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## GREAT BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND DEMOCRACY

*By*

EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS

*Professor of European history,  
Leland Stanford Junior University*



## ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

*By*

BENJAMIN RUSSELL

*Justice of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia*

Published Bimonthly by the  
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## AUTHOR'S PREFATORY NOTE

The author of this article, as an historical student, for the last 15 years has been pursuing as his special field of investigation, writing and teaching, the subject of British-American relations. For the period since 1815, he has studied the printed sources of diplomatic history in the United States Documents and in the British Parliamentary Papers, in the works of the statesmen directing British or American diplomacy; and in the unprinted manuscript materials in the Department of State at Washington, and the Public Record Office at London, up to 1860. For the public, as differentiated from the official, British attitude he has examined the leading British newspapers and reviews, and has read some 400 volumes of the works of British travelers in America. These things are stated as evidence that this article is at least based on informed and not haphazard judgment. Here he proposes to summarize his conclusions as to the justice of the American traditional attitude toward Great Britain and to state what, in his opinion, has been the basic cause of difference between the two nations. In the present article footnote citations and references are inappropriate and are therefore omitted, but a brief bibliography of useful works is placed at the end.

# GREAT BRITAIN, AMERICA, AND DEMOCRACY.

BY EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS,  
*Professor of history, Leland Stanford Junior University.*

When the European war began in 1914, the American people were uninformed as to its causes, largely indifferent to its outcome, and, save for certain vague historical sympathies with France and animosities toward Great Britain, were mainly influenced by a desire to keep out of the conflict. A few in America early took sides and expressed positive opinions as to where justice lay in the European struggle, but these few were from the well-informed elements of our population. The simple fact was that as a nation we were profoundly ignorant of Europe's history, political and social conditions, and national ambitions. America had long prided herself that she was removed from the turmoil of European politics and could preserve in peace a policy of isolation. It followed that even the very ignorance of European conditions was in some degree a matter of pride.

As the European war developed, all this was rapidly altered—rapidly from the point of view of Americans, slowly from that of the Allies, who will never understand our attitude while still neutral unless they appreciate our profound ignorance of Europe. But the American has in all things an insistent desire to know where justice lies, that he may be guided by that knowledge. In spite of momentary departures, this principle of action runs as a central thread throughout all his history. Ultimately, justice was seen to be on the side of the Allies and it needed but the touch of an offensive German attack on American national honor to throw the country enthusiastically into the war on the Allies' side. Emotionally and spiritually America had come, by 1917, to take her stand with Great Britain, France, Italy and the other nations grouped in resistance to German ambitions and German theories.

## AMERICA IGNORANT OF BRITAIN

Thus knowledge came to America upon the general issues of the war, and she sympathized, in the main, with the objects and purposes of her associates. But she was, and still is, ignorant of their present-day national institutions and characteristics; and, especially, America in the mass is ignorant of modern Britain. To America, Britain was for long our "hereditary foe," the country against whom our "militant patriotism" was expressed, since she was the only nation of real power with whom we had fought. In diplomacy Britain was the only nation with which we seemed constantly to be having disputes, owing to the fact that she, again, was our only neighbor of power,—in Canada and in West Indian waters. Still further America, by reason of the welcome extended to great numbers of Irish immigrants, and the observation that these immigrants became acceptable, law-abiding, patriotic American citizens, was unable to understand the age-long conflict between the British Government and the Irish people, and became penetrated with the vague, yet no less positive, feeling that essential justice was still denied to Ireland. But most of all America has remembered and dwelt upon the British attitude and action during the Civil War, when British statesmen, mainly sympathetic with the South, preserved a cold neutrality, yet hoped for Southern victory.

This brief analysis of the main conditions of the traditional American attitude toward Britain is evidence that Americans are still thinking in terms of the past and not of the present; but are they thinking justly even in terms of the past? This is the question which the American of to-day should put to himself, and upon which he should seek to form an intelligent, not a traditional, opinion.

## UNDERSTANDING BRITAIN'S POINT OF VIEW

First of all, however, a very simple, yet a very essential, rule of historical judgment must be stated; which is, that, to arrive at anything like a correct and fair understanding of another's actions,

one must strive to "put himself in that other's place." We in America have been too prone to assume our own attitude, to think only of our own conditions, and thus to judge Britain by our own standards. This is easy and natural, but it is not likely to bring correct knowledge. Let us see, then, what judgments we shall reach if, in each important period of British-American relations, we seek to place ourselves in the position of the British Government and the British people.

In 1776, when America declared her independence from Great Britain, the intelligent Englishmen had already taken sides in a home contest over the very question of self-government which the American colonists put forward as their justification for revolution. George III had come to the throne in 1760 with the definite purpose of breaking down those liberal and parliamentary institutions already developed which hampered royal authority. His predecessors had ruled by the consent of Parliament, whose members were, it is true, chosen by the vote of a very small proportion of the people, so that Parliament expressed the will of the aristocracy and land-owners alone; but they also held the belief that a king must rule in accordance with the will of the legislature. George III set himself to overthrow this control by an elected Parliament, and step by step had advanced toward his plan of personal rule.

Modern English historians unite in depicting the king as responsible for the disruption of the British Empire. "He rooted out courage, frankness and independence from the councils of state, and put puppets in the place of men" (Trevelyan); "his acts were as criminal as any which led Charles I to the scaffold" (Lecky); Lord Bryce, in an address in London, July 4, 1918, celebrating the American Declaration of Independence, asserted that England in 1776 was ruled by a "royal personal government and a non-representative Parliament." Four years earlier, in 1914, the same distinguished friend of the United States wrote that "if the Government of Britain had been as popular in 1776 as it was in 1876 the North American colonies would not have been alienated."

## BRITISH FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT

Those who opposed royal absolutism proclaimed the rights of self-government, of "no taxation without representation"; demanded, in effect, that the ministers of the state, though in form appointed by the king, should in reality hold office, only so long as they carried out the wishes of Parliament. Political parties in Britain were called Tory and Whig, respectively, and while the line of cleavage was based on various quarrels of long standing, the basic difference between Tory and Whig was that the former would have magnified royal authority, while the latter opposed it.

By 1776, however, the contest had become one between the "King's Friends" and those who earnestly sought to preserve the "liberties of the people." Thus, the first step in the progress toward democracy, even though the ultimate goal was not clearly seen, was being fought out in Britain at the very moment when the American colonies declared themselves independent and justified their revolution, not so much on specific acts of tyranny as on a theory that they were entitled to self-government. It followed, naturally, that clear-thinking British statesmen saw in the American revolution an important and very likely a decisive factor in the political controversy in home politics. Burke and Fox upheld the American cause. The elder Pitt (Lord Chatham), in the debate upon the repeal of the stamp tax, said: "I rejoice that America has resisted. Three millions of people so dead to all the feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would be fit instruments to make slaves of the rest. America, if she fell, would fall like a strong man. She would embrace the pillars of the state, and pull down the constitution along with her." The "King's Friends" on the other hand were for vigorous suppression and punishment of the colonial revolution; and, because of the purely patriotic dislike of seeing a part of the British Empire cut away, they gained, temporarily, the support of the bulk of those Englishmen who had any active voice in legislative matters. But from some Tories and from more Whigs came the cry that America was but seeking to establish a principle of self-govern-



ment dear to the hearts of Englishmen and of first importance in the existing controversy with the king. For years after the American revolution a leading Whig journal (the *Independent Whig*) kept standing in big type at the top of the first page of each issue, this quotation from a speech in Parliament by Lord Chatham during our revolution:

“It was the glorious spirit of Whiggism which animated millions in America to prefer Poverty *with* Liberty to gilded chains and sordid affluence, and to die in Defense of their Rights as *Men*,—as FREEMEN! What shall resist this spirit?”

#### REVOLUTION AFFECTED BRITISH POLITICS

Thus, the American revolution had a much larger importance to Great Britain than the question of whether a section of the British Empire had a right to cast off its allegiance to the mother country and rule itself. The “King’s Friends” organized armies and dispatched troops to America with an eye anxiously turned to home conditions, judging rightly that, if America were not forced to submission, the end of the personal and autocratic rule of George III would come. When, after seven years of war, it became evident that America could not be subdued, the effect was immediate in British politics.

Lord North received the news of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown “like a bullet in the heart.” The House of Commons resolved that it would “consider as enemies to his Majesty and to this country all those . . . attempting the further prosecution of offensive war on the continent of North America, to the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience by force.” Ministers resigned, acknowledging their failure. The king was forced to appoint men to office who had long asserted the principle of parliamentary government and the leaders were Whigs friendly to the American cause, a fact not to be forgotten in considering the remarkable generosity of the British Government in making a peace by which the new American states received a territorial status far beyond the hopes or expectations of the American people. The seed of democracy had long before this germinated in British

institutions. Its earlier development in British soil (as essential to America as to Britain) we have not discussed; but in 1776 that seed had become a vigorous tree in America, while as yet it was but a delicate plant in Britain. It was much clearer to British than to American statesmen that the American revolution was a contest for principles of government applicable and desirable in Britain herself. Thus America was *right* both for herself and for the mother country, and justly prides herself on her leadership in that democracy which has resulted from her revolutionary action; but Americans should understand and remember that the very principles which led their ancestors "to die in Defense of their Rights as *Men*,—as FREEMEN," received the applause and the support of those Englishmen who shared the democratic vision.

