

R. R. No. 16

# **THE SOUTH-EAST ASIAN COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TREATY**

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[A Documentary Study]



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**LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT**

**NEW DELHI**

*May, 1955*

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## PREFACE

This is a short objective study of the South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty based mainly on original documents relating to the subject. The purpose of this publication is to acquaint the readers with a few salient features about the Treaty, its origin and development, scope and structure etc.

The abbreviated terms SEATO or SEADO, which are commonly used, have, however, been retained in the publication instead of the initials SEACDT.

M. N. KAUL,  
*Secretary.*

NEW DELHI;  
*The 10th May, 1955.*

## SOUTH EAST ASIAN COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TREATY

### I.

#### Background

THE concrete concept of a South-East Defence Organization was first conceived in a major policy speech<sup>1</sup> by Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, U.S.A., on March 29, 1954. Dealing with the gradual encroachments by Communists in Indo-China and the South-East Asia, he said that the strategy adopted by Communists in Indo-China, as elsewhere, was "to confuse the issue in the eyes of the world" by playing on the spirit of nationalism. He warned that domination in that area by Red China would be "a grave threat to the whole free community" and observed that such a possibility "should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action". The risks of the "united action", he said, "are far less than would face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today".

Mr. Dulles' speech was endorsed the next day by President Eisenhower, who, however, indicated that he did not contemplate using U.S. troops in Indo-China. His policy, he said, was to make allies strong enough to handle local situations alone with financial, moral and political aid, and with U.S. military help only where vital to the security of the United States<sup>2</sup>.

The Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines favourably responded to the speech of Mr. Dulles and declared their readiness to take part in a collective security system for the South-East Asia<sup>3</sup>.

In connection with the proposal put forward in his speech, Mr. Dulles visited Europe on April 11, 1954, for discussions with the British and French Governments. A joint *communiqué*<sup>4</sup> issued after two days' talks with Sir Anthony Eden *inter alia* stated: "We are ready to take part with the other countries principally concerned in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defence within the framework of the (United Nations) Charter to assure peace, security, and freedom of South-East Asia and the Western Pacific".

On April 13, 1954, Sir Anthony Eden read this *communiqué* in the House of Commons and said that Mr. Dulles and he envisaged in South-East Asia an alliance comparable to the Atlantic Pact in Europe. When the Labour members of Parliament assailed him for alleged "sabotage" of the forthcoming Geneva Conference on Far Eastern problems, he maintained emphatically that he had made no "definite commitment" to the United States and had agreed on no "definite action"<sup>5</sup>. A fortnight later Sir Winston Churchill also made

<sup>1</sup> Facts on File; Vol. XIV, No. 700; p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> The New York Times, dated 1-4-54.

<sup>3</sup> Facts on File; Vol. XIV, No. 700; p. 97.

<sup>4</sup> Hindustan Times, New Delhi, dated 14-4-54.

<sup>5</sup> H. C. Deb., Vol. 526; cc. 969-75.

### Background

a statement in the House that no decisions had been taken in advance of the Conference at Geneva.

The diplomatic correspondent of *The Times* (4/5), referred to reports appearing in the American Press about major conflict in the views of Britain and the United States on future policy in South-East Asia. *The New York Times* (6/5) reported that it was Mr. Dulles' idea that the Western Allies should agree, before the Geneva conference started, on the kind of "united action" they would take to protect South-east Asia if the conference failed. It was Mr. Dulles' timing, not his objective, that the British opposed. They agreed that a South East Asia Pact should have the support of as many Asian nations as possible and insisted that it would take time to get the consent of these nations. Besides, the Western Powers should not announce in advance of the Geneva conference what they were going to do militarily if it failed.

At a Press conference<sup>6</sup> President Eisenhower stated on 19th May 1954 that the United States, given co-operation in other quarters, might proceed with the plan of South-East Asian defensive alliance without Britain. He made it, however, clear that he was in no sense excluding Britain, which had not wished to make any commitment, at least pending the outcome of the Geneva conference on the Far East. Mr. T. Clifton Webb, New Zealand's Minister for External Affairs, after his talks with President Eisenhower and the U.S. Secretary of State, announced that his country would not join any pact unless Britain were a member<sup>7</sup>.

Referring once again to the points of difference between Britain and the U.S.A. *The New York Times* (22/5) remarked that Britain desired the five-Power talks to be held in Singapore instead of Washington as suggested by the U.S., which also wanted Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines and Thailand to participate therein. Britain, on the other hand, maintained that if the talks were to be strictly military, they should be confined to Powers able to make real and immediate military contributions, and, if on a political level, they should be delayed until an effort had been made to win co-operation from India, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan.

On June 15, 1954, Sir Winston Churchill made a statement in the House of Commons that, in response to an invitation from the President of the United States, he and Sir Anthony Eden would fly to Washington to confer with the President on the drafting of a South-East Asia Treaty Organization as "decisions" regarding the defence of that region could no longer be delayed<sup>8</sup>.

