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1. Report of the Federal Finance Committee,  
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2. Indian Round Table Conference (Third Session)  
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3. Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform.  
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4. Abstract of Tables giving the main Statis-  
tics of the Census of the Indian Empire  
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5. Report of the Indian Military College  
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EAST INDIA (CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS)

Report of the  
Federal Finance Committee

Dated 28th March, 1932

*Presented by the Secretary of State for India  
to Parliament by Command of His Majesty  
May, 1932*

LONDON

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## APPENDIX I.

*His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's address, 25th May 1931.*

In accordance with the Resolution adopted by the Round Table Conference, this Committee is a Committee of Experts, and our task is to work out the details for the establishment of a Military Training College in India for the purpose of training candidates for commissions in all arms of the Indian Defence Services, and prospective officers for the Indian State Forces.

We have done our best to collect as representative a body as possible but I am afraid we have not succeeded in pleasing everybody. May I therefore remind you that, in our deliberations, we must not forget the interests of those who are not directly represented here, and must try to take an impartial view of the claims and counter-claims of all who may be concerned.

Before proceeding with the business in front of us, I should like to say a few words on the subject of Indianization generally.

We all know the history of Indianization, and how, after many Committees and much discussion between the Home and Indian Governments, it was decided that an experiment should be started in which eight units are earmarked for Indianization, consisting of Infantry, Cavalry and a Pioneer Battalion. It was also decided that these units, and any other units that would be subsequently Indianized, should be organized on the British basis of officers, that is to say, that all officers down to platoon commanders, amounting to about 27 for each Battalion, should be King's Commissioned Officers. This involved the gradual elimination of the present Viceroy's commissioned officers.

This apparently, although it was announced by my predecessor in the Assembly and in an article in the Royal United Service Journal, has not been grasped either by the public or by the army. Nor had people realized that, if the present Indian King's commissioned officer is to continue to receive British rates of pay, it would considerably increase the cost of each Indianized unit—in the case of an Indian Infantry Battalion, for instance, by something like Rs. 50,000 per annum.

I myself had given close attention to the problem of further Indianization during the time I was Chief of the General Staff. I realized that, although the experiment of the eight units had not had time to prove itself, it was impossible to stand still, and that we must go on and Indianize further as soon as the eight units began to fill up with Indian King's commissioned officers.

I also realized that the eight units were not popular with either the Indian public or the young Indian officer. They used the term "segregation". This I never agreed with. The Indianizing of the Indian Army by putting into units officers who in many cases did not belong to the same class as the men in the ranks was obviously an experiment. Some of them, I think, are making good now; others are not—but it was an experiment which we who were responsible for military affairs in India had to recognise involved a certain amount of risk, and the only way it could prove itself was by completely Indianizing units as soon as possible and giving the Indian full responsibility without the aid of British officers.

Further, we do not fight in modern war by means of a heterogeneous collection of units. We fight in what are known as formations—Brigades, Divisions, Corps; and each Division has to be complete and self-supporting in itself, with its Cavalry, Infantry, Engineers, Artillery and possibly Tanks or Armoured Cars, and all its administrative services.

I have therefore proposed to the Government that we shall at once start to Indianize a complete Division of the Indian Army of all arms and *et ceteras*. This means that, for the first time we make a real start with an Indian Army as a fighting proposition and not merely an experiment.

Some may say that, although we hope to arrange for an intake into the new Sandhurst, of 60 or thereabouts, this is going far too slow. I, however, am quite unable to advise Government to experiment with a larger number of units than this will mean, until such time as we can see a little more clearly whether an Army officered by Indians is going to be a fighting proposition.

At the present moment, the young Indian officers in the eight units have seven years' service. That is obviously not long enough for us to tell whether they are going to be fit to administer and train a unit in peace and lead it in war. In seven more years, however, they will have had fourteen years' service, and by that time I feel pretty certain we shall be able to give a definite opinion whether they are going to be a complete success or not; and we need not wait until a further seven years, which would bring young officers now in the Army up to 21 years' service and approaching the time when they would command units, before we decide to carry the experiment further.

With fourteen years' service, I feel convinced that these young officers will have shown themselves fit or not fit, and it will then be an easy matter to increase Indianization by Brigades or Divisions, as the authorities of the moment think fit, because by that time they will have no doubts in their minds as to whether they are conducting an experiment or building up an Indian Army that will be a reliable instrument for carrying out the onerous duties of the military forces in India.

In dealing with the expansion of Indianization, our object is to create a recognised combatant force on a purely Indian basis, which would in time replace a force of a similar size in the Imperial Army. For it is by the gradual replacement of Imperial fighting formations alone that India will be able eventually to assume responsibility for her own defence.

A programme that takes no account of indeterminate factors cannot be of any real value; for instance, between 1918 and 1930, 175 vacancies have been offered, and only 153 have been filled. Excluding 42 now at Sandhurst, that leaves 111 who ought to have passed through Sandhurst. Of these, 86 received commissions, but only 71 are actually serving in the Army to-day. That represents a wastage of 64 per cent., which I think you will agree with me is high.

Our first task is to create a steady flow of fine young officers. Once that is established, we can then proceed to expand as much as you like. Up to that point, however, I see no alternative to developing Indianization within a definite field. Accordingly we must fix our intake to start with, and trust to increasing that figure as soon as we are assured that a regular supply of candidates of the requisite qualifications is forthcoming, and that the class of candidate we are getting is of the right type.

I would ask the Committee, therefore, to concentrate particularly on the question of the supply of suitable candidates, as this seems to me to be the crux of the whole problem. It is the preliminary training of the boy between the years of nine and eighteen that counts. What we require in military officers is not only education but the qualities of character, leadership, and a sense of responsibility; these can be developed only by a regular system of discipline in schools. Such a system exists in British Public Schools, and we have done our best to introduce it into Dehra Dun and the King George's Schools.

## APPENDIX II.

## COURSE AT THE COLLEGE.

1. *General Remarks.*—The same standard on passing out of the College should be maintained as at the R. M. C., Sandhurst.

The object of the course should be the same ; namely,—

- (a) To give the cadet a broad view of his profession as a whole and his responsibilities as a servant of the State ;
- (b) To inculcate and develop the essential military characteristics of leadership, discipline and physical fitness, and a high sense of duty.

No attempt should be made to turn out a cadet as a trained executive officer. It is with his unit that his training in the details of his professional and technical duties must be completed.

2. *Division of year.*—It is proposed that—

- (a) the year be divided into two terms ;
- (b) the whole course should consist of six terms ;
- (c) each year's course be divided into two terms, and two periods of vacation, totalling three months. Several of us, however, including Sir George Anderson, Mr. Mukarji, and Colonel Haughton are of opinion that a total of three months in the year will prove to be too short a period for vacations. They point out that terms of excessive length are likely to engender staleness in teachers and pupils alike ; and they fear that the vacations will not be long enough to enable instructional and administrative staffs to prepare adequately for the next term's work.

3. *Subjects.*—These should be divided into two main sections as follows :—

*Section I.*—“ General Military Education ”, including the study of Organization and Administration.

*Section II.*—“ Detailed Military Education.”

Each Section should consist of certain obligatory and certain voluntary subjects, as follows :—

(a) *Obligatory subjects* :—

History, Geography and Strategy.

Civil Organisation and Administration, Book-keeping and Accountancy leading to Military Organisation and Administration.

Law.

Drawing (Engineer candidates should be required to pass a qualifying test in this subject at the end of the second year).

Elementary Mathematics.

Mechanics (Workshops).

Tactics, Map Reading and Field Sketching and Field Engineering.

English.

(b) *Voluntary subjects*, of which two only may be taken :—

Higher Mathematics.

Economics, including Modern History.

Electricity, Physics and Chemistry.

(c) In addition there will, of course, be the following :—Drill, Shooting, Physical Training and Equitation. (Equitation should not commence until the third term.)

(d) *Weapon training.*—The cadet will be taught the theory, tactical application and co-operation of all arms and weapons with the object of enabling him readily to assume the position of a leader and instructor within his unit.

He will not be taught such details of his weapons as can be learned in his unit's training cadre, except in so far as are required for the carrying out of tactical schemes.

4. *Allotment of work.*—The week should consist of 30 hours work, Wednesdays and Saturdays should be half holidays, and Sundays whole holidays.

5. *Examination and allotment of marks.*—The system carried out at the R. M. C. with regard to the examination and allotment of marks should be followed, viz. :—

(a) Only one examination will be held, and will be carried out by external examiners at the end of the course.

Papers in this examination will consist of alternative questions covering the whole period of the course.

(b) Certain marks are at the disposal of the General Staff officers, in their roles as Chief Instructors and as Company Commanders.

(i) Chief Instructor's marks are allotted for work carried out in their sections during each term.

(ii) Company Commander's marks are awarded, on the progress made by the cadet in general behaviour, drill, physical training, and equitation, and on the manner in which he has carried out the duties of his rank.

6. A table showing the examination and allotment of marks, as suggested, is shown below :—

NOTE.—This allotment is proportionate to the number of hours given to each subject during the course.

Period.	1st Term.	2nd Term.	3rd Term.	4th Term.	5th Term.	6th Term.	Final Examination.	Total marks for Course.
(1) Section I ..	200	300	400	300	600	600	800 (Two indoor papers.)	3,200
(2) Section II ..	100	200	400	400	700	700	600 (One indoor paper and one outdoor examination.)	3,100
(3) Voluntary subjects.	(a) { ..	..	50	100	150	200	400	900
	(b) { ..	..	50	100	150	200	400	900
(4) Company Commander ..	200	200	400	400	600	600	..	2,400
Total Marks ..	500	700	1,300	1,300	2,200	2,300	2,200	10,500


7. A cadet should obtain at least forty per cent. of the total marks in each subject, and at least sixty per cent. of the total marks in all subjects taken together.



APPENDIX III.

*Organisation of the College.*

1. It is suggested that the College, when in full working order, *i.e.*, after 2½ years, should be organized as follows:—



This makes a total of 19 officers:—

Commandant	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Assistant Commandant (G. S. O.1)	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Adjutant	..	—	..	..	..	..	1
Quartermaster	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Medical Officer	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
G. S. O., 2nd Grade	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Officer Instructors	—	—	—	—	—	—	12

2. The above instructional staff of officers has been worked out for total establishment of 150 cadets, with an average strength in each class of 12. Any increase up to a total establishment of 225 cadets will not require any additional staff, as extra numbers up to a maximum of 18 can be taken into each class.

3. The steps considered necessary to work up to the full establishment are shown in the table below :—

	1st year.	2nd year.	3rd year.
Commandant .. .. .	1	1	1
Assistant Commandant .. .. .	1	1	1
Adjutant .. .. .	1	1	1
Quartermaster .. .. .	1	1	1
Medical Officer .. .. .	1	1	1
G. S. O., 2nd Grade .. .. .	2	2	2
Officer Instructors .. .. .	4	8	12
<b>Total .. .. .</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>19</b>

4. The proportion of officers to cadets at the various Military Colleges are shown below for comparison :—

	Number of Officers.	Number of Cadets.	Proportion of officers to cadets.	Remarks.
R. M. C., Sandhurst ..	47	550	1 : 12	
R. M. A., Woolwich ..	34	180	1 : 5½	
R. A. F. College, Cranwell ..	30	100	1 : 3½	
Indian Sandhurst—				
(a) .. .. .	19	150	1 : 8	(a) Without I. S. F. cadets.
(b) .. .. .	19	225	1 : 12	(b) With I. S. F. cadets.

It is proposed that the normal tenure of appointments should be :—

- (a) Commandant, Assistant Commandant, and Adjutant .. 4 years.  
 (b) Officer Instructors .. .. . 3 years.  
 (c) O. R. Instructors .. .. . 2 years.

*Note.*—It is realized that the above may have to be modified for the original staff to ensure continuity.

6. The Assistant Commandant should be responsible to the Commandant for the organization and supervision of all educational training.

7. The two General Staff Officers, as chief instructors in each section, each with six officer instructors to assist, should be responsible for all subjects in their respective sections.

8. Of the officer instructors, one should be qualified to supervise equitation, and one to supervise physical training.

9. *Other Ranks.*—The following *British* instructional staff is considered essential when the College is in full working order, in addition to the above :—

*For drill*—

- one R. S. M. (H. Q. Staff).  
 two C. S. Ms. }  
 two C. Q. M. Ss. } one each per company.

*For equitation—*

One W. O. and two N. C. Os. (H. Q. Staff).

In addition, two Indian N. C. Os. for stable supervision, and 40 horses.

*For P. T.*—One W. O. and two N. C. Os. (H. Q. Staff).

10. The steps considered necessary to work up to the full establishment are shown in the table below :—

				1st Term.	2nd Term.	3rd Term.	3rd Year.	
<i>Drill—</i>								
R. S. M.	..	..	..	1	1	1	1	
C. S. M.	..	..	..	1	1	2	2	
C. Q. M. S.	..	..	..	1	1	2	2	
<i>P. T.—</i>								
W. O. ...	..	..	..	1	1	1	1	
N. C. O.	..	..	..	1	1	2	2	
<i>Equitation—</i>								
W. O.	..	..	..		1	1	1	
N. C. O.	..	..	..	..	1	1	2	
Horses	..	..	..	..	..	20	40	
Total W. Os. and N. C. Os.				..	5	7	10	11
Horses				..	..	20	40	

11. To start with, a band is not considered necessary.

The establishment of religious teachers, clerks, buglers, Q. M. establishment, grounds men, syces and servants can be worked out later.

12. *General*—Particular stress is laid on the necessity for the provision of the following :—

Rifle and revolver ranges.

Drill sheds.

Open air riding schools.

Well equipped sports grounds, squash and tennis courts, gymnasium and swimming baths.

A good library.

Up-to-date laboratories and workshops.

Electric installation throughout.

## MINUTES.

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## COVERING MINUTE.

I have had some difficulty in deciding upon the manner in which I, as Chairman of the Committee, should present these minutes to the Government of India, and through them to His Majesty's Government. Some of the minutes, or portions of them, are clearly expressions of dissent from recommendations in the Report. But the greater part of the material contained in these minutes consists either of criticisms of the terms of reference to the Committee, as laid down by the Government of India under instructions from His Majesty's Government, or of dissertations upon matters which have nothing to do with the details of the establishment of a military college, such as the rate and methods of Indianization, and the class composition of the ranks of the Indian Army. The decision of all such questions rests with those responsible for the defence and safety of India, namely, His Majesty's Government on the advice of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the Government of India on the advice of the Commander-in-Chief. These questions are not within the terms of reference, and have accordingly not been discussed by the Committee, nor dealt with in the Report. The position, therefore, is that six unofficial members of the Committee have submitted, in the form of minutes of dissent, opinions on technical matters which are outside the terms of reference, while the remaining twelve members of the Committee, including officials who are experts in these matters, have had no opportunity of discussing, and are even precluded from commenting upon, those opinions.

I am not in a position, however, to discriminate between one minute and another. I therefore forward them as they stand.\* I must again emphasise that the portions of them to which I have referred have no connexion with the Report of the Committee, and that I and the majority of the Committee have necessarily had nothing to do with them, and are in no way associated with what they contain.

PHILIP W. CHETWODE,  
*General.*

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\*NOTE.—One of the minutes contains quotations from an unpublished and secret official document. These quotations have been omitted from the printed report, and their places indicated by asterisks.

*Minute by Sir Abdur Rahim, Rai Bahadur Chaudhri Chhotu Ram and Mr. S. N. Mukarji.*

1. As the establishment of a Military College is the first important step taken towards evolution of a national army in the country, we have naturally given our whole-hearted co-operation in working out the details of a proper scheme. We have signed the report, however, subject to the minutes of dissent, in which we have recorded our views on certain conditions and limitations which have been attached to the scheme by the majority of our colleagues, and which in our opinion tend to frustrate the object in view of the Round Table Conference in establishing this College.

This Committee was appointed by the orders of the Government of India, notified in the Gazette of the 23rd May 1931, quoted in the report, in order to work out the details of the establishment of a Military College in India "to train candidates for Commissions in all arms of Indian defence services" in accordance with the following definite Resolution of the Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference. We set out here in full this Resolution as it must be taken to be an integral part of the terms of reference.

"(1) The Sub-Committee consider that with the development of the new political structure in India, the defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people, and not of the British Government alone.

(2) In order to give practical effect to this principle they recommend :—

(a) That immediate steps be taken to *increase substantially the rate of Indianization* in the Indian Army to make it commensurate with the main object in view, having regard to all relevant considerations, such as the maintenance of the requisite standard of efficiency. (Mr. Jinnah dissented and desired a clear indication of the pace of Indianisation.)

(b) That in order to give effect to (a) a training college in India be established at the earliest possible moment, in order to train candidates for commissions in all arms of the Indian defence services. This college would also train prospective officers of the Indian State Forces. Indian cadets should, however, continue to be eligible for admission as at present to Sandhurst, Woolwich, and Cranwell.

(c) That in order to avoid delay the Government of India be instructed to set up a Committee of Experts, both British and Indian (including representatives of Indian States) to work out the details of the establishment of such a college.

(3) The Committee also recognise the great importance attached by Indian thought to the reduction of the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure and consider that the question should form the subject of early expert investigation."

2. In our opinion the scheme put forward by the official members of the Committee does not fulfil the requirements of the above resolution.

*“The defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people and not the British Government alone.”*

The first question that we have to consider under this head is: does the official scheme “increase substantially the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army”, the main object which the conference had in view in recommending the establishment of a military college in India. Clearly it does not. The Indian Army has an officer establishment of between 7 and 8 thousand of whom about two-thirds are Indians holding the Viceroy’s Commission and the rest are King’s Commissioned officers of whom 105 are Indians. These last received their training within the last ten years at Sandhurst and Woolwich, under an arrangement with the authorities in Britain by which 20 Indian cadets are admitted to Sandhurst, 6 to Woolwich and 3 to Cranwell every year, *i.e.*, 29 in all. The scheme favoured by our military colleagues is that the College should be so designed as to give an annual output of about 60 officers which would be obtained if the intake allowed sufficient margin for wastage. No allowance has however been made in the Report for wastage. We are not taking into account the 20 cadets for the State Forces whom this College will also train. An output of 60 officers a year at the first sight would appear to double the present rate of Indianisation and it might indeed produce that effect if it were not accompanied with the condition that the graduates of the College will displace the present Viceroy’s Commissioned officers in the Indianised units, a condition which makes the apparent increase in Indianisation by means of this College entirely illusory. It is taking away with one hand what is given by the other. We shall explain this more fully presently.

3. In the meantime we wish to record our belief that even if the output of 60 officers a year were guaranteed as a genuine contribution towards *increased* Indianisation, public opinion might not be satisfied with the scheme, especially having in regard the impending “development of the new political structure in India”. Even the schemes of the Shea Committee and the Skeen Committee were conceived on more generous lines. The College, as designed, would, if the present composition of the Indian Army units were to be retained, bring about Indianising of a little more than 1/3rd of the total officer establishment of the Indian Army which, as we are informed, consists of 4 divisions of the Field Army and 2 divisions of the covering and internal security troops and 6 Cavalry Brigades. In addition to the Viceroy’s Commissioned officers 874 King’s Commissioned officers will suffice to Indianise more than 2 complete divisions of all arms and 2 cavalry brigades including the administrative and ancillary services, the staff and ordnance, etc. With an output of 60 a year the Indianising process, we understand, will take about 20 years, allowing for wastage, to produce its full effects provided things run their normal course, and at the end of that period we shall have about 4 more divisions and 4 more cavalry brigades still to be provided for. Unless, therefore, we have a definite provision for considerable expansion and for increasing the intake at the college, at short stated intervals, there is no possibility of completing the Indianisation of the essential services of the Army at any time.

4. Remote as the prospects of Indianisation would be with the addition only of 60 Indian King’s Commissioned officers a year even in the present composition of the Indian Army, consisting as it does of 12 to 14 King’s Commissioned officers and about 19 Viceroy’s Commissioned officers in each unit

we should be prepared to agree that the College, with a definite provision for considerable expansion from time to time, would ensure a fairly substantial increase in the rate of Indianisation so as to fulfil the requirements of the Round Table Conference. But the proposals of the military authorities require that each Indianised unit should in future be officered by 28 King's Commissioned officers, about half of them taking the place of the Viceroy's Commissioned officers who will then be abolished from these units. It is obvious that under such a scheme there would be no addition whatever to the strength of the Indian officer personnel and hence the chief end in view of the Round Table Conference, stated in no ambiguous terms, would not be attained. Public opinion would certainly object to the establishment of a College, hedged round with the conditions proposed, for the simple reason that the heavy cost which the State would have to incur would in no way advance India to a position when the defence of the country "would to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people and not of the British Government alone". In fact under the official scheme the rate of progress of Indianisation of the officer establishment of the Indian Army will remain as at present, for, if the present composition of the units were not to be altered, the 29 Indian King's Commissioned officers trained annually at the English Colleges, supplemented by the Viceroy's Commissioned officers, would suffice to Indianise one complete division and one cavalry brigade in the same period of time.

5. We were informed by His Excellency the Chairman that both the number of cadets to be trained at the college and the abolition of the Viceroy's Commissioned officers have been finally decided upon by the Indian and the British Governments and hence he ruled that the Committee is precluded from making any recommendations which would affect that decision. He further held that we were not even entitled to have an opportunity to discuss these questions. Nevertheless, the Committee is bound by the terms of reference, as set out in the report itself, and these terms, which must be read along with the resolution of the Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference, do not impose any such limitations as suggested. It is clearly within our province and it is in fact our duty to see that the object which the Round Table Conference had in view in establishing this College is achieved and to point out that if certain conditions are introduced that object would be frustrated. The effect of the conditions, sought to be imposed, will be as we have shown above, that the establishment of the College will lead to no increase whatever in the rate of Indianisation as the resolution of the Round Table Conference demands and the only result will be to substitute one class of Indian officers for another. No doubt the 14 King's Commissioned officers who will displace the Viceroy's Commissioned officers will have better salaries and conditions of service than the latter, and that indeed is considerable gain to them individually. But, what the College is intended to secure is not merely a certain career for its graduates but to help in increasing proportions the Indianising of the units of the Indian Army in order that the defence of India may effectively become the concern of the Indian people. From the financial point of view as well, the official scheme, with its implications and assumptions cannot at all be justified, for, if the Viceroy's Commissioned officers are not abolished, the College with the output of 60 officers a year would serve the Indianising of 2 complete divisions and 2 cavalry brigades with a little more cost than



what would be required to Indianise one division and one cavalry brigade under the official proposals.

