

DISARMAMENT

PREPARATIONS FOR THE GENERAL CONFERENCE

(February 1932)

Information Section,
League of Nations Secretariat,
GENEVA

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NOTE

This pamphlet should not be regarded as an official document engaging the responsibility of the League.

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Chapter I

PREPARATIONS FOR THE GENERAL CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

INTRODUCTION

The first General Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments opens at Geneva on February 2nd, 1932, [under the presidency of Mr. Arthur Henderson.

Invitations have been addressed to sixty-four Governments of the world, comprising all the Members of the League and the following non-members: Afghanistan, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Hejaz, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

The limitation and reduction of armaments is a vast undertaking, towards which the League has been directing its efforts from the beginning. There has been no previous attempt to reach universal agreement on armaments, and the League, realising the magnitude of the task, has always assumed that this first Conference will not be regarded as an isolated event, but as a vital stage in the continuous and progressive treatment of the problem.

The technical difficulty alone of securing an agreed assessment of the land, naval and air forces of all the States of the world is great; but still more difficult is the adjustment of political thought, which constitutes the supreme factor. The sense of security, for example, from whatever angle it may be considered, is largely a matter of political confidence. Many treaties and agreements, which have done much to make war more difficult and to develop methods of peaceful settlement, have all been designed to fortify confidence, and it is on these developments that disarmament possibilities are at present mainly founded. The first results will, in a great measure, depend on the degree of faith in these instruments and on the general political situation.

Whether reduction of armaments is in itself a necessary contribution to international confidence, or only a symptom of the degree of confidence so far attained, is a matter of argument which is reflected in the difference of emphasis on the need of strengthening the sense of security by such methods as mutual guarantees of assistance. Undertakings of this kind exist in specific agreements, such as those negotiated at Locarno, and in the wider terms of the Covenant ; but opinions differ about their adequacy, and the difficulty is to reach an agreed calculation of their effect in actual terms of reduced armaments. The whole problem goes to the root of international relations.

It is not the purpose of this pamphlet, however, to do more than give, as far as possible, a plain summary of the conditions with which the Disarmament Conference will be confronted. Attention is devoted more to the existing state of affairs than to the past. All that is attempted is a brief introduction explaining the approach to the subject, a description of the terms of the draft Convention submitted to the Governments by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, a summary of the position which the various Governments have taken with regard to the draft, and a review of subsequent developments.

OBLIGATIONS AND ASSURANCES

The general armaments obligations of States Members of the League are contained in Article 8 of the Covenant, which includes the following paragraphs directly relating to limitation and reduction :

“ The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

“ The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

“ Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

“ After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council

“ The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes. ”

Independently of these provisions of the Covenant, armaments questions are raised by Part V of the Peace Treaties in the military, naval and air clauses. The Preamble of Part V says :

“ In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations [here is given the name of the country on which these clauses of the Treaties have been imposed] undertakes to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow. ”¹

¹ Some of the main features of the Peace Treaties are as follows :

The German army is limited to 100,000 effectives, recruited on a basis of voluntary enlistment and long service ; conscription is abolished, tanks and armoured cars are forbidden, as well as guns and howitzers above a certain calibre. Trade in arms and war material is forbidden, and fortresses and fortified works are abolished and prohibited in specified areas.

Naval forces are limited to 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 torpedo-boats ; no warship must exceed 10,000 tons. The total naval personnel must not exceed 15,000, recruited on a basis of voluntary enlistment and long service. No submarines are permitted.

The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces or any dirigibles.

The carrying out of these clauses was regulated by Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, and, when these came to an end, a system of League control was substituted, according to the Treaty, whereby the League may, by majority vote, send a commission of enquiry into Germany (or, in virtue of the other Treaties, into Austria, Bulgaria or Hungary) on the demand of any State Member.

Similar Treaty conditions were applied to Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary, whose armies were limited as follows : Austria, 30,000 ; Bulgaria, 20,000 (afterwards raised to 35,000) ; and Hungary, 35,000.

When the German delegation were presented with the draft of the Treaty of Versailles in May 1919, they made a declaration stating that Germany was prepared to agree to the basic idea of the army, navy and air regulations provided that this was a beginning of a general reduction of armaments.

In reply to this declaration, it was stated that "Germany must consent unconditionally to disarm in advance of the Allied and Associated Powers". After explaining the reasons why the regulations had been made in relation to Germany, the Allied and Associated Powers added that the regulations were also the first step towards the reduction and limitation of armaments which they sought to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war and which it would be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.

These are the principal obligations and assurances upon which discussion has been based.

There have also been numerous other assurances, and there is the recommendation in the final Protocol of the Locarno Conference in which Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Poland make the following declaration :

"The representatives of the Governments represented here declare their firm conviction that the entry into force of these treaties and conventions will contribute greatly to bring about a moral relaxation of the tension between nations, that it will help powerfully towards the solution of many political or economic problems in accordance with the interests and sentiments of peoples, and that, in strengthening peace and security in Europe, it will hasten on effectively the disarmament provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

"They undertake to give their sincere co-operation to the work relating to disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations and to seek the realisation thereof in a general agreement."

Chapter II

THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

Early in 1920, the first year of the League's existence, the Council appointed the Permanent *The Permanent and Temporary Commissions.* Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions, consisting of army, navy and air force officers of each of the countries represented on the Council. At the first Assembly, however, in the autumn of the same year (when an effort was made to secure a two-year budget truce), it was recognised that the problem transcended technical considerations ; and the Assembly decided to set up what was known as the Temporary Mixed Commission, composed of recognised authorities on political, social, economic and military matters. This Commission continued in existence until the Assembly of 1924.

The first definite suggestion put before it came from Lord Esher (a member of the Commission). *The Esher Plan.* He proposed that, as had been done at Washington with naval armaments, a common measure should be fixed for the comparison of land and air forces, and that the armaments assigned to the various Powers should be represented by a ratio ; he proposed that the common measure should be fixed at 30,000 men. This was rejected, and attention was turned to the wider issues, especially those of a political nature, from which arose the Commission's effort to develop a system of mutual guarantees.

There was a long controversy between those *The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance.* who favoured regional guarantees, in the form of defensive regional treaties with a reduction of armaments proportionate to the guarantees, and those who favoured general guarantees, general treaties, and a general reduction of armaments. Eventually, the Commission reached a compromise in the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which declared aggressive war to be an international crime, maintained the principle of

general assistance, but provided also for the conclusion of supplementary defensive agreements by which signatories undertook, in case of aggression, to put into immediate execution plans of assistance upon which they might previously have agreed. These supplementary agreements were to be examined by the Council. The draft established machinery by which States threatened with aggression, or victims of aggression, would be entitled to assistance from all the other Members of the League, but the Treaty did not attempt to define acts of aggression. A commentary on this subject, attached to the draft Treaty, contained a number of points which were embodied in later proposals. Mutual assistance was to be given only to parties which had reduced their armaments, and the signatories would undertake to co-operate in the preparation of any general plan of reduction which the Council might propose and to carry out this reduction within a period of two years.

The 1923 Assembly communicated the draft Treaty to the Governments for their comments.

The Draft Treaty fails. It became obvious, when the 1924 Assembly met, that the draft Treaty could not be brought into force unless completely transformed. There

were those who held that it would complicate international relations without providing any serious prospect of a reduction of armaments sufficient to compensate for these difficulties; there was renewed criticism of partial treaties as involving the danger of a return to the system of alliances; and it was argued that, while developing the sanctions (or coercive) provisions in the Covenant, the plan made no attempt to obtain a corresponding development of the system of renunciation of war and peaceful settlement of disputes. On the other hand, there was criticism of the absence of sufficient criteria for the determination of the aggressor, and there were further criticisms by those who, while favourably disposed, desired to strengthen the guarantees of assistance.

The 1924 Assembly, faced with this situation, endeavoured to meet it by the far more comprehensive plan known as the "Geneva Protocol". The Protocol, which repeated the denunciation of aggressive war, made compulsory arbitration

the foundation of the proposed system. The jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice was made compulsory in cases covered by the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Court, and no other disputes, save those held to be matters of domestic concern, were exempt from compulsory arbitration. Parties were pledged to accept judicial decisions, arbitral awards, or unanimous Council decisions ; and failure to carry them out would constitute a breach of obligations involving consequences and sanctions according to the gravity of the case. If the parties resorted to war, the aggressor was to be determined on the principle of presumption of aggression (unless proof to the contrary was forthcoming in a decision of the Council) when resort to war was accompanied (1) by refusal to accept the procedure of arbitration, (2) by a violation of provisional measures enjoined by the Council, or (3) by disregard of other similar obligations.

The Protocol was designed to settle all controversies over the application of the sanctions provisions in Article 16 of the Covenant. Each signatory State was bound to collaborate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any act of aggression, in a degree compatible with its particular situation in regard to armaments. Each State was to be the judge of the way in which it would carry out its obligations, but not of the existence of these obligations. The entry into force of the Protocol was to depend on a General Disarmament Conference to be summoned in June 1925, and on the adoption by this Conference of a plan of reduction of armaments. The Protocol could be invoked only by States considered by the Council to be carrying out such a plan.

The Protocol was adopted by the Assembly ;
The Protocol but, early in the following year (1925), the dis-
rejected. cussion which took place in the Council left
little hope of general acceptance. The principal
arguments against it were advanced by the Government of
Great Britain, which was a different one from that which had
been in office at the time of the 1924 Assembly. This Government
disliked the new emphasis on coercive measures and the new
occasions provided for their employment. It considered it most
unwise to add to the liabilities already incurred without taking
stock of the degree to which the machinery of the Covenant had

already been weakened by the non-membership of certain great States. It suggested, as a better solution, that the Covenant should be supplemented by special arrangements to meet special needs.

The preliminaries to the Locarno negotiations were at that time under way, and the Assembly, in September 1925, recorded its approval of these efforts with a recommendation that, after such treaties had been deposited with the League, the Council should examine them and report to the seventh Assembly on the progress in general security thus brought about. The Council was also invited to encourage any preparatory steps for the organisation of a Disarmament Conference, so that it might be summoned as soon as satisfactory conditions had been assured from the point of view of general security.

The Locarno Agreements were concluded a few weeks later, and signed on December 1st, 1925. They come completely within the framework of the League and correspond with the spirit and with some of the definite features of League work. The territorial *status quo* as between Belgium and Germany and France and Germany is guaranteed, as stipulated in the articles of the Treaty. Belgium and Germany and France and Germany mutually undertake in no case to resort to war against each other ; provisions are made for the peaceful settlement of all disputes between them, and, in the event of the violation of the undertaking not to resort to war, the signatories, which in addition to the other three Powers include also Great Britain and Italy, severally agree to come to the assistance of the Power against which such violation is directed. Czechoslovakia and Germany and Poland and Germany at the same time concluded arbitration treaties for the peaceful settlement of all disputes between them.

A direct consequence was Germany's entry into the League in the following year.

A week or two after the signature of the Locarno Agreements, and in the same month (December 1925), the Council set up the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, which consisted of representatives of all States Members of the Council and of certain States

considered as being in a special position as regards disarmament. The United States of America has been a member of the Commission since the beginning, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics since November 1927, and Turkey since March 1928. Germany has always co-operated in its work, and, after her entry into the League in 1926, sat normally on the Commission as a permanent Member of the Council.

The Preparatory Commission held six sessions : the first in May 1926 ; the second in September 1926 ; the third in March and April 1927 ; the fourth in November and December 1927 ; the fifth in March 1928 ; the sixth in April and May 1929 (first part) and in November and December 1930 (second part). Its task was the preparation of a draft treaty for the limitation and reduction of armaments. During its early meetings, scarcely a problem of major importance escaped controversy.

The starting-point of the Commission's work was the circulation to Governments of a comprehensive questionnaire covering the different ideas on what should be the principles underlying a disarmament treaty. In the preparation of this questionnaire and in the subsequent proceedings of the Commission, there were serious divergencies. Some were eventually settled ; others remain.

Among the controversies (since settled or *The Chief* remaining still unsettled) have been whether *Controversies.* all armaments should be considered as interdependent, or whether naval, military and air armaments should be limited separately ; whether trained reserves should be included in the limitation of personnel ; whether war material for land forces should be limited directly by numbers and weight, by annual expenditure, by some combination of these methods, or whether publicity alone should be provided for ; whether naval armaments should be limited by total tonnage or by tonnage by separate categories of vessels ; whether there should be international supervision, and, if so, how it should be exercised, or whether reliance should be placed solely on good faith ; whether a disarmament convention should cover civil aviation, etc. Many other questions, such as the relative potential war strength of States in their industry and man power and the best way of making good any

disparity in this respect by guarantees of mutual assistance, have been prominent, and have also figured in the prolonged debates on security.

The discussions have passed through many phases and have been influenced in one way or another by events happening outside the League. It had been hoped, for example, that the Three-Power Naval Conference, summoned at Geneva by President Coolidge in 1927, would help to settle the naval difficulties which were troubling the Commission. That hope was not fulfilled ; but, on the other hand, the progress made on arbitration and security persuaded the 1928 Assembly that the time had arrived for the conclusion of a first general convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments. Later on, the London Naval Conference, at the beginning of 1930, considerably eased the naval side of the Commission's labours. A summary of the main provisions, of the Washington and London Naval Treaties is given in one of the annexes attached to this pamphlet.

One other feature of the meetings of the Preparatory Commission should be noted. The Soviet Union of Soviet Socialist Republics first proposed complete and universal disarmament within a maximum period of four years, and, as this was not accepted, they then proposed a partial and gradual reduction of armaments on the basis of a fixed percentage. The principle put forward on the latter basis was that the strongest Powers should reduce their armaments by 50 per cent, the medium Powers by 33 per cent, and the weak Powers by 25 per cent, with the application of the same principle to the reduction of naval tonnage. The objection of the Commission as a whole — though the German and Turkish representatives considered the plan contained interesting principles which would tend to stimulate the work of the Commission — was that the Soviet proposals took no account of the connection established by the Covenant between security and disarmament, were founded on principles which had been rejected some time before (the Esher plan), and encroached upon the prerogatives of the future Disarmament Conference, which the Commission considered the only competent body to deal with actual figures.

* * *

Before turning to the final results of the *Arbitration and Security* Preparatory Commission, an account should be given of the work done by the Arbitration and Security Committee, created in 1927, and of other efforts towards the establishment of confidence and security which led to the Assembly resolution of 1928 (page 14).

Included in the results of the work of the *The General Act* Arbitration and Security Committee are a number of model treaties of various kinds, some of which were recommended by the Assembly as examples of treaties which might be concluded between States, and have, in fact, served as a basis for a number of arbitration and conciliation treaties. By an Assembly decision, three model general conventions drafted by the Committee were afterwards combined in one convention known as the "General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes", which is now in force between nineteen States. By its provisions, all legal disputes are to be referred to the Permanent Court; all non-legal disputes are to be referred to conciliation commissions, and, in the event of failure, the subject of dispute is then to be referred to an arbitral tribunal for final and binding settlement.

Another plan initiated in the Arbitration and *Draft Convention to improve the Means of preventing War* Security Committee was the German proposal designed to improve the means of preventing war. States would give an undertaking that, in the event of any dispute in which they might become involved before the Council, they would carry out conservatory measures indicated by the Council. The proposal eventually came before the Assembly in the form of a draft convention, some points of which were referred to a committee for report to the 1931 Assembly. This committee produced an agreed report, which was communicated to the Governments with a request that their delegates should be empowered to take a decision at the 1931 Assembly. This Assembly approved the final terms of what is known as the

draft Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War, and expressed an earnest hope that a large number of States would sign it before the opening of the Disarmament Conference.

Great progress has been made in the acceptance by Members of the League of the *Optional Clause* for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice in all legal disputes. By September 1931, the clause had been signed by forty-six States and ratified by thirty-seven.

A further step in the same direction of confidence and security is the *Convention on Financial Assistance*, whereby, on the Council's authority, a State threatened by, or the victim of, aggression may be enabled to borrow money for self-defence. By this Convention, which was adopted in 1930 and is conditional on the entry into force of a plan for the reduction of armaments, a State attacked or in danger of attack may, with the permission of the League Council, raise loans which are guaranteed within certain clearly defined limits by the signatories to the Convention. The treaty comes into operation only on behalf of States accepting a League disarmament treaty under Article 8 of the Covenant, and the obligation to guarantee loans, besides being strictly limited in amount, comes into force primarily in circumstances when the Members of the League are in any event pledged to support and protect a fellow-Member against a peace-breaker under Article 16 of the Covenant. That is to say, the Convention on Financial Assistance is one means of discharging the financial obligations contained in Article 16 of the Covenant. The Council of the League must be unanimous in refusing access to the loan scheme to a signatory who has been attacked, provided the latter undertakes to submit the dispute to judicial or arbitral settlement, or to any other pacific procedure considered suitable by the Council.

The Convention may also be used as a last attempt to preserve peace and avert the danger of war. The Council may, if it be unanimous, grant financial assistance to a signatory undertaking

to submit its dispute to peaceful settlement and to conform to provisional measures for safeguarding peace recommended by the Council, when the other party has refused to take such steps and the Council considers that peace cannot otherwise be preserved. The Council may at any time suspend, either temporarily or permanently, the payment of whatever proceeds of the loan are still outstanding.

In short, the Convention on Financial Assistance puts into the hands of the Council an additional means to preserve or restore peace, and affords the Members of the League a convenient and practical means of discharging part of their obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant, and of making effective the peace-keeping action of the League under Article 11.

Much has been done also to clarify the possibilities of League action under Article 11 of the Covenant, and to facilitate rapid action by the League in times of crisis.

A landmark in the organisation of peace was the adoption of the Paris Pact for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, which came into force in July 1929 and is binding on the vast majority of the States of the world. Previously, in 1927, the Assembly, on the proposal of Poland, had passed a resolution in a similar sense, and the League is considering the amendment of the Covenant so as to bring it into harmony with the Paris Pact. The texts of proposed amendments, drafted by a special committee, were considered by the 1931 Assembly, whose First Committee reported that the principal difficulty and the only serious obstacle to success still lay in the hesitation of certain Members of the League to agree to an extension of their existing obligations to give assistance, even if such extension were only theoretical.

“ It may be hoped ”, says the report, “ that agreement would be greatly facilitated by the entry into force of a general convention for the reduction of armaments. Certain Members of the League, for example, have announced their intention of making their ratification of the amendment of the Covenant conditional on the entry into force of the Convention for the

Reduction of Armaments. Other Governments have expressed, as the date of the Conference draws near, preoccupations which would appear to be satisfied to some extent by the adoption of the proposed amendment.

“ Thus, on the eve of the Conference, the link between the undertakings has been further strengthened. Certain States have expressed a desire to know, before giving an opinion on the amendment of the Covenant, to what extent and for how long the Convention for the reduction of armaments will satisfy the requirements of Article 8 of the Covenant.

“ Such being the case, it would be inexpedient to attempt at present to frame final texts. The most suitable method would appear to be for the Assembly to set up a Committee for the amendment of the Covenant, consisting of representatives of the Members of the League, in order that they may, during the Conference for the Reduction of Armaments, endeavour to arrive at unanimous agreement on the bases set forth in the present report. The amendments might then be finally voted during the next session of the Assembly. ”

This course was adopted by the Assembly, which reaffirmed its intention to insert in the Covenant a general prohibition of recourse to war and the principle that the settlement of international disputes must be sought by pacific methods only.

The link between the Covenant of the League and the Paris Pact was further demonstrated by the active collaboration of the Government of the United States of America, as one of the promoters of the Paris Pact, with the Council of the League, during its consideration of the Sino-Japanese situation in Manchuria.

* * *

It was in November and December 1930 that the Preparatory Commission completed a draft Convention in the terms and conditions explained later. At its January (1931) session, the Council fixed February 2nd, 1932, as the date of the General Conference, to be held at Geneva, and, at its May session, appointed Mr. Arthur Henderson as President.

Chapter III

ANALYSIS OF DRAFT CONVENTION

Prefatory Note.

The draft Convention is not an agreed document, but represents the nearest approach to agreement which the Preparatory Commission was able to reach. It will be the task of the Conference to settle the points at issue.

Some of the articles were accepted by majority votes, abstentions were frequent, and there were numerous reservations of varying importance, either on the grounds that particular articles did not go far enough or that they went too far. Of proposals made and rejected, sometimes by narrow majorities only, many were characterised by a desire to go farther. The reservations and the rejected proposals are obviously matters of negotiation and discussion either before or during the Conference.