Opening a House of Commons debate<sup>9</sup> on foreign affairs on June 23, 1954, Sir Anthony Eden referred to what he called, the "much-publicised misunderstanding" with the U.S.A. over the proposed collective security arrangements for South-East Asia and said:

"I hope it will be possible to agree on some system of South-East Asian defence to guard against aggression. We could have a reciprocal arrangement in which both sides took

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<sup>6</sup> *New York Times*, dated 20-5-54.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, dated 21-5-54.

<sup>8</sup> *The Statesman*, New Delhi, dated 17-6-54.

<sup>9</sup> *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 529; cc. 431-33.

### *South-East Asian Collective Defence Treaty*

part, such as at Locarno. We could also have a defensive alliance, such as NATO in Europe, and such as the existing Soviet-Chinese treaty provides for the Far East."

"These two systems would, I admit, be quite different, but need be in no way inconsistent. My belief is that, by refraining from any precipitate move towards the formation of a NATO system in South-East Asia, we have helped to create the necessary conditions under which both systems can possibly be brought into being."

Stating that the idea of a pact with South-East Asia and the Pacific was not a new one and that it was wrong to suppose that "it suddenly sprang into life a few weeks ago, fully armed like Minerva from the head of Jupiter", he added that "its relevance to current events must not be exaggerated. It could be a future safeguard but it is not a present penacea".

## II

### **Preparatory Meetings**

The ultimate decision to call the projected Conference on South-East Asian collective defence had been preceded by a number of preparatory meetings including:—

- (a) the military talks held in Washington early in June, 1954 between Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A.,
- (b) the discussion, held by President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles with Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Eden in Washington towards the end of June 1954,
- (c) the deliberations of the Anglo-American study group on South-East Asian defence,
- (d) the relevant discussions between the "Anzus" Powers.

The military talks continued from 8th to 11th June, 1954. No *communiqué* was issued during or after the talks, apart from a brief statement given at the end of the first day's meeting which said that the representatives were discussing security matters of common interest in the South-East area, and that the conversations would not commit any one of the nations represented<sup>10</sup>.

Following the political discussions between the leaders of Britain and the United States, a joint statement<sup>11</sup> issued after the meeting *inter alia* said:

"We discussed South-East Asia and, in particular, examined the situation which would arise from the conclusion of an agreement on Indo-China. We also considered the situation which would follow from failure to reach such an agreement. We will press forward with plans for collective defence to meet either eventuality. We are

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<sup>10</sup> Keessing's Contemporary Archives, June 12-19, 1954, p. 13621.

<sup>11</sup> The New York Times, dated 29-6-54.

### Preparatory Meetings

both convinced that if at Geneva the French Government is confronted with demands which prevent an acceptable agreement regarding Indo-China, the international situation will be seriously aggravated."

At a luncheon given in his honour by the National Press Club, Washington, Sir Winston Churchill was asked whether the suggestion of 'Asian Locarno' made by Sir Anthony Eden in the House of Commons would be any more effective than the Locarno Treaty of 1925. In reply, he observed that comparison between the two was not possible because of totally different facts and circumstances, the principal difference being that the U.S.A. was not in the former, whereas she would have to be in that now proposed if it were to be effective<sup>12</sup>.

As a result of the political discussions [*vide* (b) above] an Anglo-American Study Group on South-East Asian defence was set up which began its deliberations in Washington and ended them on July 18, 1954.

Representatives of the "Anzus" Powers—the U.S.A., Australia and New Zealand—met in Washington on June 30, 1954, for what was officially described as "one of the continuing series of such meetings providing close consultation among the three signatories of the Anzus treaty". A *communiqué*<sup>13</sup> said that all three representatives "were agreed on the need for immediate action to bring about the early establishment of collective defence in South-East Asia—an area in which the three participating countries are all vitally concerned".

The *communiqué* also said that the situation in South-East Asia had been discussed "in the light of current developments, including the talks just concluded in Washington between the United Kingdom and the U.S.A."; that the Australian and New Zealand representatives had expressed satisfaction with the joint statement; and that the three representatives shared the conviction that the international situation would be seriously aggravated if the French Government were confronted at the Geneva Conference with demands which prevented an acceptable agreement on Indo-China.

In the course of preliminary diplomatic exchanges Britain had also endeavoured to induce the five "Colombo Plan" Powers—to participate in the proposed collective defence plan<sup>14</sup>. Subsequently the Prime Minister of Ceylon proposed<sup>15</sup> to the Premiers of the other four countries on August 2, 1954, that the Colombo Powers should confer before September to discuss and to define their joint attitude to the projected South-East Asian Treaty Organization. In view of the fact that India, Burma, and Indonesia had already expressed opposition to SEATO scheme<sup>16</sup>, the move by the Prime Minister of Ceylon did not materialise.

<sup>12</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, July 10/17, pp. 13665-68.

<sup>13</sup> The New York Times, dated 1-7-54.

<sup>14</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 13761.

<sup>15</sup> Hindustan Times, New Delhi, dated 3-8-54.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, dated 14-8-54.