*“ Maintenance of the requisite standard of efficiency.”*

6. Now let us examine the scheme from this point of view. It is not even suggested that the substitution of 12 or 14 Indian King's Commissioned officers in the place of 19 Viceroy's Commissioned officers will enhance the efficiency of an Indian unit. On the other hand, the Commander-in-Chief himself assured us that the latter are the back-bone of the Indian Army. Besides, the Viceroy's Commissioned officers will be retained in the Indian Army units officered by British officers. We fully recognise that the British officers cannot be expected to know the habits, customs and temperaments of the men in their charge and they therefore stand in need of support of the Viceroy's Commissioned officers. All the same, one certain result of the elimination of the Viceroy's Commissioned officers from the units proposed to be Indianised and their retention in the rest will be that the Indianising units will suffer in popularity, for every recruit in the ranks naturally aspires to attain the Viceroy's Commission some day and it is much to be feared, therefore, that the recruits to the Indianised units will not be of the same standard as those in the other units.

7. The only reason that we could gather from our military colleagues for the abolition of the Viceroy's Commissioned officers is that neither in the English nor in any European army is there any such class, and the Indian King's Commissioned officers should not be in need of support of another body of officers intermediate between themselves and non-commissioned officers. But we fail to see why in the face of a time-honoured practice which has been amply justified by the results, we should go out of our way to copy the British or any other pattern for the composition of the Indian Army units. We are not writing on a clean slate and we have to bear in mind that army traditions, which have acquired a distinctive value, should be cherished and not discarded. We are indeed asked to take a big leap in the dark and I fail to see why, because we are establishing a College with a view to increasing substantially the rate of Indianisation, we should eliminate an already existing Indian element in the officer establishment which has admittedly proved its worth. We are not in this connection losing sight of the fact that under the scheme that has been adopted men who have served in the ranks or as non-commissioned officers will have 50 per cent. of the vacancies in the College reserved for them. But they will be all young men chosen for their promise while the Viceroy's Commissioned officers are men of achievements. We do not share the fear of some of our colleagues that the Viceroy's Commissioned officers will not easily fit into the new scheme and in support of our position we have the example of the Indian officers of the Indian Civil Service working side by side with the officers of provincial and subordinate services. It seems therefore that from every point of view the abolition of Viceroy's Commissioned Officers should not be contemplated, unless it appears at any time hereafter that they have ceased to make sufficient contribution to the efficiency of the Army, owing to a change in the circumstances.

*Segregation of the Indianising units.*

8. Another basic assumption of the official proposals is that the Indian King's Commissioned officers will be posted in separate units so that a complete formation consisting of one division of all arms and one cavalry brigade may be wholly Indianised in its official personnel before a similar process is applied to other divisions. It has been plainly put to us that the officering of the Indian Army with Indians is an experiment and hence what is proposed should suffice for the purpose. We should be prepared to agree with this point of view if we could accept the proposition that the College, which we are asked to help in establishing is only an experiment. The resolution of the Round Table Conference makes it quite clear that no mere experiment is intended but a definite scheme of Indianising the leadership and command of the Indian Army. In our opinion an *experiment* of this character and on this scale could not possibly have been in the contemplation of those British and Indian statesmen who participated in the deliberations of the Round Table Conference. Indian public opinion will, we are certain, reject the whole scheme if it were to be regarded as an experiment. We must treat it as a serious and substantial step in a definite policy of Indianisation which has to be carried out and all that we are concerned with is to see that it be carried out under conditions which would ensure success.

9. We hold that the process of Indianising should go on simultaneously in all the divisions of the Indian Army. We are decidedly of the opinion that a general policy of segregating Indian and English officers in different divisions of the Indian Army is certain to give rise to considerable difficulties, hampering the development of that feeling of comradeship which at this stage is so essential in the interests of efficiency. It is calculated to breed mistrust and jealousies and to give rise to embarrassments when questions of promotions to higher Commands will arise in a concrete form. With the experience that we had in the Civil Departments of Government, we feel it our duty to impress upon the Government the necessity for guarding at the very outset against such risks as the policy of segregation is bound to involve. No one can be more anxious than we are that our Indian officers should accept full responsibility for leadership of the Indian Army as soon as possible, but so long as at least half of the officer establishment of the army is not Indianised the proper policy is to encourage co-operation and not to enforce segregation. The Skeen Committee, I find, also expressed the same view in no ambiguous language.

10. This College should, it is laid down, cater for all the arms, but there will be at present no provision in our institution for the training of officers even of a Flying squadron, an essential and most important arm of a modern army. The Air Vice Marshal has advised us that the cost of training a few flying officers, needed for one division, will be disproportionately heavy and in fact prohibitive and he has informed us that Cranwell which trains 60 flying pilots costs £200,000 a year. It is agreed that a proper estimate will be obtained of the cost of establishing a military flying school in India. But we feel certain that the Indian public will be greatly disappointed if Government did not at least establish an institution of the nature and scale of what is maintained by the Cambridge and Oxford Universities. We must make a beginning in this respect however modest.

11. The Committee have had no opportunity of considering the very important questions relating to the cost of the building and the requisite equipment, the salaries and conditions of service generally of the staff of the College or the pay, prospects, pensions and other similar terms of employment of the graduates of the College in the military service. All that we can do therefore is to express our general but clear opinion that in all these matters the interests of the tax-payer should be safeguarded on the one hand and no invidious distinction be made, on the other, between the Indian officers and British officers.

12. We have been influenced, we should mention, to reserve a large percentage of cadetships for the enlisted men by the assurance given to us that a sufficient number of such men with the requisite educational qualifications will be available in the ranks of the Army, and also by the fact that the Indian Army is at present composed entirely of men belonging to what are called the 'martial classes' for it is felt that an undue number of cadets belonging to the more educated but 'non-martial classes', entering by open competition even with all the checks provided by the Interviewing and Record Board, might under the existing circumstances cause embarrassments. Mr. Mukarji, who thinks that 50 per cent. is too large a percentage to be so reserved, has appended to the report a separate note on the subject.

13. We take this opportunity to draw the attention of Government to one anomaly which it is extremely inexpedient from the national view point to perpetuate in our Army, viz., the recruitment of non-nationals from territories outside the boundaries of India. At present we have no less than 17,000 such men in the Indian Army. No one who is not a British Indian subject or subject of an Indian State is eligible under the rules for appointment as an officer of the Indian Army and would not be admitted to the Indian Military College. It is not suggested that the field for recruitment to the 'other ranks' even if confined to the martial classes is not sufficiently wide to supply the entire demand. Under these circumstances it is not easy to see what necessity there can be for the Recruiting Officer being sent outside the limits of India at all. A large standing Army, such as that of India, is an extremely heavy burden on its exchequer, exiguous as it is even with people so heavily taxed, and the only justification for its maintenance is the need for the country being in a state of constant preparedness to meet all possibilities of aggression, even though remote, on the part of its neighbours. It is thus impossible for us to understand how any conceivable national policy could justify us in training and employing men in our Army who owe allegiance to States whose relations with this country, however friendly at present, we cannot always be in a position to control.

*The 1st July 1931.*

ABDUR RAHIM.

N. MUKARJI.

HOTU RAM.

*Minute by Sir Abdur Rahim and Mr. S. N. Mukarji.*

1. *Graduates of the Indian Military College should be attached to British Units in England.*—Partly because we attach great importance to the policy of co-operation and partly in order to enable the officers graduating from our College to keep abreast of the development of military ideas and conventions in Europe—the home of modern military scientific methods and tactics—we are also strongly of opinion that the attachment for a year of our cadets to British units should be carried out in appropriate units in England. In that way alone the apprehension which has been expressed by some of our military colleagues of any class of cadets suffering from what is called the inferiority or superiority complex will be fully met. It will be up to the Secretary of State for India to see that the Indian attached officers receive in every way the same treatment in the regimental social life and get the same opportunities for gaining military experience and knowledge as the colonial officers similarly attached.

2. *Sandhurst and Woolwich should not be closed to Indian cadets.*—On the question whether the British Sandhurst should for the future be definitely closed to Indian cadets the position is this. For the next 3 years our cadets have necessarily to go to Sandhurst and Woolwich and probably for a few years longer to Cranwell for training. When our College is in full working order and has gained the confidence of the public, which we hope it will very soon, the Indian parents, we believe, will no longer think of sending their sons to English Military Colleges. Further it is our duty to stand up for our own College. At the same time for a few boys who are living with their parents in England or who have been sent there for a good English public school education and who might seek a military career it is desirable that the doors of the English Military Schools should be still left open, these cases being treated as exceptional.

3. *Recruitment to the ranks of the Indian Army.*—The deliberations of this Committee have brought into prominence one important feature of the Indian army organisation which in our opinion must necessarily retard the development of a truly national army. Recruitment for the Indian Army is now confined to certain specified classes and selected areas, namely, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, the Punjab, the Western parts of the United Provinces, the Maharashtra tracts of the Bombay Presidency and Central India, and to some small extent in Madras and the Deccan. No recruitment takes place among large classes of the populations of United Provinces, the Bombay and the Madras Presidencies and the Central Provinces and not at all in the provinces of Bihar, Bengal and Assam. We fully recognise the fact that suitable material for the army is to be found more easily and in greater abundance and of a superior quality in the Punjab and the neighbouring tracts, and we do not wish to make any proposal which would tend to lower the standard of efficiency of the fighting units. But we must remember that the times are now changing and we have to take note of the passionate feelings of the national patriotism which are developing so fast in all parts of India among the populations now under the military ban in the excluded areas. There is a growing and earnest desire that adequate opportunities should be afforded to them to make their contribution to national defence. The justice of this demand has been recognised in so far that the

cadets' ranks have been thrown open to general competition. Nor can there be any doubt that a fair number of successful candidates will be obtained from what are now known as the non-martial classes. Some of them are already holding the King's Commission. It is to us quite evident that the rank and file of the Indian Army should no longer be closed to those who desire to enlist and are found to be physically and otherwise fit for a soldier's life simply on the ground that they belong to certain classes. We recognise that the Recruiting Officers operating in these areas will have to be careful in making selections and may have even to apply severer tests in the beginning than in the case of men belonging to the classes which have been supplying the army hitherto. Whether at the commencement separate companies should be formed of such recruits or whether they should be mixed up in some of the existing units is a question which must obviously be left to the military authorities to decide. In the present excluded areas which form the greater part of British India, the military authorities having altogether given up recruiting for a century or more, military traditions have naturally disappeared and it is not therefore surprising that when during the Great War sudden efforts at recruitment were made in those areas the results obtained were not uniformly satisfactory. A tradition has now to be built up afresh and the process, I am persuaded, will be very materially helped by the new forces of nationalism. Healthy and sturdy men with considerable powers of physical endurance are to be found among the peasantry and labouring classes in all these provinces including Bengal and not a few of the educated classes will be ready to join the ranks. Once a suitable atmosphere is created, progress will become automatic, and the fighting propensities of these populations, which find such frequent and unfortunate expression in anarchist and revolutionary activities and in deadly agrarian and communal riots will, under military discipline, be enlisted in the service of the State. We need hardly point out that the removal of this serious slur on the manhood of a large class of India's population deserves careful and sympathetic attention of Government and should not be brushed aside with gibes and sneers. Government are fully aware, we believe, that public opinion on this point has for some time been growing very strong and sensitive.

ABDUR RAHIM.

*1st July 1931.*

S. N. MUKARJI.

*Minute by Mr. S. N. Mukarji.*

In the selection of candidates to the Indian Military College, the majority of the Committee favour the allotment of half the vacancies, *i.e.*, 30 a year to cadets from the ranks of the Indian Army. Of the remaining thirty vacancies, they recommend that 24 a year should be open to competition and that the Commander-in-Chief should have the right to fill six vacancies by nomination from among those candidates who have qualified at the entrance examination but have failed to secure a place in open competition. This proportion between the nominated candidates and those who may enter by competition is far in excess to what has existed so far. At present, a number not exceeding five of Viceroy's Commissioned Officers may be nominated to Sandhurst, while as many as 20 vacancies at Sandhurst are offered annually by competition. Actually this power of nomination has been so far exercised in the case of two Viceroy's Commissioned Officers only.

The proposed regulation makes it imperative for the Commander-in-Chief to select as many as thirty cadets each year from the ranks of the Indian Army out of the total intake of 60. That during the last three or four years, only two persons from the Indian Army were considered fit for nomination for a course at Sandhurst forces one to the conclusion that men of the proper standard for King's Commissioned ranks are not forthcoming in the existing army. If it is intended to recruit new men of a higher type into the Army by offering them the bait of an early nomination to a course at the Indian Military College, the question naturally arises why such men should not be persuaded to sit at the open competition. They have not fared worse in the past than members of the non-enlisted classes at the open Army Entrance Examination. Of all the Indian cadets that have gained admission into Sandhurst, Woolwich and Cranwell so far, over 70 per cent. belong to the enlisted classes and these found their way there not by nomination but through open competition. This should eliminate a great deal of the fear which appears to exist among certain sections of the people that if a larger proportion were admitted into the Military College on the result of open competition, the officer ranks of the army will be swamped by members of the non-enlisted classes.

The suggested high proportion of nominated candidates from among Indian Army Cadets can hardly be justified as long as the ranks of the Indian Army are not thrown open to all classes. The objective ought to be the creation of a national army for the defence of the country and for this purpose, all the available talent should be made use of. After all, to a considerable extent, the difference between enlisted and non-enlisted classes is an artificial one. It is not that the so-called non-enlisted classes do not wish to enter the army but the fact is that they are definitely debarred from doing so. It is difficult to realise the justice of it when King's Commissioned ranks have been thrown open to members of the non-enlisted classes if they choose to come through the door of open competition. Whatever difference existed between the two classes a few decades ago, education with its leavening effect has been helping to remove it and the difference is fast disappearing. A glance at the University terms or even at the University Training Corps in the Punjab and Delhi which are the homes of most of the enlisted classes will show that except

perhaps in Tug-of-War, in most of the events, members of the non-enlisted classes have by no means played an insignificant part. In fact, in certain games and even in the U. T. C. sometimes, it is members from such classes that have shown better results than members from enlisted classes.

There is another reason why I find it difficult to accept this high proportion. If it is true that the efficiency of the British army is due to the fact that its officers have had their early training in Public Schools in England, and that we may expect such high efficiency for our Indian Army, provided we can have more schools of the type of Prince of Wales' College in Dehra Dun, where, as in the Public Schools of England, a definite effort is made in developing character, power of leadership and initiative, and provided our cadets receive their early training in such Schools before they go on to the Indian Military College, it will certainly not be in the interests of the future army of India if as many as 50 per cent. of the cadets for the Military College are taken from the Indian Army ranks, which can hardly boast of having recruits from among the Dehra Dun College boys or from any other institution of a similar type. Most of the recruits in the Indian Army are likely to be men with little education or if they are educated, they have in most cases received their education in schools which are far from the Public School type. In the Army, they are brought up in an atmosphere where they acquire the habit of receiving orders and carrying them out. There are few opportunities for the development of the powers of leadership and initiative. If it is argued that the Indian Military College with its three years' course will give such men the necessary character, it must be remembered that such men will come to this institution at the mature age of 23 to 25 years and cannot be expected to acquire traits of character which young lads in institutions like the Prince of Wales' College can acquire before they come to the Military College at the age of 18 to 20.

But I would like to record my very strong objection to the principle of nomination itself. In an ideal state, where various sections are more or less homogeneous from the point of view of education, culture and even military traditions, nomination ought to be reduced to a minimum and should be exercised sparingly. I admit that, situated as we are, there has to be for some time to come a considerable place assigned to nomination. This should be reduced to its minimum as soon as education imparted on right lines in institutions scattered all over the country is able to produce merit and character which should be the only two necessary requirements for admission to the college. I would therefore be inclined to favour as a temporary measure one-third of the vacancies to be filled up by nomination and two-thirds by competition, as against 40 per cent. by competition at present, in the hope that before long when members of the enlisted classes have equally taken advantage of the educational facilities, there shall be only one-fifth of the places reserved for nomination. This, I feel confident, will not hit the members of the enlisted classes, for under my proposal, and in view of the successes they have hitherto achieved in open competition, they will have at least 40 to 45 members of their classes in the Indian Military College out of the total of 60.

S. N. MUKARJI.

1st July 1931.

*Minute by Dr. B. S. Moonje.*

1. It is a great pity that the Government of India took it upon itself to fix the number of yearly intake of cadets for the Indian Military College, instead of allowing it to be fixed by the Expert Committee set up by it to settle the details of the proposed College, as was clearly the intention of the Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference.

The Government do not seem to have fully appreciated the significance of the general political situation in the country and particularly do not seem to comprehend the mentality of the people in respect of the problem of Defence of India, embittered as it has been by frequent repetitions, in season and out of season, of the allegation that the people of India cannot defend their country and that the Indian youth will not come forward to make the Army its profession, giving up lucrative positions in civil life.

I am positive that, when the Report of the Committee will be out and the points, on which I am painfully obliged to write this note of dissent, become widely known, there will be a great out-cry all over the country against those points.

2. Briefly, the general political situation in the country, if it could be said to be indicative of one thing more than anything else, is indicative of the mentality of the people not to accept anything in the shaping of which they had no voice. They want themselves to be the architects of their own destiny.

The Government of India Act of 1919 had provided for a review of the entire working of the Act after 10 years. A Royal Commission, called the Simon Commission, was appointed for the purpose but the country refused to accept it for the simple reason that it was composed entirely of British Statesmen and the people were not allowed a chance to shape their own destiny within the Empire for which, they said, they have shed their blood and spent their money like water and which they are still prepared to call their own if allowed.

3. That high-minded English gentleman of Christian width of mind and capacity to realise in practice the eternal Law of "Do unto others as you would wish others do unto you", Lord Irwin, feeling the pulse of the popular sentiment in the matter, brought about what is known as the Round Table Conference to make amends for the wounded pride of the people, so that the representatives of the people of India and of the British Parliament might sit together as equal partners in the Commonwealth and collaborate with frankness and sympathy in framing a constitution for India.

4. The Conference, even though meeting in most adverse circumstances, has borne fruits to the extent that on its results, so far formulated, the struggle that had begun between the people and the Government has been suspended in the hope that the present truce will be finally implemented on the occasion of the next conference into peace and friendship between the two countries—England and India.



5. One of the results of the conference is the practical unanimity on the resolutions and recommendations of its Defence Sub-Committee. The value of this unanimity was greatly reinforced by the ruling of the Chairman, Right Hon'ble J. H. Thomas which endows these resolutions with a comprehensive meaning from an eminently practical point of view. The Right Hon'ble Mr. Shastri asked a very pertinent question—"Does this classification cover the question of the rate of Indianisation? I am not clear".

*Chairman* :—" Obviously it does for this reason . . . . ."

(Defence Sub-Committee Report, page 4.)

It, therefore, led the people to hope that a new era was dawning and the people felt that ultimately the day has arrived when the stigma, which they really never deserved, of their being incapable of defending their own country, would be wiped out.

6. Now, what are the resolutions and recommendations of the Defence Sub-Committee which contributed to the creation of this sentiment in the people? If we carefully study these in the spirit of the discussions that prevailed in the meetings of the Sub-Committee, the following points stand out :—

- (a) That "with the development of the new political structure in India the defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people and not of the British Government alone".
- (b) That "in order to give practical effect to this principle immediate steps be taken to increase substantially the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army to make it commensurate with the main object in view".
- (c) That "in order to give effect to (b) a training college be established in India to train candidates for commissions in all arms of the army".
- (d) That "the Government of India be instructed to set up a Committee of Experts to work out the details of the establishment of such a college".

7. If we read (a) and (b) together, it gives a fairly correct idea of the spirit that was pervading the entire Conference and I cannot define the nature of the spirit in better words than in those of Lord Sankey, the President of the Federal Structure Committee, in which he lays stress on what he calls "the basic assumption that the constitution will recognise the principle that . . . . . the responsibility for the Federal Government of India will in future rest upon Indians themselves".

It must, therefore, be remembered here that it was under such a spirit prevailing in the Conference that the Defence Sub-Committee has adopted the resolutions and recommendations. I should not fail to emphasise here the assurance given by no less a person than the Right Hon'ble Mr. J. H. Thomas, the Chairman of the Defence Committee, himself, when replying to my speech pressing for the acceptance of my proposal "that immediate steps be taken to arrange for all recruitment henceforth for the commissioned ranks of the Army, Navy and Air Force to be made in India from amongst Indians,

provided that it shall be open to the Government of India to provide for recruitment in England to fill up such of the vacancies as cannot be filled up in India, and that due regard should always be had to the relevant considerations such as the maintenance of the requisite standard of efficiency". The assurance was as follows :—

"First of all, I should like to say this to Dr. Moonje and I say it as one who has had many years' experience in negotiations. I am indifferent to the wording of a resolution. I attach infinitely more importance to the spirit behind the declaration than to anything else." Further on he repeats at the end of his speech :—

"I solemnly tell you, never mind what the words say, the spirit behind these words is a genuine attempt to solve the question. That is the appeal I would make." Page 74.

And this assurance of the genuineness of the attempt of the Government to solve the question is contained in the resolutions and recommendations of the Defence Sub-Committee, to give practical effect to which this Expert Committee has been appointed and is meeting.

8. In view of these facts the ruling of the Chairman of this Expert Committee, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the Government has fixed the annual intake at 60 only, has come to me as a sad though highly instructive disillusionment.

9. The questions, therefore, arise :—

- (a) Who should have the authority to fix and recommend the annual intake of cadets for the College, the Government of India or this Expert Committee ?
- (b) And in respect of the recommendations of the Defence Sub-Committee, what is the relation of this Expert Committee with the Government of India on one hand and the Round Table Conference on the other ?
- (c) What are the terms of reference of this Expert Committee and who is the authority to define the terms of reference ?

10. The appointment of this Expert Committee is the direct out-come of the most clear recommendation in respect thereof of the Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference, as contained in its Resolution No. 2 (c) which is as follows :—

"That in order to avoid delay, the Government of India be instructed to set up a Committee of Experts, both British and Indian (including representatives of Indian States), to work out the details of the establishment of *such* a College."

