


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The late Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. T. Telang.

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WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

K. T. Telang.


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Dr. Dadabhai Naorojee, LL. D.

TO
DR. DADABHAI NAOROJEE, LL. D.,
(WITH PERMISSION)
AS A HUMBLE TOKEN
OF
PROFOUND REVERENCE
BY
G. S. B. MITRA MANDAL,
BOMBAY.

PREFACE.

The Gaud Saraswat Bramhin Mitra Mandal embraces with great delight this opportunity presenting this first volume of the late s. Telang's Writings and Speeches to its subscribers, sympathisers as well as the public at large. We also hope that the delay in the proposed date of delivery will be excused by our kind friends whose anxious expectations must have, ere long, been taxed not a little.

We now beg to tender our best thanks, and express our sense of great reverence to Dr. Dadabhai Naorojee — India's Grand Old Man — for kindly permitting us to dedicate this work to him. It was, we feel, a great honour done us in the work as well.

Our next best thanks are due to the noble Mr Dinshaw. E. Wacha who in the midst of manifold and weighty engagements undertook to write a very interesting and instructive introduction every way befitting the contents of this volume. The inspiration to take up this work was all his own and his encouragement has crowned the effort.

We were also greatly obliged by our amiable and pains-taking friend Mr. Bhagwantrao

S. Palekar who very courteously kept at disposal all his materials very laboriously collected all these years past.

And last but not least our thanks are due many friends and sympathisers too numerous to mention here who assisted us most enthusiastically to get this volume published and patronised.

One personal word more and done. Commemorative of struggling souls like myself feel great relief when they are fortunate enough to secure contact with souls divinely blest. Such was my lot and similar must be the case of many. Jus. Telang's association and contact elevated our soul, cultured our mind and purified our life to a certain extent. May he rest in peace and may his sage counsel and saintly life guide the foot-steps of struggling young Indians for generations to come. I am thankful to Providence thus giving me the opportunity in my old age to pay, at least partially, my debt of gratitude to that great and good man—our revered Kashinathji. May the same Providence bless us one and all to carry on the mission we have placed before us—“Light of knowledge, and warmth of Sympathy.”

Vyankatesh Anant Mayzarkar

President,

Girgaum, Bombay.

G. S. B. Mitra Mandal.

15th February 1916.

INTRODUCTION

er Having regard to the fact that I have been the
of writer of an introduction not only to the Life of
Ju Sir William Wedderburn, and to the Speeches and
be Writings of the late Mr. Ranade, and those
lar of Sir P. M. Mehta, I freely confess it was to
mi me no little embarrassment when I was ask
fri to write an introduction, by the editor of this
lo: excellent and instructive collection of the Speeches
and Writings of the late Mr. K. T. Telang,
exp hat brilliant specimen of the highest Indian in-
bh: tellectuality. I was indeed perplexed. I felt that
kil somebody else who was far more in the closest touch
hin with that eminent scholar and politician should
anc undertake the task. I suggested to Mr. Thakur
Ho the names of more than one person every way
mi better qualified than myself to undertake the duty.
un But such was his earnestness in the matter and such
ru: was his appeal that I eventually yielded to his re-
te quest. It would seem as if the stars in their course
th had conspired that I should be ordained to write
m introductions to the weighty and statesmanlike
utterances of three of my most valued friends, alas
l all gone before their time, for whom I had enter-

II SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

tained and cherished the highest regard and esteem. Sir Pherozshah and I were lifelong friends and co-workers. It was over ten years ago that I consented to write the introduction to the volume of his Speeches and Writings as collected by the assiduous Mr. C. Y. Chintamani—the present capable editor of the Leader at Allahabad.

Next, it is superfluous to refer here to my introduction to the voluminous Writings and Speeches of the late distinguished Mr. Ranade. As in the case of those of Sir P. M. Mehta, they are, in reality, a mirror of contemporary history—moral and material—of India for at least thirty years. They must, forever, remain a monument of their great talents and massive intellect, and ought to be a perpetual inspiration to the rising generation of Indians and those who may come after them. And now, thanks to the indefatigable exertions of Mr. Thakur, who has an admirable capacity for judicious selection and compilation of the writings of some of our eminent Indian citizens, an addition is made to the works of the two patriots already named, by a valuable collection in a most interesting and readable form of the written essays and the many admirable speeches made by Mr. K. T. Telang for wellnigh a quarter of a century. To me, as to all his closer friends, it must be a matter

of the most profound regret that a cruel fate should have prematurely, and in the very prime of manhood, cut him off from this mundane sphere of his multifarious and brilliant activities. That quarter of a century seems as if it were one crowded hour of a glorious life; for that period Mr. Telang seems to have surpassed many of his colleagues in public life by the good literary and social work he achieved. Tracing his writings from 1869 by which time he had finished his academic career with honours, it would seem that his earliest activities were in connection with that admirable institution, which bears the name of "The Students' Literary and Scientific Society" a society one of the founders or early pioneers of which were Mr. (now Dr.) Dada-bhai Naoroji and the late Messrs. V. N. Mandlik and Naoroji Fardunjee. I know, as a matter of fact, how dearly Mr. Telang loved that Society and how his heart was full to render it every service possible with a view to making it a power and an influence for good in matters educational and literary in the city of Bombay. I think I am not far wrong or exaggerating when I say that amongst the distinguished alumni who passed in the earliest period of our local University none has been so prolific in his literary work for that Society as Mr. Telang. It may not be uninteresting to refer here

IV SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

to the many papers that he had, with his characteristic care and ardour, prepared and read before that institution. These papers are an unfailing index, not only of the precocity of Mr. Telang's intellect but also of the versatility of his great talents.

To write at the young age of twenty a life of Shri Shankaracharya is in itself no mean a literary effort. It shows the ardour and the scholastic instinct of the genuine student of history at that early age. Evidently he must have made a study of it before he could prepare such an excellent life of that religious philosopher to be read at the age of twenty. In this respect he closely resembles the late Sir P. M. Mehta who too at the age of twenty-two prepared and read a most valuable paper on Indian Education before the E. I. Association in London in 1867. That paper was a remarkable one, seeing that many of the observations made therein still stand fast and good even to-day. But even more than the life of Shri Shankaracharya the paper which Mr. Telang read in 1873 in reply to some fantastic theories of Professor Weber, was a marked evidence of the analytical cast of mind and the historical spirit of the young scholar. The principal point which he so successfully controverted was the

ridiculous assertion of the German scholar that the Ramayana was copied from Homer. The paper should be read by modern students with the greatest interest, if not for the subject of the controversy itself so much, as for the logic and the reasoning apart from the laborious research brought to bear upon it by the analytical and critical mind of Mr. Telang.

Other essays also bear a similar stamp of resuscitation which ought to be a model of the most instructive character to such of the rising generation of our University men as would prefer to follow in the literary wake of the distinguished Elphinstonian.

With the talents which Nature had endowed him with, Mr. Telang was always a keen controversialist, but one imbued with the fairest spirit of an honest and impartial critic. He never was one-sided. He always admitted the good points in the arguments of those who reasoned on the opposite side, at the same time his logical mind was always alert to discover the weakness and the flaws of those controversialists who opposed him. If Mr. Ranade was truly Socratic in his intellect, so also, though in a minor degree was Mr. Telang. Mr. Ranade's pen went on smoothly over the most complicated field of controversy. You perceive in

VI SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

his reasoning all the powers of a great persuasive intellect without ever feeling the sharp point of the steel. In the case of Mr. Telang that point was at once felt as he went on with the iron logic of his argument. The former told us how stoic he was, neither ruffled with defeat nor elated with victory; the latter was more combative, and one felt his thrusts and cuts, and yet both differed in this respect from their eminent colleague Sir Pherozshah. The last in him had not only the sharp-pointed steel of argument but also the fire of flint. And flint and steel between them did their vanquishment of the opposing controversialists as neither the one nor the other could do. Moreover, in Sir Pherozshah's public speeches and writings there ran all through a vivid imagination, apart from sparkling wit, and appropriate anecdote as much as ridicule, banter and satire. In this respect one cannot refrain from observing that there was more polished culture of the scholar from Oxford and Cambridge than in his two Hindu colleagues who never had travelled to England for study. Indeed, Mr. Telang himself had more than once observed that for exciting the needed enthusiasm in some momentous public affairs, the fire and the imagination of Sir Pherozshah were absolutely essential. Sir Pherozshah could fire shot after shot in the

enemy's camp, and Mr. Telang could only timidly follow him at a respectful distance. In short, I may venture to say that Sir Pherozshah in the field of public life was superlative in his combativeness; Mr. Telang was comparative, while Mr. Ranade was positive. The last in him had an abundance of what was known among the Greek scholars as "sophrosyne" *i. e.* sobriety of thought combined with modesty.

Coming back to Mr. Telang, it may be fairly observed that his earliest efforts were purely academic and literary; but in the prime of his intellectual vigour he was more devoted to discussion of questions and great problems on public affairs agitating the country; while during the last period of his full manhood, alas! so soon cut off, it seemed that he was at the very height of political sagacity and worldly wisdom. In the intermediary stage we find him, at first a contributor to the columns of the *Indu-Prakash*. Here he wrote, with his characteristic nerve and verve on the odious Vernacular Press Act of 1876 during the viceroyalty of the unpopular Lord Lytton. Mr. Maclean, the then editor of the *Bombay Gazette*, had denounced the Act in no measured terms, and hesitated not to call it the "Black Act." The country, pacific as it was and untrammelled by any political agitation, was exceedingly outraged by the introduction of that

VIII SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

universally condemned piece of legislation to gag the Press. The Famine policy and the Forward policy of that Tory viceroy were greatly criticized by the independent Press—Indian and Anglo-Indian. Lord Lytton and his Government were so obsessed by that criticism, candid and plain-spoken as it was, that it was thought fit that for a time such a gag should be put on publicists of the day. But this is not the place to narrate the history of that piece of legislation. Those interested in it must be referred to the pages of the proceedings of the Viceregal Legislative Council and to the many comments to be found in the Vernacular and Anglo-Indian papers. Such was the feeling of antagonism to that Act that the agitation was kept fanning in, till a change of ministry occurred in 1880 and the Liberal minded ministry of Mr. Gladstone the premier abolished it to the great joy and contentment of the vast Indian population.

Outside the columns of the Indu-Prakash the most striking utterance of Mr. Telang was on the subject of Free Trade and Protection. Students of the history of Indian administration during the Seventies should recall to their mind the most important Economic reform introduced by the Government of India in 1876 and 1877. From 1874 the Conservative Government of Disraeli, with Lord Salisbury

as Secretary of State for India, was being egged on by the good and true manufacturers of cotton in Manchester to remove the import duty of $7\frac{1}{2}\%$ on all cotton fabrics imported into this country. Cottonopolis was alarmed at the steady rise of "Spinning and Weaving" Mills in Bombay. Its men smelt from after the injury which their cotton-trade with India might suffer with the growth of the indigenous cotton industry. It should be remembered that the revenues of India in the seventies were far from flourishing. Deficits, more or less, were common. Moreover, the sources of the revenue themselves were hardly elastic. A duty of $7\frac{1}{2}\%$ on all goods imported from abroad was for years before, continuously levied for purposes of pure revenue only. But in 1874-75 it suited the men of Manchester to raise the cry that so far as that duty was levied on Lancashire cotton goods imported into India, it was protective. Organized agitation was carried on, in the English Press and supported, of course, by Lancashire men in the House of Commons. The Conservative ministry led by Mr. Disraeli well knew that it was maintained in its place and power by a majority which largely consisted of Lancashire votes. Indeed, in those days Manchester was astute enough to press its own wishes and sentiments regarding Free Trade on the Conservative and

X SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

Liberal ministries alike. It was an easy and smooth sailing when the latter formed the Government; when the Liberals were in opposition, the Conservative Government was more or less tremulous as regards economical problems involving Free Trade principles. Manchester, knowing its strength, was always to the front pressing the Conservative Government to concede to them all that they wished for as regards the wider development of Free Trade. In 1874-75 Cotton Mills in Bombay were making ahead, and slowly driving away the import of Lancashire Trade in coarser yarns. Again, shipments of such yarns to China, though only negligible at the outset, were greatly apprehended. Lancashire was afraid lest Indian yarn should eventually supplant Lancashire yarn in the China Market, and it also feared that the coarser and medium yarn imported into Bombay might, as cotton mills grew more, prove to be negligible. Those fears were not unfounded; but the plea on which Manchester vigorously agitated to abolish the import duty on yarn and piece-goods in India was entirely fallacious. It urged on the Government at home that the duty was protective, *i. e.* while Indian cotton mills were allowed to produce their yarn and cloth and sell it to neutral markets, the duty on Lancashire cottons imported here acted

as a protection to the indigenous industry. And in as much as England was a Free Trade country the Government ought not to allow any duties of a protective character in India. The agitation of Manchester was greatly opposed by the mill-owners here and the Indian public in general. Lord Northbrook who was the Viceroy and Governor-General of India from 1872-76, himself a staunch Free Trader was candidly of opinion that the duty, in no sense, acted as a protection but was levied purely for revenue purposes. He declared from his place in the Legislative Council that no statesman having a regard to the true interests of India should submit to the abolition of that duty. It was about this period of agitation that Mr. Telang read a paper on "FREE TRADE AND PROTECTION FROM AN INDIAN POINT OF VIEW", before the members of the Sassoon Mechanic Institute. I commend the study of that paper to the readers of this Volume as it would confirm them in their admiration of Mr. Telang's controversial power apart from his careful and philosophic study of this subject itself. Mr. Telang was a Free Trader with some qualifications just as the late Mr. Ranade and Sir Pherozshah Mehta were and as I am. As far as India is concerned, we all share with the view that young industries

XII SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

bearing all the germs of future prosperity should, for a time, be protected by the Indian Government. Mr. Telang then undertook the task of proving how far the duty was in no sense protective. The reader will see for himself in that brilliant essay what penetrative power of analysis and what force of logic he had brought to bear on the controversy. It is a magnificent dialectical performance which does great credit to the writer, specially having regard to the fact that it was written when he was only twenty-seven. On my part, I have not known that any accomplished Indian, in any other part of the country since 1877, has written on such a controversial economic subject with such vigour, such force and such lucidity as Mr. Telang at that age.

If we may take the period from 1870 to 1880 as that of apprenticeship of Mr. Telang in public life we may take the remaining ten years say upto his elevation to the Bench at the close of 1889 as the period of his ripest manhood and consummate statesmanship. In the very early part of the eighties Mr. Telang had acted as one of the secretaries to the Bombay Branch of the East India Association which was originally founded by Mr. (now Dr.) Dadabhai Nawrojee in 1869. The Branch, it need not be said, was exceedingly active

in its political work at the time. The most memorable year was 1883 when the ill-starred controversy touching what is properly known as the Ilbert Bill had raged fast and furious throughout the country. The Bill was simplicity itself. Owing to the larger number of Indians entering the Civil Service it was deemed highly expedient and essential for purposes of administrative efficiency to allow Indian Civilians acting as Magistrates to have jurisdiction over the Europeans specially in distant provinces like Assam, Bihar and so forth. It was introduced into the Viceregal Legislative Council by the then Law-member Mr. (now Sir) Peregrina Ilbert. None had anticipated, much less the Government of Lord Ripon, that there would be raised such a whirlwind of irrational and unfounded agitation on that piece of legislation. It was made the subject of a bitter and most violent racial question. The Officials and the Civil Service combined with the Non-official Europeans, principally the members of the European merchant community to make common cause for the purpose of denouncing and eventually wrecking the Bill. An active agitation was set on foot by this benefited and unbenefited bureaucracy throughout the country, while their organs of the Press fed this agitation in their own columns and indulged in an unprecedented-

XIV SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

ed fulmination on the Government of Lord Ripon, and unmeasured abuse on the Indians. The flood-gates of denunciation were thrown open as had never been opened before or after, since that year. Those curious to thoroughly understand, fully and fairly, the intrinsic merits of that Bill and the irrational controversy to which it led should consult the ponderous Blue-Book which eventually the British Parliament was obliged to publish, and they should also refer to the many tracts pro and con, published on the subject. The heat of controversy was not abated till many months after the introduction of the Bill. If a gagging Press Act was, at any time, essential to suppress the enormous quantity of seditious writings and speeches then rife in the European community and in the columns of its organs of opinion, it was during that eventful period. Not all that has been said in the Vernacular and Anglo-Vernacular organs during the period of unrest which so closely followed at the heel of the departure of Lord Curzon who by his virulent attacks on the character of the educated Indian community in general had made himself, during the last two years of his viceroyalty, so odious to the Indian population, could surpass what was written and said within the short period of twelve months during the agitation just referred

to. Sedition of the Whitemen was more rife than it has ever been since. Indeed, what has been sedulously alleged as sedition which followed the unrest caused by the unpopularity of Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty pales its effectual fire before the actual sedition loudly expressed, without let or hindrance, during the period that the controversy and the Ilbert Bill lasted. Sobriety of thought and language seemed almost everywhere to have been cast to the winds. Indians and Europeans alike indulged in all kinds of mutual recriminations which in any other country might have led to a civil war. In almost every province they lost their head. Nowhere was this extraordinary phenomenon to be seen and heard at its worst than in Bengal and Assam. The contemporary literature of the day should be carefully ransacked to learn the intensity of the heated agitation. At last a truce was declared and the good Sir Auckland Colvin, then a member of the Viceregal Legislative Council, poured oil over the troubled waters and effected a compromise. It was during the heat of this controversy that Bombay alone of all the provinces kept her head cool and behaved in a manner which afterwards earned for her from so eminent a statesman no other than Sir Evelyne Baring (now Lord Cromer) then

XVI SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

Finance Minister of India the sobriquet of "the centre of political sobriety." There was a public meeting in the Town Hall to express the thoughts and feelings of Bombay on the Ilbert Bill, and none spoke at that meeting with such sober judgment, such calm and serene sagacity and with such consummate statesmanship as the then trio of great leaders of political thought in the Presidency viz, Messrs. K. T. TELANG, BADRUDDIN TYEBJEE, and PHEROZSHAH M. MEHTA. Their respective speeches stand out as master-pieces of what politicians in the West are accustomed to. Even to-day when read by the cold light of reasoning, and with all the freedom from bias or prejudice they appeal to us as the very essence of what political speeches should be in the most troubled times. Mr. Telang's speech embodied in this volume will at once inform the reader as to the ability, tact and judgment displayed therein. I am quite sure that if all his other writings are forgotten, that particular utterance in the Town Hall will stand the test of time and bear impartial witness to the political sagacity and sobriety of thought of the speaker.

The papers and memorials submitted to the Government by the Bombay Branch of the East India Association between 1880 and 1885 bear the

impress of Telang's Roman hand. The students of politics of the present generation should carefully study them as published in the journals of the Association of that important epoch.

The most memorable public service which Mr. Telang rendered during the same quinquennium was in connection with the Education Commission of 1883-84 of which he was a member, and of which the accomplished Sir William Hunter was the president. It was there that his remarkable powers, not only of analysis and criticism, but of searching cross-examination were to be seen at their best. The evidence recorded by that Commission should be carefully studied by every Indian who is keenly interested in the past history of Public Instruction in India. As an independent non-official member of the Commission, Mr. Telang has rendered yeoman's service to the cause of Indian education, and his views on that subject as expressed in his "Minute of dissent" which will be found in the second Volume of this collection, may be read with the greatest profit and instruction. They are, in a sense, his education evangel which he was not slow to propagate, in, and out of, his Alma Mater, of which he was such a prominent and invaluable member, and of which also he had the honor to be the first Indian Vice-Chancellor.

XVIII SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

Though Mr. Telang was associated with the Bombay Branch of the East India Association as its secretary, and though he tried his best to keep up its activity and usefulness, it was well-known that it was languishing for more than one reason, chiefly owing to the condition to which it was reduced by the paramount management at the head office in London. The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, apart from the Ilbert Bill incident, had proved, in every way, a memorable and an epoch-making one. India became a fully free-trading country during his regime. All import duties except on Arms and liquor were abolished. The salt duty which stood at Rs. 2/8 was reduced to Rs. 2 per maund. The policy of helping the poor indebted ryot by loans and advances was first formulated, and everything was done which might conduce to ameliorate the condition of the impoverished agriculturist. It was Lord Ripon's Government also which published the first solid and comprehensive scheme of Local Self-Government, which even after thirty-three years has not borne that fruit which was expected of it; thanks to the unreasonable attitude, if not stern opposition, of the permanent bureaucracy of the land. It was the same Government which placed the finances of the country on a surer and more solid

foundation after the disastrous famine of 1876-77 and the unrighteous Second Afghan War. Thus at the date of the departure of Lord Ripon in December 1884 India had entered on a new and a most encouraging stage of her existence. As Sir Auckland Colvin has appropriately observed, "The dry bones in the valley were galvanized into life". The whole nation was pulsating with a consciousness of greater social, intellectual and material progress. It was under such bright and cheerful conditions that it was deemed expedient by the three great leaders of thought in the City to found a new political institution which should materialize the new sentiments and aspirations which had taken such strong hold of the entire Indian community. It was deemed political wisdom to leave alone the Bombay Branch of the East India Association to its fate, and start a new association which might well represent the voice of the Bombay Presidency; and thus it was that the Bombay Presidency Association was established at the commencement of 1885.

The time was most auspicious and opportune, and it was the good fortune of Bombay to be presided over, soon after, by a statesman of the ability of Lord Reay with a European reputation for education. Bombay's political and social progress,

XX SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

it is superfluous to say, was greatly quickened during the governorship of that distinguished pro-consul. One of the earliest acts of his administration was the nomination of Sir Pherozshah M. Mehta and Mr. Telang as members of the Legislative Council to assist that body in framing the new Municipal Bill which was then on the anvil, and which, after two years' vicissitude under the able and active guidance of those two leaders supported by the liberalism of an able non-official member in the person of Sir Frank Forbes Adam passed into law, and became what has since been known as Bombay's Civic Magna Carta. It was again in the memorable year 1885 that at its close the INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS took its birth in the City of Bombay. The origin of that national institution is so well-known that it requires no special mention in this Introduction, suffice it to say, that none took a more active part in making all the necessary preparations for the holding of the Congress than Mr. Telang owing to the original place Poona having had to be abandoned on account of the prevalence of cholera there.

One of the very first important matters of a far-reaching character to which Mr. Telang, along with Sir P. Mehta and a few others devoted their attention, and brought it to the notice of Lord Reay was

the establishment of a Technical institute of a highly scientific character for the Presidency. From the Seventies downwards there was a strong feeling prevalent among some of the prominent leaders in the different provinces that side by side with the Political and Social advancement of the Indians, the material progress of the people should also march. This feeling became so far prominent that it was deemed that an early step should be taken to carry into effect the introduction of technical education into the country. Mr. Telang who held strong convictions on the subject had urged the expediency of imparting such instruction on his colleagues of the Education Commission including its learned and sympathetic president. The demonstrations held in honour of Lord Ripon on his departure from these shores led the people of Bombay to raise a handsome permanent memorial in his honour. The idea of erecting a statue and of endowing scholarships was set aside in favour of a memorial which should be of permanent utility to the Presidency; and eventually it was resolved by the subscribers of the fund which had well nigh amounted to 2½ Laks of Rupees that it should be utilized for aiding and supporting a Technical institute to be founded by the Government.

Both Messrs. Telang and Mehta and their other

XXII SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

colleagues sharing their views were most enthusiastic on the subject, and the very first prominent act of Lord Reay on his assumption of the Government of Bombay was convening a meeting of the leading citizens of all classes in the Secretariat for the purpose of discussing and elaborating a practical scheme of technical instruction. His Lordship's personal knowledge in the minutest details of all the branches of public education in Europe were of the highest value in the subsequent elaboration of the scheme which was entrusted to be framed to a small committee. By that time the first Jubilee of the great Queen Victoria was celebrated in all parts of India in 1837. The scheme had been so far matured as to enable the Government of Lord Reay to take practical action on it. So many preliminaries of a variety of character had to be arranged and satisfactorily settled, specially the question of maintaining the institution on a sound and permanent basis. The task was an exceedingly arduous one, but thanks to the combined labour of all interested in the establishment of the institute, it was successfully accomplished. The late Sir D. M. Petit offered, on certain conditions, to provide a suitable building for the institute and it was finally agreed upon that the Elphinstone College building originally built at Byculla, opposite the Victoria Gardens, should

be selected for the purpose, seeing that it was situated in the most industrial district of Bombay. With the monies provided by Sir Dinshaw, a new building for the Elphinstone College was resolved to be erected in the Fort, but in as much as the first Sir C. Jehangir Readymoney had contributed the magnificent sum of 2 Laks for the building of the College in 1864 during the Governorship of the distinguished and the accomplished Sir Bartle Frere, and the Principalship of the equally distinguished and talented Sir A. Grant, it was further resolved that the new college-building should bear his honoured name and that a marble medallion should be fixed in a prominent part of the facade of the College premises. On the other hand, it was resolved that the name of Sir D. Petit as a large donor of the new Technical institute should be inscribed on a marble tablet and fixed in the new institute in a prominent place.

Thus the building of the Institute which was named the Victoria Jubilee Technical Institute was provided for. As to its maintenance a trustdeed was prepared in which it was declared that the Institute should be governed by a Board of Trustees, composed of representatives of the various funds with which the institution was endowed, and those of the Government. In this way the constitution of the

XXIV SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

institution was formed which has stood the test of over a quarter of a century and is the most satisfactory evidence not only of the enthusiasm of its original promoters but of their great practical wisdom. But for the hearty co-operation of Lord Reay it is doubtful whether such a noble work could have been brought to such a happy accomplishment. The entire Ripon Memorial Fund was given over in trust to the trustees of the institute from the income of which alone, part of its maintenance was to be provided. Then the funds raised in the memory of the second Sir Jemsetjee Jeejibhoy and of Mr. Navrojee Furdonjee were also vested in the trustees. Lastly, the Government pledged itself by its resolution to provide an adequate annual grant for the expenses of the Institute. Nothing gave so much pleasure to Mr. Telang as the establishment of the Institution on which he had, for years, set his heart, and for which he had worked so hard. It was a second best instance of the consummate statesmanship in matters of higher scientific education, of himself and his eminent co-worker the late Sir P. Mehta.

The foundation of the Victoria Jubilee Technical Institute may truly be said to be the coping-stone of all the public activities of Mr. Telang just before his elevation to the Bench in 1889. But we must

not forget to relate here his continuous and fervent devotion to the cause of the Congress which was founded in 1885. He was one of the earliest as well as one of the most earnest of the collaborators of Mr. Hume in his great political work with which his name is now imperishably associated. The Congress, as is well-known, took its first forward leap in political progress in 1888 at Allahabad under the presidentship of Mr. George Yule—a great unofficial European name most conspicuous in the commercial history of Calcutta. He was the first European who was, by the unanimous voice of the Indian community, elected President of the Fourth Indian National Congress. But at the date of the holding of the Congress in December 1888, it had come into the ill-graces of Lord Dufferin, the very viceroy who was the first to inspire Mr. Hume at Simla to establish a political organization of the character of the Congress which might articulate the voice of educated India. His un-called-for and unfounded diatribes against the Congress movement in his speech at the St. Andrew's Dinner at Calcutta in the month previous had greatly offended the entire Indian community. It was George Yule who echoed the true sentiments and feelings of India on that regrettable speech of Lord Dufferin which did no credit either to his statesmanship or

XXVI SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

to his sense of justice and impartiality as a viceroy. The Presidential Address delivered by Mr. Yule at the Congress of 1888 is every way remarkable for the free and out-spoken sentiments of the Indian people in the matter of their political progress and education.

It is the finest speech, full of sobriety, sagacity and healthy liberalism which ever has emitted from a non-official European of the high character, eminent position and great influence of Mr. Yule, and it should be read, marked and inwardly digested by the rising generation of the Congressmen. The speech made by Mr. Telang on that occasion deserves special mention, but it, too, must also be read in its text. All that I can say here is that it was the last political speech he made at the Congress; for, by the time the next year's Congress was held in Bombay under the presidentship of Sir. W. Wedderburn accompanied by that true friend of India Mr. C. Bradlaugh whose premature death enlightened India has ever deplored, Mr. Telang had already taken his seat on the Bench of the Bombay High Court. I must, however, mention here that for ten months before the session was held he had worked exceedingly hard with the working committee to make the Congress that eminent success it was.

Lastly, side by side with the work of the Congress

Mr. Telang worked equally hard from 1885-1889 in the Presidency Association along with his senior colleague Sir. P. Mehta and myself as his junior. Apart from the share he had in the work of preparing important memorials to the Government on the Public Service question, on higher education, on the Forest and Abkari questions and other problems then agitating the Presidency, Mr. Telang was a writer of three out of the twelve remarkable Leaflets which the Association prepared at the close of 1885 for the education of the British electorate. There was the manifesto entitled "India's Appeal to the English Electors" mostly indited by the pen of Mr. Ranade which had made no little an impression in England, when the deputation consisting of the late Mr. Manmohan Ghosh, Mr. R. Mudliar along with Mr. (now Sir) Narayan Chandawarkar proceeded to London. These three Leaflets, viz:—(1) Is India lightly taxed? (2) Imperial Stock-taking, and (3) Manchester's interest in India, will be found in the present volume and may still be studied with profit and instruction by those who take a keen interest in the political progress of the country.

To Sir Pherozshah as to myself, it had always been a subject of profound regret that Mr. Telang's elevation to ⁴¹ bench greatly diminished his politi-

XXVIII SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

cal activities for which he was so eminently fitted and of which he had given such a remarkable evidence. We both were of the strongest conviction that but for that fact Mr. Telang would have proved even more valuable to the country for the patriotic services which he would have performed than he had been during the twenty years of his non-official career as a student, scholar, educationist and statesman. All the same, as indeed, a most remarkable personage to have won his laurels at a very early age and endeared himself by his genuine work to all classes of the community in this Presidency.

His crisp, clear voice seems still to ring in my ears, while I cannot too highly praise that simplicity, affability and that sobriety of thought and that ripe culture which so eminently distinguished him. His personality was charming. The more I came into closer contact with him and the more our intimacy grew, the greater was my regard and affection for him; and, I believe, the same was the case with almost all his intimate friends. That such a brilliant character should have been so prematurely cut off is India's misfortune. All the same, Mr. Telang's name will be cherished by generations to come in as much admiration and

esteem as the names of Messrs. Ranade, Tybjee, Pherozshah and Gokhale.

BOMBAY, }
10th February 1916. } D. E. WACHA.



The Hon'ble Mr. D. E. Wacha.

**WAS THE RAMAYANA COPIED
FROM HOMER ?**

{INTRODUCTION.

This little *brochure* contains a paper read by me before the Students' Literary and Scientific Society on the 2nd of September last year. In revising that paper for publication first in the *Native Opinion* newspaper, I made only a few alterations in the text, and those principally verbal. I also added all the footnotes, as the several points which they refer to came to my knowledge in the course of my studies after the paper was read before the Students' Society. This will explain the circumstance that some points which ought properly to have been concentrated into a single note now appear dispersed over two or more. The appendices were also added in the course of the revision, and are here published for the first time, having not been published in *Native Opinion* in the first instance.

In now republishing the paper in this form, I have only corrected one slip, which had remained uncorrected when the paper was published in the columns of *Native Opinion*, but which does not affect the argument. With these exceptions, I have allowed my original draft to remain intact, although I make no doubt, that the hurry in which that draft was prepared has left considerable room for improvement.

Bombay, 15-1-1873.

K. T. T.

WAS THE RAMAYANA ~~COPIED~~ FROM HOMER ?

[*A paper read before the Students' Literary and Scientific Society, Bombay, on 2nd September 1872.*]

One of our two great National Epics has recently become the centre of considerable attention on the part of orientalists and Sanskrit Scholars. An opinion, by no means particularly definite or precise, has been hitherto floating about, that both our voluminous epics, namely the Mahâbhârata and the Râmâyana, have just claims to a very high antiquity. Greater precision than this, however, has not yet been attained. True it is, that the question—what is the meaning of the Ramayana—has been asked on various occasions, and has been answered in various ways. Some have maintained that it symbolizes the progress of Aryan civilization against the aboriginal inhabitants of the country. Others have seen in it a representation of the conflict between Brahmanism and Buddhism. A third school calls it an allegory on the progress of the agricultural art.* But although these and

* See Weber pages 121, 122, 124, of the *Indian Antiquary*; and *Indian Antiquary* page 147, Mr. Pickford quoted by the Rev. K. M. Banerjea.

other interpretations of the matter of the Ramayana have been put forward from time to time, the question as to whence that matter was derived; whether it was autochthonic or based on a foreign original; whether, if autochthonic, it was purely Brahmanical or borrowed from a Buddhistical or any similar source; these and questions like these have only just now attracted any considerable degree of attention. And it is to Professor Albrecht Weber of Berlin that the credit of drawing these questions into prominent relief undoubtedly belongs.†

I own, indeed, that the conclusion, to which the learned and elaborate reasoning of Professor Weber has led him, is not one with which any Hindu will be much gratified. To be told that the Ramayana—that noble work with which so many of one's pleasing and exalting associations are bound up—that work which sings the superhuman exploits of a deified man, who, beyond almost any other Deity in their Pantheon, is the greatest favourite of the Hindus of this day—that work which has ingrained itself into the very life of the nation, so that there is scarcely a Hindu who is not more or less

† It need scarcely be said that thanks are due to the Reverend D. C. Boyd for introducing Weber's essay to the knowledge of those who are unacquainted with the German language.

acquainted with its plot—to be told that after all that work is nothing more than a Buddhist saga dovetailed to the Homeric story of the Trojan War, that causes a shock to one's notions under which not many will find it easy to be stoical. For myself, I am free to confess, that I did not bring to the study of the exposition of this new theory a mind that was very much inclined to accept it. But if the progress of scientific inquiry must needs knock off its splendid pedestal this idol like so many others which it has similarly treated, it is our bounden duty to bend under the stroke, and adapt ourselves to the altered circumstances as best we may. And therefore, feeling what I do feel, I still hope to be able to preserve towards the new theory that scientific attitude which is the only proper attitude in such an inquiry.

Professor Weber's main conclusions may be summed up as follows (I) "The entire narrative" I use the Professor's own language as rendered into English by the Rev. D. C. Boyd for the *Indian Antiquary* "the entire narrative of the exile itself has, to a large extent, been developed out of germs furnished by Buddhistic legends.*" (II) "In the existing condition of the text, however, we find unmistakable indications that the influence of Greece

* *Indian Antiquary* page 120.

6 SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

upon India was already firmly established.”† (III) “It is possible that in the addition of these two elements [namely, the abduction of Sita and the siege of Lanka] by Valmiki, we should recognize the influence of an acquaintance with the Homeric saga cycle.”‡ (IV) “The work of Valmiki can hardly date earlier than this” [i.e. about the beginning of the Christian era.]§ These, at least for the purpose of the present paper, are the principal results of Professor Weber’s laboured investigation. The other results, also of undoubted importance, concern a different set of questions, and will not here be referred to except as bearing upon these.

The first point to be considered, then, is the relation of the Buddhistic *Dasaratha-jatak*, which is alleged to be the original of Valmiki’s *Ramayana*, with this latter work. It is, I think, much to be regretted, that Professor Weber’s deliverance is not quite explicit upon this point. I have looked through the whole of his paper once and again; but except in one or two places, where the point is more hinted at than distinctly set forth, I have failed to see the grounds upon which the Professor contends that the Buddhist book is the original of which the *Ramayana* is the copy. Why may we not believe that the real relation stands the other way? Pro-

† *Indian Antiquary* page 252.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Ibid.* page 121.

fessor Weber says, indeed, at the very outset, that "the former (namely, the Buddhist account) bears so plainly the impress of a higher antiquity, that it cannot well be doubted that it belongs to an earlier age."* And he then enumerates the principal points of difference between the two accounts, intending, to all appearance, that these should be taken as confirmatory of his assertion. But he does not go on to show how that confirmation is to be derived from them. It seems to me, I must confess, a very remarkable circumstance, that upon the very point which is the principal foundation of the new theory, the position of its advocates is not better fortified than by an assertion that certain things are very "plain" and "cannot be mistaken." To me the thing is not "plain", and is capable, as Professor Weber would say, of being "mistaken," as I would rather put it, of being taken in a totally different light. I look at the points of difference set forth by Professor Weber himself. I read that "Rama and his brother Lakshmana are sent by their father into exile during his lifetime, with the sole object of protecting them from the intrigues of their step-mother." I read these words, and ask myself what in the nature of an argument for the antiquity of this version can one spell out of them? I can see no such argument at all. On the second

* Indian Antiquary page 120.

8 SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

point of difference, noted by the Professor, I find firstly, that in the Bombay edition of the Ramayana, as well as in Gorresio's edition, and as far as appears in the Raghuvansa* also, Sita is not represented as accompanying Rama otherwise than voluntarily.† And I say secondly, that even supposing it were not so, that circumstance would have no bearing upon the mutual relation of the Dasaratha-jataka and Valmiki's Ramayana. This last remark applies also to the discrepancy about the length of the period of banishment noted under the third head of difference by Professor Weber. It applies similarly to the circumstance of Rama and Sita being married after their return from exile. The only points of difference, then, which remain, are firstly, that in the Buddhistic book Sita is at once the sister and the wife of Rama, and secondly, that it knows nothing of her abduction by Ravana.§ Now admitting that the marriage of brother

* Canto XII, 9. Indeed the first hint of it, I believe, and then nothing more than a hint, appears in the Viracharita Trithen's ed. p. 65.

† There is, I am afraid, some mistake here. What it is, or how it occurred, I cannot say; unless indeed, the emphasis is not on the "voluntarily," but on "the sister not the wife", and then the point can scarcely be said to have been properly put.

§ All these points of difference are enunciated at page 120. I may say here once for all that my references to Weber's essay are to the pages of the Indian Antiquary.

and sister introduces us to an archaic condition of society, I ask, whether mention of such a marriage is evidence enough of the priority of a work to another which represents the marriage to have been in another form? Is not that but a frail reed on which to rest such weighty theories concerning the originality or otherwise of a great work?‡ Furthermore, what conclusion can be drawn from the fact that the Buddhist book has no allusion to the abduction of Sita nor to the siege of Lanka? Does the history of literature furnish instances simply of the development of romances and histories by the addition of new matter, and has it no examples to show of adaptations and epitomes divested of details? Have we already formed such a complete historical induction, that the moment we see two accounts of an event which appear in the main to

‡ In that repertory of valuable information—Mr. Muir's Sanskrit texts—I find a hymn quoted from the Rigveda in which the marriage of brother and sister is expressly condemned as "unrighteous." True, this hymn belongs to the Tenth Mandala, which is generally looked upon as the latest portion of the Rigveda. But it must be remembered against this, that the hymn is repeated in the Atharva Veda which was already regarded as revealed in the time of Patanjali, nearly two centuries before the Christian era (see below); that one stanza in this hymn occurs in the Samaveda, and that another is quoted and explained in the Nirukta. These are sufficient testimonies in favour of the view assigning a considerable antiquity to the hymn, and it is of importance in the consideration of the point taken in the text. See Muir's Sanskrit Texts (1870) V. pp. 289-90-91.

coincide as far as they go, but one of which omits a circumstance which occupies a prominent place in the other, have we, I ask, generalised so far, as to be entitled to say without more, that the work which makes no mention of the additional circumstance is the predecessor and model of that which does?† Professor Weber may think so; for myself, even after coupling this and the last noted fact, I continue to be sceptical even of their cumulative force. The position might possibly be admissible as an hypothesis, as it might no less be admissible as an hypothesis for English antiquarians of ten centuries hence, supposing them to be without any history of English literature, to hold, that Heminge and CondeU's edition of the plays of Shakespeare was only

† How upon this theory, the relations of the Panchatantra and Hitopadesa would stand is a question, the consideration of which will also throw some light upon our investigation. See, too, Babu Rajendralala Mitra's "The Homer of India." in Mookerjee's Magazine No. I. Page 52. And consider further the application of the theory to works like the Taittiriya Sanhita and Satapatha Brahmana with reference to the stories narrated in those works and quoted in Muir's Texts [1870] V pp. 230-1 and p. 253. It is noteworthy, also, that Dr. Buhler seems to hold the reverse of this theory. (See The Indian Antiquary p. 308.) In my opinion, no argument of this kind, for whichever view it is used, is sound or trustworthy. And compare the following passages in Weber's essay p. 240. "The substantial agreement" &c. and "and it treats" &c. with p. 241 "Without doubt" &c. and p. 242 "This Brahminical" &c.—passages which seem to show the weakness of this line of argument.

a later development of Bowdler's Family Shakespeare, or of some well-pruned "acting edition" of the noble works of the Bard of Avon.

Another point remains to be noted in this place. Professor Weber seems to have had a lurking suspicion,† that the change of locality, the change of the principal scene of action from Ayodhya to Varanasi, might be urged, perhaps, against the priority of the Buddhistic story, as placing the chief seat of Aryan power and civilization lower South.‡ I do not much rely on the argument, nor do I vouch for its having been in the mind of Professor Weber. But since he does attempt an explanation of the fact, it is worth remarking, that the explanation has no authority to support it, and is a mere ingenious conjecture.

† See his explanation at p. 121 and note especially the expressions "perhaps connected" and "no doubt" in the course of it.

‡ Some further light is thrown upon this fact by the statements in Mr. Sherring's book on Benares. "The sacred writings of Ceylon" says Mr. Sherring "called the Jatakas which contain an immense number of tales relating to the life of Buddha and to the early history of his religion are replete with references to Benares; indeed each Jataka is almost invariably connected with a Brahmadata king of Benares." Is it not natural to believe, that Buddha, in adopting old stories to his own purposes, changed also the scene of action, wishing to obtain that importance which would belong to a system of faith connected with the very first of sacred cities. See Sherring's Benares Chap. I *passim and infra*.

I now close this part of the subject by making a query and an observation which apply to the whole matter. The query is—what proof is there concerning the age of the Buddhistic stories themselves? This, it is evident, is a necessary inquiry, albeit Professor Weber has not gone into it. The observation is, that it is at least equally probable with the theory propounded by Professor Weber, that the Buddhist story was not the model but the copy, not the predecessor of the Ramayana developed in it, but the successor of the Ramayana abridged from it. And I say, that this is at least equally probable, because on the one hand it is somewhat difficult of comprehension how a Buddhist hero could be metamorphosed into a Brahmanical* hero, and why such a metamorphosis should be resorted to at all (since it would probably be the last thing to be done by those who wished to withstand Buddhism‡), while on the other hand

* And what is more, according to one interpretation, positively anti-Buddhistic.