## South-East Asian Collective Defence Treaty

### III

#### India and SEADO

While making a statement regarding international affairs in the House of the People<sup>17</sup> (Lok Sabha) on August 25, 1954, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru referred to the Indo-China settlement at Geneva which provided for the establishment of the independence of the three associated States—Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. Emphasising its importance, he said that these States had a good chance of proposing in collective peace rather than in war blocs. As regards the proposed collective security pact in Asia, he said:—

“We have expressed our inability to participate in this meeting because it seems to us that it is likely to reverse the trend of conciliation released by the Indo-China settlement. Collective security, according to our belief, can only come by resolving world tensions and developing a pattern of collective peace. Anything that adds to those tensions takes us away from peace. We are apprehensive, therefore, that the proposed South-East Collective Organisation will in the present circumstances do more harm than any good that it may hope to do in the future.”

Opening a foreign affairs debate in the Council of States (Rajya Sabha) on August 26, 1954, the Prime Minister observed that the Geneva Conference had brought about a great sense of relief in Asia and throughout the world, and also a greater feeling of security. Consequently there was less fear and less suspicion of one another, and a gradual move towards a settlement. The Baguio Conference was, therefore, a move in the wrong direction.

India's decision not to take part in the projected conference of SEADO nations was elaborated by the Prime Minister in the following terms:—

“Now, immediately after this (Indo-China settlement), to approach the question in the way which is likely to be adopted at Baguio Conference seems to me very likely to raise those very fears and suspicions again..... In any event, our attendance at that conference would have meant the relinquishment of the policy of non-alignment that we have followed..... Thirdly, having accepted membership and chairmanship of the three Commissions in Indo-China, it seems totally inappropriate and unbecoming for us to join a conference of this type, which really would have impeded us from functioning with that impartiality with which we are expected to function in these Commissions. For these reasons we were unable to accept the invitation”<sup>18</sup>.

Speaking at a luncheon on September 9, 1954, given by the Delhi Press Association<sup>19</sup>, India's stand in regard to the SEADO Treaty was explained by the Prime Minister who described the Treaty as an oddity since not only Asian policies had been discussed and

<sup>17</sup> Parliamentary Debates: Lok Sabha, dated 25-8-54.

<sup>18</sup> Parl. Deb.: Rajya Sabha, dated 26-8-54.

<sup>19</sup> The Statesman, dated 10-9-54.



## India and SEADO

settled by nations other than Asian but also protection had been extended to countries which did not seek protection. He used the Orwellian expressions, "double-think" and "double-talk", to describe the present state of the world. He deplored the "double-talk" over peace. Referring to modern discrepancies between profession and action, he remarked that it was curious that people these days talked of peace "in the most militant terms", nations quoted the U.N. Charter for acts which were contrary to its noble objectives, and countries expressed sympathy for colonial peoples and joined alliances which put deliberate obstructions in their way.

He compared the present pattern of international alliances like SEADO to interlocking in business because of a baffling variety of relationships, and remarked that in international affairs the effects of such interlocking were infinitely worse than in business. The parties in such alliances, he added, became interested in maintaining their *status quo* but it was obvious that their efforts to "reverse the process of historical forces would not be completely successful".

He doubted very much if SEADO could achieve its objective of preventing aggression. In his view, it was likely to increase "insecurity in people's minds" by stopping the "process of peaceful thinking", witnessed at Geneva, and which was gradually developing into "a climate of peace".

Initiating a foreign affairs debate<sup>20</sup> in the Lok Sabha on September 29, 1954, the Prime Minister observed that the Manila Treaty had not brought about "any lessening of tension" but had certainly vitiated, to some extent, the good atmosphere that was created at Geneva. He added that the Treaty was retrogressive in so far as it strove to revive the spheres of influence by big Powers in Asia. Hence the whole approach of the Treaty, he said, was not only wrong but also dangerous from the point of view of any Asian country.

He criticised the "diplomacy by threats", inherent in the Treaty, as it created a wrong atmosphere and gave an opportunity to the other party of not living up to certain pledges given "because you have broken them".

Speaking in the debate<sup>21</sup> on President's address in the Lok Sabha on February 25, 1955, the Prime Minister, without making specific mention of SEATO, launched a spirited attack on military pacts and alliances. Initiating the discussion<sup>22</sup> in the same House on the demands for grants for the Ministry of External Affairs on March 31, 1955, in the course of a review of international affairs, he referred to military alliances and defence pacts in South East Asia and the Middle East. The whole conception of the Geneva Conference, he said, was co-existence but that good effect was being undone by the developments associated with the Manila Treaty and the Bangkok Conference that followed. He expressed the fear that the intrusion of the exigencies of big-Power conflicts was creating discord and a sense of insecurity in those parts of the world.

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<sup>20</sup> Parl. Deb.: Lok Sabha, dated 29-9-54

<sup>21</sup> Parl. Deb.: Lok Sabha, dated 25-2-55

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, dated 31-3-55

### *South-East Asian Collective Defence Treaty*

In his speech to the Political Committee of the Asian African Conference<sup>23</sup> at Bandung on April 23, 1955, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru put the South-East Asian Collective Defence Treaty and the Cominform in the same category. Organizations like these could not fit into the pattern of peace and were "dangerous", he said.

