lised industries, especially to the tea industry, from the general body of consumers. It is practically a general taxation measure with a view to favour particular trades.

Apart from the balance of loss or gain the Ottawa agreement raises extremely important issues in other directions. It seeks to mould the direction of our foreign-trade and thereby the direction of our economic activity over a large field and it is necessary that we should clearly understand in what direction the change takes us. This is a time of growing economic particularism and Ottawa, falsely advertised as a prelude to world cooperation, is another indication of the same tendency. The recent denouncing by the United Kingdom of the trade agreement with Russia is a clear indication of the direction in which Ottawa leads. The Empire is to be converted into a closed economic system and it needs no deep study of the growth of protectionism during the last century to convince one that once the policy is adopted the system will become more and more closed. The argument that we can denounce Imperial Preference with six months' notice any time is highly specious. But everybody knows full well that once the policy is in operation for some years the vested interests that it will breed will make it extremely difficult to bring about any change. The Empire is a highly artificial economic unit and the adoption of Imperial Preference necessarily involves a considerable deflection of trade from its present channels. The question, therefore, that confronts us is not confined to the balance of loss or gain but extends to a consideration of the desirability of such a re-moulding of economic activities. And with regard to this the testimony of all those who have considered it has been adverse and even the Indian delegation to Ottawa admits that the adoption of a general preferential policy is not in the best interests of India. The best customers for our most important staples are all outside the Empire. There are only two policies or any combination of these, possible for India. We can aim at a more diversified and more self-sufficient economic life for our country or we can aim at specialisation under conditions of as free an international trade as is possible. No reasons, other than purely political ones, can be found to support the policy of an Empire division of labour; and politically, the future of India is extremely uncertain.

Mere trade bargains are innocuous, nay, they may in a large majority of cases be actually beneficial. And there is no

in appendix B the imports of these from the United Kingdom. We have given these figures for the four years from 1927-28 to 1930-1931 and in a separate column we have also indicated the average for the years 1927-28 to 1929-30. An average for these three years seems to us to give as reliable an index as possible of, if one may use the term, normal conditions in recent times. It will be this average that will be used throughout the following discussion. The figures by themselves are not very helpful and we have, therefore, in what follows taken each important group of articles on which preference is to obtain and examined it in some detail. We have in this examination deliberately relied mainly on one source of information-the annual reports of H. M. Senior Trade Commissioner in India and Ceylon (Mr. T. M. Ainscough) on the conditions and prospects of British Trade in India. These reports contain a variety of detailed and authentic information collected from trade and other sources and pay special attention to the competition met with by U. K. importers in the Indian market and the probable course and fluctuations of prices. In the individual examination of each head we shall give special attention to (i) the proportion of U. K. imports in the total imports under the head (ii) the various subgroups of that head and the extent of non-British competition therein (iii) the character of such competition.

We shall examine firstly those commodities to which preferential treatment is at present being accorded : Cotton manufactures and Iron and Steel.

Cotton Manufactures : The preference given to British Cotton piecegoods in 1930 was the occasion of a keen controversy in the Legislative Assembly. The principle of Imperial Preference was hotly discussed in that body but the reasons put forward for the granting of this preference were entirely other than the policy of preference. The official reasons for suggesting this course are fully explained in the note written specially for the occasion by Sir G. Rainy. The chief contentions sought to be established in this note are as follows. (i) the war and post war development in the Indian mill industry has been chiefly at the expense of the United Kingdom (ii) only about 1/8th of the imports from U. K. compete directly with Indian goods. (iii) that a duty higher than, 15 p. c. is entirely unnecessary for protecting this portion of Indian production .(iv) That though a higher duty on British goods might perhaps help Indian industry to develop more rapidly such

Imperial Preference for India

Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics
Publication No. 2.

Imperial Preference for India.

The Ottawa Agreement examined

BY

D. R. GADGIL, M. A., M. Litt. (Cantab.)

1932.

With the Director's Compliments,
for favour of review.

The Director will be glad to receive a copy of the issue containing the notice as soon as it appears.

GOKHALE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND ECONOMICS,
SERVANTS OF INDIA SOCIETY'S HOME,
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1932.

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D. R. GADGIL, M. A., M. Litt. (Cantab.)

Printed at the Aryabhushan Press, House No. 936/2 Bhamburda Peth, Poona City, by Mr. Anant Vinayak Patvardhan and published by Prin. D. R. Gadgil, M. A., M. Litt, at the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona No. 4.