‡ Especially would this be so at a time when, be it remembered, according to Prof. Weber himself, the conflicts with the Buddhists were being fiercely waged (p. 121); compare Patanjali's Mahabhashya on Panini II 4. 9. where the example ब्राह्मणश्रमणम् indicates this fierce antagonism. Professor Weber himself characterises the circumstances of the metamorphosis and its effects as only "remarkable." Yet it is worthy of note that the Professor adds a mark of admiration at the close of his statement of what he thinks must be taken for granted by one

it is easy to explain, how a separatist body would carry with them some of the traditions handed down to them while in the community from which they separated, and would, after separating, endeavour to adapt them to their altered opinions.†

We now pass on to that "unmistakeable influence" of Greece in general, and of Homer in particular, of which Professor Weber descrites traces in the Ramayana. Of course, I need not pay very much attention to what the Professor himself is inclined to consider as a mere bagatelle, as not counting for much, in his argument to prove that Homer was the model of Valmiki. But it may, I think, be pointed out, that the "analogy" supposed to exist between some of the characters in the Ramayana and some in Homer is not quite correct. What comparison can there be between the very feminine Paris, who was the ravisher of Helen, and the con-

who adopts Wheeler's view of the matter. If the mark denotes that the assumption is not very probable, that criticism, I apprehend, will apply to Professor Weber's own theory also, which is not very different (p. 122). As to the theory broached further on, that Valmiki's object in glorifying Rama-Buddha's ancestor—was to lower the estimation in which the latter was held, I do not see much probability in it. That such a result would follow is not itself very likely, for, how could Buddha lose by being affiliated on a family of renown? And besides, the Ramayana takes no cognizance of this alleged relationship of Rama and Buddha.

† And see below.

14 SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

queror of the world, the dreaded enemy of the Gods themselves, who was the ravisher of Sita? What comparison can there be between the mean coquetry of the Greek heroine and the heavenly purity of king Janaka's child? Agamemnon is Menelaus's brother, Sugriva is not the brother of Rama. Lakshmana is the brother of Rama, and is not killed; Patroklos is not the brother of Achilles and is killed. Further, if Rama is to be compared to Achilles, who is to be impressed to do service for Menelaus?—And if on account of his wife having been ravished, Rama is to be likened to Menelaus, whom, on this theory, has the Ramayana to show as the analogue of Achilles of him whose wrath was to “Greece the direful spring of woes unnumbered?” I submit that the principal characters are essentially distinct. § You will find greater similarity between the main story and the principal characters of Shakespeare's Othello and Sir Walter Scott's Kenilworth. Yet nobody ever dreamt of contending that Sir Walter Scott took his Varney from Iago or his Amy from Desdemona. As remark-

§ For the “analogies” see page 173 of Weber's essay. How much of an *ignis fatuus*, however, these “analogies” are, may be seen from this, that Mr. W. Taylor in his catalogue of MSS [vol II p XLIII] in the Library of Fort William finds the analogues of the Homeric characters in the characters of the Mahabharata, the main story of which epics, one would think, is sufficiently distinct from that of the Ramayana.

ed already, however, Professor Weber lays no stress on this. He "contents himself with the simple assumption that in consequence of the mutual relations which Alexander's expedition into India brought about.....some kind of knowledge of the substance of the Homeric story found its way into India."§ Mark the word "assumption!" I thank Professor Weber for teaching me that word. It is an assumption of the barest kind and nothing more. Let us look a little under the surface of this "assumption" to see what stuff its foundation is made of. The first circumstance, then, which attracts our attention, is that we have accounts first in DioChrysostom and then in Ælian of an Indian translation of Homer. It need scarcely be said that no such translation of Homer is forthcoming. And Professor Weber, therefore, is constrained to take shelter under the opinion, that this simply means that "the people of India equally with those of Greece were in possession of an epic conceived in the style of the Homeric poems." Professor Weber then goes on to point out, that the statement indicates a Greek influence in the Mahabharata quite as much as in the Ramayana, and finally arrives at the conclusion that "it is possible that this account of the matter was founded on some actual intimation of the existence of the *Ramayana*, but on the other

§ p. 173.

hand it evidently does not allow of being used, even remotely as a proof of that existence."§ I do in part admit the force of this last observation. But I ask, if the statement of Dio Chrysostom and Ælian is convicted of error in one part, are we bound to believe it in another part? If there was, as Professor Weber himself admits there was, no translation of Homer, why are we to believe that there was even an adaptation? Are we not, on the contrary, entitled to contend, that there was no translation and no borrowing in the case at all, that it was a mere vague impression of resemblance such as a superficial knowledge is apt to convey which led to the erroneous supposition of the two Greek writers?† I say that, at the worst, the whole matter is too obscure to cast any satisfactory light one way or the other upon the question before us. All, then, that remains to support Professor Weber's "assumption" is contained in the very questionable coincidences that have been traced in sundry particulars. And, what after all, do these coincidences come to? In two instances, they have nothing to do with the Ramayana at all, referring, as they do, to the Mahavanso and to Buddhaghos-

§ p. 176.

† See the Westminster Review April 1868 p. 420 an article attributed, on good grounds, to the late Professor Goldstucker. See 2 (?) Wheeler's India among other authorities.

sha's commentary on the Dhammapada, both works of the fifth century after Christ. § As to one of the coincidences, which does occur in the Ramayana, the hesitation about it in Professor Weber's mind indicated in the word 'perhaps' § with which the statement of the coincidence is introduced, seems, with the swiftness of the prophet's gourd, into an "absence of any room for doubt" before that statement is closed. And the coincidence itself consists in nothing more than this:—that the story about Sita being won in return for the bending of a bow as related in the Ramayana finds a parallel in a story in the Janaka-jataka, as well as in Homer's Odyssey; and further that in the Janaka-Jataka, another story which is also similar to a story in the Odyssey is coupled with this story of the bow. On this Professor Weber thus delivers himself. "If these incidents then" says he "be really capable of being referred to Homer (and the combining of the two hardly leaves any room for doubt on this point) it seems to follow that the scene in the Ramayana may also be assigned to

§ See Hardy's Legends of Buddhism p. 8 and Weber's essay p 174. See also Max Muller's Introduction to Buddhaghosha's Parables, and Turnour's Examination of Pali Buddhistical Annals No. I. pp. 4 and 6.

§ p. 174.

the same source .§" I tremble, as Chief Justice Sir Edward Ryan once said, I tremble at the accumulated presumptions involved in this position! And this is a position taken up by a scholar, whose critical rigour refused any weight whatsoever to the possibility, that Dio Chrysostom's reference to an Indian work analogous to Homer might be evidence of the existence of the Ramayana at the time referred to by him!

As to two other coincidences concerning Hanuman's command to the sun to stand still, and Rama's sleeping on the occasion of the horse-sacrifice with a golden image of Sita by him, Professor Weber has himself shown how very weak they are as a basis for any argument of the kind which

§ p. 175. It must be remembered here, as pointed out by Prof. Weber himself, that the story of the bow occurs in the Mahabharata also. It does not appear to me, therefore, that there is anything to prevent the application of Prof. Weber's argument to that work. Is the Professor prepared to accept the conclusion? I think this is a *reductio ad absurdum* of his theory, after the elaborate proof of the antiquity of the Mahabharata given by Professor R. G. Bhandarkar in a paper recently read by him before the B. B. of the R. A. Society. And, be it remembered, the story of the bow in the Mahabharata is not part of any episode which you can safely amputate without injuring the main story. It forms part—and a necessary part of that main story. Prof. Bhandarkar's paper is summarized in the Indian Antiquary p. 350.

it is sought to found on them.† And as to Asvapati II, it is, perhaps, worth adding, that Asvapati and Kekaya as names of royal personages both occur in the Sutras of Panini‡, who will be admitted, I apprehend, on all hands to have preceded the invasion of Alexander the Great.*

Thus have we discussed the "unmistakable influence" of Greece which is traceable in the Ramayana of Valmiki. One or two other points, which are akin to this, are discussed by Professor Weber under the head of the internal evidence about its date which is to be found in the Ramayana itself. Under that head we shall also discuss them. Meanwhile the results at which the considerations urged above seem to lead are not by any means consistent with this alleged "unmistakable influence." Professor Weber himself discusses the question of

† p. 175 et seq.

‡ p. 176.

‡. Panini IV, 1,84 and VII, 3,2, See too Chhandogya Upanishad. Bibl. Ind. p. 364.

* Muller's Anc. San. Lit p. 245 and Goldstucker's Panini. From this last work, however, which I happened to look into after this essay had been written and read, I find, that my expressions in the text are a little too broad. Prof. Weber, I see at p. 23 of Goldstucker, actually put down Panini at one time to as late a date as 140 A. D. (see too Muller p. 305) I need scarcely say anything on this after the almost demonstrative proof we have of Patanjali's having flourished about as many years before Christ as Prof. Weber says Panini flourished after Christ. See *infra in notis*.

the relation of Homer to Valmiki as " arising out of the relation in which Valmiki's version of the Ramasaga stands to that which is found in the old Buddhistic legends." † We have endeavoured to point out already how exceedingly weak is the basis of the position that Valmiki's story is a copy of the Buddhistic. If our reasoning there is correct, it is obvious that on the issue on which Professor Weber himself has rested the case about Valmiki's being indebted for his story to the Homeric saga, judgment must pass against his contention. But we have further endeavoured to combat the Professor's assertions on this second branch of the case on their own merits. And we say it again, that there is nothing improbable in the supposition of the Buddhists having borrowed from the Brahminical saga—while the coincidences between the latter and the Homeric legends might very well be regarded as merely accidental, or, if necessary—and for my part, I do not by any means consider it to be necessary,—as due to the reproduction by the two brother peoples of a tradition which was the inherited property of both. I have studied the Buddhistic and Homeric stories too little to say more—but it certainly does strike me

† p. 172.

upon a review of the whole matter as put by Professor Weber, who certainly cannot be convicted of putting the case against the originality of the Ramayana too low, that at the very worst, as far as the Professor's argument is concerned, the judgment must be "not proven", and not as Mr. Burnell would have us believe, "proved almost beyond doubt."†

We now proceed to a review of that internal evidence which the industry of professor Weber has extracted out of the ponderous volumes of the Ramayana, and which, as he opines, goes a good way towards fixing the chronological position of that work in Sanskrit Literature. And under this head the Professor first draws attention to the "great extent of the work, which shows that it cannot have been the composition of one poet only‡, but that centuries must have contributed to mould it into its present form."* If by this is simply meant that the original work of Valmiki has had engrafted upon it stray verses, or short passages, or even small episodes, which do not belong to him, I think this not at all unlikely. But I cannot persuade myself that this process of grafting has gone

† Indian Antiquary p. 57.

‡ Vide contra, Williams Indian Epic Poetry.

* p. 177.

so far as to point to what would, in common parlance, be understood by multiplicity of authors, or in Dr. Weber's language "composition of more than one poet." But even supposing such accretions demonstrated, what does this circumstance prove about the age of the old Ramayana of Valmiki? I think it makes against this new theory more than for it. If the works of Bhavabhuti and Kalidasa allude to events described in the Uttarakanda of the Ramayana which, according to Professor Weber himself, does not belong to the Ramayana proper, but is a later addition,† what must we allow, upon this theory, to be the minimum chronological distance between the author of the original work and these later writers who do not so much as suspect the subsequent addition† to be any thing else than part and parcel of the original? The two episodes about Visvamitra and Jamadagnya Rama to which Professor Weber proceeds next to call attention also, to my mind, point in the same

‡ p. 176 First note.

† See Kalidasa Raghuvansa XIV 39 et seq and Uttara Ramacharita Act I *ad finem*. For the age of Kalidasa see below. Bhavabhuti is said to have lived in the beginning of the Eighth century (journal B.B.R. A. S. January 1862 p. 219 quoting Prof. Wilson). See too Prof. Weber's essay at page 241, which mentions another circumstance also throwing a gulf between Valmiki and Kalidasa.

direction. In both the triumph of the Kshatriya is the central point of attraction. In the story of Visvamitra, which we shall speak of first, Vasishtha is actually represented as saying to his cow that the power of the Kshatriya is superior to his own. And though in the Bombay recension, it is not said with that distinctness with which it is put in Gorresio's, even there we have Vasishtha saying "my power is not equal [to his]".§ Again I may on this point adopt the line of reasoning which Professor Weber has followed with reference to the Ramayana generally, and without laying stress here on an argument which, in another form and used under other circumstances, I have elsewhere combated, I may, perhaps be permitted to say, that it has more force in the application which I am going to give it than it can be entitled to when used as Professor Weber has used it. It is well known that the narrative in the Ramayana of the attainment of Brahamanhood by Visvamitra does not go farther than Visvamitra's own advancement to that dignity.‡ But if we turn to Patanjali's Mahabhashya under Panini IV—1—104, we find the following story relat-

§ See Gorresio Adikanda LV—II and corresponding passage in the Bombay Edition LIV—II p. 93.

‡ See Bombay ed. LXV. 26.

ed:—"Visvamitra practised austerities to become a Rishi. He became a Rishi. He again practised austerities to become the son of one who was a Rishi. Gadhi also became a Rishi. He again practised austerities to become the grandson of one who was a Rishi—Kushika also became a Rishi." Now with these two stories before one, one may well argue thus. In the passage in the Ramayana Satananda is avowedly singing the praises of Visvamitra. Now it is unquestionably very high praise to say of a man that by his austerities he not only made a Rishi of himself but also of his father and grandfather—and this is higher praise than to say that he raised only himself to the higher rank. If then this story as related in the Mahabhashya had been known at the time the Ramayana was composed, it would unquestionably have been incorporated into it; and this argument assumes redoubled force, when it is remembered that a matter of something like three hundred and fifty stanzas in the Ramayana is dedicated solely to a eulogy on Visvamitra. Have we not, after this, good ground for holding that the Mahabhashya of Patanjali was a work later in date than the Ramayana of Valmiki ?||

|| For the age of Patanjali, see Goldstucker's Panini towards the close of the book (p. 234), and Prof. R. G. Bhandarkar's paper

Similar remarks, though not to this extent, apply to the story of Parasurama. The Kshatriya hero vanquishes the glorious champion of the Brahmins. And when Professor Max Muller speaks of the singular relation between Rama and Parasurama as having been "probably remodelled by the influence of the Brahmins," I do not quite understand him.† The Ramayana there seems to me to bear evident marks of antiquity. Professor Weber is inclined to regard the two episodes as ancient fragments incorporated by Valmiki into his work*. Be it so. The absence of that sort of apologetic tone about it, which may, I think, be traced in Kalidasa or Bhavabhuti,† shows that the

in the *Indian Antiquary* for October p. 302, upon which authorities his age may now be safely taken to be proved beyond controversy.

‡ Max Muller's *Sanskrit Literature* p. 49.

* 178 note.

† Raghu XI—89 and Mahaviracharita p. 58 Trithen's ed, with which compare Ramayana LXXVI—24 (p. 118 Bomb. ed.), where instead of Rama falling at Parasurama's feet, Parasurama makes perambulations round the former. And it is remarkable, that the only word in the Ramayana, hinting at anything like what the Raghuvansa and Viracharita refer to, is प्रपूजितः which the commentator interprets by दाशरथिना ब्राह्मणत्वात्पूजितो नमस्कृतश्च. But in the stanza in the original, Rama Dasharathi is in the accusative case, and the more natural sense of प्रपूजितः is simply "honoured" which Parasurama certainly was. It is remark-

story could not have been offensive to the spirit of the age when the Ramayana was composed, and our argument therefore remains unaffected.

Professor Weber goes on next to call attention to the catalogue of various peoples, which occurs in two places in the Ramayana, and which contains the names Kamboja, Palhava, Yavana, Saka, Barbara, Mlechchha, Tushara Harita, Kirata and others||. "Under the name Yavana" the Professor then goes on to say "we are to understand the Bactrian Greeks, or rather, perhaps, by this time, their successors", and this he considers "the decisive circumstance in the matter¶. It is unlucky that the arguments for this conclusion are set forth by him in the *Indische Streifen*, which, being written in German, is, of course, for the present a sealed book to us. Meanwhile, however, we may pit against this the authority of Professor

able, too, that the commentator mentions a various reading प्रशस्यह् for प्रयुजितः which removes even this slight hint.

|| A similar, but not quite identical, catalogue occurs in the *Mahabharata Adiparva* as cited in *Mr. Muir's Texts I p. 388 (ed. 1870)*. It may, perhaps, be worth asking, what Professor Weber means by the expression "by this time" which occurs in the quotation from his paper in the text. By what time? To my mind, it is one indication that Prof. Weber is arguing for a foregone conclusion.

¶ p. 178.

Lassen which is endorsed by Professor Muller. "Yavana is not" says the latter "the exclusive name of the Greeks or Ionias. Professor Lassen has proved that it had a much wider meaning, and that it was even used of Semitic nations."* In support of this, I may refer to the fact, that the word Yavana occurs in one Sutra of Panini himself (Sutra IV—49). And it is hardly possible to suppose that in Panini the Greeks were the people referred to by that word. Another of the names in the list above, namely Kambujas, also occurs in another Sutra of Panini IV, 1, 75. And generally, there is so little known on which an identification of these different peoples can be confidently based, it is so probable that they were originally but little distinguished from each other in the minds of the ancient Hindoos themselves, that it is by no means safe to base a hypothetical chronology upon a questionable identification§; not to say that the passage itself may have been an interpolation of later times. We know that long be-

* Max Muller *Anc. Sans. Lit.* p. 501. And according to Goldstucker, Yavanani alluded to by Panini was the Persian cuneiform alphabet. See Goldstucker's *Panini* p. 17.

§ Similar lists occur in other places in the Mahabharata and in Manu. They are quoted by Mr. Muir in his *Sanskrit texts* (1868) I p. 481 et seq. But Mr. Muir declines the task of identifying the several peoples enumerated p. 482.

fore the time of the Greeks, Darius Hystaspes had invaded India†. We know, too, that the Phœnicians, and probably also the Egyptians, carried on trade with this country before the invasion of Alexander the Great. What more natural, then, than that a poet of no jejune imagination, should describe the vanquishers of the national soldiers as belonging to those foreign people, with whom commerce or war had brought him acquainted already? The connection of these names, therefore, with the Greeco-Bactrian or Indo-Scythian sway in India, which Professor Weber characterizes as "evident", nevertheless, we submit, does require proof.

We go now to the argument which Professor Weber bases upon the fact, that whereas Ceylon was known to the Greeks only under the name "Taprobane" or Sinhala, or at one time (namely the time of the Periplus) Palaesimundu, the Ramayana throughout designates it by the name Lanka—a name which we meet with only in the Mahavanso, in a Parisishta of the Atharvaveda, and after-

† See Goldstucker's Panini p. 16 citing Herodotus and also Robertson's Ancient India § I. And though the evidence on the point is insufficient, it is not impossible, that there may have been an invasion before Darius's time. Robertson § I. But see Note I Section I.

wards in Aryabhatta and Varahamihira†. As I understand the argument, Professor Weber contends, that the ancient name of Ceylon was that which was known to the Greeks; that about the beginning of the Christian Era, or some such period, the name of Lanka commenced to come into vogue; and that, therefore, since the Ramayana mentions only the latter name, *ergo* it must be a work later than the age of the Greek writers. It seems to me, that Professor Weber has not observed the other possible alternative, namely, that Ceylon may have borne the name Lanka before the time of the Greek writers, and may have ceased to go by that name in their time. If it is objected to this, that it requires us to suppose that the name Lanka had a sort of resurrection after having been in a state of abeyance for some time, we answer first, that there is nothing improbable in it, and secondly we reply by the *tu quoque* argument. For on Professor Weber's theory, we have the name Sinhala first, and Lanka afterwards; and now in our own day we have come back to the name Sinhala. The two cases, therefore, are thus far parallel; and to argue from the

† P. 180—It is worthy of note that according to the Mahavanso, Tamraparni or Taprobane is a division of Lanka, and not the name of the whole of Lanka. (See Mahavanso quoted in Muller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature p. 270 and see further Appendix D. *infra*).

use of the name Lanka against the antiquity of the Ramayana is clearly a *non sequitur*.

Come we now to the "literary data," as Professor Weber calls them, which he has concentrated together from various parts of our poem. And in the first place, note here the remark which Dr. Weber himself makes, namely, that all these "data" are called from one recension only, that is to say, the Gauda recension. Now barring the objection which might be based upon the exceedingly strong opinion of Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall† about it, it is still quite clear, that the argument to be drawn from these data can apply to that recension alone. And this Prof. Weber candidly admits. But admitting this, he still contends, that "they certainly furnish decisive evidence against so high an antiquity as has hitherto been assigned to the poem."* We shall presently consider this evidence upon its own merits to see how far it can take us with regard to the recension which has supplied it. But certainly, even allowing the whole reasoning Dr. Weber bases upon it to be perfectly irrefragable, you cannot allow the conclusion to affect the other recensions

† p. 177 of Weber's essay ; and see too Muir's Sanskrit Texts (1868) I.-p. 54 and p. 401 notes. And about all the recensions see Weber's own remark p. 178 and see p 247.

* p. 181.

of the Ramayana, unless you can show that those other recensions also furnish the premises on which it is based. Now the first remark which suggests itself to one upon a perusal of Dr. Weber's elaborate list is that it only shows, that before the Ramayana had been composed, Sanskrit literature had been already largely developed. And therefore what the epithet of "comparatively modern" † means which he applies to the names under which the several portions of that literature are spoken of in the Ramayana is not by any means easy to discover. Comparatively modern! Compared with what? We can get no answer to that from Professor Weber's paper. Nor have we any proof that Sanskrit literature had not been largely developed long before the commencement of the Christian era, subsequently to which Professor Weber supposes the Ramayana to have been composed. On the contrary we have some proof of the reverse of this, which will appear presently. Subject, therefore, to these two general observations, we now proceed to particulars.

The Vedas need no remark at all. The Vedan-

† p. 181. It will be seen that Professor Weber does not even attempt to fix the age of any of the works referred to, or of the commencement of the use of any of those expressions on which he relies. The lacuna in the argument is remarkable but by no means rare in the paper before us.

gas and, what is more, the six Vedangas, are referred to also in a passage cited by Patanjali. § About the Siksha, one of the Vedangas, especially emphasized by Professor Weber*, it is sufficient to refer to the tradition which ascribes the first work on it to Panini†, and to the fact mentioned by Max Muller, that Sayana considers that certain chapters on Siksha had a place in the Brahmanas—an opinion, which I may add in passing, Max Muller does not attack, but accepts as a necessity||. Sutra and Kalpa occur in Panini, § Kalpasutra in Patanjali¶. The Dhanurveda, astronomy, the art of reckoning, seem to be alluded to in the Chhandogya Upanishad‡. Natakas, and what Professor Weber emphasizes particularly, even the Dharmasastra, are both alluded to, and the latter apparently

§ Introduction p. 4 (Benares Edition).

* p. 181.

† See Madhusudana Sarasvati's Prasthanabheda in *I Indische Studien* p. 16.

|| *Anc. Sans. Lit.* p. 114 et seq.

§ Pan IV, 2,65; and IV, 3,105.

¶ Under Pan IV 2,60.

‡ *Bibl. Ind. Ed.* pp. 475, 478, 493. See as to the date of this Upanishad p. 322; and with it Babu Rajendralala Mitra's translation of the Upanishad p. 86 Note. Babu Rajendralala speaks only of "authenticity," I would add antiquity also. Professor Weber seems to be in doubt as to the antiquity of the Upanishad. See the quotation from his writings in Muir's texts (1870) V 322 et seq. It is notable that the Brihadaranyaka

with respect, by Patanjali.§ Nyaya, and the derivative Naiyayika, are connected with Panini IV 2,60, and the Gana under it in which the word Nyaya stands third‡. Nastikas are also referred to by Panini in Sutra IV, 460; and the Lokayatikas and a work on their system by Patanjali.† The quotations which Professor Weber refers to,§ again, are not of much assistance to his theory; on the contrary, if any conclusion can be drawn from them at all, they rather support a view conflicting with it. They are quite unfamiliar now, and refer

(p.334. Bibl. Ind. Ed.—but see too p. 1030) and Kaushitaki (p. 118 Bibl. Ind. Ed.) Upanishads are both against the high claim of the Kshatriya admitted in the Chhandogya. My knowledge of the passage in the former is exclusively from Mr. Muir's book (1868) I. 432; of the latter I became aware independently of him in the course of my own perusal of the work. It is not by any means easy to fix the age of either of these Upanishads. The Brihadaranyaka seems to be older than Katyayana (see Goldstucker's Panini). About the Kaushitaki, a note of Prof. Cowell (p. 157 of his translation of the Upanishad) might be of some use, though it can scarcely be regarded as conclusive. If the note is correct, will not the Upanishad be older than the Mahabhashya? See Appendix D.

§ See Panini's Sutra III, 1,26 and I, 2,69 respectively.

‡ And see Goldstucker's Panini 152 et seq. वाकोवाक्य (see Chhandogya Upan. 475) is explained by Sankara to be Tarkasastra but differently by Kaiyata Mahabhashya p. 16. (Benares Ed.)

† Under Panini VII, 3,44 and see Kaiyata on the passage.

§ p. 181.

to some writers or works now entirely forgotten even in name. And when the Professor refers to the mention of Katyayana, and Jabali, and others, as well as of Dhanvantari as king of the physicians, I am not aware what conclusion he wishes to base upon it‡. And the same observation applies to his reference to the use of the words Sanskrit and Sastra—the latter of which, it may be remarked by the way, may be found used in Patanjali's Mahabhashya, both by itself and as the latter member of compounds.§

We now come to the data relating to the History of Religion.† And Professor Weber, at the very outset of his observations on this head, refers as especially noticeable to the absence of any mention of Krishna-worship in the Ramayana, and says, “of course the only legitimate inference to be

‡ But if anything does really turn upon the mention of these names, it may, perhaps, be just as well to note here, that at least one of the names enumerated by Professor Weber—namely Jaini,—occurs in connexion with a Prince named Putra of the Raghu family in the Raghuvasa XVIII, 33.

§ See page 28 (Benares Ed.) and under Pan. I, 1,6. For Upanishad, or Rahasya, not referred to in the text, see Patanjali. Introd. p. 16 (Benares Ed.); for writing, Goldstucker's Panini *passim*; for Nitisastra, and on other points, also, see Chh. Upanishad, 474 and Sankara's commentary on it.

† Prof. Weber's remarks under this head are not perfectly clear and intelligible. I have endeavoured to answer them as far as I have understood them.

drawn from this silence is that we must not push the date of the work too far back." I confess at once that I cannot understand the argument of Professor Weber on this point. The note which he gives does not mend matters, and itself requires a note of explanation. "Rama" says this note "undoubtedly represents an earlier stage of Vishnuism; but it is certainly possible that his becoming the deity of a sect is due to some previous development of the Krishna worship."† This last portion of the remark requires both explanation and proof. But if the former portion of it is correct, or rather if it correctly sets forth Professor Weber's opinion—and his language is very strong—what becomes of his argument in the text? If the worship of Rama is older than the worship of Krishna, the fact of the latter being nowhere referred to in the oldest work which glorifies the former stands fully explained. Apparently, Professor Weber entertains the notion that Krishna worship is a new-fangled system. I am not aware whether he does not see in it a Brahmanical reflex of Christianity‡. But I am now in a position to prove to demonstration, that this belief, which has been a very prevalent one, is totally false; and that Krishna-worship is

† P. 182.

‡ See for instance the *Indian Antiquary*. p. 325.

as old at least as the age of Patanjali, if not also of Panini. The point is important; a false notion on the subject is very generally received; I, therefore, set out at length the passage in Patanjali which bears out my remark. Patanjali is commenting on Panini's sutra IV, 3,98. He says "Why is it laid down that the word Vâsudeva takes the termination 'Vun' (वुन्)? Is not the object attained by the sutra IV, 3,99? For, there is no difference. The word Vâsudeva with the termination 'Vun' (वुन्) or 'Vun' (वुन्) takes the same form and the same accent. Well then, the object is this, that we may lay down that the word Vâsudeva stands first. Or rather, this is not the name of a Kshatriya. It is there a name of the Supreme Being." There is no room for mistake here. Vâsudeva is clearly spoken of in the passage as the Supreme Being—as "Bhagavân." And having said thus much, I can say nothing more upon this point, as I do not understand Professor Weber's position upon it. But I may add here—for, Professor Weber goes on to refer to this point also—that there is evidence in Patanjali proving, as I think, the existence of the belief in Siva as Bhagavân; and this evidence is as strong as that about Krishna referred to above. This is in the Bhâshya on Panini V, 2,76. The passage is interesting. Having set out the Sutra, the Bhâshya proceeds "What, is every body an "ayahsulika"

who searches for iron with a club? What if he is? It will apply to a Sivabhogavata votary of the God Siva." The word in the original which I have rendered "votary of the God Siva," is शिवभागवत, which is a rather curious compound, but Kaiyata explains it thus:— भगवान्भक्तिरस्य भागवतः शिवस्य भागवतः शिव-भागवतः.*

As to the comparison of the Ramayana and Mahabharata with respect to the liberties which they take with the grammar, admitting for the present that the comparison is unfavourable to the former, it can only affect their relative chronological position. And if it be remembered, that one of the greatest of European Sanskrit scholars, the late Dr. Goldstucker held the most ancient parts of the Mahabharata to be more ancient even than the age of Buddha, and the greater portion of the work to be older than the commencement of the Christian era,‡ the advocate of the antiquity of Valmiki's Ramayana need not be alarmed at Professor Weber's conclusion on this point: The same remark applies to the artificial and artistic variation of the metre at the close of many of the

* Brahma is also mentioned in the Bhashya. See under Panini VI, 3,21. Siva is mentioned again in the Mahabhashya in the passage quoted in Goldstucker's Panini p. 229.

‡ See Westminster Review April 1868 p. 420.

38 SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

sargas. And upon this, I may also say, that I shrewdly suspect that in some of the cases†, at any rate, these final stanzas are interpolations. Very often—indeed, it is perhaps not too much to say, more often than not—these stanzas add nothing at all to what has been already said in preceding stanzas; and in some cases they make it rather difficult to see a proper continuity between the close of a previous sarga and the commencement of a subsequent one. As to the name sarga, Professor Weber‡ has himself pointed out as noticeable the fact that in Bhavabhuti's *Uttararamacharita*, the word *Adhyaya*, and not *sarga*, is employed; and besides, even if the name *sarga* was the original and genuine name, it is explainable upon the theory, which, it is submitted, is by no means an improbable one, that subsequent authors of *Kavyas* borrowed the terminology of the *Ramayana*, seeing that that work, with respect to unity and general arrangement of subject matter, was nearer to the plan of their own works than the *Mahabharata*. So that instead of making the *Ramayana*

‡ For instance, see Gorresio *Adikand sargas XXI and XXII*. A kind friend who has seen Mr. Griffith's Translation of *Valmiki* informs me that a note in that work says that Schlegel thought all these stanzas of varying metres to be interpolations. I do not think this at all unlikely.

† p. 246.

belong to the class of the later Kavyas, we may say that the later Kavyas borrowed the terminology of the Ramayana which was hallowed by antiquity. And it must not be forgotten, that even the Ramayana abounds with stylistic characteristics, such as, among others, grammatical anomalies, which are not employed in the later literature, and which throw a big gulf between it and this later literature.

One more point, adverted to by Professor Weber under the head of internal evidence, still remains—namely, the allusions to astronomical matters which occur in the Ramayana. About the zodiac, Professor Weber has himself pointed out that as it does not occur except in only certain of the recensions, it is no evidence against the antiquity of the others.‡ I do not here go into the question whether our ancestors borrowed the zodiac from the Greeks. I do not think myself competent to do so. Besides, the work—referred to by Professor Weber as proving that the Greeks first completed it, and that the Hindus afterwards took it from them,—is written in the German language. But when Professor Weber says, that the references to astronomical matters in all the recensions furnish support for the opinion suggested by the reference to the

‡ p. 179.

zodiac in some of them, I think, we may well demur to this; firstly, because astronomical matters are as old in India as the age of the Vedas themselves; and secondly, because even if they were not, they could not still be logically employed to bolster up an imperfect argument of the description we are considering. As to the reference to the Nakshatras, the value of any argument based on it is simply *nil*, for the Nakshatras are referred to in the Sutras of Pāṇini, and what is even more, in the Vedas themselves.† Nor do I think can much weight be attached to the argument based upon the mention of the planets. We know that in India a good deal of progress in astronomy had been already made in the time of the Vedic hymns. We know that such progress was essential to the ceremonials and rites which constituted the highest walk of religiousness in ancient India. We know that Nakshatra Vidya, or the science of the Nakshatras, is mentioned in such an old work as the Chhandogya Upanishad.§ We know that in Panini, a knowledge of astronomy is certainly exhibited, and

† And see further Goldstucker's Panini p. 77.

§ See the well-known passage already referred to. And Nakshatras are mentioned in that work with very great frequency. See pp. 130, 273, 324 &ca. &ca. For the antiquity of the Chhandogya Upanishad see a former note. I may here add the fact, as perhaps bearing on that point, that a king is in that

in all probability he was not ignorant of the "Grahas."§ And knowing all this, it is somewhat difficult to believe that the Hindus were beholden to the Greeks for their knowledge of the planets. And when Professor Weber says that the planets are first* mentioned in an Atharvaparisishta and in Yajnavalkya, here as elsewhere, he certainly does not do enough for the exigencies of his argument. The *onus* still lies on him to prove that these works are of a particular date, or at least that they cannot have been written prior to a certain limit of time.

And as to the remark made by the Professor, when speaking of the supposed connexion between Mars and war, between Jupiter and sacrificial ritual, and between Mercury and commerce, to the effect that neither the names of the planets nor the Deities associated with them sufficiently or at all

Upanishad addressed as भगवोराजन् see pp. 367-9. On the Nakshatras see also Goldstucker's Panini p. 77 and Professor Lassen there cited.

§ See Panini III, 1,144. I say "probably," because of course, we do not know in what sense Panini understood the word "Graha" in that Sutra.

* What is the bearing on this inquiry of the tablet mentioned by Mr. Broadley in the Indian Antiquary p. 20? Is the tablet older than Fa-Hian's days?

explain these relations, I can only say that, in at least two of the instances cited by Professor Weber, a satisfactory explanation is possible. For, redness is a characteristic of Mars—a characteristic connoted by the names Lohitanga and Angaraka. And what more natural than to connect the redness, through blood with war? What more satisfactory explanation can be desired? And as to the connexion of Jupiter with sacrificial ritual:—The name of Jupiter in Sanskrit is Guru, which often means a religious preceptor, and the Deity associated with the planet is the priest of the Gods. How can Professor Weber's remark be explained in view of this fact? Lastly, as to the Planet Mercury:—As I have said already, the explanation of his relation with commerce is not so easy. But, perhaps, and I submit this with very great diffidence and hesitation*, the meaning of the name Budha—wise, prudent—furnishes the connecting link between that planet and commerce. On the whole, however, I put it with confidence to any fair judge to say,

* Since this paper was written, I have come across a passage in the Vidvanmodatarangini (Calc. Ed. of 1871) p. 11 which says—“बोधबोधनआतनोतु.” This seems to give some confirmation to the theory here broached. May not a misunderstanding of the name “Saumya” which also belongs to Mercury (in the sense of moon's son) have something to do with the connexion? “Saumya” means also tranquil, peaceful.

whether, seeing that such an explanation is possible, the very strong remark of Professor Weber is just when he says, that the names of the planets and the Deities associated with them afford not "the smallest explanation" of the supposed relations.

We have now gone through the several heads under which Professor Weber has marshalled the pieces of internal evidence collected by him. In the closing portion of his monograph, he takes a survey of Sanskrit literature, to see what is the earliest work in which the Ramayana is referred to. I gladly avail myself of this opportunity of bearing my humble testimony to the very great industry of which this portion of the essay bears unmistakable traces. But the result at which that branch of the argument leads is not worth very much, because, taking it at the highest, it only shows that the Ramayana is not referred to in any very early work‡. But, of course, this does not prove that it did not exist in very early times, although it might be of some little use as corroborative evidence, if other evidence of at least moderate cogency were forthcoming. There are, however, one or two additional

‡ The scarcity of works, acknowledged to be old, in which a reference to the Ramayana might fairly be expected, is also a point worth consideration here. And see how one piece of evidence looking this way is treated by Professor Weber himself p. 124.

observations which I wish to make upon this part of the subject. Professor Weber himself admits that in the Mahabharata references are often made to the story of the Ramayana. The question, therefore, at once arises—To what date do these portions of the Mahabharata belong? I have already drawn attention to the dictum of the late Dr. Goldstucker, in which that learned scholar maintains that there is no reason to ascribe even the post-buddhistic portions of that great congeries of poems to a later date than the beginning of the Christian era, while there are, according to him, several portions which are fairly entitled to a higher antiquity than the age of the Nirvana§. And even independently of authority, we are certainly prepared to

§ In considering the date of the episodes of the Mahabharata, I think, a caution is very necessary. It is a very common opinion that the episodes of the Mahabharata are later grafts on the original stalk. That opinion I do not now impugn. But in considering what portions are such episodes, we must, I think, be guided by something better and more tangible than our own opinions about what the unity of the whole work requires. What may appear to us to be out of place, and a breach of the unity of narrative, may not have appeared in the same light to those who lived in a different intellectual plane and atmosphere. And sound canons of criticism do not allow the application of the opinions of one age and clime on such matters to the works of another and a different age and clime. Thus, to take a well-known example:—Many have remarked on the incon-

contend that such portions of the Mahabharata as have no traces of having been tampered with by interested parties should be presumed to be earlier in date than the rise of Christianity. Professor Weber, we, therefore, contend, was bound to produce proof that the references to the story of the Ramayana are contained in parts of the Mahabharata which cannot be earlier than the beginning of the Christian era. Secondly, it is also worthy of remark in this connexion, as suggested by a very erudite friend,§ that whereas the Mahabharata does allude to Rama and his exploits, the Ramayana nowhere makes any mention of Pandavas, or Kauravas, or of any of the principal characters in the great action of the other Epos. Thirdly, I would call attention to the fact that, according to a quotation candidly made by Pro-

gruity of Krishna's engaging in a philosophical dialogue with Arjuna in the very midst of the battlefield after the exchange of missiles had actually been commenced by the combatants on either side. For one instance take Wheeler, who in his History of India animadverts on this circumstance. But on the other hand, it is worthy of remark that a very similar thing occurs in the Iliad also, in the shape of the well-known interview between Diomed and Glaucus. Now this part of the poem may, of course, be regarded as an episode in this sense, that it is a long-drawn chapter which does not carry on the main action. But that it is also an episode in the sense of being a later addition to the original work is at least open to question.

§ Professor R. G. Bhandarkar (now Sir R. G. Bhandarkar-Ed.) of Elphinstone College.

fessor Weber, the story of Rama is alluded to in a Parisishta of the Samaveda, namely, the Karma-pradipa, and that the portion of the story thus alluded to is that related in the Uttarakanda, a part of the Ramayana, according to Professor Weber himself, unquestionably much later than the portion which goes before it. It will hardly be logical to say that the Parisishta is a recent work because it contains an allusion to this circumstance. The date of it must be considered on other and independent grounds. This Professor Weber has not done. As I have not seen the work, I am, of course, unable to make any attempt in that direction. Professor Weber says that it bears the name of Katyayana. What this means I do not quite see. As I understand, the Parisishtas are regarded as part and parcel of the Sruti, and therefore without human authors. But if the Katyayana "whose name the work bears" is the author of the Vartikas on Panini, the story of the Ramayana goes back a very great distance into that antiquity out of which Professor Weber seeks to draw it. At any rate, the point has not been considered†, and requires to be considered as having an important bearing upon this inquiry.

† See a few more remarks on this topic in Appendix C. *infra*.

Further, the author of the Raghuvansa clearly refers to the Ramayana and to Valmiki, and what is more, he refers to the former as the first poem, and to the latter as the first poet*. Now what is the date of the Raghuvansa? Dr. Bhau Daji has assigned it to the sixth century A. D. § And even taking that date, which, I think, is the latest to which Kalidasa has been assigned on any thing like good evidence, is it likely, is it possible to believe, that the Ramayana—which, according to Professor Weber, was composed about the second century after Christ—could be regarded by the author of so old a work as the first poem? In spite of that want of a “historical sense” with which our people have been often charged, and I must admit not unjustly charged, I cannot believe that such an almost outrageous opinion could be held by any Hindoo who knew any thing of literature. But further, I must say that I do not concur in the argument advanced by Dr. Bhau Daji for the position which he takes up with regard to the date of Kalidasa † I think his date must be put somewhat

* Raghuvansa canto XV 33-41; also 63 and 64 referred to by Professor Weber p. 245.

§ Vide Journal B. B. R. A. Society, January 1862. On Kalidasa, and see Do Vol IV. No XXVIII p. 315.

† I have not thought it right to enter here into a discussion as to the worth of Dr. Bhau's argument, which, by the way, Pro-

further back. I have caused certain inquiries to be made into this matter, but for want of the necessary materials, the inquiries have not yet yielded a satisfactory result. Such as it is, however, I put it forward for what it is worth. One stanza which occurs in Kalidasa's *Kumarasambhava* is quoted in two places in the *Panchatantra*.§ Now we know as a matter of fact, that between 531-579 A. D., Nourshirvan, the enlightened king of Persia, had the *Panchatantra* translated from the original Sanskrit. That being so, I think we may safely take it, that the *Panchatantra* must have been composed, at the latest, about the close of the fifth century. And considering the distance between the two countries, and the period at which the translation was made when communication could hardly have been particularly rapid, that will, I think, be admitted to be not a very extravagant estimate. Now if we could trust to the genuineness of the text of the *Panchatantra* as we possess it, Kalidasa, the author

fessor Weber rejects without hesitation (p. 245). I here put forward only one positive fact bearing upon the question, which, as far as I am aware, has not been noticed before.

§ See p. 63 of the Bombay Sans. Class. edition in which, however, the stanza occurs only once. In Kosegarten's edition, it occurs twice, as stated in the text. See p. 59 (where the misprints are very gross) and p. 102.