#### IV

### **Attitude taken by some other countries invited to take part in the Conference or consulted on the proposal**

#### *Australia*

Making an important statement on foreign policy, with special reference to the defence of South-East Asia, Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, in a speech to the House of Representatives on August 9, 1954, observed:

"We hope that when it is seen that the creation of a South-East defence organization is designed to preserve the national integrity of Asian countries, some—it is hoped all—of these Asian countries will be willing to participate. This is not a matter of colour or race. It is a question of maintenance of democratic freedom. Australia, in association with other nations, will accept military obligations in support of our membership"<sup>24</sup>.

Elaborating the Australian Government's policy, Mr. Casey, Minister of External Affairs, in a speech to the House of Representatives on August 10 said:

"The South-East Asia Defence Organization to be set up will have no aggressive intent; its principal purpose is to guarantee the integrity and the right to govern themselves of the States of South-East Asia. In the absence of a special arrangement, an aggressor might believe that further aggression would be tolerated. Recent aggression in Korea shows the need for a security pact, but the problems of Asia cannot be solved by military means alone. Psychological and economic aspects must not be neglected..... Moreover, the Colombo Plan should not be superseded or subordinated to the economic aspects of the pact"<sup>25</sup>.

#### *Ceylon*

The statement<sup>26</sup> announcing Ceylon's non-participation in the proposed conference declared that Ceylon was "as much interested as anyone else in the maintenance of peace in Asia" and was of the opinion that this was "a matter even more for the countries of Asia than for any others that may be interested". However, "the nature of machinery for achieving this object was the most important question" and the statement went on to say that SEATO "might not be the most appropriate machinery".

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<sup>23</sup> The Statesman, dated 24-4-55.

<sup>24</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Sep. 4-11-1954, p. 13761.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*, p. 13762

<sup>26</sup> Hindusthan Standard, New Delhi, dated 4-8-54.

## Attitude of other Countries

### Indonesia

At the end of a four-hour session of the Indonesian Cabinet, the Minister of Information (Mr. Tobing) announced on August 4 that there would be no change in Indonesia's policy of neutrality and non-involvement, and declared that Indonesian membership of SEATO would not be in accordance with the country's independent foreign policy.

The Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee said on the same day that the country's foreign policy was opposed to all military pacts, and that membership in the proposed SEATO alliance would mean siding with one of the blocs in the "cold war"<sup>27</sup>.

### New Zealand

Mr. Webb, Minister for External Affairs, expressed his Government's support for a collective security in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific, during the debate on the Budget on July 30, in the following words:—

"The end of fighting in Indo-China does not mean that the need to press on with collective defence measures in S.E. Asia is now less urgent. Unfortunately, I do not think that we can deny that the settlement in Indo-China has increased the prospects of Communism advancing still further.....that is why we are anxious that something along the lines of what we call SEATO.....will be arranged. I want to emphasize that this is solely a defensive alliance.....subversion and infiltration are not easy to halt, but I believe that by the establishment of SEATO—if we can manage it, and if it includes a goodly number of Powers, including the South-East Asian Powers, we may be able to halt the spread of communism in South-East Asia. I would go so far as to say that it would be very difficult to arrange a satisfactory alliance that did not include Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia....."<sup>28</sup>

### Thailand

The Foreign Minister of Thailand expressed his country's support for a South-East Asian collective security pact on August 26 and said that Thailand would like to see defensive arrangements similar to those of the NATO. According to him, Thailand was not safe from threat from Indo-China. He added that danger to his country was twofold—a threat of aggression and a threat of Communist infiltration and subversion<sup>29</sup>.

## V

### Manila Conference

Identical statements were issued in London, Washington, Paris and the other capitals concerned on August 14, 1954 announcing that

<sup>27</sup> Keessing's Contemporary Archives, p. 13763

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13762

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* D. 13763

### *South-East Asian Collective Defence Treaty*

a conference would open on September 6 at Baguio, in the Philippines, to discuss collective security in South-East Asia, and that it would be attended by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Philippines, Thailand, the U.K. and the U.S.<sup>30</sup>

Although it had originally been intended to hold the eight-power conference at Baguio, the venue was subsequently changed to Manila, where the conference opened on September 6, 1954.

The leaders<sup>31</sup> of the national delegations were as follows:—

Australia	...	Mr. Richard G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs;
France	...	M. Guy La Chambre, Minister for Relations with the Associated States;
Great Britain	...	Lord Reading, Minister of State at the Foreign Office;
New Zealand	...	Mr. T. C. Webb, Minister for External Affairs;
Pakistan	...	Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister;
The Philippines	...	Senor Carlos P. Garcia, Vice-President and Foreign Minister;
Thailand	...	Prince Wan Waithayakon, Foreign Minister;
The United States	...	Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State.