#### REVOLUTION AIDED BRITISH DEMOCRACY

The American revolution is the starting point of a vigorous (though not the first) contest in Great Britain for the establishment of British democracy. With independence secured in 1783, America became the exemplar of the new democratic principles of government, and from that moment the whole attitude of the British Government and people toward America is determined, at bottom, by their own desires and inclinations as to democracy. This is the key to British policy toward America. In a short survey there is not space for an examination of each incident and episode of British-American relations; but the main facts of those relations may be so stated as to justify the contention that the question of expanding democracy—the fact that America was its exponent for Britain herself—decided the British attitude toward America.

The War of 1812-14 was one in which America engaged, against an arrogant belligerent, in defense, so she asserted, of neutral rights,—though those neutral rights were mostly contentions, not yet accepted and established in international law. America claimed for neutral nations privileges in trade which neither Britain nor France as belligerents were willing to concede. America insisted that a belligerent blockade, to be respected by

the neutrals, must be made effective by a squadron of vessels sufficiently powerful to prevent the ingress or egress of vessels of commerce,—a doctrine not incorporated in international law until much later. Britain denied the right of a citizen to “alienate his duty” and sought to recover runaway sailors by taking them from American ships—thus exercising the “impressment” she used on her own soil, by means of a “right of search” of American vessels. The American theory that a man could change his citizenship was new, and was then specifically denied by the European states. It lay at the bottom of the whole “right of search” controversy of 1812. But our concern here is not so much with these contentions in regard to international law as it is to examine the general British position.

In 1793 Britain had gone to war against revolutionary France on the alleged principle of “good faith” as applied to treaties previously signed by all the powers of Europe in relation to the status of the river Scheldt, in what is now Belgium. The details are unimportant, but it is interesting to note that Britain had a justifiable ground for war in a French violation of a long-standing international agreement. In fact, however, Britain went to war to check the expansion of the French revolution to other countries and especially to prevent the spread of a revolutionary democracy on her own soil,—for there was in England a strong radical movement sympathizing with the idealism of the French revolution. Aristocratic and autocratic toryism in Britain feared the spread of French sentiments at home. As the European war progressed, however, as a military despotism usurped authority in France, and as Napoleon began to dream of creating a European empire, the British nation became united in self-defense. Britain became the leader in the efforts of Europe to defeat the Napoleonic project of world empire.

#### WAR IN BEHALF OF NEUTRAL RIGHTS

In that European contest America at last became involved on what she chose to call her neutral “rights”—though these were as yet mainly “contentions” of what ought to be. America

declared war on Great Britain as the belligerent which had most effectively disregarded our "rights"—though France was equally opposed and equally offensive in so far as she could control the seas. America chose to disregard the great issue of the European war, which was the issue of world empire. From the British point of view the American attack was but a minor irritant added to the great continental conflict; yet America was no sooner in the war than there arose in Great Britain a shout from the extreme Tories that now the chance had come to deal a death blow not only to Napoleon's imperialistic ideas, but also to democracy, since America represented democracy as a political ideal and force contrary to British convictions.

The London *Times*, long the leader of aristocratic political philosophy and opinion, though at the moment in political opposition to the ministry, printed editorials urging the government to "finish with Mr. Bonaparte and then deal with Mr. Madison and democracy." In June, 1814, the *Times* asserted that England ought to "maintain the doctrine of no peace with James Madison;" and in October that it should be England's object to subvert "the whole system of the Jeffersonian school." Thus there was an element in Great Britain that saw a chance, and was inclined to take it, to throttle American democracy as the new and dangerous element in the society of nations.

Why, then, did not Britain, triumphant at last over Napoleon, seriously punish America? For in spite of a few victories in naval duels and of Jackson's victory at New Orleans, America was pretty badly whipped by 1814. There were several reasons for a British policy of reconciliation with America, but among others, and as influential as any, was the Whig party's opposition to any punishing of America, or to any effort to strike a blow at the American system of government. Castlereagh's original instructions to the British peace commissioners forbade any concession on impressment or maritime law; American shore privileges in the Newfoundland fisheries must be given up; the boundary was to be altered so as to provide an all-British military road from Quebec to Halifax; the Great Lakes were not to be used by American naval vessels, thus insuring their domination by the British; the

free navigation of the Mississippi was to be accorded by the United States so that England might have access to the western Indian country; and the Indians were to be included in the treaty in such a way as to guarantee the integrity of their territory located within United States boundaries, by a virtual British protectorate.

But Whig leaders notified the Tory Government that they would not longer support that government in its war measures if America were dealt with in this extreme manner. The simple fact was that again American democracy, for the British, had become a question of British home political theory and practice, and that again the British liberals had come to the defense of democratic institutions. The Tory Government gave up its intended punishment of America and the treaty of peace ignored the alleged causes of war and simply made peace.

#### HOME DEVELOPMENT OCCUPIED BOTH

The period from 1815 to 1844 is, on the whole, one of little serious friction between America and Britain. True, there were controversies over West Indian trade, fisheries, the Maine boundary, and other matters of less importance; but in all of these controversies one sees the Anglo-Saxon love of legal argument and forensic contention rather than the joining of issues likely to lead the two nations to war. In truth, America and Britain were each too busy in home development to have time or inclination for militant antagonisms.

America was experiencing that wonderful industrial and spiritual change that came with the sense of nationality in 1815, and with the increasing movement of population to the new West. Across the Appalachian range where, in 1790, there had been but 100,000 people, there were in 1832 some 4,000,000,—more than the total population of the United States when the peace of 1783 was signed. America was also rapidly changing in political conceptions, progressing toward a democracy based on the will of all the people, instead of one in which a minority of intelligence and wealth controlled and directed the affairs of the nation.

This change was accomplished, so it was felt, when Andrew Jackson was elected President in 1828.

In Great Britain this same principle of an expanded democracy was being contested, and the vital fact of British-American relations from 1815 to 1844 is the British Reform Bill of 1832,—though that fact nowhere appears above the surface in the diplomatic correspondence of either country. From 1815 to 1832 British liberal opinion pressed with increasing vigor for a political reform that should expand the franchise and remodel the representation in Parliament more nearly on lines of population. To every Englishman, whether Whig or Tory, the American democracy became an example to be studied, and to every British traveler it became a question whether he should write America “up” or “down,” his decision almost uniformly being in accordance with what he wanted at home—an old type aristocratic government or a new type one based on some approach to democracy.

#### BRITISH OPINIONS OF AMERICA

Melish, a Scotch Whig, wrote of America: “A republican finds here a Republic, and the only republic on the face of the earth that deserves the name, where all are under the protection of equal laws—of laws made by themselves.” Lieutenant Francis Hall notes that “laborers have not yet discovered the necessity of yielding nineteen parts of their earnings to the government to take care of the remaining twentieth.” Morris Birkbeck, an emigrant farmer, objected in England to “being ruled and taxed by people who had no more right to rule and tax us than consisted in the power of doing it”; and in America asserted: “I *love* the government . . . and thus a new sensation is excited; it is like the development of a new faculty. I am become a patriot in my old age.” A letter home, printed in the *Edinburgh Scotsman*, March, 1823, says: “I am here, lord and master of myself and of 100 acres of land—an improvable farm, little trouble to me, good society and a good market. . . . The parson gets nothing from me; my state and road taxes and poor rates amount to \$25 per annum. I can carry a gun if I choose; I leave my door

unlocked at night; and I can get snuff for one cent an ounce or a little more."

The Tory writers presented quite another picture, found flaws in society and government and warned Englishmen against admiration of things American. The best observer of this group, Captain Basil Hall, writing in 1829, reveals in every line the old Tory of the twenties complacently convinced of the perfection of the British constitution. He cannot conceive of any real sympathy, even, between the two nations. "My opinion now is that while each of our governments retains its present character, any closer intimacy between us is not likely to spring up,"—a very clear appreciation of the importance of the question of democracy as decisive in international relationships. Hall's own faith in aristocratic government is summed up in his quotation from the thirty-eighth chapter of Ecclesiasticus, in the Apocrypha:

The wisdom of a learned man cometh by opportunity of leisure: and he that hath little business shall become wise. How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough, and that glorieth in the goad, that driveth oxen, and is occupied in their labors, and whose talk is of bullocks?

Most of the travelers were Tories and most of the books were therefore unfriendly to American institutions and people. The writers sought to find flaws; and, far more than diplomatic quarrels, they irritated Americans, who did not understand that this writing was for effect upon a political situation at home.<sup>1</sup>

Such travelers' books could affect only the reading public; but American democracy had its influence also, in a minor degree, on the uneducated emigrant from Britain. In 1826 a British parliamentary committee took testimony on the causes and conditions of emigration to America. The fat volume in the Parliamentary papers in which this testimony is printed, with letters home from those who had gone to America, does not so much emphasize political liberty as a cause of emigration, as it does bring out that the emigrant, arrived in America, was instantly impressed with his physical well-being and with the social democracy that existed.

<sup>1</sup> For an analysis of some of the principal British writers between 1810 and 1860 see the author's article "The Point of View of the British Traveler in America," *Political Science Quarterly*, June, 1914.

He writes back that he has "three meat meals a day," and that, if a farm laborer, he "sits down at meals with the family" of his employer. There was a very confused notion as to how far this betterment of conditions was or was not due to democratic institutions; but the fact remains that the British laborer believed that somehow democracy and improved industrial conditions went hand in hand. The very statistics of British emigration to America show this, and show the relation of America in the British mind to the struggle for the reform bill of 1832. That emigration had been steadily growing from 1815 to 1828, when it reached the annual total of 17,840. But in 1829, when the liberal political movement in Britain gave hope, it dropped to 10,594; and in 1830, when liberal victory seemed certain, to 3,874.

