

PAN-EUROPE

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ON THE WORLD WAR

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PAN-EUROPE

by

RICHARD N. COUDENHOVE-KALERGI

With an introduction by

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER



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MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

There is ample and inviting food for reflection in the many plans that have been made better to organize the civilized world, either in whole or in large part. Some of these plans are the noble ideals of lofty spirits, content to dwell in the upper ether of human life, untrammelled by the hard limitations of reality. Others have been the projects of practical and ambitious rulers and statesmen who would knit together in closer bonds widely separated portions of the earth's surface.

Of all these projects the three which stand out pre-eminently by reason of the essential soundness of the principles on which they have rested and the measure of success that has attended them, are the Roman Empire, the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States of America. The Roman Empire represented a form of government which had substantial uniformity of political control and a central dominating power which reached by its influence the remotest limits of the Empire. The United States of America, as it has existed up to this time,

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represents the opposite principle of a federal republic, with chief emphasis upon local self-government and home control of common interests, together with a powerful central governmental agency set up to care for matters specifically named and delegated by the people of the commonwealths embraced in the federation. The British Commonwealth of Nations lies somewhere between these two extremes; it is certainly not a highly unified empire as the Roman Empire was, nor is it yet quite a single federated state as is the United States of America. Unless all present signs fail, the future development of the British Commonwealth of Nations will be rather in the direction of a federated state than in that of a rigid and unified empire.

It is quite natural that following the Great War, practical minds should concern themselves with the question as to how any recurrence of that awful cataclysm can be prevented. The principle of nationality, sound at the core as it is, may easily become a grave danger to the peace of the world and thereby to the security of the nation itself if it be pressed too far. Doubtless the perfect nation would not only be ethnographically and geographically a unit, but economically independent as well. Under the conditions of modern life no one of these situations can be more than partially met. The steady movement

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of peoples and the intermingling of races and men of varied speech and blood have destroyed the possibility of ethnographic unity. Practical as well as sentimental limitations on national growth have put limits to the attainment of complete geographic unity, while the possibility of absolute economic independence has disappeared entirely. A nation like the United States of America may stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico and yet be compelled to depend for rubber, for sugar, for coffee, for sisal and for other products upon the productive power of other nations. Great Britain, the heart as well as the head of the British Commonwealth of Nations, could not exist for more than a few weeks if deprived of the possibility of importing both food and raw materials and of selling its manufactured products abroad on satisfactory terms.

What lessons have these facts for Europe or, more particularly, for the nations of Central and Western Europe? Is it practicable and, if so, is it desirable for them to come together in some form of economic organization that shall be in effect an economic federation so as to get the benefits of free and untrammelled trade within the limits of that federation while preserving, if need be, a tariff barrier between such federation and the rest of the world? Would such an economic

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federation, if brought into existence, increase the happiness and satisfaction of the inhabitants of the nations included in it, and would it thereby reduce in number the causes of international friction and so help to establish a long and unbroken reign of international peace?

These are far reaching questions of absorbing interest. They may not be answered dogmatically or without careful reflection and prolonged study of all the facts, political, economic, social and psychological, that have bearing upon them.

Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and his associates have taken hold of these problems with fine devotion and unselfish zeal. They ask that these problems be pressed to answer and that if the answers be of good omen, that steps be taken to bring into existence a Pan Europe which shall take its place by the side of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States of America as a form of political, social and economic organization which permits at will complete freedom of trade and intercourse within its limits, together with the maintenance of the conventional barriers and limitations upon trade and commerce with the world outside.

Thoughtful men and women who look out upon the world with unprejudiced eyes, with knowledge of the lessons of history, of economics and of human nature and with hope for the future, will

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welcome this earnest and well informed discussion of what may well be the most vital and far reaching question which the Great War has put to a world which fondly calls itself civilized.

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

**Columbia University
in the City of New York
April 19, 1926**

FOREWORD

"Every great political happening began as a Utopia and ended as a Reality."—

This book is intended to waken a great political movement which is slumbering in all the nations of Europe.

Many people have dreamt of a united Europe, but few are determined to create it. As an object of longing, it remains barren; but as an object of will, it becomes fruitful.

The only force that can realize Pan-Europe is the will of the Europeans; the only force that can prevent its realization is, again, the will of the Europeans.

Thus into the hands of every European is given a share of the destiny of his individual world.

As I write, the fifth Pan-American Conference is being held in Chile. Russia is working with all her forces at self-restoration. The British Empire has surmounted the crisis of the World War. Eastern Asia is delivered from the Damoclean menace of a war with America.

Meanwhile Europe, without a leader and without definite plans, is staggering from one crisis into another. French and Belgian soldiers are occupying Germany's industrial centers. In Thrace a new war threatens to break out any day.

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Everywhere there is misery, unrest, discontent, hatred, and fear.

While the rest of the world is making daily progress, Europe is steadily going downhill.

This diagnosis implies a program.

The cause of Europe's decline is political, not biological. Europe is not dying of old age, but because its inhabitants are killing and destroying one another with the instruments of modern science.

As regards quality, Europe is still the most productive human reservoir in the world. The aspiring Americans are Europeans transplanted into another political environment. The peoples of Europe are not senile; it is only their political system that is senile. So soon as the latter has been radically changed, the complete recovery of the ailing Continent can and must ensue.

The World War changed only the political map of Europe, not its political system. Now, as before, international anarchy, oppression of the weaker by the stronger, latent war, economic disunion, and political intrigue prevail everywhere. European politics of today resemble those of yesterday more than those of tomorrow.

The eyes of Europe are turned backwards instead of forwards. The book-market is flooded with Memoirs. In public discussion the genesis

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of the last war receives more consideration than the avoidance of the next.

This constant retrospection is the chief cause of Europe's reaction and disunion. To bring about a change in this state of affairs, is the duty of Europe's youth. Upon them it devolves to build up a new Europe upon the wreckage of the old—to establish European organization in place of European anarchy.

If the statesmen of Europe refuse to recognize and to give effect to this aim, they will be swept out of existence by the nations whose destinies they so lightly rate.

Two burning problems weigh upon the European continent: the Social Question and the European Question—the reckoning between the classes, and the reckoning between the states.

The Social Question rightly dominates in public discussion; it creates and divides parties, and it is daily being threshed out a thousand times by public opinion in every country.

Meanwhile the European Question, in no way secondary to it in importance, is being simply burked. Many are not aware of its existence; it is relegated to the realm of literature and of utopia; it is not taken seriously.

And yet, upon its settlement depends the future of our culture and of our children.

FOREWORD

The European Question is this:

“Can Europe, so long as its political and economic disunion lasts, maintain its peace and independence with respect to the growing World Powers; or is it bound, in order to preserve its existence, to organize itself into a federal union?”

To put the question is to answer it; and that is why it is not put, but burked. Although in public discussion there is much talk of European questions, there is none of *the* European Question in which all of them are rooted, just as the many social questions are rooted in *the* Social Question.

Just as today every European is forced by internal politics to take a stand in regard to the Social Question, so in the future he will be forced by external politics to take a stand in regard to the European Question. Then let it rest with the Europeans whether they want union or disunion, organization or anarchy, resurrection or downfall.

One thing, however, must never again happen: the burking of a question which affects the lives of three hundred million people, by their responsible leaders.

At last the European Question must be unfolded before the public opinion of the continent, in its newspapers and political literature, and in its assemblies, parliaments, and cabinets.

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Time presses. Tomorrow perhaps it may be too late for the settlement of the European Question; and it is better, therefore, to begin today. The rapidity of the movement toward the unification of Europe is quite as important as its existence: for it depends upon the rapidity of this movement whether Europe will be a union of states or a collection of ruins.

Pan-Europe signifies—*self-help through the consolidation of Europe into an ad hoc politico-economic federation.*

The objection will be raised against Pan-Europe that it is a utopia; but this objection leaves it unscathed. No natural law is opposed to its realization. It harmonizes the interests of an overwhelming majority of Europeans; it violates the interests of only a dwindling minority.

This small but powerful minority, which today directs the fortunes of Europe, will endeavor to brand Pan-Europe as a utopia. To this the reply is that every great historical happening began as a utopia and ended as a reality.

In 1913 the Polish and Czecho-Slovak republics were utopias; in 1918 they became realities. In 1916 the victory of the communists in Russia was a utopia; in 1917 it was an accomplished fact. To a politician, in inverse proportion to his power of imagination, the realm of utopia seems greater and the realm of possibility smaller. World his-

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tory has more imagination than the puppets who make it; and it is compounded of unending surprises—of utopias come true.

Whether an idea remains a utopia or becomes a reality usually depends upon the number and the energy of its supporters. While thousands believe in Pan-Europe, it is a utopia; so long as millions believe in it, it is a program; but at once a hundred million believe in it, it becomes a fact.

Accordingly, the future of Pan-Europe depends upon whether the first thousand supporters have the faith and the propagandist force necessary to convince millions and to convert the utopia of yesterday into a reality of tomorrow.

I call upon the youth of Europe to accomplish this task!

RICHARD N. COUNDENHOVE-KALERGI

Vienna, Spring of 1923

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I. EUROPE AND THE WORLD

"In no case is it possible that 'European Separatism' shall maintain itself permanently by the side of the four great World Powers of the future: the British, the Russian, the American, and the Eastern Asiatic Empires."

1. The Decline of the European World Hegemony'

The nineteenth century was the age of European world ascendancy. The ancient Great Powers of Asia—China, Persia, and Turkey—were fast decaying, and the time no longer seemed distant when they, too, would necessarily become vassals of Europe. Africa was partitioned and, like India and Australia, dominated by Europe.

Only America, led by the United States, had freed itself from this European hegemony. The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine signified a declaration of the independence of the American continents from Europe.

But in spite of this American independence, Europe remained the center of the world. World policy was more or less identical with European policy. No one threatened this European ascendancy, the chief representatives of which were the six Great Powers: Great Britain, Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, and Italy.

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The first quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the overthrow of Europe's world ascendancy.

Today Europe has ceased to be the center of the world, alike as to political and economic power. The world has emancipated itself from Europe.

The main causes of this political revolution were the following:

(1) The expansion of the British World Empire outside of Europe through the transformation of its internal structure. Formerly a European realm with extra-European colonies, it was now transformed, at the beginning of this century, into an inter-continental federal empire. The center of gravity of this world empire was shifted by the establishment of the Union of South Africa, by territorial acquisitions made in the World War, and by the affiliation of the Arab world from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.

England today no longer rules over her far-flung Empire; she merely presides over it as *primus inter pares*.

From a European "Great Power" Great Britain has developed into an inter-continental "World Power."

(2) The expansion of the Russian World Empire outside of Europe through the transformation of its internal structure. Whereas Russia was formerly a European state with Asiatic colo-

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nies, the Ural frontier fell in consequence of the Russian Revolution. Today Russia is a federal empire without colonies, the greater part of it situated in Asia, the lesser part in Europe. The Russian Union of Soviet Republics constitutes today a Eurasian World Power; while more or less set off against the European nations, it stands forth as the champion of freedom for the Asiatic peoples. Russia's repudiation of the European democratic system signifies, politically, her retirement from Europe. Her western parts (Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bessarabia), which felt drawn to Europe more strongly than to Russia, separated from the latter and achieved their union with the European state-system. Europe's eastern frontier is marked no longer by the Urals, but by the political boundaries separating Russia from the democratic border-states.

Formerly a European "Great Power", Russia has now become a Eurasian "World Power."

(3) The Emancipation of Asia. Here the rise of Japan as a Great Power, fortified by her victory over Russia, constitutes the turning-point. While Europe was regarding the Oriental nations merely as pawns in its political and economic game, in Eastern Asia there was rising a Great Power whose influence upon the East of the Old World soon outstripped that of Europe. To its pole of power on the Atlantic—*Europe*, the Old World

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has added a second pole on the Pacific—*Japan*. The world ascendancy of the White Race is broken. At the present time the Japanese are, next to the Anglo-Saxons and Russians, the most powerful people on earth.

The rise of Japan found its complement in the Europeanization and militarization of China and the other Asiatic peoples.

The rise of Japan as a World Power has overthrown the autocratic world hegemony of Europe.

(4) The Rise of America. At the second Hague Peace Conference, held in 1907, the American republics were represented for the first time on an equal footing with the states of Europe. Since then the international importance of the South American countries has steadily grown, so that today they play a leading part in the League of Nations and actually sit in judgment upon European problems.

Meanwhile, the United States of America has developed into the leading World Power. Toward the South it exerts its influence through the Pan-American Union; toward the West (Eastern Asia) it asserts itself as the protector of Chinese independence. This rise of the United States, commencing with its victory over Spain and its mediation between Russia and Japan, was fortified by its completion of the Panama Canal, by the development of its navy, and by the growth of

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its population and wealth; and it culminated in the World War, in which the United States proved the decisive factor.

Today the United States of America is the wealthiest, the most powerful, and the most advanced country in the world.

(5) **The Decline of Europe.** The World War destroyed the power of Austria-Hungary, and mutilated that of Germany. In world politics to-day neither Germany nor the heirs to Austria play any leading part. The only two Great Powers left in Europe—France and Italy—have gained territorially through the War, but they suffered such losses in men and money that their position in world politics now rests upon insecure foundations. Their influence outside of Europe, the Mediterranean, and Asia is very slight. They are European Great Powers of the first, but World Powers of the second rank. While the remaining Great Powers are apportioning the peoples and the raw materials of the world among themselves, and at the same time organizing entire continents, France is gazing fixedly upon the Rhine, Italy upon the Mediterranean. Thus Europe's power of action in world politics is paralyzed by her disunion.

From the center of the world Europe has moved to its periphery.

The world hegemony of Europe is overthrown

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for all time. Once feared, Europe is now pitied. From its dominating position it has been thrown back upon the defensive. Threatened in a military way by a Russian invasion; threatened economically by American competition; burdened with debt, disrupted, restless and enfeebled, gravely reduced in its populative and industrial strength, floundering in economic and monetary chaos—thus it moves on from a desolate present into an uncertain future.

The fact that Russia is in an even worse plight can be in no way reassuring to Europe: for Time works *for* Russia and *against* Europe. An immense natural wealth, backed by unexhausted and more homogeneous human resources, insure Russia's future in any event. Whatever may be her immediate fate, sooner or later Russia will once again be great, powerful, and wealthy.

The future of Europe, on the other hand, is in the highest degree uncertain. It forfeited its world hegemony because its peoples were disunited; it will forfeit its independence and what remains of its former prosperity, if the disunion continues. Whether the twentieth century, which has witnessed Europe's fall from the throne of world sovereignty, will witness also its dissolution, depends upon whether its leaders and its peoples can adapt themselves to the exigencies of the time

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—or whether they plunge blindly into the abyss toward which they are rapidly moving.

2. Science and Politics

Every day the world grows smaller; through the progress of science as applied to communications, cities and countries are ever being brought more closely together.

For the natural measure of any distance is not the length of the road, but the amount of time required to traverse it; not the number of miles or kilometers, but the number of hours or days of travel. The objective measure of distances is the length of the road; the subjective, the duration of the journey.

From the taming of the horse and the invention of the sail, up to the nineteenth century, the ratio between the length and the duration of any distance remained constant.

Only the invention of the steamboat, the steam and electric railways, the automobile and aeroplane, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, put an end to that thousand-year-old relationship and introduced new time-measures for distances.

During the last hundred years the earth has grown by as much smaller—cities and countries have been brought as much closer together—as

TABLE II

1. THE INTERNATIONAL COMPLEX					
1. PAN-EUROPE			2. PAN-AMERICA		
	Millions			Millions	
	Inhab.	Sq. Km.		Inhab.	Sq. Km.
Mother-countries	800	5	U.S.A. (with colonies)	118	9-7
Colonies	129	19-7	Latin-America	91	22-8
Total	429	24-7	Total	209	32-5
3. EAST ASIA					
				Millions	
				Inhab.	Sq. Km.
China (with neighboring countries)			440	11-1	
Japan (with colonies)			80	0-68	
			Total	520	11-78
4. RUSSIAN FEDERATION			5. BRITISH FEDERATION		
	Millions			Millions	
	Inhab.	Sq. Km.		Inhab.	Sq. Km.
Soviet Russia	90	16-4	Mother-country and Dominions	70	20
Federated States and Realms	60	7	Colonies and Dependencies	894	19-3
Total	150	23-4	Total	464	39-3
2. POPULATION					
1. Pan-Eur.	2. Pan-Am.	3. East Asia	4. Russian Fed.	5. British Fed.	
Mother-countries Colonies	U.S.A. Latin-America	China Japan	Fed. States Fed. States	Mother-country and Dependencies Colonies and Dependencies	
3. AREA					
1. Pan-Eur.	2. Pan-Am.	3. East Asia	4. Russian Fed.	5. British Fed.	
Mother-countries Colonies	U.S.A. Latin-America	China	Soviet Russia Fed. States	Mother-country and Dependencies Colonies and Dependencies	

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—was likewise the first to try the new method of political organization: namely, a system of peaceful federations, culminating in the Pan-American Union and in the idea of a League of Nations.

For the individual state, as historically evolved, has become too small to be able henceforth to lead an independent existence; it must be supplemented and completed by the establishment of federations.

The leading World Powers of today are federations: Russia, England, America.

The Pan-American League, now being formed, differs essentially from earlier federations in that it is not directed against any other state-system, but solely against war, and toward furthering the cultural progress of all.

It furnishes an example which Europe will have to follow. Europe must needs supplement its modern science of communications by a modern science of politics, else it will be in danger of blindly staggering into another war and of suffocating in a very sea of gas-bombs.

3. "World Powers" instead of "Great Powers"

The old system of Great Powers has been forced to give way to a new system of World Powers.

A third entity has interposed itself between the state and humanity: the state-group.

The attempt of President Wilson to establish an

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ecumenic League of Nations failed; but, instead, a number of Leagues of Peoples have come, or are coming, into being.

The Russian Empire has become a League of Peoples, embracing in a great federal system Great Russians and White Russians, Ukrainians and Eastern Turks, Georgians and Circassians, Tatars and Armenians.

The British Empire is a League of Peoples, comprising Anglo-Saxons and Irish, French Canadians and Boers, Arabs and Indians, Egyptians * and Malays.

Pan-America is developing into a League of Peoples, consisting of Anglo-Saxons, Spaniards, Portuguese, Indians, negroes, and half-breeds.

Finally, the Chinese Federal Republic is likewise a League of Peoples, embracing Northern and Southern Chinese, Tibetans, Mongolians, Manchus, and Turkomans.

Thus while in the extra-European world the synthetic is stronger than the analytic tendency, and the petty states endeavor to lean upon the world empires, in Europe itself the contrary process is going on. Here the striving for freedom exceeds the striving for order; here even the smallest nation claims its full sovereignty, regardless of whether it can maintain itself in competition

* Egypt, in spite of its nominal independence, belongs to the British World Power.

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with others. While in the big world the process of integration goes steadily on, Europe is regressing further and further toward atomization. Austria-Hungary, Western Russia, and European Turkey have dissolved themselves into a multitude of petty states. Scandinavia has split into three realms; likewise in Germany and in Jugo-Slavia very powerful currents are moving toward a division of the Empire into separate states. And no one can say where this analytic tendency in European politics will end.

The European peace treaties gave heed only to the analytic tendencies of the European peoples, not to their synthetic needs; and today, consequently, there are in Europe fewer Great Powers and more petty states than there were before the War. The Peace failed in its second great mission—that of welding together the liberated nations; its destructive force was greater than its constructive force.

If the liberation of the European peoples is not completed by their unification, sooner or later the European states will be swallowed up by the growing World Powers.

As England, America, and Russia have done, so also Europe will have to find a means of harmonizing freedom with organization. The achievement of such harmonization will lead internally to the widest autonomy, externally to the largest

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measure of federation. England and America have led the way in setting this twofold example, England thereby preserving the substance of its empire and power; while Russia, which after the Revolution seemed to be breaking up, by the same twofold method of autonomy and federation has saved the major part of its own group of peoples.

Let Europe mark this truth, that differentiation without integration signifies destruction, and that the analytic policy now being pursued must be completed by a synthetic policy.

The political leadership of the world today resides at Washington, London, Moscow, Tokio, and Paris.

In those cities are centered the international fields of force; whereby, again, the contours of the future World Powers are indicated.

The five planetary fields of force are:

1. the American
2. the British
3. the Russian
4. the Eastern Asiatic
5. the European

A glance at the world-map reveals to us the new divisions and articulations of the world:*

I. Pan-America: the empire bounded by the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, the political unity

* See Table III.

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of which is furthered by the Pan-American movement.

The second great geographic complex is the Old World: Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia. This second complex is naturally divided, according to the quarters of the compass and the four seas surrounding it, into four empires: the Empires of the South, the North, the East, and the West.

II. The Empire of the South, bordering the Indian Ocean, is the heart of the British World Empire. It embraces the eastern half of Africa, the Arabian and Indian worlds, and Australia: Cape Town, Suez, Calcutta, Singapore, Sydney. Its northern boundary is formed by the Mediterranean Sea and the Himalayas.

III. The Empire of the North, fronting toward the Arctic Ocean, is the Russian World Empire; it borders in the West on Europe, in the South on Britain,* in the East on Eastern Asia.

IV. The Empire of the East, along the shores of the Pacific, is Japan and China, which, politically separate, are bound together by the community of race, writing, and culture.

V. The states of the West, fronting the Atlantic Ocean, constitute Europe. This complex is divided into the European continent and its Afri-

* Persia and Afghanistan are Russo-British buffer-states.

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can colonial empire, from which the former is parted by the Mediterranean Sea. It embraces continental Europe from the North Cape to Morea, and the western half of Africa from Tripoli and Morocco to the Congo and Angola.

These states of the West are disjointed and disorganized, in everlasting conflict with one another, and torn by hatred and jealousy.

None of these five world complexes has so great a past as Europe, but at the same time none of them is advancing toward so uncertain a future.

4. The World Position of Europe

Europe as a political concept does not exist. The continent which bears the name encloses a jumble of peoples and states, a powder-chamber of international conflicts, a crucible of future world wars.

The European Question and national hatreds vitiate the international atmosphere, and constantly disquiet even the most peaceful parts of the world.

That is why the European Question is not merely of local but of international import; until it is solved there can be no possibility of a peaceful development of the world. Today the European Question signifies to the world what for more than a century the Balkan Question signified

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to Europe: a source of endless insecurity and unrest.

The European Question will be settled only by the uniting of the European peoples. This unification will take place either voluntarily by the formation of a Pan-European Federation, or else forcibly by a Russian conquest.

Whether the European Question is finally answered by Europe or by Russia, in no case is it possible for "European Separatism" to maintain itself permanently by the side of the four great World Empires of the future: the British, the Russian, the American, and the Eastern Asiatic.

The world hegemony of Europe is lost beyond recall—but not yet its independence, not yet its colonial empire, nor its culture, nor its future.

By combining its forces in time Europe can still share, as a fifth and coequal factor, in the partition of the world; disrupted, it is bound to sink to a level of complete political impotence.

The present situation of Europe resembles that of Germany at the beginning of modern times.

At that time Germany, as heir to the Western Roman Empire, still exercised nominal hegemony over the Christian states of Europe; but owing to the rivalry of its princes it was weakened to the point of impotence.

While the Romano-German Empire was breaking up more and more in consequence of the striv-

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ing of its cities and provinces for independence, strong centralist nations were developing in other parts of Europe: France, England, Spain, Sweden.

Thanks to their cohesion, these nations soon became more powerful than the German Empire. In the Southwest, there was formed the semi-German hereditary monarchy of the Hapsburgs, whose interests became more and more dissociated from those of Germany as their realm expanded eastwards at the expense of Turkey. In the Northwest, the most progressive part of Germany, Holland, broke away from the Empire, to become an independent Great Power by means of colonial acquisitions—just as England today is freeing itself from European disorders, to become an independent World Empire.

Even in the days of Wallenstein a united Germany might still have repelled any foreign invasion and become the foremost Great Power in Europe. But the Thirty Years' War proved to be the turning-point, for with it begins the second chapter of Germany's decline.

The Great Powers to the north and west of Germany took advantage of her internal conflicts for the purpose of achieving their imperialistic aims. Thus Germany, during two centuries, was the "Battlefield of Europe." Danish, Swedish, French, and Spanish armies, as allies of German

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princes, laid waste the German Empire. When the great division of colonies took place in the West and East, Germany received no share. While the other nations were growing ever richer, she grew ever poorer; and with her prosperity her culture also declined.

The German petty states had to purchase their independence at the price of becoming pawns of European politics. England and France fought out their colonial differences on German soil, and largely with German soldiers.

Not even the outbreak of the French Revolution availed to unite the German princes. Their rivalry proved stronger than their solidarity. Napoleon appeared, set up the Confederation of the Rhine—and there was an end of the Romano-German Empire.

The World War signified for Europe a turning-point similar to that which the Thirty Years' War signified for Germany. Europe, which so short a time before had held the scepter of the world, was divided into two hostile camps. Negroes and Indians, Turks and Kurds, fought upon European soil. Europe became the "Battlefield of the World." Her richest regions were devastated; the flower of her population was killed. Standards of morality are lowered; hatred and jealousy are increasing.

If Europe does not learn the lesson of history,

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the fate suffered by the Romano-German Empire will fulfil itself in her own case. Both in a political and in a military sense she will become the chessboard of the world—a pawn in the hands of world politics, as once she was the arbiter. When the markets and the raw materials are divided up, she will be overlooked. The Russian and British World Powers will have their Asiatic differences fought out by German and French soldiers on the Rhine. As yesterday were China and Turkey, so tomorrow Europe will be divided into “spheres of interest”—by England, Russia, and America.