† See Academy for August 1871 p. 387.

of the Kumarasambhava, would from this be demonstrated to have flourished at the latest in the fourth century A. D. or thereabouts. But as this genuineness is not by any means beyond the reach of controversy, and although the stanza from Kalidasa on which I base my argument occurs as well in the German edition as in the Bombay edition which differs a great deal from the former, I caused inquiries to be made whether anything corresponding to Kalidasa's stanza occurred in any existing translation of the Panchatantra. The translation referred to was the Persian Anvâri Sohili; and a passage which is in sense akin to the second line of Kalidasa's stanza above alluded to was found in the very story in which it is quoted in the original Sanskrit. True it is, indeed, that the original and this Persian rendering do not agree word for word. While the original inculcates the impropriety of cutting off even a poisonous tree after once rearing it up, the translation only speaks of the impropriety of rooting out what one has oneself exalted. But it must be remembered against this, that the translation is in no part literal; that it was not made directly from the Sanskrit*; that in the part now in question, it is in verse, and that, therefore,

* It was, I understand, prepared from an older Persian version of the Arabic, which was itself taken from the original Pelhvi translation.

the translator must have been obliged to allow himself greater freedom in his rendering†. And in view of all these circumstances, I think, we are justified in taking it for granted as at least very probable, that the quotation from Kalidasa existed in the days in which the first translation of the Panchatantra‡ was made. And if so, and if upon

† On another, though similar, point taken in Appendix B, *infra*, it will be seen that I have made a reference to the English translation of the Arabic Kalila u Dimnah, while my reference here is only to the Anvâri Sohili. It is only fair to state, that the stanza from Kalidasa referred to here cannot be traced in the English translation. On the other hand it is to be noted, that this English translation has no trace also of a certain stanza which does exist in the original Arabic, as results from the quotations given in Kosegarten's introduction to his edition of the Panchatantra. Thus the stanza of the third Tantra which is numbered 113 in Kosegarten's edition, and 112 in the Bombay edition, appears from Kosegarten's Preface (p. X) to have its corresponding stanza in the Arabic Kalila u Dimnah. But Mr. Knatchbull's translation does not contain any idea like it, while it has something corresponding to the immediately preceding and immediately succeeding stanzas. See pp. 230 and 231 of the translation. It would be well if somebody who has the requisite materials were to direct his inquiries towards the Arabic Kalila u Dimnah to check the results arrived at, as it were, hypothetically here and in Appendix B. Dr. Bhau Daji possesses one copy of this Arabic version, and he offered to lend it to me. But he is unable to lay his hand on it just now.

‡ I observe from the Academy for August 1871 that Professor Benfey has been able to secure a copy of a Syriac version of the Panchatantra. It is possible that that work may assist in this investigation. It may, therefore, be permitted us, perhaps to hope that Prof. Benfey will clear up this point, as far as practicable, from his recent acquisition.

this Kalidasa may be taken to have flourished about the fourth century A. D, does it not become vehemently improbable—not to say perfectly impossible—that he should have thought a writer who was his predecessor by not more than two centuries to be the first poet, and his work the first poem in the Sanskrit language.‡ ?

One word more on this point, which I have dwelt on at some length, on account of its importance no less in itself than in its bearing upon the immediate question in hand. Professor Weber refers to an essay of his own written in the German language, where, he says, he has discussed the question of Kalidasa's date, and where he has arrived at the alternative conclusion, that Kalidasa lived either in the third or the sixth century of the Christian era†. The circumstances set forth above seem clearly to point to the former as the more likely date of the two; and if we accept that date, Professor Weber's theory with regard to the Ramayana must, I think, be incontinently thrown overboard. And here I may mention that this argument is not at all affected by the attempt made by Professor

‡ At pages 182 and 241 Professor Weber mentions other circumstances which show that there must be a good deal of chronological distance allowed for between Kalidasa and Valmiki.

† See further Mr. Muir's Sanskrit texts (1871) II. 12.

Weber to split Kalidasa into two, that is to say, to distinguish the author of the *Sakuntala* from the author of the *Raghuvansa*.* That theory of his may or may not be a correct theory.† I need not discuss it in this place. Suffice it to say here, that it is impossible to separate the Kalidasa of the *Kumarasambhava* from the Kalidasa of the *Raghuvansa*, and our argument requires the identity of the authors only of those two works.

I think I may allude in this place to the opinion of Professor Weber about the passage in the *Ayodhyakanda*, in which reference is made to Buddha by name. Schlegel thought that the passage was an interpolation.‡ But Professor Weber says that in the light of the circumstances which have been now brought to our knowledge, this opinion of Schlegel's requires re-consideration. The value of these new circumstances, and the light which they throw upon the question before us, we have already examined; but as to this passage itself, it must be remembered, first, that it does not occur at all in

* p. 246.

† I agree generally with the principle stated by Dr. Goldstucker as the one proper to be adopted in such an investigation p. 209.

‡ And this Professor Weber himself admitted when he wrote his paper on the *Ramayana* p. 122. But he has since found reason to change his opinion. See *Indian Antiquary* p. 253.

Gorressio's edition. It must be remembered in the second place, that Buddha is never again mentioned in the whole of the Ramayana. It must be remembered in the third place that the way in which Buddha is introduced into the passage under discussion is not sufficiently connected with the context. And it must be remembered also that the tendency of Jabali's remarks which elicit the wrathful expression of Rama is more towards the Charvaka than the Buddhist system—indeed, some of the stanzas in the speech of Jabali bear a striking resemblance to some of the stanzas quoted in the Sarvadarśanasangraha as belonging to Brishaspati, the ringleader of the Charvaka movement¶.

And here I close this, the principal, part of the present paper. I have now said what I have to say in reply to the several arguments put forward by Professor Weber in support of his theory. The negative portion of my task is here finished. But there are some few positive considerations to which I wish to call attention. I acknowledge, *in limine*, that the weight to be attached to these considerations is a question on which different judges may have different opinions. But I think that they ought to have some weight; and at any rate,

¶ See Ramayana (Bombay ed.) p. 202 and Comp. Sarvadarśanasangraha (Taran. ed.) p. 2 et seq. I see that Mr. Muir is also of the same opinion I, 115.

they are considerations which are calculated to throw some light upon the subject under investigation.

We shall first see what we can find in the Sutras of Panini. And it must be acknowledged, at the very outset, that what we can find there is not very much. I observe first that in Panini's Sutra VI, 1,174, the anomalous form Aikshvaka—a name meaning descendant of Ikshvaku, and frequently applied to Rama—is explained, or rather laid down to be correct, though against the general rules of grammar. I observe next, that the name Kaikeyi—a name having a most important connexion with the history of Rama, and one which is also grammatically anomalous—is explained in Panini's Sutra IV, 1,171. The name of Rama's mother also—Kausalya—is partially explained in Sutra IV, 1,171. And this is the sum total of what I have been able to find in the Ashtadhyayi itself, which is calculated to be of any use in our inquiry. Of course, this is very meagre, especially when placed by the side of what we can get in connexion with the history of the Kauravas and Pandavas. But as a partial explanation of this circumstance, it must not be forgotten, that very few other names of grammatical interest are to be found in connexion with the history of Rama, and we can expect only such names to be alluded to in the work of

Panini.‡

If we now come to the work of Patanjali, what we see there is even more meagre than what Panini gives us. I ought to add, however, that hitherto I have not been able to avail myself of anything more than merely occasional and desultory glances at the great work of Patanjali. And in the course of such a view of it, I have come across but one hint upon this subject, and that is the mention in

‡ I believe that, in numerous cases, this point is lost sight of. Absence of reference is too often regarded as equivalent to absence of knowledge, and absence of knowledge of a work on the part of any author is held to be proof sufficient of the non-existence of the work in the time of the latter. Before this proof can be held to be satisfactory—it is necessary, I think, to take careful note of surrounding circumstances. Look for instance to the Chhandogya Upanishad p. 59 and p. 288. In the former passage, Rig and Sama alone are mentioned; in the latter, Rig, Sama, and Yajus. But it would surely be the height of temerity to base on these two passages any conclusion as to the non-existence of the Atharvaveda at the time of the Chhandogya Upanishad, or on the first of them any conclusion as to the similar non-existence of the Yajurveda. And as if any body drew the latter conclusion, he could be answered by the second passage, so if any one drew the former conclusion, the passage at p. 474 of the same work would conclusively negative that inference also. The late Dr. Goldstucker's remarks at page 18 of his work are to the same effect; though it is possible, I think, to point to cases where he has not applied the principles he has himself laid down. See, for instance, p. 150 et seq. I have myself employed the argument at times, for instance, see Appendix B *infra*; but I have not done so without hesitation; and I think that some peculiarities are observable in these cases which render the argument less unsafe than it would ordinarily be.

one place of the name of Rama, which occurs in company with the names of Dhanapati and Kesava in the commentary on Panini's Sutra II, 2,34. The passage is in verse—and I, therefore, quote the lines which run as follows:—

मृदंगशंखतूणवाः ॥ पृथङ्मदन्ति संसदि ॥ प्रासादे धनपतिराम-
केशवानाम् ॥

Of course, I admit at once that the mention of Rama in this connexion is ambiguous. It is next to impossible to say which Rama is meant here. It is possible that it is Balarama who is alluded to, as Patanjali in another passage shows an acquaintance with Krishna's brother under the name Baladeva\$. But it must also be remembered, on the other hand, that neither Balarama nor Krishna has very much connexion with Kubera in any one of the well-known stories which have descended to us. And the conclusion I deduce from this latter fact is that the argument of *noscitur a sociis*, even if it were otherwise valid, could not be made to apply to the compound before us. Another hint on the subject to be found in Patanjali has been mentioned to me by the same erudite friend to whom I have already referred. It is contained in the verse:—
पश्य वानरसैन्येस्मिन्यदर्कमुपतिष्ठते; which is cited by Patan-

§ Under Panini IV, 1,114.

jali in one place,[¶] but which also, as we both think, is by no means unambiguous§.

Let us now come to the ganapatha, in which some important names are to be found. I need scarcely say that I am not prepared to dissent from those‡ who maintain that the ganapatha by itself cannot be treated as of conclusive authority for critical and chronological purposes. I quite admit the general correctness of that view, but it is only because, in the facts which I am going to set forth I see something which gives a certain value to the portions of the ganapatha I intend to rely on, that I adduce them as evidence worth attending to in our investigation. First, then, the name Sumitrâ occurs in the gana Bahvadi under Panini's Sutra IV, 1,96; and according to the rule contained in that Sutra,

¶ Under Panini I, 3,26.

§ A third instance has come to my knowledge since this paper was read. Under Panini I, 1,57 there is a stanza cited by Patanjali which runs as follows:—

स्तोष्याम्यहं पादिकमौदवाहिततः श्वोभूते शातनीं पातनींच ॥ नेता-
रावागच्छतं धारणिं रावणिंच ततः पश्चात्संस्यते घ्यंस्यतेच, where the
word Ravani is to be noted. It might be a patronymic from Ravana, and might be used of Indrajit. I must own, however, that the stanza is not in its entirety intelligible to me, and neither Kaiyata nor Nagoji Bhatta gives any help in our investigation I may remark that though Kaiyata understands श्वोभूते to be a vocative, it may simply mean "tomorrow," as in Kadambari (Taranath's ed.) p. 341.

‡ See Goldstucker's Panini p. 131 and Professor Weber there cited.

we can form from that name the patronymic *Saumitri*; so that we get here the names of *Laxmana* and his mother. The name *Sumitra* stands seventeenth in a list, which, as far as it is fixed, contains over fifty names, including among others that of *Rama* also, which occurs later in the enumeration. Now the next name but one after *Sumitra* is *Pushkarasad* from which the derivative under the rule alluded to will be *Paushkarasadi*. And this name—*Paushkarasadi*—is the name of a grammarian mentioned by *Katyayana* in his *Vartika* on *Panini VIII, 3,28†*. I think, we may, therefore, take it as highly probable, that the name *Pushkarasad* was in the *gana Bahvadi* in the time of *Katyayana*. If so, we may take it as also highly probable, that the name *Sumitra* which precedes it also existed in the *gana* in question in his time. It may, indeed, be said by way of exception to this, that the later additions to the *ganas* need not necessarily have been made at the end of the lists as they may have stood before the additions were made, but that they may have been simply foisted into some of the intermediate places in the list. I admit this to be possible, but I do not think it very probable, and for three rea-

† See *Siddhanta Kaumudi* (*Taranath's* ed.) p. 64, and note there. But I abandon the argument on this point, as the *Vartika* referred to does not seem to be *Katyayana's*—not being noted by *Patanjali*.

sons. Firstly, as these are avowedly akritiganas, there is no temptation to throw the new additions into any other than their natural places at the close of the list and after the names already existing. Secondly, to presume such an interpolation as above referred to is to take for granted, on the part of the grammarians making the additions, a conscious dishonesty of purpose, and a knowledge, or at any rate, an apprehension, that the ganas would be used for such critical purposes as they are now being made to subserve. Thirdly, the logical result of the principle involved in this exception is, that all the members of all the ganas except the first will have to be at once thrown overboard. A line of reasoning similar to this applies to the names Ravana, and Kakustha which occur in the gana Sivadi under Panini's Sutra IV, 1,112, by which we get the derivative forms Ravana and Kakutstha. The only difference between this and the last case—and it is favourable to the present—is, that here a word which is latter in the list of the Sivadis, namely Rishtishena, is distinctly mentioned in the Mahabhashya as belonging to this gana, and we are not left to prove its existence by a process of inference. In connexion with these two facts I may mention also that Saumitri occurs in the gana Gahadi under Panini IV, 2,138, and Ravani and Paushkarasadi in the gana Taulvalyadi under Panini II, 4, 61. And in order

to couple it with a previous observation based on the text itself of the Ashtadhyayi, I add here, that the word Kekaya stands third in the gana Bhargadi under Panini IV, 1,178; and it is with the assistance of this rule, that the full form Kaikeyi can be derived. Again, in the gana Gargadi, under Panini's Sutra IV, 1,105, we find the name Pulasti, from which can be derived the patronymic Paulastya, which is well known as one of the names of Ravana. And in this list, Paulasti occurs towards the beginning, when compared with the name Vatanda which is recognized in Patanjali's Mahabhashya as contained in the gana in question. The names Rama and Bibhishana, Pampa and Kishkinda, and even Lanka, also occur in some of the ganas. But I do not refer to them here as yielding evidence of much value in this investigation. I am unable to suggest any such circumstances as I have set forth above, in order to show their genuineness or existence in the time of Panini or his ancient commentator.

There is also some internal evidence furnished by the Ramayna which deserves to be weighed in the balance against that which has been adduced by Professor Weber, and which we have discussed above §. True it is, as we have conceded already,

§ I have not even attempted to set out the whole of this evidence. In fact, I am not yet in possession of the materials for

that Brahma, Vishnu and Siva are all mentioned, and mentioned with high veneration, in the Ramayana. But as has been already pointed out, neither Siva nor Vishnu, as identified with the Supreme Being, is unknown to a writer of such acknowledged antiquity as Patanjali. Brahma, too, as pointed out in a note there, is mentioned in the Bhashya. But beyond this, it must also not be forgotten that in the Ramayana, they have not yet, as far as I am aware, been aggregated into the Supreme Trinity, as they are aggregated even in the Kumarasambhava or Raghuvansa of Kalidasa§. It must also not be forgotten that Indra, too, is mentioned with great reverence in the Ramayana, and in one passage is thus spoken of इन्द्रश्चभगवान्साक्षान्मरुद्गणवृत्तः प्रभुः‡ And further, it will be found, I think that the description of the marriage of Rama and his brothers, as given in the Ramayana, exhibits a greater simplicity§ than does the description, for instance, of the marriage of Mahadeva and Parvati in the seventh canto of the Kumarasambhava; and

so doing. All I say is that if any body took a survey of the Ramayana from a stand-point opposite to that of Professor Weber's, he would be able, I think, to make out a good case on the other side.

§ See Raghv III, 27 and X, 16; and still more clearly Kumara II, 4 and 6 and VII, 44.

‡ Gorresio Bâlakanda XIV, 5.

§ This simplicity, of course, means simplicity in the rites and ceremonies to be performed.

this is another fact which places some interval between Kalidasa and Valmiki.

This is all in the way of positive evidence that I have been able to collect on this point. It is not to be denied that altogether it is not very full. But I think it deserves considerable weight. And it must be remembered, even supposing it were weaker than it is, that the mere absence of positive evidence to prove the existence of anything at any particular time is not equivalent to a proof of its non-existence at that time. It has been shown in the previous portion of the present paper that the arguments adduced to prove the Ramayana to have been composed after the commencement of the Christian era are not by any means conclusive, or even very powerful; on the other hand, we have also shown that there is some positive evidence leading to an opposite conclusion. And I say that if we fairly look at the evidence brought together by Professor Weber, and at his comments upon it; if we look at the answers which may be given to those comments and that evidence; if we look further at the positive evidence, scanty though it be, which can be adduced upon the other side: if I say, we take a comprehensive view of all this, the conclusion must be, I think, at the very least, that the antiquity of the Ramayana still remains to be disproved.

[*Postscript.*]

Since the foregoing part of this paper was finished, I have been able, through the kindness of Professor Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar to have a look at the Dasaratha Jataka in the original. And upon a perusal of it, not only do I see no reason to change the opinion I have already expressed, but I think that the narration of the story as a story of "past" times, as well as the circumstance that in the closing paragraph Buddha identifies himself and his surroundings with Rama and his surroundings, points to the view which I have suggested above, that the Buddhistic version may be after all not the model but the copy. It would appear as if Buddha was making use of an older story for his own purposes. The coincidence of some of the stanzas of the Ramayana with some of those to be found in this Pali work, as far as it proves anything, goes, I think, still further in the same direction. It gives greater force to the question I have put above, namely,—Is it possible that such a copy as the Ramayana should have been made for the purposes for which it is alleged to have been made? Surely the Buddhists could have pointed out at once that what was going to be palmed off upon the people as an old Brahmanical work was really and truly a work of their own,

only vamped up, as it were, and altered in some places, to bolster up the foundations of tottering Brahmanism. What could be the answer to such a charge? And were the Brahmins—who have been credited with so much political sagacity—likely to make such an egregious blunder? It may, perhaps, be said—if the Buddhist book was the copy, could not the Brahmans point out the cribbing? I answer—they could. But why should they do it? The Dasaratha Jataka was not put forward to stem the tide of Brahmanism, or to help on the vessel of Buddhism. It was probably an innocuous thing in the eyes of the Brahmans. It was, *at the highest*, but the old story of separatists justifying their separation by new interpretations of things accepted from antiquity.† The work made no

† Since this paper was read, the testimonies in confirmation of this hypothesis, propounded here on *a priori* grounds, have been crowding upon me. I will content myself with simply referring to them without discussing them at length. See Sherring's Benares p. 7. Babu Rajendralala Mitra's Lalita Vistara (Trans.) p. 11 and note p. 17. Mark the explanation given by Burnouf of the name Tathagata. And see Turnour's Examination of Pali Buddhistical Annals, No. 3 p. 1, which is perhaps too strong. Professor Weber, (p. 127) quoting Prof. Max Muller, speaks of the moral of the Dasaratha-Jataka as a "test of true Buddhism." If so, that will fully explain the fact of the Jataka making no reference to the abduction of Sita, consistently with the theory in the text, if any explanation is wanted. In the October number of that excellent publication—the Academy—there is a review of Fausboll's Jatakas by Mr. R. C. Childers. Mr. Childers there quotes Fausboll to the following effect.

claim as a work of authority, or as a revealed work, and needed not to be minded. I may add here, that in the Mahavanso and another Buddhistic book, a story is told of an old Buddhist king, in the course of which the island of Ceylon is referred to; and upon this, the story speaks of a giant king of Ceylon—named Ravana—who is said to have lived in a former age, and whose wickedness is there related to have brought a great calamity upon the island in the shape of a destructive deluge. (See Hardy's Legends of Buddhism p. 8).

APPENDIX A.

It will have been observed that, in the foregoing portion of this essay, I have made no allusion to the argument based by Professor Weber upon a circumstance relating to the Ramayana, which is mentioned in the Rajatarangini. The reason of the omission lay in the fact that, at the time I wrote my paper, I had absolutely no knowledge of

"Nearly all the tales of the Jataka book are old folklore in common for all India without regard to religion, and many of them treat evidently of pre-Buddhistic Bramhanical affairs and have been made Buddhistic in their application only." I may add that, after quoting this, Mr. Childers himself does not express dissent from this position. The Italics are mine, and the passage italicised offers very valuable confirmation of the remark on "the test of true Buddhism" which I have made above, and which had been made before I saw Mr. Childers's paper.

the chronology of the period to which the circumstance was alleged to belong. I have, however, been looking into the question since. And I, therefore, throw together a few observations on that topic in the present Appendix, although, as I may say at the very outset, the question seems to me one beset with great difficulties, and therefore one, also, upon which I cannot say that I have satisfied my own mind.

It is, I think, right to set out in the first instance the passage in the Rajatarangini, upon which the argument is based. Having stated that king Damodara was cursed by certain sages for refusing to give them food when asked, the Rajatarangini goes on to say अशेषमेकेनैवान्हाश्रुत्वा रामायणं तव ॥ शापस्य शान्तिर्भवितेत्यूचिरे ते प्रसादिताः ॥§ which may be thus rendered. "They being propitiated said, 'your curse shall expire when you shall have heard the entire Ramayana in a single day.'" This is the story about king Damodara, who is described in the Rajatarangini itself as the immediate predecessor of Hushka, Jushka and Kanishka, and as having sprung from the race of Asoka. With this before him, Professor Weber first quotes Lassen for the date of Damodara, and from this quotation Lassen seems to place him some time in the begin-

§ Rajatarangini page 6. Calcutta Edition (1835) line 166.

ning of the first century B. C. Professor Weber then proceeds in this wise:—"...it is certainly a singular circumstance, that the *earliest time* to which the Ramayana is referred, and then it would seem as a work that had *not been completed*, is just a period that lies exactly in the middle between the Raj of the Yavana and that of the Saka."§ Now I must say that I cannot understand the reasoning of this passage. Where does it appear in the stanza cited and translated above, that the Ramayana is by it referred to any particular date at all? How is any reference to any "earliest time" to be ferreted out of it? Where again is there any, the remotest, allusion to the work being in an unfinished state? Against all this, it seems to me patent upon the face of the passage itself, that it speaks of a completed Ramayana—for, that is the more natural conclusion to be drawn from the word 'entire' or literally 'without a remainder—that further the book must have been, in the time of the Prince referred to, already regarded as a sacred work, the hearing of which was enough to dispel sin—that lastly no *terminus a quo* for the Ramayana is fixed by this passage at all.

That being so, the next question which arises on the passage is this—What was the date of Damodara's reign? I have neither the time, nor the space,

§ p. 240. The Italics are all mine.

nor yet the materials, necessary for discussing the question here at length. I will first refer to the several authorities that I have seen on the subject. Prinsep places Kanishka "near the end of the second century." As the date for the termination of Abhimanyu's reign—118 B. C.—given, according to Prinsep, by the *Rajatarangini*, is in his opinion correct,* this "end of the second century" must be, according to him, *at the very least* ten or twelve years earlier—so that as the result of this chronology, Damodara might stand *about* 175 B. C. Professor Wilson places Kanishka even earlier than this—viz. 388 B. C. † That would send Damodara still further into antiquity. Babu Rajendralala Mitra, in his Translation of the *Lalita Vistara*, puts down Kanishka as belonging to the year 143 B. C.—apparently subtracting the four hundred years which tradition fixes as the interval between the Nirvana and the reign of Kanishka from B. C. 543, the date of the Nirvana. ‡ On this date we shall have something to say further on. The Honourable G. Turnour, in his Examination of Pali Buddhistical Annals, places Kanishka at 103 B. C. or thereabouts§ Professor Max Muller, following Lassen, sets down

* See Prinsep's *Essays* by Thomas. Vol. I, pp. 39 and 40 and 101.

† Cited in I Prinsep. 40.

‡ p. 22.

§ Paper on Buddhistical chronology p 20.

Kanishka to some years before, and some years after, the beginning of the Christian era—and he uses this date as confirmatory of the date fixed by him for Buddha's Nirvana. But he confesses that it is difficult to determine when Kanishka's reign commenced. § On the other hand, the late Professor Goldstucker does not accept Muller's date of the Nirvana, but accepting the traditional dates both about that event and about Nagarjuna's distance from it, fixes the date of Nagarjuna at 143 B. C. † And as Nagarjuna was a contemporary of Kanishka, the latter would also, on Professor Goldstucker's theory, have to be placed at about 143 B. C. Now upon these dates a variety of questions arise. Are they reconcilable? If not, which ought to be accepted? Supposing we have fixed the date of Kanishka, are he and Hushka and Jushka to be taken to have ruled jointly or one after the other? How long did they reign? And how long did Damodara himself reign? As I have said already I do not propose to go into these questions. The balance of authority—if we allow ourselves to be guided by that—is in favour of Kanishka's having flourished in 143 B.C. or thereabouts. So that we may, perhaps, take 175 B. C. as a probable date for Damodara, and

§ *Anc. Sans. Lit.* pp. 298, 299.

† Panini p. 30 *et seq.* Compare 2 Prinsep 87.

then it would result that at least towards the end of the third century B. C. a Ramayana existed which had already come to be regarded as Holy.

With this statement of the case on this point I should have contented myself, had not Professor Goldstucker endeavoured to fortify his conclusion by evidence independent of Buddhistic chronology, thus attempting to give it greater strength than it would otherwise have possessed, and had he not further expressed himself as if the proof was nearly complete. The learned Professor's argument is as follows:—§ Nagarjuna was the founder of the sect of Madhyamika Bauddhas—the Madhyamikas are mentioned by Patanjali—Patanjali can be shown to have flourished about 143 B. C. Therefore Nagarjuna may be taken to have flourished before or about 143 B. C. And as tradition places Nagarjuna about 400 years after the Nirvana, therefore the Nirvana must have occurred about 543 B. C.—which is the date fixed by the Ceylon chronology. Now the first criticism on this argument is that there is absolutely no ground shown for the identification of the Madhyamika Bauddhas and the Madhyamikas mentioned by Patanjali. On the contrary, the fact that they are said to have been "besieged" by the Yavana militates, I think, very strongly against this

§ See Panini p. 230 *et seq.*

supposition. And a further criticism is that the conclusion is irreconcilable with other known facts, and facts admitted by Dr. Goldstucker himself. Thus the *Rajatarangini* makes Nagarjuna live not only in the reign of Kanishka, but also of his successor Abhimanyu.§ Now, according to Lassen, whose conclusion is accepted by Professor Goldstucker, Abhimanyu flourished about 60 A. D.‡ Is it possible to believe—would Dr. Goldstucker have believed—that Nagarjuna flourished contemporaneously with both the princes who reigned at those two several periods?

One more observation on this topic. Professor Weber questions the credibility of the account of the *Rajatarangini*.|| But it must be remembered that there is no motive to the fabrication of such a story. For, barring the fact that Kalhana Pandit had no prescience of the critical tendencies of the nineteenth century, he could not have intended the story to furnish us with what he considered to be the date of the *Ramayana*, as in his opinion it must have been immensely older than even 1400 B. C. As to his opportunities of knowledge, they need certainly not have been worse than he had for some of the other matters related by him, which yet are

§ See Calc. ed. p 7 line 177, and see I Prinsep 39.

‡ Panini p. 234.

|| pp. 239 and 240.

taken upon his authority as entitled to a good deal of credit. And as to the inference based on the fact that he sends back the whole chronology so far as to place a successor of the great Asoka fourteen centuries before the birth of Christ, I do not think that makes very much against his credit generally, it being only another instance of the too common tendency of our Hindu writers to antiquate every thing Indian. But though the starting-point of Kalhana's chronology may have to be given up, the duration of the reigns of the princes and their order need not, *therefore*, be also given up; though I am prepared to admit that some shadow of suspicion must always rest upon them.||

¶ Comp. Max Muller's *Anc. Sans. Literature* p. 274. If from the "singular" fact, mentioned by Prof. Weber in a note to his observations on this point, about the date of Hushka, Jushka, and Kanishka, he wishes to draw any conclusion as to the time at which Ravana flourished, and consequently as to the time when the Ramayana was composed; it may be just as well to note here that a Karna dynasty is said to have flourished in the Anga country in the 2nd century A. D. (see 1 Wheeler 95); and that, therefore, a similar argument applied to the Mahabharata will bring down that work to the 3rd or 4th century of the Christian era, at the earliest! I avail myself of the opportunity here afforded of making a reference to an inscription, belonging, I am told, to the second century A. D., a translation of which is given in Prinsep's essays Vol II, p. 68. According to Professor Wilson, the inscription seems in one place to allude to Rama's Bridge. Unluckily, however, it has not been made out in its entirety, and it is impossible to say how the case really

APPENDIX B.

Since this paper was read, it has occurred to me that reference to a passage in Bhartrihari's Nitisataka might usefully be made in this investigation. In one stanza of that work Bhartrihari speaks of the Ten Incarnations of Vishnu ¶, so that the main story of Valmiki's Ramayana, at any rate, down to the destruction of Ravana, may be taken to be implied in that passage, besides that Parasurama is recognised as an incarnation of Vishnu. Now it is worthy of note that even in Kalidasa's Ragu-

stands. But from the context it may be inferred that Prof. Wilson's conjecture is not entirely unwarranted.

¶ Nitisataka 93. I see that the Vishnu Purana also recognises this divine character of Parasurama (I Muir's Texts p. 350). This Purana is quoted in Sankaracharya's Bhashya on the Svetasvatara Upanishad (Bibl. Ind. ed. pp. 65, 295 &c.) When did Sankara live? It seems to be commonly regarded as an almost settled question. But the arguments for the received date are not perfectly satisfactory. And see the Indian Antiquary p. 354 where Professor Bhandarkar suggests a date which is different from the received date, but which, it is just possible, may after all prove to be nearer the truth. I have already expressed my opinion as to the weakness of the kind of argument I have here used to show the priority of Kalidasa over Bhartrihari. As I have said there, I have used the argument with some hesitation. That hesitation has now become stronger, when I see that such a comparatively recent work as the Prasanna Raghava Nataka does not refer to Parasurama's divinity in the scene of the encounter between him and his namesake. I have not, however, thought it necessary to entirely omit the argument.

vansa*, Parasurama has not yet been raised to that rank, any more than he is in Valmiki's Ramayana. One might, however, have certainly expected an allusion to it—as it would have given the poet an opportunity of explaining away the superiority of the Kshatriya over the Brahmana as proved by the result of the encounter between the two Ramas. And the fact is even more remarkable in the Meghaduta†, where, in one and the same stanza, Parasurama is spoken of merely as “Bhrigupati”, while Vamana is “Vishnu engaged in bridling down Bali”. It is not, I think, quite unsafe to conclude from these facts, that we must allow some chronological distance between Kalidasa and Bhartrihari. The only difficulty which presents itself to me in the way of accepting this conclusion is offered by a stanza, which occurs in the Sakuntala,‡ and which is also to be found in precisely the same words in the Nitisataka§. At one time I was inclined to hold that the stanza in the Nitisataka was the original, and that Kalidasa had borrowed it from that work to put it into the mouth of one of his characters. And I was inclined to hold this,

* See Canto XI.

† See Calc. ed. stanza 58.

‡ See William's Sakuntala pp. 194-5.

§ See Bohlen's Bhartrihari p. 46-7. The stanza occurs in all the twelve copies of the Nitisataka which I have consulted.

because it would have absolved both writers of the charge of plagiarism—a literary fraud, of which no instance that I am aware of§ has yet been found in Sanskrit literature. But if the conclusion broached above is correct, this supposition must, of course, be abandoned. Now in the observations made by Professor Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar on the occasion when the foregoing paper was read, he suggested a theory which might, perhaps, obviate this difficulty. Professor Bhandarkar contends that the stanza alluded to above is one of those Subhashitas floating about in popular talk, about the authorship of which nothing definite can be laid down. According to him, therefore, the stanza in question would, both in the Nitisataka and the Sakuntala, be a mere reproduction of a part of what may be called the literature living in the mouths of respectably educated people. To some extent, I have not hesitation in accepting this theory, but to some extent only. I cannot yet persuade myself that it is true in its entirety. The stanza before us will itself illustrate my view of the matter. In dramatic poetry, where such a Subhashita is put into the mouth of a character in a play, we are, I concede, at liberty to hold that the stanza *need not necessarily* have been composed by the author

§ See, too, Dr. Hall's preface to the Vasavadatta p. 15.

of the play. We are at liberty to suppose that the author *may* have taken the stanza from among the current Subhashitas to make the conversation in his play so much more of a correct picture of an ordinary conversation in real life under similar circumstances. The same remark, may, I think, apply to ordinary poetry, not dramatic, in which dialogue is introduced—to such cases for instance as those of the stanzas common to the Ramayana and the Dasaratha Jataka—and it is but just to Professor Bhandarkar to mention that it was primarily with reference to these stanzas that his remark was made. But if the theory is extended to cases in which there is no dialogue I cannot see where we shall stop. Take for instance the stanza in the Nitisataka alluded to above. Can we say that Bhartrihari only reproduced a stanza current in his time? If we can, what will there be to prevent our saying the same thing of all the other stanzas in his works? And if we cannot be prevented from so saying, the theory will have to explain the meaning of the tradition of Bhartrihari's authorship of those works. Further, admitting for a moment that the theory is true as far as it goes, it is not to be denied that such Subhashitas must have had some authors. And on what ground are we to ascribe them to other authors than those in whose works we do observe them? The

Subhashitas may embody the wisdom of many, but they must employ also the wit of one; and this one may be, and ought *prima facie* to be presumed to be, the same writer in whose work we find them first introduced. Where the identical stanza, identical not merely in sentiment, but generally identical in words also, really occurs in two writers, that circumstance may, perhaps, be a collateral circumstance to justify the application of this theory. And in the case immediately before us, I should not be unprepared to apply that theory, having regard to the difficulty which I have suggested above.

Dr. Bhau Daji has identified Bhartrihari with the Bhartrimentha mentioned in the Rajatarangini, and he assigns to him an equal antiquity with Kalidasa.¶ This may or may not be correct. Dr. Bhau only says that the identity "is to be presumed." But it is also worth consideration, on the other hand, that the Sarasvatikanthabharana quotes *both* names Bhartrihari and Bhartrimentha;|| that the latter name is not, as I believe, much known, while the former, as well as the alternative name Hari, is very widely known. And about Bhartrihari, also, a similar argument to that urged in the text

¶ See Journal B. B. R. A. Society January 1862 (Vol VI, No. XXI) p. 218. Contra see Journal A. S. of Bengal (1862). Dr. Hall's paper.

|| See Aufrecht's Catalogue 209 a.

about Kalidasa may be employed. The difference—and it is, I think, in favour of this argument—is, that I refer here not to the Anvari Sohili, but to the English translation of the Kalila u Dimnah. At page 5 of the second Tantra, (I quote from the Bombay Sanskrit Classics edition) there is a stanza quoted which occurs in the Nitisataka.¶ It may be thus rendered, not very literally :—“Observing the injury inflicted on the sun and moon by the Graha, and the imprisonment of elephants and serpents, and also the indigence of men of talent, my opinion is that destiny is very powerful.” Thus the English rendering of the Sanskrit of the Panchatantra. Compare the English rendering of the Arabic of the Kalila u Dimnah:—“The ringdove said that it was the decree of fate which determined irrevocably both good and evil, that even the sun and moon were subject

¶ Stanza 91. It is but fair to add that in the Kavyasangraha, lately published in two parts at Calcutta, this stanza is ascribed to Vetalabhata ; but in the critical value of the Kavyasangraha I have not very much faith. Thus एका भार्या &c. (p. 43) is once ascribed to Ghatakarpara, and then (p. 46) to Halayudha ; so आत्मज्ञान &c. (301) and नमस्यामो &c. (301) both occur elsewhere as Bhartrihari's (pp. 255 and 239). Or again—and this is very remarkable—अर्थस्य &c. (p. 42) is given as Ghatakarpara's, when it is well-known to belong to the Mahabharata, and when the context shows it to be a clear interpolation in the place where it occurs in Ghatakarpara's poem. And see similarly page 29 stanza which is in Kumara canto IV *ad finem*.

to its irresistible laws in their appointed eclipses.”^{||} When I add that the two passages cited above occur in the same context in the Panchatantra and the Kalila u Dimnah—being in the same tale and referring to the same state of circumstances—when I add further that the Arabic of which the English above cited is a translation was itself but a translation from a Pehlvi rendering of the original Sanskrit, and when I add, lastly, that the English translation, according to the preface by its author, does not lay claim to literal accuracy, but acknowledges a “certain range and freedom of expression”[§], I think I have said enough to prove that my conclusion is not fanciful when I contend that the passage translated above from the Sanskrit may be taken to have existed in the Panchatantra when that work was translated for king Noushirvan. If so, the argument used in the text with regard to Kalidasa will also apply to the date of Bhartrihari. And having got thus far, we may well ask whether Bhartrihari could speak of the “ten incarnations” in the way in which he does speak, if one of the individuals alleged to be an incarnation had been raised to that position only two centuries before his time? And further, if we accept the position, not, as

^{||} p. 195 of Mr. Wyndham Knatchbull's translation. Oxford Printed by W. Baxter 1819.

[§] p. IX.

80 SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

I submit, unlikely to be correct, that Kalidasa must be regarded as a predecessor of Bhartrihari by some decades—the force of the question as applied *mutatis mutandis* to Kalidasa becomes simply irresistible.

APPENDIX C.

Among the works which mention or refer to some of the events of Rama's life as narrated in the Ramayana, Professor Weber has noted the drama called Mrichchhakatika§. But the argument which may be based upon the allusions in that work is not carried any further by the Professor, as the date of the Mrichchhakatika is uncertain. Now I find, in the first place, that the Kavyadarsa of Dandin‡ quotes from the Mrichchhakatika—and Dandin is now generally placed, I believe, in the sixth century A. D.† The distich in the Mrichchhakatika to which I allude runs thus
॥ लिपतीव तमोगानि वर्षतीवांजनं नमः॥ § Now note first,

§ p. 244.

‡ p. 217.

† Indian Antiquary pp. 177, 246 see also p. 304.

§ It may be remarked by the way that Sarngadhara attributes these words to *Mentha and Vikramaditya* probably through a *lapsus memoriae* (see Aufrecht's Oxford Catalogue p. 209a). It is not possible to say who this Vikramaditya is, nor what the 'and' means. Were the two joint authors of any single work?

that Dandin has a long discussion on this line occupying no less than seven stanzas of his work. He sets out different views opposed to his own, and for one reason or another, puts them all out of court. Now such an elaborate dissertation could hardly have been bestowed except upon a work of established reputation—and on this ground a considerable distance between Dandin and the author of the *Mrichchhakatika* must be allowed for. Further, the authorship of the drama is referred, as well by tradition as by the introduction to it, to a king named Sudraka‡. And a prince of that name is mentioned in Prinsep's *Useful Tables* as having flourished about 21 B. C. ¶. If that date is accepted, then the *Ramayana*—to the story of which, as Professor Weber himself admits, clear reference is made in the play—must be assigned to a period considerably earlier than the beginning of the Christian Era. And it should be noted, that the way in which the references to the story are introduced show that the story must have been one perfectly familiar to all classes of people. The allusions are to be found in the speeches of Sakara, who is in

‡ p. 5 Calc. Edition of Saka 1792.

¶ p. 241. Vol II of Prinsep's *Essays* by Thomas and see the note. For the dates to which the work has been attributed by various scholars see Muir's *Texts* (1870) II p. 12, where among others Professor Weber's conclusion on the point is referred to.

some respects, though, of course, not in all, the analogue of Sheridan's Mrs. Malaprop. He must make nonsense of what if put properly would be perfect sense*. In one place, this foolish ignoramus brackets Ravana with Kunti; † in another, Hanuman with Subhadra‡; in a third, Chanakya and Draupadi§. He declares in one place that he hears the smell of flowers, but cannot see the sound of ornaments¶. Well, it is this worthy—the very pink of ignorance—who talks about the characters of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, and stumbles on from blunder to blunder, making a hopelessly confounded jumble of the two. Now the propriety of putting this sort of language into the mouth of Sakara is at once evident, if we remember that both the Ramayana and the Mahabharata must have been so well known in the time the drama was written, that to have confused notions about the characters in the two epics was regarded as a piece of ignorance, of which only the foolish brother-in-law of a prince was capable, and which showed about as much intellectual calibre as the nonsense about hearing smell and seeing sound. Under these circumstances, the language is felicitous; without them, it would fall flatlong and be void of effect.

* See the note in the Calc. ed. p. 24 *et seq.*

† *Ibid* p. 26.

‡ *Ibid* p. 28.

§ *Ibid* p. 40.

¶ *Ibid* p. 36.

Mark, too, that the blunders concern the most salient points in the story. And on a review of these facts, the conclusion logically follows, that in the time of the Mrichchhakatika¶, the Ramayana must have already been venerated as a national epos by the side of the Mahabharata. And that being so, what must have been the distance of time between Sudraka and Valmiki?

Another of the works in which the story of Rama is alluded to is the Karmapradipa—a work referred to in a note in Professor Weber's essay. We have spoken something about this work in the text; but something more now requires to be added—supplementing what has been there said. I observe from Max Muller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature, that the Katyayana to whom this Karmapradipa is ascribed is the same as the Katyayana who wrote the Vartikas on Panini.‡ And Dr. Goldstucker says that the work is mentioned "as such," that is to say as a work from the author of the Vartikas, by Muller himself, "on the authority of Shadgurusishya."† Notwithstanding the concurrence, however, of these two great names, I must confess

¶ After what has been said in the text of the foregoing essay, Professor Weber will probably withdraw his dogmatical assertion, that the Mrichchhakatika was composed before Krishna-worship came into prevalence.

‡ pp. 54 and 235.

† p. 80.

to some misgivings on this point. The passage from Shadgurusishya, on which Dr. Goldstucker and Prof. Muller rely, is set out in the work of the latter. As far as it is material to the present matter it runs as follows:—§ ॥ वाजिनां सूत्रकृत्साम्ना-
मुपग्रन्थस्य कारकः ॥ स्मृतेश्च कर्ता श्लोकानां भ्राजमानां च कारकः
Professor Muller puts a query on भ्राजमानां, and says
“Bhrajamana is unintelligible. It may be Parshada ;|| And his rendering of this passage is as follows:—He composed “the sutras of the Vâjins ; the Upagrantha of the Sama Veda, the slokas of the Smriti (the Karmapradipa)” Bhrajamana is, of course, not translated by Prof. Muller, as he pronounces it to be unintelligible. But it will be observed, that the Karmapradipa, which Prof. Muller interpolates in his translation, is not in the original of Shadgurusishya. Nor, I submit, can it be understood to have been referred to by Shadgurusishya, if the words of that writer are properly interpreted. I think भ्राजमानाम् is an obvious mislection for ब्राजनाम्नाम्;‡ and the meaning of the stanza set out above is as follows—[He was] the author of the Sutra of

§ p. 238.

|| p. 235.