The resolution itself, particularly in view of its pointed reference to "such a College", has thus fixed the purpose and the terms of reference of this Expert Committee. The Government of India, therefore, plays the part merely of an agent of the Round Table Conference, and has no explicit or implicit authority to fix any of the details connected with the College. The

Government of India also on their part plainly admit this point in their resolution appointing this Expert Committee which is as follows :—

“ In accordance with the recommendation of the Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference, the Governor General-in-Council with the approval of the Secretary of State for India, has been pleased to constitute a Committee of Experts, including representatives of Indian States, in order to work out the details of the establishment of a Military College in India to train candidates for commissions in all arms of Indian Defence Services.”

There being here in this resolution an emphatic reference to the recommendation of the Defence Sub-Committee for the establishment of “ such a College ” it, therefore, clearly follows that it is this Expert Committee which has the direct authority to work out and settle all the details of the establishment of a military College in India. The fixing of the annual intake of the Cadets is the one fundamental detail which this Expert Committee should have been allowed to work out. In this respect there can be no more clear proof in support of my contention than in the reply given by the Chairman of the Defence Sub-Committee, Right Hon’ble Mr. J. H. Thomas, to the direct question of Mr. Jinnah :

*Mr. Jinnah* :—“ We agreed in principle with the question that the Army should be Indianised ..... Then the next question is how effect is to be given to the rate or the pace of Indianisation. That is a question which must be discussed by this Committee and some principle must be laid down ”.

*Chairman* :—“ I will try and apply myself to answering that question ..... Now my answer to the last question which is the fundamental one, is that there should be, as a consequence or as a net result of any recommendation, *an Expert Committee set up to give immediate effect to this.* Now, I put it to you that no one round this table—and I am not speaking as a military man at all ; but common sense tells that the first thing to do is to secure the site of the building, *number of men you are prepared to train*, the accommodation and all these things. The period is all dependent upon that.”

*Lord Reading* :—“ Yes .”

*Mr. Jinnah still pressed on his point and said* :—“ If you mean to appoint a special Committee for the purpose of considering the question of the pace of Indianisation ..... are you going to give any guide ; are you going to lay down any principles for that Committee or are you going to give them a blank cheque and say : ‘ Now you decide as you think proper ’. That is the next question which I ask ..... I want your ruling, Sir.”

*Lord Reading* :—“ I suggest that is not a matter for ruling. That is a matter for this (the Expert) Committee. ”

(Defence Sub-Committee Report, pages 41-42.)

Thus, it will be seen that even Lord Reading along with the Chairman is of the same opinion, that I am contending for, that it is the business of this Expert Committee to settle the fundamental detail of fixing the intake.

The decision of the Government of India in respect of fixing the annual intake of cadets is, therefore, most unfortunate. They are not justified in depriving this Expert Committee of its legitimate function of settling and fixing the intake.

11. Now, the questions are :—

- (a) How should the annual intake be fixed and what are the objects that should inspire the fixing of it? and
- (b) What expert authorities should serve as guide in fixing the intake?

12. The entire trend of the discussions in the Defence Sub-Committee was to press for Indianisation of the Indian Army as early as practicable. The British section of the Committee, though not so keen as the Indian, still did not vehemently oppose it. What, however, they opposed was the fixing of the actual pace of Indianisation by the Committee. They were prepared to leave it to the decision of the Expert Committee that would be set up, as will be seen from the following quotations from the Report of the Defence Sub-Committee :—

When Mr. Jinnah was pressing his point for "clear indication as to the pace" of Indianisation and wanted in the Resolutions of the Defence Sub-Committee "some words so definite that it will convey to your Expert Committee that that was the intention of this Conference" the Chairman replying eventually said that "it has been pointed out that this is a matter for the experts".

Further in order to respond to the "strong affirmation of one section of the Sub-Committee" to the effect that complete Indianisation of the officers in the Indian Army should take place within a specified period, as proposed in the Government of India's scheme of Indianisation of 1922 known as the Shea Scheme, the Chairman (the Right Hon'ble Mr. J. H. Thomas) further undertook that when in pursuance of the resolutions of this Sub-Committee, Expert Committees were appointed, those Expert Committees would, as a matter of course, take into consideration the proceedings of the Military Requirements' Committee of 1921, and the Committee on the Indianisation of the Army (known as the Shea Committee) of 1922.

This is further proof, if any be still needed, to substantiate my contention that it was the business of this Expert Committee to settle and fix the annual intake for the College and not of the Government of India.

13. The reports of these two Committees are very particularly referred to, so that they may serve as a guide in interpreting resolution 2 (a) of the Defence Sub-Committee, that is, in defining the exact meaning of the words of the resolution "to increase substantially the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army". Even the Chairman on the Defence Sub-Committee himself admits that "we want them as material for our guidance".

(Defence Sub-Committee Report, page 17.)

Though these Reports will admirably serve as a guide the interpretation of these words should be such as it should be "commensurate with the main object in view". Now, the main object to Indianisation is clearly defined in Resolution (1) of the Defence Sub-Committee which provides that "with the development of the new political structure in India, the defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people and not of the British Government alone".

14. Full significance of this definition of "the main object in view" with all its implications cannot be comprehended unless two things inherently involved in the development of the new political structure in India are clearly borne in mind :—

*First.*—That the development of the new political structure in India provides for full provincial autonomy and for entire responsibility for the Federal Government of India being thrown on the Indians themselves, except in respect mainly of the Army and the Foreign relations during a period of transition.

This means that the federating units, the autonomous Provinces, having a common federal army would like to have their due quota both in the rank and file and the officer ranks of the Army and would press for the removal of the present bar to recruitment from certain classes and practically from certain parts of India.

*Second.*—That the Defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people.

15. Now, taking these two things together, it becomes an axiomatic truth—

- (a) that a time must come sooner or later when after the period of transition has come to an end, entire responsibility for the Government of India as well as for the control and administration also of the Army and the Foreign relations will devolve on the Indians, and
- (b) that during the period of transition there must be progressive Indianisation in the Indian Army, so that Indianisation be completed by the time the period of transition comes to an end.

16. The transition period, however, has not yet been clearly defined but we hope to be able to have it done in the forthcoming session of the Round Table Conference. We may guess, however, that it may be of 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 years, but I am sure the people are not contemplating the period of transition to be as long as 30 years.

17. Assuming, however, for the sake of argument the transition period to be as long as 30 years, we come to the conclusion that the entire Indian Army should be Indianised within 30 years, so that India with its entirely Indianised Army and England with its British Army in India may collaborate as equal partners of the Commonwealth for the defence not only of India but also of the whole Empire.

18. This may be said to be the view of a layman, but what does a Committee purely of military experts like the one known as the Shea Committee say, to which pointed reference was made by the Chairman of the Defence Sub-Committee as providing a guide in the matter ?

19. This Committee was appointed in 1921 by the then Commander-in-Chief, the late Lord Rawlinson, in accordance with a resolution of the Legislative Assembly accepted by the Government of India and was entirely composed of high military officers, that is, 3 Lieutenant-Generals, 3 Major-Generals, 3 Colonels and 2 Lieutenant-Colonels, one of whom was the Secretary of the Committee.

20. Such a Committee of Experts after mature deliberations considered complete Indianisation of the Indian Army within 30 years a feasible and practicable proposition as far back as 10 years, which in other words meant replacing of 6,864 British Officers by as many Indian Officers. The Committee in their report actually drew up a scheme of such Indianisation and recommended the establishment of a military college in India with an average annual output of—

- (a) 81 cadets during the first period of Indianisation of 14 years.
- (b) 182 cadets during the second period of Indianisation of 9 years, and
- (c) Cadets ranging between 88 and 106 in number during the third period of Indianisation of 7 years.

These numbers do not include the cadets for the Indian State Forces which were fixed at 30.

If the annual output was required to be as much as mentioned above, the annual intake must be still higher. In this respect the Committee says, "to the above must be added for wastage amongst the first period officers, say 3 per cent. per annum or 50 per cent. for the full period of 14 years".

This means that the Committee recommended an annual intake of—

- (a) 81 *plus* 3, that is, 84 cadets during the first period of Indianisation of 14 years.
- (b) 182 *plus* 6, that is, 188 cadets during the second period of Indianisation of 9 years, and
- (c) Proportionate increase over a number ranging between 88 and 106 in the third period of 7 years.

These numbers do not include the cadets for the Indian State Forces.

Accordingly, the Committee (page 7, paragraph 21) prescribed the strength of the military college for India as follows :—

"During the first period approximately 330, during the second and third periods approximately from 750 to 1,000, giving an average annual output of 110 during the first period to meet the requirements of the Indian Army and the Indian State Forces and in the succeeding periods such output as will meet the increased demand."

21. Taking all these figures recommended by the purely Military Expert Committee as our guide, if I were to suggest that the figure of annual intake of

the proposed Military College should be fixed at say 110, or 115 or 120 in order to give effect both in spirit and letter to the resolution of the Defence Sub-Committee which "provides for "substantial increase" in the rate of Indianisation, it could not be called a rash over-estimate of an irresponsible enthusiast.

22. In connection with the Shea Committee, it is well worth to note two points :—

*First*—that Lord Reading, during whose Viceroyalty the Committee was appointed, admits that "the matter was examined with very great care at the time", and

*Second*—that Sir M. Shafi, a member of the then Government of India of Lord Reading, made a statement in the Defence Sub-Committee as follows :—

"I entirely agree that the scheme (of Indianisation) which was framed (by the Shea Committee) in 1922 and the conclusions which were arrived at in 1922 were the result of very careful consideration and in that lies the value of the conclusions then arrived at; that is the reason why I said that that scheme—having been very carefully considered and revised and after revision adopted unanimously by the Government of India, including Lord Reading, the late Lord Rawlinson, and all the members of the Executive Council—is a scheme worthy of the serious consideration of this Sub-Committee". (Defence Sub-Committee Report, page 58.)

Lord Reading who was present in the meeting did not challenge the statement. Consequently, we cannot conceive of a more authoritative Expert Committee than the Shea Committee.

23. Now, let us calculate the figure of annual intake by another method. The Skeen Committee from whom the report of the Shea Committee was kept absolutely secret, recommended another scheme of progressive Indianisation. According to the recommendations of the Skeen Committee, we should have been entitled to the annual intake of 60 cadets in 1933, that is, when the proposed Military College will be actually started.

If on the basis of this figure of 60, the recommendation of the Defence Sub-Committee "to increase substantially the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army" were to be made to operate then the figure of the annual intake should have been fixed, say, at 80, 85 or 90, if the measure of substantial increase be fixed at 33 per cent. or 50 per cent.

Thus, taking the mean of these two sets of figures calculated on the basis of the recommendation of the Shea Committee and of the Skeen Committee, the annual intake should have been fixed at say 100 or 105, at least.

24. There is yet another way of calculating to fix the annual intake. The Legislative Assembly in 1921 adopted a resolution which was accepted by the Government to the effect that 25 per cent. of the vacancies for India Army Cadetships at Sandhurst should be thrown open to Indian youths. The Military Requirements' Committee of 1921 over which the then Commander-in-Chief,

the late Lord Rawlinson presided, taking this resolution of the Legislative Assembly into consideration recommended :—

“ We consider that this percentage should be increased by  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. annually, so that in 10 years from now the proportion of British and Indian entering the Indian Army will be equalised.”

Now, taking the annual intake at the average rate of 120, as given by His Excellency the Chairman of the present Expert Committee, we should have been entitled to the annual intake of 66 in the year 1933 when our College is to be started. Thus, it will be seen that the Government, in fixing the annual intake of 60, has treated us so parsimoniously that we are actually deprived of as many as 6 vacancies out of 66 to which we would be entitled when the College is actually set going.

But, if the resolution of the Defence Sub-Committee which provides for a substantial increase in the rate of Indianisation were to be made operative on this by increasing the rate by 50 per cent. in order to make it a “substantial” increase, then 66 *plus* 50 per cent. increase, *i.e.*, 33 should mean an annual intake of 99.

It is highly instructive to calculate the intake of cadets other than those classed as Army Cadets according to the scheme of Indianisation recommended by the Shea Committee. The scheme provides :—

- (a) that, during the first 7 years of Indianisation, two-thirds of the King's Commissions be reserved for the Indian Officers holding the Viceroy's Commission.
- (b) that, during the remaining 23 years, 50 per cent. of the King's Commissions be reserved for them,
- (c) that the rest be thrown open to competition for outsiders.

Calculating on this basis, I arrive at the following results in regard to the intake of outsiders for the proposed Military College :—

- (a) First period of 14 years, at the rate of 34 intake per annum.
- (b) Second period of 9 years at the rate of 141 intake per annum.
- (c) Third period of 7 years at the rate of 228 intake per annum.

Thus  $34 \times 14$  *plus*  $141 \times 9$  *plus*  $228 \times 7$  makes the grand total, for the three periods, of 3,331 Commissions to be filled up by the outsiders in 30 years.

Accordingly, the average annual intake for outsiders comes to 111.

Thus, calculating from any point of view and taking a mean of the figures arrived at we are entitled to the annual intake of not less than 110 at the least. The Government has done a great injustice in fixing the annual intake at such a low figure as 60. Besides, provision should have been made for annual increment in the annual intake at a certain fixed rate as recommended by the Skeen Committee and also the Resolution of the Defence Sub-Committee.

25. *Open Competition versus Nomination.*—The question should not have been given the aspect of mutual contrariety. The normal course in all



countries including England is to obtain Cadets mainly by open competition which is supplemented by nomination for certain purposes.

This Expert Committee of the Indian Military College with the approval of the Chairman, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and his Military members has parcelled out the annual intake of 60 as follows :—

- (a) 24 for open competition, *i.e.*, 40 per cent.
- (b) 36 for nomination, *i.e.*, 60 per cent.

Though such is now the decision of the majority of the committee which includes the solid block of the officials, it must be stated here that even the military members in their original proposition had proposed 50 per cent. for open competition presumably under the impression that 40 per cent. would be too low a figure.

This is against all canons of rationalism and actual practice in all countries, including England. Competition is intended for finding out the best material so that there may be no room for allegations of malpractice or favouritism inherent in the system of nomination if practised on a large scale, but in India one has to further provide against communalism which is incompatible with or rather actually undermines all efficiency and which generates tension and antipathy between different sections of people recruited and to be recruited from. Nominations, however, within proper limits have got their own value so far as they are intended to provide for possible shortcomings of competition but they should never be allowed to supervene competition.

If England is followed in the matter of selection of proper cadets, the healthy method of competition is complemented by nomination which works out generally at the rate of  $6\frac{2}{3}$  p.c. of nominations; the rest, *i.e.*,  $93\frac{1}{3}$  p.c. being reserved for competition. The Skeen Committee fixes the percentage of nomination at not exceeding 20 per cent., and says :—

“ We contemplate that the Commander-in-Chief should exercise the power of nomination sparingly and in conformity with the principles followed by the Army Council in their exercise of a corresponding power of nomination for Sandhurst and Woolwich.”

This caution is most significant but in the case of the Indian Military College, it is thrown to the winds.

There is no precedent to this system of nomination on such a large scale in any country in the world. In the American Military College at West Point, of the full establishment of 1,334 Cadets only 180 are chosen from among the enlisted men of the Regular Army and the National Guard in equal numbers. It must be noted here that equal opportunity is given to the men of the National Guard which are of the nature of our Territorial Forces and the U. T. Cs. in India.

It is very instructive to note, from the point of view of India, how the full establishment of 1,334 Cadets at the West Point Military College is obtained. I quote here from the Skeen Committee's Report, Volume I, p. 183 :—

“ The system of admission to the West Point calls for close attention. Of the full establishment of 1,334 Cadets, 1,072 are admitted by nomination from the various States, Congressional Districts,

etc., upon the recommendation of their respective Senators and Representatives in Congress; 60 are appointed from the United States at large upon the President's own selection, and 2 upon the recommendation of the Vice-President; 20 are selected from among the honour graduates of those educational institutions which have officers of the Regular Army detailed to them as professors of military science and tactics and which have been approved by the War Departments as "honour military schools".

As regards the recommendation of the Cadets by respective Senators and Representatives in the Congress, the system is as follows:—

"In these cases the selection of candidates by competitive examination or otherwise is entirely in the hands of the Senator or Representative in Congress who has the vacancy at his disposal, and all applications for appointment to these vacancies have to be addressed to the Senator or Representative. For each vacancy the Senator or Representative nominates three candidates, one as "Principal", one as "first alternate" and one as "second alternate". The first alternate is admitted, if qualified, in the event of the failure of the principal, and the second alternate in the event of the failure of both the principal and the first alternate".

From the above stand out the following points:—

- (a) That so far as real nomination is concerned, only 62 out of 1,334 are nominated by the President and the Vice-President, that is the percentage of nomination is only about 4½.
- (b) That out of the total 1,334 Cadets as many as 1,072 Cadets are admitted from the various States, Congressional Districts, etc., according to the quotas fixed.
- (c) That 20 are selected as Honour Graduates which may be compared with the university boys of our U. T. Cs

In this connection it may be stated that many more such University men may have been included in (b).

At the Military College, Kingston, system of selection of cadets is similarly organised. It is that "each province receives a quota of vacancies each year, according to its population". These "vacancies are allotted by a Selection Board at Defence Headquarters to the most suitable candidates on each provincial list of recommendation".

Some such system is absolutely necessary in India in view of the provinces being soon converted into autonomous federating units of the Central Federal Government. Without it, it is impossible to create a really national army. Besides the provinces would not tolerate the present Army policy of monopolies in favour of a few so-called martial classes to the exclusion of others.

Besides, there being only 12 vacancies available at each half-yearly examination for open competition, I am afraid it will not be a sufficient incentive

for boys combining best brain with leadership and physique to volunteer to take the doubtful chances in such a highly restricted field of competition.

26. This system of nomination perpetuates the myth of the artificial distinction of martial and non-martial classes. It serves as a handle for the people to charge the Government with the policy of "Divide and Rule". It propagates the poison of communalism in the body politic of India. It emasculates large sections of the people and as a reaction serves to create what may be called swelled-headedness in those who are generally enlisted in the Army. It strikes at the very root of the conception of a national Army, and perpetuates the system of a mercenary Army which is the inevitable concomitant of a foreign government.

27. Besides, historically it has no substratum of truth in it; the fact is quite otherwise. In this connection what I said in my speech in the Minorities' Sub-Committee is quite pertinent. I quote it as follows:—

"But there are also other communities which are inherently capable of undertaking responsibility for the defence of India. If you look to the history of British rule and British sovereignty in India from its inception up to the time when the whole Indian Empire came into the hands of the British, you will find that the British people came to Madras, recruited their armies from the people of Madras, conquered Madras and the country surrounding Madras. When this surrounding country was conquered then this army went to a neighbouring province, and the British with the help of the Madras soldiery, conquered the neighbouring province. When the neighbouring province was conquered, soldiers were recruited in that neighbouring province, and the province next to that was conquered with the help of those soldiers. In that way it went on in mathematical progression as far as the North-West Frontier Province. . . . . They then forgot their old friends the Madrasis, their old friends the Telugus, their old friends the Beharis, their old friends, I may add here, the Bengalees, their old friends the depressed classes, who contributed largely to the success of the British arms in India. Of course, we Marathas could not lay claim to that because we were ourselves fighting the English people in those days. But at least this is true that, if the recruitment is to be made throughout India, there are communities in India which can offer you soldiers, which can offer you fit people for recruitment in the Army."

In support of what I have said above, I quote from an eminent English historian who says:—

"The founders of the Native Army had conceived the idea of a force recruited from among the people of the country and commanded for the most part by men of their own race, but of higher social position, men, in a word, of the master class accustomed to exact obedience from their inferiors. But it was the inevitable tendency of our increasing power in India to oust the native functionary from his seat, or to lift him from his saddle, that the white might fix himself there."

This is what Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, says :—

“ I agree with those who think that it is not judicious to train any native of India to the use of guns. They make excellent artillerymen, and they attach great value and importance to guns but these very circumstances make it dangerous to place them in their hands”. (Peel Report-Papers, Page 45.)

In this opinion Lord Ellenborough concurred. He said :—

“ It appears to be the concurrent opinion of all men that we should keep the artillery wholly in our hands ”.

“ The natives have a genius for casting and working guns, and we should not afford them means of enjoying it. . . . . The natives die at their guns. Their practice in this War ”—namely the Mutiny—“ is allowed to have been at least as good as our own ”.

Sir Fredrick Haines, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, says :—

“ I cannot admit for one moment that anything has occurred to disclose the fact that the Madras sepoy is inferior as a fighting man. The facts of history warrant us in assuming the contrary. In drill, training and discipline the Madras sepoy is inferior to none while in point of health, as exhibited by returns, he compares favourably with his neighbours.

General Warre, Commander-in-Chief of the Pombay Army, says :—

“ History has proved that the whole of the Western Coast is a military country producing a warlike population. The Southern Mahratas have proved themselves in former days and are still equal to any other race in India as a fighting people. Their power has been broken and their military ardour quenched by almost total disarmament, but they are still a hardy people, in a mountainous district, inured to toil, and especially good in tracing their steps over the rough and impracticable ghats. What more can you require to make soldiers ? ”

These quotations I have taken from the speech in the Defence Sub-Committee of my colleague, the Hon'ble Sir Pheroz Sethna, pages 22—24.

This is the opinion of none other than the British Experts, military and otherwise, about the fighting capacities of the natives of India other than those of the Punjab and the N.-W. F. province with its tribal territory ; for up to this period of British history of conquest in India, Punjab and the N.-W. F. Province had not been incorporated into the British India and the field of recruitment in these provinces were not freely opened to the British.

As for Bengal, history records that the army under the Nawabs of Bengal was composed mostly of Bengalees. Bengali heroism and especially of one of their generals named Mohan Lal at the battle of Plassey has inspired one of the classical epics of Bengali literature. Raja Mansing had to fight hard against Raja Pratapaditya and his generals before he could establish Moghal domination over Bengal. If readiness to die for the cause of the country under an overpowering sentiment of patriotism, however mistaken

and misapplied it may be regarded, intrepidity of conception and skill and leadership in carrying out preconcerted movements in a general plan of action be regarded as the essential qualifications of a soldier, who can say that the Bengali youth of late, have not shown them in remarkable contrast with their caricatured pictures as given by Macaulay. In short, if honourable openings for the fervour of patriotism can be devised, Bengali intellect will not fail to make its mark particularly in the scientific departments of the Army, while taking their due share on the battlefields along with officers of other classes of Indians.