There are one or two general observations to be made. The draft Convention is designed to provide the framework by means of which limitation and reduction of armaments may be achieved. It prescribes the ways and means ; it does not prescribe the figures. It will be for the Conference to define its practical scope by fixing the figures. As explained in the Convention and in the Preparatory Commission's commentary on it, such figures as are mentioned in the articles and in the annexes of the draft Convention are merely illustrative.

The following pages deal separately with each part of the draft Convention and contain, first, a brief analysis of the articles, then an account of the reservations, and, finally, a summary of the various points of view as revealed in discussion. This is completed by a summary of the general attitude to the draft Convention as explained in the concluding observations of the delegates on the Preparatory Commission.

Described briefly, the Convention opens with a general article

in which States agree to limit, and, as far as possible, to reduce, their respective armaments in accordance with its terms. It provides for the limitation of effectives in time of peace and the limitation of the period of service in conscript armies; indirect limitation of land material by means of a limitation of expenditure; the direct limitation by tonnage and gun-calibre of naval material; the limitation of expenditure on material for naval armaments; the limitation of the total number, horse-power and volume for dirigibles; the limitation of the total number and horse-power of aeroplanes; and the limitation of total annual expenditure on land, sea and air armed forces and formations organised on a military basis. It provides for publicity and exchange of information, for the prohibition of the use of chemical arms, for the creation of a Permanent Disarmament Commission, and for procedure regarding complaints.

The Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions, referred to in the draft Convention, met after the Convention had been completed and adopted a unanimous report, together with a draft annex to certain articles of the draft Convention, and a model statement in regard to expenditure on national defence, with annexed tables. The report ¹, etc., was sent direct to the Governments in March 1931, in accordance with the decision of the Council, which, in May, decided that the Governments should be asked to fill in the model statement in preparation for the Conference.

GENERAL RESERVATIONS

The Convention consists of sixty articles. Attached to the Convention as a whole are general reservations made by the German, Turkish, Norwegian and Irish Free State delegations.

Germany dissociated herself from the majority of the Commission. She reserved the right to submit to the Conference any proposals regarding standards of reduction and limitation which she might consider appropriate. As indicated both in

¹ See pa 37ge and Annex 2.

the reservations to particular provisions and in the observations presented by the German delegate to the Preparatory Commission, these refer mainly to the method and extent of the limitation of land effectives and material, but also to various other points.

Turkey reserved the right to submit her own proposals to the Conference. The system suggested by Turkey is that a maximum limit of forces should be fixed, calculated on the basis of the legitimate requirements of a large country for its national defence against sudden aggression. Armed forces exceeding this limit should be reduced gradually, and those already below the limit should remain unchanged.

Norway not having taken part in the earlier work of the Commission, her delegate made a general reservation on the attitude that his Government might adopt at the Conference, and a similar statement was made by the delegate of the Irish Free State.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics made no formal reservations, but their general attitude, as explained subsequently, was that the results of the work of the Commission were entirely negative.

THE OPENING ARTICLE

The Convention opens with a general article by which the contracting parties "undertake to limit and, so far as possible, to reduce their respective armaments as provided in the present Convention".

The representatives of a number of Governments, while accepting the principle of limitation and reduction in the spirit of Article 8 of the Covenant, stated that the reduction of all or some of the categories of armaments was not possible for them, their present armaments being far from sufficient to guarantee national safety. This reservation was made in precise form, particularly in relation to naval and air armaments, which, it was declared, were scarcely developed in the majority of States.

Points of View. The Soviet delegation proposed that the article should read simply "to limit and to reduce". This received some support, but the majority of the Commission considered that it was too rigid, that it took no account of the situation of certain countries, and that the form of the article, "so far as possible to reduce", could not be said to prejudice the general principle of reduction. Everything would depend upon what the Disarmament Conference was able to accomplish.

PART I. — PERSONNEL

There is to be a limitation of peace-time
(a) *Effectives.* effectives in land, sea and air forces and formations organised on a military basis. Calculation is to be based on the number of the average daily effectives. This number for any year is found by dividing the total number of days' duty performed in any year by the number of days in such year (see example in footnote). By formations organised on a military basis is to be understood police forces of all kinds, gendarmeries, Customs officials, forest guards, etc., which, in time of peace, are so organised and equipped as to be capable of being employed for military purposes without measures of mobilisation. It will be for the Conference to decide whether particular forces or organisations in any given country fall within these general descriptions.

For land forces, there will be limitation also of professional soldiers as apart from conscripts. For naval forces, limitation is to apply to the aggregate number of effectives, while publicity tables are to show separately the number of officers and men who have completed a specified period of active service. For air forces, it was not thought possible to make a distinction

Example. — If 1,000 men do 25 days' duty in any year and another 1,000 men do 50 days' duty in the same year, the total number of days' duty performed in this year is $1,000 \times 25$ plus $1,000 \times 50 = 25,000$ plus $50,000 = 75,000$. Divide this total by the number of days in the year in question (365) and the result is the "average daily effectives" for the year — in this case 205.

between officers and men, the difference in their functions not being so clearly distinct as in land and sea forces.

The contracting parties are to limit, in their land forces, the maximum armed forces stationed in the home country, and the maximum total of their armed forces ; tables showing separately the maximum of armed forces overseas are optional. In air armaments, there is to be limitation of the maximum total of forces, separate tables on maximum air forces at home and overseas being optional.

The period of service in forces recruited by
(b) *Period* conscription is limited for each country, and
of Service. there is also to be a general international
limitation.

Reservations. The principal reservation was made by Germany. Germany objected that the stipulations did not provide — either directly, or by a reduction in the number of the annual contingents, or by a strict determination of the period of active service — for a reduction or limitation of trained reserves, who constituted the main body of the personnel in countries possessing conscript armies. Neither did the stipulations provide for any method whereby the effectives of conscript armies serving with the colours and in reserve, and professional effectives, whose military value is naturally not capable of comparison, could be reduced to comparable units of calculation.

France declared that she could not accept the specific limitation of professional soldiers in land or air forces unless similar provision was made for limitation in sea forces.

Germany, Italy and Turkey made reservations with regard to the proposals concerning home and oversea forces.

The central point at issue on effectives has
Points been whether trained reserves should be included
of View. in the limitations. Trained reserves are men
who have gone through training in conscript
armies and are liable to be called up in time of need.

Those who have consistently opposed the inclusion of trained reserves are chiefly States with a system of compulsory national service ; they contend that trained reserves cannot be limited

without affecting the general principle of national service, and also that they cannot be limited so long as the problem of potential war strength in industry and man-power remains unsolved. The view expressed by certain States is that the problem can be met by limiting the period of service with the colours, so that the effective military value of men who pass into reserve is reduced proportionately with the reduction of the period of training.

Some States, including the United States of America and Great Britain, were for some time favourable to the limitation of trained reserves ; but, without changing their views on the subject, they subsequently gave way on this point, partly because they considered it difficult, if not impossible, to limit trained reserves under conscription (abolition of which was recognised as not possible at the present time), and partly because they considered that, if progress were to be made, it was necessary to make this concession to the conscriptionist States whose objections to the limitation of trained reserves were fundamental.

China has on many occasions proposed, without success, the abolition of conscription, and has reserved the right to raise the question at the Conference.

The point of view of several States, and particularly of Germany, is that effective reduction of armed forces is impossible without the limitation of trained reserves. Their exclusion (Germany declared) might be conceivable only if all the signatory States had a free choice ; but, under the existing treaties, there were States which did not possess this freedom and which were obliged to give up the formation of trained reserves. A convention which neglected so important a consideration could not be regarded as equitable.

Germany suggested that the value of trained reserves might be estimated, not by their numbers, but by a scale of military values, and another German proposal, which was put to the vote, was that there should be limitation of the annual contingents summoned to the colours. This was rejected by twelve votes to six (Norway, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the Netherlands and Germany), with certain

abstentions. The objection made to this suggestion was the same as that on the general question — namely, that it infringed the principle of national service.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considered the reduction of reserves as an integral and essential part of disarmament.

PART II. — MATERIAL

A. *Land Armaments.*

By a majority of sixteen votes to three, with six abstentions,¹ it was decided to apply the principle of indirect or budgetary limitation to war material for land armaments — that is to say, limitation of the annual expenditure of each contracting party on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for land armaments.

In pronouncing on this article at the Conference, the Governments will take into account the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts which met after the Preparatory Commission had concluded its work.²

The United States of America, while declining *Reservations*. budgetary limitation in any form so far as the United States was concerned, did not wish their attitude to constitute an obstacle to agreement on the part of other Powers. They were therefore prepared to apply, so far as they themselves were concerned, direct instead of indirect limitation, provided some practical budgetary method were generally agreed upon in a form sufficiently detailed and precise to constitute an effective means of limitation.

Germany made a general reservation, as, notwithstanding its extraordinary importance, the material in service and in reserve

¹ *For* : Belgium, British Empire, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Greece, Irish Free State, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Persia, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Yugoslavia.

Against : Germany, Italy, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstained : United States of America, Bulgaria, China, Sweden, Turkey, Venezuela.

² See page 37.

of land armed forces and land formations organised on a military basis was only covered by limitation of expenditure, and not by reduction and limitation of specific articles and of numbers as in the articles applying to air armaments and naval floating material. On limitation of expenditure as such, Germany reserved the right to take a decision after considering the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

Turkey made her acceptance of budgetary limitation conditional upon account being taken of the special position of countries in which industry is not adequately developed.

Points of View. This problem of the relative effectiveness and equity of direct and indirect limitation has been one of the outstanding controversies in the Commission.

By direct limitation, of which Germany has been the most emphatic protagonist, is meant the limitation directly by number of the various categories of material.

The partisans of direct limitation regard it as a perfectly feasible method, because it has already been applied to some countries in the provisions of the Peace Treaties. It would enable countries to know precisely what were the armaments of their neighbours, and would prevent States compensating for the limitation of man-power by unlimited stocks of material. Its opponents hold with equal emphasis that direct limitation would be illusory, owing to the difficulty of defining different categories or kinds of weapons ; that it would be practically impossible in regard to small arms and spare parts ; that it would operate unfairly against States obliged to buy war material abroad ; and that it implied international control of a kind which most countries were not ready to accept. The indirect method, they claim, avoids these difficulties. A further argument advanced by opponents of direct limitation is that of potential industrial war strength. The advocates of direct limitation reply that the indirect system does not cover material in existence at the date of the coming into force of the Convention, that it fails to furnish information on the market value of armaments, and does not furnish suitable means of comparison for the purposes of reduction.

Italy, who was responsible for a proposal in the Commission to combine the two methods of direct and indirect limitation, considered that the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission, with the task of watching over the execution of the Convention (as foreshadowed in other articles of the draft Convention) appeared sufficient to remove the objection that direct limitation was inconceivable without supervision.

Great Britain considered that direct limitation would prove unsatisfactory, difficult to define, and difficult to control. Where control had been tried, it had caused irritation, and it was not a method likely to spread confidence. If she could be satisfied that, in certain of the bigger weapons, some method of direct limitation would be reasonably satisfactory and generally acceptable, she would not oppose it, but, unless combined with some other limitation, it would be unsatisfactory.

The American delegation were partisans of direct limitation, with complete publicity for expenditure, weights and numbers, and put forward the suggestion contained in the American reservation already noted. It was observed by the Norwegian delegate that some combination of direct and indirect methods had not been precluded.

Germany held direct limitation to be a *conditio sine qua non* of any acceptable convention. It was the only way to disarm. It had been done once, and could be done again. Budgetary limitation alone was not acceptable, because it did not cover the tremendous amount of material accumulated in anticipation of war.

Japan saw reasons against both the systems proposed, but was prepared to accept budgetary limitation if applicable equally to all countries.

Russia stood for the simultaneous acceptance of both methods.

France's attitude was that, in the experiment of direct limitation already tried, it had been found that it did not afford any accurate estimate of a country's military position.

A vote was taken on the application of the principle of direct limitation ; nine States voted in favour of it, nine States against,

and seven abstained. ¹ A proposal to combine the two methods was also put to the vote, nine States voting for, eleven against, and five abstaining ².

As already stated, the Commission finally adopted the principle of indirect or budgetary limitation by sixteen votes to three.

B. *Naval Armaments.*

Note. — All the figures and dates are given as illustrations only ; most of them correspond to those contained in the Washington and London Naval Treaties, which, in a large degree, are the basis of this part of the draft Convention.

Each fleet is to be limited to a total (global) tonnage figure, and each State is to show how its total tonnage is distributed amongst the five different categories of war vessels. These categories comprise : ³

- Capital ships (divided into two sub-classes) ;
- Aircraft-carriers ;
- Cruisers (divided into two sub-classes) ;
- Destroyers ;
- Submarines.

¹ *For* : United States of America, Canada, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela.

Against : Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Japan, Persia, Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia.

Abstained : British Empire, Bulgaria, China, Greece, Irish Free State, Norway, Spain.

² *For* : Canada, Germany, Irish Free State, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela.

Against : Belgium, British Empire, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Japan, Persia, Poland, Roumania, Spain, Yugoslavia.

Abstained : United States of America, Bulgaria, China, Greece, Norway.

³ The definition of a capital ship is (1) a vessel of war, not an aircraft-carrier, exceeding 10,000 tons standard displacement, or carrying a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches ; (2) for parties who do not possess any capital ship exceeding 8,000 tons standard displacement : a vessel of war not exceeding 8,000 tons standard displacement, and the calibre of whose guns exceeds 8 inches.

Aircraft-carriers are surface vessels of war of whatever displacement designed for the exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft, etc.

Light surface vessels, comprising cruisers and destroyers, are other vessels not exceeding 10,000 tons and with guns not exceeding 8 inches. Cruisers are vessels within this limit but exceeding 1,850 tons, with a gun above 5.1 inches, and are divided into sub-categories : cruisers carrying a gun above 6.1 inches and cruisers not carrying a gun above 6.1 inches. Destroyers are vessels not exceeding 1,850 tons and with a gun not above 5.1 inches.

Power to transfer tonnage from one category to another, regulations for which will have to be established by the Conference for each signatory, is to be conditioned by the three following principles :

1. Account must be taken of the special circumstances of each Power and of the classes of ships involved ;
2. Powers whose total tonnage does not exceed a certain maximum limit (100,000 tons is given as an illustration) will have full freedom of transfer as regards surface ships ;
3. The amount of the transfer allowed other Powers is to vary in inverse ratio to the total of tonnage possessed by each of them.

Before laying down ships for the construction of which transferred tonnage has been assigned, due notice must be given to all the signatories, the length of this notice being left for the Conference to decide.

There is to be a limit to the tonnage and gun calibre ¹ of the capital ship, the aircraft-carrier and the submarine.

No vessel coming under the limitation imposed by the Convention is to be replaced until it becomes over-age.

Detailed rules for the disposal of vessels of war by scrapping and by other means are set forth.

No preparation is to be made in merchant ships in time of

¹ For these limits the figures of the London Naval Conference, cited as illustrations only, are : 35,000 tons displacement and 16-inch guns for the capital ship ; 27,000 tons displacement and 8-inch guns for the aircraft-carrier (and for aircraft-carriers of 10,000 or less, 6.1-inch guns ; 2,000 tons and 5.1-inch guns for the submarine.

Capital ships are deemed to be over-age 20 years after completion subject to such special provision as may be necessary for existing ships ; aircraft-carriers, 20 years, subject to the same provision ; surface vessels exceeding 3,000 tons but not exceeding 10,000 : (1) if laid down before January 1st, 1920, 16 years ; (2) if laid down after December 31st, 1919, 20 years. Surface vessels not exceeding 3,000 tons : (1) if laid down before January 1st, 1921, 12 years ; (2) if laid down after December 31st, 1920, 16 years. Submarines, 13 years.

Keels of replacement tonnage are not to be laid down more than three years before the vessel to be replaced is over-age, but for replacement of surface vessels not exceeding 3,000 tons the period is reduced by two years ; immediate replacement is permissible in the event of loss or accidental destruction.

peace for the purpose of converting them into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 inches.

The annual expenditure on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for naval armaments is to be limited.

Italy made a general reservation that she could

Reservations. not agree to any specific method of limiting naval armaments before all the Powers had agreed upon the proportions and the levels of maximum tonnage.

Germany made a reservation regarding the great value of non-floating material. Unlike floating material, it would not be subject to direct limitation by specific articles and numbers, and would only be affected indirectly by expenditure limitation. On the latter point, Germany reserved her opinion until she had studied the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

Yugoslavia, with whom Finland associated herself, emphasised the difference between recently created countries at present engaged in preparing a minimum naval programme compatible with their national security and countries having a maritime history and tradition and possessing a complete fleet. They reserved the right to ask at the Conference that recently created countries, obliged to distribute their expenditure over a number of years exceeding the duration of the Convention, should have the right to mention separately, within the limits of the agreed total tonnage, what portion of their programme they intended to carry out during the period of the Convention.

The Chinese, Spanish, Persian, Roumanian and Yugoslav delegations observed that it should be understood that the numbers and total tonnage would not be in any way binding on their countries, even as a precedent, after the expiration of the Convention.

Spain made a reservation against the provision by which aircraft-carriers not exceeding 10,000 tons are limited to gun calibre inferior to that of aircraft-carriers of heavier tonnage.

The Japanese delegation reserved the right to raise the question, possibly at the Conference, of the limitation of aircraft equipment on merchant vessels. Their anxiety was to prevent merchant vessels from being converted in times of emergency into aircraft-carriers.

The Soviet delegation emphasised the importance of providing that no preparation be made in merchant ships with a view to converting them in war-time into fighting units.

Certain delegations objected to the introduction of indirect (budgetary) limitation of naval material in addition to direct limitation.

America repeated her general reservation on this point. France did not see her way to accept budgetary limitation, as, apart from the technical difficulties, limitation of naval material was assured by the direct limitation of floating material, as well as indirectly by the limitation of the aggregate expenditure on armaments.¹ Japan made a reservation in the same sense. Great Britain, who suggested the provision, and Italy explained that their acceptance of budgetary limitation depended on the attitude finally adopted by other maritime Powers.

The figures set out in the articles and annexes *Points of View.* to this chapter have been inserted as illustrations only. Some delegations proposed other figures, or reserved the right to do so when the Conference meets. The Soviet delegation, for example, proposed a 10,000-ton limit for capital ships. Some delegations recommended either total abolition of capital ships or reduction of the maximum tonnage, and similar suggestions were made with regard to aircraft-carriers and submarines. The Soviet delegation suggested that the lower figures which they proposed should be given as the illustrations; but, while there was support for the tendency to reduction of size, the Commission kept to the figures of existing treaties for the purposes of illustration. It made it clear that this in no way involved the adoption of the numerical data, which would have to be decided upon by the Conference.

The Commission was unable to accept the Soviet proposal for proportional reduction of navies.

The provisions regarding limitation of total tonnage of war vessels and its distribution by categories, together with the principles governing transfers from one category to another, were a compromise on the long-standing controversy between the theory of limitation by total tonnage, represented mainly

¹ See " Budgetary Expenditure " (Part III).

by France and Italy, and that of limitation by categories, represented mainly by Great Britain, the United States of America and Japan. The ideas underlying the compromise were originally put forward by France, and were helped a stage farther by the London Naval Conference. The application of the proposed rules of transfer (see page 29 and footnote ¹) is regarded by the Commission as an integral part of the system agreed upon. Great Britain in accepting these proposed rules, regarded the first as governing the other two, and this was also the attitude of Italy, who declared that she would oppose transfers from the category of light surface vessels to that of submarines. This statement was formally opposed by Spain. The United States of America assumed that the third rule was not intended to apply to the Washington and London Treaties. Sweden could not accept any interpretation which might weaken the guarantees obtained by the Powers possessing fleets of small tonnage through the inclusion of the three principles, as compensation for their acceptance of a large number of rules deriving from the Treaties of Washington and London. This statement had the unqualified approval of Yugoslavia, Greece, Roumania, Turkey and Poland. Norway demanded the utmost freedom of transfer, a view with which China also agreed. Finland held that the three rules should be interpreted on a footing of equality, and the Netherlands made a formal reservation against the second rule being made subordinate to the first.