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" Whatever the remoter objects, all tariffs other than tariffs solely for revenue have one common feature. The taxation imposed by them is discriminatory, falling on some articles and not on others, falling on articles produced in one place and not at all or more lightly on the same articles if produced elsewhere. It is intended on the one hand to discourage or prevent consumers from buying as they would like to buy, as they would buy if there were no tariff. It is intended, on the other hand, to encourage producers to produce as they would not produce if there were no tariff. It is both a restriction of the liberty of consumers and a changing of the environment for producers. This effect on production is the most distinctive feature of tariff taxation as compared with direct taxation. A tariff is nearly always intended to influence directly men's lives and livelihoods, to mould the economic structure in which each man must find his niche. That is the intention nearly always. It is always and inevitably the result. "

Tariffs : The case examined. by, a committee of Economists under the chairmanship of Sir William Beveridge (1931). Pp. 34-35.

PREFACE.

There is no need to emphasize the point that the Legislative Assembly will in its November session be faced with a problem of very great importance. The consequences of the adoption of an important tariff policy like that of Imperial Preference h s far-reaching implications the nature of which is made abundantly clear in the passage which we have quoted on the page opposite. It is not a policy which should be adopted light heartedly, without proper enquiry or under the influence of considerations of passing import-ance. If the Dominions adopt the Ottawa Agreements readily it is because they have clamoured for Imperial Preference for many decades past and as for the United Kingdom, it also is ruled to-day by a party whose faith in this policy is equally old. With India the case however, is entirely different. Lord Curzon's Government definitely repudiated Imperial Preference and even the majority report of the Indian Fiscal Commission does not countenance the adoption of a general preferential tariff such as is contemplated by the Ottawa Agreement. That the leaders of public opinion have been consistently opposed to Imperial Preference was made perfectly clear in the debates on the iron and steel and cotton manufactures duties in 1927 and 1930.

We are, therefore, now being asked to consent to a complete *volte face*; and the consent is to be extorted under pressure without giving any time for deliberation or enquiry. For such an extraordinary decision and such hurried procedure the main excuse that the Indian delegation has offered is the loss that stares us in the face on the 15th of November if we do not ratify the Ottawa agreement. In the body of this publication we have shown that the extent of the loss has been greatly exaggerated and that the large mass of our producers will be entirely unaffected if we do not ratify the agreement. The loss whatever its extent is likely to be chiefly borne by the tea industry and partially by the exports of tanned hides and skins. It is important to note that in the case of selective protection, such as is practised in India, the protective tariff gives, in effect, a subsidy to a particular trade or industry from the consumers of its products. The result of the Ottawa agreement will, however, be the grant of a subsidy to highly loca-

lised industries, especially to the tea industry, from the gener body of consumers. It is practically a general taxation measu with a view to favour particular trades.

Apart from the balance of loss or gain the Ottawa agreemei raises extremely important issues in other directions. It seeks t mould the direction of our foreign trade and thereby the directio of our economic activity over a large field and it is necessary th we should clearly understand in what direction the change tak us. This is a time of growing economic particularism and Ottaw falsely advertised as a prelude to world cooperation, is another i dication of the same tendency. The recent denouncing by t United Kingdom of the trade agreement with Russia is a clear inc cation of the direction in which Ottawa leads. The Empire is t be converted into a closed economic system and it needs no dee study of the growth of protectionism during the last century to co vince one that once the policy is adopted the system will becon more and more closed. The argument that we can denoun Imperial Preference with six months' notice any time is highl specious. But everybody knows full well that once the policy in operation for some years the vested interests that it will bre will make it extremely difficult to bring about any change. T Empire is a highly artificial economic unit and the adoption Imperial Preference necessarily involves a considerable deflection trade from its present channels. The question, therefore, that co fronts us is not confined to the balance of loss or gain but exten to a consideration of the desirability of such a re-moulding of econ mic activities. And with regard to this the testimony of all tho who have considered it has been adverse and even the Indian del gation to Ottawa admits that the adoption of a general preferenti policy is not in the best interests of India. The best customers f our most important staples are all outside the Empire. There a only two policies or any combination of these, possible for Indi We can aim at a more diversified and more self-sufficient econom life for our country or we can aim at specialisation under conditio of as free an international trade as is possible. No reasons, oth than purely political ones, can be found to support the policy of a Empire division of labour ; and politically, the future of India extremely uncertain.