28. Thus, by fixing such an unprecedentedly large proportion of nomination double injustice is done to other parts of India as Madras, Maharastra, Bihar, etc. They are not allowed to offer recruits in the Army in their due proportion and now their right of offering candidates for open competition to prove their real worth without favour is being extensively curtailed.

29. *Annual wastage and total number of officers in the Indian Army.*—As regards the figures of the annual total wastage in the cadre of the officers with King's commissions and of the total number of such officers in the Indian Army that have been supplied to us, it is not possible to feel sure about their accuracy. The figures supplied to us in this Committee are as follows:—

(a) 120 annual total wastage.

(b) 3,200 total number of officers with King's Commissions in the Indian Army.

The need of accuracy about these figures is essential in order to evolve a scheme "to increase substantially the rate of Indianisation in the Indian Army", by eliminating the British element to make room for the Indian, so that the "Defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people and not of the British Government alone". This definition of the object in view permits of even the total elimination of the British element from the Indian section of the Army in India. The British section of the Indian Army will collaborate with the entirely Indianised Indian section of the Army, thus giving effect to the view expressed in the resolution that the defence of India should not be the concern "of the British Government alone".

As against the figure of 120 for annual wastage, I quote below the opinion of Colonel Brownrigg, Deputy Director of Staff Duties, War Office, London, who expressed the opinion as the representative of the War Office, London:—

"In conclusion Colonel Brownrigg, confirmed the Sub-Committee's view that 180 was an approximately accurate estimate of the annual wastage among officers serving with Indian units."

(Skeen Committee's Report, Volume No. 1, p. 41.)

Therefore, the question is—which figure should be taken as correct, 120 as told to us in this Committee or 180 as confirmed by Colonel Brownrigg?

Now, against the figure of 3,200 which we are told in this Committee represents the total number of officers holding King's Commissions in the Indian Army, I have to mention three different figures—one of 3,141 as given in the Report of the Defence Sub-Committee p. 88; the second of 3,600 given by the Skeen Committee and the third of 6,864 mentioned by the Shea

Committee, as will be evident from the following quotation from the Report of the Shea Committee, p. 14, paragraph 4 :—

“ The Committee direct attention to the fact—*vide* Appendix I (C) of their main report—that the grand total of King’s Commissions to be granted completely to Indianise the Army in 42 years (on reconsideration reduced to 30 years) would be 6,864.”

Now, the question is—which is the correct figure 3,141, as given in the Report of the Defence Sub-Committee ; 3,200 as given to us in this Committee ; or 3,600, as given by the Skeen Committee ; or 6,864, given by the Shea Committee ?

30. Having dealt so far with my fundamental objections to the ruling of the Chairman fixing the intake for the College and to the proportions of nominations and competition, as fixed, I now proceed to deal with other points in the order in which they are mentioned in the report.

31. *Nature of the College.*—I am of opinion that the course at the College should not be fixed for three years. The course at Cranwell is of two years and that at Sandhurst and Woolwich is of 1½ years. I, therefore, propose that the course in this College should be for two years only. Extension of the course to three years would involve the parent in needless extra expense of about Rs. 2,000 for fees and vacation. The first year of this course of three years is intended to be devoted mainly to academic study. What is called academic study is particularised as improving their general education and their knowledge of colloquial English. Boys generally go through enough of this kind of academic study in their high schools and colleges before appearing for the entrance examination for the Cadet Colleges. This is so particularly in the case of boys trained in the Dehra Dun College where the parent has to spend from Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 18,000 over a course of academic study of from 7 to 9 years under the best of circumstances. Besides, experience of the competitive entrance examinations has shown that, of the successful students a large majority comes from the Dehra Dun College. The remaining are from schools and colleges other than the Dehra Dun. Thus, it is not justicé to victimise the majority for the so-called shortcomings of the minority.

The special competitive entrance examination of the College puts to severe test the progress made by the student in the academic studies in his High School or College. Medical examination by the Government Medical Board ascertains if the boy is medically fit for the profession of the Army. Then what more is needed ? Why put an extra burden of about Rs. 2,000 or even more on the parent ? The Army Cadets are required to stay in the College for only two years, so that they may improve their academic studies because they have already had sufficient military training. Similarly, two years ought to be enough for non-army cadets for military training as they have already had sufficient academic training in their high schools and colleges.

32. *Interview and Record Test.*—In view of the vital importance of this test under the rules which provide that, however high a position a boy may attain in the results of his written examination, he will not be admitted into the college, if he were to fail to secure the minimum number of marks fixed for this test, I am of opinion that the Interview and Record Board should have two non-officials on it. My personal experience as a member of the Board strengthens me in my conviction that unless two non-officials are included, it with

not command the confidence of the people. It should be composed of, say, 5 members,\* which may be distributed as follows :—

- (a) A member of the Public Service Commission as President.
- (b) Two senior military officials having experience of command of Indian units.
- (c) Two non-officials, preferably members of the Central Legislature.

In England, when a nominated boy does not pass the examination he “has to come before a War Office Board which is composed of a Major-General, a member of Parliament, a distinguished clergyman and two other soldiers”.

(Skeen Committee Report Volume No. 1, page 30.)

In connection with the examination by the Interview Board, I would suggest that the examination be divided into two parts—one concerning his record in school and outside and the other about ascertaining his personality, temperament and aptitude for the profession of arms by drawing him out into a free conversation. Marks should be separately given for these two parts and then totalled for the whole test under Interview and Record. This will minimise the chances for erring in assessing the personality, resourcefulness and leadership of a boy.

33. *Power to remove unsuitable cadets.*—The power in the interest of discipline should be vested in the Commander-in-Chief, but a convention should be established by which the Commander-in-Chief would exercise the power in concurrence with the Army Council, whenever it may be established, and until such a Council is established, in consultation with the Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant General.

34. *Fees.*—The Committee by majority has decided that the fee to be paid by a cadet for his training in the College for the full course of 3 years should not exceed Rs. 4,600, *i.e.*, at the rate of Rs. 127-8-0 per month.

I regard it as very high. In support of my contention, I quote from the “*Statesman*” of the 14th June, 1931.

“That the cost of education at the Indian Sandhurst should be kept as low as possible is only right and proper, and as a principle, it has numerous precedents. Most countries recognise the State’s obligation to bear a large part of the cost of training cadets for a profession which has small material prospects to offer, and which exists solely for national defence. European countries which maintain conscript armies draw their officer personnel largely from the ranks, and where charges are made for training at military academies, as in the case of direct entry cadets, they are more or less nominal. Even in the case of the British Army, which still provides a profession for what are loosely termed the leisured classes, the cost of education at Sandhurst and Woolwich is below that of the two senior English Universities, and in the case

of sons of regular officers is purely nominal. Thanks to liberal State support, an Indian University education is relatively cheap, and if, as has been suggested, the fees at India's Sandhurst are to conform with this scale, a military education will be within the means of a large class."

It is worth noting that even in England which is a far more wealthy country than India, known for its proverbial poverty, the cost of education at Sandhurst and Woolwich is below that of the two senior Universities. Similarly, if we keep the cost of education in this military college below that of the three senior Universities of India, i.e., of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, then my proposal of fixing fees not exceeding Rs. 75 per cadet per month is most natural.

Let us now see what the fees are like in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay Universities. In Calcutta University,

1. Law College and Hostel—

	Rs.	A.	P.
(a) Tuition fee Rs. 7/8 per month. . . . .	7	8	0
(b) Hostel charges including messing, electricity, furniture and seat rent, etc., for Anglo-Indians . . . . .	26	0	0 per mensem.
(c) Games and Library, and other sundries . . . . .	4	0	0 per mensem.
Total . . . . .	37	8	0 per mensem.

2. Medical College, Madras :—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Tuition fee for a course of 6 years Rs. 970, i.e., . . . . .	13	1	3 per mensem.

3. Engineering College, Madras :—

	Rs.	A.	P.
(a) Fees for a course of 4 years at Rs. 140, i.e. . . . .	11	2	3 per mensem.
(b) Fees for games extra for tennis . . . . .	7	0	0 per year.

4. Law College, Madras :—

	Rs.	A.	P.
(a) Fees for M. L. . . . .	5	0	0 per mensem.
(b) Fees for B. L. . . . .	15	0	0 per mensem.

5. Hostel charges in Madras :—

	Rs.	A.	P.
(a) Boarding charges for Europeans . . . . .	26	0	0 per mensem.
(b) Room rent . . . . .	2	to	5 per mensem.
(c) Establishment . . . . .	3	8	0 per mensem.
(d) Water, electricity, medical, etc. . . . .	2	4	0 per mensem.

The information so kindly supplied to me by the Superintendent of the office of the Public Service Commission generally tallies with my own information as stated above. According to his information also the hostel and messing cost in the Bengal Engineering College is Rs. 30 per mensem for Anglo-Indians, and Rs. 15 for Hindus, with extra for room rent, lighting, furniture, municipal rates, and taxes. For athletics and games the monthly fee for Anglo-Indians is Re. 1-14-0.



In conclusion, the Superintendent says "the approximate cost of living in hostels affiliated to the Bombay University is Rs. 50 per mensem. In the University of Calcutta, the cost of living or messing and seat rent varies in different hostels and messes. The messing charge is about Rs. 16 per mensem. Seat rent varies from Rs. 5 to Rs. 7 per mensem and in some cases Rs. 10 per mensem, including electric charges". Bombay, of course, is known for its high cost of living.

Thus, if the principle of keeping the cost of training in the military college lower than that at the Senior Universities like Bombay, Madras and Calcutta be followed in India also, then it will be quite reasonable to fix the charges per cadet as follows :—

Rs.		
10	..	.. Tuition fee per month.
30	..	.. Boarding charges per month.
5	..	.. Light and rent per month.
5	..	.. Library and games per month.
15	..	.. Pocket money per month.
<hr/>		
65	..	.. Total per month, i.e., Rs. 780 per year.

Thus, at Rs. 780 per year, the total cost of training for the full course of 3 years would be Rs. 2,340. Supposing now the cost of uniform to be, say, Rs. 500, and of books to be, say, Rs. 250, then the total cost for a full course of 3 years including tuition, board, lodging, pocket money, books and uniform should not exceed Rs. 3,090. We may thus take it at the round figure of Rs. 3,000 for a full course of 3 years.

If this figure of Rs. 3,000 be deducted from Rs. 4,600, which is the amount of fees fixed by the majority of the Committee, then the extra cost per cadet, for 3 years is Rs. 1,600, i.e., Rs. 1,44,000 for 3 years for 90 cadets. Therefore, the extra cost of 90 cadets per year will be Rs. 48,000.

Now the question is, who can bear this extra burden of Rs. 48,000 a year without feeling it? The State or the poor parents? If the State feels that it has a claim on the patriotism of the youths, who can maintain that the poor parents have not still greater claim on the revenues of the State? And after all, the extra cost is a paltry sum of Rs. 48,000 a year.

The sociological conditions in England are quite different from those in India. In England officers are recruited mostly from what are called the leisured classes who are never in want of money, but in India it is the parents of middle classes who will mostly supply the officers. In India, if a father earns from Rs. 250 to Rs. 500 per month, and has three or four children to educate, he will not be able to pay Rs. 125 per month for the training of one of his sons at this military college, while paying for the education of his other children, and also having to maintain a household.

I am, therefore, strongly of opinion that the total cost of education at the college per cadet for a full course of 3 years should not exceed Rs. 3,000. This figure should include tuition, board, lodging, pocket money, books and uniform. It should not include vacation and private clothes.

This proposal of mine compares very favourably with the fees charged at St. Cyr, Kingston, and West Point.

At St. Cyr Military College, France, "fees are charged at the school, but there are numerous categories of boys who escape payment of fees in whole or part. Out of 300 boys in each class 50% pay nothing at all, and only 40 boys pay full fees. The remainder pay at varying rates according to their parents' means and services to the country, so that even the poorest boy is not debarred from entering the School."

(Skeen Committee Report, Volume I, page 151.)

My latest information in this matter about St. Cyr and French Polytechnique as supplied to me by General Needham, Military Attaché to the British Embassy at Paris in his letter dated Paris, the 8th April 1931, is as follows:—

"about the expense to which a boy's parents are put, the following is the official reply to my enquiries:

*St. Cyr.*

- (a) By the law of April 16th, 1930, education, etc., is free, if ten years Army service in all is given by the pupil. If not, he must repay £100 for each year completed at the school, *i.e.*, £200 in all.
- (b) The family pays £40—45 for the boy's clothes and kit but Government loans in aid are given in case of need.

*Polytechnique.*

- (a) As for St. Cyr and applicable to those who do not enter military service (a considerable percentage) or who fail to pass out. Amount repayable £130 for each year, *i.e.*, £260 in all.
- (b) Clothes as for St. Cyr but cheaper, about £30.

At Kingston Military College, Canada, "the cost to the parent of educating a boy for the full four years' course at the R. M. C. is 1,450 dollars, which is rather less than half the average estimated cost (3,000) dollars of giving a boy a 4 years' education at a Canadian University."

(Skeen Committee Report, Volume I, page 173.)

At the present rate of value of a dollar in rupees which is Rs. 2-14-0 the whole cost of a full 4 years' course to a cadet comes to Rs. 4,168-12-0, *i.e.*, at the rate of Rs. 1,042 per year. My proposal also is exactly the same, *i.e.*, Rs. 1,000 per year.

At the Military College at West Point, America, "the State pays the whole cost of the institution and in addition pays each cadet 1,072 dollars a year, out of which he has to purchase his uniform, etc., as a cadet, and can also without difficulty save enough money to buy his outfit when he gets his first Commission."

"In return for his free education at West Point, each cadet has to agree to serve for 8 years; for 4 years as a cadet at the Academy, and for a further 4 years as an officer after leaving it. If, however, in his early years at West Point, an individual cadet decides that he wishes to revert to civil life, he is usually allowed to do so", and is I suppose not made to pay back the cost of his training.

(Skeen Committee Report, Volume I, page 186.)

It this is so in the richest country of the world, why should Indians in a poor country like India be made to pay a heavy rate of fees ?

35. *Indian Air Force Cadets.*—We are told that it was in 1928 that it was decided to raise an Indian squadron of the Air Force. We were further told that India has 8 such British squadrons which with the Indian Squadron when completed will make 9 squadrons in all. Thus it will be seen that the decision of the Round Table Conference to increase substantially the rate of Indianisation has not been given effect to in respect of the Air Force in India. We wanted Indianisation of the existing force and not an addition to it of an Indian section. It means an increase in the military forces which was possibly not needed by India. We were further told that wastage in the Indian squadron will be 3 per year, and that this is such a small number that it will be more economical to send these 3 cadets for training to Cranwell than to establish a Flying Training School for them in India. We were also told that the minimum number of cadets required to justify the incurring of expenditure in establishing a fully equipped Flying School is 10. Then the question is—why were not the 8 British Squadrons reduced by 3 and why was it not decided to raise 3 Indian squadrons in substitution thereof, instead of adding to them one Indian Squadron ? Here I know I am trespassing into a field which has been precluded from us by the ruling of H. E. the Chairman in respect of the terms of reference of this Expert Committee.

In Civil Aviation in spite of many handicaps Indian boys have shown eagerness to learn flying, originality, leadership, and pluck. Large sums of money are being voted every year for the development of civil aviation. Besides, we know the Indian Territorial Forces are anxious to have the air arm added to them. Under the circumstances is it a pertinent question to ask why should not a fully equipped Flying School be established in India on the combined contributions from the Budget grants for civil aviation and the military budget ? I appeal to the Government to explore the problem in the direction mentioned.

According to the calculations given in paragraph 48 of the Report, it will cost about £100,000, i.e., 13 lacs a year for establishing a Flying Training School for, say, 30 pupils. Thus 13 lacs a year is not a big sum if divided in due proportion between the budget grants for Civil Aviation and the Military Budget. If the School be established in connection with any of the Flying Clubs, say, of Bombay or Karachi, a part of the running expenses will be recovered from the civilians desiring to have a training in flying.

36. *Attachment to British units and retention of Sandhurst and Woolwich.*—This Expert Committee has by majority recorded its opinion against both these items. I am however strongly in favour of continuing both these systems. If I am erring, I have the consolation to know that I am erring in very good company. The Skeen Committee supports me all through. The Chairman of the Defence Sub-Committee and Lord Reading also support me in respect of the existing scheme of reserving a few vacancies at the British Sandhurst for Indian cadets, as will be evident from the following quotation from the Report of the Defence Sub-Committee, page 19 :—

“ *Chairman.*—The establishment of a Sandhurst in India need not prevent the existing scheme from continuing whereby a number of (Indian) students

attend Sandhurst in this country. On the contrary I see advantages in that continuing.

*Lord Reading.*—Yes.

*Chairman.*—I do not want it to be assumed that one is necessarily a substitute for the other; on the contrary they can run concurrently and indeed, I see advantages in that.” \* \* \*

37. *Auxiliary and Territorial Forces Cadets.*—In England and countries of Europe military authorities love to offer all inducements for university men to enter the army, so that the scientific branches of their fighting machines may be kept on a high level of efficiency and abreast of the latest scientific inventions in competition with their rivals.

In India, however, the contrary is the case. Peculiar delight is taken in talking with feelings of contempt for the university men who are nicknamed as babu classes. But those of us who can envisage a day not very far distant in the future, when responsibilities for control and administration of the army and particularly for bringing it to the level of scientific efficiency of the European countries will devolve upon Indians after the elimination of the British Officers, feel impelled to provide for the caution from the very commencement that, as the British officer is eliminated, his place is taken by an Indian of the same intellectual capacity and width of mind, born of the same standard of preliminary academic education; otherwise, we may have a fine fighting machine without the trained brain for directing strategy and tactics and above all for feeding the machine with products of latest scientific developments. I feel that our national army cannot afford to do without the scientific intellect of Bengal, academic and sentimental though it may be, and the mathematical intellect of Madras, philosophical, though it is.

I am, therefore, strongly in favour of giving equal opportunities to the men of the U. T. Cs. for being nominated as Army Cadets. I may at once state here that; if the nomination had been restricted to their legitimate limits and wide scope had been left for open competition, I would not have pressed for the inclusion of men of the U. T. C. in the Army Cadets. Fortunately I find that ultimately a majority of the non-official members of the Committee have seen the importance of thus providing for the men of the U. T. Cs. and Territorial Forces and have joined in disagreeing with the Report in this respect. I hope and trust the Government will attach due importance to our protest.

38. *Location.*—The college should be located at a more or less central place so that no Province may be at a disproportionately greater disadvantage in respect of railway journeys than the other. I, therefore, suggest the following places in order of my preference :—

Mhow, Saugor, Jubbulpore, Deolali, Poona and Satara.

Climate in these places is very bracing generally all the year round except in Jubbulpore where the month of May and the first half of June is hotter than in others; but we are providing for the summer vacation of two months.

39. *Method of Indianisation.*—As I read the Resolutions and Recommendations of the Defence Sub-Committee and the Resolution of the Government of India appointing this Expert Committee, I have no doubt that the question of the method of Indianisation could legitimately be included in the

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terms of reference. But H. E. the Chairman has ruled otherwise, instead of following the example in generosity and sympathy set up by no less a person than the Prime Minister himself as President of the Round Table Conference, as will be evident from the following quotation from the Report of the Round Table Conference,

“ after the opening ceremony, the Conference decided.....to proceed to a general discussion in plenary session on the question whether the future constitution of India should be on a federal or unitary basis.”

“ The Chairman stated that he would put a liberal interpretation on the subject thus placed before the Conference and would allow reference to cognate questions and to questions which the Conference might think were involved in the decision between a constitution of the federal or unitary type”.

(Proceedings of the Round Table Conference, page 1.)

\* \* \*

However, even supposing that H. E. the Chairman was right in his interpretation of the terms of reference, I feel it would have been really graceful if the Chairman relying on precedents like these had allowed us to express our opinion on the method and pace of Indianisation.

40. By Indianisation is meant the gradual Indianisation of commissioned and other appointments now held in the Indian Army by British personnel and the rendering of India more and more self-supporting as regards all arms and services. In other words it means the elimination of the British element from the Indian Army and substitution of it by Indian officers, so that “ the defence of India must to an increasing extent be the concern of the Indian people and not of the British Government alone ”. It does not necessarily involve inevitable elimination of the Viceroy’s Commissions, though expediency and the necessity of keeping military budget within its legitimate limits may eventually lead to the gradual elimination of the Viceroy’s Commissions also.

41. Indianisation can be carried out in two ways :—

First.....By expanding the present Government scheme of Indianisation of eight Units, so as to cover what is called, by H. E. the Chairman, one whole division.

Second.....By the method recommended by the Shea Committee of 1922.

The first method has been universally condemned and there is entire agreement with what has been said by the Skeen Committee in its condemnation in paragraph 17 of their Report from which I quote as below :—

“ For reasons which appear to us to be convincing, the scheme had been extremely unpopular almost from its inception not merely with general public in India but with the Indian officers whom it directly affects and with most of the commanding officers of the Indianising units. The first and almost universal criticism provoked by the inquiries we have made is that to confine

Indian officers to these units is an invidious form of segregation and that every Indian officer should be given the same chance of selecting the unit to which he wishes to be sent as a British officer."

Thus, if the 8 unit scheme was an invidious form of segregation, the present scheme of Indianisation of a whole division is the same segregation practised, at this time, on a very much wider scale. The Government have paid no heed to the popular condemnation of this method of segregation. The Government ought to have known that this scheme of segregation will never be acceptable to the people and that it will keep the ferment of discontent and agitation perpetually alive.

42. The second method recommended by the Shea Committee appears to carry out Indianisation in its true spirit. To give a clear idea of what the method is like, I quote from the Committee's Report as below :—

" *Indianisation by definite stages.*—The Committee recommends, therefore, that the complete Indianisation of all arms and services (excluding Gurkhas for whom special arrangements will be necessary) of the Indian Army be carried out in three definite stages, each of 14 years, commencing from 1925 :—

This period of 42 years was reduced to 30 years after reconsideration.

- (a) First period : 1st to 14th year.
- (b) Second period : 15th to 28th year.
- (c) Third period : 29th to 42nd year.