While the other parts of the world, thanks to their policy of coöperation, are daily growing wealthier, stronger, and more civilized, Europe is growing poorer, weaker, and more barbarous. The inter-European tariff walls will surely thwart any far-sighted economic policy, while armaments and conflicts cannot but destroy what little remains of European prosperity.

From the standpoint of world policy the nationalist politician of Europe will become no less a laughing-stock than was the church-steeple politician of an earlier day. The petty malice of European politics will be the butt of the world's scorn.

All this will go on until finally from the Russian Revolution there will emerge a Russian Napoleon who out of the petty states of eastern Europe

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will form a Rhenish League and thereby inflict the death-blow upon Europe.

There is still time to preserve Europe from this fate. The means of salvation is called Pan-Europe—the political and economic consolidation of all the states from Poland to Portugal into a federal union.

II. THE FRONTIERS OF EUROPE

"The concept 'Europe' arose from a blending of geographical, political and cultural elements."

1. *Europe's Geographical Frontiers*

Geographically there is no European continent; there is only a European peninsula of the Eurasian continent. This peninsula is hemmed in at its base by the Black Sea and the Baltic. North of the European peninsula lie Scandinavia, the British Isles, and Iceland.

Just as the western extremity of the Eurasian continent is named Europe, so its southeastern extremity is named India. India might be called a continent with fully as much justification as Europe, for it yields to the latter neither in population nor in area; it has its own history and its own culture, which sharply distinguish it from the rest of Asia. Finally, the Himalayas form a natural geographic frontier between India and Asia, while the Urals represent a purely arbitrary dividing-line between Europe and Asia.

Today the sea serves as Europe's geographical frontier—from the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean and Black Seas, on the one side, and to

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the Arctic Ocean, on the other. Europe is without a natural frontier only in the East, where it passes imperceptibly into Asia. No mountain-range or stream separates the European peninsula from Asia. That is why Geography, in order to justify Europe's existence geographically, was forced to recognize as Europe's frontier the only north-and-south range which cuts through the great Eurasian lowland, namely, the Urals—although the latter do not delimit the European peninsula, but lie athwart the continent of Asia.

The Urals were recognized as Europe's frontier for this further reason, namely, that during the last two centuries they had formed the political boundary of the Russian mother-country.

The concept "Europe" arose from a blending of geographical, political, and cultural elements. The northern, southern, and western frontiers of this part of the world were determined by geography, the eastern frontier by politics. That is why Europe's eastern frontier has always fluctuated: from the Rhine to the Urals, from the Adriatic to the Caspian Sea.

The geographical concept "Europe" coincides neither with the cultural nor with the political concept of that name. Culturally Australia, and geographically Great Britain, are component parts of Europe; while politically both lie out-

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side of Europe and outside of the British World Empire.

One must distinguish carefully between a division of the world into continents, into world empires, and into world cultures.

Geographically, the habitable world is divided into five continents: Eurasia, Africa, Australia, North America, and South America.

Politically, the world is divided into the American, the European, the Eastern Asiatic, the Russian, and the British fields of force.

Culturally, the world is divided into four great spheres of civilization: the European, the Chinese, the Indian, and the Arabian.

These distinctions must be strictly observed, if hopeless confusions in regard to Europe are to be avoided.

2. Europe's Historical Frontiers

Hellas was the first Europe. Its opposition to Persia created the tension between Europe and Asia—created the European idea. The frontier of that Europe is formed by the Mediterranean and Ægean Seas, the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Concerning the frontier of eastern Europe north of the Black Sea, no Greek or Roman troubled his mind.

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The half-Hellenic Alexander the Great abolished the political frontier between Europe and Asia by founding the first Eurasian empire, the civilization of which was Hellenism.

Rome created the second Europe. That Europe embraced the lands bordering on the Mediterranean Sea; the Rhine and the Danube formed the northeastern frontier of Roman Europe. Culturally this frontier has not disappeared to this day.

The partition of the Roman Empire separated the Balkans from Europe and shifted the Empire's center of gravity to western Europe. Eastern Rome became a buffer between Europe and the Orient—a Eurasian empire; Europe became Roman Catholic, and Asia Minor Mohammedan, while Byzantium and Russia professed adherence to Greek orthodoxy and for centuries exerted no decisive influence whatever upon the destiny of Europe.

The Migrations of Peoples created the third Europe.

Germanic kingdoms arose upon the ruins of western Rome. This Germanic Europe, which reached its high-water mark under Charlemagne, bordered in the West on Moorish Spain, in the East on the Slavs, Avars, and Byzantines. At that time the Elbe was Europe's eastern frontier.

After the collapse of the Carolingian Empire,

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the Papacy gradually assumed the leadership of Europe; thus the fourth Europe came into being, its frontiers coincident with those of Roman Catholicism. This fourth Europe thus extended eastwards across Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary. During the Crusades it stood forth as a political unit, in opposition to Mohammedan Asia. It attained its zenith under Innocent III, who also exercised political supremacy over the kings of Europe.

Papal Europe was finally broken up by the Reformation, which divided Europe into a Protestant North and a Catholic South.

The Age of Enlightenment, the ideas of which thrust the religious quarrels into the background, laid the foundations of a fifth Europe: the Europe of enlightened absolutism. This European state-system was joined, in the reign of Peter the Great, by Russia, which during the Mongol domination had belonged to Asia. The Urals consequently became the frontier of Europe, which thus attained its greatest territorial expansion.

The zenith of this fifth Europe is represented by Napoleon. He was the last to restore the European empire of Julius Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Innocent III. Had he been victorious at Leipzig, the United States of Europe would be in existence today, whether under a Bonapartist or under a Republican régime. His downfall

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plunged Europe back into international chaos. But the idea of a united Europe, which he renewed, was no longer to be downed; it persisted in the reactionary as in the revolutionary camp, under kings as under peoples.

In the Holy Alliance, no less than in Mazzini's dream of a united republican Europe, there was rooted the idea of European solidarity. The internal politics of the last century were dominated by the conflict between the principles of Metternich and of Mazzini. The World War brought the decision: Mazzini prevailed over Metternich; the thrones of central and eastern Europe fell; the oppressed nations achieved their deliverance; Europe became democratic. Thereby the road was cleared for the sixth Europe: the United States of Europe—the Pan-European Federation.

Coincident in time with this inner-political leveling of the European states is the separation of England and Russia from Europe. While the transformation of Great Britain into an intercontinental federal empire brought England's præter-European interests into the foreground, Russia renounced Europe's democratic system by the proclamation of sovietism. Once more the eastern frontier of Europe was shifted. The place of the Ural and Caucasian ranges was taken by the political boundary separating Russian sovietism

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from European democracy. Roughly this line corresponds to the geographical base of the European peninsula.

The Urals will never again mark the boundary between Europe and Asia. It is possible that some day Russia will unite again with Europe. When that happens, however, not the Ural but the Altai mountains will form the frontier between Asia and Europe, and Europe will border on the Chinese and Japanese Empires, and on the Pacific Ocean.

It is also possible that Russia will penetrate to the West, in order, jointly with Germans and Western Slavs, to form a counterpoise to the Anglo-Saxon Powers of western Europe: then Europe's frontier will again pass, as it passed in Roman days, along the Rhine and the Alps, until it, too, is swept away by a new migration of peoples.

Today the only point of contact between Europe and Asia is the Balkan peninsula. To the North a Eurasian empire has once more interposed itself between Asia and Europe, separating them as once did the Alexandrian and Byzantine empires.

Once more Europe's eastern frontier is determined by politics: the sixth Europe extends eastwards as far as the limits of the democratic system.

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3. European Culture

Beyond the geographical frontiers of Europe, European culture embraces the entire American continent, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. In addition, oases of European culture are to be found in all of the colonies.

Europe's culture is that of the White Race, which sprang from the soil of Antiquity and Christianity. That is why European culture may alternatively be distinguished as Christian culture, as distinguished from the Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu, and Confucian cultures of Asia.

The two poles of European culture are Hellenic individualism and Christian socialism.

European culture is essentially activist and rationalist. It endeavors to achieve rational aims by forcible means. Its highest attainment is Science, and the practical applications thereof in technology, chemistry, and medicine. In this respect it far surpasses all previous cultures.

To its powerful activism, which is due to its Nordic character, European culture owes its victory over the rest of the world; for while the other cultures are fast decaying, European culture marches triumphantly on. To it the easternmost empire of the Orient, Japan, has given its adhesion, while Japan's example has been followed

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by China, Siam, Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey, and Egypt. It would appear that a century hence European culture will have absorbed all other cultures.

The Christian culture of Europe is subdivided into numerous varieties, in which perhaps the seeds of new cultural formations may be recognized.

One such variety of European culture is Americanism. It forms the most extreme contrast to every kind of Orientalism, to all contemplativeness and mysticism. It is optimistic, aspiring, energetic, and progressive. This Americanism, in point of fact, is not confined to America, but dominates likewise over the industrial centers of the Old World.

Another variety of European culture appears to be the Russian. Many circumstances, however, argue in favor of Russia as being the starting-point of an altogether new culture that will combine Asiatic and European elements in a new synthesis.

Russia, with respect to race, is compounded of European and Asiatic elements. Since the Migrations of Peoples, it has belonged, politically and culturally, to Europe and to Asia in turn. Its last Asiatic epoch, the Tartar rule, lasted from 1200 to 1498, while politically Russia has formed part of Europe only for the last two centuries. During this time it has adopted outwardly the

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cultural forms of Europe, without becoming European at heart.

Bolshevism has cast aside the European civilization imported by Peter the Great and his successors, and for the most part it has exiled or murdered the representatives of that civilization. It turns its back upon Christian and democratic Europe, and by means of European theories and Asiatic practices it is endeavoring to lay the foundations of a new form of culture.

Whether this cultural emancipation of Russia from Europe will be successful, as Oswald Spengler predicts, remains to be seen; for it is equally possible that Russia, after an interval, will continue its interrupted Europeanization and extend Europe's cultural dominion as far east as the Pacific Ocean.

So long as Russia's cultural future remains uncertain, Europe's eastern political frontier toward Russia will form at the same time the eastern frontier of the European cultural community.

Russia and Japan are the two exponents of Eurasian cultures, which will, perhaps, some day achieve a synthesis upon a higher plane.

4. Pan-Europe

Europe as a political concept embraces all the non-soviet states of continental Europe, including

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Iceland, which is united to Denmark by a personal union. What remains of European Turkey belongs politically to Asia.

To the political concept "Europe," as distinguished from its geographical counterpart, I give the name: Pan-Europe.

I am well aware that this designation will meet with protest; that objections will be raised on the ground that a Europe without England and Russia cannot properly be called "Pan-Europe"—"All-Europe." This objection is theoretically valid, but practically it bears no weight. The Pan-American Union excludes both Canada and the European colonies in America. Similarly the Pan-Hellenic movement of Demosthenes did not embrace all the Greek states. I have chosen the designation Pan-Europe, in order to express thereby the analogy of this case to Pan-Americanism and Pan-Hellenism.

Pan-Europe consists of twenty-seven fair-sized states and four small territories.*

The area of this state-complex amounts to some 5,000,000 square kilometers, its population to about 300,000,000.

These numbers, however, are not complete; for the European territories of the Pan-European state-group form but a fraction of its power-complex. In order rightly to estimate the future

* See Table I.

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possibilities of Pan-Europe, its colonies must also be taken into account.

The colonies of Pan-Europe may be divided into two groups:

(1) Pan-Europe's continuous empire in Africa (Libya, French Africa, Angola, Congo Free State), with 16,000,000 square kilometers and 53,000,000 inhabitants.

(2) Pan-Europe's scattered colonies (Mozambique, Madagascar, Dutch-Indies, French Further India, Guyana, etc.), with 5,000,000 square kilometers and 78,000,000 inhabitants.

Thus Pan-Europe with its colonies embraces an area of about 26,000,000 square kilometers and a population of 431,000,000. A comparison with the other power-groups gives us the following table:

	millions inhabitants	square kilometers
Pan-Europe	431	26
British Empire	454	36
Russian Empire	145	22
Mongolian Empire	408	12
Pan-America	212	30

These figures indicate * the world-political necessity for Europe to combine its forces. While

* See Table II.

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in the long run every separate European state would be at the mercy, politically and economically, of the World Powers above named, Pan-Europe, by combining its forces, could become one of the strongest, perhaps the strongest, power-group on earth. In population it occupies the second, in area the third place. It would be strong enough to repel any military invasion and to meet any economic competition.

By unifying its organization and rationally opening up its African colonial empire, which is very nearly equal to Asiatic Russia in extent, Pan-Europe could itself produce all the raw materials and foodstuffs it requires, and thus also become independent in a material way.

This united Europe, thanks to its intermediate position between England and America on the one side, and between Russia and East Asia on the other, and thanks also to the tradition and native gifts of its inhabitants, would be both able and fitted to be the cultural center of the world for a long time to come.

III. THE UNITED STATES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND PAN-EUROPE

"Every Pan-European must be clear as to one thing: that European federalism has no point directed against England, but, on the contrary, aims, jointly with England, to be a mainstay of world peace and a step toward world organization."

1. Little Europe or Greater Europe?

The idea of a "United States of Europe" is very old. By many Europeans it is regarded, even today, as the longed-for ideal, as the only escape from the present chaos, the only safeguard against the future collapse.

Nevertheless, this ideal remained inactive; it remained a literary problem without ever becoming a political program. Dreamt of by many, it was striven for by only a few. Many dally with the idea, but scarcely anybody lifts a hand to further its realization.

If there be no radical change in this attitude toward the European idea, the United States of Europe will forever remain an ideal and never become a political reality.

One of the main causes of this strange unreality

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of the European idea is to be found in the diversity of views respecting the frontiers of Europe. Opinion is already divided on the preliminary question touching Europe: "Are Russia and England—or is only one of them, or neither of them—to belong to those United States of Europe to which we aspire?"

This question is variously answered; and precisely for that reason it stands in the way of any Pan-European action. For many adherents to the idea of a European federation cannot conceive of Europe without England, while others cannot imagine it without Russia. Hence neither the official politicians nor the European cabinets dare to propound the European Question at all.

Since Russia, in consequence of its breach with the democratic system, has placed itself outside of Europe, the question has been greatly simplified. For a more or less close federation between a soviet World Power and a group of democratic states is practically unrealizable.

Europe, therefore, is confronted with the preliminary question only insofar as it concerns England; and an answer to it must be found before the first practical steps can be taken toward the creation of Pan-Europe.

The difficulty of the English question lies in the fact that, on the one hand, Great Britain and Ireland indubitably form part of the geographical

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concept "Europe," while, on the other hand, the British World Empire cannot possibly be regarded as a European state; whereto it must be added that English culture forms an integral part of European culture.

An analogy to the relation of England to Europe today is found in the relation of Austria to the North German Federation about the middle of the last century. While the Alpine provinces of Austria unquestionably formed part of the German unity, the Austrian Empire as such was a non-German state, though governed from Vienna.

In 1848 the unification of Germany could not be realized, though it was ardently desired by the public opinion of the entire nation, because two incompatible programs divided men's minds: Schwarzenberg's Greater-German and Bismarck's Little-German programs.

The adherents to the former pointed to the vast increase of power which Germany would gain by its union with Greater Austria, and to the intolerable situation of being permanently separated from the Germans of that country.

The Little-Germans, on the other hand, contended that a smaller but homogeneous Germany was preferable to a larger but politically disunited state; that in the event of great political decisions Austria would sacrifice Germany's interests to her own.

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Finally, in 1866 Bismarck carried through his Little-German program with the greatest possible consideration of Austria, but later on supplemented it by a close alliance with that country, thereby combining the advantages of both programs.

This political achievement of Bismarck's provides an exemplary indication of how the European Question should be solved. Just as at that time public opinion was divided on the question of the inclusion or exclusion of Austria, so today it is divided on the question of the inclusion or exclusion of the British Empire.

Just as then the Little-German and the Greater-German programs stood opposed to each other, so today the same situation exists with respect to Little Europe and Greater Europe.

The advocates of a Greater Europe cannot conceive a "United States of Europe" without England; they would make the British Empire a European federal state. By such a policy Pan-Europe would gain in power, but lose in cohesion; for a Europe embracing Australia, Canada, and South Africa would be Europe no longer, but an inter-continental World Empire. The greatest and richest members of such a European union would find themselves geographically outside the European continent. Through them Europe would be drawn into each world conflict.

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Greater Europe would fall apart into two heterogeneous portions:

(1) The English-speaking peoples of the British World Empire, scattered over the five continents; and (2) the solid phalanx of the non-English European states.

The endless tension between these two groups, whose interests are in many respects opposed, would paralyze all power of international action on the part of Greater Europe, and lead finally to a rupture.

Theoretically there is yet a second solution of the Greater-European problem: the accession to Pan-Europe of Great Britain and Ireland, but without their colonies and dominions.

Practically this solution is scarcely possible; for it would lead to the dissolution of the British Empire. To begin with, Canada would follow England's example and join the Pan-American League, while India would adhere more than heretofore to Pan-Asiatic aims—and that would be the beginning of the end of British unity. For a country cannot long belong to two World Empires at once; it must decide for either the one or the other.

For Europe, too, that solution would be no blessing. Europe would find itself in a position not unlike that of the German Confederation, when the Kings of Holland, England, and Denmark were

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German federal princes. The German Confederation lost all power of action, thanks to these members who always considered the interests of their particular kingdoms in preference to the general German interest. In the same way the English federal state would always sacrifice the interests of Europe to British imperial interests.

The adhesion of England and Ireland to Pan-Europe would be possible after the disintegration of the British World Empire. If ever in time to come Canada and Australia should unite with America, if ever India and South Africa should declare their independence, the English mother-country would always be free to join the Pan-European Confederation—just as the German Empire, after the disruption of the Hapsburg monarchy, would have welcomed the adhesion of German Austria.

But even so it is not certain that Great Britain would actually put through its membership in Pan-Europe; for while historically and geographically it belongs to Europe, it is linked to North America by ties of language, of kinship, and of culture. It might well be that these would prove the stronger ties and that England would seek and find its allies across the Atlantic Ocean—instead of across the English Channel.

So long as the British World Empire remains great and powerful, this problem will lie in the dis-

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tant future. Hence, as a practical program for Europe there remains only the Little-European solution.

The Little-European program starts from the premise that the British World Empire is a non-European empire, just as the Hapsburg monarchy was a non-German empire.

The British Empire is a World Power spread over five continents: in Europe through England; in Asia through India; in Africa through the South African Republic; in Australia through the Australian Commonwealth; in America through Canada.

Politically, Great Britain is a continent apart; it is neither European, nor Asiatic, nor African, nor Australian, nor American—just British. This continent is held together, not by geographical links, but by the common language and culture of its dominant nation and the astute statesmanship of its rulers.

It is impossible to make this continent, which exceeds Pan-Europe both in area and in population, a constituent member of any European state-group; but it is possible to make it in some way an associate member of Europe—in some such way, perhaps, as Austria was associated with Germany in matters of world policy, by the Triple Alliance.

Pan-Europe must constitute itself *without* England, but not *against* England; just as Pan-

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America was organized without, but not against, Canada. Pan-America, too, decided in favor of the Little-American solution and excluded Canada, though that country is territorially the largest in America and belongs to Europe. For the American republics were agreed from the start that Canada could not at the same time belong both to the British and to the Pan-American state-groups.

Pan-Europe would do well to follow this example set by Pan-America and unhesitatingly decide in favor of the Little-European program. On the other hand, to the friendship that exists between Canada and the American republics there should correspond a no less cordial understanding between England and the European states.

England, which is joined by many ties of interest, of culture, and of history to Europe no less than to America, is destined to become the mediator between these two continents, without belonging politically to either.

However, this proposed solution of the Anglo-European problem must be carried out in agreement with England. In the last analysis England must decide whether or not she wishes to become a federal state of Europe at the risk of losing Canada. As soon as England and Ireland feel themselves drawn to Europe more strongly than to their overseas dominions, the way to Pan-Europe must lie open to them, just as once in the first

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American constitution the fourteenth colony
(Canada) was left free to decide whether or not it
wanted to join the United States.

2. Pan-Europe and England

It would be a grievous and irreparable mistake if the Pan-European movement were to place itself in opposition to England, or to let itself be made the instrument of anti-English aims.

Pan-Europe, from its first inception, must play fairly with England. Every Pan-European must be clear as to one fact: that European federalism has no point directed against England, but, on the contrary, aims, jointly with England, to be a mainstay of world peace and a step toward world organization.

Today, and as far ahead as we can see, England's policy cannot be other than pacific. For the British World Empire is surfeited; it will require decades in which to digest all that it has swallowed. In any future war England might lose everything, while it could gain nothing of importance.

Europe, too, is in urgent need of peace. Whereas Russia and Japan might gain a great deal by a victorious war (Constantinople, an ice-free port, India, China, the Philippines, Australia), Europe stands to lose everything by a

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war; and even if it were to win, it could gain nothing of importance.

Thus England and Europe are met in a policy of peace. So soon as real and ideal guarantees are given that the Pan-European Federation is in no sense directed against England, and that its aims are pacific, then its promotion will become a matter of great interest to British policy. Otherwise England would be bound to exert itself in every way to prevent its realization.

For one of the most unchanging aims of British policy for centuries past has been the frustration of any continental coalition led by a single Great Power. To the accomplishment of that purpose were due her successive struggles against Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon I, Nicholas I, and William II. For any union of the continent under the leadership of a warlike ruler or nation signifies a permanent threat to England. Also today England could not but remain faithful to her traditional policy and oppose any hegemony in Europe.

The situation is different in the case of Pan-Europe. The Pan-European Federation would bear an offensive character no more than the Pan-American; its structure would be democratic and opposed to any hegemony; its aim pacific. For England this configuration would signify the benefits of a lasting European peace, which in no other way can be secured. To England it would be an

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immense advantage, since that country could not remain neutral in a future war, even if waged between European Great Powers. Moreover, it is in the interest of England that the economic system of Europe should be stabilized, and that in Europe she should have a substantial and reliable customer.

England, furthermore, is interested in preventing an advance of the Russian World Power toward the North Sea.

But if Pan-Europe is not realized, then a Russo-German alliance becomes a mere question of time. Then Russia would directly threaten, not only India, but also the British Isles. But it is a matter of vital importance to England's future that the coasts of the North Sea shall be in the hands of a friendly Power; hence she must needs prefer the Pan-European to a Russian vicinage.

None of these positive arguments carries any weight, however, unless Pan-Europe guarantees England's security. For since the invention of the aeroplane and the submarine England's situation has become very difficult; her insular position, formerly an advantage, has now become a disadvantage. Any considerable fleet of submarines could starve England out, while the English Channel no longer forms an obstacle to the destruction of London by bombs dropped from the air. Thus theoretically, not only France, but Belgium or

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Holland as well, would be in a position to destroy London or starve England.

Consequently, Great Britain must alter the trend of its entire policy. By military means England can no longer guard herself against an attack from Europe; but she *can* do so by political means. The only policy that would insure England's security is the creation of a friendly and peaceful European state-system, forming a neutral zone—a buffer-state on a big scale, as it were—against Russia, and thereby preventing the latter's advance toward British waters.

The relation borne by Pan-Europe to England is not reciprocal. While Pan-Europe could threaten England's very existence, England would not be able to strike a mortal blow at Europe. The starvation of Europe by means of a blockade would be impossible; for so long as Europe is at peace with Russia, it can obtain foodstuffs from that country. But even supposing that Russia joined in the blockade, Europe could maintain its communications with the great storehouse of raw materials, Africa, above or below the Straits of Gibraltar, through a tunnel or by means of submarines.

Nevertheless, Europe also has a paramount interest in preserving England's friendship and in obtaining her consent to a European consolida-

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tion. For England, in virtue of the dominating influence she exercises upon many European states (Portugal, Norway, Greece, etc.), might render the creation of Pan-Europe very difficult. Moreover, Europe, in spite of its surplus population, possesses no colonies for settlement; while England, on the other hand, is surfeited with such possessions. Hence it is an advantage to both for a part of the European stream of emigrants to be diverted to Australia, Canada, and South Africa. A closing of these territories to Europeans would be a severe blow to the Continent. Conversely, it is an advantage to Great Britain for the population of its dominions to undergo a rapid increase, so that the latter, in the event of war, might be able to defend themselves unaided, since protection by the fleet, for technical reasons, has lost its former importance.

Now there are three centers of over-population: Pan-Europe, Eastern Asia, and India. Since England's excess population is not sufficient to meet the immigrational requirements of her own colonies, her national interests demand that her sparsely inhabited territories should be peopled with Europeans rather than with Indians, Japanese, or Chinese; for a German, a Pole, or an Italian can, within a generation or two, become an Anglo-Australian—but never so a Chinaman.

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The interests of England and Pan-Europe are complementary in so many respects that war or mere rivalry between them would be disastrous to both. Hence it is necessary that hereafter they should share between them the cultural mission of Europe. While the British World Empire has assumed the extensive mission of Europeanizing the world through conquests, Pan-Europe will have to assume the intensive mission of bringing European culture to its highest development through the coöperation of all its nations.

3. British-European Entente

England's consent to the consolidation of Europe is to be obtained only by a security pact guaranteeing England's protection against a Pan-European attack.

The main points of such a pact would be the following:

(1) A compulsory arbitration treaty between Pan-Europe and Great Britain.