In regard to the provisions authorising the stiffening of decks of merchant ships, Russia proposed that no preparation at all should be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the purpose of converting them into vessels of war. The objection put forward to this was that merchant vessels must

¹ Transfer principles :

1. Account must be taken of the special circumstances of each Power and of the classes of ships involved ;
2. Powers whose total tonnage does not exceed a certain maximum limit (100,000 tons is given as an illustration) will have full freedom of transfer as regards surface ships ;
3. The amount of the transfer allowed other Powers is to vary in inverse ratio to the total of tonnage possessed by each of them.

be allowed to defend themselves against submarine attack, and that the compromise arrived at on this subject in Washington and London should not be upset.

The situation with regard to budgetary limitation, which was adopted by a majority vote, is indicated in the account given above of the reservations.

C. *Air Armaments.*

The standard of limitation for aeroplanes capable of use in war, in commission and in immediate reserve, is the number and total horse-power.

For dirigibles capable of use in war and in commission, it is the number, total horse-power and total volume. The question of rules for the measurement of horse-power was, at the request of the Commission, referred to a Committee of Experts appointed by the Council.¹

States are to refrain from prescribing the embodiment of military features in the construction of civil aviation material. No preparations are to be made in civil aircraft in time of peace for the purpose of converting such aircraft into military aircraft. States undertake not to require civil aviation enterprises to employ personnel specially trained for military purposes, and undertake to authorise only as a provisional and temporary measure the seconding of personnel (or material) to civil aviation. Any military personnel or material which may thus be employed in civil aviation must be included in the limitation figures.

States also undertake not to subsidise directly or indirectly air lines principally established for military purposes, instead of for economic, administrative or social purposes; and they agree to encourage, as far as possible, the conclusion of economic agreements between civil aviation undertakings in the different countries.

¹ This Committee has concluded its work and reached unanimous agreement on a formula which takes into account both the total volume of cylinders and the weight of the engine. (The Italian expert, though accepting the formula, stated that he would have preferred the formula by weight alone.) The report has been communicated to the Governments.

Germany made a reservation on the ground *Reservations.* that reduction and limitation do not apply to the aggregate of war material, including material in reserve, and that, therefore, in Germany's view, countries were left free to increase their stocks of aircraft not put together and to arrange their air armaments as they pleased, without exceeding the limits fixed by the Convention.

Turkey reserved her opinion on the extension of direct limitation to armaments in reserve.

Germany and Italy made reservations of a general character in regard to some of the tables concerning the relation between material assigned to home territories and oversea territories, and Turkey made a similar reservation.

Canada entered a reservation in regard to the temporary and provisional character of the seconding of personnel to civil aviation undertakings. Canada, because of her special needs and problems, required the unrestricted right of seconding in order to develop her country of vast distances and to protect her citizens and natural resources.

Great Britain wished it to be clearly understood that the provision for the encouragement of international economic agreements did not imply commitment on the part of the Governments to complete internationalisation of aviation. The British Government reserved its entire freedom of action on this point.

The decision of the Commission to limit *Points* complete aeroplanes in immediate reserve as *of View.* well as machines in service was taken by a majority of nine votes to eight, with some abstentions.

The problem of the relation between civil and military aviation has been a difficult one. The Commission's view was that the Convention should avoid any provision capable of obstructing the development of civil aviation. All efforts should be directed towards differentiating more definitely between civil and military aviation, so that Governments should be prevented from interfering in civil aviation undertakings and diverting them from purely civil objects.

The Soviet delegation made a proposal by which Governments would be bound to take steps to prevent any adaptation of civil aircraft, whether constructed by or belonging to private companies or private persons, to military purposes. The text of the article approved by the Commission does not accept this obligation on Governments to *impose* restrictions on the private manufacture or adaptation of civil aviation for purposes of war, but only prohibits them from *encouraging* such adaptation.

Canada desired to omit the temporary and provisional character of the seconding of military personnel and material to civil aviation undertakings, and only to count such seconded personnel (and material) in the quota allowed to each State. The Commission appreciated the special circumstances of Canada, but did not feel prepared to recede from the general rule, preferring that a solution should be found, if possible, in the establishment of an exceptional arrangement, the form of which would have to be settled by the Conference.

An effort was made by Great Britain to add an article limiting the annual expenditure on maintenance, purchase and manufacture of war material for air armaments, but this proposal was rejected by six votes to five, with thirteen abstentions. The objections were similar to those raised against the limitation of expenditure on naval material, with the additional objection that it was difficult to limit expenditure because of the technical evolution taking place. On the other hand, it was argued that this was just the reason why such limitation appeared desirable. Another difficulty cited was that there are countries without separately organised air forces. It would be better, therefore, to be satisfied with the general budgetary limitation of all armaments which should meet the case. The British delegation expressed particular regret at the failure of the Commission to accept their proposal, as developments in size, cost and destructiveness of military machines were to be apprehended. These developments would in no way be affected by the limitation of the number of machines, and without budgetary limitation the British delegation believed that the air arm, potentially the most destructive to civilisation, would be the most free for competitive international development.

Germany submitted a proposal to prohibit the launching of weapons of offence of any kind from the air and the employment of unpiloted aircraft controlled by wireless or otherwise carrying explosive or incendiary gaseous substances. The German delegate regarded these methods as essentially offensive, their destructive effects threatening the civil population. The proposal, however, was rejected ; five delegations voted in its favour. Those who did not accept the suggestion made it clear that they did not thereby imply the authorisation of bombardment of civil populations. Their point of view was rather that what might be done in time of war was outside the scope of a Convention dealing with the reduction of armaments.

PART III. — BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE

The total annual expenditure on land, sea and air forces and formations organised on a military basis is to be limited.

The United States of America repeated the *Reservations*. general reservation declining budgetary limitation in any form for herself, and Germany repeated her reservation pending consideration of the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

It must be repeated here, as in all references *Points of View*. to provisions for budgetary limitation, that the Governments will take into account at the Conference the report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

In adopting this principle, the Commission emphasised the fact that such limitation should be used as a check on the growth of the armaments of each country and not as a method of comparison between one country and another, because the cost and conditions of manufacture varied greatly in different countries.

Great Britain proposed that the annual expenditure on land, sea and air forces *respectively* should be limited ; but this proposal, which relates closely to the proposal for the separate budgetary limitation of air armaments, was not accepted.

The German delegate said it was a flagrant injustice to regard budgetary limitation as the principal method in the case of land armaments, whereas for air and naval armaments it was put forward as a subsidiary method.

Report of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

The Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions closely studied the technical problems submitted to them, and their hope is that the system which they unanimously propose will not only provide substantially for all the difficulties and be *prima facie* effective, but will also provide for watching possible defects of the system if they should reach serious proportions.

In the draft Convention, limitation of expenditure forms the only method of limiting land war material. It is an accessory method of limiting naval war material, and, in addition, it is the method of limiting the total annual expenditure on the land, sea and air forces.

It is said that nothing is easier than to camouflage armament expenditure by hiding such expenditure in unfamiliar parts of the budget, by making use of local or other extra budgetary funds, or by applying to armament purposes funds which have been voted for other purposes. On the other hand, very considerable differences exist in parliamentary and accounting procedure regarding the budget in the various countries, and in the extent of the publicity which this procedure attains and of the audit which is applied to it. It might therefore be thought that the limitation of expenditure would be fully effective for some countries, but illusory for others. Finally, as there are various causes which make expenditure fluctuate from time to time — *e.g.*, purely accidental causes, or variation of prices, it might be feared that every Government would demand such a maximum limit as would be, in effect, no limit at all.

The main lines of the Committee's proposals to meet these doubts may be summarised as follows :

1. The limitation will bear, not on parliamentary votes (the significance of which is very different according to the

country), but on the payments actually made during each financial year, as shown in the final closed accounts published and audited in each country. The budgets will, of course, retain all their importance for public opinion within each country, and the Governments will, in practice, be obliged to explain publicly how the estimates contained in their budgets are to be reconciled with the limitation of their actual expenditure which they have accepted in the Convention.

2. The Committee has suggested that the Governments should undertake not to indulge in the purchase of armaments on credit in such a way as to increase the armaments which they could otherwise have acquired within the limits of the Convention.

3. The draft Convention provides for an annual return of expenditure in a common form. Although these returns will not provide any basis of comparison of the strength of armaments between the different countries, it has always been recognised that a reasonable degree of uniformity was necessary for the general comprehension of the system of publicity and limitation. The Committee has drawn up this common form and has given detailed indications as to the items of expenditure which are to be given in each of the eight to ten heads contained in the form.

4. It may be that not all Governments will be able to fill in this form strictly in accordance with the instructions, and the Committee has therefore proposed that each Government should be allowed to fill in the form in a slightly different method (as its accounting procedure may require), *provided* that it explain this method to the Conference and undertakes to adhere to the same method during the period of the Convention.

5. The Committee's proposals provide that all armament expenditure is to be included, from whatever source the funds are obtained — *e.g.*, from the military budgets, from the civil budgets, from the funds of local authorities, or from entirely different sources (such as donations or voluntary subscriptions from private organisations).

6. Generally speaking, when any marginal cases arise involving either difficulties of definition or doubts as to whether they really affect the strength of armaments, the Committee has proposed that such cases, if excluded from the returns of expenditure, should be made the subject of publicity.

7. The Committee has also made proposals regarding the steps to be taken if a marked variation in the purchasing power of currencies gives rise to the need for adjusting the limits of expenditure. The Committee has also proposed that the limits of expenditure should, in fact, apply, not to the expenditure of each year, but to the average expenditure of each successive four years, the expenditure of any one year being allowed to exceed the limit to an extent to be fixed by agreement.

These two provisions should make it easier for States to accept limits which will represent their real normal agreed requirements, instead of asking for limits which will represent their " peak " expenditure.

8. The Committee was asked to examine the possibility of a separate limitation of the total expenditure on each of the three forces — land, naval and air — and it came to the conclusion that the degree of water-tightness necessary for this separate limitation could be attained.

PART IV. — EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

This chapter contains provisions for exchange of information, and publicity, in regard to the categories for which limitation has been accepted, and also some other details.

For example, although the Commission did not see its way to propose *limitation* by territories of forces stationed in oversea territories, it accepted, by five votes to four with a certain number of abstentions, the principle of *publicity* with regard to such distribution ; this publicity is limited to land forces.

States which have systems of compulsory preparatory military training are to state the number of youths who have received such training.

Governments are to provide statements showing, by categories of materials, the total annual expenditure on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of land and naval war material. ¹

For air material in service there is to be exchange of information and publicity, corresponding to the limitation stipulations.

Details are to be furnished by each contracting State on every vessel of war laid down or completed by or for such State, or within its jurisdiction.

The name and tonnage of any merchant vessel whose decks are stiffened for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 inches are to be communicated.

Information is to be provided on the expenditure incurred on civil aviation by the Governments and local authorities, and also on the number and total horse-power of civil aeroplanes and dirigibles registered by each party.

Various reservations were made by Germany, *Reservations.* concerned mainly with omission from the information tables of factors similar to those excluded also from the limitation tables — such, for example, as the omission of publicity regarding trained reserves and the number of the annual contingents.

She also objected to the option allowed to States to show the number of recruits not trained, unless accompanied by an obligation to give similar information on the number of trained reserves.

Turkey repeated her reservation on the optional indication of forces stationed overseas.

France did not accept publicity for effectives stationed in each oversea territory. She considered it materially impossible owing to constant transfers from one territory to another and the special conditions of the territories in question ; an army of accountants would be required for the purpose. The British

¹ The Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions which was instructed to consider the possibility of the practical application of this principle, was reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the technical difficulties of arriving at a sufficiently uniform and comprehensive method regarding this particular article were too great to allow them to put forward any positive proposal.

delegation concurred in the substance of this reservation.

Germany and Italy considered that particulars should be given, not only of youths who had been subjected to compulsory preparatory military training, but of all who had received such training, whether voluntarily or otherwise.

On budgetary publicity for land and naval war material, Germany made a reservation that publicity, in order to be effective, should cover the total of the land and air material and of non-floating naval material to be published by categories and numbers. The Netherlands, supported by several other States, had made a proposal on these lines. Germany made a corresponding reservation on the provision for publicity of air material in service, as she considered publicity should apply to total air material, including material in reserve.

Germany also held that publicity of civil aviation could not properly be included in a purely military convention, and should be dealt with in a special convention.

As the reservations indicate, discussion on
Points of View. exchange of information resembled the discussion on the chapters dealing with limitation.

One of the main additional controversies was connected with the publicity for civil aviation. Some members of the Commission urged the importance which the development of civil aviation might assume from the armaments point of view, and the Commission considered that the publication of information on civil aviation would be extremely useful. While accepting this principle, certain delegations doubted whether such provisions would not be more suitably included in a separate international convention, and a desire was expressed that attention should be drawn to this point.¹

Regarding the provision for information on expenditure incurred on civil aviation by Governments and local authorities (proposed by the British delegation), the United States delegate said it was doubtful whether his Government would be in a position to furnish data of expenditure incurred by local authorities.

¹ See page 71.

PART V. — CHEMICAL ARMS

This part consists of one article by which States undertake, *subject to reciprocity*, to abstain from the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes.

They also undertake *unreservedly* to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare.

Germany is of opinion that the effect of *prohibitions* on the use of chemical weapons would be incomplete unless it referred also to preparations for the use of those weapons (instruction of troops, etc.). A scheme for the reduction and limitation of armaments should, in the first place, prohibit weapons of an essentially offensive character whose destructive powers menaced not only armies but also civilian populations, weapons such as bombs from the air, large calibre guns and tanks of every kind.

There was a certain amount of discussion as to whether provisions of this kind were in their *Points of View* right place in a Disarmament Convention, which aimed, not at codifying the rules applicable in war-time or at prohibiting the use of certain arms, but rather at regulating armaments in peace-time. Attention was also drawn to the existence of other international undertakings on the same question, such as the Protocol prepared by the 1925 Conference on the Trade in Arms. It was pointed out, however, that the Governments which had acceded to that Protocol and those which would accede to the Disarmament Convention might not in every case be the same, and thus the Convention would not produce its full effect.

The Commission finally adopted the article in its present form by a majority vote, but several delegations reserved their right to submit proposals to the Conference with a view to amplifying the provisions of the 1925 Protocol.

The Commission felt unable to express a definite opinion on a question of interpretation raised by Great Britain as to whether the use of tear-gas was to be regarded as contrary to the Protocol

of 1925 and to the terms of the draft Convention. Great Britain held that it was, and very many delegates said they were prepared to approve the British interpretation. But it was decided to leave the matter to the Conference, the Commission fully recognising its importance and the necessity of careful study by the Governments.

Though recognising that the undertaking to abstain from the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases could normally be observed only subject to reciprocity, the Commission thought that the undertaking to abstain from the use of bacteriological methods should be absolute. The use of such methods would constitute a crime against international law — a crime of which no civilised Government could possibly wish to be guilty, even against the armies of a criminal Government resorting to such methods.

The Soviet delegation proposed that all methods and appliances connected with chemical and bacteriological warfare should be destroyed within three months from the date of the entry into force of the Convention. The proposal was not adopted.

Poland made a declaration, with which Finland, Roumania and Yugoslavia associated themselves, in which, though recognising the moral value of international agreements forbidding the use of such weapons, she felt it necessary that provision should also be made for practical preventive and executory measures, so that no violation could be committed without involving very unpleasant consequences for the guilty State. It would be desirable to consider the possibility of concluding a convention affording international aid on as liberal a scale as possible to any country chemically or bacteriologically attacked.

The German delegation proposed that the chapter should be headed " Prohibitions ", that bombing from the air should be prohibited and all large guns and tanks should be suppressed and destroyed. Their hope was that this would " compensate for the exclusion of land material from reduction ". These proposals were rejected by ten votes to two, with twelve abstentions.

PART VI. — MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

A. *Permanent Disarmament Commission.*

There is to be set up at the seat of the League a Permanent Disarmament Commission to follow the execution of the Convention.

Its members, the number of whom will be fixed by the Conference, will be designated by Governments, but will not represent the Governments which appoint them. They will hold office for a fixed period to be determined by the Conference, and will be re-eligible. During the time of office they may be replaced only on death, or in the case of voluntary resignation, or serious and permanent illness. They may be assisted by technical experts.

The Commission will meet within three months of the entry into force of the Convention to elect a President and Vice-President, and draw up its rules of procedure; thereafter, it will meet annually in ordinary session, or in extraordinary session in cases provided for in the Convention and whenever an application to that effect is made by one of the parties. Two-thirds of the members of the Commission must be present before business can be transacted, and decisions must be taken by a majority of the votes of the members present.

When a question brought before the Commission specially affects a contracting party not having a member of its nationality on the Commission, that party will be entitled to send a member who will take part on the same footing and vote equally with the other members of the Commission. In two specified cases, however — namely, those concerning derogations and procedure regarding complaints — the votes of members appointed by the parties concerned in the discussion will not be counted in determining the majority. This rule applies, not merely to members specially appointed, but also to ordinary members of the Commission. A minority report may be drawn up.

The Commission will receive all the information supplied

by the Governments to the Secretary-General of the League, and, apart from these regular sources of information, any member of the Commission, on his own responsibility, is entitled to have any person heard or consulted who is in a position to throw light on the question being examined by the Commission.

All reports by the Commission are to be communicated to the parties and to the Council of the League, and published. To ensure that all shades of opinion may be made known, each member of the Commission is entitled to require that account shall be taken of the opinions and suggestions put forward by him.

Each year the Commission will make at least one report on the information submitted to it, and on any special information from a responsible source which it may consider worthy of attention, showing the situation with regard to the observance of the Convention. This report is to be communicated forthwith to all the parties and to the Council of the League, and published.

France was in favour of a clause providing that members of the Commission must themselves be technical experts, giving purely technical opinions and not prejudging any political conclusions that the Governments might draw from those opinions. The delegation stated that they still preferred this system, although the majority of the Commission did not accept it.

There were differences of opinion on the number of members composing the Commission, the capacity in which they should sit, and the conditions in which they should do their work.

Points of View.

Some delegations thought that all the contracting parties should have the right to appoint a member ; but the Commission rejected this view, feeling that an institution of this kind could not satisfactorily discharge its task unless it were comparatively small in size.

In leaving the Conference to decide how many States should have the right to appoint members and how these States should be selected, the Commission thought it desirable to bring to

the notice of the Conference the three systems which had been proposed to it :

1. That of the delegation of Great Britain, which reserved the right of appointment to States Members of the Council of the League and to two or three States not Members of the League ;

2. That of the French delegation to confer this right on States Members of the Council of the League, on certain States not Members of the League — to be designated by the Conference — and on certain States Members of the League not represented on the Council ;

3. That of the Chinese delegation, which recommended that the Conference should select all the countries entitled to nominate members, it being understood that these countries should fulfil certain special conditions to be determined.

The latitude given to the Permanent Disarmament Commission to lay down, and consequently to revise, its own rules of procedure, is explained by the Preparatory Commission as a means of enabling the Permanent Disarmament Commission to vary its methods in accordance with its experience.

The Preparatory Commission says the Permanent Disarmament Commission's normal function is to examine and judge information before it. In this way it will become an essential factor in the system responsible for watching the application of the Convention, regularly reporting on the situation, and calling attention, where necessary, to any errors and omissions which experience may reveal.

B. *Derogations.*

If a change of circumstances, in the opinion of a contracting party, constitutes a menace to its national security, it may temporarily suspend any provisions (other than those designed to apply in the event of war), provided it immediately notifies the other States and the Permanent Disarmament Commission of such suspension and of the extent thereof, and communicates a full explanation of the change of circumstances.

. The parties will then advise promptly on the situation thus presented.

When the reasons for such temporary suspension have ceased to exist, the armaments which have been temporarily increased must be reduced to the level agreed upon in the Convention, and notification given of such action.

Points of View. This proposal, first introduced by the United States of America, was accepted without any reservations ; but, during the discussion, the

Soviet delegation opposed any system of derogations. The report of the Preparatory Commission draws attention to the necessity of providing for such a possibility, and states that it has endeavoured to take every precaution to avoid abuses. It notes that, in addition to the article itself, there is a further guarantee in the final provisions establishing the principle of compulsory arbitration for all disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention.

C. *Procedure regarding Complaints.*

Any violation of the Convention is a matter of concern to all the contracting parties, and complaint may be lodged by any party if it considers any other party to be violating or endeavouring to violate the Convention.

Complaints must be brought before the Permanent Disarmament Commission, which, after hearing the party whose action is questioned and any other party specially concerned, will draw up a report which, like all others framed by the Commission, must be presented to the contracting parties and to the Council of the League, and published.