Mere trade bargains are innocuous, nay, they may in large majority of cases be actually beneficial. And there is

reason why we should not enter into a trade bargain with any country because it happens to be a part of the British Empire. For example, if the Ottawa delegation had not gone beyond negotiating for a preferance for tea and linseed and free entry for a few products like tanned hides and skins, pig iron or shellac as against, say, the existing preferences on cotton piecegoods and iron and steel, the bargain could have been considered purely on its own merits. It would not have committed us specially towards either the United Kingdom or the British Empire and we could have had an entirely free hand in negotiating with the other countries. But the Ottawa agreement, with its long schedules commits us to a general preferential policy and to the principle of exploring Empire buying as far as possible and the supplementary agreement goes further and holds out the prospect of "rationalisation on Imperial lines"! The voluntary formation of international combines, cartels or trusts, we are all familiar with. But here a tariff agreement between two countries is being specially made so as to bring about such an understanding between the industries of the two countries. If there is to be rationalisation let it be on a world basis or the basis of a single country. Whatever is the special significance of a haphazard unit like the Empire in it? Either the policy of Imperial Preference is meant to be lasting and in that case there are no advantages to India in joining this economic block and becoming even more dependant on and tied up to the United Kingdom than it is at present. Or the policy is conceived of as a temporary measure preparing the ground for world co-operation. Then in the latter case it is obviously necessary that we do not commit ourselves so deeply as to remould our economic activities on an Empire basis.

Even though we are a protectionist country, there has been some method in our protectionist policy hitherto. We have been deliberate about the grant of protection and the possibility of revision and a definite term to the duration of each measure has been usually provided for. We are now invited to do that in favour of the British industrialist which we have never done for either Indian industry or agriculture in general. We are invited to give the British manufacturer a general measure of protection in our markets without previous enquiry and without an assurance that it will ultimately profit the consumer or that it serves a definite national end. The Ottawa agreement, we have been told,

cannot be treated like the report of a Tariff Board; it must be either rejected or accepted as a whole. After giving detailed consideration to the balance of immediate loss and gain and to the grave implications of the acceptance of a policy of Imperial Preference we have no hesitation in affirming that the larger interests of our country demand the rejection of the agreement presented by the Ottawa delegation.

I have to thank my friend Mr. V. R. Nayanar for his help in the preparation of the tables and the correction of proofs. I have also to thank Mr. A. V. Patvardhan of the Aryabhushan Press for expediting the printing.

Servants of India
Society's Home, Poona 4,
20-10-32.

D. R. GADGIL.

CONTENTS.

Appendix A

[Note. The preparation of the tables had to be taken into hand long before the report of the Ottawa delegation was published. There have consequently crept into them a few mistakes of additions and omissions. There have for example, been included in tables A and B camphor, asphalt and pruning knives. On the other hand apparel, cordage and rope, knitting machines and typewriters have been ommitted. These few imperfections however, do not, it is believed detract much from their utility or the broad validity of their conclusions.]

Value of Imports into India from all countries [*Rs. Lakhs.*

		1927–28	1928–29	1929–30	1930–31	Average for 3 years 1927–28 to 1929–30	* Average of U. K. imports	Percentage of col. 7 to col. 6
1	Cotton Piecegoods.							
	Grey.	2125	2019	2093	687	2079	1369	65·9
	White.	1542	1534	1328	621	1468	1349	91·8
	Coloured.	1752	1735	1515	682	1667	1136	68·3
2	Metals.							
	Aluminum.	119	108	142	101	123	41	33·3
	Brass	234	253	223	163	237	76	32·5
	Copper.	129	142	93	104	121	41	33·0
	German silver.	15	21	17	13	18	3	16·7
	Iron and steel.	2144	2024	1721	1089	1963	1161	59·1
	Lead.	12	9	9	7	10	5	50·0
	Zinc.	36	33	40	31	36	16	44·4
3	Cotton Twist and Yarn.	679	629	600	308	636	320	50·3
4	Motor Cars etc.	515	648	629	407	597	164	27·5
5	Hardware	524	523	507	360	518	192	37·1
6	Woollen manufactures.	537	502	428	231	489	168	34·3
7	Instruments and Apparatus.							
	Electrical.	283	313	361	311	319	200	62·7
	Musical.	23	25	35	26	28	16	57·0
	Photographic.	23	30	31	31	28	17	60·7
	Surgical.	23	21	22	17	22	14	63·7
	Scientific.	22	22	18	17	21	14	67·0
	Wireless.	16	14	7	8	12	8	66·7
	Other kinds.	23	27	28	31	26	19	73·0
8	Paper and Pasteboard.	301	330	372	287	334	118	35·4
9	Rubber Manufactures.	272	286	333	258	297	99	33·3
10	Chemicals.	265	248	297	261	270	151	55·9
11	Provisions etc.							
	Confectionery.	28	27	26	20	27	20	74·0
	Milk condensed. and Preserved.	83	89	88	79	87	28	32·2
	Canned & bottled fruit.	13	12	14	12	13	1	67·7
	Canned Fish	34	23	26	18	28	4	14·3
	Canned & bottled others.	63	66	67	62	65	44	67·7
	Cocoa and chocolate.	4	6	3	4	4	2	50·0
12	Drugs and Medicines	198	202	226	194	209	89	42·5
13	Paints and painter's. materials	155	144	147	112	149	105	70·5

