains, there being no house in Mundlah, I called him in.

33. On the 16th the sad intelligence of the massacre at Jhansie, and on the 18th of the mutiny at Lullutpoor, reached Saugor and Jubbulpoor, and news of the mutiny at Banda came at the same time. The Banpoor Raja too had seized the district of Chundeyree, and confined the European officers.

34. Captain F. Pinkney, my Deputy Commissioner at Jubbulpoor, at once volunteered to go to Saugor and overtake Major Gauussen's Detachment, proceed with it, and endeavor to restore order in Chundeyree and Jhansie. To this I consented, the country between Jubbulpoor and Saugor being then quiet.

35. Rumours of disaffection amongst the Native Chiefs in and around my division became rife, and I therefore lost no time in issuing orders to all my District Officers to raise extra Police, to watch all the Ghats on the Nerbudda, and to withdraw the ferry boats to the south bank, except at Mundlah and Jubbulpoor, where they were to be kept on the north bank guarded.

36. I called on all the Native Chiefs and Jaghireddars within my division to be loyal, and to raise small Contingents, and one of them near Jubbulpoor, Rao Unrood Sing of Kymoree, offered to furnish, and gave men to escort Captain Pinkney.

37. This was done at once, and many Mahajuns and Malgozars were called on to be faithful, and, if need be, to assist the Government with their Yeomanry and Contingents.

38. The measure proved of much advantage, for though the temporary extra Police and Contingents were not much to be depended on, and some even joining the rebels, hundreds of armed men were thus taken into Government pay, who otherwise would have swelled the ranks of the enemy.

39. I increased the pay of the sowars, and ordered others to be raised. This also proved a very successful measure. Many of these men have since done excellent service, and all have now been transferred to the Military Police Corps.

40. Major Gauussen's Detachment arrived at Malthone on the 18th, and finding the passes to the north of it were held by large bodies of the Raja of Banpoor's rebel troops, it was therefore halted to protect the northern frontier of the Saugor district, and keep the Banpoor Raja in check.

41. For this he did not consider his force strong enough; consequently Brigadier Sage ordered it to be strengthened by 250 men of the 31st Native Infantry, 100 of the 42nd, and fifty more sowars of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry from Saugor.
42. On this party joining Major Gaussen on the 23rd June, he proceeded to attack an old and small but strong fort, called Bala Behut, and consult the other officers, and let the prisoners go.

43. Major Gaussen apprehended a messenger of the Banpoor Raja's sepoy, with a letter addressed to the detachment, telling them that the Boondelahs (of which tribe of Rajputs the Raja is the head) were their friends, that the sepoy had acted well in resisting our interference with their religion, and that as Government had treated the Thakoors very badly, they would assist the sepoy.

44. Major Gaussen assembled the Native officers, and consulted them as to what answer should be sent. They at once wrote that they were faithful to their salt, and if the Raja sent any more ladies and officers, Banpoor should answer that they were faithful to their religion, and that as Government had treated the Thakoors very badly, they would assist the sepoy.

45. On the 20th, Captain Clerk, Deputy Commissioner of Seonee, whom I had summoned to relieve Captain Pinkney, and had relieved by sending Lieutenant Thomson, Assistant Commissioner, arrived and took charge of the district of Jubbulpore, and the next day Captain Pinkney started with his little Guard of Aheer Thakoors for Saugor, and speedily reached it in safety; but on the 25th Major Gaussen reported that some of the men of the 31st and 42nd Native Infantry at Malthone had broken into open mutiny, insisting that the Boondelah prisoners should be brought into their camp from the custody of the police, and the conduct of the detachment was so bad, he felt himself obliged to comply.

46. On the arrival of the prisoners in camp, the mutineers had surrounded Major Gaussen, and with much gesticulation and vociferation demanded their release from restraint, as they had promised them their lives when they took them prisoners. Major Gaussen consulted the other officers, and let the prisoners go.

47. The good news now reached us of the Lullutpoor officers and ladies being alive, but they were at first confined by the Banpoor Raja, who shortly after sent them to Tehree, which place they reached after many trials and narrow escapes, through the excellent conduct of Mohamed Ali Khan, Mookhtar of the Raja of Banpore. At Tehree they were kindly treated through the influence of the young Raja of Oorcha's tutor, and again befriended by Mohamed Ali Khan and his servant, both of whom have since been most handsomely rewarded by Government. I may here mention, that the Tehree authorities, at the request of the officers, sent them towards Saugor, and on the way they were seized and imprisoned by the rebel Raja of Shahgurh, who, after keeping them in a most wretched condition for three months, allowing them merely one anna a day each for food, sent them in to Saugor, when I threatened to attack him with the Kamptee Movable Column in September 1857.

48. Dacoities now were of daily occurrence in the northern part of the Saugor district, owing to the incursions of the dreaded Boondelahs, who came from Chundereey and Shahgurh, and who were soon joined by the Narhut and other Thakoors in the Saugor district. The first took place on the 16th June.

49. On the 27th of June, Brigadier Sage, considering the conduct of the sepoy at Malthone highly mutinous, and suspecting the troops in the Saugor Cantonment, consulted with the senior officers and heads of departments as to what should
be done. It was resolved to take possession of the old fort in the town of Saugor, which was used as an arsenal and magazine, and garrisoned by sepoys from the cantonment.

50. It was of great consequence that this fort should not fall into the hands of the Native soldiery or the rebels, for independent of its large stores, it was the only safe place for the European and Christian residents, in the event of the mutiny or the rebellion spreading.

51. Immediate steps were therefore taken to lay in supplies and prepare accommodation for the European families. The bulk of the treasure was taken from the Deputy Commissioner's Kucherry, and the whole of the powder from the expense magazine, and lodged in the fort. The same afternoon the Sepoy Guard in the fort was, without previous notice, relieved by twenty European artillerymen. Notice was also given at once to the European families, that preparation had been made in the fort for their reception, and nearly all took advantage of it that night.

52. Orders were then issued for the whole of the troops at Saugor to be held in readiness to march to Malthone. This was a ruse.

53. On the 29th June, while the weekly guards were being relieved at Saugor, the whole of the rest of the European artillerymen with their guns were quietly marched into the fort, where they were at once joined by all the European officers and Christian residents, who had been previously warned to proceed there with a portion of their property.

54. This being done, the Brigadier directed the Native officers of the 31st and 42nd Native Infantry, and of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, to attend on him in the fort; and on their doing so, he informed them that, notwithstanding their promises of fidelity, there had been a mutiny of a portion of each corps, that if they wished to prove themselves true they must at once give up the bad men, and if they did not do so, he would not trust the European officers to remain longer with traitors.

55. They expressed great regret for what had happened, and they all volunteered to send good men to Malthone to bring in the bad characters.

56. This was agreed to, and the men selected by their Native officers marched that evening.

57. These proceedings soon became known at Dumoh and Jubbulpoor, the only two other stations in my division where there were Bengal troops, amongst whom, as well as amongst the majority of the Christian residents, there was much excitement, but the sepoys remained quiet, doing their duty as usual.

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58. On the morning of the 1st July the portion of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry remaining at Saugor, with the exception of some of the Native officers, and about fifty sepoys, broke out into open mutiny in the cantonments, went to the Murjid, and sharpened their swords.

59. At the same time Sheikh Ramzan, the senior Subadar present with the 42nd Native Infantry, raised the Mahomedan flag, and called for followers by beat of drum. He was joined by the whole of the 42nd, who remained in the station, by a few of the 31st, and by all the mutineers of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, and the same day these mutinous troops and the bad characters of the Sudder Bazar and camp followers, plundered and injured the property of most of the officers' houses in cantonments, but did not set fire to them.

60. They also took away about Rupees 9,500 worth of copper and small silver coin, which could not be removed from the Treasury for want of time and carriage.
61. On the 2nd July a portion of the mutineers went towards Dumoh, with a view of inciting the two Companies of the 42nd there to join them and carry off the Dumoh treasure, amounting to about Rupees 1,50,000.

62. In Hoshungabad, which is my most westerly district, a plot was discovered to rob the Tehseel-Treasury of Hurda, and the Nuccebs in charge of it were most mutinous; but owing to the excellent, judicious, and brave conduct of the Deputy Magistrate (Muzheer Jumeel) there, it was saved, and (about Rupees 30,000) sent into the Sudder Treasury, under a strong Guard of Police, who remained faithful.

63. The Saugor mutiny created great alarm at Dumoh. The bankers hid their wealth on hearing of it, on the 2nd of July, and the Deputy Commissioner resolved to lodge the treasure in the jail fort.

64. But to proceed with the Saugor mutiny. The men sent out by the Deputy Commissioner of Dumoh to join them and carry off the mutineers of the 3rd Irregulars & 42nd Native Infantry, assumed the command in cantonments, and the title of "General." This the Brigadier sanctioned, but would not allow their European officers to accompany them: however, a strong party of the mutineers, who had just been armed with muskets, were sent out by the Deputy Commissioner, Major Western, to make a demonstration in favor of the 31st, which had been the most mutinous, and it returned to Saugor. Some of the men of this Company expressed extreme contrition for their conduct, but about forty-five at once joined the mutineers of the 3rd Irregulars and 42nd Native Infantry.

65. The men sent out by the 42nd Native Infantry on the same errand, (viz., to bring in the bad men) were overtaken by some of the mutineers of that regiment and 3rd Irregulars and joined them, except six, who were at once put to death by the mutineers.

66. From the 1st of July, Sheikh Ramzan, Subadar, 42nd Native Infantry, assumed the command in cantonments, and the title of "General."

67. The mutineers seized the large saluting gun on the artillery hill, which had been left there when the rest of the guns were taken into the fort, and brought it down to the quarter guard of the 42nd, which the mutineers made their head-quarters.

68. The 31st Native Infantry (except the forty-five men alluded to in paragraph 64) kept aloof from the mutineers. The Native officers of this Corps daily went to the station, and men at Malthone resolved to place his treasure in the jail fort, and by Lieutenant Hamilton, the Assistant Commissioner.

69. The 31st Native Infantry now requested permission to attack the mutineers. This the Brigadier sanctioned, but would not allow their European officers to accompany them: however, a strong party of the Customs Chupras, who had just been armed with muskets, were sent out by the Deputy Commissioner, Major Western, to make a demonstration in favor of the 31st, and were accompanied by the officers of the Customs Department, and by Captain Pinkney, who had not been able to proceed beyond Saugor in consequence of the mutiny at Malthone, and by Lieutenant Hamilton, the Assistant Commissioner.

70. The mutineers seeing they were about to be attacked, fired a round shot into the 31st from the saluting gun, and both regiments now kept up a desultory fire with their muskets nearly the whole day, but little damage was done on either side.

71. The next morning the mutineers, thinking the 31st would be aided by the artillery of the fort, left the station for the north in great haste, taking with them some conveyances belonging to the officers, but soon abandoned them on the road.

72. The Deputy Commissioner of Dumoh, as I stated in paragraph 63, resolved on placing his treasure in the jail fort when he heard of the mutiny of the 42nd. The detachment of that corps at Dumoh were greatly excited, and plundering by
the Bundelas from Shagurh had just commenced. The Deputy Commissi-
one, Lieutenant Nembhard, on the 3rd of July, on receiving an express
from Saugor of the detachment of mutineers being sent to Dumoh for his
treasure, assembled the European Officers (a Lieutenant and Ensign of the
42nd) and Native Officers, and after consulting them, it was resolved that
they and the detachment should all enter the jail fort and defend it against
the mutineers.

73. In the afternoon a Havildar of the detachment, who was taking
some money into Saugor, returned and stated that he had come on the muti-
neers, and that they would be at Dumoh early the next morning. The trea-
sure was at once sent into the Jail; the detachment are described to have
been in a very excited and mutinous state, and once, during the evening,
rushed to their arms; but, some time after, were quieted by Lieutenant Holt.

74. The Jemadar of the detachment, and one or two loyal Non-com-
misioned officers, the same evening warned the European officers that their
men were not to be depended on, and that certain danger to the European
officers would follow, should they enter the Jail; indeed, the officers had
each and all convincing proofs, that if they entered the Jail that night, they
would not leave it alive: such was their impression at any rate. And seeing
what had occurred at Saugor in this regiment, and elsewhere in so many
Corps, it is not surprising that, after consulting together, they should have
left the station that night, with nothing but the clothes on their backs, and at
the time most people thought that they were right, and they must not be
judged by after events.

75. The officers and Mrs. Holt rode direct to Nursingpoor (about seventy
miles), where, after much suffering from wet and hunger on the road, they
safely arrived.

76. On the morning of the 4th the mutineers arrived at Dumoh from
Saugor. The infantry portion went to the Jail and demanded the treasure,
which was refused by the Subadar-Major and Runjeet Sing Havildar. The
cavalry portion are said to have searched for the officers, with the intention
of murdering them; but being unsuccessful, and finding the Subadar-Major
and Runjeet Sing resolute in not joining them, and in not giving up the
treasure, the whole left the station and plundered some villages, but did no
harm in Dumoh.

77. It is impossible for me to say what the real intention of the Dumoh
detachment was. Some think that they wished to keep the treasure for them-
selves, and not to share it with their brethren. The Subadar-Major was a
Mahomedan, and his family were at Saugor in the bands of the Brigadier, who
arrested them; but he was old, and is said not to have had much influence
with his men. But Runjeet Sing was not only a fine gallant soldier, but had
great influence, and to his excellent management, pluck in every way, and
loyalty, I ascribe the safety of the treasure, which was eventually made over
to Captain Pinkney, as will be seen hereafter.

78. Looking back at the whole matter a year after its occurrence, it is
my impression that though many of the men in this detachment were prob-
lably bad, yet the body were not. The whole have remained faithful to the
State up to this time, and I am happy to say that the old Subadar-Major and
the gallant Runjeet Sing have been promoted by the Government for their
good conduct.

79. It was the impression of every one at Jubbulpore that the 52nd
would be greatly guided by what their brethren at Saugor and Nagode did, and on their hearing
of the mutiny at Saugor, there was an unmistakable change for the worse in the conduct of some
of the men: indeed, about the 3rd of July, I think it was, three Companies took
their muskets out of the Bells of Arms, with no good intentions, but they were
pacified. Some of the neighbouring Thakoors or petty Chiefs too were said to be
about to rise and join the sepoys against us, and reports came from Saugor that the mutineers were going to take Jubbulpoor after Dumoh. All this being possible, and there being many ladies and Christian woman and children at Jubbulpore, it was proposed, on the morning of the 4th July, that all females and children should at once leave the station for Nursingpoor, and preparations were made accordingly; but seeing there was every chance of heavy rain shortly falling, and that the ladies and children would have much trouble on the road, which was heavy, and the Nerubudda to cross, and even if they safely reached Nursingpoor they would have but poor accommodation, and, perhaps, not adequate protection if the Madnabadda and Saugor mutineers, and must barricade ourselves and have a guard from the regiment! They apparently approved of this, and seemed pleased.

80. It was necessary policy also to appear to place confidence in the sepoys, for had they seen we distrusted them, they assuredly would not have allowed us to congregate, if they meant mischief. We therefore told the Native officers that we were afraid of an attack from the Boondelabs and Saugor mutineers, and must barricade ourselves and have a guard from the regiment! They apparently approved of this, and seemed pleased.

81. At 2 P.M. that day notice was sent round, and before 7 P.M. all the ladies, gentlemen, and children were assembled in my house. We sat down to dinner, forty-five adults, of whom ten were ladies, and there were also fifteen children. In the house there was no accommodation for the Sergeants and Uncovenanted members of the Service, but temporary arrangements were made for them in the verandahs, and, eventually, in tents and out-houses, conveniently near and within the intrenchments.

82. Pickets of sepoys were posted in the large compound, and the officers, Sergeants and Uncovenanted, took it by turns to stand sentry at night all round the house.

83. Doubtless, that night (which was a rainy one, and would have prevented the ladies travelling over the bad roads had the plan not been changed) was one of no small danger to the Europeans of Jubbulpoor, for a section of determined men might have shot us all from the large hall door as we sat at dinner: but, thanks be to God, all passed off quietly, and, as the day dawned, the next morning we had some thousands of workmen busily engaged in barricading doors, filling bags and boxes with sand, and piling them up in the open verandahs and on the top of the house (a large pukka flat-roofed one); others were bringing in supplies and stores of all kinds. Every officer was told off to some particular work; some worked hard with their own hands, others in superintending the fortifications, or stowing away, &c., supplies.

84. Two small old guns (dangerous to the gunners if fired!) were dug up and placed in position, and the ladies employed themselves in making powder bags.

85. In fact it was the most busy scene imaginable; but that night all sat down to dinner with some feeling of security: most of us with good appetites, and stout and thankful hearts.

86. For many days every one was busily engaged; the fortifications made rapid progress in strength and size. The Sepoy Guards were gradually reduced, and at last were dispensed with, and with a large stock of ammunition, muskets, and our fowling-pieces we felt secure from any attack, unless the enemy had guns. I enclose a photograph, marked C.*

* Omitted from the Appendices.
The Civil officers, Covenanted and Uncovenanted, generally spent the day in their Offices as usual, and the Civil Administration never flagged for a day; everything in that respect was carried on as usual. Some of the officers and ladies spent a few hours of the day in their own houses, and a portion of our garrison were allowed daily to take their rides or drives as usual; some gentlemen generally accompanying the ladies however with loaded revolvers. I append a list of the Europeans, marked D.

I had in the end of June been invested, by the Governor-General, with the powers of a Chief Commissioner; all communication having ceased with the North-West, and I therefore took measures on myself without reference to any other authority, and all my wishes were most cheerfully attended to by Colonel Jamieson.

In Nursingpoor all was quiet; but rebels were gradually closing in, and from the day the Deputy Commissioner of Dumoh left his district, all was anarchy there.

In Hoshungabad the Nemaour pargannah, which is on the right bank of the Nerubudda, and had been ceded by Scindia in 1844, was disturbed, and on the 3rd of July much alarm was created by sowars from Indore, bringing exaggerated accounts of the rising at Indore, to the effect that Holkar had rebelled and blown away the Resident and all the British officers from guns.

This news was sent to me by express by the Deputy Commissioner and Commanding Officer at Hoshungabad, and the latter informed me that, as the rebels from Indore were fast advancing on Hoshungabad, he could not, with a weak wing of Madras Native Infantry and two guns, resist the enemy, who had numerous guns; and therefore proposed that the other wing of his regiment (the 28th Madras Native Infantry) should join him from Nursingpoor; that the latter station and district should be abandoned, and that the whole of the troops in Hoshungabad, Nursingpoor, Baitool, Seonee and Jubbulpore should retire to Kamptee.

Seeing however that the intelligence was somewhat improbable, and Commissioner’s orders for troops, &c., to stand fast, a retreat on our part would be disgraceful, and would not only deliver up the fine valley of the Nerubudda to anarchy, but probably endanger the whole of Southern-Central India, and at any rate lose us all my districts and the northern part of Nagpoor, I took advantage of my new powers and ordered the troops at Nursingpoor, Baitool, Seonee, and Hoshungabad to stand fast, unless actually driven in; but to enable them to move against an enemy at a moment’s notice, I put all on full battle.

My order was attended to, and I need not say the news from Indore was false, though some of Holkar’s troops had murdered some of the Europeans; but on the false reports reaching Nagpoor, the Commissioner and the Brigadier at Kamptee took it on themselves to order all the Madras troops at Nursingpoor, Hoshungabad, Baitool, and Seonee to fall back on Kamptee, in the event of Holkar’s troops advancing against them.

I resisted such interference and reported the same to Government; but at first, when all the circumstances were not known to the Governor-General, the Nagpoor order, which fortunately was never carried out, was approved. However, on further explanation, my orders were supported, as will be seen by the Appendix marked E.

The result of my orders was, that we have never lost any of the five districts alluded to.
96. I recommended that both at Hoshungabad and Nursingpoor some building should be fortified and intrenchments be made, and this was done; and I ordered extra batta to be given to all Bengal troops in the Division, who might remain loyal.

97. Some few villages about this time were plundered in the Jubbulpoor Division, and with a view of stopping this, and also to weaken the corps at Jubbulpoor, I requested Colonel Jamieson to send detachments of the 52nd to the different Tehseelees, and to Kuttungee on the Herun river towards Dumoh, and he complied with my request.

98. Early in the month signs of rebellion in Mundlah were visible, by two Malgoozars refusing to pay revenue, and others saying that our Government must go, and later in the month four of the chief landholders talked treason. Two I summoned to Jubbulpoor, but they made pretences for not coming.

99. The Rajas of Banpoor and Shahgurh sent emissaries to nearly all the petty Chiefs in these territories, telling them to join in the general rebellion; but in Hoshungabad none joined. In Nursingpoor only two or three, in Jubbulpoor a few, in Mundlah many, in Saugor several, in Dumoh nearly all, in Seonee none, and in Baitool the chief Malgoozars, Shoodeen and Ramdeen, were discovered intriguing and making arrangements to raise the Gonds, but being detected in time, they were tried and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. Every possible precaution was taken by all the District Officers and myself in offering advice, and in raising extra police, &c.

100. On or about the 9th of July the Tehseeldarees and Thannahs of Korai and Beniska in Saugor were attacked, and taken possession of; the former by the Raja of Banpoor's troops, and the latter by those of the Shagurh Raja.

101. The Tehseeldar of Korai, Ahmud Buksh, and Peer Ali, a Tumandar of police, and most of the police, joined the rebels, and some of those at Benisaik did the same.

102. On the 9th a portion of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry, and some of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, were sent from Saugor to Major Gaussen on his return from Malthone. He arrived at Saugor on the 12th: the greater portion of the Native Officers and men of the 42nd and 3rd Irregular Cavalry, with Major Gaussen, had deserted; and as this officer retired, the Raja of Banpoor took possession of the northern portion of the district, and of course plundering became general.

103. The police at Hurda in Hoshungabad broke out into open mutiny, but the Deputy Magistrate, Muzheer Jumeel, kept a bold front, and they were unable to do much harm there, although they attempted to raise the Mahomedan standard; and seeing that they could not succeed, nine of them deserted, leaving their muskets. Six men were afterwards captured, and the rest have since been brought to trial. Some hanged, and others imprisoned for life.

104. In Seonee, a large commercial town in the Hoshungabad district, there was considerable alarm, when the false news of Holkar's rebellion arrived: but the Munsiff, Ully Hossein, who is an Assistant Magistrate, behaved admirably, and not only allayed the fears of the people, but kept the police to their allegiance.

105. The Deputy Commissioner of Hoshungabad, Lieutenant J. C. Wood, sent out Mr. J. L. Thornton, one of his Deputy Magistrates, to Shagpoor, a large town with a fort in the heart of that portion of his district, where the
Oobareedars or petty Rajas hold their jaghires. This officer had great influence with them and with the police, and soon put down dacoities, which had commenced.

106. On the 8th of July, Colonel Durand and his party arrived safely at Hoshungabad from Indore, and as Major Ludlow, the Chief Engineer of this Division, was one of the party, he laid out the necessary intrenchments at the Kucherry for the protection of the residents, in case of attack from Bhopal, Indore or elsewhere.

107. On the 13th, 14th and 15th, other fugitives from Sehore, Augur and Seepee, arrived at Hoshungabad.

108. From the 21st of July no dacoities took place in the southern portion of the Hoshungabad district, but Nama-wur, on the north bank, was more disturbed, as will be seen hereafter.

109. In the middle of this month 200 armed Boondelabs took possession of the old fort at Bilheree, between Rewah and Saleemabad, in Jubbulpoor, on the Great Deccan Road.

110. I called on the Officer Commanding at Jubbulpoor to send out troops to attack them, and on the 16th a party of the 52nd marched under an officer; and the Boondelabs hearing of it decamped, but only to return reinforced and to come on to the road at Moorwara, where they stole the post horses and stopped the up-country and Calcutta daks. They then again took possession of the fort.

111. On receipt of this intelligence I sent orders to Lieutenant Bailey, Commanding a Company of the 50th Bengal Native Infantry (which I had previously brought from Nagode to Myhere on the Great Deccan Road to keep open the communication), to move down and attack the rebels, and at the same time I ordered a Company of the 52nd, under Lieutenants Barton and Cockburn at Saleemabad, also to move against the rebels; and I sent Lieutenant Baldwin, Assistant Commissioner of Jubbulpoor, as Civil Officer. Both detachments moved with the greatest alacrity, but Lieutenant Bailey arriving first, the rebels again fled, and I had the fort completely destroyed.

112. On the 25th more post horses were stolen by the rebels, who hid themselves in the jungle; but from this date plundering ceased, and the district was kept in perfect peace by a regiment, which afterwards mutinied and joined the rebels.

113. By this measure, viz., sending out parties of the 52nd, the chances against the Europeans, in case of a mutiny, were greatly decreased, and the district was restored to order, till the mutiny occurred, when, as will be seen hereafter, the 52nd stole out of the station in a dark night.

114. I must here mention that the disturbances at Nagpoo having been quelled, and the sepoys of the 52nd seeing themselves trusted, got over their fears of being disarmed; and the Europeans having been placed in a place of comparative safety in a case of mutiny, I requested the Commissioner and Brigadier of Nagpoo, if possible, to send us some reliable troops, and on the 17th of July a small body of troops of the strength as per margin, and known hereafter as the Nagpoo Movable Column, marched for Jubbulpoor under the command of Colonel J. Millar of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry.
115. On the 18th of July a Company of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, with two European officers, was sent from Saugor to the Benaka Teeseelee, and Lieutenant Hamilton, Assistant Commissioner, accompanied the detachment. From this it will be seen that Brigadier Sage’s confidence in the 31st was so far restored, that he allowed officers to accompany men on detached duty, but would not trust the men inside the fort, or allow the officers to sleep in their houses in cantonments.

116. On the 21st the rebels near Benaka, having been reinforced from Shahgurh, advanced with one gun to attack our detachment, but they were repulsed, and their gun (a large brass one, belonging to the Shahgurh Raja) captured. The Raja sent a messenger to say that he would give up the lady and officers in his power (those from Lullupoor), and the detachment moved out to receive them, but were treacherously fired on. He then sent word that he would exchange them for the gun, but this was evidently false; and as the Officer Commanding the detachment, Major Legard of the 31st, did not think his detachment strong enough to attack the rebels, who, he heard, had been reinforced by some 1,000 men, he withdrew to Saugor, bringing in the captured gun.

117. About this time (20th), the Saugor district was nearly all in the hands of the enemy. The fort of Rautgurh, in the west border, was taken possession of (and our police partly driven out, and partly induced to join the rebels) by the Nawab of Ampaunee in Bhopal, and the fort at Gurrakota in the south was taken and occupied by the Shahgurh troops.

118. At the same time the Raja of Banpoor, with from 12 to 1,400 men, moved down from the north towards Saugor, and took up a very strong position at Nurraulee, about twelve miles from Saugor Fort, and on the 25th a portion of his troops actually advanced to the cantonments and fired on an out-house of the artillery barracks; but on the troops in the station being sent against them, they decamped.

119. As Captain Pinkney could not get beyond Saugor, and was of no use in his official capacity there, and was, like the rest, in the fort, I requested him to try and recover Dumoh and its treasure, as the two weak Companies of the 42nd there were not only holding the place, but had attacked and driven the rebels out of the town. I requested Brigadier Sage to give him some troops for this purpose, but Captain Pinkney anticipated my wishes; he obtained two Companies of the 31st, under Captain Finch, and two guns, and on arriving at Dumoh (forty-five miles from Saugor) the detachment there at once made over the fort and treasure to him. The Subadar-Major of the 42nd, aided by the Moonsiff, whom Runjeet Sing, Havildar, took good care to keep in the fort with him, had managed to carry on duty in the town of Dumoh and a few miles around it, so far as to keep the prisoners in jail, the police at their posts, and to correspond with me.

120. A portion of the party, with Captain Pinkney and Captain Finch, Dumoh troops attack rebels at Hindoreeh, about twelve miles from Dumoh, the seat of the rebel Kishore Sing, who had been instigated by the Shahgurh Raja to attack Dumoh sometime before, and our little force at Hindoreeh beat a large body behind stone walls, and killed many of them.

121. On hearing that Lieutenant Nemnhard, the Deputy Commissioner of Dumoh, and his party had safely reached Nursingpoor, I ordered him up to Jubbulpoor, and after making such enquiries as I thought proper regarding his leaving his station, I ordered him at once to proceed and relieve Captain Pinkney at Dumoh.
122. Lieutenant Nembhard arrived at Jubbulpoor on the 19th July, and started, together with the two officers of the 42nd, on the 21st, escorted by a party of the 52nd.

123. Lieutenant Nembhard and his party reached Dumoh (sixty-five miles) on the 25th, and Captain Pinkney returned to Jubbulpoor to take charge of the Judge's Office.

124. The two Companies of the 31st and two guns manned by the 31st, and some eighty of the 3rd Irregular cavalry, as well as the two companies of the 42nd, remained at Dumoh, and had several engagements with the rebels, in one fight killing some fifty men.

125. On the 28th Dumoh was attacked, but the rebels were driven off with loss. The whole of the Dumoh District was now swarming with rebels, who plundered in every direction, and the Shaligur insurgents were joined by nearly every man in Dumoh of the Lodi caste, with the exception of the petty Raja of Hutree, who remained faithful throughout.

126. Some of the rebels came from the Chirkaree village, Deokoh, and wore the Raja's uniform and worked two guns, but whether with the knowledge of the Raja or not I cannot say. But it is worthy of note that, when I was passing through the Dumoh district, about five months before the outbreak, I heard of guns being at Deokoh, and that large quantities of powder and ammunition were being manufactured there, and I duly reported it to Major Ellis, the Assistant Political Agent.

127. I was anxious to have some cavalry at Jubbulpoor to send after the rebels on the Deccan road, and therefore wrote to Colonel Millar to hurry on the Squadron of the 4th Madras Cavalry attached to his column. This he did, and the Squadron arrived on the 30th of July, but the rebels had fled.

128. On the same day the rebels in Charwah and Namaour, in the Trans-Nerbudda Pargannah of Hoshungabad, were committing great depredations. Our and Holkar's villages being so intermixed that it is difficult to define boundaries and jurisdiction, as will be seen by the accompanying sketch map, marked F in the Appendix.

August 1857.

129. On the 1st of August the remainder of the Nagpoor Movable Column arrived at and crossed the Nerudda, and marched into Jubbulpoor, the 52nd going out to see and welcome them in; but had they come much sooner, the 52nd would have mutinied.

130. For sometime we had had no Mirzapoor dâks, but as the detachments of the 50th and 52nd on the Deccan Road now kept it open, and horses were again supplied, on the 3rd of August we received a number of missing dâks.

131. Colonel Millar informed me that his column was not to garrison Jubbulpoor, but was placed bodily at my disposal to march on any place in the Sauger and Nerudda Territories, and that it was on no account to be divided. I asked him to take two Companies of the 52nd Regiment, Bengal Native Infantry, with him, as it would give confidence to the corps, be a kind of guarantee for the good conduct of those of the regiment left at Jubbulpoor, and still further weaken the latter party. At first he refused, but afterwards consented.

132. I urged on the Colonel that if a portion of the column, which I had increased by two Companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry from Nursingpoor, was left at Jubbulpoor, it would make the place safe; but he positively
refused, saying it was the orders of Brigadier Prior that the column was not to be divided.

133. I had, as will have been seen, weakened the 52nd greatly; 300 No Madras troops to garrison Jubbulpur. men were on leave, and some 450 detached, so that not above 250 remained at Jubbulpur. The corps was behaving well, the two companies apparently eagerly joined the column; the police had been greatly strengthened. Major Sleeman, General Superintendent for the Suppression of Thuggee, had a large body of Nuhseeb rebels near that place, in whom he stated he had confidence, and the European residents, numbering in all some sixty or seventy men, had a safe place in my house. Moreover, Dumoh was being constantly attacked by large bodies of rebels with guns, and the officers there reported that the Bengal sepoys were losing heart from constant fighting and no relief, and as Saugor was surrounded with rebels, who would not believe we had reliable troops in India, I resolved on requesting Colonel Millar to march towards Dumoh.

134. On hearing this, Major Sleeman, Major Gordon, Executive Engineer, Some officers protest against no troops being left at Jubbulpur. Captain Vannrenen, vehemently protested against the move, declaring that every European left in Jubbulpur would be murdered on the column marching. I attach his demi-official letter, marked G in the Appendix.

135. My own mind was made up, but I thought it better to call a meeting of the senior officers on the subject, and the result was that the only actual dissenting voice to the march was Major Sleeman.

136. I attach in the Appendix marked H the opinions of the officers, as the question of the propriety of the column advancing has since been much talked of, and may not have been understood by all.

137. I reported this and everything else to Government, and Major Sleeman also wrote. He requested me to halt the column till an answer could be received, but of course I declined, and I never heard that he got an answer from Government. I received no reply, nor did I expect one.

138. The rain now began to be very heavy, and the guns and carts with Delay of the column at Jubbulpur owing to rain. the column could not move; most urgent calls for Port of Bales in Saugor taken by rebels. aid came from Dumoh, and on the 7th August the Tehsildarre and fort of Rehlee, to the south of Saugor and west of Dumoh, was taken by the rebels.

139. The two Companies of the 52nd, who were to accompany the column, Two Companies of the 52nd ordered off in advance of the Movable Column to Dumoh. being lightly equipped, were ordered off on the 6th, with their four European officers to Kuttungee, twenty miles on the Dumoh Road, to keep the boats safe at the Herun river, and were accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner Captain Clerk. They marched the next day (7th) with every appearance of joy, and though the rain was very heavy for many days, they never complained, and did their duty well.

140. Shortly after these two companies reached Kuttungee, the Senior Officer in Command, Lieutenant Oakes, received a most urgent call from Dumoh, and in consequence (in spite of rain, bad roads, and swollen rivers) he marched in two days with his detachment to Dumoh, and once or twice was engaged with the rebels near that place.

141. On the 13th of August it having been reported by the Deputy Commissioner of Saugor that the Banpoor rebels had Saugor troops advance against rebels at Rutona. advanced from Nurreeallee to Rutona, Brigadier Sage ordered all the troops off duty to proceed against them, and the Deputy Commissioner sent with the troops a large body of armed Customs Chuprassees, but the rebels fled on the approach of the troops.
The Districts of Saugor and Dumoh were, with the exception of the Sudder Stations, now entirely in the hands of the rebels; all our police had deserted or been driven in, and hundreds of Malgoozars, though well inclined, were forced to either join the rebels, or assist them with men or food, or were plundered and often tortured. No dëks were received in Saugor or Dumoh for many weeks; for some time the communication was entirely closed between us, but now and then a tiny note of a few lines was received by the hands of a highly-paid hurkars, and of those poor creatures several were mutilated or killed.

143. About this time, too, inroads by Boondelaha and Bhopal rebels were made into Chowerpatta Pergunnah in Nursingpoor (north of the Nerbudda), and the town and Thannah of Tendookhera was plundered; in fact, all to the north of the Nerbudda, except the Districts of Jubbulpooor and Mundilah (in the latter a few dacoities occurred, but were soon put down), were in a state of anarchy, and all our forts were held by the rebels, while all to the south of the Nerbudda was in perfect peace.

144. On the 17th a detachment of troops was sent from Saugor to attack the rebels at Kunera Gound, about eight miles off, and on the 19th another was sent, but on both occasions the rebels fled.

145. The rain at Jubbulpooor continued day and night until the 18th, on which day our advanced tents were sent off the first march, nine miles, and were followed the next morning by the column. I accompanied it, and by evening all were in camp.

146. The delay at Jubbulpooor was taken advantage of by me to have extra doolies and cots made up for the European Artillerymen, extra tents for pickets, &C., were supplied, ropes and large basket-boats were made up for crossing rivers and nullahs. I procured several elephants from the petty chiefs, without which the guns could never have moved, and I gave two yards of good wax-cloth to every native soldier to put under his bedding.

147. On the 20th the column again marched at daybreak, but had hardly broken ground when the rain began to fall heavily, and never ceased for several days. The cavalry and I reached the Herun river, which runs just below Kuttungee, about noon, and immediately commenced crossing the rapid and swollen stream, which was effected without any loss of life, and of but little baggage. Some of the Madras Infantry crawled into camp during the day, and a few of the officers came up; but the guns and remainder of the infantry and park did not reach us for some three days during the whole of which time it rained.

148. I must here mention that, as the Madras sepoys' tents could not be quickly enough crossed, the sepoys of the 52nd detached at Kuttungee, who were housed in a comfortable serai, brought out their tents and pitched them with their own hands for the Madras sepoys!

149. Before crossing this river, I heard that some of the rebels intended to come down from the Dumoh District, and make inroads into Jubbulpooor, and I again requested Colonel Millar to leave two guns and some infantry on the Jubbulpooor side of the river, or send them into Jubbulpooor itself, but he did not think himself authorized to do so.

150. On the 25th the Rifle Company was sent off over the hills towards Tejgurh and Dumoh on the left flank of the column, but were ordered to rejoin us at Notah on the Bearmee river.

151. On the 26th the column marched as far as Jubera during the day, seventeen miles, the guns being dragged through the mud by elephants, and the same night a detachment was sent on to the Bearmee at Notah to secure the boats, which the rebels had been endeavouring to destroy.
152. Again urgent calls came from Dumoh. The Bengal sepoys were doubtful in their loyalty, and complained that no proper assistance was given to them. In this complaint, I believe, the 31st and 3rd Irregular Cavalry Detachment did not join, and they appeared to doubt the 42nd and 52nd.

153. On the 28th the column marched eleven miles to Notab, and before morning three guns; some infantry, and all the cavalry, were crossed over the Bearmee. At daybreak I and some other officers overtook the company, and galloped ahead into Dumoh, sixteen miles, the detachment quickly following, whilst the remaining portion of the troops and park crossed the river and marched a few miles, and the next day reached Dumoh, the rebels all moving off to a distance.

154. The Punnah Raja had frequently written to me offering aid, and as the Semmeria Pergunah of Dumoh had been taken by the rebel Ranee of Jaitpoor's troops, I told him to attack them and turn them out, which he did, his troops with two small guns being under the command of his brother-in-law, Koour Shamleyjoo.

155. Meanwhile all appeared to be quiet in Jubbulpoor, and daks began to come in. My other districts, except Saugor, remained in peace; and as the Governor-General had ordered that the column should be entirely at my disposal, I consulted with Colonel Millar regarding our plan of operations. These were to clear the country of rebels in the Dumoh District, and then advance to Saugor for the same purpose.

156. The staff and the families of the officers and the artillery at Fort of Saugor continued to occupy the fort at night, but many during the day went to their houses in cantonments, and it will have been seen that many officers were out on detached duty with their men.

157. I omitted to state that before arriving at Dumoh, Captain Finch, Commanding there, had written to me stating that he had been ordered by Brigadier Sage to disarm the two companies of the 42nd, but could not venture to do so with only his small detachment of three companies of the 31st and eighty troopers, and also that on the Movable Column arriving at Dumoh, he was at once to march into Saugor with all the Saugor troops, and take in the treasure. I informed him that the column was for service, and not for garrison duty, and that he must not leave his post at Dumoh, as Colonel Millar would not give a man for any station.

158. On the arrival of Colonel Millar at Dumoh, Captain Finch told him of his orders, and asked Colonel Millar to disarm the two companies of the 42nd; but this he declined, as he saw no reason for disarming them, and did not wish, without good cause, to bring the Bengal and Madras sepoys into collision, especially as he had got two companies of Bengal sepoys in his column; and he at the same time informed Captain Finch that he could leave no troops at Dumoh, but must proceed against the rebels.

September 1857.

159. On the 1st of September a detachment from the Nagpoor Movable Column was sent out to attack the rebels at Balakote. The village was taken, and a small fort destroyed.

160. The detachment returned the next day (2nd), and that evening there were rumours that there was again alarm at Jubbulpoor, but the particulars were not known to me then, and the information was said to be false.
161. On the 4th a detachment of the Movable Column was sent to
attack Hindoreeah, twelve miles off from Dumoh, and did so, destroying the strong loopholed house of the rebel Chief, and returned next day.

162. I have stated that the Jubbulpore District was quiet, but it was
reported that some of the Thakoors and Malgoozars were ready to rebel if the sepoys mutinied; but so long as the sepoys remained true to their salt, they dared do nothing. Early in the month of September, Captain Moxon of the 52nd received information from the Pundit and sepoys of his own regiment, in whom he placed great confidence that mischief was brewing, that some of the sepoys were conspiring with a pensioned Raja, named Shunker Shah (a Gond), residing close to Jubbulpore, to attack and murder the Europeans, and though the measures were not all completed, they might be ere long. He informed Lieutenant Baldwin, the Assistant Commissioner of this, and the latter made enquiry, but at first thought the information false; however Captain Clerk, who had been out in the district, returned, and further enquiries were made, which convinced him that a plot had existed between the Raja, some sepoys, and zemindars, to attack the cantonments, kill the Europeans, and plunder the Treasury and to vn &c., on the last day of the Mohurrum, and that the reasons for this not having been carried out were, firstly, that the plotters were doubtful how many of the 52nd would join them; and, secondly, that two zemindars of the rebel party had refused to act. But the enquiry proved that at least eight or ten of the sepoys of the 52nd, two of whom were known to be very bad characters, and who shortly after deserted with their arms (and who are even now believed to be amongst the rebels in Mundlah), were in the habit of visiting Raja Shunker Shah, and his son, Rugonauth Shah, where they met some badly-disposed Malgoozars.

163. Captain Clerk, acting on the information he had obtained (Seth Kooshal Chand, being one of the informants, and a most loyal, though exacting, stingy banker), on the 14th of September, accompanied by his Assistant, Captain Baldwin, and some twenty sepoys and forty policemen, went to the Raja's house and apprehended him and his son, and lodged them safely in jail. Others were also arrested, but some rebels escaped.

164. On searching the Raja's house, several documents of a reasonable nature were found, particularly one paper (written on the back of a proclamation by me, calling on the Chiefs to be loyal) on which the Raja had written a prayer, invoking his deity to aid him in the destruction of the Europeans, to upset the British Government, and establish his own. I annex a translation, marked I in the Appendix. A second prayer, of much the same purport, in the handwriting of the Raja's son, Rugonauth Shah, was also found.

165. This family were the descendants of the Gond Raja's of his part of the country, and not only held jaghires in Jubbulpore, but in Dumoh, and were kindly treated by the European Officers.

166. But I have been anticipating, for on receiving news of Captain Moxon's, of the 52nd, suspicions on the 7th September, I called on Colonel Millar to send a detachment to Jubbulpore, and that day he sent a party consisting of two guns with twenty European Gunners, an Artillery Officer, 200 of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, and a troop of the 4th Madras Cavalry, the whole commanded by Captain Tottenham, of the 4th Madras Cavalry, towards Jubbulpore, which place they reached about the 12th or 13th, and encamped in my compound close to my house, where all the Christians of Jubbulpore were assembled.

167. In the Namawur Pergunnah of Hoshungabâd, the Mehwaties of Sutwas had risen in rebellion, and a Mahratta Pundit of Scindia's territories had appeared with
other rebels, calling himself the Agent of Scindia, and hoisting the rebel Maharatta flag, taking possession of Namawur and commenced collecting revenue, being at the same time joined by the mutinous police.

163. On the 2nd of this month, the Sohagpoor Thannah of Mundlah was driven in, and though the police had been strengthened, the attack on the Thannah of Shai-poorah followed on the 25th, and of the Ramgurh Thannah on the 26th. The police were driven in, and the Government building burned. Thus two-thirds of that district were lost, and the rebels threatened Mundlah itself.

169. At Dumoh, Captain Finch had received peremptory orders from Brigadier Sage to march for Saugor with part of his detachment, including the 42nd Companies; and on my asking him if he could take in Rupees 70,000 of the treasure, he replied that he could not undertake it, unless the Movable Column accompanied him through the most jungly portion of the road. I therefore requested Colonel Millar with his column to see him through this part of the road, and on the 8th we marched with him, taking Rupees 70,000 with us.

170. Lieutenant Dickens of the 31st was left with a portion of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry at Dumoh.

171. We crossed the Cogra river, and duly reached Birkherhee, fourteen miles towards Saugor; but before our tents could be pitched, the rain came down in torrents, and we could not move.

172. On the 10th we heard of the Ramgurh mutineers having ascended the ghats, and that they were likely to march on Nagode, Rewah, and Jubbulpore, and that the Rewah Raja could not oppose them, and had advised the Political Agent, Lieutenant Osborne, to leave his territory.

173. I then asked Captain Finch if he would take on the treasure to Saugor, as we could not accompany him, but must return towards Dumoh. He declined, and we kept the treasure; but he crossed the river, and marched alone towards Saugor with his detachment of the 31st, 42nd, and 3rd Irregular Cavalry, and duly arrived there.

174. The rain continued to pour in torrents, and our guns could not be moved; but on the 12th, at 12 P.M., we commenced our retrograde movement, and with great difficulty made eight miles, and reached our ground at 7 P.M., though the guns did not come up till much later.

175. On the 13th we marched at 5 A.M. hearing that Dumoh was again threatened, and reached that station about 8, just in time to save it, for Lieutenant Dickens" pickets had exchanged shots with the pickets of the enemy. The rear portion of the column did not arrive till 4 P.M.

176. On the 15th the town and tehsilee of Huttah, in Dumoh, was taken by the Pannah troops from the Shahgurh rebels for us.

177. The fort, town and Thannah of Nursingurh, in the district of Dumoh, were in possession of the Shahgurh rebels, and on the 16th I determined to send a force against them, and the next day a detachment, under Major Jenkins, marched for Nursingurh. That night I heard of the Dinapoor and Banda mutineers marching on Nagode, where the 50th Bengal Native Infantry were.

178. The detachment took Nursingurh, and killed about fifty rebels on the 17th, and returned the next day.
179. The Raja of Shabgurb was by this time greatly alarmed at our movements; and, thinking to make terms, he sent in the whole of our fellow-countrymen from Lullutpoor, whom he had so long had in captivity in a miserable plight in an old fort in the jungles, and they all safely reached Saugor on the 15th. I append a list marked J.

180. The accounts from Jubbulpoor were now alarming. On the second night after Raja Shunker Shah had been imprisoned, the Deputy Commissioner heard of a plan on the part of the 52nd to rescue the prisoners. The Madras detachment was turned out and remained under arms all night, and the Raja and his son were removed to my house. During that night a few shots were fired in the 52nd Lines, and a bungalow close to the lines was fired and burned down, and some eight of the 52nd deserted with their arms; but no further disturbance occurred in the city or cantonments of Jubbulpoor.

181. Raja Shunker Shah and his son, Rugonauth Shah, were tried by a Commission, composed of the Deputy Commissioner and two officers, and the evidence against them being conclusive, they were on the morning of the 18th lashed to two guns and blown away.

182. At 6 P.M. that evening, there was reason to believe that the men of the 52nd intended to make some move that night.

183. It was, however, not considered advisable to take any offensive measures against them, as it might have caused the murder of the two officers on detached command at Saleemabad, and one (Lieutenant Macgregor) at Patun.

184. About 10 P.M. that night, the whole of the 52nd left at Jubbulpoor, with the exception of one Native Officer and fifteen Rank and File, rose quietly in a body and left the station, taking with them their arms and the ammunition in pouch, and marching by a circuitous route outside the city, went towards Patun, one of our tehsieles on the Herun river, where there was a detachment of the corps under Lieutenant Macgregor, and where they expected some Thakoors with their followers to join them.

185. Directly this became known, the lines, magazine, and property of the 52nd, which they had evidently in a panic left behind them, were secured by the Madras troops.

186. Expresses were at once sent off to the officers at Saleemabad and Patun, warning them of what had occurred, and ordering them in to Jubbulpoor at once.

187. Lieutenants Barton and Cockburn at Saleemabad told their Native Officers of what had occurred, and at once mounted their horses. Their men expressed their regret at parting with these officers, and did not molest them, but said they must make the best of their way towards Delhi. Some of them shook their officers by the hand, robbed the Tehseelee of the little money there was there, the Pay Havildar handing one of the officers of the balance of his pay, and marched off quietly towards Nagode. The two officers safely reaching Jubbulpoor, and the men procuring carriage sent in the officers' baggage to Jubbulpoor.

188. Much less fortunate was Lieutenant Macgregor. On the men, who had deserted in this strange way from Jubbulpoor, reaching Patun, they confined him, took his horse from him, and would hardly give him enough food to eat. They were joined by the men of the Patun Detachment, who had a considerable quantity of ammunition. They did their utmost to get the Thakoors on the left bank of the Herun to join them, but finding that the
chief ones would not do so, they plundered Patun and crossed the river, and having succeeded in getting a rebel Thakoor of Nursingpoor, named Mirbhan Sing, and his followers to join them, they after some delay marched towards Kuttungee, and were joined by the detachment of the corps there (who also had a quantity of ammunition), except by the Mahomedan Jemadar in command, who, though a drunken character, was a loyal and good soldier, and who went in to Jubbulpore.

189. It was believed in Jubbulpore, and the sepoys said to themselves, that, on being joined by the Thakoors, they would return to Jubbulpore, plunder the Treasury and city, burn the cantonments, and murder the Europeans; but their hopes were disappointed, and they evidently feared the two guns at Jubbulpore.

190. On the 18th I heard of the mutiny of the 50th at Nagode, and immediately called in the detachment from Nursingurh, believing that the 52nd would soon also mutiny.

191. On the evening of the 19th the Nursingurh party, which included the two Companies of the 52nd, returned to Dumoh, and at 12 that night I received an express from Captain Clerk, telling me of the mutiny at Jubbulpore, and stating that the Nagpoor Rifles with us were not to be trusted. I at once went to Colonel Millar and requested him to disarm the two Companies of the 52nd with us, the first thing in the morning; and a consultation of some of the senior officers was held as to how this was to be done.

192. At daybreak on the 20th orders were suddenly issued for the whole column to march out on the Saugor Road, on the pretence of attacking some rebels. The 52nd Companies were ordered to form the Advance Guard, and the Rifles the Rear Guard.

193. The 52nd men’s muskets were loaded, having only returned from service at Nursingurh the evening before, and the Madras sepoys were ordered to load.

194. The column marched at once, the 52nd Companies leading by some 200 paces, the two Companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry heading the column, then the four guns, &c.

195. On arriving at an open plain about three miles from Dumoh, the column was halted. The guns deployed to the left, and being hid by the 28th Companies, who also deployed, they were unlimbered and double shotted with canister.

196. I then told the European gunners of the ruse: the 28th moved to the right, and the Colonel riding up to the 52nd for the first time told the officers what was to be done. The men were ordered to pile arms; their officers then told them of what had occurred at Jubbulpore, and that they must quietly give up their arms.

197. They were taken by surprise and hesitated, but seeing the guns pointed at them with port-fires lighted, they with vehement expressions of loyalty and with much lamentation, piled arms, took off their pouches, and moved to the right.

198. Elephants were at once moved to the front, and on these the arms and accoutrements were packed, and the column marched back to its old ground, where the baggage of the 52nd Companies was searched, and all arms found were taken possession of. The Rifle Company (of the 1st Nagpoor Infantry) being the Rear Guard, had never left the ground.

199. Information had now been received by me of the mutiny of the 50th and 52nd, and it was believed that the Thakoors near Jubbulpore would return and attack the city, &c., and it was by no means improbable that the 50th and Dinapoor
mutineers, who had possessed themselves of the Nagode post guns, might
all move either on Jubbulpoor or Rewah.

200. I therefore held a Council of War on the 20th, and the Column
being much too small to hold both Jubbulpoor and Dumoh against a large
body of mutineers and rebels, it was unanimously resolved to give up Dumoh
and return to Jubbulpoor. The resolution is appended and marked K.

201. I at once wrote to Koor Shamleyjoo, the Punnah General then at
Hutta, to come and take charge of the district for the British Government, and as no carriage
of any description could be procured except for
the treasure and a few records, I had the stamp paper burned; and the next
morning, in spite of heavy rain, we marched to Ubhna, eleven miles towards
Jubbulpoor, taking with us the treasure (about Rupees 1,30,000) and the
Treasury accounts. Koor Shamleyjoo attended to my call, and entered
Dumoh the same day with two guns and a considerable force. The day was
very wet and the roads heavy, but by evening we all got into camp. Lieute-
nant Dickens with his party marched the same day for Saugor and reached
it in due time, and the Dumoh Civil Officers accompanied us.

202. The next day (the 22nd) we marched with much difficulty to the
Bearnee river, only three miles, and commenced crossing the rapid and swollen
stream, but did not all get over till the afternoon of the 24th.

203. On the 25th at noon we again marched eleven miles, but the guns,
treasure, and park did not arrive till very late at night.

204. Colonel Millar wished to halt on the 26th, but I urged him to
march, and he did so in the day time.

205. The next morning (the 27th) Colonel Millar sent on the Grenadier
Company of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry and a few cavalry, as an Advance
Guard under Lieutenant Watson, and Major Jenkins, the Assistant Quarter-
Master-General, accompanied it, to secure the boats at Kuttungee on the llerun
river.

206. Just before day dawned when we were dressing, two troopers of the
Mutineers and rebels advance against
Advanced Guard galloped back into camp, stating
that the advance had been attacked on the road
by the 52nd, and that both the officers had been shot dead. No time
was lost; we advanced (with the two disarmed Companies of the 52nd well in
the rear, and the Rifle Company of the 1st Nagpoor Irregulars forming the
Rear Guard), and had hardly gone three miles when we met our Advanced Guard
retreating, and they confirmed the news brought by the troopers. The road
was a hill pass, for some eight miles through dense jungle; and when we had
got to a small village named Gobra, we met the body of the 52nd marching on
us in column of sections with colours flying. The halt was sound, the guns
unlimbered, and a round shot from one of our 9-pounders went right through
the enemy's column, and being quickly followed by several rounds of grape, the
mutineers broke to the right and left into the jungle, which was so thick we
could hardly see them. They however opened a heavy fire on us with mus-
ketery and matchlocks, the balls falling thick amongst us. Our column returned
the fire with grape and musketery, but I refer you to Colonel Millar's de-
spatch, which I append, marked L. Sufficient it is to say, that we gradually advanced,
fighting from 6 a.m. till 2 p.m., when we reached the open, the 52nd and
about 1,000 rebels scattering to the right and left.

207. The line of baggage was a very long one, but it was closed well
up, and our casualties were but few (five in number), whilst that on the side of
the enemy was about 100. The Rifles whom we had doubted came well to
the front, and on our reaching the open about two miles from Kuttungee, they
skirmished, killing several of the 52nd sepoys, chasing others up the steep
hills and bringing in three prisoners, a Pay Havildar and a Sepoy of the 52nd,
and a Boondelah. The troop of the 4th Madras Cavalry behaved admirably, following the sepoys of the 52nd far up the hills, and killing several with their carbines.

208. A Havildar and six sepoys of the Rifles who seized the prisoners brought them to me; the latter were immediately hung, and I promoted the Havildar to the rank of Jemadar on the spot. Thus the Rifles, though nearly all Oudh men, or the descendants of Oudh men, proved their loyalty, and up to this moment have, under their gallant officer, Lieutenant Pereira, done excellent and constant good service.

209. It was 3 P.M. when we reached the River Herun (nine miles) from our last camp. We had, however, not only beaten off a formidable enemy, but just before we reached the open, Major Jenkins and Lieutenant Watson galloped amongst us! Both had had the most wonderful escape, having been fired on by whole sections at a time; the former’s horse had received three balls in his body, and the latter was wounded under the left eye, but not seriously.

210. Just before we reached the river, however, I deeply regret to say we found on the side of the road the body of poor Lieutenant MacGregor, who had been brought a close prisoner from Patun by the 52nd, and had been shot by his own men early that morning. His body was sent in and buried at Jubbulpore.

211. It was nearly sunset before all were in camp, and all were hot and fatigued, the sun having shone brightly the whole day.

212. The two disarmed companies of the 52nd came up shortly afterwards, and were kept in the serai about a mile from our camp that night, during which about fifteen deserted; but the rest remained without arms, and have since been sent to Saugor, and I am told some of the worst men of the corps are amongst them.

213. The next day, whilst the bulk of the column was being crossed over the river in boats and rafts, a small light column went out in search of the enemy of the preceding day, but only came on a few stragglers, who were cut up or dispersed.

214. All our camp was not over the river before the night of the 29th September.

215. The next morning we marched eleven miles, and the next day relieved Jubbulpore.

216. On the 17th of September the Banpoor rebels from Nurreeolee (twelve miles to the west of Saugor) advanced to the Rautgurh Gate of the City of Saugor and fired a few shots at the sentries; but finding the guards on the alert, they retired.

217. On the 18th Brigadier Sage, Commanding at Saugor, sent out a detachment under Colonel Dalzell of the 42nd to attack the Nurreeolee rebels, and the Deputy Commissioner also sent 200 of the Customs Chuprassees under their European Officers, but I regret to say they found the place too strong and the attack failed. Colonel Dalzell was killed, and Lieutenant Prior wounded. The party returned next day to Saugor.

218. About the end of the month the Thannahs of Koondum and Burgee were attacked and driven in; both are in the Jubbulpore District, the latter on the south side of the Nerbudda; and this caused considerable alarm in Sonee, as it was the first appearance of the rebellion near that district, and there was reason to fear the rebellion would spread south.
219. The Deputy Commissioner of Seonee again addressed the Thakoors and sent a messenger to them, advising them to be firm to the Government; and I ordered a Company of Madras Native Infantry from Seonee to Doomah near Burgee.

Precaution taken.

220. The Movable Column arrived at Jubbulpoor on the 1st October; and as the Thanaah of Tindoookhera in Nursingpoor (on the north bank of the Nerudder) had been just driven in by the rebels, I ordered the two Companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry (which had accompanied the column) back to Nursingpoor.

OCTOBER 1857.

221. The rebel Column arrived at Jubbulpoor on the 1st October; and as the Thanaah of Tindoookhera in Nursingpoor (on the north bank of the Nerudder) had been just driven in by the rebels, I ordered the two Companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry (which had accompanied the column) back to Nursingpoor.

Movable Column relieved Jubbulpoor, and 2 Cos. of the 28th are sent to Nursingpoor.

222. The rebels in the Namaour (north of the Nerudder), Persgannah of Scindia, and were too strong for the police, who were obliged on the 3rd October to retire to Hurda, on the north of the river. The rebels plundered the town of Namaour, and confined and tortured several of the most respectable inhabitants who refused to rebel.

223. On the 8th of October, the Deputy Commissioner of Hoshungabad, with a small detachment of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, and two guns under Lieutenant Lemarchand of the Gwalior Contingent (who volunteered) marched from Hoshungabad towards Namaour via Hurda Hindia, and in spite of very heavy and bad roads, made twenty-three miles.

224. The second march they made was twenty-one miles, and it took them nineteen hours.

225. On arriving at the old City of Hindia, on the left or south bank of the Nerudder, on the 12th, they found the rebels in great force on the opposite bank. The rebels at once commenced firing on our troops with their matchlocks from behind walls and temples, which come down to the water’s edge, but on our guns opening on them they soon dispersed. But as night was approaching, nothing more could be done that day.

226. On the 12th the Hurula and Hoshungabad Police volunteered to cross the river and attack the rebels if covered by the fire of our guns, and they did so. The rebels and police were engaged for some time, the latter behaving very well, and succeeded in capturing the pretender, who was tried and hanged the next day, when Lieutenant Wood, his guns and Infantry had crossed over.

227. The dák takes a long time from Hurda to Jubbulpoor, particularly when the roads are heavy; but on hearing that Lieutenant Wood intended attacking the strong body of rebels with such a small party, I ordered him on no account to cross the river till reinforced, but my order did not reach him in time. However, all went well.

228. On the 6th and 7th I requested the Officer Commanding at Jubbulpoor to send a detachment to the Sehora Tehseelee on the Mirzapoor road, as a large village near it had been plundered, and a 2nd Detachment to Burgee, south of the Nerudder, as the rebels near had plundered a number of Government tents on their way to Bombay, and stopped the Bombay dák. Both detachments marched, and the rebels fell back into the jungle.
229. Plundering was now becoming very common in the Jubbulpoor District in every direction, and we had but very few troops to send out.

230. On the 2nd October the rebels assembled at Mynepanee on the road from Saugor to Nursingpoor, and Brigadier Sage consequently sent a detachment against them when they fled; and the detachment was then ordered to patrol the road. This had a very good effect, and the dak was re-established to Nursingpoor and Jubbulpoor.

231. The Deputy Commissioner of Saugor now resolved on sending a body of police to secure Rehlee, and requested Brigadier Sage to aid him with troops. This he did; and Lieutenant Dickens of the 31st, Ensign Grant of the 42nd, and 100 sepoys of the 31st were sent, but before they arrived, the fort had been recovered by a gallant fellow of the place, named Girdaree Naick, and his brethren, and he was at once made Killadar till relieved by Lieutenant Dickens.

232. After the 52nd were beaten off by the Nagpoor Movable Column, they, accompanied by their rebel friends and joined by many more, marched to Dumoh, where they attacked the Punnah troops, whom they soon beat. They then went to the jail, which was most gallantly defended by the jail-guard; but the latter falling short of ammunition and food, were obliged to give in, being attacked by the prisoners at the same time; and on the 52nd getting into the jail, the guard were nearly to a man murdered.

233. The mutineers and rebels then plundered the town of Dumoh, burned the records and public buildings, blew up the kucherry and gutted the Deputy Commissioner’s house, but did not burn it down, owing probably to its belonging to a native.

234. After staying some days at Dumoh, they joined the Shabgurh rebels at Gurarakotab, and daily plundered all around.

235. After a few days the Punnah troops having been reinforced returned to Dumoh, and held it unopposed till Koour Shamleyjoo made over charge of the district to me on my arrival there in February 1858.

236. On the 10th of October the troops at Jubbulpoor were reinforced by the arrival of the rest of the 4th Madras Cavalry and two companies of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry; and Captain Clark having been directed to join his regiment, the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, he did so, making over charge of the Jubbulpoor District to his Assistant, Lieutenant Baldwin.

237. But to return to the proceedings in Namaour (from paragraph 226).

238. On the 15th, Lieutenant Wood and his troops marched towards Sutwas, the head-quarters of the rebels.

239. On the 16th the Hurda Police volunteered to go to Sutwas and prevent any egress of the rebels from the fort. They were permitted to do so, and on the morning of the 16th they arrived, captured their own traitor Jemadar, and a Mewatee leader, named Lal Khan, with a few other rebels; but Thakoor Doulut Sing and his band had fled on hearing of the approach of the guns. The Police Jemadar and Lal Khan were hanged.

240. The detachment arrived at Sutwas on the 17th, and during a halt of three days nearly destroyed the fort. The troops then marched back to Hoshungabad.
241. On the 12th the Deputy Commissioner of Mundlah begged to be allowed to proceed into his district; but as I had no troops to send with him, and he could not succeed in raising extra police, I refused.

242. On the 13th the Shahgurh rebels from Gurrakotha joined by the mutineers of the 52nd, attacked Behlee, but were speedily repulsed with loss by Lieutenant Dickens and his gallant sepoys of the 31st, and police under Girdaree Naick.

243. The 52nd men did their utmost to get the 31st to join them, but without effect.

244. The Nurreaolee rebels seeing all the troops had left Saugor came close to it, and plundered all the villages near.

245. The rebels in the Jubbulpoor District were now committing great depredations and cruelties. The police were constantly kept on the qui vive, a few mutineers having joined and always leading the rebels.

246. On the 20th the Jubbulpoor Thannah of Mujholee, which had been driven in, was re-established.

247. About this time the Nursingpoor District was in great danger. The pergunnah north of the Nerbudda had again been invaded by Nawab Ally Khan of Bhopal, with about 150 Pathans from Rautgurh, accompanied by some local rebel-leaders and 500 matchlockmen, and some Customs Chuprassees, who had joined the rebels some time before. They again plundered and burned Tendookhersa and Bilkaree, and committed other depredations, and at the same time Mirbhan Sing, a noted local rebel-leader, who has given much trouble, moved down to Heerapoor on the right bank of the river, about fifteen miles from Nursingpoor, and threatened the station; consequently the intrenchments which had been commenced were rapidly finished by Lieutenant Walton of the 28th Madras Native Infantry.

248. The rebels of the Burgee Pergunnah of Jubbulpoor too threatened the south-east of Nursingpoor, so that the district was threatened from three directions at the same time.

249. Captain Ternan, the Deputy Commissioner, and some police accompanied by two weak companies of the 28th, two 6-pounders (worked by the 28th), under the command of Captain Woolley of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, marched to Saukul, opposite Heerapoor, to oppose Mirbhan Sing, who occupied a small fort commanding the village.

250. The guns were with great difficulty brought up through the ravines, and opening fire on Mirbhan Sing, he and his host quickly fled, but not without loss. This had an excellent effect, and the rebels at Tendoookhersa retired.

251. Mr. Plowden, Commissioner of Nagpoor, had most kindly placed four more companies of his Irregular Infantry at my disposal, two of which were sent to Baitool, and two to Scone, and this enabled us to get in three more companies of the line to Jubbulpoor after a while.

252. To command these companies, I obtained the services of Lieutenants Manning, Barton, and Cockburn of the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry.

253. On the 21st a very large body of rebels crossed the Herun River to attack the town and Tehseelars of Patun in Jubbulpoor. The Deputy Collector and Tehseelar and police went out to meet them, but after exchanging a few shots, by which the Tehseelar and one of the police were wounded, the police gave way to superior numbers and fled. The rebels then entered Patun, destroyed the Government buildings, and burned and plundered many houses in the town.
On receipt of this information I applied to the Officer Commanding at Jubbulpoor to send out troops, and in consequence he sent a party of infantry, cavalry and two guns, but they were too late; the mischief was done, and the rebels and a few mutineers of the 52nd had recrossed the river, and fled into the heavy jungle on the hills. But to protect this rich part of the country around Patun, 100 Infantry under an officer, and a troop of Cavalry were left at the place.

The Deputy Commissioner of Mundlah having at last collected a few police and ten men of the 52nd Native Infantry, who had remained loyal, was allowed to proceed to Mundlah, and he marched on the 22nd and reached Mundlah on the 25th.

On reaching Mundlah, the Deputy Commissioner sent a party of police to attack a small body of rebels at Ramnugger, and they succeeded in killing a few; but hearing that a large body was coming down on them, they retired to Mundlah.

Other parties were sent out with success, but the rebels took the communication cut off between Thannah of Narasingunge on the road from Mundlah to Jubbulpoor, and thus cut off the communication.

On the 25th of October the Thannah of Burtulla in Jubbulpoor, Thannahs of Burtulla, &c., in Jubbulpoor taken by rebels. on the road leading from Dumoh to Mirzapoor, was attacked by rebels and mutineers (for many of the 52nd had left the main body and in small parties joined different rebel leaders), who plundered the town and burned the dak bungalow and thannah.

On the 27th and 29th, other posts in Jubbulpoor were driven in, and the rebels were very formidable in the villages near the Mirzapoor road.

These rebels plundered and took away many dak horses, and news arrived of the Bijiragogurh Thakoor, Surjoo Pershau, having gone into open rebellion.

This man's estate was under the management of the Superintendent of Nagode, and he had no cause for discontent. He murdered the Tehseeldar, stole the dak horses, placed large bodies of men on the Mirzapoor road, and completely closed it to all travellers, dak, &c., for a long time (see paragraph 348); and as he was rich and had some twenty or thirty good guns and some 200 or 300 stand of arms, he was looked on as our most formidable enemy.

On the 30th the detachment under Captain Woolley in Nursingpoor crossed the Sonar River, and taking the enemy by surprise, routed him and cut up a great many.

ON NOVEMBER 1857.

On the 1st of November, Brigadier Sage sent out all the troops at Saugor to attack the rebels from Nurreasolee, who had been plundering close to Saugor; but they, as usual, made off into the hills, and the troops were too few to follow them up.

On the 4th, a wing of the 4th Cavalry marched from Jubbulpoor under Major Sullivan to support the infantry and artillery detachment on the Mirzapoor road, which had moved up towards Chaka to check the Bijiragogurh rebels, who threatened to come down and plunder Jubbulpoor.
265. On the 5th a party of the 4th Cavalry at the Herun River were plundered of their property by the daring rebels, and were in consequence ordered into Jubbulpore by Colonel Millar.

266. On the morning of the 6th, when the detachment on the Mirzapoor road under Major Sullivan was breaking ground before the day had quite dawned, it was taken by surprise by some of the Bijiragogurh rebels at Moorwar, who opened a heavy fire on our troops from two large guns and some thousand matchlocks. However, Lieutenant (now Captain) Clerk of the 4th Cavalry lost no time in halting and preparing for action, the two guns (9-pounders) under Lieutenant Lane, Madras Artillery, unlimbered at once and gave the enemy a round or two of well-directed grape; but after the first or second round, the axle-tree of one of our guns broke. However, whilst the axle was being replaced, the other gun kept up as quick a fire as possible; but the enemy were encouraged by this accident, and Captain Clerk therefore took them in flank, riding through a steep ravine, and with some of his men made a dash at the rebels, cutting up several, routing the rest, killing three men with his own sword, and taking the enemy's guns. The coolness displayed by Lieutenant Lane and his men in refitting a new axle to their disabled gun, under a very heavy fire, is described as admirable.

267. This detachment now turned their heads towards Jubbulpore, as it was considered much too small to resist the large body of rebels said to be advancing on them.

268. On the 7th the town of Ghosulpoor and the dâk, eighteen miles from Jubbulpore on the Mirzapoor road, were plundered by the rebels from Neemkhera, and a troop of the 4th Cavalry was sent out. They caught up the rebels, killed several, and took seventeen prisoners.

269. Captain Tottenham continued the pursuit to the village of Ramkheria, where the rebels were hiding in houses, and Captain Tottenham (who had unfortunately dismounted) whilst attempting to get into a house, was mortally wounded by a gun-shot.

270. He was taken to Ghosulpoor and died the next day. The body was interred at Jubbulpore.

271. On the evening of the 7th, Captain Tottenham's party was reinforced by Captain Clerk's detachment and also by more of the 4th Cavalry sent out from Jubbulpore under Colonel Cumberlege, who on the 9th proceeded to Ramkheria and destroyed the house from which his officer had been killed, but all the rebels except the prisoners had fled, and most of the latter he hanged.

272. On the 14th intelligence was received by Rao Udood Sing of Khymore, a faithful Thakoor in the Jubbulpore district, that a party of rebels from Mangurh in Dumoh intended attacking him, and as he had done us good service I applied for troops to be sent to his aid; consequently a detachment from Jubbulpore was sent out under Major Jenkins, Assistant Quarter-Master-General of the Nagpoor force. He attacked the rebels at a small village close to the spot where he hid when he made such a wonderful escape from the 52nd (see paragraph 208), and drove them back with a loss of twelve killed and several prisoners taken. But I most deeply regret to state that whilst Major Jenkins (a most gallant officer and beloved by all) was leading on his men he was shot through the heart by a rebel from behind a bush, but the rebel had no time to glory in the deed, for he instantly fell to the pistol of Lieutenant Oakes of the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry.
273. Major Jenkin’s remains were brought in and buried at Jubbulpoor.

274. On the 17th a considerable body of Pathans and Rohillas from Rautgurh made their appearance on a hill, about four miles to the west of Saukor, but were driven away by the police, and it is said they had to carry off, ten or twelve men. On our side one sowar had his horse shot.

275. The police post at Googree in Mundlah, which had twice exchanged hands, was on the 16th November again taken by the rebels, and as they were assembling close to and on three sides of Mundlah, in large bodies, evidently with the design of attacking the town, the police were called in and all the Deputy Commissioner’s and Government property (records, &c.) were taken into the town, which was strengthened by barricades, &c. But the rebels contented themselves with plundering the villages all round.

276. On the 17th the rebel-leader, Mirbhan Sing, crossed to the south side of the Nerbudda and burned the village and Thannah of Saukul, in the Nursingpoor district, but recrossed the same evening.

277. The police behaved badly, deserting their post when there was no necessity. A detachment of the 28th Madras Native Infantry under Lieutenant Walton was sent out, accompanied by Mr. J. Beddy, Deputy Collector; but instead of the rebels taking to their heels this time, they, being strong, required a few volleys, when they fled with considerable loss. The affair was well managed by Lieutenant Walton, who was well supported by Mr. Beddy, and confidence was restored to this part of the district.

278. Whilst this was going on, the Deputy Commissioner of Nursingpoor (Captain Ternan), along with Captain Woolley’s detachment of infantry and two guns, was on the north of the Nerbudda on the Saukor Road, and co-operating with a detachment under Captain Roberts of the 31st and Captain Mayne of the 3rd Irregulars from Saukor. Their operations were most successful, clearing that part of the country of rebels, and finally destroying Gunjum Sing, a rebel Malgoozar of note, and nearly all his followers.

279. In this affair Captain Ternan behaved with distinction.

280. On the 23rd November these troops marched upon Singpoor, held by the rebel Dilgunjun, who was seized by Captain Ternan and hanged.

281. On the 19th the troops at Jubbulpoor were further reinforced by the arrival of the two remaining weak companies of the 33rd from Baitool, and I should have mentioned that on the 6th instant the head-quarters of the 6th Madras Cavalry arrived.

282. In November the Deputy Commissioner of Scione, Lieutenant Thomson, moved out to Doomah towards Jubbulpoor to re-assure his Thakors, and some of them joined him with small Contingents and afforded him good information. Had they rebelled, the whole of their followers would have risen, and the rebellion would have rapidly spread south; but as it happened, there was little or no rebellion in Scione, though some villages towards Mundlah, Jubbulpoor, and Nursingpoor were plundered by rebels from those districts, and the Customs line was once attacked.

283. On the 20th November the Thannah of Naraisingunge in Jubbulpoor towards Mundlah, which had been re-established, was again driven in.

284. On the 23rd November the rebels appeared in large bodies close to the town of Mundlah, and during the night kept up a continual shouting and firing, but did not
attack, and the Deputy Commissioner was too weak to act on the offensive at night. However, the next day he sent out all his available police (thirty-three musketeers and seventeen matchlockmen) to reconnoitre, with orders to attack if they thought themselves strong enough; but if not, to retire.

285. The rebels at first fled, but being reinforced turned and drove in the police; but a ball from the Deputy Commissioner's rifle turned the rebels once more.

286. The rebels, however, now all gathering around Mundlah in large bodies resolved, it was believed, to attack it. The Deputy Commissioner's ammunition too began to fall short, his retreat to Jubbulpoor was cut off, and, worse than all, some of the townsmen began to show treachery, and reports were heard that some rebels were about to go round to the south of the Nerbudda to cut off the retreat to Seonee.

287. Under these circumstances, Captain Waddington considered it advisable to retreat on Seonee whilst he could, and I had advised him to do so, as he could do little or no good without troops, and was needlessly endangering his life. He therefore effected his escape to Seonee; but, as it turned out, the rebels never entered the town of Mundlah.

288. I directed the Deputy Commissioner of Mundlah to afford assistance to the Deputy Commissioner of Seonee in the Doomah direction; and in paragraphs 292 to 298 it will be seen how this was carried out.

289. The Bijiragurh rebels remained in great force on the Deccan or Mirzapoor Road, and completely cut off the direct communication between the north-west and Calcutta and Bombay: not a soul could pass, and all who attempted it were searched and plundered, some killed, and others mutilated.

290. Being very anxious to re-open this road, I applied to Colonel Munsey, then Commanding at Jubbulpoor, to send out troops to attack the rebels, and a Detachment of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was accordingly sent out under Colonel Byng of the 6th Cavalry; but he did not consider himself strong enough to attack, and our troops did nothing till the 28th or 29th, when they had a slight engagement at Dungowah, but he called for reinforcements.

291. On the 30th the rebel-leader, Devee Sing Gounteeea, attacked and burned the Jubbulpoor Thannah of Shahpoor on the road to Nursingpoor. A party of cavalry was at once sent after them, but they escaped over the Nerbudda to Burgee: however the police were re-established.

292. The Burgee rebels now becoming very bold, and I proposed a plan to Colonel Munsey to attack them at their headquarters at Nawul Peehar; but as he did not think it safe, I resolved to try another plan, if he would give some slight assistance by allowing the company of the 26th stationed at Burgee Thannah to join, and cavalry to patrol the north bank of the Nerbudda on the day of attack.

293. My plan was as follows: two companies of the 26th Madras Native Infantry were on their way up from Hoshungabad with two 6-pounders; Captain Woolley's detachment along with Captain Ternan, Deputy Commissioner, was near Saukuli in Nursingpoor, and had two 6-pounders and some Hyderabad Cavalry, and Lieutenant Thomson, Deputy Commissioner of Seonee, and Captain Waddington, Deputy Commissioner of Mundlah, were at Dumoh with a company of the 1st Nagpoor Irregular Infantry: none of these troops were under Colonel Munsey's orders. I send a sketch marked M in the Appendix.

294. I called on all these officers and troops to move simultaneously on Nawul Peehar, and Colonel Munsey permitted the company at Burgee to co-operate.
295. Early on the morning of the 7th of December, the detachment under Captain Woolley in Nursigpoor, which had now been joined by the two companies of the 25th, and two guns coming up from Hoshungabad under Lieutenant Standon, amounted in all to 334 fighting men, with four 6-pounders. They forced the passage of the Sonar River which was held by the rebels, amounting to about 1,500, under Devee Sing Guantsees and other leaders.

296. The other detachments referred to in paragraph 295 also advanced.

297. Captain Woolley arrived on the 10th at Cheerapoor, where the rebels had been in force, but having fled; Captain Terran took a small party in search of them, and when they least expected it fell on them and captured the whole of their camp equipage, including the Government tents (mentioned in paragraph 227), one 4-pounder gun, and numerous wall-pieces, jinjals, &c.

298. All the detachments were now advancing towards each other, but those from Doornah and Burgee saw little or nothing of the rebels except their head-quarter camp (of huts), which they burned, and the rebels under Bahadoor Sing fled towards Mundlah between the two parties; but Captain Woolley was more successful, for on the 14th he caught the leading rebel, Devee Sing, and hanged him.

299. This completely settled the Burgee Pergunnah of Jubbulpoor and Seonee, and from that day to this there has not a rebel been seen to the south of the Nerbudda, and affairs began to improve elsewhere also in the division. To add to our satisfaction also, we heard of troops coming from Bombay and Madras to the division.

300. On the Deputy Commissioners of Seonee and Mundlah returning to Doonah on the 19th, they established police posts between their two districts to check the Mundlah rebels, and on the 20th information being brought that Bahadoor Sing, the rebel, referred to in paragraph 297, was hiding in the jungle in the Jubbulpoor District to the east of Doonah, Captain Waddington, Deputy Commissioner of Mundlah, took fifty of the Irregular Infantry, his own police, and fifteen of the 52nd faithfils, and started on the 21st to catch Bahadoor Sing and re-occupy Keddarpoor, a Seonee Police post, which had been temporarily lost.

301. The attempt to catch Bahadoor Sing failed, but he was driven further eastward, and most of his followers deserted him. On the 25th the Keddarpoor Police were re-established, the detachment halting there till the arrival of the Deputy Commissioner of Seonee with the remainder of the company.

302. On the 27th Captain Waddington made another attack on the rebels near, but they fled; and the Deputy Commissioner of Seonee, agreeably to my orders, made over the whole of the Granadier Company of the Nagpoor Irregular Infantry (commanded by Lieutenant Barton, 52nd Native Infantry) to Captain Waddington to enable him to clear the banks of the Nerbudda of rebels in the Seonee, Jubbulpoor, and Mundlah Districts, and to return to Mundlah, which, with the exception of the towns of Mundlah and Mohow, was entirely in the hands of the rebels.

303. Captain Waddington’s little army consisted of a few police, one company of Irregular Infantry and fifteen men of the 52nd, and on the 31st of December he started on his expedition through the hills and dense jungle.

304. But I must now state what was going on elsewhere.
305. In Saugor the Deputy Commissioner went on the Nursingpoor Road, along with the patrolling troops, to re-assure the people and get in supplies, and from that time grain, &c., began to come in, and fell 30 per cent. in the Saugor Bazar.

306. On the 15th December Brigadier Sage sent a party to attack the rebels at Bhapyle and fail. Saugor troops attack rebels at Bhapyle and fail.

307. On the 26th Rebel was again attacked by the 52nd and rebels from Gurrakotta, but were driven off by Lieutenant Dickens and the Police.

308. On the 20th the two companies of the 28th, and two guns (mentioned in paragraph 292) under Lieutenant Standon, arrived at Jubbulpoor, and the next day a troop of the 2nd Hyderabad Cavalry under Captain Macintire, also arrived.

309. The rebels in the hills near Kuttungee in Jubbulpoor were still causing great trouble, and were plundering all the villages of grain near Koney, on the right bank of the Herun River, and I was again obliged to call for troops to go out there.

310. On the 21st, two companies of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, two 6-pounders, and a troop of cavalry were sent out by Brigadier A. Lawrence then in command. The guns opened on Koney, where the enemy were assembled, and drove them out, and the cavalry crossing lower down, swept the plain at the foot of the hills, driving the enemy up to their fastnesses therein.

311. More than this, the officer in command of the party thought, could not be achieved by the force under his command, the position of the insurgents being on the top of a nearly perpendicular hill covered with bush jungle.

312. This range of hills skirts the Herun for miles, with only one or two passes practicable for footmen; but I saw the necessity for our troops ascending these hills, and requested Brigadier Lawrence to detach a party for this purpose to accompany the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Baldwin, and his horse and foot police.

313. Accordingly on the 24th, two detachments, the whole under the command of Colonel Millar of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, proceeded from Jubbulpoor, one direct to Patun to attack the front of the enemy's position, and the other to ascend the pass at Kuttungee.

314. The pass had been ascended in August 1857 by the Rifle Company of the Movable Column, and many bullocks and some horses had gone up it at the time; but it was then not defended, and Colonel Millar considered it highly dangerous to attempt it, as it was for about 300 feet a flight of natural steps, and the enemy by merely rolling stones down it might occasion heavy loss to the ascending force, and as the crest was held by the enemy with some small guns, in a battery, Colonel Millar gave up the attempt and moved the party with him down to the other one at Patun.

315. On the 27th, our troops and police crossed the Herun, and saw the enemy in thousands on the hill, but some shrapnel's from our two guns made them run back, and the pass here being considered better, Captain Baldwin with his police led the way up it, and was followed by the infantry file-firing. The men safely reached the top, but pretty well blown, and the enemy for a moment again appeared to feel confidence; but they were suddenly greatly astonished to see a troop of Hyderabad Cavalry dashing up the pass under their gallant Commandant and Adjutant, Captains Macintire and Byall, who at once went at the enemy on the table-land, cutting up several and driving back the rest.
316. The police, and particularly their Jemadar Issaree Pershaud, received and deserved great praise, and on the top of the hill several of our loyal Thaikors were found ready to assist us with their Contingents.

317. Our guns were left at the foot of the hills guarded by infantry, but the troops who had ascended followed the enemy for some distance. However as no water for man or horse was to be had, they descended by the steep "Durwaza" pass at Kuttungee, and the whole returned to Jubbulpore.

318. This little expedition had a most beneficial result, as it showed the rebels that their strongest position was not tenable against our troops, and they were so awed that they have never given us trouble from this hill since.

319. In the end of this month (December) the Mewatees were again plundering in the Namaour Pergunnah of Ho-shungabad, but in Saugor and Nursingpoor matters were more settled. In the former, the majority of the staff and families remained in the fort, but a few went to their houses in cantonments, and many of the officers were necessarily out in the district with the 31st and 3rd Irregular Cavalry. Dumoh continued to be held for us by Koour Shamleyjoo with Punmah troops, and Baitool was undisturbed.

January 1858.

320. On the 2nd of January, the party under Colonel Byng of the 6th Troops on the Deccan Road attacked rebels.

321. The rebels at Narainpoor in the eastern Pergunnah of Jubbulpore joined those from other parts, and were giving much trouble; I therefore asked Brigadier Lawrence to have them attacked from two sides, and on the 4th he ordered out a force of 400 infantry, the 4th Madras Cavalry, and two 5½ inch mortars under Colonel Cumberlege, and directed the troops on the Mirzapoor road to make a combined attack on the rebels.

322. On the night of the 5th, Colonel Cumberlege's force, which was encamped at the foot of a jungly hill at Imlai, was fired on by the people of the place, and a Government elephant which carried one of the mortars was stolen. The enemy were driven off, but the elephant has not been recovered yet.

323. The next day twenty men with arms in their hands were seized by Colonel Cumberlege, and being recognized as some of the rebels were tried by Court-Martial and executed.

324. Some mistakes about commissariat supplies occurred, and the orders about the two detachments co-operating were apparently not understood; but at any rate, Colonel Cumberlege's party effected nothing, and returned to Jubbulpore.

325. The other party however from Sehore on the Deccan road, under Colonel Whistler, went over the country, reached the resort of the rebels, and alone drove them out, but did not recover the elephant which had been taken far into the hills.

326. On the 4th of January the Deputy Commissioner of Mundlaah, who (as stated in paragraph 301) was clearing the country of rebels near the Nerbudda, re-established the Jubbulpore Police at Naraingunge, and on his way captured a noted rebel "Assjeet," who was tried and hanged.
327. Matters in Mundlah and Jubbulpoor on the Seonee border were
now looking up, but to open the road between
Jubbulpoor and Mundlah it was necessary to move
on Mokas, then head-quarters of the rebel
Khooman Sing; consequently Captain Waddington and Lieutenant Barton
marched on the 7th, driving the rebels before them and taking possession
of Mokas on the 8th.

328. So precipitate was the flight of the rebels that they left behind
them a loaded jinjal and never fired on our troops, and the road was cleared.

329. The Deputy Commissioner of Hoshungabad resolved on attacking
the Mewatees in Namaour if he could get any
troops, of which there were only four companies
of Native Infantry and four guns in the district, and of these a company of
the 26th and two guns marched on the 7th with the Deputy Commissioner,
and reached Namaour on the 11th.

330. On the 12th the Deputy Commissioner of Hoshungabad received
two expresses from Nursingpoor, informing him that 4,000 rebels from Raut-
gurh had taken possession of Tendookhera in Nursingpoor, and that they
intended moving down to Hoshungabad.

331. This information made the Deputy Commissioner retrace his steps;
but his object had been effected as the dacoits had fled, and since that Namosur
has been tranquil.

332. The news sent to Hoshungabad from Nursingpoor was correct, for
the 9th about 4,000 rebels from Rautgurh and
Bhopal, including 250 Pathan horse under Adul
Mohammed Khan of Bhopal, Bulbuddur Sing of Singpoor in Saugor, and
other leaders, aided by Delun Shah, Nurwur Singh and others of Nursingpoor,
attacked Tendookhera to the north of the Nerbudda.

333. The police under Binda Pershaund, and some matchlockmen under
Rao Soorut Sing of Jinjhera and Nizam Shah, for some time most gallantly
defended the place, and not till many of them were killed, and the enemy
came overwhelming did they retreat, fighting however all the time and kill-
ing many of the enemy.

334. Rao Soorut Sing’s fine pukka house was completely destroyed,
and all his valuable property plundered, and the town and some villages were
burned; but the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Ternan, who was out with a
detachment, advanced; indeed, he had previously informed me that he thought
it probable an inroad might be made by these rebels who dreaded the
approach of the troops under Sir H. Rose coming from Indore, and I had in
consequence sent him some of the Hyderabad Cavalry under Captain Mac-
intire.

335. The troops with Captain Ternan consisted of two companies of the
Invaders of Nursingpoor district, attacked and beaten by our troops.
Cavalry, some mounted and foot police, and some
matchlockmen belonging to the Thakoors.

336. The whole advanced by forced marches against the rebels, and the
troops from Saugor patrolling the road co-operating; the rebels fled towards
Rautgurh up the ghats.

337. The cavalry under Captain Macintire, along with Captain Ternan,
Lieutenant Ryall and Doctor Bradley, made a long march, and dashing into
the rebel village of Mundenpoor, before any one there was well awake, sur-
prised all, captured some rebels (amongst whom were a son and grandson of
Delun Shah, the rebel-leader of 1842, and also in this insurrection) and killed
others. Captain Ternan shot three himself, and Doctor Bradley dragged two,
armed cap à pie, from under an earthen jar. This cleared the Chourpatta
pergunnah of all rebels of any consequence.
338. At the same time Mirbhan Sing, the most inveterate rebel in Nursingpor, and the illegitimate son of a pardoned leader of the 42nd rebellion, had arranged to attack Saugor, on the south bank of the river, simultaneously with the invasion of the Chourpatta pergannah; but I sent aid from Jubbulpoor in time, and frustrated the designs of the rebels.

339. On the 15th of January the Deputy Commissioner of Mundlah reached the head-quarters of his district after dispersing all the rebels near the Nerudda, but his force was very small, being only eighty-five bayonets of the 1st Nagpoor Irregular Infantry, fifteen of the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, and about thirty police armed with flint muskets; and his district being 3,000 square miles of hill and jungle, he could do but little beyond settling the immediate neighbourhood of Mundlah.

340. On the 15th of January Brigadier Sage placed the detachment on the Nursingpoor road at the disposal of the Deputy Commissioner of Saugor for the purpose of attacking rebels who had assembled near that road, but whenever the troops showed themselves the rebels fled.

341. As troops from Bombay were about to enter the division and proceed to Jhansie, it became necessary for me to make arrangements to send Civil Officers to accompany this force. These were as follows:—

342. Captain Pinkney, Acting Judge at Jubbulpoor, to go to Jhansie as Superintendent; Captain Clerk to go to Jhansie as Deputy Commissioner, but so long as he was employed with his regiment, Captain Maclean, the Deputy Commissioner of Baitool, was to act for him; Captain Ternan, Deputy Commissioner of Nursingpor, to go to Jaloun as Deputy Commissioner; Captain Nembhard to be Deputy Commissioner of Jubbulpoor; Captain Baldwin to act as Deputy Commissioner at Baitool, and Captain A. C. Gordon (who had escaped from Lullutpoor) to act as Deputy Commissioner at Nursingpor. These arrangements were sanctioned by Government, and Lieutenant Nembhard took charge of Jubbulpoor on the 23rd January, and Captains Baldwin and Gordon marched for their respective districts.

343. On the 25th of January the Deputy Commissioner of Saugor for the first time received authentic information that Sir H. Rose's Force might be expected at Saugor by the end of the month, but no indent or call was sent for supplies, and the troops arrived at Rautgurh in the Saugor District the next day.

344. The fort of Rautgurh was immediately attacked and was evacuated by the rebels on the 29th, when a great portion of the rebels escaped.

345. On the 31st a large body of rebels under the Banpoor Raja moved to Burodea and Jihilah, with the intention of attacking Sir H. Rose's Force; but the General on hearing of it immediately moved out and attacked them. They were quickly defeated and about 100 killed and many wounded. Our loss being one killed and six or seven wounded.

346. The force under Colonel Byng on the Deccan Road had returned to Jubbulpoor without opening out the road, but another was sent under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Whistler of the 6th Cavalry.

347. On the 23rd Colonel Whistler attacked the rebels at Ramnuggur, killing several of them and taking a few prisoners, one sepoy of the 28th Madras Native Infantry being killed and wounded.

348. On the 27th the force advanced up the road and re-established the thannah at Suleimagad.
349. The tide was now fast flowing in our favor. The Rewah troops had gone against Myhere on the Dcoor Road and taken it, and moved against Bijiragogur, which soon fell. This and Colonel Whistler’s movements opened the road.

350. On the 20th or 21st, the 1st Madras Native Infantry and a Horse Field Battery, being part of Major-General Whitlock’s Madras Force, intended for operations in my division, arrived at Jubbulpoor.

February 1858.

351. On the 1st of February the Deputy Commissioner of Saugar was requested by General Rose or Sir Robert Hamilton, Agent to the Governor-General for Central India, to collect supplies of every description for the force. This was no easy matter in a country which had for some time been in the hands of the rebels and been greatly plundered. The consumption of grain alone in the camp was 1,735 mounds daily, and thirty days’ supplies were required at once. However every exertion was made to collect supplies and to provide carriage for it.

352. The 33rd Madras Native Infantry and two 6-pounders were now recalled by the Nagpoor authorities from my Division, as they were required at Raipoor in the Nagpoor Division to quell a disturbance and small mutiny there, and on the 1st of February they marched from Jubbulpoor via Mundlah. I was glad of this move, for although the 33rd was not going for service in Mundlah, yet its passing through the district, and the sight of two guns in the hills, would have a good moral effect.

353. On the 1st February Captain Gordon received charge of the Nursingpoor District when it was in perfect peace. Captain Ternan proceeding to Jubbulpoor to join Captain Pinkney and together proceed towards Jhansie with Sir H. Rose’s force.

354. On the 3rd the force under Sir H. Rose arrived at Saugar, and the few officers, ladies, and families remaining in the fort left it, but previous to this most had taken up their residence in their own houses or had been sent into the district on duty.

Description of Saugar fort and how the garrison were accommodated.

355. I must here give some description of the fort of Saugar, and how the Europeans were accommodated in it.

356. The fort of Saugar was originally built by the Boondelahs in Chuterassal’s time, but was improved in the time of the Mahratta Government, and since 1818 has been used by our Government as an arsenal. It is an irregular quadrangle, about 400 yards long and 150 broad, built on a rock, in the town, about one-half mile from the cantonments, bounded on three sides by the town, the houses being built close up to the walls, and on the fourth side by the beautiful lake, which is a mile in length and three-quarter of a mile in breadth. The walls are high and massive, but being very old are far from strong.

357. It is commanded by a hill about half a mile off in the outskirts of the town, whence it was battered by the Mahratta Artillery many years ago.

358. The fortifications were considerably strengthened by order of Brigadier Sage, and a large sum of money was expended on it. Heavy guns and mortars were mounted on every side. The interior accommodation is native, except the powder magazine, gun sheds and storehouses.

359. Previous to the Europeans entering it, it was pretty well stocked with grain, &c.; cattle, sheep, goats, &c., public and private, were accommo-
dated in houses outside the fort; and as the town was commanded by the fort, there was no fear of a dearth of supplies, particularly as all private stores and a merchant's shop were also removed into the fort, and the supply of powder, arms, guns, and ammunition was large.

360. Little arrangement however could be made for the accommodation of a large Christian population, a list of which is appended, marked N. The buildings are low and confined, and not in good repair.

361. A large square building called the "Lal Pittarah" was made over to the married officers and their families. It consisted of a square courtyard with long low verandahs on three sides, and had been long used by us as an Armoury, and was ill ventilated and not well adapted for Europeans. The principal room or "Dalan" on the ground-floor was converted into a mess house, where the majority of the officers and their wives breakfasted and dined.

362. The European artillerymen with their families, likewise the Conductors, Band-boys, clerks and others, were accommodated in gun sheds at the west end of the fort, and subsequently when cholera made its appearance, huts were erected on the top of the gun sheds for the use of the men.

363. Brigadier Sage, with the Commissary of Ordnance and a few other officers, occupied a two-storied native building to the south-east.

364. The officers of the 42nd Native Infantry occupied a shed to the south side of the fort, and the officers of the 31st lived in a native building situated over the gateway.

365. Cooking sheds were erected on the north face of the fort, and the conservancy arrangements were as good as circumstances would admit of; but so many human beings (for there were numerous Native servants in addition to the 370 Europeans) being crowded from the 27th of June into so confined a space, cholera, small-pox, diarrhoea and fever broke out, on which arrangements were made to convert a part of a building called the "Nuzzur Bagh," about fifty yards outside the gate, into an hospital, one portion of which was made over to the officers, and another to the men. The poor children in the "Lal Pittarah" suffered most, four of them died, and the confinement injured others.

366. The Deputy Commissioner and his Assistants held their Courts as usual, and conducted business in the "Nuzzur Bagh."

367. The Civil and Military Officers were armed and embodied into three divisions, each division was out in its turn every third night, performing sentry duty and patrolling. All did their duty with alacrity and cheerfulness throughout the rains, and I have been assured by the Deputy Commissioner that he does not recollect one quarrel or private misunderstanding in the garrison.

368. It will be seen from this how much better off, in every respect, the Europeans were at Saugor than we were at Jubulpoor. At the former place they had a comparatively large and strong fort well stocked with guns, arms of all sorts and ammunition, a large number of able-bodied Europeans, besides a Company of European Artillery, and, after a time, loyal troops. Whereas at Jubulpoor we had only a large house (of eleven rooms and a verandah) and some out-houses, no cannon, but few Europeans, and no reliable troops till August.

369. On the 6th of February a small portion of General Whitlock's force arrived at Jubulpoor, and the remainder of his 1st Brigade followed in a few days.

370. On the 7th another large party of rebels attacked Saleemabad, but were driven off with considerable loss.
371. On the 9th Sir H. Rose, leaving a few troops in Saugor, marched with the rest of his force against the mutineers of the 62nd and rebels in Gurrakotta, and arriving before it on the 10th, were fired on from the fort. General Rose not only returned the fire sharply, but commenced arrangements for a siege; but on the night of the 11th, the enemy evacuated the fort and fled in the Shahghur direction. They were overtaken by a column under the command of Captain Hare of the Hyderabad Contingent, and about 100 were cut up.

372. When Sir H. Rose arrived at Saugor, the Banpoor rebels at once fled from Nurrecole and Korai, and this enabled our police to re-occupy those posts, and the taking of Gurrakotta made nearly all large bodies of rebels leave the Saugor district: consequently our police returned to their out-posts, except at Malthone in the north, which was still held by the Banpoor Raja; Padun, Diamondee and Puchumnugger all in the north, which were held by the Shahghur rebels.

373. The Central India Field Force returned to Saugor from Gurrakotta and halted there till supplies could be got ready, which, with the utmost exertions of the Deputy Commissioner and the whole of his establishment, were collected.

374. On the 11th, the 4th and 6th Madras Light Cavalry, which had been ordered to Allahabad, marched from Jubbulpoor, but had not got many marches when a telegram was received from the Secretary to Government, informing me that "the Nana" had crossed into Bundelkund with a large force; consequently General Whitlock ordered them to halt till his force could overtake them.

375. General Whitlock himself arrived at Jubbulpoor on the 3rd of February and informed me that his force was sent for service in my division, and that he was ready to undertake any operations against the rebels I thought proper, and he wished me to state my plans, even to the strength of troops to be left at stations; and I consequently laid my plan before him, which was to march in two columns by different routes on Dumoh, clearing the rebels out as we went, leaving garrisons at Jubbulpoor and Dumoh, and then marching on Saugor,—it is appended and marked O,—and he informed me at first that he quite approved of my plan and would carry it out; but this he never did as will be seen hereafter. His reply is appended and marked P.

376. I believe it was in consequence of the news of the Nana coming into Bundelkund, General Whitlock determined on taking the whole of his force with him, except a small garrison for Jubbulpoor, and marching up the Deccan Road as far as Jokai, joining the 4th and 6th Cavalry on the way. I resolved some time before to accompany him, and on the 17th February we marched.

377. On the 19th I applied to General Whitlock to send a small body of troops out to Ramnugger, twelve miles off, to destroy the small fort there, and on the 20th I asked him to destroy the little fort of Bhatgaon, both of which places had given us much trouble, and I considered it of much importance that all these little strongholds should be totally destroyed as we advanced. I also pointed out the necessity of keeping guns and troops on this road. I append the General's reply marked Q, which is to the effect that he could not spare time or troops, but had ordered Lieutenant Pereira, Commanding the Nagpoor Rifles, to do the work, and that he had arranged to get the two companies of the 28th (not under his command, and whom I had sent along with the rifles and two guns) to remain at Sehora and Saleemabed, and that he would also leave some Hyderabad Cavalry on the road.
378. We continued marching up the road, and on the 25th I reported that about nine miles off there was a small fort called Murdàngur, occupied by about 200 rebels; and as they had never been attacked, I was anxious that the General should do so, and also dismantle the place.

379. I also informed him that there was another place on our route, or very near it, named Mangur, the seat of a Gond rebel Raja, who had no fort, but had made his house pretty strong, and had about 500 armed followers.

380. I thought it particularly necessary that these rebels should be attacked as we advanced, for independent of their power of doing mischief in Jubbulpour when we had gone, they would, unless attacked, think we could not, or dared not touch them. The General's reply is annexed and marked R, stating that he was adopting measures which he hoped would succeed in not only destroying the strongholds I referred to, but in preventing the escape of the rebels. However nothing was done, neither were the strong places destroyed, nor the rebels once attacked between Jubbulpour and Dumoh.

381. On the 24th we reached Jokai, which place had been completely destroyed by the Rewah troops. Here we met the loyal Raja of Oochaira or Nagode, and the General paraded his troops for the Raja's inspection.

382. The report of the Nana having come into Bandelkund was an error, and the 4th and 6th Cavalry proceeded on their way to Allahabad.

383. The Sauger Field Force, as General Whitlock's force was officially designated, then left the Deccan Road on the 26th, and marched by seven stages to Dumoh, and on the way I more than once pointed out to the General the advisability of attacking the rebels, who, as we advanced, merely moved a short way right and left into the jungle, and I was most anxious to attack the noted rebel, Kishore Sing of Hindoree, close to Dumoh; and the General in reply stated—"Your wishes shall meet with every attention in my power." But nothing was done, and these rebels are yet at large, and never ceased plundering till very lately.

384. But to prevent the threat of this part of the narrative being broken, I have anticipated a little, and must now return to the chronological order of this narrative.

385. Sir Robert Hamilton, Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, had on the arrival of General Rose's force at Sauger, sent the 31st and 42nd Regiments and 3rd Irregular Cavalry out of that district to Shahgurh and in the Malthone direction; and as I heard that General Rose intended leaving no troops at Sauger, I begged both to remember that without leaving troops in Sauger the place could not be considered "relieved" or safe, but they informed me that they could not leave a man at Sauger.

386. On the 23rd the Deputy Commissioner of Sauger reported supplies ready for Sir H. Rose's force, and on the 27th he marched, leaving a small detachment at Sauger to bring on the bulk of his supplies.

387. On the 25th of February the rebels attacked Jubelah in the Jubbulpour District on the Dumoh road, and burned down the serai, the direct road between Jubbulpour and Dumoh was closed by large bodies of rebels, and about thirty mutineers of the 52nd under Davee Sing, who took up positions at Singrampoor and Jubelah, and also at Konda on the top of the hills, at a place near Mujholee.
388. On the 28th of February, in consequence of General Whitlock's force being near, the Burttullah Thannah in Jubbulpoor was re-established on the road between Jokai and Dumoh.

MARCH 1858.

389. On the 1st of March 1858, Lieutenant Walters of the 50th Madras Native Infantry, who was at Sebora in Jubbulpoor, with a company of his regiment made an attack on the rebels near Mujholee and killed several, taking also their ammunition and several prisoners; but I regret to say he was severely wounded, and from which wound he has not yet recovered.

390. Major Western, Deputy Commissioner of Saugor, Captain Pinkney, Superintendent of Jhansie, Captain Ternan and Maclean, Officiating Deputy Commissioners of Jalon and Jhansie, joined General Rose's force, and on the 3rd of March the General captured Malthone and the Muddunpoor Pass in the Saugor District, inflicting great slaughter on the 52nd mutineers and rebels, and entered the Shahgurh District. The police being at once established at Malthone.

391. On the 2nd of March, General Whitlock's force entered the Dumoh District, and on the 4th marched into the station of Dumoh.

392. Here Koor Shamleyjoo met me, and made over the district to me.

393. On the 4th of March I wrote as follows to Major General Whitlock: "In my memorandum of the state of my districts, I stated that in my opinion the rebels should be attacked as your force advanced, and then after leaving a garrison at Dumoh, it should proceed to Saugor; consequently as we advanced, I informed you where the rebels were, and that I wished them to be attacked and their strongholds to be destroyed; but for reasons unknown to me, but which I do not presume to question for a moment, we have passed all these places, and left the rebels intact. On the 26th February, I furnished you with a copy of the letters as per margin, stating that Sir H. Rose cannot leave any portion of his force at Saugor, which station must be occupied by a portion of your force, asking you to furnish it, and ordering the 31st and 42nd Bengal Native Infantry away. In reply, you stated in your letter No. 39, dated the 27th ultimo, that you could not afford to detach any infantry, but that your whole force was marching on Saugor with all expedition.

"I now learn that the force will halt here until you return from Saugor, and that no military operations will take place during your absence, which will be probably a week.

"Without presuming to question the expediency of your arrangements and disposition of troops, I think it is my duty to inform you and to put it on record, that when I asked you to undertake certain operations on the road, I was under the impression that they could be undertaken without-retarding the advance of your column, or at any rate that Mungurh and Puturgurh might be destroyed in a day; but these are, in my opinion, minor considerations, compared with the safety of Saugor and the permanent re-occupation of Dumoh, and if your force is not strong enough to accomplish all, I would urge the necessity of providing for the immediate safety of Saugor, after leaving a small body of troops in the station or fort of Dumoh.

"I am informed that the small body of troops left temporarily at Sau­gor by General Sir H. Rose, will probably have marched by this time, as they
were merely left to escort some supplies to his camp, and not as a garrison.

"The garrison only consists of sixty-four European Gunners and 360 Bengal Native Infantry."

394. The General acknowledged the receipt of my letter, and in person assured me he could not divide his force, or undertake the expeditions I wished.

General Whitlock goes into Saugor and divides his force.

395. On the 5th, General Whitlock went into Saugor with some artillery and lancers.

396. From Saugor, the General wrote for 200 of the 3rd European Regiment and 70 Native Infantry to proceed to Saugor by forced marches, and they did so on the 8th. He also ordered two guns, 100 of the 3rd European and 70 Native Infantry to proceed by the direct road to Jubbulpore to escort the rebels, and would have seized Delun Shah.

397. The rest of his force remained at Dumoh, under the command of Brigadier Carpenter.

398. On the 8th, I asked Brigadier Carpenter to attack the Hindoree rebels, twelve miles off; but he informed me that the General had forbidden his doing so.

399. On the 12th, General Whitlock returned to Dumoh from Saugor, bringing with him some of the lancers and Horse Artillery.

400. On the 16th of March I had a long conversation with General Whitlock; but as it ended in his not consenting to do anything against the rebels, who were plundering close to us and between Jubbulpore and Dumoh, I saw that it was no use my remaining with him, and as the Deputy Commissioner of Dumoh had arrived, and I had completed, along with him, all my civil arrangements, I resolved on going into Saugor, and accordingly I left Dumoh on the 17th, after ordering that General Whitlock should have Rupees 2,70,000 out of the five lakhs coming up from Jubbulpore.

401. On the 17th the General received orders from Government to proceed to Nagode and Punna to Huttan, and as this latter place was close to a village called Jutta-Shunker, where there were about 500 rebels with two guns, I asked him to attack them, but he did not do so. He marched out of my division after leaving twenty European and fifty Native soldiers at Dumoh, and I went to Saugor.

402. General Whitlock may have had very good reasons for not doing as I wished him, but it was my duty to look to the safety of the people and districts committed to my charge, and I cannot doubt that had the rebels been attacked as I wished, my division would have much sooner been restored to peace than it has been, particularly as the very rebels I wished him to attack are those who have plundered ever since, and some of whom will not submit to our authority, and retain places they seized.

403. About the middle of this month Captain Gordon, Deputy Commissioner of Jubbulpore, reported that the rebel leader, Mirban Sing, had once or twice come down to Herapoor on the right bank of the Nerbudda, but never dared to cross it. He had also attacked Bumhorcee, but was repulsed by the police and Customs chuprassees and followers of Dewan Pirtee Sing. He did this in revenge for a severe punishment he and the rebel leader Delun Shah had met with at the hands of the Deputy Commissioner and Lieutenant Walton of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, who took them by surprise in the jungles at daybreak and killed a great many of the rebels, and would have seized Delun Shah had the ground been good.
404. On the 20th, the Deputy Commissioner of Jubbulpore, taking
Thannah between Dumoh and Jubbul-
poor re-established, but again lost.
and Singrampore,
Juberalah and Singrampore,
but they were soon driven in again by the strong
bodies of rebels under Devee Sing and Mirbhan Sing; and though several
attempts have since been made to establish our posts there, our matchlockmen
have invariably been driven away, and it is hopeless to try it again till the
military police are armed and trained.

405. On the 24th Mr. Watts, a landed proprietor in Jubbulpore, with a
party of police and some of Major Sleeman's
rebels
disbaried, dispersed them and killed several, amongst them a man of note named
Runjet Sing, and capturing the leader Koondun Sing, who was afterwards
tried and executed.

406. The Deputy Commissioner of Mundlah's troops were not strong
enough to enable him to do much after his reaching Mundlah on the 8th January (see paragraph
338) till he could be reinforced, and this I was not able to arrange for till the
23rd of March, when he received a 2nd Company of Nagpore Infantry under
Lieutenant Cockburn, and leaving fifty of these
for the protection of the town, he, Lieutenants
Barton and Cockburn marched with the little force
as per margin for Ramgurh on the 29th, and the
next day took the Bidee Pass, which was held by
the enemy, but he fled at once.

407. On the 31st the force with the Deputy Commissioner of Mundlah
took possession of the rebel village of Ghoo-
gree without opposition, and perceiving that the
largest body of rebels were resolved to make their stand at Ramgurh, the
Deputy Commissioner resolved on attacking it.

408. When at Saugor I arranged an expedition with Brigadier Wheler
Expedition against rebels in Per-
gunnah, with a view to attack the rebels in the Relilee Pergunnah of
Saugor, and as the Brigadier ordered Lieutenant
Dickens and his Company of the 31st to move in that direction against the
rebels near the Bearmee and Beas Rivers, I wrote to Nursingpoor for a
Company of the 28th to advance against them on the other side. These two
detachments met at the place appointed, but the rebels had fled and the
detachments returned to their respective stations.

409. I reached Nursingpoor on the 30th March, and returned to Jubbulpore on the 3rd April.

410. Plundering in parts of Saugor, Dumoh, Jubbulpore and Mundlah
State of districts in March 1858.
was still going on when the month of March closed, but all the other districts were quiet,
and have not since been disturbed.

APRIL 1858.

411. On the 1st of April three signal shots were fired by the rebels
Taking of Ramgurh in Mundlah by
Deputy Commissioner's spies reported that the ghat
was occupied by the rebels in force.

412. On the 2nd the little Mundlah force advanced and attacked the
barricaded pass with a rush; this made the cowardly enemy take to their
heels, leaving three of their party dead on the field, and the troops pushed
on for Ramgurh.

413. The town of Ramgurh is situated on high ground in the plain,
and Lieutenant Barton, who commanded the party, made a dash at the place
from two sides, when the enemy evacuated the town. Lieutenant Cockburn followed them up with a few sowars, and had a narrow escape of being shot.

414. The Deputy Commissioner at once took possession of the Raja's house and established his head-quarters there. The enemy were calculated to number 1,000 matchlocks, with thirty zumbooraks and jinjals.

415. The Ramgurh rebels were now reinforced from several places. The Thakoor of Shaipoora, said to be the bravest soldier in the district, put himself at their head, and accordingly on the 9th of April they mustered strongly on the side of the hill to the north of the town, intending to attack Lieutenant Barton's force from three sides. However our party assumed the aggressive, and though the enemy came down headed by a sepoy in uniform with all the shouts and antics of wild Hindoostanee war, they were completely routed by our brave little force, leaving twenty-five dead, a 2-lb iron gun, four jinjals, and a quantity of powder and iron balls, and other property. On our side only one man was wounded. This completely disheartened the rebels. The Deputy Commissioner did his utmost to get the ignorant wild Gonds back to their occupations, and succeeded.

416. Shaipoora, another of our Teeseelers in Mundlah, was re-occupied on the 24th of April without opposition by Lieutenant Barton's detachment, and on the 27th the Gurhee of Singpoor was occupied, the rebels having fled.

417. Sohagpoor was now the only place of strength occupied by the rebels of Mundlah. This is a strong though small stone fort, and could not be attacked without guns, of which our troops had none.

418. I then asked the Commissioner of Nagpoor for a larger force to proceed from Raipoor, to assist Lieutenant Barton, and he sent Captain the Baron Von Meyern with 250 of the 3rd Nagpoor Infantry and eighty Irregular Cavalry, to surround the place. Guns in time came from Rewah and opened on the place; the two detachments already referred to nearly surrounding the fort, but the blockade was not so strict as to prevent the enemy evacuating the fort on the 18th of June.

419. The garrison were about 300 matchlockmen with some half dozen small guns, and went off to Rewah, whence they had expected assistance instead of opposition.

420. Since then the Raipoor and Rewah detachments have returned to their respective posts, but the two companies of Nagpoor Irregulars will remain in the district till the rains cease, and the police corps is organized. The district is now quiet.

421. I have anticipated, so as not to break the thread of the narrative of the late doings in Mundlah; but must now report the state of other districts in April.

422. On the 2nd of April a large body of rebels attacked the police post at Piprode on the Mirzapoor and Jubulpoor road, and killed one burkundaz and two dak horses, and carried off three more horses. The Daffadar of Police behaved very well, and drove off the rebels.

423. On the 5th the rebel-leaders, Bhao Sing and Himmut, with 300 followers, only 100 of whom however had matchlocks, attacked the Bartullah Thannah in Jubulpoor; but the Thannahdar stood his ground and fought well till reinforced by some neighbouring zamindars, when the rebels were driven on to the hills.

424. On the 14th the Teesseelar of Patun, in Jubulpoor, attacked some rebels and killed three; but on the 16th they attacked Mouzah Hurdeo, and carried off the Malgoazar and his daughter as they had assisted the police with information.
425. On the 18th Brigadier Macduff's Brigade arrived at Jubbulpoor and leaves Jubbulpoor.

426. On the 26th, 500 rebels, under Rundbeer Sing, Pertab Sing, Devee Sing, and Himmut Sing, attacked and destroyed the Thannah of Muj bhore in Jubbulpoor, and burned some fifty houses. The police behaved well, and killed five of the enemy.

427. On the 29th, the Thannah of Kuttungee, in Jubbulpoor, was again attacked, when 100 of Major Sleeman's Nujeebs were sent out and drove off the rebels, with a loss of five killed and two wounded, and on our side one burkundaz and two horses were wounded.

428. The rebels on the Deccan Road became so daring on the 29th as to fire on the guns coming into Jubbulpoor, but a few rounds soon sent them flying into the jungle.

429. During the month of April nothing occurred in the districts south of the Nerbbudda, and Saugar was nearly at peace.

State of districts in end of April.

May 1858.

430. As plundering was still going on in Jubbulpoor, it was resolved to send out troops, and on the 9th the Nagpoor Rifles under Lieutenant Pereira, and some of Major Sleeman's Nujeebs under Captain Gib, went out into the Kuttungee hills, Mr. Watts accompanying the party as Deputy Superintendent of Police; but after a time, the latter officer separated from Captain Gib. Each party met with rebels, and did good service; some twenty-six rebels were killed and others were made prisoners by Mr. Watts. Captain Gib's party killed thirteen rebels, and their leader, Juggut Sing, a sepoy of the late 52nd. Since this time nothing worthy of note has occurred.

431. Since the proclamation of Amnesty, ordered by the Governor-General, was issued on the recommendation of Sir R. Hamilton, Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, peace has greatly been restored, and many rebels have given in. Still, however, some remain bitterly opposed to us, and so long as the leaders, Himmut Sing and Bhoo Sing of Neemkhera, remain at large, it will be necessary to keep two companies and two guns on the Deccan Road to keep the dak communication open.

432. On the 16th May the rebel leader, Delun Shah, of Nursingpoor, who had long been hiding in the jungles, attacked Mudderpoor on the right bank of the Nerbbudda, his former residence, but was gallantly met by the police, who beat him off, followed him and seized him. He was a leader of note in the rebellion of 1843, and had been released. He was now tried by the Deputy Commissioner (as Special Commissioner) and hanged. This settled Nursingpoor for good, I hope; but we still want the other leader, Mirbhan Sing, whose father rebelled in 1843, and was long in jail.

433. Most of the Chiefs and Malgoozars of Nursingpoor and some in Jubbulpoor and Saugar have behaved remarkably well, and have been recommended for rewards by the Deputy Commissioner and myself; others have rebelled, and others remained passive.

Concluding Remarks.

434. Before the Districts of Chundeyree, Jnsize and Jaloun were formed into a new division, I had the satisfaction of knowing that General Rose's admirable operations had enabled Captain Pinkney to recover possession of all three districts,
and I can now with confidence and pleasure state, that peace is restored to my division of eight districts, for although we have some leaders still at large, their followers are but few; indeed, they are not more formidable now than ordinary dacoits, and they will, it is to be hoped, soon be hunted down, when the police have been drilled and properly organized; but until then, extra police (matchlockmen) must be retained.

435. It will be observed that the rebellion never went south of the Rebellion did not extend to the Nerbudda, except the one attempt in Pergunnah south or left bank of the Nerbudda. Burgee in Jubbulpore, which was soon checked, and that now the large bodies of troops have left us we are still with much fewer regular troops than we ever had in the time of peace, fast extinguishing the remains of the rebellion; but had mutineers or rebels from elsewhere with guns entered the division, we should have had no sufficient force to bring against them, and I am most anxious to see European troops stationed at Jubbulpore and Saugor.

436. The European Officers in civil employ, who have served under me in this most anxious and trying year, 1857-58, are as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputy Commissioners of the 1st Class. (Salary Rs. 1,000.)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Captain Pinkney (now promoted).</td>
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<td>2. Lieutenant Wood.</td>
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<td>3. Major Western.</td>
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<td>4. Captain Clerk.</td>
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<td>5. Lieutenant Nembhard.</td>
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<th>Deputy Commissioners of the 2nd Class. (Salary Rs. 600.)</th>
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<td>1. Captain Gordon.</td>
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<td>2. Captain Waddington.</td>
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<td>3. Captain Maclean.</td>
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<td>4. Lieutenant Hamilton.</td>
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<th>Assistants. (Salary Rs. 500.)</th>
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<td>Lieutenant Thomson, Acting, 2nd Class Deputy Commissioner.</td>
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<td>Captain Baldwin, ditto ditto ditto.</td>
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<td>Lieutenant Fitzgerald, dead.</td>
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<td>&quot; Tyler.</td>
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<td>&quot; Gordon.</td>
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<th>Deputy Collectors.</th>
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<td>Mr. H. Read (Salary Rs. 400).</td>
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<td>&quot; J. Hennessy</td>
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<td>&quot; J. Beddy</td>
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<td>&quot; J. Thornton</td>
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<td>&quot; D. A. Cameron</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; W. James</td>
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<td>&quot; D. Sinclair</td>
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437. All these officers have done their duty thoroughly, and most of them are brought prominently forward in this Narrative. Many have acted as good soldiers as well as good Civilians, and it is difficult to select those who have done best: but Captain Pinkney was in numerous affairs with the enemy, and always in the van. He has been justly and well rewarded for his public conduct as a Civilian in being made Commissioner of Jhansie, and I am happy it was in my power to bring him forward. All deserve my thanks and a Government reward; the former they have most heartily, and the latter I hope to see given in increase of salary to the Deputy Commissioners (who are underpaid and overworked), and also by some receiving Brevet rank.

438. I must not omit the officers of the Customs Department. All the Europeans and most of the Natives did good service, particularly in Saugor, where under their gallant Collector, Mr. Bell, they took a prominent part in the defence of the fort and the attacks on the enemy in the field.
439. The Uncovenanted Clerks and Assistants have done their duty well, and both at Saungor and Jubbulpoor were formed into a military corps, taking sentry duty at night, and many of them behaved with distinction.

440. The Native Ulmahs in general have behaved with fidelity, and have conducted their duties as usual throughout the rebellion; the few exceptions are mentioned in this Narrative.

441. The police in some instances have behaved with much gallantry; but in most cases with pusillanimity, and sometimes with cowardice, and even with treachery. The mounted police have behaved well, and I have increased their pay from Rupees 16 to 20 a month.

442. What my own part in the suppression of this rebellion has been, I need not say beyond that it was most arduous and trying: for months I did not know what it was to have two hours of consecutive sleep, and from daybreak till sunset I was busy.

443. I have compiled this Narrative from the returns of the District Officers and from my own private notes and official documents. It is truthful, and as it is so long, I have endeavoured to avoid comment or anecdote, which might have made it read better. I have omitted much detail, but I could not condense so much matter into a smaller space than thirty-eight sheets of manuscript.

444. As far as possible, I have written it chronologically when such would not break the thread of any particular event or series of events in a district, and I trust it will be found intelligible.

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APPENDICES.

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A.

Extract of Mr. Colvin's note to Major W. C. Euskin, Commissioner, Jubbulpoor, dated Agra, 30th May 1857.

Many thanks for your letters to 24th. They are all most satisfactory to me, marking your characteristic firmness, cool judgment, and commanding sense.

If any counsels can save us from the dangers of absurd stories about bone-dust, 'atta, &c., your's will.

_____

B.

List of English and other Christians murdered at Jhansi in June 1857.

Captain A. Skene, Superintendent.
Mrs. Skene and two children.
Captain Gordon, Deputy Commissioner.
Captain Dunlop, 12th N. I.
Ensign Taylor, 12th N. I.
Captain Burgess, Revenue Surveyor.
Lieutenant Campbell, 14th I. C.
Dr. McEgan, 14th I. C.
Mrs. McEgan and three children.
Captain Powys, Ex. Engineer.
Mrs. Powys and one child.

Mr. Carshore, Collector of Customs.
Mrs. Carshore and four children.
Mr. T. Andrews, Principal Sudder Ameen.
" R. Andrews, Deputy Collector.
Mrs. R. Andrews, and three children.
" Geo. Browne, wife of Lieutenant Browne, Deputy Commissioner, Jhaloun.
Miss Browne, sister of Lieutenant Browne, Deputy Commissioner, Jhaloun.
Mr. A. Scott.
Mr. C. Purcell. Mr. F. Munrowd. G. D. Davies. Mrs. Davies. Mr. Crawford. G. Young. "G. Elliott, father and mother. ...


**ABSTRACT.**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
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... 33
... 16
... 27

Total ... 76 names known,

and it is believed there were others whose names are not known.

**JUBBULPOOR,**
**10th August 1858.**

(Sd.) W. C. ERSKINE,
Commissioner of the Jubbulpore Division.

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C.

Photography of Agency House. (Omitted.)

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D.

List of Europeans, &c., in the Jubbulpore Garrison.

**Major Erskine.**
"Sleeman.
Lieut.-Col. Jamieson.
Major R. Gordon.
Mrs. Gordon and five children.
Captain Vanrenen.
Mrs. Vanrenen and two children.
Captain Hall.
Mrs. Hall and three children.
Captain Moxon.
"Mrs. Moxon.
Captain Martin.
"Mrs. Martin.
Lieutenant Grant.
"Mrs. Grant.
Lieutenant Clerk, Deputy Commr.
Lieutenant Crossman.
Lieutenant Baldwin, Asstt. Commr.
Captain Waddington.
Mr. R. Waddington.

Mr. W. Hall, Civil Engineer.
Dr. Wethered.
Mrs. Wethered.
Dr. Wilson.
Mrs. Wilson.
Revd. Mr. Woodington (in and out).
Mr. W. Rebsch.
Mrs. Rebsch and five children.
Lieutenant MacGregor.
"Jackson.
"Oakes.
"Barton.
"Miller.
"Manning.
"Bromley.
"Cockburn.
"Mackenzie.
"Dick.
"Graham.
Lieutenant Burnett.
Mr. Bighie.
Sergeant O'Neil and wife.
    Kimber
    Brogan
    Whiting and child.
Mr. Campbell, wife and two children.
    Sinclair.
    Cline.
    Johnson.
    Grant.
    Doran and wife.
    Hutton.
    Palmer and wife.
    Williams, wife and three children.
    O'Donnell.
    Hopkins.
    Fordham.
    E. Ridge, Sr., wife and one child.
    E. J. Ridge.