‡ I call this an “obvious mislection,” because in the first place, it is so easy to mistake the one reading for the other, and because, secondly the correction I suggest makes such excellent sense.

the Vajins; the author of the Upagrantha of the Samaveda; the author of a Smriti; and the author of Slokas called Bhraja. This I take to be the clear meaning of Shadgurusishya's words after they are freed from what I consider to be an obvious mislection. We know that Katyayana wrote slokas called "Bhraja"¶ and we know that he is mentioned as an author of a Smriti§ and also that he is quoted from as such by the Mitakshara† and the Viramitrodaya‡ and other Hindu Law Books. This account of Shadgurusishya, therefore, as I read it, is quite consistent with our previous knowledge. But upon this interpretation, where is the room for the Karma-pradipa, which Professor Muller and Goldstucker refer to? Unless that is the name of Katyayana's Smriti work, or of his "Bhraja" Slokas—a sufficiently improbable circumstance, I think—it cannot be regarded as comprehended in the account given by Shadgurusishya. Prof. Muller in one place speaks of a commentary on the Karma-pradipa.§ Does that

¶ See Patanjali's Mahabhashya, Introd. p. 6 with the note thereon of Kaiyata (Benares ed.); and Goldstucker's Panini p. 80.

§ Yajnavalkya quoted in Yajnesvar Sastrin's Aryavidya-sudhakara p. 49.

† See Bombay ed. Vyavahara kanda p. 73, 75, &ca.

‡ Calc. ed. (1815) pp. 126, 127.

§ Anc. Sans Lit., p. 201. note.

commentary afford any ground for his interpretation?

It would seem to result from this that the mention of Katyayana's name in connection with the Karmapradipa is not warranted by the authorities referred to by Professors Goldstucker and Muller for that connection. The argument in the text based upon it will, therefore, also have to be looked into, when more trustworthy information on the subject becomes available. It is certainly unfortunate that Professor Muller, who generally takes care to indicate the authorities for his assertions in accordance with the very proper practice of modern writers, should have allowed this interpolation to appear in his work, without the sanction of any authority whatever. As it is, I certainly cannot understand how that name—Karmapradipa—came in at all. Even the misunderstanding of Shadgurusishya's words, which I have endeavoured to make clear above, is not enough to account for it.

APPENDIX D.

Professor Weber has pointed out, following, as he says, other writers, that Valmiki is not perfectly at home in the geography of the Deccan.¶ On the contrary, as remarked by Professor Bhandarkar

¶ P. 180.

in the course of his observations on the foregoing paper, his describing the inhabitants of the southern regions as monkeys or apes is an indication that he knew almost nothing about them. On the other hand, we have indications in Patanjali's Mahabhashya and Asoka's inscriptions, that they knew some of these provinces of the south. Patanjali knows Chola* which is identified with Coromandel—and he knows Kerala† corresponding with Malabar and part of the Mysore dominions. Indeed Chola occurs in a Vartika which is of course older than Patanjali's time. (Patanjali also knows Sumha,‡ which is still the name of Siam.) He is also aware of a city named Kanchipura¶—which is identified with the modern Conjeveram south of Madras. Now this seems to show a good deal of progress in the geography of the southern regions of India, while Valmiki's knowledge of it may be safely pronounced to be of the vaguest—if nothing worse. What is the inference from this comparison ?

I am aware that an attempt has been made to repudiate this identity of Chola, Kerala &c. with these provinces in the south of India. Those names

* Under Panini IV, 1, 175 and Elphinstone's India 5th ed. p. 239.

† Under Panini IV, 1, 175 and Elphinstone 239.

‡ Under Pan. IV, 2,52 and see Raghuvansa IV, 35.

¶ Under Pan. IV,1, 112, and Elphinstone p. 239.

are mentioned in one of Asoka's inscriptions—and Professor Wilson, in commenting upon that inscription, says, that Chola and Kerala may probably turn out to be names of provinces in the north; because, forsooth, they occur in a gana to one of Panini's Sutras in combination with others designating countries or peoples in the North West. || But this is hardly anything like a sufficient reason for such pyrrhonism. There is, on the contrary, something to show that it is groundless. In the first place, the names are still current—and upon that, it clearly must be taken for granted, until inconsistent circumstances are brought to light, that the regions which bear the names now were the regions which bore the names in former times. Furthermore, it is remarkable, that with the two exceptions of Saka and Chola, all the names referred to by Professor Wilson—namely Kamboja, Yavana, Murala, Kerala, Tamraparni, occur in the fourth Canto of Kalidasa's Raghuvansa. § And they lodge an emphatic protest against this scepticism. Whereas the first two are mentioned in connexion with the Northern Provinces, the last four are all spoken of in connexion with the victories of Raghu in the Southern regions. And surely when we find names used in our own

|| See 2 Prinsep's Essays by Thomas p. 17.

§ See stanzas 69, 61, 55, 54, 50. Note that in Kalidasa, Tamraparni is the name of a river on the continent of India.

time of certain parts of the country identical with their names in the time of Kalidasa, we should require some strong proof, and not content ourselves with light conjecture, to show that in earlier times—in the times of Patanjali or Asoka—those names stood for very different places. To do otherwise would be adopting the philosophy of foregone conclusions, and that carried too far. See too Dandin's *Kavyadarsa* p. 435; *Kadambari* p. 176—where Andhra, Dravida and Simhala are spoken of together.

APPENDIX E.

Babu Rajendralala Mitra's paper on the so-called *Dasyus* of Sanchi gives a summary of a story related in the *Janaka Jataka*, which is very similar to the story about the curse of *Dasaratha* related in the *Ramayana*. Now it is remarkable that the line of argument which Prof. Weber adopts in determining the relation of the *Dasaratha Jataka* and the *Ramayana* applies *mutatis mutandis* to the relation of the *Ramayana* and this *Janaka Jataka*. Thus we may, I think, correctly lay down the following propositions. "Leaving out of view many

¶ *Indian Antiquary* p. 38 *et seq.*

‡ *Ramayana Ayodhyakanda* (Bomb. ed.) LXIII, 22 *et seq.*

minor particulars, the main points of difference are these:—(1) That the king shoots his arrow with the intention of hitting an unseen elephant not in order to ascertain whether the person he sees is a nymph or not; (2) that the blind parents do not at once recognize the steps of the king to be those of a person different from their son; (3) that the wounded boy immediately dies and ascends to Heaven; and consequently, (4) that the Satya Kiriya, the resurrection, and the lecture to the king, are entirely wanting! †” Now suppose, that after setting forth these points of difference, any one says, that the story in the Ramayana “bears so plainly the impress of a higher antiquity that it cannot well be doubted that it belongs to an earlier age.” Upon this supposition, I should like to know how Professor Weber and those who think with him would answer this person. I need scarcely say that I do not maintain this ground at all. I only put the case. I put it as an *argumentum ad hominem*—to Professor Weber and his school. And I ask, whether the reasoning which led them to the conclusion that the Dasaratha Jataka was the stalk which Valmiki nourished up into his well—developed Ramayana might not lead them similarly to this other conclusion that the Janaka Jataka was developed out of

† See Indian Antiquary p. 120 for the original remarks of Prof. Weber which are here reproduced with modifications.

the story of Valmiki. And if that conclusion may be drawn, I ask this further question—are we prepared to accept the result? The position, it will be observed, becomes just this. Valmiki borrows from the Buddhists and from Homer, and gives us his Ramayana. The Buddhists borrow from the Ramayana, and give us their Janaka-Jatak. Whether that will fit into the received facts of Buddhist literary chronology, I do not know. But this I do know that it will not quadrate with everybody's notions of the probable.

APPENDIX F.

I have been lately looking into the Homeric story as presented in an English dress in the first two volumes of that excellent series—the Ancient classics for English readers. And with reference to the remarks made in several places by the learned author of those two volumes—who, it is clear, is not particularly fond of theorising—and conjecturing—I may, perhaps, be allowed to suggest, that after all, even as between Greek and Hindu, the latter may yet prove to be the lender, not the borrower. Thus it is admitted that additions may have been made from time to time to Homer's original work. †

† *Iliad* pp. 4, 5.

It is more than suspected that the Greek race and religion had an Eastern origin§. It is contended that a number of circumstances betray the eastern birth of the Homeric legend.† It is suggested that Homer may have travelled to some Eastern city‡. In the light of these circumstances, is it not worth considering whether anybody is justified in taking it as a mere matter of course that Homer's work should be entirely Greek and unborrowed, while all works bearing a similarity to his work should be copied from him. The suggestion I have thrown out above will, I dare say, jar harshly on some ears. I do not put it forward, however, with anything like confidence. All I say is that a point like this shall not be taken for granted as against Valmiki. The view I prefer I have already expressed in the foregoing pages.§ And against the "analogies" noticed by Prof. Weber, he ought, I think,

§ Do p. 37.

† Do p. 116 and compare *Odyssey* p. 33.

‡ *Odyssey* 33.

§ I observe in the volume on Aristophanes in the series of *Ancient Classics for English Readers*, that the learned author of it mentions a story related by Ælian about the "Clouds" of Aristophanes, and adds that it "has been long refuted." This Ælian, I suppose, is the same as the Ælian whom Professor Weber has cited as one of his authorities about the story of an Indian translation of Homer.

also to consider the more numerous "analogies" between Homer and the Bible which are pointed out by Mr. Lucas Collins in his volume on the Odyssey.¶

**FREE TRADE AND PROTECTION
FROM AN INDIAN POINT
OF VIEW.**

FREE TRADE AND PROTECTION FROM AN INDIAN POINT OF VIEW.

[*A paper read at the Sassoon Mechanics' Institute, on the 29th March 1877.*]

The subject which I have undertaken to discuss in the present paper, is one which, as many of you are doubtless aware, has recently attracted considerable attention both in this country and in England. It is a subject so intimately connected with the whole future of our country—no less in its social and political than in its industrial aspects—that it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of having correct views upon it. At the same time it is a subject respecting which a controversy has been raging for a long time, and is even now, as the late Professor Cairnes expressed it, “active and glowing with something of its pristine fervour.”* I propose in this paper to present a conspectus of the various arguments, which have been or may be urged on either side of the controversy as it affects this country; and to set down some of the practical conclusions as to the true line

* Some leading principles of Political Economy newly expounded pp. 450-51; and compare also *Fortnightly Review* June 1876, p. 881.

of policy to be followed in this matter to which we are led by a consideration of those arguments.

Before entering, however, on a discussion of the conflicting views on this important subject, I think it desirable to draw prominent attention, at the very outset to one circumstance connected with it, namely, that the question as between Free Trade and Protection is not really one of pure Political Economy—not one, in other words, on which the verdict of Political Economy is final and unappealable. I venture to think that there are few or no questions of practical politics upon which the deliverance of Political Economy can be accepted without numerous qualifications. And it appears to me that this must become obvious even upon a slight examination of the matter. If Political Economy is conversant, as we are told by the highest authorities it *is* conversant, with wealth alone; and if in practical life, the pecuniary aspect of a measure is, and must be admitted to be, not the sole—often not even the most important—aspect to be considered; then it seems to follow that the economical view of such a measure is but one of many factors which must go to form the final judgment upon it. And accordingly, we find Political Economy spoken of in Mill's Autobiography, as “a branch of Social Philosophy so interlinked with all

the other branches that its conclusions even in its own peculiar province, are only true conditionally, subject to interference and counteraction from causes not directly within its scope; while to the character of a practical guide it has no pretension apart from other classes of considerations.*" The same view has been taken by another of the great Economists of our day—I mean the late Professor Cairnes. He says:—"The data thus furnished"—that is to say, by Political Economy—"may indeed go far to determine our judgment, but they do not necessarily, *and should not in practice always*, do so. For, there are few practical problems which do not present other aspects than the purely economical—political, moral, educational, artistic aspects—and these may involve consequences so weighty as to turn the scale against purely economic solutions. On the relative importance of such conflicting considerations, Political Economy offers no opinion, pronounces no judgment; thus, as I said, standing neutral between competing social schemes."§ And Prof. Cairnes winds up his remarks on the subject

* P 236 (3rd ed.). See also Mill's Political Economy, Preface. (Popular edition); Essays on some unsettled questions of Political Economy pp. 138-9; 140-5. (1st ed.).

§ Fortnightly Review for July 1871 p. 93. The paper has been since reprinted in Prof. Cairnes's Essays in Political Economy. See p. 256.

in this wise :—“ It supplies the means, or more correctly, a portion of the means, for estimating all, it refuses to identify itself with any.” It is unnecessary, I apprehend, to further labour a point which is so clear, as well upon the reason of the thing, as upon the authorities which have been cited and which may be easily multiplied. † Some, indeed, may think that the point should have been disposed of even more summarily than it has been here. But as Professor Cairnes has remarked in the sequel of the passage already quoted, this “ characteristic of economic science” is not “ at all generally appreciated, and some serious and indeed lamentable consequences have arisen from overlooking it.” And what is of still greater importance, in the whole of the very elaborate discussion which the question has recently undergone with reference to our Customs Tariff I am not aware of a single writer on the Free Trade side who gave its due weight to this circumstance. The great weight which is really due to it will be shown at a later stage of our investigation. At present it is enough to have drawn attention to it.

And now, with this preliminary caution, let us consider the purely economic aspects of Free Trade

† See, *inter alia*, Prof. Leslie's Essay on Financial Reform Cobden Club Essays 2nd Series p. 193.

and Protectionism in their operation in India. The objections to Protectionism, in the abstract, may, we think, be fairly summed up as follows:—

I That it benefits the comparatively small class of producers at the expense of the consumer.

II That it prevents a country from producing as much in the aggregate as it might and could produce in the absence of the protective regulation.

III That it diverts capital from its natural channels.

IV That it renders industry unprogressive, and is demoralizing to the industrial classes generally.

V That, in principle, it is destructive of all foreign trade and the moral and intellectual benefits thence resulting.

VI That it involves the great evils of the interference of the State with Trade and Industry.

There is not, I believe, any objection to the system of protection which may not be comprehended under one or other of these six heads. We shall now proceed to consider them in their order.

And first as regards the loss to the consumer. We find it often alleged* that to give protection to the growth of any article is equivalent to an enhancement of the price of that article. To this ob-

* Wealth of Nations Book IV ch. II; Chamber of Commerce Report (Bombay) 1874-75. p. 86; Fortnightly Review, June 1876, p. 889; see also Mr. Sorabji Shapurji Bengalee's letter to Lord Lytton on the Import Duties p. 3.

jection, as applied to the particular case we have now to consider, there is, I venture to think, a very conclusive reply. I do not now wish to dispute the allegation that the repeal of the import duties on cotton goods, for instance, which have been objected to as protective in their operation, will reduce the price of those goods in this country—although, having regard to what has been stated on high authority to have been the effect of the repeal of the Corn Duty in England, there may be room for doubt as to that matter.* But I will assume, for the purposes of the present argument, that such a reduction of prices will result from the repeal of the duties in question. Let us now trace the results of that measure in other directions. § There will be a deficiency in the revenue of the country to the

* See Ricardo's works (McCulloch) p. 191. Rogers Political Economy p. 235; and Gladstone's Financial Statements p. 129 whence it will appear that the operation of the repeal of the Corn Laws in England was beneficial in a different mode altogether. The passage is cited with approval by Prof. Leslie; Cobden Club Essays. (2nd Ser.) 236. Prof. Leslie, in that paper, couches his lance against all indirect taxation. It is more than doubtful, however, whether, his *beau ideal* of taxation is practicable—in India especially. See Gladstone's Financial Statements p. 518 and Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce for 1875 p. 54, Journal of the East India Association VIII, 192.

§ I have been unable to resist the temptation to add the following remarks although they do not bear on the abstract question, but only apply to the case of an impost which is necessary for revenue purposes as well as protective in its

extent of the yield of those duties. How is that deficiency to be made up? Two, and only two, alternatives seem to present themselves. Either another tax must be levied, or the public expenditure must be reduced. If another tax is levied, it must be levied either from the class upon whom the import duties fell, or from a different class of the people. In the latter case, we shall have only shifted the burden of taxation from one shoulder to another; and as we must assume, at least for the purposes of this argument, that the import duties are not objectionable on the ground of their involving any inequality§ of taxation, this result is manifestly unjust. If on the other hand, the tax is levied from the very persons on whom the import duties fell, the result will be simply, that the state will have taken with one hand what it had given with the other—will have taken in taxation what it had given in the reduction of the price of Cotton Goods. If we turn now to the other

operation. My excuse must be found in the fact that it is with reference to such a duty that the abstract question which I am discussing has been raised.

§ In point of fact the duties will be found to satisfy most if not all of the famous canons of Taxation laid down by Adam Smith. Mr. Sorabji Shapurji is also of this opinion. See his Letter to Lord Lytton p. 6 *Et seq.* Compare also Syme's Industrial Science p. 71, where and on the following pages may be seen some very incisive observations on the late Indian Tariff Act.

alternative, of economy in the public expenditure, the repeal of the import duties is simply a measure of remission of taxation. And without going very far into the question which arises with regard to that point, it may, I think, be very safely said, that there are other taxes which are more proper to be remitted than these Import Duties. Our system of Land Revenue on this side of India may be good or may be bad—that question need not be discussed on the present occasion. But the evidence afforded by the Deccan Riots, and by the awful Famine now prevailing in this Presidency, must, to most minds, be conclusive to show that the Land Tax, to put it in the mildest way, has some claims to be taken into consideration when a remission of taxation is contemplated. § A similar argument may probably be urged with much force as regards the Salt Duty. § But it is unnecessary to carry this branch of the argument any further. It appears

§ See Report of Deccan Riots Commission p. 2; The Poona Sarvajanic Sabha's Report for the Indian Finance Committee (1873); Fortnightly Review April 1876 p. 526. Since this was written our new Governor has expressed his opinion on this subject in the course of his reply to an address presented to him by the Poona Sarvajanic Sabha. Sir R. Temple holds out no hope of reduction in the Land Assessments, as he is satisfied about the care with which the settlement has been made. Is His Excellency aware of the late Mr. Havelock's experiment?

§ Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce 1874-5 p. 109; Fortnightly Review April 1876 pp. 521-8.

to me to be quite clear, that if *any* tax is to be remitted, the whole system of taxation must be considered, in order to see *which* tax is the fittest to be abolished. And if such a consideration is given to the question, strong argument and high authority will be found to support the case of other taxes than the tax on imports of Manchester goods.¶ How then does the case stand? Assuming that the repeal of the import duties on cotton goods will reduce the cost of those goods to the Indian consumer, we find that such reduction will either be counterbalanced by some additional payment in another direction, or will lead to some injustice in the general system of taxation in the country, or will cause an alteration of that system, which having regard to the interests of the people of this country, is by no means the most expedient. Of course, as I need scarcely say, I am now assuming—what at this stage of the argument must necessarily be assumed—that there is no other objection to the Import Duty than that which we are now discussing. And on that assumption, the results to be expected from the repeal of the Duty, as just now pointed out, seem to me to militate against that repeal.

But the Protectionist case, if it is to be so called,

¶ Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce 1874-5, p. 97.

in answer to this objection in the interests of the consumer, does not rest there. Assuming that the Import Duty does increase the cost of the goods liable to it, and further assuming that against such increase there is nothing to show on the credit side of the account, it may well be contended that the assumed increase will only last for a short time, and that the privations endured during its currency will be made up for, and more than made up for, by a large diminution of cost afterwards. Admitting for the nonce, that the objection we are now considering is unanswerable in the case of a country altogether unsuited to the manufacture of the goods liable to duty, it appears to me to be utterly devoid of force when applied to a country in many ways adapted to that manufacture. A concrete example will make this quite clear; and the example of the cotton manufactures in our country is as good a one as any. Now we may admit that the import duties on Manchester goods having kept their price at a high level, the Indian consumer is at present paying something more for them than he would have had to pay but for the levy of those duties. So far there is a clear loss to the consumer. But on the other hand, it must also be admitted that in many ways this country is even better suited to the manufacture of cotton

goods than England. The raw material is several thousand miles nearer; the labour required is enormously more cheap;|| and even the coal that may be necessary is not inaccessible.§ If then you have the capital and other requisites necessary to start the industry fairly, so as to bring the manufacture into full working order, without being nipped in the bud by losses or infinitesimal profits at the very beginning, it appears to me to be plain that in such a case the price of the goods must ultimately be much reduced. Upon the abstract principles of Political Economy, this conclusion appears to be a necessary one in the case put. But we are not left entirely to an *a priori* argument in this case. In 1873 there was published in the Fortnightly Review an article by Mr. David Syme, in which two or three very striking instances are given of how the levy^o of a protective duty on certain articles in the United States and in France ultimately reduced the prices of those articles—so much so, that instead of im-

|| In saying this, I do not forget that cheap labour is not necessarily or always the most profitable. But even taking note of all that is involved in this admission, the circumstance referred to in the text is one entitled to some weight on the question discussed. See on this point the Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce for 1874-5 p. 54 and Brassey's Work and Wages pp. 69, 87.

§ Compare Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce 1874-5, p. 54 and Journal of the East India Association VIII, 128.

porting them as they had done before the laying on of the protective impost, the United States and France were able to assume the position of exporters of those commodities, and the United States, indeed, were able to undersell even England herself.¶ To my mind, I own, this is quite conclusive. Both *a priori* reasoning, and the experience already gained in other countries,§ lead concurrently to the conclusion that in a country adapted to any manufacture, a protective duty, although it may in the first instance raise the cost of the manufactured article, must in the long run reduce the cost. And if this is so, can the objection we are now discussing be maintained? Can it be said that protection under such circumstances means injustice to the consumer? It is one of the charac-

¶ Fortnightly Review April 1873, pp. 449, 450, 451. Compare also Mr. Syme's Outlines of an Industrial Science pp. 87-8. What had been stated in the text also furnishes matter for consideration as against the contention of the chairman of our local Chamber of Commerce, that "no law can be laid down with greater certainty than that if you protect the manufactures of a country by protective tariffs, its export trade in these manufactures will wither and die." (Chamber of Commerce Report for 1874-5, p. 87).

§ Our own cotton manufacture shews a substantially similar result; for although our indigenous machine-made coarse cloths are not yet, I believe, cheaper in money cost than Manchester cloths, still considering their greater durability, it is in the long run cheaper to buy them than the cloths imported from Manchester. Compare Syme's Industrial Science p. 170.

teristics of civilised life, as contrasted with the primitive condition of mankind, to forego a small present good, or even to suffer a present privation, in the hope and with the intention of thereby securing some larger advantage in the future. Is it not clear, then, that in such a case as that we have put, the true interests even of the consumer dictate a policy of Protectionism instead of Free Trade ?

And this view of the subject enables us to perceive that the apparently formidable dilemma put forward on behalf of Free Trade is quite innocuous. "To give the monopoly"—says Adam Smith, in a passage of the *Wealth of Nations* which Dugald Stewart has pronounced to be "satisfactory and conclusive"*—"to give the monopoly of the home market to the produce of domestic industry in any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful regulation. If the produce of domestic can be brought there as cheap as that of foreign industry, the regulation is evidently useless. If it cannot, it must generally be hurtful."† The earlier portion of this passage

* Lectures on Political Economy—Works edited by Hamilton Vol. IX, p. 24 note.

† *Wealth of Nations* Book IV chap. II.—Vol. III, p. 113 (Wakefield's edition)

appertains to our next point. But if we look into the alternatives presented to us at the close of it, we shall find that they by no means exhaust the possibilities of the case. And our preceding observations will indicate the third alternative—namely that the produce of domestic industry may not at a particular point of time be able to compete with that of foreign industry, but may reasonably be expected to be able to do so after a short period, if in the meantime it receives suitable help and opportunities of development. In a case like this,* Adam Smith's argument, I venture to think, has but little force.

* On re-reading Chap. II of the Fourth Book of the Wealth of Nations, I find that this case has not altogether escaped the attention of its great author. But I venture to submit that the manner in which he disposes of it is not quite satisfactory, for he does not fully work out the results of the hypothesis which he accepts as not unlikely. He says:—"By means of such regulations, indeed, a particular manufacture may sometimes be acquired sooner than it could have been otherwise, and after a certain time may be made at home *as cheap or cheaper* than in a foreign country. But though the industry of the society may be thus carried with advantage into a particular channel *sooner than it could have been otherwise*, it will by no means follow that the sum total either of its industry or of its revenue, can ever be augmented by any such regulation." I have said in the text, upon this and on the next point, what appears to me to be worthy of consideration against the views here expressed. Smith's admission, however, that we may by protective regulations acquire a valuable industry sooner than we can without them, is not without value.

Upon the whole, therefore, this first objection to Protectionism in India appears to me to fail, because the principles upon which it rests do not quite square with the actual circumstances of this country. Let us now proceed to consider the next objection which is that Protectionism tells unfavourably on the aggregate production of a country. This objection is thus stated by Adam Smith in the passage† to which we have already referred. "If a foreign country", says he, "can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage. The general industry of the country being always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished,.....but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the greatest advantage. It is certainly not employed to the greatest advantage, when it is thus directed towards an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make. The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished, when it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value than the commodity which it is

† Wealth of Nations Book IV Chap. II. (Vol. III, p. 114 Wakefield's edition.) This passage is also cited by Stewart, Works IX. 25.

directed to produce: according to the supposition that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries cheaper than it can be made at home." Here again, I have no quarrel with the argument so far as it goes. What I contend is that it does not go far enough into all the possible circumstances; and the conclusion to be derived from it must, therefore, be taken, not in the general form in which it is inaccurately put, but subject to qualifications. The third alternative which we have mentioned in the discussion of the preceding objection is of great moment here also. Considered in the abstract, it is, I think, impossible to say that the total production, in the case we have put, will necessarily be diminished, if we take for the application of this test a period of time in which both lines of policy have had a fair trial. If on the one hand it cannot be denied that in the beginning the production must be diminished; it seems to me on the other hand to be equally undeniable that after the protection has had fair time to put forth its fruit, the production, in the case we have put, will regain its former extent, and may even be developed into still larger proportions.‡

It is unnecessary to dwell further on this topic, and we, therefore, proceed to the next objection.

‡ Compare *Fortnightly Review* April 1873 pp. 449-57.

"The sole effect," says Ricardo,† "of high duties on the importation, either of manufactures or corn, or of a bounty on their exportation, is to divert a portion of capital to an employment which it would not directly seek. It causes a pernicious distribution of the general funds of the society—it bribes a manufacturer to commence or continue in a comparatively less profitable employment." Now there is one point worthy of notice concerning this alleged diversion of capital, which will have to be discussed when we examine the last of the objections to Protectionism set out above—namely that based on the evils of State interference with trade. At present we have only to consider the point as regards the diversion of capital into "comparatively *less profitable*" channels. Is there any basis for this allegation as applied to our country? During the elaborate and protracted discussions on the repeal of the Import Duties on Manchester goods, I have no recollection of having met with a single fact or figure adduced to show that any diversion of capital has taken place in consequence of the protection alleged to be afforded by the Duties in question. In truth, those who took part in the interests of free trade in that discussion did not care apparently to go into any inquiry in this direction.

† Ricardo's works (Ed. by McCulloch) p. 189.

They asserted that the duties were protective, and—thought that they had done enough to condemn them; thus showing themselves to belong to that class of the disciples of “the founders of Political Economy,” who, in the words of the late John Stuart Mill,* “stop short at their phrases,” who “believe themselves to be provided with a set of catch words, which they mistake for principles—free-trade, freedom of contract, competition, demand and supply, the wages-fund, individual interest, desire of wealth &c.—which supersede analysis, and are applicable to every variety of cases without the trouble of thought.” These weighty words, I venture to think, describe only too truly the mode in which the question of the repeal of the Import Duties was dealt with in the discussion to which I have referred. And yet, as I have endeavoured to point out, if we employ a little analysis, we find, that the fundamental principles, on which the general condemnation of Protectionism rests, have no place under the actual circumstances of this country. Now it has been pointed out by Mr. Raynsford Jackson, in his paper on “India and

* See Dissertations and Discussions Vol. IV. 86. Compare also the quotation there given from Professor Leslie and the note thereon at p. 87; and Fortnightly Review for July 1871 P. 90 (Cairnes's Essays p. 251.)

Lancashire" contributed to the Fortnightly Review,† that about the close of the year 1875, no less a sum than three crores and eighty lakhs of Rupees had been invested in Cotton Factories at work in Bombay. These figures are taken by him from the Bombay Government Gazette, and they are corroborated by the detailed statement on the subject to be found in the Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce for 1873-74.§ The figures, therefore, being trustworthy, it might have been expected that some facts would be adduced to show, that this large amount of capital had been diverted from some more profitable industry. We might fairly have expected from the practical business men who discussed this question, that they should have referred to some industries, more productive and more profitable to the country, which had been starved by reason of the protective import duty having diverted capital from them to the Cotton Factories. What, however, are the facts? I find no trace of any attempt to deal with the question in any other than the "high *a priori*" method. The Bombay Chamber of Commerce does not make any reference whatever to this point. And the Manchester Chamber thinks it sufficient to assert, in

† For June 1876, p. 879.

§ pp. 41-4.

the memorial addressed by it to Mr. Gladstone, who was then Prime Minister, "that the *inevitable tendency* of any trade nursed and fostered by protection is to divert capital and labour from the natural channels into which they would otherwise be more beneficially turned."§ When a gentleman like Mr. Hugh Mason, speaking on behalf of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, in a matter so vitally affecting some of their dearest interests, can find nothing better than "inevitable tendencies" to press into his service, we may be pretty sure, I think, that there are no facts or figures to support his case. And yet if we are to argue the matter *a priori*, it appears to me, that, in the circumstances of our country, the assumptions which underlie the reasoning of the adherents of Free Trade on this point are many of them quite baseless. As Professor Cliffe Leslie has said of Political Economists generally, "they have feigned an unimpeded pursuit of wealth, a universal knowledge of the gains and prospects of every occupation in all places, and a perfect facility of migration; and from these fictions they have reasoned with exactly the same certainty as if they were real cases. The result is that Political Economy has become a

§ Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce 1873-4.
p. 39.

byword for hasty assumptions and had generalization."† In this country, where every thing is so liable to become stereotyped by custom,‡ where there is so little knowledge both of the real resources of the country, and of the proper modes of developing those resources, where there is not a superfluity of enterprise, I think that a diversion of capital, even when it is proved to have taken place in consequence of a protective impost, is not necessarily a diversion from a more profitable into a less profitable channel, cannot always be correctly looked upon as involving a loss to the country. Now in the case before us, not only is there no evidence to show any such "pernicious" diversion whatever, but there are facts which tend to prove that a considerable portion of the capital employed at present in the cotton manufacturing industry was altogether unemployed in any production—some of it was not in fact capital, strictly speaking—before that industry came into existence. I need scarcely say that not having any precise figures before me, I make this statement with some little diffidence; but I have obtained information from certain friends, very well-informed in such matters, which thoroughly bears out that statement. It

† See the Academy. April 10, 1875, p. 364.

‡ Compare, upon this point, the observations of the late Mr. Bagehot in the Fortnightly Review for May 1876, p. 737.

appears that in former times, before banking had reached its present development, the great native merchants in Bombay used always to keep large balances in hand for the purposes of their trade, so that money might be forthcoming at any time when it was required. The methods of business having now altered so as to dispense with the necessity of keeping in hand such large balances, a great portion of the capital which used formerly to remain in that form has now gone to make up the capitals of our Mills. Is this, or is it not, a desirable state of things? It appears to me that except for the fact that business is not under this system quite so safe as it was under the previous system, this result is by no means to be deprecated. So much wealth which before was not productively employed is now employed for purposes of production. The aggregate production of the country, therefore, must have increased to the extent of the outturn of this additional capital. True, it may be said, that if this protective impost had not existed, this capital would have gone to the support of some more profitable industry than the cotton manufacture. This may be said. But *a priori*, I venture to think, that, having regard to the circumstances which have been noted before, it may be contradicted with equal show of reason.

The truth is that we cannot really predicate what would have become of this additional capital but for the protective duty. Another important point connected with this matter is the circumstance, which I also learn from information, that a considerable quantity of the Government Paper formerly held by our merchants has found its way to the Native States—so that the wealth, which remained formerly in the coffers of some of our Native Princes, having been received by our merchants in Bombay, in lieu of their Government Paper, has now gone to replenish the capitals of our Cotton Factories. Here again, we see another mode in which the working capital of Bombay has received a clear addition. So much wealth which had remained idle in the hands of its possessors—idle, I mean to say, so far as any help to the actual production of the country was concerned—has now been turned into capital employed in production and going to the support of the labouring classes. These facts,* if they are facts—and I have them from men of business on whom I can thoroughly rely—seem rather to point to a state of things not entirely squaring with the *a priori* views

* I also believe, that there has arisen so much faith in the cotton manufacturing industry that the hoardings of some people have seen the light in consequence of this new industry being established among us.

of the dogmatic Free Traders, if I may venture so to call them. And they show the correctness and strong applicability to our country of a remark of Mr. Syme's, made in the paper to which I have already referred. "We are aware", he says, "that this latter advantage is considered to be an illusory one, as capital and labour, it is alleged, would only be diverted from one industry into another, without any real benefit to the country. To this we answer first, that this objection would have no force whatever, unless the *whole* capital and labour of the country were already fully and remuneratively employed, a supposition never yet realized in any country"*—and, I may add, perhaps least realized in India.

To look at the matter now from another point of view. I am unable to get access to any figures exhibiting the actual aggregate production of the Presidency of Bombay, for some years before, and some years after, the rise of the cotton manufacturing industry.† But the figures for the imports and exports of all the three Presidencies are available, and so far as they furnish a proper basis for argument, certainly do not afford any support to the Free Trader's views. I take the figures in the fol-

* Fortnightly Review. April 1870, p. 457.

† Compare Mr. Dadabhai Nowroji's paper on the Poverty of India. Journal East India Association IX, p. 237. *et seq.*

Following table from the Statistical Abstract concerning India (Number Two)—for the four years just preceding the period when the cotton industry having been established in Bombay, the import duty began, it is alleged, to act as a Protective duty.

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
	£.	£.	£.
Imports 1857-60.	14,172,485	2,540,739	11,895,060
	14,960,502	2,253,096	13,609,467
	16,156,477	2,638,400	15,750,823
	20,717,598	3,000,846	16,903,659
	£.	£.	£.
Exports 1857-60	13,443,967	2,407,906	10,740,004
	13,579,431	2,665,920	12,033,123
	14,515,938	2,224,664	13,791,696
	12,903,770	2,492,156	13,493,284

This yields, for the annual average of imports into Bengal during the period in question, £16,501,753; into Madras £2,608,270; into Bombay £14,539,752. And the average of exports similarly is for Bengal £13,610,776; for Madras £2,447,661; and for Bombay £12,514,527. Turn we now to the averages after the establishment of the cotton factories. I take the figures from the Statesmans' Year Book, which is based upon official documents. And I

122 SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

omit the years 1864, 1865, 1866, which are exceptionally favourable to Bombay. I also omit 1867, as the returns for that year give the figures only for 11 months, owing to the change of the financial year then introduced. The figures now stand as follows:—

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
	£.	£.	£.
Imports 1868-71	21,821,424	3,688,248	20,153,317
	21,325,600	4,069,535	22,849,269
	19,496,082	4,046,505	21,614,164
	18,588,706	3,982,834	14,677,838
	£.	£.	£.
Exports 1868-71	20,206,464	4,311,555	25,000,011
	21,266,324	6,114,041	23,123,611
	20,971,121	6,072,376	23,730,539
	23,240,609	5,150,726	25,102,584

We get the averages from this table as follows:—
for imports—Bengal £20,307,953; Madras £3,946,780;
and Bombay £19,823,647. And for exports—Bengal
£21,421,129; Madras £5,412,174; and Bombay
£24,239,186.

These averages are contrasted with the previous ones in the following table:—

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
Imports during 1857-60. do. do. 1868-71.	16,501,753£. 20,311,580£.	2,608,270£. 3,976,345£.	14,539,752£. 20,636,433£.
Advance.	3,809,827£.	1,368,075£.	6,096,681£.
	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
Exports during 1857-60. do. do. 1868-71.	13,610,776£. 21,465,346£.	2,447,661£. 5,409,976£.	12,514,527£. 25,121,126£.
Advance.	7,854,570£.	2,962,315£.	12,606,599£.

Now these appear to be rather remarkable figures. And the lessons they teach, whether they may or may not be fairly prayed in aid of the view I am propounding, certainly negative some of the *a priori* assertions which have been made in the course of this controversy. Speaking in round numbers, we find from these figures, that during the regime of Protectionism in Bombay, our imports have developed so, that instead of being about two millions sterling short of Bengal, we are now ahead of her in that branch of commerce by more than three hundred thousand pounds. Similarly in exports. Whereas before 1860, our average fell short of that of Bengal by over a million sterling, after 1868 we beat Bengal by nearly four millions. And *mutatis*

mutandis these remarks apply in the comparison between Bombay and Madras. If we look at the percentage of advance in the three Presidencies, we still find nearly as good results for Bombay; for whereas the development of Bengal Imports shows, speaking roughly, an advance of about twenty-five percent, that of Bombay is about forty-two per cent. Madras, no doubt, shows a higher percentage—about fifty-two per cent.* So of exports. While Bengal advances only fifty per cent, our exports are very nearly doubled as are also those of Madras. And on the other hand, looking at the absolute extent of progress both in imports and exports, our advance is greater not only than that of Bengal and Madras taken separately, but even of them both put together. One further remark deserves to be made. The great development which we have been contemplating is much more striking in the case of the exports than of the imports. If we look at the figures, we find, that whereas we are in advance of Bengal and Madras put together to the extent of two millions and upwards in the department of exports, we are only about nine hundred thousand pounds beyond them in the department of imports. Now this is very noteworthy, with reference to the

* It should be noted here, however, that the aggregate imports and exports of Madras look almost insignificant by the side of those of Bombay and Bengal.

the allegation made by the Free Traders, regarding the "inevitable tendency" of Protectionism and so forth. For a necessary condition of a vast increase of exports is an increase of the aggregate production—which is exactly the thing that Protectionism is alleged to prevent. Upon the whole, therefore, the general figures of our Import and Export Trade do not afford the slightest support to the dogmatic Free Trader's views. They show that Bombay with her Protectionist system has not gone to rack and ruin, but has been exhibiting, on the contrary, a striking development, so striking, indeed, as to throw into the shade the development, of at least one of her sister Presidencies, who are breathing "the free and bracing air of Free Trade."‡

‡ Mr. Brassey (*Work and Wages* p. 60) says that "in a country in which the erroneous policy of protection is still adopted by the Government, the price of labour from the increased demand for it, will advance, as might be expected, in a still more rapid ratio than in a country in which a free trade policy is adopted. The closing of the home markets in Russia to foreign trade is producing a sensible effect on wages and the cost of living." Now if this is so, it seems to me, that even if Protectionism did diminish the aggregate production of a country, it would still be desirable, in a country like ours, in order to secure a fair distribution. After all, it does not do much good to a country to have a few bloated fortunes in the midst of a dead level of indigence here and there chequered with squalid misery. It is better, I humbly conceive, to have fewer large fortunes if the population at large be at the same time removed above the

There is another mode of comparison which may be adopted, and which also yields results not inconsistent with those which we have now seen. The tables above set out give us the averages of imports and exports of the three Presidencies in 1857-60 and 1868-71. Let us compare these averages with the like averages for the years 1846-49. To arrive at these averages I take the figures as given in Mr. Montgomery Martin's History of British India.‡

	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Imports 1846-49.	6,22,36,232	1,02,22,110	4,33,76,038
	6,64,96,716	1,02,90,035	4,15,79,118
	5,41,85,848	1,10,88,174	4,04,36,062
	5,77,06,235	1,06,52,712	5,71,34,128
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
Exports 1846-49.	10,10,27,551	1,47,69,816	6,26,49,653
	9,51,97,977	1,58,43,167	4,96,51,927
	8,86,69,282	1,49,15,589	4,37,99,479
	9,81,97,424	1,94,63,112	6,86,21,907

reach of starvation and misery. I cannot say whether there has been observed in India any such phenomenon as Mr. Brassey has noted about Russia. In the absence of figures, I am unable to say any thing more than that I have been informed that wages have risen to some extent all over this Presidency during the last few years.

‡ See the table at the end of the book. Mr. Martin gives

FREE TRADE AND PROTECTION. 127

The averages yielded by these figures are contrasted with those which we have already arrived at in the following table:—

Years.	Bengal	Madras.	Bombay.
Imports.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
46-49	6,01,56,258	1,05,63,258	4,56,31,337
57-60	16,50,17,530	2,60,82,700	14,53,97,520
68-71	20,31,15,800	3,97,63,450	20,63,64,330
Exports.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
46-49	9,57,73,058	1,62,47,921	5,61,80,741
57-60	13,61,07,760	2,44,76,610	12,51,45,270
68-71	21,46,51,710	4,90,99,760	25,12,11,260

Now these figures show that in the case of all the three Presidencies the advance of imports in the third period beyond the second was not so great as in the second period beyond the first. But whereas the excess in the case of Bengal imports falls from 10 to 4 crores, speaking in round numbers, in the case of Bombay it falls from 10 to only 6 crores. The fall in the case of Madras is not nearly so much. The results therefore to which the

the sums in Rupees; and in the second table, therefore, I have reduced the Pounds sterling to Rupees at 10 Rupees to the Pound sterling.

figures for the imports point, in this comparison, are not different from those which we derived from the comparison we have instituted before. In the case of the exports, the advance throughout is greater in the third period than in the second. And the Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay have had a pretty nearly equal development; the extent of advance in the third period beyond the second being very nearly double the extent of advance in the second period beyond the first. And here again Madras is still far behind her sister Presidencies in the absolute total of her exports, but beats them both in the rapidity of her advance. For whereas the difference between the first two periods is only one of eighty lakhs of Rupees, the difference between the last two periods is not less than two crores and forty five lakhs of Rupees—or a little over three times the former amount. Upon the whole, therefore, the results of this comparison coincide pretty nearly with the results which we have arrived at already; and they show that the decline, where it exists, is common to Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, that Protectionism has not done any such harm to our Presidency as has not also befallen her sister Presidencies, although they have not been under a Protectionist regime.

There is, of course, one obvious criticism on

these figures, and the results we have deduced from them. Who shall say, it may be asked, that but for the system of Protectionism prevailing here, the development would not have been even more striking? Who, indeed, shall say that? I can only echo the question. I am not prepared to answer it. But I beg to point out that no grounds can be shown for holding to any such belief as is indicated in the question; and on the other hand, the logic of facts is rather against such belief. The *a priori* argument on the point, besides its intrinsic defects, has been shown above to take no account of certain circumstances of great moment in this inquiry. From the facts as we actually witness them, no argument can be derived in favour of such a belief. On the contrary we have the fact, that in the Protectionist Presidency the advance of both the Import and Export Trade has been far more striking than it has been in at least one of the other Presidencies which are not Protectionists. And under these circumstances, I think I am justified in altogether declining to launch upon the sea of speculation to which we are directed by the question above propounded.