Appendix A—(*Contd.*)

		1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	Average for 3 years 1927-28 to 1929-30	Average U. K. in insts	Percentage of col. 7 to col. 6
14	Lubricating oils other than batching	141	135	130	130	135	17	12·5
15	Building and Engineering materials.	129	122	134	110	128	70	54·7
16	Cycles.	118	129	119	72	122	102	83·6
17	Haberdashery and Millinery.	127	134	104	73	122	28	23·0
18	Liquors.							
	Ale, beer and porter	104	100	111	102	105	64	60·9
19	Stationery.	92	102	105	81	100	55	55·0
20	Earthenware and Porcelain.	81	73	72	48	75	28	37·3
21	Toilet requisites.	62	65	73	54	67	26	38·8
22	Toys and requisites for games.	64	67	65	49	65	16	24·6
23	Umbrellas etc.	63	57	44	31	54	14	25·9
24	Toilet soap.	47	50	50	31	49	38	77·6
25	Miscellaneous Leather manufactures	41	39	39	29	40	32	80·0
26	Cutlery.	39	36	41	26	39	11	28·2
27	Furniture and cabinetware.	31	37	38	28	35	13	37·1
28	Asbestos manufactures.	37	33	32	28	34	26	76·5
29	Boots and Shoes of leather.	29	26	21	13	25	20	80·0
30	Oils.							
	Fish.	5	6	6	7	6	3	50·0
	Vegetable essential.	10	10	15	10	12	3	25·0
	Vegetable non-essentials.	9	8	8	5	8	8	100
31	Firearms.	24	22	19	16	22	14	63·7
32	Cartridges and cartridge cases.	15	19	15	13	16	11	68·8
33	Vehicles not mechanically propelled.	17	17	14	11	16	8	50·0
34	Brushes and Brooms	14	15	14	12	14	5	35·7
35	Perfumed spirits.	13	12	11	8	12	6	50·0
36	Oil cloth and floor cloth.	9	10	12	7	10	5	50·0
37	Glue.	4	7	9	8	7	2	28·6
38	Smoker's requisites.	6	5	4	2	5	2	40·0
39	Leather cloth and artificial leather.	4	4	6	4	5	3	60·0
40	Engine and boiler packing.	5	4	4	4	4	4	100
					Total	13233	7624	

* Column 6 from Appendix. B

Appendix B.

Value of Imports into India from the United Kingdom.

		1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	Average for the 3 years 1927-28 to 1929-30
1	Piece goods—					
	Grey	1554	1378	1176	281	1369
	White	1420	1423	1203	523	1349
	Coloured	1259	1199	950	448	1136
2	Metals—					
	Aluminium	48	36	40	21	41
	Brass	89	84	56	28	76
	Copper	45	49	30	30	41
	German Silver					
	Iron or Steel	1364	1190	929	513	1161
	Lead	7	4	4	3	5
	Zinc	20	15	12	5	16
3	Twist and Yarn	309	356	296	127	320
4	Motor cars, etc.	170	163	159	94	164
5	Hardware	206	189	180	131	192
6	Woollen Manufactures	211	165	128	67	168
7	Instruments and Apparatus—					
	Electrical	185	199	215	174	200
	Musical	12	11	20	15	14
	Photographic	17	18	17	17	17
	Scientific	15	15	13	10	14
	Wireless	11	9	4	5	8
	Other kinds	17	21	20	23	19
	Surgical	15	13	13	10	14
8	Paper and Pasteboards	110	123	122	89	118
9	Rubber Manufactures	96	90	111	74	99
10	Chemicals	147	147	159	141	151
11	Provisions—					
	Confectionery	21	21	19	15	20
	Milk Condensed and Preserved	32	33	28	26	28
	Canned and bottled fruit	1	1	1	1	1
	" " fish	4	4	4	3	4
	" " others	41	44	46	40	44
	Cocoa and Chocolate	2	3	2	2	2
12	Drugs and Medicines	84	89	95	64	89
13	Paints etc.	112	104	100	74	105
14	Lubricating Oils	14	13	24	20	17
15	Building and Engineering Materials	75	70	65	48	70
16	Cycles	101	107	97	47	102
17	Haberdashery and Millinery	30	27	26	18	28