#### LIBERAL ENGLAND AND AMERICA FRIENDLY

Thus again the attitude toward America and American democracy was a question of British home politics. After 1832, until 1844, Jacksonian democracy in America and Liberalism in Britain made relatively easy sailing between the two nations. True, in the Canadian rebellion of 1837 Americans along the border, restless and unemployed because of our financial crisis of that year, attempted various incursions into Canada in aid of the Canadian revolutionary movement.

A governor of Upper Canada, Sir Francis Bond Head, old Tory to the backbone, had given some cause for American irritation. His first dispatch home after appointment, describing his arrival at Toronto, states that "strong republican principles have leaked into the country from the United States"; and in May, 1836, in a public address to the "loyal electors" of the province, he concluded: "The people of Upper Canada detest Democracy; they revere their Constitutional Charter, and are consequently staunch in allegiance to their King. They are perfectly aware that there exist in the Lower Province one or two Individuals who inculcate the Idea that this Province is about to be disturbed by the Interference of Foreigners, whose Power and whose Numbers will prove Invincible. In the name of every Regiment of Militia in



Upper Canada I publicly promulgate—*Let them come if they dare!*" For this speech, however, Head received a prompt reproof from the British Colonial Office, and during the crisis in Canada America amended her neutrality laws so as to permit our national Government to exercise an effective restraint over those of our adventurous citizens who itched to meddle in Canadian politics.

#### PERIOD OF IRRITATING CONDITIONS

But with 1844 there began the most irritating and dangerous period of international relations, due to conditions and tendencies that developed in either country.

America by 1844 had come to the high point of her expansion and "manifest destiny" fever. A continuous and wonderful movement of population west and southwest had carried American institutions and industry across the Mississippi, and already new tendrils of this growth were stretching out toward Oregon in the Northwest, and Texas in the South. The former territory was in dispute between Great Britain and the United States; the latter was a part of the Republic of Mexico, in which state British influence had long been predominant, and where the great Tory statesman of the twenties, George Canning, had hoped to develop a nation under British guidance capable of acting as a barrier and a check to American influence in the New World. This policy, had it been continued by later British statesmen (says Temperly, the most recent biographer of Canning), must inevitably have resulted in a clash with America. Fortunately, succeeding foreign ministers abandoned the policy of opposition to America, though Mexico was still largely under British tutelage.

American slavery had expanded rapidly with the tremendous increase of cotton production and manufacture, and the slave interests of America were demanding additional territory; their hopes were fixed on Texas and even upon Central America. Still more powerful in its effect on this "expansionist" fever was the new sense of a special "destiny" for America—a "manifest destiny" that should carry American sovereignty to the Pacific as well as extend American institutions to contiguous nations. This

sentiment was not confined to the slave-owning sections; it was general throughout all sections, save, possibly, in the New England states. America was intoxicated with her success in so rapidly having become a great and powerful nation. She was bumptious and arrogant in expressing her sense of power; and, feeling that somehow democracy was responsible for this advance in power, she was not hesitant in declaring hers to be the "advancing" civilization, and that of the old-world nations to be "decadent."

Great Britain, in 1844, had gone into political reaction, and it was this fact that determined her attitude toward America. The force of the liberal movement of 1832 had waned; indeed the very men who had been responsible for that movement were now opposed to any further extension of democracy. To them the "Great Reform Bill" of 1832 was a final step in democratic experiment, beyond which it would be unsafe and unwise to go. In this sense Lord John Russell defined his position, and in political slang became "Finality John." For the time being then both Tory and Whig aristocracy were united in the determination to hold political institutions where they were; and, in spite of the great step forward in 1832, Britain was still far from being a democracy, was still a nation ruled by its aristocracy and its wealth. Such a condition, however, did not satisfy the unenfranchised, the great majority of the British people, and this majority, now better educated and better informed, naturally looked toward America as the democratic model of what they desired.

#### BRITAIN FEARED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

The result of this British home situation was that the mere fact of the rapid advance of America in prosperity and in power had a decided interest for the "finality" aristocratic ruling classes in Britain. They disliked that advance and feared it; not primarily because of any fear of America as a rival nation; nor because of any fear of loss of colonies, such as Canada; nor even of loss of trade, such as that with Mexico. For Britain in the forties was careless of colonies and thought indeed that they were no asset,

but a burden. Stanley, the British colonial secretary in 1841, emphatically notified Minister Pakenham in Mexico that he was "not anxious for the formation of new and distant colonies." Aristocratic Britain feared rather the influence of American power and prestige as a democracy.

Again, the British travelers in America wrote with the idea of influencing home conditions. Captain Marryat in six volumes of lively description attacked American society and institutions. In the preface he wrote: "I candidly acknowledge that . . . my great object has been to do serious injury to the cause of democracy." Alexander Mackay in his *Western World* applauded our idealism and institutions as fit models for Europe. "Society in America," he asserted, "started from the point to which society in Europe is only yet tending. The equality of men is, to this moment, its cornerstone." The power of American democracy alarmed the British Tory. George Warburton, annoyed and startled at the growth and prosperity of the United States, undertook in his *Hochelaga* to open the eyes of his countrymen to the danger in the West. "They only wait for matured power," he wrote, "to apply the incendiary torch of republicanism to the nations of Europe."

But the mere size of the United States brought to these alarmed Englishmen the comforting reflection that soon there must be a breaking up of the union into several nations. This was an opinion long held. In 1830 the *Times* had said: "We might as well dream of all Europe constituting everlastingly a single government, as fancy that such a territory, and such a variegated people as those of the United States, could go on much longer under the name of a single commonwealth." In 1845 the foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, in a confidential dispatch to Elliot, the British chargé in Texas, held the same view, prophesying civil war in America as a result of territorial expansion. He believed that at least three distinct nations were inevitable—a northern, a southern and a western. From 1830 on, in short, the question of whether or not the new-world democratic experiment could achieve and maintain power, was one which held the attention of both Tory and democrat in Britain, and was clearly recognized

as having a bearing on the development of British political institutions.

#### SLAVE TRADE CAUSED DISAGREEMENT

But there was one American institution, slavery, that damned American democracy in the eyes of all humane and right-thinking men; and the British people had long been intensely aroused against slavery and the African slave trade. This last was now being revived and became a constant source of irritation between Britain and America, since the latter country, professing a horror as great as Britain's of the African slave trade, yet hampered British efforts to suppress it, by a captious (so it seemed to the British) resentment of the "right of search" exercised by British cruisers in the case of suspected slave-trading vessels flying the American flag.

Right of search for the impressment of seamen, though not disavowed by Great Britain, had not been used since the peace of 1814, but the right of searching (or "visiting") professed merchant vessels to make sure that they were not slave traders was claimed by Britain to be a necessity if efforts to suppress that trade (now condemned by all civilized nations) were to be effective. Many European nations had signed treaties with Great Britain giving mutual right of search to each other's naval vessels; but America refused to do this, and consistently objected to any search of a *bona fide* American ship. The result was that slave traders, of whatever nationality, sought safety by hoisting the American flag. The British cruiser, under orders to arrest a slave trader and bring him before an international court for trial, had to take the risk, therefore, of boarding by mistake as to character an innocent American merchant vessel, or of seeing guilty slave traders sail by in immunity. American irritation over the earlier "right of search" troubles was in the forties still a very genuine one,—was still identified in American popular feeling with the sense of national dignity and self-respect; and no American Government would then have ventured to sign with Britain a treaty of mutual right of search. Yet here was a very genuine humanitarian service, in which the whole British nation,

of all classes, was deeply interested, likely to be blocked by American sensitiveness about the "right of search"—a relic of the war of 1812.

#### SLAVERY'S EFFECT ON BRITISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

It would be an unjust accusation to say that the British Government of the forties and fifties made use of the African slave trade and right of search questions to keep before the eyes of the British people an obnoxious quality of American democracy. In fact, they had no need to stir these questions; yet their existence was an advantage to the aristocracy of Great Britain, which wished to keep things as they were. Also, quite distinct from the African slave trade stood American slavery, a domestic institution difficult to explain in a "democracy" and an obstacle to British acceptance of American political ideas. Slavery and increase of slave territory were good ground for British opposition to American territorial expansion, yet the British Government never formally and officially put forward such an argument. Rather, such steps as were taken were based on rights of existing nations. Thus, in relation to Texas, the British Government at first disliked the revolution by which that state became independent of Mexico, but later hoped to see established a powerful independent Texas, which should block American power.<sup>1</sup> A little later, when it became evident that American "manifest destiny" would soon demand California, the British Government's idea was to encourage the people in California to set up for themselves, and not be absorbed in the Great Republic. There was no thought here of British acquisition. Lord Aberdeen wrote, December 31, 1844, to the principal British agent for the Californias: "It is entirely out of the question that her Majesty's Government should give any countenance to the notion which seems to have been agitated of Great Britain being invited to take California under her protection;" but at the same time gave instructions to use every effort to persuade the province, "if it should

<sup>1</sup> See the author's book, *British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846*, Johns Hopkins Press, 1910. The documents drawn from the British Public Record Office, upon which this work is based, have since been edited by the author and published by the Texas State Historical Association under the title *British Diplomatic Correspondence Concerning the Republic of Texas, 1838-1846*, 636 p.

throw off the Mexican yoke, not to assume any other which might prove inimical to British interests." The thought was, primarily and throughout, dislike of the growing power and size of America as a democracy. For in spite of all her shortcomings, in spite of the institution of slavery, the American democratic ideal had a glamour for the British public that worried British statesmen, determined though they were that a similar democracy should get no further foothold in British institutions. That glamour,—that popular liking for America and pride in her as an offspring of the British people,—was a decided influence upon the British Government in forcing it to a peaceable adjustment of the Oregon question, at the moment when that question seemed likely to bring on war.