They recommend that during the first period of fourteen years :—

*First period of Indianisation—*

- (a) One regiment per group of cavalry, one battalion per group of Infantry, and a corresponding proportion of other services be selected for Indianisation.
- (b) The average number of commissions in fighting formations in the Indian Army to be given to Indians in each year should amount to approximately 81.
- (c) The establishment of a cavalry regiment and infantry battalion and a pioneer battalion selected for Indianisation be fixed at 28 officers.
- (d) The establishment of a pack battery selected for Indianisation be fixed at 6 officers.
- (e) The establishment of engineer units selected for Indianisation be fixed as under :—

Headquarters companies	..	..	..	3	per company
Field companies	..	..	..	6	per company.
Field troops	..	..	..	4	per troop.
Railway companies	..	..	..	7	per company.
Army Troops companies	..	..	..	7	per company.

(f) The number of officers to be posted to the Quartermaster-General's services be approximately 148.

(g) The number of officers to be posted to the Indian Army Educational Corps be approximately 54.

The officers will be posted to units as follows :—

(a) Cavalry, infantry and pioneers :—Two Indian officers would enter each such unit yearly displacing one British officer and one Indian officer as at present commissioned.

(b) Artillery :—One Indian officer would enter each battery biennially (every second year) displacing either one British officer or one Indian officer as at present commissioned.

(c) Engineer units :—Indian officers would enter engineer units as follows :—

(i) Headquarters companies : One officer every fourth year.

(ii) Field companies : One officer every second year.

(iii) Field troops : One officer every third year.

(iv) Railway and Army Troops companies : One officer every second year.

This officer would displace either one British officer or one Indian officer commissioned as at present.

In this way, after twelve years, all British officers in 7 cavalry regiments, 20 infantry battalions, 3 pioneer battalions, 6 pack batteries, 1 headquarters company, engineers, 6 field companies, engineers, 2 field troops, engineers, 1 railway company and 1 Army Troops company undergoing Indianisation would have disappeared and such units would be completely officered by Indians.

“ The Committee further recommend that, with a view to ensuring the necessary supply of militarily qualified officers for the Quartermaster-General's and Educational Services a number—approximately 16—of Indian officers should be appointed annually and posted as supernumeraries one to each of certain selected units undergoing Indianisation.”

*Indian officers to be posted to units of class.*—“ The Committee think that it will be necessary ultimately to post Indian officers to units irrespective of class, but they are of opinion that the point is not one upon which a definite decision can now be given and that experience gained during the progress of Indianisation will alone indicate the course to be followed with a view to reconciling the requirements of military efficiency and possible class feeling.”

*Test of units undergoing Indianisation to be continuous.*—“ The Committee consider it essential as a condition and test of efficiency that units undergoing Indianisation should receive in every respect precisely similar treatment to that accorded to other units

and should be employed as Covering Troops, in the Field Army and for purposes of Internal Security as occasion may demand."

*Second period of Indianisation.*—"It is recommended that during the second period the numbers of commissions to be given annually should be increased to approximately 182, and this should provide for the Indianisation of the following units:—

Cavalry regiments	..	..	--	--	--	7
Infantry battalions	..	..	--	--	--	40
Pioneer battalions	..	..	..	--	..	3
Pack batteries	..	..	..	..	..	6
<i>Engineer units—</i>						
i. Headquarters companies	..	..	--	..	..	2
ii. Field companies	..	..	..	..	..	6
iii. Field Troops	..	..	..	..	..	1
iv. Army Troops companies	..	..	..	..	..	2

Together with a proportion for the Quartermaster-General's and Educational Services, and an allowance for wastage among first period officers.

*Third period—completion of Indianisation.*—The remaining units of the Indian Army would be Indianised during the third period—which if justified by experience might be shortened.

*Ancillary Services, Quartermaster-General's Services. Officers to be trained in fighting units.*—The Committee recommend that all ancillary services be Indianised on the same lines as the fighting troops.

They think it essential that all officers appointed to the Quartermaster-General's Services, other than those of extra-professional character (e.g., Veterinary officers), should be obtained as volunteers from fighting units, with whom they will have been trained and disciplined, with whose traditions they will have been imbued, and with whose requirements they will be acquainted. The Committee, therefore, direct attention to the fact that the Indianisation of these services must await a supply of officers trained with cavalry, artillery, infantry, etc., and consequently cannot progress at a rapid rate during the first period of Indianisation."

43. In this method, while real Indianisation will be proceeding according to the time-scale recommended the newly recruited Indian officer, holding King's Commission, will have the guidance and co-operation, in his new position, of his British colleague on the one hand and of the experienced Indian officer on the other. \* \* \*

44. It will thus be clear that as we are pressing for rapid Indianisation of the Indian Army compatible with efficiency, we are counting upon the military potentialities of many of the communities of India, which had, not in the very long past, subverted foreign Empires and established their own with entirely indigenous material and skill. I am glad to find confirmation of our belief in the feasibility of rapid Indianisation without affecting efficiency in quarters least



expected and at the same time highly authoritative—I mean the Shea Committee of the late Lord Rawlinson. I cannot better conclude this note than by quoting the last paragraph of the Shea Committee's Report which fills us with hope as it justifies our faith in our potentialities and, what is more, indicates the spirit of genuineness which ought to inspire the Government in dealing with this matter :—

*Committee's recommendations the basis of a workable scheme.*—“The Committee submit that their recommendations, contained in this their report, provide the basis of a workable scheme for the most rapid practicable Indianisation of the Indian Army, while safeguarding efficiency as far as possible. The scheme which they project is deliberate and allows for the maintenance of the existing organization, formations and grouping, and obviates the necessity for costly reorganization on the one hand and expensive forms of experiment on the other ; it clearly indicates the method and time of the process of Indianisation up to final completion thus assuring the Indian people that honest and purposeful endeavour is being made to give effect to their aspirations. The interests of British officers will be adequately safeguarded, while Indians under their immediate guidance, will have the incentive that they are serving in units permeated with fighting traditions and fit for any form of military duty.”

*P.S.*—The whole system of warfare has been revolutionised since the last Anglo-German War. It is not the standing armies of nations that fight now, but the entire people supported by even the mercenaries, if available. Thus, when the entire responsibility for the Government of India will devolve on the Indians, as it must in the immediately near future as a consequence of the attainment of Dominion Status, India must be prepared to control her own defences and foreign relations. In the management of her foreign relations, if an emergency were to arise—which God forbid—who knows what combinations of nations of the world India may have to fight ? Of course, we will always count on the co-operation and friendship of England. Our present standing army will not be of much help if the military regeneration of the entire people of the land is not immediately taken in hand rigorously to make up for the time lost during the period of the last about a century of the British policy of enforced disarmament.

This can be done in the following way :—

1. Removal of the ban upon recruitment of rank and file from certain communities of the people so that all federating provinces may be enabled to contribute their quota of men in the composition of the standing army, so far as they can in consonance with the essentials of efficiency.
2. Every encouragement should be given for the growth and extension of Territorial Forces. Their training must be made more efficient and embrace all arms of the army ; so that they may in

comparison with the Territorial Forces of the other countries of the world really form the second line of defence.

3. The U. T. Cs. in their training must be made to conform as closely as possible to the O. T. Cs. of England, for these will form the main source of supply of intelligent and well educated officers for the army. Their training and discipline must be made more efficient.

The U. T. Cs. may be divided into two categories—the Junior U. T. Cs. for the boys in the High Schools and the Senior U. T. Cs. for the boys of the Universities.

4. With a view to show the way how to improve the present educational system and to remove the defects in the system as pointed out by the Skeen Committee, physical training, organised games, rifle practice and drill be made compulsory to start with in a few selected High Schools with hostels by offering special inducements in the shape of special grants earmarked for the purpose. Such schools will serve as feeders to the military College.
5. Every encouragement should be given to establish rifle clubs particularly in connection with High Schools and Colleges.

In this connection it is often said that Indians are by nature divided into what may be called martial and non-martial races. This is a mere myth as I have said in the body of the Report. Japan, hardly 75 years ago, was in a similar position in this respect. But when by the law of the land military service was made compulsory for every able bodied man of whatever caste, fighting or non-fighting, he may belong, soon the artificial distinction of martial and non-martial classes vanished automatically. Mr. Roher P. Parter in his Book called "Japan, the rise of Modern Power" page 315 says :—

"But in the field the latter (Samurai, the so-called fighting classes) showed no superiority to the conscripts (people of the non-Samurai castes) and experience in fact proved that efficiency as a soldier depended entirely on adequate military training and not on any martial spirit or instinct supposed to be inherited by the Samurai and not by the Heimim (the common folks, the civilians who had not previously the right to bear arms)."

I need say no more in this matter. The idea carries its own condemnation.

B. S. MOONJE.

*The 3rd July 1931.*

*Minute by Sir P. S. Sivaswamy Aiyer and Major-General Raja Ganpat Rao  
Raghunath Rao Rajwade.*

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1. *The Committee's task as indicated by the Round Table Conference.*— This Committee has been appointed by the Government of India in accordance with the recommendation of the Defence Sub-Committee of the Round Table Conference to work out the details of the establishment of an Indian Military College in order to train candidates for commissions in all arms of the Indian defence services. In order to understand clearly what exactly was meant to be included under the term 'details', it is necessary to refer to the proceedings of Sub-Committee No. VII (Defence) of the Round Table Conference and to the resolutions which were passed by the Sub-Committee and accepted by the committee of the whole Conference. During the discussions of the Sub-Committee it was strongly urged by several members that, subject to the requirements of efficiency and the availability of suitable candidates for recruitment as officers, some definite indication should be given as to the rate of Indianisation of the officers of the Indian army, or some period fixed within which the Indianisation should be completed. It is stated in the report of the proceedings that the majority of the members of the Sub-Committee considered it impossible, for practical reasons, to lay down any definite rate of Indianisation. Mr. J. H. Thomas, the chairman of the Committee, deprecated any precise specification of the rate or period. His remarks upon the subject are of importance. After stating that an expert committee should be set up to give immediate effect to the object of Indianisation, the chairman remarked that the first thing to do was "to secure the site of the building, the number of men you are prepared to train, the accommodation and all those things. The period is all dependent upon that" (page 41 of the Report). Lord Reading observed that the expert committee to be appointed should have before them the reports of the committees appointed during his Viceroyalty in India (the Military Requirements Committee of 1921 and the Shea Committee of 1922 on the Indianisation of the Indian Army) and that they should consider those reports. This suggestion was accepted by the chairman, who undertook that, when, in pursuance of the resolutions of the Sub-Committee, expert committees were appointed, those committees would, as a matter of course, take into consideration the proceedings of previous committees and in particular, the proceedings of the Military Requirements Committee of 1921 and the committee of 1922 on the Indianisation of the Indian Army (*vide* page 86 of the Report). There were two expert committees referred to in this undertaking and in Resolutions II (c) and III. It is obvious that the expert committee which was to be appointed to investigate the reduction of the number of British troops in India to the lowest possible figure was not primarily, if at all, concerned with the subject of Indianisation of the officers of the Indian units. Resolution II (a) recommended that immediate steps be taken to increase substantially the rate of Indianisation in the Indian army to make it commensurate with the main object in view, *viz.*, the increase of the defence of their country. Resolution II (b) recommended the establishment of a training college at the earliest possible moment to give effect to Resolution II (a). If any committee has to consider the reports of the previous committees on the subject of Indianisation of officers in the Indian units, it is the present committee rather than the committee for the reduction of the British troops. It is a legitimate inference from the proceedings and resolutions of the Defence Sub-Committee that notwithstanding the use of the word 'details' in Resolution

II (c), the principles as to the pace and method of Indianisation were not intended to be excluded from the purview of this committee. Otherwise what purpose is served by placing the reports of the committee of 1921 and 1922 before this committee? And how could the expert committee determine the number of men "you are prepared to train"? The order of the Government of India appointing the committee as published in the *Gazette of India* follows the language of Resolution 4 (II) (c) of the Sub-Committee (Defence) of the Round Table Conference.

2. *The Committee's task restricted by the Commander-in-Chief in his circular letter and by his interpretation.*—But in his circular to the members of the committee, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief stated that the committee would be concerned with all the *technical* details of the military, financial and educational problems involved in establishing an Indian military college. It was also stated that the Government of India further proposed to invite the committee to give their advice regarding the scales of pay of officers who enter the Indian army through the college, though this was not, strictly speaking, one of the problems involved in establishing the college. As regards the size of the college, it was stated that the Government of India would be in a position to indicate the annual output that would be required from the college, in order to meet the increase of Indianisation contemplated by themselves and His Majesty's Government and that the committee would probably be asked to prepare a scheme for a college of 200 to 250 students with an annual output of about 60 to 80, including a proportion of cadets for Indian State Forces. It must be first pointed out that the Commander-in-Chief was not warranted in restricting the scope of the committee's work by introducing the word 'technical' to qualify details. Is this restrictive interpretation of the scope of the reference justified? One of the questions mentioned by Mr. J. H. Thomas as requiring preliminary investigation is "the number of men you are prepared to train". This was obviously contemplated by him as a question for the expert committee. The determination of the number of cadets to be trained depends on a number of interdependent factors, (a) the number of suitable candidates likely to be forthcoming, (b) the strength of the staff and the equipment of the college, (c) the number of cadets who can be efficiently trained by the staff and (d) the number of cadets who can be absorbed into the cadre of officers, the maximum limit being set by the annual number of vacancies. Is the last factor a question of detail or of principle or of both? Even if it is a question of principle is it necessarily outside the purview of this committee or is it a matter on which the opinion of the committee has to be taken? In opening the proceedings of the committee His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief made an important exposition of the policy of Indianisation which he had proposed to the Government of India. He asked the committee to concentrate their attention particularly on the question of a steady supply of suitable candidates for the college. This announcement of policy contained several important features, the nature of which was for the first time clearly explained to the committee. It was ruled by His Excellency that the question of what should be regarded as a substantial increase in the rate of Indianisation commensurate with the main object of Resolution No. 1 of the Round Table Conference was not within the competence of the committee. In excluding this important question from the consideration of the committee and

treating it as a matter for the decision of the Government without any advice or assistance from the committee, the scope of the committee's task as indicated by the Round Table Conference has been unduly narrowed. The work of the committee has been practically restricted to a consideration of the educational and financial details relating to the establishment of the college and its opinion has not been required on any of the important military problems connected with the establishment of the college. The correctness of His Excellency's ruling with regard to the scope of the committee's work is at best seriously open to question.

3. *Vital issues as to pace and method of Indianisation.*—But apart from any question of the correctness of the ruling, the decision arrived at on the principles underlying the policy of Indianisation is very unfortunate. Questions regarding the pace and method of Indianisation have a most important bearing upon the capacity of the college and upon the speedy development of the defensive capacity of India. They are questions upon which there is a fundamental difference between the military authorities and the Indian public. The attitude of the military authorities is in favour of a very slow policy of progress. On the other hand, Indian opinion favours a bold and liberal advance with a view to the speedy attainment of responsibility for defence, with all due regard to the conditions of efficiency and safety.

4. *Arguments in support of slow policy.*—Let us first refer to the arguments which have been advanced by the military authorities in support of a slow policy of Indianisation :—

- (1) While there is plenty of fine fighting material, it has not been proved that Indians possess any capacity for military leadership.
- (2) There is a sharp contrast in India between the martial classes and the non-martial classes, the former being deficient in intellectual endowment and the latter in martial spirit. It has yet to be proved that there are classes possessed of martial spirit and intellectual capacity combined.
- (3) It is uncertain whether there will be a steady supply of suitable candidates for training for King's commissions.
- (4) Whether Indian officers of non-martial classes can command the confidence of the martial classes has yet to be proved.

In the face of so many indeterminate factors any experiment by way of Indianisation of the officer ranks is held to be a leap into the unknown and must therefore proceed very cautiously, until it is proved that Indian officers can face their responsibility.

5. *Requirements of proof of fitness.*—The degree of proof required to convince the military authorities as to the efficiency and fitness of Indian officers for command has been stated differently at different times. The Sub-Committee of the Skeen Committee were informed by the India Office that it was desired to test the worth of the Indian King's commissioned officer in a time of crisis. In the report of the Simon Commission it is stated, presumably on the authority of some official memorandum, that the Indian King's commissioned officer must stand the only test which can possibly determine his efficiency and must

qualify himself by a successful army career for high command. These statements imply that no test short of actual experience under war conditions could be accepted. On the other hand, it was stated by the present Commander-in-Chief that after a period of 14 years' service, it might be possible to judge of the fitness of the Indian King's commissioned officer for command and that it might be possible to ascertain whether the Indian officer can train his unit in peace and lead it in war. Any experiment on a large scale without waiting for the lessons of experience must, it is alleged, be attended with serious risks to the safety of India arising from external danger or internal disturbances. The validity of these arguments will be examined later on. They are considered by Indians to be more specious than sound, but they appeal to the average British layman. The British mind is essentially empirical and wishes to build upon the results of experience and is content to solve the problems of the day without looking forward beyond tomorrow. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" is a maxim which more or less accurately expresses the mentality of the average Englishman.

6. *Postulates of dilatory policy.*—Before examining in detail the reasons urged in favour of a dilatory policy, it is necessary to point out that they are all based upon a postulate which no Indian will be prepared to grant. The assumption is that so long as the capacity of the Indian for leadership is not proved to the satisfaction of the military authorities, the organisation of the army cannot be changed in character, that British officers must continue to remain in position of command and that the responsibility for the military administration cannot be transferred to Indian hands. There is even the further implication that the defence of India may conceivably have to remain for all time in British hands. Indians are quite alive to the necessity for maintaining the efficiency of the army and to the importance of not imperilling the safety of India. They are however naturally anxious to assume responsibility for the control of the army within a reasonable period. What then is a reasonable period for the Indianisation of the officers' ranks? It has been pointed out that even if British recruitment to the officers' ranks were stopped to-day, it would take 35 years for the army to be completely Indianised. The Shea Committee of 1922 which was appointed by Lord Rawlinson first recommended a period of 42 years but on further consideration submitted the shorter period of 30 years which was unanimously accepted by the Government of India as then constituted including Lord Rawlinson. The refusal of the military authorities and the British Government to commit themselves to any indication of the probable period of Indianisation, subject to the necessary conditions of efficiency and the availability of suitable candidates, is one which it is impossible for Indians to appreciate. They refuse to contemplate the contingency of India proving unequal to the task of defending herself within a reasonable period. That the country is now unable to defend itself, no one is concerned to deny. But we believe that, if the policy of Indianisation were started in right earnest and carried out on sound national lines, it should be possible for us to train ourselves and undertake the responsibility for defence within a period of something like 35 years. If the Empire had to face the danger of another world war on the same scale as the Great War, there can be little doubt that England would be obliged to train India for her own defence within a much shorter period.



7. *Arguments for dilatory policy examined.*—Let us now proceed to consider the arguments urged by the military authorities in support of a dilatory policy of Indianisation. The plea that Indian capacity for leadership has to be proved by trial is one which cannot carry conviction to any reasonable mind. That a country like India, with its historical traditions and civilisation and with its vast population and varied classes, many of whom are not inferior in intelligence or martial spirit to the people of the West, cannot produce men with gifts of military leadership is a proposition which would *prima facie* be incredible.

8. *Indian capacity for military leadership not unknown in the history of India.*—Capacity for military leadership was not unknown to Indian history. The numerous kingdoms into which India was divided often carried on wars with each other and maintained armies of their own. The Hindus, Mahomedans and Sikhs all had their armies, led by their own generals. The Tamils and Telugus of Southern India, the Mahrattas of the Dekhan, the Rajputs of Central India and Rajputana and the Sikhs of the Punjab were not wanting in military leaders of ability.

9. *Past policy directed to the suppression of capacity of leadership.*—If it is at all true that the capacity for military leadership has not been displayed in recent times in the Indian units of the army (see *per contra* Lord George Hamilton's tribute to the native officers in the Tochi Valley operations in his despatch of the 3rd February 1898), it is entirely due to the fact that Indians have been denied all opportunities for entering the commissioned ranks of the army and of cultivating any gifts of leadership. The successive changes in the organisation of the Indian army since the time of Lord Clive, and especially the changes introduced after the Great Mutiny, were all dictated by one supreme consideration, how to prevent the possibility of any rising on the part of the Indian soldiers and how to prevent them from acquiring any capacity for leadership.

The Army in India Committee of 1912-13 referred to the risk of revolt having been reduced by the retention of the higher command and administration in the hands of British officers and by the consequent lack of opportunity for Indian officers to acquire the leadership and the initiative which practice and responsibility could alone impart; and they regarded this as a most important safeguard. It was considered necessary to impress upon the mind of the Indian soldier a conviction of his permanent racial inferiority to the British soldier. The steps which were taken with the object of crushing the capacity of the Indian for leadership and the reasons which induced the authorities to take these steps will be found described in the report of the Peel Commission of 1858-59, the Eden Commission of 1878-79 and the Army in India Committee of 1912-13 and the evidence given before these committees. As observed by an English writer, it would have been a phenomenon, if the system adopted by the authorities in the training of their Indian soldier developed any capacity for leadership at all. It is adding insult to injury to suggest that the capacity of the Indian for military leadership is an unknown quantity and has yet to be established.

10. *Tests proposed impracticable.*—If the fitness of Indians for command can only be tested by experience of war conditions, it is obvious that the ful-

filment of this test depends upon contingencies not within the control of Indians. It has been said that after a period of 14 years' service it may be possible to judge of the fitness of Indians for command. The command of a unit is normally attained only after a period of 26 years' service and it is quite as likely as not that even after 14 years' service, it may be urged that the efficiency of the Indian soldier has not been subjected to the crucial test of war.

11. *Theory of martial and non-martial classes examined.*—The distinction drawn by the military authorities between martial and non-martial classes is very largely artificial and the result of the military policy which has been followed by the Government with regard to recruitment for the army. This policy was founded not so much upon innate differences in the characteristics of the people as upon the distrust engendered by the participation of particular classes of soldiers in the Mutiny. Recruitment after the Mutiny to the army was determined by the opinion of the military authorities as to the reliability or otherwise of particular classes of people for loyalty to the Government. Several classes of people who used to furnish some of the finest material to the pre-Mutiny army came under the disfavour of the Government and were no longer drawn upon for purpose of recruitment. It is just as true that military qualities can be evoked or revived by suitable opportunities and training as it is that they may languish under unfavourable conditions.