(2) Disarming of the European submarine fleets.

(3) An economic most-favored-nation system between Pan-Europe and the British Isles; a possible customs union which might also embrace British Africa (South Africa and Egypt).

(4) Colonial readjustment in Africa by an ex-

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change of England's West African colonies for
equally valuable East African colonies belonging
to Europe.

(5) England would assume the protection of
Europe's Asiatic colonies (French and Dutch In-
dies) against attack from any outside quarter.
In return, Europe would bind itself to ward off
any outside attack upon the English mother-
country (say, a Russian air attack on London).

(6) The British dominions would undertake to
accord the same rights to European as to English
immigrants.

As a seventh point in the pact, it might be laid
down that during the first years of the Pan-
European Federation the office of Arbitrator in all
conflicts that might arise among the constituent
members should be entrusted to England.

Such a pact would be of vast benefit to both
sides. Without encroaching upon the independ-
ence of either World Empire, it might enhance the
security of each, obviate a war between England
and Europe, and pave the way toward interna-
tional coöperation in the service of World Peace.
England would be spared the nightmare of an in-
vasion, and Europe might leave its colonial fron-
tier on the side of British Africa undefended.

Such a pact would be more favorable than an al-
liance, in that it would enable Europe to remain
neutral in a future war about India and the Pacific

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Ocean, while England, on the other hand, might remain neutral in a Russo-European war.

Later on such a pact might also be extended, with suitable modifications, to America, East Asia, and Russia, thereby insuring world peace for a very long time to come.

IV. THE UNITED STATES OF SOVIET RUSSIA AND PAN- EUROPE

"A race is commencing between Russia and Europe, as to which shall first recover from its breakdown."

1. Hellas as a Warning

In many ways the political condition of modern Europe resembles that of ancient Hellas. The latter's Dorian, Ionian, and Æolian tribes peopled the southern portion of the Balkan peninsula, organized numerous sovereign states and state-groups, each jealously guarding its own independence, and all full of distrust and ill-will toward one another.

Politically separate, they yet felt themselves to be members of a cultural community and, as such, superior to all other nations. A common religion held them together, as well as a common historico-mythical tradition, a common national epic, the Olympic Games, Amphyctionics, and Mysteries.

This highly gifted people was stricken with political blindness. Instead of uniting, its three Great Powers—Sparta, Athens, Thebes—vied with

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one another for ascendancy both in war and in peace. The great Persian Wars led to a temporary understanding; but as soon as the Persian peril was over, the former rivalry began again.

The climax of that struggle is represented by the Peloponnesian War, the decisive struggle between Sparta and Athens for hegemony in Greece. That war, in which all the Greek states participated, and which on both sides was waged with unexampled bitterness and cruelty, shattered Greek culture and ruined Greek prosperity. Thus in every respect it was a forerunner of the World War.

After the defeat, humiliation, and disarmament of their hereditary Athenian enemies, the victorious Spartans were not long to enjoy their dearly purchased hegemony; soon Athens was freed by Thrasybulos, while the hegemony of Greece, thanks to the politico-military genius of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, fell into the hands of Thebes. The political situation in ancient Greece in the period between the Peloponnesian and the Macedonian Wars provides an amazingly close parallel to the present-day situation in Europe.

But the ascendancy of Thebes was also short-lived. For while the Greek cities were contending among themselves for supremacy, a new barbarian Great Power was organizing itself to the north of Greece: Macedonia. The danger of a

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Macedonian invasion seemed at that time to the Greeks no less absurd than the danger of a Russian invasion seems today to most Europeans.

King Philip, at the commencement of whose reign Macedonia was in a condition of chaos, had adopted Greek culture and Hellenized his people. At the same time, by political and military thrusts he menaced Greek independence.

At the eleventh hour, the Macedonian peril called to life the Pan-Hellenic movement. A number of the Greeks, aroused and led by Demosthenes, saw the impending danger and the only means of averting it: federation. But not even the eloquence of Demosthenes availed to help Pan-Hellenism in its endeavor to overcome the local city-state nationalism. Thus Pan-Hellenism was wrecked by the petty short-sightedness of the Greeks themselves.

Not only Philip's agents, such as Æschines, opposed the Pan-Hellenists, but even the wise and noble Phocion, who started from the conviction that in its condition of decadence and disruption Hellas was ripe for political destruction and could be regenerated only by an invasion.

That doom was soon to come. First Philip forced his own admission into the Amphyctionic League, and this gave him the desired pretext for marching into Greece.

In the last moment of supreme peril Demos-

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thenes succeeded in concluding an alliance between the hostile sister-republics of Thebes and Athens. But it was already too late. Philip won the day at Chæronea and forever destroyed the freedom of Greece. Thebes was leveled to the ground, Athens was overthrown, while Sparta sank to the level of an insignificant village.

World History had passed over Hellas, because she had not heeded the call of the times.

2. The Russian Menace

Russia is Europe's Macedonia. While Europe is split up into twenty-six states, and an even greater number of sovereignties, Russia forms a single political complex with an area four-and-a-half times greater than Pan-Europe and a population twice as large as that of the most populous European state.

Aside from the short frontier against Turkey, Russia is Pan-Europe's only neighbor by land. In a military way no European state would be a match for an organized and industrialized Russia. Thus merely by its presence Russia exerts a continuous pressure upon the states of Europe—a pressure, moreover, which will steadily increase, since the growth of Europe's population cannot keep pace with that of Russia.

There is only one means of overcoming the dan-

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ger of a Russian invasion ; and that is—European consolidation.

History gives Europe the following alternative: either to overcome all national hostilities and consolidate in a federal union, or sooner or later to succumb to a Russian conquest. There is no third possibility.

Since Peter the Great, Russia has been pressing forward to the West. The Baltic states, Poland, and Finland, mark the successive stages of that advance, which did not come to a halt until the central European monarchies, Prussia and Austria, had been reached. Prussia and Austria served as a dam protecting Europe from the Russian flood. In the Russo-Turkish War Russia attempted to pass around this dam to the South. The Peace of St. Stephano which, indirectly, pushed the Russian frontiers forward to the Ægean Sea, constitutes the high-water mark of the Russian advance to the West. For at that moment Europe suddenly recognized the Russian peril; it realized that the Turkish danger had passed, and that the Russian danger had taken its place. Unanimously, therefore, Europe sided with Turkey against Russia and, at the Congress of Berlin, put an end to the Russian conquest.

Since that time Russia has recognized that her westward advance cannot succeed so long as the Central Powers remain in existence, and she has

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allied herself with their opponents in France, in the Balkans, and in Austria.

The World War ended with the destruction of the Central Powers. The European bulwark against Russia collapsed. In the place of military monarchies we find in Central Europe today half a dozen middle-sized and small states and one large disarmed state. None of these states is in the long run strong enough to ward off the Russian pressure. Poland and Rumania are too weak to be able to assume in the twentieth century the part which was played by Prussia and Austria in the nineteenth century—the part of the defender of Europe's frontiers against Russia.

The moment Russia recovers from her internal disruption, not Poland, nor Rumania, nor Czechoslovakia, will be able to stem her onrush toward the West; and still less will the disarmed states of Hungary, Austria, and Germany be able to do so. Thus the road to the Rhine, the Alps, and the Adriatic lies open to the Russian World Power. But it is clear that this frontier would be a mere stepping-stone, and that, following an armistice, Russia would conquer Western Europe as she had conquered Central Europe. Then the fate of Greece would have repeated itself in the case of Europe.

The imminence of the danger threatening Europe is indicated by the fact that twice in the

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last ten years Russia has attempted to seize the hegemony of Europe: the first time through the World War; the second time through the World Revolution. If in 1915 Nicolai Nicolaievitch had conquered Berlin and Vienna, he would have dictated the peace, and Europe would have lain at his feet. The Czech and the Southern-Slav empires would have become Russian vassal-states, and half of Europe would have become a Russian sphere of influence.

If in 1919 Liebknecht had triumphed in Germany, that country would have joined the Moscow League of Peoples, whereupon Italy and the Balkan countries, as well as Hungary, would have followed suit, and Lenin would have become the master of Europe.

Between 1915 and 1919 everything in Russia changed—save only her craving for expansion. It is bound up with no one party or personality. To that political trend the Peace-Czar Nicholas, the Socialist leader Kerensky, and the Bolshevik leaders who seized the reins of government under the banner of radical pacifism, were all obliged to yield. Czarist imperialism made use of Pan-Slav propaganda; Bolshevik imperialism relies upon the Third Internationale in the West, and upon Pan-Islamic nationalism in the East.

Just as Nicholas' Imperial Army was once larger than any other European army, so Trot-

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sky's Red Army today surpasses that of any other European state.

Russia makes no secret of her aggressive intentions. Her leaders acknowledge as their supreme aim the break-up of the European democracies and the adhesion of all the peoples to the Moscow League of Peoples. They scorn the pacific methods of the Second Internationale, and preach red militarism.

Bolshevism bears to Socialism the same relation that Islam bears to Christianity; it fights with propaganda in the one hand and with a sword in the other; it resorts to violence, terrorism, and militarism. Thus it is the masculine form, while Social Democracy is the feminine form, of Marxism.

Europe should fully realize that today, given the close relations that exist between the Union of Soviet Republics and the Third Internationale, any peace between democratic and soviet states is regarded by the soviets as but an armistice, a breathing-space permitting them to recover their strength and prepare for the next attack; for the unalterable goal of the communist leaders remains the communist World Revolution. Only in regard to the way of realizing it are there any differences of opinion among the statesmen of Russia—not in regard to the goal itself.

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Europe owes its independence solely to the accident that the Russian army collapsed a year before the German. The disruption of the Russian industries and railways has stayed the westward march of conquering Russia and even pressed that Power back to the East.

A race is commencing between Russia and Europe, as to which shall first recover from its breakdown. Europe, whose machinery supplies and railway systems are almost intact, has a head-start; Russia, on the other hand, has the advantage of political and economic unity, while Europe is split up into two dozen economic spheres and an even greater number of sovereignties. If Russia, thanks to a few good harvests, succeeds in recovering economically before Europe has achieved its consolidation, then Europe's fate is sealed. In that event the future form of Russia's political organization matters little. As soon as Russia is given an opportunity to bring Europe under its sway, it will seize that opportunity,—whether its régime be Red or White.

Red Russia's imperialistic tendencies are evident enough; but it is not less certain that, should there be a change of system in Russia, the Napoleon of the East would try to compensate his people with glory and triumphs for the rights of which he would deprive them—to balance the loss of inter-

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nal power by an accession of external power. This recipe is not new and it has generally succeeded.

3. A European Security Pact

The unanimous aim of all Europeans, regardless of party or nation, should be the prevention of a Russian invasion. For the victory of a Red Russia would mean not only the destruction of the European middle-class, but also—as the action against the social-revolutionary leaders has shown—the destruction of European social democracy.

The victory of a White Russia would be of no benefit to any party or to any class; upon the European nations would be visited the fate which Russian Poland had to suffer for an entire century. Not merely Socialism, but Liberalism as well, would be trodden underfoot, and Europe be thrown back, in a politico-cultural sense, to the age of Philip II.

Since no one can foretell in what way Russia may in the future develop, it is short-sighted and irresponsible to dally, on opportunist grounds, with the hope of a Russian victory; for it might happen that those who summon the Russian Bela Kun will suddenly find themselves face to face with a Russian Horthy, who will answer their call only the more thoroughly to crush them.

The only wise thing for Europe to do is to pur-

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sue a peaceful policy toward Russia, but at the same time to be insured against any eventuality. This insurance, to be effective, requires a solidary guarantee by all the states of Europe respecting the Russo-European frontier—a Pan-European defensive pact against the Russian menace.

Such a security pact, mentioned already at the Genoa Conference, might permanently insure Europe's safety against Russia. For if Russia knows that, were she to attack Poland or Rumania, she must inevitably encounter the armed forces of France and Italy, Germany and Spain, she will be more likely to think twice before venturing to attack, than she will be if she is able to depend upon Germany's benevolent neutrality; while for the protection of Poland only the Little Entente and France need be considered.

This European security pact would be an act both of statesmanship and of justice; for any Russian attack upon Warsaw, Lemberg, or Bucharest is indirectly aimed no less at Berlin, Vienna, and Paris. Germany and Italy would be defending, on the Dniester, not so much foreign as their own frontiers.

It is an unfair and impossible thing for Europe to demand, that Poland and Rumania, single-handed, should undertake to protect Europe against an empire thirty times larger than both of them combined. Should Russia increase her

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armaments, it would be impossible for these two countries to keep pace with her. Inevitably those armaments would utterly ruin the economic life of Poland and Rumania, until one day they would find themselves at the end of their resources and be compelled to surrender unconditionally to Russia. It is for Europe to forestall such a development and, by its own efforts, to defend its only frontier not formed by the sea—instead of leaving that defence to two relatively weak states.

A Pan-European security-pact guaranteeing the protection of the European land frontiers would insure lasting peace between Europe and Russia and lay down the foundation for a cordial understanding between the United States of Europe and the United States of Soviet Russia.

If Texas, New Mexico, and California were isolated states, there would exist for them a constant Mexican danger; but as states of the American federal union they are secure against any such danger. Similarly the Russian danger for Rumania, Poland, and Finland would disappear as soon as they became members of the United States of Europe, for the mere fact of their isolation constitutes a constant temptation for Russia and poisons Russo-European relations.

The second condition for an effective defence of the eastern frontier is European solidarity. The everlasting family-quarrels among the European

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states weaken their power of defence against Russia. Any European war would offer Russia a welcome opportunity for intervention; and once the Russian armies have secured a footing in Europe, they will scarcely relinquish it of their own free will. Russian interference in European affairs can be prevented only by the conclusion of a compulsory treaty of arbitration among all the states of Europe.

The third danger confronting Europe lies in the pro-Russian orientation of some of its states, notably Germany. A large number of Germans hope some day, through an alliance with Russia, to tear up the Treaty of Versailles and once more to partition Poland.

This pro-Russian orientation of Germany constitutes one of the gravest dangers to the future of Europe. For the adhesion of Germany to the Russian state-group would make the Rhine the river-frontier of Europe, and the rest of the European World Power would be no more than a torso, dependent upon Anglo-Saxon protection; and the Pan-European idea would be submerged forever.

The cause of this German leaning toward Russia is to be found in French pressure. The Russo-German entente will grow stronger or weaker in direct proportion to the Franco-German tension. The more Germany despairs of agreement and co-operation with France, the more certainly she must

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throw herself into the arms of Russia, if only to guard against future isolation.

It therefore depends on the Western Powers, above all, on France, whether Germany is to be saved for, or estranged from, Europe.

One thing is certain: that in the Franco-German conflict neither Germany nor France, but Russia, will in the long run be victorious. Even today France might still preserve the German sister-republic for the family of European states; tomorrow it may already be too late. And yet, upon this question hinges the future of Europe.

A less immediate danger from a forcible separation of eastern Europe lies in Pan-Slavism. The latter would become serious only in case of a sudden change in Russian internal policy. At such a moment not only would the Pan-Slav memories of the Southern and Western Slavs be revived, but Hungary and Bulgaria would also try to recover their lost territories by means of an alliance with the Russian reaction. In that event Russia's power would extend as far as the Adriatic Sea.

Only a timely creation of the Pan-European Federation can avert all these dangers. The historical moment is more favorable now than it ever has been before. Every month the situation may grow worse: it is more than doubtful whether after a victory of the Russian reaction a Pan-European Federation would still be possible.

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4. Agreement and Disarmament

Russia not only constitutes for Europe a military threat, but in an economic way she is also Europe's complement. While Europe, next to North America, is the greatest industrial region in the world, Russia is mainly an agrarian country. Russia's young industry was ruined by the Revolution, except insofar as it was situated in the border provinces and seceded with the latter from Russia.

Russia requires industrial products—in particular, transport materials and agricultural machinery—while Europe requires grain.

Russia needs Europe for its reconstruction—and Europe needs Russia. That is why a far-reaching entente between these two political complexes is needed, one which must not be allowed to break up over petty misgivings. Settled hostility between Europe and Russia would be harmful to both, and beneficial only to American industry. For along with the stabilization of economic conditions in Russia there commences a race between American, British, Japanese, and European industries for that great market of the future. In this race European policy must not hang as a millstone around the neck of European economy. For Europe is more dependent on the exchange of goods with Russia than are the Brit-

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ish and American World Empires, which themselves produce a surplus of grain. On the other hand, Europe and Russia have a common frontier, with the result that Europe is the predestined purveyor of goods to Russia, unless political misgivings stand in the way of these reciprocal economic needs.

Europe itself can be rescued from the economic catastrophe into which it was plunged by the World War only by an economic understanding with Russia and by active participation in Russian reconstruction.

Russia and Europe need each other in order that each, through the other, may regain its health and vigor. For both, for at least ten years, economic questions must take precedence over political questions; policy must be dictated by economy.

But if Europe is desirous of entering into successful competition with the great English and American industrial regions, it must act as an economic unit with respect to Russia; for so long as it is internally divided by customs barriers it cannot sustain a competition with those empires. Its economic no less than its political relations with Russia require its consolidation.

When the great peace conference between Russia and Europe is held, the interests of Europe will demand an undivided front. The pitiful spectacle of Genoa, so thoroughly shameful to Europe, must

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not repeat itself. The one party to the treaty must be Europe, the other Russia. In that way an honest agreement will be achieved more readily than if every European state conducts separate negotiations with Russia in order to steal a march on its neighbor.

Moreover, Europe must scrupulously adopt the principle of non-interference in the private affairs of Russia, and at the same time watch carefully Russia's internal development.

So long as Russia is organized on a soviet (or absolutist) basis, it will be better for Russo-European peace if these two federations remain separate. For a coming together would only lead to everlasting conflicts; the Russian communists would endeavor to overthrow the democratic system in Europe, and vice versa.

Should Russia become democratic, a new situation would result. The question of Russia's joining the European federation would then have another meaning. But it is doubtful whether Russia would want to join, for it would then become ever more conscious of its intermediate position between Europe and Asia. The Eurasian movement is gaining ground in Russia. Russia no longer looks upon itself as a state, but as a continent possessing a culture of its own, between Europe and Asia, bearing reciprocal relations to both but dependent upon neither.

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The future understanding between Russia and Europe will depend also upon the attitude of England toward Europe; for in no case can Pan-Europe allow itself to be drawn into the future Asiatic war between Russia and England. It must try to prevent this war; and if this proves impossible, it must endeavor to localize the war in Asia and itself remain neutral.

The question of European and of world disarmament is closely bound up with the Russian question. Until Europe and Russia conclude a lasting peace, neither Russia, nor Poland, nor Rumania can disarm; but France, too, cannot disarm, as its eastern allies are too weak to defend themselves alone in the event of war. Conversely, so long as the states of Europe maintain armies against one another, Russia cannot disarm, since it can never be assured that some day the European armies will not unite in order jointly to direct a blow at constituted Russia.

Thus the question of disarmament resolves itself into a vicious circle; a way out of it can be found only if the European states, by the conclusion of a compulsory arbitration treaty, render an inter-European war impossible and, next, invite the other military Powers, Russia, Japan, and China, to a Land Disarmament Conference analogous to the Naval Disarmament Conference held at Washington.

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Since Pan-Europe has twice as many inhabitants as Russia, it can always, if united, raise twice as large an army. Moreover, thanks to its more highly developed industries it has a military advantage over Russia which cannot be overrated; for in the future the technical development of a country will be more important to it for the purposes of war than the number and bravery of its troops.

If Russia's sole politico-military advantage over Europe—namely, the latter's disruption—be removed, Russia will realize the hopelessness of a war and will be ready to disarm; and the same applies to Japan and China if the only menace to them by land, that from the side of Russia, be removed. Then nothing will stand in the way of universal disarmament by land, since such a course would be encouraged by England and America in every possible way.

Either the universal militia system could then be introduced or universal compulsory service could be completely abolished. The moral and economic progress achieved thereby would be inestimable.

A new and better age might dawn.

V. EUROPE AND AMERICA

"For Europe, Pan-America signifies either a great danger or a great hope."

1. The United States of America and the Disunited States of Europe

While the forty-eight republics of North America are joined together in a political and economic union, the twenty-seven states of Europe boast of their political and economic sovereignty and systematically ruin one another by their policy in both peace and in war.

A comparison drawn between American state organization and European state anarchy leads to the following result:

The United States of America is the richest, most powerful, and most advanced country in the world. Its citizens are exempt from military service. No war has been waged upon its soil for more than fifty years. Its industry and agriculture are flourishing; its material and spiritual culture is growing year by year.

Meanwhile, disunited Europe is impoverished and burdened with debt; in consequence of its intestine quarrels it is stripped of power in world

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politics. Thriving provinces have been devastated by war. A recovery of its economic position is impossible so long as armaments devour its revenues and compulsory military service consumes a large part of its productive energies. Every country is living in perpetual fear of war. National hatreds and national envies render coöperation impossible. The general monetary chaos places a premium upon profiteering and speculation, while the fruits of honest toil are lost in the universal impoverishment. Industry, commerce, and transportation are throttled by senseless customs barriers which split Europe into economic fragments. Meanwhile its moral and material culture is declining from month to month.

To its unity America owes its unexampled rise; to its disunion Europe owes its unexampled decline.

And yet it lies within the power of Europe to attain to a position not less favorable than that of the United States; for it is peopled by the same races, it has approximately the same climate, and it is governed according to the same democratic principles.

True, the United States of America has an area twice as large as democratic continental Europe and much greater natural resources; on the other hand, Pan-Europe, with a population three times as large as that of North America, has at its dis-

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posal vastly greater labor forces as well as colonies sixty times as large as those of America (the Philippines).

Considering, then, that the outward circumstances are even more favorable to Pan-Europe than to the United States, the cause of Europe's decline lies mainly in the fact that North America is organized, while Europe is disorganized. The North American states are carrying on their struggle for existence in coöperation with, the European states in opposition to, one another.

The disparity between the development of North America and that of Europe is growing; America's prosperity is increasing, while Europe's is decreasing. Unless that tendency be reversed in time by Europe's consolidation, all that is still sound and vital in Europe will abandon that impoverished, menaced, decaying, and pusillanimous continent, in order to settle in other and more hopeful regions of the earth—above all, in America.

In the world-markets Europe will be unable to compete with America. For European industry is bound to grow more expensive as the result of the intermediate duties which violently and irrationally separate materials from factories, ores from coal mines, agricultural lands from industrial centers; moreover, it must grow yet dearer owing to the enormous taxes which Europe will have to

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levy in order to pay for the burdens of past wars and the armaments of future wars. America, on the other hand, has this advantage, that in its immense industrial regions production can be cheapened by a more rational division of labor and by large-scale manufacturing. In America, for instance, there will be a distinct factory for every type of machine, capable of supplying the entire region with that particular type, and thereby cheapening it to the utmost; while in the economic part-regions of nationalist Europe such a division of labor would be impossible. That is why, for instance, no European automobile factory can compete with the Ford works.

This inability of Europe to compete will make itself felt, above all, in the industrialization of China and the reconstruction of Russia, the two great future tasks of world industry. But if Europe succumbs in this competitive struggle, its ruin will be complete and final.

There is but one way to avert that ruin: the economic federation of Europe's continental democracies, the coöperation of that Pan-European customs union with Russia, and disarmament throughout the continent.

All this, however, is possible only on the basis of a political union of the European states, which would put the compulsory Court of Arbitration in

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the place of war and jointly guarantee all common frontiers.

This is the only road to salvation, alike for European statesmanship and European industry; if Europe refuses to follow that road, its states must perish, exactly as retail merchants perish who would venture to compete against trusts.

The road to salvation which we have indicated is in the interest of all Europeans—of laborers and peasants, of manufacturers and merchants. All its peoples and classes will profit by Europe's economic prosperity; all will suffer by its economic decline. The abolition of the inter-European customs barriers will lead, after severe crises, to the economic regeneration of the continent. For only the "United States of Europe" could in the future maintain its economic independence with respect to the United States of America.

2. Pan-America

The economic model for Pan-Europe is provided by the United States of America; the political model for Pan-Europe's development, by the Pan-American Union.

For the conditions precedent to the rise of the United States were totally different from the Pan-European conditions. In North America there is

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but one language, one mixed people, one common constitution, one national sentiment. Since its origin the United States has been a political and economic unity, if we except the time of the Civil War. Europe, on the other hand, as to both peoples and languages is historically, economically, and nationally diverse. The sense of diversity is stronger than the sense of community; hatred is stronger than solidarity. Hence it is not enough to set up European unity as the goal; it is also necessary to find the way to it.

In this undertaking the experiences gathered by the republics of the entire American continent, in the course of their efforts to organize themselves into a Pan-American commonwealth, are of the greatest importance.

Although Pan-Americanism is as yet but in process of development, still it has an immense start over Pan-Europeanism; and hence it is in a position to serve in many ways as its instructor. In both cases it is a question of organizing a continent into a world-political community; in both cases it is a question of welding together sovereign states which differ widely as to their history, language, industry, culture, and temperament, and welding them into a regional league of states, without aggressive or imperialistic tendencies, in the service of peace and of progress.

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From this parallel emerges the significance of the Pan-American movement, and of the history of its development,* for Pan-Europe.

The Pan-American idea—which means the sense of solidarity felt by the New World as opposed to the Old World—found its earliest political expression in the Monroe Doctrine. A hundred years ago, on December 2, 1823, James Monroe, then President of the United States, facing the threat to young Pan-American freedom from the Holy Alliance, published the declaration that the United States would tolerate no European interference in the political development of America.