In the later forties and during the fifties the great Irish emigration to America added an element dangerous to British-American good relations, because of political maneuvering to "catch the Irish vote." This was not a large influence, however, before the American Civil War.

From the point of view of the British ruling class the determining factor in the attitude toward America, even though inconsistently mixed at times with a kind of pride in the development of American power and prosperity, was the fear of the influence of America on the British people,—the fear of an advancing demand for a further step toward democracy.

By 1858 the leaders of British political parties were united in determination to resist democracy. They might carry on political battles with all the old-time energy on other lines, but on this one principle of opposition to democracy they stood as one party. When Palmerston, in 1859, became the head of a coalition cabinet (nominally Whig) he had a private understanding with Derby, the leader of the Tory opposition, that the latter should not push political opposition too far so long as Palmerston's government prevented the introduction of legislation for an expansion of the electoral franchise. This was an agreement by the party leaders to block democracy, now being loudly demanded by certain radicals like John Bright. The governing classes of Great Britain were united in the determination to resist democracy.

## BRITISH RULERS RELIEVED BY CIVIL WAR

The Civil War in America, at first regarded with dismay in Great Britain because of its disastrous effect on trade, once it was seen to be inevitable, brought a great sigh of relief to the British ruling class. That great monster, American democracy, had at length broken in pieces and would not longer exercise a disturbing and evil influence upon the minds of the British people. The "government of the wise" was still the best form of government. It was now but necessary to say to the British people; "See into what catastrophe this mushroom growth of a prosperous democracy has fallen. Will you now choose to follow in American footsteps and endanger your prosperity, which we, your friends and rulers, have secured for you, or will you not now agree that government should be trusted to those who make a study and a business of it, and whose sole object is your well-being?" In the minds of the ruling class it was an honest and sincere conviction that they alone were fit to govern and the collapse of American democracy seemed to mark the end of a great experiment in another type of government, exercising hitherto a dangerous attraction upon the British public.

The American viewpoint of British action and attitude during our Civil War was naturally determined by American desires. The North hoped for sympathy, the South for aid, and neither side got what it wished from the Government of Great Britain; so that in the end North and South alike were embittered. But if we look at our struggle from the British viewpoint there are two basic considerations.

## BELIEVED SOUTH WOULD SUCCEED

The first was that practically no one in England in 1861 believed that the South could be brought back into the Union by force of arms. It did not seem possible that so large a territory as that comprised within the seceding states, with so great a population and so much material wealth, could be forced to give up its asserted independence. History had never recorded a revolution where a people, with these elements of power, had failed to

achieve their independence. The very friends of the North in England, who hoped ardently for Northern success, held that hope with a faint heart. The result of this conviction of ultimate Southern victory was pressure upon the British ministry to do what nearly all declared was inevitable, i.e., to recognize the independence of the South, and to persuade or influence the North to give up a fruitless contest. This pressure was exerted in the first two years of the war by business and trade interests, by the presence of famine in the cotton manufacturing districts of Lancashire and by the ardent friends of the South. Early recognition of Southern independence was urged that the North might recognize the futility of the struggle and peace be restored. The Government of Great Britain did promptly recognize the right of the South to fight for independence and declared British neutrality in our conflict, but beyond that the ministry would not go.<sup>1</sup> Bernhardt, in his *Germany and the Next War*, with a typically aristocratic point of view, has written that "England committed the unpardonable blunder of not supporting the Southern states in the American War of Secession."

#### SAW FATE OF DEMOCRACY INVOLVED

Neutrality, a "cold neutrality" as the North termed it in vexation, was the policy chosen by Great Britain, and on the whole it was strict neutrality also, in spite of the British error in the *Alabama* case,—an error due, primarily, however, to the traditional British disinclination to permit governmental interference in private enterprises unless positive and direct proof of private misconduct were forthcoming.

But back of the cold neutrality was the second basic consideration, the conviction of the governing class,—the conviction indeed of educated Englishmen,—that in the American conflict was embraced the fate of democracy. The greatest fact to be remembered in estimating and judging British governmental and popular attitude on the American Civil War is that to the British mind democracy was "on trial," not necessarily as to its theoretical

<sup>1</sup>For a longer statement see the author's article "American Civil War from the British View-Point," *The History Teacher's Magazine*, May, 1918.



merits, but as to its ability to gain and to maintain a position of power and greatness in the world family of nations. The rulers of Great Britain waited for the accomplished independence of the South, believing that then they could put before the people with assurance the proof that, ultimately, democracies were not capable of maintaining great and powerful states.

This thought was constantly in the minds of ministers, of members of Parliament, of writers in the press, of scholars; and also it was in the mind of every man of intelligence in the unenfranchised working classes in Britain who thought of the American conflict in terms of British home politics. British publications rang the changes on this topic. The *Morning Post* said: "If the Government of the United States should succeed, . . . Democracy will have achieved the grandest triumph since the world began. It will have demonstrated to the ample satisfaction of its present and future proselytes that it is even more puissant in war than in peace. . . . And who can doubt that Democracy will be more arrogant, more aggressive, more leveling and vulgarizing, if that be possible, than it ever had been before?" The *Edinburgh Review* asserted: "It is precisely because we do not share the admiration of America for her own institutions and political tendencies, that we do not now see in the impending change an event altogether to be deplored. In those institutions and tendencies we saw what our own might be if the most dangerous elements of our constitution should become dominant. We saw democracy rampant, with no restrictions upon its caprices. . . . In the hope that this contest may end in the extinction of mob rule, we become reconciled to the much slighter amount of suffering that war inflicts on America." And again, from the *Edinburgh* two years later (1863): "Every sensible man in the country now acknowledges that we have already gone as far toward democracy as it is safe to go. This is the great moral benefit which we have derived from the events in America." The *London Times* in an editorial (1862), exhibiting the American struggle as the end of democracy, said: "These are the consequences of a cheap and simple form of government, having a rural attorney for sovereign and a city attorney for prime minister. . . . This Republic has been so often

proposed to us as a model for imitation that we should be unpardonable not to mark how it works now, when for the first time it has some work to do." Delane, the editor of the *Times*, the greatest newspaper influence in politics, had always in mind this thought of "democracy on trial." When Sherman captured Savannah he wrote privately to Palmerston, the prime minister: "The American news is a heavy blow to us as well as to the South." Lord Acton "broke his heart" when Lee surrendered.

On the side of democracy men were equally convinced of the significance of the American contest. John Bright told the workmen everywhere that the Northern cause was their cause. By 1863 the bulk of the British unenfranchised public had come to believe with him, and he could tell a great mass meeting of trades unions in London that "privilege thinks it has a great interest in it [the Civil War], and every morning with blatant voice it comes into your streets and curses the American Republic." This same mass meeting, Socialist tradition asserts, was organized by Karl Marx, who assured his followers that the cause of the North was the cause of labor and democracy. Lancashire cotton operatives, out of employment, refused to riot as was their wont, for fear riotous demonstration might lead the British Government to intervene in America on the excuse that raw cotton must be supplied to the manufacturers. Lincoln himself wrote to the workmen of Manchester applauding their sufferings for democracy, as "an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country." In short, in England, the basic opinion of our war was of "democracy on trial," and men took sides as they desired or opposed an expansion of democracy in England.

#### WHY BRITAIN DID NOT AID THE SOUTH

This being so, why did not the British Government, and Parliament, the great majority of whose members were of, and believed in, an aristocracy as the only wise government—why did not the British Government, seeing the power of its own class at stake, definitely and positively come to the aid of the South? Or

at least why did it not so twist and turn international law that Britain, as a neutral, might give direct aid and comfort to the South? The answer is found in the British habit of playing the game of politics or of international affairs like gentlemen, the habit of keeping one's word, once given, no matter at what cost to oneself. A habit of keeping faith, without which civilization ceases to advance,—this was the scruple that prevented the British aristocracy from so guiding British policy as to secure the victory of the South, the permanent disruption of the Union, and the overthrow of the principle of democracy. Great Britain had declared her neutrality in our struggle; unless given just cause for war by one of the belligerents she must, under the accepted law of nations, maintain that neutrality until such time as one or the other of the contending parties was so far conquered as to render inevitable complete defeat. Not until the South had conquered the North, or not until the North had given up efforts to reconquer the South, could Great Britain honorably recognize the independence of the South. No student of our Civil War will doubt that the fate of the Confederacy rested in the hands of Great Britain; that her recognition of Southern independence would have meant the ultimate success of the Confederacy. Yet British statesmen stuck to their word of strict neutrality, and, however cool may have been their attitude toward the Northern cause, the propriety, in accepted international law, of British neutrality was not later seriously called in question save in one case, that of the *Alabama*. For her error in this case, Great Britain paid heavy damages to the United States.<sup>1</sup>

#### AMERICANS FAILED TO UNDERSTAND

British historians almost uniformly make a generalization of this period to the effect that "British ruling classes and the Government were on the side of the South,—the British people on the side of the North." This is in the main correct, though there were exceptions (as always in generalization) on both sides.