Mr. C. Ridge.
    A. Russell, wife and four children.
    W. Russell, mother and sister.
    Little.
    Clayton.
    Gregory.
    Regly.
    Adams, wife and one child.
    Banks and wife.
    Davis, wife and four children.
    Rivett, wife and six children.
    E. Thompson, Senior, wife and seven children.
    E. W. Thompson.
    J. R. Hazle, wife and three children.
    R. A. Butterfield and wife.
    Cork, wife and two children.
    Withall.

Quarter-Master-Sergeant Fox, wife and mother.

(Sd.) W. C. ERSKINE,
Commissioner.

E.

Extract, paragraph 1st, from a letter from Officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India to the Commissioner of Saugor Division, No. 715, dated 12th February 1858.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

Para: 1st.—In reply to your letter No. 221, dated 24th July 1857, I am now directed to state that the Hon'ble the President in Council concurs with you in your views respecting the interference of the Commissioner of Nagpoor with troops serving within the Saugor Division.

G.

My dear Erskine,—With reference to my note of yesterday, and your reply in which you state your intention of consulting with Colonel Millar, regarding the halt at Jubbulpore, or immediate advance, of the Madras Movable Column, I consider it my duty to record, for your consideration, and that of Colonel Millar, my firm conviction, founded not only on the conduct displayed by the great majority of the regiments of the Bengal Army, but on my knowledge of the feelings of the 52nd in particular, that if the column leaves Jubbulpore before some very decided success for our arms in the north-west has been made manifest to the sepoys, they cannot, and will not, resist the summons to join the mutineers, and enrol themselves under the rebel king. It is my opinion, that the whole column should halt here, pending
the receipt of some authentic intelligence regarding affairs in the north-west; or in the event of your determining on an immediate advance, that arrangements should be made for the protection of the station and establishments, by leaving here, under the command of Captain Vanrenen, of the Artillery, two of the 9-pounder guns attached to the column, and a detail of Europeans to work them.

Two guns of the same calibre can be supplied to the column from the Saugor Magazine, without delay or inconvenience; whereas, if we are left to be furnished with guns from Kamptee, the mischief I anticipate will most probably occur before they can reach us. You will be naturally anxious to ensure, as far as possible, the safety of the European residents of the station, and I am sure I need not dwell on the importance of protecting the valuable establishments here located.

You are well aware of the great embarrassment which a break-up of the Approver Establishment alone would entail on Government, and the unaided efforts of my police would be quite insufficient to prevent their escape, should the mutineers think proper to release them.

I send you this in a demi-official shape, to obviate the necessity for its going through the Office; but you will accept it as my deliberate opinion on a public matter, and consequently consider it a public document.

JUBULPOOR,
1st August 1857.

Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) J. SLEEMAN.

H.

In the present state of affairs, and until we hear of the fall of Delhi, no station, occupied by only Native troops of the Bengal Army, can be considered safe.

This does not necessarily imply reflection on the 52nd now here. They have apparently been in a state of great insubordination, but appear to have calmed down, and are now quiet. Still, with the many unfortunate examples before us, reliance can scarcely be placed in any Native Regiments of this Presidency.

Under these circumstances, and considering the critical position we are placed in at Jubbulpore, and the difficulty, indeed almost impossibility, of being speedily relieved during the rainy season in the event of an outbreak of the Corps—as an Artillery Officer, I give it as my deliberate opinion, that it is not at present safe to leave this station entirely in the hands of the 52nd; and I consider it highly impolitic that the Movable Column recently arrived from Kamptee should pass on, without leaving us a single gun, or European gunner, wherewith to defend ourselves: and although it is improbable that aught I alone advance, will influence a decision on the subject, I for one most respectfully remonstrate against a proceeding which will leave us in so unprotected a state, which may expose this station to loss, and our helpless women and children to certain destruction.

I consider that a calm and temperate explanation should be made both to the Commissioner, Major Erskine, and the Officer Commanding the Movable Column, with an earnest request that all the Madras troops do not move on, at least until a reply has been received to a representation which is about to be submitted by Major Sleeman to the Governor-General in Council, and pending His Lordship’s decision as to the propriety or otherwise of the proceeding.

For many days, though not besieged, we were almost in a state of siege; throwing up intrenchments, and blockading ourselves in the Agency. Was it an imaginary danger? And against whom were these precautions taken? I was always under the belief, that it was against this very regiment to whose tender mercies it is now proposed to leave us.
This station should be provided with two guns manned by European gunners, and that before the Movable Column leaves the station.

JUBBULPOOR, 5th August 1858. (Sd.) D. C. VANRENNEN, Captain, Artillery.

GENTLEMEN,—The matter on which I wish to consult you to-day, is the advance or halt of the Movable Column.

Owing to the mutineers and rebellion, the whole of the Jaloun, Jhansie, Chundeyree, Saugor and Dumoh Districts (with the exception of the town and fort of Saugor and the same of Dumoh) have temporarily been lost to us, and a state of fearful anarchy exists in all these districts.

In Jubbulpoor both mutiny and rebellion were expected, and at one time an invasion from Native States; but happily all these have been averted. The 52nd Regiment is behaving remarkably orderly and quietly; and by three detachments of this corps having marched into the district, all appearance of rebellion has been put down. The roads in every direction, with the exception that towards Saugor, are open and perfectly safe; and so long as the 52nd remains staunch, no one I believe is afraid of any rebellion here. The question therefore as far as regards Jubbulpoor, is—is it safe to leave the station and district to the care of the 52nd Native Infantry, whilst the column advances?

The column was placed at my disposal to put down rebellion and mutiny in these territories.

Major Sleeman and Captain Vanrenen have recorded it, as their opinion, that Jubbulpoor, and particularly the Europeans, will be in great danger the moment the column leaves this; and I believe there are others who think so, and that others do not share in this feeling. The question is one of great moment, and I do not wish to decide it without fully hearing the opinions on both sides; and I therefore trust that you will either record your opinions, or allow me to do so for you.

I have already stated that the roads are open, and I particularly allude to the Deccan Road towards Mirzapoor and Nagpoor, so that those who may wish to send their families away, in the event of the column marching, can do so with safety; but no doubt some cannot well afford to send their families to any great distance.

Colonel Millar is of opinion that the column is too small to be divided, and Brigadier Prior has expressed a hope that it may be kept together.

The Rajas of Banpoor and Shahgurki have threatened to combine their forces and attack Saugor. Brigadier Sage and his Europeans are in the fort of Saugor. He has no troops available to send out; but I learn from Major Western, that the Brigadier thinks he can hold the fort and town of Saugor against any attack for some time.

From the Deputy Commissioner of Dumoh, I learn that Brigadier Sage has allowed the force now there (consisting of three companies of the 31st, two of the 42nd, eighty men of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, and two 6-pounder guns worked by the 81st) to remain till the Movable Column reaches that station, and that this force is ample to defend the fort, station and town of Dumoh. But it must be remembered that when the Brigadier allowed this, he was under the impression that Colonel Millar's force was advancing; and if he now hears of its halting here, he may not deem himself justified in keeping the whole of his available infantry at Dumoh for any length of time.

JUBBULPOOR, 6th August 1857. (Sd.) W. C. ERSKINE, Commissioner.
SINCE this memorandum was written, Major Erskine has read out his address to the officers assembled, pointing out the disturbed state of the Sanger and Dumoh Districts in particular, as well as those to the north of it, and has called for the expression of an opinion, whether under such circumstances the column should be detained here, or not.

Having already stated my opinion on the advisability of providing this station with two guns and a detail of European Artillerymen, I still adhere to it. But if they cannot be spared, the column I consider should not be halted, pending even a reference to the Governor-General in Council; it being of great importance that it should move on into the disturbed districts.

I must, however, express a hope, that an urgent requisition will be made to Government for speedily providing us both with guns and European gunners.

JUBBULPOOR, 6th August 1857.
I conceive it is highly desirable that some provision should be made for the protection of Jubbulpore, and that we should not place implicit confidence in the 52nd Regiment; but I am not prepared to advocate the detention of the whole of the Movable Column. I am of opinion that two guns, with nine or ten Europeans, would be ample to provide for the safety of this station.

Jubbulpore, 6th August 1857. (Sd.) R. Gordon, Major, Executive Engineer, Jubbulpore Division.

Having made myself acquainted with the opinions expressed on both sides of the question, as to whether the column of troops which has just arrived at Jubbulpore should halt at that station for its protection, or proceed against the insurgents, I am clearly of opinion that it would be very unadvisable to halt, and that such a proceeding would produce in the minds of the sepoys of the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry a feeling of distrust, which would in all probability produce the very evil which such measure is hoped to avert.

I am further of opinion, as it has hitherto been the belief of the men of the 52nd, that a portion of this regiment was to accompany the column; but that some small part of the regiment, say one or two Companies, should join it; but as the advisability of such a measure must depend very much upon the temper of the Madras troops on this point, the opinion of the Officer Commanding the Madras Column should of course have the greatest weight.

6th August 1857. (Sd.) S. O. E. Ludlow.

The objections urged against the advance of the Madras Column are that, from the present state of affairs in the North-Western Provinces, from the spirit shown there by the great majority of the Bengal Army, and from the state of insubordination in which the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry has been for some time past. It is probable, indeed most probable, that on the Madras Column advancing, the 52nd will mutiny, thus causing the sacrifice of the European residents, including the women and children, the loss of the Thuggee Establishments, and the disorganization of the district.

I am not aware that the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry have as yet shown any insubordination. It is true that on one occasion, on the spreading of a false report of the arrival of European troops, part of the sepoys rushed to their Bells of Arms, intending to take possession of their arms; which however, on its being clearly explained that no Europeans were coming, they refrained from doing. As however I have lately been absent from Jubbulpore, acts of insubordination may have occurred of which I have no knowledge; but the particular acts should be stated.

In the present state of the Bengal Army, I do not think that any regiment which refrains from mutiny will do so through pure feelings of loyalty; if it does refrain, it will be from local influences and self interest, and I think that these two causes will act sufficiently powerfully on the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry to prevent their mutinying. When the Madras Column advances, it will be by the Saugor Road, thus intercepting all communications between the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry and the Saugor force, which latter moreover has already acted against both mutineers and rebels, and has killed many of them. If the 52nd, having mutinied, were to attempt to make off by the Mirzapoor Road, they would have upwards of 250 miles to march, first through the Jubbulpore District, in which their route would be through a country intersected by many difficult streams and nullahs, and then through Native States presenting similar obstacles, of which States the head of the most powerful one, the Raja of Rewah, is decidedly in favor of the British Government, and has already actively shown himself to be so. The Nursingpoor Road is closed by the Nerudda and the Madras force at Nursingpoor. Regarding the Nagpoor and Mundlah Roads, it is unnecessary to say anything. The Madras Column, which for the next month will be at or near Damoh,
could, on the news of a mutiny, at once intercept the mutinous regiment on
its attempt to move off. The sepoys of the 52nd are well acquainted with all
these facts; and even if they were inclined to mutiny, I think the above
reasons are sufficiently weighty to prevent their doing so. The sepoys of the
52nd, once the Madras Column moves on, will clearly be satisfied that there is
no intention of injuring or disarming them; and this cause for mutiny,—
which in the cases that have lately occurred seems to have been the moving
one,—will no longer exist. If the 52nd had intended to mutiny, they would
have done so when the Madras Column left Seonee and before it arrived at the
Nerbudda.

The fact of the English force having occupied Allahabad and Cawnpoor,
must also be well known here.

It will thus be seen that, in my opinion, no danger will ensue to any one
from the advance of the Madras Column; but even if there were a chance of
danger, I think that the reasons for an advance are so urgent that an advance
ought to be made. At present it is well known that the Saugor and Dumoh
Districts are lost, save the Sudder Stations: those districts are in the posses-
sion of the Shalgurh and Banpoor Rajas, who now threaten the forts and
towns of Saugor and Dumoh, while the British forces at both places are
unable to keep the field. A Government in such a position cannot remain
inactive: to do so, is to retrograde. If immediate active operations are not
taken, the insurrection will undoubtedly spread and extend to the Jubbilpoor
and Nursingpoor Districts; and the Dumoh Detachment, which, when I last
heard of it, had only forty rounds a gun, will be greatly endangered. The ad-
vance of the Madras Column to Dumoh and Saugor was publicly given out;
and if it does not advance, it will be believed that Government have no troops
and cannot act; and those Chiefs and others in or near these territories, now
faithful or wavering, will be shaken in their allegiance, or join the rebels.

The Madras Column will never be more than six forced marches from
Jubbilpoor; and if mutiny should occur there, the column, even if the rivers
were up, could be back again before much danger was done, and in time to
prevent the district rising, and to take a revenge on the mutineers. As the
Agency House is well fortified against anything that could be brought against
it save guns, and as there are no guns that can be brought against it, the European residents could certainly hold out in it against the 52nd,
which number less than 400 men at Jubbilpoor, until the Madras Column
returned. The roads to Kamptee and Nursingpoor are both open and quite
safe, and these places of safety are easily available for the ladies, women, and
children, and no consideration for their safety need hamper the military
movements. Many of the Thuggee prisoners and approvers are so old and
infirm, that they are no longer dangerous; those who are considered dangerous
characters, could be sent to Kamptee and elsewhere, thus removing any appre-
hension of their possible release.

JUBBULPOOR,  
6th August 1857.  

(Sd.)  
F. D. PINKNEY, Captain,  
Deputy Commissioner.

I.

Translation of Hindoo Verse.

Shut the mouth of slanderers, bite and eat up backbiters, trample down
the sinners, you, “Sutesingharkha!”—(one of the names of “Devee,” implying
here; destroyer of the enemy.)

Kill the British, exterminate them, “Mat Chundee!”—(another of the
names of the Goddess “Devee.”)

Let not the enemy escape, nor the wives and children of such, Oh!
“Singharkha!”—(another of the Goddess “Devee’s” names.)
Show favor to Shunker,
Support your slave,
Listen to the cry of religion,
"Mathalka!"—(another of the Goddess "Devee's" names.)
Eat up the unclean,
Make no delay;
Now devour them,
And that quickly.
"Ghormat Kalka!"—(another of the Goddess "Devee's" names.)

(Free Translation.)

(Sd.) W. C. ERKINE,
Commissioner.

J.

List of Lullutpoor Officers, &c.

Lieutenant A. C. Gordon, Deputy Commissioner.
Captain Sale, Commanding 6th Regiment Gwalior Contingent.
Doctor O'Brien, Surgeon, ditto ditto.
Captain Irwin, 2nd in Command, ditto ditto.
Mrs. Irwin and 2 children.
Mr. Verrieres, Customs Patrol.
Quarter-Master-Sergeant Carroll, 2nd Regiment Gwalior Contingent.
Mrs. Carroll.

(Sd.) W. C. ERKINE,
Commissioner.

K.

At a Council of War, composed of Colonel Millar, Major Erskine, Major Jenkins, Captain Ludlow, Captain Pinkney, and Lieutenant Nembhard, assembled at Dumoh on the 20th September 1857, after disarming the two companies of the 62nd Bengal Native Infantry, which accompanied the Madras Field Force, the Commissioner laid before the Council two notes marked A and B, and the following view of the state of affairs upon which the subjoined resolutions were agreed to.

Authentic intelligence having been received that the 50th Bengal Native Infantry have mutinied at Nagode and joined the Dinapoor Mutineers who arrived there from Banda, and that the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry have mutinied at Jubbulpur and gone off with their arms and 40 rounds per man, with the supposed intention of joining some disaffected Thakoors on the lower Herun in the Jubbulpur District, there will thus remain, for the protection of the Dumoh and Jubbulpur Districts, and to cover those to the south of the Nerbudda only, the troops shown in the margin, of which the Rifles are not altogether to be depended on, and may probably have to be disarmed. The total reliable force is thus 500 Infantry and eighty Cavalry, including sick, and six guns.

The Dumoh District is nearly all lying waste in consequence of the rebellion, and has been plundered from one end to the other by the rebels.
Dumoh Khas is a large open town forty-five miles from Saugor, and sixty-five from Jubbulpoor. It cannot be defended by 200 men without guns, and the Jail fort is commanded by a hill within jinjal shot. The Jubbulpoor District has as yet in no ways suffered from rebellion, and cultivation is going on as usual. Jubbulpoor itself is a large commercial town and cantonment perfectly open, for the defence of which the 165 Infantry and forty Sabres and two guns now there are not sufficient. It is also situated near the north bank of the Nerbudda, and above mid-way on the high road between Nagpoor and Mirzapoor, which is also the main dak road between Calcutta and Bombay. In the event of this district remaining staunch and uninjured, forces operating to the south of Allahabad and Bundelkund will probably be in a great part supplied with grain from this and the districts to the north of the Nerbudda. Although insurrection has not actually as yet broken out in the Jubbulpoor District, yet dissatisfaction exists to a considerable extent, and only a few days ago a deep-laid conspiracy to murder the Europeans and raise the country was discovered by the Deputy Commissioner, Lieutenant Clerk, and happily nipped in the bud.

It is not improbable but that the 50th and 52nd will join the Dinapoor mutineers in an attempt to attack and plunder the town and district.

It thus becomes necessary to decide on the following points:

1st. Shall Dumoh be held or abandoned?

Unanimously determined that it shall be abandoned; that the Civil Officers and treasure shall accompany the Madras Column, which will return to defend Jubbulpoor; that the stamps be destroyed; and that, as it is impossible to remove the records, only the Treasury Accounts be taken away. The 200 of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, now garrisoning Dumoh, will retire to Saugor and join their head-quarters.

2nd. How is the Dumoh District to be temporarily disposed of?

That Koour Shamleyjoo, an officer of the Punnah Raja, now holding Hutta with a considerable force for the British Government, be requested to take charge of the district; that the police hold the Jail and Jail Fort until his arrival, which will probably be to-morrow, when they can follow the 31st to Saugor.

3rd. What is to be done with the disarmed men of the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry in camp?

As these men have up to this time acted against the rebels and behaved well, their lives would be greatly endangered by being left in this district disarmed; therefore it is the opinion of all, save Captain Ludlow, that they should accompany the Madras Column to Jubbulpoor. Captain Ludlow is of opinion that they will encumber the Madras Column, and that they should be sent to Saugor with the 31st Bengal Native Infantry.

4th. Shall the Rifles be disarmed?

As up to this time the Rifles have behaved well, as the letters charging them with dissatisfaction contain only assertions without proofs or particulars, as disarming them, save for any grave reasons, may seriously compromise the Nagpoor authorities, it is unanimously decided that the Rifles be not as yet disarmed, but that they be well looked after; and in case of our meeting mutineers, the question of their being disarmed be again considered.


(Sd.) W. C. ERISKINE, Major, Commr., Saugor Division.

(Sd.) W. A. P. JENKINS, Major, Dy. Ass't. Qu'r.-Mr.-General.

(Sd.) S. O. E. LUDLOW, Captain, Chief Engineer.

(Sd.) F. W. PINKNEY, Captain, Officiating Sessions Judge.

(Sd.) W. NEMBHARD, Lieutenant, Deputy Commissioner, Dumoh.
NO. 60, dated Camp Kuttungee, 28th September 1857.

From—COLO
e J. MILLER, Commanding Kamptee Movable Column,
To—Adjutant-General of the Army, Fort St. George.

I HAVE the honor to report, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that, thanks be to God, the Kamptee Movable Column gained a complete and decisive victory over the mutineers of the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, numbering about 500 Rank and File, and 1,000 insurgent matchlockmen, on the 27th September 1857.

The 52nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry having mutinied at Jubbulpoor, it was decided that the Town and District of Dumoh should be abandoned by regular troops, and that the Movable Column under my command, strength as per margin, having disarmed the detachment of the Bengal 52nd Native Infantry serving with the column, and taking with it the Dumoh treasure amounting to upwards of a lakh of rupees, and the arms and ammunition of the disarmed men, should retire to defend Jubbulpoor.

The column left Dumoo on the 21st instant, and after having been delayed in crossing the Nowtah River for three days, reached Singrampoor on the evening of the 26th September, where intelligence was received that the mutineers 52nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, numbering about 500 Rank and File, had taken up a position at Konoo, on the west of Herun river, about twelve miles below Kuttungee.

As there was a probability that the mutineers might seize and destroy the boats on the Herun at Kuttungee, on the road to Jubbulpoor, I despatched at 2 A.M. on the 27th instant, a party under Lieutenant Watson, strength as per margin, to secure the boats above referred to. This party was accompanied by Major Jenkins, Assistant Quarter-Master-General.

At 5 A.M. on the 27th, just as the column was preparing to march, two troopers galloped into camp, with the intelligence that the advanced party had been surprised by the 52nd mutineers, that the two officers had been killed, and the party retreating on our camp: I forthwith gave the order to march, and pushed on through a jungly country with a party and took possession of the village of Gobra, about three miles in advance of Singrampoor, and which commands the mouth of the pass, and to the north of which the ground is open. I waited there a short time for the guns and main body to join me. Shortly after the guns came up, the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry were seen marching along the road in column of sections. Two guns were fired into them, on which they left the road and advanced against us in the jungle on both sides, accompanied by the matchlockmen. As the position the guns at first took up was too much exposed to fire from the jungle, and the enemy were evidently endeavouring to steal round our flanks, I retired about 200 yards close to the village and took up a more favorable position, where the ground was a little more open. I kept the guns on the road, occupied the village and the jungle right and left with my infantry, and posted the cavalry in rear of the left, where the ground was open. After a brisk fire, which lasted for about half an hour, the enemy were driven back. The baggage having now closed up, I placed the treasure guarded by the 33rd in rear of the guns. Threw out a strong body of skirmishers from the 23rd on the right, a little in front of the leading gun, and another line of skirmishers from the 28th and 33rd on the left, leaving one company of the 23th with the park, and the Rifles to protect the baggage and rear. In this order we advanced slowly through three or four miles of very jungly country, driving
the enemy before us and halting occasionally to give them a few rounds from our guns.

On reaching the open country near Kuttungee, I pushed on the cavalry to feel for the enemy, who were discovered making off up the hills with their baggage in rear of the town. From the nature of the ground the cavalry could not follow them, and before the infantry arrived the greater number had effected their escape. The Rifles and parties from the 28th and 33rd however succeeded in killing some, and taking a few prisoners on the hill, and also in the town, who were afterwards hanged.

On our approaching Kuttungee we were agreeably surprised by Major Jenkins and Lieutenant Watson riding up to the column; they had succeeded in cutting their way through the ambuscade in the dark, and had concealed themselves on the hills until the advance of the column enabled them to rejoin us. Lieutenant Watson, I regret, was wounded on the cheek by a musket ball, and knocked off his horse. His escape was most miraculous. Major Jenkins’ charger had two bullets through him, and is not likely to survive.

At the entrance to the town was found lying on the public road the body of Captain Macgregor, of the 52nd Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, with his throat cut, a shot in his breast, and a bayonet wound in his body, whom the mutineers, having made prisoner on the occasion of their mutiny, had murdered at 3 A.M. before they proceeded to attack us.

My movements during the above operations were much hampered by having to keep an eye on the 120 disarmed men of the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, who accompanied the column, and by the treasure, large amount of baggage, and people retiring with us from Dumoh.

The whole force behaved well, and proved incontestably that the Madras sepoys have no sympathy with the Bengal mutineer.

The cavalry were very forward in pursuit of the enemy, and followed them up the side of the hill, capturing some of their baggage.

The Rifle Company of the 1st Nagpoor Irregular Infantry were very active in ascending the hill, and captured a Color Havildar of the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, who was one of the chief ringleaders of the mutiny. I enclose Lieutenant Pereira’s report on this subject, and beg to inform you that the Commissioner has promoted the Havildar therein mentioned to Jemadar, and that I have promoted the two sepoys to Havildars.

I feel much indebted to all the European officers, and the conduct of the European gunners was most exemplary.

I beg to add, that I received every assistance from Captain Ludlow, Field Engineer, and from Captain Harrison, Officiating Sub-Assistant Commissary General, who acted as my Staff, and from Captain Pinkney, 84th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, Deputy Commissioner, who was constantly with me, and whose knowledge of the localities enabled him to be of great service.

I enclose a medical return of casualties.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co. &amp; No.</th>
<th>Rank and name</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WOUNDED.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>33rd Regiment Native Infantry.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. 1254</td>
<td>Lieutenant H. Watson</td>
<td>Slightly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private Sheik Esmail</td>
<td>Severely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Detachment 4th Light Cavalry.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. 19</td>
<td>Trumpeter G. Cartwright</td>
<td>Mortally, since dead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. 385</td>
<td>Private Singojeeram</td>
<td>Slightly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Public followers.**

- Commissariat bullock-driver: Severely.

**Private followers.**

- Killed: one.
- Wounded: one, severely.

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**Nominal List of killed and wounded in the action on the 27th September 1857.**

**CAMP AT KUTTUNGEE,**

28th September 1857.

(Sd.) H. ADAM,

Assistant Surgeon.

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**N.**

Nominal Roll of Europeans, Commissioned, Non-Commissioned Officers, Buglers, &c., present with the Head-Quarters at Saugor.

**Brigadier W. Sage, Commanding Saugor District.**

- Lieutenant-Colonel J. Dalyell. Killed at Nurreenolee, 42nd N. I.

**Major W. Lamb, A. A. General.**

- D. Gaussen, Commanding 42nd N. I. | Constantly out on duty with troops. |
- W. P. Hampton, Commanding 31st N. I. |
- W. B. Legard, 31st N. I. |

**Captain R. H. Sale, 6th I. S. Contingent.** A Lullutpoor refugee. Out with troops.

- H. C. Roberts, 31st N. I. |
- R. G. Mayne, Commanding 3rd Irregular Cavalry. |
- W. B. Marshall, Commanding Artillery. |
- W. B. Irwin, 6th I. S. Contingent. A Lullutpoor refugee. |
- E. V. H. Holt, 42nd N. I. Out with troops often. |
- W. L. Jones. Proceeded on sick leave, 42nd N. I. |

**Lieutenant A. Ellis, Interpreter Quarter-Master, 31st N. I.**

- E. A. Dickens, 31st N. I. |
- C. W. Peter, Adjutant, 42nd N. I. |
- J. E. D. Wilson, 42nd N. I. |
- J. G. Campbell, 42nd N. I. |
- H. Fellows, Adjutant, 31st N. I |
- E. E. Litchfield, 42nd N. I. |
- A. E. Campbell, 31st N. I. |
- S. S. Sutherland, 42nd N. I. |
- C. R. Cock, 42nd N. I. |

Often out with troops.
Ensign  2nd Lieutenant F. V. Eyre, Artillery.

J. W. Grant, 42nd N. I.  Often out with troops.

Surgeon  E. B. Thring, 31st N. I.

Assistant Surgeon J. G. Kemp, M.D., 3rd I. C.

E. Tyler, 42nd N. I.

P. O'Brien, 6th I. S. Contingent.

J. Ince, M.D., Artillery.

Staff Officer, Supg. Surgeon J. Greig.  Left the fort before the relief.

Lieutenant P. Prior, Executive Engineer.

Lieutenant C. S. W. Ogilvie, Sub-Assistant Commissary General.

Lieutenant T. Nicholl, Commissary of Ordnance.

Deputy Commissioner Major W. C. Western.  Went out with troops.

Captain W. Pinkney.  Proceeded to Jibbulpore; was a few days in fort.

Lieutenant W. C. Hamilton.  Went out with troops.

Mr. W. G. B. Tyler.

H. Reade.

Surveyor, Captain J. W. Blagrave.  Died in the fort.

Lieutenant E. H. Willoughby.

Mr. Wilson.

Burrowes.

Vyalt.

A. Bonney.

G. Bonney.

Chaplain, Reverend Gavin.

Inspector of Schools, Mr. Hall.

Schoolmaster, Mr. Wiggins.  Left the fort long before the relief.

Customs Establishment, Mr. and Mrs. Bell

Bartee

and Mrs. Lawson

Hamilton

Dutton

Naylor

Varriers

Fleming

Megill

Morgan

Fenwick

Frequently out with his peons.

Sergeant-Major P. Riordan, 31st N. I.

Gill, 42nd N. I.  Invalided.

Quarter-Master Sergeant Gill, 42nd N. I.
Quartermaster Sergeant Carroll, 6th I. S. Contingent, A Lullutpoor refugee.

Band Master Robins, 42nd N. I.
Mr. Bachman, Schoolmaster.
Conductor O'Keiff, Bengal.

Palphreyman
Donne, Madras.
Kilroe
James
King
Smart
Wood
Sub-Conductor Scamiell
Sergeant Liddy
Webster
Hobbs, Bengal.
McCollogan
Dempter

Mr. Norris, Head Clerk, Magazine Office.
Wilkinson, Department Public Works.
Carroll, Madras pensioner.

Bugle Major Silver
Hannay

Bugler Delima
Angelvie
Scott
Hastings
Arbur
Allen
Francis
Gill

Fife Major McQueen
Baptist

Drummer Perkins
Williams
Lainoss
Williams

Drum Major Baptist
Duplest
White
Lindsay
White, Died in the fort.
Massey
Seymor
Thomas
Williams

Bugler E. J. Caston
Names of Women and Children.

Mrs. Western and 1 child
  Tyler and 2 children. One child died in the fort.
  Hamilton and 1 son. Left the fort before the relief.
  Read and 5 children.
  Dalyell.
  Finch and 1 child. Child died in the fort.
  Fellowes and 1 child.
  Thring and 2 children.

Miss Thring.

Mrs. O'Kieff and 2 children,
  Mrs. Western and 1 child.
  Mrs. Q.~Kieff and 2 children.
  Tyler and 2 children.
  Dempster and 2 children.
  Norris and 1 son.
  Wilkinson and 3 children.
  John Johnson, brother-in-law.
  Riordan.
  Gill and 4 sons.
  Robans and 4 sons.
  Hannay.
  Angelo and 1 son.
  Silva.

Mrs. Scott and 1 child.
  Francis.
  Bachman and 6 children. One child died on the 2nd Feb.
  Gavin and 5 children.
  Ogilvie and 2 sons.
  Holt.
  Riordan.
  Baptist and 5 children.
  White and 1 child.
  Williams and 1 child.
  Thomas and 2 children.
  McQueen.
  White and 1 child.
  Masse and 1 child.
  Baptist and 3 children.
  Willoughby.

Mrs. Marshall and 2 children.
  Mayne and 4 children.
  Kemp and 4 children.
  Bell and 3 children.
  Lamb and 2 children.
  2 Misses Lamb.

Mrs. Donne and 5 children.
  James and 4 children.

Mrs. James died in the fort.
  King and 3 sons.
  Hobbs.
  Smart and 4 children.
  Wood and 7 children.
  Scamiell and 5 children.
  Nicholl and child.
  Tyddy and 4 children.
  Webster and 1 child.
  Palphreyman.

Miss Silva.

Mrs. Scott and 1 child.
  Francis.
  Bachman and 6 children. One child died on the 2nd Feb.
  Gavin and 5 children.
  Ogilvie and 2 sons.
  Holt.
  Riordan.
  Baptist and 5 children.
  White and 1 child.
  Williams and 1 child.
  Thomas and 2 children.
  McQueen.
  White and 1 child.
  Masse and 1 child.
  Baptist and 3 children.
  Willoughby.

ABSTRACT.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>104</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery, 1st Company, 3rd Battalion</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>67</td>
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</table>

Omitted.—Mrs. Lawson and 2 children, both died.

(Sd.) W. SAGE, Brigadier,
  Commanding at Saugor.

W. LAMB, Major,
  A. A. General.

Nominal Roll of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men of the 1st Company, 3rd Battalion Artillery, with Ladies, Women and Children, attached to ditto, dated Saugor Fort, 2nd February 1858.

Captain W. B. Marshall.
  2nd Lieutenant F. V. Eyre.
Mrs. Marshall.
Francis George Marshall  }
Sergeant John Brown and 2 children, one since dead of small-pox.
  James Davidson, wife and 3 children.
  George Foster, wife and 2 children.
  James Kennedy.
  Thomas Rodgers, Staff Sergeant.
Corporal Thomas Dwyer.

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Corporal Daniel Kirby.
   Michael Mayne.
   Francis Pew.
   Timothy Ivory.
Bombardier George Chambre.
   John Dunn.
   William Evans, wife and 2 children, one since dead.
   Peter Ellis.
   John Hardman.
   John Brown.
Bugler William McCarthy, wife and 4 children.
   Daniel Healy.
Half-pay Bugler Thomas Lloyd.
Gunner Thomas Anderson. In Band at Meerut.
   William Atkins.
   Richard Brown.
   James Boyle.
   Jonathan Boucher.
   John Cathcart. In Band at Meerut.
   Michael Cavanagh, wife and 1 child.
   John Collins.
   Daniel Crowby.
   Michael Caulfield.
   James Coltman. At Darjeeling.
   John Campion.
   James Conway.
   Arthur Fahey.
   Patrick Fox.
   James Glenn and wife.
   John Halliday.
   William Heador.
   James Hannaghune, wife and child.
   Richard Hume.
   Edward Higgins.
   George Hicks.
   William Kevile.
   Timothy Kelly.
   Lawrence Lyons.
   Thomas Moody.
   Michael Madden. At Darjeeling.
   James Madden, wife and 2 children. 1 child since dead.
   Edward Malone.
   James McMauns.
   Joseph McCoffery.
   James Morrow, wife and 2 children, one child since dead.
   Charles Newman, wife and child.
   James O'Donnel.
   John O'Hanlon.
   Henry Owens, wife (absent) and 1 child (present).
   Charles O'Hara.
   Patrick Quilligan.
   James Read.
   James Shaw.
   James Stuart.
   Lawrence Stack, wife and child.
   Francis Taylor. At Darjeeling.
   Charles Smyth.
Doing-duty Corporal Robert Bankier.
   John W. Wainwright, wife, and child since dead.
Names of men who have died since arrival in the fort.

Staff Sergeant James Williams
Sergeant Michael Blanchfield Died in Hospital.
Jacob Brown
Gunner James Hogan
" Henry Howard Died in Hospital.
" James McGreary Killed by rebels in action at Bhanvla.
" Joseph Lockhart.
" John Lumoot.
" Thomas Wilson Died in Hospital, of small-pox.

Women attached to the Company and left widows.

Mrs. Blanchfield and five children.
Mrs. Williams and two children.

Medical Establishment.

Assistant Surgeon John Ince, M.D.
Steward Peter McDonald, wife and 4 children, one child since dead.
Apprentice George H. Jackson.
" Henry C. Mathew.
" George E. Carroll.

ABSTRACT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Lady</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Included in the General List.</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>2</td>
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Hospital Establishment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
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</table>

(Sd.) W. B. MARSHALL,
Commanding 3 Artillery.

(Sd.) W. SAGE, Brigadier,
Commanding Saugor District.

O.

Memorandum of the state of Districts in the Jubbulpore Division, 6th February 1858.

SENEE.

Perfectly quiet; was for a short time troubled by rebels from Jubbulpore and Mundlah. Garrison:—A Company of Nagpoor Infantry.

MUNDLAH.

The whole of the petty Chiefs are in rebellion. Their followers are chiefly Gonds, most of them armed with matchlocks. They have their headquarters at Sohagpoor, Ramgurh, and Shaipoor. At the two former places there are small but strong forts, and each fort has a few small guns. Nearly the whole country is a wild and hilly jungle. A small native force from the Nagpoor Provinces lately went to Sohagpoor and attacked it; but owing to the trails of both guns breaking, the officer in command withdrew and returned to Raipoor. A Company of Nagpoor Irregular Infantry is at present stationed at Mundlah with the Deputy Commissioner.
With the exception of the open plain to the west of the town and lying between it, the Nerbudda and Herun rivers, known as the Hydivee, has been nearly devastated by local rebels, and also by the invasion of others from Nusringpoor, Dumoh and Mundiah. The open country has been nearly cleared of these scoundrels, but they lie concealed as yet in considerable bodies in the thick jungly hills to the right and left of the Deccan (or Mirzapoor) road, and threaten to cut off the postal communication between Jubbulpore and Mirzapoor whenever troops are withdrawn from the road; and the only town of note which has escaped plunder on this road, is Sehora, near to which a small body of troops has been kept on the move, and owing to these arrangements the postal communication has lately been re-opened with Rewah and the north-west. The force now on the road consists of one company of the 26th Madras Native Infantry, two weak companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, two 9-pounders west. The force now on the road consists of one company of the 26th Madras Native Infantry, two weak companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, two 9-pounders west. The force now on the road consists of one company of the 26th Madras Native Infantry, two weak companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, two 9-pounders west.

This district is composed of four Native States under British arrangement, viz., Nagode (or Oocheyra), Sohawul, Myhere and Bijiragourgh. The former State is partially disturbed by some of the subordinate Oobareedars or Sirdars, but to no great extent. The 2nd is quiet. The Chief of the 3rd is a boy at school at Agra, but his uncles rose in rebellion. At my request (when we had no available troops), the Raja of Rewah attacked the fort and walled town of Myhere, which the Chief's uncles had seized, and succeeded in taking both; but the chief rebels escaped, and are still at large with a few armed followers. The Chief of the 4th (Bijiragourgh) rose in open rebellion, killed our Native Civil Officers attached to him, raised an army, strengthened his forts, stole our dâks and dâk horses, posted detachments on the Deccan Road which runs through his estate, attacked our detachment on the road, in which fight he was defeated and lost two guns, and for months succeeded in closing the road. But lately the Raja of Rewah has, at my request (made when we had no troops to detach), taken his two forts, nearly all his guns, ammunition, &c.; but the Chief escaped to the jungles, and will no doubt cause much trouble, and will endeavor to regain his jaghire (which I have confiscated) when no longer protected by troops. The Rewah Raja has done us good service, but his nobles are not to be depended on, and will not, I am assured by the Political Agent, believe that we have any European troops or reliable force, and are inflated with pride at their own prowess. The Raja is for the present Garrisoning the Myhere and Bijiragourgh forts for us, and also guarding the Deccan Road from Chaka to the Kuttra Pass. A regiment of Bengal Native Infantry was stationed at Nagode, but mutinied.

This district has been overrun and plundered chiefly by followers and soldiers of the rebel Raja of Shahigurth, and also by local rebels who joined him. It was found impossible to retain charge of this district after the mutiny of the 80th and 52nd Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry, as there were no available troops, and it must either have been left to anarchy or made over to the charge of some Native Chief. I adopted the latter course, and made it over to the Raja of Punnah, who holds it for us and will deliver it.
over to us when called on to do so. The garrison in peaceful times was only two companies of infantry, an obviously inadequate force to restore order and protect it now.

SAUGOR.

With the exception of the fort and town of Saugor, the whole district was overrun and plundered by local rebels, and from without, and the old forts in the interior taken from our police. The 52nd mutineers also are still in the jungles in the district, and until the arrival of General Rose's force, everything was in a state of anarchy; but as General Rose will, I believe, quell all present disturbances, though he will not leave reliable troops there, I fear, I need only say that the former garrison consisted of one company and Battery of European Artillery, one regiment of Cavalry and two regiments of Infantry, minus two companies at Dumoh, and that of these there now remains the European company of Artillery (weak), some 150 of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, some 700 of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry, and 200 of the 42nd, all armed.

HOUSHANGabad.

Perfectly quiet, except occasional plundering in the pergunnah to the north of the Nerbudda.

NURSINGPOOR.

All quiet, except occasional inroads of rebels from Saugor and Bhopal, and a few local rebels in the pergunnah north of the Nerbudda.

BAITOOL.

Perfectly quiet.

CHUNDEYREE, JHANSIE, AND JALOUN.

Not in our possession. From the foregoing it will be seen that every portion of my division to the south of the Nerbudda is now in perfect peace, but that the districts to the north of the river are more or less disturbed, and that three last named have no Government at all.

In my opinion, the first thing to be done after leaving a proper garrison at Jubbulpoor is to attack the Jubbulpoor rebels and re-occupy Dumoh, and that this should be done by two columns, one (the main one) proceeding up the Deccan Road as far as Jokaie, attacking the rebels wherever they may be found and destroying their strongholds, and giving the Rewah Raja's rabble troops an opportunity of seeing a fine strong force of Europeans and guns. This column should then take the road from Jokaie to Dumoh.

The 2nd, a smaller column, should advance direct on Dumoh via Kuttungee, attacking the rebels on the way, and halt there till the arrival of the main column, when after leaving an adequate garrison it should proceed to Saugor, and thence as circumstances may require. In this way we should, I think, clear the division of minor rebels and restore confidence, leaving the leaders to be hunted down by the police when deserted by their followers.

If any portion of the force returns to Jubbulpoor, part might come by Dumoh and the rest by Nursingpoor.

(Sd.) W. C. ERKINE, Major,

Commissioner.

(Sketch omitted).

P.

No. 20, dated Camp Jubbulpoor, 15th February 1858.

From—MAJOR-GENL. G. C. WHITLOCK, Commanding Saugor Field Division,

To—MAJOR W. C. ERKINE, Commissioner, Jubbulpoor Division.

I now beg to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 6th instant, with its accompanying memorandum.
2. With every desire to carry into operation my contemplated movement on Saugor in two columns, I feel, after mature consideration, that my force is too small to admit of its being separated, and that its movement in one body would have a more beneficial effect throughout your district.

3. The detachment of Native Infantry, comprising almost the whole of the 50th Regiment, which I think essential to leave at Jubbulpore, completely cripples me in that arm; and I must add to the above, four guns of the Bullock Battery and a detachment of Irregular Horse.

4. The direct route to Saugor by Dumoh can be shortly marched over by a large body of European Artillery, with a portion of guns which have been ordered to move with all expedition to Jubbulpore; but I consider from the many communications I have had with yourself, as well as from the various letters which you have permitted me to peruse from officers in your Department, that the present movement of my column on Jokkie would be attended with the most important results by affording a display of the combined force before the Rewah Raja.

Q.

No. 76, dated Camp at Piprode, 22nd February 1858.

FROM—MAJOR-GENL. G. C. WHITLOCK, Commanding Saugor Field Division,

TO—MAJOR W. C. ERSKINE, Commissioner, Jubbulpore Division.

In acknowledging the receipt of your letters No. 131 and 132 of the 19th and 20th instant, I beg to state that I consider the measure therein suggested as most desirable, and had I time, and troops sufficient to enable me to detach a portion to carry into effect the proposed work, I would willingly give this assistance; but it is quite out of my power for the present.

Since the receipt of your communication of the 19th instant, I have learnt from an officer present at the destruction of the fort at Ramnuggur, that it has been so effectually demolished that it can no longer afford shelter for the rebels, and I have recommended Lieutenant Pereira of the Nagpore Irregular Rifle Company to avail himself of the first opportunity of destroying the fort at Bhatgaon. I have ordered him to be supplied with powder for the purpose, and on the arrival of the guns from Jubbulpore, there will be no difficulty in levelling it to the ground in a few hours.

I perfectly concur with you that a free communication between Jubbulpore and Mirzapoor is a measure of such importance, that it would be wrong to run the slightest risk of its being again closed. From conversation with yourself, as well as the officer who has been employed on this duty, I am satisfied that the presence of troops is required to accomplish this measure; I have therefore placed myself in communication with Brigadier Prior, Commanding the Nagpore force, and recommended strongly that the two companies of the 28th Regiment Native Infantry now here be not withdrawn.

The Rifle Company should be also retained, and I have ordered two guns from Jubbulpore, and I have left behind thirty-five Rank and File of the Hyderabad Irregular Cavalry.

R.

No. 89, dated Camp Ryepoor, 1st March 1858.

FROM—MAJOR-GENL. G. C. WHITLOCK, Commanding Saugor Field Division,

TO—MAJOR W. C. ERSKINE, Commissioner, Jubbulpore Division.

I do myself the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication, dated 29th ultimo, and in reply beg to state, that I am adopting measures, which will enable me, I hope, not only to destroy the strongholds you refer to, but to prevent also the escape of the rebels now occupying them.

2. I will again communicate with you on this subject.
[. 651. ]

Narrative of events in the district of Nimar in 1857-58.

No. 157, dated Mandlaiser, 25th May 1858.

From—Capt. R. H. Keating, Offg. Political Agent, Western Malwa, in temporary charge of Nimar,

To—Sir Robert Hamilton, Baronet, Agent, Govr.-Genl., for Central India, Indore.

I have received the Circular Orders of Government, North-Western Provinces, No. 212, dated 30th April 1858, and have the honor to transmit a report of the nature called for.

2. No disturbances have taken place in Nimar, although a mutiny occurred on the northern boundary at Indore and Mhow, and one was with great danger and difficulty suppressed at Asseergurh in the southern part of the province. We passed however through much excitement and some danger, which I shall endeavour concisely to relate.

3. The year 1857 opened in Nimar by a general distribution of small cakes, which were passed on from village to village. The same I am aware has occurred all over Northern India, and has been spoken of as having been a signal for the disturbances which took place later in the year. At the time they appeared in Nimar, they were everywhere brought from the direction of Indore. That city was at the time subjected to a severe visitation of cholera, and numbers of inhabitants died daily. It was at that time understood by the people in Nimar, and is still believed, that the cakes of wheat were despatched from Indore after the performance over them of incantations which would ensure the pestilence accompanying them. The cakes did not come straight from north to south, for they were received at Bujengghur, more than half-way between Indore and Gwallor, on the 9th February, but had been distributed at Mandlaiser on the 12th January. This habit of passing on certain holy and unholy things is not unknown in Nimar. When small-pox breaks out in a village, a goat is procured, a cocoanut tied to its neck, and it is taken by the chowkidar to the first village on the road to Mundatta: it is not allowed to enter the town, but is taken by a villager to the next hamlet, and so passed on without rest to its destination.

4. During April and May, the cultivators of Pargunnahs Burwai and Dhurgaum combined together not to cultivate their land unless Government rescinded certain rules of forest conservancy, which had been enforced with a view to stopping the reckless waste of timber which has existed for years, and to a great extent still takes place. They would not listen to reason with me; they were equally impracticable with Colonel Durand at Indore, where they proceeded in a body of some four hundred persons.

5. When the events at Meerut and Delhi became known, Colonel Durand wrote to me to make some arrangement, by which we might have no local quarrels on our hands to add to the general difficulties. I commissioned my sheristadar to meet some of the patells, and an arrangement was come to for one year, and the question has so rested since, though it will have to be discussed at some future time.

6. There were some dangerous men amongst the people concerned in this combination, and I do not now know how far a knowledge of what was coming may have influenced the movement; certainly no such spirit of opposition has been shown for several years before by the cultivators of Burwai or Dhurgaum.

7. When the mutinies commenced, hopes were still cherished that this part of India might escape; but the mutinies at Nusseerabad and Neemuch convinced all that we must take our share of the evil, and what few preparations we could make were undertaken. The jail (which is an old native fort) was put in some state of defence. The treasure was removed to it, and it was appointed a general place of rendezvous. A detachment of Bheel Corps, and
police horse and foot, was told off for service in the neighbourhood in case of disturbance, and was kept with carriage complete ready to move at a moment's notice.

8. Matters continued thus, the district remaining perfectly quiet, until news arrived of the mutiny of the first Hyderabad Cavalry at Aurungabad, accompanied by a report that they were marching north via Borehanpoor.

9. On the morning of 21st of June, I marched from Mundlaiser with about thirty mounted policemen, with orders to raise what force I could and oppose the passage of the 1st Hyderabad Cavalry and the Gwalior Contingent troops at Asseer and Borehanpoor, if they attempted to pass through Nimar to the north.

10. The project seemed almost hopeless; by that time news of the disasters in the north-west had spread throughout the country, and though none of the Nimarees seemed anxious to take advantage of the times to create any disturbance, none on the other hand were willing to take service under a Government in difficulties.

11. I determined to proceed at once to the Pass of the Cattee Ghatee, a spot where the high road from the Deccan to Indore, and Hoshungabad, defiles through the Santpoora Mountains. The pass was so narrow that I found no difficulty in putting a gateway in it; and terraces, giving cover to musketry defenders, were carried along the hill side, so as to make the post a most difficult one to force. An old gun, which lay in the fort of Khundwah, was brought up and mounted on cart wheels.

12. Whilst these preparations were going on, every exertion was made to collect men; the regular police from all the neighbouring thanahs was called to the pass, and the thanadars were instructed to collect villagers to carry on the duty as a temporary measure.

13. By great exertions 400 men were brought together by the sixth day of my occupation of the post, and we continued until the end of June to watch the detachments of the Gwalior Contingent, who, from my information, I knew had an understanding with Sindia's troops at Borehanpoor, and only waited an opportunity to break into open rebellion.

14. In the meantime all had gone on quietly at Mundlaiser, where I had left Mr. S. Naher, the Deputy Collector, in charge. But on the 2nd news came in of the mutiny at Mhow, and the retreat of those Europeans from Indore who escaped the massacre at that place. I shall not attempt to narrate what occurred at Mundlaiser, but shall content myself with submitting Mr. Naher's report, and as it has already been forwarded to Government, the reply shall be annexed.

15. I was most anxious not to leave my post at the Cattee Ghatee, but on the 4th I received letters from Mundlaiser, saying that if I did not rejoin the rest of the Europeans they would all be sacrificed, as my authority alone kept the police to their duty.

16. The universal opinion then throughout the country was, that Holkar had ordered the attack on the Indore Residency, and the police at Mundlaiser were all under the impression that they would be immediately attacked by Holkar's troops from Maheswer, situated only five miles from Mundlaiser.

17. Most reluctantly then I made over the post at Cattee Ghatee to the Deputy Collector, Mahomed Lall Khan, and proceeded by forced marches to look after the European families and the head-quarters station.

18. The families I met near Dhurgaun marching to meet me, and I immediately determined to place them in the fort of Poonassa, a small complete fort in the jungle, and on no road likely to be traversed by detachments of mutinous troops. At Dhurgaun I had learned that the treasure was all safe, and had made arrangements for its transport to Poonassa.
I remained at Poonassa until the 10th July, receiving satisfactory reports from the whole districts. On that date I had the pleasure of seeing the last of the treasure arrive in safety, and by that time the place was put in a position of defence.

The mutineers from Mhow had in the meantime marched north, but the danger from Assergurh continued the same. On the 10th I marched to Khundwah, en route to my post at the Cattee Ghatee, and there received the good news that a detachment of Bombay Infantry and Hyderabad Cavalry had arrived at Assergurh, and were about to disarm the mutinous troops at that place. A few hours after information was received of the successful result of the undertaking.

Assergurh was then occupied by troops on whom reliance could be placed, so I took immediate measures to place the families and treasure in that fortress; and I myself proceeded south to give aid in bringing up the column of Bombay troops, which was moving from Aurungabad under Brigadier Stuart.

I must not omit to mention that, on making the families over to my care, Mr. S. Naher, the Deputy Collector, returned to Mundlaiser, and continued at his post throughout the rains.

It was the 17th of July when Brigadier Stuart's column entered the southern limits of Nimar; it was a difficult matter to find provision and fodder at that season of the year, but from Brigadier Stuart's letter and the reply of Government, copies of which I annex, you will perceive that arrangements made by the civil authorities gave full satisfaction.

Whilst passing through the Nimar District from Borehanpoor to Simrole, the column was never on any occasion detained by difficulties on the roads, and in fact the halting ground was usually reached by 8 A.M.; but from Simrole into Mhow, a distance of about eleven miles, took the artillery (aided by sixty fresh horses from the Bengal Battery) twelve hours to accomplish.

This fact will, I trust, be borne in mind when the Government of India have again time to bestow attention to the means of internal communication in Central India.

The Bombay column reached Mhow on the 2nd August, and from that time all immediate danger of disturbances in Nimar ceased; and we congratulated ourselves on the province having escaped from the disasters which have overtaken nearly the whole of the North-Western Provinces, and almost all the detached districts in Central India. No Government treasure has been lost in Nimar, and no injury whatsoever has befallen public or private property.

Nimar was protected by a detachment of the Malwa-Bheel Corps, and by the Nimar Police Corps, horse and foot; the conduct of these troops has been very similar. They have on no occasion shown any spirit of bravery which would permit me to bring their services to your notice for reward; but on the other hand, they have never for a moment shown any signs of treachery, or mutiny, and have throughout the disturbances behaved in an orderly and obedient manner.

It remains for me to bring to your notice the conduct of my Assistants during the whole period of the disturbances.

Mr. S. Naher, the Deputy Collector, in charge of the Sudder Station and Treasury, is the only European Assistant in this Office. The consequence is, that he constantly finds himself in charge of the Agency, and is obliged to take upon himself very considerable responsibility. During the late disturbances in Central India, I was constantly called into the districts at a short notice, on which occasions I used to leave Mr. Naher in charge of my Office. Mr. Naher's pay is but Rupees 250 a month, and is not, I think, an adequate remuneration for the responsible duties he is called upon to perform. Mr. Naher entered the Government service in 1845. He has been in receipt of Rupees 200 a month since 1850, and of Rupees 250 since April 1853, now upwards of five years. During the period he has served in Nimar, I have found him an able, zealous, and active Assistant, and I beg most earnestly to recom-
mend him to you for an increase of salary. Mr. Naher was forced to send his family to Bombay during the disturbances, and this has been a heavy drain on his small allowance.

30. Mahomed Lall Khan, the Deputy Collector of Khundwah, afforded me throughout the whole of the trying period we have passed through, the most able and energetic assistance, and showed that personal bravery which was to be expected from an old soldier of the State. Lall Khan, besides his rank as Deputy Collector, holds the first position amongst the Mahomedan gentlemen in Nimar. I am about to submit his name to you for pension, and shall in so doing detail his services, which extend over forty-nine years; but I wish to state in this communication that his conduct has, in my opinion, been unexceptionable, and deserving of the favorable notice of Government.

31. Ashruf Ali Khan, Sheristadar of my Office, and Bunkut Rao, head Karcoon of Public Works, were my Personal Assistants, and accompanied me everywhere during the period in question.

32. Lalla Billas Roy was Jail Darogah, and kept the prisoners in order with great judgment and energy.

33. Narain Sing, Mahalkurry of Pundania, and Nanoo Ram, Mahalkurry of Roostumpoor, showed great courage and devotion.

34. Zein-ullah-deen Khan, Kamasdar of Bahadurpoor, behaved in every respect to my satisfaction.

35. The same is the case with Umrut Rao, Kamasdar of Burwai.

36. Govind Rao Guness, Kamasdar of Pergunnah Maunpoor, showed himself a faithful and cool-headed servant, and on the first breaking out of the rebellion at Dhar, was most useful in conveying information to Colonel Durand, who was then in Mhow.

37. I would also beg to recommend Gunput Rao, Karcoon of Asseer, who made himself very valuable in procuring information.

38. I trust that some notice may be taken of the above-mentioned persons, whom I have selected from amongst a very large establishment from my being certain of their meritorious behaviour. Their salaries are as below mentioned :

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<th>No.</th>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Zein-ullah-deen Khan</td>
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<td>Umrut Rao</td>
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<td>Govind Rao Guness</td>
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39. Of my own exertions during the period under report, I can but state that I believe, by a reference to your records, you will become aware that my conduct met with the entire approval of Colonel H. M. Durand, who at that period officiated as Governor-General's Agent for Central India.

No. 92, dated Indore Residency, Camp Mhow, 4th August 1857.

From—LIEUT.-COL. H. M. DURAND, Offg. Agent, Govr.-Genl., for Central India,
To—CAPTAIN R. H. KAYINGE, Political Asstt. in Nimar, Camp Mhow.

I have much pleasure in forwarding, for your information, the copy of a letter No. 69 of the 4th instant, from Brigadier Stuart, acknowledging, in terms that cannot fail of being gratifying to yourself, the value of your assistance during the march of Brigadier Stuart's Column from Edulabad to Mhow.
2. I have forwarded copies to the Government of India and to the Government of Agra, and consider your road from Asseergurh and the Simrole Ghat so valuable in a military point of view, that I have requested Captain Cobbe to loose no time in connecting the road of the Simrole Ghat with the Mhow Cantonments by a metalled line of road.

No. 67, dated Cantonment Mhow, 4th August 1857.

From—Brigadier Stuart, Commanding Mhow Field Force,
To—Agent, Governor-General, for Central India.

With reference to the late march of the Field Force under my command, I have much pleasure in bringing prominently to your notice the very great assistance which I invariably received from Captain Keatinge, Political Agent, Nimar, during the whole time that he accompanied the force.

2. This officer joined me at Edulaband, and from that day up to the date of our arrival here, he worked most indefatigably both night and day to make all difficulties easy, during the time that we traversed Captain Keatinge’s districts. We found that supplies had been laid in for us in abundance at every halting place; and nearly the whole way from Asseergurh to Simrole, we had the advantage of an excellent road, which much accelerated our progress.

3. Captain Keatinge’s arrangements for crossing the force over the Nerbudda were most satisfactory, and deserve my best thanks. At 7 A.M. on the morning of the 27th July, the left wing of Her Majesty’s 14th Light Dragoons reached the left bank of the river; and by mid-day, men, horses, and baggage had been passed over by means of both a ford and a ferry, and their camp pitched. Within twenty-four hours afterwards, the whole of number 4 Light Field Battery had crossed the ferry, and three days sufficed to place the whole force on the right bank.

4. I have entered thus into detail, as I think it but just to Captain Keatinge to acknowledge the valuable assistance he has rendered on this occasion; and I beg to thank you for having deputed so able and energetic an officer to accompany the force.

No. 92, dated Agra Fort, 3rd September 1857.

From—C. B. Thornhill, Esq., Offg. Secy. to Govt., North-Western Provinces,
To—Lieut.-Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. Agent, Governor-General, for Central India.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 71, dated 4th ultimo, forwarding copy of one from Brigadier Stuart, of the same date, acknowledging the valuable services rendered by Captain Keatinge, Political Agent in Nimar, on the occasion of the march of the Mhow Field Force under his command from Asseergurh to Mhow.

2. In reply, I am desired to request that you will have the goodness to inform Captain Keatinge that the report therein rendered of his excellent co-operation and arrangements has been perused by the Lieutenant-Governor with high satisfaction and approval.

Dated Fort William, 9th September 1857.

From—G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to Government of India,
To—Lieut.-Col. H. M. Durand, Offg. Agent, Governor-General, for Central India.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated the 4th ultimo, No. 4, and in reply, to request that you will communicate the thanks of the Governor-General in Council to Captain Keatinge, Political Agent in Nimar, for the valuable assistance rendered by him to the column under Brigadier Stuart.
2. The Governor-General in Council approves of your having ordered the construction of the road between Simrola and Mhow in Holkar's territory.

No. 105, dated Mundlaiser, 24th July 1857.

From—S. J. Naheer, Esq., Deputy Collector and Joint-Magistrate, Nimar,
To—Captain R. H. Keatinge, Political Assistant, Nimar, Mundlaiser.

Finding that you have not placed on record the cause of my leaving the Fort of Mundlaiser on the evening of the 3rd July, and it having come to my knowledge that my name has been coupled with those who did not behave well on that occasion, I am compelled, much against my inclination, to lay before you this brief account of what occurred from the 1st July until our meeting with you at Soolgaum on the 5th.

2. On the afternoon of the 1st July, Mrs. Keatinge received a letter from Captain Cumming, to the effect that heavy firing had been heard from thence in the direction of Mhow. That same night a sowar, who had been stationed near Mhow, brought me news of the disturbance at Indore; but being all hearsay and picked up from travellers, it was such as I thought could not be relied on; I therefore started off two more sowars for Mhow, and an electric telegraph message to Ackberpoor for Colonel Durand; the former returned the following day, and in reply to a note from me to the signaler, I was informed that communication with Indore had ceased from 8 o'clock that morning.

3. On the 2nd, one of the sowars above alluded to, came in with a frightful account of what had occurred, inasmuch that all had been killed at Indore, with the exception of Colonel Durand, who had escaped with two guns towards Sehore, wounded in the arm, and that the Europeans at Mhow had taken to the fort. On hearing this, I thought it advisable to remove the Europeans into the fort here, the only place of security, and where our treasury had been placed, as you are aware; after which I proceeded to get in burkundazes and half the detachment of Bheels. About this time the Jemadar of horse, by name Mahmood Khan, brought me intelligence of Holkar's having turned against us, and that the father of one of our sowars, a gunner at Mahaiser, had come over expressly to acquaint him of an attack to be made on us at 3 o'clock the following morning. On hearing this, I had the small gate barricaded, got more burkundazes in, and manned the walls for a fight. I then spoke to the Subadar of the Bheels and others, giving them every encouragement, and promised them Rupees 25 for every man they shot; but, perceiving (for it was quite evident, and noticed by more than one) that the spirit of fighting was not in them, I sent them out to relieve the several outposts occupied by burkundazes, whom I got into the fort in their stead. The night passed over without an attack as you are aware. An electric telegraph message was received by me this day, I believe from the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, requesting further particulars of the Mhow outbreak, as it was then supposed, which I forwarded from Kusrawud. This paper is, I believe, with you, and is probably a reply to the message I desired to be forwarded to Colonel Durand, informing him of what I had heard of the outbreak at Indore.

4. During the greater part of the night of the 2nd, and day of the 3rd, guns were heard in the direction of Mhow; the Bheels became pressing for pay, asking at the same time for one month's back pay; some of the burkundazes refused to fight inside, and every report brought in only tended to cause still greater alarm. During the afternoon a letter by coolie reached the Post Office, bearing on its face the signature of Captain Fenwick of Indore to his son at Bombay. This, as you are aware, was opened; and on perusal was found to contain an account of the death of every individual at Indore, where their bodies had been seen, and how Colonel Durand had been followed up to Dew Guarareea, and was cut down by a sowar. With such rumours afloat, guns firing at intervals the whole night; and the greater part of the following
day; burkundazes refusing to fight inside, and their Jemadar having, as he said, no confidence in them, and the bravery of the Bheels very questionable; I asked, as you are aware, Mrs. Keatinge to cross the river with the other Europeans, as I wished to be left alone in the fort. This she repeatedly refused to do with the other two gentlemen, in whose management she said she had no confidence; and as matters seemed to be growing worse, I at once decided on removing the treasure, and marching down to Dhoolias. The necessary orders were given by me to the Jemadars and Subadar, who left apparently as if to carry them out, but to my surprise very shortly after the Jemadar of Horse with the Duffadar came back to all appearance in great haste, and reported that the Bheels had refused to leave the place; that they were coming into the fort, and that if I did not take great care there would be, as he termed it, a "dunga." Placed as I was with ladies and children, and two European gentlemen in my charge, I could not help feeling I should only be endangering their lives by my remaining any longer; I therefore considered it advisable (and, if required, can prove it was so) to leave the fort, making over charge to the two Jemadars, and the Subadar with his armed party crossed the river, staying the whole night on the opposite side, and the following morning (4th) marched to Kusrawud, which, as you are aware, is four miles from this; there we remained until evening, when, on receipt of your letter to Mrs. Keatinge, desiring us to join you, we started for Kanapoor. Previous however to our leaving it was reported to me that all the ladies and children of Surdarpoo had been killed; Lieutenant Hutchinson, a prisoner, and Captain Cumming, a fugitive. The following afternoon (5th) we, as you are aware, met you at Soolgaum, from whence on the morning of the 6th we left for Poonassa. On the afternoon (2 o'clock) of the 7th, I received your instructions to return to Mundlalsa, and at 3 I was in my saddle. I arrived at Kherry Ghat at 10 o'clock the same evening, and after travelling the whole night reached this between 9 and 10 the following morning (8th) as you are aware: I have ever since been at my post.

No. 4130, dated Fort William, 6th October 1857.

From—G. F. Edmonstone, Esq., Secretary to Government of India,
To—Colonel H. M. Durand, Offg. Agent, Governor-General, Central India.

I have received and laid before the Governor-General in Council your letter dated 7th ultimo, No. 86, forwarding copies of letters from the Political Assistant in Nimar, and from Mr. Naher, the Deputy Collector, relative to the proceedings of the latter officer during the time of the outbreak at Mhow and Indore.

2. In reply, I am directed to state that His Lordship in Council concurs in the opinion expressed by you, that no blame appears to be imputable to that gentleman.

Special Narrative, Judicial Department, No. 15, dated Fort William, 15th August 1857.

The effects of the disturbances in the North-West Provinces began very soon to be felt in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, and although nowhere had any disposition been evinced by the people to sympathise with the mutineers and insurgents, the Lieutenant-Governor could not be without more than usual anxiety to be correctly and constantly informed of the state of feeling throughout the country, and with this object a Circular was issued on the 23rd May 1857, requesting all Commissioners to send in reports on the state of the popular feeling and conditions of their districts, and to instruct all Magistrates to do the same direct to the Government.

2. For convenience of consideration, and to prevent confusion as well as unnecessary repetition, the events will be narrated in connection with the divisions in which they occurred, commencing with the provinces of Behar, and concluding with the non-regulation provinces.
3. *Patna Division.*—During the early part of June, considerable excitement is reported to have prevailed throughout the provinces of Behar, in consequence of the general spread of a belief, inculcated by designing persons, that the Government contemplated an active interference with the religious customs of the people.

4. A similar delusion existed in the same province some two years since, to remove which active and apparently successful measures were taken, which are already known to the Government of India.

5. The feelings referred to did not, however, lead to any active demonstrations of disaffection, or any overt acts of revolt before the 13th of June.

6. The various Magistrates throughout the division reported the existence of general tranquillity, but stated that the safety of the province depended on the fidelity of the Native Corps at Dinapoor, that the Mahomedan population was thoroughly disaffected, and that, in the event of any disturbance occurring at the head-quarters of the division, they feared the rapid extension of revolt, and its inevitable results, throughout the province.

7. Precautionary measures were adopted by adding to the police force in Behar, by carefully watching and regulating the Ghâts, by guarding the frontiers of the neighbouring disaffected districts, and in some stations by appointing places of rendezvous for the European residents, so as, in the event of the occurrence of disturbances, to have a known and combined plan of action.

8. The treasure at Arrah and Chuprah was removed to Patna, placed under the charge of a guard of Captain Rattray's Sikhs, and a portion of it shipped to Calcutta.

9. A Volunteer Guard was formed at Patna, measures were taken to defend the Collectorate and Opium Godown, and six companies of the Sikh Police Battalion at Sooree were marched rapidly to Patna, which they reached on the 7th of June, and where they have since continued to render valuable and efficient service.

10. The Rajas of Bettiah and Hutwah addressed letters expressive of loyalty and affection towards the Government, and placed men and elephants at the disposal of the local authorities of their districts, to assist in the maintenance of order and tranquillity. For these acts and expressions of good-will and loyalty, the thanks of the Lieutenant-Governor were communicated to those gentlemen.

11. Towards the middle of the month a panic prevailed in Chuprah and Arrah, consequent on the occurrences at Goruckpoor, Azimgur, and other places adjoining, and most of the European residents, and persons connected with the railway, took refuge in Dinapoor.

12. The Magistrates and the greater number of the civil officers remained steadily at their posts, and by their personal exertions, aided perhaps by a Circular from the Commissioner of Patna, confidence was rapidly restored and the fugitives returned.

13. At Gya considerable apprehension prevailed from the unprotected state of a large amount of treasure in the Collectorate, the presence in that populous city of a considerable number of bad characters, and the existence, in the heart of the place, of a large jail, filled with desperate ruffians under a Guard of Nujeebs, who were believed to be staunch and trustworthy only so long as the Dinapoor sepoys remained quiet.

14. A guard of European soldiers, chiefly from Her Majesty's 64th Regiment, soon restored public confidence, the wealthy native residents no longer feared being subjected to lawless violence, and the bad characters of the city were overawed.

15. As it was deemed necessary to place an officer of standing and experience in charge of this very important Magistracy, Mr. A. Money, the Officiating Collector, was directed, on the 20th of June, to assume charge of that office in addition to his own duties.
16. On the night of the 13th of June, a Nujeeb of the Behar Station Guards at Patna was detected in an attempt to tamper with the Sikhs of the Police Corps, and to excite them to mutiny.

17. In consequence of these Sikhs not being soldiers in the legal acceptation of the term, the Nujeeb was not amenable to Act XIV of 1857. The Commissioner and Magistrate of Patna were, therefore, appointed special Commissioners for the district of Patna to try and punish all offences and offenders cited in the Act referred to.

18. By them he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death, and the sentence was executed at once.

19. Each of the three Sikhs, who apprehended the traitor, was publicly presented with a reward of Rupees 50.

20. On the 13th of June, the Commissioner reported that three sepoys of the Behar Station Guards performed a signal act of fidelity by surrendering voluntarily to him a letter received from sepoys at Dinapoor, urging the Behar Guards to mutiny, and to seize the treasure at Patna before the arrival of the Sikhs. For this act of fidelity, performed at a critical moment, the Commissioner presented the faithful Nujeebs with a sum of two hundred rupees each, in the presence of their own corps and of the Sikhs, who were addressed by Mr. Tayler on the occasion.

21. It became known to the Lieutenant-Governor from private sources that, on the 21st of June, the Commissioner of Patna had caused the four leading members of the Wahabee sect, of Mahomedans in that city to be arrested, and that the same officer had taken steps to disarm the population of the city, neither of which important circumstances was communicated to the Government at the time of their occurrence.

22. The attention of the Commissioner was directed to his loose, desultory, and incomplete manner of reporting to the Government, and as the next day's paper brought no further intelligence of the dangerous and extraordinary steps he was taking, and as his report when received contained none of the detailed information required, the displeasure of the Lieutenant-Governor was communicated to Mr. Tayler, and he was enjoined to keep the Government regularly, carefully, and promptly informed of all his proceedings.

23. The Commissioner ultimately reported that he could obtain no actual evidence of the connection of the Wahabee gentlemen whom he had arrested with treasonable practices; that the evidence against them was that of an untrustworthy informer, who produced letters to substantiate his charge, of which one only was genuine; and that his statements regarding the distribution of money, the entertainment of fighting men, and other preparations for revolt, proved correct from subsequent discoveries.

24. The fanatical devotion of the Wahabees to their spiritual leaders, their abnegation of self, and their mode of confidential communication with each other without written documents, render it difficult to produce legal proof of their machinations, while their fidelity to one another is proof against temptation.

25. The Commissioner, therefore, thought it politic to detain the principal Wahabee gentlemen as hostages for the good behaviour of the sect, which is said to be numerous and peculiarly formidable from its organization, and to be ready to merge all its differences with other Mahomedans to join in a crusade against the Christians.

26. They were lodged in the Circuit House and all their comforts attended to, and they professed to be obliged to the Commissioner for placing them in a position in which no blame could attach to them for any events that might occur in the city.

27. Few, if any, arms were found in the search, and none in the houses of the Wahabees; but, in consequence of the order for disarming, a large amount of arms was produced.
28. All inhabitants were warned to remain at home after 9 o'clock at night.
29. About the same time the Court Gusht Darogah, Moulavee Mehdeec, was arrested on strong suspicion of collusion with the disaffected.
30. On the 29th of June the Commissioner reported that he had, on the morning of the 23rd of the same month, received an express from the Magistrate of Tirhoot, intimating the arrest, in very suspicious circumstances, of a Police Jemadar, named Waris Ali, who was seized in the middle of the night by the Assistant Magistrate, Mr. Robertson.
31. This man's property was packed in carts, and his horse was ready saddled.
32. In his possession were found numerous letters from Moulavee Ali Kurreem said to afford internal evidence of that individual's being engaged in a secret conspiracy.
33. Some of the letters referred to were sent to the Commissioner, and he has been directed to forward copies of them to Calcutta.
34. Immediate steps were taken to arrest Moulavee Ali Kurreem at his house at Doomree, where the Commissioner knew him to be.
35. The arrest was entrusted to the Magistrate and Dewan Mowla Buksh. The former was accompanied by Captain Rattray as a volunteer.
36. The Moulavee had fled shortly before the Magistrate searched his house, and although pursued by Mr. Lowis and his Nazir in an ekka, escaped, the Commissioner suspected from the Nazir playing false.
37. The Moulavee's house was found to be prepared against surprize; and as the evidence of his being engaged in a dangerous conspiracy seemed to the Commissioner undoubted, his property was attached and a reward of two thousand rupees was offered for his apprehension. Both measures were approved by the Lieutenant-Governor.
38. The Moulavee is still at large.
39. The Darogah, Waris Ali, was supposed to be related to the Royal Family of Delhi, and to have been employed as a spy.
40. This man is known to have been hanged on the 6th of July, but the official report of his trial and execution was not received, for some time subsequent to the period embraced in this report.
41. The next event of importance was an attempted insurrection in the city of Patna on the night of the 3rd of July, in which Dr. Lyell, the Principal Assistant to the Opium Agent, lost his life. At about 8 P.M. of the evening in question, 200 men with flags, music and guns, broke into the premises of the Roman Catholic Mission. Immediately on hearing of the disturbance, Dr. Lyell, accompanied by nine Sikhs, proceeded to the spot. He unhappily cantered on ahead of his supports, was shot, and his body mangled before his men could overtake him. Dr. Lyell's body was recovered immediately, and the rebels dispersed upon the approach of the troops to the scene of the disturbance.
42. The Magistrate with Captain Rattray, Adjutant Campbell, and a strong detachment of Sikhs proceeded to the spot at once, and fifty Nujebs from the Godown Guard marched quickly to the same place.
43. The Court Gusht of the Western Thannah, Syud-ood-deen, was fearfully hacked, but survived. He killed one rebel before he was wounded, and a teeka sowar, named Peer Beg, severely wounded another, who was taken into custody.
44. It was said to have been clearly a religious demonstration; green flags with inscriptions were said to have been carried; the cry of Deen-Deen raised, and the property of the Catholic Mission destroyed, while nothing was stolen or removed.

The portion of the report relating to the green flags was however, subsequently proved to have been incorrect.
45. Thirty of the men concerned in the disturbance were arrested and tried by the Commissioner and Mr. Lyell. Fourteen of them including Peer Ali, a Mussulman bookseller, said to be the man who shot Dr. Lyell, were condemned to death, and executed on the same day. The remaining sixteen were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. One of the leaders was the jemadar of a wealthy banker, who was subsequently arrested and tried for harbouring a deserter of the late 37th Native Infantry. He was however acquitted by the Session Judge, who reported the evidence to have been altogether unsatisfactory.

46. Intimation of the intended outbreak was sent to the Commissioner by the father of one of the leading Wahabees in custody, and was communicated to the Magistrate, but from some misapprehension on the part of the latter officer, no notice was taken of it. For this and other errors the Magistrate was removed from office.

47. Mr. Tayler reported that the enquiry was ably and zealously conducted by Dewan Mowla Buksh.

48. Peer Ali, the principal in the riot, and the man who shot Dr. Lyell, was temporarily reprieved by the Commissioner in the hope of obtaining additional information from him, but he was defiant to the last, and as nothing could be elicited from him, he was also hanged. In character, appearance, and manners he was described by the Commissioner as a brutal but brave fanatic.

49. His correspondence proved him to have been in communication with Musseeool Zuman of Cawnpoor ever since the annexation of Oudh, and showed that a secret conspiracy had existed for some time in Patna, carried on under instructions from the North-West, for some great ulterior purpose.

50. The house of Peer Ali was razed to the ground, and a post placed on the site with an inscription telling of the crime and fate of the owner, and his accomplices.

51. These measures seem to have produced good results, and with occasional slight alarms, the city and district remained perfectly tranquil to the date embraced in this narrative.

52. Several sepoys, deserters from regiments which had mutinied and been guilty of acts of violence, were tried, convicted, and executed during the month of June and the early part of July.

53. It was known that many sepoys belonging to the disbanded corps were natives of the Saran and Arrah Districts, and were believed to be skulking about their homes.

54. From the impossibility of obtaining descriptive rolls of them, or of otherwise identifying them, few were caught and brought to trial.

55. Subsequently it was said that, on hearing of the rewards offered for their capture, and the measures taken to bring them to justice, most of them had again abandoned the district.

56. During the month it was reported to the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor that Major Holmes, Commanding the 12th I. C., had proclaimed Martial-Law in the districts of Tirhoot, Chumparan, and Sarun, and had assumed military command of the said districts.

57. The act was disavowed by this Government as unauthorized and illegal, and the Magistrates concerned were simply directed to pay no attention to it, but not to act in any way calculated to place any slight or contempt on Major Holmes, who was respected as an active, zealous and useful officer.

58. The above includes every fact of any importance bearing on the revolt and its effects in Behar.

59. That profound uneasiness prevailed; that the Mussulmans generally were badly disposed; that the ordinary police agency was altogether unequal to the demands of the emergency, and that the tranquillity of the province.
depended entirely on the fidelity of the troops at Dinapoor, are, briefly, the sum of the results of the revolt to the 11th of July, the period embraced in this narrative.

60. With regard to the conduct of the public officers of the division, I regret to have to report that the censure of this Government was repeatedly conveyed to the Commissioner of Patna for the meagreness and unsatisfactory nature of his reports, for the repeated non-fulfilment of his reiterated promises to furnish detailed information of important acts and events, many of which are to the present hour unexplained, for his keeping the Government completely in the dark as to the grounds and intentions of some acts of a very questionable nature, as regards their prudence, legality and necessity, and for his inattention generally to the urgent directions of the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor to keep him quickly, fully, and circumstantially informed of every event of consequence at this important crisis.

61. The Collector of Chuprah was censured for quitting his post unnecessarily in a panic, and exhibiting a discreditably amount of pusillanimity in his proceedings.

62. The conduct of Messrs. Wake, McDonnell, and Lynch has been most satisfactory, and so has that of Dewan Mowla Buskh, Deputy Magistrate of Patna.

63. The former have exhibited proofs of activity, courage, and constancy in remaining at their posts when abandoned by others, that are worthy of all praise.

64. The conduct of all other officers in the division has been satisfactory, but does not call for particular remark.

65. With the exception of the Rajas of Bettiah and Hukwah, no Native Chief has come forward to aid the Government.

66. Mr. Garstin, a Road Officer at Chuprah, was appointed Deputy Magistrate of Buxar, and Mr. Ewen McDonnell, of the Opium Department, was nominated to assist the Magistrate of Chuprah at his own request.

67. The Commissioner reported that he continued to receive assurances of friendship and fidelity to the British Government from various native gentlemen, and among them Baboo Kour Sing of Arrah. He mentioned that intimation had been sent to him from several quarters of the suspicious conduct and infidelity of this man, but that he attached no credit to them, from the reliance he placed in the private assurances that Kour Sing sent to him of his great personal regard for the Commissioner and attachment to the Government. To put him to the test however; Mr. Tayler sent his native agent to him, intimating the suspicions entertained against him, and directing him to repair in person to Patna to give an account of himself. The native agent was at the same time directed to scrutinize everything connected with and about Kour Sing, and to submit a confidential report regarding it to the Commissioner. The report was favorable to Kour Sing, who either cajoled or deceived the agent employed by the Commissioner. Kour Sing did not, however make his appearance at Patna.

68. Bhaugalpoor Division.—During the period under review, the whole of this division remained perfectly tranquil and undisturbed. At Monghyr panic prevailed on several occasions, but from no tangible or well defined causes.

69. On the 11th of July, the Officiating Magistrate reported having discovered traces of a plot which he believed to have been hatching since the beginning of the mutinies, and in connection with which an insurrection was planned, in concert with the disaffected Mussulmans of Patna.

70. Two of the principal Mahomedans of Monghyr were sent to the Commissioner of Bhaugalpoor for trial, the result of which measure will be duly reported hereafter.

71. Rajshahye Division.—The peace of the Rajshahye Division was also undisturbed, and there were no evidences in any part of it of sympathy with the mutinies, or of the contemplation of acts of lawlessness.
72. A little uneasiness was felt at one or two stations, which quickly passed away. Some apprehensions were experienced regarding the behaviour of the 73rd Native Infantry at Julpiguee; the Commissioner issued a few simple regulations for the guidance of Magistrates; the Editor of a native paper at Rungpoor published a false report of a mutiny at Julpiguee, which he contradicted, and expressed contrition for; and a meeting of zemindars and other inhabitants of the Zillah of Rajshahye forwarded to the Government of India certain resolutions, expressing loyalty and determination to aid the Government in the maintenance of order, for which the acknowledgments of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council were returned.

73. Burdwan Division.—This division has likewise been perfectly undisturbed; groundless panic exhibited itself occasionally, and subsided spontaneously when the rumours on which it was based proved to be untrue.

74. At Midnapoor a Jail Burkundaz, who attempted to excite mutiny in the Shekawattee Battalion, was handed over to a military tribunal, tried, found guilty, and hanged.

75. The Officiating Magistrate of Midnapoor illegally and weakly, upon the urgent solicitation of the Officer Commanding the Shekawattee Battalion, sent away two sepoys of that corps, notorious bad characters, who were in confinement on a charge of aggravated assault with intention to murder.

76. Certain sepoys of the regiment interceded with their Colonel for the pardon of the offenders, and the Officiating Magistrate yielding to the solicitations of Colonel Forster, sent the men under escort towards their homes near Delhi, without subjecting them to trial.

77. The men were brought back to Burdwan from beyond Ranigunge, but were finally liberated under the orders of the Government of India, as the word of the Government for their release had been practically given. The displeasure and disapproval of the Government were communicated to the Officiating Magistrate, and the extreme impropriety of his ill-judged proceeding pointed out to him.

78. The only other occurrence in this division in any way connected with the revolt which is deserving of notice, was the presentation of petition by several landholders and others in the Hooghly District, pointing out the defenceless state of the district against the possible attacks of marauding sepoys, the inadequacy of the existing police to contend with them, and the advisability of entertaining a force from the Agoree and Gwallah classes—Lattials by profession and not such cowards as the Burkundazes.

79. The entertainment of a small experimental force at the Sudder Station of the classes mentioned was sanctioned to be extended hereafter should it prove successful.

80. Nuddea Division.—Considerable disquietude has, at times, prevailed in some parts of this division, but no open acts of violence have been committed. At the Presidency, panics have prevailed among both Europeans and Natives; various Legislative Acts suited to the existing emergencies have been passed; different public bodies and private individuals have submitted addresses of loyalty and good-will to the Government, and a Corps of Volunteer Guards has been formed; but as all of these occurrences are already known to the Government of India, and as most of them have been effected in direct communication with the supreme authorities, it is not deemed necessary to record them in this narrative.

81. In Moorsheedabad everything was perfectly tranquil to the 22nd of June, and the general feelings of the people reported to be hostile to the mutineers and their proceedings.

82. A few seditious placards were posted up in the city, and groundless rumours were spread of the existence of an uneasy spirit among the Sonthals. A panic occurred at Berhampoor on the 23rd of June, in consequence of an ungrounded belief that the two regiments at that station had mutinied. The
Nawab Nazim assisted the authorities on this occasion, and the fear passed away as soon as it was proved to be causeless. Detachments of Her Majesty's 84th and 35th Regiments were sent to Berhampoor, whose progress was greatly assisted by His Highness the Nawab Nazim. Since then, public confidence at Moorshedabad has remained unshaken.

83. A sowar and seven deserters from the 43rd Native Infantry were arrested at Berhampoor, the former for attempting to tamper with the troops at the station, the latter for desertion.

84. All were tried, found guilty, and sentenced to transportation for life. They have since been sent to Alipoor.

85. In Nuddea nothing particular has occurred. The native inhabitants of Santipoor sent in a loyal petition to the Government, which was suitably acknowledged.

86. Exaggerated rumours of the number of sepoy deserters supposed to be wandering about the country having caused alarm, an exact list was obtained, which showed them to be few in number, when all fear ceased.

87. At Jessore, the Jemadar and some of the Guard of Nujeebs, attached to the Dacoity Commissioner's Establishment, were reported by the Deputy Magistrate serving on the same establishment to be disaffected. They were arrested, and tried by the Judge as Special Commissioner. The result of the trial belongs to a subsequent period. Their plot included an intention of murdering the Magistrate of Jessore and the Dacoity Commissioner at Hooghly.

88. At Baraset fears existed of the intention of mischief on the part of the numerous Ferazees inhabiting the district. They were reported to hold nightly meetings, but no overt act of violence of any description was committed by them during the period under review.

89. A few deserters were arrested in this district, and sent into Barrackpoor.

90. In Calcutta, the Volunteer Guards were rendered subject to civil authority in all matters relating to patrolling and pickets; and the carrying of arms in the public streets, except by those having authority, was prohibited. All arms other than those issued to the Volunteer Guards were calledd in.

91. In Howrah and the 24-Pergunnahs nothing occurred to disturb the public peace.

92. The police throughout the division were strengthened. The largest additions being, for obvious reasons, made to the force in the 24-Pergunnahs.

93. Dacca Division.—Nothing occurred in this division deserving of record. A very foolish and groundless panic existed at Dacca, which was quickly dispelled by the judicious conduct of the civil authorities at the station.

94. The subsequent arrival of a party of one hundred seamen from the Zenobia and Punjaub, with two armed pinnaces, has restored and maintained the public confidence.

95. The Commissioner reported the existence of another numerous sect of Mahomedans similar to the Ferazees with a mischievous and disaffected person, named Keramut Ali, as their leader.

96. He is believed to be a native of Jampoor, and there is an influential priest of that name at the place mentioned, but the identity of the individuals has not been established.

97. The displeasure of the Government was communicated to the Commissioner of this division for being absent from his post at such a time, and for delegating a portion of the duties of his office to a subordinate in his establishment.

98. Chittagong Division.—In this division the most perfect tranquillity prevailed, and the inhabitants generally were believed to be well-disposed.
99. At Chittagong itself a groundless panic prevailed, which extended to Tipperah. It was founded on the presumed disloyalty of the detachment of the 34th Native Infantry at the former station. The three lakhs of treasure in the Collectorate of Chittagong, were quietly shipped in the Steamer Proserpine on the 2nd of July, and all alarm has since disappeared.

100. The Officiating Magistrate of Tipperah forwarded an application to the Raja of Tipperah for 200 or 300 of his troops to defend the district in case of need. This measure was very properly disallowed, and disapproved by the Officiating Commissioner of Chittagong.

101. The conduct of the officers at Tipperah, who aided instead of allaying the foolish panic, was visited with the displeasure of the Lieutenant-Governor.

102. The judicious proceedings of Mr. Chapman, who assumed charge of the Commissioner's office in the indisposition of Mr. Steer, were approved by His Honor.

103. Cutch Division.—This division was undisturbed, and the Rath Jattra at Pooree, at which some disbanded Hindoo sepoys were present, passed off with the most perfect quietude.

104. The mutiny seems to be unknown and unfelt in Orissa.

105. A proposal to disarm the pilgrims was disallowed.

NON-REGULATION PROVINCES.

106. Assam.—In Assam nothing whatever had occurred to show that the spirit of revolt had extended to that province.

107. The Local Corps have expressed loyalty and attachment to the Government, which has been suitably acknowledged.

108. The men of the Kookie Levy had volunteered to become a general Service Corps, and Cachar was in every respect tranquil.

109. In the Gossiah and Jynteh Hills a tendency to squabble among themselves had been exhibited by the Local Chiefs, but it had no connection whatever with the revolt, and is not therefore further noticed here.

110. Mr. Allen, the Special Commissioner at Cherra, had applied for the services of two additional European officers to do duty with the Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion, and recommends that two guns and a Howitzer be attached to the Corps, with an European Artillery instructor.

111. Darjeeling.—At Darjeeling, in consequence of the proximity of the 73rd Native Infantry at Julpigowrie, and a belief, which the Superintendent believes to be groundless, that the Sappers were untrustworthy, every proper precaution was taken to guard the station and its approaches. Extra policemen engaged at the expense of the house and landholders; and the station guns were placed under the charge of European soldiers belonging to the Convalescent Depot.

112. A Havildar and two sepoys of the sappers were tried by the Superintendent under Act XVII of 1857 for using mutinous language, and one of the sepoys was sentenced to three years' imprisonment in irons without labour. He was sent to Alipoor, and the sepoy of the 73rd, who was the informer
against them, was brought to the favorable notice of the Government of India.

113. The murder of an invalid officer created some alarm among the residents at the time, but the matter had no connection whatever with the revolt.

114. For the prompt trial of criminal cases, the Superintendent was vested with the powers of a Sessions Judge.

115. Sonthal Pergunnahs.—In the Sonthal Pergunnahs, so far as the people are concerned, all remained perfectly quiet, the Sonthals being peaceably engaged in their agricultural pursuits.

116. A report that there was a bad feeling among them, upon careful investigation, proved to be entirely groundless.

117. At Rohmi three troopers of the 5th Irregular Cavalry made a sudden and savage attack upon their officers, while the latter were sitting unarmed before their mess bungalow. The Adjutant, Sir Norman Leslie, was killed, and the Commanding Officer and Surgeon, who beat off the assailants with chairs, were severely wounded.

118. The murderers were discovered chiefly through the activity and zeal of the Woordie-Major, and being convicted by a Court-Martial of Native Officers, were executed in presence of their own regiment, and of a detachment of the 32nd Native Infantry.

119. A reward of Rupees 1,000, offered by the Commissioner of the Sonthal Pergunnahs for the discovery of the assassins, was, to the extent of Rupees 900, divided between three troopers who aided in the discovery and conviction of the offenders. The Woordie-Major positively declined receiving any portion of the reward, and was strongly recommended to be presented with a handsome sword and belt.

120. The Sikh Police Corps at Sooree volunteered through their Commanding Officer to proceed anywhere by forced marches, to punish the enemies of the State, stipulating only that they should be treated and regarded as European soldiers. They were thanked for their loyalty and devotion, and the greater part of the regiment was sent to Patna, where it has done, and is doing excellent service.

121. Chota Nagpoor.—The south-western frontier remained perfectly quiet. Uneasiness existed at Ranchi from the presence of a detachment of the 7th Native Infantry from Dinapoor, but this being sent away, confidence was restored.

122. The Ramghur Battalion was believed to be staunch; but as some feelings upon the subject of the cartridges had crept in among them, it was supposed that, in the event of trial, they were more likely to fraternize with, than to oppose their Dinapoor comrades.

123. Their gunners were not considered trustworthy by their own Commander, but there were none others to replace them, and no European Infantry could be spared for either Chota Nagpoor or Hazareebaugh.

124. Certain proceedings of the Zemindar of Janncondi and the Raja of Barrabhoom were regarded with suspicion, but they evidently had no connection whatever with the revolt.
The best founded fears were entertained at Hazareebagh, where there was a lakh of rupees in the Treasury, and where there were two jails containing 900 prisoners, guarded by two companies of the 8th Native Infantry at Dinapoor.

It was not supposed that they would break out so long as the regiments at Dinapoor remained quiet, and as no European troops could be spared for the station, the police force was increased. Small additions were also made in other divisions of the South-West Frontier Agency, and up to the 11th of July there was not the slightest appearance of revolt or insubordination any where.

The people were quiet and contented, the soldiers orderly and obedient.

Arracan.—In the Province of Arracan nothing having the smallest semblance of sympathy with, or knowledge of, the revolt occurred.

General matters.—On the 19th of June, in accordance with the orders communicated from the Government of India on the 18th of the same month, instructions were issued to the civil authorities in all the river stations, directing them on no account to detain steamers a moment longer than was necessary to land or take in treasure, other cargo or passengers.

They were likewise directed to recommend the European Officers of Government and European residents generally to provide for the safety of their families in places of security, so as to remove them from possible exposure to violence, and to prevent their hampering the movements of those who might be required to act offensively or defensively in the suppression of disorder, and the protection of the public and private property entrusted to them.

It was likewise intimated that free downward passages would be granted to ladies and children in all Government steamers.

A prohibition against ladies and children proceeding to the north-west during the existing disturbances, was promulgated at the same time.

On the 26th of June urgent instructions were issued to all officers on the Grand Trunk Road to be on the alert, to keep their police in full vigour and activity, and to spare no effort to secure the safety and openness of this great and important line of communication.

It was intimated to the same officers that all measures suggested by them for increasing the efficiency of their police would meet with immediate attention.

A company of Captain Rattray's Sikhs was sent to Raneegunge for the protection of that station, and to patrol the Grand Trunk Road as far as the Burrakur river.

On the 17th of June, the Lieutenant-Governor addressed a communication to the Government of India in the Military Department, suggesting the trial of mutineers and deserters by the officers of the districts through which they were believed to be passing on their way to their homes. His Honor suggested that it would be desirable to have them summarily dealt with, and that immediate means should be provided for their trial and punishment in the
districts in which they might be found, so that sentence of death might be passed, and carried into immediate execution by the local officers against any man identified as having belonged to, or being present with, a regiment in mutiny at the time of such mutiny. The officers noted in the margin were, in the period under review, appointed Special Commissioners under Section 7 of Act XIV of 1857 for the trial of all crimes and offences punishable under the same Act.

136. Conclusion.—This brings the narrative of events in the various provinces subject to the Government of Bengal down to the 11th of July last. Nothing has been introduced into the record which had not a bearing upon the mutiny and its consequences. All minor and subsidiary matters unconnected with the revolt have been omitted.

SPECIAL NARRATIVE, GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, JUDICIAL, NO. 17, DATED 21ST AUGUST 1857.

During the period between the 11th and 18th July, peace and order prevailed throughout the Lower Provinces, alarm and excitement having diminished in some, and altogether disappeared in other districts.

2. Patna Division.—The Patna Division still continued to afford the most anxiety, although no actual fresh acts of revolt occurred in it.

3. It was not until the 14th that the Commissioner furnished a detailed report of the outbreak of the 3rd, in which Dr. Lyell lost his life. His report, however, differed little in essentials from the detached statements previously submitted.

4. The rebels, variously estimated at from 80 to 200 persons, assembled at the house of a Mahomedan book-seller, named Peer Ali Khan, and thence proceeded to the Roman Catholic Church with two large flags, a drum beating, and cries of Ali! Ali!

5. The priest whom they probably intended to murder fortunately escaped, when they came out of the Mission premises, reiterating their cries, and calling on the people to assist them.

6. The death of Dr. Lyell and other circumstances connected with the disturbance were as previously narrated.

7. It was ascertained, however, that there had been no firing from the houses, and the city remained perfectly quiet after the dispersion of the rioters.

8. One of the rebels, who was wounded the next morning, made disclosures which led to the arrest of the rioters.

9. This man stated that a plot had been in existence for some months, and that men were regularly paid, and money distributed to excite the people to fight for religion and the Padshah of Delhi.

10. The letters found in Peer Ali’s house disclosed an organized Mussulman conspiracy to re-establish Mahomedan supremacy, and to overthrow the British Government; copies of these letters have already been forwarded to the Government of India.

11. The trial and execution of the rebels took place as mentioned in my previous letter.
12. Imam-ood-deen, the wounded man, was slowly recovering when the Commissioner wrote, and continued to afford useful information.

13. One of Peer Ali’s correspondents is a man of some consequence at Lucknow, hence the suspicion that the Patna outbreak was connected with, or directed from Oudh.

14. Of the thirty-six men arrested, sixteen underwent capital punishment, including their leader, Peer Ali, and the remainder, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, with the exception of two who were acquitted, there being no proof of their participation in the guilt of the rest.

15. Waris Ali, the Police Jemadar, and Peer Ali at the time of their execution requested the money they had about them to be given to a faqueet—a request which was not complied with. Some of those who were hanged exhibited the feelings of men who deem themselves martyrs; the majority were silent and undemonstrative.

16. The Kotegusht Darogah, Sheikh Syud Udin, who was recovering from his wounds, was presented with a reward of Rupees 300, and promoted as a supernumerary from the 3rd to the 2nd Grade.

17. A Jemadar and a Havildar of the 53rd Native Infantry, which mutinied at Cawnpoor, were reported by the Sessions Judge at Patna to have been tried and found guilty by him on the 30th of June, and to have been executed under his warrant on the same date.

18. The Assistant Adjutant-General at Dinapore attempted to stay the execution, but very properly was not listened to by the Sessions Judge.

19. The Wahabee leaders still continued under surveillance; the trial of the Banker, Lootf Ali Khan, was postponed by the Sessions Judge to permit of his, obtaining evidence from Benares as to whether the man harboured by the Banker was really a deserter from the late 37th Native Infantry; the Magistrate’s Nazir had not been brought to trial, and Ali Kurreem was still at large in the period embraced in this report.

20. The Commissioner was authorized to raise a body of armed sowars to act as patrols, and stabilting for their accommodation on the parade-ground was sanctioned.

21. For the more certain detection and apprehension of mutineers and deserters, five Christian subordinates on salaries of Rupees 20 a month, with five chupprasies attached to each, were engaged to watch the principal ghátás leading from the Arthah and Chuprah Districts.

22. None were however apprehended, the executions in Patna having probably rendered them cautious in exposing themselves to the risk of capture.

23. The Magistrate of Patna reported, on the 18th of July, that the city appeared perfectly quiet, the shops were open, and the inhabitants, if possible, more respectful in demeanour than usual.

24. Sarun.—The Magistrate of Sarun described his district as tranquil, the people being busily employed in cultivation, and the price of grain reduced from the favorable prospects of the season.

25. The Magistrate of Sarun having previously brought prominently to the notice of the Government the good conduct and efforts of Lalla Ishen Dyal, the Acting Darogah, and Shewchurn Shufkal, the Jemadar of the Sudder Thannah, the former was promoted to a Supernumerary 2nd Class Darogahship, and the latter rewarded with a gift of Rupees 200.

26. Shahabad.—The Magistrate of Shahabad intimated that his district remained undisturbed; that he had not been successful in the capture of mutineers and deserters; and that the influential zemindars of his district had not given him the slightest aid.

27. While endeavouring to keep up appearances in sending in numbers of sepoys on leave, not one deserter had been apprehended by their assistance, nor had any intimation of their presence been given by the landholders referred to.
28. The Magistrate particularly brought to notice the conduct of the Raja of Doomraon and of Baboo Kowr Sing as capable from their great local influence of giving him the greatest assistance, while without that aid he could get no information.

29. He considered them guilty of neglect, and the latter liable to particular suspicion from the numerous reports spread regarding him since the beginning of the outbreak, and his peculiar position as the ruined owner of vast estates, who would become supreme in the district on the occurrence of disorder, but who, so long as law and order prevailed, could barely find the means to pay the interest of his debts.

30. Mr. Wake continued to watch him narrowly, and the Commissioner summoned him to Patna, but he pleaded sickness as an excuse for not obeying the injunction, and was reported to have said that he would not go to Patna, and would resist if sent for.

31. The Commissioner had already taken steps in the matter, and was requested to report to the Government the earliest intelligence of the result of his communication with the zemindar in question.

32. Chumparun.—The Joint-Magistrate of Chumparun reported his district to be peaceable. He mentioned that cholera had broken out among the Ghurkas proceeding to Goruckpore, and that many of them had died in consequence. The Ghurkas were to have crossed the Little Gunduk on the 18th of July.

33. Behar.—The Magistrate of Behar reported all quiet, and that the extra precautions taken had stopped dacoities and common thefts.

34. The suspicions of the Commissioner regarding the hostile preparations of a wealthy resident, named Modernarain Sing, were afterwards held by that officer to have no sufficient foundation to act upon.

35. The Magistrate of Behar was directed to furnish a special report of the grounds of release of a person supposed to be Ali Kurreem, sent down from Benares for identification, on the suspicion of his being the Ali Kurreem of Patna. There were suspicious circumstances regarding him, which required investigation, particularly as, although a Mahomedan, he had attempted to personate a Hindu.

36. An urgent request was submitted by the late Principal Assistant to the Opium Agent, Dr. Lyell, for arms and other means of defending the Opium Agency, in which there were nearly two millions and a half of public property. The request therein made was complied with as far as was practicable.

37. Bhaugulpoor Division.—In all parts of the Bhaugulpoor Division perfect tranquillity existed.

38. The Commissioner reported that he had dismissed the case against the two Mahomedans sent down from Monghyr by the Officiating Magistrate, as, it appeared to him to be a gross and glaring fabrication on the part of a doubtful Christian convert, Enayut Hossein, whom the Commissioner considered the worst character in the district.

39. The Commissioner deemed the Officiating Magistrate to have exhibited a great want of judicial acumen, and directed him at once to proceed to Hooghly, to the Magistracy of which he had already been some time appointed, making over charge of the Magistracy of Monghyr to the Officiating Collector, Mr. W. Tucker. Of this measure the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor was communicated to Mr. Yule.

40. Rajshahye.—In the Rajshahye Division all was peaceable and orderly.

41. At Jalpigoreo two men were arrested by the Joint-Magistrate for tampering with the sepoys of the 73rd Native Infantry and sent to Rungpoor for trial.

42. An insubordinate trooper of the 11th Irregular Cavalry was convicted of riotous conduct, and sentenced to a year's imprisonment.
43. Dinagepoor.—In the Dinagepoor District a Feerazee Moulavie and others of the same sect had spread reports of the intention of the Government forcibly to convert native children to Christianity, which reports had caused many of the children in the Vernacular School at Mutthoorapoor to be withdrawn.

44. Orders were given to try and punish all persons spreading such false and mischievous reports; and to examine all persons wandering about as fakeers and religious mendicants, who are believed to be the bearers of intelligence from all parts of India.

45. They are said to carry letters in the bamboo which every such person is armed with, and the sticks in question were ordered to be examined to see that no treasonable correspondence was concealed in them.

46. Dacca Division.—The Dacca Division was tranquil throughout.

47. An extra guard for the city at a cost of Rupees 94 monthly was recommended to the Government of India for sanction.

48. Chittagong and Cuttack Divisions.—The Chittagong and Cuttack Divisions shared in the general tranquillity.

49. Nuddea Division.—In the Nuddea Division there was no disturbance of any kind connected with the revolt.

50. Fears were entertained for Moorshedabad, which proved to be groundless. At that place the only occurrence deserving of record was the detection of a sepoy of the late 37th Native Infantry by a trooper of the 11th Irregular Cavalry.

51. This deserter from a regiment which had mutinied was tried and sentenced to transportation for life.

52. Barrackpoor.—The Officer Commanding the Barrackpoor Division requested the co-operation of the civil authorities in disarming the inhabitants of the villages near and around Barrackpoor, but as no grounds showing the necessity for such a proceeding were advanced, the authorities referred to were requested to state the reasons on which their proposal was based.

53. A religious proclamation purporting to announce the advent of Emam Mehidee and the approach of the Day of Judgment was circulated among the inhabitants of Jingergatchea near Jessore, by a Police Jemadar, named Mahomed Ali, who came to Calcutta in charge of elephants from Dacca.

54. No importance was attached to it by the Commissioner, but further enquiry regarding it was directed to be instituted.

55. Calcutta.—At the Presidency arrangements were made to prepare the Town Hall, the Free School, the Pleaders' Chambers in the Sudder Court and the Lower Orphan School at Khidderpoor, for the reception of the European troops.

56. Burdwan Division.—The Burdwan Division was no exception to the rule of order and tranquillity.

57. Beerbhoom.—Doubts were entertained by the Judge of Beerbhoom of the fidelity of the troop of sowars attached to the Police Battalion, in consequence of their being Mussulmans chiefly recruited near Delhi and Futteghur.

58. Captain Rattray believed the troop to be perfectly loyal, and was of opinion that, in the event of their exhibiting any signs of dissatisfaction, the officer in command would have ample means of coercing them.

59. Non-regulation districts.—In Assam, Arracan, Darjeeling, the Cossiah Hills, and Cachar all was reported to be quiet.

60. S. W. Frontier.—In the South-West Frontier Agency peace was yet unbroken, and the visit of the zemindars referred to in the former narrative shown to be for the purpose of negotiating a marriage between the two families.
62. At Chyebassa a small temporary police force at a monthly cost of Rupees 34 was sanctioned. A Burkundaz Guard at Ooritani Ghát in Pergunnah Palamow was also sanctioned at an outlay of Rupees 21 a month.

63. Sonthal Pergunnahs.—In the Sonthal Pergunnahs all was quiet.

64. An application was addressed to the Government of India in the Military Department to place a few elephants at the disposal of the Officer Commanding the left wing of the Bengal Police Battalion to facilitate the movements of his men during the rains.

65. General.—On the 30th of June, the Lieutenant-Governor submitted to the Government of India a minute urging the immediate adoption of so much of his proposal of the 30th of April 1856, for the improvement of the police of the Lower Provinces as would enable him, in existing circumstances, to strengthen the police of the Province of Behar, and of the Grand Trunk Road to meet the urgent necessities of the present state of affairs.

66. The reasons for this requisition were stated in the minute, and the gist of the measure was an addition to the number and pay of the Uncovenanted Deputy Magistrates, so as to obtain the services of a large number of Englishmen in those offices, and to place a small and manageable district under the charge of each, as well as, at the same time, to increase the numbers, and to improve the position and prospects of the native police.

67. The zeal, efficiency, and public spirit of Messrs. Lynch and Vincent were brought prominently to the notice of the Government of India, those officers having continued at their posts and done good service in spite of sickness—which valuable aid the Lieutenant-Governor had not the power to reward adequately and promptly under the existing system.

68. The present staff of reliable Deputy Magistrates of experience was stated to be barely equal to the ordinary zillah duties required from them; and fresh men of a fit stamp were not to be obtained at the low scale of remuneration then allowed.

69. On the 17th of July, the provisional sanction of the Government of India was communicated, authorizing the improvement of the Civil Police in the districts of Behar* by changing the designation of Mohurir to that of Naib Darogah; by raising their salaries to Rupees 40, 35, and 30 monthly; by raising the salaries of the Jemadars to Rupees 20, 15, and 10 in the same proportions; and by raising the pay of the Burkundazes to Rupees 6 and 5 a month in the proportion of one-fourth of the former to three-fourths of the latter.

70. The Lieutenant-Governor was likewise empowered to reward for particularly distinguished services; Police Darogahs not eligible for promotion to Deputy Magistrates, by special salaries of Rupees 200 and 150 a month, the number so promoted not to exceed three of each class.

71. The appointment of twenty additional members of the Subordinate Executive Establishment to be employed as Deputy Magistrates or Deputy Collectors, or in both capacities in the province of Behar and on the Grand Trunk Road, was granted, together with the general reconstruction of the service on the footing noted in the margin.

72. The Lieutenant-Governor was not to consider himself bound to promote the present members of the executive service to the higher salaries, which were sanctioned for the purpose of attracting to the service men of the highest qualifications capable of controlling and directing
the police, and of maintaining order in the districts mentioned. At the same time those now in the service deserving of advancement were not to be deprived of it, should the Lieutenant-Governor consider them fit for promotion.

73. These arrangements were to be considered as temporary and liable to revision hereafter, and were to be reported for sanction as made.

74. The Lieutenant-Governor was also authorized to appoint Honorary Magistrates in Behar from among the respectable and influential residents of the province, gentlemen so appointed exercising the powers of Assistant Magistrates.

75. A proposal was submitted by Lieutenant-Colonel Knvytett through the Chief Engineer for the safeguard of the ferry across the Soane on the setting in of the periodical rains. Sanction was given to the proposal as far as it could be complied with.

76. The above statement includes every circumstance of interest and importance connected with the revolt during the week ending on the 18th July.

SPECIAL NARRATIVE, GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, JUDICIAL, NO. 18, DATED 22ND AUGUST 1857.

Bhaugulpur. | Asam.
Burdwan. | Avraam.
Dacca. | Darjeeling.
Chittagong. | Cacass.
Cuttack. | Chota Nagpore.

The Sonthal Pergunnahs.

In the division noted in the margin nothing whatever occurred to disturb the peace or to show the extension of mutiny or disaffection, and no cases under the recent regulations were tried.

2. Patna Division.—The province of Behar, as usual, occupies the most prominent position, not so much from any fresh acts of revolts, as from the results of the trials and further proceedings connected with events already reported.

A proposal was received from the Commissioner of Patna on the 15th of July, recommending extension of the police throughout Behar to arrest mutineers and deserters, and to prevent their committing such acts of violence and rapine, as a disbanded and rebellious soldiery freed from the restraints of discipline might be expected to indulge in.

For political reasons, Mr. Tayler, believing in the religious element of the existing disturbances, deemed it expedient to recruit his force from the Gowallas, Dosiads, and similar castes, to the exclusion generally during the present troubles of Mahomedans and Hindus of high caste. Christians, European and Eurasian, were to be enrolled wherever procurable, and it was suggested that each Magistrate and Deputy Magistrate should raise the footmen in his own district, while the horsemen, 200 in number, were to be enrolled in Patna, and organized under the personal supervision of the Commissioner.

Those who could bring good horses were to receive Rupees 20 a month, the rest were to be provided with horses at the cost of the Government, the value of which was to be gradually recovered from their pay. An advance of funds for the purchase of horses was solicited.

All were to be drilled and to be subjected to a rough semi-military state of discipline.

1. Jendadar | Rupees 2o.
2. Daffadars | 10.
50 Men at Rs. 5 each | 250.

270.

Station.

Previous to this application, authority was given to the Commissioner to raise a force of the strength, noted in the margin, for each Sudder Station.

To the proposal above detailed, the sanction of the Government of India was accorded on the 22nd of July. The arrangement was to be considered temporary, the horse and foot were to be paid at such rates as would secure the services of reliable men, and the Commissioner was called upon to submit at once a definite scheme as to the constitution and cost of the proposed Police Corps, and the manner in which it is intended to be officered and drilled,
9. On the 19th July, Mr. Tayler sent a more detailed report which contained a few particulars not previously communicated regarding the riot of the third of the same month.

10. The parties chiefly implicated were men said to be Sunnecs and Hindus, the Wahabees having no connection with the outbreak as a sect.

11. The wounded rebel, Imam-ood-deen, was promised by the Commissioner that his life should be spared as a reward for the information given by him. The inscription in the flag captured was that used by the Wahabees.

12. Mr. Tayler also reported that the Police Jemadar, Waris Ali, was earnestly desirous of ascertaining if there were any way in which his life could be spared.

The Commissioner's reply and commentary are given in his own words:

"I told him I will make a bargain with you; give me three lives and I will give you, yours.

"He then told me all the names that I already knew, but could disclose nothing further, at least with any proof in support.

"He was evidently not sufficiently clever to be Ali Kurreem's confederate."

13. On the 21st of July, Mr. Tayler transmitted a continuation of his narrative of the 19th.

He stated that warrants were out for nearly fifty men, persons said to have been either directly concerned in the late outbreak, or to form part of the several gangs receiving pay from different parties as a retainer for rebellion.

14. Imam-ood-deen, the informer, had received the title of Darogah; and Ali Kurreem was to have been elected ruler of the province, but in consequence of his absence on the night of the riot, Kasim Shere was chosen as his substitute. A horse was provided for him, but he declined the perilous distinction while the gathering was so scanty. Kassim Shere is a zemindar living some twenty-four miles from Patna, and measures have been taken to arrest him.

15. The Dinapoor sepoys were said by the same informer to have consented to the conspiracy, but to have differed with the townspeople as to the day for the revolt, the sepoys wishing for Sunday, the Mahomedans for Friday, their own sacred day. The latter was selected.

16. Several other of the conspirators subsequently seized were said to have confirmed all these particulars, and the Commissioner found all Imam-oood-deen's statements verified by collateral proof.

17. Mr. Tayler proposed keeping the prisoners last arrested until more of their number were secured, as by confronting them with each other, much useful information was obtained.

18. On the 14th the Commissioner received a letter from Lord H. N. Browne, Officiating Magistrate of Monghyr, with a copy of a Persian letter directed to Ali Kassim, the Magistrate's Nazir; this letter contained most treasonable matter, but was at once pronounced to be a forgery.

The Commissioner of Baugulpoooom dismissed the case as already recorded.

19. On the 15th another rebel was caught, who made further disclosures, which it was not deemed expedient by Mr. Tayler to detail. The Commissioner contended himself with the expression of a belief that it would be satisfactory to the Government to know that, as far as could then be ascertained, the scheme of the traitors had been frustrated, their plot disclosed, and the actors were being hunted over the country.

20. The city of Patna was said never to have been so quiet before; not a soul was to be seen in the streets after 9 o'clock, and the executions and pursuit of all bad and suspicious characters had, to a great extent, cleared the city of them.

21. Mr. Tayler expressed his acknowledgments to the European and Eurasian community for, with a few exceptions, affording their active aid in
Patrolling the city during the nights under the command of Major Nation which proceedings have tended much towards the establishment and maintenance of order.

Mr. Tayler reported that all the public officers, with one or two exceptions, had cordially and usefully co-operated in the measures adopted for the public safety, and several independent gentlemen had furnished valuable information.

22. The following respectable native residents were prominently mentioned as giving aid:

- Maharaja Bhoop Sing.
- Shaikh Ruzah Hossein.

Several others were said to have tendered their services, and expressed their willingness to be of use.

Wilayat Ali Khan was reported to be deserving of special recognition, and recommended for a dress of honour and the title of Bahadoor.

Dewan Mowla Buksh was also prominently praised, and recommended for an increase of pay and a sword of honor.

Hedayat Ali, a Subadar in Captain Rattray's Corps, was considered deserving of a marked token of approval, and a separate report was promised in his case.

23. On the 24th of July, the Commissioner reported the acquittal of the Banker, Lootf Ali Khan, by the Sessions Judge, and complained of the Judge's having refused to postpone the trial on his (Mr. Tayler's) requisition, to enable him to procure and produce further evidence for the prosecution.

24. On the 25th, Mr. Tayler sent a further communication, soliciting the advice and instructions of the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor on the propriety of detaining Lootf Ali Khan on a charge of participation, or at least a guilty knowledge of the late conspiracy and outbreak, as he had been acquitted of that of harbouring a mutineer.

25. The reasons assigned for recommending this measure were that a leading rebel, named Guseeta, who had been hanged, was at the time of the outbreak a Jemadar in Lootf Ali Khan's service; that another principal in the riot, also named Guseeta, had formerly been a servant of the Banker's, and his mother was still ayah in Lootf Ali's zenanah; that Sekimoolah, the uncle of the deserter, Mohubbut, who had been capitaly sentenced, was in the same service, and had received his nephew, who had openly boasted of his participation in the Benares mutiny. The inference of the Commissioner was that all this could not have occurred without the privity, if not connivance, of the master, and that the servants would not have dared to take part in open revolt, if their master had been loyal and well affected.

26. Mr. Tayler believed that some wealthy person must have been concerned in the conspiracy from its being known that many men had been paid and retained for direct purposes of treason, and that an example was required from among the wealthy and influential classes.

27. Many circumstances had, by this time, combined to render the Lieutenant-Governor distrustful of Mr. Tayler's judgment, and doubtful of the justice and propriety of his measures. Hence his recommendations in favour of particular persons were not hastily acted upon, and the Lieutenant-Governor declined to advise on the subject of Lootf Ali's prosecution, until he had received the record of the trial, which was called for from the Judge.

28. On the 25th of July, the Sessions Judge, Mr. R. N. Farquharson, reported that he had tried, under Act XVII of 1857, Azim Khan, Jemadar of the 37th Native Infantry, committed by the Deputy Magistrate of Barh. The prisoner was convicted on his own showing of being a deserter from his corps after it had mutinied at Benares, and was sentenced to death on the 15th.
29. On the 14th and 23rd of the same month, Moohabut Ali, a sepoy of the 37th Native Infantry, committed by the Commissioner was tried by Mr. Farquharson for rebellion, was convicted and executed.

30. On the 23rd and 24th, the Banker, Lootf Ali Khan, committed by Mr. Tayler was tried for knowingly harbouring the deserter, Moohabut Ali, and was acquitted from insufficiency of proof.

31. The Commissioner was stated to have taken advantage of an opportunity of furnishing supplementary evidence in support of his charge, and at the last moment demanded a further postponement to produce additional witnesses to prove the fact of harbouring a rebel against the prisoner.

32. This the Judge declined to comply with, from the unsatisfactory grounds on which it was based.

33. The Government Pleader was employed to conduct the case on the second day of trial, and before the defence was commenced, urged strongly a day's postponement to bring additional witnesses to prove that the deserter was really in the service of Lootf Ali Khan, but his reasons for desiring to defer the trial were deemed utterly unsatisfactory by the Judge, who peremptorily declined a postponement, and ordered the trial to proceed.

34. In reporting his refusal, Mr. Farquharson stated that he acted in the manner mentioned, notwithstanding a warning from the Commissioner that he incurred great responsibility in so doing.

35. In those circumstances, and from not knowing what steps the Commissioner might take to throw discredit on his proceedings, the Judge sent down the entire case and correspondence on the subject, directing attention to the loose way in which it was forwarded for trial, and the intermediate remarks of the Commissioner on the weight he considered due to the evidence for the prosecution. With these papers Mr. Farquharson transmitted several private letters sent to him by the Commissioner, in which, with a very indecent disregard of ordinary propriety, Mr. Tayler had continued during the trial to endeavour to influence the mind of the Judge, and almost to urge him to condemn the prisoner.

36. Mr. Farquharson mentions reports being current that some of the men, punished as being concerned in the city outbreak, were convicted by the Commissioner, presided over by Mr. Tayler, on evidence less reliable than that which he had rejected in Lootf Ali Khan's case. The Judge was not in the least cognizant of what the evidence was, but considered it his duty to report the common opinion on the subject, for the Government to take such steps as might be thought fit to test the truth of statements damaging to the civil services and to the European character at large.

37. Mr. Farquharson felt the more induced to adopt this step, from the fact of the Commissioner's having disregarded the instructions of the Government of the 11th July 1857, and persisted in himself conducting trials notwithstanding the presence of the Judge. Among them was the trial and condemnation to death of a trooper of Captain Rattray's regiment, since the receipt of the letter referred to.

38. On the 21st of July a petition, addressed to the Lieutenant-Governor, was received from Lootf Ali Khan through Mr. Fagan, a Barrister of the Supreme Court, complaining of the loss and indignity to which he had been subjected by imprisonment, stating that he was not made aware of the grounds of suspicion against him; that he was a loyal and well affected subject of the Government; that his interests and inclinations were alike opposed to rebellion and in favor of peace and order; and that the proceedings were instigated by the enmity of Velayat Hossein Khan, his nephew, with whom he was on bad terms, and between him and whom there had been hostile litigation in the Local and Sudder Courts.

39. He prayed for release in bail, and that he might have a fair and open trial.
40. The petition was transmitted to the Commissioner of Patna, with an expression of the Lieutenant-Governor's having no doubt that every care had been taken by Mr. Tayler not to subject the petitioner to any unnecessary indignity or disadvantage during his detention in jail, and pending his trial before the Sessions Judge. An early report of the result of the trial was again called for, and a copy of the letter, transmitting the petition to the Commissioner, was furnished to Mr. Fagan, the petitioner's Counsel.

41. On the 25th, Mr. Tayler replied that Lootf Ali Khan was arrested by the Magistrate under his (the Commissioner's) orders; that he passed the first night of his imprisonment in a room in the Magistrate's house; that he was taken to jail the next day; that no orders regarding his accommodation and treatment while there were issued by him; that on the 9th he was committed for trial before the Judge, by whom he had been acquitted, although there were other grave presumptions of criminality against him; that the declaration of the charges being instigated by his nephew, Velayat Ali Khan, was convenient; that the two were undoubtedly at enmity, but that he believed Velayat Ali to be too honorable and straightforward to stoop to bring false or unfounded charges against his uncle, although he would not hesitate to give true information against him.

42. These cases are related somewhat in detail in consequence of their important bearings on recent events in Behar.

43. The weekly reports of all the Magistrates in the province indicated the existence of general tranquillity.

44. At Gya, a carpenter was tried and executed for attempting to tamper with the Sikhs; and at Arrah, a mutineer was apprehended with arms in his hands, tried and hanged.

45. **Bhaugulpur Division.**—In the Bhaugulpur Division the only occurrence necessary to note was the trial on the 22nd of July of a deserter from the 37th Native Infantry, who was sentenced to death, but reprieved by the Magistrate on account of his youth, pending a reference to the Government of India.

46. **Nuddea Division.**—At Berhampoor, several gentlemen tendered their services as volunteers through Colonel Hannyngton. The offer of service was accepted by the Government of India.

47. The Judge of Moorshedabad was reported to have sentenced a deserter from the 37th Native Infantry to transportation for life instead of to death, in consequence of no arms or plundered property being found in his possession.

48. From the trial of the Nujeebs in Jessore reported in the previous narrative, it appeared that several discharged sepoys were entertained on the Dacoity Commissioner's Establishment. A few of them were disbanded sepoys of the late 19th Native Infantry, who were at once discharged and sent away.

49. At the Presidency considerable alarm prevailed in consequence of the belief that a large amount of arms had been purchased by natives, and were concealed in the city. The Commissioner of Police was directed to institute careful enquiry into the matter, when it was found that the rumours on the subject were greatly exaggerated.

A Bill is now under the consideration of the Legislature for the licensing of arms.

50. **Assam.**—The acknowledgments of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India were communicated to the native officers and men of the 1st Assam Light Infantry for the expression of their fidelity and readiness to proceed against the enemies of the State.

51. **General.**—Intimation was received from the Government of India that the Steamer *Jumna* fitted as a gun-boat, with two armed boats in tow, was proceeding to Allahabad.
52. One of the latter manned by European seamen, with a howitzer, was to be left at Patna to act on shore or afloat, as the Commissioner might determine.

SPECIAL NARRATIVE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, JUDICIAL, No. 19, DATED 25TH AUGUST 1857.

Behar.—During the week included in this statement, the Native Corps at Dinapoor, the 7th, 8th, and 40th Native Infantry mutinied, and crossing the Soane made their way unopposed to Arrah. There they were joined by Baboo Kooar Sing, a well known zamindar of that district, with a large following; they plundered the Treasury, destroyed the public and private property at the station, and beleaguered the residents in a house fortified by Mr. Boyle, Civil Engineer of the East Indian Railway. With the officers in question were a party of fifty Sikhs of Captain Rattray’s Regiment.

2. The particulars of the revolt at Dinapoor, of the unopposed escape of the mutineers, and of the disaffection of the 12th Irregular Cavalry at Segowlee, with the murder of their officers, have not been reported in detail to this Government. They have doubtless been made known to the Government of India in the Military Department.

3. Their effects, increased by the most untoward proceedings on the part of the Commissioner of Patna, have been very disastrous as regards the province of Behar and the South-West Frontier Agency, and have fulfilled the evils prognosticated from the occurrence of so untoward an event.

4. At 1 o’clock on Saturday, the 25th of July, the Commissioner of Patna received an intimation of the revolt at Dinapoor. He immediately assembled all the residents, and every defensive precaution was taken in case the mutineers should march to Patna.

5. They did not approach that city which remained perfectly tranquil.

6. Mr. Tayler made arrangements likewise to aid in the relief of Arrah, but as the mutiny of the Irregular Cavalry disarranged his plans, it was abandoned, and the offensive operations were left entirely to the military authorities.

7. The mutineers of the Irregular Cavalry after murdering their own officers, attacked the houses of the Deputy Magistrate and Sub-Deputy Opium Agent at Sewan. Messrs. Lynch and McDonnell escaped with difficulty, and the rebels were reported to have marched in the direction of Azimgur, where there was a detachment of their own corps.

8. On the 1st of August, the Commissioner reported that he had received no authentic or reliable information from Shahabad, although he had offered large rewards for intelligence.

9. The rebels had complete possession of the Ghāt on the Soane, and were said to be in force either at Arrah or Jugdispoor.

10. The Raja of Doomraon was said to have joined them, and as the Commissioner considered the crisis to be grave and imminent, and that it was necessary to concentrate the whole strength of the province at Dinapoor and Patna, and to strike a blow at Shahabad, he ordered all the out-stations to be abandoned, and the officers in charge of them to fall back on Patna.

11. The consequences of this fatal and ill-judged step will be detailed in my next narrative to the period embraced in which they belong.

12. At the time this order was issued, all was reported to be undisturbed at Chuprah, Mozufferpoor, and Gya. Chumpurun had been re-occupied by the Magistrate, and was in a state of renewed tranquility.