The contracting parties will promptly advise on the situation, and the Council will take action within the limits of its powers under the Covenant.

D. *Final Provisions.*

The first article embodies the principle that the Convention does not affect the provisions of previous treaties in which certain States have agreed to limit their land, sea and air armaments.

It also contains a provision enabling States, which so desire, to declare, when signing the Convention, that the limits fixed for their armaments are accepted by them in relation to the provisions referred to in the preceding paragraph, and that the maintenance of such provisions constitutes for them an essential condition for the observance of the Convention.

If a dispute arises concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention which cannot be settled directly between the parties, they will, at the request of one of them, submit such dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to an arbitral tribunal chosen by them.

Other articles concern the term of the Convention, and the procedure for its modification and denunciation.

Before the end of a given number of years after its entry into force,¹ the Convention is to be re-examined by the parties meeting in conference. It is further provided that, before such period has elapsed, re-examination may also be carried out at the request of a contracting party, with the agreement of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, if the conditions in which the engagements in the Convention were contracted have undergone, as the result of technical transformations or special circumstances, changes justifying a fresh examination and, if necessary, revision.

Germany stated that, in so far as the first *Reservations*. article did not refer to the Washington and London Treaties, she would vote against the draft Convention as a whole. The draft, as drawn up by the majority of the Preparatory Commission, excluded essential elements from the limitation and reduction of land armaments. Instead of leading to real disarmament, the draft would serve only to conceal the real state of world armaments or would even allow armaments to be increased. To accept it would at the same time be tantamount to a renewal of the German signature of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

A second reservation was made by Germany on the article contemplating the possibility of changes in conditions which

¹ This and other periods are to be settled by the Conference.

might justify a fresh examination and revision. Great Britain, France, Japan and Poland stated that the particular case they had in mind was the unforeseen development of civil aviation. It was on this that Germany made her reservation. She was of opinion that the development of a peaceful means of communication must in no event be made a basis for armaments, especially as no account had been taken of the essential and purely military factors of material in reserve or in stock, trained reserves, etc., and other important means of communication, such as the mercantile marine, on which, indeed, preliminary warlike fittings had been authorised.

It was on the first article relating to the obligations contained in previous treaties that discussion chiefly centred. Strong opposition came from Germany, as shown by the terms of her reservation. Germany could not recognise a convention unless it were just and equitable, and unless it paid regard to the security of all States. The draft Convention was very far from giving effect to the principle of parity of security, and that was the basis upon which the value of a convention must be estimated.

France, Poland, Yugoslavia and Roumania declared that the article was for them an essential condition of any obligations they accepted in the Convention. Any figures which they submitted to the Conference would be calculated in relation to a given situation, of which the strict application of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty was an essential part.

Italy considered the matter might be left to the Conference, as the real question was whether the draft Convention fulfilled treaty obligations undertaken ; that was a factor which could not be decided until the Conference considered the figures.

Great Britain, dissenting from the view that the Convention would not permit any real limitation of land armaments, and the United States of America, in voting for the text, explained their anxiety that nothing should be done to diminish the effect of the naval treaties to which they were parties.

Bulgaria, supported by Turkey, proposed that this first

article, being political in character, should be referred to the consideration of the Conference, but the proposal was rejected by twelve votes to five with some abstentions, and the article as it stands was ultimately adopted by fourteen votes, with some abstentions.

The countries bordering on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics laid down certain conditions for the accession to the Convention which were embodied in an article at the time of the first reading of the Convention in 1927. This article was omitted from the final text of the draft Convention, the Commission having decided to leave the examination of the proposal to the Conference, as it raised an essentially political question as well as the complex problem of the effect of the reservations which contracting parties would be allowed to make at the time of signature.

* * *

The Preparatory Commission, in the concluding pages of its report, states that the great majority of the Commission was far from sharing the attitude of certain delegates that the results were disappointing ; it regarded what had been done as an important advance on the path of disarmament. In any event, it would be for the Conference to decide as to the final adoption of the draft and to fill in the figures. The discharge of this delicate and complicated task required thorough and systematic preparation.

The German delegation proposed, seconded by the Italian delegation, that the Preparatory Commission should ask the Governments, with this object in view, to furnish detailed particulars of the present position of their armaments. The Commission welcomed the spirit in which the suggestion was made, but held that it was for the Council to take the necessary steps ; it also regarded the proposal as too restricted. Preliminary study and investigation could not be limited to scheduling existing armaments ; it would have to cover every factor which might help to inform the Conference, and to justify such concrete proposals as Governments might eventually lay before it.

The Commission also felt that it would be exceeding its competence if it accepted a German proposal to fix November 5th, 1931, as the date of the Conference. It was anxious that the utmost despatch, compatible with practical necessity, should be employed ; but it took the view that the Council, with which it rested to fix the date, was the only authority qualified to weigh the various factors that must be taken into consideration.

DECLARATIONS

At the Commission's last meeting on December 9th, 1930, general declarations were made reflecting the views of the delegations on the work done and on the work yet to be accomplished.

M. LOUNATCHARSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) described the attitude of the Soviet delegation to the draft Convention as definitely negative. His delegation had constantly endeavoured " to achieve really effective measures in the matter of reduction of all kinds of armaments ", while, at the same time, opposing any " attempts to make disarmament contingent on security ", and they were prepared to agree to the abolition of armaments or their reduction to the absolute minimum. In rejecting the draft conventions successively submitted by the Soviet delegation, the Commission had rejected " the only guarantee of peace ". The Soviet delegation had nevertheless continued their collaboration, because they were unwilling to afford a pretext for attributing " the manifest lack of success of the Commission's work " to their absence, and because they hoped that, by making concrete proposals, they would do something " towards bringing this draft nearer to the conception which must underlie any draft convention for the reduction of armaments ".

M. Lounatcharsky added :

" Unhappily, the overwhelming majority of the Preparatory Commission, by systematically rejecting the Soviet motions and following the line of least resistance, deprived the Commission's draft, from which all figures had already

been omitted, of all real meaning, using the draft to mask and justify the maintenance and increase of existing armaments. ”

M. Lounatcharsky then explained in detail his delegation's principal and most general objections to the draft Convention. These applied chiefly to the absence of a “ clear and definite statement that existing armaments must be appreciably reduced ”; to the method of limiting effectives and land and air armaments ; to certain aspects of the limitation of naval material ; to the execution of the Convention being entrusted to an organ of the League of Nations ; to the reference to the Disarmament Conference of the article in the draft Convention specifying the conditions laid down by Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland and Roumania for their accession to the Convention. It was impossible for the Soviet delegation to accept the draft Convention ; the delegation would uphold their own proposals before the Conference.

M. POLITIS (Greece) said the task in view was bold in the extreme and of urgent necessity. It was bold because they were asking that States should, “ by contract, renounce part of their own guarantees of security, although the international community had not yet given them the fullest measure of collective guarantees ”. They wanted States to begin to reduce their armaments on the strength of the guarantees already furnished, because they believed the effect of that first reduction would be to add to those guarantees by strengthening mutual trust, and this might begin to prepare the way for further progress in the parallel and interdependent directions of disarmament and security. The experiment was an imperative necessity, both by reason of the solemn promise given to the peoples immediately after the war and also for political reasons. If nothing were attempted to check the natural tendency of States to seek to supplement, by their own means, the imperfections of international organisation, there was bound to be a repetition of the competition in armaments which took place at the beginning of this century, and another war which would destroy civilisation for ever.

Lord CECIL (British Empire) said the majority of the criticisms levelled against the draft Convention were, in his opinion, based on an erroneous conception of the Commission's task. It was not the Commission's function to draft a disarmament convention, but merely to construct the framework. In his view, it was possible to fit into the framework of this draft a really effective step towards the realisation of the ideal of complete disarmament. He contended that, within the principles provided for by the Commission, the Conference would be able to carry out any degree of limitation.

“ One of the most valuable features in our scheme ”, he said, “ is that it expressly contemplates that there is to be no finality ; that the first Conference and the first advance are only to be the prelude to greater advances later on ; that we are to have a revision every five or ten years of everything that we do, so that, even if our first advance should be disappointing — and I have not given up hope that it will be the very reverse — then five or ten years afterwards we can advance still farther.

“ We have created, or proposed to create, in the Permanent Disarmament Commission, a piece of machinery which I believe to be of the most enormous value to the cause of disarmament. For the first time, we are going to bring into existence, if our proposals are adopted, an international organ of disarmament whose duty it will be to watch over the gradual, or let us hope the rapid, progress of disarmament ; because I believe, once we have started on this line, the pressure to go on and to proceed with vigour will become enormous. ”

Mr. GIBSON (United States of America) said he had throughout been sensible of the very real difficulties under which many members of the Commission had laboured. Overshadowing the discussions, though seldom spoken of, had been the anxieties and worries that had arisen from the special preoccupations felt by numerous Governments for their national security.

The draft Convention fell short of the hopes and expectations of the American delegation.

“ It fails, ” he said, “ to contain many factors in which we have always believed and which in our opinion would lead to a real reduction of armaments. What we have achieved does not hold out the promise of bringing about that immediate reduction of armaments we would like to see. Make no mistake, it is not my purpose to belittle what we have done. We can at least foresee a stabilisation of armaments, the setting-up of machinery to receive and disseminate information on armaments, to educate public opinion and to prepare systematically for the work of future conferences, as successive milestones in the continuing process of disarmament. If these things can be achieved by the coming Conference, and from present indications I think we are justified in assuming that they can be achieved, we shall have a situation obviously better than we have at present ”

“ We are all in agreement that an immense amount of preparatory work remains to be done before the meeting of the General Conference. The technical preparation for that Conference is in all conscience great enough, but a more difficult and more responsible task lies ahead of all our Governments in informing public opinion as to the facts, as to the difficulties, and as to the possible measures which may, with mutual concession, help us toward the goal we all desire to reach. This end can be served only by stating our achievements and our difficulties with moderation. ”

Count BERNSTORFF (Germany) contented himself with observing that the reservations he had made showed why he must maintain his criticism of the draft Convention. They also showed that the German Government must reject the draft, which, in its opinion, was full of the most serious and fundamental defects and omissions ; it lacked what was essential — namely, a firm determination to disarm.

“ The Conference, ” he concluded, “ will afford the very last opportunity of achieving the final goal of

disarmament, for which the German Government will work ceaselessly and with all its strength, as it has done hitherto. The Conference will be faced with an historic task ; it will have to approach the problem in an entirely different way from that chosen hitherto and so achieve the ideal — the true security of peace. It cannot succeed, however, unless it feels itself supported and urged on by public opinion throughout the world.

“ It is therefore to the peoples that I now address a last and most urgent appeal. I ask them to do their utmost to get their Governments to realise the magnitude of their task, and to see that they do not shrink from it. The peoples must not for a moment lose sight of the great dangers which might arise if, in the end, the work of disarmament failed. ”

M. SATO (Japan) said that the first stage of disarmament would probably be a modest one :

“ No great work can be carried out at one step. If we tried to do so, we should encounter immense difficulties, and might even risk causing the failure of the Conference. My Government, therefore, has always favoured moderate courses and steady but gradual progress . . . I earnestly hope that the representatives whom the Governments send to the Conference will all be armed with full powers to sign the future Convention ; otherwise, public opinion would be deeply disappointed, and that would be most regrettable. We must therefore do our utmost to bring about this result. ”

M. MASSIGLI (France) said the Commission's task was not to recommend to the Governments one of those futile manifestations which left behind them nothing but a memory of disappointment in the minds of the peoples, but to state the bases on which, after conscientious and laborious enquiry, they considered it possible at the present time to establish a general treaty for the limitation of armaments. The unanimous decisions of successive Assemblies had framed a League doctrine

in the matter of disarmament, regarding respect for existing treaties, the relation between the proportion in which armaments were to be reduced and the organisation of a system of mutual assistance, and the necessity of proceeding, *pari passu*, with the organisation of security. It would be useless to push forward disarmament faster than the general political situation allowed, and the Conference would only be able to take a first step. The Governments must ask themselves what progress had been made in the organisation of security and in the growth of confidence since the Commission started its work. What had been done with the drafts prepared by the Arbitration and Security Committee ? What had been done to promote the conclusion of regional agreements, whether for the purpose of preventing or penalising war ? What had been done in the field of arbitration ? What was the position as regards accessions to the General Act ?

All these were questions which the Governments would have to ponder before the Conference was held, and the solutions which had been found for them, or which would be found for them in the coming months, would determine how great would be the first step to be taken.

Referring to the important advance represented by the transfer of the problem of national armaments to the field of international law, he said that was the essential truth which Governments imbued with the will to peace, or, to speak more simply, Governments animated by goodwill, must have the courage to proclaim, even though to do so they had to withstand the pressure of public opinion ; assuredly, it might prove far from easy to bring public opinion back to the right path when once it had been allowed to stray from it. Yet, if there were a firm resolve, public opinion could be easily enlightened while there was still time.

M. MORFOFF (Bulgaria), while recognising that very useful work had been done, said the Commission's work left his country in a " state of flagrant insecurity ".

" Bulgaria remains open to all comers, by land, by sea and by air, for her reduced army, although it is very

expensive and is a heavy charge upon her financial situation, is hardly sufficient for local duties.

“ We hope that the experts and the future Permanent Disarmament Commission will be given a chance of finding a practical solution which, while creating no dangers for any party concerned, will put an end to our state of insecurity. ”

M. ANTONIADE (Roumania) did not share the pessimism of certain delegates. In his view an important step had been made. The League's doctrine in the matter of disarmament established an indissoluble connection and interdependence between disarmament and security.

“ When the time comes to fill in the framework we have prepared, the state of general and regional security will determine the limitations which can be agreed to.

“ The Roumanian delegation hopes that, between now and the meeting of the forthcoming Conference, certain facts, tendencies and manifestations liable to diminish security will have disappeared, and that general and regional security will have made sufficient progress to permit of an important first step being taken. ”

M. WESTMAN (Sweden) said :

“ The Swedish delegation is among those which have made no express reservations to the provisions voted by the majority. It did not feel called upon to make reservations, although the proposals which it put forward or which it supported with regard to certain vital points in the Convention did not meet with the approval of the majority, in order that the differences of opinion which have been manifested in our Commission should not be still further accentuated ; and it made a point of refraining from any action which might exercise an unfavourable influence on the heavy and difficult work of disarmament undertaken by the League of Nations.

“ This attitude has not involved, and cannot involve, any renunciation on the part of the Swedish Government of the opinions which it has stated since the outset of

our work, through the members of its delegation, and in the best interests of disarmament. My Government therefore emphasises its rights, in the course of the subsequent proceedings, to take any action and to support any proposal likely to make the International Disarmament Convention as effective and as just as possible. ”

M. MARKOVITCH (Yugoslavia) expressed the opinion that, from the technical standpoint, the draft Convention afforded “ a well-defined and well-considered framework ”. On the political aspect, he reminded the Commission that the work of disarmament was to be carried out “ within the framework of the international organisation created by the Covenant ”, and he emphasised the interdependence of all the articles of the Covenant, which formed an indivisible whole :

“ This correlation between the methods for the reduction and limitation of armaments and the political factors of the problem, the absolute observance of the Covenant and the faithful execution of all the obligations contained therein — in short, the degree of national and international security — should have found a place in the draft Convention.

“ The omission from the Convention itself of any special rule regarding the interdependence between disarmament and security in no way modifies the actual problem, and does not imply any weakening of the value of the Assembly’s formal resolutions or any relinquishment on our part of the principles on which disarmament must be based. ”

General KASPRZYCKI (Poland) stressed the necessity of proceeding by stages and of coping with a form of propaganda which sought to detract from the value of the work already done. In his opinion, the draft Convention provided “ a sound basis and framework ”. After endorsing the views expressed by several delegations on security and the interdependence of the various articles of the Covenant, General Kasprzycki stated that, in his view, there were three aspects of the problem of security — guarantees of mutual assistance,

respect for treaties, and the securing of a general *détente*. He regretted that nothing practical had so far been done to bring about moral disarmament.

“ The problem of moral disarmament is an urgent problem, which is closely bound up with that of material disarmament.

“ You cannot expect to enhance, or even to preserve, the feeling of security in an atmosphere of growing disquiet.

“ The flagrant contradiction between demands for an appreciable reduction of armaments, demands for total disarmament, and an increasingly violent propaganda tending to promote disorder or even war must be brought home to the general public.

“ World public opinion must be convinced of the absolute necessity of practical results in moral disarmament. A study of the practical means to that end is becoming more and more essential. It is one of the most indispensable conditions of the success of the future Conference. ”

M. WOO KAISENG (China) observed that the first stage had now been passed, but that numerous difficulties remained to be overcome.

“ The limitation and reduction of land, naval and air armaments is a positive means of arresting preparation for war. The work of abolition must be carried into other fields as well. We must deal with the deep-lying causes, the moral causes.

“ More than anything else, mutual understanding, a clear comprehension of the issues which divide nations, will contribute towards the abolition of war among States. We must get to know each other better and better. ”

M. FIERLINGER (Czechoslovakia) described the declarations made by most of the delegates as reflecting “ a moderate optimism based on a sense of realities ”. He emphasised the interdependence of disarmament and the problem of security.

“ The idea of peace has doubtless gained ground and valuable guarantees of security have been provided which must not be under-estimated. These guarantees and the successful results of the League’s efforts have made it possible for our Commission to complete its work.

“ We hope that, when the Conference meets, we shall be in a position to record fresh progress calculated still further to facilitate the Conference’s work, but we must not close our eyes to the distance we still have to travel before the Covenant is carried into full effect ; there is still a long road ahead of us. We must not forget that we shall have to exert ourselves very considerably, sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another, in order to achieve our purpose. At the same time, if we make this our chief concern I do not doubt but that we shall fulfil the highest aspirations of mankind, the aspirations embodied in Article 8 of the Covenant. ”

General DE MARINIS (Italy) said the Italian Government would participate in the Disarmament Conference with an earnest desire to achieve results in the form of the equitable regulation of armaments, taking into account the defence requirements of each country.

“ It should be the object of such regulation to abolish the very great discrepancies which at present exist ; these are the chief cause of the competition in armaments, and are highly detrimental to international security. I am firmly convinced that the absence of a just proportion between armaments and the real requirements of each country for defence, which exists at present, is the chief obstacle to the framing of an effective scheme for the reduction of armaments.

“ I am convinced that, if we succeed in modifying this state of affairs, we shall have made great progress in the direction of disarmament and shall greatly facilitate the next stage of our work. ”

The PRESIDENT (M. Loudon), in conclusion, said the Commission had not settled all divergencies of principle among

the different Powers ; before they began their work, the Governments knew this would be impossible. But to those who realised that, in the present state of the world, an initial effort, however incomplete, in the direction of limitation and, as far as possible, reduction of armed forces was of capital importance, he did not hesitate to say that they had accomplished their task.

“ What we have prepared is, as it were, a well-thought-out framework in which the figures will be filled in by the General Conference. Only then will our draft Convention be signed and become the first Convention for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments. It will no doubt be revised and amended many times, as mutual trust between the nations increases, by means of what has been termed moral disarmament.

“ If the provisions which we have framed appear to be incomplete, it is none the less true that never before in the history of the world have the nations, which are so jealous of their sovereign rights, contemplated the international regulation of their means of national defence. Does not this fact alone give to our work, however imperfect it may be at this initial stage, a profound significance ? ”

Chapter IV

SUBSEQUENT ACTION

COUNCIL DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION, JANUARY 1931

The draft Convention and the Preparatory Commission's report which accompanied it were submitted to the Council at its January session 1931.

M. QUIÑONES DE LEON (Spain), Rapporteur, said that, although the report did not interpret the Convention, it contained indications of the greatest assistance, and enabled the Council to appreciate the importance of the work done by the Commission.

MR. ARTHUR HENDERSON (Great Britain), President, said the draft Convention was an important document, and should be of great practical value to the Governments of the world in their efforts to ensure the success of the Conference. After reminding the Council of the obligations assumed by Members of the League in the direction of collective disarmament, Mr. Henderson described the question as the most important in present-day international politics and the acid test of a nation's loyalty to the ideals, aims and purposes of the League. If, as Members of the League, they believed in the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, the Optional Clause, the General Act and the Treaty of Financial Assistance, they ought to make their acceptance of these instruments a living reality. A mere limitation of existing forces would hardly be an adequate beginning. They must show that their work was not on paper only, that they had renounced war and the spirit which engendered war, and that they were prepared progressively to renounce the armaments by which war was carried on. He expressed the hope that all States would do everything in their power to ensure the success of the Conference.