<sup>1</sup>These generalizations on British policy are based on a study of the official and private correspondence of members of the British cabinet, from 1860 to 1865, and of both official and private dispatches of the British minister at Washington, Lord Lyons.

To the British public of to-day, indeed, it would be a matter of surprise that America had not understood during the Civil War and since that the key to British attitude, whether governmental or popular, was the question of democracy. But Americans of that time, and long after, failed utterly to recognize or to understand this, and failing to understand, were bitterly reproachful toward the British, whether of the ruling classes or of the people. If Americans were less ignorant of conditions and institutions outside their own country, this error of understanding would not have added force to that anti-British feeling which animated us for years after the Civil War.

The mere facts of British history since 1865 should have enlightened us. In 1867, two years only, after the conclusion of our war, Britain took the next great step forward toward democracy. In 1859 all leading British statesmen talked "finality" in franchise expansion, and Tory and Whig were united in determination to preserve aristocratic rule. Now, in 1865, democracy "on trial" had proved its worth in power, and Tory and Whig leaders, knowing that public pressure could no longer be resisted, raced for popular favor with rival reform bills. The Gladstone (Whig) measure was defeated by clever political maneuvering, but the Disraeli (Tory) measure replaced it and was passed as the "Reform Bill of 1867." By it the "government of the wise" came to an end in Britain, and the "government of democracy" began; for the franchise was so extended as to take in the artisan class. Later, in 1884, the franchise was extended to unskilled laborers, and by still other minor changes, Great Britain has come to full acceptance of the democratic principle of majority rule.<sup>2</sup> It is not too much to claim that the American Civil War ended the long struggle in Britain over democracy, for with the reform of 1867 there came an end to a government based on the theory of the right of education and wealth to rule the state. It was the good fortune of Great Britain that education and wealth, quietly accepting the new order in government, set themselves to serve

<sup>2</sup> The new parliamentary franchise by the Reform Act of February 7, 1918, gives the franchise to every man in Great Britain and Ireland over 21 years of age if a resident of an electoral district for the six months preceding the election. It gives the franchise to every woman over 30 years of age who has previously had the privilege of voting in local elections, or who is the wife of a local elector.

and guide, in so far as they were permitted by their new fellow-citizens.

### SISTER DEMOCRACIES SINCE 1867

Thus it is clear that throughout nearly a hundred years of American relations with Great Britain an influential factor in attitude and action up to 1867 was the question of democracy as a political form of government. Throughout all this time the Government of Great Britain as such (no matter what personal and social ties united the two nations) was in opposition, in its theoretical and practical applications, to the Government of the United States. Always in Great Britain, a minority appealed to the example of America as worthy of imitation, but it was not until 1867 that the principles of government became the same in both countries. With that date there came to the British Government and people alike a sincere desire to settle amicably all questions in dispute with America, to live on terms of extreme friendship, to proceed along similar, though not identical, lines of democratic development. Since 1867 democracy in Great Britain has been holding out hands to a sister democracy across the ocean.

But for long Americans refused this overture. In specific cases of disagreement, it is true, Great Britain was found to be astonishingly ready to make concessions, to arbitrate, to find some way out of quarrel into amity, and these cases little by little had their effect on American opinion, rendering it more friendly. Yet America long remained truculent after the Civil War, refusing to forgive to a new Britain the injuries credited to a Britain that had ceased to exist.

With the settlement of the *Alabama* claims in 1872, however, nothing remained for angry America to fix upon as a grievance, and since that date there has been no serious clash between the two nations. A small cloud threatening possible hostilities appeared in 1895 when America took up cudgels for Venezuela in that country's dispute with Britain over boundaries, but after the first shock of surprise and irritation in Britain had passed, the press, public and officials, joined in asserting that under no conceivable

circumstances should the Venezuelan question be permitted to expand into a serious quarrel with the United States, and this friendly attitude led easily to a just settlement by arbitration of the Venezuela boundary,—a settlement, by the way, which showed British claims, on the whole, to have been well-founded.

During the Spanish-American war the British Government and people had at last an opportunity to exhibit to America their established friendship. The British public, alone among the peoples of Europe, appreciated the humanitarian motives that had led America to interfere in Cuba, and sympathized with those motives; and the British Government gave repeated evidences of a similar understanding and sympathy, both in diplomacy and in the critical situation in Manila Bay when it seemed as if a clash between the American and German fleets was inevitable. From that time the attitude of the American Government toward Great Britain was altered; while on her part Britain gave further evidence of seeking for American friendship by acquiescing in the revocation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 which provided for joint control of an isthmian canal. The new Hay-Pauncefote treaty as finally ratified by the Senate of the United States was possible of doubtful interpretation. The British argued that it prohibited any discrimination in tolls as against British ships, while Congress took a different view and passed legislation giving favor to American coastwise shipping. Britain appealed to American "fairness," and the appeal was not in vain. The discriminatory legislation was revoked, but far more than any question of the fair treatment of a friendly power was the appeal in America to keep faith, to stand by the pledged word, when once that word had been given, as absolutely essential to a sense of honorable conduct,—even though in this case there were many who honestly believed that the British interpretation of the treaty was a mistaken one. America by her about face on the Panama tolls question gave testimony that she acknowledged and would abide by the principle of "good faith" between nations—a principle which in this year (1918) is at last seen to be the very basis of any hope of a world order, of any hope of a nonmilitant advancing civilization.

## AMERICA NOW APPRECIATES BRITAIN

In the war just ended America has come to appreciate fully Britain's high purpose, has come to sympathize with Prime Minister Asquith's statement at its very beginning that "this war is a war to secure the principle of good faith." The Governments of Great Britain and America have drawn together since 1898, forgetting old rancors, but the people of America, insular in their point of view and school-taught in the old animosities against Britain, have been going through the process of "forgiving Britain for past injuries," wholly ignorant of the fact that the Britain they would forgive ceased to exist in 1867. America has been holding a grudge against a thing that died 50 years ago. A new Britain was formed in 1867, a sister democracy in which the principle of government was our principle. Only now do Americans realize this and understand that in this war in which democracy, as the form of government safest and least disturbing to world order, has fought against a form of government that wished to destroy world order and to destroy democracy also,—that in this war Great Britain was fighting for American principles and American faiths.

There are many divergencies in the form and application of democratic principles. In the development of social democracy Great Britain in the last 20 years has advanced to experiments as yet but dimly glimpsed in America. But the principle itself of political democracy is the same in all countries where it has been established,—that in the people themselves must rest and remain the control of their own destinies, and that change and growth must rest upon peaceful (not forcible) revolution by methods of conciliation and compromise through the decision of majorities.

In no other great nation did this established American principle receive so early an acceptance as in Great Britain. It was this very question, as a matter of British home politics, in short, that has colored and in large part determined the whole British attitude toward America from the time of the American revolution. Of what worth is it to-day to recur to outworn controversies? Rather, the facts of the present should guide us, and in full recogni-

tion that Britain and America now stand side by side as sister democracies, let Americans also acknowledge that a spirit born in England, though brought first to maturity in America, to-day binds two peoples together for the future as it bound them in this war. It is, as Lord Chatham said long ago, a "glorious spirit which animated millions to die in defense of their rights as *Men*—as FREEMEN! What shall resist this spirit?"



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## APPENDIX.

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The editors are glad to be able to publish with the valuable interpretative article of Professor Adams a notable series of letters written by a gifted Nova Scotian jurist whose grandfather played an influential part in the colony of Massachusetts Bay but whose loyalist convictions caused his removal to Nova Scotia. Justice Russell's plea for a new valuation of Anglo-American relations gains added force from the fact that his life has largely been devoted to the public service in Canada, where for a generation he has been well-known as the author and editor of law reports, as a member of Parliament and justice of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.

### ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

BY BENJAMIN RUSSELL,

*Justice of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.*

[Letters reprinted from the *New York Times*.]

#### I. NEW HISTORY OF 1776?

THAT WRITTEN WITHOUT A CONSCIOUS PURPOSE IS BETTER TO ADVANCE  
THE "ERA OF GOOD FEELING."

Since the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies suggestions have been made from time to time of expedients looking to the perpetuation of the "era of good feeling" between the Republic and the mother country upon which we seem to have entered. Among other things it has been proposed that a new history or a series of histories should be written covering the period of the Revolution and dealing with the relations between the two countries at subsequent critical dates.

I am inclined to the opinion that no new histories are really necessary and that a more widely extended familiarity with the histories that have already been written, and written with no conscious purpose of conciliation, will be productive of better results than a series of histories written

with the conscious and deliberate purpose of coloring the narrative in such a way as to minimize the differences that have existed between our respective nations and suppress the unpleasant features that our international relations have from time to time presented.

The speeches of Edmund Burke, to begin with, would be excellent reading for any one who wishes to know what the common people of England really thought and felt about the insane course of procedure upon which the Imperial Government entered in the effort to coerce the American colonists in the closing years of the eighteenth century. But in reading those great speeches I would recommend that they should be read with the notes provided in the volume issued as one of the numbers in *Everyman's Library*. It becomes clear to any one who carefully reads Burke's great polemic that he did not have any luminous and consistent theory of the financial relations that should exist between the sovereign power and the discontented colonies, and, furthermore, that on some quite important particulars his statements of fact were unreliable.