13. In a continuation of his narrative, furnished by Mr. Tayler, the conduct of Messrs. Wake, McDonnell, Lynch, Lindsay, and some others was brought to the favorable notice of the Government, and a strong belief was expressed in the loyalty and good faith of Baboo Kooar Sing. The thanks of the Government were returned to all the English gentlemen mentioned by Mr. Tayler.
14. In referring to the proclamation of Martial Law by the late Major Holmes, the Commissioner addmitted that, although he knew that officer to have acted illegally, he refrained intentionally from noticing it, feeling that "however the formalities of civilized society might be violated, the essentials of all society, life, property, and order were most effectually preserved by the military despotism thus established, and that the end fully justified the means."

15. The displeasure of the Lieutenant-Governor was communicated to the Commissioner for concealing, or conniving at the concealment from his superiors of that which ought to be made known to them, and which was withheld from a fanciful notion of his own as to whether or not their knowledge and possible interference was likely to be attended with advantage or the contrary. At the time Major Holmes declared Martial Law in Behar, nothing whatever had occurred to justify that step, and the moment it was known by the Government, his act was set aside and cancelled.

16. Near the end of July, the Commissioner reported that he had tried four Native troopers of Captain Rattray's Corps, and that one of them, having been convicted of treason and gross breach of trust, was hanged.

17. Mr. Tayler was directed to submit his, proceedings in all the cases tried, in which the prisoners had been sentenced capitally by him.

18. Orders were sent up to make arrangements for the defence of the Opium Godown at Patna.

19. Immediately after the mutiny of the 12th Irregulars at Segowlee, and the consequent temporary abandonment of the station of Moteeharee, the Raja of Bettiah reported the circumstances direct to the Government, mentioned that he was engaged in pacifying the people around him, and in preventing further mischief. He requested that steps might be taken to protect them, and sent information of the revolt by express and by dak to the Commissioner of Patna, and the Magistrates of Sarun and Chumperun.

20. For these acts of loyalty, the personal acknowledgments of the Lieutenant-Governor were returned to the Maharaja.

21. On the 30th of July Martial Law was declared in the following districts constituting the Patna Division, viz.—

Shahabad.  |  Sarun.
Patna.    |  Chumperun.
Behar.    |  Tirhool.

In these districts the functions of the ordinary Criminal Courts of judicature were suspended in respect of heinous offences.

22. On the 31st of the same month, the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India in Council extended to the whole of the Lower Provinces of the Presidency of Bengal the operation of Act No. XVI of 1857, entitled "an Act to make temporary provision for the trial and punishment of heinous offences in certain districts."

23. The Commissioners noted in the margin were appointed under the Act, and provision was made as to which officer should conduct the trials in the event of more than one being present at the same time.

24. The Magistrates of Behar, Shahabad, and Chumperun reported the steps adopted by them for the capture and punishment of mutineers and deserters.
25. On the 30th, a mutineer of the 37th Native Infantry, named Dabeedun Panday, was summarily tried, and executed at Chumparun.

26. The Officiating Magistrate of Tirhoot reported that his district was perfectly tranquil, and suggested the immediate reoccupation of Segowlee to prevent inroads from the Terai.

27. He mentioned that up to the 9th of July, seven deserters, six from the 43rd Light Infantry at Barrackpoor, and one from the Golundauz at Allahabad, were hanged, and two from the 43rd Light Infantry sentenced to transportation for life.

28. He also stated that the detachment of the 12th Irregular Cavalry at Mozufferpoor was staunch, and that he had implicit confidence in their Ressaldar, Jurreep Khan.

29. He was rebuked for placing confidence in those who had shown themselves utterly undeserving of it, as such misplaced trust might produce evil effects.

30. The Officiating Judge of Sarun asserted that the residents of that station had abandoned it on the occupation of Aligunge by the mutineers of the 12th Irregulars, and that they intended to re-occupy it as soon as it was safe to do so.

31. The Joint-Magistrate of Chumparun reported that, on the mutiny of the 12th Irregulars being communicated to him by the Regimental Moonshee, he had abandoned the station and taken refuge at an Indigo Factory some miles from it.

32. The Officiating Magistrate of Gya suggested that, in the absence of regimental muster-rolls, mutineers and deserters might be identified from descriptive rolls furnished from the Collectories through which the family remittances were made. This he believed to be additionally necessary on account of the sympathies of the people of Behar with the mutineers, and the difficulty of tracing and arresting those who returned to their villages. The plan was approved and communicated to the Magistrates and Collectors of—

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<th>Patna,</th>
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<td>Sarun,</td>
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for their information and guidance.

33. On the 28th of July, the Officiating Magistrate of Behar reported that the mutiny at Dinapoor had thrown the place into a ferment, that nothing was to be feared from the townspeople, but that the real danger lay in the possibility of the Dinapoor mutineers, and those from Monghyr and Bowsee, should they revolt, passing through and attacking Gya.

34. The Magistrate proposed meeting them with forty-five English soldiers, 100 Sikhs, and forty Nujeebs, either in the neighbourhood of Gya, or of defending the treasure in a pucca house with the above force, if the mutineers were in too great number to be opposed in the open field. The district was said to be disaffected throughout. Many of the sepoys of the 8th Native Infantry belonged to it, and the Magistrate had no doubt that the mutineers would find plenty of sympathizers if disorder once began. He therefore strongly urged the detachment of more European soldiers to so important a place as Gya, if they could possibly be spared.

35. Rajshahye.—The Rajshahye Division continued perfectly tranquil. A conspiracy to murder the officers at mess was reported to have been discovered at Julpigori, and six more sepoys of the 73rd Native Infantry were arrested and sent to Calcutta for trial by Court-Martial.

36. There were obviously no means of securing adequate punishment by trial at Julpigori.

37. Bhaugulpooor Division.—In the Bhaugulpooor Division much alarm was caused by the Dinapoor mutineers, but no acts of revolt occurred during the week embraced in this report.
38. Nuddea Division.—In the 24-Pergunnahs precautions were taken to preserve the peace during the approaching Mahomedan festivals: the selling of arms was carefully watched, and no interruption of peace had occurred, or was, in the belief of the Magistrates, likely to occur.

39. At Moorsheadabad, Nuddea, Jessore, and Baraset all was tranquil. A disbanded sepoy of the late 19th Native Infantry was committed at the Sub-Division of Aurungabad for using seditious language.

40. At the Presidency careful search was made for concealed arms, and enquiry was instituted as to the amount of arms and munitions of war recently sold to natives by European Firms. They appear to have been considerable, but by no means to the extent that was supposed; and as the Native gun-smiths voluntarily surrendered their stock to the Commissioner of Police, and efficient measures were taken for the protection of the city during the approaching Mahomedan festivals, no danger was apprehended on the account referred to.

41. The Commissioner of Police reported that the gun and pistol barrels sold from the Arsenal as old iron were so imperfectly destroyed as to be susceptible of again being used as fire-arms. Directions were given so to destroy them, as to render them useless for conversion into offensive weapons.

42. As great alarm existed in the Mahomedan community on account of absurd rumours regarding violent measures that were to be adopted towards them: during their festival, the Magistrates were directed to point out the groundless nature of the reports, and to disabuse the people of their delusions. The principal Mahomedan gentlemen were also requested to do the same.

43. Chota Nagpoor.—In the South-West Frontier Agency nothing occurred to disturb the general tranquillity. The detachment of the 8th Native Infantry at Hazareebaugh was suspected, but had not at this time revolted.

44. Conclusion.—In the remaining divisions of the Bengal Presidency, nothing whatever occurred deserving notice as connected with the revolt. Profound tranquillity prevailed throughout.

Special Narrative, Judicial, No. 20, dated Fort William, 29th August 1857.
From 2nd to 8th August 1857 inclusive.

Behar Division.—The chief incidents of the week in this division were the abandonment of the various out-stations under instructions from the Commissioner and the gallant defence of the Arrah band.

2. The Commissioner reported on the 26th of July that he had released the Wahabee Moulavi Ouleyai Ali from surveillance, taking from him security to appear, if required.

3. The person in question was said to be the man of least consequence among the Wahabees, and it was stated that nothing had transpired in any way to implicate him in treasonable designs.

4. Mr. Tayler was again informed that the Government were entirely ignorant of the reasons of this man's imprisonment, and he was requested to supply the omission at his earliest convenience.

5. On the 3rd of August, the Commissioner was called upon to explain why he had tried and condemned to death a trooper of Captain Rattray's Cavalry after the receipt of the orders of the 11th of July, directing that when the Judge was present all such cases should be tried by that officer.

Pending the receipt of Mr. Tayler's explanation, he was prohibited from holding any further trials under Act XVII of 1857.

6. On the 31st of July, Mr. Tayler submitted a copy of a minute drawn up by him to show that, as Europeans are scattered in small numbers over several districts, with no adequate protection, nothing but murder and disaster could be expected.
7. In these circumstances, he considered concentration an imperative necessity, and the only means of recovering our position. He had, therefore, authorized all the officials of the districts to fall back on Patna.

8. Those of Chuprah had already been at Bankipore for some days, and had made an unsuccessful attempt to return to their station, having been compelled to retrace their steps on account of the defeat of the force sent to relieve Arrah.

9. The Commissioner trusted that the Government would approve the measures taken by him, as he considered that it was justified by its objects, whatever might be the temporary confusion caused by it.

10. This minute was received on the 4th of August, and on the 5th it was intimated to Mr. Tayler that his proceedings were wholly disapproved; that the precipitate flight from two stations, Mozufferpoor and Gya, was scandalous and disgraceful to the British name, inasmuch as they were not menaced with immediate attack; and one of them had a large number of available English settlers near the station, while the other possessed a garrison and other means of defence.

11. The statement of the Commissioner that he had "authorized" the officials of the district to come to Patna was questioned, because authorization implies the existence of a discretionary power, while the copy of the orders issued to the Magistrate and Collector of Gya, which had reached the Lieutenant-Governor, proved that the abandonment of that station was commanded, and left no option to the authorities, as the expression used by Mr. Tayler was intended to convey.

12. All that was necessary was to grant permission to officers to retire when their position was no longer tenable, leaving them to exercise their own discretion and judgments in the matter.

13. The difficulty of retrieving such an error was pointed out to Mr. Tayler, and he was directed, if it were still practicable, to cause all the authorities to return immediately to their respective posts, and to intimate to them the probable early issue of orders by the Government of India, placing all officers whose employment has ceased owing to the present disturbances, on out of employ allowance.

14. On the 31st of July the Lieutenant-Governor received a telegraphic message from Gya, announcing that the civil officers of the district were about to abandon the station and all in it, including the large amount of cash in the Treasury.

15. As it was known that, up to the previous day, the residents were fully prepared to repel attack and to defend themselves, having forty-five European soldiers and 100 Sikhs, with Shergotty and its little garrison close at hand, and as there was no enemy in sight, the measure was not only unintelligible, but the Lieutenant-Governor was disposed to blame very severely the apparently injudicious and pusillanimous conduct of the English officers in question, and a message was sent after them to that effect.

16. It appeared however from the letter of Mr. Tayler above referred to, which was not received until the 4th of August, that this unfortunate, unnecessary, ill-judged, and perhaps disastrous step, was adopted in consequence of direct orders from Mr. Tayler himself, and that under the influence of a local panic, he had actually directed the abandonment of all the stations in his division.

17. This act was strongly disapproved and designated as not merely injudicious but disgraceful.

In the case of Gya it was utterly without excuse or palliation. The Commissioner was, therefore, directed at once to revoke his orders, and was informed that at Gya the courage and judgment of Mr. Money, the Officiating Collector and Magistrate, and of Mr. Hollings, Sub-Deputy Opium Agent, had probably saved the town, the Treasury, and the district.
18. After the evidence thus afforded of Mr. Tayler's haste and want of judgment, following many other causes of dissatisfaction, the Lieutenant-Governor considered it no longer safe to continue that officer in charge of the Commissionership. He was accordingly directed to make over charge of the office to Mr. Farquharson, pending the completion of other arrangements then in progress.

19. At the same time a minute from the Lieutenant-Governor was submitted to the Government of India, showing that Mr. Tayler had long been a source of much anxiety to His Honor. As Commissioner of Revenue, the Board complained of his unsatisfactory method of conducting his duties, and intimated that, unless his conduct towards them changed they could not continue to work with him. In the matter of raising funds for an Industrial Institution at Patna, Mr. Tayler had excited much dissatisfaction and scandal in his division, which was still under enquiry when the present trouble began. At such a time the Lieutenant-Governor was naturally anxious to avoid any change in the head executive office of the district, and endeavoured by constant watchfulness and the aid of the Electric Telegraph, so to shape the course of the Commissioner as to turn his undoubted intelligence, activity, energy, and local knowledge to good account. But the concealment of his acts and intentions, for the avowed purpose of carrying out such of his views as he thought the Lieutenant-Governor would disapprove; his constant, indelicate, and illegal interference with the course of justice; his wilful disobedience of an order involving life and death, and his mixing himself up with the operations of the Police Magistrate and Public Prosecutor against persons whom he subsequently tried as a Judge in the last resort, created such scandal and public discontent, as to render it necessary to prohibit his again trying any such cases. By his whole line of conduct he had irritated men's minds, and engendered a feeling of insecurity among the respectable portion of the inhabitants, to such extent, coupled with his questionable proceedings in the matter of the Industrial School, as to render it impossible for the Lieutenant-Governor to trust him to call upon the zemindars, with the authority he ought to have possessed, to assist in keeping the peace in their districts. All those culpable and reprehensible proceedings were crowned by a final act of deplorable want of judgment and discretion, no less than ordering the abandonment of all stations in his district under the influence of a panic, as discreditable as it has proved disastrous. This combination of grave causes of dissatisfaction rendered it absolutely necessary to remove Mr. Tayler from his appointment of Commissioner of Patna.

20. The courage and good conduct of Messrs. Money and Hollings had, it was hoped, saved the station of Gya from the certain loss of nearly eight lakhs of rupees, besides much public and private property, and had prevented the release of many hundred desperate characters in the jail, conjoined to the risk of the whole district being thrown into anarchy and confusion.

This hope was, unhappily, not fully realized, as will be related hereafter.

21. In this serious emergency, with the whole district in a state of disorder, and at a time when a new General Officer (Sir J. Outram) unacquainted with that part of the country was about to take command of the Division, the Lieutenant-Governor considered that it would require the best exertions of the best man available to restore order and confidence among the people, and that, at such a crisis, it would be politic to render the Commissioner independent of the Board, and place him in direct communication with the Government on all subjects.

For these purposes Mr. Samuells, nominally officiating as Commissioner of Cuttack, but actually an Officiating Judge in the Sudder Court, was selected by the Lieutenant-Governor for the office, and directed to proceed at once to join the appointment of Officiating Commissioner of Patna.

22. It was understood that the appointment was to be temporary, and was to cease when the condition of the country no longer rendered it necessary. It was also recommended that, in consideration of the heavy responsibilities
thrown upon Mr. Samuells, and his extended powers as exercising the full authority of the Sudder Board, he should be subjected to no loss of allowances, other than would have occurred had he remained in his present position.

23. So much intrigue and party spirit were known to have been engendered among the natives of Patna and its neighbourhood, including the principal native officers, and so much of personal enmity had grown up among them, that it was desirable that Mr. Samuells should, if possible, have the assistance of a respectable and trustworthy native subordinate, who, though acquainted with men and things in the districts of the Patna Division, should not have had an opportunity of personally mixing in the prevalent local disputes.

24. These qualifications were united in the person of Moonshee Ameer Ali, a member of a highly respectable family in the town of Barh, in the Patna district, a Vakeel of the Sudder Court in large and lucrative practice, and for many years confidentially employed by the Government as their Vakeel in resumption suits before the Special Commissioners.

25. Moonshee Ameer Ali had already, waiving all consideration of possible loss of practice, offered his services in any way in which it might be thought he could be useful; and his professional standing and reputation, his large income from practice in the Sudder Court, and his acknowledged merit furnished, as it seemed, a very sufficient guarantee for his fidelity. He was known to have extensive acquaintance with affairs in the Patna Division, and great weight and influence among the principal zemindars; and being a man of sense, judgment and experience, he was assuredly capable of rendering Mr. Samuells very useful assistance if he should really be inclined to do good, while the character of Mr. Samuells himself rendered it very improbable that he would be able to mislead him even if so disposed.

26. Accordingly, with Mr. Samuells' full concurrence and approbation, Moonshee Ameer Ali was, on the 5th August, appointed Special Assistant to the Commissioner of Patna. The salary of Rupees 700 per mensem, which was the highest that the Lieutenant-Governor had power to assign to him, was avowedly a very imperfect compensation for the loss of practice he must undergo during his temporary absence from the Sudder Court; but he was gratified by the title of Khan Bahadour, and was also, in order to give him a position and consideration in the Division, appointed a Deputy Magistrate in all the districts of the Patna Division.

27. The appointment has been a good deal cavilled at in the newspapers, but the staple reasons assigned for objecting to it have always been fresh, that Ameer Ali was a native, and secondly, that he was a Mahomedan. To persons of any sense and knowledge of affairs, it cannot be needful to offer any refutation of objections so founded. They come from a class of persons who have made themselves ridiculous in the present day by supposing and suggesting that, both in regard to civil and military operations, we can and ought to act in future by European agency alone, without reposing any trust or confidence on native aid, a thing impossible even if it were desirable; and who are ignorant or forgetful that even in the midst of all the infamous treachery, cowardice and cruelty by which so many of our Indian fellow subjects have disgraced their name and nation, there have been not a few signal instances of courage, fidelity and humanity on the part of both Mahomedans and Hindoos; and that on more than one occasion natives of both religions have remained to face danger in defending stations and positions unoccupied or abandoned by Europeans, and have evinced a loyalty and constancy in the service of the British Government which it would be as impolitic as ungrateful to overlook or to undervalue.

28. On the 5th of August, a full report was received from the Magistrate of Chumparan regarding the mutiny at Segowlee.

29. Major and Mrs. Holmes were cruelly murdered while taking their evening drive. Doctor and Mrs. Garner with one of their children were killed in their bungalow, the other, a little girl, escaped notice, and was taken care of by the Tehseeldar of Segowlee.
Mr. Bennett, the Deputy Postmaster of Segowlee, was slain, and Major and Mrs. Holmes were both decapitated.

30. The bodies of Major and Mrs. Holmes and of Mr. Bennett were brought into Motaharee by the police, those of Dr. Garner and his family were burnt in his bungalow.

31. In consequence of the utterly defenceless state of the station, and the probability that the mutineers, being close at hand, would make their way to Motaharee, the Civil Officers with their families abandoned it and retired to a neighbouring Indigo Factory on the 24th of July, but very speedily returned.

32. The mutineers were 200 in number, with 150 followers, two elephants, and palanquin carriages; and they stated that they were proceeding on duty to Sewan by order of Major Holmes. They crossed the Gunduck at Gobindgunge on the 24th and 25th, and on the 26th the Magistrate returned to the Sudder Station.

33. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the conduct of the Magistrate, Mr. H. C. Raikes, was approved in leaving and returning to his station. It was satisfactory to find afterwards that he refused again to abandon it even on receipt of the Commissioner's order.

34. On the 1st August the Magistrate of Behar reported that, under orders from the Commissioner of Patna, communicated through the Magistrate of that place, of which a copy was forwarded, the station of Gya was abandoned at 5 p.m. of the day mentioned.

35. The treasure was left, there being no means of carrying it, and the charge of the station was made over to the Darogah and the Subadar of the Nujeebs. About the same time and under the same orders, the out-stations of Shergotty and Nowadah were in like manner abandoned by the Civil Officers, as indeed, with two exceptions, was every civil station in the Patna Division. After the Civil Officers of Gya had proceeded for three miles on the road to Patna, Mr. A. Money and Mr. Hollings, the Sub-Deputy Opium Agent, rode back, found all quiet, and took possession again of the station. The respectable inhabitants expressed great joy on the occasion, and a deputation of the priests waited on Mr. Money the next morning, promising assistance towards the maintenance of order.

36. The only attack then anticipated was from the Hazareebaugh mutineers, and the possibility of the Mussulmans' rising during Bukr Eed.

37. But Messrs. Money and Hollings resolved to hold on as long as possible, and only to retire in case of absolute necessity.

38. On the 2nd, Mr. Money called in a detachment of the 64th Foot, which was on its way eastward, to enable him to send away the treasure under their escort, it necessary. He also reported the abandonment of the Electric Telegraph Station at Shergotty, and stated that the Nujeebs were well behaved, the town quiet, the Gaivals unwilling to afford any aid, as they relied on their part of the town being considered sacred by the sepoys, and that his scruples at ultimately abandoning the place, should such a measure be forced upon him, were lessened by the indifference of the townspeople about assisting in the maintenance of order.

39. On the 3rd, intimation having been received from Dinapoor of the intention of Kooer Sing to despatch one of the mutinous regiments to Gya, it was resolved to abandon that station in the afternoon of the same day, as it was considered impossible to defend it with only eighty men, the detachment of the 64th then there. The seven lakhs of treasure were taken, and the party fell back to the Grand Trunk Road.

40. On the 5th, the Magistrate reported the safe arrival of the party at Bara, where they halted for twelve hours.

41. A night attack had previously been made on the party, apparently by prisoners and Nujeebs, and shots fired on both sides: The attack was easily
repelled, but several of the assailants were killed before their defeat was effected.

The twenty Nujeebs who accompanied the Magistrate were disarmed and sent back.

42. Before the party left the station the prisoners had been released, and Mr. Money narrowly escaped capture by them, having only had time to mount his horse and gallop off, leaving everything behind him.

43. On the 6th the party with the treasure reached Chumparan, and expected to be at Burheo that evening, where they intended to halt for a few hours to refresh the men and cattle, both of whom were much knocked up. From this place Mr. Money again sent a detailed explanation of his reasons for having returned to Gya on the 1st, and again abandoned it on the 5th.

44. Previous to this, the Lieutenant-Governor had communicated in the strongest terms his approval of the courage and good conduct of Mr. Money and Hollings in having returned to Gya, notwithstanding the Commissioner's ill-advised order to abandon it, and had given instructions for them to fall back, if such a step was forced upon them, by the Grand Trunk Road rather than to Patna.

45. Mr. Hollings had also been immediately appointed a Deputy Magistrate of the district, in order, as in the case of Mr. E. Macdonnell at Chuppra, to turn his valuable services to the best account.

46. The Judge of Behar reported, under date the 2nd of August, that he, with the troops and other residents of the station, had abandoned Gya, as already stated, by order of the Commissioner.

47. Mr. Trotter was informed that the order of the Commissioner had been disapproved and set aside, and he was directed to return to his post, with as many of the officials as he could collect, as early as possible.

48. He and all other officers in a similar position were informed of the probability of their being placed on out of employ allowances, as long as they were absent from their stations, and consequently unable to discharge their official duties.

49. On the 5th of August the Deputy Magistrate of Shergotty reported his having abandoned his station in consequence of a message from the Magistrate of Behar. It was his intention to have fallen back only as far as Burheo or Bagoda, but finding those stations deserted, he had retreated to Raneegunge.

50. Mr. Davis was ordered to return immediately with the party sent up to restore the line of telegraph.

51. The Deputy Magistrate of Nowadah also abandoned his station under the same orders of the Commissioner of Patna, and similar instructions were issued to him.

52. Lieutenant Staunton at Shergotty was vested with powers under Section 1, Act XVII of 1857, to try all persons amenable to the Articles of War for native troops for mutiny and desertion.

53. On the 30th of July, Shah Kubeeroodeen Ahmed, an influential landholder of Sasseram, reported that much alarm prevailed in the town and district in consequence of the disturbances at Arrah, and enquired how he could be useful, and what he should do at such a juncture.

54. He was informed in reply that he should exert his great and known influence in causing large numbers to refrain from conspiring against the Government, and in directing their efforts towards the preservation of peace.

55. He was reminded of his obligations as a loyal and dutiful servant of the Government in maintaining order; was told that there was probably no person in the province of Behar to whose earnest advice and remonstrances the Mussulmans of that district would so readily listen, or against whose strong remonstrances and dissuasions they would be so unwilling to act; the futility of
resistance to, and the hopelessness of ultimate success against, the British Government were indicated as being certainly known to a man of his intelligence, and he was exhorted to intimate to all over whom he possessed influence, and to be assured himself that honor and reward would accrue to all for serving the Government faithfully at the present time, in proportion to the extent of their services in the cause of order and loyalty. On the other hand, he was assured that neutrality, lukewarmness, or open hostility towards the Government, would as certainly meet with their deserts in regard to those who are known to possess and failed to exert the power of aiding the cause of law and order.

56. This correspondence was forwarded to the Government of India, pointing out that the critical nature of the times rendered it justifiable that all lukewarmness, passive countenance of rebellion, and omission to exert the authority they are known to possess over their retainers—restraining them from joining in acts of rebellion—should be visited, by legal enactment, on all influential landholders by fine or forfeiture.

57. Otherwise, by doing nothing openly to aid rebellion, and simply refraining from any exertions by which the success of rebels against the Government could be hindered, such persons, although no well-wishers to the Government, would hope to escape all punishment upon the restoration of order and tranquillity.

58. Shah Kuber-ood-deen subsequently stated that he had taken active steps to maintain order and protect public and private property, and earnestly begged for European troops to defeat and disperse the mutineers and robbers.

59. He was encouraged to persevere in his loyal and laudable exertions, and was informed that large reinforcements were proceeding rapidly to the scene of disturbance to punish traitors and restore order.

60. Chota Nagpoor Division.—During the period embraced in this narrative, the detachment of the 8th Native Infantry at Hazareebaugh, the head-quarters, and artillery of the Ramghur Battalion at Dorundah, and a detachment of the same corps at Purulia mutinied. This revolt was entirely a result of the mutiny at Dinapoor.

61. In all of those places they released the prisoners, plundered the Treasuries, carried off the ammunition in the magazines, and destroyed as much public and private property as they could lay hands on. They would doubtless also have added murder of the European officers and residents to their other crimes, had they not escaped in time.

62. The troops at Hazareebaugh mutinied on the afternoon of the 30th of July. The officers present at the station fled to Bagoda, and thence came on to Ramseegunge, with the exception of Captain W. H. Oakes, who was holding sessions at Hazareebaugh, and made his way to Ranchi.

63. Major Simpson, the Principal Assistant Commissioner at Hazareebaugh, was directed to return to his station, as quickly as possible, to use every exertion to restore confidence and order, and to refrain from spreading panic, as he appeared to have done on the Grand Trunk Road.

64. On the 5th of August, Captain Dalton, Officiating Commissioner of Chota Nagpoor, submitted a detailed report of the mutiny at Dorundah.

65. From this it appeared that a detachment of the Ramghur Regiment, with two guns, under the command of Lieutenant Graham, were marching to Hazareebaugh to attack the two companies of the 8th Native Infantry at that station. On the road they heard of the Hazareebaugh mutiny, and broke out in open revolt themselves, seizing the guns, ammunitions, and four elephants, the private property of Captain Dalton, and in spite of Lieutenant Graham's orders and the expostulations of their native officers, marched back to Ranchi with avowed hostile intentions towards the European residents there.

66. On their approaching Ranchi, it was evident that the whole corps would follow their example. The station was abandoned by all the European Officers at the latest moment to which it was safe to remain, and the step was taken with much reluctance.
67. The rebels reached the station an hour after the departure of Captain Dalton, burnt the bungalows of Captains Oakes and Moncrieff, released the prisoners, fired cannon shots at and damaged the church, and then effected a junction with the rest of the Corps at Dorundah.

68. It was feared that attempts would be made on Chyebasa and Sunbulpoor, where there were detachments of the regiment, and it was recommended that the latter should be quickly reinforced by Madras troops from Cuttack to prevent the post road to Bombay from being closed.

69. The cavalry portion of the force is reported to have behaved well. The troopers under Jemadar Ameadeen Khan having held to Lieutenant Graham and accompanied him to Hazareebaugh, and the remainder being expected to rejoin Colonel Robbins as soon as they could find the means of doing so.

70. A few men and two native officers of the Infantry force had already joined at Hazareebaugh.

71. Immediately on reaching Hazareebaugh, Captain Dalton had exerted himself to restore order. With the small force at his command, he had recovered a large quantity of plundered property, had recaptured a number of prisoners and apprehended some bad characters, had reopened the Courts, and caused business to be resumed in the bazars.

72. The Ramghur Raja had visited Captain Dalton, and had placed at his disposal some forty or fifty armed men, who were employed as picquets and in guarding the bazaar. The Raja expressed a strong desire to see a regiment of Europeans again at Hazareebaugh. The proposal was most strongly recommended by the Officiating Commissioner.

73. The few sowars in the vicinity were all called in and employed in guarding the Jail. Captain Davies, in the absence of Major Simpson, was placed in charge of the Office of Principal Assistant Commissioner. Captain Oakes continued to perform his own duties of Assistant Commissioner, and the officers of the Ramghur Local Force, noted in the margin, were present at the station.

74. The thanks of the Lieutenant-Governor were communicated to Captain Dalton for the highly creditable manner in which he and the officers with him had remained at their posts as long as it was possible to do so, and had subsequently re-occupied and attempted to restore order at Hazareebaugh.

75. The acknowledgments and high approval of his loyal conduct were also communicated by the Lieutenant-Governor, through Captain Dalton, to the Raja of Ramghur.

76. The mutineers had not succeeded in inducing any influential persons of the district to join them, and the Commissioner believe the Native Chiefs generally to be staunch and faithful.

77. The treasure abandoned at Dorundah was believed to amount to about a lakh and twenty-five thousand rupees, with stamps and postage labels to the value of about Rupees 12,000, and three maunds of opium.

78. The treasure lost at Hazareebaugh amounted to—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Rs.</th>
<th>p. a.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Silver</td>
<td>60,315</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>7,180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Notes</td>
<td>4,503</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Government Promissory Notes for Rs. 500 each</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamps</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postage labels</td>
<td>875</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received but not credited in the accounts</td>
<td>2,041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries of Government servant with Treasurer</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>9 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits for purchasing a stamp</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>8 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkarry opium two maunds</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This account was furnished by the Treasurer.
79. There were at the same time in the Magazine 30,000 percussion caps, with a large amount of balled ammunition.

80. On the 5th of August, the sepoys of the Ramghur Battalion at Purulia, consisting of ninety-three men, mutinied, plundered the Treasury which contained upwards of a lakh of rupees, released the prisoners between 2 and 300 in number, and plundered the town, bazar, and bungalows of the residents. The European Officers retired to Raneegunge.

81. In the divisions and places noted in the margin, the most perfect order and tranquillity prevailed.

82. At Dacca the Christian inhabitants offered their services as volunteers, and the offer was accepted with thanks.

83. At Serajgunge, a supply of arms, with a couple of howitzers and a provision of ammunition, were allowed to Messrs. Barry and Company, who had engaged a small party of European seamen to protect their factories and property.

84. In the Nudda divisions, the Native Troops at Berhampoor, consisting of the 63rd Native Infantry and the greater part of the 11th Irregular Cavalry, were disarmed, with the aid of Her Majesty's 90th Foot. The cavalry exhibited a strong spirit of insubordination, and were deprived, in addition, of their horses.

85. It was reported that the sepoys who had been disarmed, were making enquiry as to the arms procurable in the city; as in the event of their being obtained, it was the determination of a portion of them to desert, which they were afraid to do without arms.

86. As an additional measure of precaution, therefore, the city was disarmed also with the aid of a portion of the 90th Regiment.

The arms taken were sent to Calcutta.

87. At Jessore, the two Nuzeeds sentenced to transportation for life, committed suicide in their solitary cell on the evening preceding the day on which they were to have been sent to Allipoor. One of them had belonged to the 19th Native Infantry at the time of its disbandment.

88. At the Presidency all was perfectly quiet, and the Bukir Ead passed off without the remotest semblance of disturbance.

The sale of copper caps and arms to natives by some of the European Firms of Calcutta was prevented.

89. In the Rajshahye Division uneasiness still continued to be felt on account of the 73rd Native Infantry, and of the small detachment of the 11th Irregular Cavalry quartered at Julpigoree. Both corps were, however, obedient and orderly.

90. The Magistrate of Rungpoor, having reported that his pargannahs were treated with contempt by the Soubah of Mynpooree, was directed, in existing circumstances, not to call upon the Booteah Chiefs to aid his police.

91. The Darogah of Myagunge was committed for using highly treasonable language in the presence of certain sepoys of the 73rd Native Infantry, which had been reported by Gunga Dhur Misser, a Naik in the 2nd Company of that regiment.

92. In the Bhagulpore Division, the Commissioner appealed strongly against the order to deprive the Squadron, 200 strong, of the 5th Irregular Cavalry at that station of their arms on the following grounds:—It would be impossible to disarm the scattered troops in the interior, and it might exasperate the 32nd Native Infantry at Bowsee, and the other detachments in the Sonthal Pargannahs, as well as cause them to mutiny, and thus lead to the murder of all
European Officers in the district to whom no succour could be sent. In any event, it would be a partial and ineffective measure; seeing that any amount of arms might readily and quickly be obtained at Monghyr, the Commissioner, therefore, earnestly hoped that the order might be countermanded.

93. Mr. Yule’s representation was referred to the Government of India for orders, and ultimately the disarming was not carried into effect.

94. In the Divisions above mentioned, no prisoners were tried under Act XVII of 1857.

95. The presence of fifty men of the 5th Fusiliers at Monghyr had restored confidence, and alleged panic in the bazar.

96. Respecting the Burdwan Division, the probability of an immediate mutiny of the Shekswattee Battalion at Midnapoor was made known to the Government of India, and the serious consequences likely to result from such an event in a Bengal district close to Calcutta were referred to. A mutiny at Midnapoor would be certain to spread to Bankoorah.

97. The Magistrate of Bankoorah applied for a detachment of European soldiers to be sent to protect that station from an expected attack of the mutineers of the Ramghur Battalion, but none could be spared.

98. The urgent necessity of sending even ever so small a force of European troops to protect the railway station and coal mines of Raneegunge was earnestly impressed on the Government of India, and the request has since been complied with.

99. Intimation was received of the removal of the Baioda Telegraph station to Burkee.

100. With reference to paragraph 53 of my narrative of the instant, the military authorities at Barrackpoor reported that the object of applying for permission to disarm the inhabitants of the villages in the neighbourhood of Barrackpoor was to prevent the native soldiers procuring arms in the case of an émeute of sepoys at that station.

101. As there is now a Bill before the Legislative Council upon the subject of arms and disarming generally, it was considered advisable that this application should await the promulgation of the law on the subject.

102. As soon as the mutiny of the detachment of the 8th Native Infantry at Hazareebaugh was known, the civil authorities at Berhoom and Nya Doomka, and the Officer Commanding the portion of the Police Battalion at Sooree, were warned to be on the alert, as the behaviour of the troops at Berhampoor and Bowsee was considered doubtful. If an outbreak occurred among them, it was deemed probable that some of the mutineers would make for Bhaugulpoor and others for the Grand Trunk Road—hence the caution issued.

103. General.—Resolution No. 1359, being an extract from the Proceedings of the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General in Council in the Home Department, containing detailed instructions on the subject of the exercise of their powers by civil officers in the apprehension and trial of mutineers, deserters, and rebels, was communicated to all officers serving under this Government, whom it concerned; on the 7th of August.

104. The object of the Resolution was to save the innocent and those who from particular acts of humanity or otherwise, were deserving of clemency from the just punishment of those whose misconduct, stained by the most sanguinary atrocities, rendered them liable to, and deserving of, the extreme penalty of the law.

105. An application was made from the Military Department of the Government of India on the 6th of August to ascertain if the civil authorities were able to supply rations to the Madras Native Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, on their march from Raneegunge to Allahabad.
106. It was intimated in reply that on the Grand Trunk Road all above Govindpoor had been abandoned, and that there were no civil authorities to furnish supplies.

107. Even at Raneegunge and Govindpoor it was doubtful if supplies could be obtained for any large body of troops, as the resources of the Joint-Magistrates had already been severely taxed in providing for the wants of detachments which had already gone and were still going up. It was therefore deemed advisable that the Commissariat should make its own arrangements and not rely on the aid of the civil authorities at present.

108. On the 4th of August, it was suggested to the Government of India by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, that it might be easy and expedient through the civil and military authorities on the North-East Frontier and at Munipore to raise a very useful body of Munipoorees and Cacharees for general service. If authorized, the Lieutenant-Governor could, with the aid of Mr. Allen, a Member of the Sudder Board now on deputation at Cherra, arrange with the local authorities for the raising of a body of two or more thousand men from the warlike tribes in that part of India. The body so raised to be assembled at Cherra or Sylhet for the purpose of being organized.

109. The proposal was sanctioned by the Government of India, subsidiary arrangements for the organization were to be made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and it was intimated that Colonel Jenkins would be requested through His Excellency to raise one or two corps for general service among the warlike tribes bordering on Assam.

110. Colonel Hannyngton recommends the raising of a regiment of Sonthals, the men of which tribe, although small, were very hardy and brave, and lightly equipped would make excellent skirmishers. They could be moved rapidly, and were remarkable for their fidelity, honesty, and other good qualities.

111. The proposal was referred to the Commissioner of the Sonthal Purgunnahs for early report.

112. The Officiating Commissioner of Arracan was requested to report upon the feasibility of raising Mugh Regiment in that province for general service.

113. A proposal for raising a force from among the warlike tribes of the South-Western Frontier was suggested by Rai Tarrucknath Sein, additional P. S. Ameen of the 24-Pergunnahs, who had much experience of that part of the country, and believed that hardy, serviceable, and trustworthy men might, with the aid of the Chiefs, be enlisted in the Bancoorah and Singhbhoon jungles. The proposal was submitted to the Commissioner of Burdwan for report, and Rai Tarruknath Sein was sent up to communicate personally with that officer on the subject.

114. As soon as the Dinapoor and Hazareebaugh mutinies were known, additional measures were taken for the protection of the Grand Trunk Road. A portion of the Police Corps at Sooree was moved up as rapidly as possible, and a Company of Her Majesty's 35th Regiment was sent by rail to Raneegunge.

115. Orders were issued to the civil authorities to collect quickly carriage for the Madras troops about to march up the Grand Trunk Road.

116. Instructions were given to the heads of the various public offices connected with this Government in Calcutta to grant leave to members of the Volunteer Guards when required for military duty.

117. It was intimated to the Lieutenant-Governor that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief would be requested to nominate two officers to do duty with the Sylhet Light Infantry Battalion, but it was not deemed desirable to furnish guns to any Native Corps without an Artillery Officer to command, and a detail of artillerymen to work them, neither of which could, at present, be supplied.
SPECIAL NARRATIVE, (JUDICIAL), No. 21, DATED FORT WILLIAM, 31ST AUGUST 1857.

From 9th to 15th August, inclusive.

Behar.—On the 8th of August, the Commissioner of Patna submitted a report from the Magistrate of Shahabad, containing a narrative of the gallant defence and providential escape of the heroic little garrison at Arrah consisting of the persons noted in the margin, aided by a party of Sikhs of Captain Rattray’s Regiment, composed of one Jemadar, two Havildars, two Naiks, forty-five Privates, a bheestee, and a cook.

2. On the evening of Saturday, the 25th of July, Mr. Wake received an express from Dinapoor, warning him that disturbances were expected on that day, but conveying no further information.

3. On the morning of the following day, Sunday, the 26th, a sower posted by the Magistrate at Koila Ghat on the Soane, rode in and reported that numbers of sepoys had crossed and more were crossing the river.

4. It was found that Mr. Palin, the Railway Engineer, stationed at the ghat had, the night before, sent for the boats to the Arrah side before he left, but had not destroyed them as he had promised to do. The policemen believed to have abandoned their posts on the first alarm.

5. The police left the city on the same day, and the Magistrate failed in consequence to ascertain the force of the mutineers. Thinking it unadvisable to abandon the station with the small force at his command, and the residents and others willing to stand by him, especially as the rebels might be few in number, the Magistrate, with the remainder of his party, went into a small bungalow, which had previously been fortified by Mr. Boyle.

6. A supply of atta and grain for a few days at short rations was laid in, with a plentiful stock of water for the Europeans. The Sikhs, however, had only a few day’s water, and from the shortness of the notice, the merest necessities only were taken into the entrenchment.

7. This did not give the gallant garrison much concern, as they expected the rebels to be followed up immediately.

8. On Monday, the 27th of July, at 8 in the morning, the insurgent sepoys, consisting of the 7th, 8th, and 40th Native Infantry, reached the station, and having released the prisoners rushed to the Collectorate, where they were joined by the detachment in duty of the Behar Station Guards; they plundered the Treasury of cash amounting to Rupees 85,000.

9. They then attacked the bungalow on all sides, but being met by a steady well-directed fire, they occupied the out-houses, and Mr. Boyle’s house which was only distant sixty yards, and from these places and the cover afforded by the numerous trees in the compound, they kept up a galling and incessant fire during the whole day.

10. The mutineers were joined by a number of Koocar Sing’s men, and repeatedly declared that they were acting under his orders.

11. This arch-rebel soon appeared on the scene, and subsequently conducted the siege in person.

12. Repeated attempts by heavy bribes to induce the Sikhs to prove traitors, although urged through their own countrymen, failed utterly. The proposals were treated with derision, and these gallant soldiers remained true and steady.

13. On the 28th, two small cannons opened fire on the bungalow, one of them with 4th shot. They were daily directed to what were considered the
weakest points of the little fortress, and at length the largest of the guns was placed on the roof of Mr. Boyle's house.

14. This completely commanded the bungalow, and nothing but the cowardice, want of unanimity, and ignorance of the enemy prevented the entire destruction of the little fortress.

14½. The siege lasted a week, during which time every stratagem was employed in vain. The guns were at first fired as often as shot could be prepared, ammunition being at that time deficient, and incessant assaults were made against the bungalow. The Sikhs were not only perfectly cool and steady, but by untiring labour met and prevented every threatened disaster.

15. When the supply of water ran short, they dug a well of four feet diameter to a depth of eighteen feet in less than twelve hours, Breaches in the works were at once repaired and rendered stronger than before, and as the siege was protracted, the defences became stronger. When the want of animal food was felt, a night sally was made and four sheep were brought in. As soon as the enemy were discovered to be mining, a countermine was sunk.

16. On the 30th the relieving force from Dinapoor was defeated by the rebels.

17. The next day the rebels returned, proclaimed their victory, and offered the Sikhs, the women and the children (of whom there were fortunately none), their lives and liberty, if the Government officers were given up.

18. On the 1st of August, all the garrison were offered their lives with leave to proceed to Calcutta on condition of surrendering their arms.

19. On the 2nd the sepoys marched away to meet Major Eyre's force, and being defeated abandoned the station.

20. On the same night the garrison went forth and found that the mine had reached their foundations, and that the powder to blow them up was at hand. The enemy had almost reached the countermine; but as their powder was bad, their chance of success from this means was doubtful.

21. The gun on Mr. Boyle's house was captured and brought in.

22. During the siege, one Sikh was severely wounded, and others were slightly contused.

23. The conspicuous gallantry and exertions of Messrs. Boyle and Colvin were prominently noticed by the Magistrate, and an earnest appeal was made for the signal reward of the brave and devoted band of Sikhs.

24. The Commissioner warmly seconded the proposal, recommending that the thanks of the Government should be given to the garrison, and in particular to Messrs. Wake and Boyle, that the Native Officers of the Sikhs should be immediately promoted, and a gratuity of twelve months' pay be granted to the men.

25. The latter was given by the Commissioner in anticipation of sanction, and Mr. Tayler mentioned that the Sikhs would be gratified by the grant of a medal.

26. The Commissioner sketched a plan of military operations for the re-occupation of the Grand Trunk Road, the reduction of Jugdispoor, if it would not occupy too much time, and the subsequent march of Major Eyre's column to the North-West Provinces, if no longer required.

27. This plan was not adopted, but Kooar Sing's stronghold at Jugdispoor was captured and destroyed by Major Eyre as will be narrated hereafter.

28. Mr. Tayler, in anticipation of the sanction of the Government, authorized the removal of the officers and establishments of Arrah to Buxar, a step which had previously been urged by the Judge and Magistrate, on the ground that there was nothing to preserve in Arrah, and that it would require a military force to protect it, while Buxar could easily be rendered defensible, and its valuable stud was of great importance. This measure was not approved, and orders were sent up for the Arrah officials to stand fast.
29. Patna, Chupra, and Mozufferpoor were reported by the Commissioner to be perfectly quiet, the latter stations being about to be reoccupied immediately.

30. On the 18th of August, the Commissioner submitted a memorandum on the re-occupation of Gya, on the ground of Major Eyre's victory at Arrah, the removal of the temptation in the shape of the treasure, and the arrival of European troops at Bhangulpoor to disarm, or overawe the 5th Irregular Cavalry. It was proposed to send 150 Sikhs and forty-five European soldiers, and the Judge and other European residents with Mr. Skipwith Tayler, as Officiating Magistrate, to accompany the force.

31. On the 11th of August, Mr. Tayler submitted a detailed report on the state of the several districts of his division.

32. The Chupra Officers had left Patna on the previous day by the Jumna Steamer to reoccupy that station, in which order has been preserved during the interregnum by Caza Ramzan Ali, who had been authorized by the Commissioner to exercise Magisterial powers until the return of the constituted authorities. All was well at Mozufferpoor, and the relieving force strengthened by fifty of the new police and sowars recently raised was to march for Gya on the following day.

33. The unexpected success of Major Eyre at Arrah was said to have changed the face of affairs, and to have relieved Behar of all immediate danger.

34. A mysterious allusion was made to certain misgivings of the loyal and faithful Raja of Bettiah, respecting matters which he was unwilling to put to paper, and which he sent his Dewan to Patna to communicate personally.

35. The Doomraw Raja was reported by Mr. Wake to have joined Kooar Sing, and as fears seemed to be entertained of reinforcements being sent down the Gogra by the enemy, orders were sent to Buzar for one of the steamers lying there to watch the mouth of the Gogra, and intercept any force sent down by that river.

36. On the 12th, the Commissioner reported the arrival of the armed boats placed at his disposal, referred to in a former narrative.

37. On the same date the Commissioner was directed to ascertain and report in whose zemindary was the bridge at Billustee, which the villagers in the neighbourhood were seen in the act of destroying for the purpose of retarding the advance of Major Eyre's force.

38. On the 13th, Mr. Tayler forwarded copy of a communication from Major Nation, bringing to notice the good and faithful conduct of a guard of one Duffadar and seventeen Nujeebahs of his regiment, who were escorting carts and bullocks from Gya to Benares.

39. They were stopped by a party of armed villagers, when the carters ran away with the carts and bullocks; the Naib Nazir of the Gya Collector fled also, and the Nujeebahs feigning to agree to join Kooar Sing, carried with them the Naib Nazir's box supposed to contain money, and joined the head-quarters of their own corps.

40. The box was made over to the Commissioner unopened.

41. On the 13th, Mr. Farquharson reported having received charge of the Office of Commissioner of the Patna Division from Mr. Tayler, pending the arrival of Mr. Samuella then shortly expected.

42. An order was communicated to Mr. Farquharson through Mr. Yule to keep the civilians at Arrah if possible, and to offer a reward of Rupees 10,000 for the apprehension of Kooar Sing.

43. The offer of reward was at once proclaimed throughout the division.

44. The force for the relief and re-occupation of Gya, consisting of 150 Sikhs under Captain Rattray, and thirty-seven of Her Majesty's 84th under Lieutenant Whitlock, with Messrs. Trotter, Skipwith Tayler, and other officers, was reported to have started on the evening of the 12th.
45. Special instructions were given by Mr. Farquharson to the Officiating Magistrate to exercise moderation in punishing evil-doers, and great care in bringing to justice only those clearly proved to be guilty.

46. He was directed, in all difficulties, to consult Mr. Trotter and Captain Rattray, and to submit daily reports of his proceedings.

47. With reference to financial matters, Raja Hetmarsing Sing was directed to provide Mr. Tayler with such funds as he might require for payment of salaries and current expenses.

48. An intention was expressed of restoring their arms to the Njeebs ostensibly as a reward for the fidelity of those at Mozufferpoor, but no official report had been received of the disarming of the corps. Mr. Tayler, in a demi-official communication, had stated that he had deprived the Njeebs of their arms, but had assigned no reason for the step.

49. Several of the Tirhoot planters had not returned to their factories. Major Eyre, with a force of 400 Europeans, 200 Sikhs, and three guns, was advancing cautiously on Jugdespoor.

50. Baboo Nundepot of Mozufferpoor was reported to have presented a thousand rupees to the Njeebs of that station, and the townspeople were said to be willing to contribute to reward them for having saved the place from anarchy and destruction.

51. Further enquiry was directed into this matter, and early, report called for.

52. Mr. Farquharson promised to forward immediate reports of all occurrences of interest, and strongly advised the guarding of the mouth of the Gogra by a steamer, with the destruction of the mud forts on its banks.

53. The recommendations and proceedings of the officer in charge of the duties of Commissioner were approved, with the exception of the proposal to keep a steamer at the mouth of the Gogra, regarding which a report from Mr. Samuells was awaited before the issue of orders.

54. With respect to the special reports of district officers, the Joint-Magistrate of Chumparan intimated that he had declined to abandon his station on the receipt of Mr. Tayler's order, as he saw no sufficient reason to justify such a step. He caught and hanged a trooper of the 12th, who had been engaged in the attempt to cause disturbances at Mozufferpoor.

55. Mr. Raikes complained of a detachment of the 5th Irregular having been sent by order of the Major-General Commanding the Dinapore Division, on the recommendation of the civil authorities from Chuppra to Seegowlee, without written orders or instructions of any kind.

56. These men excited alarm in the district, and fraternized with the mutineers from Mozufferpoor. The Joint-Magistrate very properly refused to permit them to cross the Gunduck, and they were ultimately recalled by the Military authorities.

57. The circumstance was at once reported to the Government of India, and the proceedings of Mr. Raikes were approved by the Lieutenant-Governor.

58. Mr. Trotter, the Judge of Behar, reported the humiliation which he had felt in obeying the order of Mr. Tayler, and his remonstrance against it, which led to the reiteration of the order in a more positive form. At the eleventh hour Mr. Tayler changed his plans, abandoned the principle of concentration, and directed our advance on Gya, which was commenced, but as the station had, in the meantime, fallen, it was not deemed prudent or proper to continue it. The Judge and his party, therefore, fell back on Patna.

59. Mr. Trotter was informed that he was justified in his line of proceeding on the circumstances mentioned, and ordered to rejoin his station with all other officials as early as possible. The regret of the Lieutenant-Governor was communicated to him that the remainder of the party had not followed the example of Messrs. Money and Hollings; at the same time His Honor did not
blame Mr. Trotter for not adopting the bolder course, acting as he did under the shameful order of Mr. Tayler.

60. Mr. Money, the Officiating Collector and Magistrate of Behar, reached Raneegunge safely with the treasure from Gya, which was brought down by rail, and made over to the general Treasury.

61. Mr. Money was ordered to proceed at once to Calcutta to communicate personally with the Lieutenant-Governor.

62. The Officiating Judge of Sarun reported his having left his station to escort his wife to Dinapoor, and his having returned on the following day. This proceeding was not approved.

63. Mr. Lautour, the Collector and Officiating Magistrate of tirhoot, reported that he had, in obedience to the order of Mr. Tayler, after failing to persuade the other residents to remain, left his station for Dinapoor, but on arriving at the latter place he did not agree with Mr. Tayler, and considering it his duty to protect the Government property, and all who were well disposed in his district, he returned without orders, and again took charge of the station.

64. He found Tirhoot perfectly quiet, and on the 9th reported that he had posted strong guards at the ghāța; that the Nujeebs had behaved well throughout; that Mr. Raikes was holding his own at Motiharee; that his presence had reassured the people, and that he considered Kooar Sing's defeat to have removed all danger from Behar.

65. On the 17th, Mr. Lautour notified the arrival of the Raja of Durbungah at his estate, and mentioned that the Darogah of Durbungah reported the Raja's people to be stopping boats and committing petty acts of oppression. The Raja's Dewan was sent for, and would be held responsible, if the acts of oppression complained of were proven. The Raja himself was stated to be entirely in the hands of his Amlah, and to be too indolent to attend to his own affairs.

66. The second defeat of Kooar Sing and the destruction of his palace at Jugdispoor, was rapidly restoring confidence among such of the people as believe the Government of the country to have been endangered.

67. The surplus treasure at Tirhoot had been disposed of, partly by sending Rupees 50,000 to Motiharee for opium advances, and in part to the mahajuns of the city in exchange for drafts in Patna and Calcutta. The balance kept was Rupees 36,000.

68. No disturbances were anticipated at the Mohurum, and with a very few exceptions, the planters had returned to their factories.

69. Great distress from the dearness of food prevailed among the poorer classes, but the prospects of the season were fair.

70. Some of the planters in the district were said to be indifferent to being appointed Honorary Magistrates.

71. On the 17th a vernacular petition was received from Fuzzul Huq of Mozufferpoor, stating that the departure of the European officers and residents had caused much alarm. As soon as they had left, the Ressaldar and sowars of the 12th Irregular Cavalry broke into open mutiny, arrested a Thannadar and some Burkundazes, and attacked the Treasury. From this they were repulsed by the Nujeebs with the aid of the Nazirs of the Collectorate and Foudary Courts and 100 or 200 peons. They were also driven away by the same agency from the jail and Government officers.

72. On the same day the sowars are said to have attempted to plunder the property of some of the merchants in the town, when, after a fight, in which one man was killed, they were finally driven off.

73. Before leaving the station they plundered the residences of the Judge and the Collector, removing valuable horses and other property.

74. A Thannah Jemadar, named Choonee Lall, and four or five of the new police sowars recently recruited, joined the mutineers and fled with them.
75. The inhabitants who had left the station in the beginning had all returned to it.

76. This petition was referred to the Commissioner of Patna to ascertain what had really occurred at Mozaffarpoor after the abandonment of the station by the authorities, and to bring to notice those who have done good service, and were entitled to reward, and to suggest what rewards would be most suitable and acceptable.

77. On the 8th, Shah Kubeer-oold Ahmed of Sasseram wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India, stating that 2,000 of the rebels from Arrah have attacked and plundered Sasseram, destroying all they could lay hands on; that he fought a battle of six hours with them, killing twenty and wounding many more; that his own loss was two or three wounded, and that his people had seized a few of the rebels.

78. He mentioned that the mutineers had robbed the mail, burnt some of the papers contained in it, and scattered the rest about. He collected all he could find and sent them on to Shergotty.

79. The rebels were said to have gone off towards Mirzapoor.

80. The Shah, whose really loyal conduct had in the meantime been fully ascertained, was thanked cordially for the excellent and loyal conduct he had displayed, was assured that it would be neither neglected nor forgotten by the Government, and was encouraged to send the earliest possible intelligence of all occurrences in the district direct to the Government.

81. The Shah's letter was forwarded to the Commissioner to ascertain what really took place on the occasion referred to, and what part had been taken by the Shah in quelling the disturbance.

82. On the 10th a telegraphic report was received from Shergotty, announcing that no mail had been received from Benares since the 6th, that the mail had been stopped and its contents destroyed at Sasseram on the 7th, that the driver had been severely maltreated, and the Post Office Dak bungalow and Deputy Collector's house had been burnt by the mutineers, consisting, it was believed, of two regiments of Native Infantry.

83. A Telegraph Chupprasee reported the wire to be cut in many places at and beyond Sasseram. The peon had much difficulty in getting along, as the villagers plundered every one they caught, and the whole district was in a disturbed state.

84. The police had abandoned the Grand Trunk Road between Muddenpoor and Benares, and the mutineers marching leisurely, destroying as they advanced, were supposed to be marching to Mirzapoor.

85. The Sub-Deputy Opium Agent at Alleunge was compelled to abandon his post on the 26th of July by the mutineers of the 12th Irregular Cavalry. As already related, he barely had time to escape with life. His office records were destroyed, and his Treasury plundered of Rupees 3,500.

86. The Deputy Magistrate of Shergotty returned to his post on the 11th of August.

87. The Officiating Magistrate of Behar was informed of the steps taken to relieve Gyga, and directed with all other officers to rejoin with the least possible delay.

88. On the 15th a communication was received from Raja Jey Perkas Sing of Deo, proclaiming his loyalty and good faith, referring to the misrule and destruction caused by the abandonment of the district, and declaring that he had used every exertion to prevent mischief, protect the property of the Government, accelerate and secure the transmission of the post, and restore order.

89. He was informed in reply that he had been somewhat tardy in the expression of his loyalty. He was reminded of his duties to the State as an influential landlord, and of the utter futility of the rebels and mutineers attempting to resist the Government.
90. If he had really exerted himself as he stated, he would secure the approval and highest consideration of the Government, and he was strongly urged to act vigorously in the maintenance of order and in protecting the road from Shergotty to Baroon.

91. From Arrah, the latest intelligence during the week was to the effect that Major Eyre was approaching Jugdespoor with every care to avoid the chance of failure, and every prospect of success. He ultimately stormed the field works of the rebels, and pursued them to the very walls of the palace of Kooar Sing at Jugdespoor, which was precipitately abandoned and immediately taken possession of.

92. Before leaving the place, Major Eyre blew up the buildings, including a new temple, recently built by Kooar Sing.

93. From the constant expressions of loyalty received from this individual to the very last moment, and his known partiality for European society, it was difficult to believe that he meditated treason, notwithstanding the strong rumours to that effect.

94. It was mentioned in a former narrative that the Commissioner had deputed a confidential agent to visit Kooar Sing, to intimate to him the suspicions entertained against him, and to direct him to repair without delay to Patna to render a personal account of himself.

95. Syud Azim-udeen Hossein, the Deputy Collector of Arrah, was the agent employed.

96. He visited the traitorous rebel, and found him lying on a bed, pleading extreme sickness, old age, and infirmity, as preventing obedience to the order of the Commissioner to proceed to Patna. He was profuse in his expressions of loyalty and good-will, maintained that it was difficult and dangerous for him to arrest mutineers and deserters, utterly denied having any intention of acting with disloyalty, pleaded old age and infirmity in excuse of his not being personally active in the cause of order, and pleaded himself to repair to Patna as soon as his health would permit, and the Brahmins could find a propitious day for the journey.

97. The secret enquiry made on his estate did not elicit information as to the Baboo’s having made any preparations for revolt, nor did there appear to be reason to suppose that his people were particularly disaffected.

98. It was well known that they would follow him as their feudal Chief in the event of his raising the standard of rebellion, but beyond this nothing was ascertained.

99. Syud Azim-udeen Hossein shared in the defence of Mr. Boyle’s fortress as previously mentioned, and it has since been reported that he has, throughout the Shahabad disturbances, conducted himself with regular loyalty, courage, and judgment, so as to have impressed Major Eyre and the other Civil and Military Officers with a high opinion of his ability and fidelity.

100. The Deputy Magistrate of Barh, Mr. Vincent, communicated his having entered into negotiations with the Rajpoors of Rannuggur to secure their services in maintaining the tranquillity of the neighbourhood, on condition of the Rannuggur Dearah being conferred on them as a jaghire, in reward of their services to the Government at the present juncture.

101. This unauthorized and possibly embarrassing act of a subordinate officer was entirely and emphatically disapproved. He was directed at once to cancel it, and although every credit was allowed to his being actuated by good intentions, he was directed to temper his zeal with discretion to abandon at once all independent action except in case of real necessity, and to regulate his course strictly by, and under, the directions of the Commissioner of the Division.

102. As soon as it became known to the Lieutenant-Governor that the pay of the police and other establishments on the Grand Trunk Road was considerably in arrear, orders were issued to pay up the men.
103. Bhaugulpore Division.—On hearing of the mutiny of the Dinapoor Brigade, and the revolt of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, the Commissioner of the Bhaugulpore Division, who had previously deemed the presence of European soldiers unnecessary, detained 100 men of the 5th Fusiliers at Bhaugulpore, and caused fifty of the same corps to be sent to Monghyr.

104. The fidelity of the 5th Irregulars and 32nd Native Infantry could no longer be relied on, and the security of the two stations mentioned was not only essential to the free navigation of the Ganges, but was absolutely requisite to prevent the disorganization of the whole country between Rajmehal and Patna. The troops at Berhampoor had not at that time been disarmed.

105. The 63rd was known to be a disaffected corps, and after the murder of Major Holmes by men who up to that moment had exhibited loyalty and devotion, it was manifest that no Mussulman troopers could be trusted, and that the 11th as well as the 5th Cavalry only bided their time to join in the general treachery and revolt of their faithless and rebellious class elsewhere.

106. Hence, the change in the Commissioner’s views regarding the necessity of entrusting the safe custody of the two most important stations in his Division to European troops.

107. On the 18th of August, Mr. Yule, with an escort of thirty troopers of the 5th Irregulars, accompanied by four gentlemen, proceeded to Purneah to remove the treasure from that station. The Collector had reported the amount to be considerable, but it was found to be so much reduced by heavy drafts as not to need removal. Mr. Yule and his party thereupon returned at once to Bhaugulpore, which he reached on the 18th.

108. On the evening of the 14th he was awoke after midnight by a report from Major Macdonald, the Officer Commanding the 5th, to the effect that his men were either leaving or had left the station. The European soldiers were immediately placed under arms, and every precaution was taken to prevent mischief.

109. A few troopers remained staunch.

110. An immediate report of the occurrence was made to Sir James Outram, who was then at the Ghat, but he left the matter entirely in the hands of the Commissioner. As the mutineers were mounted, had an hour’s start, and had made off in the direction of Bowsee, it was considered useless to attempt a pursuit. Expresses were sent off to Bowsee, Deoghur, and Monghyr, to give notice of what had occurred, and a belief was entertained that the mutineers would take the road by Kutooria to Shergotty and Gya.

111. They plundered the letter bags which were in transit via Sooria to Behar.

112. Great fears were entertained of the safety of the officers of the 32nd at Bowsee and the peace of the district.

113. The better class of landowners were called upon to exert themselves in preserving tranquillity, and in arresting mutineers and deserters.

114. Escaped convicts from Gya were said to be causing mischief in the Monghyr District, and the Principal Sudder Ameen was sent out after them.

115. On the 16th the mutineers were telegraphed to have passed Bowsee, and Colonel Burney had sent some of his men in pursuit of them. No damage was done. The troopers were marching by Rohnee to Arrah.

116. The remainder of the division was tranquil. Fears at first prevailed at Purneah, Monghyr, and elsewhere, but the peace of these districts was not otherwise disturbed.

117. The sentence of the sepoy, who was reprieved by the Magistrate pending a reference to the Government of India, was commuted by the Right Hon’ble the Governor-General to transportation for life. It was at the same time intimated that the postponement of the execution was considered to be injudicious.
118. No persons were tried under Act XVII of 1857 during the week in the Bhaugulpore Division.

119. The temporary entertainment of fifty-four extra burkundazs for Zillah Furneal was sanctioned.

120. Rajshahye Division.—The Commissioner of the Rajshahye Division reported all quiet within his jurisdiction, and that up to the last return received by him, the mutiny at Dinapoor, and disarming of the troops at Berhampoor, had produced no bad effects on the 73rd at Julpigoree.

121. The Magistrate of Rajshahye reported having received an express from the Assistant Magistrate at Jungipore, conveying a telegraphic message from the Commissioner of Bhaugulpore, to the effect that boats with armed men had passed Monghyr on the previous day.

122. Intimation was at once sent to all stations on the Ganges and to the eastward to the Commissioner of Police in Calcutta, to the Commissioners of Nuddea and Dacca, and to the Commanders of river steamers to keep a strict watch for them.

123. The Magistrate of Rungpoor reported that the state of matters at Julpigoree was most unsatisfactory, and that he believed the sepoys to be in communication with the Bootees.

124. On the 15th the same officer submitted the following account of a disturbance at Julpigoree. Three sepoys of the 73rd were plotting the destruction of the European officers at that station. They mentioned the matter to a Haviladar, who, on pretence of joining them, went into his hut, brought out a loaded musket and shot the ringleader through the head, killing him on the spot. The two others fled into their huts, where they were apprehended.

125. A more detailed report of the occurrence was called for.

126. The rest of the district was quite quiet.

127. There were no trials in the division under Act XVII of 1857.

128. Nuddea Division.—In the Nuddea Division all was tranquil and undisturbed.

129. Baboo Issur Chunder Ghosal, Deputy Magistrate of Santipoor, offered to accompany any European Corps to the Upper Provinces as interpreter. He was thanked for his zeal, and told that he was more useful at his present post.

130. He subsequently stated that many of his countrymen were willing to take active service in the existing state of the country, and proposed the raising of militia corps from among the Choors and Latteals of Bengal. The suggestion was suitably acknowledged, and is under consideration.

131. At the Presidency peace was unbroken, and the periodical panics appeared to have ceased. On the recommendation of the Commissioner of Police, two light field pieces, with ammunition, were placed in the Police compound, several of the Police officers having been artillery soldiers, and willing to serve the guns, as well as to instruct others in doing so.

132. The same officer reported that numerous small parties of up-countrymen had lately been seen by persons who have recently travelled down the Grand Trunk Road to proceed in a southerly direction.

133. Enquiry has been instituted as to the correctness of the rumour, and the cause of the movement at the present season.

134. Burdwan Division.—The Commissioner of Burdwan intimated that during the week nothing that could in any way be associated with the revolt had occurred in his division.

135. The Magistrate of Beerbhoom reported the recapture of seven of the liberated convicts from Hazareebagh.

136. The Officiating Magistrate of Midnapoor brought to notice that, in consequence of the mutiny of the Ramghur Battalion, he had disarmed and detained a party of that corps, which was returning to Chyass from having
escorted prisoners to Alipoor. The detachment consisted of a Havildar, two Naiks, and eight sepoys. The orders of the Government of India were requested as to the disposal of these men.

137. The same officer sent a report from Captain Sissmore, stating that he with his wife and children was at Serai Kela under the protection of the Raja, who had promised to escort them to Raneegunge.

138. The Darogah of Raipoor reported the revolt at Purulea, and his apprehension of an outbreak among the Chooars in the neighbourhood.

139. The appointment of an European Deputy Magistrate at Gurbettah was strongly urged.

140. Orders were sent to the Darogah of Raipoor to consider himself temporarily under the Magistracy of Midnapoor to send in the escaped convicts captured by him, and to report constantly to the Magistrate of Midnapoor, who was armed with discretionary power to send extra burkundazes to Raipoor if necessary.

140½. The town of Midnapoor was nearly deserted from fear of the Shekawattee Battalion, but as soon as it was known that the corps in question had received orders to march, many of the inhabitants returned.

141. The Deputy Magistrate of Gurbettah reported his sub-division to be in great alarm from the revolt at Purulea.

142. The Joint-Magistrate of Raneegunge reported his sub-division to be perfectly quiet, but intimated that some excitement prevailed in consequence of the anarchy and confusion existing in the Manbhum District.

143. The same officer sent down correspondence from the Magistrate of Bancoorah, reporting the existence of considerable alarm in the minds of the authorities from the expected mutiny of the Shekawattee Battalion.

144. A large force of Europeans with guns was asked for. The Shekawattees did not mutiny, and the Europeans were not sent, as there were none to spare.

145. Authority was given to the Joint-Magistrate of Raneegunge to entertain temporarily twelve extra burkundazes to collect carts and supplies for the troops marching up the Grand Trunk Road.

146. The Civil Surgeon of Bancoorah was reported to have left his station without leave on the afternoon of the 6th of August. He was called upon to explain his reason for so doing.

147. In the divisions and districts noted in the margin, the public tranquillity was entirely unaffected by the revolt.

148. In consequence of the perilous position in which the European Officers at Juliporee were supposed to be in, orders were sent to the Commissioner of Assam to make such arrangements as he might deem most prudent to secure their safety in case of need, and instructions were sent to Darjeeling to hold two guns and all available Europeans in readiness to march on Juliporee on the requisition of Colonel Sherer.

149. The Volunteers at Dacca were placed under the command of Major Smith, Superintendent of the Elephant Kaddahs, and were furnished with arms and ammunition from the Arsenal of Fort William.

150. The arrangements which had been sanctioned for raising a body of Munnpoories and Cacharees, as well as a regiment from the warlike tribes bordering on Assam, were carried out.

151. South-West Frontier.—On the 18th of August, Martial Law was proclaimed by the Lieutenant-Governor in the districts forming the Chota Nagpoo1 Division, viz.—

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<tr>
<th>Chittagong.</th>
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<td>Cetatk.</td>
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<td>Dacca.</td>
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<td>Assam.</td>
<td>Cherra Poonjoo.</td>
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Hazareebaugh. Sumbulpoor.
Manbhoom. Lohardugga.
Singhbhum.
The functions of the ordinary Criminal Courts were thereby suspended in respect of heinous offences.

152. The proposal to raise a Police Corps of hillmen for maintaining order and tranquillity in the Chota Nagpoor Division was sanctioned by the Government of India, and Rae Tarknath Sen proceeded to Raneegunge to communicate with the Commissioner.

153. The Officiating Commissioner, Captain Dalton, reported on the 13th that he had deemed it necessary to fall back from Hazareebaugh on Bagoda, as the former station was not safe without an additional force. He had left all in good order, and hoped to be able to advance again, as soon as he was reinforced.

154. He has informed that the moment the artillery, hourly expected from Madras, arrived, a force consisting of European Infantry, Madras Artillery, Cavalry, and sepoys would be sent up in two columns to restore order on the South-West Frontier. The march of the force was necessarily delayed for want of artillery, as without guns it was not deemed right to send any force to reduce the Dorundah mutineers. One column was to march by the Grand Trunk Road to Burhi and Hazareebaugh, the other to proceed by Purulia and Ranchi.

155. In a detailed narrative of the occurrence in this Division submitted to the Government of India on the 12th instant, the services of Fergunnait Juggut Paul in arresting the progress of the mutineers of the 8th Native Infantry at Pittoria were prominently noticed.

156. As they were of a remarkable and distinguished character, and had in all human probability saved the lives of the whole of the European Officers on their retreat from Ranchi to Hazareebaugh, a special report of all the circumstances connected with them was called for from the Officiating Commissioner, in order that they might receive suitable acknowledgments from the Government.

157. In the meantime Captain Dalton was directed to express to the Fergunnait the very high sense entertained by the Government of his conspicuous loyalty and devotion.

158. The Raja of Ramgurh was thanked for his loyalty, and was informed that reinforcements would shortly be sent to restore order at Hazareebaugh.

159. On the 14th Captain Dalton, having heard that reinforcements were to be sent up immediately, intimated his intention to return to Hazareebaugh the next day with a party of Sikhs.

160. As the object of the relieving force was not only to reoccupy Chota Nagpoor, but to punish the Dorundah mutineers, Captain Dalton suggested that a sufficiently strong detachment should be sent to Hazareebaugh to cut off the Ramghur rebels in any attempt they might make to join Kooar Sing. This individual was known to be anxious to obtain the Dorundah guns, and the leader of the Ramghur mutineers, Jemadar Madho Sing, was in league with him.

161. If the rebels attempted to escape through his territory, the Commissioner had great hopes that the Sirgooga Chief would fall upon them with the whole of his force, which he had promised to have ready for any emergency.

162. The Assistant Magistrate of Govindpoor was authorized to entertain an additional police of thirty burkundazes to aid in capturing the escaped convicts from the Chota Nagpoor Jails.
163. General.—Arrangements were made for the distribution of the Left Wing of Captain Rattray's Police Corps, so as to defend the Grand Trunk Road, keep open the communication to Benares, and afford aid towards the maintenance of order at Hazareebaugh until the relieving column marched up.

164. The Police Corps, on their march from Soree, escorted the treasure at Beerbhoom safely to Raneegunge, whence it was brought to Calcutta.

165. The steps taken to re-open the telegraphic communication with Benares, and to restore the postal communication, are already known to the Government of India.

166. Orders were issued, as directed by the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General, to prevent the transport of saltpetre to the westward or north-westward, either in boats or otherwise throughout the divisions of Bhagulpur and Patna, and due notice was given that all found in transit in that direction would either be confiscated or destroyed.

167. In consequence of misconceptions existing on the subject of the effects of the declaration of Martial Law, and of the extension of Act XVI of 1857 in the jurisdiction of the ordinary Criminal Courts of the districts to which those measures applied, an explanatory circular was issued on the 15th of August. In this it was intimated that the declaration of Martial Law in no wise affected the executive functions of the Magistrate, and restricted his judicial powers only in respect to heinous offences. Heinous offenders, it was intimated, were to be committed for trial before a Commissioner appointed under Section 7 of Act XIV of 1857. All other crimes and misdemeanors were punishable, as heretofore, by the Magistrate.

168. In districts not under Martial Law, but to which Act XVI of 1857 had been extended, the powers, both executive and judicial, of the Magistrate remained unchanged; but when a Commissioner under the Act above mentioned was appointed, all cases arising out of, or connected with, the revolt and disturbances were to be committed for trial to the said Commissioner, and all other cases to the Sessions Judge.

169. As regards the higher Criminal Courts, it was ruled that their functions were suspended by the declaration of Martial Law, and that all heinous offenders were to be tried by the Commissioners appointed under Act XIV of 1857.

170. In other districts the extension of Act XVI of the same year has not necessarily any effect on the jurisdiction of Sessions Judges, but in all districts to which that Act has been extended, the Sessions Judges have been vested with powers under Act XVI, and it was stated to be the wish of the Government that all cases arising out of, or connected with, the disturbed state of the country should be tried by them in their capacity of Commissioners, and all other cases in ordinary course in their capacity of Sessions Judges.

171. It was intimated that vernacular proceedings and depositions were not required in cases tried by Commissioners under Act XIV of 1857, but full notes of the trial were to be taken by the Commissioner in English and preserved for futwa references.

172. Monthly returns in a form communicated were ordered to be furnished to the Government of all trials held under Act XIV of 1857.
No. 22, dated Fort William, 5th September 1857.

SPECIAL NARRATIVE (JUDICIAL) FROM 16TH TO 22ND AUGUST INCLUSIVE.

Behar.—The most prominent incidents of this week in the Patna Division were the re-occupation of Gya and Chuprah, the dispersion of Kooar Sing's force on the fall of Jugdespoor, and the gradual settling down of the provinces after the crisis it had gone through.

2. Upon the strong recommendation of this Government, as a special acknowledgment of the signal services performed by them in circumstances of considerable difficulty and danger, in opposition to the unqualified order of the highest executive officer in the division, Messrs. Money and Hollings were rewarded substantially.

3. The nature of the services referred to has been so fully detailed in former narratives as to render it unnecessary to repeat them here.

4. In Mr. Money's case, the offices of Magistrate and Collector were to be united at Gya as soon as a vacancy occurred in the former, and a consolidated salary of Rupees 2,000 was to be assigned to the conjoined appointment.

5. As Mr. Hollings had already attained the highest office he could hold in the Opium Agency, and as his time was not fully occupied at all seasons by his opium duties, he was appointed a Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector in Behar, as well as Sub-Deputy Opium Agent, and his emoluments were increased from Rupees 750 to 1,000 a month.

6. Intimation was received of the concurrence of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council in the removal of Mr. W. Tayler, and the arrangements made in consequence for reasons already narrated at length.

7. Gya was reoccupied on the morning of the 16th of August without opposition. All the Government offices and most of the records had been destroyed. Some of the accounts had been preserved by the Amlah at their own houses, where they had been taken prior to the outbreak. The residences of the residents had been plundered, and all the mischief was caused by the released convicts from the Jail and the bad character in the Jail, who left the town as soon as the relieving force approached.

8. No other enemy appears to have approached the place, and there can now be no doubt that its tranquillity would have been undisturbed but for Mr. Tayler's order. Many of the inhabitants returned at once, the police were recalled, the bad characters disappeared, and order was in rapid course of complete restoration.

9. A party of fifty Nujeebs was sent out, under Mr. Colin Lindsay of the Civil Service, to relieve the Tetah Sub-Deputy Opium Agency which was reported to be besieged, and holding out against a large body of rebels. It was defended by a few of the opium guards. On arriving at Jehanabad, midway between Patna and Gya, Mr. Lindsay attacked a village, in which there were 250 armed men and defeated them, killing seven, wounding five, and capturing nine, who were immediately made over to the Gya authorities for trial.

10. The Nujeebs were reported to have behaved admirably; the Darogah of Jehanabad lost a leg in the fight, and Mr. Lindsay burnt the village. Mr. Lindsay was accompanied by Mr. Whitcombe of the Railway Department. The defeated rebels retired to other villages to obtain reinforcements and to return, so a party of twenty-five Nujeebs was ordered to remain at Jehanabad.

11. The names of the Darogah and of the zemindary in which the village was situated were called for, and Mr. Lindsay, whose spirited conduct was duly acknowledged, was recommended to be cautious in so serious a proceeding as the burning of villages, which might be occupied by armed men without the consent or participation of the principal inhabitants. The acknowledgments of the Government were returned to Mr. Whitcombe, and a return was requested of all Nujeebs deserving of reward for conspicuous gallantry.
12. As reports of rapine and violence in Hilsa, Utta Serai, and Nowada had been received by the Officiating Commissioner, Major Nation was sent with a party of fifty Nujjebs to restore order in those places.

13. Mr. Hannay of the Indian Navy, the officer in command of the gun-boat, left at Patna by the Steamer Jumna, was ordered to proceed to Revelunge, and to place himself under the orders of the Magistrate of Chuppra to patrol the banks of the Gogra. Arrangements were made to send up with the gun-boat a small police force under Mr. Lynch or Mr. Ewen Macdonell as far as Derowla Ghât, or further, if practicable, in order to prevent all communication between the Fyzabad and Arrah rebels. Considerable uneasiness prevailed in the western portion of the Chuppra District from its close proximity to the Azimgur and Goruckpoor boundaries, hence the advisability of this armed demonstration.

14. Chuppra was re-occupied on the 12th when all the officials returned. The station was found in a tranquil orderly state, the jail and treasury have been well cared for, and the conduct of Kazee Ramzan Ali and the Nujjebs was well spoken of by the Magistrate. The Judge presented the Nujjebs with a reward of Rupees 500, and the acknowledgments of the Government for his good services were forwarded to the Kazee.

15. Patna was perfectly quiet. In consequence of the absence of the Sikhs on detached duty, it was garrisoned by 200 Europeans with two guns. The charge of the Post Office was made over to the Officiating Civil Surgeon; the gallows which had been established as a permanent object on the parade-ground was removed from its offensive position, and the measures adopted by the Officiating Commissioner had quieted the alarm and agitation produced by Mr. Taylor's strong-handed but inconsiderate proceedings. An émeute in the jail was, in the absence of the Magistrate, quickly and quietly suppressed by the Officiating Commissioner without bloodshed.

16. The small detachment of the 5th Irregular Cavalry at Dinapoor was disarmed on the 16th of August.

In the next evening three shots were heard in the cantonment at half past nine o'clock. On the arrival of the many officers who ran to the spot, several sepoys and followers belonging to the 40th Native Infantry and the other mutinous Corps, who had remained faithful and quiet at Dinapoor when their comrades absconded, were found dead or dying from bayonet wounds. It was rumoured on the evidence of some of the wounded men themselves that the attack was made from the river side by some of their own former comrades, probably in revenge for their not having participated in the mutiny; but there is reason to believe that affair was a savage outrage by men of Her Majesty's 10th Foot.

17. In consequence of a report from the Magistrate of Chumparan, charging Moonseee Nujjeem-ood-deen, Dewan of the Raja of Bettiah, with implication in the murder of Major Holmes, the Dewan was placed under a guard in strictly honorable confinement by the Officiating Commissioner on the 17th of August.

18. The Maharaja was informed that the arrest was for a matter relating personally to the Dewan, and unconnected with the Raja himself. The cause of his arrest had not then been made known to the prisoner, but Mr. Farquharson considered the suspicions of the Magistrate to be well grounded. The Commissioner was directed to report as soon as possible on the charge against the Dewan.

19. At a Durbar held by Mr. Farquharson on the 17th, several respectable natives-attended. They gave free expression to their grievances, and seemed much pleased at the reversal of several orders which had caused great and general annoyance.

20. The Behar Station Guards were re-armed. Orders were given that the Gya Nujjebs, who fired upon Mr. Money, were to be excepted and to be punished when captured.
21. The Darogah of Sasseeram reported that the sepoys had plundered the place, burning, destroying, or removing all Government property, and that the townspeople had resisted the mutineers. Several lives were said to have been lost on both sides.

22. The mutineers were believed to have gone towards Mirzapoor by the unfrequented route through the Clynepeor and Beebun jungle, avoiding the Grand Trunk Road. They were supposed to have consisted of Dinapoor Sepoys, who had abandoned Koer Sing after his defeat by Major Eyre.

23. In the Chumparat District all was peaceable and quiet. The abandonment of Goruckpeor and Azimgur opened up the district more freely to rebels from Oudh, but the reported approach of the Goorkha Regiments inspired confidence. Every precaution at the ghats and elsewhere was taken to prevent disorder.

24. A dacoitee, reported from the rarity of such occurrences in the district, was said to have taken place in Bettiah.

25. The Magistrate of Mozufferpoor intimated that order was perfectly re-established in Tirhoot: that the Chuppra residents had declined to return to their station, which would have a bad effect in the neighbouring districts, and that he had written to the residents at Nepal, suggesting the employment of Goorkhas to re-occupy Chuppra immediately.

26. He was at once directed to cancel this unauthorized and injudicious act, and to confine his attention to his own district. He was informed that he had been misinformed regarding the Chuprah officers, and that he had no warrant for calling on a foreign power for military aid, without the sanction of his own Government.

27. The Deputy Magistrate of Sherotty mentioned that few up-country men had passed down the Grand Trunk Road in the direction of Calcutta, that he was on the alert, and would at once make known any thing unusual.

28. The Deputy Magistrate of Nowada was directed to rejoin immediately, his district being in an unsettled state, urgently requiring his presence.

The Deputy Magistrate of Sasseeram reported from Benares what he had heard of the acts of the mutineers at Sasseeram, and as this statement differed very slightly from that recorded in a former narrative, it is not reproduced.

23. Mr. Costly was ordered to rejoin at once to submit a detailed statement of the exact condition in which he found his division, and to remain at Sasseeram until relieved by Mr. Baker, who had been appointed to succeed him.

30. The Barh Sub-division was tranquil, and Mr. Vincent reported to be doing good service. He was directed to watch the ghats carefully to prevent the approach of the Bhaugulpoor mutineers should they take that direction.

31. The latest account of Gya represented the whole of the district, with the exception of the Nowada Sub-division, to be perfectly peaceable. In consequence of uncertainty as to the movements of the mutineers' of the 5th Irregulars, Captain Rattray was unwilling to detach his men in small bodies to restore order in that direction. Major Nation had, however, already been sent there with fifty Nujjeebs, and the zamindars had been called upon to aid the authorities in seizing marauders and bringing back peace.

32. At Gya the preservation of several of the tehsselee books had enabled the Officiating Collector to commence work anew. Two hundred and fifty prisoners had been apprehended and lodged in the jail, among whom were several who had taken a conspicuous part in the recent riots.

33. Moulavee Iradut Ali, Law Officer and Sudder Ameen of Tirhoot, and Shaikh Zuhoor Ali, Police Darogah of the Mozufferpoor Thannah, sent in petitions narrating the events that occurred at their station subsequent to the departure of the authorities. They differed in nothing from the accounts previously given. The Commissioner was directed to submit, as soon as he
uld obtain authentic information enabling him to do so, a detailed state-

ment of the conduct of all the zemindars and native officers in the division.

34. A letter addressed by Maharaja Mohessur Sing of Durbhangha to the
Government of India, expressing loyalty and making mention of assistance
afforded by him was forwarded to this Government. As this Raja was not
known to have afforded any aid, it was not deemed necessary to notice his
letter.

35. In reply to petitions from several persons in Bohar praying for aid
in repressing disorder, it was intimated that the civil authorities had returned
to Gya, and that order would speedily be restored.

36. Koor Sing was supposed to be in the neighbourhood of Rhotas, and
the people of Arrah were returning to their allegiance, Major Eyre
and the European portion of his force proceeded to the north-west, and the
Magistrate of Arrah was informed that, if he felt too weak to hold that
station with 150 Sikhs, he could fall back to Buxar.

37. All the judicious acts of Mr. Farquharson during his short tenure
of the Office of Commissioner were approved by the Lieutenant-Governor,
and had tended much to restore order and tranquillity.

38. Mr. Samuells was appointed a Commissioner under Section 7, Act
XIV of 1857.

39. Bhaugulpoor Division.—The mutinous horsemen of the 5th Irregu-
lar Cavalry mentioned in the previous narratives made for Bohnee, where
they were joined by the detachment at that station. The united party then
proceeded to Bowsee in the hope of being joined by the 32nd Native Infantry,
but that Corps proved staunch. The cavalry were pursued for some distance
by the Light Company of the 32nd without result.

40. Orders were received from the Government of India to reward
Eman Khan, Woordie-Major of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, with a sword of
honor for his fidelity and devotion on the occasion of the murder of Sir
Norman Leslie, provided the native officer in question had continued faithful
in the late mutiny of his regiment. The Commissioner of Bhaugulpoor was
at the same time directed to submit a proposal for the disbursement of the
unpaid portion of the reward.

41. A company of the 32nd was ordered from Bowsee to Deoghur, fears
being entertained on account of the latter place, and orders were issued for
the prompt adoption of measures of precaution in the event of a rise of the
73rd at Julpigoree, in dread of whom considerable uneasiness existed in the
Furneesh District.

42. The telegraph stations at Bhaugulpoor, Rajmehal, and Monghyr
were, as a precautionary measure and for speed of communication, recom-
mended to be removed to the immediate vicinity of the public offices instead
of, being left, as they are now, at a distance from them.

43. The Sonthals were perfectly tranquil, and the planters all at their
factories. The remainder of the division was equally peaceful, with the ex-
ception of a little plundering from the escaped convicts of Gya in Thannah
Shaikparah. The Principal Sudder Ameen with his Sheristadar and twenty-
extra Burkundazes were sent out to arrest the runaways, and to stop their
proceedings. The Magistrate was directed to report the result of this step
without delay.

44. Babu Shamlanund Moorkerjee, Sub-Assistant Commissioner at Nya
Doomka, having good reason to suspect the fidelity of the troopers of the 5th
Irregular Cavalry at that station, sent the treasure amounting to Rupees 4,000
and the few prisoners in the jail to Sooree. The detachment mutinied subse-
quently as mentioned before. The Babu acted with judgment, coolness, and
discretion in somewhat trying circumstances. The acknowledgments of the
Government were communicated to him for his good conduct.
45. **Rajshahye Division.**—In this division no act of disturbance of the general peace occurred. The only place for which any anxiety was felt was Julpigoree. Four more sepoys of the 73rd Native Infantry were sent from that station to Alipoor. Two of them had been tried and sentenced to transportation for life. The remaining two were sent down for trial, as it was not expedient to bring forward at Julpigoree the names of the witnesses by whom their guilt could be established.

In addition to the above three men of the 11th Irregular Cavalry were forwarded to the Presidency to be tried for mutiny.

46. The Magistrate of Dinagepoor had entertained forty Burkundazes and four Jemadars for the protection of the town.

47. The enquiries made throughout this division did not show that any boats with armed men had passed down towards Calcutta, regarding which careful enquiry had been ordered as mentioned in a previous narrative.

48. The Commissioner of Rajshahye reproved the Magistrate of Rungpoor for not having made sufficient enquiry in the case of Sreenauth Dass previous to committing him for trial for treason against the Government.

The Magistrate was directed to see that all the persons present at the time of the commission of the alleged act of treason were produced before the Sessions Judge, when the case came in for trial.

49. On the supposition that the Deputy Magistrate of Kishengunge had left his station, the Assistant Magistrate of Julpigoree directed the Postmaster of Titalya to assume charge of the sub-division.

This proved to be unnecessary as the Deputy Magistrate was found not to have abandoned his post as was at first supposed.

50. **Nuddea Division.**—In the Nuddea Division the public tranquillity was undisturbed. The enquiry conducted in all parts of the division proved that no armed boats had passed down; that the exodus of up-country-men was rather in the other direction many returning to their homes, and that beyond the entertainment of extra Churundars to guard boats in which was country produce, there was nothing to justify apprehension in the matter.

51. At the Presidency an additional coree of sixty Europeans was added to the police for the protection of the city on salaries of Rupees 50 each. A Hungarian and an Armenian who arrived from Madras had been placed under observation, but were subsequently released, there being nothing proved to show that they were dangerous characters.

The importation of fire-arms and caps by Duarkanath Biswas & Co., of Calcutta was prevented, and the arms consisting of thirty-three double and single-barrelled guns with five lakhs of caps were placed in the Arsenal of Fort William for safe custody.

52. In the 24-Pergunnahs the spirit shops in Bhowanipoor and at Kalighat were ordered to be closed at 5 P.M. daily as a precautionary measure.

53. **Burdwan Division.**—With the exception of the Medinapoor Magistracy, all was reported to be perfectly orderly in this division.

The occurrence of revolt and plunder at Chyebassa was made known by Raja Chuckundar Sing, and the Ranee of Raipoor reported that the Chuars were gathering and likely to rise.

54. As this tract is in the Gurbetta Sub-division, orders were issued to send down a company of the Shekawatti Battalion to Gurbetta, and to place Captain Keighley in temporary charge of the sub-division, should that measure prove necessary.

55. A Mr. Ferry reported a general rising of the Sonthals in that portion of the north-west of Begur Pergunnah, which lies to the north of Gurbetta between that place and the south-west frontier. The Sonthals were said to be plundering.
56. The Raja of Mohurblunj was reported to have summoned to his head-quarters every Paik and other servant in the employ of the Government with a threat of the infliction of a fine of Rupees 200, or some other punishment in cases of disobedience.

The Raja was called upon to explain this suspicious proceeding.

57. The Secretaries to the Bengal Coal Company asked the permission of the Government to enroll and arm thirty Europeans for the protection of their mines and property at Raneegunge. The permission was granted, but was not taken advantage of, as the manager of the mines reported his ability to defend them without such aid.

58. The recapture of several prisoners from the Jails of Hazareebaugh and Purulia was reported. The Magistrate of Sooree was authorised to offer rewards in no case to exceed Rupees 50, for such as were apprehended and brought to him.

59. Chittagong, Dacca, and other Divisions.—In the Chittagong and all other divisions from which reports were received, order prevailed, and nothing connected with the revolt had occurred.

60. Mr. Allen, Member of the Sudder Board on deputation to the Cossiah and Jynteah Hills, reported that the Hill Chiefs were unsettled in consequence of extremely exaggerated rumours regarding the fall of the British power having reached that part of the country.

61. The detachment of the Sylhet Light Infantry at Sylhet was strengthened to maintain order during the approaching Mussulman festivals, and the district was placed under the charge of Mr. Allen.

62. Enquiries made in the Dacca Division regarding armed boats filled with up-country men were as fruitless as elsewhere, no such boats having passed down.

63. Cuttack Division.—The different districts in this division were all perfectly orderly and tranquil.

On the 10th of August, a report was received by Commissioner at Cuttack from Captain Leigh, Principal Assistant Commissioner at Sumbulpoor, intimating that the Hazareebaugh Mutineers were on the march to that station with released prisoners, among whom were two pretenders to the Sumbulpoor Raj, of whom it was probable that they would attempt to restore one to the gudgee.

64. Two companies of the 40th Madras Native Infantry were immediately ordered to march to Captain Leigh’s relief, and every practicable arrangement was made for their safe transit. But the heavy floods that occurred immediately afterwards, rendering the rivers perfectly impassable, prevented the march of this force.

65. The Commissioner subsequently deemed it desirable to delay the transmission of the force for other reasons, until he received further information from Captain Leigh as to the actual strength of the force to be opposed, and the chances or otherwise of the detachment of the Ramghur Battalion mutinying at Sumbulpoor, and proceeding to join their rebellious comrades elsewhere. There was likewise considerable probability of the Madras troops being prostrated by sickness before they reached their destination. On account of the extreme unhealthiness of the road, they would have to march along for about 158 miles.

The detachment of the Paik Corps at Ungool was strengthened.

66. The Commissioner was informed that the river route was considered by persons acquainted with it to be shorter more practicable, and much more healthy at the present season for the transport of troops.

67. There was a little uneasiness among some of the Chiefs in the Tributary Mehals, but it evidently had no connection whatever with the revolt.
68. At his own request the Commissioner of Cuttack was appointed a Commissioner under Act XIV of 1857 in the Tributary Mehals to enable him to deal with any cases that might come under the provisions of that Act with promptitude and vigour.

69. Darjeeling.—Upon the requisition of the Judge of Dinagepoor, the Superintendent of Darjeeling had sent down, as many hillmen as could be collected, to act as extra Burkundazes during the approaching Mohurrum.

70. At Darjeeling itself strict orders were issued to regulate the Mohurrum processions, and to prevent any but Mussulmans taking active part in them.

The bazaar people and servants of the residents were disarmed as a precautionary measure to prevent the chance of disturbance during the festivals referred to.

71. Chota Nagpoor Division.—The Officiating Commissioner of Chota Nagpoor reported that he had moved on to Burhi to be ready to re-occupy Hazareebaugh as soon as a sufficient number of Sikhs could be spared to accompany him. It was not considered prudent to weaken the posts on the Grand Trunk Road, lest the Bhagulpur Mutineers should march up in that direction.

72. The last account of the Dorundah Mutineers stated that the men enlisted in the Agency were at variance with the Hindustanis and Bhujeporeans, would not obey the orders of Jemadar Madhoo Sing, the commander of the rebels, and were anxious for the return of the authorities. The rebels appeared to have no immediate intention of leaving their position at Dorundah. The treasure had not been divided, and the property in cantonments and in the bazaar had been protected.

73. This was ascribed to the anxiety of the native officers and sepoys, whose homes are in the division, to compromise themselves as little as possible.

74. As most of these men have lands on which their families reside on the estate of the Ramghur Raja, that zemindar was called upon to furnish lists of them to the Commissioner, and to take measures to prevent the removal of the families in question. This step, which would soon be known to the parties concerned in the regiment, would, it was thought, render them doubly anxious to separate from Madhoo Sing and his supporters.

75. Although many of the irregular cavalry attached to the Ramghur force had formerly been drafted from the 5th Irregulars. They had continued to behave well. Naib Ressadar Shaikh Mowlah Buksh, who commanded the detachment on the Grand Trunk Road, had behaved admirably in preserving order and inspiring confidence (after the departure of the authorities) at Burhi and along the portion of the road to which he furnished guards. He was informed that his conduct would be rewarded, if he continued to act as he had done.

76. A native writer, who was living at Dorundah at the time of the mutiny, and remained there seven days after the departure of the authorities, positively affirmed that Thakoor Bishnath Sahai of Burkurghur, a distant relative of the Raja of Chota Nagpoor, had accepted from the sepoys the office of ruler, and sat daily in one of the cantonment bungalows to administer justice. He was said to have cut off the head of a man who had successfully opposed him in a law suit.

77. The Thakoor had long been looked upon as disaffected. No other zemindar had taken part with the mutineers.

78. The Raja of Ramghur continued to aid in repressing crime and maintaining order in his extensive estate, and again received the high approval of the Government.

79. The Raja of Serai Killah reported that he had afforded protection to the Principal Assistant Commissioner of Chyebassah and his family, and sent them to Raneegunge under an escort of 200 of his sepoys. He had also
stationed sepoys at the several ghâts to arrest any mutineers that might attempt to pass them. His loyalty was commended; and he was informed that his services were highly appreciated by the Government. He was also told that troops were proceeding to Dorundah, by whom the mutineers would soon be punished and dispersed. Twelve muskets with ammunition were sent to the Raja in charge of Lieut.-Colonel Birch.

80. The Darogah of Thannah Gowah in Hazareebaugh reported the circumstances in which ten armedmen had been sent for the protection of his thannah by Teekâit Phookun Sing zemindar of Goddee Gowah.

81. The Officiating Commissioner was directed to ascertain and report specifically every instance of loyal conduct in zemindars and other influential persons.

82. General.—Arrangements were made to facilitate and accelerate the passage of troops along the Grand Trunk Road, and a proposal from Mr. Money to form depôts for the sale of provisions at different points in the same line of road was submitted for the information and orders of the Government of India.

83. The Commissioner for the Suppression of Dacoity was vested with the powers of a Special Commissioner, under Section 7 of Act XIV of 1857, for the trial and punishment of all crimes and offences punishable under that Act, the said powers to be exercised in his own department only.
RETURN to an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 14 April 1859—for,

PAPERS "relating to the Mutiny in the Punjab in 1857."

India Office,  
14 April 1859.  
J. W. KAYE,  
Secretary in Political and Secret Departments.

PAPERS relating to the Mutiny in the Punjab, in 1857.

No. 75 of 1858.

From R. Temple, Esq., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab, to G. F. Edmonstone, Esq.; Secretary to the Government of India (with the Governor General), dated Lahore, 25 May 1858.

Sir,

I am directed to submit, for the information of the Supreme Government, a report, prepared under direction of Mr. R. Montgomery, late Judicial Commissioner, of occurrences in the Punjab territories during the critical period of 1857; also a report by Lieutenant Colonel Edwardes, on events in Peshawur; a report on events in Cis-Sutlej States, by Mr. G. C. Barnes; and certain selected district reports; marginally noted.* While forwarding these, I am also to submit the following narrative, and comments on the part of the Chief Commissioner.

2. It will not be necessary, after the detailed reports now rendered, to recapitulate all the events of that awful struggle, through which the Punjab passed. It will suffice to glance at them generally, and to note the policy which was adopted to confront the crisis in its various phases.

3. When the outbreak of May 1857 burst upon Hindoostan, that portion of the Bengal army which was cantoned in the Punjab territories amounted to about 60,000 soldiers, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindoostanees, chiefly Regulars</td>
<td>35,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabees (Irregulars)</td>
<td>13,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>10,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>59,656</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides, there were military organised police, amounting to about 9,000. The Hindoostanee troops shown in the above abstract had a few Punjabees in their ranks, numbering perhaps, 2,000; but of the Punjabees, troops, full one-fourth

fourth were Hindoostanee. Of the European force, one corps, viz. Bombay Fusiliers, did not belong to the Punjab complement; and arrived in detachments, at different times, between the 17th June and the end of July. Out of 12 corps (including one corps of cavalry), seven were massed, as it were, at each extremity of the province, namely, either on the Simla Hills, north of Umballa, or in the Peshawar Valley. Thus there were left to hold the country from the Sutlej and the Indus five weak European corps, distributed at the stations of Ferozepore, Lahore, Sealkote, Jullunder, and Rawul Pindee.

4. When the émeute occurred at Meerut, and Delhi fell into the hands of the mutineers, it was evident that the European troops for the suppression of the mutiny must be mainly obtained from Meerut itself, or from the hills near Umballa. To Umballa then were the Europeans ordered immediately from the hills by the Commander in Chief, General Anson. Thus the greater part of three infantry corps and one cavalry corps were collected. But there were no artillerymen in sufficient numbers; there was but little ammunition, and no heavy guns were procurable, except from Philore, on the Sutlej, 80 miles distant, with the river intervening. But the Commander in Chief, when arranging to move on Delhi, was further beset with difficulties. The hot winds had set in, rendering the season most adverse. The commissariat and medical authorities were averse to an advance; and the three native corps on the spot were demoralised, were watching events, and were ripe for an outbreak.

5. Under these circumstances, the Chief Commissioner conceived that the first step was to disarm these regiments, whom it was equally dangerous either to leave at Umballa, or take to Delhi. This course the Chief Commissioner lost no time in urging; but when the Commander in Chief took the matter in hand, the local military authorities pointed out that they had pledged themselves not to disarm the sepoys. It was in vain urged per contra that the compact had no sooner been made than it was broken by the sepoys themselves. There was not indeed the shadow of a reasonable hope that these men would prove faithful. Indeed, the incendiary fires which had been lighted up night after night in the cantonment of Umballa too surely indicated the discontent which pervaded the minds of these men. Ultimately, one corps, the 4th Light Cavalry, were sent off in various detachments, but many troopers deserted. One corps, the 5th Native Infantry, was left at Umballa; but one-fourth of their number deserted at night, shortly after the departure of the Europeans for Delhi, and the rest made off at different periods afterwards. The third corps, the 60th Native Infantry, accompanied the field force for Delhi as far as Kurnaul. Thence they were detached to Rohtuck, 40 miles distant from Delhi, to operate against insurgents in that district; but, shortly after arriving there, they mutinied, fired on their officers, and went off to Delhi. Thus it was that, through mistaken leniency and blind confidence in native soldiers, an opportunity was missed, whereby, at the outset of the disturbances, a whole brigade might have been successfully dealt with in a vigorous and exemplary manner.

6. The Chief Commissioner presumes that no officer would now deny that an immediate advance upon Delhi was the right course; but at that time such was not the opinion of the Commander in Chief's military advisers. His Excellency assured the Chief Commissioner that every officer whom he consulted was averse to this measure. The Chief Commissioner believes now, as he urged then, that if our troops had not advanced from Umballa upon Delhi, the whole population between the Jumna and the Sutlej would have risen, and that the chiefs of Puttiala, Jheend, and Nabha, who performed such excellent service afterwards, would, even if, they had stood by us, have been deserted by their own troops, or else would have been compelled by these troops to join the insurrection. But the advance of our troops towards Delhi, and the victory at Badlee Serai, near that city, on the 8th June, proved to the country that there was vitality in our cause, and power on our side.

7. It is now proper to turn to the events which occurred in the Punjab itself immediately after the arrival of the news from Delhi. Of these, first, was the disarming of the native brigade at Lahore, on the 13th May. The promptitude and success with which that all-important measure was carried out
out were truly remarkable. The credit belongs solely to the military and civil authorities on the spot. Among them, the chief praise is due to Brigadier S. Corbett, who commanded the troops, and to Mr. R. Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner. Had Lahore, with the fort, the munitions of war, and the treasure fallen into the hands of a mutineer soldiery, the preservation of order in the Punjab generally would have been scarcely possible; the consequence of such a disaster would have been felt everywhere. The actual event was that three native infantry regiments and one regiment of regular cavalry, about 3,000 well trained native soldiers, were disarmed by 400 European infantry, and 12 guns with European artillerymen.

8. The next episode was the outbreak at Ferozepore. On the British side affairs were badly managed. It was fortunate that the European barracks were close to the arsenal, into which building a company of Europeans were introduced, just before it was assaulted by the native infantry. But after the arsenal had been secured, and the mutineers repulsed, they were allowed to return, and burn buildings in the cantonment at their pleasure, during the whole night of the 14th May. No adequate efforts were made to destroy, or even to punish them. Even those who, in their flight from the station towards Delhi, had been seized by the police and the country people, were not brought to trial until reiterated orders to that effect had been issued. But, unfortunately, at Ferozepore, errors did not end here; for when, at a date subsequent to the above occurrences, the 10th Light Cavalry were disarmed, their horses were not taken away. When, however, the taking of the horses was insisted on at last, the troopers had a full opportunity of concocting their plans for an outbreak; for the order about the horses, instead of being kept secret, was formally copied and circulated in the regimental order book.

9. Among the earliest measures adopted, was the securing of the important forts of Philore and Govindgur (Umritsur). On the first news of the outbreak at Delhi, indeed on the 11th May, Sir H. Barnard, commanding the Umballa or Sirhind Division, warned the military authorities at Jullunder to arrange for the safety of the arsenal at Philore, then defended by native troops. Upon this, Brigadier Hartley promptly threw a company of European infantry and some European artillerymen into the fort. To show the immense importance of this arsenal, together with that of Ferozepore, it is sufficient to observe, that from them were derived the means of taking Delhi. At about the same time some European infantry were sent from Lahore to hold Govindgur, in conjunction with some European artillerymen already there. This place it must be remembered, was the most central and the most important stronghold in the Punjab.

10. The same eventful days witnessed stirring scenes at Peshawur. In that valley there were at that period three European regiments and a strong body of European artillery, a force more than a match for the 8,000 Hindoostanee troops in that vicinity. No sooner had the Delhi news become known in Peshawur, that Major General Read commanding that division assumed the command of all the troops in the Punjab. At a council of war held immediately by him, it was proposed to form a moveable column composed of the élite of the European regiments (one to be taken from Peshawur, the other from Rawul Pindee), with a due proportion of European artillery and with the Guide Corps, half cavalry, half infantry, and other Punjaubee troops, and Goorkhas, upon whom it was considered that reliance might be placed. It was intended that this column should assemble at Jhelum, a very critical position, and there remain ready to fall upon and crush mutineers wherever they might break out. Scarcely, however, had the troops marched from Peshawur, when it was discovered that the Hindoostanee troops there were utterly untrustworthy. And inasmuch as any considerable and successful mutiny in that valley would certainly have been followed by an invasion from the surrounding hill tribes, the European corps which had started was ordered back, and two regiments of Punjab infantry were despatched thither in haste.

11. This precaution was indeed as necessary as it was timely. For despite everything, mutinies did break out, and partial insurrection occurred in the valley. But the rising flames were speedily trampled out by the wisdom, decision, and energy of three officers, namely, Brigadier General S. Cotton,
who commanded the division, Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner, and Lieutenant Colonel J. Nicholson, the Deputy Commissioner; and our hold on this important position and territory was securely maintained. In the first instance it was resolved to disarm the 5th Light Cavalry, and three of the native infantry regiments. This having been most successfully accomplished, a select force moved out against the 55th Native Infantry, which had mutinied at Fort-Hoti Murdan, in the Eusufzye frontier. On the approach of this force, the mutineers evacuated the fort, and fled towards Swat. Many were killed in the pursuit, and many were taken prisoners. The remnant escaped for a time by wandering among the rugged hills beyond Huzara. The miserable, though well-deserved fate of these fugitives has been graphically described in the report by Major J. R. Becher, the Deputy Commissioner of Huzara. After these events, which turned so evidently in our favour, the Peshawur Valley remained tranquil. Some attempts to excite insurrection were indeed made from time to time; but gradually our position in that quarter became so firm, as to enable the Chief Commissioner to withdraw one of the Punjabee corps cantoned there, in order that it might reinforce the army before Delhi.

12. Before proceeding to measures and events connected with the interior of the Punjab, it will be proper to mention the troops from the Punjab territories, including Cis-Sutlej States, which formed a part of the army before Delhi. Of the 12 European corps (11 infantry and one cavalry), the 9th Lancers, the greater portions of Her Majesty's 75th, the 1st and 2d European Bengal Fusiliers, and about 200 European artillerymen, formed the greater portion of the European force that first marched upon Delhi; the remainder of the force coming from Meerut. In the first instance also, a second class siege train was despatched from Philore. Afterwards two wings of European corps followed. Then a considerable native force was despatched from the Punjab also. First the Guide Corps, cavalry and infantry, after a memorable march of 580 miles, at an average speed of 28 miles a day, arrived before Delhi early in June. Then the 4th Sikhs were sent from Huzara, and the 1st Punjab Infantry from Bunnoo, the 1st Punjab Cavalry and two squadrons of the 2d and 5th; all these troops joined the camp before the end of July. It will be seen presently, that subsequently two more Punjabee corps were despatched to reinforce the army, together with European troops equal to two battalions. So that five out of the 11 regiments of Punjabee infantry, and two out of five and a half regiments of Punjabee cavalry, took part in the final struggle at Delhi, and shared the honours and perils of that terrible conflict. One newly raised Punjabee corps was sent to Meerut to relieve European troops there for service at Delhi; but besides the above, there was further aid furnished from the Punjab. Artillerymen being greatly wanted in the camp, the artillerymen of the old Sikh army who were then out of employ, were enlisted in the British service, and to the number of about 300 men, and despatched to Delhi. To the same destination was sent a strong corps of Muzhubee (low caste) Sikhs, numbering 1,200 men, to serve as pioneers. A body of cavalry was raised to form the nucleus of Hodgson's horse. A second siege train of first class calibre, which will be alluded to hereafter, was forwarded from Ferozepore under escort of a Belooch battalion. A number of engineer officers were sent down to Delhi from the Punjab Department of Public Works; it is well known what excellent service they rendered, and how nobly they behaved. Among them Major A. Taylor was eminently distinguished. Lastly, the contingents of the Cis-Sutlej Chiefs were important auxiliaries to the force before Delhi, by guarding the communications in its rear. The Jheend force of 800 men went in advance of our force, and facilitated its movement, guarded the Grand Trunk Road from the camp to Kurnaul, and held the boat bridge at that point of the Jumna which commanded the communication between our camp and Meerut. From Kurnaul to Loodianah the road was held by the Puttiala troops, 5,000 strong. The lessor force furnished by the Nabha State of 800 men, escorted the siege train from Philore, and numerous convoys of stores and ammunition. Then the Jummoo Contingent, 2,200 strong, was despatched to aid in the operations before Delhi. An irregular force under General Van Cortlandt, of about 1,000 men, was sent across the Sutlej to reconquer and occupy the districts of the Delhi territory to the rear of our besieging army. A military transport train
of 30 waggons per diem was organised, under the excellent management of Captain D. Briggs, to carry men and material for the army. A waggon train was established from Mooltan to Ferozepore and Lahore, and a camel train from Kurrachee to Mooltan. Thus land transport was effectually secured from the seat of war at Delhi to the sea board of Kurrachee, a distance of 1,400 miles. As our officers could obtain but little carriage from the Cis-Sutlej States, and none at all from Delhi territory, the means of conveyance were obtained from the Punjab, and the number of elephants, camels, bullocks, and country carts collected for this purpose were enormous. Besides quantities of miscellaneous stores, the greater portion of the treasure for the Delhi force was despatched from the Punjab treasuries. In general terms it may be said that the Punjab territories contributed for the operations of Delhi six battalions of European infantry, a considerable force of European artillery, one regiment of European cavalry, seven battalions of Punjab infantry, a body of Sikh artillerymen, a corps of sappers and miners, Punjabee, three regiments of Punjabeey cavalry, two siege trains, and auxiliary native contingents of 8,000 men.

13. I am now to advert to those measures which were adopted in the Punjab to preserve tranquillity. The 12th paragraph has shown what heavy duties had to be discharged for the support of the army before Delhi. But besides that, there were some 36,000 Hindoostanee mutinous troops to be overawed if possible, and if not possible then to be overpowered. Then a long and difficult frontier, open to attack on many points, was to be guarded; and, lastly, any disposition to insurrection which might exist among the people had to be repressed.

14. The efficiency of the Punjabeey force was among the very first matters to engage attention. When the crisis came on in May, nearly one-fourth of this force was on furlough. A double period of furlough had been granted to the infantry soldiers, as no such leave had been enjoyed during the previous year. But now circulars were at once issued to recall the furlough men. Many men rejoined during the first fortnight; but some, whose homes were more distant, could not return so quickly. The men kept, however, continually dropping in, footsore and travel-worn. They were all, however, in excellent spirits, eagerly asking what route their regiments were marching by, and how they could most quickly rejoin their standards. The Chief Commissioner believes that no body of native troops have ever been seen in India superior, if indeed equal, to the Punjab force. The present war has most amply shown how they can march, how they can fight, how they can endure. They have regarded neither the burning sun, nor the drenching rain. Under every trial, they have done their duty nobly. The fact is that these troops have been gradually inured to danger and to war, and to fatigue, by active and unremitting service for the last nine years, along a rugged and mountainous frontier of 800 miles. Their splendid condition has proved that constant service in the field and hard work are consistent with thorough efficiency, and with the maintenance of the best spirit. On hearing of the revolt the men expressed an ardent desire to be led against the mutineers. The force has also been peculiarly fortunate in the number of able and zealous officers attached to it. In Brigadier General Neville Chamberlain, its commander, it possesses one of the most able and experienced officers of the Bengal army. He has seen more service than perhaps any other officer in India of his age. Every infantry corps and several of the cavalry-corps have been excellently commanded. Such officers as Lieut. Colonel Coke; Majors Lumsden, Wyld, Daly, Probyn, Rothney; Captains Henry Henderson, Hughes; Lieutenants William Lumsden, C. Nicholson, J. Watson, Younghusband, and Kennedy, would do credit to any army in the world.

15. The force is composed for the most part either of Sikhs or of Mahomedans of the country and the border; but, as already stated, it has many Hindoostanees and a few hundred Afghans and Goorkhas. The Hindoostanees were to be found in numbers in all the cavalry regiments, except the Guides. During the crisis these men were a source of deep anxiety. In those corps which remained on the frontier, however, not one case of overt misconduct occurred; some of them were suspected and summarily discharged. But most of them behaved well. Of those corps which marched to Delhi, in the 4th Sikhs, the Hindoos-

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tances were suspected, disarmed, and ordered back to the Punjab. None of these men, however, deserted, but obeyed orders, and returned to Huzara, and since the fall of Delhi have received back their arms. In the 1st Punjab Infantry, which is mainly a Pathan regiment, few Hindoostanees were to be found. In the 2d and 4th Regiments the Hindoostanees were deprived of their arms, and retained at Lahore. In the autumn, when the insurrection broke out in the Googaria district (which will be noticed hereafter), and troops were much needed, these men offered to proceed against the enemy. This offer was accepted; they were armed, and sent down to the scene of the insurrection, where they behaved well. From the Punjab cavalry which proceeded to Delhi many desertions took place, and ultimately it was found necessary to send the 1st Regiment, excepting one squadron, away to Saharunpore. But that squadron remained to do excellent service under Lieutenant J. Watson, and formed afterwards a portion of that force which relieved Lucknow. Of the 2d and 5th Cavalry Corps two squadrons, under the command of Lieutenants Nicholson, Probyn, and Younghusband, marched down towards Delhi with the 1st Punjab Infantry. Two days before these troops were to arrive in the British camp, three of the cavalry native officers, who were Hindoostanees, came to Mahomed Jafir, the senior subadar of the infantry, who was a Pathan of the Punjab frontier, and proposed that they should murder all the European officers, and join the mutineers in Delhi. Mahomed Jafir, in the first instance, refused to listen to such a proposal, and indeed treated it with contempt. But on its being presently renewed by them, he said he would think over the matter. But that very night he communicated the intelligence to Lieutenant Colonel Coke, the commanding officer, who, instead of making a single march, the next morning took the troops by a double march straight into camp. That same evening Mahomed Jafir told his story in open durbar before Brigadier General Chamberlain and other officers, and pointed out the three traitors, who were at once secured, tried, convicted, and hanged. The Guide Infantry, the 4th Sikhs, the 2d and 4th Punjab Infantry, after fighting gallantly on many occasions during the siege of Delhi, finally took a prominent part in the storming of the city, and the three last-named corps have again distinguished themselves both at Lucknow and in Rohilkund.

16. Such generally were the characteristics of this remarkable force. When the mutinies broke out among the Hindoostanees, the question was how far the contagion had spread, or would spread, among the Punjabs. This question was at that moment most difficult to decide. There was much indeed to hope, but there was something to fear. If, on the one hand, many Punjaee troops immediately evinced the best spirit, yet, on the other hand, it was to be remembered that there were some Sikhs in nearly every Hindoostanee regiment. Now, either these man had never informed the European officers of the mischief that was brewing, or if they had informed, they could not have been believed. In the first instance, then, it seemed expedient to pause, to inquire, to ascertain if possible whether a widely extended conspiracy existed in the native army throughout all ranks and all races, or whether the treason was confined to a comparatively limited circle of Hindoostanees or others. At one time it seemed probable that there was a general conspiracy among all classes; an uprising of the black man against the white. Such incidents as the misconduct of the Nusseeree battalion near Simla showed that some infection had touched even the Goorkhas, the class least likely to be influenced. Early in June, Brigadier General Chamberlain, when passing through Umrtsur to join the army before Delhi, was warned by one of the most intelligent, trusty, and experienced of the Sikh chiefs, that the disaffection might spread so far and wide that the British authorities would have to gather the European troops together, and struggle for existence.

17. By the 17th of May, however, it became apparent that the Punjab did not sympathise with the movement in Hindostan, and that a good spirit prevailed in the Punjaee troops. It was, therefore, at once resolved to augment them. There were 18 battalions of Punjab infantry and organised police. For each of these four additional companies were ordered to be raised; so that these extra numbers might form a nucleus for such new regiments as it might be necessary to raise. A few days afterwards the Sikhs were ordered to be exempted from the Hindoostanee regiments, and formed into separate battalions.
As already mentioned, all the furlough men were recalled. On the 24th of May, the Chief Commissioner received a telegram from the Governor General, conveying approval of what had been done, and intimating that all measures which might be necessary for the public safety would be upheld. In this manner 18 new regiments of infantry were raised in the Punjab, of which five were completed in May and June; in August, 8; in October, 2; and in subsequent months, 3. Besides these, there were raised irregular levies in the different districts, aggregating 7,000 horse, and the same number of foot. These troops of various kind were raised to supply the place of the Punjab regiments gone to Delhi, to overawe the Hindooostanee troops by serving as a counterpoise, and to quell disaffection wherever it might arise. There was no difficulty in obtaining volunteers in any part of the country. For the foot levies eligible recruits were forthcoming in abundance. For the cavalry the main difficulty consisted in the procuring of horses; but still the animals were obtained in greater numbers than might perhaps have been anticipated. Many excellent men were enlisted on or near the border, especially the Pathan horsemen who had served under Colonel Edwards during the second Punjab war, and upon whose fidelity much confidence was placed. These troops of all arms consisted of men from the various tribes and races of the Punjab and the adjacent countries. The foot soldiers were chiefly Sikhs, Punjaee Mahomedans, border Pathans, and Hill men from the Jummo and Kangra districts. The mounted levies were mostly Mahomedans from the country between the Jhelum and the Indus, and the frontier; that is, Pathans, Belooches, Gukkurs, and races of Hindoo lineage long converted to Mahomedanism. But although the raising of so large a body of troops was necessitated by the imminence of the crisis, yet from first to last it was the Chief Commissioner’s policy to enlist no more men than might be absolutely necessary to preserve the peace and to supply the drain for Hindoostan. The Chief Commissioner felt the expediency of preventing as far as possible the Punjaees from seeing that the physical force in the country was on their side, or from feeling that they were the right arm of the British power. The aggregate of the Punjab forces, old and new, stands as follows in round numbers:

| Old Force (including organised Police) | - | 24,815 |
| New Force | - | - | 34,000 |
| **Total** | - | - | **58,815** |

These troops are not, however, mostly Sikhs, nor do they belong to one or two prevailing castes or tribes, but are drawn from a variety of races (though chiefly comprised within Punjab limits), differing in religion, birthplace, habits, and dialects, as will be seen from following abstract, which does not include the military police:

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Under the head of Mahomedans many tribes are embraced having little in common except religion. Many of these are as utterly alien to the Sikhs as to the Hindoostanees, and have proved during the second Punjab war and on previous occasions that they could be depended on to fight against the Sikhs.

18. After the military arrangements, one of the first precautionary measures was the strengthening of the ordinary police, and the occupying of all the ferries and principal passages of the Punjab rivers. It was felt that these great streams, which, traversing the country north and south, severed the Punjab from Hindoostan, afforded peculiar facilities for preventing ingress and egress; so a strict embargo was placed upon all suspicious travellers who could not give a proper
a proper account of themselves; and especially upon faqueers and other men­
dicants of a quasi religious character.

19. So difficult did it soon become for seditious characters to pass unchal­
loved through the country, that the public post was unavoidably resorted to
by the disaffected for treasonable communications. But a strict surveil­
ance was instituted over all postal despatches. Native letters were opened and
examined by responsible British officers. In this way many important and
interesting documents came to light, which, though cautiously and even
enigmatically worded, yet served to indicate clearly the tendency of native
opinion.

20. Another matter of urgent consequence was the protection of the large
quantities of treasure in the various districts. The local officers at outlying
stations were accordingly ordered to collect their treasure, and to send the bulk
of it to stations where European guards could be obtained, and on no account
was any considerable sum to be retained anywhere, except at places where
European troops were cantoned. Bullion was as much as possible to be kept
inside fortifications, a small portion only being sent outside, so as to suffice for
daily expenditure. These orders were generally executed with promptness and
efficiency, and the result was satisfactory. From first to last the loss of treasure
in these territories did not amount to a lakh of rupees, 10,000 L, and much
even of this might have been saved, if the orders had in every case been strictly
carried out.

21. Wherever the condition of a district might be critical, or disturbance
threatened, stringent measures were adopted in the criminal department. It
was felt that in such cases the punishment must be exemplarily prompt and
severe to the last degree. Authority was given that any two civil officers sitting
in commission, should summarily try persons charged with offences directed
against the State, or endangering the public safety, and should execute capital
sentences without further references. In many localities, exposed to evil
influences, the speedy justice done those offenders had a repressive and deterring
effect; but the Chief Commissioner was among the foremost in urging severity
upon all offenders of whatever class, while the State was menaced with dangers,
and while the strongest measures were necessary to turn in our favour the
balance already borne down by the weight of opposing circumstances. There
was no room then for mercy; the public safety was then a paramount considera­
tion. In these terrible days he was obliged to telegraph injunctions for the
extermination of the mutineers, by the various means at our disposal, by slaying
them in fight, by raising the people against them, by offering rewards for their
seizure, by driving them on to destruction in the swollen rivers, in the hills and
jungles. At that juncture these measures were as necessary as they were just,
when the awful crimes which these mutineers had either perpetrated or meditated,
and the dangers they had brought upon the empire, are considered. But at a
time of success and victory, when once more we can breathe freely, when we
are relieved from the pressure of imminent peril, the Chief Commissioner has
deemed it his duty to advocate a merciful and considerate discrimination. We
must, indeed, pursue to the last the leaders of treason, and the actual perpe­
trators of hideous crime. There can be no forgiveness for them on this side the
grave. But having, by judicious inquiry, separated those whose guilt is secondary,
whose offences, though legally punishable with death, are yet free from the
blacker hues,—for these we must, in the Chief Commissioner's opinion, mitigate
punishment, extend mercy, and even offer amnesty. Even if it were morally
right to be inexorable towards every class of offenders, it certainly will not be
practicable; even the might of British power could hardly effect this; we could
not well afford to assign the number of European troops which would be
requisite to conduct a guerilla warfare over a wide tract of territory and an
indefinite space of time. In important classes of cases we may now proffer
pardon with a good grace, without any risk of clemency being mistaken for
irresolution; and thereby we may relieve our overburdened resources from a
task devoid of advantage and arduous of performance. If punitive operations
are too long protracted, the popular mind continues in that ferment which
renders complete pacification of the distracted districts, impossible. We cannot
war with large sections of the population; we must remember that they are
our
our people; our erring, guilty subjects, but our subjects still. By force of arms we have recently asserted our right to rule over them, and we must now show towards them the magnanimity of rulers. Lastly, we should not forget, that if grievously sinned against, we may have to some extent sinned also; that we have to answer for our own shortcomings and defaults, whereby we placed sore temptation before a people who have no true religion, no true morality to sustain them; that while but too many have done that which can never be palliated or condoned, numbers have been guilty in various lesser degrees. There is a Judge over both them and us. Inasmuch as we have been preserved from impending destruction by His mercy alone, we should be merciful to others; reflecting that if He were to be extreme to mark what we have done, and still do amiss, we should forfeit that protection from on High which alone maintains us in India.

22. The high amount of the charges arising from the levy of extra troops, from the miscellaneous war expenses, from the supplying of the army before Delhi with cash, rendered it probable that financial pressure would be felt. A public loan was therefore opened, bearing 6 per cent. interest, and repayable within one year. The chiefs, independent and feudatory, evinced their loyalty by subscribing liberally. The mercantile class, though some of them contributed largely, as a body withheld their money, thereby disappointing expectations which might have been fairly formed on account of their known wealth and prosperity. The novelty of the requisition may have been one reason why they hesitated to embark their capital on British securities. But it must be confessed that their tardiness and unwillingness in this matter indicated their opinion regarding the character of the contest in which we were engaged; ultimately however, upwards of 42 lakhs of rupees, or 420,000 £, sterling, were raised.