Dr. CURTIUS (Germany), while expressing his satisfaction that the Disarmament Conference could at last be convened and

unreservedly endorsing the President's appeal to all nations, explained Germany's dissatisfaction with the draft Convention, which, in his opinion, represented at most a stabilisation of existing armaments. The clear warning given by the German representative, acting on the instructions of his Government, that he would dissociate himself from the majority of the Commission, was not heeded, and the Commission even went so far as to place in the draft, which in itself was entirely inadequate, a new confirmation of the disarmament imposed upon Germany by the Treaties. It was therefore quite natural that Germany could not accept the result of the Commission's work. The Conference could only achieve satisfactory results if, before the figures were entered, it thoroughly revised the methods at present proposed. It should be guided by the fundamental principle of the League — that was to say, the equality of all its Members — and should not set security against insecurity and threats against powerlessness.

M. GRANDI (Italy), after defining the Italian view on the relations between disarmament and security, which would have to be taken into account but which was "not a preliminary condition" of disarmament, advocated discussion among the various Governments for the successful preparation of the Conference. They must neglect nothing that would make the Conference a success.

M. BRIAND (France) associated himself entirely with the President's hope that their efforts would be crowned with success. He did not know how, having gone so far, they could fail. The obligations of the Covenant were a sacred pledge. The Preparatory Commission had given them the framework of a possible Convention which would enable the Conference to bring about what all the nations of the world desired, as far as was compatible with the present factors of security. Five years to prepare such a meeting of all the peoples of the world for such a purpose was not so very much. They must not insist on the Conference achieving what was at present impossible. The Conference would merely mark the first stage in their journey, which would be followed by others. There

could be no question of establishing the supremacy of one nation over another. He hoped the time would come when, in every sphere, all nations would be placed on a footing of equality. M. Briand protested against campaigns intended to create a state of panic at the very moment when complete and absolute calmness of mind was essential to cope with the difficulties. If the Disarmament Conference were well prepared, they might expect ample results.

M. YOSHIZAWA (Japan) considered that the draft Convention provided a very suitable framework for the discussions of the Conference, which he regarded as a first step towards the goal they had in view.

M. ZALESKI (Poland) considered the draft Convention provided a solid basis for the work of the Conference. Poland would let slip no opportunity of co-operating with other Powers, and welcomed the Convention as the first step towards the disarmament which Poland was so anxious to ensure. For Poland, armaments were only a necessary evil. He hoped the feeling of security would be such as to allow of gradually achieving yet more definite results.

Mr. MCGILLIGAN (Irish Free State) said he could not regard the draft Convention as anything more than a first step, and his Government earnestly hoped that relations between States would have so improved by the date of the Conference that it would then be possible to introduce the improvements which alone could make the Convention of permanent value.

Council Resolution.

At the close of the discussion, the Rapporteur presented a resolution noting the report of the Preparatory Commission and the preliminary draft Convention; thanking the Commission for its tireless efforts; requesting the Secretary-General to transmit the preliminary draft, the report and the Minutes of the Council's proceedings to the Governments; fixing the date of the Conference for February 2nd, 1932; and instructing

the Secretary-General to undertake the initial work of the preparation of the Conference, particularly regarding :

(a) The particulars to be obtained from the different Governments with regard to the position of their armaments and all data, technical or otherwise, which might help to inform the Conference and justify such concrete proposals as the Governments might lay before it ;

(b) The preparatory studies to be undertaken by experts with a view to fixing rules relative to the adoption of a standard horse-power measurement for aeroplane and dirigible engines ;

(c) Communication to the Governments of the report, when ready, of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

After this resolution had been adopted, the PRESIDENT expressed his satisfaction at the decision taken. During the coming year, each Government would have to fill in figures in the tables of the draft Convention representing the largest possible reduction in its existing armaments. He hoped every Government would approach the matter with a full sense of the gravity of the task, and would lose no time in beginning the work.

Dr. CURTIUS said the preliminary draft Convention was not binding, and the Council had not accepted it as such ; it had merely communicated the Convention to the Governments with a recommendation that every effort should be made in the matter of disarmament. No decisions had been taken on the method by which disarmament was to be achieved ; that question would have to be discussed. Subject to these reservations, he agreed with the President's declaration.

M. BRIAND hoped that, in order to create a favourable atmosphere, Governments would be careful to avoid any action which might cause anxiety regarding the maintenance of peace. He noted the reservations made by Dr. Curtius ; it was quite natural that countries holding certain views should desire to restate and uphold them at the Conference. There would be no restrictions in that matter ; but, if the work done

by the Preparatory Disarmament Commission were regarded as negligible, and if it were intended to begin all over again the discussions of the last five years, the chances of reaching the desired results would be seriously reduced.

Dr. CURTIUS said Germany ardently desired concrete and genuine results in accordance with the spirit of Article 8 of the Covenant. He had not meant to say that every question must be re-examined, but that some would have to be settled in the course of the preliminary negotiations between Governments.

COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS (May 1931).

Particulars from Governments.

The Secretary-General having requested Governments to forward the information mentioned in the Council resolution of January, two proposals were made concerning the form in which the information should be supplied.

The Government of Great Britain emphasised the advantage of the information being supplied by each Government on a uniform model, and submitted suggestions based on publicity tables annexed to the draft Convention.

The German Government also desired that the information should be supplied on a uniform model, and forwarded model tables which provided for fuller information than the tables annexed to the draft Convention, particularly on material in service and in stock of land, naval and air armaments, and also on trained reserves. The German Government considered its proposal as better calculated than the British proposal to fulfil the requirements of the January resolution.

The Danish and French Governments accepted the British proposal in principle. The French Government's acceptance, in a letter dated April 28th, 1931, was accompanied by certain reservations. These referred, for example, to the probability that the Government would be unable to furnish before the Conference certain of the particulars mentioned in the draft Convention. It was also pointed out that, if the methods proposed by the Preparatory Commission for submission to the

Conference were employed, the results obtained would not permit of filling in the tables mentioned in the British proposal in such a way as to enable comparisons to be made of the figures supplied by the different Powers, and that the use of a uniform model was not sufficient in itself as a basis for comparisons between the armaments of the different countries, since such comparisons could be made only in the light of the explanations and comments furnished by each individual country.

* * *

The German and British proposals referred
Council to above were examined by the Council during
Meeting. its May session.

In introducing the subject, the Rapporteur, M. LERROUX (Spain), announced that the Secretariat was preparing a special edition of the *Armaments Year-Book* for the use of delegates to the Disarmament Conference, and this Year-Book would be based mainly on the replies of Governments to the Secretary-General's letter concerning the position of armaments.

M. HENDERSON said the publicity tables adopted by the Preparatory Commission were the result of lengthy discussion, and it was preferable to adopt these tables rather than to re-open that discussion. He was doubtful whether, in practice, the German proposal, which had been worked out with great care and might even be regarded as an ideal but which was based on certain principles constantly advocated by the German Government and as constantly rejected by other countries, would really facilitate or expedite the preparatory work of the Conference. Mr. Henderson added that his Government took up strongly the position that the Council should adopt the recommendations embodied in the report of budget experts¹ — namely, that States be asked to fill in before the Conference the model statement of expenditure on the basis of the last accounts available.

¹ This report was completed in the interval between the January and May sessions of the Council.

Dr. CURTIUS said that the questionnaire, if it were to satisfy the object of the Council resolution, should include all the essential factors of armaments. The Disarmament Conference could neither obtain a clear idea as to the reduction of war material required nor adequately assess the military forces of the different armies unless it had before it a complete and accurate picture of the present position of armaments, including, more particularly, documentary material on the material in service and in store, and on trained reserves. The scheme proposed by the Government of Great Britain would not, in his opinion, permit of a complete statement of armaments, as it made no provision for the important factors to which he had referred.

M. BRIAND said that, admirably framed though it was, the German proposal would give rise to the same objections as had continually been encountered by the very principles on which it was based. If the discussion were re-opened, there would be the risk of delaying preparations for the Conference. The German proposal, to his regret, he could not accept.

M. ZALESKI said he was prepared to support the British proposal if it were applied in the light of the observations submitted by the French Government in its letter of April 28th, 1931. He then drew the Council's attention to the fact that the documentary material in the *Armaments Year-Book* concerning certain countries not members of the League was marked by a number of serious omissions. The data regarding certain of those Powers were incomplete, and had not been obtained from official sources. He thought that this state of affairs placed other countries, and particularly neighbouring countries, in an unequal situation, when they were called upon to give precise information concerning their own armaments.

M. GRANDI, feeling that agreement had been reached on the presentation of data on a uniform model, urged that the information should be submitted by all States before a given date. The German tables were very complete, and the German proposal contained certain suggestions of which the Italian Government approved, but that proposal might mean re-opening

the discussion and might involve a long technical examination. The tables annexed to the draft Convention were in certain respects incomplete, and the Italian Government had only accepted them subject to reservations. He was convinced, however, that, at the moment, nothing better could be obtained. Mainly, therefore, in order to avoid any further impediment to the convening of the Conference, M. Grandi was prepared to adopt, in principle, the procedure suggested by the British Government.

M. YOSHIKAWA, while agreeing in principle with the other Governments that information should be supplied on the scale of armaments, stressed the three principles of uniformity, universality and simultaneity which should, in his view, be observed in matters of practical application.

M. MARINKOVITCH (Yugoslavia) thought the Conference should not take the present position of armaments as a starting-point, but should adopt more objective criteria. This would diminish the importance of statistical data, and he would then agree to the latter being furnished within the general framework of the British proposal. Governments, however, in giving this information would always have to take into account the necessity of substantiating concrete proposals which they might submit to the Conference.

At the end of the discussion, the *RAPPORTEUR* concluded that the British proposal was, in principle, generally accepted. The considerations on which the German proposal was based had been discussed at length in the Preparatory Commission, without, however, appearing to be acceptable to the majority of that Commission. The Council did not consider this circumstance decisive; nevertheless, it held it to be very important, and the *Rapporteur* thought that, for the moment, it was advisable to concentrate on what was practicable rather than on perfection.

He suggested that the Council should recommend each Government invited to the Conference to do its best to supply the information requested in the tables referred to in the British letter. This would permit of the wide application of the first two rules — uniformity and universality.

The Rapporteur proposed that all the Governments invited to the Conference should be asked to forward such information to the Secretary-General not later than September 15th. The Secretary-General would be asked, after consulting the President of the Conference, to arrange, in due course, for the interchange of the information received between Governments which had complied with his request and furnished the particulars asked for. Should any unforeseen difficulty arise, the Council, being in session, could always be consulted. In this way the information would not only be communicated simultaneously, but would be exchanged between the respective Governments which had supplied it.

The Rapporteur then suggested that, as Mr. Henderson had proposed, the Governments should be asked to fill in the model statement of expenditure on the basis of the latest figures, in conformity with the recommendation of the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

The request for information concerning the position of armaments would in no way affect the method that might be adopted by the Conference to give effect to Article 8 of the Covenant. The proposals which had just been formulated would help to enlighten the Conference on the situation of the different Governments in the matter of armaments without, however, preventing Governments from supplying supplementary information in support of concrete proposals that they might submit. The Conference could, of course, ask Governments for any further information, should it consider this necessary.

He asked his colleagues to accept his report, containing the proposals which he had put forward.

M. YOSHIKAWA accepted.

Dr. CURTIUS expressed his regret that the report, which was based on a much-discussed preliminary draft Convention, did not mention the measures to be taken to supply the Conference with the data required for its work. The public, he added, would be amazed to learn that States, before assembling to conclude an agreement on the reduction of armaments, should have notified only a small part of their effectives and have supplied no figures concerning the implements at their disposal. He

could not accept a report which omitted all mention of the essential factors of armaments and was so little in harmony with the principle of a full and frank interchange of information, as laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant. Not wishing, however, to prevent the necessary unanimity, and hence the execution, although inadequate, of the decision taken by the Council on January 24th, he would abstain from voting.

M. BRAADLAND (Norway), while seeing no objection in principle to the adoption of the German Government's proposal, was prepared to accept the report if the German proposal did not meet with the general support of the Council.

Mr. MCGILLIGAN, in accepting the report, said the German proposal did not appear to him too idealistic, and the acceptance of the report by the Council would not involve any obligation to confine discussion to questions arising out of the draft Convention.

Mr. HENDERSON observed that, in accepting the British proposals, the Council was in no way restricting the rights of the Conference. Should the latter, when it set to work, find certain information inadequate, it would have the right to take any measures to obtain further information.

The Council adopted the report.

German Proposal on Civil Aviation.

At the request of the German Government, the Council also considered at its May session the question of the preparation of an international agreement for the publication of information on civil aviation.

The German Government, in two letters addressed to the Secretariat, pointed out that, at the Preparatory Commission, certain delegations had proposed the conclusion of a special international convention on the publication of information on civil aviation, and the German Government had always taken the view that a convention for the reduction and limitation of armaments should not deal with civil aviation. This was

a means of communication used solely for peaceful purposes, and it would be inconsistent to include it in an armaments convention and, at the same time, to leave out of account the stocks of material for military aviation. The German Government approved, in principle, the publication of information on civil aviation, and had itself been publishing such information for some considerable time, but such publication should form the subject of a special agreement. The German Government expressed the desire that the Advisory Commission for Communications and Transit should be asked to prepare, without delay, a draft convention on the subject, to be submitted to the Council and, if necessary, to the Assembly.

After an exchange of views, the Council adopted the following resolution :

“ The Council,

“ Considering that the Preparatory Disarmament Commission in its report drew the Disarmament Conference’s attention to the fact that, although the majority of this Commission adopted Article 37 of the draft Convention governing the publication of information in regard to civil aviation, certain delegations questioned whether the stipulation contained in this article would not be more in place in an international convention other than that on disarmament ;

“ Recognising that it is for the Disarmament Conference to take a decision on this subject ;

“ Being anxious to facilitate the Conference’s task :

“ Requests the Secretary-General :

“ (1) To arrange for the Communications and Transit Organisation to proceed to an enquiry among all the Governments invited to the Disarmament Conference and to a methodical study of the present situation concerning the publication of information on civil aviation, whether as regards national regulations, multilateral conventions or special obligations ;

“ (2) To prepare on this basis for the use of the Conference a collection of all the provisions in force relating to the exchange or publication of information regarding non-military aviation. ”

*Supervision of the Private Manufacture and Publicity
of Manufacture of Arms.¹*

The 1930 Assembly expressed the desire that the Special Commission responsible for formulating a draft convention on the supervision of the private manufacture and publicity of the manufacture of arms, munitions and implements of war, should be summoned as soon as possible after the completion of the work of the Preparatory Commission. Several Governments had stated that they were unable to express a final opinion on the methods of securing publicity for State manufacture until they knew the conclusions reached by the Preparatory Disarmament Commission on the publicity of war material.

The Council, in January 1931, decided to summon the Special Commission as soon as the Committee of Budgetary Experts had submitted its report, as its enquiries might have a direct bearing on the solution of certain problems entrusted to the Special Commission.

The Committee of Budgetary Experts, however, found it impossible to recommend any method of detailed publicity on expenditure for categories of material.

During the May session of the Council, the Rapporteur said he considered that it was for the General Disarmament Conference to regulate the matter and he suggested, with the Council's approval, the postponement of the meeting of the Special Commission until after the settlement of the question by the Conference.

¹ Article 8, paragraph 5, of the Covenant :

“ The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety. ”

Chapter V

THE ASSEMBLY OF 1931

PROPOSED ARMAMENTS TRUCE

The armaments problem figured prominently in the general debate of the 1931 Assembly, and emphasis was laid on the decisive importance of the results of the February Conference.

During this discussion, a new suggestion was put forward by M. Grandi, Italian Foreign Minister, who said that an attempt should be made immediately to arrive at a really effective armaments truce, at least for the period of the Conference in 1932. A general and immediate agreement to suspend the execution of programmes for fresh armaments would not only set the peoples of the world an example of goodwill, but would create a psychological and political atmosphere of greater calm and confidence, and would do more than any declaration of principles to further the work of the Conference and to lead to tangible results.

Subsequent orators who alluded to this suggestion gave it sympathetic support, and the first definite proposal was made in the form of a draft resolution submitted to the Assembly by the delegations of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. This resolution, recording the conviction that the realisation of the undertakings in the Covenant regarding the reduction of armaments would be one of the most important means of re-establishing confidence and alleviating crushing economic burdens and emphasising the importance of creating a world opinion strong enough to ensure definite results for the Disarmament Conference, requested the Council to urge the Governments summoned to the Conference to abstain, pending the result of the Conference, from any steps for the increase in the present level of their armaments.

This resolution was referred to the Third Committee of the Assembly, at whose suggestion the President of the Assembly asked the States not represented in the Assembly but invited

to the Conference to take part in the discussion. Costa Rica, Egypt, Turkey, the United States of America and Brazil accepted the invitation. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that, in view, amongst other things, of the short notice given, it was unable to send a delegate, but it would be disposed to associate itself with the Italian proposal, provided it was adopted in a form obligatory on all countries, that it covered all classes of armaments, and that signatories affirmed that it should not in any case replace or postpone the essential problem of disarmament or limitation of existing armaments.

At the opening of the discussion in the Third Committee, the Italian delegate, General de Marinis, made concrete proposals for putting into effect the Italian suggestion. Each Government should undertake, for a period of one year dating from November 1st, 1931 :

(1) Not to increase its expenditure on land forces already authorised for the current financial year, and not to exceed the total of such expenditure during the next financial year until the expiry of the truce ;

(2) Not to place any warship on the stocks, provided always that vessels under construction might be continued and completed ;

(3) To suspend the construction of additional military aircraft, except to replace machines placed out of commission during the truce.

The principle of an armaments truce as a contribution to the preparation of the Conference met with general assent, but opinion was divided on the form and method of giving practical application to it. A number of delegations, particularly that of Great Britain, supported the Italian proposals, and Mr. Wilson, the representative of the United States of America, who observed that the Italian suggestion had been warmly welcomed in the United States, said that, generally speaking, the Italian suggestion regarding land and air armaments seemed to his Government to be practicable and acceptable. His Government, however, had not had time to consider and give approval forthwith to the suggestion on naval armaments. The representatives of Japan and France drew attention to

certain technical complications, and the Japanese representative suggested that the proposals before them should not be discussed until the start of the General Conference. This was opposed by the representatives of the United States and Great Britain, the former observing that it would vitiate the main virtue of the suggestion — namely, its immediate beneficial effect. Certain delegations felt that a vague obligation was likely to lead to different interpretations and therefore to dangerous controversy, and that only definite obligations could meet the end in view ; but this would make it necessary to draw up a convention, and time was short.

As the Rapporteur observed in his report to the Assembly, there had not been any difficulty with regard to fundamentals ; the only problem had been that of adjusting the special difficulties experienced by the various States so that by some harmonious formula the conclusions might be given with sufficient clarity to show that the Committee was not content merely to put words on paper. The Committee directed its efforts, therefore, towards framing an invitation to Governments to assume material obligations which were at the same time sufficiently flexible to allow them to be carried out.

The result was the following resolution :

“ Convinced that the crisis which at the present time is creating such profound disturbance among the nations of the world is due to a number of economic and political causes originating principally in the lack of mutual confidence between the nations, and

“ Convinced that a renewal of the competition in armaments would necessarily lead to an international and social catastrophe :

“ The Assembly addresses a solemn appeal to all those who are desirous that practical effect should be given to the principles of peace and justice upon which the Covenant is based and urges them to devote all their efforts towards creating a world opinion strong enough to enable the General Disarmament Conference to achieve positive results, including, in particular, a gradual reduction of armaments to be continued until such time as the object

laid down in Article 8 of the Covenant is attained.

“ In view of the fact that an undertaking on the part of all States not to increase their armaments would help to create an atmosphere of confidence, to prevent competition in armaments and to prepare the ground for the success of the forthcoming Conference :

“ The Assembly,

“ Requests the Governments invited to the Disarmament Conference to prepare for this event by means of an armaments truce, and, accordingly,

“ Requests the Council to urge the Governments convened to the said Conference to give proof of their earnest desire for the successful issue of the efforts to ensure and organise peace and, without pre-judging the decisions of the Conference or the programmes or proposals submitted to it by each Government, to refrain from any measure involving an increase in their armaments ;

“ Likewise requests the Council to ask the Governments to state, before November 1st, 1931, whether they are prepared for a period of one year as from that date to accept this truce in armaments. ”

This resolution, states the Third Committee in its report, is intended to prevent an increase in the effort at present being expended on the whole of the armaments of each country. Some delegates stated explicitly that they did not regard as incompatible with this principle such measures as the normal carrying out of legal enactments regarding effectives, the regular execution of programmes for the upkeep and renewal of land, naval and air material or fortifications and the constitution of the corresponding stocks.