A much more thorough and satisfactory statement of the questions at issue is presented in the monumental work of Trevelyan, as to which he tells us in his preface that the collection of his material was at first the unconscious and later the conscious occupation and delight of a lifetime. Certainly no life could have been better spent than in the preparation of these six noble volumes which tell the story of the Revolution without fear, favor or affection, with the most generous appreciation of the motives and conduct of the Revolutionary leaders and with an absolute freedom from any bias in favor of his own country.

Mr. Lecky's chapters on the Revolution, in his great history of the eighteenth century, of course will not be overlooked by any reader who wishes to become familiar with the actual facts of history and to form a just judgment of the actors in those great events. As Mr. Fiske says in one of the footnotes in his two-volume work on the period, "In his account of the American Revolution Mr. Lecky inclines to the Tory side; but he is eminently fair and candid." (Vol. I of Fiske, Page 91, note.)

All the volumes I have mentioned are well worth reading, and of course my enumeration does not begin to exhaust the list. But if I were asked to recommend a work for perusal by a reader who could not command the time required for more than a single author I should be inclined to name a work which unhappily seems to be no longer on the shelves of the booksellers, and it is mainly with the object of doing justice to the author of these volumes that I have asked for a portion of your valuable space. I refer to the two volumes prepared by the late Moses Coit Tyler,

entitled, "The Literary History of the American Revolution." The author was professor of American history in Cornell University. He describes his work in his preface as "the product of a new method, at least of a method never before so fully applied in the critical treatment of the American Revolution."

The plan of the author, he tells us, has been "to let both parties in the controversy—the Whigs and the Tories, the Revolutionists and the Loyalists—tell their own story freely, in their own way, and without either of them being liable at our hands to posthumous outrage in the shape of partisan imputations on their sincerity, their magnanimity, their patriotism, or their courage." Instead of fixing his eyes almost exclusively, as is commonly done, upon statesmen and generals, upon party leaders, upon armies and navies, upon Congress, upon Parliament, upon the ministerial agents of a brainsick king, or even upon that brainsick king himself, and instead of viewing all these people as the sole or the principal movers and doers of the things that made the American Revolution, he turns his eyes for the most part away, he says, toward certain persons hitherto much neglected, in many cases wholly forgotten—toward persons who, as mere writers, and whether otherwise prominent or not, nourished the springs of great historic events by creating and shaping and directing public opinion during all that robust time.

He aims "to present the soul rather than the body of the American Revolution; a careful, independent, and, if possible, unbiased register of the very brain and heart of the sorely divided people of the land, as those wrought and rejoiced and suffered, in the progress of those tremendous political and military events which constitute the exterior and visible framework of our heroic age." He is impressed, as who that has any understanding whatever of the period can fail to be impressed, "by the tragedy and the pathos of the period between 1763 and 1783, as the birth-time of a most bitter race feud—a race feud implacable, perhaps, and endless, but altogether needless; of a fatal disagreement between the two great branches of a race which at this moment holds a historic position in the world and a historic opportunity not only the most extensive and the most splendid, but the most benignant that was ever attained by any similar group of human beings upon this planet." His purpose is "to show that this race feud need not, after all, be an endless one, that already its fierceness has had expression enough, and that its wrath has now too long outlasted the going down of the sun; in short, to bring together once more into sincere friendship, into a rational and a sympathetic moral unity, these divided members of a family capable, if in sub-

stantial harmony, of leading the whole human race upward to all the higher planes of culture and happiness—this is an object which in our time draws into its service the impassioned desires, the hopes, the prayers, the labors, of many of the noblest men and women in Great Britain and in America.”

He confesses that he has written a new history of the growth and culmination of the race feud, so far as he is able, in the simple service of historic truth and without permitting himself to be turned this way or that by any consideration touching the practical consequences that might result from fidelity or from infidelity to his duty as a historian. Yet he expresses his belief that “one practical consequence of his history will be eirenic rather than polemic, namely, the promotion of a better understanding, of a deeper respect, of a kindlier mood on both sides of the ocean, among the descendants of those determined men who so bitterly differed in opinion, so fiercely fought, and in their anger so widely parted company, a century and a quarter ago.”

These words were written in 1897. It was of course impossible at that date to foresee the events that have brought the two nations together in common defense against a common enemy, and it may be suggested that, in view of and because of that armed co-operation, the eirenic effort of the author is no longer called for. I am not inclined to concur in that view. The rapprochement that has been brought about by what may fairly be termed an accident, or a succession of accidents, is liable to pass with the passing of the exigency that gave it birth.

If our author is justified in his judgment that, apart altogether from such an accidental necessity, which he did not foresee and with which, therefore, he could not and did not reckon, the time had arrived for a moral reunion of the several branches of the great family, it is worth while that the grounds on which he based his conviction should be understood and appreciated. If, therefore, you can afford the space, I shall at some future day make a further reference to and bespeak for the work of this author and his way of thinking about the relations between our two great nations a greater publicity than that which seems to be indicated by the result of my applications to publishers and booksellers for a copy of his valuable work.

HALIFAX, August 26, 1918.

B. RUSSELL.

## 2. NEW VIEWS OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR HISTORY.

## AMERICAN AND BRITISH SCHOLARS REACHING A FAIRER APPRECIATION OF THE ISSUES—MODERN JUDGMENT ON THE LOYALISTS.

It is trite learning to-day that the attack on the American Commonwealth toward the close of the eighteenth century was in the main the enterprise of the British sovereign. This is not to say that the financial pedantry of George Grenville and the levity and rashness of Charles Townshend were not greatly to blame for the catastrophe. But the chief responsibility must forever rest upon the sovereign with whom it was the misfortune of the empire to be cursed, for the same reason that the chief responsibility for the calamities of the present century must rest upon the German Kaiser, because his was the one will that could have prevented them and his the one voice that could have commanded otherwise. Of this unworthy British sovereign one of the most fair-minded and candid as well as most brilliant and charming of English historians, Green, in his "Short History of the English People," has said:

He had a smaller mind than any King before him save James II. He was wretchedly educated and his natural powers were of the meanest sort. Nor had he the capacity for using greater minds than his own, by which some sovereigns have concealed their natural littleness. On the contrary, his only feeling toward great men was one of jealousy and hate. He longed for the time when "decrepitude or death would put an end to Pitt" (Lord Chatham), and even when death had freed him from this "trumpet of sedition" he denounced the proposal for a public monument to the great statesman as an "offensive measure to me personally." But dull and petty as his temper was, he was clear as to his purpose and obstinate in the pursuit of it. And his purpose was to rule. "George," his mother the Princess of Wales had continually repeated to him in youth, "George, be King!"

Sir George Otto Trevelyan, in his "Early History of Charles James Fox," describes the prolonged and discreditable contest of this prodigiously foolish and obstinate sovereign with the electors of Middlesex, and no competent history of the period fails to disclose the corrupt and demoralizing methods by which he consolidated a party in Parliament composed of members who knew no other rule of political conduct than that of unquestioning and absolute subserviency to the personal wishes of the king. The quarrel of this narrow-minded and obstinate bigot with the people of the American Commonwealths was only one phase of his prolonged contest with the popular element throughout his realm,

and was the consequence of his determination to carry out the injunction of his foolish mother by establishing his personal government throughout the empire. If he had not been able by his corrupt political methods to exclude from power the great leader whose statesmanship had created the empire over which he reigned and to govern the country through such tools as Bute and North; if he had been willing to accept and retain in his service such representatives of the enlightenment and moral force of the kingdom as Lord Chatham or Burke or Lord Camden or the Marquis of Rockingham, there need never have occurred such a calamity as the breaking up of the British Empire. Self-government must of course have come in due season, as it has come to Canada, to Australia, to New Zealand, to South Africa, and as it may one day come to India. But there need have been no seven years of bloodshed, no century of estrangement, no lingering root of bitterness, no Wyoming massacre of helpless women and children, no retaliatory persecution of the unhappy loyalists, no discreditable rioting and lawlessness on the part of the excitable revolutionary masses. There was never any necessary reason in the nature of things why there could not have been throughout the nineteenth century the same union of hearts between the mother country and her lusty offspring beyond the sea that has been so beneficently and so gloriously manifested as existing in these terrible years between the motherland and the colonial dominions.

This was the vision that inspired the United Empire Loyalists and it was this aspiration that impelled the great Lord Chatham, notwithstanding his intense and hearty sympathy with the cause of the American colonists, and although "broken with age and disease," to be borne to the House of Lords to utter in a few broken words his protest against the proposal to surrender America, when he "rejoiced that he was still alive to lift up his voice against the dismemberment of this ancient and noble monarchy."

It is in his discussion of the position and principles of the Loyalists that Professor Tyler displays in a very special degree his breadth of historical comprehension and the fairness and calmness of his political judgment. I cannot forbear to quote the passage with which he introduces his citations from the sermons, pamphlets, public letters and speeches of the men who were unable to see eye to eye with the patriotic leaders of the revolutionary movement:

Even yet, in this last decade of the nineteenth century, it is by no means easy for Americans—especially if, as is the case with the present writer, they be descended from men who thought and fought on behalf of the Revolution—to take



a disinterested attitude, that is an historical one, toward those Americans who thought and fought against the Revolution. Both as to the men and as to the questions involved in that controversy, the rehearsal of the claims of the victorious side has been going on now for a hundred years or more, in tradition, in history, in oration, in song, in ceremony. Hardly have we known, seldom have we been reminded, that the side of the loyalists, as they called themselves, of the Tories, as they were scornfully nicknamed by their opponents, was even in argument not a weak one, in motive and sentiment not a base one, and in devotion and self-sacrifice not an unheroic one. While the war was going forward, of course, the animosities aroused by it were too hot and too fierce, especially between the two opposing groups of Americans, to permit either party in the controversy to do justice to the logical or to the personal merit of the other.