Appendix B—*(Contd.)*

		1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	Average for the 3 years 1927-28 to 1929-30
18	Liquors Ale Beer and Porter	63	61	69	64	64
19	Stationery	53	55	56	44	55
20	Earthen ware and Porcelain	30	28	26	18	28
21	Toilet requisites	24	26	28	19	26
22	Toys and requisistes for games	15	17	15	12	16
23	Fish Oil	4	3	3	4	3
24	Vegetable essential Oils	3	3	4	2	3
25	Vegetable non essential oils	9	8	7	5	8
26	Umbrellas	16	16	11	6	14
27	Toilet Soap	37	39	39	24	38
28	Miscellaneous Leather Manufactures	35	31	31	20	32
29	Cutlery	10	11	11	8	11
30	Furniture and cabinetware	13	13	14	12	13
31	Asbestos manufactures	30	25	22	18	26
32	Boots and Shoes of Leather	22	20	17	10	20
33	Firearms	16	13	13	11	14
34	German silver	2	3	3	2	3
35	Cartridges and cartridge cases	11	11	11	9	11
36	Vehicles not machanically Propelled	9	8	7	6	8
37	Brushes and Brooms	6	6	5	4	5
38	Perfumed spirits	5	5	5	3	5
39	Oil cloth and floor cloth	5	5	6	3	5
40	Metal Buttons	1	1	1	·5	1
41	Glue	2	2	2	2	2
42	Smokers' requisites	3	1	2	1	2
43	Leather cloth and artificial Leather	2	2	4	2	3
44	Engine and Boiler Packing	4	4	3	3	4
45	Cork manufacture	1	·9	·6	·7	1·9

Appendix C.

Value of Exports from India to all countries. [Rs. Lakhs.

		1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	Average for years 1927-8 to 1929-30	Average of exports to U.K. *	Percentage of col. 7 to col. 6.
1	Jute Manufactures	5356	5690	5193	3189	5413	203	3.8
2	Rice	3364	2599	3128	2582	3030	58	1.9
3	Raw Jute ...	3066	3235	2717	1288	3006	694	23·1
4	Tea	3248	2660	2601	2356	2826	2432	85·9
5	Ground nuts ...	1563	1937	1639	967	1713	103	6·0
6	Dressed & Tanned hides	412	440	343	260	398	363	91·2
7	Dressed and tanned Skins ...	495	491	462	368	483	403	83·4
8	Cotton Manufactures	867	780	719	522	789	35	4·4
9	Shellac	569	682	568	229	606	156	25·6
10	Linseed ...	452	331	572	541	452	110	24·3
11	Oil Cakes ...	314	384	312	208	337	112	33·2
12	Castor seed ...	258	246	215	156	240	59	24·6
13	Pig lead ...	215	215	245	217	225	116	51·6
14	Pig iron ...	179	211	259	170	216	15	6.9
15	Wheat ...	441	169	21	195	210	162	77.1
16	Spices	240	159	196	127	198	28	14.2.
17	Coffee	232	169	145	192	182	54	29.6
18	Pulses (including beans) ...	187	181	164	105	177	37	20.9
19	Wood (mainly teak)	166	177	180	140	174	88	50.6
20	Fodder, bran and Pollards ...	137	145	119	77	134	93	69.4
21	Manures ...	128	128	125	123	125	4	3.2
22	Tobacco ...	106	129	106	104	114	38	33·3
23	Cotton seed ...	145	133	55	23	111	106	96·0
24	Mica	93	90	103	63	95	43	45·3
25	Myrabolans ...	132	80	78	78	93	39	41·9
26	Carpets and Rugs...	92	94	85	67	90	44	48·9
27	Barley... ...	85	165	7	1	86	26	30·2
28	Hemp Raw ...	81	88	68	39	79	12	15·2
29	Non essential Vegetable oils ...	29	37	32	24	33	7	21·2
30	Sandal wood oil ...	22	27	33	13	24	8	33·3
31	Coir manufactures.	·7	1·1	·8	·6	·9	·2	22 2
					Total	21659·9	5648·2	

* Column 6 from Appendix D.