The armaments truce will be brought about by means of an undertaking given in the form of a declaration by the various Governments before November 1st, 1931. Certain delegations consider that it is to be anticipated that, in their replies, States will take into account the position of their neighbours, especially those who are not Members of the League.

The resolution was unanimously adopted by the Assembly, and the Council immediately acted upon it.

After having considered the terms of the replies received up to November 14th, the President of the Council informed the Governments, through the Secretary-General, that he felt justified in concluding that none of the Governments was opposed to the truce and that, on the contrary, all had declared their willingness to accept it ; that a number of Governments made their acceptance conditional upon reciprocity and that such reciprocity had in fact been achieved ; that many of the replies contained interpretations and observations, but that these appeared to be in keeping with the spirit and the letter of the resolution and report.

In these circumstances, the President of the Council expressed his opinion that the procedure most in harmony with the objects of the truce and the spirit of the Assembly's discussions would be to consider, unless and in so far as Governments did not forthwith intimate any objection to this course, that the Armaments Truce, had, under the conditions laid down in the Assembly's Resolution and the Report, been accepted for one year as from November 1st, 1931, by the Governments invited to the Disarmament Conference.

ARMAMENTS POSITION IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

Acting on the Council's instructions, the Secretary-General, on June 13th, sent a circular letter to all the States invited to the Disarmament Conference, communicating to them the Minutes of the meetings of May 20th and 23rd, at which the Council examined the question of the information to be furnished by Governments on the position of armaments in the various countries.

The Assembly was informed that, out of the sixty-three Governments invited to the Conference, twenty-five had so far replied. The Council had asked that these particulars should be forwarded before September 15th, and the Assembly, on the suggestion of its Third Committee, passed a resolution asking the Council to invite the Governments which had not yet replied to do so as soon as possible, and in any case before November 1st, 1931.

Annex 1

DRAFT CONVENTION ¹

Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties agree to limit and, so far as possible, to reduce their respective armaments as provided in the present Convention.

PART I. — PERSONNEL ²

CHAPTER A. — EFFECTIVES

Article 2.

The average daily effectives in the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed, in each of the categories of effectives defined in the tables annexed to this Chapter, the figure laid down for such party in the corresponding column of the said tables.

Article 3.

The average daily effectives are reckoned by dividing the total number of days' duty performed in each year by the number of days in such year.

Article 4.

By formations organised on a military basis shall be understood police forces of all kinds, gendarmerie, Customs officials, forest guards, which, whatever their legal purpose, are, in time of peace, by reason of their staff of officers, establishment, training, armament, equipment, capable of being employed for military purposes without measures of mobilisation, as well as any other organisation complying with the above condition.

By mobilisation, within the meaning of the present article, shall be understood all the measures for the purpose of providing the whole or part of the various corps, services and units with the personnel and material required to pass from a peace-time footing to a war-time footing.

¹ See general reservations by the :

Turkish Delegation, paragraph No. 41 of the Report :

German Delegation, paragraph No. 42 of the Report ;

Norwegian Delegation, paragraph No. 43 of the Report :

Irish Free State Delegation, paragraph No. 43 of the Report.

² See reservation by the *German Delegation*, paragraph No. 79 of the Report.

Tables annexed to Chapter A of Part I

TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE LAND ARMED FORCES

Table I. — Maximum Land Armed Forces stationed in the Home Country				Table II (optional). — Maximum Land Armed Forces stationed Overseas			Table III. — Maximum of the total Land Armed Forces		
High Contracting Parties	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least x ² months of service	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least x ² months of service	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns b and c	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least x ² months of service
A.									
B.									
C.									
D.									
.									
.									

¹ On certain tables annexed to Chapter A of Part I, see reservations by the *French Delegation*, paragraph No. 65 of the Report ;

German No. 73, 74 ..
Italian No. 73, 75, 76 ..
Turkish No. 77 ..

² *Note.* — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript land army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE LAND FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS

Table IV. — Maximum Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed in the Home Country				Table V. — Maximum formations organised on a Military Basis stationed Overseas		
High Contracting Parties	<i>a</i> Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns <i>b</i> and <i>c</i>	<i>b</i> Officers or officials ranking as officers	<i>c</i> Other effectives or officials who have completed at least x^1 months of service	<i>a</i> Total effectives, including the effectives specified in columns <i>b</i> and <i>c</i>	<i>b</i> Officers or officials ranking as officers	<i>c</i> Other effectives or officials who have completed at least x^1 months of service
A.						
B.						
C.						
D.						
.						
.						

¹ *Note.* — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript land army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

**TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE
SEA ARMED FORCES**

Table VI. — Maximum Sea Armed Forces		Table VII. — Maximum Sea Formations organised on a Military Basis
High Contracting Parties	Total effectives (officers, petty officers and men)	Total effectives (officers, petty officers and men and officials of every grade)
A.		
B.		
C.		
D.		
.		
.		

TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE
AIR ARMED FORCES

<i>Table VIII (Optional). — Maximum Air Armed Forces stationed in the Home Country</i>			<i>Table IX (Optional). — Maximum Air Armed Forces stationed Overseas</i>		Table X. — Maximum of the Total Air Armed Forces	
High Contracting Parties	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>
	<i>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b</i>	<i>Effectives who have completed at least 2¹ months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)</i>	<i>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b</i>	<i>Effectives who have completed at least 2¹ months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)</i>	<i>Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column b</i>	<i>Effectives who have completed at least 2¹ months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)</i>
A.						
B.						
C.						
D.						
.						
.						

¹ *Note.* — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript air army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY EFFECTIVES WHICH ARE NOT TO BE EXCEEDED IN THE AIR FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS

Table XI. — Maximum Air Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed in the Home Country			Table XII. — Maximum Air Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed Overseas	
High Contracting Parties	<i>a</i> Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column <i>b</i>	<i>b</i> Effectives or officials who have completed at least <i>z</i> ¹ months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers, men and officials of every grade)	<i>a</i> Total effectives, including the effectives specified in column <i>b</i>	<i>b</i> Effectives or officials who have completed at least <i>z</i> ¹ months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers, men and officials of very grade)
A.				
B.				
C.				
D.				
.				
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¹ *Note.* — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript air army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

CHAPTER B. — PERIOD OF SERVICE

Article 5.

The provisions of this Chapter apply only to effectives recruited by conscription.

Article 6.

For each of the High Contracting Parties concerned, the maximum total periods of service to which the effectives recruited by conscription are liable in the land, sea or air armed forces or formations organised on a military basis respectively, shall not exceed the figures laid down for such party in the table annexed to this Chapter.

Article 7.

For each man, the total period of service is the total number of days comprised in the different periods of service which he is liable under the national law to perform.

Article 8.

As an exception, each of the High Contracting Parties concerned may exceed the limits which he has accepted by the table annexed to this Chapter in so far as, owing to a falling-off in the number of births, such an increase may be necessary to enable the maximum total number of effectives fixed in his case by the tables annexed to Chapter A of this part to be attained.

It is understood that any High Contracting Party which avails itself of this option will immediately notify the measures taken and the reasons justifying them to the other High Contracting Parties and to the Permanent Disarmament Commission referred to in Part VI of the present Convention.

Article 9.

In any case, the total period of service shall not exceed . . . months.

Table annexed to Chapter B of Part I

High Contracting Parties	Maximum total period of service to which the effectives recruited by conscription are liable in the armed forces or formations organised on a military basis		
	Land	Sea	Air
A.			
B.			
C.			
D.			
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PART II. — MATERIAL

CHAPTER A. — LAND ARMAMENTS¹

*Article 10.*²

(Provisional text subject to the drafting of the Annex.)

The annual expenditure of each High Contracting Party on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for land armaments shall be limited to the figures laid down for such Party, and in accordance with the conditions prescribed, in the annex ... to this Article.

CHAPTER B. — NAVAL ARMAMENTS^{3 4}

Article 11.^{5 6}

Throughout the duration of the present Convention, the global tonnage of the vessels of war of each of the High Contracting Parties, other than the vessels exempt from limitation under Annex I to

¹ See reservation by the :

<i>American Delegation</i> , paragraph No. 94	of the Report :
<i>German</i> " " No. 102 and 103	" "
<i>Turkish</i> " " No. 99	" "

² *Note.* — In pronouncing on this Article, the Governments will take into account at the Conference the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts, which will have been forwarded to them in order to permit of the drawing up of the annex to this Article.

The Preparatory Commission, by sixteen votes to three and six abstentions, adopted the principle of limitation by expenditure. It also discussed the following resolution :

"The Preparatory Commission is of opinion that the principle of direct limitation should be applied to land war material."

When this resolution was put to the vote, there were nine votes in favour, nine against and seven abstentions.

Lastly, it examined the principle of a combination of the two methods. Nine members of the Commission voted in favour of this principle; eleven voted against and five abstained.

³ *Note.* — Such figures and dates as appear in this Chapter are only given as an illustration; most of them correspond to the figures and dates laid down in the Treaties of Washington and London.

⁴ See general reservation by the :

<i>German Delegation</i> , paragraph No. 109 of the Report ;
<i>Italian</i> " " No. 108 " "

⁵ See reservation by the *Yugoslav Delegation*, paragraph No. 116 of the Report.

⁶ See reservation by the *Italian Delegation*, paragraph No. 112 of the Report.

this Chapter and the special vessels enumerated in Annex II, shall not exceed the figure laid down for such Party in Table I annexed to this Chapter.

Article 12.

Table II annexed to this Chapter shows, by tonnage per category, the way in which each High Contracting Party intends to distribute during the period of application of the present Convention the global tonnage which is limited in the case of such Party to the figure laid down in Table I.

Article 13.

Within the limits of the global tonnage fixed for such Party in Table I, and failing any stricter conditions resulting from special conventions to which it is or may become a party, each of the High Contracting Parties may modify the distribution shown for it in Table II, subject to the following conditions :

(1) The tonnages by category shown for each High Contracting Party in Table II shall in no case be the object of increase beyond the figures shown for it in Table III annexed to this Chapter.

(2) Before the laying-down of the ship or ships for the construction of which the transferred tonnage has been assigned, due notice must be given to all the other High Contracting Parties and the Secretary-General and the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of the amount of tonnage transferred, the length of such notice being that laid down for each of the High Contracting Parties in Table III.

Article 14.

No capital ship shall exceed 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun exceeding 16 inches (406 mm.) in calibre.

Article 15.

No aircraft carrier shall exceed 27,000 tons (27,432 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches (203 mm.).

No aircraft carrier of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or less standard displacement shall carry a gun exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre.

If the armament carried includes guns exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre, the total number of guns carried, except anti-aircraft guns and guns not exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm.), shall not exceed ten. If, alternatively, the armament contains no guns

exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre, the number of guns is not limited. In either case, the number of anti-aircraft guns and of guns not exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm.) in calibre, is not limited.

Article 16.

No submarine shall exceed 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun exceeding 5.1 inches (130 mm.) in calibre.

Article 17.

No vessel of war exceeding the limitations as to displacement or armament prescribed by the present Convention shall be acquired by, or constructed by, for or within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 18.

In regard to the replacement of the vessels of war limited by the present Convention, the High Contracting Parties will comply with the rules set out in Annex IV to this Chapter.

Article 19.¹

No preparation shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 inches (155 mm.) in calibre.

Article 20.

In the event of a High Contracting Party's being engaged in war, such Party shall not use as a vessel of war any vessel of war which may be under construction within its jurisdiction for any other Power, or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another Power and not delivered.

Article 21.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to dispose, by gift, sale, or any mode of transfer, of any vessel of war in such a manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the navy of any foreign Power.

¹ See reservation by the *Japanese Delegation*, paragraph No. 134 of the Report.

Article 22.

Any vessels of war which have to be disposed of as being surplus to the tonnage figures allowed by the present Convention shall be disposed of in accordance with the rules set out in Annex V to this Chapter.

Article 23.

Existing ships of various types, which, prior to April 1st, 1930, have been used as stationary training establishments or hulks, may be retained in a non-seagoing condition.

Article 24.^{1 2}

(Provisional text, subject to the drafting of the Annex.)

The annual expenditure of each High Contracting Party on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war material for naval armaments shall be limited to the figures laid down for such Party, and in accordance with the conditions prescribed, in Annex

* * *

Note. — The two following articles appear in Part III of the London Naval Treaty, and are quoted as examples of supplementary restrictions which certain High Contracting Parties may be prepared to accept :³

Article ...

" Not more than 25 per cent of the allowed total tonnage in the cruiser category may be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck for aircraft."

Article ...

" In the destroyer category, not more than 16 per cent of the allowed total tonnage shall be employed in vessels of over 1,500 tons (1,524 metric tons) standard displacement."

¹ In pronouncing on this Article, the Governments will take into account at the Conference the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts, which will have been forwarded to them in order to permit of the drawing up of the Annex to this Article.

² See reservation by the :

French Delegation, paragraph No. 139 of the Report

Japanese " " No. 140 "

German " " No. 141 "

British and Italian Delegations, paragraph No. 142 of the Report.

³ See reservation by the *Greek and Spanish Delegations*, paragraph 143 of the Report.

Tables annexed to Chapter B of Part II

Table I

High Contracting Party	Global Tonnage
A.	
B.	
C.	
D.	
E.	
F.	
G.	
.	
.	
.	

Table II

Categories (defined in Annex III)	High Contracting Parties								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	.	.
(a) Capital ships									
(i)									
(ii) ¹									
(b) Aircraft-carriers.									
(cd) Light surface vessels									
(c) Cruisers.									
(i) Guns of more than 6.1 inches (155 mm.)									
(ii) Guns of 6.1 inches and less (155 mm.)									
(d) Destroyers.									
(e) Submarines.									

Table III. — Rules for Transfer

The figures to be entered in this table will be calculated on the following principles :

1. Account must be taken of the special circumstances of each Power, and of the classes of ships involved in the transfer.
2. Powers whose total tonnage does not exceed 100,000 tons² will have full freedom of transfer as regards surface ships.
3. As regards the other Powers, the amount of the transfer should vary in inverse ratio to the amount of the total (global) tonnage of each of them.

¹ For Parties who do not possess any capital ship of a standard displacement exceeding 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons).

² This figure is given as an illustration.

Annexes to Chapter B of Part II

ANNEX I

EXEMPT VESSELS

Subject to any special agreements which may submit them to limitation, the following vessels are exempt from limitation :

(a) Naval surface combatant vessels of 600 tons (610 metric tons) standard displacement and under ;

(b) Naval surface combatant vessels exceeding 600 tons (610 metric tons), but not exceeding 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) standard displacement, provided they have none of the following characteristics :

- (1) Mount a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre ;
- (2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch (76 mm.) calibre ;
- (3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes ;
- (4) Are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots.

(c) Naval surface vessels not specifically built as fighting ships which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way than as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics :

- (1) Mount a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre ;
- (2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch (76 mm.) calibre ;
- (3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes ;
- (4) Are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots ;
- (5) Are protected by armour plate ;
- (6) Are designed or fitted to launch mines ;
- (7) Are fitted to receive aircraft on board from the air ;
- (8) Mount more than one aircraft-launching apparatus on the centre line : or two, one on each broadside ;
- (9) If fitted with any means of launching aircraft into the air, are designed or adopted to operate at sea more than three aircraft.

ANNEX II

LIST OF SPECIAL VESSELS

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ANNEX III

DEFINITIONS.

For the purposes of the present Convention, the following expressions are to be understood in the sense defined in this Annex :

(a) **Capital Ships.**

(i) Vessels of war, not aircraft carriers, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, or which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches (203 mm.).

(ii) For Parties who do not possess any capital ship exceeding 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) standard displacement :

Vessels of war not exceeding 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) standard displacement and the calibre of whose guns exceeds 8 inches (203 mm.).

(b) **Aircraft Carriers.**

Surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.

(c) **Cruisers.**

Surface vessels of war, other than capital ships or aircraft carriers, the standard displacement of which exceeds 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons) or with a gun above 5.1 inches (130 mm.) calibre.

The cruiser category is divided into two sub-categories as follows :

(i) Cruisers carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.

(ii) Cruisers not carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.

(cd) **Light Surface Vessels.**

Surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), and with guns not exceeding 8 inches (203 mm.) calibre.

The category of light surface vessels is divided into two categories, as follows :

(i) Vessels carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.

(ii) Vessels not carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre.

(d) **Destroyers.**

Surface vessels of war, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons) and with a gun not above 5.1 inches (130 mm.) calibre.

Standard Displacement.

1. The standard displacement of a surface vessel is the displacement of the vessel complete, fully manned, engine and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.

2. The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of the vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight

structure), fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or ballast water of any kind on board.

3. Each naval combatant vessel shall be rated at its displacement tonnage when in the standard condition.

The word "ton," except in the expression "metric tons," shall be understood to be the ton of 2,240 pounds (1,016 kilos).

ANNEX IV

RULES FOR REPLACEMENT

1. Except as provided in paragraph 4 of this Annex, no vessel limited by this Convention shall be replaced until it becomes "over-age".

2. A vessel shall be deemed to be "over-age" when the following number of years have elapsed since the date of its completion :

(a) Capital ships : 20¹ years, subject to special provision as may be necessary for the replacement of existing ships.

(b) Aircraft carriers : 20 years, subject to special provision as may be necessary for existing ships.

(c) Surface vessels exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) but not exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement :

(i) If laid down before January 1st, 1920, 16 years ;

(ii) If laid down after December 31st, 1919, 20 years.

(d) Surface vessels not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement :

(i) If laid down before January 1st, 1921, 12 years ;

(ii) If laid down after December 31st, 1920, 16 years.

(e) Submarines : 13 years.

3. The keels of replacement tonnage shall not be laid down more than three years before the year in which the vessel to be replaced becomes "over-age" : but this period is reduced to two years in the case of any replacement surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement.

The right of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down replacement tonnage.

4. In the event of loss or accidental destruction, a vessel may be replaced immediately ; but such replacement tonnage shall be subject to the limits of displacement and to the other provisions of this Convention.

¹ Under the London Treaty, certain Powers agreed not to exercise their rights to lay down the keels of capital ship replacement tonnage during the years 1931 to 1936 inclusive, as provided in the Washington Treaty.

ANNEX V

RULES FOR DISPOSAL OF VESSELS OF WAR

The present Convention provides for the disposal of vessels of war in the following ways :

- (1) By scrapping (sinking or breaking up) ;
- (2) By converting the vessel to a hulk ;
- (3) By converting the vessel to target use exclusively ;
- (4) By retaining the vessel exclusively for experimental purposes ;
- (5) By retaining the vessel exclusively for training purposes.

Any vessel of war to be disposed of may either be scrapped or converted to a hulk at the option of the High Contracting Party concerned.

Vessels which have been retained for target, experimental or training purposes, shall finally be scrapped or converted to hulks.

Section I. — Vessels to be scrapped.

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by scrapping, by reason of its replacement, must be rendered incapable of warlike service within six months of the date of the completion of its successor, or of the first of its successors if there are more than one. If, however, the completion of the new vessel or vessels be delayed, the work of rendering the old vessel incapable of warlike service shall, nevertheless, be completed within four and a-half years from the date of laying the keel of the new vessel, or of the first of the new vessels ; but should the new vessel, or any of the new vessels, be a surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement, this period is reduced to three and a-half years.

(b) A vessel to be scrapped shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there shall have been removed and landed or else destroyed in the ship :

- (1) All guns and essential parts of guns, fire-control tops and revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets ;
- (2) All hydraulic or electric machinery for operating turrets ;
- (3) All fire-control instruments and range-finders ;
- (4) All ammunition, explosives, mines and mine rails ;
- (5) All torpedoes, war heads, torpedo-tubes and training-racks ;
- (6) All wireless telegraphy installations ;
- (7) All main propelling machinery, or alternatively the armoured conning-tower and all side armour-plate ;
- (8) All aircraft cranes, derricks, lifts and launching apparatus. All landing-on or flying-off platforms and decks, or alternatively all main propelling machinery ;
- (9) In addition, in the case of submarines, all main storage batteries, air compressor plants and ballast pumps.