When at last the war came to an end, and the champions of the Revolution were in absolute triumph, then the more prominent Tories had to flee for their lives; they had to flee from the wrath that had come, and to bury themselves, either in other lands or in obscure places of this land. Then, of course, they and all their detested notions and emotions and deeds, whether grand or petty or base, went down out of sight, submerged beneath the abhorrence of the victorious revolutionists, and doomed, as it appears, to at least one solid century of oratorical and poetical infamy, which has found its natural and organized expression in each recurring Fourth of July and in each reappearance of the birthday of Washington. May it not, however, at last be assumed that a solid century should be, even under such conditions, a sufficient refrigerator for overheated political emotion? May we not now hope that it will not any longer cost us too great an effort to look calmly, even considerably, at least fairly, upon what, in the words and acts of the Tories, our fathers and grandfathers could hardly endure to look at at all? And, surely, our willingness to do all this can hardly be lessened by the consideration that, "in dealing with an enemy, not only dead, but dead in exile and in defeat, candor prescribes the fullest measure of generous treatment." At any rate, the American Revolution affords no exemption from the general law of historic investigation—that the truth is to be found only by him who searches for it with an unbiased mind. Until we shall be able to take, respecting the problems and the parties of our own Revolution, the same attitude which we freely and easily take respecting the problems and parties of other revolutions—that is, the attitude, not of hereditary partisans, but of scientific investigators—will it be forbidden us to acquire a thoroughly discriminating and just acquaintance with that prodigious epoch in our history.

The "personal equation" introduced into the reckoning by Professor Tyler may perhaps excuse a like personal reference by the present writer. Shortly after the declaration of war by the President of the United States it fell to my lot to address an assembly of Rotarians in the City of Boston, from which city my grandfather became a voluntary exile because of

his so-called Tory principles, in 1776. I ventured to illustrate his position and that of those who accompanied him in exile by a reference to the civil war of the sixties of the last century, pointing out that the Revolutionists of 1776 were engaged in a movement analogous to that of the seceding states of the Southern Confederacy in 1860. The very doctrine of nullification, of which the policy of secession was a later development, had been propounded by the American patriots from 1764 to 1776, after which they became secessionists, as did also the nullifiers in the Southern Confederacy. The Loyalists of the earlier movement were inspired by motives entirely similar to those of the loyal and patriotic men of the Northern states from 1860 to 1864, who could not endure the thought of their Federal union being broken into fragments. The ethical and political problem that was presented to the illustrious soldier, General Lee, in the middle of the last century, whether his first duty was to his own state or to the Federal union of states, was precisely the same problem that presented itself to the Loyalists in the earlier struggle between two conflicting patriotisms. In short, the position of the Southerners in the last century was analogous to that of the Revolutionists in the century before the last, while the Loyalists in the days of the American Revolution held the position which was that of the loyal North in the days of the great Civil War.

Unfortunately, I had not at this date read the work of Professor Tyler. Had I been able to cite him as an authority for the analogy it is quite possible that the sympathetic attention of my hearers, which bore a slight resemblance to that "certain condescension in foreigners" of which Lowell wrote so cleverly in one of the best known and best remembered of his essays, might have grown into an expression of positive approval and assent.

But the fact of this analogy does not involve the consequence that the royalists were right, if or because the North was right on the questions at issue in the Civil War, or that the revolutionists were wrong if or because the seceding states were not justified in their attempt to dissolve the Federal Union in 1860. Each case must be decided on its own merits. Mr. Tyler presents the analogy only as a help toward the fair appreciation of the motives and conduct of the loyalists of 1776. He does not present it as an argument to prove the soundness of their position or the wisdom that governed their conduct. Nor do I.

They sincerely believed that it was possible to secure the redress of their grievances without resorting to armed rebellion. I must frankly confess that in this hope I believe they were mistaken. Fifty years later,

when the lesson of the American Revolution had had ample time to sink into the hearts and minds of the governing classes in the old country, the lesson had to be learned all over again. The struggle for popular government in the Canadian provinces had to be renewed near the middle of the nineteenth century, and the happy results of that struggle would no doubt have been indefinitely deferred if armed resistance had not been offered to the authority of the governing powers. The late Dr. Saunders of Halifax was certainly the last man in the world to whom one would look for justification or apology for anything savoring of resistance to constituted authority, yet he says, in his book entitled "Three Premiers": "It was not the protests of Baldwin, Howe, and other reformers which opened the eyes of the (British) Government and stirred Downing Street into honest activity. It was the crack of the MacKenzie muskets." Sir John Bourinot, in his "Story of Canada," likewise attributes the breakup of the so-called "Family Compact" and the introduction of responsible government to the rebellion of 1837. To the same general effect might be cited the testimony of an indefinite number of learned writers on Canadian history, and among them the most brilliant and versatile of them all, the late Goldwin Smith.

If the struggle for decent colonial government could not have been won without resort to arms in 1837, five years after the common people of England had been enfranchised by the great Reform bill, what reason is there to assume that the rights of the colonists against an imperial aristocracy could have been secured without the resort to arms half a century earlier, in the days of rotten boroughs and unreformed Parliaments, when the real people of England were voteless and voiceless, and the mother country lay prostrate at the foot of a monarch in command of a parliamentary majority prepared to support him in his determination to govern with absolutely no constitutional limitations on his sovereign power?

The verdict of history has vindicated the revolutionary patriots, and established their place in the line in which stand the barons at Runnymede, the heroes of Naseby and Marston Moor, and the patriotic statesmen that consummated "the glorious revolution of 1688." But that is no reason why the American people should misunderstand the motives or belittle the heroism of the loyalists who left their shores from 1776 to 1783.

Among those exiles were a number of Hessian mercenaries to whom it will be the charity of history if it allows their memory to rot. An old friend of mine who once held a seat in the provincial House of Assembly

used to tell that in his county whenever any particularly discreditable transaction occurred it was most likely to be traceable to one of these so-called refugees, and the invariable comment of the community was, "What else could you expect from a ruffinee?" But I am sure that the perusal of Professor Tyler's chapters on this subject will leave the American reader with the conviction that there was another class, the real loyalists of the Revolutionary period, who are entitled not merely to their cold respect but to their enthusiastic admiration. When Major George Haven Putnam lectured before the Canadian Club in Halifax a year or more ago he began his discourse with what President Wilson would style a "handsome" apology to the descendants of these men for the manner in which they had been treated by the forefathers of his own countrymen in the eighteenth century. I am quite sure that in this generous and statesmanlike deliverance he fairly represented the views and feelings of every educated American, and it is no surprise to me that the present generation of Americans, who have twice elected as their President a native Virginian and who can admire and glory in the chivalry and heroism of the Southerners against whom they were aligned in battle array much less than a century ago, have found no difficulty in extending the hand of cordial fellowship to the descendants of the men who laid the foundations of constitutional government and British civilization in the great and friendly Commonwealth to the north of them, in alliance with whom they now stand for the preservation of Freedom and Humanity and all that makes life worth living to the children of men.

HALIFAX, December 6, 1918.

B. RUSSELL.

## 3. THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN NAVIES.

NO GROUND FOR RIVALRY IN SEA POWER, AND MANY REASONS FOR  
CO-OPERATION.

[A letter appeared toward the end of November, 1918, in the *Baltimore Sun* from a correspondent in Paris, the tenor of which may be sufficiently inferred from the following comments.]

I think the most dangerous and damnable thing in Mr. Kent's farrago of mischievous Parisian gossip was his suggestion of a competition in naval armaments between England and the United States. If there are Americans in Paris who attribute to Englishmen or to the British Government any spirit of jealousy or suspicion because of the enlargement of the American navy they surely are suffering from nightmare. There was a time when in Canada some of our more ignorant people believed that the white fleet which was being developed, I cannot say just how many years ago, was destined for the conquest of Canada, and predicted that it would before many years be invading our seaports. Those were the days when the notorious Benjamin F. Butler was angling for the vote of the Cape Ann fishermen, and putting up his hypocritical prayer not to be led into temptation, the said temptation being that of taking forcible possession of the inshore fisheries of the maritime provinces of Canada. All that is now ancient, and, for the most part, happily forgotten, history. Those quarrels have been definitely settled, and all the clouds that lowered o'er our house in the deep bosom of the ocean buried. Since those days a common policy between the two nations with reference to the open door in China, the restraining hand of the British Government upon Continental powers which were conspiring to take advantage of the Spanish war as an occasion for the embarrassment and humiliation of the American Government and people, the part played by the British naval commander in the battle of Manila Bay, as testified to by Admiral Dewey in his autobiography, had already put an end to all such foolish international suspicions between the United States and Great Britain, and rendered a breach of the peace between these two great powers as unthinkable as a war between England and Canada.

The truth is that there never has been a moment since the settlement between the two nations by the peace at Ghent in December, 1814, when the assured ascendancy of the British navy has not been one of the essential conditions of the security and comfort of the western world in general, including the United States and Canada.