The dip we have now had into this stream of figures and tables has, perhaps, rendered us oblivious of the point at which we had left our subject.

But we must now return to it. We have pointed out, that such diversion of capital as may have occurred—if any diversion has occurred—by reason of the protective Import Duty on Manchester Goods, need not necessarily have been a diversion into an unprofitable channel. And we have also endeavoured to show that the available statistics of our trade and commerce do not negative that assertion. As regards one department of industry—and that the principal one in this country, namely agriculture, we may add to what we have already stated, the opinion of a very competent judge, General. W. F. Marriot. In an address on Indian Political Economy and Finance before the East India Association in London, he said: “whilst India thus purchases more produce from abroad, there is no reason to suppose she produces less at home; but the contrary. More land is taken into cultivation, and in Bombay, certainly, Manufactures have sprung up which did not exist previously.”* General Marriott’s mind, evidently, has not been worked upon by the bugbear of diversion of capital into unprofitable channels.† His statement, too, I may add, receives corroboration from the recently published and highly important Report of

* East India Association Journal VIII. P. 207.

† Yet the gallant General is no Protectionist. See East India Association Journal VIII. 136.

the Deccan Riots Commissioners. That Report, no doubt, is conversant only with a particular *portion* of the Presidency. But, I think, we are safe in taking their remarks as applying with small limitations, at all events on the point before us, to the *whole* Presidency. After setting out some figures for the years 1854, 1864, 1874, the Commissioners say: "In noting these figures, it must be remembered, that during the latter part of the period embraced, there was but little unoccupied waste, and the increase in Sowkar holdings implies a corresponding decrease in those of the cultivating class."§

In now continuing our argument on the point before us, we shall assume—what we have shown to be not the fact—that the Import duties have caused a real diversion of capital into less profitable channels. And we think that even after this assumption, the protective duty would be still defensible—upon the principle which has been already more than once mentioned. Upon this point, Mr. J. E. Thorold Rogers, in his book on Political Economy, asks—"What should we say of a farmer who starved his best land in order to try experiments on a rocky waste.?"† Well I may say, that this will probably be a piece of folly; although

§ P. 33.

† Polit. Econ. p. 230.

I venture to think that, under certain circumstances, it will not only be a proper thing to do, but one of a class of things without which progress of any sort would be almost impossible. But however that may be, it seems to me quite plain that this question, which Mr. Rogers apparently puts forward as a clincher, is absolutely pointless in the case we have already put. If there is any reasonable chance of making a piece of land productive,—not necessarily in the immediate future, it is quite enough if it can be made productive within a reasonable period—then I should say, that the farmer of whose holding such land formed part would not only be justified, but would be wise, in trying experiments upon it. He would be wise in looking upon the certainty of a smaller immediate outturn as dust in the balance, when set against the great likelihood of a larger aggregate outturn in the not very distant future.

We shall now proceed to the next objection—namely, that Protectionism is demoralizing, and a clog on industrial progress. Upon this point, the late Professor Cairnes has written as follows: “When once the industrial classes of a country have been taught to look to the legislature to secure them against the competition of rivals, they are apt to trust more and more to this support, and less to

their own skill, ingenuity, and economy, in conducting their business. The inevitable result is that industry becomes unproductive wherever it is highly protected.* And further on he observes that Protection "vitiates the industrial atmosphere, by engendering lethargy, routine, and a reliance on legislative expedients, to the great discouragement of those qualities on which, above all, successful industry mainly depends—energy, economy, and enterprise."† I do not for one moment wish to take from the force of these observations. They are entitled to great weight. But I cannot help thinking, that when Professor Cairnes wrote them, he had present to his mind only the case of Protection to manufactures already established; and not, at least with sufficient distinctness, the case put by Mill in the well-known passage to which Prof. Cairnes considers his own remarks to be a reply.§ A distinction must, I think, be taken here

* Some Leading Principles of Political Economy &c. pp. 483-4

† Ibid p. 487.

§ Ibid p. 484. n. Prof. Cairnes in this note quotes, as supporting his view, a remark of Mr. Wells to the effect, that no representative of any protected industry has ever proposed or even without grumbling submitted to a reduction of the protective Tariff. This may be very true. But it does not follow, that this was done because the Protection *could* not be dispensed with. There is another, and, I humbly think, a more correct, mode of

between the case of an industry to be newly established, and the case of an already established industry to be maintained. In the former case, there is no doubt scope and opportunity for that "skill, ingenuity, and economy" in the conduct of business, on which Professor Cairnes lays such great and not undeserved stress. But where the industry is still unestablished, where an experiment is to be made to see whether it will take root and grow, in such a case, Mr. Mill's dictum is far more correct than Prof. Cairnes seems to think. From Mr. Mill's express words themselves, it is manifest that the latter was the only case he contemplated. And with regard to the vast majority of manufacturing industries, we are in the very position supposed by Mr. Mill. The cotton industry, it is true, has been established for some time; but unluckily a large portion of the capital embarked in it has confined itself to the comparatively less eligible localities—being centred in Bombay instead of spreading over the cotton districts.

And even with regard to established industries, I think there may be circumstances worthy of consideration as limiting the applicability and force of Professor Cairnes's remarks. I do not think, that

explaining the conduct of these persons—they did not wish their profits to be reduced as they would be by the competition following on the reduction or repeal of the Protective impost.

there need be any demoralizing effect upon the industrial classes, where the protection is avowedly given in order to allow an industry the opportunity of taking root, and where it is clearly understood, in accordance with Mill's limitation, that the protection is to be temporary only. Protection in such a case, and with such limitations, need not necessarily be demoralizing at all. The example which Professor Cairnes adduces does not appear to me to be conclusive upon the point. And I suspect that Protectionism in France, to which Professor Cairnes alludes, was based rather upon the "Theory of the Balance of Trade", as Professor Cairnes calls it,§ on the idea that the precious metals were the only wealth. The ground upon which Mr. Mill bases his dictum‡ and the ground,

§ Some Principles &c. pp. 451, 452, 454.

‡ Prof. Cairnes (Some Principles &c. p. 484) thinks that "Protection invariably begets a need for protection." We have endeavoured to point out how this does not follow from the circumstance from which Prof. Cairnes seeks to deduce it. And *a priori* it seems to me, that the "need for support" cannot arise, where the support given is given under well understood limitations. Besides, if Prof. Cairnes's broad proposition were correct, it might be argued by parity of reason, that the newborn child should not be supported in walking— for does not support beget the need of support? But that is a position which, I apprehend, will not be accepted even by Mr. Herbert Spencer, whose views on these matters go, I believe, further than those of any other thinker. I may be, perhaps, permitted to add also, that if Prof. Cairnes's propositions about Free Trade are to be

I may add, upon which we ask for the benefit of that dictum—is another and very different one. Nor am I prepared to attach much weight to the argument, that under a system of Free Trade there is greater inducement to the artizan to invent new modes of economising labour. Although the argument is not without force, I do think, that in this country, where the principles of the working of machinery are so little understood, where there is so little familiarity with any of the sciences which are practically applied in the working of that machinery, the argument may easily be pressed too far. § Upon the whole, I cannot but think, that the principle of self-interest, on which the Free Trader so much relies, coupled with the certainty that the protection will cease within some short time, and coupled also with internal competition, would, in the circumstances in which we are placed, afford all the necessary stimulus to the exercise of that “skill, ingenuity, and economy, in conducting business” of which Prof. Cairnes speaks. And I do not

understood as universal, as applying to every society in whatever stage of civilization, it is difficult to see a logical halting-place between his doctrine and Mr. Spencer’s doctrine of “specialized administration”, which nevertheless Prof. Cairnes rejects. This point is referred to further on in the text.

§ Compare on this point Prof. Huxley’s remarks. *Lay Sermons* p. 62 *et seq* and Mr. Brassey’s *Work and Wages* p. 122.

feel at all sure that freedom of trade will really give any more.

We next come to another count in the indictment against Protectionism, namely, that in principle it is destructive of all foreign trade. Professor Cairnes says:—"Consistently carried out, Protectionism would put an end, if not to all foreign trade, at least to all such as furnished us with commodities capable of being produced in the protected country; for the essence of the doctrine is to encourage native industry, by excluding the produce of foreign industry, wherever these come into competition with commodities which native industry can produce."† And Mr. Macdonell in his Survey of Political Economy goes a step further, and observes: "Foreign trade and home trade are advantageous on the same ground, and if it be economically hurtful to have free trade between France and England, it is hurtful to have free trade between Edinburgh and Glasgow, or for that matter, to have free trade between one street and another. Diogenes living in a tub, dependent on no man, is the model and only consistent Protectionist."§ Mr. Macdonell's *reductio ad absurdum* is probably capable of answer even on the extreme Protectionist theory.

† Some principles &c. p. 452.

§ 392.

But we shall not dwell on that aspect of the subject. We have but one reply to both Professor Cairnes and Mr. Macdonell on this point. The doctrine of Protectionism, with the limitations with which we accept it, does not lead logically to the destruction of all trade—be it foreign trade, or home trade. Our doctrine only sets itself against perpetuating the results of an accident, where those results are in the long run less beneficial than might be obtained but for the accident. Whatever the benefits of trade, for instance, between England and India, I apprehend that it will not be contended by such writers as Professor Cairnes or Mr. Macdonell, that that trade should, in the interests of the whole world, for ever continue to be exactly on the existing lines—in other words, that India should continue to export the raw material to England and import the manufactured goods from England. If then we ask for Protection only to enable us to alter this state of things, which we say is the result of an accident, which the gifts of Nature to the two countries do *not* sanction, which prevents the world from producing as much in the long run as it would, if the conditions were reversed—if we ask that, then whatever other criticism our demand may be open to, it certainly is not open to this which we are now discussing. Whatever the extreme advocates

of Protectionism may be logically bound to accept as the result of their principles, the qualified protection for which alone I am now contending does not logically lead to what Professor Cairnes very justly calls the "intellectual and moral loss which would result from the withdrawal of the principal motive to the intercourse of mankind."§

Extreme cases, Sir Alexander Cockburn once said, are the tests of principles†. And I have, therefore, not been unwilling to consider even the extreme case to which Mr. Macdonell has pressed the principle of Protection. But now I will in my turn put a case—also admittedly a very extreme one—to test the broad principle of Free Trade. Suppose a small country particularly adapted to the production of one article only, which happens for some time to be in very large demand, but does not itself satisfy any of the primary necessities of mankind. According to the broad principle of Free Trade, that country ought not to waste its labour and capital on any other article of production at all, but ought to be content to receive all it wants from other coun-

§ Some Principles &c. p. 454. I may add, that I am quite prepared to accept the logical conclusion from this doctrine. If Bombay, for instance, has an established manufacture, which is better adapted to the circumstances of Poona, and which in a short time can be established in Poona by means of Protection, I would protect the Poona manufacture against Bombay.

† Compare Mill's Dissertations and Discussions IV. 124.

tries in exchange for the article in question. And yet it seems to me to be quite clear, that it would be extremely bad statesmanship, even if it were good Political Economy, to confine the production in such a case to that article. "The rhythmical tendency which is traceable in all departments of social life, which carries the devotees of fashion from one absurd extreme to the opposite one,"§ might at any time stop the demand for the article; and what then would be the condition of our small country? I have already stated that I put this as an extreme case, and yet we are not altogether free from a danger somewhat similar to that here indicated. During the discussion on the Import Duties on cotton Goods, Messrs W. Nicol and Co. of this city, addressed a letter† to our local Chamber of Commerce, in which, after premising that it is of vital importance "that each and every outlet for our cotton should be kept open," they go on to say as follows:—"This is the more important at a time when the margin between American and Surat Cotton in the home markets has to be considered, for this margin appears likely to increase rather than diminish in proportion as the Southern States recover from the effects of the Civil War. *We know*

§ H. Spencer's *Essays on Education* p. 148.

† See Report of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce 1873-4 p. 36.

that Lancashire operatives have before this refused to work E. I. Cotton ;.....and it is always a subject of serious consideration with most English Mill-owners as to what proportion of Surats their people will work up as compared with Americans. This is gradually becoming the case, too, over the Continent." Considering, that our exports of raw cotton during the ten years from 1866 to 1875 average about £20,000,000, and form over a third in value of all the merchandise exported during the same period,§ the danger indicated in this letter is not so very unlike the danger in our extreme case.

We now come to the last objection which has been urged against the Protectionist system, namely, that it involves the great evils of State interference with trade and industry. We are here brought face to face with a question which has been very powerfully debated only a short time ago, by some of the greatest intellects of this century—I mean the question—what are the legitimate functions of government? I conceive, however, that it is not by any means necessary for me on the present occasion to consider the merits of the whole controversy, to which the question has given rise, between Mr. Herbert Spencer on the one side, and

§ The precise figures may be seen in the recently received Statistical Abstract concerning India No. X. p. 49.

Professors Huxley and Cairnes on the other.‡ For I think that even accepting Mr. Herbert Spencer's view, which carries the limitation of governmental functions to the furthest point, the Protectionist case, as we have stated it, may be sustained. In considering Mr. Spencer's view on this subject, it is particularly necessary to take it in connection with his general philosophy. And one of the pervading principles of that philosophy in its sociological aspect, is that there is a relation always subsisting between a society and its institutions, which harmonizes them, so to say, and which makes the useful institutions of one society not necessarily useful in another. As Professor Cairnes observes, agreeing in this respect with Mr. Spencer: "Further it may be conceded that the qualities of mind which characterize the individuals composing a savage horde or a nomad tribe, must render it impossible that the horde or the tribe should, in its corporate capacity, exhibit the traits characteristic of a civilized nation; just as it would be equally impossible that people who are still in the state of civilization

‡ See Spencer's *Essays* (2nd series) p. 143; *Fortnightly Review* November 1871, and Huxley's *Critiques and Addresses*, p. 8 *et seq*; see also *Preface* p. VI *et seq*; *Fortnightly Review* December 1871. and Spencer's *Essays* (3rd series) p. 127 *et seq*; *Study of Sociology passim*; and *Fortnightly Review*. January and February 1875; and Spencer's *Social Statics* Part III.

presented, let us say, by the inhabitants of British India, should by amount of legislative or political manipulation, be made to yield the social and political results yielded by the more advanced nations of Western Europe.”§ Or to put it in the words employed by Mr. Spencer himself, in that “vigorous piece of argumentative writing”† which constitutes his most recent statement of the view held by him. “It is only when a considerable advance has been made in that metamorphosis which develops the industrial structures at the expense of the predatory structures, and which brings along with it a substantially independent co-ordinating agency for the industrial structures—it is only then that the efficiency of these spontaneous co-operations for all purposes of internal social life, becomes greater than the efficiency of the central governing agency”.§ It seems, therefore, to be plain, that upon Mr. Spencer’s principles, even if we leave the criticisms of Professor Huxley and Professor Cairnes out of consideration, the broad doctrine negating all Government interference in trade &c. cannot be maintained in its application to this country. Upon the general question, I may also add, that in the

§ Fortnightly Review. February 1875 p. 262.

† Huxley’s Critiques &c Preface p. VI.

§ Fortnightly Review December 1871. p. 647. Spencer’s Essays III. 157-8.

very elaborate comparisons between governmental action and individual action which we find in sundry passages of Mr. Spencer's writings, he does not appear to have attached due weight to the circumstance which is thus referred to by Professor Huxley with his usual felicity. "The state," says he,‡ "lives in a glass house; we see what it tries to do, and all its failures, partial or total, are made the most of. But private enterprize is sheltered under good opaque bricks and mortar. The public rarely knows what it tries to do, and only hears of failures when they are gross and patent to all the world."

But further. It seems to me to be pretty obvious from the whole history of our country for the last few years, that if Mr. Spencer's doctrine, in all its breadth were to be applied—or rather misapplied—to this country, we should not only fail to have the results of which Mr. Spencer speaks; we should not only fail to do the things done by Government better than Government does them; we should go without the things altogether. After pointing out that in England, all the knowledge from that possessed by the poor to that of those "who carry on the business of the country as ministers and legislators," has been "derived from extra-govern-

‡ Critiques and Addresses p. 9. Fortnightly Review, November 1871 p. 529.

mental agencies, egoistic or altruistic ;” Mr. Spencer proceeds to say : “Yet now, strangely enough, the cultured intelligence of the country has taken to spurning its parents ; and that to which it owes both its existence and the consciousness of its own value is pooh-pooed as though it had done, and could do, nothing of importance.”* Well, need it be said, that this is altogether inapplicable to the circumstances of this country ? Need we say, that the history of India during the past few years shows a state of things exactly the reverse of this ? Our canals, and our railways ; our model farms, and experiments for improving cotton seeds ; our Contagious Diseases Act, our Vaccination Act, and our Cotton Frauds Act ; our Post Office and our regulations for buggy fares ; our Archæological surveys, and our Universities, and Colleges, and Schools in all their various grades ; all show the workings of Governmental agency, not only not mischievous, in the majority of cases, but even positively beneficent. Where should we have been, if thrown upon the resources of those “spontaneously developed agencies,” whose praises Mr. Spencer is never tired of singing ? Those praises are doubtless fully merited ; but only when understood

* Fortnightly Review December 1871, p. 651. Spencer's Essays III 163-4

with the necessary limitations as regards the conditions of the social environment—limitations, which, as already pointed out, Mr. Spencer himself will probably not repudiate. In the report of the proceedings of the second International Congress of Orientalists, of which a copy is now lying before me, I find Professor Eggeling reported to have spoken as follows:—"By appointing General Cunningham and Mr. Burgess archæological surveyors, the Government of India had rendered a very great service to archæological students." And in the discussion which followed on Professor Eggeling's paper, Mr. L. Bowring, Dr. Caldwell, Mr. Burgess, and even Sir Walter Elliot—the individual of all others who has done most to help archæological students—all expressed their opinion as to the "utter insufficiency of individual action"* with regard to the preservation and collection of old inscriptions. Similar instances could be easily multiplied, if it were necessary—which, I apprehend, it is not—to labour the point any further. It seems to me, upon the whole, that Mr. Spencer's doctrine is not applicable in the circumstances of our country; and having regard to the considerations already suggested, I would add, that Mr. Spencer

* p. 38. (Trübner 1876).

himself would probably agree in this view.§

But apart from the objection based upon Mr. Spencer's doctrine of specialized administration, there are other considerations urged against Government interference with trade which now require to be discussed. The general question of the limits of the province of Government has, as is well known, been handled with his usual fulness by Mr. Mill in his *Political Economy*. And to me, I own, some of the fundamental propositions laid down by him appear to support the view which I have ventured to adopt rather than the reverse. At the very outset, for instance, Mill says, that the question of the true sphere of Government agency "does not admit of any universal solution;"† and further on, he qualifies the general proposition, that "the great majority of things are worse done by the intervention of Government, than the individual most interested in the matter would do them," by the significant addition—"in all the more advanced communities."‡ Now this is the main point in our contention. We say that the example of England is not conclusive in India—that the policy of

§ The subject has been again discussed in the *Westminster Review* for April 1877.

† *Political Economy*. (Popular Edition) p. 568 a

‡ *Ibid* p. 571 b.

Laissez faire may prove to be as mischievous here as it has proved fruitful of good in England. The question must be answered with reference to the facts of our social, political, and economical condition. How again does Mr. Mill treat the question of Government interference in education?* In principle, his arguments in favour of it appear to me to cover the case before us. I do not wish to go through all those arguments. Assuming that the existence of manufactures in a country is desirable—a point to which we shall presently address ourselves—the case of education and of Protection for manufactures would seem to stand on much the same footing. And we may say, adapting Mr. Mill's language, that "when unless introduced by Government help, manufactures would not be introduced at all, such help has the opposite tendency to that which in so many other cases makes it objectionable; it is help towards doing without help."† Look again at the principle on which the State protects those of immature judgment. A nation may be of immature judgment, just the same as an individual.‡ And with an entirely different civili-

* Ibid' p. 576 *et seq*; and compare Dissertations and Discussions IV. 12-13.

† Political Economy p. 576 b.. It is unnecessary to give detailed references. I will now content myself with referring generally to Book V. Chapter XI.

‡ In the article to which reference has been already made, I

zation from our own such as we now stand face to face with; with entirely different modes of work; with the need for kinds of knowledge rarely, if ever, cultivated amongst us; our nation is, to all intents and purposes, of immature judgment in the matters we are considering. Without State protection, without State guidance and aid, we should know but little of the resources of our country; knowing those resources we should have no knowledge of the modes of developing them; or having a knowledge both of the resources and of their modes of development, we should still be at a loss for the means of developing them, without Government encouragement. Once again, Mr. Mill's observations on the "hours of factory labour," and still more, his remarks on Mr. Wakefield's system of colonization, rest on principles which, I venture to think, are not without application in the question before us. And, therefore, considering all these matters, we are safe in concluding, that on the general principles on which State interference is justifiable, there is nothing to object to in the State en-

find corroboration for this view, in the following words of the Westminster Reviewer, who appears to be an adherent of Mr. H. Spencer's doctrine. "There is", he says, "an early stage of existence in which nations like infants or children cannot be set free from authority; they cannot judge wisely enough or act with sufficient self-control to avoid fatal or irretrievable mistakes." Westminster Review for April 1877. p. 325.

couraging the rise of manufactures in this country.

But before leaving this topic, it is desirable to consider an objection urged by Mr. Rogers to the intervention of Government in such a case. "Who," he asks, "shall decide whether a particular industry should be developed in a country by protective regulations? Who shall determine the period at which the protection shall cease? Is it not manifest that the selection of favoured industries (of course I except those which may be conceived as absolutely necessary to the well-being of the country) and the prolongation of the term of protection will be matter of perpetual intrigue.....?"§ I am quite free to admit that there is much force in these questions, considered in the abstract. But they are pointless, I submit, when viewed in the light of our present condition. Where a Government is asked to interfere, and does at times interfere, between debtor and creditor, where it decides what sort of education shall be given to its subjects; where it determines what roads shall be made, and what lines of railway laid down; where, I say, Government does all these and a legion of other things, surely it may also de-

§ Political Economy p. 233. I own that the parenthetical clause appears to me a rather dangerous one to Mr. Rogers's argument. For, whose "conception" of the "absolute necessity" is to prevail? That of the governing powers, I take it; and then you have full scope for "intrigue."

termine what industry shall be protected, and how long the Protection shall last. "Government management," says Mill, "is proverbially jobbing."§ And I am not prepared to say that our Indian Government is more immaculate in this respect than the ordinary run of Governments. But there need not necessarily be more scope for jobbing in this affair of Protection to manufactures than in the thousand and one other matters with which Government deals. And as in these latter, the possibility of jobs is not held to be an effective argument against Government interference, no more, by parity of reason, should it be such an argument in the case we are considering. The position, therefore, which we have already taken up is not rendered less tenable by the apparently formidable attack of Mr. Rogers upon it.

We have now finished the first and most important section of the present discussion. It appears to me that the facts and arguments to which attention has been drawn already are amply sufficient to justify the proposition that in a country circumstanced as ours is, Protection is not the mischievous agency which it may be in other countries; that where there is reason to believe that an industry is naturally not unadapted to the

§ Political Economy p. 580 a.

circumstances of a country, but fails to flourish there in consequence of accidents the effect of which a Protectionist policy may remove, there a Protectionist policy may not only be harmless, but in the long run positively beneficial. In his Budget Speech in 1864, Mr. Gladstone said: "Well, according to the old proverb, "give a dog a bad name, and hang him," it is, I confess, somewhat satisfactory to find that, at this time of day, we have nothing to do but to attach to any doctrine the name of protection, in order to demonstrate to any reasonable man that we have fastened upon it the worst and most conclusive condemnatory charge to which any plan can possibly be open; so much so indeed, that no man will have the courage to defend a legislative proposal under such a stigma."§ I need not say that I cannot share in Mr. Gladstone's satisfaction at this state of things. And I trust, that the observations already made have shown that if I have had the "courage" to defend a "proposal under such a stigma," such "courage" is not altogether synonymous with rashness. Mr. Gladstone may be, and—if I may say so without presumption—I think, is right, if his observation is confined to England. But in applying it to this country, we must recollect what another great

§ See Gladstone's Financial Statements p. 501.

authority of our own day has said on this subject. "I venture," Professor T. E. Cliffe Leslie has said, ‡ "to maintain, to the contrary, that Political Economy is not a body of natural laws in the true sense, or of universal and immutable truths, but an assemblage of speculations and doctrines which are the result of a particular history, coloured even by the history and character of its chief writers; that, so far from being of no country, and unchangeable from age to age, it has varied much in different ages and countries and even with different expositors in the same age and country." If then even the theoretical doctrines of Political Economy are not necessarily true of all countries alike, *a fortiori*, would the practical precepts based upon those doctrines be inapplicable to all countries alike. This truth which, I may add, has also been recognised by Mill, § appears to me to have been ignored and kept out of sight in the controversy regarding Protectionism in India. It has been said, for instance, and said by very high authorities, that the British Parliament which has signed the death-

‡ Fortnightly Review November 1870 p. 549.

§ Dissertations and Discussions IV. 88. I find that Mr. Mill had in Parliament also given a similar answer to Mr. Lowe to that which Professor Leslie has given in the Fortnightly Review. See the Indian Economist for October 1871 p. 57, where the answer is extracted.

warrant of Protection in England could not permit it to exist in its great Dependency. It is obvious, that there is an assumption underlying this argument, which is quite inconsistent with the opinions of Mill and Leslie stated above. That the British Parliament will probably *consider* the argument conclusive, may, I think, be admitted, having regard to the signs of the times, and to the fact that such a statesman as Mr. Robert Lowe holds a notion about Political Economy the reverse of that of Mill and Professor Leslie. But it does not follow that the British Parliament is *logically* bound to accept the argument. There is nothing illogical in its holding Free Trade to be good for England, and not yet good for India. It is a principle of the British Constitution that the people shall not be taxed except by the vote of their representatives in the House of Commons. Of that fundamental principle, we are not allowed the benefit, although we have frequently asked for it, and although the benefit is indisputable. Why should we have another principle of the British Constitution—certainly not so fundamental as this—extended to us, when we ask that it should *not* be extended to us, and when the benefits to be derived therefrom are, to say the least of it, problematical? The logical inconsistency does not seem to me to be greater in

the one case than in the other; and for this very good reason—in neither case is there a logical inconsistency at all.

And now let us turn to the other branch of our subject. Having, as I trust, shown that none of the stock objections to Protectionism are of any force in the circumstances of our country, I shall proceed to set down some of the positive arguments, which, I think, may be urged in favour of a system of Protectionism in India. Now everybody who has paid any attention to this subject is aware of the one universal wail for departed industries which may be heard in various parts of this country. § It is well known that several articles, which in days gone by were exported from India for the use of the rest of the world, are not now produced in India at all, having been supplanted by the products of machinery turned out in Europe and elsewhere. We have, therefore, the melancholy spectacle of old manufacturing industries either dying out or already dead, and no new ones taking their place. Now this being so, the experience of the past few years has, I think, shown, that no advantage in the way of the opening of new industries can be gained, unless

§ Compare the various articles on that subject in Mookerjee's Magazine.

some guidance and aid are forthcoming for the instruction and support of our capitalists. If then we are to follow what may be called the *Laissez faire* policy in this matter; if we are to act on the theory that trade and industry must be left alone to work out their own progress and evolution; if we are to hold all Government help towards such progress to be unjustifiable in principle, and mischievous in practice; then reasoning from our experience of the past, the conclusion as regards our future prospects seems to me to be obvious. Our general want of enterprise, our ignorance of the resources of our own country, our ignorance of the modes by which those resources are to be developed—all these will reduce us to the condition of a nation of pure agriculturists, with no manufactures worth the name to afford “scope,” as Professor Cairnes has it, “for wider and more diversified cultivation, such as is furnished by an industry branching in numerous directions and offering to enterprise a varied field.”‡ Is this a desirable state of things? Is it a state of things which we can contemplate calmly and without alarm? Surely, in the presence of the dreadful Famine now striding the narrow world of our Presidency, there cannot be two answers to these questions. Surely,

‡ Some principles &c. p. 475 *et. seq.*

when we see how the scantiness of rain in but one season has resulted in the distress of thousands, nay—in spite of official denials, I will add, for I have the most trustworthy private information on the point—has already resulted in several deaths;§ surely, when we see this, we cannot stand stoically serene before a theory, which will turn us over, bound hand and foot, so to say, to the tender mercies of the seasons. And since we have considered the objection to Protectionism based on the ground that it demoralizes industry, let me ask, is there no source of demoralization in the state of things we are now witnessing? Is there nothing demoralizing in thousands of people living on the charity either of private individuals or of the State? Is there no danger here of charitable support “begetting the need for support”? On the other hand, should any heartless theorist succeed in convincing people of this demoralizing tendency of charity, and thus dry up that refreshing fountain, will there be nothing demoralizing in that condition of things.

§ I wish to guard here against a possible misunderstanding. I think that, *upon the whole*, our Government did bravely and well in the matter of the famine. At the same time I also believe that it fell into some very grave mistakes as regards the supposed conspiracies of workmen, the “one-pound ration,” and so forth.

where man sees his brother man in distress, nay on the brink of eternity—but enslaved by a theory, will not, though he can, hold out a helping hand? See then the position in which we stand. Abandoning Protectionism, because it is demoralizing, and falling back, then, as in our circumstances we must, on agriculture, we get periodical famines. Then if we let the stream of charity flow, it is demoralizing. If we do not let it flow, it is demoralizing all the same.

“What boots it at one gate to make defence,
And at another to let in the foe?”

But legitimate as, in my opinion, this argument is, we are not left to rely upon it alone. Even if we had not, as most unfortunately we have, to count on the periodical recurrence of famines,§ it would still be true, that for our nation to be purely agricultural is not a desirable state of things. Among writers who have discussed the theory of this subject, Mr. Mill, in a well-known passage of his work on Political Economy, has said: “They”—meaning the American Protectionists—“believe that a nation all engaged in the same or nearly the same pursuit—a nation all agricultural—cannot attain a high state of civilization and culture. And for

§ Compare Journal Royal Asiatic Society XVIII, p. 422.

this there is a great foundation of reason.”* Professor Cairnes,§ too, in the sequel of the passage which I have quoted in the last paragraph, about offering a varied field to enterprise, observes: “I cannot deny that there is a certain basis of truth in the considerations just stated; and that circumstances may even be imagined in which they would possess real cogency.” The same testimony can be obtained from the mouths of practical men, and it is particularly valuable, being given with special reference to this country. In the course of the discussion at our Chamber of Commerce on the Import Duties on Cotton Goods, Mr. Kittredge said: “Agricultural countries are proverbially poor countries, and India is no exception to the rule. While she has to depend, as has been the case until very lately, wholly upon agriculture, she will remain poor.”‡ And to the same effect are the opinions of Mr. R. H. Elliott and Lieutenant Colonel Tyrrell.§ We shall presently see some of the economical grounds on which these opinions rest. But in passing I wish to draw attention here to the higher

* Political Economy. p. 558 a.

§ p. 476. See also Syme's Industrial Science, p. 185 and the memorial of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce quoted by Mr. Syme in that book at p. 77.

‡ Report of the Chamber of Commerce 1874-5, p. 98.

§ See East India Association Journal Vol. VIII, p. 126. Vol. IX, p. 49-50. See also Fortnightly Review April 1873, p. 462.

ground to which both Mill and Cairnes allude—namely, that a purely agricultural people cannot be a highly civilized people. It was with reference to this ground mainly, that at the beginning of this essay, I thought it desirable to point out the necessary limitations with which economical generalizations must be received, when they come to be applied to practice. That ground will be admitted to be a very strong one—yet Political Economy proper, I apprehend, does not take it into calculation. But further. It is now a very well recognised truth, that to raise produce by agriculture in any country is to take so much out of its soil, and that unless something is given back to the land in return for what is thus abstracted from it, the process of agriculture cannot be everlastingly fruitful. Some of you will probably recollect the comparison made by Professor Huxley* between what he calls the “matter of life” and the “magical wild ass’ skin” of one of Balzac’s stories. Well, land may be compared to this. “matter of life,” in as much as every use made of both implies “expenditure which cannot go on for ever,” though both have the “capacity of being repaired.” Now it is pretty well known, that in our country, this “capacity of being repaired” is not much

* Lay Sermons &c., p. 175.

exercised. That is not merely the result of my own inquiries, but in the general Administration Report for 1874-75, the Government of Bombay have thus acknowledged the fact:† “Land is overcropped, and too little nourishment returned to the soil; and though this deteriorating influence has been in operation for centuries, yet high prices through a series of years have stimulated the desire to secure large crops without sufficiently altering the custom in respect to the preparation of manure.” Now, it is obvious, that the mischief resulting from this exhaustion of soils is greater where the produce of agriculture is, to a great extent, exported, and only a comparatively small quantity used in the country itself.‡ And according even to Mr. J. E. T. Rogers, “a Government may with propriety check the too rapid exhaustion of a limited quantity of any commodity, when that commodity is not only valuable, but is a condition to the economical prosperity of a country.”§ The conclusion from these premises need not be stated.

Again, it is not an unfamiliar fact, that for at

† p. 115.

‡ Compare on this point, Mill's Political Economy pp. 557*et seq.*

§ Political Economy, p. 223. This admission by the way, affords a loophole for the entrance of much of that intrigue and of those means for demoralizing Governments against which Mr. Rogers strongly protests. See too P. 45 *supra*.

least three months of the year, the agricultural population of the Mofussil of this Presidency is to a great extent unemployed. Such of the people as can do so, endeavour to engage in some other work, either, as I am told, doing business as drivers of hack bullock carts or in some other way in the districts, or, as pointed out by Dr. Hewlett in his Census Report, coming down to Bombay for such employment as they can get. Dr. Hewlett§ says, that there is a large influx of such men into Bombay from the villages in the Deccan, from Kutch, Kathiawar, Colaba, Ratnagiri, Malvan, Goa, and down the coast—which is a pretty large area. It is easy, therefore, to see, that remaining a merely agricultural people, we should be economically not so well-off as our capacities would fairly entitle one to expect. A not inconsiderable portion of the time of the ryot population will be spent in doing no work—or to use the language of Political Economy, a large number of the ryots will, for at least two or three months of the year, be altogether unproductive labourers. Besides, as pointed out by Mr. Syme in the article which we have already frequently referred to, “the whole population of a country can never be

§ See Dr. Hewlett's Census Report for 1872 p. 10. And compare Poona Sarvajanic Sabha's Report for E. I. F. Committee p. 27.

fully employed, unless there be a diversity of occupations suitable to the young, the old, the weak and infirm of both sexes.”* And even in our present condition, with so few manufactures worth the name, a portion of the rural population, as stated in the Report of the Deccan Riots Commissioners, is also employed in trades and occupations other than agriculture.† It is, therefore, quite plain, that even from the purely economical point of view, even confining our attention to the means of increasing the aggregate production of the country, it is not desirable to permit our industry to be confined to agriculture.

There is another point not unworthy of note. So long as our system of Land Revenue Settlement continues to be what it is; so long as there exists a danger of a share of the profits derived from improvements on the soil being pounced upon on behalf of the State;‡ there is not, I think, much

* Fortnightly Review. April 1870. p. 461. And compare also Carey's Social Science Vol III p. 28.

† See p. 14 of the Report.

‡ It is true that this is expressly prohibited by an Act of the Legislature. But we know how a coach and six may be driven through such Acts in administering them. And I am assured by one who has very carefully and exhaustively investigated this subject, that in practice the Act is so far almost a dead letter. Even a supposed danger of this, however, is enough for our argument.

chance of large capitals being employed in agricultural improvements. I do not wish now to enter into any controversy regarding the policy of a Permanent Settlement of the Land Revenue, either on the model of the Bengal Settlement or any other.† But this I will say, that while we hear of the vagaries of the Survey and Settlement Department with such frequency as we do, it is impossible to fold our hands in content, and rest under the self-complacent belief that we are living under the best Land Revenue System that can be adopted. If this is so, it seems to me quite impossible to contend, that it will be an economical benefit to the country to devote its labour to the extension and improvement of agriculture alone. Labour will not be so devoted; and much capital will remain absolutely without employment.

Once again. Let us look at the matter from another point of view. Mr. Wakefield's theory of colonization, which, according to Mill, "has excited much attention and is destined to excite much more,‡ is based upon the truth that "a country will seldom have a productive agriculture,

† The authorities against the Bengal settlement are collected in a note in the extremely elaborate judgment of the Chief Justice of Bombay and Mr. Justice West in the famous Kanara Land Case p. 26.

‡ Political Economy. p. 75a.

unless it has a large town population, or the only available substitute, a large export trade in agricultural produce to supply a population elsewhere.”* Now considering that our Railway system may be said to be almost in its infancy; considering that the conveyance charges are still rather high; and that raw produce, as a rule, can ill-bear these additional charges; the “substitute,” which Mr. Mill speaks of in the passage now quoted, must be regarded as particularly inadequate in this country. And it is quite clear, that if we could secure in India “a larger manufacturing population”—a contingency which Mr. Mill himself hints at†—the results would be vastly more beneficial to the country. It is unnecessary to specify the modes of working of Mr. Wakefield’s plan of colonization. Its merits are pretty well understood. But the application of the truth underlying that plan to the circumstances of our country shows the desirability, even from an economical point of view, of introducing manufactures into it. In the sequel of the passage from which we have already quoted, Mr. Mill himself points out some of the conclusions to which the application of that principle leads. The passage is one, which has not attracted any attention in connexion with the

* Ibid p. 74 b.

† Ibid p. 75 b.

present controversy—at any rate, I do not recollect any reference having been made to it. I shall, therefore, make no apology for excerpting rather liberally from it. Mr. Mill opens with the observation, that “it is, above all, the deficiency of town population which limits the productiveness of the industry of a country like India.” And after pointing out that the agriculture is “conducted entirely on the system of small holdings,” but that nevertheless there is a “considerable amount of combination of labour,” and at times Government help also, he goes on to say: “The implements and processes of agriculture are however so wretched, that the produce of the soil, in spite of great natural fertility and a climate highly favourable to vegetation, is miserably small, and the land might be made to yield food in abundance for many more than the present number of inhabitants, without departing from the system of small holdings. But to this the stimulus is wanting which a large town population *connected with the rural districts by easy and unexpensive means of communication*, would afford.” So far, it appears to me, that the argument points to the establishment of various manufacturing centres, so to say, in our rural districts. But Mr. Mill proceeds to say, that “the town population does not grow, because the

few wants and unaspiring spirit of the cultivators prevent them from attempting to become consumers of town produce." And he, therefore looks to the extension of our exports of agricultural produce for the development of our resources. This is, no doubt, in some measure, correct. But on the other hand, there is now *some* demand for town produce even in the rural districts. The establishment of manufactures to supply the wants at present satisfied by the imports from Europe and elsewhere will afford the stimulus which Mr. Mill speaks of, more effectively and more extensively, than the mere extension of our export trade.* And the "more extended wants and desires" which will result from this, will lead to a demand for other commodities for which again other factories may be established. And so the various actions and reactions in the industrial organism may lead to experiments guided by correct information, till we shall have seen for what particular manufactures our country has special capacities. Such manufactures as may be found, by experiments or by anticipation from known facts, to be not adapted to the circumstances of the country may with advantage be abandoned. Such as may appear to be suitable, ought to be fostered

* Compare also on this point the remarks of Mill, *Political Economy* p. 74 b.

by temporary Protection, sacrificing a little present good for greater good in the future. And then, but not till then, will our industrial organization assume its normal state—assume that state for which, if I may say so, Nature has designed it.

In such a case as ours, Protectionism falls within the principle of the one exception recognised by Adam Smith to the general doctrine of Freedom of Trade. That exception occurs, it is well known, when, as Adam Smith himself expresses it, “some particular sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the country.”† True it is, that the particular case, which Dr. Smith had in his mind in stating this exception, was the case of the military defence of a country; and he applied the exception in favour of the English Navigation Laws. But the military defence of a country is not an end in and for itself—it is valuable only as a means to the end, which is the safety and progress and civilization of the country. And therefore, if upon consideration we should find anything to be necessary for the true progress and improvement of a country, that ought as much to come under Adam Smith’s exception as the maintenance of a powerful and extensive fleet. In strict logic, there appears to me

† *Wealth of Nations* Book IV. Chapter II. Dugald Stewart in his criticism on this seems not to question the theoretical correctness of the exception but its practical efficacy.

to be but little difference between the two cases. Now we have shown, that manufactures are necessary to enable us to make any great progress in the arts of modern civilization. We have shown that without manufactures our industrial condition must be regarded as abnormal. We have shown that, with agriculture alone, even our economical condition must needs be less prosperous and satisfactory than it is in our power to make it. It, therefore, follows, that Protection to manufactures in India stands on at least as sound a footing in theory as the Navigation Laws did in England.

But then, says Mr. Macdonell in his Survey of Political Economy, "every country possesses a natural protection for its manufactures in the cost of freight, and the natural preference of countrymen, it may be friends, to foreigners; home industries have patents, so to speak; and if this natural protection does not suffice to create manufactures, it may be assumed that they are not wanted."* I venture to think that this is not by any means a satisfactory argument. This "natural protection," this "patent," is undoubtedly a real force; but it is not the only force to be estimated. You have to take into account, *per contra*, all the circumstances noted before—want of enterprise,

* p. 391; see also Roger's Political Economy p- 232.

ignorance, and to borrow the words of Mill, "the present superiority" of the rival "in acquired skill and experience" due to his "having begun sooner."* These are not trifles, even taken singly; taken all together, they constitute a very heavy dead-weight indeed. But further, the argument that since the "natural protection" does not create the manufacture, *ergo* such manufacture is not wanted, appears to me a *non sequitur*. It is difficult to see how the conclusion follows from the premises. A far truer view of the matter, as it appears to me, is contained in the closing sentences of the Chapter from which I have quoted. Speaking of the English Economists, Mr. Macdonell there says: "They simply tell us that Protectionism is expensive to a nation. That is but part of the question. It still remains to be determined whether Protectionism may not occasionally be of service in apprenticing a nation, so to speak, to some industry, at first uncongenial, but subsequently proving suitable to it; whether it is always safe to trust to foreigners for a supply of commodities that may be of vital consequence in war; whether a mixture of city-life the concomitant of manufactures may not be so precious as to counterbalance some present loss; whether the collapse of a large class

* Political Economy, p. 556.

or interest living by a precarious home industry is always outweighed by cheapness, sometimes distributed in imperceptible portions to consumers; and lastly whether the decline in production, due to an adoption of protection, may not sometimes be followed by a better system of distribution? If I may be permitted to give an opinion on these questions, I should say that all European countries, and the United States, have outgrown the necessities of Protectionism.”§ This passage, as I have said, appears to me to be far more correct in principle than the previous one. And the last sentence especially bears out the proposition, which I have already contended for with the help of Mr. Mill and Professor Cliffe Leslie, that a good, economical rule in one country is not necessarily a good rule all the world over.