(c) Scrapping shall be finally effected in either of the following ways within twelve months of the date of which the work of rendering the vessel incapable of warlike service is due for completion :

- (1) Permanent sinking of the vessel ;
- (2) Breaking the vessel up ; this shall always include the destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and armour, and all deck, side and bottom-plating.

Section II. — Vessels to be converted to Hulks.

A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to a hulk shall be considered finally disposed of when the conditions prescribed in Section I, paragraph (b), of this Annex, have been complied with, omitting subparagraphs (6), (7) and (8), and when the following have been effected :

- (1) Mutilation beyond repair of all propeller-shafts, thrust-blocks, turbine-gearing or main propelling-motors and turbines or cylinders of main engines ;
- (2) Removal of propeller-brackets ;
- (3) Removal and breaking up of all aircraft-lifts, and the removal of all aircraft-cranes, derricks and launching apparatus.

The vessel must be put in the above condition within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

Section III. — Vessels to be converted to Target Use.

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to target use exclusively shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there have been removed and landed, or rendered unserviceable on board, the following :

- (1) All guns ;
- (2) All fire-control tops and instruments and main fire-control communication wiring ;
- (3) All machinery for operating gun-mountings or turrets ;
- (4) All ammunition, explosives, mines, torpedoes and torpedo-tubes ;
- (5) All aviation facilities and accessories.

The vessel must be put into the above conditions within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

(b) Each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain, for target use exclusively, at any one time :

- (1) Not more than three vessels (cruisers or destroyers), but of these three vessels only one may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement ;
- (2) One submarine.

(c) On retaining a vessel for target use, the High Contracting Party concerned undertakes not to re-condition it for warlike service.

Section IV. — Vessels retained for Experimental Purposes.

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to experimental purposes exclusively shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Section III (a) of this Annex.

(b) Without prejudice to the general rules, and provided that due notice be given to the other High Contracting Parties, reasonable variation from the conditions prescribed in Section III (a) of this Annex, in so far as may be necessary for the purposes of a special experiment, may be permitted as a temporary measure.

Any High Contracting Party taking advantage of this provision is required to furnish full details of any such variation and the period for which they will be required.

(c) Each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain for experimental purposes exclusively at any one time :

- (1) Not more than two vessels (cruisers or destroyers), but of these two vessels only one may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement ;
- (2) One submarine.

(d) On retaining a vessel for experimental purposes, the High Contracting Party concerned undertakes not to re-condition it for warlike service.

Section V. — Vessels retained for Training Purposes.

(a) The following vessels may be retained, for training purposes exclusively, by the High Contracting Parties concerned :

(b) Vessels retained for training purposes under the provisions of paragraph (a) shall, within six months of the date on which they are required to be disposed of, be dealt with as follows :

1. *Capital Ships.*

The following is to be carried out :

- (1) Removal of main-armament guns, revolving parts of all barbetstes and turrets ; machinery for operating turrets ; but three turrets with their armament may be retained in each ship ;
- (2) Removal of all ammunition and explosives in excess of the quantity required for target-practice training for the guns remaining on board ;
- (3) Removal of conning-tower and the side-armour belt between the foremost and aftermost barbetstes ;
- (4) Removal or mutilation of all torpedo-tubes ;
- (5) Removal or mutilation on board of all boilers in excess of the number required for a maximum speed of eighteen knots.

2. *Other Surface Vessels.*

The following is to be carried out :

- (1) Removal of one-half of the guns, but four guns of main calibre may be retained on each vessel ;
- (2) Removal of all torpedo-tubes ;
- (3) Removal of all aviation facilities and accessories ;
- (4) Removal of one-half of the boilers.

(c) The High Contracting Party concerned undertakes that vessels retained in accordance with the provisions of this Section shall not be used for any combatant purpose.

CHAPTER C. — AIR ARMAMENTS

Article 25.^{1 2}

The number and total horse-power of the aeroplanes, capable of use in war, in commission and in immediate reserve in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the corresponding columns of Table I annexed to this Chapter.

The number and total horse-power of the aeroplanes, capable of use in war, in commission and in immediate reserve in the land, sea and air formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the corresponding columns of Table II annexed to this Chapter.

Article 26.

The number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles, capable of use in war, in commission in the land, sea and air armed forces of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the corresponding columns of Table III annexed to this Chapter.

The number, total horse-power and total volume of dirigibles capable of use in war, in commission in the land, sea and air formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not exceed the figures laid down for such Party in the corresponding columns of Table IV annexed to this Chapter.

Article 27.

Horse-power shall be measured according to the following rules. . .
The volume of dirigibles shall be expressed in cubic metres.

Article 28.

1. The High Contracting Parties shall refrain from prescribing the embodiment of military features in the construction of civil aviation material, so that this material may be constructed for purely civil purposes, more particularly with a view to providing the greatest possible measure of security and the most economic return. No preparations shall be made in civil aircraft in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such aircraft into military aircraft.

2. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to require civil aviation enterprises to employ personnel specially trained for military

¹ See reservation by the *German Delegation*, paragraph No. 148 of the Report.

² See reservation by the *Turkish Delegation*, paragraph No. 149 of the Report.

purposes. They undertake to authorise only as a provisional and temporary measure the seconding of personnel to, and the employment of military aviation material in, civil aviation undertakings. Any such personnel or military material which may thus be employed in civil aviation of whatever nature shall be included in the limitation applicable to the High Contracting Party concerned in virtue of Part I, or Articles 25 and 26, of the present Convention, as the case may be.¹

3. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to subsidise, directly or indirectly, air lines principally established for military purposes instead of being established for economic, administrative or social purposes.

4. The High Contracting Parties undertake to encourage as far as possible the conclusion of economic agreements between civil aviation undertakings in the different countries and to confer together to this end.

Tables annexed to Chapter C of Part II²

Table I. — Aeroplanes of the Land, Sea and Air Armed Forces

High Contracting Parties	a		b		c		d	
	Total aeroplanes of the armed forces		<i>(Optional)</i> Aeroplanes stationed in the home country		<i>(Optional)</i> Aeroplanes stationed overseas		<i>(Optional)</i> Aeroplanes in aircraft carriers	
	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power
A.								
B.								
C.								
D.								
.								
.								

¹ See reservation by the *Canadian Delegation*, paragraph No. 163 of the Report.

² See reservation by the :

<i>German Delegation</i> ,	paragraph	No. 155	of the Report.
<i>Turkish</i>	"	No. 156	"
<i>Italian</i>	"	No. 73 and 155	"

Table IV. — Dirigibles of the Land, Sea and Air Formations organised on a Military Basis

High Contracting Parties	a			b			c		
	Total dirigibles of the formations organised on a military basis			(Optional) Dirigibles stationed in the home country			(Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas		
	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume
A.									
B.									
C.									
D.									
.									
.									

PART III. — BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE¹

Article 29.²

(Provisional text subject to the drafting of the Annex.)

The total annual expenditure of each of the High Contracting Parties on his land, sea and air forces and formations organised on a military basis shall be limited to the figure laid down for such Party and in accordance with the conditions prescribed in the Annex . . .

PART IV. — EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

Article 30.

For each category of effectives defined in the model tables annexed to this Article, the exchange of information each year shall apply to the average daily number of effectives reached during the preceding year in the land, sea and air armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of each of the High Contracting Parties.

¹ See reservation by the :

German Delegation, paragraph No. 182 of the Report.

American " " " " No. 181 " "

² Note. — In pronouncing on this Article, and in particularly as regards the possibility of a distinct limitation of the expenditure on land, sea and air forces, the Governments will take into account at the Conference the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts, which will have been forwarded to them in order to permit of the drawing up of Annex...

For this purpose, each of the High Contracting Parties will forward to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, within..... months after the end of each year, the necessary information to enable the said tables to be drawn up in the case of such Party. Each Party shall attach to this statement an explanatory note showing the elements on which the figures supplied are based, and stating, in particular, for each sort of effectives (recruits, militiamen, reservists, territorials, etc.) the number of these effectives and the number of days' service they have performed.

The said tables shall be drawn up and published with the explanatory note referred to above by the Secretary General not later than in each year.

Model Tables annexed to Article 30 (Part IV) ¹

MODEL TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF EFFECTIVES REACHED DURING THE YEAR IN THE LAND ARMED FORCES AND LAND FORMATION ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS

Table I. — Land Armed Forces stationed in the Home Country

High Contracting Parties	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least x ² months of service	d Soldiers whose period of service has exceeded the legal period of service but is less than x ² months (information to be supplied only for effectives recruited by conscription)	e (Optional statement) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation
A.					
B.					
C.					
D.					
.					
.					

¹ See reservations concerning the tables annexed to Article 29 by the *British Empire Delegation*, paragraph No. 190 of the Report ;
French " " No. 180 " "
German " " No. 187 " "
Japanese " " No. 191 " "
Turkish " " No. 188 and 77 "

² Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

Table III. — Total Land Armed Forces

Ditto

Table IV. — Formations organised on a Military Basis

Ditto

Table II. — Land Armed Forces stationed Overseas

High Contracting Parties	Overseas territory	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least x^1 months of service	d Soldiers whose period of service has exceeded the legal period of service but is less than x^1 months (information to be supplied only for effectives recruited by conscription)	e (Optional statement) (Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation)
A.	M N O P					
B.	R S T					

¹ Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

Table V. — Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed Overseas

High Contracting Parties	Overseas territory	a Total effectives, including effectives specified separately in this table	b Officers or officials ranking as officers	c Other effectives or officials who have completed at least x^1 months of service	d Soldiers or officials whose period of service has exceeded the legal period of service but is less than x^1 months <i>(information to be supplied only for effectives recruited by conscription)</i>	e <i>(Optional statement) (Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation)</i>
A.	M N O P .					
B.	. R S T .					

¹ Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

MODEL TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF EFFECTIVES
REACHED DURING THE YEAR IN THE NAVAL FORCES

Table VI. — Naval Forces

High Contracting Parties	a Total effectives, including effectives specified separately in this Table	b Officers	c Other effectives who have completed at least y ¹ months of service	d (Optional statement) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation
A.				
B.				
C.				
D.				
.				
.				

¹ Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript Navy army of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

Table VII. — Sea Formations organised on a Military Basis

Ditto

MODEL TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF EFFECTIVES
REACHED DURING THE YEAR IN THE AIR ARMED FORCES

Table VIII. — Air Armed Forces stationed
in the Home Country

High Contracting Parties	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table	b Effectives who have completed at least 2 ¹ months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men)	c <i>(Optional statement) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation</i>
A.			
B.			
C.			
D.			

¹ Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript air force of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

Table IX. — Air Armed Forces stationed Overseas

Ditto

Table X. — Total Air Armed Forces

Ditto

MODEL TABLES OF THE AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF EFFECTIVES REACHED DURING THE YEAR IN THE AIR FORMATIONS ORGANISED ON A MILITARY BASIS

Table XI. — Air Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed in the Home Country

High Contracting Parties	a Total effectives, including the effectives specified separately in this Table	b Effectives who have completed at least 2 ¹ months of service (officers, non-commissioned officers and men and officials of all grades)	c (Optional statement) Recruits not trained as defined in the national legislation
A. B. C. D. .			

¹ Note. — This figure will be determined by the duration of the longest period of service which is in force in the conscript air force of any High Contracting Party at the time of the signature of the Convention.

Table XII. — Air Formations organised on a Military Basis stationed Overseas

Ditto

Article 31.¹

If any youths have compulsorily received, during any year, preparatory military training within the jurisdiction of any High Contracting Party, such Party shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, within x months after the end of each year, the number of youths who have received such instruction.

The above information shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than in each year.

Article 32.

The High Contracting Parties concerned shall forward to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations at the end of each year the following information as to the provisions of their law relating to the effectives recruited by conscription in their land, sea and air forces and formations organised on a military basis respectively :

¹ See reservation by the :

German Delegation, paragraph No. 194 of the Report.
Italian " " " " No. 194 " "

(1) The total number of days comprised in the first period of service ;

(2) The total duration in days of the ensuing periods.

The above information shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than in each year.

Article 33.^{1 2}

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall, within months from the end of each budgetary year, communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations a statement, drawn up in accordance with a standard model, showing by categories of materials the total actual expenditure in the course of the said year on the upkeep, purchase and manufacture of war materials of the land and sea armed forces and formations organised on a military basis of such Party.

The information contained in this statement shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than in each year.

Article 34.

Within one month after the date of laying down and the date of completion respectively of each vessel of war, other than the vessels exempt from limitation under Annex I to Chapter B of Part II, laid down or completed by or for them or within their jurisdiction after the coming into force of the present Convention, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations the information detailed below :

(a) The date of laying down the keel and the following particulars :

Classification of the vessel and for whom built (if not for the High Contracting Party) ;

Standard displacement in tons and metric tons ;

Principal dimensions—namely, length of water-line, extreme beam at or below water-line ;

Mean draught at standard displacement ;

Calibre of the largest gun.

(b) The date of completion, together with the foregoing particulars relating to the vessel at that date.

The above information shall be immediately communicated by the

¹ See reservation by the *German Delegation*, paragraph No. 201 of the Report.

² *Note.* — In giving an opinion on this Article, the Governments will take into account the report requested from the Committee of Budgetary Experts regarding the number and nature of the categories to be laid down and the methods of publicity thus adopted in connection with the provisions of the annex regarding limitation referred to in Article 9 of the present Convention.

Secretary-General to all the High Contracting Parties and shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than in each year.

Article 35.

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Secretariat of the League of Nations the name and the tonnage of any vessel constructed in accordance with Article 19. (Chapter II.) With regard to existing vessels of this type, this communication shall be made within two months after ratification of the present Convention. With regard to vessels to be constructed, the communication shall be made on the date of completion.

Article 36.¹

For each of the categories of aircraft defined in the model tables annexed to this Article, the exchange of information shall apply to the maximum figures attained in each year in respect of the number and total horse-power, and for dirigibles the total volume, by the aircraft referred to in Articles 25 and 26 of the present Convention.

For this purpose, each of the High Contracting Parties will forward to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations within months after the end of each year the necessary information to enable the said tables to be drawn up in the case of such Party.

The tables referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be drawn up and published by the Secretary-General not later than in each year.

Model Tables annexed to Article 36²

Model Table I. — Aeroplanes of the Land, Sea and Air Armed Forces

High Contracting Parties	a		b		c		d	
	Total aeroplanes of the armed forces		<i>(Optional)</i> Aeroplanes stationed in the home country		<i>(Optional)</i> Aeroplanes stationed overseas		<i>(Optional)</i> Aeroplanes in aircraft carriers	
	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power	Number	Total horse-power
A.								
B.								
C.								
D.								
.								
.								

¹ See reservations by the *German Delegation*, paragraph No. 206 of the Report.

² See reservation by the :

German Delegation, paragraph No. 206 and 155 of the Report ;
Turkish " " No. 207 and 77 " "

Model Table IV. — Dirigibles of the Land, Sea and Air Formations organised on a Military Basis

High Contracting Parties	a			b			c		
	Total dirigibles of the formations organised on a military basis			(Optional) Dirigibles stationed in the home country			(Optional) Dirigibles stationed overseas		
	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume	Number	Total horse-power	Total volume
A.									
B.									
C.									
D.									
.									
.									

Article 37.¹

In order to ensure publicity as regards civil aviation, each of the High Contracting Parties shall indicate within *x* months after the end of each year to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations the number and total horse-power of civil aeroplanes and dirigibles registered within the jurisdiction of such Party. Each Party shall also indicate the amounts expended on civil aviation by the Government and by local authorities.

The above information shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than in each year.

Article 38.²

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations within months of the end of each budgetary year a statement drawn up in accordance with the standard model annexed to this Article³ showing the total amounts actually expended in the course of the said year on the land, sea and air armaments of such Party.

The information supplied in this statement shall be published by the Secretary-General not later than in each year.

¹ See reservation by the *German Delegation*, paragraph No. 212 of the Report.

² See reservation by the *German Delegation*, paragraph No. 215 of the Report.

³ *Note.* — In drawing up this annex, the Conference will have before it the standard model statement, which will be submitted to it by the Committee of Budgetary Experts.

PART V. — CHEMICAL ARMS¹

Article 39.

The High Contracting Parties undertake, subject to reciprocity, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases, and of all analogous liquids, substances or processes.

They undertake unreservedly to abstain from the use of all bacteriological methods of warfare.

PART VI. — MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

CHAPTER A. — PERMANENT DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

Article 40.²

There shall be set up at the seat of the League of Nations a Permanent Disarmament Commission with the duty of following the execution of the present Convention. It shall consist of x (figure to be fixed by the Conference) members appointed respectively by the Governments of (list to be drawn up by the Conference).

Members of the Commission shall not represent their Governments. They shall be appointed for x years, but shall be re-eligible. During their term of office, they may be replaced only on death or in the case of voluntary resignation or serious and permanent illness.

They may be assisted by technical experts.

Article 41.

The Commission shall meet for the first time, on being summoned by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, within three months from the entry into force of the present Convention, to elect a provisional President and Vice-President and to draw up its Rules of Procedure.

Thereafter it shall meet annually in ordinary session on the date fixed in its Rules of Procedure.

It may also, if summoned by its President, meet in extraordinary session in the cases provided for in the present Convention and whenever an application to that effect is made by a High Contracting Party.

¹ See reservations by the *German Delegation*, paragraph No. 229 and 230 of the Report.

² See reservation by the *French Delegation*, paragraph No. 238 of the Report.

Article 42.

The Commission shall have full power to lay down its own Rules of Procedure on the basis of the provisions of the present Convention.

Article 43.

The Commission may only transact business if at least two-thirds of its members are present.

Article 44.

Any High Contracting Party not having a member of its nationality on the Commission shall be entitled to send a member appointed for the purpose to sit at any meetings of the Commission during which a question specially affecting the interests of that Party is considered.

Article 45.

Each member of the Commission shall have only one vote.

All decisions of the Commission shall be taken by a majority of the votes of the members present at the meeting.

In the cases provided for in Articles 50 and 52 the votes of members appointed by the Parties concerned in the discussion shall not be counted in determining the majority.

A minority report may be drawn up.

Article 46.

Each member of the Commission shall be entitled on his own responsibility to have any person heard or consulted who is in a position to throw any light on the question which is being examined by the Commission.

Article 47.

Each member of the Commission shall be entitled to require that, in any report by the Commission, account shall be taken of the opinions or suggestions put forward by him, if necessary in the form of a separate report.

Article 48.

All reports by the Commission shall, under conditions specified in each case in the present Convention, or in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, be communicated to all the High Contracting Parties and to the Council of the League of Nations, and shall be published.

Article 49.

The Permanent Disarmament Commission shall receive all the information supplied by the High Contracting Parties to the Secretary-General of the League in pursuance of their international obligations in this regard.

Each year, the Commission shall make at least one report on the information submitted to it and on any other information that may reach it from a responsible source and that it may consider worth attention, showing the situation as regards the fulfilment of the present Convention.

This report shall be communicated forthwith to all the High Contracting Parties and to the Council of the League and shall be published on the date fixed in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.

CHAPTER B. — DEROGATIONS

Article 50.

If, during the term of the present Convention, a change of circumstances constitutes, in the opinion of any High Contracting Party, a menace to its national security, such High Contracting Party may suspend temporarily, in so far as concerns itself, any provision or provisions of the present Convention, other than those expressly designed to apply in the event of war, provided :

(a) That such Contracting Party shall immediately notify the other Contracting Parties and at the same time the Permanent Disarmament Commission, through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, of such temporary suspension, and of the extent thereof.

(b) That simultaneously with the said notification, the Contracting Party shall communicate to the other Contracting Parties, and, at the same time, to the Permanent Disarmament Commission through the Secretary-General, a full explanation of the change of circumstances referred to above.

Thereupon the other High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the situation thus presented.

When the reasons for such temporary suspension have ceased to exist, the said High Contracting Party shall reduce its armaments to the level agreed upon in the Convention, and shall make immediate notification to the other Contracting Parties.

CHAPTER C. — PROCEDURE REGARDING COMPLAINTS

Article 51.

The High Contracting Parties recognise that any violation of the provisions of the present Convention is a matter of concern to all the Parties.