Shortly afterwards the liberator of South America, Simon Bolivar, summoned a Pan-American Congress to Panama, in order to secure to the liberated continent a permanent peace based upon justice and solidarity. The Panama Congress met in 1826. The United States was represented by its Secretary of State, Henry Clay, who, quite apart from the work of Bolivar, was the protagonist of the Pan-American idea in his own country.

The practical results of the Panama Congress were insignificant. Yet the idea of a Pan-American Union had been born, and it was destined to exert a decisive influence upon the future.

* The data that follow are taken from Alfred H. Fried's excellent work "Pan-America" (published by Orell Füssli, Zürich).

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The first attempts at union were confined to Latin America; they found expression in the Congresses held at Lima in 1847 and again in 1864.

The rebirth of Pan-Americanism took place in the year 1881, when the United States Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, addressed to every state of the continent the invitation to a Pan-American Conference. On this occasion Blaine expressly declared that the United States wished to negotiate with its Latin sister-republics upon a footing of complete equality, and that the conference was pursuing pacific aims; both promises have been conscientiously kept by the United States of America.

Blaine's invitation was enthusiastically accepted by all the states of America. In 1889, after the fall of the last American monarchy in Brazil, the projected conference assembled in Washington.

Blaine, the great protagonist of Pan-Americanism, was elected President of the Conference, the official languages of which were English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French. Sixteen committees were constituted, among which the following are worthy of particular note; the committee for uniform customs regulations, for railway communications, for organized sanitation, for a monetary union, for a banking system, for international civil law, and for general welfare.

The most important outcome of the First Pan-

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American Conference was the adoption of a resolution to set up a general Pan-American Court of Arbitration. Moreover, the construction of an inter-continental railroad was agreed upon, tariffs were to be substantially eased, and an International Bureau of American Republics was to be established at Washington.

At first this International Bureau was intended merely to gather and disseminate to all the participating states commercial intelligence from all parts of America; but gradually it came to be the active center of the entire Pan-American movement.

Eleven years later, in 1901, the Second Pan-American Conference met in Mexico City. Meanwhile the Pan-American movement had gained in importance, and Pan-American sentiment had become intensified. With the single exception of Mexico, Pan-America had solidly given its adhesion to the Hague Convention.

The Second Pan-American Conference carried the efforts of the first a stage further. It gave more definite shape to the organization and functions of the International Bureau, accorded to it the privilege of corresponding with all American governments through their diplomatic representatives at Washington, and entrusted to it the care of the archives of the Pan-American Conferences.

At the head of the International Bureau was

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placed an administrative council, composed of the representatives at Washington of all the American republics, under the presidency of the United States Secretary of State. This council was to meet each month.

It was further resolved that the Pan-American Conferences should become a standing institution of American political life, and should meet regularly at intervals of five years. (In that periodicity the World War caused an interruption; the Fifth Pan-American Conference was postponed from 1915 to 1923.)

The Third Pan-American Conference met in 1906 at Rio de Janeiro. It gave increased definition to the system of inter-American arbitration, as well as to inter-American law. In addition it resolved to facilitate naturalization and enlarged the scope of the International Bureau, which was given the form of a permanent committee for the conduct of these periodical conferences. With a view to strengthening the central body at Washington, it was resolved to create Pan-American committees in all the republics represented.

The Fourth Pan-American Conference met in 1910 at Buenos Aires. This conference, too, furthered the cause of arbitration, of inter-American trade, of the mutual protection of intellectual property, science and education; a far-reaching plan was drawn up for the exchange of

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professors and students. The International Bureau was enlarged and given the official title: "Pan-American Union."

One of the foremost promoters of the Pan-American movement was Andrew Carnegie, who placed his wealth at the service of this great idea and contributed very largely to the development and success of Pan-Americanism.

These Pan-American Conferences, of which the Fifth is sitting at this writing at Santiago de Chile, are to be regarded as stages on the road to Pan-American unification. But outside of these conferences, too, Pan-Americanism has proved its worth: in settling the conflict between the United States and Mexico in 1914, as also in the pacification of Central America, whose five republics, after endless struggles, were reconciled by the peaceful intervention of their neighbors and are now on the way to constituting themselves the "United States of Central America."

These practical successes of the Pan-American movement are supplemented by the ideal values which it releases. Under its influence a Pan-American consciousness, a Pan-American sense of solidarity, a Pan-American public opinion, have been formed.

•These practical and ideal tendencies are directed toward a closer political, economic, and cultural consolidation of the American continent in relation

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to Europe and Asia—that is to say, to a Pan-American League of Nations.

The question of this American League of Nations which is to be erected on the foundation of the Monroe Doctrine, being thereby distinguished from the Geneva League of Nations, figures at this moment among the agenda of the Fifth Pan-American Conference being held at Santiago; and if, as is to be presumed, it does not come into existence now, it will be created at one of the next conferences. Europe must not be blind to the fact that beyond the Atlantic Ocean the states of the New World are grouping themselves into one of the most powerful federal organizations on earth, and it must adopt its own attitude toward this historical event.

3. Pan-America and Pan-Europe

For Europe, Pan-America signifies either a great danger or a great hope: a danger in the event that Europe remains divided into petty states while a continent is organizing itself across the Atlantic; a hope in the event that Europe takes a lesson from her more modern daughter and supplements the Pan-American by a Pan-European movement.

Every European politician who has the future welfare of his continent in mind should thoroughly

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study the history of the Pan-American movement and determine its consequences as they affect Europe.

An uncritical transplantation of American institutions in Europe is impossible owing to the difference in the development of and conditions obtaining in the two continents; but it is necessary thoroughly to examine what has proved good and useful in America and then to put it to the test in Europe, insofar as European conditions will allow.

Pan-Americanism has a tremendous head-start on Pan-Europeanism. While a century has passed since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine and the calling of the Panama Congress, and an entire new generation has risen since the first Pan-American Conference, the Pan-European movement has not yet begun.* Every day America will leave Europe farther behind, unless its statesmen at last can rouse themselves to set by the side of the Fifth Pan-American Conference the First Pan-European Conference.

The statesman who should be instrumental in inviting the European Powers to that conference, as Bolivar and Blaine invited the American Powers, would merit the undying gratitude of his country, of Europe, and of the world. His act

* It began with the appearance of this book.

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would waken a movement which is slumbering in all the peoples and classes of Europe, and which, once started, would never stop until Europe had been united and saved. Even a failure of the first conference would not strangle the movement; for soon a second and a third conference would meet and each would compel the execution of the temporarily broken plans of its predecessor.

A second requirement for the realization of Pan-Europe is the establishment of a Pan-European Bureau analogous to the Pan-American Bureau at Washington. This central office of the Pan-European movement might be located in Switzerland, in Vienna, or in Paris. Mr. A. H. Fried, in his work entitled "The Pan-American Union," asserts that in the year 1914 the existence of a Pan-European Bureau would unquestionably have prevented the outbreak of the World War—which is very likely true.

The Pan-European movement, which can draw upon the experiences gathered during many years by the Pan-American movement, must resemble the latter also in its aims: in the struggle against war, in the promotion of industry and culture, in the resolute rejection of all aggressive aims, and in the eradication of any sort of hegemony. Pan-Europe's constitution, too, must acknowledge the principle that the small nations of Europe have

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the same rights as the large, just as the United States enjoys, within Pan-America, precisely equal rights with Uruguay or Paraguay.

If Pan-Europe sets out from pacifist and democratic principles the same as those of Pan-America, in the future there will be, not rivalry, but solidarity, between these two sister unions. They will not threaten each other but complete each other, and will set their honor upon a mutual rivalry in the works of culture and peace.

The ocean separating these two continents eliminates all frontier rivalry, while the community of cultural assets insures their international friendship.

In this sense it would be desirable for Europe to decide betimes to withdraw voluntarily from American soil and to sell its American colonies—especially Guiana—to America. For these colonies might some day provoke a territorial conflict between the Old and New Worlds. A strict and consistent application of the Monroe Doctrine will some day make it a vital question of honor for the American people to tolerate no European colonies on their soil; and the possible consequences, to white humanity, of such a conflict between the two continents defy calculation.

Moreover, the sale of French Guiana to America, in cancellation of the war debt, might greatly

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simplify also the larger problem of world indebtedness. The colonial territories acquired by France as a result of the War would amply compensate her for the loss of that colony,* whose future, moreover, is by no means certain. On the other hand, the acquisition of Guiana would be an inestimable gain for the United States and the continuation of its traditional purchasing policy in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine (Florida, Alaska, Danish Antilles). France, having concentrated its colonial Empire in Africa and Asia, and being in no position successfully to defend its American possession, would gain, through its permanent release from debt, more than it would lose. But most essential to the peace policy of the future would be the removal of the last remaining land frontier between Europe and America, and their complete separation by the Atlantic Ocean.

The connecting link between Pan-Europe and Pan-America would be England. A Great Power on both continents, it could not belong to either without becoming the opponent of the other. Linked historically to Europe and nationally to North America, in both hemispheres it is destined to intercede in behalf of world peace, of the underlying principles of that democracy which it

* In compensation the French mandatory domains might be transformed into colonies.

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engendered, and of the future of the white race, whose protagonist it is in Asia, Africa, and Australia.

World-Britain, Pan-Europe, and Pan-America—all three of which are interested in the maintenance of world peace and of the territorial *status quo*, and are united by the same political principles as well as by a common culture and descent—would for a long time to come serve as the invincible guarantors of a peaceful development of world civilization.

But if the peoples of Europe are unable to unite, then this unhappy continent must become the center of international intrigues and the scene of international wars. The great World Powers will contend with one another for the inheritance of the wealthy colonies in Asia and Africa, and for predominance in Central and Western Europe. Thus also to its neighbors and heirs, Europe's ruin would bring no blessings, but only war and hatred.

VI. EUROPE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

"It is absurd to undertake to make an anarchic Europe the corner-stone of an international world-community."

1. Criticism of the League of Nations

The Geneva League of Nations represents President Wilson's attempt to expand the American type of political organization over the entire earth.

Europe accepted that proposal in the right perception that a continuance of international anarchy would inevitably lead to other wars, in which Europe itself would be the principal sufferer.

From the very beginning two tendencies were embodied in the idea of a League of Nations: that of world organization and that of European organization. This dilemma has brought it about that the League of Nations has become neither the world areopagus, nor the Pan-European Federation: from this internal disunion it will suffer so long as these two tendencies of organization remain clearly separate and distinct.

The ecumenical League of Nations conceived by President Wilson remains a utopia. Two World Powers reject the League of Nations: Russia and

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the United States. As regards political power, the League of Nations embraces scarcely half of mankind; its non-members are as strong as its members. Instead of an international parliament, the League of Nations has become a rump parliament. It has no title to function as representing mankind; for it represents merely a fortuitous collection of states which use it in the interest of schemes devised for their own aggrandizement. If the League of Nations should dare to tamper with the interests of any World Power among its members—say, in Indian or Korean affairs—that World Power would forthwith announce its withdrawal: and no one could prevent it from doing so. For the League has at its disposal neither the physical weapon of an international army nor the moral weapon of fair-minded justice. Thus far its judgments have been not verdicts but compromises. In Upper Silesia, Vilna, and Eastern Galicia the defenceless League of Nations has capitulated before Polish arms.

Thus the Geneva League of Nations has gravely compromised itself; it has become, on the one hand, an impotent wielder of power, and, on the other, an unjust dispenser of justice. It represents no world authority, either political or moral.

And yet the idea underlying it is a long step forward in human progress and must be welcomed by every sincere pacifist as the first timid and im-

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perfect attempt to set international organization in the place of international anarchy. Its defects reside, not in its spirit, but in its organization.

The Geneva League of Nations is inorganic; instead of organically grouping the peoples and states of the world according to their economic, cultural, and geographical affinities, it joins together mechanically, like bricks, large and small states, Asiatic and European, neighboring and distant, without regard to geography, history, culture, or economics. In it Switzerland is not closer to its neighbor republic of Austria than it is to Siam or Peru.

This inorganic grouping within the League of Nations, running counter, as it does, to the Monroe continental doctrine, has led to the estrangement of the United States. And Russia, for the very same reasons, will think twice before joining a group of states which threatens her own independent internal development.

The fundamental defect of the Geneva League of Nations is its abstract structure—rendering it impersonal and producing no response in the sentimental life of mankind, which, starting from the family, passes by degrees through nations and groups of nations, and culminates in the ideal of a world-embracing humanity. To such processes of evolution the League of Nations pays no heed; it overleaps the Pan-American as well as the Pan-

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European organization. Desiring to be everything, it is nothing. An alliance of three petty states, such as the Little Entente, is a more powerful factor in European affairs than the League of Nations, which considers itself the mouthpiece of mankind.

2. Pan-Europe and the League of Nations

The League of Nations is no substitute for Pan-Europe.

So long as Germany does not belong to the League of Nations, there is grave danger that Europe will fall apart into two camps; for already Europe has not one, but two Leagues of Nations, facing each other with hostile intent—the Geneva League and the Moscow League.

Germany belongs to neither of these two organizations; but while it lives in endless conflict with the leading nations of the Geneva League, it maintains a cordial understanding with the Moscow League. Thus it may some day happen that Germany, as well as Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, will become members of the militarist league of Moscow rather than of the pacifist league of Geneva. The upshot would be an isolated Poland and a European Rhine frontier.

Such a configuration would mean at once the end of the Pan-European idea and the end of

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European peace. First Central Europe and the Balkans, then Western Europe, would become the scene of a new migration of peoples.

It is in the interest of all Europeans that such a development shall be prevented and Germany's adhesion to the West secured. This question is fraught with fateful decisions for Europe.

But even if Germany joins the Geneva League of Nations,* the latter cannot replace the Pan-European Federation.

For in its present-day form the Geneva League of Nations constitutes a lasting menace to the independence of Europe. Thanks to it, the non-European Powers of Latin America, Eastern Asia, and the British World Empire have legal sanction for meddling in European affairs, whereas Great Britain, for instance, would deprecate any interference upon the part of European states in its imperial affairs; and similarly the United States, by reason of the Monroe Doctrine, would resent any interference in American affairs.

Thus Europe, thanks to the Geneva League of Nations, becomes the focus of world policy, a busy center of political intrigues. The problems which are submitted for discussion at Geneva are mostly European problems. Nevertheless, on the Geneva areopagus South Americans, Eastern Asiatics, and transoceanic Britons, as members of the

* As has meanwhile happened.

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League, exercise a decisive influence upon the political shaping of Europe. Questions affecting the life of Europe are decided by non-European states.

This state of affairs is rendered still more paradoxical by the fact that Russia and the United States, whose interest in European questions is much greater, take no part in these decisions, while Eastern Asiatic and South American states sit in judgment upon the affairs and problems of Europe.

Against the exercise of such tutelage by the League of Nations, Europe must sternly set itself. It must recognize what is undignified in its own international position, and voice its claim to independence and self-determination. It should leave all decisions concerning inter-continental questions to the League of Nations, while taking into its own hands the solution of purely European problems.

A hundred years later than America, Europe must proclaim to the world its own Monroe Doctrine: "Europe for the Europeans!"

The American Monroe Doctrine is the expression of American determination solidly to discountenance any European interference.

When President Monroe proclaimed that doctrine, Europe had no need of opposing a manifestation of European solidarity to that of Amer-

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ica. For in the first place, the Holy Alliance in those days represented European unity, and in the second place, Europe did not deem it possible that non-European Powers would ever dare to interfere in its internal affairs.

Meanwhile the situation has changed to Europe's disadvantage. While America today is safe from European interference, Europe has become the weakest and most vulnerable place in world politics.

For years the Rhine has been held in occupation by Britons, Americans, and Africans in time of peace; the Turks, already driven from Europe, have victoriously returned; and in 1920 Russian troops advanced as far as Warsaw and Lemberg without offending the European sense of solidarity.

If Europe wishes to escape the fate of becoming an international battlefield and an object of exploitation, it must proclaim the European "Monroe Doctrine"—its solidarity against any attack or meddling on the part of extra-European Powers. It must declare that it will not tolerate, any more than America tolerates, any interference of foreign Powers in its internal affairs. Europe must at last claim for itself the same right that America claimed for itself a century ago.

The adoption of such an attitude by Europe would be of special importance in view of the Russian menace. Any Russian attempt to force

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a constitutional change upon a European state, whether in the sovietist or in the absolutist sense, would inevitably meet with the same unanimous resistance on the part of united Europe as did Spain's attempt, a hundred years ago, forcibly to reëstablish the monarchy in South America.

If world organization is to take the place of world anarchy, then the first step must be for the states to form themselves into super-states. Just as the successive unifications of Germany, Italy, and Poland were necessary stages on the road to a united Europe, so the unification of Europe will be a necessary stage on the road to a united humanity.

It is absurd to suggest that an anarchical Europe can be made the corner-stone of an international world community; it is more likely to poison the atmosphere of the entire world by its eternal bickerings, than to range itself as a co-member of international order. First Europe, and then mankind, must unite; the process is not reversible.

The opponents of Pan-Europe will be sure to make great play with the catchword that Pan-Europe is a narrower ideal than the League of Nations; that it is immoral and impolitic to confine the League of Peace geographically to one continent.

In order to discredit the demand for a Euro-

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pean customs union, they will demand inter-continental Free Trade; in order to discredit the European security pact, they will demand an inter-continental security pact; in order to discredit the United States of Europe, they will demand the United States of the World.

This policy—the offsetting of tomorrow against today—never fails to have its effect; it is a favorite method employed by reaction to disguise itself in the mask of extreme radicalism, in order the more effectively to combat progress. These demagogues, accordingly, blind the masses by holding up more distant aims, the realization of which they deem impossible, in order to divert the attention of these very masses from aims which lie nearer at hand and the realization of which they dread.

3. Reorganization of the League of Nations

The League of Nations, as composed today, consists of four major groups:

1. The states of the British World Empire
2. The European states
3. The Latin-American states
4. The Eastern Asiatic states

Of these groups, the first alone is internationally organized. The delegates of the British World Empire form a coherent group within the League of Nations. The same Lord Robert Cecil

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who only a short time ago represented South Africa at Geneva, now figures there as the English delegate.

An issue between Australia and New Zealand, being an internal affair of the league of British states, would be settled in London, not at Geneva. Only a conflict between a British state and a non-British member of the League of Nations would be dealt with at Geneva.

By this relation which it bears to the League of Nations the British World Empire provides a model for the other state-groups represented at Geneva.

If Pan-Europe constitutes itself a League of States, the conflicts arising between European states will be settled by that League, and only conflicts with extra-European Powers will be submitted to the League of Nations. In that way the League of Nations, far from contradicting, would supplement the Pan-European federation.

It would be a grave mistake for the Pan-Europeans to combat, instead of supporting, the idea embodied in the League of Nations. Their criticism should be directed only at its mechanical conformation, not at its existence. So long as no Pan-European political organization exists, the League of Nations is the only international forum in which the states of Europe may meet, the only safeguard against European chaos. For that

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reason Germany's accession to the Geneva League of Nations is desirable from the Pan-European point of view, because that step would bring Germany within the purview of the European, instead of the Russian, political community.

At the same time, however, the Pan-European movement must advocate both the autonomy of Pan-Europe within the League of Nations, and a regional structure for the League. Its aim is to divide the League of Nations into groups and to replace the centralism of Geneva by an inter-state federalism.

The main advantage of a regional grouping of the League of Nations lies in this: that only after a reorganization on these lines would the United States of America and Soviet Russia be able to join the League of Nations without violating their international principles. For so soon as the United States and Soviet Russia are recognized as autonomous national groups, they would needs fear any foreign interference in their respective spheres of power quite as little as the danger of becoming involved in European conflicts, and the "Monroe Doctrine" of the soviets would be maintained equally with that of America.

Such an extension of the League of Nations, to be a world-embracing organization, would alone be able to give it that moral prestige which renders a League of Nations army unnecessary.

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The proposal to transform the Pan-American Union into an autonomous Pan-American League of Nations was made by the Chilean delegate Alvarez. Whether this American League of Nations, which would include also the United States, is created today or tomorrow, sooner or later it will have to come to an understanding with its Geneva rival; either the American members will have to withdraw from the Geneva League of Nations as a body, or else the American League of Nations will join the ecumenical League of Nations as a corporate unit, on the analogy of the British state-group. Either contingency—the disruption or the extension of the League of Nations by Pan-America—depends on whether or not the latter will consent to the change of regional grouping.

After the withdrawal of the Americans the League of Nations would be a loose conglomeration of Europeans, Britons, and Eastern Asiatics. Should the two latter groups withdraw from the European chaos, then the residue would be the Pan-European Federation.

But even without the withdrawal of the Americans Pan-Europe is possible within the framework of the League of Nations, provided its European members constitute a closer union, as the British did yesterday, and as the Americans may do tomorrow.

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The secession of the European delegates at Geneva for the purpose of establishing a separate national group, on the basis of Article 21 of the League of Nations Constitution providing for the formation of such groups, would signify at once the crisis and the rebirth of the League of Nations idea.

The League of Nations might become the final world authority, while the settlement of local conflicts and issues would be left to the more limited national groups. These groups would be:

1. The Pan-American
2. The Pan-European
3. The British
4. The Russian
5. The two Mongolian groups, China and Japan

Of these five super-state national groups, three are in existence today: the Pan-American, the British, and the Russian. Their super-parliaments are the Pan-American Conference, the British Imperial Conference, and the Congress of Federated Soviet Republics.

Only the European and the Mongolian worlds remain unorganized.

The Mongolian world is divided into the Japanese and Chinese Empires. The hatred between these two neighboring peoples (which appears to us as senseless as the enmity of France and

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Germany appears to them) makes the establishment of a Mongol Union seem unlikely in the near future. At the most such a union might be hastened by an aggressive policy on the part of the white against the yellow races. So long as Japan and China were unable or unwilling to agree on a common world-policy, they would form not one group, but two separate groups in the organized League of Nations, so that the League of Nations would then consist of six groups; four white and two yellow.

More important to us than the question of the Mongol Union is the question of the Pan-European Union, the only one of those six united groups of peoples which does not yet exist. Its formation is the *conditio sine qua non* of regional world organization. It is impossible that four World Powers, or Groups of Powers, should allow themselves to be outvoted by five small European states; they would draw their own conclusions and shatter the League of Nations—by withdrawing from it. Only representatives of a united Europe would have a decisive vote in the councils of the nations.

We have no right to count upon a sudden change in the political mentality of mankind, and to expect that might will invariably bow down before right. If, therefore, a stable community of states

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is to come into being today, its legal foundations must rest upon a solid system of power.

Experience teaches us that a federation has no prospect of continuous existence unless it is based on superiority of power. Such superiority expresses itself either as hegemony, if one member is stronger than all the others combined (Prussia in Germany, Greater Russia in the Soviet Empire), or else as coöperation, if every member by itself is weaker than all the rest combined (United States, Switzerland).

This coöperation must be based on a certain balance of power which precludes the risk of any hegemony; for the principle of coöperation is democratic—that of hegemony, autocratic.

Both the Pan-European group of peoples and the organized ecumenical League of Nations must be established on a basis of coöperation. For neither in Pan-Europe would any state be strong enough permanently to set itself up as master of the rest, nor in the organized League of Nations would any state-group be able to do so. The five or six power-groups that would be represented in the League of Nations would roughly balance one another; none of them, within a reasonable length of time, would dare to throw down the gauntlet to the rest of humanity.

In this way the organic League of Nations

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might become the best guarantor of world peace. Its groups, after severally disarming, would conclude among themselves a treaty of arbitration. Moreover, such a formation of groups would tend to localize possible wars: the European powers would not be bound to interfere, say, in a war between the United States and Mexico, or in an Indian or Korean war of independence. For the states of Europe the mutual guarantee would be confined to the actual European frontiers, and thereby the danger of another World War would be materially lessened.

The League of Nations would fall apart into the two elements, the unfortunate blending of which is the cause of its unfitness for life: the Pan-European Union and the World Areopagus. The Pan-European Union would be composed of delegates of the European powers; the ecumenic Court of Appeal, of representatives of the state-groups.

The Pan-European organization, by reason of its economic basis and its compulsory insurance of peace, would be more closely knit than the Geneva League of Nations—the world organization, on the other hand, more loosely knit, in order that America and Russia might join this League of Nations without having any fears as to their self-determination.

While heretofore the League of Nations has

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taken over the inheritance of the Paris Peace Conference, as a result of such a regional organization it would certainly become the successor of the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments.

In Washington, last year, the representatives of the leading World Powers met for the first time, not to end a war, but to prevent a threatening war. That task, the prevention of a Japanese-American war, which would have been an unparalleled catastrophe to civilization, has been brilliantly accomplished by the Washington Conference. Its success completely eclipses anything that the Geneva League of Nations has so far done.

At Washington, America was represented by the United States, Great Britain by England, Europe by France, and Eastern Asia by Japan; every world-group, therefore, by its strongest member. Russia alone remained unrepresented, because its government was not recognized by the other participants; but it is probable that at the next world conference the Russian World Empire, too, will be represented. Disarmament by sea would be agreed upon even without Russia—but disarmament by land, never.

Thus President Harding's work at Washington has shown to better advantage than President Wilson's work at Geneva.

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The future will lead to a synthesis between these two divergent attempts to reach world peace; Washington will become the World Areopagus; Geneva will become Pan-Europe.

VII. THE EUROPEAN WAR MENACE

"The World War merely weakened Europe—the Future War would give it the *coup de grâce*."