12. *Simon Commission's remarks of no value.*—The fact that the Simon Commission have endorsed this theory of the Military Authorities furnishes no proof of its correctness. Internal evidence shows that their remarks are an uncritical reproduction of some official memorandum. The soundness of this theory of martial and non-martial classes has been the subject of an elaborate and critical study by Mr. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, who has contributed a series of very able and illuminating articles to the *Modern Review*. (See the numbers for July and September 1930, January and February 1931.) It would be useful to give a summary of the facts gathered from an impartial study of the history of recruitment of the British Indian Army.

(1) The theory of martial and non-martial classes was unknown in the pre-Mutiny organisation of the Indian Army. The three great Presidency armies which grew up in the three centres from which British power spread over the whole of India obtained their fighting material from their natural sources, viz., the Madras army from the Tamil and Telugu countries, the Bombay army from Western India and the Bengal army from Bihar and the United Provinces and, to a limited extent, Bengal.

(2) The principles of army organisation which were adopted after the Mutiny had regard not solely, or perhaps even mainly, to military efficiency. Political consideration relating to the method of securing the safety of British rule played the most important part.

(3) The maintenance of equilibrium between different regions and classes and the prevention of preponderance of any class were recognised as important principles in the organisation of the Army. Every feature of Army organisation that would have promoted *esprit de corps* and a sense of national unity and would have been regarded as a merit in a country enjoying national self-Government was obnoxious to our British rulers. Among the sources of danger which the authorities sought to remove were (1) the admission of the

higher castes and the aristocratic classes who enjoyed a prestige in the social organisation; (2) the homogeneity of the units; (3) the too indiscriminate mixture of soldiers in the units which tended to break down mutual differences, jealousies and exclusiveness and promoted regimental solidarity and (4) intelligence, education and capacity for initiative and leadership. Lack of intelligence and education, lack of any intelligent interest in the concerns of the outer world, came to be prized as virtues in the soldier.

(4) The measures which were adopted to avoid these dangers were (a) the formation of class companies in such a manner as to foster mutual prejudices and jealousies, (b) the intensification of diversity among the component elements of units and (c) the admission of the lower castes and classes.

(5) When it was found that military discipline and service in distant parts of the country tended to obliterate religious and caste differences and promote bonds of fellowship, the expedient was suggested that regiments should be, as far as possible, confined to the provinces in which they were raised so that they might continue to retain their traditional prejudices and mutual antipathies.

(6) It was during the time of Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief that the theory of martial classes was finally evolved.

(7) The military authorities were not, even in Lord Robert's time, advocates of the principle of combining maximum efficiency with maximum economy, but they were prepared to recognise higher or more important considerations like the avoidance of the preponderance of particular classes in the Army.

(8) The Bengal army, which before the Mutiny was regarded as a fine fighting machine, was almost exclusively composed of Hindustanees from Behar and the Doab, except that latterly a proportion of Sikhs and Punjabees had been introduced. The principal castes of Hindus in the army were Brahmins, Rajputs and Ahirs. The Hindus formed the great majority. The Bengal Presidency ceased to be a recruiting area and the high-caste Beharees and the U. P. men were no longer considered to be one of the martial races of India.

(9) The decline in the efficiency of the Hindustanee sepoy referred to by Lord Roberts and Lord Dufferin was not due to the decline of the martial quality of the ordinary Hindustanee sepoy who fought so gallantly for the British both before and after the Mutiny and again during the Great War of 1914-18, but to the inclusion, after the Mutiny, out of political considerations and as a counterpoise to the high-caste soldiers, of unsuitable low class men such as Pasis, Dhanuks, Lodhas, Chamars and Mehtars who had never before or after served as soldiers.

(10) The disparaging opinion of Lord Roberts regarding the Mahrattas is contradicted by the opinion of General H. J. Warre, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, and by their achievements during the Great War.

(11) The decline in the efficiency of the Madras Army was explained by General Sir Neville Chamberlain as follows:—

“ I admit that some Madras Infantry regiments do not come up to the proper standard; but this is not because of any inherent deficiency or defect in the material available. It has been because of

the regiments being badly commanded, partly arising from a rigid adherence to the claims of seniority partly to the British officers having been constantly changed and partly to a loss of feeling of *esprit de corps* created by large reductions and a flood of supernumeraries and partly because the army has not had its fair chance of field service."

Sir Frederick P. Haines, the Commander-in-Chief, felt bound to reject the assertions ascribing comparative inefficiency to Madras troops.

(12) Whatever the truth behind the theory of the martial races, it is not proved by anything in the military practice followed in this country. The latter has never been sufficiently free from considerations of political safety to permit us to take it as a genuine test of the military potentialities of India and of the military capacity of the various tribes and castes. In their policy of combining absolute political safety with the maximum of military efficiency, Government have categorically denied the right of serving their country to millions of Indians who have forfeited their confidence or roused their suspicions by their political activities, educational progress or intellectual ability.

(13) Statistics relating to the proportion of soldiers from the different parts of India with regard to selected classes actually serving in the Indian Army on the 1st of January 1914, 1919 and 1930 show that the present-day proportions of the various classes bear no relation either to their war efforts or to their ratios in the army before the war. This want of correspondence is particularly noticeable with regard to the United Provinces, Madras and Behar. The Sikhs who formed the most numerous class in the army in 1893 have come down to the third place and the Punjabi Musalmans have now taken the first place.

(14) The comments of the Simon Commission on the war efforts of the different classes in India show no intelligent analysis or appreciation of the various causes affecting recruitment.

Mr. Chaudhuri's conclusions are amply supported by reference to official documents and I reproduce in the appendix a few of the copious extracts which he has furnished in his articles.

13. *Circumstances favouring recruitment from the North.*—As pointed out by Mr. Chaudhuri, the whole attitude of the British authorities in India in favour of the men of the north was due to the circumstance that, owing to the growth of the Russian menace by 1880, the North-West Frontier had become the principal theatre of operations for the Indian Army. The numerous tribal risings on the North-West Frontier and the necessity for guarding this vulnerable frontier which has been the gateway of invading hordes induced the Government to mass a large portion of our army in the Punjab. The military authorities found it more convenient to recruit their soldiers from the people who are near at hand, easily available and familiar with the terrain. The Government have also supplied the army of Northern India with the ablest and the most energetic officers who were most fitted to bring out the latent qualities of their men by training and organisation. As pointed out in Arthur's "Life of Lord Kitchener" (Volume II, p. 1 125), "All this tended to damp the zeal and mar the efficiency of the Madras and Bombay armies, and not a little to

foster jealousies between them and the Bengal army. Nor did the post-Mutiny reorganisation of the Indian military system do anything to abate these heartburnings, and service in the other Presidencies became increasingly unpopular. Young officers who were ambitious, or could wield influence, strained every nerve to be posted to the Bengal Staff Corps, with the result that the Madras and Bombay Staff Corps were always considerably under strength. The amalgamation of the three Staff Corps in 1891, the abolition of the Presidential armies in 1895 and the creation of Four Commands failed to popularise military service in Madras and Bombay, the conditions of which remained unhealthily stagnant."

14. *Climatic reasons alleged for non-enlistment.*—One argument urged in support of the present policy of enlistment is that the men belonging to South India and other areas from which recruitment is barred cannot stand the climate of the north-western frontier and are averse to service there. Adaptability to climatic environments is one of the characteristics of human beings and service for a period of one or two years is likely to bring about the necessary adaptation. If this were a valid argument the British and the Gurkha soldier should not be enlisted for service in India or in expeditions to other tropical countries. During the wars in foreign lands in which Indian troops were employed, nothing was heard of the unadaptability of the Indian soldiers to the climatic conditions of other countries.

15. *Geographical variations within a country not decisive ground.*—We are not concerned to deny the existence of geographical differences in physique, temperament or aptitudes. Differences are to be found even in the different parts of the United Kingdom and between county and county. The advocates of enlistment from select areas and races forget how much improvement is, and can be, effected in the physique and morale of the soldier by the conditions of service in the army which ensure a nutritious diet and regularity of habits, drill and discipline, military surroundings and regimental traditions. The troops which played a part in the Peninsular War were described by the Duke of Wellington as having been recruited from the scum of the earth enlisted for drink.

We have dwelt at some length on the history of recruitment and it may be said, that it is unnecessary to dwell on the sins of omission or commission of the Government in the past. Our object is not to sit in judgment on the past policy of the Government, but to point out the unfairness of blaming the people for the effects of a policy deliberately and systematically followed by the Government. These effects have been disastrous and the policy requires a change.

16. *Financial argument. No justification of enlistment policy.*—Whatever value may have to be attached to the professional arguments, the professional point of view is a narrow one and fails to take note of the requirements of the safety and progress of the nation all round. From this larger point of view financial economy is not the only consideration. Even the military authorities were not un-alive to the importance of considerations overriding the claims of economy. (See the remarks of Lord Dufferin in his minute of 8th December 1888, Collen's Army in India during the Viceroyalty of Lord Dufferin, page 19). The welfare of all parts of India and the development of their self-sufficiency

is an object which cannot be lost sight of by any national Government. Economy for the moment is not economy in the long run from the point of view of India as a whole. The provinces whose interests have been neglected in recruitment for the Army would be morally justified in refusing to contribute to the pecuniary burden of defence. It cannot be maintained that the provinces and classes which have ceased to supply recruits have so irretrievably declined that their martial qualities cannot be revived by throwing open the door of the army to all. Making allowance for the deteriorating effects of stoppage of recruitment among particular classes, it is an extravagant contention that entire provinces have so far deteriorated in martial qualities that they do not contain any classes capable of furnishing soldierly material for the army.

17. *Political dangers of the present enlistment policy.*—Unfortunate as its past policy has been in its effects upon particular classes of people, the present policy of the Government is calculated to perpetuate these differences and expose the peoples and provinces shut out from enlistment to the danger of domination by the classes listed as martial. This is one of the risks referred to by the Simon Commission as likely to follow the withdrawal of British troops and British officers. But the lesson drawn from this circumstance by the Simon Commission is not the urgent need of training all provinces to bear their share of responsibility for defence. The lesson which for obvious reasons they draw is that the present military policy and the presence of British troops and officers must remain more or less permanent features of the Indian administration.

The remarks of the Simon Commission that the military authorities are taking their share in the work of reducing the martial disparity between classes and races is just, as incorrect as their inferences from the figures of recruitment to the army are fallacious. Apparently the formation of a territorial force and urban battalions is referred to. But the territorial force is treated in a step-motherly way, especially as compared with the Auxiliary Force, and the formation of an urban battalion was delayed for four years after the report of the Territorial Force Committee and only launched at an inauspicious time when the political unrest in the country had become intensified.

18. *Policy of open door for enlistment called for.*—The proper remedy for the existing state of things is to throw open enlistment in the army to all provinces, classes and individuals, subject of course to the condition of suitability of the individual. It would be a tardy reparation for the injury caused by past policy. The removal of the bar against particular provinces and classes is one of the most urgent reforms called for in the organization of the army. We plead only for the policy of an open door and not for the admission of the unfit. There need be no fear that persons with no military aptitude or inclinations will enter the army in large numbers and dilute the strength and impair the efficiency of the army. It is only those individuals that have any martial aptitude and instincts that will care to enter the army and be prepared to undergo the discipline and hard life of a soldier.

19. *Change of political out-look and its bearings upon the defensive organisation.*—Political considerations have always had a share in all countries in determining the military policy of the country and India has been no exception to the rule. But the point of view from which the problem of defence should

be now approached is entirely different from that which has been hitherto adopted by the Government. The consideration which has hitherto influenced the authorities has been the best method of maintaining British rule over an alien population and for that purpose preventing the growth of martial spirit and leadership to an extent which might prove inconvenient and embarrassing to the Government. Now that responsible Government has been promised and that constitutional changes for the attainment of the goal are in sight, the angle of vision must necessarily be shifted and the primary consideration hereafter must be the evolution of a national army within a reasonable period.

20. *Importance of National Army under modern conditions.*—Apart from the constitutional and political aspects of the organisation of the army it must be realised that modern war implies a conflict not merely between the armies of the belligerent countries, but between nations. War under modern conditions is carried on on a tremendously larger scale than in the past and the successful conduct of it requires the utilisation of the whole of the man-power and the material resources of the nations engaged in the conflict. It is therefore essential that the army should as far as possible be drawn from all classes and areas and should assume a national character and that the responsibility for the defence of the country should be brought home to all sections of the population. This responsibility cannot be discharged merely by the payment of taxes to meet the military expenditure. Every class and community must be prepared to shoulder the burden of defence by willingness to serve in the army. It is a matter of familiar experience that for purposes of defence against external danger a national army possesses far greater moral strength and staying power than a merely professional army drawn from particular classes only. The military situation of India with its long frontiers is more analogous to that of the continental powers of Europe than to that of Britain. It is perhaps premature and inadvisable at the present moment to think of conscription.

21. *Need for new orientation of military organisation.*—It is absolutely necessary to give a new orientation to the policy of military organisation. Till the inauguration of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, the authorities gave no thought to the question of defence from the national point of view. The Esher Committee on the organisation of the army in India paid no attention to the national aspect of the question. The only committee, which at all approached the problem from the national point of view, was the Auxiliary and Territorial Forces Committee presided over by Sir John Shea. But it dealt only with the organisation of the non-regular forces and its recommendations have not been carried out except in the most half-hearted manner. The appointment of a committee to examine the military organisation of India from a national point of view is one of the most urgent measures to be undertaken by a responsible, or even a semi-responsible Government of India. Such a committee must be charged with the duty of devising measures for uplifting the martial capacity of all provinces creating a national army imbued with a sense of patriotism and responsibility for the defence of the motherland, and preventing the domination of one area by another or of the civil population by the soldiery. Public opinion will refuse to accept the dilemma posed by the Simon Commission that for the purpose of defence India must remain for

generations either under the heel of Britain or under the heel of the enlisted classes.

22. *Scepticism as to supply of candidates unwarranted.*—Another reason advanced in support of a slow policy of Indianisation is that we are not sure of a steady supply of recruits for the King's Commissions. We believe that when the field of recruitment is thrown widely open, there will be no difficulty in finding suitable recruits for the commissions to be thrown open to competition. The causes of the paucity of candidates in the past have been fully set forth in the report of the Skeen Committee. With the increase in the number of commissions to be offered every year, the opening of an Indian Military College and the reduction in the cost of military education to parents, there is no room for any misgivings as to the supply of suitable candidates. Even if the other provinces failed to respond to the offer, there would be no lack of suitable candidates from the enlisted areas. Sir John Maynard, the retired member of the Executive Council in the Punjab, informed the Skeen Committee that in the Punjab alone "There are many boys who do not appear for the Sandhurst examination, but are of better quality than the accepted Sandhurst candidates whom he himself had seen." We may refer also to similar testimony given by other witnesses before the Skeen Committee.

23. *Ability of officers of non-enlisted classes to inspire confidence in men of martial classes.*—A further argument urged in favour of the policy is that it remains to be seen whether Indian King's Commissioned officers, particularly of the non-enlisted classes, can command the confidence of men belonging to the enlisted classes, in the same way as the British Officers. So far as the King's Commissioned officers of the martial classes are concerned, there is no ground for any apprehension. But even in regard to Indian officers of the so-called non-martial classes, there is no reason to fear that if he has got the requisite capacity, training, tact and sympathy, he will fail to inspire confidence in the ranks: moreover, there will be the British King's commissioned officer over him, and if the former is worth his salt, it would be his duty to support his Indian subalterns in the same way as he would support his British subalterns. Much of the success of the British officer whether in the civil service or military service of the Crown, is due to his confidence that he will be backed up by his superior officers in the discharge of his duties and receive their moral support.

24. *Alleged risks of too large experiment.*—It has been suggested that the experiment on a larger scale will expose India to risks with regard to Internal security and protection against external danger. We cannot regard these risks as probable or likely. The maintenance of internal security is normally a matter for the police organisation and the main argument advanced in favour of the presence of a large number of British troops and officers is that their impartiality would not be open to suspicion. With the growing national consciousness of the people and their aspirations to self-Government, there will be less and less danger of a feeling of distrust as to the impartiality of Indian Officers as a class. As regards the fear of external danger arising from a large addition of the Indian element to the King's commissioned officers of the army, it seems to be equally fanciful. It seems to be forgotten that during the transition period, which must elapse before the Indian Army can be fully



Indianised, the Indian King's commissioned officers will be trained and guided by the British officers above them, not to speak of the Viceroy's commissioned officers who have been described as the back-bone of the Indian Army. This preliminary survey, we have been obliged to make at some unavoidable length, as it is the indispensable back-ground of our remarks on the new scheme.

25. *Salient features of new scheme of Indianisation.*—We may now proceed to examine the main features of the scheme of Indianisation which has been put forward by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and which are all intimately connected with the question of the annual output of cadets from the College. The three features of his scheme which are most open to criticism are (1) the principle of posting Indian King's Commissioned officers only to the units selected for Indianisation, (2) the elimination of the Viceroy's commissioned officers and the organisation of these units on the pattern of the British Army, and (3) the pace of Indianisation of the officers' ranks. We will consider each of these features in order.

26. *Segregation.*—The policy of posting the Indian King's commissioned officers only to the units selected for Indianisation is the continuation of the principle which underlay the Eight Units Scheme and an extension of that principle to the larger number of units, comprised in one whole division of Infantry and one Cavalry Brigade, with all their auxiliary and ancillary services. This policy of differential treatment of Indian King's commissioned officers evoked universal criticism in India. It was strongly condemned by public opinion in this country and received with feelings of profound dissatisfaction by the Indian King's commissioned officers. It has been disapproved by the British officers of the units selected for Indianisation and has been unanimously condemned by the Skeen Committee, who recommended its abandonment. A distinguished and disinterested soldier like His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner found so many demerits in it that he considered it unnecessary to go into details. (See proceedings: Sub-committee No. 7, page 73.)

27. *Arguments in favour of segregation.*—We may first consider the arguments which have been adduced in favour of the principle of the Eight Units Scheme which is now proposed to be extended to a whole fighting formation. It was explained by Mr. Brown, the representative of the India Office, before the Skeen Sub-committee that there was a certain amount of uncertainty about the way in which Indian officers might develop, that it was conceivable that an Indian officer in a time of crisis might prove unequal to his responsibilities and that if young Indian officers served side by side with British officers of the same age, rank and standing, it was possible that the shortcomings of the Indian officer might be covered up by the British officers and his defects might be concealed. This was said to be one of the main considerations which led to the adoption of the scheme. It is impossible to accept this explanation as furnishing the real reason for the principle of the Eight Units Scheme, which, for brevity's sake, we may call the scheme of segregation. It must be first pointed out that the principle of segregation cannot furnish the test proposed, as for a long time to come the Indian King's commissioned officer will always be serving under British officers and, even if the Indian officer played up to his responsibilities and stood the test of the crisis, his successes could

always be ascribed to the guidance and leadership of the British officer above him, just as it has become the fashion with English officers and historians to remark that the Indian soldier is excellent fighting material, provided he is led by British officer. If the argument really had any weight, it should tell even against the mixture of British officers of superior rank, just as much as against the mixture of British officers of equal rank in the Indian units. The real reason for the principle of segregation is the reluctance of British young men to take the chance of having to serve under an Indian officer and taking orders from him. This explanation was not vouchsafed at first, when the Eight Units Scheme was publicly announced by Lord Rawlinson in the Legislative Assembly or at any subsequent time. It was left to Mr. Young, the present Army Secretary to lift the veil partially from the genesis of the scheme in a speech in the Assembly in 1928. He deprecated the idea of attributing the reluctance of the British officer to racial arrogance but contended that the British boys would cease to come out to the Indian Army if they had to face the prospect of serving under Indian officers. The explanation that he gave was ingenious, but not even plausible. He stated on the authority of the highest military opinion in India and in Britain that in fighting units an officer establishment of persons of widely different nationalities was not a practical proposition and could not be efficient. Even in the units proposed to be Indianised, the British officer would continue and would be quite willing to serve so long as he was above the Indian officers. The objection of the British officer is not really to the mixture of persons of widely different nationality in the same unit; it is to the possibility of having to serve under a senior Indian officer that the British officer cannot reconcile himself. Though the true explanation has not been given to the Assembly, it has been frequently admitted by high military authorities that racial prejudices would never allow the British officer to take orders from a senior Indian officer and that if they had to undergo this risk, the flow of British officers to the Indian Army would stop. This fear and the device of segregating the Indian officer to counteract it were mentioned by Gen. Chesney (in his "Indian Polity", first published in 1868) by Lord Roberts and by Lord Kitchener. Lord Roberts fought against Gen. Chesney's proposal to grant commissions to Indians. He referred to the strong feeling inveterate to all ranks of the British army that natives were neither physically nor morally their equals and remarked as follows:—

"It is this consciousness of the inherent superiority of the European which has won for us India. However well educated and clever a native may be and however brave he may have proved himself, I believe that no rank that we could bestow upon him would cause him to be considered as an equal by the British officer, or looked up to by the British soldier in the same way that he looks upto the last joined British subaltern".

(Arthur's "Life of Lord Kitchener", Volume II, p. 177.) Lord Kitchener himself who was probably one of the most broad-minded Commander-in-Chief who ever served in India, and was in favour of the establishment of an Indian Military College and the admission of natives of India for higher military employment, referred to the deep-seated racial repugnance to any step which brought nearer the day when Englishmen in the army might have to take orders from Indians (Arthur's "Life of Lord Kitchener", Volume II, p. 181).