In the very interesting book entitled "Pan-Americanism," by Roland G. Usher, professor of history in Washington University, St. Louis, the writer brings out this fact in his chapter on "The Supremacy of the Sea." "We cannot," he says, "explain or understand the history of the United States if we omit from our consideration the sea power in England's hands. To it is due the predominantly English character of American civilization. The English supremacy of the sea fundamentally was and is a domestic necessity, maintained rather as a part of England's defensive position on the Channel than for the purpose of exerting influence in different parts of the world. It is this fact which we must firmly grasp if we are to understand the relation of English sea power to-day to international alliances in general and to the United States in particular." Her fleet "was not created to threaten or rule other nations, and exerts an influence in international affairs only as a result of its necessary existence for the maintenance of domestic peace and prosperity. It is to-day so vital for defense that it could not possibly be used for aggression alone; to risk in an offensive war, undertaken purely for aggression, the very bulwark of the national existence would be folly of the worst description, a fact of the utmost consequence in the study of international affairs."

The fact that the people of England could be reduced to starvation in a very few months, perhaps in a very few weeks, if they could not depend on the safety of the ocean lanes for their food ships, makes it absolutely necessary that they should have a navy able to cope with any conceivable hostile combination of powers. They have always made this their standard of safety. But in taking account of their possible enemies they have invariably, persistently and emphatically refused to consider the United States as being among the number, and they will more emphatically refuse to do so now than ever before. It is this consideration that makes it so utterly detestable and shameless a thing for Mr. Kent to have even hinted at the possibility of conditions arising when such a calculation should have to be made. The bare suggestion of such a possibility is a crime against humanity and a foreshadowing of the possible collapse of human civilization.

Let me proceed to adduce Professor Usher's testimony to the moderation and the spirit of equity in which the enormous and preponderating sea power of England has been exerted and the especial friendliness with which it has, ever since the unfortunate events preceding 1812, been governed in its relations with the people and Government of the United States. In 1823 Jefferson wrote to Monroe: "Great Britain is the nation

which can do us the most harm of any one or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should cherish a cordial friendship." "This," says Professor Usher, "has in fact been our policy, although it has rarely been openly avowed and has often been threatened with rupture by the rise of other interests upon which we clashed with England." I suppose he has in mind the fishery disputes, the painful questions arising out of the civil war, the Behring Sea controversy, the Alaska boundary question, and a number of similar difficulties, any one of which would have sufficed to bring about a war with England had they occurred between that country and any European power.

But this is, perhaps, a little aside from the track which it was my intention to follow. Let me return to my thesis. "England, on her part," says the learned historian, "has seen the wisdom of using her sea power with moderation, and of performing with scrupulous exactitude the various duties it imposed upon her in the interest of other nations. An excellent merchant marine, affording other nations dependent upon her prompt, adequate, reasonable service, with low freight rates, low insurance and brokerage, has been and still is essential to the continuance of her authority. She must freely and without compulsion do for them what they would otherwise have to do for themselves, and be satisfied with the normal profits which their own merchants might have expected to pay to a merchant marine of their own. So much was obvious. Never to abuse her power was equally important. It should never be stained by aggression, and the line between aggression and defense must be strictly drawn and never exceeded. In reality, the moderation and wisdom with which England has used her authority are more responsible than the strength of her fleets for the length of time that she has been supreme and for the relatively few times in the past when her control has been really threatened, or, indeed, advisedly questioned.

"Since the war of 1812 harmonious relations have been the rule with England, the mutual interests of both in reaching agreement in hearty co-operation have been recognized, and such a cordial understanding with England is one of the few settled facts in American diplomacy. To this sea power and all that goes with it our whole economic fabric has been adjusted. Upon it nearly everything depends. We have never known any other condition, and have had no serious reasons since 1815 to desire to change it."

The chapter closes with the following words:

“The recent growth of foreign navies has caused a concentration of English ships in European waters, and has made us feel it desirable to strengthen our navy so as to be able to protect ourselves against any other power than England. There could scarcely be a more striking testimonial to our confidence in the fairness of England, of our belief in the strength of her friendship for us, and in the firmness with which she means to maintain her policy of defense.”

These words were written in 1915, at a time when there was no apparent probability of the United States being associated with England in the prosecution of the war. In fact, the theme of Mr. Usher's book was a speculation as to the position the United States would be in relatively to the victor in the European war. As the United States is itself one of the victors, Mr. Usher's question can no longer be raised. But surely nothing has occurred to diminish the strength of England's friendship for the Republic, and the comradeship in arms must have brought about an *entente* more secure and more durable than any “entangling alliance” would have been.

B. RUSSELL.

HALIFAX, December 6, 1918.



## OFFICIAL FRENCH COMMISSION ON THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS.\*

By decree dated July 22, 1917, M. Ribot, president of the council, minister of foreign affairs, instituted under the presidency of Léon Bourgeois—who had played a very useful and considerable rôle in the two Hague Conferences—a commission for the study of the conditions in which the association to which universal opinion has given the name of Society of Nations might be constituted among the states.

This commission is made up as follows:

Léon Bourgeois, former president of the council, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, president of the commission;

Jean Jules Cambon, ambassador of France, vice president;

Vice Admiral Lacaze, former minister of marine, maritime prefect of Toulon, vice president;

Gabriel Hanotaux of the French Academy, former minister of foreign affairs;

Ernest Lavisse of the French Academy;

Paul Henri Benjamin d'Estournelles de Constant, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration;

M. Payelle, first president of the Court of Accounts, president of the commission appointed for determining violations of international law committed by the enemy;

P. de Margerie, minister plenipotentiary of the first class, director of political and commercial affairs at the ministry of foreign affairs;

M. Appell, dean of the faculty of sciences, member of the Institute;

Jean Louis Renault,<sup>2</sup> member of the Institute, member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, jurisconsult to the ministry of foreign affairs;

\* Translated from the report of Deputy Raiberti for the Budget Commission charged with examining the project of law fixing the ordinary budget of civil services for the fiscal year 1918, ministry of foreign affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Died February 18, 1918.

Paul Matter, advocate general to the Court of Cassation;

M. Péan, director at the ministry of justice;

Captain Petit, vice president of the Civil Tribunal of the Seine, attaché to the subsecretariat of state of military justice;

M. Pila, consul general, secretary general of the economic conference of the allied Governments;

Secretaries: Messrs. Jarousse de Sillac and Clauzel, secretaries of embassy of the first class.

The French Government has not arbitrarily taken the decision to constitute this commission and to compose it of eminent personalities. This decision was imposed upon it, as upon all other allied, or even enemy, Governments. For none of them can be indifferent to the concern shown by the public opinion of all peoples to see the formidable conflict which is overturning the earth result not in the cul-de-sac of an uncertain truce, but in a true peace which may leave the world as long as possible free from the return of war.

The idea is not new, however. It took form in the two Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, where all civilized states were represented. The preamble of the convention for the pacific solution of international disputes on two different occasions, on the initiative of the French delegation, declared a recognition of the solidarity which unites the members of the "society of civilized nations."

The war has placed the question in the front rank for public opinion.

It is interesting to recall briefly the most authoritative opinions expressed on this subject by the statesmen of the principal belligerent countries. . . [A number of quotations follow.]

The commission first determined its method of work. By common consent of its members, it decided that the study intrusted to it by the Government could and should be pursued without any infringement on the examination of questions which will be the proper subjects of the treaty of peace.

## NO INTERNATIONAL STATE

This first point established, it had to make it clear that the Society of Nations whose organization it studies *could not have the object of establishing an international state, superior to other states*, but solely the maintenance of peace by the substitution of law for force in the regulation of international disputes and litigations. It has thus at the outset avoided any possible concern on the subject of infringements on the sovereignty of the associated states, of which there could be no question.

The task of the commission having been thus limited, it was proposed first to fix the principles on which, in its opinion, the Society of Nations must be constituted. These principles have been established by a unanimous vote after long discussions requiring many sessions. They have been set forth in an exposition which Léon Bourgeois sent to the minister of foreign affairs on January 17, 1918. The commission was of the opinion that it would be useful for the Government of the Republic to submit them immediately to the examination and acceptance of its Allies, in order that the unity of their views might be complete before any opening of negotiations for peace and that, in the treaty of peace itself, their enemies should not be able to introduce by surprise any provision capable of altering or compromising the rules of justice and right, without which no true peace could be established and maintained.

In view of this diplomatic consultation and out of regard for the allied Governments, it does not seem possible to divulge this exposition before they have informed the minister of foreign affairs of their feeling with regard to the principles set down in it.

## FOUR REPORTS PREPARED

Without awaiting the result of this consultation, the commission has deferred to the desire of the Government in undertaking immediately the sequel of its work and in studying the application in detail of the principles fixed by itself. Four reports are at present in course of preparation and discussion. They con-

cern. (1) the history of the question; (2) diplomatic, juridic and economic sanctions; (3) military sanctions; (4) organization of international jurisdiction.

It is necessarily desirable that the same work of preparation should be done in the other countries of the Entente. Thus, when the Allies shall have determined by common agreement their views on this important subject, they will be in a position to advance it with full understanding when it shall be brought forward in the negotiations for the treaty of peace.

But, whatever the definition on which they may agree as to the juridical rules which must control in a new Europe respecting the functioning of the Society of Nations, *it is scarcely probable that the Central Empires will accept them unless forced to do so.*

In so far as the treaty of peace shall not submit the relations of peoples among themselves to special guaranties of law, they will continue, as they are to-day, to be ruled solely by the right of the strongest. Force alone can therefore create the new régime and establish the rules of justice and the sanctions of law without which no sincere and durable peace could be founded or maintained. So, while discussing among themselves the conditions of the future Society of Nations, the allied powers can never forget that if it is to exist some day, this can only result from the victory of their arms.