Senor Garcia (Philippines) acted as chairman of the conference. In his inaugural address<sup>32</sup>, President Magsaysay of the Philippines, emphasised the objective of the Conference which was "to help build an adequate system of defence around an exposed and precarious sector of the free world". He observed that it would be possible to deter aggression only if the assembled Powers declared their readiness to act swiftly to check it by every means in their power, including the use of armed force. He added:

"We shall repel aggression only if our planning includes actual procedures of organizing and carrying out measure for military, political and economic cooperation both for long-term and for emergency purposes."

Referring to talk of co-existence with Communism, he said that the only way free nations could coexist with the Communist States was to keep strong and remain vigilant.

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<sup>30</sup> The Times, 15-8-54

<sup>31</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 13763

<sup>32</sup> New York Times, dated 6-9-54

### *Manila Conference*

*"Statements by various Delegates during the opening session on September, 1954"*

Lord Reading emphasized that the Manila Conference was related to, and a logical consequence of, the earlier one at Geneva, which had ended the eight-year old war, which had disturbed the whole S.E. Asian area and had exacted heavy sacrifices from those involved. It was the task of the Manila Conference—the aims of which were purely defensive—to avoid a repetition of such sacrifices and to lay down a "focal point" for the collective defence of the area. South-East Asia, he stressed, badly needed a prolonged period of quiet to enable plans for the economic progress of the region to proceed without hindrance. He strongly refuted any suggestion that Britain had lost interest in the area and had come in search of a "toothless treaty".

Mr. Dulles stated that the conference was meeting in accordance with the U.N. Charter, and the agreement to which he looked forward would be under its provisions. The United States had no territorial interests in the area; but he declared that his country had "a sense of common destiny" with the countries concerned in opposing the spread of Communism, which could take the form of open aggression, subversion, or indirect aggression. Against the first of these dangers it would be impossible to ensure defence by stationing adequate land forces at selected points, since the free nations could not match the vast land armies of the Communist Powers; the U.S.A. would therefore think in terms of mobile striking power with strategically placed reserves.

Mr. Dulles regretted the absence of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam from the conference, but hoped that as a result of their deliberations some "mantle of protection" could be thrown over those States. He also regarded it as important to provide for other Asian countries who might subsequently wish to join the collective security organization they might set up.

Both Mr. Casey and Mr. Webb spoke in support of the proposed collective security arrangements emphasizing that the pact would be of a purely defensive character, whilst M. Guy La Chambre, like Lord Reading, spoke of the need for peaceful conditions in South-East Asia to ensure the economic development of the region.

Sir Zafrulla Khan pointed to the division of his country, one part of which bordered on the Chinese province of Sinkiang, while the other had India and Burma as neighbours. He stressed that the conference should be concerned with resisting aggression of every description and from every quarter, and said that it was a mistake to imply that one kind of aggression rather than another required speedier or a different kind of action.

Prince Wan, who associated himself fully with Mr. Dulles' arguments, stated that Siam would like as strong a pact as possible, and a pact near in substance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He offered Bangkok as the headquarters of the new regional organization, and advocated the inclusion of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam in the regional security arrangements.

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<sup>22</sup> The Times, London, dated 7-9-54

## *South Treaty*

Senor Garcia, in putting forward the view of the Philippines, also demanded a strong pact whose members would be pledged to act immediately in case of aggression against any one of them. It was necessary for nations with the same ideological faith and tradition to pool their resources. He insisted that speed was essential, for thermo-nuclear weapons did not allow of a conventional type of treaty which might call for slow consultations before action was taken.

### <sup>34</sup>*Decisions of the Conference*

The subsequent discussions were held *in camera* and no official statement was issued. The conference ended on September 8th with the signing by all the delegates of a South-East Asian Collective Defence Treaty\*.

The Treaty was made up of eleven articles, a special U.S. understanding, a Protocol to be effective simultaneously designating certain territories to be protected, and a "Pacific Charter" unanimously approved by the participating Governments.

Formosa was excluded from the Treaty area which was defined as "the general area of South-east Asia including the entire territories of Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines, and the general area of the South-East Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21° 30 min. latitude north". The treaty area could be amended or changed only by unanimous consent.

The signatories pledged themselves to settle all international disputes by peaceful means and in the event of an armed aggression against any member-nation by joint action "at the invitation or with the consent of the Government concerned".

An article of the Treaty provided that the parties' obligations under the United Nations were not affected. The member nations also undertook not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with the present Treaty.

A Council composed of all the members was established to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty with provision for military and any other planning as the situation might require.

The Treaty was to be effective as soon as ratified by a majority of the signatories. It was to be in force indefinitely, but any member could withdraw after a year's notice to the Philippines Government with which ratifications were to be deposited.

The Protocol extended protective benefits of the Pact to the States of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam, both under Articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty. Other nations "in a position to further the objectives" of the treaty and contribute to the "security of the area" were invited to join. Unanimous consent of the eight original signatories would be needed for acceptance of new partners.

The Charter promised to strive by peaceful means to promote self-government and help in raising the living standards and recorded the parties' determination to prevent or counter by appropriate

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<sup>34</sup> Facts on File, Vol. XIV, No. 723, p. 297

\* (For text of the Treaty see Appendix A).

## Bangkok Conference

means any attempt in the Treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity".