23. The traitorous symptoms evinced, and the intrigues set on foot by the non-military Hindoostanees in the Punjab territories, rendered it necessary to remove large numbers of them. These people were employed to a considerable extent among the police and other subordinate civil establishments; and as camp followers they swarmed in every cantonment, and in the adjacent cities. Most of the lower class of employés were discharged, and numbers of the camp followers deported out of the province. Such measures, though severe, were at that juncture necessitated by the conduct of these people; but when the present trouble shall have passed away entirely, it may not in future be politic to exclude altogether the foreign Hindoostanee element from the Punjab administration.

24. Wherever feudatory chiefs existed, they were called upon to furnish police contingents to assist in securing the public safety. To this call they responded with laudable alacrity, and their men proved most useful. The Rajah of Kupoorthulla, several of the Simla Hill chiefs, the lesser Cis-Sutlej chiefs, and others, distinguished themselves in this respect.

25. Lastly, it may be mentioned that later in the year a circular was issued to the effect, that the avenues of public employ were to be opened to men irrespectively of their caste, tribe, sect, or creed, and that in this respect every fair and reasonable opportunity was to be afforded to Native Christians. At such a time it was deemed right that a Christian and civilised administration should declare the principle by which it was actuated in this matter.

26. The next event of importance which happened after those already recorded was the Jullunder mutiny. On the 7th June, at that station, two native corps of infantry and one of cavalry mutinied, marched for Philore, where they were joined by the 3d Native Infantry; the whole body then crossing the Sutlej did some damage to Loodianah, and then went on to Delhi. The event, though not so calamitous as it might have been, was yet very unfortunate; for it carried an effective addition to the mutineer army at Delhi, and gave much encouragement to the revolt. The affair occurred in this wise. The native brigade at Jullundur had for some time shown unmistakable signs of disaffection. Many incendiary fires had broken out in the cantonment; the conduct of some of the sepoys had been insolent and defiant. The Chief Commissioner had himself been warned by natives on the spot that an outbreak

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might be anticipated at any moment; the local civil authorities were of the same opinion. The Chief Commissioner had more than once urged that these troops should be disarmed; General Read had actually ordered the measure. For its execution Her Majesty's 8th Regiment was present and one troop of European Artillery, and at one time a Punjab Infantry corps passing through was available as an auxiliary, but the local military authorities decided otherwise. The treasure which was sent in from the civil treasury, and which should have been placed under the custody of the European troops, was divided and placed in charge of the two Native Infantry regiments, "in order to give them confidence." When these two corps did break out, they might have been successfully attacked, broken, and dispersed before they left cantonments, but they were permitted to escape. Even then, had they been followed up with vigour, they would certainly have never been able to cross the Sutlej as a military body; but they were not pursued for some hours, and then our troops moved slower than they did. Such a pursuit was obviously worse than useless. At the passage of the Sutlej the mutineers were opposed with great spirit by Mr. G. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Loodianah. He attacked them with some native levies, and three companies of the 4th Sikhs under Lieutenant Williams. He had two half-manned guns of the Nabha chief, one of which became useless by the horses running off with the limber; the other gun he worked himself until the ammunition, consisting of a few rounds, was expended. Lieutenant Williams was badly wounded, and some of his Sikhs were killed. The mutineers effected their passage with the loss of about 40 men; arriving at Loodianah they did but little damage, as they saw that a portion of the European troops from Jullunder had by this time crossed the river in pursuit. This pursuit, however, was soon abandoned; then the mutineers, instead of taking the grand trunk road, went straight across country for Delhi, avoiding all places where they might meet European troops. A panic seems to have seized them, and they marched night and day. This turn of the affair was most providential for us; for it were hard to estimate the damage they might have inflicted had they taken the grand trunk road. In that case neither the cantonment nor any single military or civil post between Loodianah and Delhi could have been preserved from them. They would have intercepted our communications and created an alarm, which it is scarcely possible to exaggerate; and at that time it would have been impracticable to detach against them a portion of the Delhi force. In fact, there is no mode of accounting for the folly and fatuity of the mutineers on this occasion, except by recognising in the event the hand of a Higher Power.

27. It will now be proper to make further reference to the moveable column already mentioned. That column had been greatly reduced in force by the recall of one of its European regiments to strengthen Peshawur, and by the onward advance of the guides, the 4th Sikhs and the Kumaon Battalion to join the army before Delhi. Brigadier General Chamberlain had moved with the column to Wuzceerabad, on the left bank of the Chenab. Here it was arranged that the column should be augmented by troops from Sealkote, namely, Her Majesty's 52d, the European Artillery, the 35th Native Infantry, and half the 9th Light Cavalry at Sealkote; there were thus left the 46th Native Infantry, and the remaining wing of the 9th Light Cavalry. It was necessary to take the European force from Sealkote to join the column. The native troops at Sealkote had behaved well since the commencement of the crisis. The brigadier commanding and the officers expressed entire confidence in the men, but still it was not thought safe to leave the whole brigade at the station alone without Europeans. When, therefore, the European force was unavoidably withdrawn, a large portion of the native troops accompanied them, so that only a comparatively small number were left at the station. It had more than once been contemplated to disarm every sepoy regiment in the Punjab. But the Chief Commissioner found that this could not in all cases be successfully carried out. He indeed knew, but too well, that every one of these corps was rotten to the core. Many of them, still, however, preserved the appearance of fidelity, and avoided the least overt manifestation that might justify extreme measures. There was a hope that if Delhi were to fall speedily, a reaction of loyalty among these regiments would set in. But the chief difficulty was this, that in many places the disarming could not be carried through in such force as to prevent the
the men from escaping by flight; and it was of great consequence that the numbers of the Delhi mutineers should not be swelled by the accession of such fugitives. Under these circumstances, it was arranged that the moveable column should range about within a certain circle, ready to sweep down upon any station on the first alarm. But notwithstanding this precaution, the Chief Commissioner kept the policy of disarming constantly in view; and it will now be seen that necessity soon arose for carrying out that policy, in other cases besides those already recounted.

28. Early in July, the 14th Native Infantry, at Jhelum, showed symptoms of uneasiness. Whereupon the detachment of Punjabee Military Police at that station was strengthened, some mounted levies were sent there to overawe the sepoys, and two companies of the 14th Native Infantry itself were ordered on special duty to Rawul Pindee, so as to separate and weaken the regiment. Matters growing worse, it became necessary to act at once, though action was difficult. There were no Europeans whatever at Jhelum. The only available European troops were 500 infantry and six guns with European artillerymen at Rawul Pindee, 75 miles off. But at that station there was the 58th Native Infantry and the two companies of the 14th. Jhelum, however, was an important place, situated on right bank of the river of that name, and commanding the grand trunk road between Lahore and Peshawur. A successful disturbance there would have cut the Punjab into two halves. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, resolved with the scanty European force at Rawul Pindee to disarm the sepoys both at that station and Jhelum. About half the Rawul Pindee force, that is, 280 Europeans of all arms, were sent to Jhelum to disarm the main body of the 14th Native Infantry. The sepoys, however, resisted desperately, and were with great difficulty overpowered. After a regular fight during the day, they fled in the night; four hundred of them were killed in the fight and pursuit, or seized and executed. About 200 escaped into the neighbouring Jummoo territory, but were subsequently given up by the Maha Rajah Golab Singh. These men, however, having received from the officer of the Maha Rajah a promise that their lives should be spared, that promise was kept by the British officer, and they were transported beyond the seas. At Rawul Pindee, the 58th Native Infantry and the remainder of the 14th quietly surrendered their arms, excepting a few men who endeavoured to escape and were intercepted.

29. Immediately upon hearing of the outbreak at Jullundur, the Chief Commissioner deemed it absolutely necessary to disarm the two Native Infantry regiments at Mooltan, one of which (the 69th) had, in particular, evinced a bad spirit. There were at that time some 60 European artillerymen in the Fort. There was no European Infantry; but a regiment had been ordered thither by the Supreme Government, which was coming up the Indus by detachments. The first of these detachments was expected to arrive in about 10 days. Time, however, in respect to disarming these two Native Infantry corps was of the last importance; if they should hear of the Jullunder mutiny, they might rise. If we were to lose Mooltan, all the Southern Punjab would be lost with it; and the only line of communication then open, namely, that to Bombay, would be closed. Besides the 60 gunners, there were the 1st Irregular Cavalry, all Hindooostanees; the 1st Punjab Cavalry, partly Punjabees, and partly Hindooostanees; the 2d Punjab Infantry, nearly all Hindooostanees; a few men of the Local Police Battalion, and a Hindooostanee troop of Horse Artillery, with six guns. These troops aggregated about 1,200 available men; from their composition they could hardly be implicitly relied upon, and it was doubtful whether the 1st Irregular Cavalry would prove staunch. The Chief Commissioner, however, decided that, even with these doubtful means, an attempt must be made to disarm the Native Infantry corps before the news of the Jullunder outbreak should reach Mooltan. The Chief Commissioner accordingly telegraphed his suggestions to that effect to General Gowan, at Lahore, and begged that the task might be entrusted to Major Crawford Chamberlain, commanding the 1st Irregulars. The General was good enough to comply with this request, and invested Major Chamberlain with the command of all the irregular troops at Mooltan for this purpose. The disarming was effected in a masterly manner, and the conduct of the Irregulars was quite satisfactory. Too much credit cannot well be given to Major Chamberlain for his coolness, resolution, and good management.
management on this trying occasion. So delicate was the task, that the Chief Commissioner believes that if it had devolved on the officer commanding at Mooltan, or upon any officer at the station other than Major Chamberlain, there would have been a failure. As the result of failure would have been calamitous, so the result of success was most favourable; indeed the disarming at Mooltan was a turning point in the Punjab crisis, second only in importance to the disarmings at Lahore and Peshawur. Shortly afterwards, on the 17th June, the first detachment of the Bombay European Fusiliers arrived at Mooltan, and the second quickly followed; the two detachments mustered 320 men. This aid secured the place, and enabled the Chief Commissioner to move the 1st Punjab Cavalry and the 2d Punjab Infantry towards Delhi.

30. By this time repeated calls had been made from Delhi for further reinforcements of European troops; and it was urged that Brigadier General Chamberlain's moveable column should march down to Delhi. To this measure the Chief Commissioner was obliged to demur; but he agreed that General Chamberlain should go, provided that Lieutenant Colonel J. Nicholson were appointed to command the column in his stead. But by way of reinforcement, a wing of Her Majesty's 8th was despatched from Jullunder for Delhi, and a wing of Her Majesty's 61st from Ferozepore; and it was promised that the remaining wings of these two corps should follow as soon as the whole of the Bombay European Fusiliers should arrive. Some European artillerymen were also despatched. It was at this period that the gunners of the old Sikh army, many of them covered with the scars of former service against us, were enlisted to serve against the mutineers at Delhi. To the same destination were now despatched the Muzhubeen corps of Sappers and Miners (already alluded to in para. 12) who had been collected from the works of the Baree Doab Canal, and other places, and who now rendered excellent assistance in the operations before Delhi. The Judicial Commissioner, Mr. R. Montgomery, also had raised five troops of Sikh Cavalry, that formed the nucleus of Hodson's Horse at Delhi, which afterwards became so well known.

31. The Chief Commissioner then informed Brigadier General Nicholson, by electric telegraph, commanding the moveable column, of the events at Jhelum and Rawul Pindee. General Nicholson was then in the Jullunder Doab. On hearing the news, he quietly disarmed the 33d and 35th Native Infantry, and a wing of the 9th Light Cavalry. The 59th he had recently disarmed at Umritsur. Instructions were also sent to disarm the 4th Native Infantry, one wing of which was at Noorpoor, and the other at Kote Kangra. The wing at Kangra was disarmed by Major Reynell Taylor and Captain Younghusband by means of about an equal number of the local police battalion; and Kangra fortress has since been held by a detachment of European troops. The wing at Noorpoor (of which, however, some two-fifths were Punjabees) surrendered their arms at the order of Major Wilkie, their commanding officer.

32. By these measures in the Jhelum division, and in the Trans-Sutlej States, some six regiments of Native Infantry and a wing of Light Cavalry were rendered innocuous; and the disarming policy proved quite successful. No armed Native Infantry now remained in the Punjab, except the 39th at Dera Ismael Khan on the frontier, who quietly surrendered their arms; two corps at Peshawur, who were perfectly overawed, and were doing well; and one Native Infantry corps, and a wing of cavalry at Sealkote, who broke out into mutiny, as will now be described.

33. Hearing of the disarming at Jhelum and elsewhere, the Sealkote sepoys immediately broke out. The infantry contented themselves with sending their officers away; but the cavalry waylaid the officers, and murdered every European they could meet. The brigadier, four other officers, two medical officers, a missionary clergyman and his family, were slain. Many others would doubtless have fallen victims, had not the old fort at Sealkote, belonging to the Rajah Tej Singh, in which were located a body of our newly-raised levies, afforded a safe refuge for the European officers and ladies. On this occasion the military police misbehaved, the only instance of misconduct on the part of the Punjab police during the crisis. The detachment of the local battalion and the horsemen were, indeed, much too weak to oppose the mutineers with any success; but they might have defended themselves in the gaol. The native officers,
officers, however, joined the insurgents, and the men remained passive. The mutineers remained in the station during the day, pillaged all the moveable property, collected all the carriages available, emptied the treasury, burned the public offices, released the prisoners from gaol, blew up the magazines, and then, taking with them the only gun in the place, an iron 12-pounder, and all their spoil, marched for the Ravee, about 50 miles distant. On their departure the villagers from the neighbourhood entered the deserted station to plunder, but were expelled by the levies from the fort. Captain Lawrence and another officer were sent up from Lahore to form a special commission. They tried, convicted, and executed the two chief native officers of the military police, the chief native officer of the gaol, and some dozen of the villagers who were the ringleaders in the plunder. Some 40 or 50 more of the country people were flogged or imprisoned, and order was restored.

34. From the course which the mutineers took, it seems probable that they intended to proceed to Goordaspore, to induce the 2d Regiment of Irregular Cavalry stationed there to rise; then crossing the Ravee to gain over the 16th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry at Hoshypore, and the disarmed men of the 4th and the 33d, and to move across the Sutlej towards Delhi. They doubtless knew well that along this line of country there was no European force to oppose them, except the moveable column; and that lay many miles to the south, so that they might hope to outmarch it. But Brigadier General Nicholson, with the column, was at Umritisur. He received news of the Sealkote mutiny early on the day after its occurrence. He had collected a large number of light country carts, so as to be able to march rapidly in the event of such an outbreak as this occurring. He instantly marched to meet the mutineers, with 600 men of Her Majesty's 52d, and nine guns and two troops of newly-raised Sikh Horse. He placed the Europeans on the country carts, and, despite the burning sun, he made a distance of 40 miles that very day, arriving at Goordaspore in the evening. Early the next morning he heard that the mutineers had crossed the Ravee, and were advancing on the station of Goordaspore. At this moment his position was critical. By advancing against the mutineers he would have to leave the 2d Irregular Cavalry, doubtful friends, at Goordaspore. These men might at the proper moment make a diversion to the rear of the moveable column in favour of the mutineers. But Nicholson was not a soldier to hesitate. He advanced out of Goordaspore at once some six miles towards the Ravee. The mutineers had no idea of the proximity of the column, and when they saw it drawn up to bar the road, they mistook the British Infantry, in their dusky coloured uniforms, for the Umritisur Police Battalion. Under this erroneous impression the mutineers advanced with courage to the attack; soon, however, to discover their mistake. They were driven back in confusion. Many were killed, and more still were drowned in the river, which had risen since they had crossed. Many fled in various directions, and the remainder took refuge in a large island, where they were subsequently attacked and destroyed. The fugitives were seized and shot. Some escaped into the Jummoo territory, and were for the most part given up to meet a similar fate.

35. It is now time to mention certain operations set on foot from the Punjab for the recovery and pacification of certain parts of the Delhi territory. When Delhi fell, emissaries from the king and the mutineers were despatched to Hurrianah, to stir up the Light Infantry Battalion quartered at Hurrianah, Hissar, Hansee, and Sirsa. These evil messengers were but too successful; the Hurrianah Light Infantry rose, and the Mahomedan population of those parts followed their example. The country is sandy, sterile, bleak; in parts jungly. The season was inclement, and our officers had but scanty means of escaping from their awful position. Many of the Europeans at these stations were murdered; but many also, aided by some of the country people, saved their lives by flight, enduring great hardship. Thus the revolt spread to Ferozepore frontier, and to the bank of the Sutlej; there was fear that, unless we should repel the enemy from our threshold, the mischief would spread across the Sutlej and into the Ferozepore district. Therefore a force composed chiefly of new levies, two companies of the Mooltan Police Battalion and a troop of mounted police, were hurriedly collected and placed under General Van Cortlandt, who had belonged formerly to the Sikh army, and had served with Lieutenant Colonel Edwards in the second Punjab campaign, and was at this time Deputy Commissioner of Googaira.
Googaira. With this force General Van Cortlandt started to reconquer Hurrianah. After crossing the Sutlej he received some assistance from the Maha Rajahs of Puttiala and Bikaneer. After beating the rebels on several occasions, he ultimately reoccupied these districts. Indeed, it is well known how successful General Van Cortlandt was, and how by his prudence, temper, and good management he justified the trust that had been reposed on him.

36. After the action with the Sealkote mutineers, matters remained tolerably quiet in the Punjab for a short time. The violence of the mutiny had burst itself out. Many mutineers had been destroyed, though some escaped to Delhi. The remainder had been mostly disarmed. But soon the disarmed brigade at Lahore began to heave with a mutinous impulse. Before it could be ascertained what kind of mischief was brewing, one of the regiments, the 26th Native Infantry, suddenly rose, murdered their commanding officer, Major Spencer, the serjeant major and two native officers, and decamped. Hearing that the men were bent on evil, Major Spencer had gone to their lines to pacify and restrain them. There he fell, a victim of generous, though misplaced, confidence in sepoys, with whom he had served, and for whom he had laboured and cared, for thirty years! The regiment then fled, but through some misapprehension were not pursued until it was too late. They did not make for the Beas or Sutlej to go to Delhi, probably because they knew that the ferries were guarded. But they went northwards, and attempted to cross the Jutree, and so escape into the Jummoo territories. But the country people and the police got news of their flight, and collected to attack them near the river. Many were killed, and the remainder were forced to take refuge in an island. Here they were seized by Mr. F. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner of Umritsur, and put to death the following morning.

37. The other disarmed troops at Lahore, two infantry regiments and one cavalry, were then marched out of their lines and encamped in front of the European barracks and within range of the guns.

38. By this time, that is, the commencement of August, war and sickness had sadly thinned the ranks of our gallant soldiers before Delhi. On the one hand, while the numbers of the mutineers had been swollen by large reinforcements from Neemuch, Bareilly, Jhansee, and Mhow, on the other hand the succours despatched from the Punjab barely enabled our army to maintain its position on the ridge before Delhi. By August it became clear that assistance from below was hopeless. Therefore General Wilson wrote to the Chief Commissioner that unless he should be largely reinforced from the Punjab, he would not be able to hold his own position, much less to assault the town. It then became a serious question as to what was the proper policy to pursue. The Chief Commissioner had to consider whether the field force before Delhi should be reinforced at all hazards; or whether further assistance should be withheld, and an effort made to hold the Punjab with our remaining means. There were then in the Punjab nearly seven corps of European Infantry; five were regiments previously in the province, one, the Bombay Fusiliers, had recently arrived, and the seventh consisted of 250 men of Her Majesty's 8th and a wing of Her Majesty's 61st. Of these three were in the Peshawur Valley, but so prostrated by sickness that they could not muster much more than 1,000 bayonets. One regiment held Lahore; one held Mooltan and Ferozepore; one furnished the detachments to hold Rawul Pindee, Umritsur, and Jullunder. There remained one corps composing the moveable column. There were from 800 to 1,000 European artillerymen. The sick and ineffective at Peshawur being deducted, there were at that juncture not more than 4,700 effective Europeans. Many of the new Punjab regiments had been organised, disciplined, and fairly drilled. Such were the available means. But with these not only was the Punjab to be held, but there were also some 18,000 Hindoostance troops to watch and guard; and of these nearly 6,000 were armed. This large body of suspected and dangerous men was a sad incumbrance, and shackled every movement.

39. The decision of the question as to whether the army before Delhi should be reinforced or not, rested with the Chief Commissioner. After full reflection, he resolved that, come what might, our comrades before Delhi should not be abandoned. He felt that the advance on Delhi had, in the first instance, been made mainly upon his urgent solicitations. He saw that if the army before Delhi
Delhi were now to fall back, it would probably be deserted by all the native troops that were with it. Such an example would probably be followed by all the Punjabee troops in the Punjab itself, and then the whole province would certainly rise. In that extremity, the only chance for the British of preserving even existence, would have been to collect the European troops into one solid mass. But even at this period (the early part of August) things had gone so far, that very possibly it would be found that the time for such concentration had gone by; and, even if it could be effected, still there was much doubt whether the combined mass of British could be strong enough to hold its own, encumbered as it would be by large numbers of women and children, and distracted by the discordant counsels which so surely follow disaster.

40. On every view of the question it seemed to be the true policy to reinforce to the utmost the army before Delhi. Accordingly, Brigadier General Nicholson, with Her Majesty's 52d, the remaining wing of the 61st, 2d troop of European Horse Artillery, the 2d Punjabee Rifles, and some Mooltanee Horse, marched for Delhi. The moveable column in the Punjab from that time consisted of between 200 and 300 men of Her Majesty's 24th, 200 men of the 3d and 6th Punjabee Rifles, and two companies of military police, with some mounted levies. These remained in the Punjab, of course. The reinforcements above mentioned, which had marched for Delhi, were shortly followed by the remainder of Her Majesty's 8th and the 4th Punjabee Rifles. One of the newly-raised Punjab regiments was also despatched to Meerut, to enable the military authorities there to spare a further detachment of the 60th Rifles and some European artillerists, for service before Delhi. Lastly, there issued from the Ferozepore arsenal a first-class siege train, consisting of 16 heavy guns, of various calibres, with suitable stores of ammunition, the whole drawn by 16 elephants, and 548 country waggons. The utmost credit is due to Captain Lewis, the Commissary of Ordnance, for his exertions in the preparation of this train. It was escorted by a wing of the Belooch Battalion from Sindh, which had been sent up to render aid in the Punjab. At the same time the Jummu contingent, furnished by the Maha Rajah Rumbheer Singh, consisting of 2,000 infantry, 200 cavalry, and 6 guns, under the political charge of Lieutenant Colonel R. Lawrence, was despatched to Delhi.

41. Such were the last reinforcements which the Punjab was able to send to Delhi. To send them, every nerve had been strained to the utmost; the last available soldier had gone; and it only remained to await the result with a humble trust in Providence. It is foreign to this narrative to recount what glorious successes were actually attained: how General Nicholson dealt the first deadly blow to the strength of the mutineers, by defeating their force at Nujjufgurh; and how nobly he led that final assault in which he perished. When Delhi fell, the knell of the great rebellion was sounded. It spread no farther anywhere; as the mutineers dispersed in flight, the country was restored to peace. Here and there those rebels who had committed themselves beyond the hope of pardon, maintained a brief and ineffectual struggle. The chiefs who had joined in the revolt surrendered their strongholds, and gave themselves up. By the time that the insurgent Joudhpore Legion arrived at Narnound; on the frontier of the Delhi territory, they found that the country people were not on the side of the mutineers, and that there was a strong force ready to attack them.

42. By the time that Delhi fell, the tension upon the military resources of the Punjab had reached the utmost bearable pitch. After the departure of the final reinforcements for Delhi, there remained hardly more than 4,000 Europeans in the province of all arms; and the effectiveness must have been even less than this number. The spectacle of our weakness must have had its effect upon the native population, and the consequences manifested themselves in two émeutes, which occurred about this time.

43. In the hills near Murree, and in Lower Huzara, a conspiracy was discovered just in time to prevent its being carried out. The people of that country, who are all Mahomedans, were doubtless ripe for an outbreak. The success of the mutineers at Delhi, and the hopes thereby inspired of restoring Mahomedan power, had offered irresistible temptation. Early in September, one of the petty chiefs of Huzara told the Chief Commissioner's informant, an English lady,
lady, that unless Delhi fell within a week, there would be a general insurrection in Huzara. Besides the general hope of revived power for the Mahomedans, there was the lust of plunder to incite the mountaineers to attempt the sack of Murree.

44. The next émeute was in Googaira district, south of Lahore, between the Ravee and the Sutlej. On the very evening of the memorable 14th of September (the assault of Delhi), a Mahomedan official of the postal department arrived at Lahore from Googaira, came before the Chief Commissioner, and reported, with a somewhat malicious twinkle of the eye, that all the wild and predatory tribes, inhabiting the jungly country between Lahore and Moolumn, had risen. In reply to a question, he further informed the Chief Commissioner that the numbers of the insurgents amounted to exactly 125,000 men. Such information was somewhat bewildering; nevertheless, within three hours one company of European Infantry (the most that could be spared), three guns, with European artillerymen, and 200 Sikh Cavalry, started from Lahore for the seat of the insurrection. The insurgents were, of course, contemptible as soldiers, but they were a hardy, brave, and athletic race, of pastoral habits. They had but few arms, and those few had been either seized from isolated police posts, or had been imported from the adjacent independent state of Bhawulpore. Their real strength lay in the character of the impervious jungles which they inhabited, and which may be described as vast waving sheets of high grass and low stunted trees. The insurrection was put down in about twenty days, with but small loss of life on our side. Some difficulty was, however, experienced in effecting this, and some 1,500 troops, of various kinds, had to be collected together for the purpose. For some little time the direct line of communication with Bombay was interrupted, and a temporary postal line, down the right bank of the Sutlej, had to be opened.

45. Since that time peace and order have reigned in these territories. But it will be proper to consider very briefly, what were the probable causes why the Punjab people and army resisted so long the general tendency to mutiny and rebellion; why, at the last, partial outbreaks began to occur; and why a general insurrection could no longer have been stayed off if Delhi had not fallen.

46. In the first place, as previously remarked, the Punjabee troops had been well trained and disciplined. They had found incessant work to do; they had never been pampered or spoilt; they had never imbibed the notion that soldiers should not be generally useful in service. They had never learnt that anything except drill and manœuvreing would be detrimental to their military efficiency. They were commanded by excellent officers whom they regarded and respected. All the above considerations tended to bind them to our interests. On the other hand, the Punjabees despised and disliked the Hindoostanee soldiery. The Hindoostanees were boastful and vain-glorious in their bearing towards the Punjabee troops, and occasionally had been oppressive in their conduct towards the people. It was the European Infantry and Artillery, and not the Hindoostanees, that had broken the flower of the Sikh chivalry in two successive campaigns in 1846 and 1848, and the Punjabees longed to prove their superiority as soldiers against the Hindoostanees. Again, the Seikhs cherished an especial dislike against the Mahomedans of Hindostan. They entertained an hereditary hatred against the City of Delhi, where Tegh Bahadur, one of their famous warrior priests, was cruelly put to death, and where the limbs of the martyr were exposed at the gates. The Punjabees of all classes, Sikhs or Mahomedans, are fond of plunder, and the wealth of Delhi had been long notorious to all. The hope of sharing in such spoil turned the thoughts of many towards our service during the crisis. Then the whole people had been accustomed to regard our power as irresistible, and our prestige when the war broke out was mighty in their eyes. They saw that at least we held their country in considerable force, and that we were able to deal vigorously and severely with our mutinous Hindoostanees. They, perhaps, did not consider whether we were or were not equally strong elsewhere. At all events they may have been inclined to draw their conclusions from what passed before their immediate view. Then we began to engage the services of the more adventurous and excitable spirits all over the country in a popular expedition. Thus, the very class most likely to profit by disturbance, and to turn against us for the
want of something better to do, were enlisted in our cause; and the idea
got possession of their minds that (to use their own expression) the bread
which the Hindooostanees had rejected would fall to the lot of Punjabees. Many
a man who sighed in retirement for the good old days of war and excitement,
and who would have been ready to start up against us on the first sound of
tumult, marched joyously off for Delhi, to earn abroad the living he could not
get at home, and to share in the spoils of Hindooostan. Again, the Chief
Commissioner believes it may be truly said, that the people had on the whole
been well and kindly governed. They had no grievances to complain of, while
they had solid and appreciable advantages to be thankful for. Though fanatical
in some respects, they are less sensitive and suspicious in respect to caste and
religion, less enslaved to prejudice than the Hindooostanees. Their minds had
not been poisoned by malicious stories regarding the intentions of the British.
The mass of the people had never been so prosperous, so easy in circumstances,
as under British rule. Agriculture, commerce, material wealth of all kinds, was
increasing; the middle and lower classes were thriving and multiplying. In no
parts was improvement more marked than in hill tracts like Huzara, and in the
wild jungly tracts towards the south. In all parts there were numbers who could
remember the evils which war and insecurity inflict; and for some time, there
were few or none who conceived that the cause of the mutineers could ever
prosper. But it is never to be forgotten that the people were without arms.
Even in a few years, the general disarming had produced a change in the national
habits. The rougher and sturdier classes felt that they were unprepared for
strife, and that they were destitute of one principal means of resistance. Then,
fortunately, the class of men who once had been leaders in strife, and round
whom the disaffected might rally, were scarcely to be found in the Punjab.
State prisoners and dangerous characters had always been kept at a distance
from their native province. This circumstance, without doubt, proved most
opportune. The chiefs who remained, either with feudal possessions or with
independent powers, were on our side to a man. In the days before our rule they
had witnessed the effects of military anarchy, and knew that they themselves
would be the first prey of an insurgent soldiery flushed with victory over their
lawful rulers. No respectable man wished to see the revival of a military domi-
nation, such as that with which the country was threatened, should the mutiny
succeed. Those chiefs who had troops, perceived in the events of Hindooostan
an example of what would next happen to themselves, and the aged Maha Rajah
of Jummo and Cashmere trembled, lest the scenes which he remembered at
Lahore should be re-enacted in his old age by his own army.

47. On the whole, it must be said, in fairness, that the Punjab people behaved
creditably, and deserve well of the British Government. There was no marked
or extraordinary increase of violent crime; of lesser offences there was a positive
decrease upon former years. In almost all districts the civil courts were open
throughout the period of trouble, and there was no falling off in the amount of
judicial business during the year. The land revenue was paid up to the last
rupee; in the excise taxes there was actually an increase. Even the attend-
ance of pupils at the Government schools did not materially diminish; and the
public dispensaries were resorted to much as usual. All these points indicate
that the people preserved an even mind; that they never mistrusted our inten-
tions; that they were slow to doubt our power. Many of the chiefs rendered
that degree of assistance which should claim the gratitude of Englishmen. The
independent tribes on the frontier seemed either not to comprehend how really
embarrassed we were, or else to be intent on plunder rather than conquest.
They showed, in many instances, that their disposition towards us was bad, and
were frequently meditating serious irruption on various points; yet they did
not make any systematic attempt to break through that cordon of British
power, which, through the vast length of the frontier, has so long acted as a
barrier against evil. The Affghans were in a position to cause us extreme
embarrassment. But the friendly attitude of the Ameer's Government was
doubtless in part the result of the treaty of 1855, and of the closer relations
which subsisted since 1856, so greatly to his Highness's advantage. Such, so
far as secondary human causes go, were apparently the reasons why the Pun-
jabees remained true to the British during this most critical period. In
enumerating these we must never forget to look up to the first Great Cause,
namely, the Divine mercy towards us.
ERS RELATING TO

...gs, at first so encouraging, began gradually to be
after week, and month after month passed away,
down, the Punjabis then began to think that the
ower from the repeated shocks it was sustaining.
ast us seemed insuperable. When detachment
is went out of the Punjab, and none came in;
ers reached through the land; when canton-
osten was destroyed and deserted by its soldiery,
sidery letters arrived, figuratively indicating
a, and saying that "many of the finest trees
than "white wheat had become very scarce, and
country produce very abundant," that "hats were hardly to be seen, while
urbans were plentiful;" then the Punjabis began to feel how utterly isolated
we were, and how desperate was our cause. Their minds passed from con-
dence to doubt, then to mistrust, and then to disaffection. This last symptom
had begun to set in, when Delhi fell. To the last, however, the Punjabi
troops before Delhi behaved most gallantly. Though many and great were the
temptations held out, still there were no desertions. But they began to feel
and even to show their consciousness of power. The Chief Commissioner
believes that there is a limit, beyond which mercenary troops will not remain
faithful to their salt. No doubt the better they are treated, the more highly
they are disciplined, physically and morally, in the true sense of the term, the
longer can they be relied on. But when the hope of success has departed from
their breasts; when on all sides they are surrounded by enemies, who with the
one hand present certain destruction as the penalty of fidelity, and with the
other hand offer a share in the fruits of victory as the reward of desertion,
then it were vain to expect that such troops will ever fight for us to the death.
Individually they are willing enough to stake their lives for that which is worth
the risk. No men care less for safety, provided that they see a fair chance of
eventual success. But when once that chance shall vanish, then every mer-
cenary native soldier thinks how he shall best shift for himself. Who shall
say how nearly this fatal turn was approached during the late crisis? Again,
the Mahomedans of the Punjab, although after having been a vanquished and
oppressed race under the Sikhs, they had lived easily and prosperously under
British rule, are yet imbued with fanatieism impatient of control, and prone to
change. The temper of these people in Chshwar and Kohat is especially
wayward and fitful. The Mahomedans, after a time, begun to think that the
day of our rule was drawing towards its close, and that time had come when
they should strike for power and for plunder. As regards the Sikhs, one
decade only has passed since they were the dominant power in the Punjab.
They are a highly military race; their prejudices are comparatively few;
but their religion constitutes a strong bond of union; though depressed by
political disaster, it has still vitality and a power of expansion, through the
admission of new converts. It might revive in a moment through any change
of circumstances, and spread far and wide. Again, the memory of the Khalsa,
or Sikh commonwealth, may sleep, but is not yet dead. A spirit of nationality
and military ambition still survive in the minds and hearts of thousands among
the Sikhs. It were vain to suppose that thoughts of future triumphs and future
independence did not cross the imaginations of these people; that aspirations
of restoring the Khalsa were not excited during the summer of 1857. The
premonitory symptoms of danger broke out in August and September in two
points widely distant from each other, and in the very districts which, perhaps, of
all others, had most benefited by our rule. In Huzara and Googaira the bungautes
already related arose from no grievance or special cause whatever. They merely
sprung from the popular belief that British power was mortally stricken, and
they afforded examples of what would soon have happened universally if Delhi
had not fallen.

49. It now only remains to record how ably, how zealously, how effectively the
Chief Commissioner has been aided by the various classes of officers who served
in conjunction with him and under his orders, in his efforts to discharge the
difficult duties which fell to his lot.

50. From the military authorities in the Punjab the Chief Commissioner has
received much support. They freely and considerately received his advice, and
listened
listened to his suggestions. The Chief Commissioner's gratitude is especially
due to Major General Sir Sydney Cotton, for the able management of the
Peshawur Division, and to Brigadier S. Corbett, for the promptitude displayed
in the disarming of the native troops at Lahore, and to Major Crawford
Chamberlain, for the excellent arrangements whereby he disarmed the two
Native Infantry regiments at Mooltan.

51. The Chief Commissioner desires that the obligations be recorded, which
he deeply feels to be owing to Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, the commandant
of the Punjab Force. To that officer's zeal, ability, and high standard of
military excellence the present character of these troops is much indebted.
Immediately after the mutiny broke out he was placed in command of the
moveable column. His experience and his counsels were of great value to the
Chief Commissioner during the first days of the crisis. He was subsequently
appointed Adjutant General of the Bengal army, and he was severely wounded
before Delhi.

52. Brigadier General John Nicholson is now beyond human praise and
human reward; but so long as British rule shall endure in India his fame can
never perish. He seems especially to have been raised up for this juncture.
He crowned a bright though brief career by dying of the wound he received in
the moment of victory at Delhi. The Chief Commissioner does not hesitate to
affirm, that without John Nicholson, Delhi could not have fallen.

53. Among the civil and military officers in administrative employment, the
Chief Commissioner's first acknowledgments are due to Mr. Robert Mont-
gomery, the Judicial Commissioner of the Punjab. No one perhaps ever had
a more single-minded, active, and determined coadjutor than the Chief Commis-
ioner has possessed in that officer. In the midst of this crisis all persons felt
assured when Robert Montgomery was among them. His coolness in danger
and his fertility of resource were invaluable.

54. The Chief Commissioner is also much indebted to Mr. D. F. M'Leod,
the Financial Commissioner, for much valuable advice during this period.
There is probably no officer who understands the native character better than
Mr. M'Leod.

55. Among the divisional and local officers, the post of difficulty and honour
was held by Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawur.
Allusion has already been made to the admirable manner in which he discharged
his duties. His report on the events which occurred at Peshawur, and in which
he played so brilliant a part, is full of deep interest. Captain H. R. James, the
Deputy Commissioner, was officiating as the Chief Commissioner's secretary
when the mutiny broke out. Shortly afterwards he voluntarily relinquished the
advantages of that post and returned to Peshawur to enable Lieutenant Colonel
Nicholson to assume command of the moveable column; as officiating secretary,
and subsequently as Deputy Commissioner he performed good service. On
several occasions he conducted very successful expeditions in the field. Major
J: R. Becher, as Deputy Commissioner of Huzara, held a very difficult
charge, to which he proved himself fully equal. He displayed much resolution, tact,
and judgment. Captain Henderson preserved the peace of the difficult district
of Kohat, and his arrangements throughout this trying time gave much satis-
faction.

56. The point next to Peshawur in difficulty was the division of the Cis-Sutlej
States. There the population was armed; many classes were tainted with the bad
spirit so prevalent in Hindoostan. Through that territory passed the main line of
communication between the Punjab and Delhi; throughout the tract were
scattered Sikh chiefs, great and small, some independent, some feudatory. The
Chief Commissioner's acknowledgments are especially due to the Commissioner,
Mr. G. C. Barnes, for the good management whereby he kept the Sikh chiefs
firm to their allegiance, and secured their active co-operation; for the manner
in which he preserved order, and facilitated the passage of troops and materials.
Mr. G. H. M. Ricketts distinguished himself by the vigour with which he con-
trolled the disaffected city of Lododniah, and the spirited manner in which he
opposed the passage of the rebels at the Sutlej. Both Mr. Barnes and Mr.
Ricketts received the thanks of General Wilson after the capture of Delhi. Mr.
238.  
T. D. Forsyth,
so soon as they did. He despatched the 1st and then the 2d Belooch battalion organised most efficiently by Mr. H. B. E. Frere, the Commissioner of Sindh, and the final triumph, that officer most valuable; Lieutenant Dobbin also gave much satisfaction in respect to the nearly all the reinforcements of Lawre!~e of the Maha Rajah, he was appointed to command the Jummoo contingent at Delhi, and afterwards he was placed in charge of the Jhujjur territory.

58. The Chief Commissioner's military secretary, Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Macpherson, rendered valuable assistance throughout the crisis. The labours of Colonel Macpherson in the organisation of the new regiments and in the multifarious duties which devolved on him were incessant. His counsel as an experienced soldier was most useful. Since the outbreak of the mutiny there have, from first to last, been raised and organised 18 new regiments of infantry, six of cavalry, besides many thousands of levies, horse and foot. On the 1st May 1858, just one year after the mutiny, the new force numbered upwards of 34,000, which, with the previous numbers (20,000) make up an aggregate of 54,000 men. The details of this large force passed through Colonel Macpherson's hands.

59. The services of Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Lawrence also demand notice. At the commencement of the crisis he was captain of police, Lahore division; he was the first officer to discover the intended outbreak of the sepoys at Lahore. He was the sole European officer in charge of 2,700 organised military police, on whose fidelity so much depended. During the months of May, June, and July, he raised and organised 2,000 additional levies for service at Delhi, consisting of horse, foot, artillerymen, and pioneers. He formed one of the commission deputed to Sealkote after the mutiny. Lastly, at the request of the Maha Rajah, he was appointed to command the Jummoo contingent at Delhi, and afterwards he was placed in charge of the Jhujjur territory.

60. The Chief Commissioner also desires that certain officers should be mentioned, who rendered important aid in the conveyance of men and material for the siege of Delhi. The camel train, from Kurrachee to Mooltan, was organised most efficiently by Mr. H. B. E. Frere, the Commissioner of Sindh, and Major G. W. Hamilton, Commissioner of Mooltan. Major Hamilton also deserves much credit in respect to the waggon train from Mooltan to Lahore, whereby nearly all the reinforcements of European troops have been brought up the country. In the management of the waggon train from Loodianah to Delhi, Captain Briggs rendered most important service, and merits very high commendation. The exertions of Captain Lewis, the Commissary of Ordnance, in the preparation and despatch of the great siege train from Ferozepore, were most valuable; Lieutenant Dobbin also gave much satisfaction in respect to the despatch of the siege train from Philore.

61. The Chief Commissioner could not allow this notice of the officers who have distinguished themselves to be closed, without mention being made of the great obligations under which he lies to Mr. H. B. E. Frere, the Commissioner of Sindh. From first to last, from the first commencement of the mutiny to the final triumph, that officer has rendered assistance to the Punjab administration, just as if he had been one of its own Commissioners. It was owing to his indefatigable exertions that the 1st Bombay Fusiliers arrived at Mooltan so soon as they did. He despatched the 1st and then the 2d Belooch battalion from Sindh to succour the Punjab. The Chief Commissioner believes that probably there is no civil officer in India, who, for eminent exertions, deserves better of his Government than Mr. H. B. E. Frere.

62. I am now to add, that in causing this narrative to be recorded, Sir John Lawrence has not been actuated by any motive of self-laudation. Throughout the crisis he could not but feel that human means and human precautions were utterly impotent; that everything which was done or could be done to surmount such dangers and difficulties was as nothing, and that trust could be placed in Divine Providence alone. On the present occasion his sole object-
to submit to the Supreme Government a faithful account of what actually happened, and to bring to the notice of his superiors, and of his countrymen at large, the noble conduct and sterling merits of the officers who served under his orders or in conjunction with him during the critical and perilous period of 1857. The Chief Commissioner well knows that no functionary has ever been better served than he has, or owes more to his officers than he does. The Punjab officials of all grades had great difficulties to meet, and met them resolutely. They had to maintain the civil administration without interruption, despite many troubles and hindrances; to perform multifarious business connected with the raising, the supplying and transporting of troops, and all this they did; discharging their duty right well, from first to last.

63. Lastly, Sir John Lawrence desires to join with Mr. Montgomery in the expression of devout thankfulness to Almighty God. To Him alone is due the praise for our success, and our very safety. His mercy vouchsafed a happy issue to our measures and confounded the devices of our enemies. Human aid could avail us nothing in that crisis, and it is owing to an overruling Providence, and to that alone, that a single Englishman was left alive in the Punjab.

I have, &c.

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Punjab.

INTRODUCTION.

[By Mr. R. Montgomery.]

I HAVE considered it due to the several civil officers employed in the Punjab from 12 May to 31 December of 1857, to place on record, for the information of Government, the following abstract of their proceedings and exertions during that eventful period of Indian history,

2. As the Chief Commissioner was absent when the news of the Delhi tragedy reached Lahore on 12 May, and owing to this temporary stoppage of the telegraphic communication with Rawul Pindi there was no time to make a reference, I held an immediate consultation with the officers marginally noted,* and proceeded at once to Meean Meer with the Military Secretary, Lieutenant Colonel Macpherson. I urged on Brigadier Corbett, c. b., commanding the station, the imperative necessity for taking the initiative and preventing the native troops from following the example of their brethren at Meerut and Delhi. I suggested that they should at any rate be deprived of their ammunition and percussion caps. To this Brigadier Corbett readily agreed, and subsequently, with most praiseworthy boldness, determined to disarm them entirely. He executed this measure the next morning, the 13th May, in my presence in the most masterly way. The regiments thus disarmed are noted in the margin.† Promptness of action was imperative. Secret information had reached us through the police that the whole four regiments were on the watch to know what would happen down below, and that they were quite prepared to follow the example of their brethren whatever it might be. Had the disarming not been effected when it was, while the electric telegraph had given us a monopoly of intelligence, it is quite impossible to say what might have happened within 36 hours.

3. The news from Delhi had been sent off by express to Ferozepore on the afternoon of the 12th, with an intimation of the proceedings about to be adopted at Lahore. The express reached Brigadier Innes, commanding at that station, on the morning of the 13th, and enabled him to secure the arsenal and avert the junction of the Lahore and Ferozepoor Brigades of native troops, which it

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* Lieut. Colonel Macpherson, Military Secretary; Major Ommaney, Chief Engineer; Captain R. C. Lawrence, commanding Police Battalion; Captain Hutchison, Engineers; D. F. McLeod, Esq., Financial Commissioner; A. A. Roberts, Esq., Commissioner, Lahore Division; R. E. Egerton, Esq., Deputy Commissioner, Lahore.
† 16th Native Infantry; 60th Native Infantry; 49th Native Infantry; 8th Light Cavalry. This last corps was also dismounted at a later date.
is believed was intended. The information conveyed thus rapidly to Brigadier Innes enabled him to act promptly and decidedly; and when, in the afternoon of the 14th, the 45th Native Infantry attempted to storm the arsenal, they were repulsed and defeated by the force of Europeans whom Brigadier Innes had just before thrown in. Thus, within 24 hours after the receipt of the telegram announcing the Delhi massacre, the capital had been saved, and the great magazine of the Punjab; containing upwards of 7,000 barrels of powder, besides immense stores of material, had been secured.

4. Immediately after the disarming at Mean Meer, I circulated to all officers of districts west of Rawul Pindee, a semi-official letter which will be found in Appendix No. 1. The Chief Commissioner being at Rawul Pindee, arranged for the safety of the districts of the Leia, Peshawur, and Jhelum Divisions. The Commander in Chief came down to Umballa from Kussowlee and made every preparation for immediately moving on to Delhi. The Guide Corps marched down to join his force with wonderful celerity, travelling the whole distance of 580 miles in 21 days. On 8th June the siege of Delhi began. The exertions made by the officers of the Cis and Trans Sutlej States to procure carriage are detailed in the reports on those divisions.

5. The following mutinies took place in the Punjab during the continuance of the siege of Delhi:

1. Ferozepoor, 14 May. Large portion of 45th and 57th Native Infantry.
2. Hotee Murdan, 24 May. 55th Native Infantry.
3. Jullundur, 7 June. 6th Light Cavalry, 36th Native Infantry, and 61st Native Infantry.
4. Phillour, 8 June. 3d Native Infantry.
5. Jhelum, 7 July. Part of 14th Native Infantry.
6. Sealkote, 9 July. Wing of 9th Light Cavalry, 46th Native Infantry.
7. Thanessur, 14 July. Part of 5th Native Infantry.
8. Lahore, 30 July. 26th Native Infantry.
9. Ferozepore, 19 August. 10th Light Cavalry.
11. Umballa, 30 September. Remnants of 5th and 60th Native Infantry.
12. Mean Wali, in the Leia District. 30 men 9th Irregular Cavalry.

Of these mutinies, the most serious as regards the civil administration of the district was that which occurred at Sealkote, for the men burnt the Deputy Commissioner's offices and records, and set free the prisoners from the gaol. The villagers in the neighbourhood of the station plundered it, and it required the adoption of stern measures to reduce them.

6. On 11 September it was reported that an insurrection had broken out in the Googaira district among the Khurruks, a wild tribe inhabiting the extensive tracts known as the Barh. Within six hours from the arrival at Lahore of the intelligence of this outbreak, the Chief Commissioner despatched to Googaira, which was threatened by the rebels, a force of European and Sikh infantry and guns. This force marched 83 miles in three days, and arrived an hour before the rebels attacked the station. Several other tribes had joined them, and for some days they so far held the road as to delay the mails and cut off communication between Lahore and Bombay. Routes were opened up by the post-office authorities for the mails to be carried, via Jhung, on the north, and Bhawulpoor on the south, and towards the end of October this rebellion was quelled, but it greatly affected the whole of the Mooltan division, and threatened at one time to involve the Lahore division on its south-west border also; but no rising took place in this quarter.

7. The Mahommedan feasts of Bukreed and the Mohurrum are often occasions of great excitement, and serious apprehensions were felt in some places lest there should be any attempt at any émeute. A merciful Providence averted all danger; and both these festivals passed off everywhere with even more than ordinary quietness.

8. Particular occasions and events called forth from me circulars on various points of the internal government of this province. These are given in Appendices 2 to 4.

9. The
9. The six per cent. loan, which was first opened by Mr. Barnes, Commissi­
oner, Cis-Sutlej States, in his own division, and then extended to the whole
Punjab, in the end of May, afforded a good barometer of the state of the feeling
towards us entertained by the monied classes in this province; and as apper­
taining in this way to my department, I have procured copies from the Financial
Commissioner of his circular extending the loan to the whole Punjab, and also
a statement of the amount subscribed thereto in each district. These are
given as Appendices 5 and 6. It is a remarkable fact, that while the independ­
dent chiefs who gave us the help of their arms have also freely lent us their
money, the wealthy bankers of the great commercial cities, as Umritsur, Lahore,
&c., have shown a close-fistedness and distrust that augurs ill for their sense of
the security and benefits they have enjoyed under our rule. The amount
shown in the statement alluded to as subscribed in the great and opulent
division of Lahore is wholly incommensurate with the resources of its traders,
and I believe it is under contemplation by the local authorities to mark in
some signal way the displeasure of Government for the great want of confidence
and unwillingness to aid us which they have displayed.

10. The peace which the Punjab has enjoyed, in the midst of so much war, is
in a measure also attributable to the plenty with which it has been blessed by
two or three consecutive fruitful harvests, and to the opportunities for employ­
ment offered to every idle hand by the immense number of men that have been
entertained for levies, for extra police, and for the enlarged Sikh army.

11. The danger of dissemination of treason through the post-office was
recognised from the first, and in most places the district officers in person
opened every post bag and suppressed suspicious letters, especially those
addressed to sepoys.

12. The native press was early put under a strict censorship. At Peshawur
the editor of the "Moortizae" was imprisoned for publishing treasonable
matter, and his paper was stopped. The native paper at Multan was likewise
suppressed. The editor of the "Cheshmai Faiz" was ordered to remove his
establishment from Sealkote to Lahore, where his paper, together with the two
already published at the capital, was put under rigid surveillance.

13. In the succeeding paragraphs of this memorandum, reference will be made
to the miscellaneous duties which devolved upon officers. Where these duties
were peculiarly onerous, as at Loodianah, a passing mention of them has been
made, but in order to avoid repetition, a great deal of the work of most officers
has been passed over in silence, as it was the same in every district. Thus,
there is scarcely a district where the European officers in person did not carry
on regular night patrolling; there is no district officer who has not the ferries
of at least one river to guard, and many have those of two or even three. At
first the levying of men for the new army devolved entirely upon civil officers;
the entertainment of men for extra police was always their own peculiar pro­
vince, and demanded a vast amount of attention; in many cases there were
mutinous troops to be watched, and spies consulted and guided by district
officers in every place; much of their time was consumed in giving audiences to
natives of rank, and in endeavouring to assure them of the firmness of our rule,
and to enlist their good offices in inducing men to enter our service. These
services were performed by district officers and commissioners more or less
everywhere, but are barely alluded to in the accompanying minute, to avoid
tautological display.

14. An opinion has gained very general credence that an undue and causeless
dislike to Hindoostanees has been manifested in the policy of the Punjab Govern­
ment. It is argued that the revolt was a military one, and that even supposing
the Hindoostanee army to be untrustworthy, there was no ground for the universal
antipathy to the Hindoostanee nation which the Punjab Government has evinced.
I would appeal to every officer who has served under it during the memorable year
1857 to give his own private experience as to the justice of the measures
which have been adopted. I would not ask him to gather inferences from the
narrations of any other person; let him mention the name of the class whom
he personally, in his own sphere of labour, mainly feared; let him say whom he
found to be the instigators of plots, the fomenters of sedition, and the prime
movers...
movers in ill-feeling, the answer in almost every separate case would be "the Hindoostanee." Were prominent instances of this ill-will necessary, I would quote the conduct of the Hindoostane horsekeepers at Ferozepoor, of the Hindoostanee servants at Murree, of the Hindoostanee native doctors at Murree and Umbir, and the fact that the murders of Sealkote were all by Hindoos-

tanes, but not all by military Hindoostanees, for three persons were killed by one of the gaol police. There is no doubt that Hindoostanee emissaries to preach a Mahomedan crusade came up from Delhi; it is also to be borne in mind that nearly every office of value was held by Hindoostanees, who evinced a strong sympathy with the rebels. That there were loyal and true men I do not doubt, but it was impossible to distinguish them from the bad so truly as to make it safe trust to any one.

15. In September 1856 the wise and great Sir Henry Lawrence contributed to the "Calcutta Review" an article on army reform, from which the following is an extract. It is the expression of a great statesman's opinions, and now seems almost like prophecy. He is speaking of the Sikh wars, and says, "Proportionately few of the instigators of opposition at Lahore in the Sikh army were Sikhs. They were mostly British subjects, many of them British deserters. The general feeling of the Sikhs was hardly hostile; many of the Sikhs were friendly, decidedly so, compared with the Hindoostanees in the Punjab service." Beyond this I feel that it is not necessary to go in justifying the con-
duct of this Government in regard to the treatment of the natives of Hindoostan.

16. I am glad to be able to speak most favourably regarding the working of the civil courts. Notwithstanding the alterations in the Statute of Limitations, reducing the limit from 12 to six years, whereby an immense amount of extra work was thrown on the officers, and the quantity of miscellaneous work caused by the mutiny, the civil courts have been closed in but very few districts, and a much larger amount of civil work has been disposed of during the year than usual.

17. Criminal work has been more than ordinarily heavy throughout, and has been equally well performed. Act XIV. of 1857, empowering any two officers sitting in commission to try and execute any traitor or participant in violent crime, has been largely acted upon. The Chief Commissioner had, however, issued for the guidance of all officers rules very much to the same purport as the Act, before its arrival at Lahore. As the only communication between Lahore and Calcutta was at that time via Bombay, considerable delay took place in its transmission. While serious and violent crime has somewhat increased, it is a remarkable fact that the number of misdemeanors has gone down to a minimum. Perhaps this may be because the police could not or did not report them, but I consider it is mainly owing to the state of men's minds and the intention with which they were watching the result. This disinclined them from petty wrongs and acts of petty violence.

CIS-SUTLEJ STATES.

18. The proximity of this division to the focus of the revolt rendered it a very difficult matter to uphold in its British authority as supreme. The inha-
bitants of a part of it are, to a certain extent, one with the rebels of Delhi in race, in feeling, and in creed; there is no natural boundary to separate the Punjab from the north-west, and this undividedness of country, joined with the care entailed on the authorities by the imperative necessity for holding the grand trunk road, has made this division a very anxious charge. But Mr. Barnes, the Commissioner, and his district officers, having nobly and success-
fully exerted themselves to put down all discontent and crime, to show that we still had power, and meant to keep it, the feudal chiefs were ordered to furnish their quotas of horse and foot, and the revenue they have hitherto paid in commutation was remitted. The following extract from Mr. Barnes' report will show the inestimable value of the services rendered to us also by the chiefs of the protected Seikhs; and I would take the opportunity to note that the first stroke towards securing their allegiance was taken by Mr. Forsyth, Deputy Commissioner of Umballa, in calling on the Rajah of Puttiala, at the very first émeute, to send in his troops, thus leading him at once to take a decided part, from which he has never since swerved. Mr. Barnes says, "The station
station of Umballa was left with four weak companies (about 250 men), of the 2d Bengal Fusiliers, the 6th Regiment Native Infantry, and some six-pounder guns, to man which we had only native artillerymen. A redoubt was erected, with the church in the centre, and the remaining residents were concentrated in the houses around. A militia was formed of uncovenanted officers, and the magazine, the treasure, and the commissariat stores were all lodged in the redoubt, which was garrisoned by a company of the Fusiliers. Owing to the defection of the Nusseree battalion, there was no available escort for the siege train, or for the ammunition so urgently needed by the army. I offered, however, to furnish political escorts, and accordingly the siege train came down from Phillour, under a guard of horse and foot furnished by the Nabha Rajah, and accompanied by a detachment of the 9th Irregulars, under Lieutenant Campbell. The ammunition was conveyed by a party of the district police; and so, throughout the campaign, the most important military stores were constantly sent down under the charge of contingents furnished by the chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej States. Their troops protected our stations, and patrolled the grand trunk road from Ferozepoor and Phillour down to the very walls of Delhi. The safety of this province may be attributed to their loyalty and good example. The Raja of Jheend, with Captain M’Andrew and a small disciplined force, acted as the vanguard of the army, and by my directions kept always in advance. When the first detachment of Europeans reached Kurnaul, this little band proceeded 22 miles further to Paneput, quieting the country, securing the road, and collecting supplies; and in this manner they advanced boldly to within 20 miles of Delhi. A detachment of the Jheend troops seized the bridge at Bhagput, and thus enabled the Meerut force to join head quarters. A party of the Jheend sowars, with Captain Hodson at their head, rode into Meerut, and opened our communication with that station. The troops of the Maha Rajah of Puttiala guarded Thaneysur and Umballa, and the safety of Lodiana was entrusted to the Rajah of Nabha and the Kotila Nawab. These eminent services afforded by the Cis-Sutlej chiefs are thus casually noticed as part of the history of the late campaign. I feel under the deepest obligations to them; and the Governor General, in the gazette announcing the fall of Delhi, has declared that they shall not be without their reward.

19. Next in importance to the securing of the grand trunk road, and of the loyalty of the native chiefs, was the necessity for saving the treasuries from attack. They were all at the commencement of the outbreak under sepoy guards. Mr. Barnes promptly issued instructions to his district officers, in obedience to which the Umballati treasure (3,50,000 rupees) was placed under the 1st Fusiliers, and the Thaneysur money (1,00,000 rupees) sent to the same guard. Mr. Ricketts sent his 1,50,000-rupees to the care of the two companies of the 8th Queen’s Regiment at Phillour. Major Marsden, at Ferozepore, placed his in the entrenchment, where it was guarded by Her Majesty’s 61st Regiment. Only the Simla treasury remained under a guard of natives, and they, being Goorkhas of the Nusseeree battalion, were considered staunch. However, during their temporary mutiny, although the Simla treasury remained untouched, the branch treasury at Kussowlee was plundered of Rs.32,043. 14. 1., of which only 12,963 rupees were recovered.

20. I cannot do better than give, in Mr. Barnes’ own words, a history of the means adopted to secure ready and regular conveyance for stores and ammunition to the army, and sick and wounded men from it—means which never once failed of their end, and on which the district officers reflect with an honest pride, that in no case was a single cart unreasonably delayed, or a single rupee’s worth of stores plundered.

"The requirements of the army became incessant, and the road was thronged with carts laden with every variety of stores. A bullock train was suggested by Mr. Forsyth, to be carried on by the district officers. This arrangement proved defective in practice for the want of a general superintendent in charge of the whole line. I obtained leave from the Chief Commissioner to organise a 'military transport train,' under the agency of Captain Briggs, an able and zealous officer of great experience. His exertions and complete success deserve the special thanks of Government. We had been drained of our carriage, and no assistance could be drawn from either the Ganges, Doab, or the..."
Delhi territory. The army commissariat could give no help. Carts that reached Delhi never came back, and there was imminent danger of a dead lock. All these difficulties were overcome by Captain Briggs. His jurisdiction extended from Ferozepoor to Delhi, 265 miles. A train of 30 waggons a day from each of the principal stations of Umballa, Loodiana, and Kurnal, and 14 waggons from Ferozepoor was soon organised. The same number was also daily employed on the return journey. Stores of every description, especially the enormous demands for ordnance ammunition, were safely and regularly supplied to the army. The sick and wounded were comfortably conveyed from camp to Umballa; the train was in full operation from the 22d July to the middle of October. The scheme was eminently successful, owing to the skill, tact, and indefatigable energy of Captain Briggs; he has fully acknowledged his obligations to the civil authorities of the Cis-Sutlej states, who gave him their utmost support. The cost of the train was 97,317 rupees, and it has fully realised the objects for which it was organised.

21. "This division," in Mr. Barnes' words, "acted as a kind of breakwater; beyond was the raging sea, inside was comparative calm." It could not, however, be expected that the surface should be unruffled. At first the natives seemed aghast at the enormity of the odds against us; but after the first shock came the desire to rebel, and it required the strongest determination to quell incipient insurrection. The police were exhorted to use their arms freely, and unhesitatingly to kill any one found in the act of perpetrating violent crime. The lawless and predatory objects were checked by the manifestation of a will on the part of the officers; some were hung up to trees in sight of their own village; some killed in pursuit, and 123 executed by process of law, partly by district officers sitting in commission, and partly by Mr. Barnes. Besides these, 258 mutineers were executed, and 102 sentenced to imprisonment, who ought also to have been hanged, as they belonged to the mutinous regiments at Ferozepoor. It was only by such measures that districts were controlled which were quickly escaping from our grasp.

22. I turn to specify the operations which more particularly concerned each district.

Ferozepoor.

23. At a court of inquiry assembled some time previous to the Delhi mutiny, a native officer of the 57th Native Infantry, at Ferozepoor, declared that it was the purpose of his regiment to refuse the Enfield cartridge if proffered to them. This raised a strong feeling of suspicion against the corps, but the 45th Native Infantry, which was not on good terms with the 57th, and had openly declared their contempt of the resolution of the 57th Native Infantry, was considered staunch. On the 14th May, as soon as news by express from Lahore of the Delhi disaster reached Brigadier Innes, who had the previous day taken command, he ordered the entrenched arsenal to be immediately garrisoned by part of Her Majesty's 61st Foot and the Artillery; all ladies were also removed thither, and the two regiments of Native Infantry ordered into camp, in positions of about three miles apart. The way of the 45th Native Infantry lay past the entrenchment; as they approached, their column insensibly swerved towards the glacis; the movement had barely been observed when they swarmed up the slope, and attacked the position. The Europeans in an instant divined their intent, and rushed to the ramparts with the bayonet: the attack was repulsed; but before the 61st could load, the sepoys dashed at the gate, whence they were also flung back, and then, with an air of injured innocence, they re-formed their column, and marched away quietly with their European officers to the camp. During the night the church, the Roman-catholic chapel, the school-house, 17 officers' houses, and other buildings, were burnt to the ground by the men of the 45th, but not before the chaplain, the Rev. R. B. Maltby, falling to obtain a guard of Europeans, had boldly rushed, unattended, through the infuriated sepoys, and into the blazing church, and had succeeded in rescuing the registers out of it. On the 14th the treasure was moved into the entrenchment, and it was discovered that of the 45th Regiment there only remained 133 men; the rest, with a large part of the 57th, had deserted. The remaining portions of these regiments were subsequently disbanded.
24. Danger impended over this district from both north and south. To avert the threatened incursion of the mutinous troops from Lahore, the large ferries on the Sutlej were guarded, and the boats from the small ones sent to Hurreekee. To check the approaches of the wild tribes from Sirsa and Bhutteana, General Van Cortlandt, in a fortnight, raised a levy of 500 Seikhs, a force which, subsequently uniting with the Rajah Jowahir Sing’s troops, and other bodies sent down from time to time by the Chief Commissioner, amounted to 5,000 men of all arms, and performed excellent service in Sirsa and Hissar.

25. Major Marsden received information at one time that a faqueer, named Sham Dass, was collecting followers with a treasonable intent. He promptly moved against the rebel, and, coming upon him by surprise, attacked and completely defeated him with the loss of several men. Sham Dass himself was seized and executed. This act of vigour on the part of Major Marsden was a most important step in the preservation of the peace of the district, for at that critical time any show of success for the evil-disposed would have raised the whole region in revolt. In the western division 157 extra men were entertained in the police establishment, and the feudatory chiefs furnished a body of 200 horse and 40 foot; every highway robber was executed at once. This display of severity, with the presence of General Van Cortlandt’s force, and increased energy on the part of the civil authorities, I am happy to say preserved the peace of the district well.

26. On the 11th July, the 10th Light Cavalry was, as a precautionary measure, dismounted and disarmed, but on the 19th August the men made a rush at their horses, cut loose about 50 of them, and seizing every pony or horse they could find in the station, including many officers’ chargers, mounted and rode off for Delhi. With the connivance of the native horse-keepers of the Artillery they also attacked the guns, but were repulsed, though not until they had killed three of the 61st Regiment and wounded three, of whom one was a female; they also cut down Mr. Nelson, the veterinary surgeon of the regiment. Of the 142 mutineers captured, 40 were executed, and the remainder, with 25 of the Artillery horse-keepers, transported or imprisoned. In the gaol, 18 persons, including the Nawab of Raneea, who have been captured by Mr. Ricketts in the Loodiana district, were hanged. The siege train was despatched from the arsenal on August 18th, and more than 2,000 cart-loads of munitions of war were sent to Delhi during the siege.

27. Although not belonging to my department, I cannot close my report on this district without making mention of the eminent services rendered to the State by Captain, Lewis, the Assistant Commissary of Ordnance, to whom the army at Delhi is deeply indebted for his unwearied exertions and incessant hopeful energy.

Loodianah.

28. Mr. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of this district, had a most difficult part to play, and ably has he acquitted himself. The town of Loodianah commands the high road from Delhi to the Punjab. It stands on the bank of the Sutlej at the head of the bridge of boats, connecting Hindoostan with the Punjab Proper. It is filled with a dissolute, lawless, mixed population of Cabul pensioners, Cashmere shawl workers, Goojurs, Bowrabs, and other predatory races. There is a fort without Europeans to guard it, a city without regular troops to restrain it, a district traversed by roads in every direction, joining the seven commercial towns which form the emporium of its trade, and situated on a river which for months in the year is a mere network of fordable creeks, which could only be guarded by a cordon of regular troops. Mr. Ricketts had for his gaol and treasury guard a company of enemies in the shape of a detachment of the 3d Native Infantry, and on the breaking out of the mutiny received another company of the same regiment. As there was no dependence to be placed upon these men, he summoned the feudal chiefs and the independent states to send him troops. The chiefs of Nabha and Mullair Kotela sent in their men, to whom the safety of the station was entrusted. Detachments of these troops were likewise charged with the protection of the eight high roads that intersect the district of the ferries, the fords, and the ghats. The undisciplined Nabha troops unfortunately failed Mr. Ricketts in his hour of need. They bolted when going into action with the Jullundur mutineers;
mutineers; but this is not to be ascribed to any lukewarmness of their master. He was a staunch ally to us throughout. Other natives who materially aided the Deputy Commissioner were Mith Sing, Buswut Sing, the Lultan Chowdries, and of the Cabul pensioners the following, viz., Hassun Khan, Abdul Rehman, Saleh Mahomed, Shahpoor, and Shazadah Secunder.

29. On May 15, Mr. Ricketts sent his treasure to Phillour Fort. It was placed under the charge of Mr. Thornton, Assistant Commissioner, whose labour in connexion with it was greatly increased by the necessity of having to go to and fro a distance of seven miles across the swollen river on sudden and constant calls for money. At the same time Mr. Ricketts concentrated his police from the district at the station, adding by this movement 80 men to the force at his disposal for overawing the city. As a specimen of the vast amount of miscellaneous work entailed upon district officers generally during this mutiny, I take an extract from Mr. Ricketts' report, showing what he was obliged to do in Loodiana.

"Supervision began to be exercised over the post-office. Every post, without exception, till October was opened, and sorted by my assistants or myself, and great and endless were the irregularities; extra ammunition was distributed throughout the district; police supplies were accumulated at the different encamping grounds and halting places; the prisoners were looked to and re-ironed; materials were collected for bridge of boats and the repair of its approaches; a staff of artisans and labourers and an increased guard of picked Sikhs was posted there. Parties of Jagheerdaree or Contingent Horse were posted at all the tehsels and thannahs and along all the roads. Proclamations of rewards for the apprehension of deserters were promulgated; arms for the Irregulars were escorted to Ferozepore through the deserting sepoys. Ladies and children were sent out of the station and across the Sutlej to Phillour, where they had the advantage of a place of refuge in the fort garrisoned by Europeans; carriage for the transport of all kinds of army stores was collected; the bullock train arrangements were taken in hand; and the commissariat for European troops), and on saddles for Horse Artillery. Artisans were furnished for the magazines at Ferozepore and Phillour, and masons and carpenters for the new European barracks in course of construction in the hill stations, and so on in various ways which have escaped my notes and my memory. The internal resources of the district were brought into play to meet the demands of the times, whilst the spirit of the people was taken advantage of to commit them to the quarrel against the common enemy, and the various subordinate official departments were roused, by rewards freely given, and by punishments sharp and severe, to lend their co-operation."

30. Mr.
MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, IN 1857.

30. Mr. Ricketts, Lieutenant Yorke, and Captains Cox (Her Majesty's 53d), and Campbell, nightly patrolled the streets of the city at any time between 10 p.m. and 2 a.m. Captain Nicholls, Assistant Commissioner, was entrusted with the duty of forming a Sikh regiment, which the Chief Commissioner ordered to be raised.

31. I now come to the event which has called into prominent notice the bad qualities of Loodiana and the excellence of its officers, I mean the transit of the Jullundur mutineers on the 8th June. I have slightly alluded above to the abandoned character of the population. A short time previous to the arrival of the mutineers, Mr. Ricketts had received information that all the armourers and furbishers of the city were plying a most profitable trade: this could be for no good purpose. He resolved to disarm the city on the first opportunity. One presented itself when Major Coke's corps, the 1st Punjab Infantry, reached Loodiana on its way to Delhi. At dawn, on the 20th of June, on the inhabitants issuing from their homes; they found themselves confronted at every street-crossing, at every market place, by bands of these ferocious warriors, and sent back to their homes. Bodies of police, under European officers, entered each house and took the arms concealed therein. Eleven cart-loads of arms were thus discovered and seized. The inhabitants had shown the animus which had prompted them in accumulating these arms by joining the Jullundur mutineers on their passage through a few days previous, by burning the church and the mission, by pillaging the mission houses, by aiding the mutineers to mount heavy ordnance on the fort which the mutinous 3d had delivered up, by supplying them with food and water, and by pointing out the residences of Government officers for plunder and destruction. This pillage could not be prevented by the civil authorities. News of the Jullundur mutiny did not reach them till 11 hours after it took place, when the mutineers were already crossing the river and had joined the 3d Native Infantry at Phillour. Mr. Ricketts promptly went out to encounter the mutineers, searched for them all day, and came upon them after nightfall. His auxiliaries fled; his sole supporters were a detachment of Captain Rothney's corps, the 4th Sikhs, under Lieutenant Williams, who was severely wounded; he had to work a gun with his own hands until his ammunition ran out, and then was obliged reluctantly to retreat. At Jullundur and Loodiana, as in very many other places, the rebels had outwitted themselves. In their hurry, eager to escape from Jullundur, they took blank cartridges, and left the ball cartridges behind! They arrived at Loodiana, and in the height of their triumph at occupying the fort, found to their dismay that it contained vast stores of guns and powder, but no shot. They had none with them, not even musket balls. To remain was useless. They evacuated Loodiana and reached Delhi in safety, owing to the incompetence of the pursuit which was made by the military from Jullundur, and which I have adverted to in my remarks on that district. However, Loodiana was saved. The grand trunk road remained in our power. None suffered eventually from the riot except the rioters themselves and the city which harboured them; 22 of the plunderers were hanged the next day, and city fined 55,294 rupees.

32: The proposal to levy this fine emanated from Mr. Ricketts himself. It met my cordial approval, and has been sanctioned by the Chief Commissioner. I consider it one of the most masterly strokes of policy of the whole Punjab. The principle is well understood by the people, that when any members of a community disgrace themselves by violent encroachments on the rights of others, the whole community to which they belong atones for their guilt by pecuniary compensation to the sufferers, and by a fine to Government for its outraged authority. In this case it produced the most strikingly beneficial effects. It quieted not only Loodiana, but all the six market towns of the district. It inspired a salutary dread of a Government which was so manifestly inclined to hold its own, and care for neither prince, peasant, nor mutineer. Compensation was made to all the sufferers to the full extent of their losses, leaving a small balance, which will nearly cover the loss to Government property.

33. After the display of such an animus by the rabble of Loodiana and its neighbourhood, it was necessary to put it out of their power ever to display it again. To this end all native houses, within 300 yards of the fort, were levelled, and the Goojur population turned out to low lands beyond the city. The...
Goojurs of the whole city were disarmed, but not the Jats, as their subsequent co-operation with the British was reasonably to be expected, from the good feeling they had already shown. The Goojurs were also deprived of their boats, and inflated skins (for crossing the river) were made contraband amongst them. The low Hindoo staneee population, swarming in the old cantonments, was dispersed, sent home, and their houses levelled.

34. Particular instances of sedition occurred besides the great ebullition on June 8. A fanatical Goojur mouvée, after preaching sedition for some time, went off to Delhi. One or two of the Cabul pensioners (descendants of Shah Shooja) followed his example. The 3d Native Infantry, before they left, were also known to be firebrands, but nothing could be proved against them. The Hindoo chowdrees were, as a body, timid and lukewarm in our cause. On the other hand, instances of good feeling were also manifested. Ram Sing, one of these Hindoo chowdrees (or headmen), was an honourable exception to his class. He was ever active in laying in supplies, and at a very critical time advanced nearly 3,000 rupees for the public service. The Jats of the Rackote Thannah, when informed of the mutinies at Ferozepoor and Jullundur, set themselves to watch all the roads and wells, with the aim of seizing stragglers. It would be an endless task to enumerate all the instances of good and bad feeling among the people of this district. I trust the outline I have here furnished will show the difficulties that the district officers have had to battle with, and the energy with which they have met them.

**Thaney-sur.**

35. Captain M'Neile's principal difficulty in this district arose from the presence of a company of the mutinous 5th Native Infantry, which obliged him to have always at hand part of the Puttiala force to keep them in check. The disarming of this company on the 14th July set the Deputy Commissioner at liberty, and from that time he made his head-quarters at Kurnal. Mr. Levien, the Assistant Commissioner, was detached at Shahabad; and Lieutenant Parsons was sent from time to time to reduce turbulent villages, especially towards Khythul, or to watch the fords and ferries of the River Jumna. In anticipation of a visit from the Delhi mutineers, Captain M'Neile had, at the first, destroyed the stamp paper, and soon afterwards sent in his treasure to Umballa; while the gaol was fortified, and the Jagheerdars called out. At one time it was rumoured that the Ranghurs, from Hisaar, purposed to rescue their fellow clansmen from the Thaney-sur gaol, and the 31st May was the date fixed upon for the attack. Every preparation was made to repel, but it did not take place. The Ranghur prisoners were immediately afterwards secretly removed to Umballa, to be beyond hope of rescue. On June 9th the Rajah of Puttiala was compelled to draw off his forces from Thaney-sur, in order to protect his own capital, which was in some peril from the Jullundur mutineers; but as soon as he learnt that they had passed by, his troops were sent back to Thaney-sur, much to the relief of Captain M'Neile.

36. Captain M'Neile reports that the population showed an extreme reluctance to surrender to justice any of the fugitive mutineers from Ferozepoor or Jullundur. They would plunder them, but would not give them up, thus evincing a disloyal spirit, which was further shown by the refusal to pay the Government revenue. Such conduct was not to be borne. He therefore burnt the village of Asundh, which had made itself conspicuous in bad feeling, and heavily mulcted one or two others which seemed refractory. Murmuring was forthwith hushed, and the revenue was immediately paid, together with the fines.

37. Violent crime increased in this district also, and could only be checked by the same measures as were adopted elsewhere. Between the 13th and 29th June, 52 gang-robbers and other offenders were hanged in this district alone. After the middle of July, nothing occurred here worthy of note, as the people returned to their allegiance; and, after these energetic measures, the peace was not disturbed.

**Umballa.**

38. It was known for some weeks previous to the outbreak that the minds of the
the native soldiers in this station were unsettled. On the 19th April, mysterious fires began to occur, and though they were at first attributed to the thatchers, the eyes of all the residents were gradually opened to see that the soldiery, and none others, were the real authors of them. Mr. Forsyth obtained positive information, on the 7th and 8th May, that the prediction of a rebellious clique among the sepoys was, "that in the following week blood would be shed at Delhi or Umballa, and that a general rising of the sepoys would take place." On May 10th, the day of the Meerut mutiny, the 5th and 60th Regiments of Native Infantry, and the detached guard of the 60th, at the Treasury, simultaneously rushed to their bells of arms, and began loading their muskets. The Treasury guard remained under arms the whole day, in direct disobedience to orders. This overt act of mutiny was unconditionally forgiven by the military authorities; and the result was, that large portions of these regiments afterwards joined the rebels at Delhi; the remainder, when ordered into gaol, on September 1st, by the directions of the Chief Commissioner, attempted to fly, but were killed by the European troops, or afterwards captured and tried.

39. I desire to record prominently the success of Mr. Forsyth's exertions in procuring carriage at the first outbreak, when, as Mr. Barnes says, the natives, thinking 'our rule at an end, were deserted the town "like rats from a sinking ship."

40. Mr. Forsyth says: "As soon as it was seen by the Commander in Chief that an onward move should be made, a sudden difficulty arose in the want of carriage. The Deputy Commissary General having officially declared his inability to meet the wants of the army, the civil authorities were called upon to supply the demand. At Umballa there has ever been a difficulty to furnish carriage of any kind, the carts being of a very inferior description; however, such as they were, they had to be pressed into service, and in the course of a week, after the utmost exertions, 500 carts, 2,000 camels, and 2,000 coolies were made over to the Commissariat Department: 30,000 maunds of grain were likewise collected and stored for the army in the town of Umballa."

41. As soon as this first difficulty had been overcome, the necessity for preserving the peace of the district led Mr. Barnes to call on the commutation tenure chiefs to furnish men, instead of their usual tribute in money. By the operation of this order, a force of 459 foot and 259 horse was soon at our disposal; but the moral effect of these and the other influential chiefs siding with us was of far greater value than even the force they supplied.

42. Mr. Barnes observes further: "In addition to these jagheerdars, who were bound to supply levies, several public-spirited individuals volunteered their own services, and brought several followers. Among these, the most prominent were Rao Ruheem Buksh of Pinjlasa, who with 50 followers guarded the road between Umballa and Jugadree, and the Sirkundahs of Sadhena, who furnished 60 men to protect the public and private buildings in the civil station, thus relieving our police from very heavy duty."

43. I regret to say that the civil courts in this district were for some time unavoidably closed. Mr. Forsyth's time was wholly engrossed by his pressing miscellaneous duties; Captain M'Andrew, Assistant Commissioner, was on duty with the advanced guard of the Delhi field force; Mr. Plowden, Assistant Commissioner, was on detached duty on the River Jumna; and the time of the only remaining civil officer, Mr. Vaughan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, was entirely taken up with the very heavy duties of the treasury. It was not till Mr. C. P. Elliott was transferred from Lahore to Umballa that the court could be re-opened, and by his well-known industry and perseverance he rapidly cleared off all arrears in this department. The casual mention I have just made of Mr. Plowden will not, however, suffice to convey a sense of my appreciation of his services. He was detached with a squadron of the 4th Light Cavalry under Captain Wyld, and two companies of the 5th Native Infantry under Captain Garstin, to keep down the turbulent population of the banks of the Jumna. He was out in camp from 19th May to November, and was always to be found wherever danger was threatening or insurrection abroad. The force with him (Mr. Barnes states) was the means of saving Saharanpoor, whither it had gone to act in conjunction with Mr. Spankie, the energetic
Magistrate and Collector of that place. Even when deserted and fired at by the Hindoostanee troops, Mr. Plowden held on with the Sikhs, and eventually succeeded in checking the progress of the bold marauders, and destroying their short-lived power. Captain Gardner, a Delhi refugee, was sent with two other companies of the 5th Native Infantry to guard Roopur. Mr. Barnes gave him authority to act as a magistrate, if needful, and he did excellent service. He remained there until the men were called in. The zeal he displayed while thus serving his country makes me the more lament his death, which occurred at Kussowlee a short time afterwards, from illness induced by the exposure and exertions which he had undergone.

44. I have minutely detailed the events which took place in this district, owing to the most important geographical position it occupied. Any serious disturbance or suspension of our power in it would have been fatal to the success of the siege of Delhi on the one hand, and fatal to the quiet of this province on the other hand; and I can but record my feeling of deep thankfulness to the wise and good Providence who overruled all events here to the final successful issue.

Simla.

45. This district contains the large sanatoria of Simla and Kussowlee, with the military cantonments of Dugshai, Subathoo and Jutogh. At the time of the outbreak, there were on the hills the 1st and 2d Fusiliers and the Goorkha regiment, known as the Nussaree Battalion, and also the Commander in Chief and his staff. All troops were instantly ordered to march to Umballa preparatory to moving on Delhi. The European regiments and the Commander in Chief started, but the Goorkhas refused to move. There was a guard of the regiment at Kussowlee. The head quarters were at Jutogh. The Kussowlee guard, amounting to about 80 men, mutinied and marched off with a large sum of Government money to join their comrades at Jutogh, where a bad feeling had also been evinced. Some time previous to the Delhi massacre, the regiment had been thrown into a state of excitement by reports which had reached them regarding the purpose of Government to subvert their caste. They afterwards said that the men of all the hill regiments assembled at the school of musketry at Umballah had obtained leave from their respective corps to use the suspected cartridges, but the depot from their regiment had not so obtained leave, and they believed that the letters which had been sent, asking the opinion of the regiment, had been wilfully suppressed by Government. On the manifestation by the European residents at Simla of the excitement consequent on the news of the disasters in the plains and the relief of the various guards and the orders to march, the Goorkhas found they were distrusted. They knew of no enemy, and thought that all their preparations were merely to bring them into traps which had been laid to destroy their caste. They looked on the fact of the Europeans arming themselves as a mark of fear, and as a sign of a fixed intention to destroy their creed and their nation. They rose in a body, turned out their “depot men” with ignominy from cantonments, clamoured, roared, and shouted against their officers, the Government, and the Commander in Chief. The more moderate men withheld the others from the actual perpetration of acts of violence which they twice set out to perform, but for many hours the uproar in their lines was indescribable. Lord William Hay, the Deputy Commissioner, and Major Bagot, their commanding officer, at length allayed the excitement, and succeeded in making them hear reason. On assurance of the speedy redress of what they considered as their grievances, the tumult subsided, the men returned to their lines. They had heard of the march from Kussowlee of the treasury guard, expressed themselves as feeling disgraced by its mutiny, marched out to meet the party, seized and confined it, with its spoil of 7,000 rupees. Captain Briggs, superintendent of hill roads, who had been specially deputed by the Commander in Chief, arrived. The regiment was induced to appoint representatives to confer on the subject of their imaginary wrongs. Their principal requests were the restoration to service of two of their comrades who had been dismissed for mutinous language by sentence of a court martial, the payment of arrears of pay due from Government, and a free pardon to all the regiment for what they had done. Their requests were granted, but the conduct of the Kussowlee guard, condemned as
it was, by the rest of the regiment, could not be overlooked. They were not forgiven. During the progress of these conferences, the European inhabitants of Simla had been seized with a panic. Two guns, the signal of the advance from Jutogh of the murdering mutineers, had by some singular mistake been fired; the bank house, which had been appointed the rendezvous, was soon deserted, and nearly the whole English population became scattered over the surrounding hills. Many took refuge with the neighbouring chiefs from whom they received much kindness. Many reached Dughshai or Subathoo, and were hospitably entertained, but I regret to say the temporary distress among the fugitives was very severe. The Goorkhas, however marched according to orders in a day or two, and society freed from the incubus of their presence, recovered its usual tone. During the disturbance at Kussowlee, caused by the mutiny of the guard, but after its departure, the police rifled the treasury. A great part of the plundered money was, however, recovered, through the deposition of one of the criminals who turned Queen's evidence. Their native officer, on hearing of the disclosure of his villany, committed suicide. No other event of importance took place in this territory. Lord William Hay reports that the hill chiefs showed a good spirit throughout, and his principal trouble was caused by the turbulence of the low population (chiefly Hindoostanees) infesting the large bazaars which required a strong hand to restrain it.

TRANS-SUTLEJ STATES.

46. It was of the last importance that the peace of this division should be preserved, as it formed the medium through which the supplies and troops from the whole of the Punjab proper had to pass in order to reach Delhi. It was likewise important, as containing the strong forts of Phillour, Kangra, Noorpore, and Brijwara, the sanataria of Dhurmsala and Dalhousie, and the large native state of Kupoorthulla. This division was also the supply depot of a large portion of the carriage used in the transport of the troops and stores to Delhi, and Captain Farrington in his report for his district, mentions the care and labour of the telegraph was at the service of the district, the treasure was placed under an European guard. and immediate establishment there; the telegraph was at work by 10 o'clock the same evening, while 150 men of Her Majesty's 6th Foot, relieved the native companies from garrison duty by 3 a.m., of the 13th. Two guns were taken from Phillour to Jullundur and united to the two already there, and the whole placed under a guard of the 8th Queen's Regiment. Two post guns were likewise equipped to render service in any part of the district if required. The tehsil of Jullundur was strengthened to serve as a fort. The men of the Shere Dil police battalion, were called in from the district, the treasure was placed under an European guard, and all European inhabitants were brought together. The province of the Rajah of Kupoorthulla, from whom Captain Farrington had on the very first day solicited a force, tended greatly to keep the suspected native infantry regiments in check. The services rendered to the Government by this faithful ally have been made the subject of a separate report. It is therefore sufficient to mention here, that his force of six guns, 225 horse, and 1,100 infantry, was an invaluable assistance to the local authorities in this crisis, and particularly on the night of the mutiny. Under the earnest solicitation of Colonel Hartley, the treasure was subsequently placed in equal portions under the care of the two native regiments, and owing to the prudent arrangements made by Captain Farrington, the Deputy Commissioner, in forwarding all the several district remittances to Phillour, and in paying away all claims upon the Government alternately from the treasure chest in the custody of each regiment, this confidence in the guards did not cause
the loss of more than about 5,000 rupees, as the guard of the 36th Native Infantry remained staunch to the last.

48. There had been no lack of evidence to show that a mutinous spirit was abroad in the regiments. Constant fires had occurred in the station, and other signs of a bad feeling had been manifested; but I regret to say that the military authorities disregarded these warnings, placed confidence in their men, neglected an opportunity for disarming them, and the outbreak found us unprepared. At 11 p.m., on 7 June, a fire broke out in cantonments. When the officers went down to extinguish it, they were fired on, for the whole body of the native troops, with the exception of the artillery, which opened on the mutineers with grape, and of fragments from each regiment, was in open mutiny. They are supposed to have left the station in two bodies, about 1 a.m.; one party skirting the Hoshyarpoire Hills, the larger body making for the Sutlej via Phillour. The pursuing force, consisting of a detachment of Her Majesty's 8th Foot, six guns and some military police, was not ordered out till 7 a.m., when the hot June sun had already risen, and the advantage of a cool night march for them had been lost; Captain Farrington accompanied it with 150 of the Rajah of Kupoorthulla's men. No rations were sent with the Europeans, nor did any servants accompany them to cook their food. They reached Phugwara seven miles off at 11 a.m.; before this time the mutineers were at Phillour, or 17 miles a head; there they were joined by the 3d Native Infantry; they seized a boat which had been left on the west side, a small body crossed and brought over more boats, and the whole force crossed leisurely during the day. On the east side they were most gallantly attacked by Mr. G. Ricketts, Deputy Commissioner of Loodiana, who worked a gun against them himself, and by Lieutenant Williams of the 4th Seikhs, but as they were not supported by General Johnstone, who had reached Phillour in the evening, and saw and heard the engagement, they could not seriously weaken the mutinous force, which advanced to Loodiana, and took possession of the fort. This they evacuated the next morning, but they opened the gaol and encouraged the populace to destroy the church and the mission premises. At 9 a.m., of the 9th, the advance of the Europeans started again in pursuit, crossed the river at two in the afternoon, and reached Loodiana by sunset, but the General did not arrive till an hour before midnight. At 4 a.m., of the 10th, the advance left Loodiana and reached the village of Daylon at 9.30, where they heard that the mutineers were still 10 or 12 miles ahead at Malair Kotela. By this time, the Europeans were exhausted, foot-sore and dispirited. Their officers too saw that it was folly to proceed without supplies or support from the rear, neither of which could be obtained; the pursuit was therefore given up, and the troops returned to Loodiana the same night.

49. The party of the mutineers which went along the Hoshyarpoire Hills, made good its escape before the district officers could hear of its arrival. This event did not, however, seriously affect the district, as the march of the mutineers was too hurried to allow them time for much mischief, and they moved in an orderly manner to give colour to the supposition that they were a detachment on Government duty.

50. This mutiny gave rise to an order directing all females to leave Jullundur for Lahore, which was immediately enforced. The 8th Foot shortly afterwards joined Brigadier Nicholson's moveable column, and assisted in the disarming of the 33d and 35th Native Infantry, which was effected at Phillour on June 25th. The place of the troops thus withdrawn was supplied by 300 Tawannah horse, sent from Lahore by a Seikh regiment which Major Lake was requested to raise on the spot, and by extra police which he was authorised to entertain to the number of about 100 horse and 150 foot. The conquest tenure jagheerdars were also called upon for their quotas of horse, and Captain Farrington enlisted 20 Daood Pootras from Leia in his troop, thus introducing a foreign element which proved advantageous. In addition to the large number of men so entertained, a considerable number was sent to Delhi to join the artillery and guide corps. Major Lake, however, mainly ascribes the safety not only of this country but of this division in this its unprotected state, under Providence, to Rajah Rundheer Sing Alloowalia and his men. The peace of the district throughout has been excellently preserved, and the 6 per cent. loan fairly subscribed to.
Hosharpoor.

51. The first precaution Colonel Abbott, Deputy Commissioner, adopted in this district was to strengthen the tehsel and remove into its inclosure two guns from the lines of the native troop of horse artillery, where they were in dangerous proximity to the 33d Native Infantry. By employing free and convict labour, this task was accomplished by the 13th May. The same day the ladies from the civil station left for Dharamsala, and a few weeks afterwards the post-office was removed from cantonments into the civil lines, and a minute examination of all suspicious correspondence commenced. Colonel Abbott also organized a system of nightly patrolling; while in his own house he, with the two Assistant Commissioners, Lieutenants Paske and Millar, kept a constant watch. The station was guarded by about 800 men of the Alloowalia, Rajori Mundi; and Twana troops, by new levies, and by part of the Shere Dils. On the 23d May the prisoners were removed into the Brijwara fort, which was then adapted to answer both as a gaol and as a fortress, and garrisoned by police instead of by the usual guard of the 33d Native Infantry. A conspiracy was discovered on the 12th July amongst the prisoners; the five ringleaders were tried by commission, and executed by sunset of the same day, and all resistance thereby anticipated. The only disturbances in this district were caused by the incursion of servants from the large station of Simla, who spread exaggerated reports of the panic at that station, and by the rapid march of the small detachments of the Jullundur mutineers, who walked 130 miles in 54 hours, and escaped along the hills before notice had reached the head quarters of the district. Lieutenant W. Paske was twice detached with parties of horse, once to watch the Roopur mutineers, who were afterwards disarmed at Umballa, and once to pursue the flying portion of the Jullundur force.

52. Regarding the internal administration, Colonel Abbott reports:—“No cases in dispute fell into arrear in the Revenue Department; even the appeals were disposed of regularly. Treasure has been escorted from the tehsels to Hosharpoor, from Hosharpoor to Jullundur, Phillour and Umballa, without the slightest excitement. The Educational Department has been steadily at work; revenue has been paid. The courts of justice have been open; not a highway robbery has occurred; and for this great tranquillity I trust I am sufficiently thankful to Divine Providence, and the people have expressed their unfeigned thankfulness for such tranquillity by subscribing one lac of rupees (10,000 l.) to the 6 per cent. loan, and by general illumination on the news of the occupation of Delhi.”

Kangra.

53. The peculiarities of this district are its mountainous nature, the number of rivers and streams that traverse it, and the number of petty chieftains and hill forts which are dispersed over its area, the first two causes combining to make communication difficult and uncertain, and the last rendering it imperative, especially in times of anxiety like that under review, that the district officer should be kept well informed of every event occurring anywhere. Very much of its tranquillity depends on the preservation of the two strong fortresses of Kangra and Noorpoor. “He who holds the fort” (of Kangra), say the country people, “holds the hills.” Major Taylor, the Deputy Commissioner, was compelled to entertain a very large number of men to watch these ferries and the nakabs, or hill passes, and his anxiety was further increased by the manifestation, in two instances, of an uneasy feeling among the hill chiefs. The first was by Raja Pertab Chund, of Teera, who seemed inclined to raise troops on his own account. Major Lake, with great promptitude, removed the Kutoch thannadhur, of Teera, who was one of his adherents, and substituted a Mahomedan, who has since afforded constant and true information regarding the Rajah’s movements, and no outbreak took place. There was, however, one petty rising, originated by a pretender of unknown origin to the extinct title and kingdom of the late Rai Thakoor Sing, of Kullu. Under the impression that British power was annihilated, this person endeavoured to excite a rising against Gyan Sing, the rightful heir, among the people of Kullu and Seoraj. Major Hay, Assistant Commissioner 238.
Commissioner at Kullu, had, however, been on the watch, and on the first overt act apprehended the soi-disant Pertab Sing and executed him, with five of his chief men; 16 other conspirators were imprisoned by the same commission; a large store of powder and arms found in his fort, most of which seemed to have been long buried there, was destroyed.

54. A great impression was made upon the people by the energy evinced by Majors Lake and Taylor in occupying the Kangra fort. This step was taken early in the morning of 14th May, when a party of Captain Younghusband's Shere Dil police were marched into the citadel. This was further defended by a howitzer taken from the fort below. The bulk of the treasure was at the same time sent into the citadel, and the remainder lodged in the newly fortified police station. Every house in Dhurmsala was guarded by a detail of police or new levies, a part of which was also detached as the gaol guard. The post-office was brought under a strict surveillance, the ferries and passes guarded, and all vagrants seized and brought before the magistrates for examination. When information of the mutinies of the native troops at Jhelum and Sealkote reached Kangra, Major Taylor acting under my instructions, disarmed the left wing of the 4th Native Infantry, with the aid of the men of the police battalion, and marched 34 miles the same night with a part of the same body and some Sikh cavalry to Noorpoor, to disarm the right wing of the same regiment stationed at that place. The men had however voluntarily surrendered their arms to their commanding officer, Major Wilkie, at his simple request, before Major Taylor could arrive.

55. Regarding this, Major Lake very truly observes, that it was "one of the most remarkable episodes of this eventful mutiny, and one which contrasts most favourably with the horrible outrages recorded elsewhere. Too much cannot be said in favour of the regiment, which I hope will not be forgotten when rewards are given to the loyal and well-disposed. It is as creditable to the men as it is to Major Wilkie and his officers, both European and native."

LAHORE DIVISION.

56. This is the chief division of the Punjab. In it there lie the two largest commercial cities of this province, of which one is also the capital. The country side is studded with the seats of the native nobility, who under the Sikh rule coveted grants in land in these districts, as being near the metropolis, and affording conveniences for their constant attendance at court. The population of the division amounts to one-third of the population of the whole Punjab. It is watered by four of the five rivers that give their name to the province. Its value, as regards the preservation of British rule in India, could not be overrated. These several circumstances greatly increased the labours and anxieties of the officers, on whom the responsibility of preserving peace in it lay. Nobly have they acquitted themselves, and I shall have occasion to bring forward instances of vigor and cool self-reliance on their part which have nowhere been surpassed. Foremost among them stands the Commissioner, Mr. A. A. Roberts. The details in each district will show the value of his services, and the successful earnestness which marked all he did.

Lahore.

57. I have already mentioned the important move which gave us a fast hold in North India, when the empire seemed well nigh overwhelmed by the flood of mutiny which had burst forth so uncontrollably in the North Western Provinces, viz., the disarming of the troops at Meean Meer. Our danger on the morning of 13th May was far greater than we had conceived. A plot had been laid for the simultaneous seizure of the fort and the outbreak of the troops in cantonments. To understand the importance of this move, it must be borne in mind that the fort commands the city of Lahore, that it contains the treasure and the arsenal, that at Ferozepore 50 miles distant, there is another arsenal the largest in this part of India, and had these two fallen, the North Western Provinces and the Punjab must have been for the time irrevocably lost, the lives of all Europeans in these regions sacrificed, Delhi could not have been taken, and
and India must have been, *ab initio*, reconquered. But He who rules over all things had seen fit to save our country from so great a shock. The designs of the conspirators were frustrated. By 5 a.m. of the 13th, three companies of Her Majesty's 81st Foot marched into the fort and relieved the native infantry guard, while the ringing of the ramrods as the remaining companies of that regiment on the parade ground at Meean Meer, obeyed the order to load, sounded the knell of sepoy power in the Punjab. The three regiments of native infantry and one of light cavalry were cowed by that stirring sound, and by the sight of 12 horse artillery guns charged with destruction to them should they resist. The infantry piled arms and marched off with silent and angry astonishment. The cavalry unbuckled their swords, and threw them on the ground, and the capital of the Punjab was saved.

58. The next night, 14th May, at 10 p.m., Mr. Roberts, the Commissioner, accompanied by one military and two civil officers, brought to my house a paper, in the Persian character, which had just reached us, on the Sutlej, giving a confused account of the attack on the Ferozepoor entrenchment that afternoon by the 45th Native Infantry. It gave not any account of the result of the action. We conjectured that my express of the previous day to Brigadier Innes had failed of its design, that the sepoys who had gained the arsenal, had crossed the bridge of boats, and were in full march on Lahore. In the earnest deliberation which ensued, other circumstances occurred to our minds, which seemed to make our position in Lahore critical to the last degree. A Punjabee police corps, the only one we had to carry on the civil duties, and which furnished personal guards to all the civil officers at the station, was reputed to be disaffected. Happily this turned out to be quite false. Lieutenant Gulliver, engineers, volunteered to ride off to cantonments, to acquaint the brigadier with what we had just learnt, and beg him to do what he could to defend himself. Messrs. Egerton, Deputy Commissioner, and Elliott, Assistant Commissioner, went round the station to take note of what might be going on. They returned reporting all quiet. Shortly afterwards Mr. Gulliver also came back, learning from Brigadier Corbett the joyful news of the repulse of the outburst, and the comparative safety of Ferozepoor, the brigadier having received a despatch direct from Brigadier Innes. There could be no doubt that there had been a plot arranged between the Lahore and Ferozepoor Brigades, for on that same forenoon (14th May), I received two hasty notes from Brigadier Corbett, saying that all the troops in Meean Meer were preparing to desert bodily. This caused a panic among the residents of Anarkullee, and a rendezvous of all male residents took place at the central gaol. The guns, and Her Majesty's 81st Regiment, were however so quickly got ready, that the natives retired into their lines. Some who did escape were seized by the villagers of the tract called the Manjha, and taken to Mr. Thomas, Assistant Commissioner at Kussoor, the chief town of that part of the Manjha, which lies in the Lahore district, and on the direct route to Ferozepoor. Mr. Thomas sent them into Lahore. I may here notice the eminent services rendered to the State by this officer. His experience, activity, and strong common sense, induced me to place full reliance on him, and I know that to the district officer his aid was invaluable. The stalwart Sikhs who form the population of the Manjha were wholly on our side throughout. Many villages have been almost decimated by the number of recruits who have flocked to form our new regiments in memory of the bygone days, when they bravely fought against us under the banners of Runjeet Sing.

59. Defensive measures were at once adopted at Anarkullee as follows: The fort was provisioned for six months for 4,000 men, and every gate blocked up but one. All the men of the various Punjab regiments, who happened to be on leave at their homes in this neighbourhood were called in, and collected under the command of the late lamented Captain Travers. They furnished pickets for guard round the central gaol and at other places where danger seemed to threaten. A company of volunteers from the European residents of Anarkullee, was raised in 36 hours to the number of 130 men, and for some days Anarkullee was guarded only by them, a half-company of Sobhaee Khan's police battalion, and a few ordinary police. A rendezvous was appointed, and danger signals arranged. A chain of mounted police was thrown out along the roads leading...
leading to cantonments, which for a length of time, were patrolled during the night by the junior civil and military officers of the station. The usual precautions in regard to ferries, sepoys' letters, &c., were vigorously observed.

60. On the 26th and 27th, the Guide Corps passed through on their famous march to Delhi, and about a week afterwards, the moveable column under Brigadier Neville Chamberlain arrived. On June 9, two men of the 35th Native Infantry, which was one of the regiments composing the column, were blown from guns on the Anarkullee parade ground by sentence of a drum-head court martial, for sedition and intended mutiny.

61. Various petty events occurred, showing the excited state of men's minds. A trooper of the disarmed 10th Irregulars on his way down with his regiment, seized a sword and made a feint of attacking several persons, but gave up his weapon quietly at last. He was punished with five years' imprisonment; a man armed with a sword rushed out from the gates, cut down the sentry, and was eventually shot by a mounted policeman, while making for the bridge of boats. Many persons fell under suspicion from the discovery of papers, which to say the least were of very questionable loyalty, and several trials of such parties were held. The enigmatical way in which the papers were sometimes worded, or the care with which the real treason had been concealed, had the effect the criminals desired. No proof could be found, and in several cases, it was found needful to release on security, men whose characters were by no means immaculate. Those who could not give security, were detained in gaol. On the 23d May the native newspapers were placed under a strict censorship, which has ever since up to the present time been rigorously enforced, under the control of Mr. Perkins, Assistant Commissioner. On 23d and 24th July, restrictions were placed on the sale of lead, sulphur, percussion caps, &c. The Hindostanee population, including civil officials and domestic servants, had been disarmed, on June 29th; and on the 23d August, a census of all unemployed Hindostanee was taken with a view of their expulsion. The superintendence of this compulsory exodus, and the arrest and deportation of numbers of vagrants, formed no small part of the Deputy Commissioner's work. Bi-weekly kaliwas were formed of Hindostanees. They were sent down to Hurreekee Ferry, under guard of police with lists signed by a district officer, and duly checked at certain stations. As many as 2,536 Hindostanees were thus sent home during the siege, and in the few weeks immediately succeeding the capture of Delhi.

62. On the 30th July, the 26th Native Infantry mutinied at Meean Meer, and murdering Major Spencer their commanding officer, one non-commissioned European, and two native officers, fled. They escaped during a heavy dust storm, which concealed them from observation and kept us in ignorance of their route. They were destroyed by Mr. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner of Umritsur, on the banks of the Ravee. This event showed the necessity for some means of tracking any future body of deserters, especially as the loyalty of the remaining regiments was very doubtful. Four strong police posts were established in villages which lie beyond the plain upon which the cantonment is built, and the men were instructed to throw out chains of sentries and to watch narrowly all passers by. On September 17th, Mr. R. E. Egerton, officiating Deputy Commissioner, was called suddenly down to the south-west part of his district in order to prevent the taint of the Khurral insurrection from reaching the Mussulman population of that part of the country. Mr. Perkins, Assistant Commissioner was also, for a few days, stationed at a remote police post, into the boundaries of which emissaries from the insurgents were known to have come. The appearance, with Mr. Egerton, of a regiment of Wales' Horse and other demonstrations deferred the Khurrals of the district from joining their rebellious kinsmen. Mr. Egerton was out on another occasion for three or four weeks in company with the Commissioner, Mr. Roberts, in the Googaira district, on similar duty. The civil charge of this important station was confided on these occasions to Mr. R. Berkely, Extra Assistant Commissioner, who has well fulfilled the trust, and has throughout displayed much vigor.

63. In the two gaols at Lahore there were confined on the 11th May 2,379 prisoners. It was not unreasonable to suppose, that should the native troops mutiny, they would release all these desperadoes as they did at Agra and elsewhere. It was also likely that the troops themselves would have to be put in gaol.
MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, IN 1857.

64. The city, which gives its name to this district, is the principal mart in the Punjab. It is commanded by the celebrated fortress of Govindghur. It is to the Sikh what the Isle of Mona was to the Briton of Julius Caesar's day, what Mecca is to the Mahomedan and Benares to the Hindoo. On Umritsur, as the pivot, might be said to turn the loyalty of the Khalsa. Did it fail us, the Sikh might be expected to rebel; did it stand firm, their attachment was secure. It was a source of much uneasiness that the stronghold was occupied by a detachment of the 59th Native Infantry, with only 70 European artillerymen. Captain Lawrence, Captain of Police, and Mr. Roberts, Commissioner, drove over, on the 13th May, immediately after the disarming at Meean Meer, to arrange for its safety. On their return to Lahore the following the day, they represented to Brigadier Corbett the emergent necessity for pushing a body of European foot into it. He instantly complied, and notwithstanding the alarming events of that day, as narrated above, half a company of the 81st Foot was run across the same night, in ekas or native one-horse gigs. It entered Govindghur peaceably by dawn of the 15th. The 59th still remained in the fort, but as soon as Europeans were available the latter took their place. The 59th was disarmed by Brigadier-general Nicholson commanding the moveable column on July 9th. As soon as the outbreak occurred one of the first measures adopted by Mr. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner, was to provision this fortress. It was rapidly and thoroughly effected without exciting any particular notice, and the fort then became one of our bulwarks, which it had not hitherto been. Mr. Macnaghten, Assistant Commissioner, at the same time went out on the Lahore road to raise the country (a part of the Manjha) against any deserters who might come by. Rewards were offered for any sepoys who deserted, the smothered martial spirit of the people was kindled, escape for a sepoy was hopeless, for every village became to him as a nest of hornets. The temper of the people was one great cause of the achievement which has made the Umritsur district famous in the annals of 1857.

65. On 31st July a large body of disarmed sepoys appeared on the left bank of the Ravee near Balghat, asking for information as to the fords. The people's most curious attention was roused. They amused the sepoys for a few hours with various pretences while runners hastened away to the neighbouring tehsals of Ajnala, and even on to Umritsur. Pram Nath, tehsildar of Ajnala, quickly brought down every available policeman he had, and it was found that these men were the 26th Native Infantry, who had mutinied the previous day at Lahore, and after committing four murders, had travelled across country off the main lines of communication 40 miles in 19 hours. A fight ensued. The river banks were soon trodden into slime with the blood of 150 men who were destroyed by the villagers and police. By 4 p.m. Mr. Cooper arrived with about 80 horse accompanied by Sirdar Jodh Sing, extra assistant, an old Sikh chieftain. The mutineers had escaped by a ford to an island in mid-stream. Here, on Mr. Cooper's appearance, they gave themselves up. They were lodged that night in the thannah and tehsul of Ajnala. The next morning a stern example was enacted. "The punishment of mutiny is death." They were brought out in tens, shot by the Sikh levies, and the corpses thrown into an old dry well hard by; 237 were thus executed; 45 had died during the night; 35 had drowned themselves on Mr. Cooper's approach the previous day. About 42 were sent back to Lahore, and there blown from guns in presence of the whole brigade. Solemn was the sound that boomed over our cantonments announcing to the residents of Anarkullee, as they drove out in the sultry August.

See Appendices, Nos. 7 and 8.
August evening, the consummation of the punishment of the 26th Native Infantry.

66. Many Sikhs, however, on service with their regiments in the North West Provinces, failed their country and their masters. Many were drawn into the vortex of revolt, and, after the fall of Delhi, tried to steal home. A close search was made for them. When the regiments to which they belonged had murdered their officers, the men were executed. In other cases they were punished by different terms of imprisonment. This operation was carried on, by more or less, throughout the Punjab: but it is here noticed, as many of them had their homes in this district.

67. The usual amount of disaffection was found amongst the Hindoostanees in this district, and the same precautions were adopted as elsewhere, in regard to their letters, the stoppage of the ferries, and the expulsion of vagrants and emissaries from Delhi. Mr. Aitchison, Assistant Commissioner, was dispatched on two occasions into the interior, to guard a river or to give confidence to a subdivision; and Mr. Cooper himself for many weeks remained out on patrol duty every night until past midnight. Captain Perkins, Assistant Commissioner, had charge of the recruiting department; and Mr. Macnaghten, Assistant Commissioner, distinguished himself in the apprehension of an incendiary named Bhaee Malearaj Sing, and in his voluntary expedition to Ataree, on May 14th, to raise the country. Here he was willingly seconded by Diwan Narayan Sing, the agent of Sirdar Kanh Sing, Atariwala.

68. A sepoy and a native doctor of the 35th Native Infantry were hung at different times for seditious language. The executions produced a marked change in the demeanor of the people; and the moral effect of the presence of General Nicholson's moveable column at different periods, aggregating about a month, was great.

69. It might have been expected that the subscription to the 6 per cent. loan, from the wealthy cities of Umritsur and Lahore, would have been large. The opposite was the case. The punchaists, or heads of the mercantile intercyle, behaved so ill, that the authorities intend visiting them with suitable punishment. Their contributions were inappreciable. Men worth half a crore of rupees offered a subscription of 1,000 rupees, and others on the same scale. Their niggard distrust of our Government speaks very unfavourably for their loyalty, and is in strong contrast with the eager co-operation of the rural population.

Goordaspore.

70. One of the first precautions adopted here by the Deputy Commissioner (Mr. Nasmyth) was to send 700,000 rupees of treasure into the fort of Govindghur, at Umritsur. It was put under a guard of the 2d Irregular Cavalry, and run through the 44 miles, on the night of the 20th May, by relays of bylees, or light two-bullock carts. On June 3d, a feeling of still greater security was created in the station by the dismissal of the detachment of the 59th Native Infantry, to join its head-quarters at Umritsur. Its place over the treasury was taken by a party of the police battalion, from which corps also guards had been furnished to the houses of all European residents, until the 59th left. The gaol was carefully watched, and interviews between the prisoners and any of their friends forbidden, lest any design to break gaol should be formed.

71. There was an extraordinary number of Hindoostanees in this district, mostly employed on the works of Baree Doab Canal, which had its head quarters at Madhapoor. This public enterprise had not hitherto attracted natives of the Punjab in the proportion that might have been expected. Many of the native clerks, contractors, and workmen are natives of Hindooostan. As such it was needful to watch them closely, and to resort to espionage, that any projected disturbance might be stifled at once. Two civil officers, Hindoostanees of some rank in the Government service, fell under such serious suspicion that they were removed to other places, and ulterior measures against them were at one time contemplated.

72. It was impossible to guard the river thoroughly here, as it was frequently fordable; and, owing to its proximity to the mountains, and consequent liability to
MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, IN 1857.

to sudden freshes, no dependence could be placed on it as a barrier. However, all stray beams and planks which could be bound up in rafts were cleared away; all the boats but two were withdrawn or sculled; and on receipt of the news of the Jhelum mutiny, on July 7th, these two were also sunk. The river was therefore considered temporarily impassable. Two days after this came tidings of the march of the 46th Native Infantry, and wing of the 9th Light Cavalry, in mutiny from Sealkote, towards Goordaspoor. The news had been also telegraphed to Brigadier General Nicholson, who was lying at Umritsur with his moveable column. The signaller was drunk, and the message was not delivered, but an express, sent by mail-cart, reached early in the morning. He was earnestly requested to intercept the mutineers; and with his characteristic energy he started the same evening, with six guns, under Captain Bourchier, 600 men of Her Majesty's Foot, some raw Seikh levies, and a few half-disciplined Seikh horse.

73. To the commercial men of Umritsur and Lahore the metalled road offers special advantages, for it enables hundreds of native gigs or ekas to fly unceasingly between the two cities. On the day I allude to the district officers of both places were ordered to seize every ekka, bylee, and pony that was to be seen, and to dispatch them, under police guards, to General Nicholson's camp at Umritsur, on urgent public service. These vehicles, on their arrival there, were promptly loaded with British soldiers, and the force started at dusk for Goordaspoor, which is at a distance of 44 miles from Umritsur, reaching it at 3 p.m. of July 11th. It was joined at Battala by Mr. Roberts, Commissioner, and Captain Perkins, Assistant Commissioner of Umritsur. The next day General Nicholson was told that the mutineers had crossed to the left bank of the Ravee, by the ford at Trimmoo. He marched, and met them drawn up in line, near the river. The 9th Light Cavalry charged the artillery fearlessly on both flanks, and cut down some of the gunners. The 46th Native Infantry advanced boldly to take the guns, in the face of a storm of grape, which mowed them down by scores; and it was not till the 52d leaped out on them with the bayonet that they turned and fled. The remnant of the mutinous force took refuge in an island, where they erected a battery for their gun, and collected their women and their spoil. At daylight on July 16th they were attacked in this their last place of refuge. Numbers were drowned or shot in the water, many were killed in the flight, and the prisoners were all executed by martial law. On the 18th, the column returned to Goordaspoor. The villagers of the district showed that they well understood the value of a mutineer, and many were brought in by them, and executed by Captain Adams, Assistant Commissioner, and Mr. Nasmyth, in commission. Most of the party that escaped to Jummoo were made over to us by the Maharajah's officers, and tried by Lieutenant MacMahon and Captain Adams at Bheekho Chuk.

74. During the first week in August a remnant, numbering about 25 men, of the 26th Native Infantry, from Lahore, found their way into the swamps of this district. They were all killed by a party of the new levy under Messrs. Garbett and Hanna of the Canal Department, and by a separate little party of the 2d Irregular Cavalry under Major Jackson, who was slightly wounded.

75. The raising of the levy was an important part of the work of the district officers. It was entrusted to Captain Adams, and the force has been pronounced one of the best bodies of men that have been recently raised in the Punjab. On this head Mr. Nasmyth makes the following remarks, which I insert as being generally applicable: "This general enlistment was one of the most popular as it was among the most effective measures adopted by Government, and contributed in a vast degree to link the population in this part of the country with the British cause. A mutual interest and sympathy was created to support that cause which had now become common; deep and earnest were the aspirations which vibrated in every homestead, and evinced that the military spirit of the nation had been gratified, and afforded an assurance that its valiant sons would not be backward in vindicating the trust bestowed."

Sealkote.

76. At this station were located at the time of the Meerut and Delhi outbreak the following troops:

238. F Colonel
When the moveable column was formed all these troops were withdrawn, with the exception of the 46th Native Infantry and a wing of the 9th Cavalry. Brigadier Brind, who was in command, remonstrated against being left in such critical times with only Hindostanee troops. He was requested to remove all cause of alarm by disarming them. He did not see his way clear to do this, and the column marched on. Mr. Monckton, Deputy Commissioner, in conjunction with his assistants, Messrs. McMahon and Jones, and Syud Kaim Ally, extra Assistant Commissioner, had carried out the various orders which had reached him from the Commissioner, when, on the 9th July, the whole civil power was suspended by the simultaneous mutiny of all the native troops. The cavalry attacked the brigadier, and a troop shot him in the back. He died of the wound the next day. Dr. Graham, Superintending Surgeon, was shot by his daughter’s side as he drove her in his gig. Dr. Graham, Medical Storekeeper, was killed in his carriage among his children, one of whom was grazed by the ball. Captain Bishop, Brigade Major, was shot in sight of the fort, whither he was fleeing for shelter. The Reverend W. Hunter, his wife and infant child, were murdered by one of the gaol guard, a Hindostanee. The rest of the Europeans crowded into an old fort belonging to Rajah Tij Sing, which he had previously placed at the disposal of the Government officers, and which proved, humanly speaking, the salvation of the European residents. The troops in the meanwhile released from the gaol the prisoners, more than 300 in number, plundered the treasury of stamp paper and cash, and burnt the court-houses and all their valuable records, blew up their magazines, and, after revelling at large till midnight, went off with all the officers’ carriages and horses, the station gun, and all their spoil towards Goordaspour. As evening closed, Dr. Butler and his family, with Captain Saunders and his family, entered the fort. They had been concealed in an outhouse all day by a faithful Seikh watchman. Mr. Monckton, who was very ill, was carried in on a cot by some villagers. Colonel Farquharson and Captain Caulfield had been offered high pay and residence at a hill station during the hot months, if they would consent to command the mutineers. This was during the day while they were detained in the quarter guard of the 46th Native Infantry. They also reached the fort in the evening in safety.

Although the mutineers had vanished out of sight, it was by no means certain that they had left the neighbourhood. The fugitives beheld from the ramparts of the fort long lines of rustics pouring in from the villages to pillage, and to destroy what was to them useless, but to the imprisoned owners of great value, and difficult to be replaced. The detachments of the police battalion and of the mounted police had evidently made common cause with the mutineers. The lower ranks of the Hindostanee officials generally had followed in their wake; the only troops there were to guard the fort were a few raw Seikh levies, and they were but poorly armed. Many of them had never fired a musket; but they were loyal, and were the Englishmen’s only remaining hope. Lieutenant Montgomerie, of the 9th Light Cavalry, escaped to Googranwalla on horseback, thence on the mail cart to Lahore, and gave the tidings to Mr. Roberts, who communicated them at the dead of night to me. We immediately held a council, and requested Brigadier Corbett to post guns and Europeans at the bridge of boats over the Ravee. An express was sent to Ferozepoor to deprive the 10th Cavalry of their horses, and another to Major Taylor at Kangra to disarm the sepoys in that fortress, and at Noorpoor. This was done with a view of preventing their joining the Sealkote mutineers in case they escaped General Nicholson’s column. Brigadier Corbett cheerfully acquiesced, and Lahore then seemed safe from an attack. Early next day Captain (now Colonel) R. C. Lawrence, commanding police battalion, and Captain Cripps, Deputy Commissioner, Googranwalla, were deputed by me to Sealkote as a special commission to try summarily, and summarily to punish all offenders, especially the unfaithful detachments. They hung the two principal native officers of the foot
and mounted police; they hung the overseer of the gaol, and many others; they levied a fine of 7,000 rupees on the marauders' villages, as compensation to those whose property had been so wantonly destroyed; and they required the instant surrender of all plundered property on pain of death. The station was scoured of rebels, and a few days afterwards the refugees came out of the fort into the empty barracks of Her Majesty's 52d. Lieutenant M'Mahon, Assistant Commissioner, who, during Mr. Monckton's illness and under very difficult circumstances had acted vigorously, went out with 300 men to the frontier of Cashmere. He encamped at Beekho Chuk, and induced Maharajah Golab Sing's officers to give up 141 mutineers who had sought refuge in that territory. Most of them were executed by order of Lieutenant M'Mahon and Captain Adams, Assistant Commissioner of Goordspoor, who sat in commission to try them. Some were sent into Sealkote, and capitally punished there. The destruction of the main body of runaways by General Nicholson is noted in the Report on Goordspoor.

79. Mr. Monckton, Deputy Commissioner, was laid aside by illness on July 8. Captain Elliott, from Googerat, took his place on the 15th, and the gradual recapture of the liberated convicts, recovery of the stolen cash and stamp paper, and other miscellaneous duties, have occupied him and Messrs. M'Mahon and Jones very fully. About 53,000 rupees worth of stamps have been recovered, and a good deal out of the 41,000 rupees which the mutineers took. The bulk of the treasure had been lodged in the fort before the mutiny.

Googerat.

80. Googerat is a little civil station, on the high road from Lahore to Peshawur. As in all other places, the Deputy Commissioner was burdened with a company of mutinous soldiers as his treasury guard. In this case the men were of the 46th Native Infantry. They were quickly got rid of by an order to them to rejoin their corps at Sealkote. This was obeyed. Its operation left Captain Cripps, officiating Deputy Commissioner, with seven horsemen and 35 foot police, to defend three European officers, 200,000 rupees of Government treasure, and a gaol full of convicts. This state of things could not last, especially as the treasury was an insecure building, and could not be held, as it possessed no wall. The station might be attacked by either of the three native regiments from Lahore; it lay between the two places, and a junction of the mutinous brigades might reasonably be expected. To avert danger as far as possible an old tomb and its circumjacent garden were fortified, provisions were thrown in, and the treasury was sent into Lahore. Recruits were called for from the people, and they eagerly thronged in. During six months about 700 men were raised; from this body large drafts were made into three Punjab regiments, 250 men remained on duty at the station, 100 were sent down as policemen to the North Western Provinces, and even while under training, the whole body was used as ferry guards, gaol guards, and escorts. Early in July, the Deputy Commissioner hastened away to Googerat, 35 miles off, on the news of the Jhelum mutiny. There he mounted his 100 men on camels, and went away another journey of 35 miles to the very bank of the Jhelum. He learnt there that the Jhelum mutiny had ended, and on his hasty march back, he was informed that a formidable one had broken out at Sealkote, only 35 miles from his station. He hurried back to Googerat, but found to his satisfaction that it had not been threatened, the men having gone a different way.

81. In the end of September, Captain Cripps was called to traverse the southern part of his district, which abuts on the Bar, as the Khurrahs had risen in the Goonga district, and might be expected to attack some large towns under his jurisdiction. Again a forced march brought a body of the Seikhs levies under his personal command to the suspected districts, and the people if they had any evil intentions were overawed; order continued to reign throughout that territory.

82. In October, Colonel Clarke took charge of the district, and Captain Cripps was transferred to Ferozepoor on the appointment of Major Marsden to Goonga. The people of Googerat seem to have been very well affected throughout,
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throughout, and the six per cent. loan gained considerable accessions from the
monied men of the country towns.

Jhelum Division.

83. Mr. Thornton, Commissioner of this division, had to contend with the
difficulties created by the proximity of the independent kingdom of Cashmere,
by the number of restless tribes whose home is in our territory, and by the
mountainous nature of the country. The chief events of interest were the
mutiny of a part of the 14th Native Infantry at Jhelum on July 7th, and the
attack on the Sanatarium of Murree by the villagers on September 2d.

84. The division was not so strategically important as the Cis-Sutlej States,
nor was it politically so valuable as the Peshawur or Lahore divisions; but to
preserve peace in it and contentment among its inhabitants was imperative,
owing to the large number of warlike tribes who find their dwelling in its
valleys, hills, and plains. This object was happily accomplished by the enter-
tainment in British service of many of their martial spirits who chafed at
inaction, and would probably have fretted us had not a legitimate object been
given them whereon to spend their strength. Upwards of 1,000 horse were
raised from one tribe alone, the Towanahs, in the Shahpoor district. Mr.
Ousely, the Deputy Commissioner, describes his relief at their departure as
great.

Jhelum.