1. *The Danger of War*

At this moment Europe is rushing headlong toward another war. The majority of the states in central and eastern Europe are diplomatically and militarily preparing for that war. Hatred and malevolence between neighbor countries are greater than they were in 1919.

Responsibility for this imminent danger of a general conflagration is to be attributed to the international anarchy which now prevails in Europe.

Europe's position may best be illustrated by a simile:

Within a narrow space there live twenty-six human beings. These people are on a doubtful cultural and moral level, and they are armed with poisons, bombs, fire-arms, and knives. All are impoverished and awaiting the first opportunity of enriching themselves at the expense of their neighbors. They are dominated by mutual hatred and

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envy, by a spirit of vengeance and ill-will. They are busy hatching plots, sharpening and practicing with their weapons, and abusing one another privily and publicly in a most outrageous manner. They wish on no account to forego their ill-conceived freedom; and hence they prefer a condition of absolute anarchy to any form of association. Hence, too, they are determined to settle their conflicts of interest and their differences of opinion by means of duels and free-for-all fights.

Without claiming much foresight, one may hazard the prediction that ere long a murderous life-and-death struggle must break out among these savages; and that in the resulting turmoil not only those involved, but others too, will be wounded and killed.

Against such a catastrophe there is but one safeguard; inasmuch as for countless generations these twenty-six individuals are destined to live in close proximity to one another, they must resign themselves to the difficult task of making their joint existence as tolerable as possible. This they can do only by putting organization in the place of anarchy.

They must assemble, therefore, around the green table and elaborate an organization that will offer them the greatest measure of security with the least sacrifice of freedom. They must enthrone the lawsuit in place of the duel, and they

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must institute a court of arbitration for the purpose. Likewise they must renounce the privilege of permanently carrying arms, since it constitutes a standing temptation to misuse those arms. Finally they must resolve that every peace-breaker and bully among them who assaults one of his comrades and declines to submit to the established legal procedure, shall be restrained and punished by the combined forces of the rest.

If the twenty-six states wish at the eleventh hour to escape destruction, they must make the following substitutions: organization in place of anarchy; a court of arbitration in place of war; disarmament in place of competitive armaments; reciprocal guarantees in place of self-help; co-operation in place of competition.

Nowhere in the world—save in Eastern Asia—do we find such primitive and barbarous international conditions as obtain in Europe. The states of Pan-America, of Great Britain, and of Soviet Russia meet in conference at regular intervals, in order to discuss all pending questions in a spirit of peaceful good-will, and to settle threatening conflicts in a spirit of amicable justice. They confer regarding the possibility of making the continent assigned to each as habitable as possible through a harmonious coöperation.

Only the states of Europe insist upon their privilege of armed anarchy; they do not converse

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with one another save at the point of the bayonet; they uphold the principle of blood-revenge; and through pride and stupidity they reject the orderly processes of law.

They cannot, or will not, understand that it is impossible for twenty-six states to live together permanently in a crowded space of five million square kilometers without impinging on one another, and that the most trivial occurrence may suffice to turn Europe into a heap of wreckage and into an immense graveyard. Any lover of Europe who realizes this must shrink from no sacrifice in order to deliver his continent from that mortal danger.

2. The War of the Future

If the European leaders and masses possessed a correct perception of the War of the Future, they would leave no stone unturned in order to prevent it. But men are utterly at a loss as to what to expect; their imaginations are too weak, too much directed backwards instead of forwards. Less effort is needed to project reports concerning the past unmodified into the future, than to imagine things which have never happened. Thus it came about that scarcely any one, in 1913, was able to form an accurate forecast of what the World War would be like, and that its horrors

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would transcend all predictions. Hence also to-day scarcely any one can form a true forecast of the War of the Future, the horrors of which will surpass anything that the European imagination can conjure up.

Europeans conceived the World War of 1914-1918 after the manner of the Franco-German War of 1870; they conceive the War of the Future after the manner of the World War. Yet it is certain that the War of the Future will surpass the World War in terror and ruthlessness by as much as the latter surpassed the Franco-German War.

For a host of technical inventions follow one another year after year, and with them the means of destruction are steadily gaining in perfection. The War of the Future will be governed, not by mechanics, but by chemistry; it will be waged, not with steel, but with poison.

Should another war break out between two Great Powers of Europe, its object will not be to defeat the enemy forces, but to annihilate the enemy nation.

The War of the Future will be waged, across the line of battle, against the rear; above all, against the enemy capitals. There the wives and children of the soldiers will be slain by gas-bombs, in order to prevent a future war of revenge. No distinction will be made between front and rear, or be-

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tween combatants and non-combatants. Every city within reach will be destroyed, every enemy within reach will be slaughtered.

The manufacture of poison-gases has made such immense strides since 1918 that a few bombs dropped from an aeroplane would suffice to massacre a city of millions. It is ridiculous to suppose that those conducting the war will renounce that most effective weapon of warfare, even if they previously bind themselves not to make use of poison-gases; for the next war will be waged, in the most literal sense, for life or death, and any weakness in the conduct of it might spell suicide.

This War of the Future will be ended, not by the conclusion of a peace, but by the annihilation of the conquered people. The vanquished state will fare as Carthage fared after the Third Punic War.

The victorious nation in its entirety, and without party distinctions, will approve the policy of extermination pursued by its leaders; for any other issue will involve the risk that the victorious nation, during the war of revenge waged two or three generations later, will itself be overcome and exterminated by its hostile and vengeful neighbor. And if it proves impossible for neighbors to find a common *modus vivendi*, every nation will annihilate its neighbor rather than run the risk, sooner or later, of being annihilated it-

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self. In the life of the European states the process which often took place between hostile families in the days of the blood-feuds will repeat itself: blood revenge to the extermination of one party.

In any case, such a war of extermination—in which the remaining nations of the world would also become involved—would sign the death-warrant of Europe. Not even the surviving nation could ever recover from its quantitative and qualitative sacrifice of men and materials.

Should Germany, for instance, relying upon epoch-making discoveries and seduced by ambitious adventurers, commence a war of revenge against France, she would be annihilated in case of defeat, ruined in case of victory.

For whatever might be the further course of that war, one thing alone is certain—that within the first week of war the Rhenish (and also probably the Silesian) industrial district would be destroyed by bombs dropped from the air. Thus a single day might witness the destruction of a work on the creation of which the German people had lavished their best energies for an entire century. No indemnity could heal that wound or enable Germany ever again to catch up with English and American industry.

A victorious war of extermination waged by France against a European Great Power might

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conceivably for a short time secure to her the undisputed hegemony over the continent. That hegemony, however, would have been too dearly purchased; for in view of her small excess of births over deaths, France would never again make up the human losses which the victory would have entailed. Her population would rapidly fall below that of Italy, and she would be able neither to maintain her hegemony nor to check the Russian advance. Thus France would inevitably bleed to death, not only if defeated, but equally if victorious.

No European nation has at its disposal such an excess of men and of wealth that it can afford the luxury of a war without receiving, even in the most favorable case, a wound that could never again be healed.

The World War has merely weakened Europe; the War of the Future would inflict the death-blow upon it. The statesmen who sign the next inter-European declaration of war would therewith sign Europe's death-warrant. After that war Europe would be a heap of ruins, as the once flourishing cultural regions of Central Asia are today. Berlin and Paris would share the fate of Babylon and Nineveh.

Whatever may be the outcome of the European War of the Future, only one Power will emerge

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from it victoriously: Russia. Europe's self-destruction is paving the way to a future invasion by Russia, no less than China's self-destruction paved the way for a future conquest by Japan.

Whoever loves his people must be, in view of the technical and political implications of a European war, a pacifist. The chauvinist who incites his people to new wars, in genuine faith that he is serving the interests of his country, has no excuse save his ignorance and lack of a prescient imagination.

To propagate a European war, in full consciousness of what it involves, is possible only to criminal natures like Herostratus, or to men whose blind hatred for the enemy nation outweighs their love for their own, and who are prepared to compass the extinction of the enemy nation at the cost of the destruction of their own.

To every European, no matter what his nationality or class, it must be a matter of personal honor to oppose such war-propaganda by every means at his disposal. Whoever adopts a passive attitude relative to the future assumes a share of the future war-guilt, which will be heavier even than that of the past. In a life-or-death question for European humanity and culture there must be no neutrality.

Whoever shirks the decision and thereby in-

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directly gives aid to the incendiaries of Europe, is guilty of high treason against his people, against Europe, and against mankind.

3. Pan-Europe and Peace

No stone must be left unturned in order to save the world from the War of the Future.

Europe must follow the example of the pacific Great Powers. Whereas the statesmen of Europe gathered around the green table only after they had killed ten millions of people, wounded twice that number, and wrought immense havoc in every part of the world, the Japanese and the American World Powers met in conference at Washington before the threatened outbreak of their war and concluded peace—without the previous shedding of a single drop of blood. By that shrewd, generous, and large-spirited action they have spared themselves and the world unutterable misery and incalculable damage. They have saved the life, health, and property of millions of people, and on either side of the Pacific Ocean they find themselves better off than would have been the case after a successful war.

It defies all powers of imagination to think how much more favorable the position of the Europeans—not only the vanquished, but also the victors—would be today, had their Peace Conference

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met in the Spring of 1914 instead of in the Spring of 1919. That, however, is history and we cannot alter it; but we can use its lessons for the purpose of securing a better future. It is the only way in which Europe can still draw profit from its terrible experience.

For the political situation in Europe, even after the conclusion of peace, is essentially labile. There are, in Europe, at least a dozen open wounds from which at any time a fire may flow that would destroy the continent. In every nation of Europe there are ambitious leaders and war-parties who welcome any political crisis as an opportunity for acquiring more power through another war.

It is absurd optimism to share the faith of those pacifists who expect that the nations of Europe, forewarned by the dismal experiences of the last war, would decline to enter into another; for the history of the past few years disproves that theory. Since the conclusion of the World War two European states, though knowing war at first hand, have started new wars: Poland, by its invasion of South Russia; Greece, by its invasion of Anatolia. In both cases the people, blindly following their leaders, proceeded to war, while the League of Nations proved powerless to stop them.

The other nations, given an appropriate *mot d'ordre*, would also proceed to war as readily as they did in 1914.

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To base our expectations of peace on that foundation, therefore, is short-sighted and hopeless. More genuine guarantees of peace must be created which would render a war between European states no less impossible than would be a war, today, between states of the North American Union or the dominions of the British Empire—and, tomorrow, between states of the American continents.

The reciprocal interests and relations between the states of Europe are so strongly interwoven that, in the long run, there is no choice for two European neighbors save between enmity and alliance. An indifferent neighborliness is no longer possible. Europe can only become the stage either of perpetual war or of perpetual peace.

Only the Pan-European Federation, by the introduction and joint guarantee of a compulsory court of arbitration, can definitely secure the internal peace of Europe. Nothing could counterbalance the advantage that would accrue to Europe by such a League of Peace.

But the achievement of internal peace, and the unparalleled general upliftment of European life that would follow in its train, would necessarily have to be supplemented by the achievement of external peace. Europe, thus unified, would have to conclude with England and Russia, with Pan-America and Eastern Asia, treaties of arbitration

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that would safeguard it against a præter-European war.

The states of Europe, today, are too weak to enforce peace outside their own spheres of power. They could no more prevent, say, a Sino-Japanese, a Japanese-American, or a Russo-Chinese war, than they could prevent an Indian or Korean revolution. There are left in Asia many unsolved problems, the peaceful solution of which cannot yet be foreseen, and which some day will probably lead to warlike conflicts between the Great Powers of Asia. However dismal be that prospect, Europe, unable to prevent these complications, must hold itself aloof from them and make sure that at least its own continent shall be spared the disaster of future wars.

For in Europe, in contrast with Asia, there is no political success attainable which would not be overpaid a thousandfold by a war. Thus pacifism in Europe is not merely an ethical postulate, but also an injunction of prudence; not merely a demand of Europeanism, but also a demand of national egotism.

Hence European peace must be the immediate goal of all European pacifists. Once peace on the continent is secured, the way to world peace lies open. The opposite way would involve Europe in every world conflict and would merely hasten, instead of retard, its destruction.

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"If common sense fails to create Pan-Europe, then necessity will create it."

1. The Liberation of Eastern Europe

Prior to the World War Europe was split up into two systems: the liberal West and the conservative East. The majority of the western nations were free; the majority of the eastern, oppressed.

Whereas in the West the principle of the right to national self-determination prevailed, in the East there were but three master-nations: Germans, Magyars, and Great-Russians, while the remaining nations enjoyed but limited freedom.

Before the World War a Pan-European Union would have compelled the free nations of the West to violate their political creed by the assumption of a guarantee for the subjection in perpetuity of Esthonians and Latvians, Poles and Lithuanians, Czechs and Slovaks, Ukrainians, Slovenes, and Croatians; as well as for the oppression of the Italian, Serbian, and Rumanian provinces of the Hapsburg monarchy. Such a guarantee would

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scarcely have been forthcoming, as the sympathies of the West were stronger for the oppressed than for the oppressors. While in the nature of things the West was able to form alliances with the East for specific political purposes, it could not enter into a super-state federation.

On the other hand, the mentality of the eastern European emperors, and of their entourage, prevented a European consolidation. For a German, Austrian, or Russian emperor would have deemed it beneath his dignity to bow to a majority of democracies.

Thus, in the East the Pan-European idea would have been interpreted as the resuscitation of the Holy Alliance in the spirit of Metternich; in the West, as the renaissance of Europe in the spirit of Mazzini. No realization of Pan-Europe was conceivable until one of these two principles had triumphed over the other.

The World War brought the decision: the triumph of Mazzini over Metternich, of the West over the East, of the liberal over the conservative principle, of the democratic over the autocratic idea. Through the collapse of the last three European empires, the oppressed nationalities of the East became free. These liberated nations either organized themselves into democratic republics, or attached themselves to their free brothers and cousins.

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This natural revolution in eastern Europe marks a decisive stage on the road to Pan-Europe. For thanks to it, Europe received a coherent structure on the basis of nationhood and of democracy. The contrast between master-nations and slave-nations, between western and eastern Europe, ceased. Germany became a democratic republic and thus, in respect of its constitution, joined the western states. Russia alone, by the introduction of sovietism, seceded from Europe, while the border-states accomplished their union with democratic Europe, as independent national states. Thus Europe has shrunk to half its pre-war size, but by way of compensation has grown much more homogeneous in regard to its internal structure.

Today all the larger nations of Europe have their own political state as the center of their national life. The guardianship exercised over others by individual European nations has ceased. Thereby the foundation has been laid for a Pan-European union of free nations.

It is true that the revolution has not ended national oppression in Europe. Indeed millions of Germans, Magyars, and Ukrainians are delivered by their neighbors into national oppression. But unjust and condemnable as such cases are, at any rate today there is left to these oppressed nations a state of their own as a national support

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and as a center of free culture, whereas before the War there were nations of culture in Europe which were entirely deprived of national freedom.

Despite these remnants of national oppression, for the removal of which every worthy European is bound to exert himself, the political structure of Europe, as compared with what it was in pre-war days, shows a distinct advance.

Never since the end of the Holy Alliance has Europe been so ready for political federation as it is now. Psychological, and no longer political, obstacles stand in the way of its federation today. These psychological obstacles should and must be removed by the awakening of a Pan-European sense of solidarity; and to awaken this sense is the chief task of all creators of public opinion in Europe.

2. European Policy and Economy

The new map of Europe was drawn in deference to national aspirations, not with reference to economic needs.

While economic and technological development shows a tendency to break down the existing customs frontiers, new ones have been drawn by the Paris Peace Treaty.

The great German economic system, with its

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exemplary organization, was cut in two by the Danzig Corridor and mutilated by the loss of Upper Silesia, Lorraine, and the Saar District.

The Austro-Hungarian economic system is torn to shreds. Around the newly founded Czechoslovakia, whose factories once supplied the major part of the Hapsburg monarchy with industrial products, customs barriers have been drawn which separate that country from its former customers and force the latter to seek new markets.

Vienna, once the capital of an Empire of fifty millions, has a poor and not too fertile hinterland sustaining five million people, incapable of feeding that disproportionately large capital.

The Paris Peace Treaty, which politically signifies an advance over pre-war conditions, economically signifies a step backwards. The ephemeral successes of nationalist demagogues have brought disaster to millions of people, and the threat of economic ruin to the continent.

Political questions were not treated from the political, or economic questions from the economic, point of view, but instead economics was subordinated to politics, with the result that the cradle of a liberated Europe is infested with the germs of economic decay.

The economic decline of Europe is due mainly to the following causes:

- (1) The World War, with its destruction of

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commerce and trade, of the battlefields, of human life and work-a-day morality;

(2) The great European armaments and standing armies, the concomitants of political uncertainty;

(3) The exclusion of Russia, in consequence of the Revolution, the blockade, and the economic break-down;

(4) The failure to settle the reparations question, and the resulting crises;

(5) The general indebtedness to extra-European Powers;

(6) The artificial disruption of the central European economic regions, in consequence of the Peace Treaties.

These causes, combined, are mainly responsible for the monetary chaos, the unemployment, distress, and social confusion, now prevailing in Europe.

In order to unravel this chaos, all Europe must regard it as an imperative duty to rebuild the destroyed districts, to restore the morality of work, to bring the questions of reparations and debts within reach of a definite solution; to recognize Russia and energetically to further the economic resuscitation of that country, and by preparing the way to a Pan-European customs union, to resume the commercial relations which have been broken.

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All these problems, which first and foremost affect the life of continental Europe, would have to be discussed and settled at a Pan-European conference. A solution is possible only by the permanent pacification of the exhausted and stricken continent. So long as every state feels menaced by its neighbors, no atmosphere can be created in which a Pan-European economic system may grow.

Only a sweeping reconstruction of Europe along democratic and federative lines could economically justify the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the mutilation of Germany. Statesmen capable only of tearing down, and not of building up, are dilettanti and demagogues, and as such they must disappear from the political scene of their destructive works, in order to make room for constructive leadership.

With the increase of misery and distress in Europe the peoples will realize more and more the necessity of adopting a sound economic policy. Then they will gladly relinquish some of their sovereign powers, in order to save themselves from famine, bankruptcy, and war.

If common sense fails to create Pan-Europe, then necessity will create it. Today Europe could still be a community of work; tomorrow it would too certainly become a community of suffering. But perhaps then it will already be too

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late, and Europe, united or disunited, must perish without hope of salvation.

3. Pan-Europe and the Treaty of Versailles

Present-day Europe is the offspring of the Paris Peace Treaty, and from this any reconstruction of Europe must necessarily start. In Europe, today, the realist politician has no choice save between adherence to the Paris Peace, with all its shortcomings and injustices, and war or chaos.

A peaceful modification of the new European frontiers is unthinkable for a long time to come. Considering the present-day mentality of the nations and of their chosen leaders, a voluntary abandonment of the conquered territories is a psychological impossibility. The victorious European states would rather launch into another war than give up the German provinces allotted to them—just as Germany would never of her own free will have renounced either Posen, or Alsace-Lorraine, or Northern Schleswig. Whoever, therefore, aims at an alteration of the German frontiers, pursues inevitably a policy of war. Every pacifist, whether or not it is to his liking, must resign himself to the frontiers laid down at Versailles, for whoever tampers with those frontiers tampers with the peace of Europe.

It would be fundamentally a mistake, however,

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to regard the Paris Peace Treaty as the consummation of European development, instead of as its foundation. For the system of the Paris Treaty, with all its shortcomings, constitutes the first step toward the delivery of Europe from the general chaos of the World War.

The terms of this Peace Treaty have reduced the inorganic and outworn political structures of eastern Europe to their national elements, not with a view to increasing the number of European states, and therewith the universal confusion, but in order to replace the old militarist alliances, born of violence, by free associations of independent republics. With the advantages of the earlier form of association were to be combined the virtues of the new freedom. The catalysis of Austria-Hungary had no meaning save to set free its elements for the synthesis of Pan-Europe.

If the Pan-European movement is not to be deprived of every possibility of development, it must set out from the present-day European system. A Pan-European conference having among its agenda the revision of the frontiers laid down at Versailles, St. Germain, and Trianon, would fail before ever it assembled. It would lack all prospect of success, unless from the first all territorial questions were ruled out of the debate.

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Only on that condition would it be possible to subject the second complex of the Paris Treaty system, i. e., the economic, to a thorough revision. In contrast with the territorial peace conditions, the economic conditions involve no question affecting national honor, no "touch-me-not." During the last few years they have repeatedly been revised, and they must re-revised in the future. This revision was, and still is, in the interest not only of the vanquished but of the victors as well. The important point is that the reparations problem shall, as far as possible, be freed of its political entanglements and turned into a question of business, to be settled by men of affairs having the interests of both sides in mind. Their settlement will be made as soon as the opponents abandon the purely national standpoint and meet on the ground of the general European interest. For Europe's advantage is the advantage of France no less than of Germany. As Germans and Frenchmen the very people are opponents who as Europeans should be allies.

When northern France has been rebuilt in virtue of Germany's reparation efforts, European economy will be called upon to solve a larger problem: the gradual abolition of the inter-European customs barriers—the fusion of the economic national regions into one Pan-European region which

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alone would be able successfully to keep pace with American industry.*

Once the perception of this truth has won its way to success, and once economic coöperation in Europe has taken the place of the present competitive struggle, all economic presuppositions of the Peace Treaties will be automatically changed and will press forward for amicable settlement.

This friendly agreement, however, can never be achieved so long as the business atmosphere is poisoned by political problems; so long as the Germans demand the return of Danzig and Upper Silesia, and France works for the disruption of German unity. All these attempts at changing the map of Europe lead to war, while the recognition of the existing political frontiers, together with the fight against the customs barriers, leads to the United States of Europe—in which the national frontiers must lose their present importance and become merely administrative boundaries.

4. The Little Entente

The idea that in isolation the European states are not fit for survival has led to the establishment of the Little Entente, which in that sense

* This has happened in the meantime as a result of the Dawes Plan.

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may be regarded as the embryo of Pan-Europe.

By the elimination of Russia, Europe has been given a new articulation. It is divided into three main groups: the Romance West (Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, Italy); the Germanic Center (Germany, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway); and the predominantly Slavic East (Finland, Baltic states and Little Entente, Hungary, Balkans).

Immediately after the World War President Masaryk sought to fuse that eastern European state-group which had emerged from the wreckage of Austria-Hungary, western Russia, and the Balkan League, into a federation, in order to secure for those nations permanent independence in relation to Germany and Russia.

The closed territory of that national group, extending from Finland to Greece, embraces half of all the European states and a third of Europe and of the Europeans.

This large federation, which would have meant a long step toward the United States of Europe, never took shape. In its place only the Little Entente came into being, consisting of an alliance between Czecho-Slovakia, the South-Slav Kingdom, and Rumania. Closely related to that state-system is also Poland,* as well as Austria, as a result of the Treaty of Lana. Now, as hereto-

* By its alliance with Rumania.

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fore, the Little Entente tends to expand northwards and southwards, conformably to Masaryk's vision and in order to form the basis of those United States of Europe which are the object of his yearning.

Already, in its present form, the Little Entente is a European Great Power. In combination with Poland it represents seventy million Europeans, scattered over more than a million square kilometers. Accordingly, it is twice as large (in combination with Poland) as Germany, with a population equal to that of Germany before the War.

These united states of eastern Europe, thanks to their alliance with France and to their skillful leaders (above all, Dr. Beneš), have attained to an influential position in Europe. Together they have a population larger than any one of the three great European nations. Including France and Belgium, this state-group comprises two-fifths of the total population of Pan-Europe, and might become the latter's future point of crystallization, should the establishment of Pan-Europe become the main object of its policy.

Just now, however, the object of that group of peoples is not the federation of Europe, but protection against Russia and the continued subjection of Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria. So long as the Little Entente can reach no friendly understanding with disarmed and democratic Ger-

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many, it cannot fulfil its Pan-European mission, and it runs the risk of being crushed some day by a resuscitated Russia allied with Germany.

The Little Entente is the first sign pointing toward European reconstruction, a supplementing of the catalysis of Austria by a new synthesis. Its economic mission, namely, the institution of the Pan-European customs union through a Danube federation, it has not fulfilled; this may be due to the eastern European monetary chaos, which renders an international economic system almost impossible. That great task, accordingly, is reserved to it for the future.

In any case, to the Little Entente must be conceded the credit for having introduced a new political system into Europe, analogous to the American state-system, combining external solidarity with full equality of rights and internal independence, and developing that political community by periodical conferences.

Such a system might also be imitated by other European state-groups, such as Scandinavia, while the federation of such groups would pave the way to Pan-European coöperation.

IX. GERMANY AND FRANCE

"From the fearful crisis in which Germany and France find themselves today, either they will emerge as allied Europeans, or else, locked in a death-grapple, they will both succumb to mutually inflicted wounds."

1. Europe's Central Problem

The greatest obstacle to the formation of a United States of Europe lies in the thousand-year-old rivalry between Pan-Europe's two most populous nations: Germany and France.

The Frankish, that is, the Germano-French, Empire of Charles the Great fell to pieces under his son Louis. Out of its fragments Germany, France, and Italy developed.

Since then Germany and France have been contending for the heritage of Charles the Great, and for hegemony in Europe.

Despite its internal weakness, the Germano-Roman Empire maintained its European predominance until the beginning of modern times. Charles V once more attempted to restore the universal European monarchy and to break the power of France. But that attempt failed, and France emerged from the crisis with greater power than ever and soon began to lay claim herself to Euro-

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pean hegemony. During the Reformation France took the offensive, and for a period of three centuries forced Germany to remain on the defensive. Under Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV, France was the undisputed leader of the continent. Napoleon continued that tradition and succeeded in restoring, under the leadership of France, the European empire of Charles the Great.