It thus appears, that the consequences of India entirely ceasing to have any manufactures worth the name, are not particularly pleasant to contemplate. It follows, therefore, that an attempt should be made to introduce some manufacturing industries into the country; and if they cannot be secured, as they have not been hitherto secured, without Protectionism, to Protectionism we must resort. There is, however, another argument of some value

bearing upon this part of the subject. It was pointed out by Mr. Dickinson, in the course of the discussion on Mr. Elliott's paper on "Our Indian Difficulties," read before the East India Association, that "such things as Madras sheetings and Dacca Muslins were wellknown articles of commerce, and the way in which those industries were destroyed was by a most cruel system of protective duties in the English manufacturer's interest. By means of duties at the ports, and duties in transit, the native manufactures were utterly crushed out."† And Mr. Montgomery Martin has written more specifically upon this topic to the same effect§ "For many years," he says, "great commercial injustice was done by England to British India. High, indeed prohibitory, duties were laid on its sugar, rum, coffee &c. to favour similar products grown in the West Indies; still worse, we compelled the Hindus to receive cotton and other manufactures from England at nearly nominal duties (two and a half per cent), while, at the very same time, fifty per cent were demanded here on any attempt to introduce the cotton goods of India. The same principle was adopted in silk and other

† East India Association Journal VIII. 138.

§ The History of British India. p. 543 n. Compare also what Mr. R. Knight says at. Journal E. I. Association II P. 255.

articles ; the result was the destruction of the finer class of cotton, silk, and other manufactures, without adopting the plan of Strafford in Ireland during the reign of Charles I—namely, the founding of the linen trade as a substitute for that of woollen, which was extinguished in order to appease the English handloom weavers.” Mr. Martin then sets out the Resolutions which he succeeded in getting the Court of Proprietors of the East India Company to adopt, and says finally that “the late Sir R. Peel admitted the injustice, and adopted measures for its redress.” We see, therefore, that the agency employed to destroy our indigenous manufactures was this very Protectionism. And when we ask that the same instrument which was used as a sword against us should now be used as a shield for us, we are met with the reply—Oh, it belongs to an antiquated arsenal, the English Government has long thrown it aside, and it cannot be used now. I deny, that in extending Protection to any native manufactures, the British Government would be doing any injustice to the manufactures of England. But even if, Mr. Raynsford Jackson were right in contending, as he seems to do, that it would be an injustice,§ I venture to submit, that the injustice would only operate by way of compensa-

§ Fortnightly Review. June 1876 p. 896.

tion, as it were, to those to whom injustice had been done before in the interests of the very persons who are now complaining. But further, not only have Indian manufactures been crushed out by Protectionism being worked against them, but English manufactures have been in their infancy fostered by Protection being employed in their favour. We shall state the facts in the words used by Mr. Gladstone in his Financial Statement of 1864. He said: "But what is really the case of the paper-makers? Is not their trial the same, to which, one after another, almost every branch of British industry has been subjected? They grew up under the influence of protection. Protection, in a greater or less degree, unnerved their energies. They adopted, and were content to depend upon, imperfect and wasteful methods of manufacture, and when the legal protection, which had thus beguiled them into security, was by Act of Parliament withdrawn, considerable suffering ensued. That suffering gradually threw them back upon the exercise of their own invention and skill. The restorative process next commenced; and after a short interval, every one of those branches of industry, I believe with scarcely more than a single exception, has become more healthy, more vigorous, and more profitable than be-

fore.”‡ We thus find, that “almost every branch of British industry” actually grew up under the influence of Protection. And under these circumstances, it seems to me to be pretty obvious, that the demand for a free fight and no favour, which Mr. Raynsford Jackson makes on behalf of Lancashire, is not in reality so reasonable as it seems. On the terms which Mr. Jackson proposes, the combatants must be very unequally matched.

There is one other point on this branch of the subject, which I shall dwell upon—but only briefly, as it relates at present only to the cotton manufacture. It has been a subject of frequent remark, that adulteration of cotton goods is extensively carried on in England. Messrs. W. Nicol and Co., in their letter to our Chamber of Commerce already referred to, state that “adulteration of cloth has become a science now-a-days in England;” and their statement is amply corroborated.§ What now is the mode in which this so-called Free

‡ Gladstone’s Financial Statements p. 482. It will be observed that the “suffering” of which Mr. Gladstone speaks need not be undergone at all, if the Protection is avowedly given, in accordance with the limitation laid down by Mill, for a short period only, so as merely to give the industry an opportunity of taking root.

§ Report of the Chamber of Commerce 1873-74 p. 37 *et seq.*, and Syme’s Industrial Science p. 80 *et seq.*

Trade policy will work? The duties being repealed, the local mill-owners lose so much out of their profits. The result will probably be, that some at least of the capital engaged in the local industry will be withdrawn from it. The Manchester manufacturer then has nearly the whole field to himself. The adulteration may increase; and yet the poor consumer, in whose interests, forsooth, the duties were repealed, must buy those adulterated goods. Any attempt to set up a rival can, of course, be easily put down by those already engaged in the trade.‡ See, then, the result. The local consumer is entirely at the mercy of the foreign producer. Either he must go without cloth—an alternative which need not be considered—or he must take adulterated cloth. In such a case, it is evident, Free Trade becomes synonymous with restriction in favour of Manchester. Competition means the monopoly of the parties in possession.§

The net result of all our investigation appears to me to be this. The objections ordinarily urged against a system of Protection to native industry, whatever their applicability in countries more

‡ *Fortnightly Review*, April 1873, p. 453 *et seq.*

§ This is exactly paralleled by what Mill says about children "Freedom of contract, in the case of children, is but another word for freedom of coercion," (p. 577 *Political Economy*.) Compare also Syme's *Industrial Science* pp. 51, 69.

advanced in modern civilization, are void of force in the circumstances of this country. Looking only at the economic aspects of the question, it appears, that not merely is Protection to native manufactures unobjectionable, it is even desirable, in the circumstances of our country. And this position is further strengthened by the conclusions to be derived from a study of the question from a higher point of view, so as to comprehend considerations about the general progress of the country. The arguments by which this position has been here supported, also indicate the limits within which that position is tenable. For they show, that if there are some manufactures to which the country is adapted by reason of its natural possessions and capacities, such manufactures only (saving very exceptional cases) should be protected and helped to come into existence. And they show also, that the Protection should be continued only for such a reasonable period as to afford what may, in the case of each individual industry, be a fair and sufficient period of trial. Within the limits and under the conditions thus specified, the theory of Protectionism, I venture to think, is not wrong, is not inconsistent with the true principles of Political Economy when correctly interpreted and properly applied. "The

system of Protection," Professor Cairnes has said, "naturally grew out of the system of the Balance of Trade. They were not indeed so much distinct systems as different aspects of the same system."‡ This would be an incorrect observation as applied to the doctrine of Protection here advocated. That doctrine is not based at one single point on the theory, that the precious metals are the only wealth, and that the *ultima thule* of all policy is the acquisition of those metals. It rests on other data and on different reasonings.

"The aggregate wealth of a country," Professor Cliffe Leslie observes, "depends, of course, on the degree of development of all its resources; the development of all the capacities for production and commerce of all its localities and all its inhabitants. But to secure the development of all these resources or natural forces, one indispensable condition is perfect liberty in every locality, for every trade, every company, every individual, and every enterprise; to allow every effort, individual or co-operative, to be made, every experiment tried, every improvement attempted. The wealth of countries is in proportion, not to their natural resources, but to the liberty for their use".§ Now I do

‡ Some Principles &c. p. 451.

§ Cobden Club essays (2nd Series) p. 196.

not know, whether the application which I am going to give to this truth is one of which Professor Leslie himself would approve; but it certainly does seem to me, that in cases like ours, the liberty, on which Professor Leslie lays such stress, is not to be attained under the dominion of free and open competition. It is a mockery and a delusion to speak of liberty, when the native endeavouring to develop the resources of his country, can be undersold and commercially ruined by the unlimited competition of the foreigner. You may just as well speak of the prisoner, surrounded by a deep and wide moat which he cannot cross over, as enjoying liberty, because, forsooth, he has no fetters on his person. We must have a more real liberty than unlimited competition can give us. And we must also be artificially nourished and protected, till we are able to stand with our own strength; and then throw the doors open for the bracing air of Free Trade.

“We boast our light,” says Milton in his splendid Speech on the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, “we boast our light; but if we look not wisely on the sun itself, it smites us into darkness..... The light which we have gained was given us, not to be ever staring on, but by it to discover onward things more remote from our knowledge.” The light of Free

Trade, I say similarly, which we have obtained, is not given us "to be ever staring on." We must "look wisely" on it. We must not treat it as showing *all* that is to be learnt regarding national progress. And we must also recollect that what is true of one country is not necessarily true of another country. Professor Leslie says: "The lesson which investigation of facts impresses more and more on one's mind is distrust of economic generalizations; still they are of incalculable utility if we are careful, both as far as possible, to cover under them only the proper particulars, and also to use them as guides to, instead of as concluding, inquiry."† In the spirit of this weighty observation, we have declined to treat the cry against Protection as altogether reasonable; we have declined to use it "as concluding inquiry." But using the principle underlying it as a "guide," we have endeavoured to show, that the actual facts and circumstances which meet us in this country are not "proper particulars" to be "covered under" that principle. We have shown, that in India, Protection will not lead to the evils which it has led to in other countries. We have shown, that here it will not foreclose—as it does elsewhere—any benefits likely to accrue to us but for its operation. Furthermore,

† Fortnightly Review, November 1872, p. 538.

we have shown reasons for holding that it will prove full of positive benefit to us. And therefore, upon the whole, we maintain, that both on the true principles of economic science, and on principles higher than any which economic science has to deal with, the system of Protectionism is one which ought to receive a fair trial in India.

POLITICAL SPEECHES.

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I.

ABOLITION OF THE INDIAN COTTON DUTIES.

[*Speech made before a crowded meeting of the inhabitants of Bombay convened by the Sheriff, Dr. Atmaram Pandurang, and held in the Framji Cowasji Institute on Saturday, 3rd May 1879, to adopt a petition to the House of Commons protesting against the abolition of the Import duties on Cotton, the late Sir Mangaldas Nathubhai C. S. I., in the chair.*]

“Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen,—I beg to move the adoption of the petition which has just now been read by my friend Mr. Pherozechah† and in doing so I trust you will permit me, even at this late hour to make a few—and they shall be only a few—remarks. The case which we wish to present to the House of Commons on this question of the import duties, is so fully stated in the petition itself, that I need not go into the details of it. It cannot, however, be too much insisted on, that that case is not based on protectionist grounds at all. We treat this as a question of finance pure and simple, without reference to any protection of indigenous industry. The House of Commons has already passed a resolution that the import duties in so far as they are pro-

† (Now, the late Sir Pherozechah, M. Mehta) ed.

pective must be repealed. The prayer of our petition, if granted, does not require the House to withdraw from that resolution. We say that in any case the duties have now ceased to be protective and that therefore as a question of finance, they ought to remain part of our system of taxation. Gentlemen, in 1870, Lord Salisbury, who was then Secretary for India, in replying to a deputation of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, clearly declared that he would be no party to a repeal of these duties, if there was to be substituted for them some other mode of taxation. Lord Lytton, too, I believe, made a similar declaration when on the eve of coming out to this country as Governor-General. I venture to say, gentlemen, that the promise thus solemnly given to India indirectly through the replies to Manchester, have not been fairly kept. It is admitted in this petition, that there has been no additional taxation this year. But I think, gentlemen, that that admission must be taken only in a qualified sense. I venture to say, that in truth, there is considerable additional taxation ordered by the Government of India this year. Gentlemen, we all know how the Licence tax was levied last year and for what purpose. Now we have the admission of the Government of

India, that the Famine Insurance Fund for which it was announced that tax was to be "religiously" set apart has "virtually ceased to exist," that is to say, that no such fund has been established out of the proceeds of the tax last year, and no provision is made for establishing it out of the tax this year. That being so, I venture to say, gentlemen, that although in name the tax is not a new one, it is in substance a new tax for this year. The tax levied last year was one for the establishment of the Famine Insurance Fund. The tax levied this year is one for the ordinary current expenses of the State. That is in substance and effect a new tax. To this are to be added the enhanced duty on salt, and the very considerably advanced rates of stamp duty leviable under the new Act. I venture therefore to say, gentlemen, that the admission that there has been no new taxation this year must be taken with many qualifications. And those qualifications are enough to show that the promises held out to us about the conditions necessary for the repeal of the import duties have not been kept.

There is one other point, gentlemen, in connexion with this matter, which, in my view, is of very great importance indeed, as being one of many indications of a new departure in Indian policy-

I allude to the fact brought out by Sir George Campbell in the House of Commons—namely, that on this question, the Viceroy has overruled a majority of his colleagues in Council. Gentlemen, I am afraid we shall not know for a long time yet, if we ever do know, the number of votes for and the number against this repeal. But it has been credibly asserted that the Viceroy had only one of his Councillors on his side, thus standing in a glorious minority of two against a very large number against him. I say, gentlemen, that this is a most important circumstance. In a recent instance the Secretary of State set at naught the opinion of a majority of his Council, and here we have the Viceroy setting at naught an overwhelming majority of *his* Council. This is one, gentlemen, of many signs indicating that we are coming now on bad days—on the days of personal Government, of Government according to the whims and caprices of individual officers, and that the days of Government by Cabinets or Councils is passing away. However exalted the individual officer may be, who sets at naught the opinion of a majority of his colleagues, this condition of affairs, gentlemen, is one which is most unsatisfactory and mischievous. It has been touched on by *Punch* in a recent cartoon—and *Punch* you are

aware is remarkable for the accuracy and felicity of his hits. He represents a retired Indian officer asking a nephew who is in a great hurry where he the nephew is going. The nephew says he is going to the House of Commons for some important debate, whereupon the retired Indian says, "what, is the House of Commons still in existence? I thought you had improved it off the face of the earth long ago." I do not remember the precise words, but that is the effect, and it indicates one of the most remarkable tendencies of Indian administration in these latter days. Gentlemen, I cannot sit down without adding to what has fallen from my friend Mr. Nowroji a word of sympathy with our brethren in Bengal under the rebuke which was administered to them by the Viceroy in consequence of their action with reference to the subject which we are met to discuss this evening. That rebuke, gentlemen, I venture to say—though I am but a humble individual, speaking about the most exalted personage in the Indian Empire—that rebuke was most unmerited, ungenerous, uncharitable, unjust. Gentlemen, we are all pretty familiar with the mastery of English style, that *curiosa felicitas*, which characterises Lord Lytton's speeches and writings. But I make bold to say, gentlemen, that

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that mastery of style, that *curiosa felicitas*, was never turned to worse use, was never more mischievously employed, than when it was made the vehicle of that rebuke to the members of the deputation, consisting of eminent subjects of Her Majesty in Calcutta. Lord Lytton's reply to the deputation is exceptionable not merely for its fallacies and incorrect statements, not merely for its spirit and tone, but also because of its being quite unprecedented among the replies of Her Majesty's representatives to Her Indian subjects throughout almost the whole course of British Rule. In that reply, gentlemen, Lord Lytton said that he was anxious to put an end to a "fruitless and increasingly irritating controversy." Gentlemen, that passage of His Lordship's reply reminds me very strongly of a passage in another of Lord Lytton's performances—in a capacity in which, I at all events can give to his genius the tribute of a much more unalloyed admiration—I mean in his capacity of a Poet. In one of his exquisite Fables in Song, Lord Lytton describes man as a paradoxical creature, and after adducing several instances to bear out the view, he winds up thus—

" Height measures he in depth, seeks peace in strife
And calls all this the poetry of life."

His Lordship, gentlemen, has undoubtedly sought peace in strife both in our North-West where under the guidance of his Chief, Lord Beaconsfield, he has gone in quest of a "scientific frontier," and also in this affair of a domestic administration. For the problematical, "peace" in the future of the stoppage of an irritating controversy, His Lordship has resorted to a wide-spread strife in the present. And probably Lord Lytton has by this time seen, that the cinders of that "controversy" have been blown into a vigorous flame by his own breath. Gentlemen, I shall not detain you longer. I will conclude by moving that the petition now read by my friend Mr. Pherozechah be adopted.

II.

THE ILBERT BILL QUESTION.

[Before a public meeting of the native inhabitants of Bombay, convened by the Sheriff (the late) Mr. R. N. Khote, C. I. E., and held in the Town Hall on Saturday, 28th April 1883, for the purpose of considering the Ilbert Bill for amending the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sir Jamsetji Jeejeebhai, Bart., in the chair.]

"Mr. Chairman and gentlemen,—The resolution which has been entrusted to me runs as follows:—
"That the Committee of the Bombay Branch of the East India Association be also requested to take steps to have the memorial, with the necessary

alterations, forwarded to the Honourable the House of Commons in England." In proposing this resolution, it would be wrong, on more than one ground, if I were to detain you with any lengthy speech of my own at this late hour, and especially after the able speeches which have been addressed to you. But the subject which we are met to consider to-night is one of such great importance that I trust the meeting will bear with me while I make a few remarks on it. I do not propose to travel over the ground occupied so well by the speeches of Mr. Budroodin and Mr. Pherozechah and the speakers who followed them. Nor, for obvious reasons, shall I say anything about the recent doings of our European friends in the Town Hall of Calcutta. These doings were of such a nature that, to borrow the language used on a celebrated occasion by a distinguished man, now no more, the best rebuke we can administer to these gentlemen is to refrain from following so dangerous an example. There was, however, one point, gentlemen, made, I believe, at the Calcutta Town Hall, and certainly made in the public press since, to which I feel bound to refer. It has been asserted that the Bengalis entertain feelings of hatred and hostility to the British nation. Well, gentlemen, having had the honour, as you are aware, of being appointed

to serve on the Education Commission, I had recently to spend a few months in Calcutta. And during the period of my stay there I came into close, intimate, and frequent contact with the leaders of thought and the leaders in public affairs of the Bengali nation. And, having frequently had frank conversations with many of them, having thus seen them in a sort of mental undress, so to speak, I venture to affirm, and to affirm very confidently, that this hatred and hostility is a mere figment of some alarmist brain, and has no existence in reality. I think that, believing this, as I do believe it, to be the truth upon the subject, I am bound, if not by any other obligation, at least by gratitude for the kindness which I received from my Bengali brethren while I was among them, to make this statement to correct misapprehension. I need not, however, dwell any further on this point, and therefore, I shall turn at once to the main subject to which I wish to address myself. As I have said, I do not intend now to go into any of the positive arguments in favour of the Jurisdiction Bill. But I propose to examine the main points made by an eminent man, Sir Fitz-James Stephen, in his letter on the subject. Sir Fitz-James Stephen has held high office in this country, and now occupies a distinguished position on the English Bench. He

is not only a lawyer, but a writer on Jurisprudence and a political philosopher who has thought out the ultimate principles of the political creed which he holds. And, therefore, I need not say that his authority on such a subject as ours is very high, and I should be the first in ordinary circumstances to defer to it, but in this case I must say that if I was an opponent of the Jurisdiction Bill, I should be afraid of Sir Fitz-James Stephen's championship. Many years ago he wrote a work entitled "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" which, I think, may, with substantial accuracy, be characterised as the gospel of force. In that work he set himself in obtrusive antagonism to the doctrines of modern liberalism, by which I do not mean what is called by that name in the jargon of English party politics, but I mean liberalism in the broader and higher sense, as signifying those political principles, which, for us here in India, are embodied in the great Proclamation of 1858. Well, as he holds those opinions, it is plain that even his support, if he supported any measure of Government which involved any of those principles, would be an occasion of embarrassment. But apart from these general considerations, let us see for an instant what Sir Fitz-James Stephen does say. His first proposition, not first in order

in his letter, but first in importance is that the policy of Lord Ripon's Government is shifting the foundations of British power in this country, or, to use his own expression, is inconsistent with the foundations on which British power rests. Now, I deny this entirely. I say that the principles of Lord Ripon's administration, as pointed out in our memorial, are in consonance with the long-established principles of the British Government as laid down by Parliament and the Crown. And I say, further, that those principles are in accord with the lessons to be derived from the study of past history. I remember being struck many years ago, in reading the history of the Romans under the Empire, with a passage in which the author said that one great lesson to be deduced from the history of Rome was that all conquering nations, in order to render their Government in the conquered countries stable and permanent, must divest themselves of their peculiar privileges by sharing them with the conquered peoples. Now, gentlemen, we all know that it is the proud and just boast of Englishmen that they are the Romans of the modern world, and that the British Empire is in modern days what the Roman Empire was in ancient times. If so, are we wrong, are we unreasonable in asking that the lessons of

Roman history, and, as Mr. Merivale points out, the lessons of the history of other ancient Governments also, should be adopted by our British rulers? Is it not quite proper and reasonable for us to ask that the countrymen of Clarkson and Wilberforce, of Gladstone and John Bright—should not only adopt those lessons but improve upon them, and rise superior to the countrymen of Marius and Sylla, the Triumvirs and the Caesars? I venture to say, gentlemen, that if Britons are now content to fail to carry out those lessons, and to fall short of the generosity of the Romans, it will be regarded as not creditable to them by the future historian. And as a loyal subject of the British Government I should be sorry for such a result. We next come to Sir Fitz-James Stephen's second point. He says—Oh! it is all very well to ask for the abolition of these special privileges to Europeans, but every other section of the Indian Community has its own privileges which the law recognises. And he gives as an instance the fact that Hindoos, Mahomedans, &c., have their own special laws of inheritance administered to them. Now, I venture to say that no fair comparison can be made between laws of inheritance and laws of criminal pro-

cedure. The former does not affect any one save the special community to which it is administered. What does it matter to John Jones whether the property of Rama, or Ahmed, or Mancherjee goes on his death to his sons or his daughters, his father or mother or widow? But a law of criminal procedure, as has been already pointed out by other speakers, affects the other communities in a most important respect. It is plain, therefore, that the two cases which Sir Fitz-James Stephen treats as identical, are really distinguishable on essential points. Besides, it must be remembered that no other class privileges are recognised in the criminal law of British India; it is only in the civil law that they are so recognised. But, further, I am surprised at Sir Fitz-James Stephen not alluding in his letter to one point relevant to this branch of the subject to which reference is made in his own volume already referred to. He has there pointed out that the British Government in India is, involuntarily it may be, but still actually, interfering with the personal laws of natives, even in matters connected with their religious beliefs, and is applying, as Sir Fitz-James Stephen puts it, a constant and steady pressure to adapt them to modern civilization—so that the Government, as Sir Fitz-James Stephen himself puts it, is really heading a

revolution. If then the Government is actually interfering with the personal laws of us unenlightened and uncivilized natives, is there any thing wrong in their interfering with those of the enlightened Britons, with whose views and opinions, feelings and wishes they are much more familiar, and in much greater sympathy? Is there anything unfair if we ask that the same measure should be dealt out to both? Sir Fitz-James Stephen next refers to the special tribunals for Europeans maintained in Turkey and other countries. But there the European is protected from foreign courts to be subjected to British courts. Here he is protected from one class of British courts to be subjected to another. The difference is quite manifest between the two cases. Further, Sir Fitz-James Stephen says it is only natural that everyone charged with a criminal offence should wish to be tried by one of his own race and colour. But this leads to a difficulty, namely, that natives may have a similar wish. And how does Sir Fitz-James Stephen meet that? Why, he says that while no native understands English sufficiently to conduct a trial in that language properly, *attempts* are made—mark the expression, *attempts* are made—to get European officers to study the vernaculars of the country. Now, gentlemen, I

think it is not egotistical to say that the first part of the statement is the reverse of the truth. For every one European that can be shown competent to conduct a criminal trial in a vernacular language, we can show at least one hundred natives even more competent to do so in English. And as to the second part, we have not to rely only on our personal experiences. As we say at Law *habemus optimum testem confidentem reum*. Many years ago a book was published by a Bengal Civilian, called "Life in the Mofussil," in which he very candidly admitted that though he passed the examination in Bengali, he knew little or nothing of the language. Here we have a test of the success of the *attempt* to which Sir Fitz-James Stephen refers. I do not think, gentlemen, I need further detain you with Sir Fitz-James Stephen's arguments. His principal points have, I venture to say, been satisfactorily answered. There is, however, one argument to which I should like to refer before sitting down. It is put forward in the *Times of India* by a gentleman who signs himself "Maratha," but whose nationality, from internal evidence, seems to be European and not Maratha. However, on the principle of measures, not men, we shall consider his argument as it deserves to be whether it emanates

from a veritable Maratha or not. He says natives are not fit and competent judges of Europeans, because the native papers are writing about the cases of deaths of natives, at the hands of Europeans as if they were all cases of deliberate murder and the explanation of a ruptured spleen always untrue. He argues that as this view of the native papers has not been disavowed by educated natives, it indicates the state of their feelings towards Europeans, and renders them unfit judges for trying Europeans. Now, I am not one of those who believe that this explanation of the ruptured spleen is always untrue. I have no doubt that in many cases it is true, and that the language of many of our native papers on the subject is exaggerated and without justification. But having admitted that, I do not admit the correctness of "Maratha's" argument. I will not, however, analyse it now, but put another argument on the other side. We all know that many Europeans have spoken of the native communities in a way which means that they consider us all as, on the whole, a people given to perjury. This opinion, publicly expressed by some members of the European community, has not been disavowed by others. And, therefore, according to "Maratha's" logic, the true conclusion to be derived from this

is that Europeans are not fit judges for natives.— This broad conclusion follows according to “Maratha’s” principles. Certainly, in cases where natives are charged with perjury, Europeans would be, on those principles, unfit judges. Because whereas, according to the presumption of English law, the accused would have to be treated as innocent until the contrary was proved, in the mind of the European judge the native prisoner would be guilty until he proved the contrary. Mark, I don’t say this would be a correct result. But I say it follows if “Maratha’s” argument is sound, I use it only as an *argumentum ad hominem*. See then the deadlock. You cannot have European judges, and you cannot have native judges. How then is the administration of justice to be secured? I do not think, gentlemen, that I ought to detain you any longer. We have a very good case; let us take it before the House of commons. It has been taken there already, in fact, by the opponents of the Bill. Let us place our view before the House. By past experience we know that in such matters we can trust to the justice and sense of fairplay of the British House of Commons. Let us leave this matter also to their judgment, in the full confidence that it will be there decided on considerations free from all local passion and local prepossession.”

III.

RETIREMENT OF LORD RIPON.

(Before the public meeting of the native inhabitants of Bombay in honour of Lord Ripon, on his retirement from the Viceroyalty, convened by the Sheriff in the Town Hall, on Saturday the 29th November 1884, the Hon'ble Sir Jamsetji Jeejeebhai Bart., C. S. I., in the chair.)

“I have very great pleasure, indeed, in seconding the resolution which has been proposed by Rao Saheb Mundlik. And when I say that I have very great pleasure in doing so, I am not merely indulging in the conventional cant supposed to be suitable to such occasions. I really feel it to be not only a pleasure, but also an honour, to have the opportunity of taking part in such a proceeding as that we are engaged in this afternoon. Gentlemen, it was only yesterday that I was asked by two of my friends whether I really and seriously intended to join in this movement, and why I was going to do so. I answered, gentlemen, that I had not only joined in the movement, but that I had joined in it with all my heart and soul, and that my answer to the question, why I had done so, would be given this afternoon. Gentlemen, there are two tests, I think, by which we can judge, whether anyone who has been entrusted with the government of men has or has not acquired a title to the gratitude of his subjects. We may form

our judgment either from the views of those over whom he has borne sway, or from a careful analysis and examination of the measures of his administration, and after striking a balance between their merits and defects. Gentlemen, I venture to say that tried by both tests, Lord Ripon's regime will come out triumphant. Whether we look to the popularity which his Lordship has won among the people over whom he has borne sway for the last four years, or whether we consider the various measures of his administration, the conclusion is forced upon all unbiased minds that Lord Ripon's Government has been most successful. As to the first point, we have only got to consider the history of the past fortnight or three weeks which his Lordship has spent in the journey from Simla to Calcutta and notice his popularity, which remains full of vitality and power in spite of the great strain put upon it only a few months ago. The accounts which we are receiving every day point to that with conclusive effect—an effect which cannot for one moment be impeached. Again, gentlemen, there have always been amongst us men who have been branded by our critics, as constituting what may be called a permanent Opposition to her Majesty's Government in this country, however that Government may be

at any time constituted. But strange as it may seem, even these men have now walked over into the ranks of the ministerialists, so to speak, and are joining in the chorus of praise which is reverberating throughout the length and breadth of the land. Gentlemen, that is not a slight success for any ruler of men to have achieved. It is a very great triumph for an alien ruler. But then it may be said that popularity is but an unsatisfactory test to apply in these cases. I agree in that view to a certain extent. But we must here remember two kinds of popularity, which have been distinguished from one another by that eminent judge, the late Sir John Coleridge. There is the popularity which is followed after, and there is the popularity which follows the performance of one's duty—the pursuit of an honest and straightforward course. The popularity which is followed after may not afford good evidence of the worth of a man. But, gentlemen, the popularity of Lord Ripon is of the latter class, and does, therefore, constitute a fair test of the success of his Lordship's rule. But let us apply the second test to which I have alluded above. Let us examine and carefully scan, without any prejudices, some of the measures of Lord Ripon's administration, for it is impossible to go through the whole number

even of the most prominent measures on such an occasion as the present. Taking only those connected more or less closely with fiscal administration, we have, gentlemen, the beginnings made of a policy of real and powerful support to the manufactures of the country. That is a measure fraught with great possibilities. Take again the recent resolution regarding surveys and assessments of land. Gentlemen, after a great deal of complaint and outcry on that subject, we may now consider ourselves as being at least within measurable distance of the time when the ryot may be saved from one of his many vexations—the ryot who has hitherto been the object rather of passive than of moving active sympathy. Look again at reduction of the active salt duty—a measure most satisfactory in the interests of the poorer classes of our population. These measures show that Lord Ripon's policy has been one of affording genuine sympathy and tangible help to the classes of the population who are least able to help themselves, or to make the voice of complaint heard when they are oppressed. It is diametrically opposed to that policy of carrying taxation "along the line of the least resistance," which commanded itself once to some great masters of statecraft. But, gentlemen, there is one point connected with Lord Ripon's fiscal policy,

to which I must here refer, as it is the point on which the strongest attack on Lord Ripon's rule has been made, purely on grounds of reason. I refer to the repeal of the import duties on Manchester goods. Gentlemen, I remember, when that repeal was announced, being told by a friend of mine that I was allowing myself to be blinded by English party prejudices, in making an effort to publicly protest against Lord Ripon's proceedings, as we had done on the occasion of the first partial repeal of the duties by Lord Lytton's Government. I denied then, gentlemen, as I deny now, that there was any party prejudice in the matter at all. For, see how different were the circumstances in the two cases. A little consideration will make it absolutely clear that they differed entirely from each other on most essential points. In the case of Lord Lytton's measure, it was voluntarily undertaken by his Lordship's Government, when a general election was impending in England, and at a time when, in substance, additional taxation had been imposed upon the people. How stood the facts when Lord Ripon's measure was enacted? The repeal was enforced upon Lord Ripon's Government by the action of their predecessors—an action which, it was cynically confessed by those predecessors, was intended to enforce this further

step. It was taken at a time when there were no immediate English interests to please, and when, so far from there being any increase of taxation, there was actually a remission of taxation in the shape of the reduction of the salt duty, which Lord Ripon's predecessors had enhanced in some parts of the country on the plea of securing symmetry and uniformity throughout the empire. Therefore, waiving all other considerations, it seems to me capable of conclusive proof that the measure sanctioned by Lord Ripon was not at all as objectionable as that which we did publicly protest against. I have thus, gentlemen, referred to a few specific measures of Lord Ripon's rule, but they have only been referred to as illustrations. Other measures, if examined, will yield similar results. But I don't propose to dwell on them. I will rather say a word on the general tone and spirit of liberalism, which has been a pervading characteristic of Lord Ripon's rule. Whether we look at the repeal of the Vernacular Press Act or the resolution for making public the aims and scope of Government measures, or the practice of inviting people's opinions on contemplated projects, or whether we look to the great scheme of local self-government, or the manner, for that is most important, in which the late Kristodas Pal—

clarum et venerable nomen—was appointed to the Supreme Legislative Council, we see clearly the liberal policy of Lord Ripon's Government. Gentlemen, many of you will doubtless remember the noble lines in which the successor "of him that uttered nothing base" has embodied the anticipated sentiments of after generations on the reign of Queen Victoria. "And statesmen" the Laureate sings—

" And statesmen at her Council met,
Who knew the seasons when to take
Occasion by the hand and make
The bounds of freedom wider yet,
By shaping some august decree
That left her throne unshaken still
Broad-based upon her people's will
And compass'd by the inviolate sea."

The ideas so beautifully expressed in these lines are literally true of the Government of Her Majesty as represented by the present Viceroy in this country. Yes, gentlemen, Lord Ripon has made the bounds of freedom wider, by shaping divers august decrees, which have not only left Queen Victoria's throne unshaken in this land, but have made it even more broad-based upon the people's will. It is the perception of this tendency of Lord Ripon's policy to extend the bounds of freedom that is gall and wormwood to Sir F. Stephen. It is no longer necessary for us to consider whether

his views can be properly accepted or not. The principles which he seems to advocate have been finally rejected by the British Parliament and the British Crown. But it is that tendency and the tangible embodiments of it against which that eminent person, as well as some feebler and less intellectual spirits, are dashing themselves. It is that, however, on which, in my humble judgment, rests most firmly Lord Ripon's claim upon our gratitude. It is that, therefore, which explains our present movement. It is that which affords the basis of my answer to the question I alluded to at the outset of my observations. It is that which justifies the remark that, summing up the result of Lord Ripon's rule, you may say, again borrowing the language of the Laureate, that "he wrought his people lasting good." In the case of such a Viceroy, gentlemen, what we are doing this evening is not merely proper and called for, it is really inadequate. Gentlemen, I will not detain you any longer; I beg to second the motion which has been placed before you."

IV.

REFORM OF THE INDIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

(Address delivered before the second sitting of the Fourth Indian National Congress, held at Allahabad on the 27th December 1888, the late Mr. George Yule presiding).

“ I have the honour to move the first resolution which runs as follows :—

“ That this Congress do affirm the necessity for the expansion and reform of the Council of the Governor-General for making laws and regulations and the provincial Legislative Councils, already set forth in Resolution III. of the Congress of 1885 and 1886, and Resolution II. of the Congress of 1887, a tentative scheme for which expansion and reform was suggested in Resolution IV. of the Congress of 1886.”

I think you will see from the terms of the resolutions that its substance hardly requires much explanation or much in the way of remark to commend it to the acceptance of the delegates here assembled from all parts of the Empire. The subject-matter of that resolution has been considered by each of the three Congresses which have been held in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, and this Congress is to be asked to re-affirm the proposition which was passed by those Congresses. It would, therefore, be pure surplusage if I were to address any lengthened remarks to the Congress in support of the subject-matter of this resolution. The subject to which the resolution refers has not only been fully discussed and debated by the three Congresses which have been already held, but has also been debated and discussed outside these, both in the public press and at innumerable public meetings. And it has been discussed not only by those who sympathize with the Congress, but also by other bodies and individuals throughout the Empire; and the

conclusions at which they have all, as a rule, arrived have been in full accord with the resolution which the various Congresses have already passed. After all this threshing out of the matter dealt with in this resolution, it would be unpardonable were I now to inflict on the Congress any lengthened dissertation on the main questions at issue. But there are certain points in connection with this resolution which have been raised in recent controversies and brought forward by gentlemen who are authorities upon Indian questions, and whose remarks, observation and suggestion are unquestionably entitled to the greatest attention, to which I am constrained to refer.

One of our critics who, in this particular part of the Empire, will easily be identified—I mean the Lieutenant-Governor of these Provinces—has said that the Congress, in putting forward this suggestion about the expansion and reform of the Legislative Councils, has not suggested anything of a very novel or original character; that the thing which the Congress has been asking for is one which has been considered long before the Congress was dreamt of. And he has made this observation as though this fact might be supposed to throw some discredit on the work of the Congress. Perhaps discredit is a stronger word than should

be used; but the remark has been made at any rate in a depreciatory sense. Now, speaking for myself, I must say that I consider that remark as by no means one to which we need object. When a scheme does not issue forth in full panoply, as it were from the brain of a single author, but is the synthesis of the best thoughts of many brains during a long period, it is considered in practical politics as rather a merit than a defect; and therefore when Sir Auckland Colvin tells us that our suggestion is one which has been put forward long before this Congress came into existence, I welcome that remark as one of the certificates of the work of the Congress and I consider it rather satisfactory than the reverse.

But, gentlemen, we have had criticism from another quarter, about which also it is necessary to speak, though not in any great detail. We have all read Lord Dufferin's speech at the St. Andrew's Dinner at Calcutta, and in this too we have seen some criticisms upon our work, which similarly deserve some passing notice. For my own part, I am prepared to treat Lord Dufferin's criticism as on the whole friendly criticism, and as a piece of warning and advice coming from a friendly quarter, which deserves all the attention which can be bestowed upon it. But while I am prepared to welcome His Lordship's

deliverances from that point of view, I think it my duty to point out from my place here that some of his Lordship's criticism and statements have been based upon a complete misapprehension of the actual facts of the case.

I hold in my hand a newspaper report of what his Lordship said at Calcutta, and I think it is desirable to refresh your memory by reading the exact words of His Lordship's remarks in regard to the work of the Congress. "And now, gentlemen," Lord Dufferin said, "some intelligent, loyal, patriotic and well-meaning men are desirous of taking, I will not say a further step in advance, but a very big jump into the unknown, by the application to India of democratic methods of Government and the adoption of a Parliamentary system which England herself has reached by slow degrees and through the discipline of many centuries. The ideal authoritatively suggested, gentlemen, as I understand" [mark, please, the qualification implied in, "as I understand"] "is the creation of a representative body or bodies in which the official element shall be in a minority, who shall have what is called the power of the purse, and who, through this instrumentality, shall be able to bring the British Executive into subjection to their will." Before I pass on to another portion of his Lord-

ship's speech, I will pause here for the purpose of pointing out that every one of the statements made here by his Lordship is inaccurate as applied to any proposal that has ever been passed, at any previous Congress or any proposal that you will be asked at this Congress to pass. His Lordship begins by saying that we ask for democratic methods of Government for India. You have all of you, I suppose, read the reports of the three Congresses which have been already held. I myself took part in the first, but was unfortunately unable to attend the second and the third Congresses. I have, however, read the reports, and have failed to find in them anything of which it can be fairly said that either the Congress as a whole or any individual member of it, has asked for the application of democratic methods of Government to India. The next charge is that we are asking for "the adoption of a Parliamentary system which England herself has only reached by slow degrees, and through the discipline of many centuries of preparation." I say that precisely the same remark that I made with regard to the first clause is applicable to this. We have asked for no such thing, as will be obvious to those who will consider the precise terms of our resolution; and when Lord Dufferin, so cautious and circumspect a statesman as he is, has been so in-

accurate in his observations, I can only conclude that His Lordship has not had time to read our reports, and that he has taken his information at second hand, as indeed is indicated by the qualifying remark, "as I understand." His Lordship says: "The idea authoritatively suggested, as I understand, is the creation of a representative body or bodies in which the official element shall be in a minority, who shall have what is called the power of the purse, and who, through this instrumentality, shall be able to bring the British Executive into subjection to their will." The basis for that statement is our demand that the financial statement shall be brought before the Council for discussion. Not only do I not find in any of the reports any grounds for such a statement, but I find what is actually the reverse of it. It has been said over and over again that the Executive shall have the power of deciding what shall be done, and of absolutely vetoing any proposal emanating from the rest of the Council, and yet in face of such a resolution as this, which we have passed not once, not twice, but three times, such a statement has been made by his Lordship. I can only express my amazement at it, and I cannot believe His Lordship to have been capable of making it, except on the assumption that he has lacked the time to study our reports

himself. The various charges which His Lordship makes against the Congress are charges which remind me of a certain definition which was once given of a crab, *viz.*, that a crab is a red fish which walks backwards; and the criticism made upon that was that the definition was perfectly correct, except that the crab was not a fish, that it was not red, and that it did not walk backwards. Now, I may say that Lord Dufferin's criticism is perfectly correct; except that we have not asked for democratic methods of Government; we have not asked for Parliamentary institutions which England has got after many centuries of discipline; we have not asked for the power of the purse; and we have not asked that the British Executive should be brought under subjection to us.

If you permit me, I will go on to the next passage in which he says: "I am afraid the people of England will not be readily brought to the acceptance of this programme, or to allow such an assembly, or a number of such assemblies, either to interfere with its armies, or to fetter and circumscribe the liberty of action, either of the Provincial Governments or of the Supreme Executive." I say this is a programme which is not brought forward officially or unofficially by the Congress. We have never dreamt of or asked for such things as

Lord Dufferin supposes. We have—I say we have explicitly—declared that the right of interpellation which we ask for must not extend to questions military or political. Then again he goes on to say: “In the first place, the whole scheme is eminently unconstitutional; for the essence of constitutional Government is that responsibility and power should remain in the same hands, and the idea of irresponsible Councils, whose members could never be called to account for their acts in the way in which an opposition can be called to account in a constitutional country, arresting the march of Indian legislation, or nullifying the policy of the British Executive in India, would be regarded as an impracticable anomaly.” I entirely agree in this view of his Lordship, only I do not see what application it has to anything said by the Congress. We have never asked for a divorce between power and responsibility. We have, on the contrary, distinctly said that the responsibility must rest with the Executive, and that therefore, they must have the power of rejecting any resolution and vetoing any proposal, even though such should come from a majority of the Council. I need only say, in conclusion, that the criticisms which have been made upon us by the late Viceroy are criticisms which have no manner of application

218 SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

to the resolutions we have passed, or the proposals we have made, but relate rather to some imaginary scheme which somehow seems to have floated through Lord Dufferin's brains, but of which we of the Congress had never even so much as heard until he enunciated it.

INDIAN LEAFLETS,

INDIAN LEAFLETS.

LEAFLET No. 2.

IS INDIA LIGHTLY TAXED?

[Published and Distributed on behalf of the people of India by the British Indian Association and the Indian Association of Calcutta, the Bombay Presidency Association, the Sarvajanik Sabha of Poona, the Mahajan Sabha of Madras, the Sind Sabha of Kurrachee and the Praja-hita-Vardhak Sabha of Surat.]