85. The alarm at this station was considerable, as there was no European
force to restrain the native battery of artillery and the two regiments (14th and
39th) Native Infantry. The 39th were ordered to march without their maga-
zine towards Shahpoor for orders. Their destination was Dehra Ismael Khan,
but it was an object to avoid any resistance which might have broken out at
Jhelum by keeping them ignorant of their future station. They were sent
down the left bank of the Jhelum, and reached Dehra Ismael Khan without
giving trouble. The native artillery was ordered to Lahore, and there afterwards disarmed. The only regiment which remained was the 14th Native
Infantry. The Chief Commissioner resolved to disarm it notwithstanding the
commanding officer's assurances of its loyalty. Two companies were ordered
to Rawul Pindee on pretence of forming a treasure party, but in truth to weaken
the regiment; this move left but 600 men at Jhelum. Early on the morning
of the 7th, a force of Europeans and guns, which had been sent rapidly down
from Rawul Pindee, moved towards the parade ground of the 14th. It was
joined on its way by the Seikhs of the 14th. The sepoys, seeing the advancing
column at a distance, began firing on their officers, broke, fled to their lines,
and there defended themselves against our force till one p.m.; by that time they
were dislodged, and fled to a neighbouring village. This battle had, however,
cost the lives of many of our Europeans. Colonel Ellice, commanding the
detachment of Her Majesty's 24th, was dangerously wounded, and Captain
Spring was killed. The heat of the July sun told terribly upon the English
troops. The three guns (six-pounders) proved useless against mud walls and
the fortified guard-room of the 14th, and when, after desperate fighting, the
lines were cleared of mutineers, the troops were too exhausted from heat, toil,
and want of food to follow up their advantage. At four p.m. Colonel Gerrard, who
had assumed command after Colonel Ellice's fall, ordered an attack on the
village to which the sepoys had retreated. The street fighting proved disastrous
to our men; the guns were brought up too close to the houses; the gunners
and horses were mowed down by the fire of the mutineers; ammunition on our
side ran short, and a retreat was sounded. Two guns were brought off the
field; the third, after a most gallant defence of it by Lieutenant Battye, Assistant
Commissioner, in command of 30 police horse, and two or three other ineffectual
attempts to rescue it, was captured by the mutineers, and used against us.
Both sides bivouacked on the field. Early in the morning it was found that
the enemy had fled. The forethought displayed by Major Browne, Deputy
Commissioner, in removing the magazine of the 14th from their lines before
the
the second action, probably contributed much to their speedy flight, as it deprived them of any further supply of ball cartridge. The main body of the fugitives crossed into the Cashmere territory, and were subsequently surrendered by the native authorities to our Government. Many stragglers were seized by the police; some were drowned, and 144 were killed in the flight. Only about 10 men of the whole 500 who opposed us are still at large. The usual precautions were taken in this district to guard against any ill feeling amongst the people. Ferries were closed, letters opened, vagrants examined, doubtful or unemployed Hindoostanee expelled, &c. &c. A plot which was laid by a Hindoostanee underling to murder the Tehseeldar at Chickkowal and to seize the treasure, was found, out and disconcerted. When a part of the 9th Irregular Cavalry mutinied at Meeanwali, the police at Jhelum were aroused to try and cut them off. One man was seized and executed; the rest were disposed of elsewhere.

86. A levy which was raised at Jhelum continued to keep the country quiet by giving employment to the idle hands. A telegraph office was set up; a line of direct postal communication organised with the Deputy Commissioners of all adjoining districts, and with Mr. Hardinge, Assistant Commissioner, who had charge of the sub-division of Pind Dadun Khan.

Rawul Pindar.

87. Mr. Thornton, the Commissioner, was at the head quarters of this district at the commencement of the outbreak. He states that as soon as the news from the North West Provinces got abroad amongst the people, some of the well-disposed came and expressed to him their unfeigned sorrow at the prospect of the certain extinction of our rule. They considered the struggle a hopeless one for our nation. Hindoostanee emissaries eagerly fostered this idea amongst the country folk, assuring them that the King of Delhi had sent directions to his loyal subjects to send all the English down the Indus without hurting them, and that the deportation of the Hindoostanee from the Punjab which was going on was simply a fulfilment by the English of the commands of the same potentate, who had forbidden the English to keep his subjects any longer up here, as he required their services at his capital.

88. These idle tales found credence among the Mahomedan population of the Murree hills. They also had hereditary feuds; they longed to renew their old intestine contests and make an effort for the restoration of Mahomedan supremacy. Rumours reached the Deputy Commissioner, Captain Crocroft, and the other authorities, during May and June, of an uneasiness amongst some of the neighbouring tribes. It was affirmed that a "Dua-i-khair," or solemn compact, had been effected; that the object was an attack upon our power—from what quarter or in what place did not appear. Such information could not be slighted. The chiefs of several tribes were called to Murree, and told that their presence there would be of use to us as affording a ready means of communication between Government and their several clans, should their active services be needed. In reality these men were hostages, but to prevent their thinking so, a small allowance of eight rupees per mensem was made to them by the authorities. As time wore on, this allowance excited the jealousy of other tribes, whose representatives considered themselves neglected by not sharing in it. Other compacts were formed and other plots hatched, which culminated on the night of the 2d September, when the station of Murree was attacked by 300 men. The fidelity of one of Lady Lawrence's personal attendants, himself an influential man of one of the tribes which had risen, and the promptitude of the local officers, were the means, under God, of saving Murree. Lieutenant Battye, Assistant Commissioner, was informed on the 1st idem by Hakim Khan, the individual above alluded to, that the place was to be attacked that night; he could not say by what force or from what quarter. The ladies, of whom a large number was then in Murree, were immediately concentrated; the police and the detachment of European invalids were called out; the civil and military officers held a consultation, and despatched urgent requests for help to Mr. Thornton at Rawul Pindee and Major Becher at Huzara. A cordon of sentries was drawn round the station, composed of Europeans, and the police force under Lieutenant Bracken, and strong pickets were posted at three places.
places which were considered the most vulnerable. The enemy came at the death of night, expecting no foe, looking only for butchery and spoil. They were briskly opposed by Captain Robinson and his party, and soon retired, with slight loss however. One of our men was wounded; he afterwards died. This skirmish constituted the whole of the fighting; but two bodies of the enemy, of 100 men each, held two neighbouring heights during the whole of the 2d of September, and as there was no knowing how far the confederacy had spread, the station of Murree could not be weakened by sending men to drive them away. On the evening of the 3d the Commissioner arrived with a reinforcement from below. Supplies of food, which he had providently ordered to be bought in Rawul Pindee and sent up, began to arrive; the country was scourcd, rebellious villages were burnt, their cattle harried and their men seized; 27 men were punished, of whom 15 suffered death. The smoke of the 11 villages which were destroyed was seen far by a party of Khurrals which was coming on to renew the attack, while the bright and unscathed houses of Murree showed plainly that no burning had occurred there. The rebel force slunk off disheartened, and their tribe professed deep loyalty, but it was known to be second in ill-feeling only to the Dhoonds who made the attack.

89. On Mr. Thornton's pressing solicitations, Major Becher had dispatched from Abottabad his company of the Suttee tribe, in number 40 men; this had joined Mr. 1hornton. But on the receipt of more urgent letters, Major Becher sent, under the command of Captain Harding, accompanied by Captain Davies, nearly the whole of his force, leaving himself only 87 men, of whom all but 12 were recruits. The force was pushed across a most difficult country under a drenching rain. The Khurrals laid an ambush to cut it off, but Providence saved it. The road in which the trap was laid became impassable from the rain. The force turned off, and not till it had passed the spot did it learn the greatness of the peril from which it had been delivered. It returned to Huzara by Rawul Pindee, leaving Murree on the 14th.

90. After the repulse of the Dhoonds, it was found that the conspiracy affected many more clans, and a much wider extent of country than had been suspected. It reached far into Huzara, and nearly down to Rawul Pindee, and excepting the Khural insurrection in Mooltan, was by far the most extensive combination that has occurred in the Punjab during the year. Treachery was added to violence; two Hindoostanee native doctors in Government employ, educated at Government institutions, and then practising in Murree, were found guilty of being sharers in the plot; they were both executed. There seems no doubt that the hill men reckoned much on the support and directions they were to receive from their Hindoostanee friends in the station, and several of the domestic servants were seized and punished for complicity. Several, also, fled from justice, and are yet at large. Two of the ringleaders in the raid are free through the connivance of their countrymen.

91. On the frontier, beyond the district of Rawul Pindee, are the homes of the wild and disordered tribes of Sitawa and Mungultana. They are Mahomedans, keep a fanatic Hindoostanee army, and are in communication with the Hindoostanee nababs of the North-west Provinces and Bengal through this army. They were sources of much anxiety to Captain Crackcroft, the Deputy Commissioner. The state of feeling in Cashmere was unknown; the Maharajah had given no intimation at that early period of the line of policy he meant to pursue; there was a large force of Hindoostanee troops in the Peshawur district, one of which, the 55th Native Infantry, had mutinied on May 21st. To guard against dangers from Cashmere and Peshawur, it was found needful to organise a force of upwards of 1,500 policemen and dawk runners; this force was disposed down the rivers Jhelum and Indus. A moveable column was composed of detachments from Her Majesty's 24th Foot and Captain Miller's police battalion to restrain the men of the country.

92. The fort of Attock commands a very important ferry of the Indus, and Mr. M'Nabb, Assistant Commissioner, was deputed to occupy it, in order to superintend the provisioning of it for troops which were constantly crossing the river, and to protect the ferry from attack. He performed this duty with great diligence and ability, until he was removed to act as Deputy Commissioner of Jhelum, on Major Browne's promotion to the Commissionership of Leila.

Mr.
Mr. McNabb was succeeded by Lieutenant Shortt, who was also deputed to follow up the Jhelum mutineers in July, and displayed much vigour in this excursion.

93. In the district there were two regiments of Irregular Cavalry, the 58th Native Infantry, and a wing of the 14th Native Infantry, a regiment of Goorkhas, and a native troop of horse artillery; this was a brigade powerful enough to give just cause for alarm. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, who was present at Rawul Pindee, determined to disarm the Native Infantry. This was done on the 7th July, but the men did not lay down their arms for upwards of an hour after they had been ordered to do so. Even after the disarming, the men of the 14th continued so insolent and insubordinate, that they were all confined in the central gaol. The Goorkhas remained perfectly staunch throughout, and did excellent service before Delhi.

94. Other operations in this district were the dispatch of reinforcements to Murree with Mr. Thornton, and the mission of a party to act against the mutineers of the 9th Irregular Cavalry.

Shahpoor.

95. This station is the head quarters of the Customs line in connexion with the Salt range. Mr. Wright, the Collector of Customs, brought to the assistance of Mr. Ouseley, Deputy Commissioner, a very valuable reinforcement in the shape of 100 of the men of the preventive service, who, being all armed, and natives of the Punjab or else Pathans, created a valuable counterpoise to the mutinous company of the 46th Native Infantry, which formed the treasury guard. The transit of the 39th Native Infantry through the district, on their way from Jhelum to Dehra Ismael Khan, caused a panic amongst the people of Shahpoor. Strange rumours began to circulate about these men, valuable stores were buried, people became unsettled, and the commanding officer of the regiment feared to come through Shahpoor while the company of the 46th was there, expressing a hope that Mr. Ouseley had not much treasure under his care.

On the evening of the 22d May a strong guard of police marched into the treasury with three European officers of the station, and took possession of all the surplus money, amounting to 250,000 rupees; part of this was forthwith sent towards Jhelum, and part towards Dehra Ismael Khan. Under orders which were subsequently received, the Jhelum consignment was recalled; but the move which took it in the first instance from the 46th was a most ably planned one, as the Hindoostanee troops were at the same time turned out of the treasury fort, which was garrisoned by the police battalion, fortified and provisioned, and a well sunk to supply drinking-water.

96. At one time the villages of the Bar were said to be in an unquiet state. Mr. Ouseley posted 10 police horse on the confines of the tract of land so called, and as no mutiny of the sepoys took place in the district, the wild tribes remained peaceful, even when their brethren in the Mooitan division broke out. I have, in my introductory remarks on this division, adverted to the large number of Towana horse which this district yielded, and the effect on the country which the levying of them exercised.

97. The mutiny of the portion of the 9th Irregular Cavalry affected this country so far as that it called out the Deputy Commissioner, two or three of the Customs officers, and a number of the police. The mutineers were hunted like hares, as the police, the soldiery, and district officers of five or six districts were on their trail, and gave them no rest until Captain Hockin came up with them in the Jhung district, and cut them up.

98. A Hindoostanee clerk in the Customs office was detected in an attempt to unite Hindoos and Mahomedans against our Government. He was apprehended, convicted, and punished.

Gojerat.

99. The danger here was, comparatively speaking, a transient one. The chief fear was from the wing of the 35th Native Infantry, which was known to be mutinous to the core. On July 17th, they were ordered out of the station.
and directed to join the head quarters of their regiment at Sealkote. They spent the first night of their march in abusing each other for not having resisted the ejection. The entire regiment afterwards joined General Nicholson's moveable column, and was disarmed by him at Phillour on June 25th. When the Jhelum mutineers broke away, a small party of them reached an island in the Jhelum, and were cut to pieces by a party under Captain Elliot, Officiating Deputy Commissioner. Captain Elliot was accompanied by Mr. Teasdale, a clerk in the district office, who behaved with distinguished gallantry.

100. All threatened sedition in this district was, throughout the whole of the period under review, vigorously put down by Captain Mackenzie, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner, who took Captain Elliot's place when the latter was appointed to the Sealkote district.

**Leia Division.**

101. This division is situated on the Indus, and forms the western frontier of the Punjab. Its distance from Hindoostan, and consequent separation from all Hindoostanee influence, has kept it very quiet. So little has it been affected, that Captain Fendall, Deputy Commissioner of Leia, observes, that whatever he did "savours strongly of doing nothing;" but that he acted under the immediate orders of the late Colonel Ross, the Commissioner, and that it proved the wisest policy. The people are not commercial. Their intercourse with the world is very limited. They bear passively every change of rule. The principal work of the officers has been to keep the clans from devolving, each other, and to prevent encroachments on the British territory from beyond the border.

102. Colonel Ross, the Commissioner, died on August 18th. As his early instructions to his district officers were issued demi-officially, Major Browne, his successor, has not been able to furnish me with the purport of them. I am therefore reduced to the necessity of recounting events directly from the narratives of the Deputy Commissioners.

**Leia.**

103. This district remained very tranquil; only one or two slight punishments were inflicted for offences connected with the mutiny. Much anxiety was caused at one time by the arrival of a wing of the 17th Irregular Cavalry under Captain Hookin, but it remained firm. When the Khurral insurrection broke out in September, Captain Hookin marched against the rebels, leaving at Leia 40 of his men who had fallen under suspicion. The day before he marched, news reached Leia that the whole of the 9th Irregular Cavalry had mutinied at Meean Wali. Captain Fendall says, "I certainly at first thought it was a deep-laid scheme for raising the whole country; that the 9th Irregular Cavalry were to appear before Dehra Ismael Khan, be joined by the 39th Native Infantry, come on to Leia, pick up the wing of the 17th Irregular Cavalry, go towards Googaira, coalescing with the tribes, and march on to Mooltan (where there were two suspected regiments of Native Infantry). It was feasible, and would have temporarily lost us the Lower Punjab." The same gracious Providence who everywhere else watched over us, prevented this dreaded junction. The news proved to be an exaggeration. The mutineers of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, who, strange to say, were old men of the Cis-Sutlej States, were only 30 in number, and were entirely destroyed in a desperate fight, in which Mr. Thomson, the Extra Assistant of Leia, was very dangerously wounded. I desire to bring his gallant conduct in this most spirited little battle prominently to notice.

**Khangurh.**

104. Major Browne observes on this district: "The district of Khangurh entirely escaped any ill effects beyond the alarm felt by the European community at the proximity of the mutinous regiments at Mooltan, and the possibility
bility of invasion of the lower portion by bands of robbers from Bha-
wulpore." Precautions were, however, necessary. Mr. Henderson, the Deputy
Commissioner, fortified the gao, the court-house, and the chief and district
treasuries, armed all Europeans, and vigilantly guarded all the ferries which
were not closed. He detached Lieutenant Ferris, Assistant Commissioner, to
the banks of the Chenab, to establish a chain of posts along it. This object
was fully accomplished. The villagers themselves served so willingly, that a
cordon of 104 posts, extending 26 miles, was soon established. At another
time, a chain of mounted police was thrown across the district, from the
Chenab to the Indus, to cut off any stragglers of the 14th Native Infantry that
might come down from Jhelum. An intelligence department was also organised
between Khangurh, Dehra Gazee Khan, Mooltan, and Moozufferghurh.

Dehra Gazee Khan.

105. Captain Pollock's first step here was to summon to the protection of
Dehra Gazee Khan, Captain Hughes, commanding 1st Punjab Cavalry at Anee.
In a few hours this officer was on his way with 300 sabres, but his services
being needed elsewhere, Captain Pollock was directed by the Chief Commis-
sioner to raise a levy of 300 horse and 300 foot to guard the outposts, and
relieve the drilled troops, who were called on service into the field. The people
showed great alacrity in joining these levies; they performed the duties of all
but three of the outposts. On them much of the guarding of the gao and treasury
devolved, and the very entertainment of the men tended greatly to keep
the country quiet. One coalition to make a disturbance was discovered to
have been solemnly ratified by two tribes in this district; their leaders were
summoned, detained until the end of the year, and then released on security.
Individuals among the troops were also punished for using seditious language,
&c., but no general breach of the peace occurred; the vigor and energy dis-
played prevented this.

Dehra Ismael Khan.

106. At the two stations of Bunnoo and Dehra Ismael Khan, in this district,
there were located two regiments of Punjab Infantry, two of Punjab Cavalry,
two Punjab batteries, one Sikh regiment, one very weak police battalion, and
180 police horse. Many of these troops were instantly ordered away to Peshah-
wur, Jhelum, &c., and for two days, until the arrival of the 3d Sikh Infantry
from Dehra Ismael Khan, the station of Bunnoo was guarded only by a battery
of Punjab Artillery and the 3d Punjab Cavalry, and the inhabitants of the
country, "an experiment" (says Captain Coxe, Deputy Commissioner), "which it
would have been dangerous to protract." The rapid march of the troops
cau sed a temporary panic amongst the traders of Bunnoo. Captain Coxe closed
the gates, and talked the people out of their fears.

107. A fresh cause of anxiety was caused by the arrival of the suspected
39th Native Infantry from Jhelum: Captain Coxe felt their presence a source of
imminent danger, until 600 or 700 Mooltanee horse had been raised and col-
clected at Dehra Ismael Khan. The 39th were quietly disarmed on 14 July,
without the presence of other troops. Three days before this, Captain Renny,
commanding 3d Sikh Infantry, informed the Deputy Commissioner of a plot
among the Hindooestances of his regiment, 113 in number, to murder all their
officers. These 113 men were disarmed the same evening, and were subsequently
dismissed the service. The plot could not be brought home to them, though
there is little doubt it had been laid. Another conspiracy was reported amongst
the 39th Native Infantry at Dehra Ismael Khan, with the object of seizing the
fort: timely information saved it.

108. When the news of the mutiny of the portion of the 9th Irregular
Cavalry reached Captain Coxe, he marched to the Indus with a party of Mool-
tanee Horse, and, travelling 60 miles in 17 hours, raised all the country to act
against them if requisite, and sent Mr. Cowan, extra Assistant Commissioner,
to follow them up: his force, co-operating with Captain Hockin's party, was
instrumental in effecting their destruction. The frontier tribes were turbulent
during this period, as is their wont; but the presence of a moveable column
sent by the Chief Commissioner restrained them from ravaging our territory.
MOOLTAN DIVISION.

109. A large part of this division is mere waste land, covered with jungle, or else with a short grass and stunted bushes. These tracts are inhabited by several nomadic tribes, whose sustenance is from their flocks, whose habits are primitive, and whose character is restless, impatient of control, and thievish to a degree: they are Mahomedans, and profess to be descended from a common ancestor, who lived some centuries ago. In September these tribes rose in insurrection, attacked several police posts, and disarmed the policemen; took possession of the road by which all mails from the Punjab were at that time carried to England, and to all parts of India south of Delhi, and threatened to inflict a severe blow on our power, when it was at its weakest; for they rose but a few days before the capture of Delhi, when the Punjab was almost without troops. The operations which were carried on against these tribes are fully detailed below, under the report on the Googaira district, as the outbreak began there, although it seriously affected every district of the division.

110. At the head quarters of the division much anxiety was caused to Major Hamilton, Commissioner, and all the other residents, by the presence of two corps of Native Infantry, of whom one, the 69th, was known to be thoroughly bad. The post was an important one, as commanding the only outlet the Punjab at that time possessed for communication with England, Bombay and Calcutta. The troops were providentially disarmed in time, and no outbreak took place.

MOOLTAN.

111. The station of Mooltan commands the passage down the river from Lahore, and the only post road whereby the Punjab could communicate with the rest of the world. At the time of the outbreak it was occupied by the 62d and 69th Native Infantry, 1st Irregular Cavalry, a native troop of Horse Artillery and a company of European Artillerymen. The 69th was strongly suspected; the other native troops were considered staunch, and subsequent events verified the supposition in every case.

112. It was necessary to provide a refuge in case of any disturbance. The old fort which had lain in a ruinous condition since it had been battered and dismantled by the British army in 1849, was put in a position of defence, provisioned and garrisoned by some men of Captain Tronson’s police battalion. As these arrangements occupied some days, and the temper of the native troops could not be trusted from hour to hour, Lieutenant Etheridge, of the Indian Navy, who happened to be at Mooltan with his vessel, was requested to detain the steamer until the fort should have become defensible. With this request Lieutenant Etheridge willingly complied, and the steamer lay off Mooltan until it was no longer requisite to trust to it as an asylum in case of need.

113. In the early days of May a crowd of sepoys constantly thronged the Mooltan post-office, eagerly asking “for news,” and “whether the mail had arrived,” and similar questions, in themselves unusual, and were accompanied by such language and demonstrations as were freely used, tending to throw the whole establishment into bodily fear. Family remittances, which the soldier had hitherto always made through the Government treasury, now ceased to be so made. The payments which the men had made on account of these remittances were boisterously demanded back in cash; the price of gold coin rose rapidly in the exchange markets, showing a large demand for portable wealth. Such symptoms of uneasiness (occurring, too, before any outbreak in the North-Western Provinces), could not but excite the gravest apprehensions in the minds of all European residents; they could not but lead to the conclusion that the soldier were bent on some mischief, or, to say the least, that their confidence in our Government was gone, and they would rather trust their money in their own hands than in ours. When news of the outbreak in the North-Western Provinces reached Mooltan, what had been inexplicable was at once explained; the mystery was revealed; these actions were seen to be part and parcel of an universal and determined design to subvert our rule.

114. Colonel Hicks, commanding at Mooltan, failed to discover in the conduct of the regiments of Native Infantry anything which could justify him
in taking from them their arms. The Chief Commissioner, however, urgently suggested that they were to be disarmed, and, on the morning of June 10, the minds of European and native residents were relieved, commerce was re-established, and our authority vindicated by the most successful disarming of the 62d and 69th Native Infantry by Major Crawford Chamberlain, commanding 1st Irregular Cavalry. The peculiar character of this excellent move was, that the European troops were but 48 artillerymen: the other auxiliaries were all natives, and one regiment, the 1st Regular Cavalry, was composed of Hindoostanees. During the whole day the townspeople flocked to the Commissioner, Major Hamilton, expressing their hearty congratulations on the success of the measure, and their own relief at the prospect of immunity from rapine and slaughter.

115. On the 19th and the two following days of June the left wing Bombay Fusiliers came in; about three weeks afterwards the right wing arrived. The imperious requirements of the service, however, forbade the authorities to keep these troops here, and they, as well as the trusty Punjabee troops who arrived from time to time, were pushed on towards Lahore or Delhi; so that, with the exception of the 1st Irregulars, the company of artillery, and the police battalion, Mooltan had absolutely no military stand by which to resist the two full regiments of native infantry which were located there. It was an anxious time. If proof of the ill-will of the 69th be required, it is afforded by the facts that the chief native officer of the regiment and 10 men were blown from guns by sentence of court-martial for sedition and intended mutiny; that, just before the execution, they boasted of their influence, and reviled each other for the cowardice displayed in their own past inaction; that, when the regiment was disarmed, it was found that the artillery (natives), had laid the guns in anticipation of a struggle directly, on the 69th, avoiding the 62d, and that the demeanor of the corps throughout was insolent and rebellious to the last degree.

116. On the 11th August the Horse Artillery was disarmed as a precautionary measure. On the same date the enrolment of men for the new 11th Punjab Infantry was commenced, by transferring to it men from other regiments. The Googaira insurrection broke out in little more than a month afterwards. The new men at Mooltan were still undisciplined, and could hardly yet be relied on as a serviceable field force. Most of them were left to guard the station, while Major Chamberlain led out his regiment, the 1st Irregular Cavalry (Hindoostanees, with some 200 men of the raw levies), against the insurgents.

117. Another cause of anxiety at Mooltan, had been the conduct of the preventive service on the Sutlej. Very many of the men employed in it were Hindoostanees. They fled at the first outbreak in Hindoostan, and went off in numbers to join their kindred by blood and by disposition, who were enjoying a transient triumph at the deserted stations of Hansi and Hissar. Men to take their place were raised in the district, and no serious damage was done to the Government interests by their defection.

118. Under the orders of the Chief Commissioner, a camel train was organised, having one of its depôts at Mooltan. It was designed for the conveyance of private parcels, munitions of war, and merchandise, between Sind and the Punjab, and proved most useful. The care of it constituted one of the many miscellaneous duties entailed on Major Voyle, Deputy Commissioner. The duty of preserving the safety of part of the road between Lahore and Mooltan, especially during and after the Khurrul insurrection, was another most anxious charge for him. The number of widowed ladies, wounded officers, and other travellers, who passed down the way, and who were incapable of protecting themselves, made it very needful that the road should be defended. To this end, the Deputy Commissioners of Lahore, Googaira and Mooltan were desired to locate extra police, both horse and foot, at every road police station. The arrangement was vigorously carried out; and, after the end of September, when the road was re-opened, every European traveller was provided with a guard. The mail carts were also defended in their passage; for, until routes were opened up through Bhawulpour and Jhung, the Punjab was, as regards communication with other localities, hermetically sealed.
Jhung.

119. This is a wild rural district, chiefly in the Bar above described, and tenanted by the wild races of whom mention has just been made. The population is comparatively scanty. The treasury guard was a company of the 10th Native Infantry (grenadiers). It was a mere hindrance, and, at the request of Captain Hawes, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, was withdrawn to its head quarters at Lahore, where it was disarmed. Two parties of mutineers were destroyed in this district, one numbering 10 men of the 14th Native Infantry, the second the party of the 9th Light Cavalry. The villagers rendered good service in tracking this last detachment; but when, on the 17th September, the Bar tribes rose, the villagers of this district maintained but a doubtful neutrality. Communications between Jhung and Lahore were cut off. For some time great anxiety was felt at Lahore as to what had occurred there. It was known that many of the minor police stations had been rifled, and that the tribes around were all in rebellion. In a few days, however, Captain Hawes' force, 250 of the 17th Irregular Cavalry, was thrown into the disturbed region; it was supported by a party of the Leia and Googranwala new levies, while Major Chamberlain, with a force from Mooltan, advanced on Jhung from the south. Mr. McMahon, extra Assistant Commissioner, was sent out to Kote Kumalia, in the Googaira district, with a party of police horse, but it had been pillaged before his arrival, and he was soon after recalled by Captain Hawes. Lieutenant Lane, Assistant Commissioner, had command of the Leia levy, while Captain Hawes joined Major Chamberlain's force, and remained with it as civil officer till the defeat of the rebels at Kumalia, some time after. After Captain Hawes' return to Jhung, Lieutenant Lane was detached at Sherkote, where he did excellent service in apprehending rebels, and seizing their cattle.

Googaira.

120. Lieutenant Elphinstone, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, was saddled with a detachment of the 49th Native Infantry as his treasury guard. As my demi-official of May 13th informed him of the disarming of the main body of the regiment at Lahore on the morning of that day, he justly considered it inexpedient any longer to trust such questionable friends with the custody of Government property of the station and its officers. He accordingly took their arms, and ordered them to Lahore, where they safely arrived. A guard of the Kutna Mookhee police battalion was posted over the Government offices.

121. By direction of the Commissioner, Major Hamilton, Lieutenant Elphinstone had made arrangements for a horse dawk to Sirsa and its neighbourhood. On May 26th he received a few hurried lines from Captain Robertson, Superintendent of Sirsa, informing him of the disasters at Hissar and Hansi. Mr. Oliver, Assistant Superintendent, also wrote, begging Lieutenant Elphinstone to guard the Fazilke Ferry. Fearing an incursion into the Punjab, Lieutenant Elphinstone promptly despatched, under Lieutenant Pears, a force of 226 horse and foot police to Fazilke. This little force subsequently did good service in Blutteana.

122. Licenses for carrying fire arms were revoked throughout the Googaira district, and blacksmiths entertained to put in order the arms which were supplied to the new levies. Of these, 300 men were raised under the Chief Commissioner's order without difficulty, besides extra police.

123. On 26th June, Lieutenant Elphinstone found a quantity of tobacco and other contraband articles in the gaol. The discovery led to the dismissal of the overseer of the gaol, as the inquiry which it brought on was the means of showing that the man had been permitting clandestine visits to the prison by a chief of the name of Almud Khurral, who was in detention at the station at the time under suspicion of treason. This event by itself was unimportant, but subsequent events showed its relevance to all the disturbances which afterwards took place. On the night of the 26th August the prisoners made a desperate attempt to break loose. The police guard fired on them, and Mr. L. Berkely, extra Assistant Commissioner, gallantly opposed the rush of the convicts with a very small number of supporters. The émeute was subdued, but not
not until 51 prisoners had been killed and wounded, and a few had managed to escape. Ahmad Khurral had also broken his arrest, and was not forthcoming. On his apprehension, he was examined; but as no direct proof of complicity in this affair could be brought against him, he was released on heavy security, along with several other chieftains who had fallen under suspicion.

124. On the night of September 16th a man came to Lieutenant Elphinstone's house, demanding instant admittance on urgent business. He told him that all these chiefs had left the place, and were gone to their homes to raise the whole country in open rebellion, according to a preconcerted plan. On inquiry, it was found that all the men named were indeed missing. Lieutenant Elphinstone, roused to a sense which commanded this was fortified and garrisoned. Mr. Berkely, extra plot, Ahmud Khurral, was sent out to try and catch the prime mover of the plot, Ahmad Khurral. On coming up to the bank of the river, the rebel called out from the opposite side that he had renounced his allegiance to the British Government, and was acting under the orders of his master the King of Delhi. The party was out of musket-range; but Mr. Berkely brought down the fanatical Moulvee who accompanied it with his rifle, and, afterwards crossed over, and seized all the families and cattle of a large village named Jhanra, with 20 of the men, and burnt the houses.

125. By this time reinforcements had been thrown out from Mooltan and from Lahore, as well as from Jhung. Lieutenant Colonel Paton, Assistant Quartermaster General, reached Googaira, a distance of 83 miles from Lahore, in 73 hours. He commanded the Lahore force, consisting of three horse artillery guns, a company of Her Majesty's 81st Regiment, a body of Sobhan Khan's police corps, and a detachment from the newly raised 1st Sikh Cavalry. This detachment of horse made the whole distance in one continuous march with one brief rest. Lieutenant Colonel Paton arrived about one hour before the rebels attacked the station in great force in September. They retired after a few rounds of grape, but pursuit was not successful. Captain Black and Lieutenant the Honourable A. Chichester were sent on detached duty, and fell in the next day with a party under Ahmed himself, who was killed, but not without inflicting serious loss on the troops. The advantage obtained by the death of Ahmed was greatly and mournfully overbalanced by the death, in a jungle beyond Kouresha, of Mr. Berkely, who fell deserted by his men, and covered with wounds, after cutting down seven of the insurgents with his own hand. He had fallen into a trap, and many of his men also lost their lives. His death inflicted a serious blow on our power, by the confidence it gave the enemy. His gallantry at the gaol outbreak, and again in this insurrection, had won the admiration of all his superiors, and I deeply regret his loss.

126. On the arrival of Mr. R. E. Egerton, officiating Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, with reinforcements, Lieutenant Elphinstone made over charge of the station to him, and went in person to meet the rebels. He learnt that the tehsel of Hurruppa had been taken by the insurgents, and that Major Crawford Chamberlain, who had moved from Mooltan with a force of the 1st Irregular Cavalry, and a few Sikh infantry, was besieged in the surrai of Chee Chawutnee. Major Chamberlain was opportunely relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Paton's force, which was accompanied by Lieutenant Elphinstone. Major Chamberlain had been in some peril for two or three days: he was beset by crowds of rebels; the town was unfriendly, and commanded the surrai, and the country was impracticable. He ascribes his safety in a great degree to the gallantry of Messrs. Page and Taylor, of the engineer and postal departments, who volunteered for service, and with five Sikhs, held a small tower, and checked by their unerring fire all attempts at an attack from the town. The next day he was joined by Captain M'Andrew and the police battalion, and also by the Lahore Light Horse (a newly raised body of mixed European and Eurasian Cavalry), under Captain Snow, which had been moved down by forced marches.
to Googaira. He was also joined by a reinforcement from Mooltan, consisting of a party of Captain Dennis’s regiment of Punjab Infantry, and two horse artillery guns.

127. A short time afterwards a party of troops under Major Voyle and Captain Tronson moved out from Mooltan; it was afterwards joined by Major Jackson with part of the 2d Irregular Cavalry from Goordaspore; while Captain Cureton, with a squadron of the same regiment, and Captain Hockin, with a party of the 17th Irregulars, acted against the rebels in the Reechna Doab. Major Hamilton, the Commissioner, joined Major Jackson’s force as civil officer. Major Marsden, in consequence of his long and intimate acquaintance with the Googaira district, was appointed Deputy Commissioner, and remained with Captain Snow, while Lieutenant Elphinstone was deputed to accompany Major Chamberlain.

128. From Chee Chavutnee, Major Chamberlain moved, via Koté Kumalia, to attack the rebels in their stronghold of Julee. This is a fastness, from which the same tribes had succeeded in baffling the soldiers of the Sikh army. It consists of a belt of the most dense grass jungle, about five miles long and three broad, and is bounded and traversed by a stream, which serves as an additional defence. Major Chamberlain reports that even a horse could scarcely force a passage through this grass, which rose above the rider’s head, and a vast body of men might have come within 20 yards of his encampment without a man being visible. His operations against them here were, therefore, unsuccessful; but when the rebels broke away across the Bar to the Sutlej, they were briskly followed by his force. In the meantime operations had been carried on elsewhere against them. Captain Snow was severely wounded by a matchlock-ball fired from across the Ravee by an enemy who could only be reached by the rifles of his officers, but not by the firearms his men carried. The troops, however, got across the river, and the insurgents fled. This campaign was at first a very unsuccessful one, on account of paucity of troops. The swampy country was covered with a jungle or long grass, too stiff to be broken or easily cut, too green to be burnt, too dense for troops, especially cavalry, to march through, and intersected with rivers and streams. The enemy could rarely be seen, though the beating of their drums * could often be heard.

129. At last, however, the sounding of this “dhol” led to the final battle which quelled the insurrection. Major Marsden, with the Lahore Light Horse, under Captain Balmain (Captain Snow having been severely wounded), the Police Battalion, under Captain M’Andrew, and three horse artillery guns, made a march of 34 miles, under a hot sun, across part of the Bar, guided by the distant “dhol,” and by some shepherds whom he captured on the way; he came upon the enemy’s camp in the Bar by surprise, utterly routed and dispersed them, and took their equipage and cattle. A few days after this, all three bodies of troops were concentrated. Several of the chiefs surrendered. Some had already given themselves up to Mr. Roberts, Commissioner Lahore Division, who, accompanied by Mr. Egerton, officiating Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, had gone slowly down the right bank of the Ranee with a body of cavalry. The insurrection, therefore, came to a close. The force broke up on the 4th November, and subsequent operations have been comparatively trifling. Thousands of their cattle have been seized and sold, and the tribes have learnt a lesson they will long remember. The principal clans who rose were the Khurruks, under Ahmed; the Katihas, under Mahomed; the Futtians, under Bahawul; and the Wattoos, under leaders of less note.

130. All the chiefs who have not been killed, are now in heavy security employed in bringing in the property they plundered from Kote, Kumalia, Hurruppa, and other places.

131. There is some difficulty in ascribing this rebellion to any one definite cause. There seems, however, no doubt that the insurgents were fired by the desolate state of the country and the extinction of our rule, which had been given them by the liberated afterwards to the desperate attempt of Berkely, extra Assistant, to quell the insurrection. The modulations of its sounds are used for viets with a very small cavalry bugle calls.
Agra convicts, who came up to their homes through Sirsa and Bhuttiana. These men told their kindred of our emptied treasuries and our vacant gaols; our deserted cantonments and our slaughtered countrymen. They were led to believe that the Afghans were masters of Peshawur; that the power of the King of Delhi extended to Umballa; that there were no troops in Lahore or in Mooltan which could be spared to act against them, and that they might indulge their inborn love of plunder without any fear of a check. During the Sikh rule they had often been heavily mulcted, and they had been subject to the payment of a black mail, and had undergone oppression of various kinds. Spared from these troubles by our beneficent Government, taxed only with a very light assessment, and treated with consideration, they mistook our motives, and attributed to weakness what was our strength.

132. They were worked on by their fanatical leaders, the syuds, to carry on a crusade against the infidels, and with the hope of obtaining eternal salvation, by spreading the faith of Islam. Moreover, they trusted that their fastnesses, amidst swamps and thick jungle, would baffle our soldiers as they had baffled the Sikhs. They have, however, been severely dealt with, and it is to be hoped they will profit by their experience.

Peshawur Division.

133. Colonel Edwardes' report on this division has as yet been only in part received. It will be a document of great interest, and complete in itself, and it bears so special and separate a character, that it seems hardly necessary to summarise its contents in the present document. I will not, therefore, longer delay the despatch of this report, and Colonel Edwardes will be separately submitted when the whole of it comes to hand.

134. The foregoing paragraphs are a history of the events in the Punjab during the latter part of 1857. In conclusion, it only remains for me to mention those officers from whom I have more particularly received valuable aid during the period under review. Foremost stands Sir J. Lawrence, G. C. B., Chief Commissioner. I desire to tender to him my grateful thanks for the hearty support he has always given to any proposal I felt called upon to make, and to express to him my sincerest admiration of the intrepid policy he originated and so nobly carried out, even to complete success. I only express my own feeling and that of every officer in the province in saying that we have all felt it a high privilege to serve our country under him.

135. Colonel Macpherson, Military Secretary, being in charge of the Chief Commissioner's office at Lahore, the general superintendence of arrangements connected, not only with the raising of new levies, but with the marching of detachments, providing carriage, ammunition, tents, &c., stationing of guards and pickets for the security of the town and civil station, and generally all matters affecting the efficiency and distribution of the Punjab local force and Military Police, devolved mainly upon him. The Chief Commissioner knows too well, and appreciates too highly, the services rendered by Colonel Macpherson throughout this critical period to require any assurance from me; but I deem it incumbent on me here to record how prominent and important was his share in all that was transacted at the metropolis of the Punjab previous to the Chief Commissioner's arrival.

136. With health much impaired, and an office of which the duties had been enormously increased by the course of events, he nevertheless showed himself equal to every emergency; and took an active part wherever his services could be useful. When volunteer companies were formed, he superintended their organisation and drill; the examination of native letters received by the post was chiefly conducted by him; he especially maintained a complete understanding at all times with the military authorities; and his energy, resolution, and judgment, inspired general confidence. To myself personally his presence was of the very greatest value.

137. From my coadjutor, Mr. D. F. M'Leod, Financial Commissioner, I have...
ever received cordial help and wise advice. Even when laid aside from active duties by serious sickness, he refused to leave his post at Lahore. His great and varied experience was a source of great confidence to us all throughout, and the policy which led to the separation of trusty from mutinous sepoys in suspected regiments was of his origination.

138. Among the Commissioners of Divisions, I wish to bring forward prominently the names of Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Edwardes, c.b., Commissioner of Peshawur, A. A. Roberts, Esq., Commissioner of Lahore, and G. C. Barnes, Esq., Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej Division. Each of these gentlemen had most arduous and responsible duties to perform. To Colonel Edwardes was confided the custody of the frontier, to Mr. Roberts the preservation of the capital, to Mr. Barnes the keeping open of the communication between the Punjab and Delhi. One act of irresolution or one false step on the part of any of these officers would have plunged the Government into inextricable difficulties; but the conduct of all of them was marked by such consummate prudence and such indomitable courage, that their very presence in their several divisions seemed to put down rebellion by the moral force which accompanied all their acts. The other Commissioners, viz., Major Lake, Major Hamilton, Mr. Thornton, had less difficult posts, but performed their parts admirably.

139. All the district officers did well, as the foregoing record will show; but one has so conspicuously distinguished himself, that I cannot forbear mentioning his name in this place—I allude to Mr. G. H. M. Ricketts, Deputy Commissioner of Loodiana. Mr. Ricketts possesses remarkably the qualities which fit a man for doing his duty in turbulent times. For the physical and moral courage he displayed on the 8th and 9th June, I would refer to the observations on his district. My opinions on his measure of fining the refractory city are fully given there, and I consider his country owes him much for his conduct on that occasion.

140. There is also a military officer to whom I must likewise express my thanks for his ever ready energy, and the unanimity which has ever characterised him in working with the civil authorities. From the 13th May, when Brigadier Corbett willingly took upon himself the vast responsibility of disarming the native regiments under his command, the stroke which saved the Punjab, to the most trivial act in which he has ever had cause to solicit his help, his conduct has been bold, resolute and decisive. It may be said that it is beyond my province to mention this officer's services; but the whole year has been one wherein civil and military work has been so strangely intermixed, and the support which Brigadier Corbett has ever afforded me has been so great, that I cannot close this report without a passing mention of his name, and I most earnestly trust that his services will be recognised by the Government.

141. But it was not policy; or soldiers, or officers, that saved the Indian empire to England and saved England to India. The Lord our God; He it was who went before us, and gave us the victory over our enemies when they had well nigh overwhelmed us. To Him is all the praise for nerves the hearts of our statesmen and the arms of our soldiers, for keeping peace in this part of our borders, and for finally giving us the mastery against all human probabilities, and contrary to all rules of warfare. To Him who holds all events in His own hand, and has so wonderously overruled all to our success and to His own glory, do I desire, on behalf of myself and all whom I represent, to express my devout and heartfelt thanksgiving.

(signed) R. Montgomery,
Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab.

No. 64.

From Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Edwardes, Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division, to R. Montgomery, Esq., Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, dated Peshawur, 23 March 1858.

Sir,

With my No. 44, of the 22d February, I forwarded the detailed reports of Major Becher and Captain Henderson on events in the Huzara and Kohat districts
districts during the revolt of 1857; and with my No. 49, of 1st March, Captain James’s detail of the military punishments in the Peshawur district. I now proceed to report on the latter district in detail, and to remark generally on events in the whole division.

2. In the beginning of May 1857, perfect peace reigned in the districts of Huzara and Kohat, and upon their mountain borders. Their irritable and bigoted, but simple memories of which some treaties and troops in not outlaws, round whom possible ‘hostages’ auxiliaries, a detachment of Hindoostanee lad, had English., Valley? was known to be meditating mischief, army; and. Doctor and. Meerut had arrived at Delhi that morning, and. Persian tral Asia. to anyone in particular. -In it the murder the Europeans. The killing the Europeans. The. The valley of. 18 field guns to-befort: expressly: to face these elements of danger, what forces garrisoned the Peshawur Valley? about 2,800 European and 8,000 native soldiers, horse and foot, with 18 field guns and a mounted battery; in numbers and high discipline a goody army; deemed on the 10th of May equal and ready to meet the shock of Central Asia.

14. On the night of the 11th May, the telegraph announced that sepoyos from Meerut had arrived at Delhi that morning, and were burning the houses and killing the Europeans. The message, apparently, was not official, or addressed to any one in particular. In it the officer in charge of the Delhi telegraph was expressly said to have been killed; and one of his assistants, probably a mere lad, had thus nobly done his duty, in flashing this warning up to the frontier before seeking his own safety in flight. If the lad be alive, he deserves well of the

*This, consists in forbidding an offending tribe to trade with Peshawur, and imprisoning any member of it caught in the valley till the tribe submits.
the State. It required no ordinary nerve to manipulate such a message in the midst of a mutiny.

15. Nor can too much public gratitude be shown to Sir R. O'Shaughnessy, by whose personal energy the electric wire had in an incredibly short space of time been laid down from one end of India to the other before this mutiny broke out. The ignorant sepoys, rising against European civilization, were slow to appreciate its most imperial triumph; and the wire was not cut till it had done its work, and electrified the empire.

16. On the morning of 12th May, a second message, dated midnight of 10th, was received from Major Waterfield, Deputy Adjutant General at Meerut, and explained the Delhi news. The native troops were in open mutiny, and "the European troops under arms defending barracks." This last sentence was read at Peshawur with indignation. It described with fatal fidelity the Meerut policy. There was but one place in India at which a General could have crushed the mutiny in the bud; and at that place General Hewitt stood on the defensive.

17. It is well to learn all we can from experience, so I will here mention how forcibly it recurred to our minds that General Hewitt had been withdrawn two years previously from the Peshawur frontier, for the emergencies of which he was physically unfit. (During the time he commanded the Peshawur division, it is believed he never once visited the outposts, and he used to inspect his troops in a buggy.) Yet he was appointed to another large division at Meerut; no doubt a quieter place; but wherever it is necessary to keep troops, it is surely necessary to keep a commander who can head them in the field. It is not a question of age, but of efficiency. There are Radetzkus, though not many.

18. On receipt of this intelligence from Meerut, Colonel John Nicholson (a man of how different a mould!), who was then Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, proposed to me the formation of a moveable column of picked troops to put down mutiny in the Punjab; and we went together and proposed it to Brigadier Sydney Cotton, who was then commanding the Peshawur Brigade. He entirely agreed, and obtained the concurrence of Major General Read, who commanded the division; so that orders were issued that afternoon (12th May) for the 55th Native Infantry to march from Nowshera and relieve the Guide Corps, in charge of the Fort of Murdan; and for the Guides (or being relieved) to join Her Majesty's 27th Foot at Nowshera, in anticipation of Sir John Lawrence's approval of the moveable column, for which I had telegraphed to him at Rawul Pindee.

19. There was one corps in the Peshawur Contingent (the 64th Native Infantry) of such mutinous notoriety, that we ordered it out to three of the outposts, as if to meet an expected raid of the Mohmands; and it marched off on the morning of the 13th. Thus it was broken up into detachments, and much crippled for intrigue, whether in its own ranks or with other regiments.

20. Orders were also issued on this day (12th May) for the rigid examination of all sepoy correspondence in the post office.

21. Another measure taken on the 12th May was to invite Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, who fortunately happened to be at Kohat, to come over to Peshawur, and join us in a council of war. This was with the full concurrence of General Read and Brigadier Sydney Cotton; and I may here remark, that perfect unanimity and good feeling has prevailed from first to last between the military and civil authorities here, each striving only to aid the other in meeting the common danger. It is hence difficult to assign the respective shares in every successful measure.

22. Early on 13th May, Brigadier Chamberlain arrived at Peshawur. At half past ten a.m. I received from the Chief Commissioner telegraphic intelligence that the native troops at Lahore had that morning been disarmed; and that he approved of the moveable column, and had applied for the sanction of the Commander in Chief.

23. At 11 a.m. the council of war met at General Read's house, and consisted of...
of General Read, Brigadier Sydney Cotton, Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, Colonel John Nicholson, and myself. The measures resolved on were briefly these:

1st. The concentration of all military and civil power in the Punjab, by General Read (the senior officer) assuming chief command, and joining the head quarters of the Chief Commissioner, leaving Brigadier Sydney Cotton in command of Peshawur.

2d. The organization of a moveable column of thoroughly reliable troops, to assemble at Jhelum, and thence take the field, and put down mutiny wherever it might appear in the Punjab.

3d. The removal of a doubtful sepoy garrison from the Fort of Attock, and the substitution of a reliable one in that important post.

4th. The levy of a hundred Pathans under Futtah Khan Khuttuck, a tried soldier, to hold the Attock Ferry, a vital point in our communications with the Punjab.

5th. The deputation of Brigadier Chamberlain to consult further with the Chief Commissioner.

6th. The deputation of Colonel John Nicholson, as political officer, with the moveable column (but this was objected to by the Chief Commissioner).

24. An abstract of these measures of the council of war was telegraphed at once, not only to the Chief Commissioner, but to the officers commanding every station in the Punjab, with a view to inspire public confidence.

25. And in reporting these proceedings more fully by letter* to Sir John Lawrence, I suggested authorising some of the best of the commandants of the Punjab irregular force to enlist recruits from the Punjab and British frontier, with the double object of absorbing the floating military material of the country, and of filling the gaps made by the mutiny.

26. At the same time, I recommended that each of the ressalards of Mooltanee horse in the Derajat, be authorised to double the number of his men from the same reliable races.

27. The Guide Corps marched from its cantonment at Murdan this day (13th), six hours after it got the order, and was at Attock (30 miles off) next morning, fully equipped for service—a worthy beginning of one of the rapidest marches ever made by soldiers; for it being necessary to give General Anson every available man to attempt the recovery of Delhi, the Guides were not kept for the moveable column, but were pushed on to Delhi, a distance of 580 miles, or 50 regular marches, which they accomplished in 21 marches, with only three intervening halts, and those made by order. After thus marching 27 miles a day for three weeks, the Guides reached Delhi on the 9th June, and three hours afterwards engaged the enemy hand to hand—every single officer being more or less wounded. Amongst them fell Lieutenant Quentin Battye, with a bright career of chivalry in his heart, ended (poor lad) in his first fight.

28. And here I may be excused if I recall attention to the characteristic features of this distinguished frontier corps, its mixed races and nominal uniform. These do not strike us now-a-days. In 1858 we have got well accustomed to them; but in 1846, to set Poorbeah sepoys aside, and raise a corps of "Shikarees" of all nations, and say they should neither be strapped down, nor braced up, nor button strangled, but wear their own loose dusky shirts and wide pjammahs, and sun proof, sword proof turbans, and as few accoutrements as possible, was an invention—a stroke of real genius; and who conceived it? One who was as great a soldier as statesman; to whom such simple truths came by intuition; one who had served all his life with native soldiers, yet remained an Englishman, neither Hindooized nor Moslemized; one who knew and loved the native army well, yet had for years been lifting his voice to proclaim that it was a moribund body,
body, which must have new life infused into it, or die; and who ended a life spent for others in nobly meeting the storm which he had foreseen. And now that 50,000 mixed irregulars have risen by acclamation out of the ruins of a pipe clay Hindooostanee army, it is only just to remember that the Guide Corps, on which they have been modelled, was the thought of Sir Henry Lawrence. May the new native army long remain a monument of his prescience and wisdom.

29. On the 16th May, General Read and Brigadier Chamberlain joined Sir John Lawrence at Rawulpindee, and that evening I was also directed by telegraph to repair there for consultation, and started at once.

30. This day's post carried with it to many stations of the army a lithographed circular, drawn up by Captain Bartlett, the cantonment magistrate. It was in the common character of sepoy correspondence, and contained an appeal to every loyal feeling and personal interest of the native soldiery, couched in their own provincial dialect, and admirably calculated to come home to their understandings. It was one of the many genuine and kindly efforts made by the English officers to save their men from ruin—with how little effect, we all know.

31. Dark news kept coming up now to Peshawur, and a rapid change was observed in the native regiments; precautions began; Colonel Nicholson promptly removed the treasure (about 24 lacs) from the centre of cantonments to the fort outside, where the magazine was, and Brigadier Cotton placed a European garrison in it at once. At Colonel Nicholson's request, the Brigadier removed from the outskirts of the cantonment, and established his head quarters at the old Residency, which was central for all military orders, and was close to the civil officers for mutual consultation. The Residency is a strong double storied building, capable of defence, and it was named as the rendezvous for all ladies and children, on the occurrence of any alarm by day or night. Full oft was it crowded during the eventful months that followed.

32. The troops in garrison were divided into two brigades, under the colonels of the two European regiments, with guns attached to each, ready for immediate action at either end of the cantonment.

33. European guards were placed in the artillery lines.

34. A watch was set on every ferry of the Indus.

35. I think it must have been on the 16th of May, that Sir John Lawrence consented to my raising 1,000 Mooltanee horse; for before leaving Peshawur for Pindee, that evening I left the orders with Colonel Nicholson, to be issued in our joint names (for the Khans in the Derajet were as much his friends as mine). On the 18th of May, however, permission was given to raise 2,000; matters were growing worse each day, and it was now clearly understood by us in the council assembled at Pindee, that whatever gave rise to the mutiny, it had settled down into a struggle for empire, under Mahomedan guidance, with the Mogul capital as its centre. From that moment it was felt that, at any cost, Delhi must be regained.

36. On the 18th May, the commanding officer of the 10th Irregular Cavalry at Nowshera reported to Brigadier Cotton that the 55th Regiment of Native Infantry at both Nowshera and Murdai were in a state of discontent; and next day Colonel Nicholson telegraphed to us at Pindee that the detachment of 10th Irregular Cavalry at Murdai showed signs of disaffection. A wing of Her Majesty's 24th was immediately ordered to march from Pindee and garrison Attock.

37. On the 19th May the native newspaper at Peshawur published a false and incendiary report that the Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment had murdered its officers at the outposts. Colonel Nicholson immediately put the editor in prison. He was a Mahomedan, and a native of Persia.

38. The Commander in Chief most wisely telegraphed for Brigadier Chamberlain to command the Punjab moveable column, and declared that Brigadier Cotton (who had been proposed) could not be spared from Peshawur; and certainly all at Peshawur have reason to be thankful for this order.

39. Major
39. Major Becher now contributed to the moveable column one of the two irregular regiments of infantry stationed in Huzara. Captain Henderson, at Kohat, had from the first offered similar succours. Perfect confidence was felt by both those officers (and fully shared by me) in their ability to keep their districts quiet. None of us knew then, however, what we should have to go through.

40. On the 20th May I took leave of the Chief Commissioner at Pindee, and reached Peshawur again at noon on 21st. The aspect of things was gloomy to a degree. The military and civil authorities were not decided as to the temper of the native garrison. The most rancorous and seditious letters had been intercepted from Mahommedan bigots, in Patna and Thanesur, to Naik Kurreemoollah and other soldiers of the 64th Native Infantry, revelling in the atrocities that had been committed in Hindoostan on the men, women, and children of the "Nazarenes," and sending them messages from their own mothers that they should emulate these deeds, and, if they fell in the attempt, they would at least go to heaven, and their deaths, in such a case, would be pleasant news at home.* These letters alluded to a long series of correspondence that had been going on, through these men of the 64th Native Infantry, with the Hinduostanee fanatics in Swat and Sitana, mentioned in paragraph 8 of this letter.

41. The conduct of the 64th Native Infantry as a regiment (while containing these desperate traitors in its ranks) was at this juncture very peculiar. On the 18th May the 51st Native Infantry in Peshawur dispatched by the hand of a Brahmin,† to the 64th Regiment Native Infantry, and Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment, at Shubkudder, the following letter:—"This letter is sent from the Peshawur cantonment, to the whole Heriot regiment, to all the whole Heriot regiment. May it reach the Subadar Bahadoor." The letter then opens with some Indian apostrophes, and proceeds:—"For the rest, this letter is written to convey from the whole camp at Peshawur obeisance" (to Brahmins) "and benediction" (from Brahmins) "and salutation and service" (from Mussulman to Mussulman) "to the whole regiment of Heriot and Kelat-i-Ghilzie. Further, the state of affairs here is thus: that on the 22d day of the month the cartridges will be given to the Doobarun Regiment. So do whatever seems to you proper. Again (i.e., it is repeated), the cartridge will have to be beaten on the 22nd instant. Of this you are hereby informed. On reading this letter, whatever your opinion is, so reply; for considering you as our own, we have let you know beforehand. Therefore do as you think right. This is addressed to you by the whole regiment. O brothers! the religion of Hindoos and Mahomedans is all one. Therefore all you soldiers should know this. Here all the sepoys are at the bidding of the Jemadar, Soobadar Major, and Havildar Major. All are discontent with this business, whether small or great. What more need be written? Do as you think best. High and low send their obeisance, benediction, salutation, and service." (Postscript by another hand):—"The above is the state of affairs here. In whatever way you can manage it, come in to Peshawur on the 21st instant. Thoroughly understand that point. In fact, eat there, and drink here."‡ This letter reached Fort Shubkudder about sunset of the 18th May, and was given by a messenger to a sepoy of the 64th Native Infantry. The existence in its ranks of such men as the Naik Sheik Kurreemoollah, carrying on reasonable correspondence, and the very confidence with which the 51st Native Infantry addressed this letter to the 64th, leaves little doubt that the corps was in a disaffected state; and it would have been natural to expect that the men of the corps should deliberate on this letter, and if not act on it, at all events keep it secret; but they gave it up to their officers, and thus furnished to Brigadier Cotton invaluable proof of what was going on. Why did they do this? I wish I could suppose it was because they were innocent; but I can only conclude that, being broken up into three detachments, at a distance from Peshawur, and it thus being impossible to collect

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* Kurreemoollah was ultimately tried by a commission, and hanged.
† This man, Sectul Misser by name, was subsequently tried by a commission, and hanged. Gokul Misser, who wrote it, was blown from a gun.
‡ This is a proverb for letting no delay intervene.
lent and act together without the co-operation of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment, which was similarly placed in the same outposts, and having ascertained that the Killates* were not prepared to co-operate, they made the only use of the letter that was left, and gave it up to gain a name of loyalty for themselves.

42. The letter is a most valuable historic document; for it is the genuine confidence of one sepoy regiment to another on the question of the mutiny. It proves beyond a doubt that whatever moved the Mahomedans, the Hindoos were moved by the cartridges;† and it is lamentably characteristic of the conservative barbarism of India that a common piece of civilisation—an improved rifle—has convulsed the empire, and called up 150,000 Asiatics to affirm, by force of arms, that spirit can be defiled by matter, and religion converted in the stomach.

43. On the following day (19th May) Mr. Wakefield, Extra Assistant Commissioner at Peshawur, saw a fakeer sitting under a tree near his house; arrested him, searched him, and found nothing but a bag with 46 new rupees in it, which the fakeer said he had just got by begging in the lines of the 24th Native Infantry. A strong suspicion had, however, possessed Mr. Wakefield's mind, and he searched the man a second time, when a small bag, or "housewife," was detected in the hollow of his armpit, of which the ostensible purpose was to carry antimony for the eyes, but on careful examination it was found to contain a small Persian note, of which the following is a translation:—"My beloved Moollah, salam, salutation to you! After salutation and good wishes, this is the point, that instantly on receiving this, on the second day of the festival of the Eed, you must—yes, must—come here; and, if it be easy, bring a few pounds of fruit with you. Now is the time; admit no fear into your heart; such an opportunity will not again occur. Set out, I enjoin you.

(signed) "Fakeer Moollah, Naireem."

The names of the writer and of the addressee were probably false names, adopted for secret correspondence. The fakeer declared that the paper was an old one which he had picked up accidentally a long while ago, and kept to wrap up snuff. But there was no sign of either age or snuff in it, and the festival of the "Eed" alluded to, was to fall on the 25th and 26th instant; and already the rumour was abroad, that on that religious occasion, the Mahomedans of the city and valley were to rise and help the sepoys. The fakeer admitted that he was a frequenter of the sepoys lines; and though sepoys do give cowries and pice to beggars freely enough, they do not give 46 bright new rupees for nothing, neither do fakeers‡ conceal to the last, under their armpit, a housewife with nothing in it but antimony and snuff. There was no doubt, therefore, on Colonel Nicholson's mind that this letter was from Mahomedan conspirators in the garrison to Mahomedan conspirators at the outposts, inviting them to come in with a few English officers' heads, and join in a rising on the 26th May.

44. Warned by these discoveries, and by secret information from both the city and cantonment, Colonel Nicholson had endeavoured to raise levies through the most promising of the chiefs of the district, to help the European soldiers in the struggle that was coming. But the time had passed, a great danger impended over the cantonment; a profound sensation had been made by the startling fact that we had lost Delhi. Men remembered Cabul.§ Not 100 could be found to join such a desperate cause.

45. Finding things in this state, I wrote express to Captain Henderson at Kohat.

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* This distinguished regiment maintained its good behaviour throughout the crisis, though, of course, it was an object of suspicion.
† This is further confirmed by Mahomedan correspondence; for a rabid letter from a "Kaleefa Nathoo" at Thaseyur-to friends in Swat, through a naik of 64th Native Infantry, says, "On all four sides there is disturbance, and on account of the cartridges, the whole of the native army as far as Lahore have become disaffected.
‡ This man, on whom the letter was found, was subsequently tried by a commission, and hanged.
§ The ex-Wazir of Shah Shoojah is a pensioner at Peshawur, and a man of considerable ability. When Colonel Nicholson consulted him, he said plainly, "This is a crisis in which you will have to rely upon yourselves." It was true, almost prophetic, but not encouraging. Happily Colonel Nicholson was one of those men who require to be alarmed.
Kohat for any trusty levies he could send from thence; but to be of any use they must come next morning. He at once despatched about 100 men under Bahador Shere Khan (the head of the Bungushi tribe), who travelled all night, and gathered about 50 Afreedie volunteers as he came through the Kohat Pass; a strange resource truly.

46. The train of mutiny had, however, already been fired. Early on the morning of the 21st May, Futteh Khan Khuttuck (who, with a hasty levy, had been posted at the Attok Ferry), gave information to Major Vaughan in the Attok Fort, that a detachment of 55th Native Infantry, which was on duty at the ferry, was in a highly mutinous state, and ought to be disarmed. They were, indeed, soon observed to be in motion, leaving their post. Lieutenant Lind, second in command 5th Punjab Infantry (Major Vaughan's corps), quickly went across the river with a small party of his own men, halted them, and advanced alone to recall the soobadar of the 55th Native Infantry to his duty. The soobadar warned him off, called on his men to load if they had not yet done so, and the men fixed bayonets, and prepared to charge; Lieutenant Lind then called to his own men to come up, and the 55th detachment marched away towards Nowshera. As they went they were joined by another detachment of 24th regiment Native Infantry which was escorting commissariat stores to Peshawur; and leaving the stores to take care of themselves, the two bands of mutineers, between 40 and 50 in number, pushed on together for the cantonment of Nowshera. Lieutenant Lind pursued them for several miles, but only succeeded in capturing one straggler. He, therefore, with great forethought, got a horseman to ride across country and inform the commanding officer at Nowshera of the approach of the mutineers. Major Verner at once went out on the Attok road with a party of 10th Irregular Cavalry, met the mutineers at the entrance of the cantonment, and disarmed them. No sooner, however, did some companies of 55th Native Infantry, who were in Nowshera, see their comrades brought in as prisoners, than they broke out, and fired on the Sowars, who forthwith dispersed. The mutineers, now largely reinforced, proceeded to break open the regimental magazine, and having supplied themselves with ammunition, rushed to the bridge of boats, to cross the Kabul river, and join the main body of the 55th Native Infantry at Murdan, 12 miles north of Nowshera. The bridge, however, had already been broken up by that energetic and able engineer officer Lieutenant F. S. Taylor, who had also dispersed the boatmen, so that the boats might be useless. The sepoys, about 200 in number, endeavoured for some time to repair the bridge, and failing in that, flung themselves into the boats, and pushed off into the stream. Some were drowned, but the majority got safe to the other bank. The Sowars of the 10th Irregular Cavalry did not join the mutineers, but they did not act against them.

47. Colonel Nicholson was living with me at Peshawur, and we had laid down to sleep in our clothes, in a conviction that the night could not pass over quietly. At midnight the news of what had occurred at Nowshera reached us; and a most anxious council did we hold on it. It was probable that the 55th Native Infantry at Murdan would already be in open mutiny, and in possession of the fort. But to send a reliable force against them from Peshawur would only have been to give the native regiments a preponderance in the cantonment. Again, the news from Nowshera must soon reach the sepoys in Peshawur, and probably be the signal for a rise. The advantage, therefore, must be with whoever took the initiative; and we resolved at once to go to the General, and advise the disarming of the native garrison at daylight.

48. Well was it for the State that General Sydney Cotton, not General Hewitt, then commanded at Peshawur. General Cotton thoroughly understood

* This soobadar was named Sewdeen Dooby, and it has been ascertained that he was in close correspondence with Jewrakhun Dooby, a ring-leader of the 3d Cavalry at Meerut, from whom he had no doubt heard of the events at Meerut and Delhi, and had in consequence arranged to light a corresponding flame in the Peshawur garrison. The 55th Native Infantry and 3d Cavalry had been stationed together at Meerut from 1845 to 1849, and at Nowgong from 1850 to 1852, so that the men of the two regiments were intimately acquainted.

† The distance is only 24 miles, but everybody at Nowshera had probably been too busy for some hours to think of writing.
stood the danger which the proposition involved. Hitherto a large garrison of Hindostanee troops had been deemed necessary to occupy the Afghan Valley. It was now proposed to reverse matters; to disarm the majority of the troops, and call in the people and the mountaineers instead; this, too, when our prestige was gone. But it was the least of evils, and the General chose it with characteristic promptitude. All the commanding officers of corps were summoned. Day dawned before they were collected at the Residency, and for two hours the commandants of the condemned regiments protested against the measure. It was impossible not to sympathise with the soldierly feelings of Colonel Harrington and Major Shakespear; but when Colonel Plumbe declared his "implicit confidence" in the 27th Native Infantry to be unshaken by events in Hindostan, and had nothing to recommend but conciliation, while the colonel* of the 51st Native Infantry, on the other hand, predicted that his men "would attack the guns if called on to give up their muskets," hesitation was at an end. General Cotton announced his determination to disarm the four most doubtful regiments, and ordered them to parade each on its own ground at seven a.m. for that purpose (already it was past six).

49. The events of the next hour were to decide the fate of Peshawur during this war; and those who best knew the disaffection of the sepoys, and had been most convinced of the necessity for disarming them, felt most anxiety as to the issue. The corps to be disarmed were,—

- 5th Light Cavalry.
- 24th
- 27th Regiments Native Infantry.
- 51st

There was one other regiment of Native Infantry in the cantonment (the 21st Native Infantry), and two regiments of Irregular Cavalry (7th and 18th), but it was absolutely indispensable to keep one native infantry corps, to carry on the duties of the station. So the 21st was selected for two reasons; partly because it was the senior native infantry regiment, but chiefly because all accounts agreed that it had in that capacity hitherto declined to set a mutinous example. The two irregular corps of cavalry were spared, partly from the natural desire to keep them if possible; partly because at that early period of the mutiny there was some hope that, as a body, the Irregular Cavalry would at least be kept quiet by its stake in the service; partly because the 7th, which was the most doubtful, was commanded by a firm and vigilant officer (Colonel Mulcaster), who was not infected with the disease of "implicit confidence;" and lastly, because after disarming three regiments of native infantry and the regular cavalry, we could at any time coerce the irregular cavalry if necessary. It remained, however; to be seen whether the condemned regiments would submit to be disarmed, and whether the three excused regiments would not fraternise with them at once, and reduce the struggle to the simple issue between black and the white races.

50. The two European regiments (Her Majesty's 70th and 87th) and the artillery were got under arms, and took up positions at the two ends of the cantonment within sight of the parades, ready to enforce obedience if necessary, yet not so close as to provoke resistance; Colonel Nicholson joined Brigadier Galloway's staff at one rendezvous, and I General Cotton at the other.

51. These prompt and decided measures took the native troops completely aback. Not an hour had been given them to consult, and, isolated from each other, no regiment was willing to commit itself; the whole laid down their arms.

52. As the muskets and sabres of once honoured corps were hurried unceremoniously into carts, it was said that here and there the spurs and swords of English officers fell sympathisingly upon the pile. How little worthy were the men, of officers who could thus almost mutiny for their sakes; and as weeks and months passed on with their fearful tale of revelations, there were few of those

* Since dead, from exertion and exposure to the sun in quelling the ultimate outbreak of his corps.
those officers who did not learn, and with equal generosity acknowledge, that the disarming had been both wise and just.

53. For the results of this measure we had not long to wait. As we rode down to the disarming, a very few chiefs and yeomen of the country attended us; and I remember, judging from their faces, that they came to see which way the tide would turn. As we rode back, friends were as thick as summer flies; and levies began from that moment to come in.

54. That night about 250 sepoys of the 51st Native Infantry deserted and fled in every direction. They were promptly seized by the people of the district and the police, and extraordinary to say, were brought in alive though loaded with money, the savings of their pay. The ringleader, the soobadar major* of the regiment, had about 800 rupees upon his person, every rupee of which was brought in.

55. As an instance of the obstinate infatuation of the older commandants of the native troops at this juncture, I may mention that the Colonel of 51st Native Infantry, when called on to draw up the "charge" for the trial of these deserters, simply charged them with "being absent without leave," though General Cotton soon changed it to the plain English of "desertion."† The soobadar major was hanged before the whole garrison on parade, and was the first mutineer executed at Peshawur.

56. When the mutineers of 55th Native Infantry at Nowshera broke across the river, on 21st May, to join the main body of their regiment at Murdan, we in Peshawur from that moment considered the whole regiment practically in revolt, and the fort of Murdan as in the hands of an enemy; and one reason for disarming the Peshawur Native Garrison on the 22d was, to be free to march against the 55th Native Infantry. Accordingly, as soon as the disarming was accomplished, a force was organised to start that evening. But rumours came in that the 64th Native Infantry was marching on Peshawur, and it was deemed best to wait till we could see how that corps, and the Kelat-i-Ghilzies had taken the disarming of their comrades. All that was done, therefore, on the 22d was to bring Major Vaughan’s regiment (5th Punjab Infantry) from Attock to Nowshera, to protect the families of Her Majesty’s 27th regiment against any return of the mutineers from Murdan, or any outbreak of the 10th Irregular Cavalry.

57. On the 23d May the officer commanding the latter regiment at Nowshera reported that the 55th Native Infantry at Murdan were in a state of mutiny. The colonel of the 55th at Murdan reported much the same of the 10th Irregular Cavalry (of which he had a detachment). Each lamented the sad effect of such neighbours on the corps he commanded. Lieutenant Horne, the civil officer at Murdan, an unprejudiced party, arbitrated between the two; and, escaping from the fort, took refuge with the chiefs of Euusoofzye, for the sufficient reasons that the sepoys of the 55th had threatened to murder their own officers, and the men of the 10th Irregular Cavalry proposed "roasting Lieutenant Horne."‡

58. It seems almost incredible, but the Colonel of the 55th Native Infantry (a devoted soldier who lived for his regiment) reported to General Cotton that he had implicit confidence in his men, whom he considered to be only acting under a "panic."§ He begged earnestly that no force might be moved against them from Peshawur; and he declined an offer secretly made to him by about 200 Sikh recruits, to fight the rest of the regiment if the Colonel would only separate them from the Poorbeahs and give them arms.

59. But

* This man wrote one portion of the letter of the 64th Native Infantry, which has been given in para. 41.
† On the former charge, simple imprisonment or dismissal would be awardable; on the latter, imprisonment with hard labour, transportation, or death.
‡ The duffadar who was spokesman on this occasion was shot by order of a drumhead court-martial on the morning of the 26th May.
§ At this very moment his men were arranging to join the 64th Native Infantry at Abazye, and then march on Peshawur, and raise the garrison.

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59. But the do-nothing policy was not for General Cotton. In the course
of the 22d and morning of 23d it was seen that all was quiet at the other out-
posts; and at 11 o’clock at night of 23d, a force of 300 European infantry, 250
irregular cavalry, horse levies and police, and eight guns (of which six were
howitzers) left Peshawur under command of Colonel Chute of Her Majesty’s
70th, accompanied by Colonel Nicholson as political officer, and neared Murdan
about sunrise of 25th, after effecting a junction with Major Vaughan and 200
Punjab infantry from Nowshera.

60. No sooner did this force appear in the distance than the 55th Native
Infantry, with the exception of about 120 men,* broke from the fort and fled,
as Colonel Chute well described it, “tumultuously” towards the hills of Swat.

61. Then followed a pursuit, which to look back on is to renew all sorrow for
the dear-bought victory of “Delhi.” Chase was given with both artillery,
cavalry and infantry, but the mutineers had got far ahead, and had ground so
checked the guns that they never got within range. Colonel Nicholson, with a
handful of horsemen, hurled himself like a thunderbolt on the route of a thou-
sand mutineers. Even he (in a private note to me—for he seldom reported
officially anything he did himself) admitted that the “55th fought determinately,
as men always do who have no chance of escape but by their own exertions.”
They broke before his charge and scattered over the country in sections and in
companies. They were hunted out of villages, and grappled with in ravines,
and driven over ridges all that day from Fort Murdan to the border of Swat,
and found respite only in the failing light. 120 dead bodies were numbered on
their line of flight, and thrice that number must have borne off wounds; 150
were taken prisoners, and the regimental colours and 200 stand of arms reco-
vered. Colonel Nicholson himself was 20 hours in the saddle, and, under a
burning sun, could not have traversed less than 70 miles; his own sword brought
many a traitor to the dust.

62. The people of the border valley of Loond Khor favoured rather than
opposed the fugitives, and upwards of 600 made good their flight into Swat.

63. The colonel of the 55th Native Infantry, unable to endure the disgrace
of the corps he had so loved and trusted, committed suicide. Never, perhaps,
had any mercenary troops in the world foreign leaders who so thoroughly iden-
tified themselves with their men as the English officers of the Bengal army;
and never was generous confidence more diabolically abused than theirs.

64. It appeared afterwards that there had long been intrigues going on
between the 55th and 64th Native Infantry, and the 10th Irregular Cavalry and
the Hindooostanee fanatics in Swat and the neighbouring hills; and that two
Hindoostanee moulvies in the collectorate of Murdan were the hosts of the
emissaries who passed to and fro. They both fled the night before the force
came from Peshawur, but one was caught months afterwards and hanged.

65. And now another cloud seemed gathering on the frontier. The noted
outlaw, Ajoon Khan, came down to Prangar, invited, as it was believed, by our
Hindoostanee troops‡ in the fort of Abasye, at the head of the Swat river. His
native home and former lands lay close to Abasye; and had he been joined by
the 500 armed fugitives of the 55th Native Infantry, boldly come down to Abasye, and
got the fort betrayed to him by the garrison, the whole frontier would have
been in a flame. Nothing seemed more likely. But the danger was promptly
met. The force with Colonels Chute and Nicholson was nearly doubled from
Peshawur, and moved rapidly to cover the threatened outposts; and both the
Hindoostanee troops and the frontier tribes saw that, after disarming four regi-
ments

* At first it was supposed that these men were loyal, but the European offi-
cers had stopped them as they were following their comrades, and by threats and persevered divided them from the rest.

‡ I speak here of his own police pows. There were some irregular cavalry, but they only pret-
tended to act. Captain Law, who commanded a party of 10th Irregular Cavalry, got wounded in
setting a vain example to his men, one of whom treacherously fired into the 4th Punjab Infantry,
and was instantly killed. The 4th, under Major Vaughan, followed as closely as infantry could do,
and showed an admirable spirit throughout the day.

† These troops were detachments of 64th Native Infantry, K elite-i-Ghilzies, and 10th Irregular
Cavalry: but our information was to the effect that the Ghilzies were not concerned in this
conspiracy.
ments and routing another, we still had a moveable column in the field, and were standing in an eminently aggressive attitude, challenging any one to move. Ajoon Khan withdrew into the hills, and our little force encamped upon the border till Delhi should be regained.

66. Delhi was, however, not to be recovered by a coup de main. The Hindoo sepoys, having mutinied about a cartridge, had nothing to propose for an empire, and fell in of necessity with the only policy that was feasible at the moment, a Mahomedan King of Delhi; and certainly no other policy could have given such life to the coming struggle. Hitherto the question had been purely domestic between the English and their Hindoostanee army, a quarrel in which the Affghan tribes would merely desire to be on the conquering side. But a war between the Moslem and the Christian for empire must needs agitate every village in which there was a mosque and a moollah; and the city of Peshawur in particular, with its 60,000 inhabitants, had always been a hotbed of intrigue. Humanly speaking, I consider that the border at this critical period was mainly kept under by the levying of a militia. Affghans are fanatical, but avarice is their ruling passion. Every idle vagrant, every professional robber, every truculent student in the mosques, at whose finger-ends fanaticism was beginning to tingle, found a market for his sword. The population of the Peshawur Valley had never been disarmed. Being liable to raids from their neighbours, they had been allowed to keep arms in their houses; though none but outside villagers might wear arms abroad. It was not difficult therefore to collect any number of armed footmen at a short notice. Good horses are not plentiful in this irrigated country; but the head men of every village have two or three hacks, and the enlistment of their farm servants on these rips, attached all the hamlets, one by one, up,. and down to the villages, attached all the hamlets; one by one,.. and yeomen of the country, all eager to gather from the bush, the jockeys of unconquerably vicious horses endeavouring to reduce them to a show of docility by galloping them furiously about till the critical moment of inspection came. At last, sick at heart from the receipt of a bad telegram from Delhi, I prepared a proclamation that any deserter might be killed wherever found in the district, and the property on his person be appropriated by the captor. About 40 or 50 sepoys were killed in consequence in making for the Indus, and this destroyed all confidence between the soldiery and the people.

67. About this time, too, I issued a proclamation that any deserter might be killed wherever found in the district, and the property on his person be appropriated by the captor. About 40 or 50 sepoys were killed in consequence in making for the Indus, and this destroyed all confidence between the soldiery and the people.

68. As an instance of the strange things that happened in those days, I may mention that one morning 300 Affredies of the Mullikdeen Kheyl tribe (who were in disgrace and under blockade), marched from the Hills into cantonments, armed
armed to the teeth, and said they had come to fight for us, and be forgiven. I accepted them at once, and they now form the nucleus of one of the new Punjab regiments. (They were the men who repulsed the first assault of the 51st Native Infantry when it rose.)

69. Now, too, our old friends, the Mooltanee Pathans began to arrive from the Derajat to help us through a second crisis, and their example did a world of good. At first, the moollahs abused them for coming to the aid of infidels; but it was soon seen that the Mooltanees were rigid Mussulmans who never missed a prayer, and many of whom rode with the Koran at their saddle-bow; yet they announced that they came to fight for friends who had used them well; and most of the officers had a tale to tell of what they had got for their services in the East campaign, a pension or a garden, or perhaps even that climax of good things, a bit of land in perpetuity; and what Peshawuree had not heard that Foujdar Khan, the present British Vakeel at Cabul, was one of these very Mooltanees; that he began the war of 1848 as a jemadar of 24 sowars, and is now a real nawab and the ambassador of a state? It is impossible indeed to overrate the good influence that was exercised in the district by the marked loyalty of the Mooltanees. They have set a fashion which the Peshawurees have followed, as well as double-minded men can copy a simpler race; and I hope that the feeling will not altogether die away.

70. While Colonel Nicholson's activity in the field, and the enlistment of levies, were thus keeping the district quiet, General Cotton was, day by day, getting the mastery over his mutinous sepoy garrison, by a stern unswerving maintenance of discipline. On 29th May, the subadar major of 51st Native Infantry (alluded to in para. 59), was hanged in presence of the troops. The whole garrison was made to stand and see their ringleader executed with ignominy. It was said that they would not come out of their lines; but had they refused, or had there been a move among them on the parade, the General had prepared everything to put them to the bayonet; the scoundrels felt it, and stood like statues.

71. On the 30th May, a single sepoy of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie regiment, broke out into frantic mutiny, and rushed to the magazine; he was instantly shot down by his comrades, and the incident deserves to be recorded to the honour of the regiment, and the officers* who held it in that state of good feeling and discipline.

72. On the 3d June, 12 of the 51st deserters were hanged before the paraded garrison.

73. On the same morning, one detachment of the 64th Native Infantry, at Abasye, was disarmed by the force with Colonel Chute and Colonel Nicholson; and another detachment of 64th, at Shubkuddur, was disarmed by a party under Major Brougham, of the Mountain Train, who, next day went on to Michnee, and disarmed the rest of that disaffected corps. It was hopeless for the 64th Native Infantry to resist this measure; because, at each of the three outposts, they were placed between the loyal Kelat-i-Ghilzies, and the disarming force.

74. So marked was the staunchness of the Kelat-i-Ghilzies regiment, that General Cotton published a division order on the 3d June, specially exempting them from being disarmed, as in no instance had a breath of suspicion as to the fidelity of that corps been entertained.

75. And here I will turn to measures of another kind; not of repression, but of military reorganisation, which were originated at this early period. The eventful month of May had not elapsed before General Cotton had begun to make the most of his reliable material. He began by drawing volunteers from the Queen's infantry regiments, and mounting and arming them with horses and arms taken from the 5th Light Cavalry, thus securing an escort for his artillery, which could be relied on in the worst emergencies. The design was subsequently improved by an entirely new idea, and one which may yet be found extensively

* Captain F. Mundy and Lieutenant G. E. Rowcroft.
extensively useful in reorganising an army for India, viz., the association of native with European soldiers in the same corps, in a proportion sufficient to be useful, and moderate enough to be safe. To two European troops General Cotton gave one native troop of selected men from the 5th Light Cavalry; the natives relieve the Europeans of many a harassing distress, and thus leave a maximum of Europeans for actual service. By working continually with the Europeans, the natives acquire a degree of *esprit de corps*; and the system is a step towards bringing the two races together in daily life, and ignoring caste. For this reason it is less likely to be popular with the Hindoo than the Mahomedan soldiers. The Patans, whose manners at least are open and frank, take to the idea readily; and should the future native army be organised on the system of the Punjab irregular force, the success of which entirely depends on the selection of officers (which selection will have then to be made from the officers of the European regiments), it would seem almost indispensable to have some plan such as this of the Peshawur light horse for bringing officers to a knowledge of native soldiers, and eliciting an aptitude to command them.

76. On the 4th June, another excellent idea was telegraphed by Sir John Lawrence to General Cotton, viz., to pick out all Sikhs and other Punjabees from the Hindooostanee regiments of the line (where they were lost among a crowd of rebels), and form them into a separate corps. General Cotton acted on it at once; and a fine regiment was thus raised by Captain Cane, which took its part in all subsequent operations.

77. On 5th June, General Cotton projected a new European battery of artillery of nine-pounder guns lying in the magazine, to be manned and driven by more volunteers from the Queen’s infantry regiments, and horsed by the horses taken from the 5th Light Cavalry. This was entrusted to Captain Stallard, of the Artillery; and, in three months, notwithstanding the hot weather, the battery was perfectly efficient; a result which could only have been obtained by extraordinary exertions on the part of both officers and men.

78. The measure was extended with the same happy result to Captain Cox’s troop of Native Horse Artillery, the native artillerymen being replaced with European volunteers.

79. It is true that these measures diminished the strength of the European infantry regiments, but it does not require much reflection to decide that they strengthened the garrison a hundred fold; and it is in this economy and mastery of resources that an able general is discovered.

80. I believe it was some time in May that the Chief Commissioner ordered every Commandant of the Punjab irregular infantry regiments to raise four additional companies, but there was only one such regiment in the Peshawur Valley; and on 6th June, I obtained authority to establish a separate depot at Peshawur for Affghan recruits, which soon after was embodied as the 18th Regiment of Punjab Infantry, commanded by Captain Bartlett.

81. Indeed, the necessity of raising a new native army in the Punjab, with Which to replace the Bengal regiments that were rebelling at station after station, and eke out the forces available for the siege of Delhi, soon became self evident, and Sir John Lawrence set himself vigorously to the work in every part of his province. Thus, in the Peshawur Valley, three more irregular regiments were raised: the 8th, by Lieutenant C. H. Brownlow; the 9th, by Captain Thelwalt; and the 14th, by Major Shakespear.

82. These four new Punjab corps are still in the valley, and, during the late cold season, have been worked up by General Cotton to a high state of efficiency; so that it may be truly said, that, what with new artillery, new cavalry and infantry, and levies of border horsemen, the Peshawur division not only passed through this great mutiny without disaster, but moulded a bad garrison, and replumed itself with a better.

83. Before quitting the subject of new organisations, which grew out of the mutiny, I ought here to mention the “Land Transport Train,” though it was not
not matured till the middle of July. In a crisis caused by the native troops, of course the main reliance of Government was on the European soldiers, and no expedition of any importance could be undertaken without them. It became therefore a great object to move them in the hot season with the least possible fatigue; and during the earlier months of the mutiny General Cotton transported his Europeans from point to point on elephants, and in the small carts of the engineer department; but both these means of conveyance were found troublesome and fatigueing to the men. This led to the construction of the "Land Transport Train," out of material that was at hand. A number of spare ammunition waggons were fitted up by Lieutenant R. H. Brownlow, Deputy Commissary of Ordnance, so that 16 men could ride in each waggons, and their arms be stowed away in the lockers on which they sat. The waggons were to be drawn by relays of commissariat bullocks, at regular stages along the road; and it was found that, if necessary, the train could thus accomplish 40 miles in one night. The trial trip was made in the cantonment on 14th July by General Cotton, with 15 ladies and gentlemen as passengers, the waggons being ornamented with evergreens, and drawn (for this occasion only) by six artillery horses, which were ridden by six staff officers. The experiment created much amusement in very gloomy times; and having been pronounced perfectly successful, the train was regularly organised the very next day, and proved of invaluable service when continual sickness set in with more than its usual virulence. The European soldiery viewed this thoughtful effort in their behalf with gratitude. It literally opened a way to them to get out of this fatal valley when prostrated by fever; and though many fine fellows fell victims to the disease, there is no question that many were rescued from death by being removed to Rawulpindee in the "Land Transport Train."

84. I return now to the narrative of events. It is well known to you that in the first years of our rule, in this valley, the border was chiefly disturbed by the hostility of the neighbouring country of Swat. An aged priest, called the Akhoond, had hitherto been the pope of that country; but taking the usual Asiatic view of the English career in India, that it was one of aggressive designs, he expected us to annex Swat as soon as we had settled at Peshawur. He therefore advised the Swatees to create one Syud Ukbur King of Swat, and pay him a tithe of their corps to enable him to keep up soldiers for their defence. This was accordingly done, and the King, to justify his own existence, made himself as bad a neighbour to the English as he could do, without actually drawing down an expedition on his head.

85. It might naturally have been expected therefore that this Padshah of Swat would be at the head of all mischief when the troubles of 1857 overtook us. It is a remarkable fact, however, that he died on 11th May, the very day that the first news of the mutiny reached Peshawur, so that Swat itself was simultaneously plunged into civil war and entirely preoccupied with its own affairs. The question was as to the succession; king or no king? Syud Mobarak Shah, son of the deceased Syud Ukbur, wished to succeed his father; but the Swatees had grown tired of tithes, and called on the Akhoond to excommunicate the heir apparent; both sides called in their friends and allies, and prepared to settle it by arms. It was at this juncture that 500 of the fugitive sepoys of the 55th Native Infantry who had escaped from Colonel Nicholson's pursuit, burst upon the scene. They were at once taken into the young King's service, but after fighting one battle demanded pay. The King not being in funds, borrowed 100 rupees from the leader of the sepoys (a grey haired jemadar), and distributed them among the mutineers; but when this supply was exhausted, the full extent of their folly and misery seems to have struck the hoary ringleader, for he blew out his own brains. The Swatees tied a stone to his body and flung it into the river; which perhaps before many days may have carried it down through that cantonment of Nowshera, where the 55th Native Infantry had month after month drawn the high pay of the most indulgent Government in the world, for doing little but pipe-clay belts and varnish cartridge boxes.

86. Had the Akhoond of Swat at this time, standing forward as the champion of the faith, preached a crescentade against us, and hushing intestine strife, moved across the passes, and descended into the Peshawur Valley, with all
all the prestige of the 55th Sepoys in his favour, I do not doubt that he would have excited among our subjects that spirit of religious zeal which may be overlaid for a while, but never extinguished by material prosperity. Instead of this, he suddenly sided with the popular party, dismissed the 55th Sepoys, with guides to conduct them across the Indus, and expelled the young king from Swat.

87. This conclusion assured the peace of our northern frontier, and Colonel Nicholson, with Colonel Chute's moveable column, returned to cantonments in the second week of June.

88. But we were soon to lose him. The death of Colonel Chester, at Delhi, called Brigadier General Neville Chamberlain to the high post of Adjutant General, and Colonel Nicholson was instinctively selected to take command of the Punjab moveable column, with the rank of Brigadier General.

89. How common sense revenges itself upon defective systems when real dangers assail a state! Had there been no struggle for life or death, when would Neville Chamberlain and John Nicholson, in the prime of their lives, with all their faculties of doing and enduring, have attained the rank of Brigadier General? Why should we keep down in peace the men who must be put up in war?

90. Captain James, the Chief Commissioner's secretary, now took General Nicholson's place in the Peshawur district, of which he had previously had charge for several years. A stranger would indeed have been useless at this crisis, when success depended on local knowledge and personal influence.

91. After the break-up of Colonel Chute's column, the fort of Murdan was garrisoned by head quarters of Major Vaughan's regiment (5th Punjab Infantry), and the Nowshera cantonment by the 4th Punjab Infantry, commanded by Captain Wilde, both ready to move to the Swat frontier, should it be again disturbed.

92. On the 19th June, I advocated, in the search for new military classes, the raising of a corps of Muzzubees, of whom many hundreds were working on the canals of the Punjab. The idea was ultimately carried out, and improved by making them pioneers.

93. About this time, and indeed frequently throughout the crisis, rumours were rife of a rising in the Peshawur city; and on 22d June, the military arrangements on the city side of the cantonment were greatly improved by the establishment of a strong picket in the houses of the late Colonel Mackeson and Colonel Phillips.

94. I may here say, that the mischief to be feared from the citizens of Peshawur is more of the pen and the tongue than of the sword, though the town is full of a rabble who would plunder and stab freely in the rear of a disaster.

95. On 26th June, General Cotton brought the 10th Irregular Cavalry to account for their repeated instances of disaffection. Part of the regiment was in Peshawur, and part in Nowsherá. Both were simultaneously dealt with: their arms, horses, and property were taken from them† and confiscated, and the whole of the men were hurried down to Attock, where they were dismissed with two rupees each, just enough to carry them to their homes. It was a sight indeed to see these traitors brought from their saddles to their feet, and told to walk to their own provinces or starve. Their countenances, when stripped and searched in a masterly manner by a company of 3d Punjab Infantry, I never shall forget.

96. The winding up of the accounts of this regiment afforded a lesson. The corps was 60,000 rupees in debt to its bankers; and all the horses and arms, and property and arrears of pay, did little more than clear the account. To give a banker to a native regiment, is to invite two-thirds of the men to run in debt; and

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* Sweepers, who became Sikhs.
† In pity to the women and children, a baggage pony was left with every family.
and a corps that is in debt can never be really in sound discipline, or serviceable condition. It would be far better for Government to advance to needy recruits the price of their horse and equipments, and recover it by instalments. The pay of irregular cavalry has wisely been raised from 20 to 25 rupees; but this will be of little use if money lenders are allowed to eat it up.

97. In the beginning of July, General Cotton, not only deprived all the disarmed regiments of their extra batta, but put them on subsistence allowance, to their great disgust.

98. Two of the frontier outposts, Forts Mackeson and Barra, were garrisoned at the outbreak of the mutiny by detachments from the 24th Native Infantry. Barra, being only six miles from cantonments, was promptly dealt with. The sepoys were withdrawn and disarmed, and a garrison of my Mooltanee levies was thrown in; but Fort Mackeson was allowed to stand over till we were more at leisure. It was soon reported to me that the sepoys in this outpost were brewing all kinds of plans. At first they ventured to think of marching by night on the cantonment of Peshawur, and raising the other troops; but they finally turned their attention to escaping from the valley, and offered 3,000 rupees to the Afreedees of Boree, to pilot them through the hills to some ferry of the Indus. These overtures were readily entertained by the worst characters of Boree; but were disapproved of by the elders of the tribe, who reported them to Captain Henderson at Kohat. It was highly probable that had the garrison trusted themselves to the Afreedees, they would have been all robbed and murdered; but it was possible also that the Afreedees might keep faith; and a dangerous example be set. General Cotton decided to take the initiative and disarm them, and the duty was entrusted to me. I had Mooltanee levies coming at the time from the Derajat to Peshawur; and a detachment of the 3d and 6th Punjab Infantry returning from Peshawur to Kohat. By a simple arrangement, these two parties were made to meet near Fort Mackeson on 6th July, so that it was only necessary to slip out of Peshawur cantonment at night with two of Major Brougham’s mountain guns and an escort of horse, and join them. Before dawn, on 7th, we had surrounded the fort, and placed the guns in position. The sepoys were entirely surprised, and at the summons of their commanding officer, Major Shakespear, who was of our party, came out and laid down their arms. One of their number, a havildar from Oude, was absent; and in the course of the day was brought in to us from the hills, where he had gone to arrange matters for his comrades. And on examining the men’s pouches, 230 rounds of ball ammunition were missing; doubtless having been given to the Afreedees in the course of the negotiations.

99. A Mooltanee garrison was then left in Fort Mackeson.

100. The Oude havildar was tried, convicted, and blown from a gun.

101. Scarcely had this little affair been disposed of than (on 9th July) two Afreedees, of the Sissah tribe, entered the lines of the 18th Irregular Cavalry, and presented to the Hindoostanee Sowars a letter from Mullik Surajoodeen, the head of their tribe, and one of the most powerful men in the Khyber. The letter offered an asylum in the writer’s hills to any “blackmen,” either of the cavalry or infantry, who chose to mutiny and come to him; and it artfully hinted that he had authority from Cabul for giving this invitation. Strange to say, the men of the 18th Irregular Cavalry at once took the emissaries and the letter to their commanding officer, Major Ryves; an act of loyalty, for which two or three of them were promoted. The whole affair was so mysterious, that instead of hanging the emissaries, I put them in prison, and sent to ask the Sissah chief if he had written the letter; he at once acknowledged it, and said, “if the blackmen had come, he meant to give them up.” At my invitation, he came down to see me, and adhered firmly to this account; and is at this moment doing every thing he can to deserve the release of his two messengers. More unaccountable people than these hill men, I suppose never were.

102. On the 13th July, General Cotton introduced into the regiments of regular

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* Hindostanes are generally thus described by the Afghan tribes, even in written correspondence.
regular native infantry, the principle of caste companies, which had been a distinctive feature of the Punjab irregular system, while Hindoos of Oudh were mixed up indiscriminately with Mahomedans of Oudi; the Mahomedans could always carry away the Hindoos by superior force of character. By separating the castes and religions, a series of class feelings were evoked, and an approach made to counteraction. It is also much happier for the men; and the principle should not again be lost sight of. The Poorbeah soldiers have always perfectly comprehended the political action of this principle; and when, after the annexation of the Punjab, Government ordered 200 Sikhs to be enlisted in every regiment of the native army, they wheeled their colonels into distributing them, 20 into each company; by which the intention of Government was quietly neutralized. Some regiments went still further, and persuaded their English officers that these Sikhs were "dirty," and "spoil the appearance of the old Pultun;" so that the officers "did not like those Sikhs," and somehow or other, the Sikhs were not enlisted. Insuperable difficulties were found in procuring them; never was any order of Government wiser or worse attended to.

103. In para. 86, I related how Syud Mobaruk Shah, son of the late King of Swat, as well as the mutineers of 55th Native Infantry, had been dismissed by the Swatees, and told to seek their fortunes elsewhere. The mass of the fugitive sepoys, with desperate courage, set their faces towards Cashmere. They could not imagine that Maharajah Goolab Sing, who had a foot in each boat in the war of 1848–49, would not in this more awful crisis leap into the argosy of rebellion, and they anticipated a ready asylum to light a flame upon our border. Major Becher has vividly described, in his report, their wretched wanderings from glen to glen, mountain to mountain, to starve, drop, die, fight, fall, drown, or hang at last. But there had been a few who shrunk from the perils of that enterprise, and accompanied Syud Mobaruk Shah into the valley of Punjhar, which adjoins the Eusufzye side of the valley of Peshawur. Here they found a colony of Hindoostanee Mahomedans of the Wahabee sect (headed by a moulvie named Inayat), who, in return for lands at a place called Mungul Thannah, support the Khan of Punjhar in oppressing his own clan. Either this chief (Mokurrub Khan), or the clan, used to be constantly calling in our border officers to arbitrate their mutual disputes, and our decisions being generally in favour of the people, incurred for us the hatred of the khan. The present was a good opportunity to vent it, and he determined to light a flame upon our border.

104. He commenced by sending a party of the Hindoostanee and other vagabonds, under his cousin, Meer Baz Khan, into our nearest villages, and instigating them to "raise the standard of the Prophet," or, in other words, to refuse to pay their revenue. The news reached Lieutenant Horne, the Assistant Commissioner at Murdan, on 1st July, and by daylight next morning Major Vaughan (then commanding the fort at Murdan) fell upon them with about 400* horse and foot, and two mountain guns; killed Meer Baz Khan, took prisoner a Rohilla leader named Jan Mahomed Khan; hanged him and Mulik Zureef, the head man of the rebels; burnt two of the villages which had revolted, fired others, and extinguished this spark of mischief. Nothing could have been better than the promptness of this example.

105. Captain James at once repaired to the scene of these disturbances, and by his judgment, courage, and intelligence, the Eosusfzye border was saved at this period from a general rise. The most disastrous tidings came daily from Hindoostan, and echoed in still more alarming voices among the hills. Special messengers made their way from Delhi and proclaimed the extinction of the Nazarenes in the Mogul capital. Others came from the Peshawur cantonment, and invited the Ghazees to descend and inflame the country. The Ghazees came with the moulvie at their head, and planted their standard (embroidered with butchery from the Koran) on the heights of Nowranjee.

106. This mountain village was so strongly situated, that the police scarcely dared to go near it, and it became a refuge for every evildoer. Its inhabitants, about

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* 270 Rifles, 4th Punjab Infantry; 80 sepoys 2d Punjab Cavalry, and some police.
about 400 in number, welcomed the moullie with delight. The holy war seemed auspiciously opened with every requisite; a priest, a banner, a fastness, a howling crowd of bigots, and several days' provisions. But on the morning of 21st July, Captain James surprised them with a force of 800* horse and foot, and four mountain guns, under command of Major Vaughan, and put them to a disastrous flight, which the moullie headed so precipitately, that his mystic banner remained in the hands of the infidels. No less than 50 or 60 of the Ghazees were slain: and the lower village of Narunjee was destroyed.

107. The weather was fearfully hot, and the troops were too exhausted to destroy Upper Narunjee. In a few days the moullie returned with a larger band than ever from Bonyr and Punjtar, and recaptured the position.

108. General Cotton sent reinforcements from Peshawur, and on 3d August Captain James and Major Vaughan with 1,400† men assailed the place again. The Ghazees had thrown up some formidable entrenchments, and danced and yelled as they saw a small column advancing in their front. Their shouts were answered by British cheers from a second column under Lieutenant Hoste, which had gained the heights by a bye-path, and now appeared above Narunjee. A general fight took place; 30 of the Ghazees died fighting stoutly, and three were taken prisoners; amongst whom was a moullie from Bareilly, who was summarily hanged. The village was then knocked down by elephants, and its towers blown up by the engineers. Nowrunjee was at last destroyed.

109. General Cotton in his division orders, passed a well merited encomium on Captain James for his management of these affairs.

110. In one of his reports, Captain James made the following just remarks:—

"I do not myself entertain the same high opinion of the services of the khans (i. e., of Eosofuzye) as is held by Lieutenant Horne * * * * I have observed a general wish on the part of the khans to strengthen themselves, and to induce me to place the armed ‘oolooz †’ at their disposal; but I believe they are none of them actually disloyal. Their apparent restlessness is caused, I think, by a fear lest our power should fail us, and circumstances oblige them to look after their own interests." Major Becher in Huzara, and Captain Henderson in Kohat, observed the same restlessness and anxiety among the chiefs as to the result of the struggle. Those out of possession were the only parties glad of the convulsion. Those in possession (of course the large majority) were restless from fear of our Government being overthrown. Thus the loyal and the disloyal alike had to cast about for their old factions and supporters. I watched the matter closely throughout the division, and my deliberate conviction is, that the masses of both chiefs and people, though retaining their prejudices of race and religion, have no material grievance, and are conscious of the solid advantage of our rule.

111. To show, however, how entirely native confidence was at this time destroyed, I would adduce the conduct of the commercial classes, for whose special protection and profit our revenue system would seem to have been devised. If there was any body of men in India who ought to have come forward to help us in difficulty, it was "the monied interest." An opportunity was afforded them about the middle of July by the Financial Commissioner opening a six per cent. Punjab loan, repayable in a year. I first summoned the chief native gentlemen of the city, and consulted them on this delicate topic. They looked very grave; made many wise remarks on the duty of everybody to help such a paternal Government; affected an entire freedom from the vulgar belief that the English raj was coming to an end; but it was clearly their opinion not a rupee would be subscribed. Kazie Gholam Kadir, the wealthiest man in Peshawur, fell into a complete stupor the instant a loan was

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† Two 24-pounder howitzers; 4 Mountain Train guns; 150 European Riflemen; 400 Rifles, 5th Punjab Infantry; 200 men, 6th Punjab Infantry; 150 Captain Cave’s new regiment; 50 Rifles, 21st Native Infantry; 325 Levy and police horsemen; 150 sabres, 2d Punjab Cavalry.
‡ Pushtoo, for “clan.”
was named, and was evidently considering how to escape rather than how to raise it; and Nazir Kheiroollah, for whom our Government had recovered the best part of a lakh of rupees from a subject of Cashmere, and on whom a pension of 500 rupees a month had been conferred, shook his head seriously, and prophesied that to raise a loan in the city at this crisis would be found "no child's play." However, they all undertook to sound the city corporation, and bring up the chief capitalists before me the next day.

112. About two hours after the appointed time the city magnates slunk in, each trying to make himself as small as possible, and to sit in any row except the front. That hyperbole of gratitude for the prosperity enjoyed under our shadow; that lavish presentation of trays of fruits and sugar-candy with which these comfortable men formerly rolled into "the presence"—what had become of it? Alas, all vanished with our prestige! Behold a Government not only opening a loan, but imperatively needing it. Not a man would lend a farthing if he could help it.

113. Seeing this written in their faces, I opened the meeting by fining them all round for wasting two hours in times like these, and then asked them what arrangements they proposed. They asked leave to withdraw to the next room, and after half an hour more consultation, deliberately came back and said they thought 15,000 rupees might be raised with a little contrivance in the course of a few months.

114. Whether they subscribed a few lakhs or not to the loan, seemed to me, under the existing circumstances, quite a secondary consideration to whether the prestige of Government should be destroyed in the Peshawur valley by being denied a loan in the city. It was a trial of strength; and I told the corporation that, with reference to the wealth of the merchants, I considered they could, without any inconvenience, subscribe five lakhs, which amount I intended to realise, but would rather they assessed themselves according to the means of the respective firms. So I gave them a day to make out the assessment.

115. They at once settled down to the details; but as every house desired to throw an unfair share on its neighbour, I placed the assessment in the hands of the Government Treasurer, Mannull, who carried it out with a patience, firmness, good nature, and impartiality which I cannot too highly praise.

116. In the end, a loan of four lacs was arranged, and up to the present time the realisations are as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subscribed by Europeans</td>
<td>- 24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>- 3,95,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rs. 4,19,300</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

117. No less than half a lakh was put upon Kazee Gholam Kadir; and having once assured himself that it must be done, he took the lead in all the arrangements, and rode up to my house with about 20,000 rupees' worth of gold coins in his saddle-bags, which he threw down on the floor, laughing heartily at the whole business.

118. The loan operated very well on public opinion. The people enjoyed seeing the money-lenders brought to book, and respected the power which asserted itself in difficulties. The capitalists themselves were at once interested in the cause of good order.

119. There was one chief, Mahomed Khan, the Mahmund Urbah, who had fallen much under suspicion. For years he had done as little for Government as he could help; his sons had not come forward now with any efficient aid, and he himself was reported to be sending his money off to safe places in the hills. At one time I contemplated treating him in the most summary manner; but it seemed a duty to put off all severe measures as long as possible; and though the Urbah did nothing for us, he did nothing against us. When the loan was organised, I turned it to good account with this chief. I sent for him and told him how he stood in my judgment, and how impossible it was for a jagirdar to remain neutral and keep his jagir. "What would you have me do?" he asked.
asked. I told him to pay in 12,000 rupees to the loan, and send two sons down to Hindostan, with 50 horsemen. He agreed, and became a new man from that moment. His sons are with Major Stokes, watching the ferries of the Ganges and rendering good service. The Urbah himself is, I believe, as grateful as he can be for being thus saved from disgrace, and has exerted himself in several negotiations with hill tribes.

120. There being no better index of public confidence than the stock exchange, I will here mention that this 6 per cent. paper fell during the crisis of the rebellion as low as 26 per cent. discount, and that as much as two out of the four lakhs is said to have changed hands, the purchasers being chiefly European officers. At present the stock is nearly at par, the slight depreciation being rather due to native dislike of such security.

121. On the 27th July our reliable forces were much weakened by the march of the 4th Punjab Infantry to reinforce General Wilson at Delhi; but the new levies in the valley had now attained an importance which fully justified the withdrawal; and we have all watched with pride the deeds which have marked the track of that corps through Hindostan.

122. On the same day, (though the news did not reach me till 25th August) the Persian army evacuated Herat, under pressure of the operations in the Gulf, and, agreeable to treaty, made it over to an Afghan sirdar. The extent of the Indian mutinies could not at this time have been known at the Court of Teheran.

123. And here I take leave to quote some highly suggestive passages from the diary of a native correspondent at Meshid: "On 2d January 1857, a proclamation from the Shah (which has been made in every province of Persia) reached Meshid, to the effect, that the British having landed in Persia, had taken Bushire; that it was therefore necessary that true Mahomedans should rise against them, and make a religious war to cleanse these infidels from off the Persian soil * * * * * Shazada Nujjuf, a descendant of the ex-king of Delhi, at Teheran, had told the Shah that the princes and chiefs of the Indian states were ripe for a revolt against the British Government, and that a very slight movement from the Shah would be sufficient to emancipate India. The Shah, therefore sent letters under his own sign manual to the address of the several Indian chiefs, and to Bahadoor Shah, King of Delhi, through Hajee Mirza Kazim. This Hajee is a brother of Mirza Hubeeb, who was a writer in the British Commissariat, and who was killed by his own servants between Lahore and Pindее, and Hajee Mirza Kazim, some time ago, recovered all his deceased brother's property through the exertions of the English officials. He has now taken service with this Shahzada Nujjuf, from Delhi, and has deposited his family at Meshid. He himself was deputed to go to India and deliver some of the letters from the Shah to the Kings of Delhi and Lucknow, and other letters he was to send by emissaries. He left Meshid for Herat on 28th January, with ten of the king's sowers; and his intention was either to go through Cabul, if he could, or else despatch the letters by other messengers."

124. The latest entry in the journal from which the above are extracts, was 12th March 1857, and it reached me not many days after the outbreak at Meerut and Delhi; so that no suspicion can arise of these items having been concocted afterwards.

125. A rising in the city of Peshawur, on the feast of the "Bukra Ed" (1st August) was much rumoured in the last days of July, but nothing came of it.

126. A far more dangerous report, which had first been whispered in May (owing, it was thought, to the removal of stores from the magazine of Dera Ismael Khan), was now revived, and became very rife among the border tribes; that the trans-Indus territory was to be given up to the Ameer of Cabul. Our very best and staunchest supporters, such as Khwaja Mahomed Khan Khut-tuck,

* Reported in my No. 384, of 5th June 1857, to Secretary to Chief Commissioner.
Tuck, were distressed and unsettled by this rumour; so that it is not surprising that enemies eagerly caught it up, and detailed the very date when a son of Dost Mahomed Khan's was to come down and receive charge of Peshawur. An emissary of that restless villain Sooltan Mahomed Khan Barukzye, named Fuzl Hadee, took advantage of the rumour, and raised a high degree of excitement among the Oruckzye tribes of Teera, who, for some days in August, threatened a descent upon the Kohat district. The combination was, however, broken up by the sagacity of Mozuffur Khan, the chief and tehsildar of Hungoo, and the report died away as our circumstances improved.

127. On the 14th August, two out of the three divisions of the Tukka Kheyl Afreediies made their submission through Shahzada Jumbhoor, and got their blockade* removed and prisoners released.

128. On the same day the Kokee Kheyl Afreediies of the Khyber (through the influence of the ex-Urbahs of Khuleel, who had to regain in this crisis the position they lost in the last) were induced to surrender, and submit to a fine of 3,000 rupees, for the murder of Lieutenant Hand.†

129. Nothing certainly could have been more fortunate; for the very next day a red hot fanatic, named Syud Ameer (of the family of the known Koonur Badshahs), came down into the Khyber to incite the Khyberees to a holy war. This man had all his life been a mendicant wandering in Peshawur, Cabul, Teheran, Constantinople, and Mecca, and had just returned from one of these pilgrimages with a few thousand rupees; seed enough for a goodly harvest of devilry on the frontier. He planted his green flag at the village of Gaggree, in the Peshawur mouth of the Khyber Pass, and sent a summons to the Kookee Kheyl Mullicks, to leave me, and join him in a crescenda. There is something delightful in the good conduct of thorough rascals; who would have expected the Kookee Kheyl to stick to their agreement of yesterday? but they did; they went back and told the Syud to be off. He cursed them well, and frightened them a good deal with his Koran, flag, and various incantations; but the most he could get from them was five days' hospitality. He certainly made the most of his time, for his emissaries came to every regiment in Peshawur with invitations to join him; it was a most anxious period, for at any moment the Khyberees might have risen in the pass, and the Hindooostanees in cantonments; but at the end of the five days when the Syud showed no signs of leaving, the Kookee Kheyl pulled up the pickets of his horses and camels, and even reverently shut up his flag, and the Syud left the pass in a storm of Arabic.

130. But we had by no means done with him; he betook himself to the next tribe under blockade, the ousted Michnee Mohmunds, who received him with open arms; and again his incendiary letters and messages were introduced among the troops. The most evident restlessness pervaded the disarmed regiments; arms were said to be finding their way into the lines in spite of all precautions, and symptoms of an organised rise began to appear. General Cotton as usual took the initiative. On the morning of the 28th August, he caused the lines of every native regiment to be simultaneously searched, the sepoys being moved out into tents for that purpose; swords, hatchets, muskets, pistols, bayonets, powder, ball, and caps, were found stowed away in roofs, and floors, and bedding, and even drains; and exasperated by the discovery of their plans, and by the taunts of the newly raised Afreedeey regiments, who were carrying out the search, the 51st Native Infantry rushed upon the piled arms of the 18th Punjab Infantry, and sent messengers to all the other Hindooostanee regiments to tell them of the rise.

131. For a few minutes a desperate struggle ensued; the 51st Native Infantry had been one of the finest sepoys corps in the service, and they took the new irregulars altogether by surprise; they got possession of several stands of arms and used them well; Captain Bartlett and the other officers were overpowered by numbers and driven into a tank. But soon the Afreedeey soldiers seized their arms, and then began that memorable fusilade which commenced on the parade ground at Peshawur and ended at Jumrood. General Cotton's military arrangements in the cantonment were perfect for meeting such emergencies; the troops, horse and foot, were rapidly under arms and in pursuit of the mutineers. Every
132. The following return, for which I am indebted to Captain Wright (General Cotton’s Assistant Adjutant General), will show at a glance how the regiment was, in 36 hours accounted for—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total strength before the rise</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot by Captain Bartlett’s 18th Punjab Infantry</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed by district police under Captain James, Lieutenant J. Havelock and Mr. G. Wakefield</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed by Moottanee Horse levies under Lieutenant Gostling</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed by villagers, Peshawur Light Horse, Her Majesty’s 27th, and 70th, and 16th Punjab Infantry</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot by Her Majesty’s 87th, by sentence of drum-head court martial, on 28th August</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto, ditto, ditto, ditto, on 29 August</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot by Her Majesty’s 27th and 70th Regiments, by sentence of drum-head court-martial on 29 August</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded and killed by police at Huree Sing’s Tower</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total killed</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners in confinement</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummers</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men on duty as orderlies</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supposed to have reached the hills</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining to be accounted for</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

133. General Cotton, in a stirring division order, thanked the troops warmly for the promptitude with which they put down this rising; and made a similar acknowledgment, by letter, of the services of the civil officers. The exertions of all on this occasion were indeed very great. The mutineers rose at noon and the heat was dreadful. Colonel Cooper, who commanded the 51st, and joined in the pursuit of his own men, died before evening from the effects of the sun. Several horses dropped down dead, after only an hour or two of work.

134. But the example sufficed. The disarmed regiments were paralysed with the sudden retribution. Seven hundred comrades, who yesterday were ripe for the murder of European officers, ladies, and little children, to-day lay dead in three deep trenches. The Hindostanee soldiers in cantonments underwent a marked change from this date. Still no precautions were relaxed; and the 64th Native Infantry in particular (which was encamped between the cantonments and the city) had a cordon of levies drawn round it night and day.

135. On the night of 1st September, the hill station of Murree (in the district of Rawulpindepée) was threatened with attack; and though the numbers of the insurgent villagers were insignificant, it was clear that their clansmen on the Huzara frontier sympathized in the movement; and this new anxiety oppressed the whole division for many weeks. I need not enter here into its details, as they have been most fully narrated by Major Becher in his Huzara report; but I must express my admiration of the wisdom and tact with which Major Becher restrained the ill-disposed from committing themselves, and the success with which, one by one, he arrested the refugees. I believe that any false step on his part during those never-to-be-forgotten days of September, would have lost him the control of his district.*

136. At this time every Englishman in India knew that Delhi at last was to be assaulted, and that the possibility of holding our own till the tardy succours from

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* Even this rising of the Dhoonda about Murree is understood to have been instigated by Hindoostanee officials and servants, some of whom were convicted and hanged.
from England should arrive, depended on the issue. Natives, too, appreciated the moment, and breathlessly watched the effect of each day's, each hour's news upon their European masters. Great, then, was my anxiety when, on the 9th September, the fanatic Syud Ameer, who had been expelled from the Khyber, reappeared among the Mohamedans of Shah Misr Kheyl, and with 40 or 50 of the escaped 51st sepoys, made a night attack upon the fort of Michnee. The fort was garrisoned by men of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment, and the corps had hitherto behaved well; but they were mostly Hindoostanees, and who could rely on them? The Mohamedans opened on the fort with their juzails; but the 51st deserters, with a far more formidable weapon, appealed to every prejudice in the garrison, and screamed to them to betray the fort, if they valued their country or their religion. It could have surprised no one if the loyalty of the Kelat-i-Ghilzie sepoys had then succumbed; if they had murdered their officers, opened the gates of the fort, and let in the Mahomedans and the Syud leader. Had they done so, their comrades in the forts of Shubkudder and Abazye would have followed the example, and we should have lost all command of the frontier.

137. A company of Afereedie sepoys (of Captain Bartlett's regiment) was hastily thrown into the fort of Michnee, and installed in the citadel; but something more was necessary. The Mohamedans were in the highest excitement, sending "the fiery cross" to all their neighbours, and evidently determined to strike a blow for the recovery of a fief that they had forfeited some three years before. We had no troops to move out against them. It was a time for yielding with as good a grace as could be assumed.

138. I sent them word that they were just going the wrong way to work, and that if they wanted to regain their confiscated privileges, they must render some markéd service to the Government instead of adding to the embarrassments of a passing crisis. For instance, let them send the fanatic Syud Ameer up to the Court of Cabul, and there make him over to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. If they did that, and gave hostages for their good conduct till this war was over, I would gladly ask Government to reinstate them; though not on such favourable terms as formerly. Whatever the errors and short-comings of Englishmen in the East may be, they are undoubtedly believed. The Mohamedans sent in their hostages to Peshawur, packed the Syud off unceremoniously, and sat down quietly to wait for the return of peace in Hindoostan. The relief was indescribable.

139. Nor do I now (looking back on that concession) regret that it was made, even on its general merits. It was right to expel the Mohamedans in 1854, because they were faithless and unmanageable. But the trouble they gave while out, fell upon our subjects, whom they attacked and robbed. They have now suffered three years' deprivation of their income. They have experienced the fact that the Ameer of Cabul had no influence to get them reinstated; and they now resettle in our country with diminished privileges as a memento of their breach. I do not anticipate that the lesson will have to be repeated.

140. Anxiety and suspense about Delhi reached its climax on the 14th September, the day fixed for the storm, and when the telegraph at last announced that desperate feat of arms, and General Nicholson dangerously wounded, it did not sound like victory, and day by day, as gate after gate, and quarter after quarter, of the rebel city, was mastered by that band of heroes, the question still was, "is Nicholson any better"? On the 20th, Delhi was completely in our possession, and every English heart thanked God for it. There seemed a hope too that Nicholson might live. On the 23rd that hope was extinguished; and with a grief unfeigned and deep, and stern, and worthy of the man, the news was whispered, "Nicholson is dead."

141. And here I leave this narrative of the year 1857 at Peshawur. The crisis was past, the worst was over. It remains only to make some general remarks.

142. I thought it best not to break the thread of the report by noticing each military execution as it occurred, but a record of them all is indispensable to a right idea of the crisis, and of the way in which it was met by the military authorities.
PAPERS RELATING TO THE

authorities. I therefore subjoin a chronological return of the military executions in the Peshawur Valley in 1857, compiled from the records of Captain L. B. Jones, Deputy Judge Advocate, and the Assistant Adjutant General’s Office.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Rank and Number</th>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Mode of Execution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 May</td>
<td>51st Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Sepobadar major</td>
<td>Desertion</td>
<td>Hanged before the garrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>10th Irregular Cavalry.</td>
<td>Sepoys</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>51st Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Naiks</td>
<td>Desertion</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>51st Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Sepoys</td>
<td>Desertion</td>
<td>Hanged before the garrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>51st Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Sepoys</td>
<td>Desertion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June</td>
<td>55th Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Soubadar</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td>Blown from guns before the troops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>55th Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Havildars</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>5th Light Cavalry</td>
<td>Sepoy</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td>Blown from a gun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>24th Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Havildar</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td>Hanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>55th Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Sepoys</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>24th Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Havildar</td>
<td>Desertion</td>
<td>Blown from a gun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July</td>
<td>24th Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Havildar</td>
<td>Desertion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 August</td>
<td>51st Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Havildars</td>
<td>Desertion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>51st Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Of all ranks</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>51st Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Of all ranks</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sepoys</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Naiks</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sepoys</td>
<td>Mutiny</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ABSTRACT.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number hanged</th>
<th>Number blown from guns</th>
<th>Number shot by musketry</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

143. It is matter of history that when this mutiny began in the Bengal army, the European officers did not believe it. Whatever may have been the feelings of the sepoys to their officers, the feelings of the officers to the sepoys were unquestionably those of kindness, confidence, and sympathy even to the verge of mutiny. We have seen how the generous Colonel Spottiswoode persuaded himself that the 55th Native Infantry, in the fort of Murdan, was only “under a panic.” We have seen how Colonel Plumbe deprecated the disarming of the native garrison, and proposed to conciliate them; and certainly the public opinion of the European officers generally in the native force gave at first no support to the General in any vigorous measure. A court-martial assembled...
on 28th May, sentenced a sepoy of 51st Native Infantry to be simply imprisoned for the high crime of "desertion." General Cotton at once directed a revision of this sentence, which, in his opinion, would be "fatal to discipline," and called on the officers to pass sentence of death on all men convicted of desertion. "Let us," said he, "so deal with this mutiny, that the native army will never venture on another." The court, to its honour, was fully awakened by this appeal, and from that moment discipline was sternly upheld.

144. The criminals themselves seemed to take a pride in the very discipline they had dared; and stood up in line to be shot with the accuracy and steadiness of machines. They obeyed the words of command to "close to the right," or "close to the left" (so as to bring them opposite the firing party), and "dress up," with habitual obedience. Many put their right hand on their heart to assist the European soldiers' aim. In a few instances, the blowing away of one batch of prisoners from the guns broke down the courage of some whose turn was next, so that they could not be made to face the gun, and were necessarily shot by musketry; but the majority showed remarkable courage, almost to apathy.

145. Once or twice a single criminal escaped the volley of the firing party, and, though unhurt, fell as if shot, pretended to be dead, and was carted off and thrown into the dungeon, whence he afterwards crept out. One or two such were again arrested by the police or villagers in the district, and had their former sentence rigidly carried out.

146. In spite of the number of executions, sepoy prisoners became so numerous, that there was no room for them in the district gaol, and the fort at Khyrabad, and Fort Barrah, were converted into military prisons, guarded by Mooltance and Pathan levies. Whenever military works had to be executed, the sepoy prisoners were made to throw them up; nothing, in short, was more marked than the entire subjection of the mutineers at Peshawur.

147. Every European soldier slept, throughout the crisis, with his loaded musket beside him; and took it to church with him on Sunday; and this latter precaution ought to remain a standing rule at all times; for the impolicy of collecting together all the Europeans of a station in one building without arms in a conquered country is so obvious, as to look like infatuation.

148. A strong feature in the Peshawur arrangements was, and still is, the number of country levies who were called in to help the European soldiers in controlling the mutinous sepoys. The whole of the miscellaneous military duties fell to their lot; they escorted treasure, guarded guns, watched prisoners, protected private houses, and held forts; and I believe they have given uniform satisfaction to General Cotton, and to the European community. I remember no instance of misconduct on their part. Annexed is a return of their numbers.

RETURN of Irregular Levies raised from the middle of May 1857 up to 1st April 1858.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>District from which Raised</th>
<th>Total Raised.</th>
<th>Sent to Hindostan on General Service</th>
<th>Serving at Peshawur</th>
<th>Discharged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>Foot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Derajat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>2,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Peshawur</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>2,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kohat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,154</td>
<td>2,513</td>
<td>5,667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B.—These are all independent of regiments of disciplined infantry raised in the valley during the crisis by military officers.

149. Most of those who went down country have been actively engaged at Delhi, Lucknow, and along the line of the Ganges, under Lieutenant Lind, Captain L.
Captain Smith, Lieutenant Vivian, and Major Stokes. Others are now mounted police in the districts of Delhi, Meerut, and Hissar.

150. Perhaps nothing tended more than these levies to keep the frontier quiet; they absorbed all the idlers and adventurers of the Peshawur valley; and made the campaign against the Hindooostanee mutineers a highly popular service. To use a common phrase of the natives, it put the people into our boat.

151. I am bound to confess (at the risk of any inferences disadvantageous to the previous career of the levies), that crime was never so rare in the valley as during this crisis. Indeed it must be admitted that one troop alone that is now fighting at Lucknow, contains no less than 60 outlaws, headed by the redoubted Mokhurrum Khan. These men had harried our border for years, and would undoubtedly have rioted in this hour of our weakness, if not suddenly put in the way of an honest livelihood. As the native gentleman who raised the troop remarked, "Whether they kill the Poorbeahs, or the Poorbeahs kill them, it will be an equal service to the State." Lieutenant Vivian informs me, that General Franks complimented them by saying that "he never saw better skirmishers," a tribute which many a luckless Bunyah on the Peshawur border had previously had occasion to render.

152. Amongst the foot levies who guarded the cutcherries and other public buildings in Peshawur, I ought to mention the Afreedees of the Kohat Pass, under Bahadoor Shere Khan, chief of the Bungushes of Kohat. The incident is as great a revolution as the mutiny of the Hindooostanee army.

153. But successful as (by the hearty co-operation of military and civil authorities) all our measures proved for the maintenance of the peace of Peshawur during this eventful war, there can be no question that if one event had happened, nothing could have saved us—I mean if Dost Mahomed Khan, the Ameer of Cabul, had followed in 1857 his policy of 1848. That policy was a mistake, and the Ameer reaped nothing by it but disgrace and loss of character as a politician. But men do not always profit by the lessons of the past. Some difference in the circumstances too often misleads them again into the former error. The crisis of 1857 was infinitely graver than that of 1848. The embarrassments of the English in India were incomparably greater. The Anglo-Indian Empire had been based on a native army, and that army was a rebellion. If ever we were open to a death-blow, it was now. Our power in India was staked on the recovery of Delhi; to achieve it taxed the whole strength of the Punjab to the utmost, and left the Provincial Government so weak as to be unable for the moment to put down a petty rising in the Googaira district; a feather more would have turned the scale against us. No reasonable man can doubt what would have been the result had the Affghans sided against us in September 1857. That they did not do so is, under Providence, due solely to the treaties which had been made with them in March 1855 and January 1857. By the former, the past was condoned, and we engaged to respect the territories of the Affghans so long as they respected ours; by the latter we went further, sent a mission of able British officers to aid them in defending their western frontier from the Persians, and gave them a subsidy of a lakh of rupees a month to enable them to increase their army while that emergency should last. These were solid proofs of a community of interest, and the policy has been blessed with equally solid advantages to ourselves. That policy was much questioned at the time in India, and, as far as I am aware, has never yet received the approval of the Home Government. It is a satisfaction, therefore, to find it approved by the unerring verdict of the hour of trial. It may be said that when these treaties were made, no one foresaw that this mutiny would happen, which is true; but treaties are made as anchors are thrown out, to enable the vessel to ride through any storm from whatever quarter it may blow.