Russia and England overthrew Napoleon's Pan-European monarchy, which dissolved itself into its national elements. Under Prussian leadership Germany began once more to rise in power, until by its victory over France, under Bismarck, it won the position of leadership in Europe.

Germany, however, was not long to enjoy her power. Nationalism had attained to such a degree of strength in Europe that no nation desired to submit, of its own free will, to the hegemony of another. From fear of the rise of a German Napoleon the majority of European peoples leagued themselves against Germany and her vassals, until the World War terminated with the collapse of the German Empire.

Just as fifty years previously Germany had overthrown the French Empire, so France now overthrew the German Empire. For the first time in the history of the world these two neighbor states are now facing each other as sister republics. Both owe their constitution to their defeat.

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Bonapartes and Hohenzollerns had tried, by the overthrow of the neighboring people, to gain the hegemony over Europe; both lost their thrones in the attempt, humiliated their peoples, and prepared the rise of their opponents.

Now, at last, the world-historic moment would seem to have come for the two nations, rid of their dynasties, to bury the ambitions and aspirations of their self-seeking rulers, and to become honestly reconciled with each other, in order jointly to work for the reconstruction, federation, and upliftment of Europe.

A union of France and Germany was impossible so long as rival dynasties stood at their respective heads; it remained impossible so long as France was a republic and Germany a monarchy; it has become possible since the republican ideal joins the two neighbors together.

From this point of view the republicanization of Germany marks a momentous stage on the road to the Pan-European ideal. Germany's return to the monarchy would at least impede and delay, if not render impossible, the unification of Europe. In view of the German mentality, a truly democratic kingdom in the English sense would be hard to maintain; any other form of monarchy, however, would disrupt the European state-system as much as once the democratization of France disrupted the Holy Alliance.

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The Republican idea has progressed further in the last decade than in any other period since the beginning of the world. From the Pyrenees to the China Seas, republican flags are waving. One after the other, the Chinese, Russian, Austrian, German, and Turkish Empires having been transformed into republics; and no one can say where this development will cease.

The political constitution of the two neighbor peoples, French and Germans, has changed, but not so their moral constitution. Their hatred for each other is stronger than reason, stronger than their common interest; it nips in the bud any European sense of solidarity and prevents the Franco-German union, although their reciprocal interests demand coöperation.

This hereditary Franco-German enmity appears as the insurmountable obstacle to a European understanding. Nevertheless, the hope is justified that this hatred will not prove everlasting, and that a change of external conditions will be followed by a change of internal attitude. For not only are the political relations between states functions of national sympathy or antipathy, but also national friendships and enmities are frequently functions of political relationships.

In and before 1914 Serbia was looked upon in Austria as an hereditary enemy; in 1915, Italy. Of this hatred, which then seemed inextinguish-

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able, no vestige remains today. Serbs and Italians enjoy the greatest sympathy in the hearts of the Austrian people.

For two hundred years the Russians and the Turks were hereditary enemies; today they are joined by an intimate alliance.

In 1912 the Serbs and Bulgarians greeted one another as "Slavic brothers" in their common struggle against their hereditary enemies, the Turks; in 1916 Turks and Bulgarians greeted one another as "Turanian brothers" against the Serbian foe.

The Boers, who at the beginning of the century, were England's bitterest enemies, today form one of the mainstays of the British Empire.

In 1915 Germans greeted one another with "Gott strafe England!" and composed "songs of hate" against the English, while, by comparison, their hatred for France receded entirely into the background. Today the whole of Germany speaks with sympathy of England, while France has assumed Germany's rôle as the chief enemy.

For centuries Spain and France, Prussia and Austria, Venice and Genoa, were hereditary enemies, while today no trace of hatred survives in any of them. These instances might be multiplied indefinitely. Everywhere we see the hatred between nations ceasing, once the cause of it has disappeared.

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This statement of historical facts justifies the hope that the Franco-German hatred will also disappear, once the conditions that produced it are altered.

From motives partly political and partly military, the Franco-German hatred has been artificially fomented for centuries. On either side of the Rhine there have always been influential persons and classes who have thrived on this political tension, and to whose interest it has been that a lasting understanding should be prevented.

Even today in many cases the mutual hatred is still dictated by private interests. Political demagogues and economic adventurers batten on that hatred; to it they owe their fame, or their wealth; their very lives would become meaningless if Germany and France were to be reconciled.

It is clear that such deep and lasting hatred cannot disappear overnight, that in the popular mind a great deal of echoes which has been dinned into it for decades and centuries, and that a powerful antidote is needed to remove the prejudices which have accumulated on both sides.

Most essential, however, is the recognition that the destinies of Germany and France are inseparably bound together. So long as European policy and world policy were identical, the distinguishing mark was stronger than the unifying mark; today, when the future of the European continent

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in relation to the other continents is involved, the German and French interests become increasingly coincident each day. The ruin of the one must inevitably entail the ruin of the other. Hence a solidarity of reason must arise between them, even where no room yet exists for a solidarity of love.

Such love can arise only by degrees and of its own accord, out of coöperation and respect for reciprocal effort.

From the fearful crisis in which Germany and France find themselves today, either they will emerge as allied Europeans, or else, locked in a death-grapple, they will both succumb to mutually inflicted wounds.

2. France at the Crossroads

For France the vital question, with which, above all else, every one of her politicians must concern himself, is security from a German invasion.

France's remaining frontiers are protected by the sea, the Pyrenees, and the Alps; only her eastern frontier is exposed. Through that open gateway German armies have penetrated three times in the course of one century. The neighbors on the other side of the gateway are the most warlike and most capable people in Europe, superior to the French in numbers, and hostile to them in spirit.

France must concentrate all her forces upon

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securing herself against another German invasion, and must leave no stone unturned to avert the German danger, from her living sons and from their descendants.

In this position France must take warning from Bismarck's policy during the Frankfort Peace negotiations. At the outbreak of the World War certain of Bismarck's critics leveled at him the reproach that, by renouncing Belfort, he had placed the French in a position successfully to repel Germany; others again reproached him on the ground that, by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, he had roused France's implacable hatred and sowed the seed of a war of revenge. Both critics were right. To embitter an enemy without rendering him innocuous, is the grossest blunder that can be committed in international politics. Shrewd peace treaties pave the way, either to reconciliation with (Nicolsburg Peace), or to the annihilation of (Peace of Carthage), the enemy.

There are but two consistent ways of securing oneself against an enemy: the one is to render him innocuous by annihilating him; the other, to make him undangerous by conciliating him. Either you deprive him of the power, or you deprive him of the will, to take revenge. Any middle course, any vacillation between these two courses, each consistent in itself, leads to self-destruction.

France must make up her mind to adopt either

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a large policy of annihilation or a large policy of reconciliation in relation to Germany. Anything else would be diletantism.

Thus far, France seems to have been trying the first method.* The goal of the French policy of annihilation is a military Rhine frontier, and an economic Ruhr frontier; the severing of German imperial unity; an alliance with Poland for the purpose of holding down Germany and isolating her from Russia, which likewise is to be warded off.

This policy of military security, political dissolution, and economic exploitation aims at Germany's ruin and reduction to permanent impotence. For without coal and ores German industry is doomed; a third of the German population, living by that industry, would have to emigrate or starve. Only in this way would the numerical superiority of the Germans, as compared with the French, be cancelled.

The pursuit of this policy of annihilation against Germany would, for all its inhumanity, be entirely consistent in a political sense, if it did not overlook an essential factor in Franco-German policy: Russia.

For there is no doubt that Germany, having once convinced herself of the immutability of the

* Since May 11, 1924, France has been following the road to understanding. Its first result is Locarno.

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French will to bring about her destruction, will throw herself unconditionally and unhesitatingly into Russia's arms, regardless of whether that Russia be communist, socialist, democratic, or autocratic.

American capital, German organization, and favorable harvests can set Russia on her feet more quickly than Europe considers possible. Thenceforward Germany and Russia would pursue a common policy, with the object of annihilating Poland and the Little Entente, and overthrowing France. Thus France would no longer be confronting a nation of seventy millions, but a national bloc of two hundred and fifty million human beings, from the Rhine to the Pacific. This bloc would daily increase in population, power, and wealth; while France, crushed under the weight of her armaments, could not hold out against Anglo-American economic competition. Should communism meanwhile be replaced in Russia by another system, then the Little Entente, moved by its Slavic sympathies, would decide for Russia, and isolate France in Europe.

In the event of war between the Russo-German League of Nations, on the one hand, and the Western Powers, on the other, the Russian armies would reach the Rhine more speedily than the American. Even a French victory would so weaken that country that it would inevitably suc-

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cumb, in the second onslaught, to Russia's greater recuperative strength.

Thus, through initial successes, the French policy of annihilation leads in the end to the certain self-destruction of that nation. It opens for Russia the gateway into Europe, by forcing Germany into an alliance with her; it shifts Europe's frontier from the Beresina and the Dniester to the Rhine and the Alps, and it threatens that continent with war and bankruptcy. While dealing the death-blow to German independence, it purchases that brief triumph with its own destruction.

At the beginning of the policy of annihilation stands Germany's ruin; at the end, France's ruin. The *tertius gaudens* is Russia, to which, in consequence of this fratricidal strife in Europe, the hegemony over the continent must fall without effort.

If France holds these consequences in mind, and recognizes that she cannot annihilate Germany without endangering her own life, she must abandon this false course and resolutely follow the path of reconciliation. The goal of that path is Pan-Europe; the closest coöperation with democratic and pacifist Germany; reconciliation on the basis of adequate reparations; customs union for the alliance of German coal with French ores, and the development of a Pan-European mining

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industry; treaties of arbitration and security pacts; protection against Russia; joint defence against reaction; disarmament; joint reconstruction of European business and finance; establishment of the Pan-European Federation.

This program of reconciliation, with its train of consequences, insures France's future incomparably better than the program of annihilation. The joint guarantee of France's eastern frontier by all the states of Pan-Europe constitutes a more reliable safeguard than the occupation of the Rhineland. From being a permanent center of international intrigues, Germany might become the bulwark of Europe against the Russian peril. Thanks to that reconciliation with Germany, France would be in a position to abolish universal conscription, to establish her finances on a sound basis, and to concentrate all her energies upon the organization of her colonial empire. Her predominant position in Pan-Europe would secure to her a leading position in the world and the highest title to fame which a nation can enjoy: that of being the herald and protagonist of human rights.

3. Germany at the Crossroads

Germany, too, stands at the crossroads between an eastern and a western orientation, between

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a policy of revenge and a policy of understanding.

In Germany there prevails the general conviction that France is using the Peace Treaty as a means of continuing the war with other weapons, and for annihilating Germany in an economic and political sense as much as she has already done in a military sense.

Thus public opinion in Germany inclines more and more to the belief that only another war could save that country from annihilation by France: a war in which it will either win freedom, or suffer that death which patriots prefer to a life of subjection, humiliation, and poverty.

But the adherents of that idea, whose numbers grow with each forward push of the French, are fully conscious that their disarmed country today is militarily too weak to venture into another war. Accordingly they rest their hopes on the future, fomenting nationalism and national hatred in school and press, favoring a revival of militarism by the introduction of a military dictatorship or a return to the monarchy, and intriguing throughout the world against France and her allies.

Their hope of being able to overthrow France some day is based on three chances:

(1) on the possibility of some German invention, whereby France's military superiority might be annihilated by one blow (say, a new poison, or electric waves which would ignite benzine, gun-

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powder, and explosives at great distances);

(2) on grave differences between France, on the one hand, and England and Italy, on the other, changing the political constellation in Europe and isolating France;

(3) on a resuscitation of Russia with Germany's help, in which event Russia would recover Poland and the border-states, then unite with Germany, in order, jointly with the latter, to overwhelm France and the Little Entente.

Indefinite as these hopes in part may be, it is only too intelligible that a people which finds itself at the mercy of a hostile Power should clutch at any desperate expedient from which, sooner or later, it may expect help and salvation.

Of these three hopes entertained by Germany, the Russian is the surest. Only the time, not the fact, of Russia's resuscitation is uncertain. Hence the endeavors of all German *revanche* politicians are directed toward a close political, military, and economic alliance with Russia. Only because it might impede them in carrying out these plans of a Russian Alliance, do they decline membership in the League of Nations.

The consequences of this German policy of revenge are as dismal as the consequences of the French policy of annihilation.

It fortifies the German national hatred against France, thereby rendering any future agreement

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almost impossible; it leads internally either to bolshevism or to reaction, externally to dependence upon Moscow.

The highest hope of that policy is a victorious war of revenge, conducted in league with Russia, against France. If the German patriots were clear in their own minds as to the inevitable results of such a victory, they would clamor for it less ardently. For while the Rhenish industrial regions would be immediately destroyed at the outbreak of such a war, so that Germany could never again overtake the other industrial states, Russia's domination would extend as far as Posen and Upper Silesia, the Bohemian Forest and the Alps. Germany's independence would be gone, and with it the idea of a free Europe.

This German policy of revenge is confronted by the German policy of reconciliation, the aims of which coincide with those of the French policy of reconciliation. It aspires to a peaceful understanding and economic coöperation with France; the payment of an adequate sum in reparations; an understanding with Poland and Czechoslovakia by a refusal to countenance any irredentism; a democratic internal and pacific external policy; a treaty of arbitration and guarantees; membership in the League of Nations and rejection of an alliance with Russia. As its final object it aims at the establishment of a customs

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union—and, in closest harmony with France, at the constitution of Pan-Europe.

The propagandist force of the policy of revenge surpasses that of the policy of reconciliation; for from every act of violence that France commits, it receives fresh nourishment. The more all hope of reconciliation with France vanishes, the more Germany must familiarize herself with the desolate hope of a future war of revenge, and promote a policy of despair; for dependence upon the Russian ally in the future must seem to her, when all is said and done, more tolerable than dependence upon the French enemy.

Only a magnanimous action by France—say, the voluntary abandonment of the Rhine occupation in return for an inter-European security pact—could teach Germany to have faith in the French will to reconciliation, and thus deal a mortal blow to the policy of revenge.

4. Chauvinists and Europeans

Germany's decision rests in the hands of the leading French politicians. It is not yet too late for reconciliation, so long as a democratic régime is administering the affairs in Germany; but no one can predict for how long this régime will hold out against the nationalists, and when the time for reconciliation will have passed.

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Germany, too, must not allow the French to despair of her willingness to let by-gones be by-gones; for otherwise France, regardless of future consequences, and from mere will to self-preservation, must rigidly carry out the policy of annihilation.

In the same way Germany, once she despairs of the possibility of reconciliation with France, must consistently pursue a policy of revenge, and unhesitatingly decide for the easterly orientation.

Neither the French nor the Germans have any choice save that between a policy of hate and a policy of reconciliation. The crisis has progressed so far as to permit of no half-way measures; it no longer admits of anything but a straight alternative.

While on both sides the politicians who favor annihilation are moving toward a distinct and consistent goal, the same cannot be said of the politicians who favor reconciliation. The latter too often lack the courage of consistency.

In France, for instance, they say: "We want to squeeze out of Germany as much as we can get, regardless of the consequences, and then try to establish relations of pleasant neighborliness with her." In Germany they say: "We want to remain at peace with France; but we must recover Upper Silesia and Danzig, and for that purpose we must ally ourselves with Russia."

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Whoever speaks thus is short-sighted and misguided. Those Frenchmen do not consider that if they succeed neither in crushing nor in pacifying Germany, they will have to repay the reparation sums a hundredfold; and those Germans are oblivious of the fact that an alliance with Russia against Poland must drive them automatically into a war with France, whether or not they desire it.

That is why every German must make up his mind whether he wants a Russian or a European policy; he must know that the Russian alliance must eventuate in a Red or White dictatorship; the European, in democracy.

Every Frenchman must realize that he can secure his eastern frontier in a military way only by a permanent state of war, or in a political way only by a European peace treaty; that out of the present-day confusion there lead but two consistent paths: national imperialism and democratic Europeanism. He must make up his mind either to sacrifice the future of Europe in favor of a brief hegemony of his nation, or firmly to base his nation's future on a Pan-European World Power. If he chooses the latter, he must seek not merely peace—but alliance with Germany.

These alternatives are bound to divide both the German and the French foreign policies increasingly into two opposing camps: into chauvinists and Pan-Europeans.

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An unexpressed but intimate alliance exists between the German and the French chauvinists. They quote one another every day in their newspapers, they secure for each other an unfailling supply of recruits, and they beat the drum for one another in the most comradely manner. The real enemy of Franco-German chauvinism is not "the Nation beyond the Rhine"—but Pan-Europe. Against that object are directed their common hatred and their alliance; for they know that once Pan-Europe becomes a reality, there will be nothing left to justify their own existence.

Only the concerted action of all Pan-Europeans can effectively combat this leagued chauvinism on both sides of the Rhine.

The World War came about in consequence of a general revolution of the warlike minorities in the several states of Europe against the anti-war majorities. We are now experiencing a repetition of that fateful conspiracy, which can be downed only by the international coöperation of all European friends of peace.

The parts to be played in this campaign against chauvinism must be so allotted that the German Pan-Europeans will be combating the German chauvinists, and the French Pan-Europeans the French chauvinists; the converse tactics would do more harm than good to the Pan-European cause. Every one has so much barbarism to combat in his

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own country, that he has no right to reproach his neighbor before he has Europeanized himself. "Let every one but sweep outside his own door; then all streets will be clean!" Only when all people try to surpass their neighbors in justice and morality, can the process of Europeanization make headway on both sides of the Rhine.

France is compelled to adopt a policy of annihilation against an implacable Germany; Germany is compelled to adopt a policy of revenge against an implacable France. This *circulus vitiosus* can be broken only by the determination of every European to begin with a European policy at home, without waiting for "the other fellow" to begin. Thereby he will benefit not only his continent, but also his nation, whose higher culture he will be vindicating to the world by such initiative.

X. THE NATIONAL QUESTION

"The nation is a realm of the spirit."

1. *The Essence of the Nation*

The dogma of European nationalism declares the nations to be communities of blood. This dogma is a myth.

After the numerous migrations of peoples which the continent has witnessed in historic and pre-historic times, it is impossible that pure races should still exist. All the peoples of Europe (with the possible exception of the Icelanders) are mixed peoples: mixtures of Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean strains; of Aryan immigrant and Mongoloid autochthonous blood; of fair and dark, of long-skulled and short-skulled, races.

It is false dilettantism to conclude from the existence of Romanic, Germanic, and Slavic language-groups, the existence of Romanic, Germanic, and Slavic races. For no community of blood (save the European) unites French and Rumanians, Romanized Gauls and Romanized Daci. The Spaniards are Romanized Iberians, Basques, and West Goths, with Moorish admix-

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tures; the French are Gauls and Franks; the Italians are Etruscans, Celts, and Germans, with Greek and Albanian admixtures; the Greeks are compounded of Slavic, Germanic, and Albanian blood, and so likewise are the Serbs; the Bulgarians are Slavonized Ugro-Finns; the Germans of the west and south are blended with Celtic elements, while east of the Elbe they are Germanized Slavs with a Germanic strain. Hence, as regards blood, the Prussians are more closely akin to the Czechs than to the Swabians. Not even the Scandinavians are Germans of pure race, since they are strongly intermingled with Finnish and Lappic elements.

How little, in practice, even the nationalist fanatics adhere to their race myth, is shown by the fact that they are everywhere endeavoring by force to incorporate with their own people the national minorities which they declare to be racially inferior. In reality, therefore, they are convinced as much as any one, that by compulsion and training a German can be transformed into a Frenchman, Italian, Pole, or Czech, and conversely; similarly, a Magyar into a Rumanian, etc.

Whoever upholds the thesis that a nation is a community of blood, stands helpless before the fact that eminent German-Bohemians have Czech names, and conversely; that the greatest Magyar national poet, Petöfi, was of Slavic descent; that of

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the three greatest German philosophers, Kant was of Scottish, Schopenhauer of Dutch, and Nietzsche of Polish extraction; that Napoleon, Gambetta, and Zola, in respect of blood, were not French; Bernard Shaw and Lloyd George not English; Cesare Borgia not Italian; and Columbus not Spanish; that, as regards their origin, the kings of England, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania are Germans; the kings of Spain, Italy, and Sweden, Frenchmen. Thus, strictly speaking, among all the European states only the South-Slav Kingdom has a national dynasty; in all the other monarchies of Europe rulers of alien stock embody the national symbol.

Thus, in whatever way you take it, the theory that the nation is a community of blood leads to internal contradictions.

And yet there *are* European nations, and it were folly to deny their existence. These nations, however, are not communities of blood, but communities of spirit; they derive, not physically from common ancestors, but spiritually from common teachers.

Nations grow out of the actions and reactions between gifted peoples and their great men. A genius without a people creates no culture; a people without great men is not a nation. The peoples engender their leaders, poets, and thinkers,

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who on their part, through the medium of language, religion, art, and politics, transform the nation to which they spiritually belong.

Every nation attains to the full height of its consciousness only in its sons possessed of genius. Mohammed was the creator of the Arab nation, because he was the creator of Arab culture. Similarly Dante, in a certain sense, was the creator of the Italian, Luther of the modern German, Hus of the Czech nation. Corneille and Racine, Voltaire and Rousseau, Bonaparte and Zola, became the re-creators of the French nation; Kant and Nietzsche, Goethe and Schiller, Wagner and Bizmarck, the re-creators of the German nation. Today Ghandi and Tagore seem to be exercising an analogous influence upon the Indian, Lenin upon the Russian, Masaryk upon the Czech, and Mussolini and D'Annunzio upon the Italian nation.

Nations, accordingly, are *symbioses*, communities of interaction, between great men and their peoples, which latter at the same time are their fathers and their sons, their creators and their creatures.

The true religion of nationalism is hero-worship. A people is unified through common possession of heroes whom it seeks to emulate, through common ideals and ideal figures, through community of leaders, poets, and gods. The Homeric poems and the Olympian Gods made a single nation of

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the politically divided and racially mixed people of the Hellenes.

At first a people groups itself around common legends and songs, then around common religious ideas, and finally around a common literature.

Generally, the common mother-tongue is the external bond uniting the members of a nation. But common nationhood does not always coincide with community of language. Sometimes the religious or historical community is felt to be a stronger tie than the linguistic community. Thus the Irish feel themselves to be a people distinct from the English, though English is the mother-tongue of the great majority of them; in the same way most Croats consider themselves a nation apart, although a common language and racial heritage unites them to the Serbs. But in the one case as in the other, the religious diversity acts more powerfully than the community of language.

On the other hand, community of culture may conversely lead, through diversities of language, to a national consciousness—as in the case of China or of India.

During the Middle Ages, when European culture, despite the differences of language, was uniformly Christian, the occident felt its national unity far more strongly than it does today; for at the time of the Crusades Europe had one Faith, one God, one Pope, one chivalric ideal, one learned

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language. Thus the struggle of united Christendom against Mohammedans and Jews was in the fullest sense of the word a national struggle; for religion, at that time, was both the unifying and the dividing element.

With the cleavage of occidental Christianity, with the secularization of Europe, and with growing enlightenment, the spiritual bond decayed which had inwardly held the peoples together.

Language took up the heritage of religion; the nation, the heritage of the Church.

Among all the peoples of Europe there grew up national literatures, which were multiplied and spread broadcast by the printing-press. Insofar as Europeans were not illiterate, they divided themselves into readers of the German, French, Spanish, and Italian literatures. Every one of these readers felt himself the pupil and disciple of his great writers, whose thoughts he enthusiastically accepted.

Thus through its national literatures Europe came to be divided into a number of great school communities, which in consequence of the diversity of languages could not attain to a mutual understanding. In the end, the introduction of compulsory school-attendance forced every European to join one or another of these national school communities.

These school communities of the European

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spirit are the nations. They are secular-religious communities, welded together by the sacrament of language and the cult of national poets and national heroes.

School, literature, and press are the organs of the modern nation, to which they communicate, in a diluted form, the thoughts and deeds of its great leaders, for the glorification of whom they work unceasingly.

Thus considered, the myth of the common origin of individual nations contains a *symbolic* truth; for the children of one nation have indeed a common origin; they are brothers—but brothers of the spirit, not of the blood.

Just as the Arabs are descended from Mohammed, so the Chinese are descended from Confucius, the Jews from Moses. A Jew who abandons his faith ceases thereby to be a member of his nation. For the story of the common origin of the Jews is no less a scientifically untenable myth; and in view of the diversity of their languages (Hebrew, Yiddish, Spanish, Arabic), only the common faith, in this case, forms the national bond.

The nation is a realm of the spirit. All modern art in Europe is national; hence every one who has reverence for the spirit must also have reverence for the national idea.

Just as religious fanaticism is the reverse of

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religious idealism, so national chauvinism is the reverse of national idealism.

This chauvinism, which expresses itself in contempt for foreign nations, has its origin in the fact that the nationalist comes to know and to love only the works of his own literature, only the thoughts and deeds of his own heroes. The cultures which remain closed to him because he does not understand them, appear to him inferior and barbarous. The less he knows his neighbors, the more he despises them. He commits the perspective error of seeing his own culture larger, because it is nearer to him, than foreign and more remote cultures. Because, owing to his ignorance of foreign languages, he lacks a standard for estimating his own culture, he lapses into national megalomania and becomes blind to the merits of foreign nations.