U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, told the final session of the Manila Conference that the Pacific Charter was perhaps the greatest achievement of the talks because it gave SEATO "the moral offensive" against communism. He called the Treaty an "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine", and "a major step in building security".

A major concession was made by the United States when Mr. Dulles agreed not to limit the Treaty to action against only Red attacks. He finally deleted the term "communist aggression" from the main body of the pact. He made, however, an addendum to the Treaty specifying that the American agreement "to act to meet the common danger" applied "only to communist aggression". The U.S. would "consult" with the other members in the event of "other aggression or armed attack".

## VI

### Bangkok Conference

A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the eight signatory Powers was convened<sup>35</sup> at Bangkok on February 23, 1955. The Ministers were expected to discuss the possible deterrents against Communist sweep in South-East Asia and the question of raising the standards of living of the people in the Treaty area through economic aid.

The instruments of ratification<sup>36</sup> of the South-East Asian Collective Defence Treaty were deposited by representatives of the United States, Britain, Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, New Zealand, France and Australia. The ratification deposits took place in Alphabetical order. Carlos P. Garcia, Philippine Vice-President and Foreign Secretary, accepted the ratification instruments on behalf of his Government. He declared the Treaty "in full force and effect" on Friday, the 19th February, 1955.

Thus the formal ratification of the Treaty came about five months after it was signed in Manila on 8th September, 1954.

Since the ratification was completed by all the signatories, the projected meeting of the Foreign Ministers became in fact the first session of the Council of Ministers proposed under the Treaty. Sir Anthony Eden's participation<sup>37</sup> in the meeting "was without precedent in the annals of British diplomacy". Never before had "a Foreign Secretary set foot in Asia while in office".

At the open session<sup>38</sup> of the Council of Ministers the question of Communist subversion in South-East Asia was the dominant theme. It was suggested by several speakers that an exchange of all available intelligence about Communist moves should be exchanged so as to make the police work in the area easier.

<sup>35</sup> Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 4-1-55

<sup>36</sup> New York Times, dated 20-2-55

<sup>37</sup> The Economist, London, Feb. 19, 1955, pp. 605-606

<sup>38</sup> The Statesman, New Delhi, 24-2-55

### South Treaty

After an hour-long open session the meeting went into close session for a review of the situation in the Treaty area at which Mr. Dulles was understood to have outlined the issues at stake and given a clear picture of the existing dangers and an estimate of the resources which the U.S.A. could make available for use against armed invasion and to counter subversion.

According to Wilson Broadent and Lachie McDonald<sup>39</sup> writing for the *Daily Mail, London*, Mr. Dulles informed the delegates that his Government would not prefer a NATO-like organization and station large ground forces at any point. The United States, he said, wished to retain mobility of power through sea and air strength only. In the event of military aggression the United States would "turn loose" Chinese Nationalist and South Korean troops and simultaneously use American air and naval power for massive retaliation".

The British view<sup>40</sup>, as reported by Philip Deane of the *Observer Service*, laid greater emphasis on economic co-operation which could be made effective only if the U.S.A. provided the necessary fund of capital.

The Council of Ministers<sup>41</sup> decided to set up permanent headquarters in Bangkok, comprising three groups *viz.*, a military group to prepare plans for halting any armed aggression; an anti-subversion group to co-ordinate action against infiltration by communist agents; and an economic aid group to help people fight against hunger and poverty.

Full agreement on the task of military group was reached. It was to be a mobile group and its members would visit each of the member-States and make plans for local defence while studying ways and means of protecting the whole area.

In addition to an international secretariat, each State was also to have its own small secretariat.

Concluding their deliberations the Council of Ministers issued a final *communiqué*<sup>42</sup> which *inter alia* stated that dangers to peace and security in the Treaty area made it imperative that the Powers should take steps to strengthen the common defence. The military arrangements envisaged would be purely defensive in character and would not be used for purposes of aggression.

The *communiqué* also condemned "the subtle forms of aggression by which freedom and self-government are undermined and men's minds are subverted" and promised help to the peoples of the area to resist them.

It went on to emphasise the importance of implementing Article 3 of the Treaty providing for the promotion of economic progress and social well-being in South-East Asia. The *communiqué* added that economic experts would advise the Council's representatives on special questions arising from the Treaty commitments and that the first meeting of the experts would take place at an early date.

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<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 25-2-55

<sup>40</sup> The *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, dated 25-2-55

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> The *Hindu*, Madras, dated 26-2-55



### *Bangkok Conference*

It was also announced that the Council of Ministers had reaffirmed the determination of the member-Governments to support the States of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam in maintaining their freedom and independence as set forth in the Protocol to the South-East Asian Collective Defence Treaty.

## APPENDICES

### (A) Text of the South-East Asian Collective Defence Treaty<sup>43</sup>

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities.