Appendix D.

Exports to United Kingdom from India. [*Rs. Lakhs.*

		1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	Avarage for years 1927-28 to 1929-30
1	Jute manufactures	201	206	201	121	203
2	Tea	2844	2235	2219	1995	2433
3	Ground nuts	63	121	124	72	103
4	Dressed and tanned hides	335	393	310	251	363
5	Dressed and tanned skins	430	392	387	323	403
6	Cotton manufactures	36	27	41	19	35
7	Lac	188	205	159	70	184
8	Linseed	112	37	181	124	110
9	Oil cakes	104	112	119	92	112
10	Castor seed	71	55	50	33	59
11	Pig Lead	80	113	154	166	116
12	Spices	39	20	26	11	28
13	Coffee	67	40	54	52	54
14	Pulses (including beans)	40	37	35	19	37
15	Wood (mainly teak)	74	89	101	74	88
16	Fodder bran and Polards	88	106	86	47	93
17	Manures	4	4	4	4	4
18	Tobacco	26	47	42	38	38
19	Cotton seed	141	132	54	22	106
20	Carpets and Rugs	48	46	38	38	44
21	Barley	40	32	6	1	26
22	Non essential vegetable oils	7	8	7	7	7
23	Sandalwood oil	9	8	8	8	8
24	Coir manufactures	18	20	20	18	19
25	Rice	773	50	50	97	58
26	Raw Jute	168	757	556	223	694
27	Shellac	163	174	131	154	156
28	Mica	43	43	43	35	43
29	Myrabolans	47	36	34	38	39
30	Hemp Raw	15	10	12	5	12
31	Pig Iron	10	2	33	38	15

Appendix E.

Shares of Foreign countries in India's imports.

PERCENTAGES.

	Name.	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	Average for years 1927-28 to 1929-30
1	United kingdom	47·7	44·7	42·8	37·2	45.6
2	Japan	7·2	7·0	9·8	8·8	8·0
3	U. S. A.	8·2	7·1	7·3	9·1	7·5
4	Germany	6·1	6·3	6·6	7·5	6·3
5	Java	5·9	6·5	5·7	6·3	6·0
6	Belgium	3·0	2·8	2·8	2·8	2·8
7	Italy	2·7	2·9	2·8	2·7	2·8
8	Straits Settlements	2·3	2·0	2·6	2·4	2·3
9	Netherlands	1·9	1·9	1·8	1·9	1·9
10	Persia and Austria	1·8	1·9	2·1	2·8	1·9
11	China	1·8	1·7	1·7	2·0	1·7
12	France	1·7	1·9	1·9	1·7	1·8
13	Australia	·8	2·3	2·3	1·5	2·1

Appendix F.

Shares of Foreign Countries in the exports from India.

PERCENTAGES.

	Name of the Country	1927–28	1928–29	1929–30	1930–31	Average for years 1927–28 to 1929–30
1	United Kingdom	25·0	21·4	21·8	24·0	22·7
2	U. S. A.	11·1	11·8	11·6	9·4	11·5
3	Japan	8·9	10·2	10·2	10·6	9·7
4	Germany	9·9	9·6	8·4	6·3	9·3
5	France	4·9	5·3	5·3	4·9	5·1
6	Ceylon	4·8	4·2	4·2	5·0	4·4
7	Italy	3·9	4·5	3·6	3·5	4·0
8	Belgium	3·3	4·0	3·8	3·4	3·7
9	China	1·4	2·8	4·1	5·9	2·7
10	Netherlands	2·4	2·6	2·8	2·9	2·6
11	Straits Settlements	2·8	2·4	2·5	2·8	2·5
12	Central and South America	3·3	3·3	3·2	2·3	3·2
13	Australia	2·0	2·2	1·8	2·0	2·0
14	Persia, Arabia, etc.	2·5	2·1	2·1	2·2	2·2