It may be said that whether justifiable or not we strike here upon the bedrock of racial prejudice and that some weight must be attached to the fear of high military officers who are acquainted with the prejudices of their countrymen, and many of whom share those prejudices, that the admission of the Indian officer to serve alongside of British officers in the same units might have an adverse effect upon British recruitment. But is there a real danger of such a result? The prospect of having to serve under Indian officers has not deterred Englishmen from joining the Civil Service. It goes without saying that the Englishmen who enter the Indian Civil Service are, as a rule, men of superior educational attainments to the English men who enter the army. Why then should there be any falling off in the supply of English recruits in the Army? The difficulties of obtaining employment are probably nearly as keen in England as they are in this country. Economic motives largely influence the choice of a career and they are asserting themselves more and more even in the military profession. Having regard to the emoluments open to a military career in the Indian army it is difficult to believe that they will fail to attract an adequate supply of suitable candidates. In his book on "The Army", Genl. Macmunn sums up the advantages of a military career and points out that they include "a start in life at 20 years that is almost self-supporting and therefore comparing most favourably with other professions, a living wage from early days and a moderate pension otherwise only obtainable by prolonged heavy premia and some allowances to widow and children". The emoluments in the Indian army are now better than in the British, and if British young men consider the situation coolly, they will be able to appreciate the advantages of a career in the Indian army. Genl. Macmunn himself expresses the opinion "that the correct view is that if an Indian can negotiate fairly the tests and scrutinies that a British officer has to pass and that the army authorities alone are to settle, the senior Indian will be a remarkable man under whom any one may gladly serve". According to him, the British officer of the right type has an even brighter future than formerly but the lesser vessels may have a poorer one. It may, however, be said that the British public school boy class from whom the officers of the army are mainly recruited is one full of feelings of aristocratic superiority and racial pride and possessed of private means (report of the Lytton Committee on Indian Students, p. 18) and that any change in the conditions of army service may deter boys of this class from entering the army. But, as remarked by the Haldane Committee on the education and training of officers, "The type of education in the secondary schools available for children of parents in comparatively humble circumstances is now higher than it has been at any time in the past; and barriers social and intellectual, have been, and daily continue to be, broken down". If the haughty young aristocrat with his superiority complex does not care to enter the Indian Army, there are sure to be plenty of boys who have received a sound secondary school education and who are likely to be more free from social prejudices and will be attracted by the solid advantages of a career in the Indian Army and the change will be probably all to the good. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that British recruits cannot be attracted on the basis of equality with Indians and on terms consistent with Indian self-respect, India should be prepared to face the situation and learn to do without British recruitment.

28. *Arguments against segregation.*—Let us now consider the arguments against the policy of segregation of the Indian King's commissioned officer. They have been summed up in the report of the Skeen Committee. For the purpose of making this note self contained, it is desirable to reproduce a summary of the criticisms which have been emphatically endorsed by the Skeen Committee. The first and almost universal criticism is that to confine Indian officers to the Indianised units is an invidious form of segregation and that every Indian officer should be given the same chance of selecting the unit to which he wishes to be sent, as a British officer. Several Indians who now qualify for King's commissions have family connections with particular units extending over many years and it is natural and laudable that they wish to continue their family tradition. In the case of British officers such a tendency is definitely encouraged.

In the next place, the test is, as formulated by the authorities, an unfair one and too severe to impose upon the first generation of the Indian King's commissioned officers who already have sufficient disadvantages of other kinds to overcome.

The scheme is also in conflict with the principle of co-operation between the British and Indian which is applied in every other sphere of the Indian administration for the purpose of securing harmonious work and to increase the efficiency of Indian personnel. With Indianisation proceeding in the army in any measure, the only means of ensuring successful Indianisation and concomitantly the maximum degree of attainable military efficiency is to allow Indian officers to serve shoulder to shoulder with British officers, each learning from the other in every unit of the Indian army.

There is one other practical consideration to which the Skeen Committee attach great importance. The Indian King's commissioned officer is still a new element in the Indian army to which the Indian rank and file have not yet had time to become fully accustomed. By the distribution of this element in all the units alongside of the British officers the new element can be absorbed with the least degree of questioning and the least derangement of the existing system of the Indian army taken as a whole. The committee were of opinion that both for psychological and practical reasons the continuance of the scheme could only conduce to failure. The Committee therefore advised the abandonment of the Eight Units scheme and of the principle of segregation.

29. *Advantage of working with officers of equal status.*—It has been urged that the Indian King's Commissioned officer will even in the Indianised units have the opportunity of moving with his British superiors. But that cannot possibly have the same advantage as the opportunity of moving with equals of one's own age and status. This great advantage is claimed, from the psychological point of view, as one of the benefits of a system of public school education as distinguished from education at home in the society of elders only. The system of posting Indian and English officers of the same rank in one unit will promote a healthy spirit of emulation and feelings of camaraderie and brotherhood which must be beneficial to the English and Indian officer alike. It is an irony of fate that the very authorities who have been loudest in insisting upon the training of the Indian cadets in the English Sandhurst as affording the opportunity of rubbing shoulders with British

cadets of the same age and status should be so keen to deprive the Indian King's commissioned officer of a continuance of these advantages during the whole period of his service. As pointed out by Sir Valentine Chirol, in "India", "the real explanation of the policy of segregation is something which goes even deeper than the racial objection of British officers to being placed in the position of having to take orders from Indian officers". He stated that responsible and experienced British officers who were proud of the confidence and personal affection of their native officers as well as their men were afraid that the Englishmen's prestige with the native troops themselves would be gone, if they were ever placed under other than British command. (V. Chirol's "India", p. 279). The fact is there is far more affinity by culture and tradition between members of eastern races than between members eastern and western and it is much easier for one Indian to get into the skin of another Indian than for an Englishman. The late Lord Birkenhead remarked (The Indian Corps in France by Merewether and Smith, p. 472). "The intuitive and sympathetic British officer of an Indian Battalion can never be quite sure whether his outlook upon events, where those events have transcended their experience and his, retains any contact with that of his men. East is still East and West is still West".

30. *Generalisations about classes unsafe.*—To the objections pointed out by the Skeen Committee, we may add a few more of at least equal importance. The assumption underlying this principle of segregation and the proposal of a means of testing the value of the experiment of Indianisation is that every British King's commissioned officer is bound to make good and that the Indians as a class are likely to prove unequal to their responsibilities. We consider that, while individuals may fail among Indian as well as English officers, it is unjust to a class accordingly to relegate them to separate units. The Indian officer should be and is quite willing to face his responsibilities. But he is in justice entitled to ask that he should be tried under exactly the same conditions as the English subaltern. The system of differential treatment would lend itself to the suspicion that, while the defects and failures of the English subaltern will be covered up and concealed by the superior officers of his race, they would not regret the occurrence of opportunities for saying that the Indian subalterns were not equal to their responsibilities or could not command the confidence of their men. In view of the fact that high English officers are in the habit of constantly harping upon the inability of Indian officers, and especially of the so-called non-martial classes, to inspire the confidence of their men in the same way as an English officer, this suspicion may be easily created in the minds of the Indian officers. The extent to which *esprit de corps* may lead English officers to stand by each other has been happily portrayed in Galsworthy's "Loyalties".

31. *Quality of British officers.*—We may be permitted to quote a few extracts from authoritative opinions on the quality of British officers. After the disaster at Tweebosch (6th of March 1902) during the Boer War, Brodrick wrote to Kitchener that the public were insistent on the punishment of those whose carelessness or incompetence was responsible for the mishaps. Lord Kitchener replied to him that he quite agreed with Brodrick as regards punishment of those officers and men who by their carelessness or through other

causes did so much harm. He considered it most necessary for the good of the army as a whole. He wrote, "one of the great faults in British officers is that they do not look upon their work sufficiently seriously at all times. They are in many cases spasmodic and do not realise the serious nature of their responsibilities and if they do so at one time, they easily forget them. If this is due to some extent to training, it seems to be a national defect based a good deal on over-confidence". (Arthur's "Life of Lord Kitchener" Vol. III, pages 66—69).

The Akers-Douglas Committee of 1902 on the training and qualities of British officers reported that the witnesses were unanimous in stating that the junior officers were lamentably wanting in military knowledge and, what is perhaps even worse, in the desire to acquire knowledge and in zeal for the military art. The Committee had been informed by a very high authority that the majority of young officers would not work, unless compelled; that "keenness is out of fashion", that "it is not the correct form; the spirit and fashion is rather not to show keenness and that the idea is, to put it in a few words, to do as little as they possibly can". By no part of the evidence laid before them had the committee been more impressed than by that which showed in the clearest manner the prevalence among junior commissioned ranks of a lack of technical knowledge and skill and of any wish to study the science and master the art of their profession. General Sir James Moncrief Grierson expressed the following opinion on the training of British officers:—"Until the body of British officers becomes convinced that the days of playing at soldiers were over and that work in the fullest sense of the word must now be the watch-word, we despair of any attempt at reorganisation. By the work we do not mean the daily duty, but study, hard study, which must be encouraged and fostered in every way by the authorities".

Giving evidence before the committee of enquiry into the conduct of the Boer War, Lord Roberts said that he had been compelled to remove five generals of divisions, six brigadiers of cavalry, one brigadier of infantry, five commanders of cavalry regiments and four commanders of infantry battalions for incompetence, which was a very large number considering the number of troops employed. He went on to say "whether it is inherent in the British character, or whether it is owing to something faulty in the training of our officers, I cannot say, but the fact remains that surprisingly few of them are capable of acting on their own initiative . . . . . many of them do very well, if you can tell them exactly what to do and how to do it, but left to themselves they fail". (Report of the Royal Commission on the war in South Africa: Minutes of Evidence, Volume I., p. 446; Questions 10520, 10522, and 10524).

Our object in making these quotations is not to disparage British officers as a class or to ignore their merits. It is for the purpose of giving point to our remark as to the danger of generalising about classes from the conduct of individuals in times of crisis. It would be as unfair to disparage Indians as a class as it would be to disparage British officers as a class from particular instances.

32. *Segregation inconsistent with Indian self-respect.*—If Englishmen cannot tolerate a position of equality with Indians even in this country the talk and the promise of equal partnership of India in the British Empire are meaningless. The whole policy underlying the scheme of posting Indians to separate Indianised units is utterly incompatible with the self-respect of the Indians and nothing will ever persuade them to the contrary. England will have to make up her mind whether she would prefer the certain risk of offending Indian sentiment to the very doubtful risk of a check to the flow of English recruits.

33. *The elimination of the Viceroy's commissioned officers.*—We shall now proceed to the second essential feature of the scheme of Indianisation outlined by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. His Excellency informed us that it was decided that all units included in the Indianisation scheme should be organised on the British basis of officers, that is to say, that all officers down to platoon and troop commanders amounting to about 28 for each battalion or regiment should be King's commissioned officers. This involved the gradual elimination of the present Viceroy's commissioned officers. His Excellency was right in stating that, though it was announced by his predecessor in the Assembly, this feature of the scheme had not been grasped either by the public or by the army. Possibly this was a part of the Indianisation scheme as conceived by the authorities from the beginning. But implications of the scheme as to the elimination of the Viceroy's commissioned officers were never clearly pointed out till now. The proposals of the Shea Committee of 1922 for Indianisation proceeded upon this basis of abolition of the Viceroy's commissioned officers. But their report was secret and nobody knew anything about it till it was brought out from cold storage in 1928. In his speech in the Assembly in February 1923, when he explained the features of the Eight Units Scheme, Lord Rawlinson made no reference to this aspect of the scheme. It was for the first time referred to by Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood and by Mr. Young in their speeches in the Assembly in March 1928. But the full significance of the scheme was not realised by the public. In no country with even a shadow of responsible Government would such an important measure affecting the organisation of the Army have been hatched without the knowledge of the people. The fact that the Government have decided in favour of the adoption of the British pattern does not render the decision sacrosanct or immune from criticism by the public. This proposal for adoption of the British pattern in the Indianised units makes a revolutionary change in the existing organisation of the Indian Army.

34. *Arguments in favour of elimination.*—Let us first consider the arguments which have been advanced in favour of the proposal:—

- (1) It is said that the Viceroy's commissioned officer is indispensable as an intermediary between the British King's commissioned officer who belongs to another race, and the Indian rank and file, but is unnecessary in the case of the Indian King's commissioned officer. It is also said that in no other country are there two types of commissioned officers in the Army.
- (2) It is said that all commissioned officers must take part in the training and leading of platoons and troops, and that if the Indian

King's commissioned officer is unwilling to dispense with the intermediary Viceroy's commissioned officer he must be deemed to shirk his responsibility.

- (3) As both the King's commissioned officer and the Viceroy's commissioned officer belong to the same race and the same class, the Viceroy's commissioned officer would not obey the King's commissioned officer and friction might arise, making the position of the King's commissioned officer intolerable. It is also said that, if there is any difference between the Indian King's commissioned officer and Viceroy's commissioned officer in the matter of social status, the difference is in favour of the latter.
- (4) It is also said that the Viceroy's commissioned officer is the backbone of the army and that his interests and prospects must be carefully maintained.

35. *Onus of making out a case for changing an organisation which has stood the test of time.*—The present organisation of the Indian army has existed for a long time and there has been no complaint that it was defective or inefficient. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly acknowledged that the Viceroy's commissioned officer is the backbone of the army, just as the permanent non-commissioned officers in the British army who come midway between the King's commissioned officer and the men in the ranks are said to form a wonderful body. It lies upon those who wish to introduce a radical change in the *status quo* to make out a strong case in favour of the change. The mere fact that the British army is organised on a different basis is not a sufficient reason for departure from the existing organisation. There is no reason to assume that the British pattern is a model of perfection and should be slavishly imitated elsewhere. Even supposing that the existence of an intermediate link between the King's commissioned officer and the ranks is unnecessary it would furnish no argument for a change, unless it could be shown that the existing system has produced any evil results.

36. *First argument considered.*—We do not wish to embark upon a discussion of the system of organisation of the army in other countries. The organisation in every country is adapted to its own circumstances and requirements, and there is no rule of abstract logic compelling any country to adopt the pattern of any other without regard to its own administrative necessities and other conditions. Whether the removal of any intermediate links between the King's commissioned officers and the other ranks is an improvement or not, we consider that it would be most inexpedient to introduce a change in the Indianised units without introducing it in the rest of the Indian army. We feel also that for financial and other cogent reasons, to be pointed out later on, the policy of eliminating the Viceroy's commissioned officers must be abandoned in the best interests of the country.

37. *Second argument considered.*—It has also been suggested that the Indian King's commissioned officer should take charge of his men and train them, just like the British subaltern in a British unit. Whatever may be the case in the British units, there is no justification for differentiating between the Indian King's commissioned officer and the British King's commissioned



officer and imposing upon the former duties that are not laid upon the latter. If the Viceroy's commissions were abolished throughout the Indian army, both in the Indianised and the non-Indianised units, there might be something to be said in support of this plea. But if Viceroy's commissioned officers are maintained in the non-Indianised units and eliminated in the Indianised units, the maintenance of an individious dual system would cause untold harm. It would certainly be treated as a brand of inferiority upon the Indian officer, lower his status and prestige in the eyes of the other ranks and render it impossible for him to discharge his duties properly or maintain his self-respect. The unwillingness of the young Indian officer to accept different treatment from that accorded to the British King's commissioned officer of the same standing cannot in justice be interpreted as a desire to shirk responsibility.

38. *Third argument considered.*—The argument based upon the social position and status of the Viceroy's commissioned officer and the likelihood of friction between him and the King's commissioned officer will not hold water. The higher social position of the Viceroy's commissioned officer as compared with that of the direct recruit to the King's commission exists only in the imagination of the Government and the military authorities. A superiority conferred by educational qualifications must always tell in favour of the King's commissioned officer and will be recognised and accepted by the Viceroy's commissioned officer who is wanting in such qualifications. Our colleagues who are representatives of the martial classes do not apprehend the possibility of any such friction.

39. *Fourth argument considered.*—The argument that the interest and prospects of the Viceroy's commissioned officers who form a valuable element in the army should be protected may be conceded. But it really does not help the contention that the Viceroy's commissioned officers should be gradually eliminated. So far as the prospects of the Viceroy's commissioned officers are concerned, they consist in the chances of promotion to King's commissioned ranks, whenever they may be found to possess suitable qualifications. So far as the prospects of the men in the ranks are concerned, their interest lies in the maintenance of the class of Viceroy's commissioned officers to which they may expect promotion by meritorious service and conduct. The military authorities are so full of tenderness for the Viceroy's commissioned officer that they wish to improve his class out of existence. It is not by abolishing the class of Viceroy's commissioned officers, but by giving them an opportunity for the King's commission that they must be encouraged to acquire higher intellectual qualifications. The private and the non-commissioned officer must be encouraged by maintaining the Viceroy's commission class and giving them a chance of rising to that class which alone the large majority would be fit for. In the case of the exceptional few men in the ranks who may possess sufficient ability and education, they may be given opportunities of securing appointment to King's commissions by admission to the military college. The abolition of the class of Viceroy's commissioned officers would remove all prospects of promotion for the other ranks. Individual Viceroy's commissioned officers may be benefited by appointment to King's commissions, but it is difficult to understand how the class of men who now rise to Viceroy's commissions can possibly benefit by the abolition of this class of commissions.

Some light is thrown by paragraph 14 of the Report of the Committee upon the genesis of the idea of the elimination of Viceroy's commissions. It had not taken shape in the mind of Lord Rawlinson in February 1923, though it had been put forward by the Shea Committee in 1922. The reason why the idea was not seriously considered by anyone was this. If the officers' cadre in the Indian units could be wholly Indianised in 30 years, even if the Viceroy's commissioned officers had to be replaced by King's commissioned officers, it was not worth the while of any member of Lord Reading's Government to examine the soundness of this proposal for elimination. Though the abandonment of this proposal might by itself tend to shorten the process of Indianisation, the need for protecting the rights of the existing British officers would prevent full Indianisation for about 30 years. The Indian members of Lord Reading's Government were, therefore, quite satisfied with the period and did not care to worry themselves about this proposal. Lord Rawlinson had definitely made up his mind about the policy of segregation so far as the 8 units were concerned. He could defend it in the Assembly as a device for testing the fitness and efficiency of the Indian King's commissioned officers. He went on to point out that "simultaneously with the Indianisation of these selected 8 Indian units, Indians who qualified for King's commissions will continue as at present to be posted to the other units of the Indian army. The number of Indian cadets now sent to Sandhurst each year, if all pass out successfully is more than sufficient to replace the normal wastage in the 8 units alone. I draw attention to this matter, as it has a significance which the house, I am sure, will not fail to appreciate". But his successor began to consider what should be done with the Indian King's commissioned officers after the 8 units had been Indianised under the present system. Should they be posted to other units with British King's commissioned officers or should they be posted to fill up Viceroy's commissioned vacancies? He must have evidently thought that the policy of segregation should be continued and must have evidently preferred the elimination of Viceroy's commissioned officers as the lesser of two disagreeable alternatives to the course of allowing the Indian King's commissioned officers to be distributed in the other units.

40. *Objections to elimination of Viceroy's commissioned officers; adverse effect on recruitment generally.*—The objective contemplated (the elimination of the Viceroy's commission) is bound to have a very detrimental effect upon recruitment to the other ranks, for their educational qualifications would be too poor to permit them to aspire to King's commissions and the only class to which they now look forward for promotion would have disappeared.

41. *Adverse effect on recruitment to Indianised units in particular.*—Another serious consequence of this proposal is that it would affect recruitment to the Indianised units and young men of mettle and ambition who wish to enter the ranks would prefer to enlist in the non-Indianised units which hold out prospects of promotion to Viceroy's commissions. Recruitment to the Indianised units is bound to suffer in comparison and the efficiency of the Indianised units is thus bound to suffer.

The notion that, as education makes progress, educated young men will enter the other ranks of the army in considerable numbers with the ambition of rising to King's commissions through this avenue is unwarranted. In the

first place, there are not a sufficient number of King's commissions to attract any considerable number of men to the ranks. In the second place, experience shows that, save under exceptional circumstances, young men of education, even in England, do not care to be recruited in the ranks. General MacMunn observes in his book that "In Great Britain, for reasons explained, it is usually the lad of the humblest classes, the least educated classes, who selects the military life. It would be safe to say that not 20 per cent. do so from love of soldiering and adventure. Want of employment, love quarrels, *Res angusta domi* and the like, still must account for a far larger percentage of enlistment than is dignified, yet gives illogically the finest soldiery in the world". ("The Army", page 70.)

Apart from the demoralising consequences of the proposed change on the Indian army and the Indian officers, there are two most serious objections to the proposal, one relating to the cost of the scheme and the other to the time required for complete Indianisation. The number of Viceroy's commissioned officers in one infantry division and one cavalry brigade is 312 and the cost of converting them into King's commissioned officers will throw a very considerable additional burden upon the finance of the country. But very probably the intention of the military authorities is to fix the pay of the Indian King's commissioned officers on a much lower scale than that in force for the British officers in the Indian units. What exactly is the scale of pay proposed, we have not been informed. The adoption of a differential scale of pay is bound to deter young men of self-respect and spirit from entering the commissioned ranks and doom the scheme of Indianisation to failure.

42. *Retardation of Indianisation.*—The next objection to the scheme proposed is that it will indefinitely prolong the period taken to completely Indianise the officers ranks of the division and the brigade selected for the purpose, not to speak of the Indianisation of the whole army. It has been stated that if British recruitment is completely stopped, it would take 35 years for the army to be completely Indianised. This is based on the normal figures of annual wastage among the King's commissioned officers. But if the Viceroy's commissioned officers are also to be Indianised, it must necessarily take a much longer period. Out of the 60 cadets proposed to be admitted into the military college, the annual output of commissioned officers, after making allowance for wastage, is expected to be 53. The number of commissions required to replace the vacancies in the British King's commissioned ranks of the Indianised division and brigade every year would only be about 20. The remainder of the output from the college must therefore be utilised for replacement of the Viceroy's commissioned officers. How many of the graduates of the college would replace British officers and how many of them would replace the Viceroy's commissioned officers, we have not been informed. But it is quite likely that they may first be posted to fill all the vacancies in the Viceroy's commissioned ranks, the surplus only being drawn upon to replace the English officers.

43. *Differentiation in prospects.*—Yet another objection to the scheme is that side by side with the Indianised units there will be non-Indianised units in which the British King's commissioned officers will have opportunities for promotion and command, denied to the Indian King's commissioned officers

in the Indianised units and any differential treatment would be invidious. The considerations we have adduced above should be sufficient to condemn the whole scheme in the eyes of the Government.

44. *Question premature in any event.*—In any event the question of the adoption of the British pattern is one which should be left to the decision of the future Government of India after all the Indian units have been completely Indianised on the present basis. We have discussed this question of a change in the organization at some length in the hope that the Government may be induced to reconsider the decision instead of treating it as a settled fact. The zeal for imitation of the British pattern is liable to be ascribed, and not without a show of reason, to the sinister object of retarding the process of Indianisation as much as possible and not to the love of ideal perfection.