Hence it comes about that today the nations have adopted the intolerant standpoint which formerly characterized the creeds. Every people considers itself the Chosen People: Frenchmen, "la Grande Nation"; Italians, the legitimate heirs of *Imperium Romanum*; Germans, the true repositories of culture, destined to make this a healthier and better world; the Slavs, the people of the future.

This national megalomania, which is also

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shared by the lesser nations, is artificially fomented by school and press, and does not fail to find expression in politics as well. Demagogues have long since learned that they can count on certain applause by flattering national pride and praising the superiority of their own nation to foreign nations. Of that knowledge they make full use; and accordingly, from the imagined superiority of their nation they deduce its moral right to force its higher culture upon its "barbarian" enemies, to denationalize and subdue them.

The chief standard-bearer of this national chauvinism is the middle-class intelligence, which knows its own culture and sees neighboring cultures only in the guise of caricatures. Illiterate folk are immune to this chauvinism, since they are acquainted with their own no more than with foreign cultures; universal minds are likewise immune to it, because they are no less familiar with foreign cultures than with their own, and love and revere greatness even though it be foreign.

Just as a past enlightenment overthrew fanaticism, so a future enlightenment will overthrow chauvinism and pave the way to national tolerance. This tolerance will supplement the love for one's own nation by respect for foreign nations, and lay the foundations for the cultural re-birth of Europe.

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2. The European Nation

Every nation is a sanctuary—as the hearth and home of culture, as the point of crystallization for morality and progress. Just as formerly the cathedrals were held to be centers of religious life, so today the universities are held to be centers of national life. A struggle against the national idea would be a struggle against culture itself. The struggle against national chauvinism would gravely compromise itself, did it not stop short at the national idea.

National chauvinism cannot be overcome by an abstract internationalism; it can be overcome only by deepening and broadening national cultures into a general European culture; by spreading the truth that all national cultures in Europe are closely interwoven parts of a great and homogeneous European culture.

In order to attain to this European cultural unity, the peoples of Europe must learn to know, as well as their own, the intellectual leaders of their neighbors, and to estimate how much they owe, or might owe, to them. The way to that goal leads through linguistic attainments and the production of numerous translations.

In the hearts of Europeans the national pantheon is to be widened till it becomes a European

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pantheon, in which Goethe would take his place beside Shakespeare, Voltaire beside Nietzsche, Hus beside Spinoza. If only the Germans, instead of poring over Buddha and Laotse, and sneering at the superficiality of French culture, were to set about assimilating the thoughts of the great Encyclopædists, they would soon become aware how many threads lead from the latter to the Weimar Classics, and how close are the bonds uniting all that is great in Europe.

Just as we speak of an Indian and a Chinese nation, although the peoples in question speak various languages, so the Chinese and Indians would be justified in referring to us as the European nation, as a great *universitas* whose faculties are the German, French, and other languages. For culturally Europe is far more homogeneous than India. India is divided by numerous languages and countless dialects, by several religions and many sects, as well as by the differences of its castes and races.

On the other hand, Europe is bound together by the Christian religion, by European science, art and culture, which rest on a *Christian-Hellenic* basis. The common European history began with the Roman Empire and the Migration of Peoples, was continued in the Papacy and Feudalism, the Renaissance and Humanism, the Reformation and Counter-reformation, Absolutism and Enlighten-

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ment, Parliamentarianism, Nationalism, and Socialism.

The constitutions and laws of the various European states are incomparably nearer akin to one another than once were the constitutions of the Greek city-states. The same style of writing, the same mode of life, and the same social stratifications unite the Europeans, the same views respecting morality and the family, the same customs and habits, the same manner of dress, the very fashions of which are subject to the same changes. Equally the artistic tendencies in European painting, literature, and music are international: Romanticism and Realism, Impressionism and Expressionism. No less identical are the problems of internal politics and of economic life.

Measured by these numerous points of contact in European life, the confusion of languages in Europe loses its significance. Moreover, it is mitigated by the fact that many of those languages may be regarded as nothing more than dialects.

The cultural unity of the Occident gives us the right to speak of a European nation, which is linguistically and politically divided into a variety of groups. If that Pan-European cultural sense succeeds in asserting itself, then every good German, Frenchman, Pole, and Italian will also be a good European.

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Those Europeans of Romanic, Germanic, and Slavic tongue will be the bearers of that European world culture which has already achieved, and in the future is destined further to achieve, great things in every sphere of human life.

3. Nations and Frontiers

A just fixation of national frontiers is impossible in Europe; for nearly everywhere the points of view which govern their determination are mutually contradictory.

These points of view are:

1. Language frontier
2. Geographic-strategic frontier
3. Historic frontier
4. Economic frontier

In eastern Europe the difficulty is further enhanced by the fact that even the fixation of just language frontiers is impossible, on account of the linguistically composite districts (such as the Banat of Temesvar, the Dobrudja, Macedonia) and the national enclaves (Magyar Szeklers in Rumania; German language islands in Czechoslovakia and Rumania; Rumanian and Albanian language islands in Greece, etc.).

Because of the impossibility of laying down just national frontiers in eastern Europe, the victors of the World War decided to cut the Gordian knot with the sword. Relying on the principle of

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might, they succeeded in enforcing a maximum of their own national, historic, and economic aspirations. Where right would have failed, might cast the deciding vote. Had the vanquished peoples been victorious, they would not have acted differently; for Brest-Litowsk and Bucharest give evidence of it.

The result of that fixation of frontiers on the principle of might has been that Poles, Czechoslovaks, Rumanians, and South-Slavs have succeeded in realizing all their national aspirations at the expense of Germans, Magyars, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Albanians.

In consequence, all the victorious nations of eastern Europe harbor powerful minorities. Most of these national minorities are suppressed by the majorities and rest all their hope on the collapse of the new fatherland as the result of another war. Impatiently they look forward to the resuscitation of Russia and Germany, and to the overthrow of the entire eastern European policy. The center of these hopes is Hungary, which was hardest hit by the manner in which the new frontiers were drawn.

Instead of relying on a generous policy of reconciliation to banish those internal and external dangers which force them to maintain armaments and thereby undermine their finances, the governments of the victorious nations, by attempts at de-

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nationalization, vexing language regulations, the closing of schools, and other chicanes, are provoking the minorities to an increasingly desperate resistance. This policy, consistently pursued, must lead to a general war in eastern Europe which may well end in a Russian hegemony.

In western Europe insufficient attention is being paid to that danger. There is but one way to end it, and that is: a true protection of minorities by the universal enforcement of a national edict of toleration—a Magna Carta of all European nations.

This edict of toleration must unreservedly permit nobody, no matter whom (so far as it is technically feasible), to make use of his mother-tongue in the courts and before the authorities without thereby incurring a penalty, and to have his children educated in the cultural community to which he happens to belong.

The view must gain acceptance that the Nation has assumed the heritage of the Creed, in a good as in a bad sense—its humanism no less than its fanaticism. Today men live and die, murder and lie, for their nation, as once they did for their religion. In order to do away with national conflicts, it is necessary to follow today the same course which led to the extirpation of religious conflicts.

In practice, the national states of today are re-

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lying on the national axiom: "Cuius regio, eius religio." Today the dominant nations are endeavoring to force the national minorities to denationalize themselves or to emigrate, as once the dominant creeds did in relation to the religious minorities. The barbarism of forcing one's own nationality upon anybody else against his will, is just as gross as that of forcing another person to accept one's religion.

It is incumbent on every cultured individual to bring it about that, as religion is today, so tomorrow nationality shall be the private concern of every human being. The future separation between Nation and State will be a cultural deed as great as was the separation between Church and State. The concept of a "State People" will be an anachronistic as great as the concept of a State Church, and will give way to the principle: a Free Nation in a Free State.

For the nation is a realm of the spirit and cannot be delimited by frontier-lines. The German nation does not end at the imperial frontiers: Austrians and South-Tirolese, German Bohemians, German Poles, and German Swiss belong to it as much as Prussians or Bavarians. It was neither established by Bismarck, nor abolished by the World War; for it is the realm of Goethe and Nietzsche, and one of the greatest and most fertile schools of European culture. The German na-

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tion is as independent of the German Empire as once the Catholic Church was independent of the Papal States; for it moves on a different plane. Thus the high-water mark of German culture, under Goethe, coincides with the lowest abasement of the Empire at the hands of Napoleon; and the same is true of the Italian Renaissance and the Greek cultural hey-day, both of which coincided with the period of the greatest political disruption.

Realizing this fundamental distinction between Nation and State, a German inhabitant, say, of Czecho-Slovakia, must act according to the principle: "Give unto Cæsar what is Cæsar's—and unto God what is God's"; he must, accordingly, fulfil his civic duties to his State, if he wishes to be regarded as a full-fledged citizen thereof, while ever upholding his cultural membership in his own Nation. At the same time he must endeavor to be a good Czecho-Slovak citizen, and an honest German. In Switzerland this mental attitude has long been a matter of course, since in that country national freedom rules supreme. In eastern Europe this attitude will equally become firmly established, once the national edict of toleration has become law; then also the clamor for national frontiers will subside, because membership in any particular state will be a matter of no importance.

This separation between Nation and State will

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everywhere facilitate economic recovery as well as the solution of the Social Question. It will rid Europe's political atmosphere of its poisonous elements and prepare it for the Pan-European solution. Any other attempted solution of the national question leads, on the other hand, to war and hence to Europe's destruction.

Europeans must come to realize the truth that the demand for justly drawn frontiers cannot be satisfied, but that the demand for stable frontiers can be. The case of Alsace-Lorraine gives a warning. Another war would substitute new for old injustices, and would exact millions of dead and wounded as the price of such altered frontiers. Bad frontiers, in spite of everything, are better than a ruinous war. Finally, as has happened in America, a stop must be put to the evolution of European frontiers, and the attempt to change them by force must be abandoned. If the American states were forever squabbling with one another regarding the justice of their frontiers, war on that continent would be a permanent institution. But they are too shrewd for that, and almost without exception they are content with their unjust and unnatural frontiers as they are drawn. From them Europe should learn a lesson.

There is but one radical way to a permanent and just solution of the European frontier question,

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and that is: not the alteration, but the abolition, of those frontiers.

The European who, in the interest of peace, is content with the political frontiers as they are, should concentrate all his energies upon their abolition, in a national, strategic, and economic sense. The Pan-European edict of toleration deprives the state frontiers of their national meaning; the Pan-European security-pact deprives them of their strategic meaning; and the establishment of the Pan-European customs union deprives them of their economic meaning.

If these three postulates are satisfied, then all inter-European points of friction which might lead to another war, disappear. The state frontiers sink to the level of national frontiers and lose their significance. Just as today it matters little to an inhabitant of Wittenberg whether his homeland be Saxony or Prussia, so then it will be a matter of indifference to a native of Reichenberg whether his home be Saxony or Bohemia.

Once the economic and national causes of the political hatred between neighboring states are removed, that hatred will automatically cease. What alone matters is that a Pan-European legislation should put a stop to the artificial fomentation of strife between the peoples, through the medium of school and press; that an identical law, in every country, should severely punish all national

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propagation of hate as being high treason to Europe.

An inter-European exchange of teachers, students, and children will materially hasten national reconciliations.

Within the framework of the great Pan-European commonwealth every nation will carry its own culture to perfection, in peaceful rivalry with its neighbors.

XI. THE WAY TO PAN-EUROPE

"All the States of Pan-Europe would gain more than they would lose by a federative union."

1. The Stages of Pan-Europe's Development

The development from European anarchy to Pan-European organization will proceed by stages.

The first step in the direction of Pan-Europe would be the calling of a Pan-European Conference, by one or more of the European governments.

This step of initiative, which would produce an enthusiastic echo throughout the world, might be taken, let us say, by Italy, the only European Great Power living in friendly relations with all the states of the continent.

The Little Entente would equally be in a position to summon that conference. It has already acted as mediator in many European crises and has a very strong interest in the confederation of Europe.

The initiative respecting the Pan-European Conference might also be taken by Switzerland, the international and federal structure of which

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provides a model for Pan-Europe, and which enjoys the full confidence of the entire continent. The same holds true of Spain, Holland, and the Scandinavian states, whose neutrality during the War predestines them to the rôle of mediators in time of peace.

Likewise Belgium, situated between Germany and France, would be called upon to invite its neighbors, and with them Europe, to the creation of a system which would render impossible, for all time, a recurrence of what happened in 1914.

Also France, the strongest Power on the continent, could take the initiative in the unification of Europe, as did the United States on another occasion. Her prestige would gain exceedingly by such action, while there would not be involved in it the slightest risk to her power.

Finally, Germany would no less be fitted to press forward the idea of Pan-Europe. An offer of permanent peace and of a compulsory Court of Arbitration addressed to all the states of Europe, combined with a Pan-European guarantee of the Versailles frontiers, would unfold the European Question and do much to restore Germany's moral prestige.

The program of this Pan-European Conference must be firmly outlined. Territorial questions must be excluded from the debate. Committees must be formed for the questions of a

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Court of Arbitration, of Guarantees, Disarmament, Minorities, Communications, Customs, Currency, Debts, and Culture.

The first conference must pass a resolution to meet periodically, as does its Pan-American sister, and to found a Pan-European Bureau analogous to the Pan-American Bureau, as the central organ of the movement for unification.

The second step toward Pan-Europe is the conclusion of compulsory treaties of arbitration and of security-pacts among all the democratic states of continental Europe. This step can be taken independently by every state, through the conclusion of binding arbitration treaties with other European states. But also those states which are determined under no circumstances to wage an aggressive war, can constitute themselves a peace alliance with a compulsory Court of Arbitration and reciprocal frontier guarantees. The advantages resulting to the members of that peace alliance would be so obvious that sooner or later all European states would voluntarily join it. In the Pan-European arbitration treaty, England is likewise to be included only if this guarantee is limited to the European parts of the British Empire; for any general guarantee would entail Pan-Europe's participation in all future Asiatic and Pacific wars.

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The third step toward Pan-Europe is the formation of a Pan-European customs union, the federation of Europe into a coherent economic sphere.* Such a transformation of the European economic system can take place only by slow degrees; but the preparations for the abolition of customs frontiers must be energetically pushed forward. Here, too, individual states—say, the Austrian succession states—might set an example to the rest by establishing customs unions, and possibly also monetary unions. By the extension and amalgamation of such customs unions the creation of the Pan-European economic region can be prepared and hastened.

The Pan-European efforts would be crowned by the constitution of the United States of Europe, after the pattern of the United States of America. Pan-Europe, in relation to the other continents and World Powers, would proceed as a unit, while within the federation itself every state would enjoy a maximum of freedom. Pan-Europe has two Chambers: a House of Peoples and a House of States. The House of Peoples would consist of three hundred members, each representing one million Europeans; the House of States, of

*In view of the preparations for the establishment of a Pan-British tariff system, the question of the Pan-European customs union is daily growing more acute.

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twenty-six representatives of the twenty-six European governments.

In Pan-Europe, no less than in Pan-America, the principle of the equality of all national languages must obtain; for technical reasons, however, all European states should resolve to make the English language a compulsory subject, first in their secondary, then in their primary schools. For in the world outside of Europe the development of English as the medium of international intercourse is one which can be stayed no longer; it would be shrewd if Europeans followed the example set by the Japanese and Chinese. The rivalry between the European languages would cease, and international understanding would be materially promoted, if every European knew English as an auxiliary language, in addition to his own national language. The ease with which the English language may be learned, and its intermediate position between the Germanic and the Romance language groups, predestine it to the position of a natural Esperanto.

2. Pan-Europe and the States

All the states of Pan-Europe would gain more than they would lose by a federal union.

The main advantages would be these:

- (1) Security from an inter-European war;

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(2) Neutralization of Europe in world-conflicts;

(3) Protection against invasion by a Red or White Russia;

(4) Possibility of disarmament;

(5) Ability to compete with the American and British industries—in the future also with the Eastern Asiatic and Russian industries.

The inevitable results of a continuance of the past European policy would be:

(1) Another European war, ending in a devastation and decimation of the continent;

(2) Perpetual politico-military interference of the extra-European Powers in European affairs;

(3) A Russian invasion and the establishment of a Red or White dictatorship in Europe;

(4) The necessity of competitive European armaments, ending in the financial exhaustion of the continent;

(5) Inability to compete with Anglo-Saxon industry; bankruptcy and economic servitude.

Leaving aside the general advantages, there would further accrue specific advantages to most of the European states.

The greatest advantage would be enjoyed by the states of eastern Europe. Pan-Europe would permanently insure their existence, which, as conditions are, they owe merely to the impotence of Russia and Germany; they would be re-

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lieved of the crushing burden of armaments, which overtaxes their powers and works havoc with their finances.

The Little Entente would be secured against the Hapsburg danger; Scandinavia against the Russian; the Balkan countries against the Turkish.

France and Belgium, thanks to the Pan-European Federation would be secure for all time against a German war of revenge.

Germany would be safe from encroachments by her neighbors, secure against reaction and bolshevism, and could unite with her racial brothers outside the imperial frontiers in the common Pan-European super-fatherland.

An immediate advantage would be gained by the national minorities in all states, as they would be insured against persecution, oppression, and denationalization. In their common motherland, Pan-Europe, they would again find, in a bloodless and peaceful manner, that union with their fellow-countrymen which otherwise could be achieved only by the destruction of their regions of settlement, by war and slaughter.

To the European colonial Powers would be guaranteed the possession of their colonies, which, in isolation, they would sooner or later be bound to lose to World Powers.

On the other hand, those European peoples who,

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as the result of their geographical position and historical destiny, did not receive fair treatment at the time when the extra-European world was divided up—such as Germans, Poles, Czechs, Scandinavians, and Balkan peoples—would find, in the great African colonial empire, a field for the release of their economic energies. They would, above all, help the Belgians and the Portuguese in opening up their colonial empires in Africa—a task which they could manage, unaided, but imperfectly.

Also the problem of the colonization of North Africa by Italy—a problem which threatens to lead to a conflict between France and Italy because Italy needs more room for its overflowing population—might find in Pan-Europe a peaceful solution which would be satisfactory to both sides. For in spite of France's administrative control of North Africa, the Italian colonizers would then have the same rights as the French.

For the great European colony of Africa, embracing the entire western portion of the continent which bears that name, is still in large part a closed territory. In order to convert it into the future granary and source of raw materials for Europe, two main tasks would have to be accomplished:

First, the partial transformation of the Sahara Desert into agricultural land;

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Second, the extirpation from Central Africa of sleeping-sickness, which renders cattle-breeding and colonization impossible in the most fertile districts.

These two problems, upon which the future of Africa depends, cannot be solved by military leaders or politicians, but only by engineers and doctors. Only the combined forces of all Europe can accomplish those tasks and open up Africa, after its political conquest, also in a cultural and economic respect.

3. Pan-Europe and the Parties

It is incumbent on all the democratic parties in Europe jointly to support the Pan-European movement.

For the successful inauguration of the Pan-European Federation provides the only sure means of protecting Europe's democracy against bolshevism and reaction.

The anti-democratic parties of the extreme Left and Right must likewise, in order to be consistent, pursue an anti-European policy. The communists desire union with soviet Russia; the national chauvinists desire the hegemony or, at least, the unlimited sovereignty of their own nation. The former want a soviet dictatorship; the latter, a military dictatorship. Both are determined to

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plunge Europe into another war. With a view to achieving those political ends, the European communists work along concerted lines, while the European militarists support one another indirectly.

These political aims are energetically pursued in the foreign sphere by communists and chauvinists, and the democratic center-parties—be they Social Democrats or Citizen Democrats—have no positive program of foreign policy to oppose to them.

Social Democracy's official program in the foreign field aims at the establishment of a Social-Democratic World Republic. By the division of Socialism into the Second and Third Internationales, however, that program has been *de facto* excluded. Social Democracy knows that, today, the victory of the World Revolution signifies its end. The case against the social revolutionaries has proved that the hatred of communism for Social Democracy exceeds its hatred for the bourgeoisie. It follows that Social Democracy must postpone the program of the World Revolution until the restoration of the Marxist United Front.

In a position similar to that of the Social Democrats are Europe's Citizen Democrats. As the former were disappointed by Lenin, so the latter were disappointed by Wilson; on him and his program they had founded their whole foreign policy. The League of Nations turned out to be

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as great a disappointment to them as the World Revolution was to the Social Democrats.

The consequence is that the two great European middle parties have lost their "foreign bearings" and must look to opportunism for guidance. By their lack of direction they abet the radical wings of the communist and chauvinist parties. The latter, by their positive and active foreign policy, have gained a great start over these middle parties, whose foreign policy is mainly negative and consists in the rejection of chauvinism and militarism, capitalism and bolshevism.

The present-day policy of the European democrats amounts to this, that the twenty-six European states shall live a peaceful but separate existence side by side, and independently engage in competition with the World Powers of the West. This aim is short-sighted and impracticable; for the states of Europe, by their position in world-politics, are forced to live either in opposition to, or in league with, one another—not simply side by side.

Every party in Europe, therefore, must decide whether it favors the overthrow of present-day Europe by means of another war, or its consolidation by means of the Pan-European Federation. Doubtless the democrats will decide for the peace alternative, which is identical with democracy and federation.

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The leaders of European socialism more clearly recognize the necessity of Pan-European unity than do the leaders of the middle class. As evidence of this I may quote one of the most radical of the Socialist leaders in Germany, namely, Reichstag deputy Georg Ledebour: *

"Capital, like the Proletariat, instinctively presses forward toward an economic world-system. But the monopolistic urge to exploit, which characterizes Capital, drives the capitalists of a country to resort, in the first place, always to the annexation or at least the economic subordination of the countries adjoining their own state, once the need has shown itself of economically and politically fusing their own productive regions with those of that neighboring country. But such a capitalist propensity toward an extension of power threatens invariably to grow into a 'national' war, with drawn sword in hand.

"If Germany were not completely defenseless, we should already be having such a 'national' war about the Ruhr district. The military occupation, for the time being, has produced only a state of passive resistance. The stirring of the national passions is its inevitable consequence.

"To find the escape from that fateful conflict is the most pressing task of the French and German proletariats. Having recognized the need (already apparent within the capitalist framework) of an amalga-

* "European Economic Union"—published in "The Class War," 1923.

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tion of the French and German economic spheres, we must draw the inevitable conclusion, which is: the unification of Europe as a coherent economic system. Even as it is, that need would be realized without difficulty, once socialism came to the helm. Socialism, which will regulate the entire world economy, must immediately free mankind from the bonds of exploitation, no less than from the inter-state customs barriers which impede it. But even now, while we still have to contend for power within our own capitalist state organisms, we are justified in addressing to the capitalistically organized states of Europe the demand for economic federation. For such a federation is in no way incompatible with the capitalist economic system. On the contrary, already a general need in that direction is making itself felt across the narrow national boundaries.

"True, it does not seem very probable that Europe's tottering capitalistic system still has the strength to perform such an act of self-healing. If it succeeded, Capitalism's lease of life would be prolonged thereby. Nor does this militate in any way against the interests of Socialism. In Europe, with its economic outlook, the closing-up of the international proletarian ranks for the common class struggle will take place all the more speedily and achieve all the more lasting results. Accordingly, we for our part are working in the interests of Socialism, if we elevate to a higher plane the development of Capitalism in Europe.

"Now, inasmuch as France and Germany, in consequence of a desire for economic union, originally shared by both, became involved in the Ruhr conflict, and as the

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capitalistic interests in both countries, with their nationalist bent, are blinded by that conflict, it is the duty of the French and German proletariats to point out the way to salvation—the United States of Europe. If the capitalist classes are unequal to that task, then the Capitalist chaos will all the more speedily be replaced by the Socialist order.”

The views of Ledebour are shared by the majority of Social Democrats in every state of Europe.

The attitude of the European bourgeois parties toward the question of federation is less clear; nevertheless it will be decisive as regards their own fate. History once more gives them an opportunity to perform a great creative act. If they fail to pass this test, allowing petty interests to triumph over world-historical necessities, they will be proving the bankruptcy of their class and their inability to guide the destinies of Europe in the future. Stronger arms will take up their heritage and complete the task which proved too great for them.

The Pan-European ideal offers the democratic parties an opportunity to pursue a positive and active foreign policy. By that program, of which the advantages are clear and the sacrifices would be slight, European democracy might regain the ground which it lost to communists and militarists. The propagandist appeal of the Pan-European “foreign program” is certain, in that it bursts

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through the narrowness of the chauvinist perspective, without losing itself in the clouds of cosmopolitanism.

Under the banner of Pan-Europe the shattered democratic parties of all European states could unite in order jointly to conduct European reaction. A parliamentary campaign, instituted simultaneously in all states in order to compel the holding of the Pan-European Conference, can introduce the offensive of the united democratic parties in Europe and manifest their power in relation to inter-European reaction.

It is the duty of all European deputies who are neither communists nor chauvinists, to broach the European Question in their parliaments and to strive for its settlement with a whole-hearted determination.

4. Pan-Europe's Opponents

In every battle each side must have an exact knowledge of its opponents and of their motives: so in the case of the battle for European unity.

The opponents of Pan-Europe may be divided into four groups:

1. the National Chauvinists
2. the Communists
3. the Militarists
4. the Protected Industries

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The noisiest, but not the most dangerous, opponent of the Pan-European idea in all countries will be found to be the national chauvinist. He will see in Pan-Europeanism the encirclement of his own nation; he will conjure up visions of a general process of denationalization on the American pattern; and he will protest, in the interests of national freedom and honor, against any relinquishment of national sovereignty.