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

#### *Article I*

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

#### *Article II*

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and

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<sup>43</sup> The Deptt. of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, No. 795, dated 20-9-54, pp. 393-96

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effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

#### *Article III*

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

#### *Article IV*

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereinafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defence.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

#### *Article V*

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

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### *Article VI*

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertake not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

### *Article VIII*

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of South-east Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the South-west Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degree 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

### *Article IX*

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

### *Article X*

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has

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been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

### Article XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

### *Understanding of the United States of America*

The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2:

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.†

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

### *Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty*

Designation of states and territory as to which provisions of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable:

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

In witness whereof, the undersigned\* Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

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\* Signed for Australia by Richard G. Casey, Minister of External Affairs; for France by Guy La Chambre, Minister of State; for New Zealand by T. Clifton Webb, Minister of External Affairs; for Pakistan by Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister; for the Republic of the Philippines by Carlos P. Garcia, Vice-President and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Francisco A. Delgado, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Tomas L. Cabili, Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada, and Representative Cornelio T. Villareal; for Thailand by Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh, Minister of Foreign Affairs; for the United Kingdom by the Marquess of Reading, Minister of State; and for the United States by Secretary Dulles, Senator H. Alexander Smith, and Senator Michael J. Mansfield.

†In signing the Treaty the Australian representative, Mr. Casey, said in part: "I shall sign—subject to the right of the Australian Government to review the Treaty prior to ratification in accordance with Australian Constitutional practice;" The representative of Pakistan, Sir Zafrulla Khan, made the following explanation: "Signed for transmission to my Government for its consideration and action in accordance with the Constitution of Pakistan."

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### *Text of Pacific Charter*

The Delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America;

Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific;

Convinced that common action to this end, in order to be worthy and effective; must be inspired by the highest principles of justice and liberty;

Do hereby proclaim:

First, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities;

Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favourable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional procedures;

Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region;

Fourth, as declared in the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

Proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

#### **(B) SEADO Powers' Communique Issued on February 26, 1955 at the Conclusion of Bangkok Conference.**

"The Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States and a representative of France have completed the first meeting of the Council established by the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty.

"The Treaty entered into force on February 19, 1955, following the deposit of instruments of ratification with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

"The Council has held six sessions in Bangkok from February 23 to 25 under the Chairmanship of Prince Wan Waithayakon, Foreign Minister of the Government of Thailand.

"The Council met in circumstances which give increasing urgency to the objectives of the United Nations and in particular asserted their hatred of war and their determination to take all possible measures to preserve and strengthen peace.

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"They reiterated that such military arrangements as they may make will be purely defensive in accordance with their international obligations and will never be used for purposes of aggression.

"The Council affirmed the aim of their Governments as set forth in the Pacific Charter—to uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people", to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities; to continue to co-operate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region and to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the Treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

"Upholding the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, the Council stressed the paramount need for the maintenance in peace of the integrity and authority of freely constituted Governments in the area and of the right of peoples to determine their own destiny without external interference.

"They therefore condemned not only warlike action but also those subtle forms of aggression by which freedom and self-government are undermined and men's minds subverted.

"This meeting has provided the members of the Council with an opportunity for achieving their common objectives and purposes under the Treaty.

### *"Deterrent to Aggression"*

"They believe that the Manila Treaty is already exerting a positive influence for the maintenance of peace in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific and that the solidarity of the member-nations shown at the present meeting will serve as an increasingly powerful deterrent to aggression.

"The Council recognised the continuing dangers to peace and security in the Treaty area and agreed that these threats make it imperative that the member-Governments take steps to strengthen common defence.

"It was recognised that subversion and infiltration constitute a serious threat to the peace and security of the area and that this demands special efforts in all aspects of national life.

"The Council discussed specific attempts by elements directed from outside to subvert free institutions and Governments in the Treaty area. The Council viewed these subversive activities with grave concern and was determined to help the peoples of the area to resist them.

### *Efforts to Check Subversion*

"There was agreement on the need for co-operation among the member-Governments to assist one another in combating the subversive activities of international Communism.

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"The Council decided to arrange for continuing consultation and mutual assistance and to make it possible for each member-Government to draw upon the experience of the others in dealing with this danger.

"In this connection, the Council received a valuable report on the Philippines' experience in combating internal dissidence and noted the statement of the United Kingdom delegation on the improved situation in Malaya.

"The Council agreed upon the importance of implementing the article of the Treaty which provides "the parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and co-operate with one another in the further development of economic measures including technical assistance designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of Government towards these."

### *Economic Experts to Meet*

"Arrangements were made for economic experts designated by member-Governments to meet periodically wherever appropriate and convenient on matters within the scope of this article.

"The members of the Council recognised that, while certain economic matters such as trade, international payments, development, investment and sound economic progress involved a wider geographic area and desirably included co-operation with many friendly States as well as with the member-States, nevertheless, special economic questions arise out of the Treaty commitments of the member-Governments and may involve individual and co-operative steps which member-States could take to solve these questions.

"The economic experts designated will advise Council representatives on these measures. The first meeting of the economic experts will take place at an early date.

### *Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy*

"The Council noted with interest the statement by the United States delegation about the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Council is deeply conscious of the potential contributions of atomic energy to the health and standards of living of the peoples of the member-nations and welcomed the proposed discussions relating to further co-operation and assistance in the atomic energy programmes directed towards achieving these benefits.