154. And here I would beg to acknowledge the very great services of our officers in Afghanistan during the late crisis. At Candahar, with the Heir Apparent, were Major Harry Lumsden, Lieutenant Peter Lumsden, and Dr. Bellew, accompanied by Gholam Sirwur Khan Khagwanee. At Cabul, in the Ameer's Court, was Nuwab Foujdar Khan Bahadoor, our vakeel. It was thought
thought to be a service of great enterprise, for the English officers especially, when they set out for Cabul, even in a time of peace; and their situation became one of decided peril when India was in a blaze with a Mahomedan struggle. But these officers and khans, by soldierly equanimity, by a fortitude equal to the occasion, by a calm trust in the cause of England, by the good feeling which their previous demeanor had created, and by keeping the Cabul Government candidly and truthfully informed of real events, and thus disarming monstrous exaggerations of our disasters, preserved the confidence of the Ameer and his best counsellors, and were largely instrumental in maintaining those friendly relations which were of such vital importance to our success. For these unusual services, I would venture to solicit for all these officers and khans some mark of honourable distinction from Government.

155. Nor can I conclude this report without preferring a similar request for Major Becher, Captain Henderson, and Captain James. The crisis was a military one, and these officers who had charge of the three most exposed frontier districts, met it as became soldiers, and I would ask for them a soldiers' reward. It is true that they were on the civil staff like other district officers, but it has fallen to few district officers to perform the same military duties. Major Becher and Captain Henderson, besides being in civil charge of Huzara and Kohat, held the chief military command of these districts. Captain Henderson, indeed, has been in command of his regiment on the frontier since 1849; on him, therefore, devolved both the civil and military anxieties of the time. It was he who disarmed the wing of 58th Native Infantry with such promptitude. It was Major Becher, in person, who stopped the Passes of Huzara against the 55th Native Infantry. Captain James conducted two expeditions against Nowrujee, and was engaged in personal conflict with the enemy. During the seven years he has been at Peshawur, he has been in numerous expeditions and engagements with the hill tribes, has had his life more than once attempted, and repeatedly received the thanks of Government. So has Captain Henderson. So inseparable, indeed, are the military and civil duties of these three districts, that no civilian is ever charged with them, either as deputy commissioner or assistant commissioner. And the successful control of such warlike borders as those of Kohat, Peshawur, and Huzara, in such a crisis as that of 1857, should, I do think, be regarded as military service, fully entitling Major Becher and Captains James and Henderson not to be superseded. I beg to annex a memorandum of their military services for the consideration of Government, and to add that the whole merit of preserving the peace of Huzara and Kohat belongs to Major Becher and Captain Henderson. Peshawur matters having been quite enough to absorb the whole attention of both Captain James and myself.

156. The services of native chiefs who have done well in this war will be reported separately, in obedience to the call of the Right Honourable the Governor General; and I will only say here what a pleasure it is to have passed through such a time of unparalleled disaster without one chief coming to disgrace. The district of Peshawur, heretofore considered the least loyal in the Punjab, has entirely changed its character, and its levies are now fighting on our side, wherever we have an army in the field. The border people have been drawn to our officers in this one year more than they would probably have been in 20 years of peace; and I believe a lasting kindly spirit has been evoked. In this, as in all the occurrences here, it was impossible not to trace the overruling hand of God, and to be thankfully reminded continually that "the strength of the hills is His also."

157. As a last word upon the crisis of 1857, I implore the immediate attention of Government to the imperative necessity of bridging the Indus at Attock. If it be not done, some day we shall bitterly repent it.

I have, &c.

(signed) H. B. Edwards,
Commissioner and Superintendent.
PAPERS RELATING TO THE

No. 649.

(No. 54.)

From George Carnac Barnes, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej States, to Robert Montgomery, Esq., Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, dated Umballa, 5 February 1858.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your circular, No. 5, dated the 16th instant, calling for a report on the administration of this territory during the late crisis.

2. I returned from England and resumed charge of my office towards the close of March last; at that time the station of Umballa contained the following troops:

- Her Majesty's 9th Lancers.
- 4th Regiment, Bengal Cavalry.
- 5th Bengal Native Infantry.
- 60th Bengal Native Infantry.
- 2 Troops Horse Artillery (Europeans).

The musketry depot for teaching the new drill was also located at Umballa, and included detachments from various sepoy regiments, all under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Greathead, of Her Majesty's 8th Foot. General Sir H. Barnard also arrived about this time from England, and assumed charge of the Sirhind Division.

3. At the outset of this report, I trust I shall be excused for taking a very brief retrospect of the state of Upper India at the commencement of the year 1857. The discipline and loyalty of the Bengal army, from a variety of causes, had been gradually undermined. The campaigns of Afghanistan, Scinde, Gwalior and the Punjab had partially diverted the thoughts of the sepoys from their own position, but subsequent inaction in quarters had afforded them ample opportunity for reflecting on and estimating their own strength; it became impossible to conceal from them that they were opposed only by an inadequate force of Europeans. The arsenals, the forts, the public treasure, were all in their hands, and the Government itself existed only by their forbearance; sedition was spread from corps to corps, by letters and by fanatical mendicants, and organized by secret deliberations, until at last a general spirit of disaffection pervaded all ranks of the native army, and wanted only a pretext to explode into open rebellion.

Immediate cause of the revolt.

4. The spark which lit the train was undoubtedly the greased cartridges. A change in the shape of a turban had led, in 1806, to the mutiny and massacre of Europeans at Vellore; and there can be no doubt that the danger to their caste, supposed to be hidden in the obnoxious cartridge, was sufficient cause, in the existing temper of the sepoys, to incite a revolt. Incendiary fires began to blaze in every large cantonment, and soon the special grievance of the new cartridge was lost in the unmistakable signs of a general mutiny. In February, the 19th Native Infantry refused even the old cartridges, which, in common with the whole Bengal army, they had used for years. A fanatic of the 34th Native Infantry attacked his adjutant, Lieutenant Baugh, sword in hand, and the sepoys on main guard looked on, passive and exulting spectators. The troopers of the 3d Cavalry at Meerut also insolently rejected the old familiar cartridges, and shortly the sepoy rebellion, with all its horrors and heroic incidents, burst upon us.

Early symptoms of discontent at Umballa.

5. At Umballa the incendiary fires began early in March, and continued, at intervals, until the outbreak. The sepoys were all along suspected, and even among themselves the 5th Native Infantry accused the 60th regiment, and the 60th regiment the 5th, while both accused the soldiers of the musketry depot. An offer of 1,000 rupees reward, made with your sanction, failed to discover the perpetrators. The houses and property of the officers and men attached to the depot, or assigned to them for shelter, were especially marked out for destruction; and the Government also was a heavy loser. Affairs remained in this unsettled state until Sunday the 10th of May, the ever-memorable day on which the native troops at Meerut broke out into mutiny, and after burning the station and massacring all the Europeans they could find, marched unopposed to seize the fortress
fortress and arsenal of Delhi. On that day the two sepy regiments at
Umballa, probably by concert with their comrades at Meerut, rushed out of their
lines, broke open the bells of arms, and began to form and load under the
direction of their native officers. General Barnard acted with promptitude, and
ordered out the 9th Lancers and the Horse Artillery, and while they were
getting ready, he rode down, attended by his staff, and succeeded in pacifying the
sepoy. The men returned to their lines, and restored their arms to the
places where they were usually kept. Next day General Barnard issued an
address to the native regiments, assuring them of his satisfaction at their return
to duty, and promising them, if they behaved well, that their misconduct on the
10th should be overlooked.

6. On the afternoon of the 11th May, while the horrors at Delhi were yet
enacting, a brief telegraphic message came up the line from the signaler at
Delhi to the signaler at Umballa. It conveyed the news of the seizure of
Delhi by the mutineers, the murder of their officers by the 54th and 38th, and
the preparation for flight made by all the Europeans who had escaped the
general massacre; the same message was flashed along the line to the extreme
frontier, and transmitted by post to every station off the Grand Trunk Road.
Thus a monopoly of intelligence was secured for the Europeans, and by means of
the telegraph we were enabled to prepare ourselves for the coming storm. The sepoy guards at Philloor and Ferozepoor were speedily set aside by European
troops, and the inestimable advantage of two well stocked arsenals was secured
for our side. Their preservation under God's providence is attributable to the
telegraph, and in the future administration of India the telegraph must play an
important part. No native should be taught the signals, and science must be
pressed to devise means for the effectual protection of the wires.

7. At this time I was at Kussowlee; the news was known there on the 12th,
and arrangements were immediately made for getting carriage for the 75th and
other European regiments in the hills. The 75th marched the same afternoon, and I reached Umballa on the night of the 13th; Mr. Forsyth had written to c.
se

Nawab's order

8. The first object was to provide for the safety of the Grand Trunk Road,
and the two stations of Thanesur and Loodianah, which were without reliable troops. I accordingly directed the Rajah of Jheend to proceed to Kurnaul with
all his available force; Captain M'Andrew, an energetic officer, Assistant Com-
missioner at Umballa, was deputed to accompany him, and started at once with
some Putteela sowars. The Maha Rajah of Putteela and the Rajahs of Nabha and Jheend.
His orders were confirmed by me on the 14th, and as my first thoughts were
for the protection of my own division, I made the following arrangements.

9. My next thought was for the treasure: at Umballa there were 3½ lakhs
under a guard of the 5th Native Infantry; at Thanesur about a lakh under a
detachment of the same regiment. At Loodiana the treasure (about 3½ lakhs) was
guarded by a company of the 3rd Native Infantry from Philloor. At
Ferozepoor there was a considerable sum in the hands of a detachment of the
57th Native Infantry, and the Simla treasure was guarded by a party of
Gorkhas, of the Nusseeree battalion. The Umballa treasure was escorted by the
sepows themselves, and lodged safely in the quarter-guard of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, who had just come down from the hills. Captain M'Neil, at Tha-
nesur, adopted the same means for sending in his treasure to Umballa; Mr.
Ricketts sent his money to Philloor, and the Deputy Commissioner at Ferozepoor
removed his treasure to the fort, and placed it under charge of a guard from
Her Majesty's 61st regiment. Thus all the public money in the treasuries in
the plains was at once placed in security. At Simla alone was any risk incurred.

MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, IN 1857.

The news of the Delhi massacre.

March of troops, and summons to the Jut-Sutlej chiefs.

Measures to keep open the Grand Trunk Road.

For the protection of the public treasure.
Arrival of the commander-in-chief and staff.

Difficulties in providing carriage, and final start of the field force.

The defences of the Cis-Sutlej territory, and the noble assistance rendered by the chiefs.

For a time the treasure there was in the hands of a mutinous guard, but eventually it escaped plunder. The branch treasury at Kussowlee was not so fortunate. The money belonging to Government, about 30,000 rupees, was saved by the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Taylor, although the guard were in open mutiny. But the deposits* lodged for safety by the commissariat officer and executive engineer were carried off by the Goorkhas; and though 12,963 rupees were eventually recovered by Lord W. Hay, yet the balance, or 20,080 rupees, was lost to Government.

10. On the 16th May, General Anson and the head-quarters staff arrived at Umballa: his first act was to confirm General Barnard’s promises, and to pardon the two native regiments for their behaviour on the 10th. Those orders were given unwillingly, and afterwards embarrassed the Commander-in-Chief. One of the regiments, the 60th, actually marched with the field force, and eventually went over to the mutineers with their arms and ammunition.

11. Within five days of the first intelligence of the Delhi massacre, there were collected at Umballa three regiments of European infantry. The 75th Foot, the 1st and 2d Bengal Fusiliers, one regiment of dragoons (the 9th Lancers), and two troops of European horse artillery, with 6-pounder guns. There was a great scarcity of ammunition (both for light field ordnance and small arms) in store at Umballa. The Nusseeree Battalion, which had been ordered to march to Loodiana, and escort the siege train, mutinied at the eleventh hour. The Commissary-general and the superintending surgeon sent in rather extravagant indents for supplies, carriage, doolies and doolie-bearers. It was an especial feature of this crisis, that all classes of natives seemed to think us embarked in a desperate cause. The commissariat department was quite paralysed, and the camp followers, so necessary to the efficiency of an army in India, deserted the station like rats from a sinking ship. The natives seemed aghast at the enormity of the odds against us, and held aloof; the entire burthen of furnishing carriage and supplies fell upon the civil department, and Mr. Forsyth made the most strenuous exertions to meet the emergency.

With the aid of the loyal Sikh chiefs, carts, camels, mules, doolies and bearers were at last secured, and the first detachment of the advancing army marched on the 17th, and was followed by the last on the 23d May.

12. The station of Umballa was left with four weak companies (about 250 men), of the 2d Bengal Fusiliers, the 5th Regiment Native Infantry, and some 6-pounder guns, to man which we had only native artillerymen. A redoubt was erected, with the church in the centre; and the remaining residents were concentrated in the houses around. A militia was formed of uncovenanted officers; and the magazine, the treasure, and the commissariat stores were all lodged in the redoubt, which was garrisoned by a company of the Fusiliers. Owing to the defection of the Nusseeree Battalion, there was no available escort for the Siege Train, or for the ammunition so urgently needed by the army. I offered, however, to furnish political escorts, and accordingly the Siege Train came down from Philloor under a guard of horse and foot furnished by the Nabha Rajah, and accompanied by a detachment of the 9th Irregulars, under Lieutenant Campbell. The ammunition was conveyed by a party of the district police, and so, throughout the campaign, the most important military stores were constantly sent down under the charge of contingents furnished by the chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej states; their troops protected our stations, and patrolled the Grand Trunk Road from Ferozepore and Philloor, down to the very walls of Delhi. The safety of this province may be attributed to their loyalty and good example. The Rajah of Jheend, with Captain M’Andrew and a small but well disciplined force, acted as the vanguard of the army, and by my directions kept always in advance. When the first detachment of Europeans reached Kurnaul, this little band proceeded 22 miles further to Paneeput, quieting the country, securing the road, and collecting supplies; and in this manner they advanced boldly to within 20 miles of Delhi. A detachment of the Jheend troops seized the

* Treasury Money
  - - - - Rs. 2,043 14 1
Commissariat Department
  - - - - 16,000 -
Executive Engineer’s Department
  - - - - 14,000 -
the bridge at Bhagput, and thus enabled the Meerut force to join head quarters. A party of the Jheend sowars, with Captain Hodson at their head, rode into Meerut, and opened our communication with that station, 'The troops of the Maharajah of Putteala guarded Thanesur and Umballa; and the safety of Lodiana was entrusted to the Rajah of Nabha, and the Kotila Nawab. These eminent services afforded by the Cis-Sutlej chiefs are thus casually noticed as part of the history of the late campaign. I feel under the deepest obligations to them, and the Governor-General in the Gazette announcing the fall of Delhi has declared that they shall not be without their reward.

13. Previous to the departure of the field force, I had not neglected measures for the general safety of this large division. Instead of enlisting new levies of police, I called out the contingents of the jageerdars, who were disfranchised in 1849. These petty nobles are very numerous in the Cis-Sutlej territory; they all pay in times of peace a commutation tax of one-eighth of their income in lieu of service. As these chiefs had their homes and estates in this province, I conceived we had excellent guarantees for their loyalty, and I preferred such contingents as they could bring, to levies of police raised by ourselves. I therefore issued a general summons, demanding their assistance, and relieving them temporarily from the payment of the commutation. This irregular force was placed at the disposal of the district officers, and distributed to the different thannahs and tuhseels; they were employed to carry on the communications, to escort treasure, to guard the ferries, and patrol the minor lines of road. This measure has had excellent effect; all our out-posts were strengthened, and a sense of security generally diffused; the jageerdars themselves were greatly pleased at this mark of confidence, and discharged their duties with alacrity. Some that had been left out accidentally, complained of the omission, and other influential people not required by their tenure to provide a contingent, came forward with levies equipped at their own cost.

14. At this stage of my narrative, I trust I shall be excused for reminding you of the extent and position of the Cis-Sutlej territory. It comprises all the country north of Kurnaul between the Jumna and the Sutlej; the portions belonging to the British Government (excluding the hills), cover an area of 8,090 square miles, and the foreign territory intermixed with it, contains an additional surface of 7,369 square miles. The Grand Trunk Road traverses the entire length from Kurnaul to Peerozepoor, a distance of 200 miles. In this tract there are upwards of four millions of inhabitants. The people are of mixed races, but more allied to Hindostanees than to the natives of the Punjab. Throughout the rebellion the greater part of them have shown sympathy with the mutineers. The southern frontier rests on the Delhi territory. On the east lies the Meerut Division. The neighbouring districts of Sirsa, Hansi, Hissar, Paneeput and Mozuffernugger were completely disorganized. The civil authorities had either been murdered or obliged to fly. The magistrate of Paneeput had no control outside Kurnaul. The magistrate at Saharumpore held out most gallantly at the station, but his district could scarcely be called his own. The predatory population was abroad. Armed bands over-ran the country, and set authority at defiance; everywhere was anarchy and confusion.

15. This division acted as a kind of breakwater; beyond was the raging sea. Inside, as yet, was comparative calm. It became the duty of myself and the district officers to take every precaution to preserve the territory from the surrounding contagion. The first measure was to close the ferries on the Jumna. This step had been partially taken on our own instincts, but it was generally and effectually adopted by the orders of the Chief Commissioner on every river of the Punjab. A circular to the following purport was issued by myself on the 30th May. The police, strengthened by the jageerdar contingents, were put on the alert, the roads were well patrolled, and explicit instructions given, to attack and destroy any plundering band seen in the actual commission of crime. I promised them that 'not only would they be exonerated if fatal consequences ensued, but handsomely rewarded for such acts of prompt and retributive justice. Any assemblage of armed and suspicious persons was to be instantly attacked and dispersed; sedition was not to be allowed to get head.' In a circular of the 2d of June, the police were again exhorted "to use their arms freely; no responsibility would be incurred by the man who took the life of
of a robber in the act of crime; but on the contrary, such bold deeds would be rewarded by promotion." A few examples of this sort would check the spread of crime, and be true mercy in the end. These orders were constantly repeated in semi-official letters, and full authority was placed in the hands of every magistrate to act fearlessly as emergency might dictate. Every available officer was sent into the interior to preserve the peace, and furnished with an escort of horse and foot, to repress disorder wherever it might show itself. Captain M’Neile took the field in person at Thanesur. Mr. Levein, the Assistant Commissioner, was sent to the banks of the Jumna; and Lieutenant Parson, the other Assistant Commissioner, was despatched to Kyalul, at the western extremity of the district, towards Hansi. Mr. Plowden, of the civil service at Umballa, was deputed with two companies of the 5th Native Infantry, and a squadron of the 4th Lancers (natives) to Jugadree, an important town on the Jumna, on the high road to Saharanpoo; here also we had a bridge of boats. The second Assistant Commissioner, Captain M’Andrew, was with the advanced guard of the army, and there was no civil officer to send towards Roopur; but two companies of the 5th, under Captain Gardner (a refugee from Delhi) proceeded there, and I gave him full powers to act, if necessary, as a magistrate. The districts of Loodiana and Ferozepoor were less disturbed, and there was full work for the civil authorities in supplying carriage for the guns and ammunition issuing daily out of the arsenals, in providing escorts, and in facilitating the passage of the heavy Siege Train across the sands and branches of the Sutlej.

16. It was too much, however, to expect that with such examples on all sides, we would keep ourselves absolutely free from contagion. The river Jumna was fordable, and the population on both banks were a lawless and predatory lot. The "Rangurhs" of Paneeput and Hissar were in successful rebellion, and taunted their brethren in the Cis-Sutlej territory with their want of courage in still submitting to the Feringhee. Men’s minds were further unsettled by the passing of mutineers of the 45th and 57th Native Infantry from the cantonment of Ferozepoor, and by alarming stories circulated in every quarter, of the desperate position of the British in India. Towards the end of May, and beginning of June, daring outrages were of daily occurrence. The Grand Trunk Road for some days was not safe. Close to the Umballa cantonment a villager posted himself on the road with a gun in his hand, and plundered at his leisure. He was seized, and immediately executed. Villages in Thanesur, headed by their lumbardars, turned out in broad day fully armed and equipped, with drums beating and flags flying, to prey on the weaker villages. Frequent fights occurred, and the police were afraid even to report the state of affairs. The country was getting rapidly disorganized. This was not the time for hesitation; every highway robber that was seized was immediately hanged; and at my request the districts of Thanesur and Umballa, from the 5th June, were placed under a summary law, declaring highway robbery and all daring outrages of that stamp punishable with death. The two companies sent to Roopur, so far from maintaining order, were the first to excite sedition. The sepoys turned the butchers out of the town, and maltreated the town crier, who was publishing some general order of the district officer. They were, of course, recalled; but on their way back the worst of them absconded. However, five were singled out, and the crime of sedition proved against them; one sirdar, Mohur Singh, of Roopur, who had made himself conspicuous, was also seized; these men were tried by myself and Mr. Forsyth on the 5th June, and hanged the same day.

17. I should here mention that three days after the Commander-in-Chief had left Amballa, the five companies of the 5th Native Infantry remaining at the station were promptly disarmed (29th May) by Major Maitland; the two mutinous companies that returned from Roopur were disbanded without pay, and the native officers were tried by court-martial, and sentenced to death. Major Maitland referred the case to head-quarters, but eventually the men were hanged; he has been much blamed for this delay, and I regret, for his sake, that he did not hang them at once; but they enjoyed only a few days’ respite. In other respects Major Maitland behaved with great promptitude, especially in the disarming, and kept the station in excellent order.

18. I have
18. I have said that the people of these states sympathized with the mutineers, who were regarded as martyrs for their cause; they would plunder any stragglers, but they would not seize and hand them up to justice. So out of the 45th and 57th Regiments who passed through this territory, we succeeded only in capturing 20; I do not count, however, the men seized near Ferozepore; I never heard how many were captured, though I know that some were executed; these 20 were seized either in the Thanesur or Lodiana districts; they were all conveyed to Umballa; no military court could be convened to try them, so at last I tried them myself. There was only their own statements, which proved that they were deserters, at the very least, and on the 17th and 25th June I sentenced them to death; they were blown away from guns at a general parade of all the troops at the station; their executioners were the native artillerymen. There is one fact regarding the mutineers of the 45th Native Infantry which cannot be passed over in this narrative. The Maharajah of Putteeala captured a body of 100 fugitives, and shut them up in one of his forts; his dewan, Mhal Chund, a native of Delhi, by an unfortunate mistake, let them all go after taking away their arms. Reflecting over this incident at this lapse of time, I feel very doubtful whether they were not released purposely. There was a general unwillingness (from which I believe the Maharajah himself was not exempt) to surrender mutineers to the fate that awaited them.

19. To return to the course of events. Mr. Plowden found the eastern portion of the Umballa district comparatively quiet; but Saharunpoor was in great disorder. He immediately crossed, and employed the detachments under Captains Wyld and Garstin, in punishing robbers, and in restoring confidence. I left him at liberty to do as he liked, and to advance to Saharunpoor if the magistrate sent any requisition for his services. Accordingly he proceeded to that station on the 21st May, and remained there until the Nusseereee Battalion, under Major Bagot, relieved him on the 3d June. During this stay, the detachment, always accompanied by Mr. Plowden, did excellent service, and were the means of saving Saharunpoor. Several Goojur villages were destroyed, and bands of armed plunderers were dispersed. The temper of the sepoys, however, was uncertain, and there was no real dependence to be placed on them; at one time they refused to march; on another occasion some mutinied and went off to Delhi. At last, on the 12th July, when the order was issued recalling them to Umballa, the sepoys, 80 in number, mutinied in a body, fired at their officers, and killed a havildar of their own regiment, who was standing between Mr. Plowden and Captain Garstin. The cavalry detachment under Captain Wyld had previously returned to cantonments, and were here deprived of their arms and horses. Mr. Plowden was out in camp on active duty during the whole season, from the 19th May until the fall of Delhi; he showed great energy and courage throughout, and deserves the thanks of Government for his arduous services.

20. Our attention at this time was earnestly directed towards Meerut and Delhi, and the district officers were busily engaged in repressing the early symptoms of rebellion on the border, when a new danger assailed us from the west. On the morning of the 8th June I went to the telegraph office, and, to my dismay, was informed by the assistant that a message had been received during the night, not from any official personage, but from the signaler at Jullundur, to the signaler at Umballa, announcing that the Jullundur Brigade had mutinied, and were in full march to the Sutlej; the news was instantly sent back by the wires to Lodiana, and to Philloor, and proved the first intimation they had had of the outbreak. The bridge of boats was broken up, and the ghoats closed to the right and left of Philloor. But at the Lussam Ferry, four miles above Philloor, the advanced guard of the mutineers managed to seize a boat that was on the Jullundur side, and, crossing over in numbers, took possession of the other also; they were joined by the 3d Regiment Native Infantry at Philloor, and now consisted of a strong column, nearly three regiments of infantry, and one of cavalry, but without guns. Mr. Hicketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Lodiana, with two guns of the Nabha Rajah, and a detachment of the 4th Sikh Infantry under Lieutenant Williams, then encamped at

* 151 were captured.—See Captain Mercer's Report, and para. of this.
at Loodiana, opposed the crossing with the utmost gallantry, but they were unsupported. The noise and flashes of the cannonade were heard distinctly at Philloor during the early night, but Brigadier Johnstone, with his European troops and horse artillery, would not move. Next day, at 12 o'clock, the mutineers marched into Loodiana, broke open the gaol, and, guided by the rabble of the town, plundered the mission premises, and the property of supposed British partizans. The eyes of the beleaguered Europeans were strained anxiously in the direction of Philloor; still there was no sign of the pursuing column. The mutineers marched leisurely away, and got clear off to Delhi, and Brigadier Johnstone did not arrive till they were beyond pursuit. In this daring attempt to obstruct the passage, Lieutenant Williams was seriously wounded; Mr. Ricketts worked one of the guns himself; 50 of the enemy were killed or drowned, and the loss on our side was about 15 casualties. A small body of the mutineers, separating from the main column, took a northerly road skirting the hills; they crossed the Sutlej in the Hooshiarpore district, and, traversing the length of the Umballa district, eventually got away to the other side of the Jumna; they were befriended by the people, who gave them supplies, and guided them by secluded paths across the country. Mr. Forsyth started to intercept them with a party of the Police Battalion, but was not successful.

### 21. This incident did not improve our position in the Cis-Sutlej states. However, the increase of lawlessness was met with increased severity and zeal on the part of the district officers. The people of Thanesur withheld their revenue, but Captain M'Neill declared such recusancy was an act of rebellion, and that wilful defaulters would be punished as traitors; the threat was enough to bring them to reason. Wherever an outrage occurred, there the Deputy Commissioner moved with instant despatch, and dealt summary justice on all heinous offenders; it required a stern and unflinching hand to keep this unruly district in order. The number of robbers executed was 62, of whom — were hanged on the nearest trees without reference to me, and the sentence on the others was passed by myself. Serious outrages began to occur at Mookutsur in the Ferozepoor district, but the march of General Van Cortlandt's force quieted the country, and the opportunity was taken at the same time to execute one or two of the worst offenders.

### 22. After the Jullundur mutineers had left Loodiana, all those who had made themselves conspicuous in abetting the sepoys and plundering the city were at once seized by the magistrate, Mr. Ricketts. In their houses were found articles of stolen property, and a hundred tongues bore witness to their guilt. Twenty-two prisoners of all classes; Cashmeerees, Burmeas, and other noted blackguards of the town, were condemned to death; the sentence was confirmed by telegraph nearly as soon as it was passed, and the same evening the whole of them paid the penalty of their crimes. Some seditious correspondence at this time was intercepted, and all concerned (one was a vakeel of Roostum Allee Khan of Malair Kotela) were summarily hanged. It was by such measures as these, and by these alone, that the peace was preserved; any vacillation or tender-heartedness would have been fatal, for rebellion would have spread into this province, and many valuable lives would have been lost in recovering our authority. So long as order was maintained here, our communications with the Punjab on the one hand, and the Delhi force on the other, were kept unimpaired; as it was, with daily convoys of treasure, ammunition, stores, and men passing down the road, I am happy to say not a single accident occurred.

### 23. About this time also a petty insurrection arose at Jeytokee, in the Nabha territory. It was speedily put down by Major Marsden, Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepoor; and the leader, a fanatic Gooroo, by name Sham Dass, was killed. The Thanesur gaol became crowded with prisoners, many of them Rangehurs of the Delhi territory. The gaol was seriously threatened by bodies of their kinsmen. I immediately despatched a detachment of the Police Battalion to reinforce the guard, and removed secretly in one day all the more desperate convicts to the gaol at Umballa; the police at Assund, on the border, were attacked and driven in by some insurgents. Assund is well known for the bold and lawless character of its population; Captain M'Neill marched there in force, and the people deserted; but the gateways of the village were found barricaded, and entrenchments had been commenced round the village site.
24. The requirements of the army became incessant, and the road was thronged with carts laden with every variety of stores. A bullock train was suggested by Mr. Forsyth, to be carried on by the district officers. This arrangement proved defective in practice, for the want of a general superintendent in charge of the whole line. I obtained leave from the Chief Commissioner to organize a "military transport train," under the agency of Captain Briggs, an able and zealous officer of great experience. His exertions and complete success deserve the special thanks of Government. We had been drained of our carriage, and no assistance could be drawn from either the Ganges Doab or the Delhi territory. The army commissariat could give no help. Carts that reached Delhi never came back, and there was imminent danger of a dead lock. All these difficulties were overcome by Captain Briggs. His jurisdiction extended from Ferozepoor to Delhi, 265 miles. A train of 30 waggons a day from each of the principal stations of Umballa, Loodiana, and Kurnaul, and 14 waggons per diem from Ferozepoor was soon organized. The same number were also daily employed on the return journey. Stores of every description, especially the enormous demands for ordnance ammunition, were safely and regularly supplied to the army. The sick and wounded were comfortably conveyed from camp to Umballah. The train was in full operation from the 22d July to the middle of October. The scheme was eminently successful, owing to the skill, tact, and indefatigable energy of Captain Briggs. He has fully acknowledged his obligations to the civil authorities of the Cis-Sutlej states, who gave him their utmost support. The cost of the train was 97,317 rupees, and it has fully realised the objects for which it was organized. From Ferozepoor to Loodiana and Kurnaul, the district police guarded the line; beyond Kurnaul the road was protected by our excellent allies the Cis-Sutlej chiefs, whose troops garrisoned the several posts of Kurnaul, Paneeput, Kussowlee and Rhae. Without their invaluable assistance our communications could never have been so efficiently maintained.

25. At the suggestion of the Chief Commissioner we commenced on the 17th June to disarm the people. The bazaars in cantonments had been previously disarmed, and even the police, who were mostly Hindooestees, were allowed no other weapons than sticks. Mr. Ricketts took the opportunity of the presence of Major Coke's regiment to disarm the town of Loodiana. The search was effectually made, and upwards of 10 cart-loads of arms of all sorts were seized and confiscated. The several officers out in camp were busily engaged in the same duty. A proclamation was issued declaring the carrying of arms to be a misdemeanor. The towns of Umballa, Thanesur, Jugadree and Ferozepoor, were all searched under the personal superintendence of European officers; there was some delay at Simla, but eventually the bazaar there also, much to the relief of the residents, was disarmed. Since then a second and more complete search has been made in every village of this division, and the provisions of the Board's famous circular, No. 212 of 1849,* has been fully carried out. I believe that very few arms remain in our own districts. But foreign states occupy the heart of the Cis-Sutlej territory, and many of our subjects have secreted their weapons in Putteecalla. I have used my influence with the chiefs to adopt our measures, and with some success; but they are slow to move, and perhaps a little suspicious of our intentions. The disarming should be general, or much of its efficacy will be lost. From a letter intercepted towards the end of June, it appeared that there was an inquiry amongst natives for sulphur, lead and saltpetre; it seemed advisable to place some restrictions on the sale and export of such articles, and accordingly on the 4th July, the police were directed to ascertain and register the amount in store, and to prohibit the removal of any portion, or the importation of fresh supplies, without a pass; this circular was afterwards extended to the whole Punjab. It will be here observed, that in the measures adopted for the trial and punishment of mutineers and heinous criminals, or for disarming the population, or checking the importation of military stores, we only anticipated the acts almost simultaneously passed at Calcutta by the wisdom of the Legislative Council.

*Punjab arms law.
26. At a very early period of the rebellion, the probable scarcity of funds was not overlooked. The communications were interrupted, treasuries in the Agra province had been plundered. The yearly revenue could not be collected, and considerable expenditure was to be anticipated. On the 23d May, therefore, I issued a circular to my district officers, and desired them to commence their collections for the spring harvest without delay; and I may here state, that notwithstanding the disturbed state of parts of this division, and the evil example of the surrounding districts, where no money could be got in, the entire demand for land revenue in this division was realised without arrears. In some places there was a disposition to be restive, and in the lower portion of the Thanesur district, and generally along the River Jumna, the public money was collected as it were at the point of the bayonet. Still it was all saved by the promptness and energy of the district officers. At the same time I saw that the ordinary income would never suffice, and in this emergency I turned to the Sikh chief-tains of Putteela and Nabba, whose soldiers were already engaged in our cause. Both were known to have money, and I obtained from each of them, on the 23d May, a promise of assistance to the extent of seven and three lakhs respectively. I was determined, if possible, to raise an equal sum from the capitalists of the territory, who had amassed their wealth under British rule. The subject was communicated to the district officers on the 23d May, and received from the PunJab, 'nd even from British Government, not by empty professions, but by contributions to the loan, which was declared to be open for one year only, at six per cent. Loan. The Financial Commissioner extended this circular to other parts of the Punjab. The wealthy bankers were given distinctly to understand, that their demeanor in this matter would be taken as the test of their attachment to the British rule, and those who held back would lose the confidence and good-will of the local authorities. The measure proved successful. The collections realised were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHERE REALISED.</th>
<th>AMOUNT.</th>
<th>REMARKS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Puttiala</td>
<td>5,00,000</td>
<td>Rs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Nabba</td>
<td>2,50,000</td>
<td>N. B. More would have been furnished, but it was not required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; other Chiefs</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>Kulsea and Furreedkhote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Commissioner Umballa</td>
<td>2,33,591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Thanesur</td>
<td>2,35,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Loodiana</td>
<td>2,32,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Ferozepore</td>
<td>1,70,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Simla</td>
<td>91,300</td>
<td>Partly from hill chiefs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18,17,591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remittances were made to the army, to Simla and Kussowlee, where numerous families were assembled; to Mussorie, to Saharanpoor, and even to Nynee Tal. We have still upwards of 18 lakhs, including present collections and remittances received from the Punjab; and I have proposed to the Financial Commissioner to pay off some of the smaller contributions to the Six per cent. Loan.

27. There is not much more to be said. The crisis with us was from the 11th May till the end of July. After that the people gradually returned to their allegiance, and the peace was not again disturbed. Reinforcements passed down, and helped to tranquilize the country. Apprehensions were raised when the Sealkote Brigade mutinied, and when the 26th Line Infantry broke away from Mean Meer, but not a man of these regiments was fated to reach the Sutlej. General Nicholson was an officer of another stamp, and after a march of 41 miles under a July sun, the Sealkote mutineers were met and annihilated. The 26th met an ignominious death at the hands of the police or the public executioner. The "Red" and "Mohurrum" passed over quietly. The processions issued as usual without let or hindrance, but the magistrates were in their guard in the event of an émeute. In the beginning of September desolations became frequent among
among the disarmed sepoys of the 6th and the depot of the 60th Native Infantry left at Umballa. They were ordered into the Umballa gaol; on being paraded for the purpose, a voice from the ranks called out, "fly," and they instantly broke and fled. The Europeans fired and pursued them. In ten minutes 135 were killed, 33 were made prisoners, and the rest, about 40 men, made good their escape.

28. I have not received all the reports from my district officers, and write this statement at considerable disadvantage. The number of mutineers killed and executed in this division, are, as well as I can make out, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>EXECUTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umballa</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanesur</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodiana</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferozepoor</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simla</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29. The number of robbers and heinous criminals executed during these eventful months is as follows. The return is a tolerably good index of the disturbed condition of each district:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Deputy Commissioner</th>
<th>By Commissioner</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umballa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thanesur</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodiana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferozepoor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simla</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30. My thanks are especially due to Mr. Ricketts the Deputy Commissioner of Lodiana, and Captain M’Neill the Deputy Commissioner of Thanesur. Neither of these officers had the support of regular troops, while in the one case there was a large and disaffected city, and in the other a turbulent and lawless population to control. On Mr. Ricketts devolved the very arduous duty of providing carriage for the ordnance stores from Philloor, and for facilitating the passage of the Sutlej during the height of the rains; both these officers bore themselves with conspicuous gallantry and zeal; and Mr. Ricketts especially, was always cheerful, prudent, and active. In stirring times like the past he was the beau ideal of a district officer. I also desire to express my sincere acknowledgments to Mr. Forsyth, Lord William Hay, and Major Marsden. The two first officers had each a most difficult charge; Mr. Forsyth was indefatigable in collecting carriage, and in controlling the important district of Umballa. Lord William Hay had charge of Simla, which was crowded to excess with helpless women and children. His measures were characterized by judgment and tact, and attended with complete success.

31. Of the assistants, Mr. W. C. Plowden especially distinguished himself for courage and zeal. He was constantly exposed wherever danger threatened. Mr. Levein and Lieutenant Parsons had also perilous duties to discharge in the turbulent district of Thanesur. Lieutenant Nicola proved of great assistance to his superior Mr. Ricketts, and Mr. Elliott of the civil service, Mr. Thornton, and Captain Mercer are entitled to special notice.

32. It may not be amiss, before closing this report, to note down the lessons which these mutinies have impressed upon my mind; most if not all of them have been generally recognised. Although experience and knowledge of the country are now frequently depreciated, because they are too often enlisted on the side of the traditions and policy of the past, yet clear and practical views seen by the light of a long residence in this country, should help our rulers in
the arduous task of reconstructing the government. On military matters I am less qualified to speak. But all must see that our future dominion in the country, and our personal safety, can only be maintained by British troops. I think the proportion of Europeans in the standing army of India should at least be equal to the number of natives. The native regular army should consist of various races, and the Sikhs, Gooarkhas, Hindoostanees, and others, should be kept in separate battalions, so as to preserve their nationality. I think there is danger, if they are mingled together, of a general combination. I would disband and re-enlist under new conditions of general service such portions of the late Bengal army as are really worthy of this mark of confidence. Under another and more healthy system, the Bengal sepoys would make a good soldier, and cannot with justice be entirely excluded from the military service of the empire. The battalions of the regular army should be massed in large and well selected cantonments. The forts, arsenals, and the bulk of the public treasure, should be under the exclusive charge of Europeans, and the seats of Government, supreme and local, should be well protected. The humiliating spectacle of the Agra Government, beleaguered and helpless, should never occur again. No natives should be admitted into the artillery, nor initiated into the higher secrets of the ordnance department. Working on these principles, I think the numerical aggregate of our standing army might be greatly reduced.

33. In the civil department I would introduce everywhere local police battalions for each division, or commissionship. I would employ these men for all standing guards not only over the gaol, the local treasuries (containing only money for current expenditure), the civil offices, and for personal guards, but also for our police posts and subordinate revenue stations. The present number of our police might be advantageously reduced, if their places were supplied by a small complement of well trained men for a standing guard, and a band of five or six detectives at each thanannah for the pursuit and prevention of crime. At the head-quarters there would always be a reserve force to act on emergency. Secondly, I would at once set aside the cumbrous and elaborate system, both of law and procedure, now current in the Agra and Bengal provinces. The machinery is not adapted either to the people or to the agents through whom we are obliged to work. Let advantage be taken of the present revolution to introduce short and simple codes both of civil and criminal law, to limit the right of appeal, to abolish judges and boards and courts, and to act upon the principle of individual responsibility; in short, to adopt the Punjab system, uniting all departments in each district under a single head. Let us expedite the construction of railways and telegraphs, and encourage by all the means in our power, the influx of our own countrymen into India, being assured that their character and energy, moral and physical, must tend to civilize the country, dispel barbarism, and consolidate our strength. Let us in our legislative enactments give them their just precedence as a superior race, and secure to them the privileges to which by birth, and by the constitution of England they are entitled. Above all, let us each and all conduct ourselves boldly as Christians and Englishmen, tolerating other creeds, but neglecting no opportunity to inculcate our own. With such principles for our guidance, we shall speedily and yet insensibly without a violent onslaught, undermine the superstitions of Paganism and caste.

I have, &c.,

G. C. Barnes,
Commissioner and Superintendent Cis-Sutlej States.

P.S.—Such of the district reports as have been received, are submitted in original. I also beg to submit copy of a letter dated 28th of September from General Wilson, commanding at Delhi, regarding the services rendered by the officers in the Cis-Sutlej division.

G. C. Barnes,
Commissioner.

True copy.

R. Temple,
Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Punjab.
To Sir John Lawrence, K.C.B., Chief Commissioner in the Punjab, dated Delhi, 28 September 1857.

Sir,

In the despatches which I have recently submitted to the superior military authorities, I have taken occasion to express the obligations I feel towards the officers of the civil service attached to the force under my command, for the valuable aid and assistance they have afforded me in the operations before Delhi.

2. In justice, however, to two officers who, though not actually present in the field, have contributed so greatly by their well-directed energies to the successful issue of the siege, I feel bound to place on record the very high sense I entertain of the admirable manner in which they have, during a very critical period, conducted their responsible offices.

3. I beg, therefore, to bring specially to your notice the very important services rendered by the Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej states, Mr. G. C. Barnes, to whose good government, under yourself, may be justly attributed the preservation of peace in his districts, and to whose influence with the independent chiefs, I am mainly indebted for the valuable aid of the Putteeala and Jheend contingents, by means of which my communication with our rear has been kept open, and the safe escort of numerous convoys of stores and ammunition to the camp has been effected; and his most energetic assistant Mr. M. Ricketts, the Deputy Commissioner of Loodiana, of whose unflagging exertions in procuring carriage, aiding the movements of troops and forwarding supplies, and of his hearty co-operation with the magazine officer in the despatch of ammunition, I am deeply sensible, and cannot speak too highly.

I have, &c.

(signed) A. Wilson,
Major General, commanding Delhi Field Force.

Copy of the above forwarded for the information of Mr. Barnes, Commissioner Cis-Sutlej states, and for communication to Mr. Ricketts, Deputy Commissioner, Loodiana.

(signed) A. Brandreth,
Officiating Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

Lahore, 2 October 1857.

(True copies.)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Punjab.

UMBALLA, UMHITSUR, and LOODIANA DISTRICT REPORTS.

[By Mr. T. D. Forsyth.]

The station of Umballa was, at an early stage, an object of painful interest to all who watched the small cloud like a man's hand which portended the approaching storm. Here the Commander-in-Chief had ordered to assemble detachments from every regiment in the North Western Provinces to learn to practice with the Enfield rifle.

2. It was in February first that the undefined rumours of a feeling of dissatisfaction began to be circulated. Officers attached to the depot received complaints from their men that they feared exclusion from caste on return to their regiments owing to the alleged adulteration of the grease used for the cartridges. There were not wanting among us forebodings who predicted terrible outbreaks, but such were everywhere silenced as insufferable croakers. On the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief, however, in March, affairs assumed a more serious aspect; a sepoy of the 36th Native Infantry attached to the depot went to visit his brethren, who were part of his Excellency's escort, and found himself taunted with the opprobrious epithet of Christian. What measures were taken by the Commander-in-Chief it is not for me to detail; I mention the circumstance merely as occurring at Umballa, and inducing us to place somewhat of credence in the predictions which hitherto we had so entirely ignored.
3. The first symptom of disaffection displayed itself on the 19th of April, in the breaking out of fires in cantonments. One or two European barracks were burnt down; a police station was fired, and from time to time the flames broke out in a mysterious but determined manner, in spite of all the vigilance of Captain Howard and his police. The "grammies" or thatchers were suspected, and there was an evident disinclination to believe the fires to be the work of sepoys; sowars were reported on several occasions to have been seen galloping away from a building which was afterwards discovered to be in flames, and the conviction was gradually forced upon us at last, that some emissaries were at work to spread the flames of disaffection.

4. General Sir H. Barnard arrived at Umballa in the last week in April, and immediately after requested me to make use of the district police, to institute searching inquiries amongst the native soldiers as to the cause of fires and the extent of the rumoured disaffection. It was his particular desire that the inquiry should form the subject of no public report, and the information received from time to time was forwarded by him privately to the Commander-in-Chief. Sham Singh, a Sikh sepop in the 5th Regiment, was induced through the exertions of Jowala Nath, kotwall of Umballa, to give what information he could collect. It was to the effect that the Mussulmans and Hindus were united in the determination to resist what they looked upon as tampering with their religion, and that there was a clique who held consultations which were not communicated to the sepoys generally. Subsequently the information took a more tangible form, and it was positively stated on the 7th or 8th May, that in the following week blood would be shed at Delhi or Umballa, and that a general rising of the sepoys would take place; it was even foretold that there was a conspiracy amongst the Syces of Her Majesty's 9th Lancers to hamstring the horses in the event of an outbreak. All this information was conveyed to the General commanding this division, and through him forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief; but, as the officers commanding regiments expressed entire confidence in their men, the assertions of the informers were discredited, and there was a lull, a fatal calm for a few days preceding the outbreak of this fearful storm.

5. Early on the morning of the 10th of May, the kotwall brought information of the 5th and 60th Regiments Native Infantry having turned out and taken their arms, and simultaneously a man came from the treasury with the news of the guard (a detachment of the 60th Native Infantry) having suddenly got under arms. The subadar was sent for and asked to explain his conduct, which he could not do, but though ordered to dismiss his men to their lines, he kept them to their arms during the whole day, and then in the evening denied having done so. It was too plain that he had acted on a concerted plan, which, if carried out, would have caused the loss of our treasury.

6. It is not necessary for me to detail the events of that day in the cantonment of Umballa. The 5th and 60th Native Infantry flew to their arms, but were quieted and induced to return to their lines. The storm was thus for awhile lulled, but there was too good ground for future apprehension, too soon to be realised.

7. On the ever-memorable 11th of May, Brigadier Halifax sent me a hurried note calling me to his house as he had received the first telegraphic message of the arrival of some mutinous sowars from Meerut. This was shortly followed by the appalling announcement of a general massacre of all the Christian inhabitants of Delhi. The telegraphic announcement was brief and significant, and broke off with the announcement of the death of the inspector, and the words "Good bye, I am off." After that the wire vibrated in vain to the signals from Umballa; and the next communication from the city of Delhi was made after a lapse of four months by the same signaler, who had to announce the victorious entry of our troops into the city, from which he had telegraphed the news of our expulsion. News of the Delhi disaster was at once forwarded to myself and the Commander-in-Chief, and General Barnard took upon himself to call down Her Majesty's 75th Regiment from Kussowlie.

8. The worst apprehensions were entertained regarding the native troops at Umballa, and every precaution was used to secure the civil treasury from plunder.
plunder in case of an outbreak. I was anxious to remove the Government money at once into safe keeping, but General Barnard considered it unwise to distrust the sepoys. To counteract any attempt on their part, we had 200 sepoys belonging to the 4th or Sooruj Mookhee Police Battalion, under the command of Colonel Futteh Sing. These men were ordered to remain in their lines, and one-half were kept under arms all night. The roads in the civil station were patrolled vigorously by the detachment of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, and the city police were organised, and made to patrol the city in compact bodies.

9. On the morning of Tuesday the 12th May, a hurried letter from Mr. Spankie, magistrate of Saharanpoo, gave us the first news of the outbreak at Meerut. Matters appeared to become more complicated, and the want of some force to counterbalance the preponderance of sepoys in Umballa, being strongly felt, I took upon myself in anticipation of sanction, to call in the aid of the Maharajah of Puttiala, reporting to yourself and the Chief Commissioner my having done so. Tuesday and Wednesday were days of intense anxiety, as the regiment summoned from Kussowlie had not yet arrived, and the sepoy regiments in Umballa were evidently in a state of excitement.

10. On the afternoon of Wednesday the Maharajah of Puttiala arrived at Loseemli, a village a few miles from Umballa, with a force of 1,000 men. I had by that time received the orders of the Chief Commissioner to call upon him to garrison Thanesur and Loodiana; but he declared himself too weak to divide his force, and as the choice lay between these two places, I chose Thanesur. The rajah in a moment broke up his camp, and started for that place; thus displaying, from the very outset, that alacrity and devotion to our cause, which have characterised the conduct of the Maharajah of Puttiala, reporting to yourself and the Chief Commissioner my having done so.

11. On the same day I deputed Mr. Plowden to give a correct account of what had occurred to yourself and to the Commander-in-Chief, as the first report appeared to have been misunderstood.

12. On the evening of the 13th, a council of war was held at the house of Brigadier Halifax, consisting of General Barnard, Brigadier Halifax, Captain M'Andrew and myself, when it was determined to send on the troops under the command of the Rajahs Putteeaal and Jheend to Kurnaul to open communication with Meerut, and a letter announcing the 18th as the date of their arrival at Kurnaul, with a pledge that a European force should speedily follow from Umballa, Captain M'Andrew was deputed to accompany the force to Kurnaul.

13. On the following day you arrived in Umballa, and I would leave it to your able pen to describe all the military operations from that time, and propose confining myself to the part which I and other district officers took in the general operations.

14. Our first pressing difficulty was to provide carriage for the speedy transit of the European regiments from the hills to Umballa, which was accomplished by the evening of Sunday the 18th, on which day we removed our treasure, consisting of Rs. 3,71,535. 5. from the kutcherry to the quarter-guard of the 1st Europeans.

15. As soon as it was determined by the Commander-in-Chief that an onward move should be made, a sudden difficulty arose in want of carriage. The Deputy Commissary-general having officially declared his inability to meet the wants of the army, the civil authorities were called upon to supply the demand. At Umballa there has ever been a difficulty to furnish carriage of any kind, the carts being of a very inferior description. However, such as they were, they had to be pressed into the service, and in the course of a week, after the utmost exertions, 500 carts, 2,000 camels and 2,000 coolies were made over to the Commissariat department, 30,000 maunds of grain were likewise collected and stored for the army in the town of Umballa.

16. As soon as these urgent calls had been complied with, it was necessary to look to the state of the district, which, caught, in a measure, the excitement of cantonments. In Saharanpoo, the Gojurs raised their heads in defiance of authority, and it was apprehended that their brethren on this side of the Jumna would catch the infection. To overawe the disaffected, and to watch the movements of the insurgents across the Jumna, a squadron 4th Light Cavalry under Captain

N
Captain Wyld, and two companies 5th Native Infantry under Captain Garstin, were placed at the disposal of Mr. W. C. Plowden, Assistant Commissioner, who at once proceeded to take up his quarters at Jugadree.

17. At the same time it was necessary to provide for the safety of the western pargunnahs, for the petty hill state of Nalagurh had taken advantage of the complication of affairs at Simla, to raise a disturbance which threatened to extend to the Roopur tehsil. Two companies of the 5th Native Infantry were at once despatched under command of Captain Gardner, to garrison Roopur, and repel any attempt at rebellion. This detachment however was mutinous, and spread around the disorder it was sent to repress.

18. The seditious language and disgraceful conduct of the sepoys in the bazaar of Roopur, induced a misguided few to believe that the British rule was at an end, and one Mohur Singh, a Sikh Kadi of the late ex-chief Bhoo Singh, was foolish enough to endeavour to put a stop to the slaughter of kine. A slight disturbance occurred at the tehsil, and it was deemed advisable at once to recall the detachment before it broke out into actual mutiny. Three of the ringleaders, with the Sikh Mohur Singh, were tried, condemned and executed in the space of two hours. The rest of the sepoys were disarmed and disbanded, and some of them punished by court martial.

19. In order to preserve peace throughout the district, you at an early stage called out the service levies which the various jagheerdars were bound to furnish on demand. A detail of these levies with their posts is given in the margin*, and the general arrangement was as follows:

20. At Roopur the Singhpoorea sirdars took up their abode in the tehsil, and watched with their levies, all the fords and ferries on the Sutlej. No boats were allowed to ply save at Roopur, where a strong guard was stationed to examine all passengers.

21. The road between Morinda, Khurrur and towards the hills were carefully patrolled, and sowars were stationed on the road to convey with the utmost rapidity, intelligence from one part of the district to another.

22. The same arrangements were made in every tehsil, the petty chiefs or jagheerdars ranging themselves under the immediate orders of the tehsil dar, and conveying at once to their followers whatever instructions he received from myself. In addition to these jagheerdars who were bound to supply levies, several public spirited individuals volunteered their own services and brought several followers; amongst these the most prominent were Rao Raheem Bux, of Pinjilasee, who, with 50 followers, guarded the road between Umballa and Jugadree, and the Sir-kurdahs of Sadhoura, who furnished 60 men to protect the public and private buildings in the civil station, thus relieving our police of very heavy duty.

23. It was necessary to make some provision for the protection of cantonments when denuded of troops, for there was every fear lest the surrounding villagers,

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Tehsil</th>
<th>Foot</th>
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<th>Amount of Commutation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Umballa</td>
<td>144</td>
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<td>9,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>76</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4,551 15</td>
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<tr>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>7,624 11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khurrur</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2,528 19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>19,166 12</td>
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</table>

* List of the Levies kept up at each Tehsil, and Amount of Commutation remitted as Remuneration for their Services.
villagers, who are a notorious set of incorrigible thieves, should break in and plunder in a wholesale manner. The Commander-in-Chief had sanctioned the entertainment of two chokedars to every bungalow, and I arranged with the zumeendar that they were to take the whole cantonment under their charge, appointing their own chokedars, and each village was made responsible for the safety of the bungalows nearest to it. This system worked well for two or three months, when it was discontinued.

24. There was at the outset an attempt to set the law at defiance, and for several days in succession daring highway robberies were committed; but out of seven robberies not one criminal escaped detection; and the rapid apprehension, conviction, and in several cases the execution of the culprits, produced the most wholesome effect. Bands of robbers collected together, but their courage failed when they saw so plainly the fate which awaited them. One case only of dacoity occurred on the confines of the Nahun district, but I followed up the pursuit in person with Mr. Plowden, and hanged one of the robbers to a tree near his own village, and of 16 others who were caught soon after, four shared the same fate, and the rest were imprisoned.

25. It was a remarkable fact that misdemeanors at once seemed to cease, not only in this district, but throughout the country; men's minds seemed to be intent on watching the extraordinary progress of events, and none but daring crimes tempted the more reckless characters.

26. On the 8th June we received intelligence of the revolt of the Jullunder Brigade, and the rapid approach of the mutineers towards Loodiana. In order to oppose their progress, and to preserve our gaoi, I strengthened the prison guard, and threw up hasty fortifications, disposing the whole of my force, about 150 men, round the walls. Here the Reverend Messrs. Carleton and Orbison joined me, and we awaited for some 36 hours, with no small anxiety, the approach of a whole brigade of mutineers. They however avoided the station of Umballa altogether, and we emerged from our defences to endeavour to intercept a body of some 400 sepoys and 15 sowars, who were making for the Junna across the foot of the hills. The Commandant Futtah Singh refused to attack so superior a force without being supported by Europeans, for whom I urgently sought, and who arrived within five miles of the rebels at Ramgurh, but owing to some unexplained reason they did not come on till six hours too late. The pursuit was however continued vigorously for two nights and a day, and Mr. Plowden with his force endeavoured to intercept them though without success. One fact was evident to all engaged in the pursuit, that the population had decidedly not enlisted themselves warmly on the part of the Government. Not a man turned out, who was not compelled to do so, through fear of the loss of his jagheer, and in many instances, information calculated to deceive, was all that we could obtain. On this occasion the Mir of Kotah showed great lukewarmness, and I fined him 1,000 rupees for his conduct. The Pathans of Khizrabad, and the villagers of Ferozepore, Narainghur, Thusa, and Gobindpoore, were likewise heavily mulcted.

27. It became very necessary to watch narrowly the tone of conversation and correspondence carried on in the city of Umballa, and though no instance of proved treason occurred, there was much ground for suspicion, and letters speaking of the English in no laudatory terms, were now and then brought forward. Periphrasis and enigmatical sentences were used to convey doubtful sentiments, and under the pretence of sending merely commercial news, remarks on the absence of white sugar, and the abundance of goor, or of the diminution of red pepper, and the increase of black pepper, were intended to convey to comrades at a distance, accurate information regarding the weak state of our garrison or of our forces.

28. Throughout the month of June the labours of the police were incessantly devoted to the collection of carriage, and supplying generally the wants of the army. It is impossible to state accurately the number furnished, but the accounts of the Umballa tehsel show, that upwards of 900 carts and 1,800 camels, and 500 coolies, were collected for the army during this month.

29. The Post-office department was not in a state to meet the emergent demand for transport, and in compliance with the orders of the Judicial Com.
missioner, a district bullock train was organised to run between Loodiana and Kurnaul. By dint of labour and management we were enabled to despatch 20 carts daily, and often the number rose to 50, irrespective of the convoys of carts load of shot and shell, which poured in one continuous stream along the Grand Trunk Road. Great though the difficulties were, it is no small satisfaction to be able to record, that not one single instance occurred of a cart load of stores of any kind being detained or delayed, on the road between Loodiana and Kurnaul; still the difficulty of getting sufficient carriage, and the apparent impossibility of ever recovering from Kurnaul a cart which had once got there, rendered it necessary that a more complete transport agency should be organised, and this very heavy duty was on the 17th July made over to Captain Briggs.

30. Towards the end of June the orders of the Chief Commissioner were received to disarm the district, and no time was lost in carrying out this measure. As far as it was possible at that season of the year, the operations were superintended by my assistants and myself, and we collected altogether 16,000 arms. At a later period of the year we had again endeavoured to disarm the population more thoroughly, but the number of arms only amounted to 1,240; and with the neighbouring independent states of Khulseea and Putteala bordering on, and often intermingling with our own villages, it is difficult at once to complete the operation. It must be a work of time, and will require constant attention.

31. No small portion of the labour of the past year consisted in the management of the treasury, and the receipt and despatch of money to the army. Our revenue was paid in with an alacrity almost unknown, and constant remittances from Jullundhur, Hooshiarpore, and other stations, were received and forwarded to Delhi.

32. In addition to this, contributions were invited to the Government Six per cent. Loan, and though at first the people looked upon the investment with disfavour, we were eventually able to realize 2 1/2 lakhs from different parts of the district.

33. Over zeal on the part of some tehseldars caused at one time some little confusion by the collection of small sums below 100 rupees, but this was speedily set right, and on your subsequent request, I should repay a portion of the loan, I liquidated all loans of sums under 500 rupees. On this occasion the wealthy bankers of Jugadree, displayed a spirit of disloyalty and close-fistedness unworthy of a class who owe all their prosperity to the fostering care and protection of the British Government.

34. On the first outbreak of the mutiny our civil courts necessarily were temporarily suspended. One Assistant, Captain M'Andrew, was deputed with the Putteela troops; another, Mr. Plowden, was out at Jugadree; Mr. Vaughan's time was engrossed with the duties of the treasury, whilst the tehseldars and myself were wholly engaged in the duties of supplying the army. But in June I received the valuable aid of Mr. C. P. Elliott's services, and we commenced at once to clear off the civil file. The result at the end of December shows, that out of 4,231 cases filed in a year, when owing to the introduction of the new Statute of Limitations, there was a rush of suitors to our courts, only 153 cases remained undecided. The result in the criminal department is equally satisfactory. Petty crime has, as stated, not been so rife, but the proportion of apprehensions and convictions, to the crimes committed, as the returns show, far in excess of any former years.

35. On the 1st of September the orders of the Chief Commissioner to disband the remnant of the 5th and 60th Native Infantry, were received and carried out. The sepoys were to have been lodged for a time in our gaol, but an attempt to escape being made by a few; they were summarily dealt with by the Europeans.

36. Of the conduct of the 'detachment' of the 5th Native Infantry at Jugadree, I think it better to leave to Mr. Plowden to speak, as it is only fair that this energetic officer, who so zealously remained out in camp throughout the whole hot season and rains, should have the opportunity of reporting his own operations;
37. In September, the Meer of Kotaha, whom I have already mentioned, again fell under suspicion, in consequence of a letter supposed to have been written by his son-in-law Abul Hussun from Moozuffernugger. This led to the search of his fort, where a large quantity of gunpowder, sulphur, &c. was found, and shortly after I received the orders of the Chief Commissioner to dismantle his fort, which has been completely done.

38. No other inhabitants of this district have been so severely dealt with, though many have fallen under grave suspicion; and when the orders of the Judicial Commissioner for the dismissal of Hindoostanees from employ was received, I took occasion to remove many inhabitants of Umballa, such as Burkut Allee, &c., who are worse if possible than regular Hindoostanees.

39. The conduct of the native executives has throughout been very satisfactory on the whole. The thannadar of Beelaspore, Jumna Doss, was summarily removed for incapacity, and others were got rid of as being obnoxious characters; but other officials have behaved well: Gungapershaud, tehseddar of Narainghur, and Sadi-oold-deen, khan of Umballa, particularly so.

40. I strongly doubt the tehseddar of Jugadree, Moojibooddeen; and the demeanour of the extra assistant, Budrool Islam, during the months of August and September, was anything but satisfactory.

41. Of the causes which led to this rebellion it is not for me to speak, but I cannot refrain from recording one fact which was not without significance. In August 1856, a letter from the Akhond of Swat, addressed to Futteh Khan, of Pindee Gheb was brought to me when Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Rawul Pindi. Amongst much other news, the writer stated that the Mahomedans of Lucknow had written to Dost Mahomed, informing him that Oude had been taken by the British, and that, as they supposed, Hydrabad would follow, there would soon be no stronghold of Islam left in Hindostan, and unless some effort were made, the cause of true believers would be lost. In the event of the Mahomedans of Oude entering on any plan, they wished to know what aid they might expect from the Dost. The sagacious reply to this application was stated by the writer to be "What will be, remains to be seen."

I have, &c.

(sign) T. D. Forsyth,
Deputy Commissioner.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab.

LIST of COLLECTIONS made in the Umballa District on Account of Six per Cent. Loan.

<table>
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<th>NAME OF TEHSEL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sudder</td>
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<td>Rupees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Umballa</td>
<td>40,100</td>
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<td>Jugadree</td>
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<td>Khurrur</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,81,200</strong></td>
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Deputy Commissioner's Office,
Umballa, 22 January 1858.

(sign) T. D. Forsyth,
Deputy Commissioner.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Punjab.
May 1857.—On the 12th of May, when first intelligence of the Meerut and Delhi mutinies reached Umritsur, the force within cantonments consisted of the 59th Native Infantry, of whom 216 were doing duty inside the Fort of Govindghur. On the disarming of the troops at Lahore, nothing could be done but await calmly the progress of events. A rendezvous was appointed in case of a disturbance. The next evening, there came (what fortunately turned out to be a false alarm) news, that the disarmed troops at Lahore were preparing for escape, possibly with the idea of swarming into Fort Govindghur. Mr. Macnaghten accordingly, with the utmost zeal, proceeded with the tehsildar, General Hursookh Rai (who has shown great energy and fidelity throughout) to Atarce. Dewan Narain Singh, the agent of Sirdar Kauth Singh of Atarce, at once came to aid Mr. Macnaghten in rousing the villagers, and forming a barrier across the Grand Trunk Road, so as to intercept the mutineers, and give us time to prepare ourselves. In the meantime Colonel Boyd picketed out the 59th Native Infantry in various directions, by way of diversion of attention, while Captain Waddy removed the whole of the battery of artillery inside the fort. All this occupied but two hours. In the interim, I had picketed outside the gate of the fort (from that day till it was well garrisoned by Europeans), a company of Sikhs and some sowars, who at a certain signal from the fort, were to accompany me in. Having adopted all immediate possible measures, attention was paid to the feeling of the city, which was, to say the least, excited. As if to try the temper of authority, a Mussulman chokeedar had the audacity to cut down a cow, with the shallow pretence that he thought it was a dog. Setting aside Regulation, and in anticipation of approval, I had the man most severely flogged, and placed in prison with irons for a year. The effect was great, and nothing of the kind occurred since. Expecting the attack noted, I should mention, in addition to the eulogy of Dewan Narain Singh, the name of the Scindanwallah family, who at once replied to my summons, to render any such effectual aid such an emergency might call for.

Forthwith communications were opened with Goordaspoor, Jullundur, and incessant bulletins interpassed. The Goordaspoor treasure arrived safely, and was deposited in Govindghur; so also, subsequently, without awakening any suspicion of distrustfulness with the 59th Native Infantry, was the bulk of my own treasure.

The arrest and holding to bail of numbers of Bhyraghee faqueers next ensued. Numbers were deported, or held to bail, or temporarily imprisoned. Forty-four noted bad characters who had suffered frequent imprisonment, were at once incarcerated and made to work on the roads, a measure that greatly contributed to tranquillity in the city. Four new havalats were erected inside the kotwaloo for the reception of all sorts of suspicious vagabonds. Bhung was forbidden to be sold at the tanks outside the city; and at my suggestion, sepoys were forbidden to enter the city.

Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, as usual, morning after morning, the city was visited in order to allay alarm, and mark any change of demeanor. In anticipation of the orders of the Chief Commissioner, Govindghur Fort was promptly stored in three days with provisions for three months. Each different sort of provision came from different bazaars out at different hours of the day, and at different gates, which device effectually obviated any curious concentration of attention on the plain opposite the fort. Thus much briefly were the general arrangements for May.

June.—The June month presents some peculiar features. The 59th Native Infantry continued armed, though their numbers in the fort were much reduced. All letters to sepoys were intercepted; and in some, very suspicious matter was contained; but the time had hardly arrived to press matters. Evidences of the Mahomedan basis of the rebellion soon stood forth. Through Mr. Phillip's exertions a man named Doolee Singh brought to light some clear cases of seditious conversation and projected treason. Through his evidence, aided by corroborative and collateral testimony of certain native Christians, perfect proof was obtained of anticipated triumph on the part of the Moslemites. Mohammed Shureef, a relation of Rissaldar Burkut Ali, of the mounted Resallah here (himself no small thorn in my side, a Hindooostanee and resident of Shahjehanpore) Meer Sahib, a clockmaker, Myan Sahib a devilish-looking faqueer (whom I arrested at night in the city), a Noor Mahomed Khan, who admitted to have left Delhi on the 22d of May (he was an ex-moonoshee, had a fine horse and disguises, and clearly had left for the Omsade in Umritsur), a Mooshee Rujub Ali, and others were at once tried and thrown into prison, and there they are still. A Mussulman thannahdar on the day of that trial had left his district, and was found by tehseeldear Hursookh Rai, in the shop of the conspirators; he was promptly dismissed from all Government employ.

On the 9th of the month under review, the mutiny at Jullunder took place, and Mr. Assistant Commissioner Aitchison started at once with orders to intercept any who might attempt to cross at Hureekee Ghat. Nothing of the sort was attempted. But the police and villagers maintained their reputation, and handed over the Punjabi deserters from the Jullunder regiments.

The immediate arrest of Bhai Maharej Singh by the Commissioner's orders, who was found 16 miles away in a village seated amongst his listeners, by Mr. Macnaghten, in a buggy; and his removal during the night to prevent suspicion, met the Commissioner's and Judicial Commissioner's approval; other similar directions were carried out by my assistants, to whom one and all (and to Mr. Macnaghten, Captain Perkins and Mr. Aitchison particularly) I am under the greatest obligations for their ready help.

During this month, Rada Kishun Bramin was hanged in the presence of the whole moveable column under Brigadier-general Chamberlain, for high treason. A proclamation proclaiming his crime and punishment, was printed in the gaol and published in the city.

Connected with the gaol was some anxiety, it being situated inside the city. "My assistants had been urged to resort to fines and flogging, as far as possible, and valuable diminution in the numbers imprisoned was immediately perceptible, a diminution increased by the permission of the Commissioner to release certain convicts, such as the sick, or small term prisoners, on the payment of moderate fines in lieu. The severest discipline was maintained. The manufactures went on as usual, doubling the ordinary profits, no extorted, and not a single escape occurred.

The Tarun Tarun pergunnah, being the nursery of the Sikh Khalsa soldier, recruiting parties began to arrive; and added immensely to the miscellaneous business of the administration, entailing incessant correspondence, large advances and daily examination. In these duties Captain Perkins' assistance was invaluable; a bad case of highway robbery occurred, but the parties were so successfully tracked, that the property was recovered; and the undiminished activity of the police thus shown, and cordial aid of the villagers, aided by prompt rewards invariably accorded to the abettors in suppression of social disorder, operated to the prevention of any accession of heinous crime during the unparalleled season.

238.
July.—During the present month, the march of troops through this district was almost daily, and no complaints have occurred either of want of supplies, or of a single robbery. The Chief Commissioner's orders about this time were carried out concerning the reduction of ferries, the increase of guards for those that remained, and the formation of breastworks; by careful attention to which the denizens of each Doab were caged. No Hindostanees (by similar instructions) could pass any Ghaut even down without passes; nor up at all.

As matters down country grew darker, still greater vigilance was adopted, spies in disguise were organised with success, sufficient evidence was elicited from nine sepoys of the 35th Native Infantry, committed to me by Brigadier-general Chamberlain, to show their intention to mutiny after they had crossed the Sutlej. In company with the 35th they were disarmed. Associated with the efforts of my spies, was the safe surveillance of the sacerdotal high priest of infanticide notoriety, Beebee Bekramath Singh, who for six months was prohibited even horse exercise. Correspondence between Major Abbott, Deputy Commissioner of Hooshaarpool, Major Lake and myself had frequently passed concerning this dangerous character.

On the 9th of the month now referred to occurred the fight at Jhelum, and Brigadier-general Nicholson, who, with the moveable column, had been here (at Umritsur) some time, resolved to, and did at once disarm the 59th Native Infantry. Subsequently, on the 13th, intelligence was received by me in a hurried note of the 11th, of the mutiny at Sealkote, and the gallant Brigadier-general forthwith disarmed the remaining wing of the mutinous 9th Light Cavalry. The Trimmoo Ghaut action at which the Commissioner, Mr. Roberts, was present; my assistant Captain Perkins whom I despatched to aid, and General Hursookh Rai, also to aid in supplies, does not properly find scope in the Umritsur narrative.

Of the utmost importance was it to preserve tranquillity if possible, to restore confidence, and inspire hope among the great traders and capitalists of Umritsur. Frequent and laborious were the interviews. In communication with Major Hamilton, negotiations for the arrival in portions of the Bombay invoices were opened with success. Letters of guaranteed contents were sent open to me, and I franked bundles. Nevertheless more than one panic ensued, and the insidious hints and doubts thrown on our ability to afford the customary protection, in one instance resulted in almost a stoppage. It was a season of trial indeed, when the very life blood of the mercantile community was nigh dammed up. During this period the disarmed 35th Native Infantry were pitched at Jhindiala, 12 miles out; and daily reports as to their behaviour were submitted to me.

August.—The close of the month of July was signalised by the flight of the 26th Native Infantry from Meean Meer, after the murder of their commanding officer. Expecting they would take a down-country road, and the information conveyed as to their route being at fault, a party of Tewana Horse went out to Hurkee. Next morning, the 31st of July, the tehseddar of Ujnala, Dewan Pram Nath, despatched an express to me to say that the mutineers had been delayed on their road through his district, by a clever chowkeedar; that he had intercepted them, and awaited my arrival. Having suggested that such portion of the moveable column as the military authorities chose, should proceed on the Futtehgurh road, under the impression that I should be fortunate only enough to pursue the mutineers into their clutches, I started with about 80 sowars, 50 of whom were furnished by Colonel Boyd, consisting of Wild's Tewana Horse. Arriving at the banks of the river, some 24 miles, a bloody struggle, it was obvious had taken place, and 150 had been drowned and killed; the rest were just visible on an island. Leaving the doubtful Hindostanee on the bank, I put off and captured 166; subsequently others who had been gleaned up from the villagers, were brought into the Ujnala tehseld, whither back I had to escort safely the whole batch, in all present 282, (two hundred and eighty-two). Thirty-five I had counted drowning, who had thrown themselves into the river in despair at seeing us approach fully armed. Of the 285, 237 were executed by me early on the 1st of August (next morning). The remainder met perhaps a worse fate; for in the tumult
tumult of the affair, and the difficulty, with my small force, of preventing the escape of so large a squadron of desperate men, it was forgotten that one of the bastions of the tehsil, in which 66 were confined, had been fortified, and the only windows admitting light and air closely shut up. Hence, when I ordered the door to be opened, expecting resistance and a rush, from the fact of the prisoners having inevitably heard the roll of the musketry, which every ten minutes told to death ten of their comrades, no sound issued, and upon entry 45 dead bodies were dragged out. I thought at the time that it was fright, hunger and exhaustion, until I subsequently learned from Captain Perkins, who had fortified the tehsil, what must have been the true cause.

The responsibility I was undertaking I had fully calculated upon; and I cannot otherwise than feel pride in having, on report of the above disposal of the case, received in the most handsome terms the thanks of the Commissioner, the Judicial Commissioner, the head of the Punjab Government, and the Governor General in Council, for having meted out so swift and terrible a retribution.

Reference is made to the original Report, but for the continuity of this narrative, it was thought better to advert to the circumstance.

September.—During this month no stirring events occurred here affecting civil authority, or connected with the mutinies, with the exception of the hanging of a native doctor of the 35th Native Infantry for seditious conversation in denying the fall of Delhi. But much labour and trouble was expended in attempting to popularise the six per cent. loan. Anything more illiberal and less gratifying than the feeling displayed cannot be imagined. The large mercantile community upon which our system had heaped favours, and secured immunities unknown before, utterly failed in their duty to the State, and the contrast they displayed to all sections of the opposite class. The agricultural community, especially that of Sowreean, who one and all turned out to oppose the passage of traitors, and who are hardly burdened, will not be, I hope, lost sight of, when a revision of our financial policy is under deliberation.

Numerous arrests of Sikh sepoys have since taken place, who have tried to return quietly to their homes.

I hope in the above resume nothing of importance has been omitted; it is chiefly from memory. How much I am indebted to the original, firm, wise and cheering view taken by the Judicial Commissioner, Mr. Montgomery, in frequent letters exchanged during the late period, and his brilliant example, it may be out of place to mention, because every district officer can but have one deep feeling on the subject as regards himself. But I am not debarred from expressing my thanks to the Commissioner of the Division, my immediate superior, for his valuable advice, directions and suggestions, his unvarying support (when so much had to be done in anticipation of sanction), and the confidence which he has reposed in one entrusted with the charge and responsibility of administering for the Umritsur city and district during such a momentous period.

(signed) Fred. Cooper,
Deputy Commissioner.

(True copy.)
(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab.
MEMORANDUM of Prisoners incarcerated in Gaol or punished.

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
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<tr>
<td>Hanged</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Since let out</td>
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<td>Blown away by commanding officer of the station belonging to late 26th Native Infantry</td>
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<td>Counted drowning</td>
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<td>Killed by the police</td>
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<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
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(signed) Fred. Cooper,
Deputy Commissioner.

(True copy)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

MEMORANDUM of Extra Establishment.

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<tr>
<th>Date of Enlistment</th>
<th>Jemadars</th>
<th>Duffadhars</th>
<th>Sowars</th>
<th>Durr-Kundazars</th>
<th>Total Amount of Pay for the Month</th>
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<td>12 May</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10 July</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 Rs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 August</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>15 Rs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 September</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 Rs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 September</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Rs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 October</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 Rs.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>128 Rs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(signed) Fred. Cooper,
Deputy Commissioner.

(True copy)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner for the Punjab.

From G. H. M. Ricketts, Esq., late Deputy Commissioner, Lodiana, to G. C. Barnes, Esq., Commissioner and Superintendent Cis-Sutlej States, dated 22d February 1858.

Sir,

I have the honour to reply to your circular, No. 17, dated 18 January, conveying orders from the Judicial Commissioner for a report on what occurred in the Lodiana district during the early months of the rebellion.

2. Having left the district I can only reply by referring to a few notes made at the time, and from recollection of the different events.

3. I find my notes commence from 15 May, when there was no further room for the most sceptical to doubt that an anxious time had commenced, and from which period my preparations also date.

4. On
4. On that day, on the strength of a letter from yourself, I wrote off to the Jheend rajah for a troop of cavalry and two companies of infantry, but the Jheend troops being far from Loodiana, and being required down in the Delhi direction, never arrived. In their stead the Nabha rajah sent his available troops and the Malair Kotila chiefs their levies, mention of whom will be made hereafter.

5. On that day also letters were written to the principal sirdars, jageerdars and men of influence belonging to the district, that the time was come when true men should be forward with their assistance to the State, and requesting them to furnish 80 horsemen at once. They all responded with alacrity to the summons; the men were raised, equipped and mounted at once, and each leader made further preparations to supply horse and foot according to the numbers required of them under their former rulers, and in lieu of whose services they had rendered a money commutation to our Government.

6. Conspicuous amongst all was old Mith Singh, the most influential of the Mullowdh chieftains, and guardian of the present head of the family, who is a minor. Mith Singh came in person to have an interview with me, supplied 50 good horsemen, volunteered as many matchlock footmen as his jagheer could furnish, and subsequently sent me many fine recruits for the new regiment raised at Loodiana, and volunteered a considerable sum of money as a loan to Government. I feel sure his good example was of great benefit towards keeping up a good feeling towards us among the men of influence in the district, and I hope he may be favourably considered by Government.

7. The next most conspicuous was Sirdar Bussunt Singh, who owns a fine estate at Keeree, near Kunna, on the grand trunk road, and on the boundary of the Umballa district. He furnished 18 well mounted men, two being mounted on his own carriage horses, which I returned to him.

8. The Budhour chiefs were represented by 20 horsemen, but the majority of their force was sent to Ferozepoor, under whose jurisdiction their estate is situated, and where I believe they did good service.

9. The Ludran sirdars, and they alone, failed in giving me satisfaction; their men were ill-mounted, the sirdars themselves are a degenerate lukewarm set, perpetually quarrelling with each other, and difficult to manage; once they withdrew their men from the post where I stationed them. On a future occasion I should prefer their money contribution to their aid in men, and their own absence.

10. Rai Emam Buksh of the old Raikote family, also, though exempt from liability to contribution in either men or money, being a mere pensioner, furnished 10 men, and Bhae Sumpoorun Singh, of Bagrean, an equal number of horse and foot under himself in person.

11. Conspicuous amongst the less influential, were the Lulton Chowdries. The five or six brothers are old soldiers, and as such being conversant with the numerous wants and requisitions of troops, were exceedingly useful in furnishing escorts, in arranging for supplies, carriage of all sorts, in arranging and loading convoys of magazine stores, in superintending the bridge of boats and ferry at Philloor when troops were passing, in expediting the moving and transit of heavy ordnance, and in raising recruits, both infantry and cavalry. Their staunchness to Government has been often tested; they were with the old Loodiana residents G. Clerk and Broadfoot, were with the latter when killed at Ferozestah, and with Mackeson and Major Lake. I have given two of them small situations under Government (jemadar in Thannah Tuhseel at Loodiana) and one since my removal to this district I retain as an immediate attendant I can rely on; and several of the younger members are in Hodson's Horse, but I should be glad if their services, both during my time and previously, could obtain for them some substantial recognition.

12. The disposal of the horse and foot contributed by these district chiefs I shall treat on subsequently.

13. Further, to return to my early preparations on the 15th May, I find the treasure was removed by Mr. Thornton, the Assistant Commissioner, and myself from the treasury, where it was under the usual guard of the 3d Bengal Native Infantry.
Infantry, and sent under a police escort to Philloor, where it was lodged under the keeping of Her Majesty's 8th Foot, who formed the garrison there. I may as well here mention that the treasure remained there; it was not one of the least arduous duties devolving on the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Thornton, to have repeatedly to go to and fro to Philloor in compliance with constant and unexpected demands for money, the distance being seven miles, besides the passage of the Sutlej, which also, in the absence of the bridge of boats, occupies from two to four hours either way.

14. On the 15th May, also, four burkundauzes from each tuhseel and thannah, two from each first class and one from each smaller chokie were called in to assist at the station, their places being supplied by recruits; this gave me an accession of about 80 trained men to my city police; they formed all the smaller escorts and guards supplied for treasure, ammunition, magazine stores, baggage, and all the thousand supplies for the troops at Delhi.

My plan was to associate some jageerdari footmen, with a few experienced men from my police, and I am glad to say in no one instance was there any loss or delay, though the charges were most important, including remittances of treasure; and on one occasion 12 artillery waggons of artillery and small-arm ammunition for the European troops at Umballa were escorted by 30 burkundauzes to that station at a most critical time, when the native troops were all in open mutiny, and ammunition was short. The men commanding this escort refused to give over their charge to a detachment of the 4th Light Cavalry sent to relieve them, bluntly telling them they had no confidence in them; and they received great praise both from the officer commanding the station and the artillery, for their spirited conduct. I may as well state, by the way, that these Sikhs make the best possible escort for all stores of an inflammable nature, as they alone of the native population do not smoke, and they take a pleasure in preventing others from doing so.

15. A further reference to my notes, a copy of which I append, just as I kept them for the first 15 days, by which time the necessary arrangements were either carried out or in train, (and one had become so habituated to the new state of things, and orders were issued so fast that notes would have been superfluous and too numerous) shows that on that and the few subsequent days, supervision began to be exercised over all dealers in open mutiny, and ammunition was short. The men commanding this escort refused to give over their charge to a detachment of the 4th Light Cavalry sent to relieve them, bluntly telling them they had no confidence in them; and they received great praise both from the officer commanding the station and the artillery, for their spirited conduct. I may as well state, by the way, that these Sikhs make the best possible escort for all stores of an inflammable nature, as they alone of the native population do not smoke, and they take a pleasure in preventing others from doing so.

Increase of police force.

Police escorts.

Miscellaneous duties.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE
Muzbees were enrolled as pioneers. Two hundred and fifty (I think) doolie bearers were engaged and sent to Delhi for the transport service; 200 men were raised for the North Western Provinces police battalion. The men on furlough from the Ferozepoor and Lodiana Sikh regiments were formed to the number of 140 (or thereabouts) into one body, were armed and sent down to the Mozuffernugger district, where they are still, watching the Rohilcund rebels; estimates were formed of the amount of cattle available for provisions for the vast increase of European troops; and lastly, the manufacturing classes in the town were set to work at sand bags for Delhi; at tent cloth, 300,000 yards for tents for Europeans; on saddles for the Horse Artillery; artisans were furnished for the magazines at Ferozepoor and Philloor, and masons and carpenters for the new European barracks in course of construction in the Hill stations; and so on, in various ways, which have escaped my notes and my memory. The internal resources of the district were brought into play to meet the demands of the times, whilst the spirit of the people was taken advantage of, to commit them to the quarrel against the common enemy, and the various subordinate official departments were roused by rewards freely given, and by punishments sharp and severe, to lend their co-operation. I see no need to enlarge on the various heads of matters of detail enumerated above, and will only observe that the commissariat arrangements, and working of the transport train in a great measure, the supplying carriage for the Philloor magazine, for marching troops, the recruiting for all branches of the service, and the passport system, and the care of the post office, were operations continuous from the outbreak till the fall of Delhi.

16. There now remains to notice those topics of a more general nature, affecting the district in particular, and the public interests in general, and these I propose dividing into,

17. 1st. As regards the feelings of the people of all classes of the city, and of the agricultural population.

2d. On the bearing of our allies, the Nabha Rajah and the Malair Kotela chiefs, their advisers and their forces.

3d. The various posts of importance in the district, the different roads, ferries and fords which have to be commanded to ensure the safe occupation of the district.

4th. The capabilities, resources and wants of the district, and its important but neglected position.

18. First. As regards the feeling of the city population. At the commencement of May the garrison of the fort, the guards at the treasury, the general hospital, and over the commissariat stores, were all composed of detachments of the 3d Native Infantry from Philloor. When matters began to look unpleasant, the colonel of that regiment sent me over an extra company of that corps; these men were encamped close to the treasury and kutcherry, had no duties, and were a source of much anxiety to me; but I was obliged to receive them, as the military authorities at Lodiana were under the officer commanding at Philloor. At a later date, through my remonstrances, that if they were all right I did not want them; if disaffected (which they were, as they had refused the cartridges, old as well as new), I could not hold them, as I had no one to oppose them, they were recalled to their head-quarters at Philloor. The men off duty from these guards had free access at all times of the day to the city, and I know were in the habit of talking seditiously and mutinously before the police, to the zumeenars at the tsuiseel kutcherry, and in the streets of the town itself. It is to this that I am inclined, in some measure, to attribute the disaffection, which was general through all classes of the city community.

19. The city contains a most curiously mixed population. The pensioned descendants of Shah Zuman and Shah Soojah have increased to the dimensions of a small colony; amongst their retainers are men from every tribe in Cabul, some who have followed all the misfortunes of the Sudozye family, and others who have more recently joined their service. The whole of these masters and retainers
retainers may be said, with justice, to subsist on the bounty of our Government. The immense sum of 75,000 rupees a year is disbursed in pensions amongst them. It is strange, that while so many soldiers from the Peshawur frontier were fighting in our ranks, no efficient aid could be organised amongst these men; some few seek, by maintaining a haughty reserve, to support what they are pleased to call their dignity; the generality of them are sunk in the lowest debauchery, from none could I obtain any trustworthy information, even of current events; one of them, Shahpoor, I believe, was willing to be of use, as far as his capabilities extended, but he is a man of no natural parts, and of no local weight or influence amongst his brethren. Another Shahzada Secunder, an employee of low retainers, and in private life sensual and debauched, at times, attempted to inform me of the under current of feeling, but his information was so mixed up with matters of private spite and old quarrels, that I was forced to reject it in the mass as untrustworthy; to him, strange to say, we are indebted for the preservation of the lives of all the Christian children, supported and educated by the American mission; at the outbreak in Loodiana, they were deserted by the lay preacher in charge of the establishment, though he might have brought them to the treasury where he himself came for protection, but were fortunately protected by this Shahzada Secunder within his own dwelling.

20. Surdur Jhung, another Sudozye pensioner, who proved a traitor to us and his own race in Kandahar, and is now a pensioner, it is hard to say why, was in league with a Moulvie fanatic residing in the city, and was indefatigable in exciting the Mussulman population, causing seditious meetings, and giving so much trouble, that I was obliged to request your permission to expel him for a time from the city; but I now regret I did so, as he would most certainly have committed himself when the outbreak occurred. and would have been no longer a recipient of the bounty so little deserved, or a further source of doubt and anxiety to the district officer. On a former occasion, I recommended that he should be punished by the reduction of 100 rupees a month from his pension (leaving him 150 rupees), and I still adhere to my opinion, that if he remains unpunished he will consider we hold such offices lightly, and on the first opportunity he will give trouble again, and perhaps with more success. Another Shahzada, for nearly 40 years a pensioner (ever since his birth), joined the mutineers, proceeding with his whole family to Delhi, but fortunately the unaccustomed fatigue and exposure killed him; he was accompanied by others of lesser note.

21. The Cabulie followers of these princely recipients of Government bounty were conspicuous in the outrages and plunder committed in the city, their masters being unable to control them; and these facts induce me to state, that in disturbed times the Cabool colony in Loodiana will always be a source of trouble and anxiety. They should not be allowed to increase their number of Cabul servants, or be permitted to harbour those not in their service; they should be compelled to furnish lists of all in their employ, for whom they should be strictly answerable, at the peril of their pensions; and lastly, as Surdur Jung's seditious proceedings, and plan of joining the mutineers (he took his family and all his property) must have been known to all, and no report was made, they should be held mutually responsible for each other's conduct; on such conditions only should these aliens be allowed to enjoy a refuge in our territories; surely there can be no hardship in insisting that in time of need they must render some support to the State, to whose bounty they owe all they possess, or at all events, that they cannot be a source of embarrassment or anxiety with impunity.

22. In contrast to the above, I must not omit to mention that Hussun Khan a Cabuli, who did us good service in Cabul, was all along a favourable exception to the rest of his race. He was strenuous in his exertions to procure, and successful in procuring good trustworthy information: he equipped some Pathan horsemen he could rely on amongst his followers from his own country, and was in person willing to undertake any duty, or stand any exposure or risk that might be required of him. With his men he was first to occupy the fort when its complete evacuation was far from certain, and from his shrewdness and intimate knowledge of his own countrymen in the city, and his undoubted friendship to Government, he is a valuable man in time of need to any one in charge of Loodiana.
23. Abdool Rehman, formerly of Jelallabad, should also be excepted, though his age and limited means prevent his being of any great utility. He has sons native officers in our service, who have all distinguished themselves in the late mutinies; and lastly, Saleh Mahomed, the well-known double traitor of Afghan war celebrity, he raised and equipped a party of horse, with whom he long did duty at Delhi; perhaps his propensity for horse dealing, for which he had considerable scope in his appointment, tended as much as any other consideration to induce him to take active service.

24. The other residents of the city can be more briefly alluded to. They consist of a numerous colony of Cashmeerean shawl workers, imported by Sir C. Wade. They have plied their trade unmolested for years, under advantages they never could have enjoyed in their own country, being free, and untaxed. They were most conspicuous in the outbreak, in plundering the Government stores, in pillaging the premises of the American mission, where many of them had received their education, in burning the churches and buildings, in destroying the printing presses and stores of books, and in pointing out the residences of Government officials, or known wellwishers of Government, as objects of vengeance for the mutinous troops; for these offences some were executed on the following day, all had to bear their share in an impost levied on the city, to reimburse the sufferers, but what had more effect than anything else, was a threat that they should all be expelled from our dominions, whose protection they had so abused, and be banished to their own country.

25. The remaining Mahomedan population consisted of a fraternity of Goojurs, Goorjurs and Syuds, the old landed proprietors of Loodiana, and the low Mahomedan rabbles, butchers, petty traders, and discharged servants, and camp followers who infest the bazaars in all our old cantonments; they had been worked up to a high pitch of excitement and fanaticism, by the preaching of a fanatic Moulvie; he had twice roused the whole of the Mahomedan population to the very verge of an outbreak; his influence extended to all classes. He was respected by many of the Afghan Shahzadahs, with one of whom (Sufer Jung) he was in league, and with the inferior classes he was all powerful. His influence also extended far through the district, as he is by origin a Goojur, a numerous race, all along the lowlands bordering on the Sutie]; he was a compulsory resident of Loodiana, as in 1849 he was detected in treasonable correspondence with the Akhoon of Swat, whom he was secretly furnishing with arms. So to be under closer-surveillance, he was compelled to remain in the city (a measure of doubtful expedience perhaps, as he had far greater opportunities of disseminating treason in the heart of a large city than in his small and remote village) and the surveillance of course was nominal, as who cares narrowly to watch a person convicted of treason if Government treat the crime lightly, and let it go unpunished. On the arrival of the mutineers, he collected all his disciples, hoisted the green ensign of his faith, and led them to Delhi. I was thus relieved of one great source of anxiety; he has not since been accounted for, and is probably somewhere in the protected Sikh states.

26. But to return to the Goorjurs, Syuds and Mahomedan rabbles: the first named assisted the sepoys in the fort, in mounting two heavy guns in the fort bastions (the guns being heavy, a 10-inch howitzer and a 24-pounder, and being run up a steep earthen ramp by main force, unassisted by any of the usual mechanical aids, must have required some 200 men at least, besides the sepoy garrison to manage them), they possessed themselves of an immense quantity of accoutrements plundered from the fort stores, and raw materials for manufactures from the gaol.

27. As regards the Hindoo portion of the population, the principal chowdries, traders, and the banking community, who might have done much towards maintaining order, had they exerted their well-known influence over the lower classes, quietly shut themselves up with their money bags in places of safety and concealment, and allowed matters to take their course; they are almost to a man the same who welcomed the Sikh force under Itumbole Sing, when he attacked Loodiana in 1845, and, like all their class, turn with the prevailing wind, indifferent which side is uppermost, as long as there is no immediate interference with their interests. Though none benefit more by order and good Government, and suffer more from the reverse, still perhaps to none are...
are loyalty and patriotism in their truest sense and for their own sakes, more thoroughly unknown. Want of knowledge and foresight prevent their observing beyond the state of affairs immediately presented to them, which obviously is profitable; but their cowardly habits, engendered by their previous life, engrossed in the one pursuit of gain, prevents them declaring themselves prominently, while there is no gratitude on their parts for benefits, which they freely admit, for safety for years when Loodiana was the great frontier post, for unexampled freedom in trade, for exemption from all duties and taxation; there should be no further forbearance on the part of Government, and respect and assistance should be enforced through their fears and through their interests, and if it is decided that Loodiana is not to be left so entirely forgotten and unprotected in future, I should be glad to see this class compelled, by some appropriate system of taxation, to contribute to the maintenance of their own safety, and the welfare of the State. These persons have contributed some two lakhs to the Government loan, but have done so reluctantly, and none could be obtained previous to the fall of Delhi.

28. But there was one exception deserving of notice among them: Ram Singh Chowdry has throughout been zealous and useful as Bazaar Chowdry, in laying supplies and provisioning the fort, and such like duties in his line. He advanced from 2,500 to 3,000 rupees from his own funds at a time when there was no leisure to keep the accounts from day to day; there can be no greater proof of his wish to serve Government as far as lay in his power, and I hope he may be suitably rewarded.

29. The lower orders and castes, amongst them Hindus and Mahomedans, acted as rabble do, whatever their creed; followed any casual leader that turned up, and joined in promoting general disorder and in promiscuous pillage; almost every class had its representative on the gallows the following day.

30. The means taken to preserve order, and after the outbreak, the precautions taken to prevent any further disturbances, may as well find mention here. From the middle of May I used to patrol the city and its environs every night, at any time between 10 and 2; Lieutenant Campbell, of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, who was then quartered in the station, Captain Cox in engineer department, Lieutenant Yorke, commanding detachment of 3d Native Infantry, assisting in this duty, which was continued until the mutiny occurred. Further, as it was brought to my notice that the sword sharpeners in the city were busily plying their trade, 56 swords being at one time in a shop close to my house, I determined on the first favourable opportunity to disarm the whole city. Then the outbreak occurred, in which as no sword in the city was drawn on our side, there was no room for doubt for what purpose they were got ready.

31. The first favourable opportunity was on the arrival of Major Coke's regiment, 1st Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant Younghusband, with a squadron of Punjab cavalry. They arrived before dawn; by daybreak, officers acquainted with the city had taken portions of these troops round the city, posting parties as they went at every outlet. Major Coke then proceeded with the main body through the streets, posting his men at the cross roads and on all commanding houses. The surprise was most complete; when the population began to stir they were summoned to return and remain in their houses by some threatening rifleman; those foiled in one exit attempted another; but with a like result; the consternation was great, the impression being that, in revenge for the violence of the outbreak, the city was to be given up to plunder to these most unwelcome and most unexpected visitors. The search for arms was conducted by gangs of the police, each under an European officer, each party having a separate division of the city. The result was 11 two-bullock hackery loads of swords and matchlocks; these swords were distributed to the numerous new levies, who hastened down to the scene of the main conflict at Delhi.

32. Further, on the occupation of the fort by the mutineers, the townspeople in its immediate neighbourhood (amongst them the Goojurs aforesaid) assisted in mounting the cannon. They gave them in one night provisions to last them 10 days, these provisions being all carried to them in the fort; and in return the sepoys gave the townspeople free access to the stores in the fort. The next morning...
MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, IN 1857.

morning I saw some 400 townspeople at the gate, and on the crest of the glacis, conversing with the mutineers, and still supplying their wants. On endeavouring to apprehend some of them, they all received shelter and concealment in the neighbouring houses, and I was frustrated; and, in the meantime, I was with a dead wall behind me within 80 yards of the muskets aimed at me from the fort, and had to be off with more speed than dignity. As these houses were obnoxious in a military point of view, and the spirit of their inmates was hostile also, I obtained General Nicholson’s permission to level all within 300 yards, and I did so, banishing the unhoused Goojurs to seek a residence in their own lands, separated from the city by a deep nullah.

33. Again, separated from the city only by a road are the bazaars of the old cantonment; these consisted of some 1,300 houses, inhabited with the swarms of low caste camp followers, breeders of pigs and poultry, butchers, sweepers, and dealers in hides, tolerated for their usefulness where cantonments exist, but intolerable in such numbers when troops are withdrawn. On a previous occasion I represented how obnoxious they were, and requested permission to disperse them, but without success; however, during the last few months, when expediency and the preservation of order were the great requisites, as I found I could not manage these people, I took advantage of their being Hindostanes, or aliens, and dispersed them to their own houses, and levelled their houses, and Lodiana is a cleaner and quieter place in consequence.

34. My endeavours in these retaliative measures was to devise a punishment in kind, such as would be obvious to all in its working, and which might suggest itself as a natural effect from any given cause. Such punishments are better understood and dreaded from their certainty by all classes (and I confess I understand them better myself), than the orthodox admixture and alternation of fine, labour, or imprisonment, or stripes, each commutable for the other at the fancy of the judicial authority, or more peculiar still, at the option of the offender himself. For instance, the city armed itself not in its own defence, or to preserve order, and its arms were taken away. Again, the houses near the fort gave shelter to the friends and associates of the mutineers; these houses were levelled. The Goojurs proved themselves unworthy members even of such a city community, and were selected for removal from the city precincts to the lowlands in the neighbourhood; the cantonment bazaars gave trouble, and were done away with; aliens resident in the city, much themselves obnoxious, were ejected and sent to their own distant homes; individuals guilty of violent crime, robbery, or murder, were summarily disposed of, with drum-head court celerity; and lastly, when all classes joined in the outbreak, all were subject to a fine to reimburse the sufferers. Each punishment suggested itself from the crime which made punishment necessary, and followed sharply in its footsteps.

35. It was to this last measure, this fine on the city, that I attribute more than anything else the subsequent tranquillity in town and country; many influential natives have congratulated me on its aptness to the wants of the times. It was simply an application on a large scale of the village responsibility system, the one local principle in the ancient Punjab code, so appropriate in its nature, and simple and intelligible in its working, which we have engraven in our criminal system. It enlists all classes on the side of order; the higher classes, whose wants and inclinations do not incite them to join personally in scenes of violence, know that their active co-operation in behalf of Government is essential to prevent their being deemed accomplices in any outrage that occurs; the lower orders know the certain penalty for their license. Thus, when all are enlisted in the cause of order, through self-interest, and fear of its infraction, order is maintained without trouble or risk. This feeling, actually experimented on in Lodiana city, quickly spread to the other country towns (six in number) in the districts, and from these was communicated to all their neighbouring agricultural population, and with the most satisfactory results. This fine has been considered of doubtful policy, and elsewhere I have had to report at length on all connected with it, but I consider it so important that I feel this Report would be incomplete if it was not again prominently noticed.

36. In the course of this narrative allusion has so often been made to the mutiny and outbreak, that some detail of this event appears necessary. The
native troops in Loodiana consisted at the commencement of a small detachment of about 50 men of the 9th Irregulars, but they were sent down to Delhi with the 1st Siege Train; of a guard of 40 sepoys of the 3rd Bengal Native Infantry, in the treasury; about 65 men of the same regiment, in the fort; and smaller guards at the general hospital, commissariat godowns, and post office; in all, about 130 men of all ranks. Their conduct contains the same inexplicable mixture of contradictions apparent in most corps throughout this mutiny; they refused their cartridges, old and new, on parade, but afterwards took the old ones, and used them. When those humiliating explanations on the cartridge question, which emanated from army head quarters, were explained to them, I myself heard one man, a notorious turbulent character, and a man of influence amongst them, say that it was quite satisfactory, leaving nothing further to be desired on that point; they permitted the treasure to be taken away from them,* and actually assisted in loading it. The magazine conductor used to be day after day, to the last, single-handed among them, issuing stores, and superintending the works in his magazine, without any molestation, an instance of coolness and indifference to danger on the part of the conductor (Mr. Harris) which could not be exceeded. They escorted the siege train across the Sutlej from Philloor, many men working with all their might in assisting, drilling through the heavy sand, though when the train of guns was on the bridge of boats it was entirely at their mercy, and though they had previously formed a plan to possess themselves of Philloor fort and magazine, in which they were fortunately anticipated by the sudden advent of an European detachment only 18 hours before their plan was to have been put in execution; they escorted ammunition right down to Delhi camp, they were extremely civil and obedient to their own officers, and even after they were in open mutiny, and had threatened to fire on Captain Rothney and the 4th Seikhs, they allowed their officer (Lieutenant Yorke, killed at Delhi) to be with them, and showed him no insult. Of the two men of the regiment who met their death in Loodiana, one was a Jhelum Mussulman, caught as a spy; another, who attempted Lieutenant Yorke's life, and was shot by him, was a young Manja Sikh?

37. These inconsistencies can bear but one explanation; they had one fixed plan, and no minor considerations, no single outrage, or opportunity to plunder any detached treasury or defenceless city, was to be allowed as an inducement to deviate from that plan.

38. These intentions were by chance divulged by a wounded havildar of the 3d Native Infantry to an officer who found him concealed at Humayoon's tomb, after the capture of Delhi. This information was given without any attempt at palliation or reserve, and without any extra communicativeness. It was from the lips of a man who knew his end was near, and conveyed the impression of truth to his hearer; it is moreover borne out by known facts and circumstances. It was shortly, that all the troops in the Jullundur Doab had agreed to rise simultaneously; a detachment from Jullundur was to go over to Hooshiarpore, to fetch away the 33d Native Infantry, failing which, the 33d were to remain (and they did so, and are probably considered immaculate); then their arrival at Philloor was to be the signal for the 3d to join, when all were to proceed to Delhi, forcing the river as best they could.

39. The Jullundur mutineers sent a trooper in advance, galloping into the 3d Native Infantry lines, to intimate their approach; this regiment joined them. They sent intimation, probably by a spy, to Loodiana; this spy I imagine was a relative of a sepoy in the 3d, whom the sepoy had represented to me as a smart useful man, and had asked me to entertain as a private servant, which I had consented to do, when the mutinies were over, if his regiment remained unsuspected. This man I recognised on the banks of the river on the day of the mutiny, and have never seen since; his relative in the regiment was their most conspicuous leader; no doubt he was the means of communication between Philloor and Loodiana.

40. The first intelligence of the outbreak at Jullundur, was conveyed to me by telegraph, from Umballa, from yourself. The signaller at Philloor was hopelessly
hopelessly drunk, so he never heeded the signals from Jullundur; fortunately, as a last resource, the Jullundur man communicated direct on to Umballa, and then the wire near Jullundur was cut. It was at 10 A.M. before I received your orders; on the receipt of the news I could scarcely credit it, not understanding why I had received no information direct from Philloor; but doubts were soon settled by the hasty arrival of the Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Thornton, who had fortunately been that morning to Philloor for treasure, to pay these very troops; he had seen the Jullundur mutineers, had cut the bridge of boats, and hastened to me with the news. I ordered Lieutenant Yorke on the hopeless and hazardous duty to try and do what he could with his men; a few moments showed him they knew what had occurred, and that it was all up with them. I detained the onward march of the 4th Sikhs, who had most providentially marched into Loodiana that very morning, obtained three companies from that regiment, under Lieutenant Williams, second in command, turned out some 30 of the Malair Kotela chief's sowars, requested assistance from the Nabha Rajah's force, to the amount of two guns, 50 of his drilled cavalry, and 150 of his drilled infantry, and spare ammunition for the guns. I was most particular in explaining these orders to the Rajah's representative (the Rajah was absent); but I had no time to wait till the men were ready, and never suspected he would play me false as he did: he never sent the spare ammunition, though he had abundance; he sent undisciplined matchlock-men, horse and foot, instead of his drilled troops, and he next day objected to lend a gun to defend the kutchery where the mutineers were expected; I had to remove this gun myself, his own people looking on, and giving no assistance; he also denied having any ammunition, though when the danger was passed he pressed it on us in cooly loads. These troops were all placed under the command of Lieutenant Williams, with orders to come as soon as they were ready to the head of the Philloor bridge, in case the mutineers should seize the boats and attempt to force a passage, and I proceeded alone towards the bridge to get what information I could. On my arrival there I hurried off men on horseback, both up and down the river, to secure all the ferries; they were unfortunately too late at the ferry immediately above Philloor, whither the sepoys had hastened on finding the bridge of boats impracticable (it must be remembered they reached Philloor at daybreak, the ferry they seized is only three miles above Philloor, I had no intelligence till 10 A.M.), and I proceeded across to Philloor, to obtain intelligence. They had none to give beyond the fact, that the mutineers had defied him and his men, and had taken possession of the fort and treasury; on this, as I found Lieutenant Williams with the force under him all ready waiting at the side of the river, I told him what had happened. It appeared to be a regular organised plan to seize Loodiana, and we decided the best thing was to endeavour to seize the ghaht at any risk, to prevent a junction with the Loodiana mutineers; and I moreover feared the effects their successful advance would have on the city, knowing the elements of discord it contained, and there were European women and children in the fourth Seikhl camp, their only refuge. A guide was easily obtained until it got dark, when they misled us, and deserted one after the other; however, after a march of five or six miles, we came right on the head of the ghaht, with the mutineer camp directly between us and the river, which was about 120 or 150 yards off; the surprise was complete, fire was opened before they knew who we were, or what we were, and they dispersed and ran in all directions, comparatively a few only holding their ground; but these few caused several casualties amongst the 4th Seikhs (the Nabha and Malair Kotela men, horse and foot, and one gun, had bolted to a man before they were under fire), and Lieutenant Williams was severely wounded. The gun ammunition was expended, small arm ammunition began to run short, and we had to retire; and the mutineers, after an hour or two, again concentrated at the ghaht. The next morning they threw their dead into the river, so the number of their casualties could not be ascertained; villagers in the neighbourhood, and prisoners, estimated the killed variously from 45 to 65 men; 10 dead bodies were found stranded on the bank on the next day.
41. Thus, though the immediate object of the attack failed, I believe it tended to prevent the mutineers carrying out their plans against Lodiana itself, as they had collected a quantity of provision in the fort. I imagine their plan was temporarily to hold that fort and city, whence they could command the Grand Trunk Road from the Punjab to Delhi, whence they could have spread disorganisation throughout Cis-Sutlej, and have shaken the Seikh states, and by cutting off supplies and placing troops in requisition to attack them, have made a most untoward diversion for our small force before Delhi; but their ammunition was expended; in their hurry in leaving Jullundur they had carried off blank for balled ammunition, and so they had to hurry on by forced marches, avoiding any possibility of collision with our troops. It may be said that the above is conjecture; I admit there is no certain information to base my remarks on, but their combination, their collecting provisions, and the fact that (had ammunition not failed) they had the game in their hands, at least for a time, and that it was their obvious policy, bear me out in the assertion, and my impressions are based on very probable contingencies.

42. The following morning, about 11 o'clock, the mutineers arrived at the city. They were joined by their comrades in the fort, which they vacated, the party in the fort having been joined the night before by those in the treasury, who had abandoned that, to us, invaluable post, by stealth and in the night, and also by all the smaller guards. (One havildar only, a Hindostanee, manfully resisted the threats and temptations of his comrades and remained true to his salt, and two young Seikh sepoys in his guard also.) The populace rose and joined them, and then commenced that scene of disorder and promiscuous plunder above related. The houses of government officials were attacked, Madho Pershaud, the extra assistant, saved his life by concealment. The kotwal no sooner showed his portly person than he was fired on and fled; the police (excepting four men) left the kotwali and concealed themselves. The mutineers confined their depredations to an occasional imperious demand for money, to carrying off flour and grain from the bunniahs’ shops, and all horses and mules they could lay their hands upon, to assist them in their flight; they released the prisoners, though the guard were quite strong enough, had they not been cowardly or corrupt, to have prevented the release, and then they made the best of their way after a short rest, in a compact body, on their way towards the south. In the meantime no troops arrived in pursuit; I sent twice, begging the horse artillery might advance, and they might have caused them immense loss, but they could not be trusted to the 4th Seikhs, or the small detachment of Punjab cavalry, and had to wait for the European infantry; and so this second great opportunity to destroy these mutineers was lost, and as they had four miles start of the European infantry, of course pursuit was hopeless that evening.

43. On their evacuating the town, I sent detachments of 4th Seikhs and 2d Punjab Cavalry through the different streets to sweep the inhabitants back to their houses, and to search out any stragglers from the mutineer force; eight of them were picked up outside the town by Lieutenant Nicholson’s detachment of cavalry without a casualty on his side, and these were all that were then accounted for.

44. The following morning a pursuit was ordered, but it was too late; the mutineers had made a forced march in the night and were far beyond reach, but 13 stragglers were apprehended and executed. The pursuit could not have been made earlier, as the troops, though they had not undergone any wonderful fatigue in rapid marching, had been much harassed by being constantly under arms, and without provisions. The troops marched 12 miles out from Lodiana and returned, and the next day proceeded on towards Delhi.

45. There is no doubt that by the advent of the mutineers, the civil power in the district was most rudely shaken; the Goojurs along the river banks made cattle-lifting expeditions inland, and raids across the river; violent crime immediately sprung up, especially along the neighbourhood of the line of the mutineers’ route, excited in a great measure by the released prisoners; murders, highway robberies, dacoities, and village burnings, in revival of old smouldering feuds, occurred simultaneously, but fortunately successful apprehensions were made in almost every instance; some of the offenders informing me with all simplicity...
simplicity that they thought our rule was over, and the storm which had swept through like a whirlwind, was succeeded by the pristine state of tranquillity.

46. But to return to the main point under discussion from which I have found digression inevitable, in a relation of reference to numerous collateral events, and which had to be alluded to each in its place, to the interruption of the regular narrative.

47. The feeling of the Hindoo and agricultural population in general was undoubtedly devoid of sympathy with the mutineers, but there was not that active hatred of the Poorbeah soldier, which seems to have existed in the Upper Punjab; the old soldiers of the Seikh Government, who had fought against us in the two campaigns, and who are still numerous in all the large villages, have not abated in their antipathy, came forward anxiously for service, and infused no doubt a portion of their spirit into the Jat population, from which class our Seikh troops are recruited. This was most remarkable in the Seikh villages in the neighbourhood of Jugraon, and towards the southern angle of the Loodiana and Ferozepoor districts, where the population is strictly agricultural, where the men are finer, evince much force of character, and are a simple, straightforward race, who take naturally to soldiering. Had the Raikote Thannadar made the most of these people, no doubt much might have been done with them towards apprehending deserters from Ferozepoor, but he was negligent of his duty, and was removed (he was a Mussulman of the Thanesur Nawab's family). Since his removal the most successful apprehensions of mutineers and rebels have been made by them; they posted men to watch all their roads and wells, and were constantly on the alert. A similar feeling existed towards Badhour, and partly in Deylon.

48. On the direct line of the Grand Trunk Road, and to the north of it, this feeling does not exist; but one mutineer was apprehended in that direction. In the neighbourhood of Loodiana alone was any hostile feeling to the Seikh troops evinced. The guards of the 4th Seikhs were abused by the villagers for taking service in our army; sepoys of that regiment were similarly abused in the Loodiana Bazaar. In only one case was a wounded mutineer sheltered and concealed, but this was more a solitary than a characteristic instance of sympathy, as the village he was found in (Gill, four miles from Loodiana), is a regular sepoy village; perhaps it contains hardly a family without a representative in our ranks.

49. The Mahomedan Goojurs population, who exclusively possess the belt of lowlands along the banks of the Sutlej, and who have villages in almost every part of the district, are thoroughly bad and disaffected. The Moulu before alluded to as having given so much trouble, was of that race, and possessed great influence amongst them. From their position along the river banks, they commanded all the ferries, and this induced me to deprive them of all their boats, and make inflated skins contraband among them. They played me false when guides were required from amongst them to discover the mutineer camp, they were in constant communication from village to village with the Delhi rebels. I disarmed them all early in the season, but there is nothing to fear from them as regards open opposition, as they are a lazy, cowardly, thieving race, given to marauding and plunder when no great danger to themselves is probable. They are peculiarly vulnerable also, through their large herds of cattle, which constitute their chief wealth, and which thrive and multiply on the river banks, giving little trouble to their owners.

50. It could not be expected that in times like these, the hereditary thieving races, Harnis, Boureahs and Sanssees would refrain from availing themselves of the increased opportunities for exercising their congenial predatory habits. Throughout the period under report, these tribes were astir and restless; they were in constant communication with Delhi; they counted the number of the second siege train guns, on their halt at Jugraon, and speedily conveyed the intelligence to the Delhi rebels; but while the police were certain of the general direction of their movements, their hardy habits and the facility with which they assume all disguises, prevented the apprehension of any one whilst actually absent from his village. The peculiar legislation for their restraint, to which they are subjected, has proved quite inadequate in its provisions, and the difficulty is increased when men of influence, and familiar with our legislation, like...
Moonsheer Ruijub Allee, presume to entertain them as private messengers. I consider the restraint of the Bourehas especially as perfectly hopeless, without resort to some severe means, as wholesale transportation, to which I see no reason why they should not be subjected, as they have no feeling for home ties or attachment to place, beyond the facilities it offers for their depredations. They are purely a roving predatory race, who live on society from their births till they die; you might as well try to domesticate a wolf, but if they were largely transported to some place like the Andamans, where they and the natives might improve each other to their mutual benefit, the remains of the tribe might through fear be induced to attempt some settled and creditable means of livelihood.

51. On the bearing of the native chiefs our allies, the Nabha Rajah and the Maleir Kotela chiefs, not much need be said. The Nabha Rajah evinced his good feeling towards our Government by the alacrity with which he attended in person with all his available troops, which rendered the valuable military service of escorting the first siege train to Delhi, by the readiness with which he advanced money, and the expense he willingly incurred in increasing his forces. Individually, for so young a native, he is one of the most intelligent I have ever met; there is the making of a good man in him, and it would be a great advantage if he and his younger brother could be induced to visit England, leaving his territory to be administered by Puttala or by us. Like all native chiefs, his good qualities are neutralised, and his good intentions weakened by his corrupt ministers, prompters, and conscience keepers; one of whom, I have before mentioned as playing me false in need, I consider as so objectionable a minister, that if he could be dismissed through our representations, it should be exerted. As for his troops, "the Nabhas don't fight," was I fear a common saying, regarding those associated with the Jheend troops at Delhi; and in the one opportunity I afforded them, they conspicuously bolted. Should future necessity arise for their aid, their passive forbearance only should be reckoned on, and not their active assistance.

52. As regards the Maleir Kotela chiefs, old Soubah Khan was doubtless our staunch ally; he alone remembered the great friendship, for old times and in return for former assistance, borne by his house for our Government, when in the midst of hostile Seikhs, we were his only stand-by. But Soubah Khan has died since; his son is a miserable instance of imbecility and debauchery, ignorant and obese; if he succeeds to the chiefanship of his clan and the management of his territory, he will inevitably ruin all connected with him. Of the other chiefs of that family, Gholam Mahomed, who was with me at Lodiana, was detected in reasonable correspondence with Roostum Ali, his brother, who remained in Maleir Kotela; the intercepted letter contained the rankest treason, calling on him and all true Mussulmans, to rise in behalf of their faith, and exterminate all unbelievers. A tehseddar, a thannardar, and four or five in the district, being near relations of one of the principals in this correspondence, were dismissed the service. The only trustworthy member of the family is Dilawur Ali Khan, who exceeds all his brethren in intelligence, has some influence, and is reported wealthy; he offered a considerable sum as a loan to the Government, which I consider a good test; but their horsemen, one and all, are a cowardly rabble, who deserted to a man on the advent of the mutineers, saying they had not come for such duty as this. On the whole, I fear the Maleir Kotela chiefs may be transferred without any injustice from amongst the rolls of the staunch, to the most indifferent and lukewarm of friends to our Government.

53. The various posts where bodies of horse were posted are enumerated, and the strength of each post detailed, in an appendix; suffice it here to state, that detachments of district Jagheerdari horse, were maintained at each thannah and tehseddal, and on one of the minor lines of road (the old road from Lodiana to Roopur through Macheewara), the Maleir Kotela cavalry were posted along the Grand Trunk road from between Sirhind and Kurnaul, to beyond Jagraon. The 32d Puttala horse were posted on the old Ferozepoor road towards Sidoan, ten being half way between Lodiana and Sidoan, at Boondree, and an advanced picket of five at Teharah, beyond Sidoan; to these, as soldiers of our best ally the Puttala Maha Rajah, was entrusted the road towards Ferozepoor, and the ghauts where horsemen were posted.

Native chiefs.

Maleir Kotela chiefs.

Where horsemen were posted.
ghauts along the river towards Jullundur, in case the Jullundur mutineers or others should take that route, or it should have been selected by the Ferozepoor deserters. A strong post of Sowars was stationed at Jugraon, should the Ferozepoor mutineers, or from beyond Ferozepoor, have selected that road. The third road to the district through Raikote was stopped by a party there; the fourth, to the southward, whose nearest point was Maleir Kotela, was left to the chiefs of that state; half way between that city and Loodiana, on the road, was another party at Deylon. The new road to the eastward, through Sumerala, was held by sowars of Sumerala Tuhseels. Horse and foot were on the road towards Philloo, and thus all the eight roads centreing in Loodiana were guarded. The men at all these posts had to be constantly visited, and the reports made on the laxity of their discipline is beyond conception; these duties had to be left to the thannadar, tehseldar, and the vakeels of the different chiefs. I submit a rough map, in which each post occupied, and the strength at each, is entered. The Nabha force was not as a rule employed in broken parties, but was maintained as far as possible in its integrity at Loodiana, whence detachments were sent to escort treasure from the tuhseels, or to any post when danger threatened.

54. The ferries it was found impossible to guard, they were so numerous, so difficult of access, should anything happen, owing to the numerous nullahs intersecting the belt of lowlands, some six miles in width, and the neighbouring Gojoor population were so hostile; so to save further anxiety on that score, I removed all the boats to the main ferry at Philloo; but even then, several were sunk in remote creeks, and concealed in the long grass on the river banks; these were from time to time discovered and brought to the ferry also.

55. Early in the season, and again after a cessation of the rains, the river was fordable in many places; when the river is low, a ford exists at every two or three miles; these must afford constant anxiety in times of need, as they constantly vary, and the villagers carefully conceal their existence. Again, the whole riverfaring population are proficient at crossing on inflated skins; to prevent this, the supervision of an army would be insufficient. Whilst on the subject, I may as well draw attention to the extreme difficulty of crossing this river in the rains, with the means at present supplied by Government. The moveable column under General Nicholson was detained three days at the river; the whole of the cavalry, guns, commissariat, &c., were crossed in half a day; then the river came down in force, and the remainder of the time was occupied in crossing Her Majesty's 52d alone, and even then their carriage had to be left behind, and replaced with what was available on the south side of the river. This delay and the unavoidable exposure of the men caused much sickness, from which some officers and many men were unfortunately prevented from taking any further share in the campaign. The addition of a few light iron boats or pontoons, to be used as ferry boats instead of the native boats or lubberly barges of European construction, which are fit for nothing but a standing bridge, would obviate all this difficulty; and the matter is worthy of consideration, now that the country will be held in future by thorough military occupation.

56. The capabilities of the district in furnishing army requisites were most severely tested during the year; and as some information on this point may be of use hereafter, I make a passing allusion to it. Camels can be procured in numbers, especially if warning be given, from among the Jat population to the south, from Pulchowal, Jugraon and Budhan Tuhseels. These people also possess the best and greatest number of good bullocks and capacious carts adapted for military stores; upwards of 2,000 camels and about 2,000 carts with four bullocks each, were obtained mostly from them. They are a thrifty, laborious and hardy set, good agriculturists and exporters of their own produce to less favoured districts, extending even to Delhi; they willingly engage in transport duties, and physically are a stalwart race, tall in stature, brawny and muscular, and anxious for military service; and from the nature of their country, are hardy to a degree under exposure to heat and long marches.

57. Under the stigma of Malwa Seikhs, they are objected to in the ranks of our army, and latterly were interdicted altogether, but as long as they come from Malwa Seikhs.

238: p 4
from our own territory, I can see no reason against them sufficient to counteract
the advantages above mentioned, which they undoubtedly possess. The instance
of the mutiny of the Loodiana regiment at Benares should not be held con-
clusive evidence against them, for in that regiment any man affixing "Singh"
to his name, was considered eligible, his military qualifications being taken for
granted. Its native officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, were almost
all Poorbeas (one exception being a Seikh Soobadar, a barber), and at the time
of the mutiny, I believe only from 240 to 250 Seikhs altogether were present
with the regiment. On the other hand, conspicuous for its good services, has
been the Ferozepoor regiment, exclusively Seikhs, but carefully enlisted, and
mostly men of the Malwa districts; and also the 4th Seikhs, raised at Loodiana.

58. Further throughout the district, but especially towards the south, a good
breed of horses exists; from 500 to 600 horses were obtained in Loodiana in
1856, from its neighbourhood and the adjacent Seikh states, for mounting the
irregular cavalry regiments in Oudh. The Seikh sirdars, jagheerdars and re-
tainers, especially in old horsemen families, all keep and breed horses; and,
with encouragement, more might be done in those parts than in the much-jaled
Dhumnie districts, towards supplying the exigencies of the mounted branches
of the service.

59. As regards recruits, I believe 4,000 good men might be obtained in two
or three months; whilst the new regiment was being raised, men from all parts
thronged for enlistment, principally Hindoo Jats. The Mussulman population
do not take so regularly to the infantry as to the irregular cavalry.

60. There is one more subject connected with Loodiana, to which I call
attention reluctantly and with diffidence, as it trespasses on forbidden grounds,
beyond a subordinate's and civilian's immediate province. This subject is the
importance of its position, its weakness from foreign and internal sources, and,
and, it must be said, the neglect it experienced throughout the anxious months. I
relate only well known facts; if they are dispassionately considered, and the
inference deduced, my object will be gained. The only available means of
communication from the north-west towards Delhi was through Loodiana; along
that road alone, during the rainy season, could troops have marched without
great exposure and difficulty. The transport of the heavy siege stores from
Philloor and Ferozepoor could have gone by no other route, and from these
places alone were our troops before Delhi supplied. Its position commands the
passage of the Sutlej; it contains a fort, comprising a powder magazine, a
depôt for tents, various military requisites, and three pieces of heavy ordnance;
it was one of the chief depôts for collecting carriage for the forces, and the
main terminus of the transport train. Previous experience has it, that in tur-
bulent times, the city has always been a restless, troublesome place; it was the
residence of about 30 Europeans, including their families, who, with fort and
treasury in the hands of mutineers, were thankful for the poor security of the
open camp of a casual passing regiment. Safety on all these essential points might
have been ensured by a garrison in the fort of 50 English soldiers, who could or
should have been spared from Ferozepoor, Jullundur, or Umballa; as it was,
I fear the safety of what tended in some measure to the successful result of the
northern campaign must be attributed solely to the fortuitous advent of the
4th Seikhs, who passing on towards Delhi at a rate, march for march, equal to
the famous march of the Guides, arrived that morning, and were to have left
that evening; I suspect that to that regiment, also, more than to any foresight
or solicitude on the part of their superiors, are the European inhabitants grateful
for their escape from certain massacre or ignominious flight.