Article 52.

If, during the term of the present Convention, a High Contracting Party is of opinion that another Party to the Convention is maintaining armaments in excess of the figures agreed upon or is in any way violating or endeavouring to violate the provisions of the present Convention, such Party may lay the matter, through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, before the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

The Commission, after hearing a representative of the High Contracting Party whose action is questioned, should such Party so desire, and the representative of any other Party which may be specially concerned in the matter and which asks to be heard, shall, as soon as possible, present a report thereon to the High Contracting Parties and to the Council of the League. The report and any proceedings thereon shall be published as soon as possible.

The High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the conclusions of the Report.

If the High Contracting Parties directly concerned are Members of the League of Nations, the Council shall exercise the rights devolving upon it in such circumstances in virtue of the Covenant with a view to ensuring the observance of the present Convention and to safeguarding the peace of nations.

CHAPTER D. — FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 53.¹

The present Convention shall not affect the provisions of previous treaties under which certain of the High Contracting Parties have agreed to limit their land, sea or air armaments, and have thus fixed in relation to one another their respective rights and obligations in this connection.

The following High Contracting Parties . . . signatory to the said treaties declare that the limits fixed for their armaments under the present Convention are accepted by them in relation to the obligations referred to in the preceding paragraph, the maintenance of such provisions being for them an essential condition for the observance of the present Convention.

Article 54.

If a dispute arises between two or more of the High Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the present Convention, and cannot be settled either directly

¹ See reservation by the *German Delegation*, paragraph No. 273 of the Report.

between the parties or by some other method of friendly settlement, the parties will, at the request of any one of them, submit such dispute to the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice or to an arbitral tribunal chosen by them.

Article 55.

The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional methods. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

The present Convention shall come into force, for each Party whose instrument of ratification has been deposited, as soon as the instruments of ratification have been deposited by . . . (list to be drawn up by the Conference).

(Should the present Convention not have come into force in accordance with the preceding paragraph by . . . the High Contracting Parties shall be invited by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to meet and consider the possibility of putting it into force. They undertake to participate in this consultation, which shall take place before . . .)¹

Article 56.

Each of the High Contracting Parties will take the necessary measures for carrying the provisions of the present Convention into effect as soon as it has come into force for such Party.

Article 57.

Subject to the provisions of Articles 58 and 59, the present Convention shall remain in force for . . . years. It shall remain in force after the expiration of that period except in so far as it may be amended, superseded or denounced under the conditions specified in the following articles.

Article 58.

Before the end of the period of x years provided for in the preceding article, and not less than y years after its entry into force, the present Convention shall be re-examined by the High Contracting Parties meeting in Conference. The date of this meeting shall be fixed by the Council of the League of Nations, after taking cognisance of the

¹ *Note.* — It will be for the Conference to decide whether this paragraph and any supplementary provisions which may be necessary would not be better placed in a protocol of signature.

opinion of the Permanent Disarmament Commission and of the intentions of the High Contracting Parties non-members of the League of Nations.

The above-mentioned Conference may, if necessary, revise the present Convention and establish fresh provisions in substitution therefor, fixing their period of duration and laying down general rules regarding their examination and subsequent revision, if the latter is required.

*Article 59.*¹

Before the end of the period of y years provided for in the preceding article, but not less than z years after the entry into force of the present Convention, the procedure for examination and revision laid down in that article may also be carried out at the request of a High Contracting Party, with the concurrence of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, if the conditions under which the engagements stipulated in the Convention were contracted have undergone, as the result of technical transformations or special circumstances, changes justifying a fresh examination and, if necessary, the revision of such engagements.

Article 60.

In the course of a conference held in the circumstances provided for in the two preceding articles, any High Contracting Party shall be entitled to notify its intention to denounce the present Convention.

Such denunciation shall take effect two years after its date, but in no case before the expiration of the period of x years mentioned in Article 57.

¹ See reservation by the *German Delegation*, paragraph No. 295 of the Report.

Annex 2

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF BUDGETARY EXPERTS

“ CONCLUSIONS ”

1. In accordance with the mandate given to it by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, the Committee of Budgetary Experts has endeavoured to find an effective method of applying the system of limitation and publicity of armament expenditure, laid down in Articles 10, 24, 29, 33 and 38 of the draft Convention.

In the course of its work, the Committee has encountered many difficult problems of a highly technical nature.

As regards publicity of various categories of expenditure on war material dealt with by Article 33 of the draft Convention, the Committee has reluctantly been forced to the conclusion that the technical difficulties of arriving at a sufficiently uniform and comprehensive method are too great to allow the Committee to put forward any positive proposal.

On the other points, however, the Committee has been able to suggest solutions which appear to be acceptable although, having regard to the material at present available, the difficulties should not be minimised.

The Committee has realised that the appreciation of certain parts of its work will naturally be influenced by various considerations of a political character. In several instances, the Committee has been able to suggest, for the consideration of the forthcoming Disarmament Conference, alternative solutions which, from a technical point of view, may be considered as equally possible.

2. The Committee wishes to lay stress on the fact, so often underlined during the preparatory work, that, on account of the differences in the organisation of the armed forces (conscript armies, voluntary armies, etc.), no direct comparisons of the volume of armaments of different countries on the basis of the expenditure figures is possible, even if those figures include the total expenditure.

The model statement is intended to show the armament expenditure, in a simple and comprehensible form, in order to allow the Governments, the competent bodies under the Convention, and public opinion, to realise more clearly the significance of this expenditure than would be possible from a direct study of the various national accounts with all their diversity of structures.

To allow such comprehension, a certain measure of uniformity is a necessary condition. The Committee has tried to adapt the model statement of the draft annex to the actual systems of budget accounting existing in the greatest possible number of countries, and it believes that the Governments will be able in general to follow the instructions for filling it in fairly closely. It is, however, fully aware of the fact that some Governments will find it impossible to adhere to the instructions in every detail, and that they may be obliged to fill in the model statements in somewhat divergent fashions.

The system proposed by the Committee to remedy this defect is the following :

Each Government should fill in the model statement in time for the Conference and present to the Conference full explanations of all points in which it has been compelled to depart from the instructions on account of its administrative practices. The Conference should thus be able to understand fully what the various figures in the statements of the Governments signify and should be able to agree upon the limits to be fixed in the Convention, taking account of the methods of preparing these statements. Then each Government would be asked to undertake to adhere to the method as agreed by the Conference, by which its statement was filled in. This system should ensure that each subhead of the model statement (and, in particular, those subject to the limitations to be fixed by the Convention) would retain the same meaning for each country from year to year during the whole period of the Convention. The lack of uniformity would thus be compensated for by the attainment of continuity.

3. The Committee has endeavoured to suggest a system which would enable the various Governments to agree to a fixation of their limits at a level corresponding as closely as possible to realities.

In the first place, therefore, the Committee has recommended that the limits should apply to the average expenditure of four years rather than that they should be measured on the requirements of a peak year. Secondly, the Committee considers that the whole risk of variations in price levels should not be placed on the Governments, and has therefore suggested a system which will make a readjustment of the limits possible in the case of a substantial change in cost.

4. The Committee has found that doubts may arise as to whether certain expenditure does or does not affect the scale of armaments in the different countries, and that, in several cases, even difficulties in regard to the exact definition of such expenditure occur. It has been taken as a general principle, in the Committee's work, that in such doubtful cases a system of full publicity should be adopted.

Thus, as regards expenditure on pensions, the Committee has recognised that such expenditure should not be included in the model statement. As, however, changes in pension systems (or in the grant of fiscal privileges and social insurance or analogous benefits) may affect the real remuneration of the personnel of national defence services, the Committee has suggested a full exchange of information which would reveal any important change in the system followed in the different countries. Again, the Committee has recommended that subsidies or loans made by the State to armament enterprises, or financial participations acquired by the State in such enterprises, should, generally speaking, be treated as armament expenditure; but it has recommended that, when there is satisfactory ground for treating such subsidies and participations as being unconnected with armaments, nevertheless full publicity should be given to any expenditure of this nature which the Governments may have excluded from the model statement.

The Committee believes that these suggestions for supplementing limitation by publicity will, if adopted, go a long way to create confidence in the system of financial limitation, in spite of the technical difficulties in certain cases of presenting comprehensive material.

5. It is evident that financial limitation would bring about a limitation of certain important items of armaments, such as buildings, fortifications, the acquisition of spare parts, expenditure on scientific research, subsidies to armament industries, etc., and that it would also serve to prevent Governments from increasing the quality of their arms without, at the same time, reducing the number or *vice versa*, and it seems plain that many of these items cannot be satisfactorily limited by any other means. But the Committee must, on the other hand, point out that difficulty must arise in several cases as to what items it is proper to include in the model statement. There will be doubts whether the building or extension of a particular railway line is or is not carried out for strategic purposes. It will be difficult to decide whether State subsidies to private industries form part of general economic or social measures, or are to be regarded as being made for armament purposes.

There will again be difficulty in deciding whether a particular purchase for which payment is not made immediately on delivery should or should not be regarded as a credit purchase under the proposals made in Chapter 6 of this report.

Similar difficulties concerning the possibility of including in the model statement the total expenditure on national defence in certain countries which have a net accounting system, and of separating the expenditure of the three forces according to its real final employment, and determining the effects of the changes in the pensions

system, have been pointed out above or dealt with in previous chapters of this report.

It must necessarily be left to each Government to decide on its own responsibility whether these marginal cases, when they arise, are or are not covered by the limitation under the terms of the draft annex.

6. The existence of the cases referred to above makes it evident that the success of the system of financial limitation and publicity will be fully secured only if the contracting parties honour their obligations in good faith. The Committee cannot, of course, determine to what extent good faith must form the basis of the problem of disarmament as a whole, but it has thought it important to call attention to this matter as a consideration which applies to financial limitation as well as to other questions.

7. Apart from the above considerations, the system of financial limitation proposed by the Preparatory Commission and developed by the Committee will be strengthened by the production of the returns of expenditure, which will be forwarded to the competent organs, and which will make it possible to follow the development of expenditure in each individual country as regards both the total and the various categories into which the model statement has been divided. These returns will, on the one hand, serve to show the execution of the undertakings given by the contracting parties. On the other hand, if the principles suggested by the Committee are adopted, the returns will be directly linked up with the accounts published in each country. These accounts, though sometimes only produced after a certain delay, are normally subjected to audit and, together with the financial activities which they record, are surrounded with a whole network of guarantees which, by the system the Committee recommends, would acquire an international utility.

All States have not attained the same level of development in this respect and the Conference may find that the differences existing are of a certain importance. It seems improbable, however, that activities requiring expenditure on a substantial scale could be systematically hidden. The Committee stresses the fact that the limitation of expenditure is, by its very nature, linked to those manifestations by which armaments are revealed and which, irrespective of the Convention, are already subject to a large measure of publicity.

8. The Committee has tried to indicate, as fairly as possible, both the technical shortcomings of the system it has suggested and also the technical advantages which are inherent in that system. If the Governments are not only fully aware of those advantages, but also on their guard against the difficulties and prepared to apply the system loyally, the Committee is unanimous in considering that, from a technical point of view, a satisfactory working of the system can be obtained.

Annex 3

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 1921-22

By the Washington Naval Treaty, five Powers, the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, agreed upon the limitation of their capital ships¹ and aircraft-carriers.

Capital Ships.

The Treaty specified which capital ships, among those then in their possession, might be retained by the contracting parties and provided that all others should be disposed of as prescribed in the rules for scrapping.

Building programmes for capital ships were to be abandoned, and no new capital ships were to be constructed or acquired except replacement tonnage, which was to be in accordance with rules for replacement.² These provided, *inter alia*, that no capital-ship tonnage, with the exception of certain specified vessels, should be laid down during the ten years from November 12th, 1921.

The capital ships to be retained were, in number and standard displacement, as follows :

	Number of ships	Total tonnage
United States of America	18	500,650
British Empire	22	580,450
Japan	10	301,320
France	10	221,170
Italy	10	182,800

¹ A capital ship was defined as follows : " A capital ship, in the case of ships subsequently built, is defined as a vessel of war not an aircraft-carrier, whose standard displacement exceeds 10,000 tons or which carries a gun of a calibre exceeding 8 inches ".

Standard displacement was defined as " the displacement of the ship complete, fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armaments and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board ".

² By these rules, which also covered aircraft-carriers, the age at which capital ships (and aircraft-carriers) might be replaced was laid down as twenty years after the date of the completion.

The total capital-ship replacement tonnage — *i.e.*, the total tonnage to be in existence when the Treaty had produced its full effect — was not to exceed the following, in standard displacement :

	Tons	Ratio	Number of 35,000-ton units
United States of America . . .	525,000	5	15
British Empire	525,000	5	15
Japan	315,000	3	9
France	175,000	1.67	5
Italy	175,000	1.67	5

No capital ship exceeding 35,000 tons standard displacement was to be acquired by any of the contracting parties, nor was any such ship to carry a gun exceeding 16 inches in calibre.

Aircraft-Carriers.

Aircraft-carriers were defined as “vessels of war exceeding 10,000 tons standard displacement designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft”. The total tonnage, in standard displacement, was not to exceed the following :

	Tons	Ratio
United States of America	135,000	2.25
British Empire	135,000	2.25
Japan	81,000	1.35
France	60,000	1
Italy	60,000	1

Replacement of these vessels was to be effected only in accordance with the rules for replacement. ¹ No aircraft-carrier acquired by any contracting party was to exceed 27,000 tons standard displacement or to carry a gun of a calibre exceeding 8 inches. In addition, there was a limitation on the number of guns carried of over 6 inches in calibre.

No agreement was reached on the limitation of war vessels other than capital ships and aircraft-carriers.

It was, however, provided that no vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons standard displacement, other than a capital ship or an aircraft-carrier, should be acquired by or constructed by, for or within the

¹ By these rules the age at which aircraft-carriers (and capital ships) might be replaced was laid down as twenty years after the date of their completion.

jurisdiction of any of the contracting parties, and that no vessel of war of any of the contracting parties hereafter laid down, other than a capital ship, should carry a gun of a calibre exceeding 8 inches.

Among further provisions it was laid down that :

(a) Except as provided, no ship to be scrapped should be reconverted into a vessel of war ; and that

(b) No preparations should be made in merchant ships, in peace-time, for converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6 inches ;

(c) That, if, during the term of the Treaty, the national security of any contracting Power in respect of naval defence were materially affected by any change in circumstances, the contracting Powers would, at such Power's request, meet in conference to reconsider and amend the Treaty by mutual agreement.

Further, the United States of America would arrange for a conference of the contracting Powers to meet eight years after the coming into force of the Treaty, to consider what changes, if any, might be necessary in the Treaty.

(d) The term of the Treaty was to be until December 31st, 1936, and was to be continued after that date unless notice of termination had been given.

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 1930

Capital Ships.

By the London Naval Treaty the United States of America, the British Commonwealth of Nations, France, Italy and Japan agreed not to lay down during the years 1930 to 1936 the capital-ship replacement tonnage which, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, they were entitled to lay down during this period. It was agreed that France and Italy, however, might build the capital-ship replacement tonnage they were entitled to lay down in 1927 and 1929.

The United States of America, the United Kingdom and Japan agreed to dispose of three, five and one capital ships respectively — such disposal to be completed within a period of thirty months. When completed, this would reduce the number and tonnage of the capital ships of these Powers to the following :

	No.	Tons
United States of America . . .	15	456,000
United Kingdom	15	430,000
Japan	9	273,000

Aircraft-Carriers.

In regard to aircraft-carriers, the Washington Treaty definition was replaced by the following :

“ The expression ‘ aircraft-carrier ’ includes any surface vessel of war, whatever its displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon ”.

No aircraft-carrier of 10,000 tons or less was permitted to mount a gun above 6.1 inches in calibre.

Submarines.

The Washington Treaty definition of standard displacement was made applicable to all surface vessels of war of the contracting parties, and the standard displacement of a submarine was defined.

The maximum tonnage of 2,000 tons standard displacement and maximum gun calibre of 5.1 inches was laid down for a submarine. As exceptions to this, however, each Power might acquire up to three submarines not exceeding 2,800 tons standard displacement, carrying guns not over 6.1 inches in calibre, and France was allowed to retain one submarine (already launched) of 2,880 tons with eight-inch guns.

Three-Power Agreement.

In Part III of the Treaty, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Japan agreed to limit their naval combatant vessels — other than capital ships, aircraft-carriers and exempt vessels — as shown below.

For the purposes of this Part III the following definitions were laid down :

Cruisers. — Surface vessels of war, other than capital ships or aircraft-carriers, the standard displacement of which exceeds 1,850 tons or with a gun above 5.1 inches calibre.

The cruiser category is divided into two sub-categories as follows :

- (a) Cruisers carrying a gun above 6.1 inches calibre ;
- (b) Cruisers carrying a gun not above 6.1 inches calibre.

Destroyers. — Surface vessels of war the standard displacement of which does not exceed 1,850 tons and with a gun not above 5.1 inches calibre.

The following table shows the completed tonnages in the cruiser, destroyer and submarine categories which is not to be exceeded on December 31st, 1936 :

	United States Tons	British Commonwealth of Nations Tons	Japan Tons
<i>Cruisers :</i>			
(a) With guns of more than 6.1 inches calibre	180,000	146,800	108,000
(b) With guns of 6.1 inches calibre or less	143,500	192,200	100,450
<i>Destroyers</i>	150,000	150,000	105,500
<i>Submarines</i>	52,700	52,700	52,700

Vessels bringing the total tonnage in any category in excess of the above figures are to be disposed of gradually before December 31st, 1936. ¹

The maximum number of cruisers of sub-category (a) is to be as follows :

United States of America	18
British Commonwealth of Nations	15
Japan	12

In the destroyer category, not more than 16 per cent of the total tonnage is to be in vessels of over 1,500 tons. Those vessels existing on April 1st, 1930, in excess of this percentage may be retained, but no more are to be acquired or constructed till the reduction to 16 per cent has been effected.

A transfer up to 10 per cent of the allowed total tonnage of the category or sub-category into which the transfer is to be made is permitted between cruisers of sub-category (b) and destroyers.

By the rules for replacement a vessel is not to be replaced before it becomes "over age". A vessel is deemed to be over age when the following number of years has elapsed since the date of its completion :

- (a) Surface vessels exceeding 3,000 tons but not exceeding 10,000 tons standard displacement :
 - (1) If laid down before January 1st, 1920, 16 years ;
 - (2) If laid down after December 31st, 1919, 20 years.

¹ The rules for disposal correspond to the rules for scrapping in the Washington Treaty.

(b) Surface vessels not exceeding 3,000 tons standard displacement :

- (1) If laid down before January 1st, 1921, 12 years ;
- (2) If laid down after December 31st, 1920, 16 years.

(c) Submarines : 13 years.

Keels are not to be laid down more than three years before the year in which the vessel to be replaced becomes "over age", except for vessels not exceeding 3,000 tons, where this period is reduced to two years.

Safeguarding Clause. — As a Five Power agreement was not arrived at in regard to Part III, a Safeguard Clause was inserted in the Treaty by virtue of which any signatory of Part III might, on giving notice specifying the proposed increase and the reasons therefor to the other signatories, increase his permitted tonnage if in his opinion his security was materially affected by new construction by any non-signatory of Part III.

The other signatories of Part III may make a proportionate increase and will advise together on the situation.

Submarine Rules. — Part IV contains the agreement of the five Powers to apply to submarines the same rules of International Law as those which apply to surface vessels with respect to merchant vessels, and invites all other Powers to express assent to these rules.

Part V deals with the term, ratification and coming into force of the Treaty and provides that, unless a more general agreement limiting naval armaments to which they all adhere supervenes, the Contracting Parties will meet in Conference in 1935 to frame a new Treaty.

Annex 4

SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

1. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.
2. Report of the Committee of Experts on Budgetary Questions.
3. Minutes of the Preparatory Commission.
4. Minutes of the Arbitration and Security Commission.
5. Records of the 1931 Assembly:
 - (a) General Debate
 - (b) Third Committee.
6. Armaments Year-Book 1930-31.
Note. — A special edition is to be issued for the Conference.
7. Statements of Governments on the Position of their Armaments.
8. Replies of Governments regarding the Armaments Truce proposed by the 1931 Assembly.
9. Memorandum of the Polish Government on Moral Disarmament.

Note. — The Library of the League of Nations Secretariat has published an "Annotated Bibliography on Disarmament and Military Questions".