"Realising the importance to the security of the South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific of the States of Cambodia, Laos and of the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Viet Nam the Council re-affirmed the determination of the member-Governments to support these three States in maintaining their freedom and independence as set forth in the protocol of the Treaty.

"The Council was informed of the assistance which had been extended in the three States and expressed the hope that member-Governments would offer further assistance.



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"Having thus exchanged views, the members of the Council made the following arrangements to help carry out the provisions of the Treaty.

"These Governments will be represented on the Council by their Foreign Ministers or their designated representatives. The Council will meet at least once each year and more often when deemed necessary. It will usually meet in the Treaty area. Decisions of the Council will be taken by unanimous agreement.

"Designation of Council representatives: In order to assure close and continuing co-operation when the Council is not in session, the Council has agreed to designate the Council representatives who will have their seat in Bangkok. The Council representatives will maintain continuing consultation on matters relating to the Treaty and will perform such special tasks as the Council may from time to time direct.

"They may make agreed recommendations to the Council or when the Council is not in session, to the member-Governments with respect to implementation of the Treaty. Through the Council representatives, the member-Governments may raise matters relating to the Treaty and agree on the steps to be taken in carrying out its provisions.

"The Council representatives may request the member-Governments to designate specially qualified personnel to assist them in specific tasks. Working groups composed of such personnel may meet here whenever appropriate and convenient.

#### *Co-ordination of Planning*

"Council representatives will ensure appropriate exchange of information and close co-ordination of planning among such groups as may from time to time be working on projects under the Treaty.

"They will also make arrangements for a Secretariat to assist them, the personnel thereof being made available by the representatives on contributed basis.

"The Council directs that the Council representatives begin operations as soon as possible and that one of their first tasks should be to arrange meetings of specially qualified personnel designated by member-Governments to assist the Council representatives in considering means of strengthening co-operation in combating subversion and infiltration.

"The Council also requested the Council representatives to explore the opportunities for increasing cultural and technical co-operation among the member-Governments and to submit recommendations to the next meeting of the Council.

"Each of the Governments agreed to designate a military adviser to its members of the Council. The military advisers will make recommendations to the Council on military co-operation under the Treaty.

"They will meet periodically as required and will formulate their own rules of procedure and any necessary organisational arrangements.

*Appendix*  
*Military Aspects*

"The military advisers at this Council meeting met on February 24 and 25. They exchanged views concerning the military aspects of the defence Treaty and as a result of these discussions, their staff planners will meet in Manila in April 1955 to initiate plans for the implementation of certain military aspects of the Treaty. Shortly thereafter, the military advisers will again convene in Bangkok.

"Peace and security of the area: Although they represent diverse nations and peoples the members of the Council were unanimous in the belief that this meeting has enabled them to understand and appreciate the problems facing the Governments of the countries covered by the Treaty in the common effort to ensure peace and security under the Treaty.

"The progress achieved at this first Council meeting provides a solid basis for closer co-operation among the member-Governments for the good of the region as a whole.

"The members of the Council are united in their conviction that the common efforts of their Governments are contributing positively to the peace and security of the area both for the member-Governments and for other free nations in the region.

"The Council expressed the hope that these free nations will associate themselves in the near future with the work to be undertaken under the Treaty."

**(C) "Background data of the Asian countries in the Treaty**

*Republic of the Philippines*

The Philippines form the largest island groups of the Malay Archipelago and extend almost due north and south from Formosa to Borneo and the Moluccas.

They were ceded by Spain to the U.S.A. on December 10, 1898. The Republic of the Philippines came into existence on 4th July, 1946. It is governed by a constitution adopted on 14th May, 1935, and amended in 1940 and 1946. The constitution vests in the Republic all ownership of the country's natural resources, which, apart from agricultural land, may not be alienated. Exploitation of natural resources was originally limited to citizens of the Philippines but by an agreement signed with the U.S. on 4th July, 1946, it was extended to American interests and companies. This agreement expires in 1976.

Area: The total area of the group composed of 7100 islands and islets is 115,000 sq. miles, land area 114,830 sq. miles.

Population: The total population according to the census of Oct. 1948 was 19,234,182.

National Income: 7034 million pesos (in 1952) [5.63 pesos=£1 sterling.]

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<sup>44</sup> Statesman's Year Book.

## Appendix

### Thailand

A coup d'etat, staged on 29th November, 1951, abolished the 1949 constitution and restored that of 1932, under which the country had an absolute monarchy.

Area: 511,937 sq. km, about 77,800 sq. km. of which being in the Malay Peninsula.

Population: 17,517,742 (1947 census).

National Income: 23,377 million baht (in 1950) [35 baht=£1 sterling].

### Pakistan

The Dominion of Pakistan was constituted on 14th August, 1947, under the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947.

Area: 364,737 sq. miles.

Population: 75,842,165 (1951 census).

<sup>45</sup>National Income: Rs. 1806.8 crores (in 1952-53) (Source: Central statistical office, Pakistan).

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