61. Mention still requires to be made of those officers who took a share in
the various duties which have been alluded to in the course of this Report.
Captain Nicholls, assistant commissioner, continued his usual civil official duties
till the day of the mutiny, after which the civil courts were suspended, as civil
process, to be successful, must be uninterrupted and continuous; his time and
attention were chiefly required to raise and discipline the new regiment. Mr.
Thorton, c.s., arrived only early in May, having been at that time only eight
or nine months in India; he had but slight knowledge of the language, and
none
MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, IN 1857.

None of official duties; he is one of the new competition class seduced to this country with the idea that his superior education and studious, sedentary habits, the natural result of his education, were the essentials to ensure advancement in the service, and with the impression that no other qualifications were requisite; but he was speedily undeceived, and I must say he adapted himself to the new uncongenial state of things in a manner that did him infinite credit. I believe he thinks common sense and active habits are far better qualifications for the service than any brought to light by the arduous examinations he himself had passed through. He had the troublesome duty of the charge of the treasure, which involved constant journeys across the river to Philloor, and took a share in any other miscellaneous duties of the times.

62. The extra assistant, Moonshi Madho Pershaud, did not abate from his usual well known honest and efficient discharge of his duties. He never flinched from such employment as searching houses, apprehending criminals, superintending executions, conspicuous and trying occupations in such times. His life was attempted at the outbreak. I never had cause in the slightest degree to suspect his loyalty; and, where so many of his class proved faithless under temptation, I consider his conduct deserving of the favourable consideration of Government.

63. In conclusion, when I remember the various smouldering elements of discord in the city, and recall the doubtful chances of real assistance from the Nabha troops, and the still more doubtful state of the Maleir Kotela horsemen—the fact that 150 men of the mutinied 12th Irregulars belonged to the district, and also those of 9th Irregulars, who, though cut off almost to a man, were of course disloyal throughout their home relations; when I think, also, that though the Sikh population was with us, still that there must have been a limit even to their forbearance; moreover, that many of this race from the Loodiana regiment, from the Jhansi, Neemuch and Bareilly corps, whose atonality had been ruined by their association with Hindoostanees, were returning by degrees to their homes in the district, and were infecting their neighbourhood with stories of the complete disorganisation in the Lower Provinces, the conclusion was forced upon me at the time (and I think so still), that had Delhi held out three weeks longer, risings would have occurred and attempts been made to subvert the constituted civil authority in the district, by which it would have been most rudely shaken.

64. Four Appendices are furnished with this Report:
   1. Notes for the first 15 days.
   2. Statement of Jagheerdari Horse raised, and how distributed.
   3. A skeleton Map, corresponding with the above.

   I have, &c.
   (signed) G. H. M. Ricketts,
   Late Deputy Commissioner, Loodiana.
   (True copy.)
   (signed) R. Temple,
   Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Punjab.

MEMORANDUM of ORDERS and LETTERS on 15th May 1857.

Wrote to Jheend Rajah for one troop, two companies. Wrote to Mith Singh, Ootam Singh, Bussuat Singh, Ludran Sirdars, Annad Khan of Raikote, and Wuzeer Khan, for 80 sowars amongst them.

Sent 20 rounds per man to Jugraon police; sent escort for sowars' arms to Ferozepoor;

sent 45,000 rupees treasure to Philloor; wrote to Barnes, reporting, &c. Ditto to Montgomery.

Warned Baboo at post-office to open all daks in my presence.

Called in four men from each thannah and tussel; two from each 1st class, one from each 2d class chowkie.

Detained 16 return treasure carts for transporting ammunition.

Laid supplies for Guorkahs.

Sent out for 300 hackeries and 200 camels.
16 May.

Sent firewood to ghat for the sepoys.
Sent materials of all sorts to keep up the Philloor Bridge, at all risks and expense.
Sent men to prepare the roadways across the sands.
Sent a letter by P. C. to Umballa. I ordered the nine - to-day.
Sent 40 Malair Kotela men, to say the river was rising, and it was all-important to get the siege train over.
Sent carriage for 9th Irregulars.
Issued orders to guards to lay two additional horses for expresses, at each stage from Philloor to Umballa. (This was not done, and the dâks broke down.)
Gave orders to Saleh Mahomed, Shahprotobuf and Secunder to proceed by mail cart (Saleh Mahomed), or as soon as possible, for intelligence department.
Distributed Delawar Ali's men on Jugraon Road.
Recalled and collected the 32 Puteeala men; sent them, 20 to Teharah, 10 Boondree, to protect the old Ferozepore Road.
Sent all the women over to Philloor.
Sent 10 of Malair Kotela men on the Philloor Road.

17 May.

Wrote Morasilas to Putteeala, Nabha, Malair Kotela, Bagream, Bulboun, Maloulth, that the sepoys were escaping from Ferozepore, and looting the country; and directing them to make all arrangements for their disposal.
Issued orders to the tubseeldars to the same effect.
Issued orders to postmaster to lay two additional horses for expresses, at each stage from Philloor to Umballa.
Gave orders to Saleh Mahomed, Shabpoor and Secunder to proceed by mail cart (Saleh Mahomed), or as soon as possible, for intelligence department.
Distributed Delawar Ali's men on Jugraon Road.
Recalled and collected the 32 Puteeala men; sent them, 20 to Teharah, 10 Boondree, to protect the old Ferozepore Road.
Sent all the women over to Philloor.
Sent 10 of Malair Kotela men on the Philloor Road.

18 May.

Sent 40 Malair Kotela men back to Malair Kotela, to watch that road, and to send 10 of them up the road towards Raikote.
Told Aimud Khan, of Raikote, to get what men he has ready, on the look-out between Raikote and Busseean.
Issued orders about telegraph posts being kept in repair.
Sent 20 rounds per man to the police, through the guard carrying their pay, and distributed 20 rounds to all the men called in.
Sent sowars to Deilon (10), Pukowal (10), Jugraon (15).
Sent all available bullocks over to Philloor, both train and hired cattle.

19 May.

Sent Mahomed Ali's sowars down the Umballa Road.
Secured carriage for 9th Irregulars.
Telegraphed to C. in C. — what the 9th escort was to go with,— with siege train or nine-pounder battery?
Sent carriage to fort for tents for Umballa.
Sent off 200 camels to Umballa.
Warning 9th Irregulars to be ready for escort.
Warning Nabha Rajah's troops to be ready for escort.
Ordered thannadars to accompany night patrol.
Sent out to Rujjub Ali at Jugraon, to hasten to Umballa.
Sent letter by Worthington to Adjutant General, to say the river was rising, and it was all-important to get the siege train over.

20 May.

Sent 40 Nabha sowars to Jugraon, on the strength of news from the Brigadier at Jullundur (which I don't believe).
Stopped the despatch of the two squadrons of regulars.
Warned Nabha force,— 200 sowars, 100 foot,— to be ready at 11 p.m. to march to Philloor for escort.
Ditta - ditta — one troop 9th Irregulars.
Sent to Nabha Rajah to know if he wanted ammunition. (Says no, has lots.)
Sent Nabha elephants to tread down bridge road.
Got long English rope from Philloor magazine for bridge.
Sent 15- Nabha sowars to Boondree, directing the Putteeala men there to move on to Teharah, making 32 at that place, on strength of news from Montgomery.

21 May.

Sent 100 Nabha foot and 150 Nabha sowars, and one troop 9th Irregulars, to escort siege train over; all the guns were in Lodiana, and packed by 5 p.m., and the carts all in by 6; six only were brought up afterwards.
MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, IN 1857.

Got extra bullocks for Griffiths, Commissary of Ordnance, 200 coolies to help dragging the train waggon, and 150 to help to keep the bridge, with mistries, &c. Got three more letters out of the dak for sepoys; this makes eight. Got some treasure over from Ferozepore.

*Mem.—To-day I received my first official intelligence from Ferozepore; rather too late to be any use.*

22 May.

Sent 50 hackeries to Philloor for more shot and shell from magazine.
Sent 50 hackeries and 200 camels off with train, to Umballa, to Quartermaster-general. Promoted Ram Singh and Doona Singh to jemadars.
Sent guards to Campbell's house.

23 May.

Sent 50 hackeries to Philloor for more ammunition.
Sent 50 more camels off for Quartermaster General.

24 May.

Got bullock train carriage for native artillery proceeding to join train; advanced them 50 rupees.
Made arrangements for Ecd; 50 men to Kotewali, 50 to vacant cavalry lines, and 25 sowars also; 25 sowars to my place, and elephants to be ready.
Sent to Moulvies, &c., to warn them against permitting any disturbance, &c. Authorised Nathana Thanadar to entertain a jemadar and seven good men, to be stationed at Budhoun.
Takeed all the vakeels, &c., to keep their men up to the mark.
Issued orders to all thanhadars to plunder and worry all fugitive sepoys. Objected to Colonel Butler's proposition, to remove the officer in command here, replacing him by a little boy.

25 May.

Secured bullock train carriage for European artillerymen. Sent 100 coolies to river to help getting mortars over. Issued proclamations for recruits for Van Cortlandt's two regiments at Ferozepore. Issued purwannahs, &c., for all sepoys on leave from Punjab regiments to rejoin. Issued orders to commence collecting the Rubbee kist at once.

26 May.

Sent 30 Nabha sowars to Nathana, and 20 to Budhoun, and an alert to all the other posts, on the strength of Marsden's news, that they were going to rout out the remainder of the two regiments from Ferozepore.
Posted Bussunt Singh's sowars on the Kolkah road.
Sent out for 50 more hackeries for more artillery ammunition. Sent out to inquire how many camels could be got in the whole district, and from Nathana; gave Commissioner's orders to Shazada Shahpoor that he was to raise 100 horse.

27 May.

Sent 60,000 rupees, under a duffadar and six, off to Umballa by bullock train. Laid supplies for the guides at Budhoun. Ordered a third bridge over the third channel of the river. Counter-ordered Shahpoor's raising horse.

28 May.

Laid supplies for European artillerymen. Sent 1,20,000 rupees to Umballa.

29 May.

Sent a vakeel to look out for 45th, on the strength of Marsden's letter, announcing their disbanding.

30 May.

On strength of Barnes' news of the outbreak of two companies at Roopur, sent 25 Nabha horse, and 30 foot, and the Machewara Mohurrir, to Byolpore, to close that road; the same number to Sumerala, to close that road; 10 sowars of Mith Sing's to Koom, eight of Ootum Sing's to Kohara, and Takeed's to Thannadars of Machewara and Khunna, and 238. Tehseeldar
PAPERS RELATING TO THE

Teazeldar and Sumeral to stir up the villages to look out for these men, to sink, burn and destroy; told the chowkies to look alive, and closed all the ghaats, sending the boats to the far side, and told the Kotwal to put a look-out at the old seina on Kohkha Road.

Laid supplies for guides.
Recalled the 60 foot and 40 horse from Bylolpoor and Sumeral, on hearing the two companies at Roopur had left all right, leaving 10 sowars at Sumeral.

(signed)  
G. H. M. Ricketts,  
Deputy Commissioner.

(True copy.)  
H. Temple,  
Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Punjab.

LIST of JAGHEERDARS of the Loodiana District who provided Sowars and Footmen in rendering Services at Loodiana during the Months of May to October 1857.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Names of Jagheerdars</th>
<th>Annual Jumna of Jagheerdar</th>
<th>Amount of Computation paid to Government in lieu of Sowars and Footmen</th>
<th>Number of Sowars</th>
<th>Number of Footmen</th>
<th>Date from which the Jagheerdar placed his Lines, under the Orders of the Deputy Commissioner, Loodi8na.</th>
<th>Date on which their Services were dispensed with.</th>
<th>Amount of Commutation for Six Months which have been Remitted by order of the Commissioner, Gis-Batli States.</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Sirdar of Malouth</td>
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<td>10 Foot at Tehsul Loodiana, with Jagheerdar in person.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total.  - 1,94,292  - 25,334  3  - 149  42  Total.  - 12,758  4  -

Loodiana, Deputy Commissioner's Office, 29 October 1857.

(True copy.)  
G. H. M. Ricketts,  
Deputy Commissioner.

(signed)  
H. Temple, Secretary.

(True copy.)
MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, IN 1857.

RETURN of CRIMINALS (Civil and Military) punished in the District of Loodiana for Acts connected, directly or indirectly, with the Mutinies during the Year 1857.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imprisoned</th>
<th>Flogged</th>
<th>Total Number of Criminals Punished</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Bangal.</td>
<td>For 14 Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Loodiana, Deputy Commissioner's Office, 1 March 1858.
(signed) D. Simson,
Deputy Commissioner.
(True copy.)
(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

STATEMENT showing Strength and Cost of Extra Establishments employed in the Districts of Loodiana, from the Month of May to December 1857, for the Protection of the District.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months in which employed</th>
<th>Number of Police</th>
<th>Cost per Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May and June 1857</td>
<td>2 duffadars</td>
<td>Rs. 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10 Duffadars</td>
<td>433 Burkundauzes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,840 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Loodiana, Deputy Commissioner's Office, 1 March 1858.
(signed) D. Simson,
Deputy Commissioner.
(True copy.)
(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(No. 202.)
From E. Thornton, Esq., Officiating Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, to R. Temple, Esq., Secretary to Chief Commissioner for the Punjab, dated Lahore, 28 April 1858.

Sir,
In continuation of my letter, No. 191 of the 24th current, and particularly with reference to the 155th para. of Colonel Edwards' letter, No. 64 of the 23d of March, I have the honour to transmit, to be appended to the report of proceedings on the Peshawur frontier, subsequent to the outbreak in the Bengal army, statement of the military services of the three district officers of that division.

The statement of Major Becher's services has only just been received.

I have, &c.

(signed) E. Thornton,
(True copy.)
(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

Major Becher,
Capt. James,
Capt. Henderson.
MEMORANDUM of the Military Services of Brevet Major J. Becker, Bengal Engineers.

Huzara, 22 April 1858.

I. A. D. 1841-42.—Present with the army of Cabul, under General Pollock in 1841-42, A.D.; at the forcing of the Khyber Pass, the action of Tehzeen and Khoord Kabul, and the expedition into the Mazeena Valley, under Brigadier Monteath, during that campaign.

Mentioned in the Despatches of General Pollock and Brigadier Monteath. Received a medal.

II. A. D. 1845-46.—Present with the army of the Sutlej at the battle of Sobroon on the 10th February. Attached as field engineer to the division of General Sir Robert Dick, K.C.B.; severely wounded. Mentioned in the Despatch of the Right Hon. the Governor General of India. Received a medal. Recommended for brevet rank by Lord Hardinge, Governor General of India.

(signed) J. Becker,
Brevet Major Engineers, and Deputy Commissioner, Huzara.

(True copy.)

My dear Edwardes,

In 1844-45 I was employed as political officer, with a force on the Sindh Border against the Gadhee tribe, capturing the leaders, and receiving the thanks of the Government.

In 1845-46 with Sir Charles Napier against the Boogties.

In 1848, at the second seige of Mooltan, and capture of city and fort, having in the former operations under you a Sikh regiment and troop, of the force with which you took the Sheesh Mehal.

In 1851-52, at the first destruction of Michni and Dabb, and subsequent Mohummed campaign, under Sir Colin Campbell: thanks of Government.

In 1852, at the engagement of Punjpas: thanks of Commander-in-Chief.

In 1852, with the force acting against the Othman Khail and Ranezai, including the capture and destruction of Nawadund and Praughar: thanks of Government.

In 1853, at the Boree expedition: thanks of Commander-in-Chief.

In 1854, at the second Michni attack, including the destruction of Shah Moosah Khail, under General S. Cotton: thanks of Government.

In 1855, with a force employed against the Bussee Khail Afreedies: thanks of Government.

In 1857, the operations against Narinjie in Eusufzaie: thanks of Government.

The above is a memorandum of the occasions on which I have been actually employed in the field with troops during the last 14 years.

With many thanks for your kind efforts on my behalf.

30 March 1858.

Believe me, &c. H. R. James.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

MEMORANDUM of Captain B. Henderson's Services: Ensign 4th February 1841. Lieutenant 21st April 1844. Captain 5th June 1853.

Received the thanks of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, then General Commanding at Peshawur, in March 1852, for the state of the 3d Regiment, with a promise of report to Government. Copy of a letter attached.

Commanded 3d Regiment in March 1853, in the expedition under Brigadier Hodson.
Hodson into the Sheoranee hills, to punish this tribe: the Brigadier and troops received the thanks of Government for the operations, which were entirely successful.

Also served in operations, which led to the settlement of the Kohat Pass in November 1853.

Meranzaie expedition in April 1855. Commanding 3d Regiment.

Commanded head quarters of 3d Regiment, as one of the two columns of attack on the Rabeeah Khel Oruckzaie; succeeding in surprising them on the crest of the Sumana mountain before daybreak on the 2d September 1855, which led to the capture and destruction of the two villages of the enemy, with their property, and to the capture of their cattle: was thanked by name by the Governor General. Vide Mr. Edmonstone's letter, No. 737, dated 3d November 1855, to Sir J. Lawrence, an extract of which is attached; also received the thanks of the Brigadier commanding the force, in brigade order, No. 36 of the 3d September 1855, a copy of which is attached.

Meranzaie and Khoorrum expedition in October, November and December 1856, including night surprise and capture of Toorawarree; march into Khoorrum, night surprise and capture of the body of the Meanee branch of the Kabyl Khel Wuzeerees, with their property and cattle; both operations so completely successful, as to have been accomplished without the loss of life of a single soldier; and each operation securing the submission and punishment of the whole tribe so perfectly, as to have induced these turbulent lawless people to respect the Government authority from that time, and all through the recent crisis. A copy of the correspondence is attached.

Previous service,—Sutlej campaign, Moodkee and Aliwall (medal and clasp); latterly as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General with General Wheeler's force.

Served in command of Kohat district from May 1857, throughout the late crisis. Maintained tranquillity. A report of disarming a portion of the Hindoostanees, and of the Chief Commissioner's approval is attached.

Kohat, 4 January 1858.

Captain Commandant 3d Regiment Punjab Infantry, and at Kohat.

(signed) B. Henderson,

Kohat, 4 January 1858.

Captain Commandant 3d Regiment Punjab Infantry, and at Kohat.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,

Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

---

EXTRACT OF A LETTER, No. 757 of 3d November 1855, from Mr. Edmonstone to Sir J. Lawrence.

"The Governor General has read with the truest and most lively satisfaction the report which Brigadier Chamberlain has submitted of the operations of the troops under his command against the villages in question. "Brigadier Chamberlain has remarked that any man might be proud to command such troops. He has ample ground for the remark; and the Governor General desires me to add, that the Government may be both proud and happy in the knowledge that it possesses troops able and willing to perform so gallant a service, and officers capable of planning and leading and executing such attacks as are described in the papers under notice.

"The Governor General requests that his most cordial acknowledgments and thanks may be conveyed to Captain Coke and Captain Henderson who led the several attacks, for their admirable execution of the combined assault on the villages of Nasseem, Gurhee and Sunghar.

"The Governor General requests that all his sentiments regarding the expedition as expressed in the foregoing paragraphs, may be made known to the whole of the Punjab Irregular Force."

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,

Secretary to Chief Commissioner.
To the Chief Commissioner, Punjab.

Sir,

Having laid before Government your Military Secreta
14th November 1856, with annexment, I am desired to request that you will
be good enough to convey to Brigadier Chamberlain an expression of the high
satisfaction with which the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council
has read his report of the very successful attacks made on the village of Toora-
warree by the Meeranzaie field force under his command.

Council Chamber, Fort William, 19th November 1856.

(signed) R. J. H. Birch, Collector,
Secretary to Government of India.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(No. 638.)

To Colonel R. J. H. Birch, c. b., Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter 618, of the 11th current, I have the honour,
by desire of the Chief Commissioner, to forward for submission to the Right
Honourable the Governor General in Council, a copy of a letter from the
Brigadier commanding the Punjab Irregular Force, reporting his proceedings,
and those of the force employed in the Meeranzaie expedition in connexion with
an attack made on the Meeanee branch of the Cabool Khel Wuzerries, for
an unprovoked and cold-blooded murder of some camp followers on the 29th
ultimo.

2. The Chief Commissioner desires me to state, in forwarding the present
Report, that it appears to him that the plan of punishing these Wuzerries was
admirably conceived and ably carried out, that the result was most satisfactory,
and reflects high credit on Brigadier Chamberlain, Major Coke, and Captain
Henderson.*

Lahore, 22 December 1856.

(signed) J. D. Macpherson,
Lieutenant Colonel, Military Secretary to
Chief Commissioner.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(No. 700.)

To the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab.

Sir,

With reference to our military secretary’s letter, No. 638, of 22d December
1856, I am directed to convey to you an expression of the cordial approval of
Government in regard to the operations for the capture of certain Wuzerries by
whom

* Extract of Brigadier Chamberlain’s Report, No. 237, 10 December 1856:

without attributing our success mainly to them. Firstly, to Captain Henderson for the correct
information he obtained, and for having furnished Major Coke with guides, to whom the mountain
paths were as familiar by night as by day. Secondly, to Major Coke for having carried out his instruc-
tions perfectly, for, as may be seen by reference to the map, the success of the whole of the arrange-
ment depended upon our gaining possession of the summit of the mountain before the Wuzerries."
whom certain camp followers were murdered on the 29th of November last, and to state that they are considered highly creditable to the officers and men by whom the capture was effected.

Council Chamber, Fort William, 22 January 1857.

I have, &c.

R. J. H. Birch, Colonel

Secretary to Government of India

(True copy.)

R. Temple

Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(No. 12.)

To Colonel R. J. H. Birch, C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Para. 5. The excellent arrangements made throughout the expedition by Brigadier N. Chamberlain commanding, by Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Edwards, C.B., the Commissioner of the Peshawur Division, and by Captain B. Henderson, the Officiating Deputy Commissioner of Kohat, as well as the good conduct of the troops, will not fail to attract the favourable notice of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council.

J. D. Macpherson

Lieutenant Colonel

Military Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(True copy.)

R. Temple

Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(No. 202.)

To the Chief Commissioner, Punjab.

Sir,

Having laid before Government your Military Secretary's letter, No. 12, of the 9th January 1857, with enclosure from Brigadier Chamberlain, reporting the return of the Meeranzâle Field Force to Kohat, I am desired to state that the excellent arrangements made throughout the expedition by Brigadier N. Chamberlain, commanding, by Captain B. Henderson, Officiating Deputy Commissioner, as well as the excellent conduct of the troops employed on the occasion, have excited the admiration of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council; and I am to request that an expression of the approbation of Government for the good services rendered may be conveyed to all who were engaged in the expedition, and to Lieutenant, Colonel H. B. Edwards, Commissioner of Peshawur.

I have, &c.

Council Chamber, Fort William, 6 February 1857.

R. J. H. Birch, Colonel

Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

(True copy.)

R. Temple

Secretary to the Chief Commissioner.

Camp, Hungoo, 3 September 1855.

MORNING ORDERS.—36. The Brigadier begs to express his best thanks to the whole of the troops engaged in yesterday's operations; and to be able to bring their excellent conduct to the notice of Government, is to him the highest source of gratification.

In most instances, it is invidious to record the names of any particular officers, but on the present occasion, the Brigadier feels assured, that all will unite with him.
him in attributing the successful result of our operations to the very able manner in which both Major Coke and Captain Henderson led their respective attacks.

There are one or two points bearing upon the conduct of mountain operations which the Brigadier desires to impress firmly upon the mind of every infantry soldier; and the infantry corps in camp will parade at sunrise on the 5th instant, in front of their respective encampment, for the purpose of hearing what the Brigadier has to say on this subject.

(True extract.)

(signed)  J. D. Macpherson, Lieutenant Colonel,
          Military Secretary.

(True copy.)

(signed)  R. Temple,
          Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(No. 436.)

To Lieutenant B. Henderson, Commanding 3d Regiment Punjab Infantry,
Camp, Goopir Gurhee.

Sir,

The Brigadier commanding the Peshawur Field Force, desires me to take this the first opportunity of informing you how much gratified he was at the state in which you brought the corps under your command into camp on the 21st instant, after a double march of nearly 30 miles.

He further directs me to say, that he did not fail to observe the high order in every respect of your young regiment, which is most creditable to you as its commanding officer, and which he will have much pleasure in bringing to the notice of the President of the Board of Administration.

I have, &c.

Peshawur Field Force,
Head Quarters, Camp Jelala,
23 March 1852.

(signed)  H. W. Norman, Lieutenant,
          Major of Brigade.

(True copy.)

(signed)  R. Temple,
          Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(No. 827.)

From Lieutenant S. Black, Staff Officer, Punjab Irregular Force, to Captain Henderson, Commanding at Kohat.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of a copy of your letter to Brigadier General Cotton, reporting that in accordance with his orders, you have disarmed the detachment of the 58th Regiment Native Infantry.

I am desired by the Chief Commissioner to express his satisfaction at the able and efficient manner in which you carried out the orders of the Brigadier General.

Rawul Pindee,
10 July 1857.

(signed)  S. Black, Lieutenant,
          Staff Officer Punjab Irregular Force.

(True copy.)

(signed)  R. Temple,
          Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

EXTRACT of Captain B. Henderson's, No. 13, dated 8 July, to Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Peshawur.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter without number, dated 7th July, directing, by order of Brigadier General S. J. Cotton, in con-
MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, IN 1857.

currence with the Punjab Government, the disarming of the detachment, 58th Native Infantry, three companies at this station.

2. In compliance with the above order, received at 4 A.M. this morning, I have now the honour, at 5 A.M., to report that the above order has been carried out; the muskets and ammunition of the detachment being deposited in the magazine depot here.

5. I have carefully explained that good conduct will insure kind treatment, and desertion, sedition or mutiny, death.

(True extract.)

(signed) B. Henderson, Captain,
Commanding at Kohat.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(No. 197.)
From Edward Thornton, Esq., Officiating Judicial Commissioner for the Punjab, to R. Temple, Esq., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No. 191 of the 24th current, forwarding the reports of the Commissioner of the Peshawur Division, and of his district officers, on the events of that frontier, subsequent to the mutiny of the Bengal army, I have the honour to transmit, for submission to the Chief Commissioner, a copy of a further communication from Colonel Edwards, No. 79 of the 20th April, and of its enclosure, illustrative of the state of ferment in which the Hindostanee sepoys were before the mutiny actually broke out.

I have, &c.

(signed) Edward Thornton.

Lahore,
27 April 1858.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(No. 79 of 1858.)

Sir,

In continuation of my mutiny report, No. 64, of 23d March, I have the honour to forward copy of No. 83 of 30th March, from the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur, enclosing one from Mr. Wakefield, Extra Assistant Commissioner of Peshawur, which is highly illustrative of the state of ferment in which the Hindostanee sepoys were before the mutiny actually broke out. Indeed the preparedness of the native soldiery, indicates unmistakably that the corps at Barrackpore had communicated with the whole army.

2. A reward will be proposed in the proper place for the chupprassie Narain.

I have, &c.

(signed) H. B. Edwards,
Commissioner.

Peshawur,
April 1858.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.
(No. 83.)

From the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur to the Commissioner,
Peshawur Division.

SIR,

I have the honour to forward to you a copy of a letter to my address from Mr. Wakefield, Extra Assistant, Peshawur, detailing certain circumstances connected with the mutiny, which occurred prior to the disarming of the native troops on the 22d May last.

2. Mr. Wakefield appears to have zealously sought for the information regarding the state of the Hindooastane soldiery during those days of excitement, and to have elicited much that was useful. The seizure of him of the "faqueer" who was bearing a treasonable letter to the native regiments on the frontier, from the corps in cantonments, was certainly at that time an important event.

3. He likewise seems to have evinced much tact in superintending the removal of the treasure to the fort.

4. Since my arrival at Peshawur in June last, I can testify to Mr. Wakefield's active cooperation on all occasions, and I trust that he may meet with due reward.

5. I concur in thinking the chupprassie, Narain, worthy of some mark of favour, but do not consider a pension advisable. I would rather recommend him for a present of 150 rupees and promotion in the service, which, with your approval, can be carried out without reference to the higher authorities.

I have, &c.,

Peshawur,
30 March 1858.

(Hugh R. James,
Deputy Commissioner.)

(True copy.)

(R. Temple,
Secretary to Chief Commissioner.)

From G. E. Wakefield, Esquire, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Peshawur, to
Captain H. R. James, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawur.

Sir,

Having learnt that a report on the late mutiny and revolt has been called for throughout the Punjab, I have the honour to submit an account of certain circumstances connected with the mutiny, which occurred at Peshawur in the interval when the late Brigadier General Nicholson was acting both as Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner here, during the temporary absence of Colonel Edwardes at Rawul Pindae.

2. During that period, viz., from 17th to 21st May 1857, I was, from circumstances which will be hereafter detailed, in constant communication with General Nicholson.

3. Soon after the disarming of the 19th Native Infantry at Barrackpore, and while the incendiary fires were occurring at Umballa and other stations, I had remarked the altered bearing of the Hindooastane sepoys here, as coming under my observation among the "kutcheerry" and treasury guards; and I mentioned the circumstance to several, and among others to General Nicholson, and to an officer of the 64th Native Infantry.

On the announcement of the outbreak at Meerut, it appeared necessary to ascertain the temperament of the Hindooastane sepoys here; and the only man I could find to assist me, was a Hindooastane orderly chupprassie, named Narain. This man is an inhabitant of the Etawah District (North Western Provinces), and had just returned from Calcutta, where he had gone to see his late master, Lieutenant Colonel Wakefield off to England.

On being questioned by me he told me that the 19th Native Infantry when disarmed had, distrustting the public post, made a subscription and despatched emissaries to every regiment of native infantry in the Bengal army, and that
at every station from Calcutta to Peshawur, where there were Hindoostanee troops, the cry was, "We will not bite the new cartridges, and we wont give up our arms". He also told me a number of other circumstances which it would be superfluous to detail here, but which plainly showed that the disaffection extended over the whole Bengal army. I immediately went to General Nicholson, and detailed most of what the man had said; and at his request sent the chapprassie to him. General Nicholson heard his story, put a number of questions to him, and told him to continue reporting to me any information he could obtain. I should mention that from the first, this man reported the extension of the agitation to the Hindoostanee troops here, as observed by him while mixing with the sepoys. After this, he used to go daily in disguise and brought me intelligence of the increasing agitation; till finally, about the 16th or 17th of May, he attended a meeting of delegates from the 24th, 27th and 51st Native Infantry, held under a tree on the north side of cantonments. At that meeting the subject of discussion was a combined movement on the 21st of the month. The comparative numbers of Europeans and natives were calculated, and the only drawback appeared to be, that the 21st Native Infantry held aloof. The 64th and Kelat-i-Ghilzis Regiments which were at the frontier outposts, were talked of as "expected in." They evidently counted on assistance from the whole of the cavalry, regular and irregular, but the 6th Light Cavalry were reported as actively agitating, while the impression on my mind respecting the irregulars, was that they would not commit themselves. They promised the others nothing, but their assistance was counted on. All this was duly reported by me to General Nicholson. On the morning of the 19th I seized, not far from my house, a Mahomedan faqeer, and taking him over to the "kutcherry" searched him; although the man was stripped, nothing suspicious was at first found. But on searching him a second time, a bag was found concealed in the arm-pit. In this bag was another, and in that a letter, which the Commission, composed of Colonel Edwardes, Captain Bartlett, and yourself have since decided, was a traitorous invitation from the disaffected in the cantonments to their comrades on the frontier. I need not enter into details here respecting the circumstance, as the papers in the case furnish all particulars; but to continue the narrative of what occurred at the time, the man was taken to General Nicholson, who read the letter, and after questioning him, sent him to gaol.

In the afternoon of that day, the 19th of May, General Nicholson told me he had written for a European guard, for the treasure at the Residency; and directed me to be present when the guards were changed. This was effected late in the evening; and then General Nicholson told me to arrange for moving the money (about 25 lakhs) early the next morning to the fort. He said he had written for an escort, and that a squadron of the 5th Light Cavalry would be sent. From my previous knowledge of the disaffection of the 5th Cavalry, I felt anxiety on the subject, and ventured to suggest the necessity of a European escort, and asked permission to take the European guard at the Residency with me. This was readily granted, provided I could arrange with the officer commanding it. Lieutenant Tovey, although he had received no orders, was good enough to take the responsibility, and accompanied the treasure. General Nicholson subsequently applied for 50 mounted artillerymen, who also joined the escort. The next day, General Nicholson told me that he had sent a spy with the squadron of the 5th Cavalry, and that one native officer talked treason the whole way to the fort.

At 6 A.M. on the morning of the 20th a number of magazine carts came, but as they were not sufficient to take the whole of the money, and it appeared desirable to remove it in one batch, I applied to Lieutenant Hyde, the executive engineer, at the suggestion of Captain Bartlett, who had no carts available in the Sudder Bazar, for Government horse carts. Lieutenant Hyde very obligingly placed 50 at once at my disposal. By the evening of the same day the whole of the money was removed in one batch, and as far as I could gather had been safely lodged before the intelligence had time to spread. The disaffection, as I afterwards heard, could only talk of "taking it in five minutes." As one instance of how matters hung that day in a balance, I may mention that the headman in charge of the magazine carts, at about 11 A.M. appeared suddenly faint, and said he

* Consisting of 50 men of Her Majesty's 79th Regiment, under Lieutenant Tovey.
he required rest from the heat, &c, but on my threatening to flog him into working, he as suddenly revived and proceeded to work.

The 21st of May intervened, and on the morning of the 22d the disarming occurred.

In this statement I have confined myself to facts, which came under my own observation, and have tried to be as concise as possible. To narrate the details of information received would be tedious; and circumstances which at that period were of every importance, have now lost interest.

In conclusion I beg to recommend, as a case for the special notice of Government and marked reward, the conduct of the chupprassie Narain.

Although there have been many instances of fidelity and loyalty among the Hindoostanees, as far as I was aware, this was the only man out of the say, in round numbers, 20,000 men of that class in this valley, who thoroughly identified himself with us, and observed a uniform adherence at that critical time, when the first blow had to be struck, which enabled us to manage the wavering, and secure the allegiance of the country people. He mixed with men of all classes, and reported every wave and ripple of agitation. His reports for months after the disarming were continued with the same fidelity. It was arranged that his name was not to be brought forward, so as to impair his usefulness, and the excitement of subsequent events set aside all idea of report or recommendation then.

I beg, therefore to submit his case; and if I may be allowed to suggest a reward that would best suit his circumstances, and would best ensure the object of conferring on the man a benefit that would be most appropriate, I would recommend a pension of 5 rupees a month for his lifetime, commencing from the 22d May, the date of the disarming; this would, on payment of arrears, secure a donation to commence with, with a provision for life.

I have, &c.

(signed) G. E. Wakefield.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. Temple,

Secretary to Chief Commissioner.

(No. 1.)

From Major J. R. Becher, Deputy Commissioner of Huzara, to Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C.B., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawur Division.

Abbottabad, 4 January 1858.

Sir,

In reply to your letter, No. 1057, of 13th November 1857, I have the honour to submit a memorandum of the political position and military resources of the Huzara District during the mutiny in India, and of the effect which was produced.

I have, &c.

(signed) J. R. Becher,

Deputy Commissioner.

MEMORANDUM.

1. The troops in Huzara at the time of the mutiny in India, consisted of a mountain train of six guns, and two regiments of irregular infantry (the 2d and 4th Sikhs), concentrated at Allahabad.

2. 150 police horse, a company of 60 men of the hill tribe of Suttees, and 24 zumbooraks (or gunners attached to camel swivels), were under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner for general duties, to serve as escorts, or to strengthen the several posts and forts.
3. On the outbreak of the mutiny, three companies of the 2d Sikh Regiment consisting of 225 rank and file. were withdrawn for the protection of the hill station of Murree, in Rawul Pindee; and on the 19th May, the 4th Sikh Regiment marched to Delhi under command of Captain Rothney.

4. To supply its place, I was directed to raise a body of levies of the country, to the extent of 150 horse and 500 foot, and to assume military command in Huzara; these levies were enrolled by quotas from the chiefs and principal mullicks, and were the representatives of so many clans; they brought their own arms, and all were men accustomed to hill warfare. A portion was detached to watch the ferries and strengthen the most exposed positions, and all the available police horse was sent to guard the left bank of the Indus up to the fortress of Attock, until arrangements could be completed by the authorities of the Rawul Pindee District for the security of their own extent of the border.

5. The most important ferries in Huzara are those of the Indus, one at Phoora, in the Yoosufzye border near the fanatic village of Sittana; the other belonging to Jehandad Khan, the chief of Umbh. At the former the boats ceased to ply, and were drawn to the left bank under a strong guard, protected by a tower and breastwork. The mullicks of Srikote (on the Gundghur Mountains), took upon themselves and their brave clan of Mushwanees to aid in watching this point. At Umbh, although the passage of boats was not entirely discontinued, because it is necessary for the chief to hold both banks of the river, yet the boats were brought to the left bank, and securely guarded under my own orders, and every passenger was searched and questioned.

6. By these arrangements several deserters from the 51st and 55th Native Infantry were arrested, tried and punished with death.

7. Parties were placed on the principal roads and passes leading from the surrounding country into Huzara, to arrest deserters, Hindoostanees, or sedulous messengers. Some fakeers and suspicious characters were thus brought in; and an outpost in the Khanpoor Hills was able to assist in the seizure of some of the mutinous sepoys of the 14th Native Infantry on their escape at the time of disarming the regiment at Rawul Pindee.

8. After the departure of the 4th Sikh Regiment, the available strength of the one remaining infantry regiment amounted to only 341 sepoys.

9. On the 10th June, the Kumaon Regiment under Captain Ramsay marched into Huzara, and three days afterwards occurred an opportunity for testing the feeling of the force, and for a first example to the country, by the blowing from guns of two mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry who were tried and sentenced to death that morning by a court composed exclusively of native officers.

10. The most perfect order prevailed during this execution which took place on parade, before all the sepoys and the levies, and a crowd of men of the district. The two regiments which were not without Hindoostanees in their number, were addressed by their commanding officers and by myself, and marched back to their lines.

11. Three days afterwards the necessity for further reinforcements from the Punjab called away the Kumaon Battalion to the walls of Delhi, where its bravery has gloriously aided to protect our empire.

12. The fort of Hureepoor, 22 miles to the rear of the cantonment of Abbottabad, is the chief place of defence in Huzara. It was built by Sirdar Hurree Singh, to maintain the first Sikh conquest of the country, and always continued to be their base of operations.

13. It contains a large magazine, and had been stored with supplies. It was now garrisoned by the Suttee company, augmented to 100 men, and by some of the most trustworthy of the levies, with a party of Zumboorchees and Burkundauz, drilled to act as artillerymen for two Sikh guns which were on its walls.

14. Supplies were also furnished, and repairs made to the detached hill forts held as police stations; and the frontier posts along the Indus considerably strengthened in numbers, to prevent any successful affront, which even on the part of robbers would at such a time be distorted into a disaster.
15. I believe that aggressions from beyond the border are generally assisted, if not invited, from within; and where there are so many chiefs, all more or less connected in former days when they needed an asylum, or still in communication with outside tribes, and having in times of excitement great feudal influence, the main difficulty of administration is to maintain justice, and at the same time to secure the attachment of both chiefs and people.

16. Among themselves these chiefs have still their own partizans connected by mutual assistance in the Sikh days, when the revolt of one on his mountain was the beacon for others to rise in the remotest and most unexpected points, and thus, by constant combinations, they succeeded in harassing the troops and garrisons which covered the country.

17. They had then, however, much cause to rise against tyranny and insult, but since the English rule they have been ever treated with the greatest regard and consideration, and rewarded for their adherence to our side during the Sikh war of 1848; and hence the continual disaffection and disquiet and the large army have been succeeded by general content and quiet and by a control moral rather than physical.

18. A time then had arrived when, after ten years of our rule, their loyalty could be displayed to good purpose; so I rallied the principal men, to assure them of my reliance, and at the same time, by daily intercourse, to dispel the alarming and mischievous reports and influences which must reach them, and more readily be accepted at a distance.

19. The 55th Regiment of Native Infantry in Yoosufzie had mutinied, and held the fort of Hoti Murdan; and on 25th May a force was sent against them from Peshawur, but before that force reached the walls, all but about 100 had made off in the direction of the difficult hills which separate our border from the independent Mahomedan tribes, and the Swat country; they were at once most courageously pursued, with a small party of horse, by Colonel Nicholson, that great soldier whose death we all mourn; many were slain and taken prisoners, but the regiment was very strong in numbers, and had obtained a considerable start, so that about half succeeded in crossing the border with their arms, ammunition and plundered treasure, into a country where they could be followed no further, and made their way to the son of Syud Akbur, the so-styled king, and to the more famous Akhöod or minister-priest of Swat.

20. They were readily welcomed as our enemies, and the religious martyrs they represented themselves to be, but in that poor country there were neither the means nor the inclination to pay and maintain a standing army, and the sleek well-fed soldiers, most of whom were high-caste Hindoos, soon discovered the impossibility of remaining in a strange land of lawless Mahomedans, whose language they did not even understand.

21. Reports reached me of their desire to reach the country of Maharajah Goolab Singh, and their hope of sympathy and welcome among the soldiery of Cashmere; and as the road lay either through Huzara, or along its border, I desired all the chiefs and headmen to be alert and ready. I hardly expected they would proceed in a body, but rather endeavour to steal through by degrees and in disguise.

22. At Abbottabad, on the evening of the 23d June, a letter reached me from Mahomed Khan, a mullick of the village of Buttul, in Konush, enclosing another to his address from Jumal Khan of the village of "Karg," one of the most influential men of the Jeergah of "Ullye." In this assistance and a safe passage through "Kouush" was asked for 600 Hindostance soldiers, who had fled from, the "Feringhees." This intelligence was corroborated by another report to the same effect from the frontier district of Agrone; a messenger had seen the sepoys, 700 in number, they had crossed the Indus on rafts of skins, at a ferry above Tahkote, and were halted under the shade of the "umlok" trees, and by the stream in Jumal Khan's village.

23. I had with me the sons of the Khagan Syuds of Moozuffur Khan of Nundyar, and some others of authority on the frontier, and I despatched them to gather their followers and secure the principal passes at the head of the Pukhele valley.

24. The
24. The independent district of Ulye, which the sepoys had reached, is about two days' journey from our extreme possession of "Kounsh," between them intervenes the independent district of Nundyar; all are held by Swattees of a common ancestry; and Kounsh is held in jageer or fief by Mahomed Ameen Khan, chief of Gurhee, and head of the Swattees in Huzara.

25. Adjoining this are the frontier "durvalis," or glens of "Agrove," "Bagurmung," "Balakote," and Khagan, all wild and mountainous; but through each of them are several roads, by which men on foot can penetrate into Pukhlee, the more direct road being through "Kounsh," Shinkyaree and Dodyal, to Gurhee, Hububoollah and Moosufferabad.

26. Mahomed Ameen Khan was directed at once to proceed, and guard his jager of Kounsh, holding the gorges and passes, preventing supplies, and communicating with Moozufur Khan, of Nundyar, to whom I immediately wrote to check their progress.

27. On the 24th June I was at Dodyal, 25 miles in advance of Abbottabad, with a detachment of the 2d Seikhs under Lieutenant Bernard, half the Zumboorchees, and some levies of foot and horse.

28. There I met Mahomed Ameen Khan on his way to Kounsh; and, as I learnt that the sepoys would in all probability attempt the direct road, I sent for Captain Harding, commanding the regiment, who, with a further detachment, completing three companies of infantry and three guns of the mountain train, under Lieutenant Butt of the artillery, joined me the next day.

29. The cantonment of Abbottabad in rear was held by Lieutenant Boulderson, the Assistant Commissioner, with the small remainder of the regiment, and a portion of the horse and foot levies; and the remaining three guns were for safety placed in the fort of Mansearah.

30. Dodyal (as you will see in the map) is a central position in the plain, about three miles from Shinkyaree, controlling all the principal roads; and on the approach from Kounsh I selected a strong position at the gorge of the valley, to be occupied in advance.

31. My intention was to contest and obstruct the passage of the sepoys by the armed zemindars of the country, and to meet them with regular troops as they debouched into the plain, in whichever direction over this large extent of frontier hills their line of march might develop itself.

32. The spies I had sent, returned with accounts exaggerating the numbers, and describing their doings; how they were bribing and flattering, and addressing Jumal Khan by the title of "Nawab," until he told them they would excite the jealousy of his fellow mullicks; how the Mahomedan women were shocked by these strange, dark (Kula) men cooking and bathing almost naked; they were most of them armed with muskets, or rifles and swords, but had little clothing, and no cover from the rain and night dews; they were accompanied by confidential messengers from the Akhoond of Swat; and had letters calling on all good Mussulmans to aid and escort them, and excommunicating and denouncing as unbelievers all who should oppose them.

33. Mahomed Ameen Khan, on reaching Kounsh, was joined by Moozufur Khan from Nundyar, and both communicated with the party in Ulye adverse to Jumal Khan and his party. They proposed to me that they should cross the frontier, enter Ulye, and by this means attack the sepoys, but this I forbade; both chiefs had doubtless purposes of their own to serve; it must involve a fight between the two parties, and even if there should be no treachery, and it should succeed (which was doubtful), it would have greatly complicated matters on the frontier. After considerable hesitation, and leaving behind their sick, who became Mahomedans, and found shelter in the Musjids, the sepoys, on 27th June, made a march to the village of Preshung, on the Nundyar border, and in the direction of Kounsh; but finding in their front the difficult passes of Kundora and Ujjree-ke-Gullee occupied by the men of Moozufur Khan, they turned back the next day to Butteelan, the village of Syuds Gholam Ali Shah and Dilarum Shah, resolving not to attempt the passage by Pukli, but to try the far more difficult route near the Indus, and through the Kohistan.
34. Little did they know the country through which they must thread their way: on the narrow ledges of tremendous precipices, by tracks with scarcely footing for the practiced peasant, through gorges where a few could prevent a host, and over waters where seldom was to be found even the hut of the shepherd Goojur.

35. Destruction was before them. At Raeshung, the first ill-omened day of their advance, a jemadar shot himself with a musket, vainly urging the direct and easier way, and declaring that it was better to perish in fight than to starve or die miserably among those frightful rocks.

36. I had once an opportunity of serving the two Syuds of Ullye, at whose village the mutineers were now arrived, in the matter of a betrot, in which they felt their honour compromised; they were also friends of Moulvee Mahomed Ally, of Agee, a jageerdar of Hazara, and of the Khan of Agore; and as they had great influence on the northern border, I wrote to them to disabuse the people of the false report which had been spread that the British Government wished to touch the religion of its soldiers, and urging them to view these soldiers not as martyrs, but as mutineers, and to bid the Kohistanees, who were their disciples (moreeds), and all true men, oppose such rank traitors to their salt.

37. I also wrote to the jurga or council of the Kohistanees, reminding them of occasions when their cattle had been forayed by subjects of Hazara, and they had recovered them, and met with justice and partiality, and how they were free from all duties to come and go, in their trade with Hazara.

38. These letters served the purpose: one or two of their sons, with their followers, fell on the rear of the sepoys, after leaving Butteclan, when they reached a point called "Undrukeeh-ke-Gullee," just beyond the boundary of Ullye, while some Goojurs of Kohistan assailed them in front, hurling down huge stones from the rocks above. In this encounter, the son of Gholam Ally Shah was wounded, and one of the Kohistanees, by trade a smith, was shot, while eight of the mutineers were killed.

39. The loss of their countrymen enraged the Kohistanees, and again they gathered to contest a pass known as "Banda Dewan," where several more of the sepoys fell. Every step of the advance now brought new embarrassments; the knapacks and bayonets, and many of the muskets, were cast down the rocks, and a large payment in silver could scarcely procure a seer of flour.

40. At this time our subjects, the Syuds of Khagan, who, in 1852 had rebelled, and after an expatriation of three years, and the forfeiture of their estates, had only lately been restored to their country, sent me word of the situation of the sepoys, attacked in front and deprived of all retreat, and that some of the leading men in Kohistan had invited them to join as their peers or religious guides; should they go revered as Syuds, there was no likelihood of deceit; so I bade them go at once, to prove their loyalty, and obliterate all remembrance of their recent disgrace.

41. On the 5th July, the mutineers, haggard and hungry, halted on the edge of the Blue River (Neelsee Nuddee), a tributary to the Indus, at a narrow, stony place, called the Serpent's Bank (Beyla Sampan), below the village of Guddarh, which village the Syuds and the head men of Khaggu, Balakote and Konhar, reached the same day; towards afternoon a party of six sepoys came there for provisions, and were instantly seized; two of them, however, contrived to escape, giving the alarm to the rest to prepare and resist the new wild force, which was hovering above their heads, while the bands of the Syuds and Kohistanees closed in, firing down from the surrounding hills.

42. The fight lasted for some time during the next morning; many of these sepoys were killed or wounded, or drowned in the rapid stream, over which the narrow bridge had been secured, till at last they, with a desperate rush, took possession of the bridge and the village, and their further molestation was forbidden by a muollah from Palus, on the Indus, to whom the Akhoond of Swat had commended them.

43. The Syuds were then compelled to leave, sending me word of this success, which
which took place three long days' march beyond their own country, and adding
that they were on their way to meet me with a number of captives.

44. I replied that the remaining sepoys who had escaped them, moving
parallel with their border, would probably cross the extremity of Khagan, and
that they must not abandon the chase while yet there was a prospect of further
prey.

45. Beyond the River Nynsook and between Khaggan and Kashmeer lies
the territory of Durawur and Kurnah, belonging to Shere Ahmed Khan, a
chief tributary to Cashmere: I warned him of their approach, and called on
him to arm his followers, and close his frontier against their passage, and he
readily answered the call.

46. On the 15th July the Syuds conveyed 54 Poorbeah prisoners to my fron-
tier post at Balakote, of whom 13 were brought in across the hills to Shinkyaree,
where we were then encamped. These were immediately tried, and sentenced
to death, by a military court of European and native officers, on an eminence
above the town, where a gibbet was erected, and the guns drawn up, and
before all the troops these men underwent the just retribution of their mutiny:
they met death with the calmest bearing: those who were hung spoke only
to request they might be blown from the guns instead.

47. As I had anticipated, the Moollah, who had protected the remainder, con-
veyed them to Kote Gullee, on the border of Chilass, and from thence they
made for Durawur. The scouts who had been left on the mountains then con-
veyed the intelligence that the Poorbeahs had reached Nooreenar by the
Lalosur Lake, near the border of Durawur, and the sons of the Syuds imme-
diately armed, and repaired there.

48. It was a rainy day; and as they appeared through the mists on the hills
beating their drums and flattering their pennons, the hearts of the mutineers
despaired; checked everywhere, there seemed no hope; and after a faint
resistance, and a slaughter of a few of their number, they surrendered their
arms, and 124 more prisoners (amongst whom were two soobadars) and 102
muskets, were afterwards made over to the escort which I had despatched to
receive them, except a few recruits (two of whom were Seikhs), and one or
two camp followers; the rest were all executed at different stations of the
district.

49. About 20 days afterwards 43 more of these men, who had been seized in
Durawur by the soldiers of the Cashmeer Government at the fort of Shardeh,
were made over from Mozuufferabad to my guards, by order of his Highness
Maharsjah Rumbeer Singh, who had just succeeded to the rule of his father,
Maharsjah Goolab Singh, and who thus early evinced the sincerity of his alliance.

50. These were similarly tried and punished with death; since then six
wretched men, sick and footsore, converted to Mahomedanism, and disguised
as Goojurs, have been picked up at different times. A few changing their
religions, remained behind in the musjeds at Ullye, and a few may have crossed
into Chilass, where they probably serve as slaves.

51. Thus, hunted down to the last like wild beasts, was consummated the
miserable fate of the 55th Regiment, and thus they afforded a salutary example
to other mutinous regiments, by proving the far reach of our power, and that
there was no refuge even beyond our border.

52. After the force returned to its cantonments at Abbottabad, matters
remained quiet and undisturbed in Huzara, although the delay before Delhi
gave rise to the wildest rumours of retreat and disaster, and the downfall of the
English power. It cannot be surprising that Mahomedans, who had experi-
enced in their lives their own rule in this country succeeded by the Seikhs,
and again, only lately the disappearance of those conquerors whom they had
expelled on the breaking out of our battles on the Sutlej, should believe in the
feasibility of our ruin, and the return of their ancient independence; and some
of the chiefs, as I could see, began to recall their former feuds, and to reckon
up their own chances and their old allies, in case we should lose or leave the

238. s 2 country.
country. I made it my main employment to see as many as possible; and, treating the mutiny as a thing easily to be subdued, to spread cheerful intelligence of our prestige and our victories, the fidelity of the native princes, and the stern rebuke of our enemies, which even here they had witnessed. An opportunity was also taken in one or two instances of punishing, by public whipping and imprisonment, men connected with our public offices, who had given circulation to dispiriting reports.

53. As I had hitherto remained in Upper Huzara, and as the excitement at Seikh Jana and Shewa, on the border of Yoosufzaye, made me anxious regarding my own opposite border of the Indus, to which the son of Syud Ukbir, of Swat, had betaken himself, I rode down to Hurreepoor on 7th August, where I met Jehandad Khan, of Umbh, the first in rank of the chiefs of the country, who has throughout shown himself steadfast and sincere. The principal men of Lower Huzara, too, seemed all in good heart. The Khuttree traders of Hurreepoor, who were somewhat alarmed, remembering two villages of their town by the Mahomedans of the country in former days of disturbance, were, I believe, reassured by my presence; and I daily visited the fort, the small garrison of which was much diminished by the prevailing sickness of this season.

54. About the end of August I heard that many alarming reports were bruited about in the hills among the Dhoond tribe round the station of Murree; but the men whom I had sent to ascertain particulars, reported that no danger or disaffection existed.

55. Past midnight on the 2d September I received an express of that date from Mr. Thornton, the Commissioner of Jhelum, at Rawul Pindee, informing me that he had heard of a confederacy formed about 10 days before among the men of the village of Bhagun, Mukole and Muggree, belonging to the Khurral tribe in Huzara, to attack and plunder Murree, but that the attack had been deferred for further news from below. Another letter, written later in the day, at half-past six P.M., which reached me at the same time, contained a report from Lieutenant Battye, the Assistant Commissioner at Murree, of an attack actually made the night before, which he supposed to be on the part of a few of the nearest villages, and which had been repulsed by means of timely information given to Lady Lawrence by Hakim Khan, a mullick of Lohra, who was in service as a jemadar.

56. On receiving these letters, I summoned Kazee Mahomed Hussan (the vakeel of the Kurral Chief, Sirdar Hussun Ali Khan), and Cazee Ubdool Gooffar, the tuhseddar of Huzara, and instantly sent them off by day-break by the fort of Narra, to inquire from Sirdar Hussun Ali Khan what was happening among his people; I wrote to him to the same effect. I also sent off a party of Suttee Sepoys from the fort, under their soobadar, all men of the hills, and well acquainted with these tribes. Rajah Hyder Buksh Khan, of Khanpoor, who had happened to be with me at Hurreepoor, accompanied him with a small band of his men from the levies; and I sent word to Rajah Ally Gohur Khan, the Gukkur Chief, and Ally Bahadoor Khan, the Kurral Chief of Dobrah (the rival of Sirdar Hussun Ali Khan) to muster what men they could, and reach Murree rapidly from the border of their estates. In the evening a telegraphic message reached me from General Cotton, at Peshawur, requesting me to send troops from Huzara, as there was not a single available soldier in the Peshawur district.

57. The matter was urgent, and might be of very great consequence. Captain Hardinge was therefore immediately directed, by express, to march with the head quarters and three companies of his regiment, and about 100 men of the foot levies, to the relief of Murree, while I despatched from Hurreepoor 100 more of the foot levies, with 10 zoombooraks to join him on the road at the entrance to the hills, wrote off to Narra to get supplies; and sent Ubdoolla Khan, of Kullabut, and Fuzul Khan Jemadar, of the Abbottabad Kotwalle, as agents, to escort the detachment by the road of Shahj Kote, Suttohra and Lohra, which would take the disaffected country in rear, advance close upon the residence of the Khurral chief, and, I judged, most likely bring the matter to a satisfactory issue.

58. It
58. It rained heavily and incessantly during the night of the 3d and the day of the 4th September: the road after entering the hills is more difficult than I can describe; but Captain Hardinge, overcoming all difficulties by his determination, marched from Abbottabad early on the morning of the 4th September, and reached Shahj Kote before dark, a distance of 17 or 18 miles, drenched with rain, and without tents or baggage: they found shelter for the night in the village, and for food contented themselves chiefly with parched Indian corn.

59. Captain Davies, the executive officer of Huzara, with much zeal and spirit, accompanied the troops as a volunteer, being well acquainted with the roads, and in every respect likely to be of much use.

60. At Shahj Kote it was proposed to proceed to Peerkote and Moree, as being a more direct road than the one by Suthora. Against this change, Nawab Khan (brother of the Khurhal Sirdar) strongly protested, urging that the people in that direction were assembling, and excited beyond his control, and that if his advice were neglected he would not be responsible for the safe conduct of the regiment, but would at once go off with his family to Hurreepoor. I had also heard that this change of road was contemplated, and, knowing that it would bring the column through a precipitous pass, rising from the Summoondhur stream, near to which a large force under Sirdar Lehna Singh Majeetheea had once been defeated by these very Khurrals, and that it led directly on to the villages which were said to be disaffected, I sent off a hasty despatch that the Suttora road should be taken. This reached in time, and the troops, again in the midst of rain, reached Suttora in much the same plight as the day before.

61. Reports were there brought that a large number of the people had mustered to oppose in front; but Captain Hardinge resolutely pushed on, and without any opposition brought his men under the walls of the fort of Dhunna (within a few miles of Murree), on the evening of the 6th September, from whence he communicated with Mr. Thornton.

62. By that time the danger had gone by; the rebels who had gathered round Murree had been dispersed, and many of them followed up and captured; the disaffection appeared but partial, and confined to a few of the nearest villages, as the peers of Plasseh, jageerdars of Huzara, the most influential men in the Dhoond country, had been summoned, and had repaired with their followers to Murree the morning after the attack, with the principal Mullicks around, and had assisted in burning the villages, and seizing the cattle of the rebels.

63. Those of the Dhoonds, about the fort of Dhunna, had also reported themselves there. Situated as Murree is, in the extensive country of the Dhoonds, who boast of the armed thousands they can assemble, the great danger to be apprehended was a general and extensive combination, and most serious to the peace of the Punjab would have been the moral effect of any disaster at a station crowded with English ladies and children.

64. To make sure of the feeling of the country while in a controlling position, the troops continued till the 15th September at Murree, when the detachment of the regiment returned towards Huzara by Rawul Pindee, while the irregular levies who, with the chiefs I sent, had been very useful in dragging forth the fugitives from their retreats in the hills, came back through the Dhoond country by Beerungullee, finding all peaceable and well-disposed in that direction.

65. On the 20th September Captain Hardinge and his men reached their cantonment, after some hardship and much praiseworthy exertion.

66. While all this took place, I had been strengthening the cantonment of Abbottabad, by sending up the men, chiefly horsemen of Lower Huzara; for by drafts to new regiments, the 2d Seikh Infantry had been so reduced, that only 27 sepoys and 82 recruits of about a month's standing in the regiment were left behind in all the district, after despatching three companies to Murree.

67. Three of the guns, with their magazine stores, were withdrawn to the fort at Hurreepoor, and with horsemen and some levies I thus commanded both ends of the Sulhud Pass, in the event of any attack on Abbottabad, which was said to have been concerted, but which I hardly expected.
68. I also considerably strengthened the garrisons of the hill forts at Narra and Dhunna, and provided them with a supply of water in case of an attack.

69. Late at night of the 4th September, after Captain Hardinge had marched, a man from Maimood Khan, mullick of Banda, came with a message that Sirdar Hussun Ali Khan had assembled all his men, stopped all the detachment, and was in rebellion. There was reason for crediting this, although the informant was hostile to the Kurral chief.

70. Fuzul Khan, of Topee, and Nawab Khan, of Shinguree, were at hand, both men of tact and discernment, and on whom I thought I could rely. The latter is married to a daughter of the Kurral chief. They were ordered to ride at once to assist the force, bring in Sirdar Hussun Ali Khan, and send me instant word of what had occurred.

71. They wrote me that, although there had evidently been some original ill-intention on the part of the Kurals, many of whom had assembled, yet on their arrival as my deputies, the people had all declared their allegiance, and returned to their homes, and that the Sirdar and his brother had assisted the force to the best of their ability. On their return to me they were accompanied by Nawab Khan, the brother, and Azad Khan, the favourite son of Sirdar Hussun Ali Khan, to whom I explained that the matter was serious, and the Sirdar must come himself, whether well or ill, as he represented himself to be, or stand the consequences.

72. The next day he came, bringing also Pahulwan Khan and other mullicks of Bhassin, the village said to have been confederate in the project of attack, but not overtly concerned.

73. I sent back these mullicks with parties of my own to arrest the fugitive Dhoonds from Murree, and prevent their finding an asylum in their country; but Sirdar Hussun Ali Khan I retained, until hearing that rumours were afloat of my intention to seize and imprison him after the Seikh mode, and knowing his blind credulity, I allowed him to return, leaving his son with me as his representative.

74. Although the parties I had sent to Bagun were taken here and there about the mountains and caverns, and cliffs and dense forests, yet it was generally believed that the rebels who had escaped from Murree were concealed near that portion of Hazara, and eluded discovery by moving from one retreat to another. In such a wild tract an army could be baffled in its search, unaided by the assistance of the people.

75. In a few days came the glad tidings of our successful assault of Delhi; then the complete possession of the city and defeat of the rebels; then the capture of the king; but notwithstanding the illuminations and salutes of guns, it gained slow credence; it was said to be our last desperate invention. The truth was, men were slow to believe in the dissipation of visions which had generally accorded with their wishes, and raised them in their own self-esteem.

76. When it should really be believed that fortune had returned to our standard, I knew that the fate of the fugitive Dhoonds would resemble that of the 35th Regiment. They would be delivered up or driven out, if they really were lurking there; so, after some pause, I poured into the country all the levies I could command, amounting to some 300 men, in five principal bands, forming a ring round the base of Murree, guarding the River Jhelum, and cutting off escape.

77. Of the villages whose inhabitants were present, and engaged in the attack, only one hamlet of 10 or 12 families, called "Bhuttole," belonged to Huzara, and they were nearly related to Baz Khan, and other head men of Muttole, in the Rawul Pindree district, who had originated the whole plot, and were the most active of the assailants.

78. These Bhuttoean men were, I was told, concealed in the Huzara Dhoond villages of Seir and Myra. Years ago, before our rule, on the occasion of some opposition among the Dhoonds, Maharaja Goolab Singh having in vain hunted for the escaped ringleaders, at length obtained them by imprisoning the head men of the neighbourhood; and, with the example of this subtle ruler, I now called
MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB, IN 1857.

called into Hurreepoor the mullicks of Seer, Myra and Nuggree, and told them they must remain there till the Bhutteean fugitives were discovered, and until I was convinced that no others were also secreted by their connivance.

79. I again sent my two former deputies to Sirdar Hussun Ally Khan, ordering him to stay at Bagun with them; and to secure their valuable influence, I called in the peers of Plasseh; the result was, that all the Bhutteean fugitives were unconditionally made over by the Mullick of Myra, whose daughter is married to the principal man. The other Dhoond fugitives, rejected everywhere, have mostly been arrested in their own homes by the Pindee police or my own, and but very few now remain at large. The confederation, whatever it may have been, has been entirely broken up; and of those proved to have been actually engaged, some have suffered death, and very many have been imprisoned by the authorities of Rawul Pindee, their cattle confiscated, and their villages fired.

80. Among those put to death were some Hindoostanees of Murree, and undoubtedly the disturbance was planned and incited by the Hindoostaneen Mahometans, who worked upon the credulity and avarice and fanaticism of these hill tribes, assuring them of an easy plunder, in which they would have all their assistance.

81. The account of this outbreak would properly belong to Rawul Pindee; but it was so closely connected with this district, that I could not avoid dwelling on it; and undoubtedly had it not been promptly managed, or had it been supported and followed up by the people of Huzara, it would have been a far more serious matter, occurring as it did at a time of great weakness in troops.

82. Shortly afterwards two companies of the new 12th Punjab Infantry were sent me from Peshawur, and Major General Cotton was good enough to extend his tour with an escort of European Infantry and Cavalry into Huzara, as far as Mansera; a measure, I believe, productive of much good at that time, as a renewal of opinion, and a most convincing proof, of the tranquil strength of Peshawur. On the General’s departure, I was reinforced by four more companies of the 12th Punjab Infantry, under Captain Blaggrave, while the returned confidence and prospect of quiet since the fall of Delhi has enabled me to curtail the expenses, by reducing two-thirds of the levies.

83. I have now sketched the principal characteristics of the last eventful eight months, during which I have reason to thank my assistant, Lieutenant Boulderson, for his sound sense, good feeling and entire co-operation; I am also much obliged to the Extra Assistant Mirza Azim Beg, who remained alone for some months in charge of Hurreepoor, and inspired general confidence by his serenity and temper.

84. And now that I believe the worst time of trial has passed, I look back with some satisfaction at the peacefulness of this district, as a portion of the Punjab frontier, during a hurricane which has torn and raged across India with such terrible force.

(signed)  J. R. Becher.

(True copies.)  
J. W. Kaye,  
Secretary in Political and Secret Departments.
PAPERS
RELATING TO THE
MUTINY IN THE PUNJAB
IN
1857.

(Mr. Henry Baillie.)

Ordered, by The House of Commons, to be Printed,
15 April 1859.

[Price 1s. 8d.]
RETURN to an Order of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated 12 December 1857; for,

A RETURN of the NAME or NUMBER of each REGIMENT and REGULAR and IRREGULAR CORPS in India which has MUTINIED, or manifested a Disposition to MUTINY, since the 1st day of January 1857; of the Number of Officers and Men present with each Regiment and Corps at the Outbreak of any Mutiny; of the Date of the First Intimation received by any Officer of any Regiment or Corps being disposed to Mutiny; and of the Date when Information thereof was received by the Governor-General of India, and, so far as relates to the Bombay Army, by the Governor of Bombay; also, of the Date of the First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Regiment or Corps, and by the Governor-General or Governor of Bombay, for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreaks, or Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition."

India Office, 11 March 1859.

W. E. BAKER, Colonel,
Military Secretary.

(No. 2,008.)

From the Assistant Adjutant-General of the Army to the Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Sir,

In continuation of this office letter, No. 339 of the 9th February last, I have the honour to forward for transmission to the home authorities a return giving the information called for in regard to regiments which have mutinied, or shown a disposition to mutiny, since the 1st January 1857.

I beg at the same time to transmit reports which have been received from the officers commanding the corps marginally enumerated relating to the conduct of their regiments.

I have, &c.,

(signed) S. Becher, Captain,
Assistant Adjutant-General of the Army.

Adjutant-General's Office, Calcutta, 30 October 1858.

*1

*1 A

RETURN
RETURN of the Corps on the Bengal Establishment which have Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny, since the 1st of January 1857.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number or Name of Regiment</th>
<th>When and where Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Number of European Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers, and Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers present with the Regiment at the Outbreak.</th>
<th>The Date of the First Intimation received by any Officer of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date when Information of the Corps was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>The Date of the First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRESIDENCY DIVISION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Berhampore, 26th February; disbanded at Barrackpore, 31st March 1857.</td>
<td>13 European officers, 18 native officers, and 1,074 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>25 February 1857</td>
<td>25 February 1857</td>
<td>26 February 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62d Native Infantry</td>
<td>Two detachments mutinied at Deogurh and Rampore Halt on the 9th and 17th October 1857 respectively.</td>
<td>4 European officers, 6 native officers, and 492 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>7 October 1857</td>
<td>11 October 1857</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Three companies mutinied at Chittagong on the 18th November 1857.</td>
<td>3 European officers, 5 native officers, and 248 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>6 February 1857</td>
<td>6 February 1857</td>
<td>6 February 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63d Native Infantry</td>
<td>Certain men of the regiment (14 in number, 11 of whom have since been struck off the rolls for overstaying their leave) refused, or stated their reluctance to avail themselves of the indulgence of furlough, until they knew whether their brethren at Barrackpore would accept it or not. These men were ultimately permitted to take furlough, and their cases disposed of under orders of Government.</td>
<td>7 European officers, 12 native officers, and 607 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>26 March 1857</td>
<td>27 March 1857</td>
<td>26 March 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76d Native Infantry</td>
<td>Manifested a disposition to mutiny at Jelpigore; 2 companies mutinied at Dacca in November 1857.</td>
<td>8 European officers, 5 native officers, and 227 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>In June 1857</td>
<td>3 July 1857</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks by Officers Commanding the Corps.

See Colonel Burney's letter, No. 39, 18th February 1858, to the Adjutant-general of the army, annexed.

Seven companies of the corps disbanded at Barrackpore on 6th May 1857.

See Colonel Sherer's letter, No. 38, of the 27th February 1858, to the Assistant Adjutant-general, Presidency Division, annexed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th Irregular Cavalry</td>
<td>Manifested a partial disposition to desert at Berhampore</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Assam, Light Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Concerned in a conspiracy against the European officers at Jelpigoree.</td>
<td>17 August 1857</td>
<td>Reported to Colonel Sherer, commanding at Jelpigoree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinapore Division</td>
<td>7th Native Infantry Mutinied at Dinapore, on the 25th July 1857</td>
<td>25 July 1857</td>
<td>From the earliest signs of disaffection in the native army, every precaution was taken for suppressing any mutinous disposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8th Native Infantry Mutinied at Dinapore, on the 234(25th) July 1857</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>From the earliest signs of disaffection in the native army, every precaution was taken for suppressing any mutinous disposition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the night of the 20th June 1857 the native adjutant of the regiment reported to me, that some sowars manifested a disposition to desert, owing to some evil reports circulated in the lines, brought by some sepoys (deserters) from the regiments at Barrackpore. On the 21st June 1857, at mid-day, a fanatic sowar, Busseerooddeen, openly mutinied, threatened to shoot the native adjutant, released some State prisoners, "deserters," on their way to Barrackpore. This sowar, Busseerooddeen, was seized, tried by court-martial, and transferred for life beyond seas.

With the two squadrons at Jelpigoree, were disarmed and unhorsed, and sent back to regimental head-quarters by order of Colonel Sherers, commanding at Jelpigoree; dismissed the service, in obedience to instructions of Government.

The Fourth Troop deserted during the night of the 4th December from the station of Jelpigoree, and the Third Troop deserted from Camp Madargunge at 9 o'clock, p.m. of the 6th December 1857. See remarks in return from officer commanding the regiment.

See Lieutenant-colonel Hanney's letter, No. 88, 12th March 1858, to the Assistant Adjutant-general, Presidency Division, annexed.

See Colonel Templers letter, No. 8, of the 19th February 1858 (with enclosures), to the Assistant Adjutant-general, Dinapore Division, annexed.

Brigadier Rowcroft's letter, No. 428, dated 5th August 1858, to the Assistant Adjutant-general of the army, is annexed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number or Name of Regiment</th>
<th>When and where Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Number of European Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers, and Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, present with the Regiment at the Outbreak.</th>
<th>Remarks made by Officers Commanding the Corps.</th>
<th>Remarks.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dinapore Division—continued.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Azimgburgh, 3d June 1857.</td>
<td>12 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 8 native officers, and 874 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>The Date of the First Intimation received by any Officer of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny.</td>
<td>1 June 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Partially mutinied at Benares, on the 4th of June 1857.</td>
<td>10 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 14 native officers, and 965 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>The Date when Information of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny was first communicated to Superior Authority.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Dinapore, 25th July 1857.</td>
<td>11 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 17 native officers, and 1,015 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>The Date of the First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment of Loodianah</td>
<td>Partially mutinied at Benares on the 6th, and at Jounpore on the 8th June 1857.</td>
<td>3 European officers, 15 native officers, and 720 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramgurh Light Infantry Battalion.</td>
<td>2 companies mutinied whilst proceeding to Hazarea-bough 31st July. The head quarters at Durnah, 2d August; detachments at Purules some time in August; detachment at Chyebasen 5th September 1857.</td>
<td>5 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 14 native officers, and 1,052 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Irregular Cavalry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Dhaugulpore on the 14th August 1857; detachments also mutinied at Doomka and Rohnee.</td>
<td>2 European officers, 10 native officers, and 432 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Company, 8th Battalion Artillery.</td>
<td>Manifested a disposition to mutiny on the 10th June 1857.</td>
<td>10 June 1857</td>
<td>Colonel M'Cauland, commanding at Almorah, first discovered the mutinous intentions of the company, and so no report was necessary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Company, 8th Battalion Artillery, with K. Company Ordnance Drivers (No. 15 Light Field Battery) attached.</td>
<td>Mutinied. The head quarters at Barrielly, on the 31st May 1857, and a detachment at Moradabad on the 3d June.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No necessity existed for any such communication.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Native Infantry, mutinied 20th May 1857.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>None received</td>
<td>Colonel M'Cauland tried the ringleaders by court martial, and disbanded the company the day he discovered its mutinous intentions, viz., on 10th June 1857.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligarh:</td>
<td>5 European officers, 4 native officers, 240 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murpooie:</td>
<td>2 European officers, 2 native officers, 160 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etawah:</td>
<td>2 European officers, 2 native officers, 160 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boondebazar:</td>
<td>1 European officer, 2 native officers, 88 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44th Native Infantry Agra.</td>
<td>No. 8 Company mutinied at Muttra on the 30th May 1857.</td>
<td>30 May 1857</td>
<td>No opportunity offered for such an order to be issued by the commanding officer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Delhi, 11th May 1857.</td>
<td>11 May 1857</td>
<td>The regiment was disarmed on the morning of the 31st May.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67th Native Infantry Agra.</td>
<td>A detachment mutinied at Muttra on the 30th May 1857.</td>
<td>30 May 1857, when the detachment mutinied at Muttra.</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number or Name of Regiment</td>
<td>When and where Mutined, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny</td>
<td>The Number of European Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers, and Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, present with the Regiment at the Outbreak.</td>
<td>Remarks Made by Officers Commanding the Corps.</td>
<td>Remarks.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saugor District:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Wing, 1st Light Cavalry</td>
<td>Mutined at Mhow, on the 1st July 1857.</td>
<td>6 European officers, 6 native officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, and 205 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>No intimation ever received. Men strongly suspected by some of the officers during latter portion of June 1857.</td>
<td>No orders were ever issued, excepting for officers to sleep in turn in the lines, and the more to reassure the men than from apprehension of their mutinying. Orders issued about 16th June 1857.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Wing, 1st Light Cavalry</td>
<td>Mutined at Neemuch, on the 3d or 4th June 1857.</td>
<td>9 European officers, 2 native officers, 1 European non-commissioned officer, and 114 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>No intimation having been received, no report was made to superior authority, and the commanding officer (Col. Platt) had full confidence in his regiment.</td>
<td>Colonel. Platt, commanding, and Brevet Captain Fagan, adjutant, were murdered at Mhow on the night of the mutiny.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutined at Mhow, on the 1st July 1857.</td>
<td>13 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 16 native officers, and 660 men, at the time of the outbreak at Saugor.</td>
<td>On or about the 22d of May 1857.</td>
<td>On the 24th May 1857, a regimental order was issued on the subject of ammunition, in conformity with a district order, dated 23d May 1857.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Native Infantry</td>
<td>Did not manifest a disposition to mutiny, only 48 bad characters having joined the mutineers of other regiments.</td>
<td>9 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 15 native officers, and 560 men, at the time of the outbreak at Saugor.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42d Light Infantry</td>
<td>Partially mutined at Saugor, 2d July 1857.</td>
<td>12 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 9 native officers, and 672 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutined at Nagode, 16th September 1857.</td>
<td>12 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 18 native officers, and 704 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td></td>
<td>See Lieut.-colonel Hampton's letter, No. 02, 4th March 1857, to the Major of Brigade, Benares, annexed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Officers/Soldiers</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Jubbulpore, excepting two companies.</td>
<td>Jubbulpore</td>
<td>12 European officers, 8 native officers, and 156 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>The partial mutiny of the corps was immediately reported to Brigadier Sage, commanding Saugor district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Irregular Cavalry</td>
<td>Partially mutinied at Saugor, 1st July 1857.</td>
<td>Saugor</td>
<td>2 European officers, 7 native officers, and 99 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>A proclamation issued by Brigadier Sage, commanding Saugor district, was given to the native officers on the 1st July 1857.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SIRHIND DIVISION:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Light Cavalry</td>
<td>At Jullundur</td>
<td>Jullundur</td>
<td>12 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 7 native officers, and 674 native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Native Infantry,</td>
<td>Partially mutinied at Lodiana (one company).</td>
<td>Phillour</td>
<td>8 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, and 674 native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Partially mutinied</td>
<td>Jullundur</td>
<td>12 European officers, 11 native officers, and 805 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Native Infantry,</td>
<td>No outbreak ever occurred</td>
<td>Jullundur</td>
<td>14 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 13 native officers, and 974 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>No such intimation was ever received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th Native Infantry</td>
<td>At Jullundur</td>
<td>Jullundur</td>
<td>13 European officers, 8 native officers, and 759 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Rhotuck, 10th June 1857.</td>
<td>Rhotuck</td>
<td>15 European officers, 10 native officers, and 800 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 12 June 1857 - 12 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 7 native officers, and 674 native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and men.
- 7 June 1857 - 7 June 1857 - 7 June 1857.
- 5 May 1857 - 5 May 1857 - See Remarks in Return.
- 10 May 1857 - 10 May 1857 - 10 May 1857 - See Major Maitland’s Remarks.
- No such intimation was ever received.
- On the 24th May 1857, suggested measures for the restoration of confidence at the musketry depots (before the men were permitted to rejoin their regiments), and throughout the native army.
- No occasion for such an order.
- The regiment was disarmed by Brigadier-general Nicholson on the 25th June 1857, at Phillour. A jemadar was blown from a gun on the 1st September following, at Jullundur, for mutinous language, and five sepoys were imprisoned in the civil gaol at Jullundur on the 20th November 1857, for using threatening language against the lives of those who brought up the said jemadar.
- 23 May 1857.
- See Lieut-colonel R. Drought’s letter of 23d March 1858, to the Assistant Adjutant-general, Sirhind Division.
## RETURN of the Corps on the Bengal Establishment which have Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny, since the 1st of January 1857—continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number or Name of Regiment</th>
<th>When and where Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny</th>
<th>The Number of European Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers, and Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, present with the Regiment at the Outbreak.</th>
<th>Remarks by Officers Commanding the Corps.</th>
<th>Remarks.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sirhind Division—continued.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st Native Infantry</td>
<td>Jullundur</td>
<td>9 European officers, 12 native officers, and 953 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>The commanding officer states that he had no occasion to record any order, as every officer, and the officer commanding, were daily and hourly in communication with their men, and their utmost endeavours were used to subdue the excitement which prevailed.</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurrianah Light Infantry Battalion</td>
<td>Mutinied at Hansi, 29th May 1857; also the detachments at Sisar and Hissar.</td>
<td>2 European officers, 2 European non-commisioned officers, 9 native officers, and 517 native non-commissioned officers and men at Hansi.</td>
<td>Information of the intended mutiny was conveyed to the commanding officer about half an hour before it actually occurred by the drill havildar and his brother, a jemadar, who distinctly stated that nothing could prevent it; they joined the mutineers. There was not a European soldier in the station.</td>
<td>See Captain Stafford’s remarks on the mutiny, annexed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Irregular Cavalry</td>
<td>Partially mutinied by detachments at Hansi, Sisar, Moosuferanagur, Sur-sowle, and Umballah.</td>
<td>Total strength of the detachments which mutinied—8 native officers, and 333 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>No intimation was received until the men on command deserted their posts.</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lahore Division:</td>
<td></td>
<td>No information received, and no disposition to mutiny apparent.</td>
<td></td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Light Cavalry</td>
<td>Decided disposition only. Lahore.</td>
<td>7 European officers, 2 European non-commisioned officers, 4 native officers, and 273 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>No order was necessary, as the head quarters of the regiment never showed any signs of mutiny from first to last.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiment</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Other Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Light Cavalry</td>
<td>Mutinied, in part, at Ferozepore, on the 19th August 1857.</td>
<td>19 August 1857</td>
<td>There being no symptoms of mutiny in the regiment, no such precautionary order was necessary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Light Cavalry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Sealkote, 9th July 1857.</td>
<td>20 April 1857</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Decided disposition only. Lahore.</td>
<td>26 April 1857</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Ferozepore, on the 18th and 14th of May 1857.</td>
<td>25 April 1857</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Ferozepore -</td>
<td>25 April 1857</td>
<td>See remarks in Return.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Return of the Corps on the Bengal Establishment which have Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny, since the 1st of January 1857—continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number or Name of Regiment</th>
<th>When and where Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Number of European Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers, and Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, present with the Regiment at the Outbreak.</th>
<th>Remarks by Officers Commanding the Corps.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lahore Division—continued.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Manifested a disposition to mutiny in June 1857; mutinied at Mooltan, 31st August 1858.</td>
<td>13 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 11 native officers, and 571 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td>The inquiry regarding the conduct of Subadar-major began early in July 1857.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Date when Information of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny was first communicated to Superior Authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Date of the First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESHAWUR DIVISION:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Light Cavalry, Peshawur.</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 European officers, 6 native officers, and 399 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Native Infantry, Peshawur.</td>
<td>All these corps showed signs of disloyalty on various occasions.</td>
<td>11 European officers, 21 native officers, and 875 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Native Infantry, Peshawur.</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 European officers, 16 native officers, and 832 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Jhelum on 7th July 1857.</td>
<td>6 European officers, 11 native officers, and 711 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>About a month previous to the mutiny.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Disarmed at Dera Ishmael Khan.</td>
<td>11 European officers, 13 native officers, and 807 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61st Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Peshawur on 28th August 1857.</td>
<td>4 European officers, 17 native officers, and 716 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>22 May 1857 - 23 May 1857 - None by Commanding Officer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Major-general Cotton's remarks on the Return from the Peshawur Division, annexed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>European Officers</th>
<th>Native Officers</th>
<th>Native Non-Commissioned Officers and Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65th Native Infantry -</td>
<td>Mutinied at Murdan and Nowshera.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 native officers</td>
<td>2 native officers</td>
<td>278 native non-commissioned officers and men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th Native Infantry -</td>
<td>Manifested a disposition to mutiny, 7th July 1857, at Rawul Pindi.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>278 native non-commissioned officers and men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Native Infantry, Peshawur.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 native officers</td>
<td>968 native non-commissioned officers and men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Irregular Cavalry -</td>
<td>Partially mutinied on march to Bunnoo.</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>578 native non-commissioned officers and men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Irregular Cavalry -</td>
<td>Partially mutinied in the Soneput district in July, and near the River Indus in September 1857.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>250 native non-commissioned officers and men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 European officers</td>
<td>8 native officers, and 250 native non-commissioned officers and men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Irregular Cavalry, Nowshera.</td>
<td>Did not break out into open mutiny, but refused to act against mutineers.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>567 native non-commissioned officers and men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 European officers</td>
<td>18 native officers, and 567 native non-commissioned officers and men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuuserrabad:</td>
<td>Mutinied at Nusserabad on 28th May 1857.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>134 native non-commissioned officers and men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 European officers</td>
<td>2 European non-commissioned officers, 3 native officers, and 134 native non-commissioned officers and rank and file.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Immediately after the outbreak alluded to in the preceding column, despatches were sent "express" in every direction, giving notice of the occurrence. On the 22d September a full and detailed report was made to the Commander-in-Chief and the Officer Commanding in the Upper Provinces.
- The mutineers were pursued into the Salt Range of Hills near the Indus.

**Additional Information:**
- Disbandment was the first measure taken against this corps.
- See remarks in the Return.
- See Major-general Cotton's remarks on the Return from the Peshawur Division, annexed.
## Return of the Corps on the Bengal Establishment which have Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny, since the 1st of January 1857—continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number or Name of Regiment</th>
<th>When and where Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Number of European Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers, and Native Commissioned and Non-commissioned Officers and Rank and File, present with the Regiment at the Outbreak.</th>
<th>Remarks by Officers Commanding the Corps.</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nusserabad—continued.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Nusserabad, 28th May 1857.</td>
<td>11 European officers, 2 European non-commissioned officers, 8 native officers, and 849 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>On or about the 18th May, by Colonel Shuldbam, commanding, from Mr. Courtenay; by the serjeant-major, from a native employed in making pipe-clay for the regiment.</td>
<td>On the 19th May, to Brigadier Macar, commanding at Nusserabad. On the 19th May, and following day, the precautionary measures consisted in the men being ordered not to leave the lines after roll-call for the purpose of fetching water. Visiting rounds both by the European and native officers on duty several times in the course of the night. The same by the serjeant-major, but very quietly; the men being looked after by their pay and orderly havildars once in the course of the night. The keys of the bells of arms were lodged at night in the quarter-guard. All irritation and excitement was avoided as much as possible in carrying out these measures, and the commissioned and non-commissioned officers and men were quietly warned of the consequences. See Colonel Shuldbam's letter of 7th March 1858.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied at Nusserabad, 28th May 1857.</td>
<td>10 European officers, 12 native officers, and 743 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>28 May 1857.</td>
<td>28 May 1857.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neemuch:</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 European officers, 1 European non-commissioned officer, 15 native officers, and 967 native non-commissioned officers and men.</td>
<td>28 May 1857.</td>
<td>28 May 1857.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sep Becker, Captain,
Assistant Adjutant-General of the Army.
(No. 39.)

Barackpore, 18 February 1858.

Sir,

With reference and in reply to your circular letter, No. 317, of the 10th instant, calling for a complete return of every regiment that has mutinied, or shown a disposition to mutiny, since the 1st January 1857, I have the honour to report as follows:

1. The number or name of such regiment, regular or irregular, specifying whether it has mutinied or manifested a disposition to mutiny.

1. 365 men of the 92d Regiment Native Infantry, who were on command in the Santhal District, mutinied and deserted from Deogurh and Rampoor Haut; but the largest portion of the regiment, upwards of 600 bayonets, who were at head quarters under my immediate command, have remained faithful, and manifested no disposition to mutiny.

2. The number of European officers, and native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men present with each regiment at the outbreak of such mutiny.

2. At Deogurh, on the 9th October last, the date of the outbreak, the strength of the detachment was 2 European officers, 3 native officers, 18 non-commissioned officers, 2 drummers, and 177 sepoys. Of this number, 1 European officer (Lieutenant Rannie); 3 havildars, 1 Christian drummer, and 1 sepoy, escaped from the mutineers, and rejoined head quarters. At Rampoor Haut, on the 17th October last, the date of the outbreak, the strength of the detachment was 2 European officers, 3 native officers, 21 non-commissioned officers, 1 drummer, and 183 sepoys; of this number, 2 European officers, 1 native officer, 9 non-commissioned officers, and 14 sepoys rejoined regimental head quarters.

3. The date of the first intimation received by any officer of the corps being disposed to mutiny.

3. On the morning of the 9th October, a letter, dated Deogurh, 7th of that month, was received by Lieutenant and Adjutant Nowell from Lieutenant Cooper, in which this officer thus wrote,—

"These rascally Mussulmen are again exciting the Hindoos, and creating discontent, by saying, the regiment is going to Raneegunge to be disarmed, and not for service; but I have removed their fears." This belief, I regret to say, was ill-founded, for on the morning of the 9th October, two days after writing the above, he and Dhowkul Sing, subadar, were murdered. In respect to the other detachment that mutinied at Rampoor Haut on the 17th October last, no disposition to mutiny was previously evinced, but the occurrence was sudden and unexpected.

4. The date when information thereof was first communicated to superior authority.

4. From Camp Yurkoota, on the 11th October last, to the address of the deputy adjutant-general of the army.

5. The date of the first order issued by the commanding officer of the corps for adopting measures for the prevention of such outbreak, or suppression of such mutinous disposition.

5. On the report of Lieutenant Cooper commanding the detachment at Deogurh, that certain men had manifested disaffection, they were recalled to head quarters, and I had arranged for relieving the whole detachment on the 1st October, but was prevented from so doing owing to the receipt of orders for the march of the regiment. I think it right to add under this head, that on the 17th August last, when the mutinous 5th Irregular Cavalry passed by Deogurh, a mutinous feeling was manifested by 1 native officer and 3 non-commissioned officers, and they were brought to head quarters; at that time I was unsuccessful in obtaining any evidence against them, except in the case of 1 non-commissioned officer, who had left his guard on the occasion, and was sentenced to four months hard labour by a native regimental court-martial; the others remained at regimental head quarters until the occurrence of
PAPERS RELATING TO THE

the outbreak at Deogurh, when by my orders they were sent under a guard to Bhaugulpoor. They were subsequently tried by a general court-martial at Barrackpore, and suffered death by being blown from a gun.

I have, &c.

Geo. Burney, Colonel,
Commanding 32d Regiment N. L

Lieutenant-Colonel N. Mayhew,
Adjudant-general of the Army, Calcutta.

C. Grant, Brigadier,
Commanding at Barrackpore.

(No. 38.)

Jelpigoree, 28 February 1858.

Sir,

As requested in circular No. 317, dated Adjutant-general's Office, 10th February 1858, I have the honour to furnish the information called for therein regarding the regiment under my command. The 73d Regiment Native Infantry, as a body, have certainly behaved well throughout the late rebellion; but there have been numerous and repeated instances of mutiny in the corps. The strength of the regiment at the time of the first show of any mutinous feeling, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Officers</th>
<th>Natives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Colonel.</td>
<td>2 Subadars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Captain.</td>
<td>3 Jemadars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Lieutenants.</td>
<td>21 Havildars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ensigns.</td>
<td>23 Naicks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Assistant surgeon</td>
<td>14 Drummers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 Musicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>455 Sepoys.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was early in June, when men were heard to say they would not use a greased cartridge, or allow themselves to be disarmed. It was discovered too, that several sepoys, who were supposed to have gone to their homes, were remaining in the adjacent civil stations; we also knew at this time, that a messenger coming from Meerut had brought a letter to one of the men of the regiment, and that a number of sepoys had subscribed to pay this emissary to carry letters from them to Lucknow. Intimation of this was at once given to all the magistrates in the neighbouring districts; describing the messenger, who was disguised as a Hindoo fakir, and carried the letters he had with him hidden in a hollow bamboo, which he used as a walking stick; but unfortunately this man escaped detection.

All these circumstances only made us doubly vigilant in watching the movements of our men, and ascertaining (as we did through our spies) the feeling of the regiment.

Every precaution was taken by Mr. Gordon, our magistrate, to strengthen the police chowkies on all the various roads, to prevent the arrival of emissaries for evil, or the departure of seditious messengers. The laddies and children were at once sent to Darjeeling.

Up to this period, the 24th of June, there had been no open manifestation of mutiny in the regiment; but on that day two companies, who had come from Dacca, brought a report that Europeans were on their way to Jelpigoree, to disarm the corps; and finding next day that this had occasioned a vast excitement throughout the lines, I immediately ordered a parade, and explained to the men that there was no foundation whatever for this report, promising them at the same time that as long as they behaved well they should not be disarmed. By these assurances the excitement was allayed; but it was known to us afterwards, that on the night of the 24th almost all the grenadier companies, as also many more of other companies, had taken their muskets out of the "bells of arms," and slept with them at their huts; some even had loaded their muskets, and several bundles of cartridges had been loosed out all ready for use.

With the knowledge of these facts, and being told that a sepoy had been sent from Dacca to Barrackpore in March last to learn what was doing there (coupled with the circumstance of Captain Tickell having been warned by a man of his company not to dine at mess), I resolved to take immediate measures for arresting our evil-disposed men, who, if permitted to remain at large, would contaminate the whole regiment; however, before I could venture, on such a step, I saw it was most necessary I should do all I could to strengthen my hands. There were, I knew, two very powerful parties in the regiment, made up of Oude, and Bhojepore men, who were the most turbulent in the whole corps. Unless I could gain these men over, my firm belief was that the regiment would rise. The havildar majorship (a much sought prize) was at this time vacant; so to secure the Bhojepore men, I gave this appointment to one of their own clan, a havildar, by the name
name of "Arhaiba Tolla," a man known to have very great influence in the regiment; and I must say that since he has held the situation of havildar major, he has behaved admirably, most nobly indeed.

An Oude man, the drill 'naik of the regiment, by name "Bindadeen Pewaare" (who had acted for some time as havildar-major), I was aware had equal if not greater influence over his friends than Arhaiba Tolla had over his party, and as Bindadeen was known to be a good and most deserving man, I at once made him a jemadar. Both the men were not only satisfied with but highly delighted at their promotion. With my hands thus strengthened, and being assured by Arhaiba Tolla, as well as Bindadeen, that I might rely on their carrying out any order I gave them, I then told them they would soon be put to the test; and the following day, as directed, they arrested a havildar and five sepoys who were plotting to murder their officers. These men were immediately tried by native court-martial, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment. On the 22d of August, a party of the same month, another havildar and four sepoys, who had planned an attack on the officers at mess, were suddenly seized, as the others had been, by Arhaiba Tolla's and Bindadeen's party, and sent in irons to Calcutta. Six months' imprisonment for such a crime was a mere farce; so hoping that these villains would be justly punished at the Presidency, they were forwarded there for trial.

On the 30th July I ordered a parade for the purpose of having the subjoined address read and explained to the regiment; at the same time the men were told if they had any grievance to comply of, to come forward at once and state it. All appeared satisfied then but, on the 12th of August, a party of three sepoys, two of whom were armed with pistols, determined on killing some officer. Two were arrested, and sent to Calcutta for trial; the third, refusing to give himself up, and endeavouring to raise the regiment by appealing to their religion, &c., was shot where he stood by a sepoy of the quarter-guard. I promoted the sepoy at once. On the 13th August, two sepoys, friends of the men shot, said they would have revenge for the death of their friends; they were arrested, tried by court-martial, and sentenced to "imprisonment for life."

On the 11th November a sepoy loaded his musket, and declared his intention of shooting an officer; he was arrested, tried, and sentenced to "transportation for life." At his trial he said he had formerly been leagued with a havildar and five other sepoys; these were at once dismissed the service, and sent away through the thannahs. On the 22d November an attempt was made to disarm Nos. 6 and 7 companies on command at Dacca; they were killed in consequence. On receipt of intelligence of the outbreak at Dacca, I struck off the strength of the regiment all men absent on furlough, and made promotions in place of those thus struck off. I also formed two new companies in place of Nos. 6 and 7, and filled up the promotions in them immediately.

On the 31st December a havildar and two sepoys, forming part of a small detachment sent to capture a zemindar on the Bootan frontier, who had furnished the Dacca mutineers with money and supplies, went over to the enemy, and gave information of the party coming. These three men were tried, and blown away from guns.

On all occasions I promoted the men whose loyalty was conspicuous, both in coming forward as witnesses, and also in arresting and guarding the mutineers.

The date of my first communication to the Major-general commanding the division, reporting an "unsettled feeling" in the regiment, and the steps I had taken to allay this, was the 30 of July; and on the 24th of that month, I informed him of the mutinous conduct of many of the men had shown, detailing at the same time the measures I had adopted to stay the progress of this disposition, which (though they did not at once stop that) have enabled me, I am happy to say, to arrest every conspirator in, and retain perfect command of, the regiment.

I have, &c.

To Major Ross, A. A. General.

(signed) G. M. Sherer, Colonel, Commanding 73d Regiment Native Infantry.

Copy of Address.

"Men of the 73d,—You all know how anxious I have been to do every thing I could to promote your comfort here. Many of you have, over and over again, expressed your hearty thanks to me for the exertions I have used in getting you so good a hospital built, and having your lines made as dry as I could. Equally anxious have I been to preserve your good name; and for this reason, as the regiment had behaved so well, I wrote to the Commander-in-Chief to request you might not be disarmed. You all know that when you have deserved it you have been rewarded by promotion, which I have taken on myself to give you; at the same time that I have done this, I have had another most painful duty to perform. Several of your comrades, you are aware, have been tried by court-martial, and others dismissed with ignominy for most shameful and mutinous conduct. This, as I repeat, has been a most painful duty, but one I was compelled to execute. To preserve the fair name of the regiment is my most anxious desire; and unless I had separated these bad characters from the good, the whole body might have lost its reputation. Should any of you misconduct yourselves, you will be punished as your comrades have been. The Com-
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mander-in-Chief will see how the regiment has behaved, and will not permit the disgraceful conduct of a few to sully the former good name of the rest who have remained faithful to the State. I shall make a point of bringing these especially to the notice of his Excellency, and at the same time I shall ask the Governor-General to be pleased to remove the regiment to a climate which is less damp and more healthy than this."

Julpigoree, 30 July 1857.

(signed) G. Sherer, Colonel,
Commanding 73d Regiment N. 1,

(No. 58.)

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your office memo, No. 39, of the 10th February last, forwarding, for my information, copy of a circular, No. 317 of the Adjutant-General's office, dated 10th of February 1858, and in reference to the information required in that circular, beg leave to embody as follows, copies of paras. 3, 4, and 5 of my letter, No. 49 of the 4th instant, to the address of the Adjutant-General of the army:

"3. The seeds of sedition, as stated in the foregoing paras.; existing in the regiment, drill havildar, and a pay havildar, natives of Oudah, who had been living in Assam with their families, got furlough to their homes, from 1st May 1856 to the 1st January 1857, and corresponded with me to a late date, and I heard that one of them was on his return; but as neither rejoined the regiment, I presume that the intended outbreak became known to them.

4. The mutiny of the troops at Meerut and Delhi became known in Upper Assam in the beginning of June 1857, but it was not till the middle of August that the news of the Dinapore mutiny reached Dibrooghur; and from certain siuster reports received at the same time, that it became evident the same poison which had acted so banefully in India, had been at work for some time, preparing for an outbreak in Assam, the marked features of which were first developed at Golaghat, an outpost 104 miles distant from regimental head quarters, and attributable, no doubt, to exaggerated statements of the mutinies, in letters to the sepoys themselves, perhaps, before and after the defection of Koor Singh, and the mutiny of the troops at Dinapore, and also to the natural bias of the Mohamedan native commandant of the outpost; but chiefly, I believe, by the intrigues of the young Rajah of Assam, at the instigation of Manee Ram Dewan (hanged at Jorehath, 26th February 1858, along with Peealee Burooah, the agent of the rajah to the sepoys), to get the sepoys to rise in insurrection; an intrigue pretty generally participated in by the native Government omials, &c., and influential people in Upper Assam, who by their disloyal acts in disseminating exaggerated reports from native newspapers, did more to contaminate the minds of the sepoys than anything else, and create a general feeling of disquietude.

5. There was a Mohamedan intrigue at head quarters, in connexion with the young Rajah and the Mohamedaas at Jorehath, carried on by one of the native officers of the regiment, acting under the advice and arrangements of the Mohamedan native doctor of the battalion (against whom charges have been sent in), and who is known to have received emissaries of the rebellion in his house at Dibrooghur, which emissaries subsequently revisited the 34th Regiment mutineers, and advised their proceeding to Assam, where a Hindostanee regiment would be ready to join them."

2. The seeds of sedition, as stated in the foregoing paras., existing in the regiment as well as amongst some of the influential people in Upper Assam, precautionary measures for the prevention of an outbreak became necessary. The first intimation of intrigues from the darogah at Jorehath is dated 17th August 1857, and I think that the news of the Dinapore mutiny reached this about the 16th August. The strength of the corps in Assam on the latter date, was as follows:

| Lieutenant-colonel commanding and acting adjutant | 1 |
| Captain and 2d in command | 1 |
| Assistant surgeon | 1 |
| Serjeant-major | 1 |
| Quartermaster-serjeant | 1 |
| Subadars | 8 |
| Jemadars | 8 |
| Havildars | 29 |
| Naicks | 29 |
| Bugglers | 18 |
| Sepoys | 839 |

Equal to 950 of all ranks, natives.

3. The first measures taken were to call to regimental head-quarters, Captain Lowther, 2d in command, and 50 hill men and Jaroohas, of No. 8 Company, and a like number of Nepalese of No. 9 Company, from Jeypore, and on the arrival of these men at head quarters on the 23d of August—310 of the 450 men present of all ranks were natives of the Nepaul provinces and the Goolparah district of Assam—a strong pucket was posted on the left flank of the cantonment, ostensibly on account of rumours of dissaffection among the inhabitants of Mutteuck; a pucket of 50 Nepalese located day and night in rear of the sepoys light infantry lines, and 50 men were put into the fortified square under a native officer.
EAST INDIA MUTINY.

officer. Private arrangements were made for the security of the bells of arms and maga-
zine in the case of a disturbance.

4. There were in Dibrooghur four 6-pounder field guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, and
about 60 native artillery men of the local artillery company, nearly all of whom were Hin-
doostanees. I ordered a party with the latter guns to be held in readiness to proceed to
Jorethath, with the 60 men in rear of the light infantry lines, and they were kept there. In
communication with the officer commanding artillery, all extra powder and gun amm-
nition was put in the fortified square, and on the 30th August 1857, two 6-pounders, with
any attempts of the Muttucks, as a measure of defence in case of necessity, leaving the remaining two 6-pounders in the gun-shed of the artillery company,
under charge of the officer commanding and his European non-commissioned officer; the
subadar of the artillery company always sleeping in the gun-shed, and the officer commanding
artillery in the house of the gun-sergeant, close by the gun-shed.

5. These measures, and the embodying of a cantonment police, as notified in my letter of
the 20th August to the agent to the Governor-general, and herewith annexed, constituted
the precautionary measures taken up to the 1st September 1857, and their effects on the
minds of the evil-disposed were very satisfactory; on the 1st of September, the native officer,
who had been intriguing at Jorethath, was placed under arrest, ostensibly, for overstaying
his leave. By the 11th September, the young rajah was arrested and sent out of Assam; on the 16th,
an intriguing native doctor was deported from the station, and all remained quiet up to the
2d October 1857, when the naval brigade arrived.

6. The trials and inquiries already before his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, with the
civil trials in the Jorethath district, and their results, with other matters brought to light,
will show, however, that a widely-spread conspiracy was on foot for the overthrow of the
British authority in Assam.

I have, &c. (signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-col.,
Commanding 1st Assam L. I. B., &c. at Dibrooghur.

Major A. H. Ross, Assistant Adjutant-general,
Presidency Division, Barrackpore.

(Copy of Confidential Letter, No. 1.)

Sir, Dibrooghur, 20 August 1857. I have the honour to acquaint you that within the last week there has been much ex-

2. From Captain Holroyd I hear that you have been made aware of the nature of the reports
from the Seesbagur district, and that the sepoys of the light infantry battalion
had offered their services to the young rajah of Assam to take back the country. This, in
my opinion, is more likely to be the concoction of some intriguing party, who wishes to
withdraw the sepoys from their allegiance. At this station, what I have all along ex-
pected has taken place, viz., reports of an intended rise of the Muttucks, and their intrigues
also to get adherents.

3. With regard to the regiment, I can only say, that I can see as yet no signs of dis-
content, but I am well aware there are intriguing men in the corps, as well as that amongst
the Hindoostanees; we have the brothers and relatives of men whose regiments have
proved false, and I fear much more excitement on this head will take place when the
mutiny of the Dinapore regiments is known.

4. Under any circumstances, however, I think the Goorkhas, and all other classes not
Hindoostanees, will remain stanch; and referring, therefore, to the reports now prevailing
of the Muttucks and Jorethath intrigues, I have called in all the Goorkhas to head-quarters,
and the second in command, Captain Lowther, from Suddyab; and will make, I trust, such
arrangements at this station as may prove sufficient to keep the peace here, and put down
any attempts of the Assamese to rise in rebellion.

In conclusion, I beg to state, that a good system of police being required for the military
station, I have entertained this day some 30 Nepaulse men and lads to be employed as a
military police in the station. Some of the able-bodied men I have made over to Captain
Reid, commanding local artillery; these I have entertained at Rs. 6. 8. per mensem, sepoys' pay,
and all other lads at five rupees per mensem; and I trust that this measure may meet
with your approval and that of the Government.

I have, &c. (signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-colonel,
Commanding 1st Assam L. I. B., &c. at Dibrooghur.

To Colonel F. Jenkins, Agent to the Governor-general,
and Commanding Troops in Assam, Gowhatty.
Dibrooghur, 28 August 1858.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you, that in consequence of information forwarded to me by Captain Holroyd of certain intrigues going on at Jorehath, I thought it advisable to detach a party, as per margin, to the Jorehath thannah, as a support to the police at that station, and hold a party in readiness to follow if required.

2. I deem it necessary also to bring to your notice, that the names of certain native officers in the corps having been given to me as making use of seditious language, as well as intriguing with certain grandees of the country, a rumour being current of correspondence between men in the corps and Baboo Coor Sing, of Jugdispoor, coupled with apparent intention of seducing the hill men from their allegiance, by promulgating the invasion of our territory by General Jung Bahadour of Nepaul, I have taken the precaution of having the whole of our hill men at regimental head-quarters, about 200 men, which, with the other classes in the regiment not Hindoostanees, gives us the preponderance in our favour; and from evident feeling evinced by these arrangements, a check has been given to the bad spirits, and I trust everything will remain quiet.

3. I have been given to understand that the correspondence with Arrah, or from some of the Dinapore regiments, is upwards of a month old, and the recipient is said to be a native officer on command at Suddyah.

I have, &c.

(Signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-colonel, Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.

To Colonel F. Jenkins, Agent to the Governor-general, and Commanding Troops in Assam, Gowhatty.

(True copies.)

(Signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-colonel, Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.

Dibrooghur, 7 September 1857.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter of the 5th instant, and in reply to acquaint you that, as I stated to you in my note forwarded from this on the evening of the 5th instant, a party under Captain Lowther, second in command, has been held in readiness to carry out the measures proposed by you, and that all accordingly leave this at daybreak to-morrow morning to join you at Dekho Mookh, from whence you will proceed in prosecution of the business to be carried out, as may seem best.

2. With regard to ulterior measures, after the duty has been performed at Jorehath, I recommend your consulting with Captain Lowther, who has instructions to act on any suggestions you make, and to furnish a party to proceed with the regimental boat to Central Assam. The instructions to the non-commissioned officer in charge of this party should be given in writing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-colonel, Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.

To Capt. C. Holroyd, Principal Assistant Commissioner, and A. G. G., Seebasagur.

Dibrooghur, 14 September 1857.

Sir,

I have the honour to acquaint you that at the requisition of Captain C. Holroyd, Principal Assistant, Seebasagur, I detached Captain W. H. Lowther, second in command 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion, with a small party of picked men of the regiment, for the purpose of acting in concert with Captain Holroyd, for the seizure of the young sarengeah rajah of Assam.

2. Captain Lowther left this at 4 A.M. on the morning of Tuesday the 8th instant, and at daybreak next morning satisfactorily accomplished the object of his mission; enclosed I beg leave to forward a copy of Captain Lowther's report for the information of Government and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

I have, &c.

(Signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-colonel, Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.
EAST INDIA MUTINY.

(Confidential, No. 4.)

Dibrooghur, 15 September 1857.

Sir, I have the honour to acquaint you that I have considered it necessary to remove native doctor Hydait Ally, 1st Assam Light Infantry, from the station, for the following reason, and directed him to proceed to Gowhatty, to await your further orders.

2. Hydait Ally has been under my command for 18 years, and I know him to be a bigoted Mohomedan, and imbued with all the prejudices of sectarianism. He is also a disappointed man, his position in the service not being that which he might have expected, from the prospects held by him (by mistake) during the first years of his service. He is a clever, intelligent man, and possesses a tolerable knowledge of the English language.

3. During the last three months this native doctor has been much alive to all that is passing in India, and from his knowledge of English possesses better means of information. With all the excitability of his class, he has been the head and front of certain meetings which have taken place within the last six weeks, where matters appear to have been discussed of a highly seditious nature, and from the language of individuals who were cognizant of and shared in these discussions, the feasibility of seizing the guns was mooted. It would be difficult to prove this; still the meetings and the seditious nature of the discussions are facts.

In conclusion, I would respectfully suggest that he be sent to Dacca, by the regimental boat going there, to be under the orders of the superintending surgeon, who will, no doubt, find him employment in a sphere of duty where his talents will be more likely to get him standing in the service which has not been as yet afforded him here.

I have, &c.

To Colonel F. Jenkins,
Agent Governor-general, and commanding Troops in Assam, Gowhatty.

(Confidential, No. 5.)

Dibrooghur, 16 September 1857.

Sir, In continuation of my letter of yesterday's date, I have the honour to acquaint you, that I received the notes, as copied underneath, from Sergeant-Major H. Jackson, of the regiment under my command.

No. 1. (Here follow note No. 1 and No. 2, dated 15 September 1857.)

2. It is now six weeks since the ceremony of the Buckree Ead, and I can bring nothing to my recollection of the occurrences of that day, excepting that there were two parties, one of the Ghazepore men with Kootubally Khan, sepoys, came a considerable time before the others, with the native doctor, and I must admit there appeared a want of the usual cordiality in their appearance, and their numbers were fewer.

3. It is my intention, when circumstances admit of it, to take official notice of all seditious language which may have been uttered by any one under my command at this station, and if on fair grounds, to recommend the discharge from the service of the individuals who have so offended.

I have, &c.

To Colonel F. Jenkins,
Agent Governor-general, and commanding Troops in Assam, Gowhatty.

(Confidential Letter, No. 6.)

Dibrooghur, 10 September 1857.

Sir, You are aware that very serious reports have been made by the Jorehath police, affecting in a high degree the loyalty of several of the native officers of the battalion under my command.

[Signature]

To Colonel F. Jenkins,
Agent Governor-general, and commanding Troops in Assam, Gowhatty.
command. It appears to me, therefore, that some measures should be taken to prove these accusations, and I have therefore to request that you will, as soon as practicable, make such inquiries as may tend to the elucidation of this matter, the more particularly, as having placed the young rajah out of the way of tampering with, or being tampered with, men of the regiment, proofs of the delinquency of parties are then more accessible.

I have, &c.

(signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-colonel,
Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.

To Captain C. Holroyd,
Principal Assistant Commissioner, Seesagur.

(True copies.)

(signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-colonel,
Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.

(No. 1.)

To Colonel S. F. Hannay, Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.

Sir, 16 September 1867.

I beg to bring to your notice the conduct of a sepoy named Bahadoor Khan, of the 7th company, who, on the last day of Bukra Ead, used some seditious words with the intent of creating a mutinous spirit amongst the sepoys; the following were the words he made use of on Bukra Ead day; after prayers, his brother Mussulman represented the duty of paying their respects to you, but he answered, "What was the use of paying any further respects to the 'Colonel Sahib,' as in a few days more the country would turn over to the 'Nabob.'"

Feeling it my duty to make known to you anything likely to create a disturbance, I hasten to lay it before you.

I am, &c.

(signed) H. Jackson,
Sergeant-Major 1st Assam Light Infantry.

(True copy.)

(signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.

(No. 2.)

To Colonel Hannay, Commanding Officer.

Sir, 15 September 1857.

In reply to your question I beg to inform you that the words were repeated in the general assembly, and the native doctor was the head of the party.

This information was imparted to me confidentially to-day.

I have, &c.

(signed) H. Jackson,
Sergeant-Major 1st Assam Light Infantry.

(True copy.)

(signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.

INSTRUCTIONS for the Information of the European Non-commissioned Officers of the Troops at ——

Dibrooghur, 24 August 1857.

Memorandum for the Artillery.

In the event of any disturbance in the lines of the artillery or light infantry, the three sergeants in the lines will, as soon as possible, spike the six-pounder guns in the gun-shed, and for their assistance, 10 hill men are posted in the billiard room, who have orders to give immediate assistance in carrying out this measure.

Memorandum for the Light Infantry.

In rear of the lines are two havildars, two naics, 40 men, 10 of whom are a guard for the 12-pounder; 10 men will proceed to the quartermaster sergeant, who, with these, will hold the magazine; the remainder, with No. 10 company, will hold the bells of arms. The whole of the party in rear of the lines, amounting to about 80 rank and file, have their arms, and 60 rounds of balled ammunition per man. These, with No. 10 company, are, I trust, faithful, as well as some 100 men of the jarooahs and munipoories: thus making up 310 out of 450 men at this station.

(signed) S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-colonel,
Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.
EAST INDIA MUTINY.

21

Names of Native Officers here of the Light Infantry Battalion.

Mundur Kewas, subadar  -   -   -   -   -  Nepaulese.
Kirtee Sing, subadar   -   -   -   -   -  Manipurie.
Rugbeer Thappa, jemadar -   -   -   -   -  Nepaulese.
Mohabul Thappa, jemadar -   -   -   -   -  Nepaulese.
Sookdes-Kewas, jemadar  -   -   -   -   -  Nepaulese.
Gopaul Ram, jemadar    -   -   -   -   -  Nepaulese.

Fortified Square.

One native officer, two havildars, two naicks, and 50 men, mostly hill men, and jarooahs.

(signed)  S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-colonel,
Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry Battalion.

(True copy.)

(signed)  S. F. Hannay, Lieut.-colonel,
Commanding 1st Assam Light Infantry, &c. at Debrooghur.

(No. 8.)

To Major M. Lydiard, Assistant Adjutant-general, Dinapore Division.

Sir,

Dinapore, 19 February 1858.

In compliance with the Adjutant-general's office circular, No. 317, dated the 10th of February 1858, and your memorandum, No. 1, thereto appended, I have the honour to reply to the several points of information therein called for.

1st. In answer to the 1st paragraph of the circular, I have to state that the 7th Regiment, Native Infantry, under my command, for the first time showed a mutinous spirit to exist in some of the men on the morning of the 25th of July 1857, by the regimental guards (at guard mounting) dispersing, instead of obeying the orders of the officer of the day to wheel into column; and at about 3 p.m. on the same day, all those present (with the exception of three subadars, one jemadar, six havildars, seven naicks, 16 drummers and 36 sepoys) deserted with their arms, regimental colours, and cash deposited in the quarter guard, in a body, with the 6th and 40th Regiments, Native Infantry.

2d. In reply to the 2d paragraph of circular, the numerical strength of European officers and natives present with the regiment at the outbreak is shown in the return hereto appended (A.)

3d. In reply to the 3d paragraph of circular, I have to state that the first intimation, that I am aware of, having been received by any officer in the 7th regiment, of the corps being disposed to mutiny, was received by me in an official report from the regimental officer of the day (Lieutenant Dobbin), dated 25th of July last, to the effect that the whole of the guards of the regiment (at guard mounting) were in a state of mutiny, and which was, at the same time, corroborated by a verbal report made to me by the adjutant (Lieutenant Evans) in person.

4th. In reply to the 4th paragraph of circular, the date of the first information of the corps, disposition to mutiny, viz. on the morning of the 25th of July 1857, and the nature of the communication made by me, will be shown by the copy of the same hereto appended (B.)

5th. In reply to the 5th paragraph of circular, I have to state, that from the earliest signs of disaffection shown in the native army, the utmost precautions were taken by constant visits of both my self and European officers to the men's lines, to allay any signs of fear on their part of intended interference with their prejudices of caste. A strict watch was kept to prevent any arms or bludgeons being secreted. Night patrols were sent through the lines every two hours, by native commissioned officers, under the supervision of the European officers of the day. European commissioned officers were instructed, that in the event of even a fire taking place in the native lines (and which might possibly be a prelude to a disturbance), they were to rendezvous at the mess quarters of Her Majesty's 10th Foot for orders; and I annex a copy of regimental orders issued by me on the morning of the occurrence of the first indication of a mutinous spirit in some of the men of the corps, and which resulted in numerous individuals who were unprepared to escape to their officers being compelled by the threats of the evil-disposed to desert with them.

Of the fact of many men having been forced to desert by others, I am informed by those who on some plea got away from the lines, and have remained professedly loyal.

I have, &c.

(signed)  H. Templer, Brevet-Colonel,
Commanding 7th Regiment, Native Infantry.

(signed)  J. Christie, Brigadier,
Commanding Dinapore Division.

133.   C 3
PAPERS RELATING TO THE

(A.)

NUMERICAL RETURN of the 7th Regiment, Native Infantry.

Dinapore, 25 July 1858.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present at Regimental</th>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Brevet Colonel</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Captains</th>
<th>Lieutenants</th>
<th>Ensigns</th>
<th>Surgeon</th>
<th>Sergeant-Major</th>
<th>Subalterns</th>
<th>Jemadar</th>
<th>Hakim</th>
<th>Dulares</th>
<th>Sepoys</th>
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<td>Head Quarters</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(signed)  
H. Templer, Brevet-Colonel,  
Commanding 7th Regiment, Native Infantry.

Examined,  
(signed)  R. R. Mainwaring, Captain,  
In charge of the Adjutant's Office, 7th Regiment, Native Infantry.

LIST OF EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>RANK AND NAMES.</th>
<th>REMARKS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>H. Templer, Brevet-Colonel</td>
<td>Commanding the regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>W. Birch - Captain</td>
<td>Officiating Interpreter and Quartermaster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R. R. Mainwaring, ditto.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Swiney - ditto.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>F. R. Bailey - ditto.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>R. M. Ingilby, Lieutenant.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J. M. Evans - ditto.</td>
<td>Adjutant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F. B. Boyd - ditto.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>R. S. Robertson ditto.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>R. A. Dobbin - ditto.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>O. M. Graham, Ensign.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>W. C. Anderson, ditto.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>G. Saunders, Surgeon.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>James Hill, Sergeant-major.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(signed)  
H. Templer, Brevet-Colonel,  
Commanding 7th Regiment, Native Infantry.

Examined,  
(signed)  R. R. Mainwaring, Captain,  
In charge of the Adjutant's Office, 7th Regiment, Native Infantry.
Copy of a Letter from Brevet-Colonel Templer, Commanding 7th Regiment, Native Infantry, to the Assistant Adjutant-general, Dinapore, 25th July 1857.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of Major-general Lloyd, c.b., commanding the Dinapore Division, a report which I have just received from the regimental officer of the day of the 7th Native Infantry (coming on duty); and further to add, that the Adjutant of the 7th Native Infantry has reported to me, that from information he has received, he considers the whole of the guards being then mounted, and those who rushed forth on the occasion, were in open mutiny.

I have, &c.

(signed) H. Templer, Brevet-Colonel,
Commanding 7th Regiment, Native Infantry.

(True copy.)

(signed) R. R. Mainwaring, Captain,
Acting Adjutant, 7th Native Infantry.

(signed) H. Templer, Brevet-Colonel.

Extract of Regimental Orders issued by Brevet Colonel H. Templer, Commanding the 7th Regiment, Native Infantry, Dinapore, 25 July 1857.

In conformity with Assistant Adjutant-general's circular of this date, the orderly havildars of companies are directed to collect at 1 o'clock to-day all the percussion caps in use with their men, or lodged with spare accoutrements, and make over the same to the tindal of the regiment, in view to the caps being stored for the present in the artillery magazine by the quartermaster of the corps in the course of the day.

The officiating quartermaster of the regiment will see and report, for the commanding officer's information, that the regulated number of caps have been duly received back.

The whole of the companies of the regiment will parade to-day at noon in undress at their respective bells of arms, when it is to be previously explained by them to their men that the measure now ordered is merely one of precaution, to save the well-disposed from being led away to commit themselves by the evil machinations of designing scoundrels, some of whom are to be found in even the best regiments.

The native officers will immediately attend at the officiating interpreter's, to receive the orders to be explained to their companies, as above directed.

(True extract.)

(signed) R. R. Mainwaring, Captain,
Acting Adjutant, 7th Regiment, Native Infantry.

(signed) H. Templer, Brevet-Colonel,
Commanding 7th Regiment, Native Infantry.

Sir,

Agreeably to Adjutant-general's circular letter, No. 317, dated Adjutant-general's office, Calcutta, 10th February 1858, and a request from the Assistant Adjutant-general, Dinapore, by order of the officer commanding the Dinapore Division, to furnish the information called for in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the above circular letter, with reference to my being late in command of the 8th Regiment, Native Infantry, I have the honour to report as follows:

3d paragraph. I am not aware of any officer receiving intimation of the corps being disposed to mutiny.

4th paragraph. Answered in reply to 3d paragraph.

5th paragraph. Answered in reply to 3d paragraph.

I beg to state that up to the 23d July 1857, when the regiment revolted, and hurriedly fled out of cantonments, with reference to certain orders issued by Major-general Lloyd at Dinapore, commanding the division, for collecting the 15 percussion caps, usually carried
in the men's pouches, which has been duly reported to superior authority, the 8th Regiment, Native Infantry, manifested no disposition to mutiny, and were perfectly obedient and respectful in every way, and in all matters connected with their duties; all duties, parades, drills, target practice, courts martial, &c. being regularly carried on; and on the very day the three regiments deserted, a native regimental court martial assembled at the messhouse at 11 o'clock, for the trial of a sepoy, the prisoner regularly escorted from the quarter guard to the court.

With reference to the mutiny of other regiments at other stations, from the month of May all possible precautions were taken to keep emissaries and other ill-disposed persons out of the lines of the regiment, by placing day and night extra sentries in the lines of the several companies and different parts of the lines, and the native officers were urged to keep a vigilant watch in their companies.

All the native officers off duty visited me as usual in undress, seated for an hour or so for unrestrained conversation. During this time I saw them oftener, sometimes twice a week; they evinced always the best spirit, as far as I could judge; they seemed, and the men generally, to have every confidence in what I told them, as to their not having any objectionable new cartridges issued to them, or their castes any way interfered with; that the reports spread about of the determination of Government to make them Christians were propagated by evil-disposed, designing, rebellious persons, to ruin them and injure the British Government.

The regiment was held well and firmly and steadily to its duty during the three trying and important months of May, June, and July; and probably this had a certain beneficial influence on the other two regiments, the 7th and 40th Native Infantry; for, had the regiments revolted during May or June, or early in July, when few troops had arrived, and the city of Patna and the province of Behar was in a very uneasy and excited state, the consequences might have proved most serious to Patna, the districts around, and lower down in Bengal.

I have, &c.

(signed) F. Rowcroft, Brigadier,
Commanding Sarun Field Force,
Late Commanding 8th Regiment, Native Infantry.

Captain S. Becher,
Assistant Adjutant-general of the Army,
Adjutant-general's Office, Calcutta.
The 17th Regiment Native Infantry:

The head quarters and eight companies were stationed at Azimgurh. These companies were stationed on the 3d of June 1857, at nine p.m.

Two companies were quartered at Goruckpoor, and manifested a disposition to revolt during the month of June 1857. In July and August 64 men deserted from these companies.

A javadar's party of 27 men deserted from the Butte opium agency on the 11th of June, and carried off 7,000 rupees, the property of Government.

A havildar's party of 15 men at the Selimpoor opium agency, defended the government pressure against the 12th Irregular Cavalry, and then safely escorted it to Ghaseepoor, and were rewarded.

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PAPERS RELATING TO THE

EXTRACT from Orders issued to the 17th Regiment Native Infantry at Azimgur, on the
20th of May 1857, by Major F. W. Burroughs, commanding the Regiment, and read on
Parade.

Man of the 17th regiment, you have just had read to you the Governor-general's Order,
No. 645 of the 4th of May 1857; and as your commanding officer, I call your marked
attention to what the Governor-general therein says; namely, "that the Government of
India has never interfered to constrain its soldiers in matters affecting their religious faith,"
and declares that it never will so interfere. This you will implicitly believe, for it is con-
trary to English law to molest or coerce any man in his religion; do not therefore believe
the ill-disposed (the enemies both of the Government and yourselves), who would lead you
to lose your bread and respectability, nor listen to the false reports spread about by such
people.