Communism, less powerful in Europe, will combat European consolidation and any warding-off of Russian intervention by the demand for the impossible inclusion of soviet Russia in the Pan-European Federation.

Militarism will combat the Pan-European program for the reason that it renders impossible a repetition of the war which it desires; it will do so from ideal or from practical motives. This militarist Pan-Europe is made up of officers and ambitious politicians, no less than of the beneficiaries of the armament industry, and all those who stand to profit by another war.

The fourth group of Pan-Europe's opponents is the most dangerous and the most powerful.

This group consists of the industries which owe their existence to a protective tariff, since they would not be able to compete in a Pan-European economic system; of industries which owe their success, not to the quality or the cheapness of the

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goods they produce, but only to protective tariffs which exclude better and cheaper foreign goods.

To the industrialists in question the struggle for the customs frontiers means a struggle for their own material existence; a Pan-European customs union signifies their ruin. Accordingly, they will conduct the fight against Pan-Europe by every means at their disposal. They will buy newspapers and use them as weapons; they will order books and articles to be written by political economists, whose task it will be to prove that inter-European free trade spells ruin to Europe; they will attempt to stir up England against the Pan-European Federation; they will support nationalists and militarists, and will talk of national honor when as a matter of fact all they are really interested in is their own profit. They will even attempt to use their communist arch-enemies as battering-rams against Pan-Europe, and to enlist the working-class, by every demagogic device, against all that Pan-Europe stands for.

The demand for national protective tariffs is very intimately bound up with the European war menace, which forces every state to prepare for a conflict with its neighbors and hence to regard itself as a potential fortress which, if need be, must be able to satisfy all its own requirements.

So soon as the danger of a European war is dispelled, thanks to an inter-European understand-

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ing, the necessity of a closed national economic system, of a national autarchy, will likewise vanish. That confusion of the peace problem with the tariff problem aptly shows the interest of protected industry in the maintenance of international anarchy and in the propagation of national hate.

In order to justify politically the fight against free trade, national industry declares itself to be a national interest and its dissolution to be a national catastrophe.

This thesis is one-sided. Generally the industrialization of a district is followed by no increase of happiness on the part of its population. Thanks to it, contentment does not as a rule increase, nor does misery decrease. In Europe a sufficient amount of land is still available for allotment; agrarian reforms could in most countries provide sufficient land to absorb the workers thrown out of employment by the abolition of customs frontiers and of the national industries.

Thus through the progressive abolition of the inter-European tariff walls, proceeding hand-in-hand with the accomplishment of social reforms—above all, land reforms—neither the nations nor the workers would suffer injury; no one, indeed, would suffer save that group of industrialists who are unequal to a free competitive struggle in large inter-European industry.

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All European consumers, on the other hand, would profit by the improvement and cheapening of European goods which would result from free competition. The dangers which threaten from the outgrowths of the trust system, may be overcome by a socialist control, which can be carried out in Europe more easily than in America, since socialism in Europe has greater power.

In order effectually to combat that most dangerous and powerful enemy of Pan-Europeanism, what is needed is the consolidation of all those industries which have no foreign competition to fear, and which would gain new markets only as a result of inter-European free trade. These industries are, on the one hand, the agrarian, and, on the other, the monopolist, which in Europe are equal to any conceivable competition.

It is imperative to separate these Pan-European monopolist industries from the national tariff industries and to consolidate them in the service of the Pan-European idea. In that way the capitalist resistance to the United States of Europe might be broken by capitalism itself.

5. Pan-European Union

Before it can start its existence on the political map, Pan-Europe must first take root in the hearts and minds of Europeans. Bridges of understand-

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ing, of common interest, and of friendship must be thrown from people to people, from industry to industry, from guild to guild, from literature to literature. The Pan-European sense of solidarity, the European sense of patriotism, must establish itself as the crown and complement of the national sentiment.

Europe cannot wait until its governments and party leaders recognize the need for such unification; every man and every woman, convinced of the necessity of Pan-Europe, must place himself or herself at the service of that work, upon the issue of which depends the fate of a continent.

No one is so impotent as to be unable to contribute in some way to the settlement of the European Question; he can try to win adherents for the cause; he can make himself its advocate; during elections he can refuse to vote for any candidate who does not unequivocally declare himself against European anarchy and for Pan-European consolidation.

By propaganda in speech and writing, the European Question, as the problem of effecting the life of millions of human beings, is to be canvassed by the public opinion of every country, until every European is compelled to take his stand either for or against it.

A clear distinction must be made between Pan-

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Europeans and Anti-Europeans, between friends and opponents of federation. Once the Pan-Europeans have obtained the majority in every parliament of this continent, federation will be virtually accomplished.

In order to reach that goal, a movement and an organization are starting in every European state, whose object will be the building-up, by joint endeavors, of Pan-Europe: the Pan-European Union.

Europe's youth are called upon to lead this movement—the young in years and in heart. They refuse to be driven into the War of the Future by politicians grown incapable, by a sort of mental sclerosis, of changing their ideas.

They are being joined by Europe's women, who want to prevent their children, husbands, and themselves, from falling victims to the ambition of political adventurers.

The intellectual leaders of Europe are promoting that movement, in the knowledge that nationalist policy is becoming the grave-digger of European civilization, which can recover only by the establishment of a European brotherhood.

All well-intentioned Europeans are turning away from that policy of hate and envy which has brought Europe to the verge of utter ruin; they will flock to join the Pan-European movement because it is an honest attempt to realize

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what has long formed the substance of their dreams.

Men and women of all classes are coming forward, ready to make moral and material sacrifices to that great end. Just as the Pan-American movement owes a great part of its success to the generous spirit of Andrew Carnegie, so European Carnegies will also fulfil their duty toward Europe.

After this advance action will come the decisive struggle between the Anti-Europeans and the Pan-Europeans for the fate of Europe—the struggle between past and future, between purblindness and understanding, between barbarism and civilization.

The emblem under which the Pan-Europeans of all states will unite, is the Solar Cross: the red cross on a golden sun, the symbols of Humanity and of Reason.

This banner of love and of the spirit will wave one day, from Poland to Portugal, above a united World Empire of Peace and Freedom!

THREE YEARS OF PAN-EUROPE

Supplement written in February, 1925

I. WORLD POLICY

This book appeared in 1923, the year of the Ruhr occupation, the darkest and most discouraging year that Europe had known since the World War.

The following year, 1924, passed under the sign of the French May elections, of the Dawes Plan, and of the London Conference. The road was opened to a European understanding.

The year 1925 was the year of Locarno, which led to the first practical step toward European understanding and unification.

Thus Pan-Europe was a utopia in 1923, a problem in 1924, and a program in 1925.

The world-political tendency of these first three years of the Pan-European movement was:

(1) The stabilization and liberation of the new Europe grown out of the World War; the end of European strivings for hegemony, of sanctions, dictates, and revolts; increasing equality of rights as between victors and vanquished; increasing readiness for conciliation and coöperation.

(2) Increasing weariness of Europe on the part of America, Asia, Russia, and England.

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The outcome of the last presidential campaign in the United States showed, much to the surprise of Europe, that the overwhelming majority of Americans were unwilling to become co-responsible for the European situation by joining the League of Nations. America is drawing back into its own continent, ready to help Europe on condition that Europe will help itself; but America rejects all responsibilities and entanglements.

Asia is striving more and more for emancipation from Europe. Hand in hand with the cultural Europeanization of this continent goes its political de-Europeanization. Turkey, Persia, Arabia, Morocco, Egypt, Afghanistan, India, and China are seeking more or less successfully to free themselves from the guardianship of Europe.

Russia is supporting this anti-European policy of Asia and is itself becoming more and more an Asiatic Great Power. Its revolutionary efforts are growing weaker in Europe and stronger in Asia. It is drawing closer to China and coming to an understanding with Japan. It refuses to join the League of Nations and according to its sympathies is emancipating itself from Europe under the sign of Eurasia.

Following the victory of the Conservatives the imperial idea is fortifying itself in England. It finds its strongest expression in the completion of the Imperial fortress of Singapore, which forms

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the military center of gravity of the British Empire toward the Indian Ocean.

Egypt's attempt to gain independence is failing; England and the Dominions have twice refused a closer association with Europe in the League of Nations: first, through MacDonalld, the general security pact; then, through Chamberlain, the protocol.

Finally England is limiting itself to co-guaranteeing the Franco-German frontier in order to discharge its old promise to France; but at the same time it refuses to assume for Europe any guarantee going beyond that.

Thus for the European continent Locarno is a beginning; for England, an end. But England's interests are bound up with European peace and with the hope of Pan-Europe.

Parallel with this imperial development of England runs the increasing coöperation of the two Anglo-Saxon World Powers. This circumscribed entente has received a new impulse since the debt settlement and the adjustment of the Irish difficulties. Today the relations between England and America are not less cordial than those between England and Europe. England is becoming more and more a mediator between the two continents.

(3) In the last three years the foundations of Pan-Europe have been strengthened not only by

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the history of the European and the non-European world, but also by the development of the League of Nations. The latter's two well conceived efforts to insure world peace and thus render Pan-Europe unnecessary, have failed. The result of these efforts was the European Treaty of Locarno and the hope of extending it to include Pan-Europe.

With the same forced rapidity as the security and disarmament question, the economic question which the League of Nations has created must lead to Pan-Europe.

The time is not distant when the League of Nations itself will have to deal with the question of creating a Pan-European Section. The development of the world and of Europe is forcing it thereto. For in America it is powerless; there it has established itself upon the Monroe Doctrine, and hence has given itself into dependence upon a World Power which does not belong to it. In the realm of the British Empire it is powerless, since the latter's relations are controlled in London, not in Geneva. In East Asia it is powerless so long as the Russian and American World Powers continue to decide matters there as they please. Thus Europe remains the natural field of its activity; there it has secured itself, not only by Locarno, but also by preventing a Greco-Bulgarian war; there it has already figured in a practical

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way, not as a world organ, but as—Pan-Europe.

The necessity of Pan-Europe has increased, therefore, since the beginning of the Pan-European movement; but at the same time the possibility of Pan-Europe has become more obvious to those who three years ago doubted and despaired of it.

History has followed the road to Pan-Europe; when and how it will reach its goal, remains a question. But the way has been broken, and from the chaos of European politics after the World War there has emerged a lofty aim which gives new hope and new vigor to the Old World.

II. THE PAN-EUROPEAN MOVEMENT

The Pan-European Movement started in the fall of 1923 with the appearance of this book. Today, in the third year of its existence, it constitutes one of the strongest impulses in world politics.

The Pan-European movement began with the establishment of the Pan-European Union and with public discussion of the Pan-European program. At first the voices predominated which represented Pan-Europe as an ideal but utopian goal. This phase did not long endure; for the Pan-European Union quickly chimed in with European politics of the day and with its leaders.

In the summer of 1924, in the name of the Pan-European Union, I addressed an open letter to the newly elected members of the French Chamber of Deputies.* The first echo of official France came three months later, in October, 1924, when the new French President, Edouard Herriot, in a great speech delivered at the Sorbonne pleaded openly for the idea of the United States of Eu-

* Published by the Paneuropa Verlag, in "Kampf um Pan-europa," Chapter III, 1925.

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rope. The German Foreign Minister, Dr. Stresemann, answered this plea in terms of approval; and thereby the international discussion of the question was opened.

At the same time at the twenty-third World Peace Congress in Berlin the discussion of Pan-Europe stood forth prominently in the debate.*

The isolated voices which had called for Pan-Europe in 1924 became a mighty chorus in 1925, after President Herriot in his memorable speech of January 29, 1925, amid the plaudits of the French Chamber of Deputies had pronounced the words:

"Europe is no longer a small region of the world. May it renounce some of its old pride. Far off, on the Pacific Ocean, problems are presenting themselves which in the near future will probably demand the coöperation of the United States of Europe, which will demand everything that Europe has to offer in the way of power, work, science, technical knowledge and experience, in order to carry reason into those parts of the world which are still under the domination of the instincts.

"It is my greatest wish, to live to see the realization of the United States of Europe. And if I have devoted my energies with so much courage—I feel that I am justified in saying this—to the League of Nations, I have done so because in this great institution I have seen

† Published by the Paneuropa Verlag, in "Völkerbund und Paneuropa," 1925.

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the first rough draft of the United States of Europe.

"Let me say at the conclusion of these observations: There are people who must become reconciled because their collaboration is indispensable."

Since that day Pan-Europe has become a central problem in European politics. It has defenders and opponents; there are differences of opinion concerning small matters, especially with reference to England and Russia; but belief in the necessity and possibility of a European consolidation is increasing daily, and with it are increasing the number and power of the Pan-Europeans.

The periodical "Paneuropa" sent out a questionnaire containing the following questions:

"Do you regard the creation of the United States of Europe as necessary?"

"Do you regard the establishment of the United States of Europe as possible?"

To these questions 170 answers from leading Europeans were received and published,* and the great majority of them were in the affirmative.

Among the European leaders who have declared themselves for European consolidation either in the answers referred to, or else in public addresses, interviews, or articles, are such men as—Briand, Painlevé, Josvenel, Loucheur, Caillaux (who, like Nitti, has been fighting for the United States of

* See "Paneuropa," fascicle 1/3 and 6/7, second year.

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Europe for years), Marx, Loebe, Koch, Simons, Sforza, Skrzynski, Massaryk, Beneš, Vandervelde, Seipel, and Renner.

Through these Pan-European demonstrations of the political leaders of Europe the European Question has entered into a new and acute phase. The question is no longer *whether*, but *how* and *when*?

Some bring the politico-pacifist side of the question into the foreground and prefer the designation "United States of Europe"; others prefer the economic part and the designation "European Customs Union."

The greatest differences of opinion prevail regarding the English Question: that is, whether England without risking its world position can become a federal state of Europe. England alone can answer this question of destiny. Its answer might be a compromise, as Locarno indicates. For the negotiations which led to Locarno left no doubt regarding the fact that this security pact was the most extreme guarantee England could assume with respect to Europe without jeopardizing its empire.

Hence British policy with respect to Pan-Europe is affiliation, but not membership; understanding, but not federation.

England wants peace in Europe in order to

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have freedom of action for the accomplishment of its great imperial tasks on the shores of the Indian Ocean.

But precisely because England has the decisive word in the question of joining Pan-Europe this English Question cannot and must not lead to a division of the continental movement for unification in spite of the differences of opinion of Pan-Europeans in regard to the matter.

With the knowledge of the leading European aspirants to Pan-Europe the Pan-European mass-movement has begun. The press of all the parties has brought the problem up for discussion, and the idea has found enthusiastic commendation, not only among the Liberals and Social-Democrats of Europe, but also to a large extent among the representatives of national and conservative tendencies. Among the political parties of Europe the Social-Democrats and the Democrats of Germany have advanced ahead of the others with the example of including the United States of Europe in their party programs.

In the fall of 1925 the Inter-parliamentary Union resolved to work for a realization of a European Customs Union.

Numerous associations, especially representatives of the European Young Men's Movement, have declared themselves for Pan-Europe.

A Pan-European literature has come into ex-

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istence, as also have new periodicals and organizations which are working for the Pan-European idea in various ways and under various names.

Moreover, the European economic leaders, after the failure of the Ruhr policy, are perceiving the necessity of a Pan-European system of economy. Conferences, consultations, and agreements have begun in this direction and are now assuming more and more concrete forms.

For public opinion in Europe, to which three years ago Pan-Europe was either a stranger or a utopia, Pan-Europe is today neither a problem nor a program.

Divisions of the Pan-European Union are already, under the leadership of outstanding politicians, either formed or in process of formation, in Germany, France, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Austria, Hungary, and Switzerland. With other states negotiations are taking place concerning similar foundations.

The first Pan-European Congress, called together by the Pan-European Union, is to take place in Vienna in October, 1926.

In the United States of America an American Coöperative Committee of the Pan-European Union is being composed of leading personalities, with the object of promoting friendly collaboration with the Pan-European movement and with

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the future Pan-Europe. An analogous committee is being constituted in England.

In April, 1924, the official organ of the Pan-European movement, *Paneuropa*,* was opened with the Pan-European Manifesto.

In September, 1925, the Pan-European Union addressed to the General Secretary's Office of the League of Nations a memorandum † containing the proposal to carry out a federative reformation of the League of Nations in the sense of the Pan-European program—a reformation which would make possible the entrance of America and of Russia and at the same time create Pan-Europe. This memorandum culminates in the following proposals:

“The League of Nations can at once take the following steps leading to its expansion throughout the entire world and to the secure maintenance of European peace on the basis of the Pan-European program:

(1) Creation of Continental Sections on the basis of Article XXI of the Constitution of the League of Nations; first, a British, a European, and an American Section.

(2) Recognition of the principle of political continents.

*“*Paneuropa*,” 10 fascicles annually, *Paneuropa Verlag*, Vienna.

†“*Paneuropa*,” second year, fourth fascicle, Geneva, 1925.

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**(3) Proposal of a continental security pact—
for Pan-Europe and for America.**

**(4) Appointment of a Committee for the Re-
gional Affiliation in the League of Nations and
for the reformation of the Council of the League
of Nations.**

**(5) Negotiation with the United States, with
the Pan-American Union, and with the Union of
Soviet Republics regarding collaboration in this
reformation of the League of Nations on the basis
of decentralization, continental autonomy, and
the Monroe Doctrine.**

**(6) Creation of a European League of Nations
Group and Organization of States, and submission
thereto of all purely European problems.**

**(7) Elaboration of a Pan-European Collective
Treaty, combining the peace insurance of the
Geneva Protocol with the reciprocal protection of
minorities and the systematic abolition of customs
frontiers. Accession is open to all European
states and insures signatories of all political, eco-
nomic, military, and national protection resulting
from this agreement.**

**The signatories of this convention bear as a
state group the name: the United States of
Europe.**

**(8) Coöperation with the Pan-European Union
and the Pan-American movement.**

As representative of the Pan-European Union,

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in 1924 and 1925 I took several propagandist trips to Paris, Berlin, London, Rome, Warsaw, Prag, and Geneva, which brought me in touch with most of the leaders of European politics. At the end of 1925 I visited the United States of America for the purpose of delivering a number of addresses concerning Pan-Europe, of discussing the problems of Pan-Europe in their relation to America with leaders of politics, public opinion, and economics, and of calling to life an American auxiliary committee.*

The sympathetic interest evinced in America in the Pan-European idea indicates that in the oncoming contest between those who long for a unified, peaceful, and thriving Pan-Europe and those who want a continuance of the bloody past of our continent, America will unequivocally stand on the side of the Pan-Europeans.

* See "Paneuropa," second year, eighth fascicle, "Amerika."

III. WARNING

The unparalleled success which Pan-Europe has to show in the first three years of its existence has given proof that Europe is not yet benumbed, not yet lost—that faith, resolution, and courage are still stronger in Europe than skepticism, irresolution, and timidity—that Europe is now ripe, not for destruction, but for renovation and unification.

Europe has recognized that the World War destroyed the bridges leading to the past, and that every man who tries to go back across them will fall into the abyss, but that the World War left Europe in a waste in which it will starve if it stands still; and hence that the only way to safety, the way upwards and forwards, is the steep way to Pan-Europe.

The first stage of this way has been covered, and this fact must encourage every Pan-European to work and strive with redoubled energy.

The more rapidly the movement grows, the more rapidly the number of opponents and dangers increase.

Of all the opponents, however, the most danger-

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ous are those who mask themselves as adherents in order to divide the movement; and of all the dangers, the gravest are those which can increase because of the Pan-Europeans themselves.

It would be an inexcusable mistake to think the movement is yet strong enough to stand divisions without injury, and that the time has already come to push details into the foreground instead of assembling all forces for common action. There are still too many Anti-Europeans of too great power—men who talk in terms of Pan-Europeans but act in terms of Anti-Europeans. These men will take advantage of every weakness and disunion in the young movement in order to break it apart and thereby frustrate the renovation of Europe.

In the future, therefore, every man is an enemy of the Pan-European movement who attempts to divide it. The moral forces which are strong enough to transform Pan-Europe from a Movement and a Union into a Federation, are called *unity* and *courage*—union inwardly and courage outwardly.

For the struggle for Pan-Europe will become more and more difficult and severe according as the program approaches its realization. We cannot reach our goal by underestimating the difficulties and dangers, but only by remaining fully conscious of them; both, however, prevail by the power of conviction and of the will.

W A R N I N G

If the Pan-Europeans are united, they will ultimately prevail over the Anti-Europeans, who are divided by national and private egoism.

If the Pan-Europeans have faith, they will prevail over the skepticism of the Anti-Europeans, who have doubts about Europe because they have doubts about themselves.

Pan-Europe will come, in the name of Faith, Hope, and Love!

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THE PAN-EUROPEAN UNION

1. The Pan-European Movement is a non-partizan mass-movement for the unification of Europe. The Pan-European Union is the bearer of the Pan-European Movement.

2. The goal of the Pan-European Movement is the consolidation of all the European states that are willing and able to consolidate, into a political-economic federation based upon equality and peace.

3. The world-political program of the Pan-European Movement is: friendly coöperation with the League of Nations, as also with non-European states and state-groups.

4. The Pan-European Union holds itself aloof from all intervention in internal political affairs.

5. The Pan-European Union is organized according to states; but each state has its own organization and finances itself autonomously.

6. The Headquarters of the Pan-European Union is located in Vienna. It is the central organ of the Pan-European Council, in that in it all Pan-European organizations are represented, each by its own delegate.

WARNING

7. The emblem of the Pan-European Union is a Red Cross on a Golden Sun.

8. Admission to the Pan-European Union is open to all men and women, societies and associations. Applications for admission (give name, address, and occupation) are addressed to the Central Office of the Pan-European Union (Vienna I, Hofburg), or to the General Secretary's Office located in the country of the applicant.

Annual contribution of one mark, or more.

Emblems of the Pan-European Union are to be obtained from the Central Office for sixty pfennigs.

Membership cards and invitation blanks supplied free of charge on request.

Join the Pan-European Union!

Win new adherents to Pan-Europe!




TABLE I

THE STATES OF PAN-EUROPE					
I. THE CHIEF COUNTRIES			II. EUROPEAN WEST AFRICA		
	Thousands			Thousands	
	Sq. Km.	Inhab.		Sq. Km.	Inhab.
A. States			1. French Possessions	9,440	31,775
1. Germany	472,084	59,853	2. Belgian "	2,357	10,153
2. France	550,986	36,210	3. Portuguese "	1,297	4,629
3. Italy	310,095	38,886	4. Italian "	1,115	578
4. Poland	386,479	27,179	5. Spanish "	335	786
5. Spain	505,156	21,847	Total	14,544	47,921
6. Rumania	316,182	17,393	III. SCATTERED COLONIES		
7. Czecho-Slovakia	140,325	13,611			
8. Jugoslavia	148,989	12,017			
9. Hungary	92,805	8,119			
10. Belgium	30,440	7,540			
11. Netherlands	34,201	7,087			
12. Austria	83,904	6,527			
13. Portugal	91,948	5,033			
14. Sweden	448,460	5,988	1. Holland's Possess.	2,042	49,535
15. Greece	147,684	5,065	2. French "	1,759	27,296
16. Bulgaria	103,145	4,958	3. Portuguese "	788	3,344
17. Switzerland	41,298	3,880	4. Italian "	479	968
18. Finland	337,565	3,408	5. Danish "	88	14
19. Denmark	44,416	3,289	Total	5,156	81,157
20. Norway	223,798	2,650	SURVEY		
21. Lithuania	85,271	2,011			
22. Latvia	65,791	1,596			
23. Estonia	47,549	1,111			
24. Albania	87,554	877			
25. Luxemburg	2,586	261			
26. Iceland	102,846	95			
B. Territories					
1. Danzig	1,914	865	1. Pan-Europe	5,004	300,351
2. Monaco	21	22	2. European West-Africa	14,544	47,921
3. San Marino	59	12	3. Scattered Colonies	5,156	81,157
4. Lichtenstein	159	11	Total	24,704	429,109
5. Andorra	452	5			
Total	5,094,085	300,351			

TABLE II

1. THE INTERNATIONAL COMPLEX					
1. PAN-EUROPE			2. PAN-AMERICA		
	Millions			Millions	
	Inhab.	Sq. Km.		Inhab.	Sq. Km.
Mother-countries	800	5	U.S.A. (with colonies)	118	9-7
Colonies	129	19-7	Latin-America	91	22-8
Total	429	24-7	Total	209	82-5
3. EAST ASIA					
				Millions	
				Inhab.	Sq. Km.
China (with neighboring countries)			440	11-1	
Japan (with colonies)			80	0-68	
			Total	520	11-78
4. RUSSIAN FEDERATION			5. BRITISH FEDERATION		
	Millions			Millions	
	Inhab.	Sq. Km.		Inhab.	Sq. Km.
Soviet Russia	90	16-4	Mother-country and Dominions	70	20
Federated States and Realms	60	7	Colonies and Dependencies	894	19-3
Total	150	23-4	Total	464	39-3
2. POPULATION					
1. Pan-Eur.	2. Pan-Am.	3. East Asia	4. Russian Fed.	5. British Fed.	
Mother-countries Colonies	U.S.A. Latin-America	China Japan	Soviet Russia Fed. States	Mother-country and Dominions Colonies and Dependencies	
3. AREA					
1. Pan-Eur.	2. Pan-Am.	3. East Asia	4. Russian Fed.	5. British Fed.	
Mother-countries Colonies	U.S.A. Latin-America	China	Soviet Russia Fed. States	Mother-country and Dominions Colonies and Dependencies	