With regard to this important point the English public are shown only the official view of the case. The view taken by educated and intelligent Indians is very different. At present the English public listen only to the tax-eaters. They should also hear what the tax-payers have to say. The other day Sir James Fergusson, late Governor of Bombay, addressing a large audience at Manchester on the subject of India, said "that at the present time her people were not heavily taxed and it was a great mistake to suppose that they were." This is very easy for an official to say, who drew his £ 10,000 a year as salary from the taxes paid by the people of India besides a

sumptuary allowance of £4,000. But what are the real facts of the case? The following figures will give roughly an idea of the relative power of the Englishman and the Indian to bear taxation; and of the weight of taxation which they each bear:—

The total population of the United Kingdom may be taken at 36 millions and its income at £1,200,000,000 giving an average income of £33 per head. Upon this income a revenue of £87,200,000 is raised, being an average charge of about 7½ per cent. upon the national income. On the other hand the total population of British India may be taken at nearly 200 millions, and its income at Rs. 5,00,00,00,000 or say £400,000,000; giving an average income of Rs. 27 or, say £2 per head per annum; while the gross revenue of India is about £70,000,000, being an average charge of about 17 per cent. upon the national income.

Let any Englishman think what it is to live upon £2 a year, that is, upon three half pence a day; and let English working men tell Sir James Fergusson and his highly paid official brethren, whether in their opinion the poverty-stricken Indian ryot is "not heavily taxed" when upon his three half pence a day he has to pay more than double the rate paid in wealthy England.

The average income of the Indian taxpayer has been put down at Rs. 27 per annum, because that is the official estimate formed by Sir Evelyn Baring, late Financial Minister of India. But there is reason to believe that Rs. 20 or about 30s. would be nearer the mark. And it must be borne in mind that the land-tax and salt-tax fall in great measure upon the necessaries of the very poor; the salt, without which the vegetarian Indian cannot live, being taxed at a rate estimated by Professor Fawcett to vary from 500 to 2,500 per cent. upon the cost of production. The greater portion of the people of India have a bare subsistence. Dr. Hunter, Director-General of Statistics, says that: "the remaining fifth or 40 millions, go through life on insufficient food."—(England's work in India, p. 80).

India is ruled by the official and military tax-eaters and the voice of the people who are the taxpayers, is not listened to. That is the reason why Lord Randolph Churchill talks with so light a heart of two millions sterling of permanent additional military expenditure for India. This money will have to be paid by the Indian ryot out of his 3 half pence a day. Will the English Electors allow this? Professor Fawcett said of taxing India (Speeches p. 18), "the great mass of her people are in such a state of impoverishment that the Go-

vernment will have to contend with exceptional difficulties if it becomes necessary to procure increased revenue by additional taxation."

LEAFLET No. 6,

IMPERIAL STOCK-TAKING,

OR

BURKE, BRIGHT, FAWCETT, AND LORD BACONSFIELD
IN HARMONY ON AN INDIAN QUESTION.

[Published and distributed on behalf of the People of India by the British Indian association and the Indian Association of Calcutta, the Bombay Presidency Association, the Sarvajanic Sabha of Poona, the Mahajan Sabha of Madras, the Sind Sabha of Kurrachee & the Prajahit Vardhak Sabha of Surat.]

"Our Indian Government in its best state will be a grievance. It is necessary that the correctives should be uncommonly vigorous; the work of men sanguine, warm, and even impassioned. For, it is an arduous thing to plead against the abuses of a power which originates from our own country, and which affects those we are used to consider as strangers."

EDMUND BURKE.

"What you want is a new and a wiser and a broader policy, and that policy, I much fear, you will never have from the Government of Calcutta, until the people of England say that it is their policy and must be adopted."

JOHN BRIGHT.

The late Mr. Fawcett, whose name is never mentioned in India except with respect and even

eneration, used often to tell Englishmen of the duties which they owed to India and her people. India has now lost her noble champion, and must endeavour to raise her own feeble voice in support of those Englishmen who are speaking to their fellow-countrymen on her behalf.

The late Earl of Beaconsfield once declared that the key of India was in the House of Commons. Let the constituencies of the United Kingdom, then, direct their representatives in that House, now and then at least, to turn the key of the great Indian Bureau, and see with their own eyes what is going on in its secret and obscure recesses, after letting "a little more daylight" into it. During the days of the old East India Company, Parliamentary investigations into Indian affairs were a regular institution. In 1773 a most elaborate investigation took place. It was conducted by a Select Committee of the House of Commons, whose report was speedily followed up by legislation. In 1793 another investigation was made and remedial measures taken. As to the subsequent investigations the late Mr. Fawcett says: "The three Committees which were thus appointed before the Charter was renewed in 1813, 1833 and in 1853, collected information the importance of which can hardly be over-estimated. This was so

fully recognised at the time when the Committees were appointed, that many of the most eminent members of the House served upon them." And he afterwards adds: "If the questions which these various Committees had to investigate were at the time considered to be so important as to make it desirable to enlist the services of the most eminent members of the House, I think it can without difficulty be shown that there are now many subjects connected with the Government of India which not less urgently demand a most careful and thorough Parliamentary inquiry."

One great reason for such an inquiry is afforded by the fact mentioned by Mr. Fawcett as generally admitted, namely, that "when the Government of India was transferred from the Company to the Crown, many safeguards for economy were swept away, and the substitutes which took their place have proved to be comparatively ineffective." To illustrate this proposition a few figures will suffice. From a table furnished to the East India Finance Committee, 1873, by Mr. Gay, Deputy Controller-General of the Finances, it appears that, excluding the expenses on the Army and on Public Works, the cost of the Government of India increased from £14,964,867 in 1856 to £23,271,082 in 1871, and it appears from the later figures that in 1879 it stood

at £33,352,852, that is to say, that that cost has more than doubled itself in less than twenty-five years, and the advance in the first fifteen years out of that period falls short of the advance in the closing eight years. Taking the figures for the Army, we find that in 1856 the cost stood at nearly £12,000,000; in 1871 it was at £16,074,800; in 1879, at £17,092,488. And the debts and obligations of the country, which in 1856 stood at £57,764,239, entailing an annual charge of £2,332,620, advanced in 1871 to £119,000,476, entailing an annual charge of £5,000,474, and in 1879 to £145,836,440, entailing an annual charge of £6,229,792.

This portentous development of expenditure and indebtedness deserves a thorough investigation at the hands of the British Parliament. Such an investigation cannot be carried on satisfactorily in India. As Mr. Bright has said: "All the people with white faces, English, Scotch, Irish, and so forth, are nearly all in the service of Government. I am not now speaking of the handful of merchants, but all the civilians, engineers, military men, everybody—they are all in favour of, and have an interest in, patronage, promotion, salaries, and ultimately pensions." This is illustrated by recent events. In 1879 both the Viceroy and the Secretary

of State declared that "immediate measures must be taken for the reduction of public expenditure in all its branches." Yet little really was done. In truth, as Mr. Fawcett pointed out, "the work cannot be done by the Government alone. It will be necessary that they shall be aided both by Parliament and by public opinion in this country." The reason why this is so was stated by Mr. Bright many years ago, and his words are in many respects as true now as they were then. "The great body of the people in India," said Mr. Bright, "have, as we all know, no control in any way over the Government. Neither is there any independent English opinion that has any control over the Government, the only opinions being those of the Government itself or those of the Military and Civil Services, chiefly the latter. They are not the payers of the taxes; they are the spenders and the enjoyers of the taxes; and therefore the Government in India is in the most unfortunate position possible for the fulfilment of the great duties that must devolve upon every wise and just Government." In order, therefore, to strengthen, when necessary, the hands of the Government, and in other cases to direct them, in the great work of retrenchment of overgrown expenditure, a Parliamentary inquiry is indispensable.

Consider, next, another important point—and here we may avail ourselves of the language used in 1858 by a late eminent Prime Minister of England, the Earl of Beaconsfield, then Mr. Disraeli. “No one,” he says, speaking of the Anglo-Indian officers of that day, “can have been brought into communication with that large and valuable body of Her Majesty’s servants, without entertaining for them feelings not only of respect, but often of admiration. But, Sir, it is impossible to deny that if they have a deficiency, the quality in which they are deficient—and necessarily so from the career they have to run—is an absence of that feeling of responsibility which we, from our training in this House, all of us, to a greater or less degree, must possess. They live, too, necessarily in a circle of peculiar opinions—opinions which they have adopted often from force of conviction, but sometimes also from the power of habit.” Mr. Bright, too, has pointed out another but kindred shortcoming of British administration in India. “But you must remember,” he says, “that all this great population has no voice in its own affairs. It is dumb before the power that has subjected it. It is never consulted upon any matter connected with its Government. It is subject to the power that rules over it in a manner that cannot be said of the population of any civilised

or Christian people in the world." The defects here pointed out require for their remedy, among other things, a periodical Parliamentary investigation, such as used to be held in the days of the old Company. A reference to first principles, an appeal from local prepossessions, the introduction of a little of the bracing atmosphere of Parliamentary ideas into the despotism, however benevolent, of Anglo-Indian Bureaucracy, are as necessary now as they were before 1858, if, indeed, they are not now even more necessary than they were then.

Lastly, it should be stated that there was a Parliamentary Committee appointed in 1873, though with a very limited scope. But even that Committee with its limited scope ceased to exist without completing its labors in consequence of a dissolution of Parliament. Having regard, therefore, to the periods at which inquiries were held in the days of the East India Company, an investigation has now been long overdue. And the new Parliament cannot do a better thing than direct such an inquiry at the very outset of its career, so as to bring to bear upon Indian affairs the minds of those "Sanguine, warm, and even impassioned" men, spoken of by the great Edmund Burke in the extract which heads this leaflet.

LEAFLET No. 8.

MANCHESTER'S INTEREST IN INDIA.

[Published and Distributed on behalf of the people of India by the British Indian Association and the Indian Association of Calcutta, the Bombay Presidency Association, the Sarvajanic Sabha of Poona, the Mahajan Sabha of Madras, the Sind Sabha of Kurrachee and the Praja-hita-Wardhak Sabha of Surat.]

There is a belief prevalent amongst certain English politicians that England has very little interest in the maintenance of her Indian Empire, that England keeps India as a matter of glory and as a matter of sentiment rather than as a matter of positive national advantage. Let us see how the case really stands. One of the prominent facts connected with the relations between England and India is that England's rule over this great dependency enables British merchants and manufacturers to secure the advantages which flow from free trade therewith. There is perhaps no feature of England's trade more worthy of note than that whereas English goods are more or less excluded from free competition in the Continental markets and in the markets of America or even in those of England's own colonies, by means of prohibitive tariffs, the East Indian trade of England, being practically regulated by her own fiscal policy, affords a

boundless field for her own manufactures. The astonishing growth which British Commerce and manufactures has attained in recent times has been very largely the result of England's political ascendancy in Asia. This consideration alone is enough to show how great an interest the people of England have in the maintenance of their Indian Empire. The maintenance of that Empire is a necessary condition of the continued prosperity of the commerce of England. At all events it is certain that England's political supremacy in Asia has been one of the chief causes of the amazing development witnessed during the last quarter of a century in English trade and English manufactures.

A few figures would be instructive as showing the interest of Manchester in India and the value to her of the East Indian trade. By the census of 1881 the entire population of India was ascertained as under :—

	Population of British India and Feudatory States,
Adult Male Population.....	83,487,375
Do. Female „	81,113,386
Children under 14 years.....	89,291,060
	<hr/>
Total.....	253,891,821

Considering that 8 yards of cloth of the ordinary width (40 Inches) would on an average suffice for a new suit that will last a year in the case of a male, 10 yards in all in the case of a dress for a female, and 4 yards in the case of a child under 14 years of age, it would require 667,899,000 yards' or 379,488 miles' length of the average width of cloth to cover the male population of India; 811,133,860 yards or 460,871 miles in length of the average size of cloth to cover the whole of the female population; and 357,164,240 yards or 202,934 miles in length of cloth to cover children under 14 years of age; that is to say, it would require 1,043,293 or more than a million of miles or nearly 36 times the circumference of the Earth, in length of cloth to satisfy a year's clothing wants of the two hundred and fifty millions of the people of India. But while on the one hand deductions must be made for the supply of coarser kinds to the poorer classes by the indigenous handloom industry and the Cotton Mills in the capital cities and Presidencies of Bombay, Bengal and Madras, account must be taken of the finer descriptions of clothing in addition to the bare average estimated above, consumed by the well-to-do and richer classes of society in India. Balancing the one against the other, it may be said that to

clothe the population of India Manchester must yearly manufacture cloth, of the average width of 40 Inches, measuring over a million of miles. And this is what she is actually doing, as would appear from the following table:—

**CONSUMPTION OF BRITISH COTTON
GOODS.***

	1880.			
	Million Yards.	Million lbs. Yarn.	Total value (Thousands omitted.)	Ratio.
India.....	1,812	48	£ 20,100	28·8
China and Japan .	508	47	8,135	11·6
Turkey and Egypt	528	12	7,680	11·0
South America ...	491	...	6,740	9·7
Europe.....	313	94	10,330	14·9
West Indies	122	...	1,810	2·6
United States	78	...	1,750	2·5
Various	644	15	13,130	18·9
Total ...	4,496	216	£ 69,585	100·0

It will appear from the above that India stands at the head of all consumers of British Cotton Goods. The table also shows that the cloth supplied to India in 1880 was 1,812,000,000 yards or 1,029,558 miles in length of the average width. But though the supply just equals the bare average of the demand, there is scope for almost unlimited extension in the desire on the part of the people.

* See Mulhall's Dictionary of Statistics, p. 116, (Ed. 1884).

For, supposing that out of the 250 millions of the people of India only 1 million were to desire to possess themselves of 1 yard of cloth per head, then a demand would be created for cloth of that kind measuring 4,000 miles in length. The existence of such a desire is undeniable but its gratification depends upon the purchasing power of the people. This purchasing power can be acquired by them only if they are prosperous and well-governed, and have something left to them over what is necessary for subsistence. Manchester's interest, therefore, lies directly in promoting the prosperity of her Indian customers.

"On the most selfish view," as Lord Macaulay puts it "it would be far better for us that the people of India were well-governed and independent of us, than ill-governed and subject to us; that they were ruled by their own kings but wearing our broad-cloth and working with our cutlery, than that they were performing their salaams to English Collectors and English Magistrates, but were too ignorant to value or too poor to buy English manufactures. To trade with civilized men is infinitely more profitable than to govern savages. That would be doting wisdom which would keep a hundred millions of men from being

236 SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

our customers in order that they might be our slaves."

The true interest of Manchester thus consists in identifying herself with every measure which is calculated to give her Indian customers a good and economical government and which promotes their prosperity and happiness.

SOCIAL.

SOCIAL.

[Reply to Malabari's note on infant marriage and enforced widowhood in India.]

MY DEAR MALABARI,

I owe you an apology for not having written to you earlier about the two interesting notes on Infant Marriage and Widow Marriage in India, of which you have been so good as to send me a copy. But I am sure I need not be at any pains to explain to you the causes of the delay, and I shall therefore at once proceed to comply with your request for my opinion on the important subjects to which your notes have been instrumental in once more drawing general attention.

Dealing first with the first of those subjects, which is also in my judgment very much the more important of the two, I think it is necessary, at the very outset, to ascertain precisely where it is that the true centre of the mischief lies. Now, I cannot help thinking that this true centre is missed, if we keep hammering away, as is sometimes done, at the custom of celebrating what is called the "first marriage," when the bride and bridegroom are of very tender years. That custom is mischievous enough in all conscience. Yet the mis-

chief of it is in reality more of a theoretical than of a practical character. It is theoretically absurd, no doubt, that a boy and girl should be tied up in wedlock at a time of life when they are probably unable to understand, certainly unable to appreciate to the full, the responsibilities of the status on which they are about to enter. This is theoretically absurd. But although I am prepared to concede that some of the rival systems are superior to ours, in many respects, I confess I cannot see theoretical perfection in any of them. And looking at their practical results—with which after all we are mainly concerned—I see no ground for holding that there is, in point of fact, a larger proportion of ill-sorted matches under the one system than under the others. Comparing our system, for instance, with that prevalent among our English rulers, I should not draw that conclusion from such knowledge of English life as I have gathered from respectable English novels and other sources of the like character. And in such a matter the true principle which the practical reformer should adopt for his guidance is the famous one—"by their fruits you shall judge them." Now, it is admitted in your note, though it is not as generally admitted as it should be, that the "fruits" of one system are "in large numbers of cases" quite

“satisfactory.” And therefore I shall not further labour the point here. I shall only state that, in my opinion, reform is not so urgently called for on the point above noted as on another one; and that if the reform which is urgently called for can be successfully introduced, the other may reasonably be expected to follow almost of itself, if I may say so, in due course.

That reform is wanted at the principal source of mischief, which lies in an early consummation of marriage. And here, I may point out, the beginnings of a reform—very small beginnings I admit, and not such as to redound much to our credit; but still beginnings which are none the less real—have already been made in Bombay and elsewhere. Cases of deferred consummation, after girls have arrived at puberty, are known to have occurred without any protest from the castes concerned. If such cases become sufficiently numerous, a long step, I am persuaded, will have been taken towards the ultimate goal. And as this reform will come by way of development from within, it will save all the difficulties that must needs be encountered, if limits are fixed which can only be more or less arbitrary, and which, if they are not violated in individual cases, may lead, as I have reason to believe from practical experience, to much serious

inconvenience and mischief. To such a reform no opposition from caste need be apprehended. In truth, all that caste insists on at present—and even this, it may be remarked in passing, it has failed before now to do in some cases—is that a girl should not remain unmarried after attaining puberty. And therefore the truth is, not merely, as you say, that “no Shastra” enforces marriage proper (by which I understand you to mean consummation) on a girl under twelve years’ of age, “but also that no *caste*, as such,” enforces it either. The reason of the qualification contained in the phrase “as such” will appear in the sequel.

The conclusions to which the considerations above briefly indicated lead appear to me to be of some importance when we come to cast about for suitable means for remedying the existing mischiefs. Those conclusions may be thus formulated. First, that neither caste nor Shastra, as popularly understood, exacts anything more than that girls should not remain unmarried after attaining puberty. Second, that neither caste nor Shastra, as popularly understood, has anything to say in the matter of consummation of marriage. And third, that reform is most urgently called for in regard to the time of consummations and not so much in regard to the time of marriage.

Upon these conclusions the question arises—If caste and Shastra are alike out of the way, what is it that stands in the way of the reform here pointed out? My answer is, that the obstacle is in the family. The man who wants to initiate this reform finds his difficulties neither in the Shastras, which are only imperfectly if at all understood, nor in the caste, which, as such, has not claimed to exercise jurisdiction in the matter, but in those nearest and dearest to him, in his family and among his relations. To many of these the proposed new departure is distasteful, first, because it is a new departure; secondly, because it is looked upon as calculated to defer the enjoyment of the great blessing of having a son; and thirdly, though this perhaps only to a small extent, because it is calculated to interfere with the *eclat* of the celebration of the “second marriage.” These are the real difficulties in the way of reform. And now the reason why I used the expression “caste as such” before will become obvious. Not one of these difficulties is a difficulty which can be properly charged to the account of “caste as such.” It is certain members of the caste, connected with one by ties more or less close, that are the obstacles, not the caste as a whole. And it is necessary, I think, to grasp this fact fully, in order to be able to form a

really useful judgment on the various remedies proposed for our existing mischiefs. The influence "of caste as such" is already on the decrease. But even if you entirely abolished it to-morrow by legislative enactment, the evils now under consideration would not be affected at all, or affected only to a very trifling extent.

And now in this view of the real mischief and the real obstacles to the remedy of it, let us proceed to consider the various remedial measures suggested in your note. One observation which applies to them all is, that as worded they seem to refer to the first marriage, rather than to the consummation. This appears to me to show that the view of the matter above indicated has not been really appreciated by those who have propounded those suggestions. But as a slight amendment will adapt the suggestions, or at least some of them, to the view here put forward, I shall at once proceed to consider them in detail. The first of them advocates the exclusion of all married students from university examinations after a certain point of time, to be fixed once for all. At the first blush this seems a good suggestion. But on consideration I confess that I am not prepared to accept it as it stands. I cannot form any forecast of its probable operation and results. And if there is a reasonable chance—

as I think there certainly is—of its telling perceptibly on the number of pupils coming to our colleges and universities, it is plain that the suggestion, if carried out, may add one more to the long list of cases with which we are familiar—namely, cases of “killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.” If the suggestion is carried out, we may not improbably become instrumental in retarding the progress of that very education which must be, if not our sole, at least our principal lever in the eradication of existing evil customs. Remember, too, that we may thus be making the boy suffer for the sins of his parents in two ways, instead of only one as at present. The boy in the large majority of cases will be unable to prevent his own marriage, and if the father is not sufficiently alive to the benefits of a university education, the son will have good reason to exclaim, “Save me from my friends”; and taking a somewhat larger view, I think it will not be either fair or safe to entirely trust, as on this suggestion you must trust, to the good sense of parents upon such a point—a point on which the whole educational progress of the country must depend. With the most unfeigned respect for my excellent friend, Mr. M. Ghose, who, I believe, originally made this suggestion, and for my revered friend and teacher Mr. Madhavrao Ranade, who

seems to be inclined to adopt it at once, I own that I cannot persuade myself to give my voice in favour of it. I am, however, prepared—although not without some hesitation and diffidence—to go as far as this. The University and the Government Educational Department may, I think, fairly lay down a rule that the scholarships and prizes awarded by those authorities up to a student's graduation shall be tenable only by unmarried men. It will not, I think, be possible to make any use here of the distinction between the first and second marriage, which I have insisted on above. But as at present advised, I am content by way of experiment to go at once in this direction as far as I have now indicated.

Coming next to the second suggestion, I own I cannot see either fairness or advantage in the proposal to exclude married men from employment in the administrative departments of the State within certain limits. I am myself rather inclined to look upon a man with a wife and children as more likely, *cæteris paribus*, to be a diligent, steady, and honest worker, than one whose misdeeds can bring ruin only upon himself. And, on the other hand, I do not think it is fair to insist upon a qualification which is almost entirely out of relation to the work to be done. In the case of the prizes and scholar—

ships above referred to, the conditions are very different. We all know that the cares of a family are most unfavourable to the formation and growth of studentlike habits. And as the formation and growth of such habits are among the most important parts of education—even more important than passing examinations—we may well insist on a qualification for the award of scholarships and prizes which cannot be as legitimately claimed for a clerkship in the Office of a Collector or an Accountant-General. “The advantages of the proposal” seem to you “to far outweigh any possible inconvenience.” I cannot share in this opinion. You think that, other things being equal, the head of a department should prefer an unmarried man to a married man—“on the ground that he has the right to prefer the best available servant, if not the best available citizen.” I at once admit the right, but for the reasons indicated, I think the head of a department should make an exactly opposite choice. Perhaps this further reason may also be urged in favour of that view—*valeat quantum*—that while the appointment of an unmarried man helps only one individual citizen, the appointment of a married man saves more than one from distress. No doubt it might be urged in reply that by helping the one you

afford an inducement to others to remain like him for a long time in the condition of "single blessedness," and that this being by the hypothesis desirable, you are preparing the way for a great reform. But waiving the point, by no means an unimportant one, that all such artificial rules are apt to fail in their benevolent objects, and on the contrary to entail demoralization and unexpected evils—waiving, I say, this point, I must repeat here what I have said as to the previous suggestion, that it is almost impossible to form any trustworthy forecast of the probable effects of such a rule on the future progress of education. And I must say, too, that it involves the extension of an artificial system of martyrdom for sins not one's own, which I cannot contemplate with equanimity.

The third suggestion is to start an association, the members of which shall take a pledge not to marry under a certain age. You call this suggestion an "excellent" one; but in the first place, as it is put, it seems to me to be impractical. I don't think that among those who are likely to join an association for the intended purposes you will find anything like an adequate number of persons in whose case the pledge will have any practical value. Most of these probably have been already married. Besides, such a "pledge" as that

here proposed would probably succeed in driving away people from the association rather than in attracting them to it. The object of the association should be, I think, to familiarize the people with the evils of the prevailing system, and to help any body, be he a member or not, who is ready and willing to break through the system himself. If the members themselves break through it, well and good; the success of the association will be greater, more rapid, and more complete than in the other alternative. But I don't think that the success should be imperilled in advance, as it will be if a "pledge" is insisted on, which by the hypothesis we are not prepared to practically redeem. I must add, too, that I have not much faith in the operative character of pledges of this sort.

The next recommendation is that an educated man should not marry a "girl too much under his age." This, again, is not at all feasible under present conditions. Seeing that the practice of widow marriage is very far from being at all widespread among the higher castes, and seeing that the practice of marrying girls before they are thirteen, at the outside, is all but universal, it must needs be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to arrange for a marriage which shall satisfy the condition here proposed. Are the proposers then

ready to accept the alternative of enforced celibacy with all its attendant evils? I must confess that both this suggestion and the one last dealt with strike me in some of their aspects as illustrations of the old recommendation to "bell the cat."

I agree that our ordinary school-books should be made instrumental in this reform; and carefully framed reading-lessons on this and other social topics, if not made obtrusively didactic, might prove useful. I agree, too, that an association should be established for delivering popular lectures, and publishing short and cheap tracts, illustrative of the true views on these questions. I also concur to some extent in the opinion that officers of Government might do some service to the good cause by "evincing a strong personal interest" in it. One practical mode in which it will be in the power of all of them to do so is to decline to attend any of the *tamashas* which are taking place so frequently in Bombay, and on occasions in the mofussil also, "in honour of" the weddings of little children. This will be one practical method of discountenancing the present mischievous system. And its effects will not, I am persuaded, be quite insignificant. But I must say that the inclination of my opinion on these matters generally is such

as would justify you in classing me with your friends the "let-aloneists." My faith in "the education of public opinion" as a great social force is almost unlimited. And I believe that in the long run the results of that education are not only more enduring, but—what might seem paradoxical—more rapid than the results of such artificial remedies applied *ab extra* as are proposed in your note. You refer to the very limited field over which elementary education has hitherto spread in this country. Although I am not disposed to attach as much weight to it here as you seem to do, still I am by no means blind to that circumstance. But the school-master is abroad. Among the so-called upper classes education has already spread sufficiently wide for all practical purposes connected with the questions we are now dealing with, and from them social reform may be expected to filter down to the classes below them without much difficulty. But I look forward more particularly to female education as our greatest help in the solution of all these social problems. It is to the spread of education among our girls, not the limitation of university honours or official loaves and fishes to certain classes of our boys, that I am inclined to look for the remedies of existing evils. That indicates my view as regards social reforms gene-

rally. As regards the particular one now under discussion, I hold to that view even more strongly. The mischief here, as I have endeavoured to show, lies in the custom which has prevailed for centuries, and in that public opinion which has either resulted from, or at least existed along with it. Here, therefore, more than elsewhere, the best results may be expected from educating and refining public opinion. It may be a slow process, but I feel no confidence that upon any of the other courses recommended the process can be other than slow. We must work as ardently as if our efforts were to be crowned with success at once. But on the other hand, we must be content to take the fruits as they come in the fulness of time, and not be impatient or despondent if the customs which have stood for several centuries do not at once fall of a heap at the blast of our trumpets.

I come next to your second note. It is not necessary that I should go through it with much minuteness. But I may say at once that I find myself unable to accept any of your practical proposals. Your first suggestion seems to me to go no further than Act XV. of 1856, though you seem to think that it does. And when you say that what you ask for is little more than that the

“existing provision be made known to the victims and enforced in their favour by all possible means,” I must point out that you are assuming that Hindu widows are anxious to remarry, but are prevented from doing so by external force or pressure. This is a mistake, the “victims” are willing “victims” in the vast majority of cases. The public opinion of those among whom they live, move, and have their being has engraved on their minds too deeply the notion of the “impiety” of remarriage for them even to think of it as the appropriate remedy for their unhappy lot. And they will not welcome as friends those philanthropists who shall personally make the “existing provision” in their favour “known” to them. Your second and third proposals proceed on the same incorrect assumption, and they are further objectionable inasmuch as, while they will afford a powerful weapon for disturbing the peace of many families, they will be quite powerless, in my judgment, to do any good to those for whose benefit they will be professedly carried out. Lastly, as to excommunication, your proposal is either based on an incorrect assumption, or involves injustice to our orthodox brethren. If you assume that the “priest”—who, by the way, has, as a priest, nothing to do with excommunications—excommunicates all the

relatives of the parties to a remarriage, whether they take any part directly or indirectly in the proceedings or not, you are mistaken. If, on the other hand, you propose that there should be no excommunication even for those who do take part in such a proceeding, then you substitute for what you call the tyranny of caste, the tyranny of a foreign Government or of the minority of a caste. I have not the smallest sympathy with the tyranny of caste, but I have as little with tyranny over a caste. And I maintain that it would be tyrannising over caste to wrest out of its hands the power of excommunication. As Sir Joseph Arnould said in the famous Aga Khan Case:—"In fact, in every community, whether of a religious nature or not,—whether church or chapel, caste or club—there must, as requisite for the preservation of a community and as inherent in the very conception of a community, necessarily exist a power—not, indeed, to be exerted except in extreme cases and on justifying grounds—of depriving of the privileges of membership those who persistently refuse, after due notice and warning, to comply with those ascertained conditions of membership to which, by the very fact of being members of the community, they must be held to have given an implied, if not an express, consent."

That is the doctrine which I hold, and, paradoxical as it may seem, I hold it not merely as being what is demanded by considerations of justice, but also as being that which under our present conditions, must accelerate the decline and fall of caste as a power hostile to progress.

There are sundry points in your notes which are of some importance in themselves, though of minor importance as compared with the two I have here dealt with. I am, however, unwilling to delay this letter for the consideration of them. As it is, this letter has been written in patches, in the intervals of other work, of which fact, I am afraid, there is ample internal evidence in the way it has been put together. I must therefore forego the discussion of the other topics referred to. There is only one point on which I should like to say one word before I conclude. One of your correspondents, one holding a high position in the Indian Government, has warned us against trying to improve him and his countrymen, and advised us to put our own houses in order. Perhaps he does not know that our orthodox brethren give us the same advice, and the same warning, from an opposite standpoint. Sir Auckland Colvin warns us away from politics. "Hence avaunt! 'tis holy ground," he seems to say. Our orthodox brethren warn us

away with at least equal earnestness and equal solemnity from the field of social and religious reform. The latter pray in aid "the wisdom of our ancestors" and the justification of our usages by existence, as they phrase it, "from time immemorial." The former rely similarly on the superiority of the Western civilization and the breakdown of the Oriental in the presence of it. Which of these guides shall we follow?—or shall we not, in all humility, decline to follow either exclusively, and say that both politics and social reform are proper fields for us to work in? Shall we not hold that the same spirit, the outgivings of which in politics rouse the ire of Sir Auckland Colvin, must manifest itself and is manifesting itself, in social and religious matters, to the utter disgust of our orthodox friends? And shall we not hold, further, that it is vain to say to it, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no further"—whether at the one point or at the other? I venture to submit to Sir Auckland Colvin, and all others who think with him, that the true principle on this subject is laid down by one of his own countrymen, one whom, at all events, I would make no attempt to "improve," even if I felt inclined as Sir Auckland Colvin thinks we all feel inclined to try to "improve" his other countrymen. "Submission," says Herbert Spencer, "whether to

Government, to the dogmas of ecclesiastics, or to that code of behaviour which society at large has set up, is essentially of the same nature; and the sentiment which induces resistance to the despotism of rulers, civil or spiritual, likewise induces resistances to the despotism of the world's opinion." I will not further lengthen out this extract, but will content myself by referring to the essay on Manners and Fashion from which it is taken, for a statement of the principles on this subject which, coming from one of Sir Auckland Colvin's countrymen, commend themselves to my humble understanding.

I must now conclude. I have frankly expressed my dissent from many of your specific suggestions. I have also classed myself with those "Let-aloneists" against whom you have argued in the interest of what, in spite of your disclaimer, I cannot distinguish in substance from State action, though it may not be legislative action. From the answers which you have received, it seems clear that your views have been very generally understood in the same way as I understood them. But although I have ventured to express dissent both from your specific remedies and your general point of view, as I have understood it, I cannot conclude this letter without doing myself the pleasure of acknowledging that you

258 SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

deserve general thanks for attracting attention to questions which, to some extent and in some shape, are questions in which all of us, whether Hindus, Parsees, or Mussulmans, are more or less deeply concerned.

Your Sincerely,

K. T. TELANG.

16th September 1884.

MUST SOCIAL REFORM PRECEDE POLITICAL REFORM IN INDIA ?

PREFATORY NOTE.

In permitting the following address to be issued in pamphlet form, I think I ought to say a word by way of preface. I have no leisure for controversy ; and if I had leisure, I should have no inclination to throw myself into a controversy that has, in some quarters, taken the turn which the controversy raised by my address has taken. With regard, therefore, to such criticism as the *Pioneer* has been good enough to bestow upon the address, I will not permit myself to say a single word. I will leave the author of that criticism and all who agree in his view with but two remarks, namely, first, that if they will inquire into the actual work of those whom they criticise they will find reason to modify their opinion ; and secondly, that if they will inquire whether any and what actual progress has been effected in the direction of social reform which they advocate so earnestly, but not altogether in a wise manner, they will probably come to the conclusion that things are not in truth quite so bad as they seem to unobservant eyes.

Of criticism in a different spirit, I have heard and read a good deal. I have endeavoured to consider it all with as much impartiality as I could command. If I do not refer to all the items of the criticism here in detail, I hope my critics will not think that the omission is due to any want of respect. It is due to the fact, that such reference in detail would involve more labour and more expenditure of time, than I can fairly allow myself to bestow upon this subject just now. Here I can only take note of a few points, and those, too, I must deal with very briefly. In the first place, it is, apparently, needful to notify my critics of one fact, that I intended in my address to confine myself to the single point which formed my thesis. I did not intend, and I therefore deliberately declined, to deal with moral and religious reform on that occasion. But as the criticisms

made have introduced these points into the discussion, I will now repeat what I said in replying on the debate on my address, that I consider religious, moral, social, and political reforms, and all other reforms whatever, to form one integral system. You may divide them for convenience sake, and label the divisions with the names mentioned. But in ultimate analysis, the divisions are mainly divisions of convenience, and the spirit which manifests itself in all the directions indicated by those divisions, is one and the same. If that spirit is genuine, it must, I think sooner or later manifest itself in all these directions, now here now there, now with greater force and now with less. To complete the general statement, I will here add, that while I do not see any ground for thinking that any one of these must necessarily precede the other, I strongly hold the view, that any really great advance made in any one direction must, to be permanent, be accompanied by more or less advance in the other directions. And I also think that advance in any one of these directions must materially help the advance in the other directions. To all this advancement, there is in my view but one necessary condition precedent, that is the development of education—education, in the real sense of that word, of the intellect and the emotions. Such education evokes the spirit I have alluded to, and the outgoings of that spirit, when evoked, can be traced along the various directions to which I have referred.

In the criticisms made on the illustration drawn by me from English History, my critics, as I pointed out in my reply, stop arbitrarily, when they stop in their investigations at the English Reformation. Why should they not go, for instance, at least as far back as Simon De Montfort's Parliament, or King John's Magna Charta? Those events, of capital importance in English history, had preceded the religious ferment to which my critics refer as the cause of the political progress of England in the seventeenth century. The truth appears to me to be this, that when once a commotion in men's minds has begun, and thought is exercised on existing conditions, that mischief which is found to be most easy or most necessary to be got rid of is first taken in hand, and then the others are dealt with either in the course of this very process, or after the energy in the direc

tions first taken has, as it were, spent itself for the time. Religious, social, and political, conditions are thus dealt with simultaneously or one after another, in accordance with the peculiar conditions of the time or sometimes in accordance with what we in our imperfect knowledge should call accident. There is some truth, we must remember, in Gray's lines.—

“ When Love could teach a monarch to be wise,
And Gospel light first dawned from Bullen's eyes.”

I need not say more than one word on the illustration I drew from Indian History. It is said, that there was no political progress under the *regime* of Sivaji and his successors. Is it not political progress, then, to establish the authority of a native dynasty against alien rulers, as the Musulmans then were; to establish an indigenus and elaborate system of polity and administration; to evoke, by military and other achievements, a national feeling, that though living now only as a tradition, is still, I venture to think, a tradition calculated to prove of no little power for good? Was not this the very sort of work effected by Count Cavour and his colleagues in Italy? And was it not, further, this political progress, that gave to Western India the social superiority over other parts of the country involved in a comparatively mild Zenana system—a comparatively larger liberty of woman? I own I entirely fail to follow this particular objection to my proposition, unless, indeed, the objectors think, that there is no political progress short of the highest stage of representative institutions, universal suffrage, and general elections. If this is their view, I can only reply, that representative institutions and all similar marks of political progress can occur only in a nation that is absolutely free from foreign domination, or, as happily is our present case, where the foreign domination is comparatively mild and is itself of a politically progressive character. But there is political progress *before* you reach representative institutions, as there is *after* you have achieved them in their most rudimentary condition. The spread of political education and political activity among the masses of the population, and the gradual extension of political privileges and political rights from individuals and

classes to ever increasing numbers of the people at large, may be, as they often are, among these *later* stages of political advancement. But the advance made at the earlier stages is not the less real, not the less entitled to be denominated political progress, because these later stages are never reached—as they were not reached under Maratha rule.

I have one more point to add to what I have now said, and that is on the general subject of the discussion. I will ask those who differ from me one practical question. And in order to make it a really practical question, I will crave the liberty of taking actual circumstances which have occurred to myself, for which I have no doubt many of my friends could easily cite parallels from their own lives. On the Sunday on which I began to write this note, and on the days preceding and following it, I had calls from sundry different persons in connexion with very different kinds of business. One friend came to me to ask for my help in the way of influencing subscribers, and of myself writing articles, for a certain newspaper. Some students called for pecuniary help to enable them to live in Bombay while they studied at a school here. Two other friends came to ask for advice as to certain extraordinary occurrences connected with Forest administration in Canara, and the popular agitation against it. Another call was in reference to the wants of the Students' L. and S. Society's Girls' Schools, with the management of which I am connected. Still another was from a most successful acquaintance who wanted to open communications between his District and the Bombay Presidency Association in order to provide for political co-operation. A further call came from a Marathi Press for the proofsheets of a small pamphlet on a subject connected closely with Hindu Social Reform, on which I have recently been delivering a Lecture in Marathi. Another was from a friend in reference to the contemplated public meeting in Bombay to ask for the general inquiry into Indian affairs being conducted in India. Still another, and this from a friend who asks me to join in a Company to start an industry, not quite new, but one not yet very fully developed. Again I had arranged to spend a part of that Sunday in making some necessary arrangements in relation to the report of the pro-

ceedings of our National Congress of last Christmas. Once more. I had to draw up a scheme which I had promised to prepare for consideration among a few friends, in reference to translations and original composition of small tractates for Marathi Readers. At the same time I had to revise the draft Annual Report of the Bombay Presidency Association, and the draft rules of the Bombay Ratepayers' Association recently established. Again—but I need not carry the enumeration any further. What has been now said quite suffices for present purposes. And now I ask, whether those who differ from me would go the length of saying, that I ought to respond to only those among these calls which have an exclusively social aspect, and that I should leave alone the newspaper, and the Forest grievances, and the Congress affairs, and the Presidency Association, and the Ratepayers' Committee, and so forth? I should be much surprised, if any of my countrymen would say 'yes' to this question when put in that concrete form. And if the affirmative answer is not here admissible, does it not follow that what we are doing in the political sphere must be continued with strength and persistence, and that for this purpose, it is not permissible to tell political activity to cease until all our households have been put on a satisfactory basis? In other words, may we not conclude that in the India of to-day there is no necessity for social reform *preceding* political reform? And is not this further conclusion also obvious? No society can ever be so improved as to leave no occupation for the social reformer. Therefore, for the view opposed to mine, a line must be drawn somewhere, showing that a particular extent of social reform must be achieved before political reform is taken in hand. If the line is not drawn, political reform is altogether banished from matters of practical human interest. If it is to be drawn, I should like those who differ from me to draw it, and show on what grounds of reason its particular position as determined by them can be maintained.

Only one more observation and I shall have done. One of my critics, accepting my view as stated by me, objects that it will be misapplied by the opponents of social reform, and points out an indication of such misapplication. I am myself inclined

to think that the indication thus given is not quite incorrect. The position taken up in the quarter indicated is nominally identical with mine, but is not really so. Otherwise, the supposed inconsistency between my opening address and my reply—which is in reality no inconsistency at all—would not have been dwelt on as it has been there. But I would beg to point out to my critic, that I cannot fairly be held responsible for anything more than what I have said, and that which logically follows from what I have said. Against illogical inferences, or one-sided interpretations, I could not provide—especially in a discourse that was not a written discourse. And for what I could not provide against, I ought not to be held answerable.

Since writing the above, I have had an opportunity of reading and studying the observations of my friend Mr. Ardeshir Framjee on the subject of my address. Those remarks are, like everything coming from Mr. Ardeshir, the results of careful thought, and worthy of respectful consideration. I need, therefore, offer no apology for referring to them here, and I do so the more readily, because I thus get an opportunity of saying, that I cordially welcome criticism on our social usages even from non-Hindus, when the critic, eschewing platitudes and claptrap *ad captandum*, shows that he has taken pains to understand the real conditions of the problem. Mr. Ardeshir, so far as he has gone, shows signs of having done so, though he has not yet reached the practical portion of his observations.

And at the very outset, I wish to make one remark. The earlier portion of Mr. Ardeshir's discourse (as published in the *Indian Spectator* of the 21st March) contains a discussion merely of abstract principles, while my discourse was intended to deal rather with the practical application of principles—a portion of the subject which Mr. Ardeshir only just glances at in his closing paragraph. There is thus a fundamental difference in the points of view from which we have respectively approached our subject. And although I will not use the expression which used to rouse the indignation of James Mill—namely that Mr. Ardeshir's opinions are "true in theory but require correction in practice,"—it is obvious that the forces which Mr. Ardeshir

has so far considered, and the resultant of which he has pointed out, are only some of the forces which I had to take into my calculation. If Mr. Ardeshir will permit me to use a figure from Physical science, he has not taken friction into account; and rightly, as he was dealing only with the laws of mechanics. I have, as I was dealing with machinery. The conclusions we have reached must, therefore, at present necessarily appear to vary from each other.