It is more than 30 years since I joined your regiment at Daubree. Many of you were
enlisted by me during the 12 years I was adjutant. Your interests and mine are the same;
mine to preserve the character and discipline of our regiment; yours to preserve your
bread, your religion, and your respectability; the respectability and good name of your
regiment. If, therefore, you at any time believe you have any cause of doubt or complaint,
appeal through your officers to me, or to me direct if necessary; and you well know that I
have never misled you, or refused to listen to you; and that you have never been required
to do anything prejudicial to your religion. The new platoon exercise requires the top
of the cartridge to be torn off by the hands, not with the teeth; in this it differs from the old
mode of loading, so that neither in this nor in any other respect will the new cartridges be
found objectionable as regards your religion; and you may rest assured that I will not
require you to use any cartridge, or do anything detrimental to your religion.

Having this assurance, I require you to recollect that it is the duty of soldiers to obey
promptly and faithfully the orders of their officers and commanding officers. By your ful-
filling this duty, the discipline and good name of the regiment will be preserved, and here-
after I shall have great gratification in bringing to the notice of superior authority the
good conduct you have evinced at this time, and I feel assured that the Government will
not forget it.

(A true extract.)

F. W. Burroughs,
Major, 17th Regiment, Native Infantry.

PRESENT STATE of the 37th Regiment, Native Infantry.

| Column          | Colonel | Lieutenant- Colonel | Major | Captain | Lieutenants | Ensigns | Cadets | Adjutant | Inspector and Quartermaster | Surgeon | Assistant Surgeon | Serjeant-Major | Serjeants | Drummers | Securing to | Number of Men |
|-----------------|---------|---------------------|-------|---------|-------------|---------|--------|---------|---------------------------|---------|----------------|---------------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|
| Present at Head Quarters: |         |                     |       |         |              |         |        |         |                           |         |                |               |            |           |            |            |                |
| Fit for duty    | -       | -                   | 1     | 2       | 4           | 6       | 1      | 1       | 1                          | 1       | 1              | 2               | 3          | 3         | 21         | 23         | 13             | 414        |
| On regimental duty | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| On line duties  | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Sick in hospital and quarters | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Recruits        | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| In confinement or arrest | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Convalescents   | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| **Total**      | 1       | 2                   | 4     | 7       | 1            | 1       | 1      | 2       | 2                          | 6       | 1              | 2               | 3          | 2         | 1           | 1          | 1              | 17         | 789        |
| Detached       |         |                     |       |         |              |         |        |         | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| On escort duty  | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| On command, Chunar | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Absent         |         |                     |       |         |              |         |        |         | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| With leave, on private affairs | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| On medical certificate | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Without leave  |         | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| On furlough to Europe | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| On staff employ | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Serving with other corps | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Not joined since appointed | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Confused by the civil power | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Sick at Lucknow | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Musketry depot at Dum Dum | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| Wanting to complete | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |
| **Total**      | 1       | 1                   | 1     | 7       | 1            | 1       | 1      | 2       | 1                          | 10      | 10             | 10              | 10         | 10         | 10          | 10         | 10             | 1,000      |
| Establishment  | 1       | 1                   | 1     | 7       | 1            | 1       | 1      | 2       | 1                          | 10      | 10             | 10              | 10         | 10         | 10          | 10         | 10             | 1,000      |
| Excess         | -       | -                   | -     | -       | -            | -       | -      | -       | -                          | -       | -              | -               | -          | -         | -           | -          | -              | -          |

Benares, 4 June 1857.

A. C. Spectranrrod, Lieut.-Col. Commanding 37th Regiment Native Infantry.
F. Buckley, Lieutenant, Officiating Adjutant 37th Regiment Native Infantry.
List of European Officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>PRESENT</th>
<th>ABSENT</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>T. Oliver</td>
<td>Furlough to Europe. G. O. C. C., 14 December 1843.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>A. C. Spottiswoode</td>
<td>A. C. Dewar</td>
<td>Commanding the regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>J. Bentain, Brevet-Major</td>
<td>Commanding Musketry Depôt, Dum Dum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>J. Barrett, Brevet-Major</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>B. Parrott</td>
<td>Assistant to the Haaper Stud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>P. H. P. Gale</td>
<td>J. M. B. Tyler</td>
<td>Furlough to Europe on M. C. G. O. C. C., 4 April 1854.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>J. Reid</td>
<td>Furlough to Europe on M. C. G. O. C. C., 3 December 1856.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>S. Black</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner, Oode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>J. M. Clark</td>
<td>Major of Brigade, Punjaub Irregular Horse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>O. M. Glubb</td>
<td>C. R. Shaw</td>
<td>Assistant Commissioner, Simla.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>F. W. Dunbar</td>
<td>J. L. Sawers</td>
<td>Interpreter and Quartermaster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Surgeon</td>
<td>W. C. S. Clarke</td>
<td>F. A. Buckley</td>
<td>Furlough to Europe on M. C. G. O. C. C., 28 November 1855.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant-Major</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>J. Squire, M.D.</td>
<td>Commanding detachment at Chunar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster-Sergeant</td>
<td>E. Hume.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>In medical charge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Doctor</td>
<td>Wuzzle Ali Khan (3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Leave on M. C. G. O. C. C., 19 January 1856.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>S. Cary</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>A. B. E. Thomas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>J. B. Brander</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>H. H. Chapman</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>J. F. Elton</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Surgeon</td>
<td>A. Beale</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Doing Duty with the Regiment:

| Ensign              | H. L. Ramsbotham | -              | 47th Regiment Native Infantry.               |
| Ditto               | W. Tweedie       | -              | 4th Regiment Native Infantry.                |
| Ditto               | J. C. Hayter     | -              | 23rd Regiment Native Infantry.               |

A. C. Spottiswoode, Lieut.-Col. Commanding 37th Regiment Native Infantry. (Examined.)

F. Buckley, Lieutenant, Officiating Adjutant 37th Regiment Native Infantry.

Numerical Return of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORPS</th>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lieutenant-Colonel</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Ensign</th>
<th>Adjutant</th>
<th>Surgeon</th>
<th>Assistant Surgeon</th>
<th>Serjeant-Major</th>
<th>Serjeant</th>
<th>Serjeant-Ordinary</th>
<th>Naive Doctor</th>
<th>Sutler</th>
<th>Firkan</th>
<th>Havilder</th>
<th>Nalde</th>
<th>Drummer</th>
<th>Seppoy</th>
<th>Lascar</th>
<th>Fuzilier</th>
<th>Brevigre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Benares, 4 June 1857.

A. C. Spottiswoode, Lieut.-Col. Commanding 37th Regiment Native Infantry. (Examined.)

F. Buckley, Lieutenant, Officiating Adjutant 37th Regiment Native Infantry.
**PAPERS RELATING TO THE**

**RETURN of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry, which partly Mutinied, or shown a disposition to Mutiny, since the 1st January 1857, in the Benares District, called for by Adjutant-General’s Circular, No. 317, dated 10 February 1858.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Number of Men of each Regiment, showing whether it has Mutinied, or manifested a disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Number of European Officers, Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men present with each Regiment at the Outbreak of such Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date of the first Intimation received by any Officer of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date when Information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>The Date of the First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps, for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37th Regiment Native Infantry.</td>
<td>European officers 17</td>
<td>On the afternoon of the 4th June 1857, when the disarming of the regiment took place.</td>
<td>No information was ever received of any intended rising of the regiment, or in fact of any rising.</td>
<td>Every circular received, whether from the Secretary to Government in the Military Department, or elsewhere, was read to the regiment generally on parade; afterwards explained to the native officers; again read to companies by officers commanding companies; and a free translation was given to pay-havildars to be read and explained to the men at the private parades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength:</td>
<td>Native officers - 12</td>
<td>European officers 32</td>
<td>Havildars - 33</td>
<td>Drummers - 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Havildars - 29</td>
<td>European officers - 20</td>
<td>Rank and file - 60</td>
<td>Drummers - 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank and file - 1,052</td>
<td>Native officers - 20</td>
<td>Rank and file - 829</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Benares, 11 March 1858.**

A. C. Spottiswoode, Lieut.-Col., Commanding 37th Regiment Native Infantry.

(Examined.)

F. Buckley, Lieutenant, officiating Adjutant 37th Regiment Native Infantry.

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**Enclosures.**

**Sir,**

1. AGREEABLY to Circular No. 217 from the office of the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated 10 February 1858, calling for information on the subject of the late distressing disaffection of the native portion of the Bengal army, I have the pleasure to enclose a copy of the present state of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry, as it stood on the 4th June 1857, and numerical return of the regiment on the same; and state,

2. I never received any authentic intimation of the 37th being disposed to mutiny as a body, though soon after the disbanding of the 19th and 34th Regiments Native Infantry, I used to speak privately to some of the smartest and most intelligent of my native commissioned and non-commissioned officers on the subject, and asked them, and even some of the men of the regiment, various questions, trying to find out the feelings of the regiment, and received what was then called satisfactory replies; I also spoke to my European non-commissioned staff, if they observed the men were less orderly in the lines than usual, and was told that they observed nothing doubtful in the conduct of the men; and it has since transpired that up to the very last moment every man was most obedient and civil to all authorities.

3. About the end of April a subadar of the light company, Saligram Misser, who was received from the 34th Regiment Native Infantry, when that corps was disbanded at Meerut in 1843, was talking to me about family affairs, which he and others frequently did, and said he wanted leave between musters to go home to look after some buildings he had in his village; I replied, though I had promised him the leave some months previously, I did not like the idea of letting one who was so respected in the regiment by all hands as he was to go away in the then stormy state of the country; he replied, "If I did not feel certain there is nothing to fear about our regiment, I should not have asked for leave;" adding, "Of course there are rascals in the regiment, as is the case in all corps, who would be delighted to kick up a row, but the good men of our corps are too powerful for them." Well, it ended in the subadar taking his leave for 20 or 30 days in May, when he rejoined the regiment with his wife; he called on me, as is customary on his return, when I had a lengthened conversation, saying I did not like the rumours I had heard during his absence of some ill feeling in the regiment; he assured me there was nothing to fear for the regiment.
regiment in general; that he himself felt so convinced they would behave well, that he had brought his wife with him, thinking our lines the safest place for her in the then disturbed state of the country. No doubt, he said, the bad men might try and break out, and intimidate the well-disposed; but you now have a party of Europeans here, which has encouraged the well-disposed, and that neither he or those he had spoken to in the regiment dreaded an outbreak in the 27th; and I am certain he and many soldiers of the 37th were as much surprised, at what afterwards occurred, as I was.

4. Up to this moment I am still not convinced that the 414 sepoys that stood on parade, and near 400 on detached duty on the afternoon of the 4th June 1857, were all mutinous or were not well-disposed towards Government; and from what I have since heard from the men that are with the regiment now, that the evil-disposed did not amount to 150; for when I called on the men to lodge their arms in their belts of arms, I commenced with the grenadiers; and so readily were my orders attended to, that in a very short time I had got down as far as No. 6 Company, and was talking to one man who appeared to be in a very mutinous mood; so much so, that I was just debating in my own mind whether I should shoot him, as I was quite close, and had my pistol in my pocket; I was disturbed by some of the men, for there were two or three voices calling out, "Our officers are deceiving us, they want us to give up our arms, that the Europeans who are coming up may shoot us down;" I called out, "It is false;" and I appealed to the native officers, who have known me for upwards of 33 years, whether I ever deceived any man in the regiment; when many a voice replied, "Never; you have always been a good father to us;" however, I saw the men getting very excited of the Europeans, when I told them to keep quiet, that I had galloped forward, and made it not to advance, calling out, "Don't come on;" fancying they had halted, I went back to the lines, and had only just got among my men, when I heard one solitary shot, followed immediately by two others in succession; those three were fired from the 37th lines, and from No. 2 Company, and, as I afterwards heard, were fired by Gourmesunker Tribadie, pay haviladar of 3d Company; immediately a rush was made at the bells of arms which were opened by this man, a general fire commenced, while I and all my officers were in the lines among our men, without receiving any insult or molestation; indeed many of the officers were surrounded and protected by the men of their respective companies, among whom the grenadiers were conspicuous.

5. Shortly after the firing commenced, I joined our guns, between very heavy firing from both sides, and, seeing there was no chance of clearing the lines, volunteered to fire them, which was sanctioned by Brigadier Ponsonby, and while returning from this duty, I saw the sowars of the 13th Irregular Cavalry and regiment of Loodianah Sheikhs, running across country, and some of our guns opening on them.

6. Shortly after my return to the guns and the European detachment, I received orders from the late Colonel Neil, who had assumed command, in consequence of Brigadier Ponsonby being incapacitated by a sun stroke, to proceed with a party of Europeans to scour the cantonments, and to bring in all the females and children; on my way to the different houses I had occasion to pass the deputy paymaster's quarters, wherein his office and treasury were; and recollecting that a guard of about 14 men of my regiment were on duty here, I directed the officer commanding the European detachment with me to go on, pointing out the direction, saying I would soon overtake him, and went into the paymaster's compound; no sooner had I got close to the guard than they rushed towards me, asking for protection, as they were not inclined to join the mutineers, and begging assistance to enable them to protect the treasure under their charge; I merely stopped to speak a few encouraging words to them, and hastened on to overtake the European detachment.

7. My endeavour being blessed by a merciful Providence, I was fortunate enough to find all the females and children safe in their respective houses, and got them into carriages and proceeded to the appointed rendezvous, the Mint; I had hardly got half way back, when we came across a party of 60 or 70 men of the 13th Irregular Cavalry, who were galloping about in a great state of excitement, at this time it was just after sunset, they came very close upon us before they observed the Europeans, so close, indeed, that I went up to the leader and told him not to be alarmed, for just as I stepped forward some of the men saw the Europeans, and called out to their comrades that a party of Europeans had arrived; I sent out to shoot them down; this sentence was hardly uttered, when I got my hand on the bridle of the leading man who pointed his spear at me, which I turned around, and called out, "Don't come on;" the men that are with the regiment now, that the evil-disposed did not amount to 400 sepoys that stood on parade, and near 400 on detached duty on the afternoon of the 4th June 1857, were all mutinous or were not well-disposed towards Government; and from what I have since heard from the men that are with the regiment now, that the evil-disposed did not amount to 150; for when I called on the men to lodge their arms in their belts of arms, I commenced with the grenadiers; and so readily were my orders attended to, that in a very short time I had got down as far as No. 6 Company, and was talking to one man who appeared to be in a very mutinous mood; so much so, that I was just debating in my own mind whether I should shoot him, as I was quite close, and had my pistol in my pocket; I was disturbed by some of the men, for there were two or three voices calling out, "Our officers are deceiving us, they want us to give up our arms, that the Europeans who are coming up may shoot us down;" I called out, "It is false;" and I appealed to the native officers, who have known me for upwards of 33 years, whether I ever deceived any man in the regiment; when many a voice replied, "Never; you have always been a good father to us;" however, I saw the men getting very excited of the Europeans, when I told them to keep quiet, that I had galloped forward, and made it not to advance, calling out, "Don't come on;" fancying they had halted, I went back to the lines, and had only just got among my men, when I heard one solitary shot, followed immediately by two others in succession; those three were fired from the 37th lines, and from No. 2 Company, and, as I afterwards heard, were fired by Gourmesunker Tribadie, pay haviladar of 3d Company; immediately a rush was made at the bells of arms which were opened by this man, a general fire commenced, while I and all my officers were in the lines among our men, without receiving any insult or molestation; indeed many of the officers were surrounded and protected by the men of their respective companies, among whom the grenadiers were conspicuous.

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133.
detachment followed up the fugitive horsemen, who were somewhat impeded by the darkness now coming on, and, being encumbered with some wounded men and horses, were hotly chased by the Europeans; I lost sight of them altogether.

8. This skirmish commenced close to the paymaster's compound; and recalling to mind the alarmed state I had left the guard of my regiment in at that place, I thought I might as well go in and see what they were doing.

9. Here a strange scene occurred; the men were all in a strange state of confusion, and hardly knew how to receive me, for they had been joined by a party of fugitives, men of the 37th, who were burnt out from our own lines, and who seemed to think that our object was to destroy indiscriminately every sepoy we could come across.

10. Fortunately among the guard there were many old soldiers, who declared that they would trust the Europeans, and I soon succeeded in establishing a friendly conversation; here was I, surrounded by 20 odd men, many of whom had been fired upon in our lines, or burnt out of them, with only one other European; who he was I knew not; my life was at their mercy.

11. I contrived to pacify them, and entered into a long conversation, by which I think I am authorised in saying, as I did in para. 4, that I am not yet convinced that the 37th Regiment Native Infantry were not all mutineers, but only a very small minority.

12. In the course of conversation with these men, I soon found out that not only they, but the majority of the men were entirely ignorant of the intentions of the turbulent characters, for it was more than once repeated by these very men and others, who contrived to join Colonel Neil and the guns; they were much surprised at the fire being opened on them, and said "You drove away all the good men who were anxious to join their officers, but could not in consequence of the very heavy fire that was opened, and they only ran away for shelter."

13. Another reason that I have for asserting that the bad feeling was very trifling in the 37th, I had a party of complete company on duty at Chunar; those men soon heard of the disturbance at Benares, and never showed a slightest symptom of mutiny or discontent; there they remained for upwards of 10 days or a fortnight, when, in consequence of the disturbed state of the district between Allahabad and Benares, they were sent off to Gopeegunge to keep the communication open between those two stations, doing good service to the state by frequent raids against turbulent villages; and here they remained till October, when, after an absence of upwards of six months, they were ordered to return to their head quarters.

14. In conclusion I have only to say, that of the men remaining, many have been constantly on leave in the disturbed districts, and brought in much useful information, so that the intelligence department has not hesitated to call in their services, and rewarded one man very heavily, taking him temporarily into this department.

I have, &c.

A. C. Spottiswoode, Lieut.-colonel,
Commanding 37th Regiment Native Infantry.

Commanding at Benares.—Received 26th April, and forwarded with reference to Brigadier Gordon's remarks in part of the annexed return, showing that the omission of his signature there was accidental.

J. Christie, Brigadier,
Commanding Dinapore Division.

To the Adjutant-General of the Army Head Quarters.
RETURN showing the Number of European Officers, Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men of the 40th Regiment Native Infantry, who were present with the Regiment during the Mutiny on the 25th of July 1857.

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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Native</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>Present and stood fast during the mutiny</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Deserted on the mutiny of the troops at Dinapore, on the 25th of July 1857</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total present on the 25th of July 1857</td>
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E. S. Cumberlege, Colonel,
Commanding 40th Regiment Native Infantry.

STATEMENT in reply to Circular Letter from the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated Calcutta, 10 February 1858.

The 40th Regiment Native Infantry mutinied on the 25th July 1857. Accompanying is a return of the number of the officers and men, European and native, present at Dinapore on that occasion.

No intimation of any disposition to mutiny was ever received, and consequently none was ever given; on the contrary, as the following extract from a statement of occurrences, dated 28th July 1857, which was forwarded for the information of Government, will show, a hope was entertained, so far as such a feeling could be admitted during a time of defection so general and increasing, that any mutinous conduct on the part of the other two regiments would be opposed, or at least not supported by the men of the 40th Regiment Native Infantry.

Extract—"About 6 a.m., on the 25th July 1857, the 40th Regiment had just been dismissed from parade, when a cart containing percussion caps for the three regiments, taken from the magazine, passed along the road in front of our parade ground; an angry buzz of voices had arisen amongst the men in the lines on our right, and some of the men of the 7th Regiment Native Infantry were rushing in a disturbed and excited manner, and some tried to make across the corner of our parade to intercept the carts. In this they were most decidedly opposed, and turned back by the men of our grenadiers and right wing, our men meanwhile keeping perfectly quiet and orderly."

The target practice of the regiment had been continued to its completion without the slightest demur on the part of the men, and parades for exercise and inspection as usual.

E. S. Cumberlege, Colonel,
Commanding 40th Regt. Native Infantry.

J. Christie, Brigadier,
Commanding Dinapore Division.
SIR,

With reference to circular letter, No. 1, from the Assistant Adjutant-general, Dinapore Division, forwarding copy of a circular letter from the Adjutant-general of the army, and to the points on which information is therein required, I have the honor to state, that the regiment of Loodianah, as a regiment, has not mutinied, and that as the only two occasions on which any portion of it has shown a mutinous spirit, or been guilty of mutinous conduct, are on the 4th June last, when a parade was ordered, at which it was intended to disarm the 37th Regiment Native Infantry, and on the 5th June, when two companies on outpost duty at Jounpore mutinied and deserted in a body. I shall confine my statement to a relation of all the information I can furnish regarding those occurrences.

2. Up to the time at which the 37th Regiment Native Infantry were paraded, on the 4th June, entire confidence was placed in the regiment of Loodianah; and so late as the 27th of May, when a sower of the 13th Irregular Cavalry attempted to induce the regiment to mutiny, he was at once handed over to justice by havildar Attar Sing, who, for his conduct on this occasion, was promoted to a jemadar by Brigadier Gordon, Possonby; on the 4th of June the officers of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry took refuge with the regiment when their own regiment had broken into mutiny, and the regiment had remained perfectly firm, and in obedience to orders had formed line opposite the lines of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry, when the 13th Irregular Cavalry, which, without any European officers, and without any orders to that effect, had taken up a position in the rear of it, fired on the Major of Brigade, as he was carrying orders, and then fired several shots in the direction of the officers of the regiment. The officer fired in the rear, and fired on the cavalry, who immediately broke and began to disperse. It was while affairs were in this state of confusion that the guns were turned upon the regiment, and after they had once opened on its ranks there was no opportunity to rectify the mistake, and the only refuge for the regiment was in flight,; they accordingly broke and sought their lines.

3. Up to this moment the regiment had had the lives of several officers in their power, and nothing would have been easier than to shoot them had the regiment been actuated by a mutinous spirit; and it is fully believed that, with the exception of one man who fired at Colonel Gordon, then commanding, and whose shot was received in the arm by a faithful haviland, Chur Sing, who risked his life in the defence of his officer, no such attempt was made. It will be evident that after grape had once been poured into the regiment, it would be almost excusable if some men, though conscious of the innocence and rectitude of their own intentions, should be hurried into the belief that the Government, conceiving the whole native race actuated by the same spirit of treachery, had resolved to deal the same punishment to all; when, therefore, in such unfavourable circumstances, 2 subadars, 5 jemadars, 16 havildars, 10 naicks, 8 drummers, and 198 sepoys, out of the 4 subadars, 7 jemadars, 24 havildars, 24 naicks, 11 drummers, and 505 sepoys present with the regiment at Benares, returned to their ranks, or remained faithful at their posts, it may be considered to prove that the regiment had no design of joining the plans of the mutineers; but doubtless a certain number out of such a body, comprising, as it did, several Poorbees in the superior ranks, must have cherished a mutinous spirit, when mutiny was so rife, and all such would take this opportunity of deserting, besides those who might imagine that they were already prejudged.

4. As a further proof of the spirit by which the regiment was actuated when left entirely to the influence of their own feelings, I would adduce the steady loyalty manifested by the entire guard on duty at the treasury, which has been rewarded by Government for its conduct on the occasion.

5. The reports of the occurrences at Benares on the 4th of June, which reached the two companies on outpost duty at Jounpore, distorted as they doubtless were by the mutineers who fled to that station, unfortunately induced the whole detachment to mutiny, and 2 subadars, 2 jemadars, 9 havildars, 9 naicks, 4 drummers, and 140 sepoys, stationed there (with the exception of 1 havildar, Nubbeebeg, who was sick in hospital), mutinied and deserted that day, after consummating their guilt by firing on Lieutenant Mara, who commanded, and other Europeans who resided there, and plundering the treasury; up to that date their conduct had been such as to inspire Lieutenant Mara with full confidence in them, and he had not deemed it necessary to take any steps to provide against misconduct.

6. Brigadier Gordon, late commanding the regiment, having already, in a letter, No. 71, dated 27th July 1857, to the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army, in obedience to orders, given a detailed statement of the relative proportions of Poorbees and Sekhs, and of their respective conduct, I hope the statement I have now made will be considered sufficient for the occasion, and that I shall not be deemed influenced by any wish to screen the conduct of the guilty portion of the regiment, but simply to put on record an impartial statement on the points as to which information is desired.

7. That Government, after full consideration of the facts, as already reported by Brigadier Gordon, then commanding the regiment, has not considered the regiment involved in the guilt of mutiny, is established by orders having been issued to recruit it to its full strength.

2. The
EAST INDIA MUTINY.

8. The European officers present with the regiment were Lieutenant-colonel P. Gordon and Lieutenant R. W. Glasse, at Benares, and Lieutenant Mara, at Jounpore.

9. A large number of the men on furlough of the regiment took the earliest opportunity of reporting themselves to the civil authorities, and have ever since been actively employed in the districts of Shaharunpore; they are stated to have done good and willing service; a detachment from head-quarters has been stationed at Gopeegunge since 13th July last, and has done constant good service; detachments were sent on two occasions into the district on active service from this station in June and July last, when their conduct was exemplary, and the head-quarter detachment has since been very frequently employed in furnishing guards for the protection of stores; and on a late occasion a subadar's party, returning from escort duty, having received a report at the last halting ground of a disturbance in the gaol at this station, immediately made a forced march to render assistance, if such should be necessary; their zeal and promptitude on this occasion were rewarded by the civil authorities, under the sanction of the Most noble the Governor-General, with a pecuniary reward.

10th, I have the honour to enclose the return called for.

To Captain F. J. Nelson,
Major of Brigade, Benares.

I have, &c.
R. W. Glasse, Lieutenant,
Commanding Regiment of Loodianah.

Commanding at Benares.—Received 26 April, and now forwarded, notwithstanding the omission of Brigadier Gordon's signature, which is attached at foot of the first page of the next sheet, in order to obviate further delay, the omission being evidently accidental.

J. Christie, Brigadier,
Commanding Dinapore Division.

Dinapore, 26 April 1858.

RETURN of Regiments, Regular and Irregular, which have Mutinied, or shown a Disposition to Mutiny, since the 1st of January, 1857, in the Benares District, called for by Adjutant-General's Circular, No. 917, dated 10th February 1858.

Raj Ghaut, Benares, 16 March 1859.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Number or Name of each Regiment, showing whether it has Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Number of European Officers and Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men, present with each Regiment at the Outbreak of such Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date of the first Intimation received by any Officer of the Corps belonging disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date when Information thereof was first communicated to superior Authority.</th>
<th>The Date of the First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Regiment of Loodianah</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Benares:</td>
<td>2 European officers - 4 subadars. 7 jemadars. 24 havildars. 24 naiks. 11 drummers. 505 sepoys (including 72 recruits).</td>
<td>No such Intimation was received.</td>
<td>There was no such information to give.</td>
<td>There having been no reason to apprehend mutinous conduct on the part of this regiment, the only precaution taken in consequence of the generally disturbed state of the army was, that from about the middle of May, by a verbal order of the commanding officer, a picket mounted every night on the left flank of the regiment communicating with the lines of the 37th Regiment Native Infantry, and on the 2d June, as a further precaution, a regimental order was issued, directing an infixed picket of 1 jemadar, 2 havildars, 2 naiks, and 50 sepoys, to mount nightly within the lines, and furnish double sentries over the arms.</td>
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<td>Jounpore:</td>
<td>1 European officer. 2 subadars. 2 jemadars. 9 havildars. 2 naiks. 4 drummers. 140 sepoys.</td>
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R. W. Glasse, Lieutenant,
Commanding Regiment of Loodianah.

As already reported by me on several occasions up to the moment of the regiment's breaking, after having stood perfectly firm on parade for at least three-quarters of an hour, the loyalty of the corps was never suspected by any one at Benares, civil or military.

P. Gordon, Brigadier,
Commanding at Benares.
PAPERS RELATING TO THE

DISTRIBUTION Return of the 6th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry.

Bhaugulpore, 14 August 1857.

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<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment</td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>500</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

John Macdonald, Major,
Commandant late 6th Regiment Irregular Cavalry.

A. H. Duncan, Major,
Commanding at Bhaugulpore.

(No. 20.)

Sir,

Bhaugulpore, 23 February 1858.

In obedience to instructions contained in a circular letter, No. 317, from the office of the Adjutant-general of the Army, and to circular memorandum, No. 1, from the Assistant Adjutant-general’s office, Dinapore Division;

I have the honour to furnish, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, replies to the different paras. therein contained.

On the 12th June 1857 the three officers present with the head quarters of the 6th Regiment Irregular Cavalry at Rohnee, were suddenly and unexpectedly attacked by three sowars of the regiment, when the adjutant was cut to pieces, and the commandant and doctor severely wounded, no mutinous conduct or any dissatisfaction apparent amongst any others of the regiment, but, on the contrary, expressed great sympathy towards the sufferers, traced the murderers, and secured, and gave them up there and then for execution.

1st. After the murderous attempt at Rohnee, the head-quarters of regiment was transferred to Bhaugulpore, leaving 2 native commissioned, 10 non-commissioned officers, and 91 sowars at Rohnee, all went on well, the men joining their European officers, playing cricket and other games, and appearing quite happy and contented.

On the 14th August 1857 Sir James Outram arrived per steamer, landed, and inspected our little fort; a report got amongst the regiment that he was come to disarm, and then punish the regiment for the murder of the adjutant at Rohnee, and they went off bodily that night at midnight, very quietly, and doing no damage to men or property, 26 in all remaining faithful to their duty; they proceeded to Rohnee, and sent off a messenger to Doomka, and got the detachments at both these places to join them.
Total amount of mutineers, 1 ressai dar, 2 naib ressai dar, 3 jemadar, 2 kote duffadar, 28 duffadar, 4 nishanburdars, 2 trumpeters, 2 nagarchies, and 321 sowars, 1 native doctor.

2d. Number of European and native officers and non-commissioned officers and men at regimental head quarters: 2 European officers, 5 native officers, 25 non-commissioned officers, and 205 men; and men on detached command at Rohnee and Doomka, 3 native officers, 13 non-commissioned officers, and 140 men.

3d. No intimation of mutiny or dissatisfaction received by any officer prior to the sudden departure of the head-quarters.

4th. Sir James Outram was informed of the event on the instant, and reports forwarded to the other authorities by dawk, on the 15th August, or by the first dawk after the headquarters had fled.

5th. No order whatever issued by the commandant of regiment for adopting precautionary measures, as the men (of all ranks) appeared perfectly happy and contented up to the last moment.

My own opinion is, that they had only made up their minds to bolt after the arrival of the steamer, and from sheer fright at the silly report spread by two bad characters in the regiment, as I learnt afterwards.

I have, &c.

- John Macdonald, Major,
To Lieut.-Colonel Mayhew, Commandant late 5th Regiment Irregular Cavalry.
Adjutant-general of the Army, Calcutta.

A. H. Duncan, Major,
Commanding at Bhagulpore.

J. Christie, Brigadier,
Commanding Dinapore Dinapore.
### Third Company, 8th Battalion of Artillery.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number or Name of Regiment, specifying whether it has Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Number of European Officers and Non-commissioned Officers and Men, present with each Regiment at the Outbreak of each Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date of the first Intimation received by any Officer, of the Corps being Disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date when Information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>The Date of the first order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps, for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak and Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition.</th>
<th>REMARKS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Company 8th Battalion of Artillery. Manifested a disposition to mutiny.</td>
<td>Captain - - - 1</td>
<td>The Company showed no disposition to mutiny before the 1st of June 1857.</td>
<td>No necessity existed for any such communication, as Colonel M'Causland, commanding at Almorah, first discovered the intention of the Company.</td>
<td>No such orders were required, as Colonel M'Causland at once tried the ringleaders, and disbanded the Company.</td>
<td>Captain Remington, of the Artillery, who commanded this Company, is on service in Oude; to save delay, I have given the required information as the Company was disbanded under my orders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**J. K. M'Causland,** Colonel, Commanding in Kemaon.

(signed) Charles Brownlow, Captain, Major of Brigade.

N. Peney, Major-general, Commanding Meerut Division.

---

### Return of a Detachment of Native Foot Artillery, as called for in Circular, No. 317, of the 10th February 1858, from the Adjutant-General of the Army.

Almorah, 20 March 1858.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Name of Detachment.</th>
<th>Number of European, Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Officers and Private, present at the Outbreak.</th>
<th>Date when Intimation thereof was first received by any Officer, of the Detachment being Disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>Date when Intimation thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>Date of First Order issued by the Officer Commanding Detachment adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Mutiny.</th>
<th>REMARKS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Company 8th Battalion Artillery.</td>
<td>Captain - - - 1</td>
<td>Company showed no disposition to mutiny till the 10th June 1857.</td>
<td>Colonel M'Causland, commanding at Almorah, first discovered the mutinous intentions of the Company, so no report was necessary.</td>
<td>Colonel M'Causland, commanding at Almorah, tried the ringleaders by court-martial, and disbanded the Company the day he discovered their intentions, viz. on 10th June 1857.</td>
<td>The ringleaders, 17 in number, now undergoing sentence of imprisonment, with hard labour, for 10 years; remainder disbanded, and turned out of the Hills. Company committed no acts of violence or overt mutiny beyond boasting and talking of what they would do.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**M. J. Vibart,** Captain, late in temporary charge of the 3d Company 8th Batt. Artillery.

**W. J. Gray,** Lieutenant, Adjutant 8th Battalion Artillery.

**Fred. Gaittall,** Lieutenant-colonel, Commanding 8th Battalion Artillery.

**N. Peney,** Major-general, Commanding Meerut Division.
SIXTH COMPANY 8th Battalion Artillery and No. 15 Light Horse Field Battery, with K. Company Ordnance Syce Drivers.

Camp, Haldwane, 11 March 1858.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number or Name of Regiment, specifying whether it has Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Number of European Officers and Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men, present with each Regiment at the Outbreak of each Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date of the First Intimation received by any Officer, of the Corps being Disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date when Information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>The Date of the First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps, for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition.</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As nearly as can be remembered.</td>
<td>At Bareilly.</td>
<td>At Moradabad.</td>
<td>Total.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Company 8th Battalion Artillery and No. 15 Light Horse Field Battery, with K. Company Ordnance Syce Drivers, mutinied.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head quarters at Bareilly, 31st May 1857.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment at Moradabad, 3d June 1857.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Company showed no disposition to mutiny before the 31st May 1857.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Doctor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suhadar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemadar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havildar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naiks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baglers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privates</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Serjeants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havildar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naiks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Farrier</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syce Drivers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grasenor Kirby, Captain, Brevet-major, late Commanding Company and Battery.
J. K. McCausland, Colonel, Commanding in Kumaon.
N. Penny, Major-general, Commanding Meerut Division.
### Ninth Regiment Native Infantry; Station, Allyghur; Mutinied 28 May 1857.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Designation of Regiment</th>
<th>Number of European Officers, Native Officers, and Men, present with the Regiment at the Outbreak of the Mutiny</th>
<th>Date of First Intimation received by any Officer, of the Corps being Disposed to Mutiny</th>
<th>The Date when Information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority</th>
<th>Date of First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for adopting Measures for Preventing Outbreak</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Regiment Native Infantry.</td>
<td>At Regimental Head Quarters, Allyghur: European Officers - - - 5, Native Officers - - - 4, Men (about) - - - 340</td>
<td>None received</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Regiment was broken up into 4 detachments, viz., three Companies with head quarters at Allyghur, three Companies at Mympoorie, three Companies at Etawah, and one Company at Bolundshuhur. A double allowance of native officers and men were absent on furlough, consequent on the indulgence having been withheld at Feshawur. Every record was destroyed, and the information given in column No. 2 is therefore entirely from memory, but it is believed to be tolerably correct. Not a suspicion was entertained of the man's loyalty until the outbreak actually occurred, and this confidence on the part of the officers appeared fully warranted by the fact of men of all castes and classes joining in the arrest of and giving evidence against a Brahmin who had been tampering with the men the very day before the mutiny took place. There were two vacancies amongst the native officers. The invalid men had gone to their homes. A guard with Government horses was absent, and the regiment had not its full complement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jellaisen Ka Pultun.</td>
<td>At Mympoorie: European Officers - - - 2, Native Officers - - - 2, Men (about) - - - 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At Etawah: European Officers - - - 2, Native Officers - - - 2, Men (about) - - - 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At Bolundshuhur: European Officers - - - 1, Native Officers - - - 2, Men - - - 88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Allyghur, 19 March 1858.

L. Percy D. Eld, Major, late Commanding 9th Native Infantry.

N. Penoy, Major-general, Commanding Meerut Division.
## Return of a Company of the 44th Regiment Native Infantry, Mutinied at Muttra, on the 30th May 1857.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number or Designation of the Regiment Mutinying, or manifesting a Disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>Number of European and Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men present at the Outbreak of the Mutiny.</th>
<th>Date of the first Intimation being received by any Officer, of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>Date when Information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>Date of first Order, if sent by the Commanding Officer of the Corps, for adopting Measures for the Prevention of the Outbreak, or Suppression of the Mutinous Disposition.</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 8 Company of the 44th Regiment Native Infantry, when detached to Muttra, mutinied there on the 30th May 1857, (completed from other companies).</td>
<td>Lieutenant - - - 1</td>
<td>Intimation of the mutiny of the company was received by the commanding officer early on the morning of the 31st May 1857.</td>
<td>Information of the mutiny communicated to the superior authorities in the evening of the 30th May 1857.</td>
<td>The company suddenly joined in the mutiny the detachment 67th Native Infantry, at Muttra, which it was sent to relieve, and accompanied it, with the public treasure, towards Delhi.</td>
<td>The remainder of the regiment, quartered at Agra, manifested no disposition to mutiny, but was disarmed on the morning of the 31st May 1857, by order of the Lieutenant-governor; after which, many deserted, and the remainder were sent to their homes on leave of absence for two months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Examined)  
W. M. Fraser, Lieut.-Colonel, Officiating Adjutant, 44th Regiment.

## Return of the 67th Regiment Native Infantry, agreeably to Circular, No. 317, of the 10th of February 1858, from the Adjutant-general of the Army.

| Number or Designation of Corps. | Whether Mutinied or not, Station and Date. | Number of European and Native Commissioners, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men, present with the Corps on the first Outbreak of the Mutiny. | The Date of first Intimation received by any of the Officers, of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny. | The Date when Information of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny was first communicated to Superior Authority. | The Date of the first Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition. | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 67th Regiment Native Infantry. | A detachment at Muttra mutinied, on the 30th of May 1857, and marched to Delhi with the treasure. | European officers - - - 9  
Doctor - - - 1  
Serjeants - - - 2  
Native Officers - - - 13  
Non-Commissioned - - - 40  
Men - - - 840  
Christian drummers - - - 13 | 0 May 1857, when the ultra detachment mutinied. | 30 May 1857 - - - On the morning of the 31st of May 1857, the regiment was disarmed. | |

W. C. Clifton, Captain, Commanding 67th Regiment Native Infantry.  
St. G. D. Showers, Brigadier, Commanding at Agra.  
N. Penny, Major-general, Commanding Meerut Division.
Sir,

1. HAVING been directed to report upon the circumstances attending the disarming the regiment under my command, I have the honor to state, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that a detachment, consisting of a subadar and 90 men, mutinied on the 30th of May last, while on duty at Muttra; murdered their officer, Lieutenant Burton, took possession of five laces of treasure, joined their brother rebels, and marched to Delhi. The head-quarters of the regiment were disarmed the following morning, and by order of the late Lieutenant-governor; sent to their homes for two months. Some few men who were on duty in the district deserted with their arms. The officers lived in the lines with their men, until boats could be procured to take them down the river, as the roads were infested by the mutineers. The men did not show any mutinous spirit after their arms had been taken from them. Two men were apprehended on their way to Delhi, and sent into Agra. I received orders from the officer commanding at Agra to make them over to the civil authorities; I did so, and they were rescued from gaol on the 5th July by the insurgents.

2. Some of the bad characters threatened the lives of the pay havildars, as well as the safety of the treasure chest, which was secured in my house.

3. The havildar-major and 40 men have returned to regimental head-quarters.

I have, &c.

W. C. Clifton, Captain,
Commanding 67th Regiment Native Infantry.

St. G. D. Shoemers, Brigadier, Commanding at Agra.

N. Penny, Major-general, Commanding Meerut Division.

To the Adjutant-General of the Army, Head Quarters.

RETURN of Regiment, Regular and Irregular, which has Mutinied, or shown a Disposition to Mutiny, since the 1st of January 1857, in the Benares District, called for by Adjutant-General's Circular, No. 317, dated 10th February 1858.

Benares, 27 February 1858.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Number or Name of each Regiment, showing whether it Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Number of European and Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men present with each Regiment at the Outbreak of such Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date of the first Intimation received by any Officer, of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date when Information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>The Date of the first Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50th Regiment Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Major, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel - 1</td>
<td>20 August 1857</td>
<td>27 August 1857</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain - 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenants - 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensigns - 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon - 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Surgeons - 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subalterns - 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemadars - 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havildars - 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nulks - 50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drummers - 14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepoys - 554</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

J. H. Hampton, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding 50th Regiment Native Infantry.

G. A. St. P. Fooks, Brevet-Captain,
Adjutant 50th Regiment Native Infantry;

P. Gordon, Brigadier, Commanding at Benares.
### Present State of the 50th Regiment Native Infantry, at Nagode, on the 16th September 1857.

Benares, 27 February 1858.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column</th>
<th>Colonel</th>
<th>Lieutenant-Colonel</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Lieutenant</th>
<th>Ensign</th>
<th>Adjutant</th>
<th>Interpreter</th>
<th>Surgeon</th>
<th>Assistant-Surgeon</th>
<th>Quartermaster-Sergeant</th>
<th>Native Doctor</th>
<th>Subah-bahadur</th>
<th>Jemadur</th>
<th>Havildar</th>
<th>Nunka</th>
<th>Drummer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present at muster</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>544</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On leave, staff employ, or absent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On command</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>931</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**J. H. Hampton, Brevet Lieut.-colonel, Commanding 50th Regiment Native Infantry.**

**G. A. St. P. Fooks, Brevet Captain, Adjutant, 50th Regiment Native Infantry.**

---

### List of European Officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank and Names</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel - - - - J. Parsons - - -</td>
<td>On staff employ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant-colonel - - - Nuthall - - -</td>
<td>ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major and Brevet Lieut-col. J. H. Hampton - - -</td>
<td>Commanding the regiment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains - - - K. Young - - -</td>
<td>Judge Advocate-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - G. Gordon - - -</td>
<td>On staff employ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - H. Nicoll - - -</td>
<td>ditto.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - A. C. Plowden - - -</td>
<td>On furlough to Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - J. R. McMullin - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - B. E. Bacon - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - H. E. Read - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant - - - G. A. St. P. Fooks - - -</td>
<td>On civil employ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - J. M. Bayley - - -</td>
<td>Adjutant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - A. A. Munroe - - -</td>
<td>Command at Myher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - A. W. Bolton - - -</td>
<td>On civil employ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - G. J. Reeves - - -</td>
<td>Interpreter and quartermaster.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - H. V. Matthias - - -</td>
<td>On staff employ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - F. A. Lawford - - -</td>
<td>On furlough to Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - W. H. Garton - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - A. Bruce - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - B. Crockcroft - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign - - - J. W. O'Dowda - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto - - - A. Goldney - - -</td>
<td>Doing duty with the police levy at Allahabad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon - - - J. Hilliard - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant-major - - - Michael Dixon - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster-sergeant - Terence O'Brien - - -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**J. H. Hampton, Brevet Lieut.-colonel, Commanding 50th Regiment Native Infantry.**

**G. A. St. P. Fooks, Brevet Captain, Adjutant, 50th Regiment Native Infantry.**
Sir,

As directed by Brigadier Gordon, commanding the Benares District, I have the honor, agreeably to instructions contained in copy of circular letter, No. 317, from the Adjutant-General of the army, under date 10th February 1858, to the officer commanding the Dinapore Division, to forward in explanation of para. 2, a present state of the regiment at the time of its mutiny.

1. Present state and return.

2. With regard to paras. 3 and 4. On the evening of the 26th August 1857, I learnt from some of the native officers and havildars, that there was an uneasy feeling in the regiment, and chiefly in the Light Company, the ringleaders of which were named to me; viz., Jemadar Tuckutt Sing, of the 2d Company, Pay Havildar Banie Sookul, and Sepoy Shaick Foequeet Buksh, both of the Light Company. The jemadar I ordered to proceed on general leave, and the sepoy, who was born in the Palace of Delhi, I arranged to send to Benares, under the plea of superintending half mounting. On the evening of the following day, just before these men were leaving, an attempt was made to throw the regiment into mutiny by them, which I effectually put down, and reported the circumstance the following day to the Brigadier commanding at Saugor.

3. In answer to para. 5, on the morning of the 28th August 1857, I ordered an European court of inquiry to assemble, to inquire into the circumstances connected with the disturbance of the previous night. This order caused about 14 suspected disaffected men to desert during that night. The only means I had to get rid of them, isolated as my regiment was at Nagode, and the nearest military post being Saugor and Jubbulpore (the nearest of which, distant 150 miles), and from which I could get no aid, and prevented my taking any stringent measures for the punishment of the suspected men.

I have, &c.

J. H. Hampton, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding 50th Regiment, Native Infantry.

To Captain Nelson,
Major of Brigade, Benares.

P. Gordon,
Brigadier, Commanding at Benares.

J. Christie,
Brigadier, Commanding Dinapore Division.
## Return of Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry stationed at Jullundur and Phillour, since the 1st January 1857, which have Mutinied, or manifested a disposition to Mutiny.

**Jullundur, 9 March 1858.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Name of Regiment</th>
<th>Number of European and Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men, present with each Regiment at the Outbreak of such Mutiny.</th>
<th>Date of the first Intimation received by any Officer, of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>Date when Information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>Date of the First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for adopting Measures for the prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such mutinous Disposition.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th Light Cavalry</td>
<td>European officers - 12</td>
<td>7 June 1857</td>
<td>7 June 1857</td>
<td>7 June 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native officers - 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff sergeants - 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Havildars - 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naliks - 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trumpeters - 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farriers - 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troopers - 22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd Regiment Native Infantry, Scoulteen.</td>
<td>European officers - 8</td>
<td>On the night of the 4th and morning of the 6th May 1857.</td>
<td>On 5 May 1857</td>
<td>5 May 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff sergeants - 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native commissioned, non-commissioned officers and men, including musicians, drummers, lascars, and bheeshees - 674</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32nd Regiment Native Infantry, or &quot;Hiladi's Pulteen.&quot;</td>
<td>No outbreak ever occurred; but the number present when the troops at Meerut mutinied, 4th to 11th May 1857, were:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36th Native Infantry</td>
<td>At 11 p.m., 7 June 1857.</td>
<td>Immediately</td>
<td>23 May 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European officers - 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native officers - 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native non-commissioned officers - 54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sepoys - 65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European officers - 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native officers - 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native commissioned officers - 13</td>
<td>On the 24th March reported to the Commander-in-Chief, suggesting measures for the restoration of confidence at the musketry depots (before the men were permitted to rejion their regiments), and throughout the native army.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Havildars - 44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank and file - 280</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troopers - 22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>尚</td>
<td>No such Intimation was ever received.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European officers - 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native officers - 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-commissioned officers - 54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sepoys - 65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drummers - 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lascars - 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks.**

- The system of treachery and deceit was so consistently and successfully observed, that neither the commanding officer, nor any officer of the 6th Cavalry, received any intimation of impending mischief.

- One company under a European officer on duty at Loodiana, joined the mutineers on the morning of the 9th June. One company, with two European officers on escort duty with mortars and stores for the siege train, dispersed at Delhi, and allowed furlough. Of this company, two havildars and eight rank and file returned to Phillour without taking the furlough. A jemadar's party on escort duty with ammunition to Umballa, dispersed at that station. The whole of the party returned to Phillour.

- The regiment was disarmed by Brigadier-general Nicholson on the 25th June 1857 at Phillour; a jemadar was blown from a gun on the 1st September following, at Jullundur, for mutinous language; five sepoys were imprisoned in the civil jail at Jullundur on the 20th November 1857, for using threatening language against the lives of those who brought up the said jemadar.

- The order of the 23rd May 1857 was issued by the commanding officer of the 36th Native Infantry, on account of the prevalence of fires, and to prevent the harbouring of any who might be disaffected in either of the other regiments at the station.

- On the 12th May intimation of the mutinies of corps at other stations was received; and the commanding officer of the 31st states, that slight excitement apparently prevailed, and seemed to increase when the 45th and 67th Native Infantry broke out, but that there was no decided disposition to mutiny till the night of the 7th June, when the lines, which are on the high road to Phillour, were entered by the troopers of the 6th Cavalry and 56th Native Infantry, who commenced firing in all directions.

*H. McCarty, Brigadier, Commanding at Jullundur.*
PAPERS RELATING TO THE

REMARKS to Return regarding Disaffection and Mutiny in the 5th Regiment
Native Infantry.

The men of this corps attached to the Enfield Rifle Depot were five high-caste Brahmins, who fired the new cartridges without demur, and repeatedly assured me there was nothing whatever objectionable in them; there was a spirit shown to throw these depot men out of caste, and on the 21st April I sent in charges against Jemadar Shaiek Joomun, founded on the 33rd Article of War; he was tried, but acquitted by a native general court martial; this spirit still existing, though no man in the slightest degree committed himself, and being myself convinced there was nothing objectionable in the new cartridge, on the 7th May I addressed superior authority, requesting permission to make every man in the corps fire the new cartridge, which I feel confident I could have done, by not allowing too great a number of men to commit themselves at once, but the measure was not approved of by the General commanding.

On hearing of the outbreak at Delhi, the disaffection (or worse) shown by the regiment on the 18th May, was forgiven by superior authority, and all proceedings for investigation of the matter which I ordered ceased; by the same authorities conciliatory measures were used towards both the native infantry corps at this station. On the 19th May two companies proceeded into the district towards Jugadree, under command of Captain Garstin. On the 21st May the flank companies were sent to Roopur, and one company proceeded to Thanesur.

The head-quarters at Umballa, taking and performing all the duties of the station on the departure of the force towards Delhi on the 23d May.

Shortly after arrival there the civil authority reported that the companies at Roopur were behaving in a sedicious manner, and instead of doing any good were inciting the country people, on which, being then left in command at Umballa, I directed the companies to return to head-quarters. I took the opportunity of the misconduct of these companies of explaining to the men at Umballa that they had been very leniently treated in being forgiven for their misconduct on the 18th May, but now (29th May) as those companies had again misbehaved, I was determined to take away their arms, acting entirely on my own judgment and responsibility; I that evening took away the arms, and lodged them return to head-quarters. I took the opportunity of the misconduct of these companies of explaining to the men at Umballa that they had been very leniently treated in being forgiven for their misconduct on the 18th May, but now (29th May) as those companies had again misbehaved, I was determined to take away their arms, acting entirely on my own judgment and responsibility; I that evening took away the arms, and lodged them safety; by a little arrangement, and having some trustworthy men, this, I am happy to say, was successfully accomplished without any outbreak, but at considerable risk, as we afterwards found more than half the muskets were loaded. It is as well I should explain that on the 28th May, as commanding at this post, I took upon myself the disarming the inhabitants of the large bazars in cantonments, which rendered the disarming 400 men a safer measure than perhaps I should have otherwise been justified in undertaking with only 250 European soldiers in the place, the great danger being the destruction of this large station by the villagers and bazaar people, who were quite ready to plunder the place.

On the return of the companies from Roopur, I disarmed them, five men were picked out by the civil authority, tried, and two were hanged; the two native officers, and two pay havildars of these companies I tried by European court martial on the 5th Article of War; they were condemned and hanged, and the rest of the men of these companies were, under authority from Delhi, disbanded and dismissed, with forfeiture of pay and property.

Of Captain Garstin's detachment, 17 men mutinied on 2d June at Saharanpore. Captain Garstin called out the rest of his detachment, and opened fire on these mutineers, when one of them being killed, the rest decamped. This detachment continued to perform its duty in the Saharanpore District and about Jugadree till the 12th July, when being ordered to return to cantonments, they mutinied, 123 men went off from Jugadree in a body during the night, having first fired a volley over the tent where the European officers were seated; on Captain Garstin's going out and calling to them, one man turned round and fired at him, missing Captain Garstin, he killed a faithful havildar standing by him; Captain Garstin returned to cantonments with 20 loyal soldiers.

The other detachment did good service in the Thanesur district, was disarmed after the above-mentioned mutiny, and returned to cantonments. The men now continued steadily to perform station and other duties till the end of August, when in a few days 75 men deserted.

Umballa, 24 February 1858.

Fred. C. MAITLAND, Major,
Commanding 5th Native Infantry.

J. STEEL, Brigadier, Commanding, Umballa.
On the 13th May intelligence was received at Hansie of the outbreak at Delhi, and of the massacre of the Europeans at that station, and on the 20th of the same month the 4th Irregular Cavalry marched to Kurnaul, to join the camp of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. I collected as many sepoys who were on furlough as I could, but they all turned traitors, with the exception of a few who were placed in the town for its protection under a native officer of the 1st Irregular Cavalry. On the 17th, Lieutenant Barwell, Adjutant of the Battalion, was sent to Hissar to assist the Collector of the district in organizing a body of horse, and I was the only European officer with the Hurreeaah Light Infantry. The different orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief regarding the obnoxious cartridges were duly explained to the men, and, to all appearance, they were perfectly satisfied, indeed, I never heard a murmur. There were several false alarms, and the manner in which the men turned out and behaved, tended to give me confidence in them. On the 29th May, pay was disbursed by me, at my house; his brother, a jemadar in the corps, also came directly afterwards; they seemed deeply affected, and declared that the regiment would certainly mutiny in less than an hour, and implored me to fly, and on no account to come near the lines. I clearly saw that no time was to be lost, and gave notice to all the European residents in cantonments, and most of them were soon on the road to Hissar. I, of course, stayed behind, and Assistant-surgeon D. Scott and Messrs. Tapsell and Rich remained with me. We were standing near the gateway of my compound, where my guard and orderlies were, but they did not attempt to molest us, and to the last made protestations of good faith; however, in a few minutes, several volleys were fired at the sergeants, who, after having been warned by me, had returned to the lines to look after the family of the quartermaster-sergeant. We then moved off slowly to get clear of the Irregular Cavalry Bazar, as I feared our retreat might be cut off. The two sergeants here joined us, and told us they had been fired at, and that the sepoys were running towards my house. The whole cantonment was soon on fire, and feeling sure that nothing could be done, I went on and overtook the fugitives in advance, about 10 miles from Hansie. It was fortunate for us that the 4th Irregular Cavalry did march from Hansie, as their subsequent behaviour proved that they were not to be trusted. I had no means whatever of coercing the corps; not a man to be depended on. Lieutenant Hilliard, in command of the detachment at Sirsa, reported that there were rumours affecting the loyalty of his men, and that of the 4th Irregular Cavalry sepoys, and his letter was forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the army. At the head quarters of the battalion two or three men were said to be disaffected, but no unfavourable report had reached me from Hissar; I therefore, up to the last moment trusted that all would have gone on well; I was placed in a most trying situation, without the most remote hope of succour, in case anything occurred. I had been upwards of 12 years in the battalion, which was second to no local corps in discipline and efficiency. The two men who gave me warning, and afterwards joined the mutineers, saved the lives of those who escaped from Hansie, 32 in number, for in the absence of that warning I feel confident that we must all have been destroyed. The detachments at Hissar and Sirsa followed the example of their comrades at Hansie. Lieutenant E. W. Barwell was killed at the former place, and Lieutenant T. H. Hilliard was murdered by some villagers when endeavouring to effect his escape.

Wm. J. F. Stafford, Captain,
Late Commandant Hurreeaah Light Infantry Battalion.

Hissar,
25 March 1858.
### PAPERS RELATING TO THE RETURN of Troops stationed at Hansie.

#### Remark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Names, &amp;c.</th>
<th>Number of European and Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men present with each Regiment at the outbreak of such Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date of the first Intimation received by any Officer, of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>The Date when Information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>REMARKS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurreeannah Light Infantry mutinied.</td>
<td>1 European officer, 1 assistant surgeon, 1 sergeant-major and quarter-master-sergeant, 1 native doctor, 4 sub-badars, 5 jemadars, 23 havildars, 22 naicks, 9 buglers and 517 sepoyys.</td>
<td>22 May 1857. The battalion mutinied on this day.</td>
<td>On 31 May 1857, from Jhund.</td>
<td>I received information of the intended mutiny about half an hour before it actually occurred; it was conveyed by the drill havildar and his brother, a jemadar in the battalion, who distinctly stated that nothing could prevent it. They joined the mutineers. There was not a European soldier in the station.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Wm. J. P. Stafford, Captain,**

*Late Commandant Hurreeannah Light Infantry.*

---

**(No. 109.)**

Sir,

I HAVE the honor to forward the roll required by you in your letter, No. 308, of the 19th ultimo; I beg to bring to the notice of the Major-General commanding the Sirhind Division that I was only second in command of the regiment at the time of the desertion, and that my commanding officer is on sick furlough to England; what I have stated in the rolls is, as far as I can make out, correct; should anything further be required, I shall be most happy to give it as far as lies in my power.

I have, &c.

G. B. Hall, Captain,

*Commanding 4th Irregular Cavalry.*

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**(No. 417.)**

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter, No. 355, of 30th ultimo, I have the honor to transmit the return adverted to from the officer commanding 4th Irregular Cavalry.

I have, &c.

R. Garrett, Major-General,

*Commanding Sirhind Division.*

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### Return of the 4th Regiment Irregular Cavalry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Name of the Regiment</th>
<th>Officers and Men present at each Mutiny</th>
<th>Date of Intimation received of the Mutiny</th>
<th>Date of communicating Information to the Superior Authority</th>
<th>Orders issued for the Suppression of the Mutiny</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4th Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry</strong></td>
<td>1 Native commissioned and 4 non-commissioned officers, and 44 sepoys, at Hissar.</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>The head-quarters of the regiment was present during the siege of Delhi, from 29th June to this time; they were dismounted and disarmed on 18th August last, as a precautionary measure, but did duty as orderlies in the camp, and were remounted after the storming of the city. Another party of the regiment under Naib Resadullah Ghose Nainbee Khan, has done good services in the Meerut district, under Mr. C. Wilson, C. B., and is highly spoken of by that officer; this party was neither dismounted nor disarmed. The commands entered in the 2d column deserted one by one; no intimation was received at regimental head-quarters till they had deserted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Native commissioned and 3 non-commissioned officers, and 123 sepoys, at Sirsa.</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 European commissioned, 2 native commissioned, and 11 non-commissioned officers, and 53 sepoys, at Meerut.</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Native commissioned and 3 non-commissioned officers, and 28 sepoys, at Kasaully.</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Non-commissioned officer and 9 sepoys, at Umballa.</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**J. Longfield, Brigadier, Commanding at Delhi.**

**G. B. Hall, Captain, Commanding 4th Irregular Cavalry.**
### REMARKS BY OFFICERS COMMANDING THE CORPS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of the Regiment</th>
<th>Whether it has Mutinied or shown a disposition to Mutiny</th>
<th>Number of European and Native Officers, and Non-commissioned Officers and Men present with the Corps on the 12th of May 1857</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th Light Cavalry.</td>
<td>Decided disposition only</td>
<td>7 European officers, 12 non-commissioned officers, 12 Native officers, 10 Havildars, 6 Naikas, 3 Pardees, 247 Troopers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th N. I. Grenadiers.</td>
<td>Decided disposition only</td>
<td>6 European officers, 2 non-commissioned officers, 8 Native officers, 35 Havildars, 38 Naikas, 16 Drummers, 474 Sepoys.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Native L. Infantry.</td>
<td>Mutinied on the 30th of July 1857.</td>
<td>7 European officers, 2 non-commissioned officers, 12 Native officers, 44 Havildars, 44 Naikas, 10 Buglers, 788 Sepoys.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Decided disposition only</td>
<td>11 European officers, 9 non-commissioned officers, 12 Native officers, 42 Havildars, 30 Naikas, 17 Drummers, 738 Sepoys.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Remarks by the Brigadier Commanding the Lahore Brigade.

On the morning of the 12th May 1857, I received intimation by electric telegraph of the occurrence of a mutiny and massacre, and on the same morning the cantonment joint magistrate ascertainment from his spies that the four native corps intended to mutiny and seize the canton in the 14th of the month, when the monthly relief took place, and there would have been 1,100 armed men in the place; I therefore determined to disarm the whole of the four corps, which was successfully carried out on the morning of the 15th of May; the men were completely taken by surprise, and said that they had been outwitted. On the 14th of the same month, the spies reported that all the four disarmed corps intended to desert to Ferozepore (54 miles off) that night, and seize the magazine, and thus resupply themselves with arms.

At a little before noon, while I was actually making my arrangements for cutting off the intended deserts that night, Captain Hood, of the 49th Native Infantry, and two native non-commissioned officers of the same corps, rushed to my house, and said that all the corps were making as fast as possible; within a very short space I had six goes to head the deserters on the Ferozepore road; seeing which, the men slunk back to their lines, except those elsewhere mentioned, most of whom endeavoured to get to Ferozepore, and were seized by the civil authorities there and on the road. I think the case against the 8th Light Cavalry, and the 10th and 49th Native Infantry, is clear, although there are not, as far as I know, any written proofs.

I now proceed to the matter of the 20th Native Infantry. This corps was believed to be the most trustworthy of the four. During the morning of the 30th July 1857, a commissariat sergeant was told by his servant that he had heard in the bazar that all the native corps were going to rise at noon when the gun fired. At half past 11 o'clock that morning, the late Major Spencer wrote to the major of brigades, to say that he had heard a report that all the native corps were going to rise at noon, and that he thought it advisable to let me know what he had heard. Immediate arrangements were made; the European Infantry was turned out in their lines, and the artillery in theirs. At noon, the 20th Native Infantry broke out, murdered their commanding officer and quartermaster-sergeant, burned through every house in their lines for European officers, and finally effected their escape down a deep drain during a very heavy dust storm, which prevented us from seeing them even leave their lines. The following day they attacked and probably not 25 of the se who left the station were killed by the civil authorities, and the other corps kept to their lines, but there is little doubt in my own mind that they all intended to have gone off. In conclusion, I would observe, that I consider the disarming of the native troops at once of so great importance, and that I did it without reservation, who had it not been done, and the general mutiny on the 15th of May had happened, there would have been a massacre of the very large European population at Mean Meer and Lahore, and then not a man could have been spared for Delhi.

C. H. Mills, Captain, Major of Brigade.
### Return of Troops which Mutinied at Sealkote on the 9th July 1857, under command of Brigadier F. Brind, C.B.

**Sealkote, 3 March 1858.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIMENTS</th>
<th>Number and Name of Regiment, Regular</th>
<th>Whether Mutinied or manifested a disposition to mutiny since 1st January 1857</th>
<th>Number of European Officers, Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Men present at the outbreak</th>
<th>Date of First Intimation received by any Officers of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny</th>
<th>Date when First Intimation was communicated to Superior Authority</th>
<th>Date of First Order issued by Commanding Officer for adopting measures for prevention of such outbreak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right wing 9th Regiment Cavalry</td>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>Mutinied</td>
<td>9 2 3 18 220</td>
<td>18th May 1857, on the column diverging from the Sudur Bazaar (on route) to the plain, north of the entrenched magazine, and forming a company of her Majesty's 61st Regiment marching into and taking possession of the entrenched. The grenadiers, numbers 1 and 2, and first section of number 3 companies, all simultaneously loaded on the march, and made a sudden rush on to the ramparts, the remaining 7 companies ordered arms, stood for a few minutes, and then dispersed.</td>
<td>I immediately sent off an officer to report the regiment in a state of open mutiny to the brigadier commanding, it was then about one-quarter past 6 o'clock, p.m., 18th May 1857.</td>
<td>(13 May.) Mutinied and deserted on the 14th May 1857 Discharged on the 23rd May 1857.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45th Regiment Native Infantry</td>
<td>Regular</td>
<td>Mutinied</td>
<td>9 2 9 42 665</td>
<td>13th May 1857, on the column diverging from the Sudur Bazaar (on route) to the plain, north of the entrenched magazine, and forming a company of her Majesty's 61st Regiment marching into and taking possession of the entrenched. The grenadiers, numbers 1 and 2, and first section of number 3 companies, all simultaneously loaded on the march, and made a sudden rush on to the ramparts, the remaining 7 companies ordered arms, stood for a few minutes, and then dispersed.</td>
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<td>(13 May.) Mutinied and deserted on the 14th May 1857 Discharged on the 23rd May 1857.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remark.**

The right wing 9th Light Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel A. N. Campbell, and the 46th Regiment Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel G. Farquhason, suddenly broke into open mutiny early on 9th July 1857, up to which time they had been perfectly orderly and well-conducted. No officer of either corps received any previous intimation of any tendency to mutiny, the whole mutinied; no measures were or could be adopted for the prevention or suppression of the mutiny, there being no other troops here.

Within two hours information was despatched to Brigadier-general Nicholson at Umritur, who, early the next day, dispersed the left wing 9th Light Cavalry, part of the moveable column under his orders.
### Return of the late 57th Regiment Native Infantry.

**Ferozepore, 3 March 1858.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number or Name of Regiment, Regular or Irregular.</th>
<th>Whether Mutinied or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny, since 1st January 1857.</th>
<th>Number of European Officers, Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men present at the Outbreak.</th>
<th>Date of First Instructions received by any Officer, of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>Date when Information was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>Date of First Order issued by Commanding Officer for adopting Measures for prevention of such Outbreak.</th>
<th>REMARKS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>57th Regiment Native Infantry, Lord Moira, K 27th Division.</td>
<td>Manifested a disposition to Mutiny.</td>
<td>There was no outbreak in the 57th Regiment Native Infantry, but there were present on the 14th of May, 10 European officers, 14 native officers, 81 non-commissioned officers, 16 drummers, 602 sepoys.</td>
<td>25 April 1857</td>
<td>26 April 1857</td>
<td>26 April 1857</td>
<td>An uneasy feeling about the Enfield Rifle and Cartridge showed itself on the 25th of April. On the 26th, I caused a native letter to be written to the detached party at the Sealkote Depot, to assure them that no greased cartridges were in the regimental magazine, or would be used. I had this letter read throughout the lines, that all present might hear and understand. The men were satisfied, and nothing further occurred till the 14th of May, when the regiment which had been marched out of cantonments the previous day voluntarily laid down their arms, at the request of the brigadier, with the exception of 220 men, who deserted in a panic easily accounted for, under the circumstances. Of these deserters, 48 were recruits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**J. MacKenzie, Brigadier, Commanding at Ferozepore.**

**E. Darwall, Lieut.-colonel, Commanding Detachment late 57th Regiment Native Infantry.**

### Return of every Regiment, Cavalry and Infantry, and Troop or Company of Artillery, Regular as well as Irregular, which has Mutined, or shown a Disposition to Mutiny in the Peshawur Division, since 1 January 1857.

**Peshawur, 12 April 1858.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number or Name of the Regiment.</th>
<th>Whether Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny.</th>
<th>Number of European and Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers present with each Regiment.</th>
<th>Date of the First Intimation received by any Officer, of the Corps, Wing, being disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>Date when Information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>Date of the First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for adopting Measures for the Suppression of the Mutiny, etc.</th>
<th>REMARKS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8th Light Cavalry</td>
<td>All these corps have, on various occasions, shown signs of disloyalty.</td>
<td>European Officers</td>
<td>Native Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officers</td>
<td>Drummers and Pioneers</td>
<td>23 May 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Regiment Native Infantry.</td>
<td>Mutinied 20 Aug.</td>
<td>European Officers</td>
<td>Native Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td>23 May 1857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Ditto –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>European Officers</td>
<td>Native Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officers</td>
<td>Drummers and Pioneers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Ditto –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>European Officers</td>
<td>Native Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th Ditto –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>European Officers</td>
<td>Native Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**PAPERS RELATING TO THE**
The 31st Regiment Native Infantry, after being disarmed, and on hearing of the seizure of this treasonable correspondence, became highly excited, and 250 men, with the subadar-major at their head, fled into the district towards the mountains.

The bearer of the letter, a Brahmin priest, who had managed to abscond in the first instance, was subsequently apprehended in the streets of Feshawur, a few days previous to the 27th August 1857, when Major-General Cotton had ordered a search for arms to be made in the lines of all the disarmed corps who were reported to be secreting them, and on which occasion the 31st Native Infantry again became highly excited and mutined. The sepoys endeavoured to seize the arms of the newly-raised 18th Punjab Infantry, which was assisting Captain Bartlett, its commanding officer, in examining the lines, and failing in their attempts, they fled in numbers towards the Khyber Pass, where a religious enthusiast called the Syed Ameer, had invited the disaffected troops and the surrounding tribes to join him in a holy war against the English.

Owing to the activity of the troops and the assistance rendered by the civil authorities, the whole regiment (excepting 69, of whom 40 managed to reach the Khyber) were killed during the mutiny, or brought in prisoners and shot.

At the beginning of July 1857, Sir J. Lawrence, for the better security of peace in the Punjab, reported his intention to Major-General Cotton of immediately disbanding the 14th and 60th Regiments Native Infantry. Two companies of the former (on command) and seven companies of the latter (three remaining companies having been sent as a precautionary measure to Kohat in May) being at this time at Rawul Pindee, and the remaining eight companies of 14th Native Infantry being at Jhelum.

A force consisting of three horse artillery guns, three companies of Her Majesty’s 24th Regiment, and a body of Mooltanee horse and foot, under command of Colonel Ellice, Her Majesty’s 24th Regiment, was despatched from Rawul Pindee, so as to reach Jhelum at daybreak on the 7th July, to disarm the 14th Regiment Native Infantry, and to coerce it if necessary. On the approach of this force, the 14th Regiment Native Infantry having been paraded for the purpose, the men were ordered by their commanding officer, Colonel Gerrard, to seize their arms, and they no sooner heard this command, than they began to lose their muskets, and to fire on their European officers, the latter forthwith joined the advancing column.

The sepoys then broke from parade and rushed to their lines, which they held with much determination, and from which they were not dislodged until after a considerable loss on our side in officers and men.

During the night of 7th July, the mutineers fled in great numbers towards the Cashmere frontier, where, it is believed, that many obtained an asylum.

The two companies of this corps, at the disarming at Rawul Pindee, showed precisely the same mutinous spirit. They also broke from the parade ground, and occupied their lines, loading their muskets, and showing every intention of resistance. They were, however, ultimately persuaded to give up their arms.

These two companies were dismissed, in a body, from the service, by Major-General Cotton, and confined in the jail at Rawul Pindee.

This corps was removed in May 1857, as a precautionary measure, to Dera Ismail Khan, where it was disarmed without coercion. Information was received on various occasions, of the men of the 39th Native Infantry concerting plans for possessing themselves of the fort of Akilgarh, at that station; and if they have not openly shown their disaffection to Government, it is purely from want of opportunity for doing so.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Mutiny</th>
<th>14th Infantry</th>
<th>39th Infantry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>Mutinied</td>
<td>6 11 69 652</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>39th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<th>Whether Mutinied, or Manifested a Disposition to Mutiny</th>
<th>Number of European and Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers Present with Each Regiment at Date of Mutiny</th>
<th>Date of the First Intimation Received by Any Officer of the Corps, Wing, BeingDisposed to Mutiny</th>
<th>Date when Information thereof was First Communicated to Superior Authority</th>
<th>Date of the First Order Issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for Adopting Measures for the Suppression of the Mutiny, &amp;c.</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55th Regiment Native Infantry</td>
<td>Mutinied -</td>
<td>European Officers Native Officers Non-commissioned Officers Drummers and fifers</td>
<td>21 May 1857</td>
<td>21 May 1857</td>
<td>The first act of mutiny was committed by a guard of this corps on duty at the Attock Ferry, which on being relieved by a guard of 6th Punjab Infantry, threatened to shoot Lieutenant Lind, the adjutant of the latter corps, who was superintending the relief of the guards. The 55th guard, having loaded their muskets, proceeded to join the detachment of their regiment at Nowshera, pursued by Lieutenant Lind, who very prudently sent information of their approach to Major Verner, commanding the station. This officer, with a party of sowars of the 10th Regiment Irregular Cavalry, met them on entering the station, and took them prisoners. The detachment of the 55th Regiment Native Infantry having received intelligence of the above having broken into open mutiny, fired on the sowars, and released their comrades. Major Verner called upon the sowars of his corps to act against the mutineers, but the latter would not do so. The mutineers of the 55th Native Infantry at Nowshera then crossed the Cabool River, and went off to join the head-quarters of the regiment at Murdan, when the European officers were kept under surveillance by the men. Major-General Cotton on hearing of these occurrences, despatched a European force to operate against the 55th Regiment Native Infantry, and on its approach, of which the mutineers had received information, the whole of the 55th Regiment Native Infantry evacuated the fort, and ran off in the direction of Loonkoor Pass in the Swat territory. The unhesitating way in which they took this direction, clearly showed that a complete understanding existed between them and the hill tribes in these parts. A great number were cut up by the pursuing party; about 120 were brought prisoners into Peshawur and tried; 40 of them were blown from guns, and the remainder transported for life. The same number, on the persuasion of their European officers, were induced to remain in the fort. The main body of the regiment, about 650 strong, remained in the Swat territory for about three weeks, and on the 22d June obtained a passage across the Indus through the influence of the Akoon of Swat, for the purpose of making towards the Cashmere territory. On receiving this Intelligence, Major Beecher, Deputy Commissioner in Hazara, called upon all the influential chiefs of the tribes in these parts to act against the mutineers, while he himself proceeded with a force beyond the British border to operate against the mutineers if necessary, and to give confidence to our allies. All these measures were most successful. The mutineers, surrounded on all sides by enemies, were either brought in by parties to Major Beecher, who at once had them tried and shot, or they perished miserably in the different passes and defiles of a most inhospitable country. Thus was the punishment of this mutinous corps completed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The conduct of this corps up to the time of its being disarmed had been quiet and the bearing of the men respectful. But on the 7th July, when required to give up its arms, the corps, following the mutinous example of the two companies of the 14th Regiment Native Infantry (above alluded to), broke from parade, and took possession of its lines; many of the men loaded their muskets, and it was only after considerable persuasion on the part of their officers, who followed them into their lines, that the men were brought to a sense of their duty, and laid down their arms.

The mutinous feeling in this corps at the outbreak of the mutiny in May 1857, was unmistakable; on the 21st May a body of this corps during the mutiny of the 55th Regiment Native Infantry at Nowshera not only refused to act against the mutineers when called upon by their commanding officer, Major Verner, but actually permitted a number of prisoners (mutineers of the 55th Regiment Native Infantry, who had been made over to their charges) to escape without an attempt on their part to prevent it.

The conduct of a squadron of this corps at Murdan, where the head-quarters and greater portion of the 55th Native Infantry were in all but open mutiny, was worse. The sowars spoke in the most mutinous terms in the bazaars and villages, and the officers of the 55th Regiment Native Infantry, who were kept under surveillance by their men, were less apprehensive of the latter, than the sowars of the 10th Irregular Cavalry.

Captain Law, second in command of this corps, was shot in the neck while acting against the 55th mutineers on their fleeing to the hills, and on this occasion the sowars refused to act.

Major-General Cotton therefore solicited and obtained permission from the Punjab government to disarm, unhorse and disband the 10th Regiment Irregular Cavalry, which was accordingly done on the 20th June. On arrival at Attock, four rupees were given to each individual, to enable him to reach his home. The whole of the property of the corps, horses, arms, equipments were confiscated and sold, the proceeds of the sale being applied to the liquidation of the regimental debts.

The conduct of this corps before Delhi was such that Major-General Wilson had lost all confidence in its loyalty; extensive desertions had taken place from its ranks, and a spirit of disaffection evidently prevailed in the corps; it was therefore ordered to Bunnoo, across the Indus, where, by being isolated, its disloyal spirit would be rendered innocuous.

When it reached the bank of the Indus on the 22d September, a most extraordinary mutiny on the part of the Punjabee portion of the regiment was reported to have taken place by Lieutenant Campbell commanding the corps, and who himself had fired upon in the rear.

From information received, Major-General Cotton solicited permission to convene a court of inquiry to investigate the reason of this unaccountable mutiny, fully believing that although the Punjabees appeared prominently concerned in the business, the Hindustanies must have been deeply implicated. A perusal of the proceedings of the court of inquiry, together with documents connected with the trial of Bheekan Khan, a sowar of the corps, forwarded by the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, so fully confirmed Major-General Cotton in his views, that on the 16th February 1858 he submitted the whole for the decision of the Commander-in-Chief and of Government. He strongly recommended that the whole corps should be disbanded.

Sydney Cotton, Major-General, Commanding Peshawur Division.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Name of Regiment</th>
<th>Number of European and Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men present with each Regiment at the Outbreak of such Mutiny</th>
<th>Date of the First Intimation received by any Officer of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny</th>
<th>Date when Information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority</th>
<th>Date of the First Order issued by the Commanding Officer of the Corps for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such Mutinous Disposition</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th Irregular Cavalry</td>
<td>European officers - 2 Native officers - 8 Non-commissioned officers - 27 Sowars - 229</td>
<td>On the 21st September, on the line of march, just about daybreak, when 1 officer, 2 non-commissioned officers, and 27 sowars mutinied and fired on the officers, making off to the salt range of hills near the Indus.</td>
<td>Immediately after the outbreak, despatches were sent express in every direction giving notice of the occurrence. On the 224 September a full and detailed report was made for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the officer commanding in Upper Provinces.</td>
<td>On the outbreak the officer commanding the regiment, with the men who stood true, at once pursued the mutineers; two sowars were killed, and the horses of two others captured (total two men and four horses). The party was followed into the salt range of hills, a distance of about 23 miles. Information was given throughout the country, and rewards offered for each mutineer. All but six have since been killed or captured.</td>
<td>On the 20th May 1857 a wing of this regiment escorted the first siege train to Delhi, and remained there, doing good service till joined by the head-quarter wing on the 2d July. At this time the strength was—European officers 3, native officers 14, non-commissioned officers 37, and sowars 408. On the 11th July head-quarters of the regiment proceeded to Allipore, near Delhi, for the purpose of keeping open the communication with the rear. Large detachments were sent into the districts of Saharunpore, Soneput, and Paneeput. On the 21st July, in consequence of a large desertion from the Soneput detachment, it was deemed advisable to march the regiment back to the Punjab, and eventually across the Indus to Bunnoo, a distance of nearly 700 miles. On its arrival at the left bank of the Indus, before the mutiny occurred, the loss in all by desertion was—native officers 3, non-commissioned officers 10, and sowars 176; and of this number, 1 non-commissioned officer and 30 sowars only deserted after the regiment was ordered to march up country, the rest having deserted previously, and for the most part from the detachments separated from head-quarters of the regiment. The regiment never showed a symptom of mutiny till the 21st September, when the 1 native officer, 2 non-commissioned officers, and 27 sowars mutinied. The desertions from the regiment showed many were disaffected, and these were all reported immediately they took place.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Return of the 9th Regiment Irregular Cavalry stationed in the Sirhind Division since the 1st January 1857, Hoosheyarpore and Loodianah. Bunnoo, 1 March 1858.

H. L. Campbell, Captain, Commanding 9th Irregular Cavalry.
EAST INDIA MUTINY.

Sir,

Agra, 7 March 1858.

With reference to circular, No. 317, of 10th February 1858, I have the honor to make the following report for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief which is, I believe, correct, as far as my memory and other sources of information will admit in the absence of all-regimental records.

1. The 15th Regiment Native Infantry mutinied at Nusserabat, on the 28th of May 1857.

2. Present,—one lieutenant-colonel, six lieutenants, three ensigns, one medical officer, 80 non-commissioned officers, 10 Christian and four native drummers, and 755 sepoy.

3. The first definite information received was about the 18th of May, by myself, from Mr. Courtenay, of the Circus, in the evening; and on the same night the sergeant-major heard from a native, employed in making pipe-clay, that the sepoy were in the habit of meeting between eight and nine p.m., at a tank, in front of the parade.

4. I called on Brigadier Macun, commanding the station, early next morning, and communicated what I had myself heard, and also the sergeant-major's information somewhat later in the day.

5. The same day (the 19th) I had the men cautioned through their pay and orderly havildars, not to leave the lines after roll-call for the purpose of fetching water. I also directed the European officer of the day to go the rounds at uncertain hours, twice during the night, and to direct the native officer to do the same under his instructions. The sergeant-major passed through and near the lines three or four times in the course of the night, but as quietly as possible, and only accompanied by one or two sepoys. In addition to the usual roll-calls, the pay and orderly havildars ascertained once during the night that the men were in their huts.

6. By this time the Bombay Lancers, 1st Lancers, and 3rd Lancers, had been opened for the purpose of cleaning their accoutrements for a general parade next morning, had succeeded in moving stealthily under cover of the bells of arms, and possessed themselves of the guns which were but slightly guarded at the time, the cavalry night-picket not having arrived. I immediately sent notice to Colonel Penny of the 1st Lancers, and the officer commanding the 20th Native Infantry, and hurried down to my own parade accompanied by my officers. Finding the men, though in confusion, quietly disposed, and firmly believing that I had a large number of quiet men on my side, I sounded the assembly, having got out the arms, and formed line facing the position of the guns, moving out one company in skirmishing order and another in support; but soon finding there was no probability of their coming down to attack us, I withdrew them from the front, and endeavored to persuade them to move up under cover of some bells of arms in order to attack the guns, while I moved out another company from my right flank to threaten their left and rear. I soon found, however, that although I offered this last company the possibility of persuading them to open fire, and that many men from the light company especially those who were under cover of the bells of arms, instead of moving up to attack the guns were stealing over to join them, I therefore with some difficulty and delay called in these companies and formed the corps in open columns of companies close to their own bells of arms, having some time previously despatched a party under Lieutenant Thackwell to take charge of the magazine; I also contrived to bring down the grenadier company, which I knew was the most trustworthy, into the centre of the column, close to the colours.

By this time the Bombay Lancers* had been completely repulsed in their attempts to retake the guns, and I had received two messages from the Brigadier to bring away my officers to where the cavalry was formed, I therefore called on those men who were inclined to volunteer for the defence of their colours to do so, a confused crowd pretended to do so, and I attempted to move away in quarter-distance column from the parade; they

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PAPERS RELATING TO THE

soon, however, halted of themselves and asked me where I was taking them; I at once gave the order to the grenadier company to move out of the column with the colours, they endeavoured partially to obey my order but were immediately mobbed, and the men with a loud yell began indiscriminately to fire on their European officers, who, being mounted, immediately made the best of their way to join the 1st Lancers, with whom we left the cantonments that night, and retired on Beaunur. I am happy to add that, although Lieu-

tenant Thackwell (in charge of the magazine) had his scabbard shot away, Lieutenant Philpott's (the adjutant) horse dropped dead on joining the Lancers, and my own charger was severely wounded in three places, no casualties occurred.

7. One jemadar, four (4) havildars, two (2) naicks, two Christian drummers, and seven sepoys, left the regiment about the same time, and accompanied their officers to Beawur.

I have, &c.

J. R. Shuldham, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding late 15th Regiment Native Infantry.

St. G. D. Showers, Brigadier,
Commanding at Agra.

To the
Adjutant-General of the Army,
Calcutta.

Sir,
Agra, 15 March 1858.

With reference to the Adjutant-general of the Army's circular, No. 317, of the 10th February 1858, I have the honor to submit the following particulars of the mutiny of the 30th Regiment, for the information of the Major-General commanding the Meerut Division. That at Nuseerabad, about three p.m. of the 29th May 1857, the report of a gun was heard, and on inquiry I was informed that the guns of the second company, seventh battalion of Artillery had been forcibly taken possession of by some men of the 15th Regiment Native Infantry, and that that regiment was in a state of mutiny.

2. I immediately proceeded to the lines of my regiment, and was happy to find that there was no manifestation or disposition to mutiny in the 30th Regiment Native Infantry, on the contrary, the men by my order accoutréd and assembled at their respective bells of arms, preparatory to such ulterior movements as might be directed by Brigadier H. Macan, commanding the Rajpootana Field Force.

3. So confident was I of the loyalty of my regiment that I served out ammunition to the men, who loaded by order, and appeared willing to obey such orders as might be given them.

4. Soon after I observed an attack made by the 1st Bombay Lancers on the men of the 15th Regiment in possession of the guns, which was unattended with success; the 15th Regiment now fired on their officers, who had to fly from the parade.

5. No order having been received from the Brigadier commanding, I endeavoured to get my regiment to form up in battalion, for the purpose of moving to attack the mutineers, but I regret to say they evinced an unwillingness to carry out this order; this was the first intimation received by me, or any of my officers, of the regiment's disposition to mutiny.

6. Matters remained in this state until sunset, the men evincing no apparent desire to side with the mutineers, with the exception of a few men of the grenadier company, who were with some difficulty prevented from joining them.

7. After dusk, however, a sudden and decided change appeared to come over the spirit of the men, caused, as I was informed, by a communication clandestinely brought from the 15th Regiment by a subadar of that corps, to the effect that if the 30th Regiment did not join them by eight o'clock that night they would be attacked, and a fire opened on them from the guns, and that not one of the European officers would be allowed to escape; about this time it was also ascertained that the brigadier with his staff and the Lancers had left the cantonments.

8. Shortly after eight o'clock the subadar-major, and other native officers, repeatedly solicited me to quit the lines, and take my officers with me, to prevent bloodshed, and that during the night their utmost efforts should be employed in drawing off all the well-disposed men of the corps, as they were convinced that the regiment was not disaffected, but at that moment nothing could be done, owing to the confusion and alarm in the minds of the men, caused by the threat held out by the 15th Regiment. About nine p.m. I withdrew my officers from the regiment, when four native commissioned officers, one non-commissioned officer, and eight rank and file, accompanied us to Beaunur.

9. The efforts of the native officers were crowned next morning with the pleasing result of having induced about 300 men to quit their mutinous comrades, and others were fast following, when, I am informed, that two native horsemen, in the service of the nephew of the notorious dacoit Doongur Sing, of the Rajpootana States (who had been written to by jemadar Oomur Khan of my regiment) suddenly appeared amongst them, offering them carriage and the support of their master; this caused a complete reaction, and decided the
the fate of those who were wavering. I may here state that the 15th Regiment and Artillery had left the station some time prior to this, as also the disaffected men of the 30th Regiment.

10. The subadar-major, and other native officers, with a proportion of non-commissioned officers, and between 200 and 300 sepoys, now followed their officers towards Beawur; but unfortunately they halted, after having proceeded two miles from cantonments, at a village called Nandla, where they had been told by one of my servants that I was concealed: the subadar-major here went in search of me, taking with him a few men, and on their return from their fruitless search, he was surprised to find the party he had left had retraced their steps to cantonments, having been scared by the villagers, who told them that all the officers who had sought refuge at Beawur had been murdered; the subadar-major was not deterred by this information, but proceeded to Beawur, where he arrived on the morning of the 20th May with his small party, whom I disarmed, by order of Brigadier H. Macan, in the afternoon of that day: of these five native commissioned officers, one havildar, and 22 rank and file, are still with me, pending a reference made to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding them, they having had the option offered them to take their discharge, or wait, without pay, the result of their petition.

Statement, showing the Number of European Officers, Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men, present with 30th Regiment Native Infantry at the Outbreak of such Mutiny.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Officers</th>
<th>Native Officers</th>
<th>Non-Commissioned Officers and Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Return from the 72d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry, called for by Circular, No. 317, dated 10th February 1858, from the Adjutant-General of the Army. Delhi, 22 March 1858.

1. 72d Regiment Bengal Native Infantry mutinied at Neemuch, 3d June 1857.
2. Present at regimental head-quarters, 9 European commissioned officers, 1 European non-commissioned officers, 15 native commissioned officers, 100 native non-commissioned officers, 20 drummers, 847 sepoys.
3. The 28th May 1857 was the date the first symptoms of mutiny showed itself. An uneasiness had existed on the subject of the cartridges, but that was apparently set at rest by the publication of G. O. C. C., 9 May 1857, which was explained to the regiment on the day of its receipt, the evening of the 23d May. The mutinous disposition was developed on the 28th May, at about 11 a.m., under a feigned panic that the Sudder bazaar was being plundered by dacoits. A peon ran down the road bellowing out that such was the case, and that the artillery and cavalry were under arms; the cry was caught up in the lines, and the men rushed to the bells of arms, demanding their weapons. I was instantly on the spot, and believing that the affair was what it appeared, a panic, ordered the arms to be given out. Order was immediately restored; and though other panics did occur, still not any of consequence; and on the 30th May I ordered the arms to be returned, and lodged as usual in the bells of arms, and the regiment was paraded and addressed.

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addressed by me with good effect; for though information reached me that the artillery and cavalry were endeavouring to create a mutiny, I had confidence in the loyalty of the 72d Regiment. I did not, however, slacken my precautions, and never left the lines day or night, except on business which could not be transacted in writing. On the 3d June, at 9 p.m., after roll-call, the native officers in a body came to me, and stated that the men were in considerable alarm that they would that night be attacked by the artillery and cavalry, who were mutinously inclined. I endeavoured to quiet their apprehensions, but they begged me, for our own preservation, to give the men their arms, which after some inquiry I did, and the men turned in. At about 10 p.m. the orderly non-commissioned officer of No. 5 company brought to me a man named Peshukhan, who reported he had gone towards the lines of the 7th Gwalior Contingent, and made some disturbance. I immediately confined him in the guard. About 11 p.m. some cavalry troopers galloped in front of the lines, calling out "Get ready;" upon which, and two signal guns fired from the artillery, the men of the regiment turned out, and came towards the parade. I tried to restore order, and directed the companies to assemble in rear of the bells of arms, which was done, and I had every hope that, though temporarily excited, order would be restored, when I was informed that the subadar of No. 6 company had taken away his company by the rear, and that others were going to join the mutinous artillery. I went to see if such was the case, and on reaching the quarter-guard I ascertained the fact, and, moreover, that this subadar had gone to bring down the guns to open upon the quarter-guard, in which building he supposed the officers and their families would seek refuge. Such being the case, and the native officers themselves begging me not to remain, as they had lost all command over the men, and that in the event of the guns once opening, none could escape, and frequent musket-shots being fired, together with the officers' houses being in a blaze, I directed the abandonment of the station, and, accompanied by the whole of the European officers of the regiment and their families, also a subadar, a havildar and three sepoys, who remained faithful, I left the station at about 1 a.m., 4th June 1857, and fell back on the village of Jawud, 10 miles, where I expected to find some Kotah troops.

4. Information was communicated to Brigadier Macan immediately, viz. of the panic, 28th May 1857, on the same day, and from that date daily to the 3d June 1857; and of the mutiny, information was given on the 4th June 1857, and 5th and 6th June 1857 to army head-quarters.

5. The date of the first order was 28th May 1857.

P. Abbott, Lieut.-colonel,
Commanding 72d Regt. N. I.

St. G. D. Showers, Brigadier,
Commanding at Agra.

N. Penny, Major-general,
Commanding Meerut Division.

(Barrackpore, 24 February 1858.

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the Adjutant-general's circular No. 317, of the 16th instant, calling for returns of regiments which have mutinied, or manifested a disposition to mutiny, since the 1st January 1857; and in accordance with the instructions conveyed in your office memorandum attached thereto, bearing date the 18th instant, I have the honor to report, in reply, as follows, on the several points on which information is sought for; but before proceeding to do so, in justice to myself, I think it necessary to put on record the fact of my having been absent from the country, in England, during the greater portion of the years 1856 and 1857; that I only returned from home on the 6th October last, and assumed command of the regiment on the 14th of the same month, consequently my personal knowledge of the state of the regiment or the feeling of the men does not extend beyond that date.

2. With reference to the first question, then, as to whether the regiment has mutinied, or manifested any disposition to mutiny? I have no hesitation in saying, that the 2d Regiment Native Infantry (Grenadiers), at present under my command, has not mutinied; but I find myself somewhat at a loss to know how to answer the second part of that question. If the term "disposition to mutiny" is intended to apply to the regiment generally as a body, I should be disposed to say, from what I can gather from the records of the office, and from those officers who were present with the regiment during the year 1857, that it had not manifested a disposition to mutiny; but, if intended to apply individually, circumstances have occurred during the past year which might tend to the belief that a mutinous spirit did exist amongst some of the men, and which I shall therefore enumerate in detail, as far as I can.

3. During the greater part of the year 1856 the two wings of the regiment were separated. On the 1st January 1857, the right wing, with head-quarters, was at Raneegunj, and the left wing at Barrackpore, and on the 17th February the right wing, with head-quarters, joined the left wing at this station.

4. In the months of January and February 1857, several fires took place at Barrackpore and Raneegunj, about the same time, and amongst other buildings the electric telegraph office was burnt down at this station. This building was situated on the left of No. 2 and the right of No. 3, vacant lines, between the lines (Nos. 1 and 4) occupied by the
the 2d Regiment Native Infantry (Grenadiers) and 34th Regiment Native Infantry respectively, and about equidistant from both.

5. There were three other native regiments at Barrackpore, at the time these fires took place, besides the wing of the 2d Regiment Native Infantry (Grenadiers), but I believe there were no other troops at Raneegunj. There is no tangible proof, that I am aware of, that the burning of the electric telegraph cable or any of the other fires in that situation, were the acts of the men of the 2d Regiment Native Infantry (Grenadiers); but the suspicious circumstances of fires simultaneously occurring both at Raneegunj and Barrackpore, where wings of the regiment were located, gave grounds for suspicion, and the right wing with head-quarters was in consequence, I believe, ordered down to join the left wing at Barrackpore.

6. With reference to the fires at Raneegunj, however, Major Cooke, commanding the regiment, in a regimental order, dated the 13th February 1857, "thanked the officers and men for their exertions in extinguishing the incendiary fires while they were lighted in camp on the 23d of January 1857, and in doing their utmost to save the hospital, on another occasion, when the entire cantonment was preserved by their efforts, and several men burnt and injured in so doing;" and as a reward for their exertions, "the commanding officer excused all punishment drill from that date."

7. When the new cartridges were sent up for inspection to the native regiments at Barrackpore, Captain Boswell took the opportunity at a parade of the left wing for exercise, on or about the 3d February 1857, to show the cartridges to the men. Some of the sepoys objected to them, on the grounds that the paper differed from that generally made use of; and I have Captain Boswell's authority for saying that the men were perfectly quiet, respectful and well-behaved on that occasion, and showed no mutinous spirit whatever. The above circumstance was reported, and led to a court of inquiry, and the proceedings of which were submitted for the information of Government.

8. On the night of the 10th March 1857, two sepoys of the regiment, when on garrison duty in Fort William, endeavoured to persuade the men of the 34th Regiment Native Infantry on duty at the Mint to mutiny, and assist in seizing the fort. The above sepoys were put into confinement by Mudder Khan, subadar of the 34th Regiment Native Infantry, commanding the guard. They were subsequently tried by a general court-martial, and each of them sentenced, on the 30th March, to 14 years' imprisonment, with hard labour.

9. Subadar Ulif Khan, of the 2d Regiment Native Infantry (Grenadiers), who was attached to the school of musketry at Dum Dum, was put under arrest on the 28th April last, on suspicion of his having sent a seditious letter to the Rajah of Rewah. The person who took the letter, when on his way under custody to the Presidency, escaped during the mutiny at Benares, and consequently there was no possibility of tracing the offenders, unless by the discovery of the handwriting. In the meantime every endeavour has been made to trace the writer, but without success. The old moonshee of the regiment (Mirza Mehdoo) and another man, by name Moulee Sheekh Elahee Bux, who has been acting in that capacity for the last two years, have both been in confinement on suspicion for some months back, and were only released a few days since.

10. The subadar Ulif Khan, as far as I can ascertain, although under arrest since April last, has never been brought before any military tribunal. He is himself illiterate, and unable either to read or write; consequently he could not have written the seditious letter himself, but he may have got some moonshee to write it for him. From the character of the subadar, however, and one or two other circumstances, I am inclined to think that the name attached to the letter in question is fictitious, and has been assumed by the author, who is some enemy of his, either in the regiment or amongst the men of the musketry depot at Dum Dum, and from what I have seen of the native character generally, I am inclined to think that no native writing such a letter under such circumstances would have attached his own name or signature to it; nor do I think that this subadar, had he been the author of the said letter, knowing, as he does, that it is in the possession of Government, and what the consequences would be if brought home to him, would have remained so long to see the result, and he might have gone away at any time, as he has been merely in open arrest; and this speaks more for him than anything else.

11. The 2d Regiment Native Infantry (Grenadiers) was disarmed, together with the other regiments forming the native brigade at Barrackpore, on the 14th June 1857.

12. During the whole of the past year only one man deserted from the regiment; and if the number of men struck off for overstaying their furlough or for any criterion of the state of the regiment or the disposition of the men, the following returns will show:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subadar</th>
<th>Jemadar</th>
<th>Havildar</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Sepoys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Went on furlough</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined before expiration of furlough</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned after expiration of furlough</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* All struck off, with exception of 1 sepoy.

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13. One of the points on which information is called for is, the number of European and native commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and men present with the regiment at the time of the outbreak. This would hardly apply to the 2d Regiment Native Infantry (Grenadiers), as it did not mutiny; but in case it should be required to know the strength of the regiment at the commencement of the insurrection, I would beg to state, that after the two wings were united at Barrackpore, in February last, there were 10 European commissioned officers, 20 native officers, 120 non-commissioned officers, 18 drummers and 556 sepoys present with the regiment, including the station and garrison guards, and the men attached to the school of musketry at Dum Dum.

14. But now, owing to the removal of the Sikhs, of which we had about 100, the absent furlough men being struck off, and other casualties, we are now reduced to 16 native officers, 53 non-commissioned officers, 18 drummers and 671 rank and file.

15. In conclusion, I have merely to add, that since I have been in command of the regiment (14th October 1857), I have always found the men most respectful in their demeanor, most orderly in their conduct, and in every respect they have behaved themselves well; and to show what Major Cooke thought of the conduct of the men generally prior to that date, I beg to give the following extracts from that officer's farewell order to the regiment, when delivering over command:

"Since he has had that honor, no man has ever disobeyed him up to the present moment, and in spite of many false reports against the regiment (which they have felt greatly), nothing has been proved against them, with the exception of two men who tampered with the mint-guard in Calcutta, and who have been transported.

"The solicitude of the officers for their men during the panic, and for the credit of the regiment, he cannot be too grateful for.

"Nothing tangible has been hid from the authorities, and the commanding officer had hoped to have remained to see this old regiment cleared of all stains off their character, which, if they conduct themselves as heretofore, they will be."

The Major of Brigade,
Barrackpore.

W. H. Larkeis, Major,
Commanding 2d Regiment N. I. (Gra.)

C. Grant, Brigadier,
Commanding at Barrackpore.

(No. 23.)

Barrackpore, 24 February 1858.

In reply to the Adjutant-General's circular, No. 317, of the 10th instant, I have the honor to report, for the information of Brigadier C. Grant, C.B., that the 43d Regiment Native Light Infantry has not mutinied, or shown any disposition to mutiny.

On the 14th June last the regiment was disarmed; after which, seven havildars, nine naicks and 258 sepoys deserted from the corps. Having made numerous inquiries into the matter at the time, I have come to the conclusion that the men of my regiment who quitted the lines and their guards in Calcutta and the fort, did so in a panic, and not from any disaffection; the panic, I believe, to have been caused by a mixed feeling of shame and alarm; shame caused by the disarming, and alarm by reports which were sedulously spread amongst them, that the disarming was to be followed by their being placed in irons, and imprisoned or transported. The men laboured also, under the disadvantage of being away from their head-quarters, and broken up into separate parties.

Of the deserters, six have been hanged, and nine transported for life by the civil authorities; nine sentenced to two years' imprisonment by court-martial. The remainder, who returned of their own accord (49), or were sent back by the civil authorities (two havildars, one naick and 58 sepoys), were not brought to trial, but were awarded such punishment as I had it in my power to inflict.

One naick was tried for mutiny (endeavouring to dissuade a sepoy from delivering up a spy) by court-martial, and was hanged. One sepoy was promoted to havildar by the Right Honourable the Governor-general for meritorious conduct.

In justice to the regiment I may add, during the Hoolee, in March last, the authorities sanctioned the regiment accepting an invitation to dinner from the 2d Grenadiers, which was refused by the subadar-major, in the name of the corps, on the plea that in consequence of what had been occurring in the station, it was advisable that each regiment should keep to itself.

I have, &c.

H. W. Mattheew, Major,
Commanding 43d Regiment Light Infantry.

C. Grant, Brigadier,
Commanding at Barrackpore.
Sir,

In reply to your letter, No. 302, of the 17th instant, I have the honor to state, for the information of the Major-General commanding the Simla Division, that on the morning of the 10th of May 1857, it was reported to me that a sepoy of the Grenadier company, 60th Regiment Native Infantry, had just been confined in the regimental quarter-guard, by Lieutenant Brabazon, of that regiment, owing to the said and other sepoyos causing an uproar in the lines of their company, by insisting on the orderly havildar taking them to the officer of their company to bear their complaint against the introduction of the new cartridge.

Lieutenant Brabazon was passing by at the time, and was appealed to by the orderly havildar on duty, and he ordered the above sepoy into confinement, as being the ringleader in the tumult. Immediately on this being known in the lines, about 200 sepoyos of the regiment, men from every company, assembled in undress about the quarter-guard, saying that they also desired to be confined with the prisoner.

I found several officers of the regiment at the quarter-guard, and Major Maitland, field officer of the week, all endeavouring to persuade the men to return to order, and to go to their lines, but not the slightest attention was paid to any of them.

I spoke to the men, and pointed out to them their mutinous conduct, and told them they ought to know my character for justice and firmness, and that as soon as they retired properly to their lines, and not before, I would have the prisoner's case inquired into; they did so immediately. I then ordered a court of inquiry to assemble forthwith at the quarter-guard to examine into the case; and shortly afterwards, seeing the men standing in undress by companies, near their lines, I went to the light company, and from it to every other company, and pointed out to the men of each, the disgrace they were likely to bring on their regiment by such mutinous conduct, and ordered them to go to their lines, when company after company instantly obeyed.

Shortly afterwards there was a false alarm by some designing person calling out on the right of the men, and I think from the musketry depot lines, that the lancers and artillery were coming down to cut up the native infantry regiments. Upon this, men from every company ran and broke open the doors of, I think, eight of the bells of arms, and took a few of their muskets and ammunition to the lines; but after some exertion by myself and officers of the regiment, the arms and ammunition were returned into the bells of arms.

As soon as I had read the proceedings of the court of inquiry, I ordered the prisoner to be released, considering there was not much against him. I also issued a regimental order on that day, that no man was to be confined without a reference to me, to enable me to examine every case during such a time of ferment.

I felt convinced that the prisoner was a mere tool, and that the whole tumult on the 10th of May was a preconcerted plot, got up by the Mussulman and Hindoo commissioned, non-commissioned officers and sepoyos of the regiment, arising solely from the widespread disaffection, caused by the cartridge question and escalade practice. The credulity of the men, on the score of caste, being worked upon by traitors to the State. I gave the proceedings of the court of inquiry to Brigadier Hallifax commanding the station, on the 6th Regiment Native Infantry parade-ground, where he was, with Sir H. Barnard, owing to the state of mutiny that regiment was in.

The brigade paraded the next morning, to hear orders read, and I think, the 19th and 34th Regiments of Native Infantry; and as the 60th Regiment Native Infantry was returning from it, the officers were called by Sir H. Barnard, who addressed me, and said, it appeared from the proceedings of the court of inquiry that I wished to screen my regiment, as no mention was made of the breaking-in of the doors of the bells of arms, and that he had no confidence in me, and had reported me in such light, on the previous evening, to the Commander-in-Chief.

I replied that the breaking of the bells of arms was an after act, and was to be investigated by the court of inquiry on that day. These proceedings were sent in, and I believe those relating to the prisoner were sent to head-quarters, but not those relating to seizing the arms, &c., as the latter were first returned to me.

Owing to this, I attribute my having lost the command of my regiment on the 15th of May, and I have not yet heard of the cause assigned for this punishment, further than Sir H. Barnard's direct report to head-quarters on the proceedings of the court of inquiry assembled on the morning of the 10th May 1857.

I rejoined the 60th Regiment Native Infantry on the 17th of January 1857, after more than three years' absence on furlough, and was called on for the annual inspection of the regiment on the 24th of that month. I was not long at Umballa, before I observed that there was mischief brewing in the native regiments, from the absence of the respect with which I used to be treated by all sepoyos before I went on furlough. I sent for three native officers in turn, men who had been my pay havildars for years, and who, of their own accord, gave me early information of anything going on in the regiment. I told them that I observed a great change in the regiment, and asked the cause of it. The only reply I could get was, that every regiment in the service was affected, owing to the forced introduction of objectionable cartridge, and to the escalade practice.

I reported these circumstances to the Brigadier and General, but not the slightest notice was taken of my representations. I also expressed my belief that the Government post-office was made the ready means of disseminating the seeds of mutiny and rebellion throughout the army and the country; this information was likewise disregarded.

133.

About
About the 12th of May 1857, the late Lieutenant Doyne, of the 60th Regiment Native Infantry, came to me, and reported as officer of the day, that after visiting the quarter-guard at sunset, he was followed about 60 yards by the native officer on duty there, who told him that it was the intention of the men of the regiment to murder every officer present with it at 10 p.m. on that night. I considered it my duty to communicate this information, which I immediately did to the Brigadier and General, and was merely told to return to my lines.

On the night of the 12th of May 1857, to the best of my recollection, there was an alarm caused in the 60th Native Infantry lines, by some evil-disposed person spreading a report that the Europeans were coming down on the sepoys. I, and several officers immediately repaired to the lines; and to remove the apprehension of the men, I allowed a packet of 10 men from each company, under an European officer. I reported this occurrence the next day to Sir H. Barnard, who was living at Brigadier Hallifa’s. Some anonymous letters in the Persian and Nagree character were found on the 60th Native Infantry parade, and torn up.

I am not aware of any further mutinous indications on the part of the 60th Native Infantry at Umballa.

Colonel Seaton, C.B., assumed command of the 60th Native Infantry on the 15th of May, and received all records from me.

I heard it mentioned at Umballa, that such was Colonel Seaton’s confidence in the loyalty of the 60th Native Infantry, that he told the late Commander-in-Chief that the regiment would march anywhere with him. If true, this may account for the regiment having been sent to Rhotuck.

The result, however, proves how little reliance can be placed in a regiment which has once mutinied.

I fear that all records with the regiment, including the proceedings of both courts of inquiry before alluded to, were lost at Rhotuck, as they were in the adjutant’s office.

A few days after the arrival of the 60th Native Infantry at Rhotuck, there was a slight emeute one evening, which was speedily put down by the officers.

On the morning of the 10th of June 1857, I saw a large number of letters for the men of the regiment in the Persian character, which were received by post at Rhotuck by Mr. Locke, C.S., who was in our camp. He sent these letters to Colonel Seaton for delivery, and who was in a tent with Lieutenant Shebbeare, his adjutant and interpreter.

I heard from men of the regiment that these letters were distributed, and to them I attribute the mutiny on that day.

I think they hastened the mutiny by some days, and that had they not been received, it would have been a mere matter of time as regarded the marching of the 60th Regiment Native Infantry into Delhi.

I heard, on my return from furlough, that the 60th regiment had the credit of being in a high state of discipline; I cannot say that I found it so. I saw very great laxity in all ranks, worse even than when I got command of the regiment in 1849. The authority of the commanding officer had become less than mine was as a subaltern, as regards punishment drill to non-commissioned officers, owing to army standing orders being set aside by circulars, and by station orders issued by officers perfectly ignorant of the proper method of keeping sepoys in subjection, and thereby interfering with a commanding officer’s authority, and rendering him a mere cipher in the eyes of his men, and removing that wholesome dread from non-commissioned officers, without which they are next to useless.

I am not aware of a single private inspection of a company according to army standing orders having taken place in the 60th Native Infantry while I was at Umballa, without a regimental order directing it.

This was not requisite when I went on furlough in 1853.

I have, &c.

R. Drought, Brevet Lieut.-colonel,
Late Commanding 60th Regiment Native Infantry.

Major Ewart, Acting Adjutant-general,
Sirhind Division, Umballa.

P.S.—In explanation of the last paragraphs of my letter, I beg to state that I have, from an apprehension of their being considered digressions, merely hinted at the order and laxity of discipline which I found in the 60th Native Infantry; as experience convinces me, that no commanding officer, let his intentions be ever so determined for upholding discipline in his regiment, can do so unless he is supported by his immediate superior against a party in his regiment, and which I had against me in the 60th Native Infantry.—R. D.

Forwarded,

R. Garrett, Major-General,
Commanding Sirhind Division.
RETURN of Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry, Troops and Companies of Artillery, Regular or Irregular, stationed at Umballah, since the 1st January 1857, which have Mutinied, or manifested a Disposition to Mutiny.

Umballah, 1857.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Name of Regiments</th>
<th>Number of European and Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men present with each Regiment at the Outbreak of such Mutiny.</th>
<th>Date of the first Intimation received by any Officers of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny.</th>
<th>Date when information thereof was first communicated to Superior Authority.</th>
<th>Date of the first Order issued by the Commanding Officers of the Corps, for adopting Measures for the Prevention of such Outbreak, or Suppression of such Mutinous disposition.</th>
<th>REMARKS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Light Cavalry (Lancers).</td>
<td>Regiment did not mutiny.</td>
<td>The regiment did not show any disposition to mutiny.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Native Infantry</td>
<td>12 European and 11 native officers, 903 non-commissioned and sepoys.</td>
<td>Showed disaffection on 10 May 1857.</td>
<td>10 May 1857 - 10 May 1857</td>
<td>Remarks will be forwarded separately.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69th Native Infantry</td>
<td>15 European and 10 native officers, 900 non-commissioned and sepoys.</td>
<td>Showed disaffection on 10 May 1857.</td>
<td>10 May 1857 - 10 May 1857</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Examined.)

J. Steel, Brigadier, Commanding at Umballah.

H. M. Wemys, Captain, Major of Brigade.

Urmitsir, 11 March 1858.

RETURN of the 5th Company 8th Battalion Artillery, with No. 16 Light Field Battery attached.

W. Poole Waddy, Captain, Commanding 5th Company 8th Battalion Artillery, with No. 16 Light Field Battery attached.
### Return of the 35th Regiment of Native Light Infantry.

**Umritsar, 11 March 1853.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Name of Regiment</th>
<th>Whether Mutinied, or manifested a disposition to Mutiny, since 1 January 1857</th>
<th>Number of European Officers, Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men present at the Outbreak</th>
<th>Date of first Intimation received by any Officer, of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny</th>
<th>Date when first Intimation was communicated to Superior Authority</th>
<th>Date of first Order issued by the Commanding Officer, for adopting Measures for Prevention of such Outbreak</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35th Regiment Light Infantry</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks.** The 35th Light Infantry marched from Sealkote to form a part of the moveable column under Brigadier-general Chamberlain, on the 22nd May 1857. When encamped at Lahore, on the night of the 4th June, a portion of the regiment took alarm, and seized their arms; a few men, 18 or 20, loaded. On being reassured by their officers, order was at once restored. At Phillour, on the 20th June 1857, the regiment was disarmed as a precautionary measure. Since the outbreak the men have been very steady in general obedience to their officers, but never evinced any great amount of sympathy or loyalty towards the Government. Their general temper exhibited a determined passive indifference.

*M. G. Smith, Lieutenant, Adjutant 35th Regiment Native Infantry.*

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### Return of the 59th Regiment of Native Infantry.

**Umritsar, 11 March 1853.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Name of Regiment</th>
<th>Whether Mutinied, or manifested a disposition to Mutiny, since 1 January 1857</th>
<th>Number of European Officers, Native Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men present at the Outbreak</th>
<th>Date of first Intimation received by any Officer, of the Corps being disposed to Mutiny</th>
<th>Date when first Intimation was communicated to Superior Authority</th>
<th>Date of first Order issued by the Commanding Officer, for adopting Measures for Prevention of such Outbreak</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59th Regiment Native Infantry</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks.** The 59th Regiment Light Infantry was disarmed on the 8th July 1857, as a precautionary measure. Subsequent to being disarmed, two men were found guilty of secreting ammunition, and were executed. The regiment, as a body, have remained passive and obedient throughout.

*Hugh Boyd, Lieut.-colonel, Commanding 59th Regiment Native Infantry.*

*(Examined.)*

*M. G. Smith, Lieutenant, Adjutant 59th Regiment Native Infantry.*
From the Adjutant-General of the Army to the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Bombay, dated 30 April 1858.

Sir,

By direction of the Commander-in-Chief I have the honor to forward the Return called for in your letter, No. 829, of the 29th January last.

2. The information in the Return has been condensed as much as possible, consistent with clearness and perspicuity, and I am to observe that, as the framing of it depended on information required to be elicited from divisional and commanding officers at a distance, an unavoidable delay has attended its transmission to Government.

3. His Excellency desires me to request that the Right honorable the Governor in Council will favour him by allowing the vacant column (as to dates of government orders and decisions, &c.) being filled in from the respective Secretary's records.

I have, &c.

E. Green,
Colonel Adjutant-general.

Adjutant-general's Office,
Head Quarters, Mahabaleshwar, 30 April 1858.

(True copy.)

H. L. Anderson,
Secretary to Government.
BOMBAY ARMY.

RETURN affording the information on Mutiny since January 1857, as called for by the Honourable Court of Directors, for the information of the House of Commons in Letter No. 829, dated 29 January 1858, from the Military Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

Adjutant-General's Office, Bombay Army, 29 April 1858.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Name of Corps or Detachments</th>
<th>Classification of Caste in Company</th>
<th>Date and Station of Outbreak</th>
<th>Number of Officers and Men present on the Occasion</th>
<th>Date of First Intimation received by Commanding Officers</th>
<th>Date and Nature of Precautionary Orders issued, or Steps taken by Commanding Officer, and the Result</th>
<th>Date of Information, when received by the Government of Bombay</th>
<th>Date of Orders issued on the Subject by the Government of Bombay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Company, 4th Battalion, Artillery</td>
<td>11 European officers 2</td>
<td>At Shikarpore (Scinde), on the night 23d September 1857.</td>
<td>No intimation given, but owing to the preponderance of Hindostanee men, the company had been looked upon with distrust. At half-past 12 a.m. on the morning of the 24th September 1857, three guns were fired in quick succession, and immediately afterwards the native officers and pay Havildars, with several men, came and reported that a portion of the company had seized the guns, and were in open mutiny.</td>
<td>No precautionary orders; but on the firing of the three guns the 16th Regiment, Native Infantry (divided into four divisions), together with the Scinde police, attacked the rebels. Many of the artillery behaved well, and assisted to retake the guns, which was soon accomplished. Three of the mutineers were killed, but (owing to the darkness of the night) the others escaped. The attempted mutiny was traced to 10 men only; viz., three Bishnus, one Chutree (ringleaders), and six Aheeres. They are thus accounted for: five shot (three while the guns were being attacked, and two attempting to escape), four captured by police, and blown from guns, one supposed to be drowned; two men, afterwards suspected, were discharged for want of evidence, and handed over to the police.</td>
<td>3 Oct. 1857</td>
<td>10 Oct. 1857.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Company, 4th Battalion Artillery</td>
<td>26 European officer 1</td>
<td>At Hyderabad (Scinde). The company was disarmed on the afternoon of the 8th September 1857 by 20 of the First Bombay Regiment, &quot;Fusiliers&quot; detachment 16th Regiment, and some mounted and foot police, in consequence of a premeditated outbreak which was reported to be about to take place.</td>
<td>On the night of the 8th September the subadar major reported it to Lieutenant Battascombe, and the following day he obtained intelligence of the mutineers’ plan of operation; viz., first, &quot;seize the guns; second, plunder the treasury; third, take the fort, and keep it.&quot;</td>
<td>On the afternoon of the 9th September a foot parade was ordered, horses saddled, &amp;c., when (on a given signal) the guns were seized and carried into the fort, from which the native guards had been relieved by a few Europeans of the Ordnance Department. By sunset the company was completely disarmed, and the guns lodged in the fort.</td>
<td>13 Sept. 1857</td>
<td>15 Sept. 1857.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First on the 23d July 1857, and on the evening of the 12th August 1857, it was reported to the adjutant by a trooper of the 3d squadron, who at 10 a.m. and 7 p.m. was with the commanding officer. The trooper's report being most clear, and supported as it was by the evidence of others, together with the result of an investigation that had some time before been quietly made, was so convincing, that immediate and vigorous measures were adopted to forestall and crush the attempt. The plot was confined to a party of Patan Beloochees and Pundees sepoys, of the 1st squadron, who were to have at 10 p.m. attacked the standard guard and looted it, and to have massacred the Europeans, plundered treasury, and then deserted with arms and horses.

No intimation was made to any of the officers as to this regiment being disposed to mutiny; but verbal instructions had been given at orderly room as far back as the 10th June, in view to the prevention of anything of the kind.

Subedar Bhairo Purasud at half-past 10 on the night in question, reported that some of the men were equipped themselves, and loading their arms. This had been reported to him by a recruit; the subedar major of the regiment almost immediately afterwards confirmed the report.

The regiment was ordered to parade without arms, rolls called, and the recruit who gave the first intimation ordered to the front, and stated the names of the men he had seen load their arms, &c.

Eight men were found to have joined in an attempt to mutiny, and four absent from their lines while the roll was called. The whole of these were made prisoners of by their command. The lines of the mutinous squadron having been quietly surrounded on the night of the 12th August by a portion of 12th Native Infantry and men of 3d squadron, a detachment of Her Majesty's 58th Foot attacked the house of the ringleader, where the rebels were congregating; but owing to the extreme darkness of the night they escaped, with the exception of three. This attempt of mutiny is attributed to the men of the 1st squadron being for some time associated with the disorderly troops of native States, many of whom were men from the same districts, and had been discharged by the British service. The mutineers are thus accounted for; two naicks, one trumpeter, 21 troopers deserted, one subedar, two havilars, and 7 troopers tried by general court martial. Of these, three troopers were hanged and the remainder transported.

Between 10 and 11 o'clock p.m. 15th September, the major-general commanding the division first received intimation of the outbreak, and proceeded to the lines of the different regiments, and found all on the alert. One man had been seized by the men of the 7th Native Infantry in their lines. An armed party that proceeded to the artillery lines and attempted to take the guns from the gouloune on guard were driven off, the guns re-occupying for action, horses harnessed, and all ready for a move off. The 7th Native Infantry was paraded, found all present, and ready to proceed against the rebels.

The arms of the grenadiers were piled and sentries placed over them, and the prisoners lodged in the city gai. Subsequent investigation traced the plot to one native officer and 17 non-commissioned ranks and file, who were on the morning of the 20th October disposed of in the following manner; one jemadar, three havilars, one naik, blown from guns (three manned by Europeans, two by natives), one havidar, nine privates hanged; three privates shot by musketry by a portion of their own men.

This disturbance was quelled on the same afternoon by Brigadier Macan disarming and imprisoning the detachment to the following extent; two native officers, three havilars, eight naicks, 97 privates of these, one havidar, one naik, and three privates were tried and executed on the 22d August; two native officers were sentenced to five and seven years' imprisonment.
Detachment of 12th Presidency Native Infantry—continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and Name of Corps or Detachments.</th>
<th>Number of Officers and Men present on the Occasion.</th>
<th>Date and Station of Outbreak.</th>
<th>Date of First Intimation received by Commanding Officer.</th>
<th>Date and Nature of Precautionary Orders issued, or steps taken by Commanding Officer, and the Result.</th>
<th>Date and Information, when received by the Government of Bombay.</th>
<th>Date of Orders issued on the Subject by the Government of Bombay.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21st Regiment Native Infantry.</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>- - -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At Neemuch:
- European officers 3
- Native officers 4
- Men 215

At Deesa:
- European officers 4
- Native officers 9
- Men 419

21st Regiment Native Infantry. 259 633

"Kurrachee" Disarmed on the night of the 18th September 1857.

European officers 11
- Native officers 28
- Non-commissioned officers 162
- Rank and file 537

No previous intimation appears to have been made to the commanding officer until the night of the 18th September 1857, when, about 11 o'clock, Subedar Ram Sahib Misser and Jemadar Laximon Guddaria reported to Major Mc'Gregor that a portion of the men contemplated rising at midnight and plundering the treasury, and making off to Delhi with their arms, &c., and that they expected aid from the Mahomedans in the city, and from the 14th Native Infantry in camp, for which expectation, however, there appears to have been no good grounds, especially as regards the 14th Native Infantry, whose bearing and conduct on the occasion elicited the commendation of the authorities. Subsequent events proved, however, that it was a case of misunderstanding, and the order given to "pile arms," which was complied with without a murmur; the lines also were strictly examined, and all arms found were at once removed to the arsenal.

Brigadier Louth, on being informed on the night of the 18th September 1857 by the officer commanding the 21st Regiment of the plot that had come to his knowledge, marched down immediately, with three companies of the 2d European Regiment Light Infantry, under command of Colonel Stiles, and four guns under Major Blake; they reached the parade ground of the 21st Native Infantry about 12 o'clock, and were formed in line with two guns on each flank, facing the lines of the regiment; the "assembly" was then sounded, and Major Mc'Gregor paraded the men in quarter distance column, with their flank towards the Europeans; the rolls were called, and the order given to "pile arms," which was complied with without a murmur; the lines also were strictly examined, and all arms found were at once removed to the arsenal.
searching investigation leaves but little doubt that the whole of the Hindostan men of the 21st Regiment were cognizant of the intended mutiny.

The following table shows the disposal of the mutineers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposed Of</th>
<th>Harried</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Privates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blown from guns</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanged</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transported</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisoned</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquitted</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Tried</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed resisting police</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drowned</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaccounted for</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This regiment still remains at Kurrachee, doing duty disarmed. The men volunteered for service in China, but their services were not accepted.

Kolapore being a station garrisoned exclusively by native troops, active measures could not be taken until the arrival of the European force (18th August) dispatched with all haste, consisting of detachments 2d European Regiment from Bombay, per steamer 'Did Goa, and horse and foot artillery by Poona and Sattara; but the monsoon being at its height, the state of the roads was such, owing to the rivers and nullahs being swollen, that the men were detained longer than they otherwise would have been.

On the night of the mutiny (31st July), the ladies and children were placed for security in the Residency, which is about two miles from the 27th lines; and the Kolapore Irregular Infantry (who are stationed close to the Residency) succeeded, under the direction of Colonel Maughan, the Political Superintendent, in confining the disturbance to the locality it originated in; the following morning the Irregulars and a portion of the 27th Regiment Native Infantry, 674 265 "Kolapore," on the night of the 31st July 1857, at 10 p.m. European officers 12 Native officers - 13 Havildars - 44 Musicians - 22 Rank and file - 680

On calling the rolls, one havildar, one naique, and 23 privates were found to have deserted with their arms. Fourteen muskets also were found, loaded, and the privates in whose charge they were, have been transported for life.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of Caste in Company</th>
<th>Date and Station of Outbreak</th>
<th>Number of Officers and Men present on the Occasion</th>
<th>Date of First Intimation received by Commanding Officers</th>
<th>Date and Nature of Precautionary Orders issued, or Steps taken by Commanding Officer, and the Result</th>
<th>Date of Information, when received by the Government of Bombay</th>
<th>Date of Orders issued on the Subject by the Government of Bombay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men of Bombay Society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men of Hindostan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bombay Army.—Return affording the Information on Mutiny since January 1857, A.D.—continued.**

The regiment remains at Kolapore, disarmed.

Edward Green, Colonel, Adjutant-General, Bombay Army.