45. *Pace of Indianisation.*—We now come to the third important feature of the proposed Indianisation scheme, and this relates to the time required for the Indianisation of all the Indian units. It has been already pointed out how the adoption of the British pattern of organisation and the proposal to convert all the Viceroy's commissioned officers into King's commissioned officers will necessarily tend to the prolongation of the total period of Indianisation. Apart from the bearing of the change of organisation on the length of the period required, it has been said that it would take 35 years from the date of stoppage of British recruitment. *Prima facie* it might be supposed that no harm would be done even if British recruitment was stopped from to-morrow, for there would be British officers in the superior ranks of the Indian army to train, guide and direct the Indian officers for over a generation. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief remarked that he could not take the responsibility of going beyond the Indianisation of one division of infantry and one cavalry brigade for the present. No doubt His Excellency observed that his proposals were not of a static or rigid character, that after a period of 14 years commencing from 1924, it would be possible to form a definite opinion as to the success of the experiment and that it would not be necessary to wait for a further period of 7 years before deciding to carry the experiment further and that it would then be an easy matter to increase Indianisation by brigades or divisions. Assuming that on the lapse of 7 years from this date, the authorities would recommend the entire stoppage of British recruitment, the time required for complete Indianisation would be 7 plus 35, or 42 years. If, on the other hand, it was decided to stop British recruitment not completely, but only piecemeal, it would prolong the period still further. A scheme of this indefinite character will fail to satisfy Indian aspirations. If there was no proposal to abolish the Viceroy's commissioned officers or to segregate the Indian King's commissioned officer in separate units and if there was also a proposal for a liberal initial intake of Indians and a progressive annual increment of Indian recruits and a corresponding decrease of British recruits for the commissioned ranks, it might be possible to satisfy the demands of public opinion. There was undoubtedly a difference of opinion in the sub-committee of the Round Table Conference as to the stoppage of British recruitment and the laying down of a definite time table. But there can be no reasonable doubt that all the members of the Round Table

Conference would have been in favour of starting the process of Indianisation with a liberal percentage of initial recruitment. This is apparent from the unanimous resolution in favour of a substantial increase in the rate of Indianisation, commensurate with the main object in view. Having regard to the opinions expressed at the Conference it would not be proper to suggest the immediate abandonment of British recruitment. It is still open to us to express an opinion on the question whether the Indianisation of one division and one brigade now proposed is, or is not a substantial increase in the rate of Indianisation, commensurate with the object in view. Putting it crudely it may be said that compared with the 8 unit scheme the proposal to Indianise one Infantry Division and a Cavalry Brigade is a substantial increase, but considering the entire strength of the Indian Army now the increase is neither substantial nor commensurate with the object in view. In coming to a conclusion upon this question, regard may legitimately be had to the proposals of the Government of India in 1922. The resolution of the Legislative Assembly in March 1921 which was accepted by the Government was that not less than 25 per cent. of the King's commissions granted every year should be given to His Majesty's Indian subjects to start with. We may also take it that the principle of an annual increment was not unacceptable to the Government, though they were not willing to commit themselves openly to any specific rate. Had a scheme of Indianisation been started immediately, we should now have reached an annual Indian recruitment of 50 per cent. on the assumption of an increment of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. every year. We do not think that an initial intake of less than 50 per cent. of the total number of commissions thrown open every year would satisfy public opinion. As to the further steps to be taken to carry on the process, two methods of progression might be suggested, either an annual increase of 5 per cent. in the Indian recruitment and a corresponding decrease of British recruitment, or a stoppage of British recruitment to be completed in two steps, one after a period of five years and the next, after ten years. The first alternative would work automatically and bring about the cessation of British recruitment after a period of ten years. But if the automatic principle is considered objectionable and it is necessary to be satisfied as to the flow of a steady supply of suitable candidates, the latter alternative would serve the purpose. According to either of these schemes, the progress of Indianisation of the Indian Army will be completed within a period of 45 years. It must be remembered in this connection that according to the original proposals of the Shea Committee of 1922, the period suggested was only 42 years. Their revised programme, which was accepted by the Government of India, reduced the period to 30 years. We must not forget that in their supplementary report the committee expressed the opinion that it was impossible to produce the very large number of educated, trained and experienced officers in a shorter time than 42 years. But this opinion was expressed upon the basis that the Viceroy's commissioned officers would be eliminated from the army, a proposal which has already evoked a storm of disapproval.

46. *Recruitment by competition and nomination.*—Perhaps the most important question included in the agenda placed before the committee is the proportion of vacancies to be filled up by competition and nomination respectively. The importance of general education among the qualifications

of officers is now being more and more largely recognised. Even in England, where the system of purchase once prevailed, selection by competition has become the rule and selection by nomination, the exception. Though a certain number of commissions are given to men from the ranks, the number of such commissions is very limited and the proportion of the vacancies filled up by nomination to those filled up by competition is very small.

The representatives of the enlisted classes on our committee have pleaded for a large majority of the commissions being given to the members of these classes by the system of nomination. The grounds on which they base their advocacy are that it would not be possible for the Viceroy's commissioned officers and the non-commissioned officers and the private to reach the standard of general education prescribed for competition and that the boys belonging to these classes start their education at a comparatively late age and would not be able to satisfy the age requirement for entry into the military college. The argument necessarily proceeds upon the admission of backwardness in general educational attainments. No one would wish to deny opportunities for promotion to men of capacity in the ranks, provided they come up to the required level of fitness in point of education. There is no objection to the concession of special educational facilities to the sons of soldiers and officers who may be in need of help. Nor would any one be disposed to raise any objection to some relaxation of the upper limit of age for the grant of King's commissions. In spite of the educational progress which is claimed to have been made in the Punjab and among the enlisted classes of this province during recent years, it cannot be denied that their education has not sufficiently advanced to enable them to compete in the entrance examination. It is because the enlisted classes cannot come in by the open door of competition, that they plead for entry by the back-door of nomination. It is admitted by the military authorities that for several years to come, very few of the Viceroy's commissioned officers will be fit to be recommended for entrance into the military college. The same remark must hold good of the non-commissioned officers and the privates. A private cannot be recommended for admission to the college until he has put in a certain number of years of service and attained the rank of a non-commissioned officer. It has been stated by military authorities that the lowest age at which a private can become a non-commissioned officer is 30, though it is generally 40. Viceroy's commissions too are attained by non-commissioned officers only at a later age. These two factors relating to the age and the educational qualifications of the non-commissioned officers and the privates have a most important bearing upon the successful Indianisation of the officers' ranks in the army. Even taking into consideration the provision recently made for the special enlistment of promising young men of ability, the age at which non-commissioned officers and the Viceroy's commissioned officers can obtain King's commissions must ordinarily prevent them from rising to the higher ranks of the King's commissioned officer in the army; and the process of Indianisation must therefore be necessarily delayed. The admission of officers who are below the level of general educational qualifications prescribed must seriously interfere with the success of Indianisation. To admit a large proportion of such officers to commissioned ranks would be to court the failure of the whole scheme. It is on these grounds that we are unable to

agree to any large proportion of the King's commissions being offered for appointment by nomination.

The contention that King's commissions must be distributed in proportion to the number of recruits furnished by different classes of the population is untenable. In countries which have not adopted the system of conscription recruits are generally furnished by the labouring and the uneducated classes and not the educated or the upper classes. If it is contended that the upper ranks of the martial classes should be rewarded, because the lower classes of these communities furnish recruits the claim rests on no principle. To reward one man for service done by another is absurd. The only principle upon which commissions should be awarded is the basis of individual fitness and not membership of a class which furnishes recruits. In paper No. 4 of the supplementary papers to the Peel Commission Report, General Jacob strongly condemned recruitment on the basis of membership of any race, tribe or caste. (See page 77.) Mere military training or membership of a military caste cannot make up for deficiencies in general education. According to the existing practice, 16 out of 25 commissions are filled up by competition. Of the remaining 9, five are given to the Viceroy's commissioned officers and four are filled up by nomination by the Commander-in-Chief out of those who have obtained qualifying marks in the entrance examination. This works out to a proportion of 16 for competition out of 25 or a little over two-thirds. The Skeen Committee recommended that 80% of the King's Commissions should be filled up by competition and 20% by nomination by the Commander-in-Chief from among those who have obtained qualifying marks in the entrance examination. The necessity for enlarging the field of recruitment was emphasised by Sir Malcolm Hailey and by the Skeen Committee. Sir Malcolm Hailey expressed the opinion that it was not advisable to make the preference in favour of landowning and military classes a fixed item in the policy of recruitment, and he thought that the process of education among the other ranks would produce its inevitable result in reducing the preference which the other ranks may feel for officers of particular classes. It was also emphasised by the Round Table Conference. Unless the number of commissions available for competition is largely increased, we cannot expect young men to come forward in sufficiently large numbers for the competitive examination. Nor is it possible to expect educational institutions to introduce any changes to adapt themselves to military requirements. We are therefore of opinion that the proportion of competitive vacancies should be fixed in accordance with the recommendations of the Skeen Committee, i.e., at 80%.\*

Having regard to the low educational qualifications of the Viceroy's commissioned officers and the Y cadets we think that the reservation of 20% of the commissions for nomination from among both these classes is ample. We may mention that according to the recommendations of the Lee Commission on the Superior Civil Services the proportion reserved from promotion from the Provincial Civil and Police Services was only 20 per cent. The fear of the enlisted classes that they will not

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\*On a fuller consideration I now agree with Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer in fixing the proportion of competitive vacancies at 80% as against 66% which I had previously suggested in the Committee.  
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be able to obtain an adequate number of King's commissions by competition is not well grounded. It must be remembered that candidates with military inclinations are more likely to come forward from these classes than from others. The very high maximum allotted to the test of Interview and Record is also bound to weight the scales very considerably in favour of candidates belonging to the enlisted classes. In the second place, the advocates of this view ignore the educational progress which is being made in the Punjab. Lastly, a policy of protection for particular classes is not merely unjust to other classes, but deprives the former of all stimulus to progress. We do not consider it necessary to dwell upon the well-known arguments in favour of open competition as the means of excluding favouritism and attracting the best talents. One argument which weighed with the official members (see paragraph 14 of the Report of the Committee) in deciding to allot 50% of the vacancies to Viceroy's commissioned officers is that if the Viceroy's commissions are abolished, prospects at least as attractive must be substituted for them for the benefit of the young soldier. But if Viceroy's commissions are not abolished, as we contend they should not be, this argument falls to the ground. The military members of the Committee were at first inclined to allot not more than 40% of the vacancies to the Viceroy's commissioned officers and proposed 50% for open competition.

47. *Conclusion.*—We regret that we have been obliged to take a different view from our colleagues on the fundamental principles underlying the scheme for an Indian Military College. The issues involved are of such vital consequence to the best interests of the country that we have been compelled to deal with them at considerable, though not unnecessary, length, in the hope that our arguments may induce the Government to reconsider and examine their policy. We have endeavoured to discharge our duty with a desire to appreciate the official point of view and with a due sense of responsibility informed by such study as we have been able to bestow, in the case of one of us during a long period of service in the profession and in the case of the other during such opportunities as have been available in the last ten years in connection with Lord Rawlinson's Military Requirements Committee of 1921 and otherwise.

SIMLA ;  
2nd July 1931.

P. S. SIVASWAMY AIYER.  
G. R. R. RAJWADE.

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## APPENDIX.

1. Giving evidence before the Eden Commission of 1878-79, Sir Richard Temple remarked :—

“ In India under British rule, the former martial tendencies of the native population gradually become lessened till they almost disappear and this circumstance is considered to be one of the safeguards of our rule. So conscious has the Government been of this, that within the present generation the native population has been generally disarmed, that is, the people have been enjoined to give up their arms. The Government never passed its Indian subjects through the ranks, nor sent them to their homes in the vigour of life. On the contrary it has heretofore never parted with its native soldiers till they were pensioned in the evening of life. Therefore, to train them, to keep them for a limited time, either with the colours or in reserve, and then altogether to discharge them without pension to their homes in numbers increasingly large. . . . would be to ensure a constant influx into the civil population of military men no longer bound to Government and to infuse again into the people a part of that martial spirit which has been disappearing, and the disappearance of which is still advantageous to us. This would be different from the past policy of the Government, which is still as sound as it ever was, and would militate against these maxims of political safety which are likely to continue as imperative in the future as they have been in the past and are in the present.” (Appendix to the report of Army Committee of 1878, Volume I, pages 191-2.) Lieutenant-General Warre, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, stated, “ I have always been under the impression that the restoration of the martial spirit in India would be fatal to our supremacy.”

2. Speaking of the Bengal Army, Lord Ellenborough wrote :—

“ It is distressing to think that we must abandon the hope of ever seeing a native army composed like that we have lost. It was an army which under a general it loved and trusted, would have marched victorious to the Dardanelles.” [Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the organisation of the Indian Army (Peel Commission Report), 1895. Appendix to Minutes of Evidence, page 6.]

3. Sir John Lawrence's memorandum on the homogeneity of the Bengal Army :—

“ Amongst those defects (of the pre-Mutiny Army) unquestionably the worst, and the one which operated most fatally against us, was the brotherhood or homogeneity of the Bengal Army ; and for this particular defect the remedy is counterpoise. Firstly, the great counterpoise of Europeans, and secondly, that of the various native races. Had the old Bengal Army had all these remedies applied to it ten years ago. . . . it would have been a much better army. [Report of the Peel Commission (1859), Papers connected with the re-organisation, etc., page 14.]

4. Sir John Lawrence's remarks on the importance of keeping up rivalries and differences :—

“ To preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and which while it lasts makes the Mohomedan of one country despise, fear or dislike the Mohomedan of another, corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits within which differences and rivalries are strongly marked. Let all races, Hindu or Mohomedan, of one province be enlisted in one regiment and no others, and having created distinctive regiments, let us keep them so against the hour of need. By the system thus indicated two great evils are avoided ; firstly that community of feeling throughout the native army and that mischievous political activity and intrigue which results from association with other races and travel in other Indian provinces.” (Peel Commission Report, Papers, etc., page 30.)

General Mansfield's proposals for the heterogeneity of the regiment :—

“ Let all castes and let the Musalman share and share alike in the regiments of the local armies.

There may be low caste corps, and Musalman Corps.

Other regiments may be formed of companies of different castes and in all these should probably be a company or two of Musalmans. Uniformity in these respects is neither desirable nor advisable. The more diversity that can be introduced into the constitution of the different corps the better, so that in case of any future combination the heterogeneous character of the various regiments may present an effective bar to it.” (Peel Commission Report, appendix to minutes of evidence, page 100.)

6. Major-General Tucker's memorandum on the introduction of factors for separation :—

“ Talk as we will of the beneficial effects and the paternal character of our rule, we can never alter that fact that in India we are foreigners and interlopers ; and while we remain what we are, the natives of Hindustan what they are, the haughty and offensive conscious manner—the consequence of our superiority, morally and intellectually—will remain indelibly stamped in the bearing and character of the European, outweighing all the material benefits we can confer ; and it is opposed, therefore, to all experience and to common-sense, to suppose that ever under any circumstances the natives in their inmost hearts can become reconciled to our rule as a class. This has never been sufficiently understood or insisted upon. Nevertheless, it is and will be found ultimately to be the truth ; and it speaks forcibly for the strong necessity which exists for so dividing and separating into distinct bodies the ‘ different nationalities or castes’, the rulers in our eastern dominions may deem it safe and expedient to entertain in our armies, so as to render them as little dangerous as possible to the State which they undertake so solemnly and faithfully to serve, but to which solemnity they, be it always remembered, attached little or no real meaning or importance, and by which, as we have seen, they are in no way really bound.

Seikhs, Rajpoots and Goorkhas constitute perhaps the best description of men for soldiers in Bengal and there are endless varieties of others ; while the low castes will doubtlessly meet with great favour, after the events we have experienced so recently. It is, however, essential to be alike cautious with them all, and we should be most guarded and watchful with the Seikhs. Of these, one fourth part would prove an ample proportion, of Goorkhas and hill-men generally a like number, if procurable, but the real Goorkha is not to be found in any large numbers ; another fourth part, of low caste men of all sorts, and the rest must, it is presumed, be made up of the endless varieties of Hindustances and Musalman usually employed. The introduction, however, of other different elements would be advisable, if it can be done, Africans, Malays and Arabs ; anything in short, to divide and so neutralise the strength of the castes and nationalities which composed of our armies in the East.” (Peel Commission Report, appendix to minutes of evidence, page 10.)

7. On the degradation of the native officer :—

“ The founders of the native army had conceived the idea of a force recruited from among the people of the country, and commanded for the most part by men of their own race, but of higher social position—men, in a word, of the master-class, accustomed to exact obedience from their inferiors. But it was the inevitable tendency of our increasing power in India to oust the native functionary from his seat, or to lift him from his saddle, that the white man might fix himself there. So it happened, in due course, that the native officers, who had exercised real authority in their battalions, who had felt an honourable pride in their battalions, who had enjoyed opportunities of personal distinction, who had felt an honourable pride in their position, were pushed aside by an incursion of English gentlemen, who took all substantive power into their hands, and left scarcely more than the shadow of rank to the men

whom they had supplanted. An English subaltern was appointed to every company, and the native officer then began to collapse into something little better than name.

As the degradation of the native officer was thus accomplished, the whole character of the Sipahi army was changed. It ceased to be a profession in which men of high position, accustomed to command, might satisfy the... aspirations and expend the energies of their lives. Thenceforth, therefore, we dug out the materials of our army from the lower strata of society and the gentry of the land, seeking military service, carried their ambitions beyond the red line of the British Frontier and offered their swords to the Princes of the Native States." (Kaye and Mallsen—History of the Indian Mutiny, Volume I, pages 153-54.)

8. On the exploitation of the Sikhs' animosity towards the Hindustanees:—

"It was not because they loved us, but because they hated Hindustan and hated the Bengal Army that the Sikhs had flocked to our standard instead of seeking the opportunity to strike again for their freedom.

They wanted to revenge themselves and to gain riches by the plunder of Hindustani cities. They were not attracted by meagre daily pay, it was rather the prospect of wholesale plunder and stamping on the heads of their enemies. In short we turned to profit the *esprit de corps* of the old Khalsa army of Ranjit Singh in the manner which for a time would most effectually bind the Sikhs to us as long as the active service against their old enemies may last." (General Mansfield in appendix to the minutes of evidence, Peel Commission Report, 1859), page 97, cf. also General Hancock's evidence before the Peel Commission: "The feeling of the Punjabees and the heart with which they served us, was partly owing to this sort of national quasi-national feeling on the part of the Punjabees against the Hindustanee people; they had no compunction in plundering their cities and working against them." (Peel Commission Report, minutes of evidence, page 242).

9. General Hearsey on the stoppage of recruitment in Oudh, the Doab, etc.—

"I am strongly of opinion recruiting should cease in Oudh, the Doab of the Ganges and Jumna, in Shahabad and Bhojpur, and in Rohilkund and Bundelkund, that no soldiers from these districts should remain in the regular army of Bengal.

That recruiting from the Punjab Seikhs, Punjabee Musalmans, hill tribes of Kamaon, Ghurwal, Sirmoor, Bussaihir, Chumba, Lahool, the Dogras of the lower Kashmere hills, men from the hills of Muree, the Hazarah hills, even the wilder tribes of Kohat, Khyberes, Mohamands and the hillmen of Demun Koh, the tribes that herd cattle on the Punjab rivers, the Jats of Kausi Kissat, the Daud Pootras of Bhawalpur, the inhabitants of the Shekawat country, the Rajputs of Rajputana, the Beloches—all might be entertained for the regular army.

No more Brahmins, no more Musalmans of Hindustan proper to be entertained in the regular native force." (Peel Commission Report, supplementary papers connected with the organisation of the army, page 159.)

10. Major-General Cotton on the North-West Frontier recruits:—

"The newly raised troops of the Peshawar and Mooltan frontiers, and of the adjacent countries in and bordering on our territory, who have so well served us in our difficulties, and by adhering to or espousing our cause saved us at a most critical moment, are no more to be depended upon than any others. Already do they feel their importance as the saviours of our tottering government. Already do they feel the power which we have placed in their hands and they have before their eyes the baneful example of rebellion, which has been shown them by their Hindustanee neighbours, tending to prove that our Government has hitherto been placed on an insecure foundation." (Peel Commission Report, supplementary papers on the reorganisation of the army, page 121.)

11. Upon the desirability of recruiting ill-educated, lower classes of Nepal:—

“The Brahmins and Thakurs may be considered the aristocracy of the country, and together with the Khas represent its intelligence. The lower castes are, as a rule, ill-educated and somewhat obtuse. . . . Magars and Gurangs are invariably soldiers or agriculturists; they are far and away the best classes from which to enlist. The Gurungs are the least civilised and least Hinduised of all Gurkhas. They eat both beef and pork, which the Magars and others do not. The Khas are more or less under Brahmanical influence, and more national than the Magar and Gurung, and therefore less suited for employment in the Bengal Army.” [Barrow—Sepoy Officer’s Manual (2nd edition), 1887, page 100.]

12. Sir Frederic Haines on the principle of equilibrium:—

“Distinct in race, language and interests from the more numerous Army of Bengal, it is, in my opinion, eminently politic and wise to maintain these armies (the Madras and Bombay armies) as a counterpoise to it; and I would on no account diminish their strength in order that a reserve composed of what is called ‘the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure’ may be established. If by this it is meant to replace sepoy of the Madras and Bombay by a reserve of men passed through the ranks of the Bengal Army, and composed of the same classes of which it is formed, I would say that anything more unwise or more impolitic could hardly be conceived.” (Appendices to the Report of the Special Committee of 1879, Volume I, page 151.)

13. Lord Dufferin on the principle of economy:—

“Here also there is a great deal to be said against the proposal to reduce them. I have brought this question several times to notice, but hitherto my military colleagues have not seen their way to effect any reduction. Undoubtedly there are many considerations besides those of economy, which present themselves in discussing this question. Although some of the regiments of these armies are not well adapted for severe campaigns, it is considered by some that they are sufficiently good to act as the police and garrison of the country, and that it would be a mistake to trust entirely to the best fighting classes in India, while it would certainly be dangerous to allow any great preponderance of one particular class.” (Collen—Armies of India during the Viceroyalty of Lord Dufferin, page 19.)

P. S. SIVASWAMY AIYER.

G. R. R. RAJWADE.

SIMLA :

The 2nd July 1931. }