But let me proceed at once to Mr. Ardeshir's specific points—confining myself, however, mainly to those which come into contact, or conflict, with my address. As regards Mr. Ardeshir's protest against the "singular inappropriateness" of describing the rise of the Maratha power as an instance of political activity, and the quiet sarcasm which runs through it, I would only refer back to what I have already said, and in my turn record my protest, on the grounds briefly indicated above, against the "singular inappropriateness" of describing that episode as one of "daring military aggressiveness" or "*usurpation*." And to show what the spirit then manifested had "in common with the spirit of Social Reform," I need only refer Mr. Ardeshir again to Mr. Herbert Spencer's Essay which I have quoted in my address. The next point with which I must deal is that it "does not tend to lucidity of thought or energy of action to import into the discussion the analogy of the law of Physics—that force tends to proceed in the line of least resistance." Here Mr. Ardeshir has, if he will permit me to say so, mistaken my point. I was not, in fact, drawing any analogy at all. I was endeavouring to express concisely what I conceive to be a proper principle of action. Mr. Ardeshir deals with the proper principle of action in regard to social reform by itself. The principle I was actually laying down related to the question I was discussing—namely, as between social and political reform, whether the former was entitled to precedence over the latter. I see nothing in Mr. Ardeshir's remarks touching this point, or even tending to prove the incorrectness of the proposition I enunciated. Mr. Ardeshir subsequently makes another mistake, and this on a point not touching what he calls "the abstract conditions of ultimate success," but one of a most important practical charac-

ter. He says that I "with characteristic absence of the courage that goes to the making of a reformer, bewailed before a public audience my helplessness under a state of things, under which the female sex of my community refused to be led into sweetness and light and positively delighted in hugging its chains. As if the matter ended and was bound to end there!" I beg to point out, that I did nothing of the kind here imputed to me, and I feel confident that Mr. Ardeshir will himself clearly perceive the mistake he has fallen into, if he will merely read again what I said in reference to the point made here. And he will, I think, perceive it even more clearly, if he notices the context of the remarks he is commenting on. He will see that I stated a fact, and so far from "bewailing my helplessness" before that fact, so far from thinking as Mr. Ardeshir supposes me to think, in the exclamation with which the above excerpt from his letter winds up—so far from doing anything of this sort, I actually said, that we had before us "two spheres for our reforming activities,"—one of the two being that which Mr. Ardeshir supposes me to entirely eschew—and that we were "endeavouring to shake off the slavery in the one sphere as well as in the other." It must be manifest, that instead of "bewailing my helplessness," and supposing that "the matter was bound to end there," I actually expressed my opinion, that work had to be done, and that we were endeavouring to do it. I have not the slightest wish to claim to possess a courage which is not in me. I only wish to repudiate that doctrine of utter stagnation and unmitigated feebleness which Mr. Ardeshir has erroneously imputed to me.

As it is germane to this topic, and is also of great practical importance, I will add a word about another point made by Mr. Ardeshir, although it does not touch my address, viz., "treating ones' self to the sacred product of the cow and the like," as a penalty for "having visited foreign lands." It is not thus, says Mr. Ardeshir, "that the cause of reform can be advanced." Well, if this should be Mr. Ardeshir's opinion—not merely while "endeavouring to think out the abstract conditions of ultimate success," but also after having considered "whether their practical observance is quite opportune"—then I must take leave

to differ from him. But he has himself spoken—and spoken, in my judgment, wisely and rightly—of a “spirit of concession and self restraint” as being “indispensable to the removal of social inequalities.” He has also said, that “the most effectual way to counteract one tendency is to promote a sustained familiarity with its opposite.” And, therefore, I consider it still possible, that the opinion of Mr. Ardeshir which I am now discussing is only an “abstract” one, subject to modification, when the practical application of abstract principles comes to be considered. At all events, it certainly does seem to me one of the most proper forms of “concession,” one of the most effectual modes of “familiarizing” old people with reforms, to do, at their bidding, that sort of penance, which involves nothing that is *malum in se*, and which involves an inconvenience, or even an injury, of a merely self-regarding character. I admit that this is not the most courageous course; I admit also that the principle underlying it is probably liable to abuse. But that abuse can and ought to be guarded against by a watchful public opinion; and that courage is not an unalloyed benefit, as Prof. Seeley has in substance been reminding us in a recent lecture.

I must leave alone the many other points with which Mr. Ardeshir's letters bristle. They certainly are all most worthy of consideration. His view of the bearing of Mr. Spencer's philosophy on the question of State action in connexion with the problems of Infant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood; his objections to Mr. Wordsworth's statement that Hindu Society will never be reformed piecemeal and in detail; his theory that “political activity engenders an essentially self-seeking tendency of mind;” his dictum that “political and intellectual emancipation will not eradicate social evils which do not actively interfere with it;” his contemptuous criticism of those who have suggested “*ten or twelve* as the age under which a girl should not marry;” all these and other points require examination and deserve it. On many of them, I should be prepared to join issue with him. But it would be “singularly inappropriate” to do so in this place, especially as even at the date of revising these sheets for the Press (4th April),

268 SELECTED WRITINGS & SPEECHES.

Mr. Ardeshir's deliverance on the subject is not before us as a whole. I must, therefore, reserve that work for another place and some other occasion.

K. T. TELANG.

HIGH COURT,
BOMBAY, 25TH MARCH 1886. }

MUST SOCIAL REFORM PRECEDE POLITICAL REFORM IN INDIA ?

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen,—In opening the address which I have undertaken to deliver this evening, I am afraid I must begin with a word of apology for the imperfections which I am certain must be found in it. And as I am not in a position to plead the excuse of having been asked to deliver the address by any one other than myself, I must say a few words in explanation of my appearance before you this evening. Well, as one of the Secretaries of the Students' Literary and Scientific Society, it is part of my duty to see that the Society's session does not remain quite barren of essays and lectures. But in consequence of circumstances which need not now be dwelt on, although this session of the Society began as far back as October last, no essays have in fact been read or lectures delivered as yet before the Society. And when I endeavoured to make arrangements to avert any reflection upon us in consequence of this circumstance, and began to ask friends to prepare lectures and addresses, it occurred to me that the fairest course would be for me to begin by putting

my own shoulders to the wheel. And accordingly it was only at the beginning of last week, that I determined to prepare myself for the address which I am now about to deliver. The subject of that address, however, is not altogether new to me. It attracted my attention many months ago, when I was writing a letter to my friend Mr. B. M. Malabari in reference to his notes on "Infant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood." When I was writing that letter, Sir Auckland Colvin's communication to Mr. Malabari had just been published in the newspapers. And the view had been expressed in it, that we ought to turn our attention to social reform, in preference to the endeavours we were making to teach our English rulers what their duties were in the government of the country. In my letter to Mr. Malabari, I ventured briefly but emphatically to express my dissent from this view of Sir A. Colvin. And in support of my opinion, I quoted a passage from Mr. Herbert Spencer's essay on Manners and Fashions. My letter has been published in the newspapers, and I need not now go into details regarding its contents. Since then attention has been again drawn to the point, by the letter recently written on the subject of Hindu social reform by one whose authority is deservedly esteemed and highly respected by us all in

Bombay. But as the subject is one of undoubtedly great and vital importance, it is desirable to consider it on grounds of reason, and independently of the authority even of Mr. Herbert Spencer or Mr. Wordsworth.

And first, when we are asked to give precedence to social over political reform, it is necessary to consider whether there is such a sharp line of demarcation between social and political matters as must be drawn in order to give effect to this demand. I confess I think such a line cannot be logically drawn. The division is one which in many respects is one of convenience only. And even those matters which are mainly and to a great extent social have most important political aspects, and *vice versa*. Take education. It is an agency of vital importance alike for political and social purposes. Or again, take the removal of the prohibition against a voyage to England. The social importance of this is obvious. But the political value of it also is equally manifest, especially now when we have just welcomed the Indian Delegates back to their own country. Take again the question in reference to which this controversy has been raised. The question of infant marriage is a social one. But the modes suggested for remedying the evil raise great political issues, touching the

province of legislation, and the true functions and limits of State activity. Therefore it is clear, that these political and social questions are so intertwined one with the other, that a hard and fast line cannot in practice be drawn between them. And consequently, even if the preference suggested could be justified in theory, it would not be feasible to enforce it in practice.

But now, assuming that it is practicable to work on the basis of such a preference being given to social over political reform, let us inquire on what ground of reason such a preference can be laid down. I have endeavoured to follow the whole controversy as it has been going on for some time past. And I have come across only two reasons in favour of the preference thus suggested. First it is said, that slavery at home is incompatible with political liberty. Now, when understood in its true sense, I have no quarrel with this principle. I am prepared to concede, and indeed I hold the doctrine myself very strongly, that the true spirit of political liberty must be only skin-deep, if so much, in the man who can actively maintain or even passively tolerate slavery within his own household. But I apprehend, that for the application of this principle, you must have a conscious tyranny on the one side and a slavery that is felt

to be slavery on the other. Without this consciousness on both sides, I hold that the principle would be incorrect. Now, how does the matter stand in the case before us? Have we in truth got to deal with a case of conscious tyranny and felt slavery? I say, certainly not. I say, that so far as we have tyranny and slavery in the case, we have only a case of the tyranny of the past, the present being bound in slavery to it. It is not, as it is often represented, a case of male tyrants and female slaves to any notable extent. We are all—men and women, widows and widowers, children and adults—slaves, if that is the proper expression, to ancient custom. Remember this further. As regards all those burning questions, which just now trouble us in connexion with social reform; as regards enforced widowhood, infant marriage, voyages to England, and so forth; the persons who are supposed to be our slaves are really in many respects our masters. You talk of the duty which lies upon us of breaking the shackles off their feet, but they will have none of this breaking off of the shackles. To a great extent they do not feel the shackles, and they decline to let us break them. They protest against that interference with and desecration of their ancient and venerable traditions, which, from their point of view, is involved in this

course of enfranchisement. Therefore I hold, that the phrase "household slavery," as used in this controversy, is an entire misnomer. It is these so-called slaves within our households, who form our great difficulty. And under these circumstances, I venture to say, that the sort of "household slavery" that in truth prevails among us, is by no means incompatible with political liberty. The position in fact is this. Here we have what may, for convenience, be treated as two spheres for our reforming activities. There is slavery in the one sphere, and there is slavery in the other, and we are endeavouring to shake off the slavery in the one sphere as well as in the other. I can see no reasonable objection to this course. That course is a perfectly legitimate one, and as Mr. Herbert Spencer has pointed out, it is also shown to be the natural one by scientific observation.

Let us now go on to the next reason alleged in favour of the precedence claimed for social over political reform. It is said that a nation socially low cannot be politically great, that history shows no instance of such a condition. Now if this means that political and social progress go on together, that the spirit of progress working in the political sphere always manifests itself in greater or less vigour in the social sphere, I at once

admit it. The passage from Mr. Spencer's essay, which I quoted in my letter to Mr. Malabari, and which merely sums up the result of a full discussion marked by all Mr. Spencer's acumen and comprehensive grasp, shows that very clearly. But this is a very different thing indeed from the proposition involved in the present argument. It is not enough, as thus understood, to justify the preference demanded. For that purpose, it is necessary to prove that in a social condition that is at any given period unsatisfactory, political greatness is unattainable, and political progress not to be achieved. To *this* proposition, I confess I cannot see that history affords any support. And I hold, indeed, that the lessons to be deduced from history run exactly counter to this. Look at that brilliant episode in the history of India which is connected with the names of Sivaji, and the subsequent Maratha rulers—an episode on which our memories still love to dwell. I have been recently reading several of the Bakhars or chronicles of those times which have been published. And judging from them, I cannot find that the social condition of that period was very much superior to the social condition that is now prevailing. We had then infant marriage and enforced widowhood; we had imperfect female education; we had also

the practice of Sati, though that never was a very wide-spread practice. Confining our attention to the subjects involved in the practical controversy now going on, and to subjects kindred to it, it is plain, I think, that the palm of superiority cannot be awarded to the period covered by the achievements of the great Maratha power. Yet there can be no doubt, that politically those achievements were very brilliant, and that they implied great political progress, at least within the limits of their principal home. If we go back to a still earlier period, we have evidence in the writings of that famous Chinese traveller, Hiouen-Tsang who came to this country in the seventh century A.D., of a prosperous political condition, while the facts of the social condition do not indicate any very great superiority over what prevails now. The caste system was then in force. And we have it expressly and distinctly stated by Hiouen Tsang that in those days widow marriage was not practised. There you have one mark of "household slavery" certainly, yet the political condition of the provinces in Northern India ruled by Harshavardhana, or of our own part of the country, then governed by the great Pulakesi, was by no means a bad one. But it may be said that our materials for a correct picture of those times are not satis-

factory, and that it will not be quite safe to draw such inferences from our imperfect materials. I do not wish to impugn this view. I must admit certainly that the materials are not quite satisfactory. And therefore I will ask you for a little while to join with me in considering the lessons to be derived from the history of a country, whose history we can ascertain from much more satisfactory materials—a history, too, which we are sometimes charged with knowing better than we know the history of our own country. Let us look at the history of the country which we believe, and are happy in believing, to be at the very top of the political ladder to-day; let us look at the history of England in the seventeenth century A.D., the materials for which are easily accessible, and have been digested for us by such classic historians as Hallam, for instance, and Lord Macaulay. The political history of England in the seventeenth century is pretty familiar to us. The beginning of the century synchronises with the close of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, in whose time, after a pretty long period of enjoyment by the Crown of almost uncontrolled power, the rights and privileges of the people had begun to be asserted. I pass over the reign of James I and come to that of Charles I. Here you have the achieve-

ments of that brilliant galaxy of political workers, containing Hampden, the Five Members, the great men of the Long Parliament. You have then the battles of the first English Revolution, as it has sometimes been called, winding up with the proceedings of the tribunal over which Bradshaw presided, and the final catastrophe of the execution of King Charles I. A republican might object to the phrase catastrophe, but as there was a destruction of the life of one of God's creatures, it is, I hope, allowable to speak of the event as a catastrophe. Well, we pass on then to the protectorate of Cromwell, a tangible embodiment of the assertion of popular power against the Crown. Then we come after the Restoration to the well known Habeas Corpus Act. And after the short and inglorious reign of James II, we come to the great Revolution of 1688. Then we have the Declaration of Rights and Bill of Rights, till finally we reach the Act of Settlement at the very close of the seventeenth century. It would not be easy, I should say, to find out in history many parallels to the course of political progress indicated by the events I have now alluded to—a course which not merely improved the condition of England at the time, but has been followed up by greater or less progress of a similarly salutary character since, and

is being still so followed up in our own day. Listen to the words of the judicial Hallam in regard to the political position achieved by England at the close of the seventeenth century. "The Act of Settlement," he says "is the seal of our constitutional laws, the complement of the Revolution itself, and the Bill of Rights the last great statute which restrains the power of the Crown, and manifests in any conspicuous degree, a jealousy of Parliament in behalf of its own and the subjects' privileges. The battle had been fought and gained. The voice of petition, complaint, or remonstrance, is seldom to be traced in the Journals. The Crown in return desists altogether not merely from the threatening or objugatory tone of the Stuarts, but from that dissatisfaction sometimes apparent in the language of William; and the vessel seems riding in smooth water, moved by other impulses and liable perhaps to other dangers than those of the ocean wave and tempest." So much for the political condition. And now let us see what was the social condition of England, at the time when her people were achieving these glorious political successes. The materials are collected ready to our hands in an elaborate chapter, the third or fourth, of Lord Macaulay's History of England—on the condition of England in 1685.

Those who wish to examine the question for themselves must read that chapter in the original. I cannot go now into all the topics there expatiated on. The condition of the working classes, and the agriculturists, the state of the means of communication, the extraordinary extent to which children were overworked for the benefit, in the result, of the adult population, the looseness and obscenity of general conversation, these are all dwelt on in the interesting pages of Macaulay. I will not say more about them. I will only draw attention particularly to two points. The first relates to the state of female education. Macaulay gives as an instance of the miserable state of female education, and merely as an instance of what was only too common at the time, the ignorance of such a person as Queen Mary, the wife of William III.—her ignorance of her own vernacular, the classical languages being, of course, out of the question. The ignorance is shown in a sentence endorsed by Queen Mary herself on a copy of a book, a Bible, I think, presented to her. The English is such as a boy in our sixth standard classes could easily improve. I have copied out the words here, and I will read them to you. "This book," so runs the endorsement, "was given the King and I at our coronation." That is one point. Another, also

noted by Macaulay, is that husbands "of decent station," as Macaulay is careful to note, were not ashamed, in those days, of cruelly beating their wives. Well, as I said before, I need not go into further details. These are enough to demonstrate, that at the politically glorious epoch we are now surveying, the social condition of England in regard to the relations of the sexes, was by no means of a highly creditable character. Look again at the England of to-day. Politically, she continues to be as great, and as prosperous, and as energetic in advancement, as ever. How is she socially? I have noted down here a point or two in regard to this, which is worthy of consideration. But I wish to say a word of warning before I refer to these points themselves. On this as well as on the last point, I refer only to existing social evils. This is necessary for the argument. But I must not be understood as supposing for one instant, that these evils afford a satisfactory picture of the social condition of England, taken as a whole, whether in the seventeenth century or at the present day. I have not the privilege of a personal knowledge of the social condition of England even at the present day. But from all I have read and seen here; from all I have heard from those of our friends who have had the inestimable privilege of seeing with their

own eyes England and English social life; especially from what I have heard from our distinguished friends who have only just returned; and among them, too, especially my excellent friend Mr. Ramaswami Mudliar of Madras, who has publicly spoken on this subject; from all this, I have formed a conclusion, which I have no hesitation in plainly avowing, that in my judgment the social condition of England is, in many important respects, immensely superior to that of any of the sections of our Indian community. I hope this open avowal will prevent any misunderstanding of my meaning in what I have said on this subject, and also in what I am going to say. Of the detailed points, then, that I have noted, I pass over one which I had intended to refer to, but which, on second thoughts, I consider to be so liable to misapprehension that it had better be omitted. And I will refer first to the question of women's rights. That was a question on which, as we all know, the late John Stuart Mill felt, thought, and wrote, very strongly. But what has been the result of it? His very eloquent treatise on the Subjection of women has not yet had any appreciable result, as regards the practical enforcement of its doctrines, while Mr. Mill himself was, in his lifetime, ridiculed for his out-of-the-way views. Great is truth and it

prevails, says the Latin proverb, and our own Sanskrit maxim is to the same effect—Truth alone is victorious, not untruth. But for the present, the truth enunciated by Mill is not in the ascendant. Again, it was only the other day, in this very Hall, that we were informed how the relations of the working classes and the aristocratic party in England were constituted, and how the former felt a genuine and fervent sympathy with the wants and wishes of the Indian population, because they felt that in their own country and by their own people, they were treated in much the same way as we are here. Does that indicate a satisfactory social condition? Or again, let me refer to the telegram received only this afternoon, about a grand Socialist meeting of 20,000 people in Hyde Park. One of the Socialist orators there declared, that there would be bloodshed, unless social reform—by which I understand him to mean a reform in the relations of the different classes of society,—was granted. Can we say, that that is altogether as it should be? There is one more point that I would wish to refer to here, especially because it affords an even closer parallel to our condition than those to which I have now alluded. Marriage with a deceased wife's sister is at present prohibited in England. The movement for the removal

of this prohibition is not one of yesterday. It is an old one, and has gone on for many years. On the last occasion that it was solemnly discussed, the reform was obstructed, and successfully obstructed, by those who correspond in English society to our priesthood. There you have the case of a social reform, which comes as near as possible to the social reforms required among us—reforms, that is to say, of social regulations intertwined closely with religious, or what are regarded as religious, ordinances. How, then, does the whole matter stand? In this England of ours, this England, where political reform is advancing by leaps and bounds, where political affairs attract such attention as is shown by the commotion of the General Election just closed—in this England, there are still social evils, huge and serious social evils, awaiting remedy. To them attention is not directed with anything like the force and energy bestowed on political affairs—even until bloodshed is threatened. Where, then, is the lesson of history which we are asked to deduce and act upon? Once more I say, that my remarks must not be understood as implying for a moment, that I am comparing our social condition with that of England. I am doing nothing of the sort. I am only pointing the lesson taught by the contemporary

history of England—that political progress can be achieved, and is being achieved before our eyes, where social evils still remain unremedied, and where they receive but a comparatively small fraction of the attention and reforming energy of the people.

And now having dealt with the only two arguments that I have come across in support of the theory that social reform must precede political reform, I must pass on to the next branch of my observations. But before I do so, I wish to say one word. A good deal more might be said on this question of the true lesson taught by history. But having said what I have said, I think it is unnecessary to further labour the point, as the view I have taken is that which is implied in the practical advice given by Mr. Wordsworth, whose authority—especially on questions like this one, concerning the philosophy of history—may safely be pronounced to be unequalled in Bombay,

Well, then, having dealt with and shown what I conceive to be the fallacy of the arguments urged in support of the affirmative of the question which forms the subject of this evening's discourse, I will now proceed to state the arguments which appear to me to support the negative answer to that ques-

tion. And first, it seems to me to be plainly a maxim of prudence and common sense, that reform ought to go, as I may say, along the line of least resistance. Secure first the reforms which you can secure with the least difficulty, and then turn your energies in the direction of those reforms where more difficulty has to be encountered. You will thus obtain all that vigour which the spirit of reform must derive from success, and thus carry out the whole work of progress with greater promptitude than if you go to work the other way. This is the principle we actually act upon within the sphere of political activity itself. How, then, can we be justly twitted for applying the same principle as between the two spheres of political and social activity? Now if this principle is correct, it leads manifestly to the conclusion that more energy ought just now to be devoted to political than to social reform. Remember, I am not asking that our reforming energies should be confined to the political sphere. Far from it. I entirely repudiate that principle. And I don't think you could carry it out if you would. As pointed out in the quotation from Mr. Spencer's essay given in my letter to Mr. Malabari—I must ask to be excused for referring to that letter so frequently—as there pointed out, the spirit which impels to political reform

must needs burst forth in other directions also, more or less frequently, with greater or less force. I have not the remotest idea of laying an embargo on its outgoings in those directions. But this I do say, that political reform is entitled to a greater share of our energies than social, under the circumstances we have got to deal with. Every one of us cannot devote himself to every one of the numerous reforms which are wanted. Extraordinary natural gifts may enable one person, like, for instance, my friend Mr. Ranade, to devote himself successfully to many modes of activity at one and the same time. But this is not possible to us all. Therefore in dividing our energies, if we have to divide them, between political and social reform, I hold that the greater portion of our energy legitimately can, and therefore ought to be devoted to the former. And now mark how the result I allege follows from the application of the line-of-least resistance principle. What are the forces opposed to us, if I may use that compendious expression? On the one side, we have a government by a progressive nation, which is the benign mother of free nations—a nation which, by its constituted authorities, has solemnly and repeatedly declared, and in some measure practically shown the sincerity of its declarations, that it is ready to admit us to full

political rights, when we show that we deserve them and shall use them well. On the other side, we have an ancient nation, subject to strong prejudices; not in anything like full sympathy with the new conditions now existing in the country; attached, perhaps "not wisely but too well," to its own religious notions with which the proposed social reforms are closely, intimately, and at numberless points inter-twined; loving all its own genuine hoary traditions—and some of its very modern ones also which it supposes to be hoary—yet often failing to understand the true meaning and significance of both classes of traditions. As between these two groups of what I have called, only for convenience of phrase, opposing forces, can there be any reasonable doubt how the line of least resistance runs? If we compare the Government and the Hindu population to two forts facing the army of reform, can there be any doubt that the wisest course for that army is to turn its energies first towards the fort represented by the Government, where we have numerous and powerful friends among the garrison, and which is held against us only in order to test first whether we shall be able to properly use any larger powers that may be conceded to us there? As to the other fort, the case is as far as possible from being one of *veni vidi*

vici. The soldiers of the old garrison are not in the least ready to "give up," and in some respects we have yet got even to forge, and to learn to wield, the weapons by which we have to fight them.

Again, in politics, argument goes a great way; in social reform, it goes for very little, seeing that feeling and tradition are involved in it to a very large extent indeed. In politics, even such a thinker as Sir Fitzjames Stephen is content to resort to reason. He says, that if the people of India want free institutions, without wire-pulling from English Radicals, let them by all means have such institutions. Sir Fitzjames Stephen's objection is only to the concession of such institutions, when they are not asked for in India, only to prove a pet theory of English politicians. In presence of such champions of the existing order of things, logic is an instrument of power. But where feeling and tradition are the authorities appealed to, logic is almost impotent. You must then make up your minds—still to use logic, of course, but only as a subordinate agency—and you must rely more on a long, patient, toilsome, process of diverting the feelings, or to express it differently, making the soil unfit for the growth of these misplaced sentiments and misunderstood traditions, in the same

way as, according to a great scientific teacher, science does not attack the weed of superstition directly, but renders the mental soil unfit for its cultivation. You cannot say, you ought not to say here, "cut this down, why cumbereth it the ground." You must improve here, you must infuse new vitality and new vigour into the old growth. In one word, to go back once again to our old political phraseology, we have here got, like Disraeli, to educate our party, which always must be, and in this case must particularly be, a lengthy and laborious operation.

Once more. In political matters we can all unite at once. Hindus, Musulmans, Parsis, the people of Eastern India, Southern India, Western India, Northern India,—all can unite, and not only can do so in theory, they have actually done so in fact, as demonstrated at the National Congress held last Christmas. What is the secret of this? The answer is obvious. The evils, or supposed evils, are common; the remedies, not being in any way mixed up with any very powerful traditions, are also the same; and all intelligent Indian opinion is necessarily unanimous. In regard to social matters, the conditions are all altered. The evils, for one thing, are not identical. The surrounding conditions are excessively various. The force of tra-

ditions and old memories is not equal all round. And the remedies, therefore, that suggest themselves to different minds are almost of necessity different. It is plain, then, that the advantages to secure which we can all unite ought to be tried for first, so that we may obtain the benefit of the fraternal feeling which must be generated by such co-operation. If political reform is thus secured by the concerted action of all the educated classes in India, that must, and inevitably will, tell favourably on the advancement of social reform. Reading Mr. Cotton's book on *New India* the other day, I came across a passage germane to this topic, which I have copied out here and shall read to you. "Bereft of political independence," says he, "their ideas of collective action cannot have that impress of sound logic and morality which collective action alone can impart to them. A considerable degree of unity in thought and action has lately been established in political matters, and it may be hoped, therefore, that there will shortly be a similar manifestation in regard to moral and social questions." What Mr. Cotton says here is not only perfectly true, but I venture to think it is somewhat understated. In regard to moral and social questions, in the same way as with regard to political ones, there is a great deal more unity al-

ready established than he supposes. The difference there, too—as regards the goal to be reached—is but slight. The real difference is—and that I admit is at present very wide—as to the roads for reaching the goal. Some believe in legislation, some in State aid, and some are inclined to trust to the development from within of the energy of the community. Such and other important differences exist in the modes suggested for effecting reforms. But about the substantive reforms themselves, there is but little—I don't deny that there is a little—difference of views. But the general unity is not thereby marred. And the want of unity in details here referred to is due to various circumstances like those already indicated, and must gradually cease to exist.

One of our Anglo-Vernacular newspapers recently asked, how the progress of political reform was expected to tell on the advance of social reform. I say, we have just indicated one mode in which this operation will take place. In political matters, we are learning—and learning more easily than we should do in any other department of activity—the lesson, that we must act in concert, that to this end we must give and take, and sink smaller differences for the one common purpose. This, and lessons like this, when we are thoroughly imbued with

them, will form the best possible equipment for the work of social reform that lies before us. We must act together, we must disarm opposition, we must conciliate those opposed to us. Such are the modes of action which we are learning in the course of our political activity. These we shall have to apply in the performance of our duty in the social sphere. Let us remember further, that with political independence, to a certain extent, goes a great capacity for social advancement. This is not a mere empty speculation. It is a theory in support of which historical testimony can be adduced. Sir H. Maine has pointed out in regard to the Hindu Law as administered by our Indian courts, that it has now assumed a stiffness, rigidity, and inflexibility, which formed no feature of the system before British rule. In the days of the Peshva *regime* again—a *regime* which many among us are apt to look upon as very anti-liberal and narrow—there was a liberalising process going on, which, if I may be permitted to use that figure, must make one's mouth water in these days. The story of Parashuram Bhau Patvardhan is a familiar one. That brave soldier-statesman had almost made up his mind to get a favourite daughter, who had become a widow in youth, remarried. He had to abandon that intention, it is true, but still the very

fact that such an idea should have entered his mind, and should have been placed by him before those by whom he was surrounded, and that these latter should have deprecated it in the very mild manner that they seem to have done—these are facts worthy of being pondered over. Coupling them with such facts as I see in the *Bakhars*, regarding the behaviour of the Peshvas with Jivba Dada, the entertainment of Musulmans and Hindus at dinner together on occasion of the marriage of Savai Madhavrav Peshva, the marriage of the Peshva Balaji Bajirao with a daughter of a Desastha family, I confess I am inclined strongly to draw the inference, which I have held for a long time, that if Peshva rule had continued a little longer, several of the social reforms which are now giving us and the British Government so much trouble would have been secured with immensely greater ease.

And now I come to the last of the points I wish to address myself to this evening. I do so the more readily now, because I am afraid I have trespassed already too long on your attention. The remark of Sir A. Colvin which I alluded to at the beginning of this address, assumed that as a matter of fact we were devoting an extravagant proportion of our time and energy to the subject of political reform, and neglecting almost entirely—so it

appears to me to have assumed—the subject of social reform. I cannot admit this to be the fact at all. I can well understand, how such an incorrect impression should arise among those whose acquaintance with what is going on in Indian Society is from the outside, and derived from newspapers and other similar sources. In the case of political reform, it is of the very essence of the thing that a great deal should be done through the agency of newspapers. Nobody, I am sure, will suspect me of undervaluing the utility of the press in all works of reform. But I must own, that I do not think social questions are much the worse for not being talked about so much through the newspapers as political questions. For see how different the two cases are in regard to this point. In regard to politics, the efforts made so far have, as a general but not by any means as a universal rule, addressed themselves to those who come within the circle of the influence of the press. For one thing, the officers of Government have to be kept informed in regard to what is thought, felt, or desired by the people. One of the best means of effecting this is afforded by newspapers. Again, superior officers of the British Government have often to be informed of the doings of their subordinates, and informed in such a way as to enforce attention. The

newspaper press is a most potent instrument for use in such cases. But in the case of social evils, the party to be educated is to a great extent beyond the ambit of the newspaper's influence. It does not often get into the way of the newspaper, and it is too thick-skinned to be touched to the quick on that side. The mode of operation, accordingly, must here be necessarily different, although, of course, even here the newspaper is of use as an indirect means of education by way of "filtration;" and also as a means of communication with those sections of the old party that come nearest to the new; and further as a means of communication between the various sections or members of the new party itself. However, although reforming activity in the social sphere is thus usually less noisy than in the other sphere, it is not, therefore, any the less real. But before I go into details here, I am free to admit at once that the success we have achieved is excessively slight. But if I admit this, I wish to ask, whether any one is prepared to say that the success we have achieved in the political sphere is so very large after all, even with more favourable conditions? Admitting that we are miles and miles away from the goal in social reform, I hold that we are as yet equally far in political. We have made and are making prepar-

ations in both, and in both we have made a similar amount of progress. Let us glance at the facts. Female education is one of our principal items, as it is one of our principal means, of social reform. We have made some progress there. I am myself a great believer in the efficacy of female education, especially in connexion with general social reform of all descriptions. And, therefore, I need scarcely say that what we have done is small enough in all conscience. But we have done something. Our Parsi friends, with my venerable friend now in the chair as one of their great leaders, have made progress which puts us to shame. But though we are lagging behind, we too are doing something, as I need scarcely tell the members of the Students' Literary and Scientific Society. The girls at the Society's Schools have been for some time increasing in numbers. And recently we have added an Anglo-Vernacular Department to our schools, which, beginning with 12 girls in the first year, and containing 22 in the second, now opens its third year with as many as 60 girls. Again I say this is small enough, as no one can feel more strongly than I do. But it is, I will venture to say, perceptible progress. Then there is also the other great section of the Indian community—the Mahomedan. That section has

generally been regarded as averse to improvement—especially of the modern sort. But the important movement started by my excellent friend Mr. Badruddin Tyabji and his colleagues, has by its great success shown that the Mahomedan community, too, is socially moving forward. However, to return to other points connected with the social state of the Hindu community. The question of widow marriage has certainly advanced a great deal beyond the stage at which it was, say twenty years ago. The bonds of caste are getting looser, our friends are going to England with less difficulty, and more frequently, than before. [A Voice—What about infant marriage?] A friend there asks about the position of the infant marriage question. Well, even here we are not so bad as we were within the narrow span even of my own experience. The age of marriage is slowly rising. I admit again it is rising very slowly indeed, and the point it has now reached is low enough. Still there is no retrogression certainly, and there is some progress, however slight. And all these facts being such as I have pointed out, I venture to repeat, that we cannot fairly be censured for giving too exclusive attention to political at the expense of social reform.

And now, after all this discussion, I venture to

reiterate the opinion which I stated many months ago, that it is not possible to sever political from social reform altogether; that the two must go hand in hand, although the march may not in the case of both be with absolutely equal celerity. I say we must and ought to devote the greater portion of our energy to political reform, but so as still to keep alive a warm sympathy for social reform. To one like myself, who believes to a great extent in the philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer, this conclusion is not only a correct one, but almost the only one possible. But even to those who may not accept that philosophy, but who will look beneath the surface of things, to them, too, this conclusion must commend itself. Let us then all devote the bulk of our energies to political reform. Let us keep alive our sympathies with social reform and those who undertake them, and let us all help them to the extent of our powers. At all events, for God's sake, let us not set ourselves in antagonism to social reform. In this way only shall we best discharge the whole of the duty which lies upon us, the duty of reform in social as well as political matters. For I must repeat, that in my judgment they are both duties and must both be fairly attended to and discharged according to our circumstances and opportunities.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SOCIAL
CONFERENCE HELD AT ALLAHABAD
ON THE 30TH DECEMBER 1888.

Mr. K. T. Telang, said:—"In supporting the Resolution, which has now been proposed, I should like to make a few remarks on each of the six important topics with which it deals. And first as regard extravagance in marriage expenses, which is one of the crying evils of the time. That improvement is urgently needed in this matter there can be no question. I know of people going into debt, people begging about among friends and even among strangers, for the purpose of raising money to defray the expenses of the marriages of their male and female wards. Can anybody say that this is a state of thing, which ought to be allowed to last? Here we have no Shastra ordinances to break through, in order to effect the desired improvement. All that is wanted is that the prominent men in our society should see and appreciate the true conditions of the case, and thus create a public opinion that shall thresh this mischievous practice out of existence. This extravagance is merely a means for the "pride, pomp,

and circumstance" of a "grand" marriage, and serves no useful end whatever. It is a most appropriate field for the exercise by our society of its own powers and capacities for its own improvement. I may add that here, as in other matters, one of our chief difficulties will be amongst our women. It is difficult enough for the men among us to resist this love for an exhibition of wealth, which so many of our brethren are indulging in. It is still more difficult for our women to reconcile themselves to the idea of foregoing such exhibitions. But our duty here is to educate our women so as to co-operate with us, or at least not obstruct us, in this very important reform.

The next topic dealt with in this Resolution is the gradual raising of the marriageable age of our girls. It is hardly necessary in this assembly to argue that the limit of age for marriage must be gradually raised. Therefore, on this head, I will only make one remark. In discussing this matter we seem sometimes to move in a vicious circle. We cannot successfully raise the age of marriage for girls among any large portions of our community, without a wide spread of female education. And, on the other hand, any considerable spread of real female education is hardly feasible until the age of marriage is raised. There is a real

difficulty here, but the way to meet it is at one and the same time to push on female education to the extent it is possible, under present conditions, and to extend the limits of marriageable age in the same way. And as every advance is secured along either of these lines, the further advance will become more and more easy. Our progress in the later stages will be accelerated, if I may so say in geometrical progression. We need not, therefore, be at all afraid of the vicious circle just alluded to.

If we can secure the reforms now referred to, we shall have made very satisfactory progress indeed in our social improvement. The question of the marriage of child-widows will then become gradually less and less important. At present I am at a loss to appreciate the views of those who consider that there is nothing in the prevailing customs requiring improvement. I am much afraid that in this matter, more perhaps than many others, we are getting into the disastrous habit of shutting our eyes to our social shortcomings. I don't know how it may be in other parts of the country, but in our parts, I have noticed with much concern that in many quarters it appears to be thought that true patriotism consists in ignoring or denying our real defects, and in standing up for "our customs, right

or wrong." I can only say, that if this way of thinking is largely resorted to, we shall have to bid adieu for ever to all improvement, for obviously the first condition of all improvement is the recognition of an existing defect, or an existing evil. And if patriotism consists in refusing to recognise it, patriotism becomes an enemy of all progress, and an engine of mischief. Many of you may have heard, as I have, of the glorification of our custom regarding widows, on the ground that it gives scope for the exercise of the great womanly virtue of chastity. This would be perfectly true, if the widow's refusal to marry were a voluntary refusal. There can be but one feeling, and that a feeling of respect for the woman, who being at liberty to remarry chooses, of her own will, to pass her life in unswerving faith to her departed husband. But that unswerving faith, when it exists, is not quite so worthy of respect, when it is merely the result of the coercion or practical coercion of the society, in which the widow has to live and have her being. But further, for men who allow themselves the luxury of many wives in succession or even simultaneously, if they so please—for them to glorify an old custom in this fashion appears to me to be adding insult to injury. It reminds me of a Despatch sent to the Secretary of State by sir Richard

Temple, when Governor of Bombay, at the time of the Famine. In that Despatch, the unfortunate Bombay ryot, who had his land assessment wrung from him by the paternal Government of Sir Richard Temple, without any remission, was complimented by His Excellency on the spirit of self-reliance he had shown when subjected to that operation.

As regards the other kindred subject—the prevention of the disfigurement of child-widows—it is one on which, I think, I may fairly decline to say a single word. The inhumanity and iniquity of the operation cannot be made more clear by anything that I can say. The only consolation there is in regard to this matter is to be found in the fact that this barbarous custom is gradually dying out.

Passing next to the social disabilities attending sea-voyages to foreign countries, I may state my own opinion at the very outset. I cannot admit that, on the true construction of our old books, there is any such absolute prohibition against these voyages, as is commonly supposed. But I go further. I say if there was any such prohibition, we must now advance with the times, and cast aside all such prohibitions. The reasons for these prohibitions, which probably existed in old days when the conveniences for sea-voyages

were of the most primitive character, have now ceased. And the reasons ceasing, the prohibiting law must also cease. Attempts have been made to get our old Pandits and Shastris to accept, in substance, such views as I have now indicated. These attempts, within certain limits, I consider to be perfectly unobjectionable. But the Pandits and Shastris are, as a class, not men who can be expected to take practical views of these matters, and to advance with the times. Therefore, if once a question such as the present one is brought before them, and they deliberately decide against the progressive view, I think, it is better to agree to differ with them, and to leave them undisturbed in their own ways, while the newer generation goes along its own new lines.

Finally comes the question touching intermarriages between sections of a caste, which, even by a present existing custom, are allowed to dine together. Here, again, we have departed from the rule of our own old scriptures. They recognized only four castes at first. In our present circumstances, the number of castes into which the Hindu community is divided is four thousand more than four. The line along which improvement has to go, therefore, is here, again, the same as in so many other cases. Let us revert to the condition of things

in that earlier period, for which many of us are expressing so much gushing reverence in theory and talk. It is the comparatively modern period and the degenerations belonging to it, which we have to repudiate. The older condition of things will now be much more favourable to real progress ; and I, for one, shall be thoroughly satisfied, if on many of the matters now practically important we can securely occupy the position of advantage, which was occupied by our ancestors of the genuine old times."

**THIRD NATIONAL CONFERENCE.
HELD IN BOMBAY ON SATURDAY,
THE 29TH DECEMBER 1889.**

On the motion of Dewan Bahadur R. Ragoonath Rao, which was duly seconded, the Honourable Mr. K. T. Telang took the Chair.

Mr. Telang said :—

“In opening the proceedings of this meeting, I should like to make few preliminary remarks. At first everybody must admit it to be a matter of sincere congratulation, that at this third meeting of the Social Conference, we have present among us a few ladies of our own community. The question has been doubtless raised in England, whether women ought or ought not to enter into the heat and dust of political warfare. But whatever the true answer to that question may be, there can be no possible doubt, that in the sort of work we are to discuss to-day, the presence and co-operation of women is most desirable. And in order to carry out any of the reforms, which may be discussed at such gatherings, the help and co-operation of our ladies is absolutely essential. Therefore I think we may say that we have this year been enabled

to take one step forward. It may not be a long step, I don't think it is a long step taken by itself. But we may fairly look forward with hope to further progress and advancement, along the road on which the first short step has now been taken. Those who have hitherto criticized the National Congress and its proceedings, have, as we are aware, often twitted us with not paying sufficient attention to social reform, and devoting our energies exclusively to the political improvement of the country. I think I may fairly say that such gatherings as these, which have met every year since the time of the Madras Congress, afford an adequate and conclusive answer to those criticisms. But while I think this answer conclusive, I must also say that I think there is something in the criticisms from which we ought to derive some useful lesson. I have myself noticed, in the writings and speeches of many of our countrymen, a strong tendency towards devoting, I cannot say exclusive, but I must say an overwhelming share of attention to political matters. Social matters thus get entirely eclipsed, so to say, by political in some quarters, and that is the basis of truth in the criticisms to which I have alluded. Well, I think that to this extent, we ought in time to take warning from these criticisms, and as far as may be, set our

house in order. There is one other remark I wish to make. And that relates to a tendency which has also been noticeable in recent discussions to assume that social and political activities can be entirely dissociated, and to ignore the fact that the underlying principles in both groups of activities are in substance the same. We often hear propositions confidently asserted by many persons in the course of discussions on social topics, which when applied to politics, must lead to results that those persons entirely repudiate. No one will charge me with being an out and out imitator of European ways. I have not the slightest desire to adopt bodily the whole of the European social economy for myself or for our community. But at the same time I do hold most strongly to this view, that it is our bounden duty to study English social institutions, in the same way that we study English political institutions, so that we may consider how far they will suit the conditions among which we live and move. The adoption of English methods of work and of English ideals to be worked for, to which on the political side, we are so partial, is not a thing to be entirely scouted on the social side, in the way which may be observed in some quarters. The need for improvement in political matters is not greater than in social; and the prin-

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principles of improvement in both are in substance identical, whatever differences there may be in their applications. And therefore, it is my conviction that it is our duty to learn, correctly appreciate, and apply the real principles adopted by those who stand in the forefront of civilization as much in our social as in our political concerns."

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